Sidney Hook Reconsidered

By Robert Talisse
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Sidney Hook is arguably the most controversial figure in the tradition of American philosophy. Coming to prominence in the late 1920s as both the star pupil of John Dewey and an eminent Marx scholar, Hook devoted his early career to political action which placed him firmly among the fellow travelers of the Communist Party. Hook’s political disposition began shifting towards the Right just prior to World War II. Around 1940, Hook adopted a vehement anti-Communism which led him to defend the reactionary political views for which he is now notorious. The coup d’grace of Hook’s career for those who would demonize him as the quintessential turncoat came in 1985 when he was awarded the Medal of Freedom by President Reagan. What happened?

Despite seemingly incontrovertible evidence of a shift from radical Marxist to neo-conservative cold warrior, Hook maintains in his autobiography that he is "not aware of having undergone any serious conversions from the days of [his] youth, or of having abandoned [his] basic ideals. . ." (Hook 1987, 596).¹ This surprising claim so begs for philosophical elucidation that it is a wonder that no philosopher has undertaken an earnest study of Hook’s political thought in the decade since his death.² Judging from current scholarly literature, Hook has been entirely forsaken by the philosophical community at large.³ Here I take the first steps towards a reexamination of Hook’s political philosophy.

Hook’s Conception of Democracy

Central to Hook’s political philosophy is the radical conception of democracy that he inherited from John Dewey. It is with this conception that one must begin, and it is in the context of this conception that one must understand Hook’s further political commitments.

I

The Deweyan slogan, "democracy is a way of life," is notoriously ambiguous.⁴ What, exactly, does it mean to live democratically? The difficulty is compounded by critics who understand the proposition to be offering a novel definition of democracy. Actually, our discussion may begin with a strikingly ordinary formula: "a democratic society is one where the government rests upon the freely given consent of the governed" (Hook 1938, 285).⁵ This minimal conception loses its air of triviality upon an analysis of the term "freely given consent."

A government rests upon the consent of the governed when (1) political mechanisms exist by which the governed may at regular intervals register their approval and disapproval of proposed government action and policy, and (2)the government acknowledges a prima facie duty to conduct itself according to the consent of the governed (Hook 1938, 285). That is, a basic condition for consent is participation on the part of the governed in the processes of government. This much is, again, commonplace. But what of the qualification that the consent of the governed must be "freely given"?

A convenient response is that consent is freely given only when it is "voluntary [and] not subject to coercion" (Hook 1959d, 54). Surely, this is a platitude, not an analysis. There is a variety of conditions to be met if consent is to be given freely. Beginning with the most obvious of these, Hook observes:

An election held in the shadow of bayonets, or in which one can vote only "Yes," or in which no opposition candidates are permitted is obviously one which does not register freely given consent.⁶ (Hook 1959d, 54)

Minimally, then, there must be no procedural obstructions to participation if consent is to be free.

There are, however, more subtle forms of interference. As "there are few things to which a starving man will not consent" (Hook 1959e, 32), we also may speak of economic obstructions to free consent. For example:

A threat to deprive the governed of their jobs or means of livelihood, by a group which has the power to do so, would undermine a democracy. . . . (Hook 1938, 286)

This consideration may seem a variation on the foregoing examples of procedural obstacles; however, Hook goes beyond cases of blatant and direct economic manipulation. Hook notes that:

Differences in economic power make it possible for the more powerful economic group to exercise a much greater influence upon decisions that affect public welfare than their numbers or deserts warrant. (Hook 1959d, 54-55)

Hook fears that unchecked economic power will be employed to "render nugatory even legislative action" (Hook, 1959d, 55). Moreover, the economically powerful enjoy "greater advantages in mobilizing resources to influence public opinion and consent" (Hook 1959d, 55). Hook concludes:

Where the political forms of democracy function within a society in which economic controls are not subject to political control, there is always a standing threat to democracy. (Hook 1938, 286)

That is, democracy requires not only protection of the general populace from the direct domination of the economically powerful, it requires that steps be taken to ensure that economic power is not employed to control or undermine democratic procedures.

Lastly, we may speak of epistemological impediments to free consent. "Even in the absence of physical and economic coercion, consent is not free if it is bound or blinded by ignorance" (Hook 1959e, 38). The operative epistemological principle is elementary: one’s consent to a political proposal is free just in the degree to which one does not misunderstand the meaning and relevant implications of the proposal. Access to relevant sources of information is certainly not a sufficient condition for understanding a proposition, but whatever the sufficient conditions are, it is clear that understanding the meaning of a political proposal requires information. Thus democracy requires that the governed’s access to information be unrestricted. Hook writes:

The expression of consent by the majority is not free if it is deprived of access to sources of information, if it can read only the official interpretation, if it can hear only one voice in the classroom, pulpit, and radio. . . . (Hook 1938, 287)

If one is kept ignorant of alternatives, denied access to information, deprived of the opportunity to influence and be influenced by the opinions of others, consent is not free. (Hook 1959d, 54)

The commitment of a democratic society to freely given consent requires that there is no hindrance to access to relevant sources of information and to the agencies of critical discussion. Without such minimal provisions, consent is unfree since, "the individual has no more freedom of action when his mind is deliberately tied by ignorance than when his hands are tied with rope" (Hook 1938, 287).

Our analysis has shown that the very concept of "freely given consent" demands that we broaden our conception of democracy beyond the minimal procedural level with which we began (Hook 1959b, 62; Hook 1944, 50). That is, we must acknowledge that the mere existence of democratic procedural devices such as open elections and periodic referenda are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for democracy. As we have seen, other conditions are necessary such as the absence of economic pressures and epistemological impediments to free consent. Democracy as a way of life begins to emerge once is it recognized that the requisite procedural mechanisms cannot be understood as freestanding institutions to be established and then left alone. Threats to democracy cannot be abolished once and for all; democracy must be maintained. Democratic procedures must be continually protected from any force-- internal or external-- that would frustrate their registering of the governed’s free consent.

II

We have so far focused upon only the negative conditions for democracy, namely, the absence of obstructions to free consent. These conditions are in themselves insufficient. Even in the absence of impediments, democracy may not be realized. An election in which every negative condition has been satisfied may yet fail to register free consent if the governed are generally illiterate or incapable of open and critical discourse. Under conditions such as these, manipulation of public opinion and the production of artificial consent is easy; there is democracy in name only. Thus, we must also identify the positive conditions for democracy, the elements which must be in place if democracy is to prevail.

Just as there are economic and epistemological obstructions to democracy which must be guarded against, there are economic and epistemological requirements for democracy which must be provided for. It is through an examination of these positive requirements that the full meaning of democracy as a way of life surfaces. A comprehensive treatment of Hook’s conception of "economic democracy" will be undertaken in a future paper.⁷ I here focus upon the epistemological requirements for democracy which, according to Hook, are of primary importance.⁸

It has already been suggested that a positive condition for democracy is general literacy among the governed. A democratic society must therefore provide public education. But basic literacy, command of a language, is not enough (Hook 1945, 109). The principle that persons must discern the meaning and implications of a proposal before they can freely consent to it requires something beyond literacy. One’s consent to proposal x is free just in the degree to which one has examined x in some critical way; that is, one needs to have considered implications of x, entertained objections, and evaluated alternative proposals. Examining a proposal critically requires free public discourse. It follows that "democratic society cannot exist without free discussion" (Hook 1954, 117) since free discussion is a necessary condition for free consent.

However, "wherever discussion flourishes, controversy is sure to arise" (Hook 1954, 118). In the midst of controversy, free discussion can be as great a hindrance to free consent as any overt obstruction. Certain modes of discourse tend to silence debate, generate confusion, discredit dissenters rather than dissenting views, suppress relevant information, encourage dogmatism, and establish on the basis of an appeal to loyalty to tradition that which cannot be established by an appeal to evidence and analysis. That is, "Some kinds of discussion tend to undermine democratic society" (Hook 1954, 117). Democracy therefore requires that public discourse and deliberation be conducted according to a specific method by which conflicts may be judiciously resolved. Hook writes:

What is required to live prosperously and peacefully together is not a fixed common doctrine or a fixed body of truths, but a common method or set of fixed rules under which we can live with our differences. (Hook 1959e, 37)

What is this method? Following Dewey, Hook offers what he calls the "method of intelligence," or the "experimental method." What are the principles of this method? According to Hook, its principles are derived from the experimentalist epistemology embodied in the methods of science.⁹ Most generally, the experimental method treats all proposals as hypotheses to be tested. It recognizes only experimental results as reasons in favor of or against a proposal. It acknowledges challenges, suggestions, and alternative proposals from every quarter of the community. It opposes dogmatism and authoritarianism in all its forms. It is progressive in that it never closes itself to further debate and experiment. It is self-corrective in that it is willing to revise or even abandon any principle or policy if experimental conditions so require.

Like any method, experimentalism embodies certain values which can be formulated as procedural rules. In "The Ethics of Controversy" Hook outlines the "rules" for democratic discourse:

1. Nothing and no one is immune from criticism.
2. Everyone involved in a controversy has an intellectual responsibility to inform himself of the available facts.
3. Criticism should be directed first to policies, and against persons only when they are responsible for policies, and against their motives or purposes only when there is some independent evidence of their character.
4. Because certain words are legally permissible, they are not therefore morally permissible.
5. Before impugning an opponent’s motives, even when they legitimately may be impugned, answer his arguments.
6. Do not treat an opponent of a policy as if he were therefore a personal enemy of the country or a concealed enemy of democracy.
7. Since a good cause may be defended by bad arguments, after answering the bad arguments for another’s position present positive evidence for your own.
8. Do not hesitate to admit lack of knowledge or to suspend judgment if evidence is not decisive either way.
9. Only in pure logic and mathematics, not in human affairs, can one demonstrate that something is strictly impossible. Because something is logically possible, it is not therefore probable. "It is not impossible" is a preface to an irrelevant statement about human affairs. The question is always one of the balance of probabilities. And the evidence for probabilities must include more than abstract possibilities.
10. The cardinal sin, when we are looking for truth of fact or wisdom of policy, is refusal to discuss, or action which blocks discussion. (Hook 1954, 122)

Hook admits that these principles may sound like truisms (Hook 1954, 122). However, what is often not apprehended is that experimentalism presupposes a community that is committed to the project of cooperatively inquiring into common problems to reach tentative but workable solutions. Understood in its communal aspect, experimentalism is,

. . . a perpetual invitation to sit down in the face of differences and reason together, to consider the evidence, explore alternative proposals, assess the consequences, and let the decision rest-- when matters of human concern are at stake-- with the consent of those affected by the proposals. (Hook 1959e, 38)

When considered at the level of an entire community, the radical implications of experimentalism are revealed. Hook observes:

. . . how revolutionary the impact would be of giving the method of intelligence institutional force in education, economics, law and politics. Policies would be treated as hypotheses, not as dogmas; customary practices as generalizations, not as God-given truths. A generation trained in schools where emphasis was placed upon method, method, and more method, could hardly be swayed by current high-pressured propaganda. (Hook 1938, 296)

III

Hook’s conception of democracy now comes into full view. Our examination has shown that the slogan "democracy is a way of life" means that democracy-- understood in a minimal procedural sense-- implies a more extensive conception according to which democracy is primarily an epistemological proposal which requires a certain kind of community for its realization. A community is democratic in the degree to which its institutions and forms of public and personal association are arranged according to experimentalism and the principles and procedures it involves. A democratic community must identify as its essential and defining feature its commitment to the processes of experimentalism rather than its commitment to any particular results of those processes (Hook 1959d, 58).¹⁰ That is, it must employ experimentalism as its primary method of deciding and revising its policies and of resolving its controversies. Most importantly, it must be always prepared to revise its most traditionally sanctioned principles in the light of new evidence. As such, it must be perpetually engaged in the project of reorganizing its institutions according to the most current results of experimental cooperative inquiry.

In light of these considerations, it follows that no existing community is perfectly democratic. The final step in our analysis is the realization that democracy as a way of life is an ideal. A community is democratic in the degree to which it strives towards the ideal of full experimental participation of every citizen in the processes of governing the social forces which affect his life.

Hook is no utopian. He recognizes that a democratic community is "sometimes foolish, sometimes callous and hostile to the underprivileged" (Hook 1962, 64). Democratic government is not necessarily good government; a democratic community will make mistakes. Yet this is hardly a defect of democracy, it is the standing condition of life.¹¹ However, as experimentalism is by its very nature self-corrective, democracy’s commitment to experimentalism makes correction and progress possible. Hook writes, "the cure for the evils of democracy is better democracy" (Hook 1938, 292). "Better democracy" means more extensive application of the experimental method: more critical analysis and more public discourse with more participation from more sectors of the community. In so far as it is committed to experimentalism, "democracy, with all its imperfections, possesses the instruments by which it can move towards the realization of the promise of equality and freedom" (Hook 1959d, 58). The instruments and processes of experimentalism are the essential agencies of the democratic way of life. They are therefore the features which must be most widely adopted and most vehemently protected, for they alone constitute the difference between an open, but imperfect society that is nevertheless able to progressively improve and tyranny (Hook 1962, 128).

Hook’s Later Political Commitments

In the space remaining I would like to briefly comment on some of Hook’s later political commitments. Though a full argument cannot be launched here, my suggestion will be that Hook was correct to deny that his thinking took a turn to the Right.

As was indicated above, Hook maintains that the essential feature of a democratic community is its commitment to the methods and processes of experimentalism rather than its commitment to any specific principles derived therefrom. For a democracy, the epistemological method of deciding policy and resolving conflict is supreme (Hook 1977, 236). This emphasis upon the processes and methods of democracy leads Hook to a further distinction between opposition that may be called internal to democracy that which is external to democracy.

Opposition to a policy or action of a democratic community is internal if it complies with the "rules of the game" of democratic discourse (Hook 1959e, 38). Most simply, opposition is internal to the democratic framework if it is expressed in a way which honors the ten principles of democratic controversy reproduced above. Opposition is external to the democratic framework if it violates these principles. Hook writes:

Opposition of the first kind, no matter how mistaken, must be tolerated, if for no other reason than that we cannot be sure that it is not we who are mistaken. Opposition of the second kind, no matter what protective coloration it wears. . . must be swiftly dealt with if democracy is to survive. (Hook 1938, 296)

The distinction between internal and external opposition is essential to understanding Hook’s political commitments. As a careful survey of his work on the political controversies of his day will show, Hook’s principal objective always is to preserve the processes of democracy. As such, he opposes any movement or faction which operates outside of those processes as well as any principle or policy which cannot be established by them.

Hook’s criticisms of the student anti-war movement were not driven by a commitment to intervention in Vietnam but rather by contempt for the anti-democratic methods employed by the protesting students.¹² Hook characterized the student protests as an attack on the democratic process (Hook 1969, 112). Hook’s opposition to the employment of Communist Party members in public educational institutions is not grounded in his opposition to communism. Rather, Hook’s opposition stems from the authoritarian character of the Communist Party, especially its requirement that all members accept the official party line without question.¹³ Lastly, consider Hook’s criticism of the 1960s Supreme Court decisions banning voluntary prayer and Bible reading in public schools. Hook is not driven by a belief that prayer is necessary for virtue.¹⁴ Instead, Hook objects to the process by which the secular position was secured. Hook writes:

Since what one Court can do, another can undo, in the long run it seems to me that those who wish to keep religion out of the public life of a free society should look primarily to the educational processes of democracy itself rather than to the decrees of the Court to extend the secular position. (Hook 1967b, 63)

Additional texts can be cited testifying to Hook’s overriding commitment to democratic processes and the way of life they require. Certainly, his dedication to democracy led him to some positions which today are associated with the Right. However, Hook was motivated by a radical conception of democracy and a concern for its continued expansion rather than by the sentimental devotion to "tradition" which typically characterizes Conservative thought.

Concluding Remarks

Hook once said, "More important than any belief a man holds is the way he holds it."¹⁵ There is a profound insight in this. Hook’s political views are to be understood as the tentative products of the kind of inquiry which exemplifies the democratic way of life. We live at a time in which political discussion is dominated by sloganizing sound-bites; polarized platforms and party-lines have replaced critical discourse and acute analysis. Democratic participation has been reduced to responding to corporate sponsored opinion polls and "sounding off" on afternoon talk shows. Democracy dissipates. It is not what Hook believed but the way he believed, his constant engagement with political dialogue, that constitutes the radical element in his thought. Here lies the legacy of Sidney Hook and the perpetual challenge of the democratic way of life.

Robert Talisse

Philosophy Department

Vanderbilt University

Notes

1. Cf. Hook 1985, 15.

2. The philosopher who comes closest to a serious study is Cornel West. The purpose of West’s short discussion, it seems, is to demonstrate by means of Hook’s "ideological trajectory" that by mid-century, pragmatism was in "deep crisis" (West, 124).

3. The degree to which Hook is neglected is most clearly evidenced by the new books by Matthew Festenstein and Richard Rorty. Festenstein’s book claims to survey pragmatist political theory "from Dewey to Rorty: but contains no discussion of Hook. Rorty’s Achieving Our Country is subtitled "Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America" but mentions Hook only in passing. The phenonenon is typical. Neither H. O. Mounce, who claims to cover pragmatism "from Peirce to Rorty," nor John Murphy, who discusses pragmatism "from Peirce to Davidson," includes a substantial treatment of Hook. Hart and Anderson’s recent collection of essays dealing with the future of the American philosophical tradition makes no acknowledgement of Hook. Brint and Weaver’s collection of essays on pragmatist legal thought contains no examination of Hook’s major contribution to legal philosophy, The Paradoxes of Freedom (1962). Similarly, James Campbell’s study of "the meaning of pragmatist social thought" ignores Hook entirely. The sole exception I have been able to locate is John Stuhr who favorably cites Hook in a footnote, claiming that it is "unfortunate" that Hook’s work "now is generally neglected and not well-known" (Stuhr 1991, 56).

4. Compare some of Dewey’s own expressions of the principle: Dewey 1939, 155; Dewey 1937, 182; Dewey 1935, 25; Dewey 1927, 325; Dewey 1916, 93.

5. Cf. Hook 1977, 235; Hook 1976, 98; Hook 1967b, 51; Hook 1962, 64; Hook 1959b, 60; Hook 1959c, 43; Hook 1959d, 52; Hook 1944,48.

6. Cf. Hook 1938, 286; Hook 1959e, 32.

7. Hook writes, "Genuine political democracy, therefore, entails the right of the governed, through their representatives, to control economic policy" (Hook 1938, 286). Those interested in "economic democracy" may consult Hook, 1985, 19-20; Hook 1978; Hook 1977, 240; Hook 1976; Hook, 1963; Hook 1959f; and Hook 1938, 290-91. As the dates of these selections suggest, despite his supposed turn to ultra-conservatism, Hook remained a socialist throughout his life (Cf. Hook 1987, 600).

8. I am not here offering epistemological considerations as justifications for democracy. The question of democracy’s justification has been foregone; I am here interested in the epistemological requirements of democracy. The project of justifying democracy by a appeal to epistemology has recently been undertaken by Habermas and Putnam. For Hook’s view, see Hook 1959b.

9. Like Dewey, Hook often identifies experimentalism with scientific method (E.g., Hook 1956; Hook 1954, 122; Hook 1940b, 7-8; Hook 1938, 295-96). This characterization leads to unfortunate misunderstandings, as in Rorty 1983 and Rorty 1991. In the interest of avoiding confusion, I here drop reference to scientific method.

10. Cf. Hook 1977, 236; Hook 1959c, 49; Hook 1959e, 36; Hook 1944, 50.

11. The record of history shows, humans are fallible. Note also that even Plato, hailed by some as the archenemy of democracy, recognizes this. In the Republic, the kallipolis dissolves because the Philosopher Kings err (546b).

12. According to Hook, the tactics of the student movement included the seizing and destruction of research materials and notes of allegedly pro-war professors, disruption of their lectures, demolition of university property, and threats of personal violence (Hook 1969, 77 ff.). See also Hook 1987, chapter 33; Hook 1974; Hook 1969, especially Ch. 6 ("The War Against the Democratic Process") and Appendix I ("Second Thoughts on Berkeley"); Hook 1967a; and Hook 1962, Ch. 3. Note also that Hook himself opposed American intervention in the conflict, though he also opposed American withdrawal before the South’s independence was recognized by the North (Hook 1987, 583).

13. It is often claimed that Hook’s position violates the academic freedom of communists. Wilkerson provides the standard arguments of this sort. Hook’s actual position is much more subtle than his communist critics acknowledge; see Hook 1953, Ch. 1 ("Heresy and Conspiracy"). For Hook’s evidence of the authoritarian nature of the Communist Party, see Hook 1987, Chs. 13 and 14; Hook 1955, 229-239; Hook 1953, 23.

14. Hook remained a secular humanist throughout his life.

15. Reported by Capaldi, p. 18.

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