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The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Philosophers in America

From 1600 to the Present

Edited by
John R. Shook

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A few dozen new entries are added for still-active philosophers,
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Introduction

The Encyclopedia of Philosophers in America contains 450 entries about philosophical figures in America and Canada from the early 1600s to the present day. Most of these entries were selected from the *Dictionary of Early American Philosophers* (two volumes, Continuum, 2011) or the *Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers* (four volumes, Thoemmes-Continuum, 2005), with some condensation and updating. A few dozen new entries are added for still-active philosophers, so that figures born after 1940 have some representation, although the limited space of a single volume forbid any comprehensive inclusion. We hope that this survey offers an accessible account of philosophical thought, introducing the most prominent philosophers alongside many important figures who taught philosophy, wrote on philosophy, and/or applied philosophical ideas to society.

This *Encyclopedia* includes intellectuals who made contributions to the teaching, publication, or application of philosophical thought regardless of professional field, academic career, or professional title. Many figures did their primary work in pedagogy, oratory, literature, religion, theology, the arts, history, law, politics, economics, sociology, linguistics, anthropology, the physical sciences, biology, psychology, or medicine. Yet these figures did engage philosophical ideas in their intellectual work, in the traditional areas of metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, logic, ethics, social/political theory, and aesthetics, along with emerging fields such as philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of education, philosophy of law, applied ethics, philosophy of religion, speculative theology, and so forth.

Confining the impressively deep thought of so many thinkers into a single volume was challenging. The entries vary in size from a minimum of around 500 words to a maximum of 2000 words. Entry size should not be construed as a measure of intrinsic philosophical value to their subjects; their virtue lies in providing wide historical and topical breadth rather than analytic depth. Each entry contains a bibliography of writings and suggestions for further reading.

The original idea for these reference works came from Rudi Thoemmes, and I'm personally grateful to him for sending me on this extraordinary expedition into American intellectual history. I'm also grateful to Bloomsbury Editor Colleen Coalter, who perceived the value of this work and gave it every attention. My thanks also go to the many scholars who lent their advice and time to recruiting entries in this volume, including Henry W. Bowden, William D. Dean, James A. Good, Nathan Houser, Jo Ellen Jacobs, Bruce Kuklick, Ernie Lepore, Eric v.d. Luft, Murray Murphey, Russell Pryba, Dorothy Rogers, Stuart Rosenbaum, John Slater, Guy W. Stroh, Jean Van Delinder, Cornelis de Waal, Roger Ward, Stephen Wilson, Robert Wilson-Black, and Robert H. Wozniak.

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Encyc Relig	<i>Encyclopedia of Religion</i> , 16 vols., ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan, 1987).
Encyc Social Behav Sci	<i>International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences</i> , 26 vols., eds. Neil Smerlser and Paul Baltes (Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier, 2001).
Nat Cycl Amer Bio	<i>The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography</i> , 63 vols. (New York: James T. White & Co., 1891–84).
Oxford Comp Phil	<i>Oxford Companion to Philosophy</i> , ed. Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
Pres Addr of APA	<i>Presidential Addresses of the American Philosophical Association</i> , vols. 1–10, ed. Richard T. Hull (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999–2001; Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2004–).
Proc of APA	Memorial Minutes in the <i>Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association</i> , vols. 23– (1949–).
Proc of APA in Phil Rev	Memorial Minutes in the <i>Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association</i> published in <i>Philosophical Review</i> , vols. 21–58 (1902–1949).
Routledge Encycl Phil	<i>Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> , 10 vols., ed. Edward Craig (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), and <i>Encyclopedia</i> website supplements.

Who Was Who in Amer	<i>Who Was Who in America</i> , 14 vols. (Chicago and New Providence, N.J.: Marquis Who's Who, 1943–2002).
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Abbreviations for Academic Degrees

BA	<i>Bachelor of Arts</i>
BBA	<i>Bachelor of Business Administration</i>
BD	<i>Bachelor of Divinity</i>
BFA	<i>Bachelor of Fine Arts</i>
BLitt	<i>Bachelor of Literature</i>
BM	<i>Bachelor of Music</i>
BS	<i>Bachelor of Science</i>
BSS	<i>Bachelor of Social Science</i>
BTh	<i>Bachelor of Theology</i>
DCL	<i>Doctor of Classical Literature</i>
DD	<i>Doctor of Divinity</i>
DLitt	<i>Doctor of Literature</i>
DPhil	<i>Doctor of Philosophy</i>
DSc	<i>Doctor of Science</i>
EdD	<i>Doctor of Education</i>
JD	<i>Doctor of Law</i>
LHD	<i>Doctor of Humane Letters</i>
LLB	<i>Bachelor of Laws</i>
LLD	<i>Doctor of Laws</i>
LLM	<i>Master of Law</i>
MA	<i>Master of Arts</i>
MBA	<i>Master of Business Administration</i>
MD	<i>Doctor of Medicine</i>
MDiv	<i>Master of Divinity</i>
MM	<i>Master of Music</i>
MS	<i>Master of Science</i>
PhB	<i>Bachelor of Philosophy</i>
PhD	<i>Doctor of Philosophy</i>
STB	<i>Bachelor of Sacred Theology</i>
STD	<i>Doctor of Sacred Theology</i>
STL	<i>Licentiate in Sacred Theology</i>
ThD	<i>Doctor of Theology</i>

A

ABBOT, FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD (1836 1903)

Francis Ellingwood Abbot was born in Boston on 6 November 1836. Following Boston Latin School, Abbot joined the class of 1859 at Harvard College. He began his studies ranked number one in his class and graduated as a member of Phi Beta Kappa. Harvard provided the foundation for exploring philosophical ideas with associates. These discussions later led to Abbot's participation with Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and others in the Metaphysical Club. Abbot attended Harvard Divinity School and graduated from Meadville Theological School in 1863.

It was at Meadville that Abbot began a critical examination of William Hamilton's philosophy, which led to his publication in 1864 in the *North American Review* of "The Philosophy of Space and Time" and "The Conditioned and the Unconditioned." These two articles established Abbot's reputation as a significant American philosopher, with Darwin and Hamilton both responding to Abbot. It was also on the basis of these articles that the philosophy department at Harvard unanimously recommended Abbot for a faculty appointment. However, the administration at Harvard feared that Abbot's open support of evolution would harm fund raising for the College. Therefore, Abbot was not appointed to the Harvard position and for similar reasons was never able to secure a permanent academic appointment. Abbot became minister at the Unitarian Society in

Dover, New Hampshire, in 1864. The next year, the Unitarians held a conference to form a national association, which adopted in the preamble of the constitution the statement that Unitarians "are disciples of the Lord Jesus Christ." Abbot and others objected to this statement on the ground that it violated the Unitarian tradition of free inquiry. At the second conference, in 1866, Abbot led an unsuccessful attempt to remove what he considered a creedal statement in the preamble. Upon returning to Dover, Abbot resigned from the Unitarian ministry.

The retention of this commitment to Jesus in the preamble led many Unitarians, and other liberal religionists, to form the Free Religion Association (FRA) in 1867, with Abbot as a key figure in this movement. In 1869 Abbot became minister of the Unitarian Society of Toledo, Ohio, on the condition that the congregation withdraw from the National Unitarian Conference and abandon the name Unitarian. In 1870 Abbot became the founding editor of *The Index*, which was considered the unofficial publication of the FRA. Abbot published more than eight hundred articles in *The Index* and other journals.

In the spring of 1880, Abbot enrolled in the doctoral program in philosophy at Harvard, and was awarded the PhD in 1881. However, his radical philosophical and religious views remained roadblocks to academic appointments. His dissertation led to the publication of *Scientific Theism* in 1885. William James was interested in this work and secured from Abbot "advance

sheets” to share them with his class. Peirce considered Abbot’s book as doing honor to American thought and especially praised Abbot’s introduction and his view of scientific realism. Peirce also praised Abbot’s insights concerning “relations,” predicting that these insights would excite fruitful discussion. *Scientific Theism* was translated into German which served to increase Abbot’s international reputation. In 1890, Abbot published *The Way Out of Agnosticism or The Philosophy of Free Religion*, a collection of his essays. The book was heavily criticized by Josiah Royce, setting off an ugly public controversy.

Although the Unitarians had essentially accepted Abbot’s “free religion” position, he was never able to resume his former fellowship within this religious community. In September 1903 Abbot finished his last work, *The Syllogistic Philosophy*. Less than a month later, on 23 October 1903, the tenth anniversary of his wife’s death, Abbot committed suicide on her grave in Beverly, Massachusetts.

In “Theism and Christianity” (1865, in 1996) Abbot added a new perspective to his developing rational philosophy of religion. He took as axiomatic that law and adaptation underlie all existence, supporting the one great rational postulate of the unity of the universe and the mutual harmony of all facts and truths. He also viewed the individual’s nature as having a permanent and universal tendency to worship. From this postulate, he concluded that there must be an object which people are compelled to worship – a prophetic impulse guiding the center of all Being. In other words, if reason is possible, religion is rational. Abbot’s position here comes close to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason.

Based on his postulate of the unity of nature, all personal beings share a common essence or nature. God must also be a person. Certainly differences exist between the

transcendent attributes of God and the finite limitations of humanity, but their natures are identical concerning goodness, justice, and love. Abbot thus postulated a Godhead that can be interpreted and apprehended from the perspective of an ideal humanness. In summary of the foundation of his philosophy, Abbot presented a view of theism which understands that the ground and origin of all finite existence is One Infinite and Immanent Personality, that all spiritual beings are one in nature with the Infinite Personality, and that religion is the response of spiritual beings to the revelations of love from the Infinite Personality. The position is theistic because it emphasizes the oneness of the human and the divine, and it is rationalistic because it argues from the human to the divine.

Abbot relies on the scientific method for the discovery of the facts of nature. These facts are an understanding of the relations of things in nature, which is a system of the universe itself. For Abbot, nature and God are the same. It is no longer necessary to seek God outside or above nature, for modern science has laid the foundation for a natural idea of God in the discovery of the principle of the simple unity of force throughout the universe. Abbot is not saying that this principle of unity constitutes the idea of God; rather, he postulates that the discovery of this unity provides a monotheism based exclusively on scientific grounds. Instead of studying scriptures of pre-scientific religions, one now studies nature for an understanding of God. The theory of evolution also provides an important insight that the history of the universe is a connected whole. However, Abbot rejected the notion that there is a divine center of intelligence in nature, contending that the intelligence of nature cannot be centralized or localized because it is boundless.

In place of authoritarian pre-scientific religions, Abbot proposed Free Religion

based on free inquiry operating within the bounds of the scientific method. Free Religion is generally defined as the universal religious sentiment running through all special religions. Although each special religion demands obedience to a particular ideal, free religion requires obedience to one's own ideal in its natural and unperverted state. This central ideal is faith in humans as progressive beings. Nature has made a part of each person an impulse toward the Better. This impulse is the life of God in each individual. Special or artificial religion has turned humans from the instinctive love of the ideal to repulsive forms of the ideal. Special religions claim to offer some type of salvation from the reality of this world, but Free Religion seeks the following of instinctive ideals which will move humans toward individual and social perfection. The aim of Free Religion is to develop in the individual character – character for its own sake emancipated from the hope of heaven and the fear of hell. The goal of character is thoroughly secularized. Abbot was arguing that the aims of the individual and society are really one and the same.

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W. Creighton Peden

ADAMS, MARILYN MCCORD (1943–)

Marilyn McCord was born on 12 October 1943 in Oak Park, Illinois. She received the BA degree in philosophy in 1964 from the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, and then the PhD degree in philosophy from Cornell University in 1967. Having married philosopher Robert Merrihew Adams in 1966, during 1967–68 she taught at SUNY College of Cortland, and then from 1968 to 1972 she taught philosophy at the University of Michigan. In 1972 she joined the philosophy department at the University of California, Los Angeles, and became full professor in 1978, primarily teaching medieval philosophy

and philosophy of religion until 1993. During the 1980s she also worked towards ordination as Episcopal priest, earning Princeton Theological Seminary's Th.M. degree in Biblical Studies in 1984 and the Th.M. degree in Developmental Psychology and Faith Development in 1985. In 1987 she was ordained priest in the Episcopal Church in the United States of America, in the diocese of Los Angeles.

In 1993 Adams became Professor of Historical Theology in the Yale Divinity School and the Yale Department of Religious Studies, and she added the title of Horace Tracy Pitkin Chair of Historical Theology at Yale in 1998. From 2004 until 2009 she was the Regius Professor of Divinity at Christ Church, Oxford University, and served as canon of Christ Church Cathedral. She received the honorary D.D. from Oxford University in 2008. In 2009 she returned to America to become Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina. In 2013 she was named Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy, along with Robert, at Rutgers University with the inauguration of its Center for the Philosophy of Religion. She has given the Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University, and she was the 1998–99 Gifford Lecturer at St. Andrew's University. In 2011 she gave the Dewey Lecture to the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association.

Adams has acquired a reputation for outstanding scholarship in both medieval philosophy, especially Ockham, and contemporary Christian theology, including its metaphysics and ethics. Her work on theodicy and the problem of evil has garnered her the most attention. Life after death is required for any divine creation, such as the one we inhabit, that includes the horror of death. The key works are *Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God* (1999) and *Christ*

and Horrors: The Coherence of Christology (2006). Taking the problem of evil seriously, as more than a question of God's capacity to create an evidently good world and a good afterlife, Adams includes the question of Hell. Why would God be limited to the retributive justice of disproportionate suffering or eternal banishment? Adams proposes that no eternal Hell could be real if God is truly beneficent and just.

God's interest in each person's reconciliation and salvation be not frustrated by God's own creation. Even if many people refuse reconciliation, responsible for their own hellish separation from God, God would not allow that distance to persist. Even if the freedom of people to reject God is actually limited, it allows God's persuasive persistence to eventually be successful without having to be coercive. She writes in, "My own estimate is that for an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God, success with an elite isn't good enough; universal salvation is required" (2006, 206).

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John R. Shook

ADAMS, ROBERT MERRIHEW (1937–)

In his philosophical autobiography, Adams wrote of "falling in love with philosophy." The scope of his written corpus bespeaks his passion and acumen. He has made significant contributions to the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, ethics, and the history of modern philosophy. But besides loving the discipline of philosophy, Adams also loves its object. When summarizing his philosophical convictions, Adams wrote, "I believe that there is a metaphysically significant difference between appearance and reality; that there is a capital 'R' Reality that grounds everything that appears; that it is mental; that it is good; and that doing philosophy can be a way of loving it" (2009, 32).

Robert Merrihew Adams was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on 8 September 1937. Adams explains that his entry into the world of academia was motivated by the sense he ought to be a minister. With that goal in mind, he began his undergraduate work at Princeton University in 1955. He explored the ideas of Kant and Aristotle and was influenced by Hilary Putnam and Carl Hempel. Adams also

encountered the work of British philosopher A. J. Ayer, becoming enamored with logical positivism and empirical verification. He even considered doing philosophy of religion from that point of view.

After graduating from Princeton with the BA degree in 1959, Adams spent three years as a pastor of a Presbyterian church in Montauk, New York, before moving on to graduate work. He spent two years studying theology at Mansfield College of Oxford University, earning the BA in theology in 1961 (Oxford later awarded its MA in theology in 1965). He was tutored at Oxford by John Marsh and began working on the ontological argument for the existence of God. Adams considered giving up work on the argument until he was encouraged by John Hick to look into the work of Charles Hartshorne. Following his time at Oxford, Adams took another year of study at Princeton Theological Seminary, receiving its BD degree in 1962.

Adams continued his studies at Cornell University, motivated to work with Nelson Pike, a philosopher of religion. While there, Adams rejected the verificationism of Ayer. Having had his interest in ethics piqued by Douglas Arner in an undergraduate course at Princeton, Adams wanted to write his dissertation on the connection between religion and ethics. However, the rigor of the Cornell program, and his desire to complete a dissertation in a timely manner, led Adams to write on a more familiar topic: a modal version on the ontological argument. Even though Adams published only a few articles directly related to his dissertation, he nevertheless thought the argument successful, even if not persuasive. Adams also explains that his work on the ontological argument and necessary existence eventually led him to adopt a kind of theistic idealism where the structure of logic and mathematics comes from God's nature. While at Cornell, he married philosopher

Marilyn McCord Adams in 1966. Robert earned the MA in philosophy in 1967 and the PhD in philosophy in 1969.

In 1968, Adams began his career as a professional philosopher at the University of Michigan. He was hired to teach the history of modern philosophy. While at Michigan, Adams wrote a response to David Lewis's article, "Anselm and Actuality." Lewis had argued that the modal ontological argument for God's existence, and modal statements in general, are obscurantist. Lewis instead offered an indexical account of actuality where what makes a world actual is one's location within it. In "Theories of Actualism," Adams provides a theory of modal statements that is broadly Leibnizian. He suggests that the modal status of propositions possibly depends on the actual world, specifically on whether or not they are thought by God. On this view, modal propositions represent the thoughts of God and are neither primitive abstract objects, nor Lewisian concrete worlds. The theme of Leibnizian idealism is something that carries through most of his work on metaphysics. Adams later published *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist* (1994) as both a philosophical articulation and exploration of Leibniz's ideas.

While at Michigan, Adams had planned on writing a book that explored the metaphysics of modality and the problem of evil. Adams felt that a Leibnizian approach to the problem might produce a powerful answer. However, after he had spent some time working through the issues, he decided that the approach would not solve enough of the problem. One of the reasons Adams may have decided not to pursue his book-length treatment of the problem of evil was because he thought his wife and fellow philosopher of religion, Marilyn McCord Adams, had "provided a much better framework for thinking about the problem. I believe her book, *Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God*, is the deepest and

most satisfying treatment of this inherently unsatisfying subject that we are likely to have any time soon.”

In 1972 Adams went to the University of California, Los Angeles, as associate professor of philosophy, and was promoted to full professor in 1976, teaching there until retiring as professor emeritus in 1994. In 1993 he had begun teaching as professor of philosophy at Yale University, also holding a courtesy appointment in Religious Studies. From 1995 until 2003 he held the title of Clark Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics, and he also served as department chair from 1993 until 2001. Retiring from Yale in 2004, he moved to Oxford University as a senior research fellow and visiting professor of philosophy (non-stipendiary), and then returned to the United States to become Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina in 2009. In 2013 he was named Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy, along with Marilyn, at Rutgers University with the inauguration of its Center for the Philosophy of Religion. He was elected fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1991, and fellow of the British Academy in 2006. He has been president of the Society of Christian Philosophers (1981–83) and the Leibniz Society of America (1994–98).

In addition to his work in metaphysics, Adams has also made major contributions to ethics, specifically to the defense and articulation of divine command theory. When Adams first published his landmark essay, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness” in 1973, the philosophical community largely viewed divine command theories as a relic of an unsophisticated age. However, Adams, along with others like John Hare, Phil Quinn, and C. Stephen Evans, has revived the interest in and the respectability of divine command theories.

While his articulation of divine command theory did raise the profile of the theory, it remained limited in scope. For one, it was just a theory of *wrongness* and not of the right. Adams also argued that the term *wrong* only found its theistic meaning within certain religious traditions. Functionally, non-religious utterers used *wrong* in much the same way, but the meaning was context dependent. Another limitation is that Adams had not yet developed a theory of goodness.

Adams recalls that two events catalyzed his thinking on the nature of the good. First, in the 1980s, he had a late night discussion at a conference with William Alston and Alvin Plantinga. Alston and Plantinga encouraged Adams to think of goodness as resemblance to God. Second, Adams was invited to give the Wilde Lectures on Natural Religion at Oxford. In his preparation for the lectures, Adams recalls how he became highly interested in “a theistic Platonism in which God occupies something of the role that the form of the Good (or of Beauty) occupies in Plato’s ‘middle dialogues’, and more and more convinced of the centrality of the idea of intrinsic excellence, both for ethical theory and for theology” (2009, 28). Such a view of the good allowed Adams to account for all kinds of intrinsic goods (or excellence) by this resemblance relation.

In *Finite and Infinite Goods* (1999), Adams offers a fully developed account of theistic ethics. Adams begins with moral semantics. Adams suggests persons can understand the meaning of ethical terms without knowing the nature of ethical properties (in the way that both a scientist and a small child know what *water* means, but one has a better understanding of its nature). Adams then offers a Platonic theistic explanation of the nature of the Good that identifies the Good with God. He does this along abductive lines,

suggesting that such a view of the Good offers the best explanation of our intuition and language about the nature of the Good. Adams' account of the right presupposes his view of the Good, but also begins with a discussion of the semantics of obligation. Adams argues that obligation only has meaning in social contexts as a relation that obtains between persons, but merely human demands are not enough to create morally binding obligations. However, God's demands are good enough and constitute ethically valid obligations.

Adams then published *A Theory of Virtue* in 2006, in which he works out a view of "substantive ethics," rather than normative ethics, in order to include not just theories of moral obligation, but also accounts of the kind of people we ought to be.

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Jonathan Pruitt and David Baggett

ADDAMS, JANE (1860–1935)

Jane Addams was born on 6 September 1860 in Cedarville, Illinois, to parents Sarah Weber Addams and John Huy Addams. Addams had goals to attend Smith College in Massachusetts, but she attended Rockford Female Seminary in Illinois instead, acceding to her father’s plans for her future. Jane was disenchanted with the religious foundations of the seminary, but graduated with a BA in 1881. Dissatisfied with the role of a young socialite, Addams decided to travel to Europe where she began to consider the problems of the poor. It was during her second trip to Europe that Addams discovered what would give her life meaning and become her life’s work, the settlement movement. The settlement movement in England was based on the idea of connecting universities with the poor. This provided impoverished communities with trained leaders who would work and live in the neighborhoods they served. It was hoped that such an arrangement would mitigate social problems in urban areas by increasing education and cultural awareness.

Using the Toynbee Hall model, Adams and her friend Ellen Gates Starr created their own social settlement, Hull-House, in Chicago. Rather than relying solely on the Christian ethic, Hull-House incorporated democratic ideals that would allow for the full participation of all community members. For Addams, Hull-House would function both locally and nationally and indeed, Addams became the head of the settlement movement in the United States. With the help of women such as Mary Rozet Smith, Mary Keyser,

Alice Hamilton, Julia Lathrop, Florence Kelley, and others, Addams put her social philosophy into practice and contributed to the labor movement, educational reform, the international peace movement, and women’s rights.

Although not formally trained in sociology, Addams self-identified as a sociologist, and was a member of the American Sociological Society (now the American Sociological Association) from its inception. She published in the *American Journal of Sociology* and worked closely with the sociology and philosophy faculty at the University of Chicago, who, at least for a time, also recognized her work as sociological. In addition, she toured the United States lecturing at universities and various social settlements. Until 1914 at the beginning of World War I, Addams was a laudable figure in American culture and history. Her settlement work, research, social thought, and efforts in the women’s suffrage movement made her an American heroine. However, her ideals necessitated a pacifist position on the war which made her the target of academics, politicians, and the American public. Addams became president of the Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom which was ultimately her downfall, becoming a social and intellectual pariah. Despite the difficult war years, Addams eventually regained her popularity and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931. Addams died on 21 May 1935 in Chicago, Illinois.

Addams’s work is premised upon six ideological assumptions: (1) cultural feminism, a belief in the superiority of feminine values such as peace, productivity, and justice; (2) progressivism, a desire to link social activism with social scientific state reform; (3) social reform Darwinism, the advancement of society through social engineering; (4) philosophic pragmatism,

the necessity of linking truth claims to social practice; (5) social gospel Christianity, the work of bridging the gap between social class groups and calling congregations into service among the poor; and (6) the social settlement movement, an attempt to bring conscientious reformers into contact with the lives of those they sought to assist, but were separated from due to social class segregation.

Addams's perspectives on labor were enhanced by her reading of Tolstoy and her 1886 visit with him in Russia. Tolstoy argued for a more simple existence based on individual work on the land. This type of life freed individuals from the alienating impact of capitalism. Having worked the land himself, Tolstoy expected that Addams would also lead a modest life. He criticized her bourgeois ways at every turn, particularly her dress and her ownership of land that was never worked by Addams herself, but by hired help. Addams understood Tolstoy's position, and respected it. However, she understood the social expectations of the Hull-House neighborhood and knew that they expected her to be a very different type of leader than Tolstoy. She needed to dress well and to be available to meet the needs of her community, which left her unable to fully adopt the peasant lifestyle. British sociology and Fabianism made a lasting impression on Addams. Charles Booth's quantitative study of the poor in London was the inspiration for both Hull-House and *Hull House Maps and Papers* (1895), a sociological investigation of the neighborhoods surrounding Hull-House. The data were collected by the women of Hull-House and utilized by the sociology faculty at the University of Chicago for their studies of urban life. Another follower of Booth, Beatrice Potter Webb, is also linked to Addams and Hull-House. Webb visited Addams in Chicago on two occasions, once in 1893 and again in 1898. Addams also visited

Webb and her husband Sydney in 1896, 1915, and again in 1919.

Although much has been written about Addams's life and good works, not enough has been written about her social philosophy or her role in shaping the discipline of sociology. During the war years Chicago sociology separated from the more radical Addams, relegating her and the other Hull-House women to the field of social work. While the men considered Hull-House a social experiment of sorts, Addams argued that it was much more. She put her principles into action and created an institution designed to facilitate both community and democracy. She contributed much to the founding of the discipline and also to the study of the impact of industrialization on the lives of the oppressed. She brought a new level of caring and nurturing to the study of social life and recognized the necessity of women's contributions to such endeavors. Her optimism and stalwart support of peace stands to benefit us as much today as during her own lifetime.

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Julie Harms Cannon

ADLER, FELIX (1851–1933)

Felix Adler was born on 13 August 1851 in Alzey, Germany, the son of Rabbi Samuel and Henrietta Adler. In 1857 the family emigrated to the United States because Samuel, a leader in the nascent Jewish Reform movement, was named to the rabbinate of Temple Emanuel in New York City. He attended Columbia College (BA 1870) and then went on to the University of Berlin for graduate study. At the same time, he was preparing for the rabbinate at Abraham Geiger's seminary. Leaving both, he transferred to Heidelberg where he earned his PhD in Semitic studies in 1873. While a graduate student, Adler came under the influence of Hermann Cohen. At the same time it was Friedrich Albert Lange's *Die Arbeitsfrage* which, he said, "opened for me a wide and tragic prospect." Thus began Adler's life-long interests in neo-Kantian moral philosophy, in social ethics, and in the "labor" question.

Adler was expected eventually to succeed his father at the Temple. On his return to New York, his first (and last) Emanuel sermon called for "religion not confined to church or synagogue. A religion such as Judaism ever claimed to be, not of the creed but of the deed." Adler recalled later that "Some members [of the congregation] came to me and asked whether I believed in God. I said, 'Yes, but not in your God'" (Obituary, *NY Times*, 25 April 1933).

Adler had been schooled for the rabbinate or the academy. The former was now closed to him and the latter, given the prevailing anti-Semitism, seemed closed as well. However, through the good offices and the substantial generosity of several leading members of Emanuel, a chair in Hebrew and Oriental Literature was established at the newly founded Cornell University. Felix was named to it as non-resident professor and taught from 1873 to 1875.

Some of those who had heard the Temple sermon invited Felix to speak on the “plan of a new organization.” On 15 May 1876 at Standard Hall in New York City, Adler called for “Diversity in the creed, unanimity in the deed This is the common ground where we may all grasp hands ... united in mankind’s common cause” (1877). With that address, Ethical Culture was born. Exhibiting formidable powers of organization, Adler in those first years established a pattern of reform for his nascent movement. He founded the district nursing service (now the Visiting Nurse Service), a model tenement building company, a free kindergarten that grew into the Workingman’s School and which is today the Ethical Culture Fieldston School. Societies were established in Philadelphia, Chicago, and St. Louis. The Sunday meetings attracted an ever-growing audience. Newly recruited colleagues joined Adler in leading the Societies and developing, among other projects, the Legal Aid Society and settlement houses.

Adler was president from 1878 to 1882 of the Free Religious Association founded in 1866 by Francis Ellingwood Abbot and O.B. Frothingham. Among its members were Ralph Waldo Emerson, Lucretia Mott, Wendell Phillips, and Julia Ward Howe. In the 1890s, Adler began to develop Ethical Culture in Europe, Great Britain, and Japan. The International Ethical Union was organized.

Among other activities, it sponsored the International Races Congress (1911) and the International Moral Education Congresses (first in 1908 and periodically until the early 1930s). Sadly, the depression, Nazism, and war made international organization impossible and Ethical Culture abroad – except for the British movement led by Stanton Coit and Harold Blackham, and the Vienna Society – ceased to exist.

A prolific author and teacher, he founded the *International Journal of Ethics* in 1890. While continuing his Ethical Culture leadership, Adler was appointed professor of political and social ethics at Columbia in 1902, and he held this chair until his death. He was also Theodore Roosevelt Professor at the University of Berlin (1908) and the Hibbert Lecturer at Oxford (1923). He served as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1928–29. He was busy speaking, teaching, writing, organizing, and raising money for the Societies and for the Schools until the final two years of his life. Adler died on 24 April 1933 in New York City.

Adler’s Ethical Culture was situated in the nineteenth-century religious and social reform neighborhood that included the social gospel movement, the Quakers, Reform and, later, Reconstructionist Judaism as well as assorted utopians and secular radicals. Ethics, Adler held, was the “science of right energizing” (1918, p. 221); one’s own individuality emerged from the effort to elicit the individuality of the other. No one, in other words, could save him/herself alone! Again, drawing upon Kant, Adler “postulated” the “worth” of every human being. But elaborating the bare bones of a moral geometry was unsuited to Adler’s intent and passion. In an interesting turn, he imagined “worth” as emergent in ethical relationships and not as a given of being. Indeed, the

ethical character of any relationship was signaled precisely by how it contributed to this emergence. Individuation was thus a relational idea, evolving as relationships evolved. Adler's model was biological, a shift away from the Newtonianism of Kant. Adler's philosophy was organic and not atomistic. Of course, the "ideal" could never be achieved. Moral success, always elusive, remained a permanent goad and goal. The ideal, an infinite democracy of "ends," warranted an ethics of interdependence. Irreplaceability was exhibited in action. The space between ideal and empirical generated moral motivation.

Simultaneously, Adler was developing a critical reconstruction of religion. An ethical religion was not a religion of good works *per se* but of spiritual pedagogy. Good works, whatever their other merits, were the vehicle for personal and interpersonal development. Religion like ethics therefore belonged in the marketplace and in the streets as much as if not more than in the pulpit. Thus, Adler's and Ethical Culture's projects were integral to moral development and expressive of ethical religion, and not mere outcroppings of more basic realities and beliefs.

Behind the institutions and reforms was Adler's guiding question: how is ethics possible in an industrial society? A realist, he did not disdain industry, business, the economics of give and get. Instead, as he said over and over again, industry was to be "ethicized." And Adler both believed and demonstrated in thought and act that it could be done. Adler's philosophic expression of this was his notion of industrial democracy and his reconstruction of the idea of "vocation" in order to replace the dehumanizations of the assembly line and vicious competitiveness. Recognizing the move of American democracy from farm to city, he called for a representative government based in vocational groups – labor

unions, professional associations, mothers (the PTA for instance), etc. – in order to assure the power to make changes and the competence to do so. The individual in a "mass" society had neither even if he or she had the vote.

Adler did not set out in 1876 with a grand plan. But he was open to experience, learned from it, and was always looking for a way to put its lessons to work. Adler's was a philosophy of *praxis*. Adler has been difficult to place in the history of American philosophy. Labeling him as "neo-Kantian" doesn't succeed. Using discrete categories like "reformer," "religious leader," "educator," "professor," misleads as often as it instructs. He was, of course, all these things. But in Adler they came together, were instrumental to each other, and finally served the construction of an interesting turn that philosophic idealism took under the influence of American democracy and the creativity of a realistic idealist.

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Howard B. Radest

ADLER, MORTIMER JEROME (1902–2001)

Mortimer Adler was born on 28 December 1902 in New York City. He earned a PhD in psychology from Columbia in 1928. In 1927, Robert Hutchins invited Adler to come to Yale University and discuss how psychological research might be relevant to the study of law. Probably due to his conversations with Hutchins, between 1927 and his appointment on the faculty at the University of Chicago in 1930, Adler switched his interests from experimental social psychology and empirical social science to metaphysical philosophy.

Adler spent his entire academic career at the University of Chicago. He was initially appointed associate professor in philosophy of law in the philosophy department from

1930 to 1931, and then his appointment was reassigned to the Law School where he remained at the rank of associate professor until 1942. He was professor in philosophy of law from 1942 to 1952, when he retired. He returned to Chicago as a visiting lecturer from 1963 to 1968. In 1952, Adler became director of the Institute for Philosophical Research, first in San Francisco and then in Chicago after it was moved there in 1963. Along with Hutchins, he coedited fifty-two volumes of *The Great Books of the Western World* (1952). Adler was Chairman and Co-Founder with Max Weismann of the Center for the Study of The Great Ideas and Editor in Chief of its journal *Philosophy Is Everybody's Business*; Founder and Director of the Institute for Philosophical Research; Chairman of the Board of Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.; Editor in Chief of the *Great Books of the Western World* and *The Syntopicon: An Index to the Great Ideas*; Editor of *The Great Ideas Today* (all published by Encyclopedia Britannica); and Co-Founder and Honorary Trustee of The Aspen Institute. Ongoing programs started or developed by Adler include: The Great Books Foundation (with Robert Hutchins), the Basic Program of Liberal Education for Adults at the University of Chicago (with Robert Hutchins), the Executive Seminars of The Aspen Institute, the Paideia Project (a plan for major reform of public school education), and The Great Ideas seminars and lectures at the Center for the Study of The Great Ideas. Adler died on 28 June 2001 in San Mateo, California.

His first book, *Dialectic* (1927) grew out of his interest in medieval thought, providing an outline of what he thought were the most relevant philosophical and religious ideas of Western Civilization. While at Chicago, Adler expanded these ideas into lectures and then as a series of books including *The Higher Learning in America* (1936), *What Man Has*

Made of Man (1937), and his well-known *How to Read a Book* (1940), which has gone through several editions and is still in print. Adler proposed that higher education should adopt “Great Books” programs requiring all students to take core classes in Western philosophy, politics, and religion. Great Books was originally a list of one hundred essential texts in western civilization, also known as the Western Canon. During the 1920s and 1930s, a significant number of American colleges and universities adopted this curriculum, including Columbia University, his alma mater. *Great Books* has been attacked for only celebrating the accomplishments of white, European males while overlooking the voices of women and people of color.

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Jean Van Delinder

ADORNO, THEODOR LUDWIG WIESENGRUND (1903–1969)

Theodor Ludwig Wiesengrund was born on 11 September 1903 in Frankfurt, Germany. Theodor replaced his last name with Adorno, his mother's maiden name, in 1938. Adorno received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Frankfurt (now Johann Wolfgang Goethe University) in 1924. An abortive attempt to habilitate under Hans Cornelius in 1927 was overcome when Paul Tillich assumed a chair of philosophy in 1929 and directed Adorno's work. In 1931 Adorno finished his graduate studies by receiving his Habilitation with a paper titled "Kierkegaard: The Construction of the Aesthetic," and became a privatdozent at Frankfurt. Also in 1931, Adorno founded the Frankfurt School of critical sociology and philosophy with Max Horkheimer. In 1934 Adorno fled Nazi Germany to live in Oxford, England.

Adorno immigrated to the United States in 1938 and joined the faculty of the re-located Frankfurt School, now called the Institute for Social Research, at Columbia University. In 1941 he moved with Horkheimer to Los Angeles, California. After eleven years in the U.S., with Horkheimer's help he was given a professorship in Frankfurt in 1949, where the Institute of Social Research had been

re-founded, allowing him to return to Germany and continue his academic career. This culminated in a position as double *Ordinarius* of philosophy and sociology. In the Institute, which was affiliated with the university, Adorno's leadership status became ever more and more apparent, while Horkheimer, who was eight years older, gradually stepped back, leaving his younger friend the sole directorship in 1958. Adorno died while vacationing on 6 August 1969 in Visp, Switzerland.

Adorno's contributions to philosophy, social science, psychology, and cultural theory can hardly be overestimated. From his first major work on Kierkegaard and aesthetics in 1933 to *Negative Dialectics*, his 1966 masterpiece, Adorno rarely failed to penetrate the dialectical relations between exchange, the formation of alienated and mystified subjectivity, authoritarian political logic, and the contradictory nature of culture in modern society. Though Adorno sometimes lacked consistency he can nonetheless be credited, both individually and as a member of the celebrated Institute of Social Research, otherwise known since the 1960s as the "Frankfurt School," with arguably the most significant critical extension of Marx's analysis of capitalist society to date.

The wartime efforts of the Institute revolved around two main intellectual pillars: Horkheimer's dialectics project and the more massive and important "Studies in Antisemitism." The most famous study to emerge from the anti-Semitism program was *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) about authoritarian character structure, written in concert with political psychologists at Berkeley. Adorno contributed four big chapters under the heading of "Qualitative Studies of Ideology," and these chapters were the strong theoretical sections of the book. Generally, Adorno's aim in *The Authoritarian Personality* was to explore the relationship between ideological

structures and personality – a phenomenology of authoritarianism from which the meaning behind surface expressions could be interpreted in the light of empirical data.

Where Adorno's empirically rooted theorizing within the Institute's anti-Semitism studies was generally subtle and insightful, his thinking on the dialectics project was perhaps compromised by Horkheimer's impatience toward interpretations that deviated from his growing sense of despair and pessimism. Consequently, the book *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (first published in 1944 as *Philosophische Fragmente*) co-authored with Horkheimer and generally considered today to be a major publication of the Institute, identified a gulf between reason, enlightenment, and democratic liberalism, on the one hand, and irrationalism, romantic mysticism, and fascism, was in fact illusory: fascism was incomprehensible outside liberal, bourgeois democracy and the spirit of the Enlightenment. Enlightenment and terror were, in some respects, consubstantial; authoritarian mysticism was the extreme manifestation (or the logical consequence) of sober, bourgeois liberalism itself.

Upon returning to Germany in 1951, Adorno was a key player in the reformation of the Institute in Frankfurt. Adorno remained hostile to both socialism and capitalism adamant about publishing what he had written while in exile, though some Institute figures had warmed up to bourgeois enlightenment and to a large extent had buried their Marxist past. During the early 1960s Adorno was embroiled in famous disputes with Karl Popper (summed up in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*) and tangled with the existentialists that resulted in a brilliant and slim book called *The Jargon of Authenticity* – a work he described as a "propaedeutic" to *Negative Dialectics*. The most significant work of his post-war

life was *Negative Dialectics*. Adorno's core conceptual problems centered on the dynamics of alienation and reconciliation. Marx's theory of the commodity was founded upon a theory of alienation such that the social and moral statuses of things and people were dependent upon the objective appearance in the world of a non-identical other to assume the shape and form of this moral substance. For example, wheat looking over its shoulder at corn to know itself as an exchange value (the relative and equivalent poles of the value form). The Hegelian-Marxist dialectic insisted, metaphysically, that this alienation inherent in social relations (the struggle between alien wills, between subject and other, between agents and history) would work itself out, necessarily, in the direction of freedom and that subjectivity would take care of itself. Reconciliation with society and the world would emerge through education, labor, collective (class) struggle, and the rational transformation of society and nature.

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Mark P. Worrell

ALLEN, ETHAN (1738–1789)

Ethan Allen was born on 10 January 1738 in Litchfield, Connecticut. Although he showed scholarly talent, preparations for admission into Yale were halted when Allen had to return to farming after his father's death in 1755. Allen had already absorbed the Arminianism of his father, and he also heard views favoring free will and denying original sin from Benjamin Stiles, cousin of Ezra Stiles. In 1763 Allen moved to Salisbury, Connecticut, where he met a frontier doctor, Thomas Young. Young was an enthusiast of English thinkers such as deist Charles Blount and democrat John Locke. Allen's interests in criticizing the Bible, denying the divinity of Jesus, and rejecting Calvinist theology blossomed, as Young explained his own radical views defending natural theology and deism. For about a year, they collaborated on writing down their thoughts, until Young moved to Albany, taking their combined manuscript with him. Young did not see their work reach publication; he soon moved to Boston and became a leader among the Sons of Liberty to protest the 1765 Stamp Act. Allen soon became a patriot too. Later, while ruling as a virtual dictator of Vermont, Allen emerged as the closest to a philosopher-king that America has ever had.

While their manuscript rested unpublished, Young did publish a letter defending deism in a Boston newspaper in 1772. But by then their minds were more on rebellion and war. Young was a prominent patriot helping to urge Massachusetts towards independence, while Allen was the leader of a settlers' rebellion in the Green Mountains, then territory assigned

to New York. Allen put his knowledge of Locke and natural rights to liberty and property into action, arguing legal cases and producing a barrage of letters, pamphlets, and finally a book, *A Brief Narrative of the Proceedings of the Government of New York*. Allen's staunchly democratic and revolutionary diatribes were known in other colonies and contributed to the application of Locke to growing political troubles with Britain.

Preparations by the British to quell Allen's rebellion were interrupted by the start of the revolution in April 1775. Allen immediately helped to capture Fort Ticonderoga, but he was then captured by the British during an invasion of Quebec later that year. While Allen was a British prisoner of war, Young died in 1777, leaving the manuscript in the possession of his widow. Upon Allen's release in a prisoner exchange, Allen returned to the newly independent republic of "Vermont" (this name had been suggested by Young), commanded its military forces, published a widely read *Narrative of Colonel Ethan Allen's Captivity* (1779), and tried to persuade Congress to admit Vermont as the fourteenth state. Sustaining his aspirations to be recognized as an Enlightenment philosopher, Allen negotiated with Young's widow for acquiring the manuscript, supervised some needed editing, and found a publisher in Bennington for *Reason the Only Oracle of Man* (1785).

Reason the Only Oracle of Man was not the first deist publication in America; it was preceded by an anonymous pamphlet in 1771 and Young's letter in 1772. However, it was the first widely known and most notorious work of freethought and deism in America. Allen's motivations for permitting only his name to appear as this work's author likely involve a concern for Young's surviving family and his own desire for fame. "Ethan Allen's Bible" was widely attacked for its criticism of scripture, rejection of Christianity, and replacement of

Puritan metaphysics with a scientific worldview. Proud of his achievements, he often signed his letters “From the Philosopher.” Allen moved to Burlington in 1787, where he composed another manuscript titled *An Essay on the Universal Plenitude of Being*, but this shorter work was not published until 1873. Allen died near Colchester, Vermont, on 12 February 1789.

Although Allen hid the co-authorship of Young, Allen did not hide his own ignorance of deist thinkers (the Preface claims that he never read them). Nor could he hide the way that much of *Reason the Only Oracle of Man* displays close familiarity with deist arguments and Newtonian science. Estimates agree that roughly one-fifth of the book is Allen’s own writing; all the same, Allen deserves credit for full co-authorship since he did understand and approve of Young’s views. The book is stitched together in a readable fashion, swaying from discussions of the natural evidence of divine creation, design, benevolence to sharp criticisms of any scriptural authority, trinitarian theology, or moral determinism obstructing deism. The deistic God which emerges is supernaturally self-sufficient, eternal, immutable, perfectly rational and moral, and this God forged creation for the happiness of creatures. Humanity is endowed with an immortal soul, free will, and reason, and people are as capable of moral evil as moral goodness. The function of an immortal soul in a natural world remained on Allen’s mind. Allen’s manuscript “appendix” to *Reason*, titled *An Essay on the Universal Plenitude of Being and on the Nature and Immortality of the Human Soul and Its Agency* and published in 1873, defends the soul as an immaterial substance which takes up space and controls the body.

Allen’s deism reflects a frontier life, an agrarian ethos, and an individualistic spirit. Enjoying a wider acquaintance with British natural theology and rational ethics, other

American deists from Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Jefferson tended to view human nature as positively good and to advance social welfare as our highest duty. The American deisms of Thomas Paine’s *The Age of Reason* (1794) and Elihu Palmer’s *The Principles of Nature* (1802) are indebted to Allen and Young, and the severity of Biblical criticism in *Reason* would not be equaled until the 1820s.

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John R. Shook

ALLISON, HENRY EDWARD (1937–)

Henry E. Allison was born on 25 April 1937 in New York City. He received his BA from Yale University in 1959, and his MA in religion from Columbia University's joint program with the Union Theological Seminary. Allison received his PhD in philosophy from the New School for Social Research in 1964, writing a dissertation on "Lessing and the Environment." His teaching career began as an assistant professor of philosophy at State University of New York at Potsdam in 1964–65, and Pennsylvania State University from 1965 to 1968. From 1968 to 1973 Allison was associate professor of philosophy at the University of Florida, and from 1973 to 1996 he was professor of philosophy at the University of California at San Diego. While at San Diego, he served as department chair from 1978 to 1982. In 1996 Allison became professor of philosophy at Boston University, retiring to become professor emeritus in 2004.

He then taught part-time at the University of California at Davis from 2004 to 2008.

Allison has been visiting professor at Yale, Princeton, and Boston University as Findlay Visiting Professor. He received a Guggenheim fellowship in 1986–87, National Endowment for the Humanities fellowships in 1969–70, 1980, and 1985–86, and many other honors. Allison was President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1996–97. He served on several editorial boards, notable those of *Kant Studien* and *The Monist*, along with service on the advisory boards of the Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Philosophy, and the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation.

The breadth of Allison's scholarship extends widely across modern philosophy. He has published on British empiricists, Continental rationalism, Kant, Hegel, and post-Hegelian Continental philosophy. His outstanding work on the philosophy of Kant, particularly his book *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (1983) which examines the *Critique of Pure Reason*, elevated Allison to the status of one of the most significant interpreters of Kant in the twentieth century. Allison's exposition presents Kant's transcendental idealism as a viable system of thought in its entirety, deviating from the usual effort to salvage only portions of Kant's philosophy. His subsequent books on Kant concern themes from the second and third critiques. Kant scholars rarely have produced such influential commentaries and defenses of Kant's entire system.

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John R. Shook

ALSTON, WILLIAM PAYNE (1921–2009)

William P. Alston was born on 29 November 1921 in Shreveport, Louisiana. After graduating from high school at age fifteen, he studied music at Centenary College. During World War II, he was stationed in Northern California (1942–46). A trip to the Berkeley library put him in touch with Jacques Maritain's *Introduction to Philosophy* and

resulted in his deep and extensive reading in the history of philosophy. Toward the end of the War, Alston's knowledge of philosophy so impressed Charner Perry, chair of the philosophy department at the University of Chicago, that he was permitted to enter the graduate program without previous study of philosophy.

Alston's education continued at Chicago, aided mainly by Richard McKeon and Charles Hartshorne. He defended a dissertation on the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead and received his PhD in philosophy in 1951. His first appointment was at the University of Michigan as a professor of philosophy from 1949 to 1971, where he became familiar with contemporary analytic philosophy. He later held appointments at Rutgers University from 1971 to 1976, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign from 1976 to 1980, and Syracuse University from 1980 to 1992. Alston was President of the Western (now Central) Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1978–79, President of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in 1977, and President of the Society of Christian Philosophers. He is founding editor of *Faith and Philosophy*; the *Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers* (which he co-founded); the *Journal of Philosophical Research*; and *Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*. A recipient of numerous honors and fellowships, Alston became a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1990. Alston became professor emeritus at Syracuse in 1992, where he continued to teach until 2000. Alston died on 13 September 2009 in Jamesville, New York.

Alston is best known for his work in philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of religion, and philosophical theology. Early in his career, Alston helped break the stranglehold on

philosophy of the verifiability criterion of meaning. His most significant work in philosophy of language focuses on what it is for a sentence to have linguistic meaning. Two themes dominate his answer: illocutionary acts and the relation of meaning to use and rule-governance. Alston groups illocutionary acts into five categories: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and exercitives. For each category, and for many types within each category, Alston specifies the conditions speakers take responsibility for in uttering a sentence of that category and type.

To understand the meaning of a sentence is to recognize its relation to use and rule-governance, and illocutionary acts are central to this recognition. A sentence's having a certain meaning is its being usable for a certain role in communication, in the illocutionary acts one uses it to perform. Thus, (1) a sentence's having a certain meaning consists in its being *usable* to perform illocutionary acts of a certain type. Also, a sentence's being usable to perform an illocutionary act of a certain type is its being subject to a certain illocutionary rule; thus, (2) a sentence's having a certain meaning consists in its being subject to a certain illocutionary rule. Illocutionary acts unite meaning with use and rule-governance; (1) and (2) are different ways of saying the same thing. Alston's development of his theory spans nearly fifty years, culminating in *Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning* (2000).

Alston espouses versions of realism about truth and reality. In *A Realist Conception of Truth* (1996), he defends alethic realism, the twin thesis that the truth-value of a proposition depends entirely on whether what it is about is as it purports, and that truth is an important property. The first thesis, the realist conception of truth, is about our ordinary concept of truth; it is not a thesis about the property of truth, although it does presuppose

that truth is a property. Thus, Alston's realist conception of truth contrasts with deflationary theories of truth, according to which talk that appears to predicate a truth value of propositions does not in fact do so, and epistemic conceptions of truth, according to which the truth value of a proposition, belief or statement depends entirely on whether, or the extent to which, it is justified, warranted, or rational. Alston's realist conception of truth, although compatible with the correspondence theory of truth, does not require it; and it is compatible with global metaphysical anti-realism, the view that all of reality is, at least in part, relative to our conceptual choices.

Alston attempts to decide some of these metaphysical issues in *A Sensible Metaphysical Realism* (2001). If global metaphysical anti-realism is to avoid absurdities, the sort of dependence posited between reality and conceptualization must be constitutive dependence, not causal dependence. To illustrate the difference: in a non-absolute space and time, how fast a train is moving is relative to a framework; the framework does not cause the motion of the train – the engine does that – but rather constitutes what it is for the train to be moving at that speed. An alternative to anti-realism is global metaphysical realism, the view that no part of reality is in any way relative to conceptualization. Alston does not accept this version of realism but nevertheless regards it as a datum of commonsense that should be denied only for excellent reasons. Alston arrives at a *via media* between realism and anti-realism, a sensible metaphysical realism: vast stretches of reality are in no way relative to conceptualization, but some aspects of it are.

In epistemology, Alston has contributed work on knowledge and justification. Alston distinguishes two families of concepts of justification, each of which has many members.

According to the deontological family, beliefs are justified just in case one who holds them violates no duties or obligations relevant to getting at the truth. According to the truth-conducive family, beliefs are justified just in case one who holds them does so on adequate grounds and is unaware of defeaters. Alston opts for the latter family, arguing that the former mistakenly presupposes that we have voluntary control over our believing activity. Furthermore, the adequacy of grounds consists in their making beliefs based on them very likely to be true; and, while the adequacy of the grounds need not be internally accessible to believers in order for their beliefs to be justified, the grounds themselves must be thus accessible.

In *The Reliability of Sense Perception* (1993), Alston argues that all arguments for the reliability of sense perception run afoul of epistemic circularity problems; all require assuming in practice the reliability of sense perception. This feature characterizes every basic source of belief, including memory, reason, and introspection. Nevertheless, Alston argues, it is rational to form beliefs on the basis of sense perceptual experience, and to regard it as reliable, since there is no practical alternative to doing so. He advocates the theory of appearing, the view that what is most fundamental to perceptual experience of physical objects is their appearing to perceivers in specific ways. The view is best understood in contrast with its two main rivals. In contrast with the adverbial theory of Roderick Chisholm, which holds that perceptual experience is merely a way of being conscious, the theory of appearing insists that perception is irreducibly relational; it consists in an object's appearing to a subject, or, equivalently, in an object's presenting itself to a subject. In contrast with the once popular sense-data theory, a theory holding that perceptual experience consists in internal

mental objects appearing to the subject, the theory of appearing insists that, typically, physical objects themselves appear to the subject. As for explaining how experience can directly justify belief, both adverbial and sense-data theories must forge a link external to experience itself in order to account for how it justifies beliefs; according to the theory of appearing, on the contrary, beliefs are directly justified because they register what is present within experience itself.

Alston has been at the forefront of the recent trend among Anglo-American Christian philosophers to take more seriously the Augustinian motto, “faith seeking understanding.” Living out that motto in his own case resulted in work on the Trinity, the Resurrection, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, prayer, biblical criticism, and the evidential value of the fulfillment of divine promises for spiritual and moral development. Alston’s epistemological theory of religious experience has been quite influential, as have his contributions to understanding religious discourse and such other matters as whether broadly Freudian explanations of religious belief and of suffering defeat the justifications usually offered on behalf of religious belief. What is distinctive about Alston’s model is the notion of a doxastic practice, a socially learned, monitored, and reinforced constellation of dispositions and habits, each of which yields a certain belief from certain input. According to Alston, there is no good reason to think that the Christian practice is unreliable, and significantly, the variety and diversity of doxastic religious practices provide no such reason. Although like any other basic doxastic practice, Christian practice cannot be shown in a noncircular way to be reliable, it does display marks of significant self-support; consequently, those who engage in it may be regarded as practically rational.

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Daniel Howard Snyder

ALTIZER, THOMAS JONATHAN JACKSON (1927–)

Thomas J. J. Altizer was born on 28 September 1927 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and grew up in Charleston, West Virginia. He attended the University of Chicago (BA 1948, MA 1951, PhD 1955) and wrote a dissertation on Greek and Eastern religious philosophy. He taught religion at Wabash College from 1954 to 1956, Emory University from 1956 to 1968, and State University of New York at Stony Brook as professor of religious studies in the English department from 1968 to 1996.

Altizer was the lead spokesperson for, and motivating force behind, the “death of God” movement of the 1960s. He also served as the key theoretician for what came to be known as “radical theology” during the late 1960s and 1970s. Altizer exerted a considerable influence on the early phase of American religious postmodernism, particularly the work of Mark C. Taylor and Charles Winquist.

Unlike his contemporaries, Altizer has consistently written in a self-described “visionary” style, which combines the oracular nature of poetry with a metaphysical grandeur characteristic of those modern authors whom he has repeatedly cited as influences and mentors. Those figures include John Milton, William Blake, G.W.F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, and James Joyce. Although throughout his career Altizer has considered himself primarily as a Christian theologian, his impact has been almost exclusively on those academic writers who sought in the last quarter of the twentieth century to transform

the traditional discipline of theology into the secular academic field of religious studies.

From the outset of his career, Altizer focused on setting a course and developing a rhetoric that diverged dramatically from the school of neo-orthodoxy that dominated American theology and the theological profession. Altizer’s earliest work focused on Eastern mysticism and the application to theology of the thought of famed historian of religions, Mircea Eliade.

In the mid-1960s Altizer became a well-known public figure with the appearance of his book *The Gospel of Christian Atheism* (1966) and his declaration, along with fellow theologian William Hamilton, that “God is dead.” Their popularization of Nietzsche’s slogan within the seminaries and mainline churches of the day quickly captured national headlines and ignited a storm of controversy that culminated in a cover story by *Time* magazine.

Much of the general public, together with most conservative Christians, to this day have heeded only the shock value of Altizer’s message. But, in his proclamation of God’s death, Altizer hit upon a startling and original insight that, according to some interpreters, stopped Christian neo-orthodoxy dead in its tracks and paved the way for what a later generation of religious postmodernists would dub “the end of theology” itself. Altizer’s subsequent books are rich and subtle variations on this theme.

Altizer elaborated, in the context of late 20th century Protestant religious thought, the deeper implications of 19th century German idealism and existential philosophy. Because he continued throughout his career to write in his own unique declamatory style, without citing other contemporary theological writers, his importance as a crucial bridge to postmodernism is frequently overlooked. Altizer built his “radical” or “death-of-God”

theology on the notion, first intimated by Luther and later accorded pride of place by Hegel in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, that God's incarnation through Christ's sacrifice on the cross inaugurates a new historical era in which divinity can no longer be conceived as transcendent, but must be understood as wholly immanent. Following Paul's assertion that God "emptied" himself by becoming human (Philippians 2:7) through death and suffering, Altizer views the crucifixion as the moment in which the infinite is utterly identified with, and absorbed into, the finite. This divine self-emptying, or *kenosis*, is what is meant by the saying "God is dead," an event not genuinely acknowledged until the dawn of modern consciousness.

The modern era is, at the same time, an "apocalyptic" one, inasmuch as it manifests God's "total presence," a total presence experienced in solitude, loss of individuality, the recovery of a thoroughly "archaic identity," and the realization of "purely immediate speech." Altizer understands modern "atheism" as the fulfillment of all Christian history. Modernity itself is the "total silence and emptiness of an original abyss" that has become "an immediately present chaos" where the "resurrected Christ" is "inseparable and indistinguishable from the crucified Christ" (1985, p. 254).

During the 1990s, Altizer's writings dwelt on the theme of apocalypse as a term "indistinguishable" from both crucifixion and creation. In *Genesis and Apocalypse* (1990), Altizer characterizes this moment as "an alien nothingness that is absolutely irreversible" (p. 178). In *The Genesis of God*, he describes apocalypse as "genesis," as an "absolutely new act," which is the "disappearance of the will of the Creator" and the full realization of freedom. Altizer, like the epic authors he repeatedly references, has sought to delineate a new modern mythology under the cover of

rewriting Christian theology. This mythology constitutes a "reversal" of the doctrine of incarnate *logos*, where flesh now becomes "word."

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Carl A. Raschke

AMES, EDWARD SCRIBNER (1870–1958)

Edward S. Ames was born in Eau Claire, Wisconsin, on 21 April 1870, and died in Chicago, Illinois, on 29 June 1958. He received degrees from Drake University (BA 1889, MA 1891), Yale Divinity School (BD 1892), and the University of Chicago (PhD in philosophy, 1895). A churchman philosopher, Ames was a participant in what William James called the “Chicago School of Philosophy,” which included pragmatists George Herbert Mead, Addison W. Moore, and John Dewey.

Ames chose Yale Divinity School’s Congregational traditionalism for his theological studies, rejecting Harvard because of its Unitarianism. Studying at either school was a dramatic departure for a Disciples of Christ Iowan, as East Coast intellectualism was considered foreign if not dangerous. At Yale, Ames was inspired by the writings of William James, Otto Pfleiderer, Immanuel

Kant, and Arthur Schopenhauer, and he began investigations into the religious dimensions of human psychology. In 1894 the founding president of the University of Chicago, William Rainey Harper, offered Ames a fellowship in philosophy. At Chicago, Ames had a religious awakening, a realization that the ideas of Alexander Campbell, imbibed as a youth, mirrored the compelling ideas of John Locke’s reasonable Christianity. It was then that Ames was able to identify the American philosophical lineage of liberalism that he sought to advance: “Locke’s ideas of democracy shaped the political ideas of Thomas Jefferson; his educational views were practiced by Horace Mann; and his religious ideas were basic in American Unitarianism.” Ames brought a pragmatic understanding of Christianity to his congregation and classroom, informed by his aesthetic Christian (often agnostic) understanding of the psychology of religion (1959, pp. 42–3).

Ames taught religion at the newly formed Disciples Divinity House at the University of Chicago from 1895 to 1897, at Butler College in Indiana from 1897 to 1900, and at the University of Chicago from 1900 to 1935. Ames was also the minister of the Hyde Park Church, Disciples of Christ, from 1900 to 1940. From 1903 to 1951, he was founder and editor of the theological journal of the Disciples movement, the *Scroll*. Ames also made his mark among fellow philosophers in developing the Disciples Divinity House at the University of Chicago, a non-degree-granting institution closely affiliated with the Divinity School, where liberal and philosophically minded ministers and scholars of the Disciples movement gathered to exchange ideas and fellowship.

In 1905 Ames taught the first course at the University of Chicago in the psychology of religion, as part of a psychology and education curriculum recently separated

from the philosophy department. For Ames, psychology offered to religion and the churches a way of understanding the human desire to associate, independent of any particular need to speculate theologically or to follow doctrines. “At the door of most churches one is met by required beliefs in a particular conception of God ... definite ideas concerning sin and salvation What people are really seeking is access to refreshing fountains of life, sources of strength and guidance” (1959, pp. 92–3). Studying religion (Protestant Christianity primarily) through the lens of early twentieth-century psychological analysis, Ames saw religious rituals and interpersonal relationships as superceding doctrine and orthodoxy for adherents.

As a preacher and poet, Ames understood God as a “great spirit of love and comfort ... great companion ... and giver of life.” As a philosopher, his description of God emphasized God as “the reality of a social process ... the order of nature” over against a “metaphysical being of the anthropomorphic type” (1929, pp. 176–8). Ames believed strongly in the effectiveness of institutions, religious and educational, to embody the reality of a lived theology or philosophy. The value of an institution to individuals and society was gauged by answering the question: “What is its value for the fullest life of mankind?” (1929, p. 266).

Ames proffered the idea that “religion” in 1929 lacked the “old smoothness and momentum” – largely due to scholars who were at that time unsatisfied with traditional interpretations of Christian theology and scripture. This ensuing crisis of authority provided, for Ames, an important occasion for understanding God not as person but as process. God was not a person or deity somewhere “out there,” but the word and concept individuals employed to describe their highest aspirations. For Ames, the real

meaning of “God” was in his stature as “that other and larger self in which each little self lives and moves and has its being” (1959, p. 93).

His responses to early twentieth-century crises of interpretation, authority, and the relationship of science and psychology to religion were in direct opposition to an amorphous but influential Christian neo-orthodoxy and its diverse proponents, such as Karl Barth and Reinhold Niebuhr. Neo-orthodoxy, proffered by “one-time partial ‘liberals,’” was for Ames a “half-hearted and inconsistent treatment of science and religion” in which one “reverts to acceptance of traditional conceptions of revelation and supernatural grace” despite higher criticism’s rejection of this “supernaturalistic theology [which] hangs only by slender threads” (1970, pp. 110–111). Ames also joined social gospel adherents in arguing that the “resurgence of the old theological tradition in Protestantism ha[d] tended to influence church people to feel that ... there is something secular and too humanistic in the social emphasis” (1959, p. 117). Ames’s dedication to the Christian church as a natural expression of the highest human aspirations (God) was central to his philosophical writings and teaching. His greatest influence was felt by those teachers and ministers who took from his philosophy a greater understanding of the psychological and literary dimensions of religious expression.

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Robert Wilson Black

AMES, VAN METER (1898–1985)

Van Meter Ames was born in De Soto, Iowa, on 9 July 1898 and died in Cincinnati, Ohio, on 5 November 1985. He was son of Edward Scribner Ames, minister of the University Church of Disciples of Christ, and dean of the Disciples Divinity House of Chicago. His father was also a member of the philosophy department at the University of Chicago with John Dewey, James Tufts, and George Mead. Van Meter Ames was a student at the University of Chicago, where he received a BA in philosophy in 1919 and a PhD in philosophy in 1924.

He joined the faculty of the philosophy department at the University of Cincinnati in 1925 and remained there until his retirement in 1966. From 1959 until 1966, he was chair of the department. He received a Rockefeller grant to study French philosophy in France in 1948–49. He became a fellow of the University of Chicago Graduate School in 1959. He was a Fulbright research professor in Japan, where he lectured at Komazawa, a Zen university in Tokyo, where he studied Zen in 1958–59. In 1976 the American Humanist Association designated him Humanist Fellow for Outstanding Contributions to Humanist Thought in Ethics and Aesthetics. He was elected President of the American Philosophical Association in 1959 and also served as President of the American Society of Aesthetics.

Ames's range of interests included aesthetics and history of aesthetics, ethics, American pragmatism, existentialism, literature, poetry, and Zen Buddhism. He wrote on a broad range of topics, such as the history of philosophy, the nature of art, the value of aesthetics, existentialism and the arts, literature, poetry, music, philosophy of religion, Eastern philosophy with an emphasis on Zen thought, George Santayana, John Dewey, Edmund Husserl, Thomas Mann, Marcel Proust, and Andre Gide.

Ames's aesthetics is characterized by the idea that the aesthetic experience is the pre-reflective contemplation of values for their own sake. In an aesthetic experience the flow of habitual activity is interrupted by a problematic situation. Art facilitates this experience by presenting the data for it – the problematic situation – in which these values are a part and so draws one's attention to them. The response is immediate, disinterested, and pre-reflective. Once reflection sets in, the aesthetic attitude has been interrupted. An aesthetic experience

is not an isolated experience, but can occur in any area of life.

In *The Aesthetics of the Novel* (1928), Ames explains that the novel offers the aesthetic experience by bringing forth the problematic situations out of which the values the reader contemplates in his or her pre-reflective state arise. The novel typically presents problematic situations characterized through the relation of the self to other selves and to society, “the social self.” The novelist’s role is to present the values of the social, not to solve them. Any attempt toward resolution requires reflection, which is outside of the aesthetic experience.

This aesthetic attitude is also explained and defended in such writings as *Proust and Santayana: The Aesthetic Way of Life* (1937). The articles contained in this book either discuss the aesthetic way of life or use Proust and Santayana as exemplifying the tradition that values the aesthetic way of life. The aesthetic way of life is defined as an attitude that values detached contemplation over action. Aesthetic insight, or experience, as the pre-reflective contemplation of values is important because it gives meaning to life and human existence.

Ames’s description of the aesthetic experience has affinities with his characterization of enlightenment in Zen thought. “[Enlightenment] is liberation from the uneasy sense of confinement to a little, limited self to be separate from other selves and from the rest of the world” (1962, p. 9). Both enlightenment and the aesthetic attitude bring humankind together through direct, immediate experience.

In *Zen and American Thought* (1962), Ames looks at Zen’s influence and compatibility with American values. The book traces the development of American thought from Thomas Jefferson through Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and Walt Whitman, to Charles Peirce, Josiah Royce,

Henry James, Santayana, Dewey, and finally Mead, always keeping in mind Zen teachings. Mead is the pivotal figure of the volume, because in his ideas Ames finds affinities with Zen, as well as recognizing the importance of Mead for current Western thought. A central notion in Ames’s writings on Zen is the “cleavage” of Western culture, which relates to the dualisms between humankind and the world, and Zen’s holistic approach. Zen is defined as an entirely naturalistic way of thinking that denies the dualisms associated with traditional western thought. Mead is also a naturalistic thinker in that he understands one’s personality and mentality belong to the same natural process of evolution as his body. Mead’s position, akin to Zen, heals the cleavage in Western culture by making humankind at home in Nature.

Ames was a holistic thinker, whose pragmatic yet spiritual attitude permeates every area of his thought. He believed in the unity and solidarity of the peoples of the East and West, as well as the idea that human beings must accept themselves as part of nature. Ames understood art to be fundamental and the aesthetic experience as invaluable. He insisted on the idea that aesthetics, science, and religion are inseparable, because they contain corresponding values. These values are spiritual and social. Understanding these disciplines and the values associated with them is constructive in that it will bring together the peoples of the East and West.

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Melanie McQuitty

APPIAH, KWAME ANTHONY (1954–)

Kwame Anthony Akroma-Ampim Kusi Appiah was born in London, England, on 8 May 1954. He was raised in Ghana. He attended Clare College, Cambridge University, receiving three degrees in philosophy: the BA in 1975, the MA in 1980, and the PhD in 1982. He taught

philosophy and Afro-American studies at Yale University from 1981 until 1986, when he went to Cornell University to join the philosophy faculty, receiving promotion to full professor by 1989. During 1990–91 he was a professor of philosophy and literature at Duke University. In 1991 he became professor of Afro-American studies and philosophy at Harvard University, and he received the title of Charles H. Carswell Professor of Afro-American Studies and of Philosophy in 1999. In 2002 he went to Princeton University to be Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Philosophy and the University Center for Human Values, holding that title until 2014. Since 2014 Appiah has been Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University.

Appiah has been very active in the American Philosophical Association, serving as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2007–08 and as chair of the Board of Officers from 2008 to 2011. In an interdisciplinary capacity, Appiah served on the boards of the American Academy in Berlin, the African Studies Association, and the American Academy of Religion. He also served as Chair of the Board of the American Council of Learned Societies during 2005–12. He was elected to membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1995.

Appiah is one of the most prolific and honored philosophers of African descent in American philosophical history, and now stands among the greatest living American philosophers at the beginning of the twenty-first century. He has authored numerous books in philosophy, three novels, and has edited twenty anthology projects, including the multi-tome *Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience* (2005) and *The Encyclopedia of Africa* (2010), both co-edited with Henry Louis Gates, Jr.

Given his international and multiethnic background, the question of cosmopolitanism has been a primary focus in Appiah's work. The cosmopolitan theme began in *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (1992). Perhaps his most controversial work, Appiah refutes efforts by African-American (and some African) writers to view Africa as a unifying cultural homeland. Relying on his own experiences living in Ghana, Appiah reminds readers that Africa does not have a unified identity, nor should it have such.

For Appiah, the hope for an African unifying culture is merely an internalization of white racist practices that sought to exploit black people in a unified way. It was racism that "unified" Africa and the Diaspora. Thinkers have fallen for such a racialized notion of Africa, including Pan-African and "Nativist" writers like W.E.B. Du Bois and Wole Soyinka. Appiah contends that there is no "voice of Africa" that connects the whole of Africa together. Attacking ethnocentric efforts to highlight African achievements, Appiah worries that such concerns are actually the result of a kind of inferiority complex brought about by colonialism and slavery. Such efforts actually grant too much influence to colonizers and slaveholders. The notion of a unified Africa is a new notion, inspired by a felt need for identity and recognition. This need, Appiah argues, is not *per se* an African one.

In order to correct this erroneous internalization of white supremacy, Appiah adopts racial anti-realism, the claim that there is no such thing as races. Of course, there will still be talk of "race," but such talk does not refer to what speakers usually claim the term means, viz. a biological classification. In *Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race* (1996), Appiah offers a descriptive history of racism that shows the origin and development of the concept of race,

highlighting the political and biological claims made about black people (by white people). "Race" became the concept used to justify the desire to exclude black people from the greater Enlightenment project. It was never about realities; it was a political convenience that is definitely no longer needed by anyone.

In lieu of "races" qua biological types, Appiah presents a case for racial identities. These identities, insofar as a group of people may wish to describe shared social values and practices, do exist; however, such identities are cultural expressions of a given group, not intrinsic characteristics of those who claim to be members of that group. Race has always been socio-cultural, a way of unifying a group under some cause. For Appiah, race is at most a way to express communal identity and to classify certain practices and traditions (such as gospel music, jazz, and hip-hop). Yet these racial classifications only make sense in light of the broader, multicultural cosmopolitan world in which individuals find themselves. In this sense, identity does not strictly come "from within" but rather appears in concert with other (sometimes opposing) cultural identifications. To understand the greater field of interaction in which multiple identities interact (recalling that one individual may be part of multiple, at times conflicting, identities), one has to move beyond identity *simpliciter* and turn instead to cosmopolitanism. It is from the viewpoint of the cosmopolis that one can discuss identity in a non-essentializing way. By seeing identities as "merely" identities, one is free to adopt multiple identities and create possibilities for solidarity across different identity groups.

The Ethics of Identity (2005) further develops this recommendation. The problem with identities is that they can become too strong and bind people's actions and interactions to "being identified as an

X” (where X is some identity group) in stereotypical ways. At the heart of thick identification is the desire to be recognized as an X and granted freedoms against those who attack the legitimacy of X’s place in society. Appiah refers to identity formation as a kind of “soul making” in which individuals establish how they are to be recognized in a society. This process of soul making establishes political agency and facilitates in the transmission of cultural elements across generations. It is important to note that Appiah is not against soul making as such; rather, he seeks to place soul making into the broader cosmopolitan context.

Cosmopolitanism, Appiah claims, is a way to keep soul making in check. Cosmopolitanism resists thick, stereotypical notions of identity, which allows one to do one’s own soul making in light of the plurality of identity options available in a multicultural world. In the “world village” (an oxymoronic term used by Appiah) one encounters a multitude of identities, all of which are open to everyone in such a village. Appiah rejects notions of cosmopolitanism that seek to create concrete, world-wide political structures. Cosmopolitanism is a conceptual check on our own myopic creation of identities. Cosmopolitanism celebrates cultural differences instead of less interesting (and often biological) notions of human commonality. In a world in which different identities can interact with each other, one will become freed from what Appiah calls a lack of imagination about the ways in which we can be in solidarity with others, even when the particularities of our cultures do not share common elements. No culture need give up their own forms of soul making. However, one must be willing to acknowledge that soul making is never an insular (or insulated) activity. Soul making is always in the context of the greater world of human activity.

Such a notion of cosmopolitanism, of course, has ethical implications. In *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (2006), Appiah lays out cosmopolitanism’s ethical dimension. Differentiating cosmopolitanism from globalization (which often seeks to make different groups into one homogeneous world society), Appiah describes cosmopolitanism as a way to explain our moral obligations to people with whom we seem to have little in common. Instead of recognition models for ethics, which require one to be able to express the commonality one has with the other, cosmopolitanism grants that there is a plurality of ways of being human, all of which are in themselves dignified. Appiah notes that cosmopolitanism is basic, and too much effort has been wasted on trying to prevent it instead of trying to bring it about (e.g. racism, sexism, heterosexism, which try to prevent cosmopolitanism, take more effort than cosmopolitanism does).

At the heart of cosmopolitanism is a pluralism about humanity. There are many ways to be a human being, and everyone has the basic right to form themselves into whomever one wishes. Identities help with that formation, but they must always give way to the fact that everyone else is also forming themselves into human beings. Thus, the question at hand is immanently ethical, both at the level of self-formation but also at the level of human interaction and politics. Such an ethical position will lead us away from defensive identity politics and towards the creation of a “community of strangers.”

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Brad Elliott Stone

ARENDT, HANNAH (1906–1975)

Hannah Arendt was born on 14 October 1906 in Hanover, Germany. Arendt graduated from high school in 1924 and that fall, Arendt began to study theology with Rudolf Bultmann at the University of Marburg. Also on the faculty was the young philosopher Martin Heidegger, whose lectures, which would form the basis of his 1927 book *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*) were already stirring interest in *Existenzphilosophie*. She went on to study at the University of Heidelberg with the philosopher Karl Jaspers. Arendt wrote her dissertation under Jaspers on the concept of love in St. Augustine’s thought. She earned her PhD from Heidelberg in 1929, and her dissertation on “Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin” was published that same year.

As the Nazi party rose to power, Arendt became increasingly involved in Jewish and Zionist politics. Beginning in 1933, Arendt worked with the German Zionist Organization and its leader, Kurt Blumenfeld, to publicize the growing Nazi atrocities. She was eventually arrested by the Gestapo but she escaped to Paris. From 1935 to 1939 she worked as Secretary General for Youth Aliyah, a Jewish Agency for Palestine in Paris,

France, and from 1938 to 1939 she worked as a special agent for rescue of Jewish children from Austria and Czechoslovakia.

When Germany invaded France, Arendt was separated from her husband and sent to an internment camp in Gurs in southern France. She escaped and was able to emigrate with her husband and mother to the United States in 1941. Settling in New York City, Arendt worked as a journalist from 1941 to 1945, writing for *Jewish Social Studies*, *Jewish Frontier*, and *Aufbau*, a German language newspaper. She directed research for the Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction from 1944 to 1946, attempting to locate and redistribute the remains of Judaic artifacts and other treasures that had miraculously been salvaged from the ruins of the Third Reich.

In 1944, Arendt began work on what would become her first major political book, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951). She published “What Is Existenz Philosophy?” in 1946. From 1946 to 1948 Arendt was chief editor of Schocken Books in New York. From 1949 to 1952 she was the Executive Director for Jewish Cultural Reconstruction.

In 1951, Arendt began the first in a sequence of visiting fellowships and professorial positions at American universities. She became an American citizen and was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1952. In 1953 Arendt delivered the Christian Gauss Lectures at Princeton University, and in 1954 she received a grant from the National Institute of Arts and Letters. She was a visiting professor at several universities: University of California at Berkeley in 1955; Princeton University in 1959 (becoming the first woman to be full professor at Princeton); Columbia University in 1960; and Northwestern University in 1961. From 1961 to 1962 Arendt was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies at Wesleyan University

in Connecticut. From 1963 to 1967 Arendt was a professor on the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, and then from 1967 to 1975 she was University Professor of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research. From 1969 to 1975 she was also an associate fellow of Calhoun College of Yale University. In 1967, she received the Sigmund Freud Prize of the German Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung. She was awarded the Emerson-Thoreau Medal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1969. In 1973–74 she delivered the Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen in Scotland. Arendt was awarded the 1975 Sonning Prize by the Danish government for Contributions to European Civilization, which no American and no woman before her had received. Arendt died on 4 December 1975 in New York City.

Arendt was one of the America’s most prominent intellectuals. She is best known for *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), published at the beginning of the Cold War. Examining the idiosyncratic twentieth-century tyrannies of Hitler and Stalin, Arendt argued that their origins lay in imperialism’s racist ideologies already flourishing in Central and Western European by the end of the nineteenth century. The final section of her book detailed the workings of “radical evil,” arguing that the huge number of prisoners in the death camps marked “a horrifying discontinuity in European history itself.”

In 1958, she published *The Human Condition* and in 1959 she published “Reflections on Little Rock,” a controversial consideration of the emergent Black civil rights movement. In 1961, *Between Past and Future* was published and Arendt traveled to Jerusalem to cover the trial of Nazi Adolf Eichmann for the *New Yorker*. She later published her reflections on the Eichmann trial in 1963, first in the *New Yorker*, and then as a

book *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. Eichmann, a S.S. lieutenant colonel responsible for orchestrating the transportation of millions of Jews to death camps, was captured by Israeli forces in 1960. Rather than painting a conventional portrait of Eichmann as the embodiment of “radical evil,” Arendt saw him as a “typical” bureaucrat who had dutifully followed orders and was the embodiment of “the banality of evil.” Arendt’s broader point was that this type of evil was not necessarily confined to the particularities of the Third Reich, but could be found in many societies.

Her articles in the *New York Review of Books* in the 1960s and early 1970s continued to express her reservations about the new world order by criticizing growing American military intervention in Vietnam. In particular, she singled out the increasing abuses of executive power as further indication of the growing and dangerous imperialism of the presidency.

In 1970, Arendt gave her seminar on Kant’s philosophy of judgment at the New School for Social Research, published posthumously as *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy* in 1982. In her final years, she worked on her projected three-volume work, *The Life of the Mind*. The first two volumes on “Thinking” and “Willing” were published posthumously, while the third volume on “Judging” went uncompleted at her death.

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Jean Van Delinder

ARMOUR, LESLIE (1931–2014)

Leslie Armour was born on 9 March 1931 in New Westminster, British Columbia, Canada. He received his BA from the University of British Columbia in 1952, and his PhD in philosophy from the University of London in 1956. During this time he also worked as a journalist for provincial and city newspapers in both countries. Armour's teaching career began at the University of Montana, from 1957 to 1961. He then taught philosophy at California State University at Northridge in 1961–62; the University of Waterloo from 1962 to 1971; Cleveland State University from 1971 to 1977, where he also served as Dean of Arts; and finally the University of Ottawa in Canada from 1977 to 1996. After retiring from Ottawa he became a

research professor at the Dominican College of Philosophy and Theology in Ottawa, occasionally offering courses and continuing his research. Professor Armour became a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada in 1998. Armour died on 1 November 2014 in Ottawa, Canada.

Armour was primarily a metaphysician. His early books, *The Rational and The Real* (1962), *The Concept of Truth* (1969), *Logic and Reality* (1972) were influenced by nineteenth and twentieth century idealism. However, his work also shows a determination to not imitate the models of the British Neo-Hegelians, but instead to develop a consciousness-based metaphysics on his own terms. Armour defends reason as the tool we have for systematizing multiple sensations and reflections which are understood to be so through our use of language. Experience is the result of our capacity to select and express our own particular responses against a background of innumerable possible experiences and responses. The self is a "tendency to actualize possibility. ... The explanation of its activity is ultimately logical and there is no duality between it and the world which it 'experiences' since it, too, would be nothing were it not for the experiences which it has. Neither is intelligible without the other." (1962, p. 36)

Armour's focus on multiple possibilities and the need to recognize patterns in and through change, led him to discuss truth as answers that accord with systems of thought that have been established. Truth as a measure of perfection, an absolute, is an idea that fails to recognize the multiplicity of perspectives with which one can interpret experiences. Truth is better understood as the success with which one can judge what data is relevant and therefore will become the bases of available resources to answer one's questions. Armour worked out the conditions for the possibility

of truth claims in *Logic and Reality*. Such conditions were not timeless and universal. His dialectical logic emphasized the need to grasp multiple schemes and frames of reference. Appealing to the law of non-contradiction, a favorite move on the part of logicians, only works in a world where rules and symbols can be separated from experience. Such an appeal does not help us to understand the experienced world that we struggle to express in language.

Armour became interested in his Canadian roots and this led to the publication (with his former doctoral student Elizabeth Trott) of *The Faces of Reason: An Essay on Philosophy and Culture in English Speaking Canada, 1850–1950*, in 1981. This work, which surveys the major philosophers in English-speaking Canada, stands as the definitive resource in the history of Canadian philosophy.

In 1992 Armour published *Being and Idea: Developments of Some Themes in Spinoza and Hegel*, and in 1993 he published *Infini Rien: Pascal's Wager and the Human Paradox*. *Being and Idea* explored the relation between G.W.F. Hegel and Baruch Spinoza. Hegel found the monism of Spinoza suspect, but Hegel also left unsolved problems. Armour extends the idealist metaphysics beyond its subjective ground by seeking the logical properties any possible world requires.

Armour's book on Pascal explores the origins of the "wager," the seemingly incommensurable standoff between the neo-Platonists and seventeenth century skeptics over the rational grounds for accepting God as a presence in our lives. Armour argues that Pascal's mission was not to set up the "gamble" but to illustrate with the most prominent issue of the day that what it meant to be human was to face our own limitations. There will be questions that we cannot answer, but in conceiving of there being answers to them we are conceiving of

all possible answers, and God, as the source of those answers, is a good bet.

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Elizabeth Trott

ARNHEIM, RUDOLF (1904–2007)

Rudolf Arnheim was born on 15 July 1904 in Berlin, Germany. At the University of Berlin he studied experimental psychology, philosophy, and the history of art and music. While Arnheim attended the lectures on aesthetics of Max Dessoir in Berlin, he was drawn to the newest results of Gestalt psychology and worked closely with Wolfgang Köhler and Max Wertheimer, the latter being the director of his dissertation (PhD 1928) on the expressiveness of visual form. In spite of his experimental work, Arnheim became a journalist and probably would not have entered academia save for his emigration to Italy in 1933 and then the United States in 1940. In 1943 he became a professor of psychology at Sarah Lawrence College and also taught on the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research until 1968. He then went to Harvard University as a professor of the psychology of art. Arnheim served twice as the President of the American Society of Aesthetics (1959–1960, 1979–1980). He retired in 1974 and moved to Ann Arbor, Michigan, where he was visiting professor in the history of art department at the University of Michigan. Arnheim died in Ann Arbor on 9 June 2007.

Arnheim was an orthodox adherent to Gestalt psychology his entire life and never strayed from its principles and promise. What attracted him was the expectation of a naturalistic scientific theory that could do justice to human values. The image of humanity, demonstrated first by perceptual experiments and then more tangibly in social psychology, suggested that individuals naturally search after meaning, truth and understanding. People perceive meaningful, value-filled whole entities, called *gestalten*. These make up the basis of experience and scientific psychology ought not to distort this fact. But more than a phenomenological

revision of psychology, the naturalism of Gestalt theory stated that the world itself was formed by the action of structural physical laws that aided the human's interaction with that world. The meeting ground was in the perceiver's brain, where holistic physical principles guided the isomorphic formation of perceptual states. It was an updated Spinozistic view of the world.

The experiments of Wertheimer, Köhler and Kurt Koffka – the three founders of Gestalt psychology – understood perception upon a field metaphor. The percept is formed by the mutual interaction throughout the field. Thus Gestalt psychology was inherently anti-sensationalist. The doctrine of sense data was never accepted and instead a search was made for an explanation of perceived forms. Arnheim's dissertation extended this analysis into the realm of expressive form. Expression was demonstrated to be radically context dependent, as different forms were embedded in different contexts (a nose on a head, for example) and took on new expressive qualities. This did not discount the inter-subjective reality of expression, but instead outlined in a scientific way how it lawfully arose.

Arnheim's aesthetics was born of a critical attitude that presumed that the aesthetician can only rely so much on analysis or introspection. Two important papers introduced Arnheim's emerging position against the background of mid-century behaviorism, "Perceptual Abstraction in Art" (1947) and "A Gestalt Theory of Expression" (1949), both collected in *Toward a Psychology of Art* (1966). The first dealt with an imputation of cognitive abstraction to perception, a now familiar theme, and the second sought a naturalistic explanation of visual expression through the stresses and strains in the optical medium in the act of perceiving. After World War II Arnheim produced his classic text, *Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the*

Creative Eye (1954). He enunciated a more general psychology of the visual arts, bolstered by the hopeful results of Köhler's latest brain research. Arnheim outlined many different themes in this central book of his, and they may be broken down into a few elementary problems: (1) a critical realist approach to epistemology; (2) belief in the abstracting ability of the senses; and (3) a naturalistic explanation of pictorial expression.

Arnheim balanced the causal foundation of perception in brain processes against the incorrigibility of the senses in the delicate balancing act that is common to gestalt theory. This form of critical realism is partly perplexing but was regarded as the necessary concession to the facts of phenomenal reality and their genetic source in brain processes. Visual forms are created by the field-like action of the visual system to produce the simplest visual percept. This had far-reaching consequences for interpretation because these images – representing stable poles of brain activity that could subsume a large number of similar stimulus situations – preserved generality. The ability to subsume particulars under generalities blurs the distinction between seeing and knowing. We perceive what is necessary to survive. There is no problem of solipsism due to the economy of the senses, as there is in other theories, because the world also operates on economic processes. Thus, the world breaks off into holistic forms and it should be no surprise that our percepts register these forms. Art, for that matter, ought to deal in essentials, and so Arnheim removed art's reliance on figures. Just as there is no separation between seeing and knowing, forms can convey the basics of expression without the particulars. Arnheim ingeniously saw expression as the other side of the coin of the economy of perceiving. In settling on a stable percept, certain strains and stresses would arise in the discrepancy

between the most economical outcome and the stimulus input, and these strains would be the cause of the perceived tension that would ultimately give rise to the expressive content of the percept. Arnheim's solution remains as controversial as the brain doctrine upon which it is based, but it represented the hope of a naturalistic bridge between ordinary perceiving and the rise of expression.

Arnheim's ideas turned in a new direction around the time that he took his new position at Harvard. If the senses were intelligent in the sense that elementary acts of perceiving contained abstraction, this was a quality inherent to every act of perception. Seeking to represent the dynamic movement of thought in individual creative acts, however, Arnheim sharpened earlier insights (including Wertheimer's own) into the imaginistic elements of productive thinking, and specified the contribution made by vision. These insights began in an early attempt to rehabilitate mental images into psychological study and then Arnheim's next major work, *Visual Thinking* (1969). Arnheim's basic thesis was that spatial relations are the true language of thought. This was not only a psychological point; in rehabilitating vision, art is placed at the center of cognitive activity as one of the most distinguished examples of thought. The mind, Arnheim reasoned, needs sensuous images in order to make productive strides. To understand a logical rule such as "if all A are contained in B, and if C is contained in A, then C must also be contained in B," we effect a perceptual judgment based on a spatial reconstruction of inclusion. Arnheim even attempted to reconceptualize the very meaning of symbolism based on abstraction. A sign is an image "which stands for a particular content without reflecting its characteristics visually" (1969, p. 136); images are pictures "to the extent to which they portray things located at a lower level of abstractness than

they are themselves” (1969, p. 137); and a symbol “portrays things which are at a higher level of abstractness than is the symbol itself” (1969, p. 138).

His last great work was *The Power of the Center: A Study in Artistic Composition* (1982). All works of art, whether representational or not, could be reduced to systems of centers of expanding vectors. The milling centers of a work of art, in addition, always have a balancing center that gives the work legibility and finality, hence the “power of the center.” Arnheim’s reasoning updated the tendency of Gestalt theorists to work from field metaphors. Vectors, force, and so forth bring to mind the metaphysical monism of Gestaltism and the hope to link all phenomena together under common underlying principles. The relationships between the vertical and centric qualities, their varying emphases, explain the mode of existence the artist is trying to communicate. Arnheim called art “the ability of perceptual objects or actions, either natural or man-made, to represent, through their appearance, constellations of forces that reflect relevant aspects of the dynamics of human experience” (1988, p. 225).

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Ian Verstegen

AUDI, ROBERT NEMIR (1941)

Robert Audi was born on 19 November 1941 in New York City. He earned his BA in 1963 from Colgate University. He then earned his PhD in 1967 from the University of Michigan under the direction of William P. Alston. From 1967 to 1972 he taught philosophy at the University of Texas. For the next thirty years, from 1973 to 2003, he taught at the University of Nebraska, where he rose from full professor in 1976, Charles J. Mach Distinguished Professor of Philosophy in 1996, and Charles J. Mach University Professor in 2001. Audi joined the faculty of the University of Notre Dame in 2003 as Professor of Philosophy and David E. Gallo Professor of Business Ethics. He presently is John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy. In 1987–88, he served as President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division.

Audi is a leading figure in contemporary epistemology, a major contributor to action theory and political philosophy, and probably the leading ethical intuitionist since W.D. Ross. Perhaps Audi's most important work to date is *The Architecture of Reason* (2001). This brings together his already influential, central work in epistemology, ethics, and action theory to form a unified theory of rationality. He articulates the account by systematically developing parallels between theoretical and practical reason. Although neither sort of reason reduces to the other, they are informatively analogous. Structurally, both have foundations and superstructures. Both are ultimately responsive, and responsible, to experience. At the foundational level the former are capable of evaluations according to their cognitive, the latter according to their conative (understood largely in terms of felt reward and punishment), adequacy to the experiences which causally engender and evidentially ground them. At the inferential

level, or, within the superstructures, further analogies between inferential beliefs and intentional actions emerge. Both are grounded in the reasons that sustain them. Rational belief is the "connective tissue" that produces ordered relations between theoretical and practical reason. Reason, then, is no "slave of the passions," as in Humean instrumentalist accounts. The result of successful theoretical reasoning is, like a good map, "true to the territory it represents;" and the result of successful practical reasoning will, like a good itinerary, deliver the rewarding experiences it promises. Global rationality combines mutually interdependent successes of both kinds.

Audi's theory has important normative implications. For instance, it entails that, given certain normal beliefs and desires, altruistic acts are sometimes reasonably, although not rationally, required. He distinguishes many varieties of relativism, and argues that, while his theory is compatible with a wide variety of circumstantially and temperamentally variable ends, it does not entail any strong sort of epistemic or ethical relativism.

Audi's considerable contributions to epistemology, which inform his account of theoretical reason, are most comprehensively articulated and defended in *The Structure of Justification* (1993). Audi develops and defends a moderate foundationalist account of epistemic justification, which concedes the fallibility and defeasibility of justified beliefs at even the foundational level, and affords a strong (but dependent) epistemic significance to coherence. Of particular importance are the distinctions which lead to his highly original accounts of how coherence can affect justification at all levels within a foundationalist structure and how knowledge can have both internalist and externalist features. He is also well

known in epistemology for his work on self-evidence and the a priori (he defends a moderate rationalism), sense perception (he defends an adverbial account), testimony, the concept of belief, naturalism, and skepticism.

Audi is a leading moral epistemologist. His moral epistemology combines a neo-Rossian intuitionism with many of the most important epistemic features of moral epistemic “reflectionism.” This moral epistemology is the view that (a) one’s moral beliefs become more justified as one approaches reflective equilibrium, a state of coherence among one’s moral beliefs at all levels of generality, and (b) justification at no level of generality is privileged in such a way as to automatically trump justification at other levels. Audi’s moral epistemology, and his other major contributions to ethical theory, is in his *Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character* (1997) and *The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value* (2004), which contain his developed accounts of his intuitionism, and provide a sophisticated history and critical taxonomy of intuitionisms. It introduces an original neo-Kantian normative theory which, despite its Kantian leanings, allows significant relevance to the optimization of reward-realization, and an even more significant place to virtue, as regards moral responsibility and goodness.

Audi’s work in action theory, in *Action, Intention, and Reason* (1993) and *The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality* (2001), develops interdependent accounts of wanting and believing. Wanting and believing, on his view, are two of the most important concepts in action theory. His account of wanting, in particular, is informed by his “nomic and qualifiedly causal” view of the explanation of action. The connection between intending

and acting is explainable by appeal to laws – although neither a priori nor scientific laws, but rather laws of ordinary rationality – and the connection is, in a non-trivial way, causally grounded in what explains it. On this basis he develops an account of responsibility for action which is compatible with metaphysical determinism, and he begins to develop the pluralistic, objectivist account of rational action that achieves fruition in his more recent work on the theory of rationality.

Perhaps Audi’s three most distinctive contributions to the philosophy of mind are his accounts of the causal power of intentional states, the concept of believing, and mental images as properties. The first two of these are especially seminal in his work in epistemology, ethics, and action theory. In the course of defending the causal power of intentional states, he importantly distinguishes between “reasons as abstract contents” and “reason states,” and between “sustaining” and “dynamic” causal relations. In explicating belief, he introduces an influential distinction between dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe.

In *Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate* (1997), he develops and defends a view according to which someone motivated by religious reasons to advocate a coercive public policy can justifiably do so only if he also has adequate secular reasons. Audi’s further contributions to the philosophy of religion in *Rationality and Religious Commitment* (2011) and *Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State* (2011) are informed by his work in the theory of rationality. Especially influential among these are his religious epistemology, particularly his account of rational faith and his work on the permissibility of religious reasons in political and legal contexts.

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Peter Tramel

AYRES, CLARENCE EDWIN (1891–1972)

Clarence E. Ayres was born on 6 May 1891 in Lowell, Massachusetts. After graduation from Brown University with his BA in 1912, he began graduate work at Harvard, but soon returned to Brown where he completed his MA in economics in 1914. He then went to the University of Chicago to study philosophy and was awarded the PhD in 1917. He taught philosophy at the University of Chicago from 1917 to 1920, before becoming associate professor of economics at Amherst College in 1920. In 1923 Ayres, along with many other faculty, resigned from Amherst to protest the dismissal of President Alexander Meiklejohn. Ayres taught economics at Reed College in 1923–24, and then was an associate editor and author of many articles for the *New Republic* from 1924 to 1927. During the 1920s, Ayres became increasingly interested in the American institutional economists, especially Thorstein Veblen, and in John Dewey's philosophy of instrumentalism. In 1930 Ayres became a professor of economics at the University of Texas. He remained for the rest of his career, except for occasional leaves for service in government, including terms as a governor of the Federal Reserve Board during the 1960s. Ayres also served on the national committee of the American Civil

Liberties Union for twenty years. He retired from Texas in 1968. Ayres died on 24 July 1972 in Alamogordo, New Mexico.

During his nearly forty years at Texas, Ayres established the Texas School of institutional economics, which continues to remind economists of the importance of economic philosophy. His life's work became the integration of institutional economics and instrumental reasoning. Ayres's most influential work is *Theory of Economic Progress* (1962) in which he criticized the ethnocentric commercial economic view of conventional economics, articulated an alternative view of economics, and sketched a program for institutional adjustment to sustain economic progress. He defined progress in terms of finding how to do more and better things. He insisted that progress thus defined is irresistible and everywhere at war with the status preoccupations and habitual sensibilities of propriety. Progress occurs through new combinations of previously unrelated technical artifacts or ideas that bear fruit in their admixture. This includes not only accretion of technical materials or tools but more fundamentally the spread of knowledge about material process. Hence Ayres stressed widening participation as the key to progress. The more people who have the capacity and opportunity to engage in the material process of inquiry and development, the greater the pool from whence new combinations emerge. There is no trade-off between equality and efficiency or growth in a real dynamic economy.

Ayres sketched a strategy for progress to guide the democratic industrial society in taking advantage of the opportunity presented in the immediate period after World War II. The strategy consisted of intensive and extensive development of the New Deal program. Domestically the principles of balancing income flows and revamping the success criteria of corporate America

were to be deepened to secure universal participation in socially responsible prosperity. Internationally, Ayres called for application of these principles in a World New Deal intended to promote global economic progress and head off the abysmal deprivation that foments disorder and military conflict. Ayres thought that social scientists and philosophers had an ideological responsibility to advocate such bold new departures that would make possible the transition from the Welfare Society to the Creative Society.

Ayres's most philosophical book was *Toward a Reasonable Society* (1961), in which he elaborated his blending of the two most important influences on his economic philosophy. He considered the Veblenian dichotomy between knowledge, skill, and tools on the one hand and the socially structured personal relations, custom, and sentiments on the other, to be Veblen's principal legacy. Veblen's dichotomy contrasts the invidious and the non-invidious interest. The non-invidious interest refers to the common good of all humanity. To establish that a given use of resources is non-invidious is to establish its service to enhancing human life on the whole. This direct contribution to the fullness of human life on the whole is drawn in contrast to the indirect or secondary utility of goods that derives from competitive emulation and the desire to make an invidious comparison. The invidious interest resides in the individual's desire to make a comparison of relative rank and status to his or her neighbors. Veblenian waste is the expenditure of a scarce resource to satisfy the desire for invidious comparison.

Much of Ayres's work was dedicated to articulation of this dichotomy by weaving into the institutionalist paradigm the instrumental reasoning of Dewey. For Ayres, instrumental reasoning revealed that there are a handful of basic values – freedom, abundance, equality, excellence, and security – that are more or

less universally held in otherwise very diverse human societies. So also is democracy, the process of collective governance that serves to advance these basic values, revealed to be a universal aspiration. But following Dewey, Ayres conceived democracy differently from the mechanical conception of majority rule. Democracy is not simply or even most importantly voting to monitor preferences and resolve preference conflicts. Democracy is most importantly a process in which preferences are reformed with the enhanced enlightenment that comes from the process of inquiry and reasoned discourse. In effect, this view of the democratic process implies the merger of the social scientist and social reformer.

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B

BAIER, ANNETTE CLAIRE (1929–2012)

Born Annette Claire Stoop on 11 October 1929 in Queenstown, New Zealand, she received her BA (1951) and MA (1952) degrees in philosophy at the University of Otago, and her BPhil (1954) at Somerville College, Oxford. In her preface to *Moral Prejudices*, she acknowledges the importance of her interaction in the all-female academic community of Somerville, where she studied with Philippa Foot and Elizabeth Anscombe. Baier has taught at the universities of Aberdeen, Auckland, Sydney, and Carnegie-Mellon. In 1973 she joined the philosophy department at the University of Pittsburgh where she held the position of Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy until her retirement in 1995. Baier served as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1990–1991. She was married to philosopher Kurt Baier. She died on 2 November 2012 in Dunedin, New Zealand.

Baier was chiefly known for her innovative scholarship on Hume and her contributions to ethics inspired both by her interests in Hume and also, crucially, by her feminism. Even her early essays in philosophy of mind, collected in *Postures of the Mind* (1985), demonstrate her naturalist interpretations of mental phenomena, where naturalism for her necessarily includes an emphasis on social, cultural, historical circumstances as well as biological and physical structures and environments. Instead of viewing the

mind as the logical representer, or mirror, of the world, she presents minds as formed by culture as well as by nature. Her discussions of memory, intention, and action, for example, locate mind in interactions with others, the world and human conventions, thus insisting on the social nature of the normative practices involved. “To be a thinker at all,” she insists, “is to be responsive to criticism, a participant in a practice of mutual criticism and affirmation....” (1985, p. 70). A thinker is essentially a member of a community.

Although Descartes himself may have missed or at least obscured the point, Baier – along with Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, and others – insists that self-consciousness requires cultural skills, in particular linguistic ones, that we acquire during our extended dependency on other persons. “A person, perhaps, is best seen as one who was long enough dependent upon other persons to acquire the essential arts of personhood. Persons essentially are *second* persons, who grow up with other persons” (1985, p. 84). The importance of childhood for a philosophical conception of persons and minds is a point most philosophers ignore but one Baier makes central in her own philosophical development. Indeed, the developmental story becomes a main feature in all her accounts of minds and morals, including her Carus Lectures, published as *The Commons of the Mind* in 1997. “Gods,” she quips, “if denied childhood, cannot be persons” (1985, p. 85).

Baier’s influential scholarship on Hume is presented both in her 1991 book *A Progress of*

Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's "Treatise" as well as in her later essays connecting Hume with feminist ethics. Baier insisted on reading Hume's epistemology in Book One of *The Treatise* as serving his account of the passions and action in Books Two and Three. Baier reads the *Treatise* as a dramatic work whose moods and turns demand careful attention. She focuses especially on the conclusion of Book One, which she reads as Hume's "*reductio ad absurdum* of Cartesian intellect" and his turn to a new kind of philosophy, a more passionate and social successor to the gloom of the metaphysical skeptic (1991, p. 21). Thus, rather than the strictly epistemological problems elaborated in his famous skeptical analyses of causation, necessity, and personal identity, Hume's main philosophical concerns, on Baier's reading, are practical, social ones.

In her collection of essays on ethics entitled *Moral Prejudices*, she names Hume "the women's moral theorist" and "the women's epistemologist." According to her, Hume transforms the concept of reason not merely in his skeptical questioning of the meaning of metaphysical contentions, but much more importantly in showing us our reasoning capacity as a natural and practical one, essentially shared and developed in language, gesture, and sentiments shaped by intellectual, moral, and aesthetic norms. Her naturalist view of persons takes our biological nature seriously, but includes its playful as well as vulnerable character, conditioned by interdependencies, and marked by cooperation as well as conflict. "[F]antasies of freedom from our own actual history, actual dependency, actual mortality, actual biological limitations, and determinate possibilities, have on the whole been male fantasies," she claims, "and many women philosophers have found them strange" (1995, p. 323).

Harvard psychologist Carol Gilligan explores the influence for ethics of such male

fantasies in her 1982 book *In a Different Voice*. Gilligan's work profoundly influenced Baier, prompting her to ask "What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?" (1995, pp. 1–17). Objecting to obligation as the key concept of morality, Baier, with Gilligan and other feminist ethicists, shifts the focus away from legalistic, contractarian, individualistic theories of justice to an ethics of love, care, and mutual responsibilities. For Baier, the liberal views of persons and rights, underlying Kantian and contractarian ethics – notably John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* – cannot account for how real people begin as infants and *learn how* to keep promises, make contracts, respect persons, and property. Her notion of "second persons" figures even more prominently in moral contexts. As she repeatedly insists, infants need to be cared for in loving relationships so that they have even the possibility of growing up to be competent moral agents. But precisely their dependencies, vulnerabilities, and developmental potentialities show that individualistic theories of autonomous moral agents belong among those fantasies she tries to expose. Baier's feminism focuses her discussions of morality precisely on issues of vulnerability, development, cooperation, connection – familial and social relationships and responsibilities frequently not chosen at all but not on that account less meaningful from a moral perspective.

Baier's most famous contribution to ethics is her sustained discussion of trust as an important, pervasive but philosophically ignored feature of morality and human life. Supplementing theories of both obligation and care, the concept of appropriate trust also mediates between reason and feeling, "those tired old candidates for moral authority": for her, trust is neither a simple belief nor a simple feeling but, rather, an attitude informed by beliefs and influencing actions (1995, p. 10).

She defines the attitude of trust as “accepted vulnerability to another person’s power over something one cares about, in the confidence that such power will not be used to harm what is entrusted” (1995, p. 341). Trust thus entails risk as well as connection. While it can be rational to trust someone in specific circumstances, trust also presupposes limited control and limited knowledge of all the specifications in the relationship. According to her account, therefore, an omniscient and omnipotent God would be, paradoxically, unable to trust (1995, p. 187).

While Baier’s paradigm of a trusting relationship is the child-parent relationship, obviously not all relations of trust are morally justifiable. She is well aware of the power differentials operative in trust relations, and pays considerable attention to issues about the appropriateness of trust and trustworthiness, and ways of sustaining and enhancing them among the vulnerable. However, a perfectly clear, consistent test for adequate trust, or, more generally, a systematic moral theory with trust as its fundamental principle, is not her goal. She does not think that morality can be presented as a systematic theory; nor does she believe that morality needs first principles. For her it is only a dogma, one of those many moral prejudices she tries to unmask, to suppose moralities should imitate legal systems (1995, p. 214). Discretion, judgment, experience – these are necessary for sustaining trust or escaping from relationships of misplaced trust, but for her these sorts of practical judgments cannot be formulated into rules or principles.

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Jocelyn Hoy

BAIER, KURT ERICH MARIA (1917–2010)

Kurt Baier was born on 26 January 1917 in Vienna, Austria. He received his BA in 1944 from the University of Melbourne and his PhD in 1952 from Oxford University. Early in his career he taught at both the University of Melbourne and Canberra University. He emigrated to America in 1962 to become professor and later chairman of the department of philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. He was elected President of the Australian Association of Philosophy, President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (1977–78), and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Baier retired in 1995 and he died on 23 October 2010 in Dunedin, New Zealand.

In his early work *The Moral Point of View* (1958) Baier tried to sort out the various ways in which facts contribute to making moral choices. He examines the relationship between self-interest and what he calls “the moral point of view,” offering an interesting, albeit qualified, defense of self-interest which will be discussed below. He argues that a valid moral position would consider social as well

as individual facts, including special moral obligations, emotional ties to others, and one that would benefit society – drawing support from Thomas Hobbes.

For Baier, there are two aspects of the way we approach a moral problem. We obtain an overview of the facts, and then determine how much weight to give to each fact. But there is no guarantee that fallible human beings will do these things accurately. Our overview of the facts may be faulty, and we may err in determining how much weight to give to a fact. Part of the problem is that the moral principles we use in weighing facts are not all equally important. In any particular case, pleasure may be more important than law, religion may be more significant than self-interest, etc.

Baier argues that the right answer to the moral question, “What shall I do?” is the action which is buttressed by the clearest and most convincing reasons we can find. An important part of Baier’s analysis involves distinguishing among the *quality* of reasons that play a role in our moral decision. In trying to answer the question of what is the best course of action he is thinking, not surprisingly, of *good* reasons. Baier holds that there are good reasons merely as a matter of empirical observation: in our development, we learn that doing one thing rather than another will harm society. It is a matter of observation, and a psychological fact, that people form beliefs that affect their actions. Another of the critical questions Baier examines is, “Why follow reason?” Following reason comprises two tasks, a practical one and a theoretical one. Baier argues that the purpose of theoretical reasoning is primarily to guide practical decisions, and concludes that the question “Should I follow reason?” is really a question about theory rather than practice. Baier raises the possibility, however, of another perspective entirely, supposing that following the dictates of reason could give

way to following inspiration and intuition for the appropriate analyses of ethical questions. However, Baier argues that this really takes us nowhere. Even if we rely on some kind of non-rational insight, authority, etc., the answer we get would have to be checked in a rational, reasoned way.

Baier's use of the term "practical reasoning" appears to be in line with classic uses of the term, referring to any logical analysis that deals with some moral issue or other. Thus, in Aristotle's concept of the "practical syllogism," the reasoning involved is not aimed at deriving propositions but at action in daily life. The notion of practical reason has other uses as well. It can be used to refute the notion that actions are prompted only by desire. Reason comes into play, in the best Kantian-like sense, when a person separates himself from his own personal wants and is willing to evaluate his future conduct by principles that any rational person would use. With Kant, a rational moral agent has to ask only if his imagined action could be universalized. In discussions of motivation, furthermore, appeals to practical reason may seek to counter claims that only desire or inclination can ultimately prompt one to action. Yet practical reason encompasses even more than this. If properly used, it involves comparing and contrasting goals, wants and goods, in order to constitute a rational life-map of one's future choices.

Returning to the question of self-interest, while Baier attacks the concept, he surprisingly argues that in valid moral judgments, self-interested reasons can transcend altruistic ones. He maintains that doing something which would be in one's own interest, as well as in someone else's interest, may be decent reasons for doing a thing. He further holds that the reasons which are in one's own interest might, in fact, be better than those in the interest of someone else. In

that case – should the interests not contradict one another – both can be satisfied by one's actions. But when interests do collide, it is not unreasonable to choose one's own interests over those of another person. Society is better off when a person "looks out for Number One first," since each of us is the best judge of what benefits us the most, and because each person knows himself better than anyone else, he is more likely to push his own interests before someone else's. Baier concedes that there is a distinction between what we might call narrow (or selfish) self-interest and enlightened self-interest. He asks if it is possible to salvage the notion that self-interest is the moral point of view. To do so, he distinguishes between what he calls "short-sighted" and "enlightened" self-interest. As Baier understands it, the essential difference is that the short-sighted person fails to consider how his actions will affect other people, while the enlightened person knows that failing to do so will prevent him from enjoying a satisfying and full life. The enlightened person will not ignore the requirements of others.

Baier assaults the now-antiquated, though not necessarily wrong, positivist notion that moral pronouncements are simply commands or orders. Baier claims that moral questions like "What shall I do?" are really demands for new moral data. It is worth noting that although Baier speaks generally about positivist approaches to ethics, he reserves a good part of his attack specifically for C.L. Stevenson's idea that thinking about morality involves holding certain factual positions which, in their turn, lead to action. Baier claims that Stevenson is wrong because his view restrictively holds that it is only desire that leads to action, while fear, ambition, and other mental states can produce action. Baier is a type of ethical philosopher usually called a "prescriptivist." Analyses of moral language, such as those of the logical

positivists, interest him less than examining the role of moral judgments, obligations, etc., in reaching moral decisions.

Baier's interests go beyond ethical theory, as he has written on such things as technology and business ethics. A good example is his essay "Duties to One's Employer" (1983) wherein he discusses – and ultimately dismisses – the view that capitalism can support freedom and the good of all of society only if the duties of employees in a corporation are restricted to those duties they agree to of their own free choice. Another interesting outcome of Baier's work is his insistence that the right to life is not a universal right, since it may collide with the rights of other people. He applied this idea on a more general level as well, insisting that the alleged right to life of certain groups of persons might take precedence over others – an important theme in the abortion issue and other current controversies.

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Anthony Serafini

BALDWIN, JAMES MARK (1861–1934)

James Mark Baldwin was born on 12 January 1861 in Columbia, South Carolina, and died on 9 November 1934 in Paris, France. Baldwin traveled north in 1878 to enter the Salem (New Jersey) Collegiate Institute, a private preparatory school. Three years later, in 1881, he enrolled as a sophomore at Princeton. Baldwin's collegiate coursework was focused on language and philosophy. Under the influence of James McCosh, Baldwin was introduced both to Scottish mental philosophy and to the new experimental psychology of Wilhelm Wundt.

After graduating from Princeton with a BA in 1884, Baldwin went to Germany with the support of the Green Fellowship in Mental Science. There he spent a semester at Berlin, studying Spinoza under Friedrich Paulsen and a semester at Leipzig in Wilhelm Wundt's recently established psychological laboratory. By 1885, when he returned to Princeton as an instructor in French and German, Baldwin had become a devotee of Spinozan metaphysics and a self-described "enthusiast" for the new physiological psychology. At Princeton, Baldwin prepared a translation of Théodule Ribot's *German Psychology of To-day* (1886) and published his first significant paper, "The Postulates of a Physiological Psychology" (1887). In "The Postulates" Baldwin combined

principles of the Scottish mental philosophy, the metaphysics of Spinoza, and Wundtian psychology into what he conceived to be an integrative framework for mental science.

In 1887 Baldwin moved to Illinois to accept the position of professor of philosophy at Lake Forest University. In 1888, he married Helen Hayes Green and completed his PhD in philosophy from Princeton. In 1889, Baldwin accepted the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Toronto, where he soon established Canada's first laboratory of experimental psychology (and thus the first in the British Empire) and initiated a groundbreaking series of studies on infant reaching. At Toronto, Baldwin also completed his two volume *Handbook of Psychology* (1889–91).

In 1893 Baldwin returned to Princeton to assume the Stuart Chair in Psychology. There he founded a new psychological laboratory, co-founded one of psychology's most influential journals, *The Psychological Review* in 1894, and set out to elaborate his views on habit, accommodation, and imitation into what would become his two most influential contributions to psychology, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (1895) and *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development: A Study in Social Psychology* (1897).

Mind, Baldwin recognized, must be construed developmentally, both in the individual and in the species. Adopting a modified recapitulationism, Baldwin argued for an analogy between ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Because this parallelism is only approximate, however, and because stages necessary to phylogenesis are often lacking in ontogenesis, he began to consider the possibility that individual adaptations are somehow linked to the evolutionary history of the species. To lay the groundwork for this perspective, Baldwin developed his earlier

view of the relation of habit to accommodation into a biological theory of individual intellectual growth or adaptation. Having laid out a theory of individual adaptation, Baldwin then addressed the problem of the relationship between development in the individual and that in the species. "No theory of development," Baldwin suggested, "is complete...which does not account for the transmission in some way, from one generation to another, of the gains of the earlier generations..." (p. 204). The principle that Baldwin invoked to serve this function, a principle that he termed "organic selection," was only beginning to be articulated in 1895. In its most developed form (in *Development and Evolution*, 1902), the basic idea was that adaptive behaviors acquired in the course of experience differentially increase the survival rate of organisms born with hereditary variations that favor those acquisitions. Over evolutionary time, therefore, acquired adaptations can become congenital. Although this idea, later termed the "Baldwin effect," has had relatively little currency in modern evolutionary theory, it has become quite influential in current work on evolutionary algorithms in computer science. Reprinted six times within ten years and translated into at least four languages, *Mental Development* influenced a number of important scholars. Of these, the best known is probably the Swiss genetic epistemologist, Jean Piaget, who made significant use of Baldwin's ideas.

Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development: A Study in Social Psychology* was the first book to have "social psychology" in its title. Baldwin extended the principle of circular reaction to the domain of social interaction, developing a theory of social adaptation to complement his theory of individual adaptation. In Baldwin's view, social adaptation took place through a continuous three-phase, dialectical process in

which children acted as others did, experienced themselves in ways that were similar to others, and assumed that the experiences of others were similar to their own. Many of the most important concepts of George Herbert Mead's symbolic interactionism were derived from Baldwin. Lev Vygotsky's analysis of the enculturating force of the social system of meanings into which the child is born was influenced by Baldwin's views on social heredity. Baldwin also stimulated Lawrence Kohlberg towards study of children's moral development.

Elected President of the American Psychological Association in 1897, Baldwin prepared a presidential address titled "On Selective Thinking" (1898), which is foundational for evolutionary epistemology. Although obviously consistent with early pragmatism, Baldwin's *interactive instrumentalism* was founded on the principle that "knowledge presupposes a *dualism of controls*: the agent, on the one hand, and the recognized world of truth and reality...on the other" (1930, p. 10). In Baldwin's view, this meant that his approach was immune to charges of relativism and subjectivism sometimes directed towards pragmatism.

Baldwin immersed himself in editorial work on what is arguably his most important contribution to philosophy, the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (1901–05). The effect of this remarkable undertaking was immediate. Baldwin's international reputation soared. This led to his receiving Oxford University's first honorary doctorate of science in 1900 and to honorary degrees from the University of Glasgow (1901), the College of South Carolina (1905), and the University of Geneva (1909). For the first time, his writings begin to reflect the influence of G.W.F. Hegel, Hermann Lotze, Alexius Meinong, and others. What had been a nascent interest in logic became a central concern. After 1902, the

content and method of Baldwin's work was almost entirely philosophical; and in 1903 he resigned his appointment in psychology at Princeton to become professor of philosophy and psychology at Johns Hopkins University. Baldwin founded the *Psychological Bulletin* in 1904, and initiated work that would eventually become the three-volume *Thought and Things...or Genetic Logic* (1906–11). Baldwin traced the development of cognition and experience from pre-logical thought, imagery, memory, play, and the rise of meaning through discursive thought, reflection, the development of logical meaning, and implication to higher-order logical operations and aesthetic experience.

In 1908, in mid-career, Baldwin suffered a personal fiasco. Arrested in a raid on a Baltimore bordello and forced in 1909 to resign from Hopkins, he exiled himself both from America and from American psychology. Between 1908 and 1912, he divided his time between residence in Paris and trips to Mexico, where he served the government as an occasional advisor on higher education and lectured in the School of Higher Studies at the National University. While in Mexico, Baldwin worked on two of his final contributions to psychology. In *Darwin and the Humanities*, which appeared in 1909 and focused on Darwin's own human studies, Baldwin attempted to demonstrate how the natural selectionist account could be related to important issues in psychology, ethics, logic, philosophy, and religion through the application of his own principle of organic selection. In *Individual and Society*, published in 1911, Baldwin argued for a psychological (as against sociological) analysis of the nature of the social bond, the "rules of organization... which characterize the personal development of minds in relation to one another...(and) the *inner development of the social life within the group*" (p. 9).

In 1910, Baldwin was elected to succeed William James as Correspondent of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, Institute of France. From 1912 until his death, Paris was his primary place of residence. After the outbreak of World War I, he devoted much of his time to lobbying for American entrance into the war on the side of the Allies. Throughout the war, Baldwin contributed to charity and relief efforts organized on behalf of the French, and in 1917 he was awarded the Legion of Honor for his efforts. After the U.S. entrance into the war, he helped organize a Paris branch of the American Navy League; and after the Armistice, he maintained informal academic contacts with Pierre Janet, Henri Bergson, and others. His memoirs with selected letters were published in 1926 as *Between Two Wars (1861–1921)*.

Baldwin was not only important in the early institutional history of American philosophy and psychology, he was one of the period's most sophisticated thinkers. His biosocial approach introduced a level of complexity in conceptualization of the mind, its evolutionary origins, ontogenetic development, and sociocultural formation that went far beyond the prevailing thought of the period. He addressed topics as varied as the nature of developmental and evolutionary mechanisms, the relationship between reason and reality, the genesis of logic, the value of aesthetic experience, and the nature and development in children of habit, imitation, creative invention, altruism, egoism, morality, social suggestibility, social self, self-awareness, theory of mind, and enculturation. His use and in some cases introduction of concepts such as multiplicity of self, ideal self, self-esteem, assimilation, accommodation, primary circular reaction, genetic logic, genetic epistemology, and social heredity exerted a formative influence on later scholars.

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Robert H. Wozniak

BARBOUR, IAN GRAEME (1923–2013)

Ian Barbour was born on 5 October 1923 in Beijing, China. Barbour's father was a close friend and colleague of the Jesuit paleontologist, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and was involved with him in the discovery of the hominid skull called *Sinanthropus* or Peking Man. In 1931 the family returned to the United States. Barbour entered Swarthmore College, starting as a major in engineering but switching to physics. He received his BA in 1944 and MA in 1946 at Swarthmore. As an alternative to military service during World War II, he worked in a mental hospital at Duke University. While enrolled in the PhD program in physics at the University of Chicago, Barbour was a teaching assistant to Enrico Fermi, who contributed to the development of the first atomic bomb.

After graduating with the PhD in 1949, Barbour taught physics at Kalamazoo College in Michigan for four years but then decided to pursue a degree in theology at Yale University, where he took courses from H. Richard Niebuhr, Roland Bainton, and Robert Calhoun. In 1956 he earned his divinity degree from Yale and was hired as a professor in the departments of religion and physics at Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota. With the exception of one year (1973–1974) when he was Lilly Visiting Professor of Science, Theology and Human Values at Purdue University, Barbour spent the rest of

his teaching career at Carleton College until his retirement in 1986. During that time, he was the first chairperson of a newly created religion department and then director of the program in Science, Technology and Public Policy. Barbour died on 24 December 2013 in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Barbour's first major work was the fruit of a fellowship from the Danforth Foundation in 1963–64 to do research at Harvard. He attended a seminar on the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead conducted by Gordon Kaufman and read extensively in the process theology of Charles Hartshorne, John Cobb, and David Griffin. After returning to Carleton, he completed *Issues in Science and Religion* (1966). By his own admission, it was an effort to fit together the two halves of his intellectual life. In 1967–1968, he was awarded Guggenheim and Fulbright Fellowships to explore epistemological questions at Cambridge University, which issued in the publication of *Myths, Models and Paradigms* in 1974. Mary Hesse's writings on models and Thomas Kuhn's work on paradigm shifts were influential in that work. *Technology, Environment and Human Values* (1980) was the result of grants from the National Science Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities to develop a program at Carleton on Science, Technology, and Public Policy. Students and faculty in that program were drawn from the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities.

From 1981 to 1986, Barbour was the first Winifred and Atherton Bean Professor of Science, Technology and Society at Carleton. The invitation to give the Gifford Lectures in Scotland in 1989 and 1990 allowed Barbour the opportunity to write *Religion in an Age of Science* (subsequently expanded to include three introductory historical chapters and republished as *Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues*) and *Ethics in an*

Age of Technology. Both were highly regarded, but the first, above all in the expanded version, enjoyed much wider circulation. Barbour has also published *When Science Meets Religion* (2000) and *Nature, Human Nature, and God* (2002). In 1999 Barbour received the prestigious Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion. He donated most of the prize money (one million dollars) to the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (CTNS) in Berkeley, California. CTNS, under the direction of a former colleague at Carleton and close friend Robert J. Russell, has sponsored courses, conferences, and publications on science and religion for many years. Barbour has been involved in working groups on “Divine Action,” cosponsored by CTNS and the Vatican Observatory, and in the program on “Science and the Spiritual Quest” led by Philip Clayton and Mark Richardson under CTNS sponsorship.

Six persistent themes in Barbour’s work will be discussed here. The first is his appreciation for the function of models and paradigms in both theology and natural science. This appreciation led him to draw together what had been regarded as totally different worlds of discourse while respecting their inescapable differences in methodology and content. As Barbour notes, models in both natural science and theology “are to be taken seriously but not literally; they are neither literal pictures nor useful fictions but limited and inadequate ways of imagining what is not observable” (1997, p. 117).

A second theme is Barbour’s adherence to critical realism in opposition to both classical realism and instrumentalism. That is, in classical realism, theories are taken to be descriptions of nature as it is in itself, apart from the human observer. In instrumentalism, theories are thought to be merely human constructs, calculating devices for making predictions and controlling nature. By way

of contrast, critical realism claims that there are entities in the world resembling those postulated in the models, but that the model is a symbolic representation of the reality in question.

A third theme is Barbour’s fourfold typology for the relationship between scientists and theologians (or, in any case, religiously oriented individuals): conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration. While many individual scientists or theologians elude description in terms of only one category, the typology nevertheless makes clear that conflict and independence are less than satisfactory approaches to the relationship between science and religion and that relationships either in terms of dialogue or integration are more defensible. In dialogue, one presumes that there are areas of overlap between the two spheres of activity, even as they remain distinct from one another both in content and methodology. Science, for example, raises “limit-questions” (such as “Why is there something rather than nothing?”) which cannot be answered from a scientific perspective. Yet believable religious claims must likewise be somehow consonant with what is known about the physical world from a scientific perspective. Integration, to be sure, goes well beyond dialogue in that it presupposes that the data of science and religion can be organized into a single coherent worldview.

The fourth theme in Barbour’s thought is his preference for theology of nature rather than natural theology. He prefers to ground the theological worldview in the scriptures and experiences of a specific religious tradition and then to modify or reinterpret specific beliefs in the light of contemporary natural science (for example, the classical doctrines of creation, divine providence, and eschatology). Natural theology, by comparison, starts with the findings of contemporary science and, from there, tries to “prove” or establish classic religious beliefs, such as the existence of God,

life after death, etc., on purely rational grounds. Barbour's thinking is that the models and the findings of science are strictly provisional and revisable so that to base theology on contemporary science is inherently risky.

A fifth prevailing theme in Barbour's work has been his defense of emergence over reductionism in accounting for progressively higher-order levels of activity within nature. Whereas many natural scientists want to reduce all forms of life, even rational life, to ever more complex interactions at the molecular or even atomic level, Barbour is insistent that higher levels of existence and activity within nature function in terms of laws and principles proper to themselves and are not simply reducible to variants of molecular and atomic interactions. At stake here is a metaphysical assumption that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Given the requisite preparation at the lower level, a new self-organizing ontological totality will emerge, which will not only be governed by its own principles of activity, but which will also exert a type of "top-down" causation on the lower-level forms of activity characteristic of its parts or members, taken separately. Barbour avoids classical metaphysical dualism and yet does not endorse a purely materialistic explanation of the emergence of novelty within the cosmic process.

A sixth characteristic of Barbour's thought on religion and science is his consistent espousal of Alfred North Whitehead's process-relational metaphysics as the philosophy best for the coordination and potential integration of the truth-claims proper to religion and science. In Barbour's view, Whitehead best explains how God can be active in the world without undermining creaturely spontaneity and, above all, human freedom. At the same time, in line with his thinking on the role of models in religion and science, Barbour remains critical of certain weaknesses within

process-relational metaphysics, such as how to understand the continuing identity of the human self over and above a simple succession of moments of experience, and how to explain the interplay of diverse levels of existence and activity within non-human nature.

Barbour has achieved prominence in the field of religion and science both because of his pioneering work in the 1960s and 1970s on the similarities and differences between these two important spheres of human life and because of his carefully balanced presentation of controversial issues in the religion-and-science debate over the intervening years. He has also summarized his lifelong reflections on the interplay between religion and science in several books which are more accessible to the non-professional reader.

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Joseph A. Bracken

BARNES, HAZEL ESTELLA (1915–2008)

Hazel E. Barnes was born on 16 December 1915 in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. After attending public schools there, she won the Curran Scholarship which sent her to Wilson College, a women's college in Pennsylvania, for undergraduate study. She majored in classics, a course of study she would continue after earning her BA in 1937 at Yale University. In 1941 she earned her PhD in philosophy with her dissertation, "Philosophy as Katharsis in the *Enneades* of Plotinus." Barnes spent 1941 to 1945 teaching at two North Carolina colleges for women, the Women's College of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, and Queens College in Charlotte. While at Queens College, she began teaching courses in philosophy in addition to her regular classics courses. In the summer of 1944 she pursued her interest in philosophy by taking graduate courses at Columbia University.

At the conclusion of World War II, Barnes took up a teaching post for three years at Pierce College in Greece, which had fallen into ruin under the German occupation. Upon

returning to the United States in 1948, she took a position at the University of Toledo, again teaching classics and philosophy. Barnes began teaching and working extensively on French existentialism in the early 1950s. She was an assistant professor at Ohio State University in 1952–1953 and then went to the University of Colorado, where for many years she taught courses in both classics and philosophy. She retired in 1986 and was named "Woman of the Year in Philosophy" by the Society for Women in Philosophy in 1989. Barnes died on 18 March 2008 in Boulder, Colorado.

It was while she was teaching in Ohio, rather than during her time in Greece or traveling throughout Europe in the postwar years – precisely the years when Jean-Paul Sartre's star was rising – that Barnes was first exposed to existentialism. It all began innocently enough. As she recounted not long ago in her autobiography, *The Story I Tell Myself: A Venture in Existentialist Autobiography* (1997), her life-long association with existentialism originated in the innocent question of one of her students. "What is this existentialism everybody is talking about?" the student had asked (1997, p. 143). Not having an answer to such a question ready at hand, Barnes embarked on an intense study of Sartre and his cohorts. An intellectual conversion of sorts resulted. Not long after, she began teaching a regular course on existentialism, one of the first of its kind in America.

In the fall of 1951, Barnes began translating Sartre's *L'Être et le néant* (1943), a classic work of French existentialism. With the publication of her translation in 1956, she became an immediate authority on existentialism in America. Barnes was among the first to introduce existentialist works and ideas to American audiences, and she stood alongside such important figures in the translation of postwar European ideas

to American contexts as Marjorie Grene, William Barrett, J. Glenn Gray, and Walter Kaufmann. Barnes and Grene were among the first woman philosophers to puncture the patriarchal world of postwar American philosophy, which was primarily analytic in orientation at that time.

Unlike some of the other American commentators on existentialism, Barnes did not offer any philosophical genealogy for Sartre's work. She paid little attention to the German existentialists and to Kierkegaard, sometimes to the detriment of her own work. Instead, she focused her energies on the French existentialists almost exclusively, most notably Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Albert Camus. Her influential 1959 *The Literature of Possibility: Studies in Humanistic Existentialism* offered an introductory interpretation of the major themes in the works of all three.

Like many others who first introduced existentialism to America, Barnes made a conscious effort to reach out to the broader public beyond academia. *The Literature of Possibility* was written for just such an audience. But she did even more than this. She introduced existentialism over the airwaves on Ohio State's campus radio station and, in the early 1960s, she devised and "starred" in the production of a PBS television series on the subject, which she entitled "Self-Encounter." Barnes was not averse to lecturing for a wide array of audiences, from the most academically rigorous to the most general. Often, she would speak about what she liked to call "applied existentialism"; she would offer existentialist interpretations and perspectives on everything from education to aging.

Even in her more demanding written work, Barnes made every attempt to ground her thinking in the concerns of the day. *An Existentialist Ethics* (1967) was Barnes's most original work. In it she engaged figures

as diverse as Ayn Rand, Norman Mailer, and the student radicals of the 1960s – and showed that the question of an existentialist ethics was by no means an academic or abstract one. To the contrary, it was a matter of concrete and immediate experience. In the following years, she would again take up the topic of student radicalism in *The University as the New Church* (1970). Like other American interpreters of existentialism, Barnes realized that there was more than just a superficial relation between the student movement and existentialist philosophy.

Barnes has been more than just a translator and interpreter of Sartre. Her works, *Sartre* (1973) and *Sartre and Flaubert* (1981), have been indispensable. While drawing on the work of Sartre, Beauvoir, and Camus, she has made her own substantial contribution to American philosophy. *An Existentialist Ethics* was a major contribution to ethical theory. It highlighted the positive qualities of existentialism at a time when the popular conception of existentialism dismissed it as little more than a bleak and pessimistic brand of philosophy. More importantly, it offered a tangible and concrete exploration of existentialism put into ethical action. It stressed the potential relevance of existentialist thought for causes such as feminism and racial equality, causes for which existentialism proved very useful.

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Martin Woessner

BARWISE, KENNETH JON (1942–2000)

Jon Barwise was born on 29 June 1942 in Independence, Missouri, and he died on 5 March 2000 in Bloomington, Indiana. His precocity was evident from early years, and he achieved distinction in obtaining his BA degree from Yale University in 1963 in philosophy and mathematics. From there he proceeded to Stanford, where his MA was conferred in 1965 and his PhD in mathematics in 1967, writing a dissertation under the direction of Solomon Feferman. While he was at Stanford, Barwise was also influenced by Georg Kreisel and Dana Scott, reflecting their breadth of interests and concerns about the match or mismatch of logic and language. His first year after leaving Stanford he spent at the University of California at Los Angeles as a National Science Foundation fellow, after which he returned to Yale in 1968 as an assistant professor of mathematics and computer science. The two years at Yale gave

him plenty of opportunity to interact with Abraham Robinson and Paul Eklof, both of whom were involved in the study of the interplay between algebra and logic. In 1970 he went to the University of Wisconsin as an associate professor of mathematics, part of the constellation that gathered there under the leadership of Stephen Cole Kleene.

Barwise's original research interests lay in the area of infinitary logic, the use of expressions with an infinite number of quantifiers. His book *Admissible Sets and Structures* bore witness to the stamp that he put on the field, both by his research and by his style of exposition. He uses Kripke-Platek set theory for setting out his results (developed by Saul Kripke and Richard Platek), which indicates his willingness to strike out in directions not entirely fashionable. Perhaps the most visible consequence of his years at Wisconsin was the *Handbook of Mathematical Logic*. This collection, which appeared in 1977, sought to cover the entire field of logic and included contributions by leading researchers from around the world. He also edited (together with his adviser Feferman) a collection *Model-Theoretic Logics* that tried to draw together some of the strands in generalized model theory that had emerged over the previous decade.

One of the reasons for Barwise's interest in generalized quantifiers was his starting to work on problems in linguistics and its interface with logic. The work on admissible sets had already indicated the advantages of not restricting attention to just finite sequences of 'all' and 'some'. By the late 1970s Barwise was looking at sentences of the form "Most boys and girls like each other" and trying to figure out how to make sense of them. He would solicit the opinions of students and colleagues to try to get a sense of how they ought to be interpreted. He worked a good deal with the linguist Robin

Cooper, and their joint paper on interpreting such sentences launched him into a career in which philosophy of language began to take precedence over mathematical logic.

In 1979 Barwise accepted a mathematics position at Stanford, perhaps for the sake of returning to familiar surroundings, perhaps because it was difficult for Wisconsin to find a way of accommodating his increasingly wide range of interests within its departmental structure. At Stanford he worked intensely with John Perry and started to formulate what has become known as situation semantics. Progress in this field was well documented by a sequence of papers by Barwise collected at the end of the decade under the punning title *The Situation in Logic*. The concern of situation semantics was to find models on a small scale for languages as used rather than worrying about overly abstract creations that were not needed in practice. The creation of the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford under Barwise's direction helped both to bring scholars together to work on the field of situation semantics and to make sure that their results found a publisher.

In the midst of working on these issues of linguistics, Barwise also looked at questions of paradox in conjunction with the philosopher John Etchemendy. Their joint book *The Liar* offers a solution to the paradox of the title based on the technical device of hypersets in conjunction with John L. Austin's perspective on semantics (which is defended as an alternative to what they call Russellian semantics). The idea of looking at the ways the liar sentence can be used is connected with Austin's inquiries into speech acts. While the perspective offered by Barwise and Etchemendy has scarcely received universal endorsement as a resolution of the paradox, it has helped to spur interest in the anti-foundation axiom (which, as its name implies,

denies the usual "Axiom of Foundation" of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory).

Another practical occupation for Barwise during the years at Stanford was the design of software for teaching logic. He took the design of the mini-universe for "Tarski's World" as a serious enterprise and worked on it with John Etchemendy. As was typical with items of software, the shelf-life of the software itself was not so long as with some of Barwise's other enterprises, but the influence on teaching continued. The design of the software reflects the value Barwise attributed to small models for situations.

In 1990 Barwise went to Indiana University as College Professor of Philosophy, Computer Science, and Mathematics, and contributed to the rise of informatics as a major area of research in Bloomington. Perhaps his own difficulties in getting interdisciplinary support elsewhere led to his enthusiasm for the wide range of the scholarly community that came together around him. If one had to characterize the work of the last decade of his life, it was the extension of the notion of 'situation' even further to visual representations and diagrams. His volume *Information Flow* (written jointly with Jerry Seligman) presents an overview of how mathematics can be used to describe the titular subject with an undercurrent of philosophical commentary.

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Thomas Drucker

BASCOM, JOHN (1827–1911)

John Bascom was born on 1 May 1827 in Genoa, New York. His early education took place at Homer Academy followed by Williams College, from which he graduated with a BA in 1849. Bascom spent a year teaching at Ball Seminary in Hoosick Falls, New York. He later studied law in Rochester, New York, but left the law office after less than a year. He entered Auburn Theological Seminary in 1851, but left a year later to tutor rhetoric and oratory at Williams College.

Bascom next decided to attend Andover Theological Seminary, graduating in 1855. That same year he returned to Williams College, this time as professor of rhetoric and oratory. Shortly afterward, he married Emma Curtiss with whom he fathered three children.

In addition to rhetoric and oratory, Bascom taught philosophy at Williams. Between 1859 and 1874, he published six books on political economy, aesthetics, rhetoric, psychology, religion, and literature.

In 1874 Bascom was appointed President of the University of Wisconsin. During his thirteen-year tenure, Bascom successfully elevated the University of Wisconsin from an intellectual backwater to a major center of learning. He supported female scholarship and developed an innovative system of administration. At Wisconsin he was the primary professor of philosophy, ardently encouraging students to use their education for the good of society, and publishing eight more volumes on theology, ethics, and sociology. He continually pressed the spiritual element of higher learning and, in his own work, sought to reconcile Christian theology with evolutionary theory.

His central philosophical problem was maintaining the efficacy of Christian spirituality in an intellectual climate that was increasingly favorable to empiricism. His avid support of prohibition and a dispute with the regents about operational issues eventually led to his resignation from the University of Wisconsin in 1887. Soon thereafter, he returned to Williams College where he taught sociology and political science until his retirement in 1903. While at Williams College, he published another six books on theology, social theory, evolution, and nationalism. Bascom died on 2 October 1911 in Williamstown, Massachusetts.

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David L. Davis

BEARDSLEY, MONROE CURTIS (1915–1985)

Monroe Beardsley was born on 10 December 1915 in Bridgeport, Connecticut. He was educated at Yale University, receiving his BA in 1936 and PhD in 1939. He was a philosophy instructor at Yale from 1940 to 1944 and an assistant professor from 1946 to 1947. He also taught philosophy at Mount Holyoke College (1944–1946). He then was professor of philosophy at Swarthmore College (1947–1969) and Temple University (1969–1981). Internationally recognized as an aesthetician, Beardsley was also a prominent logician and philosopher of language. He was elected President of the American Society for Aesthetics (1967–1968) and President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (1978–1979), and was also a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. For many years he served as an editor of the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* and as general editor of the Prentice Hall Foundations in Philosophy series. In his retirement, Beardsley devoted a great deal of time and effort to the causes of civil rights and civil liberties, serving for a time as an officer in the Pennsylvania National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. He died on 18 September 1985 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The landmark article that inaugurated his entry into aesthetics was "The Intentional Fallacy" (1946), an essay in which he and the distinguished Yale literary critic William Wimsatt stood the prevailing literary theory on its head. The view they advanced was that authorial intent is not the factor to consider in determining the meaning of a text. Instead, they argued, words pronounced by an author have a life of their own, one which must be tied in to the fabric of literary convention and which must anticipate communities of

potential future readers. They pointed out that the original intention of the author is generally not available to the reader, so it is pointless to think of it as a standard upon which one might base an evaluation of a work; they reinforced this point in “The Affective Fallacy” (1949).

In 1958 Beardsley published *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, which immediately became known as a landmark statement of philosophical perspectives on the arts in the twentieth century. Beardsley’s line of argument is a perspicuous Deweyanism, wedded to the central importance of aesthetic experience but responsive to the heterogeneous forms that experience can take in the arts. Beardsley found much of what John Dewey said in describing and defending his notion of aesthetic experience to be vague or cryptic and unsusceptible to empirical demonstration. Nevertheless, he thought that Dewey’s notion that experience gets carved into experiences in its submission to various (generally aesthetic) strictures is a fruitful way of looking at the distinctive ways art and nature may affect us. The problem, as Beardsley saw it, was to accept this intuition while realizing at the same time that there are so many different ways in which aesthetic elements of our awareness get distributed that the notion of a core concept of aesthetic experience becomes suspect.

The aesthetic theory Beardsley defended in *Aesthetics* and throughout his life revolves around the concept of aesthetic experience. His theory of critical interpretation is an account of conditions and restraints bearing on an artwork’s capacity for conducing to such an experience. His general theory of aesthetic value is an account of differential capacities of natural and artifactual objects to occasion and sustain such an experience. And his theory of taste is an account of conditions necessary for a person to make the finest, most discriminating use of sensory input and

critical judgment in the course of aesthetic experience. Although Beardsley’s work on these various topics is in this way single-minded, it is not simplistic. By freeing the idea of understanding an art object from the task of understanding the artist and by acknowledging correlative restrictions on understanding that arise out of local and cultural contexts, Beardsley staked his claim to a complex and inherently controversial theoretical domain. Intentionalism and expressionism were off limits in one direction. Institutional theories were off limits in the other. The distinctive approach to the arts he developed between these limits acknowledged that artworks are intentional without making their meaning the captive of their creators’ intentions, and that they are institution-related without making every artwork a candidate for appreciation in an institutional setting.

Is “art” definable? Silent on this issue for most of his career, he eventually offered a roundabout definition in which an artwork is taken to be an arrangement of conditions typically intended to be capable of affording an experience with a marked aesthetic character. He insisted that there were two things about which he was sure: First, that there is such a thing as aesthetic value. Second, that it cannot be defined except in terms of aesthetic experience. The key is to make clear what makes an experience aesthetic. In his final exposition of this notion – meant both to take stock of criticisms he accepted and to incorporate ideas he had come to find congenial – he identifies five criteria to be applied as a (Wittgensteinian) family, with the proviso that an experience must have the first and at least three of the rest to count as aesthetic. The criteria are: (1) object directedness – the willingly accepted guidance over one’s mental states by properties on which attention is fixed with a feeling that “things are working themselves

out fittingly”; (2) felt freedom – a sense of release from concerns about past and future, a sense of harmony with what is presented as if freely chosen; (3) detached affect – a sense that objects of interest are set apart from us at some emotional distance, permitting us to rise above even dark and disturbing things; (4) active discovery – a sense of the mind’s exercising active constructive powers to make things cohere, a sense of intelligibility; and (5) wholeness – a sense of personal integration, a contentment involving both self-acceptance and self-expansion (1982, pp. 288–89).

In this final view of aesthetic experience, Beardsley clarifies and reaffirms the qualities of “being fully alive” he had long maintained to be the inherent values of our encounter with art. Aesthetic experience, he consistently argued, is more than a pleasant feeling. It counteracts violent and destructive impulses, conduces toward the integration of personality, refines perception and discrimination, develops imagination, fosters mutual sympathy and understanding, and “holds before us a clue as to what life can be like in its great richness and joy.” Those who knew him affirm that Beardsley’s own life reflected these same values and that his love of art and philosophy was matched by his kindness, open-mindedness, and generosity of spirit.

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Ronald Moore

BEAVEN, JAMES (1801–1875)

James Beaven was born on 9 July 1801 in Westbury, Wiltshire, England. Entering Oxford University in 1820, he received the BA in 1824 and was ordained priest in 1826. He received the Oxford MA in 1827, and BD and NN degrees in 1842. He held clerical positions in Staffordshire and Northamptonshire during the 1830s and early 1840s, and displayed remarkable intellectual capacity by publishing several short theological studies.

His scholarship, conformist views, and interest in missionary work made him an ideal candidate for a faculty position at a Canadian college. He decided in 1843 to go to the newly opened King's College in Toronto, which was chartered to be a college for the Church of England in Canada. As the professor of divinity, metaphysics, and moral philosophy he guided the small college's affairs, promoted missionary work, and built new churches, bringing the conservative and royalist High Church Tractarian movement to Ontario. King's College was closed in 1849 so that it could be transformed into the interdenominational University of Toronto. Beaven reluctantly joined the faculty of this new "godless" institution, and in 1851 he became its first professor of philosophy, as the chair of metaphysics and ethics. He retired in 1871 under pressure from students and authorities, giving up his chair to George Paxton Young. Beaven died on 8 November 1875 in Niagara, Ontario.

Beaven is chiefly remembered by the Church of England in Canada as a tireless organizer and worker for the church, and an author of useful catechisms and clerical aids. His *Account of the Life and Writings of S. Irenaeus* (1841) made a notable contribution to church history. His *Recreations of a Long Vacation* was a popular account of a diocesan tour in 1845 through the wilds of western Ontario to Sault St. Marie. But to match his place as one of the first secular professors of philosophy in North America, he also has the distinction of publishing the first philosophical work in English-speaking Canada (Jérôme Demers's 1835 Latin textbook has French Canadian priority). Beaven's *Elements of Natural Theology* (1850) only considers philosophical arguments for religious conclusions, omitting Christian articles of faith dependent on revelation. The immortality of the soul and the existence of God, the two foundations of any religion, can be rationally demonstrated primarily by a variety of arguments from design. Ontological arguments do not appear in his text; traditional cosmological arguments receive only cursory attention; and the moral argument for God's existence and righteousness is mentioned without placing much weight there. Beaven used William Paley's books as course texts, and relied on suitably modified versions of Paley's "watch-maker argument."

Unlike creationists who believe that modern science threatens not just the design argument but the entire faith, Beaven was acquainted with the geology and biology of his day and, like most other Canadian clergy and intellectuals, did not react with extreme hostility to Darwinian evolution when it arrived a short time after his book was published. Beaven was willing to grant the scientific knowledge of his day; the philosophical question was whether natural laws working

on matter could fully explain the scale and complexity of organized and living creatures. If matter alone is real, Beaven reasoned, then there could be no explanation why matter would tend to organize lawfully. Matter alone cannot explain the human mind or its growth and achievements. The simple existence of any natural laws demands postulating an intelligent designer of the universe. More significantly, this intelligent designer is the best explanation for the fact that so many laws of nature have to be perfectly and harmoniously aligned to permit the existence of intelligent creatures. Only the unique mind of God could establish this degree of harmony.

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John R. Shook

BECK, LEWIS WHITE (1913–1997)

Lewis White Beck was born on 26 September 1913 in Griffin, Georgia. He received his BA at Emory University in 1934, and his MA in 1935 and PhD in 1937 at Duke University. After postdoctoral study at the University of Berlin, he served at Emory University as instructor in philosophy from 1938 to 1941; University of Delaware as assistant and associate professor from 1941 to 1948; and Lehigh University as professor of philosophy during 1948–1949. He then was professor of philosophy at the University of Rochester from 1949 to 1979, and he served as Dean of the Graduate School from 1956 to 1957. He was visiting professor at Columbia University, University of Minnesota, and University of California, Berkeley. He was a member of the national council of the National Endowment for the Humanities (1970–1975), the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Association of University Professors (member of executive council 1954–1956), the American Philosophical Association (President of the Eastern Division 1971–1972 and board chairman 1974–1977), and Phi Beta Kappa. His awards included: Guggenheim fellow, 1957–1958; Edward P. Curtis Prize for undergraduate teaching at the University of Rochester, 1962; American Council of Learned Societies fellow, 1965; DLitt Hamilton College, 1974; LHD Emory University, 1977; and D.Phil. Tübingen University, 1977. Beck died on 7 June 1997 in Rochester, New York.

Beck was for many years a leading Kant scholar of world renown. He not only published widely used translations of Kant’s works, but also wrote expert introductions and commentaries for these works. Over the years, students and scholars have depended on Beck’s translations and helpful commentary. Beck served as editor of *Proceedings of the*

Third International Kant Congress in 1970. He also served on several editorial boards, including *Kant-Studien*, and wrote numerous scholarly articles for the journal.

For Beck, Kant is important because he set the problems of modern philosophy and also set much of its agenda with his extensive influence. This is especially true in the theory of knowledge and ethics, but it is true in other areas of philosophy as well, including the possibility of metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. In his 1965 *Studies in the Philosophy of Kant*, Beck devotes three of his own essays to Kant's famous analytic-synthetic distinction and the so-called synthetic a priori. He tried to clarify Kant's use of these ideas by asking a whole series of important questions, such as whether synthetic judgments be made analytic, does the epistemology of synthesis account for the factor of necessity in knowledge, and whether Kant wrongly made things necessary which are in fact contingent. Beck claims that Kant's use of "synthetic" as having one meaning in his transcendental logic, another in his general logic, and also another in his methodology, is confusing and unfortunate.

Beck also claimed that Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* has been neglected in favor of the more popular *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*. But he contends that an adequate understanding of Kant's moral philosophy cannot be achieved without paying attention to important discussions of freedom, the postulates of pure practical reason, and the notion of practical reason found in the second *Critique*. Beck tried to remedy the neglect of this work with his elaborate *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*, published in 1961. Beck states that it is only in the second *Critique* that all of the various strands of Kant's thoughts are woven together into the pattern of his practical philosophy. For Kant, freedom is the only one of the Transcendent

Ideas of pure reason that we can know, while the Ideas of God and Immortality of the Soul are unknowable. But morality depends on freedom and reason; morality cannot simply be a matter of faith, nor can morality be coerced. Consequently, Kant's great problem in his second *Critique* is to try to show how morality can be both rational and free.

Beck was also interested in the question of what exactly is a secular philosophy. In his 1961 book *Six Secular Philosophers* he examined this question, identifying families of secular philosophers, and giving special attention to Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, William James, and George Santayana. Beck claims that these six philosophers made important contributions to what he calls liberal religion. While we cannot expect a rigid or exact notion of secular philosophy, we can expect that secular philosophy requires independence of thought, and is not simply another theology of a defense of a particular form of religion. A secular philosophy will take religion seriously and try to answer questions concerning its meaning and value.

Beck divides the six secular philosophers he studies into two distinct families. The first group, made up of Spinoza, Hume, and Kant, considered science and philosophy as limiting the scope and validity as well as the content of religious belief. The second family, made up of Nietzsche, James, and Santayana, was most concerned with the relation of religious values to other values in life and culture. Spinoza viewed science, religion, and philosophy as all-rational in requiring reason as their basis. As a monist, Spinoza viewed God, nature, and reality as one, or essentially the same thing in substance. Kant, on the other hand, according to Beck, agreed with Hume that no religious belief can be confirmed by a scientific interpretation of nature. For both, there is no scientific basis of religion. But, Beck alleged, where Hume concluded so much the worse for

religion, Kant instead said that there is another basis for religion that is also rational. This, for Kant, is our moral consciousness. True religion can be based on the fact of morality, just as Spinoza thought it could be based on true philosophy and science. Nietzsche, according to Beck, gave a negative answer to the question whether religion could be justified by reference to moral values. Nietzsche saw the illusions of religion as encumbrances to be cast away, if humans are to become mature and masters of their own destiny.

According to Beck, both James and Santayana found an error in Nietzsche's notion that all actions spring from a natural will to power. Even if men are driven by power, this power can be transformed and made morally useful and valuable, according to James. For James, religion can help humans pragmatically, to set higher goals for themselves and make piecemeal progress, and thus improve their lives. For Santayana, religion was a myth to be taken seriously, but not literally. Taken literally, religion conflicts with fact and cannot be defended. But taken figuratively, it can have great poetic value, moral value, and beauty. For Santayana, religion pursues a life of reason through the imagination. Without imagination human life does not rise above its merely animal nature, and cannot produce the chief embodiments of culture: fine art, morality, literature, philosophy, or even science itself. Beck goes on to state in detail ways in which his six thinkers developed their secular philosophies which in their different ways sought to show the role of religion in modern life.

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Guy W. Stroh

BEECHER, CATHARINE ESTHER (1800–1878)

Catharine Beecher was born on 6 September 1800 in East Hampton, Long Island, and died on 12 May 1878 in Elmira, New York. She was the daughter of the great Calvinist theologian and preacher Lyman Beecher and his first wife.

Raised in Litchfield, Connecticut, Beecher's early education emphasized classical Roman poetry, English poetry, American literature, mathematics, science, and the domestic female arts of maintaining a household. During her early twenties she founded the Hartford Female Seminary in 1823, undertaking the education of young girls including that of her younger sister, Harriet Beecher.

In 1932 Catharine Beecher moved with her father, stepmother, and siblings to Cincinnati, Ohio, where Lyman Beecher had been appointed President of Lane Theological Seminary. Shortly thereafter Catharine established the Western Female Institute, but it soon failed financially. Daughter of one of New England's most famous preachers, sister and half-sister to seven other preachers, Beecher used her rhetorical skills to champion social reform. Her twenty-nine publications during a forty-five year period, and her numerous public speeches, reflect Beecher's dedication to addressing many of the social and religious concerns of the new republic. These include slavery, war, and the movements for the education and enfranchisement of women and non-whites. She cofounded several schools for girls. In addition, she traveled the eastern United States, especially the New England region, giving speeches to assemblies of women regarding women's education and women's rights. A second goal related to the reconciliation of her developing religious philosophy with secular moral thought, especially that of the Scottish Common Sense movement and Utilitarianism. In furtherance of this goal she wrote a number of philosophical works on philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion.

A third goal, also later pursued with her sister Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, was emancipation of Americans held in slavery. In furtherance of this goal she traveled the country giving speeches to the largely

women-led emancipation movement. In addition to writings on religious, moral, and social philosophy, Beecher authored didactic texts that reveal her philosophy of education. Chief among these is her classic, credited as founding the field of home economics, later revised and co-authored with her sister Harriet Beecher Stowe, *Principles of Domestic Science* (1870).

The Elements of Mental and Moral Philosophy, Founded upon Experience, Reason and the Bible (1831) is one of Beecher's two works on philosophy of mind. The other is *Common Sense Applied to Religion; or, The Bible and the People* (1857). Beecher was heavily influenced by the Scottish Common Sense philosophy of Thomas Reid and David Hume, and by Jeremy Bentham's Utilitarianism. She criticizes authors who examine philosophy of mind but stop short of examining the role of the divinity, divine insight, and revelation in the activities of the mind. The parallel construction of these two works, written a quarter-century apart, and the fact that the first was privately published and closely circulated, suggests that the latter is the revised, polished version of an earlier draft. *Common Sense Applied to Religion; or, The Bible and the People* goes beyond the earlier *Elements* in its analysis of the application of philosophy of mind to philosophy of religion. In these writings Beecher rather unapologetically and unphilosophically accepts the truth of the Bible as a source of revealed knowledge.

Beecher examines these questions more satisfactorily in *Letters on the Difficulties of Religion*, written in the interim between the composition of *Elements* and *Common Sense*, but Beecher's point of departure for these two works is that of a Christian philosopher who believes that the Bible is an irrefutable source of knowledge about the divine will and divine intention. From her description of the way in which Common Sense philosophy was modified by Puritan theology, Beecher's

Ethics examines what we can learn from philosophy of mind about the nature and content of moral knowledge. *Common Sense* has a lesser emphasis on ethics, but, like *Elements*, it too focuses on the consequence of moral action for salvation.

The Duty of American Women to Their Country appeared in 1845 and popularized Catharine Beecher as a speaker in the increasingly popular ladies' clubs that had long existed in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, but whose appeal had spread to smaller towns in upstate New York and the near Midwest. *The Evils Suffered by American Women and American Children: The Cause and the Remedy* is the text of a speech presented at such women's meetings during 1846 and 1847. In *Duty* and in *Evils* Beecher draws on her Puritan beliefs to set out arguments that support the view that women have a special duty to educate children and to be moral exemplars that hopefully shame men into imitation.

Beecher's anti-suffrage views are explained at length, but for the most part not philosophically, in her *Woman's Profession as Mother and Educator, with Views in Opposition to Woman Suffrage* (1872). Like many of her writings, this is addressed to a general readership of educated women, at a time when a complete grammar school education was not common for girls in America. *Woman's Profession* is a compilation of two speeches given in opposition to suffrage from the very end of 1870 in Boston and in May 1871 in Hartford. Beecher wrote an early and important pro-emancipation pamphlet *An Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism, with Reference to the Duty of American Females* (1837).

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Mary Ellen Waithe

BENHABIB, SEYLA (1950–)

Seyla Benhabib was born on 9 September 1950 in Istanbul, Turkey. She received a BA degree from the American College for Girls in Istanbul in 1970. Arriving in the United States in 1970, she earned a BA from Brandeis University in 1972 and then she attended Yale University, receiving the PhD in philosophy in 1977. She taught at Yale during 1977–79, and then held a two-year appointment as an Alexander von Humboldt Fellow at the Max-Planck Institut in Starnberg, Germany. She then joined the philosophy department at Boston University in 1981, staying until 1985. She then was a professor of philosophy at Harvard University (1987–89), professor of philosophy and women's studies at SUNY Stony Brook (1989–91), and professor of political science and philosophy at the New

School for Social Research (1991–93). From 1993 to 2001 she was Professor of Government at Harvard, where she also was chair of Harvard's Program on Social Studies (1996–2000). In 2001 she returned to Yale, where she is Eugene Meyer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy. She also was the director of Ethics, Politics and Economics program (2002–2008).

Benhabib has given the Gauss Lectures at Princeton (1998), the Spinoza Lectures in Amsterdam (2001), the John Seeley Memorial Lectures at Cambridge University (2002), the Tanner Lectures in Berkeley (2004). In 2009 she received Germany's Ernst Bloch prize, and in 2012 she received the Dr. Leopold-Lucas Prize by the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, Germany. She was elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1995, and she was elected President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association for 2006–07.

Benhabib's unparalleled expertise with the Marxist tradition, the movement of Critical Theory, and the thought of both Jürgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt, provides her with a unique vantage point on fundamental issues of contemporary political philosophy, political theory, and ethical theory. Her own theoretical position starts from the moral community relying on moral dialogue to determine acceptable norms. This position requires each person to participate as an equal in the public discourse, regulated by discourse ethics, so that consensus can fairly emerge. A thin version of discourse ethics could elicit approvals or vetoes from each person, based on one's perspectives and preferences, which others must impartially acknowledge. *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (1992) seeks deeper moral respect, able to truly comprehend and sympathize with

another's unique personal situation, to permit more substantial and mutual understanding. Benhabib appeals to Arendt's recommendation to "view each person as one to whom I owe the moral respect to consider their standpoint" (1992, 136). Benhabib continued to supplement discourse ethics with insights from Continental thinkers and feminists in her subsequent writings, such as *Feminism as Critique* (1994).

Benhabib's next two books tackled political and ethical concerns on a global scale. *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era* (2002) denies that cultures have firm boundaries and affirms a version of liberal democracy enriched by intercultural permeability. Her next book, *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Citizens and Residents* (2004), won awards from the American Political Science Association (2005) and the North American Society for Social Philosophy. Benhabib forges a type of cosmopolitanism compatible with cultural pluralism, based on equal rights and an individual's freedom to select and change cultural membership. *Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times* (2011) revives Kantian hopes for an ethical world without tight borders, where countries provide refuge for all persons regardless of origins or ethnicity.

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BERGER, PETER LUDWIG (1929–)

Peter Berger was born on 17 March 1929 in Vienna, Austria. He immigrated to the United States at the age of seventeen, and earned his BA from Wagner College in 1949. He then studied sociology at the New School for Social Research, receiving the MA in 1950 and PhD in 1954. He spent one year as a student at the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia before deciding that, though he was fully committed to the Christian message, he could not preach this message in its conventional form. Berger then taught sociology at the Women’s College of the University of North Carolina (1956–58), was associate professor of social ethics at Hartford Theological Seminary (1958–63), and then professor of sociology at the New School for Social Research. In the 1970s he taught at Rutgers University and Boston College. In 1981 he went to Boston University to become professor of sociology and theology. In 2002 Berger became professor emeritus, continuing to occasionally teach and remaining as Director of the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture and Director of the Institute for Religion and World Affairs at Boston.

Berger’s numerous publications cover a wide range of academic areas, including sociological theory, the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of religion, Third World development, and liberal theology. Berger embraced sociology as a tool for personal liberation. The central message of his *Invitation to Sociology* (1963) was that sociology can awaken us to the profound role that society has in determining our identities and values. This thin volume has sold over a million copies, helping more than two generations of readers understand how a sociological perspective can free us from social masks and enable us to accept personal responsibility for our lives.

John R. Shook

In 1966 Berger and Thomas Luckmann co-authored *The Social Construction of Reality*, one of the most widely read treatises in the sociology of knowledge. Their argument was that social processes play a pivotal role in a culture's establishment of knowledge. The sociology of knowledge was thus a modern form of philosophical relativism and cast suspicion on human claims to absolute truth. In this book, Berger identified himself with a philosophical tradition that included Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, and Karl Mannheim. He and Luckmann, like Marx, argued that human consciousness is determined by our social being. And, like Nietzsche, they demonstrated how the "art of mistrust" concerning claims to absolute or transcendental truth can lead to liberation and personal authenticity. It was, however, from Mannheim and Weber that they gleaned a somewhat utopian hope that the sociology of knowledge might enable us to minimize ideologizing influences and thereby inch closer to more reliable and universal forms of knowledge.

Berger then applied the sociology of knowledge to the field of religion in *The Sacred Canopy* (1967). Though this work was written in an abstract and jargon-ridden way, it nonetheless became one of the most important books ever published in the sociology of religion. Berger concentrated almost entirely on religious thought or doctrine, defining religion as "the human enterprise by which a sacred cosmos is established" (p. 25). By this he meant that societies invent religious beliefs as a way of bestowing authority upon their customs, morals, and socio-economic structures. Basic to his argument was the assumption that religion is human-made, a projection of our own hopes, needs, and desires. The implication was that religious doctrines do not really contain information about God but are instead the product of

humanity's speculative efforts to understand and explain the universe. A further implication was that sociology is itself a component of secularization. That is, by exposing religion as a human projection grounded in specific social settings, sociology was furthering the gradual decline of religion's influence in Western culture. Yet, in the second appendix to this book, Berger voiced his own personal (as opposed to professional) opinion that the sociological perspective does not necessarily have the last word. He countered that it is possible that humans project sacred meanings on to the world because the world really is sacred. Even though sociology is a valuable tool for understanding how social processes give specific shape to our religious beliefs, sociology has nothing to say about the possibility that there really is a transcendent reality toward which our religious beliefs point.

Berger spent much of the 1970s examining the process of modernization in Third World countries and related theoretical debates concerning the connections between economics and democracy (1975, 1977). His overarching interest, however, remained that of the possibility of meaningful religious thought in the modern world. On the one hand, Berger began his life as a staunch theological conservative, influenced by the writings of theologian Karl Barth. Yet, as his career progressed, Berger moved to a decidedly liberal theological viewpoint. He saw in the writings of the classic liberal Protestant theologian, Friedrich Schleiermacher, a model for locating the core of religion in experience rather than doctrine. First in *A Rumor of Angels* (1969) and then in *The Heretical Imperative* (1979), Berger offered one of the most lucid theological strategies of the late 20th century. In these works Berger sought to demonstrate the superficiality of modern secular thought as well as the intellectual dishonesty of

conservative religion's claim to absolute truth. In their place he proposed a liberal theological perspective grounded in humanity's experiences of a superhuman, supernatural reality. Religious thinking should proceed inductively, based upon empirical accounts of human "consciousness of something beyond itself" rather than deductively from scripture. Berger maintained that "religious truth has nothing to fear from reason...[and that] truth will reassert itself again and again no matter how many sobering questions are addressed to it" (1979, p. 86). He conceded that an empirical approach to religious thought cannot yield absolute truths. He claimed it could, however, establish the empirical fact that humans have recurring experiences of something beyond themselves, and that this might be sufficient for a faith characterized by open-mindedness and toleration.

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Robert Fuller

BERGMANN, GUSTAV (1906–1987)

Gustav Bergmann was born on 4 May 1906 in Vienna, Austria. He attended the University of Vienna, where he studied mathematics and minored in philosophy, working in geometry with Hans Hahn, a member of the Vienna Circle. Through his membership in the Vienna Circle he was especially influenced by Kurt Gödel, Moritz Schlick, Friedrich Waismann, and Rudolf Carnap. When Bergmann received his PhD in mathematics from Vienna in 1928 at age twenty-two, he was the youngest doctor produced at the university until that time.

Bergmann obtained a JD degree from the University of Vienna and worked as a corporate lawyer in Vienna. As a Jew, Bergmann was obliged to leave Austria, arriving in the United States in October 1938. In 1940 he joined Iowa's philosophy department, and added an appointment to the psychology department in 1943. Bergmann spent the remainder of his career at the University of Iowa. Bergmann was President of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1967–68. He retired in 1974, and died on 21 April 1987 in Iowa City, Iowa.

In his *Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong* (1967), Bergmann offered a critique of Austrian Realism and used it as a foil to develop his own realistic position, which exploits the syntax of the logic of A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell's *Principia Mathematica*, in which a higher-order logic

built upon set theory with ramified types provides the syntax and logical form for his realist ontology. Entities in Bergmann's world are analyzed as natured particulars, each consisting of a bare particular, a *principium individuationis*, which Bergmann, erroneously, equated with Aquinas's *materia signata*, but which in fact is akin to Aquinas's *materia prima*, and a collection of universals, or properties. Thus, the constituents of an entity such as a red circle would consist of a bare particular, Redness, and Roundness, with Redness and Roundness bound to the bare particular by an inhomogeneous nexus, called Exemplification, also a universal, with one instantiation of Exemplification to tie each of the other properties to the bare particular. Exemplification is inhomogeneous because, although it is, like Redness and Roundness, a universal, it is not a character of natured particulars. Exemplification may also tie elements (quasiconstituents) of a set to a collective. If Tom, Dick, and Harry are denoted by *T*, *D*, *H*, and the predicate "Man" by *M*, then $M = \{T, D, H\}$; but *M* does not consequently become an individual of the same type as *T*, *D*, or *H*, since *M* is a higher-level type than *T*, *D*, and *H*. "A collection of entities," Bergmann often reiterated, "is not itself an entity." With Exemplification, then, one obtains a complex or natured particular, without it, merely a "cluster."

In opposition to his brand of realism, Bergmann posed Nelson Goodman's nominalism as found in *The Structure of Appearance* and its underlying Calculus of Individuals devised by Goodman and W.V. Quine as a counter-foil. One serious difficulty with Bergmann's analysis, pointed out by Moltke S. Gram, which he failed to solve, is that Exemplification yields a Bradleyan regress, since, as a universal, it in turn requires a nexus to be bound to a bare particular. Yet it was precisely this relational regress that

Bergmann found in Goodman's system, in which particulars were to be tied to particulars by "nextness" or overlapping, on the basis upon which he defended his realism.

Because the form of Bergmann's world has ontological status (1964, p. 56), a ramified theory of types is required. The metalanguage M of a language S is interpreted, and therefore Bergmann disagreed with Ludwig Wittgenstein that "logical form is nothing," holding, on the contrary, that "a metalanguage is always interpreted" (1964, p. 254). Nured particulars are individuals, universals that comprise the properties of nured particulars are first-order. The properties or "pseudocharacters" of the metalanguage include Existence, Generality, Particularity, etc.; these are also predicates, being higher-order properties of nured particulars and syncategorematic, while character properties, such as Redness and Roundness are categorematic. Pseudocharacters are second-order predicates, properties of properties, or sets, taken as entities (individuals) in their own right; syncategories include also logical connectives; Generality and Particularity are third-level types, Existence is a fourth-level type.

In addition to developing in detail his metaphysics of logical positivism, Bergmann contributed to philosophy of logic, and to philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind. He argued in favor of a realism, comprised of a dualism of mind and matter, neither reducible to the other, and in which mental acts are intentions that pertain to the external manipulation of matter. Bergmann was influenced by the phenomenism of Austrian realists Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong, and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.

In his *Philosophy of Science* (1957) in which Bergmann dealt particularly with philosophy of physics and probability theory, he remained close to the original conception

of science as presented by the logical positivists. In dealing with intentionality, Bergmann was closer to Husserl insofar as held that mental acts involved a "fringe" and a "core" in which there was a representation of the objects perceived by the mind, the latter being a temporal sequence of perceptions of properties (e.g. redness, roundness), thought, desire, and that these mental objects are obtained by *acquaintance*, that is, as experienced objects. The mental objects have the same ontological status, then, as experienced entities. Through his theory of acquaintance, Bergmann was also close to the behaviorists, especially B.F. Skinner, insofar as he held that behavior can best be studied by observation and explained in terms of the stimulus-response mechanism.

Bergmann's work fostered an active "school" of metaphysicians of logical positivism, centered around the University of Iowa, but one which had little influence outside the Midwest. Its chief propagator was Elmer David Klemke who edited anthologies of writings on the philosophies of Frege, Russell, and Bergmann, helping to bring the work of members of the Bergmannian school wider national and international attention.

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Irving H. Anellis

BERNSTEIN, RICHARD JACOB (1932–)

Richard J. Bernstein was born on 14 May 1932 in New York City. He excelled in school, earning admission to the University of

Chicago accelerated program, where he met Richard Rorty and began a lifelong friendship and philosophical dialogue. After completing his BA in 1951 with honors in philosophy, he attended Columbia University to earn a BS in 1953, and then went to Yale University the following year, earning his MA in 1955 and PhD in philosophy in 1958. While at Yale, Bernstein was again in the company of Rorty, and encountered the philosopher who had the greatest influence upon him, Hegel, for the first time. It was also at this time that he began serious study of John Dewey under professor John E. Smith. Besides Smith, Paul Weiss and Wilfrid Sellars were two of his main influences and interlocutors. He returned to Yale as a philosophy professor in 1959, where he remained until 1965, when he was denied tenure in a controversial decision that led to student protest. After returning to Hebrew University for one year as a visiting professor, he was hired as professor and chair of the philosophy department at Haverford College in 1966, where he became the T. Wistar Brown Professor of Philosophy in 1979. He moved to his current position as Vera List Professor of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research in 1989, which is his current position. He has been the American Philosophical Association Romanell Lecturer, President of the Metaphysical Society of America, President of the Charles S. Peirce Society, and President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1988–89.

With such figures as Rorty and Hilary Putnam, Bernstein is one of the figures primarily responsible for the resurgence of American pragmatism. Bernstein’s writing career began by recovering, analyzing, and sharply criticizing American pragmatism, specifically Dewey and Charles Peirce. His first book, *John Dewey* (1966), has served as a touchstone for scholars of Dewey since,

and his “Introduction” to *John Dewey: On Experience Nature and Freedom* (1960), also remains a classic overview of Dewey’s thought.

Praxis and Action (1971) offers what Dewey might have called the “criticism of criticisms.” Bernstein’s views of four different approaches to actions are critical, yet retrieve the contribution to understanding human action and the praxis of understanding human action that they make. He argues that there is a solipsism and unavoidable nihilism in Kierkegaard and Sartre’s existentialism, respectively, though they provide a rich account of human subjectivity. The pernicious forms of *a priorism* that run through analytic philosophers’ theory of action that presents itself unselfconsciously as “the final solution” to all philosophical problems of action degenerates for Bernstein into ideological posturing at its worst. However, analytic philosophy also provides conceptual clarification at its best, dissolving the pseudo-scientific claims of previous theories and their faulty ontological biases. Marx provides a penetrating understanding of the socially embedded nature of human subjectivity and action, even if he neglects the main strengths that American pragmatism provides: a critical account of the norms of inquiry. Bernstein remarks that each of these strands of philosophical inquiry can be combined to enlighten and deepen the others.

The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (1976) takes a similar approach by presenting the metatheoretical framework of four different schools of social and political theory. Here Bernstein is perhaps most explicitly critical of empirical social science and its confused commitment to a hypostatized version of the fact-value distinction. While acknowledging the work of some of the major empiricist social scientists and philosophers with regard to

this thorny problem, clearly the influence of logical empiricism has left mainstream empirical social science blind to the ways in which it behaves ideologically, as opposed to dialogically. The three other schools of social and political theory – ordinary language analysis, phenomenology, and critical theory – criticize it for just this blindness. Bernstein remains staunchly committed to the irreducibly intentional aspect of describing and explaining human actions, against those who would map the methodology of natural science and its categories of observation onto human phenomena in its totality. However, he also claims that his emphasis on intentionality, so well formulated in the phenomenological tradition, is not incompatible with the critical theoretical point that the sources of our intentions are often the products of forces outside of our control and opaque to us, either internally or externally.

The main arguments of *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis* (1983) and *The Pragmatic Turn* (2010) concern the investigation of rationality and the consequences of a view of rationality for questions regarding the status of our truth claims, our intellectual practices, and our ethical commitments. The objectivist insists on a notion of objectivity that would eliminate from it any trace of human subjectivity, historicity, or sociality. Bernstein takes this objectivist task to be not only impossible, but a distortion of how our concept of objectivity emerges and works. He traces the insistence on this chimerical notion of objectivity, ‘objectivism’, to a certain reading of Descartes. He terms it the “Cartesian Anxiety,” an anxiety that produces the false antinomy between an objectivity dependent for its validity on an algorithmic methodology of science and a methodological relativism. Bernstein explores the debate about rationality in its various guises, concluding that there are elements to all inquiry

that must be taken into consideration; there are fallibilist, contextualist, practical, and normative dimensions to scientific inquiry understood as a practice making theoretical claims.

The ethical character of philosophy, and of all thinking, is given a grave reading in *Radical Evil*. There he says, in a typically pragmatic fashion, that though evil can never be given a full conceptual articulation and that it is “inscrutable,” there nonetheless remains a responsibility to grapple with the problem as best we can, to perform a kind of ongoing *ernst der begriff*: a labor of the concept of ‘evil’.

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Brendan Hogan

BLACK, MAX (1909–1988)

Max Black was born on 24 February 1909 in Baku, Russia, in what is now Azerbaijan. The family emigrated to England in 1912. He entered Queen's College of Cambridge University, where, under the influence of Bertrand Russell and Frank Ramsey, and to an even greater degree, G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein, his interests turned increasingly toward philosophy of mathematics first, and then toward philosophy generally. He completed the BA degree in 1930 and was awarded a year-long fellowship to attend the University of Göttingen, where he studied with Hermann Weyl, Paul Bernays, and David Hilbert. Black returned to complete the PhD at the University of London in 1939, writing a dissertation on "Theories of Logical Positivism."

While pursuing his doctoral studies, Black taught at the Royal Grammar School at Newcastle-on-Tyne, and then, from 1936

to 1940, at the Teacher Training Institute of Education at London University. In 1940 he moved to the United States to accept a philosophy position at the University of Illinois. He became a United States citizen in 1948. In 1946 he became a professor of philosophy at Cornell University, and in 1954 became the Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy at Cornell, a position he held until his retirement in 1977. He served as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1958–1959, and as President of the International Institute of Philosophy in 1981–1984, having been only the second American to hold the latter position. He was also a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In his retirement, Black continued to serve as Director of the Cornell Program in Science, Technology and Society until 1978, and he was a participant in that program until his death on 27 August 1988 in Ithaca, New York.

As a philosopher, Black understood the primary purpose of philosophy as conceptual clarification, or as he characterized his own work by the end of his career, "the articulation of concepts." In his efforts at clarifying wide ranges of philosophical problems, Black was less concerned with precise formalism than with sensitivity to common language and common sense. This sensitivity was an inheritance from his Cambridge exposure to C.D. Broad, Ramsey, and Moore, although the greatest single influence on Black was Wittgenstein. While his philosophical interests ranged widely, mathematics and language provided the central foci around which his work developed.

As Black looked back on his own work only a few years before his death, he divided his writings into three groups, expository, critical, and constructive. Black classified his magisterial *Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, as well as a number of later essays

in which he pursued themes drawn from his work with Wittgenstein, as at the same time both expository and critical. Black also included his important and pioneering logic text, *Critical Thinking*, among his expository writings, as well as *The Labyrinth of Language*.

Black characterized his constructive work as focusing most importantly on four sets of issues: vagueness, models and metaphors, induction and probability, and rationality. His work on vagueness, as already noted, started with his pioneering essay of 1937. His interest in metaphor, starting with his 1955 paper by that title, extended the importance of Black's work into the area of aesthetics. The basis of probabilistic and inductive reasoning was a long-standing concern in Black's work, starting with his 1947 paper, "Professor Broad on the Limit Theorems of Probability," and his 1949 "The Justification of Induction," and continuing through a number of later papers and exchanges defending a common-sense understanding of induction according to which the very request for a justification of induction is fundamentally misguided. Black's exploration of the notion of rationality was a particularly dominant theme toward the end of his career. In that area of his work he explored traditional problems of rationality such as the prisoner's dilemma, the core question of "Why Should I Be Rational?" and the usefulness of formal decision theory in modeling our rationality. His very last published papers were a critique of Bayesian decision theory, arguing that intelligent human choices are based more on a practical and informal art than on the application of some kind of formal calculus of probability, and an exploration of "Ambiguities of Rationality."

Black's work in the articulation of concepts also carried him deeply into questions of philosophical method and into traditional questions of metaphysics. In

the 1940s he wrote several articles on the paradox of analysis and the problem of how analysis of terms can be informative. The influence of Wittgenstein led Black to reject the notion that terms possess meanings that are constituents of the world waiting to be discovered, clarified, and categorized by philosophers. Rather Black recognized that understanding the functioning of human language also involved, to use a title of a 1949 article, "Speaking with the Vulgar." His high regard for ordinary language accordingly led Black, like many philosophers who worked in the tradition of Wittgenstein, to pay less attention to meanings and more to rules. Black devoted a good deal of attention to the analysis of rules, how they are formulated in various kinds of statements, and how they are expressed in various forms of practice. His method was to start with the deliverances of ordinary language. In particular, Black favored starting out by identifying certain paradigm cases of the application of the concepts to be articulated. He believed that through the examination of the range of these paradigm cases the philosopher can move, by an essentially inductive process, to a set of cautious generalizations that will lead to an integrative articulation of the concept. Careful examination of paradigm cases, on Black's view, enables the philosopher to identify the rules and criteria that govern the use of the concepts, and to show their place within various systems of semantically and pragmatically related concepts.

Black devoted considerable attention, starting with his 1951 "Achilles and the Tortoise," to temporal paradoxes. In 1952 Black wrote an article, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," that has been widely reprinted in metaphysics texts and elicited substantial journal response from other philosophers. Black raised his ingenious "twin globe"

counter-example to the traditional principle that distinct entities can only be distinct by virtue of some qualitative difference.

Beyond Black's interest in and important contributions to traditional technical problems of philosophy, Black also manifested a career-long concern for what one might call the more human face of philosophy. As early as 1944, Black wrote a paper, "Education as Art and Discipline." This interest in education and in ethics continued throughout Black's career. In the final decade of his life, for example, he wrote a contribution, "Humanistic Education and the Physician's Art," for an anthology on *Changing Values in Medicine*, and authored "The Mount Carmel Declaration," a statement issued by a symposium on ethics and technology.

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David E. Schrader

BLACKWELL, ANTOINETTE LOUISA BROWN (1825–1921)

Antoinette Louisa Brown was born on 20 May 1825 in Henrietta, New York. In 1856 she married Samuel Blackwell, who backed Antoinette wholeheartedly, helping to raise their children so that she could work part-time and write. She died on 5 November 1921 in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Exposed by her family to the Protestant revivals of the age and religiously precocious, she was made a member of her Congregational church at age nine. She graduated from Oberlin College's non-degree-granting Ladies Department in 1847. She then enrolled as a "resident graduate" in the Theological Seminary, which refused to enroll women officially, and which granted her neither a degree nor a license to preach upon completion of her studies.

For two years Blackwell preached where invited and lectured on women's rights, antislavery and temperance. Many a fellow preacher tried to shout her down from the pulpit. Even her own activist friends, including Lucy Stone, Susan B. Anthony, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, discouraged her, as they considered organized religion corrupt and outdated. In 1850 she was a delegate to the first National Women's Rights Convention in Worcester, Massachusetts. In 1853, taking a Congregational pulpit, she became the first woman minister of a recognized denomination in the United States. Ten months later she resigned, her increasingly liberal religious views diverging too radically from Calvinist tenets. Eventually she became a Unitarian.

Blackwell moved to New York City, volunteering in slums and prisons and studying the effects of poverty on mental health and society. At publisher Horace Greeley's suggestion, she wrote weekly articles for his *New York Tribune*, collected in her first book, *Shadows of Our Social System* (1856). In the 1870s she returned to the lecture circuit, and in 1878 was recognized as a Unitarian minister. Oberlin granted her honorary degrees in 1878 and 1908. In 1920 she cast her first vote, one of the few women's suffrage pioneers who lived long enough to do so.

In her scientific treatises, Blackwell tries to show the evolution of the universe from the simple to the complex. She brings all of Creation, however, back to "one Mind infinite in executiveness." In *The Sexes Throughout Nature* (1875) she argues against Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, disputing that the male is the representative type of the species and the female but a modification of it. She argues that on the subject of the normal powers and functions of woman at least, women are more than the equals of even the wisest men. She sanctioned part-time employment for women, made possible by assistance with household duties from men, and her greatest contribution must be that she modeled this herself by combining marriage, children, social activism, professional work, public speaking, and scholarly writing in a long, productive life.

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Cicily Corbett

BLANSHARD, BRAND (1892–1987)

Brand Blanshard was born on 27 August 1892 in Fredericksburg, Ohio, and died on 18 November 1987 in New Haven, Connecticut. Together with a fraternal twin named Paul, later a prominent social critic, he was raised by his grandmother in penurious conditions. Their home, however, was one where learning was encouraged, and the family twice relocated for educational purposes, the second time in 1910, when they moved to Ann Arbor so that the boys could attend the University of Michigan, an affordable public institution. In his junior year Blanshard won a Rhodes

scholarship, enrolling at Merton College of Oxford University in the fall of 1913. At Oxford his key influences were F.H. Bradley, Harold Joachim, and H.W.B. Joseph. When the United States entered World War I, he was drafted and assigned to an educational unit in France to teach the history of philosophy to his fellow soldiers. During this period he dropped his given first name, Percy. Upon leaving the Army, he returned to Merton to write a thesis on John Dewey's theory of judgment. After receiving his Oxford BSc degree, he moved to Harvard where he completed a PhD thesis on the "Nature of Judgment" under C.I. Lewis.

In 1921 Blanshard became an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan. He moved to Swarthmore College in 1925, where he eventually became a full professor. In 1945 he moved to Yale as Sterling Professor of Philosophy, holding that position until his retirement in 1961. He also served as chair of the philosophy department from 1945 to 1950, and 1959 to 1961.

Blanshard gave both the Gifford Lectures and Carus Lectures, an honor shared only by Dewey at that time. His many other lectureships included the Hertz (British Academy), the Howison (California), the Adamson (Manchester), and the Whitehead, Dudleian, and Noble (Harvard). His Adamson Lecture became the delightful classic *On Philosophical Style* (1954). He was a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, an Honorary Fellow of Merton College, and a Guggenheim Fellow. He received fourteen honorary doctorates; served as President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1942–45; and, despite his avowed agnosticism, was President of the American Theological Society. He published approximately 300 articles and eight books, the most noteworthy of which are his two-volume *The Nature of Thought* (1939) and the trilogy *Reason and Goodness* (1961),

Reason and Analysis (1962), and *Reason and Belief* (1974). Critical reaction to his work was highlighted by his selection as the fourth American in the distinguished series *The Library of Living Philosophers*.

Blanshard's most fundamental presupposition was that reality was ultimately intelligible and he believed that the rational life is the most valuable, for the rationalistic temperament is just the actualization of our natural desire to know and is thus productive of good. Blanshard often referred to his work as neo-Spinozistic and much of it does have close parallels with Spinoza's thought. Rationalism maintains that "reason is a faculty that can lay hold of truths beyond the reach of sense perception, both in certainty and generality" (p. 527). These truths include universals and their relations, which admit of no exception. Rationalism may also involve epistemological and metaphysical commitments. For instance, the "belief that the world is a rationally ordered whole, the parts of which are linked by logical necessity and the structure of which is thereby intelligible" (p. 528); the belief that "a and not-a cannot coexist" holds not merely for sentences but for the real world; and that facts involve a positive coherence, that "they are so bound up with each other that none could be different without all being different" (p. 528). Blanshard believed in internal relations: relations that cannot be changed or removed without affecting the terms themselves between which those relations hold. Cautious about the senses, and seeing reality as an ordered system accessible to the intellect, he was also a strict determinist, maintaining that there were no contingently true propositions – given sufficient knowledge we could deduce an effect from prior knowledge of its cause.

Blanshard is best known for his advocacy of coherence as both the nature and criterion of truth. Coherence has both metaphysical and psychological roots in his thought. As to the latter, he wrote that in reflection we

(1) specify a problem, (2) amass data through observation and memory, (3) make a leap of suggestion, (4) deduce the consequences of that suggestion, and then (5) compare these implications with fact. He argued that the last two of these steps are really a single process that establishes the coherence of a suggestion with experience. This reflective process is purposive, aiming at truth and understanding, which are essentially equivalent. But how, one asks, can we be confident that our beliefs conform to the world, and that a coherent system of beliefs offers us a genuine view of reality? In response to the oft-stated criticism that there might be more than one, indeed an infinite number of consistent and thus coherent systems, Blanshard argued first, that his ideal coherence also required comprehensiveness so that everything real and possible be included; and second, that it is impossible that there could be two such systems. For there to be two they would have to differ either in facts or structure, and if so, either one would not be comprehensive or the structure of each would be a fact not included in the other. Blanshard grants that the question whether reality is, as a matter of fact, a coherent system, with which coherent thought can accord, is itself not provable but is a postulate of reason. However, it is a postulate that is more reasonable to believe than its negation because it is progressively confirmed by experience. The truth of our present judgment thus lies in a prospective relationship between that thought and reality conceived as what would ultimately satisfy the ideal intellect.

Blanshard shared Spinoza's position that things are either necessary or impossible. Perhaps his most controversial position in this area is his insistence that causation is a necessary relation. He thought that if this were not so we would be trapped in the world of the presently given, unable to move to the realms

of the past or future and with no knowledge of actual physical objects.

In *Reason and Analysis*, Blanshard produced what is perhaps our most effective critique of the various analytical schools, and their empiricist ancestors (such as Hume), because he also offered an alternative. He points out the sharp contrasts between the idealistic rationalism that dominated philosophy at the turn of the century and the realism, naturalism, pragmatism, positivism, and linguistic analysis that gained ascendancy after the war. On a range of core issues, Blanshard demonstrates that reason must be the proper foundation of philosophical thought, and that it finds its chief work in the tracing of necessary connections between universals.

Reason and Goodness, the second of the trilogy, is primarily concerned with the question whether moral judgments express knowledge or feeling. Blanshard stands firmly on the side of knowledge, the position which began with Socrates's identification of virtue and knowledge. But the most striking example of a rationalistic ethic is that of the Stoics: "the most remarkable experiment on record in the surrender of life to reason at the expense of feeling and desire" (1961, p. 43). Two aspects of the stoic tradition in ethics are especially important to Blanshard: (1) following the guidance of what Aristotle had said was distinctive or essential in our own nature, i.e. reason; and (2) conforming to that which was essential in outward nature, i.e. intelligible law. In this way, Blanshard arrived at the same position as Spinoza concerning human freedom. How can we be fully determined and yet free? They answered that true freedom consists in acting solely from a necessity of one's nature.

Reason and Belief considers the respective roles of reason and revelation in forming religious beliefs. Blanshard again argues that we should be guided by reason alone, that to

base one's beliefs on revelation or authority is to violate an ethics of belief that should direct all our beliefs, including the religious. As an example, if reality is a coherent whole the law of causality leaves no room for miracles. Where then does God fit in? Once again, he sides with Spinoza: "For us the ultimate reality in the universe is to be found in no part of it, however great, but only in the whole. It is the universe itself, not indeed as a scattered litter of items but as the one comprehensive and necessary order that a full understanding would find in it" (1974, pp. 523–4). Such a world is neither morally nor intrinsically good, but indifferent. It is a world governed by logic, not love.

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F. Michael Walsh

BLAU, JOSEPH LEON (1909–1986)

Joseph Blau was born on 6 May 1909 in Brooklyn, New York. Blau received his BA in 1931, MA in 1933, and PhD in philosophy in 1944 from Columbia University. His dissertation was titled “The Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in the Renaissance” written under philosophers James Gutmann and Herbert Schneider. During the years of his graduate study, Blau taught English in New York City high schools. After earning his doctorate, Blau was a professor of philosophy at Columbia from 1944 until 1963, when he became a professor of religion. From 1967 to 1976, Blau served as chair of the religion department. Blau retired in 1977, and died on 28 December 1986 in New York City.

Blau's scholarship concerned two areas of overlapping interests: (1) historical American philosophy, and (2) the development of Jewish philosophy. For the first of these interests he wrote *Men and Movements in American*

Philosophy (1952). This became his best known book and it was widely studied and discussed. Published in five different languages, it was dedicated to his friend Herbert Schneider whose pattern of thought it followed.

John Dewey's influence was evident in Blau's other work. For both Blau and Dewey, God is the relationship between the actual and the ideal. God, briefly stated, must be the realized existence of human beings. Commitment to these “ideals,” in their broadest reach, is the religious attitude and religion is a quality of all human experience. If we proceed analytically we will uncover different but related types of twentieth century naturalism: (1) the poetic naturalism of George Santayana; (2) the rationalistic naturalism of Morris Cohen; and (3) the experimental naturalism of Dewey, the category in which Blau's work is best placed.

In the field of Jewish philosophy, Blau attempted to clarify the whole span of Jewish philosophy from the Old Testament to Martin Buber in contemporary time. In these writings, Blau considers creation, freedom, the theories of Philo, the Talmudists, and Kabbalists, Spinoza, Gnosticism, God, individualism, prophesy, Moses, Maimonides and other less well-known figures and groups.

Like his teacher, Salo Wittmayer Baron, Blau stressed the cross-cultural effect on the development of Judaism. Among them are: *The Story of Jewish Philosophy*, the first single volume treatment of the entire span of Jewish philosophy for the non-specialist. *The Jews of the United States (1790–1840)*, edited with Baron; *Judaism in America*; and *Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in the Renaissance*. Blau suggested that according to one understanding of the Kabbalah, humanity's spiritual and ritual acts of character aid God's own self-reconciliation, making both evil and creative deeds possible.

His colleagues (including Maurice Wohlgelegen and James Martin, Jr.) organized

Blau's festschrift volume, *History, Religion and Spiritual Democracy* (1980).

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BLEDSON, ALBERT TAYLOR (1809–1877)

Albert Taylor Bledson was born on 9 November 1809 in Frankfort, Kentucky. After graduating from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1830, he served at Fort Gibson on the frontier in the Seventh U.S. Infantry, but in 1832 he resigned his commission. He taught mathematics and French at Kenyon College in 1833–34, and then was professor of mathematics at Miami University in 1834–35. During these years he studied law and theology and was ordained in the Episcopal Church in 1835, but growing doctrinal disagreements over baptismal regeneration sent him in the direction of practicing law instead of the ministry. From 1838 to 1848 he maintained a law practice in Springfield, Illinois. He never lost his primary interest in theology and philosophy, publishing his first book, *An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will* in 1845. In 1848 he accepted a position as professor of mathematics and astronomy at the University of Mississippi, and in 1854 became professor of mathematics at the University of Virginia.

With the onset of the Civil War in 1861 he joined the Confederate Army as a colonel. Jefferson Davis soon promoted him to assistant secretary of war, and then he encouraged Bledson to compose a defense of the constitutional justification for Confederate secession. In 1863 Bledson went to London to do legal research, where he remained until 1866 when he returned to Baltimore to publish *Is Davis a Traitor? Or was Secession a Constitutional Right previous to the War of 1861?* The next year he re-founded and edited the *Southern Review*, which promoted a pro-Southern, anti-industrialist, and theological agenda. In 1871 Bledson was ordained a minister in the Methodist Church and occasionally preached, but never settled

with a congregation. For some years he ran a girl's school with the assistance of his daughter, Sophia McIlvaine Bledsoe, who also co-edited the *Southern Review* from 1874 to 1878. Bledsoe continued to edit the *Southern Review* and publish extensively in its pages until his death on 8 December 1877 in Alexandria, Virginia.

Bledsoe's *Philosophy of Mathematics* (1866) was the first advanced textbook on mathematics in America by that title, although its philosophical aspects go little beyond examinations of analytical geometry and the calculus of infinitesimals. His defense of the Confederate secession had a far wider impact, succinctly stating the best case that could be made for voluntary federalism and states' rights, which perhaps played a helpful role in Davis's trial for treason. His early book *An Essay on Liberty and Slavery* (1857) had also advanced this interpretation of the Constitution alongside a virulently racist view of slaves as legitimate property. Bledsoe, like some other Southern pro-slavery intellectuals including Robert Lewis Dabney, offered Biblical interpretations in support of slavery.

Bledsoe's theology in most respects imitates the mainstream Protestant views of providence and salvation, with a particular emphasis on the reality of free will. His rejection of Jonathan Edwards's treatise against libertarianism is grounded on an appeal to the experience of freedom and a denial that volition can be explained in terms of cause and effect. Worse, the false doctrine of predestination leads to unbelief, in Bledsoe's opinion. Another cause of unbelief is a false perspective on the nature and origin of evil. His *Theodicy* (1853) attempts to vindicate God's goodness and righteousness in the face of apparent moral and natural evils. Although designed to match John Wesley's position, contemporaries noted that Bledsoe's tactics justifying the fall and sin as necessary for the

glory and dominion of God actually proceed in a manner reminiscent of Edwards. Bledsoe also caused controversy within the Southern Methodist church through his defense of infant baptism by appeal to tradition and near universal acceptance, although he confessed that he was unable to find Biblical evidence for the practice.

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John R. Shook

BLUMER, HERBERT GEORGE (1900–1987)

Herbert Blumer was born on 7 March 1900 in Saint Louis, Missouri. Blumer earned his BA in 1921 and MA in 1922 from the University of Missouri. In 1928 he completed the PhD in sociology at the University of Chicago. The sociologist Robert E. Park and philosopher George Herbert Mead were notable influences. Blumer stayed at the University of Chicago as a professor of sociology from 1928 until 1952, when he became professor and chair of sociology department at the University of California at Berkeley. He retired in 1967 and remained an active scholar at Berkeley as professor emeritus until 1986. Blumer died on 13 April 1987 in Pleasanton, California.

Blumer was a foremost interpreter of the thought of the pragmatist philosopher George Herbert Mead. He studied with Mead and succeeded Mead as the instructor of his famous seminar in social psychology. Blumer was a leading proponent of "symbolic interactionism," a view of human social life deriving from the pragmatist traditions he encountered at Chicago. Blumer edited the *American Journal of Sociology* from 1940 to 1952. He served as President of the Society for the Study of Social Problems in 1954, and as President of the American Sociological Association in 1956. In 1983 he received the ASA's highest honor, "The Award for a Career of Distinguished Scholarship."

For Blumer, symbolic interactionism is a perspective on human social life that he found in the sociology of the "Chicago school" and the social psychology of Mead. Symbolic interactionism's logical starting point is a view of social life as interdependent or joint social actions. Symbolic interactionism shares with some other action perspectives an emphasis on meanings as prompts, organizers and guides to social actions. It is distinctive, however, in the prominence given to the role of interaction in constructing and selecting the meanings that predicate actions. Symbolic interactionism highlights a social process of interpretation in which individuals indicate salient features of situations, assess and anticipate others' actions, and construct adjustments in light of those interpretations. This process grounds "joint actions" incorporating a variety of actors. Thus, unlike some other action perspectives, symbolic interactionism focuses analysis on emergent (rather than fixed or established) meanings as predicates of actions. In this view, to understand social life it is crucial to see that the process of interaction is creative and that actors participating in interaction exercise judgment, choice, and agency.

Symbolic interaction occurs in several ways. Interpersonal interaction knits together the responses and coordinates the interdependencies of individuals. Symbolic interaction also takes place between collective actors, as in union-management bargaining. Most distinctively, Blumer attributes deep significance to an intra-personal level of interaction. "Self interaction" is the process in which one successively indicates objects to one's self and responds to those indications. Through this process, an individual attends to particular objects within a situation and – by building up interpretations and actions – fashions adjustments to the situation. An individual thus selects and fits a line of action

to the situation and with the actions of others. At the heart of this view of social life, Blumer placed the human ability to indicate one's own self as an object. The "self" is an interpretive process concerning one's own being. Blumer argued that symbolic interaction and the self are undeniable, inescapable and central features of human social life and that concepts and methods to study social life must take them into account. In particular, interaction should be viewed as a contingent and constructive process, not as a neutral conduit merely carrying causal effects. His commitment to the perspectives of symbolic interactionism provided Blumer with a durable standpoint from which to challenge concepts and methods derived from other perspectives.

Blumer emphasized generic concepts as the hallmark of science and as a major goal of research. The defining imagery of a concept, Blumer pointed out, "grasps together" features of an object under study and provides an understanding of the object and how it operates. He saw the creation and use of scientific concepts as instances of the essential human practice of indicating an object and understanding its character in preparation to act toward the object. Science seeks to establish concepts and relationships that characterize the nature of a class of instances. In doing so, scientific research empirically tests and reforms concepts. Improved concepts yield more useful understanding and control of the objects and relationships under study. Blumer thus decentered a standard sociological research emphasis on causal relations among variables. Blumer claimed that variable analysis is not a fit procedure for those vast areas of social life where contingent interpretive processes mediate relationships between conditions and effects. Human society operates through the process by which living people produce social action. He saw social structures, not

as causes of action, but as inferences from observations of action.

Blumer's substantive essays on collective behavior, public opinion, fashion, and race relations remain influential. Robert Park developed the concept of "collective behavior" to refer to such temporary, large, dynamic groups as crowds, public factions, and social movements. Blumer's discussion of collective behavior dominated conceptualizations in the field until the 1960s. Then, objections to the weight he gave to emotional and other "non-symbolic" influences in the dynamics of collective behavior placed his concepts sharply out of favor. Increasingly since the 1980s, after decades of rejection in favor of rational-choice and other cognitive perspectives, elements of Blumer's thought, if not his terminology, have stolen back into the literature. Blumer also followed up Park's interest in the study of publics. Blumer's seminal critique challenged the emerging discipline of public opinion polling with the claim that representative samples painstakingly constructed for public opinion polls fail to capture how public opinion actually works. As Blumer saw it, public opinion matters when it brings influence to bear on decision-makers. Public opinion is a social process sensitive to power, resources and effort, in which the powerful and the committed have disproportionate effects. These disproportionate effects are not captured by a concept of public opinion that sees each individual's ideas as having an equivalent effect.

Blumer's essays on race relations treat the color line as produced and modified by symbolic interaction. The relevance of this view of race relations has become more apparent as new definitions of disadvantage, new distinctions of difference, and new rhetoric of anti-racialism emerge. In *Social Order and Public Philosophy* (1988) Lyman and Vidich develop a humanistic, liberal

public philosophy from Blumer's essays on race relations and other topics and collect several of Blumer's scattered essays. The posthumous publication of *George Herbert Mead and Human Conduct* (2004) promises to expand Blumer's influence on Mead's legacy.

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Jack Weller

BOAS, GEORGE (1891–1980)

George Boas was born on 28 August 1891 in Providence, Rhode Island. He attended Brown University, where he received both his BA and MA degrees in 1913. He then earned another MA in philosophy in 1915 from Harvard University, and received his PhD in philosophy in 1917 from the University of California at Berkeley. His dissertation was entitled "An

Analysis of Certain Theories of Truth.” Boas became an instructor in forensics at Berkeley in 1917, served in the U.S. Army from 1917 to 1919, and then returned to his position. In 1921 Boas was appointed to the philosophy faculty at Johns Hopkins University by department chair Arthur O. Lovejoy, and was promoted up to full professor by 1933. During World War II, Boas again sought military service and became a Naval Reserve Commander at General Dwight Eisenhower’s headquarters. After the war, Boas led an effort to recover Belgian art stolen by the Nazis, and was decorated with the Order of Leopold by the Belgian government. Boas returned to Johns Hopkins and taught there until he retired in 1957, remaining active at Johns Hopkins for many years as professor emeritus. Boas died on 17 March 1980 in Ruxton, Maryland.

Boas was a trustee of the Baltimore Museum of Art for many years, and was President of the American Society of Aesthetics in 1950. Boas was a visiting professor at several universities; he was the Annie Talbot Cole lecturer at Wheaton College in 1932; the Truax Lecturer at Hamilton College in 1957; the visiting Mellon Professor at the University of Pittsburgh in 1960–61; a fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies at Wesleyan University in Illinois in 1961–62; and the John Danz lecturer at the University of Washington in 1965. Boas was Vice President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1948, and President in 1951–52. Boas was also invited by the American Philosophical Association to deliver the Paul Carus Lectures in 1959, which were published as *The Inquiring Mind: An Introduction to Epistemology* (1959).

Boas’s primary philosophical interests centered on aesthetics, epistemology, naturalism, and the history of philosophy. His relativism, pluralism, and naturalism were ultimately based on a nominalistic skepticism

towards objective classes and categories. This skepticism brought him to the conclusion that aesthetic value is always a matter of an ineffable and emotional personal appreciation of an artwork at a particular moment. Because personal aesthetic appreciation is partially conditioned by society, Boas also defended a stance of cultural relativism towards art and aesthetic value in *Wingless Pegasus: A Handbook for Critics* (1950) and *The Heaven of Invention* (1963).

Boas followed Lovejoy’s methodology of tracing the history of ideas, searching for dominant systems of thought in each historical period, and pondering the causes for transitional phases between them. Boas’s best efforts in intellectual history are represented by his two books *Dominant Themes of Modern Philosophy* (1957) and *The History of Ideas: An Introduction* (1969). His clearest summarization of his “history of ideas” approach is presented in “Some Problems of Intellectual History” (1953). Boas also composed narrower studies of selected historical periods, including Greek thought, medieval philosophy and theology, modern philosophy, and French Romanticism.

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John R. Shook

BODE, BOYD HENRY (1873–1953)

Boyd H. Bode was born on 4 October 1873 in Ridott, Illinois, and died on 29 March 1953 in Gainesville, Florida. Bode attended Yankton College in South Dakota; William Penn College in Iowa (BA 1896); and the University of Michigan (BA 1897). He then went to Cornell's Sage School of Philosophy,

where he received his PhD in 1900, and in that year he began teaching philosophy at the University of Wisconsin.

His first articles in the *Journal of Philosophy* and *Philosophical Review* in 1905 criticized pragmatism and realism from the standpoint of idealism. By the 1910s, Bode had moved from idealism towards pragmatism, and defended pragmatism on grounds he had found untenable eight years earlier. His pragmatism rejected idealism's "transcendental element" in experience by holding that subject and object do not exist as separate entities in experience, but are functions that arise within experience. Bode rejected the realist notion that objects of knowledge exist prior to particular situations of knowing; instead, that which exists is used in experience to make objects of knowledge. Bode's functional conception of mind held that stimulus and response are not simply fixed in the nervous system since the stimulus does not precede the response in a mechanical way. Instead, they work simultaneously; for example, a baseball player learns to judge a fly ball by seeing its flight in terms of the response needed to catch it. The object – the baseball in flight – is seen in terms of responses already at work in the actions of the player. The objective is catching the baseball in flight, which shows that stimulus and response are not simply "connected" in the nervous system but take on meaning in terms of the behavior needed to realize the objective. Therefore, "mind" is a name for the way the environment functions, and this includes both actor and action taken in relation to one another. Mind is what things do, not a "substance" or a collection of "mental states."

In 1910 Bode became a professor of philosophy at the University of Illinois, where his challenges to the absolutes of established religious sectarianism and entrenched philosophical orthodoxies attracted hundreds

of students to his classes. The inclusion of his chapter, “Consciousness and Psychology” in the cooperative volume by pragmatists, *Creative Intelligence* (1917), affirmed his status in American philosophy and openly allied him with John Dewey. In this chapter Bode’s movement away from “transcendental elements” in experience and the search for objects of knowledge existing prior to experience is complete. The question of what is real prior to or transcending experience, he argued, is “absolutely sterile.” We must learn how to explain things in terms of facts “that dwell in the light of common day.” From this point he never looked back to yearn for certainty in experience, but remained persuaded that we cannot escape the responsibility of working on the problems endemic to everyday experience.

At Illinois, Bode began teaching educational theory in a seminar along with William C. Bagley in the College of Education. Bode’s developing interest in the difference that philosophy might make in the practical human affairs made teaching educational theory attractive to him. Bode also taught logic at Wisconsin and Illinois, and his first book was on logic in 1910. When Bagley left Illinois for the Teachers College of Columbia University, Bode continued the seminar in educational theory himself. He sought ways in which thinking could function more meaningfully in human conduct. Thinking as a practical necessity became a priority over logic as an academic study. In the preface to his first book on education, *Fundamentals of Education* in 1921, Bode wrote that the volume’s purpose was “to interpret present-day educational problems from the standpoint of pragmatic philosophy.” This purpose Bode sought to realize in moving to Ohio State University in 1921 as a professor of education. Until his retirement in 1944, his presence there made that university a center for the study of educational theory.

Bode insisted that democracy as a way of life needs to more fully turn its possibilities into actualities. These possibilities must come from the experience of ordinary people and, insofar as they can be actualized, that too must take place in the experience of ordinary people working together. Like other pragmatists, Bode believed that philosophy grows out of genuine conflicts of values in the lives of human beings and, further, that philosophy generates ideas about resolving those conflicts that have to be tested in the lives experiencing the conflicts. Philosophy originates in human problems, and then it returns to those problems and attempts to make differences in striving to solve them.

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Joseph J. Chambliss

BOODIN, JOHN ELOF (1869–1950)

John Elof Boodin was born on 14 September 1869 on the Barsedt homestead in Pjätteryd parish, Småland, Sweden. Between 1885 and 1887 Boodin attended the respected Fjellstedt Gymnasium in Uppsala. Upon the death of his father in 1887, financial need led Boodin to emigrate to the United States and he settled in Colchester, Illinois. Boodin adapted quickly to his new country, first attending Macomb Normal and Commercial College, then Augustana College, followed by the University of Colorado in 1892, the University of Minnesota in 1893, and finally Brown University, from which he received the BA in 1895 and MA in 1896 in philosophy, studying under James Seth. From there he went to Harvard University in 1897 for doctoral work, where he studied with William James, Josiah Royce, and George Santayana. He received his PhD in 1899, writing a dissertation on “A Theory of Time.” Boodin served as a lecturer at Harvard in 1899–1900, and then was a professor of philosophy at Iowa College (now Grinnell College) from 1900 to 1904, and then the University of Kansas from 1904 to 1912. After a year back

in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Boodin was professor of philosophy at Carleton College in Minnesota from 1913 to 1927, and then at the University of Southern California in 1928–29, and finally at the University of California at Los Angeles from 1929 until his retirement in 1939. Boodin died on 14 November 1950 in Los Angeles, California.

During his lifetime Boodin was well respected and often cited and anthologized. A sign of the esteem of his contemporaries came when he was elected early in his career to the presidency of the Western Philosophical Association (today's Central Division of the American Philosophical Association) in 1912–13. Then at the height of his powers Boodin was elected President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1933–34. Known for his command of both contemporary science and the history of philosophy, for his creative ideas, his rigorous arguments, and his poetic style of writing, time has tended to confirm many of Boodin's philosophical hypotheses, although he is rarely read in recent years. Some interpreters read Boodin's philosophy as an effort to temper Royce's absolutism with James's realism. Boodin is often classed with idealists in the philosophical literature. Boodin's epistemology was a type of pragmatic realism, very much guided by and connected to the findings of empirical science, but he was critical of aspects of both pragmatism and scientism. Pragmatism was weak in logic and metaphysics, he thought, while science provides at most good analogies for metaphysics, and Boodin warns against taking those analogies literally. Even a perfected science would not answer some of the most serious philosophical demands, particularly that the universe must be comprehended not just rationally in terms of truth, but also aesthetically and morally in terms of beauty and goodness. Yet Boodin

kept up with the best science of his day, especially physics, and strove to conform his philosophical vocabulary and viewpoint to its findings.

Time is, for Boodin, “dynamic non-being” that acts within being, as a limit, as a mode of existence without content, as possibility. Identifying process with reality twenty-five years ahead of Alfred North Whitehead, and time with real dynamism following Bergson, prepared Boodin as few others for the philosophical encounter with the theory of relativity and the quantum revolution. Boodin was already able to deal with the idea of energy philosophically before it became the very center of natural philosophy. Following Royce, Boodin argued that “to be is to be uniquely related to a whole,” but he departed from Royce’s criticisms of realism. Royce had defined realism as the conception that “to be is to be independent,” and while Boodin granted that there is no such thing as complete metaphysical independence, individuals must be conceived as metaphysically discrete, and hence, some metaphysical relations are not internal any overall totality. The totality is rather a cosmos, an order in process, and the notion of energy “serves as a convenient name, however thin, for the whole world of process” (1910, p. 303). Boodin held that the cosmos consists of “a hierarchy of fields.” Such hierarchies of nested and mutually dependent energy fields are found in organisms of all sorts, in our daily experience.

Arguing that we may be assured of the universal applicability of logical laws, because the mind is fully at home in nature, Boodin reasons that the study of science discovers exemplifications in natural processes of a broader orderliness. “The cosmos must be conceived not merely as a dynamic equilibrium, but as a living dynamic equilibrium of such a structure or ‘curvature’ that the loss of available energy in one part is compensated

for by an equal increase elsewhere, for only a living equilibrium can be self-sustaining” (1932, p. 200). The universe is conceived by Boodin as being alive, as a sophisticated arrangement of interdependent energistic fields, dynamically encountering possibility.

The topic of God and the divine in relation to nature played a large role in Boodin’s mature work. Arguing that the first and most basic mistake in human thinking about God is the habit of severing the natural from the super-natural, Boodin argues that these are really two perspectives on all reality: the perspective of the part or individual, and the perspective of the living and developing whole. A human conception of God must be derived empirically from the way in which each and every part is suffused with the meaning of the whole. We know we live in an empirically real “community of minds” that is not wholly rationalizable, but we often fail to recognize that our relation to the divine is analogous. Rejecting “proofs” for the existence of God, Boodin sought an apt way to fill out this relation of part to whole, arguing that “we have an analogy in the human personality. The events in the life of the organism are guided by a whole pattern – the field of the individual soul – which gives a unique quality to the individual.... It is through this soul that energy is directed so as to find its place where it is needed in the life of the whole” (*God: A Cosmic Philosophy of Religion*, 1934, p. 33).

Although he had been working out his theory of the social mind for many years, Boodin’s last major development came to fruition on the eve of World War II. He attempted to set out along democratic lines the notion that “mind” (recalling this is a kind of “energy”) is not an idea that can be limited to atomic individuals. In the shadow of both communist collectivism and fascistic nationalism, Boodin sought to articulate a social philosophy that respected

individuality while recognizing that there is more to “mind” than “subcranial or solipsistic” individual psychology. Thus he outlines a social ontology on “the analogies between the organism and society” (1939, p. 130). Boodin’s analogy is, as always, more careful than the scientific and reductionistic versions found in communist and fascist ideologies. “The social organism is merely a metaphor, a vague analogy” (1939, p. 131). In terms of forming normative judgments about better and worse purposes, Boodin embraces Royce’s notion of loyalty and develops it further.

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Randall E. Auxier

BOURNE, RANDOLPH SILLIMAN (1886–1918)

Randolph Silliman Bourne was born on 30 May 1886 in Bloomfield, New Jersey, and died on 23 December 1918 in New York City. Despite dying at the young age of 32 during an influenza epidemic, Bourne had a profound influence on the pacifist intellectual movement of World War I, worked as an educational theorist and popularizer of the ideas of John Dewey, and served as an inspiration to generations of young radical thinkers. His writing career was only about eight years long, from 1911 to 1918, but he published three books, edited another, and had two collections of his work published almost immediately after his death. He wrote *Youth and Life* (1913), *The Gary Schools* (1916), and *Education and Living* (1917). He edited *Towards an Enduring Peace* in 1917, and shortly after his death appeared *The History of a Literary Radical* (1919) and *Untimely Papers* (1920). All of these works are in addition to the great many articles he wrote, mostly for *The Atlantic Monthly*, *The New Republic*, *Seven Arts*, and *The Dial*, as well as the public speeches he gave during his short time of intellectual and academic activity.

He started classes at Columbia University at the age of 23. He studied under John Dewey, Charles Beard, James Harvey Robinson, and Franz Boas. Bourne considered himself a socialist, and became a member of the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. By 1912, Bourne was the editor of *The Columbia Monthly* and an active participant in the life of the campus community. By 1913, Bourne was writing a series of essays for *The Atlantic Monthly*, which were a call to action for the nation's young to revitalize democracy and challenge the traditions of older generations. The essays were then republished as *Youth and Life* (1913). In these early writings, Bourne concentrated on vitality, change, and possibility. He argued that planning out one's life and falling into habits of old limit the ability of a person to develop her or his own self and her or his own self-consciousness. He advocated the production of social goals and ideals based upon acts of revealing present and actual failures through ironic critique: "Irony, the science of comparative experience, compares things not with an established standard but with each other, and the values that slowly emerge from the process, values that emerge from one's own vivid reactions, are constantly revised, corrected, and refined by that same sense of contrast" (1977, p. 136).

In 1913, Bourne had the opportunity to travel to Europe with the support of a fellowship from Columbia. He earned this honor just as he began in Master's studies in the then-young study of sociology. From 1913 to 1914, he toured Europe and was heartened by the heady intellectual atmosphere he found in France, especially Paris. There he found the model of activist, scholar, writer, and artist that he tried throughout his life to emulate and import into the United States. Bourne was alarmed, however, by the growing nationalism he saw in Italy and Germany. After much travel was done and many letters, journal

notes, and essay ideas were written, Bourne was forced to flee Germany just as it declared war on Russia and France.

Upon returning to the United States, Bourne completed his MA at Columbia and began writing for the new magazine, *The New Republic*. For the rest of his life, Bourne would have a continuing, though sometimes ebbing and flowing, relationship with *The New Republic*. Throughout his work at *The New Republic*, as well as in some of his later works, Bourne acted as a great popularizer of previously under-recognized figures. In addition to Dewey, Bourne also worked to bring Henri Bergson, Friedrich Nietzsche, H.G. Wells, and George Bernard Shaw to a new level of familiarity for the American public.

By 1917, however, the relationship between the ever-radical Bourne and the increasingly-moderate *The New Republic* was showing signs of strain. *The New Republic* began to consider itself a voice of intellectuals who supported the Wilson administration and the participation of the United States in the Great War. Many at *The New Republic* aimed to shape the country and the world toward progressive reform, but they thought it best to do so by supporting the war and working to shape its ends toward democratic and liberal purposes. Bourne vehemently disagreed with these tactics. Bourne argued that pragmatists, especially Dewey, surrendered their principles for the gains they saw in the Wilson administration and the potential gains they saw in the outcome of the war. Bourne held Dewey to be the exemplar of this betrayal of progressive ideals because Dewey advocated the use of force as an instrument of policy, and claimed that criticisms of the inevitable and unstoppable war were futile and wasteful.

Near the end of his short life, Bourne began work on an autobiographical novel and "The State," a lengthy political essay on the psychology of the state in times of war and

peace. Neither was finished. In “The State,” we see the repeated appearance of Bourne’s famous epigram, “War in the health of the State.” The State, according to Bourne, thrives on war, even as the people suffer. War destroys diversity, upon which democracy thrives: “War...unifies all the bourgeois elements and the common people, and outlaws the rest” (1977, p. 367). In peace, according to Bourne, we rarely think about the State—we talk instead about Government, “a legitimate object of criticism and even contempt” (1977, p. 355). In times of war, however, the State rises to power and squelches opposition. Differences among persons disintegrate as the power of the State rises to combat enemies abroad and halt criticism at home. According to Bourne, the “State is essentially a concept of power, of competition; it signifies a group in its aggressive aspects” (1977, p. 358). Bourne’s essay unifies many of his earlier anti-war writings and synchronizes his criticisms of the intelligentsia in America and his suspicions of large-scale power, bellicosity, and the desire to submit and surrender to accepted ways of living and thinking.

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Stephen A. Barnes

BOUVART, MARTIN (1637–1705)

Martin Bouvart (baptized as Samuel) was born on 15 August 1637 in Chartres, France. He went to a school at Blois for his training in classics and humanities, and then he joined the Jesuit noviciate in Paris in 1658, where he attended the University of Paris for two years. During the period from 1660 to 1670 he was a teacher, interrupted by two periods of study in philosophy and theology at the Jesuit college at La Flèche. From 1669 to 1672 he was in Rouen, and then his desire to join the Jesuit mission to Canada was granted in 1673. He sailed to Québec with Father Antoine Silvy, and worked as an assistant to Father Joseph-Marie Chaumonot. Chaumonot was priest to the Hurons at Notre-Dame-de-foy, where Bouvart helped build the mission of Notre-Dame-de-Lorette.

In 1676 Bouvart succeeded Guillaume Matthieu as Professor of Theology at the

Collège des Jésuites in Québec. From 1676 until 1698 he was responsible for upper level instruction in rhetoric, logic, philosophy, and theology. One of his colleagues during this period was Joseph Germain. In addition to his teaching responsibilities, he was also the mission procurator. After Bouvart ended his teaching career, Jean-Baptiste Duparc arrived in 1707 to become professor of philosophy and theology. Their courses of instruction followed the structure set by the Jesuit curriculum in the *Ratio Studiorum* (1599). Two years of philosophy, which included natural philosophy (the sciences) and ethics was followed by two years in theology. Logic, Aristotle, and Thomistic philosophy dominated the curriculum for the upper level students.

In 1698 Bouvart became Rector of the Collège des Jésuites and the Superior of the Mission to Canada. He was continually drawn into quarrels with Bishop Saint-Vallier, the Bishop of Québec. After Bishop François de Laval retired from the bishopric in 1688 and Saint-Vallier (who was not a Jesuit) arrived in Québec, the control of religious instruction in Québec was a point of continual dispute. Saint-Vallier had arrived in Canada with an admonishment from Louis XIV to maintain peaceful relations with the Jesuits, but the new bishop soon reorganized Québec's affairs. In 1692 Laval's beloved Seminary, which had been attached to the Jesuit College for instruction in the humanities, was forced to surrender control of parish ministries over to the Bishop, and it was reduced to just an institution for training priests (it recovered in the 1800s as the Grand Séminaire de Québec and it also founded Laval University). Among Saint-Vallier's new regulations on the College was his rule forbidding debates or theatrical performances. The bishop also took away the Jesuits' leadership of the Congrégation des Messieurs de Québec, and then took for use as another mission the

Jesuit's house and church at Notre-Dame-de-Lorette, which the fathers had built with their own labor and at their own expense.

Pursuing his agenda further, Bishop Saint-Vallier charged the Jesuit fathers with teaching the moral doctrine of probabilism, a theory that if the lawfulness of an action was in doubt, one was permitted to follow sound counsel that favored its lawfulness. According to probabilism, it is permissible to apply a doctrine from some recognized Doctor of the Catholic Church, even if other authorities do not agree. Many Jesuits followed theologian Luis Molina and his judgment favoring probabilism. Non-Jesuits argued that probabilism permitted a wide latitude in matters of moral conscience and obstructed efforts by the contemporary Church to effectively dictate ethics to the entire church. Probabilism was therefore thought to lead to increased immorality.

Bouvart eventually accommodated the bishop on the matter, and was reprimanded for cowardice by his fellow priests. He asked to be relieved of his duties, but in 1801 he was retained for another three-year term. During his second term, Bouvart criticized a *Catéchisme* and *Rituel* that had recently been released by Bishop Saint-Vallier. Bouvart's judgment that the Bishop's theological principles flirted with Jansenism was an explosive verdict. Jansenism advocated the doctrine of the soul's predestination to either heaven or hell (not unlike Calvinism). At Saint-Vallier's request, Bouvart's criticism was condemned at the Sorbonne in Paris. In 1704 Bouvart was replaced by Father Vincent Gigot, and he retired. The next year, on 10 August 1705, Bouvart died at the Jesuit college in the city of Québec.

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David Davis

and

John R. Shook

BOUWSMA, OETS KOLK (1898–1978)

O.K. Bouwsma was born on 22 November 1898 in Muskegon, Michigan. He studied English literature and philosophy at Calvin College from 1916 to 1919, and at the University of Michigan where he earned the BA in 1920, MA in 1921, and PhD in philosophy in 1928. His early philosophical tastes ran in the direction of Hegel and Absolute Idealism; his tastes later ran in a decidedly different direction, first toward G.E. Moore and second toward Ludwig Wittgenstein. Bouwsma was a professor of philosophy at the University of Nebraska from 1928 to 1966. He then was professor of philosophy at the University of Texas from 1966 until his retirement in 1974. Bouwsma was President of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1957–58. He died on 1 March 1978 in Austin, Texas.

Bouwsma's work on Moore created his early reputation, which later resulted in his invitation to give the John Locke Lectures at Oxford University in 1950–51. But by the time

he gave the John Locke Lectures, Bouwsma had immersed himself in Wittgenstein's work, particularly in the *Blue Book*. In the (unpublished) Lectures, titled *The Flux*, Bouwsma disassembled the problems of sense-experience with tools acquired from both Moore and Wittgenstein. Bouwsma anticipated changes in Wittgenstein's work that were revealed only when *Philosophical Investigations* was published.

Bouwsma's reputation later intertwined with Wittgenstein's. Unlike many influenced by Wittgenstein, Bouwsma spent little time writing about Wittgenstein. He instead applied Wittgenstein to other philosophers and to philosophical problems. Bouwsma wooed his reader from latent nonsense to patent nonsense. He led their words, exaggerated, empty and in the empyrean, back to green pastures and still waters, where they shrank and were filled. More than any other Wittgensteinian, Bouwsma internalized Wittgenstein's comment that it is philosophically significant that something makes us laugh, is comical: Bouwsma tickled his reader into philosophically significant laughter. Bouwsma's studies of English literature left their mark on his writing. His prose was dedicated, racy, idiosyncratic and high-demotic – more of a piece with John Donne than with John Duns Scotus.

During this period, Bouwsma's most significant published essays were "Descartes' Evil Genius," "The Expression Theory of Art," and "The Mystery of Time" (all collected, along with "Moore's Theory of Sense-Data," in *Philosophical Essays*); and also "Anselm's Argument," "I Think I Am," and "Double-Talk, Jackie Vernon and X" (collected, along with twelve lectures by others, in *The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry*).

His philosophical influence was as much or more a product of his teaching than of his published writings. Some of the writings

Bouwsma did for his classes, along with several unpublished papers, have been collected and edited by J.L. Craft and Ronald Hustwit in *Toward a New Sensibility and Without Proof or Evidence*.

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Kelly Dean Jolley

BOWEN, FRANCIS (1811–1890)

Francis Bowen was born on 8 September 1811 in Charlestown, Massachusetts. He attended Mayhew Grammar School in Boston and worked for several years as a clerk in a Boston publishing house before entering Phillips Exeter Academy in 1829. The following year he enrolled at Harvard from which he graduated with a BA summa cum laude in 1833. While attending college, Bowen worked in various places as a schoolteacher. In 1835, having taught mathematics for two years at Phillips Exeter Academy, he became a tutor in intellectual philosophy and political economy at Harvard.

In 1843 Bowen became the editor of *North American Review*, and remained in this position for over a decade. During this time, he wrote close to one-fourth of the articles in the review. He was also for six years editor of the *American Almanac and Repository of Useful Knowledge*. In 1842 Bowen published an edition of Virgil’s writings with copious notes and commentary. In the same year Bowen’s *Critical Essays on a Few Subjects Connected with the History and Present Condition of Speculative Philosophy* appeared. He also wrote biographies of James Otis (1844) and Benjamin Lincoln (1847). In 1848–49 Bowen delivered the Lowell Lectures, which were published in 1849 as *On the Application of Metaphysical and Ethical Science to the Evidences of Religion*. During the last part of

his tenure at *North American Review* Bowen drew fire by taking an unpopular stance on the popular Hungarian revolution, which also cost him the McLean professorship of history at Harvard College. Bowen had been chosen for this professorship in May 1850 and fulfilled the position's teaching responsibilities for the following fall semester, but the Harvard overseers, who still had to confirm his nomination in January, decided not to confirm it. Bowen lectured again for the Lowell Institute. In 1850 he lectured on political economy and in 1852 he lectured on the origin and development of the English and American constitutions.

A few years later, however, Bowen did obtain a Harvard professorship. In 1853 he was appointed Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity. The 1783 endowment for this chair required instruction that would demonstrate the existence of God and explain His providence and government, and His Revelation. Whereas Bowen's immediate successor, George Herbert Palmer, called the terms of the bequest into question, Bowen remained faithful to them, even in his 1856 *Principles of Political Economy*. Bowen remained the Alford Professor until his retirement in 1889. He died on 21 January 1890 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The Alford professorship made Bowen for many years the principal philosophy professor at Harvard. Chauncey Wright, Charles Peirce, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and William James were all his students. Bowen has been identified as an early source of pragmatism in America. A central theme that runs through Bowen's thought is that philosophy should keep in mind the practical application of ideas. Philosophy, for Bowen, should not be an ivory tower discipline.

Concerned about the British influence on American thought, Bowen advocated

the publication of an American treatise on political economy. When no satisfactory treatise was forthcoming, Bowen decided to compose one himself. This resulted in 1856 in the *Principles of Political Economy*. In this treatise Bowen defended capitalism, but as is befitting for a professor in natural religion, he did so by relating it explicitly to God. It is through God and His providence that the acts of self-interested individuals bring about the public good. Notwithstanding his strong leanings toward economic liberalism, Bowen rejected the freetrade doctrine of Adam Smith. In its stead Bowen defended a suspension of free trade on the ground that America was economically much weaker than England, and he repeatedly spoke in favor of high tariffs. In economics, Bowen also opposed Malthus's views on population and Ricardo's views on rent. He remained politically active, serving in 1876 on the US Silver Commission.

During his whole career, Bowen was a strong and orthodox defender of Unitarianism, whose philosophical underpinnings he sought to strengthen. He advocated a non-Calvinistic, freewill-based, evangelical brand of Christianity, developing his views within the context of the Scottish Commonsensism of Thomas Reid and his followers. Bowen was a strong and vocal opponent of the New England Transcendentalists, and of the many forms of agnosticism and materialism that sprang up in the nineteenth century, especially after the 1859 publication of *The Origin of Species*. In fact, Bowen's outspoken opposition against the theory of evolution made him quickly obsolete. Using his common sense based empiricism Bowen sought to provide an ardent antidote against the flights of fancy of Emerson as well as Darwin.

Philosophically, Bowen remained a strong defender of Hamilton, while developing a branch of Scottish Common Sense realism that in his later years he infused with elements taken

from German idealism. While Bowen showed a close affinity to Locke in his 1842 *Critical Essays*, the question that remained foremost on his mind was how to avoid skepticism. To address this question, Bowen – rejecting Kant’s answer to Hume – allied himself with the Scottish Commonsensists whom he saw as the natural successors to traditional empiricism. According to the common sensists, one should start with introspection and make the dictates of common sense one’s first principles. No derivation of these dictates from so-called “more ultimate truths” could produce knowledge that is more secure than the dictates of common sense. For example, the conscious experience that the will is free is better evidence for free will than any rational argument that seeks to affirm this. Bowen argued along these lines for the existence of God and the goodness of His nature. Though interested mainly in natural theology, Bowen reserved a place for revealed theology as well, and allowed for divine miracles made possible through the suspension of natural laws. Bowen’s student, Charles S. Peirce, would later advocate a *critical commonsensism*.

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Cornelis de Waal

BOWNE, BORDEN PARKER (1847–1910)

Borden Parker Bowne was born on 14 January 1847 near Leonardville, New Jersey. Bowne entered New York University in 1867 amidst the swirling new controversy of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, and in that year he was licensed to preach in the Methodist Church. He graduated with a BA degree in 1871. Bowne’s formal ordination as a Methodist deacon followed in 1872 and he was assigned a congregation of rural Long Island at Whitestone in New York State. In 1873 the opportunity came to continue his studies in Europe. He studied mainly at the universities of Paris, Halle, and Göttingen, being most

deeply influenced at the last of these by the empirical strain of Kantian philosophy prevailing in that age under Rudolf Hermann Lotze. Bowne worked as a journalist in New York City from 1874 until 1876, when he completed a MA at New York University. He accepted a call to the philosophy department at Boston University in 1877, and later refused attractive offers from Yale and the new University of Chicago as his reputation grew. In 1888 Bowne became the first Dean of the Graduate School at Boston University and held that position until his death. Bowne was instrumental in supporting integration in higher education, and in 1891 he presided over the dissertation of the first African-American to earn a PhD from an American university, John Wesley Edward Bowen (1855–1933). Bowne died on 1 April 1910 in Boston, Massachusetts.

Bowne's most lasting contributions came in the philosophy of religion. His religious background is important in this regard. Bowne was a popular guest preacher throughout his career and a volume of his sermons was published posthumously under the title *The Essence of Religion* (1910). Bowne was able to negotiate a kind of theistic naturalism that enabled him to avoid much of the controversy over evolutionary theory during his career. His basic position was that there was no naturalistic or theological basis for treating nature, its changes, developments, and laws, as something over against God. Bowne argued that unless God is conceived as working immanently within each moment of experience, be it natural or human, the sustaining continuity of natural or human experience is wholly without an explanation. Thus, every event is a special creation in the sense that the complete explanation for its existence cannot be given by science, history, theology, or any other device of human understanding.

Bowne's method was a descriptive (as opposed to prescriptive or formalist or logical) version of Kantian philosophy, similar to Lotze's, but with a greater emphasis upon the empirical roots of our descriptions. In describing experience we are enjoined to remember always the difference between our conceptual suppositions and our genuine evidence. Conceptual clarity is to be sought and self-contradiction to be avoided not because a clear description is certain to provide access to the structures of the real (be they mental or material), but because conceptual confusion is likely to cloud our judgments about what exists and what we know. Therefore, the primary function of logic is the normative clarification of thought, and the function of clear thinking is to bring to the fore knowledge, understanding or appreciation of what we value. Abstractions are tools, not principles of the real. The following passage from Bowne's (1899) treatise on method, *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, exemplifies his outlook: "The root thought of this work is that thought is an organic activity which unfolds from within, and can never be put together mechanically from without.... Knowledge is no longer something originating outside the mind, possibly in the nerves, and passed along ready-made into the mind; it is rather something built up by the mind within itself in accordance with principles immanent in the mental nature. Nothing is nearer to us than thought, and yet nothing is harder to grasp. The reason is that spontaneous thought deals with its objects rather than with itself, and the work of reflection is difficult" (pp. iii–iv).

In metaphysics, Bowne was an early proponent of process philosophy. In the first edition of his *Metaphysics* (1882), Bowne attacked the traditional notion of "substance" and "being" and suggested that it be replaced with a notion of process. This move rendered "time" and "space" as they had appeared

in Kantian and Aristotelian philosophies phenomenal as opposed to either noumenal or ontological. This and other such positions of Bowne in metaphysics labeled him as an idealist, but Bowne insisted that his brand of pluralistic objective idealism was entirely consistent with the conviction of the reality of an order quite beyond our mental processes, although such a reality cannot be conceived as wholly independent, since nothing is wholly independent of anything else at the level of existence. What was required in order to provide consistent and usable descriptions in metaphysics was a central principle which provided a reliable and fruitful clue to the place we hold in the broader reality. Bowne found this “clue” in the idea of the person. Whatever else we might suppose about the nature of reality, we can be assured that it is compatible with or not entirely hostile to the personal mode of existence. In addition, it seems that a pervasive and indeed inevitable feature of all our philosophical descriptions is that they express the perspective and values of personal beings. Thus, person is a mode of relation that we may safely take as clue to the structure of objective reality and a feature of all philosophical description.

This trajectory in metaphysics culminated in the expression of Bowne’s mature philosophy in *Personalism* (1908). Although Bowne’s philosophical system bore several names along the way, including “objective idealism” and “transcendental empiricism,” its final label was “personalism.” Whether this is a very good label can be questioned, but it has stayed with philosophy in the tradition of Bowne in subsequent generations. Personalism was an important force in mainstream philosophy until the decline of idealistic philosophies in America became a marked phenomenon in the 1930s. In theology and social ethics personalism exerted greater influence through Bowne’s student Edgar

Sheffield Brightman, and Brightman’s student Martin Luther King, Jr., who was perhaps the most important social, political and ethical thinker in the personalist tradition.

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Randall E. Auxier

BRANDOM, ROBERT BOYCE (1950–)

Robert Brandom was born on 13 March 1950 in New York City. He holds the title of Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, at the University of Pittsburgh, where he has spent his academic career, beginning in 1976. Brandom received his B.A. degree in philosophy from Yale University in 1972 and his Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1977, where he wrote his dissertation under the directorship of Richard Rorty. Besides his status as Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, he also held the title of Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy at Pittsburgh from 1998 to 2007. He was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University during 2002–2003 and he is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. A prolific author and scholar, Brandom has written or edited many books, well over 100 papers, and has delivered hundreds of talks around the world.

Particularly prestigious are his invited series of lectures, including the Locke Lectures in Prague (2007), the Woodbridge Lectures at Columbia University (2007), and the Munich Hegel Lectures (2011). A testimony to his influence among professional philosophers is that there are almost twenty books that have been published about him.

Brandom is seen as one of the leading proponents of pragmatism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, alongside his mentors Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty. Like them, his work has spanned across multiple areas in philosophy, such as philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind, as well as across philosophical traditions, including what is usually seen as analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, and American pragmatism. His work has drawn explicitly on important historical figures, including Kant and Hegel and the classical American pragmatists such as Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead, and contemporary thinkers as well.

In his often-cited work, *Making It Explicit*, Brandom has stated that humans are essentially normative beings, with a capacity to commit ourselves, both cognitively and behaviorally, as agents in the world. We are discursive beings by nature, he has claimed; our normativity is inferentially articulated (that is, we both ask for and give reasons for our beliefs and actions). The task of philosophy, then, is to make explicit these normative and rational practices, practices that are generally and usually implicit. Echoing Peirce and Dewey, Brandom sees us as agents, such that our actions are driven by purpose inquiry and interaction in the world. Inquiry and action is never purposeless, which is to say they are always performed against the background of goals; in a word they are normative. In his remarks on Kant and Hegel, for instance, he has insisted that the starting point of philosophy

is the assumption of us as skillful, practical agents. Kant, he tells us, demonstrated that we are normative creatures, both cognitively and morally; Hegel, he tells us, demonstrated that the normative structures in which we exist are largely social. As Brandom has written, Kant's deepest and most original idea was that what distinguishes judging and intentional doing from the activities of non-sapient creatures is not that they involve some special sort of mental processes, but that they are things knowers and agents are in a distinctive way *responsible* for. Judgments and actions make knowers and agents liable to characteristic kinds of *normative* assessment.

As both Hegel and the American pragmatist George Herbert Mead argued, our consciousness emerges by reciprocal recognition. A key contribution by Hegel of our understanding is, as Brandom has noted, that what institutes normative statuses is reciprocal recognition. Someone becomes responsible only when others hold him responsible, and exercises authority only when others acknowledge that authority. Along similar lines Mead argued that consciousness of things in the world is prior to the emergence of self-consciousness; there is the development of the self because of our engagement with our environments. For Brandom, we must come to recognize our commitments and entitlements (again both cognitively and behaviorally) via our interactions with other agents and our environments. *Pace* Putnam's famous quip that "meanings ain't in the head," Brandom has stated that consciousness does not happen between our ears, it is something that happens between ourselves. Just as language is social, not subjective, so, too, our agency, including our cognitive agency, is social.

Given this starting point that we are normatively discursive beings, Brandom has argued that intentionality is the core philosophical concern. He has characterized

intentionality as a pragmatically mediated semantic relation. It is a relation in the sense just noted above, that it is not internal to a given person; it is not an internal property of a person, but a relation, an interaction with the world. It is semantic in the sense that language and meaning is the fundamental medium in which we exist in the world. It is pragmatically mediated in the sense, as noted above, that it is purposeful and normative, always against a background of usefulness in flourishing in the world, in being a successful agent.

Brandom has claimed that at the center of his views is an approach to semantics from the side of inferences, rather than from the side of representations. His mentor Richard Rorty rejected what he saw as philosophy as a "mirror of nature." That is, Rorty argued that we are not essentially passive processors of information from the world, but rather are normative agents; our engagement in the world is not that we (merely) represent what is given. In a similar vein, Brandom has sometimes labeled his own view as "semantic inferentialism," emphasizing that the task of philosophy is on how to formalize (make explicit) this approach of inference rather than representation. The "semantic" component of semantic inferentialism is the commitment by Brandom to language and meaning as basic to our nature as humans. He has remarked that language is what transforms us from merely sentient creatures to sapient creatures.

Nevertheless, while Brandom has repeatedly noted our normative and interactive nature, he has also argued that language and discourse is not fundamentally about cooperation, but rather about clarity of commitment and entitlement. Borrowing terms from the German theologian Martin Buber, Brandom has remarked that intentionality is not an I-We relation, but an I-Thou relation. There is an ineliminable sociality to intentionality, but, for Brandom, the important philosophical question is about

how reliable causal connections come to be transferred into inferentially usable forms. Science, particularly cognitive science, is the best way of understanding what and how we know, he has claimed. But philosophy is not science and philosophical questions are not reducible to, not fully answered by, science. The philosopher's task and goal is to understand what we mean by our thoughts and intentionality. The philosophical question is: what do you have to do – not merely what do you have to be – such that doing something counts as thinking or meaning something? Brandom's answer, in part and to the extent that he has offered one, is that I can use your reasons and commitments by tracking inferences. So, while it is not subjective (hence, it is social), it is also interpersonal, that is, a matter of practices between persons/agents. Understanding and explicating stable forms of actions and habits, always with the function of addressing real world problems, are the tasks of philosophical analysis and evaluation.

The value of the empirical, analytic philosophical tradition, for Brandom, has been the rigor with which it has addressed these concerns and the commitment to a naturalistic understanding of our nature as knowing beings/agents. But the traditional empiricist perspective, for Brandom, failed to fully appreciate and incorporate the insights of Kant and Hegel and the American pragmatists, who insisted on the practical normativity that they saw as underlying semantics and intentionality. Scientific naturalism, with an emphasis on objects, he has insisted, is not the same thing as philosophical naturalism, which has an emphasis on subjects. This distinction can be found in the work of Wilfrid Sellars especially, whose work Brandom has written on extensively. Just as Sellars distinguished what he called the scientific image of humans (as objects of understanding) and the manifest

image of humans (as subjects of action), so, too, Brandom's work throughout his career has been focused on giving an account of how these two images are not to be seen as a dualism, but as a distinction. The appropriate philosophical approach is not to ask which of these two images is correct, but in what ways both of them provide a better understanding of our intentionality and inferential capacities, hence of our humanness.

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David Boersema

BRANDT, RICHARD BOOKER (1910–1997)

Richard B. Brandt was born on 17 October 1910 in Wilmington, Ohio. He received a BA from Denison University in 1930, majoring in philosophy and classical studies. He went on to study at Trinity College, received another BA from Cambridge University in philosophy of religion in 1933, and then studied at Tübingen University in 1934–1935. In 1936 he received his PhD in philosophy from Yale University and remained there for a year on fellowship studying logical positivism. Brandt taught philosophy from 1937 to 1964 at Swarthmore College, also serving as chair

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for nineteen years. In 1964 he became chair of the department of philosophy, and later Roy Wood Sellars Distinguished College Professor of Philosophy, at the University of Michigan. While serving as chair at both institutions he distinguished himself not only as a prominent philosopher, but also as an excellent administrator. Brandt was the John Locke Lecturer at Oxford University in 1974, which resulted in his *A Theory of the Right and the Good*. In 1981 Brandt retired and was appointed visiting professor at the Law Center at Georgetown University a year later. Brandt served as fellow for the Guggenheim Foundation in 1945, fellow for the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, California, and for the National Endowment for the Humanities. He was a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, served as President of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1969–1970, and was President of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. Brandt died on 10 September 1997 in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Brandt defended the concept of Jeremy Bentham's theory that the good follows from the promotion of the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people against the traditional criticisms and dealt with the debate over the relationship between hedonism and utilitarianism. Although most utilitarians have taken up these tasks, Brandt's treatment is quite distinct. He was also one of the first philosophers to ground an ethical theory in anthropology, most clearly found in his *Hopi Ethics* (1954). In addition, he was one of the first utilitarians to bring a clear conception of psychology into utilitarianism, which was common throughout his writings. Perhaps his interest here was due to his rejection of the traditional appeals to intuition to justify morality.

Primarily concerned with the welfare of society, Brandt's philosophy is distinguished from other utilitarians by his type of "rule-utilitarianism" and his conception of practical rationality. According to Brandt, this theory is not susceptible to the traditional criticisms that have been brought against utilitarianism and is the most effective practical theory of ethics. His major works deal with the justification of what is good or morally correct, which include detailed analyses of moral psychology. Brandt also professed a need to teach the conception, function, and value of moral codes for the benefit of society. Further, his view that utilitarianism can work toward economic equality has been quite influential on economic theory. His contributions to social ethics include theories on suicide, rules of war, welfare, and the treatment of defective newborns.

Brandt introduced the distinction between "act" and "rule" utilitarianism in his 1959 book *Ethical Theory*. He additionally discussed the connections that cultures have with ethical standards, and provided a clear account of the importance the study of anthropology has on an historical understanding of the development of ethical theories, particularly to critical ethics. Brandt also furnished an analysis of ethical standards in relation to certain schools of psychology, such as the Freudian and Gestalt theories. Some further topics discussed in this work are the Hopi Indians, forms of ethical relativism, moral obligation, distributive justice, and human rights.

According to Brandt, act-utilitarianism identifies the right action as that which carries with it the best possible consequences based on the agent's evidence. He claimed that G.E. Moore, Henry Sidgwick, and Bertrand Russell were proponents of this view. Rule-utilitarianism, however, does not see right action in relation to a certain action, but to the

prevalence of a moral code. Brandt's brand of utilitarianism adds the complexity of basing right and wrong action on the "optimal code" for a particular society. What is moral is seen as following certain moral laws, not to promote the most happiness as in most traditional forms of utilitarianism. Moral questions are answered based on the benefits that would result from the acceptance of moral rules by the individuals in a society. Brandt claimed that Mill held a similar view. The optimal code maximizes benefit, or the welfare of society. A moral virtue is one that is beneficial for society, not just an individual or group. With an injection of an anthropological view, he maintained that all societies have certain standards embedded in their cultures. Each member of a society shares in certain desires and aversions. According to Brandt, these standards provide security for individuals and also help guide them to live in a cooperative manner, as such standards inform the members of a society of their parts in organizational behavior. He additionally illustrated the development of such ethical standards in an evolutionary manner. As they are recognized as better to have for their rewards to society, ethical standards are implemented and refined accordingly.

His explication in *Ethical Theory* of the relationship that this social conscience has with moral action is also noteworthy. According to Brandt, certain shared aversions of a community are learned dispositions as well that cause guilt in one who acts counter to such aversions or disapproval in one who witnesses such an act. This point illustrates his incorporation of psychological theory into his moral philosophy, as conscience is a central part of his motivational theory of pleasure. Rather than leave the meaning of the term pleasure vague, as is the common criticism of the hedonists, Brandt provided his motivational theory of pleasure. The pleasurable activity,

he claimed, was one that inclined a person to want to repeat the experience. He maintained that this conception of pleasure entails the fact that not only physical sensations give pleasure. Another important issue that Brandt dealt with is the fact that there are various sub-groups of society that often have different moral codes. One moral code that is optimal for one group may not be optimal for another. According to Brandt, such issues fall under the subject matter of professional ethics.

Brandt expanded his John Locke lectures given at Oxford University in the spring of 1974 to become the 1979 *A Theory of the Good and the Right*. Although he claimed to be still a rule-utilitarian, Brandt provided a more advanced form than in his earlier *Ethical Theory*. In addition, he noted that some of his views had changed since 1959 and that others had been more developed. The sophistication of his discussion on ethical issues that tie in with psychology is a clear example of the latter. Some of the topics of *A Theory of the Good and the Right* are moral systems of society, welfare, justice, self-interest, and a psychological analysis of desire and pleasure. The focus of the book revolves around the questions over what is worthy of wanting and what is morally right. His favor of utilitarianism remains at the forefront of his discussion in this work, and he calls for a moral code that maximizes happiness. Brandt maintained that all people with "rational" desires would benefit by adopting such a moral code for society and then theorizes how this could be accomplished. His conception of rationality is quite distinct, however. The rational desire, according to his theory, is one that meets the criteria of a detailed test of cognitive psychotherapy. Once the desires that fail to meet this test are removed and the individual is aware of all the relevant facts, Brandt claimed that people then are able to choose a common code to live under. The code

he endorses is applicable to moral and legal matters; it includes a list of rules and certain procedures to deal with any conflicts that may arise among the rules. Critics, however, would argue that the idea of expunging the so-called irrational desires from a majority of individuals living in a community is quite utopian.

His essay “Utilitarianism and the Rules of War” provides an insightful application of his rule-utilitarianism to the rules of warfare. This essay, originally published in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* in 1972, was reprinted in 1974 in *War and Moral Responsibility*. His 1992 work, *Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights*, is a collection of reprinted essays that span a range of nearly thirty years. Included are a number of his classic essays dealing with critical and normative ethical theory. Other essays explore several applications of utilitarianism to important social issues. Brandt’s final book, *Facts, Values, and Morality* (1996), provides an excellent summary of his views. In this work he again dealt with the justification of value judgments and moral belief. Brandt sought to justify the good through an explanation of moral psychology, rather than by intuition or theories about the meanings of moral words. After pointing out several weaknesses of different ethical systems, e.g., forms of naturalism, Brandt applied his theory of utilitarianism. A moral belief is justified for society in his system if one can show that the belief is a part of a social code of morals that, if rational and free from error or confusion, he or she would support if expectations were to remain in that society.

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Jeffrey R. Post

BRATTLE, WILLIAM (1662–1717)

William Brattle was born on 22 November 1662 in Boston, Massachusetts. Awarded his BA from Harvard College in 1680 and his MA in 1683, Brattle was asked by the titular rector (and later President) Increase Mather to stay on as tutor at the college. Along with his friend and fellow tutor, John Leverett, Brattle shaped Harvard and helped it survive during many of its most difficult years. To all intents and purposes, Brattle and Leverett served as Harvard's administration from 1685 to 1696, while Mather was negotiating for a new colonial charter in England and later overseeing his large and vital congregation in Boston. In 1692 Harvard College bestowed its first honorary degrees, awarding the Doctor of Divinity to Mather, Brattle, and Leverett. While at Harvard, Brattle supervised a new generation of ministers and colonial leaders and, most significantly for American philosophy, adapted Antoine Arnauld's *Port-Royal Logic* (1662) and Anthony LeGrand's *Institutio Philosophiae secundum Principia D. Renati DesCartes* (1672) as models for

updating the Harvard curriculum of the later seventeenth century.

Beginning in 1687 and until at least 1743, Brattle's revision of Arnauld and LeGrand, entitled in a student's notebook manuscript, *Compendium of Logick*, made Cartesian rationalism the dominant philosophical paradigm at Harvard. Brattle's insistent emphasis on a conception of reasoning that possessed the qualities of being "clear and distinct" is made more comprehensible in the context of the Aristotelian scholasticism against which Descartes and his followers reacted. The conservative dialectic taught at Harvard for fifty years, and based upon the place logics of Peter Ramus and other European reformed professors, either failed to be parsimonious when it was called for, such as needlessly appending the adjective "well" to the definition of logic as the "art of thinking," or created obscure and arbitrary distinctions where none were needed, such as the complex catalog of predicaments that had long exercised logicians in Europe and Massachusetts. Begin by rejecting anything thus uncertain or obfuscatory, Brattle promised, and what remained would subscribe to the fourth rule of truth in being known "clearly and distinctly." We must never "precipitate our Judgment or determine any thing before the truth of perception shines forth, or a perception free from all manner of doubt is obtained by us" (quotation in Kennedy 1995, 263). This confidence in reason (thus excised of distorting marginalia) tending toward visible piety marks Brattle as the later Puritan he is.

The logical axiom of preferring prudence over precipitate action was put into practice in Congregational church community in ways that were highly influential for New England thought and culture. While pastor of the small Congregationalist church at Cambridge, where Brattle was ordained in

1696, many of the innovations Boston's Brattle Square church became famous for were practiced first by Brattle from his Cambridge pulpit. In the *Compendium*, he had advocated that the "orderly disposition of our thoughts" (Kennedy 1995, 320) depended upon the extent to which a "clear and distinct perception will be much furthered, if removeing all precipitance, we attend heedfully to the thing proposed, and view it as it were with internal eyes; to which it will conduce much if we consider of but one thing at once, for plenty of objects does certainly breed confusion" (321).

Along with his ministerial influence, Brattle taught unofficially as the professor of divinity at Harvard until his death on 15 February 1717 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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Harry Clark Maddux

BRIDGMAN, PERCY WILLIAMS (1882–1961)

Percy Williams Bridgman was born on 21 April 1882 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He received a BA summa cum laude in 1904 from Harvard University, and remained there for his MA in 1905 and PhD in physics in 1908. Bridgman was a research fellow at Harvard from 1908 to 1910, and then became an instructor of physics in 1910. He was promoted to full professor by 1919, and in 1926 he was named Hollis Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy. In 1950 he was named Higgins University Professor, and held that position until retiring in 1954. Bridgman died on 21 August 1961 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Bridgman was a Nobel-prize winning physicist for his path-breaking work in high pressure physics. He was also an original and important philosopher of science. He was the proponent of a position in the philosophy of science he called *operationalism* (or *operationism*), stating that the meaning of a concept consists of "the operations which [are] used by us or

our neighbour in applying the concept to any concrete situation” (1952, p. 7). Bridgman’s views were well known and often frequently cited by philosophers of science in the period from the late 1920s into the 1960s.

Bridgman’s basic thesis in operationalism dates from *The Logic of Modern Physics* (1927). The operational view has clear similarities with pragmatism, broadly construed, and with the logical positivism or “verificationism” of the Vienna Circle. Nevertheless, Bridgman was apparently completely uninfluenced by pragmatism and by the nascent movement of logical positivism. Treating operationalism as a theory of meaning, or as a demarcation criterion (as Karl Popper sought) between science and non-science, it seems to fit midway between pragmatism and logical positivism. Pragmatism might be defined as declaring meaning of a concept to consist in all the ways it could guide action (as part of a proposition that is believed), including further investigative efforts. Meaninglessness then arises if a concept or its containing proposition results in no characteristic actions. Positivism defines meaning to consist of the distinctive possible sense experiences that arise from a concept or the truth of its containing proposition. Meaninglessness arises if a concept makes no difference in actual or possible sense experience. “Operations,” by which Bridgman primarily means measurements of physical features, are actions, but not all actions are measurements. So operationalism is in this respect a narrower theory of meaning than pragmatism: fewer concepts and propositions will be operationally meaningful.

Despite Bridgman’s extensive and much-read publications, and some common ground he found with logical positivists such as Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap (especially through the mediation of Herbert Feigl) and even with pragmatists John Dewey and

Charles Peirce (as explained to him by Arthur Bentley), positivism and pragmatism seem to have played no role in the development and modification of Bridgman’s views. These earlier similar philosophies at best made professional opinion sympathetic to Bridgman’s views. The main complaint seems to have always been that Bridgman’s all-important notion of “operation” was crucially vague in ways that the positivistic notion of sense-experience, and the pragmatic notion of action, were not.

Operationalism had its origins in two closely related sources. One was Bridgman’s interpretation of what he saw as the dominant principle in Einstein’s discovery of the Special Theory of Relativity as well as the General Theory. This was that all scientific terms, to be scientifically meaningful, must have “operational” criteria for measuring them. Bridgman was especially concerned to banish from physics Newton’s ghost of absolute space; like the logical positivists, Bridgman read and was clearly influenced by the empiricism of Ernst Mach and his rejection of absolute space. However, Einstein himself, who had also been influenced by Mach, argued that it was *not* necessary that each proposition (about forces, phenomena, etc.) be testable, but only that the whole theory “implies empirically testable assertions” (as quoted in Walter 1990, p. 117). Einstein’s holistic position on theory confirmation would have been attractive to anyone familiar with the work of nineteenth century writers Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincaré, who argued that observable consequences only arise with the interaction between a main theory (about fundamental phenomena) and an auxiliary theory, usually about testing and measuring equipment, such as the auxiliary theory of optics that renders observations from telescopes and microscopes relevant to astronomy and microbiology. This view

resulted further in an important discussion about conventionalism in the geometric structure of space (for example, it depends on how one defines a straight line, say as the path of a light beam, in the auxiliary theory) that is associated with Hans Reichenbach, Ernest Nagel, and others in the twentieth century. Some sort of holistic principle of verification of an entire theory like what Einstein endorses was widely accepted in the twentieth century. Bridgman seems to have stubbornly stuck to a requirement that each term and phenomena be individually testable or relevant for measurements and operations (as did Mach, rejecting the existence of atoms).

The other source of operationalism in Bridgman's thought, and perhaps ultimately the more important one, is his understanding of the importance of "dimensional analysis" in physics. Dimensional analysis looks not at the numbers involved in equations of physics, but at the units in which they are measured. Thus from the well-known equation $F=ma$, and a study of the units used to measure quantities, we can determine that force itself is to be analyzed as: mass-units times distance-units, all divided by the square of time-units (since $a=s/t^2$). By a similar principle one can vindicate that $E=mc^2$ is, at least in terms of units measured, correct. Dimensional analysis, although it appears to be a purely *a priori* mode of guessing the basic forms of equations, is counted by Bridgman as operational manipulation of measurable quantities, and therefore operationally acceptable. He seems to have resisted any effort to describe mathematics as unique either in its subject matter or techniques. He equated (metaphysical) necessity with (epistemic) certainty, a confusion that is common enough, but then rejected any possibility of certainty, and thus necessity.

No major figure in the natural sciences or philosophy accepted most of Bridgman's

ideas. In the social sciences, Bridgman's influence has been extensive, although he often rejected the way his views were applied to social phenomena. One general problem with Bridgman's proposal was the consensus that he was stretching the meaning of operation as primarily measurement when he allowed thought experiments, and mathematical or logical operations. Another implication Bridgman drew from the importance of measurement was the ultimate subjectivity of operations (measured size is relative to an observer, as is simultaneity according to the Special Theory of Relativity, for example). He went further to propose that there are not really physical things. There *are* measurable aspects of them. This view anticipates W. V. Quine's suggestion in the introduction to *Word and Object* that physical objects are at best "posits" and even accords with Quine's eventually abandoned behaviorist theory of meaning. Finally, Bridgman declared that propositions about the future had no meaning since operations to confirm them could in many cases not be performed now.

Bridgman formulated an attempt to remake the social sciences on the basis of operationalist thinking. Most of these views were first stated in *The Intelligent Individual and Society* (1938) and reemerged at the end of *The Way Things Are*. Bridgman announced his opposition to these "totalitarianisms" (Fascist and Communist) and went so far as to refuse to work in any way with physicists who maintained such views. His more specific views about the role of the state have been called "libertarian," in the sense that he maintained only a minimal state was permissible. There is some truth in this. However, his central philosophical reality, of the operational meaning of only one's own consciousness, is actually solipsistic and would even seem to make writing articles and books a bit pointless. He argues against the

notion of duty (since it required a notion of others' consciousness) so strongly that one wonders whether moral obligations of any sort were possible.

Despite having a fine, inquiring mind and a beautifully clear writing and thinking style, Bridgman seems to hold on to the view that somehow all of what philosophy does can be done better and simply by turning to how we do science.

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Randall R. Dipert

BRIGHTMAN, EDGAR SHEFFIELD (1884–1953)

Edgar Sheffield Brightman was born on 20 September 1884 in Holbrook, Massachusetts. In 1899 Brightman's family moved to Whitman, Massachusetts. He entered Brown University in 1902, where he studied classics and philosophy, and graduated with his BA in 1906. Brightman taught for two years as an assistant in philosophy and Greek at Brown and Pembroke, the women's college, while working on his MA degree in philosophy at Brown, which he received in 1908. In the fall of 1908, Brightman entered Boston University School of Theology with concurrent enrollment in the Graduate School. It was here that Brightman came under the intellectual influence of Borden Parker Bowne, the founder of Boston personalism. Brightman was able to complete his STB degree in 1910, and he received the Jacob Sleeper Fellowship, which enabled him to study for two semesters at the University of Berlin and one semester at the University

of Marburg in the areas of philosophy, church history, and Bible.

In 1912 Brightman took a teaching position at Nebraska Wesleyan University where he taught a heavy schedule in religion, philosophy, and psychology. He was able to complete the requirements for his doctorate during that year, and he received his PhD in philosophy from Boston University in 1912. Brightman continued to teach at Nebraska Wesleyan until 1915, when he became associate professor of ethics and religion at Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut, where he remained until 1919. While at Wesleyan, Brightman wrote his first book, *The Sources of the Hexateuch* (1918).

In 1919 Brightman was invited to return to Boston University as Professor of Philosophy in the Graduate School. In 1925 he became the first Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, a position he held until his death in 1953. He spent a sabbatical year in 1930–31 at Oxford, Austria, and Berlin. Brightman served as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1936–37, the American Theological Society, and the National Association of Biblical Instructors. In the late 1940s, Brightman's health began to fail to the point that he began to withdraw from responsibilities beyond teaching and scholarly writing. Brightman died on 25 February 1953 in Newton, Massachusetts.

Brightman was the most powerful exponent of Boston personalism of his generation, and he shared many of the same philosophical concerns as his teacher, Bowne. One of their central philosophical concerns was to provide a theistic and personalistic alternative to the mechanistic materialism of philosophic naturalism and its attempts to equate nature with all reality. Brightman understood philosophical naturalism as affirming that only the being of the physical world that is able to

be investigated by the natural sciences is real, while denying any ontological status to non-physical aspects of reality such as personality and ideas. In the language of Bowne, naturalism mistakes phenomenal reality for ontological reality. Brightman was wary of equating nature with absolutely everything because this, in effect, reduces God to nature. Consequently, to avoid confusion, not to mention the philosophical and theological problems of pantheism, Brightman opts for defining nature as the “realm of phenomena” (1958, p. 247) or “the world of sense objects” (1945, p. 38). It is “the illuminating absent indicated by the shining present” of personal experience, and it “is the experience of an ordering, creative Mind other than any human mind” (1958, p. 248). Nature, in Brightman's view, is the expression and activity of a unifying force, the Cosmic Consciousness, the Cosmic Person—God. It is not mindless stuff, but rather the activity of a purposive and responsive Mind. The activity of nature is within God as a part of God's experience. Brightman reasons that “any part of God's experience (such as Nature) must be incomplete” (1958, p. 248). Consequently, it makes no sense to equate nature with absolutely everything. “Nature is [rather] one area of interaction, cooperation, and communication with God” (1958, p. 251).

Brightman argues that although the distinction between personality and nature does imply a duality in our experience, this “definition does not set up two irreconcilable and unrelatable orders of being” (1945, p. 45). Nature and personality represent two realms within one ultimate reality that has its unity in God, and thus there is a possibility of knowledge of the physical world through the reliance on “empirical coherence” as we observe and reason about our sense experiences. He objects to metaphysical naturalism's concept of nature that tends to include “conscious” persons in a “strictly spatio-temporal system”

(1960, p. 321). If naturalists insist on speaking of persons as part of nature, Brightman believes the word “nature” must then signify the “metaphysical X,” i.e., the metaphysically real that includes but also transcends spatio-temporal systems. Brightman maintains that the presence of persons, experients, telic processes, and value in our universe cannot be understood solely in terms of spatio-temporal relations and materialistic causation. Persons cannot be reduced to the relations of physical objects.

Like Bowne, Brightman maintains that both the Cosmic Person (God) and finite human persons are of an order different from the natural order. Brightman affirms that nature is immanent in God. Nature is not external to God, but God is the source of the natural order, not a part of it. Nature is the activity and expression of God, not God itself. God is also understood as the source of all finite persons, yet persons are also of a supernatural order insofar as mind, or consciousness, is understood to be externally related to the body and the rest of the natural world. Brightman’s reluctance to affirm a naturalism that includes God, persons, and the non-human world within one all-inclusive nature is due to his metaphysical conviction of the ontological primacy of persons.

For Brightman, the “person” is “a complex unity of self-consciousness that is able to develop ideal values and to act in itself and to interact with others” (1958, p. 201). Brightman’s focus is on consciousness. Without consciousness, there is no person, and, for Brightman, personal consciousness involves a level of self-awareness and reflection that makes it difficult for him to refer to many other life forms on earth as persons. Given that Brightman’s definition of person focuses so heavily on self-reflective consciousness, he uses the term person only for those non-human beings with complex, more human-like consciousness.

According to Brightman, “We belong together in interpersonal community, yet we all have individual existence and personal rights” (1951, p. 303). Such views contributed to Brightman’s support of Democratic Socialism and pacifism while at Boston University. As persons living in an interpersonal community, Brightman affirms that we ought to attempt to realize the best possible values. This interest led Brightman to develop a system of moral laws, which was one of his most significant contributions to the Boston personalist tradition and a powerful influence on his most famous student, Martin Luther King, Jr. All of King’s most significant principles for action find expression in Brightman’s moral law system. Brightman describes the moral laws as universal principles to which the will ought to conform its choices. These laws are not to be confused with prescriptions for action in specific circumstances, rather they act in a regulatory way as principles according to which one should choose if one is to be moral.

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Mark Y.A. Davies

BRODBECK, MAY SELZNICK (1917–1983)

May Brodbeck was born on 26 July 1917 in Newark, New Jersey. She received a BA degree in chemistry at New York University in 1941. She then taught high school chemistry, worked in industry, and participated as a physicist in the Manhattan project to build the atomic bomb. Her graduate training was in philosophy at the University of Iowa, earning the MA in 1945 and the PhD in 1947, both under the supervision of Gustav Bergmann. Her dissertation was on John Dewey's *Logic*. For the next twenty-seven years, from 1947 to 1974, Brodbeck was a professor of philosophy at the University of Minnesota. She was chair of the department during 1967–70 and Dean of the Graduate School during 1972–74. In 1974 she returned to the University of Iowa as Carver Professor of Philosophy and Vice-President for Academic Affairs and Dean of the Faculties. She retired from her administrative position in 1981 and her faculty position in 1983. Among her honors were a visiting professorship at Cambridge

University, a Fulbright lecture tour of Europe, membership on various editorial boards, and a fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University in 1981–82. She was President of the Western (now Central) Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1971–72. Brodbeck died on 1 August 1983 in Menlo Park, California.

Following the publication of a number of technical papers in the philosophy of science and a major essay titled “Philosophy in America: 1900–1950,” Brodbeck established her name by co-editing with Herbert Feigl in 1953 the book that for many years was the leading anthology in the field, *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*. Brodbeck’s ambitious introductory essay, “The Nature and Function of the Philosophy of Science,” succeeded brilliantly by providing a thorough but reasonably concise statement of the main ideas of the field.

Turning in 1954 to a more specialized domain, the philosophy of the social sciences, Brodbeck produced a number of important papers over the next decade and a half, including the often anthologized essay of 1963, “Meaning and Action,” a particularly incisive critique of a Wittgensteinian theory of the relation of mind to behavior. This phase of her labors culminated in 1968 with the publication of another extensive anthology, *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, to which she contributed a general introduction, substantial sectional introductions, four of the forty-one essays. Like the earlier collection edited with Feigl, this one stood for many years as the leading one in its field, and displayed once again Brodbeck’s unusual talent for organizing and making sense of the ideas of others, while at the same time continuing to offer her own technical contributions.

Brodbeck’s work in the philosophy of the social sciences led her into the philosophy

of mind. Among the papers in this area was her Presidential address to the American Philosophical Association, “Mind: From within and from without,” where Brodbeck renewed and restated her challenge to the dominant materialist theories of mind, disagreeing with most of the philosophers in the analytic tradition of her training.

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Laird Addis

BROWNSON, ORESTES AUGUSTUS (1803–1876)

Orestes Augustus Brownson was born on 16 September 1803 in Stockbridge, Vermont, and died on 17 April 1876 in Detroit, Michigan. He was largely self-educated; his only formal schooling was at the Ballston Academy in New York, where he was enrolled for only about a year. At the age of twenty-two Brownson was ordained as a Universalist minister, and began his literary career as a frequent contributor of sermons to *The Gospel Advocate and Impartial Investigator*. Brownson’s early theological and philosophical convictions were animated by a curious combination of Christianity and romantic naturalism. In keeping with much of the literature of the early nineteenth-century transcendentalists, his earliest essays were highly critical of the “otherworldliness” of orthodox Christianity. Like Ralph Waldo Emerson, George Ripley, William Ellery Channing, and Amos Alcott, Brownson looked inward to the individual conscience for a knowledge of things divine. The conscience is akin to the voice of God,

indeed a portion of divine being itself implanted upon the human soul. Brownson’s radical universalism naturally invited reflection upon the possibility of progressive advance toward a more divine-like perfection of the human condition. It was in this way that the religious views of the late 1820s and 1830s developed a pronounced political component, for Brownson felt powerfully drawn toward issues of social justice as a function of his innerworldly spirituality.

He was particularly interested in the utopian speculations of Robert Owen, Frances Wright, William Ellery Channing, William Godwin, and Comte de Saint-Simon. This interest is reflected in Brownson’s first book, *New Views of Christianity, Society, and the Church* (1836), a work inspired by the neo-Gnosticism of the French socialist Comte de Saint-Simon. In this brief volume Brownson expressed his faith in the immanent unfolding of a purified civilization that would be free of all political and social antagonisms. Similar expectations of utopian transformation, driven by profound religious conviction, are contained in the proto-Marxist essay “The Laboring Classes” (1840) and “Church of the Future” (1842), collected in *The Works of Orestes Brownson* (1882–87).

During the early 1840s, however, Brownson began a thorough reconsideration of his theological and philosophical convictions, and the politics that stemmed from them. This process would eventually produce one of the more compelling American conservative minds of the nineteenth century. Upon studying the work of fellow transcendentalist Theodore Parker, Brownson began to suspect that the form of revolutionary socialism they shared was built upon a philosophically weak foundation. As retold some years later in his autobiography *The Convert*, Brownson sensed that his religious commitment to the “religion of humanity” would lead not to utopia but, in effect, to

the death of God. Like some later critics of modernity, Brownson was disturbed by the nihilistic implications of those who desire “to be as gods” and recreate the world according to a human standard of justice. Spiritual longing, he reasoned, must ultimately identify the divine transcendent as the source of all human progress, both spiritually and socially.

The perfection of Christ became, as it were, a link to God himself, and therefore the very incarnation of the communion principle (“The Mediatorial Life of Jesus,” 1842). The idea reestablished for Brownson a more traditional understanding of the hierarchy of being, and the necessity of human dependence upon a transcendent God. Moreover, Brownson concluded that only the Catholic theological and spiritual tradition could uphold this primal distinction between the divine and human. All varieties of Protestantism, insofar as they held to individualistic epistemological assumptions, were bound to degenerate into subjectivism and a concomitant state of moral and ethical nihilism. Brownson joined the Catholic Church in 1844.

He continued his literary career through his own *Brownson's Quarterly Review* and Isaac Hecker's *Catholic World*. In his later work Brownson mainly occupied himself with two tasks: presenting the philosophical and theological case for Catholicism over and against Protestant prejudices and assumptions, and presenting his own unique political philosophy concerning Catholicism and the American regime. He was especially concerned with the familiar charge in his day that a democratic regime is incompatible with the Catholic faith. According to Brownson, the American Constitutional order is well founded to cultivate this cultural presence because of the freedom guaranteed to Catholics by the principles of toleration and the limited state. In no other nation does the Church find so much freedom to carry out its spiritual and

civilizational mission. Brownson develops this argument in one of the seminal works in American Catholic political philosophy, *The American Republic: Its Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny* (1865).

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Gregory S. Butler

BUCHANAN, JOSEPH (1785–1829)

The physician, philosopher, educator, journalist, and inventor Joseph Buchanan was born on 24 August 1785 in Washington County, Virginia. His formal education was limited to fourteen months of elementary and secondary school and, beginning in 1804, a year at Transylvania University in Lexington, Kentucky. In 1805 Buchanan began his study of medicine with Samuel Brown (1769–1830), who introduced him to the works of Hartley, Locke, Hume, and Erasmus Darwin. However, Brown left Kentucky in 1806. In 1807 Buchanan moved to Port Gibson, Mississippi, where he opened a medical practice to finance his medical education. While at Port Gibson he wrote a 173-page treatise on fever. In 1808 he travelled to Philadelphia where he presented the treatise to Benjamin RUSH. Though Rush was impressed by it, Buchanan lacked the funds to get it published, and the treatise is now lost.

With no money to complete his medical education, Buchanan walked for twenty-seven days from Philadelphia back to Lexington. Impressed by Buchanan's achievements, the

president of Transylvania University, James Blyth, awarded him a BA degree in 1808. In 1809 Transylvania offered him a position as Professor of the Institutes of Medicine at Transylvania University. However, this effort to start a medical school did not commence, so the offer fell through before he could begin teaching.

The introductory lectures for medical students which Buchanan had already prepared were instead published, with the help of friends, as *The Philosophy of Human Nature* (1812), a work that some consider the most original American contribution to psychology before William James. In this work, which is strongly influenced by Erasmus Darwin's *Zoonomia* (1794) and the British empiricists, Buchanan develops a determinist, materialist, associationalist psychology: our thoughts are nothing but brain events, and man is a machine whose final cause is pleasure. Buchanan bases his monistic materialism in part on the chemical discoveries of Humphrey Davy, from which he drew the conclusion that matter is essentially active. This allowed Buchanan to overcome the traditional conception of matter as passive. The book also contains the first formulation of the Law of Exercise: "Every action, or process of excitement, becomes more easily excited in proportion as it is frequently and forcibly performed" (1812, 71).

About the time *The Philosophy of Nature* was published, Buchanan returned to Philadelphia to study the Pestalozzian child-centered system of education under Joseph Neef (1770–1854), who had recently published his *Sketch of a Plan and Method of Education* (1808). Buchanan saw the Pestalozzian system as being in agreement with his materialist views of the mind as it construed the aim of the educator as increasing the pupil's ability for self-control by molding and drawing upon the sentiments. In 1813 Buchanan opened a school on Pestalozzian principles in Kentucky.

The school drew heavy criticism because of its high tuition rate and the total exclusion of all references to religion from the curriculum. The school lasted for little more than two years. Buchanan developed his educational program in *A Practical Grammar of the English Language*, which appeared about a decade later. Following the demise of the school Buchanan entered the legal profession.

During most of the rest of his life Buchanan was involved in journalism in Louisville. He edited several periodicals and published many articles on a great variety of topics. As an inventor Buchanan made a mark with his steam-engine designs. Substituting spiral tubes for boilers he managed to build an engine so light and effective that he even thought it possible it could be used for aerial flight. In 1824 he applied his engine to a “motor car,” which he drove through the streets of Louisville. He also contemplated, but never built, a combustion engine.

In 1810 Buchanan married Nancy Rodes Garth and they had one son, Joseph Rodes Buchanan, who they raised in accordance with Pestalozzian principles. Buchanan died in Louisville, Kentucky, on 3 September 1829 at the age of forty-four.

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Cornelis de Waal

BUCHLER, JUSTUS (1914–1991)

Justus Buchler was born on 27 March 1914 in New York City. He earned a BSS in 1934 at the College of the City of New York. He then earned an MA in 1935 and the PhD in philosophy in 1938 at Columbia University, where he studied with Morris R. Cohen, F.J.E. Woodbridge, and Ernest Nagel. His MA thesis was on Locke; his PhD dissertation was on Charles Peirce, which upon publication in 1939 became a well-respected work. Buchler taught part-time at Brooklyn College and Columbia University until he gained a full-time philosophy appointment at Columbia in 1942. He participated in the Contemporary Civilization program of Columbia College, becoming its administrative head in 1950. Buchler was book editor for the *Journal of Philosophy* and Vice Chairman of the National Academic Freedom Committee of American Civil Liberties Union from 1958 to 1965. In 1971, he became Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. In 1973 he was awarded the Butler Silver Medal by Columbia University. In the early 1970s, Buchler and his

wife, philosopher Evelyn Shirk, were founding members of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. Buchler later received the society's highest honor, the Herbert W. Schneider Award, in 1989. Buchler retired from Stony Brook in 1981, and died on 19 March 1991 in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.

While not a pragmatist, Buchler was influenced by Peirce, William James, Josiah Royce, and John Dewey. He was also influenced by George Santayana and Alfred North Whitehead. Buchler's systematic work covers two broad areas: human process and general ontology. He was guided by two principles. (1) Ontological parity, which asserts the equal reality of whatever is. (2) Ordinality, which asserts the indefinite complexity of whatever is. Any being – in Buchler's terminology, any “(natural) complex” – is what it is because it is located in orders, that is, is related to other complexes in determinate respects. Each complex “locates” other complexes and therefore, every complex is also an order (a location for other complexes). Since on this view complexity is irreducible, there are no definitive boundaries to a complex or between one complex and another. Buchler's method of exposition resembles Aristotle's by identifying previous well-known concepts (for example, in general ontology, being/becoming; in the theory of human process, experience), showing what is defective about them, and then furnishing his own categories. This method required some neologisms (for example, “proception,” “alescence”), but more typically Buchler created a novel signification of familiar concepts. In general ontology, examples are order, relation, possibility, actuality; in the theory of human process examples include judgment and communication.

Buchler characterized his work as a “metaphysics of natural complexes.” Some commentators have noted that this

seems to make Buchler's work continuous with American naturalism and have thus characterized it as “ordinal naturalism” or “ordinal ontology” (see Singer 1983). In Buchler's system, “natural complex” is the basic term of identification. A natural complex conceptualizes the reality of any complex's locations, without insisting that this is the only way of doing this. In a metaphysics of natural complexes, there is no ontological distinction between the real and unreal. Whatever is, is real; the objects we daily experience are as real as the clouds of atomic particles described by physics; fictional objects as real as material objects.

The principle of ontological parity entails that no being or any one kind of being can be singled out as the “really real.” The principle of ordinality conceptualizes the determinateness of any being (*complex*) as an interrelation of locations or traits. Actuality and possibility are ordinally defined as traits of natural complexes. For Buchler, three pairs of categories constitute the formal structure of the metaphysics of natural complexes: (1) prevalence and alescence (the technical vocabulary for concepts like being, existence, becoming, changing); (2) ordinality and relation (categories of determinateness); and (3) possibility and actuality (categories of “natural definition,” that is, categories that conceptualize the limits of a complex). The term “becoming” is suitable for certain kinds of physical and biological change – an acorn becomes a sapling, a sapling becomes a tree – but does not capture the developing-being of a logical proof or of a conceptual shift in the understanding of a historical event. With the term “alescence” Buchler intends to introduce a concept that does not obscure the insight of ontological parity, namely, that becoming (altering) is just as real as being.

The issue of the limit or boundary of any particular complex leads to the modal

categories, possibility and actuality. Necessity is defined in terms of possibility. There is a boundary to determinateness, but that boundary is itself indeterminate. Buchler's solution to this apparent paradox is to articulate boundary in terms of actuality and possibility. A boundary of a complex is determinate in so far as it contains actualities and indeterminate because it contains possibilities. This is no less true of logical as it is of empirical possibility; possibility is a matter of ordinal location. Not just anything is a possibility for a complex, because every possibility is determinate, for example, prevails in an ordinal location. Boundaries, or determinateness, cannot be wholly fixed because actualization is a condition for new possibilities. Buchler argues that according to the principles of ordinality there is no totalizing order of orders, such as "world" or "nature." He also shows that other attempts to argue for the notion of totality fail. His specific targets are Ludwig Wittgenstein, Thomas Hobbes, R.G. Collingwood, and Whitehead.

In the works on the metaphysics of human process, Buchler aims to reconceptualize the notions of experience and judgment. His theory rejects such categories as mind/body, or consciousness/nature by employing a novel category, *proception*, for broadening the conception of experience. While this category may bear some resemblance to Whitehead's prehension, it is restricted to human reality only. However, human process is always relationally located, and thus, for Buchler, experience (proception) breaks down the gap between world and experiencer. Experience (proception) and judgment is each a relation of some kind between the individual and the world.

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BUNGE, MARIO AUGUSTO (1919–)

Mario Augusto Bunge was born on 21 August 1919 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. He received his PhD in physico-mathematical sciences in 1952 from Universidad de La Plata. From 1956 to 1959 he was a professor of theoretical physics at Universidad de La Plata and Universidad de Buenos Aires, and from 1957 to 1962 he was professor of philosophy at Universidad de Buenos Aires. Unhappy with Argentinian politics, beginning in 1960 Bunge held visiting positions at philosophy departments of University of Pennsylvania in 1960–61, University of Texas in 1963, Temple University in 1963–64, and University of Delaware in 1964–65. In 1966 Bunge became professor of philosophy at McGill University in Montréal, Canada. Bunge has been awarded honorary degrees from several universities,

and became a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1984 and a Fellow of The Royal Society of Canada in 1992.

Bunge advocated the rigorous axiomatization of scientific theories, which would help eliminate unnecessary heuristic devices and models and expose the genuine relations between theories. Scientific theories should be interpreted realistically even though they are fallible, replaceable, and do not absorb the postulated entities of their predecessors; Bunge accepts the label of "critical realism" for his stance. Bunge's philosophy is comprehensively explained in the eight volumes of his *Treatise on Basic Philosophy* (1974–89), which covers his philosophy of science, ontology, epistemology, technology, and ethics. Against positivism and reductionism, Bunge legitimizes metaphysics (if conducted by the scientific method) and a type of emergent materialism that refuses any demand that one field of science (such as physics) should have an exclusive grasp on the composition of reality.

Bunge refers to his naturalistic ontology as an "integrated pluralism" which holds that science investigates various levels of dynamic systems that together make up the universe. While at any level those existing systems rely on older and underlying systems for their emergence and maintenance, their properties are not reducible to those other systems. Scientific theories can operate relatively autonomously and their scientific laws can be valid independently of any other theories about other levels. Bunge's systems approach to materialism led him to the view that mental systems should be characterized as functions of brain activity. Uncomfortable with materialistic denials that the qualitative features of consciousness really exist, Bunge locates such qualities in emergent mental systems.

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John R. Shook

BURGE, CHARLES TYLER (1946–)

Tyler Burge was born on 1 January 1946 in Atlanta, Georgia. He received his BA degree at Wesleyan University in Connecticut in 1967, and received his PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 1971. Immediately upon completing his doctoral degree, he began his professional career in the philosophy department at the University of California, Los Angeles, where he has remained since. His current title is Distinguished Professor of

Philosophy. During his career, he has also been a visiting professor at various institutions, including MIT, Munich University, Bayreuth University, Stanford University, Harvard University, and the University of Bologna. He has received numerous honors and awards, including a Guggenheim Fellowship, being named a Fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, as well as being elected to the Institut International de Philosophie, the American Philosophical Society, the National Science Foundation, and the American Council of Learned Societies. He delivered the Dewey Lectures to the American Philosophical Association in 2007. In addition, he served as the President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1998–1999.

A prolific writer, Burge has published dozens of articles, many of them collected into several books. A testimony to his acknowledged influence is a collection of essays compiled by Martin Hahn and Bjørn Ramberg on his work, *Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge*, published in 2003.

Since his earliest publications in the 1970s, Burge has been known especially for his work in the areas of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. In particular, he came to be associated with a view he called “anti-individualism.” Anti-individualism is a view about the nature of representational mental states and events. What he called “individualism” is the view that all of an individual’s representational mental kinds are constitutively independent of any relation to the world outside of the individual. Anti-individualism, on the other hand, maintains that, at least for some mental states and events, a necessary condition for them to be possible is they are in a non-representational relation with the world outside of the

individual. Representational states or events include thoughts, beliefs, intentions, desires, perceptions, and imaginings. In a word, representational states or events re-present something. There are other functional informational states or events that are non-representational, for Burge, such as the sensing of light and dark by molluscs or the visual-vestibular system in many animals that coordinates gravitational sensory information with movements of the head in order to accommodate vision. This issue of what are the constitutive conditions for understanding mentality has often been framed as the internalism/externalism debate, that is, whether (and to what extent) properties of an individual depend on features that are strictly internal to the individual or not. Within epistemology, for example, philosophers have argued over whether the justification for a belief can be features that are only internal to an agent or must justification depend upon features outside the individual? Burge has likened his anti-individualism to externalism, and claimed that reliable relations with the external world are necessary.

An often-cited thought experiment that Burge proposed to support his view is the “tharthritis” case. In this case, a person suspects that she has arthritis because of a chronic pain in her thigh. However, because arthritis is a condition of the joints, not muscles, she has a false belief, namely a belief about arthritis. But suppose that in another scenario, this person’s ailments are the same, but the medical community uses the term *arthrititis* to apply to joints and to muscles; this condition is tharthritis. In this case, Burge has said, the person would have beliefs about tharthritis, not arthritis (and her belief would be true). A necessary condition for this person’s belief to be true, however, is that it involves a relation to something outside the person. Echoing Hilary Putnam’s famous quip

that “meanings ain’t in the head,” for Burge, representations ain’t in the head. Another way to put this is that the concept *arthritis* is not the same as anyone’s conception(s) of arthritis. Individuals might have any number of conceptions associated with a concept, but what constitutes the concept is not dependent upon those conceptions. (Similarly, within epistemology, one’s inferences about a statement are not the same thing as the implications of a statement; one might very well make a false inference or fail to believe that some other statement is implied, even though it actually is.)

While Burge has identified his views with externalism, he has distanced himself from certain versions of externalism, or at least commitments that are often associated with externalism, such as physical materialism and ontological reductionism. Burge has often referred to his version of externalism as “social externalism,” because, he has argued, the individual/environment relation that is necessary for representational capacities includes elements of sociality, that is, the role of social relations in mediating between an individual and aspects of the external world. Without question, representation must include causal connections with the external world, but such connections also involve social relations. This is because representation, and our mental capacities of processing information require understanding, not merely reception of sensation. Similar to Norman Hanson’s remark that there is more to seeing than meets the eye, for Burge, representational content, for instance seeing a pen as a pen, involves more than sensory stimulation.

As Burge has remarked, the conditions that constitute representational states and events include particular sorts of causal conditions, social conditions, psychological conditions, and conditions of phenomenological consciousness.

This last component (phenomenological consciousness) points to Burge most recent work and rethinking of the philosophical doctrine of rationalism. In his latest work, Burge has argued that some types of cognition have aspects that have (or at least seem to have) a priori warrant. Such cognitive types include self-knowledge, interlocation, and reflection. With understanding (not simple information processing) as the crucial notion, Burge has argued that it is persons (not minds or bodies) that understand. Persons are defined by cognitive capacities; they are what make selves. But there are cognitive norms that are required for persons to understand. To this point, Burge has distinguished two types of norms, or warrants: entitlements and justifications. While justifications consist in warrants by reason, entitlements do not. Nonetheless, a person can have an entitlement to a belief even if no rationalizing explanation is present in the individual’s psychology. (Analogously, a person can know *x*, but not know that she knows *x*, much less be in a position to offer reasons.) Unlike many materialists and reductionists, then, Burge has been content with accepting and even endorsing mentalistic categories and descriptions. For him this does not contradict a commitment to externalism, but portrays and places externalism within a set of different ontological commitments than a strict materialism.

Throughout his career, Burge has wrestled with issues related to the bearers of intentional, or representational, properties. His early work focused on language, while his later work focused on mental states. As noted above, akin to Putnam’s notion that meaning (and meanings) lie outside the individual, Burge’s early work on language was similar in content and commitment to much of the work of his colleagues at UCLA, David Kaplan and Keith Donnellan, as well as Putnam, W. V. Quine, Saul Kripke, and especially Gottlob Frege.

Citing the work of these philosophers, Burge embraced their view of reference and meaning as a version of anti-individualism.

For Burge, linguistic reference and meaning is dependent upon semantic relations, not speakers' associations. Names refer to objects via a causal, historical semantic chain and their referents are what they are independent of a given speaker's beliefs or associations. Again, just as Burge claimed that concepts are not the same as conceptions, so, too, semantic meanings are not the same as speaker meanings. Where Burge varied from many philosophers on reference, however, is that his focus was not specifically on semantics, but on how reference was carried out within a representations system (language being one such system). How this was done was, as he has remarked, as important to him as the causal and contextual factors that make successful reference possible. This focus is what led him away from strict semantic emphases to broader psychological and mental concerns – primarily on perception, in his later work – that are related to linguistic representation. But linguistic representation is not singular or primary. Burge has insisted that for all the importance of language and the causal and social elements of language (as well as mind), his anti-individualism has a deeper root. The relations between the individual and the external world, he has argued, preceded the nature of psychological states even before language evolved. Perception has a phylogenetic priority over language and over sociality, although both are significant. The conditions for objectivity, hence of representational success, lie with non-representational relations to an external world; only then can a person have a representational state. These relations are what establish specific representational content and meaning. In his very latest work, then, Burge has extended this emphasis on

understanding perception to what he calls the “animal underpinnings” of our central rational capacities, namely understanding and reason.

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David Boersema

BURKS, ARTHUR WALTER (1915–)

Arthur Burks was born on 13 October 1915 in Duluth, Minnesota. From age ten through high school, he lived in Batavia, Illinois, west of Chicago, where his father commuted to teach mathematics at Marshall High School. Burks earned his BA in mathematics and physics from DePauw University in 1936. He received his PhD in philosophy at the

University of Michigan in 1941, writing his dissertation on Charles Sanders Peirce. After taking a government-sponsored defense-training course in the summer of 1941 at the Moore School of Electrical Engineering at the University of Pennsylvania, Burks stayed on there as a wartime instructor and research engineer. In the fall of 1945, wishing to return to philosophy, he accepted a part-time instructorship at nearby Swarthmore College for the school year 1945–46, but continued to work full-time at the Moore School through mid-February. Shortly thereafter, he began commuting to the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton for three days a week through the balance of the spring term and for five days a week that summer.

In the fall of 1946, he commenced his career at the University of Michigan, starting as assistant professor of philosophy and retiring, in 1986, as professor of philosophy in the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts and as professor of electrical engineering and computer science in the College of Engineering. Burks has received many honors, including the Russel Lectureship for 1977–78, the highest honor bestowed on a faculty member by the University of Michigan, nominated by colleagues in both philosophy and computer science. Burks was President of the American Philosophical Association Western Division in 1972–73. Burks died on 14 May 2008 in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

As Burks noted in his “Replies” for *The Philosophy of Logical Mechanism*, the 1990 Festschrift edited by Merilee Salmon, his “long-range philosophical interests have always been in broad questions of epistemology, logic, metaphysics, and value, such as those treated by Plato, Lucretius, Hume, Kant, and Peirce.” At Michigan he taught courses in logic, the philosophy of science, and the history of modern philosophy.

He has written papers in all of these areas. His major book is *Chance, Cause, Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Scientific Evidence*, in which he developed his calculus of probabilistic choice and his logic of causal propositions, together with their applications to traditional philosophical problems.

Burks's work on Peirce took him to Harvard University in 1955, to edit the seventh and eighth volumes of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, completing the series for which Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss had edited the first six volumes. In recent years, he has been an adjunct professor at Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis, consulting for the Peirce Edition Project as it produces a comprehensive chronological series of Peirce's writings.

Burks's years at the Moore School during World War II had entailed an abrupt shift from his doctoral studies in philosophy to research in electrical engineering. His main work at the Moore School was as a principal designer, under Eckert and Mauchly, of the ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), the world's first general-purpose, or programmable, electronic computer. In this U.S. Army-sponsored project, Burks contributed to the designs of the basic arithmetic unit (the accumulator) and the high-speed multiplier. His chief contribution, though, was the fundamental organization of the computer's master programmer, the component that consolidated all the local programs of the thirty individual units into a single program, with repetitions and branches. In this regard, he prepared the first electronic computer program – for calculating a shell trajectory, the task for which the ENIAC was originally conceived. When the computer was tentatively finished, Burks worked successively with T. Kite Sharpless and Robert F. Shaw to check the entire electronic system for logical correctness and for adherence to

a set of strict design principles devised to ensure reliability in this 18,000-vacuum-tube behemoth.

At the Institute for Advanced Study, where he had been invited by John von Neumann to work on the IAS Computer after the ENIAC's dedication in early 1946, he coauthored, with von Neumann and Herman H. Goldstine, the June 1946 *Preliminary Discussion of the Logical Design of an Electronic Computing Instrument*. This work, which provided the paradigmatic form of von Neumann's computer architecture, has been widely regarded as one of the most influential documents in the field. Although he left the Institute for Michigan that fall, Burks returned for the summers of 1947 and 1948. The wartime move from philosophy to what was to become known as computer science carried over to Burks's post-war years, so that he actually devoted about half his time at Michigan to philosophy and half to computer science, together with efforts to build bridges between two fields that were generally considered distinct. Fortunately, the philosophy department at Michigan took a broad view of its subject-matter. In the fall of 1948, with this strong interest in electronic computers and their basis in logical manipulations, he began consulting for Burroughs Adding Machine Co., in Detroit. A year later, he formed the Logic of Computers Group at Michigan, which Burroughs sponsored through 1954, when Burks left for his year at Harvard. That group was reestablished upon his return, supported by various government research grants, and continued beyond his retirement in 1986. It did research on programming, automata theory, computer modeling, and self-reproducing cellular automata, much of it inspired by von Neumann's original work in those areas.

Burks's Logic of Computer Group led, in 1956, to a doctoral program in computers

and then, in 1967, to a new department of computer and communication sciences in the Literary College, with Burks as its first chairman. In 1983, the faculty of that department was shifted to the department of electrical engineering and computer science in the Engineering College. Within this discipline, Burks taught courses in (and wrote papers on) computer architecture, computer logic, the theory of cellular automata, and the history of computing.

His writing on computer history began in the mid-1970s. As early as 1950, he had been asked by several corporations to consult on the ENIAC – as to who did what and when – in anticipation of the issuance of the Eckert-Mauchly patent on that computer. He was especially involved in consulting for Honeywell after the patent was granted in 1964, as Sperry Rand, which had acquired the patent rights, began demanding huge royalties from the entire electronic data processing industry. Honeywell balked and ultimately became the plaintiff in a lawsuit against Sperry Rand. In October 1973, Judge Earl R. Larson, of the U.S. District Court in Minneapolis, handed down his decision rendering the ENIAC patent invalid. A major basis for this invalidation was the finding that the ENIAC had been derived from an obscure physicist/mathematician, John V. Atanasoff, and his prior electronic computer, the ABC, through a visit Mauchly had made to Atanasoff's Iowa State University laboratory in 1941.

This case led Burks to revise his long-held view that the ENIAC was the world's first electronic computer. And he now undertook to write the history, as it became apparent that neither industry nor academia was presenting the unappealed trial outcome with either accuracy or acceptance. He recognized that the ABC, though a *special-purpose* computer, nevertheless embraced some dozen original concepts that remain basic today, and that the

ENIAC, which did go far beyond the ABC and led to the stored-program computers and beyond, was properly seen as the first *general-purpose* electronic computer.

Burks and his wife Alice wrote a lengthy article on the ENIAC for the *Annals of the History of Computing* in 1981, and then a book, *The First Electronic Computer: The Atanasoff Story* in 1988. He continues to write on this history, now the only remaining survivor of that vacuum-tube era who tries to sort out and explain the relevant issues and their roles in the modern computer revolution.

The question that most often arises with regard to Burks's career concerns a seeming incongruity between philosophy and computer science. Indeed, though the idea that a computer is a *logic machine* is quite well recognized today, this implicit connection between the two disciplines met with considerable resistance for many years, so that Burks found himself living in two separate worlds that were, to him, strongly linked. It so happened that as long ago as the 1880s philosopher Peirce had remarked on the role of logic in computing devices, even suggesting that electromagnetic relays could be basic computing elements. Atanasoff, in designing his binary serial add-subtract mechanisms, realized that he was doing logic, as he devised and followed a truth-table for adding or subtracting two streams of pulses and producing the correct sums or differences, together with their carry or borrow digits. Burks recognized that many circuits of the ENIAC were performing the logical functions of NOT, NOT-OR, NOT-AND, and complexes of these. Other computer designers also understood, to varying degrees, that they were doing logic. Burks carried the relationship forward for the rest of his career.

Burks's philosophy of logical mechanism is itself a combining of philosophy and science, with mathematical logic as a foundation.

Further, Peirce brought these same disciplines to bear on his metaphysical system. It is this coincidence that has enabled Burks both to explain Peirce's work and to criticize it in light of later scientific developments. From this perspective, it becomes clear that Burks's philosophy of logical mechanism is generally harmonious with and continuous with Peirce's philosophy. Burks shows how computer simulation can explain the role of probability and the gradual development of complexity in evolution. These two phenomena have their counterparts in the first two stages of Peirce's cosmic theory of evolution: his tychism (probability) and his synechism (gradual development). As a logical mechanist, Burks rejects Peirce's third stage, his agapism (final causation; that is, unlimited progress toward a better and better universe) in favor of a reductive account of evolution. Burks spells out his views by comparison with Peirce's views most succinctly in the conclusion to his 1997 "Logic, Learning, and Creativity in Evolution," an essay in *Studies in the Logic of Charles S. Peirce*. He gives an extended account in the Festschrift cited earlier, *The Philosophy of Logical Mechanism*.

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Alice Rowe Burks

BURTT, EDWIN ARTHUR (1892–1989)

Edwin A. Burtt was born on 11 October 1892 in Groton, Massachusetts, and died on 6 September 1989 in Ithaca, New York. When Burtt was thirteen, his father became a missionary and moved the family to south China. After rebelling against his father's religious fundamentalism, Burtt returned to the United States in 1909. He attended Yale University, where he majored in philosophy and was awarded a BA degree in 1915. He next moved to New York City to study for the ministry at the Union Theological Seminary. Although he received a BD degree in 1920 and an STM degree in 1922, Burtt abandoned his plan to become a minister to pursue a career as an academic philosopher. He went to Columbia University as a doctoral student in philosophy, when the department included John Dewey and F.J.E. Woodbridge. In 1925 he was awarded a PhD in philosophy from Columbia, with Woodbridge supervising the dissertation.

Burtt began his academic career as an instructor at Columbia, where he taught from 1921 to 1923. After completing his dissertation in 1923, he accepted a position at the University of Chicago as an assistant professor and was promoted to full professor in 1928. During Burtt's tenure at the university, the philosophy department was still a stronghold of pragmatism. Burtt was a visiting professor at Harvard University in 1927–28. In 1931 Burtt resigned from Chicago along with other prominent members of the philosophy department. He then taught at Stanford University in 1931–32. In 1932 Burtt joined the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University, where he was named the Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy in 1941. He retired as emeritus professor from Cornell in 1960 but continued to write and

publish actively. Burtt was also a visiting professor at the University of Hawaii in 1941 and 1945 and a lecturer on philosophy and religion in India, Ceylon, and China in 1946–47 and 1953–54. He received several academic awards, including an LHD from the University of Chicago in 1951 and the Nicholas Murray Butler Silver Medal from Columbia University in 1958. He was active in professional societies, serving as President of the American Theological Society in 1949–50 and President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1963–64.

Burtt is best known for *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*, published first in 1924 as his doctoral dissertation on Newton's metaphysics and then in 1932 in a revised version. In that book he maps the development of metaphysical presuppositions in the physical sciences from Copernicus and Kepler to Newton. His thesis is that contemporary philosophical issues, particularly those associated with the displacement of humans from the physical and metaphysical center of the cosmos, reflect philosophers' uncritical acceptance of the shift from a medieval worldview to a Newtonian or modern scientific worldview. That shift is particularly evident in the metaphysical categories used to frame the modern perception of cosmology; specifically, the modern categories of space, time, and mass replaced the medieval categories of substance, essence, and form. Moreover, modern reality becomes atoms and their motions, efficient causality, and the identification of mind with the brain. Burtt's supporters included Imre Lakatos, who praised Burtt for his critique of positivism's anti-metaphysical view, but some thinkers strongly criticized his main thesis. Bertrand Russell interpreted Burtt's thesis as an attack on the rational foundation of modern science.

During his tenure at Cornell, Burt taught courses in the history of religions and comparative religion. This experience had a profound impact on the direction of his scholarship, as well as on his personal life. In the late 1920s, Burt subscribed to religious humanism and signed the “Human Manifesto” in 1933 which was atheistic in intent and also substituted the spirit of humanity for traditional notions of the divine. His conversion to humanism was evident in a series of lectures that he delivered before the Institute of World Unity at Greene Acre in August 1928; these were published as *Religion in an Age of Science* (1929). Burt argued that religion must be radically transformed toward consonance with the spirit of science and must come to regard its dogmas as tentative. During World War II, however, he rejected religious humanism because of its inability to account for evil and became a member of Religious Society of Friends until his death. In 1947 while in India, Burt also took vows as a lay Buddhist to demonstrate publicly the nourishment he received from this religious tradition. Although Quakerism and Buddhism appear to be fundamentally different religious traditions, Burt found important points of contact between them; he saw the Quaker notion of “inward light” as congenial to principles of Eastern spirituality. He attempted to forge a philosophical approach or sensitivity that accommodated both Eastern and Western traditions.

Burt’s philosophical method was advanced by a trip to the Far East in the mid-1940s. His philosophical goal after the mid-1940s was to work toward a “world philosophy,” in which the limitations of Eastern and Western philosophical traditions were transcended in an integration of their achievements. To attain that integration, he developed a notion of “expansion of awareness” and introduced it in his final major published work, *In Search of Philosophic Understanding* (1965). This

newer notion eclipsed the earlier notion of context and included three essential components: presuppositions, valuations, and motivations. Presuppositions were the premises that underpin thinking and that compose the scaffolding for constructing a worldview. Valuations and motivations represent the emotional dimension of epistemology and are important for adopting specific presuppositions. Another important component of Burt’s drive towards an expanded awareness was psychoanalysis, which Burt himself had undergone since the mid-1940s. Through psychoanalysis, unconscious motivations that lead to valuing particular presuppositions can be made explicit. Burt argued that “insight” into the underlying presuppositions is required to transcend unconscious biases towards grasping truth and “ultimate” reality. Besides psychoanalysis, Burt also recommended Eastern meditation for transcending the biases often inherent in unconscious presuppositions. Burt spent the rest of his academic career trying to bridge two powerful institutions in Western society – science and religion – by developing a “new metaphysics” and attendant categories for a new world understanding, especially with the aid of Eastern philosophical traditions.

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James A. Marcum

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CALKINS, MARY WHITON (1863 1930)

Mary Whiton Calkins was born on 30 March 1863 in Hartford, Connecticut, and died on 26 February 1930 in Newton, Massachusetts. In 1880 her father became a clergyman at a Congregational pastorate in Newton, Massachusetts, and Calkins enrolled in Newton High School. Her graduation essay was entitled, "The Apology Which Plato Should Have Written." As a vindication of the character of Xanthippe, this essay displayed Calkins's early commitment to women's struggles.

In 1882 Calkins was admitted to Smith College and graduated with her BA in 1885 with a concentration in classics and philosophy. Calkins earned her MA from Smith College in 1887. Wellesley's philosophy department then offered Calkins a position in psychology on condition that she undertake a year of training in the discipline. Deliberating over the best institution at which to prepare, she decided upon Harvard University. Though the university refused to admit women formally, pressure from Calkins's father and the President of Wellesley succeeded in securing for Calkins informal permission to attend graduate seminars. Studying under Josiah Royce and William James, Calkins had the privilege of being the sole student in a seminar held by James just after the publication of his *Principles of Psychology*. She also studied psychology under Edmund C. Sanford at Clark University.

She finished her informal study at Harvard and began as an instructor in psychology at Wellesley in 1890. She held the position of instructor in psychology from 1890 to 1894. In addition to teaching, she established a laboratory within Wellesley's psychology department, which was the first established at a woman's university, and one of the first established in the United States. She incorporated the experimental ideas that she learned at Harvard into the curriculum at Wellesley; in turn, her instruction of students and laboratory work at Wellesley aided her further study at Harvard. In 1895 Calkins unofficially presented and defended her dissertation, "An Experimental Research on the Association of Ideas," before the faculty of the philosophy department at Harvard, which sent a letter to Harvard's President notifying him that she had fulfilled all of the requirements for her degree. For the next twenty-eight years, various faculty and alumni requested, to no avail, that Harvard confer a degree upon Calkins. She received an honorary degree of LittD from Columbia in 1909, and LLD from Smith College in 1910.

As a professor of both philosophy and psychology, Calkins noticed the different focuses regarding the person within each field. Whereas psychology focused on the determined aspects of the person, philosophy focused on the freedom of the person. Calkins's initial resolution to this dichotomy was derived from Münsterberg's distinction between the objectifying sciences and the subjectifying sciences. From 1901 to 1905,

Calkins drew upon this distinction in her recommendation that the study of the person utilize both sciences in a manner that keeps each science in check. She called this process a “double entry” approach. In 1909, Calkins revised her recommendation in favor of a “single entry” approach of the subjectifying sciences. While she did not negate the validity of the objective sciences, she was weary of their atomism.

Calkins’s contributions within psychology were significant. In addition to inventing a memory technique of paired associates still employed within memory research today, she published voluminously. Publications in psychology include a monograph supplement in *Psychological Review* entitled “Association: An Essay Analytic and Experimental” (1896), *An Introduction to Psychology* (1901), *Der Doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie* (1905), and *A First Book in Psychology* (1909). In addition, she published over fifty articles and reviews in the area of psychology alone. Calkins’s own metaphysical system of “personalistic absolutism” had become her prominent focus. The chief influences of Calkins’s metaphysics were G.W.F. Hegel, F.H. Bradley, and Royce. As an idealistic personalism, her metaphysics was idealist insofar as it held that all realities within the universe were comprised of mind; it was personalistic insofar as it held that all realities were a self or aspect of a self. Her metaphysics held that one all-inclusive Absolute Person comprised the lesser mental selves of the universe within it. Her books in philosophy include *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy* (1907), and *The Good Man and The Good: An Introduction to Ethics* (1921). She also edited volumes of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.

Calkins retired in 1929, having received many honors throughout her life in the fields of psychology and philosophy. In *American*

Men of Science (1903), James McKeen Cattell ranked Calkins twelfth among the nation’s top fifty psychologists. She was the first woman elected President of both the American Psychological Association in 1905, and the American Philosophical Association in 1918 (and only William James and John Dewey have also held both presidencies). In addition, she was granted honorary membership in the British Psychological Association in 1927.

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Dana Noelle McDonald

CALLAHAN, DANIEL JOHN (1930)

Daniel Callahan was born on 19 July 1930 in Washington, D.C. He studied English and psychology at Yale University (BA, 1952), taking a course on Aquinas with John Courtney

Murray. Diverted towards philosophy, he then received an MA in philosophy from Georgetown University in 1957 and the PhD in philosophy from Harvard University in 1965. He completed his dissertation on Berkeley after becoming an editor with the Catholic magazine *Commonweal* in 1961. He advocated a liberal and layperson-oriented Catholicism in many articles and three books. Becoming an agnostic, he left *Commonweal* in 1969. He briefly worked with The Population Council, which assisted Callahan and Willard Gaylin with establishing The Hastings Center, a research think tank for medical and life ethics, in 1969. He consulted with the Presidential Commission on Population Growth and the American Future (1970–71) and Ford-Rockefeller Program in Population Policy (1972–75). His first books on health care ethics and policy – *Abortion* (1970), *Ethics and Population Limitation* (1971), and *The Tyranny of Survival* (1973) – focused on the responsible use of biotechnologies in light of duties to persons and limitations to resources. *Abortion* was a finalist for the National Book Award in 1970.

Callahan served as The Hastings Center’s first President, as it grew from its first New York location in Hastings-on-Hudson, then to the Briarcliff College site in Briarcliff Manor, and then to its current headquarters in Garrison, New York, until semi-retiring in 1996 as Research Scholar and Director of International Programs. He has also been a senior lecturer at the Harvard Medical School (1998–2009), a fellow of the Yale University’s Institution for Social and Policy Studies (2004–), a senior research fellow in philosophy at Yale (2004–09), and co-director of the Yale-Hastings Program in Ethics and Health Policy (2009–). Callahan has served on several dozen councils, committees, and boards across the spectrum of non-profit organizations and government agencies and centers involved with health care and social

welfare. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine, and a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of the Humanities. He was awarded the Joseph Leiter Award by the National Library of Medicine; the Lifetime Achievement Award from the American Society of Bioethics and the Humanities; and the 1996 Freedom and Scientific Responsibility Award of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Callahan is perhaps best known for his moral skepticism towards the unbridled pursuit of death-forestalling and life-extending technologies. His book *Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society* set the ongoing agenda for deliberation about these issues, winning the 1988 Pulitzer Prize for Non-Fiction. Succeeding books, such as *What Kind of Life* (1990), *The Troubled Dream of Life* (1993), and *False Hopes* (1998), ask difficult questions about the price that individuals and societies must pay when medical research and new technologies deliver radically new powers over life and death. He urges the philosophical acceptance of aging and dying, so that medicine can prevent unnecessary death while remaining just as devoted to preventative and restorative health care. *The Roots of Bioethics: Health, Progress, Technology, Death* (2012) collects essays on these topics as well as his explorations of patient autonomy, expensive biotechnologies, resource allocation and rationing, health care reform, and government-oriented vs. market-oriented health care systems.

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CAMPBELL, DONALD THOMAS (1916–1996)

Donald T. Campbell was born on 20 November 1916 in Grass Lake, Michigan. He attended San Bernardino Junior College and then the University of California at Berkeley, where he received his BA in 1939 and his PhD in psychology in 1947 (after service in the Naval Reserve). He was a student of Egon Brunswik and Edward Tolman, and wrote his dissertation on "The Generality of a Social Attitude." Campbell taught psychology at Ohio State University and the University of Chicago before going to Northwestern University in 1953. After retiring from Northwestern in 1979, he was Schweitzer Professor in the Maxwell School at Syracuse University until 1982, when he went to Lehigh University with the title of "university professor" and relationships with the psychology, sociology, anthropology, and education departments. He also held visiting positions at several universities including Yale University. Campbell retired from Lehigh in 1994 and died on 5 May 1996 in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

Campbell was among the most important social scientists of the twentieth century. He made important contributions to psychology, sociology, anthropology, education, and epistemology. For his career's many accomplishments, he received the Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award of the American Psychological Association (he was its President in 1973), and the award for Distinguished Contribution to Research in Education from the American Educational Research Association. Campbell was elected to membership in the National Academy of Sciences in 1973, and became a member of the American Philosophical Society in 1993. Numerous universities awarded him their honorary degrees, including Michigan, Florida, Chicago, and Southern California.

Campbell's training in social psychology led to his pioneering work in the emerging field of cross-cultural psychology in the 1950s, for which he first gained recognition. His next major contribution was to uncover fundamental problems with the standard research methodology of experimentation with human subjects. His article written with Donald W. Fiske on "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix" (1959) developed the statistical methods of "quasi-experimentation" that approach the genuinely randomized scientific experiments in the natural science. Perhaps the most frequently cited paper in social science, Campbell expanded his theory of research design in later books (1963, 1979) that have long been the standard texts on the subject. Campbell also developed techniques for uncovering the deep and pervasive influences of bias and prejudice on social attitudes, which in turn can entrench "misinformation" and false knowledge. This research produced several studies and a book titled *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior* (1971).

Campbell became interested in the social creation and transmission of knowledge in the 1960s. Mostly inspired by his acquaintance with Karl Popper's philosophy of science, Campbell postulated that all knowledge is created by trial and error. Beginning with his "Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in other Knowledge Processes" (1960), Campbell wrote a series of articles applying Popper's view of knowledge as that which survives vigorous testing to various problems in sociology of knowledge. By the early 1970s, he had selected the label of "evolutionary epistemology" for his theory, and was the first to publish a paper with that title in 1974, joining a new and vibrant interdisciplinary sub-field. Other students of Popper had similarly sought a general theory of knowledge based on Popper, notably William W. Bartley. Campbell's inquiries found that basing a theory of knowledge on evolutionary considerations is as old as the theory of evolution itself, and in later works he discussed the work of such thinkers as Herbert Spencer, William James, James Mark Baldwin, and Konrad Lorenz.

Campbell's epistemology requires a naturalistic view of intelligence and a realistic attitude towards knowledge's ability to partially represent the external world. As a natural activity of an organism, the intelligent exploration of the environment requires no postulation of non-natural mental states or powers. Because the surrounding environment's features are partially responsible for the success of human experiments, and the refinement of knowledge through further successful trials is best explained by crediting knowledge with gradually approximating those external features, we should believe that scientific knowledge progresses towards some greater realistic accuracy. However, as Campbell stresses, the human organism is imperfectly sensitive only to a small range of

relevant environmental features, and heavily reliant on inductive reasoning, and therefore a strong form of the correspondence theory of truth is not justifiable.

Following other thinkers such as general systems theorist Ludwig Bertalanffy, Campbell realized that the learning accomplished by living organisms requires "downward causation" in addition to ordinary upward causation. Campbell rejected reductive materialism, which holds that the only causal powers are those of the smallest parts of reality which must in turn be solely responsible for anything "upwards" that is done by larger wholes. Campbell postulated that whole systems can also exert "downward" selective control over the activation of the causal powers of its parts. Campbell was brought to this view by his theory of learning, in which it is impossible to explain what sort of knowledge emerges by considering only the micro-causal causal powers of the brain, since it is the organism-environment interaction which regulates knowledge creation.

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ČAPEK, MILIČ (1909–1997)

Milič Čapek was born in the village of Trebechovice, Bohemia, Austro-Hungary (now in the Czech Republic), on 26 January 1909. He received a PhD in philosophy in 1935 and a MSc in physics in 1936 from Charles University in Prague. Čapek taught secondary school in his native country from 1937 until 1939 when a scholarship to study at the Sorbonne enabled him to leave what had

become German-occupied Czechoslovakia. He soon had to flee Paris as the German army advanced, and found his way, via North Africa, to the United States. During the war, he participated in the Army Specialized Training Program in foreign languages at the University of Iowa and taught physics in the Navy V12 program at Doane College and the Air Corps program at the University of Nebraska.

Returning to Czechoslovakia after the war, Čapek taught briefly at the University of Olomouc before fleeing once again, on the eve of the communist *coup d'état* in 1948, to take up permanent residence, and citizenship, in the United States. He was a professor of philosophy at Carleton College in Minnesota from 1948 to 1962, and at Boston University from 1962 until his retirement in 1974. Visiting professorships included the University of California at Davis, Emory University, North Texas University, and Yale University. Čapek died on 17 November 1997 in Little Rock, Arkansas.

Čapek published nearly one hundred articles in both English and French language journals. Čapek's doctoral dissertation argued that the philosophy of Henri Bergson anticipated novel elements in contemporary physics. Upon receiving a copy, Bergson wrote, "It would be impossible to better understand what is essential in my views of duration and matter," crediting Čapek with an insight shared only "perhaps, in some measure," by Alfred North Whitehead (Bergson's letter is reproduced in Čapek's *Bergson and Modern Physics*). Work begun in the dissertation culminated in his two major works, *The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics* (1961) and *Bergson and Modern Physics* (1971).

Čapek devoted his career to developing a metaphysics based both on the revolution created in physics by the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics and on Bergsonian insights

into the nature of time and duration. With great erudition and a firm grasp of the history of science and of philosophy, he argued that contemporary physics requires a metaphysics of events, not of enduring substances, and that these events are not the instantaneous events of standard interpretations of relativity theory, but events partaking of the qualities of Bergsonian duration. Following Bergson, Čapek argued that the passage of time requires the emergence of novelty and thus that the determinism of classical physics must be replaced with the indeterminism of quantum mechanics and Bergsonian duration.

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CARNAP, RUDOLF (1891–1970)

Rudolf Carnap was born on 18 May 1891 in Ronsdorf, now part of the industrial town of Wuppertal in the Ruhr area of western Germany. In 1908 the family moved to Jena, a small university town in Thüringen, where Carnap finished school and went to university. He attended the lectures of Gottlob Frege, whose logical ideas were fundamental to Carnap’s philosophy in all its phases. His studies were interrupted by World War I, and then he joined the party of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht before they were murdered, distributed clandestine newsletters to soldiers at the front, and wrote articles about world government and socialism for an underground newspaper. He conceived of a highest-level “conceptual politics” whose object was the planning and design of conceptual frameworks in which the species could organize its global civic cohabitation. To put the human “form of community” on a rational basis, he thought, an overall system of the sciences was needed, a Leibnizian *calculus philosophicus* or universal characteristic, of which a logic of Frege’s kind was evidently to be a central component. He received his PhD from Jena in 1921, writing a dissertation entitled *Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre* (1922) which concerned the concept of space in physics, mathematics, and philosophy.

Carnap soon became an important member of the Vienna Circle after meeting Hans Reichenbach at a conference in Erlangen in 1923. In 1926 Carnap became an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Vienna. He became a leading member of the Vienna Circle together with Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath. In 1930 he and Reichenbach founded the journal *Erkenntnis*, and in 1931 he became professor of natural philosophy at the German University in Prague, Czechoslovakia. Carnap was forced to emigrate from Central Europe to the United States in 1935 to escape the Nazi threat. He joined the philosophy faculty of the University of Chicago in 1936, at the invitation of Charles W. Morris, became a U.S. citizen in 1941, and taught at Chicago until 1952. From 1952 to 1954 Carnap was a fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. After Reichenbach’s death, Carnap was invited in 1954 to fill his position as professor of philosophy at the University of California at Los Angeles, and he held that position until his retirement in 1961. Carnap died on 14 September 1970 in Los Angeles, California.

One part of Carnap’s early utopian ideal was a “total system of all concepts” in which the whole of knowledge could be traced back to a few basic components. He did not see how to implement this idea until he read Bertrand Russell’s *Our Knowledge of the External World* in early 1922, which gave him the tools for constructing his “total system of all concepts.” His starting point had been Hans Vaihinger’s neo-Kantian “positivist idealism,” including its explicitly pragmatist orientation. But his goal was to *connect* the “chaos” with the fictive “reality” and to keep the fictions required for the construction of a “reality” to a disciplined minimum. Russell’s principle of abstraction gave him the key. Instead of *analyzing* the “chaos of experience,” as Mach and other empiricists had tried to do, qualities

and physical objects could be *constructed* by taking equivalence classes of “similar” experiences; these equivalence classes could stand in for the qualities. In place of Vaihinger’s undisciplined proliferation of fictions, Carnap thought the whole of scientific “reality” could be constructed from the primary world with just two fictions, corresponding to Kant’s categories of cause and substance.

Carnap continued to work on the system until 1926, when he moved to Vienna as a junior lecturer at the university and joined the Vienna Circle. The result was published in 1928 as *The Logical Construction of the World* (usually called the *Aufbau* after its German title), and became the Vienna Circle’s prime example of a “rational reconstruction.” It reconstructed the concept of “empirical content” or “empirical meaning,” and thus also provided the Circle with a criterion for distinguishing meaningful sentences (which could be traced back to experience in the style of the *Aufbau*) from meaningless ones (which could not). Important problems remained unsolved, arising mainly out of the Vienna Circle’s embrace of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* as an account of logic and mathematics. On the one hand, the *Tractatus* was indispensable for them, as all previous forms of empiricism had been unable to account plausibly for mathematics. On the other hand, Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning, taken literally, seemed to consign scientific theories (understood as universal laws), to the realm of nonsense, as well as all meta-linguistic “elucidations,” statements *about* language such as the *Aufbau* or the *Tractatus* itself. Neither of these indispensable kinds of statements could be expressed as truth-functional concatenations of atomic sentences. Carnap’s task, therefore, was to find a way to express scientific laws and meta-linguistic elucidations *within* the constraints of the picture theory.

His first big project on this front was the attempt to fit axiomatic (implicitly defined)

concepts into a Wittgensteinian framework. This was especially important because of the new developments stemming from David Hilbert that used a *meta-mathematics* to prove results about the structural characteristics (the consistency, completeness, categoricity, etc.) of actual (axiomatic) mathematics. It was essential to show that this meta-mathematics could actually be accommodated, at bottom, within the single, Wittgensteinian language. But after three years of work on this attempt, Carnap was convinced by Alfred Tarski in early 1930 that his results did not really capture the meta-mathematical concepts intended. He abandoned the axiomatic project. Worse, that summer Kurt Gödel showed that there were true arithmetic sentences that could not be proved from the axioms of arithmetic – a result that contradicted the main theorem of Carnap’s axiomatic project. And all these results had been arrived at by Hilbert’s meta-mathematical method. By the end of 1930, then, the Vienna Circle program was troubled by these developments.

In January 1931 the solution to all these problems came to Carnap in a sleepless night “like a vision.” He abandoned Wittgenstein’s picture theory, and instead made a sharp distinction between a pure formal calculus, mere marks on a page, and its interpretation. And he restricted interpretation to the scientific *object* language. Philosophy – the “elucidations” – in the meta-language are to remain strictly *uninterpreted*. The only reference was to *linguistic* configurations in the object language. The ordinary way of speaking of facts and things, the “material mode of speech” had to be replaced, for all statements that were not straightforwardly factual, by the “formal mode of speech”: instead of speaking of extra-linguistic facts and things, we must speak only of linguistic objects – sentences and thing-names. The material mode could still be permitted, in everyday scientific discourse, but only under the proviso that everything said

could be translated back into the formal mode. What remained of philosophy became the logic of science (“*Wissenschaftslogik*”).

One of the essential requirements was a definition of *analyticity* or logical truth, to make it possible to state whether a formal-mode sentence “holds” or is true. Carnap attempted such a definition in 1931–32 (essentially a substitutional definition). But Gödel pointed out that the definition was defective; it fell afoul of what we now know as Tarski’s theorem on the indefinability of truth. Carnap did eventually produce a new definition of analyticity, in a meta-language, under Gödel’s guidance (one quite similar to Tarski’s of about the same time), but this no longer had the privileged status that a definition in the *same language*, had it been possible, could have claimed. No particular meta-language for such a definition could claim to be “correct” or “canonical.” There are infinite possibilities. And while some meta-languages may seem more “natural” than others, or more useful for certain purposes, there is no “logical reality” for this choice to correspond to. Carnap saw that the disputes among the foundational schools, like the disputes within the Circle about the correct form of evidence statements or “protocol sentences,” revolved around the question how to set up the *language*, and there was no right or wrong way to settle such questions. One could only try out different ways, and see which ones worked better. This new attitude, which first appeared in Carnap’s reply to Neurath about protocol sentences in 1932, was definitively stated as a “principle of tolerance” in the *Logical Syntax of Language* in 1934.

The *Logical Syntax* combined the ideas of January 1931 (a sharp distinction between a formal calculus – specified by explicit rules – and its interpretation) and of late 1932 (the principle of tolerance). These were retained throughout Carnap’s later work and became the basis for his mature ideal of

explication. But the idea of restricting the philosophical meta-language to the “formal mode of speech” was dropped shortly after the *Syntax* was published, in 1935, when Carnap realized from Tarski’s semantic work that the interpretation of a calculus could also be specified by explicit rules.

Carnap’s work was interrupted by the Nazi threat and emigration to the U.S. In wartime and postwar America, Carnap had felt constrained to keep his radical ideas about society and politics well concealed, and thus to focus even more exclusively on purely technical work. Nonetheless, the new American surroundings appear to have reaffirmed and reinforced the pragmatist orientation inspired by Vaihinger.

The three and a half decades of his American career were largely occupied by a series of not very successful technical language projects. (1) He tried, in a series of semantic works, to develop a general definition of “analyticity” that would distinguish analytic from synthetic sentences in a natural and obvious way. The shortcomings of these successive attempts were pointed out by W.V. Quine, and were often taken to undermine other parts of Carnap’s view, such as the principle of tolerance itself. (2) Carnap also tried unsuccessfully to specify a strict logical relation between observation sentences and theoretical sentences. After he abandoned the *Aufbau* effort to construct theories directly from subjective experience, a series of looser definitions of “empirical content” or “empirical reducibility” were given. These attempts were also subjected to searching criticism, above all by Carl Hempel. The lesson derived from this failure has generally been to abandon the question altogether, unfortunately, instead of confining the pessimism to Carnap’s particular approach. (3) The last three decades of Carnap’s life were largely devoted to the creation of an inductive logic. This was intended as a tool for practicing

scientists, to give them a way of measuring the objective probability of a theory with respect to the available evidence. It was intended to make precise the informal usage, in everyday and scientific life, by which the evidence is taken to “make” one hypothesis “more likely” than another. Carnap’s proposals attained some currency in the 1950s and 1960s, but are no longer in the mainstream of discussion.

Our representation of our knowledge to ourselves is language-relative. We can only know what we know in the form given it by a particular language. The choice among languages, though, is not a choice we make within a given language framework. It is a practical choice, involving values. So is the choice among explications for some given explicandum. These are *external* questions, in Carnap’s terms. So knowledge and values are in a constant feedback relation to each other; knowledge shapes values and values shape knowledge. This would appear to make Carnap as radically “pragmatist” as William James. In Carnap’s ideal, reason is not the slave of the passions (or of anything else) but each side informs the other. Reason informs the passions (and the rest of life in the realm of “practice”), and the passions inform reason.

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André W. Carus

CARTWRIGHT, NANCY LYNN DELANEY (1944)

Nancy Cartwright was born on 24 June 1944 in New Castle, Pennsylvania. She received her BA degree from the University of Pittsburgh in 1966 in mathematics, and her PhD in philosophy in 1971 from the University of Illinois, Chicago. She has been a professor of philosophy at the University of Maryland (1971–73), Stanford University (1973–1991), and the London School of Economics (1991–2012). She served as both the Chair and Director of the LSE Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science from 1993 to 2001. She also was a visiting professor at Cambridge University (1974), the University of California, Los Angeles (1976), Princeton University (1978), and the University of Pittsburgh (1984). She added a position at the University of California, San Diego, in 1998. She was married to British philosopher Stuart Hampshire from 1984 until his death in 2004. In 2012 she joined the philosophy department as professor of philosophy at Durham University in England, while continuing her joint position at San Diego. She also is the

co-director of the Centre for Humanities Engaging Science and Society at Durham.

Over her career, Cartwright has received numerous honors, awards, and fellowships, including those from the MacArthur Foundation, the Institute for Advanced Study (at Durham University), the British Academy, the Philosophy of Science Center (at the University of Pittsburgh), the German National Academy of Sciences, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has also served as President of the Philosophy of Science Association (2008–10) and the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division (2008–09).

Cartwright's notoriety is based on her critique of what she has called the "fundamentalism" of much of philosophy of science. Science, Cartwright insists, is not (merely) a description, a product, but is essentially an activity, a process, of experimentation and problem-solving. A basic component of science is the formulation of specific problems to be solved, and the construction and testing of scientific models as a means of solving them. Models, says Cartwright, serve both an exploratory function and an explanatory function. That is, sometimes we construct and use models in order to have a basis for generating focused questions and avenues for future research. This exploratory purpose or function is often referred to as the heuristic function of models. In addition to this function, models are also constructed and used to evaluate or give a basis for explaining phenomena. In either case, exploratory or explanatory, we construct and use models to represent some set of phenomena.

One feature of scientific models, regardless of function, is that they have an ineliminable normative feature to them. That is, they do not (merely) describe, but also regulate. With respect to scientific models, what are meant here are the "idealized" and salient features of the phenomena

and of the model at issue. Models (and laws) involve idealizations. For example, they might assume frictionless planes or objects in a vacuum or objects that are not extended in space even though they have mass. Such idealizations are, of course, for that reason removed from actual experience, but they also allow underlying salient features of the phenomena (and of the model) to be highlighted and analyzed. Again, for Cartwright, models are purposive; they do not just happen. They are designed and constructed with particular purposes and object-phenomena in mind. As with theories, there are features of models that are desirable epistemic values and norms that are basic to models, both in their exploratory and explanatory functions: simplicity, testability, consistency, fecundity, (perhaps) quantifiability, etc.

Her challenge to fundamentalism, including her analysis of the nature and significance of models, began early on with her provocatively entitled book, *How the Laws of Physics Lie*. In this book, she argued that science does not describe the world via establishment of theoretical laws that correctly represent the features of the world. In her book she proposes what she calls a “simulacrum” view. A simulacrum is something that has the form or appearance of something else but without possessing the substance or proper qualities of that something else. (So, a scarecrow or a robot could be a simulacrum of a human.) She claims that to explain a phenomenon is to construct a model that fits the phenomenon into a theory. The fundamental laws of a theory, she says, are true of the objects *in the model*. Fundamental laws do not govern objects in reality, but in models.

Cartwright states that a theory’s laws do not literally match up to reality. This is because laws do not and cannot include all of the particularities of the instances that are said to be governed by those laws. For example, the law of universal gravitation is often expressed as: $F = Gm_1 \times m_2 / r^2$, where F is the gravitational force (or mutual

attraction) of two bodies of mass (m_1 and m_2), G is the gravitational constant (approximately 6.673×10^{-11}), and r is the distance between the centers of the two bodies of mass (m_1 and m_2). Since real bodies are extended over a certain amount of space, their mass is spread out. This is why we weigh very slightly less on a mountaintop than we do at sea level. Or, another example is the velocity of light varies depending upon the medium through which it travels. There are always, then, particularities that attend to every instance governed by a law. Philosophers and scientists refer to this as *ceteris paribus*, which means “other things being equal.” When a *ceteris paribus* clause is invoked, that is meant to imply the absence of unusual or interfering or otherwise irrelevant conditions. A very simple example of this is that a match will ignite when it is struck, but it is assumed (that is, *ceteris paribus*) there is oxygen present or the match is not immersed in water, etc. There are always *ceteris paribus* clauses pertinent to laws, says Cartwright.

This challenge to what she has called fundamentalism is not, she insists, a challenge to (or rejection of) realism, the view that there is a world independent of our theories or models or understandings. Rather, it is a challenge to a particular form or conception of realism, namely, one that claims that there is, in the final analysis, a single, correct description of the world. In her later works, such as *Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement* and *The Dappled World: A Study in the Boundaries of Science*, she has argued for a form of realism that takes the capacities of phenomena, especially their causal capacities, as the basic components of the world. As she has remarked, laws are not real, but capacities are. The causal capacities of phenomena, their ability to interact and affect other phenomena, not causal laws, need to be the focus of scientific investigation and analysis. How this has been taken by critics as being anti-realist is that she has consistently rejected the notion of a single, correct causal description of

the world. However, for her this is not a rejection of realism, but of a form of fundamentalism (i.e., that there is “one way” the world is). For Cartwright, there can be many incorrect accounts of the world, but from that it does not follow that there is a single, correct account, and certainly not in terms of causal laws.

An important aspect of Cartwright’s philosophy of science is her most recent work on correcting what she has called the “imperialism” of traditional philosophy of science. In ways that are reminiscent of the work of another philosopher of science, Larry Laudan, Cartwright takes science’s activity of problem-solving as basic to (good) science. Earlier conceptions of scientific progress stressed independent standards and criteria of rationality (for instance, falsifiability and the use of *modus tollens* arguments for Sir Karl Popper). For Cartwright, however, we should define rationality – what constitutes the standards and criteria of rational scientific practice – in terms of actual progress, namely, problem-solving ability. Good science is science that solves problems, so a theory or model that solves more problems than another is a better theory or model. Of course, this problem-solving ability depends in large part on those models capturing the causal capacities of the phenomena being investigated (so, again, there is no rejection of realism). Additionally, further problems must be solved. For example, Newtonian mechanics provided a very good model of phenomena, but as our investigation of the world proceeded, it failed to solve further problems (such as the orbit of Mercury or the motion of objects as they approach the speed of light), and hence was replaced by other models and theories.

Finally, the most recent work of Cartwright has been to flesh out connections among science, values, and politics. Just as there are epistemic values within the doing of good science (such as predictability, consistency, simplicity,

fecundity, etc.), so, too, there are social, political, and ethical values about the doing of good science. This has been her emphasis with her focus on issues such as climate modeling and public policy, for instance in her *Evidence Based Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing It Better*. Science, for her, is normative; it is an activity driven by the desire to understand the world, but understanding is relative to solving problems outside of science.

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David Boersema

CARUS, PAUL (1852–1919)

Paul Carus was born on 18 July 1852 in Ilsenburg, Germany. He obtained a PhD in classical philology at Tübingen in 1876, and a teaching position at the military academy of the Royal Corps of Cadets of Saxony in Dresden. In 1880 he published a pamphlet in which he denied the literal truth of the Bible and described it as a literary work comparable to the *Odyssey*. His employer considered these views “not in harmony with the Christian spirit” and required him to recant or quit. He quit, and emigrated to England in 1881, and then to the United States in 1884.

Carus soon came into contact with Edward C. Hegeler, a successful zinc manufacturer in LaSalle, Illinois, who had turned to philosophy. Hegeler was well-known in religious circles such as the Ethical Cultural Society and the Free Religious Association, groups positioned between Unitarianism on one side and outright materialism and agnosticism on the other. In 1887 he hired Benjamin and Sara Underwood to run his new magazine, *The Open Court*, but soon found that he couldn’t abide their

agnostic views and replaced them with Carus. Together he and Carus sought with varying degrees of success to promote the religion of science, the transplantation of European and German ideas to the New World, and open philosophical debate generally. There can be little doubt that Carus's gregarious personality, command of idiomatic English, and rhetorical flair enabled the publishing enterprise to flourish even though it never earned a profit.

Carus married Hegeler's well-educated daughter Mary, and expanded Hegeler's publishing operation to include book publishing (beginning in 1887) and a second, more technical philosophical journal, *The Monist* (beginning in 1890). Both entities survive today in somewhat altered form. (*The Open Court* was a casualty of the Depression.) Carus wrote more than seventy books and one thousand articles on philosophy, religion, history, literature, politics, poetry, mathematics, and other subjects. Working in LaSalle and Chicago, he oversaw the publication of 113 issues of *The Monist* and 732 issues of *The Open Court*. Carus was busy with these publishing enterprises until his death on 11 February 1919 in LaSalle, Illinois.

Carus's position on the margins of religious dissent enabled him to publish then-familiar mainstays of the movement, such as Moncure Conway, Ernst Mach and Charles S. Peirce. Mach wrote that *Open Court*'s English translations of his work were more important to him than the original German editions. Carus was also well-placed to be influenced by the Oriental religious thoughts and personalities that were part of the 1893 World's Parliament of Religions, a conference held with the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago. Probably *Open Court*'s best-selling title was Carus's *The Gospel of Buddha*, a compilation drawing on 45 Buddhist sources. Carus encouraged and financially supported Oriental missionaries in the United States,

including Anagarika Dharmapala and Soyen Shaku. One of Soyen's young associates, Teitaro Suzuki, translated *The Gospel of Buddha* and then spent eleven years in the US, mostly working with Carus in LaSalle, before returning to Japan and his distinguished later career as a popularizer of Zen Buddhism.

There were many tensions within the "philosophy of form" Carus tried to develop in his later years. Chief among these is ambivalence about what was meant by "form." On the one hand, we have what often sounds like a Kantian conception, or possibly a neo-Kantian conception like that developed by Hermann Cohen in the 1870s, in which "form" consists of the categories of pure reason, prior to all content, that the intellect imposes on the chaotic manifold of experience. Like Cohen and many others, Carus was dissatisfied with Kant's "pure forms of intuition" that forced particular axioms of geometry and arithmetic on us as ineluctable media of apprehending the external world; we humans have no choice, Kant had said, but to perceive the world as spatial and temporal. Though Carus accepted Kant's argument for the subjectivity of space and time, he seems not to have understood that it was precisely the fact that our sensibility imposes these forms on nature, for Kant that guaranteed the objectivity of the principles of science (within the realm of appearance). It is because the constitution of the human mind *puts* them there, Kant had argued, that the axioms of geometry are everywhere valid for us. Where Cohen had sought an alternative guarantee of objectivity, Carus wanted to keep Kant's original one – while also undermining it. Carus fails to see why Kant's arguments should block our access to a "real existence" to which the concepts Kant regards as subjective may *objectively* be applied. Carus discerns an "objective space" as an "inherent quality of things" that "is not, as in subjective space, a construction." While acknowledging that

Kant's arguments hold for "subjective" space and time, Carus somehow thought we could also, nonetheless, stand *outside* our sensibility and compare an "objective" space – a thing in itself – with our apprehensions of it.

But even if Carus had adopted a more promising strategy in regard to "form" in this highly abstract and purely intellectual sense, there seems to have been a more fundamental obstacle to his achievement of a consistent view about it. This is that "form" for him also represented the world of aspirations, ideals, or values more generally. In writing about the poet Friedrich Schiller, for instance, Carus indicates that Schiller's frequent contrast between the transient world and an "ideal world" was precisely that between the chaotic world of our sensibility and the world of "form" – the values or ideals we impose on an otherwise lifeless world. Though they may provide regulative guidance, such "ideals" were not, in Kant's view, anchored in the objective existence of the world we perceive and live in. But Carus did not accept this fundamental trade-off, and thus in effect regressed, without explicitly realizing it, to a kind of Platonic view of "forms" as trans-empirical entities that are in some vague sense "realized" in the empirical world.

Carus shared many of the concerns and preoccupations of his German contemporaries, but was unable to articulate them into a consistent overall view or a compelling argument for any particular ideal. On the other hand, his broad interests, and his awareness of intellectual trends, qualified him as an interlocutor and stimulant for more serious and rigorous minds.

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Harold Henderson and A.W. Carus

CASTAÑEDA, HECTOR-NERI (1924 1991)

Héctor-Neri Castañeda-Calderón was born on 13 December 1924 in San Vicente Zacapa, Guatemala. He won a scholarship to the University of Minnesota, where he received his BA in 1950, MA in 1952, and PhD in 1954, all in philosophy. His dissertation, "The Logical Structure of Moral Reasoning," was written under the direction of Wilfrid Sellars. Castañeda's first full-time philosophy position

was at Wayne State University from 1957 to 1969, where he founded the philosophy journal *Noûs*. In 1969 he moved (along with several of his Wayne colleagues) to Indiana University, where he eventually became the Mahlon Powell Professor of Philosophy and, later, its first Dean of Latino Affairs during 1978–81. He remained at Indiana until his death. He was also a visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin in 1962–63, and a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in 1981–82. He received grants and fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation in 1967–68, the Mellon Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the National Science Foundation. He was President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division in 1979–80, elected a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1990, and received the Presidential Medal of Honor from the Government of Guatemala in 1991. He died on 7 September 1991 in Bloomington, Indiana.

Castañeda's theory of the nature of practical thinking arose from his earliest work, on the foundations of morality, for which he developed a theory of deontic logic based on an "ought-to-do" operator. Unlike the more usual "ought-to-be" operator, which applies to propositions (*it ought to be the case that P*, where *P* is a proposition), the "ought-to-do" applies to the proposition-like entity that remains when the "ought" is removed from *John ought to pay his debts*: This is analyzed, not as *it ought to be the case that John pays his debts*, but as *Ought-to-do (John to pay his debts)*. Consistent with his later theory of guises, there is a special mode of predication that links, e.g., *John* with *to pay ones debts* to form the "practition" *John to pay his debts*, expressible in English by a subject noun-phrase followed by an infinitive verb-phrase. The special case of a first-person practition

is called an "intention": In *I ought to pay my debts*, the ought-to-do operator is applied to the *I to pay my debts* intention (i.e., the intention I have to pay my debts). This theory was explored in great detail in *Thinking and Doing* (1975), in which Castañeda showed how it can provide solutions for the paradoxes of deontic logic (including, especially, the Good Samaritan Paradox). His theories of practical reasoning have found many applications in artificial intelligence, both in the field of planning and acting, and in computational theories of deontic reasoning (especially in the work of the computational legal theorist L. Thorne McCarty). Further relevant works are "On the Semantics of the Ought-to-Do" (1970), "Intentions and the Structure of Intending" (1971), *The Structure of Morality* (1974), *Thinking and Doing* (1975), "The Paradoxes of Deontic Logic" (1981), and *Thinking, Language, and Experience* (1989).

The special role of the *self* occupied much of Castañeda's philosophical career and provided one of his motivations for doing philosophy, which, he often said, should be done "in the first person, for the first person." He singled it out for special treatment in his theory of intentions (mentioned above), and he investigated what he called the "phenomeno-logic" of "the I." ("Phenomeno-logic" is not phenomenology; rather, it is the study of the logical structure of phenomenal appearance.) One of his major discoveries was the "quasi-indicator" (or "quasi-indexical"): a term that allows a speaker to attribute an indexical reference to another cognitive agent. For example, the speaker of "John believes that he himself is rich" uses the quasi-indicator "he himself" (often written "he*") to express *John's* first-person reference to himself (that is, to John). That sentence is the *speaker's* way of depicting the proposition that *John* would express in the first person by "I am rich." The theory of quasi-indicators is related

to the notion of belief “*de se*” (i.e., beliefs about oneself) discussed by David Lewis, to the linguistic theory of “logophoric” pronouns (quasi-indexical lexical items that are found in some natural languages), and to the literary theory of “free indirect discourse” (used in narrative text to directly represent a character’s indexical thoughts, by expressing them via quasi-indicators without their antecedents); and it has been used in artificial-intelligence research in knowledge representation.

Castañeda’s *guise theory* is a theory of the mechanisms of reference and of Kantian “phenomena” – of the world as it is presented to us in appearance. Roughly, guises are items corresponding to sets of properties; they are both intensional (i.e., non-extensional) and intentional (i.e., objects of thought); some are perceivable, others only conceivable; they can be incomplete (e.g., the guise *the red square* is constituted by only two properties, whereas a really existing red square would have many more properties); and they can be inconsistent (e.g., the guise *the round square*). Guise theory is a fully intensional theory with one type of object (guises), one type of property (in contrast to theories, such as that of Terence Parsons, that distinguish between “nuclear” and “extranuclear” properties), and two modes of predication (“internal” and “external,” of which there are several varieties). More precisely, there are (1) properties (for example, *being round*, *being square*, *being blue*, *existing*, etc.), (2) sets of properties (called ‘guise cores’; e.g., {*being round*, *being square*}), and (3) an “individuating operator,” *c*, which is an ontic counterpart of the definite article that produces guises from guise cores (e.g., *c*{*being round*, *being square*} is the guise *the round square*). Guises can be understood, roughly, as things-under-a-description, as “facets” of (physical and non-physical) objects, as “roles” that objects play – in general, as intentional objects of thought. Guise theory has had an

influence on artificial-intelligence research on intensional knowledge representation.

On the Darwinian approach – which Castañeda favored – a philosopher’s writings are viewed as different (possibly inconsistent) theories struggling for survival, each of which must be treated on its own merits. He also developed a more general meta-philosophical stance: Philosophers should consult as much data as possible and construct as many comprehensive philosophical theories as possible. Philosophical analysis should be a helpful endeavor: Philosophers should not attack each other’s views but should ask questions and provide more data in order to help others develop their own theories. These theories, then, can be compared and generalized.

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William Rapaport

CAVELL, STANLEY LOUIS (1926)

Stanley Cavell was born on 1 September 1926 in Atlanta, Georgia. When he began college at the University of California at Berkeley,

he decided to pursue a degree in music. His involvement in theatre at Berkeley, as well as his coursework in literature and philosophy, started Cavell's interest in a broad range of the arts and humanities. After completing his BA in music in 1947, Cavell moved to New York City with plans to further his education in composition at the Juilliard School, but he soon realized that he was no longer interested in a conservatory education.

Cavell moved back to California to study philosophy at the University of California at Los Angeles from 1948 to 1951, and was then invited to join the Harvard University Society of Fellows as a junior fellow from 1953 to 1956. Cavell then moved back to California to accept a position at the University of California at Berkeley as assistant professor of philosophy, while he continued his doctoral work. Cavell completed his dissertation, “The Claim to Rationality: Knowledge and the Basis of Morality,” and was awarded his PhD in philosophy from Harvard in 1961. Cavell served on the faculty at UC Berkeley for six years before departing in 1962 for a year-long fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey. In 1963 Cavell accepted a position as professor of philosophy at Harvard, and in 1965 was named the Walter M. Cabot Professor of Aesthetics and the General Theory of Value. He remained in this position until his retirement as professor emeritus in 1997. Cavell's career is notable for his many professional honors and awards, including a MacArthur Fellowship in 1992. He was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (1996–1997). In addition, his contributions to film studies have been honored with the creation of the Stanley Cavell Curatorship of the Harvard Film Archive. Cavell also won the Morton Dauwen Zabel Award in Criticism from the American Academy and

Institute of Arts and Letters in 1985. He has received honorary degrees from several institutions.

Cavell's work has been most influential in the philosophy of art, particularly in regards to film. He is regarded by many film theorists as a seminal figure in the development and legitimization of film studies as a scholarly discipline. Cavell has also made significant contributions in the philosophies of literature, language, epistemology, politics, ethics, and culture. Throughout his writing, Cavell successfully explores the intersections between the traditions of analytical, continental, and American philosophies, and in so doing he reveals particular debts to such seemingly disparate figures as J. L. Austin (one of Cavell's own teachers), Ludwig Wittgenstein, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, William Shakespeare, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Henry David Thoreau. In addition, Cavell's interest in psychoanalysis helps to shape his approach to a broad range of philosophical problems. As a writer, Cavell is known for a prose style that has a unique stylistic flair; it has sometimes been likened to a form of artistic expression in and of itself. As a result of his diverse interdisciplinary approach and his interest in cultural forms often marginalized as "low culture," Cavell is often perceived to be stretching the boundaries between traditional philosophy and more practical modes of cultural criticism.

Cavell's earliest writings demonstrate the influence of Austin through Cavell's defense of ordinary language philosophy. Cavell links the precepts of ordinary language with late Wittgensteinian thought. His concerns with the problems of modern skepticism appear here, and they continue to figure prominently throughout his philosophy. Cavell sees all forms of skepticism, both ancient and modern, as emerging from the primordial human desire to escape the inevitable tribulations posed

by language. He considers efforts to ground communication in foundations considered more rational as being fundamentally skeptical. Cavell's Wittgenstein places great significance on the necessity of human judgment in regard to language and communication. Cavell sees a way out of the skeptical dilemma of language, for although common ordinary language is untidy and often disruptive, the possibilities of human judgment and interpretation open a space for meaningful communication through ordinary language, as well as through language that is marked by expressiveness and creativity. Cavell is critical of philosophical traditions that repress the value and importance of human expressivity, and he seems to hope that his approach to philosophical questions will help lead to greater theoretical understanding and acceptance of the value of human expression.

Cavell's interest in judgment and expression directly reflects his recurrent preoccupation with aesthetics. Whether the precise target of his analysis be epistemology, morality, political theory, or the philosophy of language, Cavell critiques the skeptical turn time and time again by returning to the matter of expression with aesthetic resonance. In his writings on aesthetic questions themselves, Cavell most often approaches topics from the immediate perspective and concerns of the critic. More often than not, he moves from an analysis of a particular work of art to philosophical issues rather than from theoretical issues to specific examples in the arts.

In Cavell's first book, *Must We Mean What We Say?* (1969), he addresses aesthetic issues in a more overt and exacting way than he does in any of his other publications. In fact, he argues for a more important and central place for aesthetics within the practice of philosophy. Cavell addresses a range of aesthetic topics: he analyzes the relationship between aesthetics and criticism, probes

aesthetic questions regarding artistic mediums and genres, and explicates issues surrounding notions of intentions, significance, and pleasure. The book also includes some examples of his dramatic criticism. A later book on Shakespeare, titled *Disowning Knowledge: In Six Plays of Shakespeare* (1987), solidified Cavell as one of America's leading literary critics. Here Cavell demonstrated the link between Cartesian skepticism and Shakespeare's seeming preoccupation with the volatility of human knowledge and certainty. His criticism also extends to Romantic literature, particularly that of Thoreau and Emerson, which Cavell has sought to connect to the critique and modification of Kant and more recent forms of moral perfectionism. Throughout his philosophy of literature, Cavell addresses the problem of reading, and in so doing, has emphasized that writing is a particularly human exercise, one which meets the human desire for expressive communication.

Cavell's work in film theory and criticism began with philosophical questions about the nature of the medium of film in *The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film* (1971). Cavell examines the narrative potential of film given its photographic character. He concludes that the essence of film, as distinguished from other art forms, is the fact that it is photographic. Since films are photographic, the medium allows us to see things that are not present, and in seeing what is not present, we are able to remain unseen. The fact that we are able to see the world that is not present but recreated for us in film while at the same time remaining unseen fulfills a natural human wish to be able to view the world without responsibility. Cavell also interrogates the theories of other influential film critics, such as André Bazin. *The World Viewed* is now regarded as a classic in the philosophy of film.

Cavell focused his analysis on the film genre of comedy by examining seven films of the 1930s and 1940s in *Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage* (1981). In *Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman* (1996), Cavell elucidates another genre from the same period, which he refers to as "the melodrama of the unknown woman." He demonstrates that comedies of remarriage tend to portray a woman's pursuit of a shared partnership in life and love, but that the melodramas instead chronicle a woman's discovery that she is alone and isolated in that pursuit. Both of these books mark a particular moment in film history that Cavell points to as demonstrating an evolving cultural consciousness in women about their role in society, their relationship to men, and their own potential independence.

Psychoanalysis has figured more and more prominently into Cavell's philosophy and criticism over the years. Cavell utilizes psychoanalytic readings in order to understand what causes one to be drawn to a work of art. He believes that a more comprehensive psychological understanding of the reasons for one's seduction by a work of art can yield a more intense and unfettered engagement with that art. Cavell suggests that diving into the depths of human expression is the best way to understand works of art, and to understand each other. There is no better way to examine the significance of art than to submit to the attraction we feel in our experience of a work and to dwell for awhile in our fascination and wonder. Cavell's writing insists that we retain our awareness of ordinary language and the subtle nuances and meanings that it expresses to us. His philosophical investigations into a broad range of topics challenge us to acquiesce to the experiences that intrigue and seduce us in the hopes that we might learn everything we can from those experiences rather than deny their power over us.

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CHAN, WING-TSIT (1901–1994)

Wing-tsit Chan (Ch'en Jung-chieh) was born on 18 August 1901 in Kaiping, in the rural Toy-san area of Guangdong province in south China. After graduating from Lingnan University in Canton in 1924, he came to

the United States to enroll in the philosophy department at Harvard University, where he earned an MA in 1927 and a PhD in philosophy in 1929, with a dissertation on the early Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi. Returning to China, he served as Dean of the Faculty and professor of philosophy at Lingnan University from 1929 to 1936. In 1936 Chan was named professor of Chinese philosophy and institutions at the University of Hawaii, and also served from 1940 to 1942 as the first chair of Hawaii's philosophy department. Chan and colleagues Charles Moore and Gregg Sinclair inaugurated the East-West Philosophers' Conferences in 1939, from which emerged the journal *Philosophy East and West*.

In 1942 Chan was appointed professor of Chinese culture and philosophy at Dartmouth College where he taught until his retirement in 1966. In that year he was named Anna R.D. Gillespie Professor of Philosophy at Chatham College in Pennsylvania, and taught there until retiring in 1982. From the mid-1960s to the late 1980s he also was a visiting professor of Chinese thought at Columbia University. In 1992 he received the Distinguished Service Award from the Association for Asian Studies. Chan died on 12 August 1994 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Chan published more than twenty books and hundreds of articles, in Chinese and in English, on an extraordinary range of topics in Chinese philosophy. For readers of English, the most notable of these are his works of translation, the most important being *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, a collection of edited and annotated translations representing philosophical works deriving from the pre-Confucian period down to and including philosophy in Communist China. This volume has been so influential that it was translated from English back into Chinese. Other works of translation include *Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by*

Wang Yang-ming and *Reflections on Things at Hand: the Neo-Confucian Anthology by Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch'ien*. These and other studies and translations, particularly in the area of Neo-Confucian thought, have both opened the field and defined it from their publication to the present.

In addition to being a prolific scholar, Chan was a living exemplar of the Chinese philosophical tradition, a participant in and contributor to the ongoing career of Chinese philosophy. Among the leading figures in the field of twentieth-century Chinese philosophy – including T'ang Chün-I, Mou Tsung-san, Fung Yulan, and Ch'ien Mu – Chan was the one who came to the West, making his personal and scholarly life in the United States, but always in active touch with Asia. He served as a link between the culture of China's past and the culture of its future. During a prolonged period when the Confucian tradition was under assault in China, he played a crucial role in transplanting it to the West. In a variety of ways he encouraged its life and growth in the United States and Europe until, with the thawing of frozen philosophical ground in the 1980s, it became possible to encourage renewed growth in its place of birth. Through correspondence, visits, conferences, and encouragement of younger scholars, Chan carried on the work of this complicated and fascinating transmission and renewal.

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Irene Bloom

CHANNING, WILLIAM ELLERY (1780–1842)

William Ellery Channing was born on 7 April 1780 in Newport, Rhode Island. In 1794 he was admitted to Harvard College at the age of fourteen. Although Harvard College was still a rather small institution, it provided an environment in which Channing was exposed to the leading ideas of his day. During his Harvard years he read the works of John Locke, Joseph Priestley, David Hume, and Thomas Reid, among others. He steered a course between the theological and philosophical extremes of the period. While Channing did not study evangelical authors such as Jonathan Edwards, neither did he pursue extreme rationalist authors such as Voltaire (the pen name of François-Marie Arouet). Having completed his undergraduate training with the BA degree in 1798, he made progress toward his objective of becoming an ordained minister. With the completion of advanced theological study, Channing received a MA degree from Harvard in 1802. Although he could not affirm all tenets

of orthodox Congregationalism, he also managed to secure his license to preach in 1802. Channing opted to accept the Federal Street Church's offer. He was ordained and installed on 1 June 1803, and this was the only Boston church that Channing would pastor.

Channing was soon drawn into the Unitarian Controversy. Channing's *A Letter to the Rev. Samuel C. Thacher* (1815) centered on three aspects of the attack upon liberals: their conception of Christ as a mere man, the liberals' disingenuous concealment of their beliefs, and the call for true Christians to break fellowship with liberal ministers and Christians. In response to these allegations and challenges, Channing defended the liberals' Christology. He demonstrated that there was a diversity of thought within the group that had indiscriminately been attached to "Unitarianism." ("Unitarianism" was a pejorative label suggested by the liberals' critics. It refers to an emphasis upon the unity of God at the expense of Trinitarian orthodoxy. While Channing and his comrades reluctantly accepted this moniker, it can obscure the other aspects of their theological program.) Moreover, the Christological accusations leveled by the champions of orthodoxy were not applicable to a majority of those considered to be Unitarian. The treatise's publication signaled an irreparable breach within Congregationalism. Channing's Christological assertions therein demonstrated that the nascent movement of American Unitarianism had set out upon its own course of development apart from mainstream Congregationalism.

In an attempt to establish a Unitarian beachhead beyond Boston, Channing traveled to Baltimore in May 1819 to preach at the ordination of Jared Sparks. The sermon was rushed into print that year (and later reprinted in his *Works* as "Unitarian Christianity"), and it promptly provoked responses from

Calvinists, most notably a counter-attack by Moses Stuart. With carefully chosen prose, Channing opened the body of the sermon with a summation of the Unitarian understanding of Scripture's role in revealing God to humanity. "We regard the Scriptures as the records of God's successive revelations to mankind, and particularly of the last and most perfect revelation of his will by Jesus Christ." He went on to suggest an important exegetical principle, "We do not, however, attach equal importance to all the books in this collection" (*Works* 1849, vol. 3, 60). After asserting the Unitarian belief in the "moral perfection of God" and arguing that a majority of Christians have generally "leaned toward a very injurious view of the Supreme Being," Channing went on to articulate the Unitarian conception of progress (82, 83). "We look upon this world as a place of education, in which he [God] is training men by prosperity and adversity, by aids and obstructions, by conflicts of reason and passion, by motives of duty and temptations to sin, by a various discipline suited to free and moral beings, for union with himself, and for a sublime and ever-growing virtue in heaven" (85).

In *The Moral Argument Against Calvinism* (first published in 1820) he outlined the deficiencies attached to "the five thorny points of Calvinism" and offered the Unitarian justification for their rejection of Calvinism. Channing hoped "to free Christianity from the reproach brought upon it by that system" (*Selected Writings* 1985, 459). According to Channing, Calvinism's broad and time-tested appeal could be explained by the fear it cast upon humanity, resulting in a condition in which any number of absurdities were embraced. In Channing's estimation Calvinism erred in its doctrine of humanity, but the Calvinists' chief fault lay in their understanding of God's character.

Channing was optimistic in his estimation of humanity's ability to take on the attributes of God, and this progress was dependent on a free environment in which virtue could be pursued. Ideals such as this, joined with further observation of slavery, prompted Channing to take a stand against the institution of slavery – a move that dominated the last decade of his life. The cultural elites, some of the "Boston Brahmins," that attended Channing's Federal Street Church were not pleased with their enlightened parson's foray into this coarse subject. Channing's antislavery activities, which would strengthen overtime, soured his once-superior relationship with the congregation. As the 1830s drew to a close, Channing preached infrequently in the only pulpit he ever held. Channing's *Slavery* (1835) can be understood as the fruit of these abolitionists' efforts. In this substantial treatise, Channing outlined a thorough case against slavery. Through the course of several chapters in *Slavery*, Channing detailed slavery's moral impact on humanity. The institution of slavery was a standing rebuke to Channing's religious ideals, and his understanding of Christian love bound him to oppose slavery's devaluation of human identity.

Channing's arguments against slavery were not well received among the genteel parishioners of Federal Street Church. They did not embrace Channing's association with abolitionists or savor his discussion of this coarse subject. Channing resigned in 1840, and he died while visiting Bennington, Vermont, on 2 October 1842.

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Kyle Welty

CHENG, CHUNG-YING (1935)

Chung-ying Cheng (Cheng Zhongying) was born on 29 September 1935 in Nanjing, China. He went to Taiwan in 1949 and entered National Taiwan University, receiving the BA degree in philosophy and literature in 1956. He then earned his next degrees in philosophy from University of Washington (MA, 1958) and Harvard University (PhD, 1964). He immediately began teaching philosophy of science and Chinese philosophy at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa, rising to full professor by 1972. His dissertation was published as *Peirce's and Lewis's Theories of Induction* in 1969.

Cheng has long been among the most respected scholars in the areas of Chinese philosophy and East-West comparative philosophy. He founded and presided over the International Society of Chinese Philosophy, the International Society for Yijing Studies, and the International Association for Chinese Management. Cheng founded the *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* in 1972 and has been its editor since then. He received an honorary doctorate from the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, and has been a Fulbright Senior

Research Scholar. He has been a visiting professor at many universities, including Peking University, Yale University, Oxford University, and Berlin Technical University.

His expertise extends across the origins and development of classical Chinese philosophies, Chan (Zen) philosophy, Chinese logic and epistemology, Chinese ethical philosophies, and Neo-Confucianism. His work on comparative East-West philosophy, especially in the areas of metaphysics, ontology, hermeneutics, and value theory, has also been widely influential. As an ambassador of Chinese intellectual history and contemporary Chinese thought to the West, his writings also explore ongoing relationships between Chinese culture and world culture.

The areas of applied ethics to which he has been devoted include environmental ethics, bioethics, and management ethics. His philosophical theory of Creative management (the C Theory, 1991) has been studied and applied in China for over two decades.

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John R. Shook

CHISHOLM, RODERICK MILTON (1916–1999)

Roderick Chisholm was born on 27 November 1916 in North Attleboro, Massachusetts. Chisholm entered Brown University in 1934 with intention of becoming a journalist. An introductory course in philosophy led him to switch to philosophy. After his graduation with a BA in 1938, he enrolled in the doctoral program at Harvard University, where he obtained a PhD in philosophy in 1942. He entered the U.S. Army in 1942 and served first as administrator of psychological tests to inductees and later as a clinician in army hospitals. Chisholm was discharged in 1946, and he took a position as a lecturer in philosophy of art at the Barnes Foundation in Pennsylvania. The Foundation was associated with the University of Pennsylvania, and Chisholm’s position also included an appointment there. He returned to Brown as an assistant professor of philosophy in 1947 and he spent the next forty years on the philosophy faculty at Brown. He also had numerous visiting positions around the United States, taught regularly at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and for many years, following the end of Brown’s spring semester, he taught a seminar at the University of Graz. From 1972 until his retirement in

1987 he was the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities at Brown. Chisholm was a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1968–69, President of the Metaphysical Society of America, and Executive Director of the Franz Brentano Foundation. Chisholm died on 19 January 1999 in Providence, Rhode Island.

Chisholm published influential work in many areas of philosophy, most notably in epistemology and in metaphysics. His publications in epistemology include his first book, *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study*, *The Foundations of Knowing*, and three editions of *Theory of Knowledge*. Several themes are prominent in these works as well as in Chisholm's other epistemological writings. One of them is his anti-skepticism. In an essay describing his philosophical development, Chisholm reports that the philosopher who most impressed him during his term as the president of the Harvard Philosophy Club was G. E. Moore. He heard Moore present a lecture that was later published as his well-known essay, "Four Forms of Skepticism." Like Moore, Chisholm took it as a starting point for his epistemological theorizing that we do have knowledge of the external world. This was not something he thought he could prove to the satisfaction of a skeptic. This idea can be clarified by means of an epistemological topic that intrigued Chisholm throughout his career, the problem of the criterion.

Chisholm's starting point for epistemology was the particularist thesis that we do know those things that reflective common sense tells us we know. His outlook was generally that of a "foundationalist." He held that we have a sort of direct knowledge of some of our own psychological properties. Another epistemological doctrine for which Chisholm is particularly well-known is "internalism."

Chisholm characterized internalism in the following way: "The internalist assumes that, merely by reflecting upon his own conscious state, he can formulate a set of epistemic principles that will enable him to find out, with respect to any possible belief he has, whether he is *justified* in having that belief. The epistemic principles that he formulates are principles that one may come upon and apply merely by sitting in one's armchair, so to speak, and without calling for any outside assistance. In a word, one need only consider one's own state of mind" (*Theory of Knowledge*, 1989, p. 76). A crucial implication of this doctrine is that people whose conscious states are alike must be justified in believing the same propositions. Also present in the quoted passage is a related theme concerning the autonomy of epistemology. Chisholm held that epistemologists did not need the assistance of the empirical sciences in answering their purely epistemological questions. In advancing these doctrines, Chisholm took issue with the externalist and naturalistic theories, such as the causal theory and reliabilism, that gained favor with many epistemologists toward the end of Chisholm's career.

Chisholm's work in metaphysics (broadly construed) includes influential work on intentionality, the problem of freedom and determinism, the nature of persons, and ontology generally. Chisholm's work on intentionality was greatly influenced by the Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano. In developing his views about intentionality, Chisholm always held to "the primacy of the intentional" – the idea that the intentionality (or "aboutness") of the mental is basic and is not to be understood in terms of linguistic behavior or linguistic dispositions. The debate over this issue was a central part of a celebrated exchange with Wilfrid Sellars. In his later work, a theme that emerged is the idea that the primary sort of intentionality is

self-attribution. According to this doctrine, attitudes toward abstract propositions and thoughts about external objects are ultimately to be understood in terms of the attribution of properties to oneself. This is the central theme of his influential book, *The First Person* (1981).

Chisholm rejected determinism, holding that human beings did at times act freely and that free actions could not be the result of prior causes outside the agent. Early in his career he advocated a version of the theory of agency which holds that free actions result from a distinctive kind of agent causation. On this view, a person acts freely when the person, rather than any state of the person or event involving the person, is the ultimate cause of the person's behavior. His later writings less clearly advanced this view, though throughout his career Chisholm advocated indeterminism. In his work on the nature of persons Chisholm claimed that persons are individual substances that continue to exist through changes in their bodies and minds. He consistently rejected the thesis that a person is to be identified with his or her body. Although at times he seemed to endorse the view that a person is a non-physical soul, what attracted him during the latter part of his career is the idea that persons are "minute proper parts of our gross material bodies" (1979, p. 52). Chisholm suggested that it is the best of the materialistic views of the self. Questions about the relation of persons and bodies are closely connected to more general metaphysical questions about parts and wholes and about the persistence of objects through time. Chisholm addressed all these issues with his characteristic care and precision, making use of clearly identified primitive terms and explicit definitions of the remaining terms employed in his theory. A comprehensive treatment of these topics appears in his book *Person and Object*.

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Richard Feldman

CHOMSKY, NOAM AVRAM (1928)

Noam Chomsky was born on 7 December 1928 to Dr. William (Zev) Chomsky and Elsie Simonofsky in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His father had emigrated to the United States from Russia, and was an eminent scholar on the history and teaching of Hebrew. Noam entered the University of Pennsylvania in 1945. There he came in contact with Zellig Harris, a prominent linguist and the founder of Pennsylvania's linguistics department, the first in the United States. In 1947 Chomsky decided to major in linguistics, and in 1949 he began his graduate studies in that field. During the years 1951 to 1955 Chomsky was a Junior

Fellow of the Harvard University Society of Fellows. Pennsylvania awarded Chomsky the PhD in linguistics in 1955. Chomsky received a faculty position in linguistics at MIT in 1955 and he has been teaching there ever since. In 1961 he was appointed full professor in the department of modern languages and linguistics; the graduate program in linguistics began the same year. In 1966 he was appointed Ferrari Ward Professor of Linguistics. In 1976, the linguistics and philosophy programs at MIT were merged to form the department of linguistics and philosophy; this has been Chomsky's home department ever since.

Alongside his career as a linguist, Chomsky has been active in left-wing politics. In 1965 he organized a citizen's committee to publicize tax refusal in protest to the war in Vietnam. Four years later he published his first book on politics, *American Power and the New Mandarins*. By the 1980s he had become both the most distinguished figure of American linguistics and one of the most influential left-wing critics of American foreign policy.

Chomsky contributed substantially to a major methodological shift in the human sciences, turning away from the prevailing empiricism of the middle of the twentieth century: behaviorism in psychology, structuralism in linguistics, and positivism in philosophy. Second, his groundbreaking books on syntax (1957, 1965) laid a conceptual foundation for a new, cognitivist approach to linguistics and provided philosophers with a new framework for thinking about human language and the mind. Traditional linguistics produced recommendations about socially acceptable forms of speech, guidelines for learning hitherto unknown languages, hypotheses about the origin and development of vernaculars, and a large amount of useful data concerning their current and actual phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics. It is hard to avoid the impression that there is no unified subject matter here. Cognitive linguistics, as

Chomsky conceives of it, is the study of the language faculty of individual human minds (and ultimately brains). The key observation is that having a language is a *species property* of *Homo sapiens*, both in the sense that linguistic *competence* (what speakers of a language know in virtue of being speakers) is remarkably uniform across members of our species, and in the sense that a similar competence cannot be found among members of other species. The uniformity of linguistic competence among humans had been obscured by excessive focus on the diversity of linguistic *performance* of speakers (facts about their actual linguistic behavior) and on the diversity of languages spoken in the world. Existing systems of animal communication consist of a finite set of symbols, and there is no evidence that animals can acquire much more than that through instruction. Language, on the other hand, has a recursive grammar capable of generating a potentially infinite set of expressions. Although we humans do employ language for the purpose of communication (as well as for the purposes of self-expression, clarification of thoughts, constructing and strengthening social ties, and so on) Chomsky denies that communication is an inherent function of our language and in general rejects the contention that language should be studied in the context of human interactions.

To characterize what is distinctive in his way of specifying the subject matter of linguistics, Chomsky (1986) introduced the distinction between *I-language* and *E-language*. He thinks the proper subject of the study of language is the former: a natural object *internal* to the brain of an *individual* whose working is representable as a function-in-*intension* generating structural descriptions of (as opposed to mere strings of) expressions. I-language is to be studied in a way in which we might approach, for example, the visual system. In both cases the systems produce representations employed to facilitate

thought and action, but their scientific study must abstract away from the relations these representations bear to objects in the world. (An immediate consequence of this is that semantics, insofar as it is thought to investigate language-world relations, must be an ill-conceived enterprise.) By contrast, E-language is something *external* to individuals, either a social object constituted by norms and conventions, or some abstract object, say, a set of sentences. The traditional notion of a language (like Bulgarian or Swahili) and the traditional notion of a dialect (like the Norfolk or the Yorkshire dialect of British English) are of no scientific use. Variations among competent speakers may be considered significant or insignificant for a variety of purposes and there is nothing systematic to be said about these classifications.

According to Chomsky, the language faculty is part of our biological endowment, and as such it is largely genetically determined. The chief argument for this view comes from facts about language acquisition. According to the *poverty of stimulus argument*, there are many aspects of the linguistic competence of adult speakers that could not have been learned on the basis of the primary linguistic data available for the child during the period of language acquisition (sentences and pseudo-sentences heard along with accompanying gestures and other situational clues). Consequently, these aspects are never learned and must be *innately specified*. Additional empirical evidence for innateness comes from research showing that language acquisition is remarkably fast, devoid of certain sorts of errors we would *prima facie* expect, and comes in characteristic stages whose order and duration seems independent of environmental factors. Chomsky's hypothesis is that language arises in the mind of the child through a realization in the brain of a language faculty, which begins in an *initial state* (also called *Universal Grammar*), goes through

a series of intermediate states, and reaches a *steady state*, which is no longer subject to fundamental changes.

Starting with Chomsky (1981), he began to think of Universal Grammar as a system of innate *principles* combined with a certain number of (probably binary) *parameters* whose values are not genetically fixed. Language acquisition is then a process of parameter setting, and the fundamental ways in which human languages differ can be characterized in terms of the values of these parameters. In a complex system with a rich internal structure the change in a single parameter can have a wide variety of consequences proliferating in various parts of the grammar. What is universal – *pace* parametric variation – according to Chomsky, is syntax. The construction of rule systems for particular languages can no longer be regarded as the central task for linguistics. Instead, the structure of *any* particular human language should be studied through the study of human languages *in general*, through uncovering the principles of Universal Grammar and through the identification of parameters whose setting accounts for linguistic variation. Chomsky (1993, 1995) initiated a new research program within the boundaries of the principles and parameters framework. The central idea of *the minimalist program* is the hypothesis that the language faculty is, in a sense, a perfect device. Representations and derivations are in fact as minimal as it is conceptually possible, given the constraints put on them by that they have to interact with the *performance systems* (articulatory-perceptual systems and conceptual-intentional systems).

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CHURCH, ALONZO (1903–1995)

Alonzo Church was born on 4 June 1903 in Washington, D.C., and he died on 11 August 1995 in Hudson, Minnesota. He was an undergraduate at Princeton University, where he received his BA in mathematics in 1924. Church remained at Princeton, receiving his PhD in mathematics in 1927, writing a dissertation on the axiom of choice (or, as it was more often called in those days, “Zermelo’s Axiom”). After Church’s graduation he obtained a fellowship for study at Harvard University and elsewhere. He spent the academic year 1927–28 at Harvard, where there was a good deal of philosophical interest in logic, and then proceeded to the University of Göttingen, where Hilbert and

his collaborator Paul Bernays were studying logic and looking at issues of exposition as well. After Göttingen, Church proceeded to Amsterdam, where he spent time with the Dutch mathematician L.E.J. Brouwer. On his return from Europe, Veblen was instrumental in procuring for Church an appointment as assistant professor of mathematics at Princeton in 1929. Veblen had supported Church in his application for fellowship support and felt that he had the chance to continue Veblen's efforts to make Princeton one of the centers for research in logic as a part of mathematics. It is clear from Church's recollections of his early years that there were colleagues who did not regard logic as a particularly valuable or intellectually respectable branch of mathematics. If so, Church was one of those who did the most to transform the impression of logic within the mathematical community.

Church's influence on logic took several forms. One was his central role in getting *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* inaugurated. One of the most ambitious projects that Church undertook on behalf of the Association for Symbolic Logic was putting together a bibliography of symbolic logic. Another form of influence was his teaching. Church had perhaps the most distinguished collection of logicians in history as his graduate students at Princeton, and they went forth to spread the gospel of logic to universities throughout the country. Church's course on logic at Princeton was transformed into a textbook under the title *Introduction to Mathematical Logic* (1944).

Church produced in his first decade a couple of publications that altered the face of logic forever. One task that he confronted was coming up with a mathematically precise way of specifying what it means for a function to be "effectively computable." The system which Church created is known as the "lambda calculus." The name comes from the use of the Greek letter lambda as a kind of operator that

identifies what function is being talked about as a prefix for a description of that function. The lambda calculus was not, however, the only system that was being offered for providing a precise notion of computability. Gödel came up with an approach of "recursive functions," and his definitions had a slightly more intuitive character than those of the lambda calculus. The influence of Gödel on Church and vice versa can be debated, although they were aware of one another's work. As Church was trying to fully understand the notion of "computability," he was pleased to discover that his system and Gödel's were equivalent in that they picked out the same set of functions as computable. This led him to surmise that perhaps all satisfactory definitions of computable led to the same class of functions. This surmise, which starts in tentative fashion in letters, became known as "Church's Thesis" and provided much of the original motivation behind the investigation of different models for computability.

Church was one of the first mathematicians to try to understand exactly the consequences of Gödel's proof that arithmetic was not complete. Church turned the argument that Gödel had proposed into a slightly different direction and showed that it could be used to demonstrate that first-order logic was not decidable, that is, that there was no effective procedure for deciding the truth or falsity of every statement in predicate logic. This negative result ran in parallel with results indicating that particular branches of predicate logic did have effective decision procedures.

Church rose through the ranks at Princeton, becoming associate professor in 1939 and full professor in 1947. He became professor of philosophy and mathematics at the University of California at Los Angeles in 1967. Church's devotion to work kept him at UCLA until 1990, and then he moved to Hudson, Minnesota, in order to be near his son Alonzo Church, Jr. He

received honorary degrees from Case Western Reserve University, Princeton, and the State University of New York at Buffalo.

Perhaps the best example of Church's pragmatic judgment concerned intuitionistic logic and its refusal to accept the law of the excluded middle. In his careful and explicit fashion, Church pointed out that one could work with a logical system which included the law of the excluded middle, or one could work with a logical system which did not make explicit use of the law, or one could work with a logical system which involved the rejection of the law. Any of these was a legitimate target for mathematical investigation, and the value of any of them, he implied, was where it led by way of mathematical content.

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Thomas Drucker

CHURCHLAND, PATRICIA SMITH (1943)

Patricia Smith was born on 16 July 1943 in Oliver, British Columbia, Canada. She received the BA from the University of British Columbia in 1965, and then attended the University of Pittsburg, receiving the MA in philosophy in 1966. She did further graduate work in philosophy at Oxford University as a British Council and Canada Council Fellow, receiving the BPhil degree in 1969. She and her husband, philosopher Paul M. Churchland,

began teaching philosophy at University of Manitoba in 1969, where she was promoted to full professor in 1983. During 1982–83 she was a visiting member in Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey.

In 1984 she, along with Paul, became a professor of philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. She added US citizenship after residency in California, while retaining her Canadian citizenship. She has been President of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (1984–85), served on the Board of Governors of the Philosophy of Science Association (1985–87), and was elected President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association (1992–93). She was a MacArthur Foundation Research Fellow during 1991–96. In 1999 Churchland was named University of California Professor of Philosophy. She was the philosophy department chair during 2000–07. In 2010 she retired as Emerita Professor of Philosophy and continues her work across neurophilosophy and neuroethics.

While at the University of Manitoba, Churchland formally studied neurology and neuroscience at the university's medical school. She arrived at several conclusions about consciousness and cognition that couldn't cohere with then-popular philosophical dogmas and intuitions. Since the appeal to such philosophical dictates usually rests on what "common sense" or ordinary language would permit one to sensibly say, the validity of our folk psychological descriptions of what the mind is doing, and how the mind does what it does, had to be doubted. The idea that science must throw doubts upon theories of the mind is hardly new, but just as old are philosophical systems derived from Descartes or Kant (etc.) erecting demarcation lines past which science "must" be incompetent. Asserting that brain science must nevertheless take priority over

intuitions and speculative theories of mind, both Churchlands agreed that understanding the brain is necessary for understanding the mind, mental activity is brain activity, and folk psychology should be demoted in epistemic status or dramatically modified to suit brain science. Opponents wielding their demarcations accused them of unjustly "eliminating" mental matters outright in the course of "reducing" consciousness and cognition to brain matters. Eliminative materialism was the label speedily attached to their position, despite its misleading categorization. Regardless of labeling, Churchland herself vaulted to the forefront of "neurophilosophy" as an undaunted visionary in this new interdisciplinary field, publishing her book *Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain* in 1986.

After her move to San Diego, pioneers of biology and medicine such as Jonas Salk and Francis Crick supported her neurophilosophical stance. In 1989 she began an adjunct professorship at the nearby Salk Institute, where she also began collaborating with Terrence Sejnowski, leading to their book *The Computational Brain* (1993). Her recent work on diverse topics from perception, consciousness, the self, thought, representation, learning, free will, and knowledge are gathered in *Brain-Wise* (2002) and *Touching a Nerve: The Self as Brain* (2013). She has also been at the forefront of the new interdisciplinary area of neuroethics since its inception, publishing *Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality* in 2011.

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John R. Shook

CHURCHLAND, PAUL MONTGOMERY (1942)

Paul Churchland was born on 21 October 1942 in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. He received his BA from the University of British Columbia in 1964 and his PhD in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh in 1969, writing a dissertation on “Persons and P-predicates.” His work at Pittsburgh was under the supervision of Wilfrid Sellars, whose philosophical outlook greatly influenced Churchland’s own. Churchland began academic life before graduation with an appointment at the University of Toronto, and then he became assistant professor of philosophy at the

University of Manitoba, where he remained from 1969 until 1984. He was promoted to full professor in 1979 and spent a year as a visiting member of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey. In 1984, he and his collaborator (and wife) Patricia Smith Churchland became professors of philosophy at the University of California at San Diego; they retired in 2010, but remain philosophically active.

Churchland's philosophical work has centered on themes in the philosophy of science, epistemology, and most especially the philosophy of mind. His large-scale vision of these fields, held fairly consistently since the later 1970s, begins with the claim that science gives us a (typically) accurate theoretical picture of reality, one that often departs from the equally theoretical picture of reality provided by common sense and the presuppositions of language. Many accept that science does this when describing the heavens, matter, reproduction, and so on, but Churchland has argued that it can be expected to do the same when describing the mind. Common sense provides a sophisticated but unscientific theory of human and other animal minds, invoking beliefs, desires, intentions, states of consciousness, dreams, and so on to explain behavior. But "folk psychology," Churchland argues, is just as susceptible to replacement by a superior scientific theory as commonsensical theories of the heavens, matter, and reproduction. In fact, we may confidently expect to see such a replacement, for there is already compelling evidence that our commonsensical or "folk" theory of the mind is not a good enough theory to survive future scientific developments. Epistemology too must be ready to be changed by new understandings of the mind, and in particular to turn away from its traditional focus on rules for the rational revision of sententially structured beliefs, given the likelihood

that science will abandon the concept of sententially structured belief as no more useful to psychology than the concept of the superlunary realm was to astrophysics.

All of these themes receive an early treatment in Churchland's first book, *Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind*, and are dealt with in the essays collected in his second, *A Neurocomputational Perspective*. Both books have been particularly influential insofar as they have defended Churchland's view that, while materialism is a correct theory of the mind, folk psychology is profoundly mistaken. This view, known as eliminative materialism, was initially most associated with Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty, but has come to be inextricably linked to the Churchland name. It derives its support from a number of considerations. First, while it is a manifest fact that human beings and other organisms have minds, it is not manifest how that mind is best understood as being organized. Second, there is good reason to think that commonsense psychological thinking is not the best way to understand the mind as being organized. Here Churchland brings up the fact that folk psychology has no adequate way to explain learning, sleep, dreaming, mental disorder, or many other phenomena, and scientific explanations of these phenomena show no sign of making use of concepts such as *belief* and *desire*. Furthermore, scientific explanations of "simpler" things such as language skills, action, and perception appear to be readily integrated with these other phenomena, but via theoretical constructs (such as activation vectors in multi-dimensional phase spaces) that bear no substantial relation to familiar beliefs and desires. The third and final piece of support for eliminative materialism is the claim that, if our best explanations of mental phenomena have no substantive relation to folk psychological explanations, then the posits of

the superior explanations are probably real, while the posits of folk psychology (beliefs, desires, and the like) are probably not.

Paul Churchland's more recent book, *The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul* is an unusual philosophical work. Written in an accessible style, it is as much a product of missionary ambitions as scholarly ones. While also making arguments for Churchland's philosophical views, it attempts to teach the reader how to conceive of her own mental life in terms other than those of folk psychology. Readers are introduced in some depth to parallel distributed processing (PDP or 'neural network') models of taste, smell, color vision, facial recognition, learning, categorization, inference, and more. PDP models of mental phenomena, which made their scientific breakthrough in the mid-1980s, have long been championed by Churchland as the source of a more adequate self-understanding than folk psychology; *The Engine of Reason* brings that vision of self-understanding together and attempts to make it the reader's own.

No discussion of Paul Churchland would be complete without some discussion of his ongoing collaboration with his wife and colleague, Patricia Smith Churchland. She has been almost as important a contributor to science, especially neuroscience, as to philosophy, and her interests have driven her husband's research program at least as much as the reverse. She was the first of the pair to be introduced to hands-on work in the neurosciences while at the University of Manitoba, and has remained more connected to the neuroscientific world since then.

In addition to being the leading advocate of eliminative materialism, Paul Churchland has also made important contributions to discussions of the nature of concepts and consciousness, and remains active in most debates that link philosophy and neuroscience.

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Tim Schroeder

CHURCHMAN, CHARLES WEST (1913–2004)

C. West Churchman was born on 29 August 1913 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was educated at the University of Pennsylvania, receiving his BA in 1934, his MA in 1935, and his PhD in philosophy in 1938. He wrote his dissertation on "The Logic of Modality, and his most influential teachers were Edgar A. Singer, Jr. who had been a student of William James, and Henry Bradford Smith. Churchman was an instructor and assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania from 1937 to 1948, and also served as department chair from 1945 to 1948. He then was an associate professor of philosophy at Wayne State University from 1948 to 1951. From 1951 to 1957, Churchman was professor of engineering administration at Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland,

and from 1957 until 1981 he was professor of business administration at the University of California at Berkeley. In retirement, he occasionally taught at Berkeley as a professor of peace and conflict studies until 1996. Churchman died on 21 March 2004 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Adopting the pragmatism taught by Singer, Churchman contributed to propositional logic, philosophy and methodology of science, operations research, systems theory, psychology and linguistics, decision theory, metrology, and statistics. Utilizing the mathematical tools developed in the managerial sciences, and especially cybernetics as a mathematical model for organization and application of decision theory to the real world, he applied these methods to planning and management of business operations, environmental protection, and resource allocation, and worked in developing mathematical models for psychology, managerial science, economics, and ecology. For example, *World Modeling* (1976) dealt with mathematical models of economic and social history, and *Challenge to Reason* (1968) studied management science. *Measurement, Definitions and Theories* (1959) dealt with both metrology and mathematical modeling.

Churchman and his student Russell Ackoff attempted to define personality experimentally, turning to psycholinguistics as a means of investigating the psychology of personality, a study which anticipated the structuralist approach of employing language as a key to patterns of behaviors and beliefs. Churchman wrote an introductory textbook on operations research, and two texts on systems theory, a book dealing with the application of decision theory to industrial management and management values, and another applying and justifying a systems theory approach to social systems. Churchman and his colleagues edited an anthology dealing with the mathematics of

consumer behavior, as statistically measured through sampling techniques and opinion polling. He applied the tools of dialectics and philosophy of science in an examination of the impact which researchers and managers have upon one another and the experimental data through their interactions.

In addition to his contribution to the theory of propositions in his doctoral thesis, Churchman wrote an introductory textbook of mathematical logic and scientific method, a treatment of the philosophy and methodology of science, which dealt specifically with the theory of experimental evidence, and a textbook on the use of statistics as a tool for carrying out experimental inferences, which he applied to decision theory.

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Irving H. Anellis

COBB, JOHN BOSWELL, JR. (1925)

John Cobb was born on 9 February 1925 in Kobe, Japan. His parents were Methodist missionaries. He attended Emory junior college at Oxford, Georgia, from 1941 to 1943 before entering the United States Army, where he underwent training to be a Japanese translator. After World War II, without having earned a bachelor's degree, he entered the Divinity School of the University of Chicago,

where he earned his MA (1949) and PhD (1952). At the Divinity School he studied under philosophers Richard McKeon and Charles Hartshorne. Cobb wrote his master's thesis on the theological method of the empirical theologian Henry Nelson Wieman, and wrote his doctoral dissertation, *The Independence of Faith from Speculative Beliefs*, under another process theologian, Bernard Loomer.

Cobb taught religion at Young Harris College in Georgia from 1950 to 1953 while serving as a Methodist pastor to several small rural churches. From 1953 to 1958, Cobb taught theology at the Candler School of Theology at Emory University. He moved to Claremont School of Theology in 1958, becoming the Ingraham Professor of Theology. In 1960 he took a joint appointment at the Claremont Graduate School, serving as the Avery Professor until his retirement in 1990. He is now Emeritus Professor at both the Claremont School of Theology and Claremont Graduate School.

In 1973 Cobb co-founded the Center for Process Studies at Claremont with David Griffin. The center is dedicated to promoting and applying process thought, broadly conceived, (including the ideas of Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin) across traditional disciplinary boundaries. Cobb's work has been recognized with numerous awards and honors, including co-winner of the 1992 Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order (for his book with Herman Daly, *For the Common Good*) and honorary doctorates at the University of Mainz, Emory University, Linfield College, DePauw University, and the University of Victoria.

Since his years of graduate study, Cobb has had a strong interest in the question of how religious faith can be integrated with scientific thought. Cobb places the development of process theology squarely

in the pragmatic, pluralistic, relativistic, holistic, and naturalistic tendencies of William James, John Dewey, and Charles Peirce. His application of creative transformation in his engagement with ethics and inter-religious relations carries a dialogical and fallibilist approach to philosophy of religion and theology into the twenty-first century. He finds in Whitehead a cosmology that is amenable to both a Christian vision of the world and a post-Newtonian scientific worldview. Cobb chooses Whitehead's cosmology as a means of systematically elaborating and consistently relating faith experience to wider experience and knowledge, especially scientific knowledge. Cobb views cosmology as necessary to, but not sufficient for, theology. Hence, he uses the phrase *Christian natural theology* to describe his thought. The choice of a cosmology is warranted by its coherence with empirical knowledge (consistency with faith experience) and philosophical excellence (internal consistency and explanatory power). In Cobb's writings since the late 1970s, he adds to these criteria the pragmatic ability of the cosmology to promote a just, participatory, and sustainable society. To that end, Cobb takes a decidedly post-modern approach to systematic theology by not grounding his theology in Whitehead's cosmology, but rather by using that cosmology to articulate and explore the theological significance of the preconscious experience of Christian faith or the Christian vision of the world.

Cobb believes employing Whitehead's cosmology to articulate a Christian natural theology is vindicated by its ability to illuminate several key issues confronting contemporary Christian theology: the nature of God, the problem of evil, the relationship of Jesus Christ to God, the challenge of liberation movements, the challenge of the ecological crisis, global economic justice, and the relationship of Christianity to other religions.

At the same time, in his engagement with these issues, Cobb has not hesitated to extend and/or revise many elements of Whitehead's cosmology that fail to address coherence with faith experience, philosophical consistency, or promotion of a just, participatory, and sustainable society.

The traditional theological view that God is an absolute, immutable, omnipotent, omniscient being has always presented difficulties for theodicy. If God is all powerful and all good, why is it that the innocent suffer? The *Shoah* (Holocaust) raised that question in its most radical form. The ecological crisis has raised it for all life on our planet (see 1972 and 1981). For Cobb, the power of God is necessarily persuasive rather than coercive. As the lure toward freedom and richness of experience in a relational world, God *cannot* override the freedom of actual occasions. The greater capacity for achievement of value corresponds to the greater capacity for freedom, which in turn allows for greater possibility for evil. God is, however, both the one who suffers with those who suffer and who always and everywhere acts as the creative, redeeming lure to bring about new value, even out of suffering. Here, Cobb and other process theologians have been strongly criticized as saying that God is deficient in power. Cobb responds that we can redefine omnipotence in terms of persuasive power: "It no longer means that God exercises a monopoly of power and compels everything to be just as it is. It means instead that he exercises the optimum persuasive power in relation to whatever is" (1969). Put differently, divine omnipotence is God's life-giving, creative, and liberating persuasion: perfect power expressed as perfect love.

Cobb develops his Christology in *Christ in a Pluralistic Age*, where he connects the biblical idea of Christ as the Logos of God to the Whiteheadian notion of creative

transformation. God's creative transformative activity in the world, luring the world into novel and richer forms of actualization, captures the central meaning of the Logos, by which and through which all things that have come to be have their being (John 1:3). As such, Christ is present and effective in the world even if Christ is not consciously acknowledged (although conscious acknowledgment of Christ can promote and further God's creative activity). Moreover, for the Christian to recognize Christ as God's creative transformative activity allows the Christian to find common cause with others in participating in God's aim to bring about greater achievements of value in all creation.

As Cobb came to be challenged by liberation (especially feminist) theologies on the one side and the environmental crisis on the other, he expanded his characterization of the Logos in terms of other biblical images, particularly the Sophia of God (1988) and Life (Birch and Cobb, 1981). The feminine image of Sophia is not only closely connected to the biblical notion of Logos, but it also acts as a creative lure for feeling, challenging Christians to embrace a richer, more inclusive understanding and experience of God and all of God's people, female as well as male. The image of Life also acts as a creative lure for feeling that calls both Christians and non-Christians to widen their appreciation of and commitment to all of God's creation, recognizing both God's presence in all things and God's love for all things. The fundamental interrelatedness of all entities to one another and to God recalls that what is done to the least is done to God, and to all. To ally oneself with Life is to reject anthropocentrism in favor of promoting the liberation, and thus the greater richness of experience, of the entire ecosystem.

The relationship of human liberation and ecological liberation is often viewed as

problematic in ethics. Many philosophers analyze the relationship in terms of trade-offs or compromises between the well-being of humans on the one side and the well-being of the rest of creation on the other. Cobb's theological approach is to view these two goals from the perspective of creative transformation, both ethically and methodologically. Working with economists like Herman Daly, as well as sustainable agriculturalists like Wes Jackson, Cobb has authored or co-authored a number of articles and books that treat the goals of human liberation and ecological liberation as fundamentally interrelated with the ethical values of justice, participation, and sustainability.

Cobb has long had an interest in inter-religious relations, especially between Christianity and Japanese forms of Buddhism, such as Pure Land. Cobb's aim is not to eliminate or ignore fundamental differences between religious experiences, but to explore what those differences might tell adherents about their own traditions even as his aim challenges them to incorporate insights from others. Cobb rejects efforts to reduce diverse religious traditions to an underlying perennial philosophy or even to the sharing of a common goal. Rather, he believes that greater learning and growth occurs when we recognize that diverse traditions may have different sources and different aims that ought to be appreciated and respected.

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Paul Custodio Bube

COHEN, MORRIS RAPHAEL (1880 1947)

Morris R. Cohen was born on 25 July 1880 in Minsk, Russia. In 1892 the Cohens emigrated to America and settled in New York City. He attended City College of New York, from which he was graduated in 1900 with a BS. His intellectual interests had turned from religious orthodoxy to science and socialism and he became seriously involved in the social problems of his New York community. Science and socialism combined to spark an interest in philosophy which he pursued first at Columbia, and then at Harvard where he received his PhD in philosophy in 1906. After teaching mathematics at the City College of New York for five years, he finally received an appointment in the philosophy department there in 1912. Philosophy professor Harry Allen Overstreet fought to have Cohen join him on the philosophy faculty, and Cohen was likely the first Jew in America to attain a regular philosophy position. Cohen quickly established himself as one of the most powerful personalities on the faculty and he became a pivotal figure not only in that institution but in the American Philosophical Association. After retiring from City College in 1938, he taught philosophy at the University of Chicago until 1942. Cohen died on 28 January 1947 in Washington, D.C.

Inspired by one of his philosophical models, Charles S. Peirce (of whose papers he was appointed the first editor), Cohen thought of himself primarily as a logician and philosopher of science standing firmly but moderately in the “rationalist” tradition. Against the current of the time his project was to argue that reason was an objective feature of the world and his philosophical targets were empiricism, nominalism, and atomism. Like Peirce, he started with the conviction that we have an effective method for attaining

knowledge, namely, scientific method, and then conceived of the metaphysical project as the effort to construct a general description of nature consistent with the success of that method.

For Cohen, scientific method is neither empiricist induction nor a priori deduction, but a sophisticated integration of reasoning and confrontations with the experience which fallibly delivers a real grasp of the structure of the world. The obvious success of this way of knowing has metaphysical presuppositions about the relation of mind and nature. He felt that this realistic view of science would make little sense on either an empiricist dualism of mental universals and physical particulars, or on a Kantian dualism of a creative mind and an unknowable thing-in-itself. Empiricists like Mach and Pearson were driven to construe laws and theories as mere conventions while Kantians saw them as mental constructions. Both accounts were inadequate.

Cohen proposed to overcome these dualisms and restore a robust view of nature that would make sense out of the realistic reach of science. He located the problem in their failure to appreciate the real nature of mathematics, logic, and reason in general. These were not merely mental manipulations but truly indicative of the structure of the natural world. He defended a version of logical realism construing the enterprise of logic as the exploration of the realm of possibility and hence as the basic chapter in ontology. The rules of logic, while independent of any specific content, have reference to all possible content and the relations of compatibility and incompatibility were as real as any other relations in the world.

The natural world is neither unknown nor a mere collection of particulars, but a complex of things-in-relation whose structure can be discerned by monitored reasoning. For Cohen, nature is a relational system and the intelligible

nature of any actual existent is constituted by its logical relations, its place in the system. Its nature is the group of invariant characters it involves and these characters can involve several different levels. The object can have one relational property at one level of analysis and the opposite property at another without contradiction. This invokes Cohen's famous but elusive "principle of polarity" which was central to his metaphysical vision.

Balancing this emphasis on the rationality of nature and the ability of science to discern it, Cohen was not a thoroughgoing rationalist. Although the "nature" of everything is thoroughly rational, there is more to any given being than rationality. There is a brute facticity to the individual that transcends its abstract relations and universal connections. This duality of rational nature and brute existence mirrors the dual dimensions of the scientific method that enables us to discern the nature of our world. Just as scientific method is neither purely deductive nor purely experiential, so nature is neither a rational "one" nor an irrational "plurality." Nature is rational in the sense that its phenomena do conform to rational laws at many different levels, but it also transcends rationality since it cannot be reduced to laws alone. While deeply suspicious of all forms of irrational mysticism and maintaining that everything intelligible can be expressed in logical form, Cohen maintained that the essence of all expression is to point beyond itself.

This having been said, it would be a clear mistake to think of Cohen as merely a speculative philosopher. This was far from the case. As said, from early adulthood his two passions were science and socialism, and on the latter front he was among the most active of public intellectuals in the early part of the twentieth century. From its inception in 1914, *The New Republic* recruited Cohen and he became a frequent contributor and editorialist,

as he was a contributor to many other journals of social opinion. In addition, he was extremely active in social organizations in New York and was a frequent speaker at all sorts of public forums.

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Cornelius F. Delaney

COHEN, SELMA JEANNE (1920–2005)

Selma Jeanne Cohen was born on 18 September 1920 in Chicago, Illinois. Her parents sent her to the primary and secondary laboratory school at the University of Chicago, founded by John Dewey, and she graduated in 1937. At age thirteen, she began ballet lessons under Edna McRae and fell in love, although Cohen herself admits she was at best a mediocre dancer. Her dancing ability was also hampered by her poor three-dimensional vision. McRae kept books on dance and the arts in her studio and Cohen borrowed all of them. She discovered that, other than the occasional biography, few books existed on dance history or theory. Since she was not destined to dance professionally, she vowed to write about dance. In 1939 she completed an AA degree at Stephen's College, and then returned to the University of Chicago to study English with a minor in philosophy while continuing to read anything available on dance. Cohen particularly admired Plato because he recognized the importance of dance and also because he articulated the notion that an ideal definition gives us the essence of a thing. This became Cohen's life's work: defining dance so that we understand its essential qualities. Cohen completed her BA in 1941, her MA in 1942, and while teaching in the English Department, her PhD

in English in 1946. Her dissertation on Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844–1889) focused on the relationship between his poetry and his religious thought. His poetry, oftentimes profoundly intense, used a technique called “spring rhythm” to recreate the cadence of everyday speech. The notion of the movement of words within a time frame related to her interest in dance.

Cohen began teaching English at the University of California at Los Angeles in 1946. In 1949 she attended the annual meeting of the American Society of Aesthetics, exchanging ideas with philosopher Rudolf Arnheim and later Francis Sparshott, Hilde Hein, Julie van Camp, Arnold Berleant, and Peter Kivy. Arnheim encouraged her to submit a paper on dance to *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*. Following his suggestion, “Some Theories of Dance in Contemporary Society” was published in 1950. Since then Cohen wrote more than 200 scholarly articles, book and dance reviews, introductions and prefaces, critiques, informed biographies, obituaries, and essays on dance aesthetics. Her goal was to turn dance history, theory, and aesthetics into academic disciplines. She was one of the first to note that dance becomes history the moment the performance ends, since no two dance performances are exactly alike.

Approaching dance through aesthetics and philosophy of art, Cohen strives to create a partnership between theory and the actual works of art. She believes that throughout history, dance served three functions worldwide: (1) ritual – such as dancing for spirits and gods; (2) social – such as dancing with another person; and (3) theatrical – dancing for an audience. By exploring disciplines such as anthropology, art history, music, folklore, and philosophy, Cohen attempts to make us understand why people dance and why it is important that

they dance. She asks the following questions: (1) what is the difference between body movement and dance? (2) how does one apply aesthetic standards to dance that are applicable worldwide and historically? (3) indeed, is it possible? (4) finally, how do we apply aesthetic standards to different kinds of dance and choreography found within the same time and place?

In 1952 Cohen moved to New York City where ballet, modern dance, and other forms of dance were already established and thriving. Initially she taught dance history at the High School of Performing Arts, then at a number of colleges and universities in New England such as Connecticut College for Women. In the late 1950s she became the deputy assistant to arts critic John Martin of the New York Times, and later wrote her own dance reviews. She was one of the first female critics hired by the New York Times. One of her colleagues, art critic Clive Barnes, called her dance reviews exemplary. In 1959, she co-founded *Dance Perspectives*. Extensively illustrated, each issue concentrated on a specific aspect of dance written by an expert. She remained its editor until it closed in 1976.

In 1974 at the Dance Critics Association meeting, the idea to create an encyclopedia of dance encompassing the entire world emerged from a discussion between Cohen and Arlene Croce. Cohen was drafted as editor; so began twenty-four years of intensive, exhilarating and occasionally frustrating work. Her wish to bring together scholars and performers resulted in endorsements from Rudolf Arnheim and choreographer Jerome Robbins. In her preface to the six-volume encyclopedia, finally published in 1998, Cohen explains that the significance of dance is that it promotes intercultural understanding that transcends language. She notes that the evolution of dance throughout the world reflected different

cultural forms. Understanding the diversity of dance movement enables us to “comprehend the message conveyed by the moving body” (1998, p. xviii) better than by using rigid standards that cannot possibly apply to all dance. Understanding the aesthetic value of dance enables scholars, creators and performers to think, observe and share ideas with one another and with audiences.

Cohen was a charter member of National Endowment for the Art’s dance panel, serving from 1966 to 1971. In 1976 she received a Fulbright grant to travel to Russia to conduct research on dance performance and choreography, and to interview dance historians and dance critics. In 1980 she received a Guggenheim Fellowship, which enabled her to begin work on a new book, *Next Week, Swan Lake: Reflections on Dance and Dances* (1982) that explored questions of identity using Swan Lake as her primary example. Cohen reminds us that dance theory must be combined with experiencing dance performance, that we must see dance, not only think about it.

From 1983 to 1989 Cohen taught dance history and theory at the University of California, Riverside while continuing to work on the encyclopedia. In 1990 she became a Distinguished Scholar. In a concerted effort to encourage future dance scholars, the Society of Dance History Scholars inaugurated the Selma Jeanne Cohen Awards in 1996. In 2000 Cohen’s wish to internationalize dance scholarship and make scholarly papers available to a multidisciplinary forum resulted in the Selma Jeanne Cohen Fund for International Scholarship on Dance, administered by the Fulbright Association. Cohen died on 23 December 2005 in New York City. After more than fifty years of steadfast commitment, her determination to give dance intellectual respectability and philosophical significance seems successful.

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Barbara Sandrisser

COLDEN, CADWALLADER (1688 1776)

Cadwallader Colden was born on 7 February 1688 in Ireland while his mother was on a temporary visit. Colden graduated from the University of Edinburgh with the BA degree in 1705 and, although he had been trained for the ministry, spent three years after his graduation studying mathematics and medicine. During this time his aunt, Elizabeth Hill, encouraged him to join her in Philadelphia. He arrived in America in 1710 and ran a general merchandise business for several years. In 1715, he returned to Scotland and on 11 November 1715 married Alice Chrystie, whose father was also a member of the Scottish clergy. Colden and Alice had ten children; Jane, born in 1724, is regarded as America's first woman botanist. During his brief visit he met Sir Edmund Halley who read a paper by Colden, "Animal Secretions," before the Royal Society. Colden returned to Philadelphia the following year where he established a medical practice. In 1718 Colden gave up his practice for financial reasons and moved with his family to New York City where, in the following year, he was appointed Surveyor General of the Province and Master in Chancery by his friend, the provincial governor, Robert Hunter.

In 1721 Governor William Burnet appointed Colden to the Governor's Council on which he served until his death. In 1728 Colden and his family settled on an estate he called "Coldenham" in Ulster County, New York, where he was able to retreat from the political environment of New York City and study botany, mathematics, physics, medicine, and philosophy. Colden was a remarkably active scholar in the 1740s through the early 1760s. He published two editions of his treatise on physics (1745, 1751) and a defense of Newton's method of differential calculus

(1743, 1751). He also completed a manuscript treatise on ethics (c.1746), a comprehensive assessment of British relations with the Haudenosaunee and other Native peoples in the region (1751, 1764, 1765), and numerous manuscripts on the nature of mind, physiology, and disease. He also developed a new method of printing (later called stereotype printing). In 1743 Colden published *Observations on the Fever which Prevailed in the City of New-York in 1741 and 2*. The treatise was widely circulated and led to the development of the first New York City sanitation system. After continued service on the Governor's Council, Governor Burnet appointed Colden Lieutenant Governor of the province in 1761, and served two terms as acting governor. In 1771 John Murray assumed the governorship and Colden retired at 83 to his new estate on Long Island where he lived until his death on 28 September 1776 in Flushing on Long Island, New York.

Colden's 1751 treatise, *The Principles of Action in Matter* (and his earlier work printed in 1745 *An Explication of the First Causes of Action in Matter; and the Cause of Gravitation*) challenged the starting point of Newtonian physics. For Newton, matter was to be understood as passive, characterized by inertia that must be overcome by force in order to generate the objects of experience. On the contrary, Colden argued, inertia, though certainly something that can be overcome by other forces, was not passive but active: a force of active resistance. For Colden, inertia as a mode of action is framed by two principles, one epistemic and one ontological. The first principle marks how we know the world and ourselves: "We have no knowledge of substances, or of any being, or of any thing, abstracted from the action of that thing or being. All our knowledge of things consists in the perception of the power, or force, or property, or manner of acting of that

thing” (2002, 73). In order that the epistemic principle hold as a ground of knowledge, Colden asserts further “every effect must be produced by some cause, or by some action.” The effects that lead to knowledge, he says, require a second principle about what there is: “Every thing, that we know, is an agent, or has a power of acting” (2002, 73).

Using the same general principles, Colden proposes three other modes or principles of action: motion, communication, and intelligence. Purposive agents, according to Colden, mark the presence of intelligence and their actions are called moral actions. Like the other principles of action, intelligence is not a substance that can be known, but rather is something known by what it does. Like *momentum*, purpose can be communicated and resisted. Unlike *momentum* or the other modes of material action, intelligence can affect the course of things in light of judgments, new ideas, and future plans. Since intelligence is no substance, Colden rejects the usual dualisms of mind and body. Some have argued that the resulting view is a form of materialism and to a certain extent it is. One encounters purpose in a world of material things just as one encounters resistance and motion. At the same time, while material agents are bound in a network of determined action, intelligence can operate freely in order to imagine different futures. In this sense, the principle of intelligent action cannot be reduced to a material agency. Material action and intelligence finally intersect because “the intelligent agent never acts in opposition or contradiction to the material agents” (2002, 93), that is, the mandates of intelligences are subject to failure when they communicate actions that do not comply with the possibilities available in material action. Taken together, the four principles of action form systems that purposive, materially constrained beings capable of both moral actions and actions that sustain the system.

While composing *The Principles of Action in Matter*, Colden also prepared a treatise extending that work to ethics, titled *Of the First Principles of Morality or of the Actions of Intelligent Beings* (c.1746). Here he reiterates his basic conclusions regarding the four principles of action and argues that intelligent action is framed not only by material principles but also by the products of the intersection of material principles and intelligence, that is, by the formation of habits. The work of intelligence is, in part, to foster the development of habits that contribute to good moral or voluntary behavior by purposive systems including persons. Individual actions and habits can then be judged in light of the ways in which they promote the ongoing health of the system.

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Scott L. Pratt

CONE, JAMES HAL (1938)

James Cone was born on 3 August 1938 in Fordyce, Arkansas. He went to Philander Smith College in Arkansas and graduated with his BA in 1958. Having accepted a "call" to preach at the age of sixteen, he was pastor of several African Methodist Episcopal churches, including Allen Chapel AME Church. In addition to practical experience as a minister, Cone secured professional training by earning the BD degree from Garrett Theological Seminary in 1961. Overcoming numerous obstacles, including both explicit and implicit racism, Cone entered the PhD program at Garrett. While a graduate student, Cone wrestled with the challenges of the civil rights movement, debating whether he could be of greatest service to the struggle through

leaving school and becoming involved full time, or using his educational process and faith commitment to secure tools for the destruction of racism. Cone decided to remain in graduate school, receiving the MA in 1963 and PhD in theology in 1965 from Garrett Theological Seminary, writing a dissertation on Karl Barth.

Cone was assistant professor of religion at Adrian College in Michigan from 1966 to 1969, and then accepted a position at Union Theological Seminary in New York City, where he presently is Charles Augustus Briggs Distinguished Professor of Systematic Theology. His impressive contributions to theological studies have been noted through various honorary degrees, as well as awards such as the American Black Achievement Award (in religion) from *Ebony Magazine* (1992), and the Theological Scholarship and Research Award from the Association of Theological Schools (1994).

It was at Adrian College that Cone began discussing publicly this attempt to reconcile black power and the Gospel of Christ. The intellectual pieces began falling in place as a consequence of Ronald Goetz's invitation for Cone to give a lecture in February of 1968 at Elmhurst College. In this lecture, "Christianity and Black Power," Cone verbalized his rejection of theological paradigms offered by white thinkers as universally applicable, and he began to formulate a theological interpretation of the Christ event that spoke more directly to the existential condition of African Americans, through an equating of black power and the Gospel of Christ. In this sense, Cone, unlike most other theologians at that time, saw no contradiction between black power and the Christian faith. In fact, he attempted to show a necessary synergy between the two. Cone would come to understand his theological work as a way of holding the Church accountable for praxis related to the radical gospel of Christ.

While rejected by some, this essay received positive attention from leading scholars such as C. Eric Lincoln, who Cone credits with his receiving other invitations to lecture (as well as job offers). During the next year, 1969, through the encouragement of Lincoln and the invitation from Metz Rollins, executive director of the National Conference of Black Churchmen (NCBC), to become a member of the group's theological commission (charged with writing a black theology statement), Cone gave more focused attention to his growing theological sensibilities, often arguing that the NCBC afforded him the necessary organizational and political platform on which to base his theological concerns. It was also during this year that Cone published his first book, *Black Theology and Black Power*. In this text, Cone began to outline the contours of what he would call Black Theology of Liberation. One year after the publication of this book, Cone provided the first systematic discussion of black theology in the text entitled *Black Theology of Liberation*. Here Cone provided a new grounding or foundational principle for theological discourse, one that would mark his work from that time to the present: liberation as the focus of the Christ event.

What Cone provided in these books was a turn in theological discourse, one that took seriously the reality of oppressed African Americans and used this historical lens to interpret the Christ event. In addition to scripture as a theological resource, as this shift might suggest, Cone gave attention to African American culture, African American experience, and African American history as resources for the doing of theology. And, he argued that using these various resources to read scripture pushed to the fore God's intense commitment to the oppressed. According to Cone, and this was one of the major theological shifts his work marked,

God's connection to the oppressed is so strong that God is ontologically black – with blacks representing for Cone the paradigm of oppression in the United States. Within these works, he also provided a theological analysis of violence that argued for the oppressed as the shapers of theological language and the nature of praxis. In this respect, according to Cone, physical violence could be a legitimate tool of struggle against injustice.

Cone addressed his critics within several texts, beginning with the *Spirituals and the Blues*, which focused attention on African American musical culture as theological resource for the development of a more appropriate language and grammar for the doing of theology. Other texts, including *God of the Oppressed* and *Martin, Malcolm and America* more concretely outlined the norm, sources, and structure of black theology followed this book. He has also extended his writing and teaching to include issues related to the global impact of liberation theology.

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Anthony B. Pinn

CONWAY, MONCURE DANIEL (1832 1907)

Moncure Daniel Conway was born on 17 March 1832 in Stafford County, Virginia, where the Conways were one of the most prominent and wealthy slave-holding families. In 1849 Conway graduated with his BA from Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, where the seed of abolitionist thought was planted in his mind. He began to study law for the bar in 1850 and simultaneously began to study progressive thinkers such as Horace Greeley and Horace Mann. Inspired by Mann, Conway lobbied the Virginia legislature for compulsory public education. This effort bore no fruit, but the conservatism of the Virginia legislature convinced him that slavery had stultified the thinking of the Virginia establishment, which seemed to cling to the status quo against all reason. Conway's private pursuit of knowledge drove his intellectual development and, a month after he began to study the law, his life was transformed

by an encounter with the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Emerson's celebration of the individual led Conway in new intellectual paths and germinated the seed of abolitionist thought.

Early in 1851 Conway abandoned his legal studies, choosing to become a Methodist minister instead. The Methodist Church's emphasis on the equality of all believers before God and its earlier prohibition against slave ownership by church members were consistent with his budding abolitionism. He became a circuit-riding Methodist minister on his nineteenth birthday and continued to read Emerson and other radical authors. Conway's sermons began to alarm the faithful as he emphasized the fulfillment of a person's life on this earth rather than preparation for the afterlife. During this period, he decided that his interest in educational reform, his opposition to the conservatism of the slaveholding aristocracy in Virginia, and his attraction to Emerson and other radical writers were all expressions of a desire for autonomy, not only for himself, but for all men and women. Conway embarked on the quest of a freethinker, seeking to expose and root out arbitrary authority wherever he encountered it.

In 1852 Conway left his Methodist ministry to attend Harvard Divinity School. In the Boston area he befriended several local luminaries, particularly Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and Jared Sparks. Although initially repelled by the radical Transcendentalism of Theodore Parker, he ultimately went beyond Parker's radical theology. Conway also made the short pilgrimage to Concord to meet Emerson, who introduced him to other prominent Transcendentalists. Conway graduated from Harvard with his BD in 1854 and accepted the prestigious Unitarian pulpit in Washington, D.C. He increasingly found himself torn between his opposition to slavery and his allegiance to the South. Although he

abhorred slavery, he disapproved of radical abolitionists' blanket condemnations of all southerners, arguing that northerners had been complicit in the growth of southern slavery.

In the summer of 1856 he resolutely denounced slavery in a sermon; within three months he was ousted from his position, accused of using the pulpit as a political forum. In his defense Conway maintained that slavery was a moral, and hence, religious issue. By December of 1856 he accepted an appointment to the First Congregational Church of Cincinnati, Ohio, where the members were more tolerant of his abolitionism.

Initially, Conway flourished in the heavily Germanized city of Cincinnati. He was particularly impressed with German intellectuals in Cincinnati, especially John B. Stallo and August Willich, the latter of whom sharpened his sensitivity to labor problems in the industrializing city. Conway's theology moved further left as he studied David Friedrich Strauss's *Das Leben Jesus* and questioned the veracity of Biblical accounts of miracles, the divinity of Jesus, and the authority of the Bible. In 1859 Conway's church split over his theology, but he retained a following sufficient to remain in the pulpit. He finally left the Unitarian Church in 1862 and, after leading the Conway family slaves to safety in Ohio, he moved to Boston to serve as coeditor with Franklin B. Sanborn of an antislavery weekly, *The Commonwealth*.

In 1863 he managed to convince skeptical abolitionist colleagues that he should travel to England to promote their cause. In the summer of 1863 Conway sent a letter to James Murray Mason, the Confederate envoy in London, in which he proposed that if the Confederacy would liberate its slaves, American abolitionists would advocate an end to the war that would allow the South to secede from the Union. Conway became the bane of American

abolitionists who rushed to repudiate his position. Feeling alienated, he sent for his wife and sons, having unintentionally severed his ties to the United States.

Despite this episode, Conway enjoyed the spiritual and intellectual freedom he found in London. In 1864 he was appointed minister of London's most radical religious institution, South Place Chapel, a free thought church that still meets at Conway Hall in Red Lion Square. In 1884, having regained credibility with his former abolitionist colleagues, he returned to the United States for a brief triumphal visit. After the death of his wife Ellen in 1897, he returned to the United States once more, where he denounced American imperialism and promoted free religion. In 1898 he moved to Paris where he devoted himself to the peace movement and writing. He died on 15 November 1907 in Paris, France.

Throughout the course of his life, in addition to innumerable pamphlets and articles, Conway authored over seventy books. Probably his most important literary accomplishment was his revival of the reputation of Thomas Paine, who had been condemned by Americans for decades as an atheistic Jacobin. Conway's publications, as well as his life, provide invaluable insight into American Transcendentalism, the abolitionist movement, pacifist thought, and liberal religious thought during the late nineteenth century.

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James A. Good

COOPER, THOMAS (1759–1839)

Thomas Cooper was a well-known Radical in late eighteenth-century Britain before emigrating to America, where he first became involved with the Democratic-Republican party and then took on an influential role as a pioneer of states' rights and Southern secession in the 1820s. His intellectual interests were similarly wide-ranging, covering everything from law to medicine, with particularly notable contributions to political economy and constitutional theory. Despite Cooper's ideological shifts, his thought was underpinned by a remarkably consistent set of beliefs, which included a trust in *laissez-faire* government and utilitarianism, the advocacy of free inquiry and materialism, and a combative faith in the rightness of his own views.

Cooper was born in London, England, on 22 October 1759. He entered Oxford University in 1779 but never took a degree. Cooper's *Tracts, Ethical, Theological and Political* (1789) outlines his earliest intellectual positions: it contains a Lockean emphasis on individual liberty and the right of the people to change their government, as well as a Smithian emphasis on self-interest as the ultimate motive for human action. Enthused by the French Revolution, in

March 1792 he travelled to Paris, where he mingled with Robespierre and other leading Jacobins.

Upon his return to England, Cooper was drawn into an ill-tempered debate with Edmund Burke about the legitimacy of the French Revolution. Combining Thomas Paine's egalitarian republicanism with the progressive utilitarianism of Joseph Priestly, Cooper's *Reply to Burke* (1792) comprehensively criticized the "hereditary System of Privileged Orders" as antithetical to the maxim that "all Government is, or ought to be, instituted for the happiness of the people" (54). Following the Reign of Terror and a first visit to the United States, however, Cooper became increasingly disillusioned with the French model of liberty. Thus, when the prosecution and harassment of English radicals by the Pitt government began to intensify, Cooper chose to seek refuge in America. In August 1793 he settled in Northumberland, Pennsylvania, where he was later joined by his fellow émigré Priestley, with whom he had become close friends.

Already schooled in the doctrines of Adam Smith, Cooper had more recently been exposed to the writings of the physiocrats, and upon his arrival in America began to expound the idea that agriculture was superior to commerce. Foreign trade bred wars, Cooper argued, and government efforts to protect it were restrictive and misplaced, especially when there was a burgeoning home market to be developed. Given these economic views, it is hardly surprising that Cooper's sympathies lay with the Democratic-Republican Party which was emerging under the leadership of Thomas Jefferson. When John Adams's Federalist administration passed the Sedition Act in 1799, Cooper responded by fiercely attacking it; in his *Political Essays* (1800), for example, he treats the Act as symptomatic of a conspiratorial attempt to "increase the power

of the Executive at the expence of the interest of the country" (25). Ironically, Cooper's ongoing criticism of Adams in the press then led to his own prosecution for sedition, and in May 1800 he was sentenced to six months in prison. This new-found status as a martyr to the Democratic-Republican cause in turn brought Cooper more fully into Jefferson's orbit, and the two men struck up a warm and detailed correspondence, which lasted until the third president's death.

Following Jefferson's electoral victory in 1801, Cooper began to back away from his earlier Enlightened radicalism. No longer content with abstract theorizing on natural rights, he turned more fully to a utilitarian understanding of politics, within which society was organized according to experience and practice. His familiarity with the latest scientific developments helped him to secure the position of Professor of Chemistry at Carlisle College, Pennsylvania in 1811, followed by service as Professor of Applied Chemistry and Mineralogy at the University of Pennsylvania starting in 1816. With John Redman Coxe he edited a Philadelphia magazine titled *Emporium of Arts and Sciences* (1812–14). Cooper's approach to natural philosophy was typically inclusive and practical, as suggested by his *Discourse on the Connexion between Chemistry and Medicine* (1818) and his *Tracts on Medical Jurisprudence* (1819).

Cooper became Professor of Chemistry at South Carolina College (now the University of South Carolina) at Columbia in 1819, and in December 1820 he was elected as the college's President, while continuing to teach natural philosophy. He also took on the title of Professor in Political Economy in 1823, the first such position in the country. Though it contained little that was original, thanks to his openness to controversial thinkers like David Ricardo and Jean Baptiste Say,

Cooper's *Lectures on Political Economy* (1829) was the most comprehensive and pertinent American textbook on the subject to date. Cooper, who had always seen himself as on the side of oppressed minorities, effectively laid the academic foundations for the states' rights doctrine and the nullification crisis during these years. *On the Proposed Alteration of the Tariff* (1823) offered an early argument for the unconstitutional nature of economic protectionism, while *Consolidation* (1824) provided an historical rationale for the "independent and separate sovereignty of each state of the Union" by tracing the roots of this autonomy back to the ratification debates.

Although Cooper's attacks on the federal government were largely consistent with his earlier political views, the same could not be said for his increasingly frank attacks on abolitionism. His youthful *Letters on the Slave Trade* (1787) had fully embraced the Enlightenment's rejection of racial inequality, but by the time he came to write *On the Constitution of the United States* (1826) his understanding of natural rights had narrowed to the point where he could repudiate the social implications of the Declaration of Independence. His claim that slavery ensured the greatest good for the greatest number (since blacks were naturally inferior and required its guidance) reflected his ongoing loyalty to utilitarianism – it simply happened that the flexible and optimistic utilitarianism he learnt from Priestley had evolved under Bentham's influence into a rigid pragmatism which he now used to defend the status quo.

Cooper's religious enemies, meanwhile, were inflamed by his lectures in geology, which rejected the Mosaic account of creation, and his publication of pamphlets like *The Scripture Doctrine of Materialism* (1823), which reiterated his scepticism about

the existence of the soul. The appearance of *An Exposition of the Doctrines of Calvinism* (1830), which attacked the clergy as fraudulent and self-serving, then helped to draw these tensions to a head, and in 1831 political pressure forced South Carolina College's board of trustees to open an official enquiry into Cooper's heterodoxy. Cooper survived this investigation, not least because of his residual influence as a figurehead of the states' rights movement, but in 1832 chose to resign from the college. He died on 11 May 1839 in Columbia, South Carolina.

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Matthew Pethers

COPE, EDWARD DRINKER (1840–1897)

Edward Cope was born on 28 July 1840 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He attended a private academy and the University of Pennsylvania, followed by further study at the Philadelphia Academy of Sciences and the Smithsonian Institution. He then attended the University of Heidelberg in 1863–64, receiving a PhD. He was professor of natural sciences at Haverford College from 1864 to 1867, and from 1865 to 1873 he was curator of the Academy of Natural Sciences in Philadelphia. He specialized in reptile, amphibian, and fish paleontology, first exploring Eastern regions and then several Western states, assembling and classifying vast collections of thousands of fossils. Cope was also a lead paleontologist for the United States Geological Survey during the late 1870s and 1880s. In 1889 he was appointed professor of geology and paleontology at the University of Pennsylvania, and was professor of zoology and comparative anatomy from 1896 until his death. He was an honorary member of several international scientific societies, and in 1896 he was elected President of the American

Association for the Advancement of Science. Cope died on 12 April 1897 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Cope was America's first major theoretician and philosopher on evolution, and a prominent and influential neo-Lamarckian. He postulated that most of the higher organisms arose from "unspecialized ancestors" of relatively small body sizes, whose larger descendants are much more specialized. Therefore, most current species are highly susceptible to degeneracy and extinction, and further evolution will proceed from the few remaining small and unspecialized mammals now alive. This theory is still debated today, although his idea that evolution proceeds in a relatively cumulative and linear manner has lost credibility. Cope made little advance with his theory of "acceleration and retardation" over Lamarck's own position that the learned habits of adults correspondingly modify their reproductive cells so that offspring will be more likely to display the same habit. Interestingly, this modification did not happen by a chemical mechanism, according to Cope.

In his more speculative discussions of biology, Cope could not credit chance mutation with creating fitter variations over time. The initial origin of fitter organic structures cannot be explained by selection and survival. He thus argued that biology cannot rest on materialism and Darwin's theory of natural selection, but instead must appeal to spiritual or mental forces to explain sustained growth and progress. Unlike contemporary Chauncey Wright, who was America's most sophisticated defender of Darwin's theory of natural selection, Cope insisted that higher animals and humanity could not have resulted from fortuitous chance. Entropy prevails over matter, so that there must be an organizing

force to compensate against mechanical energy's tendency to dissipate. In his early writings Cope was willing to see God's own guiding hand in all stages of evolution, following many other zoologists such as Louis Agassiz. Furthermore, Cope accepted and taught the racist notion that the "lower" (dark-skinned) races display the immature characteristics of the fully evolved "higher" (white) race.

His later writings move away from explicit theism towards a kind of vitalism. Cope's theory of evolution required an initial supply of basic mental energy that permitted primitive life to make discriminations and form successful habits that are inheritable and improvable. It was supposed to be this form of non-material energy that modified the adult's reproductive cells. Intelligence will develop in step with the increasing specialization, sensitivity, and usefulness of the organism's parts. This empiricist theory of intelligence was designed by Cope to compromise with the dominant psychological theory of psycho-physical parallelism. Parallelism had no provision for evolutionary mental development, rested on a rationalistic view of mind, and was notoriously unable to explain mind-body interaction. Like Charles Peirce's work at about the same time, Cope was unable to find in physics or chemistry the sort of energy that could explain intelligence and evolutionary progress, and so both thinkers postulated a higher form of dynamic and purposive causality and identified it with mind. Cope held that his evolutionary theory of mind eliminates the need to postulate an indeterministic free will.

Cope's theory of inherited habits resulted in his view that humanity's moral habits will permanently rest in a delicate balance between

altruism and selfishness. Excessive altruism cannot long survive in a population, although some individuals will have a preponderance of social qualities. Our destiny as a species is a perpetual struggle between justice and injustice.

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John R. Shook

CORNMAN, JAMES WELTON (1929 1978)

James Cornman was born on 16 August 1929 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He

first studied philosophy at Dartmouth, receiving the BA in 1956. He then undertook graduate studies at Brown University. Cornman received the MA from Brown in 1957, supervised by Roderick Chisholm, and completed the PhD in 1960, working with John Lenz. Cornman was an assistant professor of philosophy at Ohio State University from 1960 to 1963, associate professor at the University of Rochester from 1963 to 1967, and professor of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania from 1967 to 1978. Cornman had a Mellon postdoctoral fellowship at Pittsburgh in 1964–65, where he worked intensely with Wilfrid Sellars. He was killed in a car accident on 31 May 1978 in Norristown, Pennsylvania.

Cornman published four books and more than forty articles during his lifetime. These works presented his views on metaphilosophy, reference, the mind-body problem (issues involving sensations in particular), and philosophy of science. A fifth book, *Skepticism, Justification and Explanation* was nearly complete at the time of his death, and was published posthumously.

Cornman may be best known for his adverbial theory of sensations, and for his metaphilosophical reflections on the place of linguistic analysis in philosophy. With respect to the former, Cornman denied that there are *sensa* or phenomenal objects; thus there can be no issue of such objects exhibiting non-material properties. Sensory experiences are, for him, objectless events, which are identical to brain events. For example, it is philosophically misleading to talk about having *a pain* (phenomenal object) which is *intense* (mental property thereof). Instead, what really occurs is that someone suffers painfully, and intensely so. Cornman's central argument for adverbial materialism was its superiority over its two rivals: the utter elimination of sensation, as

in Richard Rorty and W.V. Quine, and the (to Cornman implausible) reduction of sense data to physical *entities*, as in his reading of Sellars.

As for metaphilosophy, Cornman endorsed “the linguistic turn.” However, there were three familiar varieties of linguistic philosophy that he resisted. He rejected the reform of language, as in Russell and Carnap, seeking instead a description of the actual workings of ordinary language. He insisted, against Wittgensteinians who favored linguistic therapy, that traditional philosophical problems are perfectly sensible. He equally insisted that philosophy is not *about* language: philosophers want to know about God, sensations, physical objects, the will, etc., not merely about ‘God’, ‘sensations’, ‘physical objects’, or ‘the will’. But if one rejects not just reform and therapy, but also the idea that philosophy is about language, how can linguistic analysis make positive contributions to traditional metaphysics, understood as being about extra-linguistic entities? The evidence-base (facts internal to language) doesn't seem to fit with the stated topic (facts external to language). Cornman's suggestion involved a kind of coherentist bootstrapping. Carried out in practice across several books, the method involved careful study of particular philosophical problems – mind-body relations, sense data, skepticism – each providing evidence, along the way, about which theory of reference was on the right track. Those findings about reference then provide a sort of bridge from language-internal evidence to language-external ontological results. These, in turn, would yield further results about reference, and so on. Cornman cautioned, however, that such investigations could never be conclusive or ultimate, precisely because the various

philosophical positions – about reference and otherwise – all support one another.

Cornman believed that philosophical theories generally, not just those which are more or less directly about language, have implications for the correct account of reference, and vice versa. He had hoped to write two further books, on ethics and aesthetics, thereby affording a fairly complete philosophical system against which to check his prior accounts of reference, mind, sensation, evidence, etc.

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Robert J. Stainton

CRAIG, WILLIAM LANE (1949)

William Lane Craig, born on 23 August 1949 in Peoria, Illinois, is an American philosopher, apologist, and theologian, who possibly ranks as the most important Christian apologist since the Oxford don C. S. Lewis. Craig's penchant for debate and oratory shows as early as his high school years when he was recognized as a champion debater and public speaker. Craig's attraction to academic achievement and public speaking, in large part, owed to his rare Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease. Craig attributes his life's work to a profound religious conversion when he was sixteen years old. A few years later, Craig met his wife Jan in college while serving with Campus Crusade for Christ. Craig has continued in public ministry as well as personal spiritual disciplines of daily devotions consisting of reading the Church Fathers, the Greek New Testament, and praying for missions work. Since relocating to Atlanta, Georgia, Craig has consistently taught the weekly "Defenders" Sunday School class at Johnson Ferry Baptist Church in which he lectures on various theological and apologetic issues. A podcast specifically dedicated to this class finds its place next to the *Reasonable Faith Podcast* (currently the most popular apologetics podcast on iTunes) hosted on Craig's website.

Craig's academic pedigree is enviable, boasting a PhD in philosophy (1977) under the eminent philosopher John Hick from the University of Birmingham, England, as well as a DTheol in Theology (1984) under the

brilliant theologian, Wolfhart Pannenberg, from the University of Munich, Germany. Craig earned a BA in communications from Wheaton College in Illinois (1971) and a MA in philosophy of religion under Norman Geisler from Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in Illinois (1975). While at Trinity, Craig also studied under such thinkers as Paul Feinberg, John Warwick Montgomery, and J. I. Packer, as well as open theist Clark Pinnock.

Craig accepted a position at Trinity in 1980 as assistant professor of philosophy of religion. He left in 1986 when Trinity closed the philosophy of religion department. From 1987 until 1994, he was a visiting researcher at the Université Catholique de Louvain in Belgium. In 1996 he became Research Professor of Philosophy at Biola University's Talbot School of Theology in Southern California. He has also been a visiting professor of philosophy at Wheaton College, and in 2014 he added teaching duties at Houston Baptist University as a professor of philosophy.

Craig has written numerous books, including his signature work *Reasonable Faith* (1994) and several other memorable titles such as *The Only Wise God* (1987), *Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview* (with J. P. Moreland, 2003), *The Kalam Cosmological Argument* (1979), and *Time and Eternity* (2001).

Craig's debate against Frank Zindler at Willow Creek Community Church in 1993 was a pivotal point in Craig's career, and he soon came to be recognized as a formidable apologist. Unlike many top-rate academicians whose interactions are almost exclusively within the halls of academia, Craig has successfully bridged the gap between the white collar-filled ivory tower and the blue-collar trenches. Subsequently, leading authors of popular apologetics works rely

heavily on and often try emulating Craig's approachability and research. Craig has debated notable atheists and agnostics with high frequency ever since. Despite Craig's reliance on intellectually examined evidences for the veracity of Christianity, he routinely insists that the self-authenticating witness of the Holy Spirit is the quintessential evidence of the existence of God and the truth of the Christian scriptures.

From his doctoral studies, Craig formulated a Kalam Cosmological Argument by fusing together medieval Muslim apologetics with twenty-first century science into a formidable apologetics argument for the existence of God. Molinism provides his defense of God's character in the face of the problem of evil. It is safe to say that the advance of Molinism within conservative evangelical circles, per Craig's advocacy, is a most curious development given the past theological challenges between Jesuits and Protestants. Because of historical and theological polarities, it is little wonder why evangelical apologists may display great reservation with adopting it. According to Craig, theological fatalism is a variant of ancient Greek logical fatalism.

Primary to Craig's Molinism is the curious world of middle knowledge, which rests upon the key tenet of logical priority as distinguished from temporal succession. Middle knowledge addresses three "logical moments" within God's foreknowledge. For Craig, the first moment is natural knowledge or "knowledge God could not lack and still be God," which includes all possible actions and outcomes for what God has created as well as all possible worlds. The other bookend is God's free knowledge of the actual created world. The third moment is logically posterior to God's decision to create the world. Craig uses the example of God having the ability to create a world in which George Washington was not born. In such a non-Washingtonian

world, all statements about Washington's exploits would be false. Craig reasons, "For if he [God] had created a different world, the content of his free knowledge would be different." Molinism, therefore, provides a plausible hermeneutic by which human choice does not undermine God's sovereignty, since human choice operates within the parameters of God's sovereign creation of persons and foreknowledge of what those persons would choose in every possible world.

Surprisingly for many evangelicals, Craig departs from a popular view of God's relation to time, which is that God is "outside" of time. Contrary to this common assertion, Craig argues that God is atemporal before creation but temporal after creation. Once again, Craig argues that analytic philosophy, not theology, is the key to unlocking the tension in God's relation to time. He served as president of the Philosophy of Time Society (1999–2006). Craig played a leading role in the formation of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, and served as its president (1996–2005) through its biggest sustained season of growth.

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Jeff Robinson and David Baggett

CREIGHTON, JAMES EDWIN (1861–1923)

James Edwin Creighton was born on 8 April 1861 in Pictou, Nova Scotia, Canada. He entered Dalhousie College in 1883 and studied philosophy with Jacob Gould Schurman, who became his lifelong friend and patron. Creighton followed Schurman to Cornell University in 1887, and received the PhD in philosophy in 1892. As was customary

in that age, Creighton spent 1889–90 studying in Germany at the universities of Leipzig and Berlin, returning to Cornell to defend his thesis. Creighton became an instructor in philosophy at Cornell in 1889, was promoted to assistant professor of modern philosophy in 1892, and then was named the Sage Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in 1895, holding that position until his death. Creighton also was Dean of the Graduate School from 1914 to 1923. Creighton died on 8 October 1924 in Ithaca, New York.

More than his written work, it was Creighton's ideas concerning how to live the philosophical life, and his manner of implementing those ideas, that has left a lasting mark on philosophy in North America. This contribution is marked by paradoxes, however. There was probably not another single individual as important as Creighton in establishing the form and expectations of the modern "profession" of philosophy, its role in contemporary universities, its characteristic curriculum, its professional organizations, and its form and style of publication. The professionalization of philosophy bears the mark of Creighton's vision at every turn. Yet, one could hardly find a philosopher who conceived of the philosophical life in *less* professional terms. The philosophical life was for Creighton the life of leisure – disciplined and properly employed – for the development of the mind and of character, for the formation of small groups of excellent minds who press themselves and one another for the genuine attainment of ideals.

Schurman was made President of Cornell University in 1892, and immediately appointed Creighton to the chair in logic and metaphysics. Together they established The Sage School, and quickly began to create the institutional structures required to realize their ideal of the philosophical life. The Sage

School included, in addition to graduate and undergraduate education in the history of philosophy, colloquia and gatherings at which ideas were to be presented and debated, a published journal, a philosophy club, and formal and informal ties to other centers of philosophy in the US and abroad. In effect, the pursuit of graduate education at Cornell in the 1890s set the pattern easily recognized in most every American graduate school of philosophy today.

Among the first institutions created in The Sage School were Schurman's *Philosophical Review* (founded 1892), of which Creighton became co-editor in 1896, and editor-in-chief in 1902, a position he held until his death. Creighton also served as American editor of *Kant-Studien* from 1896 until his death. These roles not only established the form in which professional philosophy would be published, but made Creighton the principal gatekeeper and the setter of standards. The great success of *The Philosophical Review*, along with the advent of *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* in 1903, squeezed out high level philosophical discussion among thinkers beyond the academy. The paradox involved is that Creighton's high standards also functioned as barriers to those who had not been enculturated to academic styles and forms of philosophical discourse. To participate in the important discussions, one would have to adopt its rules, and to adopt the rules one would need to study philosophy formally in the academy. Creighton was among a small group of philosophy professors who founded the American Philosophical Association and he was elected its first president in 1901.

Creighton's textbook, *An Introductory Logic* (1898) and its many reprintings, established the subject of logic as philosophy's

contribution to the curriculum. This textbook was still in print as late as 1947, giving it a half-century of influence during the formative period of the modern American university. The paradox arising here is that Creighton's ideas about logic were not even close to the formal discipline logic became during the revolt against idealism between 1910 and 1930. Creighton conceived of logic in humanistic terms, with little formalization.

Creighton defended a version of personal idealism he called "speculative idealism." There were three basic touchstones of his view: (1) that philosophy is a social activity; (2) the history of philosophy is central to philosophy itself; and (3) speculative idealism defines *the* philosophical attitude. The philosophical attitude does not possess a peculiar subject matter. Rather, as Gilbert summarizes it, "the business of the philosopher is not to do some one thing co-ordinate with the work of the natural scientist or of the man of practice, but sympathetically and intelligently to penetrate the work of all classes of men and to help them become intellectually self-conscious and mutually respectful." This is, of course, a Socratic conception of the place of the philosopher in the *agora*. Many readers have commented on how much Creighton's idealism resembles the very pragmatism of which he was so critical, but one might say the same for Socrates, and it was Socrates of whom Creighton was fondest. In the end it seems that the Socratic ideal is the notion that relieves some of the tensions in Creighton's simultaneous professionalization of philosophy and his humanistic concept of the philosophical life. These motions together may have been a practical way of convincing the public to award the heirs of Socrates the pension he claimed to deserve in the *Apology*, and to insure that the marketplace would always have an ample supply of gadflies. If that was

Creighton's aim, he succeeded beyond his fondest imaginings.

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Randall E. Auxier

CUNNINGHAM, GUSTAVUS WATTS (1881–1968)

Gustavus Watts Cunningham was born on 14 November 1881 in Laurens, South Carolina. In 1902 Cunningham received an MA from Furman College in South Carolina. His first teaching job was in English at Howard College in Birmingham, Alabama, where he taught from 1902 to 1905. He then studied at Cornell University under the idealist James Edwin Creighton and received his PhD in philosophy in 1908. His dissertation on "Thought and Reality in Hegel's System" became his first book, published in 1910.

In 1908 Cunningham became an instructor of philosophy at Middlebury College in Vermont, where he was promoted to full professor in 1915. In 1917 he went to the University of Texas where he remained until 1927, when he returned to Cornell as professor of philosophy. He served as chair of the school of philosophy, and also as Dean

of the Graduate School from 1944 to 1949. Cunningham was President of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1930–31, and President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1937–38. Cunningham retired in 1949, and died on 1 April 1968 in Laurens, South Carolina.

Cunningham was a central figure in the Cornell school of idealists that included Jacob Gould Schurman as well as Creighton, and followed them as an editor of *Philosophical Review*. However, he struggled with many of the central ideas in the idealist tradition. The problem of time especially bothered him, and he turned to Henri Bergson for guidance. His *Study in the Philosophy of Bergson* (1916) suggests an organic and teleological universe.

Cunningham also responded to some of the American "new realist" critiques of idealism. In their correspondence, he and Viscount Richard Burdon Haldane remark favorably on some of the work of Roy Wood Sellars. In particular, Cunningham insisted that meaning requires two dimensions. One of them is, indeed, "intrinsic" and mental, but there is also an extrinsic dimension that requires a contrast with the knowing subject. Still, he maintained that knowledge of every kind is tightly bound up with the objects of knowledge. Knowledge is impossible if what we know is wholly distinct from our knowledge. In this sense Cunningham remained an idealist.

In *The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy* (1933) Cunningham dismisses many of the common idealist arguments outright and only accepts one. The one that he accepts gives more precision to his claims about knowledge and the objects of knowledge. He says that any conception of nature without mind becomes unintelligible because it ignores the

presupposition that nature is conceivable. To conceive of nature as unknowable is ultimately unintelligible. Cunningham does not reject the Absolute, but he quotes with approval Bernard Bosanquet's "metaphor of the tide" that the Absolute is only "the high water mark" of "fluctuations" of ordinary "experience" (1933, pp. 136–7).

In the section of *The Idealistic Argument* about the Absolute (pp. 534–42), Cunningham's aversion to most kinds of reductionism asserts itself strongly. The "Absolutists" generally wanted to "sublate" individuals into the Absolute. Cunningham called this the "weakest point" in systems of absolute idealism (p. 534). The necessity of this "sublating" does not seem to follow from the nature of things themselves but from the decision to make the Absolute the principle of explanation. The timelessness of more conventional views of the Absolute continued to trouble him. He and Viscount Haldane exchanged notes of agreement throughout their long correspondence. They could agree that process is real, as Bergson, Samuel Alexander, Alfred North Whitehead and others were saying. But Cunningham and Haldane insisted that this does not deflect from the truth of idealism.

Cunningham shared the concerns of the growing analytic movement and the American realists about meaning and objectivity. He was also deeply skeptical of the personalists who adopted what he called "spiritual pluralism" and who saw nature as a collection of spirits. He could see no evidence that the "lower orders of nature are to be conceived as 'spiritual' centers," and he feared "*unbridled anthropomorphism*" (1933, p. 511).

Cunningham was a voluminous correspondent. In addition to forty-seven letters from Viscount Haldane and several from Creighton, there are letters in the Cornell archives from Herbert Wildon Carr, Andrew

Seth Pringle-Pattison, and George H. Sabine. Those from Creighton about the Absolute are particularly interesting. Much of his discussion with Haldane is about relativity and the ways in which Albert Einstein's relativity theory connects the subject and the object while at the same time permitting objectivity in science. The result, they believed, is an "idealism" of the sort Cunningham and Haldane favored.

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Leslie Armour

D

DAHL, ROBERT ALAN (1915–)

Robert Alan Dahl was born on 17 December 1915 in Inwood, Iowa. He received his BA from the University of Washington in 1936, and a PhD in political science from Yale University in 1940. He served in the federal government, first in the Office of Price Administration and later in the War Production Board, and in 1943 enlisted in the U.S. Army. After the war, Dahl joined the faculty of Yale University as an instructor of political science in 1946, and was promoted up to full professor. He became Eugene Meyer Professor of Political Science in 1955 and the chair of the political science department two years later. He was the Sterling Professor of Political Science from 1964 until his retirement in 1986. Dahl is presently a senior research scientist in sociology at Yale. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Philosophical Society, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a corresponding member of the British Academy, and was President of the American Political Science Association in 1966–67.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Dahl's name became closely associated with a controversial theory in American studies known as pluralism. This view denied the contention of such scholars as C. Wright Mills that there is a single dominant "power elite" in the United States. Dahl instead asserted that public policy at all levels is the result of both conflict and co-operation among several over-lapping but competing elites, any one of which has an effective veto over those

issues that concern it most deeply. These elites are accommodated by what Dahl dubbed a "decentralized bargaining bureaucracy."

Dahl set out this theory on a theoretical level in 1956, and he offered a supporting empirical study of the politics of the city of New Haven, Connecticut, in 1961. There has always been some ambiguity, though, whether Dahl's pluralism was a descriptive or a normative theory. In general, Dahl himself believed in this period both that a plurality of elites is an accurate description of the American scene *and* that this is on the whole good news. The specifically normative component of the theory he called "polyarchy."

Through the 1970s and 1980s, Dahl became convinced that the concentration of wealth is a great threat to democracy in any normative sense. "A desirable economic order would disperse power, not concentrate it," he wrote in 1985. In more recent writings, Dahl has largely abandoned polyarchy for a more populist conception of democracy, one that he sometimes discusses in almost wistful terms, writing for example that "looking back on the rise and decline of democracy, it is clear that we cannot count on historical forces to insure that democracy will always advance – or even survive, as the long intervals in which popular governments vanished from the earth remind us" (1998, p. 25).

Dahl's influence has been enormous, both in the United States and abroad, touching scholars as different from one another as conservative Harvard criminologist James Q. Wilson, idiosyncratic Berkeley economist

Oliver Williamson, and Edward P. Weber, author of a fine study of the politics of environmental regulation which bears the Dahl-inspired title, *Pluralism by the Rules*.

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Christopher Faille

DALL, CAROLINE WELLS HEALEY (1822–1912)

Caroline Wells Healey was born on 22 June 1822 in Boston, the oldest child of Caroline Foster and Mark Healey, a banker and investor. She received a superior education for women in her day, studying with a tutor at home until she was old enough to attend Joseph Hale Abbot's private school for girls. She married Charles Henry Appleton Dall in 1844, a Unitarian minister. She died in Washington, D.C., on 17 December 1912.

Caroline was an intelligent and precocious child. At the age of twelve, she began attending lectures by prominent thinkers of the day, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, whose lectures she was able to summarize for her father. Later in her teenage years, she attended the lectures of Theodore Parker, the abolitionist and free-religionist. She became something of a devotee of Parker's and grew so devoted to abolition that she later joined a group that helped fugitive slaves escape to Canada. She began committing herself to a range of social service causes

in her adolescence, working through the Unitarian church in which she was raised. She volunteered for the Benevolent Fraternity, the church's charitable arm, running a nursery for children of working women and doing home visitations to assist members of Boston's poor and working classes. As Caroline matured, she attended Margaret Fuller's "Conversations," a women's philosophical and literary salon. At nineteen, she was the youngest in attendance at these sessions, and attributed much of her own intellectual development to all she learned there. The works *Margaret and Her Friends* (1895) and *Transcendentalism in New England* (1897) are reflections on these early years in Transcendentalist circles.

While receiving some financial support from Charles, Dall relied primarily on her own earnings from lecturing and writing. In both Boston and Washington, where she had moved in 1879 to be close to her son, the naturalist William Healey Dall, she was well-known as an intellectual and women's rights advocate. In Washington, she even became acquainted with the nation's first lady, Frances Cleveland.

Dall was among the founding members of the American Social Science Association in 1865, which was both an intellectual and a social action organization. She helped coordinate and publicize meetings, corresponding with prominent leaders like William Torrey Harris about plans and/or speaking invitations for upcoming meetings. As a social action body, ASSA focused on helping the poor, the unemployed, and the mentally ill. Dall firmly believed in the mission of this organization and served on its executive committee from its founding in 1865 until 1905.

Dall's first writings were published in the *Christian Register* and other progressive newspapers. She served as a corresponding editor of the feminist magazine, *Una* for several years. She also helped organized the New England Woman's Rights Convention

in Boston in 1859. By 1877, she was so well known for her strong support of women's rights that Alfred University in New York awarded her an honorary LLD, the first such doctoral degree awarded to a woman in America. Reportedly, however, her strong personality made it difficult for her to work collaboratively, and she ended up alienating herself from the leadership of the women's rights movement. She turned to writing as a means of expressing her feminist views.

Dall was among the first real feminist theorists in the nineteenth century. She was well-grounded in the works of the women who came before her – Mary Astell and Mary Wollstonecraft in England, and Fanny Wright and Margaret Fuller in America – and she was among the first to make the argument that nurture, rather than nature, is largely responsible for any peculiarities of women's behavior. In her most theoretical works, *Woman's Rights under the Law*, *Woman's Right to Labor*, and *The College, the Market, and the Court*, Dall blends her advocacy for women's rights with a well-argued theory for full equality. In *Woman's Rights under Law*, Dall articulates her arguments for how and why the laws needed to be changed. The laws as articulated in her day were crafted by and for men, leaving women at a disadvantage in both social and political matters. Legal provisions regarding property, marriage and divorce, and political participation deny women their rights as both citizens and human beings; without such changes, women are essentially non-persons. It is not just a practical matter of the effect such laws have on women, but a matter of what is good and right in a state that wishes to treat all of its citizens equally.

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Dorothy Rogers

DALY, MARY (1928–2010)

Mary Daly was born on 16 October 1928 in Schenectady, New York. She received a BA in English from the College of St. Rose in Albany, New York, and an MA in English from Catholic University of America. Her desire to study Catholic philosophy and theology was frustrated by the fact that women were not accepted in the authorized programs. She completed the new doctoral program in religion at St. Mary’s College, Notre Dame, but found that it did not open teaching opportunities in challenging programs in Catholic thought. Supporting herself together with her mother by loans and by teaching in study abroad programs, she received a baccalaureate, licentiate, and doctorate (the first to a woman) in sacred theology in 1963 from the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, where state support prevented excluding women. After completing the sacred theology dissertation on “The Problem of Speculative Theology: A Study in Saint Thomas,” she completed a third doctorate, a PhD in philosophy in 1965, also from Fribourg, with a dissertation on “Natural Knowledge of God in the Philosophy of Jacques Maritain.”

Visiting the Second Vatican Council in 1965 helped to motivate Daly’s first articles criticizing the church’s policies toward women. These led to an invitation to write *The*

Church and the Second Sex, much of which was completed before she returned to the USA to take a position in the theology department at Boston College in 1966. Her courses centered on feminist ethics, enrolled both graduate and undergraduate students, and were available to students at nine additional universities and schools of theology in the Boston area. Although during subsequent years she lectured extensively both internationally and nationally, this Jesuit institution remained her professional location until she was retired as an associate professor in 1999 after thirty-three years. Daly died on 3 January 2010 in Gardner, Massachusetts.

The Church and the Second Sex calls upon the Catholic Church to reform its policies toward women and defends Christianity in dialogue with Simone de Beauvoir. However, before Daly was asked to authorize a second edition, she no longer hoped for reform of the religious traditions and had become a radical feminist philosopher and theologian. Daly then began her policy of authorizing unchanged new editions of her works with additional introductions that reveal subsequent transformations of her thought.

Daly's radical feminism considers all inherited languages, symbolic traditions, and institutions as so profoundly shaped by systems of male domination that women must refuse to grant authority to them in order to claim their own creativity, intellectual powers, and spirituality. Recognizing the power of language, her method calls for wordplay that jolts consciousness so that it sees patriarchal hegemonies and embraces women's agency. While her first books were shaped by somewhat traditional frameworks, later books reject standard philosophical and theological formulations. At the same time, however, she regularly uses classical thinkers (for example: Aristotle, Aquinas) as "springboards" for her own analyses.

The internationally influential *Beyond God the Father* is a philosophy of religion developed as a feminist challenge to patriarchal religion, specifically to Christian doctrines. It gave impetus to several different feminist movements that have transformed much contemporary theology as well as some religious institutions. While many feminists disagree with aspects of Daly's radical feminism, certain themes of her thought regularly recur throughout feminist theology and she is universally recognized as the field's pioneer. Identifying human existence with the power of "self-naming," she calls women "to name the self, the world and God," in other words, to articulate meaning in terms of their own becoming, rather than simply to conform to inherited doctrines. Later, she calls herself a "pirate" who steals resources from the intellectual traditions (for example, Thomism) in order to transform them for the sake of women's becoming. An early example is her appropriation of the ontologies of Thomas Aquinas, Alfred North Whitehead, and Paul Tillich in terms of her metaphor of Ultimate/Intimate Reality as "Verb." Daly is convinced that the women's movement has a spiritual dimension and needs to be grounded in an image of ultimate reality as dynamic interconnected process. At first she speaks metaphorically of "God the Verb." Later, she decides that the word "God" cannot be liberated from its associations with the reified Father God and she speaks simply of "the Verb." This is developed in terms of Aristotle's emphasis on final causality and, eventually, is called "Quintessence."

By the time of the third book, *Gyn/Ecology*, Daly had not only formulated her radical feminism and her rhetorical methods, she had come to personal realization of lesbianism. This, however, did not restrict her audience, since she addresses all who affirm women's becoming and are open to criticizing

societal systems that have perpetuated both psychological and physical atrocities against women and “other biophilic creatures.” She introduces here her unrelenting analysis of the “Sado-Ritual Syndrome” played out in “necrophilic” patriarchal phenomena such as witch burnings, genital mutilation, footbinding, and psychoanalysis.

From the time of *Beyond God the Father*, Daly has aimed to reveal the connections between sexism, violence, and ecological devastation. In *Pure Lust* she calls for the ecstatic recovery of “elemental” passionate participation in Ultimate/Intimate Reality as opposed to the “plastic and potted” emotions encouraged by contemporary economic systems. The *Wickedary*, with ironic humor, provides a dictionary to present the current results of the etymological experimentation that marks her writing. *Outercourse* blends autobiography with philosophy as it analyzes her own intellectual as well as personal development in terms of radical feminism’s need to criticize “foreground” patriarchally conditioned realities by invoking the “Background,” women’s original potentialities. *Quintessence* imagines the future in critical dialogue with present ecological and social violence with particular attention to threats posed by religious fundamentalisms and genetic engineering.

Some feminist theorists criticize Daly as an essentialist who does not adequately recognize the diversity of women’s experiences. Others think she successfully maintains an existentialist and ontological critique of essentialism. Her emphasis on the power of language and on the self as process resonates with postmodernism. However, she criticizes the relativism and social determinism sometimes associated with postmodernism and continues to advocate the ontological powers of intuitive reason existentially appropriated.

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Wanda Warren Berry

DANIELS, NORMAN (1942–)

Norman Daniels was born on 30 June 1942 in New York City. After receiving a BA in English at Wesleyan University (1964), he went to Balliol College for the Oxford University BA in philosophy and psychology (1966), and then to Harvard University for the PhD in philosophy (1970). He began teaching philosophy at Tufts University in 1969 and soon became the Goldthwaite Professor of

Rhetoric and professor of medical ethics there. In 2002 he moved to Harvard University to be Mary B. Saltonstall Professor and professor of ethics and population health at Harvard's School of Public Health.

Daniels has been among America's most prominent and influential philosophers working on issues of social ethics, social justice, medical ethics, and health care policy, both domestically and internationally. His consulting and advising roles have included service with the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health Organization, the National Cancer Policy Board, the National Academy of Social Insurance, and the Open Society Foundation project on Medicine as a Profession. He has participated in the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and the Ethics Working Group of the Clinton White House Health Care Task Force (1993). Policy matters receiving his attention also encompass cost effectiveness analysis for regulatory oversight, health insurance, health care allocation, elderly health care, preventative medicine, Medicare reform, AIDS treatment, and health care reform in developing countries. A major project is titled Benchmarks of Fairness, to systematize the evaluation of progress towards fairer distributions of, and efficient access to, health care resources in a country.

Daniels relies on the framework of John Rawls and his application of "reflective equilibrium" to settle on more just principles dictating a society's distribution of social and political goods and powers. Daniels regards this framework as a kind of egalitarianism, focused on the equal allocation of much-needed health resources under conditions of scarcity. His book *Just Health Care* (1985) immediately became a core text and required reading for those grappling with the roles and responsibilities of health care providers and

health care systems. Expressed in terms of "equality of opportunity," the right to adequate health care is taken to be a fundamental prerequisite for the successful pursuit of life goals. In later writings, collected in *Just Health* (2008), Daniels regards equal access to health care as a moral imperative and a human right. He also displays a growing appreciation for the "capabilities approach" advocated by Amartya Sen, suggesting a convergence with his own opportunity approach ("Reducing Health Disparities," 2013).

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John R. Shook

DANTO, ARTHUR COLEMAN (1924–2013)

Arthur Danto was born on 1 January 1924 in Ann Arbor, Michigan. He received his BA degree from Wayne State University in 1948,

and his MA in 1949 and PhD in philosophy in 1952 from Columbia University. He began teaching philosophy at Columbia in 1951, became full professor in 1966, and then was Johnsonian Professor Emeritus of Philosophy. Initially an artist before he turned to philosophy, Danto is best known for his work in aesthetics. He was married to Barbara Westman, an artist and noted creator of covers and illustrations for *The New Yorker* magazine. Danto has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, an ACLS Fellowship, and a Fulbright Grant, as well as the National Book Critics Circle Prize in 1990 for *Encounters and Reflections*. He was a longtime editor of *The Journal of Philosophy* and has been President of both the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (1983–1984) and the American Society of Aesthetics. He was an art critic for *The Nation* from 1984 to 2009. Danto died on 25 October 2013 in New York City.

For Danto, philosophy studies ways of making connections to the world. These connections take two forms: knowledge and action. They may be manifested in various ways, notably in historical events and scientific or philosophical theories, as well as in individual actions and expressions of belief. Of particular importance in Danto's later work are the connections made in the production and perception of art. Both knowledge and action are grounded on two fundamental relations: causation and representation. However, the two relations are intertwined in ways that make *representation* the central concept in all of the areas in which Danto works. The centrality of representation is displayed in Danto's analysis of knowledge and action; representation constitutes knowledge if it is caused by the state of affairs that makes it true. Something is an action when it is caused by a representation that it makes true. Danto's construal of knowledge and action applies to

both internal and external representations; beliefs or intentions, as psychological entities, but also spoken or written sentences, and visible pictures as well.

According to Danto, actions have two components: a representation and a behavior. The capacity for the behavior, he argues, is usually produced through operant conditioning. However, it becomes an action when a representation of a desired outcome is what causes the relevant movement to occur. Patterns of thought are vested in patterns of neural activity. That is part of what it means to say that beliefs are sentential states: The relevant sentences are encoded in brain tissue and neurochemicals, more-or-less as sentences are inscribed in paper and ink. This allows patterns of thought and belief systems to be conditioned through whatever literal pleasures are provided through connections to the brain's limbic system and the sub personal delights that neurotransmitters such as serotonin can supply. However, it does not follow that the contents of beliefs or the meanings of sentential states can be identified with, or reduced to, their neurological underpinnings – the electrochemical encoding by which they are internally expressed. Danto advocates a materialist conception of the mind, but it is a non-reductionist and broadly functionalist type. Beliefs supervene on brain states, but there is more to belief than neurology can ever describe. He rejects arguments for either the elimination of propositional attitudes from cognitive science and philosophy, or their identification with brain events. The methodological significance of basic perceptual abilities derives from Danto's well-known *method of indiscernibles*, his central philosophical technique to distinguish action from mere behavior, knowledge from mere belief, and artworks from mere real things. Take two texts, two pictures, two arm-raising events, two statements or propositions,

two physical objects, or two sentences inscribed in the brain. The two items in each pair may be visually identical, yet they may have a very different ontological status or be as different in meaning as night and day. This presupposes that such items *can* be visually indistinguishable, even if we know that they were intended to be, or to represent, different things. That possibility is grounded on the existence of basic perceptual abilities, basic representations, which such knowledge supposedly cannot affect. However, it then follows that we must account for the differences between the two items in terms of something other than the basic representations on which the perception of them depends. This reveals the limited semantic significance of basic elements where the difference is one of meaning or content. To capture that difference, some account of their different causal histories is required, as well as a theory of how beliefs about those histories are brought to bear through interpretations by which meaning is ascribed.

This brings us to the second way in which Danto's conception of the mind is important for his philosophy overall. His functionalist form of semantic realism raises the question of how broadly to construe the representational functions that brain states can implement. This is a question about the scope of beliefs and intentions, a matter of how we determine what they are about. A central concern in all of Danto's philosophy has to do with the relation of meaning and history, where the meaning in question belongs to representations of all kinds. In his philosophy of mind, the issue is how world history informs the contents of beliefs and desires.

The appeal to causal history can be more-or-less restricted in scope. In the more restricted application, it establishes denotation or reference; the extensional sense of what a belief or artwork represents. For

example, *The Polish Rider* depicts a man on a horse, but that this can be only a small part of the story according to Danto's method of indiscernibles. What would be recognized as the same in two identical pictures is just what the representations happen to denote. Two images may denote a man on an incline in exactly the same way, yet represent (indeed, depict) him as walking uphill or downhill, as the case may be. Equally different meanings could be attributed to exactly similar paintings of a man on a horse. Visually identical pictures can denote the same objects, yet have essentially incompatible contents and not just be variations on a theme. The same is true for thoughts and beliefs. Two of those may be inscriptionally identical and refer to the same state of affairs, yet be quite different in meaning for all of that. Apprehending the referential relation is not enough to give us a full understanding of what the thoughts and beliefs are about. Danto's fundamental commitment to the essential bearing of history on meaning implies that the relevant relations among beliefs and other representations can only be understood by way of their historical connections, conceptual roles that are long-armed enough to reach into the distant past.

For Danto's philosophy of art, his theory of knowledge and action applies to public – novels and paintings – as well as private representations. Artworks convey knowledge by virtue of the same sort of causal and representational relations that constrain true beliefs. They are also the products of actions – indeed, they are actions – in so far as they are caused by and express the artist's intentions and ideas. In these respects, Danto holds a cognitivist and symbolic expressionist theory of art. The point of calling the locus of representations a text (even where it is a painting) is to bring out the importance of interpretation for the identification of content or meaning in representations of any kind.

Interpreting such texts requires understanding a complex system of beliefs and intentions; in particular, the beliefs and intentions of the person who produced them. In that case, the maker's intentions are a particularly salient factor in the causal history of the representation and, of course, those intentions have causal histories of their own. The maker's beliefs and intentions provide a standard of correctness for the attribution of meaning to his representations, the truth conditions that make interpretation into knowledge when they play a central role in bringing the interpretation about. One work can be a parody of another, but only after the first piece has been made. The content of a belief or intention will depend on the sequence of concepts, beliefs, and ideas that have preceded it, not so much in the individual believer as in the world. It is in this sense that the attribution of belief contents, in interpretations of actions and utterances, must be conceptually and causally long-armed. Danto argues that although actions and representations in the present have to be interpreted in terms of a prior causal sequence of actions and representations, the description of that sequence often takes a quasi-teleological tone. Antecedent causes are singled out after the fact by reference to later events that make them salient, "in terms that later events make available but that generally cannot have been known about when the earlier events took place" (*The Body/Body Problem*, p. 6).

The watershed moment for the development of Danto's thinking was provided by the infamous American artist, Andy Warhol. By placing ordinary Brillo boxes in a museum, turning them into *Brillo Boxes*, as a work of art, Warhol crystallized for Danto the idea of an art world, under the auspices of which things can come to be works of art. The art world is a world that is circumscribed by the discourse of available reasons and theories about art. Art is not defined by canons simply laid down

by a de facto academy; that is, strictures with canonical status because they are espoused by philosophers, artists, curators, and critics who happen to be influential at the time.

Warhol's work, and other related developments in this period, also signaled what Danto describes as the *end of art*. His claim is not that we have reached the end of art-making, but that art history can be understood as a series of developments in the project of self-definition, in which various conceptions and attitudes about representation emerged. This project reached a culmination when ordinary objects were presented and accepted as artworks, raising and attempting to answer a philosophical question of how to distinguish art from non-art things. In so doing, art converges with philosophy, and there art's project of self-definition reached an end. Danto believes the question, 'what is art?' can be answered: Art expresses ideas and is the subject of interpretation that takes account of its history, in which it is treated essentially as metaphor.

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Mark Rollins

DAVIDSON, DONALD HERBERT (1917–2003)

Donald Davidson was born on 6 March 1917 in Springfield, Massachusetts. He entered Harvard University in the fall of 1935, was influenced by a course with A.N. Whitehead,

and graduated with a BA in philosophy and classics in the spring of 1939. He received a graduate scholarship from Harvard to further pursue these interests, studying primarily with W.V. Quine. He left graduate school in 1942 to enlist in the U.S. Navy. He was discharged in 1945, returned to Harvard, and also began teaching as a philosophy instructor at Queens College in New York City starting in 1946. He received his PhD in philosophy in 1949, writing his dissertation on Plato's *Philebus*. In 1951 Davidson joined the philosophy department at Stanford University, teaching there until 1967. He then was professor of philosophy at Princeton University from 1967 to 1970, Rockefeller University from 1970 to 1976, and the University of Chicago from 1976 to 1981. From 1981 until his death, Davidson was professor of philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley. He was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1973–74, and President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1985–86. Davidson died on 30 August 2003 in Berkeley, California.

Davidson's "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963) is devoted to refuting various arguments, then popular, that purported to show that reasons could not cause the actions they rationalize. According to each, a necessary condition for causal interaction cannot be satisfied by reasons and actions. Though these arguments are too many to be properly treated here, it suffices to say that Davidson replied to all of them by showing either that reasons and actions satisfy the necessary condition in question, or that the would-be necessary condition for causal interaction is not one at all. His first volume of collected papers *Actions and Other Events* (1980) included his chief claim about actions and events: they are concrete, dated particulars that can be described in various non-logically

equivalent and non-synonymous ways. What distinguishes them from other sorts of concrete, dated particulars is their potential for causal interaction, and so, it's part of the nature of being an event that it can stand in a causal relationship. Since Davidson treats causation as a relation between events, and takes action to be but a species of event, events comprise the very subject matter of action theory, as well as science and ethics.

Davidson's papers "Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages" (1965) and "Truth and Meaning" (1967) were inspired by Alfred Tarski. Though natural languages are spoken by finite speakers, they still have an infinity of meaningful (non-synonymous) sentences, each of which, at least potentially, a speaker could understand. This capacity seems to require that speakers have learned (a finite number of) rules that determine from a finite set of *semantic primitives* what counts as meaningful compositions, where an expression is semantically primitive if the "rules which give the meaning for the sentences in which it does not appear do not suffice to determine the meaning of the sentences in which it does appear" (1965, p. 9). Based on such considerations, Davidson requires of a theory of meaning that it specify what every sentence means by exhibiting its meaning as a function of the meaning of its significant parts (based, presumably, on their arrangement in the sentence). Let's call any such theory for a language "a compositional meaning theory" for that language. Davidson was the first philosopher to bring to prominence the importance of the requirement that a theory of meaning of our language exhibit it as compositional (1965, p. 23). The requirement focuses attention on the need to uncover structure in natural languages. Davidson's positive suggestion for a compositional meaning theory for a language L, surprisingly, utilizes no concept of *meaning* that goes

beyond truth. The observation that natural languages are compositional is the foundation upon which Davidson builds his program in the theory of meaning. For languages we do not already understand, a compositional meaning theory must be selected on the basis of "evidence plausibly available to an interpreter", that is, "someone who does not already know how to interpret utterances the theory is designed to cover" (1973, p. 128). Davidson identifies conceptual schemes with sets of intertranslatable languages (1974, p. 185). He thereby transforms the question about alternative conceptual schemes into one about whether there could be non-intertranslatable languages. Pressures from the nature of radical interpretation together with the fact that "all understanding of the speech of another involves radical interpretation" (1973, p. 125) force him to draw his critical conclusions.

Davidson's views about the nature of events and their relation to laws brought him to a stunning conclusion about the relationship between minds and bodies, namely, his thesis of *anomalous monism*. First, there are no exceptionless psychological or psychophysical laws, and in fact all exceptionless laws can be expressed in a purely physical vocabulary (1970, p. 214–5). Second, mental events causally interact with physical events (1970, p. 208). Third, an event c causes event e only if an exceptionless causal law subsumes c and e (1970, p. 208). The thesis is monistic, since it assumes there is but one kind of stuff in the world, physical stuff, but it is anomalous, since although its monism commits it to physical and mental stuff being the same stuff, it denies that that there is a strict reduction of the one to other.

Davidson argues, on the basis of a principle of charity, that an interpreter cannot find speakers to have largely false beliefs, even if she herself has no opinion as to the general truth and falsity of these beliefs.

Given what beliefs are, and how their contents are determined on this story, Davidson is committed to the impossibility that “all our beliefs about the world might be false” (1991, p. 193). A radical interpreter must have beliefs about the world in order to succeed in ascribing to others beliefs about the world. But, as radical interpretation is conceived, she also must find others largely in agreement with her in those beliefs. Davidson’s anti-skeptical argument from radical interpretation rests on two assumptions: that to be a speaker is to be interpretable by others, and that to be interpretable by others requires being largely right, not only in one’s general beliefs, but in beliefs about the local environment. On the assumption that radical interpretation is possible, the proper way to state the requirement on a speaker is that her beliefs about her environment be mostly true. The crucial aspect of radical interpretation is the importance of *causality* in determining what someone means or believes. We cannot “in general fix what someone means independently of what he believes and independently of what caused the belief.... The causality plays an indispensable role in determining the content of what we say and believe” (1986, p. 435). So, it is the central role of causation in fixing the contents of beliefs that ensures that the truth of everything we believe is not in general ‘logically independent’ of having those beliefs; and that others cannot differ too much from us in what they believe.

Viewed from his perspective, the role of a theory of interpretation is to identify and systematize patterns in the behavior of speakers in relation to their environment. If this is right, we do not first have access to facts about speakers’ meanings and attitudes, including our own. Another consequence of his taking what we might call a third person perspective of the radical interpreter as methodologically fundamental

is the rejection of all forms of traditional empiricism. In Davidson’s view, our knowledge of the world around us, of other minds, and of our own minds, has a unified source in our nature as rational beings capable of communicating with one another. Davidson argues that language, mind, and action are inseparable.

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Ernest Lepore

DAVIDSON, THOMAS (1840–1900)

Thomas Davidson was born into poverty on 25 October 1840, on a small farm in the parish of Old Deer, Scotland. As a young boy he attended the library auction of a deceased preacher, where the books were being sold in lots. Unable to compete in the bidding, when the auction was over, the auctioneer gave all of the remaining books to the delighted boy. When Davidson spread the books out in his attic room, his joy was abated, for the books were all in foreign languages – French, German, and Dutch. The studious boy began an intense study of foreign languages; by

the end of his life he had mastered thirteen, including Sanskrit, Icelandic, and Arabic.

In 1856 Davidson won a bursary prize to King's College, Aberdeen, from which he graduated in 1860, first in his class in Greek and second in the humanities. He taught Latin and Greek for six years and then made his way to Boston in 1867 where he befriended Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Bronson Alcott. In November 1867 he left for St. Louis where he accepted a teaching position in the St. Louis Public School system, under the direction of Superintendent William Torrey Harris. He joined the St. Louis Philosophical Society, led by Henry C. Brokmeyer and Harris, both committed Hegelians. Although he regularly attended meetings of the Philosophical Society, Davidson rejected Hegel's philosophy and formed a competing Aristotle Club.

In 1875 Davidson moved to Boston where he revived Charles S. Peirce's Metaphysical Club. The new club, which took up the study of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, included William James. The group's discussions revolved around the problem of relations and Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. Davidson traveled to London in June 1877, where he apparently met Heinrich Schliemann, the eminent archaeologist. From London, Davidson traveled to Greece for a walking tour of historic sites and, with Schliemann, surveys of archaeological sites.

Davidson returned to Boston in the summer of 1878 and lectured at Alcott's Concord Summer School of Philosophy in its founding year of 1879. Despite frequent trips to Europe, he was a frequent lecturer at the Concord School until its close in 1888, lecturing on a wide range of topics: Plato, Aristotle, Sappho, Dante, Goethe, immortality, education, Emerson, irony, Émile Zola, and ontology.

At the urging of his close friend Princess Katherine Sayn-Wittgenstein, in January 1880 Davidson journeyed to Rome where he met Vatican scholars, and had at least one meeting with the Pope to discuss the philosophy of Aquinas. He then traveled to the Rosminian monastery in Domodosola in the Italian Alps where he studied the philosophy of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati for two years. Inspired by Rosmini and Dante, he became enamored with the idea of a *vita nuova*, a new life of moral and spiritual regeneration. He combined the Rosminian emphasis on feeling, sympathy, and devotion to others with the Faustian urge to assimilate all cultural possibilities in his conception of the new life.

In 1883 Davidson formed a "Fellowship for the New Life" in London that counted among its members Edward Carpenter, Havelock Ellis, Ramsay MacDonald, Edward Pease, and George Bernard Shaw. According to Davidson's scheme, the group held that moral regeneration must precede social regeneration; they must live in proximity, in the same building or same neighborhood, and share tasks and material goods; they must disseminate high culture to the poor; they must repudiate competition and selfishness, the culture of acquisition, replacing it with the simple life of satisfaction in arts and crafts.

Although the Fellowship lasted through the 1890s, from its inception a rift among its members plagued the group. Some members wanted a commitment to activism and socialist ideas written into the constitution. Others saw the goal of the New Life as first and foremost spiritual rebirth and moral reconstruction. Unable to reconcile these aims, the members agreed to create a sister society to accommodate the activists. Thus, although he detested socialism, "The Fabian Society" is perhaps the most enduring outcome of Davidson's initiative.

In 1888 Davidson established his own summer school, after the fashion of Concord, first in Orange, New Jersey, and then Farmington, Connecticut. With the financial assistance of an old St. Louis friend, Joseph Pulitzer, in 1889 he purchased a one hundred and sixty-seven acre tract of land on Mt. Hurricane, in Keene, New York. Davidson built a cottage for himself, a dining hall, and cottages for guests. For ten years the “Glenmore Summer School for the Culture Sciences” brought together some of the greatest figures in American philosophy. James, John Dewey, Josiah Royce, Morris Cohen, and many others exchanged and debated ideas. Beginning in 1890 Davidson divided his year into two parts. From October through March he resided in New York City, but in early April he returned to Glenmore. After opening the buildings, he arranged the lectures for that summer’s course of study. The 1892 summer course was typical: Dewey lectured on nineteenth-century English philosophy, especially conservatism and liberalism; Harris spoke on New England Transcendentalism; Royce on ethics; Ibn Abi Suleiman on Islam; Max Margolis on Judaism; and Davidson on Greek philosophy in Christendom to the seventh century.

In 1898 Davidson was invited to lecture to a large group of young Jewish immigrants at the Educational Alliance, a settlement house on the Lower East Side. After his lecture, which emphasized high culture, he was challenged by the audience to state how its acquisition was possible for poor laborers. Davidson met the challenge by establishing a “Breadwinner’s College” at an available building, the People’s Institute, and proceeded to design a curriculum that included remedial English, foreign languages, health and hygiene, natural science, and great works in the humanities. Although Davidson died on 14 September 1900 in Montréal, Canada, his students were inspired by his example to continue the Breadwinner’s College for many more years.

In his journal Davidson defends a view he calls “apeirotheism,” which he defines as “a theory of Gods infinite in number.” There is a primary or archetypal individual, self, or God. This primary individual is Aristotle’s unmoved mover as reworked by Davidson. The primary individual is thinking or *Nous*. God thinks only of himself, but there must be some content to this self, otherwise God would be mere abstract identity ($A = A$). Therefore God must include the world as part of himself. This world consists of secondary individuals, selves, or Gods, which have unfolded from the primary individual. Davidson claims that Aristotle’s God can be fully actual yet contain at the same time unenergized reserves, reserves that are not potentials. He derives this from Aristotle’s distinction between having knowledge and exercising it, the metaphysical distinction between first and second actualities. Secondary individuals emerge from the primary individual like droplets of moisture that appear on a glass of water. The primary individual is not static perfection but “ever-advancing activity.” Although we use God as a uniquely referring name, Davidson explains, it is in fact an essence. Secondary individuals or selves are therefore essentially monadic Gods. Through cooperation, love, and the Faustian drive for all possibilities, the secondary self approaches the perfection of the primary self. Although Davidson criticized James’s theory of the absorbing “mother-sea” as pantheistic, in regard to the mechanism of immortality, something like James’s doctrine is the direction of Davidson’s apeirotheism.

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Michael H. DeArmey

DAY, HENRY NOBLE (1808–1890)

Henry Noble Day was born on 4 August 1808 in New Preston, Connecticut. Before graduating from Yale College with a BA in 1828, he lived with Jeremiah Day, his uncle and President of

Yale at the time. After college, Day taught in a seminary for a year, studied law, returned to Yale to serve as a tutor, and then spent fifteen months traveling in Europe. In 1836 he was appointed pastor of the First Congregational Church of Waterbury, Connecticut. In 1840 he became Professor of Theology at Western Reserve College in Hudson, Ohio. During his time there, he worked to make the college resemble Yale in various ways. Day also edited the *Ohio Observer*, and managed various railroads. In 1852 the theology department was eliminated when the college underwent a financial crisis brought about by low enrollment. His affiliation with Western Reserve remained merely nominal until 1858, when he became President of Ohio Female College at College Hill, on the outskirts of Cincinnati. After his resignation in 1864, he returned to New Haven where he spent the rest of his life. Day died on 12 January 1890 in New Haven, Connecticut.

His life in New Haven was Day's most prolific period; he was a full-time writer and produced most of his twenty textbooks. Whereas his earlier works had been mostly about rhetoric and bookkeeping, his later writings explored such diverse topics as logic, ethics, epistemology, aesthetics, and education. In his *Elements of Psychology*, a textbook "for beginners in metaphysical studies," he mentions William Hamilton's taxonomy of the phenomena of the mind into the three mental sciences of aesthetics, logic, and ethics. In light of their derivation from mental facts, Hamilton calls these the three nomological sciences. However, it was not until after Day had separately written on each of these three sciences that he began to delve thoroughly into the topic that evidently unified them, an undertaking that completely occupied his final years. In this book Day also described the classification of mental phenomena as falling under intelligence,

sensibility, and will. This was a common demarcation; the novel contribution of Day's approach was his treatment of sensibility as prior to intelligence, which would prevent confusion and error that arises from attempts to treat imagination and memory as part of intelligence. He also studied sensibility in greater detail than previous authors, and noted that the other two faculties, intelligence and will, cannot properly be understood independently of it.

Day's work on aesthetics was the culmination of one of his two major projects, which began with his writings on rhetoric. He described rhetoric as comprising three parts: thought, form (words), and the process of applying the thought to an appropriate form. This stance led to his interest in aesthetics, which he described as "the philosophy of form." *The Art of Rhetoric*, published in 1850 and revised in 1867 under the name *The Art of Discourse*, was an attempt to remedy a problem with earlier texts by, for instance, Richard Whately and Hugh Blair. Day noted that the former regards rhetoric as a purely logical endeavor, and emphasizes the formulation of arguments, whereas the latter treated it as entirely a matter of taste. Day, in contrast, stressed the equal importance of logic and aesthetics, as well as ethics.

Day wrote *Rhetorical Praxis* ten years later (1860), to help students become accustomed to thinking about abstract rhetorical concepts. In *The Science of Aesthetics* (1872) he used countless examples in an effort to reveal common features among these varied expressions of beauty. He maintained that beauty exists independently of the observer, arguing that both idea and matter were essential to beauty, and since they had an objective reality, so must their union. The kinds of beauty that he identified were material, ideal, and formal, which unite in varying degrees. For example, in rhetoric, material beauty is to be found in

the grammar, ideal in the logic, and formal in the application of the one to the other. Day also delineated elaborate interconnections between beauty, truth, and good, and logic, ethics, and aesthetics, and then proceeded to discuss the implications of this position. The majority of the book, however, is spent on the derivation of laws and very specific applications of aesthetic principles to the "six leading arts": architecture, landscape, sculpture, painting, music, and discourse. Here, as elsewhere, he demonstrated his meticulousness and exhaustive attention to detail.

Day also wrote *Elements of Logic* (1867), partly to improve upon the logic texts that were available at the time. However, the book also made original contributions, such as the grounding of induction on relationships of parts and their complements, and accordingly, a new classification of reasoning, and a new logical methodology. Day also asserted that thought, and all its products (notably concepts, and language – the latter of which is produced by the application of reasoning to these concepts), are entirely reducible to identity relations. Here Day departed from Hamilton, although he acknowledged his indebtedness to Hamilton's work.

Day's book on the third of the mental sciences, *The Science of Ethics* (1876), was published immediately after *Elements of Psychology*. His approach was explicitly deontological; he attempted to study "the essential principles of duty" to determine what actions are moral. He maintained that unlike rhetoric, ethics was not an art, because one could uncover objective ethical truths regardless of one's method. Indeed, he took the results of his analysis to be so self-evident that he openly presented his procedure as didactic, rather than argumentative. Unfortunately, many of his assertions reflect his theological commitments, and are hardly uncontroversial to modern readers.

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Evan Moreno Davis

DE GEORGE, RICHARD THOMAS (1933–)

Richard T. De George was born on 29 January 1933 in New York City. He attended the University of Paris in 1952–1953 before receiving his BA (egregia cum laude) in 1954 from Fordham College. He earned a PhD with

great distinction in 1955 from the Université de Louvain, Belgium. This was followed by an MA (1958) and PhD (1959) in philosophy from Yale University. After serving as an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Kansas, De George did postdoctoral study at the University of Freiburg, where he was associated with the Institute of East European Studies. This early exposure to Eastern European thought and culture, particularly in terms of the Soviet form of Marxism practiced at the time, was to have lasting influence on De George's approach to ethical studies especially in terms of international economic considerations.

From 1962 to 1964 De George served as an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Kansas, then was professor of philosophy from 1964 to 1972. During this time he was a senior research fellow at Columbia University in 1965–1966, where he also lectured in philosophy, and in 1969–1970 he was a research fellow at Yale University. He served as chair of the philosophy department at the University of Kansas from 1966 to 1972. In 1972 the University of Kansas honored De George by naming him University Distinguished Professor. He is presently University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, of Russian and East European Studies, and of Business Administration, and co-director of the International Center for Ethics in Business at the University of Kansas.

De George's administrative positions have influenced some of the most influential institutions in higher education. He has served as president of prestigious academic organizations including the American Philosophical Association Central Division (1989–1990), the Metaphysical Society of America, the Society for Business Ethics, and the International Society for Business, Economics and Ethics.

De George showed an early inclination that has been sustained throughout his

professional career of attention to political and international issues, and their relevance to theoretical ethics. This interest was to take a pragmatic and innovative turn towards business, and applied ethics in particular; and in doing so, was predictive of ethical issues latent both in the advent of the information age and the inter-relationship of economic growth beyond the strict boundaries of the nation-state. Thus De George's career was marked by what had traditionally been referred to as an "interdisciplinary" approach to ethics. This approach, however, particularly in the twenty-first century, has proven to be prescient of the pragmatic turn ethics was to take in the later stages of, and soon after, the Cold War.

Early in his career, De George had the foresight to incorporate political and economic theory into ethical inquiry by employing ethical criteria as a foundation for the validity, and viability, of social and political systems. Rather than analyzing history on the basis of economic and political considerations alone, De George subjected historical and social analyses to ethical criticism. With an underlying pragmatic emphasis, De George's turn toward applied ethics revealed that often political and theoretical constructs have an ethical underpinning in the form of foundational values which inevitably must align and define the feasibility of sustaining these values systemically. De George uses this insight as a platform from which to raise the level of contemporary ethical discourse, while simultaneously challenging systemic dogma. Rather than instituting arguments of justification for applied ethics, De George opens a continuing critical discourse that addresses ethical concerns as a means of self-examination, using intent, purpose, and consistency as a critical apparatus for re-examining the basis of foundational values. This secular and pragmatic turn in De George's applied ethics has led to the examination of

existing social and political structures, while anticipating ethical dilemmas and the means of addressing them, as they are bound to occur with advances in technology and the realignment of political and economic order.

As the author of foundational texts in business ethics, De George has had great influence on the contemporary approach to the study of the subject, using not only case studies and existing ethical issues as premises, but examining potential issues and hypothetical considerations in the form of thought experiments. Under De George's guidelines, business ethics (which, by his own admission, was not taken seriously until the 1960s) becomes fundamental to a future that demands criteria of value in order to address ethical dilemmas emerging out of the rapid development and proliferation of technology, medical advances, and global economic development.

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Laurence L. Murphy

DE KONINCK, CHARLES (1906–1965)

Charles De Koninck was born on 20 July 1906 in Thourout, West Flanders, Belgium. He received the PhD from Louvain University in 1934, writing a dissertation on “Eddington’s Philosophy of Science.” De Koninck was a Dominican novice, but preferred an academic career, and was professor of philosophy of nature and scientific methodology at the Université de Laval in Québec, Canada, from 1934 until his death. He served as the director of Laval’s philosophy faculty from 1939 to 1956. De Koninck died on 13 February 1965 in Rome, Italy.

De Koninck formulated a philosophy of science compatible with Thomistic theology and a Christian world-view. He produced stimulating and influential writings in

metaphysics, natural and doctrinal theology, and philosophy of religion. His work was widely read in both French-speaking Canada and in English-speaking Canada and the United States. In 1945 he co-founded with Alphonse-Marie Parent the journal *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*. A prominent intellectual Catholic, De Koninck was involved in the Vatican II debates in the early 1960s. Université de Laval awarded him the STD degree, and the American Catholic Philosophical Association awarded him the Aquinas Medal in 1964. De Koninck lectured widely across Canada and the United States.

Perhaps his most popular book was *The Hollow Universe* (1960), which offers a reconciliation of science, philosophy, and religion. De Koninck argued that modern science does not deserve to decide the nature of reality because the abstractions of scientific theories have no meaning apart from the ordinary yet concrete experience of nature. In his natural theology, De Koninck considerably departed from traditional arguments. Nature displays design, but design is not incompatible with chance and indeterminism, because intelligence will take advantage of randomness to still achieve its intended results. Evolution by random mutation and divine guidance towards more perfect forms are therefore quite compatible. De Koninck argued, in an interpretation of Aquinas, that spiritual causes are necessary to fully explain the emergence of the form as the perfection of matter, and that forms are evident even in the infinitely diverse partial perfections of matter.

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John R. Shook

DE LAGUNA, GRACE MEAD ANDRUS (1878–1978)

Grace Mead Andrus was born on 28 September 1878 in East Berlin, Connecticut, the daughter of Wallace R. and Annis Mead Andrus. She received her BA from Cornell University in 1903, where she was Phi Beta Kappa, and her PhD in philosophy from Cornell in 1906. The title of her dissertation

was "The Mechanical Theory in Pre-Kantian Rationalism." In 1905 she married Theodore De Laguna, with whom she collaborated on philosophical works. She taught at Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania her entire career; as an assistant professor of philosophy from 1912 to 1916, associate professor from 1922 to 1929, and as full professor from 1929 to 1944. De Laguna became department chair when her husband died in 1930. She was Vice President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1938–39, and President in 1941–42. In her retirement she continued to write, and published her third book in 1963. De Laguna died on 17 February 1978 in Devon, Pennsylvania.

In *Dogmatism and Evolution* (1910) she adopted a position broadly sympathetic with John Dewey's functionalist psychology and instrumentalism while rejecting the doctrine of immediatism, as expressed in Dewey's "postulate of immediate empiricism" and James's notion of "pure experience."

De Laguna's later work continued to explore the philosophical implications of Darwinian biology, providing a point of departure for her most important work, *On Existence and the Human World* (1963), a summation of nearly forty years of intellectual labor. She formulates what might be called a speculative naturalism, in which she situates human and non-human (including inorganic) reality along an evolutionary continuum, whose unifying element is the conception of "teleonomy," or "end-directedness."

For De Laguna, speculative philosophy is the search for being, which generic traits manifest themselves both in the wider world of nature and in the human life-world. A philosopher must make the world of nature intelligible as including within it human reality as lived. At the same time, in order to understand ourselves and our world as lived, she must uncover the very nature to which we

belong as human beings. De Laguna's project constitutes an attempt to reconcile the modern opposition between philosophies of nature and philosophies of the human life-world through the so-called *lebenswelt*.

Culture, for the elder De Laguna, constitutes the environment of humanity. The human world is a cultural one and cultures are fundamentally normative systems, which make available ideals for the integration of personality and, moreover, individuals' attainment of personhood. The premise of anthropological theory and practice is the recognition that belief systems and values are relative to culture, which is defined as a functional whole. Yet, the anthropologist, as a scientist, assumes the objectivity and validity of scientific method. As such, she must also affirm the truth of particular beliefs and note the falsity of contradictory beliefs that are to be found in the alien culture she studies. No one would fault the anthropologist for passing judgment upon those beliefs of a culture that obviously ran counter to established scientific truth. In fact, recognition of such beliefs as false often plays a significant role in the understanding of what makes the culture function.

De Laguna argued that while anthropology is justified in regarding the specific and varying moral standards of different cultures as relative to these cultures, its own scientific procedure, itself the outgrowth of a particular culture, involves the acceptance of universal and objective standards. What is true of anthropology is true of every science: scientific method is one and presupposes belief in a fully intelligible order of being. To be sure, this belief is a regulative ideal, for in practice the sciences' realization of it is incomplete and limited. Yet, the very transcendence of scientific method lies in its inherent fallibility. As self-critical and self-correcting, science must deal not only with nature and with human beings as living organisms, but with

the human achievement of culture: it must include itself as a form of being. As such, it must be critically self-engaged in relation to those actualities and potentialities of culture through which it can sustain itself. One of the potentialities, according to De Laguna, upon which the pursuit of science rests, is the ideal of universal moral standards, including the respect for human rights. With the sought-for affirmation of the unity of truth-seeking and truth-knowing, no less than that of being and the good, does the remarkable speculative project of this noteworthy American philosopher find closure.

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Gary Calore

DEELY, JOHN NATHANIEL (1942–)

John Deely was born on 26 April 1942 in Chicago, Illinois. He was educated at the Aquinas Institute School of Philosophy in River Forest, Illinois, receiving a BA in 1965, an MA in 1966 (with his thesis published in article form the same year), and a PhD in philosophy in 1967. His doctoral thesis was published in monograph form in 1971 as *The Tradition via Heidegger*. He held positions at Saint Mary's College in Indiana (1974–1976), the University of Ottawa in Canada (1968–1969), St. Thomas University in New Brunswick, Canada (1967–1968) and St. Joseph's College in Indiana (1966–1967). He was a senior fellow with the Institute for Philosophical Research in Chicago from 1969 to 1974. Later, he was professor of philosophy at Loras College in Iowa from 1976 until 1999. In 1999 he became professor of philosophy at the University of St. Thomas in Houston, Texas, where he was bestowed the title of Rudman Chair in Philosophy in 2007. He has also held several visiting positions at universities around the world, including Federal University of Minas Gerais in Brazil, Pontificia Universidade de São Paulo in Brazil, Anáhuac University in México City, New Bulgarian University in Bulgaria, and Tartu University in Estonia. He was named Thomas A. Sebeok Fellow of the Semiotic Society of America in 1993, and served as the society's President for 2001.

His books include *The Problem of Evolution: Philosophical Repercussions of Evolutionary Science* (with Raymond Nogar, 1973), his scholarly edition of *Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsett* (1985 and 2013), *Basics of Semiotics* (1990), *Four Ages of Understanding. The First Postmodern History of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the 21st Century* (2001), *What*

Distinguishes Human Understanding (2002), *The Semiotic Animal* (with Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio, 2005), *Purely Objective Reality* (2009), *Medieval Philosophy Redefined* (2010) and the *Poinsett Trilogy* (2008, 2008, 2015). This body of work is complemented by over 200 articles and a number of book series that Deely edited, including the yearbooks of the Semiotic Society of America (from 1980), *The American Journal of Semiotics* (from 2001), *Sources in Semiotics* (University Press of America/Rowman & Littlefield) and *Approaches to Postmodernity* (Scranton University Press, 2007–2010).

An authority on the work of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and a major figure in contemporary semiotics, Scholastic Realism, Thomism and, more broadly, Catholic philosophy, Deely's thinking has demonstrated how awareness of signs has heralded a new, genuinely 'postmodern' epoch in the history of human thought. 'Postmodern' here means 'after the modern' rather than the fashionable intellectual and publishing movement emanating mainly from Paris and associated with the academic trend of poststructuralism from the 1960s onwards (2003). Deely's writing on signs calls for a thoroughgoing superseding of the 'modern', proposing an understanding of humans as the 'semiotic animal' to replace the modern definition as "res cogitans" (2005).

Central to Deely's work, but certainly not the whole of it, is his excavating of the semiotic of João Poinsett (also known as John Poinsett and St. John of Thomas, 1589–1644). In Poinsett and the heritage of Late Latin thought, Deely saw a triadic theory of semiosis pre-dating Peirce, as well as a Thomist logic. Deely also draws on the 'antimodernism' and 'ultramodernism' of Jacques Maritain (1882–1973), the whole of Peirce's philosophy and logic, the writings of the theoretical biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944), and the work

of the semiotician and “biologist manqué” Thomas A. Sebeok (1920–2001). Tracking the development of a ‘pragmaticist’ realism, following Peirce, Deely’s work addresses questions of knowledge: how humans come to know (realism) and how they remember (or repeatedly forget) what they might know. This inspires Deely’s interpretation of the history of pre-modern, modern and postmodern thought (1985, 1988). Yet he is very suspicious of the term epistemology and its deployment in philosophy and in thinking in general. His early articles focused on the problems that the idea of evolution posed for conceptions of what it is to be human. This concern runs through all of his work, including his most recent discussions of the human as the animal possessing a semiotic consciousness.

As with Jakob von Uexküll, what unites human and non-human animals for Deely is the habitation of both in an *Umwelt*. An animal’s *Umwelt* is its ‘objective’ world: it is the world that the animal lives in, how it apprehends everything around itself (and even within itself); yet, at the same time, that very apprehension takes place on the basis of the sensory apparatus that it possesses and, consequently, the signs that it is able to emit and receive. A dog’s hearing, for example, a key part of its sensory apparatus, is much more honed to high frequencies than a human’s; for this reason, a dog inhabits a different *Umwelt* to a human and uses largely different signs. If an animal’s *Umwelt* is its ‘objective’ world and it is where an animal relates to ‘objects’ then there is a need to distinguish ‘objects’ from ‘signs’. Customarily, ‘objective’ implies phenomena completely separate and closed off from the vagaries of subjects’ apprehensions. Commonly, in speech, there is reference to an ‘objective view’ or that which is untrammelled by opinion and partisan perspectives. Deely, by contrast, performs a logical re-figuration of objectivity. He demonstrates that the

world that seems to be wholly independent of humans, the ‘objective’ world, can never be such.

Deely offers a thorough re-orientation of what is commonly understood as the dependency of the world on its subjects, a re-orientation derived, principally, from the distinction between ‘signs’, ‘objects’ and ‘things’. He wrote, “There are signs and there are other things besides: things which are unknown to us at the moment and perhaps for all our individual life; things which existed before us and other things which will exist after us; things which exist only as a result of our social interactions, like governments and flags; and things which exist within our round of interactions – like daytime and night – but without being produced exactly by those interactions, or at least not inasmuch as they are ‘ours’, i.e. springing from us in some primary sense” (1994: 11). Objects, on the other hand, are “what the things become once experienced” (ibid.), bearing in mind also that experience takes place through a physical, sensory modality. In this sense, even such entities as unicorns or the minotaur can be considered objects *embodied* in the physical marks of a text. But Deely argues that a “thing of experience” – an object – requires more than just embodiment. The Colosseum and the Arc de Triomphe preceded us and are expected to exist after us; but the point is that their existence as such is the product of *anthroposemiosis*. There are plenty of things, such as some metals in the earth and some things in the universe, that anthroposemiosis has not yet touched. Objects are thus sometimes identical with things and can even “present themselves ‘as if’ they were simply things” (1994, 18). Likewise, signs seem to be just objects of experience, such as the light from a candle, the scent of a rose, or the shining metal of a gun, but a sign also signifies *beyond itself*. In order for it to do so, a sign must be: not just a physical thing;

not just an experienced object; but experienced as “doubly related” (1994, 22), standing for something else in some respect or capacity (or, for short: in a context).

To demonstrate the sign/object/thing relation and the shift in dependency, Deely employs the image of an iceberg’s tip: to be sure, the tip protrudes into experience as an object (a mind-dependent entity, in the order of *ens rationis*); moreover, it is, as such, a thing (mind-independent, in the order of *ens reale*); but, above all, as is known from the popular phrase, the tip is a *sign* that there is much more below (1994, 144). An important corollary of this, though, is that whatever is beneath the tip of the iceberg cannot be *approached* as a thing. It is possible that experience could make it an object but, even then, through the sensations it provokes, the feelings about them and its consequence, it is only available as a sign. It is simultaneously of the order of *ens reale* and *ens rationis* and it would be folly to bracket off one or the other in an attempt to render it as either solely object or thing. Hence Peirce’s statement that “to try to peel off signs & get down to the real thing is like trying to peel an onion and get down to the onion itself” (Brent 1993, 300 n.84).

This realism of Deely implies, in consonance with von Uexküll, that non-human animals inhabit a world of objects. Humans, by contrast, in their awareness that there are such things as signs – as opposed to simply responding to or emanating signs – are compelled to inhabit the bio/semiosphere ethically. This is developed in Deely’s later work, especially *Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of ‘Human Being’ Transcending Patriarchy and Feminism* (2010).

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Paul Cobley

DEMERS, JÉRÔME (1774–1853)

Jérôme Demers was esteemed as the greatest educator of his time by his colleagues, and he was one of Canada's most remarkable intellects during the 19th century. Demers was not Canada's first complete philosopher (Martin Bouvart precedes him), but Demers did publish the first book of philosophy in Canada, all the more remarkable because he was native-born.

Demers was born on 1 August 1774 in Saint-Nicolas, near Québec. In 1795 he entered the Grand Séminaire de Québec. A year and a half later, he quit training for the priesthood and went back to live with his father, who was a farmer. After a week of clearing the land, he went back to the Petit Séminaire de Québec. In 1796 he started teaching third-year classes in grammar and humanities while he continued his own theological education. Demers was ordained priest on 24 August 1798. The next year, he was made a member of the seminary.

In the fall of 1800, Demers started teaching as the professor of philosophy for the

Séminaire de Québec. It included two years of study, the first in philosophy and the second in mathematics and physics, taught by the same teacher. In this manner, he discovered his dual vocation as teacher and priest. At that time, the discipline of philosophy consisted of natural philosophy (mostly mathematics and physics) and moral philosophy (logic, metaphysics, ethics). During 1827–30 one of his colleagues was John Holmes, who taught philosophy to the lower classes in the Petit Séminaire. In 1835 a colleague took over the science courses so that Demers could focus on philosophy proper. In 1842 he switched positions to become the professor of theology, and he held that chair until retiring in 1849. In addition, he carried out the duties required for managing the seminary. He served as a directing member of the community for forty-nine years and of the Petit Séminaire for seven years. He also served as a director of the Grand Séminaire for one year, procurator for nine years, and superior for eighteen years until 1842. He spent his entire life at the Séminaire de Québec. He returned to his home in Saint-Nicolas only one time when his father died. Demers died on 17 May 1853 in the city of Québec.

Very little is known about how Demers taught his grammar and humanities classes. His career can be traced from the time he started teaching philosophy, courtesy of the testimony of his former pupils and the course notes he left. At that time, it was not common practice to use printed textbooks. Since the Renaissance, teachers wrote their own courses and dictated them or had students copy them into exercise books. At Québec, Demers and other teachers followed the common practice of writing their courses, explaining them in class, and giving them to students to copy. Particularly, rhetoric, philosophy, and science courses lent themselves to this style of teaching. Philosophy and rhetoric courses and class notes were given in Latin.

Demers taught philosophy in such a manner for twenty-nine years between 1800 and 1842. At the time he taught, philosophy had four divisions: logic, metaphysics, ethics, and physics. The philosophy course addressed the first three. In 1802, 1808, and 1818, he wrote out his course. The last version was published as *Institutiones philosophicae ad usum studiosae juventutis* in 1835 and had many additions. It was the first philosophy textbook in print in French Canada.

Of particular importance in *Institutiones philosophicae* is his discussion about political philosophy in the section about ethics. Demers believed men were not politically equal and rejected the idea of social contract and a pact establishing primitive communal living. He also believed God as being the source of all power, which he gives to those who wield it on earth. As a result, respect and obedience must be given to authority and rebellion against civil power was also a rebellion against God. Furthermore, any civil uprising was not permissible and caused more problems than it solved. He was eager to participate in the discussions of his time. The philosophy textbook was used in all classical colleges after publication, except for Montréal's college, which was under strict French and Sulpician obedience.

Demers extensively participated in the religious and social circles of his time despite his preoccupation with teaching philosophy and science. In 1825, he was appointed vicar general and was also the director for the Society for the Propagation of the Faith, a member of the Episcopal council, vice-president of the Québec Education Society, and counselor and patron of the Baillairgés and the painter Antoine Plamondon.

Demers refused the episcopancy on two occasions. The first happened when Bishop Joseph-Octave Plessis died in 1825. The second was when Bishop Bernard-Claude Panet died

in 1833. He told a friend he was unworthy of the office and was not capable of the responsibilities that went with it. In 1825, Ignace Bourget, later the Bishop of Montréal, said the parish priests in the Québec district unanimously elected Demers, who said the bishops were wrong to “attack the rights of the seminary” and he would not do the same. Plessis himself, on his deathbed, said Demers would not accept the position if it were offered to him.

It has been said that Jérôme Demers, along with Abbé Holmes, was one of the founders of the Université Laval. However, he did not have a direct role in the establishment of the university in the early 1850s, since he had retired and been ill for several years. There is no doubt, though, the university would not have come about at that time without the work Demers did at the seminary as superior and procurator for twenty-seven years, which influenced the education of Bishop Laval.

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Jenifer Nipps

DEMOS, RAPHAEL (1892–1968)

Raphael Demos was born on 23 January 1892 in Smyrna, Ottoman Empire (now Turkey). In 1910 he received his BA from Anatolia College in Marsovan. He emigrated to the United States in 1913 (becoming a naturalized citizen in 1921) and earned his PhD from Harvard in 1916. He pursued post-graduate work at Cambridge in 1918–19, and later studied at the University of Paris in 1928–29. Demos taught at Harvard University for his entire career, beginning in 1919. He was named the Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity in 1945 (succeeding William E. Hocking) and held that position until retiring in 1962.

Demos also traveled and taught in many places throughout the world; as visiting professor he taught at Vanderbilt University (1962–67) as well as McGill University (1963–64); he was also the director of the College Year in Athens program, of which he was an influential founding member in 1967–68. To honor his contributions to the program, a scholarship was established in his name. His scholarship earned him many grants

and awards during his lifetime: a Guggenheim Fellowship to Paris (1928–29), an award from the Rockefeller Foundation (1956), American Philosophy Association (1959), and a grant from the Littauer Foundation (1960).

During his tenure at Harvard, he became known as America's leading Plato scholar, beginning with his studies under A.N. Whitehead, who once said that all philosophy is but a footnote to Plato. Demos would go on to publish many articles on Plato and serve as the editor for two volumes dedicated to Plato's philosophy: *Plato Selections* (1927), and *Complete Works of Plato* (1936). Raphael called himself a Christian Platonist, and grounded his philosophy within the common view that both realms share: the idea that there is a better world that is the root cause of this one, and that the idea of Good (or God) is the ultimate ground of all being, not only within this world of shadows and illusions, but also the more real realm of Ideas. His works on Plato were focused on the difficult areas of metaphysics and epistemology, and making these problems understandable for modern readers of Plato. He was hailed in his day as one of Harvard's favored philosophy professors by the many students that enrolled in his classes. Demos retired to his homeland of Greece and died there on 8 August 1969 in Kifissia near Athens.

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James C. Poteet II

DENNETT, DANIEL CLEMENT, III (1942–)

Daniel Dennett was born on 28 March 1942 in Boston, Massachusetts. In 1959 he went to Wesleyan University, took an advanced math course taught by the logician Henry Kyburg, and read W.V. Quine’s *From a Logical Point of View*. The next year Dennett transferred to Harvard and enrolled in Quine’s philosophy of language course, alongside David Lewis, Saul

Kripke, Thomas Nagel, and Gilbert Harman. He obtained his Harvard BA degree in 1963 and the DPhil degree from Oxford in 1965. He was hired by A.I. Melden as an assistant professor in the newly formed department of philosophy at the University of California at Irvine. Dennett was drawn into discussions with a small group of artificial intelligence researchers there, and also met computer scientist Allen Newell. On the strength of *Content and Consciousness*, refereed by Quine, he was promoted to associate professor in 1970.

In 1971, Dennett moved to the philosophy department at Tufts University in Massachusetts, where he has been teaching ever since. One of his visiting positions was at Harvard in 1973 during which time Georges Rey, then a graduate student, introduced him to Jerry Fodor, with whom he formed a reading group. In 1975 Dennett was promoted to full professor. The next year he was made chair of the philosophy department at Tufts, a position he held until 1982. In 1978–79 he was a Fulbright Fellow with Steven Stich in Andrew Woodfield’s philosophy and psychology research group at Bristol. The following year, he worked on problems in philosophy and AI with John McCarty, Patrick Hayes, Zenon Pylyshyn, Robert Moore, and John Haugeland at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Palo Alta, California. It was there that he met Douglas Hofstadter. At Hofstadter’s suggestion they worked together to produce an anthology: *The Mind’s I*. This experience pushed Dennett further toward the sciences and away from more traditional philosophical perspectives. Hofstadter also introduced Dennett to Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins, opening up the area of evolutionary theory to Dennett.

In 1985 Dennett became the director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, a position he still holds. The

Center was established by Tufts in order to retain Dennett when the University of Pittsburgh offered him the chair vacated by Wilfrid Sellars's retirement. Also in 1985, Dennett was named Distinguished Professor of Arts and Sciences. In 2000 he was honored with the title University Professor at Tufts University. He is also the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. He has given the Herbert Spencer Lecture at Oxford in 1979; the John Locke Lectures at Oxford in 1983; the John Dewey Lecture at the University of Vermont in 1986; and the Jean Nicod Lectures at the Institut Nicod in Paris in 2001. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2000–01. He was named 2004 Humanist of the Year by the American Humanist Association, and in 2012 he was awarded the Erasmus Prize by the Praemium Erasmianum Foundation in the Netherlands.

Dennett's philosophy centers on conceptual issues arising from scientific investigations of the mind. His main position is a kind of interpretationism in which *having* mental states is behaving in a way that is predictable with the *ascription* of mental states, such as beliefs and desires. Ascription of mental states is part of a predictive strategy, the intentional strategy, according to which an entity is ascribed the beliefs and desires it *ought* to have given its history and niche in the world. The entity is ascribed mental states under the assumption of idealized rationality in which it acts based on its beliefs to satisfy its desires. "*All there is to being a true believer is being a system whose behavior is reliably predictable via the intentional strategy, and hence all there is to really and truly believing that p (for any proposition p) is being an intentional system for which p occurs as a belief in the best (most predictive) interpretation.*" (1987, p. 29)

Dennett insists that propositional attitudes are real because they explain genuine detectable patterns in behavior.

What is crucial to understanding Dennett's view is that the real patterns which license the ascription of propositional attitudes are only detectable from a particular point of view: the intentional stance. The intentional stance can best be understood by contrasting it with two other explanatory stances we adopt: the physical stance and the design stance. On Dennett's view, a belief is real in the same way that a center of gravity is real. Physical systems have centers of gravity, though to search for them as a constituent part of an object would be to misunderstand their nature. Similarly, some physical systems are intentional systems, though again to search for a belief as if it were some proper component of a system, in the way that circuits or gears are components, is to misunderstand the nature of belief.

The subject of intentional ascriptions is an entire system considered at what Dennett coins a *personal level*. Personal level intentional ascriptions, such as having pains, are those by which we understand ourselves and others as persons in daily life. Importantly, it is not necessary to know the inner workings of a system to make personal level intentional ascriptions, just as it is not necessary to know anything of the microstructure of a magnet to recognize its magnet properties and treat it as a magnet. Of course, there are microphysical properties in virtue of which something is a magnet just as there are underlying sub-personal processes in virtue of which something is an intentional system. Sub-personal cognitive psychology is in the business of explaining those inner workings of intentional systems, but Dennett does not expect the personal level regularities to reduce to regularities at the sub-personal level, particularly if we consider intentionality

extending beyond human cognition. The personal/sub-personal distinction is that the content ascribed at the personal level likely will not map on to the content ascribed at the sub-personal level.

By considering the constraints imposed on a theory of consciousness from our expanding understanding of sub-personal processes of brain activity, Dennett has challenged the very coherence of a pervasive [mis]conception about the nature of consciousness, that there is some place and moment where experiences come together for the inner self, dubbed the “Cartesian Theater” by Dennett for its roots in the philosophy of René Descartes. This picture leads to an infinite regress that explains nothing. Our brains are constantly processing distinct (and sometimes contradictory) contents as our state of information changes. Subsystems processing different streams of content compete with each other for behavioral control of the system. There is no central executive, just local interactions of competing interpretations of experience, *multiple drafts* of the information we receive. The winning content constitutes *our* take on the world. The ascribed subject of all the winning contents is the self, for which reason Dennett likens the self to a center of narrative gravity; it is the common element in our competing narrative fragments of content around which contents are selected to be coherent with our personal history and current beliefs. The conscious self is the story the dynamic interactions of our sub-systems write in virtue of how they determine our behavior. The stable unity of the self is a feature of the world and our dispositions to interact with it, not an intrinsic feature of an inner mind.

The processes of evolution are natural processes, “cranes” as Dennett refers to them, in contrast with the fictitious “skyhook” that we can hang on the clouds to lift ourselves whenever needed. Whether from creationists

or evolutionary biologists, Dennett rejects any line of reasoning that is tantamount to positing a skyhook. However miraculous some process or structure might seem, from the complexity of the cell to the complexity of the mind, it should have a scientific explanation that essentially includes its selective history. Dennett argues that that processes can build on each other, cranes lifting other cranes, speeding up selection processes to the point of genetic engineering. All of this is natural selection explicable using Darwinian reasoning.

Free will, like everything else on this planet, had to evolve. Dennett has argued against libertarians and determinists that determinism and free will are compatible. Creatures that are not hard-wired to respond in every situation can learn how to use information to guide their actions; therefore, they have distinct possible futures, which is to say that other creatures of that type could have acted differently in those circumstances. The notion of possibility based on an intentional characterization of circumstances provides a naturalistic account of freedom, since possibilities arise as creatures evolve information-processing capacities. It is the only kind of freedom worth wanting according to Dennett, since other notions introduce freedom at the expense of willing.

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Christopher Viger

DEWEY, JOHN (1859–1952)

John Dewey was born on 20 October 1859 in Burlington, Vermont, and died on 1 June 1952 in New York City. While at the University of Vermont Dewey was introduced to a traditional form of philosophy, but he also read widely on his own in intellectual and literary journals. Upon graduation with his BA in 1879, he taught high school in Pennsylvania and Vermont for three years, and continued his philosophical reading with his college teacher, H.A.P. Torrey, upon his return to Vermont. He then entered the newly established Johns Hopkins University in 1882 to pursue graduate work in philosophy. There he encountered Charles S. Peirce, who was teaching logic, and G. Stanley Hall, the experimental psychologist. Peirce was inventing pragmatism, and Hall had been a student of William James, who publicly introduced the term “pragmatism” and developed an alternative version to Peirce’s. But the philosopher who influenced Dewey the most during his graduate study was the historically oriented neo-Hegelian George S. Morris. Upon completing the PhD in philosophy in 1884, Dewey joined Morris as an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan. In 1888 Dewey accepted the position of head of the philosophy department at the University of Minnesota.

In 1889 Morris suddenly died, and Dewey returned to Michigan as the chair of the philosophy department. In 1894 he moved to the recently founded University of Chicago as the head of the department of philosophy, psychology and pedagogy.

It was during these years that Dewey was drifting away from Hegelianism, as he later described it, and began to formulate his instrumentalist version of pragmatism. The process was mostly complete by the time he resigned from Chicago in 1904. In later reminiscences Dewey said that a “Hegelian deposit” remained with him throughout his career, but thought that he had contributed to the development of a pragmatism, or instrumentalism, as he came to regard his version of pragmatism, that had moved beyond Hegelian idealism. The years at Chicago were productive, and two of his colleagues, George H. Mead and James H. Tufts, who had also been at Michigan, became life-long friends and collaborators. Unfortunately, Dewey and Chicago’s President, William Rainey Harper, had an unpleasant disagreement over Harper’s handling of an institutional restructuring of the experimental “Dewey” school which Dewey had founded, that had dismissed Dewey’s wife, Alice, as its principal.

Dewey was invited by Columbia University to be a central member of their philosophical department, and he began teaching there as professor of philosophy in 1905. This began a long association that saw him become a world-renowned figure and America’s best known philosopher in the first half of the twentieth century. It was during the almost fifty years that he lived in New York City that he published his major books and was in heavy demand as a teacher, lecturer, writer, and public figure.

Dewey had long been involved in public affairs – he was on the first board of Jane Addams’s Hull House in Chicago – and was an advocate for various liberal causes, writing for the *New Republic* and other intellectual journals. In 1909 he played a minor role in the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. He was more involved in the founding of the American

Association of University Professors, serving as its first President in 1915. Dewey was initially opposed to American involvement in World War I, but finally decided on pragmatic grounds to support Woodrow Wilson's war policy. This strained his relationship with Jane Addams and other pacifists, notably the passionate and articulate young writer, Randolph Bourne. Dewey was disappointed in his support of Wilson but later said he would have made the same decision again, given what he knew at the time. Nevertheless, he became the principal intellectual supporter of the Outlawry of War movement in the 1920s, and did not support entering World War II, fearful of the harm to American civil liberties. Dewey was convinced that social intelligence was possible even with regard to the momentous and emotionally charged issues of war and peace.

In the 1930s Dewey became even more involved in public affairs. He was active in the League for Independent Political Action's efforts to form a third political party. This placed him in opposition to Franklin D. Roosevelt's Democratic Party and the New Deal, which he considered too much of a blind trial-and-error effort. He favored a more explicitly experimental and socialist approach. He also chaired the commission that examined the charges brought against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials. In the highly charged ideological battles of the time, this was no small or casually assumed task. Still another fray which he entered with a calm but passionate commitment to cooperative intelligence was one involving the grievances of the Communist Party insurgents within the New York City Teachers Union. Dewey patiently chaired the grievance committee, providing a working example of his faith in democracy and inquiry. Any understanding of Dewey as a philosopher must take into account this devotion to intelligent inquiry and practice.

Dewey retired from Columbia in 1929, shortly after the death of Alice, but remained at the university until 1939 as an emeritus professor and an advisor to doctoral students. Dewey remarried in 1946, and continued to publish on philosophy and social issues until his death in 1952.

What distinguished Dewey, particularly in the Chicago years, was his interest in education and his intellectual leadership of the "Dewey School." This experience provided the basis for his *School and Society* (1899), bringing him to the attention not only of philosophers but also the educated public. Dewey was also interested in epistemology and logic, publishing with his colleagues at Chicago a volume of essays, *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903). Dewey's four essays were revised and joined with more on knowledge and truth for *Essays in Experimental Logic* (1916). Another collaborative volume was the widely used *Ethics* textbook, jointly authored by Dewey and Tufts (1908). A book concerned with both logic and education, reflecting Dewey's interest in promoting a critical and experimental intelligence, was *How We Think* (1910). But the book that Dewey himself thought for many years best captured his whole thought was *Democracy and Education* (1916). Dewey understood the desired form of schooling (and education generally) to be a democratic practice. It was not just that education reflected society, but a democratic society was enhanced by schools (and other educational activities) that were democratic in character. This continuity of means and ends, as we shall see below, is one of the most distinctive features of Dewey's thinking. Perhaps the book that best serves as a programmatic statement for his later work is *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920), which anticipates many of his major books of the 1920s and 1930s. The first of these is *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), which develops

a social psychology. Through his naturalistic approach to ethics, it provides the intellectual understanding of human conduct that makes his ethical proposals feasible, working out his understanding of the social individual who engages in the moral life.

Experience and Nature (1925) is read by many as being Dewey's metaphysics, despite the fact that he was often sharply critical of metaphysics. At best it is a new sort of metaphysics, a naturalistic one, one that describes the "generic features" of our existence without any recourse to the supernatural or a reality behind the appearances. Dewey denied that he had compromised his naturalism by privileging human experience, instead giving an accurate account of the place of experience within nature. *Experience and Nature* was followed by *The Quest for Certainty* (1929), which deals with another core concern of philosophy: epistemology or the theory of knowledge. He subtitled the book, *A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action*, thus connecting it to his ongoing concern with intelligent action, and much of the book is an attack on traditional essentialist and foundationalist theories of knowledge.

The Public and Its Problems (1927) reacted to Walter Lippmann, the well regarded public intellectual and Dewey's fellow contributor to the *New Republic*, who had published two books that called into the question the feasibility of democracy. In Lippmann's view the public was not competent to govern; at best it can choose between competing groups of insiders to serve as their elected representatives. Dewey took up the challenge in *The Public and Its Problems*, describing how a mass society could be a democratic one. This book is not his entire political philosophy, only taking up the task of showing how the changing society of the 1920s could be a richly democratic one by becoming more adept at exercising social intelligence.

Dewey continued to speak to political, educational, and ethical issues in the 1930s in *Individualism Old and New* (1930), *Liberalism and Social Action* (1935), *Freedom and Culture* (1939), *Experience and Education* (1938), and *Theory of Valuation* (1939). But the more remarkable books, in terms of the reaction they received, were *A Common Faith* (1934), *Art as Experience* (1934), and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938). *A Common Faith* is interesting because Dewey was perceived as a secular humanist with little or no interest in religion, but here he recast his pragmatic naturalism as a religious way of life. Making a distinction between "religion" and "the religious," he proposed that one could, without reference to or dependence upon the supernatural, develop a meaningful life of passionate intelligence. Dewey was not just a pragmatist; he was a pragmatic naturalist. His instrumentalism was set within a naturalistic (as opposed to supernaturalistic) context. He valued science not only for what it could teach us about inquiry but also for its results. The world described by science, both physical and social, was world enough for the secular Dewey, where "secular" means "having to do with this world" and not "anti-religious."

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Michael Eldridge

DICKIE, GEORGE THOMAS (1926–)

George Dickie was born on 12 August 1926 in Palmetto, Florida. He served in the Marine Corps from 1944 to 1946. He received his BA from Florida State University in 1949 and his PhD in philosophy from the University of California at Los Angeles in 1959. He began teaching in 1956 at Washington State University, and after a brief stay at the University of Houston, went to the University of Illinois at Chicago in 1965, where he taught for thirty years. After a long and distinguished career he became professor emeritus in 1995 and returned to Florida for his retirement.

Dickie is the dominant advocate of two lines of argument central to the development of modern aesthetics. First is his adamant opposition to the claim, prominent in some early twentieth-century views, that aesthetic experience is predicated on a special state of mind, the so-called “aesthetic attitude,” and that lacking that state of mind, a proper appreciation of an aesthetic object could not be had. Second is his defense of the institutional theory, a definitional account of the nature of art. These are by no means his only important contributions to aesthetics, however. In 1988 he proposed and defended a novel account

of aesthetic evaluation, and in 1996 he presented an analysis of eighteenth-century British aesthetic theory as the basis for his own Humean theory of taste. He has been a frequent commentator on developments in the field of aesthetics, and has occupied various leadership roles in the American Society for Aesthetics, culminating in his Presidency in 1993–94.

Dickie's attack on the aesthetic attitude theory was driven by skepticism about its cognitive claims. He came to believe that there was no singular, identifiable state of mind involved in the aesthetic engagement of this or that person with this or that object. As he saw it, attention could be trained on objects for an endless variety of reasons. No common quality can be shown to run through all forms of attention properly trained on objects of aesthetic interest. For this reason, it would be pointless or misleading to say that aesthetic experience was predicated on the maintenance of a certain state of mind. Some versions of the aesthetic attitude theory (such as Jerome Stolnitz's) required that successful aesthetic attention be disinterested, and that disinterestedness implied a detachment from both cognitive and critical claims regarding the object in question. Dickie rejected this view, claiming both that there was no conceptual incompatibility among aesthetic, critical, and cognitive claims in appreciation of a given object and that empirical evidence (for example, the experience of watching a movie and writing down critical notes) runs counter to the claims of detachment. He concluded that the aesthetic attitude is a myth.

In his landmark exposition of the Institutional Theory in *Art and the Aesthetic* (1974), earlier found in “Defining Art” (1969), Dickie developed a definition of “art” meant to respond to (while taking into account the salient virtues of) the anti-definist tendency in aesthetic theory that had been advanced

by Morris Weitz and Paul Ziff among others, following the lead of Ludwig Wittgenstein. His proposed definition aimed to avoid the traditional mistake of identifying qualities common and peculiar to all objects worthy of the title “art.” The by-now obvious problem with all such efforts is that the term “art” is essentially contested and importantly elastic in its conceptual range. But the process by which things come to be understood as artworks is not itself indefinite in the way art content is indefinite. Instead, as Dickie observed, it is a product of complex institutions in which there are rules and roles, expectations and responsibilities, all of which make up a context of recognition and appraisal.

In 1964 Arthur Danto published “The Artworld,” laying out the idea that there is “something the eye cannot decry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of this history of art” that is involved in taking things to be artworks in the peculiar setting of our social understandings. Dickie refined this idea, making it a central element in his own institutional theory of art. As he formulated it in *Art and the Aesthetic*, a candidate object is a work of art if, and only if, it is “an artifact a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or person acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld)” (1974, p. 34). Dickie’s version of the artworld element incorporated personnel and a host of institutional roles and modes of interaction in addition to history and theory. People playing important roles in social institutions involving art were thereby members of the artworld. Dickie also allowed that anyone who took himself to be a member of the artworld was thereby made a member. The status of something as an artwork or not was a function of the deeming behavior of an art-involved, informed populace, rather than anything explicitly presented in the work itself.

Dickie’s theory of art evaluation is presented as disconnected from his institutional theory of art. This reflects his acceptance of Weitz’s claim that maintaining the distinction between criteria of recognition and criteria of evaluation is a central obligation of modern aesthetic theory. Dickie’s approach is to identify the seven most plausible accounts of artistic value (ranging from David Hume’s to J.O. Urmson’s) and glean from them the acceptable elements while discarding the flaws. Dickie’s theory is true to its Humean roots in combining instrumentalism, relativism, and common sense while remaining open to the prospect of the calculative comparative measurement of values.

Dickie’s allegiance to Hume is further expressed in *The Century of Taste* (1996), an historical survey and critical commentary on the philosophical shift from objective to subjective standards of taste in the eighteenth century.

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Ronald Moore

DOUGHERTY, JUDE PATRICK (1930–)

Jude P. Dougherty was born on 21 July 1930 in Chicago, Illinois. He received his education from Catholic University of America, earning his BA in 1954, his MA in 1955, and his PhD in 1960. While completing his dissertation on “Recent American Naturalism: A Critique” with professor Charles A. Hart, he taught as an instructor of philosophy at Marquette University in 1957–58 and at Bellarmine College in Kentucky starting in 1958. In 1966 Dougherty was appointed associate professor of philosophy at Catholic University of America, and the next year he became Dean

of the School of Philosophy there, the first layman to hold that office. He was promoted to full professor of philosophy in 1976, and continued to serve as Dean until his retirement in 1999. As *Dean Emeritus*, Dougherty remains very active in scholarship and the profession.

Dougherty has long been one of the most prominent American Catholic philosophers. He has published several books and over one hundred articles in the areas of theology, metaphysics, ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy of law, philosophy of science, and the history of American philosophy. He is editor of the *Review of Metaphysics*, since 1971. Dougherty has been President of The Metaphysical Society and the American Catholic Philosophical Association. He has received many honors, including the title Knight of the Order of St. Gregory and the Benemerenti Medal bestowed by Pope John Paul II; the Cardinal Wright Award from the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars; and the Aquinas Medal from the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Dougherty is one of the two North American fellows of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas.

The essays collected in Dougherty’s *Western Creed, Western Identity: Essays in Legal and Social Philosophy* (2000) are organized into three parts. The first part contrasts the views of Karl Marx and John Dewey with those of Jacques Maritain and John Courtney Murray concerning the role of religion in society. The second part discusses the nature of the law and the relation between civil law and natural law, on topics in responsibility and punishment. The third part contains essays on faith and reason, in relation to such figures as Edith Stein, Jacques Maritain, John Paul II. *Jacques Maritain: An Intellectual Profile* (2003) is a thorough introduction, providing an understanding and evaluation of many important aspects of

Maritain's philosophy from metaphysics and epistemology to social and political theory. *The Logic of Religion* (2003) surveys selected classical, medieval, and modern thinkers, including some Eastern representatives, on the nature of religion and its relationship with reason. Dougherty's *The Nature of Scientific Explanation* (2013) defends an Aristotelian and realistic metaphysical framework adequate to both knowledge of nature and knowledge of humanity.

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DRAPER, JOHN WILLIAM (1811–1882)

John William Draper was born on 5 May 1811 in the parish of St. Helens, near Liverpool, England. He received his early education at home and at the Wesleyan-supported Woodhouse Grove School in West Yorkshire. In 1829 he entered the newly opened University of London, where he absorbed positivism and Benthamism, and studied chemistry under Dr. Edward Turner, though without taking a degree. In 1832 he moved to the United States with his wife, mother, and sisters, settling in Christiansville (now Chase City), Virginia. He received the degree of Doctor of Medicine from the University of Pennsylvania in 1836. In that year he accepted the professorship of chemistry and natural philosophy at Hampden-Sydney College in Virginia. In 1839 he accepted the chair of chemistry at the University of the City of New York (now New York University), and soon took part in organizing the medical college of that institution. In 1850 he added a chair of physiology to his chair in chemistry; in the same year he became the Medical College President. He held these positions until his retirement in 1873, and he continued to occasionally teach chemistry until 1881.

Draper died on 4 January 1882 in Hastings on Hudson, New York.

Draper did valuable research in many areas of natural science, including osmoses, adhesion, electricity, spectrum analysis, capillary attraction, the chemical effects of light, and the applications of chemistry to physiology. His work on the effects of light brought him considerable distinction, as did his work in allied areas, such as the chemistry of photography. He is credited with making the world's first astrograph (1839) and the first photographic portrait (1840). Draper was an officer or member of many learned societies, including the Accademia dei Lincei of Rome, the Physical Society of London, the American Chemical Society (of which he was the first president, from 1886 to 1887), the American Philosophical Society, the National Academy of Sciences, and the American Union Academy of Literature, Science, and Art. In 1875 the American Academy of Arts and Sciences awarded Draper the Rumford Prize for his research on radiant energy. In 1860 he received the honorary degree of LLD from Princeton University.

In 1856, after the publication of his enormously successful *Human Physiology*, Draper began to shift his focus from experimental research to the social sciences, especially intellectual history: *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe* (1862) and his *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science* (1874). These books won a remarkably wide readership. For example, the *History of the Conflict* went through fifty American and twenty-one British printings and sold more copies than any of the other hundred-odd titles in the series in which it appeared, E.L. Youmans's International Scientific Series.

Two themes permeate these books. The first theme is that the history of a human

society is strikingly analogous to the life of an individual person, the progress of which, like the development of any organic form, is controlled by physical laws and shaped by surrounding physical conditions. Indeed, every society is essentially an organism; its history unfolds according to quasi-physiological laws, the life of a group or nation recapitulating the stages of a human life, under the control of physical laws. Draper finds that intellectual progress divides into five stages, which he dubs the Age of Credulity, the Age of Inquiry, the Age of Faith, the Age of Reason, and the Age of Decrepitude. The second theme is a version of the “warfare” interpretation of the history of science and religion, a struggle between two foes: religion on the one hand, particularly as represented by Roman Catholicism and its political manifestations; and science on the other, which for Draper essentially consists of the honest search for knowledge, unfettered by dogma and authority. Despite Draper's claims to impartiality, religion (particularly the Roman Catholic Church) is the villain in the story, resisting the advance of the human intellect. Science, in its essence progressive, is clearly the hero. Many of the key themes of Draper's work – for instance, that there are laws of historical change, that science and religion are in conflict, that climate and geography shape intellectual progress, and that societies resemble biological organisms – found defenders in more prominent nineteenth-century figures, including Hegel, Comte, Marx, Buckle, Durkheim, and Andrew White.

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John J. Tilley

DRETSKE, FREDERICK IRWIN (1932–)

Fred Dretske was born on 9 December 1932
in Waukegan, Illinois. In 1954 he received
a BA in electrical engineering from Purdue
University. He then received his MA in 1958
and PhD in philosophy in 1960 from the
University of Minnesota, writing a dissertation

on the philosophy of time under May Brodbeck.
Dretske's first academic appointment was
teaching philosophy at the University of
Wisconsin beginning in 1960, where he rose to
the rank of full professor. At Wisconsin he was
particularly close to fellow philosophers Berent
Enç, Elliott Sober, and Denis Stampe, and they
made Wisconsin a center for philosophical
naturalism, theories of biological function, and
causal/functional theories of the mind. Dretske
was President of the American Philosophical
Association Western Division in 1984–85. In
1988 he went to Stanford University, where
he was the Bella and Eloise Mabury Knapp
Professor of Philosophy and also served for
a time as chair of the department. He became
professor emeritus in 1998, and in 1999 he
became a senior research scholar at Duke
University. Dretske died on 24 July 2013 in
Durham, North Carolina.

Dretske's first book, *Seeing and Knowing*
(1969), deals with the question of what is
required to know that something is the case
on the basis of what is seen. He rejected the
widely held view of the time that knowledge
is some variant on the theme of justified true
belief. Knowledge requires true belief, but
inner justifications are not typically used in
gaining knowledge from the senses, nor are
they necessary for gaining such knowledge,
according to Dretske. He was in the forefront
of what came to be known as the "naturalized
epistemology" movement. The theory of
knowledge presented in *Seeing and Knowing*
held that for a subject *S* to be able to see that
an object *b* has property *P* is (i) for *b* to be *P*,
(ii) for *S* to see *b*, (iii) for the conditions under
which *S* sees *b* to be such that *b* would not
look the way it now looks to *S* unless it were
P, and (iv) for *S*, believing that conditions are
as described in (iii), to take *b* to be *P* (1969,
pp. 78–93). An important consequence of this
approach is that it allows one to know that

P, and that P entails Q, without being able to know that Q – for to know that Q might require being able to rule out relevant alternatives that are not relevant to knowing P.

Dretske's next book, *Knowledge and the Flow of Information* (1981), returns to the topic of knowledge gained via perception, but does so with new ambitions. Dretske had become convinced that the concept of natural information was central to his understanding of knowledge, but that, once understood, it also opened the way to a naturalistic theory of belief. Information, understood in Dretske's sense, is something that exists as an objective and mind-independent feature of the natural world. It is even something that can be quantified, following Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver. Dretske offers the following theory of information: A signal r carries the information that s is F = The conditional probability of s 's being F , given r (and k), is 1 (but, given k alone, less than 1) (1981, p. 65). A difficulty with Dretske's characterization of information is that, given his naturalistic ambitions for the notion of information, no appeal to background knowledge should appear in the theory of information, since information is meant to be prior to knowers. But this difficulty is fairly readily resolved by the excision of k from the theory, and later treatments of information (or "indication" or "natural meaning") by Dretske do not rely on background knowledge. The reformulated theory holds that knowledge is belief supported by information that certifies the truth of the belief. As before, such certification is not guaranteeing absolutely as such, but in the sense of guaranteeing absolutely *among relevant alternatives*, with context determining which alternatives are relevant.

Dretske's work on belief begins in the last third of *Knowledge and the Flow of*

Information, but takes on its mature form in the book that followed, *Explaining Behavior* (1988), where it meets up with theories of desire, action, and reason-based explanation. Against such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Dretske holds that actions are the causing of movements by mental states, rather than the movements themselves. Action is thus a partly mental process itself, not a mere product of a mental process. For the meaning (the content) of a belief to explain an action, on this view, is for the content of the belief to explain why it is that the mental state is part of a process that leads to the movement it does. Here Dretske's interest in information makes its appearance in this theory of belief: a belief that P is a brain state that has been recruited (through operant conditioning) to be part of movement-causing processes because of the fact that it did, when recruited, carry the information that P. Being recruited because of carrying information is sufficient for having the function of carrying that information, on Dretske's view, and having the function of carrying information is sufficient for representation. Beliefs are thus mental representations that contribute to movement production *because* of their contents (saying P is *why* the brain state is recruited to cause movement), and so form components of the process known as *acting for a reason*.

An important feature of Dretske's account of belief is that, although brain states are recruited to control action because they carry information, there is no guarantee that they will continue to do so. Yet, once they have been recruited for carrying information, they have the function of carrying information, and continue to have that function even if they no longer carry information. This is how *misrepresentation* enters the world, on Dretske's view. A state that carries information cannot be wrong so long as it

carries information: having information that P guarantees (within relevant possibilities) that P. But Dretske recognizes that an important fact about genuine representations is that they are capable of misrepresentation, and so he stresses that although brain states can carry information, they may cease to, and then brain states with the function of carrying specific information will fail to perform their functions, and so misrepresent.

Dretske next turned to the nature of consciousness, defending a representational theory in *Naturalizing the Mind* (1995). Between the representational theory of belief, desire, and action in *Explaining Behavior* and the representational theory of consciousness found in *Naturalizing the Mind*, Dretske aims to give full support to what he calls the “Representational Thesis.” This is the claim that (1) all mental facts are representational facts, and (2) all representational facts are facts about informational functions (1995, p. xiii). In seeking to extend representationalism to encompass consciousness, Dretske does not give up on his view, first expressed in *Seeing and Knowing*, that there is a fundamental difference between seeing something and seeing that something is the case, i.e., between seeing and believing. He nonetheless attempts to describe a deep underlying unity between consciousness and belief in representational terms. In *Explaining Behavior*, Dretske holds that when a brain state acquires, through learning, the function of carrying information, then it becomes a mental representation suited to being a belief. In *Naturalizing the Mind* he extends his taxonomy of representational types and holds that when a brain state acquires, *through natural selection*, the function of carrying information, then it is also a mental representation, but one suited (with certain provisos) to being a state of consciousness.

Dretske is also a leading proponent, along with David Armstrong and Michael Tooley, of the view that laws of nature are relations among universals, and he has contributed to discussions of explanation and events. He has recently returned to active work in epistemology, working on a puzzle about knowledge of one’s own consciousness. If perceptual knowledge is belief that is sustained by information-bearing perceptual states, then do we have perceptual knowledge of our own states of consciousness? Since we do not see or hear our mental representations (they are what we see and hear *with*, on Dretske’s view), it seems that we have no perceptual knowledge of our own consciousness. But surely we do not only know that we are conscious by careful reasoning and argument! This puzzle’s resolution would bring Dretske full circle, completing the naturalistic program for knowledge with which he launched his career.

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Ray Elugardo

DREYFUS, HUBERT LEDERER (1929–)

Hubert L. Dreyfus was born on 15 October 1929 in Terre Haute, Indiana. He received his education at Harvard University, earning the BA with highest honors in philosophy in 1951 and joined Phi Beta Kappa. Dreyfus then earned his MA in 1952, and a PhD in philosophy in 1964. His dissertation was titled "Husserl's Phenomenology of Perception." Dreyfus studied at the University of Freiburg on a Harvard Sheldon traveling fellowship in 1953–54; traveled to the Husserl Archives at the University of Louvain on a Fulbright fellowship in 1956–57; and went to the École Normale Supérieure in Paris on a French government grant in 1959–60.

Dreyfus began his teaching career at Brandeis University as instructor in philosophy from 1957 to 1959, and then was assistant and associate professor of philosophy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1960 to 1968. In 1968 he became associate professor of philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley, and was promoted to full professor in 1972. Since 1994 Dreyfus has been professor of philosophy in the Graduate School at Berkeley, and added a joint appointment in the rhetoric department in 1999. Dreyfus has directed several NEH summer institutes, received grants and fellowships from the NSF,

ACLS, the Guggenheim fund, and taught as a visiting professor at many universities. In 2003 Dreyfus was the Spinoza Lecturer at the University of Amsterdam. Dreyfus became a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2001, and served as President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2004–05.

The phenomenologies of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and other Continental philosophers have dominated Dreyfus's scholarly attention. Of particular interest to Dreyfus is how phenomenological explorations of learning, understanding, and intelligence contrast favorably with the excessively rationalistic traditions of modern philosophy. Both empiricism and idealism have elevated the notion of "representation" far above its proper role in learning. Expertise arrives when neither representations of one's goal, or of means to achieve it, occupy one's attention. The ordinary knowledge of common sense is grounded on accumulated living that provides for a meaningful environment, in which the agent can immediately assess the relevance of contextual features of novel situations. The representational theory, for which the mind is a logical calculator of symbols representing external matters, is entirely false to the nature of lived experience.

During the mid-1960s Dreyfus witnessed the beginnings of Artificial Intelligence at the Rand Corporation, in the pioneering work of Alan Newell and Herbert Simon. Dreyfus immediately launched a thorough attack on AI's basic principle that the brain's intelligence is similar to the computer's logical manipulation of discrete symbols. According to Dreyfus, AI is the newest mechanical manifestation of the rationalist tradition in philosophy, because they both view the mind as essentially rational, representational, and rule-governed. In

his earlier writings Dreyfus suggested that the brain's analog operations could never be duplicated by the computer's digital processes. In more recent writings, Dreyfus has suggested that neural networks may have some potential for modeling actual human learning. However, like his Berkeley colleague John Searle, Dreyfus takes the very limited success of AI as confirmation that it has contributed very little to the understanding of consciousness.

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John R. Shook

DU BOIS, WILLIAM EDWARD BURGHARDT (1868–1963)

W.E.B. Du Bois was born on 23 February 1868 in Great Barrington, Massachusetts. He attended Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee, from 1885 to 1888, earning his BA. In 1888 Du Bois entered Harvard University, earning a second BA in 1890 majoring in history and graduating *cum laude*. He was introduced to pragmatism by William James in psychology. In 1891 he earned a MA and from 1892 to 1894 he pursued graduate studies in history and economics at the University of Berlin on a Slater Fund fellowship. He worked with Max Weber, the great interpretive sociologist, and became one of his few American students. Upon his return to the United States, he taught Greek and Latin at Wilberforce University in Ohio for two years during 1894–96 while he finished his doctoral dissertation on “The Suppression of the African Slave Trade in the United States of America, 1638–1870” which was published in 1896. He received his PhD in history from Harvard in 1895, becoming the first black to receive Harvard’s doctorate. His dissertation signaled the pattern of many of his interests: the African diaspora, history, economics, and American race relations.

Du Bois was first a professor of classics and modern languages for two years at Wilberforce University in Ohio, and then an assistant instructor in sociology at the University of Pennsylvania in 1896–97. He accepted a position as professor of economics and history at Atlanta University

where he taught from 1898 to 1910, before leaving academia to work for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from 1910 to 1934. In 1934, he resigned from the NAACP and returned to his academic position at Atlanta University, where he taught from 1934 to 1944. He returned to the NAACP in 1944 as head of research on the African diaspora in a concerted effort to legitimize the status of former colonies in the new post-war world order. He was dismissed from his duties at the NAACP in 1948 over ideological disputes. He eventually became the target of anti-communist witch-hunters and in 1951 he was tried and acquitted of a federal charge of failing to register as an agent of a foreign government. Although Du Bois was cleared of all charges, the trial cost him his savings, his reputation, and his fundamental faith in American institutions. This disillusionment with the United States, however gave way to an optimistic and hopeful view of African life and culture. In 1960 he moved to Ghana, on the west coast of Africa, where he was a major intellectual and political symbol for the new state. Du Bois died on 27 August 1963 in Accra, Ghana, on the eve of the important civil rights milestone: the March on Washington led by Martin Luther King, Jr.

In 1903 Du Bois observed that “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line” (p. 7) and this problem was the center of his ideas and lifework. He became one of the greatest intellectuals of the twentieth century embracing the worldwide experience of Africans and their descendants, especially those kidnapped and sold into slavery in the New World. While at the University of Pennsylvania, he used his sociological skills to survey economic and social conditions in the black community. He lived in a social

settlement and his book was modeled on that of Hull-House Maps and Papers. Du Bois and Isabel Eaton, a Quaker, former Hull-House resident, and contributor to Hull-House Maps and Papers, produced the monumental study of *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899) which set the standard for urban studies of black communities in the United States. While at Atlanta he sponsored studies on a series of institutions, such as business, art, the church, and communities, which generated social networks and extensive scholarship on the black community. They established the ideal model for investigations in each of these topics for many decades. Between 1898 and 1904 the U.S. Department of Labor sponsored four demographic studies of the black South conducted by Du Bois. These inquiries also established precedents to document the patterns of settlement, income, and distribution which dramatically shaped the lives of African-Americans.

Du Bois’s first autobiography was *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903). It is the passionate and eloquent story of an individual, W.E.B. Du Bois, and a group, African-Americans. His unflinching criticism of Booker T. Washington created a public debate about how to fight discrimination that continues to this day. Du Bois reflected on entering Fisk University, the Jim Crow world of the South, and teaching children who must endure its cruelty. He described his travels through the Black Belt, Jim Crow railway cars, and the plantations that dotted the landscape and continued the peculiar legacy of slavery through tenant farming. Du Bois revealed how the “faith of our fathers” was a communal heritage. Music and lyrics created a heritage from the past that lives in the present. This faith was tested by the death of Du Bois’s first (and only) son, Burghardt, who was refused medical care because of the color line. Du Bois’s keening cry against the evil that killed his baby is a

heart-wrenching paean to lost hope and love. Men survived and triumphed behind the Veil, nonetheless, and the African-American leader was the key to ending the color line.

Du Bois particularly drew on the pragmatism of James and his concept of “the self” as a divided, doubled, sense of “twoness.” James’s pragmatist understanding of “consciousness” with its corollary divisions is also intellectually important. In addition, Du Bois supported Fabian socialism during this era, with a focus on state programs to provide minimal resources for health, housing, employment, and education. In 1905 he helped to establish the Niagara Movement, comprised of black men who were part of the talented tenth and demanding full equality. This group opposed Booker T. Washington’s gradual approach and political machine, and they built an alternative network of militant “race men.” In 1908 his life was altered by a race riot in Springfield, Illinois. This event sparked a “Call” for a national organization to fight for civil rights for African-Americans. Over forty leaders signed the Call, including Du Bois, which led to a conference in 1909 and the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored. This organization changed Du Bois’s life and career, as he became a leader of a worldwide, pan-African movement. With the Great Depression, beginning in 1929, the economic fate of African-Americans became direr and Du Bois increasingly despaired of achieving social justice and equality.

After many years of conflict over who controlled *The Crisis*, its policies, content, and editorials, in 1934 Du Bois left the NAACP and returned to Atlanta University and the teaching of sociology. Two of Du Bois’s most important books during this period are *Black Reconstruction* (1935) and his autobiographical *Dusk of Dawn* (1940).

In *Black Reconstruction*, Du Bois analyzed the blunders of Reconstruction and the scholarly literature that distorted that history. He examined the failure of democracy and the bankrupt economy that prevented the attainment of full citizenship for black people. His new autobiography continued these themes and sharply criticized “white folk” and their corrupt “white world.” In contrast to the strengths of the “gifts of black folk” which he praises, white racism delayed the coming of morning and the “dusk of dawn.” American class structure echoed and reinforced racial segregation similar to a feudal pattern of class and interpersonal relations. This angry and disillusioned analysis is often used in conjunction with contemporary social movements based on inter-racial conflict. To his deep sorrow, he assessed the American people, including blacks, to be too corrupt and cowardly to come to his aid. Du Bois published his final self-reflection in 1963, *The Autobiography of W.E.B. Du Bois*. The first five chapters related his travels to Europe, the Soviet Union, and China after 1958. After he observed the accomplishments of socialist nations, he finally converted to communism. The rest of this autobiography explained how and why he made this decision so late in life and in opposition to the training and pressures of American capitalism. This narrative portrayed his life as an inevitable advance toward communist ideals and praxis.

It is important to stress that Du Bois developed and executed a series of brilliant, systematic sociological investigations of African-American life. His unrelenting drive to live an intellectual life, to teach the “talented tenth” of Black America, and to destroy white myths and misapprehensions about African-Americans by means of careful research gives coherence and meaning to his accomplishments.

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Mary Jo Deegan

DUCASSE, CURT JOHN (1881–1969)

Curt Ducasse was born on 7 July 1881 in Angoulême, France. He emigrated to Mexico in 1900 and eventually moved to the United States as a young man in pursuit of business. He discovered philosophy at the age of twenty-four when he acquired a book on George Berkeley, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant. His interest in philosophy led him to the University of Washington where he received his BA in 1908 and then to Harvard, where he studied under Josiah Royce and received his PhD in 1912. He taught at the

University of Washington from 1912 to 1926. Ducasse became professor of philosophy at Brown University in 1926 and remained there until his retirement in 1958. He served as chair of the department of philosophy from 1930 to 1951 and served as acting dean of the Graduate School from 1947 to 1949. He died on 3 September 1969 in Providence, Rhode Island.

Ducasse is perhaps best known today for being one of the first champions of analytic method before it came to dominate English-speaking universities. Roderick Chisholm was one of Ducasse's more famous students. His essays typically begin by carefully reviewing and clarifying the definitions of terms like "cause," "art," and "mental." Ducasse then shows how philosophical debates over these terms arise out of misunderstandings of their definitions. Ducasse's interests were remarkably broad, and he influenced virtually every area of philosophy. His most noteworthy publications were in the areas of causation, free-will, mind-body dualism, and philosophy of art and aesthetics. He served as chair of the founding committee for the Association for Symbolic Logic and as president of such diverse organization as the American Society for Aesthetics, the Philosophy of Science Association, and the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (1939–1940). Ducasse also maintained a lifelong interest in parapsychology and paranormal activity, a somewhat surprising interest given his work in the philosophy of science and commitment to analytic method.

Some of Ducasse's most important publications were on causation. Ducasse argued against Humean critiques of causality. Ducasse held that Humeans were wrong to hold that causal relations are unobservable and to insist that causality is simply the constant

conjunction of a pair of events in nature. He felt that a correct definition of "cause," one that adhered to its actual linguistic use, would show that causal relations are observable. Ducasse also opposed Gilbert Ryle in upholding a dualist-interactionist concept of mind-body relations. He argued that there is a fundamental difference between the things described by mental or psychical terms and physical or material terms. Physical terms refer to properties that are perceptually public, whereas mental terms denote properties that are inherently private. I can inform you, for example, that I'm currently remembering a dream I had last night by using perceptually public words, be they spoken or written. But my memory of this dream itself cannot, in principle, be shared. Ducasse held that there was an irreducible difference between mental and physical language.

Ducasse's most lasting contributions were in the areas of aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Ducasse brought his interest in analytic method to his discussions of art and aesthetics. He felt that the main task of the philosopher of art isn't to propose theories of art or to comment on what qualities make one artwork superior to another, but simply to analyze, define, and disambiguate the terms we use in discussing art. Ducasse believed in the importance of prefacing any philosophic discussion of art by developing rigorous definitions for terms like "art," "aesthetic," and "aesthetics."

Ducasse defined art neither as a particular class of objects nor as a property of objects but as a type of activity. He defined art in a 1946 address to the American Society for Aesthetics as all activity that aims to create objects intended for aesthetic contemplation. He identified aesthetic contemplation with a psychological attitude in which one takes up a stance of receptivity to the sensible qualities

of some object and in which one's interest is devoid of all scientific, theoretical or practical concerns. He first elaborated this view of art as an activity in his 1929 book, *The Philosophy of Art*. He defined art as creative activity that aims at the self-objectification of an artist's feelings. An object is a work of art when it results from an activity in which an artist seeks to create something that is capable of being contemplated by herself or others that will yield back to her the feeling of which is the attempted expression.

Ducasse's view of art occasionally sounds similar to ideas in Immanuel Kant and other formalist aesthetic theories, but he was quite critical of Clive Bell's formalism. He felt that Bell's notion of significant form was unhelpful. Bell held that all art combines things like line, color, etc. together so as to produce aesthetically moving forms, referring to this distinguishing characteristic of art as "significant form." Ducasse argued that Bell couldn't advance beyond simply applying this label to the combinations of lines, color, etc. found in art, so significant form is just whatever it is about these combinations that leads us to call them artistic. Ducasse's analysis of art also led him to construe the class of art objects more broadly than other authors. He was willing to include decorative arts, fashion, personal style, and cosmetics in the category of art since they result from activities that aim at creating objects of aesthetic contemplation.

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Joshua Shaw

DWORKIN, ANDREA (1946–2005)

Andrea Dworkin was born on 26 September 1946 in Camden, New Jersey. She attended Bennington College and earned a BA in literature 1968. She died on 9 April 2005 in New York City. While she described herself as anything but an exhibitionist, she admitted that personal incidents such as being raped at age 9 and being brutally beaten by her first husband were centrally important to her life's work in feminism. A centrally informing incident was her arrest at a Vietnam War

protest. Following the arrest she was taken to New York's Women's House of Detention and given a brutal internal examination by two male doctors. She reports that they used a steel speculum and enjoyed causing her pain. The examination tore her up so bad that she bled for days and was rendered mute from the trauma. When she reported this to friends they ignored her or treated her as if she was dirty and to blame. In response she mounted a letter writing campaign that led to an investigation and her testifying on the matter to the New York grand jury. While there was ultimately no indictment, the jail was closed soon after because of public concerns. This experience of not being believed and lack of support was repeated during her abusive marriage. From these experiences she decided to devote her life to the women's movement, becoming known as a powerful and passionate speaker. Her career is notable for her speeches, the pornography ordinance she co-wrote and advocated for with Catharine MacKinnon, and her writings on male dominance and women's rights.

In *Heartbreak* (2002) she described herself as wanting to write like Plato. Her book *Woman Hating* (1974) says that her writing was expressly done as political action and not "academic horseshit." The aim was to change human consciousness, indeed to create a woman's revolution in contradistinction to traditional gender roles and the sexual revolution of the time. She identified the "sexual revolution" of the sixties and seventies as just another variation of continuing male dominance. Therefore it was not a revolution for women, but just more of the same male fantasy mentally and physically imposed upon women's lives. Male dominance, a form of "Gynocide," is a metaphysics attached to the absolute self, giving an absolute male right to the female body.

Dworkin argued that this metaphysics of male domination entails male control of speech. And, she claimed, whoever controls naming controls what truth is. Patriarchy constructs via this metaphysics a police state where every man is deputized. In its United States variant, the metaphysics makes heroes out of the property-owning (including slaves and women) "founding fathers." Truly, the US Constitution is designed to protect white male property. Male money and power rule with male law on its side. Even worse, because all language and power is male, woman polices herself or gets punished. Therefore Dworkin claims it takes a war, a political battle, to combat this tyranny. And a first step in the battle is naming, remembering, and resisting. Her ultimate aim was to create a world where women can also tell their truth and flourish, instead of only having their existence within male speech.

Life and Death (1997) describes how she set about to make this aim real. First she had to overcome her aversion to using her own experiences as evidence. Initially she tried to avoid person accounts because it seemed too anecdotal, and therefore too female and trivial. But she grew to see that her experience was evidence of an almost universal female experience, and therefore needed to be acknowledged and named rather than defined away. This devaluation of female experience was just one bit of the systemic terrorism of the totalizing effect of male dominance. To overcome female silence, the tendency to discount personal experience had to be overcome. Dworkin therefore wrote in ways bolder and stronger, deeper and colder, than those she opposed. She found the language to make the pain in women's lives capable of speech. Furthermore, she would write what must be written for the freedom and dignity of women in a prose delivered from a militant's heart.

Dworkin claims that freedom for males requires woman as a willing victim. And this is nowhere more clearly seen than in pornography. The coercion is off-screen and the women's smile to the camera is the forced smile within an act of rape. Pornographic culture graphically and systematically sexualizes inequality. Indeed, she claims, the word "pornography" is derived from ancient Greek words for writing about whores. She believes this is a case of truth in wording because it is essentially hierarchical. Worse, both right and left-wing ideology aligns against woman's rights. Pornography consists of male ideas orchestrated as "expression" in a manner that both physically and conceptually results in the destruction of woman as human. The self is seen as constructed through social institutions and reinforced through their interactions. Because culture instantiates male power, the "reasonable man" perspective is able to rule. Pornography is where this perspective is most clearly seen and inscribed. In it, woman becomes man's speech. And within pornography, the male perspective constructs a conception of woman as the object that wants and provokes its (mis)use. That is, pornography's overarching theme is that woman wants it. Indeed, woman is "actualized" through force because that is her "metaphysical nature."

This conception of pornography was central to the Dworkin-MacKinnon anti-pornography ordinance. It addressed the harms and obstructions of the pornography industry by trying to protect the women within the industry. As Dworkin puts it, it was aimed at protecting substantive equality rather than formal equality. The ideas behind this political action are analyzed in *Pornography: Men Possessing Women* (1981). The question was framed as not whether pornography is protected under the First Amendment, but

rather whether pornography keeps women from exercising their First Amendment rights.

Dworkin's book *Intercourse* (1987) offered multiple vignettes of the place of women in lives of men. Through investigations of such figures as Tolstoy's wife, Sophie and Joan of Arc, Dworkin exposed intercourse as not as healthy or liberating as society portrays it, because it can be dangerous to women, exposing them to vulnerabilities which often lead to the construction of defenses, evasions, and aggressions. Sex is hardly private – it is essentially constructed through social meanings and actions; the pretense that sex is outside of culture is false. This insight, Dworkin noted, was actively resisted in the United States because sex was conceptualized as so morally right that speaking against seems immoral, if not unpatriotic and sacrilegious.

Dworkin's hope, exemplified in her career, is that the meanings of gender could be constructed in a different way, one where women had freedom and dignity and voices of their own. She tried to construct that possibility through speeches, writings, and changes to the law. The continued ubiquity of pornography in modern society doesn't mean that her work was in vain. Improved sexual harassment laws, rape laws, and other laws are evidence that some essential battles were won.

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Brian E. Butler

DWORKIN, RONALD MYLES (1931–2013)

Ronald M. Dworkin was born on 11 December 1931 in Worcester, Massachusetts. He received a BA degree from Harvard University in 1953, another BA and an MA from Oxford University in 1955 and the LLB

from Harvard in 1957. For the next year he served as Harvard Law School clerk for Judge Learned Hand at the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Manhattan. Dworkin then became an associate at the Sullivan & Cromwell law firm in New York in 1958 and was admitted to the bar in 1959. Dworkin's academic career started as assistant professor of law at Yale University in 1962. He was promoted to professor in 1965, and was Wesley N. Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence in 1968–1969. In addition, he was visiting professor of philosophy at Princeton University in 1963, Gauss seminarian in 1965–1966, visiting professor of law at Stanford University in 1967, and Case lecturer at Case Western Reserve University in 1967. In 1969 Dworkin went to England as Chair of Jurisprudence at the University of Oxford, succeeding H.L.A. Hart, and he held this chair until 1998. Dworkin returned to America to teach at Princeton University in 1974. He then became professor of law at New York University in 1975, and becoming Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law and professor of philosophy at New York University, and he also was Quain Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London starting in 1998. Dworkin died on 14 February 2013 in London, England.

Dworkin's scope crosses a number of different disciplines; he weaves together sophisticated legal, political, and philosophical theories and inquiries with a great deal of clarity. His extensive work in the *New York Review of Books* is also notable – he published eighty articles there between 1968 and the spring of 2003 – as is his work for the United States Congress on legal aspects of Alzheimer's disease. Dworkin's account of law is directly connected to a view of moral principles, to an ethics. In holding onto the democratic ideal of equality as a fundamental virtue, he advances a theory of interpretation

of law that rests on a moral base. His addition of integrity as a means for interpreting law is as admirable as it is inspirational. After pointing out the shortcomings of more traditional and present ruling methods of interpretation, Dworkin builds a theory rooted in the foundation of morality with integrity and equality at its core. Additionally, he hopes to promote a system that would increase the consistency and fairness of verdicts made by judges by rooting their decisions in a moral framework. Dworkin always stands up for the rights of the individual, but never in a blind or unqualified fashion.

Rather than leave the ideal of equality as vague and undefined, Dworkin expresses a connection with one's ability to share in the national prosperity. His theory also entails a certain perspective on life, as one is responsible toward society to assist the maintenance of the legal system by following the laws set forth. Within this illustration, Dworkin exemplifies an important overlap between law and ethics. Equality is also defined in terms of the equal concern for the interests and well being of all citizens within a community. Further, he identifies constitutional law as the greatest current concern in judicial affairs. This concern, according to Dworkin, lies in two parts. The first deals with the topic of the liberty a citizen holds in a democracy. He claims that we must find the line that separates the majority's rights to determination and the rights of the individual that the majority may not determine. Second, Dworkin claims that constitutional law must also deal with a clear conception of equality that can be set as a reachable goal. A major issue in this debate from Dworkin's perspective is found in the distribution of wealth and opportunity.

The greater portion of his major works contributes additions of a moral perspective to various aspects of the American legal

system. However, his distinction between the "inside-out" and "outside-in" relationships between theory and practice may also prove to be quite influential to the more general philosophical world. In explaining his methods of approach in *Sovereign Virtue*, Dworkin may have uncovered the solution to the contemporary philosophical debate over theory and practice. According to Dworkin, one manner of inquiry, which he labels the inside-out approach, begins with a controversial issue and works toward a structure of theory. On the other hand, one may begin with theory and seek to apply it by some practical means later. This distinction drawn by Dworkin certainly will have American pragmatists scratching their heads over their blur of any concrete distinction between theory and practice at all.

Dworkin's first book, *Taking Rights Seriously* (1977), was both highly acclaimed and controversial. In it, he deems the "ruling theory" of law as defective. According to Dworkin, this ruling theory is made up of two distinct parts: legal positivism and utilitarianism. Both of these parts fail in their treatment of individual rights. Rights, according to Dworkin, are not always had merely because of explicit legislation; they exist prior to such action and the justification for these rights is found in equality. He identifies an ethical basis as the fundamental purpose of all law, which is the equal treatment of all citizens within a community.

Dworkin's *A Matter of Principle* (1985) includes a good deal of discussion on and explanation of his conception of liberalism, demonstrating a number of contexts in which he advances the relationship between moral principle and law. Other topics in these essays deal with discrimination (both academic and employment), methods of

adjudication, censorship, and the freedom of the press.

Dworkin's 1986 book *Law's Empire* provides a further point of view on law with a heavy philosophical slant as well as a detailed analysis on interpretation of law. The primary topic of his discussion revolves around his answer to the question over the ability of law to rule based on the silence, lack of clarity, and ambiguity of law books. Judges, according to Dworkin, do not merely apply past legal decisions to present cases – they must also interpret these past decisions as well. After dismissing the contemporary conventionalist and pragmatist points of view on the interpretation of law based on their shortcomings, Dworkin provides his alternative view of “law as integrity.” The conventionalist method is too rooted in tradition and the established authority for Dworkin's taste, while the pragmatist perspective is so disconnected that one may interpret the law in a manner that suits the individual's advantage. In constructing a method by which the past may be read into the future regarding legal decisions, Dworkin illustrates a further injection of morality into the legal system.

In *Life's Dominion* (1993), Dworkin channels his attention on the issues of abortion and euthanasia. Regarding the 1973 case of *Roe v. Wade*, Dworkin maintains that by deciding the Texas law against abortion was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court, which he notes is an appointed and unelected branch of government, in effect made law. From his perspective, abortion is not a matter that rests on the rights of the fetus, but on the intrinsic value of human life. Dworkin further compares the question of abortion with that of euthanasia and again provides a detailed philosophical discussion on human life, highlighting the social and political

implications of euthanasia. According to his view, the debate over euthanasia must include recognition for respect for the choice of the patient, his or her best interests, and the intrinsic value of human life. In addition, Dworkin echoes his perspective of ethical individualism, i.e., the view that humans have a moral responsibility to actualize their potential to the fullest and make something good out of life.

His 1996 work *Freedom's Law* provides additional suggestions for a stronger bond between ethics and the legal system in order to enhance the latter. Dworkin advances his perspective of the American Constitution and the interpretation of this document by Supreme Court Judges in the United States. The moral reading of the Constitution that he recommends preserves the ideals that he deems are found in any real democracy, by which certain types of constitutional clauses are seen as “moral principles.” In his observations on representative government, Dworkin provides a detailed view of how collective action relates to the decisions made based on interpretations of the Constitution. It is clear that his influence in the future of legal interpretation will be monumental. This work also deals with important social issues such as abortion, euthanasia, affirmative action, race, homosexuality, and free speech, while analyzing major decisions such as *Roe v. Wade*, the *Cruzan* case, and the *New York Times v. Sullivan*. The inclusion of his debate with Catherine MacKinnon over the legality of pornography also is noteworthy, as is his discussion of the defeat of Judge Robert Bork and the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas.

Dworkin's *Sovereign Virtue* (2000) and later books such as *Justice for Hedgehogs* (2011) provide further inquiry into the subject of equality among citizens. Dworkin

identifies equality as the fundamental virtue to any democracy and as key for the legitimacy for any form of government. He explores different models of equality, such as that of welfare and resources, and illustrates equality of resources as the more desirable model. Equality is properly defined in terms of the equality of concern over the citizens of a community. Since “indiscriminate equality” is never an acceptable practice, he maintains that society should set out as a goal the equal concern for all and notes the implications this view would have on the making and enactment of law. He also returns to an examination of the relationship between equality and liberty, again rejecting the traditional view that these two ideals are exclusive of one another and in direct conflict with each other. In addition, Dworkin includes another primary message from his prior works: his theory of ethical individualism. The responsibility each person holds for the success of their life and the choices they make is an integral acknowledgment for the advancement of society.

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Jeffrey R. Post

E

EDEL, ABRAHAM (1908–2007)

Abraham Edel was born on 6 December 1908 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He received his BA in 1927 and his MA in 1928 from McGill University, a BA from Oxford University in 1930, and a PhD from Columbia University in 1934, where he came under the strong influence of John Dewey's pragmatism and naturalism. He was a member of the philosophy department of City College of New York from 1931 to 1973, and a distinguished professor of the CUNY Graduate School during 1970–1973. Since his retirement he has been a research professor of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania. He has held visiting appointments at Columbia University, University of California at Berkeley, Swarthmore College, and Case Western Reserve University among others. Edel was an associate at the National Humanities Center (1978–1979); senior fellow at the Center for Dewey Studies (1981–1982); recipient of the Butler Silver Medal from Columbia University (1959); and a Guggenheim fellow (1944–1945). He has been Vice-President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (1972–1973); President of the American Society of Value Inquiry (1984); and President of the American Section of the International Association of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (1973–1975). In 1995 Edel received the Herbert W. Schneider Award for contributions to the understanding and development of American philosophy from the Society for the

Advancement of American Philosophy. Edel died on 22 June 2007 in New York City.

For well over fifty years Abraham Edel has explored ethical theory and moral practice in his extensive writings. He is the author of numerous works in moral philosophy and collaborated with Yervant H. Krikorian, his wife May M. Edel, and Elizabeth Flower in works on philosophy and ethics. In all his works he shows a commitment to empirical and scientific methods which he believes are fruitful toward the illumination of ethics. Naturalism in ethics, which Edel favors, does not imply that the problems of ethics are simple or easy. It certainly does not imply that a naturalistic moral philosophy can reach a finality or completeness by laying down fixed principles. A naturalistic moral philosophy must remain *open* and cannot stop short of fashioning a whole conception of good individuals functioning well in a good society.

In his first large-scale work *Ethical Judgment: The Uses of Science in Ethics* (1955), Edel discusses at length the problem of ethical relativity. Edel with his naturalism is willing to forgo absolute, final or a priori conclusions for ethics. If ethics is to truly apply to the world then its theories must somehow be tested by experience. Ethics, he claims, must make use of science and like science be willing to modify its methods and correct its mistakes. This implies that ethical judgments are not simply arbitrary but, like those of science, they are or can be made careful and rational. Carefulness is itself a scientific and a moral virtue, testable by its usefulness.

Likewise honesty is a value not merely in a moral sense, but also in an intellectual sense. This agrees with Edel's basic point that moral values are not special or peculiar. Moral values permeate and are relevant to all human endeavors.

Edel's 1963 *Method in Ethical Theory* attempts to do justice to the factual as well as the normative functions of ethics. That ethics must be both descriptive and prescriptive, empirical and valuational or normative, raises the so-called fact-value or is-ought questions. Like the problem of relativity in ethics, the fact-value or is-ought problem has many different strands or dimensions. Edel faces anew the problem of how suitable methods can be devised which can make piecemeal but not wholesale progress toward both better theories and better applications. Here Edel shows the great influence of Dewey's experimental naturalism, in his attempt to solve the problems of ethical methodology. Edel, along with his strong interest in ethics, also kept up an abiding interest in Aristotle. His dissertation at Columbia was on Aristotle's theory of the infinite. Subsequently, he published two books on Aristotle's philosophy in 1967 and 1982. Edel also continued his interest in Dewey. In 2001 he published *Ethical Theory and Social Change: The Evolution of John Dewey's Ethics*.

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Guy W. Stroh

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1703 1758)

Jonathan Edwards was born on 5 October 1703 in East Windsor, Connecticut, where his father Timothy Edwards was minister. Edwards attended Yale College from 1716 to 1720, receiving the BA degree. He received the MA degree there in 1723. He was tutor at the college from 1724 to 1726. Profound intellectual ferment shaped the near decade that he spent in New Haven. This was aided in part by Jeremiah Dummer's gift of some 800 volumes by means of which students at Yale had direct access to the philosophical works of Locke, Descartes, Malebranche, Gassendi, and the third Earl of Shaftesbury, the scientific works of Galileo, Newton, Boyle, Huygens, and Hooke, and the critical historical writings of Jean Bodin, Pierre Bayle, and others. Edwards's absorption of these texts was one of the contributing factors in his becoming the most significant philosophical thinker in America prior to the Civil War.

Edwards made his professional mark as one of the pioneers and architects of the revival of the early eighteenth century known as the Great Awakening. Having succeeded his grandfather in the pulpit of Northampton in 1729, he began his senior ministry by promoting the importance of personal conversion in his preaching. He soon published *A Divine and Supernatural Light* (1734), one of the sermons that had helped spark the revival, and that provided its theological underpinning. He also produced an account of the revival in his *Faithful Narrative of a Surprising Work of God* (1737), a work that brought him international acclaim, putting him in the literary company of men such as George Whitefield, Isaac Watts, and John Wesley. As the leading spokesman for New Light supporters of the revivals, Edwards published several substantial treatises on the

topic of religious experience and emotion, including *The Distinguishing Marks of the Work of the Spirit of God* (1741), *Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of Religion in New England* (1742), and his most considered treatment, *The Religious Affections* (1746). In 1749 he published his edited version of *The Life of David Brainerd*, a work that was to serve as a lasting inspiration for nineteenth-century Protestant missions.

As the revivals ebbed in the late 1740s, so did Edwards's relationship with his congregation. In 1748 his opponents used his proposal to limit access to the sacrament of the Eucharist to the truly converted as the instrument of his dismissal. Edwards wanted to reverse the fifty-year policy of Solomon Stoddard, a stance that must have seemed uncharitable, if not heretical. Though he published a defense of his views (*A Humble Inquiry Concerning... Full Communion*), the parties were irreconcilable. A council was convened, and the church voted him out. In 1751 Edwards moved his family to the Indian mission of Stockbridge, where he served for seven years. In 1758 he replaced his recently deceased son-in-law, Aaron Burr, as the president of the College of New Jersey at Princeton (later Princeton University). He died three months later after being inoculated for smallpox, on 22 March 1758 in Princeton, New Jersey.

In the midst of this turmoil Edwards finalized and published his most important philosophical treatises, which addressed the relationship of religion to major currents of Enlightenment thought. These included *The Freedom of the Will* (1754) and *Original Sin* (1758), as well as *The Nature of True Virtue* and *The End for Which God Created the World* (1765). Edwards's philosophical thought can be classed among a fraternity of late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century "theocentric" philosophers that includes

the likes of Gottfried Leibniz, Nicolas Malebranche, the Cambridge Platonists, and George Berkeley. All of these influences led Edwards, as they had led others such as Berkeley, to a version of idealism. As it had for other theocentric philosophers, Edwards's version of idealism had implications for his understanding of causality that led in the direction of occasionalism. The universe is constituted as a system of divine ideas. Its continued existence therefore depends on God's arbitrary determination to maintain those ideas in a steady stream of consciousness. All physical relations, causes, and interactions are dependent on God for their continued, consistent, and orderly operations. The laws of nature are actually the expression of the complex and harmonious workings of the divine mind and will. Edwards's idealism also allowed him to embrace an important aspect of Cambridge Platonism. The world is an ideal one; it is also a communicative one, since it is an expression of inter-trinitarian deliberations. For Edwards, this *ad extra* form of communication was fundamentally providential and redemptive in nature. The structure of the universe itself must be organized in such a way as to communicate the theology of redemption through the typological significance of its parts and workings.

Edwards was the first American to systematically describe religion as a category of experience. In doing so he was engaged in several quintessentially Enlightenment projects: the problem of the subjective, the explanatory power of naturalism, submitting human (religious) behavior to empirical (moral and psychological) analysis, and the relations of reason, will, and feeling in human behavior. As such he stands in line with other seminal American thinkers about religion, such as William James. Edwards's analytical writing about religious experience

reaches back to his early sermons, such as *A Divine and Supernatural Light* (1734), and was expanded in *The Distinguishing Marks of the Work of the Spirit of God* (1741), *Some Thoughts on the Present Revival of Religion in New England* (1742), and *A Treatise concerning Religious Affections* (1746).

Edwards's most consequential conclusion was that true religion is rooted in the affections, specifically in a delight in God's ontological and moral beauty. Affections indicate one's pleasure or displeasure with a particular object, and thus are ultimately expressions of the will. Like Augustine, Edwards understands the will to be determined by what appears to the intellect as the last, greatest, apparent good – the mind making choices. The mind's choices are rooted in the degree of affections it has; the affections are the “vigorous and sensible exercises” of the will, the “spring of action” for behavior. True religion consists in the desire for God, or holy affections. Such an inclination cannot come naturally, since sin has rendered the natural affections to include base impulses. The religious affections can only arise when the soul has encountered divine grace, so that the mind and will are reconciled to God.

Edwards's allegiance to the voluntarist moral tradition allowed him to deny to the rational faculty any final determination in religion. Rationality was a natural function of the mind relegated to the comprehension of religious ideas. Knowing the content of a religion cannot induce the mind to find pleasure in it, and so embrace it. The epistemological content of a religion does not comprise its essence. Rather, “true” religion consists in the mind's volitional orientation to religious beliefs: one must have an affective delight in them, and so choose to live out their imperatives.

Additional currents were important to the development of Edwards's ethics: British moral sense theory as found in the work of Francis Hutcheson and the third Earl of

Shaftesbury, and the Arminian rejection of Calvinist moral determinism, typified by the works of dissenting theologian John Taylor and the Anglican cleric Daniel Whitby. Edwards's responses to these developments represent the last and most significant phase of his intellectual career, resulting in four major treatises: *Freedom of Will* (1754), *Original Sin* (1758), *The End for which God Created the World* (1765), and *The Nature of True Virtue* (1765).

In these mature works Edwards takes on the assertion that natural human morality can attain the status of true virtue. Hutcheson and others had argued that humans naturally possessed the fullness of conscience, of benevolence to fellow beings, and therefore could act virtuously. Edwards argued that without divine grace the soul can have only an intellectual notion of virtue. To have true virtue is to have benevolence to Being in general, that is, to God, and in order to have benevolence to God, the soul (mind, will, heart) must possess an affective appreciation of divine beauty or excellence. Edwards followed the conventional Augustinian and Calvinist understanding of the will's freedom as being determined by what it loves and perceives as the good. The natural human will is free to choose what it desires. But since it is deprived by sin, what it desires is counter to true goodness, and thus it is not truly free. It can only perceive and choose true goodness after the application of grace; that is, it can only be truly free when it has been determined by God.

Intimately connected to Edwards's consideration of the will's ability to choose was his interest in the origins of the will's inclinations. Thus he followed up his dissertation on the freedom of the will with his treatise *Original Sin*, in press at his death in 1758, a work that cemented his reputation as the last great American defender of Calvinism. Edwards reaffirms the Augustinian notion of

the federal unity of humanity in Adam, but he does so by appealing to his metaphysical idealism. Since existence, including all human existence and identity, persists by God's constant thinking and willing, it is perfectly conceivable to think of humanity as a morally unified entity. In this sense Edwards's explication of imputed guilt shifts from a historical argument (guilt by descent) to an ontological one (guilt by shared being).

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Robert E. Brown

EDWARDS, PAUL (1923–2004)

Paul Edwards was born on 2 September 1923, in Vienna, Austria, and later became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Edwards received his education at the University of Melbourne (BA 1944, MA 1947), and at Columbia University (PhD in philosophy, 1951). He held appointments at the University of Melbourne (1945–1947) and New York University (1949–1966). From 1966 until his retirement in 1986, he was a professor of philosophy at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. He held visiting positions at Columbia University, the University of California, Berkeley and the New School of Social Research. In 1964–1965 he was a Guggenheim fellow. Edwards died on 9 December 2004 in New York City.

In his 1955 book, *The Logic of Moral Discourse*, Edwards developed a metaethical analysis that combines naturalism with emotivism, theories ordinarily regarded as incompatible, claiming they can, and need to be, combined. Edwards's book was dedicated to Ernest Nagel and contained an introduction by Sidney Hook. Both Nagel and Hook were proponents of philosophical naturalism. Rejecting intuitionism and all forms of subjectivism, Edwards attempted to combine objective or scientific naturalism, as in John Dewey, and emotivism, as in Charles Stevenson and others. When we claim that a person or action is good, according to Edwards, our approval of certain objective qualities of that person or action is what determines our moral judgment. But when we judge that the person or action is good we are referring to the qualities of each and not to our *approval* of them. His agreement with emotivism is that the referent of a moral judgment is determined by the judger's attitude, but his agreement with naturalism is his claim that the referent of a moral judgment is not the judger's attitude

but the natural facts or qualities of the action or situation that is presented for approval. This distinction, Edwards admits, is a fine one but, nevertheless, important. It allows him to agree with Dewey and naturalism in claiming that moral judgments are cognitively significant since they must contain a reference to empirical facts that can be, and need to be, verified.

At the same time, this distinction allows him to agree with Stevenson and the emotive theory in claiming that an act of approval or evaluation must be made or determined by some individual, otherwise no moral or value judgment would be involved. Edwards also goes *beyond* Stevenson's emotive theory on a number of other points. For one, he argues that it is possible to give reasons for moral judgments that surpass mere causal factors. Edwards's view is a form of cognitivism and can allow us to speak of confirming reasons or evidence for moral judgments which depend on not how well they persuade individuals, but which themselves can be tested logically and empirically to determine their validity or cogency. Also, Edwards argued that moral disputes can be settled in a number of ways, not simply if both parties arrive at the same view, whether that view has been proven or not. Edwards claimed that moral judgments do have emotive or expressive meaning, but that factual or referential meaning is not incidental to the character of the judgment. As a naturalist in ethics, Edwards cannot allow that good is non-natural, non-temporal or unconditional. Anything good in ethics, or anything good at all, will have conditions that are subject to time and change. For Edwards, that the so-called naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy in name only. Emotions, desires, interests, etc., are all *relevant* to ethics since without them there would not be ethics or value judgments at all.

Edwards served as editor-in-chief of the eight volume *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* published

in 1967. Over the years this reference work has perhaps been more widely used than any other reference work in philosophy. As editor, Edwards was quite candid about his preference for the empirical and analytic tradition of Anglo-Saxon philosophy which controlled his chosen topics and space allotments of the work. Edwards also served as general editor for the Library of Philosophical Movements.

In his other writings, on Martin Buber and Martin Heidegger, Edwards is extremely critical of what he considers a lack of clarity and a tendency to provoke mystery by obscure and invented terminology. For Edwards, clarity is always a virtue in philosophy, and so is honesty. He is always in favor of trying to judge a philosophy on moral grounds. This he believes is consistent with his metaethical view that moral judgments are fundamentally factual and emotive.

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Guy W. Stroh

EISELE, CAROLYN (1902–2000)

Carolyn Eisele was born on 13 June 1902 in Bronx, New York, and died on 15 January 2000 in New York City. She attended Hunter College High School in New York City before entering Hunter College in 1919. She graduated with a BA and honors, Phi Beta Kappa, in 1923. Eisele then began her graduate studies in mathematics at Columbia University, where she later counted it as her good fortune to have taken David Eugene Smith's famous course on the history of mathematics, in addition to other courses with Cassius J. Keyser. After receiving her MA in mathematics and education in 1923 (with an emphasis on history of mathematics), she continued her graduate study, spending several summers at the University of Chicago and later at the University of Southern California. Unfortunately, due to illness and increasing responsibilities for her parents at home, she never completed a doctorate.

Eisele was offered a position teaching mathematics at Hunter College immediately upon her graduation. Her teaching career in the department of mathematics and statistics spanned nearly fifty years, from 1923 until her retirement in 1972, with a promotion to full professor in 1965. In 1952 she received

a grant from the American Philosophical Society to support her research on Peirce in both Cambridge and Washington. Among Peirce's works that particularly attracted Eisele's attention were the many studies he presented to the American Academy of Sciences, in particular one entitled "On Two Map-Projections of the Lobatschewskian Plane," which Peirce had never printed, but which Eisele wrote up as a separate article, "The Quincuncial Map-Projection of Charles S. Peirce" (1963). She also realized that serious study of Peirce's original contributions to American science while a member of the Coast Survey had yet to be undertaken.

Her edition of Peirce's *New Elements of Mathematics*, comprised of volumes devoted to "Arithmetic," "Algebra and Geometry," "Mathematical Miscellanea" (which required two books), and "Mathematical Philosophy," was published with a subvention from the Dewey Foundation in 1976. This was also the year in which the Peirce Bicentennial International Congress was held. Eisele committed herself to the congress with great energy to insure its success as the first international meeting to be devoted entirely to Peirce. In addition to securing the cooperation of the Dutch academic community and negotiating approval of the Congress as an official international event of the U.S. bicentennial celebrations that year, she also engaged the help of the cultural attaché at the American Embassy. Not only did the Peirce Congress result in a volume of proceedings that appeared in 1981, but in the meantime, a volume of Eisele's own papers appeared in 1979.

Eisele was concerned that most readers would not appreciate the role mathematics had played in Peirce's life and works, and therefore she was determined to produce a new work, to make clear how his mathematical stance is essential to an understanding of his

philosophy. This effort would lead to Eisele's last major contribution to Peirce studies, her two volumes devoted to *Historical Perspectives on Peirce's Logic of Science: A History of Science* (1985).

When Eisele retired from Hunter College in 1972, she was elected to the Hunter Hall of Fame in recognition of her outstanding achievements. By then, she had made many contributions, not just to the field of Peirce studies, but to the professionalization of the history of science as a discipline. Eisele was President of the Charles S. Peirce Society from 1973 to 1975. From 1959 to 1962, Eisele served as an elected member of the National Council of the History of Science Society, and the award of a Doctor of Humanities degree *honoris causa* in 1980 by Texas Tech University, where she was also a member of the University's Institute for Studies in Pragmatism. In 1982 she received another Doctor of Science degree *honoris causa* from Lehigh University.

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Joseph W. Dauben

ELSHTAIN, JEAN BETHKE (1941–2013)

Jean Bethke Elshtain was born on January 6, 1941 in Windsor, Colorado. She earned a BA at Colorado State University (1963), MA degrees in history from the University of Wisconsin (1964) and the University of Colorado (1965), and a PhD in politics from Brandeis University in Massachusetts in 1973. She was an instructor at the University of Massachusetts, Boston (1973–1976) and then a professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst (1976–1987). In 1988 she went to Vanderbilt University as Centennial Professor of Political Science, becoming the first woman to hold an endowed professorship at Vanderbilt. In 1989 she added the title of Professor of Philosophy there. In 1995 she became Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago in the Divinity School. She was also a member of both the Political Science Department and the Committee on International Relations. Elshtain died on 11 August 2013 at a long-term care facility in Nashville, Tennessee.

Her academic honors were numerous. A few of note were Phi Beta Kappa Scholar, Fellow of the American Academic of Arts and Sciences, Fellow of Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study, and Guggenheim Fellow. Elshtain was appointed by George W. Bush to the Council of the National Endowment for the Humanities. She also presented the Gifford Lectures at University of Edinburgh in 2005–06.

A public intellectual involved in the justification of national and international political policy, as a theorist she started out on the liberal side of the spectrum and ended on the conservative side. As described in *Women and War*, she early on was at war with herself, advocating left-liberal ideals and yet thinking that the ideals did not properly account for the complexity seen in the real social and political world. This set her at odds with what she thought of as overly concept-driven doctrinaires. In *Real Politics* she described her mature style of scholarship as “counterpunching” against this doctrinaire strain of analysis, especially against any theorists occupying a “messianic role.” This led her to constantly emphasize the subtle and messy nature of political analysis. Ultimately Elshtain was adopted by neoconservative policy makers because of her justification of the “war on terror.” This justification was constructed through application of her take on the Augustinian just war tradition. This stance, Elshtain claimed, followed from her advocacy of political theory with ethics at its center.

She described just war tradition as a theory of “comparative justice.” In accepting that there is something that is properly described as “just war” the stance expressly repudiates the “realism” of Hobbes and Machiavelli, where justice is inapplicable between nations, as well as pacifism, where no war is ever justified. Elshtain argues that within just war theory one must look at competing values as

well as effects of action and probability of success. Further, there is also the possibility of tragedy, that is, of a situation where there may not be a single right choice. For her all of this comes out of the Augustinian tradition. The theory rests upon a hope for human solidarity and plurality but with full awareness of the existence of original sin. Because of this, human beings are recognized to be fragile and broken. The individual is, therefore, not a “chained beast” but not a little angel either. In such a world the best is not ever perfect, and “Human motives and actions are always mixed.” For Elshtain it is important to realize that human beings are always situated in traditions. Groups are important.

Fundamentally, Elshtain explains, just war theory begins within a context of complex, normative commitments, and must face these in combination with pragmatic considerations. Yet though the pragmatic considerations are required, “moral appeals are at the heart of the matter – not the *only* matter but the place from which one starts. These moral appeals are not abstract deontological *disiderata* but, rather, a version of *phronesis*, or ‘practical reason,’ in a neo-Aristotelian sense.” And because it is Aristotelian *Phronesis*, immutable rules are not available, but reasoning about just war is rather a process of clarification. For her this means that complexity must be faced directly. Even so, some basics can be listed. For a war to be just, she argues that the following factors must be true. First, there must be justifiable cause of substantial importance. Next, there can be no presumption of moral innocence or full guilt. In addition, the war must have reasonable chance of success. Further, the damage that results must not be greater than the justifying offense. Finally, the ultimate aim must be peace with greater chance of justice. This last factor is important in that it shows that just war theory requires attention to results after the war is over as well. Using this

theory she concluded that the Clinton doctrine of humanitarian intervention was unexamined and incoherent. On the other hand, the Persian Gulf War and the resulting United States policies on torture she found justified with one minor caveat. While thinking it justified she lamented that justification for those actions started with just war theory but then quickly became overly simplistic.

She certainly was not a conservative advocating for market-based politics. A better description of the position she held was that of a communitarian conservative. Her own label for her theory was that of “realist” – but not in the traditional international relations sense of realist. Instead hers would better be characterized as an Augustinian and Niebuhrian realism (also very important to her were Vaclav Havel and Hannah Arendt). Realism in Elshtain’s sense is largely attached to a sense of the reality of human limits and the hubris of trying to understand or worse reengineer society based upon dogmatically held concepts. Her writings repeatedly emphasize a sense of human finitude and temptation toward hubris. In its place she aims to identify complexity, therefore exposing through her counterpunching the blindspots of any utopian or monoculture view of human realities. She thought John Rawls’ political theory to be highly abstract, and devoid of empirical grounding. She contrasted this type of abstract theory and fixation on governmental structure with events such as the social reaction, not the political reaction, to Hurricane Katrina’s destruction in New Orleans. This, she thought, showed strong social solidarity outside of the limits of the political. Her constant refrain is that analysis must return to the concrete world as reality so as to avoid overarching concept mongering.

One further aspect of her self-proclaimed realism was the demand that religion be

allowed into political discussion. Elshtain did not argue for the elimination of the doctrine of separation of church and state. On the other hand, she did reject the separation of religion and politics – they were for her inseparable and rightly held together.

Possibly her most influential book was *Democracy on Trial*. Therein Elshtain argued for the central need for morality in democracy. Combined with the emphasis on ethical politics was a critique of rights-based views because they often ignore the corresponding responsibilities. As a theorist that focuses upon community she emphasized that democracy is broader than the political realm. Once again the themes of human finitude and theoretical hubris are central, along with a focus upon civic morals. Also important to her was awareness of the tension between individualism and needs of vulnerable. Her solution was a flourishing civic realm and patriotism. Also emphasized was another of her moral topics – that of protecting the ideals of the “traditional family.”

As appropriate for an avowed Augustinian, Jean Bethke Elshtain ended life as a Catholic. On top of the focus upon complexity and realities of human finitude, she expressed her central aim as protecting the dignity of human beings. Elshtain’s realism looked to the complex writings of the western tradition to keep complexity alive and combine hope, a sense of human frailty and forgiveness.

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EMERSON, RALPH WALDO (1803–1882)

Ralph Waldo Emerson was born on 25 May 1803 in Boston, Massachusetts, to William and Ruth Haskins Emerson. Emerson's aunt, Mary Moody Emerson, who was deeply mystical and rather morose, became an early intellectual influence on him. After attending Boston Latin School from 1812 to 1817, Emerson entered Harvard College at the age of fourteen, where he studied German philosophy with Edward Everett and George Ticknor. Levi Frisbie and Levi Hedge introduced Emerson to Scottish Common Sense philosophy. After graduating from Harvard with his BA degree in 1821, Emerson taught elementary school with his brother William. By 1825, however, he resumed his own studies with training for the Unitarian ministry at the recently founded Harvard Divinity School. He was approbated to preach, and in 1827 he began to do so in Boston and nearby towns.

On a visit to Concord, New Hampshire, he met Ellen Louisa Tucker, whom he married in 1829, the same year he was invited to fill the pulpit of the Second Church in Boston. Emerson gave sermons that emphasized the role of ethical conduct in lieu of reliance on saving grace. He denied the Calvinist theology of human depravity, and affirmed Jesus as a moral exemplar fit to guide human life. Ellen died of tuberculosis in early 1831. In addition to coping with this loss, Emerson continued to doubt his adaptability to the ministry. In the summer of 1832, he confessed, "I have sometimes thought that in order to be a good minister it was necessary to leave the ministry."

Later the same year, Emerson asked the leaders of his congregation if he could refrain from administering the Eucharist, and wrote "The Lord's Supper" to explain his objection to the doctrine of Transubstantiation. Emerson resigned from the Church when his request was denied. In December 1832, he boarded a ship to Europe, where he met Coleridge and William Wordsworth, and, by way of John Stuart Mill, he was introduced to Thomas Carlyle, who became a lifelong friend and correspondent.

Upon returning to Boston, Emerson embarked on a career of public lecturing. Soon after, he married Lydia Jackson, with whom he had two daughters and a son who lived to maturity. Emerson bought a house in Concord, Massachusetts, and lived there with his family for the rest of his life. The year 1836 proved tumultuous for Emerson; his beloved brother Charles died, his first book *Nature* was published, and his first son Waldo was born.

In *Nature*, Emerson blends his interest in Plato and Stoic philosophy with re-conceptions of divinity, history, and individual identity. He employs Kantian terminology, which came to him by way of Coleridge, with a rigor, compactness, and innovation that lead many to cite this short book as a founding document of transcendentalist thinking. Emerson moved away from overtly Christian language, and toward ideas that are more generic and conceptually fluid, but also more concretely philosophical. For example, where he had a keen interest in the life of Jesus as an exemplar, he now broadens his interest to include human conduct widely construed. In *Nature*, he takes this to an extreme, since he argues that nature provides a "discipline" for the moral life, and that its lessons are coextensive with the deepest wisdom of human performance and perfectibility: "Nature, in its ministry, is not only the material, but is also the process and

the result” (1983, 12). The source of this instruction provides a moral foundation for the network of criticisms and commentaries Emerson will develop in the coming years, since it reinforces the idea that human life should not remain beholden to the past or bounded by custom and dogma. Rather, the infinitude of nature entails the scope of human possibility in thought and action. For Emerson, this meant revelation is based on private insight, and redemption is a matter of human imagination and will.

In August 1837, Emerson delivered “The American Scholar,” an oration to the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Harvard. Emerson used the occasion to assess the current state of American thinking. Part of the query involved speculation on whether there was such thinking to speak of. The scholar, as “Man Thinking,” should be dedicated to thinking his own thoughts, and in that process aware of three primary influences on his thinking: nature, the past in the form of books, and the future in the prospect of action (1983, 12). The next summer, the seniors at the Divinity School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, invited Emerson to offer a graduation address. Where, in “The American Scholar,” he critiques habits of thinking in general terms, in the “Address” he advances a more specialized version of the earlier appraisal. In particular, he raises doubts about orthodox Christian faith and the implications of believing in miracles. Christianity errs by making truth seem an established fact of prior history, and thereby making God seem distant. Emerson contends that God is an immanent fact of human life, and that such presence is only perceptible when each person draws from “the religious sentiment” that abides within. The reaction from the Address at the Divinity School was severely negative. Already separated from the Church, Emerson was now effectively

banned from the academy; he wouldn’t be invited back to Harvard until 1866, when he was old and famous. Surviving partly on an inheritance from his first wife, he continued to lecture publicly to make up the difference. A lecture circuit was developing to meet the demand of this forum, and Emerson kept pace by writing during the winter and giving speeches during the summer.

In 1841, *Essays* was published in Boston. In the tradition of great essayists from Seneca to Montaigne to Bacon, Emerson wrote on a variety of themes and problems, many of which developed thoughts already present in earlier work, including a fair portion of material written in his extensive journals. “Self-Reliance” remains a striking and enduringly vital essay, perhaps because it stages so effectively the debate between interior inspiration and external influence. Does living with others necessitate that my integrity and identity will be compromised? Can I learn from others how to be who I am, and yet be myself? Emerson mediates the apparent paradox of education by arguing for trust in the “aboriginal Self,” which he cites as the principal guide for negotiating attempted coercion by others (1983, 268).

Essays: Second Series continues the format of the first set of essays. Like the first collection, the topics, however varied, hang together along dominant conceptual lines. Emerson focused perspicuous attention on the nature of human interiority: what makes us who we are, and how we express that nature. In the earlier *Essays*, Emerson dwelled on the benevolence of nature. Now he gives nature a more sober assessment; its gifts are not bestowed without a demand for recompense. Before, Emerson had emphasized the analogical quality of the natural and human relation. In these essays, the analogical relation is depicted as a trade that can have severe costs. In “Experience,” Emerson sets the terms of his revaluation,

specifically the link between fate and freedom, skepticism and belief.

Following up on the idea that Jesus is a fitting moral exemplar, but not the only one, Emerson published *Representative Men* in 1850. The book stands as a report on the character of individual men who, in their talent for self-representation in their creative works, reveal the promise latent in each of us. These representative men – Plato, Swedenborg, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Napoleon, and Goethe – are not exemplars for us to imitate, but examples of what resistance to imitation may produce. Their genius was not in copying others, but in being themselves.

By the mid-1850s, Emerson spoke more explicitly and widely on anti-slavery issues. In his “Lecture on Slavery” in 1854, he writes that the institution is an evil equal to cholera or typhus that has resulted from Americans’ superficial grasp of their own values. Emerson’s capacity for culture critique, and his contribution to social reform movements began with his protest against the Jacksonian plan to relocate the Cherokee Indians. By 1855, Emerson was adapting the same principles he used to reprimand slavery and the mistreatment of Native Americans to the purpose of establishing the rights of women. In a speech before a Women’s Rights Convention, he declared his support that women be given “one half of the world” through equal rights.

In 1860 Emerson published *The Conduct of Life*, which joins issues from the first two series of *Essays* with his more developed political writings from the 1850s. In 1870 Emerson published *Society and Solitude*, a collection of essays that were given as lectures in 1858 and 1859. That same year, he was chosen as an Overseer of Harvard College, and invited to deliver a series of lectures on philosophy. Emerson’s course of sixteen lectures, “The Natural History of Intellect,” was a rigorous summary and systematic

outline of ideas in development for nearly forty years. Emerson died on 27 April 1882 in Concord, Massachusetts.

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David LaRocca

ETZIONI, AMITAI WERNER (1929–)

Amitai Etzioni was born as Werner Falk on 4 January 1929 in Koln, Germany. He later selected his Hebrew name. In 1935 he and his family escaped Germany to live in Palestine (later Israel). He received his BA in 1954 and MA in 1958 from Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He emigrated to the United States, where he received his PhD in sociology from the University of California at Berkeley in 1958. He was appointed instructor of sociology at Columbia University in 1958 and was soon promoted up to full professor by 1967. He was chair of the sociology department from 1969 to 1971. Since 1980, Etzioni has been University Professor at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., and he is also the Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies.

Etzioni was a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution in 1978; a Senior Advisor to the Carter Administration during 1979–80; the Thomas Henry Carroll Ford Foundation Professor at the Harvard Business School during 1987–1989; and has been a visiting

lecturer at many universities. Etzioni was the founding President of the International Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics in 1989–90, and he was President of the American Sociological Association in 1994–95. In 1990 Etzioni founded the Communitarian Network, and edited its journal, *The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities*, from 1991 to 2004. In 2001 Etzioni was awarded the John P. McGovern Award in Behavioral Sciences, and the Officer's Cross of the Order of Merit by the German government.

Etzioni has published over twenty books on a variety of social, economic, and political topics and problems. His general political position has received the label of “communitarianism,” and is allied with the theories of such social theorists as Robert Bellah and Charles Taylor, along with the similar views of Philip Selznick, Michael Walzer, and Michael Sandel. Against what is perceived as excessive individualism in modern social and political theory, communitarians stress how membership in communities is the primary basis for life and politics. By reversing individualism's priorities, the communitarian emphasizes responsibilities over rights and social order over freedom of choice. In Etzioni's model of communitarianism, people should respect each other's dignity and autonomy, to be sure, but the classical liberal theory of rights is insufficient to provide for strong communities because it encourages selfishness over communal bonds and mere rights do not generate shared moral values. Multiple kinds of overlapping communities should simultaneously exist with society, permitting the kind of cultural diversity which encourages people to share in, and change allegiance to, more than one social group.

The Communitarian Platform, designed and endorsed by Etzioni, summarizes his political

aims and perspective. The Platform's Preamble begins as follows: “American men, women, and children are members of many communities – families; neighborhoods; innumerable social, religious, ethnic, work place, and professional associations; and the body politic itself. Neither human existence nor individual liberty can be sustained for long outside the interdependent and overlapping communities to which all of us belong. Nor can any community long survive unless its members dedicate some of their attention, energy, and resources to shared projects. The exclusive pursuit of private interest erodes the network of social environments on which we all depend, and is destructive to our shared experiment in democratic self-government. For these reasons, we hold that the rights of individuals cannot long be preserved without a communitarian perspective. A communitarian perspective recognizes both individual human dignity and the social dimension of human existence. A communitarian perspective recognizes that the preservation of individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of the institutions of civil society where citizens learn respect for others as well as self-respect; where we acquire a lively sense of our personal and civic responsibilities, along with an appreciation of our own rights and the rights of others; where we develop the skills of self-government as well as the habit of governing ourselves, and learn to serve others – not just self.”

For Etzioni, democracy is the best form of government provided that the government is empowered to aid the formation and maintenance of healthy communities of shared values and ways of life. Unlike majoritarians (or assimilationists), communitarians do not recommend social uniformity and conformity to achieve greater social order and cohesion. Like the social pragmatists, such as John Dewey, communitarians expect that public institutions, such as schools, should teach the fundamental

moral values needed in a pluralistic democracy: respect for the dignity of all, toleration of ethnic and religious diversity, and the citizenship skills needed for civic and political life.

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John R. Shook

F

FACKENHEIM, EMIL LUDWIG (1916 2003)

Emil L. Fackenheim was born on 22 June 1916 in Halle, Germany, and he died on 19 September 2003 in Jerusalem, Israel. In 1935, two years after the seizure of power by Hitler, Fackenheim decided to protest the growing hatred of Jews by going to Berlin to study Judaism. He studied for his rabbinical ordination at the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums. His study was interrupted with his arrest the day after *Kristallnacht*, the brutal attack by the Nazis on Jewish persons and property in November 1938. Since the government's policy was still at that time the expulsion of Jews, rather than their physical extermination, Fackenheim was sent to the proto-concentration camp at Sachsenhausen. Upon the guarantee of his intention and ability to leave Germany, he was released from Sachsenhausen in February 1939. Passing his rabbinic exams that year, he left for Scotland and was admitted to the doctoral program at the University of Aberdeen. With the outbreak of the war, he was interred as an enemy alien for a total of twenty months, first in Britain and then in Canada. Released from the internment camp outside of Montréal in December 1941, he attended the University of Toronto and received his PhD in philosophy in 1945. He was a professor of philosophy at the University of Toronto from 1948 to 1981. In 1983, Fackenheim went to Israel and taught at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem until his death.

Fackenheim's first essays, starting from the mid-1950s, explored the nature and viability of Judaism in the modern world. He was greatly influenced by the two twentieth century German-Jewish philosophers, Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber, as well as the nineteenth century Danish Christian philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. Fackenheim saw all three of these figures as powerfully arguing for the importance and philosophical legitimacy of a commitment to God's revelation as a foundation for the religious life of individuals and communities as well as for formulating a critique of modernity. Agreeing with Rosenzweig and Buber, Fackenheim argued against the then dominant view of many liberal Jewish thinkers that the concept of revelation was both antiquated and irrelevant. He insisted that Judaism without a belief in God's past revelations was meaningless, and that the experience of revelation was still open to Jews in the present.

In the early 1960s the topic of the Holocaust took on more and more importance in his essays. He began to suspect that the unprecedented challenge of the Holocaust to the possibility of revelation in the present undermined Rosenzweig's view that no event in history could deeply affect Jewish faith. He also saw Buber's anguishing notion of God's "eclipse" during the Holocaust as an inadequate response.

Two books of 1968, *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought*, and *Quest for Past and Future*, marked the end of the

first period of Fackenheim's work. While publishing essays on Jewish thought during this time, he had also been concerned with the issues of reason, revelation, and authority in medieval and modern philosophy. He was particularly interested in the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. While never a Hegelian, Fackenheim admired Hegel's attempt to bring together, through the concept of Absolute Spirit, reason and revelation, the universal and the particular, eternity and history, and the religious and the secular. The Hegel book concluded that "the Hegelian middle" could not succeed, but that the effort to understand the dialectical relationships between the different features of human existence should not be abandoned. *Quest for Past and Future* brought together Fackenheim's early essays on Jewish faith and Judaism. Fackenheim's own introduction to the collection, "These Twenty Years: A Reappraisal," chronicled the development of his thought but also critiqued it in two areas. First, he now found that the Jewish thinker could only address problems of contemporary life based on a prior commitment to "the singled-out condition" of the Jew, that is, to both the covenant between God and the Jewish people and to the particularities of Jewish existence in history. Second, he recognized that he had not fully faced the "scandal" of Auschwitz, even though Jews throughout the world had answered the threat of Jewish extinction by continuing to live as Jews and to have Jewish children.

God's Presence in History (1970) showed a major advance in Fackenheim's effort, which had started in 1967, to seriously respond to the Holocaust. He saw the challenge of the Holocaust to Jewish faith as unprecedented, in his words; "the God of Israel cannot be God of either past or future unless He is still God of the present" (1973, p. 137). He meant that faith in God's direction of history, or

in history's meaningfulness, cannot restrict itself to the past – the world of the Bible, or to the future – the Messianic Age. If God cannot be connected in some way to this most momentous event of Jewish history, then the God of history is totally lost. While Fackenheim insisted that no clear, direct meaning for the event could be identified, a fragmentary response which followed that of the Jewish people must be formulated. Fackenheim's most famous statement, the formulation of a new "614th commandment" added to Sinai's traditional commandments, was that "Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler posthumous victories. They are commanded to survive as Jews, lest the Jewish people perish" (1970, p. 84). Through this Fackenheim responded by way of *midrash*, that rabbinic form of interpretative story, suggesting that God's commanding presence has been felt by Jews through their conscious and unconscious recognition that Jewish survival is a sacred duty. Fackenheim's collection of essays, *The Jewish Return into History* (1978), extended his "vulnerability to history" to include the establishment of the State of Israel. He held that although there was no causative link between the Holocaust and Israel, it is only because of the latter that Jews can face the former, through a dual tale of destruction and fragmentary redemption.

The parallel studies of Jewish philosophy and general philosophy were first integrated in *Encounters Between Judaism and Modern Philosophy* (1973), in which Fackenheim brought them together through the critical encounter between such modern philosophers as Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger with Jewish philosophy and faith. His self-described "magnum opus" of 1982, *To Mend the World*, continued this mutual engagement as well as adding to the resources that Fackenheim brought to the struggle with the meaning of the Holocaust. He insisted that

the Holocaust demonstrated the vulnerability to history not only of Jewish faith but also of philosophy. Fackenheim found that Judaism, Christianity, and philosophy could be sustained today because the seeds for their mending were already planted at that time. Some acts of resistance in the name of philosophy and also of Christianity that testified to the sacredness of all human life, showed that they could sustain themselves then and had the right to continue now. In terms of Judaism, Fackenheim offered a new *midrash* that saw valiant acts of resistance as a *tikkun* or partial mending, directly or indirectly testifying to God's saving Presence even at that time.

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Michael Oppenheim

FARBER, MARVIN (1901 1980)

Marvin Farber was born on 14 December 1901 in Buffalo, New York. After receiving his BS at Harvard in 1922, Farber studied for two years in Freiburg and Heidelberg. He visited Edmund Husserl twice in 1923, was accepted as a PhD candidate by Husserl, and also studied with other prominent German philosophers including Martin Heidegger, Ernst Zermelo, and Karl Jaspers. However, Farber returned to Harvard to complete his desired PhD in 1925. From 1927 to 1974, Farber spent 47 years of his distinguished career as professor of philosophy at State University of New York at Buffalo. For a three-year span from 1961 to 1964 he also was chair of the philosophy department at the University of Pennsylvania. He was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1963–64. Farber died on 24 November 1980 in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Farber's reputation as a leading contributor to phenomenology rests in part on his early work, *The Foundation of Phenomenology* (1943), an extensive commentary to Husserl's *Logical Investigations* which many in the English-speaking world regarded as the centerpiece of Husserl's philosophy. But the public perception of Farber's role for phenomenology was shaped largely

through his life-long editorship of the journal *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, the organ of the International Phenomenological Society which Farber founded in 1940. He was its only elected President until his death.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research provided, especially during World War II and following years, a vital professional outlet for numerous refugee scholars from Europe. However, practical considerations of the time and Farber's own advocacy of pluralism in philosophical method obliged the journal to accommodate more and more articles unrelated to phenomenology. Farber, on his part, grew increasingly critical of the hybrid character of the "phenomenological movement." He abhorred the popular but "unscientific" existentialist phenomenology of Scheler and Heidegger and eventually distanced himself from what he called "subjective idealism" of Husserl himself.

In a conscious opposition to Husserl's critique of "natural attitude," Farber often characterized his own position as "naturalism," intending the materialism of Karl Marx, which remained Farber's philosophical ideal throughout his life. But there was in him an almost equally strong streak of enthusiasm for logical and mathematical sciences. If he was drawn to phenomenology for some time, it was mainly because he admired the descriptive rigor in Husserl's logical analysis of conscious experience. Farber realized soon enough that there wasn't any bridge leading from the recess of subjectivity to a socially and materially beneficial praxis. Thus what the title of his posthumously published book, *The Search for an Alternative* (1984), implied was not a promise of a new beginning, but rather a retrospective account of an outcome long since decided in favor of Marxism.

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Kah Kyung Cho

FEIGL, HERBERT (1902–1988)

Herbert Feigl was the founder and director of the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science at the University of Minnesota. The

Minnesota Center was the first successful American institution maintained by public and private funding which was dedicated to the philosophy of science. Along with Feigl's own writing and teaching, he published the monographic series *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, and the journal *Philosophical Studies* which Feigl established with Wilfrid Sellars. The Minnesota Center strongly contributed in the 1950s and 1960s to the establishment of philosophy of science as a sub-discipline of academic philosophy and profession within American intellectual life.

Feigl was born on 14 December 1902 in Reichenberg, Austria. His youthful interests in science and philosophy (Albert Einstein and Moritz Schlick were strong influences) led him to study at the University of Vienna, where he became a student of Schlick. Through Schlick, Feigl became acquainted with the Vienna Circle of philosophers and scientists who helped articulate a positivistic scientific philosophy, or "logical empiricism," in the early twentieth century. Feigl received his PhD in philosophy and physics from Vienna in 1927.

Feigl emigrated to the United States in 1930. After spending a year at Harvard in 1930–31 as a Rockefeller research scholar, he took a permanent position in philosophy at the University of Iowa in 1931. There Feigl helped introduce scientific philosophy to American philosophers both by hosting colleagues from the Vienna Circle (such as Otto Neurath) as they toured the Midwest, and by co-authoring with American Albert Blumberg (a fellow student of Schlick) the famous paper "Logical Positivism: A New Movement in European Philosophy." In this paper, Feigl and Blumberg gave this new movement its first widely accepted name. However, "logical positivism" with its foundationalist and phenomenalist overtones was soon rejected by many in favor of "logical

empiricism." Feigl helped introduce the work of the Vienna Circle and its Wittgensteinian connections to American philosophers. Within a few years, young American philosophers such as W.V. Quine, Charles W. Morris, and Ernest Nagel traveled to Europe to meet firsthand the philosophers introduced by Feigl and Blumberg.

Feigl moved to Minnesota in 1940 to become professor of philosophy, and he continued to build and stabilize the field of philosophy of science. Besides founding *Philosophical Studies* in 1950 and founding the Minnesota Center in 1953, Feigl edited several texts and anthologies that soon became standard reading for students of philosophy of science (Feigl and Sellars 1949; Feigl and Brodbeck 1953; Feigl and Maxwell 1959). Some of these anthologies were proceedings of conferences and workshops that Feigl organized at the Minnesota Center or within national meetings sponsored by organizations such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Feigl also was on the editorial board of *Philosophy of Science* and served as President of the American Philosophical Association Western Division in 1962–63. Feigl was a visiting professor at many universities and was elected to membership in the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

The cold war years of the 1950s were more favorable to a professionalism such as Feigl's than to interdisciplinary projects like Philipp Frank's. Those projects that reached back to the early Vienna Circle's efforts to reign in the metaphysical excesses of traditional philosophy and to promote science and scientific thinking as part of a broadly modern and socialist approach to life and society were too political for the anticommunist atmosphere on most campuses in the 1950s and 1960s. While Feigl's Minnesota Center grew in

influence, Frank's Institute declined. Rumors about Frank's interests in Soviet philosophy and politics circulated in the profession, and by 1952 Frank was investigated by the FBI as a possible subversive. After Frank's death in 1966, Feigl succeeded him as President of the Institute for the Unity of Science in 1967, which was soon dissolved in 1970 and absorbed into the Philosophy of Science Association. Feigl retired from his philosophy position and from the directorship of the Minnesota Center in 1971. Feigl died on 1 June 1988 in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

In his retirement, Feigl continued to publish essays concerning physicalism and the mind-body problem and published a collection of his essays in 1980. This collection reflects Feigl's body of research divided mainly among four problem areas: induction and probability, realism, empiricism, and the mind-body problem. Feigl is perhaps best remembered for the last two areas. In the debates surrounding empiricism in the 1950s and 1960s, he defended a logical empiricist model of scientific theory as an axiomatic system and built upon some workable distinction between statements true by virtue of meaning (or analytically true) and those whose truth depends on empirical circumstances (synthetic truths). Feigl thus retained, against influential protests from Quine (1951), an analytic-synthetic distinction. Feigl also retained, against the counsel of Carl Hempel (1950), the viability of a criterion of empirical meaningfulness.

Feigl's work on the mind-body problem featured an identification of mind with brain, albeit one that took inspiration from better-known identities within scientific theory, such as thermal temperature and specification of the average kinetic energy of molecules in a gas (Feigl 1958). In the influential 1963 volume *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, Feigl and Carnap further

articulated the parameters of mind-body identity theory and different versions of the thesis of physicalism and the reducibility of mental phenomena to physical phenomena that continue to organize debate and research in philosophy of psychology.

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George Reisch

FEINBERG, JOEL (1926–2004)

Joel Feinberg was born on 19 October 1926 in Detroit, Michigan. He graduated from high school in 1944, briefly attended the University of Illinois and then joined the Army, where he served in an officer training program in Chicago. At the end of World War II, he left the Army in 1946 and went on to earn three degrees in philosophy from the University of Michigan: a BA in 1949, an MA in 1951 and a PhD in philosophy in 1957. In 1955 he began teaching at Brown University as an assistant professor of philosophy. Feinberg moved to Princeton University in 1957 as associate professor of philosophy, teaching there until 1966. In 1960–61 he was a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences in California. He also spent one year as a liberal arts fellow at Harvard University Law School in 1963–64. Feinberg left Princeton in 1966 and taught at the University of California at Los Angeles before he was appointed professor of philosophy at Rockefeller University from 1967 to 1977. In 1975–76 he was the Walter E. Meyer Visiting Professor, New York University School of Law. Feinberg joined the University of Arizona in 1978 as professor of philosophy and law. In 1981–82 Feinberg served as President of the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division. He was named Regents Professor Philosophy at Arizona in 1988 and held that position until retiring in 1994. Feinberg died on 29 March 2004 in Tucson, Arizona.

Feinberg's scholarship applied rigorous analytic method to conceptual and normative questions arising in the philosophy of law as well as in the broader range of moral philosophy. Most of the central works in this body of scholarship are collected in eight volumes. Four of these eight volumes contain collections of essays published during each of the four decades of the extended inquiry. The other four volumes comprise the highly integrated analysis that constitutes *The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law* (1984–88).

Doing and Deserving (1970) contains a series of essays originally published during the first decade of Feinberg's career. These essays emphasize the application of the analytic method to a series of problematic concepts that are central to law and to morality. These include, for example, desert, responsibility, justice, punishment, and causation. These chapters provide penetrating conceptual analyses and normative arguments that clarify the meaning and legitimate functions of these concepts in law. Some chapters in this volume draw attention to the relationship between the legal applications of these morally relevant concepts and the corresponding moral applications to non-legal individual lives and relationships. *Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty* (1980) continues the application of analytic method to questions arising in legal and moral philosophy. Its emphasis shifts from explicitly legal concepts and applications to the concepts and principles of political philosophy that provide the normative foundation for legal institutions. Collectively, these essays contribute to a developing conceptual and moral foundation for legal institutions that embody liberal principles of political morality.

Freedom and Fulfillment (1992) reveals a greater emphasis on articulating the form and boundaries of legal institutions consistent with political principles. Some chapters carry

over projects begun in the prior decade by applying the previous analyses of general concepts and principles to more specific legal issues and institutions. The essay addressing wrongful life, for example, applies the conceptual analysis of harm and the liberal harm principle to the evaluation of various types of civil or criminal liability for prenatal harming. Similarly, a three chapter sequence confronts a series of analytic and normative challenges to the recognition of moral rights, and the final essay in this sequence applies a conception of moral rights to the process of constitutional interpretation. Other chapters apply the liberal harm principle to legal doctrines that raise difficult questions regarding the interpretation and application of that principle. These include, for example, legal doctrines that place limits on freedom of expression or establish a legal duty to rescue. Two essays examine a series of arguments that have been advanced as justifications for the legal prohibition of voluntary euthanasia.

Problems at the Roots of Law (2003) continues the extended integration of legal and political philosophy contained in the first three volumes. Some of these essays provide conceptual analysis of abstract concepts of political philosophy, including moral rights and intrinsic value. Some chapters reflect the shift in emphasis toward the perspective of the individual suggested in the last two chapters in *Freedom and Fulfillment*. Many essays focus attention on the complex interaction among legal institutions, the principles of political philosophy underlying these institutions, and the moral lives of the individuals who participate in them.

The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law consists of *Harm to Others* (1984), *Offense to Others* (1985), *Harm to Self* (1986), and *Harmless Wrongdoing* (1988). These four volumes contain an extensive analysis of the legitimate bases for the state's exercise of

coercive force against the individual through criminal prohibition and punishment. Feinberg advances a moderate version of the classic liberal thesis that justifies criminal prohibition and punishment of conduct that causes or threatens harm or serious offense to others. He rejects as unjustifiable criminal prohibition or punishment of individual conduct that causes only minor offense to others or harm to self. He also rejects the state's authority to criminally prohibit or punish harmless wrongdoing, understood as immoral conduct that does not cause harm or serious offense to others.

Feinberg's liberal position does not separate law and morality. Rather, it defines public and nonpublic domains of morality and limits the legitimate jurisdiction of the criminal law to the public domain. This interpretation recognizes that complete human lives extend across the individual and institutional domains, and it seeks to preserve the significance of each while allowing the integration of the two.

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Robert F. Schopp

FEYERABEND, PAUL KARL (1924–1994)

Paul K. Feyerabend was born on 13 January 1924 in Vienna, Austria, and died on 11 February 1994 in Genolier, near Geneva, Switzerland. In 1942 he was drafted into the labor service, and then into the German army. After the war, Feyerabend was able to secure a fellowship (as he had never been a member of the Nazi party) that he used to study theater science and take singing lessons at the Weimar Music Academy. In 1946 he began studying history and sociology at the University of Vienna. He then transferred to mathematics, physics and astronomy, and eventually earned an MA in astronomy. He also attended philosophy and theology lectures. In 1948, he met Karl Popper, who was an immense influence. Sometime in the mid to late 1960s, Feyerabend began to become increasingly critical of Popper and his ideas.

In 1951, Feyerabend received his PhD in philosophy at Vienna. He went to the London School of Economics to study under Popper, and in 1953 he returned to Vienna where he became Arthur Pap's assistant. In 1955 he began teaching philosophy as a lecturer at the University of Bristol. In 1958, Feyerabend

began as a guest professor at the University of California at Berkeley, and in 1959 he accepted the offer of a permanent position. He also became a U.S. citizen. Although he had a remarkable number of other visiting teaching positions over the course of his unusually dynamic career (for example at Auckland, Berlin, Brighton, Hamburg, Kassel, London, Yale, and Zurich), he remained a professor of philosophy at Berkeley until he retired in 1990. He then lived in Austria and Switzerland during the remainder of his life.

In the 1950s, he worked on Wittgenstein's philosophy and made a name for himself primarily in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. In the 1960s, he mainly argued against various aspects of logical empiricism. His most influential idea from this period is the incommensurability thesis, according to which successive scientific theories have no logical relations. Because he often used *ad hominem* arguments, or immanent criticisms, which temporarily adopt the positions under attack in order to make effective criticisms, his ideas have often been misunderstood. In the 1970s, Feyerabend began to challenge the idea of universally valid methodological rules, arguing for "epistemological anarchism." In 1976, Feyerabend began to endorse relativism and address cultural and political issues related to science. In this phase, in a reversal from his earlier views, Feyerabend began to challenge the assumption that scientific knowledge and the culture it supports is superior to other forms of life. In the 1990s, Feyerabend retracted his relativist views and his work adopted a humanist tone. Throughout his career, many of his main arguments were aimed at promoting pluralism in the pursuit of knowledge.

In a 1962 landmark essay, "Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism," Feyerabend introduced the term "incommensurability" which would become the focal point of debates

concerning realism and rationality. Scientific advance is not a steady accumulation of more and more facts, or a steady improvement of existing theories. Instead, scientific advance involves dramatic theoretical breaks in which older theories are *replaced* by new ones. Old ‘facts’ are also reinterpreted according to the new theories. Feyerabend introduced the term ‘incommensurable concepts’ in the context of criticizing Ernest Nagel’s theory of reduction and the Hempel–Oppenheim theory of explanation. Feyerabend argued that in the course of major theoretical advances, the meanings of the main descriptive terms change, and thus consecutive scientific theories have no logical relations. Exemplifying an often-repeated two-prong argumentative strategy, Feyerabend argued that these theories of reduction and explanation fail as accurate descriptions of actual scientific advance, and they are also undesirable as norms governing scientific practice because if enforced, they would stifle progress.

Feyerabend met Thomas Kuhn in Berkley around 1960. The two worked together closely in 1960 and 1961. Kuhn’s influential *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* was also published 1962, and it also introduced the term incommensurability (although with a somewhat different emphasis). The two worked together to help transform the professional philosophy of science from a discipline preoccupied with logic to what is now known as the historical philosophy of science. Feyerabend’s pragmatic theory of observation, contextual theory of meaning, and views on realism all invert the standard empiricist creed. Instead of a bottom-up model according to which we begin with common sense observations and experience and then build up theoretical systems about them, Feyerabend argued for a top-down view according to which our theoretical ideas shape our observations, our concepts, and

our interpretation of the nature of the world. Scientific theories do not merely systematize our common-sense views, but also correct them.

Events of late 1960s had several dramatic effects on Feyerabend’s intellectual development. As increasing numbers of minorities attended Berkley, Feyerabend came to see his role as a teacher as that of a cultural imperialist whose job it was to spread Western rationality. Consequently, he began to question the supposed superiority of science over other more traditional cultures, and he began to investigate the rise of rationality in ancient Greece. These two themes play out in his major publications in the 1970s and 1980s.

In 1975, Feyerabend published *Against Method*. This book propelled his fame far outside of philosophy. The book was originally planned as half of a book, *For and Against Method*, co-authored by his best friend Imre Lakatos. However, in 1974 Lakatos unexpectedly died. Feyerabend’s contribution was published by itself. The main thesis of the book challenges the traditional idea of The Scientific Method as a set of universally binding methodological rules that delineate how to do science properly. Feyerabend argued that there are no such universal rules in science. Instead, methodological rules have only a limited validity. He claimed that for any possible candidate of a universal methodological rule, for example avoid *ad hoc* hypotheses, there exists episodes in the history of science in which the rule was broken *for the sake of progress*. He tried to capture his ideas by developing a position he called ‘epistemological anarchism’. In 1976, Feyerabend first began explicitly to endorse relativism. In 1978 Feyerabend published *Science in a Free Society*, which further develops the political consequences of his “epistemological anarchism,” and contains several responses to reviews of *Against*

Method. In 1984 Feyerabend set out the view that in science, like in art, there is no progress, only change. Feyerabend repeatedly reflected on the arts and their relation to science throughout his career. He even argued that the theater, and not essays, is the better medium to treat philosophical issues. *Farewell to Reason* (1987) collects many of Feyerabend's publications that appeared between 1981 and 1987 in which he repeatedly argues for relativism.

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Eric Oberheim

FIELD, HARTRY HAMLIN (1946)

Hartry Field was born on 30 November 1946 in Boston, Massachusetts. He received a BA in mathematics from the University of Wisconsin in 1967. He then attended Harvard

University, earning his MA in philosophy in 1968 and the PhD in philosophy in 1972. From 1970 until 1976 Field taught philosophy at Princeton University. From 1976 until 1981, he was associate professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California, before his promotion to professor of philosophy in 1981 there. In 1991, he became Distinguished Professor and Kornblith Professor of Science and Values at the City University of New York. In 1997 Field went to New York University as Silver Professor of Philosophy, where he currently teaches. The National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Guggenheim Foundation have awarded him their fellowships. He was elected fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2003.

Field's worldview is physicalism: "all facts depend on physical facts and all good causal explanations depend on good physical explanations" (1992, 271). This worldview lacks a place for any mathematical entities, such as numbers and sets. His 1980 book *Science Without Numbers*, which won the Lakatos Prize, tackles the relationship between scientific theorizing and mathematics. Scientific explanations do not, according to Field, require any commitment to the existence of such mathematical entities in the course of using mathematical formulas in theoretical explanations. Mathematical entities do not have to exist in order for scientific formulas to play their assigned theoretical roles, and mathematical entities cannot have any causal responsibilities to ever make anything happen. Against W.V. Quine, Field argued that the indispensability of expressing causal explanations in terms of formulas having mathematical structures doesn't imply that the abstract matters mentioned by mathematics must have their own existence in addition to the existence of physical matters having causal responsibilities. Field has written many

papers defending his position that science can be done without a substantial mathematics.

In the realm of pure mathematics, assenting to mathematical statements requires understanding those statements, but that understanding and assent don't additionally require regarding such statements as true. In ordinary language, people indicating their assent to a mathematical statement may call it "true" in a colloquial way, but no metaphysical commitments are thereby made. Field defends "fictionalism," the view that no one need think that matters mentioned in mathematics have any status higher than fiction. *Realism, Mathematics and Modality* (1989) gathers together Field's extended arguments favoring fictionalism. Regarding mathematics as true in any more substantial way than just fiction leads to questions about how terms used in mathematics, such as the number '2', refer to an actual 2, or about how a statement such as '2+2=4' must be made true by something else that does exist. These sorts of questions typically lead on to philosophical questions of this sort: "What is real that a truth of mathematics can correspond to it?" or "What kind of non-natural reality is needed to explain how people can know mathematical truths?" The fictionalist's opponent on these questions is the platonist, as Field sees the contest, because the platonist regards most or all of these kinds of questions as quite legitimate and answerable. The platonist regards fictionalism as excessively nominalistic, but Field's fictionalism is best considered apart from other nominalistic approaches to mathematics.

The papers collected in his volume *Truth and the Absence of Fact* (2001) continue to pursue Field's general philosophical agenda of defending physicalism from "irreducible mental objects or mental properties" (30). Field elaborates his deflationary account of truth, and a robust deflationary account of

meaning or semantic content. The opponent is not only the platonist seeking a unnatural realm transcending human thought, but any dualist refusing to reduce all things minded by humans down to matters in the natural world. Mental thinking supposedly 'corresponds' to external matters, or allegedly 'intends' such matters, or is capable of apprehending "a priori" matters, but Field argues against supposing that these mental abilities are best explained by awarding them their own immaterial status. Our purposive capacity to conduct reliable inferences through rules of reasoning is similarly explicable, Field argues, without lending any unnatural status to either the inferential thinking or those rules.

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John R. Shook

FINE, ARTHUR ISADORE (1937)

Arthur Fine was born on 11 November 1937 in Lowell, Massachusetts. He left high school after his junior year to take advantage of the early entrance program at the University of Chicago where he studied physics, philosophy and mathematics, graduating in 1958 with a BS degree in mathematics. He subsequently earned the MS degree in mathematics from Illinois Institute of Technology in 1960; his supervisor was Karl Menger, of Vienna Circle fame, who introduced Fine to the mathematics and conceptual mysteries of the quantum theory. Fine returned to the University of Chicago for graduate study in philosophy, earning the PhD in 1963. He worked with Henry Mehlberg and Dudley Shapere in philosophy and Gregor Wentzel in physics, writing a thesis on realism and the quantum theory of measurement. During 1966–67 he was a postdoctoral fellow at Cambridge University, supervised by Mary Hesse.

Fine was assistant professor of mathematics and philosophy at the University of Illinois at Chicago from 1961 to 1963, and assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbana from 1963 to 1965. In 1966–67 Fine was a National Science Foundation Fellow. From 1967 to 1972 Fine was associate and full professor of philosophy at Cornell University. In 1972 Fine returned to University of Illinois at Chicago where he taught philosophy from 1972 to 1982. Fine then became professor of philosophy at Northwestern University, and from 1985 to 2001 he held the title of John Evans

Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern. In 2001 he became professor of philosophy at the University of Washington, where he is now professor emeritus. Fine also held visiting appointment at several universities including University of London, Stanford, University of California at Los Angeles, and the University of Chicago. He was President of the Philosophy of Science Association during 1987–89, and President of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1997–98.

In the 1970s to early 1980s, Fine wrote a series of papers on the foundations of physics, concentrating mostly on conceptual problems of the quantum theory. These include important papers on the quantum measurement problem, where he extended the theory of measurement to prove a general “no-go” theorem (the “insolubility theorem”). He then turned to the use of probability in quantum theory and to its connection with hidden variables, beginning an examination of the no-hidden-variables theorems of John Bell, Simon Kochen, and Ernst Specker. Fine’s analysis uncovered a probability structure underlying these theorems whose modification allows for hidden variables (including Fine’s “prism models”). This analysis led Fine to examine the locality conditions behind the Bell theorem, and to disentangle plausible physical constraints involving local causality from more arbitrary constraints employed in the proof. One issue was settled by Fine’s work which demonstrated that the Bell inequalities are both necessary and sufficient for the existence of certain joint probabilities.

In tandem with this work in foundations, Fine also produced a series of articles responsive to the issues concerning scientific change raised by the work of Thomas Kuhn and Stephen Toulmin. He argued that “commensurability” was not attainable from the Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam treatment

of general terms without a background assumption of scientific progress. But this is question-begging, since the comparison of successive theories was supposed itself to provide a demonstration of scientific progress. Instead Fine argued for a local notion of reference, one that is coarse grained (or approximate in a sense that he spelled out), contextual and good enough for certain purposes. This leads to a context-relative conception of referential stability that allows for theory comparison within limited domains. Fine’s crucial idea is that of concepts from disparate discourses having context-relative extensions that locally “overlap.” These are similar to the “shared concepts” in Putnam’s later pluralism and to concepts negotiated in the “trading zones” described in the work of historian Peter Galison.

In the 1980s and 1990s Fine’s research took a historical turn. He began investigations into the later thought of Albert Einstein, especially Einstein’s ideas concerning the quantum theory. Fine’s integration of original historical research with philosophical reflection was taken up by other philosophers of science and is now a standard part of the discipline. At the same time, Fine rejected the reigning realist orthodoxy in philosophy of science, not turning toward antirealism but toward a deflationary stance he calls “the natural ontological attitude” (NOA), and which he likes to describe in Zen-like language as “a third way.” Fine emphasizes that NOA is not a philosophical position, like realism or constructive empiricism, but rather an attitude one can take toward ongoing scientific practice and its results. Roughly, the idea is to not bring a pre-formed philosophical agenda to understanding (or “interpreting”) science, but to approach science and the significance of its results from the perspective of a participant and in terms that would arise naturally within that perspective. Fine understands this as a

way of looking at science in its particularity, rather than imposing global interpretations. To the frustration of some critics, Fine does not argue for the adoption of NOA. He thinks any such argument would presuppose an essentialist conception of science, which NOA itself rejects.

Fine's critical examination of support for realism begins with an examination of the explanationist defense, inherited from J.C.C. Smart and Hilary Putnam, who claim that unless realism is correct, science's ability to produce good explanations would be miraculous. Fine points out that a central disagreement between realism and antirealism concerns whether good explanations need to be true. Antirealists challenge the legitimacy of an inference to the truth of the best explanation, and therefore to infer realism as the best explanation for the success of science would simply beg the question against antirealism. Further, he notes that if there actually were a good realist explanation for why science is successful (assuming it is), it would be based on a realist conception according to which science tells us the truth about an external world. But Fine argues that any such explanation could be trumped by an instrumentalist who replaces the correspondence notion of truth with the pragmatic notion of general reliability. Thus if there were a good argument for realism, along these lines, there would be an equally good (perhaps better) instrumentalist argument. The converse is also true. Indeed Fine claims a metatheorem according to which any argument drawn from scientific practice that appears to support one side in the realism/instrumentalism debate can be converted to one that appears to support the other side as well. Fine concludes that the realism-antirealism issue is a pseudo-question, in something like the sense that Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath suggested, and that we should move beyond it.

Fine's recent work continues on NOA-related themes with a study of objectivity. Distinguishing what is objective from what is real (or true), in Fine's hands objectivity is trust-making, not real-making, and becomes "that in the process of inquiry which makes for trust in the outcome of inquiry." This pragmatic conception allows objectivity to apply as well to the study of the mind and human affairs as it does to the natural sciences. Fine's work continues to range over the formal sciences, the natural sciences, and the human sciences where, to adapt a famous remark of William James, it leaves the trail of a philosopher over all.

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Philip Ehrlich

FIRTH, RODERICK (1917–1987)

Roderick Firth was born on 30 January 1917 in Orange, New Jersey. He attended Haverford College and earned his BA in 1938. He then completed his PhD in philosophy at Harvard in 1943. Firth’s dissertation, written under C.I. Lewis, was titled “Sense-Data and the Principle of Reduction.” From his growing Quaker convictions he asked for conscientious objector status; he was eventually classified as unable to serve in the U.S. Army because of a heart murmur. Firth was instructor of psychology and philosophy at the College of William and Mary from 1943 to 1945 (the college resisted calls for dismissing Firth due to religious convictions against war), and then was a professor of philosophy at Swarthmore College from 1945 to 1953. He joined the

philosophy faculty at Harvard in 1953, and became Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity in 1962 (succeeding Raphael Demos), holding that position until his death. He was awarded a Guggenheim fellowship in 1952–53; an American Council of Learned Societies fellowship in 1959–60; and two fellowships at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University in 1964–65 and 1967–68. He was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1980–81. Firth died on 22 December 1987 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Firth's extended exposition of phenomenism comes from his 1949 *Mind* article on "Sense Data and the Percept Theory." In this and related articles, Firth responds to many of the traditional objections to sense data, such as the objection that a sense datum epistemology involves a false phenomenology. One of the most important objections was that the phenomenist view of experience implies that experiences, constituted as they are on the phenomenist view by the occurrence of sets of sense data, are only indirectly related to whatever it is those sense data can be said to represent. But experience itself seems to be of *objects*; the sense data themselves seem to be invisible or transparent, in a sense. The phenomenist description of experience appears to obscure this and also appears unable to explain why experience ought to be this way.

Firth believed that even though the criticisms directed at the implied phenomenology of the phenomenist position were significant, it was not clear how the newer theories of perception – like that of the Gestalt psychologists and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and William James – represented any real epistemological advance over the kinds of epistemological facts that sense data theories were designed to address.

Indeed, given Firth's own view that a sense data epistemology was more or less the basic epistemology of traditional philosophy, the failure of the newer theories of perception to provide adequate responses to the kinds of arguments that motivated talk of sense data in the first place rendered their usefulness for philosophical purposes questionable. Once these theories were adjusted so as to accommodate the phenomena that originally motivated sense data epistemologies, Firth thought that their proponents would arrive at more or less the same place as sense data theories.

Firth's defense of phenomenism made several crucial distinctions that were picked up by other writers. Most importantly, Firth argued that phenomenist claims need not be voiced as *replacing* material object statements with statements about sense data. Rather, the phenomenist could make his claims using the vocabulary of "looks as if." One thus need not try to replace claims about material objects using only terms denoting sense data in order to state the phenomenist view.

Besides his work in epistemology, Firth also made important contributions to debates about the relationship between epistemic and ethical notions of justification and the extent to which they overlap. In some of his later papers, Firth explored how ethical and epistemic notions are related, describing the different sorts of merits that a belief could have, such as whether a false belief could have instrumental value in motivating beneficial actions and the acquisition of true beliefs and so on. Firth also wrote a well-known defense of the Ideal Observer theory of the meaning of ethical statements. An Ideal Observer must be omniscient with respect to the non-moral facts, have unlimited powers of imaginative projection, be disinterested and dispassionate, consistent, and be otherwise, a 'normal person'.

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Daniel Blair

FISKE, JOHN (1842–1901)

Edmund Fisk Green was born on 30 March 1842 in Hartford, Connecticut. At his grandmother’s request, he changed his name to John Fiske in 1855 after his mother remarried. He died on 4 July 1901 in East Gloucester, Massachusetts. He was an historian, philosopher, and popularizer of science, delivering lectures on history and on Darwinism to large audiences of laymen. His fame led to the naming of Mt. Fiske, a 13,500 ft. mountain in California, by T.S. Solomons in 1895. Fiske attended Harvard College, enrolling in 1860 as a sophomore, and graduating with his BA in 1863. He became an enthusiastic adherent to the Spencerian conception of evolution as a means of explaining all the multifarious phenomenon of the natural, social, spiritual, and intellectual phenomena and developments of the universe.

Fiske entered Harvard Law School, and was awarded his LLB degree in 1865.

Fiske was an early adherent of Darwinism, and deeply influenced in particular by Spencer's philosophical generalization of Darwin's theory of evolution. His first writings on Spencer's adaptation of Darwin's theory of evolution date from 1860, making him one of the earliest American defenders of Darwin with Chauncey Wright. In considering the philosophical and theological implications of natural science, Fiske declared himself to be an "infidel," by which he meant a non-Christian.

Because of his reputation as an agnostic or atheist, Fiske was denied an academic chair at Harvard, although he served on the Harvard faculty and in various other capacities. From 1869 to 1871, he served as university lecturer on philosophy at Harvard, and in 1870 he was appointed instructor in history. In 1869–70, at the invitation of Charles William Eliot, Harvard's new president, Fiske delivered a series of lectures at Harvard on Comte's positivism. In 1872, he became assistant librarian, and served in that capacity at the Harvard library until 1879, when he resigned his position. In 1873 Fiske traveled in England for a year, conversing about evolution and his own philosophy of evolutionism with Spencer, Charles Darwin, geologist Charles Lyell, and biologist Thomas Henry Huxley. It was on the basis of the revisions of his previous works, in which positivism was replaced by evolutionism, and from the criticisms and comments of these men, that Fiske's *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy Based on the Doctrine of Evolution, with Criticisms on the Positive Philosophy* (1874) emerged. In 1879, he was elected to a six-year term on Harvard's Board of Overseers, and was reelected to a second six-year term in 1885.

Fiske was an enthusiastic advocate both of Darwin's theory of biological evolution

and especially of Spencer's philosophical applications and development of a general theory of evolution. Like Spencer, Fiske sought to apply the theory of evolution to all spheres, not merely to the biological, but to every aspect of the universe and existence. Science, Fiske held, had been little more than a disconnected collection of facts and rules, devoid of a coherent and unifying system of governing truths. Spencer's positivism, based upon the doctrine of evolution, had, finally, provided a conception of the unity of nature with causality as its unifying principle and a web of causation binding together all of these facts. Fiske argued that the human brain continued to evolve long after the human body reached its finished state of growth, and that that was the reason why a considerably more prolonged infancy was required for humans than for other species. These evolutionary views on the significance of the prolonged dependency of humans were expressed in the posthumously published *The Meaning of Infancy* (1909). He held that the human brain would continue to evolve and that, therefore, human progress would continue.

Fiske interests also included history and philosophy of history. Beginning in 1881, Fiske lectured annually on American history at Washington University in Saint Louis, and beginning in 1884 he was professor of American history at Washington University for several years, visiting for two months each year while living in Cambridge the rest of the year. He also lectured at many other universities and gave popular lectures in history across the country, and was renowned in his day for his delivery. He sought to understand political history against a backdrop of intellectual history, and saw the evolution of ideas as driving factors in the evolution of political culture: for example in *American Political Ideas Viewed from*

the Standpoint of Universal History (1885) and *Civil Government in the United States considered with Some Reference to Its Origins* (1890).

The best example of Fiske's approach to history through its leading ideas and ideals is found in his essays on the history of science and of those men who contributed to the development of science. This can be seen in *A Century of Science* (1899), in which Fiske discussed the developments of the nineteenth century. It also appears in *Essays, Historical and Literary* (1902), which contains Fiske's musings on history, philosophy of history, and historiography. In the essays collected in *Excursions of an Evolutionist* (1883) and *The Miscellaneous Writings* (1902), Fiske applied evolutionary theory and his pragmatic conception of religion to social and anthropological themes, including mythology, psychology, and linguistics, examining social evolution, religion, and the nature, origin, and growth of language. In his historical writings, Fiske undertook to demonstrate that American civilization was the most developed, arguing that, while English historians of the era pointed to the British institution of parliamentary government as evidence that the Anglo-Saxon was the most evolutionary advanced of civilizations, America had gone even beyond Britain in developing its democracy.

For Fiske, the interest in political and intellectual history was an outgrowth of his interest in, and an effort to understand, human development and civilization in evolutionary terms. In *The Unseen World and Other Essays* (1876), *The Destiny of Man, Viewed in the Light of His Origin* (1884), in *Through Nature to God* (1899), and in *Life Everlasting* (1901), Fiske sought for the religious or spiritual meaning of human existence, as elucidated and unfolded in the biological world as driven by evolution.

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Irving H. Anellis

FLETCHER, JOSEPH FRANCIS, III (1905–1991)

Joseph Fletcher was born on 10 April 1905 in Newark, New Jersey, and died on 28 October 1991 in Charlottesville, Virginia. Minister, educator and author, he was ordained as an Episcopal priest in 1929. He taught Christian ethics and pastoral theology at the Episcopal

Theological School from 1944 to 1970 and medical ethics at the University of Virginia from 1970 to 1977. His 1954 book *Morals and Medicine* provoked considerable scholarly debate about euthanasia, sterilization, and artificial insemination. His 1966 book *Situation Ethics: The New Morality* caused much controversy in the academic world and also in the popular press. In 1974 he was named Humanist of the Year by the Southern Medical Association. He was a founding member of numerous societies including the Planned Parenthood Foundation, the Society for the Right to Die, and the Soviet American Friendship Society.

Fletcher's *Situation Ethics* was an unusual book, becoming a best seller and widely discussed in the mass media by *Time*, *Newsweek*, and other venues. It opened up a series of popular and academic debates on the whole topic of the proper methods for ethics. In this work, and in others, Fletcher focused attention on many topics in medical and sexual ethics: euthanasia, birth control, abortion, genetic control, etc. His main purpose was to remove ethics from purely abstract and general discussion, and to focus attention on the specific and variable situations of life where ethics really goes on. There were antecedents for this. In Germany, Eberhard Grisebach's book *Gegenwart: eine kritische Ethik* (1928) called attention to the importance of concrete situations for any religious ethics, where each moral problem is actually unique and can be solved only by one who is concretely confronted with the problem. Earlier than this, the American pragmatist, John Dewey, in his 1920 work *Reconstruction in Philosophy* clearly emphasized the need for a truly situational approach to any moral life. Dewey argued that we cannot seek or attain health, wealth, education or justice in *general*. Action he claimed is always specific, individualized, unique, or situational.

Fletcher was aware of the efforts of Dewey and others which emphasized the need for a truly situational ethics. Fletcher claims that his own situation ethics is able to accommodate several important other perspectives including relativism, pragmatism, and utilitarianism. Moral situations are always relative to change, time, and place, and must be judged in terms of their practical consequences for the greatest good or happiness of the greatest number of people. Fletcher sets out to show that situation ethics is a kind of middle position between mere rule following or moral legalism on the one hand, and antinomianism, or a purely spontaneous view where rules are abandoned entirely on the other. Situation ethics, he claims, is superior to both. It can accept rules or laws for ethics, but only insofar as they are treated as flexible, capable of being modified as needed, for every specific situation.

Fletcher believes that moral legalism is wrong because it sets rules above people and the specific situations in which they have to act. Fletcher is critical of all major Western religious traditions as being too legalistic by relying on strict or absolute rules. Fletcher does, however, allow one absolute in ethics. Love, he claims, is always absolutely good; but love is not a law or abstract principle. Love, in a truly moral or religious sense, involves a personal concern or caring about people and their needs. Here, he distinguishes love as *agape* from love as mere eros or desire. *Agape* involves a deep caring and respect for persons as ends in themselves. *Agape*, he alleges, is not a matter of mere interest or a means to something else. It is intrinsically good. But he also claims that *agape* is compatible with reason or calculating consequences. It is not the same as impulsiveness, dogmatism, or pure subjective feeling.

Fletcher claims his situation ethics is superior to all forms of antinomianism, including the existentialism of the French

philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. Fletcher believes that moral decisions can be justified, and in fact need to be justified, by appealing to anticipated consequences. Ethical rules or principles are acceptable as long as they are pragmatically and relatively used. No principle of *agape* tells anyone how to use this love in each and every situation. Christian love, as Fletcher sees it, is not opposed to prudence or justice. Prudence and careful calculation, he claims, give love the carefulness it needs.

Fletcher contributed to the growing concern in recent ethics with all the problems of applied social ethics, medical ethics, abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, etc. By provoking as much controversy as he has, Fletcher's work is clearly a stimulus for more and better thought about what ethics can do and what it cannot do. Situation ethics, as he conceives it, offers only a method for approaching the ongoing choices or decisions of the moral life; it does not pretend to offer a fixed and final solution. Absolute security, fixity, or complacency is not to be found, or expected, in any real or concrete moral life, or theory about life.

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Guy W. Stroh

FLOWER, ELIZABETH FARQUHAR (1914–1994)

Elizabeth Flower was born on 28 April 1914 in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and died on 26 June 1995 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. One

of the pioneering women in philosophy in the United States, Flower spent most of her career writing and teaching on ethics and American philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania. After receiving a BS in chemistry from Wilson College in Pennsylvania, she studied philosophy at Pennsylvania with Edgar A. Singer and became an instructor in 1937. Upon completing her PhD in philosophy in 1939, she received a regular appointment in the philosophy department and became one of the first women in the United States on the philosophy faculty of a major university. In 1956 she became the first tenured woman in the philosophy department at Pennsylvania, and taught there until retiring in 1985. She was also Truax Professor at Hamilton College, and was a visiting professor at Barnard College, San Marcos in Peru, and the National Universities of Colombia, Chile, and Guatemala. She joined work camps and met with Spanish Republican intellectuals and philosophers while working with the American Friends Service Committee early in her career. Flower was a Fellow of the National Humanities Center in 1978–79 and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Dewey Studies in 1981–82. She was named Woman of the Year by the Society for Women in Philosophy in 1987, and with her husband Abraham Edel she received the Herbert W. Schneider Award of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy.

Flower’s best known work is *A History of Philosophy in America* (1977), co-written with Murray Murphey. Considered a standard in the field now, its two volumes outline the history of American critical thought in a different framework than what had been conventionally employed. In their account, contemporary pragmatism has its deepest roots in thinkers who, influenced by Scottish realism, sought to synthesize theology, empiricism, and evolutionary theory. Much

of the Puritans' thought was compatible with the discoveries of Newton and Darwin, for they conceived the scientific method as a tool for understanding and appreciating God's ingenuity. The ideas of the transcendentalist, Ralph Waldo Emerson and his successors in the idealist tradition, such as Josiah Royce, mediated between science and religion in an effort to present a unified worldview. Flower viewed the development of critical thought in America as a discourse that synthesized (and reconciled) scientific discoveries and religious concerns.

A phenomenon that is hardly mentioned in other chronicles of American philosophy but explored extensively by Flower and Murphey is the infusion of Scottish ideas into American critical thought. The Scottish tradition helped rescue ethics from Puritan dogma and legitimate it as a secular field of study called moral science. American philosophers found the realists' emphasis on the empirical sciences insightful and refreshing, for they were more interested in how knowledge is acquired than the Continental concerns with the validity of knowledge. John Dewey and C.I. Lewis figured prominently in their portraiture of American philosophy, as they went on to develop full-scale theories of valuation and to treat ethics like an empirical discipline governed by scientific methods and models. Their detailed portrait of the St. Louis Hegelians' appropriation of Schelling and Hegel, moreover, also demonstrates appreciation for the infusion of Continental ideas into American critical thought, which other accounts until then had left largely unexplored.

Flower chronicles a culture's history of ideas with the concrete textures of human choice, random chance, and politics in Mexico and Latin America in *Principales Tendencias de La Filosofía Norteamericana* (1963), co-authored with Murphey, and

other studies of philosophy in the Americas. The portraiture of philosophy in the U.S., Mexico, and Latin America that emerge chart the complex relations among discursive practices, political interests, institution building, and transcultural influence. Her studies of philosophy in these cultures were among the earliest attempts by an American philosopher to chronicle the development of critical thought south of the border in a systematic study of regional figures and politics.

Flower's work is not easily categorized into the rights/duty, goods/means, or character/virtue schools of moral thought of Kant, Bentham, or Plato. Yet, her concern with specific problems in ethics yielded unique contributions to the field. Her reversal of approaches and suspicion of dichotomies formed part of her skepticism toward the disciplinary tendency to debate the universal sovereignty of ethical models, for none, she believed, could cover every facet of civilization. Rather than debate the merits of a rights, utilitarian, or virtue model, she thought it was more productive to allow the situation to determine which moral theories and concepts are most fitting for deliberation. Flower saw merit in an interdisciplinary approach to problems of value and method in relation to law, education, and social theory. She believed that ethics benefited from the social and psychological sciences for increased knowledge of a rapidly changing and increasingly complex world. Flower believed that ethical theory should not only detail the dimensions of its framework, but also investigate the "emphases, commitments, and choices" into which it invests (1987, p. 28). Following the work of Edel, she argued for the use of discourse analysis as a critical tool in evaluating the cultural assumptions, investments, and reflections embedded in moral lexicons. For her, the language used

in moral discourse was not transparent, but rather was socially and historically specific, reflecting the crises, concerns, and power relations of a society. Metaphors of moral theories were thus a rich source of information about their structure and value for ethicists (1987, p. 49).

In *Critique of Applied Ethics* (1994), co-authored with Edel and Finbarr W. O'Connor, Flower evaluated ethical theories formulated since the Enlightenment in order to suggest which might serve as tools of applied ethics and how knowledge and personal experience figure in moral deliberation. She explored the moral lexicons of utilitarian, ontological, and virtue theories, for example, and their implication for solving moral problems today. For Flower, all ethical concepts are potentially useful in formulating ethical problems. Flower saw no reason why we should privilege one term like the *good* or *character* over another such as *right* (or vice-versa) in a quest for a unified system that could then be applied to all life situations. Rather, she thought it was more effective for moral deliberation to build up "an inventory of resources from the theoretical reservoir," and to attend to the different ways that each family of concepts structure moral problems and pave the way for ethical judgment.

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Angela Cotton

FODOR, JERRY ALAN (1935)

Jerry Fodor was born on 22 April 1935 in New York City. He earned his BA summa cum laude from Columbia University in 1956. He then attended Princeton University and received his PhD in philosophy in 1960, working with

Hilary Putnam. Fodor went to MIT in 1961 as an assistant professor in the humanities department, where Noam Chomsky was an influential colleague. In 1963 he became an associate professor in the departments of philosophy and psychology at MIT, and was promoted to full professor in those departments in 1969. Fodor left MIT in 1986 to become Distinguished Professor at the City University of New York Graduate Center. In 1988 he became the State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University, a position he still holds. From 1988 to 1994 he remained with the CUNY Graduate Center as an adjunct professor, where his wife, Janet Dean Fodor, with whom he has collaborated, is a professor of linguistics. Fodor is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and he was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2005–06.

The cornerstone of Fodor's philosophy is the language of thought hypothesis (LOT). LOT itself is tied to two other views Fodor espouses, namely the representational theory of mind (RTM) and the computational theory of mind (CTM). According to RTM, thinking is a sequence of activating or tokening mental representations having meaning or content. Providing an account of the mind consistent with the dominant materialist worldview is known as the "naturalization" of the mind. Though they need not be, Fodor takes mental representations to be material entities, so for him RTM is a materialist theory. His particular version of materialism is called token physicalism, meaning that every instance or tokening of a mental event is identical with an instance or tokening of a physical event, but the mental event type is not identical with any physical event type. Token physicalism allows for any number of physical realizations of minds; what makes something a mental state is its relations,

nomomic and computational in this case, regardless of its physical realization.

According to RTM, thinking is a sequence of tokening mental representations. Of course, tokening arbitrary mental representations is not thinking. There must be some principle making the sequence coherent. The computational theory of mind (CTM) specifies the kinds of sequences that constitute thinking, following Alan Turing's insight that representations with logical structure can be mechanically transformed in such a way that if the initial representation is true then the transformed representation is also true. CTM is the theory that the admissible sequences of mental representations constituting thinking are computations. In the overall project of naturalizing the mind, CTM is invoked to explain how thinking can be purely mechanistic.

Since we use language to express our thoughts, Fodor infers that certain universal characteristics of natural languages, those languages we speak such as English or Spanish, are also characteristic of our thoughts. The systematicity and productivity of natural languages are explained by their compositionality. Fodor reasons that since compositionality is the only explanation we have for how we finite beings can have languages that are systematic and productive, therefore the medium of thought must also be compositional, thereby explaining the systematicity and productivity of thought, and thus the medium of thought must be a language. Fodor takes systematicity and productivity as the benchmarks for an adequate theory of mind. His main challenge to connectionists is that they are unable to account for the systematicity of human thought because their representations do not have constituent structure (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988, Macdonald and Macdonald 1995).

Fodor's LOT hypothesis includes two more claims. First, the language of thought is innate and distinct from any of our natural languages. To learn any predicate we must be able to use a term that is coextensive with it. If the predicate is not among the first we are learning in our natural language we might learn it in terms of other coextensive natural language predicates we have already learned. But these too must have been learned and the chain traces back eventually to the first terms we learn. Since we learn them via innate coextensive predicates, there is an innate mental representation for any term of the natural language we can learn (1975). The language of thought for which Fodor argues has come to be known as "mentalese."

Fodor's naturalistic account of content is a nomic-informational theory. He initially argued for narrow content, in which meaning is entirely in the head. Fodor reasoned from CTM that representations can be individuated according to their computational role. The narrow content of a mental representation is given by that computational role, much as distinct signs in a formal system can be given an interpretation according to their role in derivations within the system. The notion of narrow content runs into certain difficulties, most notably Hilary Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment. Fodor addresses Putnam cases by taking an externalist stance. Representations continue to have a computational role by which they are individuated as syntactic types; however, their nomic connections to the world determine their content. Furthermore, since actual causal histories are not relevant for determining the content of our representations on Fodor's view, we can have representations about absent, abstract, or even fictitious entities. To have a 'unicorn' representation, for example, one merely requires a syntactic structure that would be reliably tokened by unicorns if there were any.

Fodor explains concept possession in terms of "locking on" to properties. We are locked on to a property when we have tokened a mental representation with that property as its content. The usual way of locking on to some property is to experience stereotypical instances of it, but this is not the only way. Possessing some concepts may help us acquire others, such as abstract concepts or concepts of fictitious things. Note that this does not contradict atomism because Fodor distinguishes what it is to have a concept from how we come to have the concept. He allows that getting some concepts may require having others. But having the concept consists only in having a tokened mental representation with the right nomic relations.

RTM, CTM, and LOT attempt a complete account of the mind and its structure. Fodor distinguishes highly specialized functional units of the mind, called modules, from central processing. Modules are extremely fast because they are informationally encapsulated: the information they process is domain specific. Central cognition, on the other hand, is where in the mind any information can influence the processing of any other information. Fodor's view is that he has given an account of modular thinking only (1983, 2000). Understanding central cognition is simply beyond our conceptual resources at present, according to Fodor.

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Christopher Viger

FOGELIN, ROBERT JOHN (1932)

Robert J. Fogelin was born on 24 June 1932 in Congers, New York. His father, Carl Fogelin, was a sheet metal worker and musician; his mother, Florence Sandberg, a homemaker and, after the death of her husband, a civil servant whose sharp mind carried her rapidly up through the ranks. Fogelin received his BA in philosophy at the University of Rochester in 1955. His graduate studies took him to Yale, and there he received his MA in 1957 and his PhD in philosophy in 1960, writing his dissertation under the supervision of Brand Blanshard and the unofficial guidance of Alan Ross Anderson. He was an assistant and associate professor of philosophy at Pomona College from 1958 to 1966. In 1966 Fogelin returned to Yale as associate professor, and in 1970 was promoted to full professor of philosophy. In 1980 he left

Yale to join Dartmouth College where he became the Sherman Fairchild Professor in the Humanities. He was elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Fogelin retired in 2001.

Soon after his arrival at Pomona College, Fogelin met Richard Popkin, who was teaching at nearby Claremont Graduate School. Popkin introduced Fogelin to the ideas of Sextus Empiricus and the Pyrrhonian philosophy that Sextus records in *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. At about the same time Fogelin had also found his way, through the works of J.L. Austin, to the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Thus Fogelin's education in classical skepticism began alongside his first reading of Wittgenstein, who struck Fogelin as a skeptical philosopher of a particular, identifiable sort: a Pyrrhonian skeptic.

But that view of Wittgenstein was not to blossom immediately, and Fogelin's first book, *Evidence and Meaning* (1967), is still mostly innocent of the Pyrrhonism yet to come. It presents an instructive analysis of ethical statements. For example, "X is good" becomes "There are adequate grounds for choosing X." "S ought not to do A" is analyzed as "There are adequate grounds for saying to S, 'Don't do A!'." Ethical statements can support prescriptions or imperatives, not by being equivalent to them but by noting the grounds one has for making them. Normally, the relevant grounds indicated by the statement will involve an appeal to facts. An ethical statement therefore has factual content, although it is context that determines just what the relevant facts are in a given case. The statement itself says only whether there are such facts. Still, the dependence of ethical statements upon the facts makes them subject to evaluation for truth or falsity.

Fogelin calls statements that function in this way "warrant statements" and proposes an account of warrant statements that can be

modified to fit a range of types of expression, including epistemic terms, perception terms, modal terms, and value terms. Fogelin suggests that some traditional disputes in philosophy are encouraged by the failure of the disputants to recognize that certain statements are warrant statements. For instance, when the error theorist about ethics squares off against the moral intuitionist, both agree that the term "good" in typical ethical statements is used to ascribe an alleged moral property – say, Goodness – to something. Their dispute concerns whether in fact there is any such property. Fogelin's warrant-statement analysis forestalls this dispute. Ethical statements do not attempt to ascribe a property of Goodness at all. Instead, they indicate the degree of factual backing one has for, say, choosing something or praising it. Thus the opposing sides of the traditional debate both suffer from a misunderstanding of the actual function of ethical language.

Fogelin's *Wittgenstein* (1976) was lauded for its clarity and insight and became hugely influential for its interpretation of the private-language argument as a "skeptical paradox" for which Wittgenstein proposes a "skeptical solution." He highlighted the therapeutic orientation of Wittgenstein's philosophy, calling attention to Wittgenstein's attempts to allay the impulse towards nonsensical metaphysics as a response to philosophical puzzlement by uncovering the source of the puzzlement and showing it to be an illusion. Fogelin went on to connect Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonian skeptical tradition. The new Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonist seeks further to quiet philosophical torment by exposing its original sources and making clear how philosophical perplexity arises in the first place. And it is this neo-Pyrrhonian programme that Fogelin puts into action.

In *Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification* (1994), Fogelin carries out

a neo-Pyrrhonian critique of contemporary epistemologies and their various attempts to formulate an analysis of knowledge and a theory of epistemic justification. Contemporary epistemology, he argues, is still grappling with a Pyrrhonian challenge codified in Agrippa's modes: to show how one's beliefs are justified without either falling into a vicious infinite regress, moving in a circle to presuppose the justification of the beliefs in question, or coming to rest at some arbitrary point with beliefs that are themselves not shown to be justified. The challenge is raised by the very philosophical theories that attempt to meet it – foundationalism, internalist and externalist coherentism, subjunctive analyses, and so on – but it is in fact unanswered by them, and so those theories fail on their own terms. The totality of the strength of each particular theory of epistemic justification, Fogelin suggests, is exhausted in the weaknesses of its rivals. No dogmatic epistemology can claim good credentials of its own, and none is a match for skepticism. He concludes that in epistemology "things are now largely as Sextus Empiricus left them almost two thousand years ago" (1994, p. 11). Kept in check by life's actual concerns, and unbothered by philosophy, the impulse to engage in theorizing about idealized forms of justification is allowed to sleep and the philosophical problem of epistemic justification no longer intrudes upon us. With this understanding, Fogelin's neo-Pyrrhonian reaches peace of mind.

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Samuel Levey

FOLLETT, MARY PARKER (1868–1933)

Mary Parker Follett was born on 3 September 1868 in Quincy, Massachusetts. Follett was educated first at Thayer Academy, where she developed an interest in philosophy. Four years after graduating in 1888, she entered Harvard's Annex, soon to become Radcliffe College. There she studied English, political economy, and history. She also studied abroad at Cambridge (Newnham) from 1890 to 1891. Follett received her BA summa cum laude from Radcliffe in 1898, having already published her first book, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives* (1896). Follett was a social worker and political activist in Boston for many years. She lived in England during the last five years of her life. Follett died on 18 December 1933 in Boston, Massachusetts.

Follett read Latin, Greek, French, and German and her early philosophical interests and training were in the idealist tradition. Yet she also admired William James's pluralism, and her own writings merged both views. Her holistic vision of society as a complex interactive unity, and her assertion that the individual found an identity only within group activities had similarities with ideas of the American pragmatist George Herbert Mead, a contemporary sociologist/philosopher.

Follett spearheaded community centers in Boston's poorer neighborhoods and developed evening educational and recreational programs and departments of vocational guidance in the local schools. This extended use of school buildings became a

social movement and a national example. We might see Follett as a typical example of a progressive social thinker in that she favored social planning and "control," and used her time and inheritance to pursue social projects. However, she was also often critical of American progressivism's reliance on an expansion of the suffrage to improve society, dismissing "ballot-box democracy" as feeble since it left power relations unchanged.

Her second book, *The New State* (1918) began as a report on her community activities, but developed into a more theoretical work exploring group dynamics. Follett maintained that the state was the highest expression of human endeavor, and that creativity and freedom were generated from organized social interaction of individuals not merely persuasion of the masses. Her next book, *Creative Experience* (1924) examined socio-political behavior in terms of the "wholes" of Gestalt psychology. Friendly with industrialists and perceiving industrial management as a central modern concern, she also lectured extensively on that topic.

One of Follett's most distinctive notions was that of "integration," and she applied it to both her political theories and to business management. Conflict is inevitable, yet it might serve as a forum for imaginative solutions and human progress. Three possible approaches to conflict are domination, compromise, or integration. Domination leaves one party dissatisfied; compromise often leaves all parties dissatisfied. Neither effect a qualitative change in actors' views. Integration involves reexamining motives. Often disputants do not want mutually exclusive ends. Therefore it is possible for a solution to deliver desired ends to all. To give an example: someone wishes to close an open and drafty library window; another wants fresh air. Follett's "integration" would shut the first window while opening another

in a different room, permitting air to circulate. Follett saw this as a new sort of solution which introduces a new, non-traditional leadership style. Arguing that a more natural authority derives from functional expertise than from hierarchical position, she believed that labor could participate in corporate decisions. Many of her ideas were adopted by those considering new non-coercive forms of management and social relations in both the United States and Great Britain, thus extending her influence well beyond the halls of academe.

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FOOT, PHILIPPA RUTH (1920 2010)

Philippa Ruth Bence was born on 3 October 1920 in Owston Ferry, England. She received her BA (1942) and MA (1946) from Somerville College, Oxford, where G.E.M. Anscombe was a major influence on her. She married Michael Foot in 1945. She stayed at Somerville to teach philosophy for many years in various positions: lecturer in philosophy (1947–1950), tutorial fellow (1950–1969), vice-principal (1967–1969), and then became a senior research fellow (1970–1988). Beginning in the 1960s, Foot also held visiting professorships at American universities, including Cornell, University of California at Los Angeles, University of California at Berkeley, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York University, and Princeton. In 1976 Foot became full professor at UCLA, where she was appointed the first holder of the Gloria and Paul Griffin Chair in philosophy in 1988. In 1982–1983 she was President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. She has the rare distinction of being a fellow of both the British Academy and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Best known for her essays collected in *Virtues and Vices* (1978) and numerous other articles in professional journals and literary reviews, she has lectured widely in the United States and Great Britain, as well as in other major cities of the world. She retired from UCLA in 1991, continuing to be a productive writer and active participant in philosophical discussions of ethics, publishing *Natural Goodness* (2001) and *Moral Dilemmas* (2002). Foot died in Oxford, England, on 3 October 2000.

Following in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, Foot insists that a sound moral philosophy should start from a

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theory of the virtues and vices. Accordingly, her important collection entitled *Virtues and Vices* begins with an analysis of the concept of virtue: how virtues benefit and whom; how they differ from talents and skills in being tied to the human will; and how virtues as correctives are linked to the peculiar features and deficiencies of human nature.

Foot is known for her work on specific moral issues, notably abortion and euthanasia. Her 1967 essay on “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect” does not come to any general conclusions about the moral permissibility of abortion. However, in this essay she challenges the doctrine of double effect as a theory for resolving the competing interests in cases of abortion. Is it morally permissible to inflict injury, even death, on an innocent to save another, perhaps even many others? What shall we say of the judge who under pressure from rioters frames an innocent person to save the lives of five hostages? Or the trolley driver who steers his runaway engine away from a track where five men are standing onto a track where there is only one? Despite its initial appeal, Foot argues that the doctrine of double effect is not the most useful theory for dealing with such dilemmas. While the doctrine of double effect invokes a distinction between intention in a direct or strict sense and what is foreseen as a result of the intended action, Foot thinks that a distinction between positive and negative rights, with correlative positive and negative duties, is better suited to handle these conflicts without having to invoke any utilitarian principle of greater good. The judge who considers framing an innocent person weighs the negative duty of avoiding harm against the positive duty of providing aid. In this case, killing the innocent to save others abuses the negative duty to avoid inflicting injury. The driver

of the runaway trolley, on the other hand, weighs two negative duties – not harming the five and not harming the one – and so may reasonably abide by that duty which causes the least injury possible.

In her 1977 essay “Euthanasia,” she defines euthanasia as an act “of inducing or otherwise opting for death for the sake of the one who is to die” (1978, p. 34). Claiming that human life itself is a good but leaving open the possibility that it is not always so, Foot carefully examines the various distinctions brought up in connection with euthanasia: active versus passive, voluntary versus involuntary, and killing versus letting die. Whether an act of euthanasia is justified will depend on its relation to the virtues of charity and justice. If an act is uncharitable, and hence not good for the person who dies, then the act is unjustified. Foot offers an interesting discussion of the complicated relation between a subject’s own view of her life and what makes a life good or bad. She also points out that while one always has a right not to be killed, one does not always have a right to life-prolonging or life-ending procedures. She offers a nuanced discussion of when such rights obtain that shows moral judgments demand careful inspection of the details and circumstances involved in each case.

The connection between facts and values is a major theme in Foot’s persistent opposition to emotivism and prescriptivism in ethics. She herself characterizes this opposition as “a painfully slow journey...away from theories that located the special character of evaluations in each speaker’s attitudes, feelings, or recognition of reasons for acting” (1978, p. xiv). Her early essays “Moral Arguments” (1958) and “Moral Beliefs” (1958) attack the alleged fact/value split, the claim that there is no logical connection between statements of fact and statements of value, and thus that arguments about moral issues can always

break down even when disputants agree about matters of fact. The fact/value dichotomy with its serious implications for moral reasoning was made famous by David Hume, endorsed by G.E. Moore, and developed by other 20th century critics of naturalistic ethics such as Charles Stevenson, A.J. Ayer, and R.M. Hare. Following Ludwig Wittgenstein, Foot's tactic in opposing these forms of ethical noncognitivism is to look at how evaluative terms are used in ordinary circumstances to see if the evaluative terms can be separated from descriptive factual content. Her essay on "Goodness and Choice" (1961) continues to pry apart the alleged connection between the use of value terms and the feelings, attitudes, and choices of speakers or agents. She considers how the term good is internally related or connected to such things as knives, cars, horse-riders, and farmers. The ascription of the term good in these cases depends on fulfilling certain objective criteria, whether in terms of function or purpose, as for cars and knives, or social practices, as for riders and farmers. An object is not good because it is chosen but rather because of what it is chosen for.

Without sharing the standard needs, desires, and interests of others in one's social group, one may have no apparent reason to act morally at all. Foot develops this point in her famous essay on "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" (1972). For morality as for etiquette, she claims, certain behavior may be required, not merely recommended, but that it is required still leaves open the question, why should I do what I am required to do? For her, Kant's famous categorical imperative is an empty slot; all imperatives depend for their efficacy or bindingness on people's interests or desires. If reasons for acting morally cannot be located in some universal, binding for each and every person, nevertheless Foot's

investigations consistently show that moral judgments and evaluations must be located in a social dimension. She claims that if the expression of approval and disapproval is part of the complex phenomenon we call morality, and if approval and disapproval are essentially social in presupposing determinate social practices and backgrounds, then morality itself is essentially social.

To take account of her philosophical development, scholars now writing on Foot's philosophical career divide her work into early, middle, and recent (for example Gavin Lawrence, in Hursthouse, 1995). Early Foot attacked the fact/value dichotomy, but still held that moral considerations provide reasons for acting for each and every person. Middle Foot – regarding morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives – argued against the necessary rationality of moral action. In her 2001 book *Natural Goodness*, Foot herself labels this view of morality "indigestible" (p. 59). Recently Foot claimed that acting morally is acting rationally, and practical rationality itself is necessarily tied to human goodness. "I want to say, baldly, that there is no criterion for practical rationality that is not *derived from* that of goodness of the will" (2001, p. 11). Foot articulates a thorough-going naturalistic ethics grounded in facts about human life. "To determine what is goodness and what defect of character, disposition and choice, we must consider what human good is and how human beings live: in other words, what kind of a living thing a human being is" (2001, p. 51). The just person recognizes certain considerations, such as the fact of a promise or a neighbor's need, as powerful and even compelling reasons for acting. Understanding the conditions of being human is essential to understanding human goodness and thus the dictates of morality and the ideals of virtue, or what

Foot now calls “natural normativity.” To the objection that practical rationality is simply the pursuit of happiness, she responds with a nuanced analysis of happiness as a protean concept that cannot be simply identified as the human good. Too many examples of those willing to sacrifice happiness for justice, honor, or some other virtue tell against the claim that happiness is to be identified with the human good and thus with the goal of a practically rational agent. To the claim that genuine happiness consists in a life of virtue, Foot demurs, for that view allows too little room for the genuine tragedy that may lie in a moral choice.

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Jocelyn Hoy

FOSTER, GEORGE BURMAN (1857–1918)

George Burman Foster was born on 2 April 1857 in Alderson, Monroe County, in Virginia (now West Virginia). Foster

attended Shelton College in West Virginia, and was ordained to the Baptist ministry in 1879 when he graduated. He received the BA and MA degrees at West Virginia University in 1883 and 1884. After graduating with a divinity degree from Rochester Theological Seminary in 1887, Foster became pastor of the First Baptist Church of Saratoga Springs, New York. Reputed among Baptists as a skillful preacher and intellectual prodigy, two new Baptist universities sought him for their faculties. McMaster University in Toronto financed his study in Germany at Göttingen and Berlin during 1891–1892, after which he joined its faculty to teach philosophy, psychology, and logic. Denison University also conferred the PhD degree on Foster. At the same time, William Rainey Harper, President of the University of Chicago, sought him for the faculty of its Divinity School. Foster did move to Chicago to join the Chicago Divinity School in 1895 and rose to the position of professor of systematic theology. He was made professor of philosophy of religion in 1905, and he held this position until his death on 22 December 1918 in Chicago, Illinois.

The University of Chicago was committed to keeping ties to its Baptist constituency and to disseminating to churches the new knowledge of the sciences and the historical and textual criticism of the Bible. Foster participated in the annual Baptist Congresses and regional “Ministers Meetings” and corresponded with regional and national Baptist newspapers. In doing so, he drew himself into controversy over his liberal theological views. To quell the uproar, in 1905 he agreed to be transferred from the Divinity School to the department of comparative religion, as professor of the philosophy of religion. He preached regularly in Baptist and Unitarian churches, including the congregation which he and his wife joined in 1896, the Hyde Park Baptist

Church, now the Hyde Park Union Church, in Chicago. At the time of his death he was preaching regularly in the Unitarian Church in Madison, Wisconsin. Despite the storms of controversy that engulfed Foster, at his death he remained a member in good standing of his own congregation and a minister in good standing in the Northern Baptist Convention. Memorial services were held in Mandel Hall at the University of Chicago and downtown at the Garrick Theatre, where Foster’s friend and public debater, Clarence Darrow, addressed the mourners.

Foster relentlessly pursued intellectual integrity for faith as a dynamic, living process. Faith, he said, is a task and an achievement as well as a gift. He “would rather have a minimum that was sure than a maximum that was not” (1909, p. xi). As a Baptist believer in the soul’s liberty, he rejected the coercion of creeds, yet he insisted on “the personal need of intellectual convictions with reference to religious realities” (Nash 1923, p. 38). He saw the need for “the synthesis of the stability of doctrine sufficient for church work, and the movement of science sufficient in that field ...” (“Religious Teaching,” 1897, p. 109). All who knew Foster, friends and foes alike, testified that he was a man of integrity, great intelligence, and a kind spirit. These were the qualities that energized his passionate and unconsummated search for the meaning of “the God-idea.” In their passion, self and faith contribute to the certainty and realization of God as an inner spiritual reality. Foster says, in a way recognizably contemporary to persons who are inquiring into the meaning of God today, “in this new world [of modern science] the opposition of human and divine is overcome, and all is human and all is divine at one and the same time” (1906, p. 147). Foster’s contemporaries recognized that his struggle for a new and credible theism was

an authentic, inner, spiritual one. His most recent interpreters, however, debate whether he was an orthodox Christian theist, a theist at all, a humanist, a religious humanist, or a religious naturalist. Foster's primary aim was investigating the plausibility of faith in a theology of culture.

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Edgar A. Towne

FRANK, PHILIPP (1884–1966)

Philipp Frank was born on 20 March 1884 in Vienna, Austria. He studied physics and mathematics at the universities of Göttingen and Vienna. At Vienna, he studied with Ludwig Boltzmann and received his PhD in theoretical physics in 1907. While lecturing in physics at Vienna from 1910 to 1912, Frank was a regular member of the so-called First Vienna Circle with Richard Von Mises, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath. He shared

Neurath's activist conception of scientific philosophy, which shunned excessive formalism, emphasized the instrumental and conventional aspects of science and scientific theory, and encouraged practical engagements with science and the public.

In 1912 Frank left Vienna for Prague, where he succeeded Einstein (at Einstein's invitation) as professor of theoretical physics at the German University. Frank remained in close contact with the Circle's members, especially Rudolf Carnap who came to the German University in 1931. In 1929, Frank organized within a meeting of the German Physical Society a conference on the "Epistemology of the Exact Sciences" at which Frank, Carnap, Hahn, Neurath, Hans Reichenbach, and Herbert Feigl gave talks that first introduced the new scientific philosophy of the Vienna Circle (and Reichenbach's Berlin-based Society for Empirical Philosophy) to established scientists.

Frank continued to promote logical empiricism to working scientists, the educated public and scholars in the humanities after his emigration to the United States in 1938. In 1939 he began teaching for one semester each year at Harvard University as a lecturer in physics and mathematics, and lectured at many other universities on alternate semesters. Frank retired from teaching at Harvard in 1954 and took various visiting positions, as he continued to promote the unity of science and the cultural and social roles philosophy of science should play. Frank died on 21 July 1966 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Beginning in 1940, Frank regularly attended the annual Conferences on Science, Philosophy and Religion in New York City where he defended science and scientific philosophy to the many intellectuals who regarded science as disconnected from, if not dangerous to, human culture (see Frank 1950).

After World War II and Neurath's death in 1945, Frank joined Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris, who had edited the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* with Neurath, as a leader of the Unity of Science Movement. With Rockefeller funding arranged by Warren Weaver, Frank established a new Institute for the Unity of Science in 1936 within the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Boston, serving as its President until 1965. At the same time, Frank succeeded William Malisoff as President of the Philosophy of Science Association. The Institute sponsored colloquia and conferences but lost its funding from the Rockefeller Foundation in the mid-1950s.

Frank's interest in conventionalism connected to his interest in sociology and the dynamics of theory choice. He promoted the view (associated usually with Pierre Duhem, Neurath, and W.V. Quine) that evidence logically constrains choices of scientific theories only to families of theories, each of which are consistent with specific evidence but which can be in other respects quite different from each other. In such cases, Frank argued, different kinds of values held consciously or unconsciously by a scientist or prominent in his or her culture can and often do influence theory choice and, in turn, the direction of scientific research. This insight served as his justification for promoting research in sociology of science within the Institute for the Unity of Science. "To understand that the observed facts do not determine scientific doctrines unambiguously is the most important prerequisite for understanding the role played by sociological factors in the acceptance of scientific doctrines" (Frank 1951, p. 19). This interest clearly informs the title of the popular volume, edited by Frank, titled *The Validation of Scientific Theories* (1957), which remains one of his best-remembered contributions to philosophy of science.

Frank desired to promote the study of science's social and cultural connections and mutual influences. Frank was followed by Thomas Kuhn, with whom he shared the view that science's history is punctuated by revolutionary periods and that any valid philosophy of science must accept these as data. "The history of science," Frank wrote, "is the workshop of the philosophy of science" (1949, p. 278). Yet, in Kuhn's influential *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970), the history of science counsels against unity of science and instead emphasizes the natural specialization of scientific knowledge and terminology within individual paradigms.

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George A. Reisch

FRANKENA, WILLIAM KLAAS (1908–1994)

William Frankena was born Wibe Klaas Frankena on 21 June 1908 in Manhattan, Montana, and died on 22 October 1994 in Ann Arbor, Michigan. He grew up in a Dutch Reformed community in western Michigan, and received his BA from Calvin College in 1930. He then became a graduate student at the University of Michigan, where he studied with Roy Wood Sellars and C.H. Langford, and received his MA in philosophy in 1931. For a few years he was a doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan but, after passing his required exams, he went to Harvard; he received the Harvard MA in 1935, spent the 1935–36 academic year at Cambridge University working with G. E. Moore, and returned for a PhD in 1937 from Harvard.

Frankena joined the University of Michigan faculty as an instructor in 1937 and attained the rank of assistant professor (1940), associate professor (1946), professor

(1947–1978), chair of the department (1947–1961), and was professor emeritus (1978–1994). He also held visiting positions at Columbia, Princeton, Harvard, and Tokyo Universities. A member of Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Kappa Phi, he was a trustee of Chatham College (1961–1994), Cairns Lecturer for the American Philosophical Association (1974), received the University of Michigan Distinguished Faculty Achievement Award (1965), and the Warner G. Rice Humanities Award from the University of Michigan (1978). He served as chair of the Council for Philosophical Studies; was President of the American Philosophical Association Western Division (1965–1966), chaired its board of directors (1963–1965), and delivered the 1974 Carus Lectures to the APA.

Frankena's first published essay, "The Naturalistic Fallacy" (1939), was a powerful assault on G.E. Moore's treatment of the naturalistic fallacy. By his 1976 "Concluding More or Less Philosophical Postscript," in *Perspectives on Morality*, he considered himself a "cognitivist," taking a naturalistic attitude about good, and an intuitionist stance about ought. In his 1939 essay Frankena held that Moore begs the question in his claim that naturalists commit a fallacy in defining good in terms of such natural properties as desire, pleasure, interest, etc. Frankena claims the so-called naturalistic fallacy is not a logical fallacy, since Moore simply *assumes* and does not *prove* that good is both non-natural and indefinable.

Frankena's interests then broadened to emotivism, the philosophy of education, ethics and religion, and other areas. In 1963 he authored a noteworthy introductory text, *Ethics*. Later he considered the importance of virtue ethics, a topic of great debate in recent decades. Frankena did not deny the importance of character traits in ethics, but alone they do not generate standards of

ethical behavior. With norms and virtues together, he says, we are able to act in a morally correct way. How our actions affect others has to be considered for its own sake and not, for example, for its utility in bringing about some end. This is so because morality, almost by definition, has to do with the effects of our actions, judgments, decisions, etc., on other people.

According to some moralities such as utilitarianism, what we do will be rightly judged by how much good or harm we bring to others. In Frankena's view ethical systems, at least some of them, are teleological or, perhaps better, consequentialist in that we judge them by the good or harm that they are designed to either forestall or cause. As Frankena says, the ethics of some moral philosophers are teleological. On the other hand, he rightly notes that other moral systems are deontological, in that consequences do not figure in. For example, a person has at least a *prima-facie* obligation to keep a promise regardless of the consequences. Similar remarks would apply to our verdict of the rightness of actions when they involve truth-telling, the promotion of fairness, etc. Frankena called his theory a "mixed deontological ethics," precisely because he believed it merged virtues with moral obligations – a kind of synthesis of Aristotle and Kant.

Frankena takes pains to argue that a purely utilitarian or consequentialist approach is not sufficient, though it is *part* of the answer. Also needed, however, is a principle of justice which is at the core of deontological theories of ethics, insofar as deontological theories, such as Kant's, demand respect for the intrinsic worth of all individuals and treating them equally. He admits that these principles are not universal or absolute and that in any given moral choice it may be difficult to determine which principle takes precedence. He further argues that personal

ethics and correct analysis show that there are only two fundamental principles: a principle of beneficence that he thinks grounds nonegoistic consequentialist theories such as utilitarianism; and a principle of justice which he thinks underlies deontological theories of morality. Such theories urge us to recognize the intrinsic value of all persons and to treat all equally. Frankena adds that these principles are not absolute, since they may come into conflict in some situations, and there is no formula for determining which take precedence.

In his view, there is a sense of “should” which means being “rational.” Therefore, “Why should I be moral?” equates to “Is it rational to be moral?” Frankena tries to further clarify such questions by analyzing what it means to act rationally. He surmises that a traditional answer to this question is that to act rationally means to act self-interestedly, or for one’s own welfare or benefit. His counter-argument is that this is not what morality involves and could not possibly equate to self-interest. The problem is that morality often requires actions counter to one’s own best interest. Frankena points out that the common notion that acting morally is rational only when it is for our own happiness is not necessarily true, because it is a fact that people are capable of acting for the good of others, and not just selfishly.

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FRANKFURT, HARRY GORDON (1929)

Harry Frankfurt was born in Langhorne, Pennsylvania, on 29 May 1929. He obtained his BA from Johns Hopkins in 1949, and spent the next two years doing graduate work at Cornell University before returning to Johns Hopkins, receiving his MA in 1953 and PhD in philosophy in 1954. During 1954–1956 Frankfurt served in the U.S. Army. From 1956 to 1962, Frankfurt taught at Ohio State University, first as instructor, then as assistant professor. He taught at State University of New York at Binghamton for a year before moving to Rockefeller University in 1963. Frankfurt remained at Rockefeller University for 11 years, becoming chair of the philosophy department in 1965. Frankfurt also taught at Yale University, both in the School of Law as a lecturer from 1981 to 1989, and in the philosophy department as a professor from 1976 to 1989, where he served as chair of the department from 1978 to 1987. From 1990 to 2002 he was professor of philosophy at Princeton University, where he now is emeritus professor. He has also held visiting appointments at the University of California at Los Angeles, the University of Pittsburgh, Vassar College, and All Souls College at Oxford University. In addition to his teaching, Frankfurt has been President

of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (1991–1992). He has twice received the National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship (1981–1982 and 1994) and in 1993 he was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship. He is a Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and was awarded a Romanell-Phi Beta Kappa Professorship in Philosophy (1999–2000).

Although Frankfurt's philosophical output covers a wide range, including essays on topics as seemingly diverse as the rigorous analysis of the concept "bullshit" to speculations concerning God's creation of the world, we may indicate three consistent areas of interest in Frankfurt's work. In all of these areas we find Frankfurt's insight that the will, more than reason, is the essential feature of human nature and our understanding of ourselves. The early period of Frankfurt's philosophical investigations centers on questions concerning objectivity, skepticism, and the foundations of knowledge. Frankfurt's dissertation, entitled "The Essential Objectivity of What is Known," and his work on Descartes reflect these concerns.

The second area of inquiry which arises in Frankfurt's work focuses on questions relating to morality, notably such problems as free will and responsibility. In this area Frankfurt attempts to elaborate adequate notions of freedom and personal ideals, not to provide a theory of moral obligations and rights. While beginning with questions of morality, Frankfurt's thought moves into areas of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Taking volition as central to an understanding of what it means to be human, Frankfurt's second area of inquiry focuses primarily on questions of freedom and responsibility. While his interest in the will and the volitional structure of human beings remains central to his thinking, Frankfurt's most recent work attempts to deal

with those constraints upon the will which make autonomy possible.

Thirdly, in his work on Descartes, Frankfurt advocates the controversial position that Descartes gives up his quest to find an unshakable foundation of knowledge in the external world, and instead finds satisfaction in his ability to offer a rational description of the world, even if it is impossible to know whether or not such a description corresponds to the world. As Frankfurt writes, “Descartes’s theory of knowledge is grounded in his recognition that we simply cannot help believing what we clearly and distinctly perceive. For him, the mode of necessity that is most fundamental to the enterprise of reason is not logical but volitional – a necessitation of the will” (1999, p. ix).

Classical debates on the question of free will and moral responsibility often begin with the assumption that an agent cannot be held responsible in situations where he could not have done otherwise. This assumption is referred to as the “principal of alternate possibilities.” Situations wherein the agent performs an action due to coercion are thought to provide examples of this assumption. Against this seemingly obvious assumption, Frankfurt argues that in certain situations the fact that an agent could not have acted otherwise may be perfectly compatible with his moral responsibility. In some situations, the fact that the agent could not have done otherwise may have no bearing on why the agent chose to act as he did. What is important in assigning moral responsibility, according to Frankfurt, is the formation of the agent’s will. An agent may be held morally responsible, even if he could not have acted otherwise, insofar as he identifies with the action. In situations wherein an agent forms his will with respect to a specific action, and undertakes the action he wants to undertake, the fact that he could not have done otherwise would play no

constitutive role in the formation of the agent’s will. Indeed, the agent may never be made aware that he could not have acted otherwise. What is motivating the agent to act is not the fact that he could not have done otherwise, but his identification with the action, that is, the action is being motivated by a will which the agent recognizes as his own. In these situations, although he could not have acted otherwise, the agent is morally responsible for his actions. Thus, Frankfurt argues that determinism need not be incompatible with moral responsibility.

Freedom of the will is not simply a matter of doing what we want to do. To assume that having a free will simply means having the ability to do what we want to do is to conflate freedom of the will with freedom of action. But as Frankfurt points out, although an animal may be free to run in any direction it wants, we would not assign a free will to the animal. Freedom of the will, according to Frankfurt, is a question of having the will that one wants to have. One’s will is free insofar as it is the will that one wants to have. Thus, a free will is one whose structural organization displays a coherence between one’s second-order volitions and one’s first-order desires. While one may be ambivalent about one’s second-order volitions, the “wanton” lacks these second-order volitions entirely and is moved solely by first-order desires.

Frankfurt’s recent writings address the concept of autonomy. Common sense seems to suggest that one cannot be autonomous if there are constraints placed upon the will. Not only does Frankfurt reject this position, but he goes further, arguing that certain constraints not only do not limit one’s autonomy, but may in fact facilitate it. This is true in those cases where the constraints placed on a person’s will are grounded in the person’s own nature. An example of this is when we act out of love. To love something,

or to have an ideal, is to recognize a limit to one's will – one's love or ideal is that which it would be unthinkable to violate. Thus one's love or ideal places a constraint upon the will. Loving nothing, or having no ideals is not an indication of freedom according to Frankfurt. Far from being free, the person who loves nothing or has no ideals lacks personal identity. These people are "amorphous." If autonomy means being "self-regulating," it follows that only a being which has a personal identity, which is a self, is capable of autonomy. Constraints then, when grounded in a person's own nature, are the necessary prerequisite of autonomy.

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Louis Colombo

FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN (1706–1790)

Benjamin Franklin was born on 17 January 1706 in Boston. In 1718, at the age of 12, Franklin became the apprentice of his older brother James at a printing house in Boston. In

1721, James founded his own paper, the *New-England Courant*, in which he allowed his readers to contribute weekly with their own essays and letters. Around this time, Franklin began reading John Locke, Lord Shaftesbury, Anthony Collins, and the British periodical the *Spectator*, after which the *New-England Courant* was modeled. In 1722, Benjamin began submitting several letters under the pseudonym Mrs. Silence Dogood in which he attacked Cotton Mather (the pseudonym was inspired by Mather's 1710 *Bonifacius: Essays to Do Good*).

Franklin eventually ventured to Philadelphia where he was employed by Samuel Keimer, a local printer. During this time Franklin met James Ralph and the governor of Pennsylvania, Sir William Keith. His relationship with both became increasingly close, and Keith urged him to set up his own printing business, offering to introduce him to men in the business in London. While in London, Franklin wrote and published one of his first works, a pamphlet entitled *A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain* (1725). The pamphlet was written as a response to William Wollaston's *The Religion of Nature Delineated* (1722), a commentary on morality, in the printing of which Franklin had assisted. Embracing a deist viewpoint of a mechanistic and determinist bent, Franklin asserted that man is by nature not free to make his own choices, and hence not truly responsible for his moral decisions. He argued further that pain is the sole impetus to action, and that pleasure, or the satisfaction of desire, is wholly caused by pain. He also argued strongly against the immortality of the soul. Later, in his *Autobiography* Franklin called the pamphlet a youthful mistake, something that soon became clear to him when he observed the moral decay deism caused in him and two of his friends. In subsequent years, e.g. in his

Dialogues Concerning Virtue and Pleasure for the *Pennsylvania Gazette* (1730) Franklin developed a virtue ethics in which he argued that "uniform rectitude of conduct" rather than bookish speculation is essential to the development of virtue. A positive result of the *Dissertation* was that Franklin was introduced to the philosopher and political economist Bernard de Mandeville.

Franklin grew weary of London and by 1727, he returned to Philadelphia and began his own printing business. In 1729 Franklin continued his attack upon Mather in a series of humorous letters under the pseudonym Miss. Busy Body, which appeared in *American Weekly Mercury*. The same year he published *A Modest Enquiry into the Nature and Necessity of a Paper-Currency*. Along with becoming the main printer in Philadelphia, Franklin purchased Keimer's *Pennsylvania Gazette* in 1729, which quickly became the most popular newspaper in the colonies. In 1732, he began publishing the lucrative *Poor Richard's Almanack* – named for Richard Saunders, one of Franklin's pseudonyms – which he continued to publish annually for twenty-five years, the final volume appearing in 1757. In 1731, he arranged the Library Company of Philadelphia, creating one of the first library institutions in America. Franklin also proposed a fire protection organization, the Union Fire Company, which was created in 1735. A year later, Franklin became a clerk in the Pennsylvania legislature, continuing his role in the government until 1751.

Franklin had a great interest in natural philosophy, or what we today call science. His scientific inventions and experiments are the most widely known elements of his intellectual life. In 1743, in *A Proposal for Promoting Useful Knowledge Among the British Plantations in America*, Franklin suggested the organization of

a formal correspondence between men in the colonies who were engaged in scientific inquiry. The organization of this community signified the beginning of the American Philosophical Society. He was a catalyst in the founding of the Academy of Philadelphia as well, through the publishing of *Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth in Pennsylvania*.

In the winter of 1746 Franklin began his investigations in electricity, along with some of his companions in the American Philosophical Society. Through correspondence with scientists in Germany and England he was able to construct instruments and design experiments that were eventually collected into *Experiments and Observations in Electricity* (1751). He was the first to propose that electricity did not consist of two different kinds of ‘electrical fluid’ that canceled each other out (vitreous and resinous) – as Charles du Fay had argued in 1733 – but consisted of a single fluid under different pressures, which Franklin labeled as positive and negative. Franklin was also the first to discover that electric charge can neither be created nor destroyed, leading to the principle of conservation of charge. In 1762, he received an honorary doctorate from Oxford University for his scientific accomplishments. In addition, he discovered the principle of refrigeration, invented bifocals, the Franklin stove, and proposed the flexible urinary catheter. In 1753, Franklin received honorary degrees from Yale and Harvard.

That same year he became the Deputy Postmaster, making him responsible for all of the mail in the northern colonies. He proposed the “Plan of Union” a year later, and despite it being adopted by the Albany Congress, it was rejected by the legislatures in the colonies as well as by the King’s advisors. The idea to construct a general council composed of representatives from

the colonies later influenced the Articles of Confederation and the United States Constitution. He served as a representative to the colonies in foreign affairs abroad in Europe, including an appointment as the Agent of the Pennsylvania Assembly to England, which sent him to London. Once there, he negotiated issues of taxation concerning certain estates in Philadelphia as a way to obtain funding for the defense of British colonies against the French.

During his first year in London he wrote and published *The Way to Wealth* (1757), which eventually was made the Preface to his *Poor Richard’s Almanack*. In this piece he presented several ideas concerning the human condition and proper moral conduct. It elucidated the key themes underlying the humble maxims contained in the main text of *Poor Richard’s* that were concerned with presenting human nature in a positive light. His most notable work published during this period was *Causes of the American Discontents Before 1768* (1768).

Franklin was elected to several positions while serving in London, including president of the American Philosophical Society in 1769. While he was critical of the British rule over the colonies, Franklin also condemned several aspects of society in the colonies that were not the result of England’s authority. His most significant criticisms were of the institution of slavery (though he held household slaves in the 1750s and 1760s). While in London he published “A Conversation on Slavery” (1770) in the *Public Advertiser* that outlined the similarities between political slavery and the forms of slavery being practiced in the colonies. He then formally argued against slavery in “The Sommersett Case and the Slave Trade” (1772), and right before his death he petitioned to Congress for the national abolition of slavery, representing the

Pennsylvania Abolition Society of which he was elected president in 1787.

By 1775 Franklin joined the colonial resistance movement; he helped draft the Declaration of Independence in 1776. Franklin's main role in the war for independence was as a commissioner in France seeking aid. Upon his arrival in France, Franklin became the primary representative of the New World, and was hailed for his efforts to free the colonies from the tyrannical rule of the British. Franklin remained a symbol of freedom and progress in France till his death. Franklin worked with the French chemist Antoine Lavoisier, to investigate Mesmerism (a form of hypnotism proposed by the Austrian Franz Anton Mesmer), concluding it to be a fraud. Franklin argued for the abolition of slavery until his death on 17 April 1790 in Philadelphia.

Despite Franklin's long record of public service he expressed little interest in political theory. He did, however, reject the popular notion of "natural rights," arguing that rights, including property rights, were conferred by the graces of society, and that the powers of government rested on the good opinion of the people governed.

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Cornelis de Waal

and

Monica Morrison

FRASER, NANCY (1947)

Nancy Fraser was born on 20 May 1947 in Baltimore, Maryland. She received the BA degree in philosophy from Bryn Mawr College in 1969, and then attended the City University of New York, earning the MA in philosophy in 1979 and the PhD in philosophy in 1980. From 1980 to 1982 she was assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Georgia, before going to Northwestern University in 1982. By 1993 she was full professor at Northwestern University, and she also was a member of the research faculty for the Center

for Urban Affairs and Policy Research there. In 1995 she became Professor of Philosophy and Politics at the New School for Social Research, now New School University, in New York City. In 1999 her title became Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Philosophy and Politics, and she currently holds this position. Fraser has been a visiting professor at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, the University of Cambridge, the University of Amsterdam, the University of Groningen, the University of Paris 8, and Freie Universität Berlin. During 2011–2016 she holds a Chair in Global Justice at the Collège d'études mondiales in Paris. She has received numerous academic honors, fellowships, and lectureships, including the Alfred Schutz Prize in Social Philosophy from the American Philosophical Association in 2010.

Fraser's early work involving French poststructuralism, Marxist and Leftist thought, social theory, and social justice blended seamlessly into her original insights for feminist philosophy and feminist politics. Fraser was also one of the prolific interpreters of Foucault for English-speaking audiences. Her first book, *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory* (1989), collected many of her influential essays on these topics. *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition* (1997) reflects on the weakened Leftist politics in America while economic and political neo-liberalism gained momentum in the 1980s and 90s. Although she retained respect for the Marxist politics of redistribution and its concern for class divides, she attempted to balance that concern with due respect for the struggle over the politics of identity and its foundational focus on mutual recognition.

Chastising all sides for restricting solutions to the limitations of their own ideological theorizing, Fraser designed a more pragmatist

and dialectical approach. No single definition or ‘essence’ to social justice could suffice in these modern and postmodern times. Her mounting frustration with different formulations of the liberal paradigm for democratic equality in the processes of political participation erupted against various targets, including Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and Axel Honneth. Her extended dialogue (often more like a debate) with Axel Honneth was an important milestone, published as *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (2003). Her concerns for causes such as feminism and poverty into the new century are expressed in *Stretching the Radical Imagination: Beyond the Unholy Alliance of Identity Politics and Neoliberalism* (2010) and *Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis* (2013).

Fraser’s sustained attention to issues of framing and defending multiculturalism gradually extended to its dynamic relationship with globalization and cosmopolitanism. Moving towards a “post-Westphalian” standpoint for theorizing political concerns and social activism across (and despite) national boundaries couldn’t simplify the abiding dilemmas for pursuing social justice, but new opportunities are arising. Her writing culminating in *Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World* (2008) set out her revised agenda. No longer must contested conceptions of the ‘citizen’ always frame issues; the proper representation for subjects permits new solidarities and emancipatory movements.

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John R. Shook

FRIEDMAN, MICHAEL LEE (1947)

Michael Friedman was born on 2 April 1947 in Brookline, Massachusetts. Completing his college preparation at Flushing High School in Queens, New York, Friedman became a semi-professional musician. He plays clarinet, saxophone, and guitar. Entering Queens College of City University of New York, he first majored in music, but then switched his major to philosophy. He credits Peter Manicas at Queens and Carl Gustav Hempel, then visiting Queens, as turning his interest to philosophy. He took the BA from Queens in 1969, and then entered Princeton University where he studied with Hempel and Clark

N. Glymour. One of his classmates there was Alexander Nehamas. He took the PhD in 1972 upon presentation of a dissertation titled “Foundations of Space-Time Theories: Relativistic Physics and Philosophy of Science.” His dissertation was published in a revised form in 1983.

Friedman’s first academic appointment was as Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University during 1972–1975. In 1975 he went to the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, where he served as Assistant Professor of Philosophy until 1978 and Associate Professor of Philosophy during 1978–1982. He then moved to the University of Illinois at Chicago, where he served as Associate Professor of Philosophy during 1982–1984. He was promoted to Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois during 1984–1994, and Research Professor of the Humanities during 1988–1994. At Indiana University, he served as Ruth N. Halls Professor of Arts and Humanities, Professor of Philosophy, and Professor of History and Philosophy of Science from 1995 until 2000. He has served as Frederick P. Rehms Family Professor of Humanities, and Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University in California since 2000. Friedman has also served as Co-Director of the Program in History and Philosophy of Science and Technology at Stanford since 2003, and Director of the Patrick Suppes Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Science and Technology at Stanford from 2004 to 2013.

Friedman’s impact in philosophy has extended from philosophy of science and philosophy of physics to the history of science and the historical phases of philosophy of science. He published his most influential work, *Foundations of Space-Time Theories: Relativistic Physics and the Philosophy of Science*, in 1983, and has continued to make

seminal contributions to philosophical issues arising from modern physics and the natural sciences.

Honors and awards bestowed on Friedman include: American Council of Learned Societies Fellowship (1976–1977); Canada Council Visiting Foreign Scholars Fellowship, University of Western Ontario (Spring 1984); National Science Foundation Fellowship (Summer 1985); Franklin J. Matchette Prize of the American Philosophical Association awarded for *Foundations of Space-Time Theories* (1985); George Santayana Fellow, Harvard University (Fall 1986); Senior University Scholars Award, University of Illinois (1987–1990); Lakatos Award in Philosophy of Science awarded for *Foundations of Space-Time Theories* (1987); National Science Foundation Fellowship (1988); John Simon Guggenheim Fellowship (1988–1989); Visiting Humanities Fellow, Princeton University (Spring 1992); National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship (1992); Research Fellow, Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Bielefeld (1993); Fellow of American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1997–); and Membre titulaire de l’Institut International de Philosophie (2001–). Friedman has served as the President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division (1996–97) and the Philosophy of Science Association (1997–99).

Friedman’s scholarly research in modern philosophy’s many intersections with the development of the natural sciences has resulted in several books, including his monographs *Kant and the Exact Sciences* (1992) and *Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (2013), and his edited volume *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth Century Science* (2006). He has also published volumes on twentieth century philosophy,

including *Reconsidering Logical Positivism* (1999); *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger* (2000); and *The Cambridge Companion to Carnap* (2007). He also translated a volume of Kant's writings, titled *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (2004).

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Richard T. Hull

FRISBIE, LEVI (1783–1822)

Levi Frisbie was the first Alford Professor of
Philosophy at Harvard. He was born on 15
September 1783 in Ipswich, Massachusetts.
His father Levi, the pastor in that town,
was among the first graduating class from
Dartmouth College under Eleazar Wheelock.
He completed his preparatory studies at
Andover Academy and entered Harvard
College in 1798, where Joseph Willard
was President. After graduating with the
BA degree in 1802, he taught at a school in
Concord for a year, and then he decided to
study law. His studies were halted because
he suddenly suffered from partial blindness
which afflicted him for the rest of his life.
His fitness for teaching was not affected, and
Harvard appointed him at the tutor for Latin
in 1805.

Frisbie joined the faculty at Harvard at an
extraordinary moment in time. Willard had
died in 1804 while obstacles to Unitarianism
were falling, and Unitarians quickly gained
elected to prominent positions. John Quincy
Adams, later U.S. President, was Professor
of Rhetoric and Oratory during 1803–08. In
1805 Henry Ware was elected as Professor
of Divinity and John Farrar became a
tutor; Farrar then ascended as Professor of
Mathematics and Experimental Philosophy
in 1807. In 1806 Samuel Webber became the
President, and Unitarianism’s dominance was
complete.

Frisbie’s own sentiments largely agreed
with this Unitarian shift. While a student,
he had been able to study John Locke and
the British moralists, and liberal thinkers
of the Scottish and French Enlightenments.
One of his mentors was tutor Levi Hedge
who was advocating the Scottish realism
which fit so well with natural theology and
Unitarianism. In 1810 Hedge was elevated
to Professor of Logic and Metaphysics

so that the new President, John Thornton Kirkland, could reduce that office's teaching duties. More professorships were added to the faculty as Harvard rapidly enlarged. In 1811 Frisbie became Professor of Latin. When the John Alford fund was directed to endow a new professorship in philosophy in 1817, Frisbie was elected as the first Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity, and he held this office until his death. Prominent among the textbooks which Frisbie used in his classes were William Paley's *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (1785); Jean Jacques Burlamaqui's *Principles of Natural and Political Law* (5th edn 1807); and *The Federalist* (1788). Jean-Baptiste Say's *A Treatise on Political Economy* (1803) probably came into use under Frisbie as well. Frisbie died on 9 July 1822 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

His friend and colleague, theology professor Andrews Norton, published *A Collection of the Miscellaneous Writings of Professor Frisbie* in 1823. This collection contains four complete essays, some brief lectures on moral philosophy, some lectures on "The moral constitution of man," and six poems. The essays are his "Inaugural Address" of 1818, "Remarks on Tacitus," "Examination of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments," and "Remarks on the right and duty of government to provide for the support of religion by law." In his review of Adam Smith, Frisbie criticizes the theory that moral judgment rests on sympathetic approval of another's conduct, on the grounds that one's own disposition to sympathize with another may only be a symptom of one's own moral depravity. Although the virtuous will find virtuous people commendable, some independent standard may yet be needed to specify what virtue actually is. Furthermore, there may be

commendable virtues for which not enough people have sympathy. Frisbie additionally criticized Paley's view that morality lies in what provides for the general utility of society. The tendency for these modern moralists to disconnect moral virtue from religious faith is also lamentable, in Frisbie's view.

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John R. Shook

FROMM, ERICH PINCHAS (1900 1980)

Erich Fromm was born on 23 March 1900 in Frankfurt, Germany, and died on 18 March 1980 in Muralto, Switzerland. Fromm began studying jurisprudence at the University of Frankfurt am Main, but in 1919 he attended the University of Heidelberg, where he changed his major to sociology. In 1922, under the supervision of Alfred Weber, Fromm received his PhD in sociology from Heidelberg. Following the completion of his doctorate, Fromm began focusing on psychology and studied psychoanalysis at the University of Munich in 1923 and 1924. In 1925 he started his own clinical practice, and in 1927 he helped organize the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute. By 1930, he had finished his psychoanalytical training in Berlin at the Psychoanalytical Institute and joined the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt.

During the rise of Hitler's Nazi regime, Fromm emigrated from Germany and arrived in New York City in 1934. He taught at the Institute for Social Research, the relocated Frankfurt Institute affiliated with Columbia University, from 1934 to 1939. Fromm was a guest lecturer at Columbia during 1939–42; he lectured at New School for Social Research beginning in 1941; and he was a part-time professor at Bennington College in Vermont in 1942. In 1943 he helped to found the William Alanson White Institute, the New York branch of the Washington School of Psychiatry, and worked with Harry Stack Sullivan. From 1945 to 1947, he taught psychology at the University of Michigan, and was the Terry Lecturer at Yale in 1948–49. In 1950, Fromm moved to Mexico City, where he joined the Medical Faculty of the National Autonomous University, teaching there until 1965. He founded the Mexican

Institute of Psychoanalysis in 1963. In addition to his work in Mexico, Fromm was an occasional visiting professor at Michigan State University from 1957 to 1961, and became an adjunct professor of psychology at New York University in 1962. During the 1960s and 1970s Fromm traveled and lectured across the U.S. and Europe, and also spent much time in Switzerland, where he died in 1980.

After becoming interested in Karl Marx's social philosophy, Fromm began to feel that Freud was incorrect in placing so much emphasis on the repression of sexual desires and that socioeconomic factors played a more crucial role in the origin of modern day neurosis. Thus, Fromm's psychological and philosophical system developed into a synthesis of aspects of Marxism and Freud's psychoanalysis. Fromm's original ideas about the human mind and behavior began to flourish during the 1920s, when he was appointed as leader of the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research's social psychological division.

The Frankfurt Institute was comprised of leftist intellectuals, including Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse. They sought to construct a "critical theory" of society which would revise and update Marxism in a manner that would provide guidance for potential future revolutions. During his time at the Frankfurt Institute (which became known as the Frankfurt school) Fromm surveyed blue-collar Germans, in an attempt to catalogue authoritarian or protofascist traits. The results of the survey led Fromm to believe that worker's allegiance to the left was hindered by conformist and sadomasochistic attributes which made them more likely to support a dictatorship.

The findings of Fromm's survey proved to be prophetic as Hitler's dictatorship began

to take form in the 1930s, and subsequently, the Frankfurt Institute and Fromm, who was a Jew, moved to Columbia University in New York City. In 1933, Fromm worked briefly at the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute, where he met renowned psychologist Karen Horney. Horney's ideas about sexuality impressed Fromm, while he influenced her thoughts concerning social influences on behavior. After leaving Columbia, Fromm also left the Frankfurt Institute, apparently over a dispute caused by conflicting ideas about the importance of Freud. He became a citizen of the United States in 1940, and one year later, published the book that would bring him national acclaim.

Escape from Freedom (1941) was Fromm's seminal work which delineated his ideas about society's role in shaping the masses into conformists. While most of Fromm's colleagues from Frankfurt wrote in a jargon-filled prose inaccessible to the lay reader, Fromm possessed a talent for writing with lucidity and clarity, which helped make the book a success, with over twenty-five printings to date. As a proponent of Marx's philosophy, Fromm felt that the workers of his time, especially those living in a capitalist system, had become alienated from their jobs, as well their communities. As the influence and purpose provided by culture and religion fade in a democratic society, man is left in a state of psychological dissonance and struggles to find personal identity and meaning for his life. To ameliorate these feelings, modern man seeks out the approval of his society by conforming to the rules and values established by it. Slowly, almost all traces of genuine individualism are lost as he feigns respect for things he does not truly believe, for the sake of emotional and financial protection.

According to Fromm, if a democratic political system is thought of as a sadist,

then those who submit to it, despite their true feelings, become the masochists. As the masochists receive the pain given by the sadist, feelings of powerlessness grow as personal autonomy atrophies. Fromm hypothesized that social conditions, such as those seen in a capitalist society, rob individuals of psychological needs, a robbery that becomes perversely manifested through acts of violence toward others.

Believing that modern culture was to blame for the violence witnessed around him and with the fear of nuclear war spreading, Fromm aided in starting a peace group called SANE (National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy) in 1957. He became a political advocate, meeting with U.S. leaders to discuss the Cold War, visiting Europe to talk about U.S. foreign policy, writing election platforms for the American Socialist party, marching for civil rights, etc. All the while he continued to be a prolific writer, publishing several books that added to the themes presented in *Escape*, and his popularity grew throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

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Daniel Trippett

FULLER, MARGARET (1810 1850)

Woman's rights activist, journalist, transcendentalist, literary critic, and editor, she was born Sarah Margaret Fuller on 23 May 1810 in Cambridgeport, Massachusetts. Fuller was sent to the Park School in 1821 where she stayed for only a year. In 1824 she was enrolled in Susan Prescott's school in Groton, Massachusetts, in attempts to provide her with a more traditional educational experience for

the time. In order to support her family Fuller took up teaching first at Bronson Alcott's Temple School in 1836 and then at the Greene Street School in Providence, Rhode Island, in 1837. Fuller's teaching experience in this period permitted her to explore the conversational pedagogy that would be most famously exemplified by her "Conversations" for Boston women that would begin in late 1839 and continue until 1844.

In 1836 Fuller stayed at the house of Ralph Waldo Emerson for three weeks. This would initiate the period of her life in which she was at the center of the Transcendentalist movement. Fuller soon became a frequent member of the meetings of the Transcendental club, attending the first meeting open to women the day after Emerson delivered his famous address "The American Scholar" in 1837. Fuller's standing in this circle would eventually translate into her editorship of *The Dial*, the literary organ founded to disseminate the ideas of the burgeoning Transcendentalist movement which first appeared in July 1840. She edited this journal until 1842.

During this period Fuller inaugurated her series of "Conversations" that included topics such as Greek Mythology, education, the position of women, ethics, and the fine arts. They were attended by such notable Boston women as Lydia Emerson, Sophia Ripley, and Lydia Parker, the wives and relations of Transcendentalism's leading figures. In 1843 *The Dial* published Fuller's essay "The Great Lawsuit. Man versus Men. Woman versus Women" that served as the basis for Fuller's groundbreaking *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* (1845). During 1844–46 Fuller published around two hundred and fifty articles for the *Tribune*, ranging from book reviews to commentary on social issue of the day. She was the first woman in America to have a

salaried journalistic career. In August 1846 Fuller set sail for Europe and become a travel correspondent for the *Tribune*. Later she became involved in the revolutions that were sweeping Europe in 1848 as a war correspondent documenting the rise and fall of the Roman Republic. When Fuller arrived in Rome in 1847 she met Giovanni Ossoli with whom she had a son. Fuller died, along with Ossoli and her child, on 19 July 1850 in a shipwreck off of Fire Island, New York, while returning to America from Europe.

Fuller's most important work, *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*, is a crucial document in the history of American feminism. Fuller begins that work by connecting women's rights with the progress of liberty. Although Fuller's approach is one of social critique, challenging the gender stereotypes that informed her age, the goal, in keeping with her Transcendentalist pedigree, is located in the individual. America, for Fuller, is destined to live up to its promise of liberty for all. It is only through the emancipation of women and slaves that men and masters are themselves truly free. For Fuller, the ultimate goal is "the birthright of every being capable to receive it, – the freedom, the religious, the intelligent freedom of the universe, to use its means; to learn its secret as far as nature has enabled them, the God alone for their guide and their judge" (51). In order to receive this birthright women need to be on an equal footing with men in terms of voting and property rights, education, and marriage.

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Russell Pryba

G

GAUTHIER, DAVID PETER (1932–)

David Gauthier was born on 10 September 1932 in Toronto, Ontario. He received his BA at the University of Toronto in 1954. He then studied at Harvard University, where he received the MA in 1955, and at Oxford University where he received the BPhil in 1957 and the DPhil in 1961, the latter under the supervision of John L. Austin. His main academic positions as professor of philosophy have been at the University of Toronto from 1958 to 1980, and the University of Pittsburgh from 1980 to 2001, where he became Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy. He also held visiting professorships and research appointments at a number of institutions including University of California at Los Angeles; University of California at Berkeley; Princeton University; Australian National University; All Souls College of Oxford; and École Polytechnique in Paris. Gauthier became a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada in 1979. He was executive member of various political and pressure groups including: the Toronto Committee for Disarmament; the Committee of Concern for South Africa; the Canadian Civil Liberties Association; and the Committee for an Independent Canada. In 1962 he was a candidate for election to the Canadian House of Commons.

Gauthier's main contributions to philosophy have been in ethics and moral theory, the theory of practical rationality and the formal

theory of rational choice, political philosophy, and the interpretation of early modern moral and political philosophy, especially Hobbes and Rousseau. He was one of the principal theorists – with the philosopher John Rawls and economist James Buchanan – responsible for the revival of contractarian theory, and was one of the first philosophers to introduce decision and game theory to moral theory. He has written widely in political theory and on a number of topics in politics, including secession, nuclear deterrence, democracy, and public reason.

From his earliest work he has been preoccupied by the question of the rationality of morality – what reasons do we have to be moral? Gauthier's identification of morality with principles and constraints, his conception of them as conditional on the compliance of others, and his account of their specific content are all shaped by his concern with the rationality of morals. Over several decades he developed a contractarian account of morality which sought to establish both the principles of morality and the rationality of acting in accordance with them. Teaching seventeenth and eighteenth-century moral and political philosophy in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gauthier came to appreciate Hobbes's thought, and the first of his many writings on Hobbes, *The Logic of Leviathan*, appeared in 1969. In the late 1960s, while a visiting professor at UCLA, he was introduced by Howard Sobel to game theory and to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Hobbesian moral and political theory and contemporary game

theory have been important influences on Gauthier's thought, even if he has, in recent decades, moved away from many aspects associated with both traditions.

The most complete statement of his moral theory is given in *Morals by Agreement* (1986). He has modified his views in a number of respects since writing this book. Some of his earlier essays, collected in *Moral Dealing* (1990), provide an easier and more accessible entry into his thought, and some modifications of his theory are introduced in later essays. The questions taken up in many of his writings on Hobbes and Hume are relevant to understanding his moral theory. Gauthier's interests in Rousseau, especially his psychological and biographical writings, are not necessarily those one would expect from the creator of morals by agreement.

Gauthier's *Morals by Agreement* is a theory about the nature and rationality of morality. We may usefully think of the theory as having several parts or elements. The first is an account of the human condition, giving the aim of practical reason, the natural condition of humankind, the function of constraints on action. Next is an account of the principles of conduct that rational agents would hypothetically agree to: a kind of social contract. The third element is a revisionist account of practical rationality essential to the argument aiming to show that virtually everyone, under normal circumstances, has reason to accept and to abide by the constraints imposed by these principles. Last, Gauthier argues that the principles in question are principles of morality.

Gauthier follows Hobbes, Hume, and many others in thinking that humans characteristically find themselves in "the circumstances of justice." The phrase is from Rawls – who borrows from Hume and H.L.A. Hart, a summary account of the

conditions in which humans typically benefit from cooperation. These circumstances consist principally in scarcity, relative to our needs and wants, our self-bias, and our tendency to favor ourselves and those close to us over others. Cooperation in these circumstances is mutually beneficial, and it is made possible by our capacity to constrain our self-seeking behavior by adhering to just principles of action. Gauthier defends a subjectivist and instrumentalist conception of practical rationality, according to which we are rational to the extent that our acts maximize the satisfaction of our considered preferences. Gauthier's early subjectivist account entails this agent-relativity, but it is not *necessary* for it. The presentation of the theory also pre-supposes that agents considering the terms of interaction with others reason from the perspective of their own interests – the assumption of "non-tuism." But this assumption is not essential to the theory either, and Gauthier has moved away from it.

Gauthier argues that agents in the circumstances of justice have reason to constrain their behavior by accepting and adhering to mutually advantageous and fair principles of action conditional on the compliance of others. To determine what they are, he considers the principles that suitably characterized rational agents would choose were they to consider the question. Gauthier relies on bargaining theory, part of the theory of games, to determine the principle of distribution that rational agents would select. He defends a principle of minimax-relative concession, which says that the maximum relative concession that anyone must make should be minimal, where relative concession is measured by an individual's maximal and minimal claims to the cooperative surplus. The principle says that no one may receive a

relative benefit smaller than necessary. Under certain conditions, it requires equal relative concessions. The principle does not require interpersonal comparisons of utility; rather, it would have us look at an interpersonal comparison of the proportion of each person's potential gain from cooperation that must be conceded. Gauthier's principle is similar to the solution to the two-person bargaining problem, axiomatized by Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky. Most game theorists find the traditional solution developed by John Nash more plausible, and Gauthier himself has come to favor it over his earlier position. This change-of-mind undercuts the argument offered in *Morals by Agreement* for the principle of minimax-relative concession, and it is unclear whether an argument for it can still be made. Gauthier argues that rational agents, in a pre-moral state, would constrain their interactions by "a Lockean proviso" which prohibits bettering one's situation through interactions which worsen the situation of another. Gauthier uses the proviso to develop an argument for the emergence of limited rights, or semi-natural rights, which protect each person's exercise of their own powers. Individuals, prior to agreeing to be governed by a minimax-relative concession or other principle, acquire a right to their natural assets and the fruits of their labor. These rights are limited, in certain respects, but they constrain the application of minimax-relative concession. The latter is applied to an initial bargaining situation in which agents have these rights. Gauthier's account and argument is remarkable in that he provides, in effect, a prospective, conventionalist case for rights and duties that many have thought presupposes a natural law framework.

Principled action constrains one's action, and it is rational to be so constrained. Thus, if Gauthier is right, it can be rational to abide

by certain norms or principles, even when they require acting in ways that are not best from the standpoint of the time of action. Much of Gauthier's work since *Morals by Agreement* has sought to develop, and to defend, his revisionist account of practical rationality. If all Gauthier were to establish – and it would be no small feat – was that we have reason to accept and to abide by certain principles of cooperation, then he would not have shown that we have reason to be moral. The last element of his theory is an argument, interspersed throughout *Morals by Agreement*, identifying various principles and dispositions as moral. His argument is, in effect, a functional one: the principles and dispositions in question resemble familiar moral ones in important respects. Impartiality seems, to him, to be a defining feature of morality, and it is central to the argument he makes for identifying the principles derived from rational interaction and bargaining, with those of morality.

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Christopher W. Morris

GEERTZ, CLIFFORD JAMES (1926–2006)

Clifford Geertz was born on 23 August 1926 in San Francisco, California. At the age of seventeen he enlisted in the U.S. Navy. With the end of World War II, he attended Antioch College in Ohio, where he initially majored in English before graduating in 1950 with a BA in philosophy. Geertz and his new wife Hildred turned to cultural anthropology and graduate studies in the Social Relations department at Harvard University. This newly founded interdisciplinary department included such important scholars as anthropologists Clyde Kluckhohn, David Schneider, and George Homans, and sociologist Talcott Parsons. He completed ethnographic fieldwork in Indonesia and received his PhD in social relations in 1956. Geertz was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, California, in 1958–59.

From 1958 to 1960 Geertz was assistant professor of anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley. In 1960 he went to the University of Chicago, rising to full professor of anthropology by 1964. In 1970 Geertz was invited to become professor of social science and establish a new social science program at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. At about the same time he authored *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973), a seminal collection of essays that established Geertz as a founder, along with Schneider and Victor Turner, of ‘symbolic’ or ‘interpretive’ anthropology. In 1982 Geertz was named Harold F. Linder

Professor of Social Science, and he held that title until retiring in 2000. Geertz also was a Senior Research Career Fellow of the National Institute of Mental Health from 1964 to 1970; a visiting professor of history at Princeton University from 1975 to 2000; and Eastman Professor at Oxford University in 1978–79. He received numerous honorary doctorates and scholarly awards, and was a fellow of both the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the British Academy. Geertz died on 30 October 2006 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Geertz is regarded as one of the preeminent anthropological theoreticians of the twentieth century. His influence extends well beyond anthropology to disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, and history. His elegantly written essays also appeal to lay readers on a scale not seen in anthropology since the days of Margaret Mead.

Interpretive anthropology focuses on the symbolic component of human interaction. Inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Geertz argued that symbols are not enigmas housed in the private mind, but instead are clearly observable in human societies. Even daily interaction in normal public settings contains metaphoric content potentially expressive of a people's worldview and ethos. Quoting Gilbert Ryle, Geertz identified the anthropologist's goal as "thick description," whereby the underlying significance of social interaction and behavior is sorted out, and its deeper symbolic meanings elucidated. He famously illustrated the approach in his essay "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight" (1972). Here he used an apparently mundane competition – highly valued by villagers but outlawed by the Indonesian state – to explore local Balinese conceptualizations of self, sociality, and social status. In this and other studies, Geertz deserves credit for introducing a

generation of anthropologists to the views of Ryle, Wittgenstein, Kenneth Burke, and other little-appreciated philosophers.

Critics cite Geertz's prescribed method of 'reading' culture as a 'text' to argue that his conception of culture is overly reified, too bounded and not sufficiently dynamic. His approach, they add, neglects social stratification or how inequality influences cultural production. Proponents counter by pointing to Geertz's use of ideology rather than culture, to explain the impact of stratification on colonized societies.

Geertz influenced to varying degrees a later generation of postmodern scholars, although for Geertz, culture always remained more real than most postmodernists would concede. His task was to identify and describe culture, even if we could never objectively know it. In doing so, he reinvigorated the study of culture as meaning.

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Stephen M. Perkins

GEORGE, HENRY (1839–1897)

Henry George was born on 2 September 1839 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and died on 29 October 1897 in New York City. The relatively short distance between these two cities hides the fact that George traveled extensively, having shipped out as a cabin boy at the age of sixteen for a voyage around the world. From a subsequent voyage around Cape Horn, he disembarked in San Francisco and, after failing to strike it rich in the gold fields of the Fraser River in Canada, he spent considerable time in the new state of California. Between his two voyages, George learned the printing trade in Philadelphia and, in California, worked as a printer and newspaper reporter. George’s California experiences had a profound effect in shaping his ideas on land and its role in the economy.

These travels provided the foundation for George’s self-education and led him to his major thesis that land was the critical resource in causing income inequality and should provide the basis for alleviating the resulting poverty. This self-education, so crucial to the development of George’s ideas, was also the source of his rejection by the traditional academic community that challenged his credentials as an economist and social philosopher. George received heavy criticism from a leading American economist, Francis Amasa Walker, and the legendary British economist, Alfred Marshall. However, for the most part, he was ignored by the academic economists. With a formal education that stopped at seventh grade, George hardly qualified for a university faculty appointment. In his biography of his father, his son Henry George Jr., reported that the title of “Professor” was the only title his father would have cherished. At the time of an 1877 lecture at the University of California at Berkeley there was speculation that the

University would establish a chair in political economy and George would be named to it. To his great disappointment, however, that did not occur.

In his travels, George observed a contradiction between the enormous wealth created by industrialization and growing levels of poverty among the working classes. But it was the land use and land policies of California that spurred George to find an answer as to the cause of this contradiction. His observations crystallized in 1871 with the publication of a pamphlet entitled “Our Land and Land Policy, National and State” in which he closely examined California’s land and railroad monopolies. In this pamphlet, George proposed the single tax on land as the fiscal remedy for poverty. Further refinement of his thinking on the subject ultimately led to his masterwork, *Progress and Poverty*. The latter volume was originally self-published in 1879 but shortly thereafter found a major New York City publisher, Appleton & Co.

The observations from his extensive travels stimulated George to read and comprehend the classical literature of economics which provided the context for *Progress and Poverty*. This, however, was not enough for his critics in the academy who always considered him an outsider despite the fact that *Progress and Poverty* was an international best-seller that was estimated to have sold over two million copies in George’s lifetime. *Progress and Poverty* as well as all George’s other books remains in print through the efforts of the Robert Schalkenbach Foundation. The Foundation was formed in 1925 and expressly created “to teach, expound and propagate” the ideas of Henry George.

In seeking to explain the poverty of the working classes, George addressed the distribution of income among labor, land, and capital. George found the wages-fund theory of the classical economists totally

inadequate as an explanation for the share of income going to labor. To George, it was the monopolization of land ownership and land speculation in industrial societies that were the root causes of poverty and the economic fluctuations that tormented the lives of the impoverished working classes. The poor were precluded from access to productive land and relegated to low-paying jobs in the urban centers of industrializing nations. They were also subjected to the deleterious effects of the business cycle which, in George’s view, was precipitated by the periodic collapse of speculative land values. This situation subsequently led to the working classes living in substandard conditions that were the breeding ground for the many social problems of the urban ghettos. The poor were denied the means by which they could benefit from the wealth creation of the industrial age. This, he reasoned, led to the coexistence of great poverty in the midst of great wealth.

George and his followers argued that all taxes on the productive efforts of labor and capital ought to be eliminated as both inefficient and unjust. The elimination of these taxes would remove a major obstacle to work and investment. A tax on land value, which was socially determined, could not be evaded and the revenues could be dedicated to providing services that would benefit the poor. The supply of land, which is determined by nature, would not be changed by such a tax. George defined land very broadly to encompass not only the surface of the earth but “all natural materials, forces, and opportunities.”

The ideas introduced in *Progress and Poverty* were further developed and advocated in several books, newspaper articles, pamphlets, and speeches. He produced subsequent volumes on the land question, social issues and free trade as well as a text

that integrated his thinking on economics. However, George was not content to leave his positions on the printed page and actively promoted them on both sides of the Atlantic. He was a very popular speaker, especially among the working classes and he took his mission for economic justice to all corners of the globe. In the British Isles, he visited Ireland and addressed the Irish land question, a highly sensitive political issue. George subsequently visited England and served as an advisor to the British government on land reform issues. As a teen, George had stopped in Australia on his first voyage around the world. In 1889, at the height of his popularity, an invitation to return led to an Australian trip in the following year. To this day, there is a well-established Georgist movement in Australia. In the United States, he made two runs for mayor of New York City. His second place finish, ahead of Theodore Roosevelt, in the campaign of 1886 is a well-documented political story. George died near the end of the 1897 mayoral campaign.

The literature on Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, and the single tax is huge and shows little sign of abating. George's position has been positively acknowledged by many major economists, including several Nobel laureates, as providing both efficiency and equity. From the standpoint of public finance, the equity of a tax that was highly progressive and could not be avoided as well as the relative simplicity of its administration and collection were appealing. So too were the improved efficiency and incentive benefits of removing taxes on labor and capital.

In the latter part of the twentieth century, the theory has resurfaced as the Henry George Theorem and is recognized as having a much greater degree of theoretical robustness, under certain conditions, than had been previously thought. The Georgist tax program is also seeing increased interest in the former Soviet

states and other emerging economies where the land situation is much less encumbered by past arrangements. Furthermore, a line of inquiry into the role of George's ideas relative to the physical environment has developed a "green" movement that encompasses sustainable development, natural resource use and conservation, and energy issues. The elimination of urban sprawl has been added to George's original concern for urban ghettos. Moreover, contemporary Georgists have further broadened the concept of land use to include such things as the airwaves, telecommunication spectrums and the market for pollution "rights."

The Georgist movement is sustained in the contemporary world through a variety of means. The Robert Schalkenbach Foundation in New York was created in 1925 to promote George's social and economic ideas through an extensive publication and research program. All of George's writings, as listed in the following bibliography, are still in print by the Foundation in English and other languages. The Henry George Schools, with locations around the world, teach the essence of Georgist thought to any one that is interested. There is also the Council of Georgist Organizations, encompassing dozens of entities around the world. These entities espouse all aspects of George's intellectual and policy legacy and cut a wide swath across the political spectrum.

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Joseph A. Giacalone

GERMAIN, JOSEPH-LOUIS (1633–1722)

Joseph-Louis Germain was born in Auvergne, France, on 3 January 1633. Germain entered the Jesuit order in 1756 and underwent the prescribed Jesuit education. He taught humanities, philosophy and theology at several French colleges, including Saint-Flour (1662–63), Béziers (1663–65), Cahors (1665–67), and Toulouse (1667–71). He then taught theology at Clermont-Ferrand from 1671 to 1676. Germain was ordained priest at Toulouse in 1676, and in that year he was assigned to Toulouse. He was soon promoted to Rector at Toulouse and taught in that office from 1677 to 1685. He then taught at the college of Pamiers until 1687.

In 1687 Germain became part of the Jesuit mission to Canada. He joined the faculty of the Collège des Jésuites in Québec in June of that year, where he taught philosophy and theology until 1710. Before Germain arrived, prominent members of the College faculty who taught rhetoric, theology, and philosophy were Claude Pijart (from 1657 to 1680), Guillaume Matthieu (from 1667 to 1676), and Martin Bouvert (from 1676 to 1698). Bouvert served as College Rector from 1698 to 1704, and then Jean-Baptiste Duparc arrived to teach theology and philosophy in 1707.

Collegiate education in the territory of Québec was then led by the Jesuits, who had founded the College in 1635, before Harvard was founded. Germain's courses of instruction followed the structure set by the Jesuit

curriculum in the *Ratio studiorum* (1599). Logic, Aristotle, and Thomistic philosophy dominated the curriculum for the senior students. A letter by Germain describing the College's high academic standards is printed in Macdougall, "Classical Studies in Seventeenth-Century Québec." In this letter Germain claims that the College at Québec provides the same learning as that available in Paris.

Many of Germain's students were also enrolled at the nearby Séminaire de Québec. This Seminary was founded in 1663 by Bishop François de Laval to train men for the priesthood. Since the main functions of the College and the Seminary were aligned, their faculty had close relationships and often shared duties between the institutions. From 1688 until his death in 1708, Bishop Laval lived in Québec and supported his beloved seminary. In the aftermath of Laval's death, Germain stopped teaching in 1710 in order to accept the appointment as Superior of the Canadian missions and he held that office until 1716. Germain died in Québec in January or February 1722.

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Germain published no literary works.

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GERT, BERNARD (1934–2011)

Bernard Gert was born on 16 October 1934 in Cincinnati, Ohio. He entered the University of Cincinnati and received his BA in 1956. In 1956 he entered Cornell University's Sage School of Philosophy where he received his PhD in 1962. Gert joined the philosophy department at Dartmouth College in 1959 and he has remained there ever since, becoming professor of philosophy in 1970. He was Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy after the death of Francis W. Gramlich (1911–1973). He retired in 2009. Both his daughter Heather Gert and his son Joshua Gert became professional philosophers. Gert died on 24 December 2011 in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

Gert's four books on morality, *The Moral Rules* (1970), *Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules* (1988), *Morality: Its Nature and Justification* (1998), and *Common Morality* (2004), are tightly related, as each of the later ones is a revised development of the earlier books. In contrast to most other philosophers with the notable exception of Hobbes, Gert sees morality, or what he now calls 'the moral system' or 'common morality', as being entirely concerned with not causing, but rather preventing, alleviating or eliminating evils or harms (these terms are used synonymously), of which there are five: death, pain, disablement, deprivation of freedom, and deprivation of pleasure. Morality, or the moral system, in Gert's view, has nothing whatever to do with the production or increase of positive goods.

Each of the five evils or harms is recognized as such by all rational persons, and each is something that it would be irrational to wish upon oneself. Every rational person therefore desires that no one cause any of these harms to him or her or to those within his or her circle of concern. The moral rules, of which

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there are ten, are those that one would on pain of irrationality have others obey because disobedience would either cause or be likely to cause evil to oneself or those within one's circle of concern. The first five rules are rules directly forbidding the infliction on anyone of one of the five evils. Thus they are: (1) Do not kill, (2) Do not cause pain, (3) Do not disable, (4) Do not deprive of freedom, (5) Do not deprive of pleasure. The second five rules are those such that if they were not obeyed by others, the likelihood of oneself or someone within one's circle of concern suffering one or more of the evils would be greatly increased. These are: (6) Do not deceive, (7) Keep your promises, (8) Do not cheat, (9) Obey the law, (10) Do your duty (duties here being understood as those attached to one's social roles and also to certain special circumstances in which one may find oneself).

While it is not rationally *required* to be moral – the only thing rationally required is not to bring evil on oneself without an adequate reason – it is rationally *allowed*. What this means is that the question “Why should I be moral” requires an answer, of which Gert offers several. The moral attitude towards the moral rules is that they are to be obeyed by every person (oneself included) towards all other persons unless a fully informed rational person could have an exception publicly allowed, and this could only be on the grounds that he or she would suffer or be more likely to suffer one or more of the evils if the rule were obeyed in cases of this kind than if it were violated. Whereas obedience to the rules must be understood as a moral requirement, *except* where a violation can be justified on the grounds that more evil would result from obedience in a certain set of circumstances than from violations in these circumstances being publicly allowed, there are also moral *ideals*. These have to

do with acting so as to prevent, remove or alleviate evils, and are encouraged rather than required. Finally there are *multiple* moral virtues, which one possesses if one justifiably follows a moral ideal or a moral rule beyond the norm. Thus the five harms or evils are architectonic of the whole moral system, and everything in it is in some way related to them.

An important spinoff from his work in ethical theory is his work on the application of the moral system to medical practice. Among the contributions of Gert and his collaborators to medical ethics are the following. (1) The definition of malady (disease, injury, headache, etc.), as involving one of the five evils mentioned above, or a significantly increased risk of suffering one of them. (2) Because of the differences noted above, some moral disagreements on medical matters are unavoidable allowing greater tolerance of the views of others. (3) The account of death as the permanent loss of function of the organism as a whole, and the total loss of all brain function as the criterion of death. (4) The claim that, except in special circumstances (where there may be allowable disagreement), paternalism violates at least one of the moral rules. (5) The suggestion of refusal of food and fluids as an alternative to physician-assisted suicide. Gert has argued persuasively that the same moral system that applies to all other areas of life applies to medicine while, because of allowable disagreements, it does not seek to impose answers.

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E. J. Bond

GEWIRTH, ALAN (1912–2004)

Isidore Gewirth was born on 28 November 1912 in Union City, New Jersey. He changed

his name to Alan when he was eleven. He attended Columbia University, where he received his BA in 1934. He spent the next two years doing graduate study at Columbia before accepting a Sage Fellowship at Cornell University in 1936–37. He was then invited to the University of Chicago as an assistant to Richard McKeon, who had been brought there the year before by Robert Maynard Hutchins. In June 1942, Gewirth was drafted into the army, moving up the ranks from private to captain in four years. After his military service in World War II, he spent the academic year 1946–47 at Columbia on the GI Bill, receiving his PhD in philosophy in 1948. Starting in 1947 he was a member of the philosophy faculty at the University of Chicago. He served as President of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1973–74, and President of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy during 1981–83. In 1975 he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and was named the Edward Carson Waller Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy. He retired in 1982, and remained active in writing and occasional teaching. Gewirth died on 9 May 2004 in Chicago, Illinois.

Gewirth has published works on a range of topics, but is best known for his work in moral theory. In this area, his most important work is *Reason and Morality* (1978), in which he seeks to provide a foundation for human rights in the demands of rational consistency. What distinguishes Gewirth's approach is his belief that human action has what might be called a "normative structure." Gewirth argues that, because freedom and well-being are the indispensable conditions for the possibility of action, agents implicitly assert the right to freedom and well-being whenever they act. Furthermore, in asserting these rights agents implicitly regard the fact that

they are prospective purposive agents (that is, beings capable of goal-directed action) as the *sufficient* condition for the ascription of these rights-claims to themselves. Hence, rational consistency demands that these rights be extended to every prospective purposive agent. Gewirth thus derives what he calls the Principle of Generic Consistency: “Act in accord with the generic rights (to freedom and well-being) of your recipient as well as yourself.”

In two recent works Gewirth applies the ideas seminally expressed in *Reason and Morality*. In *The Community of Rights* (1996) he makes use of his theory of rights to attack both libertarianism and communitarianism, and to defend communities organized around respect for an array of economic, social, and political rights. In *Self Fulfillment* (1998), Gewirth argues that self-fulfillment requires actualizing our rational capacities, which includes adherence to the Principle of Generic Consistency. Hence, personal flourishing cannot be achieved at the expense of violating the rights of others.

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Eric Reitan

GIBBARD, ALAN FLETCHER (1942–)

Alan Gibbard was born on 7 April 1942 in Providence, Rhode Island. He majored in mathematics and minored in physics and philosophy (studying ethics with Richard Brandt), receiving the BA degree from Swarthmore College in 1963. After serving in the U.S. Peace Corps for two years, he attended Harvard University and received

the PhD in philosophy in 1971, writing a dissertation on utilitarianism under John Rawls. He began teaching philosophy in 1969 at the University of Chicago, and left in 1974 for the University of Pittsburgh. In 1977 he became professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan. In 1994 his title became Richard B. Brandt Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy. Brandt has been a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and received the Guggenheim Fellowship. He has been elected to membership in the Institut International de Philosophie; the American Philosophical Society; the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; and the National Academy of Sciences. He was President of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association during 2001–02, and selected to give the APA's Romanell Lecture in 2000.

Gibbard's early work pondered utilitarian conceptions of morality and welfare. Utilitarian expectations that social welfare promotion could be driven by a rational decision procedure have met many practical obstacles; those obstacles strengthen if public participation is involved. People usually won't express their genuine preferences if they can deceptively vote for strategic purposes, and the risk that someone can dictate outcomes is ever-present. This raised the worry that public participation won't effectively maximize social welfare. Following the work of Kenneth Arrow and other decision theorists, Gibbard proved that strategic voting can't be eliminated from democratic voting systems with at least three choices (now known as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem).

Gibbard's view of normative judgments in *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings* (1990) takes them to be natural (psychological) events that aren't representing natural matters or providing a foundational role; they are

explained as expressions of an agent's attitude of commitment to rules governing conduct. The approval of another's conduct as morally reasonable implies a similar commitment to those rules; faulting conduct as wrong implies that moral sentiments like guilt and anger are reasonable. *Thinking How to Live* (2003) begins from people as planners who perceive and intend what should be done – this 'quasi-realism' requires that "being the thing to do" supervenes on relevant matters of fact, and the linguistic usages of moral language reflect this. (*Meaning and Normativity* dramatically enlarges on Gibbard's view of linguistic meaning in general as basically normative.) Because people pursue different life plans, disagreement over what should be done is both inevitable yet amenable to practical reasoning about facts and reasons for actions, so Gibbard's expressivism is only non-cognitivist about objective moral facts. However, ideally rational persons needn't converge on moral agreement, as they may have divergent mental constitutions, or differing views of ideal judgment conditions, and so on. Still, our normative language is built to keep open the opportunity for consensus on how to live together.

Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics (2008) seeks conditions for reasonable moral agreement among persons. Blending T.M. Scanlon with John Rawls, genuine moral practices are ones to which each individual would accept under the fair condition that one doesn't know which person in society he or she actually is. Gibbard argues that this fairness test shapes morality in the direction of a utilitarian purpose for morality as much as a system of rights.

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John R. Shook

GIBSON, JAMES JEROME (1904–1979)

James J. Gibson was born on 27 January 1904 in McConnelsville, Ohio, and died on 11 December 1979 in Ithaca, New York. Gibson received a BS from Princeton University in 1925. He took his first course in experimental psychology in his senior year from H.S. Langfeld, who had studied with the experimental phenomenologist Carl Stumpf in Berlin. After graduating, Gibson remained at Princeton as one of Langfeld's graduate assistants, and received his MA in 1926 and PhD in psychology in 1929. Although Gibson completed his dissertation attacking the Gestalt theory of perception under Langfeld's direction, the strongest intellectual influence during his graduate studies was that of the philosophical behaviorist E.B. Holt. Holt was a student of William James and a central figure among the New Realist philosophers. Holt's psychological writings fused the non-dualistic metaphysics of James's philosophy of radical empiricism with a behavioristic focus on action. Holt's distinctive brand of behaviorism was *molar* in level of analysis, *purposive* in motivational character, and *distal* in identification of the effective stimulus.

Gibson's first teaching appointment was in the psychology department at Smith College in 1928. Gibson discovered that prolonged visual inspection of a curved line results in experiencing the line as straight; and subsequent examination of a different straight line reveals an aftereffect of apparent curvature in the opposite direction. What is most significant about these findings is that a line might be expected to function as a visual primitive, i.e., an elementary sensation, on which perceiving processes operate. Instead, these results suggest that even such a seemingly basic stimulus attribute as linearity/curvilinearity is a property of

a dynamic perceiver-environment relation. More broadly, this discovery questions a clear-cut objective-subjective distinction in visual perception. A significant intellectual influence on Gibson at Smith was his colleague, the Gestalt psychologist Kurt Koffka, whose focus on organization in perceptual experience heightened Gibson's sensitivity to higher-order relations in patterns of sensory stimulation, especially the role of optical flow in the visual field as information for self-motion. Perception of one's own movement has long been treated as based solely on motor feedback (kinesthesia) from the limbs – a claim that is in keeping with the assumption that the proximal stimulus for vision is a stationary retinal image (the so-called "picture theory of vision"). Gibson's use of dynamic displays demonstrated in compelling fashion that moving through the environment generates an optical streaming as the world appears to flow around the perceiver, and that movement of the self through the world is specified by this optical flow.

Gibson joined the psychology faculty of Cornell University in 1949, where he remained until his death. The following year Gibson published *The Perception of the Visual World*, which became his most broadly influential book among perceptual psychologists, even though Gibson abandoned many of its central assumptions over the ensuing decades.

In the 1950s Gibson engaged in a program of research concerning the perception of various properties of surfaces, and this experimental work deepened his theoretical analysis of visual perception. To mention but three critical advances during this period: First, based on earlier work by his wife, Eleanor J. Gibson, they offered an original account of perceptual learning, which refers to the commonplace process of developing improved perceptual skills in some domain with experience. Perceptual learning usually

has been viewed as a process of supplementing intrinsically limited stimulus input (e.g. through associative learning). Such a step is in keeping with the viewpoint of indirect realism. The Gibsons proposed instead that perceptual learning is the differentiation of structure already present in the stimulus array. In the course of discovering heretofore, unrealized structure in available sensory stimulation, perceivers engage in a process of learning more about the world in a direct (i.e., unmediated) fashion. Second, Gibson elaborated his earlier analyses of optical flow by examining its role in animal locomotion. In a paper entitled “Visually Controlled Locomotion in Animals and Men” (1958), Gibson argued that the information in the optical flow field specifies speed and direction of movement and can be utilized by perceivers in guiding locomotion.

A third notable advance in Gibson’s program during this period was the empirical investigation of meaningful, perceivable properties of the environment. The clearest expression of this work appeared in E.J. Gibson and R.D. Walk’s classic 1960 studies using the visual cliff apparatus, which demonstrated that crawling babies experience the edge of a surface of support as affording falling-off. These findings run counter to the long-held view that information for depth/distance is not immediately available, in which case inexperienced perceivers would be unable reliably to detect depth at an edge. Indeed, this demonstration of awareness of such functionally meaningful properties of the environment at an early age necessitates a reevaluation of the stimulus information available to perceivers.

In the early 1960s these threads fused into two significant and interrelated concepts – “ecological optics” and “perceptual systems” – that together mark an important shift in Gibson’s thinking. Gibson replaced his

earlier higher-order psychophysics, which carries with it an assumption that stimulation is imposed on receptor surfaces, with a consideration of how the interaction of light and the surface features of an econiche gives rise to potential stimulus information available for an active perceiver to detect. Ecological optics is a program of analysis that examines how reflected light can be structured such that it carries information about environmental layout. The concept of a perceptual system reciprocally supports ecological optics by taking perceiving to be an embodied activity of an animal. Vision, for example, is properly considered an action system that encompasses exploratory movements of the whole organism because these actions play an essential role in the detection of stimulus information. To be more specific, structure in the array of reflected light can serve as information specifying stable environmental properties; and the isolation of this invariant structure is facilitated by changes conferred on the stimulus array from the point of view of an active perceiver. Hence, the concepts of ecological optics and perceptual systems are complementary facets of a dynamic system of animal-environment reciprocity, and jointly reflect the adaptation of species’ perceptual capacities within an econiche.

These innovations are presented in *The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems* (1966), which as the title indicates emphasizes Gibson’s ground-breaking conceptualization of perceiving. Gibson’s analysis of stimulus information is more fully elaborated, and his treatment of perceiving is further refined, in *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (1979). Among the many notable features of this book is Gibson’s explication of the concept of “affordances,” an idea that was anticipated in his earlier writings.

Gibson proposed that what is perceived by individuals are the affordances of the

environment. Affordances are functionally significant properties of the environment taken with reference to an individual, and as such, they are mutually constituted by properties of both the environment and the perceiver. For example, an object resting on a ground surface affords “sitting-on” for an individual if the object’s height falls within a certain range relative to the perceiver’s leg length. An object that meets this relational criterion (among others) not only could function as a seat for this individual, but it would be perceived as such. In short, affordances are properties of the environment considered relationally, and they are specified by information that is scaled relative to a perceiver.

With this concept Gibson addresses most fully his sustained interest in perceived meaning. For Gibson, meaning is an intrinsic quality of perceptual experience, and those views claiming that meaning must be added to perceptual experience fail to recognize the richness of the stimulus information available to be perceived. Meaning is a ubiquitous property of the environment from an ecological perspective. Further, the relational ontology of affordances brings to fruition a project that runs through Gibson’s writings and connects his work back to his intellectual predecessors James and Holt; and that project is to develop a realist account of knowing that overcomes the deeply problematic assumption of objective-subjective dualism. The concept of affordances, and Gibson’s functional analysis of perceiver-environment reciprocity more generally, reflect this effort, and in his estimation offer grounds for a direct realist epistemology.

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Harry Heft

GILMAN, CHARLOTTE ANNA PERKINS (1860–1935)

Charlotte Anna Perkins was born on 3 July 1860 in Hartford, Connecticut, to parents Frederick Beecher Perkins and Mary A. Fitch Westcott. Although part of the wealthy Beecher family, her parents divorced, leaving Gilman and her older brother to be raised by their mother in relative poverty. She married twice during her lifetime. Her first marriage to Charles Walter Stetson in 1884 was dissolved amicably in 1887 after the birth of her only child Katherine Beecher Stetson and consequent emotional collapse, leading to a nervous condition that was to plague her for her entire working life. Although she attempted to raise her daughter on her own for several years, Gilman ultimately decided to give Stetson primary custody of her only

child. Her second marriage to her cousin Houghton Gilman in 1900 proved to be much more compatible and lasted until Houghton's death in 1934. Gilman was diagnosed with breast cancer in 1932 and committed suicide by chloroform on 17 August 1935 in Pasadena, California.

Gilman attended the Rhode Island School of Design, yet this facet of her education was largely utilitarian. She did not have any formal academic training in either sociology or philosophy, although she self-identified as a sociologist and published in the *American Journal of Sociology*. Her father, a librarian, supplied Gilman with book lists (if not money) in order to advance her education. Self-taught, Gilman read many of the classic works of social philosophy so as to make a contribution to the progress of humanity, a goal she viewed as her ultimate calling.

Without the credentials to obtain a formal academic position, Gilman took her sociology on the road lecturing to the public on topics such as the equality of men and women, childrearing, religion, and the home. Gilman's social thought was infused with (1) cultural feminism, the belief in the uniqueness or superiority of feminine cultural values; (2) social reform Darwinism, the application of Darwinian principles of biological evolution to the social world; and (3) Fabian socialism, the conviction that social ills such as poverty and crime can be resolved through the systematic application of social scientific laws and democratic ideals. Gilman sought to create a more pragmatic sociology that would change society from the bottom up. Additionally, she worked with the settlement movement in Chicago, including a brief stint at Jane Addams's Hull-House.

Although she is intellectually linked to Addams and other sociologists including Lester Ward, Luther L. Bernard, Edward A. Ross, and Patrick Geddes, Gilman's

ideas remain largely unrecognized. She attempted to negate the sexism advocated by functionalists such as Émile Durkheim and to raise the status of women. Furthermore, she worked to undermine the ideas of theorists such as Karl Marx who viewed social change in terms of conflict. Rather, Gilman argued that society would only progress with the contributions and cooperation of both men and women.

Despite her lack of formal education, Gilman was a prolific writer and theorist. She wrote, edited, and published her monthly journal *The Forerunner* for seven years from 1909 to 1917. Her best known works on “the woman question” are *The Yellow Wallpaper* (1892), a fictional account of her first nervous breakdown and consequent therapy, and *Women and Economics* (1898), a treatise on the unnatural state of women’s economic dependence on men. Today these works are widely read in the academic areas of women’s studies and feminist theory. *The Man Made World* (1911) and *His Religion and Hers* (1923) are institutional accounts of gender relations in the Western world. More specifically, she discusses male domination within the legal system, education, religion, the family and so on. *The Home* (1903) and *Concerning Children* (1901) lament the subordination of women and children in the home and its consequent impact on men specifically and society in general, and how home life, childrearing, and education can be improved for the good of society. Gilman identified *Human Work* (1904), a discussion of the importance of specialization and human interdependence, as her most important contribution.

Gilman’s work was revolutionary for its time and even today. Her belief in the scientific progression of humanity through democracy and the equality of men and women is laudable. However it must be noted that

Gilman’s work was severely limited by her racism. While hints of racism and eugenics are present throughout the body of her works, her “A Suggestion on the Negro Problem” (1908) outlines a specific plan of institutionalized racism aimed at African-Americans. Although this racism does not discredit the entirety of her work, it is indicative of the social Darwinist thought common during Gilman’s lifetime.

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GILSON, ÉTIENNE HENRY (1884–1978)

Étienne Gilson was born on 13 June 1884 in Paris, France, and he died on 19 September 1978 in Auxerre, France. Gilson attended the Catholic Notre-Dame-des-Champs from 1895 to 1902, but finished at the public Lycée Henri IV during 1902–03, attending that

year the public lectures of the Sorbonne's Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, who presented Hume's philosophy in its full historical context. Gilson later said that he aspired to do for medieval philosophy what Lévy-Bruhl had done for Hume. Gilson then studied philosophy under Emile Durkheim, Victor Delbos, and Henri Bergson at the Sorbonne from 1904 to 1907 during the high tide of positivism. Gilson received his doctorate from the Sorbonne in 1913. His university career began at Lille in 1913–14, where he delivered the lectures on Aquinas that would become *Le Thomisme*. In World War I he served in the army, was captured, and used the time to learn Russian and study Bonaventure. The peace settlement gave the German University of Strasbourg to the French, who decided to make it a showcase with promising young professors, including Gilson. The German practice of organizing the Faculty of Letters around institutes rather than disciplines was retained, which led to an interdisciplinary atmosphere Gilson embraced. While at Strasbourg from 1919 to 1921, he wrote three books, each arguing in its own way for medieval philosophy.

Gilson was promoted from Strasbourg to the Sorbonne in 1921. In 1926 he was appointed professor of medieval philosophy, launched the journal *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, and visited North America for the first time. In 1929 classes began in the Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto, Canada, co-founded by Gilson and the Basilian Fathers. Awarded Pontifical status in 1939, Gilson's Institute was dedicated to following his interdisciplinary approach to medieval philosophy. In 1932 he joined the Collège de France as the chair of medieval philosophy. With the exception of the years of World War II, Gilson split his teaching between Paris and Toronto from 1929 to 1951. In 1946 Gilson was elected to the Académie Française.

Resigning his chair at the Sorbonne in 1951, Gilson spent most of his time in Canada at the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies until 1968. His last visit to North America was in 1972.

Gilson's most distinctive use of history is found in *Études de philosophie médiévale* (1921), modeled on the music he loved. Each of the eight studies focuses on a single theme, prominent among them: the meaning of Christian rationalism, theology's servant, and Thomism's historical significance. His Gifford lectures on *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (1932) were designed to prove historically his thesis of a Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages, the first of several books on this subject. In *Methodical Realism* (1936) and *Thomist Realism* (1939) Gilson took aim at neo-scholastic philosophers who tried to join the "critical method" with Thomistic realism. Such a philosophical accommodation with modernity produced an incoherent Cartesian Thomism, Cartesian in using the method of the *cogito*, but Thomistic in arriving at unsound conclusions (*Thomist Realism*, p. 25). In 1938 Gilson gave the William James lectures at Harvard, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*. Taking aim at the positivism of his teachers, Gilson attempted to show that "metaphysics always buries its undertakers," by resorting to three "experiments" – medieval, Cartesian, and modern – that had failed to accomplish the attempted internment. Gilson's appreciation of existence (*esse*) as a distinctive feature of Aquinas's metaphysics led to another series of books, beginning with *L'Être et l'essence* (1948) and *Being and Some Philosophers* (1949), where he espoused an existential Thomism.

Three of Gilson's philosophical doctrines are especially worthy of mention: Christian philosophy, epistemological realism, and existential Thomism. In all three cases

Gilson found himself disputing on two fronts: against the modern philosophy represented for him by the Sorbonne, and against neo-scholastic philosophy whose emblem was Louvain. Gilson thought the positivists at the Sorbonne and the neo-scholastics at Louvain shared a common conception of philosophy: to be rational it had to be pure, unaffected by faith. Gilson's definition of Christian philosophy is designed precisely to challenge this presupposition. Considered as an abstract system, it is true that philosophy cannot argue from faith premises; but when looked at historically and in the individual philosopher, Christian philosophy exists as one habit side by side with the habits of faith and theology, in a kind of symbiotic relationship. In the 1930s Gilson thought that even while present in the mind of one knower, theology and Christian philosophy move down such separate tracks that Aquinas "exclud[ed] from theology all necessary demonstrations of purely rational nature" (*Reason and Revelation*, 1938, p. 78). The problem is that this view pushes the "five ways" demonstrating God's existence, for example, out of theology proper, even though they occur in a book called by its author *Summa theologiae*. Consequently, Gilson later called this view "a very widespread delusion" (*The Philosopher and Theology*, 1962, p. 97) and concluded that the Christian philosophy of Aquinas was an integral part of theology: "his theology by its very nature includes not only in fact but necessarily a *strictly rational philosophy*" (*Thomism*, 2002, xiii).

The dispute over Christian philosophy led Gilson to a conflict over epistemology, again waged on two fronts. Here his immediate target was neo-scholastic philosophy, but behind it stood modern philosophy itself. Neo-scholastics like Cardinal Mercier of Louvain thought that through clever argument they could beat modern philosophy

at its own game, because they assumed the critical method was neutral about results. But his studies of history showed Gilson that the method of critique was not neutral, because it was merely the other side of the idealistic conclusions that Descartes' successors from Berkeley to Hegel had drawn. Gilson proposed an alternative: "I maintain, therefore, that just as there is in Cartesianism a *methodical idealism*, the kind that starts with *thinking*, there can be a *methodical realism*, the kind that starts with *being*" (*Methodical Realism*, 1990, p. 118). The *cogito* cannot transcend the self because it is an artificial thought experiment. Real knowledge always begins in real experience and real experience is always from the beginning experience of the real world. Gilson's job was simply to remind neo-scholasticism and modern philosophy alike of this fact. Gilson's defense of a direct but far from naive realism was one part of an early twentieth century critique that now appears to have closed down the era of modern philosophy that ran from Descartes to Nietzsche, a critique that included Husserl's use of intentionality to overcome the subjective error of beginning philosophy with a solitary Cartesian ego ultimately trapped within itself, and Heidegger's "ontologizing the phenomenological method" in order to point out the equally pernicious error on the objective side, that of the "eclipse of being."

In *L'Être et l'essence* (1948) and *Being and Some Philosophers* (1949) Gilson took his readers on a tour of that herbarium, whose specimens were labeled with the names of the great metaphysicians of the West. Aquinas's transcendentals provide a ready scheme for cataloguing their errors. "Being (*ens*), which first falls into the mind, as Avicenna said" (*De veritate* 1.1) has two sorts of attributes subordinate to it: transcendental attributes

present in all beings (essence, unity, truth, and goodness) and special modes not present in all beings: substance and Aristotle's nine accidents. Metaphysicians have committed four kinds of error: (1) Parmenides and Platonists throughout history have reversed the priority being should have over its transcendental attributes, trying to make "one" or "good" ontologically prior to being. (2) Aristotle and his medieval followers Averroes and Siger of Brabant reduced the wider notion of being to one of its parts, namely, substance, for Aristotelian metaphysics is always a metaphysics of substance, not of being in its universality. And there have been two ways that essence has eclipsed being. (3) Medieval essentialists like Avicenna, Scotus, and Suarez recognized the composition of essence and existence in beings, but they misunderstand existence, taking it for a kind of essence. (4) And modern essentialists from Descartes to Hegel, by beginning in the mind, reduced being (*ens*) to essence, thereby producing gossamer metaphysical systems completely free of the weight of real existence. Only Aquinas escapes Gilson's critique, for Aquinas had the good sense to fight the temptation to reduce being to something less real than it actually is. Though he is never mentioned, this survey seems to be Gilson's reply to Heidegger's critique of Western metaphysics: Aquinas at least had not forgotten being, and Gilson was determined that Heidegger's century would not forget Aquinas.

Gilson's impact on philosophy was worldwide, by no means limited to North America. Of special importance to the New World, however, were his success in transplanting the skills of high European scholarship and the way he made philosophy's history respectable, especially its medieval history, and most particularly the thought of Thomas Aquinas.

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R.E. Houser

GÖDEL, KURT FRIEDRICH (1906–1978)

Kurt Gödel was born on 28 April 1906 in Brünn, Moravia, then part of Austria and now Brno, Czech Republic. In 1924 he entered the University of Vienna, initially to study physics but eventually studying mathematics with Hans Hahn. He also attended lectures in philosophy and sessions of the Vienna Circle of logical positivists including Rudolf Carnap. Gödel completed the PhD in mathematics in 1929 and qualified as a *Privatdozent* (unpaid lecturer) in 1933. He retained that position until it was abolished after the Nazi annexation of Austria in 1938, but lectured only intermittently, in part because of health problems and in part because of visits to the United States. Gödel was a visiting member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey in 1933–34, the fall of 1935 (when he had to return early),

and the fall of 1938, after which he taught for a semester at the University of Notre Dame and then returned to Vienna.

In January 1940, Gödel left Vienna with his wife and took up a position at the Institute for Advanced Study, where he remained for the rest of his life. Gödel became a permanent member in 1946 and professor of mathematics in 1953. He retired in 1976. During that time he traveled little and never returned to Europe. He had many health problems, both physical and mental, and his health declined seriously after 1976. Gödel died on 14 January 1978 in Princeton, New Jersey.

Gödel’s enduring fame rests primarily on four contributions. First, in his dissertation he proved the completeness of first-order quantificational logic, that is, that if a formula of this logic is not formally refutable then there is a model in which it is true, in fact a model where the domain of the quantifiers is the natural numbers. Gödel generalized his result to prove that the same holds for denumerable sets of formulae and along the way proved the compactness theorem: If every finite subset of a set of formulae has a model, so does the whole set. These theorems, published in 1930, are the fundamental theorems of model theory.

Second, in his epoch-making paper in 1931, Gödel proved his two incompleteness theorems. First, he described for a system of arithmetic based on the simple theory of types a formula F that “says of itself that it is unprovable” and proved that if the system is consistent, then F is unprovable. If in addition the system is ω -consistent (cannot prove there is a number satisfying some condition while refuting it for each individual number), then $\neg F$ is also unprovable, and thus the system is incomplete. The method was that of arithmetization of syntax, coding symbols of the system by natural numbers so that formulae and proofs could be coded as sequences and

so also as numbers, so that properties such as being a proof of a given formula could be represented by predicates expressible in the system. Gödel showed that this could be carried out for first-order arithmetic, so that the incompleteness result applies to it as well. Second, if the system satisfies some further conditions, then if it is consistent the formula expressing the consistency of the system is unprovable. In this sense the consistency of the system cannot be proved in the system itself.

Gödel's third major contribution came in the mid-1930s, as Gödel turned his attention to set theory. Between 1935 and 1937 he proved of the standard systems of set theory, such as that of Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF), that if they are consistent, they remain so after the addition of the axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis, a generalization of Cantor's early conjecture that the power of the continuum is the least uncountable cardinal. Thus the latter cannot be refuted by standard set-theoretic principles. The proof proceeded by constructing an inner model of "constructible sets," essentially an extension of Russell's ramified hierarchy to allow levels of sets indexed by all the ordinals. He proved that it is consistent with ZF that all sets are constructible and that this hypothesis implies the axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis. Gödel's methods proved fundamental to later research in set theory.

Gödel's fourth major contribution came in the late 1940s, prompted by reflection on Kant's conception of the transcendental ideality of time. Gödel discovered solutions of the field equations of general relativity in which the matter of the universe is in a state of uniform rigid rotation and in which there are closed timelike curves. The latter raised the theoretical possibility of time travel, but

what interested Gödel philosophically was solutions in which one could not define an objective global time. Gödel published his results in two papers, as well as a philosophical comment (1949), all reprinted in volume 2 of the *Collected Works* (abbreviated as CW). His initial models appear not to be physically realistic, but the later ones may be. The work was influential in the development of general relativity and cosmology. The connection with Kant is explored in some manuscripts on relativity theory and Kantian philosophy, probably earlier drafts of 1949 (two are in CW 3).

In the 1930s, Gödel obtained other significant results in mathematical logic. Several papers concern intuitionistic logic and its relation to classical logic and modal logic. Most foundationally significant is the translation of classical logic into intuitionistic, which implies that if intuitionistic first-order arithmetic HA is consistent, then so is classical (PA). His interpretation of HA by primitive recursive functionals of finite type, discovered in 1941 but only published in 1958, introduced a method widely used in post-war work in proof theory.

Gödel's philosophical work reflected his highly rationalistic temperament as well as his training in mathematics and physics. Although the Vienna Circle, especially Carnap, stimulated his interest in logic and foundations, he reacted against their views. During most of his career positive influence came more from historical figures, especially Leibniz and Kant, than from the philosophical movements of his own day (apart from programs in the foundations of mathematics). He was aloof from the philosophical debates of the post-war period and indeed sought to avoid controversy of any kind.

Gödel is widely known for defending a Platonist view and a philosophical conception

of mathematical intuition. On the first point, he could be described as a realist; in an unsent reply to a questionnaire in 1975 he described himself as a “conceptual realist” even since 1925 (see CW 4, p. 447). In letters during 1967–68 to Hao Wang (Wang 1974, pp. 8–11; CW 5, pp. 396–99, 403–5), he argued that his realist view contributed significantly to his principal discoveries in logic. With respect to the incompleteness theorem, what he thought important was the heuristic role of the concept of objective truth, independent of provability. Remarks from the 1930s suggest that it was only over time that he came to the complete Platonism he avowed in 1944 and later writings (see Parsons 1995 and Davis 1998). Gödel nonetheless showed sympathy for idealism, and sometimes described his philosophy as idealistic. Although Kant was an important influence on him, he criticized Kant’s transcendental idealism as too subjectivist. But he was able to combine ringing expressions of realist conviction with idealist sympathies (see for example the letter to Gotthard Günther of 30 June 1954 in CW 4). Concern to reconcile these tendencies was probably a factor leading him to embark in 1959 on a study of Edmund Husserl’s works and to be favorable thereafter to Husserl’s views.

A problematic aspect of Gödel’s Platonism is that his realism extends to concepts as well as mathematical objects. Concepts are objects associated with predicates. One might expect a rationalist like Gödel to be a realist about properties and relations. But he had more specific reasons. Concepts are important to his epistemology as objects of intuition. Set theory avoids paradox by allowing that some predicates do not have sets as extensions, so that concepts are not reducible to sets or objects too much like sets. Finally, he took examples of conceptual analysis in mathematics, yielding sharp and

essentially unique concepts (such as that of computability), to indicate that such concepts are not man-made.

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Charles Parsons

GOFFMAN, ERVING MANUAL (1922–1982)

Erving Manual Goffman was born on 11 June 1922 in Mannville, Alberta, Canada. He enrolled at the University of Toronto in 1944 where he began taking sociology classes. He left Canada for the United States shortly after receiving his BA from the University of Toronto in 1945. The remainder of his formal academic training was at the University of Chicago, where he received an MA degree in 1949 and a PhD in sociology in 1953. Although he owed a debt to Everett C. Hughes, perhaps the greatest influence on Goffman was the anthropologist W. Lloyd Warner with whom Goffman studied at Chicago. Goffman worked as an assistant in the Division of Social Sciences from 1952 to 1953. After Goffman defended his dissertation, he remained at Chicago, working as a research associate for Edward Shils in 1953–54. From 1954 to 1957, he was at the National Institute of Mental Health in Bethesda, Maryland, as a visiting scientist. In 1957 Goffman was appointed assistant professor of sociology at the University of California at Berkeley. He became an associate professor in 1959, and was full professor of sociology from 1962 to 1968. Goffman then went to the University of Pennsylvania, where he was Benjamin Franklin Professor of Anthropology and Sociology from 1968 until his death. He was President of the American Sociological Association in 1981–82. Goffman died on 20 November 1982 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Goffman's earliest and still most well-known work was based in part on research he conducted for his dissertation at Chicago in 1953. “Communications Conduct in an Island Community,” a study based on field research in the Shetland Islands, a crofting community off the coast of Scotland, was later

revised and elaborated into *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, published in 1959. Self, identity, and motive all arose, not from the culture at large, not from any kind of bequeath from nature, but from and within a dramatic encounter which was evanescent and transitory. External and micro-level issues were always subordinate to Goffman, whose dramaturgical vision was located in face-to-face encounters, the study of which he regarded as fundamental.

Goffman influenced a generation of interactionist sociologists, and made the study of micro-level encounters a respected tradition within sociology. In doing so he also reinvigorated the field tradition of qualitative study in which the researcher engaged in “participant observation,” a method requiring the investigator to go directly to the scene in which human beings are conducting their affairs in order to see the most miniscule features of that life as closely as possible. His own field ethnologies echoed this theme. *Asylums* (1961) was based on extensive field work at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C., where he served as an assistant recreation director while observing and collecting data on how persons come to be regarded as mentally ill and what happens to them after they do. *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (1963) was a chilling and detailed portrait of the close ritual connection of “normals” to those with visible stigmas. An essay entitled “Where the Action is” was based on field work in casinos in Las Vegas where Goffman had trained to become a blackjack dealer. Beyond these occasions where he was literally “in the field,” there was also a sense in which Goffman was always in the field, no matter what he was studying.

Because the self was not, for Goffman, a thing, but a dramatic effect arising diffusely

from the entire scene in which an act occurs, Goffman is led to a life-long interest in how persons present themselves to others. These presentations of self are moral acts requiring both *demeanor*, the obligation to “come off” to others, and *deference*, the obligation to protect the coming off of others. Therefore the study of selfhood was not, as generations of scholars caught in Cartesian dualisms believed, the study of the inside of human agents, but rather the way in which these agents interact with the external world around them. Similar to the pragmatic philosophy of George Herbert Mead, for Goffman the self is not a product but a process, not a subjective essence, but an objective social construction. Individuality is not a personal matter to Goffman, but rather a meaning which emerges in relationships with others.

To use Harry Stack Sullivan’s terminology, a person’s self emerges, is maintained, and is lost only through a process of “consensual validation.” Following the social behaviorism of Mead, the self is the meaning of the organism, and this meaning, like all others, is established by the action of that organism and the actions of others with respect to it. Here Goffman shows his pragmatic roots. Mead articulated the foundations for a nondualistic, dramaturgical view of self when he wrestled with the question of how to account for two of the most obvious features of selfhood: continuity and novelty. He simply spoke of the self as a meaning as opposed to a thing, and as John Dewey proposed, noted that it always arose as part of a social process. Goffman continues this strand of thought.

Goffman sometimes talked of his oeuvre as within the tradition of Durkheimian functionalism, and at other times he claimed affinities to symbolic interactionism. In *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, he acknowledges an obvious debt to Kenneth

Burke's dramatism, but he was more often atheoretical, using insights and understandings from a variety of theoretical perspectives that suited his purpose at the time. So for all his theoretical acumen, Goffman was not essentially a theorist nor was he interested in theoretical things – particularly “theory talk,” a form of intellectual aggrandizement which he particularly despised. He was primarily an empiricist, an observer, a producer of insights, and a conceptual iconoclast who rarely strayed from what was in front of his eyes (1961, pp. xii–xiv).

Seemingly immune to criticism and fundamentally aloof from philosophical debates, Goffman's body of work succeeds, as Robin Williams has argued, *because* of its vulnerabilities (Williams 1988). Such a pragmatic stance toward epistemological concerns is quintessentially Goffman and has also been argued by such contemporary pragmatists as Richard Rorty. According to Tom Burns account, based on personal conversations, Goffman also took solace from J.L. Austin's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's view of philosophy as legitimating his own exploratory rather than system-building approach (Burns 1992, p. 354).

In the intellectual world of the 1950s, filled with those who held the Parsonian and Mertonian conception of order which emphasized shared moral values, Goffman was a polarity player, showing the other side of every theoretical assertion. His connection to postmodernity can be seen in his attitude, which is best expressed as a combination of irony and absurdity (Trevino 2003). But even there, Goffman's absence of a central epistemology rebels against the postmodernist's non-epistemological stance. As he shows in his last work *Forms of Talk* (1981), as long as human beings are forced by social circumstances to relate to one another through the vehicle of

communication, there will always be some kind of underlying structured “truth” in the social interactions and relationships we all share.

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Charles Edgley

GOLDMAN, ALVIN IRA (1938–)

Alvin I. Goldman was born on 1 October 1938 in New York City. He received his BA from Columbia University in 1960. He then received his postgraduate degrees from Princeton University: his MA in 1962 and PhD in philosophy in 1965. Goldman's teaching career began at the University of Michigan as assistant professor of philosophy in 1963. After rising to full professor, Goldman left Michigan in 1980 to become professor of philosophy at the University of Illinois at Chicago, where he taught until 1983. From 1983 to 2002 Goldman was Regents Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. Goldman was President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1991–92. Since 2002 Goldman has been Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He became a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (elected 2004), and was

awarded the Romanell Prize by the American Philosophical Association (2010).

In "A Causal Theory of Knowing" (1967), Goldman proposed a view of justification that some type of casual relation holds between a person's belief and the fact known by that person, such that this relation tends to produce more true beliefs. Since the existence of that casual relation need not also be known to the knower, Goldman rejects such an internalist requirement and instead upholds the naturalization of epistemology and epistemic externalism. This type of externalism came to be labeled as "reliabilism" and most reliabilists have been inspired by Goldman, along with a few other major reliabilists including D.M. Armstrong, Robert Nozick, and Fred Dretske.

In Goldman's reliabilism, elaborated in "What Is Justified Belief?" (1979), *Epistemology and Cognition* (1986), and later books, formulates a kind of foundationalism by distinguishing higher belief-dependent processes (such as reasoning) from lower belief-independent processes such as perception. Perception causes the formation of beliefs but can result in knowledge only if a perception results from the most reliable process available to the knower. Goldman attempts to forestall the sort of skepticism that attacks reliabilism (such as brain-in-a-vat scenarios) by requiring that the reliable processes needed for knowledge are reliable in the sort of "normal worlds" that are consistent with our general beliefs about the actual world.

Causal processes are also applied to understanding agency in Goldman's *A Theory of Human Action* (1970). Against Elizabeth Anscombe and Donald Davidson, Goldman argues that only some descriptions of an agent's behavior can be identified as the same intentional action. On his theory, an agent's behavior is a "basic" intentional act only if

it was caused in the appropriate way by the agent's knowledge of, and action upon, her wants and beliefs.

Placing his confidence in neurological and cognitive science to help discover the physiological and psychological processes responsible for reliable cognition, Goldman has advocated a close alliance between epistemology and the cognitive sciences. Like Dretske and some other philosophers, Goldman has depicted information as resulting from the functioning of a mechanical device complex and sensitive enough to discriminate and register changes in its environment. The new epistemologist (now doing "epistemics" according to Goldman) will proceed from the knowledge provided by the cognitive sciences and investigate how reliable a process must be to qualify for knowledge. Especially useful would be cognitive science's understanding of the more basic or native processes of perception that produce foundational knowledge.

From Goldman's own examples, displayed in *Epistemology and Cognition* and *Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science* (1993), the new epistemologist will continue to be concerned with erecting a theory of knowledge and justification immune from any Gettier-type counter examples. There are several tensions in this combination of traditional epistemology with cognitive science but three examples must suffice: (1) reliabilism is satisfied with the production of beliefs which are more than likely true or close to truth, while "knowledge" has usually required completely true belief; (2) reliabilism has difficulty by itself deciding which kinds of knowledge and learning processes are more relevant and valuable to human beings in this actual world, while traditional epistemology takes full advantage of our social institutions of knowledge production (what Goldman

calls our "epistemic folkways"); and (3) reliabilism is grounded on the descriptive conclusions of cognitive science while epistemology typically has a normative dimension. Goldman has creatively engaged these tensions, producing a highly original theory of knowledge.

In *Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences* (1992), *Knowledge in a Social World* (1999), and later books, Goldman's combination of epistemology and cognitive science requires a division of labor between individual and social epistemology. Individual epistemology considers the lone knower, while social epistemology for Goldman considers how knowers come to possess and use knowledge in groups. Knowledge itself for Goldman remains an individual matter, like belief; when a person knows something, that knowledge is not dependent on anyone else knowing it. Other social epistemologies are grounded on some types of beliefs and knowledge which are never possessed individually, but Goldman only acknowledges this possibility without dealing with beliefs had by groups.

Goldman's social epistemology considers how true beliefs may be maximized over groups or balanced against other social values. "Veritism" should be social epistemology's focus, as the goal of truth is essential to intellectual pursuits. There are five standards for a veritistic social practice (1992, p. 195): (1) The reliability of a practice, measured by the proportion of truths over errors in all beliefs produced by the practice; (2) The power of a practice, in its ability to guide knowers to truths that interest them; (3) The fecundity of a practice, its ability to bring large numbers of true beliefs to many people; (4) The speed of a practice, how quickly it produces true beliefs; and (5) The efficiency of a practice, how well it economically provides true

beliefs. *Knowledge in a Social World* applies these standards to four knowledge practices – science, law, democracy, and education.

Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public (2002), consisting of essays published from 1997 to 2001, continues the exploration of social epistemology informed by cognitive science. Goldman suggests that epistemic internalism is incompatible with the scientific naturalizing of epistemology, while also suggesting that suitably reformed understandings of the *a priori*, intuitions, and introspection will remain useful for cognitive science and epistemology. Richard Dawkins's theory of memes is incorporated in Goldman's social epistemology, along with a concern for the social pressures and technological limitations that direct and constrain scientific research. Here, Goldman's work intersects that of Philip Kitcher, who urges a more pragmatist view of knowledge, and Nicholas Rescher, who has applied pragmatism to the economics of science.

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John R. Shook

GOODMAN, HENRY NELSON (1906–1998)

Nelson Goodman was born on 7 August 1906 in Somerville, Massachusetts, and died on 25 November 1998 in Needham, Massachusetts. He attended Harvard University, receiving the BS magna cum laude in 1928 and the PhD in philosophy in 1941 under the direction of C.I. Lewis. He served in the U.S. Army from

1942 until 1945. Goodman held philosophy positions at Tufts University in 1945–46, and the University of Pennsylvania from 1946 to 1964. He then was Harry Austryn Wolfson Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis University from 1964 to 1967, before returning to Harvard University as professor of philosophy from 1968 to 1977.

Goodman published eight books, over 100 articles, and many reviews. Goodman’s major philosophical writings have appeared in several editions and are translated into several languages. He was a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a corresponding fellow of the British Academy. He was a Guggenheim Fellow in 1945–46. He gave the Sherman Lecture at University of London, 1953; Alfred North Whitehead Lecture at Harvard University, 1962; John Locke Lectures at Oxford University, 1962; Miller Lectures at University of Illinois, 1974; Immanuel Kant Lectures at Stanford University, 1976; and the Howison Lecture at University of California, Berkeley, 1985. Goodman served as Vice President of the Association of Symbolic Logic from 1950 to 1952, and as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1967–68.

In *Reconceptions in Philosophy* Goodman outlines a three-phased approach to systematically “reconceiving” philosophy that is motivated by problems for traditional views of truth, certainty, and knowledge. The first phase is the recognition that symbols do not merely describe the world, but enter into the very constitution of what is described or referred to. The second phase confronts the consequences of this recognition. The third phase examines the deficiency of traditional philosophic positions in addressing fields of cognition that include the arts as well as the sciences (since all fields of cognition rely on use of symbols). Given a revised

understanding of the role of symbols, Goodman urges the replacement of the notions of truth, certainty, and knowledge with those of rightness, adoption, and understanding, respectively.

In *Ways of Worldmaking*, and other later work, Goodman develops a non-reductive metaphysical position he terms “irrealism.” Irrealism holds that objects, properties, and relations result from the active process of fitting a representational system and world together. Irrealism investigates what it means to take seriously the recognition that symbols enter into the very constitution of what they describe or refer to. The second of the three stages outlined above, irrealism is the result of rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction and related doctrines. It is in this context that Goodman claims there are many worlds “made” or constructed by us. Irrealism can also be viewed, in a somewhat different context, as an attempt to offer an alternative that lies mid-way between anti-realism (or idealism) and realism. In this regard, Goodman’s work shares an affinity with much of the work of Hilary Putnam.

Like W.V. Quine, Goodman rejects the existence of a fixed or unique distinction between analytic and synthetic expressions. Quine, Goodman, and Morton White developed challenges to this distinction through a three-way exchange during the 1940s. With the analytic-synthetic distinction gone, Goodman holds that there can be more than one version (or, we might say, conceptual scheme) of the world, and these versions cannot be reduced. In this, Goodman and Quine (in his ecumenical mood) agree. They further agree that, since there is no neutral description of the world in such cases, the best one can do is recognize both versions. The chief difference lies in the fact that Quine privileges physical (scientific) descriptions of the world. In contrast, Goodman holds that

world descriptions from the arts are on an equal footing with those from the sciences.

Goodman rejects the notion of a neutral world that grounds all versions (or conceptual schemes). This, and his commitment to the claim that we cannot hold that conflicting versions are true of the same world (since conflicting versions commit one to logical contradictions), led Goodman to conclude that there are many actual worlds. That there are many actual worlds, and the further claim that we make or construct such worlds when we make versions, has led to some notoriety for Goodman, at least among those philosophers who share his analytic roots and view such claims as, at best, tenuous metaphors.

Truth, Goodman maintains, is a suitable notion in certain linguistic contexts, but should be reconceived as rightness since truth is but an “occasional ingredient” in rightness. The rightness of a version is a matter of fit and working. This conception should not, Goodman maintains, be viewed as simply “pragmatist.” *Fit*, on Goodman’s view, is a fitting of a version *into* a world. This contrasts the conception of truth as correspondence, whereby versions are said by Goodman to be fitted *onto* an independently existing world. In fitting a version *into* a world we work within that world and make adjustments to both the version and world. In this sense we “construct” worlds. But the world (particularly the well-entrenched elements of a world) has primacy in this process. This latter characteristic, in Goodman’s view, allows irrealism to avoid becoming an any-thing-goes relativism. Nonetheless, irrealism is commonly criticized as falling into an any-thing-goes relativism. The burden is on Goodman to show that rightness, as he conceives of it, is capable of allowing for a plurality of right versions while not permitting just any version whatsoever – a

difficult task when one rejects any objective or neutral world to do the work.

Irrealism – described by Goodman as “a radical relativism under rigorous restraints” – is perhaps best seen as the working out of his earlier book, *The Structure of Appearance* and as a continuation of his work in *Languages of Art*. In *The Structure of Appearance* Goodman defends nominalism. Physical particles, phenomenal elements, or ordinary things may all serve as the nominalist’s base. Nominalism, as Goodman sees it, permits a variety of systems (or versions) under rigorous restraints.

Goodman’s aesthetics does not approach the arts through questions of value or appreciation, but rather through epistemology. He examines the various symbol systems of the arts as means of representation. Semantic and syntactic characteristics of the various symbol systems of the arts – rather than causal features – are the focus of his aesthetics. In *Languages of Art* Goodman distinguishes between autographic and allographic art works. Identification of the autographic depends upon the history of the production of the piece; the allographic does not. Goodman sees reference as describing the relation between symbol and object. In addition to language, symbols (such as graphs, pictures, or sculptures) may *denote* or *exemplify* an object, albeit metaphorically. In this sense, the symbol enters the very constitution of the object since fit with the object goes both ways.

Goodman is also well known for his “reworking” of Hume’s problem of induction in *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*, raising “the new riddle of induction” – the problem of distinguishing those predictions or hypothesis that are law-like and can thus be projected into the future from those that are not. The riddle is raised as follows. Suppose that all emeralds examined before time *t* are green.

The hypothesis that all emeralds are green, then, seems well confirmed. Goodman notices, however, that by introducing a new predicate, *grue*, which applies to things before *t* that are green but which are blue if examined after *t*, our evidence for the hypothesis that emeralds are *grue* is just as good as for the hypothesis that emeralds are green. The point of the example, and the point of the new riddle of induction, is that we have no way of saying which hypothesis is law-like and which is accidental. To favor the hypothesis that all emeralds are green over that which states all emeralds are *grue* seems to accept certain regularities with no good grounds.

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GRACIA, JORGE JESUS EMILIANO (1942–)

Jorge Gracia was born on 18 July 1942 in Camaguey, Cuba. He emigrated to the U.S. and attended Wheaton College (BA in philosophy, 1965), the University of Chicago (MA in philosophy, 1966), Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (MSL in philosophy, 1970) and the University of Toronto (PhD in philosophy, 1971). He has taught philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo since 1971, holding the Samuel P. Capen Chair in Philosophy since 1998, and he was also named State University of New York Distinguished Professor. He also holds an appointment with the department of Comparative Literature, since 2008. He has been a visiting professor at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Universidad de Michoacán, Franciscan University, Fordham University, and Internationale Akademie für Philosophie in Liechtenstein. He has been awarded a National Endowment for the Humanities Research Fellowship, the John N. Findlay Prize in Metaphysics from the Metaphysical Society of America, and the Aquinas Medal from the American Catholic Philosophical Association. He has also given the Aquinas Lecture at Marquette

University, and served as President of the Metaphysical Society of America, the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, the Society for Iberian and Latin American Thought, the Federación Internacional de Estudios sobre América Latina y el Caribe, and the American Catholic Philosophical Association.

Gracia has been among America's preeminent Latino/Hispanic American philosophers, and among the finest medieval philosophers scholars, for over two generations. His specializations in scholastic and modern metaphysics, philosophy of language and hermeneutics, and philosophical historiography have resulted in several major books and many articles. He is also devoted to philosophical and cultural issues of ethnicity, race, and identity, grounded in his expertise with the experiences of his own heritage. Recent work has explored aesthetics and art and literature interpretation.

Grounded in his thorough scholarship on the medieval approaches to individuation, nominalism, and realism, Gracia extended his historiographical expertise through the moderns. His book on *Individuality* (1988) elaborates his own understanding of six fundamental concerns: intension, extension, ontological status, the principle of individuation, discernibility, and reference. *Metaphysics and Its Task* (1999) explains the persistence and fertility of this philosophical field and its reliance on categories, identities, and reductions. As Gracia became interested in problems inherent to philosophical historiography, subsequent books examine the relationships between philosophy and its own history, the role of textual interpretation for history of philosophy, and charting the development of philosophical concepts and systems. Books such as *A Theory of Textuality* (1995) and *Texts* (1996) provide a definition of a text and theorize about the

identity, ontology, and epistemology of texts and their use.

Gracia has also been at the forefront encouraging attention to the valuable extent of philosophical thought by both Latino philosophers in America and philosophers in Central and South America. Books such as *Hispanic/Latino Identity: A Philosophical Perspective* (2000) and *Latinos in America: Philosophy and Social Identity* (2008) recount the history, historiography, and contemporary relevance of Latin-American philosophy and its attention to cultural and political issues.

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John R. Shook

GREENAWALT, ROBERT KENT (1936–)

R. Kent Greenawalt was born on 25 June 1936 in Brooklyn, New York. He earned a BA from Swarthmore College in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a LLB from Columbia University in 1963, serving as Editor-in-Chief of the *Columbia Law Review*. After his graduation, he was admitted to the New York bar in 1963 and clerked for United States Supreme Court Justice John Harlan. In 1965 he joined the faculty of the Columbia Law School, where he has held the title of University Professor since 1991. He is also an affiliate professor with Columbia's Philosophy department. His visiting appointments have included lecturing at Princeton University, Cambridge University's Clare Hall, and at Oxford University's All Souls College. His career has focused on civil rights, constitutional law and legal philosophy, issues of church and state, free speech, and legal interpretation. He is married to the historian of religion Elaine Pagels.

Greenawalt has been closely involved with civil rights efforts from the start of his career. He was an attorney with the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights in Jackson, Mississippi; he served on the Civil Rights Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York; and he served on the

Due Process Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union. He was United States Deputy Solicitor General during 1971–1972. Greenawalt has been President of American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy (1991–93), and he is a fellow of both the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American Council of Learned Societies, as well as a member of the American Philosophical Society.

One recurring theme in Greenawalt's scholarship is the combination of liberalism, morality, and religion, with a focus on the constitutional implications of the intersection of these issues. This theme is developed in *Conflicts of Law and Morality* (1987) where he investigates possible conflicts between law and morality while developing ideas on the nature of legal obligation and legitimate reasons for violating laws, for instance in the realm of civil disobedience. His influential book, *Religious Convictions and Political Choice* (1988), further investigates these issues by explicitly raising the question as to what extent citizens legitimately can appeal to religious convictions and reasons for their political choices in a liberal democracy. He develops his argument in response to a "separatist" picture of liberalism that John Rawls and more especially Bruce Ackerman advocate, one that holds that religious reasons should be fully excluded from political decision-making. This leads him to formulate answers to questions such as, what is the proper model of good citizenship in a liberal democracy? Ultimately the investigation leads to the detailed analysis of liberal theory in relationship to theories of justice, civic virtue, and religion.

Greenawalt's work highlights greater complexities than those noticed by others in the field. For instance, when analyzing the use of religious reasons he notes differences

required by the occupation of various locations and roles where religious reasons could be used, such as that of officials, candidates, and constituents. Further, he notes that liberalism sets limits to base reasons allowed as well as possible outcomes. From his investigation he concludes that the hope for a purely procedural republic is incoherent, and liberalism is a substantive position. Because secular reasons cannot fully decide critical issues, religious reasons are often appropriate. Further, to ask to exclude religious reasons would be too invasive because these often are central to a person's political beliefs. Not only that, but the boundaries between religious and non-religious reasons, as well as that between public and private reason, are not clear enough to be set with any precision. However, religious reasons must be brought to bear in politics only in areas where there is a proper secular objective, since the foundational justifications of a state and the proper purposes of a state are all secular. A citizen cannot use religious reasons, even if genuine, to promote illiberal outcomes or objectives. Liberalism legitimately enforces a limited commitment to shared forms of reasoning, and representative political roles can demand more constraint. Religious views should not overwhelm the "common dialogue of rational secular morality." Contrary to liberal religious separationists, however, toleration requires that government must protect a large area where religious motivations and reasons are appropriate.

Greenawalt's book *Does God Belong in Public Schools?* (2005) agrees that current legal doctrine preventing schools from preferring any religion, or religion over no religion, is fair. Schools must also avoid disrespecting or excluding religion, which could appear to be the advocacy of

"secular humanism." Once again, the "wall of separation" rhetoric proves unworkable in practice. Greenawalt argues that schools should treat the history and ideas of religion seriously without focusing upon whether or not they are true. Not teaching evolution would be an endorsement of religion because the only reason to exclude evolution from the classroom would be religious. Themes such as these are further developed in the two volumes of *Religion and the Constitution* (2006, 2008) where he argues that in Constitutional religious matters there are plural values, and no simple formulas to solve all the issues.

His books *Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language* (1989) and *Law and Objectivity* (1992) once again emphasize that there is no neat way to exclude important complexity in the field. *Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech* (1995) continues this theme. There are multiple reasons for protecting speech, diverse kinds of communication, and divergent attitudes towards the individual and community from society to society. Greenawalt often looks to the contrast between United States legal culture (isolationist and conceptual), and Canadian legal culture, which is more willing to balance competing values and look internationally for legal possibilities.

Ultimately, Greenawalt uses factors such as whether speech is immediately directed at a person, or if it is made at a distant location, to distinguish how hate speech should be protected. Abusive and hurtful words in specific contexts can be protected as honest barometers of political sentiments. He finds quite important the analogy of hate speech regulation to that of fighting words. Greenawalt also focuses on the feminist-inspired equality versus speech debate, and issues surrounding pornography. US law

seems simple and categorical, ignoring the problem of some speech potentially forcing out other speech. Canadian law, he notes by contrast, takes positions closer to those advocated by Catharine Mackinnon and Andrea Dworkin which prioritize equality among citizens.

Law and Objectivity (1992) and *Legal Interpretation: Perspectives from Other Disciplines and Private Texts* (2010) explore multiple theories of legal interpretation, examine the limitations inherent to legal analogies, and distinguish the different interpretive needs of separate areas of law. For example, he notes that contract and constitutional law require quite different attitudes towards the legal text. Greenawalt finds that courts do not really run on general theories; they should acknowledge how they are fallible, and reliant on unofficial interpretation as well. In addition, justice and public policy have a significant part to play. Intention is important but not easily identified with simple analytic tools. But this is not a doctrine of despair because United States Supreme Court practice shows that “a legal system can function fairly well without an overarching coherent methodology.” He judges that the sensible interpretive stance acknowledges that “meaning has many meanings, that a choice of one standard that counts as ‘the meaning’ comes down to a question of what will lead to desirable practical choices” (2010, 206).

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Brian E. Butler

GREENWOOD, ISAAC (1702–1745)

Isaac Greenwood was one of the first natural philosophers to hold an academic post in the American colonies. He was born on 11 May 1702 in Boston, Massachusetts. At Harvard College he studied with tutor Thomas Robie, perhaps the colonies' best mathematician and astronomer. Greenwood received the BA from Harvard in 1721. He then studied for the ministry under Cotton Mather. With a letter written by Mather – introducing him to the secretary of the Royal Society of London, James Jurin – Greenwood set out for London in 1723. The British natural philosophers were intrigued by the fact that Greenwood had been inoculated, and, as a result, Greenwood had the opportunity to meet with the Royal Society, engaging in discussion with, among others, Isaac Newton. Greenwood also worked as a preacher in London, and in that context he met Thomas Hollis, a London merchant. Hollis had already formed a strong affiliation with Harvard: he had bestowed books, various kinds of scientific equipment, including a 24-foot telescope, and scholarships; he had also contributed to an endowment for a Professorship in Divinity.

Hollis endowed a second Professorship to Harvard, one in Mathematics and Natural Philosophy, for which he nominated Greenwood. In 1727, Greenwood became the Hollis Chair of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy. He was one of the first Americans to make a living as a natural philosopher and the first colonial academic to rigorously promote and popularize Newtonianism. In 1737 he faced the charge of “intemperance,” to which he confessed. Another account of his dismissal has it that Greenwood's deistic variant of Newtonianism, to which he appended his own flourishes regarding

cycles and regeneration, threatened the puritanism of Harvard's new President, Edward Holyoke. According to Greenwood's eulogist, his dismissal in 1738 was because Harvard's “Sphere of Action” was “too small and confined to the enterprising genius of Mr. Greenwood” (quoted in Sibley 1933, 478).

In 1738, a few months after losing his position, Greenwood turned again to public lecturing, setting up his own school in Boston, and then he began a new school in Philadelphia. Benjamin Franklin helped to provide the school's educational equipment. In spite of Franklin's substantial assistance and encouragement, however, Greenwood was again unable to continue in this manner. Confronting his financial struggles, Greenwood enlisted in the British Navy and went to sea as chaplain, a “companion and instructor to Captain Frankland” on the *Rose Man of War*. He later served on the *Albrough*; a few months after its return he died on 12 October 1745 in Charleston, South Carolina.

Greenwood's first publication was his defense of inoculation: *A Friendly Debate; or, A Dialogue between Academicus, and Sawny & Mundungus, Two Eminent Physicians, about some of their Late Performances* (1722). The preliminary work for Greenwood's Harvard course is found in his *An Experimental Course of Mechanical Philosophy* (1726) which outlines 16 lectures on mechanics. These were meant as foundational to his later work, *A Course of Philosophical Lectures* (1739, see Leonard 1981, 168, who corrects the date of publication), advertised in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* of 5 June 1740. While at Harvard, Greenwood published three texts in the *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London*, and, in the meantime, wrote his *Arithmetic* (1729), a 158-page

anonymous textbook, the first of its kind in the colonies, which included applications relevant to commerce.

The title of Greenwood's most philosophical work is *A Philosophical Discourse Concerning the Mutability and Changes of the Material World*. The central premise in this text is that "Nature is in a perpetual course of change" (1731, 2). He instantiates this premise with examples from the frontiers of science (referencing, among others, Newton, Haley, Cheyne, and Hales). He draws a more Heraclitean, and less than mechanistic, conception of the Newtonian world. And despite Greenwood's earlier efforts as a preacher, Greenwood argues from the understanding of nature captured in his central premise, to, not the existence of a divine being, but to the preservation of the soul, a "substance" that "implies the idea of life and action" (20), the latter being the one role he explicitly designates for divinity.

Until Franklin's talks on electricity in 1772, Greenwood was the only American public lecturer on science to "contribute" to meetings of the Royal Society (510). Greenwood's lectures were, as Stearns puts it, "imitated in every colonial college," his course being "the first of its kind in New England and a model of" public lecture series, "which soon were to become widespread in all of the American colonies" (447). Greenwood introduced to the colonies the "itinerant lecturer" and scientific demonstrations, bringing science to the public. According to Franklin biographer, D.F. Hawke, it was in this capacity that Greenwood was able "to expose" Franklin "to an organized, scholarly approach to natural philosophy," making clear to the latter that mathematics is not necessary for being a "Newtonian philosopher"; in fact, "one lecture offered 'various experiments concerning electrical attraction and repulsion'" (1976, 63).

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Timothy D. Lyons

GRENE, MARJORIE GLICKSMAN (1910–2009)

Marjorie Glicksman was born on 13 December 1910 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. She entered Wellesley College in 1927 and majored in zoology. Although interested in philosophy as a teenager, it was not until

1931, after graduating with her BA from Wellesley, that her philosophical studies truly began. In 1931 she traveled to Germany as an exchange student, ending up in Freiburg im Breisgau. There, she learned her philosophy “at the feet of Martin Heidegger” (2002, p. 4). She read Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* that summer – partly while at sea, heading home to Madison for the summer recess – and returned to Germany in the fall of 1932. During the 1932–33 school year she studied with Karl Jaspers in Heidelberg while Heidegger was on leave. The spring semester of her studies in Heidelberg were cut short by Hitler's rise to power, and she returned to the United States, where she undertook graduate study in philosophy at Radcliffe, “as close as females got in those days to Harvard” (1995, p. 5).

Glicksman earned an MA and a PhD in philosophy in 1935 from Radcliffe, writing a dissertation on *Existenzphilosophie*. She then traveled to Europe again, this time to Denmark on a postdoctoral fellowship, where she did work on Kierkegaard. She faced a bleak job market when she returned, as a woman in a profession dominated by men and suffering the effects of the depression. She became a Director of Residence at a junior college in southern Illinois. After the start of World War II she went to the University of Chicago, where she worked as an assistant and instructor of philosophy until 1944 when the men began returning from the war. She got the job, she said, as part of “a noble experiment,” for she was the first woman the department had ever hired (1995, p. 5). While at Chicago, she took part in Rudolf CARNAP's seminar, discovering that she had major misgivings about logical positivism.

From 1944 until 1957, she was out of academia, but by no means exiled from philosophy. She had married David Grene in 1939 and lived as a wife, mother, and farmer

in rural Illinois until 1952, when the family moved to Ireland. Although not affiliated with any academic institution during this period, Marjorie Grene continued to do important work during this time, most of it related to existentialism. It was also during this time that she met Michael Polanyi, with whom she would work closely for many years to come. In 1957 she went to Manchester, England, to work as Polanyi's assistant, helping him to compose his book *Personal Knowledge* (1958).

In 1959 Grene held a lectureship at the University of Leeds in England. A year later she took up a similar position at Queen's University in Belfast, Ireland. Having divorced David, in 1965 she moved back to the United States, becoming a professor of philosophy at the University of California at Davis, a position she held until retiring in 1978. From 1988 until her death, she was honorary distinguished professor and adjunct professor of philosophy and science studies at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Among many honors, Grene was named a fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1976, and also joined the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Grene died on 16 March 2009 in Blacksburg, Virginia.

In the years after World War II, Grene was among the first thinkers to introduce American audiences to existentialism. Along with such notable figures as Hazel Barnes, William Barrett, J. Glenn Gray, and Walter Kaufmann, she played an important role in the postwar American reception of European ideas, a process which intellectual historians have only recently begun to explore in detail. Grene's writings on Heidegger, for example, were some of the earliest interpretations of his work available in English.

Despite having begun her philosophical career "at Heidegger's feet," Grene's relation

to existentialism in general, and Heidegger in particular, has been largely antagonistic. The second essay she ever published, in 1938, found Heidegger's philosophy original yet prone to mystification and dogmatism. She concluded a later essay on the Freiburg philosopher, an essay first published in 1958, with these words: "Behind the cheap rhetoric, what is there? The ghost of the Quest for Being fencing with the ghost of Aristotle. Something, but by no means enough" (1976, p. 70). The same sort of appraisal can be found in her 1957 book *Heidegger*. More recently, emphasizing more than ever Heidegger's political misdeeds (Grene was in attendance when Heidegger presented a version of his notorious *Rektoratsrede* at the University of Heidelberg in 1933), she finds Heidegger "a worthy successor to Hegel as a master of German philosophical fraud" (2002, p. 549).

Her skeptical view of existentialism was not limited to Heidegger. In *Dreadful Freedom: A Critique of Existentialism* (1948) she took on the other existentialists as well, so in vogue in the postwar years. At least when held up to figures such as Sartre, Grene could find in Heidegger something of value, namely his anti-Cartesian philosophical perspective. At least Heidegger, like Jaspers, refused the existentialist moniker. Though she wrote about them extensively in the forties and fifties, it was obvious that Grene was no existentialist.

When she returned to academic life, Grene's work changed direction. Working closely with Polanyi, perhaps the most recognized scientist-turned-philosopher of the time, Grene became interested in evolutionary theory, which would culminate in her work on the philosophy of biology. It was also during this time that she began working extensively on Aristotle, work which led to the publication

of *A Portrait of Aristotle* in 1963. The final component of her intellectual development during this time was the work of French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Reading Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* in 1960 was, in her own estimation, a kind of "revelation" (2002, p. 20). The work clarified many of the anti-Cartesian elements she had absorbed, but not fully appreciated, in her earlier studies of existentialism. Placing Polanyi and Merleau-Ponty alongside evolutionary theory and biology, Grene tried to go beyond the Cartesian *cogito*. In *The Knower and the Known* (1966), for example, she pointed toward a naturalist, contextualist approach to understanding, one which would not try to deny or surpass the embedded character of existence and knowing. Her work up to the present has continued, for the most part, these themes.

Grene has balanced her interests in the history of philosophy and the philosophy of biology. Without in any way reducing philosophy to the study of genes and molecules, without in any way reducing it to the realm of cognitive science – indeed, in direct opposition to these "reductionist" temptations – she has opened up fruitful paths in the philosophy of biology. In the 1960s and early 1970s she was preoccupied with the threat of reductionism. Grene has always been careful to protect philosophy from the encroachment of science (especially so-called "pure sciences" like physics), while simultaneously highlighting the links between the two. Much of her philosophical work has been devoted to such themes in the philosophy of science, including *Approaches to Philosophical Biology* (1969) and *The Understanding of Nature* (1974), as well as numerous important essays and edited volumes.

Her work on Descartes, including *Descartes* (1985) and *Descartes Among the Scholastics* (1991), has shown how research into the history of philosophy can explore historical themes without denying contemporary contexts. Throughout her career, Grene has helped broaden the horizons of American philosophy. In this regard, collections such as her 1976 *Philosophy In and Out of Europe* reveal how important a role she has played in the development of American thought during the latter half of the twentieth century. Her thinking is often a welcome, though far from uncontroversial, rejoinder to the jargon-laden and often inconsequential musings of much contemporary philosophical work. A good example of this no-nonsense approach to philosophy is her most recent book, *A Philosophical Testament* (1995).

The first woman to be the subject of a *Library of Living Philosophers* volume, Grene has opened up numerous philosophical pathways with her work. With her keen philosophical presence and her acerbic wit, she left a lasting impact on continental philosophy, on research in the history of philosophy, and on the philosophy of biology.

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Martin Woessner

GRIFFIN, DAVID RAY (1939–)

David Ray Griffin was born on 8 August 1939 in Wilbur, Washington. He earned a BA degree from Northwest Christian College (1962), a MA in counselling from the University of Oregon (1963), and a PhD in Philosophy of Religion from Claremont Graduate School (1970). His first teaching position was in the theology department at the University of Dayton, where he remained for five years. In 1973 he returned to Claremont to become Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Theology at the School of Theology at Claremont and to co-found, along with John B. Cobb, Jr, the Center for Process Studies. Griffin retired as Emeritus Professor from Claremont in 2004 and lives in Santa Barbara, California.

Griffin has been exceedingly prolific and uncommonly broad in his areas of interest and expertise. He is the author of twenty-nine books, the editor of another thirteen, and has published more than 248 articles. In conventional terms his academic interest and publications fall into five categories: religion, process philosophy, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and contemporary social issues, especially the events of 9/11 and climate change.

One of the central themes of Griffin's work in Christian theology is that supernaturalism is not essential to the Christian faith. He takes supernaturalism to assert that God exists outside of time and space and can break into the normal patterns of causality that govern the natural world at will. For Griffin, a naturalistic understanding of God is more rational. If one assumes, for example, that God has the power to suspend the laws of physics and to prevent virulent diseases from taking human life, then one is forced to explain why there is so much evil in the world, assuming also that God is good. This

intellectual problem does not arise within the context of a naturalistic theology. If God is conceived as all-powerful in the sense that God has some power over all things then evil acts, both large and small, can be attributed to other agents and to the randomness of uncoordinated agents such as microbes and viruses. The Holocaust, for example, and the suffering that is resulting from climate change are, from this perspective, not acts of God, they are rather anthropogenic acts of evil. Griffin's most extensive treatment of these issues is in *God, Power, and Evil* (1991).

Modern science also has its intellectual problems. Chief among these are its inability to explain the evolution of experience from dead matter (or pulses of subjectless energy) and the interaction of the human mind and body. Griffin has addressed these two issues in many of his books, most notably *Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism* (2000) and *Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem* (2008). Building on the process philosophy of organism developed by Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), Griffin argues that the key to resolving both of these issues is to abandon the modernist notion of material substances and to replace it with the idea that to be actual is to be something for oneself (an experience) and then something for others (an object). Reality is composed of events and these events are self-experiencing. To use the language of Whitehead, "there are no vacuous actualities."

In most cases being something for oneself does not involve consciousness. Consciousness is a very unusual way of being something for oneself, probably limited to complex organisms with brains and central nervous systems, and even then, only to certain aspects of experience at certain times. A great deal of human experience,

for example, never rises to the level of consciousness. Experience, not conscious experience, is universal which is why Griffin prefers the term "panexperientialism" over "panpsychism" to name his position. The word "psyche" has long been associated both with conscious experience and with the idea "mental substances."

To say that experience is universal, however, requires qualification. For Whitehead, and for Griffin, experience is a characteristic of all actual entities. Many of the "things" we experience are not actualities but rather aggregates of actualities. Another way that Griffin names this worldview is "panexperientialism with organizational dualism." The phrase "organizational dualism" is his way of distinguishing between actual entities and aggregates of actual entities. Aggregates of actual entities have many of the properties Descartes attributed to extended substances, but unlike Descartes' extended substance, they do not constitute a metaphysically unique way of being actual. A moment of human experience is an actual entity, as is a moment of cellular experience and a moment of atomic or molecular experience. Families, clubs, and nations, from this perspective, are not actuality entities but rather aggregates, as are trees and vegetables, rocks, tables, and asteroids, for example. Trees and vegetables are aggregates of cells, and rocks, tables, and asteroids are aggregates of atoms.

Griffin has coined additional ways of naming this position. In addition to calling it "panexperientialism with organizational dualism," he has also described it as NaturalismPPP (where the three p's stand for prehension, panentheism, and panexperientialism); and "constructive postmodernism." He contrasts NaturalismPPP with NaturalismSAM, where SAM stands for Sensationism, Atheism, and Materialism

– three doctrines he rejects. Sensationism is his term for what is more commonly referred to as sense empiricism, the doctrine that experience is limited to sense experience. For Griffin, sense experience is a highly advanced type of experience that evolved rather recently out of more primitive forms of non-sensory experiences.

The impossibility of explaining how experience evolved out of dead matter (or out of subjectless pulses of energy), and how conscious experience evolved out of experience, simply does not exist if one begins with the assumption that to be anything at all is to be something for oneself. Over time, entities with very little experience gave rise to entities with more complex experiences and conscious experience arose out of unconscious experience. Evolution, from this perspective, entails no metaphysical gaps. Minds and bodies are numerically separate entities, but they are metaphysically similar. The myriad of events that make up a living body are not without a modicum of experience and the mind, like the events in the body, passes into objectivity and becomes part of the past actual world of the events that make up the events of the body. The intellectual dilemmas of modern science are rooted in sciences uncritical (and largely unacknowledged) modern worldview.

Unlike most professional philosophers, and academics in general, Griffin has ventured into areas that are commonly perceived as “non-academic,” such as parapsychology, and into politically sensitive topics, most notably, his writings on the events of 9/11. He has concluded that there is good evidence for some types of psi phenomena, but not others, and that the official account of 9/11 is implausible. His work in these areas is no less scholarly than his work on other topics, but insofar as many have made *a priori* judgments

on these topics, his work on these topics is widely ignored by academics.

In *Unprecedented: Can Civilization Survive the CO₂ Crisis* (2015), Griffin turns his attention to social and environmental problems resulting from the burning of fossil fuels and how modern society could, and should, transition away from this path. There is wide-spread scientific consensus that human activity is resulting in a significant disruption of the earth’s climate and that business as usual will have catastrophic consequences.

It is possible that, of all of his intellectual achievements, Griffin will ultimately be best known as the philosopher who introduced China to a particular type of postmodernism that, along with traditional Chinese philosophy, became the basis for a sustainable civilization. Many of his books have been translated into Chinese. Some universities, including Zhejiang University, have included Griffin’s work on their “must read” list for all post-graduate students. No other living Western philosopher has achieved this status. Another indication that Griffin’s work is taken with utmost seriousness in China is that, as of 2014, there were 26 research centers in China devoted to Constructive Postmodern philosophy.

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Marcus Peter Ford

GROS, JOHN DANIEL (1737–1812)

John Daniel Gros was born on 22 June 1737 in Webenheim near Zeibrucken in the Bavarian Palatinate (now in the Saarland region of Germany). Gros attended the University of Marburg from 1758 until 1761 and then went to the University of Heidelberg for theology study. He went to Holland with the intention of following the standard procedures for becoming a minister in the German Reformed Church, but finding that a ship to America was ready to set sail, he got onboard without receiving his ordination and arrived in Philadelphia in 1764. In 1765 the coetus of the German Reformed Church of Pennsylvania ordained Gros, without waiting for the Dutch authorities to ordain him, explaining that there was a real risk that he would become an independent minister. This event is significant by reflecting the growing need for pastors in America, and the gradual separation of the German Reformed Church in America from Church authorities in Holland.

In the years between 1765 and 1773 Gros pastored several congregations in Pennsylvania. He achieved prominence in the Reformed Church, appointed clerk of the coetus in 1768, and president in 1769. In 1773 Gros left Pennsylvania to minister a church in Kingston, New York. During the Revolutionary War, Gros also served as a chaplain in the New York State militia. After the war Gros served as the pastor of the German Reform Church in New York City from 1783 until 1795.

In 1784 Columbia College was opened in New York City, to continue the legacy of the colonial King's College. No president was initially appointed, but the new faculty included Gros as the first Professor of German and Geography. By 1787 a President was

appointed, William Samuel Johnson (1727–1819), but he was a lawyer rather than a minister and the seniors needed a philosophy professor, so Gros added the title of Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1787 while Johnson taught rhetoric and logic. Gros held both positions until 1795 when he left New York City to become the pastor of a church in Canajoharie, New York. In 1789 Gros was awarded an honorary Doctor of Divinity degree from Columbia and he served as a trustee of Columbia from 1787 to 1792. In 1800 he retired from the ministry and spent the rest of his life on a farm near Fort Plain, New York. Gros died in Canajoharie on 25 May 1812.

Gros's lectures in moral philosophy were published in 1795 as *Natural Principles of Rectitude for the Conduct of Man in all States and Situations of Life*, which was based on his course in moral philosophy and the first textbook on moral philosophy to be published in the National period. Gros defines moral philosophy as "that science which gives rules for the direction of the will of man in his moral state, or in his pursuit after happiness" (1795, 10). As part of moral philosophy Gros also provides treatments of jurisprudence, general economy, and domestic and international politics. Gros asserts that sense is not the guide to human conduct as it is in the lower animals. Instead "man is not to follow sense, but as it is directed by understanding and reason; these are to direct the steps of his feet, and desires of his heart – not to obey but to regulate sense and passion" (17). This doctrine reflects Gros's European training as well as his understanding of the thought of the ancient world.

Ultimately the *Natural Principles of Rectitude* defends the rationality of religious belief. This can be seen in his treatment of natural laws. "God has promulgated human laws, by endowing man with understanding,

reason and judgment. As far as reason extends, so far extends the promulgation of natural laws: it may, therefore, be well said to be written into every man's heart. Hence it follows, that ignorance of the laws of nature is vincible and leaves no excuse. All NATURAL LAWS ARE DIVINE; that is to say *depend on the will of God* for nature and all that flows from it is by the will of God" (63–4). Thus, the reason to obey natural laws is not because they have a tendency to lead to the happiness of oneself and of others but because it is the will of God. One cannot be ignorant of natural law because God has written it into everyone's heart. Thus, reason functions in order to recognize the universality of natural law insofar as both reason and natural law are God given. However, the justification for the obligation is itself not rational but rather divine.

The historian Wilson Smith has argued that what makes Gros significant in the history of ideas, and distinguishes him from other professors of moral philosophy in the early National era, is his idea of the respectful citizenry. It was this kind of political conservatism that made him a safe instructor as a Dutch Reformed minister at a non-sectarian college, as early Protestant sects all shared a belief in the theological underpinnings of allegiance to government. Gros's conception of the moral citizen is one who is obedient to the legitimate authority of the state, enshrined in laws which seek to establish the happiness of the citizenry.

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Russell Pryba

GRÜNBAUM, ADOLF (1923)

Adolf Grünbaum was born on 15 May 1923 in Cologne, Germany. He emigrated to the United States in 1938 and entered Wesleyan University in Connecticut, where he received his BA in 1943. He then earned an MS in physics from Yale University in 1948, and stayed at Yale for his PhD in philosophy in 1951, writing a dissertation on "The Philosophy of Continuity." From 1950 to 1960, Grünbaum taught at Lehigh University, becoming professor of philosophy in 1955. In 1960, Grünbaum was appointed Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, and named the Director of a new Center for Philosophy of Science. Like Herbert Feigl's older Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, Grünbaum wanted to develop a premier

research institute. In 1961 Nicholas Rescher was appointed associate director and they led the Center since then. Grünbaum has also been a research professor of psychiatry since 1979. In 2003 Grünbaum resigned from the philosophy department, although he retained his position as Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy of Science.

Grünbaum has received numerous honors and awards. Among them are the Senior U.S. Scientist Award from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in 1985; Italy's Fregene Prize for Science in 1989; the University of Pittsburgh's first Master Scholar and Professor Award in 1989; Yale University's Wilbur Lucius Cross Medal in 1990; the University of Konstanz's honorary doctorate in philosophy of science in 1995; and the University of Parma's Silver Medal in 1998. In 1985 Grünbaum gave the Gifford Lectures in Scotland and the Werner Heisenberg Lecture at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, and in 2003 he gave the Leibniz Lectures at the University of Hannover. Grünbaum is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and a Laureate of the international Academy of Humanism. Grünbaum's achievements have also been recognized by his election to two terms as President of the Philosophy of Science Association from 1965 to 1970, and his election as President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1982–83. He has recently been elected President of the Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science for 2004–05, and President of the International Union for the History and Philosophy of Science for 2006–07.

Grünbaum's first book *Philosophical Problems of Space and Time* (1963) elaborates his views that neither space nor time, being continuous, have intrinsic metrics, and therefore that the foundations of physical science involving the measurement of time and space are conventional. Grünbaum's conventionalism is not aiming at showing the arbitrariness of theories; rather, he shows how it is an objective fact about nature that many metrics will permit scientific knowledge. As Hans Reichenbach also argued, following Albert Einstein, there is no way to determine whether events distant from one another are simultaneous, and Grünbaum points out, there is no way to determine whether the movement of a measuring rod changes its length. Therefore, measurable time relations, including the direction of time and even the speed of light, must be conventionally stipulated, leading towards what has been called a "causal theory of time." Grünbaum shows, however, that Einstein's theory of general relativity required the concept of absolute space-time. *Geometry and Chronometry in Philosophical Perspective* (1968) and the second edition of *Philosophical Problems of Space and Time* (1973) expand and modify several of his key arguments for his type of conventionalism. Some younger philosophers of science, including Wesley Salmon and Bas Van Fraassen, were influenced by aspects of Grünbaum's conventionalist program.

A corollary to Grünbaum's treatment of time and energy is that there is no reason to believe that the universe had a beginning (despite the Big Bang hypothesis), and in later writings he has criticized cosmological arguments that presume an origin for the universe and a need to explain such an origin by appeal to a supernatural cause. His article "The Pseudo-Problem of Creation in Physical Cosmology" (1989) set out his

main complaints, and more recent articles developed his anti-theistic cosmology.

Grünbaum was not satisfied with Karl Popper's criterion of falsifiability, holding that theory choice was far more complicated than merely making more experiments that might show a theory to be false. He argued against Popper in *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique* (1984) that Sigmund Freud's theory of psychoanalysis is indeed falsifiable. Of perhaps greater significance is that Freud, according to Grünbaum, violated many fundamental principles of scientific reasoning in his defenses of psychoanalysis. In addition, Grünbaum claims, Freud unreasonably argued that since his type of therapy by analysis is uniquely effective, his theory of the development of personality is superior.

Grünbaum did not want to move too far in the opposite direction from Popper's falsifiability towards the sort of relativism that cannot find any sufficient reason to prefer one theory over another. For example, Grünbaum argued against what he took to be the thesis of Pierre Duhem and W.V. Quine that a theory may always be suitably modified to avoid falsification. Grünbaum's own philosophy of theory choice has largely stayed with the limits of the empiricism of probabilistic inductivism, seeking theories whose ability to explain observed phenomena can best be extended to explain new phenomena.

Grünbaum has been a staunch defender of naturalism against phenomenalism on the one hand and supernaturalism on the other. In "Causality and the Science of Human Behavior" (1952) and some other writings he defends compatibilism. This compatibilism holds that all human behavior is open to scientific explanation regardless of whether the explanation uses deterministic or

statistical scientific laws, and that our feelings of freedom are irrelevant to the explanatory success of those theories. In addition to criticizing cosmological arguments for God, Grünbaum has criticized theism on various other grounds, including arguments that morality grounded on divine authority is monstrous, and that belief in God may be a delusion caused by irrational psychological motives. Grünbaum's preferred stance is secular humanism.

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John R. Shook

GUNTER, PETE ADDISON YANCY, III (1936–)

Addison Y. Gunter was born on 20 October 1936 in Hammond, Indiana. “Pete” later became his nickname. After a nine-year residence in New York, the family moved to Texas. Gunter holds BA degrees in philosophy and literature from the University of Texas (1958), a BA in philosophy from Cambridge University (1960), and a PhD from Yale University (1963). He taught at Auburn University (1962–1965) and the University of Tennessee (1965–1969). He

then moved to North Texas University in 1969, and he has been Regent's University Professor since 1987. His honors include membership in Phi Beta Kappa (1957), Marshall Scholar (1958–1960), membership in the Texas Institute of Letters (1973), and the San Antonio Conservation Society Book Award (1998).

Gunter is best known for his work in environmental ethics. His academic and environmental specialties are woven into a complex unity in his teaching, writing, and lobbying for more progressive environmental and ecological stances. His is a major North American voice in these fields. Gunter's initiatives have contributed to the passage of significant national and state legislation protecting green spaces and ecological enclaves. He became chairman of the Big Thicket Task Force of the Texas Committee on Natural Resources in 1992. He linked organizing efforts in several environmental fields with a philosophy of creativity when he alleged in *The Big Thicket* (1993) that working to set up biological and environmental sanctuaries "allows man and nature, economics and ecology, to coexist.... In a world where good causes often die and honest hopes lose themselves in sheer futility, something lasting and living has been actually achieved. People tried, and it mattered" (1993, pp. 167, 189).

Gunter has cultivated the philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophy of literature, and ecological ethics, with the philosophy of Henri Bergson serving as a departure point for richly diverse studies in the work of a score of leading American and European philosophical personages of the twentieth century. Gunter's literary studies, coupled with his insider's knowledge of those figures, enable him to configure their complex philosophical positions with singular brevity and clear effect. Concerning Bergson, Gunter has done

major service in shredding the anti-intellectual label which is often associated with the Anglo-American analytic tradition to Bergson and his work. Gunter's efforts have been the first steps in showing that Bergson's philosophy can contribute to a life-centered environmentalist viewpoint. He reinterprets Bergson for contemporary American philosophy in arguing for connectivity between Bergson's stress on intuition and his modifications of simplistic, mechanistic science. Gunter shows how these views can be synthesized in an account of sound, reflective life sciences. Some Mexican and South American philosophies, where Bergson is a major influence, have room for this revitalized Bergson. Such emphases allow for a future-oriented blend of environmental and economic concerns within a workable land ethic for all the Americas.

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Bertrand P. Helm

GURWITSCH, ARON (1901–1973)

Aron Gurwitsch was born on 17 January 1901 in Vilnius, Lithuania, which was then part of Imperial Russia. Gurwitsch entered the University of Berlin in 1919, where he became a student of Carl Stumpf, who later sent him to Edmund Husserl at Freiburg University. Stumpf next advised study with the psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein and the Gestalt psychologist Adhémar Gelb at the institute at Frankfurt for the investigation of the aftereffects of brain injuries. Gurwitsch's dissertation, "Phänomenologie der Thematik und des reinen Ich," was first accepted by Max Scheler, who died before the thesis could be defended, and then by Moritz Geiger. It was published in the organ of the Gestalt school, *Psychologische Forschung*, in 1929 and translated in Gurwitsch's *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology* (1966). Husserl was quite impressed by it and they met regularly until 1933.

In 1933–34 Gurwitsch began teaching at L'Institut d'Histoire des Sciences at the Sorbonne in Paris with a series of lectures on Gestalt theory attended by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who had already read Gurwitsch's dissertation. His posthumously published *Esquisse de la phénoménologie constitutive* is chiefly based on the last of these lectures. Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz had been recommended to each other by Husserl, they finally met in 1937, and their twenty-year correspondence documents their friendship and complementary thinking. Schutz helped

Gurwitsch evade the Nazis a second time by facilitating his emigration to the United States in 1940. He lived on grants and temporary instructorships at Johns Hopkins University and elsewhere until he became an assistant professor of mathematics at the new Brandeis University in 1948. He moved to the philosophy department in 1951.

During World War II Gurwitsch began work on his magnum opus, *The Field of Consciousness* (appearing first in French in 1957, then the English original in 1964). Excised from the manuscript was a segment of 150 pages posthumously published as *Marginal Consciousness* (1985). Unfortunately, this text was never expanded to include an *Auseinandersetzung* with Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, whom Gurwitsch considered his peers in the creative development of phenomenology. Schutz tried twice unsuccessfully to bring Gurwitsch to the New School for Social Research. But upon Schutz's death in 1959, Gurwitsch became his successor at the New School. Working alongside Dorion Cairns, he taught during a time when phenomenology was attracting much attention in the U.S. and the New School was a major center. During this period he composed *Leibniz: Philosophie des Panlogismus* and was preparing to write a book entitled *Reality and Logic*. He retired in 1972 with an additional retirement awarded by the German government to compensate for the career denied him by the Nazis. He died on 6 June 1973 in New York City.

Gurwitsch's phenomenology is called constitutive because it is focused on how all objects indicate the intentional consciousness for which they are identical or different, animate or inanimate, experienced in various ways, posited in various ways, etc. He recognized two versions of constitutive phenomenology, transcendental and

mundane. Like Husserl, he emphasized the transcendental version, while Schutz found the mundane version, phenomenological psychology, sufficient for his purposes. Gurwitsch rejected the sensuous hyletic data of Husserl and, in addition, he returned to the early James and the early Husserl by denying that there are egos or I's who engage in consciousness and bestow meaning on sense data. He was as unable to observe reflectively such an alleged subject of consciousness just as he was unable to observe reflectively any dualism of sensations and supervenient factors in objects-as-perceived.

Drawing on Wolfgang Köhler's work on chimpanzees, and later Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, Gurwitsch emphasizes how objects can have functions or uses in relation to actions; explains in Gestaltist terms how such uses arise and can change; and holds that objects are cultural by virtue of having such uses. He thus accepted that the cultural sciences have priority over the natural sciences, which was also accepted by Husserl, Schutz, John Dewey, and others.

Gurwitsch identifies three constants within reality, at least two of which are marginal at a given time. These are one's own body; the inner time of one's stream of consciousness; and the real world as a whole. All three are marginal when one thematizes non-real or ideal objects such as theorems when one is thinking mathematically. But when one of these three is thematized, the others will be marginal or relevant. But for Gurwitsch, what unifies one's whole field with the possible changes exemplified is the stream of consciousness within which the consciousnesses of the various and varying items are "co-present," in other words, occurring together, a position that could be expected of a constitutive phenomenologist. Finally, orders of existence have "relevancy principles." For reality in general the

relevancy principle is temporality, with both spatiotemporal and purely temporal orders being parts of reality. Streams of consciousness also belong to reality in general and make up the intersubjectivities correlative to which there is objectivity. But when consciousness as a temporal order presents itself as a purely temporal and intentional order, and thus not as part of the spatiotemporal world, it can be called "transcendental" and be reflectively seen to ground the world and the sciences of its aspects, which is a constitutive phenomenological position in philosophy.

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Lester Embree

H

HACKING, IAN MACDOUGALL (1936–)

Ian Hacking was born on 18 February 1936 in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. After receiving a BA from the University of British Columbia in 1956, he went to Cambridge University, from which he received both another BA in 1958 and a PhD in philosophy in 1962. He remained at Peterhouse College of Cambridge as a fellow for two years. From 1964 to 1969 Hacking was associate professor of philosophy at British Columbia, and from 1969 to 1975 he was a university lecturer in philosophy at Cambridge. In 1975 Hacking joined the philosophy faculty at Stanford University, and then in 1982 he was appointed to the faculty of the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology at the University of Toronto, perhaps the most distinguished philosopher in the history of the Institute. From 2000 to 2006 he also held the Chair of Philosophy and of the History of Scientific Concepts at the Collège de France in Paris. His wife is the philosopher Nancy Cartwright. Hacking won the Canada Council for the Arts Molson Prize in 2001, and he became a Companion of the Order of Canada in 2004. During 2008–2010 he was Peggy Downes Baskin Distinguished Visiting Professor in the Humanities at the University of California, Santa Cruz.

It is not surprising that Hacking received a position at the Collège de France in view of his long attachment to the work and influence of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. One

of the threads of Foucault's work that runs consistently through Hacking's writing is the "archeology of ideas." This appears strongly in his *The Emergence of Probability* (1975), which gives an account of how probability came to play so prominent a role in European thought in the seventeenth century and after. The subject remains central to Hacking's work, as witnessed by his later volumes *The Taming of Chance* (1990) and *An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic* (2001).

Hacking has been assigned a position among the relativist philosophers of science who discount the pretensions of the discipline to any commanding position above the dispute. As he demonstrates in his *The Social Construction of What?* (1999), this is rather too simple a picture of someone well aware of the furor being created in the name of science and anti-science. Hacking argues that different settings can require different sorts of orientation toward social construction and that a universal dissolution of theoretical questions via social construction is inappropriate. It is true that his views of the role that social construction can play are unlikely to find a warm welcome among the scientists best known for taking social construction to task, but among his points is that the context of the scientist performing an experiment is different from the critic and the philosopher standing outside observing.

One way of characterizing Hacking's approach to issues of philosophy of science and philosophy of language together is not just that he is interested in history but that he

is interested in prehistory. This has sometimes led to claims that he is inclined to tell a story that would serve as a plausible explanation for what happened rather than to produce a full-fledged account on the basis of the sources available. While such an approach may be problematic for those approaching the period as historians of science, it certainly produces a philosophy that is historically literate. If, for example, Hacking examines a theoretical claim such as the possibility of radical mistranslation and does not see examples of that in the historical record, he argues that this is *prima facie* evidence against that theoretical claim.

On the strength of his published writings, Hacking has managed to bridge gaps between a continental philosopher like Foucault and the analytical tradition in which he was brought up and between philosophy and history of science. While some of his work has been specifically devoted to the subjects in which Foucault was interested like mental illness, he has generally brought Foucault's slant to settings in which its influence in the English-speaking world had previously been slight.

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Thomas Drucker

HAHN, LEWIS EDWIN (1908–2004)

Lewis Hahn was born on 26 September 1908 in Swenson, Texas. He received both his BA and MA from the University of Texas at Austin in 1929, and his PhD in philosophy from the University of California at Berkeley in 1939. At Berkeley Hahn studied the *Tractatus* with Moritz Schlick of the Vienna Circle and aesthetics with Stephen C. Pepper, for whom he also assisted for two years. Hahn’s dissertation was “A Contextualistic Theory of Perception.” Hahn taught philosophy at the University of Missouri, Columbia, from 1936 to 1949, and at Washington University, St. Louis, from 1949 to 1963, where he also served as department chair during that time. He served as associate dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in 1953–54 and as dean from 1954 to 1963. From 1963 to 1977 Hahn was a research professor of philosophy at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, until retiring as professor emeritus. From 1977 to 1981, he was distinguished visiting professor at Baylor University. He died on 23 November 2004 in Carbondale, Illinois.

Hahn traveled widely, to China, Japan, Taiwan, Russia, and other countries. He was a member of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO from 1965 to 1967. Hahn edited *The Proceedings and Addresses of the APA* from 1960 to 1965 and served as co-editor for the first two volumes of *The Early Works of John Dewey*. Hahn also edited or co-edited volumes for *The Library of Living Philosophers* from 1981 to 2000.

Hahn describes his position of contextualism, which is heavily influenced by Pepper and John Dewey, as a “pragmatic naturalistic world view which treats time and change seriously and takes as its root metaphor patterned events, things in process, or historical events... the self-sufficient substances of the older substance-attribute metaphysics are replaced by textures” (Allen and Handy 2001, p. 129). He distinguishes between “practical drive perception,” which is used in reflective inquiry to solve problems, and “aesthetic drives” which enable us to take in the “quality of a situation or a texture,” adding that the latter is a “good part of what makes life worth living” (p. 130). Hahn’s contextualism emphasizes pluralism, world dialogue, fallibilism, evolution, and education. Most of his numerous essays are contained within *Enhancing Cultural Interflow* (1998) and *A Contextualistic Worldview* (2001).

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Michael W. Allen

HALL, GRANVILLE STANLEY (1844–1924)

G. Stanley Hall was born on 1 February 1844 in Ashfield, Massachusetts, and died on 24 April 1924 in Worcester, Massachusetts. Hall attended Williams College, from which he graduated with a BA in 1867 with the intention of becoming a minister. After a year at Union Theological Seminary in New York City, where he gradually lost interest in orthodox religion, he spent three years studying in Germany. There he heard lectures by Emil DuBois-Reymond in physiology and Friedrich Trendelenburg in philosophy. Hall returned to America thinking of teaching school; but finding no position, he returned to Union to finish his BD degree, which he obtained in 1871.

After tutoring for a year in New York City, he received an appointment to teach English at Antioch College in Ohio where he remained until 1875. Intending to return to Germany, he first went to Harvard University where he taught English. While at Harvard he met William James and saw James's small physiological demonstration laboratory. Hall's position at Harvard allowed him to take courses in philosophy and to pursue a doctoral thesis, which he did under the supervision of James while working in the laboratory of the physiologist Henry P. Bowditch. In 1878 Hall received Harvard's first PhD degree with a thesis on the muscular perception of space. With no teaching position available, Hall returned to Germany, remaining there until 1880. Working in Carl Ludwig's laboratory of physiology, he published research with Johannes von Kries and Hugo Kronecker. Although he did no research with Wundt, he took courses in Leipzig during the time when Wundt's laboratory was first opened for student research and thereby Hall became Wundt's first American student.

Hall returned to America in 1881 and first received notoriety not for his psychology but for his lectures comparing German and American education. His lectures were sufficiently well received that they led in 1882 to a call to Johns Hopkins University, where he rose to professor of psychology in 1884. At Hopkins, Hall lectured and published on education and child study, but his passion was for the psychology laboratory, which he established unofficially in 1883. Hall's laboratory was the first *research* laboratory in psychology in America, since James's 1875 founding of his laboratory at Harvard was for demonstrations in physiology. At Hopkins, Hall also came into contact with many who would become the leaders of American experimental psychology. He supervised the first doctorate in psychology in America, that of Joseph Jastrow. Among his students were John Dewey and James McKeen Cattell. Together with William James, George Trumbull Ladd, John Dewey, and James Mark Baldwin, Hall was a leader in the transition from philosophical to scientific psychology in the 1870s and 80s. In 1887 Hall made the first of his great contributions to the establishment of psychology as an independent discipline in America, by founding and editing *The American Journal of Psychology*.

Hall promoted the "new" experimental psychology by providing publishing outlets and by employing book and topical reviews to condemn the literature of philosophical psychology that still existed in the late 1880s and 1890s. In 1891 he founded the *Pedagogical Seminary*, which later became the *Journal of Genetic Psychology*. Hall had a life-long interest in the study of sex and taught what may have been the first class on sexuality in America. He was a champion of evolutionary theory, a view that cut through virtually all his work on development and

education. He was an early supporter of Sigmund Freud; and it was Hall who arranged in 1909 for Freud to make his only visit to the United States, to lecture at a meeting in celebration of the 20th anniversary of the founding of Clark University. Freud's lectures, published by Hall in English translation in the *American Journal of Psychology*, introduced most Americans, and even most Europeans, to Freud's psychoanalysis. Hall's interest in education continued throughout his career, even during his experimental interlude; and late in life, his interest in religion was revived. He founded the *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education* in 1904 and published, among others, *Jesus the Christ, in the Light of Psychology* (1917). His book, *Adolescence* (1904), was widely read and very influential in the field. Late in life he would come full circle with a book entitled *Senescence* (1922).

In 1888 Hall accepted the Presidency of the newly founded Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. Clark, based directly on the German model, was initially conceived as a graduate school devoted to research and scholarship without an undergraduate college, and this design greatly appealed to Hall. In 1892, while at Clark, he made another significant contribution to the professionalization of American psychology, founding the American Psychological Association. Hall was its first President in 1892. Hall remained at Clark for the remainder of his career, stepping down as President in 1922, two years before his death.

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Rand B. Evans

HANSON, NORWOOD RUSSELL (1924–1967)

Norwood Russell Hanson helped transform professional philosophy of science in the late 1950s and 1960s. Over the course of a career in which he taught at Cambridge, Indiana, and Yale, Hanson popularized one of the defining ideas of post-positivist philosophy of science, the notion that scientific observations are “theory-laden,” and promoted the intellectual union of history of science and philosophy of science.

Hanson was born on 17 August 1924 in New York City. After service in the U.S. Navy during World War II as a decorated fighter pilot, he attended the University of Chicago where he earned a BA in 1946. He then did further study in physics at the University of Columbia, receiving his BS in 1948 and MA in 1949. As a Fulbright scholar during 1950–52, Hanson studied philosophy at both Oxford University and Cambridge University. He was a lecturer in philosophy of science at Cambridge from 1952 to 1957 while he completed his doctorate there, and he received his PhD in philosophy in 1956. In 1957 Hanson accepted an appointment from Newton P. Stallknecht, then chair of Indiana University’s philosophy department. After helping to establish the Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Hanson went to Yale University as professor of philosophy in 1963. Hanson is remembered as a flamboyant character. He regularly traveled in his personal vintage Grumman Bearcat and became known on Yale’s campus as “the flying professor.” Hanson died while

piloting his airplane on 18 April 1967 near Cortland, New York.

Though credit is usually given to Thomas Kuhn for the idea that scientific perceptions are influenced or shaped by paradigmatic commitments, it was Hanson who brought late Wittgensteinian notions of “seeing” and “seeing as” into mainstream philosophy of science as a tool to help explain disagreement among scientific observers. Because a strict division between observational and theoretical languages was a standard feature of then-dominant logical empiricist conceptions of science, Hanson’s view can be seen as an early revision of what came to be seen as logical empiricist dogma. His appeals to perception and optical illusions were designed to suggest that observations and beliefs (and, hence, observational and theoretical languages) were more connected and mutually influencing than previously supposed. This debate was revived in the 1980s by Jerry Fodor (Fodor 1984) in ways suggesting that logical empiricism models were not so naive as Hanson and his followers came to believe.

This was not Hanson’s only point of attack on logical empiricist orthodoxy. He also sought to counteract the profession’s tendency to study completed, more or less justified scientific theories. The title of his *Patterns of Discovery* was itself a reply to Hans Reichenbach’s famous distinction between contexts of discovery and justification, only the last of which Reichenbach took to be the proper domain of scientific philosophy. Many believed that scientific discovery and creativity were phenomena to be studied by psychologists and sociologists, not philosophers. Hanson appealed to Charles Sanders Peirce’s conception of abduction to explain scientific creativity and hypothesis formation as he argued instead that there were patterns in the development and discovery of scientific theories (1959). In both history

and contemporary sciences such as particle physics (1963), Hanson urged philosophers to examine these patterns in order to better understand science.

Hanson’s reliance on pre-Galilean physics in developing his account of Galileo’s work in physics suggests the influence and proximity of his Indiana history colleague Edward Grant, whose *Source Book in Medieval Science* (Grant 1974) helped facilitate the growth of history and philosophy of science as a unified discipline in the 1960s and 1970s. Hanson and Grant established Indiana’s Department of History and Philosophy of Science in 1960. This department established a model for HPS programs in other universities and continues to uphold Hanson’s adaptation of Kant: history of science without philosophy of science is blind; philosophy of science without history of science is empty.

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George A. Reisch

HARDIN, GARRETT JAMES (1915–2003)

Garrett Hardin was born on 21 April 1915 in Dallas, Texas. In 1932 Hardin won both a University of Chicago academic scholarship and a dramatic arts scholarship at the Chicago College of Music. A month’s attendance convinced him that he could not follow both paths simultaneously, and so he abandoned the dramatic scholarship. In 1936 Hardin graduated from the University of Chicago with a BA in zoology, studying under the ecologist W.C. Allee. He then transferred to Stanford University, where he obtained his PhD in

microbial ecology in 1941. His most influential mentors were the microbiologist C.B. van Niel and the geneticist George W. Beadle, who was later awarded a Nobel Prize. Shortly after graduation Hardin began work at the Carnegie Institution of Washington’s Division of Plant Biology, which had a laboratory on the Stanford campus. For four years he was part of a team investigating antibiotics produced by algae, as well as the future possibility of using cultured algae as animal food.

In 1946 Hardin resigned his research position at the Carnegie Institution to accept an associate professorship at the University of California’s campus in Santa Barbara. During the next two decades he devoted much of his time to developing an ecologically oriented course in biology for the general citizen, which he adapted to closed-circuit television. He was appointed full professor of human ecology in 1963, holding that position until he retired in 1978. Hardin’s work on population control and immigration reduction was supported by grants from the Pioneer Fund from 1988 through 1992.

Hardin is best known for his 1968 essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” and his later work, “Living on a Lifeboat,” which critically examines the long-term consequences of foreign aid, immigration, and other seemingly ethical activities. Concerned for the environmental sustainability of the planet, he argued against policies and ethical views that would increase population and reduce natural resources. Through all of his work he discusses “tough love ethics.” His analogy of the lifeboat is used to argue against sharing resources with those in poverty by implying that such sharing will only threaten disaster for all in the long run. In his 1985 *Filter Against Folly* he expands on his ethical position in distinguishing three filters that must be used in the practical use of ethics: literacy, concerned with correct use of language; numeracy, an

appreciation of quantities; and ecolacy, the study of relationships over time.

Hardin has received many honors. In 1973 he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and in 1974 to the American Philosophical Society. In 1979 he was awarded the Margaret Sanger Award for his support for the wider provision of birth control and population limitation. In 1993 he was one of the recipients of the Phi Beta Kappa annual book prizes for his book *Living Within Limits: Ecology, Economics and Population Taboos*. Hardin and his wife were members of the Hemlock Society and felt very strongly that they wanted to choose their own time to die, which they accomplished on 14 September 2003 in Santa Barbara, California.

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John William Bates V

HARKNESS, GEORGIA ELMA (1891–1974)

Georgia Harkness was the first female theologian to teach in Protestant seminaries in the United States, at Garrett Biblical Institute and Pacific School of Religion. She was a social activist, challenging churches and society to overcome sexism, racism and militarism. Harkness was trained in and taught philosophy, became a Boston Personalist and a philosophical idealist, and then turned to theology in the second half of her career.

Harkness was born on 21 April 1891 in the tiny hamlet of Harkness in the Lake Champlain area of upstate New York. She chose Cornell University, where her strongest influence was James Edwin Creighton. His speculative idealism provided Harkness a subsequent natural entry into Boston Personalism. The two philosophical systems shared common optimistic liberal tenets: the centrality of the individual and personality, the ability of the mind to bring truth and freedom to any given situation, and confidence in a steady and dependable natural and social world. After graduation with a BA from Cornell in 1912, she then earned one of the first MRE degrees from Boston University's School of Religious Education in 1920, and a MA in philosophy in that year. While in her

master's programs, she began taking classes under Edgar S. Brightman, professor of philosophy at Boston University, who became her foremost academic mentor. Brightman had earned his PhD under Borden Parker Bowne, the founder of Boston Personalism, one of the first comprehensive system of philosophy of lasting influence developed in the United States. Brightman taught Harkness that religion is a person's total attitude toward what the self considers to be superhuman and worthy of worship or devotion. All religious experience aims to express a person's attitude toward what is regarded as the chief value of all values in life. Religion, like philosophy, is practical because it leads people to deeper meaning and purpose in life.

After receiving her PhD at Boston in 1923, Harkness gained her first college teaching position as assistant professor of religious education at Elmira College, and taught there in the philosophy department until 1937. Harkness moved to Mount Holyoke College as associate professor in the department of history and literature of religion in 1937, remaining there for only two years. Her self-understanding as a teacher and a scholar was strongest during the years from 1922 to 1939. By 1939, she had begun to strongly question the adequacy of her philosophical position and to define herself as a theologian rather than as a philosopher of religion.

Harkness's philosophy was grounded in the tenets of triumphant religion or triumphant idealism. The language of triumphant religion gave expression to the quest for an ideal of philosophical objectivity to enable a person to live religiously, a position which underlay her writing until she was almost fifty. Harkness's commitment to triumphant religion is presented definitively in four of her books: *Conflicts in Religious Thought* (1929), *The Resources of Religion* (1936), *The Recovery of Ideals* (1937), and

Religious Living (1937). She stated in these writings that her basic religious concern was to discover the "true grounds upon which one may believe in and live by moral and spiritual ideals." The definitive statement of her faith in 1937 is summarized in these words from *The Recovery of Ideals*: "Living in Christ, one could look the world in the face, do a mighty work, and know that nothing could daunt the soul" (p. 190).

In her late forties, suffering from her father's death and the strains of work, Harkness entered a dark night of the soul that lasted for almost eight years, from 1937 to 1945. Harkness became professor of applied theology at Garrett Biblical Institute, a Methodist seminary in Evanston, Illinois, in 1939. She was the first woman in the United States to obtain a theological professorship. She remained there until she moved to the Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley, California, in 1950. Her years at Garrett provided personal support and professional direction as a theologian. In 1945, when Harkness had come out of her depression, she wrote *The Dark Night of the Soul*, which grew out of her understanding of the inseparable connection between one's emotional and physical condition and one's spiritual pilgrimage.

In her maturing theology, she wrote that the problem of evil, from the standpoint of Christian faith, is resolved in an acceptance of God's grace, in a belief that God's grace is sufficient for all circumstances. She interpreted her former spiritual goal to live triumphantly as the pride of doing good works for God, which constituted a deep level of self-centeredness in which a person quested "for spiritual blessings through communion with Him not for the love of God but for one's own satisfaction." (1944, p. 339) In her former commitment to triumphal religion, Harkness had believed that human beings gained their

own spiritual victory, that salvation came by the living out of high ideals. Through the redemptive experience at the heart of her dark night of the soul, she now knew that the victory was in God's grace and human acceptance.

After retiring from Pacific School of Religion in 1961, she lived in Claremont, California, with her companion of thirty years, Verna Miller, whom she had met in Evanston while on the faculty of Garrett Biblical Institute. Harkness died on 21 August 1974 in Claremont, California.

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Rosemary Skinner Keller

HARMAN, GILBERT HELMS (1938–)

Gilbert Harman was born on 26 May 1938 in East Orange, New Jersey. He received a BA at Swarthmore in 1960, and a PhD at Harvard in 1964. The title of his dissertation was “Skepticism and the Definition of Knowledge.” Harman has been a professor of philosophy at Princeton University since 1963, where he presently is James S. McDonnell Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy. Harman has earned several honors and awards, including a Guggenheim Fellowship and fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the James D. McDowell Foundation.

Significant early influences were Richard Brandt, Noam Chomsky, John Rawls, W.V. Quine, H.P. Grice, Wilfrid Sellars, and Donald Davidson. In early work Harman argued against Chomsky’s reasons for introducing transformations into generative grammar and against Chomsky’s position for an innate language faculty. But he soon changed his mind on both topics.

In semantics Harman rejects any identification of meaning with truth conditions while agreeing that accounts of truth conditions can shed light on the meanings of logical constants. His view is that other apparently conflicting theories of meaning are really theories about different topics: the content of psychological states, the intended meanings of utterances, and the significance of speech acts.

Some of Harman’s work discusses the possibility of uncovering the logical form of sentences in ordinary language. He argues that, if logical principles hold by virtue of form, then *modus ponens* is not a principles of logic, because “if” is a sentence complementizer

rather than a sentential connective. He takes a stand against nontrivial notions of analyticity and a priori knowledge but rejects Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation. He defends a non-solipsistic version of conceptual role semantics and a related functionalist account of psychological states. Harman also defends the existence of a “language of thought” that includes (but is not limited to) one’s natural language. He argues that propositions should be construed as semantic types instantiated, for example, by various attitudes. He rejects the claim that perceptual states have an intrinsic qualitative character of which one is aware.

In epistemology, Harman favors a distinction between logic as a theory of implication and consistency and the theory of reasoning and inference: reasoning consists in change in view by addition and subtraction of beliefs. He emphasizes the role of explanatory considerations in reasoning, discusses what kinds of simplicity considerations are relevant, and discusses pragmatic aspects of theoretical reasoning.

Concerning practical reasoning, Harman argues that intentions are self-referential. He distinguishes positive, negative, and conditional intentions, holding that it is inconsistent to have intentions that cannot all be carried out given one’s beliefs, in the way that it is inconsistent to have desires that cannot all come true. Since intentions involve acceptance of a more or less determinate plan, he explains doing something intentionally in terms of carrying out that plan.

In ethics, Harman defends a form of moral relativism that allows for moral bargaining as an important part of moral reasoning. He argues that the “fundamental attribution error” shows that people do not differ in respect of character traits in the way envisioned by virtue ethics. He offers an analysis of intrinsic value and argues against philosophical

appeals to second or higher order desires in order to explain value or freedom. He also finds an analogy between linguistics and moral philosophy.

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Elizabeth Harman

HARRIES, KARSTEN (1937–)

Karsten Harries was born on 25 January 1937 in Jena, Germany. He was educated at Yale University, receiving his BA in 1958 and PhD in philosophy in 1962. From 1961 to 1963 he was an instructor of philosophy at Yale, and then he was an assistant professor from 1963

to 1965 at the University of Texas. Harries returned to Yale as associate professor of philosophy in 1966 and was promoted to full professor in 1970. He was visiting professor at the University of Bonn in 1965–66 and 1968–69. He was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1971–72. During 1987–91 Harries held the position of Mellon Professor at Yale. Harries has also served as department chair from 1973 to 1978 and in 1987–88. He presently holds the title of Howard H. Newman Professor of Philosophy.

Harries has published primarily on Continental philosophy, aesthetics, and metaphysics. His first book, *The Meaning of Modern Art: A Philosophical Interpretation* (1968), maintains that art expresses human ideals, and that understanding a work of art requires understanding the ideal image involved. Each historical period of art expresses the ideals (religious and moral) of the age. Harries's next book, *The Bavarian Rococo Church: Between Faith and Aestheticism* (1983), applies this theory to a specific place and time period. The ornamentation characteristic of rococo is hard to justify by modern standards, but is explicable in terms of underlying ideals animating the use of space and design.

In the culmination of his thought on aesthetics, *The Ethical Function of Architecture* (1997), Harries argues against the modern tendency to divorce aesthetic quality from reason and morality. His extensive work on German philosophy, especially Hegel and Heidegger, is applied to the aesthetics problems of the relation between architecture and ongoing human life. The ethical responsibility of the architect to exemplify human values should be matched by the community's responsibility to experience buildings as centers of their social lives. "The ethical function of Architecture is inevitably also a public function. Sacred and public architecture provides the community

with a center or centers. Individuals gain their sense of place in a history, in a community, by relating their dwellings to that center” (1997, p. 287). *The Ethical Function of Architecture* won the American Institute of Architects 8th Annual International Architecture Book Award for Criticism.

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John R. Shook

HARRIS, ERROL EUSTACE (1908–2009)

Errol E. Harris was born on 19 February 1908 in Kimberley, South Africa, from a family

immigrated from England. Harris studied philosophy at Rhodes University College in South Africa and at the University of Oxford, where he obtained a BLitt degree. After serving in the British Army during World War II, he received his PhD in philosophy from the University of the Witwatersrand in 1950, where he became a full professor in 1953. His first important philosophical work, *Nature, Mind and Modern Science*, appeared in 1954. In 1956, Harris was appointed professor of philosophy at Connecticut College and moved to the United States, where his philosophical activity could prosper unimpeded, gaining growing recognition in the subsequent years. In 1962 Harris became Roy Roberts Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kansas. In 1966 he became professor of philosophy at Northwestern University, and was later named the John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy, teaching there until his retirement in 1976. Harris was President of the Metaphysical Society of America in 1968–69 and President of the Hegel Society of America in 1977–78. He died in High Wray near Ambleside in Cumbria, England, on 21 June 2009 at the age of 101.

The most conspicuous achievement of Harris's research activities at Kansas and Northwestern was the publication of two significant works: *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science* (1965) and *Hypothesis and Perception: The Roots of Scientific Method* (1970). Over the years, along with his original and prevailing theoretical interests he also developed a historiographic concern for the thought of the two most prominent representatives of modern metaphysics, Baruch Spinoza and G.W.F. Hegel. Spinoza's philosophy is reconstructed, interpreted and appropriated by Harris in *Salvation from Despair: A Reappraisal of Spinoza's Philosophy* (1973). He convincingly argued

for the thorough cogency, truth and up-to-dateness of Hegel's speculative logic in *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel* (1983). In retirement his philosophical activity went on uninterrupted, giving rise to numerous articles and volumes, the most original and important of which is *Formal, Transcendental, and Dialectical Thinking: Logic and Reality* (1987).

Harris began from the insuperable inconsistency of philosophical empiricism in all its versions worked out by European thought from Locke to the twentieth century analytic philosophers (1954, pp. 117–86, 274–351). The verification principle, upon which empiricism is grounded, is held by Harris to be false because sense-perception is devoid of immediate self-evidence, depending on an interpretative context that is a product of thinking's discursive activity. Furthermore, the verification principle is also unable to account for the empiricist epistemologist's claim to truth for his own doctrine. The hypothetico-deductive method, to which some epistemologists such as Karl Popper resort in order to integrate the plain shortcomings of the inductive one, is in truth epistemologically unfruitful, owing to its merely analytic and conjectural nature. A careful examination of the theoretical results achieved by contemporary physics, biology and experimental psychology, as well as of the peculiar procedures of scientific inquiry and discovery, concordantly proves that philosophical empiricism is not even in harmony with the specific orientation of contemporary science. Science supports a world-view that is relativistic, holistic, organicistic, teleological, and hierarchical in character, and therefore flatly contradicts the (unconfessed) atomistic, mechanical, and pluralistic metaphysical presuppositions of formal and mathematical logic, wrongly privileged by philosophical empiricism.

Harris's critique of the naive realism of positivistic epistemology avoids ending up in a more or less radical form of relativistic or historicistic subjectivism (1954, pp. 29–42) or even scepticism. On the contrary, Harris pursues the real possibility of the knowledge of objective truth. This, however, would not reveal itself in a static, immediate intuition, but rather at the apex of a teleological process, whose more abstract and elementary forms are the theoretical perspectives worked out by the natural and human sciences, whereas its most concrete, fully-blown phase coincides with the self-reflective activity of metaphysical thought. The fundamentals of the metaphysics outlined by Harris (see 1965, pp. 451–93) appear to be strongly influenced by Spinoza's rationalistic monism, Hegel's absolute idealism, R.G. Collingwood's philosophical logic (especially by his insightful doctrine of a hierarchically ordered ontological "scale of forms"), as well as by H.H. Joachim's coherence theory of truth. In an enlightening passage in *Nature, Mind and Modern Science* he tersely summarizes its fundamental tenets as follows: "The philosophical theory demanded by the modern outlook must, accordingly, maintain five main theses: (i) that mind is immanent in all things; (ii) that reality is a whole, self-sufficient and self-maintaining, and that coherence is the test of truth of any theory about it; (iii) that the subject and object of knowledge are ultimately one – the same thing viewed from opposite (and mutually complementary) standpoints; (iv) that events and phenomena can adequately be explained only teleologically, and (v) that the ultimate principle of interpretation is, in consequence, the principle of value" (1954, p. 206).

Harris's interpretation of Hegel outlines something like a "reform" of Hegel's *Naturphilosophie* that rejects as obsolete at least three of its main contentions: (1) that the natural sciences are nothing more than the

product of the finite intellect's analytic activity; (2) that owing to the peculiar externality and contingency of their theoretical perspective on nature, it is impossible cogently to prove the coming to be in it of a unitary process of *real* biological evolution; and (3) that the "bad infinity" of the spatio-temporal form of inorganic nature is clear evidence of its insuperable self-contradictoriness. According to Harris, in fact, Einstein's theories of special and general relativity (1965, pp. 41–63), as well as the contemporary cosmological theories of the "expanding universe" (1965, pp. 85–108), involve a plausible conception of the physical universe as a "finite but unbounded Whole," so that it can be safely regarded as an objective embodiment of that very category of the *infinitum actu*, or "true infinity," which Hegel had instead confined to the subjectivity of life and spirit.

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Giacomo Rinaldi

HARRIS, MARJORIE SILLIMAN (1890–1976)

Marjorie Harris was born on 6 June 1890 in Wethersfield, Connecticut, the daughter of George Wells and Elizabeth Mills Harris. She received her BA from Mount Holyoke College in 1913, where she was Phi Beta Kappa. From 1913 until 1917 she was an instructor in philosophy at the University of Colorado in Boulder. She then earned a PhD in philosophy from Cornell University in 1921. Her dissertation was titled "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte." In 1921, Harris became an assistant professor of philosophy at Randolph Macon Woman's College in Lynchburg, Virginia. She was promoted to associate professor in 1925 and full professor in 1930. She also served as department chair until her retirement in 1958. Among numerous other professional affiliations, she was a member of the American Philosophical Association, the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (President, 1940), and the Virginia Philosophical Association (President, 1946). She died on 27 March 1976 in Rocky Hill, Connecticut.

A recurring, if not the dominant, theme in Harris's writing is the vital role of philosophy in penetrating the significance of life and in the adequate adjustment to it. Though she does not explicitly use instrumentalist language to describe this function, her debt to the pragmatists John Dewey and George Herbert Mead is clear. There is also a profound influence from Henri Bergson, whose notion of "life" powerfully informs her reflections. Philosophy thus is "the art of life," which consists in adopting the attitude summarized by the phrase, *sub specie aeternitatis*, "from the viewpoint of eternity."

In her book *Sub Specie Aeternitatis* (1937), which consists of two chapters on "The

Function of Philosophy” and “Bergson and the Art of Life,” Harris identifies this attitude with taking an objective stance upon the data of experience. Such a perspective is morally inclusive and cognitively generous; it involves a transcendence of the ego. To the extent that it involves detachment from the push and pull of our narrow and narrowing self-interest, it does so not to be free from life but to be free for life and to attain a more satisfactory adjustment to experience. Likewise, philosophy functions by reminding us that we are better able to achieve that sought for equilibrium of life by discerning what is implicit in experience rather than imposing our subjective categories – our “selective emphases,” as Dewey would say, upon experience. These biases, or rigid constructs for understanding, impoverish our capacity to make sense of the unpredictable flux or the world. These biases also cripple our appreciation of that novelty that would nourish and sustain creative responses to living.

Philosophy functions as well, according to Harris, when it disposes us to think experimentally, to regard all our beliefs as hypotheses until confirmed – and then never completely – by actual experience. Finally, philosophy provides us, in a word, consolation, in enjoining us to accept the inevitable in a positive manner.

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Gary S. Calore

HARRIS, WILLIAM TORREY (1835–1909)

William Torrey Harris, son of Zilpah Davison Harris and William Harris, was born on 10 September 1835 in Killingly, Connecticut. Harris studied at Phillips Andover Academy in Andover, Massachusetts. In 1854 he enrolled at Yale College, where his philosophical interests ripened. Restless at Yale, he left in the middle of his junior year, traveling to St. Louis in 1857 to buy farmland for his father and to seek his fortune. He was hired as instructor at Franklin Grammar School in 1858. His penchant for foreign languages led him to develop skills in German, French, Sanskrit, Hebrew, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese.

In 1858 Harris met Henry C. Brokmeyer, a German immigrant, at a meeting of a literary club at the St. Louis Mercantile Library. The fiery Brokmeyer persuaded Harris that he must study the philosophy of Hegel, and the two men became lifelong friends. Although Brokmeyer and Harris were intense students

of Hegel's logic, Brokmeyer convinced his pupil that he must study the entire Hegelian corpus in the original language, including works that were generally neglected by English-speaking Hegel scholars at the time, such as the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* and the *Philosophie Propädeutik*. Brokmeyer taught Harris to read Hegel in the context of the German neo-humanist tradition initiated by Goethe and to interpret his political philosophy as a mean between the extremes of the revolutionary left-wing Hegelians and reactionary Prussian conservatism.

The philosophical work of Brokmeyer and Harris was disrupted by the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861. A staunch unionist, Harris was exempted from military service by an eye injury and remained in St. Louis as principal of Clay School. During the war he worked on a translation of Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, which helped him formulate an Hegelian interpretation of the conflict. Surrounded by the most appalling and lawless guerilla combat of the war, it is perhaps unsurprising that Harris concluded that the violent conflict was the result of Americans' disregard for social institutions, such as the Constitution, and blind faith in a rather shallow conception of individualism.

In January 1866 Brokmeyer and Harris resumed their philosophical plans by founding the St. Louis Philosophical Society with Brokmeyer as President and oracle, and Harris as Secretary and organizing engine. The Philosophical Society was part of a larger "St. Louis Movement," which included an art club, an Aristotle club, a Shakespeare society, the St. Louis Academy of Science, the St. Louis Philharmonic Society, and the Academy of Useful Science. All of these organizations were primarily composed of local professionals: public school teachers and administrators, judges and attorneys. The most important achievement of the

Philosophical Society was the publication of a quarterly journal, *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, and Harris edited its 22 volumes from 1867 to 1893. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* was the first philosophical journal in the English language without a theological or denominational agenda. Throughout its brief history, *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* evolved beyond its initial purpose, serving as a vehicle for the innovative philosophical reflections of Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, Josiah Royce, and many other prominent American and European thinkers.

By 1868 Harris had risen to the position of Superintendent of the St. Louis public school system. Under Harris's leadership, the St. Louis public schools rose to national and international prominence. He drew upon insights he gained from the writings of Hegel, Karl Rosenkranz, and Freidrich Froebel to reorganize both the school's curriculum and its management. In partnership with Susan Blow, in 1873 Harris oversaw the organization of the first successful public kindergarten program in the United States and a normal school for teacher training in 1874. Harris' work in the public schools was driven by his conviction that they should reconcile post-Civil War Americans by uniting oppositions. Despite his emphasis on qualitative culture, Harris was also one of the first educators to require science courses as part of the curriculum, emphasizing their practical benefits. As author of the *Appleton's School Readers* from 1878 to 1889, Harris's views on education were particularly influential in the national public school curriculum.

In 1879 Harris moved to Concord, Massachusetts, at the invitation of Bronson ALCOTT who had launched the "Concord Summer School of Philosophy." Harris offered sophisticated lectures on philosophy, art, and literature at the school each summer

until it shut its doors in 1888. In 1889 he accepted President Benjamin Harrison's appointment to the position of United States Commissioner of Education, a post he held until 1906. Commissioner Harris pressed for national kindergartens, equality of education for the sexes, the standardization of exams for teachers, elevated requirements for medical and dental degrees, and the creation of open door colleges for all Americans, regardless of their means.

From 1890 to 1908 Harris spent his summers at Thomas Davidson's "Glenmore" resort in the Adirondack Mountains at Keene, New York. Davidson's "Summer School for the Culture Sciences" brought young immigrants from the Lower East Side of New York City to study and discuss philosophy, literature, language, history, and the social sciences. With Dewey, Royce, James, and many other thinkers as their mentors, the group enjoyed discussion and the exchange of ideas combined with camping, hiking, and outdoor camaraderie. But by 1908 Harris' health had deteriorated. He and his wife moved to Providence, Rhode Island, next door to his brother, who was a physician. Harris died in Providence on 5 November 1909.

The most prominent feature of Harris's thought can be identified by noting that he devoted his life to the promotion of both individual and cultural *Bildung* through what he called "speculative philosophy." Contrary to current parlance, for Harris, speculative philosophy is concrete philosophy because it is contextual thinking. Speculative philosophy assumes that in order to understand anything we must comprehend it in all of its relations. Harris's Hegelian speculative philosophy is not as foreign as one might think to the pragmatic modes of thought that soon arose in the United States. Reflecting back on Brokmeyer's tutelage and *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Harris wrote that

Brokmeyer "impressed us with the practicality of philosophy, inasmuch as he could flash into the questions of the day, or even into the questions of the moment, the highest insights of philosophy and solve their problems."

Harris sought a centrist position in his religious philosophy, much as he had done in his political thought, by avoiding extreme left- and right-wing interpretations of Hegel's thought. Whereas right-wing Hegelians claimed that Hegel preserved and upheld the entire gospel story, Harris was concerned only to preserve the doctrine of the trinity. Whereas left-wing Hegelians read Hegel as a pantheist or as reducing God to the human race in its historical development, Harris sought to preserve the notion of a transcendent God that manifests himself in the world.

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HARTSHORNE, CHARLES (1897–2000)

Charles Hartshorne (pronounced "hart's horn") was born on 5 June 1897 in Kittanning, Pennsylvania. He was educated at Haverford College where he received his BA in 1917. During World War I he was a volunteer in

the Army Medical Corps in France. After the war he went to Harvard University where he received his PhD in philosophy in 1923. He then studied for two years in Europe as a Sheldon Traveling Fellow, and for the next three years he was an instructor and research fellow at Harvard. He was A.N. Whitehead's assistant and put in charge of editing the papers of Charles S. Peirce. He was joined by Paul Weiss in 1927, and their six-volume edition of the Peirce papers was published in 1931–35.

Hartshorne was a professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago from 1928 to 1955, and he also held a joint appointment in the Meadville Theological School from 1933 to 1955. He then taught at Emory University from 1955 to 1962, and University of Texas from 1962 to 2000. Hartshorne was President of the American Philosophical Association Western Division in 1948–49, President of the Charles S. Peirce Society in 1950–51, and was also president of numerous other scholarly organizations. Throughout his career he made frequent travels domestically and abroad, and he was an internationally recognized ornithologist specializing in oscines; his main research was published in *Born to Sing* (1973). He always enjoyed good health and he remained productive into his final years. He died on 9 October 2000 in Austin, Texas.

For Hartshorne, metaphysics is the enterprise of discovering *a priori* truths about existence. His method, however, is not the traditional one of deducing metaphysical theorems from self-evident axioms. On the contrary, Hartshorne's final appeal is to experience. This is not to say that metaphysical propositions are empirical in the sense that Karl Popper gives the term (in other words, falsifiable by some conceivable experience). For Hartshorne, metaphysical propositions are true, if at all, of every conceivable experience. His method can be characterized as a reflective

equilibrium between experience, in its widest sense, and hypotheses about the necessary features of existence.

In his first book Hartshorne argued that sensations exist along an “‘affective continuum’ of aesthetically meaningful, socially expressive, organically adaptive and evolving experience functions.” Hartshorne’s critique of empiricism is complemented by his suspicion of anthropomorphism. He denied that “experience” is synonymous with “human experience.” Descartes bifurcated the world into the human and the nonhuman and he put *all* experience on the human side. How far down the evolutionary scale sentience extends is a fair question. Hartshorne rejected as a temporal form of dualism the idea that mind emerges from mere insentient matter. Hartshorne’s version of panpsychism, which he called psychicalism, maintains that the world is a theatre of interactions among “active singulars” of varying levels of complexity held together by affective bonds. Thus, the most universal values are aesthetic, in the root meaning of the term, “feeling” (*aesthesis*). The most concrete relation among active singulars is “feeling of feeling,” an expression he borrowed from Whitehead.

Psychicalism may seem to be false, for not every object of experience is an experiencing object. Hartshorne argued, however, that naïve sense experience can no more settle this issue for metaphysics than it could reveal the atomic structure of matter for science. He appropriated Leibniz’s distinction between singulars and composites. For Hartshorne, only active singulars have experiences, and every active singular is a composite, but not every composite is an active singular. In this way, for Hartshorne, feeling can be everywhere even though not everything feels, somewhat as vibration can be everywhere even though not everything vibrates, for example, rocks.

With sufficient complexity, a composite may become an active singular; a multi-celled zygote is not a center of feeling, but the baby it becomes is. Individual cells may nevertheless have feeling. Hartshorne believed that each of us has confused perceptions of the feelings of our cells. As he was fond of saying, hurt my cells and you hurt me. He doubted that plants are active singulars, although their cells may have cell-like experiences. The inorganic realm is entirely devoid of psychic qualities, but its micro-constituents need not be. Here, the “variable” of experience must be near its limits.

Following Peirce, Hartshorne argued that the strict law-like regularity that determinism implies is nowhere to be found, nor is it required by the practice of science. On the contrary, effects outrun their causes. From the earliest moments for which there is any evidence, the universe has been the womb of a cumulative evolutionary process, staggering in the variety and diversity of its products. The degree of novelty can be negligible, as in the nearly exact repetition of pattern in chemical processes, or it can be dramatic, as in the flowering of human genius. Hartshorne noted that his indeterminism is the mean between the contrary extremes of unqualified determinism (where causes uniquely determine effects) and chaoticism (where causal relations are nonexistent). The relation of cause to effect is mirrored in temporal asymmetry. With Whitehead, but against Peirce, Hartshorne accepted the atomicity of becoming. Active singulars are discrete momentary processes. With Peirce, but against Whitehead, he held that possibilities form a continuum. For Hartshorne, time is “objective modality.” The past is fully determinate; the future is a partially indeterminate field of possibility; the present is the process of adding onto the determinateness of the past. Hartshorne also held that modal distinctions are grounded in temporal becoming. Necessity is the

common element of all temporal alternatives; something is not logically possible unless it was always possible or becomes possible in the fullness of time.

Hartshorne argued that psychicalism, indeterminism, and temporal becoming satisfy his criteria of a sound metaphysical theory. If it is necessary that something exist, as he accepted, it is a further question whether it is necessary that something contingent exist. Many philosophers affirm a wholly non-contingent divine reality that freely created a contingent universe. A hallmark of Hartshorne's metaphysics, and arguably his signal contribution to philosophical theology, is that deity necessarily has contingent aspects. Hartshorne argued that God's decision to create is part of God, yet it must be contingent if it is to be free. Hartshorne says that God is both necessary and contingent, but in different respects: God's existence is necessary (it cannot not be), but God's actual states are contingent (each could have been different than it is). God's *existence* is necessary, infinite, and eternal, whereas God's *actual states* are contingent, finite, and temporal. By conceiving God as inclusive of the world, Hartshorne preserved the contrast between them, establishing a view he calls *panentheism* (in other words, all-in-God). Hartshorne appropriated and updates Plato's doctrine of the world-soul. God's relation to the world is analogous to the relation of a person to the cells of his or her body. God is the whole; each creature is a fragment of the whole. For Hartshorne, the aim of religion is the acceptance of our fragmentariness.

Hartshorne's argument for the existence of God is a cumulative case of which the ontological argument is one element. In *Creative Synthesis*, he presented the ontological proof as one of six strands in a "global argument" for God's existence – the other "proofs" are non-empirical versions of

the cosmological, design, epistemic, moral, and aesthetic arguments. After *Creative Synthesis*, Hartshorne stressed the eliminations of options in the sixteen-fold matrix as a way of arguing for dipolar theism.

Because aesthetic values are, for Hartshorne, the most universal, he conceived the cosmos, at any stage of its evolution, as permeated by divine beauty. There is a dynamic beauty of the universe that God appreciates and to which God contributes. This is not to deny the tragedies and horrific evils that disfigure existence. God too feels these, but is not defeated by them. In Hartshorne's view, the objective measure of aesthetic value is a mean between the double extremes of unity and diversity and simplicity and complexity. God is guided by these ideals in an everlasting effort to bring what is best from both the triumph and wreckage of our lives.

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Donald Wayne Viney

HAVEN, JOSEPH (1816–1874)

Joseph Haven was born on 4 January 1816 in Dennis, Massachusetts. He received his BA degree in 1835 and MA degree in 1838 from Amherst College. Haven then studied at Union Theological Seminary in New York City in 1836–37 and at Andover Theological Seminary from 1837 to 1839. He was ordained a minister in 1839 at Ashland, Massachusetts, and served the church there until 1846. In 1840 he married Mary Emerson, the daughter of Ralph Waldo Emerson, with whom he had ten children. From 1846 to 1850 he was minister of the Harvard Church in Brookline, Massachusetts. During this period Haven was the editor of *The Congregationalist*.

In 1850 Haven became Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Amherst College, succeeding Henry Boynton Smith. He remained at Amherst until 1858, when he was appointed Professor of Systematic Theology at the Chicago Theological Seminary. Haven retired in 1870, but after several years of occasional teaching, lecturing, and traveling, he returned briefly to university service in 1873–74 as acting Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at the first University of Chicago (which closed in 1885). He received several honorary degrees: a DD from Marietta College in 1859, a DD from Amherst College in 1862, and an LLD from Kenyon College in 1862. Haven died on 23 May 1874 in Chicago, Illinois.

Haven wrote the book for which he is best known, *Mental Philosophy* (1857), as a text for use by his students. A second textbook, *Moral Philosophy* (1859), was also written at Amherst for student use as a sequel and supplement to his *Mental Philosophy*. A collection of previously published essays, *Studies in Philosophy and Theology* (1869), and a *History of Philosophy* (1876) were published later in his career. *Mental Philosophy* dealt with a natural science of mind “resting on experience, observation, and induction – a science of facts, phenomena, and laws” for which “the word Psychology is now coming into use...” (1857, 16). The unitary mind expressed itself through faculties, primarily the tripartite categories of Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will. Haven’s intellectual debt, like that of most of the authors of such texts in this period, was primarily to John Locke and the Scottish School of Common Sense. In 1889, Haven’s *Mental Philosophy* became the first Western psychology textbook translated into Chinese; it had been previously translated into Japanese in 1875 (Kodama 1991).

For Haven, the understanding of moral science depended upon an understanding of mental philosophy; moral conduct depended

upon the action of mind. The moral faculty was subsumed under the intellect and was part of the mind’s capacity for reasoning. Haven rejected theories that attributed moral judgments to the sensibilities (feelings). Haven’s moral philosophy was, nonetheless, a science separate from mental philosophy that focused on the laws of conduct and duty. Haven stressed especially the moral guides appropriate to the political responsibilities of citizens.

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Alfred H. Fuchs

HAYDON, ALBERT EUSTACE (1880–1975)

Albert E. Haydon was born on 17 January 1880 in Brampton, Ontario, Canada. He received degrees from McMaster University,

the BA (1901), BTh (1903), BD (1906), and MA (1907). The University of Saskatchewan awarded him the MA (1912) *ad eundem gradum*. Haydon was ordained to the Baptist ministry and served Baptist churches in Dresden and Fort Williams, Ontario (1903–1918). While still serving as a Baptist minister, he became a doctoral student at the University of Chicago under George B. Foster. He received his PhD in theology in 1918 from the University of Chicago; his dissertation was “The Conception of God in the Pragmatic Philosophy.” Haydon succeeded Foster in 1918 as professor and chair of the department of comparative religion. During his years at Chicago, he aligned himself with both the Unitarian and Ethical Culture traditions. Haydon ministered to the First Unitarian Society of Madison, Wisconsin, from 1918 to 1923. Haydon retired in 1945, and then served as Leader of the Chicago Ethical Society from 1945 to 1955. In 1956 he was awarded the American Humanist Association’s Humanist of the Year award, and McMaster University awarded him an honorary LLD in 1964. Haydon died on 1 April 1975 in Santa Monica, California.

Haydon’s contributions to the field of comparative religion are evident in numerous books and articles. He participated in a new era in the study of religions, which sought objectivity and made an attempt to escape the limitations of apologetics. He offered some “warning canons” for those engaged in such study: the necessity of (1) escaping all bias, (2) being scientific, (3) rigidly excluding all *a priori* ideas, (4) considering every idea and institution within its total situational context, and (5) avoiding the use of all jargon, often ending in “ism.” Haydon stressed the need to give specific individual significance to every element of religious study, keeping in mind that no single science can provide a descriptive interpretation of the materials of religion.

Haydon argued that the new study of religion was hampered by an idea of religion dictated by the patterns of Christianity: (1) the idea of a personal relationship with God and the spiritual world, (2) the belief about God and the supernatural being accepted as embodiments of truth, and (3) the idea that humans are universally endowed by nature with a capacity to apprehend God. He argued that the result in the first phase of the scientific study of religion was inappropriately to judge all “culture religions” by these dominant ideas of Christianity. From Haydon’s perspective, the key mistake in past studies was to approach religion as if the gods or beliefs were the central focus of religion. This approach considers primitive people to hold inferior beliefs and those who project gods as supernatural beings to hold a superior belief.

Haydon proposed that religion be approached as a social matter concerning the life interests of the group, taking into account the social, intellectual, emotional, and physical components of the religious complex. Haydon defined religion as a way of living in which a group functions to acquire a complete and fully satisfying life. Such a life requires a socially accepted set of practical and ideal values, a social technique for realizing them, and an understanding of a social relationship with the extra-human powers impacting life. In essence, religion, for Haydon, is a functional cooperative or shared quest of the “good life” or ideally satisfying life.

When a religion moves beyond a focus on the human struggle to survive, it becomes, according to Haydon, a “culture religion.” When religion adopts values that go beyond material survival, its gods cease being nature gods and become gods who help in the realization of these values. Religion changes from the search for a good life in this world

to the quest for a good life in a future world. With this radical transformation, the goals and characteristics of religion change. Instead of reinforcing the value of human effort in solving problems, emphasis is given to inherent human weakness and the tragedy of human effort overwhelmed by the forces of evil. Individual immortality emerges as a new theme, and religion became the way of achieving it. Haydon postulates the demise of supernatural religion in modern cultures, because the historic deities are no longer at home in the intellectual climate of science and technology and because modern changes in social organization no longer require the help of the gods to establish justice and to order society. He pointed out that these cultural changes undermine the traditions and institutions related to supernatural gods, with the result that these gods will die.

Haydon viewed it as a cruel irony that, as humans are increasingly able to satisfy their material wants, they lack a religion that can give direction to their quest. What is needed is a synthesis of the religious vision, a unifying goal, to give direction to modern society. The role of religion is to summon the intelligence and good will available for developing a social order in which creative efforts will support spiritual or ideal values – values that provide a more satisfying life for all persons and a way of living to enable the hopes and ideals of the modern age to be fulfilled.

For Haydon, a religion for the modern age will make it obvious that the human task is here on this little planet, because it is here that a cosmic, value-increasing process has reached a level of consciousness and personality. He argued that such a religion is possible if humans will apply scientific analysis to the problems that hinder the quest for a good life for all. Haydon believed that the scientific method is not a cure-all for the ailments of our individual-social-economic

organism. Nor does this living religion offer the absolute assurance and dogma of supernatural religion. However, he contended that applying the scientific method can foster the development of piecemeal solutions based on an intelligent ordering of human affairs in light of common ideals.

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W. Creighton Peden

HAZARD, ROWLAND GIBSON (1801–1888)

Rowland Gibson Hazard was born on 9 October 1801 in South Kingstown, Rhode Island. Hazard attended school in the town of Bristol until he was eleven, after which he joined his brothers at the Friends' boarding school in Westtown, Pennsylvania. Hazard returned to Rhode Island in 1819 to join his oldest brother Isaac in the textile business of their father. In 1833 Hazard began writing his *Essay on Language*. The essay, which discusses how language and knowledge relate, was published two years later. Hazard distinguishes between the language of ideality and the language of abstraction. The first is a more basic use of language whereby we associate terms with their primitive perceptions, and the second comes about when we dismiss the associated ideals and communicate with others in a way that pays attentions exclusively to the terms themselves; and while this second mode facilitates communication, it also involves a necessary distortion. One of Hazard's primary interests was the way in which a poet tries to blend narration and ideality in a common language by extending terms into the recesses of thought where terms have not yet been extended.

In 1841, while travelling in the South, a free African-American, who had been unjustly confined to a chain gang in New Orleans because he was assumed to be an escaped slave, was able to approach Hazard who then set to work visiting with him and many others who were detained under the same premise. With the help of the lawyer Jacob Barker, he was able to obtain freedom for possibly a hundred men held incorrectly as slaves. These activities also brought many personal threats against Hazard. Hazard was elected to the Rhode Island House of Representatives

in 1851, 1854, and 1880, and the Rhode Island Senate in 1866 where he was active in legislation regarding, among other things, railroad policy, lottery suppression, and efforts to curb elected official bribery.

In 1861 Hazard was ready to publish *Freedom of Mind in Willing; or, Every Being That Wills a Creative First Cause*, which was his refutation of Jonathan Edwards's *Freedom of the Will*. This work was motivated by Unitarian clergyman William Ellery Channing, who had been impressed by Hazard's *Essay on Language*. However, because of the onset of the Civil War, the book was not published until 1864. Hazard distinguishes volition from the other mental faculties in an attempt to defend the freedom of the will, thus creating a psychology divided into three areas: volition, feeling, and knowledge. Both feeling and knowledge are passive and independent of will: we have sensations whether we will them or not, and those sensations lead to accumulated knowledge. One may nevertheless will conditions under which different sensations and knowledge can be cognized, but the effects that the new conditions bring about would be the same whether we had willed the new conditions or not. As a result, both feeling and knowing are passive effects of mind, not active faculties. Hazard extends this characterization to other faculties such as memory, judgment, reasoning, and imagination, all of which were traditionally described as being active. The will, then, is thus limited to the mind's effort, inseparable from the mind or agent, which originates from some want. The will, indistinct from the mind, is free to enlist effort to try to effect whatever changes are needed in order to secure the objects of want. The will is free to act, but only indirectly, and this misunderstanding is the source of the confusion around the question of the freedom of the will.

Soon after, Hazard went to Europe where he met John Stuart Mill. They corresponded for several years and met again in 1866 on Hazard's second trip. Their personal conversations and letters eventually culminated in Hazard's third book, *Causation and Freedom in Willing*, published in 1869. After a long and gradual decline in health, Hazard passed away in his home in Peace Dale, Rhode Island, on 24 June 1888. After his death, his collected works were published in four volumes by his granddaughter Caroline in 1889.

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Dereck Coatney

HECKER, ISAAC THOMAS (1819–1888)

Isaac Hecker was born on 18 December 1819 in New York City. A Catholic priest, he was the founder of the Society of Missionary Priests of St. Paul the Apostle (Paulists). As a philosopher Hecker was primarily interested in demonstrating the compatibility of Christianity and the culture of the nineteenth century in America, departing from the orthodox Catholic theology based upon Rome's authority. Hecker only had a few years of public schooling in New York City and was raised as a Methodist. His brothers were involved in the 1830s with the Locofoco movement, inviting Boston Unitarian minister Orestes Brownson to New York to address factory workers on economics and political reform. Hecker and Brownson became friends; Brownson introduced him to transcendentalism and Henry David Thoreau.

In 1844 Hecker became a Roman Catholic, joining the congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer and receiving an education in Belgium and Holland for the priesthood. He was ordained in London in 1849 and returned in 1851 to the United States as a missionary focused on preaching and writing.

Hecker's philosophical reflections were influenced by German Romanticism and Kantian idealism. He made theological arguments that confession and absolution were simply sacramental expressions of human striving and culture, causing some

church leaders to fear Hecker's American pragmatic approach to theology. Although Hecker was not initially given permission to found the Paulists because he lacked the support of his own superior, in 1858 Pope Pius IX allowed Hecker and four Americans to found the Society of Missionary Priests of St. Paul the Apostle, in New York City. The original purpose of the order was to convert American Protestants in particular. Hecker became the leader of the Paulists and held the position of superior until his death.

The Paulists never attracted a numerically significant membership, but Hecker's order did produce several important leaders in American Catholicism during the twentieth century. Hecker's life and philosophy came to fruition in Paulist Press, which later became an important publisher of materials on liturgy, New and Old Testament studies, and other critical issues in the Church. Hecker established *Catholic World*, a Catholic opinion journal, in 1865. In 1866 he established Paulist Press and in 1869 he attended the First Vatican Council as the theologian of the Baltimore archbishop. He was a theological reformer ahead of his time, as many of his ideas came to fruition as church doctrine during the Second Vatican Council of the early 1960s. Hecker died on 22 December 1888 in New York City. Hecker's views became the subject of a controversy, which finally ended when Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Testem Benevolentiae* (1899) condemned Americanism as the source of heretical ideas that some churchmen, especially European priests, had attributed to Hecker.

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Robert Wilson-Black

HEDGE, LEVI (1766–1844)

Levi Hedge was born on 19 April 1766 in Warwick, Massachusetts, as the oldest child of Lemuel Hedge (1734–1777), a Harvard-trained Congregationalist minister, and Sarah (White) Hedge (1741–1808). In 1801 Hedge married Mary Kneeland, a granddaughter of Edward Holyoke, who was President of Harvard during the mid-1700s. They had one son, the transcendentalist Frederick Henry Hedge (1805–1890). Hedge studied at Harvard while apprenticed to a stonemason, receiving the BA degree in 1792. After his graduation from Harvard, Hedge became the first preceptor at Westford Academy in Westford, Massachusetts. Three years later, in 1795, he became a tutor at Harvard. In 1800 Hedge was the first to be appointed as a permanent tutor at Harvard, by President Joseph Willard. In 1808 he received an honorary MA from Brown University, and in 1823 he received an honorary LLD degree from Yale College.

In 1810, in part because of his Unitarian leanings, Hedge was appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics by the new President, John Thornton Kirkland, which was the first time that philosophy instruction had been separated from the presidency at Harvard. Levi Frisbie joined the Harvard faculty in 1817 as the first Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity. In 1827 Hedge became the second Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity, a position that had been vacant for five years after Frisbie's death. In 1832 an attack of paralysis forced Hedge to resign from that position. Hedge died in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on 3 January 1844.

Hedge was instrumental in the introduction and the spread of Scottish philosophy at Harvard. In logic he moved away from Isaac Watt's *Logic, or The Right Use of Reason* (1724), a work of strong Lockean leanings that had long been the standard textbook at Harvard, by incorporating the views on logic of Scottish enlightenment figures like Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart, and Thomas Brown. In 1816 Hedge published his *Elements of Logick* to replace Watts's *Logic*. Hedge's *Logick* soon became the standard American textbook on the topic. In fact, it is one of those books for which it can safely be said that it wholly eclipsed its author. Hedge said it took him fourteen years to complete it. According to Hedge, the foundation of logic lies in the philosophy of the human mind. The book begins with a description of the affections and operations of the mind: sensation, perception, consciousness, attention, abstraction, association of ideas, and analysis. Hedge next treats logic proper, dividing reasoning into demonstrative and moral, and subdividing the latter into induction, analogy, and reasoning from facts. *Demonstrative* reasoning applies where we are solely concerned with the consequences of exact definitions and

precisely stated axioms or hypotheses. Hedge's psychologistic leanings show themselves in the view that demonstrative reasoning is directly dependent upon intuition.

For Hedge, *moral* reasoning embraces all reasoning that is not wholly dependent on intuition or demonstration. The term "moral" is here to be taken broadly. It includes, for instance, all reasoning in the empirical sciences that does not fit the above narrow definition of demonstrative reasoning. According to Hedge, logicians have unjustly ignored this second type of reasoning and he spent considerable effort studying the different kinds of moral reasoning. Hedge raised several of the standard problems about induction and developed a rudimentary calculus of probability. After Hedge's retirement, his *Elements of Logick* was quickly replaced with Richard Whately's *Elements of Logic* (1825) as the textbook of choice. In 1827 Hedge published an edited and abridged edition of Thomas Brown's *Treatise on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, originally a rather unwieldy course of lectures, to make it more accessible and suitable as a textbook.

Hedge's teaching and writings are central to the development of a Harvard brand of Scottish philosophy, a school of thought that has realist leanings in opposition to the nominalism of the British empiricists (especially Locke). This intellectual climate at Harvard was conducive to the development of pragmatism half a century later.

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Cornelis de Waal

HELD, VIRGINIA POTTER (1929–)

Virginia Held was born on 28 October 1929 in Mendham, New Jersey. She received her BA from Barnard College in 1950 and attended the University of Strasbourg and the University of Paris before beginning her "first career" as a reporter. Held was on the staff of the *Reporter* from 1954 to 1965 and made contributions to such publications as the *New Leader*, the *Public Interest*, and the *Nation*. Her first book was a reporter's account of contemporary attitudes toward morality. In 1968 Held received her PhD in philosophy from Columbia University. She was a professor of philosophy at Hunter College of the City University of New York

from 1969 until retiring in 2001, and also was on the faculty of the Graduate School of the City University of New York after 1977. Held was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 2001–02.

Held's work in moral, political, and social philosophy has its roots in and is always inextricably linked to a commitment to achieving moral clarity about actual decision-making contexts. Throughout her career, Held has defended the usefulness of theory for practice and the objectivity of moral judgment. She has argued that moral theory is more like scientific theory than is typically acknowledged but has resisted ethical naturalism. Held has argued that just as scientific theories must withstand the tests of observational experience, so must moral theories withstand the "tests" of moral experience. This claim is a challenge to such methods as John Rawls's reflective equilibrium, in which the theorist looks back and forth between theoretical claims and particular judgments about *hypothetical* decision-making contexts.

Moral philosophy has long been substantially immersed in a debate between consequentialist and deontological moral theorists, both sides assuming that a single moral theory should be adequate for all moral questions. Held has argued for a "division of moral labor," in which independent moral inquiry proceeds in distinct moral realms – the political, the legal, the economic, the familial. She has also argued that in all realms of moral inquiry, attention to the perspectives of women is called for to redress its historical absence.

Held has joined other feminist philosophers in rejecting the dominant contractual model of society defended by such heirs to the tradition of Locke, Hobbes, and Kant as John RAWLS and the rational choice theorists, because it presupposes

that persons are essentially independent and motivated predominantly by rational self-interest. Held points out that persons are actually typically dependent on others and typically they are significantly engaged in relationships with others. Having rejected the traditional conception of “economic man” as a model for an array of social relations, Held has explored alternative models; most extensively, the relationship between a “mothering person” and a child.

A *mothering person*, for Held, is a woman or a man who has primary responsibility for the care and development of a child. Rejecting the traditional idea that mothering is essentially a “natural,” and so less fully human, activity, Held describes it as the very human activity of creating new persons – persons who will speak a language, share a culture, and engage in morally significant activity, thought, and feeling. The moral duties involved in being a mother or a child are not exhausted by negative duties to “leave others alone.” On this model, theory begins not with uninvolved individuals who must be brought together in society but with very involved individuals. A morality based on this model would be “the morality of being responsive to the needs of actual, particular others in relations with us” (“Non-contractual Society: A Feminist View,” 1987, p. 133). A political theory based on this model would acknowledge that contractual thinking, while possibly appropriate to some domains, is insufficient to establish the mutual concern, trust, and cooperativeness necessary to hold a society together. Held came to believe that while the concept of justice is not dispensable in moral and political theory, the concept of care is more widely applicable and conceptually prior.

The idea that moral thinking is always the thinking of individuals who are related to

others in morally significant ways is central to Held’s work. Held has argued that moral responsibility may be borne by corporations, nations, and ethnic groups, as well as by “collectivities” defined strictly in terms of the relation in which their members stand to particular events or opportunities for action. She has also argued that a satisfactory account of the moral person requires attention to the individual’s social location—to her social relationships and to the nature of the social roles she occupies.

According to Held, cultural structures and norms are as much in need of philosophical attention and moral scrutiny as political or legal structures and norms. Recognizing the social power of the mass media and the way commercial interests guide and limit the issues and images presented within them has led Held to call for greater economic independence in the production and distribution of cultural products.

Held has played a substantial role in a number of contemporary philosophical debates—arguing, for instance, that in addition to political and civil rights, individuals in a sufficiently prosperous society have social and economic rights to “a decent life, adequate self-development, and equal liberty” (1984, p. 184); that *the public good* is a concept with significant content and that at least some decisions concerning a society’s economic activities should be guided by an interest in it; that terrorism may be justified in circumstances of profound injustice, when it would be reasonable to believe that rejecting available uses of violence would allow the continuation of serious human rights violations for longer than it would be reasonable to ask the victims of those violations to wait for relief. Held has argued that it is the responsibility of those with power to strengthen or create alternative means of addressing injustice.

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Karen Kovach

HEMPEL, CARL GUSTAV (1905–1997)

Carl Hempel, known as “Peter” by his friends, was one of the youngest of the scientific philosophers who brought logical empiricism from Vienna and Germany to North America in the 1930s. As a student of Hans Reichenbach, Rudolf Carnap, Moritz Schlick, and Friedrich Waismann, Hempel was a broad-minded representative of logical empiricism during the 1930s and 1940s. Yet Hempel was also young enough to have survived logical empiricism. He articulated some of its shortcomings in the 1950s, helping to prepare for the later growth of alternative historicist approaches in science studies.

Hempel was born on 8 January 1905 in Oranienburg near Berlin, Germany. He studied mathematics and logic at the University of Göttingen with David Hilbert in 1923–24. After briefly studying at the University of Heidelberg, Hempel moved to Berlin in 1924, where he encountered Reichenbach and his Berlin Circle of scientific philosophers. Hempel also studied physics with Max Planck and logic with John Von Neumann until 1928. While accompanying Reichenbach to the 1929 conference on the Epistemology of the Exact Sciences in Prague organized by Philipp Frank, Hempel made connections with his future colleagues in the Vienna Circle with whom he would later bring scientific

philosophy from a war-torn Europe to the more stable United States.

In 1934 Hempel completed his Berlin PhD in philosophy, writing a dissertation titled “Beiträge zur logischen Analyse des Wahrheitsbegriff.” In that year he emigrated to Belgium where he co-authored his first major work in logic with Paul Oppenheim in 1936. He emigrated to the United States in 1937 to be Carnap’s post-doctoral student at the University of Chicago. In 1939–40 he taught philosophy at City College of New York. From 1940 to 1948 he was professor of philosophy at Queens College in New York, and from 1948 to 1955 he was professor of philosophy at Yale University. In 1955 he joined the philosophy faculty of Princeton University, and was named Stuart Professor of Philosophy in 1956, holding that title until becoming professor emeritus in 1973. After holding visiting positions at Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1974, the University of California at Berkeley in 1975, and the University of Pittsburgh in 1976, Hempel became University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh in 1977 and held that position until 1985. Hempel died on 9 November 1997 in Princeton Township, New Jersey.

Hempel was a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, the American Philosophical Society, and a corresponding fellow of the British Academy. He was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1961–62.

Hempel contributed to the central debates and themes of philosophy of science: probability theory, logic, scientific explanation, induction, semantics, and theory structure. He is perhaps best known for articulating the “Deductive-Nomological” (D-N) model of scientific explanation in the late 1940s (see *Aspects of Scientific*

Explanation, 1965, pp. 331–496). On this model, explanation consists in the logical deduction of descriptions of particular facts we wish to explain from generalizations or laws taken to hold over those instances. Such laws and appropriate background conditions together constitute the “explanans,” Hempel proposed, from which “explananda” can be logically derived. Understood as a schema to focus attention on the problem of explanation, Hempel’s work in explanation was successful and influential. Like any idealization, it failed to capture aspects of scientific practice and required modifications to treat cases involving statistical generalizations and cases where scientific laws remain unknown. Still, the simplicity and clarity of the model and some of its consequences (such as the logical symmetry between explanation of observed facts and prediction of future facts) made it compelling for a growing profession.

Hempel’s model also popularized the unity of science and fueled debates about relations between the sciences and humanities. In “The Function of General Laws in History” (1942) Hempel presented his D-N model as a model for historical explanation by arguing that historians tacitly appeal to law-like generalizations in their accounts of historical events. With this “covering law” model of historical explanation, Hempel suggested that the logical force of proper scientific and historical explanations came from the same, logical source. And because such historical generalizations were ultimately empirical, as are laws in natural science, Hempel could count his essay as a contribution to substantiating the “methodological unity of empirical science” (1942, p. 243) in which history and historical sciences could claim membership. Hempel’s essay was equally provocative in fields such as philosophy of biology and philosophy of social science and remains a classic contribution to philosophy of history. Hempel

indirectly provided a clear voice to often heated debates, arising especially after World War II and the invention of nuclear weapons, about the role of scientific thinking in society and antiscientific claims about alleged fundamental differences between science and the humanities – differences that Hempel and other logical empiricists usually denied.

Other topics in philosophy of science that Hempel gave canonical treatment include the Theoretician's Dilemma (why posit abstract theoretical concepts at all if the point of science is to help us navigate among empirical phenomena?); the paradoxes of confirmation (in which a proposition such as "all ravens are black" finds confirmation in any observation at all); and the logic of functional explanation in biology and social science (see, for example, 1945; 1958; 1959). While Hempel's work on these topics generally promoted and sustained logical empiricism, his classic work on the criterion of cognitive significance (1950, 1951, 1965) took stock of the increasingly difficult task of formally and adequately specifying the basic idea of logical empiricism: that properly scientific propositions were cognitively significant whereas those of metaphysics and pseudoscience were not. Though Hempel never dismissed the purposes such criteria were designed to meet, he helped solidify opinion (perhaps partly because of his logical empiricist credentials) that finding such a criterion was at least a matter for "further constructive work" in philosophy of science, if not a quest that should be abandoned or reconceived. W.V. QUINE shortly afterward published his influential essay "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in 1951, questioning the possibility of formally distinguishing analytic and synthetic sentences, a result that Hempel took to corroborate his own and similarly ominous verdict about cognitive significance.

While contributing both to the rise and the fall of logical empiricism, Hempel's

career nonetheless captures the spirit of that movement and, in particular, its ability (indeed, its ambition) to avoid scholastic dogmatism and, like science, to abandon or modify beliefs or hypotheses when relevant evidence from science, logic or history mounts against them. Though the legacy of logical empiricism is still in question, and is being reinterpreted if not resuscitated by some contemporary philosophers (such as Friedman 1991), Hempel's work and especially the careful, empiricist attitude it illustrates continues to be respected and emulated.

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HENDEL, CHARLES WILLIAM, JR. (1890–1982)

Charles W. Hendel was born on 16 December 1890 in Reading, Pennsylvania, and died on 12 November 1982 in Salt Lake City, Utah. He attended Princeton University (BLitt 1913); Marburg University in Germany (1913–1914); College de France (1914); and returned to Princeton (PhD in philosophy,

1917). He served in the United States Army Infantry as second lieutenant in 1917–1918. His first academic positions were at Princeton Preparatory School (1919), and as instructor at Williams College (1919–1920). Hendel then was assistant professor (1920–1926) and associate professor (1926–1929) at Princeton University. He went to McGill University to become MacDonald professor of moral philosophy and chairman in 1929 and also was dean of the faculty of arts and sciences during 1937–1940.

Hendel moved to Yale University to be professor of moral philosophy and metaphysics in 1940 and chaired the department from 1940 to 1945. His title at Yale was Clarke Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics from 1943 until his retirement in 1959. Among his honors was the Gifford lectureship in natural theology at University of Glasgow in 1962–1963; President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1940–1941; and President of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy in 1959–1961.

Hendel was a leading Hume scholar. Not only did he edit widely used editions of Hume's major works, but he also made valuable contributions to Hume scholarship. In his major work, *Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume*, he integrated the different facets of Hume's thought and developed criticisms of Hume that went further than anyone before. Hendel was one of the first scholars to demonstrate that Hume's major philosophical works were motivated by theological concerns. He argues that Hume investigated the principle of causation because he wanted to explain the world order without an appeal to God. Hendel convincingly showed that Hume's claim that we can logically think of something existing without a cause was founded on his desire to show that the existence of the world

does not entail God as its cause. According to Hendel, Hume's discovery of the non-rational character of the causal inference is not skepticism in the sense of total doubt, but skepticism in the sense that one should never be secure in having knowledge because one should always be looking for further verification.

Hendel additionally advanced some interesting ideas concerning Hume's religious position, which many scholars now accept. Readers of Hume often concluded that he was an atheist without faith. In his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, they see Philo, the religious skeptic, as his spokesman who argues against Cleanthes, the religious dogmatist, who thinks reason can establish religious beliefs. Hendel denies this and argues that both characters express Hume's thinking because both represent valid ways of looking at the matter. Philo, the skeptic, is right in showing the defects of our reasoning in proving the existence of God. Cleanthes is right in insisting that the theist position, given our nature, is the one we must accept. Hendel concludes that Hume is Pampilus who listens to the arguments on both sides. He is not a participant in the debate. Rather, for the sake of truth that all views represent, he is detached from any personal interest in one character or the other. Rational proof for or against God is impossible. Nevertheless, religious belief is natural in the sense that it is the outcome of human nature.

In his discussion of Hume's theory of causality, Hendel presented a provocative analysis of Hume's theory of belief, which implies that Hume was an idealist. He argues that Hume held the position that things are believed to exist only when they are conceived in relation to other objects of perception. Though this is certainly true of ideas, Hendel goes further and asserts that it is also true of impressions – thus suggesting the idealist

position that no content of experience can be real unless it is part of a coherent system of other experience.

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Richard W. Burgh

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HICK, JOHN HARWOOD (1922–2012)

John Hick was born on 20 January 1922 in Scarborough, England, and grew up in the Anglican tradition. At age 18, while studying law and in a skeptical stance toward religion, he experienced an evangelical conversion. He turned towards ordination in the Presbyterian church and the study of philosophy and theology. Before receiving an MA in philosophy at the University of Edinburgh in 1948, he served as a conscientious objector in the Friends' Ambulance Unit from 1942 to 1945 during World War II. In 1950, he received a DPhil from the University of Oxford. His dissertation was the basis of his first book, *Faith and Knowledge* (1957). He then studied theology at Westminster Theological College, Cambridge, in 1953. Also in 1953, he married and was ordained in the Presbyterian Church of England.

From 1956 to 1959, Hick was assistant professor of philosophy at Cornell. From 1959 to 1964 he was professor of Christian philosophy at Princeton Theological Seminary. While at Princeton, the Presbyterian Synod of New Jersey denied his membership application, thereby threatening his teaching appointment, because Hick refused to affirm the doctrine of the virgin birth. The dispute became bitter and public but was defused in 1962 when the General Assembly ordered his acceptance. Hick then was lecturer in divinity at Cambridge University from 1964 to 1967. In 1967 he became professor of theology at the University of Birmingham, in whose pluralistic atmosphere he began to develop his distinctive views on world religions.

In 1972 he became Governor of Queens College, Birmingham. In 1979 he became Danforth Professor of Philosophy of Religion at Claremont Graduate School in California, from which he retired as emeritus professor in 1992. He gave the Gifford Lectures in 1986–87, which were the basis for his *An Interpretation of Religion* (1989). He received the Grawemeyer Award in 1991. Hicks died on 9 February 2012 in Birmingham, England. The John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion was established at the University of Birmingham.

Early in his career, in *Faith and Knowledge* (1957), Hick gave a vigorous defense of a realist, cognitive approach to the experience of a transcendent reality, a reality that can nonetheless be experienced or interpreted in a variety of ways. He rejected the reductionist claim, common in that period, that experiences of the transcendent could be explained in naturalistic terms. His later thought followed a Kantian direction where the actual experience of the transcendent is understood to be experienced in metaphorical ways as a phenomenon shaped by various religions and traditions, even though all point to one and the same noumenal reality.

When he was defending a more traditional account of Christian faith against the noted falsification challenge of Antony Flew in the 1950s, he argued that eschatological claims could be verified, and thus be cognitively meaningful, even though they might not be capable of falsification (in the case that no one survives death at all). The University Discussion in the 1950s, as it came to be known, dominated philosophy of religion for a quarter of a century. Three parables were given at the original discussion, and Hick added a fourth, the Parable of the Celestial City, calling for eschatological verification, which usually has been seen as integral to that significant discussion. In light of his later

well-known pluralist approach to religion, it is noteworthy that in that early parable, closer to his evangelical roots, he tended to consider only two outcomes: naturalistic death or encounter with the risen Christ in the Celestial City.

In *Evil and the God of Love* (1966), Hick propounded a major alternative to the Augustinian free-will defense in theodicy; this, too, involved a major emphasis on eschatology. Drawing especially on the early church father Irenaeus and the modern theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher, he delineated a free-will defense that did not presuppose perfection in the beginning of creation but in the future. Creation thus offers a “soul-making” potential that has to be realized by each individual. Besides being more compatible with the Hebrew story of creation, it offered the advantage, as compared to Augustine’s perfectionist notion, of being more compatible with evolution and modern science. While many across the theological spectrum have moved to this Irenaean account in its broad outlines, Hick’s particular view required universalism because of his sensitivity to the magnitude of human suffering; if anyone were to be denied the consummation, Hick believed that creation would be unjustified.

Yet another eschatological dimension was added to his theodicy in *Death and Eternal Life* (1976), a book devoted entirely to the issue of the afterlife. Hick here further developed his desire to draw on all major world religions and offered a remarkable synthesis. Still working within an Irenaean person-making framework, he argued that since people are usually not very developed at the end of this life, they go on to become reincarnated in other worlds many times until they are perfected enough to get off the wheel of life. Drawing on the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*, he suggested that between lives,

people may experience therapeutic reflection enabling them to take a further step in their next life. The final consummation of person-making occurs when everyone has become one with God. Hick also offered significant arguments for the coherence of the idea of an afterlife in his “replica theory” of identity. Although he did not regard theistic proofs as necessary for faith, he also made contributions to the discussion of arguments for the existence of God.

Hick further pursued his pluralistic concern for all world religions in his “Copernican revolution” in religion, for which he is perhaps most well-known. These ideas were launched in *God and the Universe of Faiths* (1973) and in a book he edited, *The Myth of God Incarnate* (1977). In 1986, Hick and Paul Knitter organized a conference at Claremont that resulted in a book arguing for a theistic rather than Christocentric approach to religious pluralism, *The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Towards a Pluralistic Theology of Religions*. In the same year, his Gifford Lectures drew all of these themes together into what is perhaps his *magnum opus*, *An Interpretation of Religion* (1989). Particular religions, he argued, have tended to see themselves as central and absolute and others as peripheral, yet all major religions have produced their full share of saints and sinners. The claim of moral and religious superiority, he concluded, is arrogant and unfair to other religions. He changed this strategy by placing the noumenal Real at the center and having all religions revolving around it. Concerning Christianity, he argued that historical criticism has shown that Jesus did not consider himself to be divine in the strong Chalcedonian sense and that religious language is largely metaphorical, as is the language of religion in general. Jesus Christ can be seen as the way to God for Christians but not as an exclusive way that is unique from all other religions.

The great world religions thus represent different perspectives on the Real and on the central religious emphasis of sacrificial love. Individuals may affirm their own way of worship while recognizing legitimacy in other ways. Hick’s views have been widely celebrated, although he has been criticized for offering a synthesis that in effect proposes another religion, for not doing justice to the unique claims of religions, and for taking a Christian slant, emphasizing love, on the essence of religion.

Beyond his distinctive ideas, Hick conveyed complex ideas clearly and defended them effectively. His introductions to the philosophy of religion, to theodicy, to world religions, and to eschatological issues have been staples for teaching these subjects even for those who do not agree with his conclusions.

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HICKOK, LAURENS PERSEUS (1798–1888)

Laurens Perseus Hickok was born on 29 December 1798 in Bethel, Connecticut, and he died on 7 May 1888 in Amherst, Massachusetts. In 1818 he entered the junior class of Union College in New York, graduating with a BA degree in 1820. Hickok was ordained in 1824 at the church in Kent, Connecticut, where he served as pastor until 1829, when he was called to succeed Lyman Beecher in the pulpit of the Congregational church in Litchfield, Connecticut.

Hickok's self-education in theology and philosophy led in 1836 to his appointment as Professor of Theology at Western Reserve College in Ohio. In 1844 he became Professor of Theology at Auburn Theological Seminary in New York. At Auburn, he published his first book, *Rational Psychology; or, The Subjective Idea and the Objective Law of All Intelligence* (1849). In 1852 he became Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and Vice President of Union College. At Union he published a number of important works. These included *A System of Moral Science* (1853); *Empirical*

Psychology; or, The Human Mind as Given in Consciousness (1854); *Rational Cosmology; or, The Eternal Principles and the Necessary Laws of the Universe* (1858); and “Psychology and Skepticism” (1862) which was written in response to a critical review of his revised *Rational Psychology*.

Hickok served as Acting President of Union College for several years before being confirmed as President in March 1866. He resigned from the presidency and his professorship in 1868, and moved to Amherst, Massachusetts, where he continued to write and publish on theological subjects. With the collaboration of his nephew, Julius Hawley Seelye, President of Amherst College, Hickok revised his books until his death in 1888.

The priority that Hickok assigned to rational over empirical psychology is evident in the order in which his books were written. The first, *Rational Psychology*, argued that an empirical psychology cannot go beyond a description of the facts of conscious experience and therefore needs a metaphysical, transcendental grounding to meet the criterion of a true science. Hickok recognized the domination of British empiricism in American thought, developed in Locke’s system as well in the philosophies of Berkeley, Hartley, and Hume (and, in opposition to Hume’s skepticism, the Scottish School of Common Sense). However, he believed Locke’s system to be only a partial philosophy of mind because Locke rejected a priori knowledge. Hickok welcomed Kant’s investigations into the origin and validity of all knowledge and his spur to the search for the general and universal a priori principles that govern what must be the facts of experience. The method for discovering these principles was the exercise of pure reason.

For Hickok, science entails identifying the correlation between the idea (subjective fact of experience) and the universal necessary

law, identified through reason independent of experience. He devoted book two (around 600 pages) of his *Rational Psychology* to determining the a priori principles consistent with the facts of experience for Sense, Understanding, and Reason, the three faculties of the Intellect, where Intellect was in turn conceived as one of three modes in which the mind operates (the others being Sensibility, or Susceptibility, and Will). Intellect encompasses the mind’s capacity for knowing and is the source of all cognition.

A System of Moral Science, Hickok’s second book, followed the pattern set by the *Rational Psychology*. Rather than being concerned with detailing examples of moral conduct for students, Hickok concentrated instead on the delineation of the ultimate rational principle (“the intrinsic excellency of spiritual being” and a “spirit to act worthily of its spirituality”) that governs moral conduct within the spheres of personal duties to mankind in general and to civil, divine, and family government in particular. Civil government, he argued, exerts its authority through rewards and punishments, divine government through love and loyalty, and family government through a mixture of the two. All three constitute objective moral powers. In this text, Hickok demonstrated “his independence of current opinion by his outspoken treatment of the theory of the state, which was conceived in a Hegelian manner.”

Hickok’s *Empirical Psychology* elaborated the facts of mind as given in experience, tested by individual consciousness and the manifestations of collective consciousness in social and cultural phenomena such as language. Although Hickok gave pride of place to his *Rational Psychology*, it was his *Empirical Psychology* that had wide circulation as a textbook. Written in a style and with content accessible to students, it attained considerable popularity for use

in courses in mental philosophy in the antebellum period and, in revised form, continued in use until the textbooks of the “new psychology” replaced the authors of the pre-Civil War era. A chapter on anthropology, in which Hickok discussed the mind-body relation and the influence of race, gender, and temperament on mind, distinguished the *Empirical Psychology* from other texts of the pre-Darwinian era.

In a concluding chapter of *Rational Psychology* entitled “The Competency of the Human Mind to Attain the End of Its Being,” Hickok addressed the end or purpose of the human mind, which he believed to conform to the highest good of humanity. While the animal portion of mind seeks happiness, the spiritual portion seeks self-approval. The difficulty of achieving the higher spiritual ends lies in the hedonistic animal nature of mind; achieving spiritual fulfillment rested, Hickok concluded, with the coming of a savior. Hickok’s conviction that rational principles provide meaning for empirical facts was not restricted to his psychology. In his *Rational Cosmology*, he relied on reason as the instrumental human faculty to identify those general and universal principles for all sciences. As a philosopher-theologian, Hickok’s rational principles were consistent with the notion of a rational Author in which all facts of experience can be grounded. This was a position that he defended against attacks arguing that his philosophy was pantheistic, skeptical, and much too heavily influenced by German transcendental philosophy.

Hickok’s psychology was a serious attempt to provide a theory of mind that rested on a solid metaphysical foundation. His approach offered an alternative to the empirical psychologies that constituted the British tradition in American mental philosophy, and foreshadowed the tension within later

scientific psychology between an emphasis on empirical fact-gathering and the pursuit of theoretical principles within which the facts may be understood.

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Alfred H. Fuchs

HINTIKKA, KAARLO JAAKKO JUHANI (1929–)

Jaakko Hintikka was born on 12 January 1929 in Vantaa, Finland. Hintikka went to the University of Helsinki. His major subject was first mathematics where the most impressive teacher was professor Rolf Nevanlinna. During that same time, influenced by the charismatic philosopher Eino Kaila, Hintikka started to study theoretical philosophy as a second major. Already in 1947–48 he followed the lectures on logic by the young professor Georg Henrik von Wright who soon became Ludwig Wittgenstein's successor at Cambridge. Hintikka spent the year 1948–49 as an undergraduate at Williams College in Massachusetts. He received the degrees of Cand. Phil. in 1952, and Lic. Phil. in 1952 from Helsinki. In his doctoral dissertation, which he defended with von Wright as the faculty opponent, Hintikka extended to full first-order logic the so-called distributive normal forms that von Wright had developed for monadic predicate logic. Hintikka received his PhD in philosophy from Helsinki in 1953.

Hintikka taught philosophy for one semester in 1954 at Harvard University. He returned to Harvard as a Junior Fellow from 1956 to 1959, working in the new field of modal logic. In 1959 Hintikka was appointed professor of practical philosophy (moral and social philosophy) at the University of Helsinki. In 1964 he also became professor of philosophy at Stanford University, where Patrick Suppes and Dagfinn Føllesdal taught, making it one of the leading centers of philosophical

logic. Hintikka's new interests included inductive logic and semantic information. In 1970 Hintikka was appointed to a research professorship in the Academy of Finland which allowed him to establish a research group of younger Finnish scholars working mainly in logic, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and history of philosophy. In 1978 Hintikka and his wife Merrill Hintikka were appointed to philosophy positions at the Florida State University. Hintikka resigned from his research position in Finland in 1981, but maintained close cooperation with Finnish logicians and philosophers. In 1990 Hintikka became professor of philosophy at Boston University.

He was Vice President of the Association for Symbolic Logic from 1968 to 1971; President of American Philosophical Association Pacific Division in 1975–76; Vice President of the Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science during 1971–75 and President in 1975; Vice President of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies from 1993 to 1998; President of the Charles S. Peirce Society in 1997, the chairman of the organizing committee of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy in 1998, and the President of the International Institute of Philosophy from 1999 to 2002. Hintikka has been awarded honorary doctorates in many universities: Liège, Cracow, Uppsala, Oulu, and Turku.

In mathematical logic, Hintikka's dissertation *Distributive Normal Forms in the Calculus of Predicates* showed that each formula in first-order logic can be transformed to a disjunction of constituents. In 1955 Hintikka defined model sets as a new tool in logical semantics, and constructed a new proof of the completeness of first-order logic. In the 1970s he developed (with Veikko Rantala) a new system of infinitary logic which allows

infinitely deep formulas. Hintikka's interest in partially ordered quantifiers led in 1980s to a new system of logic. This "independence friendly logic," or IF-logic, is still first-order in the sense that quantifiers range over individuals, but it is much more powerful than the traditional Fregean first-order logic, as it allows quantifiers to be informationally independent of each other. In *The Principles of Mathematics Revisited* (1996), and in several papers with Gabriel Sandu, Hintikka has argued that the IF-logic constitutes a genuine revolution in logic. Among other things, it puts the incompleteness results of Kurt Gödel and Alfred Tarski in a new light, as it is possible to construct a truth definition for the sentences of IF-logic within the same language.

In the area of intensional logic, in 1957 Hintikka – independently of a slightly earlier proposal by Stig Kanger and a later one by Saul Kripke – presented the basic idea of the possible-worlds semantics for modal logic. In *Knowledge and Belief* (1962), he applied the technique of model sets to lay the foundations of epistemic and doxastic logic. Later he applied these semantical methods to deontic logic. In treating knowledge and perception as propositional attitudes, Hintikka had to face philosophical issues concerning quantification into modal contexts and the cross-identification of individuals in different possible worlds. These topics, which led him into debates with W.V. Quine, Föllesdal, and David Lewis, are discussed in *Models for Modalities* (1969) and *The Intentions of Intentionality* (1975). Starting with *The Semantics of Questions and the Questions of Semantics* (1976), Hintikka has also applied his system of epistemic logic to give an account of the logic of questions and dialogues.

On philosophy of logic and mathematics, Hintikka realized that his distributive normal forms, due to the undecidability of first-order logic, vindicate "Kantian" themes in the

philosophy of logic: constituents provide a tool in defending Kant's thesis that mathematical truths are synthetic a priori. In his John Locke lectures given at Oxford University in 1964, Hintikka argued that logical inferences may be non-trivial or non-tautological by increasing "surface information" when they require the introduction of new individuals into consideration. Mathematical statements are synthetic in Kant's sense when they contain surface information. Hintikka has also shown that this idea has interesting connections to the traditional discussions about analysis and synthesis in geometry (*The Method of Analysis*, 1974).

According to Hintikka's program of "logical pragmatics," semantical relations between language and world are man-made and thus dependent on pragmatics. Game-theoretical semantics, which can be applied in a fruitful way in infinitary logic and IF-logic, has been developed by Hintikka (with several collaborators, among them Saarinen, Carlson, Sandu, and Jack Kulas) into a comprehensive framework for the study of natural language. Important topics to which this method has been applied include quantifiers (every, some, any), pronouns, anaphora, questions, and metaphor. Hintikka has generalized his semantical work into the conception that language is a "calculus" which can be interpreted and reinterpreted in various ways. This view (which can be found in George Boole, Charles S. Peirce, David Hilbert, and the later Rudolf Carnap) is contrasted by Hintikka with the thesis that language is a "universal medium" whose relations to extralinguistic reality cannot be expressed in language. Hintikka regards this distinction as the "ultimate presupposition" of 20th century philosophy. The universal medium view, which leads to the thesis that semantics is ineffable, he finds in Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine.

Hintikka has applied his distributive normal forms to many problems in philosophy of science, among them the definability and identifiability of concepts with respect to theories, the deductive-nomological model of explanation, and the problem of incommensurability. Starting from the observation that constituents can be regarded as descriptions of possible worlds (relative to the expressive power of a given linguistic framework), Hintikka constructed in 1964 a new system of inductive logic. Unlike Carnap's system, Hintikka's method allows the assignment of non-zero inductive probabilities to genuinely universal statements. He also showed how these probability measures lead to a natural definitions of semantic information – or depth information in contrast to surface information – and systematic power. Hintikka's ideas have been further developed by, among others, Hilpinen, Tuomela, Pietarinen, Niiniluoto, and Theo Kuipers.

Hintikka employed his theory of propositional attitudes (knowledge, perception) in epistemological studies. For example, these applications have generated new perspectives on Kant's notion of things in themselves, Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, Husserl's phenomenology, and pictorial representation in art. Hintikka's pioneering studies in epistemic logic have also recently made a strong impact in artificial intelligence and cognitive science.

Hintikka has combined his systematic interests with historical studies which reconstruct and re-evaluate important philosophical doctrines. His discussions have included Plato's notion of *episteme* and the tradition of "maker's knowledge," Aristotle's theory of modality, Descartes's *cogito* argument, Leibniz's view on plenitude, Kant's notion of intuition, Peirce's theory of reasoning, Wittgenstein's account of

language-games, and Arthur Lovejoy's thesis about unit ideas.

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Ilkka Niiniluoto

HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST (1873–1966)

William Ernest Hocking was born on 10 August 1873 in Cleveland, Ohio, and died on 12 June 1966 at his farm near Madison, New Hampshire. His family moved to Newton, Iowa, in 1893, and from 1894 to 1896 Hocking attended Iowa State College, studying primarily civil engineering. There he read William James’s *Principles of Psychology* (1890), which made a great impression on him. He moved in 1896 to Davenport, Iowa,

and taught mathematics at Duncan Business College, and later was made Principal of the Davenport Public School, holding that position for four years while he earned enough money to continue his education. Hocking chose to attend Harvard University to study with James, where he received his BA in 1901 and his MA in 1902. He traveled to Germany in 1902–03, studying with Wilhelm Windelband and Edmund Husserl, becoming fast and lifelong friends with the latter. He returned to Harvard in 1903 and completed the PhD in philosophy in 1904.

Hocking, like so many other distinguished Harvard products of that generation, was caught in a battle of giants: James, Josiah Royce, and George Santayana. In the case of Hocking, Royce was the victor for his philosophical soul, but no student of the three great philosophers ever wholly shed the influence of any of them. That Hocking should have written on philosophical psychology indicates a culmination in his earlier fascination with James's psychology. Hocking remained convinced throughout his life that the social sciences could act as a solid guide to responsible philosophical reflection, so long as both strove to be ever more scientific, in the broad sense of German *Wissenschaft*, rather than the narrower, reductionist ideas of natural science that were gaining in popularity throughout Hocking's career. This optimism about the possibilities for human knowledge was not only a characteristic of Hocking's thought, but of his personality, which is often described as tenacious in its optimism. Hocking was the product of a progressive and relatively peaceful age, and his optimism should be seen in that light.

Hocking's initial appointment after graduation was teaching philosophy at Andover Theological Seminary from 1904 to 1906, followed by two years at the University of California at Berkeley, where

he had been invited by Royce's and James's old friend and philosophical sparring partner, George Holmes Howison. Howison was an idealist, like Royce, and Hocking's idealist leanings were reinforced during his years in California. Howison's commitment to personalism was more explicit than Royce's and Hocking's own later insistence upon person may have been reinforced by Howison's views. In 1908 Hocking was called to Yale University where he taught philosophy for six years while finishing *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, which appeared in 1912. This well received and widely reviewed work resulted in Hocking's call back to Harvard as professor of philosophy in 1914 where he remained until his retirement in 1943.

Whether or not Hocking is regarded as a process philosopher, it is clear that his move in the direction of the concrete is one he attributes to the role of pragmatism in his thinking. Feeling in Hocking's view is social before it can be individual, and its immediacy just is the originally undifferentiated orientation of a particular perspective upon a broader reality. Individuality develops later, sociality being its basis. Hence, we are with others before we have selves. And it is others we understand first and foremost in the act of experiencing. Our self-understanding, when it comes and such as it is, is a reflection upon what we understand about others. This is not first or foremost a cognitive process for Hocking, it is a process of feeling, a natural process, with psychological results. To this extent Hocking follows Royce's notions about the "community of interpretation." Where Royce understood how partial experience opened out onto a whole, he was more optimistic about the capacity of human intelligence to grasp that whole than Hocking's type of radical empiricism allows. Hocking believed that some a priori knowledge was genuine, but

not generalizations extending to the whole of reality. James, on the other hand, was ruling out any role for a priori knowledge, and Hocking believed we could achieve more than he allowed by reasoning upon the particulars of concrete experience and generalizing responsibly. This is, methodologically speaking, the middle path Hocking was able to negotiate using his insight into the cognitive value of feeling. Feeling is not a dead end, it is an opening outward onto what is genuinely and immediately there, and taking its natural course it develops into ideas, which are generalizations from a unique perspective of what is felt.

What sort of “idealism” issues from the claim that “feeling has cognitive value”? This view of feeling has many implications. Hocking always took for granted the need for a metaphysics of individuality that preserved personhood and freedom, but he departed from the logic-driven versions of idealism that were dominant in his formative years. Rather, Hocking took his direction from a more intuitive, concrete and pragmatic sense of human experience that first affirms the validity of inter-personal experience and only then seeks a conceptual understanding that will be maximally consistent with experience and true of it, insofar as language and abstract expression permit. This account sees logic as the best articulation of the ordering activity of the mind, but refuses to give any logic the status of the necessary lawgiver of the mind, and even less would logic be binding upon the structures of existence. Logic is rather a result of the efforts of finite minds to grasp what they are already doing, and any account of the logic of mental activity would need to be revisable in light of a better understanding of the powers and limitations of finite minds, with the best understanding being provided by the progress of the

social sciences. Thus, as the project of self-knowledge proceeds in history and cumulative experience, we should expect to have to revise our understanding of logic. Hocking’s view involves relinquishing the claim that any given logic is the foundation of all mental activity, and it also turns away from idealistic and philosophical psychologies, in preference of empirical ones. Consequently, Hocking sees the necessity we seem to discover in logical relations as a necessity strictly internal to the accounts of logic and reason we have offered, highly mediated accounts based on our reflection upon experience, understood historically, culturally, and symbolically.

The basis for this view of the mediated character of knowledge is again the cognitive value of feeling. Hocking argues that feeling always strains to produce ideas: all feelings strive towards a sort of self-clarification, and the resulting ideas cannot exist alone but depend for their very being upon these prior feelings. The sociality of feelings then requires articulation along both a subjective and objective side. On the subjective side, immediate social feelings develop according to an immanent dynamism that is the community of interpretation. Subsequent mediated experience, including knowledge, draws both its content and existence from this immediate social feeling. Among the basic characteristics of immediate feeling, apart from its sociality, are that it is personal, plural, communicative, and presupposes freedom. On the objective side, this view of immediacy requires, in turn, a broader account of the existing order in which finite human beings exist, and a creative role for them. For this science reason is useful, but reason is only one among many principles that mind employs in understanding and describing its reality. The ensuing metaphysical issues run as follows: Granting

that feeling and desire are social, intentional in structure and issue in thought, why does feeling exist rather than nothing? Granting that no one can honestly doubt that he or she experiences feeling, what creates it? Is feeling one or many, ultimately? Is its knowledge-content meaningful apart from each particular occurrence of each feeling? If so, what validity supports the claim that it is either one or many? These are the sorts of questions Hocking would have addressed in the complete metaphysics he promised but never published. He wrote much of what was needed to address these questions for his Gifford Lectures in 1938–39, but his revision of them was interrupted by World War II, and no revision ever brought these writings to a form that satisfied Hocking.

Hocking was not satisfied with a merely inferential knowledge regarding the personal character of reality and therefore finds Royce's response theory inadequate phenomenologically, and his logical solution to the problem in his proofs for the existence of God from the reality of error and ignorance overly abstract. It is here that Hocking turns to mystical experience for assistance. In what types of experience may we find the ground of an inferential knowledge of the personal reality of the other? According to Hocking, the "immediate experience of the Real is regarded by the mystics as a somewhat unusual or privileged state of being...a sort of initiation, after which one is no longer an *outsider* in the world" (1939, p. 453). More importantly, "the mystic is a radical, without caution, trimming, or compromise, in his assertion of the essential value of life" (1939, p. 455). The essential value of life is not asserted first as a theoretical principle or a universal law, but as a practical condition of the transformed will of the mystic. Hocking holds the individual person to be the creative node that communities produce in their

evolution and histories, and which in turn transform those communities, either for better or for worse. Our "vital circuits" become in ethical life "will-circuits" by way of the transformation of immediate feeling into cognitively elaborated values. We consciously pursue our own moral evolution, and we do so in community. A "passion for righteousness" becomes the creative impetus in creating a preservative "a world faith" in which the permanent moral gains of humankind are built upon indefinitely.

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Randall E. Auxier

HOLMES, JOHN (1799–1852)

John Holmes was born on 7 February 1799 in Windsor, Vermont. Holmes adopted Catholicism, and went to study the philosophy portion of the classical program at the Petit Séminaire de Montréal. Holmes soon decided to become a priest, and the bishop

of Québec, Joseph-Octave Plessis, assigned him to the Séminaire de Nicolet near Trois-Rivières, where he taught philosophy classes during 1819–20 and 1821–23 while pursuing theological studies. He was ordained priest on 5 August 1823, and in October he was appointed assistant priest at Berthier-en-Haut (Berthierville, Québec) and a missionary at Drummondville. By 1825 he had abandoned the assistant priesthood, and instead ministered to the faithful between Drummondville and Sherbrooke, traveling constantly in winter and summer. His love of study and teaching brought Holmes to a position in the Petit Séminaire de Québec on 3 March 1827. He arrived in August, took responsibility for the philosophy instruction, and was so well-liked that he became a member of the community in the following year. However, teaching soon proved to be too much of a stress to his frail health. In 1830 he was given the position of director of students and prefect of studies, to which he applied himself with enthusiasm. He remained in this position until 1849; this appointment marked the beginning of an extremely fruitful phase of his career.

Holmes spent his first three years at the seminary observing and reflecting upon the gaps in the curriculum. Latin, French, English, science, and mathematics were included, but only in the philosophy portion of the curriculum, and Holmes found the offered history and geography to be thin. He introduced Greek in 1830, and then required mathematics study during every year of college, a move which constituted a revolution all on its own. From then on, the seminary had two science teachers and a philosophy teacher, while English, history, and geography were taught from textbooks, and still partially in English.

Holmes and his colleague Jérôme Demers prepared texts for history, philosophy, and geography, while Holmes purchased manuals

for other subjects. Holmes published *Nouvel abrégé de géographie moderne suivi d'un petit abrégé de géographie ancienne à l'usage de la jeunesse* in 1831, and this work had several later editions, staying in print until the 1880s. Holmes encouraged students to take up music, public speaking, and drama, which led to the formation of a brass band in 1833, and in 1838 he also introduced the teaching of Canadian history. Holmes even went as far as to revise the end-of-year examinations to make them more like the literary exercises of French colleges before 1760, reviving the grand demonstrations of the seventeenth and eighteenth century Jesuit and Oratorian colleges.

Holmes became involved with public education as well. In 1835, the standing committee of education and schools declared that one of the most important defects of public schooling stemmed from the lack of training for teachers, and decided that it was necessary to set up normal schools. On 21 March 1836 a bill was enacted that provided for two normal schools for men, one in Montréal and one in Québec, each under a management committee of ten. As a member of the Québec committee, Holmes was asked to research elementary instruction, teaching methods, and teachers' colleges in other countries, as well as to hire directors for the normal schools. Holmes left Québec for the United States on 12 May 1836. He visited colleges throughout New England, collecting information on their administrative, pedagogical, and financial practices, as well as their systems of teaching. He then wrote reports and forwarded documents and books to the management committees, accomplishing all of this by June.

Having seen what he believed to be the best of the United States, Holmes then traveled to Europe to gather information on the British, German, and French systems. Arrangements

were made for him to meet members of learned societies in the name of the Literary and Historical Society of Québec, and thus Holmes went to England, Scotland, Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy to carry out his task. He met ministers, rectors, teachers, and members of the London and Paris academies; he purchased books and instruments and wrote detailed letters whenever possible, describing his experiences and observations. He was successful in every mission assigned, and he hired Andrew Findlater and François-Joseph-Victor Regnaud as the normal school teachers for Canada. He resumed his position as prefect of Petit Séminaire de Québec in August 1838 with the same passion as before.

Over the next ten years or so, Holmes' continual quest for knowledge did not falter in the slightest. He was a frequent bookshop client and an active member of the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec. He was involved in publishing the second volume of documents put out by the society in 1840, documents which he had helped to collect during his trip to France.

In the winter of 1848 Holmes gave a series of talks at Notre-Dame cathedral in Québec, which were published under the title *Conferencés de Notre-Dame de Québec*. Holmes was also politically active, being acknowledged as a true Canadian who took a genuine interest in the goings-on of his adopted country. During his ministry in the Eastern Townships, Holmes noticed that the area needed an increase in population, and therefore encouraged movement of settlers into the townships. After 1840, he may have entertained the idea of regrouping the British territories of North America into a kind of customs union, but although he had well-argued political notions, one cannot label him as a member of the Patriote party.

Instead, Holmes' correspondence from Europe contains counter-revolutionary remarks.

Holmes gave up his office as prefect in 1849 and traveled in search of rest, only to return to Québec to instruct candidates for the priesthood on preaching. He died in L'Ancienne-Lorette (now enclosed within the city of Québec) on 18 June 1852. The seminary, recognizing Holmes' enormous contribution, inscribed his name as a founder of the Université Laval in its charter granted in December 1852.

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HOLT, EDWIN BISSELL (1873–1946)

Edwin B. Holt was born on 21 August 1873 in Winchester, Massachusetts. He attended Amherst College in 1892, and subsequently enrolled at Harvard University, receiving a BA degree in 1896. Holt's most influential teachers at Harvard were William James, Josiah Royce, and Hugo Münsterberg. Holt began graduate studies at Harvard in 1897, but left for a year of military service in 1898 during the Spanish-American War. Holt studied medicine at the University of Freiburg in 1899, and then psychology at Columbia University with James McKeen Cattell, receiving his MA degree in 1900. Holt returned to Harvard for further graduate study. After receiving the PhD in psychology in 1901, Holt was appointed instructor at Harvard, and subsequently promoted to assistant professor in 1905. He resigned his position in 1918, but was persuaded to return to teaching as visiting professor of psychology at Princeton University from 1926 to 1936. Holt died on 25 January 1946 in Tenants Harbor, Maine.

Holt adapted the conceptual structure of Royce's Idealism to meet the metaphysical commitments of James's radical empiricism. The latter was James's project of developing an alternative to the matter-mind dualism of the British Empiricists, on the one hand, and the mentalism of Neo-Kantian varieties of Idealism on the other, *both* of which placed reality beyond the knower's immediate grasp. Through radical empiricism, James sought to develop the groundwork for a realist epistemology. Holt felt that Royce provided a logical system for deriving a succession of hierarchically structured domains of experience, or "universes of discourse," that included mathematics, geometry, physics,

chemistry, and psychology. The differences that exist among these orders of discourse were seen as differences in the functional *properties* existing at successive structured levels of a common substance, rather than differences in *substance* as found in a dualistic metaphysics. Departing from Royce, however, who envisioned this common substance to be mind, Holt argued that these domains were all ultimately composed of a common ontologically neutral “stuff,” along the lines of James’s notion of “pure experience.” Further, Holt proposed that these manifolds of structure are externally related, each logically connected but operating independently according to different specifiable principles. This framework permitted Holt to make a case for consciousness as but one of many *irreducible* domains within a pluralistic universe of ontologically neutral stuff.

The most significant concept in *The Concept of Consciousness* (1914) is that of a “cross-section,” which was inspired by James’s treatment of consciousness in his classic essay “Does Consciousness Exist?” A cross-section is defined as any portion of one manifold that is articulated by operations specific to a different manifold. For example, perceiving is an operation specific to the manifold that is consciousness, and at any particular moment perceiving selectively articulates a portion of the manifold that is the so-called material world. Just as a searchlight from a boat at night illuminates features of a shoreline that exist independently of the boat, so consciousness selectively discriminates some features of the domain that is the material world existing independently of the psychological order. As the landscape example illustrates, that which is illuminated by the searchlight at any moment is neither dependent on the light for its existence nor exists within the light; rather, it is *a function of the relationship* between the two. Likewise,

the environment that is perceived is neither dependent on the perceiver for its existence, nor exists within the knowing mind; it involves an awareness of properties that are a function of the operations of the knower. That is, what is experienced resides in the relationship between the knower and the known. Significantly, from this perspective, perceiving is a direct relation between knower and known, rather than being mediated by a mental representation. The commitment to indirect realism that mental representations require is invariably tainted with the specter of solipsism. Finally, because consciousness as a cross-section of the material world is always selective and partial, with further transactions more can be discovered about the universe of discourse that is the material world.

In 1910 Holt collaborated with five other philosophers, including R.B. Perry at Harvard and W.P. Montague at Columbia, to produce a program for a new philosophical approach they called “The New Realism.” Their initial platform offered an explication and extension of James’s radical empiricist philosophy and a defense of it in the face of criticisms principally from Idealist quarters. In spite of acknowledged differences among this group, what they took as common ground was their objection to the epistemological claim that a mind can only have direct knowledge of its own mental states. They opposed not only Royce’s idealism, but also any account of knowing that takes mental representation as its epistemic starting point. This essay was followed two years later by the book, *The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy* (1912). In addition to a joint introductory chapter by the group, each philosopher contributed an individual chapter. The aim of Holt’s chapter was to address what is commonly identified as the fatal challenge to any direct realist proposal, namely, the

occurrence of perceptual illusions. If the world is experienced directly, how can one account for errors in perceptual experience, illusions being the most dramatic sort? The realist position is “as things are perceived so *they are*,” which must be distinguished from the claim “as things are so *they really are*.... Because while all perceived things are things, *not* all perceived things are *real* things” (p. 358). The realist’s position is that while the knower-known relation is direct, that does mean that it is free of error; directness is to be distinguished from veridicality. Holt illustrates this point with reference to the left-right reversal in a mirror reflection, which while producing error is fully explainable within the conditions of the mirror-perceiver relation.

Holt attended the 1909 Clark University lectures given by Sigmund Freud and was deeply impressed by Freud’s psychodynamic view, principally because it made a compelling case for the active and purposive nature of mind. In perhaps his most widely read book, *The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics* (1915), Holt argued that the everyday phenomena Freud studied, such as slips of the tongue, forgetting, and humor, starkly revealed that mind was fundamentally comprised of “wishes” for courses of action. As a result, Freud dramatically demonstrated that the appropriate analytical unit for psychology was a mental function, rather than a static element of mind (such as a sensation). Psychological functions are directed rather than random; they are “specific responses” which the body is prepared to execute with regard to some feature of the environment. Freud was especially helpful in showing that everyday actions are often best understood as arising from conflicting desires, or from Holt’s perspective, in terms of the joint action of several specific responses innervated concurrently.

Holt’s behaviorism is distinctive, being both molar and purposive rather than reductionistic and mechanistic. Holt’s purposive behaviorism resembles John B. Watson’s approach and that of his successors only in a shared positivistic outlook. His psychological perspective is most fully developed in the “Response and Cognition” essays that are appended to *The Freudian Wish*. Three *interrelated* ideas run through the two essays. First, the appropriate unit of analysis for psychology is the functional relationship between the behaving organism and some feature of the environment. Holt rejected the notion that psychological phenomena are reducible to underlying biological states of the organism because the psychological domain consists of properties of the organism-environment *relation*, and as such there are distinctive natural properties manifested only at that level of analysis. Holt’s student Edward C. Tolman became the most visible exponent of this view within twentieth century psychology. Second, psychology like any natural science was to look for lawful functional relationships between variables within its domain of analysis. In its failure to do so, psychology has been prone to invent fictitious, hidden causes of non-natural character, namely, those due to mind in the sense of an extended, Cartesian entity. Such mentalistic fictions can be overcome, and psychology can fully embrace a natural science perspective, by looking beyond immediate, antecedent “causes” of behavior, for example, proximal stimuli at receptor surfaces. Third, behavior is to be viewed as a “specific, integrated response” to increasingly distal features of the environment. That is, as behavior becomes progressively integrated, the effective stimulus is to be found at more distal and molar levels of the environment. This is Holt’s claim of the “recession of the

stimulus,” which would find it most complete development in the ecological psychology of Holt’s student James J. Gibson.

From 1926 until 1936, Holt taught psychology courses each spring semester at Princeton, while spending the rest of the year at his home in Tenants Harbor, in Rockland County, Maine. During this period, Holt brought to conclusion the first volume of a projected two-volume work, *Animal Drive and the Learning Process: An Essay Towards Radical Empiricism* (1931). This work can be seen, in part, as an attempt to provide the biological underpinnings of the philosophical and psychological perspective Holt had been developing throughout his career. A core concept in the book is the “reflex circle,” which because of its dynamic quality is better suited to an account of purposive action than the reflex arc, the reductive and static cornerstone of classical behaviorism and its offshoots. The “reflex circle” was later adapted by Gordon Allport in developing his influential idea of the “functional autonomy” of action.

Holt’s prominence in psychology declined by the middle of the twentieth century, but his legacy was conveyed to post-1950s psychology by his two most prominent students. Tolman’s cognitive behaviorism work served as a critical bridge between behaviorism and the reemergence of cognitive psychology. Gibson’s ecological approach to perception proposes a functional analysis of psychology based on person-environment reciprocity, and in so doing offers grounds for the direct realist epistemology that James initially sought in his radical empiricism and that Holt attempted to advance.

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Harry Heft

HOOK, SIDNEY (1902–1989)

Sidney Hook was born on 20 December 1902 in Brooklyn, New York. He earned his BA from City College of New York in 1923, and was influenced by philosopher Morris R. Cohen. Like many of Cohen’s students, Hook was drawn towards naturalism and pragmatic empiricism, and sent on to graduate study at Columbia University under

John Dewey. After receiving his PhD in philosophy in 1927, writing a dissertation on “The Metaphysics of Pragmatism” (published that year), Hook was appointed instructor of philosophy at New York University in 1927. He was rapidly promoted and became department head in 1934, holding this position until his retirement in 1969. Hook was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1959–60. In 1973 Hook became a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University. He was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1985. Hook died on 12 July 1989 in Stanford, California.

Hook was the most prominent defender of the legacy of Dewey’s pragmatism during the middle and late twentieth century. This legacy of naturalistic humanism and pragmatic liberalism fell upon Hook’s shoulders early in his career, as Dewey quickly recognized Hook’s commitment to the main principles of his own pragmatism. Among those principles was democratic socialism, which advocated the public control of industry for the general welfare. Hook’s early work attempted to synthesize Dewey’s theory of democratic inquiry with Karl Marx’s justification of socialism. He found sufficient overlap between them, concerning the preeminent role of science and the priority of action over pure reason, to describe how democracy and socialism are compatible. As a proponent of democracy however, Hook rejected both historical materialism and determinism, and any violent means of revolution. Hook was happy to describe himself as a Marxist as well as a pragmatist, because a friend of democracy, in Hook’s view, would not prefer the tyranny of the capitalist class. As Marxism and communism became close synonyms during the 1940s, Hook stopped referring to himself a Marxist since a well-managed

capitalism should not be confused with the totalitarian form of communism.

While sympathetic to the economic and democratic side of Marx, Hook held communist ideology and political tactics in contempt. Watchful towards the Soviet Union in the 1930s, he soon recognized that the Soviet experiment was turning against basic human rights and the civil rights of political liberty and freedom of speech. Hook remained a staunch defender of freedom of political inquiry first and foremost; whether he should be categorized as a liberal or conservative can obscure his radical commitment to the experimental method of democratic deliberation. Hook and Dewey organized a commission that refuted Stalin’s accusations against Leon Trotsky in Mexico City in 1938, and took the then-unpopular position before and during World War II that Stalinism was just as dangerous as Nazism. During the Cold War, Hook argued that communists should not be allowed to teach, on the grounds that those who cannot respect freedom of thought and speech do not deserve to have their own speech protected. Most of his ideas about justifying and protecting democracy are collected in *Political Power and Personal Freedom* (1959).

For Hook, democratic inquiry should be responsible for morality as well as law. Hook’s pragmatism accepted the reality of value pluralism, and paralleling a denial of absolute truths in epistemology and science, he rejected absolute values in morality. Religion should no longer control morality, and indeed Hook was philosophically opposed to religion, preferring atheism. His naturalism restricted reasonable belief to empirical grounds and scientifically justifiable theories. Hook’s mature conclusions about empiricism, science, and metaphysics can be found in the essays collected in *The Quest for Being, and Other Studies in Naturalism and*

Humanism (1961). Calling himself a “secular humanist,” he advocated both freedom of religion and strict boundaries to keep religion from controlling politics.

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John R. Shook

HOPKINS, MARK (1802–1887)

Mark Hopkins was born on 4 February 1802 in Stockbridge, Massachusetts. The grandnephew of theologian Samuel Hopkins,

he was educated at private academies. In 1820 he went to Mecklenburg, Virginia, to teach. He then entered Williams College in Massachusetts as a sophomore and graduated with his BA degree in 1824, giving the valedictory oration. He then began the study of medicine in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. In 1825 he was appointed tutor to the junior class at Williams, but he resumed medical studies, and in 1829 received his MD. After practicing medicine in New York, he was appointed in 1830 as Professor of Rhetoric and Moral Philosophy at Williams. Hopkins was also licensed to preach by the Berkshire Association of Congregational Ministers in 1833. Elected President of Williams College in 1836, Hopkins was the youngest man ever to hold office as college president in the United States, and in this same year he was also made Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy and ordained a Congregational minister. The following year he received the honorary DD degree from Dartmouth, and in 1841 Harvard College conferred on him that same degree. In 1868 he was elected President of the Academy of Metaphysical and Ethical Sciences (apparently a short-lived society). Hopkins retired from the presidency of Williams College in 1872. Hopkins died on 17 June 1887 in Williamstown, Massachusetts.

An 1856 alumnus of Williams, future U.S. President James A. Garfield is reported to have said in 1871 that “The ideal college is Mark Hopkins on one end of a log and a student on the other.” This famous statement defines the true small college: a group of professors and students working together in a friendly, often informal way, to make higher education a reality. Hopkins, in his evangelical cast of mind, thought more highly of developing moral and spiritual character than of imparting knowledge alone. Though aware of the weak points of

Unitarianism, he came under the influence of the Unitarian William E. Channing and turned away from the system of Jonathan Edwards. He also rejected the intuitionism of Ralph Waldo Emerson, considering it relativistic and chaotic, and leading to moral anarchy. We need more than a refined Emersonian appreciation of nature, he implied; we need an informed conscience.

During his tenure as President of Williams, science was promoted, while the older theology of strict Calvinism was removed. Instead, astronomy, chemistry, physics, world affairs, mathematics, landscape gardening, languages, and ethics were taught. Hopkins presented a Christian conception of ethics. He approved of the Scottish Common Sense School of philosophy which provided refutations of skepticism about God’s existence, the truths of revelation, and the authority of natural law. James McCosh at Princeton University held that Hopkins was a utilitarian because for him an act was right if it tended to the good and happiness of all. Yet, Hopkins rejected as *too* utilitarian the widely used text *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (1785) by William Paley. He also held that a fair and nonsectarian presentation of evidence would create a rational conviction of the truth of Christianity. Hopkins was likely unaware of the so-called higher criticism of the Bible and he rejected Darwinism. For Hopkins, Christianity was the path to progress and happiness. In *The Law of Love* (1869), he expounded the idea that behind duty stands love, which is the supreme motive and law of life.

Hopkins’s major contribution to ethics is *Lectures on Moral Science* (1862). His ethics is teleological; the duties of man to himself and to God are determined in the light of his end as a creature of God. Our moral nature is made up of these powers of the mind: the moral reason, moral affections, conscience,

and free will. Hopkins tried to reconcile reason with faith. Reason is the basis of ethics, while faith is the distinctive principle of religion. A person is rational and free, with a moral sense, and is held accountable for his actions. Reason is a power by which humanity is especially made in the image of God; without free will there would be no obligation or responsibility, and no praise or blame could be earned by anyone.

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Edward W. O'Brien

HORKHEIMER, MAX (1895–1973)

Max Horkheimer was born on 14 February 1895 in Stuttgart, Germany. After service in the German military in World War I at a domestic post, Horkheimer studied at several universities. At the recently established University of Frankfurt am Main, he earned his PhD in philosophy in 1922 and was habilitated in 1925. His adviser, Hans Cornelius, was a chief representative of neo-Kantianism. In the early 1920s, Horkheimer wrote on aspects of Kant's philosophy. In the late 1920s, Horkheimer turned to problems in the sociology of knowledge. Horkheimer gained an interest in this area through friends at the *Institut für Sozialforschung* (Institute of Social Research), an avowedly Marxist think-tank at the University of Frankfurt.

In 1930, Horkheimer became Director of the Institute and held that position until 1958. Also in 1930, he assumed a professorship at Frankfurt in the field of "social philosophy," the first of its kind, created specially for him through the help of Paul Tillich. Horkheimer's inaugural address as Institute director, "The

Present Condition of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute of Social Research,” set the outlines of the Institute’s endeavors for the next three decades. Horkheimer announced that under his directorship, the Institute would strive to bring about a unity of speculative philosophy and the empirical social sciences. Philosophers would pose theories about the nature of consciousness and experience. Empirical social scientists would test these theories against hard evidence, and report the results to the philosophers. In turn, the philosophers would reflect on these results and offer reformulated theories to the social scientists, who would test them, report the results, and so on, with the process continuing indefinitely.

The principles behind this methodology were clearly Hegelian rather than Marxian. Horkheimer felt that an unusually high degree of collective perspicuity concerning human affairs would issue from the Institute’s research program – an intellectual virtue consistent with Hegelianism that had Kantian overtones as well. Done separately, Horkheimer found speculative philosophy to be uninformed and naïve, while empirical research is condemned to “long, boring, individual studies that split up into a thousand partial questions, culminating in a chaos of countless enclaves of specialists” (1993, p. 9). The Institute would strive to be a handmaid to both classifications of learning, leading to ever sharper and more precise knowledge among scholars at large.

Just as the Institute was setting out under Horkheimer, Hitler came to power in Germany. By early 1933, nearly every one of the members of the Institute, each of whom was Jewish and in some way tinged with leftism, had fled the country. An inquiry to the President of Columbia University, Nicholas Murray Butler, led to an offer by Columbia to house the Institute. In 1934, Horkheimer,

along with several of the Institute’s members, moved to New York City.

During the first years in New York, the Institute pressed on with two big efforts that were to integrate philosophy and empirical social science more or less along the lines Horkheimer had specified at the inaugural. The first bore fruit in the 1936 *Studien über Autorität und Familie* (“Studies on Authority and the Family”). Another project that Horkheimer tried to see to completion was one he had underscored in the inaugural: a survey of “skilled craftspeople and white collar workers” in Germany and other European countries. Due both to disagreements among the Institute staff over theoretical approaches and the loss of completed social-survey instruments during the departure from Germany, this project came into being incompletely over the next fifteen years, in the form of occasional articles by Institute affiliates.

Aside from being director, Horkheimer was one of the Institute’s philosophers. Horkheimer spent the mid-1930s composing essays in philosophy and intellectual history. These essays appeared in the Institute’s journal, the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (*Journal of Social Research*), which had become effectively in-house with the Institute’s move to New York. Horkheimer insisted that the one thing that could wash away the imperfection of utopianism from Kant and Hegel had decidedly come on the scene by his own day: economic progress. Given the abundance of wealth in the twentieth century, everyone had a chance to be moral along Kantian and Hegelian lines, since one did not have to worry that in sharing material property there might not be enough to go around. Moreover, the industrial economy had ushered in new disciplines of research and inquiry, specifically empirical social science, which was up to the challenge

of doing the number-crunching required by the categorical imperative.

In 1937, with help from two Institute members, Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno, Horkheimer unveiled the concept of “critical theory” in the *Zeitschrift*. Here Horkheimer argued, among other things, that since the modern self was deeply mal-conditioned by capitalism, one hallmark of truly enlightened thought must be its manifest irrelevance. However, after the critical theory essay, Horkheimer and other members of the Institute made concerted efforts to integrate themselves into American academic life. Horkheimer taught at Columbia’s night school and established contacts at the American Jewish Committee and other research foundations. When World War II began in Europe, Horkheimer retired the *Zeitschrift* and started an English-language journal, *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*.

Horkheimer’s work proceeded along two lines in the 1940s. In philosophical work, his own *métier*, Horkheimer extended the claims of pessimism that he had outlined in the later *Zeitschrift* essays. In Institute-wide endeavors in sociological research, Horkheimer supervised a number of projects that could at last claim to represent the sort of marriage of theory and empirical social science that Horkheimer had promised in 1931. The philosophical work resulted in a book that is today regarded as a classic of twentieth-century letters: *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, which Horkheimer co-authored with Adorno. For several years in the early 1940s, Horkheimer and Adorno worked intensively on this book from their homes in Southern California. A first version was published in 1944 but circulated only to Institute members. A revised version was brought to print in 1947 by an Amsterdam

publishing house. Unlike virtually everything else done by the Institute at that point in time, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* was written not in English but German and concealed from American readers as much as possible.

The thesis of the book was that the impulse toward rational thought in Western societies was itself responsible for the major examples of irrationalism rampant in the modern world: Nazism in central Europe; Stalinism in the Soviet Union; and “mass culture” (a term this book did much to bring into currency) in the United States. Rationality’s step-by-step victory over superstition, religion, and the unknown, over the ages, had been enabled by a latent lust for annihilation on the part of rationality itself. Once rationality had banished every conceivable redoubt of faith and guesswork, all that remained was the underlying lust for annihilation. This unfortunate characteristic had to do something with itself in a world where there were virtually no pseudo-knowledge forms left to annihilate. Therefore the modern world, which had been ushered in by brilliant bursts of rationality, was fated to collapse into psychosis. This argument suggested that Horkheimer and Adorno had learned from Freud more than they had let on previously. In the late 1930s, Horkheimer had evicted Erich Fromm out of Institute for being too much of a Freudian.

Horkheimer published in English a minor version of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* with significant optimistic emendations, called *Eclipse of Reason* (1947). Aside from this work and one talk at a philosophical conference in 1946, Horkheimer studiously endeavored to keep *Dialectic of Enlightenment* from American readers. He did the same thing with respect to German readers in the 1950s and 1960s, conceding to a republication in 1969

only after an extremely acrimonious serious of encounters with student activists who demanded that the book be reprinted.

The University of Frankfurt invited Horkheimer back, not only to assume his professorship and to reestablish the Institute in its former home, but to become the university's president. Horkheimer became the first Jewish President of a German university, and served from 1951 to 1953. The Institute of Social Research, now referred to colloquially as the "Frankfurt School," became famous as the organization that had kept German culture alive during the country's darkest hour. From 1954 to 1959 he lectured periodically at the University of Chicago. In 1958, he passed the Institute directorship to Adorno. Horkheimer authorized a republication of a selection of the *Zeitschrift* essays and the milder *Dialectic of Enlightenment* of 1947. Both were introduced with new forewords that indicated Horkheimer's mixed feelings about these works. The books were soon translated into English and gained significant American readership for the first time. In 1959, Horkheimer retired from his professorship at Frankfurt and moved to Switzerland, where he would live until his death on 7 July 1973 in Nuremberg, Germany.

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Brian Domitrovic

HOUDET, ANTOINE-JACQUES (1763–1826)

Antoine-Jacques Houdet was a philosophy professor who lived through times of tremendous change in the Catholic Church and education in Canada. Houdet was born

on 1 December 1763 in Château-Gontier, France. He went to the Séminaire d'Angers in 1783 and completed its program of two years of philosophy and four years of theology. He was ordained priest in 1788 and admitted into the Society of Saint-Sulpice in 1789. He then taught theological dogmatics at the Séminaire de Nantes in 1790. When the French Revolution erupted and the new government demanded that all clergy take an oath of loyalty, his order of Sulpicians refused and Houdet soon went to Spain.

Trying to rejoin his order in a French-speaking land, he arrived in Montréal in 1796 and joined the faculty of the Collège Saint-Raphael. His Director was Jean-Baptiste-Jacques Chicoisneau, and other faculty included Claude Rivière and Jacques-Guillaume Roque. Together they reformed the institution's educational standards and improved its reputation. Immense challenges lay everywhere. Having been the leaders of education in Canada, the Catholic orders were undergoing an era of disruption and struggle due to the British conquest and the French Revolution. However, Houdet represented the resurgence of higher education in French-speaking Canada, as many priests were making their way there in the aftermath of the Revolution.

The colleges of French Canada had suffered heavily from the British conquest of 1759. The oldest college in North America, the Collège des Jésuites in the city of Québec, was completely destroyed soon after. However, the two smaller seminaries survived, in Québec and Montreal. The Séminaire de Québec, founded in 1663 by François de Laval, then became the leading institution of higher education in Canada. It became a college in 1765 and taught some science and philosophy in addition to theology, and accepted students not intending the priesthood. However, the departure of many priests after the British

conquest and the suppression of the Jesuit order that began in 1773 further weakened the intellectual quality of higher education. Accordingly, the philosophical instruction was sporadic, but newer influences from Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke were able to join the traditional Thomistic theology. The arrival of Jérôme Demers to fill the chair of philosophy in 1800 stabilized philosophical teaching in Québec.

The other surviving seminary, the Collège Saint-Raphael, was founded in 1767 at Montréal by the Sulpicians. A chair of philosophy was established in 1789. While Houdet held that chair from 1796 until 1826, his seminary grew and became known as the Collège de Montréal during the nineteenth century (it later diminished to a secondary school in the twentieth century). Since instruction in "philosophy" then encompassed both natural philosophy and moral philosophy, Houdet taught many subjects including mathematics, science, and astronomy, along with rhetoric, belles-lettres, ethics, and metaphysics. The lectures that Houdet gave in rhetoric and belles-lettres were published after his death and used for another generation of students. With his colleague Rivière he also composed a *Grammaire française pour servir d'introduction à la grammaire latine* in two volumes (1811). Houdet taught at the Collège de Montréal until his death on 7 April 1826 in Montréal.

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John R. Shook

HOURLANI, GEORGE FADLO
(1913–1984)

George Hourani was born of Lebanese parents on 3 June 1913 in Manchester, England. For his junior and senior years, he moved to London to study classics at the Mill Hill School. In 1936 he received his BA in Greek and Latin literature, Greek and Roman history, and ancient and modern philosophy with honors from Oxford University. At the suggestion of Philip Hitti, the well-known historian, he entered Princeton University, where he received his PhD in history in 1939. His dissertation was published under the title *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times* (1951) and reprinted several times. Hourani’s scholarship was aided by his extensive knowledge of Greek, Latin, Arabic, English, and French and competence in Hebrew, German, Italian, and Spanish.

Hourani began his teaching career at the Arab College in Jerusalem, leaving for England when the English mandate over Palestine ended in 1948. He taught history at the University of Michigan from 1950 to 1967, and then completed his career

as professor of philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He was named Distinguished Professor of Islamic Thought and Civilization, teaching there until his retirement in 1983. Hourani died on 19 September 1984 in Buffalo, New York. Those of us who were fortunate to be his students not only benefited from his insistence on high scholarly standards, but also enjoyed frequent invitations to his house.

More than anyone before him, Hourani brought to the attention of American intellectual circles the importance of Arab and Islamic philosophy. His publication of eight books and tens of articles include the first annotated English translations of some very important texts, such as *Fasl al-Maqal* (Decisive Treatise) by Averroës. Especially through his work on Islamic ethics and the relation of religion to philosophy, he demonstrated that, contrary to the common view, Arab/Islamic philosophy did not merely transmit Greek philosophy to the West, but was characterized by much originality, especially in the field of ethics, something that makes it worthy of study at American universities. His efforts were continued by his students, whom he viewed as his “future books”; several of them became well-known scholars at Western universities.

Hourani’s early writings reflect a deep interest in Arab/Islamic culture, society, politics, and literature, as his book on seafaring and articles on Syria, Egypt, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and Arabic literature reveal. His interest in these issues did not diminish, as his TV and radio appearances, and other public activities, especially in the late 1970s showed, but his later writings were more focused on pure philosophy, ethical issues, and the relation of religion to philosophy in Islam. Here he established himself as an original thinker and philosopher.

Hourani's prominence as a scholar was recognized by many prestigious awards and grants. SUNY promoted him to Distinguished Professor, and after his death established a graduate fellowship and a lecture series in his name. He served as President of the Middle East Studies Association in 1968–69 and the American Oriental Society in 1978–79.

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HOWISON, GEORGE HOLMES (1834–1916)

George Holmes Howison was born on 29 November 1834, in Montgomery County, Maryland, and died on 31 December 1916 in Berkeley, California. When Howison was four years of age, his parents foreswore the institution of slavery, freed their slaves and moved to Marietta, Ohio, on the Muskingum River, largely for the educational and cultural life of the young city. There was in Marietta a great variety of Christian sects, but they were distinguished by having forged an early consensus and ecumenism, a co-operative community in which even Protestants and Catholics worked together, an example of religious pluralism in action. There Howison attended first Marietta Academy and later Harmar Academy where he was afforded a classical education, particularly emphasizing the antique languages. He entered Marietta College at age 14 and commenced his study of German, not touching upon philosophy until his senior year. After taking his BA degree in 1852, Howison first pursued Christian ministry, graduating from Lane Seminary in Cincinnati and being licensed to preach, but rather than taking a charge Howison returned home and served as a schoolteacher and principal in a series of Ohio towns, eventually being called to Salem, Massachusetts, in 1862.

At age 30 Howison became professor at Washington University in St. Louis, arriving in 1864. He believed he was being appointed to a chair in English literature and was preparing lectures in those subjects but on arrival discovered a more established educator had been given the position. Howison accepted an appointment in mathematics instead and during the following years taught courses and even held chairs in

Shams Inati

all the branches of mathematics, including applied fields such as mechanics and astronomy, but also in political economy and Latin. Howison established a solid reputation as a scholar in mathematics with a treatise on analytic geometry that appeared in 1869 and an algebra primer that appeared in 1870. Here in St. Louis Howison also came into contact with that select subdivision of the St. Louis Philosophical Society called The Kant Club, which met at the home of William Torrey Harris. Howison joined at the time the Club was reading Hegel's *Phenomenology*, and it was the association with Harris and the St. Louis Hegelians that turned Howison's interest to philosophy.

The young Massachusetts Institute of Technology made Howison its professor of logic and philosophy of science, in which capacity he served from 1872 to 1878. During these years Howison studied and wrote on numerous subjects, but began his earnest writing and lecturing in philosophy. After losing his position Howison gave a course of lectures at Harvard Divinity School, and one in the Concord School of Philosophy in its inaugural summer, and otherwise pieced together what work he could, getting to know both Emerson and Alcott better all the while. Perhaps most important among the activities of these years were the informal meetings in the Temple Street rooms of Thomas Davidson with a small group that included William James and Borden Parker Bowne. American philosophical pluralism and American personalism were founded in those fortnightly meetings. These views were variously developed by James, Bowne, Davidson, and Howison, but an examination of the general commonalities leaves little doubt of their common origin.

Beginning in 1880 Howison used the opportunity of his unemployment to travel

and study through Europe, meeting along the way various lights of philosophy. Being most impressed with the University of Berlin, "the most serious institution of a very serious nation," Howison enrolled in 1881, at 47 years of age. There the course of Jules Michelet turned Howison from Hegelian absolutism back to a Kantian strain of thinking which remained with him. Returning to the U.S. in 1882, Howison hoped for a call to Harvard and had reason to think it likely to come, especially given what James calls "the extra-ordinary development of his intellect in the last four years." But Royce had been called to Harvard during Howison's absence and had made a great impression. Howison taught privately for a year and then, dispirited, resigned himself to leaving Boston and accepted a position at the University of Michigan. Notwithstanding congenial colleagues and ample resources, Ann Arbor was not to the liking of the Howisons and finally the opportunity came for Howison, nearing 50, to settle down and build something permanent.

The University of California decided to begin a philosophy program and offered Howison the position of Mills Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity in 1884, and an opportunity and resources to create a philosophy program according to his own vision. Over the next decades until his death, Howison proceeded to build the philosophy program and The Philosophical Union of the University of California to oversee the growing faculty and enrollment, and to loose upon the world a group of able and fiercely loyal students, including for example, Arthur O. Lovejoy. Howison became a popular and controversial speaker and a towering cultural figure in Northern California and there created what has been called the California school of American

personalism. His heterodox teachings about the nature of God placed him at odds with the theological community.

Howison was calling his philosophy “personal idealism” before Borden Parker Bowne was using the label. Bowne was also a pluralist and a practicalist if not a pragmatist, holding that no philosophical problem was severe enough to hold practical action at bay for very long, and that the final solution to philosophical problems lay in practical action. In this domain Bowne and James were similarly opposed to Howison’s rationalism. In method Bowne regarded the person as an indispensable starting point for philosophical reflection, and while reason never warranted claims of ontological knowledge, practical faith picked up where knowledge left off. Howison insisted upon ontological and eternal status for the individual person, and his notion of pluralism was part and parcel of this conviction. To abandon this claim was to threaten one’s pluralism.

Howison did not publish his own philosophical position in any form suitable for a public response until 1901, with a collection of essays bearing the perhaps unfortunate title of *The Limits of Evolution and Other Essays*. Howison was not attempting to deny that evolutionary theory does properly explain certain kinds of developments in biological life, but rather registering an objection to those who attempt to make the idea of evolution explain things beyond its genuine reach, such as social and moral development, but he also articulates in detail what many still hold to be limits in evolutionary theory.

Howison’s mature statement of his personal idealism is contained mainly in three essays: the Preface to *The Limits of Evolution*; “Personal Idealism and Moral Aims”; and “The Many and the One,” which was written for the 1904 Congress

and Exposition of 1904 in St. Louis. First, Howison understands philosophical reason as a quest for unity, and his pluralism has to be understood as distinct from “chaotic individualism,” of which he suspected James. In Howison’s view, “every actual mind, as that mind in its wholeness is, is absolutely public and universal; and even in the mind’s *temporal* aspect, the aspect of its struggle toward knowledge over the rugged road of experience, such a public and universal view must in every mind be potential.” Therefore, everything that exists is either a mind, objectively available, or the contents of a mind, ordered and also available. The idea of privacy of existence is a logical error. Time and space are the products of the correlation of minds, whose essential correlation was neither spatial nor temporal, but logical. The fundamental constitution of these personal minds is moral and eternal, while God is the “fulfilled type” of every actual mind. Together these minds form a “republic” or a “City of God,” and are free relative to the natural world, the rational order of which they are the source. The minds evolve towards an ideal union under the auspices of a final cause which is God’s activity. The objective and public character of all minds renders moral virtue of an “intrinsically social and federal character,” leading Howison to espouse a sort of democracy of immortal spirits in which moral endeavor and education are synonymous, and within which all problems are solvable and the freedom of each individual can be fulfilled.

In his maturity there were precious few subjects upon which Howison could not speak as an expert, few places in the U.S. and Europe where he had not gained a first-hand grasp of the land and the people, and no Western philosophical, humane or scientific study of which he was not the

master. Far more than is writing it was this breadth of living and learning, of touching and influencing the finest minds and subtlest thoughts of his age, that made Howison a crucial agent in the formation of American thought.

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HULL, DAVID LEE (1935–2010)

David Lee Hull was born on 15 June 1935 in Burnside, Illinois, and died on 11 August 2010 in Chicago, Illinois. He earned a BA in biology from Illinois Wesleyan University in 1960. In 1964, he was the first recipient of a PhD from Indiana University's newly formed History and Philosophy of Science program. While at Indiana, Hull took courses with Karl Popper and Michael Scriven, Roger Buck was his dissertation advisor. Hull taught both biology and philosophy as assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, from 1964 to 1984, becoming professor in 1972 and serving as department chair during 1977–80. In 1985, he moved to Northwestern University, where he became Dressler Professor in the Humanities in 1989. He retired as professor emeritus in 2000.

Hull received a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1980–81. He became a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

in 1992. He served as President of several professional societies, including the Society of Systematic Zoology (1984–85), the Philosophy of Science Association (1985–86), and the International Society for History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology (1991–92). During 1998–2001, he served on the American Philosophical Association's Committee on the Status of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in the Profession. (Hull himself identified as a homosexual, and was widely admired for his mentorship of gay and lesbian scholars during the often hostile American academic environment of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.)

Hull published five books and many papers that ranged across forums in biological taxonomy, philosophy of biology, history of biology, general philosophy of science, and philosophy of history. His work has been cited, discussed, and used not only by philosophers, but also by prominent biologists, such as Ernst Mayr and Stephen Jay Gould. Hull's main philosophical contributions fall into three categories: (1) the philosophy of biological taxonomy, in which he famously attacked "essentialistic" views and defended the thesis that species are historical individuals; (2) the theory of selection processes, in which he exchanged the concept of "interactor" for that of Richard Dawkins' concept of "vehicle," and suggested an account of selection processes general enough to apply to immunology, individual learning, and the development of science itself; and (3) a naturalized and evolutionary philosophy of science, built in part on the selectionist model just mentioned.

In one of his earliest publications, "The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy" (1965), Hull reviewed accounts of the species concept from Aristotle to the mid-twentieth century, arguing against "essentialism" (the effort to

define the species concept by giving necessary and sufficient conditions for membership) and proposed a cluster concept of species as an alternative. In later papers, "Are Species Really Individuals?" (1976) and "A Matter of Individuality" (1978), Hull became an influential defender and developer of the proposal (earlier made by biologist Michael Ghiselin) that species be treated as spatially and temporally extended wholes that have individual organisms as parts, rather than (as is traditionally done) as classes that have individual organisms as members. This view came to be known as the "species-as-individuals" thesis. Hull argued that it resolved long-standing puzzles about how things that have contingent histories, such as species, could be defined.

Beginning in 1980, Hull made significant contributions to the theory of selection processes. In the then-heated debate over the "units of selection," G.C. Williams, Richard Dawkins, and others had controversially argued for the explanatory priority of genes over organisms or groups of organisms within processes of natural selection. According to Dawkins, genes are the only "replicators" in biological systems, and thereby the only entities that can provide continuity from one generation to the next. Organisms are merely the "vehicles" of these replicators, things whose function is to facilitate replication. Hull argued that neither replicators alone, nor replicators and (what Dawkins had called) vehicles, are sufficient for selection. Rather, what defines selection processes is a combination of replicators and *interactors* – that is, entities whose interactions with environments cause differential rates of survival of replicators. If there are no replicators, there is no intergenerational continuity, and thus no evolution at all. On the other hand, if there are no interactors, then there is no possibility of differential replication, and

thus no possibility of selection. Hull pointed out that there are plausibly many different kinds of interactor-replicator pairs undergoing selection at any given time in biological systems. Furthermore, this realization necessitates developing a more nuanced view of so-called biological “hierarchies” than had been widely assumed, including by many of Dawkins’ critics.

In his work of the late 1980s to 2000s, Hull sought to expand his analysis of selection processes to include immunological processes, psychological (learning) processes, and cultural processes, including and in particular, the development of science itself. *Science as a Process* (1988) presents his selectionist interpretation of several episodes in the history of biology, including interactions between two communities of biological taxonomists from the 1950s through the 1980s, and between numerical taxonomists (pheneticists) and cladists. Hull’s account sketched a middle-ground position on the internalism vs. externalism controversy in sociology of science, insofar as it recognized both “external” factors (such as size of research community, institutional supports, and desire for credit) and “internal” factors (such as pursuit of truth and sense of intellectual honesty) as contributors to the development and success of science.

Hull also made influential contributions to discussions of reduction in biology, particularly in his *Philosophy of Biological Science* (1974) and “Informal Aspects of Theory Reduction” (1974), wherein he voiced suspicion about widespread claims that Mendelian genetics had been or was currently being reduced to molecular genetics, since strict correlations between laws of the former and latter theories had not ever been explicitly made. In *Darwin and His Critics* (1973) and several essays from the mid-1970s (collected in his 1989 *Metaphysics of Evolution*), Hull

also contributed to the understanding of Darwin’s place in intellectual history – in particular, by stressing the novelty of his theory of natural selection in comparison with contemporaneous ideas about what good science should be.

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Phillip Honenberger

I

IHDE, DON (1934–)

Don Ihde was born on 14 January 1934 in Hope, Kansas. Ihde studied speech and drama at the University of Kansas, where he received his BA in 1956, and theology at Andover Newton Theological School, where he graduated first in his class with an MDiv in 1959. In 1964 he completed his PhD in philosophy at Boston University under the direction of John Lavelly and Erazim Kohák. Ihde's first position was at Southern Illinois University. He remained there until 1969 when he made the transition to the philosophy department of the State University of New York at Stony Brook. Throughout his career, Ihde exerted a strong administrative presence: he was the initial doctoral program director and resume those responsibilities intermittently thereafter; for eight years he served as department chair; and for five years he acted as the Dean of Humanities and Arts. Quite recently, Ihde enlarged the scope of inquiry conducted at Stony Brook by founding the Technoscience Research Group. He is presently Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Stony Brook.

By introducing his unique post-foundational style of phenomenology (one that has much in common with the praxis orientation of American pragmatism) to new audiences, Ihde has come to acquire an international following of diverse scholars. Artists, architects, cultural studies theorists, engineers, historians, literary critics, philosophers, scientists, and sociologists frequently cite Ihde's work. Ihde's

widely anthologized essays and frequently reissued books have been translated into numerous languages, including Danish, German, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Persian, and Swedish. Ihde's research career has taken shape over the course of three phases: (1) he has been a philosopher who concentrates on understanding and enlarging the nature and scope of the phenomenological style of analysis; (2) he has been a philosopher of technology; and (3) he has been a technoscience theorist whose research overlaps with the interdisciplinary field of science and technology studies.

Determined to avoid becoming labeled a Ricoeur scholar, Ihde wrote two books that were thematic in scope. His *Listening and Voice: A Phenomenology of Sound* (1976) reorients philosophy away from its taken-for-granted assumptions about vision and experience in order to analyze the phenomenon of auditory linguistic presence as an embodied experience. In *Experimental Phenomenology* (1977), Ihde applies his active style of "doing phenomenology" and shows that phenomenological analysis is an experimental form of conduct, one that, in some instances, has more to offer epistemically than scientific analysis.

During the second phase of Ihde's career, he became a philosopher of technology. Although influenced by the classical phenomenologists, such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ihde revises significantly their projects by analyzing technological praxis as an embodied activity.

Husserl is shown to have prematurely divorced the lifeworld from the (putatively derivative) domain of science by obscuring how scientific knowledge is instrumentally mediated. Heidegger is shown to have maintained an untenable, dystopian perspective on technology, one that achieves its coherence by reifying the essence of technology vis-à-vis romanticized contrasts between large industrial technologies that reduce nature to standing reserve and poetic technologies that allow nature to be appreciated for its intrinsic worth. Merleau-Ponty is shown to have been sensitive to embodiment relations, although disinterested in turning the subject of technology into a worthy topic of sustained inquiry. It is during this phase that Ihde wrote *Technics Praxis* (1979), *Existential Technics* (1983), *Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth* (1990), and *Philosophy of Technology: An Introduction* (1993).

During Ihde's third phase, in which he became a technoscience theorist, he wrote and edited a number of books including *Instrumental Realism: The Interface Between Philosophy of Technology and Philosophy of Science* (1991), *Expanding Hermeneutics: Visualism in Science* (1998), *Bodies in Technology* (2002), and *Chasing Technoscience: Matrix for Materiality* (2003). Trying to bridge the gap between the philosophies of science and technology, Ihde argued that the philosophy of science, as traditionally conceived, is an incomplete enterprise because it fails to examine critically the role of technology in laboratory settings. By focusing upon the phenomenological theme of embodied perception – both microperspective and macroperspective – Ihde establishes the importance of interpreting science in terms of the concrete, technological practices that engage scientists visually. What Ihde proposes, therefore, is a material hermeneutics that allows us to interpret instruments as non-linguistic

analogues to texts. In doing so, he provides a means for us to understand how the reality that scientists study is co-constituted by the technological instruments they use, and he is able to convincingly argue against Diltheyan critics who claim that while hermeneutics and the natural sciences remain separate and distinct enterprises.

This focus on the topic of materiality enables Ihde to connect his research with a new group of intellectual interlocutors, Science and Technology Studies theorists, such as Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, and Andrew Pickering, who concentrate on matters pertaining to material agency. While Ihde appreciates their decisive refutations of social constructivism, he remains critical of their failure to posit the embedded and embodied human perceiver as the invariant origin of all knowledge claims.

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Evan Selinger

INADA, KENNETH KAMEO (1923–2011)

Kenneth Inada was born on 7 May 1923 in Honolulu, Hawaii. After serving in the U.S. Army as a Sergeant of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team during World War II, Inada returned to Honolulu to begin his study of philosophy. After completing his BA in 1949 at the University of Hawaii, and his MA in 1951 at the University of Chicago, he received his PhD in Indian and Buddhist philosophy from the University of Tokyo in 1960, having been encouraged to study there by D.T. Suzuki. He was the first American at Tokyo University to earn that doctorate. Inada began his academic career at the University of Hawaii in 1960, where he spent nine years teaching philosophy before accepting an appointment as associate professor of philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo in 1969. Professor Inada retired as Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy in 1997. Inada died on 26 March 2011 in Honolulu, Hawaii.

Inada's interest in Buddhist philosophy lay primarily in its naturalistic approach, which as both a philosophy and way of life Buddhism presents a holistic account of natural processes without appeal to metaphysical elements. It likewise understands and effectively treats

the causes of human suffering, stressing the individual experiential process as integral to a full realization of its philosophy. These characteristics of Buddhist – indeed, of Asian thought in general – Inada sought to expound and clarify throughout his scholarly career as a comparative philosopher. Initially concerned to correct mistaken views held about Buddhism (and *shunyata*, or “emptiness” in particular), Inada joined ranks with other contemporaries in comparative thought to quell the misreadings that often arise when one is influenced by “orientalism.”

Inada also came to see a need within comparative philosophy to move forward toward a more radical understanding of the discipline, and to more globally philosophize on the ontological and cosmological dimensions of Asian thought. Never having lost touch with the interdependency of all life, Asiatic thought and culture offer, for Inada, not only a natural and holistic perspective on the world but also aesthetic and ethical values to help guide us in our behavior, both individually and socially.

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Marty H. Heitz

INGERSOLL, ROBERT GREEN (1833–1899)

Robert Green Ingersoll, “The Great Agnostic,” was born on 11 August 1833 in Dresden, New York. He died on 21 July 1899 in Dobbs

Ferry-on-Hudson, New York. By the time of his adolescence the family lived in Wisconsin, where he stumbled upon the poems of Robert Burns. His self-guided study of Burns and later Shakespeare, coupled with forced exposure to Christian scripture, defined his literary background. Ingersoll apprenticed to a lawyer, read for the Illinois bar, and established a successful law practice in Peoria with his brother Ebon Clark Ingersoll. When the Civil War began, Ingersoll raised a regiment and was awarded the rank of Colonel. He served with distinction and was captured, paroled, and discharged from service. By 1863 he had begun to serve the Union cause as a civilian speechmaker and to campaign for candidates of Abraham Lincoln’s Republican Party. Ingersoll’s gift for rhetoric was immediately prized. Less welcome was the fact that in the course of his self-education he had rejected his father’s Christianity as obviously untrue and morally repugnant. In 1867 a Republican governor appointed Ingersoll Attorney General of Illinois, but his outspoken religious opinions barred him from elective office and from further political appointments. His brother Ebon, who held similar beliefs more circumspectly, served Illinois as a U.S. Congressman from 1864 to 1871.

Ingersoll attained national prominence in 1876. At Indianapolis he gave a sentimental speech about the travails of Union soldiers in the Civil War; an evocative excerpt was widely reprinted as “A Vision of War.” Contemporaries regarded it as the noblest statement on the war save only Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. Ingersoll reprised this speech to huge crowds each Memorial Day as long as he lived. Also in 1876, Ingersoll nominated James G. Blaine for President at the GOP convention in Cincinnati. Though Blaine was not nominated, Ingersoll’s nominating speech – which famously described Blaine as a “plumed knight” – electrified the nation and was a staple of rhetoric texts for decades.

Ingersoll built an enviable career as an attorney; in connection with a high-profile Grant Administration political scandal, he orchestrated the lengthiest defense in a U.S. criminal trial to that time. Yet he enjoyed his most significant success as an orator. For three decades Ingersoll was the GOP's premier political speechmaker, campaigning for every Republican presidential candidate but one from Ulysses Grant to William McKinley, all of whom attained the White House. The only Republican to lose a presidential bid during Ingersoll's public years was the one he declined to support.

During the 1870s Ingersoll emerged as the leading attraction on the American Chautauqua circuit. In an era when public lectures were the dominant mode of popular entertainment and learning, Ingersoll was undisputed king of American oratory. After hearing Ingersoll speak at a political event in New York City, Mark Twain wrote home his wife, "Lord! What an organ is human speech when it is employed by a master." Crisscrossing the nation by train over three decades, Ingersoll gave more than 1200 lectures to packed, high-paying houses. He was seen and heard by more Americans than any one else before motion pictures and radio. Ingersoll would stride onto a stage empty save for a small table and a pitcher of water, speaking for up to four hours without notes on subjects ranging from science to Shakespeare, from Reconstruction to Darwin, from improving the treatment of prisoners to elevating the status of women and ending the corporal punishment of children. But his most controversial subject was religion.

Ingersoll inveighed against the traditional Christian worldview of his day. Inverting a bromide by Alexander Pope, he famously quipped that "an honest God is the noblest work of man." In vivid prose he dismissed the concept of a deity as an obvious and deeply flawed human creation. "Each nation

has created a god, and the god has always resembled his creators. He hated and loved what they hated and loved, and he was invariably found on the side of those in power." Ingersoll defended the right, indeed the obligation, of free men and women to inquire for themselves and to follow the truth where it led without regard for dogma. He ridiculed the notion that a world of pain and injustice could be the handiwork of a loving omnipotent God. Most of all, he savaged the doctrine of eternal punishment, then so central to American Christianity, as an incomprehensible miscarriage of justice: surely no offense committed by a mortal could merit perpetual torment!

Ingersoll was a household name during America's Gilded Age. On the platform and in print, he debated the leading Christian spokesmen of his era, from prominent American divines to British Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone. In perhaps the greatest irony of Ingersoll's life, his chance meeting on a train with the devout New Mexico governor Lew Wallace prompted Wallace to write *Ben-Hur*. This religious novel would become the bestselling novel of the nineteenth century and inspire two influential twentieth century motion pictures.

Ingersoll was known as "Colonel Bob" for his Civil War service and as "The Great Agnostic" for his opposition to popular piety. Driven in large part by Ingersoll's celebrity, popular American atheism, agnosticism, and iconoclasm enjoyed a period of prominence now known as the Golden Age of Freethought, roughly from 1875 to 1914. Irreligion was never broadly popular; it remained controversial, and even at its height was reviled by most Americans. Still, its shadow never fell closer to the mainstream of American thought than during Ingersoll's public life. Ingersoll never pretended to academic eminence and had little contact with

the philosophical establishment of his day. But his high-profile advocacy played a key role in exposing thoughtful Americans with or without formal education to such issues as the problem of evil and the injustice of eternal damnation. He used his celebrity to advocate for such then-advanced ideas as birth control and Darwin's theory of evolution.

At his death in 1899, Ingersoll was cremated and his ashes interred in Arlington National Cemetery. Ingersoll's fame persisted for decades following his death. A lavish twelve-volume set of his collected works was a coveted purchase among freethinkers, radicals, and reformers. Despite its high cost, the collected works went through a dozen editions between 1900 and 1929. For at least half a century following his death his published works were cited as a primary influence by Americans who had abandoned their childhood faith for atheism, agnosticism, or humanism, alongside Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Thomas Paine's *The Age of Reason*, and impartial study of the Bible itself.

Today Ingersoll is too little remembered. Principal memorials include a small museum at his birthplace, a statue in a Peoria Park, and a memorial plaque upon New York's Gramercy Park Hotel, which occupies the site of his Manhattan townhouse. Contemporary Americans might benefit by bearing in mind this agnostic firebrand who was nonetheless a tireless apostle of family and fireside and a treasured arrow in the GOP's political quiver. Philosophers might better remember him for his seminal role in building popular awareness of such previously heretical ideas as the human authorship of religious creeds,

racial and sexual equality, and ideals of political and social autonomy that would be foundational to the progressive reforms of the twentieth century.

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Thomas W. Flynn

J

JAGGAR, ALISON MARY (1942–)

Alison Jaggar was born as Alison Mary Hayes on 23 September 1942 in Sheffield, England. She received a BA in philosophy from Bedford College, University of London, in 1964. She then received the MLitt degree from the University of Edinburgh in 1967. In 1970, she earned a PhD in philosophy from the State University of New York at Buffalo. During 1970–72 she taught philosophy at Miami University of Ohio, and then joined the philosophy faculty at the University of Cincinnati. In 1984 Jaggar was named the Obed J. Wilson Professor of Ethics at Cincinnati. During 1984–85 she also was the First Laurie New Jersey Professor in Women's Studies and Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. In 1990 she became Professor of Philosophy, and Professor of Women and Gender Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder, which is her current position. In 2008, the University of Colorado honored her as Arts and Sciences College Professor of Distinction. In 2014 she added part-time duties as Distinguished Research Professor at the University of Birmingham, UK.

Jaggar's work on feminism's ethical and political dimensions during the 1970s helped to introduce feminist philosophy into academia. In 1972 she participated in the founding of the Society for Women in Philosophy. Her course on feminist philosophy in 1977 may have been the first offered at any U.S. college. Her pioneering book *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (1983) offered an account of several

intellectual paths taken by feminist theorists in their formulation of a feminist political philosophy. She characterized the primary routes as liberal feminism (indebted to the American political experience), socialist feminism (inspired by European traditions), Marxist feminism (though not necessarily communist in practice), and radical feminism's fundamental critique of patriarchy and patriarchal politics. Jaggar's pluralistic and inclusive approach opened fresh ground for exploratory and emancipatory feminist inquiries into women's lives, experiences, and statuses around the world.

In the area of feminist philosophy as a critique of philosophy, Jaggar took revolutionary steps toward exposing academic philosophy's deficits, both in a disciplinary sense, and in its central methodological presumptions. From metaphysics and epistemology to value theory and ethics, Jaggar offered feminist alternatives and contributions. Her essays "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology" (1989) and "Caring as a Feminist Practice of Moral Reason," to mention only two representative writings, are exemplary philosophical studies into the new intellectual possibilities sought by feminist thinking. Her essay "Feminist Ethics" (1992) is another piece often cited as foundational and inspirational for the field. The goals of feminist ethics, she wrote, are "first, to articulate moral critiques of actions and practices that perpetuate women's subordination; second, to prescribe morally justifiable ways of resisting such actions and practices; and third, to

envision morally desirable alternatives that will promote women's emancipation" (1992, 361). Jaggar's recent work has centered on global ethics, moral reasoning, and naturalizing epistemology.

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John R. Shook

JAMES, HENRY, SR. (1811–1882)

Born in Albany, New York, on 2 June 1811, Henry James was the son of William James, an Irish immigrant who through instinct, intelligence, and industry achieved social prominence and died as the second wealthiest man in the state of New York. Henry graduated

with the BA degree from Union College in 1830. Something of a prodigal son, he returned home, working as an editor and studying law until his father's death in 1835, when he entered Princeton Theological Seminary. His departure from the seminary in 1838 without a degree signals a lifelong theological passion too pure to find satisfaction in orthodoxy. Married in 1840, Henry and Mary Robertson Walsh James had five children: William James (born 1842), Henry (1843), Garth Wilkinson (1845), Robertson (1846), and Alice (1848). The children were educated in a variety of settings on both sides of the Atlantic, as James sought to encourage and challenge their minds while freeing their spirits from any external control. The uneven results of his pedagogy parallel those of his philosophy. William achieved brilliance in psychology and philosophy, as did Henry in literature; Alice's keen sensibility could not find or create an appropriate expression; Wilkie was wounded in the Civil War and later failed in an attempt to develop an agricultural community of freed slaves in the South; and Robertson never found a calling and succumbed to alcoholism. Henry lived long enough to appreciate the fortunes of his grown children; he died on 18 December 1882 in Boston, Massachusetts.

Henry James's intellectual fervor, free-ranging intellect, and colorful rhetoric inspired interest and admiration among his philosophical contemporaries, yet failed to win their full assent or even to satisfy his own desire for clear and cogent expression. For example, in response to James's *The Secret of Swedenborg* (1869), William Dean Howells quipped that "he kept it," and son William circulated among the family a cartoon of a man flogging a horse with the caption, "Father's Ideas." But it is a mistake to dismiss James as a thinker in his own right. Without the consolation or support of orthodoxy, James was in a deeper sense the ultimate Protestant,

taking the spiritual insights of Calvinism too seriously to be satisfied with its intellectual structure, even in his own formulations.

Like many of his contemporaries, most notably his personal friend Ralph Waldo Emerson, James foresaw unprecedented possibilities if Americans would recognize the necessity of casting off the weight of the past and the encumbrances of contemporary institutions in order to begin a new life of dignity and purity. Yet James knew that the process of realizing these possibilities was more complex than his "fair unfallen friend" Emerson could conceive, and he knew that at the center of his quarrel with his contemporaries, both those of the party of the past and those of the party of the future, was a fundamental disagreement about human nature and the character of human experience. James had no sympathy for the pessimists who preached the old gospel of sin and redemption; however, he thought that the optimists gained their cheerfulness too easily, because they failed to grapple with the reality of evil. The fundamental problems of life, as he saw it, were not moral failings or physical disasters so much as the consequences of attachment to spiritual selfhood. Although ironic, it is fundamentally fortunate that self-attachment leads inevitably to tragedy, for by experiencing the evil of self-centeredness a person begins to see a new way of living, where true humanity can be found in the freedom and equality of all human beings.

James pleased neither the orthodox believers, who wanted to bring the judgmental force of a transcendent deity to bear on the immorality of individuals, nor the freethinking optimists, who wanted simply to leave religion behind so that humanity might progress smoothly forward. Neither did his thinking please James himself, for he was never satisfied with his own articulations.

He found Swedenborg's metaphysics and Fourier's sociology superior to contemporary alternatives, yet finally inadequate to express the truths of his own experience. If reliance upon them renders his thinking abstruse to later readers, his frustration with even his own best formulations provides a pathway whereby James's insights may be retrieved.

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James G. Moseley

JAMES, WILLIAM (1842–1910)

William James was born into a wealthy family on 11 January 1842 in New York City. He was educated at home, and with his family (including his famous novelist brother, Henry James, Jr.) made frequent trips to Europe. James's father, Henry James, Sr., was deeply influenced by the mystical philosophy of Emanuel Swedenborg, counting among his friends numerous literary and philosophical luminaries, including Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. James studied chemistry and comparative anatomy at Harvard, and later, at the age of twenty-two, entered Harvard Medical School. While attending medical school, he took a year off to join the distinguished biologist Louis

Agassiz in an expedition to the Amazon, to collect specimens in Brazil. James returned and completed his medical degree in 1869, but never practiced medicine. In 1873 he became an instructor in anatomy and physiology at Harvard. In 1875 he began teaching psychology at Harvard, and then philosophy, in 1879. James was professor of philosophy until his retirement in 1907. James achieved great eminence and popularity as a professor and public lecturer. His death on 16 August 1910 at his summer home in Chocorua, New Hampshire, was mourned as the passing of one of America's greatest philosophers.

Together with Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey, James was a founder of pragmatism, America's only indigenous professional philosophical movement; and it is for his pragmatism that James is chiefly remembered today. James's brilliant and original contributions to philosophy continue to have wide influence and appeal. Chief among them are his pragmatic methodology and theory of truth, his fideism, especially as expressed in his doctrine of the will to believe, his philosophy of religion, and his radical empiricism. In addition to having a distinguished place in the history of philosophy, James is also regarded as one of the great figures in the history of psychology. His two masterpieces, *The Principles of Psychology* (1890) and *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), are both classics in that field. It testifies to the breadth and depth of James's thought that these two books are also regarded as classics in philosophy.

Two major pillars provide the basis of James's philosophy. The first is his view that the mind is teleological, and that the function of mental activity is to fulfill the organism's purposes and interests. James's teleological conception of the mind is a reflection of the late 19th century's enchantment with the language

and concepts of Darwinian evolutionism. But James utilized the concepts and metaphors of Darwinism in ways which reached far beyond their original biological significance. Extending the notions of "the struggle for existence," "survival of the fittest," and "adaptation" to meet his own philosophical purposes, James argued that the function of human cognition must be understood in terms of the human struggle for success. Success, for James, was to be understood in light of the fact that human beings are purposive and goal-positing organisms. On the basis of this view, he argued that the adequacy of both our actions and beliefs must be measured in terms of the degree to which they help us fulfill those purposes and goals.

The second pillar of James's philosophy is his radical empiricism, that all phenomena are fully explicable in terms of actual or possible experience. James rejected what he called "transexperiential" objects and principles. As he stated in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, "everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of being experienced must somewhere be real." James's analyses of personal identity, truth, knowledge, and reality reflect his adherence to this fundamental idea. While James's teleological conception of mind and his radical empiricism constitute the basis for his analyses of particular philosophical concepts, they also constitute the basis of his metaphilosophy: his view of the nature and importance of philosophy itself. James's pragmatic method was meant to restore the empirical relevance of philosophy. James considered philosophical theories to be no different in important respects from the more ordinary claims of everyday life, in that they are useless if taken in isolation from the needs and purposes of the human beings who create and act upon them, and whom they ultimately must serve.

While James countered his speculative colleagues by insisting that philosophical claims must be understandable in terms of an individual's experience, it would be a mistake to interpret his version of empiricism in narrow or traditional terms. In advocating what he called the doctrine of "radical empiricism," James rejected the kind of empiricism which resulted in positivism or in scientism: the view which maintains that the methods and principles of empirical science provide the sole legitimate route to knowledge. He took as strong a stand against what he saw to be the excesses of his narrowly scientific contemporaries as he did against the excesses of speculative metaphysicians. Throughout his career, James tried to steer a reasonable course between speculative metaphysics on the one hand, and scientism on the other. He described his aims in the opening chapter of *Pragmatism*, where he announced that his pragmatic philosophy was intended to mediate between "tender-minded" (speculative) world-views on the one hand, and "tough-minded" (scientific) world-views on the other (1907, p. 13). James sought, along with the speculative metaphysicians, to bring out philosophy's potential to address the deepest metaphysical, moral and religious issues; and at the same time – along with the narrower empiricists – to remain grounded in experience as the ultimate justification and test of philosophical claims.

James's justification of faith is one of the most notable aspects of his philosophy. In the title essay of his book *The Will to Believe* (1897), James challenged the notion that evidence alone is the sole ground for justifying belief. He argued that there are occasions when the evidence for a belief is not sufficient, but the consequences of believing are so unusual or personally important, that the subject may be justified in believing on pragmatic, moral, or what

he sometimes called "passional" grounds. By emphasizing the pragmatic and moral contexts of believing, James sought to demonstrate the self-defeating and irrational nature of the philosophically ensconced principle of evidentialism: that belief is justified only to the extent that it is supported by adequate evidence. In *The Will to Believe* and elsewhere, James sought to contextualize the significance of concepts such as "belief," "evidence," and "justification" by reference to the wider context of the exigencies of life. Critics, intellectually scandalized by James's attempt to legitimize emotions and desires as justifications of belief, lost no time in thinking up new names for James's doctrine; "the will to deceive" and "the will to make-believe" were two favorites. However, James's position was far more subtle than his critics allowed. He was not remiss, as his critics believed, in failing to acknowledge what they took to be certain obvious conditions of epistemic justifiability. Rather, his goal was to undermine at the outset the prevailing epistemic and existential paradigm under which those conditions seemed so plausible.

Of the many philosophical concerns that occupied James throughout his life, the problem of free will and determinism held the most dramatic personal significance. In various works, including *The Principles of Psychology*, *The Will to Believe*, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, and *Pragmatism*, James addressed the issue of free will from different points of view, including that of science, speculative philosophy, introspective experience, and morality. In choosing to believe in free will, James argued, he thereby constituted the reality of the free will in which he believed. James's voluntarism regarding the philosophical treatment of free will itself leaves interesting work to be done regarding the complex pragmatic and other possible meanings of the concept of freedom.

James's theory of truth is perhaps the most well-known aspect of his philosophy, and it stands at the heart of his pragmatism. It is developed most fully in *Pragmatism* (1907) and *The Meaning of Truth* (1909). He held that the truth of a belief is determined by the degree to which it is "fit," the degree to which it ideally can survive, initially, in the life of the individual, and later, among a community of inquirers. A belief's survivability, in turn, is determined by the degree to which it can help human beings fulfill their purposes and interests. In his less careful moments, James equates the "most fit" (and hence, "most true") beliefs with those that *in fact* survive in the process of inquiry. He posited a hypothetical and normative conception of truth under which truth is constituted not necessarily by beliefs which *in fact* survive (some beliefs may survive gratuitously), but rather by beliefs which *deserve* to survive, because they offer the best instruments for fulfilling purposes within the context of experience. James held (if not always consistently) that the mere survival of a belief – its consensual acceptance by a community – is not sufficient to guarantee its truth.

In *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (1912), James worked out his view of the metaphysical and epistemological primacy of experience. The key concept here is that of "pure experience," which James used to designate the ultimate metaphysical nature of the universe. As the ultimate reality, pure experience provides the basis of the pragmatic realities of our everyday world. James insisted, however, that pure experience not be understood as a single "stuff." James held that a major advantage of his doctrine of radical empiricism is that it offered a way of transcending long-standing philosophical dualisms which had led philosophers into many unnecessary quagmires. He had particular interest in deconstructing the dualisms of

knower/known, subjective/objective, mental/physical, thought/thing, and fact/value. James argued, against both his idealist and empiricist predecessors, that these dualistic categories do not represent anything ontologically basic. Rather, they are merely functional distinctions which teleological subjects make within the stream of their experience, distinctions which have proven useful as they seek to fulfill their purposes and interests.

Although he vigorously rejected the doctrines and practices of conventionally established religions, he offered two main sorts of arguments in favor of religious sensibility and belief. The first were pragmatic arguments, which were developed primarily in *Pragmatism*, and several articles in *The Will to Believe*. The second were experiential arguments, found primarily in James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. First and foremost, the book is an analysis of the phenomenology of religious experience, illuminating central aspects of the religious consciousness. Also in this book are seminal discussions on the relationship between philosophy and religion, in which James outlined what he took to be the inadequacy of philosophical methods to provide sufficient understanding or defense of religious claims. James tried to show that the personal experience of the individual provides an effective (indeed the only effective) route to knowledge of the divine.

James's work has influenced a wide range of thinkers, both in America and abroad. These include John Dewey, Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, Edmund Husserl, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and others in the fields of psychology, literature, science, and education. His influence also extended to numerous thinkers later in the twentieth, and into the twenty-first centuries, including W.V. Quine, Thomas Kuhn, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Rorty.

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JEFFERSON, THOMAS (1743–1826)

Thomas Jefferson was born in Shadwell, Virginia, on 13 April 1743. He died at his home, Monticello, also in Virginia near Charlottesville, on 4 July 1826, fifty years to the day after the signing of the Declaration of Independence. He was educated at William and Mary College in Williamsburg from 1760 to 1762, where he was instructed by professor William Small in science and moral philosophy. Jefferson remained in Williamsburg to study law privately with George Wythe for some years and then to practice at the Virginia Bar. In 1769 he assumed the duties which fell upon the sons of aristocratic planters by becoming a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses.

Jefferson then held many public offices: Governor of Virginia, 1779–81; Minister of the United States to France, 1785–89; Secretary of State, 1790–93; Vice President of the United States, 1797–1801; and President, 1801–1809. He was a member of the American Philosophical Society from 1780, and its president from 1796 to 1815. He wished to be remembered most as “Author of the Declaration of American Independence, of the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and Father of the University of Virginia” – words which he instructed to be inscribed on his tombstone.

While Jefferson wrote many public papers, in connection with the various political offices he occupied, and while he was an inveterate letter-writer, he published only on work of book length – his *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1784) – during his long public life.

This means that his philosophical, ethical and political thought has to be pieced together from a variety of disparate sources. Clues are also to be found in his political activity.

To the extent that he was a deist, Jefferson could not be the thoroughgoing materialist that he sometimes claimed to be. He was, however, suspicious of all claims to knowledge of matter spiritual, indeed of anything that was not part of the tangible and visible, natural, world. It was in the natural world that God had placed man, and it was in the natural American wilderness that American man found himself placed. It was there the task, even the duty, of American man to come to masterful, but useful, knowledge of this wilderness – to know it, and to tame it; to convert it to human purposes. At every turn, Jefferson’s philosophical thinking has this practical cast. Thus, besides his other objections, he considered that the building of philosophical systems or speculations about the supernatural simply wasted valuable time, and diverted effort and talent from more urgent tasks.

As far as truths about the natural world were concerned, Jefferson was an empiricist in the Lockean tradition: our knowledge of the external world comes to us through the evidence present to our senses. In this respect, knowledge of human affairs was no different, but it did have another dimension – it came through experience and through the study of history, which was but experience at second hand. Jefferson’s approach to the past was never nostalgic; he thought in a resolutely forward manner all his life, and used history as a storehouse of human experiences, mostly to be avoided. This reflected his belief – for which there was an obvious and substantial foundation – that the American experiment was a wholly new one in human affairs. The experiment he referred to encompassed far more than America’s political development: it included, as well, imposing a human order

on America's wild environment. It was for this project, after all, that the American Philosophical Society had been founded; and it was in accordance with the project that Jefferson compiled his *Notes on the State of Virginia*: an exhaustive examination of the topography and nature of his native country, together with reflections on the development of its human and social ordering.

While his approach towards knowledge of the natural world was relatively straightforward, his thinking about moral 'truths' was more ambiguous. At the time of drafting the Declaration of Independence in 1776, he was a moral rationalist. He consented to, or himself made (it is not clear), the change in his original draft whereby "sacred and undeniable" rights became "self-evident" ones (White 1978, 246–7). Such truths in ethics were discovered by an intuitive reason which was implanted in and is available to all men. Teasing out the implications of consequences of the discovery of such truths – consequences for the moral conduct of men, and of the institutions they established – depended, however, on the exercise of a discursive reason, which was available only to the few – the men of wisdom, talent and virtue, whom Jefferson called society's 'natural' aristocrats, as opposed to the 'artificial' aristocracy of birth and wealth (letter to John Adams on 28 October 1813, in Koch and Peden's edition, 632–3).

Later, and drawing to some extent on Scottish common sense philosophy, in particular Francis Hutcheson, Jefferson came increasingly to emphasize a "moral sense" by which men become aware of moral truths (letter to Peter Carr on 10 August 1787, *ibid.*, 430–31). Epistemologically, thus, he assimilated moral knowledge into knowledge of the natural world, for the moral sense was a sense like all the others that men possessed. Further, it was a different human faculty from

reason, though it could accept tutoring from this source. Since he acknowledged that the moral sense, while every man possessed it, could be underdeveloped or even perverted in some men, he was still able to adhere to his doctrine of the natural aristocracy – men whose moral sense was highly developed, and whose judgment, therefore, was to be respected, if not deemed authoritative. Endorsement of moral-sense theory did not cause Jefferson to abandon his earlier moral rationalism, nor did it prevent him from time to time appealing to revelation as the source of moral knowledge.

Jefferson never described himself as a Christian in a philosophical, as opposed to an ethical, sense. Here he was at most a deist. In effect, Jefferson assumed the existence of God; God was necessary to account for the creation. This creation was beneficent one, and it had been accomplished in a single, complete and perfect act; there was no room for evolution. But that was not the end of the matter, for the creation laid tasks upon men. Through either his intuitive reason or his moral sense, it was up to man to discover his inherent nature, and the "laws of nature and of nature's God" (Declaration of Independence, in Koch and Peden's edition, 22), which imposed duties on man, and from which he derived his rights.

Under natural law man had a duty to preserve his life and his liberty in order to pursue his happiness. Jefferson was convinced that man had been placed on earth for happiness. By happiness he meant no capricious and insouciant hedonism. He drew from both Epicurean and Stoic thought the idea that happiness consisted in tranquility of the mind and 'in-do-lence' of body (letter to William Short on 31 October 1819, *ibid.*, 696), but also that the achievement of such states of mind and body required discipline and self-control. He later came to realize that, while this

thought did have something to say about one's duties to others, it was relatively undeveloped in this respect, and could there be considered rather too self-centered an approach to social living. However, much Jefferson stressed the value of human independence and autonomy, he always insisted that man was a being made to live in society.

Jefferson found in the life and teachings of Jesus – if one ignored the mystique of divinity which the Church had since attached to the historic Jesus – a complete guide to man's duties of charity and benevolence to others. It was impossible, Jefferson felt, to achieve a state of happiness without practicing such virtue towards one's fellow beings. He called himself a Christian in this respect, and in this respect alone – it was the way, he thought, in which Jesus would have recognized himself as a Christian. Jefferson was sufficiently impelled by the importance of Jesus's example to compile his own "bible," extracting from the Gospels, which eventually appeared posthumously in 1904 under the title *The Life and Moral of Jesus of Nazareth*. He began this during his first presidential term, and it occupied him intermittently into old age. In his ethical thinking Jefferson thus revealed himself as much an eclectic as he was in his philosophical thinking.

Jefferson's political thought has been variously labeled – liberal, humanist, republican – but each label misses something. A useful point of departure is to consider what the Declaration of Independence meant for Jefferson. On the surface, it was, of course, an assertion of American independence from British rule. But at another level it can be seen as a declaration of individual independence and autonomy. Jefferson adhered to a view, which can be traced back to Aristotle, that human fulfillment and happiness depended to a degree upon a certain level of economic independence. In the American context, this

meant land ownership. Land ownership not only gave economic independence; it also tied the fortunes of individuals to the fortune of their county. It was a consistent theme of Jefferson's thought that the cultivators of the earth are among the most virtuous and public-spirited people. In them, Epicurean/Stoic and Christian ideals find their most natural fulfillment.

Jefferson took nothing on authority – he counseled his nephew to question the existence of God, and assured him it was of no great consequence if, upon investigation, it should prove that God was not. In every respect Jefferson tried to remove the dead hand of the past from the living generation. The world belonged to the living: their rights in it were sovereign. Where individual independence and autonomy were at issue, and law and constituted forms a hindrance, the latter were to be disregarded. If the hand of the present should be oppressive, it was man's duty to remove its weight – "Rebellion to Tyrants is Obedience to God" was Jefferson's motto (Malone, vol. 2, 183). This was a potentially anarchic feature of his thinking, which he did not explore in its full extent, though it was reflected in his resolute optimism regarding the good sense of human beings. The simple fact was that at Monticello, government and politics seemed at best an irrelevance.

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Adrian Oldfield

JOHNSON, SAMUEL (1696–1772)

Samuel Johnson was born on 14 October 1696 in Guilford, Connecticut. He attended the collegiate school newly founded in Saybrook, Connecticut (later moved to New Haven and renamed Yale College), graduating with the BA degree in 1714 and serving as tutor from 1716 to 1719. He accepted Congregationalist ordination and the pastorate of West Haven, Connecticut, in 1720, though by 1722 he had joined Timothy Cutler, the rector of Congregationalist-affiliated Yale, in a highly public and controversial declaration of Anglican allegiance at its commencement exercises. Shortly thereafter Johnson sailed to England, and by 1723 he had secured Anglican ordination and a New England missionary appointment from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. He assumed leadership of a newly completed Anglican church in Stratford, Connecticut, in 1724, the first in the colony.

Johnson became the most prominent advocate for Anglicanism in colonial New England. It was in many ways an unpopular cause. Anglicanism was seen as alien to the “New England Way” of quasi-independent local congregations for its adherence to the ideal of bishops and for its Arminian view of human freedom. Between 1745 and 1748 Johnson published three pamphlets in debate form criticizing the Calvinist conceptions of predestination and innate depravity. Although the number of converts Johnson actually recorded may not seem dramatic, only a

10 percent increase in Stratford between 1740 and 1750, when he died he left behind him 43 Anglican congregations run by 16 priests. Many of the latter he trained personally. His late-career view of bishops with only spiritual and no legal or political power was part of the transition from British-led Anglicanism to the founding of the American Episcopal Church after the Revolution. Johnson died on 6 January 1772 in Stratford.

More so than is generally the case with the run-of-the-mill cleric, Johnson's corpus and career are closely connected to the history of philosophy in colonial America. With his reputation as a man of learning he was offered the headship of the College of Philadelphia by Benjamin Franklin in 1752. He turned this down, but in 1754 he accepted the presidency of the newly established King's College in New York City (later Columbia University). His *Elementa Philosophica* (1752) was the first textbook of moral theology published in America, and used at a colonial institution, the College of Philadelphia. Johnson later used it himself for the capstone course in moral philosophy required of all King's seniors.

While Johnson's Platonism underwent adjustment in conversation with Locke and (especially) Berkeley, throughout the early corpus there remains a significant cognitive dissonance between the highly speculative affirmation of Platonic truths and the pretensions of an empiricist's emphasis on knowledge coming through the senses. Joseph Ellis has remarked that Johnson seems to have "oscillated between a mere mouthing of Lockean terminology and a fascination with the least innovative parts of Locke's *Essay*" (Ellis 1973, 39). The short treatise "Logic" written in 1720 showed a better understanding of Locke at least in so far as it grasps the basic distinction between qualities inhering with the structure of matter and qualities inhering in the human mind that perceives that matter.

Johnson regularly visited Berkeley when the bishop was in Newport trying to sort out the possibility of a college for Bermuda and dedicated the *Elementa Philosophica* to him. More than epistemological considerations, what drew Johnson to Berkeley was the latter's seeming embodiment of a modern philosophical acuity with no resulting loss of religious content. Similar to fellow rationalist G. W. Leibniz's search for the original human language most determinately connected to the structures of the universe, Johnson saw the potential for deescalating doctrinal divisions in supposing that words have little connection to the realities beyond them. Why cause civil disruptions that hurt us all if we can't know whose words fit the facts better? Backpedaling within the directionality of Deism, Johnson qualifies in the *Elementa Philosophica* that even though reason could see the divine archetypes, reason cannot be regarded as autonomously responsible for that knowledge because the presence of these archetypes in the human mind remains an emanation of the divine.

Johnson's publishing output had run its course by the 1760s. After a protracted dispute (until 1763) with the trustees of King's about curriculum, administration and his successor, he left New York to resume his duties at his old Connecticut pastorate. With religion firmly implicated in the breaking up of the Anglo-American community, Johnson devoted some portion of his remaining intellectual energies to imagining a faction-resistant, if not a faction-free, mode of Christianity. Eighteenth-century undergraduates did find in the pages of Johnson's *Elementa Philosophica* a pluralistic conception of political unity rendering religious uniformity unnecessary. At the same time, however, Johnson never wholly shed a Calvinist pessimism about human abilities imbibed from his Puritan upbringing. His aloof distress at revolutionary factionalism joins the perspective of founding fathers such as John Adams who

feared democracy's power to sustain its own best ethical sentiments unchecked by some counterbalances of elite oversight.

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Stephen A. Wilson

JONES, MAJOR JAKE (1918–1993)

Major J. Jones was born on 24 December 1918 in Rome, Georgia. He received his BA from Clark College in 1941. He then did graduate work at Gammon Theological Seminary where he earned a BD in 1944, and at Oberlin College for his MST in 1950. As did many African-American scholars of his generation, Jones earned his ThD from Boston University in 1957. While completing his education, Jones pastored United Methodist churches in Tennessee and Kentucky. Jones held several academic posts over the course of his career, including college minister and professor of religion at Fisk University; a member of the faculty at the Interdenominational Theological Center; President of Gammon Theological Seminary from 1967 to 1985; and then chaplain of Atlanta University Center for several years. Jones died on 22 January 1993 in Atlanta, Georgia.

Jones's work in social ethics and liberation theology gained him invitations to lecture

at numerous institutions, such as Berkeley's Graduate Theological Union and Emory University. Jones also served on the board of directors for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Black Methodists for Church Renewal, as well as being a member of the board of trustees for Clark College (which later became Atlanta University Center). Jones was President of the Association of United Methodist Theological Schools, and in 1985 he was President of the Society of Christian Ethics. He had a long career with numerous accolades, including a declaration from President William Tubman of Liberia in 1971, and the Distinguished Alumni Award from Boston University's School of Theology also in 1971.

Jones authored numerous articles and three major books: *Black Awareness: A Theology of Hope* (1971), *Christian Ethics for Black Theology* (1974), and *The Color of GOD: The Concept of God in Afro-American Thought* (1987). As black theology developed in the late 1960s, Jones played a significant role in the formation of a liberation and reconciliation-based theory of religion and theological discourse. Along with James H. Cone, J. Deotis Roberts, Gayraud Wilmore, and others, Jones formulated a response to social injustice, drawing together the best of the Christian faith and the philosophical punch of black power. Within his work, Jones employed the personalism he had studied at Boston University to explore the doctrine of God in ways that responded to the needs of African-Americans. He avoided narrow perceptions of God and embraced a theological discourse that maintained the uniqueness of black religious expressions while also holding to a concern with broad applicability. In this sense, Jones promoted a theological discourse that sought to hold the particular and universal in creative tension. In interpreting the Christian

message for African-Americans, as Jones often commented, his aim within his teaching, church ministry, and writings was to promote an understanding of God's liberating activities in the world in ways that protested against injustice and encouraged human fulfillment.

Tied to this aim was a theory of black religion, highlighting a Christian orientation, that recognized the thick and complex nature of black religious experience. Attention to the complexity of black religion, he argued, was necessary in light of the manner in which it blended a variety of theological and religious sensibilities and cultural aesthetics within the context of oppression and struggle. Furthermore, according to Jones, the goal of black religion involved the promotion of greater self-identity and communal-social relationships through connection to the divine. In terms of ethics, Jones, like most working within the context of African-American experience, attempted to draw from scripture a set of liberation-struggle principles that could then be applied to the particular situation of African-Americans. To a lesser degree than some more "radical" thinkers, he did not base his system of liberation ethics on a depiction of Jesus the Christ as a revolutionary who sanctioned violence as a proper response to injustice. Rather, Jones sought to work out a system of ethics that highlighted the transformative power of *agape*. In part, this is a consequence of his early commitment to the theological principle of hope as the source of change. This principle, as Jones constructed it, appears concerned with the eventual possibility of reconciliation in ways that make violence both impractical and ultimately an isolating process. Through this cautionary note, Jones sought to maintain the ability of black theology to be self-critical and open to dialogue by placing African-American experience within a larger socio-political context.

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Anthony B. Pinn

K

KAELIN, EUGENE FRANCIS (1926–)

Eugene Kaelin was born on 14 October 1926 in St. Louis, Missouri. He obtained his PhD in philosophy from the University of Illinois in 1954 and taught in the philosophy department at the University of Wisconsin from 1955 to 1965. He then was professor of philosophy at Florida State University from 1965 until his retirement in 1996. His major writings focused on issues in aesthetics where he blended themes from both the analytic and the continental traditions.

Kaelin maintains that aesthetic experience involves nonverbal communication, which takes place by means of the perception of an artwork. His understanding of aesthetic experience as a form of communication has its roots in the aesthetic philosophy of Benedetto Croce. Kaelin accepts what he views as Croce's basic insight – namely, that art is akin to language in the sense that it is a vehicle for communication. At the same time, however, Kaelin is interested in overcoming Croce's fundamentally idealistic orientation in which the actual artwork is identified with the artist's intuition. For Croce, the material composition or physical entity (such as the painting on the canvass, the sculpted marble, the notated musical score, etc.) is the evidence by which we infer the existence of the internal intuition. This internal intuition – the creative, inner, and spiritual act of the artist – is the real artwork, while the material composition is merely its public externalization. Croce's

aesthetic theory is a continuation of a much broader philosophical tradition in which the inner (internal, mental, subjective) is separated from and (often) prioritized over the outer (external, physical, objective).

Kaelin's resistance to Croce's idealism is part of a much deeper resistance to philosophical orientations that are fundamentally dualistic and built upon the plausibility of an atomistic analytic methodology. For example, Kaelin objects to analyses that seek to reduce the significance of aesthetic experience to the intent of the artist. Analyses reducing the significance of aesthetic experience to viewer reaction are also unsatisfactory. First, we cannot treat the artist as simply one viewer among others, at least in some cases. In certain cases, artistic intent carries special weight (1989, p. 24). Second and more importantly, these kinds of reductive views risk losing the notion of there being constraints on viewer reaction. Kaelin maintains that not just any old reaction will be appropriate to a given artwork and that the viewer is to bring to the work "only those associations that are controlled by the formal structures of the concrete object we call 'the work of art'" (1989, p. 25). These formal structures ground the authority of aesthetic judgments: "The greater authority of a trained perceiver stems from knowing by past acquaintance what constitutes the authentic controls of aesthetic response" (1989, p. 34). The existence of these structures insures that not all judgments regarding aesthetic significance are equal; not all interpretations carry equal authority.

The normative issue Kaelin is engaging concerns constraint on interpretation and the locus (or loci) of that constraint. Kaelin urges us to resist the temptation to reduce constraint (and ultimately significance, meaning, and value) to either artistic intent or viewer reaction. Instead, Kaelin favors a more holistic orientation with special emphasis on the formal structures of the artwork itself. Kaelin's position has its roots in existentialism and phenomenology, for example, in Martin Heidegger's account of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Kaelin writes that "Art is communication, and not empty expression. When we stress the process of art as communication, rather than self-expression, we are emphasizing the sociality as opposed to the individuality of artists.... Even so, the process must be visualized from both its end-points, as well as from the central and mediating object which unites them" (1962, pp. 91–2). Kaelin holds that the overcoming of reductive analyses requires a more holistic orientation as well as a return to the things themselves – the artwork. This, in turn, suggests that the proper methodology for philosophical aesthetics is phenomenology. He urges that we accept only those accounts of aesthetic significance that "accord with *an experience* of the qualities of an artwork as they appear to our attentive consciousness. We find ourselves here stipulating the necessity of the phenomenological reduction as the grounding principle for the judgment of aesthetic qualities ..." (1989, p. 160).

Kaelin holds that the primary function of art criticism is not to issue pronouncements concerning rankings or classifications of artworks based upon appeals to general universal principles or rules. Instead, the primary function of art criticism is to further aesthetic communication. Kaelin writes: "If a work of art is created and experienced as a context of significance, it becomes

the business of criticism to elucidate the significance unique to its context.... The critic's primary function, then, is to ensure aesthetic communication, and not to pass judgment, to assess "values," to place an artist in history as a "major" or "minor" contributor to his culture, or to create a new – verbal – work of art, which merely happens to be inspired by the experience of the work under consideration" (1970, p. 281). Art criticism furthers aesthetic communication when, by employment of proper phenomenological methodology, it calls attention to the formal structures of the artwork and, thereby, reveals the artwork's significance.

Kaelin understands the function and value of public art education largely in terms of the relationship between the formation of certain kinds of people and the sustaining of democratic political institutions. By training the perceptual and imaginative capacities of individuals and by inculcating critical thinking skills, aesthetic education contributes to the formation of citizens with the capacity to engage well in the deliberative participatory functions constitutive of democratic forms of government.

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Robert E. Money, Jr.

KALLEN, HORACE MEYER (1882–1974)

Horace Kallen was born on 11 August 1882 in Berenstadt, a town in the German (now Polish) province of Silesia. The Kallen family came to the United States when Horace was about five years of age and settled in Boston, where the father became the rabbi of a German-speaking Orthodox congregation. When he was eighteen he entered Harvard, and in 1903 he received the BA degree magna cum laude. After graduating, Kallen took a position at Princeton University as an instructor in English, but after two years his contract was not renewed. It was intimated that had the administrators known that he was a Jew, he would not have been appointed to

the instructorship, and it was also suggested that he was undesirable because he taught atheism. Kallen returned to Harvard and was awarded the PhD degree in 1908. For the next three years he was a lecturer in philosophy and assistant to James, Santayana, and Josiah Royce. Before completing his graduate studies, he received a fellowship that made it possible for him to travel to Europe where he studied with pragmatist F.C.S. Schiller at Oxford and attended the lectures of Henri Bergson in Paris.

In 1911 Kallen became an instructor in philosophy and psychology at the University of Wisconsin, where he remained until 1918 when he resigned over his lack of academic freedom to defend pacifists during World War I. His years at Wisconsin had been productive. In 1914 his book on James and Bergson was published; in 1918 he published *The Structure of Lasting Peace*, and in the same year *The Book of Job as a Greek Tragedy*. In 1915 *The Nation* published his articles that contained the first formulation of his philosophy of democracy and cultural pluralism; and it was in those years that he became deeply involved in Zionist ideology and action. These developments made Kallen restless and eager to be in New York or Boston, where he could be more influential. Fortunately in 1919 the New School for Social Research (now the New School University) was founded in New York, and Kallen was asked to join the founding faculty comprised of Thorstein Veblen, John Dewey, James Harvey Robinson and Charles Beard. Kallen eagerly accepted the invitation and became professor of philosophy and psychology. Among his many political and educational activities, Zionism and international pacifism were foremost. He supported the American Jewish Congress, the World Jewish Congress, the Conference on Jewish Relations, the American Association for Jewish Education,

and the formation of Israel. He taught at the New School with pragmatic-minded colleagues Sidney Hook and Morris R. Cohen until 1969 and was professor emeritus until his death on 16 February 1974 in Palm Beach, Florida.

His closest philosophical affinity was with pragmatism, and his closest personal affinity was with James, who considered Kallen as his protégé. When he knew that he would die before completing his last work, James entrusted Kallen with the manuscript of *Some Problems in Philosophy* which Kallen published in 1911. If, as Kallen has said, James was the first democrat in metaphysics, then Kallen himself was the second. They both broke with a long philosophic tradition that can be traced back to pre-Socratic Greeks and coming down through Kant, Hegel, F.H. Bradley, and Royce. James and Kallen refused to accept the distinction between appearance and reality as aboriginal and final, because for them the distinction was secondary and functional. They looked for reality not in abstractions and logical processes but in the flow of experience and in the insights offered by the intelligence. They did not try to build systems but looked for instruction in the piecemeal character of knowledge and the plural character of reality that this knowledge disclosed. In the place of a universe they found a multiverse; in the place of one order they found no order at all or many orders, all of equal reality and value. In place of a single whole, a neatly organized system or Absolute, they found variety and multitudinousness of experience. Instead of denying appearance as mere error or illusion, they affirmed the reality of identity and change, of continuation and mutation, of the confluence of past and future. They affirmed the reality of “real duration,” process, becoming, change, and novelty. They rejected rigid materialism and mechanistic explanations, and accepted

the possibility of chance, uniqueness, of surprises and contingency.

The name and fame of Horace Kallen, however, is identified not with the philosophy of Individualism, but with the idea of culture and the philosophy of cultural pluralism. His philosophy uses concepts that clearly implicate group existence and of identification of the individual with a group and its customs, laws, loyalties, and ideals. How did Kallen mediate between the individual and the group? Part of the answer can be found in Kallen’s biography. Professor Wendell opened his student’s mind to receive his Hebraic legacy, “converting” Kallen to Judaism – not to his father’s religion, but to the Jewish/Hebraic heritage of culture, thought, and values, to a comfortable feeling of kinship with the Jewish people and their history and experience. In time, however, Kallen tended to think that all associations, without exception, were voluntary; that a person has the liberty to reject the fact that he is a Jew or a Pole or a Swede. While a person cannot change his grandfather, he can reject him as many have done. In a free society membership in a group is effected not by status but by contract.

In later years Kallen expressly qualified his individualism. No person is merely an individual. While the elemental term in every group is “the individual in his indefeasible singularity,” he knew of no instance, Kallen added, “of an individual building his personal history solely by himself, from himself, on himself.” “Rugged individualism,” he wrote, can be viewed only as a case of extreme selfishness. Kallen criticized sharply those who questioned the patriotism of hyphenated Americans. The more societies a person “can join or leave, the more varied their forms and functions, the more abundant, the freer, the richer, the more civilized is likely to be the personality which lives and moves

and nourishes its being among the diverse communions. It is the variety and range of his participation which does in fact distinguish a civilized man from an uncivilized, a man of faith and reason from an unreasoning fanatic, a democrat from a totalitarian, a man of culture from a barbarian. Such a man obviously orchestrates a growing pluralism of associations into the wholeness of his individuality.” The hyphen, he wrote, “unites very much more than it separates.” By his spirit, by his faith and reason, a person “orchestrates” his diversities into a unity or a successful union; and a society, by the process of “orchestration,” unites the unique and the diverse into a community alive “to mutual appreciation and respect, to pleasure in one another, to cooperation with one another, or at worst to agreeing to disagree.” The “union of the different” constitutes the spirit of the society or nation or association of nations. Hyphenation and orchestration make possible the American idea of “E pluribus unum,” a union immeasurably enriched by the pluralism of cultures of which it is composed.

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Milton R. Konvitz

KANE, ROBERT HILARY (1938–)

Robert Kane was born on 25 November 1938 in Boston, Massachusetts. He received the BA degree from Holy Cross College in 1960, and then attended Yale University, receiving the MA in philosophy in 1962 and the PhD in philosophy in 1964. His dissertation on "Intentionality and Mind" was advised by Wilfrid Sellars and Rulon Wells. He was assistant professor of philosophy at Fordham University (1964–67) and assistant professor of philosophy at Haverford College (1967–70) before going to the University of Texas in 1970. By 1985 he was promoted to Professor of Philosophy, and in 1995 he was named University Distinguished Teaching Professor. He currently is teaching on phased retirement.

Along with Harry Frankfurt, Kane has been at the forefront of debates over mental agency and free will for nearly four decades. Kane is mainly known in these areas for defending the stance on free will labeled as "libertarianism." His defense of libertarianism finds that people have genuine free will in part because indeterminism permits the freedom to do otherwise while deciding to act. Kane takes the naturalistic worldview to be broadly accurate, so he seeks scientific findings compatible with this indeterminism. Against the grain of free will debating, which usually finds libertarians

trying to evade or supplement science's understanding of what is possible in a physical world, Kane never departs from the scientific worldview. He recently recounted how his work on free will began with a challenge from Wilfrid Sellars: "I began thinking about free will shortly after Strawson's seminal essay "Freedom and Resentment" appeared in 1962, when my philosophical mentor at the time, Wilfred Sellars, challenged me to reconcile a traditional incompatibilist or libertarian free will with modern science. As a compatibilist about free will, Sellars doubted, as did Strawson, that a libertarian or indeterminist free will could be accounted for without reducing it to mere chance or appealing to what Strawson had dubbed panicky metaphysics" (2014, 36).

In his 1985 book *Free Will and Values*, Kane accepts the principle of alternative possibilities (one could have done otherwise), and he requires that sub-stages to the psychological process of decision-making be indeterministic. Specifically, how considered reasons for acting become available for conscious deliberation must be indeterministic, and the conscious effort of deciding among those reasons must be indeterministic. Kane has repeatedly pointed to the way that quantum indeterminacies among complex neural pathways could permit the needed cognitive indeterminacy. Because deliberations conclude in decisions for a sufficient reason, those decisions are not caused by mere chance, and moral reasons can stand behind moral decisions, Kane hoped that his libertarianism could avoid the usual criticisms. As he himself realized, a fundamental problem remained. To be responsible for one's moral action, it isn't enough to have been able to do otherwise; one cannot be responsible for what one cannot truly control. Far too much about our psychological lives that factor into decisions

(such as our drives, emotions, desires, values, priorities, and so on) haven't been in our full control, since we didn't decide to have them in the first place, or at least we haven't controlled how potent they are.

In *The Significance of Free Will* (Oxford, 1996), Kane agreed that moral responsibility resides in one's self-control over the important psychological matters – such as character, life purposes, primary motivations, and so on – so that one can have “ultimate responsibility” for who one is as a moral agent. Looking at a person's life as a historical development of character, special self-formative moments have helped to create that character and hence helped to control future moral decisions. Here, and in later writings, Kane developed his expectation that moral agency involves “plural voluntary control.” In Kane's words, “Agents have plural voluntary control over a set of options... when they are able to bring about whichever of the options they will, when they will to do so, for the reasons they will to do so, on purpose, rather than accidentally or by mistake, without being coerced or compelled in doing so or willing to do so, or otherwise controlled in doing or willing to do so by any other agents or mechanisms” (2007, 30).

Kane's work on agency, value theory, ethics, and wisdom is necessary reading to follow his theoretical strategies concerning moral responsibility and free will. His books *Through the Moral Maze: Searching for Absolute Values in a Pluralistic World* (1994) and *Ethics and the Quest for Wisdom* (2010) are among the most searching and valuable efforts found in recent philosophy.

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John R. Shook

KAUFMAN, GORDON DESTER (1925–2011)

Gordon Kaufman was born on 22 June 1925 in North Newton, Kansas, where his father Edmund G. Kaufman was President of Bethel College from 1932 to 1952. He received his BA degree from Bethel College in 1947, an MA in sociology from Northwestern University in 1947, a BD from Yale Divinity School in 1951, and a PhD in philosophical theology from Yale University in 1955. He taught at Pomona College from 1953 to 1958,

and at Vanderbilt University from 1958 to 1963. He was professor of theology from 1963 to 1969 and Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr. Professor of Divinity from 1969 to 1995 at Harvard Divinity School. Kaufmann died on 22 July 2011 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

During the 1960s Kaufman established his reputation as a leading figure in the transition from neo-orthodoxy to the historicism and social constructivism which dominated much Christian theology from the 1970s onward. His *Relativism, Knowledge and Faith*, published in 1960, began with the premise of Karl Barth and the earlier “dialectical theologians” that direct knowledge of God outside the sphere of revelation is impossible. But, unlike Barth and his followers, Kaufman refused to ignore the challenge of conceptual relativism and the philosophical task of analyzing the conditions for knowledge. From the outset, Kaufman’s approach was strongly influenced by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, a stance that became increasingly more explicit. Like Kant, Kaufman regarded theological thought, which in his early career he associated with “metaphysics,” as a drive toward the “synthesis” of all knowledge and experience. In Kaufman’s historicist model, this synthesis included cultural and anthropological data of all kinds.

By the late 1960s, Kaufman had incorporated the methodology of analytic philosophy, which was then all-pervasive at Harvard and which confronted theology with the issue of whether its own “metaphysical” language was meaningful or coherent in any fashion. In *God the Problem*, Kaufman inquired whether the word God refers to anything real, or whether our religious and theological ideas are merely artifacts of the “imagination.” He also asked what such terms as God, revelation, transcendence, and divine “act” mean for Wittgenstein. It was here that

Kaufman moved away from a faith-centered historicism toward a position that had affinities with earlier American pragmatism and that would become familiar as “constructivism” or “constructionism.”

For theological discourse to be meaningful according to sound criteria, Kaufman argued, it must understand the notion of God, not as an object or facticity of some sort but as an “imaginative construct.” This construct serves a “practical posture” in generating an appropriate worldview or ordering personal experience in such a manner that moral activity and “seriousness about life” remain possible. Just as Kaufman in his early work applied Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, at this stage he deployed the arguments in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, which treat God as a necessary “postulate” of thought that grounds morality. Kaufman also maintained, along with Kant, that Christian theism – the view that the divine is ultimately personal or “agential” – offers the best analogical framework within which to elaborate the symbol God.

During the 1970s, Kaufman refined this approach considerably by elaborating for the first time and in extensive detail the “method” of constructionism. In *An Essay on Theological Method* (1975), Kaufman pointedly defined theology as “construction.” In emphasizing the triadic architecture of theology, the essay reveals Kaufman’s intensive reading of Hegel during the first half of that decade. Kaufman characterized previous approaches as “first-order” and “second-order” theologies. First-order theology was obviously Barthianism, stressing God’s self-disclosure through Scripture. Second-order theology corresponded to Kaufman’s earlier stance. “Third-order theology” coincided with Kaufman’s new position, which he retained for the remainder of his career.

Third-order theology does not begin with “faith” but with experience, including the varieties of “religious experience.” Third-order theology is the third or synthetic “moment” (a Hegelian bit of nomenclature) in the enterprise of theological construction. It takes up into itself the first moment, which is naïve and unreflective doctrine or experience, along with the second moment, which is a pragmatic or humanistic assessment of that experience. Third-order theology departs from every effort to anchor God-talk in a particular religious tradition and sets forth a structure of discourse congruent with contemporary experience. Theological “constructions” are true and meaningful insofar as they enrich and order such experience at an ultimate level.

By the time he published his key work, *The Theological Imagination: Constructing the Concept of God* (1981), Kaufman had aligned this method of “pragmatic validation” for theological construction with the new social and political agendas that emerged during the Vietnam era. Theology is inauthentic, Kaufman insisted, if it does not contribute to a process of “humanization.” Theological construction must take into account a variety of criteria, such as sensitivity to the diversity of world religions, gender issues, the multiplicity of moral values, and the ecological crisis. Kaufman termed this approach the “indigenization” of theology. Although the absolute referent for theology can never be described or known, constructivism requires that theologians immerse themselves in their own immediate cultural context. Theology must be devoted to critiquing those traditional and “absolutist” constructs of God that perpetuate social injustice in a given historical milieu. Thus the route of Kaufman’s work had turned in the opposite direction. Whereas the early “neo-orthodox” Kaufman relied on the language of monotheistic absolutism to

engage and critique cultural relativism, the later liberal Kaufman deployed the argot of cultural relativism to engage and critique monotheistic absolutism.

The third phase of Kaufman's writings brings these two polarities into some kind of clear tension. The shift was catalyzed by Kaufman's own reflections on the threat of nuclear holocaust, first signaled in his Presidential address to the American Academy of Religion in 1982 and his visit soon thereafter to Hiroshima, where the first atomic bomb had fallen. Theology, Kaufman declared, must set its face toward the ultimate limiting factor in all human experience: the prospect of planetary annihilation. Theology must be concerned neither simply with the salvation of souls nor with the relevance of ideas and symbols. Rather, it must address the survival of the species. Although essentially an exercise in "imaginative construction," theology cannot merely be a mouthpiece for the cultural fads and fashions of the day. The Christian symbol of God, Kaufman suggested in *Theology for a Nuclear Age* (1985), is not so bad after all, since it evokes a sense of both mystery and familiarity. Such a picture of God both "relativizes" and "humanizes" all other symbols and constructions. What Kaufman dubbed "nuclear eschatology" throws into a new perspective the fragility of all "ecological" communities, human and animal. The construct of God functions to "ground" the value of all life across the evolutionary continuum against the apocalyptic menace of nuclear catastrophe.

At the same time, Kaufman wrote in his book *In Face of Mystery: A Constructive Theology* (1993), the construct of God must be fundamentally "reconstructed," but not strictly as a feint for either authoritarian morals or activist politics. Apocalyptic terror underscores the importance of the symbol God as the "underlying reality" or "ultimate

mystery" of our world. The symbol "orients" us toward the wider flanges of the "cosmic-historical trajectory" of life in this sector of the universe, pointing toward a "humanely" ordered future that is at once compatible with the idea of intelligent purpose. We cannot know or identify this evolutionary purpose but we can capture it provisionally or metaphorically. The difficulty lies in our tendency to absolutize or reify our metaphors and symbols.

In Face of Mystery reaffirms, without the hesitation evident in Kaufman's middle years, the centrality of Christian theological language, including the Incarnation and the Trinity. Christianity is neither one religion among many others nor an exclusive window on religious truth. The "normative" conception of the human upon which we build all adequate constructions of God must be informed by the image of Jesus. Theology, in the end, must be faithful to what H. Richard Niebuhr called a "radical monotheism" that is "brought into significant connection with the poignancy and power of the story and character of Jesus and the radical ethic which he lived and inspired in others." (2001, p. 31).

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Carl A. Raschke

KELLER, EVELYN FOX (1936–)

Evelyn Fox Keller was born on 20 March 1936 in New York City, New York. She completed a BA in physics at Brandeis University in 1957, an MA in physics from Radcliffe College in 1959, and a PhD in physics at Harvard University in 1963. From 1963 to 1980 she held various appointments in the New York City area, including as instructor of physics at New York University (1962–63), assistant research scientist at the Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences at NYU (1963–66), assistant professor in the Cornell University Medical College (1963–69), associate professor at NYU (1970–72),

and associate professor in the Natural Science division of the State University of New York, Purchase (1972–82).

In the 1970s, Keller became increasingly interested in social, political, and psychoanalytic issues. From 1979 until 1984 she was a visiting fellow in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Science, Technology, and Society program. In 1981, she became visiting professor at Northeastern University and then full professor of mathematics and humanities in 1982. She remained at Northeastern University until 1988, when she moved to the University of California, Berkeley, as a professor in the department of Rhetoric and in Women’s Studies. She was a Fellow of Stanford University’s Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in 1991–92. In 1992 she returned to MIT’s Science, Technology and Society program, this time as professor of History and Philosophy of Science, where she has remained since 1992, half-time since 2001. Keller has received a National Science Foundation fellowship (1957–61), a MacArthur Fellowship (1992–97), and a Guggenheim Fellowship (2000–01). She is an elected member of the American Philosophical Society (2006) and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2007), and has been inducted into the Science Hall of Fame (2011).

Keller’s main philosophical contributions fall into three categories: (1) an analysis of relations between gender and science; (2) an analysis of relations between science and society more generally, particularly regarding language’s mediation between the two; and (3) an unusually scientifically acute and philosophically sophisticated set of case studies in the history of science, particularly of biological sciences in the twentieth century. Keller’s studies of the interplay between scientific theory, on the one hand, and the linguistic, technological, psychological,

political, and other “external” factors that play a role in shaping it, are among the subtlest and most insightful in the literature. She usually conducts these inquiries through discussion of particular episodes or trajectories in the history of science. History thus becomes her philosophical laboratory.

From 1964 to 1976, Keller’s primary intellectual foci were theoretical physics and mathematical biology, including authorship or co-authorship of more than a dozen published papers in science journals in that and related fields. According to her autobiographical accounts, she experienced profound discrimination and isolation as a female graduate student at Harvard in the 1950s and 1960s. In the course of the 1970s, aided in part by psychoanalytic therapy, the burgeoning feminist movement, and her own empirical investigations into the status of women’s careers in science, she gradually came to see her problems at Harvard and in her early career as not merely personal but also political.

In “Gender and Science” (1978), Keller discussed the psychological factors at play in the widespread identification of science with masculinity. She suggested that a threefold identification of maleness, emotional detachment (or “objectivity”), and science, on the one hand, and femaleness, emotional attachment or involvement (also “subjectivity”), and lack of scientific credibility, on the other, had been forged in the collective consciousness and in many individuals’ lived experience. This identification could be traced, first, to the greater independence from their mothers and other emotional attachments that was widely educationally and societally expected of men, and, second, to a conception of science that privileged such “independence” and “unattachment” as epistemic modes.

Keller’s first book, *A Feeling for the Organism* (1983), was a biography of

the twentieth-century cytologist Barbara McClintock, whose idiosyncratic view of genes jumping from one place on the chromosome to another was for a long time widely ignored or denigrated before eventually being accepted and celebrated by the mainstream biological research community. Keller suggested that McClintock’s unusually sympathetically engaged relationship to her subject matter (her cultivation of what McClintock called a “feeling for the organism”) was a key factor both in the uncommon novelty and empirical successfulness of her work, and its uncommonly poor initial reception. Yet Keller also stressed that the institutions and practices of science, though initially resistant, eventually made way for McClintock’s discoveries and professional success; these institutions and practices thus, in an important sense, prepared the ground for their own correction.

Keller’s next book, *Reflections on Gender and Science* (1985), collected the 1978 essay with others that explored the “Gender and Science” theme along psychological and historical dimensions. For instance, Keller discussed the influence of an analogy (sketched, among other places, in the writings of Francis Bacon) between males’ sexual conquest of females, and scientists’ epistemic conquest of nature. Keller also discussed the applicability of her increasingly complex views about science and gender to McClintock’s life and work.

From the mid-1980s until the present day, Keller’s work has moved away from anything that could be construed as a primary concern with gender and science, and towards an analysis of relations between science and social factors in general, especially language. In *Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death* (1992), she signals that she considers the issues of gender and science discussed in her earlier work to be only especially salient examples within the

larger problematic that now occupies her: the relation between science and society. Many essays in *Secrets* explore the way that ordinary language and the normative and political commitments it reflects are taken up within scientific research programs, or reflections on those research programs, and thereby affect the content and commitments of science itself: sometimes and in some ways, beneficially; sometimes and in some ways, harmfully. For instance, she points to the way that a conflation between the terms “self-interested” and “competitive,” within evolutionary biology, parallels a similar conflation in everyday language, and has questionable interpretive effects in both domains. Another turn in Keller’s work, starting roughly with *Secrets*, is a move away from psychological and psychoanalytic approaches.

In the 1990s and 2000s, Keller’s concern with the positive and negative epistemological implications of social factors becomes increasingly central. In *Making Sense of Life* (2003), she highlights the diversity of questions that scientists at different times have asked, and the way that these questions have been differently motivated and have led to different evaluations of contemporaneous and prior research programs. Characteristically, Keller approaches this problem not in the abstract, but through detailed case studies of episodes in twentieth-century molecular and developmental biology. Keller also expands her concern with language and metaphor as mediating factors between science and society to a concern with models, including physically instantiated models such as computers and model organisms.

In Keller’s work of the 2000s, goals that might be classified as scientific (rather than philosophical or historical) play an increasingly central role. One can discern an intention to use historical, philosophical, and scientific modes of evidence and analysis

together, to move her own, her readers’, and the wider community’s understanding of the focal subject matter – whether genes, nature-vs.-nurture, or ecosystems – to a more satisfactory state, as judged along all of these dimensions of possible evaluation (historical, philosophical, and scientific). In *The Century of the Gene* (2000), she reviews contemporary research in molecular genetics, arguing that it shows the need for theoretical alternatives to the twentieth century’s “gene centrism.” In “Beyond the Gene but Beneath the Skin” (2001), she emphasizes the significance of organisms’ bodily boundaries against contrary tendencies in developmental systems theory.

Since her study of the views of Barbara McClintock, and perhaps even since her early work on slime molds, Keller’s clearest sympathies have been with theories and approaches that posit complex interactions displaying both order and contingency. Keller’s attraction to scientific theories that emphasize self-organization, distributed causality, and complexity thus reflects her unusually subtle and sophisticated historical and philosophical mappings of science’s relation to social factors, and vice versa.

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Phillip Honenberger

KILPATRICK, WILLIAM HEARD (1871–1965)

William Heard Kilpatrick was born on 20 November 1871 in White Plains, Georgia. He enrolled at Mercer University in 1888 and graduated with his BA degree in 1871. At Mercer’s library, Kilpatrick came upon a copy of Darwin’s *Origin of the Species*, which

captured his interest and stimulated a lifelong interest in science. After graduation from Mercer, Kilpatrick enrolled in the graduate program at Johns Hopkins University. His graduate education was interrupted at the end of his first year, when he accepted a position as a teacher of algebra and geometry. In 1896, Kilpatrick accepted a position as principal of Anderson Elementary School, and the following year he returned to Mercer University, having accepted an appointment as professor of mathematics and astronomy. At the end of his first year of teaching at Mercer, he enrolled in a summer school session at the University of Chicago, where he came under the influence of John Dewey. After teaching at Mercer until 1906, Kilpatrick enrolled in the graduate program at Columbia University Teachers College in 1907, and received his PhD in education in 1912.

Kilpatrick began teaching at Teachers College as an instructor in 1909, before completing his doctoral studies, and was promoted to professor of philosophy of education in 1918. He spent his entire teaching career at Teachers College, where he was one of the most popular and highly respected instructors. He retired from Columbia in 1938. Kilpatrick died on 13 February 1965 in New York City.

Science and mathematics were among Kilpatrick’s earliest academic interests, and this is reflected in his early appointments to instructional positions as an algebra and geometry teacher and a professor of mathematics and astronomy. His early teaching experience and his exposure to Dewey’s ideas further broadened his intellectual horizons, stimulating an enduring concern not just for what students learned, but how they learned it. He began to integrate educational practices and ideas into political contexts, following Dewey’s idea that there is an intimate connection between education,

experience, and a democratic way of life. Kilpatrick quickly became a national leader of the progressive education movement and remained so until his death.

Of utmost importance to Kilpatrick was that students be stimulated to continually expand and integrate their experience, to examine and develop their values through social interaction with others. Toward this end, he developed what has become known as his project method, which is guided by a dominating purpose that is of interest to the students. According to Kilpatrick, the interests of the students should be at the heart of any project approach to education. The project method has four fundamental phases: purposing, which reflects the interests of the participants and sets the goals of the project, planning how to reach the desired goal, putting the plan into execution, and judging or evaluating the outcome of the plan. The project method aims to expand autonomy in pursuit of worthwhile activities and to develop a sense of moral responsibility.

As with Dewey, Kilpatrick viewed democracy as much more than simply the government, or the electoral process; rather, democracy both depends on and engenders a way of life. His project method was intended to foster nothing less than the progressive growth of a democratic way of life. He tried to establish these principles in his own teaching, and it is no wonder that his respectful attitude and genuine feelings of positive regard for his students gained him a place among the most popular instructors at Teachers College.

A gifted scholar, his concern for the interaction between individuals, society, and politics is reflected in Kilpatrick's many published works. Combining the analytical bent of a scientific mind with the attitudes and concerns of a progressive educator and philosopher allowed him to make significant

and original contributions to the disciplines of education and philosophy.

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Michael R. Taylor

KIM, JAEGWON (1934–)

Jaegwon Kim was born on 12 September 1934 in Taegu, Korea. He attended Seoul National University from 1953 to 1955 before earning his BA at Dartmouth College in 1958 and his PhD in philosophy at Princeton University in 1962. He taught philosophy at Swarthmore, Brown, Michigan, Cornell and John Hopkins before returning to the University of Michigan as professor of philosophy from 1971 until 1987. There he became the Roy Wood Sellars Professor of Philosophy in 1986. In 1987 Kim moved to Brown, where he became the William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy, which is his current position. He

became a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1991. He was President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division in 1988–89.

Kim has been a consistent critic of non-reductive physicalism, which was the orthodox view in the philosophy of mind before his sustained attacks. In place of non-reductive physicalism, Kim has advocated a modified reductionist program to understand mind within a physicalist framework.

On Kim's account, events are structured complexes, individuated by their constitutive substances, properties and times. Moreover, the account downplays the distinctions between events, states, conditions and processes. All of these can be understood as structured complexes of substances exemplifying properties (or standing in relations) at a time or over a duration of time. Kim's property-exemplification account finds two events in this example, constituted by two different properties. This result has been raised as a criticism of the property-exemplification view, the objection being that the view multiplies events implausibly. Kim deflects this criticism by distinguishing between properties and predicates. Hence the same event might be described with different predicates, so long as the different predicates pick out the same property.

Kim distinguishes a variety of supervenience relations. For example, many philosophers have defended claims involving "weak supervenience": A family of properties *A* (for example mental properties) *weakly supervenes* on a family of properties *B* (for example physical properties) if and only if, necessarily, for any *x* and *y*, if *x* and *y* share all their *A*-properties then *x* and *y* share all their *B*-properties. The import of weak supervenience is that there exists a correlation between one kind of property and another. Specifically, two

things that share their *B*-properties must also share their *A*-properties. Alternatively, it is possible to define stronger relations. A *strongly supervenes* on *B* if and only if, necessarily, for any property *F* in *A*, if an object *x* has *F*, then there exists a property *G* in *B* such that *x* has *G*, and *necessarily* if any *y* has *G*, then *y* has *F*. This “strong supervenience” carries a modal force that is stronger than weak supervenience. This is implied by the second occurrence of “necessarily” in the definition of strong supervenience. Various relations of strong supervenience can be defined by varying the interpretation of “necessarily.” For example, there can be natural necessity, metaphysical necessity, logical necessity, or analytic necessity. Kim has argued that weak supervenience is not strong enough to play the role that philosophers require. For example, philosophers defending naturalism in ethics often couch their positions in terms of weak supervenience. The idea is that natural properties are somehow metaphysically prior to moral properties, so that a thing’s moral properties depend on its natural properties. But weak supervenience, Kim argues, is too weak to capture this idea. Lacking modal force, it is too weak to capture any dependence relation at all.

Kim argues that mental realism is an essential condition of agency, and therefore an essential part of our deepest self-conception. However, non-reductive physicalism cannot preserve mental realism, or the causal efficacy of the mental. One version of non-reductive physicalism is “emergentism.” Kim argues that emergentism is faced with a dilemma. Either the mental property has independent causal powers, and it is in virtue of these that one reaches for the umbrella, or the mental property has no new causal powers, but rather “piggy-backs” on the causal powers of its underlying brain activity. If we take

the latter view, emergentism amounts to a kind of epiphenomenalism. But if we take the former view, emergentism violates a basic commitment of physicalism: that the physical domain is “causally closed.” This line of reasoning suggests that physicalism must embrace reductionism: physicalism can save the causal efficacy of the mental only by reducing the mental to the physical. On this view, mental properties have causal efficacy because physical properties have causal efficacy, and mental properties are reducible to physical properties.

Kim has defended a qualified property identity view, which he has labeled “multiple-type identity theory.” Consider that any mental property is “realizable” in various physical organisms. For example, it is plausible that any number of animals, possible or actual, can have beliefs, desires, visual images, and pains. This rules out the possibility that mental types can be reduced to physical types in a one-to-one relationship. Nevertheless, Kim argues, we might still be able to identify mental types with physical types in a “local” fashion. For example, we might identify human beliefs with physical property *P*, dog beliefs with physical property *P**, Martian beliefs with physical property *P***, etc. This sort of local reduction is not clearly possible, Kim points out. Nevertheless, he argues, reductions of this sort are standard in science, and we should not expect more regarding mind-body reductions.

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John Greco

KITCHER, PHILIP STUART (1947–)

Philip Kitcher was born on 20 February 1947 in London, England. He received his bachelor’s degree from Christ’s College, Cambridge, in 1969 and his PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 1974. He has taught philosophy at the University of Vermont (1974–1983), the University of Minnesota (1983–1986), the University of California, San Diego (1986–1999), and Columbia University since 1998. He has been the John Dewey Professor of Philosophy since 2003, and he also holds the title of James R. Barker Professor of Contemporary Civilization. He was awarded a Lifetime Achievement Award and a Distinguished Contribution Award from the

American Psychological Association, as well as the Prometheus Prize from the American Philosophical Association. In 1997–98 he served as the President of the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division, and in 2002 he was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Kitcher's work has spanned philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of biology, epistemology, explanation, ethics, and most recently pragmatism. He has also written on the relationship between sciences and culture, for example, on the implications of the genetic revolution to our understanding of personhood, as well as several works critiquing creationism and advocating secular humanism. In addition, he has written on philosophical matters that connect philosophy and science to the arts, in particular aspects relating to James Joyce, Thomas Mann, Richard Wagner, Gustav Mahler, and others.

For many philosophers of science, however, Kitcher's claim to fame came about because of his work on the nature of scientific explanation. Prior to the 1970s, the prevailing view about the nature of scientific explanation was Carl Hempel's Covering-Law Model, a model in which logical or statistical laws formed an ineliminable component of explaining why a given event occurred. Such explanations have the structure of a logical argument. However, explanation conceived in terms of physical laws and past causes, said Kitcher, was inadequate. Along with some other critics of Hempel, most notably Michael Friedman, Kitcher proposed what is known as the unification model of scientific explanation. This model emphasizes the goal of explanation as understanding, along with the sense that understanding the world is enhanced to the extent that we recognize and establish interconnections among phenomena. For example, we think that evolutionary theory provides (correct) explanations because it

makes sense of lots of phenomena, including lots of different kinds of phenomena.

Kitcher claimed that although we want an account of explanation to advance our understanding of the world, we must see explanation as a form of activity, not as an argument. This activity, Kitcher claimed, involves an ordered pair consisting of a proposition and an act type. For Kitcher, the history of science indicates that scientific practitioners draw from a set of possible explanatory arguments (what he calls an *explanatory store*) and adopt the one that provides the greatest epistemic coherence, where coherence involves various epistemic values we associate with scientific understanding, such as predictive power, promise of future understanding, consistency with accepted laws, simplicity of theory, etc. For instance, the history of science shows that theory acceptance is based not just on simplicity and predictive power, but also on explanatory promise. This motivational factor has been an emphasis for all of his work and especially in his most recent work on pragmatism. His numerous writings on the social dimensions of science emerge from this emphasis. Why should we care about explanation or truth or personhood or any of the fundamental issues of philosophy? This was at the forefront of his *Science, Truth, and Democracy*, as well as various other books and papers, such as *Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature*, *The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities*, *The Ethical Project*, and *Science in a Democratic Society*.

Drawing on the work of John Dewey and William James, while also both critiquing and expanding upon them, Kitcher's most recent work has championed a pragmatist philosophy. His *Preludes to Pragmatism: Toward a Reconstruction of Philosophy* is an

open acknowledgement of the significance of pragmatism, not only its application to a wide range of philosophical issues and topics, but also as a means of approaching those issues and topics, a mind-set of how and why those issues and topics matter. The question of “why,” Kitcher claims, is front and center for a pragmatist stance. For Dewey and for Kitcher, questions of value are central to philosophy and from them flow a host of inquiries into religion, social life, politics, education, and art.

For Kitcher, pragmatism holds to a naturalistic approach to traditional philosophical concerns; it endorses a holistic approach to meaning and truth; it insists on the recognition and importance of no inquiry as disinterested (hence, the rejection of a fact/value dichotomy) and of non-goal-based standards of evaluating inquiry (hence, the rejection of metaphysical realism). Central to pragmatism are the following: beliefs are instruments with coping with the world; the acceptability of a belief is ultimately a function of the extent to which the belief allows for successful adaptation to the world; all beliefs are fallible; and truth and rationality depend upon utility in coping with future experience. These doctrines, while directly epistemological, apply to ethical and political matters. “Apply” might be a misnomer here, since, for pragmatists, belief, as the product of inquiry, is never disinterested or noninterpretive. Axiological elements (both ethical and political) enter into inquiry and are not simply tacked on at the end of inquiry as an application.

Where a correspondence view sees truth as a relation between a sentence or belief on the one hand and facts or states of affairs on the other, and a coherence view sees truth also as a relation between a sentence or belief on the one hand and a set of other sentences or beliefs on the other, a pragmatist view of truth is that

it is as relation among (1) a sentence or belief, (2) facts or states of affairs, and (3) a set of other beliefs. In addition, there is always a normative component to claims of truth and even the desire to establish a conception of truth (again: why do we care about truth?).

A second example of Kitcher’s endorsement of pragmatism, and how he sees its value outside of academia, is his discussion of the concept of race. He claims that, while naïve notions of essentialism can be rejected, it is possible to develop an account of races as biologically meaningful units within the human species because nature does not delineate these units; rather, the categories and classifications that are meaningful depend upon both facts about the world and also our normative projects. These projects are, for Kitcher, partly biological, partly social, and partly a mix of the two, as in instances where medical concerns might call for different treatment regimes for different types of people. As Kitcher put it, if race matters, it is a meaningful unit, otherwise not. For Kitcher’s philosophy, normativity matters whether the issue is race, truth, knowledge, or goodness.

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David Boersema

KNEELAND, ABNER (1774–1844)

Abner Kneeland was the first broadly popular freethinker, and the last person jailed for blasphemy, in the United States. He was born on 6 April 1774 in Gardner, Massachusetts, and received a brief education at Chesterfield Academy in New Hampshire. After he moved with the family to Vermont at age twenty-

one, he joined a Baptist church in Putney and received a license to preach in 1801. Within two years Kneeland became a Universalist as he read the theological works of Elhanan Winchester and then met Hosea Ballou. In 1804 he was licensed to preach by the Unitarians in New Hampshire and began ministering in Langdon, New Hampshire, in 1805. He held positions in the New England Universalist General Convention and helped compose a new Universality hymnal. He also was elected to the state legislature and served during 1810–11. In 1811, Kneeland accepted the ministry of the Universalist church in Charlestown, Massachusetts.

In 1814, Kneeland decided to stop preaching, because he concluded that the Bible could not be the word of God. By 1817 he was preaching again, and in 1818 he found a church willing to listen to his developing views in Philadelphia, the Lombard Street Universalist Church. From 1819 to 1823 he edited the *Christian Messenger*, which was renamed the *Philadelphia Universalist Magazine and Christian Messenger*, and then a newspaper titled the *Gazetteer*. He published *A Series of Lectures on the Doctrine of Universal Benevolence* in 1818 and his exchanges of letters with Ballou questioning scriptural revelation inspired Ballou to publish *A Series of Letters in Defence of Divine Revelation* in 1820, which includes some of Kneeland's letters. Kneeland also published a translation of the New Testament, notable for the way that passages about divine punishment, damnation, and hell were left untranslated.

By the 1820s Kneeland was gradually moving through and beyond both Unitarianism and Universalism, questioning his belief in any supernatural deity. During this period the writings of Joseph Priestly influenced Kneeland's thinking, and he also encountered socialist and skeptic Robert Dale Owen. After his Philadelphia church began to rebel against

Kneeland's radical views, Kneeland started another ministry in 1825 in New York City at the Prince Street Church. Once again his congregation rebelled, so he departed with some followers in 1827 to form the Second Universalist Society. He permitted Frances Wright to speak from his pulpit, at a time when she could find no other place to speak. By this time Kneeland was so anti-clerical and skeptical about God that Ballou persuaded him to resign from the New England Universalist General Convention in 1829.

Kneeland explained his departure from Universalism in his 1829 work, *A Review of the Evidences of Christianity*. He associated with Owen's and Wright's freethought and socialist followers and published articles in their journal *Free Inquirer*. In 1831 he joined the First Society of Free Enquirers in Boston in 1831, and quickly became a popular lecturer, speaking in front of crowds of thousands of people. He founded the *Boston Investigator* in 1831, which became his platform for advocating freethought and social reform, including public education, labor issues, abolition, and women's rights. He also published tracts and pamphlets composed by himself and others (including Owen and Charles Knowlton) which criticized the institution of marriage, the unavailability of birth control, and the inequalities of race, sex, class, and wealth.

In the *Investigator* issue of 12 July 1833 Kneeland expressed his Philosophical Creed, which included his pantheistic statement that God and Nature are equivalent. This statement reads, "I believe that the whole universe is NATURE, and that the word NATURE embraces the whole universe, and that God and Nature, so far as we can attach any rational Idea to either, are perfectly synonymous terms. Hence, I am not an Atheist, but a Pantheist; that is, instead of believing there is no God, I believe that in

the abstract, all is God; and that all power that is, is in God, and that there is no power except that which proceeds from God” (repr. in *An Introduction to the Defence of Abner Kneeland Charged with Blasphemy*, 1834, 16).

In a December 1833 issue of the *Boston Investigator* Kneeland reprinted a letter stating that he does not believe in God, in the context of an explanation why he rejected Universalism’s supernaturalist view of divinity. The Massachusetts Attorney General promptly obtained an indictment for blasphemy and committing treason against the interests of society, under a 1782 statute. From 1834 until 1838 Kneeland was constantly in courts as he fought the charges. Despite his arguments that he was actually a pantheist, belief in God was never really put on trial, since the prosecution made a far greater spectacle by focusing on the supposed dangers of Kneeland’s radical social and political views. After three hung juries, the State finally obtained a conviction, which was upheld by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw in *Commonwealth v Abner Kneeland*, 37 Mass. (20 Pick) 206 (Sup. Ct. Mass. 1838). Kneeland served sixty days in jail during the summer of 1838. The resulting outcry and protest from leading intellectuals including Ralph Waldo Emerson, William Ellery Channing, and William Garrison put Massachusetts in a shameful spotlight, and no one was ever again jailed for blasphemy in the United States. Some states, including Massachusetts, have not yet removed blasphemy laws from their statutes, although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional in 1952 (*Joseph Burstyn, Inc v. Wilson*, 343 U.S. 495).

Despite his court battles, Kneeland continued his organization efforts. Together with atheist Benjamin Offen, he helped form the United Moral and Philosophical Society

for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge at Saratoga Springs, New York. This freethought society held annual conventions until 1841. In 1839 Kneeland moved to Iowa in order to start a utopian community which he called Salubria, located on land in Van Buren County, south of the present-day town of Farmington. This small colony of freethinkers never grew, despite Kneeland’s frequent optimistic letters back to the readers of *Boston Investigator*. After Kneeland’s death in Salubria on 27 August 1844, the community disbanded.

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John R. Shook

KNOWLTON, CHARLES (1800–1850)

Charles Knowlton was born on 10 May 1800 in Templeton, a rural town in north central Massachusetts. Knowlton was introduced to Thomas Paine's book, *The Age of Reason*, a deistic treatise containing a critique of organized religion. Knowlton was impressed by Paine's assertion that all things must follow the laws of nature and, although God was the creator, God did not interfere with these laws. Thereafter Knowlton was what was then called a freethinker, but what was later called an atheist.

Knowlton began his study of medicine soon after, first with Charles Wilder of Templeton, then with Stephen Batchellor of Royalston, Massachusetts. Knowlton spent two months in the Worcester jail for the then not uncommon crime of dissecting a dead body. During his incarceration his only reading material was John Mason Good's

Study of Medicine. Knowlton continued his medical studies with Amos Twitchell of Keene and took two courses of medical lectures at the New Hampshire Medical Institute in Hanover, later renamed the Dartmouth Medical School, where he received the MD degree in 1824.

During his time with Batchellor, Knowlton read the French anatomist, Marie François Xavier Bichat, whose suggestion that passions are seated in the viscera did not satisfy him. Knowlton began to form the concept that the soul or mind is created in and by the brain, so that ideas come by way of the senses and passions and must have their seat in the nervous system. When Knowlton decided to write his graduating thesis on the passions, he was unable to reconcile the concept of the soul. Putting the concept of the soul aside, he concluded that the action of the brain was only thought and that the action of the brain and nerves together was sensation.

At twenty-nine, while practicing rural medicine in Hawley, Massachusetts, Knowlton wrote and self-published *Elements of Modern Materialism* in 1829, a well-written, wide-ranging deist polemic. Everything that God created was matter. There were no agents or forces except the material. Even God Himself was matter and had a definite place in the universe. Knowlton was a deist, believing that nature continued according to its own laws without further action on God's part. He refuted the existence of the soul as something distinct from the brain and nerves, because it was supposed to be ethereal, not composed of matter. He said that physiology alone must teach the human constitution. There are no events without causes. Facts cause thoughts and thoughts cause actions. Consciousness arises from the nervous system. Sensations – seeing, hearing, smelling, taste and feeling – arise

from the interaction of the nervous system and the brain. Passions are feelings that arise from internal organs. Grief, anger, love, etc., are passions that owe their existence to the brain, while other passions have their origins in other organs. The soul is only a name for a function in the human head. A person does not die because the soul flies away, but when organs cease to function and thus lose their physiological properties.

He returned to medicine and opened another rural medical practice in Ashfield, Massachusetts. He believed that a high birth rate resulted in financial burdens on young couples and put a strain on the health of mothers. He soon began dispensing contraceptive advice, although it was illegal, and put together a pamphlet on the subject, which was also illegal. In 1832 he published anonymously the first edition of *Fruits of Philosophy*, and in 1833 he published a second edition under his own name. Written for the general public, this was among the first medical guides on how to prevent conception, predated only by Robert Dale Owen's book *Moral Physiology* in 1831. *Fruits of Philosophy* gave married women and their husbands the practical knowledge to limit the number of pregnancies, and although the physiology and the methods he advocated became obsolete in the twentieth century, they were up to date for his time. *Fruits of Philosophy* went through nine editions in Knowlton's lifetime. Knowlton advocated abstinence, not primarily on moral grounds, but because that was the most reliable way not to overpopulate the world. By 1839 ten thousand copies had been sold. It was finally reviewed in the *Boston Medical and Surgical Journal*, the most prominent American medical journal of the time, in 1843. In 1844 he was elected a fellow of the Massachusetts Medical Society. He died suddenly in

Winchendon on 20 February 1850. After his death, *Fruits of Philosophy* continued to be published internationally until the 1890s, chiefly through the efforts of Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh after 1877.

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Francine Netter Roberson

KOCH, ADRIENNE (1912–1971)

Adrienne Koch was born on 10 September 1912 in New York City. She died on 21 August 1971 in New York City. She received her undergraduate education at New York University, earning her BA in 1933. She then received her MA in 1934 and PhD in philosophy in 1942 from Columbia University. Her dissertation on “The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson” was written under the mentorship of Herbert W. Schneider, and won the Woodbridge Prize for best dissertation. Although trained as a philosopher, Koch gained recognition as a historian. However, Koch’s research interests cannot be presented as initially philosophical and later historical. Koch’s life-long work between philosophy and history reflects the following central belief that guided her research: American political philosophy is inextricably bound to the study of the political writings and correspondences of America’s founding statesmen whom Koch consistently dubs “philosopher-statesmen.”

Koch was a philosophy instructor for five years at New York University while in graduate school. During World War II, Koch worked as an analyst for the Office of Economic Warfare and as a political analyst for the National Planning Association. In 1946 Koch was hired by Tulane University, and later taught at the University of California at Berkeley from 1956 to 1964, and the University of Maryland at College Park from 1966 until her death in 1971. Her appointments were at various times in philosophy, history, political science, and American studies. Koch was a visiting professor at several universities and awarded fellowships and scholarships from the Guggenheim, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations.

Koch’s general area of research was American political philosophy of the Enlightenment era. Koch focused both on the political philosophy of founding statesmen, and on utilizing Enlightenment thinking to illuminate contemporary political issues. Koch’s contributions to political philosophy and history are as diverse as compiling and editing the works of American Enlightenment statesmen, publishing her novel ideas on the mutual influence between the original American philosopher-statesmen, and addressing contemporary political crises such as the Cold War and the rapid development of third world countries.

Koch was also an advocate for women’s liberation. At a time when working outside the home was not commonplace, Koch advocated coupling motherhood with a professional career. She herself balanced mothering twins, her academic career, and married life with economist Lawrence Kegan.

With regard to Enlightenment political philosophy, Koch focused on Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Adams, and John Quincy Adams. Koch co-edited compilations of the philosopher-statesmen’s work, such as *The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (1944) and *The Selected Writings of John Adams and John Quincy Adams* (1946). In other writings, Koch emphasized the mutual intellectual influence and strife between the leading figures who shaped early American government.

In *Adams and Jefferson: “Posterity Must Judge”* (1963), Koch intersperses original documents by both Adams and Jefferson within a chronological depiction of the political rivalry that developed between these two men whom she describes as dueling “titans.” In *Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration* (1964) Koch argues that her research into unpublished

sources indicates that Jefferson's political philosophy is not exclusively "Jeffersonian" insofar as it developed out of an intense intellectual collaboration and deep friendship with James Madison. Her 1966 book *Madison's "Advice to My Country"* bolsters this claim by explicating Madison's individual philosophy as centered around the themes of liberty, justice, and union.

While she focused on the Enlightenment, Koch also addressed contemporary political issues and published on broader themes. In *Philosophy for a Time of Crisis: An Interpretation* (1959) Koch describes post-World War II political and social existence as verging on a state of monumental crisis. The crisis was precipitated by diverse, but not unrelated, events such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conflicts between communism and capitalism, and the rapid development of underdeveloped countries. Koch compiled selections from renowned intellectuals across disciplines as diverse as philosophy, physics, and religion whom she believes respond in unique ways to the crisis of the twentieth-century. In a subsequent text, *Power, Morals, and the Founding Fathers: Essays in the Interpretation of the American Enlightenment* (1961), Koch adapted some of her own earlier published articles into a text which argues that Franklin's, Adams's, Jefferson's, and Madison's reflections on humanism and the productive relationship between power, liberty, and morals provide useful tools for approaching a resolution to the twentieth-century crisis.

Koch not only contributed to the existing scholarship on American Enlightenment thinking, and drew important connections between American political philosophy and the founding statesmen, but she also applied the wisdom offered by historical and

philosophical investigation to the resolution of contemporary issues.

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Sarah K. Donovan

KONVITZ, MILTON RIDBAZ (1908–2003)

Milton R. Konvitz was born on 12 March 1908 in Safad, Palestine, then a part of the Ottoman Empire (now located in Israel). Konvitz was raised in Trenton, New Jersey, and attended New York University where he received a BS in 1928, an MA in philosophy in 1930, and also a JD in 1930. He then went to Cornell University to earn his PhD in philosophy in 1933. His dissertation committee was chaired by George H. Sabine, and an expanded version of the dissertation, *On the Nature of Value: the Philosophy of Samuel Alexander*, was published in 1946.

Konvitz returned to New Jersey to take a position in a law firm and, in 1935, to go into practice for himself. In 1938 he became General Counsel for the Newark Housing Authority and took part-time faculty positions at New York University, and at the New School for Social Research, teaching courses on the legal aspects of public housing, planning and conservation, judicial administration, legal method, and civil liberties. The latter course and that on public housing were among the first of their kind to be taught in this country.

In 1943, he served briefly as American Civil Liberties Union staff counsel at the request of Roger Baldwin, its founder. Almost at the same time, Thurgood Marshall, later to become the first African-American Supreme Court Justice, invited him to join the staff of the National Association of Colored People Legal Defense and Education Fund. During this period he published two more books: *The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law* (1946) and *The Constitution and Civil Rights* (1947).

In 1946 Konvitz accepted the offer of a full-time position at Cornell University, to become one of four founding faculty

members of Cornell's New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, with a joint appointment in Cornell's Law School. During his almost thirty years at Cornell, he also played a decisive role in the establishment of its Department of Near-Eastern Studies and the revival of a program of Jewish Studies. Retiring from Cornell in 1973, Konvitz died on 5 September 2003 in Long Branch, New Jersey.

What soon came to distinguish Konvitz's teaching career at Cornell was a two-course sequence on "The Development of American Ideals," taught for over twenty years, always attended by hundreds of students. It linked Supreme Court decisions to underlying constitutional principles and to the more basic ethical principles which he had found from his youth onward in literature, the Bible, Greek and Roman writers, the major philosophers, and the great figures of literature. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has acknowledged the importance his teaching had on her own thinking.

Konvitz was a most prolific writer who wove into his academic writings material from beyond the formal, academic boundaries of his disciplines: the legal aspects of labor-management relations, but above all constitutional law, civil rights and liberties, and their bases in the two-century history of the origin and interpretation of the Declaration of Independence, the American Constitution, and especially the Bill of Rights. Many of his early writings focused more concretely on the legal aspects of civil rights and liberties, the best known being *The Constitution and Civil Rights* (1947). In this and two early books dealing with aliens and immigration, his fundamental positions could already be discerned in his critical comments on decisions and opinions in these fields of Supreme Court justices or other judges who are seen to discriminate, to curtail, or to

support executive or congressional curtailment of the “basic freedoms” of non-U.S. citizens. His fundamental belief was that foreigners, like Americans, are first and foremost human beings with inalienable rights.

The roots of Konvitz’s ideas about fundamental rights and of equality ultimately go back, on the one hand, to his position on the definition of religion – the individual’s religious beliefs and acts claimed to be based on these beliefs – and even a step deeper: to his position on the place of “conscience.” In *Religious Liberty and Conscience* (1963) he argued that the three arms of government must stay as much as possible even out of defining religion and conscience in order to avoid specifying what beliefs and acts individuals will not be permitted to claim as based on religion. Konvitz’s most basic concept from which all else flows, including his conceptualization of religion, is the idea of “conscience”. “Since every man is made in the image of God, every man has dignity... and a conscience that purports to him, rightly or wrongly, to be the voice of God. This, at least, is how the believer reads the facts. Everyone, therefore, believer or non-believer, has a conscience that has the power to impose on him duties ‘superior to those arising from any human relation’. He owes supreme allegiance to the command of his conscience. It is not, therefore, a question of ‘religion’ or ‘religious belief’ or relation to any Supreme Being or God” (1978, p. 45).

In the area of the relation between Christian and Jewish theological theses, Konvitz deals explicitly with the issue of Jews as God’s “chosen people.” This assertion had made him uncomfortable throughout his life, when he began to admire the contributions to ethics by philosophers and theologians. Why should God not consider their contributions as coming from a “chosen people”; why would he choose at all? Konvitz’s solution is to argue

that the fact that one people is chosen simply does not logically exclude others from being chosen too, and that all humanity is “chosen” in the sense of having been created by God from Adam. On the obligation of Jews to follow ritual law, Konvitz holds that such duty must be voluntarily, as part of the individual’s interpretation of what God has commanded, and of the individual’s interpretation of the kind of Supreme Being, if any, which for that person exists. This theme is heard in *Nine American Jewish Thinkers* (2000), in which several of his subjects reject ritual and are agnostics if not atheists, nor necessarily Zionists. Yet the two topics, Israel and ritual, may be linked here because he was deeply concerned about the confrontation in Israel between traditionalists and secularists. He urges recognition that each side has only part of the truth, and that both should exercise tolerance lest disaster befall.

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Henry A. Landsberger

KRIPKE, SAUL AARON (1940–)

Saul Kripke was born on 13 November 1940 in Bay Shore, New York. Kripke studied at Harvard University, receiving a BA in 1962 but not before publishing his first contributions to logic. He then became a junior fellow at Harvard from 1963 to 1966, holding a concurrent position at Princeton as assistant professor of philosophy from 1964 to 1966. Kripke never received a doctorate, for the reason that no faculty at any of the universities with which he was associated

felt qualified to examine him. He was lecturer at Harvard from 1966 to 1968, and then became associate professor at Rockefeller University in 1968 and full professor in 1972. Upon the dissolution of Rockefeller's philosophy department, he went to Princeton University in 1977 as McCosh Professor of Philosophy. After becoming emeritus professor in 1997, he was a visiting professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the City University of New York. In 2003 he became a full-time professor of philosophy at the City University of New York Graduate Center, where he presently is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy. Kripke is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the British Academy, and he was the 2001 Winner of the Schock Prize in Philosophy.

On the strength of his contributions to formal logic, semantics, metaphysics, the theory of truth, the mind-body problem, and Wittgenstein interpretation, Kripke is now regarded as one of the foremost philosophers and logicians. By virtue of his achievements in modal logic, semantics, and metaphysics, Kripke has helped forge a position – the so-called New Theory of Reference – as influential in the latter twentieth century as ordinary language philosophy was in the middle and logical positivism was in the early part of the twentieth century.

In spite of the great advances in logic made in the latter half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, the logic of modal notions remained relatively obscure until the late 1950s. C.I. Lewis developed a number of axiomatic systems, yet no formal demonstration was available to show that any such axiomatic system was consistent, or able to certify all inferences that are valid. Kripke codified a *relative* notion of possibility by defining an *accessibility relation* on worlds. For any given world *W*, there is some subset

W' of W such that each element of W' is accessible from W . These, intuitively, are the worlds that are possible relative to W . Kripke shows that different restrictions on the accessibility relation (transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity, etc.) yield different theorems of modal logic, and correspond to different axiomatic systems already understood. The innovation led to an explosion in work on modal logic beginning in the middle 1960s, and had profound implications for semantics and metaphysics.

In *Naming and Necessity* Kripke undermined the dominant theory, the Description Theory of Names, by arguing that proper names are *rigid designators*, where a name N rigidly designates object O just in case N refers to O , and N refers to O in every world in which O exists. From the premise that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus, and the premise that both 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' rigidly designate their bearer, it follows that Hesperus is necessarily identical with Phosphorus. Kripke remarks, however, that the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus is only known a posteriori. Hence we may infer that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is both necessary and a posteriori, a conclusion that disagrees with the longstanding doctrine that the necessary and the a priori coincide. Likewise, Kripke holds that *natural kind terms* such as 'gold' and 'water' have properties analogous to proper names construed rigidly: If 'water' refers in the actual world to H_2O then it refers in all counterfactual situations to stuff with that same molecular structure. If water is H_2O , then it is necessarily but once again not a priori. The overall picture that emerges from the account of language that Kripke offers suggests our epistemic and semantic relation to the world to depend much less on what we know or believe about the meanings of our words, and much more about how we are causally situated in our social and

physical environment than had commonly been acknowledged.

Kripke argued that mental states, such as the state of being in pain, are not identical to states of the central nervous system. As we have just seen, were they so identical they would necessarily be. However, Kripke argues, it certainly seems conceptually possible that there be a case of a pain that has no physical realization, or a physical state alleged to be identical to a sensation that is not in fact so. Perhaps, it might be replied, the sensation is necessarily identical to the brain state, but the sensation is not essentially a pain? Kripke responds by observing that if a sensation is in fact a pain, it is hard to see how that very sensation might have been anything other than a pain. Notice that all one need grant to Kripke is (1) the necessity of true identity statements, (2) that it is conceptually possible that there be disembodied states of mind, or states of the Central Nervous System not identical to sensations, and (3) that pains and other sensations are essentially the sensations that they are. These three premises together argue against the alleged contingent identity of sensations and brain states.

In 1984 Kripke published *Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language*, which immediately gained considerable attention. In this book he argues that the force of Wittgenstein's considerations about rule-following, as set forth primarily in the *Philosophical Investigations*, had not been fully appreciated. Kripke suggests that for there to be such a thing as a rule, and as a special case for an expression to be meaningful, there would have to be such a substantive fact in virtue of which one pattern of behavior conforms to a particular rule. Kripke then argues that no such substantive fact seems to be forthcoming. Any putative such fact is either insufficient to make it the

case that one form of behavior conforms to a rule, or instead is simply a restatement of that very rule. Some commentators, unconvinced that Kripke has properly interpreted Wittgenstein, have used ‘Kripkenstein’ to denote that doctrine which Kripke claims to discern in Wittgenstein, leaving aside whether this claim is correct.

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KUHN, THOMAS SAMUEL (1922–1996)

Thomas Kuhn was born on 18 July 1922 in Cincinnati, Ohio. He earned all his academic degrees at Harvard, where he received a BS in 1943, an MA in 1946, and a PhD in physics in 1949. Kuhn began his academic career in 1952 teaching in the general education in science program established by his mentor, Harvard President James Bryant Conant. After failing to be awarded tenure in 1956, Kuhn became an assistant professor of history of science in the philosophy department at the University of California at Berkeley, and was soon promoted to full professor. In 1964 he moved to Princeton University’s newly established history and philosophy of science department, and in 1969 he was named M. Taylor Pyne Professor of Philosophy and History of Science. In 1979 he moved to

the philosophy and linguistics department at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where from 1982 until his retirement in 1991, Kuhn was the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy and History of Science. He was President of the History of Science Society during 1968–70, and was a member of American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the National Academy of Sciences. Before his death, Kuhn had been trying to update his views on science first developed in his most famous book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Kuhn died on 17 June 1996 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Conant was keen to keep alive the classical ideal of science as an organized form of pure inquiry at a time when science was becoming increasingly captive to big business and the military. Conant designed “General Education in Science” not to increase the ranks of scientists but to teach future leaders of business and politics how to evaluate science properly. Conant enlisted the efforts of Kuhn and other disenchanted young scientists (notably Gerald Holton) to present case studies of science as a theoretically driven, methodologically disciplined, puzzle-solving activity – what Kuhn would later epitomize as “paradigm.” Conant despatched Kuhn to study other history and philosophy of science programs, especially in the United Kingdom. A peculiar feature of the specific General Education course co-taught by Conant and Kuhn, “Natural Sciences 4,” was its restricted historical focus to roughly the period 1600 to 1900, when scientific experiments could be performed easily on a tabletop for public demonstration. This general focus carried into Kuhn’s writing on the history of science, though its significance is typically overlooked by commentators who imagine Kuhn to have put forward an account of scientific change valid for all periods – and all disciplines – in the history of science.

Kuhn refused to write the history of a period in which the central intellectual debates remained open. For him, history’s jurisdiction was confined to the status of the past as a foreign country, separated in time as if by space. This was one of the origins of the “incommensurability thesis” that Kuhn later associated with how inhabitants of a later paradigm regarded those of an earlier one. In a related and equally illuminating analogy, Kuhn likened historic shift in paradigms to the periodic switches that bilinguals perform between the two languages in which they are fluent: There are no word-to-word or even sentence-to-sentence translations, only decisions to adopt one linguistic framework or the other. Kuhn, while perhaps dissatisfied with the current subsumption of science under what C. Wright Mills had popularised as the “military-industrial complex,” was reluctant to say openly that science had betrayed its classical mission of organized pure inquiry, perhaps because of the larger threat that a destabilized scientific establishment might pose to national security. Indeed, the general tenor is that one should keep a “heads-down” attitude toward changes in the larger social environment, if they do not demonstrably impede one’s own particular research trajectory. In correspondence with the sociologist Jessie Bernard in 1969–70, at the peak of the student movement, Kuhn elaborated that when faced with external social pressures, true scientists will turn conservative, sticking as closely as possible to their specialized problems. Kuhn did not regard biologists or social scientists – or indeed chemists after 1850 – as “scientists” in his strict sense precisely because they were incapable of insulating their problem-solving activities from larger societal demands.

Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* must rank among the most

radically misread books of history, and may be the book that has benefited the most from its misreading. The big mistake most readers make is to think that Kuhn means “science” primarily in a descriptive rather than a prescriptive sense. Here it is worth recalling the plot of this book, which has now sold a million copies in twenty languages. It is basically an idealized history of science that would not have been out of place in the nineteenth century. Its thirteen chapters roughly track the phases of a science’s life cycle, starting with its divisive pre-scientific roots in metaphysics, religion, and politics. For Kuhn, science begins in earnest once a group of inquirers, typically enjoying some institutional privilege or protection (such as a scientific society, a professional association, a university department) take control of the means of knowledge production from such divisive elements. This happens once they adopt a “paradigm,” which means both an exemplary piece of research and the blueprint it provides for future research. In securing a paradigm, researchers agree to a common pattern of work and common standards for adjudicating their knowledge claims. Most actual science – what Kuhn calls “normal science” – consists of little more than the technical work of fleshing out the paradigm’s blueprint. Kuhn deliberately selects the phrase “puzzle-solving” (as in crossword puzzles) over “problem-solving” to underscore the constrained nature of normal science.

It follows that, as far as Kuhn is concerned, the Galilean image of the scientist as the heroic breaker of tradition is almost a complete myth. Most scientists are narrowly trained specialists, as conceived on the medieval master-apprentice model, who try to work entirely within their paradigm until too many unsolved puzzles accumulate. Once

the number of such “anomalies” has reached a certain threshold, the paradigm is in “crisis,” and only then do scientists legitimately engage in wide-ranging normative discussions about the future direction of their field. A “revolution” occurs when a viable alternative paradigm has been found. The revolution is relatively quick and irreversible. In practice, this means that an inter-generational shift occurs, whereby new scientific recruits are presented with a history that has been rewritten to make the new paradigm look like the logical outgrowth of all prior research in the field.

It is common in accounts of Kuhn’s significance to stress the supposedly central role he played in the 1960s and 1970s in overturning logical positivism as the dominant philosophy of science, at least in the English-speaking world. In this context, it is often said that Kuhn stressed the historical, subjective, and social dimensions of science, bringing it closer to the rest of human experience – in contrast to the ahistorical, objective, and abstract conception of science favored by the positivists. The exact role that Kuhn himself played in this matter, however, is far from clear. It is true that soon after the publication of *Structure*, some ambitious young analytic philosophers, notably Dudley Shapere, translated Kuhn’s rather amateurish understanding of philosophical issues into problems that could be treated by the linguistic techniques of the day. These were canonized as problems of “meaning variance,” “theory-ladenness of observation,” and so forth. Kuhn was also linked with other like-minded contemporaries such as Feyerabend, Toulmin, and Norwood Russell Hanson. But Kuhn himself remained aloof from this incorporation of his work until the publication of *Structure*’s second edition in 1970 initiated a largely frustrating

two decade period of engagement with philosophical critics.

Kuhn's philosophical frustrations had several sources but, most fundamentally, he always thought of himself primarily as a philosopher and increasingly desired to be recognized as such. Kuhn was at heart, one might say, a "genetic epistemologist" who regarded the growth of knowledge at both the individual and the collective level as an evolutionary process anchored in certain formative experiences (which, in the case of science, he associated with the acquisition of a "disciplinary matrix" and the mastery of "exemplars" in problem-solving). Among the few philosophical influences Kuhn openly admitted were Jean Piaget, Alexandre Koyré, and Émile Meyerson, all of whom were "geneticist" in this sense. This helps to explain why despite the inspiration that Kuhn has provided to contemporary social studies of science, the only social process that seriously interested him was enculturation. He held that a scientist's competence, including her capacity for innovation, was largely prescribed by her original training, such that a paradigm shift had less to do with old scientists learning to see the world a new way than simply the replacement of old scientists with new ones trained differently.

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Steve Fuller

KURTZ, PAUL WINTER (1925–2012)

Paul Kurtz was born on 21 December 1925 in Newark, New Jersey. He received his BA from New York University in 1948, then went to Columbia University, where he earned his MA in 1949 and his PhD in philosophy in 1952. The title of his dissertation was "The Problems of Value Theory." From 1952 to 1959, Kurtz taught at Trinity College in Connecticut. He then was a professor of philosophy at Union College in New York State from 1961 to 1965, and during that time he also was a visiting lecturer at the New School for Social Research. In 1965 Kurtz became professor of philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo, and taught there until retiring in 1991. He founded a publishing company, Prometheus Books, in 1969 in Amherst, New York. Kurtz was a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science since 1992, and had authored or edited over fifty books and many hundreds of articles. Kurtz died on 20 October 2012 in Amherst, New York.

Kurtz carries on the legacy of the pragmatic and naturalistic humanism that he acquired while at Columbia. Committed to the superior rationality of scientific inquiry, he has staunchly defended science and reason against all forms of superstition, mythology, and fraudulent deception. Kurtz is the founder and chair of both the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (founded in 1976), the Council for Secular Humanism (founded in 1980), and editor-in-chief of the journal *Free Inquiry*. Kurtz is also founder and chair of the Center for Inquiry in Amherst, New York. He was Co-President of the International Humanist and Ethical Union, and Humanist Laureate and President of the International Academy of Humanism.

Kurtz has argued for a comprehensive philosophy of secular humanism in his many books. Long involved with the American Humanist Association, he contributed to the composition of the Humanist Manifesto II with Edwin Wilson in 1973, and authored the Humanist Manifesto III in 2000. Humanist principles such as grounding morality in human happiness and not supernatural revelation, and demanding respect for individual liberty, support an active democratic culture that encourages free participation by all citizens. Humanistic ethics in Kurtz's hands takes a broadly utilitarian concern for the long-term welfare of all people, but restricts this utilitarianism by appeal to basic liberty rights and adds a communitarian respect for social groups.

Several of his books present his philosophical views of science, naturalism, ethical theory and political theory. In the areas of philosophy of science and naturalism, central works are *Philosophical Essays in Pragmatic Naturalism* (1991), *The New Skepticism: Inquiry and Reliable Knowledge*

(1992), and *Skepticism and Humanism: The New Paradigm* (2001). Three more books develop his humanistic ethics: *Forbidden Fruit: The Ethics of Humanism* (1987), *Eupraxophy: Living without Religion* (1989), and *Affirmations: Joyful and Creative Exuberance* (2004). Among his later books, *Multi-Secularism: A New Agenda* (2010) explores the diversity and flexibility to secularism, and *The Turbulent Universe* (2013) elaborates his overarching vision of scientific and humanistic naturalism.

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John R. Shook

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LADD, GEORGE TRUMBULL (1842–1921)

George Trumbull Ladd was born on 19 January 1842 in Painesville, Ohio, and died on 8 August 1921 in New Haven, Connecticut. In 1860, Ladd entered Western Reserve College, pursued the study of classics and philosophy, and learned German. He graduated in 1864 with a BA degree and was awarded an honorary MA in 1867. Ill health delayed his planned entrance into Andover Theological Seminary until 1866 and hindered his studies there, but he managed to graduate in December 1869. He began his career as a minister in Edinburg, Ohio. In his two years in Edinburg, Ladd pursued his studies in theology and philosophy and worked to improve as a public speaker. His sermons, more philosophical than religious, attempted to inform the members of his church about current biblical scholarship, philosophy and advances in science. Instead of sermons that reinforced orthodox Calvinism, Ladd gave his parishioners a form of liberal Protestantism that tried to mediate between orthodoxy and modern views. The Spring Street Congregational Church (later the Grand Avenue Congregational Church) provided more scope for the development of Ladd's views on theology and philosophy. Although he moved even further from traditional beliefs to more liberal views, he continued to try to balance orthodox beliefs with new ideas from science that emerged under the influence of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution. In Milwaukee, he was outspoken on civic issues,

opposing corruption in politics, supporting religious instruction in public schools, and preaching temperance.

Ladd began to consider a career change that would provide a more suitable forum for his developing views on theology and philosophy. In 1879, he accepted a three-year appointment at the Andover Theological Seminary as the Southworth Lecturer on Congregationalism. In June of 1879, to his surprise, he was informed of his election to be the Edward Little Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Bowdoin College, a position which he also accepted, and from which he was still able to give lectures at Andover. In 1880 he became the Valeria Stone Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Bowdoin. In 1881 Ladd was appointed professor of philosophy at Yale University, a position that he held until his retirement in 1905, when Charles M. Bakewell succeeded to Ladd's position. His textbooks and his teaching at Yale, which included founding a psychological laboratory (1892) and appointing an instructor, E.W. Scripture, to supervise it, helped to establish the new experimental psychology as a discipline. His academic career at Bowdoin and at Yale coincided with the transition from mental philosophy, the "old psychology," to a new scientific psychology in the United States.

Ladd was the second president of the American Psychological Association in 1893, serving after G. Stanley Hall and before William James. Ladd also was President of the American Philosophical Association in

1904–05, and Vice President of the Section on Psychology and Anthropology of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1911–12. In his lifetime he received a number of honors, including honorary degrees from Western Reserve College (DD 1879, LLD 1895), from Yale (MA 1881), and from Princeton (LLD 1896). Ladd's critical examination of doctrinal issues and liberalization of beliefs appeared in the two volumes of *The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture* in 1883. Ladd's views were attacked as heretical sophistry by orthodox theologians who believed in the divine inspiration and infallibility of the Bible.

Ladd's first and most significant contribution to the new psychology was *Elements of Physiological Psychology* (1887). Ladd organized and condensed the results of the recent scientific studies in physiology and psychophysics that promised to provide new scientific facts about mind. He summarized in some detail what was known about the brain and the sensory-motor functions of the nervous system as a necessary basis for understanding the physiological mechanisms that related activities of the senses and the nervous system to conscious experience. He described and discussed the results of research on sensation and perception, on reaction time as a measure of the time taken by mental processes, on feeling and emotion, and speculated on the physical basis of higher mental processes, such as memory and will. These first 500 pages of the 900 page *Elements* emphasized the laboratory results produced by the new physiological, experimental psychology that had been given name and status by Wilhelm Wundt at the University of Leipzig. Ladd's *Elements* offered little to those interested in the abnormal, in anthropology (social psychology), in instinct or the evolution of mind in the species or in individual development. For Ladd, the new psychology

was a significant part of philosophy. He was not sympathetic to the rush of some of his colleagues in the new discipline to shed the metaphysical questions that no longer seemed to them appropriate to psychology as a natural science. He devoted the last 400 pages of the *Elements* to discussions of metaphysical issues, including the difficulties of defining consciousness and its primary phenomena for a scientific psychology and the impossibility of correlating changes in brain states with conscious experience. It was to metaphysics that Ladd appealed to make sense of the facts of mind that the laboratory produced. Ladd also rearranged and edited the contents of *Elements of Physiological Psychology* to create a textbook for classroom use, *Outlines of Physiological Psychology* (1890). This text emphasized the psychophysical and physiological results appropriate to a scientific study of mind and as such could have been a landmark offering in the new psychology.

Unfortunately for Ladd, the text was greatly overshadowed by the huge success of James's *Principles of Psychology* published in the same year. Ladd nevertheless continued to write, publishing *Psychology: Descriptive and Explanatory* (1894), *Outlines of Descriptive Psychology* (1898), *Philosophy of Mind* (1895), and *Philosophy of Conduct* (1902). In his psychology and the philosophy of which it was a part, Ladd strove to retain the ideal and the real in a universe governed by an Absolute, an Intelligence that provided a unity to the world and the place of human beings within it. His commitment to a metaphysical dualism that posited an independent mind belonging to a self set him apart from those who were more willing to accept a materialistic monism that saw mind as an epiphenomenon. Ladd may have looked forward to a monism that he could accept, but he did not believe that psychology had yet reached that point in its development.

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Alfred H. Fuchs

LADD, WILLIAM (1778–1841)

Ladd was born on 10 May 1778 in Exeter, New Hampshire, to a wealthy family. He was educated at Exeter academy and Harvard College (BA in 1797) before shipping out on one of his father's merchant vessels. He quickly rose to the rank of captain and spent the majority of his twenties and thirties at sea, with two notable land-bound stints: in Florida, where he attempted in vain to establish a plantation based on free labor rather than slavery; and in Georgia, where he made enough money as a trader to allow him to retire from business, become a gentleman farmer, and start a family.

Although there are hints of his aversion to violence from early in his life, Ladd's mission to promote a cultural shift towards pacifism appears to have been provoked by the War of 1812 and consolidated in 1819 with his involvement in the Congregational Church in Minot, Maine. The balance of his public life from that point forward was devoted to building up the theological, political, and practical infrastructure of a national peace movement that would thrive for two decades and form the basis for later groups dedicated to the cause.

Outside of religious objections to violence particular to the Quakers, Mennonites, and Brethren, pacifism in any form was virtually unknown in North America before the nineteenth century. Among its prominent heralds was David Low Dodge, influential founder of the New York Bible Society, the New York Tract Society, and the New York Peace Society, who wrote the first non-Quaker radical pacifist tract, *The Mediator's Kingdom Not of This World* (1809). In Massachusetts, Unitarian minister Noah Worcester braved a publisher blackout of anti-war material during the War of 1812 to self-publish *A Solemn Review of the Custom of War* (1814). Differences between the more sectarian views of Dodge and the pragmatic emphases of Worcester threatened to open a schism in the American peace movement before it officially arrived, and it was only through the work of Ladd that the breach was temporarily bridged and the cause of nonviolence could continue into mid-century.

Under the pseudonym "Philanthropos," he subsequently wrote a series of 32 essays on the subject for *The Christian Mirror* (Portland, Maine) from 1823 to 1826, many of which were issued in two collected volumes in 1825 and 1827 for wider circulation. Viewing nonviolence as the epitome of Christian

scripture – and what differentiated it from Judaism and Hellenism in particular – Ladd believed that genuine Christian faith obliged one to oppose all martial means of settling disputes, and that American culture should be brought into line with pacifism as a step towards changing U.S. foreign and domestic policy. Traveling widely to plant new peace societies throughout the United States (eleven in 1827 alone, seven of them founded by Ladd), he earned a reputation as an effective organizer for the movement.

The American Peace Society was formed in 1828, with Ladd as its first president, to coordinate the many local groups springing up around the country. Initiating a correspondence with European pacifists, Ladd helped promote the slim but powerful syllabus of Western peace writing from Émeric Crucé, Hugo Grotius, and Abbé de Saint-Pierre, to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Jeremy Bentham. For the next 13 years, Ladd used his position to canvas the states for new members and new chapters and to keep up a flood of public lectures and newspaper editorials, the two prongs of his strategy to influence public opinion. As editor of the American Peace Society's journalistic organs, *The Harbinger of Peace* (1828–1831) and *The Calumet* (1831–1835), Ladd oversaw a careful détente between nonresistance absolutists, who objected to defensive wars and state coercion, and more moderate members aiming merely to stem unnecessary offensive wars. The careful balance he struck was overturned with the appearance on the scene of ultra-pacifists such as Thomas Grimké and William Lloyd Garrison, both of whom began pressing the Society to take the strong pacifist position that war is "utterly irreconcilable" with Christianity. In 1838, the Garrisonians split from the American Peace Society to form the New England Non-Resistant Society, marking

the end of a unified peace movement. Ladd died on 9 April 1841 in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

By virtue of his 1831 pamphlet calling for the establishment of a Congress of Nations and a Court of Nations, Ladd became a leader of the movement to provide international bodies for the settlement of disputes between countries. Support for such plans was high in New England, where the establishment still grumbled about the disruptions caused by the War of 1812, and the farcical Aroostook War of the late 1830s made clear the mischief that could thrive in the absence of international protocols. Ladd's expansion of his original pamphlet, published as an "Essay on a Congress of Nations" in 1840, stands as a founding document in the internationalist push that would eventually result in the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.

More than any other figure of his era, Ladd embodies the transition of pacifism from the theological fringe to the center of Christian doctrine, and thence to the motivating spirit of international politics.

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Michael Ziser

LADD-FRANKLIN, CHRISTINE (1847–1930)

Christine Ladd was born on 1 December 1847 in Windsor, Connecticut, and died on 5 March 1930 in New York City. She received her BA in 1869 and the LLD in 1887 from Vassar College. After teaching science and mathematics in secondary schools for several years, she undertook graduate study at Johns Hopkins University, admitted under special circumstances because the university was not open to women. Although she qualified for the PhD degree in 1882, it was withheld at that time because of her gender but granted more than four decades later when the university celebrated its semi-centennial in February 1926. By then Ladd had attained an enviable reputation in both logic and psychology. She was the pioneer American woman in those two fields as well as in mathematics.

Ladd studied at Johns Hopkins with J.J. Sylvester and Charles S. Peirce, who became a life-long friend and colleague. Her first paper on logic (1883) detailed her modification of the logical algebra of Boole and proposed that syllogistic reasoning might be reduced to a single formula, the “inconsistent triad” or “antilogism,” whereby any two of the three propositions will yield a valid contradiction of the third. Josiah Royce referred to this as “the definitive solution of the problem of the reduction of syllogisms” and further commented that “it is rather remarkable that the crowning activity in a field worked over since the days of Aristotle should be the achievement of an American woman” (Shen 1927, p. 60).

Following completion of graduate work, Ladd married Fabian Franklin, a member of the mathematics faculty at Johns Hopkins and her former classmate. In 1891–2 they spent a year studying in Europe. By that

time Ladd-Franklin had begun working on the problem of binocular vision, combining her mathematical interests with the new experimental psychology. She expanded her research on vision in the laboratories of G.E. Müller in Göttingen and H. von Helmholtz in Berlin, who held opposing theories of color vision with Müller following E. Hering’s position. Ladd-Franklin’s new theory attempted to incorporate the strong points of both. She assumed a photochemical model whereby complementary colors are due to retinal chemistry and proposed a three-stage evolutionary development of color sensation. Her contributions to color vision science continued to the end of her long life. In the year before her death a collection of her papers published between 1892 and 1926 appeared as *Colour and Colour Theories* (1929).

Ladd-Franklin never held a professorial appointment. She was however ceaselessly active in research and writing and taught as a part-time lecturer in psychology and logic at Johns Hopkins from 1905 to 1909, and after the family moved to New York City following her husband’s shift from academia to journalism, at Columbia University from 1914 to 1927. She was associate editor for logic and psychology for J.M. Baldwin’s *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (1901–2) and authored many of the articles, including some attributed to Peirce (Brent 1993, p. 275).

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Elizabeth Scarborough

LAMONT, CORLISS (1902–1995)

Corliss Lamont's fiercely independent thinking challenged prevailing ideas in philosophy, economics, religion, patriotism, world peace, and the exercise of our civil liberties. Born to Wall Street wealth, he championed the cause of the working class, while derided as a "socialist" and a "traitor to his class." His humanist belief that earthlings have evolved without supernatural intervention and are responsible for their own survival and well-being on this planet caused traditionalists to label him a "godless atheist." His insistence that the United States maintain a productive relationship with the Soviet Union in the face of prevailing anti-communist hysteria earned him the accusation by Senator Joseph McCarthy of being "un-American."

Corliss Lamont was born on 28 March 1902 in Englewood, New Jersey. Lamont

was educated at Phillips Exeter Academy and Harvard University, graduating with his BA in 1924. In the fall he attended Oxford University where, by good luck, he arrived too late for a dorm assignment and was taken in by Julian and Juliette Huxley. Lamont went on to take a PhD in philosophy at Columbia University in 1933. His dissertation was on issues of immortality and was later published as the *Illusion of Immortality*, for which John Dewey wrote an introduction and which Lamont considered his most important book. Lamont was a part-time lecturer in philosophy at Columbia from 1928 to 1932 and 1947 to 1959. He also lectured on occasion at Cornell, Harvard and the New School for Social Research. His usual course was on "The Philosophy of Humanism."

In 1934 Lamont visited the Soviet Union, intrigued with the experiment with democratic socialism and a planned economy in the movement idealized by John Reed as the revolution that shook the world. This first inspired Lamont to write *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* (1935), a book that later would spark the wrath of Senator Joseph McCarthy. His next book aimed to popularize and explain the concept that seemed so dreaded by capitalists. It was entitled *You Might Like Socialism* (1939). He continued to strongly champion the ideals of the revolution, over-long he said, unbelieving of the anti-socialist sentiments that began saturating the American media, certain that its detractors were merely propagandists bent on its destruction, and who feared contagion would spark from a touted worldwide movement.

Lamont always remained independent in his thinking and his affiliations. Though many college-age idealists had joined the Communist Party, he refused. While being supportive of their rights, he always stated strong philosophical and organizational reservations. He was criticized by them for

his refusal, yet on the other hand, he was also criticized by conservatives for his sympathies for socialism. Lamont ran unsuccessfully for U.S. Senate in 1952 on the American Labor Party ticket, and attempted again in 1958 with the Independent Socialist Party.

Lamont greatly admired George Santayana, whom he described as pure but whose stance disappointed him because of Santayana's non-engagement in defending Humanism and social reform. Santayana was no crusader and kept himself above the fray. His correspondence with Santayana is found in the Corliss Lamont Rare Book Reading Room at Columbia, and in *The Works of George Santayana*, for which Lamont provided most of the funding.

Over a span of sixty years Lamont published close to thirty political and philosophical pamphlets. He promoted freedom of choice, the public's right to know, freedom of information, civil liberties, world peace and the United Nations. With his third wife Beth Elberta Keehner, also a humanist activist, Lamont continued to publish pamphlets and place ads in the *New York Times*. He criticized Pentagon spending, participated in protests – even marching in a Washington, D.C., anti-Gulf War demonstration – and denounced the policies of the State Department against Cuba. During his lifetime he was honored by many organizations such as the NAACP, including the Gandhi Peace Award in 1981. He served on the Board of Directors of the National Urban League, the ACLU, and the NECLC. He served also as an honorary President of the American Humanist Association until his death.

On 26 April 1995 Corliss Lamont passed away peacefully on a sunny day enjoying the birdsong in his own garden overlooking the Hudson, in Ossining, New York. A memorial tribute to his life in the form of a civil liberties debate attended by hundreds was

held at Columbia University on 18 September 1995. To celebrate his centenary year in 2002 a civil liberties forum was held in the Law Department at Columbia University in which a dozen speakers warned of new civil liberties dangers with the recent passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. Many observed that Lamont would have been heartsick at the turn of events in the war against terrorism, U.S. foreign policy, and American relationships with the rest of the world.

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Beth K. Lamont

LANGER, SUSANNE KATHERINA KNAUTH (1895–1985)

Susanne Knauth was born on 20 December 1895 in New York City. In 1920 she graduated from Radcliffe College in Massachusetts, and married a historian, William L. Langer, in 1921. She went with her husband to study at the University of Vienna and then came back to Radcliffe to get a MA in 1924 and a PhD in philosophy in 1926 as one of A. N. Whitehead's first students. Langer taught at Radcliffe, Wellesley, and Smith Colleges on

temporary positions, despite her quality as a philosopher, and raised a family. She received a divorce in 1942, and in 1943 she taught philosophy at the University of Delaware, and from 1945 to 1950 she lectured at Columbia University. She was professor of philosophy at Connecticut College from 1954 until her retirement in 1962. In 1960 she was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She died on 17 July 1985 in Old Lyme, Connecticut.

Langer's first significant work, *Philosophy in a New Key* (1942), became very popular, especially outside the academy, although it was hardly a traditional work. The basic project of the book was, in its historical context, remarkable. The previous fifty years of philosophy had seen a swing from the dominance of idealism at the end of the nineteenth century and first part of the twentieth to the dominance of scientific conceptions of philosophy such as logical positivism. Langer aimed to reject both of these dogmatic approaches, while taking from each what she saw as their truth. She took from idealism a focus on the mind as an ordering device operating with structures of symbols, but rejected its repudiation of any reality beyond the mind. She took from positivism the mind as a grasper of reality, but rejected what she saw as its narrow emphasis on the methods of science. She brilliantly understood what the majority of interpreters (especially the logical positivists themselves) had not understood, how Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* of the relation between language and the world was fundamentally one of great abstractness. It presented a *form*, which could be filled out in many ways. It was not at all an assumption of the model that language meant the language of science. Langer herself explored the possibility that language could include the presentational symbolisms of the emotions,

the language of ritual and myth, and – most significantly for her future work – the language of music and the arts.

The link of expression and form was developed at length in Langer's best-known work of aesthetics, *Feeling and Form* (1953). Langer famously defined art as "the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling" (1953, p. 40). "The symbol is, from first to last, something created. The illusion, which constitutes the work of art, is not a mere arrangement of given materials in an aesthetically pleasing pattern; it is what results from the arrangement, and is literally something the artist makes, not something he finds" (1953, p. 67). Langer applied this general theory in subsequent chapters to the vast range of types of art – painting, sculpture, music, dance, literature, drama, and film.

Representational painting is a useful model for interpreting Langer, not because she generalized from the concrete way in which such a painting seemingly mirrored its subject, but because she abstracted from that concrete example a relationship that can be carried over to other kinds of art. Wittgenstein famously said he thought of the picture theory of language when he saw in a court room the model of a traffic accident used to assist the court to see what had happened. But the way in which for him language mirrors the world is much more abstract than the concreteness of the courtroom model. So it was for Langer. Linguistic symbols in the strict sense were discursive or referential. There were also what she called "presentational symbols" (1942, p. 96ff). These symbols presented whole forms wordlessly and indivisibly; these were the forms of art. We understand both forms of symbol as related in the same abstract way to what they symbolize.

Art's forms were symbolic of feeling; that was the sense in which they were for

Langer expressions of feeling. That notion can also be built up from a simple-looking case. We begin with ordinary expressions of anger, say, or fear, or joy, or pride. Then we move from the painter throwing their brush across the room in anger, to Edvard Munch painting his famous scream. Then we move to a complex poetic expression of love, and on to Gerard Manley Hopkins's poems expressing the existential abyss of a wavering religious faith. Eventually here too we reach abstract expressionist painting or dance or sculpture, or – what in many ways is Langer's paradigm – music. What makes the angry throw not a work of art, and *The Scream* or *The Hawk* works of art is the unique complexity of the symbolic form embedded in those artifacts, and the unique complexity of the feeling which that symbolic form symbolizes. The symbolic form is in the artist's mind; they make it appear in the artwork they create. The form symbolically mirrors the feeling.

Langer took from the expression theory of art the thought that art was the realization of feeling. She took from formalism the thought that what made an artifact an artwork was its form. She made the essence of art the realization of the symbolic form of feeling – not the expression of feeling, nor the realization of symbolic form, but both combined. She interposed between the artist and the artwork a symbolic, presentational form in the artist's mind; artistic creativity was the fashioning of an artwork which had that same form.

Langer's philosophy was a new key implied a whole theory of the mind, as well as a whole theory of art. After the completion of her theory of art, she turned her attention to developing further the theory of the mind. Some preliminary essays appeared in 1962, but the whole theory appeared only in her final, and by far the longest, work: *Mind: An*

Essay on Human Feeling (1967–82). *Mind* can only be described as a work of staggering erudition and ambition. The key to the work is a simple inversion. One might think that sentience is the most general category of mentality, so that feeling is one form that sentience takes, perception another, and abstract calculation yet another. Langer turned such a thought on its head. Feeling was the most general category of mentality; perception, or abstract calculation, were thus modes of feeling. The theory was continuous with her interest in art, in that art and the creation of art operated as a running example throughout the book of mentality itself. Art was not so much one form of mentality, as the essence of mentality. As Arthur Danto showed, the work seems to rely on an important insight into the mind. There is something that it is like to be me from the inside, and propositional knowledge will never reveal that. Danto refers to this “something” as a “densely knotted tissue of feeling of which we are enfabricated” (1984, p. 646). Langer’s work may be seen as an attempt to present this densely knotted tissue.

Altogether unlike Langer’s theory of art, her theory of the mind has received virtually no attention either inside or outside the philosophical academy. It is not difficult to see why. The work appeared just as cognitive science was in its infancy, and it was not hard to judge that this new and exciting discipline offered more promise for the understanding of mentality than Langer’s reduction of mentality to feeling. Humanistic psychology of the kind Langer’s work represented rapidly became unfashionable in philosophy and psychology alike. However, Langer’s theory of art remains still one of the most interesting, most subtle, and most challenging theories in twentieth-century philosophy of art.

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Roger A. Shiner

LAUDAN, LAURENS LYNN (1941–)

Larry Laudan was born on 16 October 1941 in Austin, Texas. He received his

BA magna cum laude in physics from the University of Kansas in 1962. He then studied philosophy, earning an MA in 1964 and a PhD in 1965 from Princeton University, studying with Thomas Kuhn. Laudan was a lecturer in philosophy of physics at University College, London, from 1965 to 1969. In 1969 he became associate professor of philosophy and history of science at the University of Pittsburgh, and was promoted to full professor in 1972. He served as chair of the history and philosophy of science department during 1972–74 and 1976–77. From 1981 to 1983, Laudan was a visiting research professor at the Center for Science and Technology Studies at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and then stayed as professor of philosophy of science and science studies from 1983 to 1987. From 1987 until his retirement in 1997, Laudan was professor of philosophy at the University of Hawaii. Since 2000 Laudan has been a senior investigator at the Instituto de las Investigaciones Filosóficas of National Autonomous University of Mexico.

Laudan's philosophy of science argues that scientific progress proceeds by problem-solving, of either the empirical or conceptual sort. Since science aims at increasing the number of solved empirical problems (which often requires resolving conceptual problems), then theories are rationally judged by their success in this practical aim. Unlike epistemologists who compare actual scientific methodology with abstract logical criteria having an extra-scientific origin, Laudan's pragmatist theory attempts to show how scientific knowledge has grown. Kuhn and Stephen Toulmin have also made this attempt, and similarly emphasized the role of conceptual problems in theory change, although Laudan finds that even the core tenets of a scientific theory drifts over time. Unlike

the positivist and formalist approaches of Karl Popper or Carl Hempel, Laudan does not require that theories be compared according to their derivable sets of observations. The impossibility of such a comparison, apparent by the 1970s, has encouraged scientific relativism, but Laudan is instead interested in the practical rationality of preferring more successful theories. In *Progress and Its Problems* (1977), Laudan rejects several time-honored assumptions of previous philosophy of science, including the notions that scientific progress requires (1) a fixed methodology; (2) the cumulative retention of the successes of earlier theories; and (3) a convergence on "the truth." Laudan argues that since we have no way of determining to what extent our scientific theories about unobservable entities are correct, it is irrational to believe that any of our theories are even partially true.

Laudan, unlike Paul Feyerabend, does not abandon scientific realism for relativism after denying that we can justifiably make any claims about theoretical truth. To be a scientific realist, for Laudan, only requires recognizing the admitted practical benefits of using theoretical terms in a realist manner and thus requires accepting semantic realism, but scientific realism does not require believing that any of those terms actually corresponds to some reality. Nor does scientific realism receive support from the abductive argument, popularized by Hilary Putnam in the 1970s, that only a scientific theory's approximate truth could explain its practical success. As Laudan points out in "A Confutation of Convergent Realism" (1981) and *Science and Hypothesis: Historical Essays on Scientific Methodology* (1981), most past scientific theories enjoyed much empirical success without being true at all; and many scientific theories might, for all we know, actually be close to the truth without

enjoying much practical success. Scientific realism cannot be defended by the principle that “if a scientific theory is true, then it will be successful,” any more than a simplistic pragmatism could be defended by the principle “if a scientific theory is successful, then it is true.”

Laudan’s sophisticated pragmatism instead leaves behind the old epistemological search for a priori methodological rules. Laudan argues that methodological rules in science are best understood as hypothetical imperatives of the form, “to realize cognitive aim A, follow method B.” Methodological rules therefore evolve along with science itself, and cannot be legislated outside of actual scientific progress. This normative naturalism, presented at length in *Science and Values* (1984) and *Beyond Positivism and Relativism* (1996), requires that epistemological rules of inference have a fallible status like every other scientific claim. The philosophical study of scientific methodology is naturalized, not by W.V. Quine’s reduction of epistemology to descriptive psychology, but by evaluating methodologies within the overall progress of actual scientific problem-solving.

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John R. Shook

LAVINE, THELMA ZENO (1915–)

Thelma Zeno Lavine was born on 12 February 1915 in Boston, Massachusetts. She received a BA from Radcliffe College in 1936, and an MA in 1937 and PhD in philosophy in 1939, both from Harvard University. Her PhD dissertation was entitled “The Naturalistic Approach to Theory of Knowledge” working with Ralph B. Perry and David W. Prall. She also studied with C.I. Lewis and was influenced by his Kantianism. At Harvard, Lavine studied psychology as well as philosophy, and her first teaching position was in both fields at Wells College where she taught from 1941 to 1943. She then was a professor of philosophy at Brooklyn College from 1946 to 1951, and the University of Maryland from 1955 to 1965. Lavine then went to George Washington University to become Elton Professor of Philosophy from 1965 until 1985. In 1985 she was appointed Clarence J. Robinson Professor of Philosophy and American Culture at George Mason University, a position that she held until her retirement in 1998. Lavine died on 28 January 2011 in Washington, D.C.

Lavine wrote and lectured on a wide variety of topics, including the ideas of the Founding Fathers, Judaic thought, Women’s Studies, and Biomedical Ethics. In addition to being an exceptional scholar she earned recognition as a distinguished teacher. At the University of Maryland she was given an Outstanding Faculty Member award, and at George Washington University she won an Outstanding Professor award. From 1965 to 1970, in addition to continuing to teach Philosophy, she attended seminars at the Washington School of Psychiatry. In 1984 she was in an advanced training program in psychotherapy there.

One of Lavine’s earliest writings, “Naturalism and the Sociological Analysis of Knowledge,” was included by Yervant H. Krikorian in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, together with essays by John Dewey, Sidney Hook, and other distinguished American philosophers. In her paper, Lavine takes Dewey’s philosophy to be the “vanguard of twentieth-century naturalism.” In 1991, she gave the fifth Patrick Romanell Lecture on Philosophic Naturalism, “Modernity and the Spirit of Naturalism,” at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association Central Division. In her lecture Lavine presented an analysis of American naturalistic pragmatism in a historical context.

Writings by Lavine have been published in the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan as well as the United States. Perhaps her most unusual work is a television series, *From Socrates to Sartre: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy*. Consisting of thirty lectures, it was first presented by the Maryland Center for Public Broadcasting in 1979 and has appeared repeatedly on commercial as well as university television stations, and students could earn college credit for it. She dealt with the same topic in a book, *From Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophic Quest*, of which 250,000 copies were published, and translated into Japanese.

American philosophy became a major concern of hers, especially Dewey and pragmatism. However, her understanding of pragmatism and American philosophy and her own philosophic ideas was enriched by a strong background in European philosophy which she also wrote about. Lavine was a founding member of SOPHIA, the Society of Philosophers in America, which was organized in 1987, and she has been active in the Society for the Advancement of

American Philosophy, of which she was President from 1992 to 1994. In 2000 she was honored by this organization, which presented her with the Herbert W. Schneider Award for distinguished contributions to the understanding and development of American philosophy.

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Beth J. Singer

LAZEROWITZ, ALICE LOMAN AMBROSE (1906–2001)

Alice Ambrose was born on 25 November 1906 in Lexington, Illinois, and died on 25 January 2001 in Northampton, Massachusetts. She attended Millikin University, where she received the BA degree in philosophy and mathematics in 1928. After receiving her MA in 1929 and PhD in philosophy in 1932 from the University of Wisconsin, she attended Cambridge University, from which she eventually received a second PhD in 1938. At Cambridge, Ambrose studied with two of the giants of 20th century philosophy, G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Ambrose returned to the United States in 1935 to take a philosophy position at the University of Michigan. In 1937 Ambrose accepted a philosophy position at Smith College, where she taught until her retirement. A year after her arrival at Smith, she married her colleague Morris Lazerowitz, while usually publishing under her maiden name of Ambrose. She was promoted to full professor in 1951, and was named Sophia and Austin Smith Professor of Philosophy in 1964, and held that position until her retirement in 1972. With her husband, she then taught as a visiting professor at Carleton College, Hampshire College, and the University of Delaware. Lazerowitz served as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1975–76, and as editor of the *Journal of Symbolic Logic* from 1953 to 1968. She was also widely known as a social activist. Among her many contributions to the causes of peace and social justice was her chairing of the Committee for Freedom of Latin American Philosophers.

Lazerowitz's scholarship focused primarily in two areas. She was primarily a logician and philosopher of mathematics. Her *Fundamentals of Symbolic Logic*, written

with Morris Lazerowitz in 1948, was one of the most influential textbooks on the new symbolic logic in the 1950s. The other focus of her work lay in the elaboration and extension of the views of her two great teachers, Moore and Wittgenstein. In the early 1930s, she was among the group of students to whom Wittgenstein dictated his *Blue and Brown Books*. Her last published book was a set of notes of Moore's *Lectures in Metaphysics, 1934–1935* (1992). In the intervening sixty years she published, often in collaboration with Morris Lazerowitz, numerous books and articles in which she followed Wittgenstein's and Moore's approach to linguistic analysis. Topics included such issues as Moore's defense of common sense, and fundamental philosophical concepts like thing, property, and number.

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David E. Schrader

LEHRER, KEITH EDWARD (1936–)

Keith Lehrer was born on 10 January 1936 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He received his BA in philosophy from the University of

Minnesota in 1957, and his PhD in philosophy from Brown University in 1960. He taught at Wayne State University in 1963 and the University of Rochester from 1963 to 1973, before becoming a professor of philosophy at the University of Arizona. He was appointed Regents Professor in 1990, holding that title until retiring as emeritus professor in 2001. He continued to teach part-time and publish on many philosophical topics, including philosophy of mind, aesthetics, and philosophy of art.

Lehrer was editor-in-chief of *Philosophical Studies* for many years. He has held numerous positions in the American Philosophical Association, including President of the Pacific Division in 1988–89, and Chair of the National Board of Officers from 1992 to 1995.

Early in his career Lehrer made significant contributions to the literature on free will and determinism. Later he became a leading interpreter and defender of the eighteenth century common sense philosopher, Thomas Reid. Lehrer’s book on Reid was largely responsible for a surge of interest in that philosopher, making Reid better known now than he was in previous centuries. Lehrer’s greatest contributions, however, have been in epistemology. There he has defended and refined an original coherentist theory over the course of four decades. In the process, he has made significant contributions to nearly every important topic in contemporary epistemology, including the nature of epistemic justification, the analysis of knowledge, and skepticism. In recent years Lehrer has defended a general theory of rationality, also with strong coherentist themes.

Lehrer himself has identified a common theme unifying his work in these various areas: that of the “metamental,” or mental states that have other mental states as their intentional object. The human mind,

according to Lehrer, is a metamind. It is a monitoring system that evaluates first-order representations, such as desires and beliefs, and thereby turns them into uniquely human possessions: preferences and acceptances. Moreover, our metaminds involve preferences among preferences, thereby giving rise to control (and hence freedom), and they involve acceptances about acceptances, thereby giving rise to understanding (and hence knowledge). It is this sort of mind, Lehrer argues, that makes us distinctively human. It distinguishes us from animals that act on desire, but that do not act with freedom. It distinguishes us from animals that possess information, but that do not possess knowledge. Metamind also allows kinds of concept formation that would otherwise be impossible, and it allows forms of rationality that would otherwise be impossible.

Lehrer defends a coherence theory of justification and knowledge: knowledge is true acceptance that appropriately coheres with other things that the knower accepts. A person's belief that *p* coheres with other things she believes just in case believing *p* is the most reasonable thing to do, given those other beliefs. Sometimes Lehrer has explained his position in terms of "undefeated justification." *S*'s belief has undefeated justification just in case (1) *S*'s belief coheres with the other things that *S* believes, and (2) any correction in *S*'s belief system would preserve that coherence. In other words, given any correction to *S*'s belief system, her belief that *p* would continue to cohere with the corrected system. Even if there is some chance that one has erred in accepting that *p*, Lehrer argues, it does not follow that one does not know that *p*. It is possible to have justification for one's belief, and even undefeated justification for one's belief, even if there is some chance that one's belief is in error. We may put the

point another way: the mere possibility that one has erred is not sufficient, all by itself, to defeat one's justification. For it may be reasonable to believe that one is capable of error (that is, to believe that one is fallible), and to nevertheless believe that one has not erred in a particular case. Lehrer argues that we may "neutralize" the skeptic's (valid) objection that we are fallible, that there is always a chance that we err. In doing so, we avoid the extremes of both dogmatism and skepticism.

What does it take for someone to be rational or reasonable? According to a widespread view, rationality consists entirely in reasoning well about means for achieving ends. This instrumentalist view of rationality implies that our goals and purposes (our ends) cannot be evaluated as rational or irrational. Lehrer argues against instrumentalism and its attendant "autonomy of ends" thesis. He suggests that we can construct a better theory if we focus on Aristotle's claim that man is a rational animal. By making the rationality of the person central, Lehrer argues, we can explain why other things are rational, including the person's preferences concerning his or her ends. For example, if I assume that I am rational, then this gives me a reason for saying that my preferences are rational, via the following argument. (1) I am rational. (2) I prefer that *A*. Therefore, (3) I am rational in what I prefer. In conclusion, (4) I am rational in my preference that *A*. Lehrer notes that the inferences to (3) and (4) are not deductive, but instead are explanatory. It is because I have certain dispositions to be rational (this is what (1) says), that I have a reason to think that my preferences are rational (this is what (3) and (4) conclude).

Lehrer suggests that I have a reason for accepting the first premise that I am rational by way of a similar looping argument. Roughly, the assumption that I am rational gives me

a reason for thinking that I am rational in accepting the things that I do. Moreover, one of the things I accept is my own rationality. Therefore, my rationality explains why I am rational in accepting premise (1) above, that I am rational. This circle is not vicious. On the contrary, it is central to Lehrer's position that personal rationality is explanatory of other kinds of rationality: it is because I embody certain dispositions regarding my acceptances that what I accept, including premise (1), is rational. Of course this kind of looping argument does not allow us to prove that we are rational to a skeptic who denies it. But that is not what the argument is supposed to do. Rather, it is supposed to explain why premise (1) is rational.

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John Greco

LEIGHTON, JOSEPH ALEXANDER (1870–1954)

Joseph Alexander Leighton was born on 2 December 1870 in Orangeville, Ontario, Canada, to James Leighton and Jane Speers

Leighton. His education included a BA with high honors and the Governor General's Medal from Trinity College, Toronto, in 1891; a PhD in philosophy from Cornell University in 1894; and an STB from the Episcopal Theological Seminary in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1896. While in Cambridge, Leighton participated in the seminars of William James and Josiah Royce. He studied philosophy at the Universities of Tübingen, Berlin, and Erlangen in 1896–97.

Leighton served as professor of philosophy and chaplain at Hobart College in New York from 1897 to 1910. He was then appointed professor and head of the philosophy department at Ohio State University, where he taught from 1910 until his retirement in 1941. Leighton also was visiting or acting professor at Stanford University (1925), the University of California, Los Angeles (1928, 1937), the University of Utah (1932–33), and the University of Southern California (1938–39). Leighton was Vice President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1907, and President of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1937–38. He served on national committees of the American Association of University Professors, was a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, served for many years as university preacher at Cornell University, and often preached in various Episcopal parishes. Leighton's membership in professional and scholarly societies also included the American Psychological Association and Phi Beta Kappa.

Influenced by American idealists such as Royce, James Edwin Creighton, and George Holmes Howison, as well as British idealist Bernard Bosanquet, Leighton's scholarship throughout his long career reflects his interest in personal idealism, and in making

idealist views cohere with interests in science and human values. Moving away from the abstraction of absolute idealism, Leighton adhered to a view of the world as an organic whole comprised of individual wholes, though always within the context of community. This dual focus on the individual and community is reflected in Leighton's many works in social and political philosophy, including *The Individual and Social Order* (1926) and *Social Philosophies in Conflict* (1937), the latter researched during Leighton's travels in Europe. Later in his career, his interests in community expanded to include cultural anthropology. After his retirement, Leighton worked on a project in this area to be titled *The Diversity of Cultures and the Unity of Mankind*, which was cut short by failing eyesight. Leighton's *The Field of Philosophy* (1918) has been used in several editions as an introductory textbook.

As a philosopher, Leighton modeled a lifelong commitment to liberal education against over-specialization and narrow vocationalism. Leighton's political interests included a firm commitment to progressive democracy, staunch support of the League of Nations and the United Nations, and loyalty to both his Canadian background and American citizenship. Leighton died on 17 June 1954 in Worthington, Ohio.

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LEONARD, HENRY SIGGINS (1905–1967)

Henry Leonard was born on 19 December 1905 in Newton, Massachusetts. He received his BA from Harvard in 1927, his MA in 1929, and his PhD in philosophy in 1931. Leonard remained at Harvard as a lecturer from 1931 to 1934, and after a year at the University of Rochester as instructor, returned to Harvard to teach from 1935 to 1937. He was an assistant and associate professor at Duke University from 1937 to 1949. In 1949 he went to Michigan State College (which became Michigan State University in 1955) as professor and head of the philosophy department. He was named University Professor in 1962, and held that title until his death on 11 July 1967 in Frankfurt, Germany. Leonard was President of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1963–64.

Leonard was a philosophical logician during a time of great optimism that logic, viewed as a normative discipline, could be used not only to illuminate philosophical issues, but even more broadly to serve as a basis for practical success in life. While the purely formal roots for this conviction can be traced directly to Bertrand Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*, Leonard's conception of logic was equally influenced by the work of the great American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce. The result was a conception of logic that included

purely formal core, but also included areas of application as well. *An Introduction to the Principles of Right Reason* (1957) is a systematic expression of this conception of logic. Leonard presents a comprehensive informal semantics, including an account of definition that remains unsurpassed in the literature. Reviving a much older conception of the subject, Leonard defined logic in this sense as “the science of exact reasoning,” (1957, p. 11) with the emphasis falling equally on “science” and “reasoning.”

Leonard also brought broadly philosophical considerations to bear on logic itself. Advocates of the standard logic tended toward a parsimonious semantics structured around reference but not meaning, bivalence but not modality, and what now seem to many to be arbitrary assumptions regarding existence. Leonard’s writings repeatedly question whether such a restrictive interpretation is reasonable, and his “Wide Language W,” presented in part in “Essences, Attributes and Predicates” (1964), presents an alternative semantics that includes much of what had been ruled out by others. In addition, his article “The Calculus of Individuals and Its Uses,” written with Goodman, questions another limitation imposed by standard logic, that while relations between classes are of theoretical interest, individuals as such bear no interesting relations to one another. Leonard and Goodman counter that assumption with their calculus. While Leonard’s ideas were often radical for their time, they inspired much of the interesting later work in nonstandard logic.

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James Van Evra

LESIEUR-DÉSAULNIERS, ISAAC-STANISLAS (1811–1868)

Isaac-Stanislas Lesieur-Désaulniers was a priest and professor at the Saint-Hyacinthe Seminary who left behind few writings, but nevertheless influenced a generation of students with his ideas about common reason, Catholic theology, and the relevance of social custom and religious tradition.

Désaulniers was born on 27 November 1811 at Sainte-Anne-d’Yamachiche in Lower Canada (now the province of Québec), the son of a prominent farmer who also served

in the local assembly. Historians know very little about his early life, except the date of his birth and his parents. It was not until he entered the Séminaire de Nicolet near Trois-Rivières in Lower Canada in the mid-1820s that he left any records at all. He graduated from the seminary in 1829, was accepted into the priesthood, and immediately took a post at Séminaire de Saint-Hyacinthe, located east of Montréal. During his seminary studies, he became fascinated with ideas about reason, particularly the question of whether religious and societal traditions were grounded in common rationality. His intellectual interests lined up well with the faculty at Saint-Hyacinthe, so he was a good fit for the institution.

Upon joining the faculty at Saint-Hyacinthe, Désaulniers was appointed Professor of Sciences. In 1831 he became Professor of Philosophy. In 1833 his life took an interesting turn when the bishop presiding over Saint-Hyacinthe requested that he study abroad for an extended period of time. Bishop Jean-Jacques Lartigue believed that to advance academically, the seminary needed its professors to train in areas beyond the specialization of the seminary, particularly in science and the arts. To that end, he sent Désaulniers to the Jesuit University of Georgetown in Washington, D.C. (which later became Georgetown University). He studied there from June 1833 to July 1834. His brother François, the professor of science and philosophy at the Séminaire de Nicolet, participated in a similar study abroad program, and the two men became the first French Canadian priests to study outside the seminaries in Canada.

While at Georgetown, Désaulniers became heavily influenced by the writings of French priest and philosopher Hugues-Félicité-Robert de La Mennais (1782–1854), who had recently published a critique of

the current social order and broken with the Catholic Church. Upon returning to Saint-Hyacinthe, the conflict over La Mennais was carried on between Bishop Lartigue and critic Abbé Jacques Odelin. Pope Gregory XVI condemned La Mennais in 1834, which discouraged Désaulniers from further interest in the philosopher, particularly after his seminary adviser joined in the criticism of La Mennais' theories. Although he realized he could not be too strident in his support for La Mennais, Désaulniers continued to read his work and was influenced by his philosophies.

Désaulniers taught physics during 1834–39 and 1844–47, and he also taught philosophy from 1837 to 1849 using the textbook *Institutiones philosophicae ad usum studiosae juventutis* by Abbé Jérôme Demers at the Séminaire de Québec. In 1837 Désaulniers was formally ordained as a minister of the Catholic Church, an honor he had worked toward for most of his adult life. That same year, the faculty at Saint-Hyacinthe came under attack from some segments of the Church for allegedly teaching in contradiction to accepted Catholic doctrine. Désaulniers came to the quick defense of his colleagues and the seminary. He signed a letter guaranteeing that the faculty were teaching orthodox church doctrine and were not encouraging theological rebellion or opposing the social order in any way. His new status as an ordained priest gave more weight to his position, and he used it to defend the seminary that had nurtured his career since he joined the faculty.

Désaulniers made significant contributions to the popular press, offering articles on a wide range of subjects from theology and philosophy to the arts and sciences. But his main career focus was always on his teaching. He introduced the seminary's first courses on agricultural chemistry and on political

economy (1845), demonstrating his mastery of diverse subject material. He added the teaching of theology to his duties during 1847 to 1851. He also helped raise funds when the seminary needed money to expand its curriculum, increase enrollment, or build new facilities for classroom space.

One of the most formative intellectual experiences of Désaulniers's career was his first trip out of the western hemisphere. A wealthy family of one of his seminary students offered to pay for his trip if he would act as a guide, informing them on historical and theological issues along the way. He agreed and was able to visit most of the countries in western Europe, along with several in the Middle East and western Asia. This two-year trip exposed him to many of the great universities in Europe, particularly in Paris and Rome. It also put him in touch with the work of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Christian scholar whose work would interest Désaulniers for the rest of his life.

Upon arriving back in Canada, Désaulniers took his new duties as superior of the seminary, an administrative role that he held from 1853 to 1860. In 1860 he returned to teaching at the seminary, with an emphasis on theology and philosophy. In his later years, he became an ardent defender of clerical authority and opposed many of the church reforms that theological liberals were proposing. Along with colleague Joseph-Sabin Raymond, he supported the restoration of interest in Aquinas. Désaulniers died on 22 April 1868 at Saint-Hyacinthe, after a long and well-regarded service to the seminary.

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Désaulniers published articles in many of the French Canadian journals and newspapers, including *L'Avenir*, *Le Courrier de Saint-Hyacinthe*, *L'Écho du cabinet de lecture*

paroissial, *Le Journal des Trois-Rivières*, *Mélanges religieux*, *La Minerve*, *Le Pays*, and *La Revue canadienne*.

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Blake Ellis

LEVI, ISAAC (1930–)

Isaac Levi was born on 30 June 1930 in New York City. He received his BA from New York University in 1951, and then received his MA in 1953 and PhD in philosophy in 1957 from Columbia University. Levi wrote his dissertation, "The Epistemology of

Moritz Schlick,” under the direction of Ernest Nagel. Levi began his teaching career at Western Reserve University as an instructor of philosophy in 1957, and was assistant professor there from 1958 to 1962. From 1962 to 1964 Levi was assistant professor at the City College of New York. Returning to Western Reserve in 1964, he was promoted to full professor in 1967, the same year that Western Reserve College merged with Case Institute of Technology to become Case Western Reserve University. Levi also served as chair of the philosophy department from 1968 to 1970. In 1970 Levi became professor of philosophy at Columbia University, and also served as chair of the department from 1973 to 1976 and from 1989 to 1992. Levi was named John Dewey Professor of Philosophy in 1992 after the retirement of Sidney Morgenbesser, and held that position until his retirement in 2003.

Levi has been a visiting scholar at several universities, including Corpus Christi College of Cambridge University in 1972–73; Darwin College of Cambridge in 1980 and 1993; Australian National University in 1987; All Souls College of Oxford in 1988; the Institute for Advanced Studies of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1994; and Wolfson College of Cambridge in 1997. In 1966–67 he was a Guggenheim Fellow and Fulbright Research Scholar at the London School of Economics. For many years Levi served on the editorial board of the *Journal of Philosophy*. Levi was elected to membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1986. He received a PhD *honoris causa* from the University of Lund in 1988.

Levi has made major contributions to epistemology and rational choice theory. His basic stance is pragmatism’s naturalistic antifoundationalism, in which a theory of knowledge should explain the expansion and modification of existing knowledge, rather than

engage in a quest for original, foundational, or a priori grounds of knowledge. Since all judgments upon changing one’s knowledge itself depend on one’s current knowledge base, the relations between potential new knowledge and present knowledge require a sophisticated treatment. Levi’s epistemology begins from the criterion of internal consistency, and explores the rational means of modifying and expanding knowledge through observation and inference, while risking the introduction of error. Justifying such changes is the task of his complex inductive decision theory, which must judge “credal probabilities” that attempts to more realistically model actual learning than idealized Bayesian theory which cannot handle indeterminate probabilities. This requires an affirmative view, which Levi adopts, towards objective chance in statistical inference.

On Levi’s epistemology, a distinction must be made between certainty and incorrigibility. A confidence amounting to practical certainty in one’s unchallenged knowledge base is rational since that base is the starting-point by which other potential knowledge is judged to be possible. This practical certainty is quite compatible with the epistemic point that all knowledge is corrigible, since no part of one’s knowledge could be judged to be immune from all future opportunities for learning. In philosophy of science, Levi’s position therefore largely coincides with W.V. Quine’s combination of fallibilism with a realistic commitment towards our best current theories.

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John R. Shook

LEWIS, CLARENCE IRVING (1883–1964)

Clarence Irving Lewis was born on 12 April 1883 in Stoneham, Massachusetts, and died on 3 February 1964 in Menlo Park, California. His interest in philosophy had already awakened during his high school years, and continued as he entered Harvard University in 1902. In his third year, Lewis enrolled in the famous Metaphysics course shared by Josiah Royce and William James.

Lewis came to express a sharp preference for Royce over James; the former emerging then and thereafter as Lewis's ideal of a philosopher. By fall 1908, he was back at Harvard, where R.B. Perry's course on Kant left the most lasting impression. Lewis earned his PhD in philosophy in 1910 with a dissertation titled "The Place of Intuition in Knowledge."

From 1911 to 1920, Lewis taught philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley. His need for a class textbook in logic led to his *Survey of Symbolic Logic* (1918). He returned to Harvard from 1920 until his retirement in 1953. Lewis was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1933–34. In retirement Lewis taught for a year at Princeton, and then moved to Menlo Park, California, where he occasionally offered courses at Stanford University for some years before his death in 1964.

Lewis possessed an architectonic intellect, rendering his own temperamental preference for Kant and Royce more understandable. His initial years back at Harvard were spent with the newly arrived Charles Sanders Peirce manuscripts, in which he immersed himself for two full years. Lewis came to adopt the mantle of "pragmatist," but saw his own position as unique, occupying a place in the intellectual spaces between James, Royce, and John Dewey. This recognition began a period of thinking and writing that resulted in *Mind and the World-Order* (1929), soon followed by *Symbolic Logic* (1932), written with C.H. Langford.

Lewis's major reworking of these themes of meaning and knowledge appears in *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (1946), where he extended his thought into the area of value. Increasingly by mid-century his attention moved into the direction of ethics. In fact, the late stage of his career, and

indeed his final years after leaving Harvard were spent preparing a series of manuscript essays which he had hoped would become a book dealing with ethics. During this period, he produced *The Ground and the Nature of Right* (1955) and *Our Social Inheritance* (1957). Unfortunately, the ethics book stubbornly refused to take final form before Lewis's death in 1964, but under the editorial hand of John Lange, Lewis's 1959 lectures on the Foundations of Ethics, delivered at Wesleyan University, were prepared for publication as *Values and Imperatives* (1969). In addition, *The Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis*, a volume of his articles covering the years from 1912 to 1957, appeared in 1970.

Lewis occupies a special place in the history of American philosophy, linking the era of William James and Josiah Royce with that of W.V. Quine. His epistemology is based upon the distinction between two fundamental elements; one aspect is the result of the legislative or categorical activity of the mind while the other is independent of human thought, and is identified as the given content. Lewis is adamant about the necessity of the latter element. It represents that part of experience that is not fashioned by thinking. The mind's inability to alter or displace it is clear evidence of its independence in the knowledge process. What is more, Lewis argues that without the certainty that can only come from this given element in experience, there could be no empirical probabilities whatsoever. If one were to relinquish a belief in given certainties of this sort, then one would be left with no alternative but skepticism. This, to Lewis, is unacceptable. The philosophical skeptic became Lewis's lifelong opponent, and he sought to defeat this adversary whenever and wherever it arose on the broad field of philosophical speculation.

Lewis's doctrine of the given was a crucial weapon in this struggle against skepticism. Not simply confined to the receptivity of the present moment, it is instead the relational awareness of a specious present stretching both backwards into the past and forward to the future. Here, Lewis's position suggests a debt to James' own notion of the continuous character of the undifferentiated stream of thought. For Lewis, the given contains real relations within it, relations that only become articulated and precise when subjected to conceptual ordering. When so ordered, the given passes into the complex experience that constitutes the ground of empirical knowledge. This ordering is accomplished by means of the legislative or categorical activity that Lewis treats under the heading of "the pragmatic a priori." Its roots can be found in Lewis's own logical studies in which he concluded that the traditional idea of a single set of objective and universal logical laws, attributable to reason or grounded in the very nature of reality itself is mistaken. In place of a single, authoritatively definable system of logical rules, there are instead a multitude of possible logical systems that could be employed. These systems are all internally consistent, so the decision to employ any one system of logical inference over the others that are available is made on pragmatic rather than strictly logical grounds. Abstraction can analyze the knowledge process down into its components: the given, the a priori concept by means of which the given is ordered, and the act which interprets the one by the other. Rather than privileging the a priori as an absolute element in the mind, Lewis maintains that is pragmatic in nature, social in its constitution, and responsive to the practical ends of the human knower and actor. There are many possible systems of order, just as there are alternative

systems of logic. A priori systems of order are deliberately chosen, and certainly can be altered in the face of further experience. For Lewis, the choice between such a priori systems answers to the practical task of ordering experience in the light of ends to be achieved.

Lewis's most detailed expression of his theory of knowledge is in *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (1946). It presents a single sustained argument that proceeds through the problems of meaning, empirical knowledge, and valuation. This change is reflective of Lewis's now constant awareness of the skepticism of his positivist adversaries. Rejecting the view that meaning is originally located in language, Lewis argues that linguistic meanings are actually derivative of a deeper kind of meaningfulness to which he gives the name sense meaning. Such conceptual meanings are social products and provide the ordering without which no knowledge nor effective practical action is possible. The presence of the appropriate sensory cues allows one to apply these a priori conceptual meanings to experience, thereby introducing the order so fundamental to subsequent action. Empirical knowledge is expressed in what he refers to as non-terminating judgments. Such judgments are non-terminating in that they cannot be decisively verified. They are probable only, and their probability is the result of the verification of the terminating judgments that they entail. Building upon his theory of sense meaning, the meaning of any non-terminating judgment is translatable into an inexhaustible series of terminating judgments, each of which expresses a hypothetical conditional statement. Each individual terminating judgment articulates a test routine and an imagined result; it thus identifies a test procedure as well as what one is to expect in

direct experience as a result of performing that test. Upon carrying out the test routine, the actual occurrence of the anticipated result specified by the conditional conclusively verifies the terminating judgment in question. This conclusive verification of the terminating judgment establishes, in its turn, a measure of the probability of the related non-terminating judgment. The full meaning of that non-terminating judgment would be found in an infinite series of the terminating judgments that it entails.

In the crucial third book of *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, Lewis was intent upon putting the noncognitivist theories of value and ethics to rout, and his main weapon is the establishment of values judgments as a species of empirical judgment. Statements of value are non-terminating judgments that entail a whole series of terminating judgments. These latter behave here as they did in empirical statements of fact; they articulate a test routine and an imagined result, the execution of the test routine results in the direct encounter of a positively valued experience that Lewis calls intrinsic value. This direct encounter of experienced value is a predicted result specified by the terminating judgment. The actual accrual of this result is the verifying experience that establishes the empirical truth of the non-terminating judgment of value. Intrinsic value is the direct experience of the given as gratifying or grievous, and each terminating judgment articulates a test routine, or a line of practical activity, which results in the production of just such a direct experience of the gratifying or grievous in one's immediate experience. Unlike questions of value, the central problems at stake in ethical theory, that is, the articulation of the meanings of justice and rightness, can never be accomplished through an appeal to empirical facts alone.

In 1955 Lewis published *The Ground and Nature of Right*, in which his doctrine of the rational imperatives receives its first systematic treatment. Thinking must conform to the imperatives of consistency and cogency, and action must be in accord with the imperatives of prudence and justice. The latter imperative is of special importance as it is the moral imperative that guides ethical conduct. This rational imperative of justice commands that human individuals adopt only those ways of acting that are justifiable for others to likewise adopt. Each person is obligated to recognize the objective reality of other autonomous individuals, and thus to refrain from interfering with other such individuals as they similarly pursue the *summum bonum* of a life that is good as a whole.

In *Our Social Inheritance* of 1957, Lewis sketches an outline of a social theory built around the shared customs and beliefs inherited and acted upon by autonomous moral agents guided by these rational imperatives. Pragmatic agents, at once embodying the cumulative habits and beliefs of the past, yet also enjoying the individual autonomy and freedom to identify and articulate new proposed courses of action that may contribute to lives judged to be good on the whole by those who live them, represent the constituent elements of Lewis's pragmatic social ideal.

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E. Paul Colella

LEWIS, DAVID KELLOGG (1941–2001)

David Lewis was born on 28 September 1941 in Oberlin, Ohio. He received a BA from Swarthmore College in 1962, and a PhD in philosophy from Harvard University in 1967, where he worked under W.V. Quine. He joined the philosophy department at the University of California at Los Angeles in 1966. He moved to Princeton in 1970, and later became the Class of 1943 University Professor of Philosophy, holding this position until his death. He was a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and an honorary fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. He received honorary degrees from the University of York, Cambridge University, and the University of Melbourne. Lewis died on 14 October 2001 in Princeton, New Jersey.

Lewis's doctoral thesis was reworked into *Convention* (1969). The book deepens our understanding of the platitude that language is conventional, by first providing a general account of what a convention is, and then explaining what the conventions of language are within that general framework. The notion of a possible world makes an important appearance in *Convention*. Lewis's basic notion of the meaning of a sentence has two factors: the mood of the sentence (interrogative, declarative, etc.), and the truth condition associated with the sentence, which is a set of possible worlds. Lewis's use of possible worlds to clarify important concepts and issues was hardly isolated to this case. It was a persistent theme throughout his career, nowhere better exemplified than in his second book *Counterfactuals* (1973), which investigates those ways of thinking and talking that report what would have happened if such and such had been the case. By all accounts, the systematic and rich analysis that he

provided put the topic of counterfactuals onto center stage in analytic philosophy and made such turns of phrase as “at the closest possible world” part of the philosophical lexicon.

With an analysis of counterfactuals ready at hand, philosophers were encouraged to use them to shed light on myriad areas of philosophical puzzlement. An example is Lewis’s own counterfactual analysis of causation, which begins with the simple thought that event *x* causes event *y* just in case, were *x* not to have occurred, *y* would not have occurred either. The simple thought needed refinement and qualification. Suppose my shooting causes your death, but that if I hadn’t shot you, someone else on the sidelines would. Then it is not true that if I hadn’t shot you, you wouldn’t have died. Lewis was sensitive to these and other concerns, but he remained convinced that a satisfying account of causation could be built upon the counterfactual idea.

What are possible worlds? To this question, Lewis offered a distinctive (and for many, somewhat shocking) answer, his so-called “modal realism.” Possible worlds are concrete universes, just as concrete as this one, many of which contain flesh and blood individuals just like ourselves. What makes it true that there is a possible history in which donkeys talk – assuming that such a history is at least possible – is the existence of a concrete universe in which donkeys are talking. Such was Lewis’s preferred picture of what a possible history really is. For the most part though, Lewis framed his philosophical analyses in such a way that they did not especially rely on that picture. For that reason, the popularity of his work was not much impeded by the fact that modal realism only attracted a relatively small following.

Why did Lewis believe the thesis that possible histories are bona fide concrete universes that really exist? Part of the story

involves, surprisingly, a kind of conservatism. Unlike Quine, and like G.E. Moore, Lewis had a profound respect for common sense. Since common sense embraces possibility and necessity, possible individuals as well as actual ones, so should philosophers. But why the particular conception of possible worlds as concrete? Some understanding of the matter can be achieved by noticing some converging themes in Lewis’s philosophical temperament: on the matter of basic ontology, a nominalistic tendency to prefer a metaphysics of concrete objects over a metaphysics of abstracta; and on the matter of basic ideology, a preference for simple first order languages (of the sort one learns in a basic predicate logic class) as a framework with which to describe the world over languages with primitive operators (such as primitive tense operators or, what is especially pertinent here, primitive modal operators). But more importantly, Lewis saw many problems and difficulties in the details of alternative approaches to possibility and necessity, many of which are laid out and explained in his third book *On the Plurality of Worlds* (1986). The metaphysical posit of an infinite plenitude of concrete universes, one for each possible history, was part of a grand metaphysical system that Lewis developed and refined throughout his career.

Lewis advocates a sort of anti-holism. The goings on in the actual world (and possible worlds like the actual world) are determined by extremely local goings on. Describe what is local to each and every point in space and time and you will have, in essence, captured the whole truth about the actual world. The fundamental facts about the actual world are physical facts: they are the sorts of things that an ideal physics would capture. No fundamental fact about actual reality would be “left out” by an ideal physics. Lewis posited a kind of metaphysical hierarchy – a “naturalness”

ranking – running from similarities that are maximally deep metaphysically speaking, to ones that are shallow to varying degrees. He then put this naturalness ranking to work in explicating a variety of metaphysically important notions, such as laws of nature, intrinsicity, physicalism, and so on, and also in providing an account of the nature of thought itself.

Laws of nature would seem to provide a counterexample to localism. Lewis himself, as we have seen, insists that the laws of nature are contingent. But couldn't the laws of nature vary while the local matters of fact stay the same? (In the limiting case, we might imagine two empty voids with different laws of nature governing them.) Sensitive to such worries, Lewis provided an account of laws of nature that rendered them fully compatible with localism. His picture – much in the spirit of David Hume – was that laws of nature are merely those true generalizations that “achieve an unexcelled combination of simplicity and strength” (Introduction to *Philosophical Papers Volume 2*, p. xi).

In his “Elusive Knowledge” (in *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology*) he popularized and systematized a so-called contextualist approach to knowledge according to which the meaning of the verb “to know” does not stay fixed across conversational contexts. The upshot of his account is while ordinary people often speak the truth when they say “I know such and such,” it is also the case that when one engages in argumentation with the skeptic, the verb ‘know’ acquires a meaning such that one should concede that the skeptic is right when she says “We know hardly anything at all.” Lewis’s work on knowledge applies some of the lessons provided by his more general picture of how meaning is influenced by conversational dynamics, a picture outlined in “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (in *Philosophical Papers Volume 1*).

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John Hawthorne

LIPPMANN, WALTER (1889–1974)

Walter Lippmann was born on 23 September 1889 in New York City. He attended private schools in New York City and entered Harvard University in 1906. Soon after arriving at Harvard, Lippmann became a socialist and was co-founder of the Harvard Socialist Club. He earned a MA in philosophy in 1910 and became a reporter for the socialist newspaper, *Boston Common*. In 1911 he went to work for muckraking journalist Lincoln Steffens. In the 1912 elections Lippmann supported the Progressive Party and former President Theodore Roosevelt. These efforts caught the attention of Herbert Croly, who in 1914 invited him to join the staff of *The*

New Republic where he worked as associate editor from 1914 to 1917. In 1917, Lippmann was appointed Assistant Secretary of War and after World War I he helped to draft peace agreements for 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

In 1920 Lippmann left *The New Republic* and from 1921 to 1931 he was on the editorial staff of the *New York World*, serving as editor the last two years. In 1931 he began writing a syndicated column, *Today and Tomorrow*, for the *New York Herald Tribune*. Lippmann began living in Washington, D.C., in 1938 and his column later moved to the *Washington Post* in 1962. Though he initially supported Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, Lippmann later changed his mind, uncomfortable with its collectivism (*The Good Society*, 1937). He continuously earned high marks for his political writings, as well as being a farsighted and incisive analyst of American foreign policy. Lippmann opposed the Korean War, McCarthyism, and the Vietnam War. He was awarded a special Pulitzer Prize citation in 1958 for his superior news analysis in *U.S. War Aims* (1944), *The Cold War* (1947), *Isolation and Alliances* (1952), and *Western Unity and the Common Market* (1962). He was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in September 1964. In 1967 Lippmann stopped writing his regular newspaper column and moved back to New York City, where he died on 14 December 1974.

Lippmann's concerns about modern democracy are announced in his controversial books *Public Opinion* (1922) and *The Phantom Public* (1925). Both books expressed Lippmann's growing disillusionment with pragmatic progressivism and its vision of participatory democracy, and directly criticized John Dewey's hopes for an educated and politically active citizenry. Since the typical citizen is too ignorant, narrow-minded, and apathetic to help with national issues and

problems, real political power should rest with elected officials and expert social scientists. These elites should “manufacture consent” by manipulating public opinion towards pre-decided goals. These attacks provoked Dewey to compose *The Public and Its Problems* (1927) in reply.

During the 1920s and much of the 1930s, Lippmann carefully watched the domestic and international scene. He vacillated between advocating disarmament or increasing American naval strength, and whether to foster international cooperation or to build an Anglo-American domination of the seas. He argued against military intervention against Nazi Germany in hopes that somehow this would maintain the current system of international stability. After World War II, Lippmann recognized that the American policy of containment was haunted by the prospect of continuous if not total war. He also worried that such a policy would result in a misuse of American power both domestically and abroad. He foresaw how a policy of containment placed the United States on the defensive, forced to continuously react to Soviet aggression around the world. It also forced the United States to fund and support its own satellite states, puppet governments and agents, neglecting its own “natural allies” in the Atlantic community.

Lippmann’s influence was due to his ability to form cooperative relationships with leading politicians, to write about their policies with some insight, since in many cases he helped form them. According to one biography (Steel 1980), Lippmann played an important role in shaping American war aims in 1917; in helping Senator Borah defeat the Versailles Treaty; in settling an angry dispute with Mexico in the late 1920s; in developing the concepts of the 1940 destroyer-bases deal and of Lend-Lease; and even in responding to Soviet threats after the war.

Though inclined toward conservatism, Lippmann’s proposals were contradictory and his fundamental preference for caution was clear. He usually adopted the views and endorsed the policies of those in power at the beginning of their terms. However, as their actions led them either to failure or placed the nation into some jeopardy, Lippmann reproached them and finally demanded their removal in favor of “safer” men; to see Franklin Roosevelt replaced by such men as Alf Landon or Wendell Willkie; Harry Truman by Thomas Dewey and Dwight D. Eisenhower, finally, Lyndon Johnson by Richard Nixon in 1968. This serial transition from admirer to critic reflected his ability to continuously re-evaluate political leaders and policies, no matter how promising they were initially. No matter the political climate, Lippmann’s prose, analysis, and insight were incisive and influential.

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Jean Van Delinder

LOCKE, ALAIN LEROY (1885–1954)

Alain L. Locke played many roles in his life: cultural critic, editor, author, mentor, educator, patron of the arts, and philosopher. Locke was born on 13 September 1885 in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and died on 9 June 1954 in New York City. He received his BA from Harvard University in 1907. Locke was the first African American to win a scholastic competition to become a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University from 1907 to 1910, earning a BLitt degree, and at the University of Berlin in 1910–11. Locke was an assistant professor of education at Howard University in Washington, D.C. from 1912 to 1917, and then founded Howard University's philosophy department when he became professor of philosophy in 1917. Locke was the first African American PhD from Harvard University's department of philosophy in 1918.

Locke's short essays, "Cosmopolitanism" (1908), "Oxford Contrasts" (1909), and "The American Temperament" (1911), written while a Rhodes Scholar, tell the story of his aversion to racial essentialism, whether in the form of European racialism or black *kitsch*. Locke's cosmopolitanism was a part of his lived experience in Europe, exemplified by his experiences with racial prejudice and his relationship with future luminaries such as Pixley K.I. Seme, creator of organizations that became the African National Congress in South Africa, and Horace M. Kallen, future cultural pluralist and later a noted Zionist.

Locke presented a series of lectures, sponsored by the then-nascent National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), in Washington, DC in 1916. These lectures were collected in an anthology, *Race Contacts and Interracial Relations* (1992). Locke argued that race did not determine culture and that race was not a biologically determined category. He contended that race was strictly socially defined and thereby constantly changing. Racialized groups for Locke were warranted in organizing themselves as socially shaped cultural groups, of which their racialization

was a cultural feature, in order to defeat racism and to promote their cultural goods. Race consciousness, whether functionally beneficial as a way for groups to sustain cohesion and promote their unique cultural goods or as a vicious source of prejudice, was considered by Locke as relatively permanent. However, contrary to the then most noted anthropologist of race, Franz Boas, and the tendency of the most noted sociologist and political activist of the time, W.E.B. Du Bois, Locke rejected the link between blood and racial genius and blood and culture. Race was a non-natural category. He tended to sustain the Darwinian picture of groups competing for scarce resources, where race was one way to form cohesion to maximized offspring chances, but he rejected the social Darwinian justification of racism, namely, that whatever race dominated surely was ipso facto evidence of their inherent superior cognitive ability. Racism for Locke was a function of practice – groups usurping undue material and status resources through an array of relationships.

Locke can be seen as one of the first “Renaissance” men of the modern age because he is best known for the crucial role he played in the Harlem Renaissance (1919–35), when his edited anthology *The New Negro* (1925) served as the anchor of an innovative collection of literary and art works that inaugurated the Harlem Renaissance. Locke was the most influential intellectual associate of an entire generation of artists, writers, and scholars, including authors in the anthology, *The New Negro*. Authors in *The New Negro* portrayed blacks as responsible, creative, complex, and honorable agents. *The New Negro* poets, playwrights, artists, sculptors, and essayists avoided romanticizing African people as primitives, emotionally uncontrolled and lacking virtues. For different reasons, Houston A. Baker, Jr.,

in *Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance*, and George Hutchinson, in *The Harlem Renaissance in Black and White*, concur that the classical heritage which the vast majority of Renaissance authors hoped to recover was not a pristine African culture nor a vision of the pure emotive primitive. Locke was concerned to make apparent those features of African American culture that existed historically, which were either nascent in the artistic production of the victimized black or openly expressed but ignored.

Locke’s expressionism – namely, that the aesthetic dimension arises from experience and is often an expression or reflection of feelings and needs intricate to cultural realities – motivated his argument that black folk culture was a source of sophisticated and universally valuable aesthetic products. Locke rejected the traditional distinction between folk art and high art in which high art was the product of independent intellects uninfluenced by folk culture. High culture, for Locke, best existed as an expression of the sophisticated results of select folk expressions. The Renaissance for Locke was not a recovery of the classical, nor a return to a pristine past, but a recovery and creation of the universalizable within the past and present folk. Locke’s expressionism existed in conjunction with his advocacy theory approach. The project of aesthetic appreciation and creation, for Locke, in its best manifestation existed as a function of promoting human uplift. It was not the disinterested, dispassionate, unconnected, third-person observer of artistic form, structure, idiom, and theme that determined the beautiful. Rather, it was such for realistic features in living relationship to content, context, function, expression, experience and contribution to human uplift that represented the best traditions of artistic creation. For Locke, artistic expression is invariably tied to

the existence of some community, although likely a matter of individual creation. Commitment to a community's uplift or expressing some feature of a peculiar history is compatible with the creating of universally valuable art. In one sense, valuation is always tied to transvaluation and transposition. Thus, his view of indeterminacy in language translation, the sociality of language and the fluidity of possible meanings undergirded his approach to community and identity.

Locke favored moderate cosmopolitanism and democratic socialism, contrary to an approach to community that promoted racial nationalism advocated by the nationalist Marcus Garvey, leader of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, or that of class analysis of Marxist-influenced socialist activists such as Hubert H. Harrison. Locke's approach is best exemplified by his anthology, *When Peoples Meet: A Study in Race and Culture Contacts* (1942), co-edited with Bernard J. Stern, published by the Progressive Education Association.

Locke's approach to pedagogy was enlivened by his cosmopolitan approach to community and values. Cultural education in the arts creates alternative, non racist, xenophobic, ethnocentric values and ways of viewing persons as full agents. It does so because artistic appreciation involves reformation of perception, whereas appeal to analysis, reasoned argumentation, and dialogue (literal mindedness) or propaganda (which relies on maintaining rigid categories and uses the same assumptions about reality as its object), all fail to accomplish a substantially new arena of thought. Locke, as the President of the American Association for Adult Education in 1945, introduced cultural education as a central feature of adult education.

Locke's faith in art as ennobling and providing alternative perceptions was often criticized as romantic. W.E.B. DuBois, the

leading political and intellectual head of liberal and progressive activists during the Renaissance, criticized Locke for promoting art for its own sake and expecting alternative perspectives to be a substantive source for social change. Although Locke never claimed that cultural changes were the sole, primary, or fundamental causal agent for social change, he consistently maintained that altered perspectives through the arts were a crucial factor for the possibility of change. His rejection of folk culture as itself high culture, that is, the anarchist view that all cultural products are inherently equal, and his maintaining the distinction between high and low art, although within the context of advocacy art, was criticized by such artists as Zora Neale Hurston and Claude McKay as being elitist and as maintaining the stifling view that African American artists had a moral responsibility to engage in racial uplift.

Locke's theory of valuation, his advocacy aesthetics, his insistence on moral imperatives as a necessary condition for the possibility of a moral community, his pedagogy of discipline and cultural integration, and his views of community as an evolving democratic experiment, all form a unique chapter of American pragmatism.

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Leonard Harris

LONERGAN, BERNARD JOSEPH FRANCIS (1904–1984)

Bernard Lonergan was born on 17 December 1904 in Buckingham, Québec, Canada, and he died on 26 November 1984 in Pickering, Ontario. His father's family emigrated from Ireland to Canada in the early 1800s; his mother's family were originally immigrants to the American colonies but migrated to Canada after the war of independence, because of their support for the Loyalists. At age thirteen Lonergan entered Loyola College, a Jesuit school in Montréal. Although he was satisfied with his studies, he felt that the Jesuits did not challenge him as much as did his parish school. In 1922, Lonergan entered the Jesuit novitiate at Guelph, Ontario. After his novitiate training, Lonergan entered the juniorate years in 1924. Since the Canadian Jesuit providence did not have a house of philosophy at the time, Lonergan was sent to Heythrop College located a few miles from Oxford University, and was awarded a BA from Heythrop in 1930. In 1933 Lonergan began formal training in theology at the Collège de l'Immaculée-Conception in Montréal, and in November of that year he was transferred to the Gregorian University in Rome. He was ordained to the priesthood on 25 July 1936. The following year he began ten months of tertianship in Amiens, France, where he learned of his future dissertation advisor, Charles Boyer.

In 1938 Lonergan returned to the Gregorian to begin his doctoral work in theology. Upon consultation with Boyer, he chose the topic of operant grace in St.

Thomas. He submitted a written copy of the dissertation on 1 May 1940 but, because of the war, did not defend it until 8 June 1943. He was finally awarded his doctorate on 23 December 1946. Lonergan had departed Rome in May 1940, and upon arriving in Canada he was appointed to teach theology at Collège de l'Immaculée-Conception. In 1947 he moved to Regis College in Toronto, where he also taught theology. While in Canada, Lonergan published his well-known *verbum* articles from 1946 to 1949 in *Theological Studies*, which appeared later as the book *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*. Work on the *verbum* project began around 1943 and focused on Thomistic cognitional theory, especially in terms of introspective rational psychology. In *Verbum*, Lonergan explored Thomas's understanding of *verbum mentis* or the inner word, as well as judgment in terms of the reflective act of the intellect. In 1953 Lonergan was appointed to a faculty position in theology at the Gregorian University in Rome. At the time of the appointment he was working on a theory of human cognition, which was published in 1957 as *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*. For Lonergan, the act of knowing is composed of experiencing, understanding, and judging. Importantly, this whole process is cyclical. As experiences expand, further questions for understanding present themselves. As these questions are pondered, further insights into the relationships of experience occur. These insights engender further questions of judgment, which lead to further experience, etc. The coalescence of these insights gives rise to higher viewpoints into the intelligibility of our selves and our world.

Lonergan taught at the Gregorian until 1965, when he returned to Montréal to undergo surgery for lung cancer. He returned

to his appointment on the theology faculty at Regis College, holding that position from 1965 to 1975. In his seminal book *Method in Theology*, Lonergan proposed a transcendental theological method “concerned with meeting the exigences and exploiting the opportunities presented by the human mind itself. It is a concern that is both foundational and universally significant and relevant” (1972, p. 14). Based on his revised cognitional structure of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, he enumerates and discusses eight functional specialties required for conducting theology. These specialties include research and communication at the level of experiencing, interpretation and systematics at the level of understanding, history and doctrine at the level of judging, and dialectic and foundation at the level of deciding. Each specialty is dynamically interrelated with the others and this integrated series of specialties yields knowledge of a loving God. Importantly, Lonergan's method of theology leads not just to knowledge of a loving God but also to a being-in-love with God and others through religious conversion.

Lonergan was the Charles Chauncey Stillman Professor of Roman Catholic Theological Studies at Harvard Divinity School when *Method* was published in 1972. However, he occupied the Stillman chair for only one year, 1971–72, and then returned to Regis College in Toronto. In 1975 he became a visiting distinguished professor of theology at Boston College. There he taught seminars in theology, including his book *Method*, and in macroeconomics. Lonergan's concern in macroeconomics was for a new world order based on enlightened individual concern for the welfare of society.

Lonergan retired from Boston College in 1983. He received numerous awards

during his life, including seventeen honorary doctorates, as well as the Companion of the Order of Canada by Governor General Roland Michner in 1970 and the John Courtney Murray Award from the Catholic Theological Society in 1972. He was also elected a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy in 1975. Lonergan's influence on twentieth century Catholic theology and philosophy is unparalleled. His life-long mission to bring Catholic studies into the twentieth century was a resounding success. The Lonergan movement, named by his followers, continues to gain momentum.

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James A. Marcum

LOOMER, BERNARD MACDOUGALL (1912–1985)

Bernard M. Loomer was born on 5 March 1912 in Belmont, Massachusetts. He received a BA from Bates College in Maine in 1934 and a PhD in philosophy from the University of Chicago in 1942. His dissertation was titled “The Theological Significance of the Method of Empirical Analysis in the Philosophy of A.N. Whitehead.” From 1942 to 1965, he was a professor of philosophy of religion at the

University of Chicago Divinity School. He was also Dean of the Divinity School and a leader of the Federated Theological Faculty from 1945 to 1954. From 1965 to 1977, he was a professor of philosophical theology at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California. Loomer died on 15 August 1985 in El Cerrito, California.

Alfred North Whitehead was a significant influence on Loomer's academic work and was the subject of his dissertation, which is considered a major contribution in the development of the movement known as process philosophy. Throughout his career, Loomer's writings drew on both empirical and rational aspects of Whitehead's thought, although, over the course of Loomer's career, rationalism played an increasingly more prominent role in his theological outlook. This tendency could be seen in the methodological focus of many of his writings and in his frequent critiques of philosophical positions that he characterized as taking leaps of logic. The empiricist strand in his thinking is evident in his appreciation of religious naturalism.

Charles Hartshorne credited Loomer with naming the process philosophy movement, though later in his life Loomer referred to the movement as “process-relational philosophy.” By this switch Loomer emphasized the centrality of relationships in the process of becoming, a move away from a sole emphasis on process. One of Loomer's most prominent essays, “Christian Faith and Process Philosophy,” published in 1949, defended process philosophy against the criticisms of conventional theology, most notably the idea that process philosophy does not allow for establishing the existence of an unambiguous religious and ethical reality. Loomer also argued, against process theology's critics, that the empirical methodology of process thought does allow

for identifying the workings of God in history. While Loomer never abandoned the position that there is no point beyond history, he did maintain the ultimate ambiguity of nature and history.

Another of Loomer's works, "S-I-Z-E is the Measure," similarly incorporates religious thought and concepts of God into broad understandings of history, the natural world, and relational forms. Loomer asserts that there is no reasonable basis for identifying God only with the virtuous portions of the world and of history and that God must be present in the evil and suffering of the world – a move which represented a step away from the dominant perspective of religious naturalism. "S-I-Z-E" also expresses Loomer's belief that relationality is the ultimate criterion for the value of religious experiences. Relational components are best interpreted by their depth and breadth, with greater amounts of each contributing to the greater intensity of religious experiences while simultaneously allowing more room for contrast. Contrast contributes value to religious experience by allowing God to be experienced in varying and possibly contrasting ways. This leaves open the question of how one discerns what is of God and what is not.

Loomer's deanship at the University of Chicago Divinity School, undertaken at the relatively early age of 33, likely curtailed his written theological output. The "Chicago School" of theology evolved into a center for process thought during Loomer's tenure as dean. The "Chicago School" of theology was an American theological movement centered at the University of Chicago and utilizing modern historical research to locate the presence of God in social and natural processes. His influence in facilitating and leading the Chicago School's continual refinement of concepts related to process philosophy should figure prominently in any

measurement of his theological contributions. Loomer's leadership in the development of process theology continues to influence present day process-oriented thinking and the religious institutions that this philosophical movement has shaped.

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and

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LOVEJOY, ARTHUR ONCKEN (1873–1962)

Arthur O. Lovejoy was born on 10 October 1873 in Berlin, Germany. Lovejoy finished high school in 1891 at the Germantown Academy outside Philadelphia. That summer the family moved to Oakland, California, and Lovejoy was admitted to the University of California in nearby Berkeley. He focused on philosophy and came under the powerful influence of George Holmes Howison, who encouraged Lovejoy to pursue graduate work in philosophy. Upon graduation with his BA in 1895, Lovejoy decided, over the opposition of his father, to study philosophy at Harvard University. At Harvard, Josiah Royce and William James had the greatest impact on Lovejoy. In addition, he took classes in comparative religion, Hebrew religion, Sanskrit, and Buddhism. Lovejoy completed his work for the MA in philosophy in 1897, which turned out to be Lovejoy’s only advanced degree. He continued his studies at Harvard during 1897–98, and then went to France for additional study from 1898 to 1899. His work at the Sorbonne and the Bibliothèque Nationale focused on historical inquiries into Jewish and other religious thought. Influenced by William James’s hostility to the PhD degree, Lovejoy never completed his doctorate after returning to the United States.

Lovejoy held the position as the only philosopher at Washington University in

St. Louis, Missouri, until 1907, when he accepted a one-year visiting appointment at Columbia University where he taught two courses, took advantage of the research libraries, and enjoyed concerts and the theater. After his year in New York, Lovejoy accepted a position in philosophy at the University of Missouri in Columbia, where he remained for two years teaching ethics, Kant, evolution, and English philosophy. In spring 1910 Lovejoy joined the faculty of the Johns Hopkins University as professor of philosophy. He became an articulate advocate of academic freedom, and with colleagues such as John Dewey he founded the American Association of University Professors in 1915. He became the first secretary of the organization and in 1918–19 served as President.

His philosophical colleagues elected him President of the American Philosophical Association in 1916–17. In the 1930s Lovejoy published three major books, *The Revolt Against Dualism* (1930), *The Great Chain of Being* (1936), and with his colleague George Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* (1935). He remained at Johns Hopkins, except for brief visiting appointments, until his retirement in 1938. Particularly notable were his two visiting appointments at Harvard in 1932–33, when he delivered the William James Lectures that would become *The Great Chain of Being*, and again in 1937–38. He continued his research and writing over the next two decades. In retirement he published an important collection of essays, *Essays in the History of Ideas* (1948), as well as *The Reason, the Understanding, and Time* (1961) and *Reflections on Human Nature* (1961). A second collection of essays, *The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays* (1963), was published shortly after his death on 30 December 1962 in Baltimore, Maryland.

Lovejoy's many writings fall into three major areas: philosophy, history of ideas, and defense of academic freedom. In philosophy Lovejoy was an especially acute critic of other philosophers, and he often developed his own philosophical positions in opposition to the ill-considered arguments of his peers. He staked out a realist position in opposition to Howison and Royce. While he was sympathetic to James's pluralism and temporalism, he also criticized the looseness of James's arguments on behalf of pragmatism. Lovejoy was also an advocate of making philosophy more scientific and of instituting procedures within the discipline that would ensure philosophic progress.

Lovejoy's investigations in the history of ideas ranged from classical Greece and Rome to the twentieth century. He explored the development of religious ideas, notions of primitivism, the rise of temporalism and evolutionary thinking, aspects of the Enlightenment and Romanticism, and problems associated with relativity and relativistic physics. Lovejoy also developed the concept of the "unit-idea," especially in *The Great Chain of Being*. "Unit-ideas" are separate, atemporal entities that have persisted in human thought. The task of the historian of ideas is to trace these unit-ideas through their many manifestations and permutations over time. In addition to his own many efforts in the history of ideas, Lovejoy established *The Journal of the History of Ideas* in 1940 to provide a scholarly forum for the field. Lovejoy also helped establish academic freedom as an important principle in American colleges and universities. In 1915 he helped draft the initial statement on academic freedom for the newly established American Association of University Professors. During both World War I and the communist scare following World War II, Lovejoy defended academic freedom but also limited the protection offered by the

principle. Professors working actively for a German victory or who were members of the Communist Party should be denied protection of the principle Lovejoy argued, because if they came to power they would abolish academic freedom.

Lovejoy's one effort at cooperative philosophizing, his association with a group of philosophers who called themselves Critical Realists, the most prominent of whom was George Santayana, failed to produce the kind of agreement Lovejoy hoped. *Essays in Critical Realism* (1920) was in part a response to an earlier volume by the New Realists in 1912. In opposition to the New Realists who argued for a direct realism in which the objects of experience were directly known, the Critical Realists generally adopted a dualistic and representative epistemology in which objects were real but our knowledge of them was mediated by ideas. Unfortunately, they could find no common ground on central epistemological questions, and the shared affinities that marked the volume hardly constituted progress toward science-like truth.

Lovejoy most fully developed his epistemological position in his 1928 Paul Carus Lectures of the American Philosophical Association, which was published as *The Revolt Against Dualism* (1930). Lovejoy defended both epistemological and psychophysical dualism with a genetic argument. He argued that both grew naturally out of man's reflection on his experience. He also argued for the real existence of ideas in the physical world and for the absolutely crucial role of ideas in mediating physical objects in the experiences that give rise to knowledge. Lovejoy concluded that the revolt against dualism had failed because of serious logical problems and an inability to adequately account for our ability to know directly a separate physical world. Epistemological and

psychophysical dualism, Lovejoy argued, are logically consistent and capable of giving a rational account of the existence of physical reality and of our ability to gain reliable knowledge of that reality through ideas.

Lovejoy's most significant achievement in the history of ideas was *The Great Chain of Being* (1936). The book was both a study of the idea of the Great Chain of Being, which had been a powerful scientific and philosophical concept in eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe, and a prime example of Lovejoy's methodology in the history of ideas. Lovejoy traced the ways in which philosophers and others used three "unit-ideas" – plenitude, continuity, and gradation – from the time of Plato to the early nineteenth century to understand how the world as they knew it came to be. In tracing the histories of these three ideas over more than two millennia, Lovejoy sought to uncover the logical processes by which thinkers moved from an absolute, static conception of the universe to a pluralistic and evolutionary understanding of the world. In many ways, Lovejoy's historical work was an effort to demonstrate how the ideas that undergirded his own pluralistic and temporalistic philosophy came to the fore by the nineteenth century.

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Daniel J. Wilsons

LYALL, WILLIAM (1811–1890)

William Lyall was born on 11 June 1811 in Paisley, Scotland. He was educated at the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh. He was ordained minister of the Free Church of Scotland, and served congregations in Broxburn, West Lothian, Uphall, and Linlithgow before emigrating to British North America in 1848. His first appointment was as a tutor at the (Presbyterian) Knox College in Toronto. In 1850 he joined the Free Church College in Halifax, Nova Scotia, as a Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and of Classical Literature.

It is astonishing that Lyall, teaching all of the arts subjects offered, found time to publish his major work *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature* in 1855. In 1860 he was transferred to the Theological Seminary in

Truro, Nova Scotia. When it closed in 1863, Lyall returned to Halifax as Professor of Logic and Psychology at Dalhousie College. He was awarded an honorary LLD degree from McGill University in 1864, and was named a founding fellow of the Royal Society of Canada when it was established in 1882. He taught at Dalhousie until his death on 17 Jan 1890 in Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature was one of the earliest books of philosophy written in Canada, and among English-language texts in that country it was preceded only by James Beaven's *Elements of Natural Theology* (1850). Lyall was influenced by the Scottish attitude toward religion, that religion should provide a reasoned argument for holding a belief in God, or for the promotion of self-restraint; religion should not just be a series of threatening diatribes on soul-saving. His philosophical predecessors were Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart, founding members of the Scottish Common Sense School of philosophy. The Common Sense School became a background against which Lyall worked out his own philosophical views.

Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature begins with an analysis of the intellect, declaring the fact of consciousness to be intuitively evident. The second part is an explanation of the emotions as the sources of our uniqueness as human beings, and the third part unites intellect and emotion in the moral, collective consciousness of a community. Lyall anticipates the developing neo-Hegelianism of the late nineteenth century. Consciousness, as understood by the followers of Hegel, including F.H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, T.H. Green, and J.M. McTaggart, is the first ground of ideas of self and other. Lyall rejected the division, suggested by Descartes, between the cogito and the external world. When faced with two competing claims about the origins

of experience – the world, or the conscious self – Lyall claimed that we intuitively grasp the truth of the primacy of consciousness, but that intuition does not negate the reality of the external world. We have no experiences without the idea of an external world, and without experience in an external world we have no ideas of space or time. One's world is not restricted to mental events. But neither is it a product of the imprinting of an external reality.

Lyall was determined to accommodate two pressing dichotomies that his new home in Nova Scotia brought into sharp focus: the unavoidable externality of nature, and his belief in God. Humanity alone could not have created such a world of power and beauty, the Romantic world that shaped his imagination during his education, and an untamed wilderness that surrounded him. Reason was not enough to explain these different worlds; some account of the imagination and its power to construct the world was needed. A century later in 1963, Northrop Frye would make the same point in *An Educated Imagination*, but to a much wider and more receptive audience.

In his moral philosophy, Lyall resists the strictures of reason alone. Perhaps the orderly life of Kant in the eighteenth century seemed too remote to make sense out of life in Nova Scotia in the mid-nineteenth century, prior to Canadian confederation in 1867. For the Scottish philosopher the conflicts of moral life in the Maritimes, conflicts that Kant and his followers argued could be so neatly resolved by an educated will and a trained sense of duty, required empathic understanding before one could begin to generate theory. Lyall cuts to the quick in declaring the emotions to be critical to judgments about actions. His moral theory draws on both Kant and Hume. He departs from Hume's emotive account by insisting

that our emotions are subject to a law of duty that is part of our human nature and to which law, through our awareness of it, we give reverence. Yet the affinity with Kant, that such a claim invites, is modified by Lyall, who thinks that the intellectual will and its attendant purity fail to explain the real force behind reverence for the moral law.

With characteristic Scottish resolve he worked to adapt concepts and theories to new circumstances. In doing so he launched a tradition of a rational compromise that is exemplary of the early philosophical works written in Canada. Lyall's creative use of the concept of love as our link to both the moral and intellectual world generated the possibility of new conceptual associations that could resolve differences between communities, nature, and the Creator.

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Elizabeth Trott

LYONS, DAVID BARRY (1935–)

David Lyons was born on 6 February 1935 in New York City. He received a BA from Brooklyn College in 1960 in philosophy and American studies. Lyons then received both a MA and PhD in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963. He did post-doctoral work on a Knox Fellowship at Oxford University, where he was introduced to legal philosophy by H.L.A. Hart. Lyons's interest in utilitarianism was evident when he published his first book *Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism* in 1965, which reflected the ideas of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

Lyons began teaching philosophy at Cornell in 1964, and received a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1970. He served as chair of Cornell philosophy department from 1978 to 1984, and began teaching in the Law School in 1979. While at Cornell, Lyons was the recipient of numerous awards including the Clark Distinguished Teaching Award and was named the Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy in 1990. Lyons has also received major research fellowships from the Society for the Humanities and three Fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities. Throughout his academic career he has directed seminars for legal practitioners discussing issues of ethics, constitutional law and legal interpretation. In addition, Lyons helped develop Cornell University's Program of Ethics and Public Life. When he retired

from Cornell in 1995, Lyons joined the faculty in the School of Law at Boston University in 1995 and was appointed professor of philosophy in 1998. Shortly thereafter in 2001 he was once again honored as the Law Alumni Scholar.

Lyons is a leading authority on legal philosophy, writing comprehensively on utilitarianism and the moral aspects of legal theory. His personal commitment to being a responsible citizen has directed his interest in the practical applications of law and its relationship to significant social moments in history, such as the civil rights movement. Influenced by the intellectual work of Bentham and Mill, in addition to his reasonable ideals, Lyons philosophical scholarship encompasses a utilitarian approach. A “normative” theory, the central component of Utilitarian theory is that right actions can be demonstrated by their effect on society. Utilitarianism holds that good is whatever brings the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people. In the context of law it provides a standard for appraising and guiding behavior in the interest of all citizens. Utilitarianism can further be understood as a theory, which claims that decisions should be made to promote good behavior.

Drawing from his knowledge of philosophy and deep understanding of the law and the role it plays in society, Lyons has authored seven books including *Ethics and the Rule of Law* (1984). Lyons approaches the concept of law as an instrument to evaluate and determine individual as well as social conduct or philosophically determine what is *good* or *bad* behavior. Furthermore, Lyons recognizes the historical gravity of the law that while it is capable of doing good, such as recognizing human rights (like the Geneva Convention), the law can equally commit malevolence, for example, by upholding segregation and Jim Crow laws. Pointedly, Lyons is concerned

with the values and ethics associated with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ within the legal framework. What does ‘good’ or ‘bad’ mean? How sound is this argument constructed? Is there a moral standard underlying these arguments? And how can it be defended?

Lyons has engaged in various forms of political action and civil disobedience against South Africa’s system of apartheid. He was arrested for participating in sit-ins on the Cornell campus urging divestment from South Africa. He also assisted in writing the principal Faculty and Staff Against Apartheid document including why “Cornell Should Divest.” Other recent scholarship addresses monetary reparations claims made on behalf of African Americans.

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Randy L. Wells

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MACINTOSH, DOUGLAS CLYDE (1877–1948)

Douglas C. Macintosh was born on 18 February 1877 in Breadalbane, Ontario, Canada. He became an ordained minister of the Baptist church, and his higher education began at McMaster University in 1899 where he graduated with a BA in philosophy in 1903. He then went to the University of Chicago Divinity School, where he received his PhD in 1909. After a brief appointment as professor of Biblical and systematic theology at Brandon College in Ontario, he joined the faculty of Yale University Divinity School in 1909 as a professor of theology. He was Dwight professor of theology in the Divinity School from 1916 to 1942 and professor of theology and philosophy of religion in the Graduate School from 1933 to 1942. Macintosh remained a Canadian citizen throughout his life, which ended on 6 July 1948 in Hamden, Connecticut.

Macintosh is generally categorized with Henry Nelson Wieman as one of the two great exponents of liberal empirical theology in the first half of the twentieth century. Both Macintosh and Wieman agreed with the Ritschlian position that viewed religious ideas as essentially a matter of value judgments. But the theologies that they developed on the basis of the empirical examination of human valuation differed markedly. Wieman restricted himself to the examination of common human experience, whereas Macintosh developed his theology on the basis

of both common human experience and his professed Christian religious experience of God. Also, insofar as each appealed at times to pragmatic justifications of religious belief, Wieman and the Chicago School generally found the pragmatic instrumentalism of John Dewey congenial, whereas Macintosh rejected Dewey's instrumentalism and appealed only to the pragmatism of William James. Finally, against Ritschlian theology, Macintosh insisted on the need for metaphysics, believing that judgments of value need to be related to judgments of existence. These convictions were in place when he published *The Problem of Knowledge* in 1915 and constitute the thread of continuity uniting all of his publications. For Macintosh, theology is the necessary intellectual expression of religious experience, a product of personal appreciation of experienced religious value. His central concern was always to demonstrate the certainty of God's existence and the validity of the knowledge of God provided by Christian faith. His fully developed constructive position is to be found in Part Three of *The Problem of Religious Knowledge* (1940). The principal works that develop the several aspects of this constructive position are *The Reaction Against Metaphysics in Theology* (1911), *The Problem of Knowledge* (1915), *Theology as an Empirical Science* (1919), *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1925), *The Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of Modern Thought* (1931), and "Experimental Realism in Religion" (1931).

Macintosh's constructive position, which he calls "critical monistic realism in religion,"

has four constitutive parts: religious perception, empirical theology, normative theology, and metaphysical theology. He has summarily stated his position as follows: “I hold that there are absolute values, universally and eternally valid for persons, which values (or ideals) we can progressively learn to appreciate and realize; that reality is whatever it must be for there to be such values and for their realization by us to be imperative; that there are real persons, a real world of things, and an existent reality so divine in quality and function as to be a worthy object of religious trust and worship; that all of these realities, physical, humanly personal, and religious, or divine, exist independently of any ideas or subjective appearances of them; that of all these realities we can have some direct experience, from which we can gain some verified knowledge; and finally, that our limited knowledge of these various realities may be supplemented by intuitional thinking and a belief or faith which tends to become reasonable through critical and constructive thought” (1940, p. vii).

Critical monistic realism in religion begins with a theory of knowledge that establishes the validity of knowledge in general and of religious knowledge in particular. Macintosh wanted to validate the felt certainty of religious faith. He criticized and rejected naïve realism and dualistic realism, the former because it allowed no distinction between appearance and reality and the latter because it allowed us to know only the appearances but not the reality behind the appearances. He opted for epistemological realism of the monist variety, which recognizes a partial identity between ultimate reality and the appearances through which this reality is experienced by us. He termed this “perception in a complex,” the actual perception of reality in and through the presented content of experience. Religious experience provides a

particular complex through which religious knowledge of the divine can be had. Religious knowledge is knowledge of that reality that is manifest in the existence of absolute values, universally and eternally valid for persons, and that makes those values imperative for us. Macintosh insists that this perception of the divine can only be had by those who make the “right religious adjustment” to the divinely functioning reality. This right adjustment includes an attitude of trust and receptivity, which are at the basis of personal conversion and a willingness to live one’s life by the values so disclosed as absolute. Religious knowledge also recognizes the essentially numinous quality of the object of religious experience.

Empirical theology applies a distinctive form of scientific method to the data of religious experience in order to establish adequately tested religious truths. As a scientific theology, empirical realistic theology logically assumes the existence of the object of its inquiry. In a circular manner, it recognizes the divine in the experience of valuation of absolute ideals in living religious traditions, Christianity in particular, and then inquires into those experiential processes to discover the nature of the divine and the manner of its operation in human life. Macintosh states a number of verified laws descriptive of the functioning of a divine reality when there is a right religious adjustment on the part of the person or group. Summarily stated, these are: the promotion of good will, the definite beginning of an ethico-religious life, the experience of Christian joy, a life of Christian love, an assurance of an essentially Christ-like God and of reconciliation with him, a sense of divine guidance, a sense of peace and healing in mind and body, and the reign of God’s will in the social order.

Normative theology goes beyond the empirically verifiable knowledge that is the

result of scientific theology. Critical monistic realism holds that reality is at least partially present in acts of perception. Scientific theology deals with that which is perceived and so can claim to be objective. Normative theology is entirely subjective: it has its basis in the religious or imaginal intuition which is the experience of faith in the transcendent aspects of ultimate reality or God. Normative theology must not contradict the truths of scientific theology, but it can appeal to the pragmatic principle enunciated by William James, which states that we have a right to believe those ideas that are necessary presuppositions of actions directed toward the realization of fundamental human purposes.

It is here that Macintosh brings into theology ideas that he believes are reasonable statements of faith. So we can reasonably believe in moral optimism, the conviction that the best aims of humanity and the purposes of God coincide. We can believe that God is one and acts in a consistent manner. We can believe that God, as the highest being, is personal in nature and purposefully seeks the highest ideals. We can believe that God is omniscient and omnipotent. We can believe that God is holy love. We can believe that the transcendent God is the same God whose effects have been formulated by scientific theology.

Specifically Christian beliefs can also be reasonably held. Because Jesus is taken by Christians to be the supreme historical example of a person having the right religious adjustment, we are justified in finding in him clues to the character, will, and attitude of the transcendent God. Also, we can affirm the immanence of God in Jesus as a person intimately united to God. We can aspire to such an intimate union with God ourselves.

In all of his normative theology, Macintosh is accused by Wieman of exceeding the limits of empirical inquiry. But Macintosh replies

that Wieman's God, based only on common human experience, lacks the content which makes God a meaningful and dynamic force in actual religious life. He believed that theological ideas will be winnowed by metaphysical assessment, but he also believes that theology can contribute to the successful development of an adequate metaphysics. Toward the end of his career, Barthian crisis theology attracted a large following in America. Macintosh rejected it as a form of irrationalism antithetical to the convictions of empirical, scientific theology. However, the neo-orthodox movement did eclipse his theology, and little attention has been given to Macintosh in succeeding years.

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MACINTYRE, ALASDAIR CHALMERS (1929–)

Alasdair MacIntyre was born on 12 January 1929 in Glasgow, Scotland. MacIntyre earned a BA in classics from Queen Mary College of the University of London in 1949, and an MA in philosophy from the University of Manchester in 1951. Early in his career he held positions at Manchester, Leeds, Oxford, and Essex. MacIntyre came to the United States in 1970 where he has been professor of philosophy at Princeton, Brandeis, Boston, Wellesley, Vanderbilt (1982–1988), Yale (1988–1989), University of Notre Dame (1989–1994), and Duke (1994–2000). Since 2000 he has been a senior research fellow in

philosophy at Notre Dame. He was elected President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (1984–1985), a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a corresponding fellow of the British Academy. MacIntyre has been a Gifford Lecturer at Edinburgh which resulted in *Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry* (1990). Swarthmore College, Queens University in Belfast, Williams College, and the University of Essex have all awarded him honorary degrees.

Early work on Freud and Marx contain the seeds of much of MacIntyre's later work. He belonged to the Communist Party from 1947 to 1956 but left amid revelations of Stalin's atrocities. Despite disagreement with the Party, a 1959 essay, “Notes from the Moral Wilderness,” defended Marxism against the claim that it was responsible for Stalinism, faulting Stalinism for employing means incompatible with Marxist ends. For MacIntyre the connection between Freud and Marx lies in human desires. Just as, according to Marx, some socially embedded rules repress natural human desire, so also, according to Freud, internalized societal norms repress natural human desires. MacIntyre became disenchanted with Marxism after concluding that it failed as predictive social science and thus failed to provide a basis for the end toward which both history and human nature strive. Nevertheless, MacIntyre argues that Marx provided a vision of a society of individuals who are in agreement about ends and on rules for achieving those ends. A society among whose members there was agreement on both ends and means existed, according to MacIntyre, in classical Greece, but none exists any longer. This leaves moral theory with a problem: how can disagreements be overcome when those disagreements are among adherents to, not only different, but seemingly incommensurable, moral

principles? Such disagreement occurs not only between cultures but within cultures whose traditions embed incommensurable principles. In MacIntyre's view we are heirs to numerous and incompatible moralities. Adherents to such rival moralities are without neutral grounds, appeal to which might resolve their differences.

Relativism is the moral predicament such choices present. If there is no mutually recognized ground for moral rationality that differing convictions can appeal to in order to resolve their differences, there is only choice without reason. In MacIntyre's account of the history of ethics, both emotivism and Nietzsche can be fully understood only against the background of the failures of the Enlightenment. That history is richly narrated in MacIntyre's major works, especially *After Virtue*, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry*.

Enlightenment philosophers tried to provide an epistemic foundation for objective and universal moral truth. In MacIntyre's history of this project not only do Enlightenment philosophers begin with premises that are incompatible, leaving debate between them irresolvable and interminable, but their views are also internally inadequate. The legacy of the Enlightenment is the absence of community in contemporary moral life. MacIntyre's *After Virtue* proposes a view of the moral life which is a modified version of Aristotle's, a view which insists that teleology is essential to human nature and human practice. The rejection of Aristotelianism in the Enlightenment and, more specifically, the rejection of a distinction between fact and value, is offered as the origin of the contemporary problem. The Enlightenment dropped the notion of a telos, the end of a human life, attempting instead to provide epistemic grounds for moral judgment. The result was interminable disagreement like

that between Kant and utilitarianism. Within an Aristotelian frame one argues that we ought to live in such and such ways, since so living achieves the telos of human nature. For Aristotle, that telos, what is potential in us, is constituted by the facts of human nature. As MacIntyre argues from his early work on, without a telos within the reach of reason, reasoning about action is mere instrumental reasoning, since there is nothing to reason about but the means to satisfy individual preference. The prevalence, thinks MacIntyre, of such reasoning in modern culture renders modern culture emotivist. In addition to Nietzsche and emotivism, such instrumentality is, according to MacIntyre, a feature of Max Weber's sociology, Enlightenment liberals, and twentieth-century liberals such as John Rawls. Rawls excludes concern with the ends of life from his theory of justice. In contemporary life, MacIntyre argues, inattention to the ends of life leads to a managerial, bureaucratic culture that fails to recognize a distinction between manipulative and nonmanipulative social relations.

MacIntyre's *After Virtue* rejects the Aristotelian idea that human nature is metaphysically fixed. What MacIntyre adds to Aristotle is historicism. Expressing this historicist and anti-metaphysical conception of the human telos, in *After Virtue* MacIntyre says "the good life for man is the life spent in seeking the good life for man" (1984, p. 219). An account of such a life requires an account of the practices in which we are engaged, an account of how the practices fit into a human life and, finally, an account of what constitutes a moral tradition, a tradition within which the moral adequacy of the practices and the life of which they are a part get assessed. Each successive account is layered on what precedes it, and these provide the resources for MacIntyre's teleology, the notion of a practice being fundamental. Each in succession

presupposes, but is not presupposed by, what precedes it. Each also has associated virtues. The virtues are habits of behavior that tend to enable achievement of goods internal to practices, habits that foster the good of a whole, unfragmented life and which promote the search for the good for human beings. Some virtues – honesty, justice and courage – are according to MacIntyre essential to every practice and every tradition.

Practices and associated virtues have a history and history does not reveal any unified conception of the virtues nor agreement about particular virtues. As a result some claim that MacIntyre himself succumbs to relativism. He offers Aristotelian teleology as an alternative to Nietzschean perspectivism, yet these can be thought incommensurable alternatives, and as such they present a choice without reason. This MacIntyre concedes. “For nothing I have said goes any way to show that a situation could not arise in which it proved possible to discover no rational way to settle the disagreements between two rival moral and epistemological traditions” (1984, p. 277). The problem *After Virtue* set out to solve remained. “Thus *After Virtue*, in this respect as in others ought to be read as a work still in progress” (1984, p. 278). What MacIntyre’s project required at the end of *After Virtue* was an account of practical reasoning which would provide a “rational way to settle the disagreements between two rival moral and epistemological traditions.”

The provision and refinement of such an account of practical reasoning is the task of *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* and succeeding publications. But the account there developed is teleological, broadly Aristotelian, and not all that distinct from the substantive theory of the moral life presented in *After Virtue*. While otherwise incommensurable traditions employ broadly Aristotelian and teleological reasoning, the

pursuit of different ends imposes different constraints on practical reason. Yet, no particular end of a worthy human life is presupposed by the broadly Aristotelian character of practical reasoning. At the end of *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* MacIntyre says there are alternative ways of developing the history the book narrates: “as Aristotelian, as Augustinian, as Thomist, as Humean, as post-Enlightenment liberal, or as something else” (1988, p. 402). It again seems that MacIntyre leaves unresolved the problem he set out to solve. However, while giving Aristotelian teleology a place it had not been given at the conclusion of *After Virtue* MacIntyre, in important respects, abandons Aristotle in favor of St. Thomas Aquinas.

MacIntyre finds Aquinas superior to Aristotle for several reasons. Aquinas, unlike Aristotle, writes from tradition, taking account of alternative and incompatible traditions, proposing ways to overcome their differences while incorporating what is best in them and discarding what is no longer defensible. Moreover, Aquinas recognized that moral argument is open-ended and revisable, and so he developed requirements of practical reasoning for which Aristotle saw no need. Aristotle thought he had an uncontroversial standard of what was to be achieved, at least implicitly, in existing city-states. On the other hand, Aquinas realized that reasoning needed resources to reconcile alternative, incompatible views of the moral life. Adherents to alternative moral beliefs do not accept relativism but are rather committed to the truth of their respective beliefs. Such commitments, according to MacIntyre, leave them also “committed to a set of theses about rational justification” (1994, p. 8). For example, they must recognize that claims to truth are fallible, a commitment that further imposes a burden of justification. Further, one must understand one’s own claims from the

standpoint of alternative positions and provide not only a justification for those claims but account for alleged mistakes of alternative and competing claims. Thus while reasoning must always begin from within some particular tradition which limits it and constrains it, and while alternative developments of a tradition may be consistent with its history, “the exercise of philosophical and moral imagination are on occasion sufficient to enable inquiry to identify and transcend what in those limitations and constraints hinders inquiry and renders it sterile” (1994, p.23).

Rejecting relativism, MacIntyre also avows the realism that seemed abandoned with the rejection in *After Virtue* of the Aristotelian idea of a metaphysically fixed telos. The goal of practical reasoning had been to achieve understanding of a human life that is adequate to the telos of a historically situated human life. In *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* and later writings, the goal of practical reasoning is understand the telos of a human life that is adequate to human life. For MacIntyre it remains, however, that reasoning must always begin from within some particular tradition which limits it and constrains it. His 1999 *Dependent Rational Animals* further develops Aquinian themes in MacIntyre’s position.

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Richard Liebendorfer

MACKINNON, CATHARINE ALICE (1946–)

Catharine A. MacKinnon was born on 7 October 1946 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. She earned a BA at Smith College in 1969, and followed that with a JD (1977) and PhD in Political Science (1987) from Yale University. MacKinnon began teaching as assistant professor of law at the University of Minnesota (1982–84), and then was professor of law at York University in Toronto (1988–90). She has taught at the University of Michigan Law School since 1990, and holds the title of Elizabeth A. Long Professor of Law. For many years she has been the James Barr Ames Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard University. She has also been a visiting professor at the University of Chicago, and lectured at many universities.

MacKinnon is one of the world's highest cited living scholars and has been very influential in advocacy of women's rights worldwide. Her legal accomplishments are profound. She pioneered the legal claim for sexual harassment. Her book, *Sexual Harassment of Working Women* (1979), offered the theory of sexual harassment later enshrined in United States law by the Supreme Court in the 1986 opinion *Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson* (Rehnquist opinion for a unanimous Court). With Andrea Dworkin, MacKinnon created ordinances recognizing pornography as a civil rights violation. While their model ordinance was ruled unconstitutional in the United States by the Seventh Circuit in

American Booksellers v. Hudnut (Easterbrook opinion), the Canadian Supreme Court has largely accepted MacKinnon's approach to pornography. More recently her work has taken on a more international character. For instance, MacKinnon represented Bosnian woman survivors of Serbian genocidal sexual violence under the United States Alien Tort Act and won a damage award of \$745 million in the case of *Kadic v. Karadzic* (2000), the first legal recognition of rape as an act of genocide. She also works with Equality Now, an NGO that promotes international sex equality rights for women. During 2008–2013 she served as the first Special Gender Adviser to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court at The Hague. As a legal activist MacKinnon has been a tireless and relentless advocate for feminist issues. MacKinnon's legal accomplishments can be read as a testimony to the power of philosophical analysis when utilized in service of real-world issues of justice and legal procedure.

MacKinnon finds that pornography sexualizes coercive power, violence and subordination. Pornography is not the only social institution that does this, but it is one that, under MacKinnon's analysis, is utilized as evidence to create a critique that can then find the same dynamics in others less explicit in their sexual dynamics. She argues that pornography, though, should not be analyzed "morally," which under liberal theories means to have the analysis be reduced inevitably to an issue of competing values, but rather as an issue of power, hierarchy and violence-enforced gender subordination. Power, hierarchy and subordination are, under this analysis, clearly present, less disputable and more legally remediable if properly identified and labelled. MacKinnon claims that the more effective the construction of gender assumptions is in society, the more invisible yet necessary and natural these socially

constructed roles will appear. That is, a society that is premised upon male epistemology will have naturalized an epistemological stance that renders gender difference inevitable and the male stance “objective” and true. Male epistemology also renders “objective” all kinds of social tools for the enforcement of gender inequality.

MacKinnon further critiques the public/private split. By placing family relations in the private realm, male power gets a realm unobstructed by the state, an area read as beyond state regulation, but that is actually constructed and supported by the state in order to preserve male power. That is, the limits of the liberal state are constructed in a way that preserves and accentuates male power in purportedly state-free areas. For MacKinnon this type of invisible male power, this violent and coercive power that reads as neutral, is most clearly seen in the manner under liberal law that the physical act of pornography gets categorized as speech. Not only is this categorization of pornography as speech highly questionable, but so is the resulting inability of United States courts to see the conflict between its First Amendment jurisprudence and its equality jurisprudence. MacKinnon argues that even if something is rightly thought of as speech, this doesn’t end the inquiry because there are other rights to be protected as well. And there is no guarantee that these rights will not conflict, therefore requiring a consideration of which values will trump. Pornography inscribes and helps enforce gender subordination, therefore creating a civil rights violation under guarantees of equality. But in regards to pornography courts have only been able to see speech. Once again male perspective is rendered neutral, invisible and determinate and woman a text, an idea, written by men.

To combat this result, MacKinnon constructs a theory of feminist jurisprudence.

Through investigating examples such as rape laws that rely upon ideas of the “reasonable rapist” or of definitions of consent that could be satisfied by a female corpse she exposes the male perspective that passes as legal neutrality. Further, she critiques the concept of justice inherited from Aristotle – that justice is treating like things alike and different things differently – as just another way law enforced male-dominated gender hierarchy under the pretense of objective neutrality. This is because the definition of what counts as “like” is male-based. Therefore under sameness/difference jurisprudence, the only way to be equal is to be equally male, and therefore not female. As opposed to this model, MacKinnon advocates, once again, a jurisprudence cognizant of power and hierarchy and suspicious of uncritical notions of objectivity and neutrality. She advocates most basically a jurisprudence that acknowledges the female experience.

MacKinnon analyzes the modern liberal state in a manner influenced by Marxist thought. She takes from Marxism the idea of social dominance as a dynamic force as well as the project of uncovering ideologies of dominance masquerading as neutral, necessary and natural. She also appreciates the Marxist attention to social context. This is contrasted with the assumptions central to the liberal state which in addition to the public/private split includes the conception of a context-free autonomous self that is the author of intentional and self-willed actions. With these assumptions MacKinnon notes that liberalism presumes equality where Marxism sees ideology, inequality and exploitation. In this she sees Marxism as the more accurate theory of the state in that it gets right the self as socially constructed and the state, even the liberal or so-called negative state as an active and constructive force. But, on the other hand, MacKinnon is critical of the Marxist fixation upon class and, worse yet, the treatment of

woman as private or natural, not socially constructed. Therefore the Marxist theory of the state, like the liberal theory of the state, is founded upon and replicates male ideology. The feminist theory of the state sees sexism as an omnipresent aspect of the modern state. Further, it sees the presumptions of the liberal state to be empirically false and in service of a male epistemology instantiated as a method of social control.

MacKinnon's later work incorporates a theory of international relations. Summing up her theory of the state she noted four ways in which the state protects and constructs male dominance: (1) the public/private split; (2) domination naturalized as difference; (3) an idea of consent that hides coercion; and (4) framing sexual politics as a moral issue rather than a political one. MacKinnon argues that this is replicated in the international order. States protect male power and international rights laws let states enforce international rights amongst themselves and therefore states have incentives to collude. The international order, as MacKinnon puts it, just puts another layer of men on top of women. MacKinnon has been remarkably successful in gaining recognition of woman's treatment as human rights violation. For instance, the state-sponsored systematic genocidal rape that was first treated as just private harm became recognized as a human rights violation under *Kadic v. Karadzic*.

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Brian E. Butler

MACQUARRIE, JOHN (1919–2007)

John Macquarrie was born on 27 June 1919, in Renfrew, Scotland, an ancient town on the River Clyde located six miles from Glasgow. He won a scholarship to the University of Glasgow, from which he received an MA with honors in mental philosophy in 1940 and a BD degree in 1943. Upon graduation, he rejected a scholarship for further graduate study in theology and joined the British Army as a chaplain.

Following his war service, Macquarrie became minister of St. Ninian’s Church, Brechin (Church of Scotland) in 1948, and joined the University of Glasgow faculty as a lecturer in systematic theology in 1953. He completed his PhD in 1954 with a dissertation on Rudolf Bultmann and Martin Heidegger, which was the basis for his first book, *An Existentialist Theology*, published in 1955. This book was well received and widely reviewed in both the United Kingdom and the United States and catapulted Macquarrie into prominence. He was called to Union Theological Seminary in New York City in 1962 as a professor of systematic theology. In 1965 he was ordained a priest in the Episcopal Church. In 1970, he became Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Christ Church of Oxford University, where he served until retirement in 1986. He died on 28 May 2007 in Oxford, England.

Looking back on his career, Macquarrie speaks of the “existentialist phase” in which his theological career first flowered. In *An Existentialist Theology* (1955), he focused

on Bultmann’s treatment of St. Paul’s anthropology. His interpretation included Bultmann’s program of demythologizing and Heidegger’s existential analysis, which strongly underlay Bultmann’s work. He wrote a companion book, *The Scope of Demythologizing* (1960), which dealt with Bultmann’s critics on both the right and the left. In 1962, he and Edward Robinson translated Heidegger’s seminal *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*), a translation that was highly successful and has proved to be a durable work. He published *Studies in Christian Existentialism* (1965), a collection of essays, *Martin Heidegger* (1968), a small book in a series on the makers of contemporary theology, and *Existentialism* (1972), a thematic treatment of this influential philosophical movement. While always the theologian, Macquarrie has nonetheless appreciated existentialism for its anthropological focus, its phenomenological (non-speculative) method, and its non-substantial view of human selfhood. He highly values the existential analysis of Heidegger, especially as providing a contemporary language for interpreting the Christian message, couched as it is in the “indirect” language of myth, symbol, analogy, and paradox. Macquarrie has never been uncritical of existentialism, especially when it restricts itself to individual existence and limits itself to the human dimension only. Heidegger himself resisted being called an existentialist and saw the existential analytic of Dasein (human existence, basically) as the way into ontology, the study of Being. Macquarrie proved himself to be in thorough agreement with that view as he increasingly made use of the later Heidegger’s ontological focus.

If Macquarrie’s efforts as a co-translator of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* have given him wide exposure and general appreciation in academic circles, it is his *Principles of Christian Theology* (1966) that has given him

a prominent place in the Christian Church and theological education as a premier theologian. Macquarrie took the philosophical notion of Being as Christian theology's central and unifying concept. This reflects his existential-ontological approach, whereby the beginning point for theology is the analysis of human existence, and Being is that notion in terms of which God is to be interpreted. For purposes of ontological analysis, Macquarrie draws on Heidegger's understanding of Being as the condition of any thing having being at all. He interprets God as Holy Being or the letting-be of beings. God's tri-unity is understood as primordial being, expressive being, and unitive being, an understanding that connects with both philosophical analysis and theological tradition. Macquarrie structures his systematic theology in three parts: philosophical or natural theology (human existence, revelation, Being and God, language, religion); symbolic theology (Trinity, Jesus Christ in both person and work, the Holy Spirit and salvation, eschatology); and applied theology (church, ministry and mission, word and sacrament, worship and ethics).

Ever alert to the cultural and intellectual context in which theology must be written, Macquarrie produced a number of works in the 1960s and 1970s dealing with topical concerns: the intellectual ambience of theology and religious reflection (*Twentieth Century Religious Thought*, 1963); issues of language occasioned by the challenge of positivism and linguistic empiricism (*God-Talk*, 1967); secularization (*God and Secularity*, 1968); situation ethics and the new morality (*Three Issues in Ethics*, 1970). More or less coincident with his move to Christ Church, Oxford University, where he had duties as both theologian and canon, Macquarrie increasingly focused his writing on ecclesial and ecumenical concerns with

Paths in Spirituality (1972), *The Faith of the People of God* (1972), *Christian Unity and Diversity* (1975), *The Humility of God* (1978), and *Christian Hope* (1978).

Three works form a significant, late-career trilogy, focusing on humanity, deity, and Christ: *In Search of Humanity* (1982); *In Search of Deity* (1984), which was the Gifford Lectures of 1983–1984; and *Jesus Christ in Modern Thought* (1990). Significant developments include an increasing emphasis on human self-transcendence, reflecting the influence of the eminent Roman Catholic theologian Karl Rahner; dialectical theism, Macquarrie's refinement of panentheism, where the organic model of deity is preferred and developed over the monarchical, transcendent-only model of classical theism; and the balancing of adoptionist and incarnational themes in the interpretation of Jesus Christ. Macquarrie's work is always deeply informed by both historical studies and contemporary reflection. To the traditional Anglican trilateral of Scripture, tradition, and reason, Macquarrie adds a deep feeling for experience and the convictional roots of rational thought.

Macquarrie's catholic approach to liturgy and ministry has served him well in his ecumenical efforts and writings, especially in his *Theology, Church, and Ministry* (1986) and *Mary for All Christians* (1991). He has lectured widely to both Roman Catholic and Protestant audiences, lay and professional. His career-long interest in the religious "other" and in inter-religious dialogue issued in *Mediators between Human and Divine: From Moses to Muhammad* (1996) presents a thoughtful, sensitive, and ungrudging approach to religious diversity. Eschewing both exclusivism and thoroughgoing relativism, he opts for a position of "openness and commitment," which honors the need to both give to and receive from other religious positions.

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J. Harley Chapman

MADISON, JAMES (1751–1836)

In his life's work, Madison fused together the three dominant philosophies of post-revolutionary, antebellum America: Lockean liberalism; classical republicanism; and Christian Protestantism. Born on 16 March 1751 on Belle Grove Plantation near Port Conway, Virginia, Madison went to the College of New Jersey at Princeton (now Princeton University), followed by a year of postgraduate work in Hebrew and political philosophy. At Princeton, Madison spent his last two years under the tutelage of college president and moral philosopher John Witherspoon, a Scottish Presbyterian Calvinist minister, whose ideas about the depravity of human nature and the need for divided government likely influenced Madison's later political thought.

Madison served in the Virginia state legislature from 1776 to 1779 and helped draft

the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. He was a delegate to the Continental Congress during 1780–83, and then served as a member of the Virginia House of Delegates from 1784 to 1786. During this period he composed his *Memorial and Remonstrance* in 1785 to defeat a proposal for a tax to support teachers of religion. While he subscribed to Locke's idea that a legitimate government had a duty to protect the peoples' rights to life, liberty, and property, he was more skeptical of the French Jacobins' call for revolution in the name of liberty, equality and fraternity. Madison assisted with enabling the compromise with anti-federalists that brought about the Constitution's ratification. As a leader in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1789 to 1797, he aided President George Washington in assembling and organizing America's first federal government. Madison is known as the "Father of the Bill of Rights" for his role in composing the first ten amendments, the Bill of Rights, that protect civil liberties.

Though an early ally of Washington, John Adams, and Hamilton, all champions of strengthening the federal government's powers, Madison later broke with their ranks. He joined Thomas Jefferson in the formation of the Republican Party, later called the Democratic-Republican Party, to offer an alternative to the Federalists' vision of a strong central government. This alternative was republicanism, the view that the legitimacy of federal power derives from the consent of the people, and thus depends on a compact between the federal government and the states. During Jefferson's two terms as U.S. President, Madison served as Secretary of State from 1801 to 1809, overseeing both the successful Louisiana Purchase and the unsuccessful Embargo Act of 1807. During his own tenure as President (1809–1817) he was initially beset by numerous problems (a series of defeats at the start of the War of

1812, a divided cabinet, and an obstructionist Congress), but he eventually saved the reputation of his presidency by championing many of the same federalist reforms he had initially opposed on republican grounds, such as a national bank, a standing army and navy, federal financing for the construction of road and canals, and a tariff-based taxation system. Madison spent his later years living at Montpelier, his plantation home in Orange County. He edited his personal papers for posterity, served as rector of the University of Virginia Board of Visitors from 1826 to 1834, and participated in the convention of 1829 to revise Virginia's state constitution. Madison died at Montpelier on 28 June 1836, the last of the Founding Fathers to die.

Perhaps Madison's most impressive political, as well as philosophical, accomplishment was to draft the Bill of Rights, which helped to forge the compromise between federalists and anti-federalists necessary for ratifying the Constitution. In order to persuade the states to ratify the Constitution, Madison shared with John Jay and Alexander Hamilton the task of writing a series of pseudonymously authored essays, totaling eighty-five articles mostly published in New York City newspapers, during 1787 and 1788. Later scholarship generally agrees that Madison composed twenty-six essays: numbers 10, 14, 37–58, and 62–63.

In Federalist #39, Madison asks and answers the question: What is the nature of a republic? In Madison's words, a republic is "a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior." It is a representative form of government, since citizens are (at least indirectly, if not directly) self-governing, for "no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people." In Federalist #39, Madison also discusses the

relationship between the concepts of federalism and nationalism. He borrows the term ‘federal’ from the anti-Federalists, conceding that each state is sovereign prior to its decision to give up certain liberties “to be bound by its voluntary act” to the union. Thus, “the new Constitution will, if established, be a federal and not a national constitution,” a kind of a Lockean social contract between the states.

In Federalist #10, Madison explains the problem of factions, namely, that the development of groups with shared interests (advocates or interest groups) is inevitable and dangerous to republican government. If we try to vanquish factions, then we will in turn destroy the liberty upon which their existence and activities are founded. Responding to the anti-Federalists, Madison summoned the specter of majority tyranny, warning that in such a small republic large factions would form that may extinguish individual liberty. He argues that a large and diverse republic will stop the formation of a majority faction; if small groups cannot communicate over long distances and coordinate effectively, the threat will be negated and liberty will be preserved.

In Federalist #51, Madison addresses the relationship between government and human nature? Government, he asserts, is necessary because humans are not “angels,” but can be selfish, ignorant, vengeful, harmful to other humans, so that “you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” Madison’s belief that human nature is fundamentally flawed and depraved can be traced to his upbringing and education in the Calvinist faith. This belief also becomes Madison’s justification for a bicameral legislature. The legislative must be divided so that it is less powerful and dangerous to the other branches. Madison believed that Congress, especially the Senate, would include among its members many “Enlightened Statesmen” who would

“refine and enlarge” public opinion by filtering out the selfishness and ignorance of the masses.

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Shane Ralston

MAHAN, ASA (1799–1889)

Asa Mahan was born on 9 November 1799 in Vernon, New York. The New Light and New Divinity revivalism of this period was undergoing a shift toward softer varieties

of Calvinism that readily accommodated a greater emphasis on emotions and on freedom of the will as focal points of conversion. Mahan immersed himself in this ethos of revivalism at every opportunity, abandoning accustomed notions of limited atonement and “natural inability” in favor of the more optimistic New Divinity theologies of Nathaniel Emmons and Nathaniel Taylor.

Mahan began to formally define his voluntarist position and the rudiments of an intuitionist “common sense” realism while he studied theology at Hamilton College in Clinton, New York. Heated debates between various rival schools of moderate Calvinism provided additional impetus to theological and philosophical reflection at Andover Theological Seminary, where he began graduate studies in 1824 upon his graduation from Hamilton. Mahan’s recollections of Andover were not happy ones: “We solved our problems of theology as we had done those of geometry, when in College, and with no more seriousness or reverence in the one case than in the other” (1882, 154). What preserved his religious enthusiasm and his curiosity regarding the nature of the human will was his ongoing participation in revivals and his growing concern about slavery. He married Mary H. Dix in 1828 and was ordained pastor of the Congregational Church at Pittsford, New York, in 1829. A few years later he was called to the Sixth Presbyterian Church of Cincinnati, Ohio, where his involvement in Lane Theological Seminary afforded new opportunities to immerse himself in the arena of education.

As a trustee at Lane, Mahan encountered a volatile community of student abolitionists, led by Theodore Weld, and a more conservative administration, led by President Lyman Beecher and board of trustees that tried to limit anti-slavery activism on campus. Sympathetic towards Weld and the “Lane Rebels,” Mahan joined a mass departure of

students for recently founded Oberlin College. He was elected the first President of the institution in 1835, joined by famed revivalist, Charles G. Finney, who became the professor of theology. Mahan immediately began his teaching duties as Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, and he published on a wide range of theological and philosophical subjects. Mahan led Oberlin until 1850.

Mahan's most notable scholarly achievement during his Oberlin presidency was the publication of a widely acclaimed collegiate textbook entitled *Science of Moral Philosophy* (1848). From the Scottish realism of Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart, Mahan assumed a primal correlation between the "known condition and wants of man" and divine revelation in the natural world and in Scripture. When confronted with the varied evidences of the moral law, the mind discovered through intuition the existence of the good as well as a sense of obligation to will that good. This sense was not just a matter of duty, but a more fundamental urge to love and serve the divine author of the moral law. Mahan sharply differentiated his version of "rightarian" moralism from Kant's categorical imperative by emphasizing the grounding of moral obligation in "the intrinsic character of the end itself," which was God. With Immanuel Kant, he stressed that intuition was a universal moral sense. But with the Scottish moralists and their American counterparts (including Francis Hutcheson and Francis Wayland), he associated the intuitions with an innate religious consciousness. A self-originating freedom of the will was central to the operating of this consciousness, with resulting decisions and actions either in obedience or disobedience to God.

Mahan translated his ethical brand of common sense philosophy from a "religion of maxims and resolutions" into a "religion of love" that was indebted as much to Wesleyan and Arminian theology as it was to Scottish and

German strands of moral philosophy. Mahan therefore readily developed the theological implications of moral intuition in terms of the traditional holiness doctrine of "entire sanctification" or "Christian perfection." He defined perfection as the state reached when one's "internal capacities" were completely adapted to the intuited moral requirements apprehended in nature and reasoned from Scripture. Absolute moral perfection was never attainable, but successive stages of perfection could be reached in the moral faculty. At any point where one's moral intentions and actions accorded with God's revealed will, a degree of perfection was realized. As the likelihood of falling away from this harmony of wills diminished, it was possible to reach higher levels of habitual conformity between intellect (understanding), sensibilities (emotions), and will. Ultimately, this "higher order" attainment represented a victory over sin and a transformation into the very image of God.

Mahan's general commitment to Scottish moralism and realist philosophy continued throughout the remainder of his teaching and administrative careers at Cleveland University (President and Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, 1850–55) and Adrian College in Michigan (President, 1860–71). More subtle refinements in his theology and philosophy, especially concerning epistemology, are evident in an impressive two-volume work written during his final years of semi-retirement in England, entitled *A Critical History of Philosophy* (1883). Mahan died on 4 April 1889 in Eastbourne, England.

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Philip E. Harrold

MALCOLM, NORMAN ADRIAN (1911–1990)

Norman Malcolm was born on 11 June 1911
in Selden, Kansas. His undergraduate years
were at the University of Nebraska, where

O.K. Bousma was one of his teachers, and
he received his BA in 1933. He then went
to Harvard, earning the MA in 1938. The
most important philosophical influences
on him during his graduate years were G.E.
Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein, with whom
he studied on a fellowship at Cambridge
University in 1938–39. His Harvard PhD
was granted in 1940. He was an instructor
of philosophy at Princeton from 1940 to
1942 before joining the U.S. Navy. After the
war he returned to Princeton and then spent
another year in Cambridge during 1946–47 to
study with Moore and Wittgenstein. In 1947
he joined the Sage School of Philosophy at
Cornell. Malcolm became associate professor
in 1950, and full professor in 1955. In 1964
he was appointed Susan Linn Sage Professor
of Philosophy, and he chaired the department
from 1965 to 1970. He was a fellow at
the Center for Advanced Research in the
Behavioral Sciences in Stanford in 1968–69;
was President of the Eastern Division of
the American Philosophical Association in
1972–73; and joined the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences in 1975. Malcolm retired
from Cornell in 1978. During the last twelve
years of his life he lived in London, and was
appointed a visiting professor and fellow
at King's College London, where he gave a
seminar mainly devoted to the philosophy of
Wittgenstein. Malcolm died on 4 August 1990
in London, England.

Malcolm was one of the most influential and
important practitioners of ordinary language
philosophy in the United States. He is also
well known for his contributions to the study
of Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings, including
a memoir of him. Malcolm also made notable
contributions to the philosophy of mind and
to the problem of free will, in addition to a
number of other significant articles in the
history of philosophy, epistemology and the
philosophy of religion.

For Malcolm, the importance of studying the use of ordinary language came from Wittgenstein's and Moore's view that many philosophical problems and puzzles could often be put to rest or dissolved with proper attention to the way in which certain words like knowledge or thought were used outside of the context of philosophical discussion and argumentation. Given a sufficiently clear picture of how words are used in ordinary contexts, many supposed that philosophical problems would be revealed as by-products of a systematic misuse of language by philosophers. On this view, a good many philosophical problems were generated by an excessively narrow view of the different senses of words. Attention to the full range of a word's senses would reveal a misuse of language to be at the root of a perceived philosophical difficulty, for a large number of cases.

Malcolm's investigations of ordinary language often yielded interesting and surprising results. In his article "Thoughtless Brutes" (in *Memory and Mind*) he contended that only of a creature that had language could we say that it had thoughts and consciousness. In contrast to other philosophers on this matter, Malcolm did not mean that languageless creatures did not have feelings and perceptions. On the contrary, Malcolm held that there was a large part of human and animal life that overlapped and that it was only the belief that all feelings and perceptions ought to be understood in propositional terms that kept philosophers from seeing this similarity. Nonetheless, there is another sense in which creatures without language could not be said to be capable of fully *propositional* thought since it was only through the possession and use of language that a creature could form sentences, the vehicle of propositional content.

The role of language in the study of the mind shaped several of his other contributions.

In his first and most notorious book *Dreaming* (1959), he argued for the thesis that talk of sleeping subjects being in certain characteristic mental states was a confusion. Specifically, the problem that Malcolm was most concerned with involved the idea that dreams are mental occurrences that happen to their subjects while they are asleep and unconscious. Malcolm argued that it made no sense to say that there could be mental occurrences that happen to a subject who could not be aware of them. With that in mind, one could not sensibly say that a given description of a dream was the report of a sequence of inner events within the sleeping subject's mind. In the absence of consciousness, there simply is nothing to report in that regard. Rather, careful attention to the language in which dreams are described reveals that dreams are not occurrences at all. Rather, dream reports ought to be viewed as manifestations or dispositions to say certain things upon waking. Malcolm's views about dreaming are probably best known as extreme illustrations of philosophical versions of behaviorism and are not now regarded as serious theories of mental life or of dreaming.

Other than his work in the philosophy of mind, perhaps Malcolm's most well-known argument comes from his 1968 discussion of free will in his essay "The Inconceivability of Mechanism." Malcolm argued that the view that all human actions are mechanically determinable was, in essence, incoherent and involved a kind of "pragmatic paradox." The very intention to assert or state the thesis of mechanism presupposes the legitimacy of intentional notions, such as purposive action and belief. Further, Malcolm argued that mentalistic and intentional notions are bound with normative considerations. Malcolm contended that one could not eliminate intentional notions in such a way as to make room for a mechanistic view of human behavior. The problem is particularly acute

when trying to assert that mechanism is true of a human being. The idea is that mechanism and reductionist explanations are self-undermining; the very attempt to state them exposes their falsity. For if one succeeded in asserting mechanism, then there would be at least one intentional action after all.

In philosophy of religion, Malcolm defended a version of Ockam's ontological argument on which the important idea was one of necessary existence. Malcolm noted that there are two different arguments that could be called the ontological argument. The usual version, according to which existence is a property, Malcolm found flawed. However, there is another argument that can be found in Anselm's work that is much stronger. On this argument, what is important is that if God exists, then his existing is necessary. Malcolm argued that a version of this argument was valid.

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Daniel Blair

MARCUS, RUTH CHARLOTTE BARCAN (1921–2012)

Ruth Barcan Marcus was born Ruth Charlotte Barcan on 2 August 1921 in New York City. She attended New York University, studying mathematical logic with J.C.C. McKinsey and graduating with a BA in philosophy and mathematics in 1941. She earned her MA in philosophy in 1942, and PhD in philosophy in 1946, from Yale University. Her doctoral dissertation, supervised by Frederick B. Fitch, introduced predicates and quantifiers into systems of C.I. Lewis's propositional modal logic. Three articles in the *Journal of Symbolic Logic* in 1946 and 1947 – published under the name Ruth C. Barcan before her marriage – established the foundations of quantified modal logic (QML). Following a

postdoctoral fellowship taken at the University of Chicago, during which she participated in Rudolf Carnap's seminar, she remained in the Chicago area, teaching as a visiting professor of philosophy at Northwestern University (and raising four children), as attention to her published writings grew. Particularly important was "Modalities and Intensional Languages," which defended quantified modal logic against then-popular objections proposed by W.V. Quine to its legitimacy and intelligibility. First published in 1961, the paper was presented at a famous February 1962 symposium of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science that included a formal response by Quine as well as subsequently published discussion by Marcus, Quine, Dagfinn Føllesdal, and Saul Kripke.

Marcus was a professor of philosophy at Roosevelt College in Chicago from 1957 to 1963. In 1964 Marcus became the first head of the philosophy department at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle (now the University of Illinois at Chicago), building it in a period of six years from a faculty of two to a nationally prominent faculty of twenty. After three years at Northwestern University from 1970 to 1973, she went to Yale in 1973 to become Reuben Post Halleck Professor of Philosophy, a position she held until her retirement in 1992. In addition, she has held fellowships from the National Science Foundation (1963–64); the Rockefeller Foundation (1973, 1990); the Stanford University Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences (1979); the University of Edinburgh Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities (1983); Wolfson College of Oxford University (1985, 1986); Clare Hall of Cambridge University (1988); and the National Humanities Center (1992–93). A collection of many of her most important articles, *Modalities: Philosophical*

Essays, appeared in 1993. After 1994 she was a visiting distinguished professor at the University of California at Irvine, as well as a senior research scholar at Yale. Marcus died on 19 February 2012 in New Haven, Connecticut.

Marcus was President of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association (1975–76); Chair of the U.S. National Committee of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science (1977–79); Chair of the American Philosophical Association Board of Officers (1977–83); President of the Association for Symbolic Logic (1983–86); President of the Institut International de Philosophie (1989–92); and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1977).

Modal logic is the logic of the modes, such as necessity and possibility, of a proposition's truth or falsity. While C.I. Lewis (1912, 1932) had developed a series of five axiomatized systems (S1–S5) of modal logic utilizing sentential operators of necessity, possibility, and "strict" (necessary) implication, Marcus was the first to develop modal systems incorporating predicates, relations (including identity), and quantifiers. In doing so, she raised – and in many cases helped ultimately to settle – important issues in the philosophy of language and metaphysics. In her later work, she also made important contributions to the understanding of the consistency of moral codes (with their "deontic" modalities of obligation and permission) and the nature of belief.

One important element of QML as developed by Marcus (1947) is the Necessity of Identity principle, holding that all identities are necessary is an immediate consequence of the necessity of statements of self-identity. It seemed paradoxical to many that a true identity statement such as "Cicero is Tully" should be necessary. It seems paradoxical partly because

such names were widely regarded as having different descriptive contents as their meanings, and partly because necessity was often not distinguished from logical truth (truth in virtue of logical form), analyticity (truth in virtue of meaning alone), and a priority (knowability without empirical evidence). Marcus defended the necessity of such identities by arguing that names are purely referential “tags” that designate their objects directly, without any descriptive content that could differ among different names. This response initiated the “direct” theory of reference to which Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan later added causal accounts of *how* directly referring names can preserve their reference over time. The 1990s saw a historical controversy over the extent to which the leading elements of Kripke’s theory of reference and related doctrines were derived from Marcus (see Fetzer and Humphreys 1998). Following Kripke’s careful distinction of necessity from logical truth, analyticity, and a priority (Kripke 1972), it is now widely accepted that all true statements of identity are necessary.

An objection made by Quine to QML was that it carried with it an objectionable commitment to *essentialism*, the view that objects have some of their properties necessarily and others only contingently (Quine 1960). Marcus noted in response that, while quantified modal logic allows the formulation and hence intelligibility of sentences asserting that an object possesses a property necessarily, there are (as demonstrated in Parson 1969) systems of QML consistent with the falsehood of all such sentences except those attributing necessary possession of “logical” attributes such as self-identity (which are not plausibly regarded as “essentialist” in the Aristotelian tradition of essential properties). Furthermore, she argued, statements attributing to an individual membership in a “natural kind,” such as “*h* is

a horse,” are very plausibly and commonly regarded as necessary and essential. The contradictory conclusion about rationality and two-leggedness, she showed, can be avoided by drawing a scope distinction (rather as in the case of 9 and “the number of planets”) between two interpretations of the initial premises. It is now widely agreed that QML is not committed to essentialism in any objectionable way.

In addition to the Necessity of Identity, Marcus adopted, in her original development of QML, an axiom that soon came to be known as the *Barcan Formula*: $\Diamond(\exists x)\alpha \Rightarrow (\exists x)\Diamond\alpha$ [where ‘ $\Diamond$ ’ is the possibility operator, ‘ $\exists x$ ’ is an existential quantifier, ‘ α ’ represents any well-formed formula, and ‘ $\Rightarrow$ ’ is the operator of strict implication].

She also proved the converse: $(\exists x)\Diamond\alpha \Rightarrow \Diamond(\exists x)\alpha$. But whereas the converse of the Barcan Formula only allows inferences from what is actual (namely, something possibly satisfying the condition specified by ‘ α ’) to a possibility (namely, that of something satisfying the condition specified by ‘ α ’), the Barcan Formula allows inferences from what is merely possible to what is actual – a seemingly more suspect procedure from an ontological or metaphysical point of view. Acceptance of the Barcan Formula seems to require that the domain of possible things not exceed the domain of actual things, for only then does the possibility of something satisfying a given condition guarantee that it is something *actual* that accounts for this possibility. Kripke’s approach to modal logic, in contrast, allows the domain of possible worlds to include non-actual objects and thereby permits rejection of the Barcan Formula. The correctness of the Barcan Formula remains controversial.

Marcus’s contribution to ethics lies primarily in her ground-breaking work on *moral dilemmas*: cases in which one has an obligation

to do *x* and an obligation to do *y*, even though it is not possible to do both *x* and *y* (1980). Using a standard account of consistency, she rejected the then-prevailing view that any moral code that does not rule out the possibility of moral dilemmas is thereby inconsistent. Marcus (1981, 1983, 1990) has also offered a comprehensive theory of the nature of belief, according to which: *x* believes that *S* just in case, under certain *agent-centered circumstances* including *x*'s desires and needs, as well as *external circumstances*, *x* is disposed to act as if *S*, that actual or non-actual state of affairs, obtains. This is a largely behavioral rather than language-centered conception of belief, for it treats belief as a relation between a believer and a state of affairs, where states of affairs are understood not as linguistic or quasi-linguistic entities, but rather as possible structures of actual objects, properties, and relations.

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Don Garrett

MARCUSE, HERBERT (1898–1979)

Herbert Marcuse was born on 19 July 1898 in Berlin, Germany. He was drafted into the army in 1916 during World War I. Marcuse turned to radical politics while quite young and was briefly active in the counter-cultural youth movement; during this period he also became a socialist. After demobilization, Marcuse attended Humboldt University in Berlin, but soon transferred to Freiburg University where he completed a PhD in literature in 1922 on the German artist-novel ("Der deutsche Kunstlerroman"). He then worked as a bookseller in Berlin before he returned to Freiburg to write his habilitation in philosophy under Martin Heidegger in 1929.

He began work at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research in 1932 but had to flee to Geneva, Switzerland, in 1933 when Hitler came to power. He then emigrated to the United States in 1934.

From 1934 to 1942 he taught at Columbia University where the Institute for Social Research was granted offices and an academic affiliation. He became a U.S. citizen in 1940. In December 1942 he began working at the Office of War Information as a senior analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and in March 1943 he began working for the Office of Strategic Services as an intelligence analyst on Nazi Germany. After the end of World War II, he continued working for the United States government in the State Department as head of the Central European Section of the Office of Intelligence Research from 1945 to 1951. Still an avowed Marxist, Marcuse became dissatisfied with America's Cold War politics and returned to the academy. He taught political theory at Columbia University in 1952–53, and at Harvard University in 1954–55. He was professor in political science at Brandeis University in Massachusetts from 1954 to 1965. He then taught in the philosophy department at the University of California at San Diego from 1965 until he retired in 1976. He died on 29 July 1979 in Starnberg, Germany.

Marcuse was one of the most celebrated members of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. The Institute was the American version in exile of the famous Frankfurt School, a radical think tank which, after Hitler's rise to power in Germany, argued for a "critical theory of society" that transcended traditional Marxism and provided the basis for a new anti-authoritarian radicalism. Only Theodor Adorno and Erich Fromm among Marcuse's Frankfurt School colleagues have won comparable renown.

Marcuse believed in the necessity of a life-changing revolution, yet remained acutely

aware that most real-world political forces (including socialist parties and trade unions) were gripped by a disabling conformism. In every phase of Marcuse's career, the tension between these tendencies occupied a central place in his thinking. During the period of SPD rule culminating in the Nazi victory of 1933, Marcuse worked to reconcile the notion of revolution with the unhappy realities of proletarian "reification" (as posited by the heterodox Marxist philosopher Georg Lukács) and what Marcuse's Freiburg University mentor Martin Heidegger called "thrown," unfree, heteronomous existence. After Hitler's ascent, with reification more visible and revolution less credible than ever before, Marcuse joined the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research, led by Max Horkheimer, whose work on class consciousness and psychoanalysis (with Fromm) had spurred a sensibility attuned equally to revolution and counter-revolution.

From 1933 to 1941, while working for the Institute in exile (primarily at Columbia University), Marcuse wrote prolifically for Institute publications, probing totalitarianism, liberalism, culture and ethics from the vantage point of a blend of theories unique to the Frankfurt School: Karl Marx on alienation, Max Weber on authority, and Sigmund Freud on sadomasochism. The writings of this period, while far from optimistic, remained cautiously and tenaciously hopeful about the realistic prospect of a revived socialism. But in the next period, under the pressure of war, the Institute circle (and worldview) began to fracture and darken.

In 1942, not long after publishing a major philosophical work titled *Reason and Revolution* on Hegel, Marx, and dialectics, Marcuse left the Institute to become a wartime intelligence analyst in the Office of Strategic Services, focusing mainly on Germany. Here Marcuse's outlook darkened even further. Influenced by an eclectic mix of popular

psychosocial theories (Frederick Taylor's theory of scientific management, behaviorist industrial psychology, and Jünger's theory of the mass *worker*), Marcuse's worldview underwent a subtle metamorphosis. Now, instead of seeing alienation and liberation as partial, intertwined tendencies, Marcuse began to portray both as absolute – and as absolute opposites. This became strikingly clear in the series of influential books that Marcuse wrote after leaving government for academia: *Eros and Civilization* (1955), *Soviet Marxism* (1958), *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), and *An Essay on Liberation* (1969). Carefully examined, these books reveal a dual structure: an opening half, arguing that alienation is total, the working class is totally coopted and controlled, unions and parties are "totally mobilized" for the status quo, capitalism is impregnable, and realistic hope for resistance is nearly nil, followed by a second half in which Marcuse insists, in jarringly different style, that a utopian future, including a "permanent revolution of nature and the senses," can be attained by an aesthetically and erotically non-repressive "Great Refusal." Some of these totalizing claims mutated slightly in Marcuse's later texts, written in the final decade of his life, after the New Left rose, flared, and exploded. But the core tension in his thinking remained clear to the end: an unblinkingly negative vision of a world portrayed as totally alienated, coupled with an absolute refusal to accept alienation. From this tension was born a surprisingly complex body of work.

At the time of his death in 1979, Marcuse was perhaps the most controversial philosopher in the world. He had risen from the shade of a government bureaucracy to a worldwide reputation as what *Time* magazine called "the guru of the New Left." Students and disciples such as Rudi Dutschke and Angela Davis won international notoriety for their radicalism.

Marcuse was no less visible, vehemently protesting the Vietnam War while sketching his pessimistic yet prophetic vision. Subsequently, the luster of his reputation has dimmed considerably. But Marcuse is still vividly remembered as an archetype, and paragon, of intellectual radicalism and engagement.

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David N. Smith

MARGOLIS, JOSEPH ZALMAN (1924–)

Joseph Margolis was born on 16 May 1924 in Newark, New Jersey. He received his MA in philosophy in 1950, followed by his PhD

in philosophy in 1953, both from Columbia. His dissertation was titled “The Art of Freedom: An Essay in Ethical Theory.” Margolis taught philosophy at numerous institutions including Long Island University (1947–1956), the University of South Carolina (1956–1958), the University of Cincinnati (1960–1964), and the University of Western Ontario (1965–1967). Since 1968, he has been a professor of philosophy at Temple University, where he has held the honorary title of Laura H. Carnell Professor of Philosophy since 1991. He has also been visiting professor at Northwestern University, the University of California at Berkeley, University of Toronto, and New York University. Margolis is a member of several national and international philosophical organizations, and served as President of the American Society for Aesthetics during 1987–1989. He also holds the title of Honorary Lifetime Member of the International Association of Aesthetics. He has served on the editorial boards of many journals including *American Philosophical Quarterly* and *The Monist*.

Margolis has made substantial contributions to many areas of philosophy including metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of history, aesthetics, and ethics. Margolis takes seriously Nietzsche’s proclamations upon the death of God and the sickness of “nihilism,” attempting to dwell in the conceptual space that lies between them. Perhaps the most fundamental unifying theme in Margolis’s philosophical reflections is his defense of the doctrine of “the flux.” This signifies his basic alignment with the strain of Western philosophical thinking that emphasizes change as opposed to permanence, becoming as opposed to being, or, in terminology favored by Margolis, historicity as opposed to invariance. He argues that defense of the flux includes as constituent elements emphases on the importance of praxis, on

the historicity of human beings (including their cognitive capacities), and on the denial of cognitive transparency and privilege. The emphasis on praxis signifies that “theory, science, cognition itself are guided by the largely tacit, biologically grounded activities of human societies seeking to survive and reproduce their numbers, always in accord with the contingent pattern of life of particular cultures” (*Pragmatism without Foundations*, 1986, p. xviii).

Margolis holds that a genuine defense of the flux, including an emphasis on praxis, an emphasis on the historicity of human beings and of human thinking, and a rejection of cognitive transparency and privilege, is incompatible with all appeals to “privileged neutrality, objectivity, universality, apodicticity, apriority, or modal necessity” (1996, p. 7). He characterizes his denial of invariance as “a philosophical ‘bet,’ a pragmatic, negative conjecture to the effect that no such invariance *will be* successfully sustained” (1989, p. 187). The denial of invariance is not put forward as an invariant modally necessary thesis. By treating the denial of invariance as a bet, Margolis aims to formulate his position so that it avoids traditional self-referential paradoxes.

Margolis’s view is without foundations in the sense that in addition to the denials of transparency, privilege, and modal invariance, it also includes the endorsement of what we might call an internal vindication of distributed truth-claims. In other words, distributed truth-claims, i.e., particular truth-claims, put forth within a particular domain of inquiry, are justified to the best of our lights and by appeal to principles, methods, theories, etc. that are internal to that form of inquiry. There is no capacity to step outside of first-order inquiry in order to grasp a neutral set of rules, principles, frameworks, etc. that can then be used to assess the adequacy of our

first-order inquiry. Second-order legitimated inquiry, while distinct from first-order inquiry, is bound by the same constraints imposed on all forms of inquiry – namely, constraints that flow from the flux, the historicity of human beings, and the rest. Though he views these levels of inquiry as indissolubly linked (there being no first-order inquiry without second-order reflection on and attempts to legitimate first-order inquiry), there is no cognitive privilege to be had at either level.

Margolis urges that any sustained and plausible philosophical reflection concerning our cognitive relation to reality reveals an indissoluble combination of realist and idealist elements. The great mistake of those who defend the traditional correspondence theory of truth, for example, consists in their inability to recognize the unavoidability of this symbiosis. Rigorous objective inquiry does not require modal invariance, whether that modal invariance is grounded in the nature of reality (the prejudice of the ancients) or in the nature of reason (the prejudice of the moderns). It is the maintenance of canonical bivalent values that quickly leads to the generation of self-referential paradoxes and contradictions, historically thought to infect all forms of relativism. Robust relativism, on the contrary, avoids these formal criticisms by eliminating the canonical bivalent values, at least in certain domains of inquiry. Robust relativism does not entail the rejection of bivalence and excluded middle across *all* domains; rather, it simply requires that we remain open to the possibility of their rejection within specific domains of inquiry. It holds that in certain domains of inquiry (such as interpretations of artworks, human history, high-order theories in physics and metaphysics), our best understanding of and truth-claims about a given sector of reality may well require the rejection of bivalence and the law of excluded middle.

Margolis argues that robust relativism is particularly well suited for the realm of human culture – i.e., our understanding of human selves and, by extension, cultural phenomena like artworks. He sharply distinguishes between cultural entities and physical entities. The former are as real as the latter, but “possess inherently distinctive structures – ‘Intentional’ or culturally significant, intrinsically interpretable structures – that mere physical entities simply lack” (*Selves and Other Texts*, 2001, p. 35). Under the rubric of “intentional structures” (or “intentional properties”), he includes “the linguistically and lingually meaningful, the representational, the expressive, the institutionally purposive or rulelike, the intentional and intensional as manifestations of cultural formation, the symbolic, the semiotic, the rhetorical, the stylistic, the traditional, the historical, the narrative” (p. 160). Margolis argues that sustained efforts within contemporary analytic philosophy to reduce intentional structures to non-intentional structures or to eliminate intentional structures from our understanding of cultural entities are misguided and that the arguments provided on behalf of such efforts are unpersuasive. Margolis rejects all forms of reductive and eliminative physicalism.

The reality of cultural entities requires that we resist and abandon one of the strongest prejudices within the philosophy of science – the “unity of the sciences” program. Not only should we abandon the prejudice that our inquiries into physical nature supply us with the paradigm of objective inquiry, we also should remind ourselves that our inquiries into physical nature are, themselves, culturally secured inquiries. Such inquiries get their meaning by their standing within the larger cultural context.

Margolis proposes several general yet substantive moral principles for our

consideration. He terms one principle “summum malum.” This principle calls attention to the fact that human beings are “most affected by the most extreme and prolonged suffering of whole populations or relatively large groups, under circumstances that they cannot control or much mitigate... for instance, those having to do with disease, hunger, starvation...enslavement, concentration camps, annihilation, the disorganization of family life, and the like” (1996, p. 215). Margolis suggests that we attempt to construct a morality around such general principles. Legitimization of such principles must be internal to human moral thinking itself. Furthermore, the fact that multiple moralities could be constructed upon the basis of such principles and that each could be reasonable or appropriate is something we should expect, not fear. The availability of a variety of plausible fundamental principles and moralities is what we are likely to find when we attempt to dwell between invariance and nihilism.

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Robert E. Money, Jr.

MARSH, JAMES (1794–1842)

The University of Vermont in Burlington, still a fledgling institution in 1826, was more than a day's journey from the intellectual centers of early America. Nevertheless, at least for a few years, the capacious intellect of James Marsh made Burlington synonymous with new ways of thinking while he served as president and professor at the University of Vermont. Marsh adapted ideas from British and German romantic idealism to craft a new philosophy that he hoped would restore vitality to orthodox Reformed Christian theology in the United States, which he believed was stuck in the "sensuous thralldom" of a

stale empiricism. This "Marsh philosophy" supported and linked religious experience, educational endeavors, and social reform.

Marsh was born on 19 July 1794 at Hartford, Vermont. He enrolled in 1813 at Dartmouth College in nearby Hanover, New Hampshire. There he experienced a religious conversion in 1815, and subsequently embarked on an attempt to understand philosophically his religious, moral, and aesthetic feelings. Marsh found what he deemed the "empiricist" texts in the Dartmouth curriculum – John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Jonathan Edwards's *Freedom of the Will*, Bishop Butler's *Analogy of Religion*, and Dugald Stewart's *Philosophy of the Human Mind* – unsatisfactory for his quest. After one year of coursework at Andover Theological Seminary in Massachusetts following his 1817 graduation with the BA degree from Dartmouth, Marsh returned to Hanover for a two-year position as a tutor. During his tutorship, Marsh – stimulated by his wide reading in literature, including Byron and Wordsworth – began to question the philosophy of Locke and the Scottish common sense school that his Dartmouth teachers had instilled in him. Marsh returned in 1820 to Andover, then the leading theological institution in the United States, for three more years. He studied with the Professor of Sacred Literature, Moses Stuart, who was one of the few to encourage Marsh's reading in German scholarship. Marsh was possibly the first American to read Immanuel Kant in German, though he did so with difficulty. He also studied extensively the work of Johann Gottfried von Herder, Kant's student turned foe, and other German writers from the romantic idealist milieu, including Schiller, Schelling, and the Schlegels. After graduating from Andover in 1823, Marsh found a job teaching languages at Hampden-Sydney College in Virginia and teaching Hebrew

at the adjoining (Presbyterian) Theological Seminary of the Synod of Virginia in Prince Edward. The University of Vermont elected Marsh as its President in October 1826, and returning from Virginia to New England's deepening religious quagmire re-ignited Marsh's antipathy toward the empirical philosophy that buttressed the various schools of Congregational theology.

Marsh must be understood in the context of the early nineteenth-century New England theological landscape, especially the splintered world of Congregational thought. New England Congregationalism experienced growing fissures during this period. The recently formalized Unitarian denomination aroused widespread fear; the flames of the Second Great Awakening continued their challenge of authority and orthodoxy as they spread; and Jonathan Edwards's heirs continued to attack each other. Marsh's dissatisfaction with the prevailing modes of thinking in New England Congregationalism, particularly what he perceived as their inability to explain religious experience and moral obligation, led to his philosophical and educational innovations. Marsh blamed empiricism for the theological chaos and became determined to publish something that showed a better way, drawing on the romantic and idealist philosophical currents from Britain and Germany that he had been studying. Marsh established his scholarly reputation while serving as the University of Vermont's President from 1826 to 1833, and then as Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy from 1833 until his death. Marsh died on 3 July 1842 in Burlington after a long battle with tuberculosis.

Marsh announced his views in a long "Preliminary Essay" to his 1829 American edition of the 1825 work *Aids to Reflection* by the British romantic Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who recognized Marsh as his foremost American interpreter. The "Preliminary Essay"

was Marsh's major philosophical work and aimed to articulate a new philosophy to replace empiricism's "sensuous thralldom" as the basis for American theology. Marsh believed this task was crucial, because he was "fully convinced, that we can have no right views of theology, till we have right views of the human mind." Marsh criticized those who claimed to interpret texts and do theology free from philosophizing and metaphysics; he probably aimed this criticism most directly at the commonsense realism then widespread in American Protestantism. Marsh believed his philosophy supported religious feeling and moral self-determination, which empirical philosophy failed to do.

The Marsh philosophy, sometimes known as the "Burlington philosophy" or "Vermont transcendentalism," asserted a closely linked metaphysics and epistemology which he thought adequately explained human experience. It centered on sharp ontological dualisms: nature and spirit as distinct realms of reality; Understanding and Reason as distinct mental powers which respectively operated in natural and spiritual reality; form and spirit as distinct components of human beings and of their cultural products, such as literature. According to Marsh, the human mind – particularly the faculty of Reason, which was the seat of both religious experience and moral decision-making – contained all the truth of Christianity in latent form, although it needed proper stimulation to reach full expression. His philosophy emphasized a theory of correlatives and tended toward teleological and hierarchical thinking.

Marsh's desire to provide a sound philosophical basis for his feelings of religious experience and moral obligation led him to prescribe the philological study of English literature, and to institutionalize these studies in the University of Vermont at a time when such organized studies were unknown in American academia.

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Ethan Schrum

MATES, BENSON (1919–2009)

Benson Mates was born on 19 May 1919 in Portland, Oregon. He received his BA at the University of Oregon in 1941. During World War II he served as a cryptographer. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of California at Berkeley in 1948. Mates joined the philosophy department at Berkeley in 1948, rising to the rank of full professor in 1964, where he remained until his retirement. A gentle person, with a remarkable talent for funny anecdotes, Mates was regarded with affection and admiration by students. He was a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and was President of the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division in 1983–84. Mates died on 14 May 2009 in Berkeley, California.

A historian of philosophy, philosopher of language, and logician, Mates did groundbreaking work on logic in antiquity, and ancient skepticism, and he was an

internationally recognized Leibniz scholar. *Stoic Logic* (1953) remains one of the best works on the logic of the Old Stoa; its discussion of Diodorean implication inspired Arthur Prior's work on tense logic. "Synonymity" (1950) contributed an enduring puzzle to the philosophical literature on meaning and the propositional attitudes. Mates proposed synonymous expressions were everywhere intersubstitutable in a language including modal operators and propositional attitude verbs, since anything weaker takes words to be synonymous which intuitively are not. But Mates noted that clear cases of synonymy seem to fail the strengthened criterion in embedded attitude contexts, for intuitively we cannot substitute 'Hellenes' for the last occurrence of 'Greeks' in "Nobody doubts that whoever believes all Greeks are Greeks believes all Greeks are Greeks."

Mates's article "Analytic Sentences" (1951) is an important early response to W.V. Quine's criticism of analyticity in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" published in 1950. "On the Verification of Statements about Ordinary Language" (1958) sparked a famous debate with Stanley Cavell in "Must We Mean What We Say?" (1958) on the adequacy of armchair intuitions about meaning. Mates's classic logic text *Elementary Logic* (1965) introduced a novel model theory that does not rely on satisfaction, and is still widely used and admired. *Skeptical Essays* (1981) is devoted to the thesis that "[t]he principal traditional problems of philosophy are genuine intellectual knots: they are intelligible enough, but at the same time they are absolutely insoluble" (p. 3). This book treats semantical and set-theoretic paradoxes, the problem of freedom of the will, and the problem of the external world.

Mates's masterwork, *The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language* (1986), gives a nominalist reading of Leibniz's philosophy. *The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's*

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Kirk Ludwig

MATHER, COTTON (1663–1728)

Cotton Mather was America's first public intellectual, making a broad swath of learning available to the literate masses, and alerting them to important intellectual issues and trends. Mather was born on 12 February 1663 in Boston, named after his two grandfathers, Richard Mather and John Cotton, the two most revered divines of Puritan New England. His father Increase Mather carried this mantle for over sixty years as the minister at North Church in Boston, overseer and President at Harvard College, and as an important political figure. Mather received his early education from the preeminent schoolmaster in New England, Ezekiel Cheever. He entered Harvard College at age 11, the youngest ever to do so. Given his speech impediment, Mather seems to have gravitated toward natural philosophy, on the expectation that his future professional life might well be in medicine rather than divinity. He excelled as an undergraduate, graduating with the BA degree in 1678, and then he received the MA degree in 1681.

After graduation the 16-year-old minister began filling pulpits in the area. He impressed a number of churches; one of those was his father's North Church, which voted him to assist his father in 1680. In 1688 he treated Martha Goodwin for possession; he published his observations in *Memorable Providences,*

Relating to Witchcrafts and Possessions (1689). But while Mather believed in the reality of witchcraft and its demonic sources, he was (initially) a voice of restraint regarding the magistrates' response to the problem. He then defended the conduct of the Salem witch trials, and he published the notorious *Wonders of the Invisible World* (1692), which provided incendiary material on witchcraft and gave full vent to the concerns that underlay them.

In 1691 he began to advocate for a coalition of Dissenters through the proposed union of Congregationalists and Presbyterians. He preached against civil penalties for religious conscience. Though he still considered Anglicanism a threat to primitive Christianity, he promoted meetings of joined worship among Protestants. In 1716 he published the pamphlet, *The Stone Cut Out of the Mountain*, in which he proposed a new basis of unity among all Christians: belief in the Trinity, in the work and person of Christ, and love of neighbor. In 1718 he preached at the ordination service of Elisha Callender, a Baptist. In 1725 he published *Vital Christianity*, in which he embraced Quakers as a part of this fellowship.

Something of a celebrity for the *Magnalia Christi Americana* (1702), he was awarded an honorary Doctor of Divinity degree from the University of Glasgow in 1710. He began contributing materials to the Royal Society of London, for which he was made a Fellow in 1713. In 1721 the Society published his *Christian Philosopher*, the first book of general science by an American. He tried but failed to get his other great works published, most notably the "Biblia Americana," "Angel of Bethesda," and "Trip paradisus." He helped to place Yale College on firmer footing, acting as a link to benefactors such as Elihu Yale himself, as well as book agent Jeremiah Dummer. He was offered the position of rector at Yale after Timothy Cutler's defection to Anglicanism in 1722, though he declined it.

He died six years later, on 13 February 1728 in Boston, in a state of repose.

Mather's literary output was remarkable. With some 450 publications, he was the most widely published author in the colonial period. He published more works than all other New England ministers of the 17th century combined. And this doesn't include the many extensive treatises that remained unpublished at his death, such as the "Biblia Americana" and the "Triparadisus." His library was the largest in colonial America, one that even impressed European visitors. It had reached some 3,000 volumes before his fortieth year, and, after inheriting half of his father's library in 1723, probably contained more than 7,000 volumes. Taken in its totality, Mather's literary remains are the single most important source of our knowledge of early colonial intellectual and religious life.

After the turn of the century Mather became one of the leading public intellectuals on matters scientific, and especially medical. *The Christian Philosopher* (1721) was the first book of general science written in America. Mather's final major contribution to the medical field was his "Angel of Bethesda." Probably begun around 1711, and reaching some 300 pages, it was the first comprehensive medical text in America. Citing over 250 medical authorities, it offered advice to a popular audience on prevention, hygiene, and the treatment of specific diseases. Though much of it relied on dubious folk remedies, it also promoted the understanding of the germ theory, the psychosomatic nature of illness, due regard for mental and emotional illness, and the causes of stuttering, among many topics.

In 1710 he published *Bonifacius, An Essay upon the Good*, which provided a theoretical (theological) basis for moral concern, as well as specific advice to various professions and social classes on their proper conduct, an early call to the American ideal of civic mindedness.

It was broadly influential, and inspired the young Benjamin Franklin to satirize Mather in his "Silence Dogood" essays. Mather also wrote extensively on social ethics, concentrating his criticism on the abuse of power in the mistreatment of slaves, Native Americans, the poor, and the socially vulnerable. In 1693 Mather began two major works of historical investigation. The first of these, the *Magnalia Christi Americana*, was published in 1702 in London. It rehearses the founding and development of New England under the aegis of divine providence. Whatever the defects of the work, it has become a treasure trove of information about seventeenth-century Puritan New England, containing over 50 biographies, as well as vital information about political and religious developments.

Mather's second great project was the "Biblia Americana," an attempt to bring together excerpts of the best of contemporary scholarship and offer them to a wider public. In keeping with his generally progressive outlook, Mather offered his audience a liberalizing view of the coherence between biblical interpretation and modern knowledge. He brings what he knows of critical history, comparative literature, antiquity, geography, and science to bear on the text.

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Robert E. Brown

MAY, ROLLO REESE (1909–1994)

Rollo May was born as Reese May on 21 April 1909 in Ada, Ohio, and died on 22 October 1994 in Tiburon, California. May attended Oberlin College, where in 1930 he received a BA in English in addition to three minors: history, literature, and Greek. After earning his degree, May went to the American College at Salonika, Greece, from 1930 to 1933, where he taught English and attended several seminars

given by respected psychoanalyst Alfred Adler. This intellectually stimulating period in Greece apparently inspired May to pursue greater, more ambitious questions about man and his place in the world. In 1933, influenced by his religious upbringing and his psychological knowledge gleaned from his time in Greece, May returned to America, enrolling at New York City's Union Theological Seminary. While taking some time off to help his five siblings deal with their recently divorced parents, May returned to Michigan State College, where he counseled male students.

On his return to the Union Theological Seminary, the confluence of May's life events began to blossom and develop into his own original brand of thought, as he studied under the tutelage of the eminent Paul Tillich, whose work uniquely blended themes of existential philosophy, psychology, and theology. In 1938 May earned his BD degree. He preached for two years at a Congregational church in Verno, New Jersey, but left the ministry and began his struggle with tuberculosis. During this period May published his first two books, *The Art of Counseling: How to Gain and Give Mental Health* (1939) and *Springs of Creative Living: A Study of Human Nature and God* (1941).

May earned his PhD in psychology from Columbia University in 1949. His dissertation, published as *The Meaning of Anxiety* (1950), was well received and reflected the growing popularity of humanistic or client-centered psychology that would aid in dismantling the dominance of behavioral psychology. In 1948 May joined the faculty of the William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and Psychology in New York City, where his colleagues included Erich Fromm and Harry Stack Sullivan. He also was a psychology lecturer at the New School for Social Research from 1955 to 1976, and served as visiting professor at Harvard in 1964, Princeton in 1967, New York University in 1971, Yale in

1972, University of California, Santa Cruz in 1973, and Brooklyn College in 1974–75. May left teaching in 1976 and moved to California to resume his clinical practice, while maintaining several secondary capacities at the Saybrook Institute in San Francisco and the California School of Professional Psychology. In 1987 the Saybrook Institute opened the Rollo May center, a facility intended to promote research and publication in areas related to May's field of interests.

May's unique style of counseling fused existential philosophy and spirituality. During his first struggles with tuberculosis, May meditated upon the philosophy that he had continuously espoused: through courage and acceptance of the inevitable tragedies and hardships that human beings will face, personal freedom can be discovered. The importance of *courage* and being able to overcome the anxieties of life cannot be overemphasized in its importance to May's own philosophy, concepts that were markedly influenced by May's studies with Tillich and his insatiable reading of European existential philosophers such as Søren Kierkegaard. For May, the concept of courage was not meant to be the opposite of Kierkegaard's despair, but rather the ability to continue on, courageously and authentically, in the face of despair.

In 1958, May, along with Ernest Angel and Henri F. Ellenberger, edited *Existence*, a book which introduced America to existential psychology. This new brand of psychology had many parallels to certain aspects of humanism (the similarities being so strong that the two fields are often thought of as virtually synonymous) and phenomenology in that it examines the subjective experience of the individual's inner world. When dealing with the therapeutic approach, existentialism differs from other psychotherapies in that it does not focus primarily on early childhood experiences and the conflict

among unconscious drives and instincts, as that of the Freudian school of thought. And, unlike some Neo-Freudian therapies and behaviorism, existential therapy does not place its primary focus on environmental influences and conflicts. Instead, the existential approach attempts to promote self-fulfillment, creativity, and a personal, almost spiritual strengthen of the will, by heightening the client's level of awareness concerning the "givens" of existence that all human beings must face. These existential inevitabilities include the manner in which one develops his or her own unique ways of dealing with the ultimate concerns or anxieties caused by human existence such as isolation, choice, personal responsibility, ascribing meaning to one's life, death, etc.

By the late 1970s, May had become one of the most influential and important American psychologists of his time. Other psychiatrists, such as Viktor Frankl (best known for his book *Man's Search for Meaning*) were writing on similar themes. The central message of May's psychology remained the same: while hardships, cruel twists of fate, and anxiety are imbued in the life of all human beings, by fully accepting these existential conditions inherent in life, one can begin to find dignity, worth, and a power or courage that lies within all persons. By introducing the ideas of European existential philosophers into mainstream America, May added an important dimension to American psychotherapy and social work.

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Daniel Trippett

MAYHEW, JONATHAN (1720–1766)

Jonathan Mayhew was born on 8 October 1720 in Chilmark, Massachusetts, the son of Experience Mayhew, missionary to the Indians of Martha's Vineyard. He attended Harvard College on scholarship from 1740 to 1744, receiving the BA degree. Mayhew received a MA degree in divinity in 1747; Aberdeen University in Scotland awarded him an honorary Doctor of Divinity degree in 1750. He served as pastor of Boston's Congregationalist West Church from 1747 until his death. Mayhew became famous on both sides of the Atlantic as a proponent of Enlightenment theology (including Arianism), a champion of radical Whig political principles, and a defender of the civil and religious liberty of English Protestant dissenters and New England Congregationalists.

Mayhew's first book, *Seven Sermons* (1749), was his most important contribution to early American philosophy. Although each sermon in this collection purported to offer exegesis of Biblical passages, Mayhew's analysis of Scripture itself was minimal in this work; he argued in a more philosophic than theological vein, emphasizing reason and "natural religion" over faith and revealed religion. Rather than offering original arguments though, *Seven Sermons* popularized the philosophic and theological ideas of the English Enlightenment in mid-eighteenth century New England. Drawing upon John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, *Seven Sermons* took as its basic premise that truth "exists independently of our notions concerning it." Mayhew criticized both skeptics and fideists for treating truth as inaccessible to human reason. *Seven Sermons* challenged New England's Calvinist theology and argued in favor of English

rationalist theology, principally that of Samuel Clarke. Treating reason and benevolence as God's defining attributes, Mayhew rejected predestination and argued that God desires happiness for all his creatures. He also rejected the Calvinist doctrine of the total depravity of man, claiming that God creates all humans with the natural capacity to acquire and act upon moral and religious knowledge through reason and the moral sense (1749, 30–40).

Mayhew argued in *Seven Sermons* that individuals can and must think for themselves, following truth wherever it leads rather than deferring to the dogmas of religious authorities or conforming to the whims of the majority. He criticized Roman Catholicism, the Church of England, and orthodox Calvinism for requiring Christians to subordinate their own judgment to religious creeds. Having created humans with natural faculties sufficient to acquire moral and religious knowledge, Mayhew propounded, God endows humans with a "right and duty of private judgment," each individual's moral sanction to exercise those faculties and apply that knowledge in pursuit of his own happiness (and salvation). Insisting that civil government has no jurisdiction over religious belief, he wrote that those persons "who any ways discourage freedom and judgment in religious matters, are... incroachers upon the natural rights of mankind... because God has not only given us liberty to examine and judge for ourselves; but expressly required us to do it." In pursuing truth as his reason dictated, without concern for public opinion, Mayhew provoked controversy in 1755 with his second set of *Sermons*, in which he questioned the doctrine of the Trinity, to the horror of Calvinist divines like Jonathan Edwards (1749, 11, 46, 51–52, 59–60, 86).

Following the publication of *Seven Sermons*, Mayhew published several highly

influential and controversial sermons in the 1750s and 1760s on political subjects. His 1750 pamphlet, *A Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission and Non-Resistance to the Higher Powers*, affirmed the people's right to use force in defending life, liberty, property, and conscience against tyrannical rulers. The *Discourse* analyzed Paul's Epistle to the Romans (13:1–8) in light of Enlightenment rationalist theology, principally that of Benjamin Hoadly. Against this passage's traditional interpretation as enjoining Christians to offer non-resistance, or only "passive obedience," to tyrants, Mayhew's reading required Christians to disobey, and even forcibly resist, rulers who forfeit divine authority by using their power to invade the rights of their subjects. Challenging the Church of England's elevation of King Charles I to sainthood, the *Discourse* outraged high-church Episcopalians in New England by contending that Parliament had the right to resist, depose, and execute Charles I as a tyrant in 1649. Mayhew gave the Massachusetts Election Sermon in 1754, which further advanced natural rights, consensual government, and other political principles of John Locke and the English radical Whigs. Mayhew renewed his battle with New England Episcopalians with his 1763 *Observations on the Charter and Conduct of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts*. By attacking a plan to introduce bishops to America, this work provoked a transatlantic debate on religious establishments and the rights of Protestant dissenters (Mayhew 1750, 7–18, 24–28, 37–48).

By the eve of the Stamp Act Crisis, Mayhew was widely viewed by New England Congregationalists and English Protestant dissenters as a great champion of civil and religious liberty. In opposition to the Stamp Act, he gave a sermon on the nature of liberty on 25 August 1765 that some blamed for inciting a mob attack upon the home of Massachusetts

Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson. In his last published work, *The Snare Broken* (May 1766), Mayhew lauded Britain's repeal of the Stamp Act and reaffirmed his commitment to radical Whig principles. He died at the age of forty-five on 9 July 1766. John Adams extolled Mayhew as one of the five men who started the American Revolution. Historians consider him a theological forerunner of New England Unitarianism.

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J. Patrick Mullins

McCLENDON, JAMES WILLIAM, JR. (1924–2000)

James W. McClendon, Jr. was born on 6 March 1924 in Shreveport, Louisiana. He earned his BA in chemistry at the University of Texas and received a call to serve the church while there as well. He earned an MA in divinity degree at Southwestern Baptist Theological School in Fort Worth, Texas. He then went to Princeton Theological Seminary and earned an MA in theology, and returned to Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary to earn a ThD in theology in 1953. McClendon studied with Walter Thomas Connor, a Baptist theologian who did his own doctoral dissertation on "Pragmatism and Theology" under Edgar Young Mullins at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville, Kentucky. McClendon's other teachers during his study included William Estep and T.B. Maston. He also did post-doctoral work in philosophy at the University of California in Berkeley with J.L. Austin and John Searle, and at Oxford University with Ian Ramsey.

McClendon's first teaching position was at Golden Gate Baptist Theological Seminary in San Francisco, California, and taught there from 1954 to 1966. He was asked to leave after he supported a financial campaign to fund one of his students to go to Alabama to march with

Martin Luther King, Jr. McClendon was hired by the University of San Francisco for the next academic year. With this teaching position, McClendon was the first non-Catholic theologian to teach in a Catholic theology department in the United States. Although he was not yet a pacifist, he was asked to leave this school after three years of teaching for publicly speaking out against the war taking place in Southeast Asia. McClendon had visiting professorships at Baylor University, Goucher College, Stanford University, Temple University, the University of Notre Dame, and the University of Pennsylvania. He spent most of his teaching career, from 1971 to 1990, at the Church Divinity School of the Pacific, an Episcopal seminary part of the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California. In 1990, he went to Fuller Theological Seminary as a scholar-in-residence and remained there until his death on 30 October 2000 in Pasadena, California. McClendon was President of the National Association of Baptist Professors of Religion and edited its dissertation book series. Throughout his academic career, McClendon also served as an interim pastor for Baptist and Mennonite churches in California, Louisiana, and Texas.

McClendon called his biblical realism "biblicism": the Bible is absolutely authoritative and thus self-interpreting. His collection of essays, *Pacemakers of Christian Thought*, contains McClendon's interpretation of modern theologians such as Karl Barth, Rudolph Bultmann, Emil Brunner, E.J. Carnell, W.T. Connor, Austin Farrer, Reinhold Niebuhr, William Temple, and Paul Tillich. McClendon's next book was groundbreaking in theology as it started a new methodology in theology called "narrative theology." His *Biography as Theology: How Life Stories Can Remake Today's Theology* analyzes the lives of four people – Dag Hammarskjöld, Charles Edward Ives, Clarence Jordan, and

Martin Luther King, Jr. – giving a theological interpretation of those lives. McClendon claims that his *Biography as Theology* is a more focused and a more theological version of William James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*. It is more focused because it only discusses four figures, and it is more theological because the categories that McClendon uses are theological categories like ecclesiology rather than psychological categories like experience.

In 1975, McClendon and his co-author, philosopher James M. Smith, published *Understanding Religious Convictions*. McClendon and Smith use philosophers such as J.L. Austin, R.B. Braithwaite, William James, Ian Ramsey, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and William Zurdeeg to construct a speech-theory of religious language, to develop an account of truth that takes pluralism seriously, and to propose a science of convictions that is a theological version of James's science of religions. In 1994, another version of this book was published with the title *Convictions: Defusing Religious Relativism*. This book has the same goals as the first version but employs different philosophers. While retaining Austin, James, and Wittgenstein, McClendon and Smith replace Braithwaite, Ramsey, and Zurdeeg with Stanley Fish, Richard Rorty, and John Searle.

Although *Biography as Theology* and *Understanding Religious Convictions* seem like completely two different types of books, McClendon manages to bring them together in his systematic theology in three volumes: *Ethics* (1986), *Doctrine* (1994), and *Witness* (1999). In *Ethics*, McClendon constructs a three-stranded ethics – body ethics, social ethics, and resurrection ethics – that cannot be separated as it is like three strands of a single rope. In his social ethics, McClendon discusses the necessity of an ecclesial community to make sense of his three-stranded ethics.

Social ethics is only possible when the church is the church. For the church to be the church, the third strand is crucial because the church is the resurrected body of Christ for the world. Hence, in his resurrection ethics, McClendon discusses the relationship between Christ and the church. For the church would not be a community if Christ had not resurrected from the dead. Because he resurrected from the dead, he defeated death; life, not death, is the end of the story. The church is a witness to Christ's reign on earth – a reign that is “the peaceable kingdom,” which is a phrase McClendon borrows from Stanley Hauerwas. In *Ethics*, therefore, McClendon shows how baptist churches ought to *live* in order to have the baptist vision.

After showing the relationship between the Trinity and the church, McClendon shows the relationship between the church and the world. This relationship is called witness exactly because the church is a witness to how peace is only found in Christ as the body of Christ. Therefore, the church engages with the world with the hope that the world might come to be a part of the body of Christ as well. A “theology of witness” cannot be a private affair for both philosophical and theological reasons. McClendon uses his earlier works to argue, contra Alvin Plantinga, first that Christian language is not propositional but is “embedded in the *practices* that constitute Christian existence” (2000, p. 277) and second that Plantinga is a relativist. Plantinga's relativism is found in his “Advice to Christian Philosophers” – which argues that Christian philosophers have their own projects and topics. According to McClendon, “others will find that they, too, have topics and projects distinctively their own” (p. 277). McClendon is then led to ask: “can there...be such dialogues in a plural world in which the topics and projects of various groups are so plainly disparate?” (pp. 277–8) “Once Plantinga's

first step is taken,” answers McClendon, “philosophers who take it can no longer shrug aside the challenge of relativism. What can still be attempted is to *defuse* it” (p. 278).

McCleendon’s systematic theology developed from (1) his desire for his reading audience to be Baptist churches and academic philosophers and theologians; (2) his interest in taking modern theologians seriously, and his hope that Baptists would take modern theology seriously as well; and (3) his interest in philosophical theology, and his attempt to teach Baptists how to think philosophically about theological problems and theologically about philosophical problems. Because of the continuation throughout his career of these three principles, McClendon’s philosophical theology remained faithful to his baptist roots.

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Jacob Lynn Goodson

MCCOSH, JAMES (1811–1894)

James McCosh was born on 1 April 1811 in Patna, Scotland. At the age of thirteen he began studies at Glasgow University, and graduated in 1829. He subsequently pursued a Masters of Divinity at the University of Edinburgh, where he studied under the evangelical theologian, Thomas Chalmers, and the leading Scottish philosopher, Alexander Hamilton. McCosh graduated and entered the ministry in 1834. Maintaining a deep interest in philosophy while working as a parish preacher, he wrote *The Method of the Divine Government* (1850), arguing that evidence of God’s existence could be found in nature. In 1856 McCosh became professor of logic and metaphysics at Queen’s College in Belfast, Ireland. There he completed his most systematic philosophical work, *The Intuitions of the Mind, Inductively Investigated* (1860). He also engaged in a written debate with John Stuart Mill, stemming from the latter’s criticism of Hamilton.

In 1868 McCosh moved to the United States to become President of Princeton College. He wrote his highly regarded contribution to the history of philosophy, *The Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, Critical, From Hutcheson to Hamilton* (1875). He also dedicated considerable effort to reconciling evolutionary theory with theism in, for instance, *The Religious Aspect*

of Evolution (1887). After retiring in 1888, McCosh remained active and influential at Princeton. He died on 16 November 1894 in Princeton, New Jersey.

McCosh attempted to adjudicate between epistemological extremes, with the hope of forging a palatable synthesis. At one pole are the rationalists, such as Plato and Descartes. As McCosh and many others see it, these philosophers develop deductive philosophical systems which, though potentially consistent, can claim no epistemological grounding in the world. They build lofty edifices disconnected from experience. At the other pole are the empiricists, who aim to root philosophy in the experiential. Though welcoming this second approach, McCosh contends that the empiricists go astray, providing a mistaken analysis of experience. Their errors lead to an exaggerated skepticism and a depleted world view. John Locke, for instance, fails to include substance as something knowable. And David Hume does the same for the individual self.

Hume claims that experience provides no knowledge of a self, or the individual substance included in or persisting through the variety of experiences. Not only do we fail to “catch” ourselves “at any time without a perception,” we “never can observe anything but the perception.” No self amid the perception is experienced. Granting Hume’s first point, McCosh denies his second. Hume’s “very language contradicts itself. He talks of catching himself. What is this *self* that he catches?” Inherent to every perception is the recognition of a perceiving self: “we never observe a perception alone. We always observe self as perceiving” (1875, p. 128). The self is not some metaphysical, unknowable entity. It is directly experienced. With any impression we are conscious, not only that something is receiving the impression, but that the receptor is conscious of what it receives. Moreover, this perceiving self is

itself experienced not as a mere impression, but as an object, and one that is distinct from the not-self of experience. Relatedly, contra Hume, to remember is not merely to “reproduce” a set of sense impressions. Rather it includes the recognition that those particular impressions are *re-produced*, or that they were impressions experienced by the self in the past. Also included in memory is the recognition that the self that experienced the past impressions is continuous with that which now recalls them. Thus, in the activity of perception, we do have knowledge of a self; and it is knowledge of something that endures through its various impressions. In the act of perceiving, we also possess knowledge of a not-self. We know an external object in our experience of its qualities. Both the object and qualities are known in “the same concrete act” (1875, p. 129). Embodied in the very experience of an object is the knowledge that it is distinct from us. McCosh rejects Mill’s characterization of the external world as the possibility of future sense experiences. Though dedicated to pursuing Reid’s general program, McCosh considers Reid’s list of self-evident “principles of commonsense” far too liberal, hence significantly mistaken. Seeking to remedy Reid’s errors, McCosh attempts to accurately identify and classify the intuitions. In addition to the conviction that there is a self and a not-self, we have certain necessary convictions about space, time, and causation.

As is suggested by his distaste for post-Kantian romanticism and transcendentalism, McCosh denied the legitimacy of the rejection of reason and the appeal to the unknowable to save religion. Religion must ultimately find its footing in knowledge. And this knowledge cannot be only of appearances but of that which God has given us, the world. For McCosh, if the self is entirely distinct from the world, it is entirely distinct from God. The religious understanding begins then, not with faith

beyond the realm of appearances, but with realism. McCosh holds the legitimization of our belief in causation to be imperative here; it is this belief that bridges the philosophical and the religious. Our causal intuitions connect us to the world and, through the world, to God.

McCosh’s realism licenses empirical science as an essential component of religion’s foundation. Although an adequate understanding of the world requires both religion and science, we should criticize neither from the context of the other. He wrote, “When a scientific theory is brought before us, our first inquiry is not whether it is consistent with religion, but whether it is true” (1896, p. 233). And while, for McCosh, any genuine truth in science will ultimately be consistent with religion, we ought not be hasty in our judgment. These points bear significantly on debates about human origin. On this issue, as with epistemology and ontology, McCosh finds himself between extremes: conservative theism on one side, and novel developments in the evolutionary theory on the other. Seeking again to adjudicate between poles, he denies that evolutionary theory genuinely conflicts with theism. Being deeply interested in the theory of evolution – or “development” as he called it before Darwin’s *Origin of the Species* – he has no desire to uphold the doctrine of the special creation of individual species. Yet he also rejects the notion of chance selection, in favor of the teleological (without William Paley’s mechanical emphasis). In fact, he sees evolutionary theory as lending considerable credence to the “argument from Final Cause”: while nature does not reveal a purely progressive plan, God used “many and varied means” to bring humanity to where it is (1887, p. 30). Once settled at Princeton, McCosh pushed forcefully to have evolutionary theory included in the curriculum. Much of his philosophical work there was focused on the task of reconciling evolution and theism.

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Timothy D. Lyons

MCDOWELL, JOHN HENRY (1942–)

John McDowell was born on 7 March 1942 in the city of Boksburg in Union of South Africa, then a dominion of the British Empire. He received his BA from the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1962, and then attended New College of Oxford University on a Rhodes scholarship, earning the BA in 1965 and the terminal MA degree in philosophy in 1969. He taught at Oxford for two decades, as Fellow and Praelector in Philosophy in University College (1966–86) and as University Lecturer (C.U.F.) in Philosophy, Oxford University (1967–86). He then became professor of philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh in 1986, and was named University Professor in 1988. He retains his British

citizenship. McDowell is a fellow of the British Academy and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Among his many invited lectures, he has delivered the John Locke Lectures at Oxford University in 1991, and the Woodbridge Lectures at Columbia University in 1997. In 2010 he was a recipient of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Distinguished Achievement Award.

McDowell defends a minimal empiricism, prioritizing the answerability of our beliefs about worldly matters to our experienced encounters with the world. Empiricism has wavered between crediting unbidden experiences with the responsibility for causing beliefs so that reliable learning can occur, and crediting the learner's own control over reasoning among beliefs for ensuring reliable knowledge. If the most informational events (perceptions, for example) are caused (and hence beyond our responsibility), we lose responsibility for the beliefs we do hold, and it becomes meaningless to expect that people should believe this rather than that about the world. On the other hand, if a learner controls how experiences are informational in the first place, they may not supply any resistance to whatever a knower is already able to believe. Empiricism has often tried to preserve responsibility by taking the 'content' or 'quality' of items of experience to be quite different from the concepts or beliefs assigned to fitting well or badly to those items. That distinction, whether in the form of a sense data theory, a scheme-content dichotomy, a reason-cause dichotomy, an intellect-senses division, and so on, only reiterates the core problem, according to McDowell.

Following Wittgensteinian themes and Wilfrid Sellars's repudiation of the Myth of the Given, McDowell's *Mind and World* (1994) urges that what is sensed cannot be entirely independent from conceptualization in the first place; our (natural) capacity

to infuse moments of experience with conceptual meaning readies them for further roles in beliefs and inferences. This means that the events of the world as known aren't aloof from the conceptual realm, and that the way the world participates in what can be conceptualized. For example, it isn't the case that a veridical and a deceptive observation must have an identical intrinsic content that prevents reasoning from telling them apart. (Admitting such pure content is the route back into Cartesian internalism and skepticism.) McDowell's position joins other anti-skeptical and externalist views of meaningful experiences and thoughts about them, encouraged by Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson and fostered by Hilary Putnam, for example.

The essays collected in *Mind, Value, and Reality* (1998) and *Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality* (1998) pursue these themes across philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and knowledge, action theory, value theory, and ethics. Unburdened by a forced dichotomy between what is objectively real and what human cognition grasps, McDowell shows how the observable properties and preferable values that we objectively discuss and pursue are just as real as any scientifically confirmed entities. As a pluralistic naturalist, our "second nature" (as McDowell had phrased it in his earlier writings) as intelligent explorers of the world doesn't mean that experience must be torn between being either entirely natural or entirely normative. This is true of moral experience had by people of sound moral sense; features of human situations calling for action can be objective moral properties reasonably calling for our moral responses in correct action. What matters is whether those properties are reliably amenable to our better judgment and hence can play cognitive roles (supplying good reasons for acting, for example) in moral inferences and

justifications, and not whether those properties are also recognized by any scientific field's theories.

McDowell isn't seeking to "naturalize" moral cognition or moral properties, just as he isn't trying to "reduce" reasoning to natural patterns or laws, but rather he is loosening the grip of a modern philosophical conviction that naturalism must be so strictly bound to scientific modes of thinking. And nothing else, no metaphysics or logicism or Platonism, can similarly supply an external standpoint outside our best practices for "objectively" classifying the genuine ontological status of all matters. Objective matters and our best reasoning about them have their natural home in our anthropocentric lives, or nowhere at all.

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John R. Shook

MCGILVARY, EVANDER BRADLEY (1864–1953)

Evander Bradley McGilvary was born on 19 July 1864 in Bangkok, Siam (now Thailand), to Presbyterian missionaries. He attended Davidson College, where he received his BA in 1884. After studying theology at Princeton Theological Seminary, where he received an MA in 1888, he returned to Siam for three years of service during 1891–94 as a translator to his father's Presbyterian Seminary in Chiang Mai. Upon returning to the U.S. he obtained his PhD in philosophy from the University

of California at Berkeley in 1897. McGilvary also taught philosophy at Berkeley, first as an instructor during 1895–97 and as an assistant professor during 1897–99. In 1899 he became Sage Professor of Ethics at Cornell University. In 1905 he became professor of philosophy and head of the department at the University of Wisconsin, holding these positions until his retirement in 1934. McGilvary died on 11 September 1953 in Madison, Wisconsin.

McGilvary was frequently invited to lecture at several universities. McGilvary delivered the Howison Lecture in 1927, and the Mills Lecture in 1928, both at Berkeley. In 1939 he gave the Paul Carus Lectures for the American Philosophical Association. In these lectures he began putting together the views he had been developing for many years. His written account of the lectures was never completed; in 1956 it was published posthumously with a number of previously published essays as *Towards a Perspective Realism*. McGilvary was President of the Western Philosophical Association in 1911–12, and the American Philosophical Association (now Eastern Division) in 1913–14.

McGilvary described his own philosophy as "perspective realism." Insofar as perspective realism is a metaphysics, it is to be conceived as an integration of physics and psychology. Visual perspectives provide the most intuitive examples of what perspectives are, although McGilvary would eventually extend the notion of a perspective to every aspect of reality, going so far as to consider even beauty a property objects have from a certain biological perspective. In the visual case, an array of "objects sensibly perceived by an observer from any one of the positions his eyes may occupy is his perspective from that position, and any object in that field is 'in that perspective'" (1956, p. 156). Pragmatism exerted considerable influence on McGilvary's thinking, particularly in his rejection of what

he regarded as the dogmatic approach of past philosophies. His rejection of dogmatism resulted in his acceptance of the method of postulates. Postulates he viewed not as dogmas but, rather, as useful assumptions in guiding his own inquiry. One postulate central to his philosophy was that every relation is a relation between terms that are not analyzable into relations, which relies in large measure on two fundamental distinctions, that between two kinds of properties: dynamic and nondynamic, and two kinds of individuals: things and substances. Dynamic properties constitute the subject matter of physics and provide the basis for nondynamic properties, such as secondary qualities. While substances are the sorts of individuals that consist in dynamic properties, things consist in substances combined with the nondynamic properties to which the substance's dynamic properties give rise. As for the relation between dynamic and nondynamic properties, McGilvary tells us only that the later "grow" from the former "like branches grow from a tree." (1956, p. 35)

Physical objects and their properties are real, not ideal, according to McGilvary. But the properties a thing has are not had absolutely but rather are had from a perspective. This is true of both primary qualities (for example, shapes) and secondary qualities (for instance, colors). Colors, in fact, become properties of objects "from the perspective of the eye." Such relativity to perspective is a distinguishing characteristic of McGilvary's "perspective realism," a term he coined to distinguish his own position from that of earlier perspectivists such as Russell, A.N. Whitehead, Samuel Alexander, and George H. Mead. For the most part, earlier perspectivists had concentrated on space and spatiality, but McGilvary attempted to extend perspectivism to memory and even the physical and physiological conditions that determine the attributes an object possesses.

His realism, however, was less radical and merely acknowledged that the world given to experience is the real world as "common sense" would have it.

Consciousness, secondary qualities, and visual objects induced by cortical stimulation are described as "epiphysical," meaning that they are the *result* of physical events without themselves *being* physical events. Further, coming into consciousness no more transforms the biological organism than entering into the relation of matrimony transforms the groom. Epiphysical phenomena are the byproducts of emergent nonphysical relations which give rise to mind – a mind being any "conscious biological organism." Although McGilvary relies on the concept of emergence, he is careful to distinguish his own position from "creative evolution," a theory brought into prominence by Henri Bergson as well as C. Loyd Morgan's "emergent evolution." Such descriptions, McGilvary avers, place insufficient emphasis on novelty as an essential consequence of emergence. Because of this, he prefers the expression "innovative evolution." It is not to be ignored that perspective, also, enters into the production of epiphysical qualities and, therefore, innovative evolution. Consciousness is a nondynamic relation, which "supervenes" upon a dynamic process under dynamic neurological conditions.

McGilvary incorporated past events into present perspectives. Moreover, memory perspectives, for example, include what is perceptually past. Unlike perceptual perspectives where the past is merely inferred, past perspectives may be given in present memory perspectives. The objects of awareness from the perspective of a memory will have properties differing from the original, owing to the occurrence of new experiences and relations that intervene between the time of one's original experience

of the object and the time of the occurrence of the memory itself. McGilvary accepted the idea that the present has duration and is not instantaneous. For this reason it has frequently been referred to as the “specious present.” Acceptance of such a notion necessitated on his part a reconsideration of the meaning of the word ‘past’ which, given his acceptance of a specious present, requires disambiguation. McGilvary argued that while an object in my room may be to the north of some other object in my room I cannot say of either object that one is to the north of my room. There may be other objects outside my room that are to the north of it, but they cannot be said to be to the north of it in the same sense of ‘north’.

Just as Hume had taken empiricism to whatever conclusion it led him, if McGilvary is to be remembered, he will be remembered as the philosopher who once having accepted perspectivism, carried it as far as his realism would allow.

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Steven Bayne

MCINERNY, RALPH MATTHEW (1929–2010)

Ralph McInerny was born on 24 February 1929 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He received a BA from St. Paul Seminary in 1951, and an MA at the University of Minnesota in 1952. He then attended Université Laval in Québec, earning a PhL in philosophy in 1953 and a PhD in philosophy in 1954. His entire teaching career, after one year at Creighton in 1954–55, has been spent at the University of Notre Dame, where he became a full professor in 1969. Since 1978 McInerny has been the Michael P. Grace Professor of Medieval Studies. He has also served as the director of the Medieval Institute from 1978 to 1985, and director of the Jacques Maritain Center since 1979. McInerny died on 29 January 2010 in Mishawaka, Indiana.

McInerny was editor of *The New Scholasticism* from 1975 to 1989. He was President of the Metaphysical Society of America in 1992–93, and President of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 1980–81, the latter organization having

also honored him with its St. Thomas Aquinas Medal for Eminence in Philosophy in 1993. In 1999 McInerny gave the prestigious Gifford Lectures in Glasgow, Scotland. He was the founder and publisher of *Crisis: A Journal of Lay Catholic Opinion* (1981). He is also the author of many books of fiction, including the popular Father Dowling stories. In 1993 he received the Boushercon (Mystery Writers) of America Lifetime Achievement Award.

At Laval, McInerny became a student of the great Thomist, Charles De Koninck, known for his distinctive interpretation of Aquinas as a philosopher and marked by his fidelity to the teachings of Aristotle. Laval or Aristotelian Thomism, as McInerny calls it, highlights Aquinas's role as a philosophical interpreter of Aristotle, as a disciple who carries forward the teaching of his mentor. This school finds in the commentaries on Aristotle, in contrast to the explicitly theological works, the considered philosophical teachings of Aquinas. Embracing Aristotle's order of philosophical disciplines, this school insists that philosophical inquiry presupposes a mastery of the logical works of Aristotle and that metaphysics presupposes and reposes upon physics; it also defends the real, if limited, autonomy of philosophy in relationship to theology. Against the great Thomistic commentator Cajetan, McInerny argues that the doctrine of analogy is principally a logical, not a metaphysical, teaching; it has to do directly with the order of naming and only indirectly with the order of being. McInerny's three book length studies – *The Logic of Analogy* (1961), *Studies in Analogy* (1968), and *Aquinas and Analogy* (1996) – constitute a major contribution on this topic in the history of Thomism.

Nothing more powerfully illustrates the resources of Laval or Aristotelian Thomism as both an exegetical and a philosophical approach than McInerny's work on analogy.

A large part of the case for analogy as logical, rather than ontological, doctrine consists in a careful analysis of the passages in Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle where analogy figures prominently. Two things emerge from this analysis. First, Cajetan and other commentators were deceived by etymology, assuming that what Thomas calls analogy must correspond precisely to what Aristotle calls analogy. But whereas Aristotle typically uses analogy to speak of proportion between things, Aquinas uses it to speak of an ordered plurality among words, corresponding to Aristotle's notion of "things said in many ways by reference to one." Second, attention to Aristotle's conception of the proper order of learning, of the nature and role of logic in relation to the philosophical disciplines, highlights the status of analogy as a logical, not an ontological, doctrine.

In this and other works, notably in his translation, with introduction, notes, and interpretive essay on Aquinas's treatise, *Against the Averroists: On There Being One Intellect* (1993), McInerny shows Aquinas to be a remarkably astute philosophical commentator on Aristotle, whose interpretations hold up not just against the rivals of Aquinas's own day but also against contemporary interpreters of Aristotle. McInerny distinguishes between a horizontal procedure, which examines "knowledge of what belongs per se to being after the fashion of properties of its subject," and a vertical procedure, which seeks the "cause of its subject, the efficient and, preeminently, the final cause of whatever is, of being as being" ("Ontology and Theology in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," in *Being and Predication*, 1986). God enters into first philosophy, not as part of the proper subject matter, but as cause or principle of the subject matter, being as being. McInerny also appeals to Aquinas's commentaries on both Aristotle and Boethius

to argue that Aquinas detected the roots of the distinction between essence and existence in a number of the texts of his ancient and medieval predecessors.

In *Aquinas on Human Action* (1992) McNerny argues that Aquinas carefully lays out Aristotle's definition of happiness, shows that the definition itself is adequate, but that, as Aristotle himself acknowledged, Aristotle could provide only an incomplete account of how human beings might achieve happiness. In his work on ethics, McNerny argues cogently that, although Aristotle does not himself speak of natural law, Aquinas's teaching is a legitimate development of Aristotle's conception of practical reason. And McNerny has been at the forefront of the late twentieth century revival of natural law thinking, engaged in sustained debate with other Thomists over how best to articulate Aquinas's teaching. His chief interlocutors and opponents within the world of Catholic moral philosophy have been John Finnis and Germain Grisez, who accept some version of the fact/value split and who espouse an autonomy of practical reason and a basic-value egalitarianism. All of these suppositions strike McNerny as more Kantian than Thomistic; they run afoul of Aquinas's Aristotelian supposition that practical reasoning is ensconced within and operates by reference to a hierarchy of goods appropriate to human nature.

McNerny articulates in Aristotelian terms Aquinas's account of the primary principles of the natural law. The most fundamental principle, "do good, avoid evil," develops the Aristotelian thesis that the "good is what all desire," that is, all desire occurs under the formality of the good (*ratio boni*). As McNerny observes, "The supposedly troublesome transition from Is to Ought suggests that the formality of goodness, that which is perfective and fulfilling, is not already present in any desire" (*Ethica*

Thomistica, 1997). Given Thomas's position, there can be no serious problem with an is/ought gap, since "ought" is already embedded within the "is" of human nature and action.

One welcome consequence of McNerny's more Aristotelian reading of natural law in Aquinas is his unique contribution to a central debate in late twentieth century ethics. In works such as *Ethica Thomistica*, *Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice*, and *Art and Prudence* (1988), McNerny demonstrates how Aquinas offers an important alternative to the contemporary division between rule-based and virtue-based theories of ethics. In one way, McNerny integrates the two by depicting the virtues as insuring the proper application of the precepts of the natural law. But in another way, both the precepts of the natural law and the virtues are said to supply the ends of human action, in light of which prudence commands what is to be done in the concrete. Hence, law and virtue are two different but compatible ways of talking about the goods of human action.

One of the traditional projects McNerny defends is the oft-discredited project of natural theology, which purports to be able to reach certain truths about the existence and nature of God by unaided human reason. He devoted his recent Gifford Lectures to this topic, composing two books along the way: the unpublished *Preambula Fidei*, a technical and scholarly defense of our ability to know God by natural reason; and *Characters in Search of Their Author* (2001), a more accessible presentation of the same perspective. The latter book defends natural theology as "one version of the quest for God," as a way of coming to see our "part in a vast cosmic drama."

For McNerny, Kierkegaard is the great counter-example to the dominant strain of modern philosophy, for Kierkegaard saw that it was necessary to adopt indirect, poetic modes of communication to an audience that,

in its captivity to speculative philosophy, had forgotten what it means to be human. For Kierkegaard as for Aquinas, philosophy is about discovering and living a certain kind of life, the good life for human beings.

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Thomas S. Hibbs

MCKEON, RICHARD PETER (1900–1985)

Richard Peter McKeon was born on 26 April 1900 in Union Hill, New Jersey. McKeon entered Columbia University as a pre-law student in 1917, later switching to a pre-engineering curriculum. His studies were interrupted by World War I when in 1918 he became an apprentice seaman in the U.S. Navy and served until the end of the war. Upon his return to Columbia in 1919, he changed his course of study to the humanities and earned both his BA and MA degrees in 1920. His master's thesis dealt with philosophical approaches to art and literature. McKeon continued his studies, focusing on philosophy,

at the University of Paris where he earned the *diplôme d'études supérieures* and the *diplôme d'élève titulaire de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes* in 1923 and 1924. In 1925, McKeon returned to Columbia where he became an instructor in philosophy and Greek. His dissertation on the philosophy of Spinoza was written under the direction of Frederick J.E. Woodbridge and John Dewey. He completed his PhD in philosophy in 1928.

In 1929 Columbia appointed McKeon to the post of assistant professor of philosophy. He held this position until 1935, though he spent a year as visiting professor of history at the University of Chicago in 1934–35. In the early 1930s McKeon met Robert Maynard Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago, and found that he shared many of Hutchins's ideas for reforming collegiate education – such as grounding undergraduate studies in a general, not specialized, education strongly influenced by philosophical analysis. After his year as visiting professor, McKeon was appointed professor of Greek and Dean of the Division of the Humanities in 1935. Along with Hutchins, Mortimer Adler was also instrumental in bringing McKeon to Chicago. McKeon remained at Chicago until he retired in 1974, but he continued to teach part-time into the early 1980s. McKeon died on 31 March 1985 in Chicago, Illinois.

McKeon was heavily involved in the reforms that shaped the College in the 1940s. He later disagreed with Hutchins, however, over issues of faculty involvement in the governance of the University. McKeon resigned his deanship in 1947, and was named Charles F. Grey Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy and Greek. McKeon was also instrumental in the preliminary studies of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and developing the cultural and philosophical projects of

UNESCO. He also served as President of the American Philosophical Association in 1951–52, Vice President of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies in 1953–54, and President of the International Institute for Philosophy during 1953–57. The late 1950s saw both the beginning of McKeon's involvement in a major reorganization project for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and his participation in the Rockefeller Brothers Special Studies Project, an investigation into the moral, political, and economic aspects of relations between the United States and the rest of the world. Highlights of the later years of McKeon's career include his appointment as Carus lecturer for the American Philosophical Association in 1963, and receiving the Quantrell Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching at the University of Chicago in 1971.

McKeon's scholarly breadth served as a centrifugal force in his philosophy. He wrote on a wide variety of subjects, from ancient, mediaeval, and contemporary philosophy, to literary criticism, democracy, and culture. Such wide-ranging pursuits were consistent with his overarching interest in the nature of pluralism and its implications both philosophically and culturally. He recognized the experience of pluralism as extending beyond differences which too often closed off consideration of what it is that allows for complimentary understandings of presumed contrary positions. For McKeon, contrary philosophical positions were more often the result of differences in the mode of thought employed by the philosopher and not in any intractable differences of perspective or philosophical object.

McKeon isolated four modes of thought that unnecessarily collide as a consequence of failing to recognize and distinguish between these modes of thinking. The first is 'assimilation' which attempts to find similarity

among differences and then integrates these distinct positions into a unified whole; the second is ‘discrimination’ in which the perspective of the observer determines the nature or character of the object; the third is ‘construction’ which seeks to find a complex whole through a process of building it up from its separate parts; and the fourth is ‘resolution’ which attempts to find solutions by formulating suitable methods for the each distinct set of problems at hand (1990). To recognize the methods by which philosophers construct and attempt to solve particular dilemmas and questions is to recognize the pluralistic nature of inquiry itself and the complimentary truths which reside within diverse sets of philosophical and cultural positions.

McKeon’s importance and contribution to American philosophy has yet to be fully realized. The depth and diversity of his philosophical works speaks to McKeon’s mature insight in approaching human thought in terms of complexity and diversity and not in the grand theoretical style of singular truths and methods.

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Jeffrey K. Beemer

MCVICKAR, JOHN (1787–1868)

John McVickar was born on 10 August 1787 in New York City. He matriculated at Columbia College in 1800 and studied under the professor of moral philosophy, John Bowden.

In 1804 McVickar graduated with the BA degree at the top of a class of thirty-one, and then traveled with his father in Europe, where he received some instruction at Oxford University. McVickar studied for holy orders under the future Episcopal Bishop of New York, John Henry Hobart, and was ordained as a deacon in the Protestant Episcopal Church in 1811. He then served as minister to the parish of the Church of St. James in Hyde Park, New York, until 1817.

In 1817 Bowden retired from Columbia. With Bard's support, McVickar was appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Belles-lettres at Columbia College, initiating a life-long career at the institution. He also held the title of Professor of Intellectual Philosophy and Political Economy from 1818 to 1857. He received the honorary MA degree from Columbia in 1818, and later received the honorary STD (Doctor of Divinity) degree from Columbia in 1825. In 1857 new professors arrived and teaching responsibilities were restructured. "Prof. Mac," as he was known to students and friends, moved into a reduced teaching position as Professor of Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, which he taught part-time until his retirement in 1864. McVickar died on 29 October 1868 in New York City.

The influence of McVickar's early teachers was enduring. At Columbia, McVickar (initially one of only three teaching faculty) taught across a wide range of subjects, including revealed and natural religion, moral and intellectual philosophy, rhetoric and composition, and history. The curriculum reflected a conventional commitment to Common Sense philosophy. Human reason was assumed to provide the basis for understanding religious and metaphysical questions, as well as the social and political world. McVickar sought to inculcate this understanding in his students through a

single, compulsory college course. Yet within the traditional curricular structure he enjoyed enough leeway to introduce new subjects: McVickar was among the first American instructors of political economy. He expressed an interest in teaching political economy in 1818, and had incorporated the subject into his classes by the 1820s.

McVickar's conception of political economy drew on the major European sources and authorities. Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo loomed large in the economic thought of the period. McVickar synthesized the ideas of these established thinkers in his *Outlines of Political Economy* (1825), a reprint of an extended article written by the British follower of Ricardo, John Ramsay McCulloch. McVickar's distinctive contribution lay in his extensive notes to McCulloch's essay, in which he confirmed a broadly Ricardian overview of political economy. As social analysis, McVickar's work was normative and conservative. It assumed a static configuration of natural stations and classes in society: capitalists were bound to pursue profits; laborers to depend on wages; and landowners to live on rents. Political economy was intended to promote the benign balance between the different elements of society in a harmony of interests, rather than to reform or reconfigure these purportedly natural relations.

McVickar supported the principles of free trade and limited government. He insisted that an increase in wages would threaten profits, and so damage national growth. Taxation should be minimal. Nevertheless, the particular circumstances of the United States again threw up some instances which required caveats. The undeveloped state of American infrastructure, McVickar averred, justified government intervention to effect domestic improvements in transportation, such as the Erie Canal. McVickar opposed the imposition of any

protective tariffs to sustain American industry. Some regulations of economic relations were justified, however. Gambling, prostitution, and financial speculation should be prohibited, and slavery was condemned, as these areas of economic life both failed to contribute to the national wealth and contravened moral law.

McVickar issued an American edition of Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection* in 1839. McVickar's introductory essay to the volume was designed to compete against James Marsh's essay in Marsh's earlier American edition, and to defend Anglicanism against Coleridge's mysticism.

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Robin Vandome

MEAD, GEORGE HERBERT (1863–1931)

George H. Mead was born on 27 February 1863 in South Hadley, Massachusetts, and died on 26 April 1931 in Chicago, Illinois. Mead earned his BA from Oberlin College in 1883. After several years as a teacher and tutor for college-bound students, he resumed his formal education in 1887 by enrolling at Harvard University to begin work toward a PhD. While at Harvard, he studied philosophy with professors George Herbert Palmer and Josiah Royce. In the fall of 1888 he left Harvard to begin three additional years of graduate study in philosophy and physiological psychology at the universities of Leipzig and Berlin. His professors in Germany included Wilhelm Wundt, Hermann Ebbinghaus, Friedrich Paulsen, and Wilhelm Dilthey.

Mead began his professional career in 1891 as an instructor at the University of Michigan, hired by John Dewey. When Dewey was called to the University of Chicago in 1894 to head a new department of philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy, Mead moved with him to become part of a department that included two other faculty formerly connected with the University of Michigan: James H. Tufts and James R. Angell. Mead remained

a member of the Chicago philosophy faculty until his death in 1931. Although Mead never completed work on his dissertation at the University of Berlin, his lack of this degree was not a serious impediment to his academic career, either at Michigan or Chicago. He rose to the rank of full professor of philosophy in 1907 and chaired the department following the retirement of Tufts. He was President of the Western Philosophical Association in 1916–17. Near the end of his career he was honored by being chosen to give the Paul Carus Lectures of the APA in December 1930.

In addition to his academic work, Mead devoted a good deal of time to the leadership of various voluntary organizations working toward educational and social reform in the city of Chicago. Beginning in 1908 he served for fourteen years on the Board of Directors of the University of Chicago Settlement, a social service institution inspired by the example of Jane Addams's Hull House. During much of this period he held the position of treasurer for the Settlement and was a leading member on its finance committee. He chaired the organization's committee on studies and publications for a number of years, and was President of the Board of Directors from 1919 to 1922. Mead also served for a decade, along with Jane Addams, as a Vice President of the Immigrants' Protective League, and in 1910 he played a leading role on an ad hoc Citizens' Committee formed in an attempt to resolve the grievances leading to a strike by 25,000 of the city's garment workers. He was for twenty-five years an active member of the large and influential City Club of Chicago. From 1908 to 1914 he chaired the club's committee on public education, and from 1912 to 1922 he was a member of the club's Board of Directors. He served as Chair of this Board in 1917–18 and as President of the club during 1918–20.

Mead's influence and many of his contributions to philosophy are closely linked

to the course on social psychology he regularly taught at Chicago beginning in 1900. This course had a direct influence upon many students and colleagues in philosophy and sociology, and an indirect influence upon many others in the years following his death in 1931. The "Chicago school of sociology" was in part inspired by Mead, especially Ellsworth Farris and Herbert Blumer. Shortly after Mead's death, Charles W. Morris, one of his former students who had recently returned to the University of Chicago as a faculty member, began the job of editing student notes taken in several offerings of Mead's social psychology course in order to create the volume titled *Mind, Self and Society* (1934). Three additional volumes based upon Mead's lectures and unpublished manuscripts were published after his death. These include *The Philosophy of the Present* (1932), *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (1936), and *The Philosophy of the Act* (1938). The most important of his many articles were reprinted in *George Herbert Mead: Selected Writings* and *George Herbert Mead: Essays on His Social Philosophy*.

In his early publications Mead applied Dewey's organic model of conduct by attempting to show how the distinction between subjective and objective elements of experience could be treated as a functional, rather than a metaphysical, distinction. Mead attempted to avoid the notion of an independently existing mental reality with all the familiar problems of idealism or psychophysical dualism to which this notion had historically led. Mead argued that our perception of physical objects is the result of what Dewey described as the mediation or interpretation of a stimulus content by the ways we respond into it. Such objects arise within our experience when our distance experience of colors, odors, sounds, etc. is mediated by imagery drawn from previous manipulatory

or contact experiences. Subjective or psychical consciousness, on the other hand, is a phase of human conduct that arises when our action is unable to proceed because of ambiguous stimuli or conflicting response tendencies. It is to be understood in terms of the functional role it plays in the resolution of such ambiguities or the reconstruction of such inhibited conduct.

Mead expanded early Chicago functionalism by including insights from his growing interest in social psychology. He now saw that an adequate functionalism needed to emphasize not only the *organic* character of human conduct but also its fundamentally *social* nature. Furthermore, while his earlier essays had focused on the ways in which perceived physical objects and subjective consciousness arise and function within conduct, he now emphasized the social dimensions of conduct that make such developments possible. Mead thus moved toward an increasingly genetic and social kind of functionalism. In these essays Mead formulated almost all the main concepts of his mature social psychological thought, elaborated further in such essays as “A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol” (1922) and “The Genesis of Self and Social Control” (1925). Later, with editorial help from Charles Morris, they were presented once again in *Mind, Self and Society*.

Beginning with an analysis of the social dimensions of animal and human conduct, Mead offers a genetic hypothesis concerning the manner in which human language may have arisen from the rudimentary kind of social act he calls a “conversation of gestures.” He also sets forth social and genetic theories of human self-consciousness and rational thought. All of these social psychology theories make use of one of Mead’s most distinctive concepts: the human social capacity to “take the attitude or the role of the other.” This capacity to

respond to one’s own acts and vocal gestures as others in one’s social environment tend to respond to them, he contends, is the key behavioral mechanism by which we import into our conduct those social structures that make possible our acquisition of language, significant symbols, rational intelligence, and self-consciousness. What Mead found appealing about this theory was that it took a completely naturalistic and non-dualistic view of everything distinctive about human beings. Human language, personality, self-awareness, and rational thought were all manifestations of the biological and social structures of human conduct.

Mead also formulated a naturalistic conception of the *moral* dimension of human experience in such essays as “The Social Self” (1913), “Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences” (1923), and “Philanthropy from the Point of View of Ethics” (1930). Our consciousness of established moral values, he holds, is not an intimation of some special realm of standards existing apart from human life; rather, it is an awareness of meanings that have arisen within human social conduct and have acquired special normative status because of their effectiveness in guiding that conduct in satisfying ways. Similarly, our moral reasoning is simply the application of our symbolically mediated intelligence to conflicts of values that have arisen within human experience.

As Mead developed this naturalistic view of human selves in his social psychology lectures and writings, he often referred to himself as a psychological “behaviorist.” At other times, when he was working out various technical philosophical implications of his analysis of human social conduct, he referred to himself as a “pragmatist.” Philosophical pragmatism has two fundamental features, Mead suggests in *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* and “The Philosophies of Royce,

James, and Dewey in their American Setting” (1930). One is a psychology that regards reflective intelligence as a phase of conduct or behavior; the other is a view of knowledge based upon the notion of experimental inquiry, in which problems arising within conduct are dealt with by means of hypotheses that are tested by their ability to resolve these problems and thereby get conduct successfully going again. Mead enriched Dewey’s view of scientific inquiry by showing how the personal experience of a socially structured human individual functions in the resolution of problems that have arisen within a shared or common world of objects constituted by a community of social selves.

Mead embraced Alfred North Whitehead’s concept of nature as an organization of “perspectives” or alternative space-time stratifications, but he revised this view in order to make room for the emergence of minds that could think their way into a plurality of these perspectives. Only in this way, Mead believed, would it be possible to account for the shared world of everyday experience and scientific inquiry. Not surprisingly, he found the key to this proposed revision in his own view of the human social capacity to “take the attitude or the role of the other.” Sociality, he suggested in the 1930 Carus Lectures (included in *The Philosophy of the Present*), might even be construed as a fundamental feature of nature as a whole. If this were done, it would be possible to articulate a meaningful sense in which the appearance of human thought in nature was a culmination of that sociality present throughout nature.

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Gary A. Cook

MEIKLEJOHN, ALEXANDER (1872–1964)

Alexander Meiklejohn was born on 3 February 1872 in Rochdale, England. He emigrated with his family to the United States in 1880

and settled in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. He attended Brown University and received his BA in 1893. He then received a PhD in philosophy at Cornell University in 1897, and began teaching philosophy that year at Brown as an assistant professor of philosophy. Meiklejohn was promoted up to full professor and also served as Dean from 1901 to 1912. From 1912 to 1923, he was President of Amherst College. He was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1924–25. In 1926 he became professor of philosophy and education at the University of Wisconsin, and retired in 1938. While at Wisconsin, Meiklejohn continued to experiment with educational reforms, and designed an Experimental College which operated from 1927 to 1932. In the late 1930s he led the School of Social Studies for adult education in San Francisco, California. In retirement he continued to publish his ideas about philosophy of education and educational reform. He was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1963. Meiklejohn died on 16 December 1964 in Berkeley, California.

Meiklejohn's liberal and experimental philosophy found expression in his creative work in pedagogy and philosophy of education, and in his passionate devotion to freedom of speech. *The Experimental College* (1932) was widely influential, and provoked many later experiments by liberal arts colleges in the 1950s and 1960s. Meiklejohn's experimental college at Wisconsin fostered intellectual community between students and between students and teachers; traditional lecturing methods were replaced; grades and examinations were eliminated; and the curriculum was tightly controlled. While his specific techniques were not adopted completely anywhere else, modified versions of his suggestions gradually spread throughout U.S. higher education during the second half of the twentieth century.

Meiklejohn was one of the founders of the American Civil Liberties Union in 1920. After World War II, freed from the responsibilities of teaching, Meiklejohn lectured widely across America, wrote several books, and soon became one of America's most prominent defenders of freedom of speech and academic freedom. In Meiklejohn's justification of the First Amendment to freedom of speech, citizens have a special right and privilege to freely discuss political issues and any other issue. Rather than starting from the individual's right to speak, Meiklejohn preferred to argue that in a democracy, it is the overriding responsibility of the public to hear everyone's voice. On Meiklejohn's theory, the government can never preemptively silence a speaker in a public forum, even if there might be a foreseeable danger. Meiklejohn was a vocal and forceful critic of the anti-Communist purges and loyalty oaths, and also made an impact on court decisions protecting citizens from consequences when they criticize public officials. The Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Library at Berkeley, founded in 1965, carries on his legacy and spirit of defending civil rights.

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John R. Shook

MELAND, BERNARD EUGENE (1899–1993)

Bernard Meland was born of immigrant Norwegian parents on 28 June 1899 in Pullman, Illinois, a south Chicago suburb. He did his undergraduate work at Park College (BA 1925), a Presbyterian school in Kansas City, Missouri. He then earned a BD from McCormick Theological Seminary. He completed his PhD at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago in 1929 when it was at the height of its influence as a "modernist" school within liberal Protestant theology. His first appointment was in 1930 as professor of religion at Central College in Fayette, Missouri. In 1936 he joined the

faculty of Pomona College in California, where he taught courses in the history and philosophy of religion. In 1945 he returned to the University of Chicago Divinity School as professor of constructive theology. Meland retired in 1964. He published fourteen books, edited two volumes, and 150 articles from 1930 to 1989. Meland died on 8 February 1993 in Chicago, Illinois.

Meland's career and his thought were intimately connected to the phases of theology at Chicago's Divinity School during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century. He studied under Shirley Jackson Case and Shailer Mathews during the socio-historical period (roughly 1908–1926) of "the early Chicago School of Theology," which focused on the functional adaptation of groups and individuals to their historical, cultural, and natural environments. He was influenced particularly by the mystical strains of Gerald Smith. He participated in the empirical theology at Chicago (1926–1946), which was dominated by the empiricism and realism of Henry N. Wieman. Meland himself embodied the third phase of theology at Chicago (1946–1966), commonly called "constructive theology." Here he reworked concepts of elementalism, the structure of experience, a new realism, and appreciative awareness. Although he was commonly associated with Wieman's empirical theology, a form of liberal Protestant theology deeply formed by the assumptions and methods of modern science, Meland's emphasis was more on the aesthetic dimension of religious experience and the symbolic forms of culture than on an empiricism defined by the scientific method.

As a liberal Protestant, Meland was interested more in the re-construction of the symbols and practices of Christian faith within the modern context ("constructive theology") than in the interpretation of historic doctrines

and practices of Christianity (systematic theology). As a representative of empirical theology, his philosophy of religion had several aspects. First it was liberal, by establishing religious thought on the basis of experience rather than the authority of tradition. His liberalism was shaped more by William James and Henri Bergson, emergent evolution, and the new physics, than by Kant, Darwin, or Newton. Second, his philosophy of religion was naturalistic: the one realm of reality is the natural concrete world of lived experience, a world broader than those of reductionistic materialism or humanism. Third, it was empirical: it focused on the concrete character of events in order to discover and generalize commonly shared features of experience. Fourth, it was experiential: it was focused on the concrete relational context rather than the Kantian or liberal evangelical experience of a transcendent reality. Fifth, it was realistic: it was critical of the mentalism and rationalistic tendencies of much liberal thought. Sixth, it was process-relational: it offered a speculative vision of the whole generalized in the categories of the process metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead.

Meland's empirical theology, which he also called "empirical realism," was an alternative to the abstract concept of experience found in classical empiricism. Instead of appealing to a religious experience (conversion) or to a religious quality of experience (Friedrich Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence or Paul Tillich's ultimate concern), he appealed to the mystery and depth of experience as such. Drawing on James's radically empirical notion of "the perceptual flux" and on organismic thought based on the new physics and emergent evolution, Meland claimed that the most immediate empirical datum is the sheer act of existing. We live more deeply than we can think. Experience, as a lived bodily event,

is richer than sense experience, linguistic expression, or conceptualization.

Throughout the 1930s Meland described his view of experience as “mystical naturalism.” The sense of a “more” to experience was expressed as an “elementalism” or “creaturalism,” a sense that the roots of life go into the universe itself, that we are children of the earth, that we are earthbound, that we belong to a vast, cosmic neighborhood, which prompts “the worship mood” of awe and wonder. In contrast to modes of thought that begin with a categorial scheme employed as a literal description of reality, empirical realism was a form of religious inquiry rooted in elementalism, which begins with “the primacy of perception.” Existence understood within the context of radical empiricism embraces simultaneously qualities of immediacy and ultimacy. Ultimacy is not a supervening reality which casts its shadow on experience or invades experience from outside. It is a dimension of experience within the “Creative Passage” that transpires to give depth of meaning to the human situation as immediately discerned within our structured experience.

As a component of experience, culture is the human flowering of existing structures and facilities, becoming manifest as an ordered way of life in the imaginative activities and creations of a people, their arts and crafts, their architecture, their furniture and furnishings, their costumes and designs, their literature, and their public and private ceremonies, both political and religious. Culture neither simply produces experience nor simply expresses experience. Culture exists as a mode of reciprocal interaction between pure experience and structured meaning through the medium of language. Language is the primary means of culture in conveying the depth of experience and shaping our encounter with the deeper realities of

lived experience. The forms of culture, which embody the contextual character of lived experience beyond the individual tracks of subjective experience, are internalized by the individual by way of symbolization. Authority rests in reality itself, in its depth and richness, not in an authority which can prescribe or proscribe beliefs about reality. Our religious beliefs about reality depend on an empirical description of the depth and richness of reality as it is experienced in individual, cult, and culture.

Unlike postliberal theology, Meland’s postliberal empirical realism treats experiential, linguistic, and cultural modes of theology not as discreet methods, perspectives, or options but as aspects or elements of a realism that provide an empirical context for philosophy of religion and theology.

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Tyron Inbody

MILLIKAN, RUTH GARRETT (1933–)

Ruth Garrett was born in Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, on 19 December 1933. She received the BA from Oberlin College in Ohio in 1955. Upon her marriage she added Millikan to her name, raised a family, and pursued her doctorate at Yale University. She composed her dissertation on “Empirical Identity,” working with Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Bernstein, and Paul Weiss (with a boost from Charles W. Morris along the way), and received the PhD in 1969. She taught philosophy at Berea College and the University of Western Michigan before arriving at the University of Connecticut in 1977. During 1991–92 she was a fellow at the

Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, and became full professor in 1992. From 1993 to 1996 she was a half-time professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan while maintaining half-time duties at Connecticut. From 1996 until retiring in 2004 she was a full time professor at Connecticut. During 2001 she was the Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor. The American Philosophical Association selected her to give the Patrick Romanell Lecture and the John Dewey Lecture. As emeritus professor, she has occasionally offered courses at Connecticut and elsewhere.

In agreement with Wilfrid Sellars’s “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” and its approach to the meanings of ‘mental’ terms and concepts, Millikan has substantially naturalized those insights for a thoroughly social and biological approach to intelligence and language. Her first book, *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories* (1984), offers a broadly applicable theory of biological function, so that the functioning of linguistic and mental matters can be identified without resort to such allegedly first-person and subjective things like intentions, concepts, or phenomenal data. It is not necessary to first comprehend consciousness before explaining the human facility with denoting and describing the things in the environment. Unlike foundationalism, no ‘pure’ knowledge or acquaintance is required, and unlike holism, no postulated theorizing is presumed. Millikan’s realistic stance about universals and truth is a continuing theme in her subsequent books.

Millikan joins the small but growing trend towards teleosemantics among philosophers in the search for a truly Darwinian account of everything mental and linguistic, in preparation for a grand synthesis with neuroscience. Her persistent opposition defends some sort of descriptivism: to understand a concept one

must be able to define its intrinsic meaning, or taking concepts to play the role in thoughts that words play in a sentences. This is all too mentalistic already; Millikan takes language as functioning within groups sustaining conventions for their practical purposes, not within Cartesian minds contemplating detached thoughts. Among the many intriguing ideas she promotes, the idea of the “pushmi-pullyu” representation has garnered attention for its basic capacity to both descriptive and motivating. Millikan has also been influential in other areas of semantics and speech act theory.

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John R. Shook

MILLS, CHARLES WRIGHT (1916–1962)

C. Wright Mills was born on 28 August 1916 in Waco, Texas. After graduating from Dallas Technical High School in 1934, and anticipating a career as an engineer, Mills entered Texas A&M College. In 1935 Mills transferred to the University of Texas, where he received a BA in 1938 and a MA in philosophy and sociology in 1939. In 1939 he entered the doctoral program in sociology at the University of Wisconsin. Mills completed his course work in 1941 and was appointed associate professor of sociology at the University of Maryland, with his high blood pressure giving him a deferment from military service. Mills was awarded his PhD in sociology in 1942. His dissertation, *Sociology and Pragmatism* (published in 1964), applied the sociology of knowledge to the development of the philosophy of pragmatism, especially the work of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. The University of Maryland provided both an opportunity to become involved in what was going on in Washington, D.C., as well as a way-station on the road to Columbia University and New York. At Maryland he began writing for progressive magazines like the *New Republic* and continued to define himself as an innovative intellectual and sociologist, concerned with the fundamental issues of the era. He saw reformism and liberalism, illustrated by the New Deal, as no longer a valid answer to American and world problems.

In 1945 Mills took a position as research associate at Columbia's Bureau of Applied Social Research (BASR). He was appointed assistant professor of sociology at Columbia College in 1946, and was promoted to associate professor in 1950 and to full professor in 1956. But Mills's ties with Columbia and professional sociology in general were loosening more and more, after a clash with the BASR director, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and then with his department. Mills once again began to occupy the role of a marginal man, both at Columbia and in relation to his political friends in New York, who negatively viewed his sociological interests. But his empirical work served him well, giving credibility to subsequent books.

Mills continued to focus on the different social classes and their political impact in *New Men of Power* (1948), *White Collar* (1951) and *The Power Elite* (1956). Mills visited Europe in 1956, and he was a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Copenhagen between 1956 and 1957. He visited Cuba in 1960, interviewing Castro, Che Guevara and others, and published *Listen Yankee* in 1960. Mills died in West Nyack, New York on 20 March 1962, just prior to the publication of *The Marxists*, a broad-ranging analysis of many different species of Marxism.

While still a graduate student at Wisconsin, Mills developed a close relationship with Hans Gerth, who brought to the faculty ideas from European classical sociology, including the work of Max Weber and Karl Marx. Collaboration with Gerth later resulted in two joint books: *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (1946), and *Character and Social Structure* (1953). *The Causes of World War Three* was published in 1958 and *The Sociological Imagination* appeared in 1959. Three years after Mills's death, *The New Sociology* was published, a book of essays in his honor. His own essays were collected

in 1963, and his doctoral dissertation finally found a publisher in 1964; his addresses were published in 1968, and his letters appeared in 2000. In 1964 the Society for the Study of Social Problems began to give a yearly prize for the book that “best exemplifies outstanding social science research and an understanding of the individual and society in the tradition of the distinguished sociologist, C. Wright Mills.” In 1997, a survey of members of the International Sociological Association asked them to identify the ten books published in the twentieth century which they considered to be the most influential for sociologists. They ranked *The Sociological Imagination* second, preceded only by Max Weber’s *Economy and Society*.

Mills’s trilogy on social stratification – *The New Men of Power*, *White Collar*, and *The Power Elite* – are concerned with the passivity or alienation of the masses, as well as power within the United States as a whole and not just specific organizations or social classes. The 500 “new men of power” he studied joined with the business and political elite to stabilize the economy and maintain existing patterns of social stratification. *White Collar* centered on the newly emerging middle class, a diverse group including middle managers, salaried professionals and technicians, sales people and office workers. Like David Riesman in *The Lonely Crowd* (1950) and William H. Whyte in *The Organization Man* (1956), Mills was concerned with the isolation and alienation of the white-collar individual, who he felt was adrift in a society that failed to question its fundamental structures. Mills’s *The Power Elite* came to grips with the impact of the continuing technological revolution throughout the world, following through on pragmatism’s focus on science’s impact on human affairs. Mills argued neither for a conspiracy among elites nor for the evils of capitalism, but rather drew a complex picture

of top, middle and lower levels of power working together, building on Max Weber’s analysis of class, status and power. However, Mills’s *The Causes of World War Three* and *Listen Yankee* lacked such a balanced argument supported by data, with his voice becoming shrill and partisan.

His *The Sociological Imagination* (1959) proved to be his most influential book, where he returned to his pragmatic and sociological roots required for fulfilling what he called “the promise of sociology.” Mills castigated both “grand theory,” as illustrated by Talcott Parsons, and “abstracted empiricism,” as exemplified by the research at the BASR. Mills succeeded in charting a general course for sociologists to follow the scientific ideal, of opening up to all knowledge relevant to the complexities of a given problem, by contrast with the failure of specialized sociologists to communicate with one another. *The Sociological Imagination* emphasized the importance of shuttling far up and down language’s “ladder” of abstraction, and specifying the kinds of phenomena that abstract concepts should take into account. Mills stated that “the sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within society” (1959, p. 6–7). Mills’s vision pointed toward a scientific method which would employ systematically concepts centering on social structure (such as social stratification) *as well as* concepts focusing on the individual (such as alienation) *as well as* concepts oriented to historical change (such as anomie). As a result of such a broad orientation to the research process, the individual sociologist would be able to range widely over the complex problems of modern society. The sociologist would avoid both “grand theory” with no empirical or historical basis and “abstracted empiricism” with no broad theoretical relevance.

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Bernard Phillips

MINSKY, MARVIN LEE (1927–)

Marvin Minsky was born on 9 August 1927 in New York City. He attended the Bronx High School of Science, and then served in the U.S. Navy during 1944–45. He began undergraduate studies in 1946 at Harvard University, receiving his BA in mathematics in 1950. During his subsequent doctoral work at Princeton University, Minsky began his seminal work on machine learning by constructing a machine, the "SNARC," that was intended to learn a task on the basis of something analogous to reward. He received his PhD in mathematics in 1954, writing his dissertation on "Neural Nets and the Brain Model Problem." From 1954 to 1957 he was a junior fellow of the Harvard Society of Fellows.

In 1958 Minsky became an assistant professor of mathematics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 1959 Minsky co-founded MIT's Artificial Intelligence Laboratory with John McCarthy, serving as its co-director until 1974. In 1974 he became a full professor in the electrical engineering department, and Donner Professor of Science. In 1990 he became Toshiba Professor of Media

Arts and Sciences. He became a fellow of the American Association for the Advancements of Science, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, and the Harvard Society of Fellows, and served a term as President of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence in 1981–82. Among Minsky's many awards and prizes are the Turing Award of the Association for Computing Machinery (1970), the Killian Award at MIT (1989), the Japan Prize (1990), and the Benjamin Franklin Medal (2001).

The philosophical significance of Minsky's work falls mainly within those areas of philosophy of mind continuous with the cognitive and computer sciences. Minsky argued that our minds are team efforts, compounded out of the operations of many *agencies* – a term of art designating sub-personal specialized systems of widely varying complexity and functional level. Though related to artificial intelligence notions like *schemas* and *scripts*, such agencies are more functionally inclusive than either. They also have vaguely conative properties: besides representing information, they have positive expectations of data that will fit a situation, along with the capacity for self-activation. What virtue this approach loses through imprecise definition it seeks to regain by accounting for an unexplainably intelligent system in terms of a "society" of less intelligent, and hence more understandable, systems (1985). Subordinate to this thesis, and separable from it, is the claim that knowledge-representation is best explained or modeled by Minsky's notion of *frames*, in terms of which he sometimes characterizes his agencies. The idea is that of a data structure with "slots" for the representation of properties, and made stereotypical through the occurrence of default values for the properties of such situations generally.

Both of these specific approaches to cognition and human agency deeply influenced a variety of contemporary and subsequent views, including

the homuncular functionalism of Daniel Dennett and William Lycan. Minsky's influence on the philosophical wing of AI resulted not simply from the number or impact of his publications, but through his many supervisees who went on to successful research careers in turn. Even when wholly or partially rejected, as by theorists like Hubert Dreyfus or Jerry Fodor, Minsky's approach provoked replies which are themselves influential in the recent philosophy of mind.

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Tim Kenyon

MITCHELL, ELLEN SMITH (1838–1920)

Ellen Smith was born on 21 December 1838 to Edwin R. and Harriet H. Smith in Geddes, New York, near Syracuse. She married a man named Merrit Slade at the tender age of 16, and a bitter poem written two years later indicates that she was probably abandoned by him. She was educated at Homer Academy in upstate New York, where she took the teacher training course. After graduating from Homer in 1859, she taught in the public schools in Port Byron and Cairo, Illinois. By 1865 she had moved to St. Louis to be with Joseph W. Mitchell, a lawyer whom she married in 1867, began a career as a writer and public intellectual. She died on 17 May 1920 in Syracuse, New York.

Mitchell was a member of the American idealist movement in St. Louis, Missouri, and later in Concord, Massachusetts. She was active in the St. Louis branch of the movement, attending meetings of its Philosophical Society and contributing to its *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. She also led women's philosophy discussion groups, first in St. Louis and then in Denver where she taught philosophy at the University of Denver

from 1890 to 1892. Mitchell was one of the very few women of her generation to teach philosophy at a co-educational institution. She was also one of only six women to lecture at the innovative Concord School of Philosophy during the 1880s, speaking on Aristotle's view of friendship in 1887.

Mitchell published several philosophical works: two articles in *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, one lecture at the Concord School, two lectures at women's congresses, and one book, *A Study of Greek Philosophy* (1891). Her contributions to *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* include a critique of Schopenhauer, entitled "The Philosophy of Pessimism" and a Hegelian interpretation of Plato, "The Platonic Dialectic." Mitchell joined her idealist contemporaries in her criticisms of Schopenhauer, who she believes created a system in which the choice between negation and affirmation lies solely with the individual, a point of view destined in the end to nihilism. Mitchell's article on the Platonic dialectic consists of a Hegelian reading of the Platonic dialogues, which she reproduced in her *Study of Greek Philosophy*.

Mitchell's "Study of Hegel" and "Plea for the Fallen Women" were both presented at the congresses of women that met regularly in the late nineteenth century. Despite their divergent themes – Hegel's philosophy and prostitution, respectively – both demonstrate that she had a respectably clear understanding of the American idealist program. The "Study" shows an understanding of Hegel as the early American idealists understood him. It focuses on the relation of mind to nature, subject to object, the unity behind all finite objects that makes them recognizable, and the relation of the individual to society. Her "Plea" provides evidence of Mitchell's feminism – a cause embraced by many in the idealist movement. In the "Plea" Mitchell maintains that with more career options women would be less

likely to reach the levels of degradation and poverty that drive them to prostitution. She also insists that the demand for prostitutes contributes to the cyclical nature of the problem: men seek out prostitutes; women desperate to support themselves turn to this “oldest profession” because they see no other options. The double standard regarding the sexual behavior of men and women allows men to be immoral by patronizing prostitutes, but forbids women to express their sexuality when single and their potential infidelity when married.

Mitchell’s *Study of Greek Philosophy* drew heavily on the work of Hegel and Zeller, amounting to essentially a paraphrase at times. Yet when she wrote it, Hegel’s *History of Philosophy* was not yet in English translation. Therefore, with this work, Mitchell was indeed presenting something new to a reading public in America that was unable to study Hegel’s work in German. After receiving harsh criticism for this book in a review published in *Philosophical Review*, Mitchell stopped writing purely philosophical work. She did, however, continue to meet and work with women’s groups, one of which she formed when she returned home to support and care for her aging mother. Toward the end of her life, she was revered in Syracuse where she had grown up, leading a women’s Round Table discussion group, corresponding with Julia Ward Howe, and remaining involved in women’s rights and suffrage activism.

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Dorothy Rogers

MOHANTY, JITENDRA NATH (1928–)

Jitendra Mohanty was born on 26 September 1928 in Cuttack, Orissa, India. Mohanty received his BA in 1947 and MA in 1949 from Calcutta University, and his PhD in philosophy from the University of Göttingen in Germany in 1954. In his distinguished career, Mohanty has held various teaching and administrative positions. He was the Vivekananda Professor and head of the philosophy department at Burdwan University in India from 1962 to 1967; Acharya B.N. Seal Professor of Mental and Moral Sciences at the University of Calcutta from 1967 to 1972; professor of philosophy at the New School for Social Research from 1973 to 1978; George Lynn Cross Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oklahoma from 1977 to 1985; and since 1985 Mohanty has been professor of philosophy at Temple University. He has also been Woodruff Professor of Philosophy and Asian Studies at Emory University from 1998 to 2002.

Very early in his career (1956), Mohanty distinguished between the theoretical and the practical modes of givenness (the latter further subdivided, following Kant, into the technologically practical and the morally practical). The objects that are given in these modes are distinguished accordingly: generalities, universals, and abstract entities in the theoretical; and the objects of outer perception and persons in the practical. This distinction between theory and practice continued to be one of his central concerns. In early 1990s in a series of lectures at Jadavpur University at Calcutta he develops this distinction systematically from a historical perspective to demonstrate that “what theory does, at its best, *is to reinterpret practice in its discourse*, and thereby seek to *appropriate* it as its extension, its application, its actualization. *Theory thus proclaims and establishes its sovereignty, and accords to practice the dignity of realizing the theory*” (Gupta 2001, p. 33).

In Part 3 of *The Concept of Intentionality* (1970) Mohanty attempts to come to grips with the relation between intentionality and reflexivity found in the West and India alike. Influenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and taking into account the idea of bodily subjectivity, Mohanty tries to find a place for the Freudian psychoanalysis in the Husserlian framework, which leads him to propose a theory of the degrees of intentionality and the degrees of reflexivity. He argues that the two series vary inversely, implying thereby that the greater and more determinately object-oriented the intentionality (as in “knowledge”), the less self-consciousness it is; and more reflexive it is, the less determinately intentional it is (for example, in feelings and volitions). Mohanty argues that the degree of intentionality on his scheme varies with the degree of transparency of consciousness and both depend upon the presence or absence of *hyletic* component in the intentional experience.

While showing how Husserl in his theory of meaning attempts to keep a balance between the extremes of Platonism and anti-Platonism (psychologism), Mohanty develops a more generalized theory of consciousness according to which consciousness is not a one-dimensional series of mental events, but rather a correlation between two series: one belonging to the level of temporal mental acts and the other to the level of ideal meanings, the correlation being a many-one correlation (many different acts having the same content).

This leads him to an interpretation and a rehabilitation of transcendental philosophy, which Mohanty now construes not as a search for the conditions of the possibility of a putative science but rather as an answer to the following question: How, in the privacy of mental acts, do objective *meanings* get constituted? Given that the world is a tissue of meanings, it would result in a demonstration of the constitution of the world in the intentional life of the transcendental ego. In some of his later works, including *Phenomenology Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy*, Mohanty argues that the transcendental ego and the empirical ego are not two different egos; they are one and the same considered from two different perspectives. The ultimate foundation of experience is neither consciousness alone nor the world alone, but rather consciousness-of-the-world recognized as an intentional structure.

In *The Self and its Other*, Mohanty argues for a complex stratified theory of the identity of a self. The self is a higher order identity founded on several lower order identities such as the identity of a bodily subject, the identity of a person as a historical entity, the identity of an ego realizable in a “reduction” to the inner stream of consciousness, and the identity of a subject or self-consciousness. He

also argues for an internal relationship of a self to its others by showing that just as a self can find itself through the others, so the other can also be found within oneself.

In some of his recent works (such as his “Response to the critics,” in Gupta, 2000), Mohanty emphasizes the need to overcome four dogmas: (1) the dogma of “exclusive oppositions”; (2) the dogma of “the privacy of the mental”; (3) the dogma of the irreducibly public availability of language; and (4) the dogma of “one-level philosophical truth.” Dogma (1) posits, for example, an opposition between essentialism and historicism; (2) takes the mental to be private by excluding such mental entities as thoughts and theories; (3) overlooks the phenomenological-subjective aspect of language; (4) (to which the above three are reducible) is corrected by recognizing that philosophical truths are multi-leveled. Realism and idealism, essentialism and historicism, can each be true at a different level of discourse.

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Bina Gupta

MONTAGUE, WILLIAM PEPPERELL, JR. (1873–1953)

William Pepperell Montague was born on 24 November 1873 in Chelsea, Massachusetts. Montague received his BA in 1896 and his MA in 1897 from Harvard. In 1898 he obtained his PhD in philosophy, also from Harvard. Following his graduation, Montague became an Austin Teaching Fellow at Harvard, and he taught for one year at Radcliffe College. In 1899 he went to the University of California at Berkeley, where he took up the post of instructor in philosophy under the post-Kantian idealist George Howison. It was also at Berkeley that Montague befriended Harry Overstreet. Montague remained at Berkeley for four years, before moving to Barnard College of Columbia University in 1903. At Columbia he was a tutor of philosophy

until 1906, after which he was appointed an instructor in philosophy. In 1907, he became a member of the Graduate Faculty and was promoted to assistant professor. In 1910 he became associate professor, in 1920 full professor, and in 1941 he was appointed Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy, holding that position until his retirement in 1947. Montague died on 1 August 1953 in New York City.

During his long tenure at Columbia, Montague was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1923–24, and chaired three U.S. delegations to the International Philosophical Congress in Oxford in 1920, Prague in 1934, and Paris in 1937. In 1928 Montague became Carnegie Visiting Professor of International Relations in Japan, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. In 1930 he delivered the Terry Lectures at Yale, in 1932 the Ingersoll Lectures at Harvard, and in 1933 the Carus Lectures at the University of Chicago.

In contrast to Berkeley, which was heavily dominated by idealism, Columbia University was a stronghold of realism, providing a much more hospitable environment for his philosophical views, which were decidedly realistic. Montague distinguished philosophy from three other domains: science, religion, and art. With science, philosophy shares the emphasis on free and critical inquiry, but in contrast to science it focuses on questions too general and too comprehensive for the scientific palate. Like religion, philosophy embodies a vision of the cosmos and humanity's place in it. However, whereas in religious systems human hopes, fears, and aspirations may enter in the construction of a view of the natural and the supernatural, the philosopher's interpretation must satisfy the demands of reason. Finally, comparing philosophy with art, Montague observed that in his creativity the philosopher is

like the artist, but unlike the artist the philosopher severely restricts himself in the sort of creations he allows. The philosopher concentrates solely on creations that are probably true and that are clear guides for action.

During the 1909 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Montague joined Perry, Holt, Walter Pitkin, Walter Marvin, and Edward Spaulding in a revolt against metaphysical idealism, which then dominated philosophy. On the instigation of Montague and his Columbia colleague Pitkin, this collaboration resulted in "The Program and First Platform of Six Realists," which was published in 1910. The paper generated significant debate, especially within the *Journal of Philosophy* and the *Philosophical Review*, and became an official discussion piece at the 1910 American Philosophical Association meeting. Key to the position of the new realists was their firm belief that an important part of the objects known is independent of the knowledge relation. In line with this conviction, the new realists rejected psychologism (which would make the laws of logic depend on how we think), maintained a doctrine of external relations (our knowing the object does not change the object), and were advocates of a doctrine of direct perception.

While initially a polemical movement, the new realists developed a number of positive theses in a second cooperative venture *The New Realism*, which appeared in 1912. This volume also spurred ample debate. However, major problems with the new realists' stance (such as the problem of error) and differences among its six proponents caused the movement to fade away by the end of the decade. Montague advocated a subsistential realism, which set him apart from the other new realists. Montague did not consider objective reality in terms of objects

perceived though the senses, as most of these realists, but in terms of meanings grasped conceptually.

Throughout his career Montague displayed a lively interest in the mind and he developed a naturalistic conception of the mind in terms of potential energy. The empirical scientist cannot perceive potential energy any more than she can perceive conscious thought, so why would not thought be a species of potential energy? When we compare the coiled spring with the central nervous system, with its billions of cells intricately connected and continuously fueled with impulses from the senses, could this not be seen as a field of potential energy of a sufficient complexity to account for the human mind? Montague thought that it did. Furthermore, such an interpretation would explain not only the private nature of consciousness, but also its duration, its purposiveness, and how it preserves, through memory, the past in the present. In this manner, Montague could maintain an almost Cartesian psychophysical duality, while holding on to naturalism. Montague avoided the deeper problem of how unconscious matter could attain consciousness by arguing that sentience is not an emergent property of a certain distribution of particles, but is intrinsic to material being itself. This is his panpsychic postulate, for which he developed in *Belief Unbound* (1930) what he called “the preface to a proof.”

Within philosophy of religion Montague maintained a type of pantheism. Montague thought that there was too much goodness and purposiveness in the universe for it to be the outcome merely of blind mechanistic processes. At the same time there exists too much evil and inconsequentiality in the world for the universe to be truly the product of an all powerful, all knowing, and entirely good God. In consequence, Montague conceives of a finite deity who has an enormous power,

but it is a power that is nonetheless limited. Faithful to his panpsychistic postulate, Montague even raises the hypothesis that the universe might be some sort of animal, which like all animals would live in an environment. However, whereas commonly the environment is an external constraint upon the animal, the environmental constrains upon the God-animal would be solely internal ones.

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Cornelis de Waal

MORGENBESSER, SIDNEY (1921–2004)

Sidney Morgenbesser was born on 22 September 1921 in New York City. He received a BA in Jewish philosophy from the Jewish Theological Seminary in 1941 and was ordained as a rabbi. He also received a BSS from the City College of New York in 1941. He then studied at the University of Pennsylvania, completing an MA in 1950 and his PhD in philosophy in 1956. After teaching at Swarthmore College and the New School for Social Research, Morgenbesser joined the faculty of Columbia University in 1954, where, with the exception of visiting appointments at Princeton University and the Hebrew University, he remained throughout his career. In 1975 he was named John Dewey

Professor of Philosophy, a position he held until retirement in 1991. He continued to occasionally teach as a special lecturer at Columbia until 1999. Morgenbesser died on 1 August 2004 in New York City.

Morgenbesser's teaching and scholarly engagement extended to departments across the Columbia campus, including economics, physics, and sociology. His career reflects his longstanding appreciation of John Dewey, both for Dewey's scholarly work and his lifetime of active involvement in ongoing issues of social concern. Morgenbesser's early student and collegial contacts with Nelson Goodman and Ernest Nagel were also influential.

Morgenbesser's main interests were in theory of knowledge, human rights, philosophy of the social sciences, and pragmatism. He had a commanding knowledge of the ideas and literature in many of the major areas of philosophy and the social sciences. In addition, Morgenbesser remained personally involved in the political and ethical controversies of the day. He was an intellectual force in the Jewish community in debates and deliberations that touch on these and other matters. Morgenbesser played critical roles in developing the field and practice of medical ethics in New York City, and in stimulating subsequent philosophical research. He was a member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Philosophy* for most of his career. He also served on the editorial boards or as unofficial advisor to publications such as *Social Research*, *Economics and Philosophy*, *Svakra*, *The Nation*, and *The New York Review of Books*. He was named honorary chair of the Conference on Methods and for many years participated and provided intellectual guidance for its biannual programs.

Morgenbesser authored or co-authored over 50 articles and reviews on a wide variety of topics, in journals and magazines so diverse as to include *The Reconstructionist*,

Commentary, *The New Republic*, *Scientific American*, along with more standard academic venues in philosophy and other fields. In addition, he edited or co-edited 6 anthologies, including *Philosophy of Science* (1960) which set the stage for subsequent such volumes in this field.

Morgenbesser's influence, though, extends far beyond that of his written work. He taught, lured into philosophy, and helped initiate and encourage the projects of generations of students. He has been a resource, intellectual confidant, and acute critic not only to his colleagues at Columbia, but to scholars around the globe. At lectures and in discussion, his now widely repeated pithy comments would go right to the heart of the matter, exposing or challenging a position's basic assumptions and commitments. The festschrift in his honor, *How Many Questions?* (1983), provides but a small sample of the scope of Morgenbesser's interests and the range of scholars on whom he had an impact.

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Robert Schwartz

MORRIS, CHARLES WILLIAM (1901–1979)

Charles W. Morris was born on 23 May 1901 in Denver, Colorado. He studied engineering and then psychology before completing his undergraduate study at Northwestern University, receiving his BS in 1922. Morris then pursued philosophy and studied with pragmatist George Herbert Mead at the University of Chicago. Morris wrote a dissertation titled “Symbolism and Reality: A Study in the Nature of Mind” and received his PhD in philosophy in 1925. Morris was an instructor in philosophy at the Rice Institute in Texas from 1925 to 1931. From 1931 to 1947, he was an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago, and from 1948 to 1958 he held the title of lecturer at Chicago. From 1958 to 1971, Morris held a special appointment as research professor at the University of Florida. Morris died on 15 January 1979 in Gainesville, Florida.

During the 1930s and 40s, Morris articulated and promoted a general theory of symbols (“semiotic”) that he believed would endow philosophy with sufficient theoretical and scientific power to better understand all things from mathematics to cultural discourse to mental illness (understood as symbolic processes gone awry). For Morris, philosophy and the semiotic founded by Charles Peirce were more than academic, technical projects. He believed semiotical sophistication was key to better understanding, engaging and criticizing the century’s revolutionary developments in science as well as social theory and politics. Morris was happy to collaborate with the philosophers of the Vienna Circle (and their American and British sympathizers) who also aspired in the 1930s to bring epistemological and scientific sophistication to popular culture. He helped Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach,

and Philipp Frank emigrate to the U.S., find academic appointments, and adjust to American life. Morris also articulated semiotic as a positivist-friendly synthesis of American pragmatism and the Vienna Circle’s anti-metaphysical scientific philosophy. In a series of papers reflecting this collaboration as well as Morris’s leadership (with Carnap and Otto Neurath) of the Unity of Science Movement and its *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, Morris presented semiotic as a pragmatic generalization of Carnap’s logical syntax (Carnap 1937). In Morris’s *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism* (1937), he described how a mature semiotic theory of symbols would address not only formal relations within a language but also semantic and pragmatic relations to the world and language users, their expectations, beliefs and values. One instance of Morris’s and, more broadly, pragmatism’s liberalizing effects on logical empiricism was Carnap’s adoption of Morris’s tripartite schema as he outlined a “complete” semantic theory of language (Carnap 1939, 1963).

Though collaborating eagerly with different philosophical and scientific programs, Morris always considered himself a pragmatist. In the early 1950s, he wrote privately that “in technical philosophy I feel closer to Mead than to anyone else. In a general sense I consider myself as part of the movement of American pragmatism as represented by Peirce, James, Dewey, C.I. Lewis, and Mead” (1992, pp. 38–9). The breadth of Morris’ career and interests is remarkable, for he tirelessly pursued unifying, synthetic approaches to both technical and broadly philosophical problems. Besides seeking to harmonize American pragmatism and early twentieth-century analytic philosophy and philosophy of science under the umbrella of semiotic, for example, he also attempted to carry the nineteenth and twentieth century debate in

American philosophy concerning religion and science (represented, for example, by Paul Carus's journal *The Monist*) into an increasingly scientific and international world. Morris's entrance into this debate was his lifelong interest in Buddhism, which he began to incorporate into his philosophical writings with the book *Paths of Life* (1942). This book articulated a Buddhist "world religion" that Morris continued to develop and promote in his postwar career. He traveled to China and India in the late 1940s, regularly reviewed manuscripts for the journal *Philosophy East and West*, and was an active participant in the postwar Humanist movement.

For multiple reasons, Morris's philosophical career declined after World War II. His major work *Signs, Language, and Behavior* (1946) in which he proposed central concepts and terminology for a future science of semiotic, was heavily criticized by philosophers (including Dewey and, most vigorously, Arthur Bentley) for what they perceived as an unacceptably behavioral and biological approach to symbols and meanings (see Morris's responses to critics in 1948). Morris's project was also out of step with postwar analytic philosophy that was interested less in the scientific and cultural ambitions embraced by the Unity of Science Movement and more in the study of formal logic and ordinary language. This professionalization and depoliticization among academic philosophers was encouraged by the highly anticommunist political climate of McCarthyism, while the specific decline of the Unity of Science Movement and its ideals was hastened by the reputations of Otto Neurath and the larger movement he led as "communistic" (Reisch 2005).

During the 1950s and 1960s, Morris persevered in his semiotic project, which became increasingly empirical and

questionnaire-based. His work was by this time largely disconnected from philosophy. He was read mainly by social scientists dedicated like Morris to promoting a synthetic postwar "science of man" (1951) and by students of semiotics in the tradition of Peirce, such as Thomas Sebeok and Roman Jakobson in the United States and Karl Otto Apel and Ferruccio Rossi-Landi in Europe.

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George A. Reisch

MORRIS, GEORGE SYLVESTER (1840–1889)

George S. Morris was born on 15 November 1840 in Norwich, Vermont. His father was a devout Congregationalist, maintaining a Puritan home life and ardently supporting abolition and temperance. Morris graduated first in his class with his BA at Dartmouth College in 1861 but delayed seminary enrollment to volunteer for the Second Vermont Brigade, serving as regimental postmaster. After witnessing several battles including Gettysburg, Morris was mustered out in August 1863 and returned to Dartmouth for the MA in 1864. That year he began study at Union Theological Seminary with Henry B. Smith. Smith's liberalizing influence was an introduction to historicism and idealism. Morris abandoned plans for the ministry and followed Smith's advice to undertake two years' study of philosophy in Germany. Courses with H. Ulrici and F.A. Trendelenburg, along with reading of Kant, Schelling and Hegel, guided Morris towards a synthesis of Aristotle and voluntaristic idealism that envisioned an organically growing unity of humanity with God.

As philosophy chairs were almost exclusively occupied by ministers and seminary graduates in that era, Morris instead taught as professor of modern languages and literature at the University of Michigan from 1870 to 1880. Since Michigan's chair of philosophy was occupied by popular preacher Benjamin F. Cocker (who taught from 1869 to 1883), Morris's hopes for a philosophy position waited until the new John Hopkins University ask him to give visiting lectures during the January months of 1878 and 1879. Josiah Royce attended the 1878 lectures and Morris was one of Royce's examiners for his doctorate awarded that spring. President Gilman of Johns Hopkins then offered Morris a half-time lecturer appointment starting in the spring of 1880 to join philosophy faculty Charles Peirce and G. Stanley Hall, and this appointment lasted until 1885. Since Morris was teaching fall semesters at Johns Hopkins, Michigan made him professor of ethics, logic, and history of philosophy at Michigan for the spring semesters starting in 1881. He was a full-time professor and head of the philosophy department at Michigan from 1885 until his untimely death on 23 March 1889 in North Lake, Michigan.

His first book, *British Thought and Thinkers* (1880) develops criticisms of sensationalistic materialism made by British neo-idealists such as T.H. Green. Human perception cannot be a passive reception of given sensations, since the mind demonstrably plays an active role in establishing experience's organization, meaning, and value. Materialism cannot dismiss the reality of teleological causes, necessary for life and reason. *A Critical Exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1881) reflects Trendelenburg's Aristotelian attacks upon the Kantian threat of subjectivism and rationalism. Consciousness must transcend any individual mind because a self-reflective consciousness could know

itself as such only insofar it understands some larger whole of which it is a part. A personality has life only as a functioning part of society and ultimately, of God.

Morris's most constructive work emerged when he gave the prestigious Ely Lectures at Union Theological Seminary in 1883, published as *Philosophy and Christianity*. Supernaturalism's dualism cuts off humanity from God, while Hegelianism's inexorable dialectic eliminates human potentiality and responsibility. Life is goal-directed activity, which is its own end. For life to possess both freedom and significance, we must exist in a web of organic relations with the wider social systems of life that comprise God. The best form of absolute idealism will follow Hegel's clue that experience and reason mutually interpenetrate: the meaning of any mental process is determined only by its functioning within the growth of the larger whole embracing each person, and that knowledge is the reward of successful cooperative interaction with one's environment. The distinction between intelligence and reality has only a logical function without any metaphysical implications. Natural science is supreme in its own sphere of investigations; science cannot contradict philosophy or religion unless science's truths are rashly supposed to be the only truths. Knowledge does not aim at eternal truths about fixed realities, somehow guaranteed by God's purely logical and unchanging mind. Instead, Morris's universe, unlike most other neo-Hegelianisms of that era, is an active process of directed growth at every level. God is therefore in process as well, and humanity's moral character and conduct affects divine providence.

Morris traveled across Europe in 1885, visiting the leading idealists in Scotland and Britain, and attending lectures by J.E. Erdmann in Halle and Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig. Upon

his return Cornell University repeatedly tried to lure him to the chair of Philosophy and Christian Ethics, but without success. Morris's last work, *Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History* (1887), further reflects his agreement with Edward Caird and Bernard Bosanquet that mind is thoroughly social in origin and functioning. Morris's view of the social life of personality was a forerunner in America to the next generation of young idealists who incorporated a social psychology including Royce, John Dewey, George Mead, and Alfred Lloyd. Dewey was Morris's finest student at Johns Hopkins, colleague at Michigan from 1884 to 1888, and successor to Morris's chair upon his death.

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John R. Shook

MORRIS, THOMAS VICTOR (1952–)

Thomas Victor Morris is an American philosopher, born in Durham, North Carolina, on 13 April 1952. Morris attended Durham Academy, and then was a Morehead Scholar at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, which has honored him, along with Michael Jordan, as a recipient of their "Distinguished Young Alumnus Award." He went to college with his eye on law school and an eventual corporate presidency, but finished instead with a religion major (BA, 1974). While at North Carolina as an undergraduate, he started his first book—on the apologetic methodology of Francis Schaeffer—and collected his first royalties when he was in graduate school at Yale University. Among his most important teachers in college were Bernard Boyd, a popular professor with a flair for the dramatic, who turned Morris on to biblical studies; George Schlesinger, who showed Morris how formally developed philosophical techniques can be deployed in defense and analysis of traditional religious belief; and New Testament Greek professor Wright Doyle, who encouraged Morris to cultivate his nascent philosophical skills.

Morris then went to Yale University for graduate work. He studied extensively both analytic and Continental philosophy and earned a doctorate in philosophy and religious studies in 1980, writing his doctoral dissertation on the incarnation of Christ. He took a number of classes with Paul Holmer, who introduced Morris to Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard, and, more indirectly, Pascal.

Morris became excited by the seminal work of Saul Kripke and began to consider how he could apply the new developments in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language to an understanding of the most difficult and central Christian doctrines, such as the doctrine of the Incarnation, the foundational Christian belief that in the life of Jesus, God had taken on human form. Morris recounts that the theologians at Yale were perplexed at the ins and outs of Leibniz's law, and the philosophers were plain dumbfounded by his interest in understanding and resisting theological heresies like Nestorianism and Appollinarianism. Morris has written, "An unusually large group of faculty came to attend my dissertation defense the way a crowd tends to gather at the scene of an accident." He later published his dissertation in book form as *The Logic of God Incarnate*, a book that has come to be seen as a classic text in contemporary philosophical theology.

After Yale, he taught for fifteen years at the University of Notre Dame (1981–1996), where his teaching was legendary. He was also prolific in producing extremely rigorous work in philosophical theology and the philosophy of religion. He is considered an important contributor to analytic discussions of many critical areas in both philosophy and theology. He has also written other important works in general philosophy, as well as in philosophical theology, such as *Anselmian Explorations: Essays in Philosophical Theology*, *Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism*, *Philosophy and the Christian Faith*, *Our Idea of God*, and *God and the Philosophers: The Reconciliation of Faith and Reason*.

Anselmian Explorations explores the notion of God understood in the Anselmian sense, in two senses: a distinctively Christian conception informed by a posteriori deliverances of special revelation, and a conception informed by a

priori philosophical notions like instantiating the maximally compossible collection of great-making qualities. Morris meticulously and rigorously articulated such a theological methodology, defending it against objections and showing a wide variety of its implications and applications.

Other books include *Understanding Identity Statements*, *The Concept of God*, *The Bluffer's Guide to Philosophy*, *Divine and Human Action*, *God and the Philosophers*, and *Making Sense of It All*. In *Making Sense of It All*, Morris examined one of the great Christian thinkers of all time, Blaise Pascal. In this book, Morris highlighted Pascal's observation that diversion is one of the greatest spiritual dangers of our age, keeping questions about the meaning of life at bay for so long. He points out that people are hungry to engage in intelligent dialogue about the purpose and meaning of life. He draws from Pascal's view in the *Pensées* that people need to understand the larger context of their lives in order to determine how to live. As people confront ethical dilemmas in everyday life, they begin to ask more probing questions that eventually lead to ultimate questions about life, death, morality, value, meaning, and purpose.

His twelfth book, *True Success: A New Philosophy of Excellence*, launched him into a new adventure as a public philosopher and adviser to the corporate world. Harkening back to the tradition of Ralph Waldo Emerson, he left academia to strive to bring wisdom from great thinkers into contemporary and practical questions. In 1995 he founded the Morris Institute for Human Values, based in Wilmington, North Carolina, where he now lives. As a motivational speaker about ethics and excellence and their organic connections, he applies philosophical themes and concepts to business and professional life, bringing practical philosophy back into

the cultural mainstream. He has attempted to make philosophy more widely accessible, introducing large numbers of readers and listeners to the themes and thinkers of philosophy. He strives to make philosophy interesting, intelligible, and practical to the ordinary person.

His notes from his Notre Dame introduction to philosophy course served as the foundation for a big yellow book often seen in college dorms nationwide the night before final exams, *Philosophy for Dummies*. His books written since assuming the mantle of public philosopher, besides *True Success*, include the highly acclaimed and best-selling leadership classic *If Aristotle Ran General Motors*, *The Art of Achievement*, and *The Stoic Art of Living*, in which he relates the ideas of Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, transforming them into intelligible concepts and practical applications to contemporary life. With his son Matt, he also edited *Superheroes and Philosophy*.

One of his more recent bestselling books is about life and business entitled *If Harry Potter Ran General Electric: Leadership Wisdom from the World of the Wizards*. In this work, he explored the philosophical implications and themes from the popular classic series by J. K. Rowling and applied them to lessons in leadership and ethics. His recent foray into social media culminated in a book entitled *Twisdom (Twitter Wisdom): A Philosopher Ponders Life in 140 Characters or Less*, available exclusively through Amazon.com. His most recent work can be found on his new website and blog www.TomVMorris.com.

He was known by students as "TV Morris," in part because he appeared as the philosopher he is in the Special Features portion of *The Young Indiana Jones Chronicles: DVD Collection* presented by Lucas Film, and on *The Complete Superman Collection DVD*, presented by Warner Home Video. He was also

featured on television in a segment on ethics for The Learning Channel; in commercials on network TV as the national spokesman for Winnie the Pooh, Disney Home Videos; on Regis Philbin's talk show (after Regis's daughter, who had taken Morris as a teacher at Notre Dame, raved about him to her dad); and on The Today Show with Matt Lauer, among other national broadcasts.

After studying rigorous philosophy and producing technical work in the field for many years, Morris has also now become known for his wit, wisdom, and high energy in disabusing people from thinking of philosophy as divorced from the everyday.

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David Baggett

MORTON, CHARLES (1627–1698)

Charles Morton was baptized at Egloshayle in Cornwall, England, on 18 February 1627. He was educated at Queen's College, Cambridge (entered 19 June 1646), New Inn Hall, Oxford (1648), and Wadham College, Oxford (admitted 7 September 1649, receiving the BA degree on 6 November 1649 and the MA degree on 24 June 1652). From 11 July 1655 Morton was the rector of Blisland and a prominent member of the Cornish Ministerial Association. He was removed from Blisland rectory following the "Act for the Confirming and Restoring of Ministers" in 1660.

Between an unknown date (c.1666–75) and 1685, Morton ran an academy for religious dissenters near London in Newington Green, Middlesex. Around 1682 Morton was arrested and excommunicated by the ecclesiastical

courts for illegal teaching, and for violating a university statute known as the Stamford Oath. Many of his students voted illegally for the Whig candidates in the pivotal London shrieval elections of 1682, and several, including Daniel Defoe, fought for the Duke of Monmouth against James II in 1685. Early eighteenth-century Tories maliciously argued that Morton's politics textbook *Eutaxia* favoured limited monarchy, and Presbyterian church government.

Perhaps to avoid further prosecution, Morton travelled to Boston in June 1686, and started taking private pupils. An early promise of the presidency of Harvard College was not fulfilled, although he was vice president by 1697. His manuscript systems of logic and natural philosophy, written in English, were copied by Harvard students from the 1680s until the 1720s. Morton was installed as pastor of the first church in Charlestown on 5 November 1686. After preaching a sermon attacking the revocation of the Massachusetts charter by King James II's administration in 1687 he was prosecuted for sedition, but acquitted. Through his work for the Cambridge Ministerial Association, he also played a role in the Salem witchcraft controversies. He died on 11 April 1698 in Charlestown, leaving fifty pounds to Harvard College.

Morton's published works include narrative poems on Biblical texts, short essays in natural science, brief treatises on moral reformation, and a more substantial text, *The Spirit of Man* (1693). However, his importance as a philosopher rests upon his teaching, discernable through surviving manuscript treatises in logic, physics, ethics, and pneumatology, together with his brief "Advice to Candidates for the Ministry" and his manuscript "Vindication of himself" against the Stamford Oath.

Morton's "A Logick System" is a short, analytic, Aristotelian compendium in the

tradition of Robert Sanderson's *Logicae artis compendium*, simplifying Porphyrian and scholastic terminology with an occasional appreciation of Ramus and a scepticism towards Cartesian logic. Morton has frequent recourse to scholastic devices, including Propyry's tree, Porphyrian categories, and the division of syllogisms according to the mnemonic 'bar-ba-ra'; he emphasises the fallacies of non-syllogistic reasoning. However, he is sympathetic to the neoteric view that the predicaments of 'where, when, site, habit' are modes of being rather than accidents. Unsurprisingly, Morton uses logic to engage in theological controversy: he attacks transubstantiation, consubstantiation, the infallibility of the Pope, sectarian enthusiasm, and false prophecy.

Morton's "Compendium Physicae" follows a standard structure for early modern natural philosophy textbooks. It begins with general principles, astronomy, the elements, meteors and comets, metals, and minerals, and proceeds to discuss the growth and procreation of plants and animals, the five senses, the sensitive appetite, and locomotion. Morton's general principles include the belief that "new discoveries do beget New Suppositions" (1940, 5), but his speculations on matter and form are firmly in the Aristotelian tradition. He notes Cartesian and Epicurean definitions of matter, but chooses to adopt an Aristotelian structure for his sections on the four elements; nevertheless, he has frequent recourse to his own observations and the writings of Boyle and the Royal Society. It is important not to overstate Morton's contribution to the New Science: throughout the text he balances the ideas of the Cartesians and the Royal Society with the arguments of the ancients.

In ethics Morton favoured an analytic method and an Aristotelian classification of virtues, adopting the standard practice of criticising Stoicism as fatalistic and

Epicureanism as atheistic. In his text “Of Ethicks and Its End” he defines liberty of the will as rational spontaneity, which he views as the will’s enforced following of the dictates of the understanding. However, Morton’s intellectualism is distinct from Arminianism and Molinism, and represents a strand of moderate Calvinism. For Morton, virtue is a habit seated in the will, not the sensitive appetite; he insists that God’s will and law demand mediocrity in agreement with the dictates of right reason. Virtue, he argues, follows from the concurrence of external causes (God and education) and internal causes (the body and soul).

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Mark Burden

MOTHERSILL, MARY (1923–2008)

Mary Mothersill was born on 27 May 1923 in Edmonton, Alberta. She received her BA from the University of Toronto in 1944, and her PhD in philosophy from Harvard University in 1954. Her dissertation on value theory and the work of C.I. Lewis and Charles Stevenson was titled “Moral Theory and Meta-Ethics.” Mothersill held appointments teaching philosophy at Vassar College from 1947 to 1951, Columbia University from 1951 to 1953, the University of Connecticut from 1953 to 1957, the University of Michigan from 1957 to 1958, the University of Chicago from 1958 to 1961, and Barnard College of Columbia University from 1964 until her retirement in 1992. She was also visiting scholar at Wolfson College, Oxford; All Soul’s College, Oxford; and the University of London. She served as Vice President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1997–1998, and President in 1998–1999. She was professor emeritus and a senior scholar at Columbia University until her death in New York City on 22 January 2008.

Mothersill’s general approach to philosophy attempted to conjoin common sense practices of ethical discussion and art criticism with philosophically informed ideas. This general approach toward philosophical practice can be seen in her paper “‘Unique’ as an Aesthetic Predicate” (1961). She argues that while many claim that all artworks are unique, this claim is either unhelpful or uninteresting. She attempts

to diffuse this platitude by showing that upon analysis, it has little substantive meaning. Of course, all works of art are unique insofar as they are ontologically distinct individuals, but this interpretation is uninteresting. If unique, however, is supposed to be a property that is a good-making quality of the work, then more needs to be said about exactly what it is about a particular work that makes it so unique, and thus the burden is placed on describing why that specific property is a good-making quality.

Mothersill’s early work focused on ethics. Ethical philosophy at the time Mothersill was writing was in part concerned with the difficulties involved in advancing a theoretically neutral ethical philosophy. In order to combat this difficulty, philosophers utilized the distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics. Meta-ethics is the branch of philosophy that purports to analyze ethical predicates and establish criteria for their application, and not commend or exhort any particular action, which belongs to the domain of normative ethics. Mothersill’s ethics questioned the legitimacy of this distinction. Meta-ethical theories themselves are inherently normative, insofar as the normativity of ethical terms comes not only from the meanings of the words themselves, but also from the context in which they are used. It makes no sense, then, to attempt to understand their meaning in isolation. Further, philosophers’ reliance on the view that normativity is the distinguishing feature of ethical discourse is mistaken if normative predicates such as “good” and “right” have application beyond the bounds of ethical discourse, and thus an analysis solely within the context of ethics will not exhaust the use to which these words can be put.

In Mothersill’s aesthetics, a central theme is the resolution of a tension brought about by two vastly different claims. The first

claim is that there are no principles or laws of taste that can be used to justify inferential judgments about whether works of art are beautiful. The second is that despite the first claim, legitimate judgments of works of art are possible. Criticism of the arts is both justified and fruitful, as evidenced both by the copious amount of art criticism that exists, as well as our strong, common sense intuition that we are justified in taking a work of art to be beautiful. The solution to this tension turns on the question of relevance, which purports to ask: what features of art are relevant to successful and legitimate criticism of them? Drawing influence from David Hume and Immanuel Kant, as well as Arnold Isenberg, Mothersill claimed that beauty is the feature of artworks that is relevant to proper aesthetic judgments. Her major book-length work *Beauty Restored* (1984) is an attempt to motivate this claim while providing an account of the meaning and indispensability of the concept of beauty in our philosophical and critical discourse.

Mothersill's account opposes a substantial portion of the aesthetic theory of her contemporaries, on the question of how her contemporaries addressed the question of relevance. Despite the many answers that were offered, many held that positive answers to the question (such as Monroe Beardsley's unity, complexity, and intensity) were either easily defeasible or trivial. This claim was the predominant insight of what Mothersill calls the "anti-theorists," which includes such figures as Paul Ziff, Morris Weitz, and Stuart Hampshire. Such proponents of the institutional theory of art such as George Dickie and Arthur Danto also belong to the catalog of anti-theorists. In general, the anti-theorist contention is that since no good answer to the question of relevance is forthcoming, we should maintain that art is an open concept, subject to revision. While agreeing with the

anti-theorists that rigid definitions of art are not worthwhile, Mothersill argued that the anti-theorists are still committed to principles of taste, that is, generalizations about what constitute legitimate critical features of a judgment of a work of art. If not, there would be nothing to distinguish works of art from things that are not works of art.

Mothersill finds a fundamental mistake in analytic philosophical aesthetics, contending that both pro-theorists and the anti-theorists alike accept the following argument about what an aesthetic theory of taste must look like: either there are principles of taste, or we are committed to subjectivism or relativism, and since subjectivism or relativism is clearly wrong, then we must accept principles of taste. This is a false dilemma. We do not have to accept either relativism or principles of taste, and can nevertheless have an account of what is important in works of art. It is the concept of beauty that provides the way out of this dilemma.

Mothersill's positive account of beauty claims that beautiful works cause pleasure in virtue of their aesthetic properties. Aesthetic properties are the properties of works of art that we take to be the cause of the pleasure that we experience. However, since any property of a work could just as well be a property of another work which does not please us, aesthetic properties must belong to individuals alone. Individuals are particular works of art, e.g. paintings and faithful reproductions or particular pieces of music. The experience of aesthetic properties is characterized by what Mothersill referred to as "apprehensio ipsa," a phrase borrowed from Aquinas' account of the beautiful, which means "apprehension in itself." The term is intended to stress that more is involved in the experience of a beautiful thing than just mere perception of an object. Rather, when we recognize that an individual pleases us in

a way we are accustomed to call aesthetic, the properties we point to when asked to express reasons for our judgment are the aesthetic properties. Through this account of beauty, there is thus a method for deciding which works of art are good ones, and a foundational justification for art criticism.

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Matthew Turner

MOTT, LUCRETIA COFFIN (1793–1880)

Lucretia Coffin was born on 3 January 1793 in Nantucket, Massachusetts. At age thirteen she was sent to study at the Nine Partners Quaker School in Dutchess County, New York. Coffin became a teacher there after her graduation from the same school, and at the age of eighteen she married James Mott, another teacher at the Nine Partners school. It was there that she began to follow the Quaker views of abolitionist Elias Hicks, and

where she first encountered institutionalized sexual discrimination when she discovered the female teachers at the school were paid one-third of the wages that the male faculty received. Lucretia became a prominent member of both the abolitionist and women's suffrage movements. She has often been credited with the label of America's first feminist.

In 1821 Mott was ordained as a Quaker minister. She used her position to begin to speak out on issues of anti-slavery and moral reform. With support from her husband, they often sheltered runaway slaves in their home. In 1833 they both created the Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Society. She was also one of the founding members of the Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society. In 1840 Mott was chosen as one of six female delegates to speak at the World Anti-Slavery Conference in London, England. There she generated a good amount of recognition and interest for herself. Motivated by her rising popularity, she returned to the United States and in the winter of the following year Mott spoke in front of the U.S. Congress and held a private audience with President John Tyler. In 1848 she, along with Elizabeth Cady Stanton, organized the historic Seneca Falls Convention on women's rights, the first such convention to take place in the United States. She went on to be elected as the first president of the Equal Rights Association after the end of the Civil War, she authored the book *Discourse on Woman*, and she contributed toward the founding of Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania. Mott died on 11 November 1880 in Abington, Pennsylvania. Mott is best known for her work in the advocacy of rights for women and slaves, and it was her progress in these areas that earned her the title of "feminist." Mott was a model for augmenting rhetoric with substantive action. As she considered

slavery to be the product of evil morality, she thus refused to take part in any of the products made from slave labor. Though she stood by her fellow Quaker reformists in most areas concerning equality and rights, there was one issue where she differed significantly from her peers: divorce. Mott opposed any significant legal changes to the laws governing divorced women's ability to have access to and control over their children (in the mid-18th century fathers were unilaterally given custody of children in divorce cases). This is partly because her theology and morality were influenced by both Unitarian teachings as well as Quaker.

Though the Quaker ethic was first and foremost in her speeches and writings, Mott also associated with the likes of fellow Unitarian-minded contemporaries such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, and Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise. Together they established the Free Religious Association in 1867.

When the American Equal Rights Association was faced with an internal schism over the debate of where to focus their reforming efforts first – women's suffrage or suffrage for freed black slaves – the group split into two warring factions. Mott intervened and was able to use her position as president of the Association to make peace with the leaders from each side, including Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Lucy Stone. When slavery was finally abolished in 1865, Mott actually began to work even harder for securing the freed blacks' right to vote.

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Alexandra Perry

MUELDER, WALTER GEORGE (1907–2004)

Walter George Muelder was born on 1 March 1907 in Boody, Illinois. Muelder attended Knox College in Galesburg, Illinois, where

he earned the BS degree in 1927. He earned his STB from Boston University in 1930 and completed his PhD in philosophy in 1933 under Edgar S. Brightman at Boston University. Muelder completed a year of study in 1930–31 under Paul Tillich in Frankfurt, Germany. During 1933–34, Muelder was a Methodist minister on a two-point circuit in northern Wisconsin. The next six years were spent at Berea College in Kentucky, where Muelder taught philosophy and the Bible until 1940, when Muelder accepted an appointment at the University of Southern California to teach Christian Theology and Christian Ethics.

In 1945 Muelder became dean of Boston University School of Theology, an appointment he held until 1972. During his tenure as dean, Muelder became one of the world's most prominent ecumenical leaders. He served the World Council of Churches for many years, serving in many high level capacities, including Chair of the Commission on Institutionalism from 1955 to 1963 and Chair of the Board of the Ecumenical Institute from 1961 to 1968. After his retirement, Muelder taught occasional courses at Boston University for many years until 1994. Muelder died on 12 June 2004 in Boston, Massachusetts.

Muelder was an outstanding educator and scholar who helped bring greater coherence and relevance to the discipline of Christian Social Ethics, and he helped continue to deepen and strengthen the Boston personalist tradition. Muelder also had a lasting influence on society through the prophetic works and words of his students. Martin Luther King, Jr., the most well-known student at Boston University during Muelder's tenure, points to Muelder as being a significant influence on his approach to social action even though he did not take a course with Muelder. Muelder

remained committed to the political ideals of democratic socialism even in the midst of the rabid anti-communism of the 1950s. At times critics referred to him as the part of the “pink fringe of Methodism,” a criticism he once made humorous by having pink lining sewed into one of his jackets for a special School of Theology occasion.

Perhaps more than any other Boston personalist, Muelder emphasized the communitarian nature of the person. Muelder described the person as a *socius* with a private center, affirming both the person’s relations to the community and the integrity of the person’s experience. The person-in-community does not exist outside of relations with the community, but the person is also not just the sum of his or her relations. Boston philosopher L. Harold DeWolf and Muelder expanded on Brightman’s formulations by highlighting their communitarian aspects and emphasizing the social experience of persons. Muelder argued that the communitarian aspects of the moral laws are implicit in Brightman’s formulations, but it is important to emphasize the social context in which personal moral responsibility takes place. The communitarian aspects of the moral laws focus on the question: “In what social context do we choose?” The communitarian moral laws include the Law of Co-operation, the Law of Social Devotion, and the Law of Ideal Community (1966, pp. 113–24).

Muelder also reflected on the implications of Boston personalism for ecological ethics. He made a personalist investigation of the person/body/environment relationship in his essay, “Person as Embodied and Embedded” (1994). Muelder held to the more traditional personalist definition of person “as an experient (a self) capable of reason and willing ideal values” (1994, p. 1). However, he realized that such a definition of person is problematic

when coupled with the traditional personalist understanding of reality as “a society of persons divine and human” (1994, p. 2). The ontological status of non-human beings comes into question when both formulations are accepted. Instead of altering the traditional personalist view of the person, Muelder modified the personalist conception of reality. Muelder affirmed the reality of “preconscious transactions which are value oriented,” and he includes such transactions, or experiences, in his definition of reality (1994, p. 3). He agreed with Peter A. Bertocci and John H. Lavelly that “the various modalities of the subconscious and unconscious...belong to the person as a whole,” and he agrees with Lavelly that mind and body are abstractions, “partial differentiations of a more fundamental reality” (1994, p. 6).

Muelder’s recognition of the reality and value of non-human experiments allows him to expand his notion of community to include all of life. Thus his position may be described as an ecological communitarian personalism that affirms the person-in-ecological-community. His view of our intimate connection with nature and his view that non-human beings are also centers of value activity, led him to adopt Albert Schweitzer’s position that human persons should practice a “reverence for life.” Muelder believed this attitude should express itself through efforts to create a just, participatory, and ecologically sustainable society.

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Mark Y.A. Davies

MUNITZ, MILTON KARL (1913–1995)

Milton K. Munitz was born on 10 July 1913 in New York City. He received his BA from City College of New York in 1933, and his MA in 1935 and PhD in philosophy in 1939 from Columbia University. His dissertation was on "The Moral Philosophy of Santayana." In 1946 he became assistant professor of philosophy at New York University, was promoted up to full professor, and served as department chair from 1968 to 1973. In 1973 he was appointed Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Bernard Baruch College of the City University of New York, and for the next ten years until retiring in 1983 he also was member of the Graduate Faculty of CUNY. Munitz received Ford, Fulbright, and Guggenheim fellowships and held visiting appointments at State University of New York at Brockport, U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and Bar Ilan University in Israel. He was awarded the Butler Medal in Silver from Columbia University in 1963. During his retirement, Munitz published three more books. Munitz died on 23 September 1995 in Scarborough, New York.

Munitz greatly contributed to philosophical cosmology and scientific ontology. He had a

career-long focus on the problem of creation, taking a naturalistic stance without adopting any absolute perspective. His empiricist demand for meaningful conceptions and pragmatic confirmations of such questions as “Is the universe finite or infinite?” and “How was the universe created?” exemplifies his search for the unification of science with metaphysics. In *Space, Time, and Creation* (1957) he even subjects Albert Einstein’s general relativity to this sort of analysis. In *The Mystery of Existence* (1965), Munitz decides that the question of why there is something rather than nothing is a genuinely meaningful and philosophical question, he concludes that by his scientific criteria the question will remain unanswerable.

Further study on the question of existence led Munitz to a prolonged study of philosophy of language, logic, and semantics. *Existence and Logic* (1974) offers analyses of statements of singular existence and the statement that the world as a whole exists. Munitz argues that existence should be equated with what it is to be the universe and has no positive meaning beyond this final whole. In Munitz’s last books, his cosmological speculation begins to merge with his deep interest in mystical and transcendental religions. Moving away from naturalism, or perhaps expanding naturalism, he portrays reality as far deeper and richer than what perception and science can discover. His final speculations are presented in *The Question of Reality* (1990) and *Does Life Have a Meaning?* (1993) make lasting contributions to philosophical cosmology.

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John R. Shook

MÜNSTERBERG, HUGO (1863–1916)

Hugo Münsterberg was born on 1 June 1863 in the Prussian city of Danzig, and died on 16 December 1916 in Boston, Massachusetts. After completing a course of study at the Danzig Gymnasium in 1881, Münsterberg enrolled at the University of Leipzig in 1882. There he began his study of psychology with Wilhelm Wundt, who had recently established one of psychology’s first research laboratories. Münsterberg took his doctoral exam with Wundt before moving to Heidelberg, where he completed work on his doctoral thesis, *Die Lehre von der Natürlichen Anpassung in ihrer Entwicklung, Anwendung und Bedeutung* (1885), and pursued studies in medicine and philosophy with the goal of informing his psychological researches.

In 1887, after having been awarded an MD from Heidelberg, Münsterberg began lecturing

on psychology at the University of Freiburg. He remained at Freiburg until 1892, publishing both on idealist philosophy and physiological psychology. During this period, his best known works were *Die Willenshandlung*. *Ein Beitrag zur physiologischen Psychologie* (1888) and the *Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie* (1889–92). In 1892 Münsterberg was persuaded by William James to accept a three-year appointment to direct the new psychological laboratory at Harvard University. The psychology program at Harvard was embedded in the Philosophy Department, an arrangement that allowed Münsterberg to pursue both psychological and philosophical work in the company of scholars such as James, Josiah Royce, George Santayana, and George Herbert Palmer. Except for two years from 1895 to 1897 when Münsterberg returned to Freiburg, he remained at Harvard until his death.

In the course of his career, Münsterberg had a number of administrative responsibilities. He was chair of the Harvard's philosophy department from 1899 to 1905, served as President of the American Psychological Association in 1898, and was President of the American Philosophical Association in 1908–09. Münsterberg also organized and directed the International Scientific Congress held in conjunction with the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair, and he was the founding director of the America-Institute in Berlin.

Münsterberg's early work in Freiburg focused heavily on refining physiological theories of the reflex-arc, but after arriving at Harvard he began to explore the relationship between psychology and philosophy. As a philosopher committed to a system of Fichtean idealism, he was compelled to maintain that the realm of the physical object was distinct from the world of the mental or psychical object. However, his writings on psychology's place in the system of human

knowledge reveal a complex and sometimes paradoxical understanding of the interaction between the physical and psychical realms.

Münsterberg's publications in the decade surrounding the turn of the century comprise in large part a series of critiques of the unsophisticated philosophical underpinnings of psychology as practiced by his American colleagues. In the German tradition, laboratory work was one component of a larger psychological program that incorporated philosophical systems, while in America, the laboratory work itself was rapidly coming to dominate psychological discourse. Münsterberg was troubled by what he saw as a confusion of the mental and physical realms in American psychology. The physiological measurements that formed the basis of experimental psychology could not by themselves, he argued, provide the scholar with any meaningful understanding of the mental facts or objects they accompanied. The entire experimental program in psychology was valid only if philosophers could develop a system by which the non-physical mental states, which by definition could not be measured directly, could be uniquely and certainly correlated to empirically observable physical states.

Münsterberg laid much of the blame for the state of American psychology on the prominence of positivist philosophy. Positivism, which he believed to have gained favor in intellectual circles primarily as a result of nineteenth-century advances in the physical sciences, encouraged scientists to assume that their experimental measurements had meaning in the absence of larger explanatory frameworks. The most serious consequence of positivist influence for psychology, in Münsterberg's opinion, was the tendency of psychologists to assume that their external physiological measurements were in some way a direct assessment of internal mental states.

In a joint address before the American Psychological Association and the American Philosophical Association in 1905, Münsterberg expressed his belief that throughout modern human history, idealism and positivism had moved in cycles, with one waxing as the other waned (Münsterberg, 1906). Long dominant positivism, he thought, was now once again in decline and idealism would rise to take its place. The ascendance of idealism was, in Münsterberg's opinion, long past due, and towards this end he was a close ally and vocal supporter of his Harvard colleague Josiah Royce.

The study of Münsterberg's philosophical work in this period is problematic for several reasons, not least of which is his failure to develop (or even attempt) the idealist theory of mind that he so often claimed was necessary. His major philosophical work, *Philosophie der Werte* (1908), along with its English language companion, *The Eternal Values* (1909), laid out much of his idealist program but never sufficiently addressed the psychological relationship between the physical and the mental. *The Eternal Values* is an impressive work nonetheless, consisting mainly of a discussion of the nature of will and its relation to human action. Münsterberg argued that will was the conscious striving to satisfy values, whether individual values or over-individual values, and the experience of knowing the world was the result of these exercises of will. Münsterberg was a famously prolific scholar, and the Harvard Psychological Laboratory produced an impressive body of experimental work under his direction, much of it collected in the *Harvard Psychological Studies*; but Münsterberg insisted on a sharp division between the experimental and speculative work of his students.

After 1908 Münsterberg shifted his interests away from philosophical systems and began working in applied psychology.

His easily-popularized applied work, most famously his studies of courtroom psychology (*On the Witness Stand*, 1908) and industrial efficiency (*Psychology and Industrial Efficiency*, 1913), brought him the scorn of many of his professional colleagues but significant fame in American society at large. After his death in 1916, he continued to be remembered as one of the founding figures of applied psychology in the United States, but his earlier philosophical work has been widely ignored by American scholars in favor of Royce's more developed idealist system.

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Susan Marie Groppi

MURPHEY, MURRAY GRIFFIN (1928–)

Murray Murphey was born on 22 February 1928 in Colorado Springs, Colorado. He received the BA from Harvard University in 1949. His interests were in both American civilization and philosophy, and he studied with Perry Miller and F.O. Matthiesson in the former field, and W.V. Quine in the latter. He also audited classes with C.I. Lewis and started a friendship with long-time Harvard philosopher Burton Dreben. Murphey received a PhD in American Studies from

Yale in 1954, but again worked in philosophy. His dissertation on Charles Peirce was completed in 1954 under Rulon Wells in the philosophy department. A revised version, *The Development of Peirce's Philosophy*, was published in 1961.

Murphey accepted a two-year post-doctoral fellowship in 1954 at the University of Pennsylvania and in 1956 was appointed to assistant professor in its department of American civilization. Serving for many years as department chair, Murphey identified its investigations with a social scientific approach to the study of American culture, using first a variety of sociological methods, then forms of quantitative analyses, and finally the techniques of cultural anthropology. He also edited the official journal of the American Studies Association, *American Quarterly*. For a quarter century, from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, American Civilization at Pennsylvania under his leadership was recognized not only for its distinctive approach but for the high level of its training and its contribution to the field of a number of well-known practitioners. Murphey retired in 2000.

His scholarship over this period reflected his commitment to the study of philosophy. He continued his interest in the history of American philosophy and especially the pragmatist tradition. Notable are his two-volume *A History of Philosophy in America* (1977), co-authored with Elizabeth Flower, and Murphey's own books about C.I. Lewis and W.V. Quine.

Murphey contributed to the philosophy of history, writing *Our Knowledge of the Historical Past* (1973), and *Philosophical Foundations of Historical Knowledge* (1994). Both of these books drew on Murphey's deep knowledge of the social sciences, his historical erudition, and his unparalleled command of the latter-day pragmatic tradition, especially

as it had been worked out at Harvard in the writings of Quine, Nelson Goodman, and Hilary Putnam. Nonetheless, Murphey was often at odds with the relativistic aspects of the thought of these men. Instead, in a critique of late twentieth century forms of pragmatism, he combined the common-sense realism he had learned from Peirce with the scientific empiricism absorbed from the logical positivists. The result was a position that argued for the objectivity of historical knowledge. This position is further developed in *Truth and History* (2009).

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Bruce Kuklick

MURPHY, ARTHUR EDWARD (1901–1962)

Arthur E. Murphy was born on 1 September 1901 in Ithaca. Murphy received BA degrees in philosophy and political science from the University of California in 1923. In 1925, he received the PhD in philosophy from the same institution. Murphy was hired by the University of California as an instructor in philosophy in 1926. He remained there until June 1927, when he became, for one year, an instructor at the University of Chicago. He spent the following year as an assistant professor at Cornell University. From 1929 to 1931, he was again at the University of Chicago, this time as an associate professor. At Chicago he was a colleague of George Herbert Mead, whose posthumously published *Carus Lectures* Murphy edited (*The Philosophy of the Present*, 1932). From Chicago, and at the age of only twenty-nine, Murphy moved on to Brown University as full professor. In 1939, he became head of the department of philosophy at the University of Illinois. In 1945, he returned to Cornell as chair of its philosophy department, becoming Susan Linn Sage Professor in 1946. He remained at Cornell until 1953, when he took the chair in the philosophy department of the University of Washington. In 1958 he became chair of the philosophy department at the University of Texas, a position he held until 1961. Murphy died on 11 May 1962 in Austin, Texas.

In addition to these appointments, Murphy had several visiting positions throughout his career. From 1931 until his death, he served on the editorial committee of *International Journal of Ethics*; from 1934 until 1939, he was book editor for *Journal of Philosophy*; from 1936 until his death he edited the Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series; and from 1949 to 1953 he edited *Philosophical Review*. He presented two series of Machette Lectures, in 1948 at Purdue University and in 1952 at Brooklyn College. He presented the Carus Lectures at Berkeley in 1955, then spent years revising and expanding them for publication. They appeared posthumously as *The Theory of Practical Reason* (1965). From 1943 to 1946 he served as chair of the American Philosophical Association's Commission on the Function of Philosophy in American Education, and with the other members of the Commission he co-authored *Philosophy in American Education* (1945). In 1950–51, he was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. He was a member of Phi Beta Kappa and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

In a number of articles and reviews beginning in 1926, he articulated his best known doctrine, a view he called *objective relativism* (OR). OR begins by rejecting what Murphy called the absolutist presupposition (AP), the claim that objectivity and "ultimate relativity" are incompatible (1927, p. 123). AP states that a quality or aspect of a perceived object or event cannot be both objective – belonging to that object or event itself – and relative – belonging to that object or event "from a standpoint, and under such limitations as the perspective relations involved in perception impose" (1963, p. 67). According to OR, "what is seen is an aspect of the object, and...the object really does own all its aspects, under the conditions and from the standpoint of observation.... The object, in

all its aspects, is what it is perceived to be, and in thus apprehending it we are seeing it as it is" (1963, p. 67). Accompanying this epistemological claim, OR also maintains that events are, ontologically speaking, more basic or fundamental than objects. OR denies AP and is thus able to assert that events – entities with external relations – are primary, in other words, substantives of which objects – entities with internal relations – are properties. If OR is true and existence/occurrence is substantive despite its relativity, then "[e]xistence is not a character of objects, but objects are characters of existence, of events" (ibid., p. 131).

By the mid-1930s Murphy had abandoned some, but not all, of OR. He eventually came to think of OR as having three separable "aspects" or "phases." He continued to endorse the first of these, which he called *contextual analysis* (CA). CA is the "primarily logical or analytic" aspect of OR which "stresses the essentially contextual meaning or reference of statements, and the fact that, when this reference is made plain, many of the 'paradoxes' which in the past have served as grounds for the dialectical demolition of legitimate knowledge-claims are eliminated" (1963, p. 68). To employ the method of CA is "to take particular pains to know what we are talking about, where statements made are supposed to apply, and how their truth-claim is to be tested" (1943, p. 297). The use of CA in philosophy results in *critical philosophy*, which Murphy was careful to distinguish from "critical philosophy" in the sense in which that phrase was used by British philosopher C.D. Broad. Murphy rejected the second, epistemological aspect of OR, *perspective realism*, especially as it was defended by E.B. McGilvary, arguing that it leads to a paradoxical and chaotic phenomenalism "in which everything truly is what it appears to be" (1963, p. 72). In its third phase, OR develops into a *speculative philosophy*,

which Murphy defined as metaphysical inquiry that seeks to give a rational, unified account of the experienced world by articulating a picture of reality as a whole. This account must be not only general, in that it applies to all specific aspects of reality, but also, and more importantly, *ultimate*, in that it provides the most fundamental and basic account of reality possible. In 1940, Murphy completed a manuscript entitled “Contemporary Philosophy.” In this book-length work, he surveyed a number of philosophical trends current between 1890 and 1940, including idealism, pragmatism, realism and speculative philosophy, and he articulated his own views on what philosophy and philosophical method can and should be. This work was not published in Murphy’s lifetime, but much of it was eventually published as *Reason, Reality and Speculative Philosophy* (1996).

Murphy’s interests and concerns had swung away from epistemology and metaphysics and in the direction of moral and social philosophy, specifically to the question of the role played by reason in ethical and practical affairs. This work appeared in numerous articles and two books, *The Uses of Reason* (1943) and *The Theory of Practical Reason* (1965). The concept of a *practical reason*, of a reason or justification for action, makes sense only with regard to agents, beings who are personally responsible for the things they do: “the conceptions of practical action and of personal agency are so intertwined that neither makes usable sense without the other” (1965, p. 9). But it is not just agency that is required to make sense of practical reason. What is needed are agents who are concerned with, and accountable to, one another in their actual everyday interactions. What’s more, persons are capable of engaging in practical reasoning only insofar as they belong to a community and share a life. One can employ

practical reason only if he understands the reasons given within his community to justify conduct both practically and morally.

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Robert Lane

MURRAY, JOHN CLARK (1836–1917)

John Clark Murray was born on 19 March 1836 at Thread and Tannahill near Paisley, Scotland. Murray attended Paisley Grammar School and then both Glasgow and Edinburgh Universities. He received his MA from Edinburgh and also studied at the Universities of Heidelberg and Göttingen. In 1862, Murray was appointed to the chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Queen's University, in Kingston, Canada. Murray's tenure at Queen's is memorable primarily for his vocal promotion of higher education for women. Murray married activist and poet Margaret Polson in 1865. After a decade, Murray moved to fill the same position at McGill College in Montréal in 1872, joining William Leach, and remained there for over forty years. Murray held the John Frothingham Chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy at McGill from 1873 until his retirement in 1903.

While at McGill, Murray continued as an advocate of women's education, and also taught philosophy classes and lectured on psychology. In addition, he published nine books, forty articles, numerous reviews, and some verse. His writings, which discussed topics ranging from Spinoza to independent Canadian nationhood, include articles published in prominent American journals like the *Philosophical Review* and the Chicago-based journal *Open Court*, as well as in the *British Quarterly*, *Macmillan's Magazine*, and the *Canadian Monthly*. Murray was awarded an LLD from the University of Glasgow and was a charter member of the Royal Society of Canada. Murray's controversial views on women's rights and the role of arts in the university curriculum precipitated a quarrel with McGill Principal William Dawson and Murray was forced to retire in 1903. Murray died on 20 November 1917 in Montréal, Canada.

Murray's philosophical thinking was a blend of Calvinism, German idealism, and Scottish Common Sense Realism. He was particularly influenced by William Hamilton, but also maintained an interest in science, particularly physics and physiology, throughout his career. His two texts on psychology were particularly influential in the United States. *The Industrial Kingdom of God*, Murray's fascinating attempt to provide a solution to the growing problems of industrial society by merging classical liberalism and ethical idealism, was written in 1887, but was not published until 1982.

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Margaret Nunnolley Olsen

N

NAGEL, ERNEST (1901–1985)

Ernest Nagel was born on 16 November 1901 in Nový Mesto in Bohemia, Austro-Hungarian Empire (now in the Czech Republic). He and his family emigrated to the United States in 1911, and he became an American citizen in 1919. He attended City College of New York, where he graduated with a BS in 1923, and studied with Morris R. Cohen. Nagel then received his MA in 1925 and PhD in philosophy in 1930 from Columbia University, where his teachers included John Dewey. Nagel taught philosophy at Columbia beginning in 1931, and in 1955 his title became John Dewey Professor of Philosophy. He retired in 1970, and continued to teach in retirement. He also was a visiting professor in 1966–67 at Rockefeller University. Nagel was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1954–55, and in 1977 he was elected to the National Academy of Sciences. Nagel died on 20 September 1985 in New York City.

Nagel's most important contributions were in philosophy and logic of science, logic, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mathematics. With Cohen, he wrote *Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (1934), one of the earliest introductory logic textbooks for philosophy undergraduate courses to include symbolic logic. It employed the axiomatic method, while retaining features of older textbooks that covered formal and informal fallacies, syllogistic, inductive logic, and scientific method. Cohen and Nagel

promoted the ideas of Charles Peirce, and succeeded in entrenching much of his logical views in philosophy of science and logic in the U.S. The *Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* and an abridged version, *An Introduction to Logic*, remained in use for three decades, and in 1993 a revised edition was published by logician John Corcoran. With James Roy Newman, Nagel authored *Gödel's Proof* (1958), which suggested that the Heisenberg Indeterminacy Principle in physics, among other phenomena, was an example of the kind of uncertainty to which Gödel's theorems pointed.

In *The Formation of Modern Conceptions of Formal Logic in the Development of Geometry* (1939), Nagel considered the philosophical influence import of the development of non-Euclidean and projective geometry on the nineteenth-century conception of the mathematical enterprise, on the nature of mathematical truth, and the nature and foundations of mathematics.

Initially, under the influence of Cohen, Nagel was a logical realist, combining the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle with the pragmatism of Peirce. Nagel argued that the principles of logic are a priori, representing universal and eternal features of nature. Nagel anticipated W.V. Quine's conception in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" that the dichotomies of the analytic and synthetic and the formal and empirical or a priori and a posteriori are both artificial.

Employing "empiricism" as a synonym for Peirce's "pragmatism" and "pragmaticism,"

Nagel defined it to a tool or procedure for the study and description of reality, and held it to be a methodology that avoids the traditional philosophical and logical puzzles that “derive almost entirely from isolating knowledge from the procedures leading up to it, so that it becomes logically impossible to attain” (quoted in Buchler 1939, p. xvi). As an advocate for Peirce’s pragmatism, Nagel held that Peirce sought “to construct a system of philosophy so comprehensive that for a long time to come achievements in all departments of research, in mathematics, in the natural sciences, in history, in sociology, would appear simply as details filling out its outline” (Buchler 1939, p. xiii). Nagel claimed that the “recognition of the role played by symbols or language in human behavior and knowledge” together with the “recognition that human knowledge is an achievement of biological organisms functioning in social contexts” were Peirce’s two most fundamental insights. Peirce, he thought, understood his semiotic to provide a systematizing theory that would unite the findings of both the formal (logical) and the empirical (biologico-social) approaches of inquiry.

Nagel gradually moved towards an operationalist conception in which he held both logic and science to be abstract and functional. The laws, principles, and conceptions of logic and science are developed by extrapolation and generalization of experiential knowledge and derive their meaning from the coherence they bestow upon our understanding of the universe. This position was most thoroughly expressed in his *Logic without Metaphysics* (1957). In science, Nagel adopted a reductionist thesis as a counterpart to his operationalism, considering the behavioral and social sciences to be ultimately translatable to the terms and concepts of the physical sciences. In his most influential work, *The Structure of Science:*

Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (1961) and other writings, he argued for the systematic reduction of the behavioral and social sciences to physical science, despite the apparent references which they make to non-observable entities and despite their appeals to value judgments.

Nagel’s approach to philosophy of science was through its techniques and procedures and its methodology, in such works as *On the Logic of Measurement* (1930) and *The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation*. Nagel also contributed the conception of the nature of scientific theory and the relation of scientific methodology and theory formulation. Among the tools used by science in formulating hypotheses to which Nagel gave particular attention were those of logic and mathematics. He focused early in his career on probability, writing *Principles of the Theory of Probability* (1932), and later in his career he worked on induction (1963). He consistently defended the frequency theory of probability, based upon experimental-observational methodology of the random coin toss.

In both his early pragmatic positivism and in his later operationalism, Nagel stressed the rational nature of the scientific enterprise and of its methodology. Referring to his mature philosophy as “contextualist naturalism,” Nagel rejected reductive materialism in favor of a broad naturalism (1945). His rationalism is evident in his concern for the logic of the sciences, as reflected in *Sovereign Reason* (1954) and in *The Structure of Science*, in which the logical nature of the scientific endeavor is made paramount.

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Irving H. Anellis

NAGEL, THOMAS (1937–)

Thomas Nagel was born on 4 July 1937 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. He emigrated to the United States and became a U.S. citizen in 1944. He was educated at Cornell University (BA 1958), Corpus Christi College of Oxford University (BPhil 1960), and Harvard University, where he received a PhD in philosophy in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. He was an assistant professor of philosophy at University of California at Berkeley from 1963 to 1966, before moving to Princeton University, where he was a professor of philosophy from 1966 until 1980, becoming full professor in 1972. He then moved to New York University, where he was chair of the philosophy department during 1981–1986. In 1986 he added an appointment to the Law

Faculty, where he became Fiorello LaGuardia Professor of Law in 2001. In 2002 he was appointed University Professor at NYU. He retired from his philosophy position in 2013. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, as well as a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy.

Nagel's emerging ideas about first-person experience were elaborated in "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" (1974). He argued that the problem of consciousness was probably intractable philosophically. For every conscious creature, Nagel argued, there is something that it is like to be that creature and to experience the world from that creature's perspective. The subjective character of experience could not be captured by functionalism or the identity-theory, he argued, since these presuppose no point of view. Physicalism is accordingly untrue, Nagel argued, insofar as it implies that all the facts about experience can be expressed from an objective standpoint. His protests against naturalism and preferences for idealism are elaborated in *Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament* (2010) and *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False* (2012).

"Moral Luck" (1976) addressed the problems of determinism and responsibility. Nagel observed that ordinary attributions of responsibility for causing harms do not control for contingency. Chance and accidental circumstances contribute to many of the bad outcomes we are blamed for and blame others for. Nagel next sought to work out the implications of subjectivity for normative theory. Moral and political theories, as he had made clear in *The Possibility of Altruism* (1970), are formulated from an objective perspective. Yet their justification has to take into account the experiences of the persons who act and suffer under moral regulation. From the first-person perspective,

a conscious being's pains and pleasures count more than the pains and pleasures of other creatures. We can forget or ignore this feature of our constitutions when engaged in moral theorizing or when transported by the nobility of the impersonal perspective. However, our egoism limits what we can ask of ourselves and of others. This limitation has a bearing on the problem of affluence, and more generally on problems of distributive justice as discussed in Nagel's *Equality and Partiality* (1991).

Mortal Questions (1979) summarized the analytic-phenomenological papers of the 1960s and 1970s, continuing his principle themes: how experience and objectivity offers sharp insights into commonplaces of everyday life. *The View from Nowhere* (1986) provided a lengthy discussion of objectivity and its limits. Nagel held fast to what he termed "normative realism." He distinguished the sense in which moral inquiry was different from inquiry into natural objects and processes, reaffirmed his commitment to impersonal reasons, and insisted on a link between the acceptance of those reasons and the truth of the theory embodying them.

Nagel has published more collections of reviews and essays, including *Other Minds* (1995) and *Concealment and Exposure* (2002). A recent book, *The Myth of Ownership* (2002) advocates redistributive taxation. Nagel's view is that government actions can reduce the conflict between personal and impersonal perspectives, and such conflict-reduction ought to be a prominent principle in policy-making. Two of Nagel's prominent students, Samuel Scheffler and Susan Wolf, have taken up aspects of the problem of impersonal "agent-neutral" vs. personal "agent-relative" perspectives.

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Catherine Wilson

NASR, SEYYED HOSSEIN (1933–)

Seyyed Hossein Nasr was born in Tehran,
 Iran, on 7 April 1933 (19 Farvadin 1312 A.H.
 solar). After completing his early formal

education in the traditional Iranian and Islamic school system, he arrived in the United States of America on 17 December 1945 to begin his high school education at The Peddie School in Hightstown, New Jersey, from which he graduated as the valedictorian in 1950. He then graduated from Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a BA in physics in 1954. Subsequently, he received a MA degree in geology and geophysics from Harvard University in 1956, and his PhD in history from Harvard in 1958, specializing in Islamic cosmology and science, under the tutelage of scholars such as I. Bernard Cohen and Harry A. Wolfson.

From 1958 until 1979, he held the post of professor of philosophy and the history of science at the Faculty of Letters at Tehran University. He was the first Agha Khan professor of Islamic Studies at the American University of Beirut in 1964–65. In 1973 he founded and presided over the Iranian Academy of Philosophy. The 1979 Iranian Revolution forced Nasr to flee his homeland; he returned to the United States where he accepted temporary teaching posts at the University of Utah (1979) and Temple University (1980–83). From 1984 until the present, Nasr is the University Professor of Islamic Studies at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. In 1973 he was elected to the Institut International de Philosophie. Nasr presented the prestigious Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1980–81, published in 1981 under the title *Knowledge and the Sacred*.

Nasr is mostly recognized for his in-depth exegesis and commentary on the Islamic worldview in general and Islamic traditional sciences in particular. Texts deserving special mention in this regard include *Ideals and Realities of Islam* (1966), *Islamic Life and Thought* (1981), *Traditional Islam in the*

Modern World (1987), and *Islam: Religion, History, and Civilization* (2003). In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, Nasr responded with *The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity* (2002), written for a broader audience to dispel misperceptions of Islam instigated by this tragic event and others, while at the same time calling for further ecumenical exchange between the world's living traditions.

Nasr proffers a comprehensive philosophical system united under metaphysics. He has been one of the most outspoken proponents of *Philosophia Perennis* (Perennial Philosophy), or what is also known as Traditionalism. The opening pronouncement of *Knowledge and the Sacred* (1981) reads, "In the beginning Reality was at once being, knowledge, and bliss and in that 'now' which is the ever-present 'in the beginning,' knowledge continues to possess a profound relation with that principal and primordial Reality which is the Sacred and the source of all that is sacred" (p. 1). In all of his writings, this transcendent Reality (the Sacred, the Divine, God) serves as the *axis mundi* around which Nasr's worldview circumambulates. All knowledge and all action guided by knowledge, according to Nasr, are grounded in the Sacred. Rather than mediating all epistemic pursuits, which should aim at knowing Reality, philosophy has instead become the means by which to justify what science is doing regardless of philosophy's findings.

Moreover, religion has even been torn away from philosophy, not to mention from science itself. Whereas previously, traditional sciences, which include biology, cosmology, medicine, philosophy, metaphysics, and so on, understood natural phenomena and humanity itself as *vestigia Dei* (signs of God), modern science has severed the universe, including humans, from God, according to Nasr. The natural world or cosmos has a meaning

beyond itself, one that modern secular science is intentionally ignorant. Though science has employed philosophy to develop an “ethics” to justify its current practices, Nasr insists that until we return to our sacred origins and once again align our epistemic pursuits to the overriding metaphysical reality, the devastation of the Earth will continue; science, religion, and philosophy must be united. All other efforts will be stopgaps at best; the only true solution is to focus our attention once and for all to that primordial Reality, which is the everlasting guide to our scientific pursuits or *scientia sacra* (“sacred science”), as Nasr calls it.

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Lucian W. Stone, Jr.

NEVILLE, ROBERT CUMMINGS
(1939–)

Robert C. Neville was born on 1 May 1939 in St. Louis, Missouri. He received his education at Yale University, earning the BA in 1960, MA in 1962, and PhD in 1963. He was ordained as elder in the Missouri East Conference of the United Methodist Church in 1966, and has been a pastor in Missouri and New York. From 1963 to 1965 Neville was a philosophy instructor at Yale; from 1965 to 1971 he was an assistant and associate professor of philosophy at Fordham University; and from 1971 to 1977 he was associate and full professor at State University of New York at Purchase. In 1978 he went to State University of New York at Stony Brook as professor of philosophy and religion and chair of the religion department; from 1982 to 1985 he was Stony Brook's Dean of Humanities and Fine Arts; and then he returned to teaching until 1987. In that year Neville became professor of philosophy, religion, and theology and chair of the religion department of Boston University, the position

he continues to hold. He was also Dean of the School of Theology during 1988 to 2003. Then he was Dean of Marsh Chapel at Boston University from 2003 to 2006, and he was executive director of the Danielsen Institute from 2005 to 2009. He has been President of the Metaphysical Society of America in 1988, the American Academy of Religion during 1990–92, the International Society for Chinese Philosophy in 1992–93, and the Association of United Methodist Theological Schools.

Neville's theology has been constructed from traditional Christian doctrines and his selective interpretations of the pragmatism, semiotics, and process traditions of American philosophy. Neville holds that religious hypotheses can be pragmatically tested in experience, but not proven in any a priori fashion. While theology is metaphysical, asking after conditions of experience, it is actual lived experience to which any theological hypothesis must answer. The meaning of religious beliefs, semiotically understood, is not representational but instrumental. Religion therefore leads to experimental engagements with the world, resulting in more or less valuable information; religious language is not trapped with a hermeneutically sealed enclosure of culture. This empirical and realistic understanding of religious truth nevertheless recognizes the biologically and culturally conditioned existence of human inquirers.

Religious inquiry, for Neville, fundamentally asks why is there anything at all and why things have their complex determinate forms. Neville's preferred answer to the existence of the world and its entities is the postulate of God as the creator *ex nihilo*. While finding in A.N. Whitehead's process thought some useful conceptions of the divinity as active creator, Neville rejects the process theology view that creation and God are united in the process

of creativity, and worries that Whitehead's God cannot know our subjective selves. Neville defends the doctrine of the Trinity as three aspects of God: God as the source of creation, the telos of creation, and the activity of creation. While God is deeply involved in creation, permitting most intimate knowledge of the world, an ontological distinction remains between creator and created. Each existence contains within its nature essential self-relating features and accidental features relating it to other things including God.

In *The Recovery of the Measure* (1989), Neville proposed a philosophy of nature based on the concept that "all determinate things are harmonies of essential and conditional features." Neville finds the relational qualities of beauty and goodness in everything. However, this is not the sort of optimistic view that Neville accuses process theology of fostering. For Neville, human life balances between fragile harmonies and the chaos of contingency. From our limited perspective, evil is quite as real as goodness, and this contrast established value.

In the three volumes of *Philosophical Theology*, God is an inspiration of hope and love but cannot be directly cognized since God is the indeterminate and infinite ground of Being, while all we experience is the totality of the world with all its variety. Neville does not take much interest in process philosophy's theory of the radical openness of the future and of human freedom. For Neville, all creativity must be God's creativity; human freedom is our own self-development through God creativity, and God's final plans cannot be affected in any way by the actions of created things. This is not classical determinism or theological predestination for Neville, as the process of God's sustaining creativity itself supplies our being.

Neville has written extensively on Chinese and Indian religion and theology, finding

interesting points of comparison between them, process theology, and his own views. He also has engaged concerns in bioethics, behavioral therapy, war and peace, and technology.

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John R. Shook

NIEBUHR, KARL PAUL
REINHOLD (1892–1971)

With the exception of Martin Luther King, Jr., Reinhold Niebuhr was more influential than any other twentieth century theologian in the United States. He contributed to American

social and political philosophy and was arguably the century's most important social ethicist.

Reinhold Niebuhr was born on 21 June 1892 in Wright City, Missouri, to Gustav Niebuhr, a pastor of the German Evangelical Synod and Lydia Hosto Niebuhr, the daughter of a West Coast missionary in the same synod. His brother, Richard Niebuhr, also became a theologian. In 1913 Niebuhr arrived at Yale's Divinity School, where he earned a BD in 1914 and an MA in 1915. In August 1915 he took up his post at Bethel Evangelical Church in Detroit. Niebuhr found himself deeply engaged in civic social issues: opposing Henry Ford as well as the Ku Klux Klan; championing the labor movement; serving on the Mayor's Inter-racial Committee and the Detroit Council of Churches Industrial Relations Committee; joining the Fellowship of Reconciliation; and pastoring a congregation that itself had become, under his leadership, a notable community force in its own right. Niebuhr even published his first book in Detroit, *Does Civilization Need Religion?* (1927). Shortly after, he published a volume of personal meditations that remains popular, *Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic* (1929).

In 1928 Niebuhr became professor of Christian Ethics at the Union Theological Seminary in New York City and taught there until 1960. Always a dramatist of theological ideas in the public arena, with a large secular as well as religious audience, Niebuhr's literary output over these years was remarkable. In one decade alone, from 1942 to 1952, he published over seven hundred articles, wrote chapters for numerous books edited by others, founded and edited the influential bi-weekly, *Christianity and Crisis*, and penned five books of his own, including his theological masterpiece, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, given as the Gifford Lectures in 1941 and

1943. *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (1944), *Faith and History* (1949), and *The Irony of American History* (1952) are other major works of this period.

These mid-century decades as a writer were matched by an ambitious travel, teaching, and consulting schedule, all of which brought Niebuhr public access and acclaim. He served the Federal Council of Churches and World Council of Churches in various capacities and traveled widely in the United States and abroad on the lecture circuit. Developments in Europe, especially Great Britain and Germany, captured his ongoing attention and commentary. In the post-World War II years he was a member of the Council of Foreign Relations and served as a member of the U. S. delegation to the UNESCO conference in Paris. Harvard offered him a university professorship and his *alma mater*, Yale University, considered him for its presidency. *Time* magazine put him on the cover of its 25th anniversary issue in 1948; *Life* magazine featured him in both 1946 and 1948. Together with Paul Tillich, the colleague he helped bring to Union Seminary from Nazi Germany, Niebuhr commanded the theological heights in the 1940s and 1950s and, with Tillich, enjoyed recognition as a leading public intellectual.

Niebuhr published *Moral Man and Immoral Society* in 1932, establishing the baselines of the social ethics school that would come to be associated with him, labeled as "Christian realism." He meant to demolish the liberalism of those who dreamt that social change could be accomplished by educational and evangelical means, and to press the case that justice could not be realized apart from religion's alliance with power leveraged against economic, social, and political privilege. This attention to the play of power, together with Niebuhr's contention that Enlightenment reason and moral idealism

were as ideologically tainted and subject to self-serving interests as religion itself, was the “realism” component. “Christian” referred to the sources of Niebuhr’s theological doctrine of human nature and the making of history. While on the basis of his realism he rejected a belief in human perfectibility and the inevitability of progress (the secular and religious liberalism of his day), he also recognized and elaborated the reality of human freedom and the human capacity for self-transcendence. This means “indeterminate possibilities” on the part of creatures who, created in the image of God, are always breaking the mold. Yet creative human freedom also means that good and evil tend to grow apace. Greater evils are commonly the corruption of greater goods. Moral accomplishments may be real but they are never secure.

Niebuhr worked out his dialectical doctrine of human nature as both incurably fallible and boundlessly creative in a way that sought to avoid the fusion of religion and politics while at the same time harnessing religion as a power for social transformation and a source of energy for the social struggle (“the ethical reconstruction of society” noted above). In doing so, Niebuhr and Christian realism placed issues of power at the heart of the moral life, while viewing the moral life itself as a continuing battleground of both self-regarding and other-regarding, or “social,” impulses. A decent life in society, then, is not guaranteed by any better education or religion but only by a system of checks and balances. Niebuhr concluded that the relevant, proximate moral norm for the ordering of society is justice rather than love, and the relevant strategic goal is the most equitable distribution of power possible. A later aphorism, from *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense* (1944) captured Christian realism

and the implications of *Moral Man and Immoral Society* well: “Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary” (1944, p. xi).

Marxism influenced Niebuhr throughout the 1920s and 1930s. It offered a coherent framework of meaning for the storm and struggle of these years and it did so in ways that generated, rather than abandoned, hopes for a more just social order. Later Niebuhr would elaborate the reasons for this framework and these hopes in his masterpiece of theological anthropology, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (1941–43). In that work Marxism is no longer a salient source. But in the 1930s it was, and it accompanied his preoccupation with a political-economic crisis that in turn led him into both socialist thought and socialist politics and, in the 1940s, to the left flank of the Democratic Party. He helped found the Union for Democratic Action in 1941, serving as its first national chairman, and also chaired the successor organization, Americans for Democratic Action. He worked ardently for the socialist cause as the moving spirit of the Fellowship of Socialist Christians. He helped to set up the Delta Cooperative Farm in Hillhouse, Mississippi, and the Southern Tenant Farmer’s Union, and supported the candidacy of Norman Thomas for president on the Socialist Party ticket in 1932 and 1936. Later in that decade and the next he found Franklin Roosevelt persuasive. Roosevelt’s skillful fashioning of both national unity and a dynamic mixed economy countered Niebuhr’s conviction that capitalism could not be reformed. And while he did not wholly abandon his attention to political economy and his attention to white racism (America’s gravest social problem, in his judgment), he turned more and more to global politics and the need to rally U.S. support for resistance to the specter of fascism. The role and responsibilities

of the U.S. as a global power became one of his major themes from the 1940s to the end of his career in the mid-1960s. Niebuhr, a chief intellectual source for the school of diplomacy known as “political realism,” ended his years as a critic of U.S. presence in Vietnam and a citizen worried about the consequences of imperial power on the part of a nation that never thinks of itself as an empire (*The Irony of American History*, 1952).

Niebuhr’s “more conservative religious convictions” eventually displaced his Marxism as a source of insight and became elaborated as the “doctrine of man” of his *magnum opus*, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, which also was the work that established him as a formidable purveyor of Christian apologetics. *Christian Realism and Political Problems*, *The Self and the Dramas of History*, *The Structure of Nations and Empires*, and *Man’s Nature and His Communities* all appeared between 1953 and 1965. Niebuhr relocated from Manhattan to a summer home in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, where he died on 1 June 1971.

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Larry L. Rasmussen

NIELSEN, KAI EDWARD (1926–)

Kai Nielsen was born on 15 May 1926 in Marshall, Michigan. He attended the U.S. Maritime Academy in 1944 and served in the Merchant Marine in 1944–45. He attended St. Ambrose College in Iowa from 1945 to 1947, transferred to the University of North Carolina where he earned his BA in English with honors in 1949, and then earned a PhD in philosophy in 1955 from Duke University, writing a dissertation on “Justification and Morals.” Nielsen was instructor of philosophy at Hamilton College in New York from 1955 to 1957; assistant professor of philosophy at Amherst College from 1957 to 1960; visiting assistant professor of philosophy at New York University in 1960–61; and associate professor of philosophy at Harpur College in New York in 1961–62. In 1962 he became associate professor of philosophy at New York University, was promoted to full professor in 1967, and served as department chair in 1967–68. From 1970 until retiring in 1989, Nielsen was professor of philosophy at the University of Calgary, and also was department chair from 1984 to 1989. Since 1993, Nielsen has been adjunct professor of philosophy at Concordia University in Montréal, Canada. Nielsen has been one of Canada’s most eminent philosophers for over three decades. He was one of the founders of the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* in 1971, elected President of the Canadian Philosophical Association for 1983–84, and became a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada in 1988.

As a staunch defender of pragmatic naturalism, skeptical atheism, and Marxist egalitarianism, Nielsen is simultaneously one of philosophy’s clearest writers and most controversial figures. He has published more than twenty monographs and edited volumes, and more than four hundred articles.

Nielsen launched his rejection of theism in two books, published in the same year: *Scepticism* (1973) and *Ethics without God* (1973). Religious skepticism (unlike philosophical skepticism) is warranted, because arguments for the existence of a theistic God are failures. Religious experience cannot serve as a rational foundation, and theological arguments must specify what is meant by “God.” If an anthropomorphic God is intended, such a conception is easily shown false by modern knowledge. On the other hand, any sophisticated conception of God uses religious language to speak about God in a way that prevents any reasonable verification or falsification, and such language is hence meaningless. *Ethics without God* asks whether moral can be disentangled from religion, and Nielsen answers affirmatively, offering a broadly consequentialist ethical theory. That there must be such an ethical theory capable of justifying moral rules becomes obvious when considering the divine command theory and related theories. The fact that God has commanded or willed moral rules does not legitimate them, since sheer tyranny carries no reasonable moral legitimacy. Whether we are justified in believing that God is not a tyrant must logically depend on our ability to appeal to an independent moral theory to judge God and the ordained moral rules. Similarly, whether the existence of God can supply life with meaning and purpose requires independent standards. These arguments are developed and supplemented in subsequent writings, including *Philosophy & Atheism: In Defense of Atheism* (1985) and *God, Scepticism and Modernity* (1989).

Nielsen’s social and political theory was formed with heavy influences from Marxism and John Rawls. To arrive at a socialist outcome that could satisfy the demands of both equality and liberty, Nielsen proposes to largely accept Rawls’s principles of

justice, with the provision that roughly equal distribution is more reasonable than Rawlsian unequal distribution. In *Equality and Liberty: A Defense of Radical Egalitarianism* (1985), Nielsen argues that capitalism cannot satisfy the principles of justice, which require among other goods a meaningful occupation and health care for all. Against libertarians, such as Robert Nozick, he takes the view that maximizing freedom is achievable only after equalization of wealth. In *Marxism and the Moral Point of View: Morality, Ideology, and Historical Materialism* (1989), Nielsen anticipates and refutes the complaint that the Marxist suspicion of ideology leaves Marxism with no moral position from which to criticize capitalism. In *Globalization and Justice* (2003) the failures of global capitalization to meet even basic expectations of justice are rehearsed. Although globalization is even threatening democracy itself, Nielsen finds hope in global democratic socialism, which would, he claims, receive far greater approval around the world.

Although there are no objectives or purely rational foundations for morality, Nielsen understands the alternative of subjectivism to be a satisfactory moral theory, so long as it can be pragmatically reasonable to be moral in order to achieve happiness. The question, "Why should I be moral?" is neither meaningless or contradictory, but satisfactorily answerable for the sort of people that Rawls places in the original position for deciding principles of justice. Although morality is essentially tied to culture, resulting in cultural relativism, it is possible to at least require universalizability for morality, as Rawls does in following Kant on this point; and in Nielsen's view the universalizability test can at least helpfully expose partiality and prejudice. The ideals of justice emerge from considering what rational people would together find to be the most

practical way to achieve their vision of the good life. Perhaps Nielsen is best classified as a rule utilitarian, although his relativistic and pluralistic refusal to define happiness or "the good" separates him from classical utilitarianism.

Nielsen's metaphilosophical views emphasize anti-foundationalism and pragmatic naturalism. Unlike traditional naturalism, which simply substitutes foundational faith in science for faith in the supernatural, Nielsen's pragmatic, historicist, and pluralistic naturalism is what remains after the excesses of supernaturalism, dualism, and idealism have fallen into mythology. This naturalism converges with the neopragmatism of Richard Rorty, about whom Nielsen has sympathetically written (1991). Nielsen's *On Transforming Philosophy: A Metaphilosophical Inquiry* (1995) and *Naturalism without Foundations* (1996) are the most detailed presentations of his naturalism and pragmatism.

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John R. Shook

NODDINGS, NEL (1929–)

Nel Noddings was born on 19 January 1929 in Irvington, New Jersey. She received a BA degree from Montclair State College in 1949, began teaching, and then earned an MA in mathematics from Rutgers University in 1964. After many years in high school teaching and administrating, she earned a PhD degree in education from Stanford University in 1973. She taught education at Pennsylvania State University, briefly served as the University of Chicago's director of precollegiate education, and then in 1977 she joined the education faculty at Stanford University. She also was the director of teacher education, an associate dean, and an acting dean while at Stanford. Noddings held the position of Lee L. Jacks Professor of Education from 1992 until her retirement as professor emerita in 1998. After leaving Stanford University, she did visiting lecturing at Columbia University and Colgate University, and was the 2002–03 John W. Porter Distinguished Chair in Urban Education at Eastern Michigan University. She was president of the Philosophy of Education Society and the John Dewey Society.

Noddings is grounded in the moral psychology and normative ethics of care, in which the caring relationship between two people is taken as fundamental for successful development and adult flourishing. Since caring relationships cannot be fostered apart from surrounding social conditions, the ethics of care also prioritizes supporting and nurturing conditions, such as loving families, nurturing schools, and protective civic institutions. Among the influences on her theorizing are John Dewey's educational philosophy oriented around the child and Carol Gilligan's psychological inquiries into women and morality. Noddings published *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and*

Moral Education in 1984, adding her voice to a small but growing cadre of scholars across several disciplines reviving interest in altruism and virtue ethics, as a sounder alternative to deontological and utilitarian views of morality. Noddings applied her ethics of care to educational theory in *The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education* (1992) and several later books.

Noddings came to distinguish her ethics of care and its emphasis on one-to-one relationships apart from virtue ethics and its emphasis on character development in her book *Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education* (2002). Genuine ethical caring is uniformly altruistic, unlike our basic ability to care for those who already are attached to us and please us. A person acting from an “ideal” of care dutifully seeks out relationships with those who need caring, and resists cruel institutions making it easier to not care for others. Schooling should be safe environment for caring for each child’s unique developmental and intellectual needs. The caring relationship between student and teacher is paramount, and flexibility and creativity with curricula, testing, grade promotion (and so forth) are required. Because holistic caring to promote the child’s future happiness is required, teaching cannot be insulated from wider neighborhood and social problems, so the teacher must also embody civic caring and the concern of the community for each child, integrating these factors into class atmosphere and the curricula as well.

The ethics of care doesn’t stop at national borders. Noddings has also explored the role of education for humanity’s moral development, and for the ethics of global cooperation, in *Peace Education* (2012) and *Education and Democracy in the 21st Century* (2013).

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John R. Shook

NORTHROP, FILMER STUART CUCKOW (1893–1992)

F.S.C. Northrop was born on 27 November 1893 in Janesville, Wisconsin. After receiving a BA from Beloit College in 1915 and an MA from Yale University in 1919, he went to Harvard University, where he earned another MA in 1922 and a PhD in philosophy in

1924. He was appointed to the Yale faculty in 1923 as an instructor in philosophy, and was promoted to full professor in 1932. He chaired the philosophy department from 1938 to 1940, and was the first Master of Silliman College from 1940 to 1947. In 1947 Northrop was appointed Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law, and he held that title until retiring in 1962. He was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1962–63. Northrop died on 21 July 1992 in Exeter, New Hampshire.

Northrop was very active in several academic and cultural organizations. In 1949 he was decorated by the government of Mexico with the Order of the Aztec Eagle for his studies in Mexican culture, one result of which is his chapter titled “The Rich Culture of Mexico” in the best selling *The Meeting of East and West*. In 1958 he served as the U.S. Representative in the thirteen nations SEATO round table conference in Bangkok, Thailand. Northrop was a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the New York Philosophy Club and the American Academy of Political and Social Science. His cosmopolitan experience and interest in international relations resulted in several books, including *European Union and United States Foreign Policy: A Study in Sociological Jurisprudence* (1954).

Northrop’s major contribution to philosophy is in epistemology, specifically his typology of concepts. He divides all concepts into two kinds: intuition and postulation. The source of the meaning of the concept is the source of its difference for Northrop. A concept by intuition is one that denotes, and the complete meaning of which is given by, something that is immediately apprehended. Northrop gives blue in “the sense of the sensed color” as an example of a concept by intuition. The other kind of concept is concept by postulation, whose meaning

in whole or in part is designated by the postulates of the deductive theory in which it occurs. Blue in the sense of wavelength frequency in electromagnetic theory is a concept by postulation. These two types of concepts exhaust the available concepts (i.e., providing terms with meanings) from which any scientific or philosophical theory can be constructed and therefore provides a means to do comparative philosophy, analyze and solve the problem of world peace, tame nations, provide a philosophical anthropology, explain why economists from Adam Smith to Karl Marx were incapable of providing a dynamics to supplement their statics, and to ground art and religion as well as legal and ethical theory. Northrop substantiates these claims in *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (1947).

Unlike (certain interpretations of) Plato and Plotinus, there is in Northrop no propensity to degrade or downgrade the world as it is sensed in favor of the world as known by concepts by postulation. To experience the visual image of blue is as epistemically valuable and irreducible as knowing blue postulationally. The two sources of all our knowledge give information that is both complementary and supplementary. Without concepts by intuition we could never know the world in its particularity; without concepts by postulation we could never know the world in its universality and necessity. We now have enough information to give a name to Northrop's epistemology. He calls it "logical realism in epistemic correlation with radical empiricism." In other words, reason (in the form of concepts by postulation) epistemically correlated with the senses (in the form of concepts by intuition).

Northrop was an important participant in the emerging field of comparative philosophy. He asserted that Eastern philosophy has emphasized the intuition or aesthetic type

of concept, while Western philosophy emphasized the postulation or theoretical type of concept. Therefore, the East has focused on the arts, while the West has been preoccupied with science. Since both kinds of concepts are essential and complementary categories of experience, the Eastern and Western traditions can benefit from mutual learning and sharing.

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Fred A. Seddon, Jr.

NOZICK, ROBERT (1938–2002)

Robert Nozick was born on 16 November 1938 in Brooklyn, New York. Nozick went to Columbia University in 1955 where he majored in philosophy, working closely with Sydney Morgenbesser. After receiving his Columbia BA in 1959, he went to Princeton University where he earned his PhD in philosophy in 1963, under the supervision of Carl G. Hempel. He was assistant professor of philosophy at Princeton from 1963 to 1965; assistant professor at Harvard University from 1965 to 1967; and associate professor at Rockefeller University from 1967 to 1969. In 1969, at the age of 30, he was appointed full professor of philosophy at Harvard, where he remained for the rest of his career. He served as department chair from 1981 to 1984. In 1985 Harvard University appointed him Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy. In 1998 he was named Joseph Pellegrino University Professor, and held that position until his death on 23 January 2002 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Nozick was a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, a member of the Council of Scholars of the Library of Congress, and a Senior Fellow

at the Harvard Society of Fellows. He was John Locke Lecturer at Oxford University in 1997, and President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1997–98. In 1998, he was awarded the American Psychological Association's Presidential Citation, which honored him as "one of the most brilliant and original living philosophers."

Nozick published five books during his career. *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1974) offered a vigorous critique of the fundamental principles of distributive justice. *Philosophical Explanations* (1981) addressed such fundamental matters as the nature of the self, the character of knowledge, the source and status of free will, and the basic structure of ethical norms. *The Examined Life* (1989) included reflections on themes such as love, death, sex, happiness, creativity, evil, and wisdom. *The Nature of Rationality* (1993) provided novel accounts of rational action and rational belief. *Invariances* (2001) addressed such wide-ranging subjects as quantum mechanics, consciousness, and the nature of necessity. In addition, Nozick published a volume of his collected papers, *Socratic Puzzles* (1997), which included essays on ethics and political philosophy, choice and utility, philosophical methodology as well as works of short fiction. In addition to these six books, his 1963 dissertation, *The Normative Theory of Individual Choice*, was published in 1990, which addressed a number of problems in decision theory and game theory.

Although it is Nozick's political philosophy in *Anarchy, State and Utopia* that made a name for him among the wider public, his greatest influence among academic philosophers can also be traced to his discussion of Newcomb's Problem (1969) and his "tracking" theory of knowledge in *Philosophical Explanations*. Indeed, entire volumes of critical essays have been devoted to discussions of each of

these views. Numerous additional article-length discussions of Nozick's work have been published in a wide range of journals. Despite this large secondary literature, Nozick resolutely refused to attend or respond to critics, saying that "what pleases me and excites me is to think new thoughts about new topics."

The task of distributive justice, Nozick contended, can be captured by the slogan "From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen." Whether a particular distribution of goods is just depends on the process by which the distribution came about, not on the pattern that the distribution exhibits. Just as we would consider it legitimate for basketball player Wilt Chamberlain to acquire wealth as the result of each citizen voluntarily giving a quarter to watch him play, so too might it be legitimate for the resources of society to be distributed in radically inequitable ways: "no...distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously realized without...stop[ping] people from transferring resources as they wish to...or continually (or periodically) interfer[ing] to take from some persons resources that others...chose to transfer to them." Such coercive interference, he maintained, is unjustified: it involves a violation of "persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things." In addition, he maintained that there is much that is appealing about the minimal state itself: "the minimal state...[which is] the only morally legitimate state...is the one that best realizes...utopian aspirations...treating us with respect by respecting our rights" and allowing us to pursue our own chosen ends with dignity and respect.

Of the many proposals in *Philosophical Explanations*, the discussions of knowledge, personal identity, and free will provoked the greatest interest among professional philosophers. Nozick proposed that in order

to know something, we must "track" the truth: *S* knows that *p* if and only if (1) *p* is true, (2) *S* believes that *p*, (3) if *p* weren't true, *S* wouldn't believe *p* (by the method that she does), and (4) if *p* were true, *S* would believe that *p* (by the method that she does). Because the view denies "closure" – according to which if *S* knows that *p* and *S* knows that *p* implies *q*, then *S* knows that *q* – it provides a novel answer to the skeptic. One can allow that we know all sorts of ordinary propositions about the external world, while conceding that we do not know that we are not subject to massive delusion by an evil demon. While few philosophers – not even Nozick himself – accepted this account as a definitive characterization of the nature of knowledge, and while many found its starting point implausible, the view played an important role as a foil in discussions of knowledge over the next decades. Nozick's views on identity over time – that "to be something later is to be its closest continuer" – were similarly innovative and similarly controversial. By suggesting that identity over time might be determined in radically extrinsic ways, Nozick opened up important new avenues for discussion.

Nozick's *The Examined Life* offered a wide-ranging collection of speculative essays and "meditations" on topics of perennial human concern, such as love, happiness, sex, and evil. A number of the essays offered important insights into the problems they addressed – the discussion of love, for example, includes an influential discussion of the non-interchangability of the beloved, and the discussion of parents and children includes a widely cited criticism of the legitimacy of unrestricted inheritance laws.

In *The Nature of Rationality*, Nozick suggested that previous discussions of rational belief and rational decision-making had given insufficient weight to what he called "symbolic utility" – the utility

associated with the outcomes and actions that are symbolized by the act in question. Throughout the course of the volume, Nozick applied the idea to a number of extant puzzles in rational choice theory and decision theory, including Newcomb's problem, Prisoner's dilemmas, issues in the ethics of belief, and the lottery paradox. While the proposals put forth in *The Nature of Rationality* did not provoke the sort of widespread discussion associated with his first two books, certain of its insights – particularly its discussion of the role of principles in overcoming weakness of the will – generated considerable interest.

Nozick's final work, *Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World*, published shortly before his death, was even more wide-ranging than his earlier writings. Drawing on resources from analytic philosophy, evolutionary psychology, quantum mechanics and cosmology, Nozick addressed topics as diverse as the relativity of truth, the nature of objectivity and necessity, the function and origins of consciousness, and the genealogy of ethics. The central insight of the work is that objectivity is "invariance under all admissible transformations." Similarly provocative is his account of necessity. Something is necessary only if we cannot imagine how it might be otherwise. But our inability to imagine things, Nozick suggests, may result from constraints on our cognitive capacities, not from the nature of things themselves. As a result, he proposes, it may be that "lack of invention is the mother of necessity."

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NUSSBAUM, MARTHA CRAVEN (1947–)

Martha Craven was born on 6 May 1947 in New York City. She attended Wellesley College in Pennsylvania from 1964 to 1966 and then transferred to New York University as an undergraduate, where she acquired her married name of Nussbaum and graduated with the BA degree in 1969. She then received the MA in 1971 and PhD in philosophy in 1975 from Harvard University. Her first book, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium* (1978), was developed from her dissertation. She taught at Harvard as an assistant and associate professor of philosophy and classics from 1975 until 1983. She was a visiting professor at Wellesley during 1983–84. In 1984 she joined the faculty of Brown University in 1984 as a professor of classics and philosophy, adding the title of professor of comparative literature. In 1995 she moved to the University of Chicago as Professor of Law and Ethics with appointments in the Law School and the Philosophy department. In 1999 she was named Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at Chicago.

Nussbaum is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a founding member and Past President of the Human Development and Capability Association,

and a research advisor at the World Institute for Development Economics Research. She was President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division in 1999–2000. The recipient of more than 50 honorary degrees, among her other awards are the APA Henry M. Phillips Prize in Jurisprudence and the Prince of Asturias Prize in the Social Sciences. Famously, she generated controversy over her testimony in the important United States case *Romer v. Evans*. Nussbaum is one of the world's most important public intellectuals, and consistently shows the importance of philosophical analysis for important social issues, such as proper ethical thinking, education, and justice.

In Nussbaum's early work, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, she argues that human excellence is a fragile growth dependent upon many factors that are incapable of fully being controlled. Because of this, a large factor in human excellence is its essential vulnerability. Nussbaum sees this issue as a main preoccupation of ancient Greek thought. That is, the question of how can human good be good and reliably human when this is partially a problem of luck be answered properly? This question acknowledges, she thinks, aspects that Kantian ethics has to wrongfully ignore in that it tries to avoid the issue of luck altogether. Aristotle, and the Greeks, on the other hand understood the importance of relationships, for instance, while also understanding that relationships of any depth render the self more vulnerable. It may be the case that the richer the set of values embraced, the more risk is involved. She sees the tragic poets as embracing and articulating this picture of human life. The attempt to avoid tragic conflict, as most clearly exemplified in Socrates' rejection of fragility in his trial and death, is one type of particularly human tragedy in one-sidedness.

Plato's Socrates advocates for a goodness without fragility, and without emotions. Nussbaum thinks that emotions are essential for a flourishing human life, such as pity, empathy and love. She follows the lead of the tragic poets in acknowledging the existence of incommensurable goods. Human beings live within a relational situation of unavoidable risk and limitation. Once one acknowledges the existence of fragility and tragedy, ethical values must be cognizant of these facts. Nussbaum develops a cognitive and embodied theory of the emotions, wherein beliefs about the world and what is just, fair, and desirable (among other evaluative concepts) ground emotions.

This theory animates *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*. Hellenistic philosophy is described as a type of compassionate philosophical medicine for the alleviation of human suffering with human flourishing as its ultimate aim. With that aim, Hellenistic philosophy adopts a therapeutic stance towards the emotions as its main strategy. Medicine is used as an analogy because philosophy should be seen as an equally immersed art. The aim is to properly separate good desires from bad. This practice, in turn, rests upon holding that desire is founded and structured upon beliefs that are available to analysis. Therefore emotional therapy entails cognitive therapy. This, in turn, requires an education in philosophy, rational argument and conceptions of the human good.

Much of Nussbaum's later work develops and applies these ideas in the realm of law. For instance, in *Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life*, she argues that literary imagination is an essential part of public rationality, for ethical evaluation and for legal reasoning (especially that of the judge). Nussbaum's analysis takes as its main oppositional model the economist's world-view; economists tend to level down

incommensurables so as to ignore the difficulty or impossibility of ranking them. Economists also try to reduce complex motivations to a simple mechanical metric therefore sacrificing psychological depth and complexity. Complex emotions are central to rational decision making, and proper emotions are grounded by cognitive content.

The combination of emotion and law is further developed in works such as *Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law*. She claims that not only are emotions implicated in the law, they are an essential part of law's content. For instance, there are the essential emotions, such as anger and grief. And much law is rightly premised upon feelings of vulnerability and insecurity. Even in law, appeals to emotion serve as a reminder of common humanity, since our laws and our emotions "incorporate thoughts." But, importantly, because emotions have structure and content, they are both analyzable and prone to errors. For instance, the emotions of shame and disgust are especially likely to be "normatively distorted" due to features of their specific internal structure. This is because disgust embodies magical ideas of contamination and purity and nonanimality. Shame is, on the other hand, more complex; if used carefully, it has a positive role in social life. But in both cases they are prone to be attached to attempts to hide from human fragility, vulnerability, and animality, thus becoming attached to an escape fantasy of purity and projective disgust.

Once the centrality of emotion, and the complexity of human values are accepted, the importance of the humanities for human flourishing becomes evident. This Nussbaum argues for in books such as *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* and *Not For Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities*. Nussbaum laments a focus in education that doesn't

value the skills necessary for democracy, but rather aims at producing “useful machines.” Education for democracy means that there are specific abilities that a nation needs in its citizens, such as the ability to think well about political issues, recognize fellow citizens as people with equal rights, have concern for others, to imagine variety of complex issues, judge leaders critically and realistically, think of the good of nation as a whole and to see nation as part of a complex world order. Further, education should not be just for economics and citizenship, but also for developing the tools necessary for meaningful lives. An emphasis upon the humanities and the arts can help to develop the capacity to see from other’s point of view, teach compassion toward weakness and abilities of cooperation and reciprocity, concern for others, help undermine destructive emotions and strengthen critical thinking and respect for dissent.

Her Capabilities Approach to political justice is presented in *Women and Human Development*, and developed *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*, worked out in collaboration with economist Amartya Sen and others. Nussbaum makes a much more explicitly normative and constitutional use of the idea of capability, focused on what people are able to do with real opportunities. Nussbaum argues that this means one must situate the approach in the narrative context of actual human lives. In *Women and Human Development* she focuses upon the daily lives of women in India, finding that they often face systematic privation. She argues that the best way to protect from such privation would be to politically protect specific central capabilities. By focusing upon capabilities, not functionings, her approach provides a large area for individual choice.

She identifies ten capabilities that are central to the ability to live a truly human

life. Included in them are protections for such capabilities as the ability to live to the end of a normal length human life and not have one’s life reduced to not worth living, bodily integrity, the ability to produce self-expressive works and engage in religious rituals without fear of political ramifications, the ability to be able to form a conception of the good and critically reflect on it, being treated with dignity and equal worth, and the ability to own property and seek employment on an equal basis with others. These capabilities are heterogeneous and incommensurable, not to be bargained off against each other, and serve as a foundational set of necessary values for the constitutional structure of government. Furthermore, they are to be seen as creating bottom-up threshold for government protection. In later work she has expressly positioned the list of capabilities as compatible with and somewhat of a corrective for aspects of Rawls’ political liberalism.

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O

ODELIN, JACQUES (1789–1841)

Jacques Odelin, a priest and philosopher, was born on 5 August 1789 in Saint-Constant, a town near Montréal in Lower Canada (now the province of Québec). His prominence was tied to his challenge to the theory of French priest and philosopher Hugues-Félicité-Robert de La Mennais (1782–1854) that common sense is the source of certainty. Odelin preferred the teachings of Descartes, which affirmed authority while upholding the revered right to reason. Odelin engaged other leading intellectuals of Canada in disputes ranging across philosophy.

While attending the Collège de Saint-Raphaël in Montréal from 1801 to 1811, Odelin studied under the Sulpician Antoine-Jacques Houdet, one of the well-known philosophers of the day. For further theological training towards the priesthood he went to the Séminaire de Nicolet near Trois-Rivières in 1811 where Jean Raimbault was Superior. Odelin also taught the fifth-year class in belles-lettres during 1811–12, the two-year philosophy program in 1812–13, the sixth year in rhetoric in 1813–14, and philosophy again during 1814–16.

On 4 February 1816 Odelin was ordained as priest by Bishop Hoseseph-Octave Plessis. He soon quit teaching and became an assistant priest at Sainte-Marguerite-de-Blairfindie (L'Acadie) from 17 February to 18 September that same year. Odelin also served as assistant priest in the Montréal parish of Saint-Laurent

from September 1816 to September 1817. From September 1817 to October 1819, Odelin served as chaplain of the Hôpital Général of Québec where his primary responsibilities included mission work. Odelin next received a parish charge at Saint-Gregoire (Bécancour) where he served until 1821. It is here that Odelin found that some parishioners showed some “indifference” to religion.

Odelin's difficulties continued when he was appointed to Ours-du-Saint-Esprit (Saint-Esprit) from September 1821 until 1827. From February 1827 to October 1831, Odelin's priestly powers were suspended after two parishioner petitions accused him of drunkenness and insinuated sexual misconduct. After briefly living in Detroit, Odelin endured a “Rule of Life” punishment during 1830–31, which required retraining in the dogmatics of religion and morality, moderation with alcohol, and good behavior towards “members of other sex.” By October 1831 Odelin was granted full absolution of his previous faults, and restored to full priestly duties at Saint-Hilaire, where he remained for the rest of his life.

It was at Saint-Hilaire that Mr. Odelin became known by the title “Canadian Metaphysician” because of increased awareness of his strong philosophical views. In 1833 Odelin began questioning the orthodoxy of Bishop Jean-Jacques Lartigue and Joseph-Sabin Raymond, professor of philosophy at Séminaire de Saint-Hyacinthe, for their adherence to La Mennais's theory concerning common sense as the source of certainty.

Odelin claimed that La Mennais's flaw was that he used a single criterion for determining common sense in his philosophy. Odelin carried on this dispute in local periodicals such as *L'Ami du peuple, de l'ordre et des lois* of Montréal and *L'Echo du pays* of Saint-Charles. In 1833 and 1834, Odelin wrote some thirty articles, first under the anagram Dionel and later under his own name, attacking the views of La Mennais, and essentially the logic and philosophy of much of Catholic teaching across Lower Canada. Raymond and John Charles Prince countered Odelin with many more articles written in opposition.

Over time, Odelin's following grew. In July 1834 the debate ended when Pope Gregory XVI published *Singulari nos* to condemn the teachings of La Mennais. These metaphysical debates had implications for both ecclesiastical and political authority, which also drew in Odelin. 1837 and 1838 was a time marked by rebellion across Canada. During this period, Odelin was asked by Bishop Jean-Jacques Lartigue to openly display loyalty to the government. In 1840 Odelin signed a petition from clergy against a union between Upper and Lower Canada. On 9 June 1841 Odelin suffered an unexpected death in Saint-Hilaire. He was known for his philosophical view of man as an intellectual and moral being that uses the senses to participate in the Trinity.

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Seth J. Batiste

OFFEN, BENJAMIN (1772–1848)

Benjamin Offen, author, lecturer, and freethinker, was born on 30 December 1772 in Sussex, England. A shoemaker by trade, Offen was self-educated. In 1824 Offen emigrated to America, and after settling in New York City, the center of American freethought at the time, he quickly established himself as a leading figure in the movement. In 1825 Offen organized the first known birthday celebration of Thomas Paine in America. This event signals the influence of British émigrés like Offen and fellow reformers, such as Robert Owen, who were ironically much more familiar with Paine's thought, on the revival of freethought in America.

In the wake of the Paine celebration, Offen helped to found the Free Press Association, an organization that he served as president until it dissolved in 1829. Together with atheist Abner Kneeland, he also helped form the United Moral and Philosophical Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge at Saratoga Springs, New York. This freethought

society held annual conventions until 1841. Most of Offen's freethought career was in the service of the Society of Moral Philanthropists who held weekly lectures at Tammany Hall in New York City for over a decade. Offen specialized in criticism of the Bible. His attacks on the moral laxities of the clergy were often offensive to the standards of good taste at the time. One of the most publicized events in which Offen participated was a debate on the veracity of the Bible in 1835 with Dr. William W. Sleigh. The debate went out for fifteen nights and was reportedly attended by thousands, and the proceedings were published in 1836. First in 1828, and then again in 1844, Offen undertook lecture tours of upstate New York in order to secure support for freethought periodicals. Offen died in New York City on 12 May 1848.

Offen's major publication is *A Legacy to the Friends of Free Discussion: Being a Review of the Principal Historical Facts and Personages of the Books Known as the Old and New Testament; with Remarks on the Morality of Nature* (1846). Offen challenges the veracity of the Bible, the existence of God and the social impact of Christianity. In these pages one gets a flavor of what Offen's lectures at Tammany Hall must have been like, at least insofar as content. What is of more significance however than Offen's attacks on religion is his defense of freethought and naturalistic morality. In the work's preface Offen offers a definition of freethought. "It is the exercise of the reasoning faculties. Without Free Discussion man cannot exist. His physical existence might indeed remain; but he could no longer be deemed a man. Without investigation it is impossible to arrive at Truth; hence the utility of Free Discussion. This is never denied when science is the subject; and we have yet to learn why it should be restrained in any case; and also *how* and *when* any set of men became possessed of the

right to restrain the exercise of the reasoning faculties of their fellow men" (1846, iii).

What is significant about Offen's defense of freethought is both his attribution of reasoning as an essential feature of humans and his assertion that the freedom of investigation found in the sciences cannot be principally restricted from other areas of inquiry. In this latter position Offen is prefiguring a central tenet of pragmatism that would develop later in the century. One can readily identify Charles Peirce's dictum that no one shall block the path of inquiry in Offen's defense of importance of free discussion in the pursuit of truth. Man is lost, Offen claims, only when he strays from the light of reason. "All men in common, have reason to consult, by which man will learn the duty he owes to himself and also to his fellow beings. The error lies in being taught, that reason, when in full exercise, will lead him into error" (viii).

Offen's goal in *A Legacy to the Friends of Free Discussion* is not simply to rehearse his arguments against Christianity honed in the lecture hall. He additionally endeavors to provide an outline of a naturalistic morality. For Offen, the person who servers morality from religion can "by the use of this reason, without the aid of revelation, discover the duties which he owes to himself, and also the true relation in which he stands to his fellow mortals" (205). Further, Offen argues that the infidel has an advantage over the believer because the unbeliever is in a better position to understand that moral failing is not to be conceived in terms of an original state of sin but rather only insofar as one fails to fulfill their duties to other human beings.

Claiming that nature has both endowed human kind with reason and a tendency to shirk from pain, Offen proposes a hedonistic standard of morality. Our duty to ourselves,

and to others, is to employ our rational powers to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. Because all living creatures retreat from pain equally this provides the only necessary groundwork for morality. Since this fact is grounded in nature no revelation is required to inform humanity of their moral obligations. One has no right to inflict pain on another because they are governed by the same human nature that causes one to find one's own pain abhorrent. "Let every human being, then, turn to laws of his own organization, namely, to his love of happiness, and aversion to pain. These laws will give him unerring instruction as to the duties which he has to perform, and also as to what evils he is to avoid" (209). Although Offen is regularly credited with being a leading figure in the revival of freethought he perhaps ought to be counted amongst American defenders of a Utilitarian standard of morality as well.

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Russell Pryba

OTTO, MAX CARL (1876–1968)

Max C. Otto was born on 28 September 1876 at Zwickau in Saxony, Germany, and died on 2 October 1968 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In 1881 he was brought by his parents from Germany to West Virginia. At a relatively late age he enrolled at Carroll College in Wisconsin, and after a year he transferred to the University of Wisconsin, receiving a BA in history in 1906. After a year of advanced study, first at the University of Chicago and then the University of Heidelberg, he returned to the University of Wisconsin and earned a PhD in philosophy in 1911, working with Professors E. B. McGilvary and Frank C. Sharp. He was appointed assistant professor of philosophy at Wisconsin in 1907, and spent the rest of his long career there. Otto was promoted to full professor of philosophy not long after his initial appointment, and served as chair of the philosophy department from 1936 until his retirement in 1947. He was President of the American Philosophical Association Western Division in 1929–30.

Otto became the most well-known member of the philosophy department, which included like-minded pragmatists Boyd Bode and Horace Kallen. Otto was an ardent admirer of William James and John Dewey, and

developed his own form of pragmatism, which he called humanistic pragmatism, or sometimes scientific humanism. His courses and his writings reflected his deep philosophical commitment to making philosophy relevant to the problems of human beings. His first book, *Things and Ideals: Essays in Functional Philosophy* (1924) was followed by *Natural Laws and Human Hopes* (1926). His third book, *The Human Enterprise* was published in 1940. Its subtitle, “An Attempt to Relate Philosophy to Human Life,” is an apt and accurate summary of his aims in his books and in his teaching. *Science and the Moral Life: Selected Writings* was published in 1949.

In 1943 Otto was one of five well-known members of the profession selected by the American Philosophical Association to serve on the newly established Commission on the Function of Philosophy in Liberal Arts Education, which traveled around the country to meet in organized sessions with various groups of people interested in the topic. *Philosophy in American Education: Its Tasks and Opportunities* (1945), to which Otto contributed two chapters, “Professional Philosophy and the Public” and “Philosophy in the Community.”

Perhaps the idea that Otto was most well known for was what he called creative bargaining (or, on occasion, realistic idealism), which was an idea inspired by James’s essay, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life.” Otto was intrigued by a method for resolving conflicts of interests, and was first presented in *Things and Ideals* and developed in his other books. For Otto, the transcendent interest is “an organization of affairs which will enable mankind to move step by step toward the fulfillment of life generously and nobly achieved” (1940, pp. 349, 367). For some persons, Otto says, “life is a series of business transactions,” because

modern business has evolved for so many people into their overriding interest, trumping all others, and this is a distortion of the proper and sensible end of human life, “the *human* enterprise.” Business, in Otto’s view, is properly only a part of life, but Business, with a capital “B,” has loomed so large as to become identified with life itself. “A society which refused to identify life with business, which recognized business, as generally conceived, to be parasitic on life, and which recreated itself in response to this recognition, would liberate and develop human powers now left to atrophy or to find satisfaction in sentimentalism or dreaming” (1924, p. 155). He asked, “Shall business have a *place* in life, or *be* life? [This] is ... the momentous social question of our time” (1926, p. 93).

Otto distinguished sharply between cosmic atheism and ethical atheism, claimed that too many people who decried cosmic atheism, who professed a militant faith in the existence of God, were at the same time ethical atheists, people who failed to live up the ethical ideals that faith in God was meant to support and require. Otto was a cosmic atheist and a Unitarian. However, he insisted that he was not an ethical atheist. Although he expressed an “affirmative faith in the nonexistence of God” (1940, p. 334), he maintained that the idealistic moral work which faith in the existence of God had previously buttressed now needs to be accomplished without this cosmic metaphysical faith, since so many powerful figures in the society, though they loudly profess to be religious and God-fearing, are actually ethical atheists – that is, acquisitive, materialistic, rapacious, greedy, and immoral.

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Marcus G. Singer

P

PAINE, THOMAS (1737–1809)

Thomas (Tom) Paine was born on 29 January 1737 in Thetford in the shire of Norfolk, England. Paine decided to go to America to seek his fortune. Benjamin Franklin, whom Paine had met in London, provided him with letters of introduction and helped him procure a job as a writer and later editor of *Pennsylvania Magazine*, where Paine's writing ability became evident. Paine wrote about social issues during this time, and his association with Franklin helped him to become acquainted with the leaders of the American independence movement.

In January 1776, Paine anonymously published *Common Sense*, which was extremely successful. Paine's arguments for the severing of ties with Britain were written differently than those of the philosophers (which were not passionate enough), the journalists (not philosophical enough) and the other leaders of the rebellion (not enough of either). Paine's clarity, the ability to put the high philosophical ideals into context with what was going on in the colonies at the time but yet be understood by everyone, is what makes this pamphlet unique. *Common Sense* went even further than the original sentiment, protesting English taxes (which he knew well as an excise tax collector), advocating breaking away from England and declaring independence. It is thought that around 150,000 copies were sold in 1776 alone. Paine continued to write for the *Magazine* and actually served as a volunteer to General Nathanael Greene for

some time. In December 1776, he began *The American Crisis* pamphlets, which bolstered both the revolutionaries and the cause that he supported. He learned first-hand what the troops were going through and wrote this series as an inspiration to them.

After the war, Congress gave Paine a farm in New Rochelle, New York, for his extraordinary work in the war effort. Paine reportedly gave all the money he made from *Common Sense* to the cause, in addition to writing his many pamphlets, articles, and editorials. He lived in New Rochelle for a few years following this award. In 1787 he traveled to Europe and became embroiled in the French Revolution controversy by writing a response to Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (and thus ending their friendship). In this work, called *The Rights of Man* (1791 and 1792), he defended the French Revolution and attacked the system of monarchy, and thereby threatening the King of England and the foundation of the British government. Paine argued that revolution is a proper method to secure the rights of its citizens if the government does not. If the government cannot fulfill its duties to safeguard the rights of its citizens, he felt, then the government itself is "illegitimate" and therefore ought to be removed. Paine's argument seems to follow the work done by John Locke in his *A Second Treatise on Civil Government* (1689) and expresses Paine's belief in a "natural rights," which included dignity for all men, civil liberties, and political equality.

The Rights of Man was intended to stir the common man, and as *Common Sense* did in America, his new book sold very well (over 200,000 copies) because it explained his ideals in a very understandable way. As a result, Paine was tried for seditious libel in Britain *in absentia*, and found guilty after he fled to France. The people of France embraced his coming and he (as well as several of the other American patriots) was named an honorary French citizen. He was elected to the National Convention in 1792 and represented a district despite his lack of French speaking skills. Eventually, he grew into disfavor of Robespierre and those in power in France, and was thrown into prison in December 1793. He barely escaped the guillotine and was released from prison in November 1794, publicly denouncing George Washington for not coming to his aid. He remained in France until 1802, whereupon he returned to the United States.

Just before Paine was imprisoned in France, he began writing *The Age of Reason* (1794) and wrote parts two and three of this work in 1795. Paine was a Deist in his beliefs; he did not follow either his mother's Anglicanism or his father's Quakerism. He wrote about his "natural religion" and attacked institutionalized religious systems, including Christianity. Christianity was regarded as particularly bad, as Paine felt that the Church was corrupt, looking for political power and oppressing its followers. Paine compared the Church to the governments he discussed in his earlier works, and felt that a revolution here was needed too.

The Age of Reason criticizes the Bible, religious revelation, miracles, and everything that was "supernatural" about religion. Paine felt that reason replaces revelation, although reason still could be used to argue for the existence of God. Paine's style, again, made those philosophical ideals, this time regarding religion, accessible to the common

reader, both intellectually and financially (since the pamphlet was rather inexpensive as well). This work was highly criticized as it was published. The British Government prosecuted the publishers of *The Age of Reason*, even going to the extreme of having many copies burned right off the presses. *The Age of Reason* was received a little better in the U.S. and contributed to the heightened interest in Deism during that era.

Paine returned to the U.S. in 1802 and lived a quiet life for his last few years, sharing time between his farm in New Rochelle and a room in Greenwich Village in New York City. Paine became increasingly estranged from society due to his views. He had already irritated the English (with *Common Sense* and *The Rights of Man*), was neither on good terms with the French (hence his imprisonment), the Americans (due to his criticism of Washington) and he had finally attacked organized religion. Despite being invited to return to America by President Thomas Jefferson, in his last years he was essentially an exile. Paine died in obscurity in New York City on 8 June 1809.

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Timothy Binga

PALMER, ELIHU (1764–1806)

Elihu Palmer was born to a farming family in Canterbury, Connecticut, on 7 August 1764. He attended Dartmouth College, studying philosophy and theology with President John Wheelock, and he received the BA degree in 1787. He entered the ministry in the Presbyterian Church and served as the minister of a church in Newtown on Long Island in New York, but he was removed in 1789 as his denials of both Christ's divinity and the reality of original sin became more strident. He then became a Baptist minister, but after his dismissal for heresy once again, in 1791 he

moved to Philadelphia to practice law. Yellow fever took his vision and his wife in 1793. No longer able to work, he traveled across the Eastern United States lecturing on deism. Palmer became good friends with freethinker Thomas Paine, whose book *The Age of Reason* (1794–95) was a great inspiration for Palmer, and he published a defense of Paine in 1794.

Palmer helped organize deistic societies throughout the early United States, including the Deistical Society of the State of New York in 1796. He composed this organization's statement of Principles: "1. That the universe proclaims the existence of one supreme Deity, worthy of the adoration of intelligent beings. 2. That man is possessed of moral and intellectual faculties sufficient for the improvement of his nature, and the acquisition of happiness. 3. That the religion of nature is the only universal religion; that it grows out of the moral relations of intelligent beings, and it stands connected with the progressive improvement and common welfare of the human race. 4. That it is essential to the true interest of man, that he love truth and practise virtue. 5. That vice is everywhere ruinous and destructive to the happiness of the individual and of society. 6. That a benevolent disposition, and beneficent actions, are fundamental duties of rational beings. 7. That a religion mingled with persecution and malice cannot be of divine origin. 8. That education and science are essential to the happiness of man. 9. That civil and religious liberty is equally essential to his true interests. 10. That there can be no human authority to which man ought to be amenable for his religious opinions. 11. That science and truth, virtue and happiness, are the great objects to which the activity and energy of the human faculties ought to be directed" (1824, 10–11; Muelder 1940, 83).

Unlike his contemporaries, Palmer's populist critiques of revealed religion were formed in the context of the Church's life,

rather than outside of it. In his 1802 *Principles of Reason*, he derided Christianity for its superstitions and assaults on human dignity. In contrast to other prominent American deists of the time, he did not seek to rehabilitate either the Bible or the figure of Jesus. As an inspiration for "fanatics," Jesus was "a murderer in principle," and the Bible was "indecent" and "immoral." He understood God to be a distant creator, co-eternal with the world. Palmer offered reason as a systematic moral alternative to revealed religion, resting his system upon his ideas of "reciprocal justice" and "universal benevolence." He sought to ground virtuous behavior upon the alleviation of suffering, a morality dictated by human reason and not revelation. Palmer's staunch republicanism was as radical as his religion, and he denounced both the Church and European monarchies as partners in tyranny.

Palmer's passion and rhetorical skill helped form deism into a popular movement. He published two periodicals while living in New York, *The Temple of Reason* (1800–01), and *The Prospect, or View of the Moral World* (1803–05). Palmer then returned to Philadelphia, where he died on 7 April 1806.

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Kyle Potter

PAYNE, DANIEL ALEXANDER (1811–1893)

Daniel Payne was born on 24 February 1811 in Charleston, South Carolina. Although born in the South during the time of slavery, Payne and his family were free. His early education consisted of lessons from his mother, training available through the Cumberland Street Methodist Episcopal Church, and training by tutors in the basics of several ancient languages, history, the natural sciences, and Scripture. Payne worked to educate young children in his community, although laws against educating African-Americans resulted in the dismantling of the school he started in South Carolina. Payne enrolled in Gettysburg Theological College in 1835 because of his growing interest in the pastorate, but health issues necessitated the end of his formal education in 1837.

Payne was ordained by the Lutheran Church (Franckean Synod) two years after ending seminary training and he began a long career in church ministry. In 1841 he left the Lutheran Church and affiliated with the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME Church). As a member of this denomination he continued his commitment to formal education by developing educational opportunities for young people in Philadelphia. In addition to this educational work, he was ordained and pastored Israel Bethel AME Church in Baltimore, Maryland. Through his direct relationship with the educational system and with the AME Church, Payne began to publish articles that extended his concern with formal education by encouraging ministers within the Church to seek opportunity to refine their grasp of philosophy, theology, and the other basic elements of a classical education. His stance on formal education was convincing, and as a result he was made chair of the AME Church's Committee on Education. In this capacity he developed a curriculum to be followed by those entering AME Church ministry. For Payne this educational agenda was one dimension of his attack on emotion-based and intellectually weak folk religion dominant within many of the local churches. He was much more interested, for example, in formal hymns and thoughtful sermons than old spirituals and the religious energy of ecstatic experience encouraged through superficial sermons by untrained preachers.

In 1848 Payne began work on a history of the AME Church that explored its doctrinal development, historical progression, and its theological and philosophical foundation. This history was followed by other texts: *The Semi Centenary and the Retrospection of the AME Church in the United States of America* (1866); *The History of the African Methodist Episcopal Church from 1816 to 1856* (1891); and *Recollections of Seventy Years* (1888).

In 1852 Payne was elected a Bishop of the AME Church. With greater visibility and control over a larger region of the Church, Payne began developing literary groups and lyceums to encourage attention to theological and philosophical issues of the day. A more institutionally significant development initiated by Payne was the purchase of Wilberforce University in Ohio. After purchasing this institution, he guided its development for several years as its President from 1863 to 1876. He was the first African-American to head a college in the United States. In his later years he was a prolific author and lecturer. He died on 29 November 1893 near Xenia, Ohio.

Although Payne had no formal training in philosophy, his sermons, speeches, and lectures addressed numerous philosophical issues as they related to the development of the African-American community during the nineteenth century. He gave a considerable amount of attention to the problem of evil and the manner in which African-Americans might respond to this issue in keeping with a firm faith in good and clear sense of historical context. This issue was particularly important in light of slavery, the devastation of the Civil War and the failure of Reconstruction. In addition, Payne's writings speak to a concern with philosophy of identity as it relates to the effort of African-Americans to gain stature as full citizens of the United States. Other issues debated within African-American communities did not escape his attention, and as a result he gave considerable thought to the relationship between Africa and African-Americans. Some argued for emigration as the proper stance – the movement of African-Americans back to Africa for cultural renewal, political progress – and the natural outgrowth of a teleological understanding of history. Payne connected African-Americans to the United States, and argued that the identity and purpose of African-American life

is revealed through work within the context of North America. He maintained that a proper relationship to Africa involved missionary activity by which African-Americans took Christian sensibilities to foreign lands as a part of divine providence. He warned, however, that they must avoid introducing yet another form of imperialism.

Issues of ontology were present in Payne's writings and sermons to the extent that his time period was marked by a sense of American "chosenness" (in other words, manifest destiny) that often involved a degrading of African-Americans through a questioning of their humanity and their ability to participate within American society as equals. Payne argued that African-Americans were in fact children of God. Regarding this point, in a speech titled "Welcome to the Ransomed" (1862), he discussed the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. He remarked that "the Eternal loves all, and manifests the infinity of his nature, by his universal care for all mankind. In this, He also demonstrates His universal Fatherhood, and thereby establishes the brotherhood of man." African-Americans, by this connection to the divine, are worthy of full participation in the life of this country. And in fact, the positive development of the United States required their creativity and talents exercised with morality and an ethic of honest labor. Payne was convinced that slavery deformed humanity by damaging moral agency. However, with freedom came the potential for moral regeneration and active participation in the unfolding of God's plan for humanity. In this sense, Payne's abolitionist sensibilities were guided by a philosophy of human progress as an inevitable part of a divine plan.

These various dimensions of his work made Daniel Payne one of the most important figures of the nineteenth century, and arguably the most important African-American church leader of his era.

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Anthony B. Pinn

PEGIS, ANTON CHARLES (1905–1978)

Anton Pegis was born on 24 August 1905 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He received his BA in 1928 and MA in 1929 from Marquette

University. In 1929 he went to study with Étienne Gilson at his newly established Institute of Mediaeval Studies at the University of Toronto, Canada, receiving his PhD in philosophy there in 1931. He held philosophy positions at Marquette from 1931 to 1937 and Fordham University from 1937 to 1944, before returning as professor of history of philosophy at the Institute in Toronto with a concurrent appointment in the graduate department of philosophy at Toronto from 1944 to 1952. Pegis was elected President of the Institute in 1946 and oversaw the expansion of its faculty, programs and renowned library.

In 1952 Pegis resigned as President of the Institute to become Director of the Catholic Textbook Division of Doubleday and Company in New York, although he continued to lecture part-time at Toronto. After nine years at Doubleday, Pegis returned in 1961 to his appointment at the Institute and Department in Toronto, where he taught until his retirement in 1971. As emeritus, Pegis offered occasional courses at Toronto and helped establish the Graduate Center for Thomistic Studies at the University of St. Thomas in Houston, Texas. He served as the Center's first Director from 1976 until his death on 13 May 1978 in Toronto, Canada. Among his offices and distinctions, Pegis was President of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 1946 and awarded its Aquinas Medal in 1975; he was elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada in 1950; and he was awarded an honorary LLD by Marquette in 1956.

Pegis was the first of a prominent group of historians of medieval philosophy, which included Joseph Owens and Armand Maurer, who were students of Gilson and who spent their careers at his Institute of Mediaeval Studies at Toronto. All were dedicated to Gilson's project of the historical recovery

of medieval philosophy, particularly that of Thomas Aquinas, and largely endorsed his highly controversial idea that it exemplified what he termed Christian philosophy. Pegis's historical research ran the gamut of the medieval period and was principally concerned with the medieval assimilation of Greek philosophy and especially of Aristotle's psychology. This assimilation, according to Pegis, was not simply a baptism of Greek sources, in which offending theses were corrected or excised, but an innovation, in which Greek philosophy was taken in new directions and revitalized under the influence of the overarching theological purpose to which it was put. With Gilson, therefore, Pegis rejected the neo-Scholastic reading of medieval philosophy, meant to support the nineteenth century revival of Thomism as a philosophically legitimate enterprise, that as a matter of historical fact philosophy existed in the middle ages, and above all in Aquinas, as an autonomous science, wholly independent of its instrumental use by theology.

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Stephen D. Dumont

PEIRCE, BENJAMIN (1809–1880)

Benjamin Peirce was born on 4 April 1809 in Salem, Massachusetts, and he died on 6 October 1880 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He obtained the BA degree in 1829 from Harvard where he had the formative experience of reading Nathaniel Bowditch's proof sheets (which he extensively corrected and revised) for his translation of Pierre-Simon Laplace's four-volume *Mécanique Céleste*. In 1831 Peirce was appointed a tutor at Harvard College and became responsible for the entire mathematics program. In 1833 Peirce obtained his MA degree from Harvard and was appointed University Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy. Nine years later, in 1842, he was made the first Perkins Professor of Astronomy and Mathematics, a post he held for the rest of his life. In 1867 Harvard awarded him an honorary LLD degree. In 1833 Peirce married Sarah Hunt Mills with whom he raised a family of four sons and one daughter. The eldest son, James Mills, became a professor of mathematics at Harvard and first dean of

the graduate school, and the youngest son, Herbert Henry Davis, became a diplomat. It was son Charles Sanders Peirce, however, who, as a philosopher, logician and scientist, most exemplified the intellectually innovative and wide-ranging genius of his father.

Benjamin Peirce played a key role in establishing a professional scientific community in the United States through, for example, his involvement in the founding of the Smithsonian Institution and the National Academy of Sciences. In the creation and functioning of a number of other organizations he played important background roles, only being recognized publicly when he was called on to assume a prominent role as when he was appointed consulting astronomer for the Nautical Almanac (1849–67) and superintendent of the U.S. Coast Survey (1867–74). As superintendent of the Coast Survey, Peirce obtained an act of Congress authorizing scientific operations to create a transcontinental geodetic connection from coast to coast along the 39th parallel. He appointed his son Charles to be in charge of gravity determinations, such determinations being necessary to establish the transcontinental link. As superintendent, Peirce also helped his good friend and colleague, Louis Agassiz, mount an expedition around the tip of South America to collect evidence that Agassiz hoped would refute Darwin's theory of evolution.

During all of these activities Peirce remained a professor at Harvard where he almost single-handedly introduced research as a component function of a university mathematics department in America. Among his students were Simon Newcomb and George W. Hill who became leaders of the scientific community of their generation. Peirce was instrumental in bringing from England one of the greatest mathematicians of the time, J. J. Sylvester, to the newly founded

Johns Hopkins University. He authored eleven textbooks, with six at an elementary level. The bulk of his research publications concerned astronomy, geodesy and mechanics, and it was his computation in 1848 of the general perturbations of Uranus and Neptune that first established his scientific reputation. He also contributed to experimental methodology and in his time was widely known for his criterion for rejecting aberrant experimental data. Nevertheless his work in pure mathematics has proven to be at least as enduringly important, especially in what he termed linear associative algebra. The often-quoted assertion that “Mathematics is the science which draws necessary conclusions” is the first sentence of his treatise on the subject (1870, 97). In it he developed means to classify all complex associative algebras of dimension less than seven. It provided ideas that aided Charles Peirce in his development of the logic of relatives.

Benjamin Peirce's philosophical interests ranged far beyond the theoretical questions in mathematics and logic for which he is usually remembered. He propounded a broad and far-reaching evolutionary rationalism based on Laplace's Nebular Hypothesis, which held that the solar system has evolved from a giant revolving gaseous mass that has cooled and condensed. Peirce's evolutionary philosophy gave emphasis to five key elements: (1) *Chaos*, which “had for Peirce a definite mathematical meaning – that set of initial conditions from which, under the differential equations of dynamics, nothing followed”; (2) *Matter*, “in itself inert, and without powers or properties except that of receiving and retaining any amount of impressed mechanical force”; (3) *Force*, “the great wonder worker, which gave the universe all its dynamic properties”; (4) *Motion*, “the chief characteristic of the universe ... the sole clue to the presence of both force and

matter, and ... without motion there would be no events at all”; and (5) *Equilibrium of forces*. “In inorganic systems, a balance of forces produces no change in motion, whereas unstable equilibrium results in an acceleration. The striking thing about organic or living systems, Peirce held, was just their ability to remain in unstable equilibrium without destructive motion taking place.” Peirce noted that “given the primal chaos with its homogeneous distribution of matter and energy, ... the slightest speck of discontinuity would suffice to start nebular evolution, by providing a focus for gravitational attraction.”

Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology included a number of doctrines that would reappear in the philosophy of his son Charles. He held that there was such an intimate relation between the structure of the universe and that of mind that “the parallel developments in the realms of matter and spirit formed a single cosmology, a vast orderly cosmos infused with ideality.” Peirce was a strong advocate of the underlying continuity of the universe and of the fundamental lawfulness of evolution. At bottom, the universe has to be rational (law governed) to be intelligible.

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Albert C. Lewis

and

Nathan Houser

PEIRCE, CHARLES SANDERS (1839–1914)

Charles S. Peirce (pronounced “purse”) was born on 10 September 1839 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He was the second son of Benjamin Peirce, Harvard professor of mathematics and astronomy, and Sarah Hunt Mills. Charles Peirce obtained his BA from Harvard in 1859, and in 1860 he studied with the naturalist Louis Agassiz before entering Harvard’s Lawrence Scientific School in 1861. In July of that year he was appointed a regular aide in the U.S. Coast Survey. In 1862 he received his MA degree from Harvard, and on 16 October of that same year he married Harriet Melusina Fay, who later became a prominent feminist and social activist. In 1863 Peirce graduated summa cum laude with a ScB in chemistry from the Lawrence Scientific School.

After his graduation Peirce continued to work for the Coast Survey. In November

of 1872 he was put in charge of pendulum research to determine the exact shape of the earth. Working with European geodesists, Peirce continued to do internationally respected pendulum research until he resigned from the Survey in 1891. From October 1869 until December 1872, he was also an assistant at the Harvard Observatory, which led to his *Photometric Researches* (1878), the only book he published during his lifetime. While still in Cambridge in the early 1870s, Peirce joined Chauncey Wright, his lifelong friend William James, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and others, in discussions which they called “The Metaphysical Club.” Peirce introduced his doctrine of pragmatism to this club, and this event was brought to the world’s attention in 1897 by James.

Apart from his appointment as lecturer of logic at Johns Hopkins from 1879 to 1884, Peirce never held an academic position, though he did deliver series of lectures at Harvard (1865, 1869, 1903), and at the Lowell Institute (1866, 1892, 1903). While at Hopkins, Peirce edited and published an influential volume entitled *Studies in Logic* (1883) consisting of essays by him and his students, and also performed psychological experiments. Peirce’s short academic career is due in part to his cantankerous personality, in part to powerful enemies, and in part to the appearance of immorality caused by his second marriage to Juliette Froissy Pourtalais just two days after his divorce from Zina Fay who had left him six years before. In 1887 the Peirces moved to a small farmhouse near Milford, Pennsylvania, where he died on 19 April 1914.

After leaving the Coast Survey in December 1891, Peirce spent the last decades of his life as an independent scholar. In addition to a great quantity of highly original work, Peirce contributed hundreds of book reviews, mostly for *The Nation*, supplied numerous entries

for James Mark Baldwin’s *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (earlier he had written about 16,000 entries for the Century Dictionary), wrote college textbooks and even schoolbooks in mathematics, and developed a correspondence course in logic. Though highly successful with his reviews and the articles he wrote for Paul Carus’s journal *The Monist*, Peirce failed to get any of his book manuscripts published. The latter includes the manuscripts for two logic books: “How to Reason” (1894), and “Minute Logic” (1902).

About ninety percent of Peirce’s writings were never published during his life. Peirce’s lifetime publications are estimated to total no fewer than ten thousand, with new materials still being discovered. Shortly after Peirce’s death, Josiah Royce arranged for Peirce’s papers to be sent to Harvard, where they remain, though much of the material related to his scientific work is preserved in the National Archives.

Peirce is probably best known as the founder of pragmatism and for his semiotics. Though pragmatism preceded the full development of his semiotics, in his mature view pragmatism is located within semiotics. The seed of Peirce’s pragmatism flows from his celebrated pragmatic maxim: a conception means only the totality of the practical consequences we can conceive the object of that conception to have. Intertwined with pragmatism is Peirce’s rejection of the traditional conception of science as systematized knowledge, arguing that what defines science more than anything is the devoted, well-considered, life *pursuit* of knowledge. Hence Peirce’s first rule of reason, that in order to learn one must desire to learn, from which follows his famous corollary: Do not block the way of inquiry.

Peirce not only contributed to a staggering array of scientific issues, he also devoted much attention to a classification of the sciences. This classification is here used to structure Peirce’s main contributions to philosophy. Peirce’s

first divide is between mathematics and the positive sciences. Peirce then divides the positive sciences into philosophy and the special sciences, subdividing the latter into the physical and psychical sciences. Philosophy is subdivided into phenomenology, the normative sciences (esthetics, ethics, logic), and metaphysics.

The field Peirce himself was particularly interested in is logic, the study of how people should reason when they seek true answers to the questions they ask, and he was a pioneer in the mathematization of logic. His contributions include the expansion of the logic of George Boole and Augustus De Morgan to include the logic of relations, quantification, probability theory, the development of a single-connective logic, the intuitionist negation, and truth-function analysis. He also experimented with three-valued logic and proved what is now called Peirce's Law: $((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A) \rightarrow A$ (where $\rightarrow$ expresses implication). Beginning in the 1880s, Peirce shifted his attention from algebraic to geometric logic, inspired by his study of Euler's diagrams and the use of diagrams in chemistry. In 1896 he completed his *entitative graphs*, with the universal quantifier, disjunction, and negation as primitives, and which have the full expressive power of algebraic first-order logic with equality. They were soon replaced by the more sophisticated *existential graphs*, which have the existential quantifier, conjunction, and negation as primitives. The existential graphs encompass three sub-theories, the alpha, beta, and gamma graphs, corresponding respectively to propositional, predicate, and modal logic. Peirce had a great influence on twentieth-century mathematical logic, mainly through Ernst Schröder's *Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik* (1890–95), Thoralf Skolem, and Giuseppe Peano who based his notation of predicate calculus on Peirce's general algebra of relations of the first half of the 1880s. Like Boole, but against Frege

and much of twentieth-century logic, Peirce considered logic a calculus for analyzing human reasoning, rather than a means for describing natural language.

The positive sciences deal with positive facts, i.e., facts that cannot be obtained by reasoning alone. First comes phenomenology, or *phaneroscopy* as Peirce called it, which studies the phaneron or the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind. Phaneroscopy includes an analysis of the phaneron, using medieval distinctions between the various types of mental separation, such as precision and dissociation. Reflection upon the phaneron also reveals the three categories – firstness, secondness, and thirdness – that are at once pervasive and exhaustive, meaning that they are present in all we can think of, and that any attempt to frame a fourth category will give a result that is reducible to the first three.

In Peirce's classification, the normative sciences study phenomena in relation to specific ends. Traditionally these have been beauty, goodness, and truth, giving the disciplines of esthetics, ethics, and logic. According to Peirce, logic is dependent upon ethics. Just as ethics aims to tell you *should* act if you want to attain goodness, logic purports to tell you how you *should* reason if you want to attain truth (attaining the truth being one species of goodness). Peirce heavily criticized those who see logic as part of psychology or who believe that logic must be grounded in metaphysics. Peirce distinguished three basic kinds of reasoning: abduction, deduction, and induction. In abduction a series of apparently unrelated premises is replaced by a single proposition, called the hypothesis, which brings them all together and explains them. Building on this threefold distinction, Peirce sketched the dynamics of scientific inquiry as follows: We begin with an abduction, that is, the formation, selection, and adoption of a hypothesis. Next, by means of deduction,

predictions are derived from this hypothesis. Finally, these predictions are tested through induction, leading to a confirmation, rejection, or modification of the hypothesis.

Peirce was one of the founders of semiotics, the doctrine of signs that aims to furnish a general theory of representation and interpretation. Semiotics is intended as a formal theory. It studies “what *would be* true of signs in all cases.” In contrast to Ferdinand Saussure’s binary semiology, Peirce’s semiotics is triadic. Correlating his notion of the sign with the three categories, he defined the sign as something (a first) that relates something else (its object) to a third (its interpretant). On Peirce’s definition signs are always embodied. There is always something not as such a sign that comes to function as a sign. This Peirce called the *ground* or the *representamen*. Since, for Peirce, the interpretant is itself always a potential sign to some future interpretant, there results an unlimited, triadic process of sign-action or *semiosis*. In fact on Peirce’s semiotic conception of man, we appear to ourselves as a sign that needs continuous interpretation. However, later on Peirce also allowed for a *final interpretant*, which is the interpretation that would finally be decided upon as the true one at the end of inquiry, thus situating his pragmatic conception of truth within his semiotic system.

An important maxim of logic is the celebrated *pragmatic maxim*. It states that any conception used in philosophy, religion, or otherwise, cannot mean anything other than the totality of the practical consequences we can conceive the object of that conception to have. For Peirce, these practical consequences are the experiential effects that can influence future rational or deliberative conduct. This connects the maxim directly with the notion of self-control, making it clearly a normative maxim. For the realist Peirce, it is not the individual act that counts, nor the particular

experiential effects, but the *habits* that are generated. Application of the pragmatic maxim to the concept of truth has led to a new theory of truth, generally referred to as the pragmatic theory of truth, in which something is true when in the long run it would be agreed upon by the community of inquirers.

The third branch of philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics studies the most general features of reality and real objects to create a worldview that can become a roadmap for the special sciences. Since metaphysics comes after logic, logic’s imperatives apply full force to metaphysics. Metaphysics, for Peirce, is an observational science that should obey the important principle never to settle a priori what can conceivably be settled by experience. Peirce’s own contributions to metaphysics center on the issue of nominalism and realism, his evolutionary cosmology, and his so-called neglected argument for the reality (though not the existence) of God.

In his neglected argument for the reality of God, Peirce aimed to stay close to religious experience (recall that, for Peirce, metaphysics is an observational science). He called the argument neglected, because theologians ignore it, intent as they are to protect doctrinal purity rather than stimulate religious experience. It is an argument for the *reality* of God, not the *existence* of God, because to say that God exists would confine Him to the brute, mechanical sphere of action and reaction, and reduce religion to mere fetishism. Starting from *musément*, the pure play of our fancy, the argument is an abductive one, meant to be broadly inspiring rather than narrowly formalistic.

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Cornelis de Waal

PELLEGRINO, EDMUND DANIEL (1920–2013)

Edmund D. Pellegrino was born on 22 June 1920 in Newark, New Jersey, and raised in Brooklyn, New York. He received a BS degree, honoring in chemistry, from St. John's University in 1941. He then attended the New York University College of Medicine, earning the MD in 1944. After internships, residencies, research fellowships, and hospital positions during 1944–59 in New York and New Jersey, and following service in the Air Force as a physician and flight surgeon (1946–48), he became a professor of medicine at the University of Kentucky (1959–66) and at the SUNY Health Sciences Center at Stony Brook, New York (1966–73),

where he subsequently was appointed Dean of Medicine, and chairman of the Health Sciences Center. Having transitioned to administrative roles, he then was Chancellor of the Center for the Health Sciences at the University of Tennessee (1973–75), and President and Chairman of the Yale University-New Haven Medical Center in Connecticut (1975–78).

In 1978 Pellegrino became Professor of Clinical Medicine and Community Medicine at the Georgetown University School of Medicine, and later that year was named President of the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., a position he held until 1982. Thereafter he was named John Carroll Professor of Medicine and Medical Ethics at Georgetown, and also became the director of its Kennedy Institute of Ethics in 1983. In 1989 he shifted his administrative duties to Director of Georgetown's Center for the Advanced Study of Ethics (CASE). In 1991 he founded the Center for Clinical Bioethics within the Georgetown University Medical Center and served as its first director. Stepping down from directing the Center in 1996, he returned to clinical and educational roles as John Carroll Professor of Medicine and Medical Ethics from 1996 until retiring in 2000 as Professor Emeritus, although he remained an active presence at the Center. Pellegrino was appointed as Chair of the President's Council on Bioethics, serving President George W. Bush's administration from 2005 through 2009. Following his tenure at the Council, he returned to Georgetown to re-assume direction of the Center for Clinical Bioethics through 2012. In 2013 it was renamed the Edmund D. Pellegrino Center for Clinical Bioethics in his honor. Pellegrino died in Bethesda, Maryland, on 13 June 2013.

Pellegrino was among the first professors of medicine to teach advanced courses in medical ethics, while at the University of Kentucky in the late 1950s, and he remained

at the forefront of philosophy of medicine and medical ethics for sixty years. In 1969, Pellegrino was a founder of the Society for Health and Human Values, which later became the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, and served a term as its president. He was the founding editor of the *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, and published many books and hundreds of articles.

Pellegrino's immense stature in medical ethics, moral philosophy, and the medical humanities was amply recognized in many ways. He was a fellow of the American College of Physicians, a member of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, a Hastings Center fellow, and a distinguished fellow with The Center for Bioethics & Human Dignity. The recipient of many honorary degrees, he also received the Beecher Award for Life Achievement in Bioethics from The Hastings Center, the Benjamin Rush Award from the American Medical Association, and the Abraham Flexner Award from the Association of American Medical Colleges. His prominence was not due to academic achievements alone. He helped to found Washington Archdiocesan Health Care Network for the poor in 1984; he hosted the visit of Pope John Paul II to Catholic University of America in 1979; he served on UNESCO's International Bioethics Committee, and in 1994 he joined the advisors of the Vatican's Pontifical Academy for Life. Befitting his Catholic service, he was the recipient of University of Notre Dame's Laetare Award in 1998, perhaps the highest honor for Catholics bestowed in the U.S., and he received the John Carroll Society's 2013 James Cardinal Hickey Lifetime Service Award.

Pellegrino argued that a robust philosophy of medicine is essential to define both the responsibilities borne of its practice, and the moral and therapeutic agencies of the physician.

According to Pellegrino, the primacy of the patient's good underlies the goals and practices of medicine, and serves as the fiduciary bedrock of the doctor-patient relationship. In 1979, he published two seminal works: "Toward a Reconstruction of Medical Morality: The Primacy of the Act of Profession and the Fact of Illness," and *Humanism and the Physician*. Successive works, often co-authored with David Thomasma of Loyola University Chicago, defined the philosophy of medicine, the act of medicine, the covenantal basis of medicine as profession and practice, and the importance of key moral and intellectual virtues of the physician for the clinical relationship. These virtues include fidelity to trust, benevolence, effacement of self-interest, compassion, intellectual honesty, justice and prudence. In *A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice* (1981) and *For the Patient's Good: The Restoration of Beneficence in Health Care* (1988), Pellegrino's foundations concerning the 'telos' and ultimate ends of medicine yield four essential goods to be promoted by this doctor-patient relationship: the biomedical good, the good according to patient's choice(s), the good of the patient-as-person, and what the patient regards as ultimately good (inclusive of religious values), in ascending order of importance.

The physician's ethical compass may be fixed on the patient's medical well-being, as virtue ethics demands, yet physicians are increasingly constrained by demands of multiplying social interests. The medical profession experienced dramatic stresses from broader society as the twentieth century proceeded, arising from legal regulations protecting the patient as a citizen, financial considerations regarding the patient as a consumer of insurance and government funds, and corporate interventions regarding the doctor as an employee to be managed. What shall happen to the very idea of medical ethics, if health care professionals cannot reliably

act accordingly? Pellegrino's profound meditations on such questions started early in his career. In addressing medicine as a profession, he developed systematic, masterful investigations into the commoditization of medicine, medical paternalism, ethico-legal tensions and conflicts, and ethical relativism. At the core of his arguments was his postulation of a fundamental philosophy of medicine, which served to structure and inform ethical constructs and conduct within the experiential situations that encompass the attending doctor and the ill patient.

Dismissive critics faulted Pellegrino's emphasis upon virtue ethics and adherence to formulaic moral doctrines from a single denomination, despite his efforts to situate the virtues as aspects of individual agency, and to ground moral doctrine in humanistic ways. Admiring critics such as Robert Veatch argued that medicine has become a social contract, influenced by polyglot ethical values, and clinical bioethics could not be entirely grounded on such a narrow (and somewhat antiquated) basis as a "covenantal" relationship of a dutiful doctor and a vulnerable patient. Despite such criticisms, Pellegrino's seminal contributions have been regarded as establishing a philosophical basis of the medical profession, the good of the patient, and key virtues important for the practicing physician. Taken together, his high ethical expectations for the practices of medical care and medical professionals remain a worthy and philosophically challenging standard.

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PEPPER, STEPHEN COBURN (1891–1972)

Stephen Coburn Pepper was born on 4 April 1891 in Newark, New Jersey, and died on 1 May 1972 in Berkeley, California. Pepper attended Harvard University, receiving his BA in 1913, MA in 1914, and a PhD in philosophy in 1916. Much of Pepper's later work in metaphysics and value theory developed from Ralph B. Perry's *Present Philosophical Tendencies* and *General Theory of Value*.

Upon graduation, Pepper taught for one year at Wellesley College, after which he served in the military as an officer during World War I. In 1919 Pepper joined the philosophy department of the University of California at Berkeley. He was named Mills Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity in 1954, succeeding George P. Adams in that appointment, and he retired in 1958. From 1939 to 1947, he also served as Assistant Dean of the College of Letters and Science, and was chair of the philosophy department from 1952 to 1958. Pepper's strong interest in art, and his popular course in aesthetics, resulted in his serving as chair of the art department from 1938 to 1952. Though always a philosopher, Pepper took seriously his role as chair of the art department. At this time, university art departments tended to emphasize art history and theory. Pepper sought balance and variety, insisting that greater value should be given to the creative work of active artists. Pepper wrote numerous books, articles, and reviews on aesthetics. After his retirement in 1958, Pepper taught as a visiting scholar at Macalaster, Tulane, Carleton, and Williams, as well as the San Diego, Santa Barbara, and Santa Cruz campuses of the University of California. Three times he was called back to teach at Berkeley. Among his many awards

are honorary degrees from Colby College (LHD), Tulane (LHD), and the University of California (LLD). He was a member of many professional organizations, and served as President of the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division in 1935–36.

Pepper's work is difficult to summarize as he worked in many fields, but he made special contributions to three areas: metaphysics, general value theory, and aesthetics. For Pepper, all begins with metaphysics. He thought of metaphysical systems as being somewhat like scientific hypotheses, except unlimited in scope. In his 1942 book, he spoke of them as "world hypotheses." He was never able to settle on a single metaphysical position as having the whole truth. Instead, he saw four, equally acceptable, world hypotheses: formism, mechanism, organicism, and contextualism. "Formism" is Pepper's term for the sort of philosophy offered by Plato. "Mechanism" is his term for the naturalism of Hobbes or Hume. "Organicism" is the absolute idealism of Hegel. "Contextualism" is John Dewey's pragmatism. Each of these hypotheses is based on a different way of seeing the world. For instance, mechanism interprets the world in mechanical terms. These ways of visualizing the world Pepper called "root metaphors."

Pepper disdained any attempt to combine the best features of each of these four world hypotheses, seeking some single and completely adequate theory of metaphysics. He was convinced that such mixtures would only lead to confusion. According to Pepper, each world hypothesis can only be worked out on its own terms. Late in life, Pepper thought he had discovered a fifth world hypothesis, which he called "selectivism." Its root metaphor is the purposive act, which he saw (though critics disagreed) as somewhat like A.N. Whitehead's "actual occasion." He set forth this hypothesis in some detail in his Carus lectures, published as *Concept and Quality* (1967).

Pepper's concern with the purposive act seems to have developed out of his study of value theory. He had come to feel that Perry's "value as any object of any interest" was an oversimplification. Here he was influenced by various psychologists, notably his colleague at the University of California, E.C. Tolman, author of *Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men* (1932). He even found a place in his value theory for the theory of evolution, as most philosophers since Herbert Spencer have not. Pepper saw our values as emerging through a number of "selective systems" of a purposive sort which lead us (legislating) in different ways. These range from such simple things as the need for a drink of water when we are thirsty, to the need to save the world from the threat of global warming or nuclear war. Pepper thought that we are dealing here with *facts*, not simply emotions. It is a *fact* that some things (water, for example) will satisfy my thirst; others will not. It is a *fact* that some actions will lead to nuclear war and others will not. Pepper's views on value theory were set forth in a number of works, from his 1947 *Digest of Purposive Values*, to his monumental *The Sources of Value* (1958), considered the last major work in general value theory of the twentieth Century, and his *Ethics* (1960).

Pepper's finest work was done in aesthetics. Early on, Pepper admired Dewey's work on aesthetics, especially in *Art as Experience* (1934). But he felt that Dewey had improperly included elements that did not belong in a pragmatist, or contextualistic, aesthetic. In 1937 he published his own *Aesthetic Quality: A Contextualistic Theory of Beauty*. Actually, Pepper thought that each world hypothesis would lead to its own aesthetic theory. In his *The Basis of Criticism in the Arts* (1945), probably his most valuable work in aesthetics, he examined a work of art in light of how each hypothesis would view it. At the conclusion, Pepper added an essay on the work of art,

which he saw as a curiously neglected topic in the literature of aesthetics. But he felt the topic needed more elaboration than could be given in a single essay, which led to *The Work of Art* (1955).

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Elmer H. Duncan

PERRY, RALPH BARTON (1876–1957)

Ralph B. Perry was born on 3 July 1876 in Poultney, Vermont. With thoughts of entering the ministry, Perry attended Princeton as an undergraduate, receiving his BA in 1896. He then went to Harvard, completing his PhD in philosophy in 1899. Though he did not become a Presbyterian minister as he had

once planned, Perry retained a strong interest in religion and was especially interested to understand the intersections of belief and theory in philosophy. Perry considered idealism and skepticism to be potentially false and misleading tendencies in modern thought. His major philosophical project was the rational justification of moral ideals. Perry was instructor of philosophy first at Williams College in 1899–1900, and then at Smith College from 1900 to 1902. Perry returned to Harvard in 1902, and his career there spanned the course of five decades. Perry was promoted to full professor of philosophy in 1913, and retired in 1946. He had developed a strong relationship with James, which led to the production of several works on James, including his two-volume intellectual biography, *The Thought and Character of William James* (1935) which earned him the Pulitzer Prize in 1936. Perry was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1920–21. In 1937–38 he gave the Spencer Trask Lectures at Princeton University on The Meaning of the Humanities. In 1942, Perry was made a member of the National Institute of Arts and Letters. Perry died on 22 January 1957 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Perry's early work was devoted to clarifying issues of method and to differentiating current schools and trends in American philosophy. In 1905 he published *The Approach to Philosophy*, followed by one of the most widely read of his works in 1912, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*. During this early period, Perry's article "The Ego-Centric Predicament" (1910) appeared in the *Journal of Philosophy*. Perry's purpose in the article was clearly expressed: to make evident that the arguments of idealism were invalid. While refuting idealism, "The Ego-Centric Predicament" also served as a kind of polemic for philosophical realists interested to develop

a full critique of idealism and to create the technical formulations by which to begin advancing the epistemological agenda of the “new realism.” Later that year, the *Journal of Philosophy* published “The Program and Platform of Six Realists,” indicating both the timeliness and influence of Perry’s article and the interest of other philosophers to join the campaign for a “new realism.” Although the “new realism” never developed into a coherent school of philosophers, Perry would use it to conceptualize a naturalistic understanding of morality and a theory of values. His two most significant works in these areas are *The Moral Economy* (1909) and *The General Theory of Value* (1926).

In *The Moral Economy*, Perry conceived of morality mainly as prudence, which he characterized as a type of intelligence. The prudent mind, as Perry described it, seeks to balance right-mindedness and open-mindedness in the pursuit of interests. Perry sought to cast morality as fundamentally practical and rational, and saw “practical wisdom” as the goal of moral theory. We are moral, Perry declared, because of an irrevocable commitment to life – that is, to the goodness of life. Each person is “morally liable” for the contribution he or she makes (or does not make) to the general quotient of well-being. This quotient of well-being is what sustains and improves the general field of interests, for which we are, as rational beings, responsible. Goodness, in the most basic sense, is the “fulfillment of interest” (1909, p. 11). Perry rendered life as a moral drama, in which interests are compelled to recognize other interests and are formed into partnerships or alliances against the “common hereditary enemy”: “the heavy inertia and common wear of the cosmos” (p. 13). “Morality is not a useful fiction...it is a body of compelling truth that will convince wherever there is a capacity to observe and

reason.... [T]he saving grace of morality is directly operative in life; needing no proof from any adventitious source, because it proves *itself* under observation” (1909, p. 41). Perry affirmed the utilitarian-progressive features of the moral economy, believing such an economy respected the dignity of persons through a fundamental respect for the rational powers of the individual to recognize the claims of the higher interest. In addition, Perry believed the controlling interest of the moral economy was conducive of “good will”: “The justification of any act lies in its being provident; in its yield of immediate fulfillment and its generous allowance for the other interest, the remote interest, and the interest that is as yet only surmised. The good will is the will to participate productively, permissively, and formally in the total undertaking of life” (1909, p. 69).

The Moral Economy included a discussion of virtues and their progressive ordering. The presence of a particular virtue, Perry explained, a virtue’s purpose, is to align choice and behavior with values, that is, to fix choice and behavior upon certain principles. These principles and virtues, Perry explained, arise out of the experiment of living. A set of virtues will persist in the moral economy only to the extent to which they have been “verified” in the history of society as contributing to some definite value. There is, thus, “no final and comprehensive order of virtues” (1909, p. 73). A moral economy will have its own order of principles and values – its own stage of organization – corresponding to a level of general fulfillment toward which it aims. Thus, moral economies could be compared and contrasted and their progressive characters could be objectively determined, “tested” even, Perry believed.

Of course, there were many questions and issues attending Perry’s formulations in *The Moral Economy* which he would seek to

answer in the *General Theory of Value* (1926). If the moral economy was not to be understood in relativistic terms, the question of values and their so-called objective character needed to be further addressed. In valuing an object, we are invested in its being according to the attitude we hold of it. Valuing promotes the attitude we have towards an object – towards an object's being consistent with our personal preferences and judgments – whereas cognition prepares us to deal with an object's actual existence. Perry maintained value and valuation were not relative or subjective. Insofar as we hold opinions of objects, values exist. These values were neither true nor false, as in the case of matters of cognition. The purpose of value theory was to provide the means for studying judgments about interests. Whether or not an object was "good" or not, that is, whether or not this attitude served the interest of the person, could, Perry believed, be empirically studied. For that matter, as he indicated in *The Moral Economy*, Perry believed a critique of values was possible. What permitted the ranking of value was the existence of principles, of standards, through which interests and actions could be judged and their values compared. An object is worthy of our interest and/or action to the extent of its value; the better object – that is, the better interest, the better claim – is the one in which we find more value. Perry listed three standards of measurement – *intensity*, *preference*, and *inclusiveness*. These standards, Perry believed, enabled a clarification of the terms of comparison, making clear that value was variable with its circumstances and that some comparisons were in fact incommensurable. The ability to measure comparative value was thus limited, but was, ultimately, a matter of quantity, Perry believed.

Religion was of particular interest to the formulations of both *The Moral Economy* and the *General Theory of Value*. The sense of

duty, Perry thought, was not sufficient to move individuals towards integrative, harmonious development of their personalities and interests. The moral community was dependent not on formal duty, abstractly considered, but on "good-will." Good-will, Perry explained, was a virtue connected with piety, a religious value arising from a reverence for living well, not just for oneself but "for all life" (ibid.). It is the spirit of good-will, Perry explained, "rather than narrow complacency that inspires my assuming of the special tasks and responsibilities defined by proximity, descent, and special aptitude. Life as a whole is built out of individual opportunities and vocations. It is required only that while I live effectively and happily, as circumstance or choice may determine, I should conform myself to those principles which harmonize with life, and bring an abundance of the whole out of the fruitfulness of individual effort" (p. 113). "Good-will is the moral condition of religion, where this is corrected by enlightenment" (p. 113). To Perry, God was both a "norm of legitimate aspiration" – a general will socially embodied – and a divine being exceeding the social order, simultaneously. In the spirit of William James, Perry concluded, "God is a being far exceeding and surpassing man, and yet dependent on man's moral effort. The world becomes divine through being willed to be divine.... [I]ts being divine is conditioned by the dynamic faith through which high resolves are carried into effect. God's existence may in this sense result from a belief in God, though not from a belief that God already exists" (1929, pp. 687–89).

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Dean Papas

PHELPS, ALMIRA HART LINCOLN (1793–1884)

Almira Phelps, philosopher and educator, was born as Almira Hart in the town of Berlin, Connecticut, on 15 July 1793. She attended her sister's school in Middlebury, Vermont, and in 1812 she attended a female academy in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. Almira became the principal at the Sandy Hill female academy in New York in 1816. In 1817 she married Samuel Lincoln, editor of the *Connecticut Mirror* of Hartford, who died in 1823. After his death, she moved to Troy, New York, to teach at the female seminary founded by her sister Emma Willard. This period marked the beginning of her writing career, and in 1829 she published the first of many books. *Familiar Lectures on Botany* (1829) became widely used, went through nine editions in the following ten years, and launched her career as a textbook writer.

In 1831 Almira married John Phelps, a prominent judge from Vermont, with whom she had two children. Over the next several years Almira Phelps published *Botany for Beginners* (1831), *Geology for Beginners* (1832), *Lectures to Young Ladies* (1833), *Chemistry for Beginners* (1834), *Familiar Lectures on Natural Philosophy* (1837), *Familiar Lectures on Chemistry* (1838), and *Natural Philosophy for Beginners* (1841). She also wrote a novel, *Caroline Westerly* (1833). In 1938 she took charge of the Young Ladies' Seminary in West Chester, Pennsylvania, after which she became head of the Female Institute of Rahway, New Jersey.

In 1841 Phelps received an invitation from the Episcopal Bishop of Maryland, Rev. William Rollinson Whittingham, to take charge of a diocesan school, the Patapsco Female Institute, in Ellicott's Mills, Maryland. Phelps became principal and her husband was the business manager of the Institute, which soon attained a great reputation due to its high academic standards. A proponent for the betterment of the education of young girls, Phelps focused on creating a curriculum rich in the sciences, mathematics, and natural history, which was designed in particular to train highly qualified teachers. Phelps remained in this position until 1855, eight years after her husband died, and later she retired and settled in Baltimore. In the following years she wrote frequently for national periodicals. She also published a number of books, including a novel titled *Ida Norman* (1848) and two books, *Hours with My Pupils* (1859) and *Christian Households* (1860), and she also edited *Our Country, in its Relation to the Past, Present, and Future* (1864).

Among the beliefs of the time promoted by Phelps and others was the belief in the social value of a woman's education, as it pertained to her role as a mother, and educator of the 'other sex'. Phelps says, "is not the character of the future men of our republic to depend on the mothers we are now educating?" (quoted in Bolzau 1936, 268). While a noble sounding argument, according to some of the literature on female education found in publications such as the *American Journal of Education* and the *American Annals of Education*, the need of educating women for their own happiness was not as popular as the argument for the need to educate women as mothers and educators of future men.

Although she was highly influential in the emancipation of women in regards to education, when women sought freedom from subjection and asked equal rights of suffrage,

Almira joined those who opposed female political progress in other matters. She became active within the anti-suffrage movement writing, and supported the anti-suffragist group, according to which voting was also "incompatible with the occupations which nature assigned to women in the domestic sphere" (quoted in Bolzau 1936, 389).

Phelps was elected a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1859. She was the second woman to be elected, following Maria Mitchell, and she read a paper before the body in 1866. She read a paper again before that organization in 1878, on the "Infidel Tendencies of Modern Science." Phelps died in Baltimore, Maryland, on 15 July 1884.

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Marta Pires

PLANTINGA, ALVIN CARL (1932–)

Alvin Plantinga was born 15 November 1932 in Ann Arbor, Michigan. He received a BA in philosophy from Calvin College in Michigan in 1954. He received the MA in philosophy from the University of Michigan in 1955, and the PhD in philosophy from Yale University in 1958. His dissertation was on “Ethics and Metaphysical Naturalism.” From 1958 to 1963 Plantinga was assistant and then associate professor of philosophy at Wayne State University. From 1963 to 1982, he was professor of philosophy at Calvin College. In 1982 Plantinga became the John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, where he also directed the Center for Philosophy of Religion from 1984 to 2002. He retired from the University of Notre Dame in 2010 and returned to Calvin College, where he serves as the first holder of the William Harry Jellema Chair in Philosophy. Plantinga has received numerous academic fellowships,

including Guggenheim, National Endowment for the Humanities, and American Council of Learned Societies fellowships. In 1975 he became a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has delivered many named lectures, including the 1988 Wilde Lectures at Oxford and the 1987–88 Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen. Plantinga was President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division in 1981–82, and President of the Society of Christian Philosophers during 1983–86.

Plantinga is almost single-handedly responsible for the remarkable resurgence in philosophy of religion and Christian philosophy that swept the United States in the last thirty years. His impact has gone well beyond philosophy of religion and has defined research programs in metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. The actualist possible worlds semantics he developed in *The Nature of Necessity* (1974) remains significant for modal logic and modal metaphysics, and his analysis of epistemic warrant as proper function has proved one of the most fruitful theories in post-Gettier epistemological research. From *God and Other Minds* (1968) to *Warranted Christian Belief* (2000) on to *Knowledge and Christian Belief* (2015), Plantinga’s greatest contribution has been in defense of the claim that belief in the God of theism has no reason for shame in the court of epistemic evaluation. Plantinga has argued that any epistemological theory that rules out the possibility of rational or justified theistic belief will prove to be implausible.

The first three chapters of *God and Other Minds* are startling; they comprise over one hundred pages of argument that the three paradigm instances of natural theology – the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments – all fail as proofs of God’s existence. In the second part of the book, however, he argues that a similar verdict must

hold for the most popular arguments *against* theism, notably the argument from evil, so that an unsettling rational parity hovers over the discussion. Before declaring agnostic stalemate, however, Plantinga turns to the problem of other minds and demonstrates that the best argument for belief in other minds, the argument from analogy, fails in a way reminiscent of the failure of the teleological argument. This result touches off a thorough investigation into the nature of rational belief and its relation to philosophical argumentation, from which Plantinga derives the amazing, though tentative, conclusion: "If my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the latter." (p. 271)

In *The Nature of Necessity* Plantinga applies modal metaphysics to two traditional weapons in the theist's arsenal, the ontological argument for God's existence and the free will defense against the argument from evil. He also treats these two subjects in *God, Freedom, and Evil*, published in the same year but without most of the technicality of *The Nature of Necessity*. Plantinga concludes that the ontological argument, while not demonstrative, is nonetheless adequate to ground rational theistic belief for those convinced of the truth of its key premise, that it is possible that some necessarily maximally great being exists. Plantinga's free will defense, based on his idea of "transworld depravity," exposes the failure of the logical argument from evil against belief in God. Work on the argument from evil has switched in the last thirty years to a nearly exclusive focus on the empirical argument, and a large reason for this shift is the growing consensus that Plantinga has solved the logical problem.

The third phase of Plantinga's defense of theistic belief takes on the widely held conviction he calls "evidentialism," the

view that belief in God can be rational only if it is supported by propositional evidence. Plantinga holds that theism requires no such evidence. After all, many paradigmatically rational beliefs do not require it. Our perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, and simple logical and mathematical beliefs are all considered "properly basic," rational without appeal to any other beliefs, but grounded firmly in experiences appropriate to produce such beliefs. Plantinga argues that theistic belief is similarly grounded in appropriate experience. He labels this position "Reformed Epistemology," because of its conceptual origins in the work of John Calvin and other great Reformed theologians such as Karl Barth and Herman Bavinck. Plantinga bases his argument on the Calvinistic notion of the *sensus divinitatis*, the idea that God has provided us with an epistemic faculty whose function is to perceive immediately the presence and action of God in the world. Plantinga develops a theory of the *sensus divinitatis* as functioning alongside of and isomorphic to such familiar epistemic faculties as perception, memory, and the intuitive grasp of fundamental logical relationships.

Plantinga develops a full-blown epistemological theory in the two volumes that constitute the prequel to *Warranted Christian Belief*, published together in 1993 as *Warrant: The Current Debate* and *Warrant and Proper Function*. In these volumes Plantinga argues that the proper subject of epistemological research is not simply justification, which he argues has little to do with knowledge; rather, he proposes, we should be seeking a theory of *warrant*, that property which, added to true belief, produces knowledge. He presents his own theory, which states roughly that a belief has warrant if and only if it is produced by properly functioning epistemic faculties operating in an environment conducive to their proper function.

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James F. Sennett

POPKIN, RICHARD HENRY (1923–2005)

Richard H. Popkin was born on 27 December 1923 in Bronx, New York. He received his BA and MA degrees from Columbia University in 1943. In 1944 he was a graduate student at Yale University, but he returned to receive his PhD in philosophy from Columbia in 1950 with a dissertation entitled “The Neo-Intuitionist Theory of Mathematical Logic.” Popkin's first philosophy appointment was at the University of Connecticut in 1946–47. He then was a professor of philosophy at the University of Iowa from 1947 to 1960, and Claremont College in California from 1960 to 1963. In 1963 Popkin helped found the philosophy department at the University of California at San Diego by becoming its first chair. He then was professor of philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis from 1973 to 1985. He also held visiting appointments at the University of California, Berkeley, as well as Duke, Brandeis, McGill, CUNY, Tel Aviv, UCLA, and Emory. After becoming professor emeritus he became adjunct professor of history and philosophy at the University of California at Los Angeles. Popkin died on 14 April 2005 in Santa Monica, California.

Popkin was a Fulbright Research Professor at Paris (1952–53) and at Utrecht (1957–58); Guggenheim Fellow (1970); ACLS Fellow (1966); NEH Fellow (1975); William Andrews Clark Professor at UCLA (1981–82 and 1997–98); Visiting Scholar at Bibliothek Herzog August, Wolfenbüttel,

Germany (1987); Visiting Scholar at the Folger Shakespeare Library (1988); Director of the Leiden Summer Seminar, Foundation for Intellectual Research (1990); Visiting Research Fellow, Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies at Arizona State University (1991); Research Fellow at Institute for the Humanities, University of Michigan (1992); and Woodruff Distinguished Professor at Emory University (1993 and 1994). Popkin was elected as Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1996. In addition, Popkin is a founder and co-director of the *International Archives of the History of Ideas*; founding editor and president emeritus of the *Journal of the History of Philosophy*; and director of the Foundation for Research in Intellectual History (1990–95).

Popkin's dissertation topic suggested an interest in skepticism. Intuitionism was developed in part by the Dutch mathematician L.E.J. Brouwer, in response to challenges he posed to the foundations of mathematics. Popkin's focus soon shifted from mathematics to pure skepticism and the history of philosophy. *The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Descartes* (1960) is a book of revolutionary importance. However, the seeds of Popkin's radically revisionist history of philosophy first appeared in a series of articles on "The Sceptical Crisis and the Rise of Modern Philosophy" published in the *Review of Metaphysics* in 1953–54. Expanded versions of the *History of Skepticism* appeared in subsequent years. The most recent edition is entitled *The History of Skepticism from Savonarola to Bayle* (2003).

Throughout his entire academic life Popkin studied the arguments of Sextus Empiricus, along with their dissemination, their interpretations, and their influences on philosophers and theologians. When Popkin started his career, there was little interest in the history of philosophy in America and even

less in skepticism as a body of philosophical positions and systematically ordered arguments. Skepticism at most was a mere label for a doubting attitude. The tremendous resurgence of interest in skepticism (and Pyrrhonism) over the past three decades is in good measure because of Popkin's persistent explorations in the history of philosophy, especially from the sixteenth century to the present.

The Protestant Reformation created a perfect milieu for skeptical arguments. One needed to know which book was the Bible, what were the marks of the True Church, etc. When the Latin texts of Sextus were printed in 1562 and 1569, a handbook for intellectual war was made available to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation polemicists. The impact of the criterion problem, namely by what standard can we determine the truth of a given claim, created imponderable difficulties for all parties. To determine the truth of a claim we need to know that the standard is itself true. Thus truth requires a criterion and the criterion must be true. Or we can try to avoid that circular reasoning by asking for a criterion of truth, and then a criterion of that criterion, etc. A whole chain of difficulties ensues: for example, criteria relevant to sense perception, to logical principles, etc.

When Popkin was at Iowa, he became interested in Judaism both personally and religiously, and also as a scholarly exploration. Popkin devoted several years to studying who was who in Spanish and Portuguese Jewry. With the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, many fled to the Netherlands and although often several generations from their Jewish origins, they sought to reconnect with their roots. People who were Catholics "on the outside," but remained Jewish on the inside, were known as Marranos. Popkin soon became interested in Isaac La Peyrère who maintained that the Bible was not the history of all mankind but

only of the Jews. He advanced the thesis that there were Jews before Adam. His book on the subject of these so-called pre-Adamites was known to be in Spinoza's possession. Popkin soon saw a connection with the sort of Bible criticism that was emerging from La Peyrère's studies and the Marrano Messianism that was being developed. Thus Popkin tied the skeptical (philosophical) crisis of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries together with the skepticism being engendered by the Marranos. The views of Sabbatai Zevi, the Jewish mystical Messiah from Izmir, caught on like wildfire among European Jewish communities, but they also generated skeptical (criteria) problems. In any case, the problem in one sense was solved when Sabbatai became a Moslem. As for La Peyrère's pre-Adamism, it unfortunately played an important role in the articulation of racist theory in the early nineteenth century.

Popkin has the remarkable quality of being able to take the received wisdom on any topic and turn it upside down, requiring a rethinking of that wisdom. No one bothered to notice what Berkeley meant when he said he was offering a refutation of skepticism. Berkeley meant *real* skepticism, not just religious doubts. Berkeley was familiar with the arguments of Sextus Empiricus and especially of Pierre Bayle, and designed his arguments to meet their objections. When he said he was refuting the skeptics, he meant it. Similarly, both Jewish and Christian philosophers and theologians of the second half of the seventeenth century were constantly on the lookout for messianic and millennialist ideas. Two examples: a vast amount of Newton's writing is devoted to a study of prophecies, and Sir Robert Boyle was a founding member of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England. Why New England? Because Boyle believed that the Indians are a remnant of the Lost Tribes of Israel, and that

conversion of Jews was especially dear to God and facilitated the return of the Messiah. Even Berkeley's trip to Connecticut in 1728 may have been influenced by the hope to convert the (Jewish) Indians. Popkin has studied these and related themes which so greatly interested many philosophers and theologians of earlier centuries.

Popkin's interest in Amsterdam and its Jewish community naturally brought him to Spinoza, and he has published many articles and a book on Spinoza (2004). It was once thought that Spinoza was excommunicated from the community by a collection of narrow-minded Jews who were hostile to all philosophical ideas and especially to Spinoza's. However, a closer examination of that community reveals that they were not anti-intellectual religious hard-liners, but prosperous businessmen who fully appreciated the freedom which the Dutch Republic and Amsterdam afforded them. Perhaps their complaint was that Spinoza had taken up La Peyrère's thesis that Moses could not have written the Pentateuch. Spinoza expanded on that claim in his own writings, and offered arguments which undermined the very idea of prophecy. Popkin sees this as constituting a skeptical challenge to all Bible-based religion. Spinoza is thus a founder of what was to become known as Bible criticism. On the other hand, there seems to be no question but that his was an abrasive personality. Popkin does not believe that all the details regarding Spinoza's expulsion have yet been assembled. Perhaps the businessmen in the community simply did not like a troublemaker in their midst, which has happened to other philosophers.

Popkin's critical eye has taken him in other directions. Most spectacularly, he became interested in the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy. He read the twenty-six volumes of the Warren Commission's report, interviewed witnesses

and reporters, and concluded there was no case against Oswald, the putative assassin. Since Oswald was himself killed while in Dallas police custody, there was no satisfactory resolution. But Popkin turned up considerable counter evidence to the Warren Commission conclusions, which appeared in his *The Second Oswald* (1966).

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Harry McFarland Bracken

PORTER, NOAH (1811–1892)

Noah Porter was born on 14 December 1811 in Farmington, Connecticut, and he died on 4 March 1892 in New Haven, Connecticut. He entered Yale College at sixteen and graduated with his BA degree in 1831. Porter came early under the influence of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s *Aids to Reflection*. He studied for the ministry at Yale Divinity School without graduating, and then served as Rector of Hopkins Grammar School in New Haven in 1838, the same year he was ordained. Porter then held a pastorate in New Milford, Connecticut, during 1836–43. Upon the retirement of Yale President Jeremiah Day in 1846, Theodore Dwight Woolsey became Yale’s President while Porter became Yale’s Clark Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics, a position that he held from 1846 until his death in 1892, when George T. Ladd assumed it. Porter received the honorary DD degree from the City University of New York in 1858, and the honorary LLD degree from Edinburgh in 1886.

Porter yearned for a mastery of German thought, and received permission to study at the University of Berlin under Adolph Trendelenburg. He returned to Yale, surer of himself and somewhat under the influence of Descartes, Locke, and Kant. His book *The Human Intellect*, considered a great achievement, was published in 1868. This treatise assailed English associationist philosophy and attempted to show how German idealism could modify the “mental science” derived from the Scottish Common Sense school. In 1875 Porter published

The Elements of Intellectual Science, an abridgement of *The Human Intellect*. Both books were standard college texts until the end of the nineteenth century, when William James's *The Principles of Psychology* replaced them in 1890.

In 1871 Porter became President of Yale, retaining that position until 1886. He was among the last generation of American scholars to hold a college presidency and a professor's chair at the same time at a major college. After stepping down from the Presidency, he continued as Professor of Philosophy until his death in 1892.

In *The Human Intellect* Porter insisted that the student of philosophy must study psychology, an inductive science, before metaphysics. Introspection, more than observation, gives us the data of psychology; we must study our own minds at work. Our minds are not passive, as John Locke and John Stuart Mill had held. Porter rejected the associationist view of the human mind as too mechanical and irrational and believed that the mind was active. The mere association of ideas is no substitute for reasoning. Porter maintained that knowledge does not begin with Locke's "simple ideas" but with wholes and patterns. The mind analyzes these patterns into ideas and then articulates them in language. We know that things exist in relation to one another. The important relation of cause and effect (which Hume had explained as only a subjective contribution of the mind to the act of knowing) and spatial and temporal relations are, in Porter's theory, as objective as things themselves. Thing is related to thing – that is the pattern by which the mind actively grasps and knows the external world. One can analyze experience by breaking it down into its parts, after it has been grasped as a whole, and also seeing how important language is to these processes. Porter's views on these matters were refined in Germany by

his contact with the ideas of Karl Becker and Adolph Trendelenburg.

For Porter, it is the self, the individual agent, which knows things, which remembers, reasons, and interprets. The self is conscious of itself and knows its own operations. We have immediate knowledge of the self and its mental states; these mental states are changing and variable; they come and pass away. But we are conscious that our *mental* selves are unchanging and permanent, and are distinct from our changing mental states. The self is one stable entity, with many states belonging to it. Kant was therefore wrong in asserting that we cannot know the "thing-in-itself," for we know the self as a permanent reality. Porter also claims that the self knows the not-self, and this knowledge, too, is certain knowledge. Since it is certain, it is clear that the not-self (for example, ordinary objects in everyday life) is also objectively real. We can and do know matter directly, and so the world external to the mind is objectively real.

He left a place for God in his system of thought. He said that man need not know completely in order to know at all. Since the human mind is finite, it cannot know completely the Absolute, the Infinite Being, yet the mind can know God in a finite way. The Infinite must be assumed to account for the finite universe; hence, God must exist. We know *that* God exists; we have a partial knowledge of *what* God is. Porter uses the argument from design: the ordered universe reveals God as rational designer, as a thinking agent, a self-existent intelligence. Porter's God is active. God carefully constructed the universe, made its laws, and designed nature as we observe it.

Porter was also responsible for teaching ethics at Yale, and in 1885 he published *The Elements of Moral Science*. Porter advances a Christian theory of morals; the teachings of Christianity, he thinks, can be looked at

as an ethical system. But his standpoint is reason, not revelation. Porter argued that man is a moral being, and that right and wrong are discerned by the intellect, but that the conscience, while certainly part of the mind, is not a separate faculty of the mind. The standard, or norm, in morality is the moral law, an immutable ingredient of man's moral nature. A contemporary described Porter as a eudaemonist, one who defines and enforces moral obligation by its relation to happiness or personal well-being, in the tradition of Aristotle. Porter derived the "ought" of duty from the "is" of human nature, and stressed certain ends toward which we should strive. The moral agent, the individual person, is largely self-regulating and inner-directed, though not completely autonomous. Moral sense and conscience mean the same thing: the intellect and sensibility working on general or specific problems of morality. An optimistic streak runs through Porter's approach to ethics. Conscience, for example, can be improved and sharpened by cultivation and development. If one's conscience is in doubt, or in error, one can seek spiritual guidance. Porter realistically acknowledged that conscience can become debased and darkened. Self-evident truths may be overlooked or forgotten. It is possible to fall prey to a sophisticated and yet shallow moral code. It is easy to confuse darkness for light and vice versa. Moral purity can be defiled by perversions; the human intellect can slip into degeneracy, though the conscience can never be destroyed. The influences of religion are always there to strengthen an erring mind.

In 1880 a serious and significant dispute arose between Porter, Yale's president, and William Graham Sumner, Yale's professor of political and social science. Sumner assigned Herbert Spencer's *The Study of Sociology* as a textbook. Porter objected to the book's use in a letter to the trustees, suggesting that

Spencer's atheistic materialism would morally and religiously harm immature students and therefore damage the college. He told the trustees that *The Study of Sociology* was indefensible in the curriculum because the book was an unscientific attack against theism, and that it was only a dogmatic pamphlet containing some intolerant sarcasm. Porter also objected to an experimental course such as sociology within the liberal arts curriculum.

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Edward W. O'Brien

POSNER, RICHARD ALLEN (1939–)

Richard A. Posner was born on 11 January 1939 in New York City, New York. He received his BA in English summa cum laude from Yale College in 1959. In 1962, he graduated from Harvard Law School with a JD magna cum laude. After graduation, he clerked for United States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan Jr. from 1963 to 1965, and then worked in the next several years as an assistant to Commissioner Philip Elman of the Federal Trade Commission, an assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States Thurgood Marshall, and as general counsel of President Johnson's Task Force on Communications Policy. Posner began teaching law in 1968 at Stanford Law School as an associate professor, and from 1969 to 1981 he taught at University of Chicago Law School as a professor of law (and as Lee and Brena Freeman Professor of Law after 1978). After his appointment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1981, he still teaches as a senior lecturer. Posner became a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in December 1981, and served as the Chief Judge of the Court from 1993 to 2000.

As a full-time federal judge, a law-school professor, a researcher and scholar, and a public intellectual (in his own words),

Posner has shown extraordinary energy and intelligence with his prolific writings. He has produced numerous books and hundreds of articles and book reviews, covering a wide range of topics from economic analysis of law and justice, to studies of federal court system, relations between law and literature, sexuality and sex-related laws, aging, public health, public intellectuals, democracy, Clinton's impeachment trial, and the 2000 presidential election, to name a few.

It is his economic analysis of law, however, that first established Posner's major academic achievement, contributing to the thriving field of law and economics. Influenced by utilitarianism and early economists such as Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi who applied economic theories into tort law, Posner expanded the application of economics to a variety of other legal subjects, such as antitrust, public utility and common carrier regulation, contracts, family law, criminal law, primitive law, racial discrimination, jurisprudence, privacy and procedure. Based on the assumption that people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions, Posner argued that economics can explain both market and nonmarket behavior of people involved in or affected by laws and legal institutions. He proposed and sought to test the theory that the common law is best explained as if the judges were trying to promote economic efficiency, and called for major reforms and urged wealth maximization as a goal of legal and social policy.

As an extension of his methodology in early studies, Posner adopted and proposed a pragmatic approach to law in his more recent writings. Strongly questioning the function of normative moral philosophy in study and professionalization of law, Posner suggests that scholars and practitioners should approach legal and policy judgments "on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualism and generalities". Different from philosophical

pragmatism, Posner's "everyday pragmatism" tries to send a lay sense of pragmatism to people facing current problems and seeking practical solutions. According to Posner, a pragmatic judge aims at decisions that are most reasonable, when all things, both case-specific and systemic consequences, are considered. Legal pragmatism should be empiricist and forward-looking, not completely bound by past decisions through strict deductions. Posner tried to show how pragmatic adjudication makes more sense in solving critical issues, such as the Clinton's impeachment and the 2000 presidential election.

Consistent with his approach, Posner strongly encourages interdisciplinary study of law. Pointing out limitations of traditional doctrinal analysis of law in most law schools, Posner calls for incorporations of other fields of science, and argues the importance of applications in law of analytic methods, empirical techniques and findings of social sciences. His study of law and economics and later efforts to embrace, for example, sociology, psychology and literature in his writings are such examples.

Posner has been criticized by conservatives who question his moral relativism and his pragmatism that leaves doubts about deductive legal analysis. Liberals object to his refutation of moral philosophy in study of law and legal institutions. Posner's pure economic approach to human interactions and analyses in sensitive issues such as abortion, baby selling and racial discrimination also bothered many people. Nevertheless, there is little question that Posner's legal career and profession as a law professor, a judge, a scholar and a public intellectual has a great influence on his works.

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Bin Liang

POTTER, WILLIAM JAMES
(1829–1893)

William James Potter was born on 1 February 1829 in North Dartmouth, Massachusetts. He grew up in a Quaker community as an extremely serious and very shy person. Potter was educated in the district schools of Dartmouth, the Friends Board School at Providence, Rhode Island, and the Bridgewater Normal School. He graduated from Harvard College with the BA degree in 1854, having been strongly influenced by William E. Channing and Theodore Parker. After teaching a year, he entered Harvard Divinity School in 1856. From 1857 to 1859 he studied at various German universities. Potter was ordained and installed on 28 December 1859 as minister of the First Congregational Society of New Bedford and served in this position until retirement in 1892. Potter died on 21 December 1893 in Boston, Massachusetts.

During the Civil War, Potter was noted nationally as a minister who addressed the great issues facing society. Edwin M. Stanton, the Secretary of War, had Potter drafted

and assigned to the Sanitary Commission, which was responsible for military hospitals. Seeking the betterment of the world, Potter devoted his ministry to temperance, women's suffrage, civil service reform, the rights of the freedmen, the Indians, the Chinese, and other oppressed peoples, and education of the young.

When Potter and others formed The Free Religious Association (FRA) in 1867, his name was dropped from the *Unitarian Year Book's* list of Unitarian ministers. He was secretary of the FRA from 1867 to 1882, and President from 1882 to 1893. Potter also served as editor of *The Index* from 1880 to 1886. It was due to Potter's efforts that the FRA developed an international correspondence with leaders of other religions, which contributed to the development of the World Congress of Religion in 1893.

By 1865, Potter became increasingly uncomfortable with representing himself as a Christian, and thus the desire for a universal religious fellowship came to dominate his religious thought more and more. This shift from Christianity to a universal religion is evident in Potter's hundreds of essays and sermons, many printed in *The Index*. Under the influence of Darwin's theory of evolution, Potter began to develop an intuitional approach that looked behind animal instincts to inherited habit and social affections. For Potter, the material universe in all its aspects has been created and shaped by an internal power. On the basis of the information provided by science concerning the development of the universe and this planet, Potter contended that humans have a moral sense and reason that must have its source in the Eternal Power. He rejected the supernatural or the miraculous as arguments for a special revelation from a deity or for religious truth in general. To Potter, all religions were natural, so he made

no distinction between natural religion and those religions which claimed to be revealed. As Potter became more acquainted with the world's religions, he became less concerned with trying to validate the universality and permanence of essential Christianity and more concerned with natural religion. Potter was also influenced by Theodore Parker's view of absolute religion and its three primary ideas – God, duty, and immortality – which were given by direct natural revelation in the human consciousness. Potter also agreed with Parker that Jesus was to be understood as both an exceptionally great religious teacher and a fallible human being. However, as Potter's ministerial career developed, he placed less emphasis than did Parker on the contributions of Jesus, due to his increasing interest in natural religion and the world's religions.

Potter moved from transcendentalism to empiricism, as he accepted the doctrine of evolution and saw science as the standard for testing our beliefs. However, Potter did not limit science to the domain of the material world and its forces. Rather, he provided an expanded empirical approach that included mental and moral functions that we call spiritual or religious, even though these functions had been understood in the past on the basis of erroneous theories. Potter viewed God as immanent in nature and human beings, although at the same time transcending each. Potter's empirical orientation led him to a pantheistic view of God.

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W. Creighton Peden

PRATT, JAMES BISSETT (1875–1944)

James B. Pratt was born on 22 June 1875 in Elmira, New York. An interest in religion and philosophy soon developed and gained momentum at Williams College, where he studied with philosopher John E. Russell. After graduating with his BA in 1898 he enrolled at Harvard University, where he studied philosophy under William James and Josiah Royce. Frustrated with the confusing and sometimes contentious state of philosophical instruction at Harvard, Pratt advanced only as far as a MA degree in 1899. He studied law for a year at Columbia University, then taught Latin for two years at an academy near his home in Elmira. In 1902 he resumed graduate study in philosophy by taking courses at Berlin University during a year of European travel. Along with his new friend and classmate, William Ernest Hocking, Pratt most appreciated Otto Pfleiderer's course in the philosophy of religion. After a four-year absence, Pratt returned to Harvard where he studied under William James, receiving a PhD in philosophy in 1905. He began

teaching philosophy at Williams College in 1905, where he remained until his retirement in 1943. John William Miller, an idealist, was his philosophy colleague for much of that period. Pratt died on 15 January 1944 in Williamstown, Massachusetts.

Pratt's publishing career was launched in 1907 with *The Psychology of Religious Belief*. Here, and in his next work, *What Is Pragmatism* (1909), Pratt demonstrated both an appreciation of William James's accomplishments in the empirical study of religious experience as well as a departure from his mentor's pragmatist philosophy. Pratt was interested in the psychological impact of religious doctrines and beliefs on the human mind, adopting a functionalist approach to the study of religion that was qualified by his deep conviction that there remains something distinctive about religious experience itself. He rejected as too abstract the idealist reconstruction of religion, drawing on the growing criticism offered by James, Charles Peirce, and John Dewey. In the course of his search for a philosophical grounding of religious experience, however, Pratt signaled an emerging commitment to a version of metaphysical realism that would lead him beyond the limited epistemological concerns of the pragmatists. This independent direction eventually gave rise to his most noteworthy achievements in the psychology and philosophy of religion. It also earned him membership in a loosely organized movement in American philosophy known as critical realism.

Pratt's friend and colleague, Gerald E. Myers, describes the publication of *Essays in Critical Realism* in 1920 as a "famous moment in American philosophy." A group of philosophers which included Arthur O. Lovejoy, George Santayana, and Charles A. Strong, joined Pratt in advocating a new approach to the classic epistemological dualism

between ideas and objects. Pratt asserted that the mind can indeed point beyond itself in an intentional way, possessing a uniquely self-transcendent capacity. Against Locke and certain "neo-realists," who overlooked the intricate amalgamation or "quality-group" of sensory perception and structures of meaning (conception), Pratt held that the chasm between knower and known, mind and object, is bridged by an *active* process of perception that combines reaction with intention. In sharp contrast with the apparent solipsism of Locke's epistemology, a real outer reference to independently existing things is obtained, "*not* [as] a part of one's own experience, but [as] a bit of reality in its own right" ("Critical Realism and the Possibility of Knowledge," 1920, p. 95). While distortion or error may occur in perception and that the "ultimate nature of reality" is beyond one's immediate grasp, Pratt's critical realism assumed a sufficient coordination (or teleology) between the psycho-physical capacity of mind and "outer reference" in the rest of nature to facilitate reliable perceptions beyond one's original "mental content."

Pratt did not think critical realism required traditional metaphysics, but he admitted a kind of "faith" or "inborn hypothesis" regarding the independence of external reality. Pratt's realist epistemology prompted further inquiry in the philosophy of religion throughout the 1920s and 1930s, especially as he pursued the implications of a functional psychology of religious experience which, for many of his contemporaries, had "destroyed its object." In *The Religious Consciousness* (1920) and subsequent works, Pratt defended metaphysics, whether of the materialistic or "spiritualistic" variety, as a worthy scholarly vocation even though it exceeded the limits of verifiable human experience. As much as he professed a chastened interest in the more immediate phenomena examined by

psychology, he could not resist speculation regarding the “truths of theology” and the “benefits of mysticism” in his later books. These interests are pronounced in his occasional forays in the comparative study of religions (inspired in part by Otto Pfleiderer), including *India and Its Faiths* (1915) and *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism* (1928), as well as in the summaries of his epistemology in *Personal Realism* (1937) and *Naturalism* (1939).

Pratt’s dual interest in theology and philosophy is reflected in his roles as President of the eastern branches of the American Theological Society in 1934, and President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1935–1936. In *Can We Keep the Faith?* (1941) and in other later works, including numerous essays in *Harvard Theological Review* and the *Journal of Philosophy*, he defended an accommodating form of “immanent teleology” that accounted for his wide-ranging views on world religions and contemporary developments in the philosophy of religion.

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PRIESTLEY, JOSEPH (1733–1804)

Joseph Priestley was born at Fieldhead, Yorkshire, England, on 13 March 1733. In 1755 he became assistant minister at Needham Market in Suffolk, where he was not a great success, due in part to his Arian views. Upon his appointment in 1761 as tutor in languages and belles-lettres at the academy at Warrington, he was introduced to chemistry by Matthew Turner, whom John Seddon had invited to give lectures at the academy. He was ordained in 1762, and from this time he spent a month of every year in London, where he got to know Benjamin Franklin, John Canton, Richard Price and others. He was made LLD by the University of Edinburgh in 1764 and was elected to the Royal Society in 1766.

In 1767 he moved to the Mill Hill Chapel at Leeds. *Appeal to the Serious and Candid Professors of Christianity*, in which his newly acquired Socinian views were first expressed, appeared in 1770, and an extended program of polemical writing started which also included the publication of the *Theological Repository* (1769 onwards), a journal to promote the interchange of (mainly radical) theological views. He also conducted numerous scientific experiments and wrote a series of works outlining his materialistic views. In 1780 Priestley moved to Birmingham, and became co-pastor of the New Meeting in Birmingham. He became a member of the Lunar Society, had good relations with the Anglican clergy, and continued his annual visits to London and his scientific work. All this came to an end with the Birmingham Riots of 1791, fomented, in part at least, by Priestley's views on the French Revolution.

Priestley had long contemplated emigration to America. He preached his farewell sermon on 30 March 1794, and sailed to New York, landing there on 4 June to an extraordinary welcome. He did not stay since he and his sons were interested in a settlement in Pennsylvania in which their mutual friend Thomas Cooper, an emigré from England and possibly the William Hammon who had published Matthew Turner's atheistic tract, *An Answer to Dr. Priestley's Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever* (1782), was involved. Priestley stayed in Philadelphia for two weeks and then moved on to Northumberland, Pennsylvania, which was to be his base for the rest of his life, because the Philadelphians were suspicious of Priestley's Unitarian views. He died in Northumberland, Pennsylvania, on 6 February 1804, and was buried in the Quaker Meeting Ground there. He never acquired American citizenship.

As a philosopher Priestley's reputation rests on a number of works published in the 1770s,

of which the first was his *Examination of the philosophies of Reid, Beattie, and Oswald* (1774), which argued that the instincts found in the Scottish common sense philosophy were effectively occult qualities and that those philosophers had failed to take into account the associationism of David Hartley, of which Priestley produced an edition with Introduction in 1775. These essentially critical works found their positive counterpart in the *Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit* (1777), Priestley's most important philosophical work, containing the fullest expression of his rejection of dualism. This was followed by supplementary works such as *The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated* (1777; often referred to as the *Illustrations*) and *The Doctrine of Divine Influence* (1779), as well as replies to his critics, including John Palmer and Jacob Bryant.

In the *Disquisitions* Priestley starts with a discussion of the properties of matter, maintaining that matter is not that "inert substance that it has been supposed to be; that powers of attraction or repulsion are necessary to its very being, and that no part of it appears to be impenetrable to other parts" (xxxviii). Since the powers of sensation and thought are not incompatible with these powers in the way that they have been supposed to be repugnant to solidity or impenetrability, there is no reason to think that mind and matter are as distinct as has been supposed. Resistance is derived not from solid matter but from a power of repulsion acting at a distance from the body itself. Conversely, it is the power of mutual attraction that keeps what are essentially divisible bodies or atoms together – "no substance can retain any form without" (5) – and solidity disappears. Matter, having no other properties than repulsion and attraction, is therefore penetrable. It is here that Priestley moves from the Newtonian view as he has so far expressed it, in the observation that all the

matter in the universe could be contained in a nutshell, to the assertion that matter “consists of physical points only, endowed with powers of attraction and repulsion” (19).

A person, besides one’s material properties, is possessed of the powers of sensation, perception and thought. The powers of thought have never been found other than in conjunction with organized matter, and that they ripen and decay or else, for example, from a blow on the head. No ideas come to mind other than through the bodily senses and there are no signs of independence of the mind from the body before death. Priestley then discusses the vehicle of the soul, dismissing it as a “vehicle of the imagination.” All the powers normally ascribed to the mind, such as abstraction, the influence of reason, the unity of consciousness, the self-moving power and indivisibility of the soul, the capacity of the mind to overlook or ignore sensations presented to it, can be reduced to the operation of matter. Even the argument from the corruptibility of matter does not entail the existence of an immaterial substance. We have no proper idea of any essence and this particularly applies to the divine being, who therefore cannot be supposed to be material; it “has properties most essentially different from everything else,” and so no proof of the materiality of man can be extended to God.

Priestley, quoting Hobbes, thinks that liberty is merely the absence of all impediments to action, or a “liberty of suspending our determination” (*Illustrations* 1783, 6). But even so, following Locke, this entails a determination to suspend a volition, which is in fact another volition. Hence “there will be a necessary connection between all things past and present, and to come, in the way of proper cause and effect, as much in the intellectual, as in the natural world; so that... no event could have been otherwise

than it has been, is, or is to be...” (8–9). It is difficult to understand how Priestley could effect an ethical theory on this basis since the basis of any eighteenth-century theory is that one could have acted other than one did, in a disinterested fashion, aided in various ways by the constitution of one’s nature. Priestley comes up instead with a doctrine of divine Providence such that it becomes a moral duty not to interfere with its fulfillment.

Priestley’s views on the simple humanity of Christ, rejecting the doctrine of much of traditional Christianity, confirm the unique power of God. *The History of the Corruptions of Christianity* appeared in 1782, followed in 1786 by *The History of Early Opinions Concerning Christ*: both argued that the early Church was Unitarian in doctrine. *Notes on All the Books of Scriptures* (1803–04) represents a final systematic attempt to expound this theme. Priestley’s writings on history and rhetoric – which arise out of his teaching activities and exemplify the same evolutionary methodology as the rest of his works – and in the field of English grammar are of crucial importance.

This starts to make sense in the context of Priestley’s millenarianism. Man acts as the instrument through which God’s plans for the universe are achieved, and in the fulfillment of which God Himself is continually present. The mechanism of God’s providence was revealed through prophecy but the intention was similarly clear in the ultimate triumph of truth. Political liberty relates to those who take part in the political process while civil liberty is in the political process while civil liberty is the power which the members of the state reserve to themselves and which their officers must not infringe. This should be as wide as possible that people might learn the difference between right and wrong through experience. God has so organized the world that man’s natural desire to seek pleasure and

avoid pain will produce this result in a social context, rather than the realization of a pure ethical insight.

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John Gareth Stephens

PUTNAM, HILARY WHITEHALL (1926–)

Hilary Putnam was born on 31 July 1926 in Chicago, Illinois. Putnam received his BA degree in 1948 from the University of Pennsylvania, and obtained his PhD in philosophy at the University of California at Los Angeles in 1951, working with Hans Reichenbach. Putnam taught philosophy at Northwestern University in 1952–53 and at Princeton University from 1953 to 1961, and then he was professor of philosophy of science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1961 to 1965. He then became professor of philosophy at Harvard in 1965 and remained there the rest of his career. In 1976 he became Walter Beverley Pearson Professor of Modern Mathematics and Mathematical Logic; later he was also named Cogan University Professor. He retired in 2000.

Like Putnam, his wife Ruth Anna Putnam has been another important interpreter of the pragmatist tradition. Together with Richard Rorty and other “post-analytic” thinkers, Putnam was responsible for the recent renewal of interest in pragmatism among both analytic philosophers and their critics. In addition to Rorty, Putnam was influenced by many other major late twentieth century philosophers, including his Harvard colleagues W.V. Quine and Nelson Goodman, with whom he has shared many insights but whose relativistic views he has criticized.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Putnam became well known as a pioneer of *semantic externalism*, more precisely the causal theory of reference (independently developed by Saul Kripke), and the *functionalist* theory of the mind. He later gave up functionalism, embracing a conception of the mind closer to Aristotle and Ludwig Wittgenstein instead. But he continued to hold an externalist

view on semantics, without the scientific assumptions often attached to such views. According to Putnam, the external world with which speakers of a language causally interact must play a crucial role in the fixation of the reference of the linguistic expressions they use. One of Putnam’s famous thought experiments pertaining to this issue is the science fiction scenario known as the “Twin Earth.” What really exists in the natural world environing us – in this case, whether its seas and rivers are full of H₂O or some other complex substance XYZ phenomenally indistinguishable from H₂O – partly determines what our linguistic expressions mean; in this case, whether our word “water” refers to H₂O or XYZ. As there is only XYZ to be found on the Twin Earth, although that imagined planet is otherwise identical with ours, the people living there can only refer to XYZ when they speak about water, just as we refer to H₂O. “Meanings ain’t in the head,” but partly in the world we speak about. Moreover, there is a “division of linguistic labor” that contributes to the determination of reference: language-users need not individually know the correct descriptions of the referents of their terms in order to be able to refer. For instance, we can refer to electrons by using the word “electron,” even though few of us (practically speaking only theoretical physicists) know what electrons *are* in the sense of being able to accurately describe their properties. For ordinary language-users, it is sufficient that there are such experts in the linguistic community.

The environing natural and social world plays its role in the fixation of reference by imposing causal constraints on successful referring. In the absence of causal connections with for example H₂O, we could not refer to this substance by the word “water.” But this account of causal constraints should not,

Putnam reminds us, be taken as a reductive causal explanation of the metaphysical nature of reference. In the 1980s and 1990s, Putnam rejected the idea that reference could be reductively defined in terms of causal (or any other physical, non-normative, non-intentional or non-semantic) notions. Attacking physicalists and other reductive naturalists who defend causal theories of reference, he queried whether the reference of our term “causes” is itself causally fixed as a part of the fundamental causal structure of the universe. This is something he finds unintelligible. There is no way to escape normative notions in semantics; words can be used rightly or wrongly. No part of the world, including causality, can self-identify itself as causally explanatory.

Functionalism, which Putnam defended in the 1960s and early 1970s, is the view that mental or psychological states are “functional states” of an entity. Such states can be possessed by biological organisms, such as humans, but there is no reason why they could not be possessed by artificially created intelligent systems, such as computers. The “hardware” is inessential, insofar as the functional organization of the system is complex enough. Thus, human mental states and actions are comparable to the “software” of a computer. In this way, we are, according to functionalists, analogous to computers. By the late 1980s he came to see functionalism as a scientific and utopian project. We have no meaningful notion of an ideal psychological theory that could identify our functional states in a manner in which the functional states of a computer can be identified. The functionalist’s conceptions of human perception and conception rely on what Putnam has called a “Cartesian-cum-materialist,” 17th century picture of the mind. The functionalist does not sufficiently appreciate the pragmatist (and

Wittgensteinian) point that to have a mind is to engage in irreducibly intentional activities in the world, instead of just manipulating formal symbols.

Putnam’s views might still be described as functionalist in the sense of emphasizing the practical functions human beings (and potentially any beings with minds) must perform in a common natural and social world, but he is no longer a functionalist in the specific sense in which that term is used by philosophers of mind. Typical functionalists are reductive materialists in the same way as typical causal theorists of reference. Against both, Putnam has urged that there is no way to naturalize the normative and intentional notions we need to account for our mental and linguistic capacities.

For Putnam, *metaphysical realism* is the combination of three theses: (1) there is a way the world is in itself, mind- and language-independent; i.e., the world consists of a fixed set of mind-independent objects and their properties; (2) this independent world can, in principle, be described in a complete, unique, absolutely true representation (presumably an ideal scientific theory); (3) truth is a non-epistemic notion of correspondence between linguistic items (statements, beliefs or theories) and the objects and/or states of affairs existing in the mind- and language-independent world. Putnam’s *internal realism* is the denial of all three theses. Claiming that the world can be correctly described from a number of different perspectives, reflecting our interests and purposes, Putnam’s internal realism is a version of the *pluralism* one finds in pragmatists like James and Dewey. The internal realist says that no description of the world, not even the most advanced scientific one, is the world’s or nature’s own. Descriptions available to us are grounded in human purposes and practices. Ontology,

truth and reference are internal to conceptual schemes serving different purposes. The upshot of this conceptual relativity is that we live in a human world; there is no “ready-made” world. Putnam has emphasized the *context sensitivity* of linguistic meaning, epistemic justification, and rationality. It is, in Putnam’s view, dangerously scientistic and culturally harmful to think about natural science as being somehow more intimately in touch with the true structure of reality than other human language-games. We should instead adopt a commonsensical “natural realism.” Putnam’s other preferred labels of “pragmatic realism,” and “realism with a small ‘r’,” still accurately apply. His rejection of metaphysical realism can be combined with a pragmatic (commonsense) realism affirming the objectivity and independence of the world.

Putnam defends the ungrounded, non-foundationalist (but humanly fundamental) status of ethics. The ethical is in no need of external justification: no science can teach us to make the kind of distinctions requiring “moral perception” (which is to be distinguished from any mysterious intuition). Putnam is opposed to any picture in which ethics is treated as something to be justified “from outside,” be that picture evolutionary, utilitarian, or contractarian. All these pictures try to defend ethics in non-ethical terms. In *Ethics without Ontology* (2004) Putnam writes an “obituary” of ontology, continuing to attack the assumptions of metaphysical realism, this time through his defense of the fact/value entanglement. Putnam challenges the standard order of priority among philosophical subdisciplines, especially metaphysics and ethics. In a Jamesian spirit, Putnam urged that we need to develop “moral images of the world” in which metaphysical and ethical elements

are profoundly entangled. Putnam also attempted to bring religious issues, typically marginalized in scientifically oriented analytic philosophy, back to the center of philosophy. He wrote insightful papers on religious language and the possibility of rationally discussing religious belief, noting that “scientific” attacks on theism are based on misunderstandings. Scientistic critics of religion fail to understand religious forms of life and religious uses of language.

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PUTNAM, RUTH ANNA (1927–)

Ruth Anna Putnam was born on 20 September 1927 in Berlin, Germany. Her mother was Jewish and the family suffered great hardships during Nazi Germany. She emigrated to the United States after World War II and entered the University of California at Los Angeles, earning a BS in chemistry in 1954. She then received her PhD in philosophy at UCLA in 1962 and married Hilary Putnam in that year. She taught philosophy at Wellesley College from 1963 to 1998, and is presently professor emerita. In addition to an active publishing record on a variety of philosophical topics, Putnam has participated in numerous Jewish organizations and causes in the U.S. and Israel.

Putnam's work has been primarily concentrated in topics of epistemology, philosophy of science, moral and value theory, and political theory. Her early writings ask probing questions about empirical knowledge. What began as a protest against the notion of internal "mental" representations resulting from perception grew over the years into an interest in reviving a type of direct and externalist realism inspired in part by William James, John Dewey, and John Austin. Putnam has found that not only are the objects of common sense experience directly perceivable, but so are their values. She has argued that "the facts" of what is perceived are mutually dependent on "the values" that we are interested in pursuing. No description, even a scientific description,

is free from entanglement with a normative valuation involved in the establishment or significance of that description. She therefore rejects the philosophical "fact-value dichotomy" that enforces a sharp distinction between propositions of fact and normative judgments. Hilary Putnam, in several articles in the 1980s and 1990s, has defended this view as well. Ruth Anna Putnam proposes that our formation and use of beliefs and desires make a "seamless web" through action. She also rejects the Quinean plan of permitting only value-free science to give the definitive account of how things are. Her pragmatism is realistic without being scientific or reductionistic. The processes of improving the "fit" between theories and reality, so emphasized by traditional realists seeking correspondence, are humanly normative processes that selectively decide what is relevant to theory formation and testing.

The tradition of classical pragmatism has informed much of her work on moral, social, and political theory as well, and Putnam has enriched and extended that tradition in return. From Putnam's pragmatic perspective on our capacity for gradually transforming character, which is also our modifications to social relations, people are neither tightly trapped in cultural traditions nor free to take completely detached stands for surveying the rationality of one's culture or political system. In "Neither a Beast nor a God" (2000) Putnam pragmatically surmounts the supposed liberal-communitarian divide by aligning with a political liberalism somewhat like Rawls' later position that acknowledges the strength of communal or national bonds of loyalty. Putnam would go beyond political liberalism towards a more comprehensive liberalism that can justify some state power (like taxes and public education) while placing constraints on that power to respect human dignity.

Putnam, like Rorty, sees an alternative to foundational or a priori political theorizing, by taking the experimental view that societies with greater respect for human dignity foster greater human flourishing and tend to sympathetically blend their cultures with neighbors, gradually enlarging the moral community. This possibility of continued enlargement of sympathy and respect for others, for which Rorty only hopes, actually has an established empirical ground that fallibly justifies our commitment to continuing liberalism's experiment. Putnam also emphasizes that liberalism by its nature can and will learn from other religious and cultural traditions, so liberalism will likely take new and diverse political forms for experimentation.

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QUINE, WILLARD VAN ORMAN (1908–2000)

W.V. Quine was born on 25 June 1908 in Akron, Ohio. He graduated with a BA *summa cum laude* in mathematics from Oberlin College in 1930. Quine completed his MA in 1931 and PhD in 1932 at Harvard University. He wrote his dissertation on “The Logic of Sequences: A Generalization of *Principia Mathematica*,” under the direction of Alfred North Whitehead. In Europe, Quine attended Moritz Schlick’s lectures and met A. J. Ayer, Kurt Gödel, Karl Menger, Hans Hahn, and Hans Reichenbach, and also worked with Alfred Tarski. At the end of his term as a junior fellow in 1936 Quine started a three-year instructorship in philosophy at Harvard. In 1941 Quine was promoted to associate professor. Quine entered the U.S. Navy in October 1942 as a lieutenant, working in radio intelligence in Washington, D.C., deciphering codes used by German submarines. He was discharged in late 1945 with the rank of lieutenant commander and returned to Harvard in February 1946. In 1948 he was promoted to full professor of philosophy and appointed a senior fellow of the Society of Fellows. In 1956, Quine was appointed Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy, and held that position until retiring in 1978. Quine died on 25 December 2000 in Boston, Massachusetts.

Quine’s first two books, *A System of Logistic* (1934) and *Mathematical Logic* (1940), both aimed to improve on the symbolic and mathematical logic developed

in Bertrand Russell and Whitehead’s *Principia Mathematica*. His *Methods of Logic* was published in 1950. A revised edition of *Mathematical Logic* appeared in 1951. He then published *From a Logical Point of View* (1953); the title was recommended by his Harvard colleague Henry Aiken, after they had heard Harry Belafonte perform the calypso song “From a Logical Point of View” in a Greenwich Village nightclub. Two essays in the volume, “On What There Is” and “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” are classics of analytic philosophy.

“Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” perhaps the most important and influential essay ever written in analytic philosophy, claims that it is not possible to validate individual statements by checking each against our experiences. Often labelled as the “Duhem-Quine” thesis, this view holds that new experiences can only test an entire system of thought, which led to Quine’s rejection of the two dogmas of empiricism: the analytic-synthetic distinction and reductionism. By the former doctrine, Quine means the view that declarative sentences separate into analytic sentences – those that are true or false solely in virtue of their meanings – and synthetic sentences – those that are true or false in virtue of both their meanings together with how the world is. The positivists hoped to defend empiricism by showing that every meaningful synthetic sentence either has an experiential content or reduces to sentences with an experiential content. Sentences of logic and of mathematics, however, are analytic: they

are necessary solely on the basis of their meanings. Quine denied both of these dogmas without, however, rejecting empiricism.

In 1960, Quine published his most famous and influential book *Word and Object*. In chapter 2, Quine imagines a field linguist trying to translate the language of a faraway tribe; he dubs this exercise “radical translation.” While a rabbit runs by, one native utters “Gavagai.” In like situations, the linguist uses “Lo, a rabbit” and so, the field linguist posits that “Gavagai” translates (means the same as) “Lo, a rabbit.” If she learns that the native assents to, and dissents from, “Gavagai” in just those circumstances where she assents to, and dissents from, “Rabbit?”, then this evidence supports her translation of one expression for the other.

Most sentences are, of course, not so directly connected to sensory stimuli. Translating these less sensory (or observational) sentences requires what Quine calls “analytical hypotheses.” One of Quine’s more controversial doctrines is that different analytical hypotheses while yielding distinct translations, might nevertheless both equally well facilitate communication. The doctrine can be put even stronger: there is no (possible) evidence that can distinguish among these diverse analytical hypotheses. This doctrine is Quine’s so-called “indeterminacy of translation” – the view that no single correct translation exists. No one analytical hypothesis can be singled out as the correct one as long as all can be fit together in effective communication. In *Word and Object*, Quine also discusses language acquisition and the genesis of reference, defending the view that before being proficient with a language a child must first learn a cluster of interrelated grammatical particles and constructions, such as pronouns, numerals, the *is* of identity, and so on.

In 1963 Quine published *Set Theory and Its Logic*. Three years later he published two collections, *Selected Logic Papers* and *The Ways of Paradox, and Other Essays*. Another

collection, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, appeared in 1969. In 1970 he and J.S. Ullian coauthored *The Web of Belief*, a brief tract on scientific method, and Quine published *Philosophy of Logic*. Quine’s dissatisfaction with his account of language learning in *Word and Object* later produced *The Roots of Reference* (1974), in which he speculates about how children acquire their referential apparatus.

Quine tagged his position “naturalized epistemology.” Naturalism rejects the view that scientific knowledge is justified on extra-scientific grounds. He set as an ideal the replacement of philosophy by science. Naturalized epistemology becomes the scientific investigation of the acquisition of science. Quine defends naturalism on the basis of two other doctrines that he embraced, namely, “holism” and “unregenerate realism.” According to the doctrine of holism (the denial of reductionism), not every single sentence of a scientific theory is associated with a unique set of confirming and disconfirming experiences; therefore, you cannot separate sentences into those that are true in virtue of how the world and into those that are true solely by virtue of their meanings alone. By an unregenerate realism, Quine means that scientific knowledge is continuous with commonsense knowledge, and so, we cannot raise global doubts about such knowledge. An unregenerate realist sees that the skeptical challenge confronting science must arise from within science; and so, the reasons for rejecting science are just further scientific claims.

Empiricism, for Quine, is the view that both the scientific evidence and the meanings of words ultimately must rest upon our senses. He is not an introspective empiricist in the manner of John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume, or the early Rudolph Carnap. Rather, Quine’s empiricism is externalized. Since Quine holds that scientific theories are statable as distinct

sets of sentences, and that the evidence for, and the meanings of, these distinct sets of sentences are ultimately sensory, he naturally infers that the evidential basis for science is best evaluated from the standpoint of language acquisition. To say that the evidential basis for science is best evaluated from the standpoint of language acquisition Quine means that in learning the meaning of any given sentence, what one must learn is exactly what evidence there is for the truth of that sentence. According to Quine, language acquisition should be studied behavioristically. The advantage of his empiricism over the earlier introspective one is that language learning, on Quine's account, becomes as a matter of course both public and amenable to investigation by intersubjective techniques.

Quine's answers to the central epistemological questions – how is scientific knowledge acquired and why does it work so well – begins with his philosophical naturalism. This naturalism is the doctrine that the best theories of science and, in particular, of learning are those according to which children are endowed with a capacity to acknowledge and collect recurrent salient sensory stimuli. Because children are also innately disposed to babble and to imitate the speech of adults, and also because they are amenable to behavioral conditioning, and behavioral reinforcement largely from adults very soon has them responding to concomitant nonverbal stimulus conditions by producing the appropriate strings of linguistic sounds. Talk of ordinary objects, as Quine likes to say, is close at hand, and then science is not far behind. Theoretical sentences inherit whatever empirical content they carry via the diverse connections that they carry with the observation sentences of the language. In only a matter of time, then, the child goes beyond behavioristic conditioning and induction in order to acquire language that surpasses observation sentences.

By Quine's holistic account of natural knowledge, the apparent necessity of logic and mathematics is explained by their centrality to one's web of belief and not by their being analytic (true by definition). Their centrality is demonstrated by the great degree of disruption to one's web of belief that would ensue if some logical or mathematical truth were given up as false. Quine calls the desideratum that the least possible modification is to be done to one's web of belief the "maxim of minimum mutilation." Still, sometimes the drastic step of denying a general principle, or even a logical or mathematical "law," will have to be taken. He cites the example of how quantum mechanics can be accommodated to one's web of belief if one is prepared to relinquish the law of excluded middle – this is the law that states that every proposition is either true or false. Quine argues for his empiricism naturalistically: he argues for it, that is, on the grounds of natural science: the only evidence for science, ultimately, is the activation of our nerve endings. So, on Quine's view, natural science and empiricism dovetail to support one another.

During the 1980s Quine published *Theories and Things* (1981), *The Time of My Life: An Autobiography* (1985), and *Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary* (1987). In 1990 Quine published *Pursuit of Truth*, in which he clarifies various views on meaning, reference, and knowledge. His last book was *From Stimulus to Science* (1995), in which he finally came to agree with Carnap that mathematics lacks empirical content altogether.

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Ernest Lepore

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RAMSEY, ROBERT PAUL (1913–1988)

Paul Ramsey was born on 10 December 1913 in Mendenhall, Mississippi. He was the son of John William Ramsey, a Methodist minister, and Mamie McCay. He was educated at Millsaps College (BS 1935), Yale Divinity School (BD 1940), and Yale University (PhD in religion, 1943). While at Yale he was a graduate student of H. Richard Niebuhr. Ramsey was instructor in history and social sciences at Millsaps College (1937–1939), and was assistant professor of Christian ethics at Garret Biblical Institute of Northwestern University (1942–1944). He then taught in Princeton University's new department of religion as assistant professor from 1944 to 1947, associate professor from 1947 to 1954, and professor from 1954 to 1982. He was named Harrington Spear Paine Professor of Religion in 1957. He also was chair of the religion department in 1959–1963, 1973, and 1976. He died on 29 February 1988 in Princeton, New Jersey.

Ramsey's extraordinarily active and prolific career included writing eleven books, editing six others, and being the recipient of eight honorary degrees from many colleges and universities. He was a Kent Fellow of the Society for Religion in Higher Education (President, 1950s). He was instrumental in forming the Society of Christian Ethics (President 1962–1963), was elected a member of the American Theological Society (President 1964–1965), and was a trustee of

the Council on Religion and International Affairs (1968–1975). He served on the Drew University Board of Trustees from 1968 to 1975. He was elected to the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Science in 1972, and in 1981 he was named recipient of the Henry Knowles Beecher Award for contributions to Ethics and the Life Sciences.

Ramsey's specialty was Christian ethics. His best known work, *Basic Christian Ethics* (1950), was for decades one of the most widely used undergraduate texts, as well as an extensively used book for seminary training. Ramsey argued that the mythological and apocalyptic language of Scripture provides insight into the nature of morality. "Whether in the old law or in the new covenant, God manifests His will in something objectively given to which man must conform rather than something conformable to man. Christian ethics is an ethics of perfection which cuts man to fit the pattern, not the pattern to fit man" (1950, p. 85). Also inherent in Ramsey's thinking is his belief in the efficacy of Christian ethics which supercedes any natural law, whether or not such a morality is imbedded in human hearts.

In the 1940s, Ramsey's primary concern focused upon the topic of justification for killing. While a student at Millsaps College, he was a pacifist. Under the influence of both H. Richard Niebuhr and Reinhold Niebuhr at Yale, Ramsey moved away from a liberally idealistic Protestantism to a Niebuhrian realism. Chastising liberals and conservatives, Ramsey stated both avoided thinking about the

actual use of power for positive purposes or its political morality. He felt that both groups, liberals and conservatives, believed the use of force could be eliminated before banishing porcupine nation-states from the planet.

Ramsey became a spokesperson for counterforce strategy – unlike many Roman Catholics, especially in Great Britain, who had concluded that nuclear pacifism was the appropriate response to issues of a just war. For him, this counterforce strategy is what should form the conscience of free people, with a “collateral” deterrence that such a policy could afford. He favored the possibility that “a bluff,” or the appearance of a willingness to release massive nuclear weapons, could serve as a deterrent to any enemy. Ramsey reversed his support for “a bluff” as a possible moral deterrent in a letter to *Newsweek* (5 July 1982). He acknowledged that collateral civilian damage becomes an aftermath of war. He withdrew his support of the “bluff,” for two reasons: it would not be a deterrent and “one should never occasion mortal sin in others, tempt them to it or enlist them for it. It is never right to do evil, or to intend to do evil, so that good may come.” He did not deny that consequences are irrelevant; however, his primary focus concerned questions of agency and means.

In 1957 Ramsey edited Jonathan Edwards’s famous 1754 essay *Freedom of Will* with a 130-page introduction that many consider a definitive analysis of Edwards’s Calvinism. Ramsey presented both a study of eighteenth-century intellectual life in the United States and an examination of the problem of free will with a comparison of Edwards’s thoughts to those of Hume, Leibniz, and Locke. Ramsey highlighted Edwards’s relevancy to contemporary philosophical context, feeling that liberal theologians of his time could have benefited from an analysis of the thoughts of Edwards, thereby gaining in substance and firmness of ideas.

Ramsey’s later years witnessed the development of broad, innovative and daring medical research. Perceptions as to what constitutes an ethical experiment or procedure were evolving, leading Ramsey to consider their moral implications and apply his extensive analytical and technical skills. In 1970 Ramsey published both *The Patient as Person* and *Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control*. Five years later he published *The Ethics of Fetal Research* and three years later *Ethics at the Edges of Life: Medical and Legal Intersections* based upon the Hampton lectures he gave at Columbia University. In these writings Ramsey argued that love and care for another does not allow for active euthanasia but “does allow one to die.” In addition, he challenged the use of children for research unless the medical procedures were for their benefit. Dealing with the topics of euthanasia, abortion and the overt neglect of newborn babies, Ramsey clearly emphasized the value of human life in every stage.

A philosophical idealism can be traced throughout Ramsey’s writings. Beginning with his dissertation, *The Concept of Man in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce and Bernard Bosanquet*, this idealism continued with his first book *Basic Christian Ethics* in 1950, to the editing of Jonathan Edwards’s *Ethical Writings* in 1989, to opposition to situation ethics in the 1960s, to his just war theories and often controversial position in the 1970s in support of the Vietnam War, to his interest in medical ethics beginning in 1968. This continuum was grounded in his assertions stated in *Basic Christian Ethics*. This foundation is the Biblical understanding of the righteousness of God and the reign of that righteousness in the Kingdom of God in Jesus Christ as the two sources of Christian love. This love is manifest to neighbor, to care for the vulnerable, to deliverance for captives and

regard for aliens, and in medical situations; it is the unifying theme of his life work.

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Nancy Hurd Schluter

RAND, AYN (1905–1982)

Ayn Rand was born Alisa Zinovyevna Rosenbaum on 2 February 1905 in St. Petersburg, Russia, to middle-class, cultured, largely non-observant Jewish parents. At age 16 she entered Petrograd University, graduating three years later, in 1924; history was her major subject and philosophy her special interest. She subsequently studied for a year at the State Technicum for Screen Arts. In early 1926 she emigrated to the United States, and eventually

took up residence in Hollywood, where she changed her name to Ayn Rand. She worked initially as a screen writer for the Cecil B. DeMille studios. Her first play, *Night of January 16th*, was produced on Broadway in 1935, and the first of her four novels, *We the Living*, was published in 1936. *Anthem* followed in 1938, *The Fountainhead* in 1943, and *Atlas Shrugged*, her magnum opus, in 1957.

In 1951, Rand moved permanently to New York City. After the publication of *Atlas Shrugged*, she turned to nonfiction, elaborating on the philosophy expounded in the novels and applying it to current cultural and political issues. She lectured widely at universities and colleges and to private groups throughout the U.S., and wrote numerous essays, many published in periodicals she edited or co-edited: *The Objectivist Newsletter* (1962–65), *The Objectivist* (1966–71), and *The Ayn Rand Letter* (1971–76). The philosophical speeches from her novels, and her philosophic essays and lectures, became the basis for a series of seven book-length collections, starting in 1961. Rand died on 6 March 1982 in New York City.

In an afterword to *Atlas Shrugged* Ayn Rand said: “My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute.” Rand’s vision of human beings as able to achieve great things, and of the universe as open to their efforts, is clearly a significant part of her widespread appeal. Happiness, for her, is the emotional state that results from the achievement of objective values. Such values and the means to them can only be identified by reason, and Rand holds that they cannot be achieved without such virtues as independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, and pride.

Rand’s virtue-focused rational egoism differs from traditional eudaimonism in that

Rand regards ethics as an exact science. Rather than deriving her virtues from a vaguely defined human function, she takes “Man’s Life” – i.e. that which is required for the survival of a rational animal across its lifespan – as her standard of value. This accounts for the nobility she ascribes to production – “the application of reason to the problem of survival” (1966, p. 9). For Rand, reason is man’s means of survival, and even the most theoretical and spiritual functions – science, philosophy, art, love, and reverence for the human potential, among others – are for the sake of life-sustaining action.

Following Aristotle, Rand views the world as made up of individual entities, and understands causality as the relationship between an entity and the actions necessitated by its nature. Choice is a type of causality. It is the nature of reason, our distinctive form of consciousness, to be volitional; its operation is up to us. Rand defines reason as “the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses” (1965, p. 20).

Rand’s ethics is founded on an argument that the concept “value” depends on the concept “life” and so is only meaningful in the context of an organism pursuing its life as its ultimate value. Animals automatically desire what they need to survive, but human desires are based on volitional thinking. So, each person must adopt his life as his ultimate value, and then choose to discover and enact the means necessary to achieve it. Someone who does not pursue life can have no values at all, and is irrelevant to ethics.

Rand identifies three cardinal values: Reason, Purpose, and Self-esteem, with the corresponding virtues of Rationality, Productiveness, and Pride. Reason is our means of survival. Rationality is the acceptance of reason as one’s only source of knowledge and guide to action. Rationality

requires a person to do *his own thinking* (*independence*) and stay true to it in *action* (*integrity*). It requires *honesty* – the refusal to fake reality – because the unreal does not exist and can be of no value. It requires *justice* – the moral evaluation of others – because rational, productive people are good *for us*, while irrational parasites are worthless or dangerous.

The fundamental right is the right to life, which is the source of all other rights, principally the rights to liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. The only moral political system is the one that protects individual rights, including property rights: *laissez-faire capitalism*. Rand criticizes prior ethicists for conceiving of values as either *intrinsic* (as in Plato, Moore, and religious traditions) or as *subjective* (hedonism, utilitarianism, Nietzsche, pragmatism, etc.). On her view values are *objective*. Values (like concepts) are formed by a consciousness in accordance with the facts of reality.

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Gregory Salmieri
and
Allan Gotthelf

RANDALL, JOHN HERMAN, JR. (1899–1980)

John Herman Randall, Jr. was born on 14 February 1899 in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Randall attended Columbia University and went into philosophy there, earning a BA in 1918, an MA in 1919 and a PhD in philosophy in 1922. He studied with John Dewey, and also much influenced by a small, close circle of friends, most of whom became fellow teachers of philosophy at Columbia: James Gutmann, Horace Fries, Herbert Schneider, and Irwin Edman. His wife, Mercedes Moritz Randall, was a prominent writer and peace activist. Columbia made Randall a lecturer in philosophy in 1920, and he remained at Columbia for the rest of his career. Many of his students of five decades became philosophers all over America. He became the first Woodbridge Professor of Philosophy in 1951. In 1956–57 Randall was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division. Randall officially retired in 1967, and died on 1 December 1980 in New York City.

Randall was one of the first group of teachers of Columbia's pioneering general education course, "Contemporary Civilization in the West." With the publication of an intellectual history of the West that grew out of this course, *The Making of the Modern*

Mind (1926), in print for over fifty years, he became widely known. In 1925 he inherited from Woodbridge the year-long graduate course in the history of philosophy, which became his major instrument of influence on generations of young philosophers and others at Columbia.

Randall usually called himself a naturalist and a functionalist, as Woodbridge did, rather than a pragmatist as Dewey did. He said that "naturalist" implied a stronger belief in the world we are part of, and its intelligibility, and a stronger link to like-minded philosophers of the past, back to Aristotle. In Randall's earlier decades, "naturalist" meant to the public to be non-religious. He learned from his minister father, who did not believe in a personal God or in any narrow creed, and from the historian of Christian theology, Arthur Cushman McGiffert, that the Christianity of the early Greek Fathers was varied, symbolic, and multivalent. It was not literal or dogmatic, much less modern fundamentalist; nor had this complexity ever completely died out in the evolving, never static, churches. Randall was secular, but he never broke with his father or turned upon on Christianity, even when he signed his radical colleague Corliss Lamont's *Humanist Manifesto* in 1933. His attitude and his exegesis were sympathetic. When students asked, "But *do* you believe in God," Randall would smile and say, "That depends on what you mean by God," being neither deceptive nor joking, but taking a complex, favorable stance. In this spirit he helped his colleagues Fries and Schneider set up at Columbia one of the first secular programs of the study of religion. In this spirit, much later, he co-taught seminars with modern theologian Paul Tillich.

Randall used "naturalist" to mean a complex and intellectually optimistic position. While recognizing the endlessness of debates about "the real world," he did believe in a natural universe, material and other, which is

not “out there,” beyond subjective minds, but one which we, bodies and minds alike, are fully part of. Very sympathetic to German and other idealists, he still held with Aristotle that the universe is prior to our mental processes. Randall held, with Aristotle, that the world (including ourselves) is intelligible and knowable, that it is natural for us to learn and know, and that organized rational inquiries, the sciences, are the ways to acquire that immense knowledge. He elaborated on this in his *Aristotle* (1960), which proved widely convincing. Much more controversial was his treatment of Plato, in classes and in his *Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason* (1970) in which he followed Woodbridge’s *The Son of Apollo*. Plato was not a “metaphysician” in the bad sense, preaching an erroneous Theory of Forms, much less a totalitarian state. He was, rather, a benign (not sneering) ironist, setting forth discussions and arguments about then new ideas in which he and other Greek intellectuals were interested, establishing important points for the first time, casting doubt on many more, delineating the characters, virtues and foibles of his milieu, a beautiful paean to rationally conducted life and thought.

Randall’s most original archival scholarship was done on a Guggenheim Fellowship to Italy in 1933–34 on the Averroist (Aristotelian) school of philosophers at the University of Padua in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries. He found and maintained that they were far from being the alleged formulaic fossils immune to Renaissance humanism who resisted modern science but were blown away by Galileo. Rather, they, especially Pomponazzi and Zabarella, were engaged in evolving, fruitful thought in the various natural sciences, relevant steps up which Galileo ascended and extended. Randall’s *The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua* (1940) was widely convincing. Randall’s treatment of the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries naturally centered on “the gradual development of science” which “produced the really great revolution from the medieval to the modern world.” He was impressed and moved by Spinoza’s “reverent attitude” toward nature newly revealed as never before by the mathematical scientists. Randall generated an influential image, “the Newtonian world machine,” a cosmos like a stationary engine, wheeling forever without any evolution, and an influential hypothesis, that the philosophers and scientists of the eighteenth century were engaged in the fruitful but failing attempt to discern equally simple mathematical laws that would describe and prescribe for the human mind and human society.

It is difficult to pinpoint Randall’s lasting influence on American philosophy. Other schools than “Columbia naturalism” were more prominent from the mid-twentieth century on. If American optimism and liberalism have declined, in various senses, this crystallized philosophical expression of them may have declined with them. Yet many members of other movements and indeed other professions still hold in whole or in part to these basic naturalist positions: a secular but not adversarial stance toward religion, a belief in the genuine reality and intelligibility of the universe and of the ability of the many sciences to illuminate it, and a conviction that the long history of philosophy is not just a chronicle of errors, but a two and a half thousand year record of how a number of human minds achieved remarkable and abidingly relevant insights. Insofar as these sentiments are still a part of the American intellectual baseline, Randall lives on.

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Francis B. Randall

RAPOPORT, ANATOL (1911–2007)

Anatol Rapoport was born on 22 May 1911 in Lozovaya, Russia, where he attended revolution-era public schools until emigrating to the U.S. in 1922. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1928. Before turning to mathematics, Rapoport studied music, first in Chicago and then in Vienna from 1929 to 1934 at the State Academy of Music and Performing Arts. The rise of Nazism cut short his career as a pianist and conductor and he returned to the U.S. where he took up the study of mathematics. Rapoport studied at the University of Chicago, where he received his BS in 1938, his MS in 1940, and his PhD in mathematics, under the direction of Nicholas Rashevsky, in 1941. Rapoport served as a Captain in the U.S. Air Force during World War II, assigned to liaison work between U.S. and Russian forces.

After the war, Rapoport returned to the University of Chicago where in 1947 he joined the Committee on Mathematical Biology. He taught as an assistant professor at Chicago for seven years. In 1954–55 he was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University,

conducting research in cybernetics. In 1955 he accepted a position as associate professor of mathematical biology at the University of Michigan. In 1960 he was promoted to professor and senior research mathematician at the University of Michigan's Mental Health Research Institute. In 1968–69, Rapoport spent a year as professor of applied mathematics at the Technical University of Denmark, returning then to Michigan for a final year. In 1970 he moved to the University of Toronto where he became professor of psychology and mathematics, and also professor for peace and conflict studies. After taking a mandatory retirement in 1976, Rapoport continued to occasionally teach at Toronto and other universities as professor emeritus. In 2001 he finally ended his teaching responsibilities but continued to publish. He died in Toronto on 20 January 2007.

Rapoport served as President of the International Society for General Semantics (1953–55), The Society for General Systems Research (1955–66), and the Canadian Peace Research and Education Association (1971–72). In 1976, Rapoport received the Lenz International Peace Research Prize and he has been awarded honorary degrees from the University of Western Michigan, the University of Toronto, the Royal Military College, and the University of Bern.

As a scientist, mathematician, expert on game theory and social thinker (and an early music theorist), Rapoport belongs to many categories. Much of his work belongs to areas of game theory and its social applications. Starting from his early work, which modelled biological systems including symbiosis, he was led to broader examination of cooperation as an extension of biological notions. From the beginning Rapoport has worked across disciplinary boundaries, in particular looking at ways in which biology and economics can attack issues. With

Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Ralph Gerard, and Kenneth Boulding, he founded The Society for General Systems Research in 1956, which became the International Society for the Systems Sciences.

Much of Rapoport's work is most readily classified as scientific, with an eye to social applications, rather than specifically as philosophical. His general philosophical bent in using game theory is aimed at strategies for cooperation rather than at the more common philosophers' focus on individual self-protection. Unlike philosophers such as David Gauthier, Rapoport showed that morality is ultimately derivable from prudential interests. This is particularly clear in his approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma, where two prisoners are separated and informed that regardless of what the other person does, each will do better by confessing, whereas both can see that collectively they will do better if neither confesses (when both "cooperate"). His analysis resulted in the development of and support for the strategy *Tit for Tat*, which consists of playing a cooperative play on the first trial and then imitating the other player in all other trials. The success of this strategy in the tournament organized by Robert Axelrod, and published in 1984 in *The Evolution of Cooperation* (Basic Books, New York) has been widely noted. *Tit for Tat* is robust, thriving in a variety of environments, immediately punishes and immediately forgives, is as transparent as possible, and does not attempt to outdo the other agent. This strategy looks in no way like the kind of self-directed prudential strategy that, since Plato's *Republic*, has seemed to many social philosophers to be the most basic kind of rational self-interest, and so his work challenges a long philosophical tradition. Rapoport had previously noted in his book *Prisoner's Dilemma* that *tit-for-tat* should elicit cooperation if played consistently, but

that book is a psychological study, not a work on achieving peace. In *Peace* he imbeds the discussion of *tit-for-tat* in a larger context that uses ideas from his earlier interest in systems, his knowledge of biology, and his commitment to something like Karl Popper's "third world" of conceptual structures.

His work has consistently been directed toward broad social goals of harmony, agreement, conflict resolution, and peace. It is characteristic of his background in biological thinking that his connection with ecology and with ways of conceptualizing peace does not come directly from the philosophical tradition.

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William R. Abbott

RAUCH, FREDERICK AUGUSTUS (1806–1841)

Frederick Augustus Rauch was born on 27 July 1806 in Kirchbracht, Hesse-Darmstadt, about thirty-five miles northeast of Frankfurt. Upon completion of his Gymnasium education, Rauch continued his study of classical literature at the University of Giessen. After three years at Giessen, at age twenty he accepted a position as teaching assistant at Hadermann Institute in Frankfurt. Rauch submitted a treatise, *In Sophoclis Electram Observationes*, to the philosophical faculty at the University of Marburg, which granted him the doctorate in 1827. Rauch returned to Giessen in November 1828, where he was admitted to a philosophy seminar in philology under Professor Friedrich Gotthilf Osann, and where he passed an oral examination and was provisionally habilitated as Privatdozent.

By 1830 Rauch published three books, *The Identity of Hindu, Persian, Pelasgian, German, and Slavic as Expressed in Language, Religion, and Customs* (1829), *Lectures on Goethe's Faust* (1830), and *The Clarification of the Universe or the Determination of Mankind* (1830). Rauch left Germany and arrived in New York City in the fall of 1831, and quickly moved to Easton, Pennsylvania, a town already crowded with German-Americans, many of whom were members of the Reformed Church to which Rauch was accustomed. In 1832 he was ordained by German Reformed Synod at York. In that year he accepted a position as professor of the German language at the newly founded Lafayette College, but he resigned three weeks later in order to accept a more secure position as the principal of the classical department and Professor of Biblical Literature in the German Reformed Seminary in York, Pennsylvania. In 1835 the school moved to Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, where, the following year, it became Marshall College with Rauch as its President and Professor of Hebrew, Greek, and German. The Seminary followed the College to Mercersburg two years later, taking the name of Mercersburg Seminary, and Rauch also taught Biblical Literature.

In 1837 he published "Ecclesiastical Historiography in Germany," in which he began to display a debt to Hegelian philosophy. Among other works, Rauch completed a substantial essay on Goethe in 1839, and in 1840 he published his *Psychology*. Rauch died in Mercersburg on 2 March 1841. At the time, he was in the process of completing revisions for the second edition of his *Psychology*, which was published in 1841. Much like the third part of Hegel's *Encyclopedia*, the *Philosophy of Mind*, Rauch's *Psychology* is divided into two parts, anthropology and psychology. Rauch follows Hegel in other

ways as well, depicting Cartesian mind/body dualism as a pernicious myth. For Rauch, mind and body, objectivity and subjectivity, are one. Reason is in the world, and at the same time the world is encompassed within it, thus reason is theoretical or formal freedom. In order to actualize freedom, self-conscious mind must be determined by none other than itself. The development of self-determination is the development of will. Also like Hegel, Rauch rejected faculty psychology, presenting cognition and volition as aspects of one mental life rather than separate faculties that can oppose one another.

Rauch then proceeds to a cursory discussion of morality, and ends the book with a section on religion. Emphasizing the sovereignty and personality of God, Rauch claimed that true religion is "produced by a peculiar activity of God upon the heart of man." That is to say, true religion is not attained by man's effort; it is God's action upon the individual's heart, utterly changing the individual by restoring him to "peace with himself, with the world, and with God" (1841, 388). In brief discussions of various world religions – fetishism, Buddhism, Brahmanism, the Persian religion, the Egyptian religion, the Greek religion, and Roman religion – Rauch leaves no doubt in the reader's mind that Christianity is the true religion and all others are mere superstitions. This final section demonstrates that Rauch's Hegelianism is quite consistent with that of theologically conservative Hegelians such as Karl Daub (with whom Rauch may have studied at Heidelberg) and Philipp Marheineke.

Soon after Rauch's psychology was published, reviewers raised the issue of the personality of God, in an effort to discern whether Rauch fell prey to the pantheistic heresy. Despite this controversy Rauch's *Psychology* was highly influential at Mercersburg for many years, and was used

as a text at the Universities of Vermont and Dartmouth College among other places. Rauch's philosophical thought prepared the way for the Mercersburg Theology that developed after his death under John Williamson Nevin and Philip Schaff.

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James A. Good

RAWLS, JOHN BORDLEY (1921–2002)

John Rawls was born on 21 February 1921 in Baltimore, Maryland. Rawls graduated *summa cum laude* from Princeton University in 1943, where his interest in philosophy developed under the influence of Norman Malcolm. After enlisting in the Army and serving as an infantryman in the Pacific theater during World War II, Rawls returned to Princeton in 1946 for his graduate work, earning his PhD in philosophy in 1950. Rawls was an instructor in philosophy at Princeton from 1950 to 1952, an assistant and associate professor of philosophy at Cornell from 1953 to 1959, and professor of philosophy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1960 to 1962. He joined the Harvard philosophy department in 1962 where he was later promoted to James Bryant Conant University Professor in 1979, holding that position until retiring in 1991. Rawls accepted honorary degrees from Oxford, Princeton, and Harvard, and he was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1974–75. He also received the National Humanities Medal in 1999, in part for his mentorship of women in philosophy. Rawls died on 24 November 2002 in Lexington, Massachusetts.

Rawls's first period is defined primarily by the development of Rawls's theory of justice, called "justice as fairness." This period includes not only *A Theory of Justice*, but also Rawls's early articles as well as his essays from the 1970s which build upon the principal themes of *Theory* and respond to some of the book's many critics. A second period begins with the essays published throughout the 1980s which introduce ideas that later appear in *Political Liberalism* and which enable Rawls to recast justice as fairness as a "political conception of justice." This period is defined primarily by the notion

of “political liberalism” with its idea of “public reason.” The later period also includes Rawls’s philosophical exchange with Jürgen Habermas and his account of international law and justice in *The Law of Peoples*.

The guiding idea behind Rawls’s theory of justice is that our lives and projects should not be determined by pervasive inequalities that are rooted in contingent social and economic circumstances. How, then, should we arrange the institutional structure of society in order both to achieve a proper distribution of social benefits and burdens and to minimize arbitrary distinctions in the assigning of basic rights and opportunities? Rawls answers this question by means of two principles of justice, initially introduced in an early article, “Justice as Fairness” (1958), and expounded in detail in *A Theory of Justice*. Each person, first, has an equal right to a system of equal basic liberties that includes rights to speech, conscience, integrity, legal protection, and political participation. Second, social and economic inequalities are permissible only if they satisfy two conditions. According to what Rawls calls “fair equality of opportunity,” these inequalities must (1) be attached to positions and offices that all have fair chance to attain. This means that persons who are similarly talented and motivated should have the same chances for success in the social system, regardless of their starting places in life. And, according to what he calls the “difference principle,” (2) social and economic inequalities must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.

The first principle protects the rights and freedoms celebrated by classical liberalism. However, Rawls does not treat ownership of the means of production as a matter of basic liberty. Indeed the second principle of justice, with its ideas of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle, demonstrates a strong commitment to egalitarianism,

thereby distinguishing Rawls’s conception of justice from classically liberal views which would permit far greater social and economic inequality. Yet the second principle would seem to require a sharp reduction in existing inequalities in education, access to medical care, opportunities for political influence and income and wealth. Rawls rejects the notion that, in the very institutional design of society, some persons might be sacrificed politically or economically for the greater welfare of others. The problem with utilitarianism is that it cannot adequately explain our considered judgment that the rights and interests of *each* member of society must be protected. One of the main goals of *Theory* is to provide a systematic alternative to the utilitarian views that had long dominated modern moral and political philosophy.

A society is just insofar as it is organized in terms of Rawls’s two principles of justice. And the two principles of justice are valid because they would be chosen in the original position. What justifies the original position as the starting point for seeking principles of justice? Rawls answers this question by relying on the nonfoundationalist notion of “reflective equilibrium.” Self-evident first principles are not necessary in order to begin the work of moral and political philosophy. Instead, some of our judgments, such as the wrongness of slavery, might serve as “provisional fixed points” for testing the adequacy of other ideas. In seeking reflective equilibrium, we compare alternate proposals to such “considered judgments” at all levels of generality, revising both our principles and judgments until we identify the conception of justice that most convincingly renders our judgments consistent with one another and with sound principles of justice. Thus the original position is based on ideals of freedom, equality, and fairness that we accept, or would accept on due reflection.

According to Rawls, the changes to his view in the 1980s, beginning with “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (1980), were increasingly concerned with a problem internal to his own theory. The third and final part of *A Theory of Justice* is devoted to the question of stability, namely, the question of whether and how citizens living in a society governed by the two principles of justice would acquire an adequate sense of justice as well as the requisite motivation to maintain just institutions. A major component of Rawls’s treatment of the stability question is an argument for the congruence of the right and the good, that is, an argument about why citizens should understand acting justly to be part of the human good. The problem, however, is that under the very political institutions recommended by the two principles of justice free human beings will inevitably affirm a number of reasonable conceptions of the good life, many of which will be incompatible with the Kantian commitments of Rawls’s own congruence argument. It is this “fact of reasonable pluralism” that led Rawls to introduce a number of new ideas over the course of next decade in an effort to modify and correct his account of how a just society could also be stable over time. The recently published *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* presents a unified account that includes many of these new ideas along with other important changes to the Rawlsian theory of justice.

In *Political Liberalism* these new ideas take center stage. In *Political Liberalism* and the essays leading up to it, justice as fairness is interpreted as a strictly *political* conception of justice. A political conception of justice can be worked out in terms of the fundamental ideas of a democracy’s public political culture and is intended to apply only to the basic institutional structure of society. It should also be possible to express a political conception as freestanding, separate from the

comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines which provide answers to questions concerning God, matters of first philosophy, nonpolitical values and the meaning of human life. Rawls includes under the category of “comprehensive doctrine” not only traditional religious views, but also the moral doctrines of philosophical liberals such as Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill.

How can a diverse group of citizens, especially citizens with deep and abiding religious convictions, also endorse a political conception of justice that supports a constitutional democracy? Rawls uses a “liberal principle of legitimacy” based on a “criterion of reciprocity.” Citizens and officials must offer justifications for the exercise of political power which they reasonably think other citizens might reasonably accept. A key term in the theory of political liberalism is *reasonableness*, which is applied to political conceptions of justice, comprehensive doctrines, forms of disagreement and other ideas. A reasonable citizen is prepared to offer and abide by fair terms of cooperation and to treat others as politically free and equal, capable of and interested in exercising their basic moral powers. Reasonable citizens also acknowledge the burdens of judgment, or the idea that failure to reach agreement in important matters might be due to the difficulties in reasoning and judgment encountered by even sincere and conscientious deliberators. Public reason requires that citizens and officials avoid relying solely on comprehensive justifications, whether religious or secular, in setting the fundamental terms of their political association.

Basic human rights are not equivalent to liberal constitutional rights. So while a decent people must recognize liberty of conscience and protect members of minority religions, it might also refuse to incorporate the separation of church and state into its political organization. In this and other ways,

a decent people would fall short of satisfying the conditions of liberal justice. Nevertheless, in contrast to aggressive, “outlaw states,” peoples that meet the minimal normative criteria associated with decency are to be tolerated and acknowledged as members of a “Society of Peoples.” In addition to these important distinctions between types of peoples, *The Law of Peoples* also addresses other pressing issues of foreign policy and global justice, including just war doctrine, distributive justice among peoples, and the duties of well-ordered societies to assist societies that are burdened by unfavorable social conditions, such as a lack of resources, knowledge or political tradition.

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RAYMOND, GEORGE LANSING (1839–1929)

George Lansing Raymond was born on 3 September 1839 in Chicago, Illinois. His father, Benjamin Wright Raymond, had been one of the first mayors of Chicago, from 1839 to 1840 and again from 1842 to 1843. Raymond graduated with a BA from Williams College in 1862 and from Princeton Seminary with a BD in 1865. As a college student, Raymond showed promising talent as a poet; while a freshman he competed against the entire college to win the first prize in a verse contest. His interest in poetry led to a more general fascination with representation, form, and art theory, which became his main philosophical focus. From 1865 to 1868 he traveled throughout Europe, studying aesthetics at the University of Tübingen and studying rhetoric and oratory in Paris. Raymond taught rhetoric, oratory, and literature at Williams from 1874 to 1880. In 1880 he became the first Professor of Oratory and Aesthetic Criticism at Princeton University, where he remained until 1905. From 1905 to 1912, he was professor of esthetics at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Raymond died on 11 July 1929 in Washington, D.C.

Raymond’s monumental series of seven volumes entitled *Comparative Aesthetics* was published between 1886 and 1906. The

series was celebrated as the most systematic, ambitious, and comprehensive aesthetics project ever to be published, and it was enormously popular, going through many editions. The series addresses all practices considered forms of fine art by mid-nineteenth century American standards: poetry, painting, sculpture, music, and architecture. In each volume, Raymond stresses the underlying form of each art practice, suggesting that unity is an essential feature of all works of art.

The series is notable for its distinction from the German philosophy that held considerable sway in mid-19th century American and British academia. Aesthetics, in Raymond’s time, was either narrowly focused on very specific questions concerning a single art practice, or was written in a style devoid of artistic sensitivity. In contrast, Raymond became well-known for bringing his subtle aesthetic sensibility to a broad range of artistic practices and questions to argue for their essential interrelatedness. Raymond’s work also stood out for its naturalistic orientation toward aesthetics, characterized by careful, empirical – almost scientific – research and classification, as opposed to the highly abstract idealism that was then in vogue.

Unity of form was a central principle that Raymond developed in his series. In each volume he applies the same questions to a wide range of areas of artistic endeavor. In *The Representative Significance of Form* (1900), he set out to understand “the kinds of truth derivable from nature and from man.” He asks of gardening the very questions he poses to historic painting and poetry, and concludes that there are three kinds of artistic significance: the religious-artistic, the scientific-artistic, and the artistic-artistic. Religious-artistic significance is likened to art produced by inspiration and, for Raymond, is the most instinctive, while scientific-artistic significance results from investigation and is the most reflective.

Artistic-artistic significance occurs as a result of imagination, which Raymond defines as part inspiration, part investigation, and which entails a kind of struggle between instinctive and reflective ways of knowing. These same themes appear in *Art in Theory* (1894), in which he explores the very definition of art by discussing its distinction from nature and the differences between use and beauty.

The Genesis of Art-Form (1892) seeks to locate the mental and material origins of artistic form, wondering if art is a rendering of an artist's own mind, or the forms of nature. The volumes on poetry, music, and painting, sculpture and architecture very self-consciously follow the same format as developed in *The Representative Significance of Form*, which, Raymond tells us in his preface, was written first, despite being published toward the end of the series sequence.

Raymond published *The Essentials of Aesthetics* in 1906, in which he argues for a set of essential artistic methods that underpin all art forms and practices. Raymond's empirical approach was balanced by an interest in psychology, then only a nascent discipline. Raymond devotes several chapters to questions of the artist's emotions, the meaning of genius, and, as in *The Representative Significance of Form*, the imagination – what he called “the mind within.” Stressing the representative force of art – as opposed to the imitative or communicative – Raymond evokes the necessity of the imagination for apprehending and responding to that which is represented. In this regard, he elevates both the artist and the spectator as engaging in a uniquely aesthetic experience.

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Marjorie Jolles

REICHENBACH, HANS (1891–1953)

Hans Reichenbach was one of the most influential figures in philosophy of science during the twentieth century. He promoted

a form of logical empiricism in Germany which he and others, notably, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, and Carl Hempel, brought to the United States before World War II. While making substantial, enduring contributions to the kinds of problems and methods philosophers of science employ, Reichenbach also cultivated talented students, including Hilary Putnam and Wesley Salmon, and wrote regularly for popular audiences.

Reichenbach was born on 26 September 1891 in Hamburg, Germany. He first studied engineering at the Technical University in Stuttgart before studying mathematics, physics and philosophy at the Universities of Berlin, Erlangen, Göttingen, and Munich. He completed his dissertation on the concept of probability and earned his PhD in philosophy from the University of Erlangen in 1916. His teachers included some of the most celebrated physicists and philosophers of the twentieth century, including Max Born, Ernst Cassirer, Albert Einstein, David Hilbert, Max Planck, and Arnold Sommerfeld.

By 1919, Reichenbach had become a *privatdozent* in Stuttgart, and known in scientific and philosophical circles for his talents in physics as well as for his interpretations of relativity theory and quantum theory. In 1926, Reichenbach applied for a permanent position in philosophy in Berlin, but soon found obstacles in his way to full academic recognition and success. This pattern would recur throughout his career. In part, Reichenbach's trouble was intellectual, insofar as his technical philosophical interests in *Wissenschaftstheorie* were foreign to conventional European disciplinary divisions. Reichenbach's philosophical writing was highly technical and closely tied to the work of physicists and mathematicians. This was a radical departure from the methods of mainstream philosophers in Germany, who saw philosophy as prior to and methodologically

distinct from natural science. In part, his trouble was political. Like Otto Neurath, Reichenbach was a scientific philosopher who had flirted with socialist politics. Before and after serving in the military in Russia from 1915 to 1917, Reichenbach had some political involvement with the student socialist movement.

After a dispute with the physicist Max Planck, his sponsor, about the extent of his prior socialist engagements, Reichenbach finally obtained a position at the University of Berlin in natural philosophy and physics, which he held from 1926 to 1933. The appointment was not to a full professorship in philosophy, but instead to a special assistant professorship in the physics department. Einstein and Planck were among those instrumental in securing the Berlin position, although they had tried, without success, to seat Reichenbach in a full professorship.

In Berlin, Reichenbach founded a philosophical circle, the Society for Empirical Philosophy, which existed from 1927 to 1933. Reichenbach's Berlin group, like the well-known Vienna Circle around Moritz Schlick at the University of Vienna, held that philosophical problems could only be solved by carefully framing them in language of formal logic, and that philosophical theories could only be confirmed or disconfirmed by empirical evidence. While Schlick's circle followed upon the so-called First Vienna Circle of Neurath, Philipp Frank, and Hans Hahn, Reichenbach's followed the Society for Positivist Philosophy organized in Berlin by Josef Petzoldt. Like the Circle around Schlick, Reichenbach's group included scientists and philosophers such as Reichenbach's student Carl Hempel and psychologist Wolfgang Köhler. Though the two groups had significant differences, both were dedicated to reframing philosophical problems and presuppositions in light of the results and methods of modern science and logic. One important collaborative

venture between Reichenbach and the Vienna Circle was the journal *Erkenntnis*. Always seeking to promote and cultivate scientific philosophy, Reichenbach founded the journal in 1930 as a conversion of the older *Annalen der Philosophie* with the support of its publisher, Felix Meiner.

In the fall of 1933 Reichenbach was abruptly dismissed from the University of Berlin under the government's so-called "Race Laws." Reichenbach had Jewish grandparents on his father's side, and so failed to meet the conditions of Aryan purity stipulated by the Nazi government. Along with many other German intellectuals, Reichenbach emigrated to Istanbul. Resolving to leave Turkey upon expiration of his contract, Reichenbach took the advice of Charles Morris at the University of Chicago (who had helped arrange for Carnap's position there) and published a book in the United States before seeking an American academic appointment. The result was *Experience and Prediction* in 1938, and an appointment that year as professor of philosophy of science at the University of California at Los Angeles.

Upon arrival in the United States, Reichenbach again encountered political obstacles. With the United States at war with Germany in the early 1940s, he was classified by the U.S. government as an enemy alien and effectively placed under house arrest. Aside from his trips to campus, he was required to remain at home. While this was far less severe than the internment suffered by Japanese-Americans in California, it did cause Reichenbach to consider whether he could remain in America. Reichenbach did remain, however, and he thrived at UCLA where he taught for the rest of his life. His philosophical and professional ambitions suffered little as a result of his emigration. After a lifetime strewn with obstacles to his intellectual pursuit, he found at the end of his

life that his path was much easier. Just before his death, Reichenbach accepted an invitation to deliver the prestigious William James Lectures at Harvard University. However, Reichenbach unexpectedly died on 9 April 1953 in Los Angeles, California.

With the help of his students such as Carl Hempel, Wesley Salmon, and Hilary Putnam, Reichenbach helped establish philosophy of science as one of the central areas of professional philosophy in North American universities. After the war, Reichenbach organized conferences that helped the profession define and debate its central goals and methods and he continued to promote the virtues of scientific philosophy to non-specialists both inside and outside of academia. Reichenbach's book *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* was one of the best selling introductions to philosophy of science of his day. It helped to establish the reputation of philosophy of science as a vibrant field dealing both with traditional philosophical problems and with new questions in response to exciting developments in the sciences.

In *Experience and Prediction* Reichenbach attempts to solve Hume's skeptical doubts about what philosophers now call inductive inference, our reasoning from past to future regularities. Reichenbach's novel proposal attempts to accept Hume's reasoning while still allowing that there is a use of inductive reasoning which can be pragmatically justified. Reichenbach claimed that he was not attempting to justify an inductive principle, like the principle that the future will be like the past, but rather to *vindicate* an inductive *method*. He argued that the inductive method can be vindicated as a method guaranteed to find the truth, if there is a truth. His idea is that the truth an inductive method could discover is a truth about the probability of an outcome. One begins with an assignment of probability to an outcome. Reichenbach calls

this a *posit*. Then one makes observations, and adjusts the probability based on the relative frequency of the actual outcome in the observed trials. If there is a truth about the actual probability of the occurrence or event in question, this method will approach this probability in the limit. That is, with further trials and adjustments, the posited probability will approach the actual probability if there is an actual probability.

Reichenbach pioneered the application of a three-valued logic to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. He also attempted to come up with a formal characterization to the general notion of a law of nature. However, unlike many of his contemporaries, Reichenbach did not think that the resources of deductive logic were adequate to frame a formal definition of the concept of laws of nature, or of the related notions of counterfactual conditionals and causal inference. Although he held that laws of nature could not be simply expressed in terms of the universal quantifier and material conditional of first order deductive logic, Reichenbach attempted to develop a precise characterization of the notion of a law of nature through a careful logical analysis of natural language. It was Reichenbach's conviction that there is a "hidden precision of language" within the ordinary natural language of scientists and laypersons.

While most of his published works engage technical issues in the logic and methodology of science, Reichenbach had interests in all areas of philosophy. This is particularly evident in *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*, where Reichenbach deals with such themes as the nature of moral directives, evolution, and the search for certainty, as well as on topics in logic and the philosophy of science. As he canvasses the history of philosophy, Reichenbach describes a series of attempts to overreach on the part of philosophers. The desire for certainty and the need for

moral directives, for example, without a clear scientific methodology, led philosophers to posit philosophical systems which lacked empirical grounding. With the tools of modern logic and scientific methodology, Reichenbach argues, we can make advances in these areas. In the realm of ethics, for example, he holds that ethical claims are expressions of our volitional nature. We classify as "good" those things we desire, and as "bad" those things from which we are repulsed. Traditional systems of moral philosophy are simply compilations of our shared volitions. They are not universal directives of reason. The study of such systems should instead proceed by the scientific observation of the collective behavior of human beings.

While Reichenbach's writings on moral theory are not widely cited today, the emotivism view he defended is still discussed, if not widely held, by moral theorists today. Reichenbach's contributions to the philosophy of science, to epistemology, and more specifically to the logic and methodology of science, however, have remained enormously influential.

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Saul Traiger

RESCHER, NICHOLAS (1928–)

Nicholas Rescher was born on 15 July 1928 in the German town of Hagen, Westphalia. Rescher studied mathematics and philosophy at Queens College in New York City (BA 1949), and then became a graduate student at Princeton University's philosophy department, where Alonzo Church strengthened Rescher's interest in logic. Rescher earned his PhD in philosophy in 1952. Following a period of military service, he spent some years at the Rand Corporation in California. Rescher's academic career began in 1957 at Lehigh University, where Rescher taught philosophy until 1961.

At Lehigh, Rescher met Adolf Grünbaum, who helped bring Rescher to the University of Pittsburgh as professor of philosophy in 1961. Grünbaum and Rescher formed the nucleus of Pittsburgh's philosophy department which soon became world famous, including such figures as Kurt Baier, Alan R. Anderson, Nuel D. Belnap, and Wilfrid Sellars. In 1964 Rescher founded the *American Philosophical Quarterly* (serving as editor until 1993), and later on the *History of Philosophy Quarterly*. Rescher also served as chair of the philosophy department and Director of the Center for Philosophy of Science, established in 1960. Rescher was awarded honorary degrees from Lehigh University, Queens College,

Loyola University of Chicago, the University of Konstanz, and the Argentina National Autonomous University of Cordoba. He was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1989–90, and also President of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, the Metaphysical Society, the G.W. Leibniz Society, and the Charles S. Peirce Society. In 1977 he was elected an honorary member of Corpus Christi College in Oxford. In 1983 he received an Alexander von Humboldt Prize by the German Federal Republic for distinguished scholarship in the humanities.

Rescher is a prominent defender of pragmatism, and an extremely prolific author (over one hundred books) about nearly every field in philosophy. Rescher's early interests shifted from the history of Arabic logic and philosophy, to logic and analytic philosophy of science, and then to epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and a philosophy of science conceived in much broader terms. More recently his work has considered issues pertaining to social philosophy, political philosophy, and metaphilosophy. Rescher draws a distinction between a more flexible "pragmatism of the left" and a more conservative "pragmatism of the right." The "pragmatism of the left" or "subjective pragmatism" endorses a greatly enhanced cognitive relativism, while the "pragmatism of the right" or "objective pragmatism" sees the pragmatist stance as a source of cognitive security. Rescher sees Charles S. Peirce, Clarence I. Lewis, and himself as adherents to the pragmatism of the right, with William James, F.S.C. Schiller, and Rorty as representatives of the pragmatism of the left. The "right" or "objective" pragmatism is based on what works impersonally for the realization of some objective purpose, in an impersonal way.

Rescher's kind of pragmatism leads to objectivity, in the sense that objective

constraint, and not personal preference, is the fundamental premise of our cognitive goals. What we mean to achieve in starting the process of empirical knowledge is control over the natural environment of which we are ourselves essential part, and this control, in turn, may be both active (interactionistic) and passive (predictive). Although he openly declares his idealistic stance, Rescher recognizes the presence of a "reality principle" that is practically forced upon us just in view of our belonging in the natural world, and despite the fact that we play, in that same world, a very special role (quite different, that is, from the role played by stones, stars, or animals). Our control over nature, in turn, can never be total. We create the social-linguistic world, but not natural reality. It should be admitted that we have access to natural reality only through social and linguistic tools, but it is fallacious to draw, from this premise, the conclusion that people create the whole of reality, both social and natural. Any clear border-line between the social and the natural world is therefore illusory. Nature imposes inescapable constraints upon us; but, at the same time, people always see nature from their point of view, as their condition of "accessibility" to nature itself. However, there is no need to conceive of this condition in purely individualistic and solipsistic terms: it rather pertains to the entire human species.

Objective pragmatism claims that (a) our social-linguistic world evolved out of natural reality; (b) this social-linguistic world acquires an increasing autonomy; (c) between the social and the natural worlds there is no ontological line of separation, but just a functional one; (d) however, the accessibility to natural reality is only granted by the tools that the social-linguistic world provides us with; (e) this means that our knowledge of natural reality is always tentative and mediated by our conceptual capacities; (f) there is no

need to draw relativistic conclusions from this situation, because the presence of “an objective reality that underlies the data at hand” puts objective constraints on personal desires that we are able to overcome at the verbal level, but not in the sphere of rational deliberations implementing actions. Rescher claims that idealism, broadly speaking, is the doctrine that reality is somehow mind-correlative or mind-coordinated. However, his specifically conceptual idealism stands in contrast to an ontological doctrine to the effect that mind somehow constitutes or produces the world’s material. Scientists will not find in his philosophy the basic anti-scientific attitude endorsed by the classical idealists and some contemporary neo-idealist thinkers, who deem natural science unimportant because it deals with a second-level reality that is created by the human (or divine) mind (or spirit).

What can we possibly think about natural reality in itself, and how can we say what it is like? Even for imagining a world totally devoid of human presence, we must use human concepts. Conceptualization is not an option we can get rid of, but a built-in component of our nature of human beings. According to Rescher, we can only distinguish between the *that* and the *what* of this purported mind/thought independent reality. In this case, we are sensibly entitled to claim *that* it exists, while simply rejecting the challenge to specify *what* it is like. There is little justification for believing that our present-day natural science describes the world as it really is, and this fact does not allow us to endorse an absolute and unconditioned scientific realism.

As for political and ethical issues, we should have in mind an acquiescence-seeking society where the goal is that of minimizing the number of people who strongly disapprove of what is being done. We should never forget that the idea that all should think alike is both dangerous and anti-democratic,

as history shows with plenty of examples. Since consensus is an absolute unlikely to be achieved in concrete life, it is desirable but not essential; consensus is no more than one positive factor that has to be weighed along with many others.

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RICORD, ELIZABETH STRYKER (1788–1865)

Elizabeth Ricord was the first woman to publish a philosophy textbook and the first woman to teach college-level philosophy in the United States. She was born Elizabeth Stryker on 2 May 1788 in New Utrecht, Long Island. She had no formal education but received an excellent education from her father and private tutors. At age twenty-two she married the physician Jean Baptiste Ricord-Madianna (1777–1837), a son of a successful ship owner in the West Indies who had fled with his family from France during the French Revolution. Following their marriage the couple travelled to the West

Indies where Jean Baptiste did field research in botany and natural history, and practiced medicine. This marriage of a devout Catholic and a pronounced Calvinist failed, most likely because of cultural and religious differences. In 1823 Elizabeth Ricord returned with her sons to live in New Jersey.

In 1829 Ricord moved to Geneva, New York, and in that year she founded a school for young women, called the Geneva Female Seminary. She was the school principal and primary instructor there until the early 1840s. This seminary was a classical academy having the main purpose of training teachers, and it served more than a thousand students during its first decade. The seminary was part of the great religious revival that spread through western New York in the early 1830s. In 1831 another women's school opened in Geneva, organized by Miles Squier.

Ricord had studied the available literature on women's education, and her curriculum was modeled after the most advanced examples of education for women in the northeast. One model was the high school for young ladies already operating in Greenfield, Massachusetts. Ricord's seminary, which typically had as many as two hundred students enrolled each year, offered a balanced course of instruction that included languages, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, geology, history, literature, rhetoric, philosophy, and theology. Many of her students became teachers themselves, and some assumed even higher leadership roles. Among Ricord's students was Caroline Severance (1820–1914), who helped organize the Ohio Woman's Rights Association with Lucy Stone, and later she was a leader of the American Woman Suffrage Association. Another student was Mary Mortimer (1816–1877) who co-founded a women's seminary in Milwaukee with Catherine Beecher.

In 1831 Ricord added a course in "intellectual philosophy" to supplement the already existing course in "moral philosophy," and she changed this course's title to "mental philosophy" the next year. This course formed the basis for her *Elements of the Philosophy of Mind*, which appeared in 1840. The seminary's 1839 catalogue listed the textbooks read by her students, which include Hugh Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-lettres*, Lord Kames's *Elements of Criticism*, Levi Hedge's *Elements of Logick*, Francis Wayland's *Elements of Moral Science*, and William Paley's *Natural Theology*. As the principal, Ricord taught these upper-level classes; because these texts were widely used at the men's colleges of that era, she was teaching college-level introductory courses in philosophy and theology. Besides *Elements of the Philosophy of Mind*, she also published *Zamba, or the Insurrection: A Dramatic Poem in Five Acts* in 1842, which reflected what she experienced in the West Indies.

Unable to secure endowments, and having some health difficulties, she stopped teaching in the early 1840s and the school closed. In 1845 Ricord moved to Newark, New Jersey, where she founded the Newark orphan asylum. She was director of the asylum until her death in Newark on 10 October 1865.

Elements of the Philosophy of Mind was the first American philosophy and psychology textbook written by a woman and the first book-length academic work to explicitly address gender. The book was published in Geneva by her long-term supporter J. N. Bogert, and it appeared simultaneously in New York City. American philosophers had begun to compose their own treatises on intellectual philosophy and psychology during the late 1820s and 1830s. As this field developed and metaphysics separated away as its own subject, the labels of "mental philosophy," "philosophy of mind," and "psychology"

became more common. Two pioneers, Thomas Upham at Bowdoin and Francis Wayland at Brown, produced widely read books during this period which were as advanced as those from Europe. Several more textbooks by American philosophers from this period offered introductory expositions about mental philosophy for use in junior-level classes and preparatory academies, and Ricord's *Elements of the Philosophy of Mind* fits into this genre. Her book displays particular debts to Scottish common sense realism, especially Dugald Stewart, and also to the eclecticism of the French scholar Victor Cousin. The work is not solely grounded in reason, but also, and explicitly and pervasively so, in Revelation. As a result the book effectively offers a natural theology of mind, with an eye on the cultivation of mind and the formation of character.

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ROLSTON, HOLMES, III (1932–)

Holmes Rolston III was born on 19 November 1932 in Staunton, Virginia. With a profound interest in nature, he decided to study physics and biology as an undergraduate. He received his BS from Davidson College in North Carolina in 1953. He then received a BD from Union Theological Seminary in 1956, and his PhD in theology and religious studies at the University of Edinburgh in 1958. From 1958 to 1968 Rolston worked as an ordained Presbyterian minister in the Appalachian Mountains of southwest Virginia. During this time he studied botany, zoology, mineralogy, geology, and paleontology at East Tennessee State University. He became a noted bryologist and naturalist. Disturbed by the rapid technological development of the surrounding wilderness, he strove to preserve the natural integrity of mountain regions in southwest Virginia and northeast Tennessee, especially Mount Rogers and Roan Mountain. He felt compelled to study philosophy to integrate apparent conflicts between his religious faith and atheistic naturalism.

Rolston completed an MA in philosophy of science from the University of Pittsburgh in 1968, and accepted a position at Colorado State University as an assistant professor of philosophy and religion in that year. He was associate professor (1971–1976) and professor of philosophy (1976–present), currently holding the position of University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy. During 1974–1975 he

was a visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of World Religions at Harvard University. In 1991 he was the Distinguished Visiting Russell Fellow at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California, and was a noted lecturer at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and at Gustavus Adolphus College. A member of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, he served as President from 1989 to 1994. He delivered the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1997–1998, which were later published in his book *Genes, Genesis and God: Values and Their Origins in Natural and Human History* (1999). He received the Templeton Prize for Progress Toward Research or Discoveries About Spiritual Realities in 2003.

His most influential writings are the seminal article “Is There an Ecological Ethic?” (1975) and his book *Environmental Ethics* (1988), in which he formulates a systematic ethical theory of the environment. Rolston is widely recognized as the father of environmental ethics as an academic discipline. In *Environmental Ethics*, Rolston’s fundamental proposition is that humans have *duties* to the environment: that is, to sentient life (higher animals), non-sentient life (lower animals and plants), species (especially endangered), and ecosystems (all life, rivers, mountains, inorganic matter). Humans have duties beyond those that they have to each other because nature has *intrinsic* value. Environmental ethics is more than an ethics of resource/use and benefits/cost. In harmony with Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic,” Rolston’s ethical theory is *ecocentric* rather than anthropocentric. Although wild nature – sentient and non-sentient life – is amoral, humans must have genuine respect and duties toward it. Non-human life is part of a larger ecosystem of which humans are also members. We have an obligation not to interfere with the delicate balance of life within the ecosystem. More fundamental to

Rolston’s ecocentrism, however, is that non-sentient life should be valued since evolution has demonstrated that sentience (including humans) is an outgrowth of non-sentient life. Moreover, all life is intrinsically valuable, regardless of human consciousness. Nature’s life-value is only reflected by consciousness.

Rolston argues that duties to endangered species can outweigh duties to sentient life – even including human life. He refers to the sparse population of the mountain gorilla (about 240 during the writing of his book) in the Parc des Volcans, a national park in Rwanda. If the park were eliminated, it could sustain about 36,000 people at a subsistence level, twenty-five percent of one year’s population growth. Without solving more serious problems, the extinction of the mountain gorilla would only provide momentary relief in space for a very small portion of the growing population.

On a philosophical level, Rolston believes that duties to ecosystems transcend duties to individuals, including sentient life, non-sentient life, and endangered species. Ecosystems provide diversity, unity, and active stability. The process of maintaining stability in nature often involves conflict. Ethical philosophy is misguided when it eschews this conflict in favor of cooperation. What is expected in a culture should not be required in wild nature. Predators and parasites have necessary functions in an ecosystem.

The overarching principle of Rolston’s theory of environmental ethics is *systemic value*. Rather than a thing, systemic value is a process. For Rolston, diversity and advancement (increased complexity through time) are proof that evolution is not entirely random. The possibility that nature can be valued systemically indicates the presence of an “anthropic principle.” Systemic valuation leads to an *ecological valuation*, a process in which the subject (the human viewer) and

valued object (nature) are within the same circumscribed field. “We say that valuing is in as well as of nature” (1988, p. 203). This is possible since human beings have evolved from nature and are part of it. What humans are looking at in nature are not just things but a process of interconnections.

In *Genes, Genesis and God* Rolston strives to reconcile naturalistic evolutionary theory with religious belief. Rather than discrete entities, genes evolve in organisms that are part of families, species, and ultimately, ecosystems. Rolston discredits genetic theories that do not take into account this holistic perspective. Secondly, the rise of human culture and its manifestations – science, ethics, and religion – cannot be explained solely by naturalized evolution, namely, genetics and natural selection. Culture transcends genetics. Nature precedes culture but does not determine it. By definition, culture is transmitted through history by symbols (language), and is present only in the species of *homo sapiens*. Where natural selection occurs from outside-to-in (environment to genes), culture occurs from inside-to-out – a conscious selective process. Science, a manifestation of culture, transcends genetics through the intellect, but it is not the final word. While the objective knowledge that science offers is useful, it does not answer questions about the meaning of life.

Rolston believes that only ethics, and ultimately religion, address the questions concerning life’s value. Curiously, reflection on genesis of life produces a religious response. This phenomenon implies a connection between religion and wild nature.

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Charles F. Frantz

RORTY, RICHARD MCKAY (1931–2010)

Richard Rorty was born on 4 October 1931 in New York City. His parents were intellectuals and social activists who worked for Workers Defense League, and were part of the non-Communist (Trotskyite) Left in the 1940s. Rorty’s grandfather was the Social Gospel theologian Walter Rauschenbusch. His early

childhood experiences help shape his mature thoughts on political issues. When he was fifteen he entered the University of Chicago and was awarded a BA in 1949 and a MA in 1952, studying with Charles Hartshorne. He then went to Yale University and earned his PhD in philosophy in 1956. His dissertation, “The Concept of Potentiality,” was supervised by Paul Weiss. At Yale he was a philosophy instructor in 1956–57. He then enlisted in the U.S. Army, serving from 1957 to 1958. Thereafter, he was an instructor and assistant professor of philosophy at Wellesley College from 1958 to 1961. He then moved to Princeton University where he achieved the rank of Stuart Professor of Philosophy. Rorty left Princeton in 1982 to go the University of Virginia as University Professor of the Humanities, remaining there until 1998, when he became a professor of comparative literature at Stanford University, the position he held up to his death on 8 June 2007 in Palo Alto, California. He was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1979–80. He received several honors and grants including a Guggenheim fellowship in 1973–74 and a MacArthur Fellowship during 1981–86.

Rorty’s indebtedness to John Dewey is acknowledged, and he often refers to himself as a pragmatist. However, he also found inspiration in the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger. Rorty does not fit neatly into the pragmatic school of thought, nor, for that matter does he fit neatly into either the analytic or continental schools. His thinking is pragmatic in stressing the importance of *praxis* over *theoria*, but he has taken what is called (but did not coin) “the linguistic turn.” Where most pragmatists are committed to situating thinking in terms of experience, Rorty sees language as the only medium in which to work. He tends to situate thinking in a historical context. This is an approach he acquired from Heidegger and other continental thinkers. Thus, he presents

the reader with a challenging amalgam of different approaches in his philosophical practice: pragmatic, linguistic, and historical. At one point he briefly embraced the label of postmodernist, but later he felt that this term had too much unnecessary baggage to be useful. However, if postmodernism is the distrust of systematic attempts to find an underlying unity to philosophical projects, it may have some relevance.

Rorty came to philosophical prominence after publishing *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* in 1979. Starting with an analysis of Descartes, he wanted to show how the problems associated with a theory of knowledge were misguided. As long as one held to a view of the mind as an interior reflection of an outer world, one would always be stuck with host of dualisms: inner vs outer, mind vs body, subjectivity vs objectivity, appearance vs reality. All of these dualism can be dispensed with, as well as the question of the foundation of knowledge, once one drops the view of the mind as the seat of representations of the world. Rorty wants to show how rational, empirical, and/or transcendental questions about knowledge of the world can be dismissed as resting on the metaphor of the mind as a mirror. Hence, any question of getting things right about the world is made irrelevant. The whole notion of a true representation of reality is grounded in the hope that something like a God’s eye perspective can be achieved. Once this hope is seen as a useless passion, one can proceed to a more pragmatic notion of beliefs. As Rorty puts it, objectivity should be replaced by solidarity. The desire to get things right once and for all can be replaced by the quest for intersubjective agreement. Fidelity towards an objective view of the world is not as valuable as loyalty towards one’s fellow citizens.

What served as a preface to his criticism of epistemology are his early thoughts on

eliminative materialism. Rorty had prepared the way by arguing that inner subjective states could be replaced by talk about brain states. Where other materialists had tried to argue that mental states were identical to material states, Rorty took a different approach. There is no need to show how two seemingly irreconcilable states were really denoting the same object. All one had to show was that one side of the identity equation could be dispensed with. When one comes to recognize that the workings of the brain could account for the behavior of humans, there was no further need to posit anything like a soul or self, a subject behind the scenes, to predict people's behavior. One can simply drop or eliminate such beliefs as an inner person over and above the material workings of the brain. Rorty's whole approach in these matters was not to promote what has come to be known as cognitive science. He was making a much more pragmatic move. Rorty was trying to show how one's vocabulary in discussing a philosophical topic made a difference in one's beliefs about that topic. In this way, he wanted to show that one way of talking about a person, the vocabulary of science could replace the vocabulary of inner subjectivity. His orientation is pragmatic, and he uses a manner of narrative recontextualization in dealing with philosophical problems in terms of vocabularies in telling a better story.

Rorty thinks that philosophers should avoid argumentation and proof about lofty topics such as Truth, the Good, and Rationality. To borrow a theme from Wittgenstein, one should bring metaphysical words back to their ordinary use. Thus, rather than naming intellectual ideals, these terms can be interpreted as moral virtues by defining them pragmatically. For example, instead of seeking the Truth, one speaks truthfully. Instead of aiming at the Good, one does a good deed. Instead of being inspired by Rationality, one acts in a rational

manner. For Rorty, one should see philosophy as the art of conversation. Another definition that Rorty has used is that philosophy is a "family romance." Doing philosophy is a personal struggle to find one's voice from within all those other thinkers who preceded one in the tradition. There are still plenty of stories for philosopher to tell about the heroes and villains from the past. To many who have taken philosophical problems as a serious enterprise, Rorty's ironic style of philosophy seems destructive of a noble and grand tradition. However, he denies that it would mean an end of philosophy. Since philosophy should not aim at getting things right, there is no way philosophy could come to an end. As long as the conversation is continuing, there is philosophical "progress."

In his social and political philosophy, Rorty maintains an uneasy alignment with the Enlightenment. He accepts the fact that the Enlightenment has provided Western culture with the basic beliefs without which a democracy could not function: equality, liberty, and toleration. However, he is unhappy with the Enlightenment's need for a theory of human nature and the belief in universal rationality as necessary conditions for self-governing. For Rorty, there is no need to ground social practices in *a priori* principles. Democratic practices, as well as others, can be articulated from within a pragmatic and historicist perspective.

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Richard Rumana

ROSEN, STANLEY HOWARD (1929–2014)

Stanley Rosen was born on 29 July 1929 in Warren, Ohio. He earned a BA at the University of Chicago in 1949, having attended classes for only nine months because he had been excused by placement exams from the rest of the program. From 1950 to 1952 Rosen studied in the philosophy department at the University of Chicago, and from 1952 to 1955 he studied with Chicago's Committee on Social Thought. He studied Greek with David Grene, political philosophy with Leo Strauss, and other philosophical subjects (including Thomas Aquinas and Descartes) with Yves Simon. His 1955 PhD dissertation, "Spinoza's Argument for Freedom of Speech," was completed under the direction of Strauss.

In 1956, Rosen joined the philosophy department at Pennsylvania State University, where he was later appointed Evan Pugh Professor of Philosophy in 1985. He was a Fulbright research professor at the University of Paris in 1960–61. While in Paris he spent time in the company of Alexandre Kojève, whose influence on him was no less significant than that of Strauss, and whose philosophical doctrines he analyzes, in connection with those

of Strauss, in the title essay of *Hermeneutics as Politics* (1987). In 1994, after almost forty years at Penn State, Rosen retired and then went to Boston University to be the Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy and University Professor. He was President of the Metaphysical Society of America in 1991. Rosen was the Priestley Lecturer at the University of Toronto in 1997, the Cardinal Mercier Lecturer at the Catholic University of Leuven in 1998, and the Etienne Gilson Lecturer at the Institut Catholique in Paris in 2003. Rosen retired from Boston University as professor emeritus in 2008, and died on 4 May 2014 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The breadth of Rosen's thought makes it difficult to characterize his philosophical accomplishments in a few words. His first book, *Plato's Symposium* (1968), and his later books and articles on Plato's metaphysical and political thought, including *Plato's Sophist* (1983) and *Plato's Statesman* (1995), transformed Plato studies in the English-speaking world. Rosen also wrote on the most influential philosophers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including *G.W.F. Hegel* (1974), *The Question of Being: A Reversal of Heidegger* (1993), and *The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (1995).

In his second (and probably most influential) book, *Nihilism* (1969), Rosen introduces the overriding critical theme of his *oeuvre*. The book begins by reflecting on the consequences of the separation of the conception of "reason" from the conception of "good" in modern rationalism, which took the value-neutral science of mathematics as its model. It follows from this separation that reason can say nothing about its own goodness, or that the assertion of goodness is necessarily non-rational. In Rosen's formulation, nihilism is a condition in which the sense or significance of speech is indistinguishable from silence. Yet he shows that the two leading critical responses to modern rationalism in

the twentieth century, Heideggerian ontology and the "ordinary language philosophy" originated by Wittgenstein, culminate in the silence of internal contradiction and radical historicity. In the face of this philosophical crisis, which he sees as only one of the more recent manifestations of the perennial problem of nihilism, Rosen advises us to reacquire ourselves with Plato's understanding of the Ideas as objects of noetic vision and the Good as the fundamental principle of intelligibility. But as he explains at length in *The Question of Being*, this re-acquaintance is impeded by the powerful influence of Heidegger's misinterpretation of Platonic metaphysics as a kind of ontological utilitarianism that itself gives rise to an instrumentalist conception of reason and thus to nihilism.

Like *Nihilism*, *The Limits of Analysis* (1980) is a spirited defense of philosophical reason and in particular of metaphysics. In this book Rosen shows that analytical philosophy depends for its intelligibility on the context of analysis, but is unable to provide a conceptual understanding of this context (and in particular of the analyst himself). Analytical philosophy is unable to maintain the distinction between philosophy and poetry, which is to say that it culminates in nihilism. Rosen is not aligned with deconstructionism and post-modernism. The latter modes of thought are no less lacking in *finesse*, and therefore no less extreme, than those they seek to replace. The philosophical *esprit de finesse* is characterized by openness to the wholeness of the whole. This openness is rooted in Socratic eros, and Heidegger's philosophical epigones are erotically deficient. To take a small but telling example, Jacques Derrida's attempted deconstruction of Plato's *Phaedrus*, which rests upon his characterization of Plato as "nothing by intention but a metaphysician of presence," fails because Derrida "seems to have a tin ear for theology" and "has nothing to say

about divine madness” (1987, pp. 72–4). These shortcomings render him insensitive to the relevant context of analysis, namely, the dramatic and literary wholeness of the dialogue itself, and thus to the evident playfulness of the passages he takes so seriously. Rosen asserts that Heidegger’s misinterpretation of Plato is rooted in a similar mistake (1993, pp. 10, 191).

As Rosen makes clear in *Hermeneutics as Politics*, humanity threatens to degenerate into bestiality. Rosen’s defense of the erotic enterprise of philosophy thus turns into a defense of humanity itself. This becomes especially clear in two of his collections of essays, *Metaphysics in Ordinary Language* (1999) and *The Elusiveness of the Ordinary* (2002). Philosophy must furthermore avoid transforming ordinary experience into a technical artifact, as in the case of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology on the one hand and ordinary language analysis on the other. Rosen’s very high ranking of Plato seems to reflect his agreement with Strauss that the Platonic dialogues provide a truer phenomenology of pre-theoretical life, and in particular of the ordinary beginnings of philosophy, than other thinkers have been able to furnish.

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Jacob Howland

ROYCE, JOSIAH (1855–1916)

Josiah Royce was born on 20 November 1855 in Grass Valley, California. He received his BA in classics in 1875 from the new University

of California in Berkeley, studied philosophy in Germany for a year, and returned to attend Johns Hopkins University where he earned a PhD in philosophy in 1878. He taught composition and literature at the University of California at Berkeley from 1878 to 1882. In 1882 Royce was appointed to the Harvard philosophy faculty as a replacement during William James's sabbatical, and he never left Harvard. He was promoted to professor of the history of philosophy in 1892 and served as department chair from 1894 to 1898. Royce gave the Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen in 1899–1900. He was President of the American Psychological Association in 1902 and President of the American Philosophical Association in 1903–04. Royce was named Alford Professor of Philosophy in 1914, and held that title until his death on 14 September 1916 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Royce was among the most accomplished, ingenious and original thinkers America has produced, and stands as an equal among its true giants, among them Peirce, James, and George Santayana. The years between 1882 and 1895 established Royce as one of the most eminent American philosophers. His publication in 1885 of *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, and in 1892 of *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, both based on Harvard lectures, secured his place in the philosophical world. The former of these contained a new “proof” for the existence of God based upon the reality of error, which drew much attention. To be in error is to be in error in comparison to some total truth, Royce argued, and we must either hold ourselves infallible or accept that even our errors are evidence of a world of truth. Having made it clear that idealism depends upon postulates and proceeds hypothetically, Royce defends the necessity of objective reference of our ideas to a universal whole within which they belong, for without these postulates, “both practical life and the commonest results

of theory, from the simplest impressions to the most valuable beliefs, would be for most if not all of us utterly impossible” (1885, p. 324). Hence, the justification for idealistic postulates and the Absolute is practical.

The sense of “Absolute” Royce defended was quite different from the ideas of Hegel and British idealist F.H. Bradley. Royce's Absolute is the ground and originator of community, a personal, temporal being who preserves the past in its entirety, sustains the full present by an act of interpretation, and anticipates every possibility in the future, infusing these possibilities with value as the ideal of community. The principal difference between Royce's Absolute and the similar idea held by other thinkers is its temporal and personal character, and its interpretive activity. This divine activity Royce increasingly came to see in terms of the notion suggested by Peirce of “agapasm,” or “evolutionary love.” Royce developed the philosophy of the individual person in greater detail in his Gifford Lectures, published as *The World and the Individual* (1899, 1901). Simultaneously Royce was enduring a resolute assault on his hypothetical absolutism from James. Royce later admitted that his engagement with the philosophy of Bradley may have led to a more robust version of the Absolute than was warranted, and his persistent reading of Spinoza might have had similar effects.

The First Series of Gifford Lectures made the case against three historical conceptions of being, called “realism,” “mysticism,” and “critical rationalism,” by Royce, and defending a “Fourth Conception of Being.” It is worthy of note that in his 1915 course on “Metaphysics” Royce says that one could substitute the term “interpretation” for “conception” in the phrase “Fourth Conception of Being” (see 1998, p. 168). Whether one sees the account in the Gifford Lectures as a conception or an interpretation is

immaterial to Royce, a merely verbal matter. Realism, according to Royce, held that to be is to be independent, while mysticism and critical rationalism advanced other criteria: immediacy in the case of mysticism and objective validity in the case of critical rationalism. As hypotheses about the fundamental character of being, Royce shows each of these conceptions falls into contradiction. In contrast Royce offers as his hypothesis that “to be is to be uniquely related to a whole.” This formulation preserves the three crucial aspects of being, namely the Whole, the individual, and the relation that constitutes them. Where previously Royce’s hypotheses about ontology had taken for granted that relations are discovered in the analysis of terms, here he claims that terms are constituted by their relations, and insofar as terms are taken to refer to entities, as we must assume, we are obliged to think about individuals as uniquely constituted by a totality of relations to other individuals and to the Whole that are theirs alone.

This social metaphysics lays the groundwork for Royce’s philosophy of loyalty. *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908) sets out one of the most original and important moral philosophies in the recent history of philosophy. His notion of “loyalty” was essentially a universalized and ecumenical interpretation of Christian *agapic* love. Broadly speaking Royce’s is a virtue ethic in which our loyalty to increasingly less immediate ideals becomes the formative moral influence in our personal development. As persons develop, becoming better able to form loyalties, which is the practical and on-going devotion to a cause bigger than themselves, and as these loyalties become unifiable in the higher purposes of groups of persons over many generations, humanity is better able to recognize that the highest ideal is the creation of a perfected “beloved community” in which each and every person shares. The beloved community as an ideal experienced in our acts of loyal service integrates into Royce’s

moral philosophy a Kingdom of Ends, but construed as immanent and operative instead of transcendental and regulative.

Royce called his later philosophy “absolute pragmatism,” which is the claim that ideals are thoroughly practical, and the more inclusive ideals are maximally practical. The concretization of ideals cannot therefore be empirically doubted except at the cost of rendering our conscious life utterly inexplicable. If we admit that the concretization of ideals genuinely occurs, Royce argues, then we are not only entitled but compelled to take seriously and regard as real the larger intelligible structures within which those ideals exist, which is the purposive character of the divine Will. The way in which persons sort out higher and lower causes is by examining whether one’s service to a given cause destroys the loyalty of others (which is what is best in them). The higher causes are less destructive of the loyalties of others. Ultimately personal character reaches its acme in the service of lost causes, such as the Christian idea of the Kingdom of Heaven, through which we may learn that our ultimate loyalty is to loyalty itself.

The final phase of Royce’s thought, exemplified by *The Problem of Christianity* (1913), unifies his hypothetical ontology, temporalism, personalism, his social metaphysics based on the fourth conception of being remain clear, and the operation of *agapic* loyalty and the unity of finite purposes in the ideal of the beloved community. Royce never was an absolutist in either method or ontology; his ethics and religious philosophy certainly grew and matured, but the basic philosophical framework did not shift. Having provided throughout his career an idealistic way of grasping the Will, in contrast to Schopenhauer’s pessimistic treatment, it remained for Royce to rescue Pauline Christianity, in a universalized and modernized form, from the critique of Nietzsche and others

who tended to understand will in terms of power and who had rightly observed that the historic doctrine was no longer believable to the modern mind. Striking in this work is the temporal account the Holy Spirit, the Holy Catholic Church and the communion of saints as a universal community. This community is a process of mutually interpretive activity which requires shared memory and shared hope.

Towards the end of his life as social and political conditions in the world deteriorated, Royce wrote furiously. At the outbreak of World War I he argued that an international insurance corporation, administered by a league of nations, which would pay reparations to any nation that was the victim of aggression, would have the effect of securing world peace. Although he had become frail, Royce's bitter disappointment at the imperialist aggression of his beloved Germany may have hastened his relatively early demise at age sixty.

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Randall E. Auxier

RUSH, BENJAMIN (1746–1813)

Benjamin Rush was born in Byberry Township in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, on 4 January 1746. He was brought up by his mother, Susanna, *née* Hall, and partly by her brother-in-law, the Reverend Samuel Finley, an evangelical Presbyterian preacher, attending his West Nottingham Academy from the age of eight. This was a preparatory school for the College of New Jersey (later Princeton University), where Benjamin received the BA degree in 1759. His medical career started under Dr. John Redman in Philadelphia. At just sixteen he was placed in charge of patients. To further his medical education he left for Europe in 1766, as was common among American trainee physicians, in order to undertake a medical degree at the University of Edinburgh, from which he graduated in 1768. He met various European literati, including English historian Catherine Macaulay, French philosopher Denis Diderot, and Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume.

Rush returned in 1769 to practice medicine in Philadelphia and to become the first Professor of Chemistry in the Medical Department of the University of Pennsylvania, the first medical school in America. In 1776 he married Julia Stockton; six months after his wedding, he and his father-in-law each signed the Declaration of Independence. Rush played important roles in the Revolutionary War and the founding of the United States. From a young age Rush was opposed to British rule of America. He opposed the Stamp Act of 1765, joined the cries of “No taxation without representation,” and supplied the title and many of the ideas of Thomas Paine’s pro-independence pamphlet, *Common Sense*. Rush always remained politically active, but contentious and uncompromising.

Rush was a delegate to the Continental Congress from 1776 to 1777. His *Observations*

upon the Present Government of Pennsylvania argued in 1777 for a bill of rights, a constitution, and general laws, all of which were to become part of the United States Constitution years later. After the Revolutionary War he held a number of prestigious appointments at the University of Pennsylvania, culminating in 1791 in a professorship of medical theory and clinical practice, which he held for the rest of his life. Appointed by his friend Adams, he served as Treasurer of the United States Mint from 1799 until his death on 19 April 1813 in Philadelphia.

Rush's politics were based on his philosophical views of liberty and republicanism. This thinking can be traced to his early travels to Edinburgh and London, where he became familiar with the life and works of John Wilkes, a renegade and controversial member of the British Parliament. Rush had dinner with Wilkes in his prison cell and found him quite entertaining and engaging. Rush would later call himself a steadfast whig, a worshipper of liberty, and a passionate defender of his political and ethical principles.

In 1766, on his way to Edinburgh, Rush was outraged to see slave ships harbored in Liverpool. This aversion to slavery remained with him throughout his life. His 1773 pamphlet, *An Address to the Inhabitants of the British Settlements, on the Slavery of the Negroes in America*, first published under a pseudonym, argued that black Americans were neither intellectually nor morally inferior to whites. In 1803 he became president of the National Convention of Abolition Societies.

Rush pioneered in the study and treatment of mental illness. The American Psychiatric Association still has a portrait of Rush on its seal and medallion. In 1787 he became the consultant in charge of the mentally ill at the Pennsylvania Hospital and worked there for the rest of his life. In 1812 Rush published America's first psychiatry textbook, *Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the Diseases*

of the Mind. In his 1786 *Enquiry into the Influence of Physical Causes upon the Moral Faculty*, Rush argued that the capacity to distinguish right from wrong can be affected by certain mental and physical conditions such as diet, madness, hypochondria, and hysteria, and in such cases this deficiency must be cured by medicine and not by moral instruction. He also pioneered more progressive treatments, some of which anticipated future developments in psychiatry and psychoanalysis.

Rush accepted the dominant associationist psychology of the time, the empiricist psychology of John Locke and David Hume. Rush might therefore be seen as a materialist. The mind, for him, was more a product of the brain than of any spiritual or immaterial substance. Rush claimed that his account of the mind was compatible with belief in a Christian God, insofar as the flux of ideas and experiences was part of God's design, much as Newton saw the physical laws of nature as a manifestation of God's creation. Rush agreed with Hume and other Enlightenment thinkers that the study of ethics, just as much as science, demanded experimental reasoning. He also saw associationist psychology as indicating that our mental lives were akin to those of animals.

Rush was among the first modern physicians or philosophers to think about what today is called medical ethics, composing his 1789 *Observations on the Duties of a Physician, and the Methods of Improving Medicine*, as well as various lectures.

Rush was one of those Enlightenment figures who have few parallels today: a visionary who ranged across science, philosophy, and politics, driven by an overarching mission or conception of the world, in his case a Christian one, both to abolish monarchy and tyranny and to advance the science and art of medicine, especially for the sake of the sick poor. When Rush died,

Jefferson said of him in his 27 May 1813 letter to Adams: “Another of our friends of seventy-six is gone, my dear Sir, another of the co-signers of the Independence of our country. And a better man than Rush could not have left us, more benevolent, more learned, of finer genius, or more honest.” Adams replied, “I know of no Character living or dead, who has done more real good in America.”

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Dan O'Brien

and

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SABINE, GEORGE HOLLAND (1880–1961)

George H. Sabine was born on 7 December 1880 in Dayton, Ohio, and died on 18 January 1961 in Washington, D.C. He received a BA in 1903 and a PhD in philosophy in 1906 from Cornell University. He taught philosophy at Stanford University from 1907 to 1914, at the University of Missouri from 1914 to 1923, and at Ohio State University from 1923 to 1931. In 1931 Sabine was called to Cornell University as Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy, a position that he held until his retirement in 1948. From 1940 to 1944 he was also Dean of the Graduate School, and from 1943 to 1946 he was Vice President for academic affairs. Following his retirement, Sabine was visiting professor at the University of Washington, the University of Oregon, and Northwestern University. Sabine was invited to make his home at Telluride, a distinguished student residence at Cornell, where he lived for the last four years of his life. In 1957 he delivered, under Telluride auspices, three public lectures on Marxism that were heard by many hundreds of students and faculty members in the largest auditorium on the Cornell campus and were subsequently published as a monograph by Cornell University Press.

Sabine was chiefly famous for *A History of Political Theory* that was published in 1937 (the last edition that he prepared, the third edition, was published in 1961, shortly after his death). The book, comprised of nearly a thousand pages and covering the full range

of political thought from the ancient Greeks through Marxism, Communism, and Fascism, was recognized and acclaimed throughout the world as the standard, or perhaps even classic, history of political ideas. The work has been translated into Greek, Italian, Hebrew, Japanese, Arabic, Indonesian, Hindi, Spanish, Persian, and Chinese. The book is famous not only for its scholarship, but also for its critical style, its insights, and its just treatment of countless vexing value problems. As a leading political philosopher and scholar, Sabine was awarded honorary degrees by Union College, Kenyon College, Oberlin College, the University of Missouri, and Ohio State University. Sabine was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1938–39. Upon his retirement in 1948, colleagues and former students presented him with a notable *Festschrift: Essays in Political Theory Presented to George H. Sabine*, published by Cornell University Press.

Although Sabine's lifelong special interest was the complicated history of seventeenth century English religious and political thought, his favorite thinker was the eighteenth century philosopher David Hume, whose *Treatise of Human Nature* had a profound influence on Sabine's study and understanding of the course of social and political thought. In the Preface to the third edition of *A History of Political Theory*, Sabine states that his own philosophical preference as a historian was Hume's criticism of natural law and its applications

in religion, ethics, and politics. So far as he could see, Sabine wrote, “it is impossible by any logical operation to excogitate the truth of any allegation of fact, and neither logic nor fact implies a value.” Consequently, Sabine believed that the fusion of these operations in Hegelian idealism or in its Marxian variant “merely perpetuated an intellectual confusion inherent in the system of natural law.” The natural law belief in rational self-evidence, and the belief that there is a determinate order of evolution or historical progress are equally unverifiable. “As for values, they appear ... to be always the reaction of human preference to some state of social and physical fact; in the concrete they are too complicated to be generally described even with so loose a word as utility.”

Sabine thought of his approach as a “sort of social relativism.” Political theory is, on the one hand, a part of philosophy and science, and on the other hand, it is a reflection upon morals, economics, government, religion, and law. Ideally, the historian of political theory should neglect neither factor. “Ideally both should be conceived and presented by a historian with equal clearness; political theory in action ought to receive equal treatment with political theory in books.” Admittedly, however, this demand on the historian’s scholarship “is impossibly heavy.” The world-wide acclaim of *A History of Political Theory* is, however, evidence that the author’s scholarship was heavy enough to satisfy the demand.

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Milton R. Konvitz

SALMON, WESLEY CHARLES (1925–2001)

Wesley Salmon was born in Detroit on 9 August 1925, the middle child of Wallis and Ruth Springer Salmon. His father was a mechanical and electrical engineer. After studying in Detroit at Wayne University in 1943–44, he transferred to the University of Chicago where he first met Rudolf Carnap and received his MA in 1947 with a thesis on Whitehead's conception of freedom. He then entered the doctoral program at the University of California at Los Angeles, where Hans Reichenbach supervised his dissertation on John Venn's theory of induction. Salmon received his PhD in philosophy in 1950. Although Reichenbach died in 1953, he remained, along with David Hume, a dominant influence on Salmon's philosophical work, almost all of which was in philosophy of science.

Salmon taught philosophy at the State College of Washington from 1951 to 1954; Northwestern University in 1954–55; and Brown University from 1955 to 1963. He went to Indiana University in 1963, where he was appointed Norwood Russell Hanson Professor of History and Philosophy of Science in 1967. He then taught at the University of Arizona from 1973 to 1981. He was President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1977–78, and a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Salmon was University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh from 1981 to 1999. His last teaching position was as a visiting professor at Kyoto University in 2000. He died on 22 April 2001 near Madison, Ohio, while traveling away from home.

During the early years of his philosophical career until the mid-1960s, Salmon concentrated mainly on induction, probability,

and confirmation. Hume's problem of induction challenged the very foundations of science by questioning whether there could be any *rational* justification of claims that went beyond what we could observe. Reichenbach accepted Hume's arguments that there could be no noncircular deductive or inductive argument to establish the truth of conclusions of such ampliative arguments, but he offered a pragmatic justification for the standard method of inductive generalization. That is, he tried to show that whether or not nature is uniform, the method of induction by enumeration would be successful if any other method could succeed. Salmon believed that although Reichenbach's justification was not adequate – as it justified not just one rule but a whole class of asymptotic rules – it nevertheless provided a valid basis for attempting a more satisfactory justification. Salmon's final assessment of the matter was that this significant problem remains an unsolved but valuable part of Hume's philosophical legacy.

In his close study of the theorem on total probability, which serves as a transitivity rule in the standard calculus of probability, Salmon sorts out several valid and invalid inductive transitivity relations and sets down conditions under which a probabilistic analog of deductive contraposition is admissible and when it is not. Salmon exposes the radically ambiguous nature of the concept of confirmation: In some cases when we say that a hypothesis is confirmed we mean that it has a high degree of confirmation in an absolute sense; in others we mean that its probability or degree of confirmation has been increased to some degree (incremental confirmation). Carnap had drawn the distinction, but it was widely ignored or misunderstood before Salmon reiterated Carnap's results, extended them and applied them in philosophical contexts. He shows that much of the counterintuitive character of incremental

confirmation arises from a strong tendency to think about inductive reasoning as analogous to deductive truth-functional logic.

In addressing the questions of whether science yields objective information about the world and whether science itself is a rational enterprise, Salmon maintains a strong realist position grounded in the principles of logical empiricism that were developed in the early years of the twentieth century. In particular, he shows how the considerations that convinced physical scientists of the reality of atoms and molecules provide a philosophically sound argument for realism that does not exceed the bounds of empiricism. His argument differs substantially from the many defenses of realism that have been offered in response to Bas Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism which, although it does not deny the existence of unobservable entities, rejects the possibility of our knowing anything about them. Despite not having a complete solution to Hume's problem, Salmon offers an affirmative answer to the key question of whether inductive logic contains the resources to provide legitimate inferences from data about observables to conclusions about unobservables. Salmon tries to show how objectivity can be obtained within the Bayesian framework. He argues that while features such as judgment and persuasion, so important to Kuhn's account of theory choice, have no role in the H-D model, they do figure as plausibility considerations that can be assessed objectively and used to determine prior probabilities in the Bayesian analysis. Salmon's careful analysis of the differences between explanations and arguments led to his rejection of the epistemic conception ("a third dogma of empiricism"), and pushed him towards the view that causal factors – including probabilistic causal factors – are essential to scientific explanation. This in turn led to a deeper study of the intertwined problems of causality and

explanation, which constitutes the major focus of his mature work.

In the late 1970s, Salmon formulated a process theory of causality, which includes the "at-at" theory of causal transmission. In this work, he draws a basic distinction between causal interactions (which are localized in space-time) and causal processes (which may extend throughout vast regions of space-time). He then analyzes the concept of causal propagation on the basis of the ability of causal processes to transmit marks. This analysis draws upon Bertrand Russell's at-at theory of motion, which provided a resolution of Zeno's paradox of the flying arrow. Salmon argues that this explication of causal propagation makes sense of the ability of causal processes to transmit causal influence without invoking anti-Humean "powers" or "necessary connections." Salmon's causal account of explanation maintains that to explain an event is to exhibit it as occupying its (nomologically necessary) place in an intelligible pattern. His account differs from Michael Scriven's earlier conception of causal explanation in offering a careful analysis of physical causality rather than treating the concept of causality as too primitive to be analyzed. Salmon's conception is also called "ontic" because it emphasizes existent physical relationships. The ontic conception differs from Hempel's epistemic conception and from the modal conception that says that because of the lawful relations between the conditions leading up to the event to be explained, there is a relationship of "nomological necessity" between the antecedent conditions and the event. Nomological necessity can be said roughly to derive from laws of nature similar to the way logical necessity derives from the laws of logic.

Salmon made important contributions to our philosophical understanding of space and time with his work on the one-way speed

of light, clocks and simultaneity in special relativity, and the curvature of physical space. His introductory book *Space, Time and Motion* (1975) is a pedagogic masterpiece.

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Merrilee H. Salmon

SANDEL, MICHAEL JOHN (1952–)

Michael J. Sandel was born on March 5, 1953, in Minneapolis, Minnesota. While a student at Brandeis University, he went to Washington, D.C., as a journalist intern to cover the Watergate hearings during the Nixon administration. After graduating with the BA degree in 1975, he went to Balliol College of Oxford University on a Rhodes scholarship, where he earned his PhD in philosophy in

1981. In 1980 he began teaching political philosophy at Harvard University as an instructor in political philosophy, becoming full professor by 1999. In 2002 he received the title of Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of Government. He has been a visiting professor at the Sorbonne in Paris, delivered the Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Oxford University, and gave the BBC Reith Lectures in 2009.

From 2002 to 2005, Sandel served on the President's Council on Bioethics. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Possibly the most popular professor at Harvard, his undergraduate course on Justice has enrolled more than 15,000 students, and it was the first Harvard course to be made freely available online and on television. The move to make the lectures publicly available placed Sandel central to ongoing controversy over the use of MOOCS (massive open online courses) in contemporary education.

Sandel's career has largely focused upon the topics found in the title of his first book, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (1982). He mounts a pointed critique of what he claims is the conception of the self that John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* requires in order to be coherent. In response, he offers what he believes is a more desirable option. Sandel ultimately argues that the picture of the self that Rawls' theory requires is too thin morally and epistemologically to be plausible. Rawls' theory allegedly requires a "voluntaristic" self that chooses without any prior foundation his or her ends and, therefore, is so distanced from any and every end that there is really no real self left. Such a self is fully unified before any commitment, that is, before and independent of any desires or ends, so it ends up attached, ironically, to only the thinnest of utilitarian interests. Sandel argues for the reality of a more "encumbered" self, attached to ends and desires, effective prior

to conscious decisions, many of which are found to be constitutive of the self. These are already part of the self, largely due to the self's situation within families, societies, and various other communities. He describes this as an "epistemic" self rather than a voluntaristic self.

Sandel then questions the Rawlsian claim of the primacy of right to the good. There is a tension found in Rawls' need for a Kantian conception of justice combined with his rejection of Kant's metaphysics. Sandel claims that this tension forces Rawls to construct an empirically based "Humean" Kant. This construction allows Rawls to argue that there are objective requirements of justice given the plurality of ideas of the good. But, once again, these Humean and empirically grounded circumstances of justice are also critiqued as less minimal or objective than Rawls would claim, and therefore more limiting as a result. For Sandel, Rawls' theory of justice, and its primacy of rights, requires the thin voluntaristic conception of self in order to arrive at his two principles of justice. That is, the effects of the veil of ignorance and the original position require the thin "deontological self." Therefore, deontological liberalism is just as thin and just as implausible.

What Sandel ultimately aims to show is that Rawls' "weak" assumptions are actually quite strong, very limiting, and implausible. If the moral self that Rawls requires is so thin, then it actually eliminates the separateness of selves found in its invocation. A contract implies a plurality of selves, but Rawlsian subjects are indistinct from each other; only one is really necessary for deliberations, and that one must choose Rawls' principles of justice. This conflicts with Rawls' claims that his theory of justice respects the separateness of persons. This distracts from a more realistic and desirable understanding of politics as a realm of risk and possibility, what Sandel

describes as the politics of the encumbered self and pathos.

In *Democracy's Discontent* (1996), Sandel continues his critique of liberal thought, diagnosing the broader quest for a neutral procedural republic. This hope, he claims, is too thin to sustain public culture. This liberal vision of neutrality between ideas of the good, that is, cannot “inspire” public sense of duty and engagement that actual liberty requires. The hope for neutrality, once again, requires too thin a conception of the “liberal self” for such a minimalist liberalism to seem plausible. Though unworkable, that is not to say that it has not been attempted. Indeed, his central example in the book is the actual evolution of United States Constitutional law from “substantive” rights to purportedly neutral and procedural rights. He views this as the doctrinal evolution to “rights as trumps” and minimalist liberalism’s priority of right. Constitutional law, Sandel claims, offers incoherent decisions due to the need under the procedural republic for unrealistic voluntarist ideas of religion, the family, etc. That is, the unencumbered self required by the procedural republic cannot sustain the rights that the Court finds protected, but the justices do not theoretically have the resources to support their conclusions. Indeed, for Sandel, liberalism in the procedural sense is “self-refuting” both as an incoherent ideology and as a political project that ends by destroying the resources necessary for a real human life. Sandel offers his rival civic republican theory, founding liberty on shared self-governance and a strong public. This theory reengages analysis of the relationship between economics and virtue, and possibly a return to more nuanced views of political economy. Following this line of thought, Sandel contrasts the civic virtue of the republican citizen with the virtue of the consumer. This topic is also explored in *What Money Can't Buy* (2012).

Sandel’s project ultimately aims to offer the United States a more vigorously democratic and active public philosophy founded upon vigorous citizenship and the hope for community: the hope of civic republicanism. Sandel’s critique of Rawls’ conception of justice and the hope for a procedural republic is powerful, but his own conception of civic republican politics may not be much more substantive. As discussed in *Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?* (2009), Sandel accepts the Aristotelian claim that there is no way to arrive at a neutral priority of right to the good conception of justice. Justice claims are claims about worthy of merit and what is deserved, but these are contested ideas that need to be worked out in public discussion. It is therefore necessary, theoretically and in political life, to renew civic culture and aim for democracy based upon ideals of civic republicanism.

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Brian E. Butler

SANTAYANA, GEORGE (1863–1952)

Jorge Nicolás Ruiz de Santayana, who later called himself George Santayana, was born on 16 December 1863 in Madrid, Spain, and died on 26 September 1952 in Rome, Italy. His parents were both Spanish. In 1872, Santayana's father took him to America, to reunite the family in Boston. He attended Boston Public Latin School, and then in 1882 he went to Harvard University. William James became Santayana's mentor, though the two men were very different in temperament and in their philosophical positions and never became personal friends. Santayana's BA was awarded *summa cum laude* and *in absentia* in 1886, he having already sailed for Europe and graduate studies in philosophy in Germany, studying at Göttingen and Berlin. After two years, he felt out of sympathy with

the prevailing German academic philosophy, and doubted whether he could compose a successful doctoral dissertation in German. He therefore returned to Harvard, and received his PhD in 1889, writing a dissertation under the supervision of Josiah Royce on the German philosopher Rudolf Hermann Lotze.

In the fall of 1889, Santayana became a temporary philosophy instructor, which started his Harvard teaching career which spanned some twenty-two years. In 1896 he published his first philosophical book, *The Sense of Beauty*, which maintains that the individual invests the aesthetic object with the beauty that he perceives in it. In 1907 he was made full professor, following publication of the five volumes of *The Life of Reason: Or the Phases of Human Progress*. The volumes are titled: *Introduction and Reason in Common Sense* (1905), *Reason in Society* (1905), *Reason in Religion* (1905), *Reason in Art* (1905), and *Reason in Science* (1906). Some have viewed *The Life of Reason* as Santayana's closest approach to a pragmatist standpoint. However, Santayana disliked James's personalism and radical empiricism, severely criticized John Dewey's naturalism as "half-hearted" in the 1920s, and never agreed with pragmatism's view of truth. In 1900, Scribner's brought out *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, which expresses Santayana's conception of religion as poetry. As imaginative, mythic, and symbolic interpretations of the condition of man in the universe, the great religions of the world may be said to have a kind of symbolic truth, though they are not factual accounts of real events. This is reiterated in a late work of 1946 entitled *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels: Or God in Man, A Critical Essay*. In 1901, Santayana published *A Hermit of Carmel, and Other Poems*, his final book of new poems. After this time, he wrote some significant literary criticism, but mainly concentrated on philosophy and only

occasionally composed a poem. In *Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe* (1910), Santayana analyzes the works of these three masters, finding the Roman poet Lucretius the most satisfactory for having effectively incorporated in his *De Rerum Natura* (On the Order of Nature) the naturalistic and materialistic philosophy of Democritus and Epicurus (a philosophical position akin to Santayana's own).

When his mother died in 1912, leaving him a substantial sum of money, he resigned his professorship and moved permanently to Europe, settling in Rome by the mid-1920s. *Egotism in German Philosophy* came out in 1915 and was much criticized for being propagandistic. *Character and Opinion in the United States, with Reminiscences of William James and Josiah Royce and Academic Life in America* was published in 1920. In 1922, his *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* presented some fifty-five relatively short essays on a host of subjects, many of which dealt with aspects of the English landscape, character, literary figures and their writings, politics and philosophy. In 1923 a selection of his *Poems* was published, as was *Skepticism and Animal Faith: Introduction to A System of Philosophy*, preparing the reader for the four-volume presentation of Santayana's mature philosophy which was to follow under the general title of *Realms of Being*. *Realms of Being* consists of four separate books, each devoted to a principal aspect of the system, titled *The Realm of Essence* (1927), *The Realm of Matter* (1930), *The Realm of Truth* (1938), and *The Realm of Spirit* (1940). Santayana also produced a number of other books of various kinds on various subjects, including *The Last Puritan: A Novel in the Form of a Memoir* (1935), a fictional biography of an ill-fated young American patrician, Oliver Alden. This novel, written by Santayana over a period of some forty-five years, largely

as a recreation from his labors in technical philosophy, has been compared to the best work of Henry James.

During World War II, he wrote his autobiography in three volumes: *Persons and Places: The Background of My Life* (1944); *The Middle Span* (1945); and *My Host the World* (1953). Published in 1950, *Dominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society, and Government* expresses Santayana's dissatisfaction with political liberalism and its concomitants of democracy and republicanism. He believed a consortium of numerous countries, like the United Nations, or its predecessor the League of Nations, to be incapable of solving serious international problems. He felt that the authority of individual great nations was the power under which the peace and prosperity of the world was to be achieved. The great thing was for powerful nations to avoid crushing the individuality of smaller ones, to permit them to preserve their native political forms and customs, and by these measures encourage the success and prosperity of all nations.

Santayana thought that the views of ancient Greek naturalists and materialists in philosophy were essentially correct and he subscribed to the fundamental tenets of their philosophy. Matter, for Santayana, is the fundamental element of being. The realms of essence, matter, truth, and spirit should not be thought of as regions or elements of being, but rather as types or features of the world of our experience. Primary and fundamental to Santayana's whole system is his doctrine of essences. Santayana's essences are individual and multifarious forms of definiteness; and generic essences have no superiority over specific ones. All of our perceptions, or even thoughts, are essences; but the reality of essences does not depend upon anyone thinking of them. In Santayana's system, the locus of all power and efficacy is formless

matter, which has the power to select and combine with essences to create substance, constituting all the objects of the physical world.

Everything is natural; there is no supernatural. There is, therefore, no God to provide an origin or rationale for existence, which is irrational and incomprehensible. Everything is contingent. Man is an animal for whom, in a godless and non-anthropocentric universe, there is no afterlife and no special dispensation of any sort. Unconscious nature is necessarily indifferent to the plight of man, and human life is ultimately without meaning. The realm of truth consists simply of all those essences that are selected by matter for actualization. As in the case of essences, truth is immaterial and eternal; but it is always about events that take place in time. Also, like essences, truth is independent of mind: something is true whether anyone ever knows about it or not. It is the sum of all the facts, a record of everything that has ever happened.

According to Santayana's modified skepticism, we can never know reality directly, and therefore our knowledge of the truth must be mediated through symbols. We know the truth by intuiting essences effectively symbolic of reality, when the idea we have of events corresponds to what has been actualized in the world. Our belief that the perceptible world really exists and must be dealt with occurs through what Santayana calls "animal faith" – our instinctive tendency to believe in the reality of the world that we perceive. Spirit is the psyche or vital physical organism which has become self-aware. Spirit's natural vocation would be the disinterested intuition of essences, the contemplation of essences for their own sake. But the demands of the vital organism or psyche with which the spirit is conjoined arouse the spirit out of its contemplative state and require that it attend to its environment for the purpose of promoting

the well-being of the individual whose spirit it is. For Santayana, there is no freeing of the spirit at death for continued experience. There is no afterlife, no reincarnation, no heaven of any sort. From Santayana's naturalistic and materialistic point of view, the individual spirit is extinguished at death, and there can be no disembodied spirits, no gods, angels, devils, or other supernatural beings. Thus, while Santayana's philosophy denies the possibility of life after death, it emphasizes the importance of life on earth and places a supreme value upon human happiness. For Santayana, the good life – the life of reason – is one based upon self-knowledge and one that harmonizes the passions and subscribes to the Greek ideal of moderation.

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William G. Holzberger

SCANLON, THOMAS MICHAEL (1940–)

T.M. Scanlon was born on 28 June 1940 in Indianapolis, Indiana. He received the BA degree from Princeton University in 1962 and the PhD in philosophy from Harvard University in 1968. He began teaching at Princeton in 1966 and transitioned to Harvard in 1984. He was named the Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity in 1988, succeeding Roderick Firth in that position. He has been awarded the MacArthur Foundation Grant and the Guggenheim Fellowship for Humanities.

Scanlon's approach to morality primarily concerns whatever obligations that each person happens to generically owe to any other generic person, and prioritizes those universal obligations over any special obligations that some people may feel towards other specific people. Because this "core" to morality cannot take into account any particularity or specificity about people as individuals, such as whether some people deserve more relief from suffering, or other people need greater assistance in achieving their goals, the obligations within this core are about what is impermissible to do to any person, instead of being about what is required to do for some people. Like Kant,

Scanlon takes the basis to the value of human life to be the human capacity to be rational and live reasonably with others. Like John Rawls, Scanlon specifically expects genuine moral obligations to survive a generic test of reasonableness, which would be a test against what any reasonable person would agree to. This places Scanlon in the Contractualist tradition of ethics and politics, with the proviso that the moral rules are those that any reasonable person (not actual people, who display variable rationality) would accept. In *What We Owe to Each Other* (1998), his brief formulation is, "An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement." Because a contractualist philosopher can then proceed to define what reasonable agreement objectively consists of, no actual people need ever be consulted (in the same way that Rawls can determine by himself what an anonymous set of generic reasoners would decide behind the Veil in *A Theory of Justice*).

This procedure isn't democracy in any direct manner, but rather the search for reasoned justifications for enforcing a set of rules in a human society. Relativism or subjectivism is thereby avoided, since the reasonableness of rules isn't entirely reducible to what people happen to think or prefer. The objective status of normative reasons is defended in *Being Realistic about Reasons* (2014). Scanlon's contractualism has an answer to the puzzling question, "Why should I be moral," since on his definition, each genuine moral rule is reasonably acceptable. However, an indeterminate number of kinds of actions can be equally right, so long as they aren't forbidden; ranking certain moral deeds as more moral than others isn't the objective.

Trying to ascertain the degree of moral praiseworthiness to an action shouldn't depend too heavily on the actor's intent; Scanlon discusses this matter in chapter two of *Moral Dimensions* (2008).

Scanlon's political philosophy and philosophy of law are similarly within the contractualism tradition. He denies that rights must promote the general good. A proposed right should be rejected if the imposed duties from that right would be reasonably rejected by anyone ("Rights and Interests," 2009). A rejection is unreasonable if the consequent burden on another is greater; valid rights therefore tend to minimize burdens rather than maximize benefits, which Scanlon views as consistent with the full moral equality of each person. In several writings Scanlon depicts this consistency as a point of convergent agreement between rule utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and contractualism.

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John R. Shook

SCHEFFLER, ISRAEL (1923–2014)

Israel Scheffler was born on 25 November 1923 in Brooklyn, New York. Scheffler received a BA from Brooklyn College in 1945 and an MHL from the Jewish Theological Seminary in 1949. He received his PhD in philosophy in 1952 from the University of Pennsylvania, working with Nelson Goodman. Scheffler was appointed to the faculty of education at Harvard University in 1952. He was named Victor S. Thomas Professor of Education and Philosophy in 1964, a position he held until his retirement in 1992. Scheffler died on 16 February 2014 in Newton, Massachusetts.

Scheffler’s writings are far ranging and reflect the scope and influence of ideas of the American pragmatists, W.V. Quine, and especially Goodman. His *Four Pragmatists* (1974) offers an introduction to Peirce, James, Dewey and Mead. Throughout his career, he has published extensively in the philosophy of education, dealing both with standard problems in epistemology and with issues related to the aims and processes of education. His applications of analysis to educational theory have made him a leading figure in the philosophy of education.

A number of Scheffler’s articles are collected in his *Inquiries: Philosophical Studies of Language, Science and Learning*

(1986). Several of the earliest publications are in meta-ethics, being devoted, in particular, to analyses of ethical naturalism and justification. *On Human Potential* (1985) and *In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions* (1991) address issues in both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of education.

Scheffler has also published widely in the philosophy of science. His papers on explanation, predication, confirmation, teleology and empiricism develop theories that are elaborated and brought together in his general work, *The Anatomy of Inquiry* (1963). Scheffler’s *Science and Subjectivity* (1967) criticizes subjectivist interpretations of observation, meaning, reference, and theory change in science. His nuanced defense of scientific objectivity is in opposition to both the “standard view,” as well as the accounts of Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, N.R. Hanson, and related thinkers.

A characteristic feature of Scheffler’s work is his avoidance of intensional and modal notions, and his commitment to inscriptional strategies instead in philosophical semantics. In various publications he has shown how to deal with many of the core topics in the philosophy of language while remaining within these stark limitations. Scheffler’s paper, “An Inscriptional Approach to Indirect Discourse” (1954), was perhaps the first account of the semantics of indirect discourse. His account was extended to certain propositional attitudes in *Anatomy of Inquiry* (1963). In *Beyond the Letter* (1979) Scheffler offers detailed treatments of ambiguity, vagueness, and metaphor, while his *Symbolic Worlds* (1997) applies his nominalistic approach to non-linguistic symbols, for example, to ritual. In “Plea for Pluralism” (1999), Scheffler develops his metaphysical doctrine of pluralistic realism as a new alternative to Charles Peirce’s monism and Goodman’s irrealism.

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Robert Schwartz

SCHNEEWIND, JEROME BORGES (1930–)

Jerome Schneewind was born on 17 May 1930 in Mt. Vernon, New York. He received the BA degree from Cornell University (1951). At Princeton University, he received the MA (1953) and PhD (1957) degrees in philosophy. He served in the U.S. Army Signal Corps from 1954 to 1956. Early teaching positions in philosophy were at the University of Chicago, Princeton University, and Yale University. Mid-career appointments were held at the University of Pittsburgh (1964–1975), and Hunter College and the CUNY doctoral faculty (1975–1981). At Pittsburgh he also served as dean of the College of Arts and Sciences (1968–1973), at Hunter College as provost (1975–1981), and he has had other academic administrative positions. In 1981 he became professor of philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, and also served as chair of the department (1981–1991); he retired in 2002.

Schneewind’s chairing of the American Philosophical Association’s committee on teaching (1972–1977), is particularly notable because of its bearing on his attitude toward the shaping of student-educator interactions, and because of his philosophy of moral education. Schneewind’s work has been recognized by the Guggenheim and National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowships, and by his selection in 1996 as

a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Early publications by Schneewind include the editing of, and introductions to, three separate collections of essays by John Stuart Mill and about Mill's work. These three collected editions share a network of methodological themes, and disclosed Schneewind's interest in looking beneath the surface meanings of specific moral views in order to detect the vital, social, and human circumstances of which they are a part. These early publications revealed the often unnoticed rich elaborations of British moral philosophy which were projected during the Victorian period of the late 19th century. Mill is the centerpiece of a moral tableau extending backward to Joseph Butler and forward to Henry Sidgwick. The methodological lesson Schneewind offers is that the moral theorizing which is set out in original sources ought to be positioned toward, and appraised within, the contextual secondary critical literature.

Schneewind works off an erotetic, historical logic, one which has its parallels, if not its backing, in the philosophy of history of R.G. Collingwood. Moreover, Schneewind's appetite for a close analysis of individual moral philosophies, as situated in their changing historical settings, has been sharpened by a self-imposed tutelage in the writings of C.D. Broad, and in the works of such exacting idealists as J.M.E. McTaggart, T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley, and, most tellingly, Henry Sidgwick. Some techniques used by Schneewind in advancing his historical and critical moral philosophy are an imaginative and novel blend of the earlier work by these British thinkers.

Schneewind's detailing of essential features in the thought of Mill, Sidgwick, and Kant provide telling moments of his reconstruction of Western moral theory. Mill is highlighted as the most influential philosopher in the English-

speaking world in the 19th century. Although Mill is not to be taken, then or now, as the most profound of pure thinkers, especially not in metaphysics and epistemology, his social thought on moral, political, and social issues was dominant in its various and more practical lines. As far as the utilitarian strain of moral philosophy goes, Sidgwick, perhaps even more so than Bentham and Mill, provides support for Schneewind's account of moral philosophy and its history. Sidgwick qualified and upgraded the Bentham/Mill axis of utilitarian theory, by making it more sensitive to the intuitionist emphases in ethics by William Whewell and some of the German idealists, especially Kant. Schneewind argues that Sidgwick's formulations have played a substantial role in determining the broad outlines of 20th century Anglo-American ethical theory. *Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy* (1977) gives backing for the important claim that moral philosophy and its history is *sui generis* in Western intellectual history, and is not a secondary variable dependent on a primary body of religious, metaphysical, and epistemological theories.

Schneewind's comprehensive study, *The Invention of Autonomy* (1998), positions moral theorists at various stages of removal from the half-dozen principles that constitute the format of the Divine Corporation model. This work gains its foreground clarity when we see a progressively dimming Divine Corporation model in its background, rather like the looming figure in the frontispiece of Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651), though no longer possessing the full powers of absolute sovereignty suggested there. One of the attributes of divinity as construed by Thomas Aquinas (and later cited by Samuel Taylor Coleridge) was the attribute of aseity (from *a se*, in and of itself). The narrative structure of Schneewind's account of the invention

of autonomy in Western moral theory has it developing out of divine aseity and reaching its finished product in human autonomy.

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Bertrand P. Helm

SCHNEIDER, HERBERT WALLACE (1892–1984)

Herbert W. Schneider was born on 16 March 1892 in Berea, Ohio. After beginning his college studies at City College of New York, Schneider transferred to Columbia in 1913 and completed his BA in 1915. At Columbia, he studied under John Dewey and took his PhD degree in philosophy in 1917. Schneider wasn't in Dewey's shadow long before becoming a major philosopher in his own right. He gained a considerable reputation in the United States and in Europe (with many of his works being translated into various languages) for his distinct style of philosophical scholarship, a style combining his interests as a philosopher, religious scholar, and intellectual historian.

After serving for a number of years as instructor and assistant professor at Columbia, Schneider was appointed full professor of religion and philosophy in 1929. The program in religion was new, and the appointment was consistent with Schneider's research interests, which combined the study of religion, history, and philosophy. One of his first acts in his newly appointed position was to institute a graduate seminar in the study of religious movements in American culture.

In 1930 one of Schneider's best known works was published, *The Puritan Mind*, a study of the moral and intellectual features of New England Puritanism. The appeal of Puritanism to the philosopher Schneider explained in historical terms. If the once living history of a religion like Puritanism was still worth studying it was for the philosophical novelty and dialectical paths that religion had embodied in relation to the social life of a community. To study the Puritan intellect, according to Schneider, required the study of careers and social movements, to comprehend

as fully as possible “the lives and deaths of famous ideas” (1930, p. 7).

Schneider wrote *The Puritan Mind* before New England Puritanism had become a major field of interest to American historians. His study helped give shape to the newly formed discipline of the “history of ideas” in the United States, which Schneider viewed as a branch, or an extension, of philosophical study. Unlike his contemporaries, Arthur Lovejoy and Vernon Parrington, who viewed the study of ideas in terms of “units” or “currents,” Schneider viewed the mind as belonging to an “ever changing past” which must be approached in “the self-same spirit of imaginative adventure” (1930, p. 4f). His work was different from that of Perry Miller’s on New England Puritanism, with its preoccupation with the intricacies of Puritan rhetoric and theology. Schneider felt it was the responsibility of the philosopher to be concerned with the apprehension of the “living ideas” of the past.

Schneider’s monumental *A History of American Philosophy* appeared in 1946. The scope and detail of Schneider’s analysis of the history of American philosophy remain unparalleled. Schneider’s *History* was a collaborative venture with Joseph L. Blau, who supplied the extensive bibliographies to each chapter, and was intended to be used with Blau’s anthology of *American Philosophical Addresses*. Schneider offered a fairly comprehensive historical account of the status of philosophy in America to recent movements, and the second edition (1963) added chapters that brought the story to his own times. The philosophical schools of the “old and new realisms” were of considerable interest to Schneider. In his own more metaphysical works, Schneider continued the realistic and naturalistic tradition he inherited. Like his similarly influenced colleague at Columbia, John H. Randall, Jr., Schneider

advocated a relativistic and contextual methodology for empirical inquiry into reality and its “ways of being.” His book of that title, *Ways of Being* (1962) is the culmination of that work. Schneider was not optimistic about the future of that type of empirical naturalism; although he made no predictions for the future of American philosophy, he foresaw a declining interest in American empiricism in favor of analytical logic, semantics, and phenomenology.

The dominant impression Schneider sought to impart through his *History* was that the search for a “nativist tradition” in American thought was futile; even the most “characteristic” and “genteel” patterns of American thought were foreign inspirations. To Schneider, the philosophical past was “as fully confused as the present” and it was, therefore, important not to try to impose a central content, dominant note, or moral lesson on the past (or present). History, Schneider felt, including the writing of the history of philosophy, involves us in the problems of a variety of contexts and a multiplicity of ideas and directions, from which we gain only (and at best) a loose hold on the uses and value of philosophical thought, past and present. Schneider had an especially strong sense that he and his contemporaries were in the “experimental stages” of writing intellectual history, and, to his credit, he distrusted and departed significantly from the neat thematic outlines and homogenizations of the American past which were then in vogue. He resisted strongly making any generalizations about American character or theorizing about patterns of mental development, believing such writings to have only the appearance of being profound and to belong to the lowest levels of what he termed “wisdom literature.”

From 1952 to 1956 Schneider was head of the Division of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies in the Department of

Cultural Activities with UNESCO in Paris. His interest in political theory, in particular the theory of human rights and his continuing involvement in several UNESCO projects led to the development of his philosophical work on public morality. He presented this work as public lectures at Indiana University, in the spring of 1954, and then in the presentation of those lectures as a book, *Three Dimensions of Public Morality* (1956).

In *Three Dimensions*, Schneider speculated that the once revolutionary faith of the Enlightenment in “liberty, equality, and fraternity” had dissolved, along with the moral order essential to the good society had been disintegrating. Liberty, equality, and fraternity he viewed as the fragmented terms of political discourse, each operating independently of the other without any regard being shown for the essential interdependence between the three terms as belonging to a single public vocabulary and unifying political vision. The three ideals that were once by tradition parallel had become, as he showed in his analysis of various nations and the international community, the isolated sources of confusing divergences within and between nations.

To Schneider, the urgent philosophical need in politics was not merely to render a moral analysis of the modern political situation of fragmentation but to demonstrate empirically how these three traditional ideals can again be correlated in the lives of citizens, nations, and the international community. In this, the philosopher, he proposed, must balance the pursuit of the practical problems of politics with the theoretical articulation of the elements of public ethics. Indeed, well before “communitarianism” had become the critical interest of sociologists and political theorists, Schneider, in *Three Dimensions*, set himself to the task of clarifying the relations that obtain between liberty and equality, between rights and needs, and sought to

highlight the disposition and habits supportive of these relations.

Schneider was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1948–49. He retired in 1957 from Columbia, and died on 15 October 1984 in Claremont, California. Recognizing Schneider’s achievements, The Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy awards each year its Herbert Schneider Award for lifetime contributions to the understanding and advancement of American philosophy.

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Dean Papas

SCHRAG, CALVIN ORVILLE (1928–)

Calvin O. Schrag was born into a Mennonite farming community on 4 May 1928 in Marion, South Dakota. He received his BA in 1950 from Bethel College in Kansas and then proceeded to Yale Divinity School, where he received his BD in 1953. In 1957 he received his PhD in philosophy from Harvard, where he had developed a keen interest in Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy which seemed to provide him a welcome alternative to classical metaphysical speculation. While at Harvard he served as teaching assistant to Paul Tillich and was also greatly influenced by John Wild, another Harvard professor, who left Harvard a few years later for Northwestern University in protest against Harvard's philosophy department's adoption of a rigidly analytic approach to philosophy and was the most important driving force in the 1960s behind the great expansion of interest in Continental philosophy, phenomenology, and existentialism in America. Schrag also made a significant contribution to this expansion with his first two books, *Existence and Freedom* (1961), which had its origin in his Harvard dissertation, and *Experience and Being* (1969).

In 1957 Schrag was appointed assistant professor of philosophy at Purdue University where he remained until his retirement

in 2000. During this time he traveled widely and held visiting appointments at the University of Illinois, Northwestern University, and Indiana University. In 1982 Purdue awarded him with the first named chair in its School of Liberal Arts, the George Ade Distinguished Professor of Philosophy. During these years Schrag produced an impressively long list of essays and articles, along with eight books.

Throughout his long and highly productive career Schrag has played a key role in the development of Continental philosophy in America. His own philosophical development mirrors the way in which Continental philosophy in America has itself developed over the last several decades. Starting with an early interest in the existential philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger (the "existence-problem"), Schrag increasingly devoted his attention to issues in the phenomenology of lived experience and, subsequently, to issues in philosophical hermeneutics as they pertain to the human sciences, discourse, action, textuality, rhetoric, and communication. In more recent years, he has addressed himself to the challenges posed to a phenomenologically and hermeneutically oriented philosophy by various "postmodern" writers and has also returned to an early interest: the philosophy of religious experience.

As one of the early exponents of the phenomenological movement in America, Schrag has greatly influenced subsequent generations of American Continental philosophers. His relation to classical phenomenology was never merely expository but always involved a serious attempt at critique and reassessment aimed at "reconfiguring" this tradition and, in particular, at freeing the notion of "subjectivity" from its traditional epistemological-metaphysical context by resituating it in the domain of praxis, in

such a way as to mark out a path to a new humanism.

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Gary B. Madison

SCHURMAN, JACOB GOULD (1854–1942)

Jacob Gould Schurman was born on 22 May 1854 at Freetown, Prince Edward Island, and died on 12 August 1942 in New York City. He began his university studies near his home town at Prince of Wales College in 1870. After two years he moved on to Acadia University in Nova Scotia where he studied from 1872 to 1875, and then to the University of London where he received the BA in 1877 and the MA in 1878. From 1877 to 1880 he studied in Paris, Edinburgh and (as a Hibbert Fellow) in Heidelberg, Berlin, and Göttingen. Schurman was appointed professor of English literature, logic, and political economy at Acadia University in 1880. Two years later he became professor of philosophy at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia.

In 1885 the Cornell family, who had founded the university at Ithaca, New York, persuaded Schurman to become the chair of philosophy there. Seven years later, he became President of Cornell University and in that year became a naturalized citizen. Schurman held the presidency for twenty-nine years; during his tenure Cornell became one of the leading American universities. He established research professorships, and campaigned for scholarly standards. His early work on establishing rules for intercollegiate athletics played a part in the later foundation of the Ivy League. He was a convinced democrat in his academic and political life alike and sought to wipe out every form of discrimination on the Cornell campus. The support of African-American women and scholarships for Chinese students were among his causes. His work on the Philippine Commission was not popular with those who thought the islands should be kept under American tutelage and he spent much of the rest of his life campaigning for Philippine independence.

Throughout his professional career, Schurman had a growing interest in politics, and during leaves of absence from Cornell he served as the first chairman of the Philippines Commission and as U.S. Minister to Greece and Montenegro. He was U.S. Minister to Greece (1912–13), and after his retirement from Cornell in 1920, he was named U.S. Envoy to China (1921–25), and the Ambassador to Germany (1925–30).

All of Schurman's strictly philosophical books were written between 1881 – when he was still at Acadia – and 1896, a few years after his acceptance of the Cornell presidency. Another work, *Balkan Wars* (1914), contains the germs of a philosophy of history, and it remains relevant to its subject matter as diplomatic history. German idealism, especially Kant, informed his philosophical writings. With his former student, James E. Creighton, Schurman developed Cornell's Sage School of Philosophy into a robust center of idealism. They founded and co-edited the *Philosophical Review* in 1892, which immediately became the premier American journal for philosophy.

Schurman's writings first attracted attention because they dealt with the conflicts between science and religion and responded to the issues posed by the theory of evolution. His worldview was founded solidly on reason and experience, and his early works deal with the moral issues posed by people who applied Darwinism to social ethics. *The Ethical Import of Darwinism* (1887) argued against the Social Darwinists that evolution has only an indirect bearing on moral principles. Moral theories cannot be based upon scientific principles, yet an indirect bearing of biological science on them stems from two sources: One is the facts of history, the other, the place of humanity in the universe. Moral theories have factual premises, and different historical situations pose different problems. Schurman argued that this does not invalidate

Kantian universal ethics, however. It merely complicates the problem of deciding which moral maxim is to be applied on a given occasion. Schurman insisted that the universe is evolving and with it the social systems that must respond to physical and historical change. This affects the way that we apply moral principles, but not necessarily the principles themselves.

Schurman also hoped to find a rational foundation for religion, and two of his later books focus on his attempts to do this. It is legitimate, he argued, to hold that there is a divine prius at the root of reality. He believed that such notions can be argued about rationally without the emotions that aroused so much deadly dispute of the kind he had seen in the Balkans.

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Leslie Armour

SCHUTZ, ALFRED (1899–1959)

Alfred Schütz was born in Vienna, Austria, on 13 April 1899. After service in World War I, he obtained a doctorate in philosophy of law at Vienna in 1921 with Hans Kelsen. With his friend Felix Kaufmann, he then studied Edmund Husserl’s *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (1928) and *Formale und transzendente Logik* (1929), and thereafter considered himself a constitutive phenomenologist. Schutz published *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* in 1932. When the German invasion of Austria arrived, Schutz moved his wife and children first to Paris and then New York City in 1939, where he lived the rest of his life. Starting in 1943 he taught sociology during evenings at the New School for Social Research. He soon was teaching part-time in both sociology and philosophy, and had influential students in both disciplines, including Maurice Natanson. Schutz served as chair of the philosophy department from 1952 to 1956, and was professor of philosophy and sociology until his death. In 1940 Schutz and Marvin Farber were leading organizers of

the *International Phenomenological Society* and they edited its journal, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, for many years. Schutz died on 20 May 1959 in New York City.

After Schutz’s death his book *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* was reprinted in Germany (1960) and translated as *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (1967). Also, the first three volumes of his *Collected Papers* were published in 1962, 1964, and 1966. His work was then part of the worldwide surge of interest in phenomenology beginning in that era, influenced a score of disciplines, and there were translations into ever more European and Asian languages. There is a vast secondary literature and even a video of his life and thought.

Schutz used “*Geisteswissenschaften*” and “*Kulturwissenschaften*” in addition to “*Sozialwissenschaften*” in the 1932 work. This variously expressed category includes not only the “social sciences” of economics, jurisprudence, sociology, and political science, but also biography and the histories of art economics, music, philosophy, and politics, which are historical sciences, and while in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s he added cultural anthropology, linguistics, and the sciences of mythology and religion to the list. Given the extension of the concept, “human sciences” or even “cultural sciences” are preferable expressions in English. Schutz used “*Wissenschaftstheorie*” and “*Wissenschaftslehre*” as synonyms for “*Methodenlehre*.” The former expressions can be rendered as “theory of science” or, more concisely and with an easily formed adjective, “science theory,” which is preferable because it covers disciplinary classification and basic concepts as well as rules of procedure. Moreover, it is inclusive of reflections by scientists themselves on those topics, which Schutz considered natural to the cultural

sciences, whereas to call such reflections philosophical can be exclusionary with respect to scientists' own reflections on their disciplines. For Schutz, a science theorist of whatever discipline reflects on and thus learns from actual scientific practice. Then a philosopher can offer insights that scientists (beginning with scientific science theorists from scientific disciplines) might find beneficial. This can be called "gentle prescriptivism" and might explain why Schutz's work is appreciated in many disciplines.

Beginning in his *Aufbau*, Schutz attempts to clarify the basic concepts (*Grundbegriffe*) of the interpretative sociology of Weber and then all of the cultural sciences. "*Subjektiver Sinn*" is what an actor bestows on her own actions and is the fundamental datum of cultural science for Schutz. The usual translation is "subjective meaning." In later work, however, he used "construct" and "interpretation" instead of "meaning," and in one of his very last writings he points out that Weber's contrasting *objektiver Sinne* of the partner, everyday observer, scientific observer, and philosopher are equally subjective, in other words, relative to each type of interpreter. To avoid the undesirable connotations of "subjective" and "objective," one might speak in English of "insider" and, with pertinent qualifications, "outsider" interpretations or constructs, which also alludes to in-groups and out-groups, as Schutz himself does in late works. Cultural science (and philosophy) can then be said to seek intersubjective outsider theoretical interpretations of everyday common-sense insider interpretations. Further basic concepts include "the interpretation of one's own and others' experiences, meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation, symbol and symptom, motive and project, meaning-adequacy and causal adequacy, and, above all, the nature of ideal-typical concept formation" (1967, p. xxxi).

Schutz was concerned with the cultural rather than the naturalistic sciences. In the texts critical of positivism, he is careful to state where he agrees with the positivists concerning scientific knowledge on such things as restricted universality, predictability, and objectivity. He nevertheless considers the socio-cultural world concrete (in other words, it is the whole from which abstraction proceeds), and thus fundamental. In contrast, according to the postulate constitutive for the naturalistic sciences, one ought to abstract from what makes persons and cultural objects be what they are, in other words, one ought to abstract from the common-sense constructs always already bestowed upon them. There are also postulates for species and particular naturalistic sciences, but if one does not perform this fundamental naturalistic abstraction, one retains the subject matter of the cultural sciences. In this age of naturalism, however, a postulate may well be needed whereby the cultural scientist ought explicitly to refrain from performing the naturalistic abstraction on the basis of which there can develop such things as behaviorism.

There are two especially important and explicit postulates for the cultural sciences in general: They are the postulate of adequacy and the postulate of subjective meaning. Here "adequacy" signifies that each term in a scientific model referring to human action ought to be constructed in such a way that it would be accepted as understandable and reasonable by the actor and also her partners and onlookers in everyday life. Although he does not say so, it can be surmised that Schutz would expect that the thoughts expressed about scientific practice by science theorists ought to have analogous adequacy as judged by the scientists themselves.

The postulate of subjective interpretation, as Schutz also expressed the second general postulate, holds for philosophical, scientific, and common sense outsider as well as for

insider understanding. In his earlier thought, he relies on a postulate drawn from Georg Simmel whereby one ought to trace all concrete social phenomena back to modes of individual behavior. But in later thought, he also recognized not only in-groups and out-groups, but also what might correlatively be called “shared constructs” relative to them, in other words, shared insider interpretations and shared outsider interpretations. What Schutz assumes with this postulate, then, is that the actor understands what she is doing and that anyone who wants to understand the meaning of an action ought to investigate the common-sense individual insider interpretation in which it is constituted. Only the actor knows when her action begins and ends, what phases it has, and, above all, its purpose.

Schutz’s description is noetico-noematic or phenomenological because it is produced through reflection on projecting or planning and on the plan as projected or planned, and the same goes for executing and then retrospectively examining the action. The plan itself is an ideal object, a concept or construct. But planning, executing, interpreting, understanding, etc., are psychic processes occurring within what Husserl calls the stream of “inner time.”

Since psychic processes would seem to belong to the finite province of meaning or theoretical universe pertaining to psychology, they would be defined by the basic concepts of this discipline and investigated by the methods proper to it. Hence Schutz’s commitment to constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude rather than transcendental phenomenology needs clarification. He does not discuss what sort of science phenomenological psychology is, but since meaning is originally constituted within the inner time of the self and since such meaning makes things cultural, it is difficult not to consider it a cultural science. Psychology is foundational for the cultural

sciences in a way that is roughly similar to the way physics is foundational for the naturalistic sciences in positivism, in other words, chemistry depends on physics, biology on chemistry, and the social sciences on biology, provided everything is treated as a natural thing.

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Lester Embree

SEARLE, JOHN ROGERS (1932–)

John Searle was born on 31 July 1932 in Denver, Colorado. He began his undergraduate studies at the University of Wisconsin in 1949, and transferred to Oxford University in 1952 with a Rhodes Scholarship. He completed his Oxford BA in 1955 and remained at Oxford as a lecturer at Christ Church College while working for the MA and DPhil degrees, which were both conferred in 1959. Upon leaving Oxford, he became a professor of philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley in 1959, where he currently holds the position of Mills Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language. Searle has been awarded numerous honors and fellowships, including membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Jean Nicod Prize. Searle was President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Society in 1989–90.

Searle was chiefly influenced by two of Oxford's most famous philosophers of language, P.F. Strawson and J.L. Austin. Searle developed a comprehensive treatment of the nature of speech acts, culminating in his first book, *Speech Acts* (1969). He extended the Austinian analysis of how language is used to do such things as assert, promise, and command, to develop both a detailed analysis of the general nature of a speech act and a taxonomy of the range of speech acts. The fundamental premise behind Searle's analysis is that language use is a rule-governed activity. The first goal in studying communication, then, is to distinguish the range of possible linguistic actions (speech acts), and specify the rules that correspond to each one. On Searle's account, every speech act has two parts: a *propositional content* determined by predication and reference, and an *illocutionary force*, the particular way in which the propositional content is offered (such as a

promise or a threat). Speech acts fall into different kinds according to variations in their illocutionary force. There are five basic types of illocutionary force, and so, five basic things one can do with language: (1) make a claim about how the world is (*assertives*); (2) try to get someone to do something (*directives*); (3) undertake an obligation to do something oneself (*commissives*, e.g. promise); (4) express one's feelings (*expressives*, e.g. congratulate someone); and (5) affect a change in the world by means of one's speaking (*declarations*, e.g. christen a ship).

In subsequent work, Searle extended the analysis of *Speech Acts* in several directions. First, he undertakes a more thorough taxonomy of the range of speech acts. This also involves him in tackling a variety of “non-standard” uses of language, including indirect speech acts, fictional discourse and figurative language (see the essays collected in *Expression and Meaning*, 1979). Second, he tackles one of the central, yet unexplained, notions employed in the account of speech acts: intentionality. Speech acts are intentional on two levels: first, they involve producing linguistic items (sounds or marks) that have intentionality (that are about something); second, they involve mental items that also have intentionality, namely, specific intentions of the speaker to produce certain effects on their hearer(s). Examining this crucial aspect of the theory of speech acts resulted in *Intentionality* (1983). In Searle's view, the intentionality of linguistic items derives from the intentionality of mental states, which have their intentionality *intrinsically*. Four crucial points of connection exist between speech acts and intentional mental states or events. First, there is a counterpart to the distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force, namely, between the “representational content” of the intentional state and the “psychological mode” (e.g. hope,

belief, or desire) in which that content is held. Second, like speech acts, intentional states have what Searle calls a *direction of fit*. For example, beliefs, like assertions, have a mind-to-world direction of fit: they are correct when what is in the mind fits (corresponds correctly to) the world. Desires, like intentions, are the opposite: they succeed when the world comes into line with what is in the mind. The third point of connection is that the performance of each speech act just *is* the expression of an intentional state with the same content, and the actual possession of that intentional state is the condition for the sincerity of the speech act. Fourth, the conditions of satisfaction for various speech acts carry over quite directly to the intentional states that have corresponding directions of fit, as we just saw for assertion and belief.

Searle is clear that intentionality must ultimately have a biological explanation. He takes it to be one of the hallmarks of our mental lives, but while emphasizing its importance, he rejects one of the most popular approaches to intentionality in the literature, computationalism or what he calls *Strong AI*. Against computationalism, Searle has produced one of the best known arguments in the philosophy of mind: the Chinese Room Argument (CRA). Searle disputes that merely running a computer program could generate a mind; at best, a program simulates mental processes. We are to imagine a room in which a person is locked with a set of rules in English for manipulating Chinese characters *solely on the basis of the characters' shapes*. When a piece of paper bearing a string of Chinese characters is slipped under the door, the person looks up the characters (by their shapes) in his book of rules, which instructs him as to what to do next (look up other instructions or write down certain characters). This eventually results in his writing a string of Chinese characters on another bit of paper

and sliding it back under the door. It may look as though a native Chinese speaker is providing responses to questions slipped under his door; yet the person in the room does not understand Chinese, so a computer does not understand what it computes either. Running a computer program is not sufficient to have a mind.

Searle (1992) develops a second (and in his view stronger) argument against computationalism: formal (computational) properties couldn't possibly suffice for intentionality (or consciousness) because they are *observer-relative*. Whether something is instantiating a given program is not a brute fact about the universe, but depends on a decision by observers to treat a certain physical process as an instantiation of that program. As Searle puts it, "syntax is not intrinsic to physics" (1992, p. 208). This argument challenges the computationalist to show how computational properties are objective properties of physical entities.

Searle rejects any attempt to treat consciousness as a computational phenomenon. Instead, he advocates a view he calls *biological naturalism*, which treats the explanation of consciousness as analogous to bodily processes such as digestion. Just as there is nothing more to digestion than the causal processes occurring in the stomach, consciousness is simply the effect of processes occurring in the brain. The key idea here is that consciousness is at once *caused by* lower-level processes occurring in the brain, and at the same time a higher-level *feature of* the brain. With this account of consciousness in place, Searle is able to connect it with intentionality, via what he calls the *Connection Principle* (CP). According to CP, there are no intentional mental states that are not at least in principle accessible to consciousness. Intrinsically intentional states always have what Searle calls an *aspectual shape*: they represent their content under a

particular description or from a specific point of view. This aspectual shape cannot be fully characterized in third-person terms, because it is inherently subjective in nature. As a result, the only way to account for the intentionality of an unconscious mental state (in particular, for its aspectual shape) is to require that the mental state be accessible to consciousness; only in surfacing to consciousness does aspectual shape become visible.

With this account of consciousness, intentionality, and language in place, Searle turns his attention to the social dimension of human experience, in order to investigate the nature of facts about such human-made institutions as governments, money, and soccer games. *Making the Social World* (2009) is the culmination of his inquiries. Searle takes such *institutional* facts to be objective, and seeks to understand how such facts come into being. Searle takes the explanation of institutional facts to depend on three factors: collective intentionality; the assignment of functions to objects; and constitutive rules. The notion of *collective intentionality* captures our ability to have shared intentional states. At the same time, humans (and other animals) are able to *assign functions* to all sorts of objects. Of particular interest to Searle are cases in which the assignment of a function depends not on the physical features of the object (as with the log-bench), but only on our collective assignment to it of that function. Searle's paradigmatic example here is money. Certain bits of paper count as money only because we collectively assign them that status. In such cases, which Searle calls *status functions*, our treating the object as having its assigned function is constitutive of its having that function. Searle points out that all such *constitutive rules* are of the form "X counts as Y in (context) C": certain bits of paper count as money in the United States.

Institutional reality is created when collective intentionality, the assignment of functions, and constitutive rules come together in a very specific way. Searle has written on a number of other topics, including metaphysical realism, truth, normativity, rationality, and on naturalizing human freedom in *Freedom and Neurobiology* (2004).

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Reinaldo Elugardo

SEBEOK, THOMAS ALBERT (1920–2001)

Thomas Sebeok was born on 9 November 1920 in Budapest, Hungary. He died on 21 December 2001 in Bloomington, Indiana. In 1936, he moved to Cambridge, England, and enrolled in Magdalene College. His father, anticipating World War II, advised him to join him in New York City and Sebeok arrived in 1937, later taking citizenship in 1944. By 1939 Sebeok was enrolled at the University of Chicago majoring in linguistics. In his senior year he studied with Leonard Bloomfield. The principal influence upon Sebeok at Chicago was Charles Morris, whose *Writings on the General Theory of Signs* Sebeok published in 1971. Morris steered Sebeok into anthropology to complete his BA degree in 1941. Sebeok transferred from Chicago to Princeton in 1942 to continue his graduate studies; for actual direction he commuted to New York where linguist Roman Jakobson was teaching in exile at the New School for Social Research. Sebeok always regarded his regular consultation with Jakobson as the real guidance he received toward his 1943 MA in anthropological linguistics. That was the year he joined the Indiana University faculty at Bloomington. In 1945 Sebeok completed his Princeton PhD in Oriental Languages and Civilizations.

Sebeok worked at Indiana in several programs and departments, but especially at one of its celebrated and unique “research centers,” the Research Center for Language Studies, to which name, as Director, he later added semiotics. Sebeok was named Distinguished Professor of Linguistics in 1967 and established programs in semiotics. In 1978 his title changed to Distinguished Professor of Linguistics and Semiotics, sharing with his friend and colleague, Umberto Eco, the signal honor of holding a designated chair of semiotics. In 1991 he retired from full-time teaching and became Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Anthropology, of Linguistics, of Semiotics, and of Central Eurasian Studies. Over his long career he received five honorary doctorates, many fellowships, and the Distinguished Service Award of the American Anthropological Association. He was a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, President of the Linguistic Society of America in 1975, and President of the Semiotic Society of America in 1984. From 1998 until his death in 2001 Sebeok was the Director of the Center for Applied Semiotics at Indiana University.

One would have expected Sebeok to approach semiotics from the standpoint advocated by Ferdinand de Saussure and his followers under the rubric of “semiology.” But Sebeok never for a moment fell for the idea that semiosis could be adequately reduced or assimilated to a linguistic model of signifying, an idea he simply brushed aside as a “pars pro toto” fallacy – without denying that the semiological studies had a rightful place within the larger scope of semiotics proper. Sebeok studied animal communication, coining the term “zoösemiotics” in 1963. He distinguished sharply between *language*, as having in itself nothing to do with communication but which, through exaptation, gives rise to linguistic communication as species-specifically human,

and *communication*, which is a universal phenomenon of nature.

Sebeok's choice of "semiotics" as the logically proper name for the doctrine of signs may well have been made during his crucial year at Stanford. Soon afterwards, in 1962 at Indiana, he took a first step toward developing a larger paradigm for the study of signs in communication by organizing a conference on the theme "paralinguistics and kinesics" that brought together leading figures from cultural anthropology, education, linguistics, psychiatry, and psychology. Sebeok entitled the volume from that conference *Approaches to Semiotics* (1964) and used the title again in 1969 to launch his book series with the publisher Mouton, marking the beginning of semiotics as an intellectual movement in North America. An assimilation of the seminal semiotic work of Charles S. Peirce was already underway, notably in the persons of Jakobson and Sebeok. Sebeok had established the term "anthroposemiotics" (1968) to cover study of the human use of signs, as in 1963 he had established the broader term "zoösemiotics." In 1981 Martin Krampen, in an article published under Sebeok's editorship in the international journal Sebeok had helped name *Semiotica* (Latin for "semiotics"), introduced the term "phytosemiotics" for study of the action of signs among plants and between plants and animals viewed from the side of the plants. The three terms – phytosemiotics, zoösemiotics, anthroposemiotics – completed the naming of the knowledge arising from the action of signs corresponding to the traditional division of living nature into plants, animals, and humans, and soon enough inspired Sebeok (1990) to consider the action of signs as criterial life. He advanced the further thesis that sign-science and life-science are coextensive, a vision he named "biosemiotics," and used the term to entitle a volume including the challenge to his

thesis as too narrow (Deely 1991). Central to biosemiotics was the biology of Jakob von Uexküll. Over the last decade of his life he tirelessly promoted both. He came also to see a close affinity between semiotics and cognitive science, as the latter was developing toward the end of the twentieth century (1991).

Sebeok's influence has permeated all the terms and distinctions of debate in the development of the study of signs as an inherently interdisciplinary intellectual paradigm global in scope. The open question within semiotics at that juncture, marked by a formal conference (Nöth 2001) addressing just this point of how far the action of signs extends, was no longer whether semiology is superordinate to, co-ordinate with, or subaltern to semiotics, but only whether semiotics is broader even than zoösemiotics. On this question two positions had emerged.

There was the comparatively conservative position (how ironic for time to cast the revolutionary figure of Sebeok in such a pose) which would extend semiotics to the whole of living things, plants as well as animals and microorganisms. The conservative faction in the matter of whether the action of signs, and hence the paradigm of semiotics, can be extended beyond the sphere of cognitive life rallied under Sebeok's coinage, "biosemiotics."

The more radical faction (chief among which must be counted Peirce himself, and most recently Robert Corrington 2000) did not quarrel with the inclusion of phytosemiotics along with zoösemiotics and anthroposemiotics under the umbrella of semiotics, but argued that even this extension leaves out something that must be included, namely, the physical universe at large which surrounds biological life and upon which all life depends. The radical faction in semiotics by the end of Sebeok's life argued that what is distinctive of the action of signs is the shaping of the past on

the basis of future events. In this accounting, the action of signs (or “semiosis”) can be discerned even in formation of rocks and stars as *physiosemiossis*, to be codified under the rubric of “physiosemiotics.” Whatever proves to be the full extent of sign action, Peirce’s proposal (1998) that the universe as a whole, even if it does not consist exclusively of signs, is yet everywhere perfused with signs, is a thesis that better than any other sums up the life and pioneering work of Sebeok.

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John Deely

SEDGWICK, CATHARINE MARIA (1789–1867)

Catharine Maria Sedgwick was born on 28 December 1789 in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, and she died on 31 July 1867 in Roxbury, Massachusetts. Internationally famous as a writer and considered both at home and abroad to be one of the founders of a truly "American" literature, Sedgwick was recognized in her lifetime as a significant contributor to the public debates of her era. Her works popularized progressive, Unitarian thought about self-improvement and religion, and demonstrated her keen interest in philosophy as it might shape morality and moral social behaviors.

During her three and a half decades as a writer, which coincided with the period of nation-forming debates following the Revolution, Sedgwick was a leading figure in Boston and New York City, as well as in the Berkshires, not only in literary circles but in overlapping circles of Democrats, Unitarians, reformers, benevolent workers, and educators. Unitarian minister William Ware's request in 1834 for a contribution to his Sunday Library series inaugurated Sedgwick's reform writing, which included her most popular works *Home* (1835), *The Poor Rich Man, and the Rich Poor Man* (1836), and *Live and Let Live* (1837). In 1834, when Sedgwick had published only a quarter of her final output, she was considered a national treasure, evident in her inclusion in the first volume of *The National Portrait Gallery of Distinguished Americans* in 1834, which was a compendium of mostly generals and politicians, in which only four writers and two women were included.

Sedgwick's fifteen-month tour of England and Europe in 1839–40 confirmed her celebrity status and culminated in her two-volume *Letters from Abroad to Kindred at Home*, in which she critiques American ideas and practices as she reflects on cultural differences

in the countries she visits. Deeply committed to the moral education of future citizens (and perhaps prompted by her awareness of the lack of educational opportunities for girls), Sedgwick helped to launch children's literature in America.

Taken together, Sedgwick's interest in self-education, her conversion to Unitarianism in 1821, and her lifelong reverence for nature as a source and reaffirmation of God's presence suggest her importance as a transitional writer whose works bridge the gap between Calvinism and Transcendentalism. Nature imagery as evidence of the sublime recurs throughout her fiction and personal writing. Sedgwick was against slavery, but not an abolitionist; a moderate, she was opposed "both to slavery and the "excesses" of the abolitionist movement. Sedgwick did not publish her own thoughts on slavery until her 1853 essay "Slavery in New England." Sedgwick's final work, *Memoir of Joseph Curtis, A Model Man* (1858), about a Quaker reformer, confirms her life-long view that "usefulness" and "disinterestedness" (selfless action) were not masculine or feminine duties but *human* virtues. She was, to many, a "model woman," whose works merit continued attention.

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Lucinda L. Damon-Bach

SEELYE, JULIUS HAWLEY (1824–1895)

Julius Hawley Seelye was born on 14 September 1824 in Bethel, Connecticut. He graduated with his BA in 1849 from Amherst College. He then studied at Auburn Theological Seminary, graduating in 1852. Seelye then studied philosophy at the University of Halle during 1851–53. He was ordained to the ministry in 1853 in Schenectady, New York, and served as minister of the First Reformed Dutch Church until 1858. Seelye became professor of mental and moral philosophy at Amherst College in Massachusetts in 1858. In 1875–76 he represented the Tenth District of Massachusetts in the Forty-fourth Congress.

After his public service, Seelye remained a professor of philosophy and was chosen as President of Amherst in 1877, where he was also minister to the college during a successful presidency marked by growth in faculty and financial resources. Seelye appointed Charles E. Garman as assistant professor of philosophy in 1880, who carried on the tradition of outstanding philosophy teaching at Amherst. Seelye retired in 1890 and died on 12 May 1895 in Amherst, Massachusetts.

Seelye taught a conservative moral philosophy and traditional Congregational theology at Amherst for thirty-two years. Because evolution was not considered a body of

knowledge acceptable for Christians to teach at Amherst, President Seelye in his 1877 inaugural address effectively prohibited the teaching of evolution on Amherst’s campus. This announcement was met with strong resistance. Professor B.K. Emerson, professor of geology and zoology, continued teaching evolution, while the department of biology gave instruction understood to be consistent with the biblical account of creation. In 1880, President Seelye responded by removing geology courses from the required curriculum. The College countered in 1884 by creating formal departments, creating the department of mineralogy and geology, in which courses could be selected among a group of elective sciences. Seelye’s innovative “Amherst System,” widely adopted at other colleges, introduced a governance system in which students are allowed to govern their own affairs and decide on disciplinary methods through a College Senate.

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Robert Wilson-Black

SELLARS, ROY WOOD (1880–1973)

Roy Wood Sellars was born on 9 July 1880 in Egmondville, near Seaforth, Ontario, Canada. The family soon moved to the University of Michigan where their father completed his medical education. He enrolled in the University of Michigan in 1899, where he came under the influence of the philosophers Alfred Henry Lloyd and Robert Mark Wenley. Although Sellars's natural philosophical disposition was quite different from that of his idealist teachers, the subject was his principal interest when he graduated with his BA in 1903. He continued his study of philosophy at Hartford Theological Seminary, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Chicago, and finally back at the University of Michigan. In 1905 he was invited back to the University of Michigan as a replacement instructor, where he stayed as a regular faculty member after receiving his PhD in philosophy from Michigan in 1908. He remained a professor of philosophy at Michigan for over forty years. He spent the academic year 1909–10 in France and Germany where he became acquainted with Henri Bergson and Hans Driesch, in sharp contrast to which he began to develop his own version of evolutionary naturalism. In 1911 he married a cousin, Helen Maude Stalker, and in the next two years two children were born: Wilfred Stalker Sellars, who also became an eminent philosopher, and Cecily Sellars, who became a psychologist.

Sellars regularly taught courses in the philosophy of science and his closest associates included many scientists. A particularly close associate was the distinguished neural anatomist, C. Judson Herrick, with whom he frequently discussed scientific perspectives on the mind-body problem. In this scientific environment Sellars's own philosophical perspective was formed and came to fruition.

He published prolifically and was duly recognized by the philosophical community. In 1918 he was elected Vice President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, and in 1923–24 he was President of the Western Division of the APA. He retired from the University of Michigan in 1950 and died on 5 September 1973 in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Sellars was a systematic philosopher with epistemology as the keystone of his philosophical system. Sellars articulated a theory of the nature, conditions, and reach of human knowledge that he called "critical realism." His first book, *Critical Realism* (1916), and his contribution to the cooperative volume, *Essays in Critical Realism* (1920) – joined by George Santayana, Charles Strong, A.O. Lovejoy, J.B. Pratt, A.K. Rogers, and Durant Drake – were devoted to articulating his critical realism. In this account of knowledge, the mind-independent object was directly known through the mediation of subjective meanings. Sellars, then, was not faced with the daunting task of inferring external things from the knowledge of internal states since what is "directly" though "mediately" known is the external thing via internal discriminations and cues. He viewed this "natural realistic attitude" as the perspective of common sense and saw scientific explanation as continuous with and a refinement of it.

Much of Sellars's philosophical effort was spent on developing a sophisticated epistemological theory, "critical realism," which would underwrite the realism both of common sense and of science. His theory involved an analysis of the conditions, nature and extent of the various levels of knowledge that kept "directness" in knowledge while allowing "mediation" in the process. At the most basic level he proposed a casual theory of sense-data as a functional ingredient in a direct account of perception. Perception is

paradigmatically directed toward the group of middle-sized physical objects in our environment but this basic information can be manipulated and extrapolated in sophisticated ways to yield scientific theories which displayed the elemental structure of the same physical world. Human knowing is an affair of levels, an achievement capable of improving as techniques improve.

In virtue of this critically realistic theory of knowledge, Sellars felt that he had put himself in a position to articulate a naturalistic metaphysics and philosophy of mind. He had shown how we could have cognitive access to an independent reality whose structure and characteristics he could now discuss. On the general ontological level Sellars was a materialist, at a time when such view was not at all fashionable, and the materialism he endorsed was continuous with a realistic understanding of natural science. The entities that ultimately constitute the world are physical systems characterized by intrinsic endurance. The macrocosmic systems we directly encounter are secondary endurants which are ultimately composed of primary endurants, the structure and characteristics of which it is the business of physics to determine. Secondary endurants are temporal and contingent while the primary endurants are thought of as eternal and necessary.

Sellars avoided the pitfalls of reductive materialism by stressing the dynamism and organization of matter in such a way as to account for emergent novelty. His acceptance of the significance of organization led him beyond reductive materialism to an evolutionary account which involved emergent properties as a function of organization. In *Evolutionary Naturalism* (1922) Sellars presented a theory of evolutionary levels in nature wherein the higher levels were characterized by genuinely novel properties which emerged from the integrative causality at the lower level. He

argued that there are junctures in nature at which critical organization occurs, giving rise to novel properties describable by different kinds of laws. The levels he distinguished were matter, life, mind, and society. The differences between these four levels, though real, were seen ultimately to be matter of degree.

The level in which Sellars was most interested was that involving the emergence of mind. As organisms become more complex they become capable of storing and using past experience to guide their responses to their environment. Organisms capable of this kind of relatively sophisticated behavior are characterized as “minded” and as a class they constitute the level of mind. The cognitive system is basically the organism, and the mind most specifically is the brain in the context of the central nervous system. Sellars was well aware, however, that this quasi-behavioral account of mind did not of itself do justice to the subjective dimension of human experience, that of consciousness. In addition, we have a self-acquaintance with ourselves that is not reducible to knowledge about ourselves, even as minded. His behavioral account of mind had to be supplemented by an explanation of the privacy of consciousness as well as the phenomenon of introspection. The knowledge that objective psychology and neurophysiology present us of the brain-mind is like our knowledge of any other physical system. Consciousness, however, is a function of our bearing a unique relation to one physical system, namely, our own brain, the relation of being literally on the inside of it participating in its function. Our consciousness is the inner qualitative content of that physical system which is our brain which we also know about the outside. We are not dealing with two things but merely the “inner” and “outer” aspects of the same thing. Its evolutionary role would appear to be related to the level of guidance required for

our sophisticated responses to environmental pressures. Evolution has favored those organisms that have a heightened awareness of their environment and can foresee the consequences of possible actions. Sellars presented an integrated view of these various aspects of his philosophy in *The Philosophy of Physical Realism* (1932).

Although Sellars's reputation was made primarily by his work in epistemology and metaphysics, from his earliest years he was also concerned with the dimension of value both ethical and religious. Early in his career he published *The Next Step in Democracy* (1916) and *The Next Step in Religion* (1918), and one of his very last efforts was *Social Patterns and Political Horizons* (1970). He viewed religion as a pervasive cultural force but one which now should give way in favor of a responsible scientific humanism. He was one of the drafters of the *Humanist Manifesto* (1933), and around the same time he wrote a number of articles for *The New Humanist* explaining and defending humanism as a religion.

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Cornelius F. Delaney

SELLARS, WILFRID STALKER (1912–1983)

Wilfrid Sellars was born on 20 May 1912 in Ann Arbor, Michigan. His father, Roy Wood Sellars, was a naturalistic philosopher of

considerable distinction in the first half of the twentieth century. He received a BA from the University of Michigan in 1933, and an MA from the University of Buffalo in 1934. He then went to Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, where he received a BA with first class honors in philosophy, politics, and economics in 1936, and an MA from Oxford in 1940. He attended Harvard during the next year, but never completed a PhD degree. Sellars was an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Iowa from 1938 to 1943. After military service in the U.S. Navy from 1943 to 1946, he joined the philosophy faculty at the University of Minnesota. He became full professor in 1951 and served as chair of the philosophy department from 1952 to 1959 (in the last year he was visiting Yale). From 1958 to 1963 he taught at Yale University, and then he moved to the University of Pittsburgh as University Professor of Philosophy and research professor of the history and philosophy of science, a post he held until his death. Sellars was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1970–71. Sellars died on 2 July 1989 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Sellars had a systematic philosophical vision that ranged from logic through language, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and epistemology to ethics, and all the pieces fit together into an integrated whole. Moreover, he was deeply immersed in the history of philosophy and carried on his constructive philosophizing in a running dialogue with the great figures of the past, a point often lost on his more narrowly analytic contemporaries. Substantively he stood firmly in the Kantian tradition (his regular Kant seminar was famous).

One *magnum opus*, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (1956), contained a devastating critique of phenomenalism and foundationalism in epistemology in general

(“The Myth of the Given”). It also sketched a positive philosophy of mind involving both a verbal behavioral theory of meaning and a functional account of thought. This was followed in 1962 by “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” where he drew the famous distinction between our ordinary understanding of our place in the world, “The Manifest Image,” and the more austere explanatory picture, “The Scientific Image,” in which what is distinctive about us does not have such a prominent place. The project of philosophy was to fashion a synoptic vision of persons-in-the-world which integrated these two images in a metaphysical picture of how all things fit together in a coherent world.

Sellars’ philosophical orientation involved a thoroughgoing critique of Cartesianism in all its guises: foundationalism in epistemology, privileged access to the mental in the philosophy of mind and all dimensions of dualism in metaphysics and ethics – and this critique was thoroughly systematic. Given the systematic character of his thought, however, there is no easy way into his system. However, a relatively easy way in is to approach his thought through the “myths” and “images” he made famous.

The first of these, “The Myth of the Given,” targets the alleged “givenness” of sensory experience and of introspection in turn. Epistemic givenness seems to be required by the threat that without such there would be an infinite regress of justification and thus no justification at all. The thought is that if empirical knowledge is to be ultimately justified it must rest on a foundation of basic knowings of either a perceptual or introspective sort. Sellars agrees that our knowledge can’t be inferential all the way down but calls into question the assumption that these non-inferential starting points must themselves be epistemic. Epistemic givenness is seen to be a mere myth.

Rejecting positivist and empiricist philosophies of science, Sellars articulates a robustly realistic view of scientific theories and the entities they postulate. Given his view of the close connection between explanatory power and ontological significance, it is thus reasonable to believe that postulational science provides us with the best account of the structure and make-up of our world. His mantra was “science is the measure of what there is, that it is, and of what there is not, that it is not.” The scientific picture of the world is ontologically primary. Sellars articulates this view through the *manifest image* – *scientific image* distinction, with the relationship between the two images being far from simple. Though scientific image is ontologically primary, the manifest image is not simply superseded or replaced by it. With the manifest image Sellars means our ordinary conception of the world of macro-objects and persons in which we conceive of ourselves both as thinkers and as agents in common sense. It is the world as theoretically elaborated by Aristotle and his descendants down to Strawson. This picture of the world, although methodologically indispensable, is in the final analysis false. The true picture of the world is the one in the process of being articulated by postulational science. This “Scientific Image” is a genuine rival and one considerably more austere and disenchanted but it is strongly recommended by the increasingly complete and powerful explanations provided by the natural sciences. But Sellars resists reductionism. Although ontologically primary, “the Scientific Image” cannot stand alone. Meanings, abstract terms, norms and ultimately persons must be somehow fused with it into a synoptic vision of the world in which we live and act.

The complication is that “the Scientific Image” is thoroughly naturalistic having no place for Platonic or mentalistic entities of

any sort. Sellars needs accounts of our basic semantical notions that are compatible with this austere naturalistic description of the world. While the surface grammar of our language seems to invite Platonism and mentalism, he sees this invitation as basically misleading. While “meaning” statements seems to require a relational account, Sellars argues on the contrary that they simply classify linguistic items functionally in terms of linguistic roles. Reference and denotation are handled similarly. Second, he continues in the same spirit to explain abstract singular terms in terms of linguistic types which are metalinguistic roles. Next, practical reasoning, actions and norms have to be integrated into the picture and he does this by extending his functional account of thoughts to violations and intentions, especially those we-intentions characteristic of a group, and tying these volitions and intentions to conduct.

This brings him finally to “persons.” To think of an individual as a person is to think of it as a member of a community whose we-intentions determine the standards of the community in ways that give rise to those rights and duties that specify membership in it. Hence, the concept of the person is not really reconciled with “the Scientific Image” but rather joined to it in such a way that the world as described by science is now “our” world in virtue of its relation to our purposes and intentions.

Sellars was a powerful philosophical influence on those who entered his sphere but his sphere was smaller than it ought to have been. He was a systematic and historically informed thinker at a time when this was unfashionable and his writing style in contrast to his lecturing was notoriously difficult. But his views are still very much alive in his students and at the University of Pittsburgh, the philosophy department he made famous.

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Cornelius F. Delaney

SELZNICK, PHILIP (1919–2010)

Philip Schachter (he changed his name to Philip Selznick in young adulthood) was born on 8 January 1919 in Newark, New Jersey. He completed his undergraduate education at City College of New York earning a BSS in 1938. He earned a MA in sociology in 1943 and a PhD in sociology in 1947 from

Columbia University. He then completed a law degree in 1951 at the University of Utrecht, Netherlands. Selznick taught sociology at the University of Minnesota in 1946–47 and the University of California at Los Angeles from 1947 to 1952. He joined the sociology faculty of the University of California at Berkeley in 1952, where he created the Center for the Study of Law and Society in 1961. He became a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and in 2003 Selznick won the Law & Society Association's Kalven prize. Selznick retired in 1984, and died in Berkeley on 12 June 2010.

Selznick's work is noteworthy for its contributions to sociological theory and in its blending of pragmatism, structural functionalism, and the engaged critical sociological imagination. Sociologists of Selznick's generation do not think of themselves, or wish to give the impression, of doing philosophy. Sociology during this era had already been imbued with positivism and Spencerism, two philosophies of the social that had led the discipline down paths it still prefers to forget. Selznick and his contemporaries rejected both of these earlier projects in favor of Talcott Parson's structural functionalism, which stressed both the individual agency and the structural constraints to action that are indicative of modern liberal bureaucratic society.

For Selznick, sociology would not engage in philosophy, but in the formulation of a general theory that would be testable at the level of the "middle range" of conscious actual experience. A general theory, akin to a philosophy of society, would emerge from the careful consideration of particular cases: a theory of institutions emerges from the study of actual existing bureaucracy. This methodology is adopted by Selznick because of the limitations placed on academic knowledge by the "highly

contingent" nature of truth. The project would not be a philosophy of society, but a theory of the social and the dynamics of its stability and change. Selznick's concerns in regard to the need to develop a general theory of "purposive organization" that explains the "informal" and "non-rational" dimensions of trade unions, governments, corporations, parties, social movements, and other formal organizations. These are of special interest because they are "rationally ordered instruments" where people come together to achieve a clearly articulated set of goals. Philosophy to Selznick is too abstract; sociological theory must serve the concrete purpose of guiding social change. His early theory of bureaucracy and organization, his foundational study of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and his later writings on communitarianism all attest to a consistent concern with social change and the rationalization of social life.

An implicit philosophical concern is with the application of pragmatism to sociological theory. Selznick asks questions regarding the relationship of individuals to the social institutions that they directly experience either as workers or citizens. He asks whether a society characterized by increasing rationalization, can social change understood by Selznick as the working out of Enlightenment, be guided to a successful result by social theory? To Selznick the increasing bureaucratization and expanding anomic mass culture seem to be calling progress into question along with the autonomy of the individual. Selznick later expresses these questions in attempting to construct a liberal communitarianism in his later writings on community and morality.

Selznick's *TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organizations* is both a theory of organizations and as an institutional history of one of the largest

public projects of the New Deal. Along with his *Leadership in Public Administration*, this work ultimately influenced sociological work in social history, public administration, public policy, and social movements. As Selznick was active in the socialist-left movements of the 1930s, he turned his attention in *The Organizational Weapon* to these same organizations, in particular the Communist Party U.S.A.

Selznick later writes of his “intense, fruitful, and in some ways extraordinary” encounter with American Trotskyism, which established “the fate of ideals in the course of social practice ... the conditions and processes that frustrate ideals or, instead, give them life and hope” as a central theme of his work. Selznick was also influenced through associations with his wife, the feminist sociologist Gertrude Jaeger Selznick, the Frankfurt School’s Leo Lowenthal, and Daniel Bell with the critique of Enlightenment and progress.

This same contradiction of frustrated ideals that “give life and hope” is very much present in his later writings on community and communitarianism. During the 1970s, Selznick turned towards theoretical writings that would at the same time intervene into those conditions which frustrate social progress. Legal aspects of these social processes first interested him, but he soon turned to the problem of community in contemporary society. Selznick presents community and society as complementary “frames of reference.” Much of the communitarian writing of the 1980s by both sociologists and non-sociologists focused on a basic sociological point: there are no well-formed individuals bereft of social bonds or culture. Political philosophers such as Alasdair Macintyre and Michael Sandel are “doing sociology.” Sociology and communitarianism are in fundamental agreement regarding the social origins of the self, and that communitarians are simply

following a historic tendency of sociologists to criticize atomistic individualism. Selznick identifies communitarianism with the central problems of sociology. There is little difference between the communitarian perspective on politics and a proper sociological perspective on society. Selznick points to the vital role that sociological knowledge plays in governing, and the role of communitarianism as a political doctrine based upon sociological principles. Sociological theory occupies a “special office” in this regard. The goal is to develop a sociological theory of the origins, character, and development of morality, the self, institutions. This theory will be embodied within a liberal communitarianism which will bind liberty to a secure ethic of “social responsibility.”

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B. Ricardo Brown

SHEFFER, HENRY MAURICE (1882–1964)

Henry M. Sheffer was born on 1 September 1882 in the western Ukraine region of the Russian Empire. When he was ten years old, his family emigrated to the United States and settled in Boston, where he attended Boston Latin School. He then went to Harvard University, receiving his BA in 1905, MA in 1907, and PhD in philosophy in 1908 for his dissertation titled “A Program of Philosophy Based on Modern Logic.” The readers for his dissertation were philosopher Josiah Royce, psychologist Edwin B. Holt, and mathematician Edward V. Huntington. Sheffer studied logic in Europe on a Sheldon Traveling Fellowship for two years, and then taught at a series of universities for one year each: Seattle, Cornell, Minnesota, Missouri, and City College of New York. In 1916, Sheffer became an assistant professor of philosophy at Harvard University, was promoted up to full professor in 1938, and taught at Harvard until his retirement in 1952. Sheffer died on 17 March 1964 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Sheffer was strongly influenced by Royce and, through Royce, by Charles Sanders Peirce. Reflecting on the early 1930s, W.V. Quine wrote that “American philosophers associated Harvard with logic because of Whitehead, Sheffer, Lewis, and the shades of Peirce and Royce ...” (1985, p. 83). When Sheffer taught logic during the 1930–31 academic year, he still talked of papers by Oswald Veblen and Huntington, as well as of aspects of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North

Whitehead’s *Principia Mathematics* and of some of his own work, while mentioning David Hilbert only so as to reject Hilbert’s formalism (Quine 1985, p. 82).

Sheffer’s most important contribution to logic was the logical operator now called the “Sheffer stroke,” which is also known as the NAND (*Not AND*) operator: $p \text{ NAND } q$ is true if and only if not both p and q are true. This single logical operator can be used to construct any Boolean function. Sheffer presented his logical operator in a 1913 paper “A Set of Five Independent Postulates for Boolean Algebras with Application to Logical Constants,” one of his very few publications. Although the term “Boolean algebra” originated with Peirce, who used it in the manuscript “A Boolean Algebra with One Constant” of the winter of 1880–81 (Peirce 1989, pp. 218–21), and also “Note on the Boolean Algebra” of the fall 1881–spring 1882 (Peirce 1989, pp. 264–6), this term’s earliest appearance in print seems to be in Sheffer’s 1913 article.

Peirce anticipated the Sheffer stroke as well in “A Boolean Algebra with One Constant.” In this paper, Peirce also presents the Peirce arrow (or the NOR operator) which is the only other logical operator that can by itself provide for a truth-functionally complete set. Because Peirce’s books and manuscripts did not reach Harvard until late 1914, it seems that Sheffer discovered his logical operator without knowledge or benefit of Peirce’s work. There is no evidence that Royce or anyone else could have conveyed knowledge of Peirce’s work on this aspect of logic to Sheffer. Peirce’s biographer Joseph Brent says that it could only have been after the autumn of 1926, when Paul Weiss first arrived at Harvard, that Weiss discovered in a basket marked “to be discarded” one of Peirce’s most important papers in logic titled “A Boolean Algebra with One Constant” (Brent 1996, §16). Written about 1880, while Peirce was

at Johns Hopkins University, it proposed a Boolean algebra with one constant and was “a striking anticipation” of Sheffer’s identical proposal. There is, unfortunately, no means of ascertaining *when* this document was placed in the “to be discarded” basket, or by *whom* it was placed there.

Bertrand Russell’s “most immediate” reference in the lectures on logical atomism in which a “modified truth table” occurred were to papers by Sheffer and Jean Nicod, and he notes the use which the Sheffer stroke could be put to reduce the number of propositions required for *Principia*. Shosky (1997, p. 11) argues therefore that Sheffer relied “on Frege’s use of material implication and at least the truth table technique” to arrive at the Sheffer stroke, and that Russell derived the truth table matrix independently. However, one of the columns in the matrix defining the sixteen binary connectives includes what has come down to us as the Sheffer stroke (along with its negation, Peirce’s arrow). Peirce’s influence on Sheffer’s work was decided, and it appears that Sheffer borrowed the multiplication tables used by Peirce to apply to logic (Grattan-Guinness 1997, p. 600). Sheffer’s work on truth tables occurs in a mimeographed manuscript titled “General Theory of Notational Relativity” (1921) which Sheffer circulated among his friends and colleagues, and which was the basis of a talk given by Sheffer at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, held at Harvard in September 1926, summarized in Sheffer (1927). But Sheffer’s methods differed from the truth table method as we know it today (Grattan-Guinness 1997, p. 600).

The Sheffer stroke has proved fruitful for logic, leading, for example, to the development of combinatory logic. Nicod (1917) simplified the axiom system developed by Sheffer. Using the Sheffer stroke, the second edition of *Principia Mathematica* (Russell and

Whitehead 1925, pp. xv–xix) replaces the five primitive propositions *1.2–*1.6 of the first edition. In his “New Sets of Independent Postulates for the Algebra of Logic” (1933), Huntington took a cue both from Peirce’s “A Boolean Algebra with One Constant” and Sheffer’s “A Set of Five Independent Postulates for Boolean Algebras” to demonstrate that a Boolean algebra could be defined in terms of a single binary and a single unary operation. Moses Schönfinkel was the creator of combinatory logic. In his 1924 article “Über die Bausteine der mathematischen Logik,” he developed a system which was constructed as an extension of the concept of the Sheffer stroke to first-order functional calculus. Schönfinkel presented a universal connective U of mutual exclusivity which reduces all functions to single-valued functions and treats the values of these functions as truth-values. Thus, for a binary relation $F(x, y)$, we construct the single-valued function $fX(y)$; and for classes F and G of Schönfinkel’s system, we rewrite UFG as $(UF)G$, which is to be translated as “ F and G are mutually exclusive (classes).” We can define the usual logical connectives of propositional calculus in terms of U , and eliminate the variables of first-order, and even higher-order, functional calculi.

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Irving H. Anellis

SHELDON, WILMON HENRY (1875–1980)

Wilmon H. Sheldon was born on 4 April 1875 in Newton, Massachusetts, and died on 26 February 1980 in Rutland, Vermont. His degrees were all from Harvard

University: BA (1895), MA (1896), and PhD in philosophy (1899). Sheldon taught philosophy at the University of Wisconsin (1899–1900), Harvard University (1901–03), Columbia University (1903–05), Princeton University (1905–09), and Dartmouth College (1909–20). In 1920 he became a professor of philosophy at Yale University, where he chaired the department from 1923 to 1926. Sheldon became Clark Professor of Philosophy in 1936, and held that position until his retirement as emeritus professor in 1943. He was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1921–22; Nathaniel Taylor Lecturer at Yale Divinity School in 1936; Mahlon Powell Lecturer at Indiana University in 1942; F.J.E. Woodbridge Lecturer at Columbia University in 1943; and G.H. Howison Lecturer at the University of California at Berkeley in 1943.

For Sheldon, the reconciliation of philosophies was his goal. Sometimes Sheldon found another philosophic type to reconcile, and sometimes he developed a new method of reconciliation, but the general intent persisted over his entire career. This creed he expressed succinctly: "It is better to be broad in our sympathies, to embrace conflicting doctrines in the hope of later reconciling them ... than to retain a narrow and unprogressive consistency" (1911, p. 525). Closely related to his belief in reconciliation is his belief that philosophic types represent basic human needs. Reconciliation is represented as a conservation of value. The best philosophy, then, is the philosophy that appeals to the most lasting values; after many centuries of weeding, humankind has settled on the basic philosophical types as representing those values. The single most lasting of all values is the value of the conservation of those types (reconciliation). Historical eclecticism is not what Sheldon has in mind. To him, reality cannot be metaphysically understood without

knowledge of the distinct ways in which it has been understood in the past. No one could be less interested in historical scholarship for its own sake. For Sheldon, philosophy has a “job” to do in contemporary civilization. The types of philosophy must be organized so that a unified view is achieved, a view that can serve as a “guide of life.” He modestly admits the fallibility of the unified view he offers and hopes that it will be improved in the future. The choosing and arranging of types is something that must be done constantly. It is significance rather than precision he values; it is the search by each generation for *some* significant arrangement that is invaluable, not any supposedly ideal arrangement.

In his metaphilosophy Sheldon develops a theory of the relations between philosophical types and sometimes claims that this theory is itself a metaphysics describing the generic traits of the real when actually, as a metaphilosophy, it cannot describe more than the generic traits of philosophy. When he finds that philosophical types are related in polar ways, he draws the dubious inference that in any true ontology there must be polar pairs corresponding to the conceptions of the real in the ontologies between which he has found polar relations.

After publishing his most comprehensive metaphysical work, *God and Polarity: A Synthesis of Philosophies* (1954) Sheldon published three books of non-technical philosophy in which attention to love took the place of his earlier attention to polarity and reconciliation of types of philosophy: *Sex and Salvation* (1955), *Rational Religion: The Philosophy of Christian Love* (1962), and *Agapology: The Rational Love-Philosophy Guide of Life* (1965).

Sheldon declared war on all “analysis,” from the “critical” method to recent linguistic philosophy. The fervor of his guide-of-life view is largely a reaction against analysis. He is in dead earnest, has high hopes for

philosophy, and is not willing to see its position in the world drop to that of a mere game. Philosophy is not worth its salt unless it can produce a body of usable doctrine, and usable doctrine can be found only by “doing things” in the world, not by debating the logical justification for doing anything.

Sheldon’s career-long effort to reconcile systems shifted the battleground from metaphysics to metaphilosophy. He settled the strife by adopting an unorthodox metaphilosophy, but now the question is whether philosophers will agree on the metaphilosophy. Is there any reason to suppose that they will agree more on that than they did in the first place?

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Peter H. Hare

SHIMONY, ABNER ELIEZER (1928–2015)

Abner Shimony was born on 10 March 1928 in Columbus, Ohio. He received his BA in mathematics and philosophy from Yale University in 1948, his MA in philosophy from University of Chicago in 1950, and his PhD in philosophy from Yale in 1953. After serving in the U.S. Army Signal Corps from 1953 to 1955, he earned a second PhD in physics from Princeton University in 1962. In 1962 he became assistant professor of philosophy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and was promoted to associate professor in 1968. In 1973 he was appointed associate professor of philosophy and physics at Boston University, was promoted to full professor in 1973, and taught at Boston until retiring in 1994. Shimony was President of the Philosophy of Science Association in 1995–96. In retirement he remained active in lecturing around the world, research, and publishing. Shimony died on 8 August 2015 in New Haven, Connecticut.

Shimony's *Search for a Naturalistic World View*, a two-volume collection of his papers published in 1993, won the Lakatos prize in 1996 for an outstanding contribution to

the philosophy of science. These essays are interrelated parts of a continuing investigation into the prospect for a naturalistic world view, within which metaphysics as illuminated by natural science, coheres with epistemology, as illuminated by scientific method.

Volume one, *Scientific Method and Epistemology*, contains essays introducing Shimony's world view including his argument for a naturalistic but non-physicalistic treatment of mind, his evolutionary approach to perception including his impressive argument that detailed study of empirical psychology enhances rather than undermines our confidence in perception as a source of knowledge about the world, his seminal technical contributions to Bayesian epistemic probability including his classic Dutch book result and an exciting alternative derivation from the idea of epistemic probability as epistemic estimate of a frequency, in addition to his very important work on scientific inference. It could be argued that Shimony's classic treatment of objective Bayesian probability theory is one of the most thoughtful and informed treatments of scientific inference ever published. It converts personal probability into a constructive instrument for learning about the world. The next essay in the volume suggests improvements on Shimony's earlier treatment. Reading these two essays together, along with the three technical essays on Bayesian probability theory and the essays on a naturalistic world view, is a very effective way to exhibit scientific inference as a central component of epistemology. These essays present and illustrate Shimony's thesis that methodology itself is an empirical enterprise, in which we learn from experience how to refine our learning from experience. Volume one concludes with an essay on Thomas Kuhn and another on fact and value, both of which are judicious acknowledgements of the social context of science while defending the objectivity of the scientific enterprise.

Volume two, *Natural Science and Metaphysics*, contains Shimony's famous essays on measurement and non-locality in quantum mechanics, as well as his very interesting treatments of metaphysical illuminations from the scientific treatment of complex systems and the nature of time. Shimony's profound investigations into the problem of quantum entanglement and non-locality have been major contributions to the design of experiments testing for violations of classical probability inequalities (Bell's Inequalities) and to understanding implications of their outcomes for contextual hidden variable theories and the interpretation of quantum theory and its compatibility with special relativity.

Shimony continues to draw upon his profound contributions to quantum mechanics and its philosophical implications, as well as his seminal contributions to Bayesian epistemology, to develop a measured treatment of science as a source of knowledge.

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SHOEMAKER, SYDNEY SHARPLESS (1931–)

Sydney Shoemaker was born on 29 September 1931 in Boise, Idaho. He received his BA in philosophy from Reed College in 1953 and his PhD in philosophy from Cornell University in 1958. He taught philosophy at Ohio State from 1957 to 1960. Then he returned to Cornell to join the philosophy faculty in 1961, where he was made Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy in 1978, holding that position until retiring as professor emeritus in 2004. Shoemaker has held fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Guggenheim Foundation. He has given several major lectures around the world, including the John Locke Lectures at

Oxford in 1972. He served as co-editor of *The Philosophical Review* from 1964 to 2002. He has held several offices in the American Philosophical Association, including President of the Eastern Division in 1993–94.

Shoemaker has one unifying project to his work: to articulate and defend a materialist account of the human person. There are many aspects of personhood that seem to count against a materialist account. For example, it is not clear how materialism can understand the nature of minds, or give an adequate account of various mental phenomena. Nor is it clear how materialism can account for the identity of persons through time. If the same person can have different bodies, or if it is possible for some persons to exist with no body at all, then how can persons be no more than their material bodies? Shoemaker's project is to examine these problems and others, and to show that they can be resolved within a materialist framework.

Shoemaker has been a leading defender of “functionalism” in philosophy of mind, to defend mind-brain identity. According to functionalism, mental phenomena such as pains and beliefs are to be understood as higher-order functional states having a functional role in a thinker's psychology. A functional role, in turn, is to be understood in terms of the state's causal relations, or how it fits into a network of causes and effects. For example, pain is to be understood (very roughly) as that state of the organism that is caused by damaged tissue, and that is the cause of crying out, avoidance behavior, etc. To take another example, the belief that it is raining is to be understood (again, very roughly) as that state of the organism that is caused by certain sorts of visual imagery and is the cause of appropriate sorts of behavior, such as reaching for one's umbrella. On Shoemaker's view, mental states can be *defined* in terms of their functional roles. This understanding

allows that mental states such as pains and beliefs can be “realized” in very different sorts of beings. The materialist can embrace a functionalist account of minds and mental phenomena, and then hold further that all realizations of the mental are in physical organisms. Shoemaker has also argued that the materialist can account for privileged access to qualitative mental states, and for other special sorts of self-knowledge regarding the mental.

Shoemaker defends the view that personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity. *A* is the same person as *B* if and only if *A* and *B* share the right sort of continuity among various psychological features. This fits nicely with a functionalist account of mind. Given that mental states are to be understood in terms of their causal relations, including their relations to other mental states, it is guaranteed that a persisting person will display psychological continuity of the right sort. That is, on a functionalist account, to have experiences, beliefs, memories, desires, etc., *just is* for these states to be causally related to further mental states in appropriate ways. Once again, the view that Shoemaker adopts is consistent with materialism but does not entail it. It might seem that we care about psychological continuity just because continuity usually accompanies personal survival, and what we really care about is survival. Just the opposite is true, Shoemaker argues. We care about personal survival because survival usually accompanies psychological continuity. What we really care about, however, is the continuity.

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John Greco

SIMON, HERBERT ALEXANDER (1916–2001)

Herbert Simon was born on 15 June 1916 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and died on 9 February 2001 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He was admitted to the University of Chicago with a full scholarship in 1933, and began applying the kind of mathematical rigor found in the hard sciences, such as physics, to the social sciences. He earned his BA in political science in 1936, and remained at the University of Chicago for graduate studies. In early 1937 he had his first publication. During his graduate studies, Simon worked with the econometrician and mathematical economist Henry Schultz, the mathematical biophysicist Nicholas Rashevsky, and the philosopher Rudolf Carnap. All three taught Simon something of the application of mathematics to science. Simon was also strongly influenced by Charles Merriam and Harold Lasswell in the political science department. Simon was a research assistant to Clarence Ridley, and by 1939 Ridley and Simon had become national authorities on measuring public services. While technically still a research assistant, Simon was made the director of Administrative Measurement Studies for a three year project at the University of California at Berkeley. He completed his PhD in political science for the University of Chicago in 1942. He later turned his dissertation into his first book, *Administrative Behavior*.

In 1942 Simon attempted to enlist for combat duty but his color blindness kept him out of World War II. Instead, he took a political

science position at the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago. During this time he attended the seminars of the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics. In 1946 he became chair of the department of political and social science at IIT. Simon left IIT for the Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh in 1949, to help found a new Graduate School of Industrial Administration, which quickly became one of the top business schools in the world.

In 1952 Simon became a consultant for RAND, where he met Cliff Shaw and later Allen Newell. By 1955 Newell and Simon, together with Shaw, began using computers to model human reasoning based on their insight that computers were not mere number crunchers, since they could be programmed to process arbitrary symbols. Newell, Shaw, and Simon became pioneers in cognitive science and artificial intelligence research. Newell and Simon helped establish the world class computer science department at (the renamed) Carnegie Mellon University. With the change in his research and a shift in thinking at GSIA away from his views, Simon moved to the psychology department in 1965, becoming the Richard King Professor of Computer Science and Psychology, the position he held until his death. He remained a member of GSIA as associate dean and also became a member of the departments of philosophy and social and decision sciences. Simon was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 1967 and the following year he became a member of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee. In 1978 he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, and received the National Medal of Science from President Reagan in 1986.

Simon's first important contribution to understanding human thought came from critiquing the received view of rationality in economics and management sciences, the

subjective expected utility (SEU) theory. According to SEU, economic and management decisions are made by determining which of the alternatives available is optimal. SEU is only an idealization, as it is impossible in practice to specify a single utility function to account for competing and contradictory interests, just as it is impossible to determine all possible future states arising from distinct courses of action or to determine the likelihood of the future states we can predict. Simon realized that once practical limits are imposed, the adequacy of SEU depends more on the approximating assumptions than the theory itself. Simon launched an empirical investigation to determine how we actually make decisions.

Simon's positive account of decision making, bounded rationality, and its application to microeconomics is the work for which he was awarded his Nobel Prize. Using thinking aloud protocols, that is, having people talk out loud as they are thinking through a problem and listening to what they say about what they are doing, Simon realized that rather than being optimizers, human problem solvers are "satisficers." What he meant by this term is that people find satisfactory or good enough solutions. Moreover, we do not consider all or even most of the possible alternatives facing us. Though in principle anything could be relevant to any situation we are considering, most things in practice are only weakly related so we treat them as irrelevant. The space of possible solutions to most problems is vastly beyond our cognitive abilities to explore. Simon thought that one of the functions of emotions is to focus attention, thereby limiting the number of things we take to be relevant. Thus, his theory of rationality not only avoids SEU's commitment to omniscient agents, even as idealizations, it makes our value systems a fundamental determiner of our decisions in such a way that

different values can influence our decisions at different times, the others being deemed irrelevant in those circumstances.

Simon's methodology in using computers to investigate human reasoning rests on his fundamental hypothesis, seminal in the "cognitive revolution," that humans and computers alike are instances of physical symbol systems that process information. Seen at this level of abstraction, a science investigating the information processing itself, independent of its physical instantiation, is possible; the science of human reasoning, cognitive science, need not wait on neuroscience. "Finally, there is a growing body of evidence that the elementary information processes used by the human brain in thinking are highly similar to a subset of the elementary information processes that are incorporated in the instruction codes of present-day computers. As a consequence it has been found possible to test information-processing theories of human thinking by formulating these theories as computer programs – organizations of the elementary information processes – and examining the outputs of computers so programmed. The procedure assumes no similarity between computer and brain at the 'hardware' level, only similarity in their capacities for executing and organizing elementary information processes" (1992, p. 77).

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Christopher Viger

SINGER, EDGAR ARTHUR, JR. (1873–1954)

Edgar A. Singer, Jr. was born on 13 November 1873 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He received his BS degree in engineering from the University of Pennsylvania in 1892. In 1894 he earned a PhD in philosophy from Pennsylvania, writing on “The Composite Nature of Consciousness.” His father also earned his own doctorate in 1896, writing on “The Content of Education, Historically Considered.” The psychology department at Harvard University gave Singer his first academic appointment from 1894 to 1896. At Harvard, Singer worked alongside pragmatist William James.

In 1896 Singer returned to the University of Pennsylvania where he accepted the first of a series of appointments as senior fellow in philosophy (1896–98), instructor of philosophy (1898–1903), and assistant professor of philosophy (1903–09). The Spanish-American War drew Singer away from the academy briefly; he served as a sergeant in the First U.S. Volunteers. In 1909 he returned to the University of Pennsylvania as professor of philosophy. He was given the Adam Seybert Professor of Philosophy chair in 1929. Singer occupied this chair until 1946 when he retired. In 1944, his alma mater awarded him an honorary LL.D.

Singer was the President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1930–31. Singer was a member of several professional groups including the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Philosophical Society, Phi Beta Kappa, the Philosophical Circle of New York, and the Fullerton Club of Philadelphia. Singer died on 4 April 1954 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Singer characterized his philosophy as “empirical idealism” as he sought to retain idealism’s promise of human freedom in an apparently mechanistic world while, at the same time, fully embracing the empirical method. As Milton C. Nahm explained, “Singer was basically interested in the solution to the problem of human freedom and he saw clearly that originality and creativity are but alternative names for freedom in the aesthetic universe of discourse. The question uppermost in Singer’s mind was the reconciliation of mechanism and freedom” (Nahm 1957, p. 585).

Like Francis Bacon and William James, Singer averred that knowledge is power and that human progress is the result of cooperation in the control of nature. But Singer had much more than scientific mastery of our environment in mind. The moralist is the architect of human cooperation and the artist provides the creativity that is necessary to both the prudent moralist and the effective scientist. The artist reveals the shortcomings and tragedies of the human condition, thereby arousing discontent, but also inspires the courage that the moralist and the scientist need to create anew. Despite Singer’s stress on the artist and aesthetics, he was dedicated to the precision and methodology of early twentieth century pragmatic empiricism. He carefully defined his philosophical terms and based his insights on observation of human behavior, demanding that all philosophical conclusions be tested by experimentation.

Singer's pragmatic philosophy made an impact on the development of systems engineering, through his student and colleague C. West Churchman and Russell L. Ackoff. In 2000, the School of Engineering and Applied Science of the University of Pennsylvania established the Ackoff Center for Advancement of Systems Approaches.

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David LaRocca

SINGER, IRVING (1925–2015)

Irving Singer was born on 24 December 1925 in New York City. He received his BA in 1948 and PhD in philosophy in 1952 from Harvard University, writing a dissertation titled "An Approach to Aesthetics through the Criticism of Santayana's Views." From 1953 to 1956 he was an instructor in philosophy at Cornell University, and from 1956 to 1959 he was an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan. In 1959 he joined the faculty of the philosophy and linguistics department at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was promoted to associate professor of philosophy in 1959, and became a full Professor of Philosophy in 1967. He retired as professor emeritus in 2013. Singer died on 1 February 2015 in Brighton, Massachusetts.

Singer has maintained a high interest in the philosophy of George Santayana, from his first books including *Santayana's Aesthetics: A Critical Analysis* (1957) to recent work including another book titled *George Santayana, Literary Philosopher* (2000). Singer has assisted the critical edition of Santayana's works published by MIT Press, and wrote the introduction to the fourth volume, *The Last Puritan*. Singer has himself

made major contributions to the aesthetics of film, notably in *Reality Transformed: Film as Meaning and Technique* (1998) and *Three Philosophical Filmmakers: Hitchcock, Welles, Renoir* (2004).

Inspired by his critical reaction to Santayana's aesthetics and theory of value, Singer approached the philosophy of love in *The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther* (1966) by first distinguishing love from either individual or objective appraisal. According to Singer, love is the free and gratuitous bestowing of value upon something or someone, without regard to the interests of ourselves or others. Ancient Greek and medieval conceptions of love seek intrinsic idealized goodness in the object of love, instead of requiring that love is not to be compelled by the object of love. In *The Nature of Love*, vol. 2: *Courtly and Romantic* (1984) Singer disentangles the courtly and romantic types of love, arguing that romantic love is a more recent post-seventeenth century phenomenon related to the movement of romanticism. *The Nature of Love*, vol. 3: *The Modern World* (1987) brings Singer's story down to the twentieth century.

In the 1990s Singer expanded the scope of his explorations to approach the question of the meaning of life in another trilogy of works. The second volume of *Meaning in Life*, titled *The Pursuit of Love* (1994) declares that "Love is freedom in the midst of conditionality." Singer sets himself against both Sigmund Freud and Jean-Paul Sartre, who dominated twentieth century thinking with their psychological theories which claim that all love is basically some form of self-love. Singer instead views love as helping to form voluntary bonds of attachment and social relationships between people, and hence love cannot be reduced to self-interest or a means to happiness. In all three of his books on the meaning of life, Singer rejects the search for a pre-given meaning of life and instead portrays

meaning as something creatively formed through actual living. On this view, elaborated in *Meaning in Life*, vol. 3: *The Harmony of Nature and Spirit* (1996) and *Feeling and Imagination: The Vibrant Flux of Our Existence* (2001), the imaginative creation of meaning in life will be more fundamental than any search for happiness.

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John R. Shook

SINGER, MARCUS GEORGE (1926–)

Marcus G. Singer was born on 4 January 1926 in New York City. He received his BA in 1948 at the University of Illinois, and his PhD in philosophy in 1952 at Cornell University. He taught at Cornell from 1948 to 1951, and then taught philosophy at the University of Wisconsin from 1952 until his retirement in 1992. He was visiting fellow (1962–1963) and honorary research fellow (1984–1985) at Birkbeck College of the University of London; a visiting fellow (1977 and 1984–1985) at the University of Warwick; and director of a public lecture series on American philosophy (1984–1985) at the Royal Institute of Philosophy in London. Singer was elected President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division (1985–1986).

In *Generalization in Ethics* (1961), Singer lays the foundations for a rational and normative system of ethics. He combines the careful analysis of ethical concepts with normative ethics and makes a distinction between moral rules and principles. Moral principles are always relevant to every

situation, whereas moral rules only cover *some* situations or actions. Singer gives careful attention to exactly how moral principles function, explicitly and implicitly, in ethical argumentation. Singer's emphasis on generalization has been influential and received favorable responses from American and British philosophers including A.I. Melden and R.M. Hare.

He advanced a number of moral principles including the "generalization principle" which can be formulated in several ways, but is always relevant to any moral situation, stating that what is right or wrong for one person must be right or wrong for any similar person in similar circumstances. Another is the "principle of consequences" stating that if the consequences of someone's performing a specific action would be undesirable, then that person ought not to perform that action. Singer rejects the claim of Kantian ethics that the consequences of actions are irrelevant to the determination of moral rightness, and also rejects Kant's claim that lying is always wrong, even for benevolent motives. He insists that although lying may be generally wrong, its wrongness cannot be determined purely in formal terms, apart from the consequences it may have; and that to hold that lying is always wrong is to confuse a moral rule with a moral principle.

According to Singer, instead of asking whether lying could ever be willed as a universal principle, Kant should have asked the following: Could it be willed as a universal law, that everyone should lie in a specific situation where it is known that telling the truth will be put to a morally bad use, and where lying will effect the prevention of murder or serious harm? Singer holds that the "principle of consequences" is a *necessary* ethical or moral principle. It is necessary because its denial involves a self-contradiction, and because, like the "generalization principle," it is a necessary presupposition of moral reasoning.

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Guy W. Stroh

SKINNER, BURRHUS FREDERIC (1904–1990)

B. F. Skinner was born on 20 March 1904 in Susquehanna, Pennsylvania, and died on 18 August 1990 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. From 1922 to 1926 Skinner attended Hamilton College in Clinton, New York, where he majored in literature, intending to become a writer. Upon receiving his BA in 1926 he spent a year at his family home in Scranton, Pennsylvania, trying in vain to realize his literary ambitions. During this year, he was a subscriber to the literary magazine *The Dial*, where he read a review of John B. Watson’s *Behaviorism* by Bertrand Russell. After reading Watson and the newly translated works on conditioned reflexes by Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov, Skinner decided to pursue graduate training in psychology at Harvard, where he enrolled in 1928. Skinner completed his PhD in psychology at Harvard in 1931, writing a dissertation on the nature and concept of the reflex, part of which was published as “The Concept of the Reflex in the Description of Behavior” in that year. Skinner remained at Harvard until the summer of 1936, first on a National Research Council Fellowship, then as a member of the Harvard Society of Fellows. Another fellow at that time, W.V. Quine, became interested in behaviorism from Skinner; and Professor Alfred North Whitehead challenged him to offer a comprehensive behavioristic explanation of language. This challenge set the stage for Skinner’s writing on the topic that culminated in the 1957 publication of *Verbal Behavior*.

In 1936, Skinner was offered a professorship at the University of Minnesota, where he taught psychology (and interacted with prominent logical positivist Herbert Feigl) until 1945, when he took a position as chair of the psychology department at

Indiana University. In 1948, after delivering the William James Lectures at Harvard, he returned there as a professor of psychology for the rest of his career. In 1969 he received the United States National Medal of Science, and in 1972, amidst some controversy, was named Humanist of the Year by the American Humanist Association. For his role in developing behavioral principles that were applied to ameliorate the lives of people with mental disabilities, he was honored with a Kennedy International Award in 1971. Skinner retired from teaching in 1974, but continued to write and lecture until his death.

Skinner wrote in a variety of genres on a broad range of topics in the science and technology of behavior, beginning with his laboratory research with non-human organisms (primarily rats and pigeons), and extending to his ideas on the design of cultures and social practices. In his early experimental work, Skinner made an important distinction between respondent and operant behavior. He defined respondent behavior as a class of passive autonomic responses to eliciting stimuli, such as the responses of glands or smooth muscles to stimulation (e.g., salivation to the presentation of food). In contrast, operant responses were those that actively operated on the environment to generate consequences, as when a pigeon pecks a key and grain is delivered. Operant responses may or may not be systematically influenced by prior stimuli.

Skinner built his scientific and philosophical system around the concept of the operant. Much of his experimental work was conducted in specially designed operant chambers in which he precisely controlled and manipulated various aspects of the organism's environment. He then automatically recorded ensuing rates of operant response and represented these rates graphically. In this

way, he was able to observe and inspect the *ongoing* behavior of *intact* organisms in interaction with their environment, enabling him to discern regularities of responding that would not otherwise have been observable.

Over the course of his career, Skinner was committed not only to a science of behavior, but to a technology of behavior that could be used to solve human problems and design better cultural practices. In 1948 he published a fictional utopian novel, *Walden Two*, which depicted a community run almost exclusively with the use of positive reinforcement. He also used the behavioral principles he derived from his experimental work to develop educational technologies such as programmed instruction, which he described in his 1968 book *The Technology of Teaching*.

In 1971, in his role as social critic, Skinner published a controversial best-seller, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, possibly his most polemical and widely read work. He emphasized the danger of clinging to traditional yet sentimental beliefs in free will and personal autonomy. According to Skinner, adherence to these beliefs prevented widespread acceptance of the fact that behavior is effectively controlled by the environment, thus thwarting the potential of the science and technology of behavior to develop culture-sustaining, rather than culture-destroying, practices. He believed that a scientific formulation of human behavior, while inherently deterministic, could nonetheless maximize feelings of freedom and dignity by minimizing the use of aversive control and maximizing the use of positive reinforcement.

While Skinner made important and influential contributions to the science and technology of behavior, his place in psychology has been widely and vociferously debated. He has been both

highly honored and roundly criticized both within and outside the discipline for his unyielding behaviorist position on matters of ontology, method, and epistemology. He is perhaps best known to both psychologists and philosophers as the originator of radical behaviorism (sometimes referred to as operant behaviorism, or descriptive behaviorism), which he defined as the *philosophy* of the science of behavior. Radical behaviorism eschews mentalistic explanations of behavior, opposing the position that behavior is caused by the activity, will, or function of the mind. Along with earlier forms of behaviorism, radical behaviorism represented a departure, both philosophically and methodologically, from the introspective psychology of the early twentieth century that viewed the nature and structure of consciousness as the proper subject matter of psychology.

Skinner was opposed to a hypothetico-deductive approach to the science of behavior, and because of this he was often accused of being anti-theory. Skinner strongly objected to theory defined as “any explanation of an observed fact which appeals to events taking place somewhere else, at some other level of observation, described in different terms, and measured, if at all, in different dimensions” (1950, p. 193). Although he noted that generating conjectures and hypotheses about behavior was fun, he maintained that it was also less efficient than actually observing behavior. For example, one of his main objections to cognitive psychology and Freudian psychology (and, for that matter, the behaviorism of Clark L. Hull) was their reliance on theories that made use of hypothetical mind processes or entities which themselves required explanation, when an analysis at the level of behavior could prove more parsimonious and useful. Skinner characterized these types

of approaches as relying on a potentially infinite series of homunculi or “little men” inside the brain, each itself requiring explanation at the level of another, smaller, inner homunculus.

Skinner’s system has been widely characterized as one of the most thoroughly and consistently positivistic theory in psychology. Skinner was heavily influenced by the descriptive positivism of Ernst Mach, especially Mach’s *Science of Mechanics*. Skinner’s brand of positivism emphasized the visual display and inspection of data (through cumulative records), rather than the mathematical representation of them. The latter moved beyond the observable patterns in the data themselves to another (unnecessary) level of abstraction. While logical positivism accepted theories, hypotheses, and hypothetical constructs (if they could be logically reduced to the publicly verifiable), Skinner’s brand of positivism avoided these devices in favor of observable and specifiable functional relations.

Skinner’s functional analysis does not rely solely on the organism’s history of reinforcement within its own lifetime, it also relies on the history of reinforcement contingencies operating during the evolution of the species, making up the genetic endowment of the organism. His system relies on “selectionism” as a key concept, both in the individual organism’s ongoing interaction with the environment, and in its phylogenetic past. According to Skinner, a particular operant response is selected from a pool of responses because of its effect on the environment, analogous to the way a physical variation that generates favorable consequences for an organism is selected. Further, Skinner distinguished between biological and cultural evolution. In cultural evolution, the unit of analysis shifts from behavior to social practice. Cultural evolution

occurs when social practices that have reinforcing consequences for the group (not the individual) are selected, thus optimizing the survival of the culture.

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Alexandra Rutherford

SKLAR, LAWRENCE (1938–)

Lawrence Sklar was born on 25 June 1938 in Baltimore, Maryland. He received his BA from Oberlin College in 1958. He then received his MA in 1960 and PhD in philosophy in 1964 from Princeton University. His dissertation was titled “Inter-theoretic Reduction in Natural Science.” Sklar was an instructor and assistant professor of philosophy at Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania from 1962 to 1966. Sklar then returned to Princeton, where he was assistant professor of philosophy from 1966 to 1968 and associate professor from 1968 to 1974.

Since 1974 Sklar has been a professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan. He held the title of William K. Frankena Collegiate Professor of Philosophy from 1995 until 2002, when he received the title of William K. Frankena Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, his current position. Sklar has been visiting professor at several universities, and among his many invited lectures he has given the Lakatos Award Lecture at the London School of Economics and Political (1996), the John Locke Lectures at Oxford University (1998), and the John Dewey Memorial Lecture at the University of Vermont (2001). He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He was President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division in 2000–01, and President of the Philosophy of Science Association in 2007–08.

Sklar is a prominent philosopher in the fields of epistemology, philosophy of science, and metaphysics. His book *Space, Time, and Spacetime* (1974) was awarded the Franklin J. Matchette Prize by the American Philosophical Society for the outstanding philosophical book of 1973 and 1974. Its chapters encourage a re-engagement between philosophy and science by covering philosophical problems of the epistemology of geometry, absolute motion and substantial spacetime, causal order and temporal order and causal order, and finally the direction of time.

Sklar’s *Philosophy and Spacetime Physics* (1985) is a collection of articles published between 1974 and 1985. They continue to advance Sklar’s view that space-time physics cannot by itself settle such issues as finding the best methodology of justifying scientific theories, whether the geometry of space-time should be interpreted realistically or conventionally or reduced to non-geometrical concepts, and whether a substantialist or relational view of space-time should prevail. Sklar prefers a “modestly radical empiricism,” that respects the theory-observation distinction and the principle of methodological conservatism, to the alternatives of naturalism and pragmatism. These issues are also pursued in his introductory text *Philosophy of Physics* (1992) which focuses on space-time physics, statistical mechanics, and quantum theory.

Sklar’s book *Physics and Chance* (1993) was awarded the Imre Lakatos Award in 1995 for the best book in the philosophy of science. This book surveys twentieth century developments in classical thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, concentrating on philosophical problems in equilibrium and non-equilibrium theories, entropy, irreversibility, and various cosmological speculations. *Theory and Truth* (2000) shows how some of

the major abstract epistemological concerns over whether science can claim truth actually arise in the normal process of refining and developing scientific theories. The practice of evaluating scientific theories usually involves such concerns as whether theories really model unobservable structures, why theoretical idealizations may not track natural processes, and how the historical succession of new theories replacing old theories can cast doubt on our best current theories.

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John R. Shook

SMART, RODERICK NINIAN (1927–2001)

Ninian Smart was born on 6 May 1927 in Cambridge, England, to Scottish parents. After attending Glasgow Academy, he studied at Oxford University, earning his BA in 1951, MA in 1953, and BPhil in 1954. From 1952 to 1965 Smart was a Lecturer in philosophy and religion at the University of Wales, and from 1956 to 1961 he also was a lecturer at the University of London. From 1961 to 1967 he was a professor at the University of Birmingham. In 1967 he was appointed professor of religious studies and head of the new religious studies department at the University of Lancaster, and he held these positions until 1988. He was named J.F. Rowny Professor of Comparative Religions at the University of California at Santa Barbara in 1977, dividing each year between Lancaster and Santa Barbara until 1988, and he held his position at Santa Barbara until retiring in 1998. Smart died on 29 January 2001 in Lancaster, England.

Smart published over 30 books ranging across philosophy of religion and theology, Eastern religion and philosophy, comparative religion, history of religions, and topics relating to religion including education, ethics, and politics. He strongly advocated the influential view, defended in his first book *Reasons and Faiths* (1958), that philosophy of religion should not be undertaken in ignorance of comparative religion. To escape the boundaries of Western theistic doctrines, the full range of human religious experience and doctrinal creativity should be respected and considered. Once admitted into consideration, religious experience for Smart becomes the way to explain doctrinal and metaphysical disagreements between religions. As mediated by religious practices, religious experiences can be correlated with religious beliefs; for example, in *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy* (1964) Smart suggests that Christian devotional rituals correlate with belief in a personal God, while Buddhist meditation rituals correlate with belief in an impersonal divine realm. *The Concept of Worship* (1972) and some later works including *Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs* (1996) further pursue this careful attention to the diverse religious practices of the world.

Smart's *The Philosophy of Religion* (1970) and his subsequent critical discussions of faith and reason offer no conclusive method or argument for rationally preferring one religion or "worldview" over the rest. Although religions must at least help prevent life becoming meaningless by supporting basic values, enhance a believer's moral life, offer revelation behind a charismatic founder or profound theory, and be internally consistent, Smart finds that these goals are all adequately met by the world's major religions and most smaller religions. In *Secular Education and the Logic of Religion* (1968) and *The*

Phenomenon of Religion (1973) Smart distinguishes seven dimensions of religion: doctrine, mythology, ethical beliefs, rituals, religious experiences, social institutions, and symbolism.

Smart's own religious attitudes embraced the numinous rather than the mystical, and preferred the idea that the divine continually interacts with the human realm. He could not follow the Marxist, sociological, or psychological reductions of religion to the human realm. *The Science of Religion and the Sociology of Knowledge* (1973) criticizes among others Peter Berger and his projective theory of religion. Smart's Anglicanism, explained in *Christian Systematic Theology in a World Context* (1991), is moderated by Buddhist themes and tends towards panentheism.

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John R. Shook

SMITH, HENRY BOYNTON (1815–1877)

Henry Boynton Smith was born on 21 November 1815 in Portland, Maine. In 1834 he graduated from Bowdoin College and went on to study theology with Moses Stuart and Leonard Woods at Andover Theological Seminary. Due to ill health, he left Andover and returned to Maine where he completed his theological education under the direction of Enoch Pond at Bangor Theological Seminary. After serving as librarian and tutor at Bowdoin, in 1837 Smith went to Germany to further his theological studies. During his time in Germany he attended the lectures of August Tholuck at the University of Halle and August Neander, August Twisten, Leopold Ranke, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, and Ernst Hengstenberg at the University of Berlin.

Returning to America in 1840, Smith again served as a tutor at Bowdoin. In 1842 he agreed to serve as pastor of the Congregational Church of West Amesbury, Massachusetts. Smith remained as pastor until 1847 when he accepted the position of professor of moral philosophy and metaphysics at Amherst College. Three years later he moved to Union Theological Seminary in New York City as its fourth faculty member. He served as Washburn Professor of Church History from 1850 to 1853 and then as Roosevelt Professor

of Systematic Theology from 1853 until retiring in 1874. Smith died on 7 February 1877 in New York City.

Drawing on his studies in Germany, Smith delivered the Porter Society Address at Andover in 1849, defending the importance of philosophy for the religious believer. While German idealism had the potential to veer into pantheism, Smith insisted that rational thought, philosophical acumen, and intellectually powerful defenses were necessary for adequate religious belief. For Smith, philosophy was the handmaiden of orthodoxy.

Reflecting his indebtedness to the mediational theology of his German mentors, particularly Tholuck, Neander, and Twisten, Smith throughout his career characterized scientific inquiry as a principle of critical analysis that could be widely applied rather than identifying science with a specific subject field such as chemistry, geology, or biology. In this context, Smith argued that Americans had too little respect for history, often regarding it as nothing more than lifeless dates learned by rote memory. Smith insisted that history, including church history, was a science and its study should place its facts within generalizations rather than regard them as atomistic units of information. Beyond that, history was developmental, encompassing both causes and purposes. Finally, proper historical methodology must have checks and tests to verify its facts and validate its conclusions.

While Smith subsumed his historical reflections beneath his theological purposes, in a larger sense his writings were important as efforts to introduce nineteenth-century German Romantic categories with their emphasis on organic and developmental thinking to a literate and educated American public. As an essayist, editor, teacher, and public lecturer, Smith also played a leading role among New School Presbyterians and in their reunion with the Old School Presbyterians in 1869. He served

as editor or co-editor of *American Theological Review* from 1859 to 1862, *American Presbyterian and Theological Review* from 1863 to 1868, *American Presbyterian Review* from 1869 to 1871, and *Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review* from 1872 to 1877. Never publishing a full systematic presentation of his ideas, Smith's legacy included his commitment to the compatibility of reason and faith, his appropriation of German organic and idealist thought, and his affirmation of a Christocentric theology.

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Walter H. Conser, Jr.

SMITH, HENRY BRADFORD (1882–1938)

Henry Bradford Smith was born on 14 January 1882 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He received his BA from the University of Pennsylvania in 1903, and stayed there for his PhD in philosophy in 1909, writing a dissertation titled “Transition from ‘Bewusstsein’ to ‘Selbstbewusstsein’ in Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology of Mind’.” In 1911 Smith became instructor in philosophy at Pennsylvania, was promoted up to full professor in 1924, and held that position until his death on 17 November 1938 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Smith was Vice President of the American Philosophical Association in 1935.

Bradford worked on the relation of Aristotelian logic to the algebraic logic of the Boole-Schröder calculus and to the logic of William Hamilton. He defended classical logic against mathematical logic, arguing against the assertions of algebraic logicians that all of Aristotle’s “postulates” are true. He worked on the theory of implication and authored a number of logic textbooks. In his *Symbolic Logic* he employed the term “symbolic logic” to discuss mathematical logic, using it in the context of his discussion on deriving Aristotle’s postulates from the Boole-Schröder calculus.

In his writings Smith showed first how to deduce the postulates of Aristotle’s system directly from the Boole-Schröder calculus and then proved the consistency of Aristotelian “algebra” by showing how to deduce the postulates of the Boole-Schröder calculus from Aristotelian syllogistic, using respectively the definitions for Aristotelian inclusion $a < b$ and for the Boolean inclusion $a \supset b$. Next, he developed the Hamiltonian set of forms from the properties of the Boole-Schröder calculus, then from these

established the characteristic features from Aristotle’s logic of obversion, contraposition, and simple conversion where they occurred, and subalternation and the valid moods of syllogisms.

With the forms of Aristotelian logic thus defined, he expressed in terms of Boolean inclusion and deduced the fundamental properties of William Hamilton’s logic. Archie Bahm argued, however, that Smith failed to prove the invalidity the equivalent of *Barbara* given in *Principia Mathematica*, as Smith (1927, p. 132) had claimed to do by this method of translation, while Paul Henle argued that it is “difficult to see” Smith’s system as equivalent to Aristotelian logic. Smith had also become embroiled in controversy when his *Foundations of Formal Logic* was reviewed by Ralph Monroe Eaton, Smith complaining in response that Eaton had completely misunderstood his work, and that there were “certain conceptions which have confused [the] modernist” Eaton.

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Irving H. Anellis

SMITH, JOHN AUGUSTINE (1782–1865)

John Augustine Smith was born in Westmoreland County, Virginia, on 29 August 1782. After receiving his BA degree from the College of William and Mary in 1800, Smith studied medicine in London at St. Thomas’ Hospital, where in 1805 he received, not an MD degree, but an M.R.C.S. (Member of the Royal College of Surgeons), the basic British qualification to practice. Shortly after returning to America, he began private medical practice in New York City.

From 1808 to 1813 Smith lectured on anatomy and surgery at the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia College, and from 1811 to 1820 he was a

trustee of that institution. In 1814 he returned to Virginia to become President of the College of William and Mary, serving in that capacity and as Professor of Moral Philosophy until 1826. He had offered his resignation because Thomas Jefferson and other influential Virginians opposed his plan to move William and Mary from Williamsburg to Richmond. Back in New York, he lectured on anatomy and physiology at Columbia until 1836 and was President of the College of Physicians and Surgeons from 1831 to 1843. Thereafter he returned to private practice. Smith died in New York City on 9 February 1865.

Never one to shy from controversy, Smith took active parts in current debates on slavery, race, phrenology, medical education, evolutionary theory, and other issues. He was a polemicist against whatever he perceived as atheistic, reductionistic, or physicalistic influences on social, moral, or political philosophy.

In his 1817 lecture on government, Smith presented his political philosophy as supportive but critical of representative democracy in the form of constitutional republicanism. He was especially critical of elected officials who would champion their own particular ideologies and promote their personal interests rather than, as they were supposed to do, reflect the will and represent the interests of their constituents. In order to rein in such officials and compel them to do their civic duty, he suggested stronger systems of checks and balances than were already present in the American Constitution. He further claimed that ordinary citizens had a “right of instruction,” by which they could teach their representatives their preferences and then command these representatives, as the delegates of the people’s natural power, or as the instrument of the majority’s will, to fight for these preferences toward the goal of the common good. If an official were then

to go his own way after having been thus instructed, he would be no better than a tyrant. In practical politics, exercising the right of instruction served to assure an equilibrium between the stability of government and the changing conditions of the people. Committed to political stability as well as to natural human rights, Smith strongly opposed Jean-Jacques Rousseau's social contract theory as inherently weak, unreliable, and incapable of providing sufficient stability to enable the implementation of its programs. Smith often cited Adam Smith favorably and acknowledged indebtedness to Dugald Stewart for what he called "metaphysical" insight into the nature of politics.

Smith's 1840 collection of lectures is the *locus classicus* of his ontology of the human being. He took racial classification seriously, believed in the natural and permanent inferiority of non-whites, and saw God's work in the creation of these distinctions. He did not accept John Locke's theory of the human mind as *tabula rasa*, but instead claimed that the readily observable differences in character and mentality between, for example, the fawning black African slave and the independent white European citizen were innate, stringent, and indelible. Such differences were determined by physiology and revealed in physiological investigations. This was not to reduce the human soul to physiology, but rather to assert that God had created differences in the souls of individuals according, at least in part, to their race, and had used human physiology to develop and express these differences.

In *Select Discourses* Smith analyzed categories of differences in human moral character and disposition as, in general, results of conflicts among various organs and physiological systems. The key battle was the liver, spleen, lungs, and other "imperfect" organs and glands, on one side,

versus the brain, the seat of the mind, the soul, morality, the higher emotions, and all gentle, subtle, civilizing factors, on the other. Smith especially blamed the liver for being languid, much too large, insufficiently diverse, and thus the source of most human misery, not only as physical disease, but also as moral debauchery: "Give the liver the same degree of influence, but deprive the brain of its power, the skin of its blood, the muscles of their plumpness and their fat, and you form the most contemptible being that inhabits this earth. He is poor, weak, mean, and malicious; devoid of every noble sentiment – of every generous feeling" (1840, 25).

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Eric van der Luft

SMITH, JOHN EDWIN (1921–2009)

John E. Smith was born on 27 May 1921 in Brooklyn, New York. Smith received

his BA from Columbia University in 1942. In 1945 he received his MDiv from Union Theological Seminary, where he studied with both Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich. His interests were American philosophy and philosophy of religion, and he received his PhD in philosophy from Columbia University in 1949. His dissertation was written under the direction of Herbert Schneider and was published in revised form in 1950 as *Royce's Social Infinite*. While at Columbia, Smith also studied with Jacques Barzun and Lionel Trilling. From 1946 to 1952 Smith taught in the departments of philosophy and religion at Barnard College. In 1952 he joined the faculty at Yale University, where he later was appointed Clark Professor of Philosophy. Smith retired in 1991 and continued to teach one course each year as professor emeritus while residing in New Haven. Smith died on 7 December 2009 in Arlington, Virginia.

Smith was President of the American Philosophical Association's Eastern Division (1981–82), the American Theological Society, and the Charles S. Peirce Society. He has also received a variety of professional awards, including the Herbert W. Schneider Award from the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy.

Smith is recognized for his powerful interpretive work in American philosophy, for his outstanding teaching career, and for his original contributions to the philosophy of religion. His interpretive work began with his first book, which involved a study of the dialectic of self and community in Josiah Royce's idealism. His exploration of American thought continued when he served as General Editor of seven volumes of Jonathan Edwards' collected works. Smith is also recognized for his assessments of the history and future of American pragmatism.

In his classic work, *The Spirit of American Philosophy*, and in his later *Purpose and Thought*, Smith offered clear and insightful analyses of the work of Charles Peirce, Royce, William James, John Dewey, and Alfred North Whitehead. Smith's interpretive work was never merely historical, however. His own work developed directly out of his studies of James's and Royce's concerns with the self, of Dewey's emphasis on community and the social import of thought, and of Peirce's attention to metaphysical inquiry in a non-absolutist vein.

Smith's contributions to the philosophy of religion are not systematic in the sense that they define a closed architectonic. Rather, he takes a particular outlook and employs it to interpret key concepts and relationships relevant to philosophy and religion. His outlook is guided by the revised, or what he sometimes calls "recovered," versions of "experience" and "reason." On the one hand, he rejected the notion of traditional empiricism that experience is characterized by a separation of self and world. He understood experience as an avenue of direct encounter with the world. On the other hand, reason should not to be limited to deductive practices, as had been the case with much of the rationalist tradition. Smith developed a conception of "living reason" that sees our reasoning capacity, not as a tool for producing certainty, but as a faculty for providing meaning and purpose for human experience in a historical setting. As he argued in *The Spirit of American Philosophy* in response to contemporary rejections of reason's efficacy, "Faith in reason can be recovered when we once again understand reason not as an abstract formal structure which stands apart from a world of brute fact, but as a living power which informs the world about us and shapes our thought and

speech" (1963, p. 188). As he examined the religious dimension of experience, Smith employed these revised concepts to arrive at original interpretations of, among other things, the self in its relations to community and God, the relation of faith and reason, and the meaning of God in human experience.

At the heart of Smith's work is an exploration of the meaning of the self in its social and natural environment. He believed the existential querying that appears in human life, particularly in the religious dimension of experience, to be foundational to philosophical inquiry. The self is thus the locus of purpose, interest, and concern. At the same time, he recognized the individual's need for a social environment that both allows and enables the growth of meaning. In *Purpose and Thought*, Smith made this point explicit: "it is quite naïve to ignore the social character of religion and to suppose that it is found in pristine form only in the depths of the individual soul without dependence on enduring institutions and their structures" (1984, p. 183). Religious life begins with the individual but then orients the individual toward the human community and toward God.

Smith's discussions of God, like those of W.E. Hocking, focused less on describing God's attributes in the abstract than on exploring what God meant for human experience. As he explained in *The Analogy of Experience*, "Since the generic concept of God is rooted in experience and the quest for God is also experiential and not a merely speculative endeavor, the actual disclosure of God becomes essentially related to experience" (1973, p. 89). He described the possibility of "direct experience," which is unmediated but temporal, as an avenue of encounter not only with other persons but with God. Such experiences might generate a religious outlook and reorient the whole

of one's life. Like James, Smith suggested that we look for the presence of God in the purposes and actions of those whose lives are animated by faith. The life of religious faith is an experimental life that involves both seeking and reasoning.

Reason and faith are thus not mutually exclusive in Smith's thought but instead reciprocally dependent. Faith calls for understanding, and reason, being finite, must accept the presence of faith. Faith may begin in "direct experience" of God, but any such experience still needs to be lived and tested. As Smith argues in *The Philosophy of Religion*, "although intuition or immediate experience may turn out to be essential for any approach to God, it is never sufficient and self-sustaining" (1965, p. 7). Living reason is called on to find the meaning of God in experience and to make sense, both theoretically and practically, of faith. Reason does not provide necessary and certain accounts of religious doctrines. At the same time, reason cannot be dismissed in philosophy and religion. For Smith, metaphysics is not to be overcome but revised. Our living reason can provide metaphysical perspectives and ideal purposes and, at the same time, be used to examine their efficacy in history and experience. Living reason establishes a ground for a pragmatic and experiential approach to our faiths, hopes, and beliefs.

Smith's work is a subtle and original development of American idealism and pragmatism with an emphasis on the religious dimension of experience. By not adhering to any school of philosophy and resisting the turn to analysis, Smith worked against the current of much philosophy of religion in the 20th century. Nevertheless, the lucidity of his analyses of experience and the reasonableness of his reconstructions of traditional philosophical issues assure his work a place in the history of American philosophy.

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Douglas R. Anderson

SMITH, SAMUEL STANHOPE (1751–1819)

Samuel Stanhope Smith was born on 15 March 1771 in Pequae, Pennsylvania. Throughout his life he was known by his middle name, Stanhope. Raised for a time in Virginia, he lived in New Jersey for most of his adult life. Smith's greatest accomplishments were in education. Smith helped found two colleges in Virginia: Hampden-Sydney College and Washington College (now Washington and Lee University). Smith served as Hampden-Sydney's first President from 1775 until 1779, when he returned to the College of New Jersey at Princeton (now Princeton University) to be Professor of Moral Philosophy and Theology. Smith then served as the seventh President of the College of New Jersey from 1795 to 1812. Smith died on 21 August 1819 in Baltimore, Maryland.

Smith graduated with the BA degree as valedictorian from the College of New Jersey in 1769, studying under college President John Witherspoon. He married Witherspoon's daughter, Ann, and they lived in the Witherspoon house while he taught and later served as president. Witherspoon schooled Smith in the Scottish philosophy of Common Sense, particularly in the work of Thomas Reid, requiring a dramatic shift in Smith's thinking away from Berkleyan idealism and immaterialism. The lingering influence of Jonathan Edwards toward idealism, although not of the Berkeleyan sort, had remained dominant among the college faculty of philosophy and theology at the time. Witherspoon's rejection of idealism not only impacted Smith's thinking but also the history of Christian philosophy in America. Witherspoon's introduction of Scottish Common Sense philosophy remains quite influential, even to this day, of Evangelical Protestantism in America. Smith was attracted

to Reid's strong role for intuitionism as well as the defense of a universal moral sense that reshaped his notion of epistemology and moral philosophy.

After his graduation, Smith was ordained in the Presbyterian Church and served as a missionary in Virginia for some years. In 1775 Smith helped to found Prince Edward Academy (later named Hampden-Sydney College) near Farmville, and he served as the first President until 1779, teaching most of the classes along with his brother John Blair Smith.

In 1778 Smith corresponded with James Madison about the free will and determinism debate within the philosophy of religion. The background here is that Presbyterians were known to be determinists while Episcopalians were known for leaning toward a stronger notion of free will. Between Madison and Smith, then, the expectations would be that Madison – as an Episcopalian – would defend free will while Smith – as a Presbyterian – would defend determinism. However, the opposite is the case in their correspondence. In a letter to Madison, Smith defended “the *liberty of moral action*” on the grounds of “the idea of *power*” inherent within human nature: “Human liberty is as evident and undelusive as the principle of our nature.” Moreover, Smith argued that his defense of free will avoided the problems that Jonathan Edwards had identified as the problems with Arminianism: Smith denied that his theory entailed an overly subjectivist determination of the will and the problem of an infinite regress concerning motive. At this point in the argument, Smith's common sense philosophy is significant because he argues that moral intuitionism avoids the problems Edwards claims plagues the Arminian understanding of free will.

During the 1780s, Smith devoted much of his energy to a growing debate concerning

the inter-relationship of the sciences. Smith strongly defended the harmony of *all* of the sciences: physical science, mental science, theological science, and political science. What brought these sciences together, according to Smith, was that they were all based upon “scientific reasoning,” meaning “empiricism, induction, and rigorous logic” (Noll 1989, 101). Smith thought that scientific reasoning not only provided the best and most accurate forms of knowledge but also inspired the heart and strengthened the will. The published account of these arguments is found in Smith’s *An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species*, which he delivered to the American Philosophical Society in 1785 and published in 1787. It was printed initially in Philadelphia, then Edinburgh and London, and in German translation. Smith produced a second edition with slightly revised arguments in 1810. The particular argument of the book, as the title suggests, is that humankind shares a common origin no matter what “complexion” or “figure” an individual has. Smith attributed diversity among the species to contingent environmental factors. Smith made his case *scientifically* – that is, with what he understood to be empirical evidence – grounding his claim that there is no conflict between good science and biblical or revealed religion.

Between the years of 1795 and 1809, while serving as President at the College of New Jersey, Smith published mostly on theological matters: *A Discourse on the Nature and Reasonableness of Fasting, and on the Existing Causes that Call Us to that Duty* (1795), *A Discourse on the Nature, the Proper Subjects, and the Benefits of Baptism* (1808), *The Resurrection of the Body* (1809), along with volumes of his lectures on evidences of Christian religion and moral and political philosophy. These works actively apply

Thomas Reid’s Common Sense philosophy to the particular theological questions of fasting, baptism, and the resurrection of the body. In his book on fasting, for example, Smith argues that laws of nature operate perfectly, and therefore remain reliable, because the perfect God is the source of these laws. Smith reasons science is trustworthy because scientists study these divinely generated laws of nature.

In 1815, four years prior to his death, Smith published his systematic theology: *A Comprehensive View of the Leading and Most Important Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion*. In this large work he addresses topics common to systematic theologies at the time: natural theology, the Trinity, the covenant between God and humanity, the doctrines of justification and sanctification, the sacraments of baptism and the Lord’s Supper, and a concluding chapter on eschatology. Smith’s systematic theology is unique, especially during its time, for its claims about scripture as well as his understanding of the relationship between religion and science. Science comes up in every chapter in different ways, since he attempts to harmonize particular theological questions with what he considers the best philosophy and science of his day. Smith does not reject the Bible (he regularly uses the phrase “biblical religion”) but he claims that the laws of nature offer the most reliable forms of revelation. One of the unique features of Smith’s systematic theology is that he provides no chapter or discussion on “the doctrine of Scripture” or the Bible as “the Word of God” which is unusual for an ordained Presbyterian minister during this time. This speaks to Smith’s passion for science and what he understood as necessary for the harmonization between revealed religion and science.

Smith’s place in current discussions within philosophy and religious studies is to locate him as an important figure in the initial

development of Scottish Common Sense philosophy in the tradition of Evangelical Protestantism within America.

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SMITH, WILFRED CANTWELL (1916–2000)

Wilfred Cantwell Smith was born on 16 August 1916 in Toronto, Canada, and died there on 7 February 2000. He studied Hebrew and Arabic at Toronto University and received his BA with honors in Oriental Languages in 1938. Smith next studied at Cambridge University for two years, and then went to India from 1940 to 1945, where he was ordained a Presbyterian minister and taught at the Forman Christian College in Lahore, India (presently in Pakistan). Smith went to Princeton University for further graduate study, completing a MA in 1947 and a PhD in religion in 1948.

Smith spent most of his academic career as a professor of religion at McGill University in Montréal from 1949 to 1963, where he founded the Institute of Islamic Studies in 1951; Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, from 1973 to 1978; and Harvard University from 1964 to 1973 (also directing the Center for the Study of World Religions) and again from 1978 to 1984. In retirement he was a senior research associate in the Faculty of Divinity at Trinity College of University of Toronto. Smith was President of the Canadian Theological Society, the American Society for the Study of Religion, the American Academy of Religion, the Middle East Studies Association, the International Congress of Orientalists, and the Humanities and Social Sciences section of the Royal Society of

Canada. He was a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and in January 2000 he was elected as an Officer of the Order of Canada.

Smith first taught in a Christian missionary college in Lahore before the partition of India, where he worked happily alongside people of different religions and came to admire their dedication and integrity. The ruin and devastation of Lahore in 1948, after the riots and massacres that marked the partition of India, motivated Smith's lifelong dedication to inter-religion understanding. His first two books attempted to understand the factors that had led to the creation of Muslim Pakistan. The first of these, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis* (1946), was largely a Marxist treatise but he soon repudiated this work as not only inadequate in its understanding of Islam but also as missing the crucial historical role of ideology and morality. Concerns for these factors marked his *Islam in Modern History* (1957), the book that established his reputation as a scholar of Islam. This latter book still offers valuable insight into political problems of the Middle East.

While at McGill, Smith turned his attention to comparative religion, and especially to the way it was addressed in North American universities. He set out his findings in his seminal *The Meaning and End of Religion: a New Approach to the Religious Traditions of Mankind* (1963). Here appears his deconstruction of the idea of a religion as a quasi-static, reified, and bounded entity set against similar entities. Smith suggested instead that we think of religions as internally diverse and ever changing cumulative traditions. These traditions are the means whereby faith is imparted and through which it is expressed. What matters in the study of religion is the inward, invisible dynamic of faith. But what exactly is faith? This question became Smith's central concern for the next ten

years, and he reported his conclusions in two major works: *Belief and History* (1977) and *Faith and Belief* (1979). His last significant contribution to the academic study of religion was a work not yet fully appreciated, *What is Scripture? A Comparative Approach* (1993).

Smith's writings emphasize his insistence on the unavoidability of the personal quality of all religious activity. Because the inner life of other persons is accessible only from what they choose to reveal of themselves, those who undertake any study of other's religious lives must reflect deeply on the nature of personhood. Persons are constituted by self-reflection, by their selection and by their shaping of meaning; thus, persons' truthfulness, integrity, authenticity, and ability to love must become vital foci of attention. Because such qualities are difficult to quantify, many students of religion have sought to avoid these issues by retreating into an assumed objectivity. "Such scholars," Smith wrote, "might uncharitably be compared to flies crawling on the outside of a goldfish bowl, making accurate and complete observations on the fish inside, measuring their scales meticulously, and indeed contributing much to the knowledge of the subject, but never asking themselves, and never finding out, how it feels to be a goldfish." When dealing with humans, this approach is inhumane. More empathetic techniques are needed because, as he remarked, the proper study of mankind is by inference.

Smith saw history as the process of human involvement in an environment that is simultaneously both mundane and transcendent. Human religious and spiritual life involves a relationship with transcendence, a term Smith uses to indicate whatever overarches mundane, physical existence, including ideals, convictions, and relationships with other people. But Smith also intends by the idea of transcendence what

theists call God or the Eternal. The response to both forms of transcendence Smith calls faith; human beings everywhere, he contends, have always lived from faith, and have lost it only when overtaken by nihilism, ego-disintegration, anomie, and despair. Smith saw this relationship to transcendence as ubiquitous among humanity. Smith's writings are replete with his attempts to define faith, yet finally it remained for him imponderable, a matter of inference only. In his last attempt, in 1998, Smith suggested that faith might be a sense of the transcendent reality to which it is said to be a relation, as well as the source from which it derives. "My own view would be that any appreciation of beauty; any striving for good; any pursuit of justice; any recognition that some things are good, some are bad, and that it matters; any feeling or practice of love; any love of what theists call 'God'; all these are examples of personal, and communal, faith."

Smith recognizes that some Western traditions, not normally seen as religious, have enabled people to respond, often with heroic integrity, to great ideals. Smith asks us to see these secular traditions, including humanism and rationalism, not only as intellectual options but as forms of faith, as movements of the human spirit in response to transcending ideals such as justice and truth; he wrote that justice is one such transcendent ideal: "something only partly actual but beckoning, demanding our allegiance and rewarding to pursue; let alone, to realize" and that truth is "an ever elusive yet ever demanding goal, enormously rewarding both those who seek it and those who find it, however partial the intermediate truth that is all that one ever finds." Smith saw that responding with loyalty and discipline to these ideals is a profound faith commitment through which persons and whole societies have been able to organize themselves and to find coherence with the

larger universe. This broad tradition in the West he called *philosophia*, writing that there can be no way of telling whether a tradition is religious or not just by looking at it from the outside. What makes a tradition religious is the way human lives are affected by it. A corollary of this view is that any religious tradition may also become a vehicle of unfaith or anti-faith, and that many acts perpetrated in the name of religion can equally be nihilistic, life denying, and inhuman.

For Smith, faith can never be equated with belief. The suggestion that religious commitment is about believing propositions for which there is no evidence, he called a woeful fallacy. One difficulty here is the fact that the English language has no verbal form corresponding to the noun, faith. We talk of love and say, "we love"; we talk of hope and say, "we hope"; we do not talk of faith and say, "we faith." In *Faith and Belief* Smith explored the implications of this foible of the English language. When faith is equated with belief, gross misconceptions arise. There are more important elements in religious traditions than their beliefs, and the proper (though ungrammatical) question is, what do they *faith*? Asking first about the propositional beliefs of others impedes encountering them at the level of faith. Much of today's interfaith thinking owes its inception to Smith's thought about these distinctions.

Smith touched the intellectual life of the second half of the twentieth century at two other noteworthy points. He often referred to himself as an intellectual living within the tradition of *philosophia* and he claimed an active neo-Platonic imagination; he was philosophically against all reductionism. When the inward truth of persons is ignored, only superficial analysis can occur. Acknowledging his debt to Martin Buber, Smith led the study of comparative religions in treating the other not as an "It" but rather

as a “Thou.” His vision for interfaith colloquy in the world community demanded that “we,” that is “we all,” learn to talk together about “us” and “our” responses to transcendence.

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SMULLYAN, ARTHUR FRANCIS (1912–1998)

Arthur F. Smullyan was born on 16 May 1912 in New York City. He received his BA from City College of New York in 1937, and then went to graduate school at Harvard University, where he earned his MA in 1940 and his PhD in philosophy in 1941. After teaching mathematics at Williams College in Massachusetts from 1943 to 1946, he joined the philosophy faculty at the University of Washington in 1946, where he was promoted to full professor in 1956 and served as department chair from 1956 to 1968. In 1968 Smullyan became professor of philosophy and department chair at Rutgers University. He served as chair until 1976, helping to establish the doctoral program, and taught until retiring in 1982. Smullyan died on 23 October 1998 in Tacoma, Washington.

Smullyan primarily worked in philosophy of logic, epistemology, and philosophy of science. He authored an elementary logic textbook as well as an introductory philosophy book containing readings in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of religion. In philosophy of logic, Smullyan was particularly interested in modality and modal logic. His article on “Modality and Description” (1948) argued that some alleged modal paradoxes suggested by W.V. Quine

can be resolved by treating the relevant expressions as descriptions or class abstracts instead of names. Some claim that this article was useful for the later development of direct reference theories of names, and related work on definitive descriptions. Smullyan's "Absolute and Restricted Concepts" (1977) was a philosophical application to the theory of concepts of Quine's "New Foundations" set theory.

Following his Harvard teachers C.I. Lewis and Ernest Nagel, Smullyan was also interested in defending and developing a foundationalist empiricism. In "Aspects" (1955) he points out that the role of the "sense-datum" has been confused, since philosophers has conflated traits of sensations that can be described and those that cannot. Many objections to sense-data, or what Smullyan labels "sensa," have assumed this conflation, in order to complain that there is no infallible way to describe every sensory trait. Other objections to sense-data suppose that they must be subjectively private since they cannot all be really of external physical objects. Smullyan argues that sensa are aspects of objects, and that we construct our understanding of objects by selecting some aspects as definitive and permanent traits of those objects. "The Concept of Empirical Knowledge" (1956) Smullyan argues that empirical knowledge need only rest on inductive probability, not certainty. In "Sense Content and Perceptual Assurance" (1973), Smullyan argues that we justifiably have perceptual assurance of the existence of external objects.

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SNIDER, DENTON JACQUES (1841–1925)

Denton Jacques Snider was born on 9 January 1841 near Mount Gilead, Ohio, and died on 25 November 1925 in St. Louis, Missouri. In 1856, backed by a forty-dollar loan from an aunt, he entered nearby Iberia College, a "backwater academy" which no longer exists. The following year, assisted by three hundred additional dollars from the aunt, he transferred to Oberlin College, where his fascination with

German flowered into interest in classical language and literature. Upon graduating with his BA in 1862 he enlisted in the army, feeling obliged to help preserve the Union.

Snider moved to St. Louis in March 1864. It chanced that Henry Brockmeyer took meals in Snider's boarding house, the Pension Française. In addition to Sunday afternoon meetings of the club, he began regularly visiting Brockmeyer's law office for philosophical discussions. In effect, he had enrolled in "the University Brockmeyer," majoring in Hegel and Goethe. In January 1866 the club regulars formed the St. Louis Philosophical Society, with Brockmeyer as president and Harris as secretary. Snider was the sixth signatory of the society's constitution, following Brockmeyer, Harris, Britten Hill, George Holmes Howison, and Dr. Hall. Although Harris attained much greater national recognition, Snider became the most prolific writer of the group, generally known as the St. Louis Hegelians.

In 1867 Snider joined the faculty of the St. Louis High School to teach mental philosophy, moral philosophy (using Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*), history, and various branches of natural science. He continued his own education, supplementing the University Brockmeyer with diverse studies in law, Hegel's *Philosophie der Natur*, and botany. He even took a course in anatomy, including cadaver dissection, in a medical school. In 1871 he became Assistant Principal and, inheriting a class in Shakespeare attached to that position, immersed himself in Shakespeare for six years. In 1877 he began a two-year long sojourn in Europe, returning late in 1879 to teach high school for another year and a half.

At this time he embarked on the "super-vocation" with which he subsequently identified himself, becoming a "Writer of Books." He wrote around 50 of them, including autobiography, memoirs of

European travels, literature (poetry, drama, a novel), commentaries on Shakespeare, Goethe, Homer, and Dante (whose works he considered Western Civilization's "literary Bibles"), and an important history of the St. Louis Movement. His books were self-published, almost all under the imprint of Sigma Publishing Company ('S' for Snider, St. Louis, and Shakespeare). The few articles and poems appearing in periodicals were invited; Snider was reluctant to accept editorial revision and adjudged the major East Coast publishers too provincial to appreciate Midwestern ideas.

Since none of his books were commercially successful, Snider needed a more lucrative sub-vocation. He found one in 1879, when a "cultural epidemic" in St. Louis led to his being enticed into resigning from the high school to offer what would now be called adult-education classes, primarily to "wealthy high-toned ladies" (1920, p. 261). Foremost among these ladies was Susan Blow, who, assisted by Superintendent Harris, instituted the first kindergarten in American public schools. Snider also lectured at the Concord School of Philosophy each summer from 1880 until 1885 on various literary classics, from Shakespeare to the Greek historians. The Concord program grew progressively less philosophical during this period, and Snider became convinced that literary schools of the sort he was conducting would be its heirs.

Snider moved to Chicago in 1884 because it was a better "center of propagation" for a life of "literary hoboism." He lectured in cities as diverse as Milwaukee, Boston, New York, Omaha, and Minneapolis. He considered the Chicago Literary Schools, conducted from 1887 until 1895, "the greatest practical single achievement of my life" (1920, pp. 520, 569). He was involved in other progressive movements in Chicago and was among those Jane Addams consulted

about the establishment of Hull House, where he lived for a few months beginning in the fall of 1893. The core of Snider's Chicago students consisted of persons associated with the Chicago Kindergarten College. Early in 1894 Elizabeth Harrison, principal of the Chicago Kindergarten College, hired him to replace an ailing psychology instructor. That course initiated his "most intense and creative" period, in which he wrote the books expounding his psychological system. Those were written in St. Louis, to which he returned following the final literary school in Chicago. In 1906 he was involved, under the leadership of Amelia Fruchte, in establishing the Communal University.

Snider specifies twenty-two of his works as components of a "System of Psychology," which is "the fulfilment of the St. Louis Movement" (1920, p. 599). This system, "the new Universal Science...in spite of to-day's pragmatic prejudice against all systems," has three divisions: "the psychological organon," treating feeling, volition, and intellect; "the world psychologized," treating physical and biological science, art, literature, history of philosophy, institutional sociology, and philosophy of history; and "the self psychologized," consisting of biographical studies of Lincoln, Froebel, Goethe, Emerson, and Shakespeare. This Psychology is not what most persons call "psychology" which Snider labeled "physiological psychology." Rather, it is the successor to two earlier "universal Disciplines," oriental religion and European philosophy. Each universal discipline attempts to explain everything, but their basic principles differ. Religion appeals to an ultimate origin or God, philosophy appeals to natural law, and Psychology appeals to psychical activity. Whereas religion and philosophy have been largely outgrown, Psychology is progressively assimilating all subject matters as specific forms of the psychic activity.

Snider's Psychology tackles the general question of how cognition, including such modes of thought as the Darwinian hypothesis and evolutionary psychology, can arise from apparently dead matter. He proposes that a universal psychical process underlies physical nature, life, and consciousness, impelling evolution towards increasingly fuller forms of awareness. This "Pampsychosis" is the ultimate cause of natural order and is an all-encompassing conscious self. This version of pantheism or panentheism resembles the view of his contemporary, Henri Bergson, who also envisions reality as fundamentally energy or process (an *élan vital*) and who declared that "supra-consciousness" is at the origin of life. Unfortunately, Snider only provides his routine trinitarian distinctions in lieu of Bergson's conceptual clarity and eloquent exposition. The three stages of the "All-psychosis" are the "Primordial One as the creative Self," Nature or "the stage of separation," and the stage of self-awareness in human consciousness.

The highest human values are realized institutionally rather than in the intentions and actions of individuals. "The realm of freedom is the Institutional World" where free-will is objectivized in an order of actual facts, in contrast with the subjective freedom of individual moral agents. Snider recognizes three basic institutional forms: the secular, inherited from Greece and Rome; the religious, principally a Christian legacy; and the educative, a modern development. The primary secular institutions are family, society, and state. Religious institutions arise because all peoples have "some form of God-consciousness." Since institutions evolve toward greater freedom, the implicit goal of institutionalized religion is "the liberation of God."

All science "unconsciously presupposes Psychology," by explaining nature in terms

originally applied to activities of the self. History chronicles the progress of the *Weltgeist* and uncovers the “institutional law” which must be obeyed to actualize human freedom. Philosophy is a meta-discipline, “the Thought of Thought” elucidating and systematizing concepts found in the other arts. Unfortunately, philosophy tends to become dogmatic. The cure for this disease is Psychology, which never forgets that the self’s “own inner movement as the source of all science, and specially of philosophy” (1901, p. 613).

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SOBER, ELLIOTT REUBEN (1948–)

Elliot Sober was born on 6 June 1948 in Baltimore, Maryland. He received his BA degree in 1969 from the University of Pennsylvania, where, the following year, he also received a Masters of Science Education degree. He attended Cambridge University as a Research Student during 1970–72, and then he attended Harvard University, where he received a PhD in philosophy in 1974. His home institution since 1974 has been the University of Wisconsin, where he is currently the William F. Visas Research Professor and the Hans Reichenbach Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy. He has been a visiting scholar at various universities around the world, and he was a visiting professor at Stanford University in 2003–04.

Sober has received numerous awards, fellowships, and grants, including ones from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the National Science Foundation, the International Academy of Philosophy of Science, and the Linnean Society of London. He is a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has been the American Philosophical Association’s Patrick Romanell Lecturer. Most recently, in 2014 he received the Carl Gustav Hempel Award to recognize a lifetime of scholarly achievement in the philosophy of science

and to acknowledge scholarly excellence and professional collegiality. In addition to these honors, Sober has been President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division, the Philosophy of Science Association, and the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science and Technology (Division of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science).

Along with the work of Michael Ruse and David Hull, Sober brought the philosophy of biology to the forefront of attention among philosophers of science. Prior to the 1980s, philosophers of science focused primarily on concerns and issues that arose within and from physics. For example, most of the work on the nature of explanation, confirmation, laws, theories, and other topics drew heavily, if not exclusively, on how those issues related to physics, with comparatively little focus on biology. As an instance, the literature on the nature of scientific explanation famously centered on (critiques of) Hempel's Covering-Law Model, a model in which logical or statistical laws formed an ineliminable component of explaining why a given event occurred. However, explanation conceived in terms of physical laws and past causes ignores the fact that biological organisms and systems are (often) teleological, or goal-directed. Consequently, there are functional explanations in biology that are absent in physics and chemistry. Sober was a pioneer in the examination and articulation of philosophical issues related to functional explanation.

Sober's ground-breaking book, *The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus*, provides a sustained analysis of basic aspects of evolutionary theory, such as the concepts of selection, adaptation, and fitness. As an example, he articulated the distinction between the 'selection for' some trait vs. the 'selection of'

some trait. The presence of some feature of an organism (for instance, say, certain birds having a particular color of feathers) might make that organisms better adapted to its environment, and, so, make that organism more fit with respect to that environment. In such a case we might say that there is selection for that feature. However, some other feature of that same organism (say, the color of its eyes) might not make any difference in its fitness or its adaptability. Nevertheless, eye color was selected in the sense that this feature was passed onto future generations. In this case we might say that there is selection of, but not selection for, that feature. Likewise, Sober articulated conceptual distinctions for the concepts of fitness and adaptation. A common conception that people have is the notion of "survival of the fittest." What exactly is meant by saying that an organism is fit, or has fitness? Often the answer that is given is that an organism is fit if it is adapted to its environment. This, however, raises the question of adaptation. Some features of organisms seem to be explainable by saying that they are adaptations; that is, those features help the organism survive and reproduce. However, not all features of organisms appear to be adaptations, in much the same way, as noted above, that not all features that are selected are selected for.

Given that there is selection in nature, at what level – or on what units – does selection operate? One view is that selection operates on individual organisms. Some, including Richard Dawkins, have said that it is really the organism's genes that are the unit of selection. After all, they say, it is the genes that determine the features that the organism has and it is the genes that will benefit by the organism's fitness, since it is the genes that will be passed on to that organism's offspring. Sober, emphasizing the basic significance of

populations, has advanced the view of whole groups of organisms (perhaps even whole species) as the unit of selection. The reason for this is that there are features of organisms (and, yes, they are caused by genes) that benefit whole groups, sometimes even at the risk of the individual organisms. For example, some behaviors result in individual organisms seeming to put themselves at risk, such that the group (say, a herd or a family) will better survive. Groups that include risk-taking individual organisms, they say, have greater overall fitness than those that do not. Sober has consistently argued for pluralism with respect to the issue of units of selection, meaning that depending upon the concerns about selection, the different units (gene, individual organism, group/population) are more or less salient. With respect to what is called the “replicator question” (what gets replicated and, hence, survives?), the gene is the most salient unit of selection. However, if the question is the “interactor question” (what interacts with and responds to selective forces?), then the individual organism is the more salient unit, since it is the interaction between the environment and the organism, as this interaction is mediated by traits of the organism that affect its expected survival and reproductive success. Finally, if the question is the “beneficiary question” (what benefits from selection?), then the group is as salient as the gene or organism, since groups/populations benefit as well as the replicators and interactors. Sober particularly endorses this pluralist view in his analysis of altruism as a fitness-enhancing trait, because such behavior has survival value for the group/population, more than for the gene or individual organism.

In tandem with this focus on groups and populations, Sober has argued against reductionism as necessary of particularly useful for biology and evolutionary theory.

Biological organisms are, of course, physical objects and biological theory cannot contradict basic theories of physics. Nonetheless, as was noted earlier that teleological and functional explanations cannot be reduced to causal explanations, so there is little promise to a hard reductionist program. Even if reductionism were possible in theory, for Sober, it would not be viable in practice for biologists.

Sober has expanded his stands on matters of issues within philosophy of biology, such as the nature of species, selection, adaptation, and so on, to issues involving psychology, ethics, and action theory generally. In particular, along with David Sloan Wilson, he has been instrumental in explicating the evolutionary basis and nature of altruism. Where many biologists and philosophers initially took the lessons of evolutionary theory, especially under the rubric of “survival of the fittest,” to stress competition as fundamental to life, Sober has consistently drawn on group selection and groups as adaptive units to also emphasize the evolutionary basis of cooperation, compassion, and unselfish behavior.

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David Boersema

SOLOMON, ROBERT CHARLES (1942–2007)

Robert Solomon was born on 14 September 1942 in Detroit, Michigan. He earned a BA degree in microbiology from the University of Pennsylvania in 1963. He then studied philosophy at the University of Michigan, receiving the MA degree in 1965 and the PhD degree in 1967. After lecturing at Princeton University from 1966 to 1968, he was an assistant professor at University of Pittsburgh during 1969–71 and at the City University of New York in 1971–72. He then went to the University of Texas in 1972 as associate professor, and became full professor in 1977. He also became Quincy Lee Centennial Professor of Business in 1986 and was named a Distinguished Teaching Professor in 1997. His productive writing included books written with his wife, Kathleen Higgins. He was President of the International Society for Research on Emotions. Solomon died on 2 January 2007 during travel in Zurich, Switzerland.

Solomon played a large role in cultivating philosophical interest in the history of modern European philosophy, especially the legacies of Hegel, Romanticism, Nietzsche, and the existentialists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. From this rich heritage, he developed an interest in the large role for the emotional aspects of life. His own theoretical stance argued that an emotion consists of an attitudinal judgment favoring or disfavoring some matter that stimulated the emotion. Emotions are evaluative as well as qualitative. Therefore, an emotion arises with the involvement of higher conceptualizations and cognitions; emotions cannot be merely qualitative perceptions untouched by thought. Further, an emotion may not be attached to any distinctive feeling, but it must be intentional, so that an emotion is always about something.

The most controversial view on emotions taken by Solomon may be his claim that the cognitive and intentional features to emotions make them amenable to volitional control. We evidently do control emotions after initially aroused; Solomon added that we can be held responsible for our emotions, especially if we fail to control them or put them to appropriate use. His books *Not Passion's Slave* (2003), *Beyond Reason: Emotions, Culture, and the Limits of Rationality* (2004), and *True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us* (2006) are the essential readings on this topic.

His ethical theorizing emphasized emotion-laden values such as trust, cooperation, personal integrity, and communal caring. Expectations about virtuous commitments to social infrastructures and institutions pervade not just the civic life but the business world as well. Solomon elevated the applied ethics field of business ethics to new heights with his books *Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business* (1992) and *A Better Way to Think about Business: How Personal Integrity Leads to Corporate Success* (Oxford, 1999).

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John R. Shook

SOSA, ERNEST (1940–)

Ernest Sosa was born on 17 June 1940 in Cardenas, Cuba. He came to the United States and entered the University of Miami, discovering philosophy in his senior year. After graduating from Miami in 1961, Sosa went to the University of Pittsburgh and obtained his PhD in philosophy in 1964. He then went to Brown University for a post-doctorate position from 1964 to 1966, and then returned one year later to join the philosophy faculty. Sosa was chair of the philosophy department from 1970 to 1976, and was appointed the Romeo Elton Professor of Natural Theology, a position previously held by Roderick Chisholm. From 1998 until 2007 Sosa was a visiting professor at Rutgers University; was professor of philosophy during 2007–08; and Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy

since 2008. He was a visiting fellow at Oxford in 1997, and at the Australian National University in 2002. He gave the John Locke Lectures at Oxford in 2005, and gave the Carus Lectures to the American Philosophical Association in 2010. He was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 2004–05, and elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2001.

Sosa reconstructs the argumentative theory of justification as follows: (AJ) For a belief to be justified is for the believer to justify it or to have justified it; and for one to justify a belief (really, successfully) is for one correctly and seriously to use considerations or reasons in its favor. But why accept AJ? Sosa argues that the argumentative theory is in trouble as an account of epistemic authority in general. For to “correctly” use reasons in favor is surely to use *justified* reasons in favor, and in that case we are faced with a vicious regress. Any response gives up the argumentative account of justification by specifying an alternative basis for justification, such as coherence or social standards. Similarly, it is impossible to specify the non-evaluative basis of supervening epistemic properties. Similar considerations apply, more broadly, against internalist theories of justification.

The problem for foundationalism is to explain how some knowledge can be self-standing. The problem for coherentism is to explain how some circles can be virtuous. Sosa argues that the dispute can be resolved by adopting a “Cartesian” solution. In Sosa’s terminology, animal knowledge requires that one’s true beliefs have a reliable source. Here the foundationalist is correct, in that not all reliable sources involve inference from further beliefs. For example, perception and introspection are highly reliable, but neither proceeds by inference. Reflective

knowledge, which is of a more excellent sort, requires more than a reliable source. For reflective knowledge, one needs a perspective on the reliability of one’s sources. Here the coherentist is right, for a reflective perspective just is a sort of coherence in one’s overall body of beliefs. Sosa argues that a virtue approach provides further insight into both the internalism-externalism dispute and the foundationalism-coherentism dispute. A virtue theory makes the normative properties of persons more fundamental than the normative properties of actions, defining the latter in terms of the former. Sosa argues that an analogous approach proves fruitful in epistemology.

Sosa’s approach is to define intellectual virtue in terms of reliable (or truth-conducive) cognitive character. Roughly, a cognitive faculty or habit counts as an intellectual virtue just in case the beliefs it produces are likely to be true. Hence good eyesight, sound memory, and various kinds of sound reasoning all count as intellectual virtues, while wishful thinking, superstition, and various kinds of fallacious reasoning fail to qualify. Again roughly, a belief has epistemic authority, or positive epistemic status, if it is produced by an intellectual virtue. Knowledge can then be understood as true belief produced by an intellectual virtue. The resulting view is externalist, in that positive epistemic status is understood to supervene on factors that are relevantly external to the knower. Nevertheless, Sosa argues, the insights of internalism are preserved. According to Sosa, a virtue approach in epistemology reveals two false dichotomies. A fully adequate theory of knowledge preserves the insights of both internalism and externalism concerning the nature of knowledge, and both foundationalism and coherentism concerning the structure of knowledge.

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John Greco

SPARSHOTT, FRANCIS EDWARD (1926–)

Francis Sparshott was born on 19 May 1926 in Chatham, England. He attended Corpus Christi College of Oxford University, earning BA and MA (1950) degrees. He came to Canada in 1950 as a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Toronto. In 1955 he joined the staff of its affiliated institution, Victoria University, where he remained until his retirement in 1991. He was made a University Professor in 1982, and in 2000 received an honorary doctorate from the University of Toronto. He is also a much-published poet. He has been a member of the League of Canadian Poets since 1968, and its President in 1977–1979.

His book on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (1994) is unique and controversial. The *Ethics* begins with the question, “How shall I organize my life?” In Sparshott’s view, all the familiar topics of the book – intellectual and moral virtue, the varieties of justice, weakness of will, the varieties of friendship, the end for mankind, and so on – are not, as is standardly thought, a series of discrete discussions of topics within ethics. They form a continuous linear

argument, each with its place. As Sparshott acknowledges, his approach gives hostages to history: we have no empirical reason to think the book was all written at the same time (and some to think it was not), or even that the pieces were intended by Aristotle to be one book. Sparshott acknowledges he must assume that it was (1994, p. 4). His commentary is a valuable meditation on Aristotle's text, even if deep questions about historical accuracy are begged.

The main body of Sparshott's philosophical work is in aesthetics. He declares in *The Structure of Aesthetics* that he is "not offering solutions to problems, or doctrines to be accepted or rejected, but material" for people seriously interested in aesthetics "to consider in reaching their own conclusions" (1963, preface). The chapter headings illustrate the comprehensiveness and the distinctive approach: "The Approaches to Aesthetics," "Beauty: The Term and Its Relations," "Art and Nature," "Art: The Concept and Its Validity," "Art: Modes and Genres," "Has Art a Function?," "Art and the Individual," etc.

The Theory of the Arts (1982) is his major philosophical achievement, because here he comes recognizably closer to genuinely offering a theory of art. The book shows the same virtues of comprehensiveness, subtlety at the level of detail, intelligent and penetrating argument and critique. In addition, there is also a position there, albeit one of predictable complexity. The main expository devices of the book are the four Lines – the Classical Line, the Expressive Line, The Mystic Line, and the Purist Line – with the first-named in pride of place. The Classical Line focuses on the artwork conceived as the product of knowledge and skill. This classical conception is suspended precariously between art seen as imitation and art seen as beautiful. The Expressive Line begins with the assumption of art as the production of knowledge and skill, and extends that to focus essentially on art as related to a

mind behind the artwork, rather than the work. The Mystic Line refines away the relation to a particular artist's mind to a connection with, say, Universal Mind. The Purist Line focuses so strongly on the mind behind the work that the qualities of that mind are all that matter, and the work itself drops out as irrelevant.

As he argues at some length in *Off the Ground: First Steps to a Philosophical Consideration of the Dance* (1988, pp. 3–82), the aesthetics of dance has been neglected by philosophers and art theorists. He traces this neglect primarily to two factors. One is "professional," as it were. Dance is a unique phenomenon. The kind of dancing "that anyone can do and everyone does" and "the sort of dancing that can be done only by a dancer who has undertaken a transformation of the body into a performing instrument" are both genuinely forms of dance as an art (1988, p. xvii). This is not so for the traditional fine arts. My daughters' paintings, or my attempts at singing, are not artworks.

Moreover, dance did not have a place in "certain prominent and influential systems that [in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries] assigned to the fine arts in general a definite and important position among the exercises of the human intellect" (1988, p. 30). Philosophical aesthetics is, Sparshott believes, inherently conservative as to its priority rankings of issues and theories (1988, pp. 7–9). Once dance was left out, left out it remained. It is possible, of course, to generate a theory of dance by taking some established aesthetic theory and mechanically apply it to dance, but Sparshott derides such an approach (1988, p. xx). A serious aesthetics of dance, therefore, has to begin pretty much from the beginning, to examine dance in all its richness with an open mind, and a mind primed for conceptual exploration, and see what is there, and where the arguments lead. And this is exactly what Sparshott does in

these two books. The first concentrates on the nature of dance itself. Sparshott locates dance in its place in the general scheme of things developed in *The Theory of the Arts* (1982). He discusses aspects of the meaning of dance, what is and is not dance and the art of dance, and how dance compares with near-neighbors like ritual, gymnastics, or mime.

A Measured Pace; Toward a Philosophical Understanding of the Arts of Dance (1995) focuses more or less entirely on dance seen as a fine art, rather than on dance in general. Although the official line again is that the book merely “present[s] materials...which people presenting a general theory or philosophy of dance should know about” (1995, p. xv), there is in the book, if not a theory, at least a unifying theme: “dancing, when done for its own sake... tends to draw its significance from the fact that in it the dancer’s self is transformed: to say that a dancer’s body is either the medium or the instrument of dance, though not actually false, is misleading” (1995, p. 5). Sparshott later compares dance in this respect with singing (1995, pp. 358–60). There, he finds the idea of the voice as an instrument not misleading. To learn to sing in the sense of the fine art of singing just is to learn to do certain kinds of things with one’s voice. Producing a finely executed song, then, could be “just a job”; but Sparshott rejects the testimony of dancers who speak so of their work (1995, p. 463). This construal of dancing leads Sparshott to take expression more seriously as the form taken by the art of dance than he did in *The Theory of the Arts* (1982) as a theory of art in general (1995, chap. 5). The emphasis on self-transformation by the end of the book shades into the presence of the dancer as person in the execution of the art (1995, p. 453), but that still marks a special peculiarity of dance.

Performance is for Sparshott a technical term, “the imputed end of any action conceived as intelligently intended to achieve

just that end” (1982, p. 41). “Performance” is not anything “mere,” to be contrasted with reality, or genuineness. Performances are a special class of real things, including but not confined to things more ordinarily thought of as performances – things done by actors, musicians, or dancers. The life of the poet is not just writing; it is performing. So is criticism. The philosopher should not just think or study; they should perform. Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* is not just a book; it is a performance. Philosophy, art, and life should be performed – done with intelligence, done with an intended end, and able to invoke and withstand criticism.

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Roger A. Shiner

SPAULDING, EDWARD GLEASON (1873–1940)

Edward G. Spaulding was born on 6 August 1873 in Burlington, Vermont, the son of Americus V. and Mary Rice Spaulding. Spaulding received a BS degree from the University of Vermont in 1894 and later an honorary LLD degree in 1921 from Vermont. In 1896 Spaulding received an MA degree from Columbia University. In 1900 he received his PhD in philosophy with a dissertation on the philosophy of mind from the University of Bonn, Germany. In 1903, he married Olivia Strong Minor. Spaulding was philosophy instructor at the College of the City of New York from 1900 to 1905.

In 1905 Spaulding was called to Princeton by its President, Woodrow Wilson, who was enlisting many promising young teachers into the faculty to inaugurate the preceptor system of assistant professors of philosophy. After serving as a perceptor for nine years, Spaulding was appointed full professor in 1914, and in 1936 he became the McCosh Professor in Philosophy. During World War I, Spaulding served for a brief time during 1918 in the U.S. Army as a 1st Lieutenant in the gas defense training unit of the Engineer Corps, and then the Chemical Warfare Service where he was appointed an intelligence officer. Spaulding was professor of philosophy at Princeton until his death. He also taught summer courses at the universities of Harvard, Chicago, Michigan, Washington, and Oregon. Beginning in 1907, he was for many years a lecturer in philosophy at the Marine Biological Laboratory at Woods Hole, and at the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences. He was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1932–33. Spaulding died on 31 January 1940 in Princeton, New Jersey.

Together with Edwin B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, William P. Montague, Ralph B. Perry,

and Walter B. Pitkin, Spaulding was one of the six New Realists who in 1910 proposed a new platform for philosophy, and he collaborated with them on *The New Realism* (1912). In the “Platform,” Spaulding argued that we can have direct knowledge of objects (in other words, untainted by the knowledge relation), that the knowledge relation must be seen as an external relation, and that truth is independent of proof and fallible knowledge.

In *The New Rationalism* (1918), Spaulding develops a systematic account of new realism by seeking to identify the postulates from which each philosophical system can be logically derived. Though closely allied to naturalism, Spaulding denies that naturalism can provide a complete account of reality. For Spaulding certain ideals that are discovered by reason alone, such as truth, justice, and goodness, are real too, because they are logically prior to, or independent of, human nature. In the semi-popular collection of essays *What Am I?* Spaulding develops a philosophical anthropology conformant to modern science and his own realist philosophy. In *A World of Chance*, Spaulding continues on the path he set out in *The New Rationalism*. Spaulding aims to give an account of the structure of reality that conforms with the findings of modern logic and the theory of values, as well as with contemporary physics and biology.

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Cornelis de Waal

SPIEGELBERG, HERBERT (1907–1990)

Herbert Spiegelberg was born on 18 April 1904, in Strasbourg, Alsace (then in Germany). Spiegelberg underwent the

Protestant confirmation in 1919, having been convinced by his fellow Alsatian Albert Schweitzer that it was mainly a societal convention, although Schweitzer also pointed out Christianity’s positive ethical implications. In America Spiegelberg became associated with the Quakers (also through Schweitzer’s mediation), deeply impressed by their hospitality and social kindness. Though he began his university career by studying jurisprudence, Spiegelberg became increasingly more interested in philosophy, under the tutelage of Heinrich Rickert at Heidelberg, then at Freiburg where he studied under Edmund Husserl, then at Munich with Alexander Pfänder.

It was during the Freiburg and Munich period that Spiegelberg turned to phenomenology. Spiegelberg considered Pfänder as his real teacher and, convinced of the importance of Pfänder’s writings, he later re-published and translated some of his writings into English. Spiegelberg defended his PhD thesis in 1928 in Munich under Pfänder. The dissertation was entitled “Das Wesen der Idee” (The Essence of the Idea), and dealt with problems raised in Husserl’s seminal work *Logische Untersuchungen*, particularly the Second Investigation on the ideal unity of the species. This short dissertation was published in 1930, in the last volume of the official publishing organ of the Phenomenological Movement, the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung*, published by Husserl in conjunction with Max Scheler and Alexander Pfänder.

Because of his Jewish origin, Spiegelberg was unable to complete the *habilitation* examination necessary to become professor in the German university system. Instead, he emigrated in 1933, first to Switzerland and England, where he held several temporary teaching positions, and then in 1938 to the United States. In 1944 he was naturalized

as a U.S. citizen. In 1941 Spiegelberg found employment as an instructor of philosophy at Lawrence College in Appleton, Wisconsin, where he was promoted to full professor in 1953. In 1961–62 he served as Fulbright professor at the University of Munich, and from 1963 to 1971 he was a professor of philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. Spiegelberg died on 6 September 1990 in St. Louis, Missouri.

Spiegelberg directed a well-known annual phenomenological workshop at Washington University from 1965 to 1972. He was a member of numerous philosophical societies and was a founding member of the “Husserl Circle.” Among many other academic affiliations, he belonged to the advisory board of the Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, as well as the journal *Husserl Studies*. Spiegelberg is widely known for his historical survey, the 2-volume *The Phenomenological Movement*, which remains the most encompassing and comprehensive account of the history of the phenomenological movement. Besides his historical studies in phenomenology, he also published several substantial works on ethical issues, such as *Gesetz und Sittengesetz* (Law and Moral Law), *Steppingstones Toward an Ethics for Fellow Existents*, and *Sollen und Dürfen* (Ought and May).

Spiegelberg devoted himself to essentially two branches of philosophical research: phenomenology and moral (and legal) philosophy. His work in the latter field was influenced by the phenomenological philosophy of his teacher Pfänder. Within phenomenology, his publications can be subsumed under two related categories: historical and systematic.

Concerning his historical work, Spiegelberg was interested in presenting the so-called “Phenomenological Movement,” a term coined by its founder Husserl, in the

most true and historically adequate manner. His two-volume book with this title, written in English and intended as an introduction to phenomenology in America, is both historically and philosophically a model of philosophical historiography. Besides the best known figures (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre), Spiegelberg was the first to devote serious historical research to recovering the phenomenological groups in Munich and Göttingen. *The Phenomenological Movement* shows that Spiegelberg had an excellent understanding of the theories the phenomenologists were professing. He insisted in the last edition of this standard work that “all [he] wanted to be [was] a guide but not a mere chronicler.” Many of his essays dealing with phenomenological themes in the stricter sense have become classic essays in the tradition of phenomenological philosophy proper. Among them, one needs to mention his studies on “‘Intention’ and ‘Intentionality’ in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl,” “Husserl and Pfänder on the Phenomenological Reduction” (both also reprinted in the *Context*), and his book-length study *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry* (1972). This handbook-type study presents a sovereign blend of historical accounts of phenomenological psychology in “some major schools of psychology” (Brentano, Husserl, Jaspers, Binswanger, Goldstein, Boss, among many others) as well as systematic assessments of their philosophical achievements. This work also features highly interesting comparisons between phenomenological efforts at psychology with approaches in contemporary psychoanalysis (Freud, Jung, Lacan and others). Spiegelberg took this attempt seriously as bringing phenomenology into the arena with other philosophical schools and generally academic concerns, in order to study “the impact of phenomenology in areas other than philosophy,” as he points out in the preface.

Generally speaking, he saw phenomenology as a descriptive discipline dedicated to a realistic account of the world, and thus was rather critical of Husserl's transcendental turn to idealism.

His systematic interest in phenomenology as an important contribution to contemporary philosophy, especially to ethics, led him to become an editor and advocate of the work of his teacher, Pfänder. Pfänder was considered one of the very important representatives of the phenomenological movement but by the end of World War II was already nearly forgotten. Not only out of mere reverence for his teacher, but also from the conviction that Pfänder's work merits a renewed attention, Spiegelberg edited and translated several works by the Munich philosopher, and wrote a short introductory monograph on Pfänder's phenomenology. Already the titles of Pfänder's works that Spiegelberg selected indicate that Spiegelberg especially admired Pfänder's work on moral philosophy and sought to help it gain greater attention.

Parallel to these multifarious activities, Spiegelberg continued to pursue his own systematic work in moral philosophy, beginning with his dissertation and first book-length study *Antirelativismus* of 1935 to his last work, *Steppingstones*, published in 1986. Although *Sollen und Dürfen* was not released to the public until 1989, it had already been completed by 1937 during Spiegelberg's sojourn in England where he had come under the influence of British moral philosophy. In *Antirelativismus* he attempts to salvage values from any sort of "relativism and skepticism" by applying the method of eidetic intuition that Husserl developed in the *Logical Investigations* to the sphere of values and the moral imperative – a task Husserl had carried out with respect to pure logic. He further pursued this line in his *Gesetz und Sittengesetz* (also of 1935), in

which he attacks what he calls "legism," in other words, an "over-emphasis on the role of law, regardless in which field it occurs." He applied this criticism mainly to the spheres of ethics and legal philosophy.

As Scheler had similarly argued against Kant's focus on living in accordance with the "moral law" (*Sittengesetz*), Spiegelberg proposes a return to an ethics of values that he sees realized already in Ancient philosophy, mainly in that of Aristotle. He criticizes a "legistic" ethics for being "removed from life" and "artificial." Instead, a "law-free ethics" insists on a "fundamental givenness" that enables the intuitive graspability of oughts, ought-nots, and mays. Only on this basis can one hope to erect a new "practological philosophy" that avoids the errors of "legism."

The individual and the ensuing solidarity of individuals in our global society are also the focus of his ethical essays, written between 1944 and 1983, which Spiegelberg collected in his *Steppingstones Toward an Ethics For Fellow Existents* (1986). In these essays, he addresses specific contemporary moral issues in the nuclear age, and offers a number of remarkably timely reflections on contemporary issues. He takes position on issues such as the rights of the "naturally handicapped," the burning problem of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the question of legitimate civil disobedience in a nation that is preparing for nuclear warfare. These reflections culminate in the recurring phrase of the individual's "accident of birth" that merely by chance places one among a group or nation of "haves" or "have-nots." From this follows not only the demand for solidarity in our global society, but also the duty for those born as "haves" to lend support to the "have-nots." This is already formulated in his "Creed" of 1937, written in Latin: "*In con-sortis locum quem casu tantum non occupas te transpone et sortem actu suam tuam potentia respice.*"

“Transpose yourself into the position of your companion in fate, it is only by accident that you do not occupy his place; and respect the fate that is his by actuality as the one which could be potentially yours.”

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Sebastian Luft

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STACE, WALTER TERENCE (1886–1967)

Walter T. Stace was born on 17 November 1886 in London, England. He received a BA from Trinity College in Dublin, Ireland, in 1908. Originally intending to take orders in the Church of England, his growing skepticism caused him to join the British civil service where he served in Ceylon from 1910 to 1932. While in the civil service, he foreshadowed his future career as an academic philosopher by publishing *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy* (1920), *The Philosophy of Hegel* (1924), and *The Meaning of Beauty* (1929). In 1932 Stace abruptly changed careers, retiring from the British civil service to become professor of philosophy at Princeton University. He became President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1949–1950, and retired from Princeton in 1955. He died on 2 August 1967 in Laguna Beach, California.

Stace’s most important statement of his philosophical method was his epistemological work *The Theory of Knowledge and Existence* (1932). He criticized realism, pragmatism, idealism, and transcendentalism in favor of a strict empiricism that insisted that one simply cannot go behind or beyond the data of experience in establishing the foundations of knowledge. Instead, one must always begin with what is given in experience. The starting point of human knowledge is the solitary mind perceiving a hodge-podge of disconnected presentations, such as red patches, soft things, or volitions. From this solipsistic stream

of diverse and disconnected presentations, how does one come up with the idea of an independently existing external world? Stace contended that the existence of an independent external world can neither be logically proved nor inferred from the primordially given stream of solipsistic presentations. He also repudiated the argument of certain realists, like Bertrand Russell who assumed that the belief in a world external to oneself arose as a prejudice or as a result of some instinctive belief. Instead, Stace argued that “belief in an independent external world is a mental construction” (1932, p. 95), a kind of fiction or assumption invented by the mind without any foundation in the stream of presentations impinging upon it. Stace contended that “the concept of the external world is a social product” (p. 100). It is only through communication with others whose minds are similar to our own that we construct an external world independent of our solitary stream of presentations.

Stace characterized his major work on ethics, *The Concept of Morals* (1937), as an attempt “to give a satisfactory radical empiricist account of morals” (p. 17). Using this empiricist methodology, he challenged the validity of all forms of ethical absolutism as well as the forms of ethical relativism that were currently in fashion. Stace advocated a modified utilitarianism centered on a single moral principle, from which all particular duties could be derived in much the same way that all forms of physical motion, such as the elliptical orbits of planets, the parabolic orbits of comets, and the downward motion of free-falling objects on earth, can be derived from one universal law of gravitation. Stace formulated that universal moral law as follows: “Act always so as to increase human happiness as much as possible. And at the same time act on the principle that all persons, including yourself, are intrinsically of equal

value” (p. 180). Any action is morally good if it is in accordance with this law (if the action is unselfish) and morally wrong if it is not in accord with it.

Time and Eternity (1952) was, in Stace’s words, “a defense of religion,” although, as he was careful to add, “I do not in this book retract naturalism by a jot or a tittle” (p. vi). Stace never abandoned his empiricism and scientific naturalism, even in other later writings. Instead, he discovered mystical experience and attempted to integrate its manifold implications into his earlier philosophical perspective. Stace argued in *Time and Eternity* that “genuine religion” is “founded in the mystical sense of man” (p. 18). He also made the controversial assumption that genuine religion revealed to human beings through the experiences of its greatest mystics, “is the same for all men” (p. 22). Furthermore, he contended that “religious truths depend wholly on religious intuitions” (p. 156), intuition being explicitly equated with mystical experience.

Considering the crucial role that mystical “intuition” played as the foundation of all “genuine” religion in *Time and Eternity*, it is not surprising that Stace’s last major work, *Mysticism and Philosophy*, focused on mysticism and its philosophical significance. Stace surveyed important introvertive experiences where all awareness of multiplicity and individuality disappears, where the mystic experiences “pure consciousness” devoid of any empirical content, and where the mystic’s “individual pure ego” merges with the “pure ego of the universe,” the One, the Universal Self. He concluded that the Ultimate Self encountered during introvertive mystical experiences was neither an objective fact (since objectivity presupposes a subject-object dualism absent in this mode of experience) nor a subjective illusion (for the perceptual simplicity of these experiences

is devoid of any disorderly sequences of events that distinguish subjective experiences from veridical ones) but was, instead, a third alternative, a “transsubjective” (p. 148) datum beyond both time and space, “the unity of the pure ego... independent of any individual ego” (p. 196). Mystical experiences are beyond the laws of logic and, for that reason, intrinsically paradoxical and self-contradictory when anyone describes them accurately. This is where the alleged ineffability of mystical experiences originates. The majority of recent scholars of comparative mysticism have thoroughly repudiated both Stace’s tendency to homogenize mystics’ experiences and his assumption that the contextual dimension of mysticism is relatively unimportant.

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Jess Hollenback

STALLO, JOHN BERNHARD (1823–1900)

Stallo was one of the first proponents of Hegelian philosophy in America. He was born Johann Bernhard Stallo on 16 March 1823 in Sierhausen, Oldenburg, Germany. Due to his family’s inability to pay for a university education, Stallo emigrated to Cincinnati, Ohio, in the spring of 1839. In 1844 Stallo accepted a teaching position at St. John’s College at Fordham, New York, where he taught physics, mathematics, and chemistry. It was at St. John’s that Stallo wrote his first major work, the highly influential *The General Principles of the Philosophy of Nature* (1848). This work, which he later viewed as a failure, was one of the first Hegelian accounts of an evolving universe, and had an enormous effect on scientists, philosophers, artists, and other writers. Soon after its publication, however, Stallo began to study law, and in 1849 he was admitted to the Ohio bar. In 1852 he began a long career as a judge in Cincinnati and

he achieved prominence and respect for his judicial expertise, but his philosophical work continued. From 1885 to 1889 Stallo was U.S. Minister to Italy. He remained in Italy for his retirement years, and died on 6 January 1900 in Florence, Italy.

Stallo's influence on subsequent philosophers was widespread. For Ralph Waldo Emerson, Stallo was his first acquaintance with Hegelian ideas; for Josiah Royce, Stallo served as confirmation of the fecundity of idealistic philosophy; and for pragmatists like Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, he was an inspiration for their inquiries in the philosophy of science.

In the decade after the Civil War while he was active in law and politics, Stallo refined the ideas that first appeared in *The General Principles*. Although in *The General Principles* Stallo described various accounts of nature in German philosophy, including Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Oken, the main focus was upon Hegel. The Hegelian assumption that runs throughout this work is that mind or thought is fundamentally identical with the forces that animate the natural world. This view was opposed to the dominant materialistic view as well as the dualisms of nature perpetuated by Kant between matter and spirit and the objective and subjective. Stallo found the unity of man and nature, of subjectivity and objectivity, in a unitary evolutionary idealism. To Stallo, all manifestations of life are but a process verifying the vital processes of the whole. Nature is the totality of phenomena, the totality of objects that can be experienced by sensuous and introspective observation. Thus Stallo's "psychology" coalesced with his epistemology. Conscious mind is an active interchange with seemingly external objects that reveals the mental character of those objects and at the same time its own reality in and through them. This interchange reveals three progressive phases: perception, where

external objects are not engraved upon the mind but rather their particularities become general qualities and relations, observation, where everything exists in its properties, not beside them, and cognition, where the unity of objects depends upon the observer.

Stallo's other major work was *The Concepts of Modern Physics* (1881). Hailed as a landmark of intellectual history and a vital contribution to the philosophy of science, it contained what Stallo termed his mature philosophy and avoided the overt Hegelianism of *The General Principles*. The goal of *The Concepts of Modern Physics* is to analyze the relation of the physical sciences to human cognition. This contribution to what he termed the "theory of cognition" was divided in this work along two lines, the first a critique of the mechanical view of nature that argued that proponents of that view could not logically reconcile this view with contemporary findings in science. The second half of this work illustrated what he believed were the main metaphysical errors in modern physics. Following Hegel, Stallo sought to expose and undermine the atomo-chemical view of nature that had its roots in Greek philosophy and was carried forward by Newton and Descartes.

Like contemporary philosophers of science, Stallo put forward criteria for determining the truth of hypotheses. His four criteria were that the hypothesis must simplify the data of experience, the explanatory phenomenon must be a datum of experience and not some occult quality, the hypothesis must not contradict itself or established laws of nature, and the hypothesis must admit of deductive inferences. He argued that the search for things to correspond with concepts, the assumption that the more general concepts and realities pre-exist to the less general, the assumption that the order of the genesis of concepts is identical with the order of things,

and the belief that things themselves exist independently of and prior to their relations all result in metaphysical errors.

Early Hegelians like Stallo believed that Hegel's political philosophy was a needed stimulant to an ossifying democracy, even though Stallo, unlike Hegel, believed that the state must be essentially democratic. From Hegel, Stallo realized that a republican form of government was something that must be continually reconstructed and learned, that religious freedom required a consistent separation of church and state, and that freedom is not a given but must be secured by the creation of conditions that make it possible.

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Scott Bartlett

STANTON, ELIZABETH CADY (1815–1902)

Elizabeth Stanton was born Elizabeth Cady on 12 November 1815 in Johnstown, New York, and she died on 26 October 1902 in New York City. She attended Johnstown Academy and received the best education available to women at Emma Willard's Troy Female Seminary in Troy, New York, graduating in 1832. She then read law in her father's office, Daniel Cady, a United States congressman and later a New York Supreme Court judge. This was where she first learned about the discriminatory legal system for women and began to think about ways to change it. In 1840, she married lawyer and abolitionist Henry Brewster Stanton.

Later that same year, while attending the 1840 World Antislavery Convention in London, she met abolitionist and women's rights activist Lucretia Mott. After she, Mott and the other female delegates were refused seating, Stanton became involved in the women's rights movement. In 1848 she worked to pass a bill granting married women's property rights by the New York legislature. Also on 19–20 July 1848, she and Mott organized the first women's rights convention in Seneca Falls, New York, where Stanton lived with her husband. This convention is credited with launching the American women's rights movement and resulted in a resolution calling for woman suffrage. Stanton also introduced her feminist version of the Declaration of Independence, calling it the *Declaration of Sentiments*. She ascribed the inferior status of women as socially defined, due to their lack of legal and political rights rather than innate inferiority. Stanton argued that women were endowed with the same natural rights and capacity for rational thought as men.

After meeting Susan B. Anthony in 1851, they began a fifty year collaboration promoting women's suffrage. Stanton wrote most of their speeches as well as letters, pamphlets, articles and essays for periodicals such as Amelia Bloomer's *Lily*, Paulina Wright Davis' *Una* and Horace Greeley's *New York Tribune*. During the Civil War, she and Anthony worked for abolitionism, organizing the Women's National Loyal League in 1863 to further efforts to immediately free the slaves. From 1868 to 1870 Stanton was co-editor with Parker Pillsbury of a weekly newspaper devoted to women's rights called *The Revolution*. In 1869 she helped organize the National Woman Suffrage Association, serving as its President until 1890, when it merged with rival American Woman Suffrage Association. She was then elected the first President of the new National American

Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) serving from 1890 to 1892. With Susan Anthony and Matilda Joslyn Gage, Stanton compiled the first three volumes of the six-volume *History of Woman Suffrage* (1887). She also published *The Woman's Bible* (1895–98) and an autobiography, *Eighty Years and More* (1898). Stanton drafted the federal suffrage amendment that was introduced in every Congress from 1878 until it passed in 1920. Stanton worked tirelessly for women's suffrage until she died in 1902.

Stanton first articulated the idea that women should be men's equals, in law and in political participation. Using the Declaration of Independence for a starting point, Stanton argued that though it had struck down the old world aristocracies based on birth and hereditary privileges, it had created another type of inequality, a new aristocracy based on sex alone. Universal male suffrage meant that women had no legal or political rights and were subject to the "absolute and cruel despotism" of men whether it was her father, husband, brother or son. Stanton thought the remedy for this injustice was to grant women the same political rights as men. Once suffrage was granted to women, this would provide the opportunity for a social revolution overthrowing the pervasive social and cultural norms that perpetuated women's inferior status.

Stanton also criticized organized religion for reinforcing the political legitimacy of male authority and the subjugation of women. Her irreverent and feminist critique of the Bible, or what she termed "male theology" was published as the *Woman's Bible*. Stanton's dislike of organized religion was facilitated by contemporary Christian political activists attempting to close public institutions on Sundays and trying to reverse divorce law liberalization in order to establish Christianity as the state religion. She thought that women

could only achieve true equality in a secular state and tried to warn women of how an increasingly politicized organized religion opposed their efforts to gain political or legal rights. Stanton was particularly worried about how religious orthodoxy reinforced patriarchy and undermined women's attempts to be self-sovereign.

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STEARNS, ISABEL SCRIBNER (1910–1987)

Isabel Stearns was born on 23 June 1910 in Manchester, New Hampshire. She was educated at Smith College (BA 1931) and Bryn Mawr College (MA 1933, PhD 1938). Her dissertation was titled "The Nature of the Individual." She was an instructor in philosophy at Smith College (1936–38) before making her career at Bryn Mawr as an assistant professor (1938–44), associate professor (1944–52), and full professor (1952–79). She died on 26 April 1987 in Germantown, Pennsylvania.

A gifted and esteemed teacher selflessly devoted to her students, Stearns was no less a gifted metaphysician whose writings demonstrate broad historical learning, dialectical subtlety and speculative imagination. She was influenced by a wide spectrum of contemporary authors and movements, among them, the process philosophers, the pragmatists, the gestalt psychologists; and Suzanne Langer, with whom she briefly lived as a younger colleague while an instructor at Smith College.

The foundation of Stearns's work is the methodological primacy of the individual; the individual, that is, as irreducibly mediating conceptual polarities: the sensuous and the rational, the temporal and the timeless, the natural and the ideal. It is in the very

complementarity of these and like opposing notions, and not in the reduction of any one to the other, that she grounds her metaphysics. Yet, for Stearns, the individual itself is not ontologically or epistemologically ultimate, as in its propulsive movement through the world it presupposes, gestures toward and creates existents that transcend it. This idea is perhaps most fully illustrated in her article “Time and the Timeless” (1950). In her view, temporal passage cannot be understood except as the passage of enduring entities – namely, individuals. Yet time cannot be simply reduced to the temporal continuity of individuals, for time is likewise a succession. The temporal presents us with discontinuity in discrete endings and beginnings, yet there is never a real rupture in the movement of time. The individual in process enters into the paradox of time in its irreducibly dual meaning: that of a present which never fails, yet within which one event becomes after another. Stearns insists that time is comprehensible only as dynamic, that is, in terms of past-present-future (the so-called A-theory), and not in terms of the static relations of “before-after” (the so-called B-theory). Thus, there is a sense in which the individual “becomes” in time and yet “is” time. Time both creates and is created; it both determines and is determined by, individuals, in whose enduring the totality of time is located. Such a totality is never actualized nor is it self sufficient – Stearns denies that time is in any sense “absolute” – yet it is nevertheless real and it is “one” (1950, p. 190).

For Stearns, each temporal determination (past, present, and future) can be said with time itself, to possess a dual nature. The present both comes to an end and endures; in one sense it becomes past, in another sense, it is never finished. It transcends specific terminal presents (though it is not unrelated to them) and is centered in individuals.

This transcendent aspect of the present is its timelessness. Yet, at the same, time, the present is not a timeless present in the sense of a “moving knife edge” of sheer simultaneity, otherwise it could not encompass the past and future and constitute the transition of becoming. The future has two aspects as well: the relevance of *this* present for something new, a relevance that is immanent in the present; and the negativity or “*not-yetness*” of an ontologically open future. It is this negative character in which the future’s transcendence consists (1950, p. 194).

Stearns’s analysis of the past parallels that of the present and future. She is explicitly critical of Mead’s philosophy while at the same time she acknowledges its profound influence upon her thought. Mead rejects the traditional conception of the past as that which is over and done with, arguing, in effect, that there is no past, or at least, no metaphysically relevant – because there can be no pragmatically relevant – sense of the past that is not always the past of some present and therefore itself present. Thus, one of the senses in which we must construe the past, according to Stearns, is as a *passed present* and not merely as a *present past*. These two facets are complementary; neither is eliminable without doing violence to the concept. The past is truly complete, final, irreversibly actual and, at the same time, still ongoing, living within the individual’s present. Moreover, it is the former aspect of the past as a bygone present, as something unalterable, beyond the reach of the present that defines its transcendence.

Stearns brings to a conclusion her elegant account of time, and with it perhaps, the essential direction of her work, with the following passage: “Three different sets of phenomena, then, unite to establish the fact that the temporal cannot be isolated from the timeless: the status of the past as a transcendent fact; the appearance of the eternal in the midst

of the present; and the necessity for a timeless dimension of the individual within which it may experience trans-experiential meanings” (p. 200).

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Gary S. Calore

STEVENSON, CHARLES LESLIE (1908–1979)

Charles L. Stevenson was born on 27 June 1908 in Cincinnati, Ohio. He received his BA degree from Yale University in 1930, his BA from Cambridge University in 1933, and his PhD degree in philosophy from Harvard in 1935. From 1934 to 1935 he taught at Harvard while doing graduate work. From 1939 to 1946 he was assistant professor of philosophy at Yale. In 1946 he joined the staff at the

University of Michigan, where he became professor of philosophy. During 1945–1946 he was a Guggenheim Fellow. Stevenson served as President of the American Philosophical Association Western Division in 1961–1962. He retired from Michigan in 1977, and died on 14 March 1979 in Bennington, Vermont.

Stevenson was the leading exponent of the emotive theory of ethics in the United States. His 1944 book, *Ethics and Language*, brought the emotive theory into greater prominence. Stevenson did not invent an emotive theory of ethics, but he produced the most detailed and carefully analyzed version of this theory. Earlier in 1923 C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards’s *The Meaning of Meaning* had stated that since the notion of “good” is the defining subject-matter of ethics, this peculiar ethical use of “good” is purely emotive. In 1936 the British philosopher A.J. Ayer and other logical positivists formulated the outlines of an emotive theory of ethics where they claimed that moral judgments typically do not state any facts that could be verified or refuted but, rather, moral judgments simply express emotions, favorable or unfavorable feelings about honesty, murder, justice, etc. Stevenson basically agreed with this but sought to fill in the details of this theory with extended analysis and sought to free this approach from criticisms based upon misunderstanding.

Stevenson made a distinction between normative ethics and what has become known as metaethics. Stevenson limited his approach to the latter. While he admitted that normative questions make up the most important part of ethics, his analysis leaves these questions unanswered. Typical normative or value questions would be: is abortion wrong, is capital punishment morally good, is it always good to keep promises? Stevenson’s whole effort is not normative but metaethical. It is concerned with questions concerning the *meaning* of

moral concepts and judgments, as well as with questions of their evidence and proof.

Stevenson saw the need for being quite careful in admitting that very often moral concepts and judgments are vague and contain a mixture of factual and emotive elements. This led him in his major work *Ethics and Language* to provide two patterns of analysis for ethical or moral discourse. The simple judgment that Smith is an honest person, for example, turns out to be complex insofar as it involves both factual and emotive meaning. Nevertheless this judgment for Stevenson would not be a moral judgment at all if it lacked any emotive meaning; that is, if it did not tend to arouse anyone's feelings of approval or disapproval. Stevenson insisted that his emotive theory, far from implying that moral language is thoughtless and irrational, actually finds a useful place for being thoughtful, giving reasons, and utilizing factual evidence in the endeavor to have an influence and make a difference, in short, to actually guide people's behavior. Moral concepts and judgments would be idle and useless if they had no pragmatic function in directing future courses of action. The emotive theory can explain why it is pointless to make moral judgments about what is unavoidable or about matters that human effort cannot help or do anything about.

Stevenson's version of the emotive theory had a great influence in calling attention to the need for careful consideration to be paid to the *language* of ethics. Soon after his *Ethics and Language* was published in 1944, several more works appeared dealing directly with ethical discourse. Stephen Toulmin's *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics* (1950), R.M. Hare's *The Language of Morals* (1952), Paul Edwards's *The Logic of Moral Discourse* (1955) and others, carried on their own analysis of moral language but they also made numerous criticisms of Stevenson's work. In 1945 Dewey published an article

"Ethical Subject-Matter and Language" in which he took issue with the emotive theory on two principle points, the one theoretical, the other moral. Dewey argued that the isolation or separation of emotive meaning from descriptive is impossible. Emotive meaning, as any kind of meaning, is always situational. Dewey also alleged that the practical or moral consequence of viewing ethical terms and judgments as principally emotive is a kind of moral laxness or weakness and discouraged the effort to locate sound empirical evidence for moral decisions. Edwards also diverged from Stevenson's position by arguing that it is possible to give reasons for moral judgments that go beyond mere causal factors. He also argued that moral disputes can be settled in a number of ways, not simply if both parties have come to hold the same view, whether this view can be proven or not. J.O. Urmson, in his 1968 book *The Emotive Theory of Ethics*, argued that if one desires to change a person's evaluative attitude one does not wish to change only – or most importantly – his emotions, but rather the whole pattern of his thinking and behavior.

In *Ethics and Language*, Stevenson saw no need to make a distinction between the terms "good" and "right," nor did he think that these terms required different patterns of analysis. Lewis and others considered this a mistake. As normative or evaluative terms "good" and "right" apply to things beyond the province of ethics. "Right" and "wrong" are normative terms in mathematics, science, in ordinary practical affairs, as well as in ethics. The same applies to the terms "good" and "bad." Naturalists and pragmatists such as John Dewey, C.I. Lewis, and others did not oppose Stevenson's emphasis on metaethical concerns. They agreed that ethical language requires careful analysis. However, they objected to Stevenson's approach insofar as they saw this as closing off any intelligible or

cogent approach to normative ethics. It is not only that Stevenson did not, himself, offer any normative ethics, but his emotivism precluded the very idea of any cognitively significant normative approach to ethics. That is, for Stevenson, no normative moral judgments could be said to be valid or invalid, correct or incorrect.

During the 1960s and 1970s Stevenson continued to develop his theory further and to respond to various criticisms of his views. In one of his last essays, “Value-Judgments: Their Implicit Generality,” published posthumously in 1983, he provided a concise summary of his meta-evaluative theory and went on to test his own theory with attention to points that he said he had previously neglected. Stevenson never considered his emotive theory fully finished. He developed a theory which not only made an impact, but actually opened-up a whole series of investigations in metaethics which others are still carrying on.

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Guy W. Stroh

STOCKTON, ANNIS BOUDINOT (1736–1801)

Annis Boudinot was born on 1 July 1736 in Darby, Pennsylvania. The second of ten children and the first daughter of Catherine Williams and Elias Boudinot III, a silversmith and merchant. She married Richard Stockton (1730–1781), a politician and a veteran of the Revolutionary War. Well-educated for a woman in her era, Stockton became one of the most published poets in eighteenth-century America.

Annis’s parents had returned to the American colonies shortly before her birth, after operating a plantation in the Caribbean. They first settled in Philadelphia, then moved to Princeton, New Jersey, in the early 1750s. Annis was exposed to a vibrant intellectual and

cultural life in Princeton and began reading and writing poetry. Her first published poem, “To the Honorable Colonel Peter Schuyler,” was published in the *New-York Mercury* and *New American Magazine* in 1752, when she was just sixteen years old. Annis’s brothers Elias and Elisha became prominent politicians. Elias Boudinot (1740–1821) was a lawyer, Congressman, and president of the Continental Congress. It was through Elias that Annis met Richard Stockton; Elias started his career in Stockton’s law office and later married Richard’s sister, Hannah. Elisha Boudinot (1749–1819) was a lawyer and New Jersey Supreme Court Justice.

Annis and Richard Stockton married in 1757 or 1758 and had six children. Her husband was as prominent a politician as her brothers were. He served on the governing Council of New Jersey, was appointed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, and was elected to the Second Continental Congress. He was also the first person from New Jersey to sign the Declaration of Independence. But while serving in the Revolutionary War, Richard was captured by the British, imprisoned, and harshly treated while in captivity. His health deteriorated after 1778, and he died three years later. Nearly two hundred years after his death, a new college was named for him, Richard Stockton College in Pomona, New Jersey, which welcomed its first incoming class in 1971.

After her marriage to Richard, Annis relocated with him to his father’s estate in Princeton, New Jersey, which she called “Morven,” a name inspired by the James MacPherson novel, *Fingal*. While Richard focused on his legal and political career, Annis found time for writing, alongside her domestic duties as a wife and mother. She made Morven into a gathering place for politicians and intellectuals, among them George and Martha Washington, Benjamin

Rush, James Sterling, William Paterson, Francis Hopkinton, and other women writers: Deborah Logan, Susanna Wright, Hannah Griffitts, and Elizabeth Graeme Fergusson. During the many meetings she hosted at Morven, Stockton and her fellow thinkers discussed intellectual and political matters, among them the question of American independence. Annis and other women married to revolutionary men, such as the wives of William Paterson and James Sterling, formed a group to aid the Continental Army.

Though not generally counted among America’s earliest feminists, Stockton was certainly aware of her role and status as a woman in the nascent republic. In the last decade of her life, she read Mary Wollstonecraft’s *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, then newly published in England. As she discussed this work by letter with her oldest daughter, Julia, she compared and contrasted the situation of women in America to that of women in England, finding largely that in the new world, women had more social freedom and more real contributions to make to political life.

Stockton’s poetry often focused on the feminine domains of moral virtue and religious piety. But she also discussed themes related to the Revolution and political autonomy. Her fellow writers, Elizabeth Graeme Fergusson, Hannah Griffitts, and Susanna Wright, also wrote patriotic poetry, reading their work at her parlor discussions. Their contemporary in Boston, Mercy Otis Warren, wrote drama as her contribution to revolutionary thought and action. In recent decades, feminists have recognized the special and specific role women’s writings played in building social and political movements. Caroline Wigginton labels the letter writing and poetry readings that women engaged in “epistolary neighborhoods,” which provided them with a semi-public audience to whom they could

express their ideas. In the company Annis Stockton kept, this audience ensured that her ideas would be heard by influential men and therefore have an impact in the political world. She corresponded with political luminaries, like George Washington and Benjamin Rush. She also wrote poetic tributes to both individual leaders and to the American republic as a whole. Perhaps the best such example of Annis's writing is her "Epistle to General Washington," in which she writes, "Our Nations Cement is the federal bond/The golden chain that links this favour'd land/Which if kept bright, will more and more refine/And Constitute a government devine."

Annis was loyal to the Revolutionary cause throughout the war. When the British army was reported to be heading toward Princeton, she is said to have buried as many valuables and documents as possible on the grounds of Morven. She then travelled south to Monmouth, New Jersey. The British general Cornwallis did indeed arrive with his troops, occupied Morven, and ransacked the estate. His troops discovered many of the keepsakes Annis had buried and are thought to have burned the library as well. However, some historians have suggested that, since Richard Stockton was rumored to have made an oath of loyalty to the British while under duress in prison, some of the damage to Morven may have been at the hands of incensed revolutionaries. In either case, many of Annis's writings were destroyed, and the family took on immense financial losses in the incident. In later years, the American Whig Society recognized Annis for her patriotism by granting her honorary membership in the organization – the first woman to be honored in this way.

After her husband's death, Annis Stockton lived in the family estate with her children. She continued to write and advocate for American independence. Eventually, Stockton left Morven to live with her youngest daughter

Abigail in Fieldsboro, New Jersey, where she died on 6 February 1801.

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STONE, LUCY (1818–1893)

Lucy Stone was born on 13 August 1818 on a farm near West Brookfield, Massachusetts, and she died on 18 October 1893 in Dorchester, Massachusetts. Stone was born to Francis and Hannah Matthews Stone, the eighth of nine children. Her father held religious convictions that men naturally dominate women. As a result, Stone spent part of her education learning Hebrew and Greek so that she could locate the “misinterpretations” of the Bible in order to fight against discriminatory gendered practices of the church.

Stone was a suffragist, abolitionist, public speaker, writer, publisher, advocate, activist, and feminist. She was a pioneer in many respects: the first Massachusetts woman to earn a bachelor’s degree, the first woman who refused to take her husband’s name in 1855, and the first person to be cremated in New England. However, Stone should be remembered most for her committed life as an activist for abolition and women’s enfranchisement. At a young age, Stone acquired a keen sense of injustice that inspired her lifelong dedication and passion to fight for equality for all. Unlike several of the major historical suffragists, Stone was relentlessly loyal to her commitment for universal suffrage.

Stone attended Mount Holyoke College for a short period of time and several years later transferred to Oberlin College where she graduated with a BA degree in 1847. During her academic pursuits, Stone was inspired by the Grimké sisters and William Lloyd Garrison. She was married to Henry Blackwell in 1855 by Reverend Thomas Wentworth Higginson, who read their “Marriage Protest” manifesto objecting to the loss of civil rights for women upon marriage. Stone gave birth to two children, a son who died after birth and a daughter, Alice Stone Blackwell, who later followed in her mother’s footsteps to become a notable activist for women’s rights.

While at Oberlin, Stone organized and developed the first debate society among college women. After graduating from Oberlin, she became a lecturer for the Anti-Slavery Society in Massachusetts and engaged in political protests. In 1858, while residing in New Jersey, she held a personal protest to expose “taxation without representation” by refusing to pay property taxes because she was not granted the right to vote. In 1855 she drafted legislation for the state of Kansas about married women’s property rights that was immediately passed. In 1870 she embarked upon a long career as the founder and editor of *The Women’s Journal*, which focused on political, legal, educational, and social equality. The *Journal* lasted until 1917 when it merged with two other suffrage papers to become *The Woman Citizen*. Stone continued her public speaking engagements and edited the *Journal* up to her death. Her last understandable words to her daughter, “Make the world a better place,” speak to her political commitment.

In 1850 Stone helped organize the National Women’s Rights Convention in Worcester, Massachusetts, which grew out of the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention. It was during the 1850s that Stone converted Susan B. Anthony to the suffrage movement. In 1863 Stone, Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton formed the Woman’s Loyal National League. This joining of forces linked women’s issues to abolition. For many years to follow, the three women struggled with ideological and strategic differences. This ultimately led to a split in which two factions emerged: Anthony and Stanton formed the National Women’s Suffrage Association and Stone developed the American Women’s Suffrage Association with the help of Julia Ward Howe and Henry Blackwell. In 1890, with the leadership of Alice Stone Blackwell, the two groups merged to form the National American Women’s

Suffrage Association with Stanton as President, Anthony as Vice President, and Stone as Chair of the Executive Committee. Despite the many years of tenuous and adversarial tension among these three notable women, they continued communication throughout the years.

Stone was a pivotal player in the suffrage and abolition movements, yet does not hold the notoriety of others. Her work of exposing the inequality of marriage and the role of the state in marriage remains relevant to the antiquated marriage legislation still enforced to this day.

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Susanna Jones

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STRAUSS, LEO (1899–1973)

Leo Strauss was born on 20 September 1899 in Kirchhain, Hesse, Germany. He served in the German army during World War I, and then studied philosophy at the universities of Marburg, Frankfurt, and Berlin before going to Hamburg to study with neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer. He earned his PhD in philosophy in 1921, did post-doctoral study with Edmund Husserl, and encountered phenomenological and Nietzschean critiques of rationalism. While working as a research assistant at the Academy for Jewish Research in Berlin from 1925 to 1932, and then travel as a Rockefeller fellow in the social sciences in France and Great Britain, Strauss published studies of Spinoza and Hobbes. His first book about his own conclusions was *Philosophy and Law* (1935), which announces his discovery, developed in subsequent works, of the superiority of Greek rationalism and the Socratic mission of civic criticism.

Strauss emigrated to the United States in 1938, becoming an associate professor of political and general philosophy at the New School for Social Research. He became a U.S. citizen in 1944. From 1949 until 1967 he was professor of political philosophy at

the University of Chicago, receiving the title of Robert Maynard Hutchins Distinguished Service Professor before he retired from Chicago as emeritus professor. In 1968–69, he was visiting professor of political science at Claremont Men's College in California, and from 1969 until his death he was Scott Buchanan Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence at St. John's College in Maryland. Strauss died on 18 October 1973 in Annapolis, Maryland.

Strauss struggled with the legacy of modern political theory, critical of its individualistic and atheistic excesses yet unable to recommend another system over liberal democracy. In *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis* (1936) Hobbes is credited with formulating the primary features of modernity, including its hedonistic individualism and its distance from the natural law tradition. *Natural Right and History* (1953) and *Liberalism, Ancient and Modern* (1968) similarly fault subjectivism and its rejection of natural right for destroying the possibility of virtue and civilization itself. Subjectivism, lacking any objective standards for morality or justice, is simply nihilism. For Strauss, the only alternative (seeing no hope in supernatural revelation) is to return philosophy's attention to the objective natural foundations of right and justice. This return to foundations would be a return to the classical conception of politics, presented in detail in *The City and Man* (1964) and *The Argument and Action of Plato's Laws* (1975), which pursued the art of producing human virtue within the social life. This pursuit entails, for Strauss, a rejection of the modern conception of politics as the means of maximizing personal liberty. Since happiness comes from virtue, and not freedom, modernism's appeal to the individual's own happiness is doubly confused and disastrous.

There is a human nature, primarily social for Strauss, and knowledge of it can be

used to justly adjudicate the claims made by competing social, ethnic, and religious groups. The social sciences, caught up in the materialistic and positivistic attitude of the natural sciences, have only promulgated the fact/value dichotomy, resigned itself to historicist relativism, and abandoned the search for knowledge of the good life. The conviction that human beings are indefinitely flexible and malleable has become a dogma. A typical symptom of the social sciences' impotence is its disregard for the sort of education required for virtue; instead, the social sciences have considered education only insofar as it might be modified to maximize the efficient production of workers for capitalist society.

In *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (1952) and portions of *What Is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies* (1959) and other works, Strauss suggests that intellectuals who were unable to follow the prevailing political opinion of their day, and yet wished to write genuine political philosophy in criticism, often resorted to misdirection, metaphor, and esoteric symbolism for expressing their views. The "useful myths" to maintain cohesive society, perpetuated by intellectual elites, remained an attractive option for Strauss (and his followers), although he himself pointed out that since Machiavelli, benevolent deception of the public is no longer a simple matter. Nevertheless, elites must rule, and to rule a democracy, an internal aristocracy will have to covertly promote the sorts of political truths that the masses would not tolerate.

Strauss's strong preference for classical political theory over modern liberalism was not unique during the twentieth century. However, Strauss led a large group of disciples and lived long enough to see their careers flourish. By the mid-1960s, Strauss had produced an able group of like-minded political scientists and philosophers, including

Alan Bloom, and has been credited with inspiring a neo-conservative movement that remains influential in U.S. politics.

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John R. Shook

STROLL, AVRUM (1921–2013)

Avrum Stroll was born on 15 February 1921 in Oakland, California. He received the BA in 1943, the MA in 1948, and the PhD in philosophy in 1951, all from the University of California at Berkeley. Stroll first taught

philosophy at the University of Oregon in 1951–52, and then the University of British Columbia from 1952 to 1963. In 1963 he became professor of philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He was All-University of California Lecturer in 1965 and a Guggenheim Fellow in 1973. He retired in 1991 and remained at UCSD as a research professor. In 1996 he received the Constantine Panunzio Emeriti Award. Stroll died on 12 September 2013 in La Jolla, California.

Stroll's interests and work concentrated on the philosophy of language, epistemology, and the history of twentieth century analytic philosophy. In philosophy of language, his view is that most philosophical problems originate in non-technical contexts and involve subtle extensions and misuses of everyday speech. Though Stroll was not adverse to introducing technical terms in philosophy, he was adamant that these should be held to a minimum, and that virtually whatever can be said that is sensible can be said in ordinary language. His example-oriented approach to philosophical questions, as an alternative to theory building or to the quest for essences, is embodied in his *Sketches of Landscapes: Philosophy by Example*. This work also contains an essay on the logic of examples, and provides a solution to the problem of fictional reference.

In epistemology, Stroll's contributions have focused on the nature of the external world, skepticism, knowledge and certainty, and the connection between language and reality. His *Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty* has been, since its publication in 1994, a standard work of reference for scholars. It also constitutes one of Stroll's multi-pronged assaults on the bewitchment of philosophical skepticism.

In *Surfaces* (1988), Stroll conducts an investigation into how we organize (using the logic of ordinary speech) a conceptual model of the world whose components are surfaces,

edges, margins, seams and boundaries. This approach, never before attempted in philosophy, has generated a substantial literature on the ontology of boundaries. *Surfaces* is also an attack on *indirect* as well as *direct* theories of perception. Though Stroll agrees with J.J. Gibson that we generally see things as they are, he denies that this amounts to seeing them *directly*, and proposes his own "piecemeal realism" according to which our perception is only rarely and under special conditions to be described as *direct*. He holds that in normal cases objects are neither seen directly nor indirectly. In this, he deviates from the tradition of direct realism, and obviates the problems that come with it, including the idea that a *general* account of perception can explain all the possible ways that human beings see things.

Stroll's *Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy* contains biographical sketches of philosophers he has known personally, such as W.V. Quine, Gilbert Ryle, and Ruth Marcus, as well as evaluations of their work.

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Danièle Moyal-Sharrock

STRONG, CHARLES AUGUSTUS (1862–1940)

Charles Augustus Strong was born on 28 November 1862 in Haverhill, Massachusetts. In 1872 Strong’s father was appointed president of the Rochester Theological Seminary and the family moved to Rochester, New York, his father’s home town. Strong attended Phillips Exeter Academy from 1877 to 1880 before entering the University of Rochester. He spent his sophomore and junior year at the Gütersloh Gymnasium in Westphalia, Germany. In 1884 he received the BA degree from the University of Rochester. In 1885 Strong received a second BA summa cum laude from Harvard University, where he studied with Josiah Royce and William James. At Harvard he was also a classmate of George Santanaya who remained a life-long friend. Strong went to the University of Berlin in 1886 on a Walker Fellowship from Harvard, which he shared with Santayana. At Berlin he studied with Friedrich Paulsen.

Strong returned to the U.S. in 1887. From 1887 until 1889 he was an instructor of psychology and philosophy at Cornell.

In 1889 he married Elizabeth “Bessie” Rockefeller, the eldest daughter of John D. Rockefeller, and he returned to Europe where he spent a year at the University of Paris before becoming a docent at Clark University in 1890. He quickly went back to Europe to spend a year at the University of Freiburg. Returning to the U.S., Strong was an associate professor of psychology at the University of Chicago from 1892 to 1895. He then went to Columbia University, where he was a psychology lecturer until 1903 when he was promoted to professor of psychology. In 1910 Strong retired from teaching, because of his wife’s share in the family fortune. They lived in Lakewood, New Jersey, but often spent long periods in Europe, mostly France and Italy. In 1919 the University of Rochester conferred the LLD upon him. In his final years, Strong was largely isolated, spending most of his time in his library behind his typewriter. Although he continued to be in frequent contact with Santayana in Rome (the letters are in Santayana’s published correspondence), he had few intellectual colleagues among his friends. He died on 25 January 1940 in Fiesole, Italy.

Throughout his life, Strong was deeply interested in the origin of mind in the universe, a question which he connected with issues in epistemology, metaphysics and physiology. In his first book, *Why the Mind Has a Body* (1903), he defended a panpsychism, to which he was introduced by Paulsen. According to Strong, the bodiliness of things is a product of perception which makes them appear to us as material. Strong believed that his monistic doctrine allowed him to resolve the problems of contemporary dualistic theories.

Strong further developed his panpsychism, moving, under the influence of Santayana, toward critical realism. Firmly rejecting what he called the fallacy of new realism, on which the phenomenal was identified with the real,

Strong held that perception involves not two but three elements: the subject, the object, and the form in which the object appears to the subject. To describe the third, Strong utilized Santayana's concept of "essence." The critical realist Durant Drake accepted and advocated Strong's views and Strong contributed an essay to *Essays in Critical Realism* (1920), which included essays by Drake, Santayana, A.O. Lovejoy, and others. Strong developed this critical realist panpsychist view in several books: *The Origin of Consciousness* (1918), *A Theory of Knowledge* (1923), *Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind* (1930), and *A Creed for Skeptics* (1936). Though deeply influenced by James's views on consciousness and cognition, Strong rejected James's pragmatism, his indeterminism, his will-to-believe argument, and the phenomenological side of his radical empiricism.

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Cornelis de Waal

STROUD, BARRY (1935–)

Barry Stroud was born on 18 May 1935 in Toronto, Canada. He received his BA from the University of Toronto and his PhD from Harvard University in 1962. He joined the philosophy department at the University of California at Berkeley in 1961, where he has been full professor since 1974, and then was named Mills Professor of Metaphysics and Epistemology. He was President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1995–96; a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. As a visiting fellow of New College and All Souls College, he delivered the John Locke lectures at Oxford University in 1986–87. In 2007 he was named Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor of Philosophy.

Stroud is a noted Hume scholar, and a leading contemporary epistemologist. He has also written influentially on Wittgenstein, modality, and issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and language. His first book, *Hume* (1977), which won the Matchette Prize, argued for a naturalistic reading of Hume against reading him as a radical skeptic, contributing to a significant reevaluation of Hume's philosophy.

Influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin, a central concern of Stroud's work

is the relation of everyday life to philosophical inquiry, especially the danger of distortion that lies in our attempt in philosophical inquiry to reach a general understanding of ourselves and our place in the natural world. This is the central theme of both *The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism* (1984) and *The Quest for Reality* (2000). The first book is concerned with the sources of the problem of our knowledge of the external world: “how the problem arises and how it acquires that special character that makes an unsatisfactory negative answer inevitable” (1984, p. 1). The problem lies in the conception of our access to objective reality as epistemically mediated by “ideas” or “appearances,” a conception which seems itself to be presupposed by the project of understanding human knowledge in general.

The Quest for Reality is concerned with the general philosophical project of uncovering the nature of reality, how things are as opposed to how they appear – the conception of reality underlying the problem of the external world – with the investigation of the reality of color as a case study. Its central question is “how we arrive at a determinate conception of an independent reality out of everything we believe to be so before any philosophical reflection begins” (p. 20). The idea of a reality absolutely independent of us presupposes that we can discover that our pre-reflective beliefs about the world are, in some respects, fundamentally misleading. This requires that we give an “unmasking explanation” of our mistaken beliefs, about, for example, color, which shows how we come to have them in terms of other things we believe about how the world really is.

Stroud argues that, for the case of the unreality of color, we cannot both identify the beliefs and perceptions that we wish to explain and deny in general the reality of color. If the lesson generalizes, a central project of

philosophy cannot be carried out. We cannot start out with ordinary beliefs and perceptions and show that we are in fundamental ways mistaken about the nature of the world. This would not show that we were not mistaken, but only that we could not coherently come to that conclusion. Stroud’s work represents perhaps the most searching examination of the nature and limits of philosophical inquiry in contemporary philosophy.

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SUPPES, PATRICK COLONEL (1922–2014)

Patrick Suppes was born on 17 March 1922 in Tulsa, Oklahoma. He began his college studies at the University of Oklahoma in 1939, but found it to constricting, and he transferred to the University of Chicago, which he found too unstructured. In his junior year, he transferred to the University of Tulsa. During World War II he served in the Army reserves, and finally earned his BS from the University of Chicago in 1943, while in uniform. After the war, in 1947, Suppes went to graduate school at Columbia University, where he was especially influenced by Ernest NAGEL, and earned his PhD in philosophy in 1950 with a dissertation on “The Problem of Action at a Distance.” Suppes joined the philosophy faculty of Stanford University in 1950, was named Lucie Stern Professor of Philosophy in 1975, and continued to be active at Stanford after his retirement in 1992. Suppes died on 17 November 2014 in Stanford, California.

Suppes was a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the National Academy of Sciences. He was awarded the Butler Medal in Silver from Columbia University in 1965, the Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award from the American Psychological Association in 1972, and the National Medal of Science in 1990. Suppes has been President of several societies: the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1972–73; the American Educational Research Association in 1973–74; the National Academy of Education during 1973–77; the Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science from 1975 to 1979; and the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science in 1976 and 1978.

Kirk Ludwig

Suppes was associated with the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford, and he was a pioneer in the development of the computer as an instructional tool in language, logic, and mathematics. At CSLI, Suppes concentrated on development of computer-aided language instruction, designing mathematics courses as well as programs for computerized foreign language instruction and for computer aided logic instruction. He also participated in the development of elementary-school level mathematics courses using computer-aided instruction. He traveled the short distance to Berkeley on a regular basis, attending seminars given by Alfred Tarski and learning axiomatics from J.C.C. McKinsey, both of whom had a significant influence on him.

Suppes is the author of several introductory logic textbooks, an introductory textbook in axiomatic set theory, and has worked on the applications of logic to computer languages and in philosophy of logic. In the late 1950s and into the late 1960s Suppes participated, along with W.V. Quine, Hugues Leblanc, and Irving Copi in the effort to develop simplified and correct rules of inferences for the quantified formulae of first-order functional logic. Edward John Lemmon (1961) showed that Suppes's formulation of EI in his *Introduction to Logic* (1957) was incorrect, while Leblanc showed that Quine's formulation, and hence ultimately Copi's in the first edition of his *Symbolic Logic* as well, was also incorrect.

Suppes is best known for his work in philosophy of science, including in particular philosophy of physics. His main contributions concern the foundations of quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics, probability theory, inductive logic, the theory of measurement, and causality. He is also interested in the methodology of science and in mathematical techniques of physics, which

has been the special focus of his research outside of, and alongside of, his work on computer-assisted instruction in particular and education in general. He devoted attention to the way in which children learn mathematical concepts, and this contributed to his work in the preparation of instructional materials in mathematics. He has also been active in the preparation of collective works, serving as editor or co-editor of numerous works in philosophy of science, including philosophy of physics, and in the logic, semantics, and philosophy of artificial and natural languages.

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Irving H. Anellis

SWABEY, MARIE TAYLOR COLLINS (1890–1966)

Marie Collins was born on 8 December 1890 in Kansas City, Missouri. She studied under Mary Case and Mary Whiton Calkins at Wellesley College, where she received her BA in 1913. The following year she received her MA from the University of Kansas. In 1914–15 she was an assistant in philosophy at Wellesley College, and then was an instructor at Broadbudd Institute in West

Virginia. In 1919 she received her PhD from Cornell University, where she studied under James E. Creighton.

After completing her education, she was an instructor at Wells College in New York in 1919–20; she then married philosopher William Curtis Swabey on 19 June 1920. William became an instructor of philosophy at New York University in 1923, and the following year Marie did the same. They joined Herman Harrell Horne who had been NYU's professor of philosophy since 1909. Marie was an instructor from 1924 until 1928, an assistant professor from 1928 until 1934, and an associate professor from 1934 until 1956, when both Swabeyes retired. During her career, Swabey belonged to the American Philosophical Association and the Association for Symbolic Logic. Swabey died on 3 March 1966 in Aptos, California.

Swabey's research addressed a wide variety of topics, but it did not lack unity. As her colleague Louise Antz wrote in a memorial after Swabey's death, "the guiding idea of her books and teaching was that reason, as presupposing the freedom and impartiality of the mind, implies the falsity of any merely naturalistic or psychologistic account of human nature" (*Proc of APA v40*, 1967, p. 127). This guiding idea is especially salient in Swabey's *Logic and Nature* (1930, 1955). There she contends that logical considerations form the basis of metaphysics, and she attempts to derive an ontology from universal laws of thought. She also defends rationalism, the acceptance of which involves "acceptance of the transcendent competence of reasoning and the recognition of its capacity as an infinite part to encompass the whole" (1955, p. 23), against varieties of anti-rationalism, the latter being assaults, stemming from "certain theories of organic causation and of the biologically instrumental nature of thought," on "any attempt to give an objective account

of being in its general aspects” (1955, p. v). Swabey argues that these attacks on reason’s ability to achieve objective knowledge are self-defeating.

Similar themes occur in Swabey’s other works. In *Comic Laughter* (1961) she argues that the comic reflects the reality of the universe as a rational structure. In *Theory of the Democratic State* (1937) she tries to provide a rational foundation for democracy, one that has roots in the laws of logic. In *The Judgment of History* (1954) she challenges historical relativism, arguing for the possibility of objective historical knowledge and for the existence of permanently valid values.

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John J. Tilley

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TALBOT, ELLEN BLISS (1867–1968)

Ellen Bliss Talbot was born on 22 November 1867 in Iowa City, Iowa. She earned a BA from Ohio State University in 1890 and a PhD in philosophy from Cornell University in 1898. One of the first truly professional academic women philosophers, Talbot was among the first female members of the American Philosophical Association and one of seven women who also held membership in the American Psychological Association in the organizations' first decades. Talbot spent her academic career as a professor of philosophy at Mount Holyoke College from 1900 to 1936, serving as chair of the philosophy department for over thirty years. She died in Spartanburg, South Carolina, at the age of 100 on 25 January 1968.

Talbot's dissertation focused on Fichte's epistemology, and the majority of her work continued to explore the nature of knowledge, especially as it is related to consciousness. She published her first article in 1895, where she set herself apart from other thinkers in this era as decidedly more modern and prepared for the intellectual developments of the coming century. In form, her writing is direct and her footnotes detailed and precise. In content, her work shows a clear understanding of some of the key challenges philosophy would face in the decades ahead: distinguishing itself from other disciplines, establishing a systematic method of inquiry, and resisting reliance on

metaphysical assumptions that cannot be demonstrated.

Talbot's article "The Doctrine of Conscious Elements" (1895) discusses the newest theories of mind and insisted on a purely scientific psychology, unfettered by theories of mind/body dualism, soul, or other metaphysical constructs. The philosopher must analyze consciousness free of all assumptions given to us by metaphysics, Talbot said. Philosophy's current task is to make sure to stay within the proper bounds of inquiry so that it can arrive at a set of truly philosophical determinations, rather than simply attempt to mimic religion. As her thought evolved, she explored the work of Fichte as the philosopher who she thought was best able to conduct the sort of inquiry required of contemporary philosophy.

Shortly after she began teaching at Mount Holyoke, Talbot published "The Relation of the Two Periods of Fichte's Philosophy" in 1901. She explains that the apparent shift in Fichte's thought, from a focus on Ego/God in his early work to one on Being/the Absolute in later works, is really a deeper expression of his sense of unity. In his earlier years, Fichte was simply trying to work out the relation of the individual to the world. His later thought focused on the unity of the whole. Because consciousness necessarily points to a duality – an I/Not I – yet it is also striving to achieve unity, it was appropriate for Fichte to first explore the relationship of individual consciousness to the objective world, *then*

to look at the unity of all being. Thus what seemed to be a change in Fichte's thought was actually simply a natural progression of thought within it.

Talbot used Fichte's thought as a lens through which to view the work of her colleagues in the pragmatist movement, a school of thought that was gaining recognition when she published "The Philosophy of Fichte in Its Relation to Pragmatism" in 1907. In this article, she asserts that pragmatism has much in common with Fichte's idealism. Specifically, pragmatism recognizes along with Fichte that in practical life an individual 'creates,' in a sense, a world that is useful, because we make objects and events suit our purposes: "in practical life, the subject makes the object conform to it" (p. 501). In failing to recognize that human inquiry is an active, dynamic force in the world, Fichte falls short in an area in which pragmatism is particularly strong. Yet in one area his thought not only surpasses pragmatism, but provides a model it would do well to follow: his ability to reconcile subject and object. For Fichte, there is a unity, not only to thought, but also between and among objects in the world. His understanding of Being provides a oneness that works in and through individual finite subjects. This makes for a unified, cohesive whole that pragmatism, with its focus on individual inquiries, aims, and desires, cannot provide.

Roughly one-third of Talbot's work consisted of original discussions of philosophical problems, particularly on questions of human freedom and moral value, as in "Humanism and Freedom," "Individuality and Freedom," and "The Time-Process and the Value of Human Life." In these writings, she explores how values, experience, and human freedom intersect with and/or reinforce each other. The most innovative of these writings are the "Time-Process and Value" articles, written when

Talbot was a mid-career academic. Here she discusses values and moral goods not as fixed entities, but as dynamic processes which can have a greater or lesser impact, depending on the context, specifically in regard to time. The articles show us that Talbot had a great deal in common with the pragmatist, personalist, and process thought that was under development in her day. Her work as a whole demonstrates that she was a competent philosopher who was comfortable entertaining new ideas and interested in making abstract thought relevant to everyday human problems.

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Dorothy Rogers

TAPPAN, HENRY PHILIP (1805–1881)

Henry Philip Tappan was born on 18 April 1805 in Rhinebeck, New York. Tappan

attended Union College, studying with President Eliphalet Nott and graduating with the BA degree in 1825. He then went to Auburn Theological Seminary in New York and graduated in 1827. He later received an honorary Doctor of Divinity degree from Union College in 1845, and an honorary LLD degree from Columbia College in 1854.

Tappan's first position was Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at the University of the City of New York (later renamed New York University). He also taught the classes in belles-lettres during much of this period. Tappan held this position from 1832 until he left in 1838 during a faculty dispute with the university administration. He next opened a private school for girls in New York City. This shift allowed him to focus on philosophical and pedagogical matters, where his real impact would be felt.

Tappan is especially notable for two accomplishments during his remaining life. First was his philosophical approach: he was open to European philosophy, he desired to graft varying intellectual currents into the American philosophical scene, and he wished to harmonize philosophical development with biblical morality. His early writings centered on philosophical and theological issues involving free will. His two volumes sharing the title *The Doctrine of the Will* (1840, 1844) defended Thomas Reid's common sense approach to agent causality. His volume on *Elements of Logic* (1844) won wide praise; the French common sense philosopher Victor Cousin declared it the equal of any logic book in Europe. Tappan's pamphlets were often in direct dialogue with foreign thinkers, primarily from England and Germany, and unlike most of his conservative contemporaries, he was much less exclusive and much more willing to actually participate in a united cosmopolitan, transatlantic pursuit of truth. His cosmopolitan breadth was also apparent in his *Step from the*

New World to the Old and Back Again, where he documented his foreign excursions as a literal description of how one can adopt and graft differing ideologies in the progression of American thought.

Tappan's second, and more important, accomplishment was the implementation of his progressive pedagogical views as the inaugural President of the University of Michigan in 1852. This university, one of the first to adopt principles of the German education model, was a consummate fit for the progressive teacher. When he arrived at the campus in Ann Arbor there were only fifty students taking a rote classical curriculum. Tappan was instrumental in modernizing and professionalizing the university, and the system he established served to be a founding model for American research institutions. Tappan held the title of Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy while he was university president. He taught classes in "mental philosophy" (which included metaphysics), rhetoric, and logic to the juniors and seniors, and "moral science" to the seniors. During that era, moral science consisted of ethics, social and political theory, and political economy. Tappan's sustained devotion to Scottish common sense philosophy dominated his instruction.

After several public conflicts with the university board of regents and quiet complaints that his religious views were heretical, he was dismissed from his position as president in 1863, an action that was met with loud disapproval from the majority of the university faculty, student body, and community. Tappan spent the rest of his life in Europe. Reconciliation with Michigan was later achieved after a new board of regents were elected, but only after another decade was passed and Tappan's poor health prevented him from returning. Tappan died on 15 November 1881 in Vevey, Switzerland.

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TARSKI, ALFRED (1901–1983)

Alfred Tarski was born Alfred Tajtelbaum on 14 January 1901 in Warsaw, Poland, which at that time was part of the Russian Empire. He died on 26 October 1983 in Berkeley, California. In 1918 he entered the University of Warsaw as a biology major, but after taking a logic course with Stanislaw Lesniewski he turned to the study of mathematics and philosophy. He wrote his doctoral thesis under Lesniewski's direction, submitting his thesis "O wyrazie pierwotnym logistyki" (On the Primitive Terms of Logistic) in 1923 and receiving his PhD in mathematics in 1924, becoming the youngest PhD produced by that university. In addition to Lesniewski, the major influences on Tarski were mathematicians Jan Lukasiewicz, Wacław Sierpiński, and Stefan Mazurkiewicz, and philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbiński. In 1923, he and his brother Włocław changed their name

from Tajtelbaum to Tarski and converted from Judaism to Roman Catholicism, in order to demonstrate their Polishness.

Together with Adolf Lindenbaum, Tarski can be seen as a founder of and nucleus around which Polish logicians contributed to the development of algebraic logic during the period between the two World Wars, and of which Helena Rasiowa and Andrzej Mostowski became leading successors. Tarski taught at the Polish Pedagogical Institute in Warsaw from 1922 to 1925, and was then appointed *docent* in mathematics and logic at the University of Warsaw, where he later became Lukasiewicz's assistant. In the seminars on the method of quantifier elimination which Tarski gave at the University of Warsaw during 1926–28, he formulated the theorem, known as Tarski's Theorem, that the first-order theory of real numbers with $+$, $*$, $=$, and $>$ allows quantifier elimination. From 1925 until 1939 he also served as mathematics professor at Warsaw's Zeromski Lyceum.

In the autumn of 1929 Karl Menger was asked to lecture at the University of Warsaw. During this trip he became acquainted with the work of the Warsaw School of Logic, and met Lindenbaum and Tarski. Menger felt that both the Vienna Circle and the mathematicians should become familiar with the "logico-philosophical work of the Warsaw school and invited Tarski to deliver three lectures before the Colloquium" (Menger 1994, p. 147). These lectures took place in February 1930. The major result of the visit was Tarski's introduction to Rudolf Carnap and Kurt Gödel. This was the beginning of a lasting professional relationship between Carnap and Tarski, and also between Gödel and Tarski.

In August 1939, Tarski was attending a conference on the Unity of Science being held at Harvard University. Two weeks later came the invasion of Poland that began World War II. Tarski was given temporary positions at

Harvard from 1939 to 1941 and at the City College of New York in 1940, and was invited by Gödel to the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton during 1941–42. With letters of recommendation from Bertrand Russell and W.V. Quine, Tarski was able to join the faculty University of California at Berkeley in 1942, where he was assistant professor of mathematics until 1945, promoted to associate professor in 1945, and full professor in 1949, and he later became research professor at the Miller Institute of Basic Research in Science in 1958–60. Tarski was elected to the National Academy of Sciences, the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences and Letters, and the British Academy. He was President of the Association for Symbolic Logic during 1944–46 and the International Union for the History and Philosophy of Science in 1956–57. Tarski became emeritus professor in 1968, but was asked to continue teaching until 1973; he continued to supervise research students until his death in 1983.

In 1933 Tarski published "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" establishing a theorem asserting the undefinability of the concept of truth. Here Tarski took truth to be a syntactical property. This was followed in 1936 by "On the Concept of Logical Consequence." Tarski had given a semantic definition of truth as a correspondence theory, according to which "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. Tarski further claimed that the conclusion of an argument will follow logically from its premises if and only if every model of the premises is a model of the conclusion. Formal scientific languages can be subjected to more thorough study by the semantic method that he developed. In 1944 his "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics" appeared; debate continues whether Tarski's semantic theory is a variation of a correspondence theory of truth or a deflationary theory of

truth. A revised version of Tarski's 1933 semantic theory of truth, for model-theoretic languages, in collaboration with Robert Lawson Vaught in their "Arithmetical Extensions of Relational Systems" (1956). The chief criteria for this definition were formal correctness and material adequacy. Formally it is required that $(\forall x)\text{True}(x)$ iff $\phi(x)$, where "True" does not occur in ϕ , and the definition meets the requirement for material adequacy when we have $\phi(s)$ iff ψ where s is the name of a sentence S of the language L and ψ is a copy of S in the metalanguage M for S . Tarski introduced the term and concept of metalanguage, thereupon popularized by Carnap, on analogy with David Hilbert's concept of *metamathematics*.

In "On the Calculus of Relations" (1941, p. 73), Tarski called Charles Peirce "the creator of the theory of relations," which Ernst Schröder continued and systematically developed. As a consequence, Tarski saw it as his task to take up where Peirce and Schröder left off and saw himself in an important sense as the direct mathematical descendent of Peirce.

Tarski wrote more than ten books in different areas of mathematics, and his teaching influenced many young mathematicians. His work includes *A Decision Method for Elementary Algebra and Geometry*, *Undecidable Theories*, written in cooperation with Andrzej Mostowski and Raphael Mitchel Robinson, and the collection titled *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics* (1956, 1983). Tarski used the method of proof devised by Jacques Sturm in 1940 to prove the completeness of elementary algebra and geometry, and in 1949 he presented a decision procedure for elementary algebra and geometry based on algebraic methods.

The Boole-Peirce-Schröder tradition was to some extent absorbed through the more recent quantification-theoretic and set-theoretic traditions into the new mathematical

logic, and has, as Tarski noted in "On the Calculus of Relations," been reduced to a consideration of the connections of algebraic logic to first-order functional calculus. Tarski and Steven Givant's *A Formalization of Set Theory without Variables*, which appeared in 1987 after Tarski's death, was the culmination of Tarski's work in algebraic logic, producing a system bringing together Schröder's goal of developing the class calculus as a branch of algebraic logic with Russell's goal of founding all of mathematics on a small number of logical assumptions. Tarski and Givant achieved this unification by creating a branch of algebraic logic that founds set theory and number theory on a small number of logical assumptions, on the basis of the calculus of relations. But it should be noted that these two goals were also brought together by Peirce, who had already made a start at its realization, especially in "Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives," in "The Logic of Relatives," and "On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation."

Tarski began this work as early as 1953. In *A Formalization of Set Theory without Variables*, here a three-variable fragment of first-order logic L_3 is given in which an axiom system is developed which presents set theory and number theory as sets of equations between predicates constructed from two binary predicates denoting the identity and set-theoretic elementhood relations. This presents a partial positive reply to Ernst Schröder's question in *Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik* of whether an algebra of relatives can express all statements about relations as equations of the calculus of relations. Tarski and Givant developed $L^\times$ as a formal language that is an analog of the algebraic theory of relations, containing two binary relations: identity and set membership, along with the usual Boolean operators. They next derived the theorems, familiar from number theory

and set theory in first-order logic as equations of L^x . Thus they established a representable relation algebra, where representability is the counterpart of completeness of axiom systems in first-order logic. Next they considered L^+ , which contains the usual logical axioms of first-order logic and the set membership relation of L^x , and a set of translation axioms. L^x is a fragment L^+ which contains only variable-free equations, and including only equations of L^+ of the form $R = S$. Within this theory, they considered a proposition of first-order logic expressing the existence of an equation of three variables which cannot be expressed in first-order logic without using four variables, and a formula of first-order logic which could be translated into L^x but not into L^+_3 , and which appears, therefore, to be a counterexample to Peirce's Reduction Thesis holding that equations of four or more terms can be rendered in the algebra of relatives using combinations of binary and tertiary relations.

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Irving H. Anellis

TAYLOR, CHARLES (1931)

Charles Taylor was born on 5 November 1931 in Montréal, Québec, Canada. In 1952 he was awarded a BA in history with first class honours from McGill University in Montréal. He earned a second BA degree in politics, philosophy, and economics from Balliol College of Oxford University in 1955, again with first class honours. He was awarded an MA in 1960 and a PhD in philosophy in 1961 from Oxford, having been a fellow of All Souls College. Returning to Canada in 1961, he was appointed to the departments of philosophy and political science at McGill University. In 1976 he went back to Oxford to take up the Chichele Professorship of Social and Political Theory, but returned once more in 1981 to McGill and the city he loves and which remains his home. Taylor's homecoming did not preclude him from taking a variety of visiting positions at places such as the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the New School of Social Research in New York. He retired from McGill in 1998. Since 2002 he has been on the faculty at Northwestern University, where he has a joint appointment in the Law School and in the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences as a permanent

visiting professor of philosophy, and also is a Board of Trustees Professor.

It would be hard to deny that living in Québec, a province that constantly debates its continuing place in the Canadian federation, has influenced Taylor's work as a political philosopher. His reflections on nationalism, on democracy's need for inclusion, and his important account of the politics of recognition have all been directly affected by his experience of living, and being politically active, in Québec. At a wider level, residing in a country bordered by the world's largest and probably still most confident liberal democracy has also shaped Taylor's thought about different styles and understandings of liberalism. It would be difficult to overestimate the significance Taylor imputes to language and to culture in the creation and transmission of meaning in human life. Yet one of the interesting and challenging features of his thought is that while imputing great significance to culture and language in fashioning identity, he does not accept any idea that identity is purely an artefact of culture or language. This is because Taylor subscribes to something like a conception of human nature, a belief that there are certain features that necessarily accompany being human and which transcend differences of time, place, culture and language. In his approach to philosophical anthropology we see therefore a mixture of elements: some aspects of the self can only be understood by reference to the person's wider cultural context, while others are part and parcel of what it means to be human. In Taylor's view, among the features that all human beings share are: being language animals; being self-interpreting animals; having identities that are profoundly constituted through dialogue; having purposes which play an important part in a person's sense of who they are and, finally, being situated in what he calls moral

space, which means being located within a moral framework, having a certain orientation to the good and being a strong evaluator.

Both these aspects of Taylor's approach to philosophical anthropology – the perennial and the culture-dependent – are illustrated clearly in *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. He outlines the features that he takes to be constitutive of human selfhood, and identifies the distinctively modern aspects of the self and traces the ways in which these have developed over the centuries. This is not a straightforward task, because one of the things Taylor emphasises is the multiplicity of the modern self: several strands and sources, sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory, have gone into making the modern identity.

One of the major values that Taylor associates with the modern self is a disengaged notion of freedom. Rather than imagining itself as connected to some wider cosmic-cum-moral order, the modern self believes that it can properly understand and define itself in the absence of any attachment to this ambient reality. The disengaged self makes of its world an object, and stands toward it as a subject whose task it is to understand and control that world. Another important strand of modern selfhood is inwardness. The modern self sees itself as an entity with inner depths and believes that exploring, coming to know and perhaps expressing these inner depths is a valuable undertaking. Thirdly, the modern self has a powerful sense of its own individuality or uniqueness, and aspires to live in a way that is true to that individuality. According to what Taylor calls this "ethic of authenticity," each person has to discover an original way of being, to recognise it as a true or faithful expression of who they are, and to adopt and take responsibility for it. The fourth element of the modern self is the idea of nature as source. What Taylor means by this is that

modern selves harbour a sense that interaction with the natural world can be a source of moral renewal, and such contact enables them to hearken to the voice of nature within. There is seen to be something profoundly valuable for humans about contact with nature. Finally, the modern self is informed by an ethos that Taylor calls the affirmation of ordinary life. This revolves around the idea that what happens in the spheres of work and family makes a substantial contribution to one's sense of the value and meaning of life.

This is an identity picture of the modern self, whose history Taylor traces in *Sources of the Self*. It is noteworthy that in constructing his history of the modern self, his focus is overwhelmingly on the cultural realm. And within the realm of culture, the accent falls heavily on canonical works of philosophy. Even when he looks beyond philosophy to other cultural products, Taylor's interest tends to remain in written texts, although some consideration is afforded to the ways in which forms of cultural creativity such as music and the visual arts have contributed to the modern identity. Overall, however, although he does not deny their influence, Taylor pays minimal attention to the role that economic activities and institutions, changes in modes of production, science and technology, or systems of government and law, have had in forging the modern identity.

Taylor's *Modern Social Imaginaries* (2004) continues the concern expressed in *Sources* with the distinctive ethical or normative features of modern existence, although less attention is paid there to philosophising about the self and more to articulating the assumptions, presuppositions and beliefs needed to appreciate the modern western view of society, the economy, and politics. With the term social imaginary, Taylor refers to the loose, general and often tacit sense people have about how society operates and what

holds it together. As he defines it, the term captures “the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (2004, p. 23). Much of Taylor’s interest in this project lies in examining how modern individuals can understand themselves, their society and the natural world in a purely secular way, without any necessary reference to the divine nor even to a transcendent realm of any sort. However, he also believes that by mapping the contours of the modern social imaginary as it has developed in the west, we will be better placed to recognise the diverse ways in which different cultures have modernised and continue to modernise. As this suggests, for Taylor there is no linear route to a single destination that is modern society: rather different cultures can incorporate key components of modernity in different ways, so that modern modes of communication and information technology, of industrialisation, of state formation and of economic organisation can acquire different meanings in different cultures. And, as a consequence, different cultures can have different social imaginaries when it comes to modernity.

Taylor’s efforts as an expositor of G.W.F. Hegel (1975, 1979) have been important here, for his careful study of Hegel’s philosophy has helped him to identify and criticise the prevalence of atomist assumptions in western culture generally and within the social sciences more particularly. In direct contravention of atomist common sense, Taylor insists that the self is always socially situated and that the individual necessarily points beyond him or herself to their social relations. The community is ontologically prior to the individual in his view, because of the way irreducibly collective forces like

culture and language—and forms of religiosity, as *A Secular Age* (2007) recounts – shape and inform individuals. Thus he argues that because certain goods and even conceptions of the self are only available to individuals by virtue of the culture to which they belong, the fact of belonging to a community or society takes pride of place in explaining social and political norms, values and practices. Rather than reject notions of individualism altogether, Taylor has sought to explain them by identifying their wider cultural sources. He thus contends that even “the free individual or autonomous agent” so heavily inscribed in the common sense of modern western culture “can only achieve and maintain his identity in a certain type of culture.” Such an individual “is only what he is by virtue of the whole society and civilisation which brought him to be and which nourishes him” (*Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, 1985, pp. 205–6).

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Ruth Abbey

TAYLOR, JOHN (1753 1824)

John Taylor of Caroline was an important republican theorist and lawmaker. Once labeled "the philosopher of Jeffersonian democracy," James Madison thought Taylor to be one of the most important of anti-Federalists. His writings are considered some of the most complete expositions of the ideals of the early Jeffersonian movement. Taylor was born on 19 December 1753, probably in Caroline County, Virginia. Taylor graduated with the BA degree from the College of William and Mary in 1770, and admitted to the bar in 1774. Taylor served in the Continental Army during the Revolution, served as a member of Virginia House of Delegates for several terms, and was a U.S. Senator during 1792–94, 1803, and 1822–24. He presented the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and was also the author of the Virginia Remonstrance in 1781. While in the Senate, Taylor served as floor manager for the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution. He died on 21 August 1824 at his plantation home, "Hazelwood," near the town of Port Royal in Caroline County, Virginia.

A fierce polemicist, Taylor focused on constructing a theoretical protection for states'

rights and a decentralized interpretation of the Constitution. For instance, in *An Enquiry into the Principles and Tendencies of Certain Public Measures* (1794), Taylor showed concern over growth in the power of federal government. He argued that through loose construction of the Federal Constitution via phrases such as “necessary and proper” and “general welfare,” the federal government (mostly through the executive and judicial branches) will be able to eliminate the rights of states to their own sovereignty. In contradistinction to a powerful and centralized federal government, Taylor argued for the Jeffersonian virtues of independence through an impartial government, active citizen participation in politics and agrarian values combined with a natural free market that rewards industry and talent.

These ideas are further elaborated in *Arator: Being a Series of Agricultural Essays Practical and Political* (1813). First, he developed in great detail the importance of agriculture, particularly modernized agriculture, to a healthy American economy. This point neatly dovetails with his second issue, which is the centrality of localized democratic government based upon agrarian values. *An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States* (1814) continued to construct Taylor’s version of Republican Liberalism. The inclusion of Locke’s ideas in combination with classical republican virtues is a mix somewhat unique to America at the time. Also significant is Taylor’s rejection of the idea that a republican government can only function with truly virtuous citizens. For him, laws actually restrain vice and excite virtue: laws can construct a society in which citizens are educated and habituated towards virtue. The values of equality, freedom, common knowledge, and self-government are all central to Taylor’s picture of government.

In particular, Taylor argued for specific civil rights of freedom of religion, speech, press, and for the predominance of state-based citizen’s militias over a federal army.

His *Construction Construed and Constitutions Vindicated* (1820) further elaborates Taylor’s theory of the U.S. Constitution. First, sovereignty is described as indivisible and always kept by the people. Power starts in the people, and then is delegated to various parts of government. As opposed to the idea of a balance of power (viewed by Taylor as resting upon feudal levels of status), a division of power can respect the equality and sovereignty of every citizen. Further, as opposed to the division of powers between federal branches, Taylor finds division of powers between various local, state and federal representatives to be more conducive to true freedom and equality. States’ rights are the first set of rights delegated by the people. The federal government gets whatever contractually delegated powers it has from the people and the states, and therefore cannot claim supremacy over either. As opposed to a broad use of the necessary and proper, war making, and commerce clauses, along with the theory of “implied powers” promoted by Chief Justice John Marshall and legal theorist Joseph Story, Taylor argued strenuously for a narrow construction of the Constitution.

As the largest slaveholder in Caroline County, it is noteworthy that Taylor did not attempt to utilize his own conceptions of equality and liberty to examine the issue of slavery in a more explicit manner. His statements on the problem tended to see slavery as an unfortunate system not conducive to the best agrarian republic. Slavery is thought of as not morally justified, but, on the other hand, Taylor was not pro-abolition. He seemed to believe that the best that could be done was to make the practice as humane as possible, and to hope that it would slowly be eliminated.

One of the thirteen original vice presidents for the American Colonization Society for Colonizing the Free People of Color in the United States, an organization aimed at sending black Americans to colonies in Africa, he thought that an integrated American society was unrealistic. Finally, Taylor warned that the issue of slavery could be used strategically by political opponents, and that such a focus might ultimately divide the union.

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Brian E. Butler

TAYLOR, RICHARD (1919–2003)

Richard Taylor was born on 5 November 1919 in Charlotte, Michigan. He attended the University of Illinois and completed a BA in zoology in 1941. At the onset of World War II Taylor left the seminary to join the U.S. Navy and served until 1946. Oberlin College in Ohio granted Taylor an MA degree in 1947. He went to Brown University and became the first doctoral student to work with Roderick Chisholm, whose influence remained strong

throughout Taylor's career. Brown's President Wriston helped arrange his appointment to the tenured faculty upon receiving his PhD in philosophy in 1951. Taylor became the first William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown beginning in 1959. Brown proved a collegial environment for Taylor, and he became deeply involved in its educational planning, but a desire for new intellectual horizons prompted him to relocate in 1963. After a brief stay at Ohio State University and two years at Columbia University, Taylor moved to the University of Rochester in 1966. Peter Van Inwagen, one of his most prominent doctoral students, edited a festschrift of works in Taylor's honor in 1980. In 1981 Taylor added the Leavitt-Spencer Adjunct Professorship at Union College, and subsequently served several terms as Resident Distinguished Philosopher at Hartwick College. Taylor retired from Rochester in 1985. His retirement in the Finger Lakes region of New York was dedicated to parenting and his beekeeping hobby. He died on 30 October 2003 in Trumansburg, New York.

Based on such publications in *Analysis* and *The Philosophical Review*, Prentice Hall invited him to compose a primer, *Metaphysics* (1963), which remains widely used. *Action and Purpose* (1966), the culmination of his analytic writing, defends an account of agency as irreducible to causally determined events. A second phase, hailed by his 1968 article "Dare to be Wise," focuses on the value and nature of philosophical insight, and develops substantive views on law, politics, and moral theory. At the close of his professional career, his move away from academic analytic philosophy had become pronounced, and his later writings on political and moral matters frequently favor an expository and less analytic style.

Action and Purpose, a work closely allied with similar work by Chisholm, seeks to revive

an ancient Greek concept of efficient cause, crediting agents rather than events as causes. Taylor's theory of agency resists dualism between material and intelligent orders of reality. Echoing Gilbert Ryle and William James, he argues that spiritual substances and ineffable mental episodes can resolve no real questions about how intelligence is embodied. Concepts such as "choosing" and "trying" are empty if they are taken as private inner experiences, since they are fundamentally realized and recognized in patterns of action.

Taylor's 1968 "Dare to Be Wise" urged academic philosophers to recapture the ancient emphasis on wisdom, rather than to profess a particular specialized kind of knowledge. Though analytic exercises were recommended as "harmless" tools to sharpen the mind, the goal of mature philosophy must be seen in the sort of "showing" or "displaying" suggested by Wittgenstein or by Buddhist reflections. From that point forward, Taylor's work gravitated towards concern with personal character and meaning, ethics in the virtue tradition, and matters of public controversy in politics and law. His 1973 *With Heart and Mind* turns towards profound themes such as god, eternity, love, death, illusion, and reality, and acknowledges a departure from philosophical dialectic, suggesting that philosophical understanding of such matters lies in recognizing apt metaphors and imagery.

In *Freedom, Anarchy, and the Law* (1973), Taylor elaborates an account of political freedom intended to correct a fatal ambiguity within Mill's defense of liberty. If only direct physical harm to others must be prevented, then theft and all other harms to one's extended interests must be allowed by the state. If all actions which harm others' various extended interests must be prevented, then any action must be curtailed by the state if it offends or frustrates anyone's ambitions. Relying on the Greek distinction between nature

and convention, Taylor distinguishes those injuries which would be experienced as such by anyone, regardless of cultural conditioning, from those which are experienced only because of contingently acquired attachments and values. Prevention of the latter, he argues, is not worth the cost to liberty. In “The Basis for Political Authority” (1983) Taylor argues that respect for freedom is guaranteed not at all by democracy, but by the institution of a certain kind of judicial authority, one that secures deference and functions much as a priesthood. It is to the benefit of a free society if its judges adhere solemnly to applying a text such as the U.S. Constitution, and to its detriment if it seeks to impose value systems more specific than liberty.

Though his political theory recommends insulating citizens from the imposition of any positive vision of the good, his moral theory is far from egalitarian. In *Good and Evil* (1970), *Ethics, Faith, and Reason* (1985), and *Restoring Pride* (1996), Taylor develops a brand of elitist virtue theory deeply influenced by Aristotle and Schopenhauer. Targets include rationalism about moral motivation, all varieties of casuistical moral judgment on particular actions, and prevalent Christian models of character virtue. Instead, he urges an account of moral concepts as dependent on human will. Though his apparent confidence about discerning a dividing line between nature and culture is among the least convincing aspects of Taylor’s moral and political writings, the exhortation to honesty regarding the will remains provocative.

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Elise Springer

THOMSON, JUDITH JARVIS (1929–)

Judith Jarvis was born on 4 October 1929 in New York City. She received her BA from Barnard College in 1950, her MA from Cambridge University in 1956, and her PhD in philosophy from Columbia University

in 1959. Her first teaching position was at Barnard where she was a lecturer (1955–1959), instructor (1959–1960), and assistant professor of philosophy (1960–1962). She married James Thomson, and moved to Boston in 1963, first as an assistant professor at Boston University (1963–1964), and then to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1964 where she became full professor in 1969. During 1990–1996 she held the Laurence S. Rockefeller Chair in Philosophy at MIT. She has received a large number of awards and honors, and contributed in many ways to professional philosophy in America. During 1992–1993, she held the Presidency of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division, and in 1999 she gave the Tanner Lectures at Princeton University. She is chair of the American Philosophical Association's board of officers for 2002–2005, and gave the APA's Carus Lectures in 2003. Thomson retired from MIT in 2004.

Much of her work discusses the morality of a range of issues of practical concern, including those gathered in *Rights, Restitution and Risk*, and "Self-Defence," "Physician Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments," and "Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers Brief," written with John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, T.M. Scanlon and Thomas Nagel. *Moral Realism and Moral Objectivity* (written with Gilbert Harman), "The Right and the Good," and *Goodness and Advice* contain general treatments of meta-ethics and moral theory. *The Realm of Rights* is an expansive work that includes all three themes.

In metaphysics she has concentrated on questions about actions and events, and about time and parts. *Acts and Other Events*, "The Individuation of Action," and "The Time of a Killing" present a metaphysics of action, while "Parthood and Identity over Time" and "The Statue and the Clay" take up a range of questions about identity and constitution.

"Parthood and Identity over Time" is particularly noteworthy for resisting the view, so dominant in contemporary metaphysical thought, that the notion of a temporal part can be used to account for various puzzles about identity. In addition to her work on moral philosophy and metaphysics, Thomson has made contributions to philosophy of mind ("Molyneux's Problem"), philosophy of science ("Grue"), and philosophy of language. Her work is characterized by its exemplary clarity, its foundation on examples, its inventiveness, and depth.

In the 1970s Thomson became extremely well known as the author of "A Defense of Abortion," which appeared in the first issue of *Philosophy and Public Affairs* in 1971. Suppose the fetus is a person – how is it supposed to follow that it may not be killed? She presents this imaginary case: "You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment and the Society for Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours...." Thomson completes the story by imagining that the director of the hospital tells you that you can't unplug yourself without killing the violinist, and moreover that you must remain like that for a period of nine months (and, in another version of the story, for the rest of your life). Does morality require that you stay in bed so that the violinist may live? The intuitive response is that it cannot be required by any reasonable moral principle that you lie in bed for the rest of your life. But then there must indeed be something wrong with the argument from the premise that the fetus is a person and all persons have a right to life to the conclusion

that abortion is impermissible. The right to life does not consist in, or include, the right not to be killed; nor does it consist in, or include, or the right to be given the bare minimum to sustain life. It consists rather in the right not to be killed unjustly. On the other hand, if the right to life consists in the right not to be killed unjustly, the straightforward argument above is invalid. The position on abortion that emerges at the end of the article is not what every defender of abortion wants – it does not entail that abortion is morally permissible in every case, for example – but Thomson makes a persuasive case that it is nevertheless intuitively the correct response.

Rights, Restitution and Risk, The Realm of Rights, and a number of later articles further investigate the idea that for a person to have a right is for him or her to have a certain moral status, and in particular into the relation between this idea, on the one hand, and other moral ideas, on the other, including in particular the ideas associated with talk about ‘ought’ and ‘good’. The theory that emerges is not easily summarized in a pithy phrase, but, as Thomson says in *Goodness and Advice*, a theory that would replace consequentialism “would lack the simplicity of Consequentialism. But then we really shouldn’t have expected a theory of what we ought to do to be simple as Consequentialists take it to be” (2001, p. 47).

The Realm of Rights opens with some meta-ethical remarks, and in particular includes a discussion of the Fact-Value Gap, the idea that no moral sentence is entailed by any factual or non-moral sentence. The issue of how to react to the Fact-Value Gap forms the basis of much of Thomson’s recent work, contained in *Moral Realism and Moral Objectivity*, “The Right and the Good,” *Goodness and Advice*, and other works. Her starting point is an observation due to Peter Geach (“Good and Evil,” 1956) about the logic of the word

‘good’. Geach observed that ‘good’ is in many ways like ‘big’: you aren’t plain good or big, you are a good pianist or a big land mammal. Indeed – and this point is Thomson’s rather than Geach’s – the situation with ‘good’ is more extreme than the situation with ‘big’. In the latter case, a statement of the form ‘X is big’ uniformly permits expansion into a statement of the form ‘X is a big F’. Not so for ‘good’. Sometimes a statement of the form ‘X is good’ permits this sort of expansion. But sometimes it does not, permitting instead expansion to ‘X is good at doing F’ or ‘X is good for F-ing’ or ‘X is good to Fs’ or ‘X is good with Fs’ and perhaps others. Thomson summarizes these points in the slogan: all goodness is goodness in a way, and goes on to develop them in two directions. First, she argues that the persuasiveness of the Fact-Value Gap depends largely on failing to see that all goodness is goodness in a way, and failing to see something which is entailed by this, that there is no such property as the property of goodness (or of rightness etc.). Second, Thomson argues that, if there is no such property as goodness, we are in possession of a very good reason to reject utilitarianism. Utilitarianism here is a thesis which defines the right in terms of the good, or, rather, as the right action as the one that makes the world better than (contain more good than) it would otherwise. But if there is no property of goodness, there is also no relation of betterness; hence utilitarianism rests on a mistake.

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Daniel Stoljar

THOREAU, HENRY DAVID (1817–1862)

Henry David Thoreau was born to John and Cynthia (Dunbar) Thoreau on 12 July 1817. He reversed the original order of his given and middle names to Henry David Thoreau in 1837, the year he graduated with his BA degree from Harvard College. In 1837 Thoreau also met Ralph Waldo Emerson and began his writing personal journal, at Emerson’s urging.

Thoreau was first published in *The Dial* magazine in 1840 with Emerson as his sponsor. Over the next four years Thoreau published a number of poems, essays, book reviews, and translations in *The Dial* until its publication ceased in April 1844. Thoreau’s major publications after that time consist of *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers* (1849), *Resistance to Civil Government* (1849), and *Walden* (1856).

A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers is a chronicle of Thoreau and his brother John’s 1839 exploration of those rivers. The fourteen-day trip took the two brothers from Concord, Massachusetts, to Concord, New Hampshire, and back again. Published ten years later, this work introduced the themes of interior and exterior exploration as the predominant themes of Thoreau’s writing and of his life. His attention to minute details enabled him to draw close connections between nature and human

nature, especially the shared, continuous process of transformation. Thoreau, like Goethe, sought himself in his surroundings, and sought truth as an internal reflection of nature. He found in nature's laws the moral foundation for his own life, consciously rejecting both Christianity and the state as the basis for moral authority.

Walden is Thoreau's account of his two-year experiment of living deliberately, housed in a small cabin he built for himself on Walden Pond, a short walk from Concord, and an even shorter walk from Emerson's house. He planted beans, corn, and potatoes, and tried to live as simply as possible by providing for his own minimal needs. Thoreau's project was to discover for himself what he required to live and how best to meet those requirements. In withdrawing from the greater society, he pursued an act of internal and external reform. Internally, he sought his own liberation from dependence on his parents, Emerson and others, while he struggled to earn an income sufficient to support himself. Externally, he withdrew from a society he saw as corrupted by two unsupportable evils: slavery and a war of expansion with Mexico. During his fourteen-month stay at Walden, he wrote *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers*, based on his journal notes from that trip, and also wrote the first draft of *Walden*, along with a couple of lectures and an essay titled "Ktaadn."

During his stay at Walden Pond, in July 1846, Thoreau was arrested for refusing to pay his poll tax. He spent one night in jail before someone paid his tax, and he was released. Thoreau's refusal to pay the poll tax was based on his moral objections to slavery and the war with Mexico. This event became the basis for Thoreau's essay "Resistance to Civil Government," and an important intellectual component of the argument for non-violent resistance campaigns, including those led by

Mohandas Ghandi, Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr., and César Chavez.

Thoreau's views toward individual conscience and political life drew not only from the stoic and Emersonian traditions of individualism, but also from extensive reading in Eastern philosophy, especially Confucianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Thoreau read the *Bhagavadgita* while at Walden, at a time when his writing schedule and the demands of his scientific interests left little time for reading. By 1850, his reading had expanded to a systematic survey of the extant literature on ancient Eastern texts. Thoreau began his survey of Hindu literature with Elliot Cabot, who thought of Hinduism as transcendental idealism. Thoreau's reading included *The Laws of Menu*, *Mahabharata*, *Visnu Purana*, *Icvara Krsna*, the *Sama Veda* and four Upanishads. From this Hindu transcendentalism, Thoreau drew much of his main theme of individual freedom through withdrawal. This withdrawal was not complete, though. Thoreau hosted the antislavery society's annual meeting on 1 August 1846, one week after his arrest, and also entertained friends from time to time.

In addition to civil disobedience, Thoreau wrote on two other major themes during his Walden years: civilization and primitivism. About a year into his stay at Walden, Thoreau embarked on a two-week journey into the Maine woods to climb to the top of Mount Ktaadn. There, Thoreau encountered unspoiled wilderness, which he described as primitivism, or wildness. The relationship between civilization and primitivism became a dominant theme of "Ktaadn," the essay based on his excursion into Maine, and drafted at Walden Pond. Thoreau's understanding of humankind's relationship to nature was altered by his experience of the unforgiving Maine wilderness. "Ktaadn" expressed a more savage aspect of nature than

is found in his earlier work and one that need not be kind to man. Recognition of nature's indifference to man brought to Thoreau a sense of terror, which he recognized as a basis for experiencing the sublime. This wild side of nature he found indispensable to the civilized man. Inspired by Darwin, Thoreau read the works of Linnaeus and acquainted himself with the historical development of botany. With this grammar of natural science, Thoreau was enabled to see the earth as poetry, famously displayed in his description of a frozen clay bank, beside railroad tracks, thawing in the spring.

Thoreau's legacy, however, lies as much in his personal journal, which ran to a million words, as in his published works. Thoreau is perhaps best known for two famous quotes, "If a man is out of step with his fellows, perhaps it is because he marches to the beat of a different drummer," and "The masses of men lead lives of quiet desperation." The essence of Thoreau's thought lies between those two quotes. The first insists that one must live according to his own lights, and the second reminds us of the consequence for not doing so. In these respects, Thoreau followed his own advice. He continued to work actively against slavery and helped at least one slave escape to Canada, by way of the Underground Railroad. He wrote and delivered the lecture, "Slavery in Massachusetts," as a response to the Fugitive Slave Act and the Anthony Burns affair. Anthony Burns was an escaped slave, who was arrested in Boston and remanded back into slavery according to the terms of the Fugitive Slave Act.

Two years later, Thoreau met Walt Whitman, another anti-slavery poet and writer. From May to July of 1861, Thoreau took his final excursion to Minnesota with Horace Mann, Jr. Thoreau died in Concord, Massachusetts, on 6 May 1862 at the age of forty-four.

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David Davis

TOULMIN, STEPHEN EDELSTON (1922–2009)

Stephen Toulmin was born in London, England, on 25 March 1922. Toulmin received a BA from King’s College in 1942, and earned his MA in 1947 and PhD in philosophy 1948 from Cambridge University, studying with Ludwig Wittgenstein. Toulmin became lecturer in philosophy of science at Oxford after graduating, staying until 1955. Taking a philosophy post at the University of Leeds, Toulmin then published *Uses of Argument* (1958). This work drew hostile reception by notable analytic philosophers, but it was popular in America among communication scholars with a particular interest in the uses

of rhetoric. It can be argued that the success of *Uses of Argument* marks the beginning of Toulmin's classification as an "American" philosopher. This designation was fortified by his entry into the United States in 1959 and service as a visiting professor at New York University, Stanford University, and then Columbia University.

The American attraction to Toulmin's analysis can partially be accounted for by its pragmatic orientation, and its ability to apply structural method to understanding rhetorical arguments. By analyzing the nature of arguments, Toulmin's range of inquiry had approached the analysis of rhetorically structured arguments: the relevance of the application of practical argument to ethics; the foundations of ethics as reason proceeding from experience; and the relationship of science to reason as an applied praxis. The scope of Toulmin's inquiry was proscriptive of ethical problems as they might occur out of scientific culture and the consequences raised by the application of formal reason to practical moral thought. The expansion and recognition of his groundbreaking use of argument to the substantive nature of applied reason was first apparent in his return to England, where from 1960 to 1965 he was director of the Unit for History of Ideas of the Nuffield Foundation.

Toulmin returned to the United States in 1965 when he became a professor of philosophy at Brandeis University (1965–1969), then professor of philosophy at Michigan State University (1969–1972). In 1972–1973 he was professor of humanities at the University of California at Santa Cruz. During that time he published *Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts*. In 1973 he became professor with the committee on social thought at the University of Chicago. *Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts* contained the provocative suggestion that

conceptual understanding was a collective process of assimilating meaning and subjecting these constructs to rational critical thought as a consequence of experience and not, necessarily, a conclusion based upon strict formal propositions.

This structural approach to applied reason in scientific procedure earned Toulmin a place with the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1975–1978), established by the United States Congress. At that time he published, with Albert R. Jonsen, *The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning*. The revival of casuistry as the foundation for ethical understanding was a tradition that had remained intact in Catholic theological thought. Toulmin's application directly reflected the inherent evolution of legal thought out of Common Law in which a collective of "case studies" established critical precedence for the validity of a premise from one case to the next. Toulmin's use of casuistry was prescient in its grasp of the use of case studies in applied ethics.

After his stay at the University of Chicago, Toulmin took a position at Northwestern University as Avalon Foundation Professor of the Humanities (1986–1992). He published *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* in 1990, a work critical of the understanding of the Enlightenment and modern philosophy since Descartes. Toulmin held that Cartesian rationalism had arbitrarily divided epistemology into recalcitrant structures, with strict formal reasoning on one side and subjective intuition on the other. He asserts the view that human understanding is composed of conceptual understanding related to direct experience and subject to critical, rational thought and, thus, is a synthetic proposition rather than a series of arbitrary principles.

In 1992 Toulmin became Henry Luce Professor at the Center for Multiethnic and

Transnational Studies at the University of Southern California. Throughout Toulmin's long and distinguished career he has held visiting professorships at Bryn Mawr, Dartmouth College, and Southern Methodist University. He also has been a Phi Beta Kappa National Lecturer, a visiting scholar at the Hastings Center, and a Guggenheim Fellow. In 1998 he was named Jefferson Lecturer by the National Endowment for the Humanities. Toulmin died on 4 December 2009 in Los Angeles, California.

His applied ethical constructs have recently focused on the relationship between local and global institutions from a non-governmental perspective and border, as well, on the analysis of the interdependency of global structure beyond the nation-state. In 2001 Toulmin published *Return to Reason*, where he once again draws a distinction between reason and rationality, arguing that reason must temper the formal rational process in order to confront the emerging problems of twenty-first-century civilization. In many ways Toulmin's title for his latest publication is both a model for and an example of his earliest claims about the nature of logic.

In his early publication *The Uses of Argument*, Toulmin made a distinction between substantial and analytic arguments. Substantial arguments appealed to content for validity. Analytic arguments appealed to form. Substantial argument is an example of inference where a conclusion is reached on the basis of coherence, while analytic argument is based on a consistency of the conclusion to the premise. Analytic arguments must therefore base their premises on a universal truth, while substantive arguments refer to the context of a particular situation. If applied to ethical reasoning, analytic arguments are more in line with Kantian deontological principles, wherein a singular truth, such as "lying is wrong," must be applied in degrees

to all situations. The substantive argument, in contrast, may look to a situation and the *reason* for lying for its moral content; such as, telling a potential murderer that one does not know where his victim is hiding is not wrong. A rational principle, such as $2 + 2 = 4$, must be invariant and always true. A reasonable principle, however, such as lying to a murder-crazed individual does not admit to an invariant truth but, rather, admits the circumstance that has incurred the lie. Thus a rational principle may have no bearing on a practical situation.

A great deal of Toulmin's work draws upon this distinction between theoretical and practical argument, and demonstrates that theoretical arguments are often useless in reasoning about everyday situations. Despite this fact, Toulmin claims that theoretical and analytic models have dominated formal and academic thought since the Enlightenment, partially as a consequence of the historical insecurity of the Thirty Year War and the consequent rise of Cartesian certainty as an antidote to skepticism. This critical analysis of modern philosophy is undertaken in *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*. Toulmin suggests that the division of analytic and substantive reasoning is a late-comer in the history of philosophy, and that Aristotle employs theoretical argument but also employs practical or substantive arguments, particularly in ethics. This tradition was lost, he says, in post-Renaissance Europe and the rise of Cartesian thought, particularly in the need for certainty in analytic reasoning and the exclusively rational constructs of Cartesian methodology. In practical and applied reason there can be no absolute: rather, the conditions of probability, such as our judgments, may be probably-correct or probably-incorrect, depending on the conditions. In this we have a movement away from Kantian ethics and a movement toward axiological or value-based

reasoning, in which a conclusion is probably correct or incorrect in accordance with the values or claims held by the premises which, too, is up for critical examination.

The way we arrive at practical judgments is through examining values, and then examining case-specific examples in order to reach a synthetic proposition. The model for practical argument is developed from the idea that justification is the primary function of practical argumentation. As contrasted to the process of inference in analytical propositions, the role of practical argument is to justify claims. Justification is a reflective activity and, therefore, reflects on the nature of experience rather than inferring an absolute conclusion. Justification is a process of testing through critical thought and examination. It is a collective and ongoing reflection on the nature of human experience. An argument is tentatively sound if it survives the ongoing critical process, including the test of time, and is justified as a verdict grounded in the collective of experience.

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TUCKER, GEORGE (1775–1861)

George Tucker was born on 20 August 1775 in the British colony of Bermuda. Tucker arrived in the United States in 1795 to reside in Williamsburg, Virginia, where his relative St. George Tucker lived. He soon entered the College of William and Mary and graduated with the BA degree in 1797. After further study of the law Tucker was admitted to the Virginia bar in 1801. His Richmond law practice was not successful, but his practice in Pittsylvania County during 1808–1818 was much improved. He was elected to the lower house of the Virginia General Assembly, serving from 1815 to 1817. After his move to Lynchburg in 1818 he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1819 and he served three terms.

In 1822 Tucker published *Essays on Various Subjects of Taste, Morals and National Policy*, which earned the approval of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. They recommended Tucker for the position of Professor of Moral Philosophy at the new University of Virginia, and he began teaching in 1825. By 1826 he had taken over instruction in political economy from the professor of law, so in later years his title was Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy. Following the nondenominational spirit of Jefferson, Tucker did not use any religious text for moral and political philosophy, disdaining Joseph Butler and William Paley. Tucker gave instruction primarily from his own lectures, and assigned books in the Scottish tradition such as *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* by Hugh Blair, *Elements of Criticism* by Lord Kame, and Dugald Stewart's *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind* and *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man*.

Tucker's major works during his service to the university were *The Laws of Wages, Profits and Rent Investigated* (1837), *The Theory of Money and Banks Investigated* (1839), and *Progress of the United States in Population and Wealth in Fifty Years* (1843). Tucker retired in 1845, and William McGuffey was appointed to the professorship of moral philosophy. In retirement Tucker lived in Philadelphia and enjoyed an intellectually active life. He participated in the American Philosophical Society and the Historical Society. His later works included a *History of the United States* (1856–58), a volume of his lectures titled *Political Economy for the People* (1859), and a collection of articles published under the title *Essays, Moral and Metaphysical* (1860). Tucker died at the home of a daughter in Sherwood, Albemarle County, Virginia, on 10 April 1861.

Tucker tended to follow the Scottish Common Sense school in psychology and

ethics. As an ardent expositor of Adam Smith, laissez-faire and free trade economics, and agrarian politics, Tucker generally maintained Jefferson's liberalism. Tucker favored a central bank, a free press, universal education (including women), the disestablishment of religion, and the gradual emancipation of slaves. He predicted the dissolution of slavery on economic grounds as an inefficient alternative to capitalism, and he disagreed with Jefferson's blatant racism even while he agreed that full political and social integration was imprudent (Rose 1999). Among the articles collected together for his *Essays* are "On our Belief of an External World," "On Cause and Effect," "On the Association of Ideas," "On Dreams," "On Beauty," "On Sublimity," "On Classical Education," "On the Siamese Twins," and "On the Lore of Fame."

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John R. Shook

TUCKER, ST. GEORGE (1752–1827)

Among the important legal theorists in America, St. George Tucker's annotated

edition of Blackstone was one of the most influential legal treatises in early American jurisprudence. His annotations, which clearly documented where American law had diverged from English common law, became a central source for the understanding of American law, and particularly the Constitution in the formative era. Not only was it highly influential in its time, but also with the current Supreme Court's emphasis upon "original understanding," Tucker's writings and notes have exercised a powerful influence on contemporary Constitutional jurisprudence. His distant relative George Tucker was a prominent political economist and a professor of moral philosophy at the College of William and Mary. His son Henry St. George Tucker (1780–1840) was a judge of the Virginia Court of Appeals and a professor of law at the University of Virginia, while another son, Beverley Tucker (1784–1851), became a professor of government and law at the College of William and Mary.

St. George Tucker was born on 10 July 1752 in St. George, Bermuda. In 1772 he travelled to Virginia to study at the College of William and Mary. Tucker studied law under George Wythe and then joined the Virginia bar in 1774. During the revolutionary war he smuggled arms from the West Indies for Patrick Henry and served in the Virginia militia. In 1796 Tucker wrote the anti-slavery pamphlet *A Dissertation on Slavery: With a Proposal for the Gradual Abolition of It, in the State of Virginia*. This treatise, notable for being one of very few writings of the time both originating in the South and demanding an end to slavery, was addressed to the General Assembly of Virginia. The Assembly ignored it.

Tucker was a well-respected legal mind and served for many years as judge at various levels within state and federal government. He was Virginia district judge from 1788 to 1803. From 1803 to 1811 he served on the

Virginia Court of Appeals. In 1813 Tucker was nominated by President James Madison to a position on the Federal District Court and then he was reassigned to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in 1819 where he served until his retirement in 1825. Tucker died on 10 November 1827 at the home of his stepdaughter near Warminster, Virginia.

As a judge, Tucker again displayed his ambivalent relationship with the institution of slavery. For instance, in the case of *Hudgins v. Wrights* (1803) Tucker rejected a lower court decision that had accepted the argument that Virginia's Declaration of Rights had ended the legal status of slavery and, further, Tucker held that legally blacks were presumed to be slaves unless they could satisfactorily prove otherwise. The decision therefore placed the burden of proof upon blacks to prove their legal right to freedom.

While a judge, Tucker succeeded his mentor Wythe as Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary, teaching from 1790 until 1803. Called the first modern professor of law and the "creator of the American law degree," Tucker is most influential in American legal culture, though, for his rigorously annotated version of Blackstone's *Commentaries*, known as "Tucker's Blackstone," published in 1803. This five-volume edition of Blackstone became the standard work of American law for its generation, one of the most widely read legal text of its time, and the first major American treatise on the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The text is still one of the most frequently cited legal treatises by the Supreme Court. His version of the *Commentaries* was notable for the careful documentation of where American law had changed common law principles and "improved" upon English tradition. Through this documentation Tucker made a case for the importance of legal change and popular sovereignty.

Tucker's work was also notable for his strong take on freedom of speech and his early advocacy for the "state rights" strict interpretation of the Constitution. While this theory of a compact between the states was strongly rejected by Supreme Court Justices John Marshall and Joseph Story, it has remained a powerful minority theory in Constitutional jurisprudence.

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Brian E. Butler

TUFTS, JAMES HAYDEN (1862–1942)

James Hayden Tufts was born on 9 July 1862 in Monson, in western Massachusetts. He enrolled at Amherst College in 1880 and graduated with his BA and Phi Beta Kappa in 1884. While at Amherst, Tufts was strongly influenced by Charles Edward Garman, who instilled in him the necessity for freeing issues of the meaning of life from the constraints of outdated theology. He entered Yale Divinity School in 1887, intending to prepare for the ministry; but, after receiving the BD degree in 1889, he joined John Dewey in

the philosophy department at the University of Michigan instead. Tufts remained at Michigan for two years, teaching philosophy and psychology courses, before leaving for doctoral work in Germany at the universities of Berlin and Freiburg. He completed his dissertation at Freiburg on “The Sources and Development of Kant’s Teleology,” working with Alois Riehl, and received his PhD in philosophy in 1892.

Tufts returned to America as assistant professor of philosophy at the just-opened University of Chicago. During his long career there, he rose through the ranks to full professor, and also served as department chair, Dean of the Senior Colleges, Dean of Faculties, Vice President, and Acting President in 1925. He edited *The School Review* from 1906 to 1909, and edited *The International Journal of Ethics* from 1914 to 1931. He was the author of numerous books and articles on the history of philosophy, ethics, and social issues. Along with Hartley Burr Alexander, Tufts has the unusual distinction of being elected to the Presidency of all three divisions of the American Philosophical Association: President of the Western Philosophical Association in 1905–06; Joint President of both the Western Philosophical Association and the American Philosophical Association (now Eastern Division) in 1914–15; and the Pacific Division in 1934–35. Tufts retired from Chicago at the end of 1930 and moved to California, where he occasionally taught at southern California universities. Tufts died on 5 August 1942 in Berkeley, California.

Tufts was a member, with John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, of the social pragmatist movement that developed in Chicago in the late nineteenth century. Tufts generally avoided the logical and epistemological disputes surrounding the nature and meaning of pragmatism – disputes that he found to be of little value – and focused upon advancing

social pragmatism’s melioristic program for society. Convinced that economic and technological changes had made the lives of virtually all of the members of the community less secure, Tufts and others worked to improve the conditions of education, housing, nutrition, health care and employment in the Chicago area. In his related ethical writings, Tufts demonstrated a strong emphasis upon reconstructing customs to enable society to focus upon topics of vital contemporary interest. In his contribution to *Ethics*, the volume that he co-wrote with Dewey, Tufts explored the development of the moral tradition of the West, and considered ways that it might be adapted to address contemporary social ills. *The Real Business of Living* was written to assist high school students grasp the long process of cooperative interaction that is the foundation of public morality. *America’s Social Morality* was a book for the general public that offered a portrait of the moral condition of American society and attempted to portray the historical roots of the various institutional strains and tensions.

Tufts’s commitment to the reconstruction of society was grounded in an interpretation of Darwinian evolution that emphasized the continuity of the organic world, the central fact of embodiment, and the need for experimentalism and reconstruction. Also central to Tufts’s world-view was his belief in the social nature of the self. The ethical implications of this social perspective were three: the importance of studying the history of humankind to uncover the origins of its moral ideas and practices, the examination of the mores of society and their development over time due to various social pressures, and the ongoing need for moral inquiry into the problems of social institutions rather than into theoretical or meta-ethical issues.

The broad conception of social service that was central to social pragmatism was at the

foundation of Tufts's thought. He rejected philosophers' narrow concern with what Dewey called "the problems of philosophers" and their progressive withdrawal from "the problems of men." We also find Tufts suggesting that there would be a great benefit from a period of work in which philosophers attempted to "follow the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, Locke, Descartes and Kant, not by discussing their problems, but by attacking the most vital public questions of our day." When philosophers again become more concerned with the fundamental issues of human existence – patterns of work and education, as well as other social institutions – it would be possible to reconnect the lives of scholars with the broader work of the society.

This inadequate relationship between our ideas and our lives called for attempts at conceptual reconstruction. The goal was not to uncover what these terms "really" mean through historical and analytic study. To do so would at best only determine the terms' possibilities as conceived by those who lived long ago. Rather, Tufts maintained that what is necessary in ongoing conceptual reconstruction to reconnect these concepts with the basic human values to which they point, while at the same time not allowing their traditional meanings to prevent developments to satisfy new situations. Tufts placed a large part of the responsibility for this conceptual reconstruction upon philosophers, who should attempt to construct and revise such ideals as equality, justice, and freedom to enable us to address our social problems.

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James Campbell

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UNGER, PETER KENNETH (1942–)

Peter Unger was born on 25 April 1942 in New York City. He graduated from Swarthmore College with a BA in 1962, and went on to Oxford University, where he earned his DPhil in philosophy in 1966. From 1965 until 1972 Unger taught philosophy at the University of Wisconsin. In 1972, he joined the philosophy faculty at New York University, where he has taught ever since. He has held Guggenheim and National Endowment for the Humanities fellowships.

Unger's work is notable for its readiness to take seriously positions that other philosophers have dismissed out of hand. His collected papers bears the subtitle "Selected Heretical Essays"; not surprising for a volume which includes, among others, essays entitled "A Defense of Skepticism" (1971), "An Argument for Skepticism" (1974), "There Are No Ordinary Things" (1979), "I Do Not Exist" (1979), and "Why There Are No People" (1979). Throughout his wide-ranging philosophical writings – including groundbreaking work in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and the philosophy of mind – Unger stands out as a philosopher of striking analytical acumen, methodological sensitivity, and intellectual honesty. His willingness and ability to follow philosophical arguments to their logical conclusions has served as a constant challenge to other philosophers seeking to defend more moderate positions.

Unger's early work focused primarily on epistemology. His early papers on

skepticism have been widely anthologized, and, along with his important books in this area, *Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism* (1975) and *Philosophical Relativity* (1984), played a central role in revitalizing interest in fundamental questions in epistemology. In a series of papers in the 1970s and 1980s, Unger turned to a number of central issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of language surrounding problems of individuation, identity and vagueness, articulating the important "problem of the many" in his paper of the same name. In *Identity, Consciousness and Value* (1990), he tackled the metaphysical problem of personal identity, defending a subtle view that combined physical and psychological criteria.

In *Living High and Letting Die* (1996), Unger turned his attention to ethics, arguing that each of us has a moral obligation to do as much as we can to alleviate the suffering of others. In *All the Power in the World* Unger returns to a number of fundamental problems in metaphysics, including the nature of the physical, the mind-body problem and free will.

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Tamar Szabó Gendler

UPHAM, THOMAS COGSWELL (1799–1872)

Thomas Cogswell Upham was born on 20 January 1799 in Rochester, New Hampshire, and he died on 2 April 1872 in New York

City. Upham attended Dartmouth College and graduated with his BA degree in 1818. During a religious revival at Dartmouth, he dedicated himself to God; upon graduation, he enrolled in the Andover Theological Seminary, a bastion of Congregational trinitarian orthodoxy. After his graduation with the MA degree from Andover in 1821, he became assistant pastor at the First Congregational Church in his hometown of Rochester, New Hampshire. On 16 July 1823 he was ordained at Rochester and began a promising pastorate that ended soon after it had begun when he was invited to join the faculty of Bowdoin College in Maine. Appointed to Bowdoin in September of 1824, Upham continued to serve his Rochester church while he prepared himself for his new position of Professor of Metaphysics and Ethics, which he took up in February of 1825.

In 1826 Upham published the first half of his *Elements of Intellectual Philosophy*; the full volume appeared in 1827 and a second edition was published in 1828. In 1831 this textbook, revised and expanded, was published in two volumes under the title *Elements of Mental Philosophy, Including Two Departments of Mind, the Intellect and the Sensibilities*. After reading Asa Burton’s *Essays on Some of the First Principles of Metaphysics, Ethics, and Theology* (1824), Upham completed his system of mental philosophy by addressing the will as third coequal department of mind in *A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on the Will* (1834). The complete system was published in three volumes by Harper’s in 1840; an abridged edition in one volume covering the Intellect and the Sensibilities was published in 1840, to which a much-abridged section on the will was added in 1861. In 1840 Upham also published *Outlines of Imperfect and Disordered Mental Action* as Number 100 in the Harper’s Family Library Series. It was the first attempt at a systematic treatment of abnormal psychology by an American author.

His literary contributions also included *Letters Aesthetic, Social, and Moral, Written from Europe, Egypt, and Palestine* (1855). The book was so widely popular in a private printing that it was republished commercially for a wider audience. In 1836, his antiwar articles were gathered together in *The Manual of Peace*, reissued in abridged form in 1842 by the American Peace Society. The Society removed chapters that opposed capital punishment and slavery, positions which were not universally shared by its members.

From 1840 to the time of his death, Upham published several popular books on holiness theology to express his personal views on religion. He was persuaded that individuals might achieve freedom from committing sin (sanctification) by making their own will subject to the will of God, thus going beyond a state in which one is forgiven for sins (justification). His books included *Principles of the Interior or Hidden Life* (1843), *Life of Faith* (1845), *Divine Union* (1851), *Christ in the Soul* (1872), and, posthumously, *Absolute Religion* (1873). At Bowdoin College, he was instrumental in bringing Calvin Stowe to the Bowdoin faculty and Calvin's wife Harriet Beecher Stowe to Brunswick, where she began to write *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. Upham retired from Bowdoin College in 1868.

Upham's contributions to the philosophy of mind began with his 1827 *Elements of Intellectual Philosophy*. The *Elements* preceded the publication of most other American textbooks of the discipline, summarizing and interpreting original sources for students to introduce them to the study of mind. He depended most heavily on the philosophies of John Locke and the Scottish philosophers of Common Sense, Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart. Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) and Stewart's *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind* (1792–1814) were popular

texts, and were among those read by Upham as a student at Dartmouth and at Andover. The addition of the words "for Academies and High Schools" to the title of the abridged third edition of the revised and expanded *Elements of Mental Philosophy* made Upham's textbook among the first designed for use in secondary schools.

Upham distinguished intellectual philosophy from metaphysics and its association in the public mind with speculations for which there were no answers and no practical utility (e.g., whether angels occupied space). The scientific method employed to determine the laws of nature, mind, or human conduct is empirical and inductive, collecting and organizing facts (empiricism) and inferring from them (induction) the general laws or principles that governed them. In the later decades of the century, "science" would imply laboratory investigations; but for Upham and his contemporaries it implied gathering facts from any source that seemed to provide insight into the operations of mind. The most important observations are those of one's own consciousness or of one's own behavior and the behavior of others. The ultimate arbiter of what constitutes a mental fact is the judgment of consciousness, which serves to distinguish among mental processes as the basis for classifying them.

Upham's classification of mental processes constituted a theory of mind. Although mind, for Upham, is unitary and not capable of division, its processes can be classified and organized within three departments or categories of mental operations. The existence of the divisions, and the processes grouped within them, rests on the evidence of consciousness. Upham's tripartite organization not only describes mental processes but also suggests how they operate to translate mental activity into behavior. Upham's theory of mind is explicit in the

relation of the processes of the Intellect to those of the Sensibilities; any excitement of the processes of the sensibilities depends upon activation by some process of the intellect. Emotions and desires, natural or moral, can be activated by perception or memory, focused by attention or past associations. The nature of any action, and whether action results or not, depends on the activation of the will by the sensibilities. Upham's treatment of the Will, as the third department of mind, dealt with three philosophical issues and the empirical facts that might resolve them: whether the will is governed by laws, and hence determined; whether the will is free; and the power of the will. Uniformities of individual conduct and human behavior within social systems support the view that the will is governed by laws, since uniformities in human behavior suggest lawful regulation. At the same time, human beings are confronted with choices, and are therefore free to choose among alternatives, either in accord with the instincts or passions or from motives of moral responsibility. Upham concluded that the will is both free and governed by laws; how both could be true, he was content to leave as a mystery.

Upham's textbook also broke new ground in its discussion of the abnormal functioning of mental processes, unusual for its time and for the Scottish common sense tradition in which Upham wrote. He included discussion of the abnormal in the belief that understanding the aberrations of mind could throw light on its normal functions. Descriptions of various disordered states were attributed to specific disorders of normal mental processes. Disorders of the intellect of external origin include, for example, sensory disorders (seeing apparitions), disordered attention (an inability to focus attention), and somnambulism. Disorders of the intellect of internal origin are identified with, for example, such processes as memory (e.g., senility), imagination (delusions), and

idiocy. The sensibilities too have corresponding disorders: of appetites (alcoholism), of affections (hypochondriasis or phobias), or of derangements of moral sensibilities (the absence of conscience). Disorders of will are those characterized by a condition in which actions seem to be determined by passions and the absence, or subjection, of will.

Upham also addressed questions of moral accountability of the insane and the treatment due to them. He recognized that individuals whose will is disordered should be free from responsibility for their actions. Whether an individual should be held accountable or not was left to be decided in particular circumstances. Upham advocated no specific psychological treatment for imperfect or disordered mental action, but suggested medical remedies for disorders having their origin in ills of the body (such as bloodletting). In his 1840 *Outlines of Imperfect and Disordered Mental Action*, Upham introduced his system of the mind to a popular audience.

Upham's philosophy not only influenced the development of academic psychology in America but contributed to the country's broader intellectual development.

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Alfred H. Fuchs

URBAN, WILBUR MARSHALL (1873–1952)

Wilbur M. Urban was born on 27 March 1873 in Mount Joy, Pennsylvania. In 1892 Urban began his studies at the College of New Jersey, which changed its name to Princeton University a few months after he received his BA in 1895. At the College, Urban studied with Alexander Thomas Ormond and James Mark Baldwin. After graduation, Princeton named him the Chancellor Green Fellow in Mental Science, which enabled him to study in Germany, first at Jena with Rudolf Eucken, then in Leipzig with Wilhelm Wundt. Urban received his PhD in philosophy from Leipzig in 1897 writing on the "History of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," and then returned to New Jersey to spend a year as reader in philosophy at Princeton. His dissertation was published in 1898 as the first volume of the *Princeton Contributions to Philosophy*, edited by Ormond.

After four years as professor of philosophy and psychology at Ursinus College in Pennsylvania from 1898 to 1902, Urban assumed a professorship at Trinity College in Connecticut, where he spent the next eighteen years. In 1909 he published *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws, Being an Introduction to the General Theory of Value*, which he understood to be his first extended critique of ideas that began during his graduate studies in Germany. Urban's conclusion was to renew the investigation into human values by considering work in epistemology and logic. Baldwin had stimulated his thinking about genetic psychology, but here Urban offers his first systematic treatment of his axiology and the genetic psychology of human values, importantly figured as a response to Friedrich Nietzsche and Alexius Meinong. Urban understood his axiology to mean the metaphysical status of value.

By this time, Urban was blending theories of phenomenology with neo-Kantianism. In 1913, he went to Graz to study with Meinong. While in Austria, he began to read the work of Heinrich Rickert and Edmund Husserl. Urban's version of phenomenology sought to blend Plato and Hegel so that we could understand values as prior to objects of value (Plato), but also intimately dependent upon those objects (Hegel).

In 1920 Urban became Stone Professor of Philosophy at Dartmouth College, succeeding Wilmon Sheldon to that appointment when he had gone to Yale University. In 1931 Urban made his last academic move, following Sheldon to the department of philosophy at Yale University, where he also served as chair and director of graduate studies. He received two honorary degrees, an MA from Yale in 1931, and an LHD from Trinity in 1937.

In Urban's *Language and Reality: The Philosophy of Language and the Principles of Symbolism* (1939), he addressed current issues in semantics. *Language and Reality*, though influenced by Ernst Cassirer's work, continues Urban's project on axiology. The appearance of *Beyond Realism and Idealism* (1949) marks his effort to offer something restorative to the perennial rift between realists and idealists, a division he thought could and should be overcome.

Urban served as President of the American Philosophical Association in 1925–26, and his presidential address was entitled "Progress in Philosophy in the Last Quarter Century." Urban retired from Yale in 1941. With a book-length manuscript – *Studies in the Philosophy of History* – completed on his desk, Urban died on 15 October 1952 in New Haven, Connecticut.

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David LaRocca

USHENKO, ANDREW PAUL (1900–1956)

Andrew P. Ushenko was born on 26 November 1900 in Moscow, Russia. After service in the navy during the Bolshevik Revolution, he traveled in India, Europe, and China before emigrating to the United States around 1925. He was accepted to the mathematics graduate program at the University of California at Berkeley. He soon switched to philosophy and earned his MA in 1926 and then his PhD in philosophy in 1927, writing a dissertation on "The Logic of Events." From 1929 to 1936 Ushenko was instructor and assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan; from 1936 to 1949 he was associate professor

of philosophy at Princeton University; and from 1949 until his death he was a professor of philosophy at Indiana University. He died on 11 September 1956 in Mt. Gilead, Ohio.

Ushenko worked primarily in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of logic. He was especially interested in the nature of change and time, relativity theory, the theory of meaning, and the conflict between classical logic and the new logical methods. Ushenko was interested in non-classical logic, and he sought to develop a temporal logic in *The Logic of Events* (1929). His *The Theory of Logic* (1936) and *The Problems of Logic* (1941) defended his vision of logic against the "postulationist theory" of Rudolf Carnap and Alfred Tarski which would unify logic with mathematics instead of philosophy. His logical theory was instead "intuitionalist" because it interprets logical symbols with a common language such as English.

The problem of the existential import of propositions became subject of a lively debate between defenders of Aristotelian logic and proponents of mathematical logic, especially in the first decades of the twentieth century. In the 1920s, Ushenko debated with F.C.S. Northrop on the existential import of universal affirmative propositions in Aristotelian categorical logic. He also considered the relation of Russell's work on the theory of types to what he considered earlier examples, and sought to establish the nature of the relation between Hegelian logic and Russell's mathematical logic. Soviet Georgian set theorist Levan Petrovich Gokieli, who sought to defend dialectical logic against formal logic, used his work on the axiomatization of logic (Gokieli 1947) to repeat arguments set forth by Ushenko in his rejection of formalism in logic.

The concept of dynamism, not far removed from the ideas of Alfred North Whitehead's

process philosophy, inspired Ushenko to reject material substances for a metaphysics of events and processes in *The Philosophy of Relativity* (1937). Ushenko went on to apply dynamism in explorations of philosophy in *Power and Events: An Essay on Dynamics in Philosophy* (1946) and aesthetics in *Dynamics of Art* (1953) which includes an introduction by Stephen C. Pepper. *The Field of Meaning* (1958), also introduced by Pepper, designs a dynamic and contextualist theory of meaning and verification.

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V

VAN FRAASSEN, BASTIAAN CORNELIS (1941–)

Bas van Fraassen was born on 5 April 1941 in Goes, The Netherlands. He immigrated with his family to Canada in 1956, and attended the University of Alberta, receiving a BA in 1963. His graduate work was at the University of Pittsburgh, earning an MA in 1964 and a PhD in philosophy in 1966, where he wrote his dissertation “Foundations of the Causal Theory of Time” under the supervision of Adolf Grünbaum. He taught philosophy at Yale University from 1966 to 1969; the University of Toronto from 1969 to 1982; and the University of Southern California from 1976 to 1981. From 1982 to 2008 Van Fraassen was McCosh Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. He then became Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State University. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Van Fraassen is most famous for his work in philosophy of science, but he has also done important work in philosophical logic. Van Fraassen proved the completeness of free logic, and also developed supervaluationist semantics. Supervaluationist semantics is still often discussed in the context of vagueness: it provides a way of accommodating all the standard logical truths even in the face of vague sentences which are neither true nor false. Also, van Fraassen did work on modal logic, deontic logic, quantum logic, and the logic of conditionals. During his early period,

van Fraassen also continued his work on philosophy of time, writing *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time and Space* (1970). He has recently returned to his early interests in logic, publishing in 2003 *Possibilities and Paradox: An Introduction to Modal and Many-Valued Logic*, co-authored with J.C. Beall.

Van Fraassen’s 1980 book *The Scientific Image* offers a new way of understanding science, and is still frequently taught in philosophy of science classes and debated in top journals. The position that he develops, *constructive empiricism*, holds that the aim of science is to give us theories which are empirically adequate. Roughly speaking, a theory is empirically adequate if and only if what it says about the observable things and events in the world is true. Constructive empiricism is in contrast to the doctrine of scientific realism, according to which the aim of science is to generate theories which give a literally true story of what the world is like, in both its observable and unobservable aspects. Van Fraassen called his position “constructive” to indicate his view that scientific activity is one of construction rather than discovery. Constructive empiricism includes a doctrine about what it is to accept a scientific theory. Van Fraassen holds that acceptance is not the same as belief; accepting a scientific theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. Here the idea is to capture the pragmatic dimension to theory acceptance: reasons for committing to and working with a scientific

theory are different than reasons for believing the theory to be true. Van Fraassen holds that the logical positivists went too far in their attempts to turn philosophical problems into problems about language. He does not think that the claims that theories make about unobservables, or the more metaphysical claims theories make about reality, are meaningless; he just thinks that it is reasonable to be agnostic about whether these claims are true. Also, in contrast to the syntactic view of scientific theories, van Fraassen promulgates the semantic view, where a theory is formulated as a class of mathematical models, together with hypotheses that specify how these models putatively represent reality.

Many of the controversies surrounding constructive empiricism are related to van Fraassen's emphasis on the observable/unobservable distinction. Van Fraassen has a lot to say about what "observable" amounts to, but the rough idea is that an entity is observable if and only if it is capable of being directly perceived by the unaided senses. Thus, dinosaurs and distant stars are observable, while elementary particles and objects that one can only see with the aid of a microscope are not. The observable/unobservable distinction is critically discussed in many of the essays in the book *Images of Science*, a collection of responses to *The Scientific Image*.

After *The Scientific Image*, van Fraassen's next major book was *Laws and Symmetry*, published in 1989. Van Fraassen continues espousing an empiricist understanding of science by arguing that there are no laws of nature, and critiques the inference to the best explanation (IBE), the rule that one should infer that the best explanation one has for a phenomenon is the true one. Van Fraassen argues that explanation is a pragmatic notion, and is not a guide to truth, defending a probabilistic, voluntarist epistemology. In

the 1970s and 1980s, van Fraassen published various papers in the area of foundations of quantum mechanics. This work culminated in his 1991 book *Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View*.

In the 1990s, van Fraassen's work turned to the question "what is it to be an empiricist?" This culminated in *The Empirical Stance* (2002) and *Scientific Representation* (2008). Van Fraassen positions empiricism in opposition to (pre-Kantian) metaphysics, and argues that many formulations of empiricism in the past have themselves ended up being metaphysical positions. He holds that there is no one doctrine that can characterize empiricism; instead empiricism should be viewed as a philosophical stance. Roughly speaking, a stance is a cluster of attitudes, commitments, approaches, and sometimes beliefs. It is not just empiricism that is a stance, according to van Fraassen; many other philosophical positions are best understood as stances as well. *The Empirical Stance* also contains a discussion of the relationship between science and religion. Van Fraassen is a theist, though *The Empirical Stance* is one of the few places where the point comes up in his philosophical writings. Van Fraassen holds that science is a paradigm of rational inquiry, but he also holds that science doesn't require a secular attitude.

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Bradley Monton

VAN INWAGEN, PETER JAN (1942–)

Peter van Inwagen was born on 21 September 1942 in Rochester, New York. He received the BS from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1965 and the PhD in philosophy from the University of Rochester in 1969, working with Richard Taylor and Keith Lehrer. He was a professor of philosophy at Syracuse University from 1971 to 1995. He then moved to the University of Notre Dame to be John Cardinal O’Hara Professor of Philosophy. He gave the Gifford Lectures at the University of St. Andrews in 2003, published as *The Problem of Evil* (2006). He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2005, and served as President of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2008–09, and President of the Society of Christian Philosophers during 2010–13.

Van Inwagen’s prominence as philosopher of metaphysics, ethics, and religion has as much to do with his penetrating and incisive scholarship as it does with his well-deserved stature as a Christian philosopher. He has

deeply influenced debates over free will, materialist ontology, the ontological status of persons, and arguments for and against the existence of God.

His first book, *An Essay on Free Will* (1983), began by questioning contemporary philosophy's dominant view that free will can exist in a deterministic world. Too many philosophers have tacitly accepted "compatibilism" by agreeing that free will requires determinism, despite the way that "incompatibilism," as van Inwagen labeled it, still has good arguments supporting it. Determinism asserts that "the past determines a unique future" (p. 2). Van Inwagen holds that free will requires that agents can be responsible for actions by having some control over what causes them, but that causal responsibility (and hence moral responsibility) is impossible to locate if determinism is true. If incompatibilism has the stronger position, then science-minded philosophers (such as Daniel Dennett, a target of van Inwagen's later writings) will fail to find genuine free will in a deterministic world, no matter how cleverly they seek grounds for moral responsibility in the way we intelligently conduct ourselves. Other philosophers simply deny free will's reality, relegating moral responsibility to a conventional or fictional status. Van Inwagen affirms free will and moral responsibility by defending "libertarian free will" and raising doubts about determinism, at least where personal agents are concerned.

In later essays such as "Free Will Remains a Mystery" (2000) and "How to Think about the Problem of Free Will" (2008), van Inwagen admitted the plausibility of a classic argument against free will based on the supposition that indeterminism is correct instead. If chance is quite real, then chanciness infuses the causation of events (and chance may mean the absence of causation, too), so an

agent's capacity to control actions is eroded (and maybe eroded away entirely) by chance within the order of worldly events. The more that chance involved, the less control is possible by an agent, and hence free will may not be possible in an indeterministic world, either. Van Inwagen isn't the first philosopher to admit that free will may not be coherent concept no matter the way the world actually works; J.C.C. Smart and Peter Strawson had reached that skeptical point, for example. Nevertheless, van Inwagen holds that persons have a special ontological status, so that naturalistic worldviews, deterministic or indeterministic, may not entirely decide the question of free will.

In *Material Beings* (1990) van Inwagen explored metaphysical options for assigning a special ontological status to organisms. An organism, unlike any other kind of object, has parts ordered in just the sort of relationship required to compose a single object: that unique organism. This isn't true about the aggregate elementary particles (found in pieces of wood, for example) that happen to be presently arranged in a chair-like shape: there is no chair over and above those molecules. *Ontology, Identity, and Modality* (2001) expressly starts from Quine's position on ontological commitment and its central principle that "the single sense of being or existence is adequately captured by the existential quantifier of formal logic" (p. 21). He is led to the position that uncreated abstract properties must exist, contra nominalism (and contra Christian theology), and hence reductive materialism is incorrect. Persons are fully material objects that think and feel and display responsibility, so it is more reasonable to attribute free will to persons than to deny free will. It is also more reasonable to expect some sort of material continuity between this life and the resurrected life to come.

Van Inwagen has also enriched the debate whether the argument from evil can raise much doubt about God. *The Problem of Evil* (2006) explains that the first sins of humans are at fault for the fallen and tragic world we live in, and God cannot be faulted for providing a providential afterlife, nor for allowing many evils which serve to turn humans towards God.

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John R. Shook

VEATCH, HENRY BABCOCK (1911–1999)

Henry Veatch was born on 26 September 1911 in Evansville, Indiana. He attended Harvard, which granted him his BA with honors in 1932, his MA in philosophy in 1933, and, after two years of study at Heidelberg, his PhD in philosophy in 1936. He spent most of his career at Indiana University (1937–65), becoming distinguished senior professor of philosophy in 1961. From 1965 to 1973 he was professor of philosophy at Northwestern University, and from 1973 to 1983 he was professor of philosophy at Georgetown University. Veatch died on 9 July 1999 in Bloomington, Indiana.

Veatch was popular and rigorous teacher because of his wit and insightfulness, and he mentored over fifty doctoral students. He was active in professional groups, including the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, the Society for Metaphysics (President, 1960–1961), the American Philosophical Association (President of the Western Division, 1970–1971) and the American Catholic Philosophical Association

(President, 1979–1980). Veatch received a wide variety of honors and was active in the Episcopal Church.

Veatch was a prolific author, writing ten books, over fifty articles, and dozens of book reviews. Although his training was in analytic philosophy, he became a realist early in his career, and later he was a leading proponent of a modernized Aristotelian-Thomistic viewpoint. Veatch did extensive and technical work in logic. He held mathematical logic to be fundamentally nominalistic and concerned with the relationships we establish within the conceptual structures we choose to set up, making it useful in developing science but not in philosophy and the other humanities. Aristotelian logic, however, is based on a realist metaphysics and is concerned with the proper ordering of our cognitive acts, through which we can understand the world and justify our moral values.

In epistemology, Veatch rebutted modern views of sensation and ideas as mere representations, which logically lead to idealism and scepticism. He defended Aristotelian realism and empiricism: we do grasp objectively what things are, however incompletely. This knowledge, although sometimes wrong, is corrigible and is generally reliable. He also held it reasonable to remain open to religious faith claims. To make sense of our world, Veatch recommended a return to Aristotelian metaphysics: its notions of actuality and potentiality, matter and form, substance and accidents, and the four types of causes. Only through them can we attain a consistent and objective understanding of our changing world and of our role as responsible agents within it.

In ethics, Veatch argued against relativism, utilitarianism, and deontology and instead defended a natural law view. His attacks on positivism and analytic

philosophy, which were dominant in the mid-20th century, make him now seem rather prescient. He thought of himself mainly as a defender of what many had come to think of as outdated views which, when properly understood, were really more objective and insightful than most theories of the last four centuries. He wrote works that heightened the appreciation of Aristotle that professional colleagues, as well as informed readers, found stimulating.

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Gerard J. Dalcourt

VENDLER, ZENO (1921–2004)

Zeno Vendler was born on 22 December 1921 in Devecser, Hungary. He was educated in Hungary and trained as a Jesuit priest in Maastricht, Holland, receiving the STL degree in 1952. He came to the United States and received a PhD in philosophy from Harvard University in 1959. He briefly taught philosophy at Boston College during 1957–59 but left the Jesuit order, and then taught philosophy at Cornell University during 1960–63 and Brooklyn College in 1964–65. In 1965 Vendler was one of the founding members of the University of Calgary's philosophy department with his appointment as associate professor. He was promoted to full professor in 1967, and served as department head in 1971. In 1973 he went to Rice University as the McManis Professor of Philosophy, and in 1975 he went to the University of California at San Diego, where he was professor of philosophy until retiring in 1989. Vendler died on 13 January 2004 while visiting family in Kossuth, Hungary.

Vendler is best known for his work at the intersection of linguistics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. An early association with linguistic scholar Zelig Harris, who Vendler deeply admired, was of lasting influence. A common theme running through Vendler's first three books is that there is great philosophical payoff to be had from the investigation of the structure of words and the way they behave in various contexts. In this sense, he was among the last and linguistically most sophisticated of

the ordinary language philosophers. One of Vendler's most important contributions concerns the general notion of the "aspect" of a verbal phrase. Although Vendler credited Aristotle with this discovery, his own work resurrected, clarified and greatly expanded the notion. The "Vendler Classification" is now a standard notion of contemporary linguistic theory.

Vendler's classification broke verbal phrases into four categories, depending on whether they had one, both, or neither of two independent properties. The first property was telicity. A verbal phrase is telic if, as a part of its meaning, it specifies a goal or endpoint, as in "build the house" and "reach the top of the mountain." Verbal phrases lacking such an endpoint specified as a part of their meaning were called "atelic," and they include "laugh" and "know the answer." Vendler famously showed that a mark of telicity and atelicity concerns what sort of durational modifications can be added to the verbal phrase. It is completely normal to say, for instance, that Mary built the house in two weeks or that she reached the top of the mountain in two weeks. However, it is not as natural to say that Mary built the house for two weeks or that she reached the top for two weeks. In contrast, the only meaning that can be assigned to sentences like "Sue laughed in an hour" or "Sue knew the answer in an hour" is one where "in an hour" means something similar to "within an hour after some previously specified time." Importantly, "in an hour" cannot mean what it can mean when it modifies a telic phrase. Similarly, there is no oddity at all in the sentences 'sue laughed for an hour' and 'sue knew the answer for an hour.' The "for an hour" or "in an hour" test is widely used today as a diagnostic of telicity.

The second property is that of continuity. A verbal phrase is continuous if they specify

processes consisting of 'successive phases following one another in time' (1967, p. 99). For example "drive the car" and "draw a picture" are both continuous expressions. In contrast, "lose the keys" and "be made of wood" are discontinuous. As with telicity, Vendler noted that there were several diagnostic tests for continuity. In general, only continuous verbal phrases comfortably take the progressive. So although it is natural to say that John was driving the car or drawing a picture yesterday, it would be much less natural to say that he was losing his keys or that the chair was being made of wood.

Although much of Vendler's work involved the careful analysis of everyday language, such efforts were always directed toward understanding traditional philosophical issues from epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind and language.

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Kent Johnson

VLASTOS, GREGORY (1907–1991)

Gregory Vlastos was born on 27 July 1907 in Istanbul, Turkey, to a Greek father and a mother of British and Greek descent, and was raised in a Protestant faith. Vlastos graduated from Roberts College of Istanbul in 1925 and came to America to study for the ministry. After receiving a BD degree from Chicago Divinity School, he studied philosophy at Harvard under Alfred North Whitehead, receiving his PhD in philosophy in 1931. His first position was in the philosophy department of Queen's University in Ontario. He married Vernon Abbott Ladd in 1932 and with her was active in Christian socialist causes. An increasing interest in Greek philosophy took Vlastos to Cambridge University in 1938 to study under F.M. Cornford. After serving in the Royal Canadian Air Force during World War II, he accepted a philosophy position at Cornell University in 1948, where he learned the methods of analytic philosophy recently introduced to America and applied them to ancient philosophy. In 1954–55 he was a fellow of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, working with Harold Cherniss.

In 1955 Vlastos became Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University, and held that position until 1976. There he organized the classical philosophy program and led the philosophy department as chair for two long periods, during which Princeton became one of the top philosophy departments in the country. After retiring, Vlastos moved to the University of California at Berkeley, where he was the Mills Visiting Professor of Philosophy until 1987. He also was a distinguished professorial fellow at Christ's College of Cambridge University in 1983–84. Vlastos died on 12 October 1991 in Berkeley, California.

Vlastos combined the rigor of classical scholarship with the precision of analytic philosophy. His studies on Plato, Socrates, and Presocratic philosophy, by their careful scholarship and vigorous argument served as paradigms of a new style of work in the history of philosophy. In a time when historical texts were not considered important to philosophy, he brought them to life. In particular, his article "The Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides*" (1954) provoked replies by such leading philosophers as Peter Geach and Wilfrid Sellars, against whom Vlastos held his own. He excelled in writing articles that challenged old orthodoxies and opened new lines of interpretation. In Presocratic studies he stressed the role of political ideals in shaping theoretical conceptions. In Platonic studies, he championed a developmental reading of Plato in which the early Plato adhered to Socratic methods and assumptions, which the mature Plato replaced by, or grounded in, complex epistemological and metaphysical theories.

In a career that spanned three generations, Vlastos set the standard for research in ancient philosophy. His program in classical philosophy at Princeton became a model for education in the history of philosophy, and his doctoral students were in demand throughout the country. More than any single person, he was responsible for the central place ancient philosophy now occupies in philosophy departments in the United States. The summer seminars he taught at Berkeley introduced many young scholars into the study of Socrates, where his own interests lay at the end of his career.

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Daniel W. Graham

VOEGELIN, ERIC HERMAN WILHELM (1901–1985)

Eric Voegelin was born on 3 January 1901 in Cologne, Germany. He attended the University of Vienna, where he earned his doctorate from the Faculty of Law in 1922 and taught political science. Under pressure from the Nazis, Voegelin was fired from the faculty in 1938 for his publications criticizing racial ideologies, Adolf Hitler, and National Socialism. He and his wife immigrated to the United States in 1938, where they became citizens in 1944. Voegelin taught at a number of American institutions before settling at Louisiana

State University, where he taught political science from 1943 to 1958. He then taught at the University of Munich until 1967, when he returned to America and occupied a research professorship at Stanford University's Hoover Institution until his death on 19 January 1985 in Stanford, California.

Voegelin developed a far-reaching philosophy, integrating political theory, sociology, and philosophy of history with metaphysical, epistemological, and moral elements from the Greek, Hebraic, and Christian traditions. As an anti-modernist, he sought a remedy for the ideological alienation of modern intellectual and secular movements, which denied the Divine-Ground-of-Being. He referred to such ideologies of cultural disorder as "deformations of reality." Voegelin believed his role as a philosopher was to "restore the problem of the metaxy" to a society whose intellectuals had posited a quasi-gnostic, materialist view of reality, which denied the existential tension of a humanity dwelling "in-between" the Divine and the temporal. Voegelin was also a mystical philosopher whose published works addressed a number of theological problems. In the 1980s, he developed his earlier ideas into a philosophy of consciousness.

Although Voegelin's training was in sociology, political science, and philosophy of law, he later expanded his research and became a recognized expert in other fields. In an era of increasing specialization, Voegelin endeavored to attain the linguistic, literary, and historical training necessary for what he described as the attainment of "comparative historical knowledge" of civilizations and social structures. As a result of the enormous breadth and linguistic power of his published books and essays, Voegelin's work presents a

formidable intellectual challenge as each part is related to the whole. The *Collected Works of Eric Voegelin* spans thirty-four volumes, including an eight-volume *History of Political Ideas* and his highly acclaimed five-volume *Order and History*.

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Albert Hernández

W

WALZER, MICHAEL LABAN (1935)

Michael Walzer was born on 3 March 1935 in New York City. He graduated from Brandeis University in 1956 with a BA in history. He completed his PhD in government at Harvard University in 1961. Walzer was a professor of government at Princeton University from 1960 to 1966, and at Harvard University from 1966 to 1980. In 1980 he became a permanent faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. Walzer was the UPS Foundation Professor in the School of Social Science until he retired in 2007.

He is probably best known for his landmark study, *Just and Unjust Wars*, which is now in its third edition and used in countless classrooms the world over. If Robert Nozick represents conservatism (or “classical” or “neo” liberalism) whereas John Rawls represents liberalism (of contemporary or “welfare” form), then Walzer is probably the most articulate exponent of a plausible socialism, thus rounding out the mainstream political spectrum. Walzer’s socialism is unique in many ways. First, it demands respect for individual autonomy and human rights, and thus is not a crude collectivism. Second, it is democratic. Third, it is not utopian and it considers the world outside one’s borders. So it is not a Platonic exercise in imagining a hermetically sealed perfect society. Finally, it is remarkable for its support of, and delight in, difference and pluralism, and toleration of such.

The best mode of progressing in social philosophy is, says Walzer, to admit that we are neither discovering nor inventing but, rather, *interpreting* our existing moral heritage in light of its inner principles and various external pressures on it, notably the flow of history. Failure to contextualize interpretation within history leads either to excess abstraction or to pretence about having invented something already there in the moral world we share. Which is the best (most biting and motivating) form of moral and political criticism? Walzer’s ultimately persuasive answer: uncovering hypocrisy. Some of history’s most successful moral reformers, such as Jesus, Martin Luther, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr., all made liberal and powerful use of accusations of hypocrisy.

Walzer claims that it is a sociological fact that there is essentially unanimous endorsement of the “thin” principles: those rules present in every society’s moral code. These *universal* rules regulate our conduct with everyone, and they are mainly prohibitions, such as “don’t murder,” “don’t enslave or torture,” “don’t aggress or dominate,” “don’t be cruel or deceptive,” and so on. Of course, people violate these rules but that’s not the point: the point is that people *still have these rules as part of their moral and political ideals*. So when, for whatever reason, they betray these rules, they open themselves to scathing charges of hypocrisy. Walzer asserts that the substance of thin morality is essentially the same as the substance of modern human rights theory, minimally conceived. Above

and beyond the moral minimum denoted by the thin universalism of human rights, there is and should be room for moral, cultural and personal diversity – and such pluralism should be tolerated, even celebrated.

As regards distributive justice, each good should be distributed only in accord with that good's meaning within that culture. Health care in the West, for example, should be distributed not on the basis of ability to pay, since that has nothing to do with health's meaning, but rather on the basis of medical need. And so universal, public health care systems are called for, and are the norm, in developed Western societies, with the present exception of America. The reason why America fails in this regard is that it has allowed one good, money, to intrude on the sphere of another good, health. But each good should be distributed according to its own meaning. Why? Because failure to do so results in aggression, domination, and even tyranny. Money controls health care distribution in America because well-resourced stakeholders, including hospitals, drug makers, researchers, and insurance providers, want it that way, because it ensures their domination of the sector and their continuing profitability. Walzer calls for the state to offset market forces in this regard, to ensure universal distribution on the basis of need.

The state plays a large, and largely positive, role in Walzer's social philosophy. Its role is to protect everyone's human rights (thin) yet also express a community's identity (thick). Above all, the state is to ensure distributive justice domestically and to protect its community from outside aggression internationally.

Walzer believes in international justice, but not global governance. He thinks every nation should have its own state, and that every state must respect individual human rights and refrain from aggressive and domineering

designs upon other states. This more modest, pluralistic goal is much more achievable in our era than is global governance, yet it would also substantially improve upon the status quo. It better reflects the best consensus we actually do have, as opposed to imposing an invented scheme around which there is none (outside faculty conference rooms).

On Walzer's doctrine of personal identity, he views the self as complex, multiple and plural, and he resists the many who believe that the richness of the human self can be reduced down to one or two "essential" elements, such as soul, rationality, selfishness, or animality. Such people are either inexperienced with life or, more often than not, expressing a crude ideological agenda of their own. There are multiple layers of identity and interest in each of us, plural expressions of memory, movement and value, and the occupation of many salient roles. Walzer correctly cautions us to be suspicious of those who would reduce the rich complexity of the self. We should not reduce the self to fit into some ideologue's Procrustean bed; rather, we should structure society in a complex, plural and liberating way which allows for and nurtures our multiple selves and interests.

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Brian Orend

WARREN, MERCY OTIS (1728–1814)

Mercy Otis Warren was born on 25 September 1728 in West Barnstable in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and she died on 19 October 1814 in Winslow house, Plymouth, Massachusetts. She joined her brother James in his elementary education and followed him through his advanced studies at Harvard, although as a woman she did not actually attend.

As a force favoring the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments) to the Constitution, her role assured Mercy Otis Warren status as being a founder of this nation together with Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson. Her involvement with the colonies' severance from Great Britain, and advancement of an influential ethics and political philosophy at such a critical juncture in the history of a new nation, supplied a legacy. As a woman, however, she had no opportunity to hold office or contribute official documents or actually be named "founder." She had ideas and she had an eloquent pen, affecting events and contributing to laying the philosophical foundations for this new nation.

In 1754 at age twenty-six she married James Warren. Before her fourth of five sons was born, she had adjusted to living on the Warren Family estate, Clifford Farm, near Plymouth. She had her portrait painted by John Singleton Copley, and her brother James had delivered his famous civil rights speech claiming that, "taxation without representation is tyranny." Before 1767 at which time she met Abigail and John Adams, Mercy's husband had been elected to the Massachusetts House of Representatives and her last son was born.

It was at John Adams's request that she began her public writing career on behalf of patriot causes. Her first writings were political dramas published in newspapers

Massachusetts Spy and *Boston Gazette* and as pamphlets. Her last writing was her three-volume *History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution, interspersed with Biographical, Political and Moral Observations* published in 1805. These texts launched Mercy Otis Warren into history and confirmed her as a political theorist of her time and place.

Her dramas *The Adulateur* (1772–3), “The Defeat” (1773), *The Group* (1775–6), *The Blockheads* (1776), and *The Motley Assembly* (1779) articulated and advanced the patriot causes, and her poem “Squabble of the Sea Nymphs” responded to the 1774 Boston Tea Party. The dramatic satires, though they were never performed on stage, earned Warren the designation of first American woman playwright. During this time and well beyond it, Mercy Otis Warren penned her political philosophy and ideas on ethics to her friends and acquaintances. This correspondence eventually composed the bulk of her work on history. The Warren home, Winslow house in Plymouth, became a haven for political discussion which among other enterprises originated the committees of correspondence in the same year that *The Adulateur* was published.

The great human principles, according to Warren, are self-defense and distinction, both of which are susceptible to being fostered as either virtues or vices. By “distinction” Warren meant the seeking of superiority. From this principle develops the social, political, and moral community. This natural character of human nature must be channeled and subject to governance. For Warren the end of freedom is moral virtue. Virtue, for Warren, being the aim of human action depends on political freedom. Freedom allows the individual moral responsibility. Warren’s political philosophy may be summed up in this quotation from her *Poems*: “freedom and virtue shall united

reign” (1980, 190). Warren’s philosophical arguments in her *History* urge safeguards in the federal system against commercialism and accumulation of power.

Warren’s most important and last public argument, 1788 *Observations on the New Constitution*, was published anonymously and for many years was assumed to be the writing of Elbridge Gerry. Warren was appalled by what the original 1789 U.S. Constitution failed to include, so she provided a theory for why a Bill of Rights must necessarily be part of the Constitution. Without such rights, so much of what was fought for under the name of “freedom” was lost, as were the institutions to uphold it, such as the freedom of the press.

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Therese B. Dykeman

WATSON, JOHN (1847–1939)

John Watson was one of Canada's foremost intellectuals for over fifty years. He was a leading representative of the idealistic system that dominated Anglo-American philosophy before World War I. Watson was born on 25 February 1847 in Glasgow, Scotland, and attended the Free Church School in Kilmarnock. At Glasgow University he

studied theology, classics, and philosophy with John and Edward Caird, receiving the MA with highest honors in 1872. He quickly accepted an offer to replace John Clark Murray as the philosophy chair for teaching logic, metaphysics, and ethics at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario. He threw himself into the struggles of a growing provincial college, resistant to subsequent offers from larger universities because "the whole atmosphere seemed to radiate with life and enthusiasm." In 1889 his title became professor of moral philosophy, and in 1901 he added the responsibilities of Vice Principal. The curriculum expanded through his introduction of economics, political science, and psychology at Queen's, and he was an early advocate of the admission of women.

Watson served as head of Queen's philosophy department for fifty-two years, retiring in 1924. Over those years Watson achieved international recognition for his important books on idealism, morality, and religion. He was a visiting professor at University of California at Berkeley in 1895–96, following Josiah Royce's visit and continuing the Berkeley debates on conceptions of God (published as *Christianity and Idealism*). Watson received the supreme honor of giving the Gifford Lectures at Glasgow in 1910–12. Watson also had a reputation as an excellent teacher, making philosophy a popular discipline and producing numerous graduates to fill ministerial and philosophy positions across Canada. As professor emeritus he published still more philosophical essays and commentaries. He also continued to pursue denominational unification and helped to found the United Church of Canada in 1925 (although he never joined it). Watson died on 27 January 1939 in Kingston, Ontario.

Following John and Edward Caird, Watson elaborated a theistic idealism that prevented

God from either retreating into a remote abstraction or absorbing all other spiritual beings into one predestined pantheism. To achieve such a balance, Watson demanded that God must be available in human religious experience, the sort of experience organized by each person's independently rational mind. His Presbyterianism rejected Calvinism as hostile to free will, morality, and rational religion. A mysterious and imperious God could only divorce faith from morality by demanding an impossibly high standard of goodness that condemns all conduct to uselessness. The Cairdian theology instead found morality to be religion's essence, and as Watson argued, they must progress together over time. Materialism and evolution cannot account for this progress, or even explain genuinely moral feelings such as altruism, and so religion grounds society. Religious ideals lead, but never transcend, our actual social order. If our experience of unity with God is deeply connected with our moral life, then Watson further concluded that our commitment to moral/religious ideals is a commitment to our community, which includes God. Most of Watson's efforts were devoted to showing how the best interpretations of both Christian and idealist truths converge on this unification of God with humanity.

The harmonious co-dependence of all people with each other, their natural environment, and God is suggested by a vision of a living whole of internally organized parts. The proper functioning of any part (such as a person) is at the same time the intended functioning of the divine whole. Neither totally separate nor completely merged, a person retains a measure of individual freedom and responsibility even though dependent on the use of God's spiritual activity to reason and learn. Independence cannot require a mythical free will operating outside of nature's causal network. Nor can

science's understanding of nature explain consciousness or will, since a material body can only be a cause for other material body and no system of material bodies could know itself or any other system. Positive freedom is our capacity to act according to our (always partial) moral knowledge.

Watson argued strenuously against personalists and pragmatists who appealed to immediate or radical experience to guarantee independence and freedom, but in Watson's view they found only chaos and irrationality. Watson's type of speculative idealism, which brings human personality into direct relationships with nature and God, also diverges from another kind of idealism represented by F.H. Bradley, who argued that relations and personality are ultimately unreal. In the 1880s and 1890s the philosophers closer to Watson's position were also indebted to Caird, especially Bernard Bosanquet in England, and George Morris and John Dewey in America. Although Dewey later moved away from absolute idealism, he retained a social psychology and communitarian religious morality that located personhood's growth and worth within a larger evolving system.

Watson, like Bosanquet and Dewey, rejected utilitarianism's subjective and hedonistic psychology and instead developed a theory of personal self-realization that simultaneously depends on the whole community's cultural enrichment. The Christian should strive to unite his will with God, by uniting with the social community in pursuit of its ideals. Churches should demand no doctrinal or ritual forms; their traditions are not revelations but human creations that aesthetically arouse the heart's devotion. Watson was a liberal and progressive thinker who hoped that actual moral standards would more closely approximate over time the highest Christian ideals of love and justice.

For Watson, whose moral philosophy placed a responsibility for advancing the social good on all adults equally, political participation must be as equally distributed. The widest possible democracy is thus the best instrument for this common moral/political mission. A pluralism of diverse individuals, and not a restricting uniformity, is the natural outcome of a social community producing an ever wider array of goods and good lives. Watson's theory of political federalism, standing opposed to unrestrained individualism, materialism, and capitalism, follows from his vision of interdependent and mutually supportive citizens. Broadly socialistic and anti-nationalistic, he outlined an influential path for Canadian federalism that is also applicable to international relations. His final book, *The State in Peace and War* (1919), also proposed a world government based on democracy, tolerance, and multicultural integration.

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John R. Shook

WATSON, JOHN BROADUS (1878–1958)

John B. Watson was born on 9 January 1878 on a farm near Travelers Rest in Greenville County, South Carolina. He studied philosophy and psychology with George B. Moore at Furman University in South Carolina and received an MA in 1899. In 1900 Watson began philosophy graduate study at

the University of Chicago, taking courses with philosophy with John Dewey and psychology with James R. Angell. Unable to benefit from their functionalist and pragmatist philosophy, Watson received his inspiration elsewhere. Neurologist Henry Herbert Donaldson, with whom Watson studied the white rat, and biologist Jacques Loeb inducted Watson into the standpoint of reductive materialism. After receiving his PhD in psychology in 1903, he did further experimental research on animal behavior as an assistant in psychology at Chicago from 1903 to 1908.

In 1908 Watson became professor of psychology at Johns Hopkins University, and after the departure of James Mark Baldwin in 1909, he was head of psychology and philosophy department and the editor of *Psychological Review*. In 1912 Watson and the psychology department separated from philosophy, by then under the leadership of Arthur O. Lovejoy. In 1913 Watson announced his behaviorist psychology in lectures at Columbia University, and was elected President of the American Psychological Association in 1915. During World War I Watson served in the Army Signal Corps. Confronted by university officials over his affair with his graduate assistant, whom he later married, Watson resigned from Johns Hopkins in 1920. Interested in applying his behavioral psychology to the marketplace, having already pioneered courses on the psychology of advertising, he joined the J. Walter Thompson advertising company, the first business of its kind in the world, and soon was a Vice President located in New York City. Watson was responsible for redirecting advertising from an informational strategy to a strategy of manipulating the consumer's emotions. Through popular books, lecturing, and public speaking, Watson molded himself into America's expert psychologist, able to

comment on all facets of society. In 1935 he went to the William Esty Company and created more advertising innovations until retiring in 1945. He lived most of the rest of his life in Woodbury, Connecticut, and died on 25 September 1958 in New York City.

His 1914 book *Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology* described the proper scientific destiny of psychology, away from the introspective exploration of consciousness and towards the objective prediction and control of behavior. With Columbia's Edward L. Thorndike already leading the way to behaviorism, and inspired by Harvard's Robert M. Yerkes assistance (they founded the *Journal of Animal Behavior* in 1910), Watson overcame his reluctance to disown the rest of the psychological community. Many potential critics in fact praised Watson's 1914 manifesto, including Dewey and others long frustrated with the control of idealistic and dualistic metaphysics over psychology. However, widespread acceptance of behaviorism had to wait until after experimental psychology proved helpful to the U.S. government and the war effort. In 1919 Watson published his *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, which provided a wide treatment of human psychology, and a new generation of psychologists during the 1920s and 1930s gradually adopted many of behaviorism's tenets, including B.F. Skinner.

Skinner's behaviorism was the result of the confluence of many trends in American psychology. Skinner was following many psychologists who demanded that psychology ally with evolutionary biology, and his view that adaptation to environmental pressures select and reinforce habits was not revolutionary. Nor was his stance against introspection and consciousness new; several prominent psychologists and philosophers, notably William James, scorned any psychology still assuming that its object of

study was a rational soul, immaterial substance, or ghostly inner theater of ideas. However, Watson's strong scientific reductionism and materialism drew staunch opposition from philosophers and psychologists. Watson declared that psychology must not refer to perceptions, concepts, ideas, reasoning, meanings, and purposes, since they are not objectively measurable and controllable. Resistance came from those who remained convinced that psychology should correlate mental events with physiological events, and those who approved of the use of teleological explanation in addition to mechanistic explanation. Many scorned Watson's apparent authorization of reductive materialism's elimination of the mental life and its qualitative features, and rejected his crude individualism and stimulus-response methodology. Watson's behaviorism should not itself be reduced to the type of behaviorism that emerged in the 1950s, but rather studied in its proper context of its earlier intellectual environment.

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John R. Shook

WAYLAND, FRANCIS (1796–1865)

Francis Wayland was born on 11 March 1796 in New York City, and he died on 30 September 1865 in Providence, Rhode Island. He graduated in 1813 with the BA degree from Union College in Schenectady, New York, where he received an education from President Eliphalet Nott that had liberal elements and exposed him to Scottish common sense philosophy. Wayland, with a scientific turn of mind, then went to study medicine in Troy, New York and New York City during 1813–15. His scientific aptitude was re-enforced when he returned to Union College first as a tutor, 1817–21, and then for a year during 1826 to teach mathematics and natural philosophy (science). However, the call of the ministry was strong. Wayland began and ended his career as a preacher, although he held what he considered scientific ideas throughout his life. Wayland was pastor of the First Baptist Church in Boston from 1821 to 1826.

Wayland became President of Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island, in 1827 because of his religious views and his intellect. At Brown University, teaching

many students in his philosophy and theology classes, he developed the ideas and theories for which he is remembered within philosophy. After retiring from Brown University in 1855, Wayland returned to preaching in Providence, while continuing his writing and engaging in civic endeavors until his death.

The four works to which philosophers make frequent reference are: *A Discourse on the Philosophy of Analogy* (1831); *The Elements of Moral Science* (1835); *Elements of Political Economy* (1837); and *The Elements of Intellectual Philosophy* (1854). *The Elements of Intellectual Philosophy* is a pretty standard presentation of Scottish Common Sense philosophy. In this and other works, Wayland again and again cites Thomas Reid, a leading Scottish common sense philosopher. *The Elements of Political Economy* is praised as an early defense of free market economic theory. Wayland does note the difference between Moral Science and Political Economy.

The Elements of Moral Science is Wayland's most well known book. Wayland began teaching ethics, Moral Science, using William Paley's *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, but he soon found himself disagreeing with much of the text and decided to do his own lectures, which became his textbook. He does not rely on religious faith to ground his moral principles. He grounds his presentation in the laws evident in the universe. He does attribute these laws to a Creator, but it is the laws themselves that are the basis for the moral science. Once the moral laws of the universe are seen, morality is a matter of reading and arranging these laws so that human behavior will lead to delight.

Wayland's foundational work for this topic is the lecture entitled *A Discourse on the Philosophy of Analogy*, which he presented to the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Rhode Island in 1831. Wayland takes the traditional Scottish

Common Sense position, but adds his own scientific outlook. Wayland was cognizant of the scientific methods developing during his time: "The first step in the progress of knowledge is the observation of facts.... [Changes] do not take place at random, but in the order of a succession.... The order of this succession is next noted, and this forms the first conception of a law of nature. Subsequent observation and more accurate experiments determine more of the circumstances actually connected with this law of succession... and thus a nearer and nearer approximation is made to pure and unchangeable truth" (348). Analogies between observations are not the only type he considers; analogies between laws can lead to higher or more general laws as well.

Something rather unique is Wayland's recognition that the answers research develops are only as good as the questions asked. Ambiguous questions lead to ambiguous answers. Furthermore, when nature answers the researcher's questions, recognition is made that the answers given must themselves be interpreted. While Wayland believes in unchanging laws of nature, he acknowledges a great deal of clear, logical thought is needed to find approximations of these laws. An affinity for nature and for nature's Creator leads to scientific discovery.

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David E. Pfeifer

WEISS, PAUL (1901–2002)

Paul Weiss was born on 19 May 1901 in Manhattan, New York City. In 1924 he enrolled in three philosophy courses in the

free night school at the College of the City of New York, and then Weiss enrolled as a day student for the following semester, completing the remaining courses for his high school degree. Weiss studied with Morris R. Cohen and graduated with his BA in 1927. Since he had completed all of the requirements for the bachelor's degree by the end of the fall semester of 1926, he enrolled in courses at Harvard during the spring of 1927, where he received his PhD in philosophy in 1929. During his first semester at Harvard, Weiss volunteered to help Charles Hartshorne who had begun the task of editing the manuscripts of Charles S. Peirce. Soon afterward, Weiss joined in the work officially with the approval of the department chair, C.I. Lewis. During Weiss's teaching at Bryn Mawr, from 1931 until 1946, he published a number of seminal essays in the philosophy of logic, metaphysics and ethics. His first major work was *Reality*, published in 1938. His second was an exploratory one in the foundations of ethics, *Nature and Man*, published in 1947.

Weiss taught as a visiting professor at Yale in the fall of 1945, after which he returned to Bryn Mawr for the spring semester. In 1946 he accepted an appointment as professor of philosophy at Yale. He founded the *Review of Metaphysics* in 1947, and started the Metaphysical Society of America in 1950. In 1950 Weiss's third major work, *Man's Freedom*, was published, and *Modes of Being* was published in 1958. In the next decade eight more books followed, exploring politics, art, history, religion, education, family, and sports. Weiss received tenure at Yale, the first Jewish professor there to receive tenure, and later he became Sterling Professor of Philosophy. After Weiss reached Yale's mandatory retirement age in 1969, he became the Heffer visiting professor of philosophy at Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C.,

where he taught until 1994. Weiss died on 5 July 2002 in Washington, D.C., at the age of 101.

In *Reality*, Weiss offered a comprehensive presentation of his naturalistic view of the full texture of the universe and of man's place in it. Weiss rejected phenomenalist, idealist and naïve realist orientations in epistemology; and although he rejected the skeptical dilemmas of Kantian analysis, he recognized the importance of both perceptual synthesis and imaginative synthesis in the formation of propositional attitudes. In his logical analysis he was Peircean, but he did not accept the metaphysics of signs that Peirce had articulated. Although he did not accept the Aristotelean conception of matter and form, he recognized the ontological reality of the complex structure of supervening individuals and both the internality and externality of spatial and temporal relations. Weiss showed that the changes that occur in our world arise from the multiplicity of independent, substantial entities and that these changes are the source of the perceptual judgments by which we come to know these beings.

In *Nature and Man* the issues of the temporal and modal structure of the organism and of psychic disposition become focal areas of his concern. There the problem of how organisms can act to complete themselves, and the prerequisite of such completion – freedom – are explored in detail. There is a fundamental concern that underlies the unity of individuals, whatever their order of complexity might be. That concern is both a vector and a surge toward completion that is the exhibition of the freedom every individual possesses. In the first half of *Nature and Man* Weiss defends the view that there is a freedom resident in every individual existent, one rooted in the future intimate to it; in the second half of that work, he argues that such freedom is decisive for an understanding of

the evolution of organic and psychic existence and of the emergence of selves.

Weiss faced the problem that is a central feature in human life: how the past functions in the emergence and disclosure of the self in the world. For human beings, the many strands of that problem can be summed up in the form of the question, "What is the meaning and source of guilt?" In Weiss's investigations, guilt is the symbol of the most pressing theoretical problem in philosophy: the ultimacy of selves. This is the issue of whether the self can be superseded, surpassed as a mode of unitary functioning by a super-self, a higher being that emerges from the self. If a super-self, whether conceived as a society, a political state or a divinity could emerge, then the presumptions that there are ethical demands, universally binding on selves, could be surpassed.

In *Man's Freedom* Weiss reworked a number of essays he had published as early as 1941. *Man's Freedom* offered an answer to the problem of guilt and the ultimacy of selves. Self-completion is no longer defined in terms of conquest and absorption of the other, but is treated in terms of a primary self-discipline. In the cosmological and ethical analyses in *Nature and Man*, Weiss had defended the view that once a self had been disclosed, no further evolutionary jump was possible. He had claimed that a self could not be superseded because it had an awareness of the Good for itself and others. But the Good was not sufficiently definite to be used as a standard by which a self could be shown to be unsurpassable. If human beings must create the Good, must will that the Good be realized, then such loving dedication would be but an empty gesture were they only willing to attempt to rectify the evil that was a consequence of their own activity. Every past evil, including the lack of harmony that the presence of multiple sources of power (concrete

individuals) necessitates, must in some sense be responded to by human beings if they are to perfect themselves.

After three decades of serious reflection upon the responsibility of human beings and contrary to much (but not all) that he had written earlier, in *Modes of Being* Weiss concluded that God must exist. This conclusion results from the double-sided character of the self that human beings can become. First, an ethical self emerges from the recognition of guilt, from the recognition that as a human being it is responsible for all that occurs, even the unforeseen consequences that it did not intend. Second, a self emerges most fully in its acceptance of itself as a symbol of the problematic, ultimately nameless, eternally unfulfilled, incomplete, but continually completing cosmos. Such a double condition is so paradoxical that it seems to be an absurd one. Yet the paradox of this responsibility and this acceptance projects selves to the recognition of the meaning which lies within this seemingly absurd universe: fraught with evil, the universe is neither inherently evil nor absurd. It only seems so because we have cognized unity as an ideal which cannot be achieved. Corresponding to the unity as hoped for but incomplete unity (an incomplete, imperfect condition which we as selves are) is another who, although not omnipotent nor omniscient, is yet the unity of this cosmos operating from within it. That unifying power is God. In *Modes of Being* Weiss recognized that God makes the universe companionable. Guilt itself is not an evil; guilt is the vehicle by which the divine assessment is communicated. Were guilt to be avoided or ignored, we would never discover the existence of God. But were God not found, a self would be unable to verify that not only its interests, but also its responsibilities were cosmic in range.

Beyond All Appearances is the seminal work for all of his later writings, reshaping the pluralism of *Modes of Being*. In *Beyond All Appearances*, Weiss explained more effectively than he had done in *Modes of Being* how the early analysis contained in his first three works foreshadowed the turn to the fundamental realities that he had called the *modes of being* and later *finalities*. Weiss examined how it is possible to move below the surfaces, the appearances, of the individuals within our world in order to probe the character of the realities that lie within and between them. The communion of beings that is the heart of Weiss's vision, expressed most deliberately and carefully in *Beyond All Appearances*, and later tested in *First Considerations*, *You, I and the Others*, *Human Privacy*, and *Being and Other Realities*, is that although the togetherness of beings is a given, the communion of beings is created. In *Being and Other Realities*, Weiss rejects his earlier identification of God with the unifying, harmonizing aspect of the universe. While maintaining that the harmonizing of disparate dimensions of the universe was evidence of an impersonal Affiliator, he was also led to recognize that the ultimacy of selves was to be found in their relation to an impersonal Assessor rather than to divinity.

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Robert L. Castiglione

WEST, CORNEL RONALD (1953)

Cornel West was born on 2 June 1953 in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and grew up in Sacramento, California. As a youngster, West was influenced

by the Baptist church, and the commitment of the Black Panthers to political action. He received his BA degree in Near Eastern Languages and Civilization in 1973 from Harvard University, graduating *magnum cum laude* in three years. He then became the first African-American to graduate from Princeton University with a PhD in philosophy in 1980. His dissertation was later published in revised form as *The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought* (1991). He was a student of Robert Nozick and John Rawls at Harvard and Richard Rorty at Princeton, and he was heavily influenced by American pragmatists such as Emerson, Thoreau, Peirce, James, Royce, Dewey, and Niebuhr, among others. While a doctoral student, in 1977 West began teaching philosophy as an assistant professor at Union Theological Seminary in New York City, and he published his first book *Prophecy Deliverance!* (1982).

From 1984 to 1987, West taught at Yale University's Divinity School and also held a joint appointment in the department of American Studies. In 1987–88 he taught at Union Theological Seminary again. In 1988, he returned to Princeton as a Professor of Religion and Director of the African-American Studies program. This position lasted until 1994, when West accepted another joint appointment at Harvard as Professor of African-American Studies and a faculty member of the Harvard Divinity School. Teaching one of the University's most popular classes, West was appointed, in 1998, to be the first Alphonse Fletcher University Professor, and taught a mixture of religious and philosophy courses. After a public dispute with then-President Lawrence Summers, West left Harvard to return to Princeton in 2002 to hold the title of Class of 1943 University Professor and create one of the world's leading centers for African-American studies. In 2012, he returned to

Union Theological Seminary as Professor of Philosophy and Christian Practice.

Along with this long and esteemed career in teaching and academic scholarship, West is one of the most prominent public intellectuals of our time. West has acted in popular cinema such as the *Matrix* trilogy, gives extensive television interviews and commentary, and participates in several music artists' albums while creating three albums of his own.

A self-described "Christian revolutionary," West fuses Christian love and social hope with a Marxist critique of capital and empire. Despite embracing the tragically existential nature of life, West believes in compassion for others especially of the suffering and marginalized. West's notion of "catastrophic love" means a kind of "steadfast commitment to the well-being of others." West emphasizes a multiracial philosophical orientation which is committed to the fight against social injustices within the prophetic tradition of African-American liberation theology. West's philosophy articulates a position of "prophetic pragmatism" that draws on Rorty, and more, but reads them in ways that account for the plight of Black and other oppressed people. Prophecy is not meant to be a foretelling of future events, but a call to recognize and address social calamities and evils.

In what reads like an outright indictment, West writes in *Prophecy Deliverance!* that "American philosophy has never taken the Afro-American experience seriously. Even during the golden age of Royce, James, Santayana, and Dewey it remained relatively unaffected by the then rampant lynchings and widespread mistreatment of Afro-Americans." His most philosophical book, *The American Evasion of Philosophy* (1989), argues that Emerson's enthusiasm spurs the "labor" of human agency to achieve the aims of the social gospel. Pragmatic philosophers have much to offer but their teachings will

not be as impactful if not for the sacrifice and commitment of those reformers and pioneers who fight against the evils of racism, crypto-capitalism, mass incarceration, and disproportionate levels of access to resources or opportunities. The struggle and resistance to the experiences of discrimination, poverty, and outright dehumanization shape West's prophetic pragmatism to be rooted in the cause for social justice. West's political philosophy is anti-utopian, but believes in the progress that can result from the social democratic and experimental forms of inquiry. Such a task of social reform can come by way of creative democracy in the mode of Emersonian individualism and pragmatic experimentalism.

From West's visionary concerns there arises the demand that we all recognize our responsibility in the systemic and historical role in the perpetuation of social and personal evils, which we must seek to eradicate. Philosophy is not simply an academic exercise done in a secluded ivory tower, away from the "real world," and neither can it be indifferent to the social circumstances and tensions that persist in the struggling and suffering of others in their hope and dreams of a meaningful life. West is critical of an academic bourgeois elite which is insensitive to the unthinkable calamities facing a majority of the earth's inhabitants. Philosophy should not only seek to provide meaning and interpretation to the continued agony of existence, but must work to lead us to ask questions about the fragile and fragmentary nature of our experience when it calls out for a remedy against injustice and unfairness. While we look to the betterment of the future, we are obliged to call upon and search for the wisdom of the past that can act as a guide and reflective lens for our own values.

In West's own words and description, we can say that "the praxis of prophetic

pragmatism is tragic action with revolutionary intent, usually reformist consequences and always visionary outlook.” Philosophy should be viewed from the climax of human solidarity against struggle and collaborative effort at democratic norms and processes. Philosophy would do well to draw on the Afro-American experience as a challenge to any triumphalist narratives about America and its privilege. We do a great disservice when we ignore at home the very injustices that Americans claim, all around the world, to fight against. We must work to remedy those social ills that still plague our communities and consciences, especially poverty, racism, and militarism or materialism, which Martin Luther King Jr. regarded as inextricably linked sources of evil. It is no mystery, from West’s perspective, that the origins of Western philosophy are symbolized in the life and figure of Socrates, who not only was willing to die for his way of life, but believed philosophy itself to be a kind of “preparation for death” as a therapeutic care of the soul. Through the emphasis of faith through works, love and devotion toward others, philosophy aims to cultivate the freedom of every individual to take up their own projects or calling.

West views prophetic pragmatism as concerned with Afro-American history combined with its cultural and political struggles. Philosophy should provide desirable responses to those present obstacles confronting African-Americans. On West’s interpretation, pragmatism began with Emerson’s admonition that we are to be active and mindful of our involvement in political and cultural groups. The Emersonian strain in West’s thought is meant to challenge traditional wisdom and its naïve inheritances. We must take seriously the circumstances of the tragic.

West’s participation in rallies, demonstrations, and marches, and his frequent arrests during protests, all attest to his commitment to applied ethics. West’s philosophy emphasizes the tragedy and melancholy of a life in which we must face the catastrophic, to endure the “nightmare” of ecological exploitation, the heartlessness of political and social monopolies, and the loss of a sense of hope that the world can be anything other than God-forsaken.

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Myron Moses Jackson

WHEELWRIGHT, PHILIP ELLIS (1901 1970)

Philip Ellis Wheelwright was born on 6 July 1901 in Elizabeth, New Jersey. After receiving his BA at Princeton University in 1921, Wheelwright continued his graduate studies at Princeton and successfully defended a dissertation on Charles Renouvier's concepts of liberty and contingency in 1924. After teaching for one year at Princeton, Wheelwright spent the next ten years at New York University from 1925 to 1935, reaching the rank of professor of philosophy in 1928 and serving as department chair from 1927 to 1932. Wheelwright left NYU to devote two years to scholarly research, and then was a member of the philosophy faculty at Dartmouth College in New Hampshire as professor of philosophy from 1937 to 1953.

In 1954 Wheelwright became professor of philosophy at the newly founded University

of California at Riverside. He received honorary degrees from Dartmouth (MA 1939) and the University of California (LLD 1968), and was the Visiting Churchill Professor at the University of Bristow in 1960. He was the President of the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division in 1965–66. In 1966 Wheelwright retired from teaching, and he died on 6 January 1970 in Santa Barbara, California.

A devoted teacher, Wheelwright not only made a significant impact on his own students, but also on the generations of students and scholars influenced by his texts on Aristotle and the pre-Socratics, as well as an influential volume on Heraclitus, his favorite Greek philosopher. Yet his scholarly interests were not limited to the ancient Greeks. He also published important writings on the British empiricists, modern philosophy, metaphor, logic, and aesthetics. His work on metaphor remain particularly significant, especially his book *Metaphor and Reality* (1962).

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Shannon Kincaid

WHITE, MORTON GABRIEL (1917)

Morton G. White was born on 29 April 1917 in New York City. In 1932 he entered the College of the City of New York at the age of fifteen. In his first year, his mathematics teacher was the distinguished logician Emil Post, and the philosophy teachers who influenced him most were Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel. In 1936 White went on to graduate study of philosophy at Columbia, where Nagel was a main attraction for him. In the summer of 1938 he also attended a logic course by W.V. Quine at Harvard University. Although his main interest was philosophy of science, he wrote a historical dissertation, “The Origin of Dewey’s Instrumentalism” (published in 1943), and received his PhD in philosophy in 1942. During 1943–45 White taught physics at Columbia. In 1946 he became assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, where he came to know Nelson Goodman. In 1948 he became professor of philosophy at Harvard. There he enjoyed the friendship of Henry Aiken, W.V. Quine, and Burton Dreben, and they were instrumental in bringing Goodman to Harvard. White also formed close friendships with colleagues outside the philosophy department, notably with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in history, and with Isaiah Berlin, who often visited Harvard from Oxford. In 1970 White joined the Institute for

Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, where he is now professor emeritus.

White's production might appear to spread over a disparate collection of topics, from history and its philosophy over philosophy of language and of science to freedom of the will. However, they are all united through his interest in holism, which gradually became more and more prominent in his writings. Dewey's instrumentalism is a theme of *Social Thought in America* (1949), where it is submitted to critical scrutiny, together with other prominent ideas in early American social thought: Thorstein Veblen's institutionalism, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's realism, and also Charles A. Beard's ideas of how underlying economic forces influence social life and James Harvey Robinson's "new history" view, that history is not merely a chronicle of the past, but a tool for explaining the present and shaping the future.

Social Thought in America expresses doubt about two interrelated ideas that had dominated philosophy for hundreds of years, up through the logical empiricists: the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements and the distinction between the descriptive and the normative. These doubts were worked out in several of White's later works, and his alternative, holistic view is his core contribution to philosophy. The systematic development of these ideas begins in his next book *Toward Reunion in Philosophy* (1956). This book was originally intended as a second main part of *Social Thought in America*, but in order to not delay the publication of that volume the philosophical discussion was confined to a couple of final chapters. White's qualms about the analytic/synthetic and the descriptive/normative distinctions intensified as he was working on *Toward Reunion in Philosophy*, and he also saw that a third traditional view was intertwined with these two, namely the assumption that ontological

statements, that is philosophical statements about what there is, are sharply distinguished from statements about how the world is.

Toward Reunion in Philosophy therefore ends up having three parts, one for each of the following three questions: What is? What must be? and What should be? A fourth and final part is devoted to the interplay between these three questions. There were extensive discussions of these issues in the forties and early fifties. The analytic/synthetic distinction was discussed in correspondence and conversations between White, Goodman, Quine and Alfred Tarski. As for existential statements, Quine had earlier criticized Rudolf Carnap for his claim that such statements, unlike descriptive statements, express choices of linguistic framework. Quine argued against Carnap that ontological statements are as scientific as physical statements. Concerning normative questions, White offers an account "in which I deny that they are meaningless and in which I also deny that they are settled by a mode of argument which is wholly different from that which is used in science." (1956, p. 22) "The resulting picture is that of a scientist bringing a system of logical and scientific theory to experience and that of the moralist bringing a combination of logic, scientific theory, and moral principle to bear on his moral problems. By traditional standards it involves a breakdown of the epistemological differences between the logical, the physical, and the ethical. By positivistic standards it involves a breakdown of the semantic walls between the analytic, the synthetic, and the emotive." (1956, p. 257)

Similar views were put forth by John Rawls in "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics" in 1951 and by Israel Scheffler in "On Justification and Commitment" in 1954. Scheffler gives credit to Goodman, but apart from this there are no cross references

between these authors to tell us where the ideas originated first. While Goodman and Quine focused on logic and science and Rawls and Scheffler limited themselves to ethics, White proposed a comprehensive holism that treats logic, science, and ethics as components in one unified whole. As White stresses in the passage just quoted, his view involves a breakdown of the epistemological differences between the logical, the physical, and the ethical as well as of the semantic walls between the analytic, the synthetic, and the emotive.

White himself finds this broad holistic view foreshadowed by the American pragmatists, especially James and Dewey. In several later works he explores these antecedents of his own view. *What Is and What Ought To Be Done* (1981) and *A Philosophy of Culture: The Scope of Holistic Pragmatism* (2002) are both devoted to this topic. *What Is and What Ought To Be Done* expands the Duhem-Quine holistic view on testing of scientific theories to the testing of our whole web of normative and descriptive beliefs. While White's holism is less comprehensive than Quine's when it comes to individual testing, White insists that the limited bodies of belief which are tested may contain a mixture of descriptive and normative statements, and in *What Is and What Ought To Be Done* he gives several examples of such mixtures. Another very important point is an extension of the notion of evidence to include not only sensory experience, but a special sort of moral feeling or emotion that guides us in our selection of moral views in a way analogous to the way sensory experience that guide us in our choice of scientific theories.

A Philosophy of Culture: The Scope of Holistic Pragmatism gives a thorough historical and systematic examination of the development of this corporatist view. The word 'culture' in the title expresses a main

point of the book, namely that while much of philosophy in the twentieth century focused on science, philosophy should have a much broader scope, and include all aspects of the human endeavor, it should be a "philosophy of culture." The holism of Quine and Goodman should be expanded to include this whole field, include philosophy of history, philosophy of law, ethics, and other normative disciplines.

White's holistic pragmatism has repercussions in many areas. Philosophy of history has been mentioned. His book *Foundations of Historical Knowledge* (1965) works out how explanation of action and historical events interweaves with natural and social science, statistics, epistemology and ethics and other normative disciplines. He also often comes back to the philosophy of law. And in *The Question of Free Will: A Holistic View* (1993) he argues that rather than starting out with some absolute principles of determinism or free choice we should consider the relevant data concerning these notions and a wealth of other descriptive and normative notions, including the ethical principle "every obligatory action is free," and then try to work out a theory that organizes all these data in a simple way.

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Dagfinn Føllesdal

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1861–1947)

Alfred North Whitehead, a British-born philosopher who attained widespread fame

in America in the first half of the twentieth century, is perhaps best known among the wider public for his famous saying that all subsequent thought "is but a series of footnotes to Plato." He was born in Ramsgate, on the Isle of Thanet, England, on 15 February 1861. In 1880 he enrolled in Trinity College of Cambridge University with a scholarship in mathematics. He took the Mathematical Tripos examinations in 1883 and graduated First Class. In 1884 he also placed First Class of Part III of the Mathematical Tripos. He then presented a dissertation on Maxwell's theory of electricity and magnetism, and was elected a Fellow of Trinity College in 1884. In that year, he was inducted into the famed "Cambridge Apostles." Whitehead lectured in applied mathematics at Cambridge as a Fellow and Senior Fellow (promoted in 1903) until 1910. Having taught as a Lecturer for over twenty-five years, usually the maximum allowed, and with little hope of obtaining a mathematics chair there, he resigned from Cambridge in 1910 and moved to London. In 1914 Whitehead accepted a full professorship of applied mathematics at the University of London in the newly established Imperial College of Science and Technology, and for some years he was also Dean of the Faculty of Science and had other administrative positions. He remained at the University of London until 1924, when he was offered a five-year appointment as professor of philosophy for what was then the highest salary at Harvard. At the age of 63, Whitehead retired from his position at the University of London and sailed to America to take up the post at Harvard University. Apart from delivering the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh during the academic year 1927–28, he did not return to England, but remained in America as a naturalized citizen. In 1937 he retired from Harvard and continued to write until his

death in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on 30 December 1947.

Whitehead won many awards and honors from universities and societies. He was elected to the Royal Society in 1903, and received its Sylvester Medal in 1925. He received the James Scott Prize from the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1922, and the Butler Medal from Columbia University in 1930. In 1931 he became a Fellow of the British Academy, and was awarded the British Order of Merit in 1945. Whitehead was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1931–32.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Whitehead began a collaboration with Bertrand Russell that resulted in their *Principia Mathematica* (1910–13), which attempted to establish the foundations of mathematics in formal logic. Subsequently their philosophical and political interests diverged and their collaboration ceased altogether, though the two remained respectful friends. Other works from Whitehead's academic period in England include *A Treatise on Universal Algebra* (1898), *On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World* (1906), *An Introduction to Mathematics* (1911), *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge* (1919), and a significant work in the philosophy of science, *The Concept of Nature* (1920).

After coming to America, Whitehead published a continuous series of works on broader themes, encompassing the history and philosophy of science, the philosophy of history, his thoughts on education, and, most famously, an ambitious attempt to develop a descriptive metaphysical system commensurate with early twentieth century relativistic cosmology and quantum mechanics, labeled as “process philosophy.” Works during this American period of his career include *Science and the Modern*

World (1925), *Religion in the Making* (1926), *Symbolism* (1927), *The Function of Reason* (1929), *Process and Reality* (1929, based upon the Gifford Lectures of 1927–28), *Adventures of Ideas* (1933), and *Modes of Thought* (1938). Whitehead also gave and published a number of lectures and essays on diverse topics during this period, many of which can be found in collections such as *The Aims of Education* (1929) and *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (1947).

In *The Concept of Nature* (1920), written while Whitehead was still teaching in England and allegedly in the grip of anti-metaphysical and largely logical and empirical approaches to philosophy, he discusses for the first time the concept of an “event” – a well-defined temporal activity or episode of finite duration, a “quantum” of experience – as an alternative fundamental notion to that of matter or substance at a single location in space and time. He likewise introduced the notion of a non-temporal “form of definiteness” or “enduring object” (examples include specific geometrical shapes, or precise shades of the color blue) as among the components or constituents of events, the particular combination or “togetherness” of which in a concrete episode of experience defines its novelty or uniqueness. The “flux of becoming,” the radical temporality and transitoriness of discrete events, was set against the enduring, eternal backdrop of timeless, Platonic forms, everlastingly available as potential ingredients in finite temporal experience.

The Principle of Relativity (1922), argued against Einstein's interpretation of the radical discontinuity of space, the paradox of simultaneity, and the “reversibility” of time (which Whitehead saw as tantamount to destroying the distinction between past and future), and what Whitehead objected to as the arbitrary privileging of electromagnetic

propagation in a vacuum. Whitehead's alternative theory yields a mathematically equivalent but philosophically divergent account of these physical concepts, retaining the common-sense notion of well-ordered sequences of events that distinguish past from future, together with a substantive conceptual distinction between space and time as dimensions of experience. The project of developing a geometry of space-time occupied Whitehead as early as 1905, yet this geometrical preoccupation continues much later as the focus of "The Theory of Extension," considered by mathematically inclined philosophers to be the most original and important portion of *Process and Reality*. In view of the continuity of Whitehead's major interests across time and two continents, it might be more accurate to discuss his intellectual journey as a sustained pursuit of the mathematical physics of Clerk Maxwell and Henri Poincaré, interrupted for a decade or so by a flirtation with the very different, foundationalist project of logical positivism during his collaboration with Russell.

His Lowell lectures, delivered in February and March of 1925 during Whitehead's first year at Harvard (published as *Science and the Modern World*) offered one of the first comprehensive interpretations of the intellectual history of modern science, revealing the manner in which early disputes and philosophical disagreements among the founders of modern science were subsequently lost or compromised in the gradual forging of the broad intellectual consensus that characterized "Newtonianism" or "materialistic mechanism." Whitehead's most famous work, *Process and Reality* (1929), stemmed from his Gifford Lectures in 1927. His attempts to sketch a detailed cosmological foundation for twentieth century physics to

replace the cosmology of Newtonianism have elicited comparisons with Hegel, Leibniz (to whose *Monadology* the specific temporal atomism of this work is specifically indebted), and Aristotle. One of the most striking features of these lectures is the sustained dialogue or discussion that Whitehead carries on about the nature of physical substance, subjective experience, and the space-time continuum with the great European philosophers of the past who had contributed so heavily to the forging of traditional views on these subjects. Like William James and John Dewey, he resolved to return philosophical activity to pre-Kantian modes of thought focused less on studying the instrument of knowledge (the mind or human reason) than on understanding the broader flux of experience that constitutes the natural world in which that instrument is perpetually immersed, and from which it emerges as an evolutionary product. The mistake of over-generalizing properties of human reason and its conceptual categories to experience generally (instead of the other way around), Whitehead labeled as "The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness."

The two most significant concepts discussed in Whitehead's formal metaphysical system in *Process and Reality* are actual entities (or actual occasions) and eternal objects. The shift toward the term 'occasion' and away from 'entity' in turn suggests that those actualities are not entitative, substantive, or material in the traditional sense, but are episodes or occasions of pure activity or 'process'. 'Actual occasions' designate the fundamental quanta, units, or building blocks ('monads') of which, according to Whitehead's Ontological Principle, all entities of whatever sort are composed. The Ontological Principle establishes the claim that, at the core, change and becoming are the primary characteristics of 'true things,' while being conceived as

unchanging substance (Aristotle, Locke) or inert matter (Newton, Descartes) is either the product or the appearance of episodes or ‘occasions’ of creative, generative activity.

The discrete properties that occasions of experience possess, however, stems from two quite different sources. Each occasion or episode ‘prehends’ (that is, grasps or actively appropriates, either to incorporate as ‘feelings’ or eliminate) elements or features achieved in past occasions of experience. This fundamental act of prehension distinguishes the present from the past; past occasions are themselves no longer active as prehending subjects, while the concrete results or outcomes of their brief episodic experience are available as determinate objects to be ‘prehended’ by subsequent subjective occasions of experience. In this manner, past events are causally efficacious; their persistence shapes and conditions the prospects of the present. There also is a second source of determinateness that contributes to the novelty and uniqueness of each experience. In *Process and Reality* he coins the term ‘eternal objects’ for these Platonic universals, to distinguish them from the characteristics of earlier, objectified occasions prehended as data in each new occasion of experience, or ‘concrecence’. These ‘eternal objects’ bear close comparison to the universal qualities or properties of sense data or sensibilia that permeated the epistemological theories of early twentieth century analysis. Again, according to the Ontological Principle, such ‘objects’ are not ‘actual’, in that they are not themselves events or processes, but are rather to be understood as components or ingredients in actual occasions.

Among Whitehead’s most famous students and followers were W.V. Quine, Gregory Vlastos, Paul Weiss, and Charles Hartshorne; Weiss’s influence at Yale University in turn drew attention to Whitehead from another

generation that included Robert C. Neville and Richard Rorty.

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George R. Lucas, Jr.

WIEMAN, HENRY NELSON (1884–1975)

Henry Nelson Wieman was born on 19 August 1884 in Rich Hill, Missouri. He graduated with a BA from Park College in 1907. Wieman pursued his religious inquiry at San Francisco Theological Seminary and in a year-long study in Germany with Rudolf Eucken, Wilhelm Windelband, and Ernst Troeltsch. Wieman went to Harvard University to study with William Ernest Hocking. He accepted Hocking's interest in religious experience as a datum for inquiry but rejected Hocking's idealism. Wieman received the PhD in philosophy in 1917 and taught philosophy and religion at Occidental College until 1927. During this time he read Alfred North Whitehead, discovering a form of process philosophy without Bergson's anti-intellectualism.

On the basis of his publication of *Religious Experience and Scientific Method* (1926), Wieman was invited to teach at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. Wieman was recognized as both a naturalist and a theological realist, and it was thought that he would oppose the religious humanism which was becoming more common within the faculty at the time. While at Chicago from 1927 to 1947, Wieman did his most important work in developing a form of naturalistic theism. After a series of visiting professorships, he had a second career from 1956 to 1966 as a professor of philosophy at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale.

Wieman was active in the founding of the Institute for Religion in an Age of Science and *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science*. He died on 19 June 1975 in Grinnell, Iowa.

Wieman's work shows a remarkably single-minded focus on the task of formulating a naturalistic concept of God. His philosophy was an epistemological naturalism, which claims that human knowledge is limited to the world of events. For him, any reality bearing on human life must be encountered within nature. Yet Wieman was also a theological realist. He never doubted that traditional religious beliefs and practices bring people into relation with a real, operative power. Wieman believed that in traditional religions their myth and ritual shape the believer's attitudes and expectations so that they are open to being changed by a power greater than themselves. For example, in the theistic faiths, the idea of a benevolent supernatural deity may lessen the hold of fear and desire, diminish the tendency to cling to the present arrangement of one's life and relationships, and inculcate trust in the process of growth and change. In Wieman's opinion, these beliefs and the practices open people to the working of processes that transform human life in ways that could not be planned or contrived. However, they do this without providing any knowledge of the factors involved.

For many intellectuals who shared Wieman's naturalism, the adaptation of religious thought required some form of humanism. For them, the object of religious effort ought to be an increase of human well-being. But Wieman felt that religious humanism is merely devotion to presently existing visions of human good and their realization. He believed that what is needed for the good of human life to increase is not the realization of good as now conceived but a transformation of persons in which

new concepts of good come into being. The problem of life is not to realize goods that we can now imagine but to undergo a change in consciousness in which there will arise possibilities of value we cannot imagine on the basis of our present awareness. This renewal of the mind cannot be imagined before it arises and it cannot be planned or contrived. Wieman's naturalistic theism preserves a traditional religious insight that people must cultivate a willingness to set aside presently held values and open themselves to a creativity that leads the mind toward a wider awareness.

This critique of religious humanism was clearly developed in a notable exchange with the philosopher and humanist John Dewey in 1934, on the occasion of the publication of Dewey's *A Common Faith*. Dewey claimed that his humanism was religious because it cultivated a sense of the supportiveness of aspects of nature in the growth of human good. Natural conditions suggest possible changes that would yield a better life and support intelligent human effort to bring this life about; so humanism must include a degree of piety toward nature. But, for Dewey, the factor which brings about actual change toward betterment is human intelligence and communal effort. Wieman replied that Dewey's religious attitude toward nature was deficient because it detaches human intelligence and effort from their natural context. The correct view is that the growth of human welfare is the result of the total situation of interaction of humans and nature. It is this that is creative, and not human effort alone.

Wieman's associates in his early years at Chicago were Edward S. Ames and Shailer Mathews. With others, they had come to be referred to in theological circles as the Chicago Naturalists. They did consider themselves naturalistic theists, yet their

concept of the natural divine was simply those unspecified aspects of nature which make human life and the growth of good possible. Mathews called this “conceptual theism,” because God is taken simply as a concept of those unspecified factors in nature that foster the fulfillment of human life. The value of this view was said to be that it encourages a reverent attitude toward nature and a feeling of relatedness to the universe. Wieman shared with his new colleagues the belief in the importance of the reverential attitude toward nature, but he was not satisfied with the vagueness of their formulations. He wanted a clear concept of the divine as a “structured event” within nature, which can serve as a substitute for the waning influence of myth and ritual. Specificity, he believed, is required to guide human action in a time of increasing technological power. Religious inquiry must be able to make clear exactly what conditions are required in personal and social life to bring people into the best relation with nature’s creative power.

Beneath created order is the creative character of the energy of the universe. The metaphysical categories, which for Wieman are mind, matter, structure, event, and quality, additionally include creativity. This is a discoverable character of existence. It is the minimum structure that energy must have to produce the evolving world we observe. For Wieman, creativity is the naturalistic equivalent of God, the actual power to which traditional myth and ritual related people. It creates the human organism through the process of evolution; it elaborates the mind and increases the richness of experience when life is lived in openness to transformation by it; it is the basis of the moral absolute (which is always to act so as to foster the operation of creative transformation); it answers prayer in the sense that it creates an expanded awareness in which solutions to besetting

problems may be found; it brings about the beloved community through the deepening of interpersonal relations. When people set the conditions for its operation, progressive integration transforms human life beyond the reach of intelligence and effort.

Beginning with his major book, *The Source of Human Good* (1946), and increasingly in his subsequent writing, Wieman’s desire to identify a specific structured event as the observable creativity, which is the naturalistic equivalent of God, led him to emphasize the manifestation of creativity in human communication. Wieman’s theological realism is seen in his repeated claim that the human task is not to contrive a better form of living based on present understandings but rather to set the conditions under which creativity may operate to expand our awareness. He came to feel that the broad vision of creative synthesis at work on all levels of the cosmos lacked the specificity necessary to guide human decision-making in the modern world. What was needed was a more focused delineation of the way creativity works in human life.

Wieman’s description of “creative interchange,” or “the four-fold creative event,” dominates his later writings. The creative event consists of four sub-events. (1) An idea or experience that embodies one person’s unique way of seeing things is communicated to another. (2) This idea is integrated into the system of meanings that is the other participant’s mind. (3) This integrating has the effect of expanding the world that the second person is able to perceive and appreciate. (4) Since the participants have come to share a way of perceiving or interpreting experience, their ability to enter into creative interchange in the future is increased. The creative event thus must include communication, integration, expansion of awareness, and building of community. Wieman claimed that this process is at work throughout life, creating

and expanding the mind and its appreciable world. The conditions necessary for creative communication include honesty and candor in expressing our particular way of seeing things. Perhaps most important among the conditions necessary for creative interchange is that those involved must not cling to or insist upon the maintenance of their present patterns of interpretation. Wieman was also concerned about the broader context of communication, involving problems of poverty and health as well as social and economic justice.

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Marvin C. Shaw

WIENER, NORBERT (1894–1964)

Norbert Wiener was born on 26 November 1894 in Columbia, Missouri, and he died on 18 March 1964 in Stockholm, Sweden. As a child prodigy he was encouraged early in formal studies by his father Leo, a professor

of Slavic languages at Harvard University. He received a BA degree from Tufts College in 1909 and, after entering Harvard Graduate School to study zoology, moved to enter the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University in 1910. In 1911 he transferred to the Harvard Graduate School and received an MA degree in 1912 and a PhD in philosophy in 1913.

In 1913 Wiener studied logic and philosophy under Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore and J.M.E. McTaggart, and mathematics under G.H. Hardy and J.E. Littlewood, at Cambridge University. In 1914 he interrupted his studies at Cambridge for a stay at the University of Göttingen attending lectures of David Hilbert, Edmund Landau, and Edmund Husserl. In 1915 he studied philosophy with John Dewey at Columbia University. From 1915 until 1919 he held a variety of jobs in and out of academia, including lecturing in the Harvard philosophy department and the mathematics department of the University of Maine in Orono. During 1918–19 he served in the U.S. Army as a private at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland.

From 1919 to 1960 he taught at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, beginning as an instructor of mathematics, and was promoted up to full professor by 1932. Not one for easily rejoicing in honors, he accepted membership in the National Academy of Sciences in 1934 only to resign in 1941 as an expression of his unhappiness with several aspects of the organization.

Though Wiener's high standing in the scientific community rested mainly on his mathematical achievements, it was his pioneering work in cybernetics that appears to have had the widest influence. His founding work in the field, *Cybernetics*, appeared in 1948. His "patron saint" for cybernetics, Gottfried Leibniz, served as his historical inspiration not only for the

notions of a universal symbolism and of a calculus of reasoning, but also for the close relation between mathematical logic and the mechanical computer. He also suggested that human behavior could be modeled computationally. In Wiener's hands the notion of self-regulated or feedback systems became a guiding theme in the neuro-physiological work of his colleagues Warren S. McCulloch, Walter Pitts, and Arturo Rosenbluth.

An impact in philosophy which Wiener and his contemporaries may not have anticipated came from *The Human Use of Human Beings* (1950) which has been cited as the foundational treatise in what is now called computer ethics. Wiener described the pervasive changes in society of the "second industrial revolution" brought about by computers, including the need to establish new codes of conduct for professional organizations and new ways in philosophy of analyzing social and ethical concepts.

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Albert C. Lewis

WILD, JOHN DANIEL, JR. (1902–1972)

John D. Wild, Jr., was born on 10 April 1902 in Chicago, Illinois. He received his PhB from the University of Chicago in 1923, his MA from Harvard University in 1925, and his PhD in philosophy from University of Chicago in 1926. From 1927 to 1961, he taught philosophy at Harvard University, rising in the ranks from instructor to full professor. Wild moved to Northwestern University in 1961 to serve as professor and chair of the department of philosophy. Wild was President of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division in 1960–61. In 1963 he resigned from Northwestern University to accept a professorship in

philosophy at Yale University. Wild retired in 1969 and died on 22 October 1972 in New Haven, Connecticut.

As a student at the University of Chicago, then a center of pragmatism, naturalism, and social psychology, Wild was conspicuous for his independence of mind. Although the influence of Darwinism on philosophy in America had engendered pragmatism and naturalism, Wild's intellectual and emotional response led him in the opposite direction. In 1929 he published an essay in a volume edited by a member of "the Chicago school," in which he argued that "the grand strategy of evolution" in this world, reflected in the inner life of man, is a process that transcends itself, culminating in absolute, immutable Being. This theme, redolent with moral and religious concerns, suffused all of Wild's later philosophical works. Wild's thought originated in meticulous scholarship, then climbed to levels of illuminating yet novel interpretation, rising to the speculative heights of a fertile eclecticism in order to return, singularly equipped, to confront the problems of praxis.

Wild's philosophy, as it unfolded in later decades, manifested two aspects: realism and existentialism. Although this distinction of aspects seemed to some of his disciples – such as Henry Veatch – to betray a split mind or change of heart, Wild himself beheld a developmental unity between realism and existentialism. Wild's realism is a classical realism that sought to synthesize Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology with Plato's ethics and philosophy of culture. He inspired the third realist movement in American philosophy in the twentieth century. Classical realism is traditionally viewed as a philosophy of substance and essence. Distinct from new realism and critical realism, Wild's classical realism nonetheless imitated their strategy. It involved a group of philosophers who

organized themselves into the Association for Realistic Philosophy, who published a Platform, and who authored a cooperative collection of essays, entitled *The Return to Reason* (1953) with Wild as editor as well as contributor. In a time fraught with moral and political crises, Wild sought to return to the reason of classical realism as the panacea for contemporary cultural ills.

Paramount in the formation of the realist aspect of Wild's philosophy was the influence of Plato. In Plato's *Theory of Man* (1946) Wild sought to elicit from the ancient philosopher a coherent theory of culture that would project an ideal standard for cultural aspiration and evaluation. Plato, according to Wild, provided a vision of the true, natural order of reality including life and culture, a hierarchical order of things as they proceed from ultimate being as their source. Within the hierarchy the higher levels are more real than the lower, and the latter subserve the former as means to ends, climaxing in the pinnacle occupied by the self-sustaining cause of being. Although the hierarchy is objectively necessary, it is not practically necessary. There is no force compelling men to choose what is objectively necessary. The hierarchy at every level is vulnerable to the domination of a higher level by a lower. Humanity is especially susceptible to such inversion, which Wild named "anotropism." With Plato as his guide, Wild described and condemned anotropism in the arts, in life, in individual behavior, in society, in ontology, and in epistemology, and he traced its origin back to the ancient Sophists.

The existentialist aspects of Wild's philosophy were evident not only in his early articles but also in the essay he contributed to the realist's cooperative volume, *The Return to Reason* (1953). In this essay, entitled "Phenomenology and Metaphysics," Wild argued that phenomenology is the only method

which describes accurately and adequately the immediate data of experience upon which metaphysics must be based. He emphasized that the immediate datum permeating every experience is existence.

Two years after the appearance of *The Return of Reason* (1953), Wild published *The Challenge of Existentialism* (1955), signaling an intensification of his interest in existentialism and phenomenology. For Wild, writing in the mid-twentieth century, the classical realism he espoused confronted two rival movements: analytic philosophy in the English-speaking world and phenomenology and existentialism on the European continent. Analytic philosophy he dismissed as "the breakdown of modern philosophy." Classical realism, unrevised, would be the only viable philosophical alternative, were it not for existentialism. Hailed as the challenge to analytic philosophy, it also challenges realism, which is revitalized, if not transformed, in responding. In *The Challenge of Existentialism* Wild elucidated the main theories of European philosophers: Søren Kierkegaard, Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Gabriel Marcel. He highlighted their strengths and exposed their weaknesses. Above all, he focused on their potentialities for alignment with realism. To the existentialists he later added William James, whom he called "the first American existential philosopher."

In *Human Freedom and Social Order* (1959) Wild declared that the existentialists' exploration of the *Lebenswelt* is the most important philosophical achievement in the twentieth century. The life-world where we begin is the real world outside the cave and we subsequently descend into the cave. Wild described the life-world of the ordinary as open to intimations of and an openness to an authentically Christian philosophy accessible to reason nurtured by faith. Thus the reason of

classical realism, responding to the challenge of existentialism, embraces the crown of faith.

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Andrew J. Reck

WILLIAMS, DANIEL DAY (1910–1973)

Daniel Day Williams was born on 12 September 1910 in Denver, Colorado, and died on 3 December 1973 in New York City. His parents were traditional Methodists; his father was a friend and biographer of William Jennings Bryan. During Williams's student years at the University of Denver (BA 1931) he grew increasingly, even painfully, dissatisfied with the faith of his youth. When he entered Chicago Theological Seminary in 1931 he was ready for an alternative, and there he encountered the "Chicago School" of theology. Under the teaching of Wilhelm Pauck, Day received an introduction to neo-orthodoxy. But the figures who were to influence him most were Henry Nelson Wieman and Charles Hartshorne, who led him to the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Day earned his MA in 1933 at the University of Chicago and his BD at Chicago's Theological Seminary in 1934. In 1934 Williams entered Columbia University to study the history of philosophy, and also took a seminar with Reinhold Niebuhr at nearby Union Theological Seminary. The subject of his 1940 PhD dissertation was the emergence of liberalism at Andover Theological Seminary during the 19th century, though his treatment showed the

influence of neo-orthodox realism. Williams already had a rather unusual combination of concerns: an interest in liberal theology; a sympathy for neo-orthodox points of view; and a conviction about the significance of philosophy for theology, process philosophy in particular.

After brief stints as pastor of First Congregational Church in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and as instructor in religion at Colorado College, he joined the faculty of the Chicago Theological Seminary in 1939, remaining there when the Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago Divinity School was created in 1943. Throughout this period, he was the most eclectic of the resident process theologians, in that he brought an empirical methodology inspired by Wieman into conversation with a wide array of theological alternatives.

In 1954 he left Chicago to work with H. Richard Niebuhr and James Gustafson on a study of theological education. One year later he accepted a position as professor of theology at Union Theological Seminary in New York City, and held this position until his death. Dominated by Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr, his environment was quite different from Chicago. Williams began to articulate a response of his own, which sought to reconstruct liberalism while maintaining its essential features. Finding grounds for a new foundation in empirical theology, reminders of overlooked features of the Christian tradition in neo-orthodoxy, and a new and more fruitful philosophical superstructure in process metaphysics, his goal was to put forward a more robust and realistic theology in the American liberal tradition.

The essentials of that tradition were, in Williams's view, the twin categories of freedom and development, the chief expression of the former being freedom for theological inquiry, as opposed to the view

that religious truths can be known only by faith, and the central focus of the latter being social improvement through human endeavor, in contrast to the view that hopes for a better world are naïve and utopian. These twin tenets were to be preserved, but there were other features of liberalism that needed to be critiqued and corrected. Central among these were an inadequate doctrine of sin that attributed evil to factors for which there could be no personal responsibility and a deficient doctrine of redemption in which the problem of evil was misconstrued as a problem of an unfinished creation so that a redeemer was unnecessary. There were other weaknesses as well: an understanding of God uncritically inherited from Protestant orthodoxy, and the notion of love that was too vague, subjective, and variable to be ethically useful.

The starting place for the reformulation of liberal theology was one Williams had inherited from the Chicago empiricists, Wieman in particular, and that was human experience. According to this school of thought, knowledge and its verification can be obtained only from a critical interpretation of what is found in experience. But Williams's empiricism was distinctive, both in its willingness to go beyond common human experience to an acceptance of religious and Christian experience and in its readiness to bring this experience into an interpretative relationship with particular acts of God and the culminating givenness of God in Jesus Christ. In maintaining that the doctrine of Christ as universal Logos implies that Christian beliefs will become more intelligible under the formative influence of philosophy, Williams found warrant within the tradition for revising the tradition.

There were two related areas where Williams was a process theologian pure and simple: his doctrine of love and his doctrine of God. For the former, he took a cue from

Hartshorne, who held that an analysis of love was the key for understanding the being of God. However, rather than follow Hartshorne's method, Williams proceeded empirically as Wieman did, and then followed the implications through to their metaphysical conclusions, as Whitehead did. His analysis involved discerning the structures present in the human experience of love, determining whether they are essential to that experience and, therefore, belong necessarily to being, and applying the results to the being of God. *The Spirit and the Forms of Love* showcases this approach.

Williams was in general agreement with Whitehead's doctrine of God, though his modifications are noteworthy. On the one hand, he accepted the process philosopher's protest against the God-as-Monarch view. Williams was an articulate apologist for God-as-Fellow-Sufferer, arguing that unless God somehow participates in the world's sufferings the central Biblical assertion "God is love" is unintelligible. On the other hand, he was also critical of Whitehead's failure to portray God as a fully actual, initiative-taking subject and of his unanalyzed preference for persuasion over coercion. On the latter point, Williams contended that coercion is an undeniable fact of experience; if it belongs to being, then a Whiteheadian must allow it to belong to God's being as well. These modifications had a direct bearing on Williams's reconstructed liberalism. The liberal program required that persons of good will, who desire to advance God's purposes in the world, be able to do so with well-founded confidence. Recognizing that such efforts often do not appear to meet with immediate success, Williams maintained that it is important to be able to reckon that God has some measure of prevenient and assertable influence. Williams thus argued for a God whose power was commensurate with liberalism's hopes.

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William D. Eisenhower

WILSON, MARGARET DAULER (1939–98)

Margaret Dauler Wilson was born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on 29 January 1939, and she died in Princeton, New Jersey, on 27 August 1998. She received her BA in 1960 from Vassar College, and her PhD from Harvard University in 1965. She taught at Columbia University as an assistant professor of philosophy from 1965 to 1967, and the Rockefeller Institute (now University) from 1967 to 1970. In 1970 Wilson became the first woman faculty member in the philosophy department at Princeton University. In 1998 she was named Stuart Professor of Philosophy, but died later that year on 27 August 1998 in Princeton, New Jersey.

Wilson was active in many professional organizations. She was President of the

Leibniz Society of North America from 1985 to 1990. She was also President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Society in 1994–95. Her professional honors include a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1977–78, an ACLS Fellowship in 1982–83, and a Centennial Medal from the Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in 1989. She was also elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1992.

Wilson is known primarily for her work in early modern philosophy, having published numerous articles on the epistemology, metaphysics, perception and mind-body problem of virtually all major seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers. A collection of thirty-one of her papers in this area appears in *Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy* (1999). Her book *Descartes* (1978) is one of the classic interpretive works on Descartes’s *Meditations*, and remains an important introduction to his philosophy. She also developed an interest in issues involved in ascribing consciousness to animals, as shown in her APA presidential address on “Animal Ideas.” This topic also reflected her strong theoretical and practical interest in the ethical treatment of animals and environmental concerns.

Limited space prohibits a detailed analysis of her work on even a single topic. A typical example is “Can I Be the Cause of My Idea of the World (Descartes on the Infinite and Indefinite)” (1986). Here she considers an important question concerning Descartes’s argument for the existence of God in the Third Meditation (basically, that his finite nature is insufficient to account for his idea of such an infinite being). What about his idea of *res extensa*, taken as the entire material world, indefinite in extension? Wilson carefully considers numerous passages from Descartes’ published works and letters, and comes to the plausible

conclusion that, though this is not explicitly included in his “mental inventory” of ideas, such “indefinite” conceptions also require a source outside of his own power to generate ideas. That is, as opposed to the *particular* material bodies considered in the argument for the existence of God, the idea of such indefinite extension (or, for that matter, the number series) would also prove the existence of “*something* outside of, and greater than, himself” (p. 354).

Wilson’s articles on Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant have been published in more than a dozen influential anthologies, and in leading philosophical journals such as *Journal of Philosophy*, *Noûs*, *Review of Metaphysics*, *Philosophical Review*, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, and *Journal of the History of Philosophy* from 1967 through 2002. It would be difficult to do basic research on any major early modern thinker without taking her work into account. She left a legacy that will be influencing and informing students of seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy for some time to come.

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Doren A. Recker

WINE, SHERWIN THEODORE (1928–2007)

Sherwin Wine was born on 25 January 1928 in Detroit, Michigan. His father, born as Herschel Wengrowski, had emigrated from Poland (then in Russia), and the family raised him in Conservative Judaism. He earned the BA in philosophy in 1950 and the MA in philosophy in 1951 from the University of Michigan. He encountered humanistic thinking again when he entered the rabbinic program of Hebrew Union College for Reform Judaism in Cincinnati, Ohio in 1951. He was ordained as a rabbi in 1956, and the following year he volunteered to be a U.S. Army chaplain, stationed in Korea. Returning to Detroit in 1958, he assisted at Temple Beth El in Detroit, and in 1959 he organized a new Temple Beth El in nearby Windsor, Ontario. The Detroit

temple hadn't forgotten Wine; in 1963 some quite secular members asked him to start a new congregation, so Wine established the Birmingham Temple in a Detroit suburb. The founding of Humanistic Judaism dates from that year, because the word 'God' was eliminated from worship services, leaving the Jewish ethos and cultural history. Recitations of the Torah and the Shema prayer, and any mention of a supreme being, were also eliminated. This departure from all other forms of Judaism drew much attention. By December 1964, a Detroit Free Press headline read, "Suburban Rabbi: 'I Am an Atheist'," and stories in *Time* magazine and the *New York Times* soon followed.

Wine's explanation rested on the empirical impossibility of knowing whether God exists, so this "agnosticism" about the meaninglessness of the concept of God wasn't quite atheism. In later writings he also recounted how the Holocaust must make God implausible. The Humanist conviction that human life remains meaningful and valuable for itself, regardless of whether a God exists, sounded enough like atheism to many. Conservative and Orthodox rabbis denounced him, demanding his recantation or expulsion. His congregation grew, and relocated to Farmington Hills, Michigan, where a new building was opened in 1971 to accommodate hundreds of families in later years. In 1969, Wine founded the Society for Humanistic Judaism for expanding its outreach; it began a Rabbinic Program in 1991.

In 1976, Wine established the Center for New Thinking, serving as its Director until his death, as a forum for emerging thinking in religion, politics, arts, sciences, and philosophy. In 1981, he helped found the Voice of Reason, and promptly merged it with the Center for Moral Democracy, an organization started by Ethical Culture

leaders, to form Americans for Religious Liberty in 1982 to advocate for separation of church and state. Also in that year, Wine joined with secular humanist and philosopher Paul Kurtz and other humanists to found the North American Committee for Humanism and its Humanist Institute for training humanist leaders. Wine presided over both organizations from 1982 until 1993. In 1985 he helped organize the International Institute for Secular Humanistic Judaism, and also the Conference on Liberal Religion. In 2007 he was a founder of Scientists and Citizens United to advocate science-informed policy. The American Humanist Association named Wine as Humanist of the Year in 2003, the year of his retirement from Birmingham Temple. Wine died on 21 July 2007 in a car accident while vacationing in Essaouira, Morocco with his life partner Richard McMains.

As of 2010, Humanistic Judaism had over 50,000 followers worldwide in more than 100 congregations, which reflects the high rate of secularity among Jews in North America. Wine formulated its primary tenets, preferring Enlightenment and modern interpretations of the Jewish worldview. As a secular movement, Wine's Humanistic Judaism was a major inspiration within the late twentieth century revitalization of religious humanism that was underway at the century's beginning. For Wine, Humanistic Judaism is secular for those who wish to celebrate their Jewish heritage for its continuity with one's ancestors, and its ability to enrich one's appreciation for Jewish aesthetic and literary sensibilities. As a humanistic movement, it is open to anyone wishing to participate, theist or atheist. Jewish identity has to do with self-identification, and the ethical principles of Judaism are, with suitable modernization, capable of guiding anyone's life towards its natural fulfilment.

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John R. Shook

WIREDU, KWASI (1931)

Kwasi Wiredu is currently Distinguished University Professor Emeritus at the University of South Florida. He was a

professor there from 1987 until retiring in 2007. For much of his career he was a professor of philosophy at the University of Ghana, where he taught from 1961 to 1984. He had studied philosophy there, receiving the BA in 1958. He then received the B.Phil. in philosophy from Oxford University in 1960, where his teachers included Gilbert Ryle, Peter Strawson, and Stuart Hampshire. During his career, he was a visiting professor at UCLA, University of Ibadan, University of Richmond, Carleton College, University of Minnesota, and Duke University. He has also held fellowships with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the National Humanities Center. From 1983 to 1998, Wiredu served on the committee of directors of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies.

Wiredu is one of the best known and widely cited contemporary African philosophers. His book *Philosophy and an African Culture* (1980) revolutionized the field of African philosophy, and set an agenda for postcolonial philosophy that respected both cultural traditions and philosophical rigor. He is also the author of *Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective* (1996). In addition, he is the editor of *A Companion to African Philosophy* (2003) and (along with African philosopher Kwame Gyekye) *Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies* (1992).

In *Philosophy and an African Culture*, Wiredu makes his famous distinction between what he calls "traditional African thought" and "modern African philosophy." In the postcolonial epoch, these represent two possibilities. The first one would jettison the European philosophical machinery taught by the British and French colonizers and return to (and perhaps restore) traditional African worldviews, concepts, and practices. There is, of course, a kind of legitimacy and identity

politic involved in such a restoration. Wiredu disagrees with such efforts, calling instead of a direct philosophical engagement (i.e., interpretation, critique, and clarification) with African traditions in order to remove unhelpful superstitions and concepts that are at odds with the otherwise modern and global efforts by African governments to fully enter modernity (namely in terms of technology). This philosophical engagement need not jettison modern philosophical techniques (particularly analytic epistemology, logic, philosophy of language, and philosophy of religion), nor does it trivialize African traditions. There is a way, Wiredu argues, to do philosophy in a rigorous way without embracing all of the European conclusions.

Certain beliefs, African or otherwise, prove to no longer be tenable in the modern world. It is philosophy's task to examine, critique, and perhaps diffuse such non-tenable beliefs. Such a critique is not an effort to undermine the culture; when done in the correct spirit, such critique improves the culture. Thus, regardless of the "national origin" of the philosophical technique in use, particular cultures, even if significantly different than the national origin of the technique, can hold better and more consistent beliefs by philosophical methods. Modern African philosophy hence uses modern philosophical techniques to examine and critique beliefs, preserving those worth keeping and eliminating those that are (a) anachronistic (no longer applies in the modern world), (b) authoritarian (sustained by appeal to authority, usually political or religious), and (c) superstitious.

Yet there are ideas, sensibilities, practices, and concepts in African thought worth preserving and presenting to the global philosophical community. African concepts can help resolve some long-standing European philosophical questions. For example, Western questions about the interaction of mind and

body are based on European notions of mind and body. For Wiredu, African notions of the body, spirit, and soul can help resolve the West's philosophical tensions. Unfortunately, colonialist treatment of African ideas usually prohibits Westerners from acknowledging that Africans understand things in a different (and in this case, better) way, a way that solves the problem Westerners pose as unsolvable only due to the way in which they have asked the question.

To communicate the wisdom of African tradition, one must philosophize correctly and demand a kind of philosophical universalism that allows arguments to break through one's own ethnocentric point of reference. This is the theme of his book *Cultural Universals and Particulars*. Wiredu claims that philosophy must use cultural particulars (there is no "view from nowhere") in the hope of finding universal ideas that everyone can use. To do this, translation will have to be key. Some ideas will be easily translatable, others will not. In the cases when translation of a term is difficult (for example, there are several Akan words for which Wiredu cannot give a one-to-one translation), conversations are needed to familiarize interlocutors with the nuances of the ideas. Key to Wiredu's position is that there is no default translation language for philosophy: there are Western terms that have no Akan equivalent, and vice-versa. One cannot (colonially) disregard an Akan concept simply due to the lack of a Western language equivalent. Likewise, modern-day Africans cannot avoid a useful Western concept simply because "it is in the language of the oppressors." If there is no Akan term for a concept, one might have to use a different language.

The strength of Wiredu's paradigm for African philosophy is that it is both postcolonial and anti-ethnocentric. It allows for Africans to philosophize with the concepts

created by their own cultural practices, while also directly engaging a global modernity that involves many different languages, practices, and concepts. It takes African concepts seriously precisely by submitting those concepts to rigorous scrutiny. Wiredu is confident that African concepts will survive such scrutiny and thus be contenders in philosophical debates.

A good example of using African concepts inside of philosophical debates is Wiredu's notion of truth as opinion. This claim gets to the heart of Western philosophy going back to Plato's Divided Line. Wiredu is not suggesting that there is no such thing as truths; rather, he is making sure that one is aware that there is no privileged point of view that is freed from the point of view that grounds opinion. In other words, there is no clean divorce between truth and opinion; if truth had to be understood from the "view from nowhere," it would never be known, for no one has such a view. It is only due to (Western) (mis-)understandings of truth as opposed to the first-person perspective that such a distinction between truth and opinion exists. Wiredu shows that the objectivist claim that truth is distinct from opinion is itself an opinion.

The objectivist notion of truth, Wiredu argues, has to be rejected in a postcolonial philosophical paradigm. That notion is oppressive, having facilitated colonialist thought and the subjection of Africans. Truth as opinion grants the existence of truths as "warranted assertions" without the additional (often political) forces that, although themselves unwarranted, "make" things true for the sake of conquest and persecution.

In further essays concerning truth, Wiredu offers an Akan notion of truth that centers on the moral responsibility of people who formulate opinions. The Akan word for "truth" better translates into English as "truthfulness," the ability to state things as

they are. In contemporary epistemology, that ability has a place in virtue epistemology. Epistemic warrant is not an accidental feature of propositions and the state of the world; rather, it involves a set of habits in those who are epistemically virtuous. Likewise, one can be epistemically vicious and therefore a poor epistemic agent. The Akan already have such a notion, so Wiredu would argue that the African philosopher would want to bring the Akan virtues regarding truth into epistemological discussions.

Wiredu's philosophy opens up a vital avenue for African philosophy to interface, engage, critique, and participate in the modern global philosophical conversation. His work calls all philosophers to be aware of the cultural underpinnings of concepts and practices that are always present in the philosophical life.

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Brad Elliott Stone

WITHERSPOON, JOHN (1723–1794)

John Witherspoon was born in Gifford, Scotland on 15 February 1723. He secured matriculation into the University of Edinburgh at thirteen and entrance into a Masters program at sixteen, both ages then customary. After receiving the MA degree in 1739, he stayed on at the university for four further years of theological training, after which time he was granted a probationary preaching license in 1743. He took up his first ministerial post in Beith, Ayrshire, in 1745. He was promoted to the larger and more prestigious Laigh Kirk

in Paisley in 1757. St. Andrews University granted him an honorary Doctor of Divinity degree in 1764. He remained in Paisley until making his 1768 transatlantic journey to become the sixth President of the College of New Jersey at Princeton (later Princeton University). He was elected to the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia in 1769. During the same year, 1776, as he supported Tom Paine’s *Common Sense* as an argument for independence from Britain, Witherspoon published a paper on Newtonian theory. His book “Lectures on Eloquence” was among the first major treatises on rhetoric produced in America.

Beyond his career as an educator, Witherspoon was also highly active in American politics. He served as a member of the New Jersey state legislature. He served as a delegate of New Jersey in the Continental and Confederate Congresses on two occasions between 1776 and 1782. He was the only minister to sign the Declaration of Independence. An avid federalist, he signed the Articles of Confederation and served on the New Jersey convention that ratified the Constitution. He also combined several political speeches and shorter discourses into a monograph on the circulation of paper money, *Essay on Money as a Medium of Commerce* (1768). Yale granted him an honorary LLD degree in 1785. He died on 15 November 1794 at his farm near Princeton. He was succeeded in the presidency by Samuel Stanhope Smith.

Witherspoon’s caustic parody of the fashionableness of Moderate divinity, *Ecclesiastical Characteristics* (1753), included a wide-ranging critique of the moral sense theory of Francis Hutcheson. In 1753 he also published a short article on Lord Kames in the *Scots Magazine* that sought to illuminate the danger of determinism for morality. His 1757 work in the pamphleteering war between

the factions, *A Serious Inquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Stage*, placed him in the national limelight; and the resulting promotion to Paisley secured further invitations to address national religious organizations. His appeal for the College of New Jersey trustees was that he was both distinguished and outside the orbit of the controverted Old Side/New Side tension dividing American Presbyterians.

Available to students in manuscript before it was first published in the collected edition of his works (1800–1801), his *Lectures on Moral Philosophy* was one of the most influential early American writings on the subject as the foundation of his own required course. The lectures considered the theories of such eighteenth-century figures as Archibald Campbell, David Hume, Samuel Clarke, William Wollaston, Bishop Joseph Butler, and Bernard Mandeville (at least by suggestion) before ultimately recommending the exponents of Scottish “common sense.” His list of students includes six fellow members of the Continental Congress, twenty-one U.S. Senators, thirty-nine U.S. Representatives, three Supreme Court Justices, thirteen college Presidents, and one U.S. President, James Madison.

While Jonathan Edwards certainly knew Hutcheson well as part of the “moral sense” school of Scottish philosophy, Witherspoon is widely, if not universally, rated a major colonial American spokesperson for the “common sense” school. Different polemics govern the two trajectories of Scottish thought, to be sure. Hutcheson is part of a sweep of moral theory that seeks to show, counter to a composite position encompassing naturalists about human selfishness and natural law jurists proposing prudential remedies for it, that we have the requisite principals of virtue for both individual and social goodness. In advocating for “common sense,” Thomas

Reid struggled against the concerns that made haggling about theories of morality seem worthwhile in the first place. Even though it rarely mentions Reid, Witherspoon’s “Lectures on Moral Philosophy” was part of the popularization of Reid’s ideas. Given the non-technical use to which Witherspoon put them, the differences between the “moral sense” and “common sense” are not as relevant as the common ground: affirming a power both to know and to do collaborative good with one’s neighbors.

Witherspoon was like other Americans after the Revolution, who used Scottish enlightenment philosophers for purposes that were socially conservative but without abrogating the liberal political tradition that these figures stood for in their Scottish milieu. Witherspoon was simultaneously a supporter of revolution and a social conservative. Like many of the founding fathers, he drew selectively from portions of the Whig tradition of British republicanism. He claimed early and loudly that the patriot cause was justified as a fight for liberty, etc. Liberty was a primary good of social life that ought not to be yielded in the social compact of mutual protection (Witherspoon 1982, 124). Like other founders, however, he also saw democracy as inherently containing instabilities. Witherspoon cites as his most serious doubt about the patriot cause that the colonies would not be able to hold a unified front given their unique constituencies and economic interests. His “Thoughts on American Liberty” invokes adherence to the explicit prohibition against any colony making individual accommodations with Britain (1804–5, vol. 9, 75). Witherspoon shared the recognition of many founders that religion would play an important role in the maintenance of public virtue a vigilant citizenry needed to sustain its liberty long-term. His “Pastoral Letter” to

Presbyterians in New York and New Jersey, for instance, counseled that respect between religious denominations was a crucial part of maintaining unity between the colonies.

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Stephen A. Wilson

WOLFSON, HARRY AUSTRYN (1887 1974)

Harry Wolfson was born on 2 November 1887 in Ostrin, Lithuania. He received a traditional Jewish education in Talmudic studies in such centers of Jewish learning as Grodno, Bialystok, Kovno, Vilna, and Slobodka. He rebelled against the traditionalism of his parents and Talmudic teachers to attend the Slobodka Yeshiva that was an outpost of the Musar movement begun by Israel Salanter, where he learned a technique for studying, analyzing, and questioning texts that he never abandoned. In 1903 Wolfson emigrated to the United States and, while continuing Talmudic studies at the Rabbi Isaac Elhanan Yeshiva, eventually attained an American elementary and secondary education. He entered Harvard University in 1908 thanks to winning the Price-Greenleaf scholarship. Wolfson received a BA (1911), MA (1912), and PhD in philosophy (1915) from Harvard. He began teaching at Harvard as an instructor of Jewish literature and history in 1915. In 1925 Wolfson became the first Littauer Professor of Hebrew Literature and Jewish Philosophy at Harvard, and held that position until his retirement in 1958. As a pioneer in the study of Jewish philosophy, he was widely honored and received numerous honorary degrees, and became a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He died on 17 September 1974 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

On the eve of receiving his MA in 1912, Harry Wolfson decided that a “man should have a middle name” and adapted the name of his hometown, using a Hellenized form of “Austryn.” That combination of the old and the new characterized his work. His study on Spinoza, whom he called “the last of the ancients and the first of the moderns” sets the tone of his investigation of Jewish philosophy. Wolfson used the technique he learned in

Slobodka to reconstruct Spinoza’s sources and to show the creative way he transformed those sources so they would address a modern consciousness. He continued that type of reconstruction to show that the philosophies of Philo of Alexandria, the medieval Jewish philosophies of Saadia Gaon, Judah Halevi, Moses Maimonides, and Hasdai Crescas have intimate correspondences with thinkers of the Islamic Kalam and with the philosophies of the Christian Church Fathers. He often argued that Medieval philosophy is “one philosophy written in three languages” and that no inherent differences separate the problems and solutions offered by Jews writing in Hebrew, Muslims writing in Arabic, or Christians writing in Latin.

Wolfson’s early essay on “Maimonides and Halevi” attempted to find a type of medieval Jewish pragmatism comparable to the American philosophical pragmatism he has found in Harvard. Several of his contributions to the *Menorah Journal* from 1915 to 1925 show him grappling with current issues such as Zionism and Jewish adaptation to the modern world. By the end of 1925, however, he had concluded that scholarship should remain aloof from the issues of the day. Ideas should be uncontaminated by external reality. His decision not to visit the State of Israel because the actuality there would disturb the ideal that he had in his mind reflects this contention.

Wolfson’s thought contributed to ongoing debates about the meaning of Jewish philosophy in several ways. First, while many scholars contend that philosophy was an alien element in Judaism, an unnatural admixture of “Athens” to “Jerusalem,” Wolfson disagreed. He argued that all scriptural religions naturally face the challenges to their views of the divine, of revelation, and of human nature found in “religious philosophy.” Religious philosophy in Judaism, therefore,

is an essential outgrowth of biblical religion. Secondly, he argued for a substantive notion of divinity. Wolfson objected to existentialists and demythologizers who would reduce the “Philonic God of Revelation” to some sort of humanistic value. He contrasted the “Professed atheist” with the “Verbal atheist” – the latter pretends to a belief in God but then added, “it depends on what you mean by God.” As a historian of Jewish philosophy, Wolfson refused to accept the latter’s cavalier attitude toward philosophical definitions of the divine.

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WOLIN, SHELDON SANFORD (1922)

Sheldon S. Wolin was born on 4 August 1922 in Chicago, Illinois. He served in the U.S. Air Force during World War II. He received his BA from Oberlin College in 1946, and did graduate study at Harvard University, earning an MA in 1947 and a PhD in political science in 1950. He was an assistant professor of political science at Oberlin from 1950 to 1954. Wolin then went to the University of California at Berkeley as an instructor of political science, where he was promoted up to full professor by 1961. He became a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1966. In 1971 Wolin became professor of political science at Princeton University, and although he retired from full-time teaching in 1987, has continued to vigorously lecture and publish as emeritus professor at Princeton and remains at the forefront of political theory.

Wolin’s first book, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (1960) is widely credited with helping to reinvigorate interest in political theory for Anglo-American political science. By defining politics as a social

activity of deliberation about the good of the entire society, Wolin drew attention to public debate about matters that deserves to be called political and also to the absence of public debate about other important matters that has somehow been removed from politics. Wolin pointed to a wide variety of enterprises that are in private hands yet have enormous public consequences and remain unscrutinized by politics. Central figures in the Western political tradition, and even the U.S. Constitution itself, have encouraged the harmful stance that activities classified as private should be exempt from public and governmental scrutiny and intervention. Alongside this development of emaciated political life, Wolin accused political science of becoming devoted to the scientific study of behavior, policy, and administration, instead of investigating how the political life can be nurtured and incorporated into civic life. *Politics and Vision* was one of the most influential books in political theory during the second half of the twentieth century, and still helps to shape debates over participatory democracy.

Sheldon's books on Hobbes (1970) and Tocqueville (2001) are major contributions to our understanding of the development of political life and thought in Britain and America. Sheldon's collections of essays titled *The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution* (1989) further explores the key question of political theory: How can citizens become engaged and effective democratic participants, where such participation requires the capacity of taking responsibility for the common good and society as a whole? Wolin at times appears to despair for this vision of politics, fully recognizing the overwhelming powers of technological and technocratic forces now in control. Wolin often expresses a

preference for the small-scale politics of local community life, and highlights rather than solves the problem of how to foster a sense of community for an entire nation.

In his 2008 book *Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism*, Wolin declares that the United States is no longer a democracy. The vast growth of state and corporate power now obstructs democratic participation and prevents citizen control over the government and society as a whole.

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WOLLHEIM, RICHARD ARTHUR (1923 2003)

Richard Wollheim was born on 5 May 1923 in London, England. After serving in the British Army from 1942 to 1945, he attended Balliol College of Oxford, where he first read history and then philosophy, politics, and economics, receiving both his BA and MA in 1949. Wollheim was appointed assistant lecturer at University College, London in 1949 and later elected Grote Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Logic in 1963. He was also head of the philosophy department from 1963 to 1982. In 1982 he came to the United States to become a professor of philosophy at Columbia University. In 1985 he was appointed Mills Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley, the position he held until his death, and served as chair of the department from 1998 to 2002. During the period from 1989 to 1995 he was also professor of philosophy and humanities at the University of California at Davis. He was made a Fellow of the British Academy in 1972, and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Science in 1986. Wollheim died on 4 November 2003 in London, England.

Among Wollheim's distinguished addresses and lectures are the 1982 William James Lectures, published as *The Thread of Life* (1984), the 1984 Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts, published under the title *Painting as an Art* (1987), and the 1991 Ernst Cassirer Lectures, which appeared in print as *On the*

Emotions (1999). Notable early writings include *F.H. Bradley* (1959), a sympathetic reading of a figure then known mainly through caricatures by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore; *Socialism and Culture* (1961); and "A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy" (1962).

Art and Its Objects (1968) established Wollheim's reputation in the philosophy of art and remains a fixture of the aesthetics curriculum. It introduces views on the ontology of art, representation, expression, interpretation, the aesthetic attitude, and the value of art, many of which were further developed in later writings. "Criticism as Retrieval," published as a supplement to the second edition of *Art and Its Objects* (1980), vigorously defends the thesis that art interpretation is the reconstruction of the process of artistic creation viewed as a contextualized, intentional act. Another supplementary essay, "Seeing-as, Seeing-in, and Pictorial Representation," gives Wollheim's influential theory of pictorial representation as involving seeing-in, a species of seeing characterized by simultaneous awareness of features of a picture surface and of a scene it depicts. The assumption that the content of a picture is determined by the content of certain experiences of it has been endorsed by many philosophers.

Wollheim was a student of Freudian psychoanalytic theory, especially as interpreted by Melanie Klein and as applied to art criticism by Adrian Stokes. Wollheim's *Sigmund Freud* (1971) lays out Freud's life and thought with analytic clarity. Wollheim's subsequent writings are the offspring of rigorous philosophical theorizing wedded to a psychoanalytic view of human nature. The hybrid is explicit in his accounts of the moral emotions (guilt and shame) and of the expression of emotion in art as a response to anxiety taking advantage of a mechanism

of projection. It is implicit in *Painting as an Art*, which offers close, psychoanalytic readings of the paintings of Ingres, Manet, Picasso, Poussin, and Titian. Wollheim was exceptional among philosophers of art for his insights about individual works of art and he is admired for the philosophically grounded art criticism he contributed to several periodicals, especially *Modern Painters*.

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Dominic M. Lopes

WOLTERSTORFF, NICHOLAS PAUL (1932–)

Nicholas P. Wolterstorff was born on 21 January 1932 in Bigelow, Minnesota. In 1949 Wolterstorff entered Calvin College, where he studied with Henry Stob and Harry Jellema and received a BA in philosophy in 1953. Wolterstorff continued his studies in philosophy at Harvard University where he earned his MA in 1954 and his PhD in philosophy in 1956, writing his dissertation with Donald C. Williams on Alfred North Whitehead. After teaching briefly at Yale as an instructor of philosophy from 1957 to 1959, Wolterstorff returned to Calvin College in Michigan, where he taught as professor of philosophy for thirty years from 1959 to 1989. At Calvin, Wolterstorff reconnected with his undergraduate friend, Alvin Plantinga. From 1986 to 1990, Plantinga held an appointment as professor of philosophy at the Free University of Amsterdam. In 1989 Wolterstorff succeeded Paul L. Holmer as the Noah Porter Professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale University Divinity

School, and also held joint appointments in the philosophy and religion departments. Wolterstorff was President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division in 1991–92, and President of the Society of Christian Philosophers in 1992–95. In 1994–95 Wolterstorff gave the Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews University in Scotland. Wolterstorff retired in 2002 as professor emeritus, and he later became a scholar with the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia.

In 1970 he published *On Universals*, a defense of realism about universals according to which universals are kinds capable of being multiply or repeatedly instantiated. Among the enduring contributions this book has made to the debate concerning universals is its attack on “trope nominalism.” Wolterstorff applies this realist framework to aesthetics in two books published in 1980, *Works and Worlds of Art* and *Art in Action*. In the former, Wolterstorff argues that works of art that are capable of multiple performances or impressions are best thought of as kinds of a special sort, namely, “norm kinds.” He contends, furthermore, that we should think of artistic representation as “world projection,” the activity in which artists project worlds of various sorts by way of painting portraits, writing books, and so on. In *Works and Worlds of Art*, Wolterstorff defends what he calls a “functional approach to art” (1980, p. x) according to which works of art are instruments and objects of a variety of types of action, not simply objects of contemplation.

In *Reason within the Bounds of Religion* (1976), “Can Belief in God Be Rational if it has No Foundations?” (1983), his Gifford Lectures of 1995, and later books, Wolterstorff defends a position now known as Reformed epistemology. Wolterstorff developed an alternative epistemology involving the concept of entitlement or permissible belief

and the criteria for its application. Drawing upon work in contemporary speech act theory, Wolterstorff develops the thesis that much of God’s discourse is best understood as God’s performing illocutionary acts such as asserting and commanding by way of the speech acts performed by human beings (such as acts in which humans assert sentences). Wolterstorff then turned to the history of philosophy. The resulting books, *John Locke and the Ethics of Belief* (1996) and *Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology* (2001), represent Wolterstorff’s effort to advance a different narrative of modern philosophy. The narrative is one in which Reid’s views rather than Kant’s emerge as the most promising alternative to classical foundationalism.

Beginning with work in the philosophy of education in the 1960s and 1970s and continuing with *Until Justice and Peace Embrace* (1983) and *Religion in the Public Square* (1997), Wolterstorff has argued that Christians should primarily be concerned to struggle for justice, where justice is understood in terms of the biblical conception of shalom. Shalom, says Wolterstorff, is human flourishing, that state in which persons dwell in harmony with God, others, nature, and themselves. Justice is that state of a society in which everyone, widows and orphans included, have ample opportunity to enjoy the goods constitutive of shalom. Christians should not accept what some call the liberal theorist’s “public justification thesis.” Christians may appropriately appeal, and in some cases may appeal only, to religious reasons when engaging in public political discourse. To require otherwise is to demand what is in many cases not only psychologically impossible, but also unhelpful.

According to Wolterstorff, there is no independent, common source – whether “reason,” “public reason,” or the like – that

yields principles of sufficient richness to guide our public political life. Whether we are religious or not, our only choice with regard to public political discourse is to articulate, in a manner respectful of our fellow citizens, those reasons that seem best to us from the perspective of our own particular narrative identities. Wolterstorff explores further these themes of justice and the location of the Christian in the space of society and politics in *Justice: Rights and Wrongs* (2008) and *The Mighty and the Almighty: An Essay in Political Theology* (2012).

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Terence Cuneo

WOODBIDGE, FREDERICK JAMES EUGENE (1867–1940)

Frederick J.E. Woodbridge was born on 26 March 1867 in Windsor, Ontario, Canada. In 1869 the family moved to Kalamazoo, Michigan, where Woodbridge grew up. He attended Amherst College and studied philosophy and religion under Charles Edward Garman, graduating with his BA in 1889. Woodbridge enrolled at Union Theological Seminary to continue his studies. In 1892 he left Union on a traveling fellowship and went to Germany for graduate studies on philosophy at the University of Berlin. There, exposure to Hermann Ebbinghaus’s lectures on the history of philosophy and the opportunity for detailed study of Friedrich Trendelenburg’s work on Aristotle greatly influenced Woodbridge’s views. This historical scholarship supplied the basis for his mature philosophical realism and naturalism.

In 1894 Woodbridge returned to the United States and began a teaching position as a professor of philosophy at the University of Minnesota. In 1902 Woodbridge accepted a position at Columbia University as the first Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy. He served as President of the Western Philosophical Association in 1903–04 and as President of the American Philosophical Association (now the Eastern Division) in 1911–12. In 1904, Woodbridge and colleague J. McKeen Cattell founded *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, known

since 1921 simply as *The Journal of Philosophy*. Woodbridge taught philosophy at Columbia until 1912, when he became the university’s Dean of the Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, and Pure Science. In this position, Woodbridge was instrumental in molding Columbia into a genuine, world-class university. He retired as Dean in 1929 in order to return to teaching, returning also to the University of Berlin in 1931–32 as the Visiting Roosevelt Professor of American History and Institutions. Woodbridge retired from teaching in 1937, but he continued to edit *The Journal of Philosophy* until his death on 1 June 1940 in New York City.

Woodbridge was an important figure in the transition to philosophical realism and naturalism in the United States from the neo-Kantian and idealist philosophies that were dominant there in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A classical realist, Woodbridge characterized his philosophical position as a synthesis of Aristotle’s naturalism and Spinoza’s emphasis on structure, tempered by Locke’s empiricism. Woodbridge played a significant role in the revival of Aristotelian trends of thought in the United States, and in the development of the classic American naturalistic interpretation of Aristotle. Woodbridge also had an important impact on John Dewey, after the latter’s arrival at Columbia in 1905. Their interaction and exposure to the naturalistic metaphysics Woodbridge promoted helped Dewey recognize the possibility of a type of metaphysics that purported to be neither speculative nor transcendental and thus could provide a valuable grounding for his naturalistic epistemology and psychology. While Woodbridge authored several books and numerous articles, it was through his tremendous influence as a teacher that he had his greatest effect. His teaching shaped the views of many philosophers from the next

generation of naturalists, including Morris Cohen, John H. Randall, Jr., Ernest Nagel, and Sterling Lamprecht.

Woodbridge's philosophical perspective was highly historical, as evidenced by his own characterization of it in historical terms, and he emphasized the history of philosophy in his teaching. In this way, and through encouraging historical interests in his students, he was a leader in establishing the history of philosophy as a major philosophical discipline in twentieth century America. His interest was more thematic than scientific; for him the relevant issue was explaining how and why these historical figures have something important to say to us in our own time. In an era of epistemologists, Woodbridge was an unabashed metaphysician. However, on his understanding, metaphysics was descriptive and empirical. Following Aristotle, Woodbridge saw metaphysics as a form of scientific inquiry, differing from the special sciences only in virtue of subject matter, not in virtue of method. Whereas the special sciences each focus on a limited subject area and thus on only a particular type or portion of existence, metaphysics applies the scientific method to investigate "existence *as* existence" or existence in general.

He saw scientific inquiry as involving a methodological realism, an approach Woodbridge called "realism in principle" in contrast with the sort of "realism of selection" characteristic of eliminativist or reductionist views. His realism was a commitment to the primacy of an inquiry's subject matter; he grounded scientific inquiry on a principled naïveté that insulated its subject matter from skeptical questioning or denial. Thus insulated, the subject matter (rather than prior theoretical assumptions) should lead the inquiry, determining both the methods used and distinctions drawn in the investigation, and the meaning and

adequacy of the inquirer's interpretation. As a scientific investigation into the ontological categories that apply to any and every subject matter, realistic metaphysics, according to Woodbridge, would acknowledge as ultimate the categories of individuality, structure, natural teleology, dynamism, activity, potentiality, and contingency. Overlooking inquiry's contextual nature could only be, on Woodbridge's view, a distorted and unrealistic metaphysics that missed some of Nature's richness and variety. This general point was precisely his criticism both of modern philosophy and of pragmatism. On his view, loss of context in the former had led it to transform acceptable philosophical distinctions into untenable, radical dualisms that eventually forced a choice between the equally problematic alternatives of skeptical epistemology and idealism. With regard to pragmatism, while Woodbridge viewed this approach as a valuable method for clarifying mental activities, one which itself involved a demand to respect contexts, he held that the pragmatists had extended their procedures and concepts beyond their legitimate context of application to that of Nature in general and thereby generated confusion and fruitless controversy.

As a realist, he held that morality and religion are shown to be real through their occurrence in human experience. Thus, while nature considered apart from human ideals contains no values or divinity, it must include the conditions necessary for their reality. Nature therefore provides the basis for its own transcendence in human activity. Unlike the three realms of being, however, this "moral order" is not something that can be given a scientific account; the supernatural is not a realm of knowledge. Woodbridge held that while moral and religious discourse appears to make claims about the activities and natures of objects, their grounding in human ideals

makes their function expressive rather than cognitive, about devotion to certain values and ideals.

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James A. Woodbridge

WOOLMAN, JOHN (1720–1772)

John Woolman was born on 19 October 1720 near Mount Holly, New Jersey, and he died of smallpox on 7 October 1772 while traveling in York, England. He received his education from Quaker elders in authoritative Friends authors (e.g., William Penn and George Fox) as well as in the vocational skills needed for a respectable trade. Dry goods income intermittently supplemented his primarily itinerant ministry.

Although it constituted only one element of his ministry, Woolman is best known for his anti-slavery agitation. Writing influential essays on anti-slavery in 1754 and 1762, and a posthumously published "Plea for the Poor" that urged simplicity, Woolman sought to integrate Quaker theology with Quaker activism to oppose any complicity with slavery or worldly corruption and achieve greater harmony of action and belief. Woolman's writing and social activism exemplified Quaker theology, using peaceful opposition to effect change. A recorded minister since 1743, Woolman kept a journal for most of his life documenting his attempts to live up to Quaker principles.

In 1754, Woolman wrote his first essay concerning slavery: *Some Considerations on the Keeping of Negroes*. In it, he asserted that God's universal love afforded Friends an "integrity of heart... [as] a sure token of our

being partakers of that salvation which God hath appointed” (1989, 204). This salvation required charity among the community of believers because God’s wisdom, imparted through quiet discernment, “ought to humble us in prosperity and excite us in Christian benevolence towards our inferiors” (211). Slavery, then, destroyed divinity because it denied human connections, lithifying human prejudice to obscure communion with God. “God’s love is universal,” Woolman wrote, and if “the mind is sufficiently influenced by [it],” then the “heart is enlarged towards all men” (202). Woolman concluded slavery fundamentally rejected God’s law and warned, “He hath opened our understandings... concerning our duty toward this people... Should we now... neglect to do our duty in firmness and constancy... it may be that by terrible things in righteousness God may answer us in this matter” (93).

Woolman’s peaceful opposition to injustice through “soft persuasion” (Heller 1989) was solidified during the broader upsurge of evangelical piety in colonial America known as the Great Awakening. The sharp contrast between Woolman’s quietist impulses and the emotionally charged, out-of-door revivals of this period sets off key elements of his thought in high relief. Woolman eschewed sensationalism because it elevated an individual activist above the community that he thought was the best medium for receiving God’s wisdom. Consequently, when Woolman began to agitate for abolitionism, he knew it was the community, not individuals, that had to recognize “divine Truth” in his ministry. His writing compared Friends to Biblical figures, using these “figures of speech [to] invoke a shared audience” and garner respect among Elders (Heller 1989, 3). It is likely for this reason that Woolman did not begin his anti-slavery ministry until older slaveholding Friends had died. So timed, his activism

would not challenge community authority or threaten community bonds.

The great war for empire that erupted in the Ohio River Valley challenged pacifism as the Pennsylvania legislature instituted war taxes and militias for the first time in 1755. Woolman defended Quaker’s historic pacifism, asserting war destroyed man’s connections with God, dehumanizing all who were complicit with destruction. For Woolman, Christianity and war were irreconcilable.

Compounding these challenges to pacifism, Quakers grew increasingly wealthy in this period as the Atlantic economy expanded. Yet much of this wealth came from slave labor and placed a heavy moral yoke across Friends’ collective shoulders. Woolman’s most widely reprinted work, *A Plea for the Poor*, directly engaged this dilemma. Woolman argued the Atlantic economy redirected human labor toward consumption and left “too small a number of people employed in things useful” (1989, 275). He argued God’s law required Friends to maintain simplicity. If they were to “deviate from the Devine law and... indulge their desires in conforming to worldly pomp,” he warned that it would oppress “not only toward poor people,” but toward everyone responsible for paying rents to sustain great estates and everyone laboring in slavery to sustain the global commodity markets (1989, 44, 275). Observing the interconnections between luxury and violence, Woolman implored Friends to recognize “the seeds of war have... nourishment in these our possessions” (255). This led Woolman to assert flatly: “wealth desired for its own sake obstructs the increase of virtue” (239).

Woolman’s thought extolled self-denying charity toward humanity discovered through introspection, not the liberating qualities of a reason proud to be autonomous from the two-fold shackles of traditional religion and communal custom. It was the real community

of sincere Christians who could truly empathize with the suffering of others in their humility (1989, 90–91), not the imagined community of autonomous reasoners to whom he called for aid in pursuing his lofty goals.

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M. Scott Heerman

WRIGHT, CHAUNCEY (1830–1875)

Chauncey Wright was born on 20 September 1830 in Northampton, Massachusetts. He attended the Select High School there, and then received a BA from Harvard University in 1852, having shown exceptional ability in mathematics, physics, and astronomy. The only professor who influenced him was the mathematician Benjamin Peirce, father of Charles S. Peirce. His early interests in philosophy were Galileo, Bacon, William Hamilton, and John Stuart Mill. Except for Galileo, interest in the others eventually faded, except for Mill's utilitarianism, and were replaced by the influence of Charles Darwin.

After college Wright became a member of the mathematical staff at the Cambridge Observatory, assigned to the *American Ephemeris and Nautical Almanac* to calculate relationships among nautical data supplied by astronomers. Wright worked for the *Ephemeris* from 1852 to 1872. He invented new formulas so that he could do a year's calculations in three months; during the other nine months he talked philosophy with students, friends, the members of two clubs, the Septem and the Metaphysical Club. These clubs included Peirce, William James, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Nicholas St. John Green, along with colleagues in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In this way he became known as the Socratic Sage of Old Cambridge, where he resided the rest of his life.

Wright was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1860 and

served as its recording secretary from 1863 to 1870. He contributed many essays and reviews to the *North American Review* and the *Nation*. Wright died on 11 September 1875 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Norton published his major essays as *Philosophical Discussions* (1877) and James Bradley Thayer edited Wright's *Letters* (1878). No one else in Cambridge ever filled his conversational role.

Skilled in mathematics and physics, Wright was the first technically proficient philosopher of science in America. He clearly defined and defended the hypothetico-deductive approach to science and was a constant critic of the "summary" view of lawfulness held by the entire British empiricist tradition. Wright essentially stated in a new way the views of Galileo and Kepler which had declined as a result of a too literal interpretation by the British empiricists of Newton's famous "Hypotheses non Fingo." According to Wright, scientists in general demonstrate in their work the hypothetico-deductive method and hence their concepts and laws cannot be interpreted as generalizations drawn from empirical facts, as Hume and Mill had contended. Wright observed that empirical generalizations are limited in scope whereas fundamental laws such as those of gravity and thermodynamics have unlimited scope. Moreover, the concepts of lower-order laws, such as Kepler's, while they have a limited range, that range is precisely known, unlike generalizations from experience where the scope is indefinite.

Wright made still another significant contribution to philosophy of science by distinguishing the different senses of explanation in experimental science and derivative science – physics and chemistry versus geology and meteorology, so to speak. The former operate in experimentally controlled situations while derivative sciences try to explain a concrete series of events

in the complex and apparently irregular physical world. In the experimental sciences prediction is often taken as explanation, but in the derivative sciences the complexity prevents prediction. However, prediction and explanation are not identical, and perfectly good explanations are made in geology and related sciences. Darwin's concept of natural selection, Wright continued, is similar to geology; it has explanatory power but cannot predict. The explanation of the genesis of species, however, has much evidence in its favor, evidence from paleontology, comparative anatomy, geographical distribution, and so on. Again, prediction and explanation are not synonymous.

Wright was probably the earliest American intellectual to understand and philosophically defend Darwin. He argued with those critics who said that Darwin's concept of species was conventional, arbitrary, and relative. Wright differentiated different senses of species and was able to show that in one sense at least Darwin's concept of species was not relative or conventional. Darwin was so impressed with Wright's essays that he had "The Genesis of Species" (1871) reprinted in England at his own expense and sent to his scientific collaborators. He also mentioned Wright's "The Limits of Natural Selection" (1870) in his own book *The Descent of Man* (1874), and he and his wife invited his American friend, who was touring England, to be their house guest, which was the most enjoyable event of Chauncey's life. During this visit Darwin asked Wright to work on the problem of determining in the evolution of languages when an advance can properly be ascribed to self-conscious, rational behavior. Wright responded with his most sustained essay, "The Evolution of Self-Consciousness" (1873).

Numerous authors have seen Wright as the precursor of various aspects of Peirce's or

James's versions of pragmatism. However, as a determinist, Wright rejected absolute chance and would have rejected Peirce's synechism and other notions as another generalization of evolutionary thought. It is difficult to say precisely what James meant by "pragmatism" but clearly he accepted a forward-looking pragmatic meaning of "truth" whereas Wright held a correspondence theory. On the other hand, James acknowledged that Wright's analysis of sign reasoning formed the basis of his chapter on Reasoning in *The Principles of Psychology* (1896), one of the chapters most appealing to John Dewey. Wright in fact had more in common with Dewey than with Peirce or James; they were both naturalists and avoided all philosophical dualisms. Having neither faith nor knowledge, Wright was an agnostic. James never understood how moderate Wright's agnosticism was compared with W.K. Clifford's and Thomas Huxley's.

Wright's emergent naturalism influenced later philosophers in a way that would have embarrassed him had he lived to know about them. Samuel Alexander poking around a secondhand bookstall in London found a copy of *Philosophical Discussions* and was so attracted to the notion of emergence that he developed his own full-blown doctrine of emergence in which even God is an emergent event. Wright would not have been happy being a precursor of process theology and philosophy. Cosmological speculation about the production of systems of worlds, Wright thought, also belongs to the derivative category of science. The cosmologist uses the laws of physics to explain the physical history of the system of worlds where there has been an uncontrolled, complete interpenetration of the principles at work. The fact that ordinary weather phenomena exhibit the same logical features of causal complexity and apparent irregularity, and that the effort to predict

them runs into the same difficulties as the cosmologist's effort to explain the production of systems of worlds, like ordinary weather, shows overall no development or any noticeable tendency whatever but is a "doing and undoing without end" – a kind of weather that might be called "cosmical weather." Wright based his ateleological view on what he called the principle of countermovements. He agreed with Aristotle that the physical universe is uncreated and eternal.

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Edward H. Madden

Y

YOLTON, JOHN WILLIAM (1921–2005)

John Yolton was born on 10 November 1921 in Birmingham, Alabama. He received his BA with honours at the University of Cincinnati in 1945. He did postgraduate studies at the University of California at Berkeley from 1946 to 1950, and then earned a PhD in philosophy from Oxford University in 1952. Yolton was a visiting lecturer at Johns Hopkins University in 1952–53; assistant professor of philosophy at Princeton University from 1953 to 1957; associate professor of philosophy at Kenyon College from 1957 to 1961; and then professor of philosophy at the University of Maryland from 1961 to 1963. From 1963 to 1978 Yolton was professor of philosophy at York University in Toronto, Canada, serving as department chair from 1963 to 1973. He also served as Acting Dean of graduate studies at York from 1967 to 1968, and Acting President from 1973 to 1974. Yolton left York to become professor of philosophy at Rutgers University in 1978 and Dean of Rutgers College (until 1985). From 1989 until his retirement in 1992 Yolton was John Locke Professor of the History of Philosophy at Rutgers. Yolton died on 3 November 2005 in Piscataway, New Jersey.

For philosophers studying the philosophy of John Locke, John Yolton's work has been a necessity. No fewer than eight of his books are about Locke, and much of the rest of his work shows the influence of his study

of Locke. Yolton began his career at a time when history of philosophy was largely regarded as a graveyard of past errors. The texts of philosophers like Locke were read in order to see how they had gone wrong, and they were treated as though they were about eternal conceptual issues and as though their intellectual environments were essentially those of the mid-twentieth century. In this milieu Yolton demonstrated how to read the history of philosophy, and Locke in particular, with reference to the writings of other thinkers. Yolton brought out the importance of recognizing that Locke is in many ways not our contemporary, although we may be able to learn much from him.

Several themes are found in Yolton's work. First, the controversies over the use of the term 'idea', and the considerable importance attached to the claim that innate ideas are central to human moral and social values, and the consequent importance of innate ideas for religious thinkers. Second, the religious, social and ethical significance of Locke's failure to insist that thinking required a separate spiritual substance, which led to Locke's being labelled a Spinozist by some. Third, the large interconnection between apparently epistemological issues and the larger social and religious arena. Yolton's work thus highlights connections between Locke and other authors of his time, and between Locke the epistemologist and cognitive psychologist and philosopher of language on the one hand and Locke the social and religious thinker on the other.

Yolton's influence comes in part from his having made the philosophic public more aware of writers and positions that had receded into the mists, and in part comes from his having thus encouraged others to take the historical context of writers from Descartes to Kant more seriously.

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William R. Abbott

YOUNG, IRIS MARION (1949–2006)

Iris Marion Young was born on 2 January 1949 in New York City. She studied philosophy at Queens College, CUNY and graduated with the BA and honors in 1970. She earned her MA and PhD in philosophy from Pennsylvania State University, finishing in 1974. Her dissertation, "From Anonymity to Speech: A Reading of Wittgenstein's Later Writing," was supervised by John M. Anderson. Young first taught at Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Massachusetts, and then at Miami University in Ohio. From 1991 until 2000 she taught political theory in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. In 2000 she became Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and held that position until her death on 1 August 2006 in Chicago.

Young's works focused upon feminism, justice, democratic theory and group representation. She was also very engaged in grassroots activism. Her own brand of feminism founded upon phenomenology and post-modern critical thought is developed most clearly in *On Female Body Experience: "Throwing Like a Girl" and Other Essays* and *Intersecting Voices*. Young presents an analysis of women's experiences as attached to vulnerable bodies and therefore

includes essentially embodied experiences such as aging, birth, menstruation, and more generally the social regulation of body. This embodied analysis quite effectively communicates the different body experience of a woman. Of course, Young is wary of any overly essentialized idea of woman or woman's experience, but on the other hand she is unwilling to see the difference as wholly constructed. Her theory therefore sees the "feminine" as a social construct and the "female" as a biological reality both combining to construct the experience of the lived and gendered body. In addition to the biological and the institutional, though, she also includes individual agency. Therefore her feminism combines a historicized and relational analysis of gender with biology and belief in the presence of individual agency. Gender is exposed as a basic aspect of society that both constructs and follows from personal identity and social institutions.

In *Justice and the Politics of Difference* she uses much the same set of tools to investigate individual and group identity in relationship to contemporary social and political analysis. Her ultimate aim is to offer a conception of democracy based upon the reality and desirability of difference and diversity. She argues that dominant theories of both justice and democracy ignore the real and important existence of social groups. For instance, according to her standard conceptions of both liberal individualism and communitarianism cannot handle group affiliations of any depth. Liberal individualism cannot handle important aspects of group because it sees all groups as entered in to voluntarily and cannot fully explain the power of social institutions. On the other hand, Young argues that communitarian thought often overemphasizes homogeneity and underestimates the complexity and centrality of diverse groups within society. She offers a model of the

democratic city with overlapping locations and multiple opportunities for each inhabitant as an alternative ideal. Most important to Young, distributional analysis (such as that of John Rawls) renders the issues of domination and oppression difficult to understand or even discern. This, in turn, leads her to emphasize the importance of specific context and the embeddedness of social issues of justice.

Young identifies five important aspects of oppression that are irreducible to each other: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. All are rendered close to invisible by conceiving of justice as an issue of distribution. Further, once oppression is so analyzed, the importance and centrality of groups to social and political activity becomes manifest. Importantly, the analysis she offers can combine an awareness of the importance of oppression for both the individual self and for structural oppression. This is because the self is largely constituted through its group affiliations. But just as the self is fluid and constituted largely from relations but also includes individual agency, so are groups constructed in relationship. Groups are largely social constructions, but those most important and most intractable, such as gender and race, are not to be seen as essentially a voluntary association. Therefore group identity is both essentially relational and fluid but also intractable in that group membership is often socially prior and not a matter of individual decision.

Young's *Inclusion and Democracy* depicts justice as an activity and a social process – democracy is not just a way to get justice, but an actual element of justice itself. One important norm she finds to be central – that of inclusion. Affected parties must, that is, have the opportunity to participate, be represented, and influence outcomes.

One important focus of representation is that of proper or allowable democratic

communication. Young focuses upon the exclusionary result of popularly held ideals of democratic deliberation. Her analysis exposes the fact that even apparently neutral ideals of proper civil discourse can be seen to exclude democratic representation. She advocates for an open area for communication that doesn't rest upon narrow ideals of reason or democratic etiquette. Therefore, democratic communication must include other forms of communication – especially greeting, rhetoric, and narrative – to overcome political exclusion and marginalization.

Her posthumously published work *Responsibility for Justice* claims that an earlier idea of social obligation as group responsibility has been replaced by a belief that people are poor due to their own choices and habits, so they deserve their lower position in society. This as a sole focus inappropriately excludes the rich from being critiqued. Young doesn't discount personal aspects to status, but structural impediments are ubiquitous and should not be discounted either. She gives as an example a single mother named Sandy who, through circumstances beyond her full control, is situated in poverty even though choices are rational and no one person who she interacts with acts unjustly towards her individually. We therefore need a different conception of responsibility in order to understand institutional injustice. Responsibility, as she sees it, is not a blame game, but a stance that encourages awareness of the unfortunate consequences of social actions that should be avoided and remedied in future. This is a social connection model of responsibility, wherein many individuals share in responsibility since their actions are in web creating unjust effects. Young's analysis also finds different levels of responsibility due to aspects of power, privilege, interest, and ability as a group to effect change. Even "victims" are part of the cause of injustice, and therefore

have responsibility for remedies too. As with her theory of democracy, large systemic effects are central and implicated in justice, so national borders are largely irrelevant to the issue of justice, and international obligations can become clear.

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Brian E. Butler

YOUNG, THOMAS (1731–1777)

Thomas Young was born on 19 February 1731 in New Ulster, New York. His father had immigrated to America with a group of Presbyterian dissenters led by Colonel Charles Clinton (ancestor of governors George Clinton and DeWitt Clinton), who noticed Thomas's intellect and urged education. He was a remarkable self-learner, assisted in mathematics with the schoolmaster John Wilson, languages with a minister, and science with access to Colonel Clinton's library. Lacking funds for college, Young was apprenticed to a doctor and by his early twenties he had his own successful practice in Connecticut. Young was notable for his early use of inoculation. In 1762 Young settled in New York near the border with Connecticut in an area that he artfully named "Amenia." Ethan Allan moved to nearby Salisbury, Connecticut, in the following year and the two free thinkers quickly found each other, forming a bond that helped shape the course of the American Revolution. Young also became the first American deist to openly publish his views, predating Allen by fourteen years.

Young's dissatisfaction with Calvinism had blossomed into a preference for natural science and free will over scriptural revelation and divine predestination. Allen had already arrived at similar conclusions. Young was especially impressed by the rationalism of natural theology and the politics of John Locke, and Allen absorbed these philosophical

tenets. They became notorious in their towns for airing unorthodox opinions, in a religious atmosphere still unsettled by theological controversies aroused by Jonathan Edwards. Young had been convicted and punished by the court of Dutchess County for blasphemy against Jesus Christ. Young and Allen were also writing down their theological arguments and they quickly amassed hundreds of pages of manuscript which was later published by Allen as *Reason the Only Oracle of Man* (1784). Young took the manuscript with him when he departed for Albany in October 1764, and he did not live to see it published. Political affairs consumed his time. He assisted Albany-area landowners with their dispute over settlements in the neighboring Green Mountains, then claimed by New York. Young anonymously published *Some Reflections on the Disputes between New York, New-Hampshire, and Col. John Henry Lydius of Albany* (1764). Allen had also invested in that territory, and wrote pamphlets applying Lockean principles in defense of the independence rights of his fellow settlers. Allen soon became the military leader of his "Green Mountain Boys" and promoted widespread rebellion there.

The 1765 Stamp Act had aroused Young's own patriotic zeal; he quickly joined a Sons of Liberty group in Albany, moved in Boston to advocate rebellion by 1767, and he devoted the rest of life to the liberty of his homeland. Young, along with Samuel Adams and James Otis, was among the loudest voices in the newspapers (often using pennames) and in the streets of Boston to protest British policies. Young was appointed to Adams's *Committee of Correspondence* upon its formation in 1772, and participated in the 1773 Boston Tea Party (some credit Young with the idea). In 1774 Young and other Boston leaders began scattering to avoid British arrest. He went to Newport, Rhode Island, and then Philadelphia,

where he met Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Rush, and Thomas Paine. Young kept in touch with Allen, who was then negotiating with the Continental Congress on behalf of “Vermont” (Young had suggested that name). In 1776 Young participated in the writing of the new constitution for an independent Pennsylvania, and this constitution supplied for the model for Vermont’s constitution. In December 1776 Young was appointed senior surgeon for the Continental hospital in Philadelphia, but Young later caught a fever there and died on 24 June 1777.

During Young’s residence in Boston and Philadelphia, his religious unorthodoxy was as well-known as his political zealotry. Some skeptics towards his revolutionary plans attacked his lack of respect for Christianity. He was provoked to publish defenses of his views on religion in area newspapers during 1770, 1771, and 1772. In the *Boston Evening Post* on 27 August 1770 Young described his views on revelation, and his letter in the 18 March 1771 issue of the *Boston Evening Post* denied that he was an atheist or an immoralist. Young’s longer 1772 letter, printed in the Boston newspaper *Massachusetts Spy* lists his positive assertions about a supernatural creator who benevolently designed a world of natural laws and a system of moral justice by which humanity is judged. Young admitted how he could not accept Calvinist principles of predestination and eternal damnation, but he asked his readers to judge him by his public service to mankind. The dispute continued in the newspaper for a while, including a letter from Samuel Adams defending Young’s patriotism. There also was a sixteen-page pamphlet defending deism which was anonymously circulating in Boston in 1771, but this “Sermon on Natural Religion by a Natural Man” lacks Young’s characteristic sophistication and the author’s identity remains unknown.

Young’s letters were the only published expressions of his deism during his lifetime. Allen’s determination to rescue their joint manuscript from Young’s widow guaranteed the preservation of Young’s fullest thoughts on deism. Unorthodoxy did run in the family; his younger brother Joseph (1735–1814) also became a doctor and a patriot, and he became an early advocate of Universalism with his *Calvinism and Universalism Contrasted* (New York, 1793). Young’s own stature has been long obscured by his early death and the absence of his name on *Reason the Only Oracle of Man*. Examination of the book’s chapters reveals how Young probably authored as much as four-fifths of the text, evidenced by the numerous passages displaying the high linguistic proficiency, technical knowledge of physics and physiology, and elaborate explanations of British deistic arguments which Allen himself admitted he never accessed. Allen’s desire for fame and a motivation to protect Young’s surviving family can account for the way that Allen happily took all the credit for *Reason*.

The portions primarily composed by Young outlines a system of natural religion that reaches deism by omitting any role for miracles, inspired revelation, or divinely installed intuitions. Like other intellectuals of that Enlightenment era whose specialty was medicine, Young believed that the human being and human society should be understood through a few mechanical principles, and he published widely on medical problems. In *Reason*, the human capacity for rationally understanding the lawful operations of the natural world is the only foundation for religion. Reason has a three-fold foundational role. Our reflection on reason’s powers supplies a model for a supremely rational mind. The rational design of the world suggests the hand of a supernatural intelligence in creation of the world. Reason itself demands a satisfactory explanation for the existence of the world. We

may conclude that only a supreme supernatural mind could be responsible for all creation. Although Young does not hesitate to exalt the many perfections of God, there are obvious logical gaps between the defects of nature and humanity and a perfectly benevolent God, which *Reason* does not fully bridge. The general optimism of Young's view of creation as perfectly designed is not matched by much effort to argue that apparent natural evils can be justified as necessary for creation's overall goodness.

There is an additional tension between Young's optimism about nature's perfections and Young and Allen's pessimism about human evils. Unlike some other early deists or universalists who saw much goodness in human nature, *Reason* emphasized a moral struggle in the human heart. Young and Allen were in complete agreement that God's benevolence towards humanity and God's judgment on human responsibility implies that people have an immortal soul that exercises free will. Their shared conviction that humanity must respect freedom was earnestly applied in their joint quest for political liberty.

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John R. Shook

Z

ZEDLER, BEATRICE HOPE (1916–2006)

Beatrice Hope Zedler was born on 14 May 1916, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the daughter of Edwin and Cecelia M. (Koch) Zedler. She was educated at Marquette University where she received her BA summa cum laude in 1937 and MA in 1938. She was awarded the PhD in philosophy by Fordham University in 1947, writing a dissertation on “St. Thomas’ Critique of Avicennism in the ‘*De Potentia Dei*’.” Zedler taught at Marian College, Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, as instructor in English and philosophy in 1939–40, and then at College Misericordia in Dallas, Pennsylvania, during 1941–43. In 1946 Zedler joined the philosophy department at Marquette University, teaching there as a philosophy instructor (1946–51), assistant professor (1951–54), associate professor (1954–63), and full professor (1963–86). Zedler held the Women’s Chair of Humanistic Studies during 1967–71, and was Marquette’s Aquinas Lecturer in 1983. She died on 22 February 2006 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

A scholar of great erudition and breadth, Zedler is renowned for her translations and studies of Western and Arabic medieval philosophy, as well as for her groundbreaking historical and biographical work on women in philosophy. Yet she was no less at home in the interpretation of the major figures of classical American philosophy. Her sensitive and astute explorations of often neglected aspects of Dewey’s thought, for example in “The Quiet

Dimension of Experience” (1979), in which she allows Dewey’s poetry to illuminate his aesthetic theory, are especially noteworthy.

Though much of Zedler’s work focused on medieval thought, her knowledge has been fully engaged to clarify momentous current events. Her article, “The Ayatollah Khomeini and His Concept of an Islamic Republic,” carefully narrates the philosophical origins of Khomeini’s political beliefs, tracing them back through Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes to their bedrock in Plato’s political theory. In her 1983 Aquinas Lecture, *How Philosophy Begins*, Zedler draws on St. Thomas to probe the idea of wonder as the source of our need to philosophize. She finds the answer, in part, in biography: in hardship and loss; in reversal of fortune; in “the sting of reality.” “Each temporal and earthly experience,” she writes, “can actuate our potentiality for knowing. Each is an invitation to think. Through successive acts of thinking about successive experiences, our philosophical life develops and *moves* towards achieving its fulfillment.” (p. 35).

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Women Phils

Gary S. Calore

ZIFF, ROBERT PAUL (1920–2003)

Paul Ziff was born on 22 October 1920 in New York City. He practiced art until 1942 when he entered the United States Coast Guard, serving until the end of World War II. In 1946 he enrolled at Cornell University to study with the painter J.M. Hanson. He was awarded the BFA in 1949, and in 1951 received a PhD in philosophy after completing a dissertation under the direction of Max Black. Ziff taught philosophy at Michigan in 1952–53; Harvard

from 1953 to 1959; Pennsylvania from 1959 to 1964; Wisconsin from 1964 to 1968; and the University of Illinois at Chicago from 1968 to 1970. From 1970 until his retirement in 1988, he was William Rand Kenan Jr. Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina. As much an artist as a philosopher, Ziff was awarded on a Guggenheim Fellowship for painting in 1962–63. He died on 9 January 2003 in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

Ziff’s primary contributions to philosophy were in philosophy of language, aesthetics, and philosophy of mind, but he also made important contributions to epistemology and philosophy of religion. His work brought together disparate influences in surprising ways, and his importance to the discipline consisted in his style of philosophizing as much as in his defense of doctrines. Ziff was a student at Cornell when Ludwig Wittgenstein and his later philosophy made their appearance in America, and in 1955 he went to Oxford to work with J.L. Austin on a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

Unlike most of those who grasped the power of “ordinary language philosophy,” Ziff also was influenced by more formal philosophers such as Nelson Goodman and W.V. Quine. Stronger still was the influence of linguists such as Noam Chomsky and Zelig Harris. Ziff’s *Semantic Analysis* (1960) was the first major work to bring together philosophy of language and the “new linguistics.” The theory he sketched in this book was motivated by his interest in aesthetics: he wanted to know what “good painting” means. The final chapter is an analysis of the meaning of ‘good’ that has rarely been exceeded in rigor and insight. Among the many important ideas that have found their way into the literature (often without acknowledgement) is the view that a semantic system is best characterized as a recursive system. In a later work, *Epistemic Analysis* (1984), Ziff subjected the word

‘know’ to the same kind of obsessive analysis to which he had earlier subjected the word ‘good’.

Ziff’s major work in aesthetics is a series of papers published in the 1950s and 1960s, and his beautiful, brilliant, sometimes aggravating book, *Antiaesthetics* (1984). Aesthetic appreciation is what matters for Ziff, and here he provocatively asserts that “anything that can be viewed is a fit object for aesthetic attention.” He challenges the rigidity and pretentiousness of the aesthetic establishment by asking us to contemplate a beer can on the side of the road along with a Dubuffet painting in the Museum of Modern Art. He brings to the forefront questions about the aesthetic appreciation of nature, a topic largely ignored since Kant, and he anticipates the rise of evolutionary psychology by posing questions about the evolutionary history and functions of our aesthetic practices.

Careful study of Ziff’s claims and arguments yields large returns but his passion was for inventing, creating, reframing, and rediscovering questions. By the time those in the mainstream had arrived on the scene, Ziff was usually on to something else. In the words of one of his students, Ziff was “inexhaustibly creative, unflaggingly analytical, and proudly iconoclastic.” He was an early explorer of various concepts and ideas including functionalism, the role of empirical inferences in philosophy of mind, the importance of

pragmatics in a theory of language, *ceteris paribus* clauses in understanding, and concepts of vagueness.

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Further Reading

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