HISTORICAL ESSAYS IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

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Volume 11:	Historical Essays in 20th Century American Philosophy	

HISTORICAL ESSAYS IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

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Editorial Foreword

James Edwin Creighton (1901–1902), one of the founders of the American Philosophical Association, asserted that doing philosophy doesn't happen in a vacuum; it is no longer done by individuals cogitating in solitary stillness—if ever it was—but by thinkers working in collaboration and informed by the thoughts of others.[1] Given the globalization of intellectual activities and the historical expanse of the body of work with which they resonate, philosophers need to be able to read works that connect them with their colleagues across space and time. As Creighton put it, "an association can . . . prove a stimulus to the forces which are essential for progress in philosophical work" (1:30).

By that time, many Academic associations were forming: the Modern Language of America (1883), The American Historical Association (1884), The American Economics Association (1885), and The American Psychological Association (1892).[2] The time was ripe for philosophy to follow suit.

The presidential addresses of any philosophical association are a vital part of that intellectual interaction. Sadly, papers of philosophical associations, valuable as they are, are typically distributed, if at all, in cheaply reproduced form, most copies of which are discarded by their recipients on the way to the nearest bar. Those few that survive such dismissive treatment typically languish in boxes stored by well-intentioned members of the society who may entertain vague thoughts of putting them together in some compilation—some day—when they their other academic obligations are less time-consuming.

Readers, in the hope that your "some day" is realized one day, I have decided to take the opportunity afforded to me by this, my eleventh and final Editorial Foreword of the Centennial Series, to relate how I produced the series, to serve as something of a guide to well-intentioned future historiographers. It's meant to shed a light on the path in order to help you to move those valuable papers out of those boxes and into the public forum where others can benefit from the wisdom embodied in their content.

In the early 1990s, Robert Ginsberg, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy & Comparative Literature at Penn State Delaware County, and then President of the American Society for Value Inquiry, approached me about a way to commemorate the first quarter century since its establishment. The history of the Society had already been published,[3] but no comprehensive archive of their presidential addresses existed. Bob suggested that I collect and publish the addresses in a single volume. I did so, adding to each address a biographical sketch and photo of the past president. The result of that effort was *A Quarter Century of Value Inquiry*,[4] which established the format I and others would follow in other volumes developed for a series that became Histories and Addresses of Philosophical Societies (HAPS), a special series under the auspices of the Value Inquiry Book

Series (VIBS), published by Rodopi (now Brill). I became the HAPS Special Series Editor, and, to date, HAPS, which is now co-sponsored by the Conference of Philosophical Societies, has published seven additional volumes.

After completing work on *A Quarter Century of Value Inquiry*, I conceived the idea to similarly collect the addresses, photographs, and biographical sketches of the individuals who have served as presidents of the three divisions of The American Philosophical Association (The APA) on the occasion of their centennial, which they would celebrate in 2000.

I had no particular credentials for doing such historiography other than having just edited the first HAPS volume. But I did have a strong belief that the addresses of philosophical organizations are important records that should be formally preserved as a significant part of the organization's history. So, armed with minimal experience but strong belief, I put my proposal to Eric Hoffman, then Executive Director of The APA, that I compile and edit the entire 100 years of its presidential addresses. Happily, he disclosed that The APA was, indeed, looking for ways to commemorate its centennial and he liked my idea. Before long, I was duly authorized to start the project.

The boards of the three divisions charged Philip Lawrence Quinn, John A. O'Brien Professor of University of Notre Dame, who served for many years as president of the Central Division and then also as president of The APA (1994–1995),[5] and Ernest Sosa, then of Brown University who went on to serve as a president of The APA (2004–2005) to supervise the early work. The APA awarded me a grant of $30,000 to cover initial production expenses. What I at first envisioned to be the biggest obstacle to the project, quickly faded into its role as the easiest aspect of it in light of what lay ahead!

Once committed to doing the Centennial Series and obtaining the support of The APA, I encountered several other major obstacles. I soon discovered that, as is the case with many such organizations, not even a complete or accurate list of the presidents, their years of tenure, or the titles of their addresses was readily available. The reconstruction of such a list from the minutes of the Association and other references and records led to a number of puzzles and mysteries, the resolution of which occupied my efforts for some three years. Discussion of these can be found in the Editorial Forewords of each of the ten volumes.

Keep in mind, this was a time before the journal *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, not even published until 1927, was archived in JSTOR for convenient access. Not all the addresses were published in the *Proceedings*, or in *The Philosophical Review* before that. After much research, we eventually found some in private collections or university archives, never having been previously published. In some cases, presidents elected had been unable to serve, and thus gave no addresses at all. In those cases, we searched for writings that were representative of those presidents'

thoughts at the time. One notable case deserves special mention: David Benjamin Kaplan (1980–1981) delivered "*De Re* Belief" extemporaneously to the Pacific Division of The APA, in Portland, Oregon on 27 March 1981, and it had not been previously published. In support of the project, he generously wrote out his paper for this publication in 2000 from memory, two decades after first delivering it!

Even addresses that had previously been published presented many editorial problems. They had been published primarily as transcriptions of the spoken word, spoken by presidents who had a variety of mother tongues informing their English presentations. The print publications had little editorial effort devoted to standardizing even punctuation and grammar, which did not enjoy the same consistency at the start of the twentieth century as it does now (*if* it does now!). Moreover, addresses given to contemporaries seldom required that the speakers supply full names, titles, or even sources for their citations or allusions, since most listeners were intimately familiar with the subject matter and the philosophers being discussed; authors who slipped into languages other than English, especially German or classical Greek and Latin during the earliest years, most likely also had listeners who shared their fluency.

As philosophy has changed focus over time, so has the language of philosophy. Paul Marhenke (1949–1950) asserted that to be "significant, we require that [a sentence] be translatable into the ordinary idiom" (5:513).[6] This can be understood as a prescient admonishment that to remain significant, philosophers should give up esoteric language that would become increasingly incomprehensible to future generations. In keeping with that dictum, I have put the matter in ordinary language elsewhere, which bears repeating: "make reading your writing easy so that the reader may give full thought to your thinking."[7]

Nonetheless, listeners at the beginning of the twentieth century were far more familiar with esoteric language styles in vogue at the time than are contemporary readers. Thus, for these volumes to be informative to contemporary academics and instructional to scholars over and above being mere transcriptions of the words as spoken at the time they were delivered, we endeavored to "fill in the blanks" for new generations of readers who could be expected to struggle with the same presentations that their intellectual progenitors easily understood. From a purely editorial standpoint, we faced many foreign phrases and titles that needed translation, incomplete citations, citations that pointed to publications no longer in print (for which we attempted to find the same works in more recent publications), ambiguous references to persons and events, quotations given without sources, and outright misquotations.

A wonderful illustrative case in this regard is "Recent Poets on Man and His Place," delivered by Katharine Everett Gilbert (1946–1947),[8] for which we dug up sources for dozens of unattributed snippets of poetry and many publica-

tion details for incomplete citations. While the address remains a vivid exposition as it was delivered, we hoped that easy access to the full poems and other sources Gilbert cited would serve as an enriched resource for scholars studying Gilbert and the concepts she discussed.

In many cases, photographs, life facts, dates of birth and death, and even some addresses themselves were missing from any public records. One of the most challenging conundrums in this category concerned the very title of the address delivered by Albert Ross Hill (1904–1905), which was reported variously in two different publications by two different titles. But a transcript of the address was never found. Finally, I resorted to using parts of two different papers Hill had written on the same topic as his address.[9]

Again, researching such details was no easy matter in the days before electronic access to a myriad of electronic library archives and nearly instantaneous contact with people who could source quotes or otherwise provide data via the Internet and e-mail. Obviously, over time, some of our research activity got easier. We benefited from an increasing amount of biographical data becoming easily accessible online. Easier too was directly communicating with the still-living philosophers or their family members, who were able help us to complete biographical sketches and clarify passages in the addresses. We progressed from having to send out letters via traditional mail services in hopes of getting some reply after weeks or months, to being able to easily use e-mail to reach authors very quickly and efficiently. Moreover, we found the still-living subjects of the Series to be gratified to have their work revisited.

Thus, as another gem of advice to future historiographers, I will state emphatically that in this age of technology and fully populated databases, with even digital images of ancient documents available at our fingertips, we no longer have any valid excuses for anything less than accurate citations and quotations or for proceeding without proper attributions and copyright permissions.

Fortunately, today, most universities and colleges also have paid staff positions for archivists who are charged with preserving data about the members of their faculties who achieve notability in their professions. Usually such institutions have a news bureau photographer charged with portraying faculty members who have achieved professional recognition. Those archivists and the materials they collect formed the base and bulk of the data from which I drew for most of the volumes. But many photos remained missing; finding images constituted a main research challenges for the series. In one case, I had to find three contemporaneous photos for one past president who had served multiple times. In another case, we used a photograph of a formal portrait provided by an historical library. While arguably the most frustrating, the search for biographical data and photographs, especially when I had to rely on idiosyncratic sources, was undoubtedly the most interesting as well. Our sources included relatives and

former students of deceased past presidents, death records, newspaper and magazine stories, United States Census data, the now-famous ancestry.com, many hours of devoted research by a genealogist who befriended us via the Internet, and some dusty searches through cardboard boxes stashed in attics. We included the sources for all the biographical data we used—again, as a way to instruct future historiographers about places to start their hunts as well as to provide proper attribution of our sources. As well, to be able to use the photos that we were able to obtain, cropping out others from group shots and restoring creased and crumbled snapshots was necessary—another benefit made possible by the advance of technology over the time as we worked on the series. Thus, as Drew Christie, in his contribution to this volume, "Philosophers during the Last Decade of the Cold War, the 1980s,"[10] reviewed the changes in philosophy that resulted from the advance of computer technology, so too the advance of computer technology changed how the history of that philosophy is compiled and reported.

As the Acknowledgments in each of the ten volumes attest, our efforts required the assistance of hundreds of individuals who gladly offered their knowledge and their time to get the job done. More advice to future historiographers: never underestimate the potential services of your siblings, children, classmates of your children, parents of those classmates, your former students, your in-laws, and even total strangers you may meet online.

So, don't hesitate to reach out: the world abounds with people whose generosity is immeasurable and who have amassed an astounding fund of knowledge that they are willing, even anxious, to share. It's there for the asking. Asking widens the circle of our philosophical interaction; it instructs others in the principles of intellectual and academic scholarship, it might even encourage someone to join in the process of "doing philosophy," and it offers others the opportunity to feel appreciated. Reciprocally, express your gratitude and pay their kindnesses forward. Professionally and personally, we have gained far more from producing this series than merely documenting the addresses!

After getting the volumes written, getting the project published was the second major obstacle. While HAPS was established as a series to publish histories of philosophical societies, Rodopi envisioned it to be a series mostly of single volumes with an occasional two-volume celebration. The APA Centennial Series would require at least ten volumes and require a multi-year commitment on the part of a publisher. Hence, Rodopi declined the proposal; I had to research other possible publishing options. Publishers in the United States that I contacted didn't want any part of the project without a guarantee of sales of so many copies, or a substantial cash subvention against royalties. Such was not particularly surprising, as publishers routinely reject proposals that portend financial loss—those destined not to make back at least their initial investment.

While academics supposedly write not for profit but for professional communication, publishers must pay attention to the bottom line to stay in business.

Moreover, at the time I was doing publisher shopping, many of the biographies had not yet been completed and many addresses, such as Hill's, still hadn't been located. I had barely begun finding the photographs that we intended to publish, and obtaining them meant also obtaining another 300 copyright permissions to publish them once we found them. In short, I had big plans, grand intentions, and admirable commitment, but absolutely no collateral to offer publishers to guarantee I could produce the series as proposed. I seemed a poor bet, indeed!

Finally, with the able assistance of Sosa and Quinn, a contract was negotiated with Kluwer Academic Publishers, which published the first editions of the first four volumes of the series, but which then pulled out for a couple of justifiable, but frustrating reasons: Ours was a niche market with low projected sales. Since Kluwer is based in The Netherlands, ours was considered a "foreign" publication; costs for marketing in the United States were relatively high, and their European markets were narrow. I found myself publisher shopping again.

During my tenure as Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo, I had become personally familiar with Paul Kurtz (the "father of secular humanism"), who had founded Prometheus Books publishing house in 1969. He was able to arrange for Prometheus to publish Volumes 5 and 6. Unfortunately, the costs of warehousing books had impacted on the industry to the extent that those bound volumes—physical quality of the paper, print resolution of the photos, and the front matter and cover design—were, in my opinion, less than ideal. At the same time, seeking resolution of those issues was impracticable because poor projected sales had again become a factor. Ultimately, we had a parting of the ways, and I was, once again, publisher shopping. Before continuing with how I resolved this issue, I will offer another crucial piece of advice: always insist on a prepublication copy of any print version of your work prior to committing to a publisher/printer. Get the details of the print quality that you expect memorialized in your publishing/printing contract.

Finally, I was able to negotiate with Prometheus a return of all copyrights to previous volumes, clearing the way for me to self-publish the entire series, with updated and revised versions of the earlier volumes and completing Volumes 7 through 11. That was the point at which we also switched from warehousing volumes to a print-on-demand model for hard-bound copies, and adding electronic versions for e-book readers to the offering.

The benefits and detriments of self-publishing would require discussion beyond the space constraints of this essay. Suffice it to say, however, that these final changes to the media and the marketing model, made possible by technolog-

ical advances not readily available when we started, made copies far more affordable and virtually eliminated the issue of projected sales.

For every problem resolved though, another arises as a consequence of the resolution. For the Centennial Series, after I took the leap to self-publish, I faced the new problem of marketing and distribution; sustainability of distribution without personally becoming a distributor was an important issue. To meet that need, the Philosophy Documentation Center (https://www.pdcnet.org/wp/) has stepped in to make the entire series available in print and electronic versions.

After addressing the historiographical research, editorial, and publication issues, we come full circle, back to addressing why anyone should willingly volunteer for such torture, the results of which will probably not advance careers much and most certainly won't advance one's financial wealth. In reply, I will reiterate that doing the historiography of philosophy helps to preserve the body of knowledge that we, as a profession, have endeavored to create—or created as we endeavored to think. We can best plan where we're going if we have a clear idea of where we've been. We can better learn how our predecessors' ideas can inform today's thoughts if we remain better informed about what their ideas were.

What we've done in offering this series (and I say "we" because I could never have done it alone), is to preserve fund of knowledge embodied in The APA presidential addresses and make it readily available for scholarly research. Each address serves as a snapshot in time, of what was going on in philosophy at that time, of what that particular philosopher had in mind at that time, and often of what was going on in the larger world while academics were busy going about "doing philosophy." The bibliographies included with the addresses and the essays of Volume 11 offer a plethora of resources for readers to consult if they wish to further explore the topics, to walk the path the authors walked as they came to that point in their intellectual lives.

Creighton was wise: philosophy we do isn't done in a vacuum. We are the products of our life experiences; our philosophical inquiry is intricately entwined with our personal identity, with others with whom we've associated, with those under whom we've studied, and what we experienced along the way. By providing the biographies along with the addresses, we make it possible to trace a philosophical genealogy that has informed the addresses. How readers use the information they read will be influenced by who they are, and who they are, we hope, will be influenced by what they read.

To conclude, I offer the Centennial Series as a sort of philosophical time capsule that reveals to the future what our first 100 years of American philosophy was like, and as an incentive to our intellectual progeny to enjoy an even more fruitful second 100 years. None of us reading this now will be around to see how the second 100 years will have shaped up, but I sincerely hope that this series will have helped to inform those who are.

Richard T. Hull
Tallahassee, Florida

Notes

1. "The Purposes of a Philosophical Association," delivered to the first annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, at Columbia University, in March 1902, see this series, vol. 1, pp. 29–42.

2. Soon thereafter followed the American Anthropology Association (1902), the American Political Science Association (1903), the American Sociological Association (1905), and the American Academy of Religion (1909).

3. John W. Davis, A History of the American Society for Value Inquiry: Part One, pp. 712–733; Eva H. Cadwallader, A History of the American Society for Value Inquiry: Part Two, pp. 735–741; and Robert W. Loftin, A History of the American Society for Value Inquiry: Part Three, pp. 749–752; all in *Inquiries into Values: The Inaugural Session of the International Society for Value Inquiry*, ed. Sander H. Lee, vol. 11 of Problems in Contemporary Philosophy (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1988).

4. Richard T. Hull, ed., *A Quarter Century of Value Inquiry Presidential Addresses before the American Society for Value Inquiry* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994).

5. See Quinn's Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious, vol. 10 of this series, pp. 317–341.

6. "The Criterion of Significance," delivered 29 December 1949 before the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association at Mills College, Oakland, California; reprinted this series, vol. 5, pp. 511–528.

7. Richard T. Hull, *Guide for Preparing Volumes in the Value Inquiry Book Series*, 3rd ed. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003).

8. Presidential Address delivered 27 December 1946 before the annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association at the Hotel Taft, New Haven, Connecticut; reprinted this series, vol. 5, pp. 321–344.

9. "The text of Hill's presidential address has been reported variously as 'Psychology and Education,' by Arthur O. Lovejoy, the *Journal of Philosophy* 2, no. 14 (1905): 377 [and] 'Philosophy and Education,' *The Philosophical Review* 14, no. 4 (July 1905): 508, was never published per se. The editor suspects that it was 'cannibalized' for other addresses. Reprinted here are portions of two other addresses, one delivered later the same year to the Missouri State Teachers' Association ('The Articulation of High Schools, Colleges, and Universities'), the other delivered in 1908 at Hill's inauguration as President of the University of Missouri ('The University and the State'). These addresses may well contain elements from the Presidential Address delivered 21 April 1905 to the Western Philosophical Association, at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska, and provide insight into the thinking of Hill" (1:152).

10. This volume, pp. 199–219.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

1900–1901	First year of the Western Philosophical Association
1901–1902	First year of the American Philosophical Association
1920–1921	American and Western Philosophical Associations merge, forming **The American Philosophical Association**; former American and Western Associations become Eastern and Western Divisions of The APA, respectively.
1924–1925	First year of the Pacific Division
1985–1986	Western Division changes name to Central Division

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are most honored to have Nicholas Rescher (1989–1990), a past president of The American Philosophical Association, as a contributor to this volume.

> Rescher's chapter in this volume, Presidential Views on Philosophical Progress, is a revised version of "American Philosophy Today," *The Review of Metaphysics* 46 (1993): 717–745. Parts of the essay are also found in fuller contextualization in the chapter, American Philosophy at the Century's End, in *Studies in 20th Century Philosophy* (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2005), pp. 1–26.

A series as comprehensive as the American Philosophical Association Centennial Series would be impossible to produce without a small army of individuals and organizations who contributed in many ways, large and small, at every step of the process. Each of the first ten volumes contains an extensive list of these individuals and what role they played. Here, in this final volume of the series, I want acknowledge those who have contributed to this volume and to the Centennial Series generally.

First, I owe many thanks to the people who got this project off the ground and assisted with getting it published. Eric Hoffman, Executive Director of the American Philosophical Association when I first proposed the series, not only gave me his hearty endorsement, but arranged for me to receive a $30,000 grant to cover production costs. He arranged for the boards of the three divisions of The APA to be represented by Ernest Sosa and Philip Lawrence Quinn, who supervised my early work and who helped to negotiate the first contract with Kluwer Academic Publishers, who published Volumes 1–4. Michael Kelly, who had become executive director of The APA by 2001, negotiated the transfer of the series from Kluwer to Prometheus Books. Steven L. Mitchell, of Prometheus Books, was a patient and responsive editor who provided me both guidance and authority in editorial decisions. Prometheus published Volumes 5 and 6. As I negotiated regaining the copyrights to the series from Prometheus, which allowed me to self-publish the remainder of the series, Attorney Zick Rubin and The APA Executive Director, David Schrader, gave meticulous attention to the details of this transfer. Finally, George Leaman, Executive Director of the Philosophy Documentation Center (PDC), has worked with me to ensure that PDC will be responsible for marketing and distribution of the series.

Most importantly, I wish to express thanks to John R. Shook, who agreed to be the compiling editor for Volume 11. Although envisioned as part of the Centennial Series from the project's inception, there is always a huge distance between concocting the idea for such an ambitious volume and actually getting

it done. John, unlike me when I started the project, had already established impressive credentials as a historiographer of philosophy with his publication of the four-volume *Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers* and the two-volume *Dictionary of Early American Philosophers*.[1]

This experience made him uniquely qualified to do a terrific job of it. The downside of that was that his experience also made him acutely aware of the prodigious amount of work and drain on his time that producing such a volume entails. I am eternally grateful to him that he accepted my invitation and carried it out so ably and with such impressive results. As well, I owe a debt of gratitude to the many contributors who wrote for the volume. Theirs was a daunting challenge, which they completed admirably.

Finally, for Elaine, my cherished life partner, who has supported me with her love, compassion, and patience for over fifty-five years, there are no words adequate to express my deep gratitude and love. Through most of the time that Volume 11 was in production, her commitment was challenged in unexpected ways that neither of us ever envisioned. She is my strength, and I dedicate this series to her.

Richard T. Hull
Tallahassee, Florida

Note

1. *Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers*, 4 vols., ed. John R. Shook (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005), and the *Dictionary of Early American Philosophers*, 2 vols., ed. John R. Shook (London and New York: Continuum, 2012).

EDITORIAL NOTES

The present three divisions of The American Philosophical Association—Eastern, Central, and Pacific—have had as their precursors: in the case of the Central Division, the Western Division, and, before that, the Western Philosophical Association; in the case of the Eastern Division, the American Philosophical Association. Obviously, confusion is possible, and in order to keep some distinction among the names, reference to the entire association is rendered as "The American Philosophical Association (The APA)," with the definite article capitalized. The precursor to the Eastern Division is rendered as "the American Philosophical Association (the APA)," with the definite article in lower case (except if the term is quoted from a previously published address or, of course, when occurring at the start of a sentence).

Throughout this volume, the first instance of each past President in each chapter will give the person's full name, followed by the years indicating their terms of service as presidents of The APA or one of its precursors.

For brevity, citations referring to *Presidential Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, volumes 1–10, will be placed in-line in the text, and will specify only the volume number prior to the page locators; for example, "(3:234)" indicates p. 234 in Volume 3. A complete list of addresses titles with their page spans can be found in the Appendix for easy cross-reference.

The e-book edition has, for technical reasons, other treatments for a number of formatting issues from those of the print version. Indexing has been treated in the conventional manner for the print-on-demand and PDF versions of the volume. However, page locators in such an index shown in the electronic book version would be irrelevant, since electronic books "scroll" and have no individual pages, per se. In the first ten volumes, page locators were omitted from the indexes for the electronic versions. For this volume, we offer an interactive index. The page locators as shown in the print version have been retained, since they may be helpful for scholarly research or citation. The hyperlinks for the page locators shown in the interactive index are then linked to the place where that page would have begun in the print version. Contingent on e-book reader settings and the size of the screen, however, the index entry may appear to be several "pages" further into the manuscript. For convenience, some e-book readers will have a link at the bottom of the screen to return to the starting place in the index.

Another difference between print and e-book versions was necessary due to large amounts of white space that sometimes appear between lines and, in some cases, between words (which differ depending on the font size selected, the particular reader being employed, and other factors) in the e-book. To avoid this issue as much as possible, some long paragraphs and sentences in the print version, have been broken into shorter paragraphs and sentences in the e-book version. In some cases, this required minor wording changes for grammar.

The print version of this manuscript has been prepared in Times New Roman font, which is not available on Kindle or Nook. Instead, those readers offer the Georgia font face, which was designed for clarity on a computer monitors even at small sizes, and which is considered ideal for e-book readers. To the untrained eye, we found that the only noticeable difference between Times New Roman and Georgia is that Georgia appears larger (and its bold, bolder) at the same font size as Times New Roman.

While individual readers may have good reasons to select different font sizes, font faces, or line spacing in the font options (Aa) menu of their e-book readers, the best way to view the paragraphing, line spacing, and other style details built into this volume is to select Times New Roman (if available) or “publisher defaults” in your font options.

INTRODUCTION

John R. Shook

This companion volume to the ten-volume American Philosophical Association Centennial Series was envisioned by its general editor, Richard T. Hull. Anticipating when this multi-year project would culminate in the definitive collection of writings by philosophers who had each been elected president of one of the three divisions of the American Philosophical Association during its first 100 years, Hull asked me to edit a capstone volume of essays that presents both a retrospective and introspective overview of the series. I am pleased to be able to deliver this volume, which completes the most ambitious scholarly work about The American Philosophical Association (The APA) yet assembled.

The nineteen chapters in this volume are a magnificent set, surveying nearly 250 addresses. This is a stunning accomplishment by a fine group of scholars. Their dedication to the historical and contemporary study of philosophy in America is exemplary. They each have produced extremely valuable essays to guide the reader through the ten volumes of presidential addresses and survey the extraordinary diversity of philosophical thought represented there.

The first ten chapters each chronologically focus on one decade of the twentieth century. The assigned task was to weave together an account of that decade's addresses, pointing out the prominent topics and common themes among them, and discussing the philosophical movements they represented during their day. The next nine chapters are topical essays, each centering on a philosophical issue or area, and selecting out relevant addresses illustrating how that issue or area was developed over the course of the twentieth century. The choice of topical areas for this volume was determined by the number of presidential addresses falling under those areas, not by any proffered measure of their intrinsic merit or value for American philosophical thought. Many philosophical topics, such as those relating to anthropology, culture, or religion, are as equally important as any selected for inclusion here, but too few presidential addresses centered on them. Nevertheless, these addresses were not neglected, because they still receive due attention in their respective decade's chapter.

As James Good relates at the opening of the chapter on the first decade of the twentieth century, early presidential addresses typically provided sophisticated philosophical insights into broad intellectual concerns. With that goal firmly set by exemplary philosophers of stature and influence, the mission to professionalize the academic discipline of philosophy was taking one more step in the middle of a long journey. For some philosophers of that era, the examples of the ongoing professionalization of neighboring disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and history weighed heavily on their minds. Good's chapter is a clear window through which one can observe how the presidents used their

elected status in front of their peers to try to position philosophy's characteristic concerns with respect to the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. These early presidents also took their opportunities to try to shape the way philosophy itself should be done, by both example and exhortation. One of Good's citations for further reading about the formation and first decades of The APA deserves mention here: readers are well advised to consult James Campbell's thorough work, *A Thoughtful Profession: The Early Years of the American Philosophical Association*.[1]

Philosophy was among the last of the academic disciplines to be professionalized in the United States. The APA's second decade began with a continuation of the earnest debates among idealism, realism, and pragmatism, but social upheaval and World War I, followed by the tumultuous 1920s, made metaphysics an otiose extravagance. The burdens of the real world severely strained the young profession. Philosophy's guiding light was German-made, yet Germany was suddenly the enemy of civilization.

Philosophy was supposed to provide ethical wisdom, but what consolations could be offered for a tragically horrifying war? Randall Auxier identifies the presidencies of several pragmatic-minded and socially-oriented philosophers trying to guide philosophy through urgently practical matters. Matthew Broderick carries the tale through the 1920s, as peacetime for the civil realm was paired with dramatic scientific upheaval. Does science supply the standard of objective knowledge to which philosophy should aspire, or does the overthrow of scientific theories in abrupt revolutions instead open up vast vistas of fruitful metaphysical speculation for philosophy?

By the 1930s, the professionalization of philosophy was awkwardly, yet fully, completed. The second generation of scholars who earned their PhDs from young doctoral programs during 1890–1915 had, by then, reached mid-career and began populating The APA presidencies. Brian Henning organizes the addresses from the 1930s by the philosophical school they defended, indicating how philosophy was entirely controlled by debates within philosophy proper. Only the sudden rise of Fascism in central and southern Europe during the final years of that decade turned some presidential heads towards political issues. My chapter on the presidential addresses from the 1940s also highlights the substantial number of addresses tackling political questions, along with larger humanistic concerns about the capacity of humankind to govern itself, and the ultimate fate of civilization. To read a few of the most anxiety-driven and heart-rending addresses during the height of the war, and at the start of the atomic age, is to suffer with those presidents through truly dark and depressing visions of philosophy's stark irrelevance.

Presidents during the 1950s, in Frank Ryan's estimation, appeared to be casting about for great systems of philosophy as espoused by their teachers, but mostly succeeded in fostering a dramatic surge of diversity and breadth into the

profession. Their addresses typically reflected their own specialized scholarly interests more than any generation of philosophers before them. Yet the cumulative effect was to infuse philosophy with much-needed flexibility and fresh perspective. It was during this decade that addresses were heard about such matters as Zen Buddhism, Soviet jurisprudence, Plato's Demiurge, a universal grammar, nonlinguistic ritual, the tragic sense of life, logical positivism's failures, existentialism's contingencies, scientific naturalism, aesthetics, and undetached rabbit parts.

During the 1960s, widely regarded as the time when analytic philosophy achieved professional domination, many philosophical movements were still amply represented. As many presidents were explaining concerns for deep puzzles encountered while following out analytic precepts as there were presidents sounding confident that analytic techniques were finally resolving persistent puzzles. David Johnson and I also note how ethics rode of surge of interest from several presidents, and the area of history of philosophy also enjoyed some overdue attention. David Boersema's discussion of addresses from the 1970s shows how the heights of analytic philosophy were actually reached during that decade. The topical areas of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of science now formed the "core" to professional philosophy, and important addresses staked out vital positions on that core.

According to Drew Christie's narrative about that decade, during the 1980s, the history of philosophy, continental philosophy, ethics, and political philosophy regained a better balance with the analytic core. This reflects a broader diversity of interests and perspectives on philosophy by these presidents. A contributing factor was the revolt of the self-styled pluralists during the late 1970's.[2] They wrested away exclusive control over The APA presidency and its Eastern Division meeting's annual program from the reigning analytic camp, with the unexpected but timely assistance of Eastern Division president Richard Rorty.[3] The 1990s went on to witness, as Mark Tschaepe documents, a re-stablilized sense of philosophy as a profession that could handle large internal dissents across schools and movements. Many presidents sought to advance their areas of interest with creative combinations of views from various philosophical fields, and greater interest in interdisciplinary theoretical work was also much in evidence.

The chronological chapters are followed by the topical chapters. Gazing over the twentieth century's presidents, Nicholas Rescher examines addresses that concern the idea of philosophical progress. From the hopeful to the pessimistic, these addresses, not surprisingly, also disagree about what is meant by "philosophical progress." Few could deny that fads and fashions swept through philosophy no less frequently than the waves passing through other intellectual endeavors. Some presidents appealed to the ever-increasing specialization ex-

pected of professional philosophers, and its accompanying reliance on sophisticated argumentative technique, to make a case for some sort of progress. Other presidents made the rejoinder that only the appearance of progress was gained thereby, since specializations enhanced the guild-like structure of philosophical fields where initiates into arcane and esoteric matters could no longer understand other fields, or communicate their learning to other academic disciples or to the public.

Tibor Solymosi next turns to the crucial relationship between philosophy and the sciences. The emergence of philosophy as its own professionally academic discipline, first in Germany during the first half of the nineteenth century, and then followed by English and American versions in the second half of the nineteenth century, involved a birth struggle against the mothering sciences. Was philosophy's right to be an independent discipline in the new academic superstructure for the university to be based on its own proprietary *scientia*—its own distinctive methodology, irreplaceable by any other mode of knowledge? That question had torn apart psychology already; experimentalists sought mathematical formulas for causality among mental processes, while proto-behaviorist functionalists appealed to teleological explanations and introspectionists demanded that the certainties of phenomenal consciousness take precedence.

This dispute was so destabilizing that philosophy had left psychology's orbit by the dawn of the twentieth century, but Anglo-American philosophy simply duplicated that dissent for itself. Several schools of philosophy claimed that they alone were capable of being scientific (in the broadest sense of possessing a genuine *scientia*), while other schools claimed that philosophy's humanistic distinctiveness instead lay in its non-scientific inquiries. Behind all these controversies lay the fundamental question: In what sense could philosophy still be relevant to science? Did philosophy hold the driving keys to the methodological engine making all science possible, or must philosophy be content to join the other humanities with the domestic task of getting our human experience of life comfortable with the sciences?

Philosophers who maintained close relationships with ongoing streams of philosophical thought on the Continent pursued these grand questions no less avidly. Cynthia Gayman's comprehensive four-chapter survey of continental-minded presidents, active in every decade of the twentieth century, reveals how thoroughly Kantian, Hegelian, Marxist, Nietzschean, phenomenological, hermeneutic, existentialist, postmodern, and feminist traditions (along with many more) sustained their impact on philosophical thought in America. Furthermore, as Gayman explains, many of the presidents not known by reputation as continentalist in spirit were, in fact, trying to bridge the growing divide between analytic and continental philosophy long before that effort became somewhat fashionable in the 1980s and 1990s.

The abiding concern for real-world problems of humanity animating much of continental philosophizing was also energizing philosophical work in America in the areas of political theory, political philosophy, and the ethos of democracy. Brian Butler supplies exhaustive evidence that American philosophers never abandoned these areas of philosophical inquiry during any of this century's decades. Great political events, both domestic and foreign, were the natural occasion calling for commentary and analysis, of course. From the convulsions of World War I and World War II, to the Vietnam War and the long Cold War, all the way to dawn of a hopeful new age for global democracy, prominent American philosophers reflected on perennial philosophical problems inherent to maintaining civic order, searching for political stability, finding the basis for human rights, and constructing constitutions for justice and peace.

Nancy Stanlick presents a survey across another perennial arena for philosophical investigation: the realm of ethics. Axiology, metaethics, the disputes among rival ethical systems, normative ethics, and applied ethics all received careful attention from presidents of The APA across the decades. Another perennial field of philosophy is aesthetics, discussed by Russell Pryba in the closing chapter. As he demonstrates, although twentieth-century aesthetics did not enjoy anything like the prominence in American philosophy that it enjoyed in the nineteenth century, a large number of the presidents made substantial contributions to issues concerning the nature of beauty, the distinctiveness of aesthetic experience, art and creativity, and the status of the art object and the art world.

In closing, permit me to express some thoughts about the nature of this companion volume and the primary volumes of The APA presidential addresses themselves. That these eleven volumes were assembled for perusal and study in permanent published form is itself an event in the course of professional philosophy calling for explanation. Collected volumes such as these, along with encyclopedic reference works, require vast energies and unparalleled scholarly effort.[4] Interest in the history of philosophy is one thing; dedication to the historiography of philosophy is another.

It is almost beyond words for me to express my profound respect and gratitude for the numerous professional philosophers here in America who have sustained the historiography of philosophy in America. The way that several of the presidents were themselves highly respected historiographers of philosophy is a comforting thought. Of even greater comfort is the knowledge that philosophy itself is a historically cumulative enterprise having the grandest experimental scope. Therefore, familiarity with its intellectual genealogies is necessary for anything worthy of characterization as philosophical achievement and progress.

Notes

1. James Campbell, *A Thoughtful Profession: The Early Years of the American Philosophical Association* (Chicago: Open Court, 2006).

2. Bruce Wilshire, The Pluralist Rebellion in the American Philosophical Association, in *Fashionable Nihilism: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 51–64.

3. Neil Gross, *Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 216–227.

4. My thoughts especially turn to the several hundred contributors to the *Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers*, 4 vols., ed. John R. Shook (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005); and the *Dictionary of Early American Philosophers*, 2 vols., ed. John R. Shook (London and New York: Continuum, 2012).

THE APA PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES 1901–1910

James A. Good and John R. Shook

1. Introduction

For over two millennia, Western philosophy has concerned itself with issues of truth, beauty, and justice. Although some may complain that in recent decades professional philosophers have unduly narrowed their focus to issues of linguistic truth and meaning, the presidential addresses delivered during the first decade of the twentieth century demonstrate that philosophers were equally concerned with broader philosophical issues. Their topics covered a wide range of themes including beauty, moral judgment, and philosophy of religion. Nonetheless, one can also discern in the first years of the American Philosophical Association (the APA) the seeds for the narrowing of focus as evinced in addresses such as "The Purposes of a Philosophical Association," given by James Edwin Creighton (1901–1902), in which he claimed that at American Philosophical Association meetings, philosophers should eschew discussion of practical issues such as how to teach philosophy. Most of the addresses in that first decade were consistent with Creighton's emphasis, as evinced by the focus Frank Thilly (1900–1901; 1901–1902; 1912–1913) placed on the problems of induction and mind/body dualism in "The Theory of Interaction" and "The Theory of Induction," with no real consideration of the practical import or application of those issues.

Indeed, Creighton and several other presidents in the first decade of the APA displayed more concern with the reputation of philosophy than about any responsibility to address social or existential problems. To some extent, it is natural for presidents of a professional philosophical association to devote their addresses to metaphilosophical concerns such as the state of the profession, philosophical methodology, and the purpose of philosophy.

Concern with the reputation of philosophy is directly relevant to the creation of professional philosophical associations. As other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, and political science were declaring their independence from philosophy, philosophers were also concerned about the narrowing of their field. For that reason, philosophers who read Volume 1 today may find it profitable to consult the wealth of scholarship on the history and effects of professionalization more generally.[1]

It might be fruitful to reflect a bit on what Creighton and other philosophers sought to accomplish through the process of professionalization. In the thirteenth century, a "profession" was the act of taking the vows of a religious

order. In our more secular age, a profession is commonly defined in dictionaries as an occupation requiring special training in the liberal arts or sciences. Professionalization is the socio-historical process through which an occupation becomes professionalized. In the nineteenth-century United States, professionalization came to mean the establishment of an autonomous association that would set standards and qualifications for a well-defined, generally white collar, middle-class occupation. As these associations were founded, it was imperative that each one distinguish its "professional" practitioners from "amateurs" in the field and establish its autonomy as the sole arbiter of the distinction it created. In academia, professional associations have tended to correspond to specific disciplines within the organizational structure of research universities, which emerged at the same time as the new professional associations. Indeed, to carry out their functions of distinction and demarcation, professional associations must exercise some form(s) of discipline upon their members and, indirectly, upon non-members.

Exploration of the difference between an amateur and a professional philosopher reveals a bit more about the purposes of professionalizers. The term "amateur philosopher" seems to be of rather recent origin.[2] To think about the difference, one might consider how the citizen soldier of the colonial period compares with the Civil War officer trained at West Point, or how the early nineteenth-century midwife compares with the mid-nineteenth-century medical doctor. In both of those trades, professionalization ushered in greater technical sophistication that imperfectly correlates with improvements in actual results.

Probably few of us would prefer to live in a society in which many people died of infections that are now easily cured, but professionalization of medicine alone did not dramatically reduce the infant mortality rate. That required substantial improvements in diet and living conditions. The staggering death tolls of battles like Shiloh and Gettysburg might lead one to question the value of professionalization of the military. In both cases, it was important that the increased technical sophistication of professionalization did not give birth to a new form of scholasticism, in which practitioners were so cloistered from the rest of humanity that they lost empathy for the human effects of their techniques. Medical doctors must look beyond the examination room to the living conditions of their patients; officers must look beyond tactical maps to the carnage on the battlefield and the suffering of soldiers and their families.

Originally, "amateur" connoted one who pursued a calling out of love for the subject matter, rather than as a moneymaking career. In this sense of the term, Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and William Torrey Harris are prime examples of amateur philosophers in the United States. It is worth noting that Harris, editor of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* and a founding member of the St. Louis Philosophical and Literary Society, believed he was pro-

fessionalizing American philosophy by surpassing the technical sophistication of American transcendentalists such as Emerson and Thoreau and by founding the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, in 1867. To some extent, the transcendentalists seemed to agree with Harris on that point.[3] At the very same time, however, Harris thought the transcendentalists were too concerned with abstract verities; he sought to give American philosophy a stern push in the direction of practicality. Specifically, Harris and his cohorts believed philosophy should give meaning to the lives of individuals by inculcating self-understanding. They talked a good deal about how the study of philosophy and classic literature could help people identify their vocations, understood as their purpose for society, and thereby achieve personal fulfillment as they pursued it. In his life, Harris set a good example of what the St. Louis Hegelians had in mind. He was active in educational reforms, serving as superintendent of the St. Louis public school system from 1867 to 1880, and was United States Commissioner of Education from 1889 to 1906; in politics, he weighed in on issues of race relations and American imperialism.[4]

Thus, it makes sense to see the work of the St. Louis Hegelians as an early movement toward the professionalization of American philosophy even though, by 1900, their work was neglected by professionalizing American philosophers who held university positions. With the exception of pragmatists such as John Dewey (1905–1906) and James Hayden Tufts (1905–1906; 1914–1915; 1934–1935), many of those who founded the Western Philosophical Association (the WPA) in 1900 and the APA in 1901 sought to separate social reform and political activity from scholarly pursuits. This brings us to certain divisions that existed among the early professionalizers.

The St. Louis Hegelians believed that philosophy would gain respectability by being "scientific," but they tended to understand that term to mean that philosophy should strive to be systematic. Dewey, Tufts, and most of the other presidents in the first decade of the APA agreed that philosophy should be scientific, but saw it as experimentation in laboratory settings. Indeed, a primary motive for the founding of philosophical associations was to lend credibility to philosophy by providing a safe harbor in which "professional" philosophers could demonstrate their scientific objectivity. This meant that the founders of the professional associations sought to demonstrate that their research was not motivated, and thereby not biased, by a political agenda. With the exception of those like Dewey and Tufts, this meant that philosophers' involvement in social and political reform efforts should be narrowly circumscribed.

2. Inaugural Addresses of The APA

Frank Thilly of the University of Missouri delivered the first two addresses of a professional American philosophical association, the WPA, because he was in-

strumental in its founding in 1900. He was well acquainted with efforts at professionalizing philosophy from his graduate and post-graduate years before arriving at Missouri. Berlin and Heidelberg, where he did his graduate studies, were German centers of academic philosophy conducted at its highest levels. His subsequent two years as a philosophy fellow at Cornell University under the supervision of Jacob Gould Schurman further impressed upon him the merits of establishing a truly professional corps of philosophers in America. Schurman had founded *The Philosophical Review*, and Creighton, another Schurman protégé at Cornell, founded the APA the year after Thilly founded the WPA (the APA and the WPA later merged in 1920 to form The American Philosophical Association [The APA]). After Thilly moved east to teach at Cornell in 1906, he was elected, in 1912, to the presidency of the APA as well.

In his 1901 address, "The Theory of Interaction," Thilly focused on the relationship between mind and body, specifically the theories of parallelism and interactionism. He asserted that based on logical and physical laws—the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of identity, the principle of causation, and the conservation of energy—there can be no cause without an effect or effect without a cause. Mind and matter are two completely different forms of existence, so a mental state cannot cause a physical state, or vice versa. For these reasons, parallelism asserts that there is no causal relationship between mind and matter.

The principle of the conservation of energy states that energy cannot be lost, but this does not preclude the possibility that energy in the material realm might be transformed into a different type of energy in the mental realm. Thus, Thilly argued, this physical law does not rule out interaction between mind and matter: "The state of consciousness is not a cause in the sense of producing or creating anything out of itself. It is a cause in the sense of being an element without which another element called a physical occurrence cannot take place" (1:11). He continued:

> Parallelists deny interaction because they believe it contradicts the law of the conservation of energy, the causal law, and the alleged law that no physical occurrence can have anything but a physical occurrence as its cause. But interaction does not contradict the first two laws properly understood, and the last law is not true. The old-fashioned thinker reasoned by analogy that, because his consciousness caused movements, consciousness was the sole cause of movements in the world. The new-fashioned thinker reasons by analogy that, because physical changes cause movements in the inorganic world, physical changes must be the sole causes of movements in the organic world. (1:12)

Thilly concluded that interaction does not contradict any scientific laws. Experience tells us that mind does interact with matter.

In Thilly's second address to the WPA the following year, "The Theory of Induction," he addressed the question of induction: What is the nature of induction and what is its validity? He began by acknowledging that most would agree that induction is the derivation of a general conclusion from particular facts. He noted that some prefer to exclude unscientific induction, simple enumeration, but not everyone agrees with that. Some distinguish between perfect induction, which is certain, and imperfect induction, which is merely probable. Although scholars describe it in different ways, Thilly claimed that there is general agreement that induction is based on the assumption of the general uniformity of nature. Some see this assumption as a postulate of our thinking, while others see it as a product of experience.

Thilly set out to address these issues by making his own observations about the definition of induction and its characteristics. He began by stating that induction is a process of conscious inference, and agreed with the general consensus that deduction draws a particular conclusion from a universal, and induction does the opposite. Whether a particular inference is induction does not depend on the truth of the conclusion, because there are cases of hasty, unreliable induction. Induction is not necessarily limited to finding causal relationships; it merely finds regularity of relationships, some of which may be causal. Some believe "induction seeks to discover the inner, necessary relations existing between things" (1:18), but Thilly disagreed.

Thilly disagreed with those who define induction as "forming hypotheses, drawing their consequences, and verifying them" (1:20). For him, that process is a mixture of induction and deduction.

How do we know when an inductive inference is valid? He asserted:

> In other words, we reach the greatest possible certainty for our particular inductions when we subsume them under generally accepted principles, or prove them deductively. That is why sciences become more and more deductive in the course of time. (1:22)

When we discover a causal connection between two phenomena, this is not induction because causation is a necessary connection. When we ask how we can prove induction, we are asking for deductive certainty. "Induction, therefore, may be proved by assuming the law of uniformity. We are warranted in leaping from part to whole by the regularity, or orderliness, or uniformity of nature" (1:23). But how do we know that nature is uniform? We can only muster inductive proof for the uniformity of nature. Because we have experienced uniformities, all of nature must be uniform. Or, rather than an assumption about the whole of nature, we might mean by the uniformity of nature merely that we expect an experience to recur in the future. If we experience something a number of times, we begin to

expect it to continue to recur. This is "the psychological ground of our inductive inference" (1:24). Inductive proof is based on this "feeling of expectation" (1:24).

Creighton outlined his conception of the purpose of the association that he worked so hard to establish. According to him, the APA would serve a social purpose, and that alone could be of scientific benefit, but it must do more than that. When Creighton talked about philosophical progress, he clearly equated progress with the notion that philosophy must become increasingly scientific.

Creighton asserted that philosophical progress is a goal:

> In the first place, I would ask you not to suppose from my remarks that I regard the new Association as a kind of universal panacea for all the ills from which philosophy suffers. An association can only act as one cooperating agency among others, or, at most, prove a stimulus to the forces which are essential for progress in philosophical work. (1:30)

He continued, saying that scientific progress requires "conscious cooperation between a number of individuals" (1:31). Philosophers are engaged in a search for truth. Communal inquiry helps us avoid subjectivity. Although some complain that philosophy had become too focused on its history, Creighton argued that knowledge of the history of philosophy is an essential part of philosophical progress. Rather than study the past less, we should focus on historical study that informs us about current problems:

> The history of philosophy is only intelligible when read in the light of present-day problems. Not only is it true that, from a strictly philosophical standpoint, the study of the thought of the past can never be anything more than a means to the better comprehension of the problems of the present time, but, in itself, the former remains to a large extent incomprehensible except as its disputes and questionings are brought into relation to our own problems, and interpreted in their light. (1:32)

While Creighton saw value in the study of the history of philosophy, he saw it as secondary to the solution of philosophical problems. Indeed, he believed that study of the history of philosophy should be in service to contemporary philosophy. More than anything, he emphasized that knowledge is gained through social interaction as well as individual study. He saw the facilitation of that social interaction as the primary purpose of the association. Philosophers have been slow to catch on to the social nature of their work because they are dogmatic and because they hold their views emotionally. One reason the association is more important is because philosophers have given up the effort to deduce a system from first principles and now rely more heavily on induction. For

that reason, philosophy must now start from experience. This requires philosophers to reach out beyond their own limited experience (1:33–34).

3. Perspectives on Philosophy

The early presidents of the APA and the WPA took their opportunities to draw attention to their visions for philosophical work and their preferred systems of philosophy. Idealists, naturalists, empiricists, and pragmatists each took their turn at defending distinctive principles of their philosophies.

In "External Point of View Philosophy and Its Correlations," Alexander Thomas Ormond (1902–1903) articulated a plausible, rational alternative to the "external point of view," according to which mind knows the world and its objects from an external vantage point. He believed the external point of view had been thoroughly discredited by skepticism, and that philosophy must vindicate itself with a plausible point of view in order to regain credibility. Indeed, Ormond believed that philosophers place too much faith in the mind's ability to impose a rational scheme upon the world because they misunderstand the relationship of the mind to the world. This error is manifested in philosophers' proclivities toward "over-subtlety" and "over-abstraction," "for it must be admitted that the philosopher's most besetting fault is a tendency to hypostasize abstractions" (1:47).

By a "philosophical point of view," Ormond meant one that philosophers can occupy fully enough to translate any inquiry into philosophical terms. He claimed that Kant's Copernican Revolution provides exactly that by teaching philosophers that they must focus on how the world conforms to mind, abandoning all efforts to determine how the mind corresponds to the world. This gives philosophers an internal point of view because it prevents them from presuming that they can occupy a position outside of the world. For Ormond, the Copernican Revolution established that consciousness is central to the world.

Next, Ormond moved beyond exposition of Kant to a more creative project, the articulation of a unique method for philosophy. He began by asserting that the central core of consciousness is endeavor, more specifically, the "*endeavor to realize*" (1:51). For Ormond, this demonstrated that the first data of consciousness is will. To avoid the question of whether will or idea is the primary foundation of the self, which Ormond described as the dichotomy of Schopenhauer versus Plato, he proposed that will and idea are combined in reason, which is both ideational and volitional. Although he did not provide a definition of knowledge, it is clear from many passages that his post-Kantian philosophical context makes knowledge a mental construction rather than a mere reflection of a world over and apart from the mind. Knowledge is the process through which the "mind reduces its world to terms of its own experience" (1:50).

Finally, Ormond was concerned with the problem of demarcation, specifically that of distinguishing philosophy from science. Although "philosophy bakes no bread," he conceded, it can and should serve a practical role. By providing objective knowledge of the world, science solves many practical problems, but it tells us nothing about truth, beauty, and goodness. Philosophy, on the other hand, provides knowledge of the inner meaning of things by focusing on the "concepts and analogies" by which the subject makes the world intelligible. In so doing, philosophy gets at the inner meaning of things and addresses higher, albeit practical, concerns such as "the ultimate meaning of life." As Ormond summarized, "we will say, then, that while philosophy bakes no bread, it does, in connection with religion and art and science, promote an ideal of living that makes it very much more worthwhile that bread should be baked" (1:56). He concluded that philosophy and science play complimentary roles, providing us with practical knowledge in both a mundane sense and in a higher sense (1:53–56).

In "The Problem of Metaphysics," delivered to the WPA, Frederick James Eugene Woodbridge (1902–1903; 1911–1912) also grappled with the problems of the legitimation and demarcation of philosophy, focusing specifically on metaphysics. For Woodbridge, metaphysics was indispensable. Although they deny it, even when scientists such as Ernst Mach and Rodney Brooks question the conceptual assumptions of their scientific fields, they engage in metaphysical speculation and demonstrate its continued importance. Thus, Woodbridge saw metaphysics as an entirely separate field of knowledge from science. Science reveals the laws of the physical world through experimentation; metaphysics reveals the nature of reality through definition of concepts. He went on to assert that metaphysics is also separate from religion, and took umbrage with the "suspicion and the hope that metaphysicians are really poets or theologians in disguise" (1:64). Metaphysics, for Woodbridge, was a purely theoretical and logical endeavor.

In order to make progress, Woodbridge asserted, metaphysics must follow the lead of recent work in logic and epistemology in their return to "the immediate facts of life" for its subject matter (1:61). Much as Creighton asserted, Woodbridge believed that the study of history helps us understand our present situation and present problems. Specifically, from the history of metaphysics, Woodbridge averred that we have learned of:

> the weaknesses in the evolutionary conception and in traditional terminology, the futility of the distinction between appearance and reality, the necessity of an independent metaphysics, the need of a logic of definition, the non-explanatory character of much of metaphysical knowledge, with a recognition of the value of such knowledge, the metaphysical failure of the distinction between epistemology and metaphysics. (1:66)

He went on to assert that there may very well be other lessons, but these lessons seem particularly important.

Woodbridge's debt to Aristotle was apparent as he derived five fundamental problems of metaphysics, to wit: to define individuality, continuity, purpose, potentiality, and chance. In so doing, he believed that he had stated "the problem of metaphysics in terms of its most essential elements, and in independence of its concrete content" (1:72). Indeed, he maintained, "a complete definition of these concepts would be a very close approach to the complete definition of reality" (1:72).

Although Josiah Royce (1903–1904) focused on "pure pragmatism" in his "The Eternal and the Practical," his address was a direct response to the newly emerging philosophy of pragmatism as seen in William James's (1906–1907) *The Will to Believe*, Dewey's *Studies in Logical Theory*, and F. C. S. Schiller's *Humanism*.[5] As James and the other pragmatists would agree, Royce held that pragmatism in its simplest form can be traced to a variety of ancient sources, and that elements of it can be seen in Kant's distinction between pure and practical reason, Fichte's ethical idealism, and Hegel's discussions of the resolution of conflicts between theoretical and practical reason.[6] As Royce opined, "pragmatism is ancient, is human, has been faced countless times before and will be considered countless times again, so long as men labor for the good, and long for the true" (1:78). Rather than a "startling new discover[y]," Royce held that he was dealing with a philosophical point of view, "old religions and social orders already made familiar to the wise men of yore" (1:78). Emphasizing pragmatism's history facilitates Royce's analysis of what he saw as the central doctrine of all pragmatisms, steering clear of exegesis of recent texts.

Royce had some special credibility regarding the task he had set for himself. He already had an impressive publishing career, and, as he explained, he had embraced pragmatism himself, publishing article based on that point of view in the the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* in 1881.[7] By 1903, he had also been a colleague of James at Harvard for eleven years, a fact no doubt well-known to his audience. However, in an effort to navigate above recent controversies about pragmatism, Royce stated that he would focus exclusively on a question of "eternal importance": "How far is our knowledge identical with an expression of our practical needs?" (1:79). In what followed, Royce argued that pragmatists underestimate our need for truths that transcend temporal, practical needs.

Tellingly, Royce explained that he alloyed his pure pragmatism by supplementing it with a concept of "actual truth" (1:79). "Within its limits," he asserted, pure pragmatism is "a partial statement of the truth" (1:80). Indeed, he provided a weighty laundry list of ways in which he still agreed with pragmatists. In short, he still believed that individual need shapes our mind's construction of its objects, that individuals actively perceive their world in search of solutions

to immediate problems in concrete situations, and that this is not a finished world, but is one in the making. In a later passage, Royce declared allegiance to the view that all thinking is action because it is an adjustment to a present experience. Despite all that he had in common with pure pragmatism, and even one of the current variety, for example, Dewey, Royce interjected "that my only final hope, as a seeker of truth and as a human being, is in the eternal" (1:80). The eternal, argued Royce, follows from the fundamental human need for companionship.

Because companionship is one of our deepest human needs, Royce argued, we want our particular pragmatic truths to be true for others, as well as for ourselves. Stated in another way, when we claim that a belief is true, we want to claim more than that it meets our current conscious, need because we want others to agree with us. To illustrate this point, Royce talked about the commitment that current pragmatists have to the truth of the theory of evolution. They claim that pragmatism is a corollary of evolution, demonstrating that philosophy and science have been reconciled, and thereby bequeathing exclusive credibility to pragmatism as a theory of truth. According to Royce, the then-present-day pragmatists abandoned pure pragmatism by claiming that the theory of evolution had been proven true in a more ultimate sense than pure pragmatism provides.

According to pure pragmatism, we can only say that a truth is true in our present situation, but the doctrine of evolution must be based on data collected from a vast number of objects, many of which existed a long time ago. Because of our fundamental need for companionship, Royce added, it is perfectly natural for pragmatists to want others to agree with their truth claims about evolution and about pragmatism itself. Indeed, opined Royce, "pure pragmatism would be, after all, a lonesome kind of doctrine" (1:88). We all want to be able to assert agreed upon standard truths, to be authorities on some topics.

This yearning for timeless truth, according to Royce, is part of what it means to be a rational being. Our rationality is bound up with our sociality:

> In brief, to believe that my judgment is true, is to believe that another point of view than my present point of view, in case this other point of view is what it ought to be, actually confirms my own judgment about this object. This other point of view, however, is a point of view that relates to the same object, or else it could not be conceived as confirming my judgment about this object. (1:92–93)

The cognitive actions of finite beings are different from their other actions, Royce claimed, precisely because they believe their cognitive constructions ought to be seen as true by other beings like themselves. Our socio-rational nature requires us to be "more than pure pragmatists" (1:93). Moreover, for our truths to satisfy our natural needs, they have to be true, not only for ourselves or

for a large number of people, but for an invariant, eternal single self, of which finite selves are partial functions. For Royce, without such a single self, we cannot have a coherent conception of truth. Otherwise, our cognitive constructions, our truth claims, are no more than singular attitudes, and not truths in any sense of the term. As Royce, phrased it, "if there is such a self, our need to make judgments that can be true or false is satisfied. If there is no such self, no judgment is either true or false" (1:97).

Thus, for Royce, "everything is practical; and everything seeks nothing whatever but its own true self, which is the Eternal" (1:96). It is not difficult to imagine how pragmatists might counter Royce's criticism. No doubt, they would deny the existence of Royce's absolute self or that individuals possess the natural needs Royce describes. Moreover, they would object that he equivocates on "truth."

In "The Mission of Philosophy," George Trumbull Ladd (1904–1905) declared that the "peculiar sphere of philosophy" should be to seek and find the "rational union" of the two worlds, the world of facts and the world of values (1:127). Although Ladd was critical of Kant, he accepted Kantian dualism, which is, of course, the traditional philosophical dualism dating back to the pre-Socratics. He rejected Kant's phenomenal realm, claiming that judgments of fact are not judgments about phenomena, but about the "actual qualities and relations of things and selves" (1:127). However, even value judgments, i.e., "aesthetical, ethical, and religious" issues, are judgments about facts that occur in experience. Philosophy's mission is to sort through the apparent conflicts between the two kinds of facts, and to harmonize them through rational examination because "the undying faith of humanity, is in a certain Oneness, or Unitary Being, which shall somehow both respond to, and explain, the totality of human experience" (1:127). There is no final conclusion to this task; it is a "progressive realization" (1:128). Every generation must engage in this task anew as science discovers new facts and as cultural conditions change. Rather than a "lifeless, substantial unity," Ladd had in mind "a living functional unity" (1:131). Man must be a growing self, "And what is true for the individual is true for society" (1:131).

Philosophers must study the discoveries of the particular sciences in order to recognize their ontological implications and to explain those implications to scientists and others. Thus, philosophers have to be willing to learn from scientists and teach them that science is as much "a theory of Reality" (1:134) as are more traditional philosophical subjects such as aesthetics, ethics, and religion. When philosophers fulfill the mission of philosophy, all of these disciplines work together to provide us a conception of "a perfect ethical Spirit" (1:135). Ladd emphasized that although we live in an ever-evolving world of particular things, the evolving universe is also a cosmos. By "cosmos," Ladd seems to have meant that reality is a progressing, rational unity.

In this, we see the remaining vestiges of Ladd's liberal, Congregationalist theology combined with his vision of a developing society. This mindset is also evident in his comments on epistemological issues. Contra Kant, Ladd maintained that all knowledge requires the involvement of all faculties—"intellect, feeling, and will"—and, "cognitive judgment[s]" are "temporary solution[s]" problems (1:133). Here Ladd harkened back to his 1894 *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*,[8] speaking of the individual as a rational, but also spiritual, unity with functional faculties, who must constantly adapt himself to a world that is forever in the making.

Dewey's 1905 presidential address, "Beliefs and Realities," centered on an ongoing debate between pragmatists, such as himself, and realist and idealist philosophers in America. Although Dewey was already well-established as an expert on public education and the philosophy of education, this address offered a wide-ranging assessment of philosophy itself. Indeed, this may very well be the most densely packed and perhaps provocative address in Volume 1.[9]

Dewey's primary philosophical concern was reductionism. More specifically, he argued that philosophers tend to reduce all human experience to knowing experience. Twenty years earlier, he had begun to address this tendency with his conception of the "psychological standpoint," according to which everything that appears, or more accurately occurs, in experience is real because, as finite creatures, we cannot occupy a position beyond human experience in order to make extra-experiential judgments about reality.[10] In addition, experiences, dreams, optical illusions, feelings, and imaginings, etc., are all real experiences, according to Dewey, that function in a wide variety of ways in our everyday lives. Rather than discount non-knowing experiences as though they are barren of philosophical import on the assumption that they have little, if any, connection to extra-experiential reality, Dewey encouraged philosophers to acknowledge and reflect upon the full range of human experience. Indeed, for Dewey, human experience is the philosophers' exclusive, albeit expansive, realm of study. Thus, by the time of this presidential address, the psychological standpoint and its implications had been a persistent theme in Dewey's writings for some time, perhaps most famously in his 1896 *The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology*.[11] The key point, for Dewey, was always to argue for a richer philosophical conception of experience, which is, at once, a metaphysical, epistemological, and even a vocational point because it includes the recommendation of a broader conception of the philosophical craft. This sheds a great deal of light on passages like the following within the presidential address at hand:

> Sensationalist and idealist, positivist and transcendentalist, materialist and spiritualist, defining this universe in as many differing ways as they have different conceptions of the ideal and method of knowledge, have been at one in their devotion to an identification of reality with something which

> connects monopolistically with passionless knowledge, belief purged of all personal reference, origin, and outlook. (1:160)

This passage highlights Dewey's concern that many different schools of philosophy, and perhaps that most philosophers, were guilty of reducing experience to knowing experience. This theme persisted throughout his mature works.

In the title of another 1905 essay, "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," Dewey announced a new name for the psychological standpoint, emphasizing the full philosophical import of his conception of the philosopher's task.[12] In that work, Dewey continued to argue that philosophers must appreciate the full range of human experience in order to understand is. As an example, for Dewey, emotional experiences are equally real and important as knowing experiences, to both the individual and to the philosopher.

Returning to Dewey's presidential address, however, we should pay some attention to a frequently overlooked footnote. When Dewey said above that idealists are guilty of this reductionism, he hastened to add an exception to that general rule:

> I except Hegel from this statement. The habit of interpreting Hegel as a Neo-Kantian, a Kantian enlarged and purified, is a purely Anglo-American habit. This is no place to enter into the intricacies of Hegelian exegesis, but the subordination of both logical meaning and of mechanical existence to *Geist*, to life in its own developing movement, would seem to stand out in any unbiased view of Hegel. At all events, I wish to state the debt to Hegel of the view set forth in this paper. (1:170n4)

This passage helps us understand Dewey's point more deeply. He was arguing that Hegel, of all philosophers, held the same expansive meaning of experience. Dewey made this point by distinguishing Hegel from philosophers that he called "neo-Kantians." Elsewhere, I have argued that Dewey dubbed at least some of the British neo-Hegelians, such as Thomas Hill Green, as neo-Kantians because they sought to ground knowledge in an unknowable thing-in-itself, thus reducing reality to a realm that, in principle, cannot be experienced and, at the same time, devaluing quotidian experience.[13] In this way, these philosophers elevate the realm of logical universals to an unknowable ground of knowledge and cast aspersion on the experience of the "common man" (1:159).

On the other hand, according to Dewey, Hegel provided an example of a logic of lived experience by subordinating logical and "mechanical existence" to "life in its developing movement" (1:170). Dewey maintained that Hegel resisted the Kantian temptation to posit a thing-in-itself to ground knowledge. Nonetheless, Dewey also made clear that his allegiance, or non-allegiance, to Hegel is

not the point. Never a disciple of any philosopher, Dewey merely deemed it to be important to acknowledge a crucial debt to Hegel.

Perhaps most importantly to his audience, Dewey's presidential address was part of a sustained attack on the "epistemological industry," an attack worth considering in some detail.[14] This returns us to the main thrust of Dewey's address, which was that philosophers should move beyond epistemology-centered philosophy because it unduly narrows their task. Even so, Dewey also lamented that the then-current pressures of professionalization were reinforcing this narrowing of philosophy to something unrecognizable to "the common man" because it is useless to him. While "the professional man, the philosopher" nobly engages in a search for truth through "passionless imperturbability" and "absolute detachment," the common person rightfully ignores him. As philosophers (epistemologists) retreat into their metaphorical laboratories, examining beliefs without regard for how they actually function within complex, evolving situations fraught with ethical and existential import, beliefs appear as discrete objects of analysis. This in turn leads the philosopher/epistemologist to assume, "ready-made and finished reality" must somehow correspond to beliefs so observed. In this way, the philosopher/epistemologist forgets, "beliefs are personal affairs, and personal affairs are adventures, and adventures are, if you please, shady." In stark contrast, the common person formulates, asserts, and acts on beliefs in a world "of affections," with "the gallantry of adventure, the genuineness of the incomplete, the tentative" (1:160).

If Dewey can be said to make a metaphysical point in this address, it was that there is not a finished reality for the philosopher/epistemologist to discover and define, because "the world has meaning as somebody's, somebody's at a juncture" (1:160). Again, according to Dewey, none of us can escape human experience in order to talk about what exists behind or beyond it. Philosophers, just like the common person, should face the world as we actually experience it.

In Tufts's address, "Some Contributions of Psychology to the Conception of Justice," given to the WPA in 1906, his longstanding interest in social justice and philosophical conceptions of justice was on full display, as was his debt to "Professor Dewey" (1:179). Much like Dewey, Tufts emphasized the individual's social context, eschewing formal conceptions of equality, rights, and justice that are removed from everyday life, in favor of the concrete realization of equitable and just social conditions. Having worked closely with Dewey at the University of Chicago from 1894 to 1904, Tufts was also profoundly influenced by the Hegelian contextualization of the individual and recent developments in psychology. As one reads the address, it becomes apparent that Tufts's commitment to institutions such as Hull House, the Institute for Juvenile Research, and the State Housing Commission was based on a philosophical outlook that champions the common person.

Tufts opened his address by arguing that the individual must be understood as developing from and living within a complex web of heredity and environmental inheritances. Perhaps borrowing directly from Dewey, he described this realization of man's social and biological nature as "the psychological standpoint." Our gradually increasing understanding of the implications of that standpoint has been accompanied by a measured evolution of law and systems of justice, leading to a more painstaking circumscription of individual responsibility. Whereas "in early Germanic law the person was held responsible with little if any regard to his intent or personal agency" (1:179), now, when adjudging liability, we must not only consider who actually committed the crime, but also the social resources, or lack thereof, that entered into the individual's moral maturation. Consideration of actual social conditions, rather than exclusive focus on an individual's deed, allows society to move from merely abstract to concrete justice, an unequivocal advance for Tufts.

This discussion took Tufts to a consideration of distributive justice, inauspiciously, in the midst of the severe economic recession of 1906, which rapidly devolved into the 1907 Bankers' Panic.[15] No radical, Tuft began with a nod to the importance of private property, but claimed:

> our present system of distribution . . . results in such vast inequalities that we no longer count our millionaires, on the one hand, and, on the other, there are estimated to be in this most favored country ten millions of persons in poverty. (1:179–180)

Although the American economic system purports to treat all persons as equals, for Tufts, that claim only makes sense when we view individuals in abstraction from their actual conditions. When we are honest about those conditions, he argued, it is clear that the playing field is tilted rather severely. Although he flirted with socialist ideas in this address, he was at most a social democrat, leery of utopianism of any kind. He freely admitted, "no distribution of property is likely to be just" (1:183), and, in a reference to President Theodore Roosevelt's political platform, conceded that Americans seems to want nothing more than a "square deal"—a modicum of equal opportunity—rather than equality of outcome (1:183). Tufts was uncritical of this American attitude toward distributive justice and even suggested that it was a sign of social health because psychology and religion both correctly warn of the dangers of being overly concerned with material wealth.

Rather than a redistribution of material wealth, Tufts advocated for a more equitable distribution of social resources. He shifted gears to a high note, lauding progressive democracy's rudimentary provision of urban parks, libraries, and public health services to the disadvantaged, and closed the address with a

benign argument for more universal public education, albeit an education based on the vision of social justice that Tufts offered:

> The basis for social justice in this sphere of mental goods is therefore an education which shall awaken mental and social interests; the superstructure of justice which we may hope will rise is a satisfaction of these interests by social means. (1:185)

Put simply, Tufts's vision of social justice was that every individual should be given the resources each needs to fully develop its own aptitudes and talents. He claimed his recommendation was based on a realistic, rather than pessimistic, view of American society, one that upholds its democratic values without lapsing into mere paternalism because, in a democracy, "what is done through public agencies" is done "by the people" (1:186).

In his 1906 address, "The Energies of Men," James's iconoclastic approach to philosophical and religious issues was on full display. A medical doctor and psychologist by training, James was quite open to the scientific study of religious experience and volition, as evinced in works such as *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), *The Will to Believe* (1897), and his Gifford Lectures, published as *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902).[16] James also voiced his approval of the work of Gustav Fechner, famous as a founder of experimental psychology, but also for his willingness to take religious experience seriously as a subject of scientific study. Both men sought to study human experience in its entirety, including mystical experiences that other scientists did not take seriously.

James opened his address with an explanation of his preference for functional, over structural, psychology, the former of which he described as being the "physician's attitude" (1:193). Structural psychology, according to James, is analytical, while functional psychology is clinical. From this distinction, one can surmise that James considered the former speculative, and the latter empirical. Having made that distinction rather summarily, James focused on what he considered to be a conception of functional psychology, at least as understood by the common person, which he described as "the *amount of energy available* for running one's mental and moral operations" (1:194). He conceded that scientists ignore the conception, probably because of its vagueness, but it was enough for him that it was a common conception. We are all familiar with the notion that we have reserves of energy that normally go untapped, often described as a "second wind," thus it is a legitimate topic of study.

James was interested in the phenomenon of second wind. "*Excitements, ideas, and efforts,* in a word, are what carry us over the dam" (1:195). In "hyperesthetic conditions," we have a heightened sensitivity to our environment. "Habit-neurosis" inhibits us, leading us to give into a certain amount of fatigue. We have to learn to push through this in order to realize our full power.

Speaking of the emotions and energies that accompany experiences, which may spur individuals to rise to the occasion or fail, James remarked:

> Even here we are witnessing (some of us admiring, some deploring—I must class myself as admiring) the dynamogenic effects of a very exalted political office upon the energies of an individual who had already manifested a healthy amount of energy before the office came. (1:196)

This remark might have been an allusion to Theodore Roosevelt, United States President from 1901–1909, and infamous for his inability to be inactive.

James gave examples of great energy and endurance during wars and the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906. He also talked about people who show great energy and endurance characterized by a "morbid impulse" (for example, bulimia, dromomania). "Sprees and excesses" can be temporarily medicinal (1:198). Asceticism can also be dynamogenic: "Ignatius Loyola's spiritual exercises," "the Yoga system" (1:198–199).

Our will is "the manometer of our faiths" (1:202). What we are willing to do shows the strength of our faith in something. James talked about how suggestion and asceticism (methodical or unmethodical) can liberate stored energy, and then talked about how ideas can do the same (1:202). Not all ideas will do this. It must be a "live idea" to the particular person. A religious oath, a religious vow, a pledge, a promise to a sweetheart, or one's word of honor can be dynamogenic. "Fatherland," "The Union," "Holy Church," the "Monroe Doctrine," "Truth," "Science," "Liberty," Garibaldi's phrase "Rome or Death," etc., are so many examples of energy-releasing abstract ideas, and he emphasized that all of these ideas have an essential "social nature."

Conversion experiences can release energies because they remove inhibitions, giving us feelings of freedom and power. Beliefs challenge our will. James talked about "optimistic religions"—"New Thought," "Christian Science," "Metaphysical Healing," or other forms of spiritual philosophy—that do not depend on "fear thought" (1:204).[17] Interestingly, he ended on a quasi-Aristotelian note:

> I have thus brought a pretty wide induction to bear upon my thesis, and it appears to hold good. The human individual lives usually far within his limits; he possesses powers of various sorts which he habitually fails to use. He energizes below his maximum, and he behaves below his optimum. In elementary faculty, in coördination, in power of inhibition and control, in every conceivable way, his life is contracted like the field of vision of an hysteric subject—but with less excuse, for the poor hysteric is diseased, while in the rest of us it is only an inveterate habit—the habit of inferiority to our full self—that is bad. (1:205)

James's study raises two problems for pragmatic philosophy: "that of our powers" and "that of our means." We need a "topographic survey . . . of the limits of human power" (1:206).

4. Professional Philosophers at Work

Despite Dewey's admonition to philosophers to avoid entanglements and dead-end entrapments set by utterly abstract and artificial intellectual puzzles, the puzzling would not be deterred. Professionalization meant specialization, and if a philosopher cannot control the technical terms and delimited scope of a specialized problem, what was the point of professional philosophy?

Walter Bowers Pillsbury's (1906–1907) presidential address, "The Ego and Empirical Psychology," tackled a set of assumptions about the substantial self, assumptions tracing back to Descartes and Hume:

> Of the reasons that have been given for assuming a distinct mind, three are most prominent: (1) For the known there must be a knower; (2) the mental states can receive unity only from a unitary substance, and that we do not find in mental states; and (3) in a series of discrete mental states, such as Hume assumed to constitute mind, there can be no continuity, no real identity. (1:212)

The first principle is a typical insistence of idealists. Idealists who insist that known objects must be metaphysically united with the knower are not consistent, because within mental knowledge, they abruptly demand a divide between the known idea and the knowing self, a divide so great that only a knowing self could overcome. Furthermore, this principle leads to an infinite regress problem. How does the knowing self know its ideas that constitute its knowledge? There must be something else within this knowing self's consciousness to represent that relationship between the known ideas and the knowing of them, and so on, leading to an infinite series of more and more stages of internal representations. (Readers may recognize an analogy to the Aristotelian Third Man problem.) To prevent the infinite regress, it is sufficient to admit that ideas can relate to, and "know" each other in the relationship within consciousness.

This reasoning assists with the dissolution of the second principle upholding a substantial self. How would a self provide the allegedly required unity? Mental states enjoy a degree of unity in continuity, to be sure, but what would unity within a self provide? Unity within a whole self would dissolve what is admittedly genuine, namely the distinctiveness and discreteness to mental states. Finally, a substantial self absorbing and unifying discrete mental states could not really yield identity. Adding something to each and every mental state would not erect a general sense that they all have a common basis. Pillsbury faulted a lack of cooperation between theorizing about the mental functions that thought per-

forms, and postulating structures that organize the mind: "structure and function must be brought together and made parts of a single whole" (1:214).

Pillsbury went on to remind his audience that the brain retains remembered experiences, which in turn shape and interpret new ongoing experiences; therefore, no ideas are entirely original in perception and no cognitive function operates aloof from that ongoing groupings and re-groupings of experiences. He further suggested that our perception of a continuous and identical self is due to the way that our distinctive selves for private and public engagements all depend on this core mass of accumulated interpreted experience. A preoccupation with that core brought to subjective focus for its own sake, however, does not really reveal any "substantial" foundation for everything mental. He asserted, "self-consciousness, then, as an individual as opposed to a social fact, is not a mystery or even a privilege; it is a luxury, a satisfaction of idle curiosity, and that by quite simple means" (1:212). What about the genuinely empirical self, so far as scientific psychology can understand it? This is Pillsbury's thesis:

> The self is merely all that we are and know, organized, self-unified, and self-identical, a growing vital unity that as a whole is effective in every experience. When it is directed toward the control of action, we know it as will; when choosing from the many stimuli that offer, as attention; when interpreting the stimulus, as perception or judgment; when constructing new forms from old experiences, as reason. But it is the same everywhere, always active, and active in very much the same way in every kind of mental process. (1:224)

Harry Norman Gardiner (1907–1908), like Pillsbury, directed his discussion, in "The Problem of Truth," against metaphysical presumptions that make truth more of a mystery than a concrete achievement. His initial target was absolute idealism, which expects all truths to cohere within a single vast interconnected system. That whole system is admittedly unknowable, so erecting a criterion for any particular truth that it be a part of this system is unworkable in practice. True propositions should be recognizable as individual truths, regardless of the proper place in any system, and irrespective of how they stand in logical relations to other truth:

> Truths differ in value and significance; some are trivial, some perhaps sublime. But, apart from special theory, there is no apparent reason why a proposition about even so trivial a circumstance as the present state of the weather—which indeed may be important enough on occasion—should not be as true as the truest propositions about such exalted objects as the existence of God, the constitution of the universe, and the destiny of the human soul. (1:230)

If propositions can be true taken singly, then a true proposition picks out, not all of reality or reality in general, but exactly that portion of reality intended by the meaning of the proposition. This implies an intellectual relation between proposition and fact, which is a kind of representationalism, but it takes a neutral approach, prejudiced toward neither idealism nor dualism. Pragmatism fails to do justice to the way that most true propositions answer to facts without any possibility of human verification. Additionally, pragmatism counter-intuitively takes verified facts to depend on the means of verification, but then there is no explanation why pre-existing facts should be verifiable. Finally, pragmatists want truths to be relative to someone or another's own needs, but they inconsistently want their pragmatist theory to be universally and logically valid.

Frank Chapman Sharp's (1907–1908) address, "The Objectivity of the Moral Judgment," was concerned with the question of whether assigning truth or falsity to a moral judgment can be rightly done independently of individual attitudes about that judgment. Sharp affirmed that this can be done, and impartiality is, therefore, the needed methodological step. An objective judgment appeals to facts of the matter about the situation in question, facts that can be ascertained from an impartial perspective, omitting subjective interests.

Moral judgments are not inferred from facts, but they make reference to relevant justificatory facts. Furthermore, if all of those facts stand unaffected regardless which person happens to examine them, then that moral judgment can be considered to be objective. Hence, what one member of a community can impartially judge to be right, any member of that community should be able to judge as right. This requirement of consistency applies to each person individually as well: a reasonable person must reconsider two moral judgments if they cannot both be objectively correct.

In the ordinary moral life of intuitive judgment, by contrast, four basic kinds of criteria for moral conduct appear to be widely operative. We sometimes appeal to the greater good achieved. Sometimes we demand vengeance in defense of what is right, regardless of whether any additional good may come of it. At other times, our aesthetic sense of the beauty or idealized form to an action earns our admiration. Finally, a direct sense of antipathy or revulsion attaches to kinds of conduct to immediately convey their wrongness.[18]

Sharp then subjected these four bases of common-sense moral judgment to his test for moral objectivity. Vengeance promptly fails; impartiality cannot license retaliation for its own sake. The aesthetic ideal cannot be universalized either without destroying too many good people. As for eudaimonism, although we have universalizable duties to increase the good of others when we are able, that cannot go so far as pure altruism (for some must be deserving of keeping charity). With moderation in mind, "choose always the greater good" is the single general principle that can pass the test of objectivity (1:263).

The address of Hugo Münsterberg (1908–1909), "The Problem of Beauty," reproached philosophers for largely ignoring aesthetics and the philosophy of beauty. Although psychology has been assisting, too many rival theories fail to agree on the phenomena to be explained, or the principles available to explain the beautiful. What almost all have in common is the assumption that whatever the content of the aesthetic experience, or the psycho-physiological processes generating those experiences, it is precisely a sense of lingering pleasure or enjoyment that characterizes beauty. The way that psychology has been allowed to analyze phenomena down to passing feelings and sensations is behind that misleading presumption.

First, the aesthetic phenomenon is nothing like what the psychologist describes it to be. It is unified (no subject-object division appears) and it is reliably objective (instead of fleetingly subjective). Furthermore, the aesthetic is available everywhere that experience goes, if we willingly take it to be of aesthetic interest. In fact, every will's determination to live in a real ordered world (and not a cacophony of sensations) proves that such a reality must be eternally objective compared to the subjectivity of personal desire. That harmonization, that beauty, reigns supreme:

> The beautiful may be pleasant and agreeable but it is never beautiful because it is agreeable. It is beautiful because it is perfect, because every demand which is raised in its manifoldness is completely satisfied by the will of the other parts. The objective satisfaction resulting from the will to have such a perfect self-agreeing world is the only aesthetic attitude; the subjective satisfaction resulting from the chance desires of the personality is the practical attitude which may change with every man and with every hour and which lies below the level of aesthetics. (1:280)

The grand harmonization of wills as an ideal and as a reality is an absolute value, which transcends ethics as well as any aggregation of personal satisfaction. Any artwork, if it has genius in it, is an individual expression of will directing the mind toward that ultimate value.

Similarly, science's drive to systematically reconstruct all things into a logical system of interrelated entities is an expression of this same willful drive to absolute harmony in unity:

> The aesthetical value of beautiful unity and the logical value of connected existence are thus equally fulfillments of the over-personal, absolute demand for the self-realization of a world in this chaotic experience. (1:287)

By coincidence rather than design, Arthur (Schauffler) Oncken Lovejoy's (1908–1909; 1916–1917) address, "The Obsolescence of the Eternal" took an antagonistic position over against Münsterberg's affirmation of absolute totali-

ties. Lovejoy defended an evolutionary metaphysics, of not merely change and development over time, but the addition of real positive characters and beings to the total cosmos. Against materialism and its conservation laws, Lovejoy defended dualism, claiming that the emergence of qualitative experience from early organisms added just those original positive realities to physical realities.

Lovejoy argued that qualitative experience cannot even be predicted from, much less reduced to, physical arrangements of matter in this way:

> Suppose that in the course of the redistribution of matter and energy, sentient organisms have already appeared; suppose that in one of these organisms there is about to occur the first rudimentary experience of color-vision; and suppose that there hovers above the scene, at the moment, [Pierre-Simone] Laplace's perfect physical calculator, a being fully acquainted with the quantity of matter and energy present in the universal system and with the unchanging laws of their distribution, but destitute of any experience or idea of any of the secondary qualities. . . . He will also know, as a detail of this distribution, that there will occur just that arrangement of moving parts in the ether and in what we now call the rudimentary eye of the organism, which *we* know to be the invariable correlate of the sensation of red. But *he* will not know anything of the sort, nor have the least ground, in his perfect acquaintance with the laws of his qualitatively uniform system, for suspecting that anything so strange is about to happen as the sudden appearance of sensible redness in the universe. (1:302)

This sort of argument has reappeared in each generation.[19]

Lovejoy next argued that metaphysical eternalities cannot have any real relationship with events proceeding in time; hence, the eternal lacks any explanatory power to account for temporal processes. Supernatural eternalities are powerless to affect the evolving world, and some type of eternal transcendental Self behind mental appearances must be similarly bereft of control over our mental life. Eternal Selves, whether divine or human, cannot have any practical utility for making real-world moral decisions, either.

Lovejoy's diagnosis for this philosophical obsession with the metaphysically eternal goes back to theological struggles with resolving the problem of evil so that divine goodness may be assured. However, we should ask, why the philosopher must misuse reasoning to try to save both the eternal and the temporal:

> There are, I incline to think, only two types of philosophy that quite thoroughly know what they are about—Oriental illusionism and thoroughgoing temporalism—Shankara and Heraclitus. And between these alternatives I do not find it possible to hesitate. The eternal is, then, I think, the

> characteristic but not necessarily incorrigible distemper of adolescent metaphysics. So long as the belief in it has prevailed, it has produced in philosophy logical irresponsibility, an unwholesome sort of otherworldliness, and an intellectual priggishness based upon the idea that the philosopher was dealing with a finer, higher, more elegant class of realities than those with which the common man or the scientist were concerned. (1:311)

The topic of evolutionary philosophy was the subject of "The Philosophical Aspects of Evolution," given by John Grier Hibben (1909–1910). Befitting the centennial of Darwin's birth, which provided the theme to many academic addresses around the country at that time, Hibben offered some assessments of the impact of evolutionary thought.

Three philosophical concerns were raised by Darwinian evolution, which have taken clearer forms, but still await answers. First, while humanity arose from non-human animals, to what extent did we evolve to be more than just animals, and acquire some higher worth? Our capacity for self-knowledge and potentially endless self-progression as a species appears to be unique among animals. Second, are there any legitimate teleological factors within human nature, even if external destinies are not compatible with evolution? After all, human beings are able to freely plan and executive vast designs and modifications to anything and everything, intelligently shaping the world through our own goals. Third, can the processes of life be comprehended to the point where all features of conscious and intellectual life are just physiological? Hibben held out hope that biology would discover the orderly regularities within all processes of life, down to the molecular level. He believed that thought would be understood to be an organic process, lawfully organizing nervous energies for living an active life.

Hibben finally identified a fault with philosophers, such as Bergson and James, who first suppose that anything conceptual must be rigid and alien to the flux of experience. Knowledge, especially scientific knowledge wielding its flexible and growing concepts, can successfully interpret experience without being false to it.

This decade's final presidential address was delivered by psychologist Carl Emil Seashore (Sjoestrand) (1909–1910). His address, "The Play Impulse and Attitude in Religion" sought a deep relationship between enjoyable self-expression, the role of play for the healthy realization of life in activities, and the essential role religion play in the developed life. He elucidated the deep connection between play and religion in this manner:

> Religious life is the crown of life. It is the richest and most varied of our natures; yet it involves no faculty which is peculiarly or specifically religious. It is through our senses, our memory, our reasoning, our feelings,

> and our actions that we are religious. Then if play is the means of growth and a large source of enjoyment, as has just been maintained, it is this for religious life just as it is for social, ethical, or business life. And this is my thesis: Play is a preparation for religious life, and one of the chief means of its realization. We become religious through play and to be religious is often to play. (1:343)

He found the essence of the religious life in the transformative energies released by imaginative performances, elevating play to a level of entrancing "fascination":

> The most effective play is characterized by the experience of fascination. . . . This element of fascination or elation with mental intoxication may be seen in some degree in all play, be it the romping of the infant, the adolescent mating plays, the sport of youth, or the successful pastime of the adult. And this element of fascination and elation is one of the characteristics of religious life. . . . Religious devotion, religious faith, religious fervor, from that of the ignorant believer to that of the dominating seer and prophet, reveal this trait. The history of conversion, revivals, and great religious movements need not be reviewed to substantiate this claim. (1:344)

Seashore enumerated several additional personal and social benefits from religious performances in play, such as the development of personality, social fellowship, finding joy in life, and appreciating mysterious and transcendent matters in a relatable way.

Notes

1. See for example, Thomas L. Haskell, *The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth Century Crisis of Authority* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Bruce Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860–1930* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979); Richard Ohmann, *English in America: A Radical View of the Profession* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Burton J. Bledstein, *The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976); James Campbell, *A Thoughtful Profession: The Early Years of the American Philosophical Association* (Chicago: Open Court, 2006).

2. See Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy*; and Kuklick, *Churchmen and Philosophers: From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985).

3. An 1872 entry in Bronson Alcott's journal related that philosophical discussion was superficial in Boston. According to Alcott, "philosophy is published in St. Louis";

see *The Journals of Bronson Alcott*, ed. Odell Shepard (Boston: Little, Brown, 1938), p. 444. It seems Emerson agreed with Alcott, which is why he encouraged Thomas Davidson to go to St. Louis in 1868; see Davidson, "Autobiographical Sketch," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 8 (1957): 532. Accounts of Alcott's and Emerson's trips to St. Louis are also instructive on this point; see Henry A. Pochmann, *German Culture in America; Philosophical and Literary Influences, 1600–1900* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), pp. 271–272; Alcott, *The Journals of Bronson Alcott*, p. 340; Henry Brokmeyer, *A Mechanic's Diary* (Washington, D.C.: E.C. Brokmeyer Publisher, 1910), pp. 229–233; and Emerson, vol. 5 of *The Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Ralph L. Rusk (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), pp. 421–422, 514, 521.

4. Denton Snider (1841–1925), one of the leading members of the St. Louis Hegelians, decided that his vocation was to be a writer of books. Indeed, he published more than forty books, but also worked for Harris as a public school teacher and administrator, worked briefly in Jane Addams's Hull House, and was an indefatigable public lecturer on classical literature and philosophy. Henry Conrad Brokmeyer (1818–1906) is another interesting example. A co-founder of the St. Louis Philosophical and Literary Society, Brockmeyer also served in the Missouri legislature, on the St. Louis Board of Aldermen, and even served a term of lieutenant governor of Missouri (1877–1881). For more on the St. Louis Hegelians' conception of philosophy, see James A. Good's Introduction to *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy (1867–93)*, 22 vols. (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press, 2002); Good, "The Value of Thomas Davidson," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 40 (2004): 289–318; and Good, The St. Louis Hegelians and the Lost *Bildung* Tradition in American Philosophy, in *The St. Louis Philosophical Movement*, ed. Britt-Marie Schiller (St. Louis: Webster University Press, 2009), pp. 9–26.

5. William James. *The Will to Believe and Other Essays* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897); John Dewey, et al., *Studies in Logical Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903); F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism: Philosophical Essays* (London: Macmillan, 1903).

6. William James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1907). For recent sources on pragmatism in German idealism, see James A. Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John Dewey* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006); and Daniel Breazeale, "Fichte's Conception of Philosophy as a 'Pragmatic History of the Human Mind' and the Contributions of Kant, Platner, and Maimon," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 62 (2001): 685–703. Royce's interpretation of Hegel is also relevant to the relationship between pragmatism and idealism. For an interesting recent article on that topic, see John Kaag, "American Interpretations of Hegel: Josiah Royce's Philosophy of Loyalty," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 26 (January 2009): 83–101.

7. Royce, "Kant's Relation to Modern Philosophical Progress," *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 15 (October 1881): 360–381.

8. Ladd, George Trumbull, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory: A Treatise of the Phenomena, Laws, and Development of Human Mental Life* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1894).

9. This essay was previously examined, through a different lens, in Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity*, pp. 236–237.

10. Dewey, The Psychological Standpoint (1886), in vol. 1 of *The Early Works of John Dewey*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), pp. 123, 125, 127. For more on the development of Dewey's conception of the psychological standpoint, see Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity*, pp. 134–137. Shook provides further insight into Dewey's use of the psychological standpoint in *Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), pp. 44–46.

11. Dewey, *The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1896).

12. Dewey, The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism (1905), in vol. 3 of *The Middle Works of John Dewey*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), p. 158.

13. Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity*, pp. 137ff.

14. Dewey first used the term "epistemological industry" in "Psychology and Philosophic Method," initially published in the *University Chronicle* 2 (1899): 159–179 (California). This essay was reprinted separately as "Consciousness" and Experience, in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt, 1910), pp. 242–270.

15. For a fascinating account of the interplay between the rise of pragmatism and the profound post-Civil War economic transformation, see James Livingston, *Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 1850–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

16. James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: H. Holt, 1890); *The Varieties of Religious Experience; A Study in Human nature; Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh in 1901–1902* (New York: Modern Library, 1902).

17. William James called this "healthy-mindedness" in *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: H. Holt, 1890); *The Varieties of Religious Experience; A Study in Human nature; Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh in 1901–1902* (New York: Modern Library, 1902).

18. One is reminded here of psychologist Jonathan Haidt's current classifications for bases to moral judgments; see his *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012).

19. Today's philosophers may recognize the essentials of the knowledge ("Super-scientist Mary") argument offered by Frank Jackson in "Epiphenomenal Qualia," *Philosophical Quarterly* 32 (1982): 127–136.

A MOMENT OF SHINING RELEVANCE: PROFESSIONAL PHILOSOPHY, 1911–1920

Randall Auxier

From our vantage point of the twenty-first century, it can be difficult to understand what it was like before the outbreak of the Great War—before the Even Greater War made that name obsolete. Several generations of Europeans had gone to their graves with an ever increasing sense that after the Napoleonic Wars, the fundamental conflicts that had divided Europe, had been settled, the wars were over, and that civilization had triumphed. Yes, there was that disappointing conflict between France and Prussia, but it had been brief and the Prussians had behaved in a more or less humane fashion, requiring only that honor and dignity be restored to them, and then leaving the French to sort out their mistakes. It was not a bloodless affair by any means, but by 1910, it was a distant memory and gladly pushed into history. Yes, there had been some conflicts among the European powers as they divided the world among themselves, but these had been handled by treaties after conflicts that, from the safety of Europe, seemed like skirmishes—skirmishes like the Boer Wars.

With the exception of problems on the fringes of various empires, which were very much to be expected among those who have read any history, the Europeans had settled into something like a *pax brittanica*. The effect of all this peace was that the bulk of the European world was populated by people, especially leaders, who were several generations removed from the realities of war. Wars existed mainly in the imaginations of the leadership, being gradually confused with fairy tales of national honor, noble sacrifice, and opportunities for heroism. Some word of the horrors of the Civil War in the United States had reached the awareness of some Europeans, but the United States was an isolated backwater, still struggling to free itself from the barbarism of chattel slavery. Americans were barely literate at best and lacked the most basic institutions that make savages into civilized persons. There was little reason, from the standpoint of any self-respecting European, to worry about what happened among the half-educated or half-aware. Butchering one another is all that one can expect from those who flout God and King and the gifts of the superior civilization.

It is not quite accurate to say that no one saw the conflict coming. But for each person who did, there were millions available to gainsay the prophecy. Barbara Tuchman has described it as well as anyone can hope to in *The Guns of August*[1] and the essays collected in *The Proud Tower*.[2] As she says, disaster is rarely as pervasive as it seems from recorded accounts, but in the case of the Great War, we find the exception. This was disaster on a nearly universal scale,

not least because it failed to come to a stable conclusion. We now can see clearly that this *particular* war, at just *this* moment, could have been averted, but not the conflict itself. Nietzsche had jotted down the thought, "the Germans always come after the others, much later: they are carrying something in the depths."[3] He had become obsessed with what he so prophetically called "European nihilism." He thought that the arrival of nationhood to Germany in 1871, and its late entry into the race for colonies, not to mention its seething anti-Semitism, boded ill for European civilization. By the time the Germans came around to doing something together, the decline was beyond stopping. This kind of vision was, to say the least, out of step with the triumphalism of the age. But German self-assertion was resented. This group had never been successfully subdued since Julius Caesar did it and there was more fear than envy in the attitudes of the older colonial powers.

After an effort of several centuries, the *non*-German Europeans had nearly completed the conquest and subjugation of the world, and, on the weight of the principle that to the victors go the spoils, they had built a magnificent, interconnected industrial society by developing extracted (some would say stolen) resources and using the blood, sweat, and tears of exploited peoples who ought to have had control of those resources. Needing a justification, or at least an excuse, for the maltreatment and regular slaughter of hundreds of millions of human souls, the imperative of paternalism settled in—all that was done was for the improvement, indeed, the very salvation, of the whole of humanity. I will repeat, then, that this was not the work of anyone who spoke German (a point not lost on the Germans as they struggled for something to be proud of in the tangled web of European history). It is very difficult for people in our day and age, people who know and cannot possibly forget or set aside what the Germans did in the twentieth century, to get a sense of how the Germans were perceived and how they saw themselves prior to the Great War. The professional philosophers in the United States, and indeed, the general citizenry, was about to be put to the test of having to struggle with questions of a fundamental sort between 1911 and 1920.

For the *non*-German colonial powers, an *ethos* and a complex set of discursive practices had developed to support the adventure of colonization: the poor within were not to be coddled and the heathen without were to be governed as benevolently as their "savage" natures would allow. It was akin to *patria postestas*, however, as these powers assumed authority over the life and death of the peoples they conquered. This kind of justification and authority was all asserted and believed, without irony, by many hundreds of thousands of decision makers over the course of 400 years. Such ideas and discursive practices had seeped into the Americas and had been taken up and adapted for other purposes,

closer to home. The idea that the whole proud tower might collapse in flames was quite beyond the reach of the discursive practices of the Europeans.[4]

The human amalgam that was pleased to appropriate for itself the name "Americans" was interestingly ambivalent about the habits of rule and the sheer extent of the British Empire. There were always Anglophiles in these groups, and there was still a shadow of an ancient dispute with the Francophiles, but this had faded into a story told by Henry Adams by 1900.[5] The Americans had some ancient experience with the shortcomings associated with any dreams of empire, and they had a stern warning from the Father of the Country about where that sort of shenanigans leads. But they also wanted the whole continent, and by 1893, a coaling station halfway across the Pacific Ocean was more than a little bit desirable. Only a few good opportunities for colonial control remained, so they set about taking some of Spain's colonies, and somehow managed to make it all look glorious or at least justified.

A few professional philosophers, such as William James (1906–1907) and Josiah Royce (1903–1904), did protest, although not too loudly or effectively. There was general condemnation of the Belgian slaughter of the Congolese people, and an occasional mutter of "dreadful" about the second Boer War, but the general absence in the nineteenth century of the kind of endless warfare in Europe that had characterized the previous 2,000 years was taken by many Americans as a hopeful sign, and as evidence that the word "civilization" as it issued unironically from the lips of triumphalists might not be wholly devoid of meaning.

Even the pacifists among the Americans—such as John Haynes Holmes (former student of Royce and James, and a pacifist who managed to live long enough to take a stand against every major American conflict of the twentieth century)—could believe, in 1910, that war, as it had existed for all of human history, might be over, and that it was the duty of each and every person to prevent its recurrence. The view that war was at an end, indeed, that we had evolved beyond it, was popular. After all, there were tens of thousands of decision makers in the Americas who needed to justify a recently completed subjugation of an indigenous population and a number of small but inexcusable wars of conquest.[6] Yet, in spite of the war with Spain and the brutal suppression of the Filipinos, things had been quiet enough in the decades leading up to the Great War to make even some wise ones to allow themselves to hope that even if the slaughter and oppression could never be justified, at least, perhaps, it was over. The future was to be negotiated.

Even among those who, like Nietzsche (and later, Lenin with his radical comrades), saw the conflict of the imperialist powers on the horizon, none would have a predicted the scale of the blood bath to come. The received view was that the dawning century would see progress. Demographers estimate that the world's population in 1850 was approximately 1,265,000,000. A conserva-

tive estimate of the number of human beings who died directly due to forces that the Europeans called "civilization" during the twentieth century would easily exceed that number. We need not even include deaths from famine that were weather-related or other natural disasters to reach such a number of avoidable human carnage. We might well get there on the strength of wars and consciously directed genocidal campaigns alone, leaving aside mass starvation due to Western greed, Cold War geo-posturing, and various Great Leaps Forward. A significant portion of those deaths was to be among the Europeans themselves, who killed each other by the millions and proved the absurdity of their claimed superiority as providers of an example of civilized behavior.

All this death and murder was in the offing in 1911, but it did not become an official topic of discussion among professional philosophers until the Great War was underway. There were numerous reasons for this. One assumes that philosophers talked about such concerns over drinks in their informal discussions, but the American Philosophical Association (the APA) and the Western Philosophical Association (the WPA) saw no reason to place the condition of European civilization among its chief concerns in any official way. The people in North America who devoted themselves to the study of philosophy had been busily professionalizing their work and practices for a dozen years by that point. They knew that the United States was an intellectual backwater in the view of the European world, and that stung, but the remedy would be found by seeking a place for the humanities generally and philosophy in particular among the modern scientific and industrial/agricultural behemoth that was growing from coast to coast. The universities were changing in the United States and Canada; they were becoming something the Europeans would not necessarily treat with intellectual respect, but there was no stopping what was already happening. A discipline would either get on the bullet train or get run over by it.

Like the Germans in Nietzsche's prediction, philosophers were latecomers to the race for professionalization, and perhaps they also carried something in the depths. It was not an enthusiastic push to professionalize. Rather, the aim was only to ensure the survival of instruction in philosophy in the modern university. Even without the gift of second sight, everyone could guess that the public's view of philosophy would tend to work against its continued inclusion and respectability unless it professionalized.

There had been some significant discussion of this aim of survival, and how to fulfill it, during the first decade of both associations, along with a more or less constant project of merging the two organizations. But there was not serious industry among the philosophers, as indeed there never has been (and perhaps never should be; the point is surely debatable and I, for one, would not care to live in a world in which philosophers were more industrious than they currently are). James's initial response to the suggestion of a professional society of

philosophers had been a thorough rejection of the idea with a declaration that philosophers were solitary beasts in their holes and not suitable for organizing.[7] Still, with effort, they were rounded up and herded into one town or anther for a dozen years, easily foreseeing what they needed to do, but only sluggishly responding to the need.

The philosophers clearly saw the importance of documenting the history of philosophical activity in North America prior to the formation of the professional discipline, and some of their early activity, desultory as it was, aimed to fulfill this need. Like good Protestants, they appointed a committee, which dutifully made a not overly ambitious plan to gather and publish important philosophical papers from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The plan was discussed for some years, greatly refined, and assigned to different executors of the plan, but then never really executed.

Still, in surveying the presidential addresses delivered during the first twenty years of the two associations, one cannot help being struck by the broad and impressive historical learning of nearly all of them. Frank Thilly's (1900–1901; 1901–1902; 1912–1913) address, "Romanticism and Rationalism" perhaps provides the best example. There can be no question that these philosophers valued history. But it was not history of the Americas that they knew and valued; it was the history of European philosophy as it had been taught to them especially *by the Germans*. The historical consciousness of the early professional philosophers in the United States was distinctly and incontrovertibly German. There was an intimate connection between the development of professional philosophy in the United States and Canada and advanced study at the grand German universities. James Campbell makes this point in his history of The American Philosophical Association (The APA), and emphasizes it this way:

> The fact that so many American philosophers had studied in Germany would have been nothing more than an interesting statistical aberration had they not returned ready to embody this new understanding of the nature and possibilities of scholarship. . . . These German-trained scholars returned to America with a conception of education as the uncovering of new knowledge; and they saw their role in the university to be revealing more and more about the nature of existence in what the Germans called the *Geisteswissenschaften* [humanities].[8]

Thus, *teaching* was not the repetition of any history except to the extent that it orients the present day teacher upon the task our professors learned in Germany. Teaching depended upon the "work" devoted to revealing new knowledge. This attitude accorded well with the mood of the modern universities, which was leaving behind the theological model of moral education for Christian service.[9]

In spite of the hostility among some influential members of the APA (and, indeed, it was much worse there than in the WPA) to employing the professional association and meetings to discuss the teaching of philosophy, there was, nonetheless, some discussion of the topic, and some sharing of ideas and experiences and ideas about norms and syllabi, but nothing was done to change or promote it. It was becoming clear by the second decade, as the association developed, that a minimum of structure of actual governance and of energy among those governing was the course most favored by the beasts when they left their individual burrows.[10]

What was becoming clear was that, in support of the model for higher education they had learned in Germany, these professional philosophers preferred one activity above all others, and almost to the exclusion of all others, which was arguing with each other about philosophy. Harry Norman Gardiner (1907–1908), the APA's long-time secretary, had pronounced this activity the "proper" business of the organization, and on this point nearly everyone seemed easily persuaded. Getting philosophers together to argue about philosophy is not difficult. Getting them to do anything else, in groups, is a different matter, with the sole exception of drinking, which has the effect of increasing the volume and intensity of the former, but at the cost of coherence and efficaciousness. No one seems to have demanded an explanation of why this was the proper business of the professional philosophers; but then again, perhaps it is so obviously the preference of people who study philosophy that no one *needed* an explanation.

The one other thing the philosophers managed to agree upon, after a dozen years of discussing it, referring it to committees that did not very much about it, then re-discussing it, and re-persuading themselves, was that merging the WPA and the APA was both desirable and inevitable. As if to prove that even fate can be delayed, if not entirely cheated, the philosophers managed to do nothing concrete about the inevitable until 1914, when they actually met together in Chicago and under the same president for both organizations, James Hayden Tufts (1905–1906; 1914–1915; 1934–1935). It took another six years for the various committees actually to merge the organizations. Even then they decided to have separate presidents, officers, executive committees, meetings, program committees, and so forth. The sense in which these divisions (and their youngest sibling, the Pacific Division, begun in 1924) make up a single organization is still a subject of considerable academic debate (not debate among academics, but debate that leads to no action) (2:xi).

Still, no one needed to explain to the now-professional philosophers the importance of appearances and how far from reality appearances may be. The aim was to be *perceived* as a professionalized group, not necessarily to *become* one. I have argued elsewhere that the ideas put in motion by James Edwin Creighton (1901–1902) to fabricate the appearance of professionalism, while

maintaining the praxis of individual beasts in their burrows, was then, and remains today, a defensible aim. It is not easy to adapt the study of philosophy to the practical demands of a changing world, especially one as uninterested in genuine moral and spiritual self-assessment as the advocates of European colonialism. Honest philosophers would surely be obliged to ask uncomfortable questions such as whether water torture is ethical, for example, as indeed the philosophers finally did begin to do after the outbreak of the Great War.

Before World War I, the APA and the WPA had been carrying on a three-way argument among idealists, realists, and pragmatists about the fundamental nature of knowledge, existence, and proper philosophical method. Campbell has described this era very ably in the sixth chapter of *A Thoughtful Profession*. It is to this conversation that the presidential addresses of presidents Charles Montague Bakewell (1910–1911) ("The Problem of Transcendence," 2:5–21), Evander Bradley McGilvary (1910–1911; 1913–1914) ("The 'Fringe' of William James's Psychology: The Basis of Logic," 2:25–45; and "Time and the Experience of Time," 2:135–152), Frederick James Eugene Woodbridge (1902–1903; 1911–1912) ("The Problem of Metaphysics," 1:61–73; and "Evolution," 2:47–56), Addison Webster Moore (1911–1912; 1917–1918) ("Bergson and Pragmatism," 2:63–75; and "The Opportunity of Philosophy," 2:277–288), John Elof Boodin (1912–1913; 1933–1934) ("The Existence of Social Minds," 2:99–133), and Boyd Henry Bode (1913–1914) ("The Psychological Doctrine of Focus and Margin," 2:159–173) belong. Each of those addresses was a valuable contribution to the discussion. It would behoove professional philosophers of today to be better familiarized with this discussion, since the pragmatists and realists are still at it, with no idealistic voice to triangulate it.

The plan for discussion sessions for the APA supports Campbell's astute characterization, but in 1914, the discussion was given to "Constitutional and Political Guarantees," and in 1917, to "Ethics and International Relations," which are clear indicators of a departure from earlier habits. Also, as I will further elaborate below, the decision to dedicate the 1915 meeting largely to recognition of Royce's work was not as apolitical as it might at first appear. In 1919, the topic was "The Nature of Community," and this was undertaken in the midst of the Paris Peace Conference, which resulted in the Treaty of Versailles.

I assert that the joint meeting of the APA and the WPA in Chicago in December of 1914 was surely a sort of high-water mark of social relevance for the professional philosophers of the United States. In Tufts, they had chosen the right sort of president for the role of national influence. He was a worldly individual, a natural leader both intellectually and personally, and he did not shrink from the leadership task at hand in 1914.[11] Among the founding faculty at the University of Chicago, Tufts had been president of the WPA in 1906, Dean of the Advanced Schools, and, both before John Dewey (1905–1906) arrived in 1894

and after Dewey left in 1904, the Philosophy Department Chair. Campbell argues that Tufts's importance far exceeds the place he has been accorded in the historyof professional philosophy in the United States, and this is surely true.

The point is that the APA and the WPA knew very well whom they had chosen to lead them during this difficult time: arguably the first true expert in applied ethics that America produced, but not in the narrow sense of that subdiscipline today. Rather, Tufts led an active life, advising businesses and governments, sitting on various boards, advising on economics, organizational principles, corporate responsibility, and authoring nine books and hundreds of articles and reviews (1:173–174). Thus, he was a highly visible representative of philosophy, as one would sincerely hope philosophy would be perceived by the public. He would eventually be asked to fill in as President of the University of Chicago in 1925. He advised state and city governments and, during the Great War, he was district director of Student Army Training Corps for the states of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan.[12]

In Tufts's presidential address, "Ethics of States," delivered a little over four months after World War I broke out, he offered a very astute and detailed analysis of the paradoxes evident in the ethics of nation-states, with particular applications to the examples of the present. After enumerating some of the well-recognized problems, in which states behave in ways they will not tolerate from their individual citizens, he stated:

> And if we seek a final paradox, more striking than the others, we find it in the real or assumed solemnity with which nations at war on the one hand suppress discussion, claim that political considerations take precedence over morality, and regard victory as a mark of divine approval, while on the other they appeal to the justice of their cause and recognize the importance of giving it the color of self-defense. "Even victorious wars," said [Otto von] Bismarck, "cannot be justified unless they are forced upon one . . . . Success,"[13] he explained to [Helmuth Karl] Moltke when revising the Ems telegram,[14] "however, essentially depends upon the impression which the origination of the war makes upon us and others; it is important that we should be the party attacked."[15] The present war has exemplified these various paradoxes in more striking form. (2:175)

Tufts provided a clear-eyed summary of the problems associated with the growth and creation of nation-states, something he had discussed in greater detail earlier in *Ethics*, which he co-wrote with Dewey in 1908.[16] But as was his wont, he was not prepared to condemn the nation-state altogether for its faults. Running the analogy of individual behavior to national behavior, but looking out for the genuine disanalogies, he said:

> In defense of the national state, it may be urged that it represents about as large a group as in the present stage of civilization can act harmoniously and feel its order to be autonomy and its culture its own free creation. We cannot do justice to the men now yielding up their lives, we cannot be fair to the honored and respected men, our friends and colleagues on both sides of this present war, except as we recognize the full worth of that which enlists their devotion. We may freely acknowledge the high purpose of the state; we may even agree with [Gustav] Rümelin that the state is bound to maintain itself,[17] and that under existing conditions this may involve means that are abhorrent to our standards of morality. (2:179)

Having noted this disanalogy, Tufts returned directly to the positive analogies of national to individual morality:

> But at the same time let us not fall into the fallacy of saying that evil is good. Going about armed, spending a large part of one's days and wealth in revolver practice, and of one's nights in listening at the neighbor's door to discover plots, devising means to catch him napping and studying the precise moment at which one may shoot first and call it self-defense, lynching suspects, burning houses, and incidentally shooting the children of bystanders, all this may be "necessary" in certain stages of savagery or frontier life. But no man can call it good. And insofar as nations conduct themselves in this fashion, we must challenge the situation. We must maintain that if our end requires such a means we are in a stupid and pitiable condition. . . . Instead of glorifying national or imperial states, we should say: If this is the best they can do, we had better look for another principle of organization and reserve our enthusiasm and moral applause. (2:179)

By the middle of 1917, many would call such words treasonous. It portends world government when civilizational progress will allow it. It is the opposite of "my country right or wrong." Yet, the discourse was very much in keeping with the sort of theory Tufts had favored for years: that the development of civilization produced, for better and for worse, the idea that the individual is the existential seat of moral authority. This was not an ontological truth; it was a historical achievement, and there is no reason at all to suppose that it is the final end of the growth of civilization. Individualism has the strength of holding each of us to a high standard of responsibility, but the weakness of undermining the thickest bonds of community. Thus, communities must be progressively rebuilt upon the intelligent action that follows from our best bonds of sympathy. A mere formalism, whether legal or formal, will not bring our states into the sort of relation with one another that we demand in our relations with our own neighbors.

The most telling phrases are those that situate the nation-state in the broad sweep of the history of civilization. At one and the same time these ideas reinforce the triumphalism that would become hard to believe after the Great War and impossible to believe after its successor. The death of Western humanism and its narrative of progress were on the way, but never accomplished. These wars were not the fault of humanists, but it is difficult to know whether the narrative of progress may have simply trailed the colonial conquest as an explanation and justification for the destruction, or might have genuinely contributed at each stage to the psychology that fueled the next conquest. In any case, after World War II, the search for a post-humanist narrative was understandable, and a story like the one Tufts told, along with its optimism and exhortations, was beyond being passé. Still, the search for a new account left behind, when it shouldn't have, the sweeping historical sense and understanding, obscuring it in a cloud of technicalities, dialectic, and self-suspicion that led away from the big questions of philosophy.

Tufts's address was not, then, a simple foray into political opinion or an attempt by a philosopher to become a political scientist. It was a genuinely thorough piece of thought regarding the way nation-states exist, their moral strengths and weaknesses, how they come to be what they are, as moral developments of our human yearnings to have basic needs met, and how and when they overreach. Here were the philosophers, in December 1914, becoming a community with some fair expectation of some efficacy in their united voice, meeting together in an important historical moment, and having something to say to the public that was worth serious consideration. In 1915, they would contribute vitally to the formation of the American Association of University Professors, which, among other things, was dedicated to insuring the independence of such perspectives in a (foreseeably) difficult and impending future.

In the next four meetings, although the two organizations seemed to have frightened themselves, structurally speaking, into re-separating, there really was a more or less constant effort to watch what was happening in the world and to reflect upon it with the detachment of both historical understanding and non-ideological philosophical distance. Alfred Henry Lloyd's (1915–1916) eloquent case made in "The Doctrinaire in Time of Crisis," for a higher neutrality is certainly among the true gems in the history of professional philosophy in the United States. He pushed beyond the rhetoric and politics of Woodrow Wilson's neutrality and argued that philosophical ideas cannot belong to nations as if there were some automatic stamp to be placed upon them because one group favors them over another or creates them at some special point in history or for some more limited reason than the dignity of the idea requires.

In his 1916 address, Lloyd took as his theme the problem of being "doctrinaire" in the relation between one's active life and one's thoughts. He echoed a

famous line of thought with which Wilson and James, among others, had become associated. In Wilson's formulation, it was, "the leader of men sees but one side," that such a person "lacks that subtle power of sympathy that enables the men who write the great works of imagination to put their minds under the spell of a thousand motives not their own but the living force in those whom they interpret."[18] In James's words, this is "a certain blindness" that he explained as being due to the way that ideas come to our thinking in association with certain sorts of feelings.[19] Speaking in April of 1916 at the WPA, the nation had just been through the awful tumult of trying to remain neutral in the face of increasing pressure to enter the war. In Lloyd's able hands, this idea of blindness or one-sidedness becomes a distinction between mere neutrality in a disagreement in which both sides (or all sides) have some valid reasons, and what he called a "higher neutrality."

One supposes here that Lloyd borrowed a card from Wilson's political hand and raised the stakes by rendering it into philosophical principle. People were accusing Wilson of being doctrinaire, academic, out of touch, a faint-hearted academic, even an unmanly coward for refusing to fight. Wilson had taken a true walloping from the press for his remarks of 10 May 1915, three days after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, in which he said, "there is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."[20] Lloyd, in setting out his distinction, was both defending Wilson and exhorting him to remember that he must continue to rise above politics.

What is most striking in Lloyd's address was his way of seeing the profession of philosophy and a road open to the APA and the WPA for them to have relevance to the wider world. By this moment, the professional organization of philosophers was surely feeling it had a voice and a role to play in national and international affairs. Lloyd said:

> Not long ago the "practical" men of society were given to finding fault with the universities for sending out doctrinaires and inefficients generally. Their fault-finding had some warrant, I do not doubt, although to any "practical" man any real thinker may seem inefficient. Sensitive to the criticism, however, the universities adopted reforms. (2:216)

He then described the decline of the humanities and classics and the rise of an "idolatry of specialism" (2:216), which, if it places a check on such doctrinaire (i.e., humanistic) thinking, does so at the cost of narrowness. Warning that a crisis requires deeper thinking, he continued:

> suppose the universities should not respond to the present call [for real vision]. History has many examples of institutions being found wanting in

> critical moments, the work required being taken up by agencies quite outside the institutional walls. . . . Our universities may fail in their duty. Yet the goal [of providing real vision] is greatly worthy of their striving and, in any event, what life must have it usually gets; if not in one way, then in some other. For the great change that seems to be drawing near, men of commanding vision must come and surely will come. (2:217)

Here Lloyd warned the association that it must provide the vision, the higher ideals, it must play a role in convincing both students and the public that the sweep of history must be grasped. He opined that professional philosophers ought to be the ones to do it:

> From all that I have said so far there is at least one very obvious conclusion. Our profession never has had larger possibilities. It has never been more worthwhile or in face of greater responsibilities. The philosopher, the thinker, above all the young thinker of today is challenged, as never before. To speak very directly, the current issue of preparedness cannot be met by mere military organization, by armies and munitions alone. . . . Your interest, as shown by the chief topic of discussion at this meeting of the Association, certainly indicates that you are responding to the present demand and the papers presented, some of them already read and discussed, show how fully you realize that the problem is not a narrowly political one but a problem demanding the widest and freest study; a problem, if I may so express myself, that must be brought by thinkers, trained to skill and widely informed, to the court of the Idea. Today's vision must measure fully to the issue. (2:217)

This was a vision of professional philosophy that was not to be realized. But at this moment in history, the path to such vital relevance lay open. Lloyd was not mistaken. Whatever the reasons may be that prevented the pursuit of social relevance, it was not for lack of a sense of its possibility. As Lloyd said, "not to face the possibility of a new kind of life is to refuse to face honestly a real phase of the great struggle. It is such a mistake to suppose that there is no fighting in thinking and no courage required of the thinker" (2:216). One hopes that Wilson took heart from his colleagues.

In 1916, the APA dedicated a great portion of its proceedings to a consideration of the life and career of Royce. That might seem like a diversion from relevance, but in fact, it was not. Royce had become one of the most ardent public speakers in the nation; his speeches supporting America's entry into the War on the side of the Allies were being printed in newspapers everywhere. It was known by everyone arranging the 1916 meeting that Royce had become a household name in support of going to war. Everyone in the APA also knew that

Royce had a long and friendly relationship with President Wilson, begun when Wilson was still a student at Johns Hopkins and before the APA gathered at Wilson's Princeton in 1906, where he spoke and Royce provided the response on the part of the Association.

Royce and Wilson met several times over the years, and a decision to place Royce at the center of a meeting, with his new book on war still fresh from the presses,[21] was far from being an act of neutrality. Perhaps the APA had been saddened by the unexpected loss of William James, who died in 1910, and felt resolved not to allow another great philosopher to pass without doing affording adequate honor. (Royce had, in fact, been in poor health.) But the political message implied by dedicating a meeting to Royce at just that time can not be mistaken. It was an effort to be socially relevant, at least in part. The gesture came just in time, in any case, since Royce did not live to see another meeting of the APA. Few Americans loved Germany more than Royce did, and to advocate war against them broke his spirit and, some say, finally killed him at the premature age of 61 in 1916.

After the Great War, there was perhaps too much of a rush among professional philosophers to get back to what Warren G. Harding had so ineloquently called "normalcy."[22] Their election of Mary Whiton Calkins (1918–1919) to the presidency of the APA coincided with national suffrage for women and she spoke on the topic of personhood in her address entitled, "The Personalistic Conception of Nature." Before the War, the WPA had elected Hartley Burr Alexander (1917–1918; 1919–1920; 1929–1930) to the presidency; after the War, the APA would do the same. He was, in many ways, perhaps the closest thing to a true Renaissance man who ever taught philosophy in the universities of the United States. The Pacific Division of The APA would also elect him president later, making him the only person to serve in the top office of all three.

There was never anything irrelevant in Alexander's blending of concerns, but he stood at one and the same time so much closer to so many worlds of human praxis than the ordinary college professor, being anthropologist, archeologist, and artist, and so far above the normal run of teachers, being original theorist and poet, that I suspect most of his fellows simply stood mute in his presence and hoped he would instruct them. That today he should be so little recognized in the history of American philosophy is little short of a crime.

More could be said about those meetings and presidents who did not serve during the War, but the meetings during the Great War form a kind of zenith of possibility for professionalized philosophy in the United States. There was a moment here when simply yacking at one another formally and informally might not have become the proper business of our organization. With exemplars like Tufts and Lloyd, it was possible to set a different course. If the critique of studied irrelevance among professional philosophers offered by John McCumber

is true, and our refusal of social responsibility during the time of the Cold War is accurate—one assumes it is—then that refusal was already our established ethos before the Cold War came. Once our professional associations settled into normalcy during the 1920s, they never really emerged from that sleepy condition.

The Great War had changed the relationship of American professional philosophy to philosophy in Europe. France, Germany, and Great Britain had each sacrificed an entire generation of young men, those born between 1880 and 1900. Many of those who were already trained to take the chairs of the professors, who were just a bit too old to fight—Ernst Cassirer, Henri Bergson, Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, Alfred North Whitehead (1931–1932), Oswald Spengler, Edmund Husserl, Paul Valéry, and lesser lights—and rising through the ranks of academia, did not return after the War. Those who did return and entered the academy afterwards were not interested in listening to the old men and their triumphalist-sounding humanism.

The survivors were to reject the idealism and the narrative of progress that had nourished the previous century. It was an amazing moment for the introduction of ideas that departed from that narrative. The survivors, along with those such as Heidegger who had somehow avoided military service, wasted no time setting aside the old and attempting to re-create the narrative of the West according to patterns they could actually believe, whether absurdist or nationalist, or they evaded the grand story altogether and dove into technicalities. The United States had not lost a generation and had not suffered in the same way. It took some time before the change in European philosophy would take hold across the ocean.

There was certainly talk of "reconstruction in philosophy," as Dewey called it,[23] and an "outlawry of war" movement among the freshly reinforced ranks of pacifists, but continuity outweighed change at that moment and the American philosophers were more than ready to resume their argument about idealism, realism, and pragmatism. But something had changed. American philosophers were more likely to fulfill all their training in the States, and when they did go to Europe for study, it would be in Great Britain or France, not Germany. In the fog of that awful decade, James, Charles Sanders Peirce, Royce, George Holmes Howison, William Torrey Harris, and Borden Parker Bowne had passed away and Santayana had decamped to Europe permanently. The generation that started the APA was handing the reins to its first generation of students and the general feeling must have been altered.

In late December 1916, when Arthur (Schauffler) Oncken Lovejoy (1908–1909; 1916–1917) was president of the APA, the Battle of Verdun had raged all year, at a cost upwards of three-quarters of a million casualties, perhaps approaching a million. The Battle of the Somme had begun in July and lasted until mid-November, and saw another million casualties in half as much time. Wilson had, three weeks ahead of Lovejoy's address, demanded that Congress pass the

legislation necessary to regulate the railroads so that the United States military could be made ready for, as everyone had come to realize was inevitable, the United States's entry into the Great War on the side of the Allied Powers. Thus, when Lovejoy delivered "On Some Conditions of Progress in Philosophical Inquiry," he spoke at the close of the bloodiest year of battle in human history, on the verge of war with Germany, and he chose that moment, and no other, to speak on the meaning of, and hope for, progress in philosophical inquiry.

At a poignant moment in his plea, Lovejoy called on the authority of a man who, as "an eminent man of science turned philosopher, the founder of a somewhat influential doctrine [viz. energism] describes how the secret of the universe dawned on him" (2:238). He did not name the eminent man, or identify him with a nationality, but he added parenthetically that "it would be a pity to translate what follows out of the charming and appropriate German in which the tale is told" (2:238). Lovejoy then proceeded to read from Nobel Prize winner Wilhelm Ostwald's 1912 book on energism the story of how Ostwald had come upon the insight that thinking itself, like everything else in nature, is energy, and is connected in the most intimate ways with the most beautiful bursting and blooming and buzzing life. Ostwald described not being able to sleep one night due to an agitating idea trying to come clearer, and finding himself walking in the Tiergarten (in Leipzig, one assumes) in the earliest part of the morning, where he had what Emerson would call an experience of the sentiment of virtue, of the goodness and the beauty of all things, of their harmony and perfection, and of the invisible eye that sees all and is in itself nothing.[24]

In recognizing that eminent man of science, whom no one had heard from since the Great War began, and whom everyone would have known as a devoted follower of the 1905 Nobel Peace Prize recipient Bertha von Suttner,[25] Lovejoy marked the ugliest, bloodiest year of the worst war in human history by reading to his audience in German. This audience did not need a translation. It was not an act of rebellion or defiance, or a political act of any kind, to read in German to so many who had friends, loved ones, memories, spiritual debts, inspiration, and deep affection for people who, as they all knew, were soon to be wholly demonized and blamed for every ill of civilization.

Today, one is not allowed to offer any defense for German behavior in the twentieth century, and surely that stern convention is properly observed. But to the philosophers gathered in New York to hear Lovejoy speak, and feeling with some justification that in Wilson, one of their own was guiding the nation, the note of hope seemed more appropriate than the note of condemnation. Somewhere on the other side of the trenches there were those who believed in peace and in every decent thing.

Almost all of those philosophers spoke German, as Lovejoy knew, and none of them could imagine what atrocities lay on the horizon. Surely this har-

binger of humanity and humanism, this late, reluctant entrant into the colonialist aggression, would recover itself, somehow, and be a guiding light to history. And who knows? If the Old World colonial powers had listened to Wilson and had not placed upon Germany the whole burden of world guilt, had not tried to scapegoat the Germans *alone* while exonerating themselves from responsibility for centuries of rape and pillage and murder, horrors the Germans would perhaps exceed but had not yet committed, the twentieth century might have proven itself worthy of a better destiny than it achieved.

Our "small band of philosophers," as Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1936–1937) once called it,[26] could only hope. Royce sent Wilson a copy of *War and Insurance* when it appeared late in 1914.[27] It outlined a practical plan for avoiding *all* future wars—a plan that resembled in a number of uncanny ways, the Fourteen Points. But Wilson's plan was subverted by the desire for revenge, to have a people upon whom to pin the violence of all sides. By the end of the decade, the die had been cast, and the League of Nations was already on a course for failure. This was due in no small part to the wicked small-mindedness of Henry Cabot Lodge, a man whose name ought to be mentioned in the same company as Sen. Joseph McCarthy and Benedict Arnold, and the corrupt United States Senate. The United States came to deserve a good deal of the blame for the conditions that created a still worse world war, and at least some among our profession foresaw it and tried to prevent it.

Notes

1. Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Macmillan, 1962).

2. Barbara Tuchman, *The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World before the War, 1890–1914* (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

3. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2011), p. 56 (e-book).

4. The image of the proud tower was taken by Tuchman from Edgar Allan Poe's poem "The City in the Sea," which can be found in *The Oxford Book of American Light Verse* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). For those who have never taken a few moments to read this poem, it is short and it is worth the effort.

5. Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams: An Autobiography* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918).

6. See, for example, Royce's history, *California: A Study of American Character: From the Conquest in 1846 to the Second Vigilance Committee in San Francisco* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1886).

7. I have discussed the formation of The APA in some detail in *Time, Will, and Purpose* (Chicago: Open Court, 2013).

8. James Campbell, *A Thoughtful Profession: The Early Years of the American Philosophical Association* (Chicago: Open Court, 2006), p. 34.

9. This movement has been well documented by numerous historians, from Andrew Dickson Whitehead's *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Chris-*

tendom (New York: Macmillan, 1896), written within the conflict, to George Marsden's *The Soul of the American University* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

10. Campbell recounts an effort begun in 1911 by the APA Committee on Definitions to create a uniformity of vocabulary for the papers and discussions. Needless to say, this got nowhere and such niceness disappeared altogether with the outbreak of the Great War; see *A Thoughtful Profession*, pp. 149–157.

11. An excellent summary of Tufts's character and achievements is available in the Introduction written by James Campbell to *Selected Writings of James Hayden Tufts*, ed. James Campbell (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), pp. ix–lvi, and a sense of his personal perspective can be gotten from his autobiographical essay "What I Believe," reprinted as chapter one of that collection (pp. 1–18); his view of the place of philosophy among the other graduate studies (published in 1898) is the second chapter.

12. The S.A.T.C. was a program proposed by the War Department under Wilson that many today would find deeply alarming. "Colleges that participated in the S.A.T.C. program became full-time military posts under the control of officers of the United States Army. In fact, the objective of the S.A.T.C., as stated by the Students' Army Training Corps Regulations, was to, 'utilize effectively the plant, equipment, and organization of the colleges for selecting and training officer candidates and technical experts for service in the existing emergency.' The federal government thus took over colleges that participated in the program, often times placing Army officers above their administrative counterparts." The S.A.T.C. transformed and militarized the culture of the colleges that participated. It is hard to know whether Tufts took the position to slow the spread of such militarization (as seems likely) or from a sense of service to the nation—or both. What is certain is that he was no narrow nationalist. See the article about the S.A.T.C. as the forerunner of R.O.T.C: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~rotc/satc.html (accessed 1/26/2015). William Ernest Hocking took a leave from Harvard and did similar work in the Northeast, with the aim of teaching officers to be ethical in warfare. One could barely hope for wiser teachers of future officers.

13. Otto von Bismark, vol. 2 of *The Man and the Statesman: Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto, Prince von Bismarck*, trans. Arthur John Butler (London: Harper and Bros., 1898), p. 101.

14. The Ems Telegram was ostensibly a telegram from the Prussian Kaiser, Wilhelm I, to his Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck which, when published (and as anticipated by Bismarck) precipitated the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871.

15. Bismarck, *The Man and the Statesman*, vol. 2, p. 101.

16. See Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1908), pp. 147–163, 171–198. Reading the 1908 edition as opposed to the 1932 revision of the book is needed in order to see the lines of continuity between this earlier work and Tufts's presidential address. By 1932 the Great War had already had its effect and the general failure of its resolution was becoming evident to all.

17. Tufts refers to the work, well-known at that time, by Gustav Rümelin entitled *Politics and the Moral Law* (New York: Macmillan, 1901).

18. This passage is extracted from a lecture, "Leaders of Men: An Address," that Wilson gave at the University of Tennessee, in Knoxville, 17 June 1890. See *The Politics of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. August Heckscher (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p.

70. It is also important to remember that Wilson exhorted people to overcome their narrowness almost constantly; see, for example, ibid., pp. 61–63.

19. See William James, On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings, in *Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1899), pp. 229–264.

20. Heckscher, *The Politics of Woodrow Wilson*, p. 253.

21. Josiah Royce, *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York: Macmillan, 1916); reprinted (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1967).

22. In his speech to the Republican Convention of 1920, Harding said, "America's present need is not heroics, but healing; not nostrums, but normalcy; not revolution, but restoration; not agitation, but adjustment; not surgery, but serenity"; see Michael A. Cohen's *Live from the Campaign Trail: The Greatest Presidential Campaign Speeches of the Twentieth Century and How They Shaped Modern America* (New York: Walker & Co., distributed by Macmillan, 2008); available online at http://www.livefromthetrail.com/about-the-book/speeches/chapter-3/senator-warren-g-harding (accessed 15 March 2015).

23. John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957/1948).

24. W. Ostwald, *Der Energetische Imperativ* [The energy imperative] (Leipzig, Germany: Akademische verlagsgesellschaft m.b.h., 1912), p. 7.

25. Von Suttner was one of the most influential peace activists of her generation, an Austrian Baroness, and the author of the widely influential novel *Lay Down Your Arms* (London: Longmans, Green, 1892). Ironically, she died on cancer two months before the outbreak of the Great War.

26. From a letter from E. S. Brightman to Charles Hartshorne (1948–1949) in December 1933, in speaking of the passing of Durant Drake. See *Hartshorne and Brightman on God, Process, and Persons: The Correspondence, 1922–1945*, eds. R. E. Auxier and M. Y. A. Davies (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), pp. 12–13.

27. J. Royce, *War and Insurance: An Address Delivered before the Philosophical Union of the University of California at its Twenty-Fifth Anniversary at Berkeley, California, August 27, 1914* (New York: Macmillan, 1914).

PHILOSOPHICAL LEGACIES OF THE 1920s

Michael Brodrick

In human affairs, periods of conflict and turbulence are often the most interesting and the most decisive. The 1920s was such a period for philosophy in America. Those purposes and institutions that had shaped philosophy during the first half of the nineteenth century and earlier began to conflict with a new vision of philosophy's mission suited to a new institutional framework. Philosophy in its traditional guise consisted largely of Christian apologetics mixed with a healthy dose of personal opinion. Taught mostly by college presidents who were also ministers, its purpose was to "put the final touches on the education of the Christian gentleman."[1] Professional philosophers as we know them today did not exist. By 1925, however, philosophy had emerged as a narrowly defined discipline within a modern university setting, creating a very different set of incentives for its practitioners. It was now possible to earn a comfortable living doing philosophy provided one produced a steady stream of scholarly material reflecting philosophy's new disciplinary parameters. From its marginal existence in the "old-time college,"[2] philosophy emerged as a viable career path, driven in large part by desire for professional advancement.

That to which James Campbell refers as the "professionalization of philosophy"[3] gained substantial momentum during the 1920s, as philosophers pursuing academic careers responded rationally to the new incentives placed on them by churning out a body of highly technical literature aimed at philosophical progress. Because the hard sciences were setting the standards for modern academic disciplines, it was widely believed that progress in philosophy would look very much like scientific discoveries. This created a climate of ideas that was, in many, ways antagonistic to those pockets of systematic idealism that remained from the late nineteenth century. While nineteenth-century idealism was sufficiently sophisticated to qualify as a framework for progress, its emphasis on human values placed it at odds with the neutrality supposedly required for scientific discoveries. The result was a conflict between idealism and "realism," the discourse within which philosophical progress was thought most likely to occur.

A third party to this conflict took the form of a movement to return philosophy to its ancient roots in the search for practical wisdom by rejecting its development as a highly specialized discipline made in the image of science for the purpose of professional advancement. This was the beginning of the current popular view that philosophers should play an increasingly powerful role in addressing a wide variety of social problems.

For better or for worse, the conflict and turbulence of the 1920s shaped philosophy in America in ways that remain visible and consequential today. The presidential addresses of The American Philosophical Association (The APA) delivered in the 1920s stand as a permanent record of those conflicts, with all of their implications for assessing what philosophy is and should be today.

Neither grouping philosophies nor attempting to determine the overall trajectory of philosophy during a given period can be approached as an exact science. Regardless of how philosophies are categorized, ideas shared in common create overlap among the resulting groups. Thus, there may be valid arguments for different groupings. Philosophers subscribing to the vision of philosophical progress may also see ways in which such progress can be helpful to society, placing their thoughts in at least two categories. However, even philosophies that share much in common normally lean in one direction or another. A philosophy that is idealistic in its framework but is most often engaged in technical exposition for the purpose of refuting materialism arguably belongs in the category of philosophical progress, as opposed to that of idealism, because progress in resolving technical disputes is its overarching purpose. It is because philosophies normally lean in one direction or another with respect to relevant concerns that it is possible to place them within a scheme of categories, providing a basis from which to determine the general landscape of ideas during a given period and to infer philosophy's overall trajectory.

My analysis of The APA presidential addresses of the 1920s tells the story of philosophy in America during that period by placing the addresses discussed in one of three categories. Those categories stand for three major philosophical orientations that existed during that decade. The story of American philosophy during the 1920s then emerges as one of conflicting claims stemming from divergent philosophical trends competing for the future of philosophy. I use the same analysis to explain what philosophy is today and what it ought to be. What is ultimately relevant is not in which category a particular address is placed, but how each address displays one of three fundamental orientations, pulling philosophy in one direction as against the others.

The categories that form the structure of my analysis derive from James Campbell's groundbreaking study of the early history of The APA, *A Thoughtful Profession*. They are philosophical progress, practical wisdom, and idealism. Working from Campbell's account[4] of Arthur (Schauffler) Oncken Lovejoy's (1908–1909; 1916–1917) address entitled, "On Some Conditions of Progress in Philosophical Inquiry" (2:223–253), in which Lovejoy called on philosophy to progress, I define philosophical progress as the attempt by philosophers to agree on answers to specific technical questions. In other words, the aim of philosophical progress is to discover new facts. During the early years of American philosophical societies such as The APA, members often formed "discussion groups"

in the hope of solving certain technical puzzles once and for all, creating philosophical progress. This was part of a larger effort to achieve among philosophers the same high levels of agreement about philosophical questions as that achieved by scientists with respect to scientific questions. The predominant discourse of philosophical progress was that of realism, a broad movement focused on clarifying the nature of knowledge and the methods and procedures of knowing.

Several addresses given during the 1920s called for philosophical progress; others focused on making the case that philosophers should pursue practical wisdom of the sort that is useful in addressing the problems of human life, especially social problems. Such a re-focusing of philosophy would constitute a return to its ancient roots as an instrument of human flourishing.

Still other addresses displayed a third basic orientation. They attempted to defend and strengthen the sort of idealistic philosophy that predominated in America during the late nineteenth century. Such addresses represent what might be called conservative tendencies within American philosophy, because they seek to conserve what was once widely viewed as the right orientation for philosophy by updating older arguments for idealism. While those addresses that fall under the category of idealism share an emphasis on human values with those grouped under that of practical wisdom, the idealistic addresses tended to place human values within the context of traditional religious ideas. In contrast, those addresses that called on philosophy to reaffirm its ancient commitment to practical wisdom saw a much more expansive role for philosophy in advancing human values. They often suggested that philosophers must proactively apply their expertise to address a wide range of social ills.

Of the twenty-six addresses given during the 1920s, the sixteen addresses discussed here are those that most clearly exemplify one of the three philosophical tendencies I distinguish for the sake of my analysis.

In "Progress in Philosophy in the Last Quarter Century," Wilbur Marshall Urban (1925–1926) tied the notion of philosophical progress to a form of realism that would uncover objective truths about the world. He distinguished two conceptions of progress, before identifying the second as the more significant. First, he defined progress as "development from simplicity to complexity" (3:269). Philosophy routinely progresses just by growing more complex; it had certainly progressed in that sense between 1901, the year The APA (then the WPA) was founded, and 1925. However, elaboration by itself is not progress "in any ultimate sense" (3:269). In distinguishing a second conception of progress, Urban referred to what he called the "criterion of totality" (3:270). Progress in an ultimate sense is total, occurring not just in one direction but in all. To Urban, the hallmark of real progress in philosophy is the expansion of "collective self-consciousness" (3:271) that occurs when the full "implications" of the latest advancements in human knowledge become widely realized and understood.

One such advancement was Darwin's theory of evolution. Urban declared that after Darwin, "no one can write philosophy in the same way." He referred to understanding the full implications of evolution as "the specific task of this period." True philosophical progress would mean not just working from the notion of evolution to devise new philosophical theories of greater complexity than their predecessors, but grasping how evolutionary ideas could fundamentally alter traditional philosophical projects, such as the search for truth. That would amount to "finding out what all this means for the collective consciousness of mankind" (3:272).

At first, the spread of evolutionary thinking gave rise to genetic and pragmatic theories of knowledge that presented truth as a relative reality. While not destroying knowledge altogether, Urban argued, such theories "can denature it, can take all the value out of it" (3:280). This lesser form of philosophical progress eventually led to the real thing:

> The revival of realism, both in Germany and in England and America, represents progress, not only in the sense of elaboration . . . but also in the larger sense of collective consciousness of the problems of knowledge and reality. (3:278)

Compared to pragmatic theories of knowledge that quickly grew out of evolutionary thinking and threatened to infect truth with relativism, the "new realisms" established "a world of being that has intrinsic significance" (3:278). Urban concluded, "the 'rake's progress' of pragmatic or genetic logic is about run" (3:279).

In praising the new realisms with their account of truth as an objective reality, Urban put in place necessary conditions for the notion of philosophical progress that formed the basic orientation of one major group of philosophies during the 1920s. Without a body of objective truths to be gradually discovered, philosophical progress in the ultimate sense distinguished by Urban could not take place.

In "Immediacy and Meaning," George Plimpton Adams (1927–1928) reiterated the basic tenets of realism of the sort that formed the heart of the notion of philosophical progress. His targets were other versions of realism that posited immediate objects of consciousness that lacked inherent meaning. Both George Santayana and C. D. Broad described what amounted to "a self-contained and self-enclosed area of immediacy" (3:382). Adams grouped Clarence Irving Lewis's (1933–1934; 1954–1955) pragmatic theory of knowledge and John Dewey's (1905–1906) account of immediacy and meaning with the views of Santayana and Broad. All of these shared the "initial premise," "there is somewhere in experience, cognitive or non-cognitive, an impervious nucleus of immediacy" (3:385). In other words, "the presence, in or before experience, of a content, the

whole of whose nature and existence, as a somewhat immediately given, is exhaustively grasped in or by the process of experiencing it" (3:385) was the common thread uniting them.

However, accepting the view that immediate objects of consciousness are inherently meaningless meant denying some or all of realism's purported capability to discover objective truth, weakening the case for the possibility of philosophical progress. Taking a different approach, Adams defended the thesis, "meaning as well as immediacy is present throughout all levels of conscious life or experience, whether cognitive or non-cognitive" (3:386). He claimed, "to suppose that any content can be immediately given without any trace of some such meaning is to commit what I should call the fallacy of detached and self-contained immediacy" (3:386). For Adams, "to recognize in all experience a fabric of meanings which transcend immediacy" is to render experience "intelligible" (3:395). His conclusion that experience is inherently meaningful and therefore intelligible places him in the same camp as Urban. Both Adams and Urban embraced the sort of epistemological realism that makes philosophical progress possible, when such progress is defined as describing an independent reality in ways that are increasingly accurate, until final conclusions can be reached.

Because it proceeds as if establishing final answers to questions about how mind and body are related, Wilmon Henry Sheldon's (1921–1922) "The Soul and Matter" anticipated the notion of philosophical progress that received its characteristic articulation in terms of epistemological realism later in the decade. Sheldon aimed to show that mind is both irreducible to physical processes and capable of causing "material changes" (3:61). For him, the claim that mind cannot be reduced to physical processes is best supported by the fact that mind has "properties or functions" that are incompatible with how physical nature operates. In memory, for example, a "past event is present" (3:57). Since "presence of the past" is "incompatible with the conditions of material reality" (3:57), it is clear to Sheldon that mind has at least one function that cannot be reduced to a material process.

To show that mental phenomena can be causes of "material changes" (3:61), Sheldon moved from analysis of cognitive mental states to an account of mental states that he termed "affective-conative" (3:64). The hallmark of mental as opposed to material agency is that mental agency proceeds by "the presence of a future end" (3:67). Such agency originates in desire-based or affective-conative mental states. For example, when we desire to prolong pleasure, it is the presence to consciousness of what is desired, while, in another sense, that object is off in the future, that drives our behavior. This form of agency is "incompatible with material conditions which do not permit the future to be a cause" (3:67).

By defining matter as that which has "the potency of offering resistance" (3:71), Sheldon developed a version of materialism that leaves open the possibil-

ity that mind is actually a "kind of matter" (3:72), one that is "far less restricted than the matter with which physical science is conversant" (3:72). An organism's resistance to tendencies to behave in ways that foreshorten pleasure is an effect of affective-conative mental states aimed at prolonging pleasure. Such states are "mental" in that they do what physical processes are incapable of, namely enabling the future to be a cause of behavior, but they are clearly material in a more fundamental sense, inasmuch as they offer resistance to contrary tendencies impinging on them.

From there, Sheldon attempted to establish the immortality of the soul on the basis that "mind-stuff" must be an "imperishable entity," because "there is as much ground for believing it to be eternal as for believing physical atoms to be eternal." This convinced Sheldon that mind-stuff is actually "soul-substance." He concluded, "the individual soul or person, being as substantial as any electron, is certain to endure" (3:73).

William Pepperell Montague's (1923–1924) "The Einstein Theory and a Possible Alternative" (3:147–166) anticipated the notion of philosophical progress that Urban articulated. Montague explained why one of the assumptions behind Einstein's special theory of relativity might be false and offers an alternative to that theory. Its efforts to improve upon scientific theories by adopting the discourse and methods of the physical sciences places Montague's address squarely in the category of philosophical progress. Montague even designed an elaborate experiment, with input from colleagues in the Physics Department at Columbia University, to put one of Einstein's theoretical assumptions to an empirical test that he thought would either confirm or disconfirm his suspicions about the special theory of relativity. It would be hard to devise a better example of philosophy attempting to progress by discovering new final facts about the world. The notion of philosophical progress that developed during the 1920s demanded no less from philosophy.

If those addresses that either assumed or explicitly developed a framework of philosophical progress represented progressive tendencies within American philosophy, those that started from idealistic assumptions, some of which attempted to defend idealism by devising new and better arguments, represented tendencies that were essentially conservative. One example of the latter sort of address is Edgar Lenderson Hinman's (1920–1921) "Modern Idealism and the Logos Teaching." Hinman saw the idealism of his day developing away from its roots in a form of philosophical theism known as Logos theology. The rising stars in the world of idealism were pantheistic as opposed to being consistent with traditional Christian theism, as Logos theology was. To Hinman, this was an alarming trend for several reasons. First, "the pantheistic editing of modern idealism is not the better argued and more consistent one." Second, that finite beings are "less than real" in pantheistic idealism meant that the "determinate

conception of life and of cultural values . . . true to the spirit of the Christian outlook" that Logos theology preserved would "lose all point and significance." If "every definite form of existence is supposed to be merged and absorbed into a pantheistic Absolute," then any "characteristically Christian type of motivation" would be destroyed. In the third place, because pantheistic idealisms tend to view the Absolute as nothing more than the universe or the totality of existence, where "the actual itself is to display itself as rational," they lean toward "elevated . . . secularism" or "refined paganism." Such idealisms are fundamentally unsympathetic to a "specifically Christian interpretation" of culture (3:37–38).

At the center of Logos theology is the ideal of the perfection of the individual through self-sacrifice for the benefit of a larger whole. Hinman's purpose was to show that while pantheistic idealists deviate in various ways from the true logic of idealism, that of Logos theology, modern Absolute idealism is in fact fully consistent with Logos theology. His focus was on the systems of two pantheistic idealists in particular, Bernard Bosanquet and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, both of whom he admired but wanted to correct (3:38).

Of the philosophically "conservative" addresses of the 1920s, Hinman's was perhaps the most extreme. Not only did he reject the epistemological realism that characterized the movement for philosophical progress, he did not even want to bring absolute idealism up to date. What Bosanquet and Radhakrishnan likely viewed as improvements on older formulations of idealism, Hinman saw as mistakes. Among his gravest concerns with newer forms of idealism was that they did not bring out the teleological character of the "world-system," an essential feature of traditional idealism. To Hinman, the correct form of idealism supported the timeless values of Christianity. For examples of the correct form, he looked to "[Josiah] Royce [(1903–1904)] . . . and many writers of his type of thought" (3:38). That Royce, who died in 1916, had not fully embraced Absolute idealism when he gave the Gifford Lectures between 1898 and 1900,[5] confirms that Hinman was fighting a distinctly rear-guard action.

William Ernest Hocking (1926–1927; 1927–1928), perhaps the most eminent philosopher among The APA presidents of the 1920s, was also committed to idealism, although he sensed that it would have to be updated from what it had been during the late nineteenth century. In "Mind and Near-Mind," Hocking called for the development of a true "science of mind." That Hocking wanted a "science" rather than a "philosophy" of mind suggests he was aware of and perhaps sympathetic with the idea that philosophy should attempt to progress by imitating the sciences. At the same time, however, he was convinced that philosophy should continue to operate within an idealistic framework, rather than embracing the realism normally associated with the philosophical progress movement. Hocking warned that previous attempts to create a science of mind, instead of "dealing with mind itself," dealt by mistake with what he called

"near-mind." That category encompassed a variety of "substitutes for mind" that are "systems of objects . . . equivalent to mind only for certain restricted purposes." To Hocking, a true science of mind would be at the same time a science of the self and of human nature. Moreover, such a science would "supply the lacking continuity among the sciences" (3:313).

One reason continuity among the sciences was lacking at that time was that attempts to apply the procedures and methods of the physical and mathematical sciences to the mind had been less than fully successful. This was largely due to confusing mind and near-mind. Physical processes must be understood in terms of cause and effect, but "a causal system can at best be but a Near-mind" (3:315). However, minds and near-minds are not "profoundly distinct and disparate in nature" (3:313–314). While mental processes are "at least partly rational" and must therefore be explained at least partially in terms of reasons, such processes are also in some sense causal. This is one basis for the continuity that exists between the physical sciences and psychology. As Hocking aptly put it matter:

> The mind, then, differs from every object of nature in being in addition a hold upon the possible, the future, the valuable—or, to put these together, upon possible future value. Its essential activity is to bring possible future value into connection with actual present fact; and my proposition is that it is the *only agency for doing this*. (3:320)

A true science of mind would attempt to infer the laws of mind by observing mind's "characteristic activity," rather than by working backwards from the laws of physics to those of mind. This a posteriori procedure, shared with the physical sciences, would further cement their continuity with psychology.

Although the idealistic framework of Hocking's thought is not front and center in "Mind and Near-Mind," his view of mind as an "agency" for actualizing possibilities belongs to the tradition of idealism. More significant for the present analysis is that Hocking viewed his account of mentality as a developing science that belonged alongside physics and mathematics. Unlike Hinman, he was not seeking to recover an "orthodox" version of idealism, but was looking for ways in which idealism could be modernized without surrendering its essential claims.

In "What Does Philosophy Say?," Hocking immediately distanced himself from the notion of philosophical progress by declaring that philosophy "has no corporate judgment" (3:397) and by affirming "the everlasting importance of differing" (3:398). At the same time, he thought philosophy should be getting at objective truth. To Hocking, while Americans had been "an unphilosophical people," he was writing at a time when that tide was beginning to turn. "This is

for us a great moment," he asserted, "also a responsible and a dangerous moment" (3:398). A central question for him was "whether, without falling into any of the vices of orthodoxy, we cannot do what the instinct of our students seems to require of us, and present philosophy as having something to say both objective and sayable" (3:400). He lamented that, looking at the most ingenious works of philosophy, probably no professional philosopher "finds any proposition which he can adopt as it stands" (3:401). To him, there was "something melancholy about it all, this immense waste of gifted energy and hope" (3:401). However, this was not Hocking's final conclusion about philosophy's limits. He claimed there are "certain views about the universe which are assumed or postulated in the nature of the philosophic enterprise itself, so that every philosopher by his activity, if not by his doctrines, acknowledges them" (3:402).

Hocking held that all philosophers require at least three propositions: "that things have a meaning," "that we human beings are competent to grasp that meaning, or some of it," and "that it is worthwhile to do so, and ought to be attempted" (3:403). The first assumption, that things have a meaning, means "there is nothing meaningless in the world (taking things one by one) and (taking them collectively) the world as a whole is not meaningless" (3:404). That, according to radical empiricism, we do not experience meaning directly does not "afford justification for supposing that no meaning is there" (3:404). The second part of the assumption, that the whole can have meaning, leads to a logical "difficulty," because meaning is "relative," applying "only to what is partial" (3:405). Hocking's response to this difficulty is that here "our intuitions must give instruction to our logic" (3:405). To him, "we know . . . [that] unless the whole . . . has meaning, the meanings of the parts are illusory" (3:405).

Regarding the second assumption that all philosophers must make, that we can grasp some of the meaning in things, Hocking was clear that meaning does not exist in relation to intelligent beings but actually inheres in things and in the world as a whole. "When we postulate that things have meanings," he said, "we are putting the meanings on the same plane of objectivity with the things" (3:408). Moreover, "the structure of the world is in itself significant: there is, in some sense, an objective reason in the make-up of things" (3:409). That meaning exists irrespective of its relation to us does not mean we are incapable of grasping it. On the contrary, "to suppose that the world has produced meaning-seekers incompetent to assess meanings is to suppose a typically meaningless situation, such as our first postulate forbids us to assume" (3:410).

Hocking's third assumption was that because meanings inhere in things and in the world as a whole, and because we are capable of knowing those meanings, "they ought to be known by us . . . [it is] a sort of cosmic pity if they are not." The presence of meaning in objects creates an "imperative" to know those meanings. He concluded:

> philosophy is possible . . . because the meanings are first of all actually there; because they are such as our reasons are destined to reproduce; and because the incentive to find them is the call of reality itself. And we add, that as knowledge is one of the objective values of the world, the philosopher's joy in the apprehension of meaning is at the same time a realization of the cosmic nisus toward being known. (3:411–412)

While Hocking rejected the idea that philosophy can proceed by "corporate judgment," distinguishing his view from that of philosophical progress, his claim that things and their meanings are "on the same plane of objectivity" would seem to shift his position closer to something like philosophical progress. If there are objective meanings to be discovered by philosophers, then it stands to reason that philosophy can progress by discovering them and even that philosophers can eventually agree on what they are. Hocking praised disagreement among philosophers not as a desirable end but as a means of reaching agreement.

Yet there is at least one reason for not placing Hocking's address in the category of philosophical progress. I refer to Hocking's claim that values are among the objective "meanings" to be discovered by philosophy. While it is true that the realism underlying philosophical progress assumes that there is an objective reality that can be known, many realists argue that values are excluded from that reality. To them, values are distortions introduced from the side of the inquirer that would have to be discounted before objective reality could be known. This is appropriately consistent with the scientific method that is their model. The central claim of one version of realism is that the nature of objective reality is essentially different from that of human discourse. Hocking showed his idealism by insisting that independent reality consists of the terms of human thought and judgment, namely meaning and value. The fact that his address arguably belongs under at least two categories—philosophical progress and idealism—nicely showcases the direction of the prevailing winds of doctrine, from the idealism of the nineteenth century to an imitation of science-like progress by discovering value-neutral facts.

Besides searching for ways of making philosophy progress and attempting to modernize the idealism of an age that was rapidly passing away, The APA presidents of the 1920s often sought to reconnect philosophy with the ancient quest for practical wisdom. For the most part, however, such presidents wanted philosophers to address social problems rather than proposing what individuals might do to improve their lives. While he does not suggest how philosophy should respond to social problems, pragmatist Ralph Barton Perry (1920–1921) concerned himself with establishing a necessary condition of avoiding social disasters. In "The Appeal to Reason," Perry attempted to provide "a clarification of the status and functions of reason in human affairs." The need for this came

from the "modern denial" of reason, which resulted in "the great calamity which has overtaken European civilization during the last six years," World War I. The war convinced a great many people that "the fortunes of mankind are the work of insidious and catastrophic forces which reason at its best can only witness and helplessly deplore" (3:29). Perry's thesis was that reason can control human behavior, even if that is not always what happens. There was, then, no basis for being so cynical as to think that human beings lack the very requirements of avoiding social catastrophes.

What was the intellectual basis of the "modern denial of reason"? An important contributing factor was a false dichotomy between the purposive and the mechanical side of human nature. This had emerged because of widespread sentimental attachment to purposiveness, which had long been viewed as the single feature distinguishing human beings from animals and "physical nature." Scientists responded by allowing non-scientists to interpret human nature in terms of purposiveness, while focusing their own interpretations exclusively on "the causal nexus of nature" (3:7), concluding that any "'higher' or 'spiritual' processes of man are inefficacious" (3:7). Either human behavior was completely determined by spiritual processes, such as purposes, or its source was completely mechanical in nature. However, it was hard to see how behavior could be controlled by spiritual processes, if such processes were "inefficacious." Perry called the claims of scientists to the effect that reasons and purposes do not control human behavior "absurd and scandalous" (3:10). To him, such claims were contradicted by ordinary experience, which shows that human beings routinely act according to purposes and plans. It is obvious that human behavior is purposive, so "we should not ask ourselves whether reason and purpose control human conduct, but how they control it" (3:10).

To explain how reason controls our behavior, Perry proposed something like a functionalist account of human intelligence, which he defined as establishing "stable and reliable beliefs" through trial and error (3:11). Even critics of reason would likely agree that better understanding of our own behavior often leads to behavior that is less instinctive and more rational. Such a functional account avoids the "absurd" conclusion that purposes and beliefs cannot enter into the determination of human behavior, because they are "spiritual" realities, "[that] are nowhere in mesh with the driving wheels, but simply fan the air" (3:7). It is this that enables Perry to conclude that human behavior can be rational, rather than being a product of "forces which reason . . . can only witness and helplessly deplore."

While there are no recommendations regarding specific social problems in Perry's account of reason, it did allow for the possibility that human beingss will avoid social calamities by relying on reason to determine their actions, even if that is not what we end up doing. On top of viewing philosophy as establishing

the necessary conditions for the possibility of rational behavior, Perry clearly saw the love of wisdom as an activity of reason capable of guiding societies toward the greater good.

A year earlier, in 1922, Edward Scribner Ames (1921–1922) had given an address entitled, "Religious Values and the Practical Absolute," that went even further in the direction of showing how philosophy can address social problems. In religion, Ames saw a powerful ally of "democratic-scientific" (3:88) societies in their quest for moral progress. Between 1900 and 1922, a new understanding of religion had been reached that was largely "functional or behavioristic." The new consensus was that religion is best defined as "an active striving toward the realization of desired ends or felt values" that are "ideal and social in character" (3:81). This suggested that much common ground now existed between religion and science, inasmuch as science aims at improving human life. Moreover, religion had "learned to direct attention to the ideal of democracy, recognizing that this ideal fundamentally involves the qualities of neighborliness and genuine respect and love of fellow man" (3:88). Christianity in particular faced "a new epoch . . . [that] requires that she identify herself completely in spirit and purpose with the highest values of modern democracy and science" (3:89).

This did not mean that religion and science could be friendly at all levels. On the contrary, in its "narrower role" as a "detached reflective investigator" (3:91), science has been "irritating and confusing to the practical spirit of religion" (3:91). Ames analogized science in this mode to "a strenuous physician and surgeon producing a powerful catharsis and amputating limbs and removing organs decadent and useless, or infected by superstition" (3:91). But for religion to be successful in promoting the values of a democratic-scientific society, it would have to work together with science, at least on a practical level. Religion had long operated in the realm of what Ames called "practical absolutes," emerging from the human struggle to survive and flourish in a difficult world. Because success in that struggle demands the ability to act decisively, religious values had to be accepted as absolutes. Now scientific evidence could help identify those values and plans that should be treated as practical absolutes, within an ongoing process of inquiry leading to better "absolutes" (3:92).

For religion, the cost of successfully merging with "the democratic-scientific project" was that it would have to surrender all claims to infallibility and embrace "unreservedly the value of science both in its method and in its results" (3:92). In Ames's opinion, however, their marriage was bound to accelerate moral progress. Science by itself was "already yielding results so encouraging and so full of promise that the projects of expert social engineers are beginning to be thought of as guides to new social values which are genuinely religious" (3:93). The natural next step was that science and religion should be united by their mutual commitment to the greater good of society. This was the vision of

moral progress driven by secular intellectuals with near-religious fervor that was destined to achieve widespread popularity through the efforts of Dewey and other progressives.

Also speaking in 1922, Walter Goodnow Everett (1922–1923), in an address entitled "The Problem of Progress," considered not philosophical progress but moral progress at the level of societies, placing his remarks squarely in the category of reconnecting philosophy with its ancient quest for practical wisdom. Everett's overall purpose was to defend progress as a "working ideal" (3:123). That ideal, he thought, should be "construed primarily as a present fact and achievement, not merely as a hope for the remote future" (3:128). Moreover, its practical objectives ought to be "found in attacking existing evils that thwart and cripple humanity, and in directing creative energy to the enlargement of [humanity's] more immediate meaning and worth" (3:128). To this attention to the present Everett recommended adding a "reasonable concern for the more immediate future" (3:128). Disregarding our obligations to posterity "is usually linked with ignorance, selfishness, and trivial gratification" (3:128).

While "classical idealism" led to the view that morality:

> is made to involve the demand for . . . perfection on the part of finite beings, and because this perfection never is, and never can be, reached in the successive stages of individual and social effort, morality is convicted of inherent contradiction and failure, (3:128)

Everett argued the opposite: "When I listen most attentively to the best voices that speak within me," he explained:

> I find an imperative . . . which bids me seek the good with all my strength, and to have no other will or purpose than that which is dictated by its requirements. But with a clearness equal to that with which I recognize this obligation, I also see that this imperative is neither a requirement nor a pledge of perfection. (3:129)

Even if we are prepared to say that the very notion of progress contains within it "the idea of the perfect," we find that the perfect has "no concrete content" (3:129). It turns out to be "a limiting rather than a defining concept" (3:129). We must not "require the impossible," Everett warned, because that is to "relax our hold on the possible" (3:129).

Everett defined progress as both "the effort to overcome evil" and the discovery and realization of the good "in richer forms and in wider range of meaning" (3:136). But the demand for richer forms and wider meanings of the good did not commit him to an ideal of infinite progress. "To the end," he assured his audience, "death and accident, defeat and suffering will play their part in the drama of existence" (3:137). Nor did he embrace an idealized vision of social

reform, as did others who argued for a rebirth of philosophy as an instrument for improving human life. To Everett, it was "an axiomatic truth" that:

> most movements of social reform are bound to be disappointing. Some single principle or line of advance seems to its advocates to promise a golden era. Evils, however, have a way of reappearing in other forms, because they are grounded in human nature and its environment. (3:138)

However, that does not destroy the value of "genuine experimentation" with respect to the arrangements that constitute societies, recognizing that value would reduce the "danger of assuming that, because customs and institutions have hardened into rigid forms, no others are desirable or possible" (3:138). While not aiming for or expecting perfection, we should do our best to make things incrementally better. Of all the views of philosophy as an engine of moral progress presented in the addresses of the 1920s, Everett's was perhaps the one most in line with common sense and the lessons of ordinary experience.

A common theme in a number of addresses making the case for returning philosophy to its centuries-old search for practical wisdom in the service of society is naturalism. However, while naturalism can be construed in ways that stress human helplessness in a vast, non-human environment, presidents who dealt with naturalism tended to present it as enabling and motivating human effort aimed at the greater good. In "The Emergence of Naturalism," Roy Wood Sellars (1923–1924) referred to "many surprises" that had occurred in philosophy "during the last two decades." The growth of pragmatism and realism were among them, as was the rise of "a more adequate type of naturalism" (3:173).

Sellars was writing in what he viewed as "a period of transition" between "the old view of the world and of man's life and the new which is forming" (3:175). He offered an extended narrative of the gradual emergence and clarification of naturalism since the ancient Greeks. There were plenty of "technical inadequacies" of ancient naturalism, but "the central and admirable feature remains—a clear-eyed, courageous choice of a rational view of things, seen only in part, and yet felt to underlie the vast procession of nature" (3:182). He described "three forces" that "dissolved" the "theological interpretation of the world" after the Middle Ages. These were "change of interest, growth of self-confidence, and increase of knowledge" (3:184). He also distinguished subjective from objective naturalism (3:186). He concluded, "once more the current is setting toward naturalism, but a naturalism with a broader and more thoroughly tested foundation. Once more, then, naturalism is emerging" (3:191).

The trouble with past naturalisms was their "supposedly negative and forbidding atmosphere which has, perhaps, rendered many people desperate adherents of supernaturalism. They have felt themselves hanging over an abyss of mechanical processes which had no relationship to value" (3:192). Thus, the natural-

ism now emerging must be combined with humanism. "It must be humanism which comprehends in the concrete that man's aims and satisfaction are not alien to his environment, but grow from it and secure their meaning from their setting" (3:192). Moreover, until naturalism combines with humanism, naturalism will be "unable to compete with the subtler forms of supernaturalism which people the vast beyond, which eludes our senses with beckoning hands and chants of angels" (3:192).

While not explicitly arguing that moral progress should be increasingly driven by philosophers in search of practical wisdom after the fashion of the ancients, Sellars set the stage for that view by playing up the notion that nature supports human effort. A similar point was made by William James (1906–1907), who argued that if nature does not positively guarantee the eventual triumph of good over evil, we can at least rest assured that it is "congenial" to human purposes. The modest notions of James and Sellars to the effect that whatever the ultimate outcome of human efforts, nature is not openly hostile to them, would lead to much grander visions of what we can expect to accomplish through the use of intelligence, especially in its more articulate forms. Well beyond the 1920s, pragmatists such as Dewey presented human intelligence as nearly unlimited in its potential for improving society.

Another ingredient in the view that driving large-scale moral progress should be the primary mission of philosophers is that there is no sharp division between values and facts. Philosophers' visions of progress are far easier to implement if the facts with which they must work in doing so are not essentially alien to human purposes. Taking up a version of this argument, Edmund Howard Hollands (1924–1925), in "Nature and Spirit," offered a critique of the distinction between facts and values. In his view, values direct us to facts in the first place and even shape the facts or realities to which they lead us. While classical thinkers recognized no difference between objects of knowledge and the subjects knowing them, seeing human beings as fully integrated with the natural world, later theorists tended to posit a division between thinking minds and the world about which those minds did their thinking. To Hollands, this division was "a great cause for the lack of calm and poise, the felt presence of inner conflict and disunion, which has been noticed as distinguishing the temper of the modern man from that exhibited in classical literature" (3:241). It also led to a false theory of how scientific hypotheses arise. They do not issue from impartial minds lacking all internal connection to their objects but flow instead from the interest we naturally take in the world around us.

The notion that interest is somehow at odds with scientific inquiry is one Hollands did not take seriously. On the contrary, all forms of "organized thinking" are undergirded and supported by "immediate feeling and conviction," according to him. Such immediacy is a "normal phase of experience, not to be explained away, of which any adequate philosophy must take account" (3:242).

Mysticism is an easy target for criticism, because one can simply deny that mystical states yield knowledge of the world. However, all the "greater philosophies" with their "great constructive systems" were devised on the basis of some immediate intuition about the direction in which truth lies. Heavyweight philosophers from Plato to Bergson developed their systems from "mystical roots" (3:244). As Hollands indicated, his thesis is nicely captured by a sentence from Plato, who wrote, "the things known not only obtain from the Good their being known, but also their being and their essence" (3:247).

The claim that *what* we know receives from the Good its *being known* is, at most, mild. As interested beings, we are naturally drawn to some facts, while hardly noticing others. Even the stronger claim that objects of knowledge also derive from the Good "their being and their essence" is on the milder side. Our purposes clearly shape what objects are to us. However, while these claims, as stated by Hollands, are not overly strong, that he did not explain their limits left the door open for the extreme view that facts are mostly if not entirely malleable to human intelligence. Such a view obviously favors the notion that above all, philosophers ought to be driving moral progress on a grand scale, since, if that view is true, then little else besides lack of intelligence, imagination, or creativity stands in the way of such progress.

Of the presidents whose addresses directly touched the idea that philosophers should provide the practical wisdom necessary for moral progress, George Rebec's (1925–1926) touch was perhaps the lightest. "Back to the Antinomies" was largely historical and technical, but it managed, if only briefly, to raise the question of the limits of moral progress. Rebec saw contemporary life and thought as shaped largely by the ancient problem of the one and the many. To him, attempts to sort out this problem provided the basic conceptual framework for Western thought, not only in the ancient world, but also during the Middle Ages, the modern period, and up to the time he was writing. The problem of the one and the many is a sort of "antinomy" or "paradox," because its underlying assumption is that somehow the infinite must be present in the finite. For example, abstract thinking requires the use of universals, such as "human" or "good." However, if individual beings are to belong to universal classes, then they must embody the complete forms that designate those classes. It does not make sense to say that a being embodying part of the form of humanity belongs to the "human" class. But if each individual human embodies the complete form of humanity, then the infinite is present in the finite, creating a paradox or antinomy.

Empirically minded philosophers have been content to ignore this problem, focusing instead on the fact that individual beings exist, while also belonging to conceptual classes. There is no need to explain how a relation is possible, if that relation is obviously actual. To them, the fact that the infinite must be present in the finite is an ultimate puzzle that both calls for a solution and cannot be

solved, because all attempts to solve it end up reinstating the original paradox. The greatest philosophical minds, including Plato, recognized that this problem is permanent and honestly admitted as much. Plotinus let on that he knew it was an intractable problem by approaching it through "mystical faith," specifying "the inscrutable infinite as somehow guaranteeing the supremacy of ordered reason, good, and beauty" (3:258), even if human minds remain incapable of understanding how that order is possible.

Rebec's view was that everyday life, in many ways, embodies the paradox of the one and the many, in that we tend to be divided in our basic allegiances, with one foot in the finite world of human effort and the other squarely in a realm of infinite goods. In many ways, Kant was the quintessential philosopher of modernity, because he understood that a human being is "a denizen of two Worlds" (3:261). Like Plato and Plotinus, Kant viewed the paradox of the one and the many as irresolvable. He therefore held, for example, that we should act as if there is an infinite Kingdom of Ends where perfect justice prevails, even if we have no way of knowing for sure whether that is true. Thus, the paradox of the one and the many enables us to understand both the trajectory of Western thought and the human condition itself, which has changed little since ancient times. "The logic of modern life," Rebec declared, "is antinomial" (3:261).

With respect to moral progress, Rebec's address set a trap for those who take seriously the idea that philosophers should concentrate their efforts on leading us to a better world through their insights. The implicit assumption behind that idea is that philosophers are, in fact, capable of doing what it is said they should do. That is a fine assumption, as long as what they should do does not exceed human limits. However, Rebec's suggestion that our allegiance is divided between the finite and the infinite implies that philosophers and those influenced by them should strive for infinite moral progress, regardless whether it is actually achievable. If we really are finite beings, such a strategy can lead us nowhere, except to human tragedy.

Having examined the address of the president whose views on philosophers as agents of moral progress were arguably the least developed, I now turn to those three addresses that exhibit the strongest views of philosophers in the role of society's moral avant-garde. Within that group of three, my account moves from the least to the most ambitious.

The title of Alexander Meiklejohn's (1924–1925) address, "Philosophers and Others," suggests the high esteem in which he held philosophers in relation to non-philosophers. Philosophers are to lead, while the rest of the world follows. Rather than spending their careers talking to each other within the Ivory Tower, philosophers should engage with "the outside word," where the public longs for "learning which shall show the way of life" (3:219). While philosophers should be "disinterested" in at least two ways that Meiklejohn distinguished, they

have an obligation to share their wisdom with others. "Philosophy," Meiklejohn declared, "can save the world; without philosophy, unless philosophers can do their part, our present scheme of human living will go to smash" (3:220).

Meiklejohn's claim, "philosophers must rule" was unambiguous, but he was equally clear that, unlike Plato's philosopher-kings, philosophers should not be given "external authority" (3:225). Their influence should be decisive but in an indirect way. "Philosophers must be rulers," he said, "but rulers of thinking. And the control of thinking is not carried on after the same manner of the control of external affairs" (3:225). The influence of philosophers is rather to be felt through the ways in which they choose to organize intellectual activity within society. However, this does not render their influence less profound than that of Plato's philosopher-kings. On the contrary, what scholars study is a most consequential matter for society, because human flourishing depends largely on their insights. No society can afford to have "much of its intellectual energy . . . fly off into . . . unpractical pursuits" (3:223), much less devoted to "devising machines and practices for . . . wholesale . . . destruction," as commonly occurs during times of war or of military threats. Meiklejohn called on philosophers to take charge of all this by directing scholars to study those matters that are most likely to advance society if they are studied. "I come with a challenge to the philosophers—a demand upon them," he said. "Will you assign to scholars their various tasks? This is your work. It is a work which no one else can do properly. It is a task upon the doing or not-doing of which depends the making or unmaking of our social order" (3:223).

On top of his "challenge," Meiklejohn offered "a program or a fragment of a program" going beyond "abstract recognition of the need of intelligent guidance of thinking" to "concrete and specific action in the face of a very urgent, very critical enterprise in which we human beings are engaged" (3:225). This program started from a set of questions around which philosophers should organize society's intellectual activities. "In a word," he said, "I think that your most urgent duty is to clarify and to direct other thinkers in clarifying that plan for human living which we call Democracy" (3:226). Philosophers are "called upon to become advisers to the many, the intellectual leaders of a great popular venture in the freedom of the human spirit" (3:227). While democracy "in a merely political sense" may be sufficiently simple and clear, democracy as a "scheme of life" needs both clarification and elaboration if society is to improve. The maxim, "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed" seemed to Meiklejohn to "get its force from a passion, a conviction, which lies far deeper than that dictum, and which would remain even if our present political machinery were swept away" (3:227). The fact that this "deeper something" forms the basis of our society and yet "is not formulated, is not understood" is a paradox that only philosophers are equipped to resolve. They

must ensure, "our deepest social impulse" will not be "left blindly to turn upon itself and break itself to pieces" (3:227). They are to give it "eyes to see its goal, to measure its powers, to fix its facts, to chart its course" (3:227).

Short of philosophers holding the reins of "external authority," it is hard to imagine a more central role for them in relation to moral progress than that of devising the social and political arrangements under which all of us should live. Meiklejohn's vision of philosophers as moral leaders and guardians of a "deeper" democracy was restrained only by his insistence that, while defending society's most cherished values, philosophers must also be "disinterested." They must not study for the sake of "prestige and fame and recognition" (3:221), nor bend the truth for their own advantage or that of others (3:222). How anyone engaged in such a high-stakes normative enterprise could be an impartial seeker of truth at the same time was not explained. Also of concern is Meiklejohn's unquestioned assumption that, of all professional people, those in the best position to devise successful social and political arrangements are philosophers.

Although Felix Adler (1928–1929) said considerably less than Meiklejohn did regarding how philosophers might implement his vision of moral progress, in "The Ethical Problem," he set the goal of moral progress infinitely higher. What Adler referred to as the "ethical problem" was nothing less than "reconciling the spiritual equality of man with the inequalities that exist in human society" (3:463). At the heart of this problem was a traditional understanding of "spiritual equality" as a kind of ultimate sameness. That inequalities within society range from unequal status to unequal natural endowments made "reconciling" them with spiritual equality, understood in this traditional sense, a seemingly impossible feat. In place of the old understanding of spiritual equality, Adler offered what he called the "organic ideal" (3:471), which was the notion that all individuals have an equally important role within an infinite metaphysical organism or totality that is at once dynamic and eternally at rest in its own self-fulfilling activity. "One of its immediate corollaries," Adler explained, "is that we must . . . substitute equivalence for equality—equal value of functions, inasmuch as each function and each functionary is indispensable, instead of equality in the sense of sameness" (3:471).

To Adler, the infinite totality presented:

> the spectacle of a meadow on which bloom an endless variety of plants and flowers, or better, because this would be a static picture, . . . [of] a galaxy in which the distinctively colored light of each star is kindled by the diverse rays of the innumerable host of which it is one. (3:474)

He longed for the day "when mankind shall be sufficiently far advanced to consider the different nations of the earth as depositories of special gifts, as func-

tionaries," because "then the foundation of a society of nations will be securely laid" (3:474). While Adler did refer to "the efforts of human society to organize itself after the spiritual pattern" (3:474), he also held that, from the standpoint of eternity, society already conforms to that ideal arrangement. "Thus," he concluded, "both the successes and the failures and frustrations we meet with in the endeavor to organize the finite groups, are experiences that lead us beyond this finite human society to the seeing in mind the infinite society, the multiple godhead" (3:476).

Unlike Meiklejohn, Adler did not explicitly assign the role of moral leadership to philosophers, to whom all "others" looked for guidance. However, he did expressly describe moral progress as an infinite task, implicitly creating moral obligations that no finite being can fulfill. "There is in finite man," he said, "a certain movement toward the infinite." To Adler, the "ideal aim" of ethics was "the perfect organization of personalities." This is where his vision was even bolder than Meiklejohn's. Given Adler's assumption that an infinite totality, in which every finite being has its equally valuable function, already exists, perhaps we do not need to worry about dis-incentivizing moral behavior by placing infinite obligations on finite beings. However, if that assumption proves unfounded, we are left with an ethics that ensures moral failure, creating strong incentives to disregard morality altogether (3:474).

No address of the 1920s expressed a more unqualified commitment to philosophers as moral leaders than Max Carl Otto's (1929–1930) "Meditation on a Hill." Otto viewed most philosophers as hopelessly preoccupied with purely speculative matters of little value to the man or woman in the street in search of the good life. This explained why "very intelligent people" often found philosophy "to be triviality made ponderous" (3:553). Philosophy, Otto declared, had "fail[ed] the common man" (3:554). It is all well and good for philosophers to engage in "sheer intellectual discipline" (3:555), but they must also respond to the "imperative" to lead people to better lives. People of all ages were turning to philosophy in large numbers, "in search of something they feel a deep need of" (3:556). An abundance of social crises called for the attention of philosophers:

> The weakened authority of custom, the spiritual bewilderment prevailing in the general mind, the hope persisting through disillusion, and never more lively in human hearts, that life be somehow shown to have real meaning in spite of superficial appearances to the contrary—all this should prove to be exactly the soil in which philosophy takes root. (3:556)

This was the vision of philosophy that seemed to have originated with James, "who inaugurated the contemporary movement which would transform philosophy from a tangential influence into a powerful social solvent" (3:556).

The vision would prove widely appealing, leading to the politically engaged pragmatism of Dewey and others later in the century. It remains appealing today, as a growing number of philosophers seek to shape public opinion and even directly influence public policy. The vision's appeal derives from a noble egalitarian sentiment that can be expressed as a narrative. At one time, philosophers were privileged experts engaged in rarified intellectual activity. They seemed to sniff at the crude practical problems faced by ordinary people. This went on until those with a conscience began exhorting the rest to put their expertise to work for the greater good of humanity. Their efforts eventually placed philosophers squarely among the people, removing them from the ranks of what might be viewed as a ruling class. From there, philosophers could lead the people to a better future "by making philosophy a *sense of direction* in the midst of life, rather than a *sense of having arrived* in a realm beyond life" (3:556).

However appealing this vision may be, Otto believed that there is danger in assuming that non-philosophers would be lost without philosophers to guide them. No less fraught with risk is the assumption that philosophy "is not solely, nor even primarily, a set of views" (3:557). Philosophers have been a small minority in societies going all the way back to ancient Greece. This is not because all philosophers were privileged, although some were, but because most people take little or no interest in philosophy. They go about their lives blissfully unaware of the problems and perspectives that fascinate philosophers. The notion that masses of people desperately seeking better lives are waiting with bated breath for philosophers to lead them out of their misery tends to reinstate the discredited view of philosophers as members of an elite ruling class, inviting them to behave accordingly.

But suppose that masses of people are, in fact, waiting to be led by philosophers. Are philosophers capable of leading them successfully? To think that they are requires a great stretch of the imagination. No matter how much philosophers want to help the masses, they trade in generalizations that, as generalizations, necessarily fail to account for the innumerable specific details that determine the predicaments of individuals. Because philosophers receive broad training as thinkers, not as empirical investigators, their products cannot be more than "a set of views." Some non-philosophers may find those views invaluable in their quest for the good life, but philosophers must leave it to them to decide how they apply. Philosophers may address concrete matters in ways that are helpful, but they can do so only by invoking abstractions. Within the framework of philosophers as moral leaders, to think otherwise is to risk making policy recommendations or passing legislation formed without reference to countless relevant details.

The philosophical trends set in motion during the 1920s continue to this day. While absolute idealism has lost most of the popularity it enjoyed a hun-

dred and more years ago, weaker versions of idealism abound. From theories claiming that values inhere in things, to the view that successful scientific predictions suggest a world consisting of logical or mathematical relations, the conservative tendencies that shaped philosophy during the 1920s remain alive. The notion that philosophy can progress by discovering new truths is one that many philosophers deeply engaged in current technical controversies hold dear. But the growing trend in professional philosophy is a version of the view, also growing rapidly during the 1920s, that the central mission of philosophy is to furnish practical wisdom capable of driving moral progress at the social level. An increasing number of philosophers, whether "analytic," "continental," or "American" in their orientation, see philosophy as a powerful weapon in the social and political struggles of the day. To them, the morally best society would be one in which, to quote Meiklejohn, "philosophers must rule" (3:223–224).

I have already suggested why, given the high level of generality at which philosophical discourse necessarily proceeds, this view is potentially dangerous. However, why there is a natural bias that tends to lead philosophers to this view still needs to be explained if that bias is ever to be exposed and corrected. When professionals of all kinds achieve mastery of their medium, their work becomes second nature, to the point where they are likely to forget that any medium exists between their input and the results of their efforts. This phenomenon is visible in medicine, when physicians, often with the best of intentions, are too quick to dismiss the stated preferences of their patients for courses of action that conflict with their professional judgment. They have seen so many similar cases that they almost forget that a unique individual exists between their actions and the consequences that flow from them. Something like this happens to philosophers, with the difference being that their medium is not human beings but concepts and words.

Philosophers are verbal virtuosos, capable of drawing the finest of distinctions and clarifying subtlest shades of meaning. Yet the fact that they have mastered their medium means they are less likely to notice that it exists. The result is that all philosophy has an idealistic bias. Philosophers who once intended to describe the world end up by describing only ideas. Having mastered their medium, they lose awareness of the fact that their work is mediated.

This idealistic bias is the common thread uniting the three philosophical trends herein distinguished. The idealism of the 1920s and before was largely a verbal edifice that substituted concepts for existing realities. Philosophical progress, while it did posit an independent reality with features upon which philosophers could potentially agree, depended on a form of direct realism that failed to distinguish immediacies—i.e., ideal objects—from the ontological realities they presumably signify. More troubling, because of its far-reaching practical ambitions, the movement that seeks to establish philosophy as an engine of so-

cial reform often fails to observe the gap between ideas and the existing world they describe. While ideas may be qualitatively complex, the world of facts is quantitatively much vaster than the most sophisticated system of ideas is complex. If philosophers forget, as they are likely to, that their always conceptual products describe something essentially non-conceptual, the result will be ideas that look and sound good but which may lead, if implemented, to unforeseen negative consequences, whether as legislation, as regulations, or as broad public policy.

I do not mean to suggest that philosophy is not in a position to contribute to moral progress. On the contrary, extended reflection on human values that proceeds by drawing precise distinctions can shed much-needed light on moral problems that would otherwise fester in the dark. However, rather than seek to reform society, philosophy should aim to enable individuals to think clearly for themselves. Some students of philosophy will go on to influential positions where, hopefully, they will look for unbiased empirical confirmation of their ideas. Those that go elsewhere will at least have the wherewithal to persuade others that possibly there are better ways of doing things. Finally, all who come in contact with philosophy will be in a position to enjoy richer, more meaningful lives, itself a form of moral progress.

The APA presidents of the 1920s who called for philosophy to renew its ancient commitment to practical wisdom were fundamentally right in thinking that philosophy can leave us better off than we were before. If there is one enduring legacy of the 1920s, I hope this is it.

Notes

1. James Campbell, *A Thoughtful Profession* (Chicago: Open Court, 2006), p. 12.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
3. Ibid., pp. 35–37.
4. Ibid., pp. 165–180.
5. Published as *The World and the Individual; Gifford Lectures Delivered before the University of Aberdeen*. 1st Series: The Four Historical Conceptions of Being (New York: Macmillan, 1899); and *The World and the Individual; Gifford Lectures Delivered before the University of Aberdeen*. 2nd Series: Nature, Man, and the Moral Order (New York: Macmillan, 1901).

PHILOSOPHY IN THE AGE OF FASCISM: REFLECTIONS ON THE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES OF THE APA, 1931–1940

Brian G. Henning

1. Introduction

The opportunity to read and reflect on *Presidential Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 1931–1940*, the fourth volume of the American Philosophical Association Centennial Series, has been in equal measures rewarding, humbling, and taxing. Having recently completed my own edited volume of presidential addresses of another philosophical society, I have been thoroughly disabused of the notion that there is any particular form or content that defines a philosophical presidential address.[1]

As Edward Gleason Spaulding (1932–1933) aptly described the matter in his address entitled, "Freedom, Necessity, and Mind":

> they do not conform to any type or norm; some are general, others are specific; some are confessions of faith, others, of doubt; some ask, What is philosophy about?, others, What about philosophy? Their titles and subject-matter are various, their conclusions manifold. Evidently a presidential address before this Association may be about almost anything, provided it is philosophical, whatever one may mean by this term (and it means different things to different philosophers), so that really there is a large range of possibilities before a president who is in search of a topic, for topics are not in search of presidents. (4:159)

Perhaps it should not be surprising that the topics of the addresses are as varied as the field that they represent. The addresses of the 1930s ranged from aesthetics, science, ethics, and political theory to epistemology, metaphysics, and religion. Nevertheless, I have endeavored to impose some order on the collection, grouping them into six rough divisions, primarily by their similarity of subject matter or methodology.

The first group focused on the ongoing debate between idealism and realism, with more representation from the latter than the former. The second group includes eight addresses that are similar because to some degree, they address classical figures and ideas in the pragmatist tradition. The third section comprises two essays on personalism. The fourth section considers the addresses of Clarence Irving Lewis (1933–1934; 1954–1955) and Alfred North Whitehead

(1931–1932). Although one could justify locating them in either the first or second sections, given that the work of Lewis and Whitehead have had the most enduring and significant impact on subsequent thought, it seems appropriate to consider them separately. The fifth section examines six addresses that are similar in that they are all concerned with examining the scope, purpose, and value of philosophy itself. The sixth and final group of addresses is defined not by their philosophical commitments, but their discussion of the growing threat of totalitarian Fascism in Europe and the Pacific. Historically, I found those in this group to be most interesting in that they provide a window into the depth of the existential and philosophical threat posed by fascist ideology of the 1930s.

Before turning to the first group, I would like briefly to consider four addresses that do not neatly fit within the other divisions. The first is by Matthew Thompson McClure Jr. (1932–1933), who delivered "The Greek Conception of Nature." In many ways, this address might be seen as a doggedly scholastic attempt to defend an Aristotelian conception of nature in the face of an ever-more-reductionist scientific materialism. The characterization is not wholly inapt. Yet, in arguing against modern dualism and for a recognition of the teleological character of life, McClure was, in a sense, making claims quite similar to those defended by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James (1906–1907), John Dewey (1905–1906), Henri Bergson, and Whitehead.

Charles Bruce Vibbert (1934–1935) was elected, but, due to illness, was unable to serve. In the absence of a presidential address, his essay "The Perception of Movement in the Philosophies of Descartes and Bergson," included in Volume 4, focused on two points: "(1) How we know motion; and (2) What the movement so known is" (4:315–316).

George Holland Sabine's (1938–1939) "Logic and Social Studies," is unlike many in its cohort in that Sabine's expertise and interests were in the area of political theory. While certainly an important and long-standing area of study for philosophers, the investigation appears more peripheral, especially given the world events of the late 1930s. Jay William Hudson's (1938–1939) address, "Recent Shifts in Ethical Theory and Practice," was also unusual in that it considered ethical theory and practice as revealed through ethics textbooks.

2. Debates in Epistemology—Idealism and Realism

I will consider Gustavus Watts Cunningham's (1930–1931; 1937–1938) two addresses together. "On the Second Copernican Revolution in Philosophy" is relatively unusual in that it was largely a response to "Meditation on a Hill," which was the address delivered by his predecessor, Max Carl Otto (1929–1930). Otto had apparently alluded to James and Dewey in defense of the view that traditional philosophers have not been sufficiently concerned with issues concerning

"a philosophy of life" (4:22) and against the "spectator theory" of knowledge (4:24). Cunningham found little in Otto's address to justify this accusation (4:35). On the contrary, he contended that pragmatists should not reduce philosophy to "a philosophy of life" and that "the philosopher cannot in the end escape ontological issues" (4:35–36).

In Cunningham's "Meaning, Reference, and Significance," he claimed that at least four types of "meaning-situations" can be identified: "the conventional, the linguistic, the postulational, and the existential" (4:480). He asserted, "all of our reasoning, so far at least as it proceeds through the medium of referential meaning-situations, aims at the clarification of points of view centering around what occasionally is in reference" (4:481–482).

Spaulding began "Freedom, Necessity, and Mind" with a defense of his decision not to examine "what the rôle of philosophy should be in the present economic, social, and political crisis, or any other immediately practical question" (4:159). After all, he delivered his address at a time when nearly one in four American workers was unemployed. Though he granted that philosophy should and does speak to "practical aspects of life," he argued that the philosopher has "a still more important function than this, and that is to be thoroughly impractical" (4:159). I take Spaulding's point to be that philosophers should resist the urge to reduce philosophy's worth to its practical important. I will return to this question in the section that addresses the scope, purpose, and value of philosophy itself.

Spaulding was a member of the New Realists, who were opposed the monism of the absolute idealists and the relativism of the pragmatists (4:157). Central to their position was the rejection of John Locke's secondary qualities, returning to something closer to classical Aristotelian realism, in which qualities are not contributed by consciousness but are "out there" in the world.

Spaulding's "Freedom, Necessity, and Mind," represented the New Realists' interest in epistemology and its intersection with developments in science, in this case, Werner Karl Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy,[2] which had been formulated less than a decade earlier and which was a subject of much interest. Although Spaulding noted that his comments went far beyond the principle of indeterminacy, it does provide an interesting context for an otherwise classical philosophical topic. His main thesis went beyond Heisenberg to argue:

> Mind is correlative with the fact in the universe of what I call Disclosure; that, further, whether there is consciousness or not, *there is* Disclosure, i.e., that Disclosure is logically prior to consciousness, the assumption of consciousness being but one possible hypothesis to explain Disclosure; and, finally, that, from the evolutionary point of view, Disclosure has emerged as a function of Freedom, but that, in relation to what precedes it, it is *contingent*. (4:187)

The full meaning of this position is only partially revealed; that is, Spaulding arrived at this conclusion, but had insufficient space to fully defend it. However, in fairness, in a presidential address to one's peers, perhaps being provocative and interesting is more asset than liability.

John Elof Boodin (1912–1913; 1933–1934) "sought to preserve the tradition of philosophical idealism from Plato to [Josiah] Royce [(1903–1904)] within the contemporary framework of science" (2:97). However, even an idealist such as Boodin felt compelled to label his address "Functional Realism," which, he says, traces its lineage "back to Protagoras" (4:235).

Naïve or direct realism, according to Boodin, holds that the qualities and relations that we sense exist in objective nature just as we perceive them, while critical realism holds that the qualities and relations that we sense are mostly due to the percipient and therefore do not exist objectively in nature. He defended a functional realism, wherein "the qualities and relations which we perceive are functions of objective nature and the percipient organism in perspective relation to one another" (4:235). Functional realism is Boodin's attempt to conceive of the knower's relationship to its world given that science has revealed that human knowers are emergent from a cosmic process, not separate from it. Thus, he explained:

> functional realism holds in common with present science that the bifurcation of thing and environment is vicious, that things exist only in fields, in mutuality with other things, and that they have properties only in their dynamic interrelations. (4:236)

The knower is always already embedded and entangled within the field of nature that is the object of investigation.

3. Pragmatism in the 1930s

As a group, the single largest philosophical trend within addresses of the 1930s was the pragmatism of Peirce, James, Royce, and Dewey. Although all of the addresses focused interest on their own projects, the underlying vestiges of these pragmatist giants are clear in nearly a third of the presidential addresses delivered during the 1930s.

"On a Possible Science of Religion," the address given by Edgar Arthur Singer Jr. (1930–1931), is heavily indebted to James in its approach to religion, though it ultimately plots its own course:

> To many a thoughtful man of this day, the only science worthy to be called a science of religion is one better called a psychology of religious expres-

> sion. To some of us, however, the possibility remains open that our fathers undertook no meaningless task in attempting to establish by science the truth of certain religious propositions: the proposition "God is," together with its practical implications. (4:3)

Although on its face, this passage seems to embrace the mantle of the medieval scholastic, that impression was quickly dispelled when Singer went on to explain his understanding, "a man's *God* is whatever end that man has accepted as the supreme end of his living" (4:3). If I understand Singer correctly, it would seem that his conception of religion is better understood as a teleological ethics. Though rather opaquely, Singer ultimately comes to the conclusion, "God, an *Idee*, ought to be pursued as life's supreme and ultimate end" (4:12).

Although Jacob Loewenberg (1930–1931) read unpublished manuscripts of Hegel while he was in Berlin under the influence of Royce, he came to see Hegel's excesses and to develop what he called "problematic realism."[3] However, as the title of his presidential address, "*De Angelis*," indicates, the topic of his address was quite different. Availing himself of the "complete liberty" in the choice of topics given to presidents, Loewenberg scrutinized what he called the "angelic method" in philosophy, which is but another name for what Dewey called the "spectator theory of knowledge" (4:51):

> The phrase expresses with perfect precision the mission of traditional metaphysics. That mission consists in overcoming and supplanting the merely human view of things. . . . And in so far as they succeed in transcending the human perspective and contemplate reality from the point of view of a supposed superior being in full possession of truth, philosophers not only anticipate but actually embody the angelic nature. They have, in fact, become as angels. (4:52)

Thus, to a large degree, Loewenberg's address was an extended criticism of what he perceived to be the excesses of traditional metaphysicians who are like "recording angel[s], noting and describing the real as it compellingly reveals itself to his infallible vision" (4:54). In this method, he dramatically concluded, "lies the glory and the pathos of the philosophic enterprise" (4:61).

Like Spaulding's "Freedom, Necessity, and Mind," William Briggs Savery's (1931–1932) "Chance and Cosmogony" was partially inspired by Heisenberg's groundbreaking work in physics. Savery's task was to explore the philosophical significance of chance (*tyche*; from the Greek god of fortune), using the work of the philosopher who takes chance more seriously than most: Peirce. Savery defended chance, not as a *vera causa* or as an entity, but as "the absence of determination" (4:110):

> My theses are as follows: (1) The world is contingent, undetermined by necessity. (2) The probability is that it is undetermined by efficient causes, entirely at the beginning, and partially after the beginning. (3) The world as a whole is undetermined by final causes. In this sense, also, it is chance. (4) The method that we must use to explore the world is the method of probability, which is itself a doctrine of chances. (4:110)

Though science now continues to be dominated by chance more than ever, the ontological significance of this indeterminacy is still too often lost on scientists and philosophers alike. Savery was right to note, "Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty is here the all-important piece of evidence, and at last we seem to have an empirical verification of the *tychism* of Charles Peirce" (4:105).

David Wight Prall's (1937–1938) "Knowledge as Aptness of the Body" presented a dramatic counterpoint to the rationalist tendencies within the Western philosophical tradition. Rather than seeing reason, thought, and knowledge as the special functions of a unique faculty, Prall defended the claim, "knowing is the aptness of the body to specific motions in response to particular complexes of data" (4:506). Upon reading his systematic defense of this claim, one may recall the similar position taken by Maurice Merleau-Ponty.[4] However, it is more appropriate to regard Prall's view as a species of behaviorism, which was ascendant during this time:

> "Knowledge" is the word that men invented as a label for just what *is* learned; that what is learned is aptness of the body in response and nothing else, and that this process, which is carried out largely unconsciously for the most important kinds of learning, is the inculcation of a habit without which, fully formed and completely dominating our whole behavior as organisms, we should not be alive at all. (4:507)

What I find most intriguing are the concluding lines of Prall's address, where, regarding the behaviorist position he had been defending, he said:

> It has been developed by some of the most brilliant and most learned of modern psychologists. And it is the natural heritage of every American student of philosophy who has not been completely immunized to the thought of Peirce and James and Dewey. (4:508)

Given that Peirce, James, and Dewey are not normally seen as behaviorists, the extent to which the understanding of the pragmatist tradition was still in flux during the 1930s is quite revealing. We will see this in James Bissett Pratt's (1935–1936) address as well (discussed below). Surely this characterization

might be apt to some degree, but to assert it without defense, as Prall does, implies that it was too obvious to require further explanation. It is interesting to see the extent to which the pragmatist tradition has changed over time.

Harold Chapman Brown's (1924–1925; 1932–1933) "Mind—An Event in Physical Nature," reflected his lifelong interest in the philosophy of science. He noted that history presents two different accounts of the development of mind: those that conceive of mind as a sort of directive force or energy (what he calls the "Aristotelian-Hegelian" tradition, of which he sees Bergson and Whitehead as exemplars) and the "materialistic tradition" of Democritus, Lucretius, and Hobbes (4:135–136).

Brown ultimately rejected both the panexperientialist and the physicalist traditions in the philosophy of mind. He argued that, by conceiving of all reality as process or as an energy, the panexperientialist makes of the world something of a "cheshire grin":

> He abstracts process from stuff as we might abstract a grin from a face. If the face vanished existentially, however, leaving only the grin, we should comment with Alice, "Well! I've often seen a cat without a grin, but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life!" So is a world of mere energy. (4:136)

He was no less critical of the materialists:

> on the other hand, to follow the other alternative and accept the term "mind" as denoting an hypostasis merely, is philosophically to follow the radical behaviorists and admit that "we find no mind in our laboratories." (4:136)

The position he defended is that mind is:

> a highly organized [process] in certain physicological structures when their significance is attached to their qualitied aspect. . . . Mind is the name we give to a distinguishable set of such properties in human organisms when those processes are interpreted by the qualitied aspects of the structures involved. (4:147–148)

Though space constraints allow me to do no more than merely stipulate the claim here, this, it seems to me, is closer to Whitehead's position than Brown appears to have recognized. His flippant dismissal of Whitehead seems to be infected with concerns of vitalism, which is common among those who have not sufficiently understood Whitehead's system. However, Whitehead could have agreed with Brown's conclusion:

> The thesis I wish to maintain is that the processes of human life, men's love and hate, their aspirations and their despair, their reachings out for truth, beauty, and goodness, are all the working out of this fundamental characteristic of very complex organisms, the processes of the internal structure of which require subtle coördinations and recoördinations, if they are to maintain themselves in a varying environment. (4:149–150)

Deeply influenced by James, with whom he studied at Harvard while preparing his dissertation, Pratt was not satisfied with the status of the debates between idealists and realists. However, he was not satisfied with Spaulding and the New Realists' attempts to resolve these conflicts either. Along with philosophers such as Durant Drake, Arthur (Schauffler) Oncken Lovejoy (1908–1909; 1916–1917), George Santayana, and Roy Wood Sellars (1923–1924), Pratt ultimately advocated for what he called "Critical Realism."[5]

Pratt's "The Present Status of the Mind-Body Problem," is a wonderful time capsule, providing in a tidy package the state of the perennial question as to the relation of the mind and the body. His concern, as his title implies, was not to solve the mind-body problem, but to capture the state of the debate. The thrust of his thesis, insofar as there is a positive one, is that he understood, but found misguided, the rejection of interactionism in favor of naturalism (4:385). Unfortunately, his position was more assertion than argument. This address is a helpful reminder that the debates over naturalism and philosophy of mind are not new, but have been actively raging for more than three-quarters of a century.

John Dashiell Stoops (1933–1934) was, at the time of his presidency, among the few remaining students of James and Royce, but Neal W. Klausner wrote that "his real intellectual companion was Dewey, to whom he dedicated his first book." (4:260). Stoops's affinity for Dewey can be seen in his "Society and the Subjective Mind," in which he defended a conception of mind as a product of "emergent evolution" against the materialists and dualists of his day (4:264). Stoops rejected the reductive excesses of the mechanistic materialists who eliminate the "inner side" of organisms (4:264). Though they retain and even revere the subject, he also rejected the rationalism of the dualists who fail to account for a dynamic nature that is able to give birth to life and mind.

Stoops not only discussed the emergent evolution of subjective mind, but also argued against the deeply ingrained individualism of much of the Western tradition. In keeping with Dewey's conception of the fundamentally social nature of the individual, Stoops defended the "subjective mind," and the "social mind," which is "the outgrowth of a control of environment" (4:271). For him, mind is the emergent product of a social organism interacting with its environment. Thus, like Peirce, James, Whitehead, and Dewey, he rejected both the necessitarianism of the mechanist and the bifurcation of the dualist:

> The mind as subjective is not a reality outside of nature or independent of nature; it is that phase of nature herself in which institutions and natural events are consciously undergoing a revision, a reorganization. . . . This view of the subjective implies that mind is a phase of a larger world of society. (4:274)

To many contemporary pragmatists, Charles William Morris (1936–1937) might seem to be unusual in that he sought to illustrate and defend the continuity between George Herbert Mead's (1916–1917) work and that of the logical positivists.[6] His address, "Peirce, Mead, and Pragmatism," is a solid, but unexceptional discussion of the points of connection between the work of Peirce and Mead. He began by noting that there seem to be more points of divergence than convergence between the two. One of the things I appreciate about Morris's exposition, taken from a historical viewpoint, is that it provides a window into the excitement and energy around the work of the pragmatists in the early decades of the twentieth century. Although he did not defend the thesis, he claimed:

> It becomes clearer than ever before that there is a sustained unity to the pragmatic movement. Pragmatism reveals itself in all its phases as a series of constantly deepening analyses of a single set of theses. The differences between the leading representatives are primarily variations on a common theme, variations in part dictated by differences in fields of interest and application. There are genuine differences to be sure, but these too are often merely differences as to the permissible range of extension of a doctrine otherwise held in common. Pragmatism comes thus to take on an integrated character. (4:451)
>
> One has the sense of a complex philosophic tapestry which has been woven through coöperative enterprise. The movement has in our day achieved something of an esthetic culmination, like a fine conversation which has worked itself out to its natural termination. (4:451–452)

It is important to note, however, that this claim came from the perspective of someone who was similarly interested in demonstrating that logical positivism (logical empiricism) and pragmatism are "different emphases within a common movement" (4:463). In this way, Morris's work is quite similar to Lewis's, whose presidential address we will also consider.

4. Personalism

Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1936–1937) is most associated with what came to be known as Boston personalism. His personalism was heavily indebted to the

thought of Borden Parker Bowne, who emphasized the importance of personality and self-identity in his "personalistic idealism and theism" (4:407). Taking Bowne's work as his starting point, Brightman developed an unorthodox view of God as a self-limited being:

> For Brightman the person was an irreducible, complex unity of active consciousness, self-identifying rather than unchangingly identical. The Cosmic Person, then, if he is indeed immanent in a changing world, cannot be unchanging. . . . Brightman concluded that God cannot be considered both omnipotent and omnibenevolent in light of the suffering evident in the evolution of both species and person. (Bertocci, cited 4:407)

Some of this finitistic theism can be seen in Brightman's address, "An Empirical Approach to God." He began by defending the appropriateness of the topic of his address, noting, "many academic Americans seemed to Norman Kemp Smith to view it as 'no longer worthy even of debate.'" (4:411). If this were true in 1936, it is likely even more true today.[7]

The question that Brightman's address sought to answer is ancient in its pedigree, but unorthodox in its solution: "Is verification of the idea of God possible?" (4:412). Similar to Aristotle's claim in the opening book of *Nicomachean Ethics*, that one can only expect the level of precision appropriate to the subject matter under study, Brightman argued that verification is relative to the object of study:

> Confusion between the kind of verification possible in physiology and that possible in psychology gave rise to extreme behaviorism. It is reasonable to infer that the verification of a metaphysical proposition would in some respects differ from verification in any one of the special sciences. To derive a concept of verification from one field and to clamp it down on all fields is, even when baptized by the sacred name of scientific method, not method, but methodological dogmatism, or methodological chaos. After all, the nature and limits of verification are determined by the nature and limits of the field of investigation. (4:413)

Given this account of the type of verification that is relevant to his metaphysical question, Brightman moved on to consider what we mean by the idea of God. Whereas classical theology asserts or assumes that the conception of the divine must necessarily imply traits such as omnipotence and omniscience, Brightman believed that the idea of God was "undergoing evolution" (4:415). Nevertheless, he found sufficient agreement to form something of a tentative account of what the idea of God might entail:

> (1) the belief that there is a unified, objective *summum bonum* [highest good] or supreme value, either as an actual realized being or as a cosmic goal for future realization; (2) the belief that this *summum bonum* is not only final, but efficient, so that in some sense it controls or dominates cosmic process; (3) the belief that the final and efficient aspects are best conceived together by thinking God as a cosmic mind, a rational, purposive experient. Accordingly, God is a supreme cosmic experient, controlling cosmic process, for an end of the highest possible value. (4:415)

Given this basic idea of God, Brightman asked whether any reason exists to suppose that such a being is real. He rejected the ontological arguments of Anselm and Descartes, contending that they are all too infected by the classical notion of God as omnipotent. In place of these metaphysical arguments for the existence of the divine, Brightman proposed "a genuinely empirical approach." It is empirical not, of course, in the reductive sense of Hume or his materialist heirs, but a radical empiricism in the tradition of James (4:416–417).

Given this empirical approach to the idea of God, Brightman concluded, "empirical thinkers may well find a finite God to be the most comprehensive hypothesis for the interpretation of all the facts" (4:426). This unique form of personalist Christian theology never became dominant, but it did make another appearance two years later in Ralph Tyler Flewelling's (1938–1939) address, "Three Windows into Reality."

Flewelling represented a diminishing philosophical trend in the 1930s, which opposed the growing dominance of positivism and which would become analytic philosophy. Against it, he defended a broadly humanistic, theistic personalism, consistent with his serving for nearly forty years (1920–1959) as the founding editor of the journal *The Personalist* (4:564).

5. Whitehead and Lewis: Major Figures of the 1930s Who Influenced Subsequent Philosophy

With the 1925 publishing of his Lowell Lectures, *Science and the Modern World*, Whitehead made quite a splash soon after his arrival at Harvard in 1924 (4:66).[8] However, his 1927–1928 Gifford Lectures, published in 1929 as *Process and Reality*, were dauntingly difficult to read and received a mixed reaction.[9] Drawing from his work in science and mathematics, he sought to construct a grand metaphysical system that did justice to the insights of evolutionary biology, relativity theory, and quantum mechanics. Though it was similar in its ambitions to earlier metaphysical system builders, such as Kant, Leibniz, and Hegel, it was noticeably different in rejecting the modern metaphysical project of seeking a closed system of apodictic truths. In this way, Whitehead attempted to frame a

new way of doing metaphysics that recognizes it as a "hypothesis" that must be continually revised.

This fallibilistic approach to metaphysics is quite unusual compared to the standard of modern metaphysics, but it makes sense relative to the pragmatist bent of the early twentieth century. Although Whitehead developed his ideas in Britain, independent of the classical American tradition, he consistently and approvingly made mention of the similarity of his thought to his American cousins. Like Peirce, James, and Dewey, Whitehead rejected dualism in favor of a panorganicism or panexperientialism.

Like some of the other pragmatists, particularly Peirce, Whitehead cannot be neatly put into either the empiricist or idealist camps. Whitehead's own solution to the impasse between the two warring camps was, as he put it in his Gifford Lectures, the "transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis."[10] As George R. Lucas has put it:

> In fact, we will now observe that this task [of transformation] had already been accomplished (albeit inadvertently) by the realists themselves. Whitehead's philosophy seemed, at the time, grounded in the more recent developments in relativity theory and quantum mechanics, and also seemed compatible in the main with the positions of the leading evolutionary cosmologists. As a result, later critical realists, deeply frustrated by the abject failure of their own efforts, saw in Whitehead's speculative system the last and best hope for the salvation of their own philosophic endeavor.[11]

Whitehead's presidential address, "Objects and Subjects," provided a window into his complex process metaphysics.[12] One of his most significant contributions to twentieth-century thought, his repudiation of the notion of "valueless, vacuous actuality, had previously been published in *The Function of Reason*."[13] Reality is not a closed system of passive, inert, lifeless bits that are brought into external relations by absolute and unflinching laws of nature. Ours is an open ended, processive cosmos, a creative becoming of vibratory vectors of energy defined by mutual dependence and interrelation.

For Whitehead, Western thought too often proceeded under the assumption that human subjects are fundamentally different than, an exception to, the rest of reality. "Experience" had been interpreted narrowly to refer to an active knowing subject surveying a world of passive objects. As Whitehead noted in his address, no topic has "suffered more" at the hands of philosophers than the subject-object relation (4:71). Though our unavoidable seat of experience, we should reject Descartes's invitation to take the thinking subject as ontologically basic. Whereas Descartes takes the thinker to be creating the occasional thought, Whitehead's philosophy of organism "inverts the order, and conceives the

thought as a constituent operation in the creation of the occasional thinker. The thinker is the final end whereby there is the thought."[14] Consciousness and thought are undeniably important, but are late-stage, high-grade forms of experience; they are not ontologically basic. In his address, Whitehead argued:

> I contend that the notion of mere knowledge is a high abstraction, and that conscious discrimination itself is a variable factor only present in the more elaborate examples of occasions of experience. The basis of experience is emotional. Stated more generally, the basic fact is the rise of an affective tone originating from things whose relevance is given. (4:71)

By reducing the subject-object relation to the knower-known relation, philosophers are in danger of committing what Whitehead called the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness."[15] Too many thinkers proceed under the assumption that their abstract formulations, whether linguistic or mathematical, can, in principle, adequately characterize reality. Whitehead argued that although language is an essential tool for thought:

> Thus in philosophy linguistic discussion is a tool, but should never be a master. Language is imperfect both in its words and in its forms. Thus we discover two main errors to which philosophic method is liable, one is the uncritical trust in the adequacy of language, and the other is the uncritical trust in the strained attitude of introspection as the basis for epistemology.[16]

Language, however, will always fall short:

> Words and phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign to their ordinary usage; and however such elements of language be stabilized as technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap.[17]

It is perhaps for this reason that Whitehead often returned to poets, whose rich use of metaphor captures a greater share of the texture of reality than the mathematically precise, but necessarily reductive, accounts of scientists.[18] Thus, with Wordsworth, Whitehead believed that too often, "we murder to dissect."[19] Simplification and reduction are useful, but we must not forget they are necessarily partial formulations, abstractions standing in place of concrete reality. We do great violence to reality when we mistake an abstraction for what is concrete.

For Whitehead, part of the problem with taking the knower-known relationship as fundamental is that it fails to adequately represent the *constitutive* nature of relations. Knowing is always at arm's length, as it were; a subject *has*

knowledge of the object. Cognitive relations are external to the subject; they do not affect or constitute what the subject is. I can intellectually *understand* what joy is—I can have knowledge of it—but that does not *make* me joyful. Feelings, on the other hand, are internal and constitutive. When I am fearful or angry, it is not a sterile cognitive state. I do not *have* anger, or *know* anger, I *am* angry. It is part of what I am at that moment. It is this sense of internal, constitutive relatedness that Whitehead had in mind in arguing in "Objects and Subjects" that "the basis of experience is emotional" (4:71). Indeed, elsewhere, Whitehead went so far as to suggest that his "philosophy of organism" could be seen as a sort of "critique of pure feeling" analogous to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.[20] To capture this insight, Whitehead argued that it is not "comprehension" that is the most basic form of relation, but "prehension," from the Latin root "to grasp." He held that prehension is the most basic form of relation between individuals (4:72).

According to Whitehead's "philosophy of organism," the most basic form of relation is not a subject that *has* knowledge of an object, but a subject that comes to *be* by being affected by another—other subject-superjects, to be precise. It is in this context that I understand Whitehead's appeal to the Quaker notion of "concern": "the occasion as subject has a 'concern' for the object" (4:71). What Whitehead was after is the "affective tone" that comes with concern:

> It must be distinctly understood that no prehension, even of bare sense, can be divested of its affective tone, that is to say, of its character of a "concern" in the Quaker sense. Concernedness is of the essence of perception. (4:75)

Following Plato's *Sophist*, Whitehead recognized that to exist is to affect and be affected (4:74). The most fundamental relations are constitutive; the object affects, gets inside the subject. Similarly, in *Science and the Modern World*, Whitehead asserted: "the position here maintained is that the relationships of an event are internal, so far as concerns the event itself; that is to say, that they are constitutive of what the event is in itself."[21] The world is not composed of static subjects that *have* relations. Rather, each dynamic subject *is* its relations. Importantly, this view utterly rejects the invidious dualism that bifurcates the world into subjects and objects. Instead, according to this view, "subject and object are relative terms" (4:72). Every individual is at once a subjective unification of experience *and* an object for others; it is a subject-superject. Whitehead asserted:

> This is the doctrine of the emergent unity of the superject. An actual entity is to be conceived both as a subject presiding over its own immediacy of becoming, and a superject which is the atomic creature exercising its function of objective immortality. It has become a "being"; and it belongs to the nature of every "being" that it is a potential for every "becoming."[22]

> The subject, thus constituted, is the autonomous master of its own concrescence into subject-superject. It passes from a subjective aim in concrescence into a superject with objective immortality. At any state it is subject-superject.[23]

This is the most basic characterization of actuality. "The oneness of the universe, and the oneness of each element in the universe, repeat themselves to the crack of doom in the creative advance from creature to creature."[24]

Notice that on this view, not only is subjectivity not best understood in cognitive terms, it is also not limited to human beings. *Every* energetic pulse of reality is a subjective center of experience. Subjectivity is not limited to human knowers; it reaches into the deepest depths of reality. "Apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness."[25] This unique form of pansubjectivism washes away the final vestiges of dualism, irrevocably reshaping the contours of the philosophical landscape.

Unfortunately, Whitehead's metaphysical system, what he called the "philosophy of organism," was born in the wrong season. The winds of philosophical interest shifted from his complex philosophy of organism to logical positivism and its attack on metaphysics of every stripe. Although logical empiricism ultimately fades from interest, the appetite for metaphysical system building does not return. Indeed, even when the great interest in metaphysics returns to the American academy in the closing decades of the twentieth century, it has been declawed of its systematic tendencies, content with description.

Among the presidents of the 1930s, Lewis has perhaps most significantly affected the trajectory of subsequent philosophical thought. From his pioneering work in modern modal logic,[26] he was instrumental in the rise of analytic philosophy, which came to dominate academic philosophy for the latter half of the twentieth century. He defended several propositions that have come to define the analytic project: (1) a sharp analytic/synthetic, a priori/a posteriori distinction; (2) reductionism concerning the meaning of a physical object statement to the actual and possible sense experiences that would confirm the statement; (3) a foundation for all empirical knowledge in our direct apprehension or immediate awareness of the given character of experience; and (4) the division of experience into its given content or character, on the one hand, and the form we impose on it, or the concepts in the light of which we interpret it, on the other.[27]

Willard Van Orman Quine (1957–1958) famously called (1) and (2) the "two dogmas of empiricism,"[28] Wilfrid Stalker Sellars (1970–1971) called (3) the "myth of the given,"[29] and Donald Herbert Davidson (1973–1974; 1985–1986) called (4) the "third dogma of empiricism,"[30] although in Lewis's mind, (4) may owe more to Kant than to the empiricists. Interestingly, Lewis credited "a course in metaphysics offered by James and Royce with inspiring the 'conceptual pragmatism' of his *Mind and the World-Order* (1929)" (4:213).[31] This

analytic wing of the pragmatist tradition continued through the work of philosophers such as Davidson, Richard McKay Rorty (1979–1980), and Robert Brandom. In Lewis's address, "Experience and Meaning," he explored:

> questions concerning the limitations imposed upon significant philosophic discussion by this requirement of empirical meaning; in particular certain issues which are likely to divide those who approach these problems with the thought of James and Peirce and Dewey in mind from the logical positivists. (4:217–218)

He began by critiquing the idea of what James called the "specious present": "all must finally dissolve into the eternal now of actually given experience" (4:219). To maintain this, Lewis argued, is a:

> reduction to absurdity of both knowledge and meaning. If nothing can be known but what is literally within the cognitive experience itself, and what is meant can be only that which is present in the experience which is the bearer of that meaning, then there is no valid knowledge and no genuinely significant meaning. (4:221)

This problem is, of course, as Lewis noted, the problem philosophy has inherited from Kant (4:222). Lewis's response to this problem was to appeal to the pragmatist tradition, in which "knowing begins and ends in experience; but it does not end in the experience in which it begins" (4:223). His interpretation of this pragmatic maxim was:

> The requirement of empirical meaning is at bottom nothing more than . . . that the terms we use should possess denotation. As this requirement is interpreted by pragmatists and positivists and others who share the tendencies of thought which have been mentioned, no concept has any denotation at all unless eventually in terms of sensuous data or imagery. (4:227–228)

This passage nicely captures the extent to which, for some philosophers in the 1930s, the positivist and pragmatist traditions were of a piece, as we saw Morris argue in his address. In this sense, the analytic tradition is not opposed to, but is in part an outgrowth of, the pragmatist tradition.

6. What Is Philosophy? On the State (and Nature) of the Discipline

One of the most common tendencies in the 1930s was to take the occasion of delivering a presidential address to give a commentary on the state of the disci-

pline, a sort of philosophical state of the union, if you will. As Spaulding put it, "some ask, What is philosophy about?, others, What about philosophy?" (4:159). The addresses considered here take up questions such as these.

As the title, "Philosophy and the Problem of Value," suggests, Albert Perley Brogan's (1931–1932) address defended the ancient, but at the time unpopular, view, "the primary task of philosophy is the study or the theory of value" (4:116). In defending this claim, he wanted to avoid the "misunderstanding" that this limits philosophy to ethics and aesthetics. Much of Brogan's talk sought to demonstrate that logic and epistemology are also properly part of the problem of value. Indeed, having been inspired by his reading of Dewey's *Experience and Nature*, he concluded that logic (and epistemology) are ultimately part of the general theory of value and therefore part of philosophical investigation (4:127). Thus, his claim, "all problems that are primarily problems of value are philosophical" was not intended to be reductive (4:116–117).

Brogan evinced an expansive understanding of value, but it was not all inclusive. Like Loewenberg, he rejected what he called the "royal road to existence" or metaphysics; i.e., he rejected the idea that philosophy is a special means by which to gain knowledge about existence. Rather, he considered questions of existence to be in the domain of the "special sciences" (4:120). Thus, by defining the boundaries of philosophy with the problem of value, Brogan's aim was to "eliminate this aspect of philosophy" (4:123), i.e., he aimed to eliminate metaphysics or the "the study of reality" from the scope of philosophy (4:123). No doubt many in the audience agreed with his conclusion, even if not his premises. Over the course of the following decades, The American Philosophical Association (The APA) would become increasingly hostile to metaphysics. Indeed, it was this trend that led Paul Weiss (1966–1967) to found *The Review of Metaphysics* (1947) and the Metaphysical Society of America (1950).

Thomas Vernor Smith's (1934–1935) address, "'The Tragic Realm of Truth,'" advocated for modesty in the pursuit of truth. He began by admitting his fondness for science and its achievements, applauding its stirring of "the hunger and hope of mankind for truth" (4:332). However, he was doubtful of science's ability to sate the hunger it has stirred: "Science has restirred the hunger and hope of mankind for truth. . . . What science has given us becomes, indeed, as stones to the bread we expected of it. We have asked for truth; we have been given gadgets" (4:332).

Nonetheless, Smith's address was not primarily about the inadequacy of science, but about the inadequacy of human beings to arrive at truth. As he stated, "lowly wants, only dimly conscious of the next step, are more potent social forces than are the most shining ideals encompassing all peoples and all times" (4:340). This sort of epistemic modesty was also the focus of Stephen Coburn

Pepper's (1935–1936) address, "The Quest for Ignorance or The Reasonable Limits of Skepticism."

Pepper was a major figure in the field of aesthetics during the first half of the twentieth century (4:345–347). In his address, he considered the ancient challenge of "utter skepticism." He claimed, "the blackest black appears only with the whitest white, . . . utter skepticism—a skepticism void of all knowledge—could not know itself and stands refuted in its very utterance" (4:349). His task was not mainly to refute the pure skeptic, but rather to ask, "How much can be reasonably doubted?" (4:349).

Pepper rejected as unreasonable the "black skeptic" who doubts everything, insisting instead that we ought to embrace:

> a gray skepticism . . . [that] admits as much ignorance as a reasonable skeptic can accept. . . . If this sounds more like the quest for knowledge than the quest for ignorance, perhaps that is because there is no difference between the two, provided both are reasonable. (4:361–362)

Whereas Smith and Pepper were both concerned with the proper scope or limit of philosophical study, in the same year, Warner H. Fite (1934–1935) was interested in examining how philosophy can be distinguished from other disciplines in the academy. His "The Philosopher and His Words" is an example of a presidential address that focused not on a particular philosophical issue of concern, but turned its gaze on philosophy itself. He noted that if he were speaking as president of a scientific society, it would be natural to consider the progress in the profession over the previous forty years and perhaps take a prospective look into future trajectory of current work. "But I doubt whether philosophy is the kind of study to which the idea of progress is applicable. . . . Philosophy bakes no bread, it likewise solves no problems" (4:281). These surely would have been fighting words to the numerous pragmatists who would have been in the audience.

Fite's interest was to account for the nature of philosophy as against its competitors in the academy. Whereas every other department in the university is demarcated by its special methods and its particular content, philosophy seems to study everything and nothing: "Philosophy is then a matter not of any special method but of universal thought. It is peculiar only in having transcended all peculiarities" (4:281).

Curt John Ducasse's (1939–1940) "Philosophy and Natural Science" also took up this topic of the nature of philosophy, asking, "what specifically distinguishes philosophy from other human enterprises and what sort of method is appropriate to its tasks" (4:595). In particular, Ducasse's concern was to contrast philosophy and science. His approach diverged from Fite's and defended the view that what distinguishes philosophy from science is indeed its subject matter

(4:599). Specifically, philosophy is distinguished from science in being the study of the introspective mind (4:608). Much of Ducasse's address was devoted to arguing against certain forms of naturalism to demonstrate that, in fact, something exists beyond the subject matter of science. His central claim was that "Mind" is not reducible to "Nature" and, therefore, the "facts of introspection, because of their private character, are not amenable to scientific study" (4:603).

Harvey Gates Townsend's (1936–1937) "On the Possibility of a Better World," is the last within the group of addresses that focused on the nature and scope of philosophy. His thesis was twofold: he defended a particular view of what philosophy is and, in light of world events of the time—especially the rise of Hitler in Germany—argued that philosophy has an important role to play in conceiving of what a better world would look like.

In considering the nature of philosophy, unlike Smith and Brogan, Townsend sought to defend the importance of metaphysics, especially against the ascendant positivists. Indeed, he went so far as to argue:

> all of the supreme efforts of the philosophical mind are metaphysical. All speculations concerning acts, words, meanings, values, internal and external relations, categories, phenomena, persons, and prejudices, are but subsidiary efforts to get at the nature of things. (4:436)

Interestingly, Townsend was not making his strenuous defense of metaphysics and philosophy merely in the context of an internecine debate among warring philosophical tribes. He was convinced that philosophy must not give up its aim at getting at the nature of things, in order to resist "undisciplined frenzy of political power" of the likes of Hitler (4:439). He urged philosophers to lead the way in asking "to what extent and by what means can any order, political or otherwise, be willed into existence?" (4:440). The address did not end up doing much to depict what a better world would look like, but it did attempt to argue that philosophy should play a significant role in conceiving of this better world so that it might order "the life of a man who, dreaming, thinks; and through him it orders the world" (4:445).

Townsend's address provides a natural transition to the next major group, which concerned how The APA presidents during the 1930s saw the role of philosophy in relation to the very real existential crises that became World War II.

7. Philosophy, Fascism, and the Fight for Democracy

Whereas the opening years of the 1930s saw the greatest economic depression in United State's history, by the end of the decade, the Allies of World War II were engaged in an existential fight for their very existence in both Europe and the

Pacific. Superimposing these defining events on the presidential addresses of that decade, the extent to which the Great Depression made no appearance is striking. Perhaps those at the pinnacle of the philosophical world were sufficiently uninterested in or insulated from the devastation that was plaguing much of the population.

Contrarily, the virulent rise of Nazism in Germany, Fascism in Italy, and nationalism in Japan increasingly arrested the attention of the presidents. Although from our twenty-first century vantage point, the eventual victory of the Allies might seem to have been inevitable, in the closing years of the 1930s, Japan had invaded and committed terrible atrocities in China, and Hitler and Mussolini were on the march across Europe. Eventual victory was not so certain then, and the existential threat to democracy was palpable in many of the addresses delivered during this period.

In "The Institution as an Agency of Stability and Readjustment in Ethics," James Hayden Tufts (1905–1906; 1914–1915; 1934–1935) argued that social institutions have been "a principal factor in [the] moral advance" of humanity (4:295). They play this role in helping to conserve what has been learned through experience. In this way, an institution "brings a sense of direction, and organizes impulses, habits, and collective strength to deal with the situation or conflict" (4:296).

However, Tufts's was not an abstract or sterile discussion. He explicitly made his comments on the importance of social institutions in the context of:

> the ever-present threat of war manifest in increasing expenditure for armament by all the great powers and not least by our own nation, and the virtual suspension of free inquiry and discussion in three of the great nations of Europe. (4:297)

It is these social institutions, Tufts believed, that would be part of the bulwark against the rising tide of Fascism and totalitarianism. A year later, Edwin Thomas Mitchell (1935–1936) would deliver his address on a similar topic, focusing particularly on the role of law in society.

Mitchell's "Social Ideals and the Law," was unusual among the others of his decade in that it focused exclusively on the "ancient and honorable alliance between philosophy and the law" (4:389). Defending a vaguely pragmatist position, he claimed that underlying his account of ideals and their role in society is Dewey's thought. Mitchell's position on ideals, their function in society, and embodiment in politics and law, has distinct Hegelian overtones. However, he concluded by noting, "the philosophy that is here suggested, but left only as a suggestion, is a dynamic idealism whose central feature is not the Hegelian *Idee*, but commonplace ideals" (4:402).

By the term "ideal," Mitchell meant "whatever is before the mind when we envisage the better self or the better community" (4:398). Ideals are finite, but have persuasive force. Though he made no explicit reference to the rising tide of Fascism and totalitarianism in Europe and Asia at that time, his conception of ideals and their function in democracy seemed quite apt. The struggle between democracy and Fascism was, in many ways, a struggle between competing ideals. This is even more explicitly evident in "History as the Struggle for Social Values," given by Joseph Alexander Leighton (1937–1938) two years later (4:513–541).

Leighton's early writings had focused on metaphysical and theological problems under the influence of Bernard Bosanquet, Royce, and the German Idealists, but he moved away from this toward more objectivistic and empirical viewpoints.[32] His address reflected both his interest in idealism and in historical and cultural interpretation. However, like Mitchell, Leighton had largely left his Hegelian origins behind. He began by rejecting three views that align the development of human culture with "cosmic evolution":

> First, Herbert Spencer's unilinear theory of evolutionary progress; second, Bergson's theory; and third, the theory of emergent evolution. We may call these respectively the unilinear-ascent theory, the jumpy theory, and the step-wise pyramidal theory. (4:515)

Unfortunately, I found Leighton's analysis to be poorly developed and, as a result, ultimately more assertion than argument.

What is interesting to see is the sense in which Leighton's discussion of history and evolution was set within the context of discussions and debates over the trajectory of human civilization. His address represents a sensitive defense of the importance of liberal democracy against the rising tide of totalitarianism. Indeed, his address was a literal call to arms:

> If liberal democracy is to be saved and go forward, it must be through the leadership of the United States and the youthful British Dominions and the lesser free countries. It is time to stop talking about mere ideologies. The fascist ideologies are arming to the teeth and successfully levying blackmail. (4:532)

Leighton is characteristic of those who, at the time, argued that a Hegelian idea of the state justified the subordination of the individual to the community. Apparently, Hegelian idealism was being used to provide intellectual defense of Fascism and totalitarianism in Germany:

> If we accept the Hegelian idea of the state, then there is no place for liberty or democracy (which to me are two aspects of the same social principles). For then the state is the omnicompetent community—the Mortal God. (4:532)

I suspect that Hegelians will take issue with this characterization, but as a characterization of the view of Hegel's intellectual influence in Germany, it reflected what appears to have been a common concern at the time among Anglo-American philosophers.

In supposed opposition to this Hegelian idealism, Leighton spoke eloquently of the role of society and the relationship of the individual thereto. The individual, he argued, is not a cell within the body of the state, wholly reducible to it. Society does not progress by consuming and subordinating the individuals that comprise it. This seems to partially be behind his rejection of a panorganicism: "The denial of the intrinsic value of the human personality involves the rejection of any universally valid values" (4:534).

Most striking of all is the extent to which Leighton argued for the moral responsibility of philosophy teachers to become engaged in the war as teachers:

> Democracy is emerging in one of the most momentous secular crises in the history of culture. On us teachers falls, I think, a heavy share of the burden of democracy. If the confusion continues, and some rabble-rouser, greedy for power, arises, we may all be either shut up or shot. If you think this is unduly alarming, consider the case of Germany. We are primarily teachers, and our field offers peculiar opportunities for us to bear witness to our faith in civic and spiritual freedom, to be achieved only through coöperation for the equalization of opportunity and the diffusion of the light of social intelligence. (4:539)

Leighton's moving words bring to life the depth of existential uncertainty that gripped the world at that point in time. What the result of the struggle between democracy and Fascism would be was not at all clear. He not only called for his fellow philosophers to throw off their "owlish habit" but even called outright for America to enter the war:

> To say that we Americans have no responsibility and freedom of choice in this hour of decision is a counsel of cowardice and despair. . . . I believe that you and I and all of us are confronted with the challenge to choose whether we shall knuckle down to tyranny controlled by demonic powers or march forward with resolute wills towards the dawn of an earth of worthy and comradely persons—a world set free. (4:540)

In Glenn Raymond Morrow's (1939–1940; 1953–1954) "Plato and the Rule of Law," delivered in 1940, we have among the most explicit engagement between philosophy and the terrible events gripping Europe. Morrow's task, one I suspect that would hardly occur to a contemporary audience, was to consider whether Plato's conception of the state could be used to defend and justify the Third Reich. Morrow cited a story in the *New York Times* that quoted a Russian professor who suggested that Plato was "the founder of Fascism," as well as several American philosophers who concurred with the assessment, claiming that *Republic* was the "'original philosophical charter of Fascism' and 'one of the most dangerous items in the education of the Western world'" (4:635).

Morrow was interested to examine whether an association of Plato and Fascism could be justified. There is a long-running debate over whether and how to understand the political views outlined in *Republic*, and there is good reason to believe that *Republic* is better read as a treatise on human psychology and morality than as a blueprint for social organization.

Morrow noted that when Plato tried his hand in practical politics in Sicily:

> the advice he gave the young Dion does not seem to have been a counsel of absolutism. According to the *Seventh Letter*, the chief reform he urged upon Dion, and later upon the young Dionysius, was to restore the constitution of Syracuse, which had fallen into abeyance during the tyranny: in short, to replace absolutism with a government of laws. (4:635–636)

Plato's council in Sicily and its relationship to what he defended in Republic is still a matter of contention among scholars.

However, as Morrow noted, the *Republic* is not the only work that Plato wrote on politics. Instead of focusing on the *Republic*, Morrow asked, "What did Plato mean by the rule of law?" in the context of *Laws* (4:636).

To make an interesting and compelling discussion all too short, Morrow concluded, "whatever he may have believed when he wrote the *Republic*, in his later years Plato would not have agreed even in theory with the advocates of power untrammeled by law" (4:636). Rather, Plato came to defend a state in which the law is sovereign over the rulers, who were themselves servants of the law (4:649). As we would say in America, no one is above the law. Thus, Morrow convincingly demonstrated that those who sought to defend Fascism would have to look to someone other than Plato to establish its intellectual legitimacy.

It is gratifying to see that a philosopher of Morrow's ability and stature used the opportunity of his presidential address to discuss matters of such grave concern to the world. After all, just months before he gave his address, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union had invaded Poland, starting World War II.

In "Human Nature and the Present Crisis," Edward Octavius Sisson (1939–1940) dedicated the entirety of his address to the war that "touches every one of us, not only as men and women, but particularly as philosophers" (4:615). For those of us born decades after the successful end of World War II—especially given how utterly different (lacking) are the demands made on most citizens by twenty-first century modern wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan—it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the depth of the existential threat posed by Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, and Hideki Tojo. On 29 December 1939, when Sisson spoke, the horrors of the war were just starting to unfold:

> Straining my perception of what is now in process and my imagination of what may come to pass, taking the most adequate overview I can command, without hesitation I set what may be epitomized as democracy, or the American Dream, to use a more sentimental expression, against the nightmare which now rides the storm in Europe and perhaps most of the rest of the world. (4:615)

"I do not think I know which side will win," Sisson admitted baldly. Even more telling, he continued, "still more, I admit, or rather definitely insist, that I do not know which doctrine is ultimately true" (4:615). The doctrines of which he spoke and the crises to which he alluded concerned not just the outcome of the brutal war in Europe and the Pacific:

> The final adjudication in both actuality and theory hangs upon that vast question which Kant proposes as the total subject-matter of philosophy: "What is Man?" On that ultimate query too, I am compelled to recognize that I do not know. (4:615)

Sisson's not immodest goal was to respond to "that most astounding of all things in the form of print, *Mein Kampf*" (4:616), by defending "the view of man and of human life" called democracy (4:616). Like Socrates, who, at the opening of *Apology*, noted that he must respond not merely to his new accusers, Meletus and Anytus, but first his old accusers, Sisson noted that there are two "violent attacks upon democracy today, one old and the other in a sense new" (4:617). The old attack, which was leveled by Plato himself against democracy, is that only the few are fit to govern and, "the preponderant mass are so inferior in intelligence and character that they must be governed without participating in the governing process themselves" (4:617). Like Sisson, I will not belabor the analysis of this old, but real argument against democracy. The new attackers are more interesting.

For Sisson, the new challenge to the democratic idea was totalitarianism:

> It is the doctrine that not the human individual, the person, but the State, is the supreme end of our world and its historic process. That the individual is not, or at best only in an inferior sense, consummatory, but rather instrumental. "The State is the march of God in the world." (4:617)

The crux of the argument concerns, Sisson contended, one's conception of human nature. He argued that the rise of totalitarianism was but the most virulent form of a historical trend toward corporate forms of being. Though he did little more than diagnose the problem, he keenly presented the problem with the trend toward "corporate dominance over the individual" (4:629). Interesting for those of us living in an age when the specter of tyranny and totalitarianism has largely retreated to the oil-rich corners of the globe, Sisson was not merely concerned with the political fight between democracy and totalitarianism:

> When I speak of the historical rôle I mean to include far more than the extreme or dramatic phases of autocratic governments and social orders and to include no less the pervasive control of the corporate in democratic regimes as well. And when I speak of culmination in our own day I refer not only to the terrific apparition of totalitarianism in Europe, but also to the growing corporate control of economic life in our own American society. (4:629)

Sisson's concerns and objections were prescient indeed, now that corporations are bestowed legal rights once reserved for only persons.

> All the parables of Juggernauts and Frankensteins and Leviathans are inadequate to symbolize the devastating ruin of precious values which the concept seems to me certain to wreak, and which certainly we can see proceeding before our eyes. (4:629)

The courage and candor of Leighton, Morrow, and Sisson are moving. Considering them as group, I cannot help but wonder whether current presidents of The APA are sufficiently concerned to address similar problems of our day. True, thankfully, we are not immanently confronted with the threat posed by a world war, the arguably inflated rhetoric of the "war on terror" notwithstanding. However, this is not to say that there are not serious crises that threaten the very existence of civilization.

The question for those of us today, indeed the question for philosophers of each age, is to ask what the defining threats and challenges of our age are. When I look at the world and consider this question, I believe the answer may be that too many philosophers are neglecting their duty to address issues such as the immoral treatment of non-human animals, the genocidal pursuit of fossil fuels in

the face of potentially catastrophic climate change, and the subordination of individuals, not to the fascist state, but to corporations and what many believe to be their obscenely wealthy owners.

Only those with the fortune of hindsight will be able to judge whether I am right in this estimation. If this time is like every other, and I believe that it is, then there are some contemporary issues that the myopia of the present utterly obscures, but on which future generations will judge us harshly. Philosophers have an obligation to take up their ancient Socratic task to rouse the lumbering horses of our civilization into considering what is most important.

Notes

1. Brian G. Henning and David Kovacs, eds., *Being in America: Sixty Years of the Metaphysical Society* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014).

2. W. Heisenberg, "Uber den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik" [On the ideological content of the quantum theoretical kinematics and mechanics], *Zeitschrift für Physik* 43, no. 3–4 (1927): 172–198.

3. Loewenberg, Problematic Realism, in vol. 2 of *Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements*, eds. George P. Adams and William Pepperell Montague (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc.), pp. 53–81.

4. See Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962).

5. James Bissett Pratt, Critical Realism and the Possibility of Knowledge, in *Essays in Critical Realism: A Co-operative Study of the Problem of Knowledge*, ed. Drake Durant (London: Macmillan and Co., 1920).

6. See Charles William Morris, *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism* (Paris: Hermann et cie, 1937).

7. Although philosophy of religion was a vibrant area of study in the opening decades of the twenty-first century, according to a recent survey of philosophers, 72.8 percent indicated that they accepted or leaned toward atheism. PhilPapers Philosophical Research Online. The PhilPapers Survey, http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl (accessed 2/28/2015).

8. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World. Lowell Lectures, 1925* (New York: Macmillan, 1925).

9. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, corrected ed. (New York: Free Press, 1979/1929).

10. Ibid., p. viii.

11. George R. Lucas Jr., *The Rehabilitation of Whitehead* (Albany: State University of New York Press), p. 37.

12. Part of my commentary here will be published as "Following Lucretius's Dart" in a volume to yet to be titled, eds. Sarah Demeuse and Manuela Moscoso (forthcoming, Archive Books, 2015).

13. Alfred North Whitehead, *The Function of Reason* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1929), p. 30.

14. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 151.

15. Ibid., p. 7.

16. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Free Press, 1933), p. 228.

17. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 4.

18. See, for instance, A. N. Whitehead, The Romantic Reaction, in *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

19. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 224.

20. Ibid., p. 113.

21. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Free Press, 1925), p. 104.

22. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 45.

23. Ibid., p. 245.

24. Ibid., p. 228.

25. Ibid., p. 167.

26. See "Implication and the Algebra of Logic," *Mind* 21 (1912): 522–531; "The Calculus of Strict Implication," *Mind* 23 (1914): 240–247; *A Survey of Symbolic Logic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1918).

27. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, s.v. "Clarence Irving Lewis." http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lewis-ci/ (accessed 2/28/2015).

28. W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," *The Philosophical Review* 60 (1951): 20–43.

29. Wilfrid Stalker Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, pp. 253–329, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. 1, eds. H. Feigl and M. Scriven (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956). Originally presented at the University of London Special Lectures in Philosophy for 1956 as "The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind."

30. Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 47 (November 1974): 5–20; reprinted this series, 8:209–222.

31. C. I. Lewis, *Mind and the World Order* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1929).

32. Albert R. Chandler, "Joseph Alexander Leighton," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 28 (1954–1955): 63–64.

PHILOSOPHERS DURING WARTIME AND PEACETIME, 1941–1950

John R. Shook

1. Introduction

The tumultuous 1930s were gone but not forgotten. Academics were watching as war seemed to be returning Europe to savagery at the beginning of the 1940s, and they began pondering the destiny of their civilization. By 1941, the number of democratic countries in the world had dropped to thirteen, and only two among them counted as great powers.[1] Yet America seemed unwilling to defend England, much less Europe, or any other continent, from totalitarianism and military dictatorship.

Would autocracy be the actual fate of Western civilization and all civilizations? If philosophy could truly speak to fundamental matters of universal concern, now was the time.

2. The Stage Prepared

The generation of The American Philosophical Association (The APA) presidents who served during the 1940s, almost all born between 1884 and 1900, had experienced World War I and then the Great Depression during the first half of their careers. Entering seniority and leadership positions during the 1940s seemed inauspicious by comparison. To whom could they turn for examples of steadfast wisdom? Many among this generation had been influenced by pragmatism or progressivism, or their combination. Yet their champion, John Dewey (1905–1906), was determined to take an isolationist stance, exemplified by his March 1939 editorial entitled, "No Matter What Happens—Stay Out."[2]

On 7 December 1941, Dewey looked out upon Cooper Union's crowded auditorium, filled with listeners eager to hear his scheduled talk, "Lessons from the War in Philosophy."[3] If they knew that this planned session was gathered to discuss World War I, they didn't care, as that day's news from Pearl Harbor filled their thoughts. However, Dewey refused to say anything about the new war, and said that philosophy cannot guide unfolding events or usefully judge them afterwards.[4] What use was pragmatism as a public philosophy?

Few philosophers defended pragmatism after episodes like that. Only Dewey's student, Herbert Wallace Schneider (1948–1949), stands out as a progressive and cosmopolitan leader among this decade's presidents, and he made his own greatest impact on world affairs during the 1950s and 1960s. In all fair-

ness, the other schools of philosophy in America were not much help either. Idealism had been dominant for several decades, but the great idealists had all left the scene due retirement or death by 1940. The rationalist and relationalist personalisms of (Percy) Brand Blanshard (1942–1945) and Charles Hartshorne (1948–1949) were philosophically impressive yet politically impotent. Hans Reichenbach (1947–1948), the only other president from the 1940s of much note, was the first representative of logical empiricism to be so honored, and the first of many from that analytic genre to ignore social and political values altogether in a presidential address.

With the exception of only Schneider, Blanshard, Hartshorne, and Reichenbach, none of the other presidents who served during the 1940s were great expositors of their schools of thought. They comprise an undistinguished assembly, to be blunt. They were exemplary figures in their discipline for academic expertise and thoughtful scholarship, but beyond the merits to their instruction and erudition, little of consequence survives. This group mostly counted among that "Lost Generation" that came of age during World War I—fated to fall "in between": both too late and then too early, not quite card-carrying endorsers of world-shaking ideologies and worldviews, only borrowing from philosophical systems around them as best they could. The best among them were syncretic, while the rest were at most eclectic. All of them were destined to be front and center for a global stage of conflict and carnage unworthy of any generation.

3. Philosophers in Wartime

Charles William Hendel (1940–1941) delivered his "Reflections on the Spirit of Man" in December 1940, as Europe's new war raged. He used that backdrop of death and destruction to point the finger of blame on materialism and its resignation to the proposition that might makes right. Materialism can stay busy tracking the shifting tides of strength, making predictions about which side may win, but materialism must be unable or uninterested in knowing which side should win. Materialism breeds cynicism and quietism:

> There is a dispiriting view of history and humanity in the world today. The present phenomenon in human affairs is seen simply as another instance of the rise and fall of empires. It is the age-old shifting of power from some nations possessed of it to others that are not. (5:3)

Worst of all, this spectator stance toward events on a global stage loses sight of individual people trying to know right and wrong, and who are fighting for the good and the true. The importance of the human spirit fades away, when all we

look to is how much control can be exerted over nature's fruits and how much control humanity can exert over itself.

Much was promised by the "scientific" spirit of inquiry and technology to make life better. Much was promised by a philosophy of technology applied to humankind itself. Hendel's generation, spellbound by a fresh violent application of technology, seems enthralled by a philosophy that materialized all values:

> For it is believed that man's everlasting problem is that of adapting himself to the conditions of his physical environment and a social existence. Real needs such as food, clothing, shelter, sexual, and other necessities, these are what call the tune and supply the motifs of the dance of life. There is no real value in anything else, which we must consequently dismiss as absurdity and an impediment to progress. (5:10)

This pragmatic materialism accepts historical and cultural relativism, which demoralizes the masses and reduces elites to fatalistic impotency. The only figures empowered by that paralyzed social body are those "men of destiny," as Hendel called them, who ignore lessons of history, feel certain that they ought to rule, and expect to write the history books. Hendel preferred the spiritualization of values, so that they are appreciated as timelessly and universally valid. Only then, he contended, could a different destiny be envisaged for free and dignified peoples establishing their own political orders and lasting civilizations. Whether the collisions among cultures and religions, each morally certain about its cosmic mission, are less violent than any materialistic war, Hendel did not pause to consider.

America would soon enter World War II, and its educational institutions braced for the sweeping changes sure to arrive. The Congress on Education on Democracy, held in 1939 at Columbia University, was the occasion for President Roosevelt's declaration, "education for democracy cannot merely be taken for granted. . . . That the schools make worthy citizens is the most important responsibility placed upon them."[5] The philosophical question, "What is the pedagogy that truly makes worthy citizens?" went unanswered.

In his address, "Pot Shots at Present Pedagogy," Benjamin Apthorp Gould Fuller (1940–1941) could not foresee how the American university would be dramatically transformed before the decade was over, but he was quite sure that educational change had already gone too far. As Hendel did, Fuller faulted pragmatism, in the guise of "progressive education" (5:27). The best college experience should remain just as his own had been at Harvard forty years earlier—professors exemplifying scholarship in teaching more than publishing, curricula emphasizing humanistic and cosmopolitan values, very few electives, and small class sizes to liberalize the mind instead of large vocational courses to

train the body. Progressive education prioritizes the most expansive accessibility of the masses to the narrowest of practical goals: functioning in an industrial and over-managed capitalist economy. All sense of history and perspective gets lost, and no one can properly evaluate, must less wisely judge, the great events of the present day. Progressive education can only adjust the individual to the present social situation; nowhere does anyone receive guidance about adjusting society to the enduring needs and rights of the individual. Fuller's list of strident complaints was a prescient catalogue of every call of alarm over the "crisis in American education" heard during the rest of the twentieth century.

Radoslav Andrea Tsanoff (1940–1941) also had the moral ideals of civilization on his mind, as evinced by a book on that theme that he published soon after delivering his presidential address, "Conviction and Tolerance."[6] Divisive and inconclusive ethical theories seem unable to guide the moral conscience, if modern peoples should still be said to possess such a spiritual thing. Mere conviction becomes fanatically evil, so intelligent judgment must balance moral zeal, yet excessive intellectualizing tolerates too much and struggles too little.

Tsanoff offered a different way to balance conviction and tolerance: remain loyal to one's own moral convictions, yet respect the right of all others to that same devotion. The remaining danger is bland toleration of indifference, not caring what motivates others, which restrains us from hurting their feelings yet prevents us from taking them seriously. Invoking Josiah Royce (1903–1904), Tsanoff charged the loyal conscience with a higher duty to incorporate others' view of the good into estimations of moral duty (5:74). The implication that there is no final discharge of duty, that what shall be morally right will develop into the future, represents the unification of conviction with tolerance.

Grace Mead Andrus De Laguna (1941–1942), only the second woman president of The APA as of that date, delivered her address, "Cultural Relativism and Science," just three weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Perceiving the anti-pragmatist tenor among some philosophical colleagues, she staunchly defended empirical science in general and the social sciences in particular. Her career had been mildly favorable toward pragmatism and its grounds in the behavioral study of humanity.

Psychology, ethnology, and anthropology appreciate cultural relativity only through their approaches to human universals permitting any culture at all. Science is not relativistic in spirit; neither must it be only concerned for the transient and expedient. It seeks to understand the natural order with tentative theories, unfettered by mythical or ideological dogmas. Invoking Dewey, De Laguna called for the scientific spirit to further pervade and unify a disjointed proto-culture labeled as "Western civilization" (5:96).

Cultural relativism can degenerate into a learned hopelessness that nothing can be done about inter-cultural conflicts. But the social sciences are still human

sciences if conducted properly: understanding another culture, as a trained ethnologist can, demands a higher level of tolerance from a due respect for the dignity and merit to all forms of human life. The ethnologist's home culture hardly fulfils that respect; the indigenous population under study may not even conceive of it. Where does it comes from, then? Cultural relativism cannot say, but the scientific spirit can: there is a universal order to be found across humanity's cultural ways that can be appreciated in its own right, an order setting high humanistic standards of moral conduct owed all peoples, regardless of whether they too recognize that order. The sciences, thanks to that humanistic valuation of culture as culture wherever it flourishes, are elevated above mere relativism themselves, and enter into ownership by all humanity as a common possession and a common good.

In "Materialism in Democracy—Democracy in Culture," Ephraim Edward Ericksen (1941–1942) also invoked pragmatist Dewey along with William James (1905–1906) as he defended another social science, economics, as a noble search, not only for grounding individual rights, but also for the investigation of proper conditions of wider social cooperation. Mere competition as zero-sum conflict has never been the story of economic progress. Quite the opposite: the more that the economic spirit enervates a culture, the more each person's eyes are lifted up toward opportunities to benefit large groups first and foremost.

The individual has economic rights only to the extent that all do, a thoroughly democratic result on both practical and ideal levels. Ericksen called for economics to frankly acknowledge its principled spirit, forever displacing the notion that economics has nothing to say about social values. Only conservatism benefits from an economics chained to cold facts and iron laws, profiting from the dehumanization of citizens and the poverty of civic life. Calling for the socialization of industry is the opposite of government or corporate tyranny over labor; it is the only opportunity to foster the democratic experience of the people. Economics for a democratic culture should measure progress not in monetary terms, but by "the quality of human life and the sharing of what is best in human experience" (5:121).

The December 1941 meetings of The APA were the last major gatherings of the association for several years. No academic conferences could be confidently scheduled or well attended between 1942 and 1945 because of wartime restrictions on travel; most buses, trains, and airplanes could not be spared for ordinary civilian use.

Elijah Jordan (1941–1943) had been elected at the 1941 Western meeting, but could not attend, although he sent his undelivered 1942 presidential address, "Concerning Philosophy," for the usual publication in *The Philosophical Review*. Jordan evidently was in a severe mood, and targeted pragmatic materialism again for stern censure. His survey of modern philosophy treats it as a

"monstrosity" deserving only the label of "atomic mysticism" (5:130). The quest for universals was abandoned and being was forgotten:

> The fundamental fact that meets us now is a world in chaos, a cosmic chaos, a *contradictio in substantia* [objection in nature] for which there is no description black enough. Falling into the pit of subjectivism has left us without a morality, no vestige of character remains. For a mess of garbage man has sold his soul to the business man, and the world of reality is sold out. So there is no obligation, for there is nothing to be responsible *to*. God died, and the world dissolved, when man found his destiny in himself. And the responsibility for the situation is philosophy's. (5:142)

He then delivered a resolute verdict of condemnation upon empiricism and pragmatism as sobering as any:

> Our scientific thought has abandoned the search for the realities of existence, and has sought nothing but technical means and processes by which the realities and the values could be reduced to terms of our interests, forgetting that for interests there is neither substance nor law, neither reality nor value. And while we have in our egoistic stupidity insisted that the world should come to terms with our subjective purposes, the world has laughed in our face and has gone its own way, which is not the way that human wish or subjective motives would have it, but a way determined by its own inertia, and so leads to no end. And our refusal to see and follow the reality to the end that the reality be made conscious of its destiny has left us without a destiny. (5:142)

Jordan's sobering address was the last one received until World War II was ending.

Daniel Sommer Robinson (1943–1944) was elected president of the Western Division at its 1942 meeting, but delivery of his address had to wait until the 1946 meeting. Donald Sage Mackay (1942–1943) did not deliver a 1942 presidential address either, as that Pacific Division meeting had been canceled, as were the 1943 and 1944 meetings. Mackay's paper, "The Illusion of Memory," was sent to *The Philosophical Review* for publication in the summer of 1945. While Jordan longed for stable being, Mackay celebrated its departure. His observations on the specious psychological presence of the past lead him on to skeptical questions about the supposed indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy. No substrate of being is left, but only persistent patterns of relations for science to postulate and explore.

Victor Fritz Lenzen (1943–1945), a popular professor of physics, was elected Pacific Division President by mail ballot in early 1943. However, since meeting cancellations persisted, his paper, "The Concept of Reality in Physical Theory," was published in 1945. In it, he agreed about the scientific reliance upon theoretical constructions. He affirmed that physical space is "a form of relatedness of events," a characterization that "leaves its structure undefined" (5:207).

Blanshard was elected at the 1941 Eastern Division meeting held just weeks after Pearl Harbor. That meeting, anticipating the coming wartime strictures, agreed that officers may serve an additional year if necessary. Blanshard sent a letter to division members in 1943, asking if officers may serve a third year during 1944, since meetings and elections were still impractical; he received that consent. Blanshard was the only functioning president of The APA during the war years, holding his office from the December 1941 division meeting until spring of 1945, serving over three full years—by far the longest term of office of any president to date. His letter to the membership after the hoped-for meeting in February 1945 (again canceled) included a call for an election of officers. He added, "we have held office longer, lived a more shadowy existence, and lived it in more shadowed times, than any other officers the Association has had. May that unenviable record remain unique!"[7]

A mail ballot then elected William Kelley Wright (1945–1946) to the presidency in the spring of 1945. The publication of presidential addresses was delayed until mid-1945, and the first meeting of The APA to be held after the war was the Pacific Division's meeting in December 1945.

Philosophers were hardly silenced during the war, however, as articles in *The Philosophical Review* and a few other philosophical journals were evidently inspired by current events. George Hartmann of Columbia University's Teacher College obtained seventy-five replies from noteworthy philosophers across the country to a questionnaire on pacifism, publishing his summary as "The Strength and Weakness of the Pacifist Position as Seen by American Philosophers."[8]

Under Blanshard's presidency, a handful of The APA committees carried on, and delegates were sent to participate in sporadic activities of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). A report to the ACLS, "Philosophy in the United States 1939–1945," was prepared by Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1936–1937) and later published in 1947.[9] Brightman made special mention of a major project of The APA, the Commission on the Function of Philosophy in Liberal Education, which was led by Blanshard and successfully conducted through small meetings in several states during the war despite travel difficulties. The Commission also received additional commentary from communications by postal mail. Blanshard submitted a lengthy report about that commentary with numerous excerpts from many philosophers, providing revealing insights about conflicting perspectives on philosophy's continued relevance.[10]

Later in 1945, Blanshard, along with Curt John Ducasse (1939–1940), Hendel, Arthur Edward Murphy (1950–1951), and Max Carl Otto (1929–1930) published a consequential volume of reflective essays titled *Philosophy in American Education: Its Tasks and Opportunities*.[11] Blanshard's opening essay in that volume not only noted the rift still separating pragmatists from non-pragmatists over the value of metaphysics, but it also highlighted the growing chasm between those two camps and the camp of positivists, who entirely dismiss all treatment of values and ethics from philosophical consideration.

Was this war within philosophy unresolvable?

4. Philosophy at War with Itself

Blanshard sent a presidential address, "Current Strictures on Reason," for publication in *The Philosophical Review*, in 1945. Recalling how he had started this paper's composition in late 1942, he tried to revive memories of how fragile everything seemed during the war's darkest days. The life of reason, justice, and truth, could have been lost—possibly lost forever.

Even after the tide had turned and victory was grasped, Blanshard remained attuned to cynical voices on all sides that reason had been impotent, was still impotent, and must forever be impotent to direct humanity's affairs. Nothing external or objective really controls what people think and judge, these voices announce as the revealed wisdom of the day. He insisted on holding out hope for reasonableness:

> To be reasonable implies at the least that there is an objective truth and right which we can at times apprehend, and that if our thought follows a certain course, it is because it is laid under constraint by the objective pattern of things. (5:177)

Blanshard then identified three schools of academic thought that deny the possibility or efficacy of this reasonableness: the naturalists, the psychoanalysts, and the positivists.

The naturalist, according to Blanshard, claims that all cognitive processes are dictated by natural laws, so all judgment occurs by strict compulsion from internal neurological conditions. That determinism presumably eliminates the opportunity to be guided by objective matters instead. Naturalism cannot eliminate reasonableness so easily, however. Rational necessities have a reality independent from all laws of nature and psychological events, Blanshard affirmed, and his proof appealed to an inner feeling that one is guided by those objective necessities while one is reasoning, and not anything under one's own mental control.

The next opposition to reasonableness comes from the psychoanalysts and allied explorers into the psychological depths of emotionality, who conclude that reason is controlled by feelings, and such deep feelings like loves, desires, and fears are beyond conscious control. Blanshard easily granted the perennial contest between reason and emotion, but he hastened to point out that reason must have some objectivity and influence for us, for if it were so inconsequential, we would hardly notice the unreasonableness of so many emotional episodes.

The third kind of opposition to reasonableness, from the positivists, admits external realities but denies that we could form a final intelligible worldview from our limited access through observation. Reason can demand that we discern the true framework of the world, but it will forever be disappointed. Not even logic has a basis in external realities. Reason and logic are not decisive for actual empirical work of settling on just-good-enough descriptions of what we can contingently and conventionally agree about the world. Blanshard could only state his final rationalist assertion to conclude this paper: "all necessary propositions must be taken to assert of existence and that no factual propositions are altogether contingent" (5:193).

Blanshard turned out to be the last of the presidents of The APA from that mighty school of idealism, which had held sway over philosophy in America for three generations; but he did not get the last word. The final words from those wartime years happened to come from successive pragmatist-minded presidents: George Perrigo Conger (1944–1945) and Wright.

Conger was unable to deliver his address, "Method and Content in Philosophy" until the division's first meeting after the war, in May 1946. His address, like Blanshard's, reflected the wartime years that shaped its theme, as philosophy pondered its fundamental options and available directions. Unlike Blanshard, however, Conger was unwilling to place the full burden of philosophy's purpose and destiny in the hands of any single philosophical movement, even one so distinguished as rationalism. Instead, he called for a truly comprehensive philosophy striving to take all methodologies and perspectives into proper account. Not only would that comprehensive philosophy unify scientific fields and integrate social ethics on a planetary scale, it would incorporate all religion as well:

> a truly comprehensive philosophy may adumbrate and begin to suggest a truly comprehensive religion. The great religions, too, or, more accurately, their theologies, are partitionings of a manifold—the same old manifold, the universe—common to them all. In a planetary culture, the old walls behind which the adherents of each particular religion huddled, or on which some sat and looked down on others, or through which many a devoted missionary tried to force his way, are bound to crumble. In their place eventually we shall have one landscape, whether it is garden or rub-

> ble. With a comprehensive philosophy, we shall be able to press toward the ideal . . . it is the function of each of the great religions to bring out the best in the others. (5:316)

Wright's address comported well with Conger's, similarly calling for a joint philosophical effort of the widest possible scope and impact. The ultimate division within philosophy, Wright said, was not between schools, but between temperaments. The great philosophers exemplify magnanimity, a generosity of intellect eager to encompass all knowledge and wisdom, something that no science or religion could or should attempt. Even among philosophers, few have tried, while many have bailed, shrinking away from that daunting task.

Only now, at "The End of the Day," as Wright titled his address, can we perceive the close of the glorious period of Modern Philosophy:

> With the close of the nineteenth century, the last rays of the setting sun seem to have disappeared, and to have been followed by the slowly dimming twilight of the present. The five most significant philosophers of the past twenty years, perhaps some of you will agree with me, have been Samuel Alexander, Henri Bergson, Dewey, George Santayana, and Alfred North Whitehead [1931–1932], all born over eighty years ago. What younger men show promise of becoming their equals? (5:256)

Philosophy will go on, of course, but which temperament will prevail? Wright continued:

> Philosophy will always occupy a considerable domain, including at least metaphysics, epistemology, theoretical ethics and aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion. In addition to these subjects, magnanimous philosophers, with their broader and less specialized outlook, will continue to cooperate with the technicians in every field of human inquiry and activity in which adjustments to new situations must be made upon an extensive scale. In every situation involving reflective adjustments, realists, idealists, instrumentalists, and philosophers of every school will be able to offer suggestions. Nothing that is of real human significance, whether in the realm of pure essences and subsistents, or in that of practical emergencies, can be alien to the interest and sympathy of a magnanimous philosopher. (5:259)

Yet Wright saw no magnanimous philosophers among his generation. Whom did he see?

> In contrast to the magnanimous philosopher, a minute philosopher fails to arrive at any constructive interpretation of the world and humanity in their

> mutual relationships. Even if a philosopher is magnanimous in his own thinking, he may fail to make his constructive outlook intelligible to his students or the readers of his books, and so he may be a minute philosopher so far as his influence upon other persons is concerned.
>
> Among minute philosophers I mean to include those who seek to know more and more about less and less, who confine their attention to trifling problems which throw no light upon any significant aspect of human life or of the world as a whole. (5:259)

Instead of creativity, there is only the shifty business of intense concentration and stubborn consistency. The arid scholasticism of analytic philosophy was becoming the dominant tenor, but it had plenty of company. Keeping your head down at one's own bench was to be the uninspiring offspring of that "PhD Octopus" that James had warned against,[12] and that anti-humanistic scientism rewarded by professionalization and politicization of research. Worse, Wright admonished, that stifling atmosphere of conformity is a breeding ground for the "triflers, cranks, debunkers, and pedants" (5:266), who parasitically dispense pseudo-knowledge under the guise of profundity.

As Wright did, we may ask ourselves which sort of temperament prevails in our own times. Our answer may be as dispiriting as his was. All the same, no generation is deprived of great challenges and moral causes, if only one would be willing to look up and around. Forward-looking philosophers tried to find their bearings as their clouds of war dispersed.

5. Philosophers in Peacetime

The years 1946 and 1947 brought immense relief at the arrival of peace, but intellects remained unsettled while the possibility of global cooperation seemed remote. If it were possible, an even greater threat to humanity had emerged, as the Atomic Age dawned upon a surprised world. How would philosophy prove relevant to these alarming times? A pragmatic spirit dominated the presidential addresses during these years, even if an optimistic outlook could not.

To William Ray Dennes (1945–1946) fell the opportunity to deliver the first presidential address in person to colleagues at a division meeting in four years, in December 1945. Entitled "Conflict," it began with these sobering words:

> That violence breeds violence is not a new discovery. . . . But few expected that the resultant tensions would be anything like as menacing as they have been rendered by the invention of explosives which exceed the destructive force of TNT not by a factor of 2, or of 10, or even of 100, but by a factor

> approaching 1,750,000 pound for pound. It is not hysterical rhetoric but the soberest of facts that leads us to recognize the probability that unless effective international control is achieved within ten or twenty years several nations will possess large stocks of devices by which they could shatter and roast to death, within an hour or so, half the population of a country like ours besides obliterating its cities. And if (as seems, fortunately, doubtful) means should be discovered to confine close to the surface of the earth the flow of radioactive gases released by the explosion of these instruments, their horrible (and in many cases lingering) destructiveness would be further multiplied. The problems which consequently face us are not new in kind; but the increase in their intensity and urgency is staggering. The word is on the lips of every responsible man and woman that we human beings, hundreds of millions of us and of many nations, must either find ways to resolve our major disagreements effectively, and pretty quickly, or we shall very probably soon destroy ourselves. (5:225)

It may appear that conflicts over values ultimately go back to theoretical disputes, the obstinate belief systems to which we cling. If so, then disagreements appear to be irresolvable, for each belief system will assume the privilege of determining facts for themselves. However, because values are at stake, people are most practically concerned with realizing those values for life—should we be surprised to discover that many of the same values are widely prioritized, and disputes are actually about the best means to achieve them? This practical matter can be intelligently approached with far-reaching inquiries into the actual consequences of optional policies and practices. Coordinating those inquiries and synthesizing the results for application to human ends would require philosophy's creative reconciliation. It is not the pacification of competing powers over life that demands philosophy's attention, but rather the testing and harnessing of competing theories of life.

Robinson was also convinced of the practical utility of philosophy in human affairs. He had published *Political Ethics* in 1935,[13] and would publish *Principles of Conduct* in 1948.[14] A philosophical grasp on science's general depiction of the world is essential to working with science's theoretical implications as they race ahead of familiar moral and political principles. His address, "A Philosophy for the Atomic Age," contrasted unifying positivism, scientific relativism, and process metaphysics. Whichever scientific philosophy proves the most adequate may depend on its applicability to the incredible technological powers recently acquired at the atomic and subatomic levels. Nature can no longer be depicted as aloof and static for describing and mapping; scientific experience is now about technological scrutiny and transformation of nature for our multiplying ends. The distinction between pure and applied science is invis-

ible to ethics as well, which has the right to scrutinize all implications for the acquisition of knowledge:

> The ethical principle that in the technological development of pure knowledge those implementations of natural power which would promote the common good are right, whereas those that would destroy it are wrong is probably universally acceptable among thinkers concerned with ethics.
>
> Such a principle implies a definite restriction upon technological developments of scientific knowledge, and that is precisely what the ethical conditioning of science means. (5:293–294)

This "ethical conditioning of technology" (5:296) can refocus philosophy on the opportunities for advancing human progress once again.

Katharine Everett Gilbert (1946–1947) looked to art and aesthetics, especially poetry, for guidance on human welfare and progress. The full meaning of life offered by the most powerful ideas enthralling and enchanting humanity can be divulged by bold poetry. That is why "important poetic fiction may, by its apparent intense unreason throw light on those metaphysical first principles that Whitehead says 'mutely appeal for an imaginative leap.'" (5:326) An ongoing conversation between poetry and philosophy should make fruitful contributions to our ethical quandaries as well.

In "The Role of a Philosopher," Marten ten Hoor (1945–1947) similarly found a predominate responsibility to negotiate among other disciplines and creative endeavors rather than to seek some ultimate reality or supreme method. Those lofty, but illusive, goals would not impose order among philosophers, not even among specialists in logic or metaphysics, and could not impress non-philosophers, who only detect irrelevant abstraction instead of concrete relevance. The philosopher of ethics, a practical-minded and multi-disciplinary ethics, should make the greatest impact on human conditions:

> Since social institutions are intended to promote the realization of values, the social sciences must of necessity be based on ethics. The moralist and the social scientist should therefore cooperate in the translation of moral wisdom into social practice. Obstacles to such cooperation are the deterministic philosophy of social institutions professed by some social scientists, the preoccupation of others with the mechanics of social processes, and the mutual professional isolation and antagonism of social scientists and philosophers. That the problems of the individual and of the social institution are so disparate and so unrelated as to forbid this cooperation is not an acceptable objection. (5:381)

Reconciling the ideal and real, as the "intellectual conscience of the social theorists" (5:382), will require not only an interdisciplinary competence but also a linguistic reform. Novel but unnecessary terminologies, excessive confusion and carelessness, ignorant repetition of old ideas, and sheer verbalism as a substitute for elucidation only worsens the isolation of professional philosophy from academia as well as reality itself.

Exercised properly, philosophy could increase world understanding as well as the understanding of the world, according to Cornelius Krusé (1947–1948). His address, "What Contribution Can Philosophy Make to World Understanding?," was delivered at a joint meeting of the Eastern Division and the Second Inter-American Congress of Philosophy at Columbia University (5:408). Krusé took this opportunity to discuss the newly formed United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and its ambitious goals for international cooperation on education, science, culture, and communication. These aims are entirely consistent with democracy as a way of life and politics.

Where does philosophy fit in? Philosophers have been defending absolute values or subjective values for millennia; is there any practical alternative? As far as the real world of human affairs is concerned, what is needed is a discerning inquiry into "universal" values: concrete values already accepted and pursued by most peoples around the world. Universality may appear to be a poor substitute for assured certainties, whether of the transcendent or intuitive sort. All the same, certainties have not proven their solidity or practicality. Moreover, they have been responsible for tyrannies. Universality could do better asserted Krusé:

> It must not be supposed that search for values of universal validity carries with it, as is so often feared, the rejection of diversity in world outlook and way of life. Quite the opposite is true. The true philosopher will be a lover of plurality, rejoicing in man's diverse ways of conceiving his place and destiny in the world. It is not uniformity but orchestrated unity which the world is in need of. (5:404)

Abram Cornelius Benjamin (1947–1948) appreciated the universality of the philosopher's domain, yet that level of generality leaves plain communication behind, resulting in "Philosophy, the Cult of Unintelligibility." Sorted by temperament and technique, Benjamin surveyed over a dozen sects and schools of thought, each trying to pair intelligibility with terminology, with varying degrees of success. Truly creative and speculative philosophy will not be delimited by common sense or ordinary language where new ideas are needed, just as science could not be restricted, and unfamiliar situations are encountered:

> The philosopher must use his technical language because what he wants to say is something which the average man does not want to say because he has never been confronted with the necessity for saying it. The language of the common man is adequate to the situations with which he is in immediate contact, since it was devised to communicate about just such states of affairs, and he will realize its insufficiency only when his experience has broadened to include situations which cannot be adequately described in these terms. (5:444)

That experimental spirit can be lost, however, if the speculative philosopher retreats into a "rationalistic, deductive method of exposition and justification" (5:444), makes "attempts to clarity terms by reducing them to other terms which are equally obscure" (5:445), or retreats into tedious repetition in book after book. Philosophy's remaining hope is to open paths into new realms and clearly explain show how one may get there and back again.

6. Specialization and Fragmentation

As philosophers entered the last three years of a tumultuous decade, the post-war boom was expanding prosperity, colleges and universities were swelling with students, and disciplinary demands seemed more urgent than before. Most presidential addresses narrowed to topics from one area of philosophy or another, such as epistemology, philosophy of science, or naturalism.

Everett John Nelson (1946–1947; 1966–1967) offered "A Defense of Substance," taking substance to be the locus of causal powers exemplified in regular laws of related events. Causal power cannot be reduced to any number of qualities or relations, and surely irreducible to mere constant conjunctions. Power itself may be 'indefinable' (5:357) but substantial powers need be hypothesized in order to account for the verifiable regularity of conditional patterns of events: "any evidence that the data of experience occur according to stable law or in an orderly manner is evidence of the existence of substance as a ground of that law or order" (5:358).

Reichenbach also chose empiricism and rationalism in their basic forms as unacceptable extremes for his address, "Rationalism and Empiricism: An Inquiry into the Roots of Philosophical Error." Empiricism and rationalism take their extreme forms because rationalism first adopted the degree of necessity and certainty obtainable in mathematics as the standard of knowledge, while empiricism demanded that same high standard from experience:

> The empiricist has always attacked rationalism by the argument that the rationalist neglects the contribution of sense observation to knowledge. But

> in developing his own philosophy, the empiricist unconsciously accepted the fundamental thesis of rationalism, according to which genuine knowledge has to be as reliable as mathematical knowledge, and thus was pushed into the hopeless position of proving that empirical knowledge was as good as mathematical knowledge. (5:421)

Empiricists were thus forced toward either naïve materialism or empiricist skepticism. Naïve materialism would be scientific but ends up crudely metaphysical instead; empiricist skepticism abandons all hope of justifying anything scientific. Empiricism must abandon the rationalist standard of knowledge.

Ironically, mathematical physics has shown the way for empiricism. Mathematics itself offers analytic truth unable to describe any reality. However, the theoretical choice among geometries to describe the universe liberates science from logical guarantees, while synthetic rules yielding probabilities through induction by enumeration are able to guide predictive knowledge of future events. Only by the early twentieth century was science's own liberation from rationalism unavoidably obvious. Until then, philosophers could get away with interpreting science as each pleased, permitting their tacit preference for rationalism to distort what they could understand about the experimental sciences.

The solution to philosophy's blindnesses is now clear:

> What, then, can we do to build up a better philosophy? The study of error should help us to find the truth. Since philosophy is dependent on science, we should make this dependence the conscious condition of our work: we should know that the nature of knowledge can be studied only through analysis of science. The idea of a philosophical theory of knowledge that derives the general outlines of knowledge from the structure of the mind, or from an insight into the nature of being, should forever be abandoned. There is no ontology, no separate realm of philosophical knowledge that precedes science. Theory of knowledge is analysis of science. Philosophy does not contribute any content to knowledge; it merely studies the form of knowledge as exhibited in the work of the scientist and examines all claims to validity. In so doing, the philosopher will know that all he can strive for is a philosophy of the knowledge of his time. (5:429)

A franker statement of scientific philosophy could not be found. What happens to normative philosophy?

> The philosopher, who had to renounce setting up the principles of physics, will be ready also to renounce setting up the fundamental ethical imperatives. His task can only consist in a logical analysis of moral behavior,

> comparable to his analysis of cognitive behavior. He will point out the significance of implications for moral behavior, of the relations connecting the different volitional aims, making one aim subordinate to another; and he will emphasize the necessity of studying psychology and sociology to everyone who wants to combine volitional aims into an ordered system. Without the results of these sciences, implications between volitional aims cannot be set up, since these implications depend on the synthetic knowledge comprised by psychology and sociology. As in the theory of knowledge, the work of the philosopher in the field of ethics will essentially consist in establishing order, in making explicit the logical controls of a field of behavior so controversial and so indispensable. (5:429)

Lest anyone accuse Reichenbach of abandoning the tenor of his times and the knowledge that the world has barely survived yet another crisis, he did defend his philosophy's quest for universality:

> The sober study of truth is deprived of the glamour of artistic creation; but it carries the advantage of paving the path to universal agreement, of setting up results that eventually will be exempt from controversy and attack. It is the path of science on which the philosophy of logical analysis is marching. Though less attractive to the romantic mind, the adoption of scientific method will appear the inescapable consequence of an unprejudiced study of the history of philosophy; it is the only successful path open to the philosophy of the twentieth century. (5:430)

By coincidence, the next address was delivered by a philosopher similarly concerned for philosophy's relationship with science, but who arrived at a diametrically opposed position. Herbert Wallace Schneider (1948–1949) spoke about "Metaphysical Vision," and offered to metaphysics an opportunity for a very different destiny than becoming just an aspect of science:

> So metaphysics, too, could be a science—the science of ontology. It could ask with more precision and persistence than is ordinarily profitable, what the world is. . . . True propositions could thus be systematized not merely as logical statements, but as descriptive of states-of-affairs. These states-of-affairs would be the data for an analytic ontology, without benefit of any postulates or presuppositions other than the general rules of scientific method. No cosmology, theology, value theory, or transcendental deductions need complicate its wholehearted devotion to types of being. No claims to primacy or to ultimacy need embarrass its modest place among other sciences. There is no reason, therefore, why ontology could not be

> scientific enough to satisfy the fussiest logician. On such austere and possibly barren ground metaphysics could, if it chose, eke out its little life among the sciences. (5:457–458)

Surely metaphysics can have a wider vision that that! Would metaphysics turn away from its futile rationalism only to be reduced to sterile empiricism? Never!

> Is it any temptation to a metaphysician to live peacefully on such terms among scientists, when he might do battle gloriously among philosophers?
>
> For philosophers, unlike scientists, live contentiously, and what they euphemistically call "dialectic" is usually disputation. Their inquiries are not peaceful and cooperative, but rather the occasions where opposites meet, and their "associations" are meetings for exhibiting such oppositions. It is in this environment that at least *modern* metaphysics has chosen to live. It never has both eyes on its own field of inquiry, but always one eye on the other philosopher. It is habitually critical and not merely analytical. It lives by self-criticism, hesitation, evaluation, and complication. To its own particular concern with being it brings the added load of its own history and of human experience in general. Its ambition is not merely to be true but to be empirical as well; not merely to understand how things exist but to report man's experience with existence. Thus it struggles with a double interest in man and in nature. It tries to be scientifically philosophical. Whereas any ordinary philosopher is systematically contentious, the metaphysical philosopher is contentiously systematic, for he insists on putting the whole of human experience into scientific form and at the same time putting the whole of science into the form of human experience. (5:458)

Philosophy is not fated to merely be a sub-domain of scientific method, but it should resolutely be scientifically philosophical in a much broader sense:

> I would conceive philosophical metaphysics as a peculiar method of binocular vision which can be applied to any subject matter, not for the sake of integrating knowledge systematically, but for the sake of illuminating by its plurality of perspective those aspects of a particular being which no one science or any other art can reveal. Though the method may be conceived systematically, there is no systematic application of it, no universal insight, no insight into reality as such, no wisdom-in-general. For the correlation of perspectives is achieved not in a third type of system which synthesizes science and experience, but in practice and imagination. Philosophic insight, like intelligence, is not expounded in treatises, for it cannot

> be formulated systematically; it exists piecemeal in practical judgment, critical ability, and poetic imagination. (5:463)

Schneider's pragmatist respect for pluralism and perspective, and for empirical integration over dialectical systematization, was echoed by another pragmatist, Donald Ayres Piatt (1948–1949). Piatt similarly called for philosophy to become more scientifically oriented without getting absorbed into science's methodologies and theories. If science is truly liberating, and all science is ultimately to be applied science, then science should be absorbed into the radical social efforts to relieve suffering and injustice. The bondage to which Piatt referred in his "Philosophy, Pragmatism, and Human Bondage" is the loss of empowerment that our social structures have imposed on us, without much knowledge or consent of individuals. Wasn't the point of reason and knowledge to be human liberation?

> Human bondage gives point and poignancy to the thesis that the main concern of philosophy should be the nature of the world with man in it as its central fact. This is simply because man is man, man is the central fact, and there is no getting away from him. To take man as central is to take his problems seriously, and this requires recognition that the problem of knowledge and the problem of valuation are not at bottom two problems but are one and the same problem. (5:480)

The stunning successes of science demand readjustments not merely between human beings and nature, but between people and their social environments. If we live in an "Age of Anxiety" (5:472), philosophy's rationalist neglect for real human problems only makes matters worse. Philosophy can reassert its opportunity to empower us:

> By turning its attention away from things as they are to the way in which things are connected in passage, and by giving man an appreciable control over things in passage, science has imposed a heavy responsibility upon philosophy, the responsibility for becoming scientific about the ends of life as well as about the means for achieving these ends. The objective need-demand situation makes the philosophical enterprise perform a genuine service, mediating between the rich complexity of human life as immediately experienced and suffered and the objective causal structure exhibited by the sciences. So it is that a kind of pragmatism has emerged in our inquiry as a hopeful tertium quid between philosophy and human bondage, pragmatism signalizing the militant faith of the "I" in creative human intelligence. (5:481)

7. Philosophy and Science

Other presidents of the 1940s had the significance of science on their minds. If philosophy were restored to significance because of science, then the matters that science is able to find and verify as significant must have crucial importance. Paul Marhenke (1949–1950) selected for his topic "The Criterion of Significance" in order to demand the strictest criteria for anything significant that any science or philosophy is capable of declaring. A declarative is significant only if it satisfies the grammar and orthography rules of a language and be capable of clear expression in ordinary idiom.

Marhenke dismissed the notion that esoteric language used in some metaphysical systems is meaningful despite its untranslatability into ordinary language. If esoteric expressions are meaningful, he declared, then someone who genuinely understands their meaning would produce that meaning in ordinary idiom: "Anyone who has mastered the esoteric idiom and knows what is being said is ipso facto in a position to communicate his knowledge in the language he shares with the rest of us" (5:515).

Put plainly, Marhenke justified his claim that esoteric metaphysics is meaningless unless a translation into ordinary language is produced on the grounds that meaningful metaphysics is evidently translatable into ordinary language. If ordinary idiom commonly finds tautologies positively informative, Marhenke has said something significant about significance to his audience.

Marhenke next rejected theories from Bertrand Russell and Moritz Schlick, holding that sentences obtain their significance by expressing non-psychical propositions, or truth conditions, by pointing out that we could not tell what proposition or state of affairs could be responsible for any sentence's meaning until we first knew its significance; so significance holds priority. He went on to criticize Rudolf Carnap's verifiability criterion for empirical meaning, noting that one "cannot devise an observation test until you know the meaning of the sentence you are going to test" (5:525)

Albert Edwin Avey (1949–1950) focused on epistemological considerations about truth and falsehood in his address, "Truth and Falsehood, Mostly Falsehood." Philosophies have little difficulty proposing a bewildering variety to concepts of truth and knowing truth, without sufficiently attending to falsity and error. Saying a great deal about the reality of truth without explaining the origin of error raises suspicion that little has been accomplished on the matter of attaining knowledge or thinking that objectivity is possible. Realisms do not handle the problem of subjectivity well, while pragmatisms and idealisms appear to require either that there is no knowledge, or that there is no error.

The relationship of the knower to reality is the basic issue, and there these problems reappear in different guise. Is that relationship fatalistically or deter-

ministically settled by reality itself, or does human freedom have a role? Dualism would account for that freedom of the knower to deviate from an accurate grasp of reality, but it would also permit a complete disconnection, so far as anyone could tell, even between separate minds. Monism imposes events on a passive mind unable to see error; dualism allows events to be so different from reality that minds cannot locate truth.

> The problem of error is clearly a phase of the problem of the One and the Many in the structure of Reality. The difficulty with excessive monism is that it stifles the possibility of error. This we reject not from the ethical point of view. If it could be made intelligible as interpretation of fact we could accept it even though counter to what we might approve. But our problem is not ethical; it is epistemological and ontological. Errors occur, and we ask, how is it possible that they should occur? What structure does a reality have which allows this? On the other hand if there is no unity whatever how can any fact refer to any other? (5:566)

Truth and falsity must be a relativistic, conditional, and pluralistic matter. "Critically considered, all discourse operates within the confines of mentality. Whether there is any reality beyond these confines is an unanswerable question." All the same, "mind does transcend any particular event which is within its ken; especially does thought transcend sensation" (5:570):

> the causal interplay of the subjective and individual with the objective and general must be due to the existence of some kind of common denominator, some basic principle of continuity between the two. All monistic metaphysics holds this to be the case, whatever name is given to ultimate reality. The escape from solipsism through the concept of causality then means that so far as the ultimate unity is concerned there is a sense in which there never is any isolation. (5:571)

Avey hastened to explain that we may never know that ultimate unity, of course—whether idealism or materialism is correct, we will not be in a position to verify conclusively. However, the connectedness of knowledge to real matters within our range of active experience as it grows does permit both the possibility of error, and hence of truth.

I conclude this survey of the 1940s with two presidential addresses delivered in 1949 by two eminent thinkers of their generation, Hartshorne, a process metaphysician, and mystical empiricist Walter Terence Stace (1949–1950). Hartshorne began his address, "Chance, Love, and Incompatibility," by announcing that each of the three principles named in his title apply universally to all reality. Chance and love have other categories with which they are incompatible, and still others that must be related (such as chance presupposing incom-

patibility and correlating with necessity), but Hartshorne was ultimately interested at the compatibility of chance and love in mutual tension with each other. On the way to exploring that mutual compatibility, he discussed too many philosophical topics and puzzles to recount here. He did insist on a pragmatic view of knowledge, and the partial openness and particularity of the future, setting the stage for his affirmation of free will:

> We say that knowledge is for the sake of prediction and control. But prediction and control, if taken without qualification, exclude one another. One predicts an eclipse, but does not control it. One controls—from moment to moment—one's conversational utterances, but just to this extent one does not predict them. To predict is to renounce further control; to hold open for control is to renounce prediction. If I predict what I shall say tomorrow, I imply that I shall tomorrow make no decisions concerning my speech; for the decisions must already have been made. If Beethoven had predicted one of his symphonies, he would have created it already; and if a psychologist had predicted it, he would have been just such a composer as Beethoven and assuredly no psychologist. The predicter of Newton must be at least a Newton. Such absurdities may help to teach us that—as Dewey has been contending for nearly half a century—the basic function of knowledge is not to focus a mental camera on the future but to discover what *present* limited potentialities, that is to say, partial indeterminacies, are given for resolution in the future. The resolution itself will be the coming of the future, and to talk of predicting its form is to suppose that something can be settled while it is still unsettled. The object of knowledge is not the future as determinate, but present realities as materials from which alone the future can be made. (5:490–491)

What Karl Popper had pointed out in a conference paper in 1948 (but did not publish until years later[15]) about prediction and prophecy in the social sciences, Hartshorne here proclaimed to be valid over the range of all possible human knowledge, including metaphysics. Human decisions are both concretizations of past contributing conditions and explorations of emerging potentials extending into the future.

Love is a supreme value, but like everything else, it has no guaranteed reality and must take its chances, so to speak, with potentials and opportunity. "Tragedy is thus inherent in value" (5:502), and affirming love's value is no exception, so no theodicy of perfection can be reckoned. All the same, the correlation of chance and love permits the (partial) realization of all human values that can be achieved. Chance and love can only receive ongoing mutual adjustment seeking the attainment of an ultimately aesthetic standard:

> This adjustment requires that destructive conflict arising from incompatibility of values should be mitigated without paying too high a price in loss of individuality, from which spontaneity, chance, and danger cannot be eliminated. It is through love that tragedy is, not indeed wholly prevented, but made bearable and given whatever beauty it is capable of. The love that can do this is that which expects to share with others the sufferings from which no actuality, human or superhuman—subject as all must be to chance and incompatibility—can entirely escape. Such love is not, as Plato thought, the search for the supreme beauty. In its highest human and superhuman forms it simply is that beauty. (5:503)

Stace shall be permitted to have the last word of the decade for our survey of the 1940s. Regarding science itself, religion should no longer resist. Stace was more concerned for "Naturalism and Religion." Shall the scientific worldview of naturalism, confident in its discoveries of so many interconnections among the universe's phenomena, finally dismiss supernaturalism? Naturalism may try, but mystical experience still asserts a relationship with an utterly non-natural kind of reality, insisting that it alone connects with that reality in a way that no other mode of knowledge can. Religion must prove to be immune from absorption into the naturalistic web of explicable forces and events.

Stace had a narrow view of what may count as religious experience, yet he expansively allows that most people may have a taste of it:

> Religious experience, at its highest point, is identical with mystical experience. And since practically all men are capable of religious experience in some degree, it follows that practically all men are capable of mystic experience in some degree. Although we usually class only a very few rare and very exceptional men as "mystics," and the rest of us as non-mystics, yet there is in fact no such hard and fast line. It seems likely that the religious consciousness of the ordinary so-called non-mystic is in reality a lower degree of, or a diluted and perhaps impure version of, the mystic consciousness. (5:536)

The ineffability, non-rationality, and unnaturality of such experiences are fused together, not inferred. The ineffable must be unnatural and nonrational since the natural is conceptualizable (a precondition for rationality and naturality), but the mystical experience never is conceptualizable.

However, what is devoid of conceptualization is not automatically devoid of any quality or positive reality in itself (as most of the world's mystics themselves admit). Just because language must apply only sets of negations to the supernatural does not mean that the mystical experiences themselves consist of

absences and negations. Why should mystical experiences conform to either positive or negative language, when they usually do have positive content, regardless of what any *via negativa* theology might try to say about them? No Apophatic theology could know that all mystical experiences are essentially quite similar in voidness, for the possibility of comparison requires applicable concepts, of which there are admittedly none.

The mystic personally knows next to nothing about these experiences as well, but at least it can be understood what their content is not, and it is, by all accounts, not like natural conceptualized experience That is why letting these experiences gesture at the supernatural is still sensible and cannot be ruled out. That is also why letting mystics apply symbolism and metaphor must not be ruled as nonrational.

Theology's popular descriptions of God for lay people are, therefore, just as much hostile to religious experience as any scientific naturalism. The symbolic language from mysticism is primarily about "the inner subjective experience of the mystic" (5:547), and will not necessarily reveal any objectivity or truth about the supernatural as well, even if mystics assume so.

Nevertheless, Stace argued that despite its subjectivity:

> the value of the religious experience is intrinsic, and not merely instrumental; second, that it is sui generis, and cannot be reduced to moral or any other value; third, that it is the supreme value of human life, transcending all other values, precisely as the religious man claims. (5:550)

Once again, misguided theology is the greater obstacle to this affirmative mystical stance, by getting trapped into mistaken claims that the superiority of the mystical implies the unreality of the natural:

> I say that mystics do not necessarily object to a naturalistic and subjectivistic interpretation of the mystic experience; that there are world-religions which actually interpret it in precisely that way; and that therefore the common assertion that an objectivist interpretation is absolutely bound up with the religious consciousness and cannot be rejected without doing violence to that consciousness, is nothing but a Western or Christian provincialism, not essential to religion, and no necessary part of the universal religious spirit of man. (5:553)

Stace then drew out the surprising implications to this overall stance toward religious experience. The subjectively mystical experience must affirm the supernatural, yet this subjectivity cannot dissolve or devalue the natural world. Mystics must be religious about their experiences, but those experiences are

naturally human all the same. Therefore, it unnecessary for naturalism to reject religiosity, and religious naturalism is the common inheritance of humanity.

Notes

1. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), p. 49.

2. John Dewey, "No Matter What Happens—Stay Out!," *Common Sense* 8 (March 1939): 11.

3. John Dewey, Lessons from the War—in Philosophy, in *The Later Works, 1925–1953*, vol. 14, *Essays, Reviews, and Miscellany, 1939–1941*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: SIU Press, 1988), pp. 312ff.

4. John Patrick Diggens, *The Promise of Pragmatism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 2.

5. Quoted in I. L. Kandel, *The Impact of the War upon American Education* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949), p. 10.

6. Radoslav Andrea Tsanoff, *The Moral Ideals of Our Civilization* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1942).

7. "Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association of 1944–May 1, 1945," *The Philosophical Review* 54, no. 4 (July 1945): 369–399, at 397.

8. George Hartmann, "The Strength and Weakness of the Pacifist Position as Seen by American Philosophers," *The Philosophical Review* 53 (1944): 125–144.

9. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Philosophy in the United States 1939–1945," *The Philosophical Review* 56 (1947): 390–405.

10. Brand Blanshard, "From the Commission's Mailbag," *The Philosophical Review* 54 (1945): 197–259.

11. Brand Blanshard, et al., *Philosophy in American Education: Its Tasks and Opportunities* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945).

12. William James, "The PhD Octopus," *Harvard Monthly* (March 1903), http://grammar.about.com/od/classicessays/a/The-Ph-D-Octopus-By-William-James-Classic-Essays.htm (accessed 03 March 2015).

13. Daniel Sommer Robinson, *Political Ethics: An Application of Ethical Principles to Political Relations* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1935).

14. Robinson, *The Principles of Conduct: An Introduction to Theoretical and Applied Ethics* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948).

15. Karl R. Popper, Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences, in *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963/2014), pp. 452–466.

AN ANXIOUS AGE: AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY DURING THE 1950s

Frank X. Ryan

1. Introduction

In faded Polaroid prints, the 1950s appears as a bucolic land of steeples, Studebakers, and white picket fences, family values and nosy neighbors, where indiscretions only happen behind closed doors, and where atrocities afflict people only in far-away places. For American intellectuals of the period, the prevailing sense was quite different. These were the younger siblings of the "Lost Generation": too young to remember the hope and optimism vanquished by the War to End All Wars, yet charged with the unenviable task of piecing together a world shattered by two conflagrations. They faced not flack puffs in their skies, but mushroom clouds in their nightmares; not the overt threat of invading armies, but a vague "communist menace" who could be your neighbor, or you if your neighbor were sufficiently paranoid. Obsessed with the ideal of social justice, they remained largely oblivious to the oppression of minorities, women, and the poor in their midst. This generation did not have the romantic luxury of declaring itself lost; it was just anxious and adrift.

The presidential addresses collected in Volume 6 of the The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series expressed the indecision and transience of the times. As Dilman Walter Gotshalk (1950–1951) observed, "today, philosophy seems to be in a lull. The greatest living philosophers are venerable older men whose main work is done, and the younger men have not yet grown to greatness" (6:48).

John Dewey (1905–1906), George Santayana, and Ludwig Wittgenstein all died during the decade, and, with the exception of Willard Van Orman Quine (1957–1958) and Clarence Irving Lewis (1933–1934; 1954–1955), the leading American philosophers—Sidney Hook (1959–1960), Ernest Nagel (1954–1955), John Herman Randall Jr. (1956–1957), Max Harold Fisch (1955–1956), Max Black (1958–1959), Oets Kolk Bouwsma (1956–1957), Abraham Kaplan (1958–1959), Paul Arthur Schilpp (1958–1959), and Arthur Edward Murphy (1950–1951)—were all their predecessors' standard-bearers.

These presidents made up for what they lacked in originality with scope, breadth, and diversity. Nine of the thirty contributors were foreign born, and beyond the familiar American motifs of naturalism, realism, and pragmatism are themes extending to logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy, existentialism, phenomenology, Asian philosophy, and Soviet jurisprudence. Some

used the occasion of their addresses to present their current research; others reached for larger, integrative themes. There were gut-wrenchers, like Melvin Miller Rader's (1953–1954) impassioned plea for the renewal of the human community, and gut-busters like Randall's biting send-up of logical positivism. Even the more technical pieces, however, are uniformly interesting and accessible, geared for verbal presentation and non-specialists.

2. Philosophy in the 1950s

No one sets the tone for this anxious age more poignantly than Gotshalk. In "Twentieth Century Theme," he observed that in spite of an array of technological marvels, "a note of grimness, harshness, and disenchantment" (6:41) had worked its way into the national psyche. The optimism at the opening of the century had succumbed to a pervasive anxiety, dread, and a "narcissistic enchantment with Nothingness" (6:41).

Modern philosophy first embraced materialism and Newtonian physics, then shifted to a buoyant objective idealism geared to becoming and process. In the twentieth century, however, neither substance nor flux seemed sufficient to account for the complexities of nature, nor did their mere interaction. Instead, insisted Gotshalk, existence is manifest in the complex interdependence of stability and change, where "relation" itself becomes the essence of being. Human affairs, too, must be reexamined in terms of relations played out on the world stage as conflicts between creativity and control, innovation and stagnation, the visionary and the reactionary. To sort this out, to suggest the shape of a proper balance, philosophy must shed its fashionable skin of over-specialization and open itself to the "telic actualities and possibilities in all domains of current human existence" (6:50).

Hook shared Gotshalk's sense of the tragic in philosophy, but suggested a different way to channel it. A Jewish immigrant and renowned political activist, his initial enthusiasm for Communism soured with the harsh realities of the Soviet dictatorship. In "Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life," he asked, "What, if anything, has philosophy to tell us about the human condition, about the fate of man and his works?" (6:559). On one hand, there is no dearth of moralizers eager to take up the cause of "the human condition" and loudly proclaim that they have the answer. On the other hand, moralists who use reason and language to set a program of action are in short supply. To become relevant to a given discipline, philosophy must not merely heap platitudes upon it; it must become thoroughly familiar with its details. At the same time, it must connect concrete practices with the ways of the world at large, which we call metaphysics. This is what Dewey called "critical philosophy of social life,"[1] and what Hook called "philosophy as *normative* social inquiry" (6:562).

Hook pointed out that pragmatism had long valued social inquiry as the primary mission of philosophy. Less touted is its involvement with the tragic aspects of human existence, though no philosophy is properly called "social" without such engagement. Unlike other traditions, pragmatism does not identify tragedy primarily with sickness, old age, or death. Technology is alleviating the burdens of illness and decrepitude, and Socrates's notion of death as part of life seems preferable to wallowing in morbidity. Moreover, noted Hook, the possibility of death breathes freedom into life: "It is nobler to exist and struggle in a world in which there is always a vital option to live or die" (6:566). Choosing to live is a commitment to making things better; should we fail in this endeavor, death is the solace that no evil or suffering lasts forever.

Pragmatism's tragic sense is fully revealed in its commitment to moral deliberation. As Hook noted, asking "What should I do?" primarily occurs in situations where one perceived good conflicts with another, and the rejected good is what we come to call evil (6:566). With goods that are complex or momentous—the basic choices of love, friendship and vocation—the sense of tragedy is pronounced. "We have sacrificed to become what we are," Hook reminded us, in experiences that permanently transform us (6:567). More dramatic still are social dilemmas where the rights of the few conflict with the good of the many. Our utmost moral duty, accordingly, is to be *conscientious* in critical deliberation and consequent action. Ultimately, pragmatism's appreciation of tragedy is more serious and heroic than other approaches because it neither resigns itself to tragedy nor takes an easy way out, but instead takes responsibility for continued living without yielding to despair.

In "The Philosopher's Commitment," Philip Blair Rice (1952–1953) preached a more personal route to philosophical redemption. He reminded us of Plato's dual challenge to philosophers: (1) honor philosophy itself—seek truth and wisdom, and (2) "return to the cave," using the wisdom obtained in doing so to promote the intellectual and physical improvement of humankind (6:170). We might disagree about how successfully any given contemporary philosopher, such as Sartre, balances these obligations. Nevertheless, said Rice, the only obvious way to display our commitment to philosophy is by "continuing to do the general kinds of things we are doing already in our professional capacities" (6:174). This means we acknowledge circumstances in which philosophers are justified in retreating to their towers for long periods, or perhaps even a lifetime. However, philosophers, by nature, are normative animals, and simply by following their professional instincts they cannot help but express a concern for truth and justice. "To maintain standards of honest learning, courageous thinking and conscientious teaching" (6:180) amid the growing "hysterical atmosphere," offers Rice, is sufficient to meet our responsibility.

In "The Abdication of Philosophy," Schilpp renounced any tendency to accede to the status quo. In an age where our planet is threatened with nuclear annihilation, most erstwhile "lovers of wisdom" are not content merely with "business as usual," but strive for business increasingly relegated to the manipulation of language. Indeed, given that wisdom resists strict verification and classification, most philosophers avoid discussing it, thus effectively abdicating philosophy's historic mission. While scientists had raised their voices against the nuclear arms race, philosophers had largely remained silent. This detachment had become institutionalized by an emphasis on research, where teaching is at best a necessary evil.

According to Schilpp, this did not mean that philosophers should do less thinking and more acting. Actually, they should do more of both as they figure out how to apply abstract ideas to concrete social problems. Schilpp reminded his audience that Dewey embodied the notion that thinking is for the sake of action, and that the purpose of wisdom is to influence the conduct of life (6:535). One cannot do political theory without a deeper grounding in the social, which, in turn, invokes an entire worldview. Attention to the technical details of such a view is important, but that is not the point or purpose of such analysis. Instead, as Dewey said, "philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men."[2]

Echoing Schilpp's activism was Randall, who, in the witty and sardonic "Talking and Looking," reminded us that experience is historic, pluralistic, and personal. Prior to the arrival of the logical positivists in America, there was a genial competition among idealists, realists, and pragmatists for the possession of truth. Though they disagreed, they respected each other's viewpoints and, to varying degrees, benefited from them. The positivists, however, had imposed a narrow sectarianism. They cited only their own works and brushed off other views as "meaningless." Any foray beyond the formal analysis of language, such as science or history, was deemed not just wrong, but "unphilosophical." Of course, such dismissals are not meant to be discussed or defended, since they too are just "emotive" utterances. "One can at least understand why Stalin was interested in censoring critical thinking. But why should we be concerned to censor ourselves?" (6:355).

While being mindful of philosophers' mistakes of the past, linguistic and otherwise, Randall insisted that philosophers of vision can still engage in metaphysics and "speculative" philosophy. Philosophy will be richer to the extent it can overcome its self-imposed intellectual isolation and engage science, religion, humanity, and art. This is preferable to simply talking about talk. Far from tethering ourselves to "ordinary language," we should promote the cult of "extraordinary language," whose masters include Aristotle, Hegel, Peirce, Alfred

North Whitehead (1931–1932), and Heidegger. Or, better yet, we should see for ourselves, since looking is more decisive than talking.

Randall reminded us that Bertrand Russell clung to traditional empiricism's associationalist psychology nearly a half century after the classical pragmatists renounced it. Only at the time he spoke was mathematical logic and the "picture" theory of the early Wittgenstein giving way to "a genuinely functional theory of meaning" (6:359) where the meaning of language "now consists in the way it is used, the role it plays, the job it does" (6:359). Randall hoped that this signified the end of positivism's narrow sectarianism, and a new willingness to "cooperate fruitfully with the other critical currents of our time" (6:360).

Another advocate of broad philosophical engagement, Fisch, in "The Critic of Institutions," chided Whitehead's claim that philosophy should set forth abstractions that complete and synthesize the methods of the special sciences. He found this position excessive, given that scientific proliferation is the antithesis of "synthesis," and too limiting, inasmuch as the scope of philosophy far outstrips that of science alone. Instead, he proposed that philosophy should become generally critical of institutions, of which the sciences are but one kind. An institution identifies a common purpose that promotes some connected set of present and future activities. In one way or another, every human value is conditioned by institutions. As Aristotle noted, institutions came into being so that we might live, and they are modified and compounded so that we might live well: Institutions "are the conditions and means of those activities in which the good life consists in that society" (6:332).

Fisch found it no exaggeration to say that philosophy began in civic, rather than cosmic, wonder. The most enduring theme in the history of philosophy has been the relation between nature and institutions. Virtually every other problem—fact and value, matter and form, body and mind—is a variant of this. Moreover, while the natural sciences have only a peripheral relation to philosophy in the present day, philosophy remains integral to the social sciences. Every institution, including language, is a concern of the social sciences, yet the social sciences need philosophy to resolve confusions within their functions, methods, and concepts.

While Randall and Fisch reflected the strong antipathy most division presidents had toward positivism, David Rynin (1956–1957) struck a conciliatory note. Playfully titling his address "Vindication of L*G*C*L P*S*T*V*SM," he conceded the stigma of its very utterance. While he, too, forswore positivists who just "talk about talk" and enjoy trashing metaphysics and ethics, he limited his discussion to the connection between truth and verifiability. It is self-evident that no statement is meaningful unless there exists either a sufficient condition of it being true or a necessary condition of it being false. However, to claim we know *the* meaning of a statement, we must be able to assert *both* the sufficient

and necessary conditions of its truth or falsity. For Rynin, this showed that we can know what conditions a statement must have to be meaningful without knowing its actual meaning, or even whether it has a meaning. To confuse being meaningful with having to deliver a determinate meaning is the source of the unwarranted criticism directed at verificationism. The principle demands only that a statement must be verifiable in order to be meaningful; it does not make the excessive additional demand that verification must deliver some fixed and final meaning.

Though less contentious than logical positivism, existentialism had a limited American following in the 1950s. Philip Merlan (1959–1960) saw existentialism as comparable to pragmatism in its call to commitment and social activism. Throughout recorded time, students of human nature have been stymied by the dual traps of objectivism and relativism. Cultural differences and the vagaries of being human undermine claims to objective values, but relativism is corrosive and ultimately unsatisfactory. Some have tried to find a middle ground in sheer commitment: My justification may be no better than yours, but it's *mine*—fighting for it makes it worthwhile. Though noble, this is clearly perverse, given that means do not justify ends.

When we narrow our focus from values in general to what we can *know*, the problem grows even more acute. If all claims are radically contingent, then nothing is secure and we wander forever in darkness. To escape such relativism, *something* must ultimately matter, asserted Merlan, "something on which man's salvation and damnation depend" (6:594). Rationalists have long enshrined this as some universal human characteristic that transcends our particularity. In the realm of moral action, this is manifest in the general will or a categorical imperative; in the realm of contemplation, it is an *intellectus actives*, or universal intelligence. Merlan asserted that some Marxists and Freemasons who "approvingly understand" his point (6:596).

Merlan conceded that the quest for a universal intelligence, where all sing the cosmic chorus in unison, is opposed by romantics, for example Friedrich Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard, who champion particulars over universals. In perfecting what is uniquely mine, I achieve truth by singing the song only I can sing. Existentialism champions this particularism without imposing essential intelligence or any such absolute. Man is the sum total of his accidents.

Saying I begin in absolute relativism, that I am *free* to make myself, means that I am actually saying that I determine myself. For Heidegger, this is the awareness of being-itself, the true task of each human individual. However, it is also the avatar of Hegel's absolute—that the particularity of my self-creation is what I acknowledge as the absolute, of being-itself. What stands as a non-relativistic truth for all seekers in all ages thus amounts to this: In the fact of our contingency is the confirmation of the absolute.

3. Realism, Naturalism, Pragmatism

Amid the travails of the World War II, philosophers such as William Ernest Hocking (1926–1927; 1927–1928), Elijah Jordan (1941–1943), Charles William Hendel (1940–1941), and John Elof Boodin (1912–1913; 1933–1934) brought comfort by way of a revival of rationalism, idealism, and religiosity. By the 1950s, however, the previously dominant stalks of realism, naturalism, and pragmatism had again taken root. Students of Whitehead, Ralph Barton Perry (1920–1921), Roy Wood Sellars (1923–1924), and Dewey were at the height of their power and influence. Some, like Randall, perceived an opportunity to renew the philosophical competition temporarily interrupted by absolutists and positivists.

Lewis's early work in strict implication and modal logic eventually broadened into what others have labeled as a "conceptual" pragmatism. In "Realism or Phenomenalism?," Lewis worried that the perennial questions of philosophy were becoming lost in the minutiae of language analysis and the meaning of meaning. Among the most important of these is problem of objective reference. Though it straddles both metaphysics and epistemology, the problem must be formulated exclusively in terms of experience, since "there is nothing beyond experience which can be adduced for our inspection" (6:244). This does not mean that objective reference is futile, since empirical knowledge is impossible without it. But it does suggest that it must be approached in terms of "characters and relations within cognitive experience itself" (6:245). The metaphysical inference that thought refers only to its own content, however, is the fallacy of phenomenalism. The mere credibility of empirical evidence does nothing to establish the *truth* of any claim, which involves the subject-object relation.

Accordingly, "independent reality is not something to be proved but an original acknowledgment which all men make confronting the facts of life" (6:246)—an "independent factuality" (6:247) that forces itself upon our will yet is amenable to our manipulation. Even George Berkeley supposes such an independent reality, though he conceives it as the content of God's mind, as does Absolute idealism on an even grander scale. Like phenomenalism, idealism does not resolve the problem of objective reference posed by empirical realism, it merely defers the objective to the realm of a cosmic intellect.

An even deeper pragmatic naturalism was pursued by Nagel, who "combined Peirce's logical pragmatic method with the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle" (6:257). In "Naturalism Reconsidered," Nagel echoed Lewis's concern that philosophy had become specialized, piecemeal, and increasingly constrained by scientific findings and methods. However, he noted, philosophers continue to pursue grand ideas that cannot be ignored. Conversely, specialized studies have led to results applicable to human nature and the cosmos itself.

This integration of the broad and the specific supports a naturalistic outlook inclusive of a general account of the universe, our place in it, and a logic of inquiry. It is not a set of specific ideas or theories, but an expansive outlook that, first and foremost, affirms "spatio-temporally located bodies, whose internal structures and external relations determine and limit the appearance and disappearance of everything that happens." Events, relations, behaviors, and meanings, while real, are contingent upon these basic physical structures. Such structures, moreover, are plural and rudimentary: while cast in *real* systems of organization, including progressive systems of life and humanity, they are not manifestations of some underlying homogenous or telic "ultimate reality" (6:262).

Nature, accordingly, is neither our facilitating "home" nor an implacable foe that has doomed us to extinction. Human beings are indeed "continuous" with other manifestations of organic and inorganic organization, but this does not justify the claim that we are the "end" of nature or its most adequate or august manifestation. Human history is a *human* phenomena. Our ultimate success or failure depends upon how wisely we choose hypotheses and balance the exercise of our powers.

Virgil Charles Aldrich (1957–1958) was eager to expand this naturalistic outlook into the realms of imagination, aesthetics, and volition. In "Chess Not without the Queen," he noted that although the return to ordinary language has broadened the game of philosophy beyond the narrow strictures of positivism, philosophers were still playing chess without the queen—whose full utilization requires talk of *things* and *objects* beyond mere talk about language. "There is the field, and there are the things in it. This is reality" (6:460). As constrained by language, things appear as objects, their natures and characteristics determined by the methods of the natural sciences. Observation is the coin of the realm of scientific ascertainment. Imagination actualizes reality in the realm of the aesthetic, and volition specifies things in terms of values, purposes, and the sacred. Descriptive metaphysics offers a neutral way to invoke fields and things without implicating them in any of these three categories.

Quine's early contributions to mathematical logic later blossomed into sweeping critiques of ontology and meaning. In "Speaking of Objects," Quine noted that the seemingly positive response of natives to a linguist who says "rabbit!" while pointing to one, is not indicative that they share his meaning. Their understanding of "rabbit!" might be akin to "undetached rabbit parts" or something even more alien to the linguist's sensibilities. Even if the linguist then gets creative—looking for patterns of affirmation and other behavioral cues in multiple contexts, he ineluctably imposes his own ontology onto whatever translation is ultimately deemed most likely or workable. To a lesser degree, the same incommensurability of meaning occurs among native speakers of the same language: When we agree that we understand each other, that does not mean we all

share an identical conceptual scheme, but only that the coordination between our verbal cues and consequent actions are adequate to our expectations (6:437–440).

That the communication of meaning is always indeterminate to some degree does not mean we cannot develop a viable theory of its emergence and use. In developing language, young children initially regard "mother," "water," and "red" as equally thing-like, only later learning to discriminate, respectively, enduring existences, scattered substances, and distributed properties. But it is mastery of individuating terms, such as "apple," that marks our initiation into the nuanced realm of classes and class-membership, of what it ultimately means to know objects.

Quine is often viewed as a philosopher who synthesized elements of pragmatism and positivism. Following this path quite literally, Paul Henle (1953–1954) was raised in Cleveland and earned both his undergraduate and graduate degrees from Harvard, where he studied symbolic logic under Clarence Irving Lewis 1933–1934; 1954–1955). In "The Problem of Meaning," Henle noted that neither pragmatic nor positivist theories of meaning have been hailed as wildly successful; they have "come to a standstill," so perhaps it's time to shake things up. He aimed to "discuss . . . the next step in their development" (6:230). Henle explained that the theories he was about to discuss:

> all maximize the linguistic element in theory of meaning. They not merely take language as the typical or even the only case of meaning to be considered, but also they treat linguistic meaning, . . . within language itself. For this purpose, one type of statement is singled out, and meanings of other statements are explained in terms of the meaning of these. (6:230)

He defined two types of statements that can be subjected to verification criteria:

> statements to which everything else is reduced *observation* statements. . . . The reason for this choice of terms is obvious: the observation statements are such that their truth is easily ascertainable by observation, and in fact they are supposed to be nothing more than reports of observations. Statements which are not observation statements, that is, statements which reduce to observation statements, I shall refer to simply as *ordinary* statements. (6:230)

Henle's primary concern was to counter the positivists' tendency to reduce all statements to observation statements. For example, statements such as "Jamal is politically astute" or "Wendy is of high moral character" contain interpretive content that defies strict empirical verification. Nor do people who express religious beliefs perceive themselves to be merely making emotive statements; instead, they sincerely believe that they are making statements of fact.

About the pragmatic and positivistic theories he had elucidated, Henle finally concluded:

> theories of the sort we have been taking up are unsatisfactory. They attempt to reduce ordinary statements to observation statements. This reduction does not come off and, even if it did succeed, the field of ordinary statements would be unduly limited. (6:236)

He also explained that understanding and metaphor, broadly construed, are worthy conveyors of meaning (6:234–236).

Yet another pluralist in the philosophy of language was Russian born Max Black. Despite his training in mathematics and logic, he was soon disenchanted with the positivist's aim to make language an exact science, insisting that an acceptance of conceptual vagueness and looseness is essential to understanding our social and linguistic practices. This aligned him more closely with pragmatism and the later Wittgenstein.

In "Language and Reality," Black speculated on the prospects of our finding a "universal grammar" beneath the superficial differences characteristic of each language. As Black put it, "were it possible to construct a philosophical grammar, or any fragment of it, it would be very tempting to say that something would thereby have been revealed about the nature of ultimate reality" (6:484). This idea was expressed by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* as follows: "To give the essence of proposition means to give the essence of all description, therefore the essence of the world."[3]

However, when we endeavor to look for such a grammatical rule or law, we find the results are disappointing. We might identify two basic terms, for example, "stop" and "go," that correspond with two discrete basic actions; but, as Black tells us, "of course, a tap on the shoulder would do just as well" (6:485). Alternatively, some logicians claim that predicate notation eliminates the copula between subject and predicate; others say it preserves the function of the copula without the extraneous word "is." Indeed, the subject-predicate relationship itself may be is dispensable (6:486–487). Contemporary linguists are pondering the conclusion, "No grammatical concept seems to be per se sacred or universal, far less indispensable."[4]

The ultimate problem with attempting to set forth a universal grammar is not with the purely grammatical particles and transformation rules; these, after all, can mean whatever we tell them to mean. Instead, the problem lies in supposing there are simple, fixed, and absolute states of the world these to hook onto. The world does not come to us absolutely, but in contexts, and "there are no adequate criteria for deciding whether contextual situations are to be counted

as the same or different" (6:492). Consequently, holding out for some universal grammar is neither promising nor productive.

George Boas (1951–1952) delivered an address entitled, "Philosophy and Ritual," in which he advocated for the study of meaning beyond language to culture. Most philosophers under-appreciate the extent to which habit shapes our worldview. Individual habits and social customs guide the foundations of epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics—the history of our own culture and our evaluation of others. Whatever we perceive to be outside the prescribed pathways of custom and ritual remains conceptually and verbally impoverished—defined in terms of its lack of familiar features rather than their own unique assets. "The paradox of habit is that we forget those facts of experience with which we are most familiar" (6:87). The only way to break this paradox is to consciously expose our prejudices, and cultivate a taste for novelty and experimentation.

An even broader survey of the influence of culture was offered by Charner Marquis Perry (1954–1955) in "The Rationale of Political Discussion." He noted that although the institutions that underlie political discourse in any given society are never adequately understood by that society, some general characteristics of the conditions necessary for successful political discussion can be identified:

> When an established order—government and laws—is inadequate to enforce agreements, discussion becomes ineffectual. What is reasonable and prudent for one man to propose or to do depends in large part on his estimate of what other men will do; and unless estimates can be based on operating institutions or customs, discussion deteriorates because of uncertainty. . . . Unless existing institutions keep factions broken up into many small ones, discussion is likely to be ended by a dominant faction or frustrated by the sharp oppositions of interest and ideals between two or three large groups. (6:273)

The goal of a politically enfranchised culture is attainable, though not without challenges. In pursuing this vision there is no ultimate ground or Archimedean pivot—we always start in the middle of things. Still, optimal political discussion involves a willingness to integrate facts and values, utilize scientific methods, and strive for synthesis within an atmosphere of give-and-take.

Pragmatism with an Eastern twist enlivened the philosophical anthropology of Van Meter Ames (1959–1960). In "Zen to Mead," Ames contended that Zen Buddhism resonates well with American thought and philosophy, although we know it by other names. Both value "practical wisdom" over "spiritual cultivation" (6:611). For both, the epitome of spirituality is the art of practical living. Ralph Waldo Emerson swooned within the "transparent eyeball" of the divine and found bliss in a mud puddle on a cloudy day. For Peirce, our "glassy es-

sence" is revealed within the holistic play of integrated signs. James found the quintessence of self-satisfaction in the "beautiful stream" of immediacy. Dewey's youthful "mystical experience" left him with the conviction, "faith means not worrying"[5] and that the fullest expression of experience is in aesthetic unity. Finally, in George Herbert Mead (1916–1917), said Ames:

> the scientific West arrives at something like a fusion of the Confucian cultivation of virtue through the bonds of family and community, Taoist laissez-faire and yearning for nature, and Buddhist compassion for man's need of Nirvana. (6:622)

Abraham Kaplan (1958–1959) described himself "by training a positivist, by inclination a pragmatist, in temperament a mystic," (6:498) with broad interests extending to philosophy of religion and Eastern philosophy. In "Philosophic Sense and Mystic Sensibility," he asserted that rationalism (the extreme of sense) and mysticism (the extreme of sensibility) are "the two poles between which philosophy must move," yet they are inextricably intertwined as the love of wisdom and the humanization of that love (6:502). Mysticism wraps itself in obscurantism, the absence of propositional content. As such, it is a form of silence. Yet silence is essential to communication and practical living (6:503). As pragmatism tells us, meaning is ultimately not propositional, but situational—"communication depends upon communion" (6:504).

Kaplan next distinguished "shadow mysticism," which is involved with the occult, from "naturalistic mysticism":

> The occult is traceable, however, not to mysticism, but to a metaphysics of *transcendent parallelism*: there is a realm of Reality, parallel to that of nature and experience, of which the latter is a reflection, if we have the eye to see it and the wit to understand it. Mysticism involved in such a metaphysics I call *shadow mysticism*, . . . by which the Source of all Light may be inferred from experienced darkness. The world of nature becomes a texture of symbols, with allegory the only mode of symbolization. Shadow mysticism is obscurantist because no dictionary can be provided for the interpretation of its symbols—what is allegorized is by definition outside the range of possible experience. (6:502)

Naturalistic mysticism, to the contrary, does not compete with reason and science; instead, and like aesthetics, it offers an attitude toward life "at home in the things of this world" (6:508). In this sense, mysticism is "a quality *in* experience rather than as an avenue to a Reality outside experience" (6:509). Like aesthetic experience, it is not subject to empirical verification, though it can be judged to

be genuine or artificial, profound or clichéd, enduring or fleeting. Naturalistic mysticism does not aspire to deliver new truth, but to affirm the familiar truth as "a loving intimacy with life" (6:510). Unlike shadow mysticism, which aspires to decipher God's plan for heaven and earth, naturalistic mysticism sees the divine as manifest in the world: "Every single thing is an end in itself, not a means to salvation" (6:515). For Kaplan, pragmatism inspires not a transcendent monism, but a radical pluralism of love, commitment, and action. Mysticism is a delight in the fullness of things, a religion of joy.

Bouwsma's address was entitled, "'On Many Occasions I have in Sleep Been Deceived'—Descartes." The possibility that one may currently be dreaming is a cornerstone of Descartes's methodological doubt. Initially, the comparison between waking and dreaming seems plausible; they share a "grammatical analogy" inasmuch as both have discrete content, vivid imagery, and are remembered and reported (6:406). Yet they are also significantly different; a factual report has verifiable content that dreams do not possess. When Descartes proclaimed that we may be deceived by dreams, he is duped by the grammatical analogy into thinking that dreaming is like a factual report—that the dream content is falsified by knowing I was really asleep in my bed. However, since he has no way to verify the content of his dream, Descartes cannot actually declare he was deceived, whereby the skeptical argument loses its force.

4. Philosophy of Science

The anxiety of the times was manifest in reflections about science. The decline of positivism had created deep suspicions about the prospects of a secure and determinate "unity of the sciences," though Thomas Kuhn's exposé of science as a fallible and revisable collection of human institutions would not reshape the intellectual landscape until the 1960s.[6]

Reflecting this uncertainty was Albert George Adam Balz (1955–1956), who, in "Prime Matter and Physical Science," noted that modern physics acknowledges a handful of primitive constants: the mass and charge of electrons and protons, Planck's constant of minimum mass-energy, gravitation, the velocity of light, and the cosmological constant:

> The constants that repeatedly emerge in the equations represent, correspond to, or point to brutely residual factors alleged to be independently there in the domain which physics claims as its own. (6:287)

We do not know why reality is configured this way, and we are not sure which of these constants are essential, which are accidental, or which are likely to be reconfigured in the future.

Theorists often speak of constants as constraints—of what *cannot* happen in nature. Nonetheless:

> If physical science, while mathematical, nevertheless differs from mathematics, if it is *about* existence, then, unless physical science is merely an irresponsible fairy tale, its findings of constants must be of capital import for any philosophical position whatever. . . . even though the physicist does not realize that this is what his equations are about, its constants nevertheless represent brutely residual factors in what does exist. (6:287)

Accordingly, physics is of capital importance to metaphysics. The constants of physics may be mere abstract possibilities, mere essences, but if they tell us something about the very grain of existence, then they are privileged essences.

Conversely, essences that contravene Planck's constant or the velocity of light are incapable of actualization.

As such, concluded Balz, contemporary physics embodies the claim of Thomistic metaphysics that "prime matter" intrinsically accepts certain possible configuring forms while rejecting others.

Hugh Miller's (1950–1951) perspective was less medieval and more pragmatic. In "The Science of Creation," he listed "three epochal discoveries":

> [that] dethroned classical thought, which had established knowledge upon absolute a priori principles. The first was the disestablishment of absolute geometry, which left only statistical description, implemented by arithmetic. The second was the so-called uncertainty principle, the discovery that physical change is not subject to exact and exhaustive theoretical analysis. The third was [Kurt] Gödel's proof of the incompletability of number-theory, which entails the incompletability of all theory. (6:5)

The only unconditional existence is the plurality of particular existences—everything involving form or change is contingent. Particular existence is the sole epistemic value. In the futile attempt to exceed this—to separate additional factual theoretic values from merely useful pragmatic ones—Miller found the philosophy of science frustrating and dishonoring itself. Even worse, it has fostered the rift between purportedly objective scientific truths and the subjective beliefs of social affairs. Beyond its menial function of quantifying particulars, we should embrace modern science as a creative power akin to history, aesthetics, ethics, and religion.

Filmer Stuart Cuckow Northrop (1952–1953) saw an additional connection between our scientific outlook and legal systems. In "The Philosophy of Natural Science and Comparative Law," he suggested that studying a society's civil codes may be the best way to appreciate its underlying values and beliefs.

Communal norms, after all, are embodied in laws; they contain explicit content the people of a community actually utilize to prescribe and enforce proper conduct. Legal codes come in three types: "(1) the intuitive mediational type, (2) the natural history type, and (3) the abstract contractual type" (6:124).

The intuitive mediational type, typical of Eastern cultures, eschews formal canons for situational compromises brokered by mediators. This process is analogous to instrumental pragmatism. The codes of the natural history type "are expressed in the syntactical grammar of the language of common sense objects and relations. . . . [and] describe the social norms of the inductively given status quo." Northrop offered examples of this type in classical China, classical India, and Mohammedan legal codes (6:125–127).

The abstract contractual type, a codified law:

> differs from the natural history type in that it replaces common sense language with a technical terminology. . . . very important consequence of freeing ethical and legal norms from the mere natural history description of the social status quo, thereby permitting the construction of legal and social entities and relations different from any which are observed in any traditional society. This type of law came into being for the first time with the Roman Stoic philosophers who created the Western science of law. (6:127)

The differences among these types are both practical—mediation effective within a clan or village does not translate well to an impersonal urban setting—and theoretical: whereas non-Western cultures focus upon the concrete realities of individuals in specific situations, Western societies elevate the formal and abstract above the status of mere particulars. Accordingly, claimed Northrop, our commitment to universal scientific laws reinforces our acceptance of abstract theories of justice and morality.

5. Ethics, Culture, Aesthetics, and History

Much of Murphy's important work was in metaphysics, where he coined the term "objective realism" to denote the ontological priority of events over things. The abstract character of justice theory in the 1950s was evident in the title of his address, "The Common Good."

Granting that appeals to "the common good" are persuasive, Murphy wondered what we are appealing to when we invoke such a good. The common good has obvious emotive force, but that alone is not a sufficient sanction or justification for action. It is effective as a premise motivating the acceptance of a prescribed social action or policy, but what accounts for this efficacy? The reason, no doubt, is that a common good is the ideal content of an understanding shared

by individuals or groups—an understanding that adjudicates disagreements or conflicting claims, and offers cogent reasons *why* the prescribed act or policy conforms to this standard.

Still, while this may explain how a social standard is maintained and why it is effective, it does not supply the conditions by which it is a bona fide *good*. After all, Murphy noted, the common good is invoked, not by the entire community, but by influential groups and individuals within it, whose motives may be suspicious or worse. An agreement forged upon a common good worthy of the name must be open to the informed scrutiny of everyone in the community affected by it. Many, of course, will dismiss this criterion as unrealistic. But unless we can preserve the notion of the common good, even in imperfect form, the notion of ethical agreement reached by reasoned discourse will give way to sinister alternatives.

Rader, a champion of social justice, had been charged with subversive activities in 1948 for allegedly attending a Communist rally a decade earlier. Rader's successful effort to refute the charge and clear his name gained national attention.

In "Crisis and the Spirit of Community," Rader argued, "Hitler and Stalin would never have had a chance if modern civilization had not been monstrously defective, and until the basic evils are removed, new specters will arise, time and again, to haunt us" (6:209). For centuries, the Western world has increasingly championed the prestige and power of the individual, with rivalry and conflict being the norm:

> Modern dictatorships have sought to prevent social disintegration by extreme coercion, leader-worship, and chauvinism. But the cure is worse than the disease. The alternative to both a communist or fascist dictatorship and an individualistic system of devil-take-the-hindmost is the cultivation of free, cooperative communities. (6:209)

According to Rader, such a profound transformation cannot be accomplished by intellectual or political activities alone. Instead, it requires the profound conviction that our "ideals are based upon the nature of things" (6:210)—an intensity found only in religious and spiritual feelings. It is no accident that the great religions of the world all originated in close-knit communities:

> In the intimate community, human beings first learned the ways of fellowship. Only within the matrix of loving personal relations, men like Jesus and Buddha and Lao-tze came to spiritual birth. (6:213)

The most influential of the world's religions have both "tapped the deepest roots of human feeling" and "have sought to extend these values to the widest com-

pass and thus to universalize them" (6:214). Religions have flourished without a concept of God or the divine, but they cannot exist without the commitment to community, self-transcendence, and universal love that ameliorates our inherent loneliness and alienation. Rader believes a truly liberal religion:

> can teach human beings to return love for hatred. It can awaken in men's minds the hope of the great community. It can penetrate the iron curtains of the human spirit by kindness and patient understanding. (6:221)

Perhaps most significantly, it can promote a *humanistic science* where art, religion, and politics can mature to the point where they may acquire full stewardship over our dangerous runaway technologies.

Margaret Georgiana Melvin (1951–1952) opened her address entitled "The Legal Norm in Soviet Jurisprudence," by noting that Marx appropriated from Hegel the idea that history is both self-evolving and necessarily self-destroying—that everything real ultimately becomes irrational, and, "all that exists deserves to perish."[7] Whereas legal canons are traditionally regarded as a set of absolute and abstract principles, Soviet jurisprudence is sensitive to the dictates of evolving and changing concrete human relations. Law is regarded as "a social science in need of a scientific methodology" (6:58). However, as the first modern state to abolish private property, civil law protecting the property rights of individuals no longer exists in the Soviet Union.

Another international perspective was offered by John David Goheen (1957–1958). In "Concerning a Tendency in French Ethical Thought," he remarked that French and American philosophers appear to occupy very different worlds. Beyond the barrier of language are significant conceptual dichotomies. Anglo-American thought, skewed toward the analytic tradition, focuses on logic, language, and science. French philosophy, indebted to phenomenology, operates within the theatre of "experience" and the social sciences, especially psychology. The French also resist the tendency to question the cognitive significance of ethical claims or "reduce" them to the descriptive behavioral sciences: "Attitudes and feelings are as much objects of 'phenomenological description' as anything else" (6:421). French ethical phenomenologists tend to embrace a "moral psychology" where the complexities of decision and choice are focal. Where existentialists tend to emphasize the absurdity of choice, phenomenologists examine *intentionality* for clues to "axiological attitudes" expressed in moral discourse. Goheen observed that though these philosophers have little interest in American ethics, they eagerly appropriate our developments in psychology, anthropology, and sociology. The budding interest American philosophers have expressed in integrating ethics and the social sciences may help build a bridge between these disparate traditions.

Bertram Emil Jessup (1955–1956) focused on the junction of philosophy and literature. In "The Data of Aesthetics," he praised a relational view of aesthetics, including both creative-critical activities and the scientific and philosophical analysis of these. Aesthetic data is infinitely rich and historically connected. Theory should follow the data, not the reverse. Historically, art has served too many diverse purposes to be pigeonholed into determinate categories, such as specific materials or values such as beauty or economic viability.

Richard Peter McKeon's (1951–1952) address transitions us from the critique of art to the art of effective discourse. One of the century's great historians of philosophy, his "Symposia" is an intellectual history of that wild and heady admixture of food, drink, and intense conversation. Though Socrates's exploration of the nature of love is its most famous incarnation, symposia in various forms have been common from antiquity to the modern era. As McKeon noted, the symbiotic character of group discourse and libation often produces results that exceed the sum of the individual thoughts.

Edward William Strong (1952–1953) opened his "On Judging History" with the observation that throughout the ages, historians have disagreed about the criteria by which they "make value judgments in assessing significance and worth of histories as they have been written" (6:150). Some have regarded "pure history" as analogous to "pure science," a dispassionate recounting of "just the facts" without interpretation or embellishment. Others have emphasized the art of selection, with an eye toward highlighting events that are unusual, dramatic, and make for a great story. A few have insisted that historians cannot stand outside of the events they depict, and that moral evaluation is imperative. Strong agreed with the latter camp, arguing that perspectives are inescapable. Facts are not relative, but their selection and interpretation is. Strong cited Robin George Collingwood, who asserted in his *The Idea of History* (1946), "The value of history…is that it teaches what man has done and thus what man is" (6:157).

In "The Demiurge in Politics: The *Timæus* and the *Laws*," Glenn Raymond Morrow (1939–1940; 1953–1954) wryly remarked, "no one can study the *Laws* critically without asking what Plato was trying to do when he wrote it" (6:187). Many critics believe that *Laws* lacks the charm and clarity of the earlier *Republic*, which remains Plato's definitive account of the ideal society. Scholars often dismiss the *Laws* as a work of crotchety resignation or even see it as "hopelessly confused" (6:188).

However, Morrow disagreed with this assessment. In the *Republic*, Plato also expressed doubt that human nature is redeemable, and lamented that the prospects of a philosopher-king are remote. The *Laws* expressed not resignation but "a more comprehensive grasp of the difficulties that have to be overcome" (6:189). What later scholars have criticized as an obsession with minutia, such as funerals and drainage systems, Morrow saw as the close and careful work of a

craftsperson who has learned that deliverance is in the details. Plato had built his Academy as a training ground, not for abstract theoreticians, but for hands-on social engineers.

Notes

1. John Dewey, Critical Pedagogy, in *Dewey's Critical Pragmatism*, ed. Alison Kadlec (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 44.

2. John Dewey, The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, in *Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude*, eds. Boyd H. Bode, Harold Chapman Brown, John Dewey, et al. (New York: Holt, 1917), pp. 3–69, at 65.

3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: German and English*, 2nd ed., trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge, 1962), 5.4711.

4. W. J. Entwistle, *Aspects of Language* (London: Faber and Faber, 1953), p. 162.

5. See Max Eastman, "John Dewey," *Atlantic Monthly* 168 (1941): 673.

6. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

7. Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerback and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy* (New York: International Publishers, 1941), p. 11.

THE APA PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES DURING THE 1960s

David Johnson and John R. Shook

1. Introduction

The 1960s is widely regarded as a decade when analytic philosophy became thoroughly American and consolidated its dominance over philosophy in America. If that perception has some validity, it cannot be confirmed by the presidential addresses delivered during this period. Americans hardly had a monopoly over the presidential offices in the three divisions of The American Philosophical Association (The APA), as ten of the presidents during this decade were foreign-born. The addresses themselves, taken as a group, are not characterized by typical analytic themes with much frequency.

If there is any safe generalization to be made about this decade's addresses, we could point to the manner in which almost all of them offered broad surveys about each president's approach to philosophy in general or about the president's preferred philosophical movement, rather than narrow investigations into specialized technical problems.

2. Philosophy Unified?

Some philosophers, such as John Daniel Wild (1960–1961), even forecasted reunifications among philosophical movements. His address, "The Exploration of the Life-World," sought common ground on empirical matters. Appealing to William James (1906–1907) and his radical empiricism for inspiration, Wild urged philosophical appreciation for ordinary lived experience and close study of its features. Much of pragmatism, existentialism, and phenomenology, and even ordinary language philosophy could at least agree to methodically investigate the human life-world and its primal significance. One vast chasm remained: the radical divergence between the world described by rational and scientific discourse, and the world that living beings like us actually experience (7:7).

Denying that philosophy should subordinate itself to the sciences, Wild asserted the undeniable realm of "world facts." World facts have a reality as humanly interpreted and value-laden events making an undeniable impact on us, because we all live through them. By contrast, scientific facts largely lack that meaningful structure. Their meaning also arises from our interactions with reality, but strictly controlled and regulated by methods and instruments. Universal

objectivity can be acquired and accessed by everyone, at the price of omitting almost everything of immediate vital importance to each individual.

Having sharply dichotomized scientific facts apart from world facts, Wild outlined the role of interpretation for understanding world facts:

> The interpretation of such world facts must, therefore, fall into two distinct steps: first, finding out what these events meant to the persons involved in their lived existence; and second, searching for their real meaning. Such an interpretation will not be exclusively concerned with objects. It must be concerned with "subjective," or better, with intentional factors as well. It will avoid the traditional concepts of substance and subject, and will recognize that human existence is always stretched out into a world field. It will not subsume historic events under laws of succession, and then place them in a neutral objective frame. It will seek rather to discover types or structures of lived existence in the open horizon of the life-world. It is dealing with free beings capable of choosing styles of life and global world interpretations of their own. Hence it will aim not at prediction and causal control but simply at understanding. (7:10–11)

Phenomenology is central for discerning features of experience, having only a fleeting, contingent, or illusory existence as far as objective science is concerned, which are necessary to the humanly lived world:

> The philosophical phenomenologist will be especially concerned with the clarification of those structures like time, history, freedom, death, and world itself which seem to belong necessarily to human existence, and thus to make any world version possible. (7:13)

In the lived world, divides between the subjective and objective are not fundamental, and no mode of truth takes priority, not even scientific truth. The charge of mere "subjectivism" has no jurisdiction there. Superior authenticity is the better test for humanistic interpretations than the perspective from any scientific confirmation. The life-world has ontological and epistemic priority. Wild offered his reasons:

> First, the basic data of the sciences are first found in the life-world, as I have indicated. Second, life cannot be lived without overarching philosophic interpretations of the world which are beyond the proper scope of science. Man is a philosophic animal who can evade or postpone philosophic issues while he is doing science. But he cannot postpone them indefinitely as he exists in the world, and reflects seriously on his existence.

> The world requires global answers. For these and other reasons, I believe that the world horizon is prior and more inclusive. (7:18)

Another proponent of phenomenology viewed the relationship between the life-world and the natural world quite differently. Marvin Farber's (1963–1964) "The Philosophical Interest in Existence" found no difficulty with the notion of natural experience. He warned against the design of a special "philosophical anthropology" to encompass stretches of existence treated inadequately by naturalistic anthropology. His warning was stark and pointed—philosophers offering descriptions of "pure" experience arrive at features more theological than existential. Philosophical anthropology "is really a redesigning of a long-familiar traditional view of man, resting upon the hopes of many centuries" (7:208).

If disconnected from the environing world, mind inflates to transcending and absolute dimensions. However, it is not the satisfyingly simple religious realm, but the frustratingly complex social realm, where we are most human:

> No account of existence is apt to be more one-sided and incomplete than one concerned with human existence. . . . A descriptive survey of human existence without mention of the actual nature of economic processes and social relations is seriously incomplete and may well be misleading. One is far closer to knowing human beings fundamentally by seeing them in factories and in the fields, in fulfilling professional functions, and in their competitive business undertakings. . . . How does this view of man compare with characteristic portrayals of man under the heading of "philosophical anthropology?" The emphasis often shifts to the supertemporal or nontemporal, to the "essential," and away from the basic facts of natural experience. (7:209)

For Farber, seeking an unnaturally existential ontology only manages to "inject mystery into ontology" (7:217). Existence, however manifest, and not experience, is the genuine basis for philosophy. "The processes of physical nature and of the experience of real persons in the social and natural world constitute the starting-point for a real ontology, and not a fictional ego" (7:219).

Other presidents similarly grappled with ways to situate the relationship between science and philosophy. Socio-cultural mediators are apparently needed.

Perhaps there is a role for art? In his address, "Remarks—Mainly about Knowledge and Reality," Barnett Savery (1960–1961) argued that in the same way that philosophers and scientists attempt to describe reality with their words, artists, too—whether they be writers, painters, musicians or sculptors—attempt to describe reality with their work. In fact, artists may more successful in their descriptions of reality than their scientific and philosophical counterparts.

Savery explored the nature of knowledge and defended the realization that knowledge does not require certainty; it is not contradictory to suggest "I know, but I may be wrong." Further, although knowledge has a descriptive character, it also has performative aspects. To say that one knows is sometimes to say that one has a certain state of mind, which is a description; but to say that one knows can also be a performative utterance, like a promise:

> In many cases of knowing, we do guarantee evidence, reasons, grounds, [and] justifications for our statements. These performances that support our statements help us distinguish instances of knowing from instances of belief. (7:28)

Further, the pragmatist may be right about knowledge in that it is a "relative rather than absolute concept" (7:31). Savery expressed concern about the concept that only logical and scientific knowledge is "proper" and he was downright skeptical of the proposition, "all 'cognitive' expressions must be expressed in propositional form" (7:31). If true, of course, art is in a much better position to capture such truths than science or philosophy, and not only can art describe reality, but it can do so more successfully than philosophy and science—at least when it comes to such truths.

Savery went on to show how art composed at a certain time expresses the philosophical attitudes of that time. Take, for example, "the Parthenon expresses the idea of the finite and the bounded" (7:33), found in Greek philosophy. Dante's *Divine Comedy* gives us a clearer picture of the Christian worldview than perhaps any of the medieval philosophers. The Baroque style and its "world of structure, matter, and motion" (7:34) reflected rationalism; representationalism, which gave us "the world of reality, of flesh and blood, with all its sensuousness and quality" (7:34), reflected empiricism. It was an era of anti-intellectualism in which Romanticism was born. In our current era, where the most accurate descriptions of reality are mathematical formulas, which seem to be "nonrepresentational," perhaps the artist is best suited to "explain" the nature of reality. Perhaps, in fact, "reality is the imitation of art" (7:34).

Ernest Addison Moody (1963–1964) was similarly prepared to look to the social world for mediating factors between the sciences and philosophy. He focused on language in "The Age of Analysis." His address speculated about the future of philosophy—specifically analytic philosophy—by ruminating about its past and analyzing its present state. Moody was particularly critical of, and pessimistic about, his impression that it seemed to be solely about linguistic analysis.

Since C. D. Broad wrote *Scientific Thought*,[1] analytic philosophy (which he called critical philosophy) has become almost exclusively interested in the logical analysis of language. The virtue of this approach is that analytic philoso-

phy need not compete with other disciplines as its purpose is to examine the language in which those disciplines express their discoveries. The downside is that analytic philosophers could not resist the temptation to look in the mirror and examine the language in which they were expressing their examinations, which lead to useless questions like "what is the meaning of 'meaning'" and left little time to spare for their original task.

Analytic philosophy did not begin this way. Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore were concerned with the analysis of facts in their "quest for the elementary bed-rock for empirical knowledge" (7:228) and thought it was "possible to discover constituents and basic structural features of the world" (7:229). However, thanks to Gottlob Frege and *Principia mathematica*,[2] it became clear that explicating the logical form of sentences could eliminate certain philosophical difficulties (for example, Alexius Meinong's golden mountain[3]) and might even reveal "basic structural traits of the world" (7:229). Thus, the focus on language began.

Logical positivism made short work of the latter suggestion, soon "proclaimed the thesis that the only subject matter of philosophy is language" (7:231), and took to the task of rendering metaphysics meaningless and formulating the syntax of science. Moreover, the only alternatives to this approach focused on language as well: the latter Wittgensteinian analysis of language based on the assumption, "meaning is use" and "the phenomenological description of the *Lebenswelt* [life-world] pursued by continental philosophers" (7:230). And so, philosophy found itself:

> in somewhat the same position as the theologians of the later fourteenth century, whose theological language had turned out to be another self-contained world which could not be tied to the object of religious belief. . . . Its residual language game, which continued to be played within secluded university walls for two centuries, came to be scorned and derided by a society that had turned elsewhere to re-establish contact with the realities language is supposed to describe. (7:231)

The criticisms of the purely linguistic approach to philosophy under consideration are obvious and biting. It fails to provide answers to the religious, moral, and political questions society cares about. We teach courses on these topics, but nothing learned is applicable to real life. When teaching a course on ethics, for example, we point out the shortcomings of every ethical theory and thus establish that no moral theory is an effective guide for everyday life. Moreover, we are more interested in illustrating our methods and confining them to trivial imaginary cases than we are in applying them to more significant, difficult, real-world problems.

While the atomic bomb "threatens to annihilate the human race," all you can find in philosophy journals are disagreements between "the devotees of ordinary language and those of constructed linguistic systems" (7:233). To respond, philosophers might suggest that philosophy has always just been about the examination of language; but, in fact, it has not. They might point out how logic and philosophy of mathematics have clarified problems in the empirical sciences, for course it has—but of course, logic and mathematics do not exhaust all of philosophy. There is nothing useful, or even philosophical, about describing how people talk in various circumstances.

As an alternative to analytic philosophy, there is what C. D. Broad called "speculative" philosophy, whose:

> object is to take over the results of the various sciences, to add them to the results of the religious and ethical experiences of mankind, and then to reflect upon the whole. The hope is that, by this means, we may be able to reach some general conclusions as to the nature of the universe, and as to our position and prospects in it. (7:227)

Fortunately, contrary to common understanding, it does not presuppose analytic philosophy. In fact, the reverse is true.

Need we despair? Moody saw a parallel between the then-modern situation and situations of the past, in which realism gave way to conceptualism, nominalism, and finally, to skepticism. But at the end of such stories—of Greek philosophy, of medieval philosophy, and the Renaissance—comes a new conceptual framework that enters the scene to reset the process and start things all over again. Perhaps there is hope; perhaps a new cosmological framework is on the horizon. Besides, there is no way "for us to foresee what use may be found for the fruit of our labors in the philosophical world-frame of the future" (7:239).

In his address, "Essences, Attributes, and Predicates," Henry Siggins Leonard (1963–1964) drew attention to a feature of modern logic, the logic of variables and binding operators, to show how a continuity between philosophy and science can be recognized. Leonard first complained that much of recent logic had presumed that characterizing and classifying are mutually entailing, but this only holds for artificial logical languages that diverge from English and other ordinary languages. In English language subject-predicate sentences, subject terms may not denote and predicates may not entail existence. For Leonard, no analytic attributive entails existence or non-existence. He supplied another illustration of separating the analytic from existence, pointing out how most modern logical systems agree on the argument, "if for every x, x is P, then for some x, x is P," which in turn says that at least one thing exists (7:260). Yet this is a metaphysical claim. Leonard supplied further examples to make his points that es-

sences do not entail existences, and not every attributive identifies an attribute. Leonard's more generous and philosophical language showed how to treat predicates that are occurrences of attributive terms; essences dictate how things are to be conceived; some true attributions can be excluded from a thing's essence, and some attributes of a thing are not true unless it actually exists.

In seeming defiance of Moody's critique of language-focused analytic philosophy, Leonard offered up an alternate logical language that he thought more accurately parallels ordinary English and was "more suited to the purposes of metaphysical inquiry than are the object languages associated with most modern styles of logic" (7:271). He called it "language W," which seemed to primarily be constructed to avoid certain existential problems that appear in modern logical systems, such as the fact that, to ascribe a property to something entails that that thing exists—which makes statements like "Santa Claus lives at the North Pole" or "Santa Claus does not exist" quite problematic. To solve such problems, he divided attributes into those that entail existence, those that entail nonexistence, and those that are neutral regarding existence, such that "X exists" is neither analytic nor self-contradictory.

Every singular sentence can be converted into a subject-predicate sentence. However, in language W, they do not entail existence: "All general terms are treated as attributive terms and all single subject-predicate sentences are regarded as characterizing rather than as classifying" (7:253) (this is a necessary addition to avoid the aforementioned existential problems because set membership entails existence.)

Leonard also proposed two quantifiers: square quantification and round quantification. A squared universal statement (denoted ⌜For every possible *x*, *x* is P⌝) is true relative to whether the squared statement ("For every possible x, x is P") is true regardless of how that statement is interpreted; a squared existential statement (⌜For some possible *x*, *x* is P⌝) is true if the original statement is true on at least one interpretation. Round quantification denotes that something actually exists, so that ⌜For every actual *x*, *x* is P.⌝ is synonymous with ⌜For every possible *x*, if *x* exists, then *x* is P.⌝ (7:259).

Leonard also introduced an "essence-abstractor," which allows one to identify essences and thus ascribe properties to fictional entities; thus, "an illustrative subject-predicate statement would be, Pegasus is essentially an *x* such that *x* is a horse" (7:261). (However, Leonard is quick to point out that the ontological argument for God's existence does not work in language W; something exists essentially only if it actually exists.) He concluded by introducing the "attribute-descriptor," "'the attribute in virtue of the possession of which *x* is such that'" (7:268) and looking at the way definite descriptions function in language W. If nothing else, Leonard demonstrated "what the object languages of modern

logic are really like, how they differ in fundamental ways not only from English but from one another" (7:271).

In "Reflections on the Possibilities of Metaphysics," William Henry Werkmeister (1964–1965) tried to defend the relevance of metaphysics to modern philosophy by articulating metaphysical questions that modern philosophy raises and spelling out different metaphysical approaches to answering them. The modern concentrations in philosophy—logical positivism, existentialism, etc.—lead to metaphysical questions themselves. Metaphysics' notion that meaning requires verification cannot be verified; philosophy's notion that reason is useless can only be reasoned to. So, both leave open metaphysical questions to be answered. Moreover, the question of why there is something rather than nothing, questions about the nature of mind, the possibility of free will in a deterministic universe, the distinction between living and nonliving things, and the question, "in what sense is human reason capable of understanding reality?" are all metaphysical questions yet to be answered.

But what is metaphysics? Aristotle called it the study of Being. "Being" remained an ambiguous term interpreted in many ways. Christian Wolff is faulted for metaphysical futility when pronouncing such obscure things as "everything that is possible is what it is" (7:282). However, metaphysics need not be done in this way. Kant inspired two different approaches: Schopenhauer's conjectural metaphysics (which unfortunately remains conjectural), and a personalistic metaphysics that "revers[ed] the Kantian order" (7:283) by making the person the key to understanding reality. Hegel, inspired by Descartes's approach, conceived of truth as self-certitude, and made "the crucial fact of metaphysics knowledge itself," knowledge "verifies itself to itself," and is a "self-manifestation of the Real" (7:283). Then there is Heidegger's approach, who thought that the Greeks had confused "Being" and "to be," and who understood the latter in terms of *Dasein*. "The essence of *Dasein*, being synonymous with existence, lies, of course, in its 'to be'" (7:284). When Heidegger is pressed for an interpretation of this "to be," he replied: "*Es ist es selbst*"—it is itself. It is what it is! A less illuminating conclusion has seldom been drawn from so prolonged and tortuous an argument as we encounter in *Sein und Zeit*[4] (7:284).

Some metaphysical questions may never be answered and some may be unanswerable; but we need metaphysics to even try to figure out which is which. Language analysis can play an important role in the latter task as well as other tasks of metaphysics, such as ontology (an analysis of "the categories of Being" (7:285)). Werkmeister closed by articulating the two steps such an analysis would require: "the recognition of the categorical differences of the various strata of the Real, and the recognition, also, of the uniqueness of the categories belonging to each stratum" (7:286), and then "to ascertain whether or not there

exists also a categorical structure that relates the various levels one to another and thus provides categorical context and continuity from level to level" (7:287).

Edwin Arthur Burtt (1964–1965) similarly wished to sort out which kinds of metaphysical or speculative inquiries still possess relevance. His address, "Truth, Understanding, and Philosophy," defended philosophical speculation against several charges. Do the speculative elements to a philosophy fail to admit full empirical validation? No philosophical position admits of such conclusive demonstration. Do the speculative aspects to a philosophy yield an overall view of the universe?

No one tackling large philosophical issues will fail to take a broad perspective over what counts as most relevant for selective treatment. Granted, the trans-empirical and universal approaches found in speculative thought are too often paired with over-confident claims to superior truth. Instead, wiser speculations generate comprehensive understandings instead of dogmatic knowledge:

> Today a philosopher can no longer speculate in the way in which he was expected to in the past. He cannot be a super-scientist or a super-theologian or a super-poet or a super-anything else. But he can understand what the scientist, the theologian, the artist, the man of affairs, is accomplishing as each of them performs his chosen task. To win such understanding he does not need to master an extensive range of detail in any of these areas; it is enough to reach the point where he grasps the essential role of each in the over-all adventure of man and its reflective interpretation. (7:303)

Alfred Stern's (1965–1966) defense of the "spiritual" had much in common with Burtt's support for the "speculative." Stern's "What Are Spiritual Phenomena?" sought a moderate and sensible role for these matters. Distinguishing spiritual phenomena apart from narrower religious matters and from abstract theological issues liberates the spiritual for philosophical inquiry. If philosophy resists the concretization of the spiritual, its essential role is revealed:

> It is my contention that there is no spiritual being, no spiritual reality, for it is impossible to find a spiritual phenomenon which, as far as its being is concerned, is not either psychical or physical, or both at the same time. What characterizes the spiritual is not being, not reality, but meaning. As "spiritual," we designate all phenomena which have one thing in common: to mean something other than they are in their immediate reality. (7:357)

He clarified his view thusly: "One of the characteristics of spiritual matters is that their meaning remains identical, even when their physical and psychical

substrata undergo certain changes" (7:364). He offered many examples of spiritual matters. A compelling example is the meaning to a literary work, which cannot be reduced either to its physical preservation (any number of physical substrates will serve), or to any mental instantiation (it is preserved even while no one is contemplating it).

Another president attempting to elevate a philosophical standpoint above limitations set by categorical divisions was Paul Weiss (1966–1967). In "Separate and Equal, but Integrated," Weiss highlighted the excesses inherent in both ontology and criticism. Ontology will seek systemic finality; however, criticism will not commit with finality. The opposition of the two leaves them both inadequate and self-refuting:

> Neither empiricism nor ontology fully exploits its characteristic virtue. Both are incomplete, but neither can nor is willing to say so. The ontologist is unable and unwilling to acknowledge the reality of the world in which he speaks and lives, while the empiricist cannot and will not affirm what it is on which he depends in order to be intelligible. (7:403)

They cannot be blended or merged, but ontology and criticism can be integrated when both realize how much they need each other. Ample and accommodating pluralities, not a rigid monism, will be their product.

Herbert Marcuse (1968–1969) also pronounced unfavorable verdicts against business-as-usual academic philosophies, with a rebellious tone. In "The Relevance of Reality," he denied that any philosophy purporting to describe human-independent realities must be impotent to influence any realities. Concepts important to philosophy ultimately derive from actual manifestations of those concepts in historical events surrounding philosophers:

> All philosophy, no matter how abstract and speculative, constructs its conceptual universe with the material provided by a particular historical universe, which remains operative even in the purest abstractions and speculations—not as sociological conditioning "from outside," but as the very stuff of which concepts are made. By virtue of this situation, the philosophical concepts remain inextricably ideological: their universality remains a particular one, confined by the historical situation. (7:558)

Philosophy can no longer evade its struggle with ideology. The human quest for reason and freedom (as foretold by Marxism) is the reality most relevant to every field of philosophy, including linguistic analysis, aesthetics, epistemology, and history of philosophy:

> The abstract, universal Telos of the philosophical quest is now translatable into the real Subject of history: it is emerging in the global struggle against the powerful international and national policies of domination and exploitation which tend to converge beyond all boundaries and particularities; and the rebellion against these policies assumes an equally universal character. (7:560)

Like Marcuse's Marxism, Frederick Ludwig Will's (1968–1969) pragmatism located the relationship between mentality and reality in life's practical activities. In "Thoughts and Things," he protested against that supposedly inner "theatre," where intentional thought resides "as a Cartesian mind or a Hobbesian brain" (7:570). Thought's independence gets excessively prioritized to the point where its mere presence to a self-conscious self is sufficient for its validity. Whether thoughts (be they material or spiritual in nature) successfully represent anything real beyond thought inevitably becomes the unsolvable epistemic puzzle. That some ideas may accurately represent objects is not enough for knowledge, since that lucky coincidence is not the same thing as justifiably knowing that a correspondence actually holds.

Information about the world is conveyed to us, but the utility to considering the information as representations does not also license status as true or false (7:575). There is nothing about conceptual thought (or language) guaranteeing that it can be perfect for, or even adequate to, what gets conveyed in experience. Fortunately, thinking depends on things in the world, not the reverse. "Thinking is an activity which we engage in not only in the world of things, but by means of things in this world, supported and sustained by them" (7:583). Will proceeded to draw out pragmatist implications to this view of thought for epistemic notions of verification, empiricism, deduction, and induction.

In "A Kind of Materialism," Stuart Newton Hampshire (1969–1970; 1990–1991) examined the philosophy of a philosopher (whose identity he kept secret until the end), interpreting him as a particular kind of materialist (regarding philosophy of mind). This philosopher suggested that human beings, their behavior and the mentality behind it, are to be studied and explained scientifically in the same way as everything else—by looking at the materialistic mechanisms that lie behind them. Of course, many of these explanations lie beyond our current scientific knowledge, but such mechanisms undoubtedly exist and such explanations are accurate.

Although accounting for the behavior of others in this way is easy, the question remains whether materialists can turn such reasoning back upon themselves to explain their own mentality in this way. Scientists' perception of the sun is different from children's because their knowledge alters their perception. In a similar way, if a materialist has a thought, considering the physical mecha-

nisms that lie behind the thought alters that thought (or, we might say, leads to a new thought). However, here a problem enters the scene, for the philosopher's understanding of that thought in materialist terms is a mental event too, which is explicable in materialist terms. Realizing this will change the thought itself, leading to yet another thought, having yet another materialist explanation—an infinite regress. Thus, the (yet to be revealed) philosopher's suggestion for another (Copernican-like) paradigm shift (in which we come to understand all mentality in materialistic terms) is problematic because it seems impossible.

The philosopher Hampshire had been describing turned out to be Spinoza, who maintained, "every idea is united with a particular modification of the body, and also . . . that, in reflection, ideas can be made the objects of other ideas up to any level of complexity" (7:604). However, Spinoza did not appear to recognize the infinite regress to which these notions, taken together, lead. So:

> the classical materialists are wrong in supposing that the two orders of explanation could properly be reduced to one . . . because . . . they write only from the standpoint of scientific observers of men [meanwhile forgetting] that, as they observe, their own thought involves thought about its causes, and that its changes [also] have to be explained in these terms. (7:605)

Hampshire concluded:

> It follows that we should never ask whether a type, or a particular specimen, of human behavior, or of feeling, are finally and properly to be explained by physical, or by psychological, causes, as if this was a proper exclusive disjunction. (7:606)

In "Philosophical Disagreements and World Views," William Thomas Jones (1969–1970) argued:

> the wealth of proposed solutions generated for any particular philosophical problem, be it in ethics, epistemology, or metaphysics, can be accounted for, at least in part, by differences in the worldviews of philosophers. (7:613)

Jones began by describing what he calls "dimensions"—continuums on which one falls regarding assumptions about a topic (such as how friendly one is regarding Abraham Lincoln or how disposed one is to believe in plots). If you consider where you fall on every possible dimension, then that is your "worldview." Jones then gave three examples of where conflict in dimensions generates divergent philosophical conclusions: the (1) immediacy/mediation, (2) continuity/discreteness, and (3) static/dynamic dimensions. For example, different worldviews regarding the latter will lead to differing views regarding change. To one, change is an illusion or paradox; to the other, belief in stability is only generated by psychological insecurity.

Different views regarding continuity/discreteness makes a person see the world in a different way; one will see it as a collection of discrete entities (for example, Hume's billiard balls), the other sees it (and its "objects") as a merging continuous whole with no sharp distinctions (for example, Hegel's bud, blossom, fruit). This difference can motivate many philosophical differences, for example: different theories of truth (correspondence versus coherence) and of mind (regarding the difference, or lack thereof, between the mind and its object). Further, one will see infinite regressions, whereas the other does not. In political philosophy, one will value individuals, and the other the state or populous. In logic, one will place all propositions into categories (for example, contradictions and non-contradictions); the other will think such categories are "tentative and provisional" (7:620). This difference even generates different approaches to philosophy (which seems to point at the analytic continental divide):

> Logicians with discreteness-orientation complain that logicians with a continuity-orientation introduce muddle and confusion by refusing to draw sharp distinctions. Logicians with continuity orientation charge that logicians with a discreteness-orientation over-simplify. . . . An investigation that terminates in discrete segments, however minute these segments are, will never adequately represent the continuities they perceive. (7:620–621)

The immediacy/mediation "dimension is . . . an array of possible orientations . . . ranging from a preference for what is at a distance, objective, and neutral . . . to a preference for direct communion, empathy, and involvement" (7:621). One person seeks an experience that is "lived through" or "personal" and another person seeks an experience that is "witnessed from outside . . . [that generates] knowledge about" (7:621). Although many are between the extremes, on one end, we see an emphasis on objective facts, formal proofs, and a quest for an ideal scientific language (for example, logical positivism); on the other, we have those who seek an ideal "language of poetry and mysticism, in which we express our insights and intuitions" (7:622). This leads to different approaches to argumentation (which again seems to point to analytic/continental divide).

Those in the middle ground can, at least sometimes, communicate with (or at least understand) both extremes. While convergence on one dimension within one school might generate an "internally harmonious" school, a simultaneous disagreement on another might generate conflict within that school, and lead to "radically different philosophical schools" or even "conflict within a philosophical system" (7:624). For example, persons orientated toward both discreetness and mediation will see themselves as individuals in a world of objects with the desire and ability to capture the world, and its objects, with language. However,

change from "mediation" to "immediacy" and now "language is perceived as a barrier to be overcome . . . so that the philosopher can experience the world immediately; i.e., as it really is, undistorted by language" (7:626). Unfortunately, this leads to frustration: the immediacy orientation, and corresponding distrust of language, makes one think this cannot be done.

3. Reason and Truth

Several presidents selected core topics that involved reasoning, knowledge, self-knowledge, logic, science, or truth.

Abraham Irving Melden's (1961–1962) address was entitled, "Reasons for Action and Matters of Fact." His focus centered on the possibility of moral knowledge and the status of moral reasoning. He pointed out an initial puzzle about giving reasons for moral "oughts." True facts, even if relevant to a situation calling for a moral judgment, are insufficient for justifying a moral claim. As it is sometimes expressed, an is-ought logical gap looms. As Melden put it, truth-claims apparently cannot be moral reasons (7:65).

Only facts already possessing a special status beyond truth, facts that are morally relevant in a compelling manner, could be reasons for moral action. But what sort of oddly compelling facts could these be? For example, Charles Leslie Stevenson's (1961–1962) pattern of analysis for normative statements of the form "I like x; do so as well" might state a compelling good, but, of course, frequently it cannot. Solicitations (and imperatives, etc.) may be persuasive, but not because a genuine moral reason has been given (7:65–68). Evidently, all such compelling urgings must depend on the recipient's prior assent or commitment to something like "I want x," but that is the very thing to be justified by the giving of moral reasons that, in turn, must somehow rest on facts (7:73).

Melden had little sympathy for ethical naturalism. He did object to the psychological doctrine that acting and believing must be strictly separated:

> I wish to take exception to the contrast frequently drawn between reasons for doing and reasons for believing. According to this contrast the former cause agents to do, the latter cause minds to conclude or infer; and, since these are radically distinct functions of intelligence, reasons for doing and reasons for believing are mutually exclusive groups of items. (7:73)

Reasons for believing that x should be done are describable facts. It is not their static truth, but their dynamic relevance in a particular situation that makes them reasons to act for a person. A person who has never had any wants or commitments cannot be factually reasoned into acquiring them. However, the quest of ethical naturalism is mistaken. Real people already do have such motives; what they need for concrete actions are reasons for believing morally relevant facts to

that situation. Many questions remain (7:76), but moral philosophy deserves a fresh start.

In "Rational Action," Carl Gustav Hempel (1961–1962) also delineated and explored some of the philosophical questions raised by the critical and explanatory aspects of the concept of rational action. He first suggested that we avoid determining the rationality of an action by judging the rationality of the beliefs upon which it is based. Instead, we should determine whether the action in question offers the optimal prospects for achieving the actor's desired goal, given the beliefs the actor has. Making the rationality of an action relative to the beliefs the actor has will be more useful when explaining certain types of human behavior, especially when delineating between people whose actions make sense given their beliefs and those who do not.

Of course, the rationality of an action given a person's beliefs is not always easy to ascertain—such as when an actor does not have a specific end state in mind or when there is uncertainty involved. For example, suppose someone has a choice between (1) having an equal chance of winning a platinum ball versus an lead ball, or (2) an equal chance at a gold ball versus silver. Whether it is rational to choose (1) or (2) depends on whether it is rational to maximize one's minimum (choosing (2) means silver is the worst one can do) or to maximize their maximum (not choosing (1) eliminates the greatest possible gain: platinum).That just depends on what type of calculus you adopt. But when it comes to using rational action as an expository concept, we do not want to make William Dray's mistake and think that if reported reasons are to explain why someone did an action, then they must be good reasons.[5]

Sometimes, people act for irrational reasons. Although it is somewhat accurate to suggest that if someone acts rationally, they are in a certain dispositional state, this cannot be the whole story, because one has the dispositions one has due to the objectives or beliefs that one has. A physical body that is electrically charged does not merely have a disposition to behave in certain ways under various testing procedures; instead, it has such dispositions because it has the property of charge. Likewise, people do not merely have the disposition to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances, but behave that way because they have certain beliefs and objectives (although Hempel did not conceive of belief in any kind of platonic or dualist sense).

However, the discovery of persons' dispositions, for example, through observing their behavior, cannot independently reveal their beliefs and objectives, because such things are epistemically interdependent. If we have other reasons for knowing what persons' objectives are, we could draw a rational conclusion about their beliefs based on their actions. However, one and the same action could be indicative of two different sets of beliefs or objectives. (To use another example, a man may rob a bank because he wants to get rich and he does not

think he will get caught, or because he is so poor that he does not care whether he gets caught.)

Moreover, to derive someone's beliefs based on that individual's actions and unknown objectives almost always assumes that the person is behaving rationally—that is, the person is following the course of action that offers the best chance of success. But of course, a person may not always act in a way that offers the best chance of success—again, people do not always behave rationally—thus, an agent's actions will not always be indicative of the agent's beliefs. In fact, the assumption of rationality may make such explanations function like ideal gas laws. Very few things behave exactly as such laws describe, but the laws do give us gross approximations of what to expect. Even then, it is not clear how we should understand what it means to suggest that an agent has certain beliefs and objectives at a given time. After all, agents may hold beliefs that they are not currently consciously entertaining. Moreover, an agent may not recognize a simple logical relationship between beliefs; an individual may believe A, and that belief may entail B, but the same person may not believe B. An individual may even believe one statement and not another, without recognizing that both statements express the same proposition. So, we cannot even understand beliefs as assentions to propositions, but only as assentions to statements. These problems notwithstanding, one may find some explanatory power in the concept of consciously rational agents—whose actions are rational given the objectives and beliefs, which they consciously take into account at the time.

Theories based on mathematical models for maximizing expected utilities also have explanatory power in specific and carefully controlled experiments. However, we are still far from fully understanding rational action. It is something perhaps historians should take into account when they draw conclusions about beliefs and goals of an historical person based on the assumption that the person being critiqued was acting rationally. This is perhaps the best we can do for now, but that does not mean that we need ignore the identified limitations or that other procedures do not need to be developed.

In "Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception," after a quick history of the hostility toward science in philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century and in continental philosophy, Maurice Henry Mandelbaum (1962–1963) criticized the then-modern notion of a strict divide between the domain of the sciences and the domain of philosophy. Specifically, he was critical of the idea that philosophic theories of sense perception should be independent of what scientists say about the objects we perceive.

Mandelbaum was responding to philosophers such as G. E. Moore, Susan Stebbing, and Gilbert Ryle, who ignored philosophical problems about our knowledge of the material world raised by scientific descriptions and concepts (for example, molecular movement and the existence of electrons) and the rele-

vance of scientific discoveries about the functioning of our sense organs to those questions. In this vein, they neglect to appreciate that our common sense perception does not reveal many things (for example, that light reflecting objects is necessary for sight) and that scientific explanations do not merely fill in details concerning that which we already know. Both facts are, in fact, philosophically important. If, unlike Ryle, we choose examples beyond close medium-sized objects, and instead, think of our perception of (for example) stars, and what science reveals about them (for example, despite what our perception tells us, we are not seeing a tiny, but a very large object), we realize that direct realism is not always the epistemically preferable theory. (While Ryle raised objections to such arguments, they seem to stem from his misconception of the nature of philosophy itself, which he saw as a discipline limited to the analysis of concepts and whether they legitimately belong in certain disciplines. While this approach can certainly be enlightening, it does not exhaust philosophical approaches or even give the correct results.[6])

The conflict regarding what geologists and theologians say about, for example, the age of the earth cannot be dissolved by restricting certain concepts to certain disciplines. What one says is true and the other says is false; this is shown through science. This is also the case regarding matters of fact and physical descriptions; the conflict between a common sense and a physicist's description of a table cannot be reconciled by restricting certain concepts to different domains. The relationship (and conflict) between these descriptions is important to identify and doing so could help us evaluate the causal theory of perception and the tenability of direct realism. All in all, while "it is possible to be too solemn and deferential when we consider 'Science,' it is also possible to succumb to an unwarranted distrust of the sciences, placing too great a trust in the concepts of everyday life" (7:144).

After some opening remarks about his personal journey from logical positivism to "logical empiricism," in "The Power of Positivistic Thinking," Herbert Feigl (1962–1963) argued that although logical positivism goes too far in eliminating every kind of metaphysics, if appropriately liberalized, it can solve a number of vexing philosophical problems (for example, the skeptical problem) and justify a common-sense view of reality—what he calls a "realistic ontology of common sense and of science" (7:179). Saying that he had considered alternate titles such as "The Rise and Decline of Logical Positivism," Feigl addressed attempts to describe and then resolve the tensions between empiricism and logical positivism.

Early on, logical positivism took on the metaphysicians and theologians. However, instead of hearing that their beliefs were unwarranted, the metaphysicians and theologians were surprised to hear the positivists—armed with the

weapon of Occam's razor and respect for an instrumentalist view of science—declare that theology and metaphysics simply made no sense.

Later, the verificationist notion of meaning was introduced by positivists: nothing is meaningful unless it can be verified. This allowed logical positivism to rightly spot "the verbal sedatives that were offered (unintentionally) in place of genuine scientific explanations" (7:160). Although many object that this principle is self-refuting because the principal itself cannot be verified and is thus meaningless, Feigl suggested that there are many ways to avoid this criticism. One maintains, "the meaning criterion is a *proposal* and not a proposition; and that as a proposal it is to be judged in view of its fruitfulness" (7:182). Feigl simply revised the criterion to suggest "the cognitive meaning of a factual statement consists in its truth conditions" (7:182).

The problem with logical positivism (one shared even by those who propose alternatives to it like Karl Popper), is that it fails to distinguish between different kinds of metaphysics or transcendence, and in rightly dismissing one, it wrongly dismisses them all. Feigl offered three distinctions:

> (1) The *innocuous* transcendence involved in ordinary assumptions about the past, the future, physical reality, and other minds. (2) The *precarious* transcendence of "far out" hypotheses in the natural and social sciences [for example,] current cosmology, speculations regarding the origin of life, or theories in depth-psychology. . . (3) The *pernicious* transcendence which results in unanswerable questions, unsolvable problems, or inscrutable mysteries. (7:183)

While dismissing metaphysical notions of the third kind, old-line positivists would also throw out "the other two 'babies' with the 'dirty bathwater'" (7:183).

For example, it would correctly point out the ridiculousness of unanswerable pseudo-problems like the skeptical problem and the problem of other minds, which indeed are ridiculous. After all:

> it is only through surreptitious and self-deceptive steps that [one] arrives at the sort of philosophical doubt that questions our right to believe in the existence of such quite ordinary things as physical objects, other persons' mental states, [or] the occurrence of past or future events. (7:184–185)

But it would do so by declaring the problems meaningless in the name of strict verificationism, and, in turn, it had to dismiss questions about the structure of the universe and the existence of other minds as meaningless, and thus dismissed common sense theories such as atomic theory and the existence of other minds. In other words, "the transcendence involved in the realism of ordinary life and of science is quite innocuous, only rarely precarious, and never pernicious!" (7:190). And yet, as a consequence of dealing with the pernicious problems, the positivist dismissed them all. (This was true of both nineteenth- and

twentieth-century positivism and mistakes that seemed to lead to this overzealous verificationism were those like failing to appreciate "the logical difference between the confirming evidence and the truth conditions of our knowledge claims" (7:187). Or, like Popper, positivism failed to realize that although induction cannot be proved, it can be vindicated, per Hans Reichenbach (1947–1948) (7:189).

This positivist dismissal is not necessary; there are easier ways out of the pernicious problems that do not involve suggesting that they are meaningless or taking out every other metaphysical suggestion with them. The problems demand more proof than is logically possible to provide; they fail to realize that we are not limited to our experiences, but instead we can use our intellect to compare hypotheses. The pernicious problems are "not meaningless but so outrageously improbable as to be safely dismissed as false" (7:191). In short, the hypotheses that correspond to our common sense are the best—most parsimonious and plausible—explanations. So, to avoid the pernicious problems, we need not dismiss them as meaningless, along with them and every other metaphysical notion. Finally, Feigl delivered his conclusion:

> The meaning criterion of the logical positivists, if appropriately liberalized, permits us within the frame of the hypothetico-deductive, inductive, and analogical procedures of cognition to countenance as harmless the transcendences involved in ordinary realism. . . . The primary aim of the positivists was to restore to philosophy a natural and reasonable view of the world. But in their zeal to purge philosophy of all pernicious metaphysics, they overshot their goal. They used Occam's razor so radically that they nearly cut away the very core of science itself. (7:193)

In "A Metaphysical Paradox," Stephen Gregory Vlastos (1965–1966) similarly tackled philosophical puzzles about predicates and essences. He attempted to sort out what Plato must have meant by his seemingly paradoxical statement that the Forms of objects (which are non-physical abstract objects) are more perfectly real than the objects that instantiate them. How could a physical bed, which I know exists, exist less than an abstract object? How, in fact, can existence occur in gradations?

The word "real," Vlastos argued, is ambiguous, and its meaning is not always synonymous with existence. One can rightly say "these flowers are not real" without denying their existence, but instead, merely be pointing out that they are artificial. Of course, Plato never explicitly distinguished between these senses of real, but one need not explicitly make a distinction to employ it. After all, children use and understand rules of language that they cannot articulate. Indeed, Plato

uses this sense of the word when he speaks of the "really good and noble man" and of existing Greek constitutions not being "really real" (7:339–340).

Fortunately, this sense of real admits of gradations—just as we need it to in order for it to help us make sense of Plato's linguistic behavior and resolve this apparent paradox. Indeed, his language in the *Republic* (end of bk. 5) makes it clear that he thinks the Forms *and* their instances exist. Vlastos asserted, "where the 'is' is clearly existential, it is applied distributively to each, and conjunctively to all grades of reality" (7:341). Alternatively, the phrase "really real" does not assert, but categorizes the kind of existence that the Forms have (and that their instances lack).

Why is this important to Plato? You want to look to a real flower (not an artificial one) if you want to know what flowers are really like, and if you want to love something of greater value. The same is true of the Forms. If you want to know what beauty is, look at the Form—the genuine article—not something that merely resembles it. Likewise, the proper object of love is the Forms, not their instances. While the latter do exist, they are not the genuine article.

Vlastos had already defended the former (epistemic) doctrine in print,[7] but went on at length to defend the latter here (presumably for the first time). Passages in Plato, where he speaks of loving the Forms, are often skipped over by philosophers (in the same way embarrassing passages in the Old Testament were skipped over by Vlastos's mother). Yet, this love even plays a key role in the great argument of the *Republic*, which suggests that the good man at his worst is still happier than the bad man at his best, because the philosopher loves them:

> The Forms . . . but are themselves the focal points of a most uncommon experience, which [Plato] discovered for himself and found incomparably more satisfying than any other. The Forms are 'more real' than their instances in that sense as well. (7:344)

This brings us back around to what Vlastos found (and has always found) most troubling about this paradox: the confidence—the certainty—with which Plato thought he could prove it:

> The gravest flaw in the theory . . . issues from his imperfect understanding of that very experience which meant more to him than any other vision of Form. For if he had understood it as deeply as he felt it, how could he have thought of it as certifying cognitive and even political infallibility? What troubled me about Plato's metaphysical paradox when I first came across it was his confidence that he could prove it. Now that, understanding his paradox better, I admire it all the more, I think that I was right to be troubled. The mystic is the last person in the world who can afford to be an authoritarian. (7:347–348)

Julius Rudolph Weinberg (1964–1965) selected another major philosopher as the subject matter for his address, "The Novelty of Hume's Philosophy." As the transitional figure toward philosophical naturalism even greater than Spinoza, Hume was able to select out combine crucial logical, psychological, and empirical views already accessible from earlier Greek and medieval systems in an original manner.

Weinberg discussed historical antecedents and Hume's versions of these views: (1) denying, "causality and causation are intuitively or demonstratively certain" (7:313); (2) affirming, "we have no idea of cause, objectively considered, other than constant conjunction" (7:318); (3) claiming, "universal propositions which would suffice to make an induction certain or probable could not be logically certified" (7:321); (4) defending how we have "no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities" (7:323); and (5) holding that we should doubt "a single identical substance persisting numerically unchanged throughout psychic life" (7:326). While naturalism remains indebted to Hume, important parts of his philosophy can be relegated to obsolescence, such as his extreme nominalism and skepticism.

Philip Ellis Wheelwright (1966–1967) pondered philosophical and psychological issues about one's self and the selves of others in his address, "On the Meaning of 'You.'" He promptly reminded his audience that neither the *I* nor the *you* can be isolated and treated apart from the other, and promised to show that their dialogical relationship thoroughly grounds our ability to conceive, and believe in, the existence of other selves. The first section asserted that any *you* is contingent on an *I-you* experience (*Erlebnis*) (7:419). This *you* is reciprocally conceived as an *I*, just as one considers one's self to be an *I*. A *you* is always addressed directly; we do not speak of an absent person as a *you*, but as a *he* or *she*. No *he* or *she* is ever an *it*, but only a potential *you* (7:422). As one further point, the *you* has no plural (7:422)—we properly use "they"—a *you* and another *you* do not form a class with its own self-character (7:423). Section two explored how the use of *you* presupposes the belief in the existence of other selves (aliosubjectivity) (7:423). Dialogical aliosubjectivity is held in the context of an actual encounter among people: "You are a conscious self." Conceptual aliosubjectivity is propositional: "He is a conscious self" or "There are conscious selves other than myself." In section 3, Wheelwright defended his overall view:

> My central thesis is that the dialogical judgment is prior—both existentially and epistemologically prior—to the conceptual judgment in either of its forms, general or particular. . . . aliosubjectivity must be dialogically encountered before it can be conceptually understood; and that the truth of the conceptual judgment is rooted in the truth, partly discovered

> and partly affirmed as a primordial act of living faith, of the dialogical judgment. (7:424)

Wheelwright concluded with tentative observations about the crucial roles for child-parent interactions in the psychological development of the capacity for appreciating others as selves to be addressed as *you*.

In "Metaphysical Presuppositions of Induction," Everett John Nelson (1946–1947; 1966–1967) argued:

> causal necessity is synthetic, that it must hold between events in virtue of their properties, and that it is, therefore, a necessary condition of the soundness of induction . . . [and] accordingly [that] among the necessary conditions of empirical inference is the truth of propositions that assert more than is given in or confirmable by sense experience. (7:431)

In other words, he argued that empiricism is a non-empirical doctrine. He started by reviewing Hume's problem of induction, namely, that it entails that the foundation of empirical inference is a non-logical causal necessity. He did not deny a difference between induction and deduction, but he did suggest that a proper formulation of an inductive argument, which makes explicit the (non-empirical) rules that govern it (effectively adding them as premises), makes the argument deductively valid. He raised the question in terms of whether propositions like "this A is B" serve as evidence for propositions like "All A are B." Indeed, they do, but only if we also have a rule in virtue of which the former confers some probability on the latter—a Principle of Induction (7:432).

There are two kinds of universal propositions: lawlike or nomic ("all crows are black") and non-law-like, or accidental ("all chairs in this room are brown"). The former supports subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals ("if this cardinal were a crow, it would be black") and the latter do not ("if this chair were in the room, it would be brown") (7:433). What accounts for this? Either they differ in their relation to the other propositions or they differ in their nature. However, the former explanation seems inadequate because a set of propositions that assert nothing more than a constant conjunction cannot support a conditional. (That would make it more than the sum of its parts.) A nomic universal asserts something an accidental one does not—that being an A is sufficient or necessitates being a B (7:433). This is further evinced by the fact that an accidental universal being false requires a counter example (a non-brown chair in the room), whereas a nomic universal can be false without one; if there merely *could be* a non-black crow, the nomic proposition "all crows are black" is false (7:433).

The connection nomic propositions assert is a necessary connection, but not (*pace* rationalism) a logically necessary one; thus the necessity called for is synthetic. Such a connection asserts "a relation between the properties of A and B such that an instance of A is sufficient to or necessitates an instance of B" (7:436). Such a relation must be causal, so nomic universals assert causal rela-

tions. Although synthetic necessity is troubling to some, it undoubtedly exists (for example, if anything is colored, it is extended); and although Nelson did not pretend to know how we acquire knowledge of such truths, we clearly have it. Necessary connection cannot be abstracted from constant conjunction; nevertheless, we understand what "A necessitated B" means.

So what are the necessary conditions for instances of A that are B to soundly infer, "all A are B"? Nelson suggested that enumerative induction can provide a principle of induction that suggests a causal connection in virtue of properties, with a principle like this: PI. → .G/A_1B . . . A_nB=*a/b*. It follows deductively, "the probability judgment itself . . . given n instances of AB, is probably true to the degree *a/b*" (7:438). But that is not the inductive conclusion; the inductive conclusion is not about the degree to which the evidence supports a statement, but it is the statement itself. We drop the evidence, as it were, and we assert only the conclusion in alignment with a "Principle of Inductive Detachment" (7:438). When we see a rapidly falling barometer, we do not conclude "it's probably going to rain given the falling barometer" but simply "it's likely going to rain." And so, this principle of induction serves as a kind of hidden premise in inductive arguments by which we derive that their conclusions are likely. (Nelson had no answer to the question of whether the principle is true.)

So "the uniformity theory of law and of causation is untenable, [and] a Principle of Induction postulating only the existence of uniformities is inadequate" (7:439). The latter fact is made even clearer by the realization that, among other things, even if one knew that all existing crows (past, present, and future) are black, one could still not know whether the nomic universal "All crows are black" is true. Why? Because the evidence set of all existing crows would not reveal whether "if there was one more crow, it would be black" is true or false. It tells us nothing about counterfactuals.

Nelson closed with a few speculative suggestions about the unity of objects—what makes a collection of properties an object (and not just a set of properties that happen to "go together") and keeps it distinct from other objects. We do, he suggested, have a prime example of such an object: ourselves. As well, it can serve to help us understand how events can be related in exactly the same way—in terms of causation. In the same way that there are "real bonds," which hold between my properties that make me a person, there are real bonds that hold between events that generates causation (7:442).

In his address, "Diversity," Gustav Bergmann (1967–1968) hoped to develop an "articulate ontology of cardinal and ordinal arithmetic" (7:504), which can ground the truth of propositions in arithmetic. He was especially concerned with accounting for the ontology of sets (which he calls "classes"), which can help make sense of statements like 2 + 3 = 5. However, he would show, this

cannot be accomplished without the introducing "diversity" into his ontology along with yet another ontological principle: the principle of selection.

Bergmann started by describing the history of his quest to ground propositions of arithmetic, vaguely hinting at problems that he has encountered, and suggesting his main problem was a bloated ontology. In his ontology, there are "things," "facts," and "subsistents." Things are simple. Only facts have constituents (which are things). Universals are things and they have properties. It is a principle of ontology, Bergmann suggested, "what is presented exists." To be presented with a thing is to be presented with its type, or form. It follows, therefore, that forms exist; they are a subsistent. A tie ("nexus") is also a subsistent, and among them is exemplification, which ties things into atomic facts (for example, a particular exemplifying green) (7:496).

This is as far, Bergmann said, as his critics allowed him to go ontologically—but that did not stop him from going further. Instead of "true" and "false," he categorized facts into those that are "actual" and those that are "potential." These he called "modes" (7:497). He defended their place in his ontology by suggesting that they do three jobs:

(1) They make sense of how one can think of something that doesn't exist.
(2) They "can give a realistic account of perception" (7:497).
(3) They help us make sense of belief and disbelief, and reconcile the fact that correspondence is the nature of truth and yet coherence is our only criterion of truth (7:498).

They also help us make sense of necessities, which brought him to his next point: logical connectives—most certainly negation and binary conjunction—are presented to us in perception.

When we consider two colors, green and blue, we are presented with them not being the same. So we have "four entities, the two things, their being diverse, and the complex of which these three are the constituents" (7:501). Diversity is what we have to add to make the set, a set; without diversity, it's a single object instead of a set. Why? Because if thing 1 and thing 2 are not diverse (i.e., distinct), they are the same object.

Although diversity is similar to exemplification, it is different. Two diverse things exemplify diversity; a thing and a form do not (even though they are not identical). In short, diversity makes possible the existence of classes, for objects in a class must be diverse (from each other).

Finally, in an effort to deal with the problem of infinite sets, Bergmann introduced his principle of selection. "There is an enumeration character for each selection, whether finite or infinite" (7:503). This principle cannot be proven; this is why it is a principle. But he also suggests that the "actually infinite" is something that we can say exists but which we cannot actually conceive.

4. Values, Aesthetics, and Ethics

Normative and axiological topics were the subject of several addresses during the 1960s, a decade that saw some of the twentieth century's leading thinkers on aesthetics and ethics rise to presidencies in The APA. This was an "age of analysis" as several presidents openly admitted; the philosophical explorations of values during this decade reflected that age no less than the exploration of topics like knowledge and truth. Another worry on almost all presidents' minds when they dealt with values was the is-ought gap between facts and values.

Isabel Payson Creed Hungerland (1962–1963), delivered "The Logic of Aesthetic Concepts." Aesthetic descriptions of an art object cannot serve the same function as, nor have the same value as, descriptions of the ordinary features of things that we use to discriminate them apart. Aesthetic descriptions and their validity require separate logical analysis, not to be assimilated to justifications for asserting propositions or entailment relations between propositions. Talk of criteria for ascriptions is confusing and unhelpful, especially in aesthetics. Hungerland claimed that there are, properly speaking, no criteria for aesthetic ascribings, even though such ascribings have preconditions, and aesthetic ascriptions have truth conditions (7:155). Furthermore, although aesthetic ascriptions can seem just like descriptions made from "normal" perspectives by "normal" observers in appropriate situations, they cannot be reduced to such descriptions. There remains an essential role for an observer's peculiar "mental stance" (7:157) encompassing such matters as common sympathies, snobberies, outlooks, personal history, training in certain arts (7:157).

This stance on aesthetics appears to ally with subjectivism rather than objectivism, as Hungerland admitted (7:158), yet it cannot be classed with subjectivism, since aesthetic ascriptions are not fully reducible to reports of subjective impressions, feelings, emotions, attitudes, and the like. On the other hand, Hungerland denied objectivism since aesthetic ascriptions should not be based on specific and isolatable features that any object could display to just anyone. They have more to do with the sort of psychologically holistic experiences studies by gestalt psychology (7:163). Aesthetic ascriptions are not determined by someone having taking a pre-specified standpoint—those ascriptions instead recommend that we come to take a certain perceptual viewpoint (7:165). Aesthetic judgments can be justified by non-arbitrary support from a cultural milieu of like-minded people, even if there are no truth conditions to be given for them.

Henry Nelson Goodman's (1967–1968) address, "Art and Inquiry," agreed with Hungerland that the discrimination and evaluation of art objects cannot be reduced to the passive recognition of static features, or be answerable to whatever counts as the "normal" manner of observing the perspectival properties of things. Only the active intellect, inquisitive and exploratory, can do justice to fulfilling the aesthetic purposes that art objects embody. Seeking only disinterested pleasures or special emotions only fails to do justice to art; better to say

that art is distinguished by satisfactions sought in them (but not necessarily gained, in the case of disturbing or poor art). The contribution of the inquisitive aesthetic evaluator is crucial, but it is necessary to reject a presumed dichotomy between the cognitive and the emotional. In aesthetic appreciation, the emotions can function cognitively during inquiries into art (7:454). Indeed, appropriately controlled emotions drive the evaluations central to any inquiry, not excluding scientific inquiry.

The modulation of cognitive emotions is mainly conducted through symbolism; Goodman outlined core features to symbolic systems, such as syntactic and semantic density and relative repleteness. Exercising our symbol skills beyond immediate need is the entryway to the artistic world and the delights of playful discovery. Goodman concluded by accounting for typical features of art appreciation and the art world with his account of aesthetic inquiry.

James Louis Jarrett Jr.'s (1967–1968) address, "Literary Functions, Roles, Masks," discussed and evaluated a variety of theories about the artistic craft of writing. Should writing simply exemplify "the" craft or the formal criteria for writing? Should writing instead convey and induce in readers the author's subjective thoughts and feelings? Perhaps the artist's task is to arouse pre-approved social sentiments, or the dominant ideologies or theologies of the times. On the other hand, perhaps the artistry arises from a confessional stance taken by the artist. How much do the roles adopted by authors, or the intentions of authors, dictate the reader's interpretations?

Critics fully awakened to the ample opportunity to judge a literary work by not just the author but the author's role, status, or intention, are then empowered to pass verdicts more about those factors and purposes than any intrinsic merits to the work. Such verdicts, so easily rendered, can, in turn, next license judgments of sincerity/insincerity upon an author. Is this a case of committing the "intentional fallacy"? (7:474). On the other hand, why could an author not honestly deliver on a promise to provide what the intended audience wants from a literary work? Having paid due respect to so many variables when attending to the literary value of a work, Jarrett offered his typology for categorizing authors, using such labels such as: "as entertainer, as prophet, as game player, as reporter, and as spellbinder" (7:477). We must be willing to enter into relationships with authors in their masks. "Writers and other artists play many parts, vary in how they see their true function, wear a multiplicity of masks; and part of what it is to come to see, to listen, to read aesthetically is to accept, nay to delight in this variety" (7:488).

Turning from presidential addresses on aesthetic appraisals to addresses concerning moral appraisals, we do well to begin with Charles Leslie Stevenson (1961–1962). He directly tackled problems surrounding the questions of subjectivism and relativism attaching to value theories in his address, "Relativism and

Non-Relativism in the Theory of Value." He first pointed out how descriptive terms are rarely relative in all respects; typical terms can be relative in one respect yet not in another, depending on how the term is applied within a broader context. This, in turn, shapes the way that "relativism" may be applied. Asserting that relativism is the approach to some set of terms concerning some topic or another is way to basically claim that those key terms are all relative terms (7:112). However, the warning that terms are never "relative" in themselves must be heard.

Asserting that relativism concerning the basis of values usually involves taking "X is good" to mean "X is approved by ____" (7:112).The relativism arises because the circumstances or situations those people find themselves are omitted from the analysis of "good," so that only the people involved (and their beliefs, intuitions, attitudes, and so on) are referenced. Stevenson aimed to "contrast a relativistic theory of value with a simplified version of the view that I have worked out in my *Ethics and Language*. . . . the so-called non-cognitive view" (7:114).

Unlike naturalistic subjectivism's focus on mere feelings, which cannot account for genuine disagreements over an issue, expressions by two people of their divergent attitudes toward something are at least directed toward the same independent thing, and can be supported by reasons to believe that those attitudes are justified (7:115–116).

Stevenson took great pains to emphasize how his approach makes room for the crucial role of reasons supporting approvals, reasons that are themselves beliefs about appropriate attitudes taken toward things. He then asserted:

> when we claim that the factual reason, R, if true, would justify or help to justify the evaluative conclusion, E, we are in effect making another value judgment, E', of our own—the latter serving to evaluate the situation that we shall have if the facts of the case include those that R purports to describe. (7:121)

That long and complex chains of value judgments undergird our specific evaluations of concrete matters before us should not be surprising. What should be more surprising is that anybody should not only assent to relativism but try to live by it. Stevenson concluded:

> A consistent relativist, when asked what is good or right, et cetera, would in effect discuss only what is or was considered good or right, et cetera, and thus would himself stand committed to no value judgments whatsoever. He would be a non-participant on evaluative issues—as no man, in practice, can be. (7:123)

Arthur Campbell Garnett (1960–1961), like Stevenson, found the dynamic life of commitment to be the ultimate ground for evaluative judgments. Garnett selected "Freedom and Creativity" for his theme. Freedom is usually conceived as freedom from restraining conditions. However, eluding restraint, by itself, has no positive value, and presupposes that this freedom is the opportunity for creative action, which is the true bearer of value. He found creativity in the living activity of every biological organism, and levels of self-determination characterize behavior as it becomes more purposive and self-directed. In humanity, creative action is a far better candidate for the supreme good in life than pleasure or reason. Creativity is (usually) pleasurable, and reason is needed to guide creativity. Creativity is always valued in and for itself, but one person's exercise of free creativity can degenerate into blind habit, and it can limit or harm that of others. Creativity is, therefore, always limited by its earlier manifestations, internally and externally. That is why acts of will are always delimited and incomplete rather than utterly free from conditions.

Feeling as if we do something on a spontaneous whim reflects situations where habits are so balanced or inconsequential that any choice will do. Such a choice seems radically "free," yet those kinds of choices are not really exemplary of free creativity. We do experience a sense of creative willing when we partially deviate, for good reasons and purposes, from familiar habits in pursuit of who we think we really are and ought to be. Reasons for acting have more to do with the future than the past. Moral judgment exemplifies that creativity in the name of the true self.

> Thus moral judgment, when clear-sighted, endorses the creative intention but demands that it shall express the full capacity of the rational self for creativity—that expression which sees its own activity as truly creative only so far as the variety and order it creates facilitate the efficiency of creative activity wherever else it is expressed. The outcome of this analysis is that *it is good that men should be free*, provided that their freedom is not only a freedom from external restraints upon the self, but also a freedom of the creative impulse within the self to find its own expression, guided by the fullest possible illumination of its own intelligence, and sufficiently independent of the determining influence of habit structures that canalize activity in accord with pre-established norms and goals. (7:48)

Our capacity to take responsibility for our actions is predicated upon our prior developed capacity to look after and take responsibility for our own self as it should be. Worry over determinism cannot deflate this account of responsibility, according to Garnett. Whatever prior conditions prevail prior to decisions, they cannot be regarded as determining decisions. While necessary prior condi-

tions for deliberately creative acts must have been present, sufficient conditions were not; creative volition is the extra needed factor for creative decisions. That volition is a purposive manifestation of the self in the present moment, and not any abandonment to chance or irresponsibility. Besides, no determinism is proven by logic or evidence, so we are free to assert the value of our moral responsibility as a robust act of self-creativity without fear of contradiction.

William Klaas Frankena's (1965–1966) address, "On Saying the Ethical Thing," appealed to Peter Frederick Strawson's notion of creative philosophical work in addition to descriptive or elucidatory work. Metaethical inquiries into the meaning and justifications for normative judgments should be normative themselves, in the sense that metaethics can recommend certain understandings of moral language, especially where they might avoid the ambiguities of ordinary moral discourse (7:377). Moral discourse largely consists of appraising, commending, criticizing, prescribing, and so on; ethical naturalists and intuitionists try to reduce or eliminate those modes of discourse in favor of factual matters and only disagree over where (in nature, or in the mind) those matters are located. Stevenson sketched his emerging view like this:

> a normative judgment entails a claim that one who takes a certain point of view and is rational within that point of view (that is, knows the facts, is clearheaded, et cetera) will take a certain attitude, perform a certain action, or at least subscribe to the same judgment. (7:387)

Moral judgments are not really factual assertions about matters, but rather acts of approvals adopted from a certain reasonable point of view (7:387). Approvals may be more or less well supported by reasons, of course, so disagreements over judgments can be cognitively pursued and (possibly) resolved by rational persons.

Vivian Jerauld McGill (1968–1969) announced from the outset of his address, "Scientific Ethics and Negotiation," that his position on ethics was:

> a cognitive, naturalistic theory of ethics, which we shall also call pragmatic. By "cognitive" we mean that moral judgments can be construed as true or false, and that some can be known to be more probable than others. "Naturalistic" signifies that moral judgments are susceptible of confirmation by the methods of the empirical sciences and observation. . . . the best policies and right decisions can be arrived at only by the give and take of opposing parties, in terms of probabilities pertinent in every way to the realizing of common interest. (7:513)

Like other presidential addresses of this decade on normativity and morality, McGill made his own complaint against the supposed divide between the cogni-

tive and the emotional. Emotions can and should have their reasons, of course, so cognitivism has an advantage over emotivism. He selected Stevenson's established view (without citing his presidential address), favoring non-cognitivist emotivism, for criticism. Just because we cannot really "demonstrate" the truth of moral judgments cannot mean that we never have good reasons for them, or that they cannot really be true or false (7:515).

McGill thought cognitivism to be overturned by considerations that moral judgments are more like imperatives than descriptions, so they are not knowable and, therefore, they cannot be true or false. He pointed out that the normative force to a recommendation rests ultimately on appropriate reasons available for asserting it, and not the mere way it was asserted. Those reasons are in the realm of facts, facts made relevant by the situation calling for an evaluation. Is this a violation of the is-ought dictum? Here, McGill appealed to John Dewey (1905–1906):

> An effective answer to the doctrine that ought cannot be derived from is, we believe, was stated by Dewey on many occasions. It is fallacious to infer the desirable from the desired only when the desirable is taken to be an incorrigible absolute, and it is forgotten that the desired can become more and more desirable as it is appraised in larger contexts of causally related events and probabilities. (7:519)

Those who ignore the crucial role of context in normative appraisals can be launched into a pursuit of the ultimate or intrinsic good, to finally settle reasons on firm foundations. Ethics, then, confronts the equivalent of foundationalism or the problem of the criterion, as in epistemology. Ethical principles are not premises for deducing specific normative judgments valid in all circumstances. Rather, their validity resides in their (so far) established utility for guiding the success of our practical activities in the long run for most or all people.

McGill advocated for a scientific ethics, but cautioned:

> in recommending a scientific ethics we include under "scientific" not only bodies of known propositions and their proofs, but also the process of discovery, the choice of problems, subject matter, methods, goals, having the broad purpose of serving human needs of all kinds, including the contemplation of truth. Ethics, similarly, is understood as a process of discovery as well as justification of moral judgments and ethical principles. (7:523)

Concluding, he proposed, "negotiations be taken as a model for ethics" (7:526).

Richard Booker Brandt's (1969–1970) "Rational Desires" got started by considering the issue of intrinsic values, values for which it is rational for a person to desire for their own sake. This way of approaching intrinsic values is far

narrower than the traditional philosophical search for values intrinsically good for all people no matter their rational states of mind. Brandt defined a "rational desire" first, as "one that is *not irrational* . . . one . . . not irrational to have." He used the term rational desire "for any desire that survives confrontation with vivid awareness of relevant facts" (7:635). The origin of acquired desires, and the maintenance of authentic desires, can be explained in terms of what were then considered speculative areas of psychology, for example, he asserted, "stimulus generalization is involved in the formation of desires and aversions" (7:644). He also discussed how the pruning and diminishment of irrational desires can be accomplished.

Brandt endorsed the distinction between claiming that something happens to be desired and asserting that something is desirable. Saying that something is desirable implies that it would be desired by people trying to be maximally rational about it. By extension, something is intrinsically valuable if it would be desired by a person who is successfully rational.

Our final address, by Roderick Milton Chisholm (1968–1969), tackled theodicy in "The Defeat of Good and Evil." Chisholm assumed that there are such things as intrinsic goods (pleasure, happiness love, etc.) and that they are states of affairs. Furthermore, we say that some state of affairs more generally can be intrinsically good (or evil) where it entails the existence of an intrinsic good (or evil). Citing earlier work with Ernest Sosa, in which they set forth a value calculus,[8] he summarized their conclusions as follows:

> We have assumed, of course, that the relation of being intrinsically better is one that is asymmetric and transitive. And we have also assumed the following: that all indifferent states of affairs are the same in value; that all good states of affairs are better than their negations; and that all bad states of affairs are worse than their negations. (7:536).

Applying the value calculus to good and evil, Chisholm discussed the balancing off and defeat of good and evil. He explained that even if a wider whole contains something quite good in itself, yet that whole is not good, the good part is balanced, but not eliminated, by its context (7:537). As to evil, analogously:

> There will be a whole with a good part and a bad part; these parts will exclude each other; the whole itself will not be bad; but it will be worse than its good part. We needn't say, however, that the whole has a good part; for if a whole is not bad and is worse than one of its parts, then the part that it is worse than will be a part that is good. If the whole is neutral, then the badness of the part will be counterbalanced; if the whole is good, then the badness of the part will be outweighed. . . . When evil is balanced off, we

> may yet regret or resent *its* presence in the larger whole. . . . But if goodness is ever defeated by a whole that is bad, then we may well regret or resent the very part that is good. . . . But if badness is ever defeated by a whole that is good, then, as I have suggested, we may well be thankful for the very presence of the part that is bad. (7:538–541)

Regarding theodicy, Chisholm made some observations: First, an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent God could not have created a world containing only intrinsic goods. Second, If God must create a world that is absolutely good, it can contain regrettable evils so long as they are defeated evils. However, no theologian is in a position to know that we live in an absolutely good world. Indeed, for all anyone knows, we might be in an absolutely evil world that is defeating all its goodness (7:545–546).

Notes

1. C. D. Broad, *Scientific Thought* (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
2. Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, *Principia mathematica*, 2nd ed. 3 vols. (Cambridge, UK: The University Press, 1925–1927).
3. Discussed in Meinong's *Über Gegenstandstheorie* (1904). For an English version, see *On the Theory of Objects*, in *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, ed. Roderick Chisholm (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 76–117.
4. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Being and time) (Halle ad Saale, Germany: M. Niemeyer, 1927); published in English as *Being and Time* (New York: Harper, 1962).
5. See William Dray, *Laws and Explanation in History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 122, 124.
6. Mandelbaum cited Gilbert Ryle's *Dilemmas* (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1954).
7. Gregory Vlastos, Degrees of Reality in Plato, in *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, eds. Renford Bambrough and Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, and Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 1–19.
8. Roderick M. Chisholm and Ernest Sosa, "On the Logic of 'Intrinsically Better,'" *American Philosophical Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (July 1966): 244, 249.

PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA DURING THE 1970S

David Boersema

1. Introduction

During the twentieth century, a handful of books appeared that dramatically altered how academic philosophers understood and approached their discipline. Such works included (in the 1950s) Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*[1] and (in the 1960s) Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.[2] Works such as these were lightning rods of philosophical focus and immediately became required reading for philosophers of all persuasions. Regardless of their sub-fields or specialties (such as ethics, philosophy of mind, or aesthetics), and regardless whether they endorsed or criticized them, philosophers across the philosophical spectrum were aware of and influenced by them.

During the 1970s, philosophy in America was bookended by two such works: John Bordley Rawls's (1974–1975) *A Theory of Justice*[3] and Richard McKay Rorty's (1979–1980) *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*.[4]

During the first half of the twentieth century, academic philosophers largely ignored social and political philosophy. This was due in major part to the influence of logical positivism and its focus on the analysis of language, which insisted that questions about values, including moral and political values, were best left to social scientists. At the same time, the social and political philosophy that was being done tended to emphasize either utilitarian or Marxist thought. The publication of *A Theory of Justice* changed that.

Rawls is often credited with reviving serious attention to political philosophy generally and with social contract theory particularly in the late twentieth century. He brought back to the forefront the notion of rigorous normative political philosophy from a social contract perspective. At the end of the decade, *A Theory of Justice* challenged the centrality of epistemology (in terms of content) and linguistic analysis (in terms of methodology) in philosophy.

Rorty, too, at least for many academic philosophers, brought serious attention to classical American philosophers back into the spotlight, especially John Dewey (1905–1906) and William James (1906–1907). In addition, although he was trained in the analytic tradition, Rorty took the work of European continental philosophers seriously and integrated it into his own pragmatist perspective and positions.

The result of these two works was that philosophy in America in 1980, although in many ways was unchanged, looked, in other ways, quite different from what it did in 1970.

2. Metaphilosophy

Twentieth-century philosophy generally displayed a concern with various broad themes, and these concerns were reflected in The American Philosophical Association (The APA) presidential addresses during the 1970s. Perhaps the broadest theme was that of philosophical methodology, or metaphilosophy. From the early decades of the century, analytic philosophers especially wrote explicitly and voluminously about what the appropriate and legitimate purview of philosophy should be (*what* philosophy should be concerned with), appropriate philosophical methodology (*how* philosophers should go about their business), and appropriate goals or purposes for doing so (the values of and within philosophy; in a word, *why* philosophy matters and what counts as good philosophy).

The rejection of late nineteenth-century idealism by the common-sense view of G. E. Moore and the formal logicist views of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein were programs meant to explicitly illustrate the role of philosophy. While the history of science showed distinct progress over time, philosophy did not—because philosophy lacked a clear sense of the kinds of questions it should ask and topics it should address, as well as how it should proceed.

In particular, the view of many American philosophers was that the job of philosophy was to engage in conceptual analysis. The empirical sciences, both natural and social, have the job of describing and explaining what the world is like. The job of philosophy, they postulated, was to investigate, analyze, and expose underlying logical forms and structures. In his work on logical atomism, Russell provided a paradigmatic statement to this effect:

> The business of philosophy, as I conceive it, is essentially that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis. Philosophy is more concerned than any special science with relations of different sciences and possible conflicts between them; in particular, it cannot acquiesce in a conflict between physics and psychology, or between psychology and logic. . . . Although, moreover, comprehensive construction is a part of the business of philosophy, I do not believe it is the most important part. The most important part, to my mind, consists in criticizing and clarifying notions which are apt to be regarded as fundamental and accepted uncritically. As instances I might mention: mind, matter, consciousness, knowledge, experience, causality, will, time.[5]

Closely related to the metaphilosophical theme of philosophical methodology, was the "linguistic turn" taken by academic philosophers, with language itself becoming of paramount importance in American philosophy during the twentieth century. In very large part, philosophy became philosophy of language. The attitude that philosophical problems were fundamentally linguistic was shared by both formal language thinkers, such as Russell and Rudof Carnap and by ordinary language philosophers, such as Wittgenstein, John Austin, and Gilbert Ryle. Carnap, for instance, expressed much the same view as had Russell:

> Philosophy is the theory of science. . . . Philosophy deals with science only from the logical viewpoint. Philosophy is the logic of science; i.e., the logical analysis of the concepts, propositions, proofs, theories of science, as well as those of which we select in available science as common to the possible methods of constructing concepts, proofs, hypotheses, theories. What one used to call epistemology or theory of knowledge is a mixture of applied logic and psychology (and at times even metaphysics); insofar as this theory is logic it is included in what we call logic of science; insofar, however, as it is psychology, it does not belong to philosophy, but to empirical science.[6]

Only a few years prior, Ryle had claimed:

> Philosophy must then involve the exercise of systematic restatement. But this does not mean it is a department of philology or literary criticism.
>
> Its restatement is not the substitution of one noun for another or one verb for another. That is what lexicographers and translators excel in. Its restatements are transmutations of syntax, and transmutations of syntax controlled not by desire for elegance or stylistic correctness but by desire to exhibit the forms of the facts into which philosophy is the inquiry.
>
> I conclude, then, that there is, after all, a sense in which we can properly inquire and even say 'what it really means to say so and so.' For we can ask what is the real form of the fact recorded when this is concealed or disguised and not duly exhibited by the expression in question. And we can often succeed in stating this fact in a new form of words which does exhibit what the other failed to exhibit. And I am for the present inclined to believe that this is what philosophical analysis is, and that this is the sole and whole function of philosophy.[7]

Given this metaphilosophical stance, academic philosophy seemed, for many, to become removed from general social and cultural affairs and notice. Some, such

as Dewey bemoaned what he saw as philosophers focusing on the problems of philosophers rather than the problems of (ordinary) people. Others, which is to say academic philosophers themselves, saw this as a concerted effort to make philosophy more legitimate and rigorous, and hence, in the long run, more meaningful. For them, speculative philosophy was not a serious or important enterprise, whereas a more "scientific" philosophy was. A statement by Willard Van Orman Quine (1957–1958) in 1979 captured this sentiment succinctly:

> Inspirational and edifying writing is admirable, but the place for it is the novel, the poem, the sermon, or the literary essay. Philosophers in the professional sense have no particular fitness for it. Neither have they any peculiar fitness for helping to get society on an even keel, though we should all do what we can. What just might fill these perpetually crying needs is wisdom: *sophia* yes, *philosophia* not necessarily.[8]

As evinced in the addresses delivered during the 1970s, the metaphilosophical question of the appropriate nature and function of philosophy was still very much alive, with several addresses explicitly focused on such issues. "Epistemological Enlightenment," delivered by Arthur John Terence Dibben Wisdom (1970–1971), was, despite its title, not about epistemology. Rather, it was an essay on the question of what sort(s) of knowledge philosophy can offer. True to Wisdom's Wittgensteinian proclivities, the address was written in dialogue form, with a questioner asking probing questions, and a responder, in Socratic fashion, showing the faults of positivism and the purpose of philosophy to see how to clear up faulty assumptions and methods. To his credit, Wisdom acknowledged that the role of philosophy as conceptual janitor is unsatisfactory, as his interlocutor remarks, "I wouldn't think much of the medical profession if the best of them had only the merit of remedying the mischief made by others" (8:42). He argued that progress is made by philosophers showing how previous philosophical answers and approaches are infelicitous. His address was an exemplar of ordinary language philosophy's attempts more to dissolve conceptual problems than to solve them.

In "Method in Philosophical Psychology (From the Banal to the Bizarre)," Herbert Paul Grice (1974–1975), too, was concerned primarily with philosophical methodology. Where Wisdom's address approached this issue by way of a discussion of epistemology, Grice did so via a discussion of philosophical psychology. However, this issue was a conduit by which he wrestled with what he saw as appropriate and fecund philosophical method.

Historically, Grice claimed, philosophers have approached problems related to philosophical psychology: (1) analysis by definition, (2) status of principles, (3) justifiability of attribution, and (4) selective principles of relevant laws. What

followed was a detailed analysis and critique of pursuing these various approaches. His conclusion, "we must be ever watchful against the Devil of scientism" (8:331), is less important here than that his concerns were with regard as to how philosophers should best engage with questions of mind, motivation, and action.

Like both Wisdom and Grice, Alice Ambrose Lazerowitz (1975–1976) was openly and explicitly indebted to Wittgenstein. Her address, "Commanding a Clear View of Philosophy," centered her concerns on the nature of what are philosophical problems and appropriate means of engaging with them. Her main thesis was, "philosophical pronouncements are not truth-value statements" (8:368) and, in typical Wittgensteinian fashion, her means of supporting this thesis was to compare and contrast them with mathematical claims, empirical claims, and modal claims.

3. Language

As just noted, philosophy in America and across the English-speaking world during the twentieth century had been characterized as the "linguistic turn," with its focus on language as the source of philosophical problems. Philosophical attention to language was not unique to the twentieth century, but became paramount then. A particular emphasis of linguistic philosophy was the issue of denotation and reference: How does language hook up with the world? How, for example, did negative existential claims (such as "Santa Claus does not exist") make sense or have a truth value if the terms in the sentence do not refer to anything? In the 1970s, this issue of the nature of reference became front-and-center for a great many philosophers in America; it was almost single-handedly the result of the work of Saul A. Kripke.

For many logicians and philosophers of language, Kripke had already established himself as an important figure, having published a completeness theorem for modal logic[9] and, in large part, having resurrected the study of modalities (possibility, necessity, and contingency) as a subject of serious concern. It was implications and applications of the results of modal logic that resulted in *Naming and Necessity*, which brought Kripke his lasting renown.[10] As the title of his lectures indicates, Kripke drew connections between the modal element of necessity and the semantic issue of naming. The natural point of contact for the two, he noted, was the Leibnizian principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (if two objects are identical, then they are indiscernible; they have all properties in common). If two objects really are identical, that is, if "$a=b$" is true, then, said Kripke, that identity holds across all possible worlds, which is to say that "$a=b$" is necessarily true. From this starting point, Kripke questioned and ultimately rejected, the view that names attach to objects in virtue of contingent properties that are associated with those names. Proper names, however, such as "Saul

Kripke" or "Princeton University" designate the same object in all situations and contexts (or possible worlds). Kripke dubbed these as "rigid designators." Names refer semantically and are, therefore, not dependent upon any features that speaker might associate with those names or with objects. It is important to distinguish between "speaker reference," what a speaker refers to by using a name, and "semantic reference," what a name refers to. So, the name "Saul Kripke" refers to a specific individual, even if I mistakenly use that name to refer to another individual.

In addition, Kripke argued, natural-kind terms, such as "water," "gold," or "tiger," like proper names, function as rigid designators; identity statements involving them—for instance, "Water is H_2O"—are, if true, necessarily true. Just as the features we associate with an individual do not constitute the semantic reference of a given proper name, so, too, the features we associate with a natural-kind term (for example, being malleable, shiny, yellow, as associated with gold) do not constitute the semantic reference of a given natural-kind term. In a word, identity is not the same thing as identification. A consequence of this position is that analyticity is distinct from a prioricity. Whether a statement is analytically or necessarily true is distinct from how we come to know it as true (either a priori or a posteriori). We can, and do, come to discover necessary truths empirically.

For many academic philosophers, Kripke's work was a paradigm shift. His rejection of long-standing earlier views of the nature of reference was hailed by many as having debunked them. For many philosophers of language, he put both semantics and modalities on a secure and substantive footing. His conception of reference came to be, for the most part, the received view. This view came to influence areas of philosophy outside of formal logic and language, such as philosophy of science and philosophy of law. With respect to American philosophy during the 1970s, Kripke's impact is obvious and immediate. Of the thirty presidential addresses, close to one quarter of them dealt directly with issues of modality or reference. Addresses by Lazerowitz, Ruth Charlotte Barcan Marcus (1975–1976), Hilary Whitehall Putnam (1976–1977), and Leonard Linsky (1976–1977) all explicitly discussed Kripke's conception of reference.

4. Modality, Meaning, and Language

Questions of extensional versus intentional semantics, denotation, reference, and relationships between syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic meanings, Wittgenstein's use theory—these and more issues were a mainstay of philosophical concern. As was also noted above, Kripke's proposed picture of reference generated even greater attention to the issue of reference and modality. Marcus's "Dispensing with *Possibilia*" was exemplary of this attention. Marcus had long argued for a conception of reference and modality that many philosophers claimed

not only preceded the work of Kripke, but also made very much the same points as he later did. Others claimed that Kripke's work, while influenced by Marcus's, was independent and went beyond what she had proffered.

Marcus's address was a defense of the substitutional interpretation of logical quantifiers as opposed to an objectual interpretation. In the latter case, individual objects are taken as basic, so that an un-interpreted sentence, such as $(x)Fx$, should be interpreted as saying: for a given domain, all objects x possess the property F. In the former, substitutional interpretation, the sentence $(x)Fx$ should be interpreted as saying: All substitution instances of F are true. The concern had to do with quantifiers in modal contexts and any ontological commitment to possible (or necessary) objects, to which Quine and others had objected. Marcus argued that propositions, not objects, are what are semantically basic, so that Quine's discomfort was misplaced.

Linsky, in "Believing and Necessity," also centered on concerns connected to modality and the debate between appropriate interpretations of quantifiers. In his address, however, the focus was on doxastic modalities, that is, contexts involving knowledge. If proper names are rigid designators (they pick out the same object in all possible worlds, in which they pick out anything at all), then complications arise for contexts, in which $a=b$ (that is, both a and b are rigid designators that pick out the same object), but Smith does not believe $a=b$. Linsky concluded that such a modal commitment requires idealized knowers/believers, meaning those who know/believe all of the logical consequences of what they know/believe.

Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani Hintikka's (1975–1976) address, "Gaps in the Great Chain of Being: An Exercise in the Methodology of the History of Ideas," also dealt with issues of modality, but in quite different ways from Marcus's and Linsky's. Hintikka looked not at modal semantics, but at historical conceptions of possibility and necessity, especially motivated by ideas developed in Arthur O. Lovejoy's *The Great Chain of Being*.[11] Particularly, Hintikka challenged Lovejoy's concept of a "unit idea," meaning a single concept around which historians can and should focus to see how they combine and recombine with each other over time. Hintikka argued that the realization of possibilities is not a unit idea, supporting his argument with an analysis of Leibniz's Principle of Plenitude (briefly: all things being equal, simplicity is better than complexity) and an analysis of G. E. Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy.[12] He noted that Moore's concern was that a defining, or constitutive, property is not the same thing as a constantly contingently associated property (in Moore's case, for defining *good*). This is to conflate (constant) contingency with necessity. For Hintikka, the value of the Principle of Plenitude is as a conduit for seeing other truths. The broader lesson to be learned, for him, was "this is what we ought to be looking forward to in

intellectual and conceptual history in general: not to unit ideas but to ideas that can accurately reflect different thinkers' outlooks" (8:393).

Two final, and significantly influential presidential addresses during this decade that centered on the issue of linguistic meaning were Patrick Suppes's (1972–19732) "Congruence of Meaning" and Donald Herbert Davidson's (1973–1974; 1985–1986) "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," both of which wrestled with what is involved and presupposed by sameness and difference of meaning. Suppes noted that a major problem in the philosophy of language was what constituted two sentences or expressions as being genuinely synonymous.

Noting that Carnap, Quine, and others had proffered answers to this question, Suppes suggested that understanding geometric congruence might prove to be a means to inform and aid understanding of semantic congruence. Starting with the assumption of geometry as a formal system, and suggesting that it can shed light on logical formal systems and ultimately on non-formal natural languages, he identified various definitions of congruence along the model of semantic trees. Some congruences are straightforward (for example, "John and Mary are here" and "Mary and John are here"), while some are more complicated (for example, "They got married and had a baby" and "They had a baby and got married."). Suppes claimed that certain properties that held for geometry could help clear up some of the semantic complications. For example, in Euclidean geometry a congruence of polygons means that there is a 1:1 correspondence between their vertices. Suppes suggested that with respect to semantic congruence, two sentences with "terminal words" that are congruent (same denotations), that they, too, are congruent. While insisting that his conclusion is not that analyzing semantics along such lines is equivalent to reducing natural languages to formal systems, Suppes's address was paradigmatic of the formal analysis methods and goals of many philosophers of language during the 1970s and beyond.

Of all the presidential addresses during the 1970s, Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" is likely the most well-known and frequently cited. For many philosophers of the time, meaning was considered to be something more than or different from a direct correspondence between words and the world. For them, meaning was said to be relative to a language, or conceptual scheme. Davidson disagreed and took the issue head on:

> Conceptual relativism is a heady and exotic doctrine, or would be if we could make good sense of it. The trouble is, as so often in philosophy, it is hard to improve intelligibility while retaining the excitement. At any rate, that is what I shall argue. (8:209)

After considering what a conceptual scheme could be (for example, is it a matter of organizing conceptual/linguistic content in some way(s) or other; is it a

matter of fitting experiences into conceptual/linguistic structures?), Davidson concluded that the very notion that there could be different conceptual schemes that are incommensurable with one another presupposes some means of comparing them in order to be able to make such a claim. That is, to say that Conceptual Scheme #1 differs (in radical ways) from Conceptual Scheme #2, there must be a way of recognizing in what ways they are dissimilar, but this in itself would require a prior level of commonality. Quite simply, to meaningfully claim that there is disagreement, there must be some agreed upon criterion or standard (or scheme, if you will) for such disagreement to be possible. However, he added, "if we cannot intelligibly say that schemes are different, neither can we intelligibly say that they are one" (8:221). The very idea, then, of a conceptual scheme—if it is to play the radical role of rejecting realism—is, for Davidson, incoherent.

5. Realism

Related to both metaphilosophy and language is the issue of realism, an issue that was addressed in numerous presidential addresses during this decade. Here the notion of realism focuses on the issue of the view that there is a real world "out there," independent of our theories and beliefs about it. If not via our simple everyday experience, then by science, at least good science, we discover what that world is really like. In a phrase, ontology is not epistemology. This nutshell view, though, may be too simplistic, even for just characterizing what realism is. For one thing, realism claims not simply that there is a real, independent world out there, but that there is one world and, so, ultimately one correct description of that world. Nevertheless, different philosophers mean different things by the term "realism." Jarrett Leplin, for example, identified at least ten different notions of (scientific) realism.[13]

Various notions of realism focus on different philosophical matters. For example, the emphasis on science as getting true, or approximately true, or closer-to-the-whole-truth accounts is one focus. Notions that emphasize referential success or making genuine, existential claims are another focus. There is also a common-sense, clear position that the world is the way it is independent of how we think of it, which is analogous to the semantic reference/speaker reference issue noted above in the discussion about Kripke. "Good" science gives us a correct picture of the world by giving us true (or true-like) representations of the world. In addition, the history of science shows us that we are getting better at describing the world the way it really is; that is, our current models and theories are closer-to-the-whole-truth than previous models and theories were. The things and events and processes that our models and theories talk about and refer to (for example, electrons and genes and electromagnetic fields) are really "out there" in the world and to the extent that our models and theories are good, they

correctly identify and describe and make use of these things and events and processes. Our best models and theories "cut nature at its joints," meaning that we correctly describe the natural classes of things as they really are.

The issue of realism for many analytic philosophers in the 1970s arose as a response to challenges raised by a number of very influential writers in that decade, among whom were Quine, Henry Nelson Goodman (1967–1968), and Kuhn. All three, in effect, argued that there is no single, correct description of the world because there is no single way the world is; there is no single way of how the world is partitioned (or, how things in the world are categorized, or, linguistically, what predicates and individuals satisfy true sentences). This does not mean that anything goes or that sentences are not true or false or that there is no difference between ontology and epistemology. Rather, they argued, "realism" has no explanatory power or value. Realists, of course, rejected and countered all of these arguments and proposals. The point here is not to suggest that either realists or their critics were correct, but that this was a significant point of concern for many American philosophers during the 1970s. This is reflected in the fact that a number of the presidential addresses were directly related to this issue, including the addresses by Putnam, William Payne Alston (1978–1979), Rorty, and Hector-Neri Castañeda (1980).

Alston's "Yes, Virginia, There Is a Real World" was the most directly and staunchly realist. He defined realism as "the view that whatever there is is what it is regardless of how we think of it" (8:625). Alston's address was a rebuttal and refutation of the various sorts of criticisms of realism, such as those of Quine, Kuhn, Rorty, and Wittgenstein. All of them, he remarked, confused and conflated epistemic justification with truth and epistemology with metaphysics. The language games we play, the schemes of translation we devise, the epistemic standards we acknowledge are all about our engagement in a world that is what it is, and the way it is, independent of our engagement.

At the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum was Rorty, who, in "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," defended what he took to be the metaphilosophical substance and stance of pragmatism, at least in the versions that he associated with James and Dewey, while he distanced himself from much of the work of Charles Sanders Peirce (8:653). Rorty portrayed pragmatism as being anti-theory, anti-essentialist, anti-fact/value dichotomy, and anti-interest-independent inquiry, and anti-grounding. We are, he held, agents in a contingent world and the history of philosophy, including contemporary philosophy, was an effort to ignore and dismiss our contingency. Embracing such contingency, he claimed, is not to endorse irrationalism, or a "silly" version of relativism that "anything goes" or that there are no criteria or standards by which to assess and adjudicate competing claims about the world. A conception of a timeless truth or reality, for Rorty, simply served no function and is philosophically

inert. It offers no explanation and no guidance for inquiry or action. It is as irrelevant to genuine concerns of being in the world as is solipsism. Not simply false for him, realism as a philosophical doctrine is impotent and irrelevant.

In "Realism and Reason," Putnam distinguished what he saw as two senses of realism: metaphysical realism and internal (pragmatic) realism. He characterized metaphysical realism as less an empirical theory than a model; a model that is, or purports to be, a model of the relation of any correct theory to all parts of the world. It is the view that there is a single, correct symbolic representation of the world. This metaphysical realism, which Putnam suggested is realism with a capital "R," is not only opposed to all forms of irrealism, but is also opposed to common sense, or realism with a small "r." Underlying metaphysical realism is the notion that nature is partitioned in a particular way, that similarities are given, that we will discover (we hope) the individuals and kinds that compose the furniture of the world. Internal realism rejects these features. Just as there can be alternative mappings of a geographer's description of the earth (for example, Mercator, polar), so can there be alternative, equivalent, descriptions of the way, or ways, the world is. Internal realism is not committed to there being one and only one true theory of the world. Rather, our symbolic representations of the world are answers we give to questions about the world; they are explanations we give for our passive and active engagements with the world. However, explanations are interest-relative. While not conflating truth with justification, Putnam claimed that any meaningful sense of truth is nevertheless epistemic. With the relativity of cognitive goals and interests, there is conceptual relativity, but, as noted above, for Putnam this is not incompatible with (internal) realism. From the insistence on this conceptual relativity, though, it does not follow that anything goes, that all is relative. For Putnam, the importance of notions of truth and reference and correspondence were in their roles in explaining the success we have in engaging in the world. As he quipped: "Internal realism is all the realism we want or need" (8:424).

During the 1980s and 1990s, Putnam modified his conception of internal realism to emphasize the importance and role of perception in what he came to call "natural realism," while still rejecting metaphysical realism. This focus on perception as it relates to realism and issues of reference is exactly the concern raised by Castañeda in "Reference, Reality, and Perceptual Fields." He noted that perception is an experience (hence, subjective), but an experience of the world (hence, objective). "The fundamental form of attributions of perception is 'At time *t* and place *p* X saw Y Fing'" (8:722). However, whereas perception is indexical—that is, it is specific in time and place—thoughts are categorized and non-indexical. If, for instance, Smith saw (at time *t* and place *p*) the neighbor's cat sleeping, sleeping is not an index. Castañeda pointed out, "the structure of experience is intersubjectively built into the structure of general language with

which we experience aspects or bits of reality" (8:705). We must and can only understand the nature of experience by placing experiences within the context of what is conceivable, which goes beyond what is (merely) perceptible. This, for Castañeda, was not a rejection of any and all forms of realism or reference to external reality, but was an acknowledgement of the necessity of relating a philosophical account of realism and reference via categorized experience. In his later work he developed this concern thought what he came to call "guises."

6. Mind and Knowledge

In Quine's 1969 "Epistemology Naturalized," he suggested that questions about knowledge are best answered by turning to the empirical sciences; traditional philosophical epistemology was at best irrelevant and, even more, misguided.[14] In Ernest Sosa's 1980 "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge,"[15] he argued for a revamping of epistemology in terms of virtue epistemology, that is, epistemology should be understood as a normative discipline that emphasizes epistemic (or intellectual) virtues as fundamental to the nature of knowing (as a process) and knowledge (as a product), either in terms of reliable cognitive faculties or of reliable knowledge-seeking character traits. In the decade between these two papers' publications, philosophers wrestled with various challenges to traditional epistemology, even though of the presidential addresses during this decade, only a few were directly concerned with epistemology. At the same time, in large part because of advances in empirical sciences related to mentality and sentience, the philosophy of mind was taking a more prominent position in the attention of philosophy in America.

In spite of, or at least alongside, the emergence of a naturalized epistemology and philosophy of mind, the influence of Wittgenstein, which was so pronounced during the 1950s and 1960s, continued into the decade of the 1970s, as was noted already from the addresses by Wisdom, Grice, and Lazerowitz. This influence was true also in the areas of philosophy of mind and epistemology.

Norman Adrian Malcolm (1972–1973), in his "Thoughtless Brutes," argued for taking animal consciousness seriously by rejecting the conflation of having thoughts and expressing thoughts as well as of having thoughts and thinking. While one can express thoughts via propositional content, that is not equivalent with the having of thoughts requiring it. In addition, for Malcolm, lack of thoughts does not entail lack of mind, as there is a large component of human consciousness that is "non-thoughtful" and certainly non-propositional, leading to his claim that "grammatical form is not index of psychological reality" (8:146).

Echoing much the same sentiment, if not specific Wittgensteinian context, as Malcolm did, May Selznick Brodbeck's (1971–1972) "Mind: From Within and from Without," was an endorsement of non-human animal consciousness as

well as a rejection of propositional content as a necessary criterion for consciousness or knowledge. Discarding what she saw as the inadequate physical reductionism of the predominant views of materialism, behaviorism, and identity theory, Brodbeck insisted on consciousness as a phenomenological "feel." She labeled this "primary knowledge," that is, what we know and experience without evidence or criteria. As she phrased it, "We don't have to *find out* whether consciousness does or does not exist" (8:126).

Robert George Turnbull's (1977–1978) address, "Knowledge and Forms in the Later Platonic Dialogues," while engaging heavily in historical textual exegesis, displayed an epistemological view that dealt with concerns—and came to conclusions—that were not dissimilar from those of Malcolm and Brodbeck. The lesson to be learned from Plato's late works, said Turnbull, is that conventional language (and include here everyday experience) might well fail to provide genuine knowledge:

> What Plato seems to envision, where a suitable conventional language is at hand, is people growing up, as we say, learning the language and thus, through the linkage of language, sense experience, and activity, able to get around. But it is one thing to exercise conceptual abilities, however well, on and in the passing show. It is another to learn to investigate deliberately what it is to be two, what it is to be a triangle, or what it is to be just. (8:562)

In other words, it comes as no surprise that philosophical epistemology is not adequately addressed by taking a common-sense, phenomenological approach.

Arthur Walter Burks (1972–1973), however, presented a very different picture of mind and consciousness, as well as a very different philosophical stance and approach to these matters. In "Logic, Computers, and Men," he threw down the gauntlet from his opening remark: "Tonight I will advocate the thesis: A FINITE DETERMINISTIC AUTOMATION CAN PERFORM ALL NATURAL HUMAN FUNCTIONS" (8:183). Unapologetically behaviorist in approach, Burks claimed that it does not matter whether a machine feels, but whether it can behave *as if* it feels. Surveying what he took to be "man's internal computing system," Burks maintained that this is not different in kind from the computing system of possible machines. As such, Burks's views were very much in line with the functionalist account of mind, associated largely with the work of Putnam, especially in the 1960s.

Similar in tone and sentiment with Burk's views, William Craig (1978–1979), in "Boolean Logic and the Everyday Physical World," argued that set theoretic entities and functions can suffice to characterize the relations and

properties that can be used to articulate the laws that describe and account for the physical world.

Although not directly related to philosophy of mind or traditional epistemology, Alonzo Church's (1973–1974) address, "Russellian Simple Type Theory," shared a basic approach to philosophical concerns as did Burks's: analysis of formal systems can and will yield solutions to philosophical problems. By the time Church gave his presidential address in 1974, he had a long-established worldwide reputation for his work in mathematical logic. In 1936, he had published two landmark works that resulted in what has come to be known as Church's Theorem and Church's Thesis, both of which flowed from work on the decidability problem; i.e. the problem of whether there is an effective, algorithmic method for a formal system (such as arithmetic or predicate logic) that determines, or decides, in a finite number of mechanical steps whether a particular statement is provable within that formal system.[16]

In 1931, Kurt Gödel published his famous incompleteness theorem, in which he showed that any consistent formal system capable of expressing the truths of arithmetic would contain true statements that were unprovable within that system, and, as such, the system would be incomplete.[17] While a decision procedure for sentential logic (or, propositional calculus) had been developed, viz. truth tables, none had been demonstrated for predicate logic. Church's Theorem showed that no such procedure for predicate logic is possible. Church's Thesis showed that effectiveness is identical with, and so replaceable by, the concept of mathematical recursion. At the same time, Church's student, Alan Turing, proposed a notion of computable functions as ones for which the values could be determined by computing machines (what has come to be called Turing machines).[18] These computable functions turn out to be the same as recursive functions.

Following this work, Church turned his attention to formal semantic theory and the philosophy of language in his presidential address. Of particular concern for him was the theory of types, which was formulated by Russell to overcome logical paradoxes that beset the foundations of mathematics and set theory. For example, Russell had articulated the set of all sets that do not contain themselves as elements, which produced the result that this set both did and did not contain itself as an element. The theory of types was proffered to resolve such paradoxes, based on the assumption that different types, or levels, of meaningful statements could be enunciated, where type 0 might be about objects in the world and type 1 would be about objects in type 0. The problem was in the "grammatical" rules that allowed such a set to be formulated in the first place. The simplified theory of types, which Church advocated, modified these formation rules by requiring that every variable be assigned a number that signified its type and any

statement of the form 'x is a member of y' would be meaningful if and only if *x*'s type-number is one less than *y*'s type-number.

Related to concerns about knowledge, its nature and justification, the only presidential address during the 1970s that was clearly and centrally focused on philosophy of science, even though this field of philosophy was at the very core of analytic philosophy in America at this time, was that delivered by Wesley Charles Salmon (1977–1978). His "Why Ask 'Why?'?" instantly became a seminal paper in the issue of scientific explanation. It was, along with other works of his, key to proposing the causal model of explanation as an alternative to Carl Gustav Hempel's inductive-statistical model (8:515), "which takes explanations to be arguments, . . . the *inferential conception*," and which Salmon refuted (8:519). Salmon claimed that (scientific) explanations must invoke and involve causality, which, he argued, was missing in Hempel's account. Salmon recognized that his statement of the theory of causal explanation required fleshing out (which he elucidated more fully in *Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World*).[19] Nonetheless, at the time, his work generated a renewed interest and body of literature on the nature of scientific explanation that led in subsequent years to Bas C. van Fraassen's pragmatist model, Philip Stuart Kitcher's (1997–1998) information model, and more.

7. Persons and Identity

The question of what constitutes personal identity and the nature of the self has had a long history in philosophy. Three addresses during the 1970s dealt directly with this topic: those of Wilfrid Stalker Sellars (1970–1971), Marjorie Glicksman Grene (1971–1972), and Lewis White Beck (1971–1972).

In "'. . . this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks. . . .,'" Sellars, renowned for his criticism of "the myth of the given," drew extensively from Kant in looking at understanding and reconciling the seeming dual nature of persons: a material entity and a subjective consciousness. Echoing his own well-known distinction between the scientific (material) image and the manifest (subjective) image of the world and ourselves, Sellars elaborated on how the notion of the "I" was addressed by Kant and earlier philosophers, but also by twentieth century linguistically-oriented philosophers (or example, treating a logical subject as a bare particular or in singular referring and indexical expressions). By following what he took as the importance of Kant's practical reason—namely, that it presumed an agent in the world—Sellars concluded that it would well behoove contemporary philosophers to take both the scientific and manifest images seriously and "to *come* up with a concept of nature which not only finds a place for *reason* and the *causality of reason* (tasks which any naturalist will undertake), but also for the *autonomy of reason* and the *reality* of the moral point of view" (8:28).

Grene, in "Sartre and the Other," also focused on the question of the self, but from an analysis of Sartre's works, not Kant's. Like Kant, Sartre emphasized the seeming dual nature of persons (the material "being-in-itself" and the subjective "being-for-itself") and the ineliminable and irreducible sociality of being an agent in the world. Grene drew on Sartre's work to emphasize that persons are agents (beings-in-the-world) in multiple ways, including but not limited to cognitive agents. The self is ultimately relational and consciousness is a matter of this multitude of relations, some of which are material and cognitive, others of which are emotional and affective.

Finally, a noted Kantian scholar, Beck, in "Extraterrestrial Intelligent Life," was also concerned with the question of persons. Noting that throughout history, philosophers and non-philosophers alike have pondered, posited, and argued over the existence and nature of non-human life forms (for example, deities), and noting that at the end of the twentieth century, there was now the emerging science and technology to perhaps actually encounter extraterrestrial life, Beck argued that serious consideration of this topic had genuine philosophical value because it gave (once more) good reason for wrestling with the nature of what constitutes a person. As he remarked:

> thinking about and even hoping to find extraterrestrial civilizations, however, sharpen our search for, and appreciation of, the peculiar virtues and vices of the only form of life we know. Exobiology and other exo-sciences cannot proceed merely by generalization from terrestrial experience; they must construct models of a more abstract nature of which terrestrial life and society are specifications. In that way, hypotheses about extraterrestrial situations may throw light on the terrestrial, while the illumination of the extraterrestrial by hard facts about life on Earth is at best dim and wavering. (8:83)

Just as Sartre had claimed our engagement with the other generated a new self-awareness, and thus in a sense a new self, for Beck, this could be writ large if/when we encounter ET.

8. Value Theory

As was noted in the introduction, Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* is often credited with having resurrected normative ethics for analytic philosophers. For the earlier decades of the twentieth century, philosophers working in value theory focused on metaethics and moral epistemology. (This is not to say that no one worked on normative ethics at this time; a notable exception was Dewey.) The positivists had relegated value theory to the realm of being literally nonsensical

(non-empirical) proclamations or to disguised psychological or emotional testimony. By the mid-1940s, Charles Leslie Stevenson's (1961–1962) *Ethics and Language* had established emotivism as a (if not the) prevailing view.[20] The major challenge to this view came with Stephen Toulmin's, *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics*.[21] Influenced by Wittgenstein's philosophy of language games, with the meaning of claims being housed in specific kinds of contexts, Toulmin argued that moral reasoning is a language game distinct from that of empirical declaration. The logic of value statements was different than that of scientific statements; normative claims were not reducible to descriptive ones. For Toulmin, ethics was not objective in the sense that ethical terms referred to things or properties or relations "out there" in the natural world, but neither were they merely subjective emotional responses. Where the positivists insisted on a sharp fact-value distinction, Toulmin rejected this position, claiming, again, that value claims were testable and verifiable on grounds other than those for descriptive, empirical ones. Moral knowledge, moral justification, and moral reasons are grounded in contexts and purposes that are related to, but not reducible to, factual knowledge, justification, and reasons.

This focus on reason in ethics was reflected in the later metaethical work by philosophers such as Richard Mervyn Hare and Philippa Ruth Bosanquet Foot (1982–1983). It was also reflected in the presidential addresses of Henry Babcock Veatch (1970–1971), Alan Gewirth (1973–1974), Rawls, William Henry Hay (1974–1975), Kurt Erich Maria Baier (1977–1978), and David Shepherd Nivison (1979–1980).

Both Gewirth and Baier addressed the "is-ought" problem. Gewirth, in "The 'Is-Ought' Problem Resolved," in effect naturalized the issue by arguing that agents are purposive actors, hence their actions are value-pursuing and, as such, they commit agents to advocate certain necessary prerequisites for such action, such as rights of freedom and basic well-being (otherwise such action would not be possible). Consequently, agents make judgments to fulfill the condition of prescriptiveness and must acknowledge that these pertain to all relevant agents. Schematically, this comes out to: Is→Rights→Duties→Ought.

In "The Social Source of Reason," Kurt Baier placed the is-ought problem within the context of the relationship between morality and rationality, with particular attention to practical reason. He rejected what he called the "core conception" of rationality, by which he meant a purely, or fundamentally, cognitive conception. He distinguished between *reasons why* (or *for*) and *reasons to* (that is, explanatory reasons and normative reasons). Practical reasons (and practical reasoning), however, is not coextensive with intentions or motivations. Practical reason, for Baier, has an irreducible sociality; as he put it: "practical wisdom is the pooling, storing, and cumulation of [community members'] learning from bitter or sweet experience" (8:497). Finally, the connection to morality is that it

is "a system of recognized social directives, purporting to constitute overriding reasons on the ground that they are, or have an in-built tendency to become, for the good of every member alike" (8:497).

Nivison's "Two Roots or One?" constitutes the only address during the 1970s that incorporated Eastern philosophical thought. Nivison focused on moral reasoning and its relation to moral action. The roots to which he referred in the title of his address come from the writings of Mencius, a fourth century BCE Chinese philosopher. They speak to two sources of moral action, (heartfelt) motivation and recognized obligation (or, desire and duty). Mencius's answer to the question is "one," that is, both right judgments about what I ought to do and how I truly feel about what I ought to do, in the final analysis, come from the same source: the heart. Nivison used this position to explore the nature of moral normativity and practical reasoning via what is relevantly internal to agents and what is external to them.

Veatch's "Language and Ethics: 'What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba?'" and Hay's "Under the Blue Dome of the Heavens," although touching on the issue of moral reasoning, were more broadly metaethical, focusing on how recent philosophers had approached ethics. Veatch rejected the linguistic turn in philosophy as it was applied to ethics. He argued that philosophers turned their backs on genuine and important ethical work by shifting their attention to moral and ethical language at the expense and neglect of substantive moral problems. Here he included the work of a number of analytic philosophers of the preceding and contemporary generation: Wisdom, Foot, John Rogers Searle (1989–1990), and William Klaas Frankena (1965–1966). In the end, he dismissed linguistic metaethics as a "bum steer."

For his part, drawing impetus from Kant's two awesome things—the starry sky above and the moral law within—Hay also engaged in a metaethical critique, but more focused on the question of what do we want from (a) moral theory? He concluded that moral know-how, tacitly understood and practiced, "the moral law as it exists in the exercise of judgment by human beings" (8:349), is the proper desideratum, even if it is contextual and cannot be explicated with necessary and sufficient conditions.

In his address, "The Independence of Moral Theory," Rawls argued that moral theory is independent of other parts of philosophy (theory of meaning, epistemology, or philosophy of mind), which, he claimed, can contribute very little to, and in fact might block advance in, moral theory. Many philosophers, according to Rawls, hold a mistaken hierarchical arrangement of philosophical subjects, with theories of meaning, knowledge, and mind as foundational and other subjects, such as moral theory, built on them. While there might well be interconnections between these different subjects, the more proper arrangement of them is along his famous conception of reflective equilibrium, in which moral actions

and experience lead to formulations of moral truth and vice versa. Moral conceptions emerge from agents engaging in the world, for Rawls, they are derived.

Two other addresses that fall under the broad rubric of value theory, but not moral value theory, are those by Herbert Fingarette (1976–1977) and Monroe Curtis Beardsley (1978–1979). Fingarette was a highly influential voice in philosophy of law prior to and during the 1970s. In his address, "Punishment and Suffering," he argued unapologetically for a retributivist view of legal punishment, that is, a view based on legal wrongdoers being punished on the basis of desert, not on the basis of a utilitarian basis of deterrence.

Civil laws are (one of) our collective means of regulating people's behavior; law is an institution of government and its nature and function rest in its power to regulate behavior. While civil law is certainly related to morality and to utilitarian concerns, its nature *as law* is separate from them. Fingarette's version of retributivism is often referred to as maximal retributivism, meaning it is always wrong not to punish lawbreakers, as opposed to a minimal retributivism, meaning it is always wrong to legally punish someone who is not a lawbreaker. Thus, for maximal retributivism, breaking the law is sufficient for punishment, while for minimal retributivism, breaking the law is only necessary for punishment. For Fingarette, law is not law—it cannot regulate social behavior—unless it committed to a strong retributivist position on punishment and Fingarette insisted on any consideration of penological reform to retain such a commitment, as the expense of law becoming incoherent.

Beardsley was, and continues to be, recognized as a towering figure in contemporary aesthetics. His *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* is still recognized as a seminal work in the field.[22] His address, "In Defense of Aesthetic Value," was a defense of a functionalist account of aesthetic appraisal and, subsequently, an analysis of the nature of value generally, with special attention to aesthetic versus moral value. Beardsley's renown resulted in large part from his rejection of artists' intention as a standard or criterion for aesthetic appraisal or criticism. Likewise, the (emotional) response of the audience of an artwork is, for him, irrelevant. Quite simply, confession is not criticism!

With respect to aesthetic criticism, including both interpretation and evaluation, Beardsley insisted that there are criteria that pertain to the artwork, independent of the artist and the audience. In particular, unity, complexity, and intensity are criteria by which to understand and assess art. What he meant by a functionalist account of aesthetic appraisal—determining if an artwork is good or bad, better or worse—was an account "which assigns to the art appraiser the task of estimating how well the artworks that fall under his scrutiny fulfill their primary or central purpose" (8:574).

The reasons given for appraising the aesthetic value of an artwork (as opposed to, say, its moral, economic, historical, sentimental, etc. value) must relate

to objective features and aspects of the artwork itself, with the purpose being characterized, if not defined, by the aesthetic nature of it. Presumed here was a view that aesthetic value is not reducible to other values (again, moral, economic, etc.) because aesthetic experience is irreducible to other kinds of experience. The criteria of unity, complexity, and intensity mentioned above constitute aesthetic experience, so that artworks that possess these qualities are better than those that do not, for Beardsley.

9. What Was Missing

The majority of non-English European philosophers writing during the 1960s and 1970s was ignored by academic American philosophers. Jacques Derrida was virtually unknown to American philosophers, although, by 1978, three of his books had became *de rigueur* reading in Europe had been published in English translation: *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*; *Of Grammatology*; and *Writing and Difference*.[23] By 1969, Michel Foucault had published several works that were also already part of the philosophical canon in Europe, some of which had been published in English translation by 1973: *Madness and Civilization*; and *The Birth of the Clinic*, *The Order of Things*.[24] Likewise, by the end of the 1960s, Jürgen Habermas had produced *Theory and Practice*; *Toward a Rational Society*; and *Knowledge and Human Interests*; all published in English translation by 1973.[25]

For many American philosophers, continental philosophy generally consisted of what they knew of existentialism, which basically meant Sartre and Heidegger, and to some extent, a few others, such as Merleau-Ponty or nineteenth-century thinkers such as Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Some other names, such as Husserl, were known to American philosophers, but essentially unread by them. Quite simply, to the majority of American philosophers, while Kant was seen as a pivotal figure, from Hegel onward through the nineteenth and twentieth century, continental philosophy was ignored or dismissed. It had stopped, for all intents and purposes, with the existentialist writings of the 1940s and 1950s, or, for some, with contemporary interpreters and apologists of Marxism. The works of what came to be thought of as major schools of thought, such as critical theory, structuralism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism, were simply not on the radar screens of American philosophers in the 1970s, much less on their bookshelves or in their classrooms.

Of the thirty addresses delivered during the 1970s, only two dealt at all with contemporary European philosophers: Grene's "Sartre and the Other" and Rorty's "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism." At the start of the decade, Grene spoke on Sartre as he related to issues of knowing and identity, while at the end of the decade, Rorty mentioned Nietzsche, Heidegger, and even

Habermas, but all within the context of fleshing out his version of pragmatism. Nevertheless, this lacuna of interest in or awareness of continental philosophy would change in the following decade, so that by the end of the 1980s, Derrida, Foucault, Habermas, and many others, were no longer unknown and were, for a growing number of academic philosophers, taken more seriously.

Other philosophical movements, schools, and approaches that barely appeared to be of concern in the presidential addresses of the 1970s were feminism, applied philosophy (for example, bioethics), and even "American" philosophy itself, with the exception of some discussion of pragmatism, for example, by Putnam and Rorty. These absences include discussion or engagement with "classical" figures, such as Simone de Beauvoir, Mary Wollstonecraft, Emma Goldman, and Jane Addams (with respect to feminism), as well as contemporaries, such as Suzanne Langer, Mary Daly, and Julia Kristeva.

Many philosophers today claim that there has recently been a renaissance of attention to philosophical pragmatism and that this was largely due to Rorty's work. While in one sense, this claim of a renaissance is true—there has been a noticeable increase in works about and influenced by classical American pragmatism—in another sense, this claim is misleading. I say misleading because pragmatism has been with us continuously since Peirce is said to have coined the term in the 1870s. Russell and Dewey engaged in rousing debates on epistemology, logic, and truth throughout the first third of the twentieth century; Quine championed pragmatism via his brand of naturalism throughout his career. Likewise, Putnam openly expressed not only sympathy with, but in many ways, identification with pragmatism.

So, while pragmatism as a philosophical tradition, or perhaps school, was overshadowed throughout much of the twentieth century by other traditions and schools (for example, logical empiricism, ordinary language analysis, phenomenology, structuralism, critical theory), it was neither absent nor lacked philosophical impact. Furthermore, while pragmatists often focused on epistemological issues such as truth and knowledge, they also—most notably Dewey—addressed concerns of social and political philosophy. Nevertheless, in the presidential addresses of the 1970s, the work of Peirce, James, and Dewey—not to mention W. E. B. Du Bois and Alain Locke—are among fundamental American philosophers whose work was not addressed, including areas of standard analytical concern, such as ethics, philosophy of language, mind, or science, although these figures wrote voluminously on these topics.

In subsequent years, as these areas (continental philosophy, pragmatism, feminism) became more mainstream in academic philosophy, they were also reflected in presidential addresses, for example, those of Richard Alan Wasserstrom (1986–1987), Richard Jacob Bernstein (1988–1989), Martha Craven Nussbaum (1999–2000), and others. But during the 1970s, they were sidelined.

Fully half of The APA presidential addresses delivered during the 1970s focused on interrelated issues of metaphilosophy, language/meaning, reference, ontology, realism, modality, and logic. Another group of eight talks centered on value theory (mostly ethics, but including philosophy of law and aesthetics), with the remaining addresses focusing on epistemology and philosophy of mind. The two outliers—if that is an appropriate way to identify them—were one talk on Sartre (by Grene) and one talk on extraterrestrial life (by Beck).

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THE LAST DECADE OF THE COLD WAR, THE 1980s

Drew Christie

1. Introduction

Several broad factors influenced the presidential addresses delivered to The American Philosophical Association (The APA) during the 1980s. The 1980s was the last decade of the Cold War. It was a decade of rapid developments in digital computer technology, high-profile United States Supreme Court decisions on social justice issues, and a free-market, conservative political swing in the United States with the election of President Ronald Reagan. The slow death of mid-century positivist programs in philosophy (behaviorism, emotivism, instrumentalism, and the unification of science) cast long shadows. Finally, within The APA, we saw notable swings from pragmatist dominance to the dominance of analytic philosophy, and from philosophers finding inspiration in Hegel to finding inspiration in Hume.

The 1980s saw the term "globalization" come into widespread use to describe a sharp increase in world trade. Throughout the decade, there were important developments that, in retrospect, foreshadowed the collapse of the Soviet Empire: The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. A classic example of imperial overreach, the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989 after ten years of unsuccessful combat. The Soviet Politburo elected Mikhail Gorbachev as Communist Party General Secretary in 1985. Gorbachev introduced a policy of glasnost (greater openness), which had the unintended effect of allowing more effective dissent. The Berlin Wall, erected in 1961, was symbolic of the Cold War as a whole. In 1987, President Reagan gave a speech at the Brandenburg gate near the Berlin Wall, in which he challenged Gorbachev, "tear down this wall!" Mostly peaceful revolutions were occurring throughout central Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1990, the Berlin Wall collapsed and Germany reunified. The twelve republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics disbanded in 1991.

One spin-off of the Cold War was the rapid development of computing technology, since computers were ideal for real-time military intelligence. Computers were on everyone's mind. Everywhere desktop computers with word-processing and spreadsheet software replaced typewriters and calculators. Companies invested heavily in the new technologies and computer changed most jobs. The analogy between computers and minds was a strong influence on the development in psychology of computational models of mind, while some philosophers disputed the scope and limits of the mind-computer analogy.

Two large general issues during the 1980s added interest to questions concerning the capabilities of computers. President Reagan longed for the end of the nuclear standoff, during which a fragile peace was maintained through fear of "mutually assured destruction" (MAD). He envisioned a computer-managed missile shield that would destroy all incoming missiles. His 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, aka "Star Wars") focused debate about the capabilities of computers, since an effective shield would require enormous computer power. Critics of SDI (for example, The Union of Concerned Scientists) raised the concern that existing computer systems were not sophisticated enough to manage such a shield.[1] The ensuing debate focused attention on the capabilities of digital computers.

A second high profile debate centered on computers and the game of chess. For a time in the 1970s and 1980s, it was unclear whether any chess program would ever be able to defeat the expertise of top human players. In 1968, International Master David Levy made a famous wager that no chess computer would be able to beat him within ten years. He won his bet in 1978 by beating Chess 4.7 (the strongest computer program at the time), but acknowledged then that it would not be long before he would be surpassed. In 1989, the computer Deep Thought, in an exhibition match, defeated Levy. In less than a decade, the best programs would defeat the world champion. The fact that a computer could beat the most intelligent human beings at the sophisticated game fueled speculation about computer "intelligence."

Looking with a wide-angle lens, American philosophy during the last two-thirds of the twentieth century centered on naturalism, empiricism, and the demise of mid-century positivism. The term "naturalism" is used in the very broad sense of twin commitments, first to an ontological denial of the supernatural and of fundamental teleological claims, and second, to a methodological commitment to science as a source of knowledge and the ideal of investigation. The term "empiricism" is used in reference to the doctrine that all knowledge is derived from sensory experience. Naturalism and empiricism, both strongly influenced by Hume, were allies for the most part. Naturalistic (empiricist) projects focus on "placement problems"; that is, how the 5 m's—morality, mind, meaning, modality, and mathematics—fit into a naturalistic (empiricist) world. For example, how can mental states (for example, my belief that it is raining) causally interact with the natural world of atoms in motion? The puzzle is how beliefs and atoms interact, given that they appear to be such completely different things. David Hume argued that none of the five m's fit easily into a world of sensory impressions and physical objects.

A dictionary definition of "positivism" would indicate that it is a theory that theology and metaphysics are earlier imperfect modes of knowledge and that positive knowledge is based on natural phenomena and their properties and

relations as verified by the empirical sciences. In philosophy, positivism was a spirit that spawned programs that were more specific than that. In the middle of the twentieth century, a cluster of positivistic theories appeared to offer answers about the placement problems: behaviorism (mind), emotivism (morality), verificationism (meaning), and formalism (mathematics). Instrumentalism tackled the problem of unobservables. A single scientific method was to unify the sciences and bring about order. Each of the positivistic movements appeared to offer solid, scientific ground on which to stand.

However, by 1970, each of the positivist theories had encountered severe difficulties. Kurt Gödel undermined mathematical formalism with his stunning incompleteness theorem, in which he showed that that consistent formal systems complicated enough to include ordinary arithmetic would include sentences that were true but not provable.[2] Noam Chomsky showed with mathematical clarity that behavioristic models were far too simple to encompass language use.[3] Peter Geach noted logical difficulties in attempts to formulate emotivism.[4] Verificationism itself was unverifiable. Instrumentalism appeared less plausible as scientists brought molecules into the realm of the observable. Finally, the hoped-for unification of science failed to materialize.

The second half of the twentieth century was a long retreat from the tight strictures of mid-century positivism. The retreat took care to avoid the sinkholes of theology, historicism, Hegel, Heidegger, and relativism. It was a retreat, not a change of topics, for several reasons. First, the positivist pole remained very much in view; few members of The APA explored the historical concerns of Hegel, Marx, or Nietzsche. Second, there were many sophisticated efforts to give updated variants of quasi-positivistic views (for example, Hilary Whitehall Putnam's (1976–1977) machine state functionalism,[5] Bas C. van Fraassen's constructive empiricism,[6] and Alan Gibbard's updated non-cognitivist emotivism[7]). Third, the dominant written form was the science-like professional research journal paper. As philosophers moved away the positivist pole, there was a general concern that philosophy remain more like science than art. Moves away from the positivist pole opened space for a return to Aristotle, which was particularly evident with the rise of virtue theory and modality. As philosophy moved cautiously away from the positivist pole, numerous disputes arose as to whether someone had moved too far or too little.

Philosophical milestones in the move away from the positivist cluster of theories were Willard Van Orman Quine's (1957–1958) attacks in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism";[8] Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*;[9] Wilfrid Stalker Sellars's (1970–1971) *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*;[10] Putnam's "Minds and Machines," a machine functionalist successor to behaviorism;[11] Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*;[12] Saul A. Kripke's *Naming and Necessity*;[13] and John Bordley Rawls's (1974–1975) *A Theory of Justice*.[14]

The decline of mid-century positivist approaches to naturalism and empiricism set the stage for philosophy as represented by The APA presidents in the 1970s and 1980s.

Regarding God, Nietzsche wrote, "we have killed him,"[15] suggesting that the rise of science unleashed skepticism that undercut religion. Just as Nietzsche thought that the death of God would cast long shadows, the 1980s was a distinct era in the decades-long shadows cast by the death of the mid-century positivist programs. The mid-century positivist programs died by their own hand. Each purported naturalist placement drew criticism from those who thought it was too close mid-century positivism and those who thought it approached a dangerous sinkhole.

It is an interesting question as to why the positivist pole exercised such a powerful attractive force to philosophers of The APA. The move away from religion, the rise of science, and increasing professionalization made positivist grounding and the associated solutions to placement problem attractive. Furthermore, the "positivist" solutions to the placement problems were often as good as any alternative. If, in retrospect, we find the mid-century positivist programs implausible, we should remember that initially, they were all attractive.

It would be a mistake to say that logical positivists dominated The APA at mid-century, that the positivist programs enjoyed widespread support. Instead, by the 1970s, The APA philosophers were often taking failed positivist programs as their serious predecessors. More philosophers responded to Rudolf Carnap, Bertrand Russell, and Hans Reichenbach (1947–1948) than to John Dewey (1905–1906) or to Alfred North Whitehead (1931–1932). For example, philosophers of mind looked back to the demise of behaviorism, not to the idealism or pragmatism that reigned in the first third of the twentieth century.

The APA presidential addresses of the 1980s explored issues of mind-body, ethics, science, and the nature of philosophy in the context of a landscape changed by intellectual trends during the previous fifty years. In each domain, they reflect a distinctive tone.

2. The Relation between Mind and Body

The problem of mental causation was the topic of Frank Thilly's (1900–1901; 1901–1902; 1912–1913) first presidential address of the APA, "The Theory of Interaction," in which he stated, "the question concerning the relation between mind and body has occupied the center of philosophical interest since the days of Descartes" (1:3). Thilly defended what he called common-sense interactionism: "states of consciousness are causes of changes in the physical world, and physical occurrences the causes of changes in consciousness" (1:3) against par-

allelism: "the theory which denies that there can be a causal relation between the mental and physical realms" (1:3).

Parallelism is sometimes associated with Spinoza's dual-aspect theory. Interactionism became the doctrine of mental causation. It is important to note that, unlike Descartes, Thilly's interactionism made no appeal to a soul. Parallelism accepted mental-mental and physical-physical causation, but not mental-physical causation. Then, as now, parallelists made an appeal to the conservation of energy. Thilly identified several contemporaries as "parallelists": Hermann Lotze, William James (1906–1907) and George Trumbull Ladd (1904–1905). Thirty-five years later, James Bissett Pratt (1935–1936), in his address, "The Present Status of the Mind-Body Problem," again defended interactionism, which he saw as ancient common sense. Like Thilly, Pratt argued strenuously against versions of materialism that disallow interaction between the mental and the material. He went further than Thilly, asking why interactionism is perennially under siege. He suggested that since the Renaissance, naturalism has held enormous sway. For Pratt, failure to place mind in the natural world suggests that naturalism might be wrong; in other words, the world may contain non-natural mysteries. He is among the last philosophers of The APA who, in discussing mind-body issues, took the possibility of non-natural mysteries seriously.

Seventy years after Thilly's first address, mind-body issues still occupied the center of philosophical interest. In addition to the spread of computers and computer models of mind, two major developments changed the terms of the debate. First, the so-called linguistic turn, in the early twentieth century, reframed issues of mind as issues of language use and the world. Second, in the 1950s, Chomsky's generative grammar revolutionized the study of language.[16] Behaviorism, one of the mid-century positivist theories, had attempted to define mental states in terms of observable behavior. To behaviorists, ordinary use of mental state terms (for example, anger, love) where simply convenient ways of describing patterns of behavior. Mysterious, difficult to investigate, mental states became naturalistic, observable patterns of behavior. In other words, behaviorism placed mentality in the physical world of matter in motion. Chomsky effectively ended the reign of behaviorisms. The 1980s looked for a more sophisticated placement of the mental in a material world.

Despite changes in the terms of debate, Thilly's 1900 skepticism concerning the counter-intuitive claims of strong materialists was still very much alive in 1980s debates about the relation between the mental and the physical. His interactionism (mental causation) raised the issue of how mental phenomenon (beliefs and meanings) fit into the world of atoms and quarks that empirical scientists describe.

Putnam is the most cited philosopher in the presidential addresses of the 1980s. One reason for his prominence is that in 1960,[17] he defended the strong

materialist claim that the mind was a Turing machine (an idealized digital computer), a claim also known as strong artificial intelligence (AI), the name used by computer scientists to develop software capable of performing tasks that, if done by human beings, would require intelligence. Putnam's advocacy of strong AI mirrored widespread claims that intelligence was nothing but "symbol manipulation," something at which computers were very good.[18]

Two other important contributions by Putnam were "multiple-realizability" and "content externalism." Multiple-realizability is the claim that mental states can have physically different realizations in different systems. For example, dog pain might be physiologically quite differently from human pain. Externalism is the claim that the content of a mental state depends not only on the associated brain state, but also on an organism's environment and history.

Two strands of 1980s mind-body debate focused on the questions (1) Can computers think? and, (2) Is mental causation possible? The opponents of strong materialism were not Cartesian dualists who postulated mind stuff. Rather, they tended to be property dualists (supervenience or non-reductive physicalists) who rejected contemporaneous analyses (reductions, translations) of the mental in terms of the physical. In "On Refuting the Skeptic," Benson Mates (1983–1984) reminded us of how strong the skeptical tradition is in philosophy; it is no surprise to see widespread philosophical skepticism concerning Putnam's strong-materialistic claim that human minds are idealized digital computers. A leading skeptical intuition was that computers, far from being intelligent, blindly followed instructions.

The Chinese Room Argument (9:691) described in "Is the Brain a Digital Computer" by John Rogers Searle (1989–1990), which he had originally proposed in 1980[19] concurred with the skeptical intuition that computers only mechanically follow directions. Imagine a person in a box who is given cards containing Chinese characters. Knowing no Chinese, the person mechanically looks up the symbols in a dictionary and returns correct translations. From outside the box, it looks like the box "knows Chinese." Searle thought it was clear that the box (computer) does not display intelligence, thus he argued that intelligence must be more than rule-governed syntactic symbol manipulation. In popular terms, Searle maintained that computers were complex machines that only did what they were told.

Searle was not persuaded by his opponents, who denied that intuitions about a person using a look-up table were relevantly analogous to discussions of what computers performing millions of operations per second could do. His address was a reply to more than a decade of objections to his original Chinese Room Argument.

In "*De Re* Belief," David Benjamin Kaplan (1980–1981) illustrated the formal complexity surrounding issues of language, mind, and body. Kaplan dis-

tinguished *de re* from *de dicto* assertions (9:25), a scholastic distinction revitalized by Quine in the 1950s.[20] *De dicto* beliefs (for example, "Ralph believes the sentence, 'Orcutt is a spy'") remain within the realm of the semantic and the mental, which *de re* beliefs make contact with the world itself ("Ralph believes of Orcutt that he is a spy"). Kaplan followed Quine in thinking that "quantifying in" is inherently problematic. Quine was suspicious of the coherence of modal language. His view was an instance of a mid-century positivist program called extensionalism. The defining feature of extensional predicates/properties is that what they apply to in a given possible world, for instance, the actual world, depends only on what is true at that world. Extensionalism has roots in empiricism and Hume's suggestion that necessities are merely constant conjunctions. Quine's 1950s extentionalism lost favor in the 1970s and 1980s, as philosophers came to believe that Kripke's important work in modal logic had sufficiently clarified modal terminology. With the rejection of extentionalism, Kaplan's work on "quantifying in" became less interesting. The demise of extentionalism and the embrace of modalities was a major shift in philosophical discourse during the 1970s and 1980s. Characteristic of the shift is that philosophers at end of the twentieth century were at ease talking about possible worlds.

Philosophers who attempted to analyze larger units in terms of smaller are said to be working "bottom-up." In "Machines and the Mental," Frederick Irwin Dretske (1984–1985), thinking bottom-up, explored the possibility of a machine displaying intelligence. He very carefully worked out the details of strong physicalism, starting with the homely example of a key's opening a door. Of course, the key does not literally open a door; rather, it is the person using the key who opens the door. Painstaking analysis of simple examples is characteristic of Dretske's approach to philosophy. He suggested that a necessary condition of "machine intelligence" is that the system in question adjust its responsiveness to the environment. His strong naturalism led him to explore locating information and agency within the physical world. He is associated with "teleosemantics," based on Ruth Millikan's *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories*,[21] and went on to write *Naturalizing Mind*.[22]

Donald Herbert Davidson (1973–1974; 1985–1986), who, like Kaplan, was a student of Quine's, was as influential as any philosopher in the 1970s and 1980s. He popularized the use of the word "supervenience." For example, the aesthetic supervenes on the physical in the sense that two atom for atom identical paintings have the same aesthetic properties. Davidson had popularized the idea that mental states supervene on physical states, that is, there could be no change in mental state without a change in physical state. Philosophers distinguished many varieties of supervenience during the subsequent decade. Davidson argued further, introducing his famous swampman thought experiment, that mental states are not brain states in any straightforward way. Suppose light-

ening kills Davidson while he is hiking in a swamp. At the same time, nearby in the swamp another lightning bolt spontaneously rearranges a bunch of molecules such that, entirely by coincidence, they take on exactly, atom for atom, the identical form that Davidson's body had at the moment of his sudden death. Davidson maintained that the new creature, "swampman," despite being physically identical to Davidson, would not have any mental states whatsoever; for example, swampman could not remember going to Paris because swampman never went to Paris. Swampman illustrates Putnam's mental state content externalism, that is, that the content of mental states depends on the external environment. Many find Davidson's swampman thought experiment to be so unrealistic as to be useless. Davidson's general view, elaborated again in "Knowing One's Own Mind," is consistent with his swampman example but less fanciful. In it, he proposed "anomalous monism," according to which (1) mental states are physical states, yet (2) relations among mental states cannot be captured by physical laws (9:403). For example, having the thought that milk is in the refrigerator and wanting milk is being in a particular physical, neurological state. The anomalous monist claims that there are no physical law that connect S1 with S2. Davidson's supervenience (non-reductive) physicalism is a species of interactionism reminiscent of Thilly's.

Jonathan Francis Bennett (1987–1988) was a key participant in the 1960's revival of Kant, from an analytic perspective, with his two influential commentaries, *Kant's Analytic* [23] and *Kant's Dialectic*.[24] *Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes*[25] evinces the breadth of Bennett's historical studies. Bennett also wrote an influential study, *Rationality*,[26] which made him well suited to tackle the issue of animal intelligence in his address entitled "Thoughtful Brutes." The discovery by Jane Goodall in the 1960s that chimpanzees use tools overturned a long tradition of thought about what makes us uniquely human, namely, tool use and language.[27] Goodall's discovery raised the question whether chimpanzees, now known to use tools, might also be capable of language. Thereafter, researchers attempted to teach chimps language.

Bennett began his discussion by distinguishing non-human animal signaling systems from human language. For example, Vervet monkeys have three distinct warning cries, but this sort of signaling, Bennett argued, does not make them language speakers. Animal signaling systems, even as complex as the dance of the honeybee, do not evince any sort of syntactic structure. Human language use is "intentional," that is "flexible, finely and rapidly adaptable to relevant changes in the circumstances" (9:525). Concerning the behavior of primates with symbols, Bennett asserted, "the very regularity of this behavior unfits it to display that adaptive flexibility that is the only clear mark of intention" (9:527).

In his survey of two decades of animal language research, Bennett suggested a thought experiment: imagine a robot, "Describer," that moves around

and correctly labels things; for example, red key. If all a describer does is describe, then it fails to understand. Even the best describer lacks the concept of a key or of a color. Accurate labeling is a necessary component of intelligence, but it is far from sufficient. In "'. . . this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks . . .,'" Wilfrid Stalker Sellars (1970–1971) had made a similar point about mere "labeling" without comprehension. Following simple commands (fetch, throw) like labeling items associates a stimulus with a response. Again, no understanding is necessary. A system can fetch without having any concept of why it might be useful. After years of training, chimp "language" remained at the level of following orders and labeling. An advanced order-following describer may well outperform a child at important tasks (fetch the blue catheter from the autoclave). A command-following, recognizing, and describing, robot can be impressive and invaluable without genuinely understanding words or concepts.

Bennett noted that two distinctive features of human language appear to be the ability to express beliefs about the past and beliefs about generalities. None of the animal signaling systems studied contained differences in tense or contained quantifiers. Chimpanzees were unable to combine symbols to form meaningful sentence-like sequences. Animals using symbols appeared unable to go beyond moderately capable describers. He reluctantly concluded that language is a uniquely human phenomenon (9:534).

Indirectly addressing mind-body issues, in "Metamental Ascent: Beyond Belief and Desire," Keith Edward Lehrer (1988–1989) stressed in the extraordinary complexity of second-level human thought about first-level beliefs and desires. Our metamind can resolve inconsistencies among beliefs and form preferences among desires. Lehrer approach was top-down in that he analyzed very complex thought in terms of smaller constituents. He suggested that free will is the metamind at work. Lehrer targeted the view that mind is primarily as matter of beliefs and desires. Lehrer's metamental shows how much more complex human thought is than Bennett's Describer or Searle's Chinese Room.

Asserting, "first order beliefs and desires are the materials for metamental processing" (9:623), Lehrer conceded that it is impossible to prove the existence of metamental processes. Thus, assuming their existence for the purpose of his discussion, his thesis was:

> the function of metamental ascent is the resolution of conflict at the first level . . . We resolve conflict among our desires for rational decision in the interests of practice. We resolve conflict among our beliefs for rational acceptance in the interests of truth. The resolution of such conflicts is essential to freedom and knowledge. (9:624)

Like Davidson, Jaegwon Kim (1988–1989) was one of the most discussed philosophers during the last third of the twentieth century. Kim and Davidson

defended two poles of the 1980s mind-body debate: reductive and nonreductive physicalism. Kim's *Philosophy of Mind*[28] offered an admirably clear and non-partisan account of the state of the mind-body debate, which reflects his overview of the field that was, for many years (through three editions), the standard high-level introductory text in the field. It weaved together more thoroughly than is possible here the contributions of Putnam, Davidson, Searle, Bennett, and Dretske. Coming close to endorsing reductionist physicalism, in "The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism," Kim argued that philosophers like Davidson are too easygoing in their claims to be, on the one hand, materialists, and on the other hand, mind-body property dualists (9:643). Of the presidents of The APA who served in the 1980s, Kim most nearly approximates the "parallelists," critiqued by Thilly in 1901, who thought materialism had dramatic consequences on our ordinary notion of mind. Along with parallelists of the early twentieth century, Kim questioned whether mental and the physical realms can interact:

> On [Davidson's] anomalous monism, that an event falls under a given mental kind is a causally irrelevant fact; it is also something that is entirely inexplicable in causal terms. Given all this, it's difficult to see what point there is in recognizing mentality as a feature of the world. I believe that if we push anomalous monism this way, we will find that it is a doctrine virtually indistinguishable from outright eliminativism. (9:645)

Kim argued that nothing short of type-type reductionism could avoid epiphenomenalism. He also questioned Putnam's multiple realizability argument, namely, that types of mental states cannot be physical types because mental states are realized differently in different organisms and systems (9:643, 645). He considered that possibility that mental properties are complex disjunctions of many types of physical realization. He concluded, "nonreductive materialism is not a stable position. There are pressures of various sorts that push it either in the direction of outright eliminativism or in the direction of an explicit form of dualism" (9:655).

3. A Changed Ethical Landscape

Ethics is a second domain in which the 1980s presidential addresses reflect changes from previous decades in philosophical discussion. Emotivism, the metaethical view that moral judgments do not function as statements of fact but rather as expressions of the emotional attitudes, had spurred a major mid-century positivist program focused on metaethics. After decades of being wary of discussing social issues, Rawls's monumental *A Theory of Justice*, along with high profile Supreme Court decisions, opened the door for Anglo-

American philosophers to discuss substantive ethical theories and specific social issues. Rawls turned away from metaethics and toward Kantian moral theory. Ethical theorists in the late 1960s and early 1970s focused on deontological (Kantian) ethics versus the utilitarian (consequentialist) ethics of John Stuart Mill.

Philippa Ruth Bosanquet Foot (1982–1983), in "Utilitarianism and the Virtues," championed virtue ethics as a neglected alternative to deontological and consequentialist ethical theories. Her advocacy had been foreshadowed by G. E. M. Anscombe's famous "Modern Moral Philosophy," which crystallized an increasing dissatisfaction with the forms of deontology and utilitarianism then prevailing.[29] Virtue theory emphasizes the role of one's character and the virtues that one's character embodies for evaluating ethical behavior. Virtue theory is a return to Aristotle after centuries of Kant and Mill. According to virtue ethics, which act is morally right is the one that a virtuous person would perform. Keeping promises illustrates the difference among the three approaches. A deontologist follows the rule, "Keep your promises." The Utilitarian (consequentialist) weighs the pros and cons of keeping promises. For the virtue theorist, keeping promises is a matter of character, of who one is.

The return of Aristotelian virtue theory was a significant development in the 1980s, and Foot was a key figure. She focused on utilitarianism, most especially taking issue with its consequentialism (9:187). She argued that welfarism, or the "sum ranking of welfare," allowed the rights of some to be discounted so that others might benefit. She also took exception to Amartya Sen's concept of "goal rights," since they, too, failed to account for some actions others would judge to be wrong (8:188). Moreover, Foot advocated for recognition of virtues (states of affairs recognized to be good) and that virtues, rather than utilitarian objectives, guide action (9:195–198).

In "Communal Ties," Julius Matthew Emil Moravcsik (1987–1988) represented another alternative to the rights-consequences dichotomy, namely, communitarianism. Communitarianism arose, in part, as a response to the sort of individualism that President Reagan's free-market ideology encouraged. Communitarians recognize that communities have interests that are distinct from individual interests. For example, sidewalks require many property owners to give up part of their property. Other uncontroversial public goods are police, fire, and military protection. Communitarians go further and consider good health, significant education, jobs, and a sense of community to be public goods. Both virtue ethics and normative communitarianism are usefully contrasted with the spirit of the 1980s exemplified by the slogan "Greed, for lack of a better word, is good" of the movie *Wall Street* [30] and the Robert J. Ringer's title, *Looking Out for #1*.[31]

In his address, "Luck," Nicholas Rescher (1989–1990) defended the widespread view, most explicit in Kant, that "*moral* status and stature are wholly determined by what one wittingly tries to do and not by one's success, by actual performance" (9:675). His foil was Bernard Williams, who had ar-

gued that luck plays a largely unacknowledged role in moral assessment. Consider two equally negligent drivers, one of whom hits a pedestrian while the other does not. How can it be right to assign different levels of blame, and different punishments, to two people whose *mens rea* was the same? Williams had argued that luck is indeed a factor in moral assessment. Rescher defended the Kantian view that while luck has a tremendous effect on reputation and hence social reward, it is not morally relevant. He turned the question around. Why be puzzled that the unlucky (those who are caught) are punished and blamed. It is simply a fact that social reputation and rewards deviate significantly from actual morality. William's claim was that our actual practice of moral praise and blame is far more influenced by results than we officially think it is.

Joel Feinberg's (1981–1982) "Sentiment and Sentimentality in Practical Ethics" is an example of applied ethics, that is, the philosophical discussion of pressing social and political issues. The first journal devoted to applied ethics, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, started in 1971. It represented a cautious step away from the philosophical ivory tower of the 1950s and 1960s. Feinberg was both a lawyer and an academic philosopher. His best known work is his monumental *The Moral Limits of Criminal Law*.[32]

Is such appeal to the heart legitimate? One response, which Feinberg rejected to as hasty, is to dismiss all appeal to sentiment as irrelevant. He moved the discourse to a more general level by noting the wide array of historical issues in which gut reactions of distaste are a critical component. He noted that issues of sensibilities has been debated for centuries in the case of dead bodies, for instance; yet, over time, reasonable balances developed. For example, the use of dead bodies in medical education required explicit authorization from Parliament in the Dead Body Bill of 1828. Opponents forcefully argued that a widespread practice of desecrating dead bodies would promote a callous, indifferent society. Furthermore, they argued, the practice would be unfair to the poor, from whom the majority of cadavers would come.

Feinberg believed that we are fortunate that the social interest in educating doctors overrode public disapproval of dissecting bodies. Of course, the practice of using as cadavers the dead bodies of indigent persons has long since ceased to be controversial. The predicted unfortunate consequences did not occur. Feinberg bolstered his argument with a second example. Automatic autopsies of possible crime victims met opposition at first. Again, the practice quickly came to seem routine. Similar issues come up regarding transplanting organs of the dead and performing autopsies on crash victims with a view toward improving vehicular safety. Public policy issues pitting the interests of some against the sensibilities of others occur frequently.

For Feinberg, these case histories show that appeals to sentiment should neither be rejected out of hand as irrelevant nor accepted because of loud predictions about dire consequences. Reasonable compromises often emerge. As he

put it, "in summary, I find no unmanageable conflict between effective humanitarianism and the maintenance, under flexible control, of the essential human sentiments. I hope that conclusion is not too optimistic" (9:106).

Richard Alan Wasserstrom (1986–1987) was, like Feinberg, both a philosopher and a lawyer. He was deeply involved the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s. He served as an attorney in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice during 1963–1964 and as the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the Tuskegee Institute (a traditionally African-American school) during 1964–1967 (9:471). Characteristic of the high profile Supreme Court decisions of the era was *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*, 402 U.S. 1 (1970), which legitimated the busing of children across school district lines to achieve racial balance. Such decisions prompted public protests, even riots. Wasserstrom focused on applied ethics in his address entitled "Preferential Treatment, Color-Blindness, and the Evils of Racism and Racial Discrimination." Should members of historically disadvantaged groups receive preferential treatment? The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of preferential treatment programs, certainly in cases where a history of discrimination could be shown. For example, a fire department with a history of refusing black applicants would adopt a policy by which black candidates would preferred to white candidates of similar ability until the department reached the racial balance of the city.

Opponents of such programs argued that justice demanded a color-blind ideal (9:481), that preference based on socio-economic status would be more just (9:478), and that race-based preference was egregiously over and under-inclusive (9:478). At the time, race-based programs were so controversial that they were used primarily to right serious historic wrongs. Educational institutions presented additional issues concerning preferential treatment that Wasserstrom did not discuss. The Supreme Court upheld the legality of preferential treatment in educational settings to achieve a diverse student body in *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke*, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

Ultimately, Wasserstrom defended the attention to race taken by programs of preferential treatment for three reasons:

> attention to [race] in processes of selection is one means by which to dismantle this unjust racial system. . . . the focus upon the existence of an unjust racial system invites explicit attention to its complexity . . . that is constituted of both material and ideological features. This focus encourages the search for the occurrence of entrenched social misunderstandings and social self-deception where matters of race are concerned. And third, because the aim and design of these programs is . . . to undermine and eradicate that unjust racial system, there is no theoretical tension whatsoever between the re-

> alization of that objective and the anticipation of the full disappearance of the concepts of racial identity which are themselves an important element of that system. (9:488)

The third applied ethicist who served as president of The APA during the 1980s was Richard Thomas De George (1989–1990), who focused on the importance of consistency in moral debate. He was well-known for his founding role in the creation of the discipline of business ethics. The appeal to consistency is important because often there is little else on which ethical adversaries agree. De George's *Business Ethics* [33] is on its eighth printing and is available in many languages. The field of business ethics developed at a time when many argued that businesses had duties only to their shareholders. De George focused on the importance of consistency in moral debate in his address "Ethics and Coherence." The rise of "applied ethics" in the 1970s was a partial counterweight to the decline of public intellectuals among philosophers of The APA.

4. The Goals of Science

The philosophy of science was another major theme that characterized the 1980s; it had changed from mid-century when the unification of science was a core positivist program. Published in 1962, Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* influenced discussion of science for years to come. Kuhn argued that scientists, far from being detached truth evaluators, tend to be devotees of one or another paradigm. An explicit target of his work was the positivist idea that there was a single, unified "scientific method." He suggested that the heterogeneous collection of practices called "science" had no essential unity in either method or goal. He developed several historical examples. For example, Copernicus's earth-centered solar system did not initially generate superior astronomical predictions. Putnam, noted for his many contributions to the philosophies of mind and language, was also an important philosopher of science who aimed to temper Kuhn's most relativistic claims.

In "The Goals of Natural Science," Ernan Vincent McMullin, (1983–1984) supported Kuhn's general approach by stressing the many different goals that people whom we now call "scientists" have had at different times in different eras. Babylonians believed the gods communicated to men by means of omens, both in the sky and on earth. Properly interpreted, messages from the gods predicted political changes, crop failures, etc. Babylonian astronomers became quite adept at predicting lunar eclipses and other important celestial events. There is no record of any theoretical interest among Babylonian astronomers as to why celestial objects moved. McMullin called Babylonian predictive astronomy a P-science, which contrasts with Aristotle's deductive (D-Science). The

deductive and the predictive goals of astronomers sometimes conflicted. The deductive and predictive goals of science join to form theoretical science around the time of Descartes and Galileo. "In T-science, the predictive power characteristic of P-science blends with the explanatory force characteristic of D-science." In the 1950s, Reichenbach had maintained that only T-science should count as genuine science. McMullin, like Kuhn, defended a broader characterization of science that includes the sophisticated stargazing of both Babylonia and Ancient Greece. He asserted, "the goals of science have changed fundamentally over the centuries" (9:293) and, "the goal of technical control played virtually no part in the origins of science" (9:293).

McMullin's careful look at the history of science brought important insights to what is often an ahistoric discussion of the nature of science. His epitomized the use of the history of science in the 1980s. Kuhn had suggested that scientific rationality was a myth. McMullin replied that the evolution of science evinces rational change every step of the way, rational, that is, in terms of the goals of the time. McMullin admittedly "did not carry the historical story much beyond 1700" (9:299). He noted that instrumentalism champions a greater role for predictive science relative to theoretical science in the larger category of science as a whole. He concluded, "the goals of any complex human activity are best grasped by recreating, as faithfully as one can, how that activity has taken shape" (9:300). He left open the possibility that a sophisticated form of instrumentalism in the future may gain institutional acceptance and alter the balance in theoretical science between deduction and prediction.

Though never widely popular among Anglo-American philosophers, Sigmund Freud's theories of mind captured public attention. Karl Popper, influential during the middle half of the twentieth century, challenged the scientific credentials of psychoanalysis and of Marxism because both failed to formulate falsifiable hypotheses. Popper aimed to solve the "demarcation problem"; that is, drawing a line between science and non-science (aka pseudo-science). In "Freud's Theory: The Perspective of a Philosopher of Science," Adolf Grünbaum's (1982–1983) dismantling of Freudianism is a prime example among analytic philosophers of policing a line between science and non-science. Grünbaum's anti-Freud project started well before Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. After Kuhn, Popper's hope for a sharp demarcation between science and non-science gave way to of a fuzzier border with degrees of merit along multiple dimensions (repeatability, fruitfulness, precision, coherence with existing science, explanatory power).

Joseph John Kockelmans (1986–1987), the only continental philosopher among the 1980s presidents, delivered "On the Problem of Truth in the Sciences," in which he defended a Heideggerian version of "scientific realism." His scientific realism followed Kuhn in allowing scientific truth to be relative to the best

science on an era as opposed to the "constructive empiricism" defended by Van Fraassen.[34] "Constructive empiricism" attempted to rescue as much of empiricism as possible from the demise of mid-century instrumentalism. From the perspective of The APA mainstream, Kockelmans's views were perilously close to the Other, to the sinkhole of historicist relativism.

5. The Nature of Philosophy and of The APA

A fourth major theme in the addresses of the 1989s concerned the nature of philosophy itself. I will begin with an overview of themes evinced in twentieth-century presidential addresses of The APA.

The Name Indexes included in each of the ten volumes of the The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series provide a valuable record of trends within the organization. Each citation represents the judgment of an esteemed senior member of the profession. The indexes summarize the judgments each decade of approximately twenty to thirty presidents. From the 100-year perspective, the two most noticeable trends are a shift away from American pragmatism (James and Dewey), which dominated the citations in the first half of the century toward analytic philosophers (for example, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine) who dominate the second half of the century. The 1980s are the last decade in which a classic American pragmatist (James or Dewey) appears among the five most cited twentieth-century philosophers of the decade. A second tendency is that among philosophers prior to the twentieth century, there is a reversal in significance between Hegel and Hume. Reference to Hegel outnumbered those to Hume by 3:1 at the start of the twentieth century. The situation steadily reversed to the point where Hume references outnumbered those for Hegel by 3:1 at the end of the century. A similar reversal occurred between the German Idealists and the Empiricists.

Jean-Paul Sartre, during the decade of the 1950s, was the only continental philosopher to appear during the century among the top five contemporaries. References to Marx, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger are scare throughout the decade. During the course of the century, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, consistently were among the most cited. Kant was most cited during the first two and last three decades of the century; Plato was most cited between 1920 and 1970. At the end of the century, there was a noticeable increase in the number of citations to Descartes and Kant relative to Aristotle and Plato. Four popular philosophers in the first third of the century—F. H. Bradley, Josiah Royce (1903–1904), J. M. E. McTaggart, Bergson, and Bernard Bosanquet—each influenced by Hegel, disappear in the last two-thirds of the century. Bergson, after four decades among the most cited, also disappeared. The 1980s are characterized by the dominance among historic figures of Descartes, Hume, and Kant, and by

twentieth century analytic philosophers Putnam, Russell, Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Quine. Pragmatists, continentals, and Hegelians are notable by their absence. Even Plato and Aristotle are much less cited than in most previous decades. Note also the disappearance of public intellectuals (James, Dewey, Whitehead, Russell, and Sartre) in the second half of the twentieth century.

In "Philosophy as/and/of Literature," Arthur Coleman Danto (1983–1984) noted how the historical specificity of the twentieth-century academic philosophers focused on scholarly lectures and papers written by experts for a small audience of experts. Among his many contrasts, he listed:

> dialogues, lecture notes, fragments, poems, examinations, essays, aphorisms, meditations, discourses, hymns, critiques, letters, summae, encyclopedias, testaments, commentaries, investigations, tractatuses, *Vorlesungen*, *Aufbauen*, prolegomena, *parerga*, *pensées*, sermons, supplements, confessions, sententiae, inquiries, diaries, outlines, sketches, commonplace books. (9:230)

Danto's paper raised the question as to how the narrow and historically specific choice of medium influences the message. Might narrowness of content accompany narrowness of style? Though acutely aware of the stylistic narrowness of academic Anglo-American philosophy, Danto did not call for change.

In "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," Richard McKay Rorty (1979–1980) had suggested that the most significant divide in philosophy is between those influenced by Hegel's historicism and those who reject Hegel. According to Rorty, analytic and continental philosophers agree about philosophers through Kant, but then the roads diverge; analytics go from Kant to Frege to Russell and G. E. Moore, while continentals go through Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx and Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger. Support for Rorty's location of a fork in the road is that Hegel was the explicit target of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Moore and Russell. Both followers of classical pragmatism and continental philosophers find far more room for Hegel in their cannon than do most philosophers who served as presidents of The APA.

One could hardly find a more anti-Hegelian ode to Timeless Reason, with which most members of The APA would agree, than Robert Nemir Audi's (1987–1988) address, "The Architecture of Reason," in which he said:

> There is a rational structure that can guide our inquiries . . . And reason, the critical voice in human conversation, the authority that subverts authority, the fabric of our excellences, the form of our forms of life, endures as a vital force in building theories of the reality it enables us to know. (9:562)

Both John Edwin Smith (1981–1982), in "The New Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," and Richard Jacob Bernstein (1988–1989), in "Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds," argued that the classical American pragmatists, though prominent in the founding of The APA, were, by the 1980s, wrongly neglected. In "Things in Themselves," Manley Hawn Thompson Jr. (1982–1983) implicitly agreed, by drawing Peirce into his discussion of the Kantian thing-in-itself.

Alvin Carl Plantinga (1981–1982), in "How to Be an Anti-Realist," and Joseph Quentin Lauer (1985–1986), in "Why Be Good?," saw a larger place for religion in philosophical discussion than was the norm in post-war philosophy. Alasdair Chalmers Macintyre (1984–1985) in "Relativism, Power, and Philosophy," argued that The APA philosophers, in their recoil from all hints of relativism have overlooked important truths in relativism. Danto, Smith, Bernstein, Thompson, Plantinga, Lauer, and Macintyre all pointed to ways in which mainstream American philosophy was historically narrow and could benefit from making further use of classical pragmatism, phenomenology, religion, and history. Their respectful opinions were ignored.

The APA and other professional societies reflected intellectual disputes about the nature of philosophy. The APA was the largest American philosophical organization throughout the twentieth century. Two rival institutions were also established. The Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) started in 1962. Ten years later, The Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy formed. Its analytic/continental/American divisions are evident in the presidential addresses of the 1980s. Rather than come together, each group thrived independently in subsequent years, though the SPEP and SAAP could not ignore The APA's greater size and influence.

The great decline in the influence of American pragmatism occurred during the Cold War. After World War II, presidential addresses of The APA were directed exclusively to specialists. Public intellectuals disappeared from citation lists. Some suggest that to maintain a low profile, The APA avoided politics and emphasized formal issues. The waning of pragmatism and the desire to keep a low profile appear to be correlated, although the reasons for this are difficult to establish. John McCumber's *Time in the Ditch* explored several connections.[35] During the 1940s, a number of presidents chose to comment on societal issues such as the state of education and of society, the need for the greater dissemination of the scientific spirit, and the allegedly dispiriting influence of materialism. These papers included "A Philosophy for the Atomic Age" given by Daniel Sommer Robinson (1943–1944). By contrast, not a single 1980s address took up geopolitical topics. Graduate students were advised to focus on narrow scholarly debates and to avoid large issues. During the 1980s, The APA membership was as concentrated in analytic philosophy as at any point.

During the 1980s, a vigorous debate ensued among intellectuals about postmodernism and deconstructivism. Of postmodernism, Jean-Francois Lyotard said, "simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives."[36] His masterwork was *La condition postmoderne*.[37] Another popular movement during the 1980s was Jacques Derrida's deconstructivism. A dictionary definition of "deconstructivism" is a philosophical and critical movement, starting in the 1960s and especially applied to the study of literature, that questions all traditional assumptions about the ability of language to represent reality and emphasizes that a text has no stable reference or identification because words essentially only refer to other words. Postmodernism and deconstructivism deserve mention because they were broad philosophical claims about the state of the society and the way to read texts, yet they were thought to be the Other. When not ignored by The APA establishment, postmodernism and deconstructivism were mocked and scorned. Since postmodernism and deconstructivism were popular in the social sciences and in literary theory, The APA was often seen as aloof, even detached. Far from feeling reproached, The APA prided itself on not falling for fades.

On a sociological note concerning the nature of philosophy, compared with other disciplines in the humanities, academic philosophy was slow to include women. There was only one woman president in The APA prior to World War II: Mary Whiton Calkins (1918–1919). Between 1940 and 1989, there were only ten women. Only one of the presidents in the 1980s was a woman. The situation prompted speculation, particularly among feminist philosophers and the small number of minority philosophers, about why academic philosophy was so male and so white.

All of the readily available answers were at best half-truths that broached stereotypes. Was academic philosophy too adversarial for most women? Was the emphasis on symbolic logic too cold and impersonal? Was the discipline too impractical for newcomers to academia? Debates about philosophy and gender grew as the number of women in philosophy increased. Subsequently, the 1980s was the last decade during which women presidents were the great exception. In the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, there were sixteen and fifteen presidents who were women respectively. "Philosophy's Civil Wars" by Linda Alcoff (2012–2013) documents this evolution.[38]

9. Conclusion

Philosophical discussion in the 1980s was significantly different from previous decades in four main areas: the relation of mind and body, the ethical landscape, the goals of science, and the nature of philosophy itself. This last decade of the Cold War influenced philosophers through the rapid development of digital

technologies, controversial Supreme Court rulings, and the election of President Ronald Reagan with his conservative, free-market policies. The 1980s saw a turn from Hegel to Hume, a steady decrease after mid-century in the influence of James and Dewey, a fall then sharp rise in Kant's influence.

The 1980s displayed the ongoing rejection of the positivist projects that were prevalent during the 1930s to the 1960s: behaviorism, emotivism, instrumentalism, extensionalism, and unified science. The decade was well characterized by the fact that Putnam, paradigmatic of the analytic philosopher, was the most cited philosopher, more than even Kant or Plato. Postmodernism and deconstructivism were the Other to be avoided. Domination of The APA by analytic philosophy was all but complete. Keywords for the philosophical decade include naturalism, placement problems, analytic philosophy, reductive/non-reductive physicalism, mental causation, interactionism, content externalism, supervenience, multiple realizability, extensionalism, virtue ethics, communitarianism, applied ethics, postmodernism, and deconstruction.

Notes

1. *Space-Based Missile Defense: A Report* (Cambridge MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, March 1984).

2. Kurt Gödel, "*Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia mathematica und verwandter Systeme I*" [On formally undecidable propositions of *Principia Mathematica* and Related Systems I], *Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik* 38 (1931): 173–198.

3. Noam Chomsky, "The Case against B. F. Skinner," *The New York Review of Books* (30 December 1971).

4. Peter Geach, "Assertion," *The Philosophical Review* 74 (1964): 449–465.

5. Hilary Whitehall Putnam, Minds and Machines (1960), pp. 362–385, and The Nature of Mental States (1967), pp. 429–440, both in *Mind, Language, and Reality* (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1975).

6. Bas C. van Frassen, *The Scientific Image* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1980).

7. Alan Gibbard, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).

8. W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," *The Philosophical Review* 60 (1951): 20–43.

9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillan, 1953).

10. Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).

11. Hilary Whitehall Putnam, Minds and Machines, in vol. 2 of Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 362–385.

12. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

13. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

14. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).

15. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), p. 181.

16. Noam Chomsky, "Three Models for the Description of Language," *IRE Transactions on Information Theory* 2, no. 3 (1956): 113–124.

17. Putnam, Mind and Machines.

18. See note 5.

19. John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains and Programs," *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 3 (1980): 417–424.

20. W. V. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," *Journal of Philosophy* 53 (1956): 177–187.

21. Ruth Millikan, *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories*: *New Foundations for Realism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).

22. Fred Dretske, *Naturalizing the Mind* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

23. Jonathan Bennett, *Kant's Analytic* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966).

24. Bennett, *Kant's Dialectic* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

25. Bennett, *Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

26. Bennett, *Rationality: An Essay towards an Analysis* (New York: Humanities Press, 1971/1964).

27. See Jane Goodall, *My Life among Wild Chimpanzees* (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 1963).

28. Jaegwon Kim, *Philosophy of Mind* (Boulder, CO: Westeview Press, 1996); reprinted 2006, 2011. Also translated into Korean (1997), German (1998), and French (2008).

29. G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," *Philosophy* 33 (1958): 1–19.

30. Oliver Stone and Stanley Weiser, *Wall Street*, directed by Oliver Stone (America Entertainment Partners, 1987).

31. Robert J. Ringer, *Looking Out for #1* (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1977).

32. Joel Feinberg, *The Moral Limits of Criminal Law*, 4 vol. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984–1988): *Harm to Others* (1984); *Offense to Others* (1985); *Harm to Self* (1986); and *Harmless Wrongdoing* (1988).

33. Richard T. De George, *Business Ethics* (Upper Saddle-River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2010/1982).

34. Bas C. van Fraassen, *The Scientific Image* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

35. John McCumber, *Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001).

36. Jean-Fransçois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1983).

37. Jean-Francois Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir* [The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge] (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1979).

38. Presidential Address delivered to the Eastern Division of The APA in Atlanta, GA, December 2012, http://www.alcoff.com/articles/presidential-adress-apa-eastern-2012 (accessed 4/24/2015).

THE APA PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES IN THE 1990s

Mark Tschaepe

> Twentieth-century intellectuals, who adopt schemes of values that incorporate the destabilizing discoveries of the past, easily imagine that the transition must be relatively painless—although the persistence of people who seek to prevent those discoveries being thrust on their children might give us pause. (10:518)
>
> Philip Stuart Kitcher (1997–1998)

Reading through the presidential addresses of The American Philosophical Association (The APA) that were delivered throughout the 1990s, a striking feature is observed. There is a tension within and between many of the addresses that comes closest, in a general sense, to the theme of Kitcher's "Truth or Consequences?," in which he expounded upon the ongoing debate between Gnosticism and Romanticism. Gnostics are those who are "confident not only of the power of scientific investigation to advance our knowledge of nature but also of the value of such advances" (10:511), while "romantic poets and naturalists, Luddites, devout people of various faiths, some feminists, and multiculturalists—have protested the hegemony of the sciences" (10:511).

Throughout the presidential addresses of the 1990s, there are representatives of the gnostic view, which involves a turn away from traditional non-scientific methods of inquiry within philosophy and toward the methods and findings from within the sciences. Many of the representatives of this group are those who proposed new methods by which to answer old questions, as well as old methods by which to answer new questions.

According to Kitcher, the fundamental crux of the tension between the two groups is whether the "painful" enlightenment of the sciences is to be valued over the ideals of those who fit into the opposing category. The guiding question Kitcher entertained is from the side of the Gnostics, represented by Thomas Henry Huxley. The question is whether the ideal of a person who is strong enough to accept any truth is an appropriate ideal. According to Kitcher, Huxley contributed to a grand project the ideal of which was to take priority over all other projects in the search for knowledge of how nature works. The romantic criticism of this priority is "the subordination of all goals to the epistemic" (10:514).

Painful enlightenment, which is what the Gnostics advocate and the Romantics resist, is defined as an episode or series of episodes wherein "people acquire beliefs that have an impact on their values" (10:515). These episodes are painful because they involve a resignation to the idea that the world is not how it

was believed to be. "Enlightenment is painful when we lose the parts of our schemes of values that give shape and direction to our lives" (10:524). Kitcher explained four types. The first is one in which "before the discovery, people have valued a particular goal and devised a single strategy for attaining it, only to learn that a key presupposition of this strategy is incorrect"; the second involves discoveries "inconsistent with claims that are essential to prior justifications of the value of the goal"; the third "cases in which the discovery reveals that the valued goal is unattainable"; and the fourth "examples in which the discovery is taken to show that there is no basis for valuing the goal" (10:515).

> Painful enlightenment is different. Even though the epistemic goal of knowing some aspect of nature may be achieved, the principal consequence of the advance in knowledge is constriction of the set of available strategies and/or destabilization of the scheme of values. (10:516)

The Gnostics take such consequences to be well worth the pursuit of knowledge, while the Romantics blanch at the idea that this specific type of knowledge is worthy of subordinating all other values. As Kitcher stated:

> Gnostics are committed to a strong progressivism, one that sees the history of the sciences not simply in terms of epistemic gains but as contributing to the improvement of human lives, both instrumentally and through the elucidation of what it is best for us to pursue. (10:517)

However, the Gnostic must contend with the challenges posed by the Romantics, which largely consist of the need "to explain [the Gnostics'] notion of value-progressiveness and to show how it is realized in the history of inquiry" and "the problem of short-term losses" (10:517). While the Gnostics declare that scientific understanding of the world is worth all sacrifice, the Romantics hold fast to the idea that there are beliefs worth preserving that may betray the epistemic findings from scientific discourse.

One of the major objections that the Romantics make to the gnostic ideal of painful enlightenment is that an assumption is made "that epistemic utopia is approached by coming to know more" (10:521). As Kitcher indicated, the debate between the Gnostic and the Romantic remains in a stalemate, with each providing its own preferred list of things that are taken to be valuable. This, however, does not mean that all inquiry is to end. Kitcher concluded, "[the Romantics'] questions ought to modify discussions and decisions about the ways in which the sciences are to be pursued and applied" (10:525). The push and pull of each group upon the work of the other actually helps shape the generation of knowledge rather than simply hinder all movement.

The presidential addresses of the 1990s evince a muddied, but similar phenomenon at work. On one side, the steadfast Romantics steeped in the tradition

of philosophy—essences, thought experiments, traditional divisions of philosophical problems—sustain the methods of accepted, canonized philosophy while addressing new questions, while on the other side, the Gnostics are pushing their way into the specifics of areas of scientific discourse that had been largely neglected or purposely avoided for much of the century, addressing old questions with new techniques and data. At times, there is a strange beauty to the contrasts among the addresses; at other times, it is surprising that some addresses even spring from the same discipline, much less from even the same professional organization.

Elliott Reuben Sober's (1998–1999) "Testability," is a suitable representation of the gnostic point of view. Sober argued for the importance of testability, disputing the notion that the concept of testability, "like the analytic/synthetic distinction, is supposed to be a vestige of a bygone age" (10:569). He argued that testability is an important concept in science, and thus, an important goal in the philosophy of science. In opposition to those who argue that testability is irrelevant or undefinable, he claimed:

> If a set of observations provides a test of a proposition because it bears relation R to that proposition, then a proposition is testable when it is possible for there to be a set of observations that bears relation R to the proposition. Testing is to testability as dissolving is to solubility. (10:569–570)

Testability relates to the predictions that a hypothesis makes, along with being able to contrast that hypothesis against other hypotheses. When conjoined with auxiliary assumptions that are considered as given, hypotheses make specific predictions. These auxiliary assumptions are important because they provide an unquestionable ground from which to contrast competing hypotheses.

Sober used the examples of the hypothesis of intelligent design and the hypothesis of evolution by natural selection to exemplify the importance of testability. With regard to evolution by natural selection, there are specific hypotheses that may be tested against competing hypotheses, which share specific auxiliary assumptions.

However, this is not the case with much of intelligent design. "If we don't know what traits organisms would probably have *if* God designed them, then we won't be able to test the hypothesis *that* God designed them" (10:585). Darwinism does not suffer the same problem as intelligent design:

> The worst-case scenario for Darwinism is that the theory, . . . entails that what we observe was very improbable. However, this, by itself, isn't enough to reject Darwinism and opt for the hypothesis of intelligent de-

> sign. We need to know how probable it is that the features would exist, if they were the result of intelligent design. (10:587)

We do not know how probable it is that these features would exist, so there is no way of testing the intelligent design hypothesis.

The importance of testability with regard to philosophy of science—and philosophy—indicates a movement away from the Romanticism described by Kitcher and a gravitation toward the gnostic point of view that epistemically favors the value of scientific method, regardless of the painfulness of enlightenment. Sober's example of Darwinian evolution contrasted with intelligent design is a nice example of this movement within philosophy. "Science," he suggested, "is the art of the testable" (10:588). At the end of his address, Sober referred to the historical regularity by which empirical sciences have branched from philosophy. He indicated that there is no reason to believe that this branching process will somehow end. Rather, it seems to be continuing. In what could almost be a nod to Kitcher's address, with regard to the gnostic point of view, he ended:

> Future generations of philosophers will look back at us and smile indulgently, charmed by the fact that we thought that this or that problem could be solved by the methods of philosophy we now have at our disposal. Some of the innovations that will permit this change to take place will occur within philosophy, but others will be empirical results in science. The boundary between what is empirically testable and what is not will shift, but I expect that the concept of testability will remain epistemologically important. (10:590)

Philosophy gives birth to more empirical scientific pursuits, and with those births are shifts away from the "charming" methods that philosophers once held dear. This understanding of the evolution of philosophy as a progression is from the gnostic point of view. Drawing an analogy between tests and testability of scientific hypotheses and the theories within philosophy, Sober admonished that "*inference to the best explanation*" (10:588) is not the equivalent of hypothesis testing or testability. He did not find the concept (or the inferential process) to be objectionable just so long "as it does not give the false impression that scientific inference allows one to discriminate between empirically equivalent theories" (10:588).

In a subtle way, the distinction Sober drew between scientific testing and philosophical argument contributes to the gnostic attack upon Romanticism. Scientific methods that empirically contrast hypotheses solve problems through a brand of scientific reasoning, which is considered epistemically valuable by most philosophers who advocate inference to the best explanation. However,

inference to the best explanation without empirical testability, at least according to Sober, should not be taken as pure form of scientific reasoning. Its epistemic value is less than the process of scientific testing. The idea of pure reason, apart from empirical testability, could be said to have given way to the idea of fallibilism within philosophy. In fact, fallibilism may be understood as part of Kitcher's Gnosticism insofar as it is at the core of scientific methodology.

In his "Damn the Consequences!" another philosopher of science, Larry Lynn Laudan (1994–1995) began by declaring, "many of us see the current philosophical era, an era of fallibilism, as one in which these old categories no longer apply" (10:303).

Laudan framed a debate related to that of the Gnostic and the Romantic: that of the skeptic and the foundationalist. This debate does not directly map onto that indicated by Kitcher, but there does seem to be a relationship between the two. According to Laudan, "the traditional skeptic's role is now played by the epistemic relativist; the foundationalist's part is taken by what I call the philosophical optimist" (10:303). Collapsing the debate, Lauden claimed that both sides are incorrect in subscribing to what he called "a consequentialist theory of evidence or plausibility" (10:304). According to Laudan, consequentialism is fundamentally flawed. He defined consequentialism as "the view that the plausibility or acceptability of a hypothesis or theory is determined exclusively by an examination of the truth of the accessible consequences of that hypothesis or theory" (10:304).

Two variants of this view are hypothetico-deduction and inference to the best explanation. Because both the epistemic optimist and the skeptic buy into consequentialism, neither stance succeeds. Laudan purported to "show that being a consequence of a hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to qualify something as evidence for that hypothesis" (10:306). Here, he continued the criticism of inference to the best explanation, which was, as we have seen, entertained by Sober.

According to Laudan, partisans of inference to the best explanation "insist that hypotheses derive support only from those phenomena which they explain better than their rivals" (10:308). As he demonstrated, there is a significant difference between supporting evidence, which is often antecedent to evidence for a hypothesis, and true empirical consequences. The conclusion he drew turned Kitcher's bifurcation of philosophy on its head:

> epistemology is not principally about truth; it is about warrant. What people have supposed is that the warranting conditions of a statement must be drawn from that statement's truth conditions. They get epistemology via semantics. Truth conditions become warrant conditions. Or better, what warrants a theory must be found among the things that would make the the-

> ory true. Plausible as this idea is, it is plainly wrong, for the reasons I have already indicated. Epistemology is not a stepchild of semantics because truth conditions and warranting conditions are not the same thing. (10:310)

The combination of Sober's argument pertaining to the perpetual shift into scientific method and Laudan's argument that epistemology pertains to warrant rather than truth indicates a third trend that was gaining momentum in the 1990s, especially with regard to philosophy and science, viz. fallibilism, to which Laudan referred at the opening of his address. Still, the fallibilist is closer to the Gnostic than to the Romantic insofar as fallibilism fully embraces the painful enlightenment to which Kitcher referred. It seems that fallibilism, which acknowledges the contextual and often temporary status of warranting conditions, was a fitting stance for the last decade of the twentieth century, which so often entailed tarrying between Gnosticism and Romanticism.

The fallibilist trend continued in Arthur Isidore Fine's (1997–1998) "The Viewpoint of No-One in Particular," wherein he criticized the "view from nowhere" and "absolute conception" put forth by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams (10:531). Fine took both to task for their (mis)understanding of scientific method as statically objective, i.e., as a "specifically scientific way of knowing" that does "not separate process from product" (10:537). As an alternative, Fine proffered experimentalism, which is a brand of the fallibilism Laudan advocated:

> What I am supporting here is an experimental point of view. It is basically John Dewey's [(1905–1906)]. The idea is that we learn in inquiry how better to conduct it. Thus, I am urging that we move beyond the heated debates over objectivity by trying out different conceptions of what counts as an objective process, that we learn from those trials and that we use this knowledge to move toward temporary equilibria about the characteristics of objectivity. (10:536)

This is in stark contrast to the realist attitude put forth by Nagel and Williams, whom Fine claimed wanted to separate the realm of natural science from the realms of mind and human affairs. Instead, Fine urged a focus on process wherein "objective procedure is something that needs to be tailored to the subject matter under consideration in a way that generates trust" (10:542).

We learn whether a process warrants trusting its product through the process of inquiry. Fine urged, "procedural objectivity does not guarantee objectivity for the products of inquiry" (10:540). This resembles Laudan's position concerning warrant. At the end of his address, Fine warned that it is a mistake to view scientific method as somehow special or separate from other forms of thinking. Similar to Laudan, Fine's position seems to capture that emerging at the end of the century, which is one that overcomes what might be considered the dogmatism of Gnosticism and the traditionalism of Romanticism. With regard to both positions, Laudan and Fine together embraced a far more painful

enlightenment that does not forsake scientific endeavor, but definitely calls all absolute claims into question. Fine captured the fallibilism of science in practice:

> Science proceeds on the basis of trial and error and what happens in most laboratories and in most centers of calculation on most days in most years is the methodical, procedurally objective production of errors. The whole conception of method, moreover, suffers from an incommensurability of ends. We want to maximize the attainment of truth and for that purpose, we need to take risks in the generation of hypotheses. We also want to minimize error and for that purpose, we need to avoid risk and flights of fancy. Sometimes we can strike a balance between risk taking and risk avoidance, but not always and not according to any general scheme. Procedural objectivity is terrific, but it scarcely guarantees overall reliability much less access to what is really real. (10:539–540)

One of the major themes at the end of the twentieth century was surely that of experimentalism—not only experimentalism, but a reexamination of the products of experimentation. This called into question the a priori principles upon which much of scientific and philosophical endeavor had been built. However, during the upheaval of the 1990s, not all philosophers bought into the wholesale overhaul of foundational principles.

In "Philosophical Naturalism," Michael Lee Friedman (1996–1997) argued that philosophy and science do not operate without foundational, a priori principles, which, he asserted, are mathematical. Friedman brought the importance of such principles to bear in his argument against what had become a dominant theme in the latter half of the twentieth century, namely, that of philosophical naturalism. He declared that philosophical naturalism is characterized by two ideas:

> the rejection of any special status for types of knowledge traditionally thought to be a priori . . . all knowledge whatsoever is now conceived as having fundamentally the same status as that found in the empirical natural sciences. . . . The totality of human knowledge is pictured as a vast web of interconnected beliefs on which experience or sensory input impinges only along the periphery. . . . [and] philosophy, as a discipline, is also best understood as simply one more part—perhaps a peculiarly abstract and general part—of empirical natural science. (10:413)

Friedman understood this form of philosophical naturalism to stem primarily from the work of Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine (1957–1958).

He argued that empirical science and philosophy do not merely consist of a large string of conjunctions culminating in a vast web of knowledge, but:

> a generally agreed upon and taken for granted background that makes possible an inquiry we can honorifically characterize as 'scientific'—that is, as progressive, as problem solving, and as capable of wide if not universal consensus. (10:423)

He proffered a core of accepted science (or Kuhnian normal science)—consisting mostly of mathematical principles—from which revolutionary science is one step removed, while philosophy is two steps removed.

Friedman fits into Kitcher's category of Gnosticism in proposing the epistemic core of science over and above the contingencies of much empirical science and philosophy.

Also speaking on the subject of naturalism, in "The Charm of Naturalism," Barry Greenwood Stroud (1995–1996) challenged the conception of naturalism as being anything more than open-mindedness. He stated:

> When we look at this most recent enthusiasm for what its proponents call "naturalism," I think we find that, whatever they are excited and optimistic about, it is not naturalism as such. . . . What is usually at issue is not whether to be "naturalistic" or not, but rather what is and what is not to be included in one's conception of "nature." (10:369)

Stroud distinguished two aspects of naturalism: "a view of what is so, or the way things are, or what there is in the world" and "as a way of studying or investigating what is so in the world" (10:370). The first pertains mostly to the opposition to the view of supernaturalism, by which Stroud meant "the invocation of an agent or force which somehow stands outside the familiar natural world and so whose doings cannot be understood as part of it" (10:370). In this regard, naturalism is surely a gnostic view (in Kitcher's sense) that attempts to fulfill the painful enlightenment of negating supernaturalism, which we may understand as a romantic view, from consideration.

The second sort of naturalism is epistemological naturalism, which Stroud located as being opposed to Rudolf Carnap's philosophy. Carnap "sought a reduction of all talk of external bodies to talk only about possible sense experiences" (10:372). Quine objected to Carnap's attempt at rational reconstruction, However, as Stroud remarked, their dispute was really "about what *philosophy* is or ought to be doing" (10:372). In Stroud's view, Quine and Carnap are actually close in their naturalistic view, but they do not take it far enough. As he noted, Quine blanched at the work of philosophers such as Thomas Kuhn, Michael Polanyi, and Philip P. Hanson, because of the disruption their studies brought to scientific observation and methodology.

As a corrective to Quine, Stroud remarked, similarly to Fine and Laudan:

> Scientific epistemology must be prepared to accept whatever the empirical study of human beings actually reveals. If it turns out that human knowledge is acquired without there being a firm, fixed line between so-called "observational" and "non-observational" terms, or if what a philosophical "theory of evidence" calls "evidence" is never actually appealed to in the acceptance and rejection of scientific hypotheses, then so be it. That will have to be accepted as the way knowledge is in fact acquired. (10:373)

Stroud's point was, if you are going to be a naturalist, you have to accept what the findings are in studies of human beings. One cannot pick and choose the painful enlightenments to accept. He asserted, "a more open-minded or expansive naturalism will admit states of affairs and psychological phenomena that are found problematic from a more restricted naturalistic point of view." (10:381). He indicated that this leaves naturalism as open-mindedness, and the only thing distinctly naturalist about it is its opposition to supernaturalism. Still, the underlying point is one that echoes those of Laudan and Fine, as well as Kitcher. The philosophical era is one with a growing advocacy for painful enlightenment.

One aspect of the advocacy for painful enlightenment over Romanticism is a turning away from standardized approaches to philosophical problems and toward pluralism. Of all the addresses delivered in the 1990s, that delivered by Patricia Smith Churchland (1992–1993) is exemplary with regard to the general themes that carry through the end of the century. Her address, "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" signifies a tendency in the last decade of the twentieth century to move away from what might have been considered the standard, monolithic tradition of Western philosophy and the beginning of a move toward greater diversity. At the same time, Churchland's address is one deeply embedded within the gnostic category. Her philosophical realignment toward neurobiology is perhaps one of the greatest threats to those whom Kitcher called the Romantics.

Churchland's address captured the nascent movement away from traditional philosophy in a couple ways. First, she is one of seven women presidents of The APA during that decade, which was a significant increase over previous decades. While this represented a shift in The APA toward diversity, and it was surely still not enough; for instance, there were no persons of color among the presidents of The APA during the 1990s. Still, the shift was a beginning, regardless of its hesitant nature.

Another way that Churchland moved away from tradition was her blatant openness to, and early adoption of, scientific work outside the philosophical discipline. She captured the trend that was only beginning to gain steam, as is evident in many of the other addresses, by looking to neurobiology for help in answering philosophical questions about consciousness.

When Churchland looked to neurobiology, which includes neuroscience and psychology, she recommended "that it would be wisest to conduct research on many levels simultaneously, from the molecular, through the networks, systems, brain areas, and of course behavior" (10:180):

> From the vantage point of considerable ignorance, failure to imagine some possibility is only that: a failure of imagination—one psychological capacity amongst others. It does not betoken any metaphysical limitations on what we can come to understand and it cannot predict anything significant about the future of scientific research. (10:183)

One way of describing the addresses of the 1990s, well represented by Churchland, is as a rising from the armchair by philosophers. It is a hesitant, slow rising, but a rising all the same. It is professional philosophy giving way to openness toward not only past scientific research that has come to be accepted, but toward a scientific future that is available to facilitate philosophical progress. Says Churchland, "in any case, the trick is to generate testable, meaty hypotheses rather than loose, frothy hypotheses susceptible only to experiments of fancy. The trick is to make some real progress" (10:189).

If this particular decade, the 1990s, looks to anything, it looks to the possibility of real progress, one stimulated by a gradual rejection of much of tradition and characterized by a slow acceptance of new modes and resources of inquiry. Churchland's approach to philosophical questions through neurobiological research is the most extreme by comparison to the other addresses of this decade, but it is also the most emblematic of the movement from the philosopher's armchair that can be detected, even in the faintest sense, in many of these addresses.

Just as Churchland looked to neurobiology to inform philosophy of mind, Alvin Ira Goldman (1991–1992) looked to cognitive science to address issues within both philosophy of mind and moral theory. In "Empathy, Mind, and Morals," he argued, "empathy may be the key to one sector of the philosophy of mind and to several sectors of moral theory. But whether [it is] depends heavily on the outcome of empirical research in cognitive science" (10:79). He stated that for the most part, "two approaches to the nature of mental attribution have dominated contemporary theory" (10:80). These are theories of intentional states and the language theory of mind. The first "says that the language of intentionality embodies a stance adopted toward others, one that presupposes or imputes to them a high degree of rationality"; the second "says that the language of the mental presupposes a commonsense 'theory' of mind, a set of causal laws which interrelate stimulus inputs, internal states, and behavioral outputs" (10:80).

Goldman suggested a third approach worth considering: imaginative projection, i.e., empathy. He focused on both a wide sense of empathy—a process of simulation that pertains to philosophy of mind generally—and a narrower

sense of empathy, which entails the emotional state of sharing attitudes, sentiments, or emotions. Cognitive science, which has progressed in studies of both meanings of empathy, can, according to Goldman, inform philosophy in a manner hitherto unexplored. Regarding ethics, he said:

> to the extent that both descriptive and prescriptive ethics should seek to place human moralizing within the context of human biology, it is instructive to inquire into the evolutionary origins of moral psychology. (10:97)

Like Churchland, who suggested that philosophy look to neurobiology to solve the problems of consciousness, Goldman suggested that philosophers should look to the sciences to solve their problems concerning mind and morals. Both Church's and Goldman's addresses represent a gnostic shift in philosophy, wherein the traditional (Romantic) views of mind and morality are seriously challenged by scientific experimentation. Both advocated positions that entail accepting the painful enlightenments that such challenges pose.

Of course, not all of the addresses of the 1990s advocated for such a change. Sidney Sharpless Shoemaker's (1993–1994) address is one that represented not so much a resistance to change, as a steadfast settling into the armchair. Shoemaker's "The First-Person Perspective" stands in stark contrast to those of Churchland and Goldman. Unlike theirs, his remained in the realm of thought-experiments with discussion of "C-Fibers." Still, Shoemaker's skepticism regarding first-person narratives within thought experiments indicated an important turn toward the third-person narrative, which is the narrative of science. As Shoemaker stated:

> Where it seems to that one can imagine discovering the realization of a putative possibility from the first-person perspective, one should always ask whether this seeming discovery could be confirmed from the third-person point of view. If one finds that it is impossible in principle that it should be, one should look to see whether the first-person thought experiment can be faulted I have tried to fault the first-person thought experiments considered here. (10:226)

Shoemaker's account of mind and body remained firmly entrenched in the debates sustained by William Lycan and John Rogers Searle (1989–1990). Churchland largely acknowledged the importance of such debates, but moved onward into the specifics of science, firmly entrenching herself in the laboratory of the neuroscientist. Goldman, in a similar fashion as Churchland, moved beyond the positions of Daniel Dennett and Jerry Fodor, leaving them in the armchair while he made his way into the cognitive science lab. Shoemaker remained in the armchair, but he did move in the general direction of the laboratory. These three addresses signified a theme that carried through a number of the addresses,

the turning away from the worn debates of the mid- to late 1900s, toward new considerations that would carry philosophy into the twenty-first century.

Within the realm of moral philosophy, Richard Henry Kraut's (1993–1994) "Desire and the Human Good" is emblematic of a kind of new approach to a modern philosophical issue that provides a kernel of the tradition in creating that approach. Kraut addressed the pluralist turn within moral philosophy which attempts to value multiple perspectives in a non-hierarchical manner. He argued that such a pluralist stance cannot rest upon that to which he referred as the "desire theory," which ultimately attempts to ground the multiform of goodness in individual desires. He stated, "what we need is a theory that is more objective and in this respect closer to the eudaimonistic theories of ancient and medieival philosophy" (10:256).

This was not merely a return to Aristotle's *eudaimonia* (human flourishing), however. Kraut was attempting to bridge the conception of objective virtue that flourishes in the work of Plato, Aristotle, and Christian thinkers, with the pluralistic evaluation of morality that had gained momentum near the end of the twentieth century. He questioned what makes something desired worth wanting (10:260). The three criteria he established were all rooted in love. He stated that what makes a life a good one is, at least, that a person must love something, that what a person loves must be worth loving, and that a person must be related in the right way to what that person loves (10:261). One of the major tasks of morality, according to Kraut, then, is to determine what the basis of worth is in an objective sense, not in the relative sense of desire alone. He concluded his address by saying, "in deciding which sorts of lives it is good to live, we cannot bypass the task of evaluating our desires by asking whether their objects possess the qualities that make them worth wanting" (10:266).

Kraut advanced beyond the modern moral philosophy by not relying upon reason alone, but leaving open the possibility of worth being based on something other than reason. His address even advanced beyond the traditional concern that has been limited to human beings as moral agents. Kraut considered non-human moral agents as well, which is another shift in the discourse that begins to emerge in the addresses of the 1990s.

Margaret Dauler Wilson (1994–1995) also addressed non-human animals as agents in "Animal Ideas." As did Kraut, she returned to the work of earlier philosophers to address progressive ideas. She considered the question of the epistemic status of non-human animals, concentrating on four central questions concerning cognition and consciousness. She asked whether non-human animals "reason," and if they do, then "how does their 'reasoning' compare with that of human beings?" (10:278). She asked whether non-human animals "evince still other kinds of mental states, such as non-rational 'knowledge' or conscious 'sensibility' which are in some ways continuous with those of human beings"

(10:278). She questioned whether "some human beings, such as fetuses, idiots, madmen, or (as Locke says) the decrepit elderly [are] closer than others to the condition of brutes" (10:278). Finally, she asked, "what are the *bases* we have for answering questions about brute mentality in specific ways?" (10:278).

To address these questions, Wilson looked to debates concerning these issues between Descartes and his contemporaries, which were then followed by those of Locke, Leibniz, and Hume. She indicated that these thinkers' debates about such questions are relevant to the then-current work that was ongoing in the sciences concerning both non-human animal cognition and ethical considerations with regard to non-human animals. Her address reveals that the philosophical tradition was not being completely overthrown. Rather, the tradition remained useful even as philosophers moved forward and began to utilize other disciplines to inform their own work.

Even when some aspects of philosophical tradition seem well-worn or even ready for disposal, some remain resilient in the face of change. In her address, "Goodness and Utilitarianism," Judith Jarvis Thomson (1992–1993) made this point concerning utilitarianism within moral philosophy. As she stated:

> Our problem isn't merely that it continues to have its friends, though it does; our problem is deeper, lying in the fact that we haven't found—and its friends are delighted to draw our attention to the fact that we haven't found—a way of positively killing it off. (10:157)

Thomson indicated that utilitarianism, as a theory of right, will not go away, but she also pointed to the problem that there are two senses of good: goodness-for and good with regard to what people ought to do. She criticized the utilitarian for being concerned for the state of the world *apart from* specific acts. Looking to an emendation of utilitarianism, she referred to William David Ross, whom she labeled as a "quasi-utilitarian." Ross had established a list of prima facie duties that inform the goodness of actions. Thomson read Ross as suggesting that his list of prima facie views may be looked at as actual views of duty in which "we are to choose the act which is itself best" (10:168).

According to Thomson, ultimately, "an act's being just, or good for people, supervenes on certain of its natural features, so also, at the next level up, does an act's being the one we ought to choose supervene on its being just, or good for people" (10:169). She indicated that there is a double supervenience, which signifies that utilitarianism errs in reducing the right to the good. In the same vein as Ross, Thomson advocated an advance—a *quasi*- stance—in which independent principles are used to found moral theory.

Just as Thomson called for moral theory to address specific acts, in "The Future of Feminist Liberalism," Martha Louise Craven Nussbaum (1999–2000)

addressed the need for political theory to address specific aspects of life that have been underappreciated and underrepresented within philosophical examination: need (dependency) and justice in terms of the family. According to Nussbaum, "liberalism, even in its strongest forms, has not yet given satisfactory answers" to these "deep problems exposed by feminist thinkers" (10:680).

The neglect of the first deep problem—that of the "need for care in times of *extreme* dependency"—stems from that to which Nussbaum aptly referred as "the fiction of competent adulthood" (10:680). This is the idea that, apart from human infants, most persons are autonomous agents with only the most basic political dependencies. Nussbaum stated, "life, of course, is not like that. . . . there are many citizens who never have the physical and/or mental powers requisite for independence" (10:681).

The need for a discussion of need and dependency had been largely ignored by Kantian and, in turn, Rawlsian liberalism. According to Nussbaum, this neglect could best be supplanted by adopting "a political conception of the person that is more Aristotelian than Kantian, one that sees the person from the start as both capable and needy" (10:687). The Kantian notion of the autonomous, rational agent must be overhauled because this type of person does not by any means constitute the socio-political world. Nussbaum contributed to the painful enlightenment that acknowledges that human beings are far more diverse and dependent upon one another than traditional philosophy has conceived. Because of this realization, our philosophical orientation and approach must adapt to this diversity instead of merely continuing to neglect it.

Regarding family, Nussbaum asserted:

> One the one hand, the family is among the most significant arenas in which people pursue their own conceptions of the good, and transmit them to the next generation. This fact suggests that liberal society should give people considerable latitude to form families as they choose. On the other hand, the family is one of the most non-voluntary and pervasively influential of social institutions, and one of the most notorious homes of sex hierarchy, denial of equal opportunity, and sex-based violence and humiliation. (10:690)

She strongly remarked that the family is a *social* institution, "whose influence is pervasive and present from the start of a human life" (10:691). Being a social institution, the family is not a natural entity, i.e., a natural kind. The Western nuclear family, for instance, is a parochial concept that must not overshadow non-nuclear groupings, such as same-sex couples, "village groups, extended families, women's collectives, *kibbutzim*" (10:692) and others. In addition, the family is "a creation of state action, enjoying a very different status from that of a church or a university" (10:692).

In order to address issues of the family, especially after acknowledging its contextual contingency, Nussbaum urged that questions concerning justice and the family "be left to the contextual deliberation of citizens, in the light of their history and their current problems" (10:695). Against the claim that her suggestion might seem dangerous in an "intuitionist" sense, she proffered a fallibilist position: "we should not purchase definiteness at the price of falsehood, by stating or implying that a parochial grouping is ahistorical and universal" (10:695). This approach to justice undermines the Romantic conceptions of the autonomous self and the ahistorical family, replacing a largely homogenous picture with a picture of reality that includes its heterogeneity.

Many philosophers in the 1990s, including Nussbaum, had a great facility for peeling back pictures of reality that were far too homogenous and idealized—Kitcher might say, "too Romantic"—to expose what had hitherto been unmentionable. Mary Mothersill's (1998–1999) "Old Age," probably performed this act of exposure more explicitly and more effectively than any of the others, and, although Nussbaum's address closes the decade chronologically, Mothersill's is appropriate to close this sketch of the 1990s, especially given its topic.

Mothersill opened, "old age, spanning, as it does, the concepts of life and death raises issues of great philosophical interest" (10:551). Traditionally, the topic of old age has been forsaken in philosophy for the topic of death, but Mothersill indicated that she found old age to be a more promising philosophical topic. "For one thing, it opens the possibility of confirmation and disconfirmation, and it *does* have analogues" (10:553).

One of the greatest problems with old age is a practical one: as more people age without dying, there is a greater need for resources. As Mothersill stated, removing a Romantic obfuscation from the issue:

> We, the oldies, are very expensive. We do not pull our weight. We are mostly unemployed and assumed by those whose opinions count to be unemployable. We are unproductive. Some of us live off pensions and annuities; others (not everybody) have social security, which, as we are reminded daily, is running out of funds. We have a disproportionate number of medical problems, many chronic and severe. Some of us need part-time caregivers; some need round-the-clock institutional care. Who is responsible for us? Who is supposed to provide for our housing and pay our medical bills? Who is to keep us from dying of boredom? (10:554)

According to Mothersill, these are issues that philosophers need to begin to address. They have neglected the elderly for far too long.

Mothersill also pointed to the need for gerontology to utilize philosophy. She stated, for instance, "*Successful Aging*[1] presents the views of neuropsy-

chologists, cell biologists, sociologists, but not of philosophers" (10:557). Although more than half the essays in that book make the point that "old age is not a disease, and old age is not to be thought of as a process of gradual dying" (10:557), Mothersill charged, "in none of the essays is there even a hint of what is required for something to count as 'a disease'" (10:557). Philosophy has the tools by which to help answer the question of what counts as a disease, but philosophers need to confront perhaps the most immediate painful enlightenment of life, which is becoming old.

In her own insightful way, Mothersill is exemplary of one of the major themes of the 1990s in philosophy, which was a call to end denying the realities that philosophers had previously neglected. Although the only *truly* common theme in all of the 1990s addresses is that they had philosophical topics, the underlying criticism levied toward much of the doxa leading up to the 1990s in philosophy is apparent in these addresses. Perhaps that has something to do with it being the end of a century, or perhaps it simply has to do with the very nature of philosophy.

Note

1. John W. Rowe and Robert Louis Kahn, eds., *Successful Aging* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998).

PRESIDENTIAL VIEWS ON PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRESS

Nicholas Rescher

1. The Question of Progress

Science and technology are inherently progressive enterprises of rational interaction with nature based on increasingly sophisticated observation and experimentation. So here, later means better: there is no sense returning to an earlier state of the art after another has visibly established its superiority. Ordinary life is something else again. Here, younger generations do not have a track record of profiting from the experience of their elders: each generation learns only from its own mistakes without much benefit of intergenerational transmission. In matters of behavior, be it at the personal (moral) level or at the level of collective action in social and political affairs, people's sense and sensibility is but rarely more elevated and worthy than it was in the past. Here, thought and action develop kaleidoscopically in relation to one another without any strong impetus to amelioration: ordinary life seems to take its random walk over a terrain pervaded by the contingencies of fad and fashion. So, to all visible appearances, the human condition is such that in science and technology, pragmatic rationality rules, while in ordinary life, it remains largely inopportune and inert. But what about philosophy?

It is critically important to distinguish from the very outset between progress *in* philosophy and the progress *of* philosophy. After all, philosophizing — considered in its totality as a field of deliberation and discussion—marches on apace from month-to-month and year-to-year. Ever more books pour forth from the presses, ever more journals issue from innumerable publishers. True to the maxim of "publish or perish," the world's 25,000 professors of philosophy make entire forests pay tribute to their efforts—to say nothing of the nowadays-popular postings in cyberspace. All this productivity has greatly enhanced philosophy as a field of academic and scholarly endeavor.

But of course, the issue of progress in philosophy—substantive progress in resolving or at least elucidating the issues of the field—is something else again. Here progress seems to occur in a much less massive and impressive way.

Most philosophers incline to view substantive progress in philosophy as a matter of rational consolidation and emergent consensus. Here matters are likely to seem decidedly bleak. For thanks to philosophy's balkanized nature, it transpires that with respect to virtually all of the problems on the agenda of philosophy, there is a plurality of discordant opinion, and that no one position or school

of thought has managed to establish itself decisively as the casually agreed position of the community as a whole.

Already at the very dawn of modern philosophy, René Descartes complained, "philosophy has been cultivated for many centuries by the best minds that have ever lived and that nevertheless no single thing is to be found in it that is not subject of dispute."[1] To all appearances it might well be that, as Bertrand Russell put it in 1912:

> philosophy is to be studied not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves, because these questions . . . enrich our intellectual imagination.[2]

A sensible treatment of the question of philosophical progress is inevitably going to have to come to terms with complex and controversial issues. For progress in every area of inquiry will never be a merely volumetric matter of more written product—of more discussion and more information. Thus, after all, it would overlook the crucial question of importance vs. insignificance of evidential understanding vs. triviality. In philosophy, as in every area of science or scholarship, the issue of progress will have to provide in matter of illumination and depth of understanding. It is one of the scandals of epistemology that on this crucial issue of importance, we have effectually no guidance from philosophers and cognitive theorists. "How are we to tell what is correct and important, and what is not?" is one of those seemingly unavoidable questions that theoreticians have somehow managed to avoid.

Actually, the issue before us—philosophical progress—has very different dimensions. In particular, it encompasses a range of very different questions:

> Can philosophy make progress?
> Does philosophy presently make progress?
> Has philosophy made progress in the past?
> If so, when, where, and how much?
> What are the prospects of philosophical progress in the future?

All of these questions presuppose yet another crucially preliminary issue:

> What is it that would (or could) constitute philosophical progress? Wherein would philosophical progress consist?

Furthermore, over and above this conceptual issue, yet some normative questions loom:

If (and insofar as) philosophy does not make progress, does this impact negatively on the nature of the subject itself?
Does it somehow derogate from the subject's value and significance?
Or is it perhaps somehow inappropriate to expect philosophy to be a progressive venture?

After all, there are in theory various different possible modes of philosophical progress. These include in particular:

Raising new issues; expanding the thematic agenda.
Asking new questions; posing new problems and puzzle.
Introducing new ideas = new consideration to take into account.
Clarifying issues; introducing new concepts and elaborating new distinctions.
Finding and substantiating new answers to old questions.
Introducing new perspectives and new points of view.

However, when deliberating about philosophical progress, one seldom has such a broad range of issues in view. Almost invariably, one focuses on resolving problems and answering questions definitively or at least more reliably than heretofore; on narrowing the range of disagreement and contracting the realm of controversy through making manifest the superior plausibility of certain issue-resolutions. Progress is seen as a matter of achieving a rationally substantiated consensus on the basic issues of the field. This is the aspect of the matter that has been the primary concern to presidents of The American Philosophical Association (The APA), manifesting itself since the earliest days of the organization.

2. Presidential Perspectives

Most philosophers much prefer doing some piece of philosophical work to thinking about the prospects of the enterprise at large.[3] In the face of a contrast with the obvious progressiveness of the natural sciences, they try to avoid the onus of such potentially embarrassing questions.

There is, however, something of an exception to this rule—one that becomes clearly manifest in the range of our present concern—namely presidential addresses. The opportunity to deliver such an address seems to embolden its producer to step back from matters of detail, to take a broad view of the subject to ruminate—perhaps even pontificate—about the nature of the field. In this way, the topic of philosophical progress has time and again come to figure in presidential addresses.

Among the first to touch the subject was Alexander Thomas Ormond (1902–1903) who, in "External Point of View Philosophy and Its Correlations,"

saw philosophical progress in terms of an increasing "reasonableness" whose nature is "a test of the congruity of any given content with experience as a whole, or with our ideal of experience as a whole" (1:53). Here, as he saw it, "experience" encompasses our cognitive experience with rational inquiry in all its dimensions. Over time, this experience so unfolds that:

> [the development of] knowledge—and by that I mean the whole insight we seek into the meaning of our world—is a business that, when viewed largely, will involve the methods and results of both the scientific and philosophical investigations (1:55)

Progress, as Ormond saw it, lies in the "integration [of science and philosophy] under some comprehending and synthetic concept of knowledge . . . . [that makes it] possible for us to combine the functions of both scientific and philosophical investigation" (1:55). Progress thus regarded lies in enhancing the systematic coordination of empirical and speculative inquiry. To be sure whether and to what extent such progress has been achieved—or is even achievable—is open to discussion and deliberation. The realization of this desideratum might well be a matter less for expectation than for hope, but "so long as we entertain this larger hope, we will not be willing that philosophy should be shorn of the theoretic criteria and aims" (1:57)—"the interpretation of the world is the light of reason and purpose" (1:56).

As Ormond thus saw it, philosophical progress is a perfectly meaningful conception that looks to a systemic unification of knowledge. While this enterprise is (in Kantian terminology) rather more a regulative ideal for philosophizing than an accomplished fact that is the fruit of its efforts, nevertheless the prospect of progress is something of which the philosopher should never despair.

George Trumbull Ladd (1904–1905) also raised the issue of philosophical progress in his address entitled, "The Mission of Philosophy." He lamented, "the barrenness of definite and permanent results shown by philosophical discipline may be made a [proper] subject of complaint" (1:128). This state of things is inevitable, however, because while the natural world addressed by science is indeed constant, the human world addressed by philosophy is ever-changing. In consequence, "each day and generation must have its very own philosophy," while nevertheless, "every age must attack anew the problems which, with all these appearances of variable antiquity . . . . need prospectively to be wrought over anew" (1:128). And yet, despite ongoing change, a certain progressive directionality is to be looked for. Here amplitude of vision and unity of coordination are the crux. For the characteristic mission of philosophy lies in such matters as "harmonizing with one another and with itself the particular sciences, and also as constituting to the betterments and the uplifting of the life of humanity" (1:135). Granted, such a road is difficult to travel. But this, so Ladd maintained, is no reason to despair of the prospect of making progress along its way. For as he saw it, the cognitive progress of science, on the one hand, and the

social progress of culture, on the other, are destined to carry philosophy forward in their wake.

An unusually hopeful view of philosophical progress was expressed by Andrew Campbell Armstrong (1915–1916) in his presidential address entitled "Philosophy and Common Sense." Turning his back to the European carnage of the day, he saw philosophy as contributing to the consolidation and advancement of "the rule of reason" (2:203) through facilitating "the production of new spiritual fact" (2:204). This project affords a powerful force that "expands the intellectual and moral order by broadening its scope . . . [and] creating spiritual limits among the segments of man's world" (2:204). He continued:

> things of the spirit . . . are the constituent factors of human nature, the essential reality of man's world. In so far as philosophy fosters these it accomplishes its mission. As they progress, it [too] gains in scope, in consistency, in power. (2:204)

Viewed in this essentially Hegelian perspective, philosophy is a progressive enterprise that at once contributes to and benefits from a constantly expanding and deepening progress in humanity's intellectual and spiritual development.

In "The Problem of Progress," Walter Goodnow Everett (1922–1923) approached the issue of philosophical progress in its broadest bearing on human progress at large, defining this as "an increase in the values consciously realized and enjoyed by humanity" (3:122). The capacity of philosophy to support and foster this sort of progress, while indeed discussable, should not be deemed a lost cause. For "it may come to be seen that progress involves not only a transvaluation of certain values, but also a reversal of some current standards of judgment" (3:137). For "the idea of progress for the future is not an idea that is true or false independent of our human attitude, our intelligence, and [our] will" (3:139). On this basis, philosophy itself can progress through its contribution to human progress at large. As well, "no uncertainty as to the fortunes of progress can lessen our obligation to labor for it" (3:140). Accordingly, Everett maintained that philosophical progress deserves to be seen as a practicable and inherently desirable prospect.

Wilbur Marshall Urban (1925–1926) chose to lecture on "Progress in Philosophy in the Last Quarter Century" (3:267–288). Here, he saw his first task as that of "answering the significant questions as to what real progress is or whether real advances, in the sense of real [contributions to] knowledge have taken place" (3:269). He stressed that these themselves are "philosophical, or, if you will, metaphysical questions" (3:269). We must, as he saw it, worry whether "the whole epistemological movement of modern philosophy [is] an *Abweg* [wrong path] leading into a blind alley" (3:270).

In addressing this question, Urban nailed his flag to the mast of the fact-value distinction. Scientific progress, as he saw it, is a matter of enhancement of our grasp of the world's facts; philosophy by contrast, faces the task of "widening the conception [of knowledge] to include ethical, economic, æsthetic and logical values" (3:273). For here, scientific inquiry about what people *do* value does not address the measuredly normative issues of appropriateness—of all they *should* value. For this issue leads into an autonomous reality, requiring "*the recognition that value is a logically primitive concept that can be neither defined nor validated in terms of anything else*" (3:274). Value, that is, is sui generis: its ultimate basis impervious to factual and scientific considerations, (at least at the level of ends as counter-distinguishable from means). Insisting, "value is neither an empirical existent, nor an essence, neither a quality nor a relation, but a unique form of objectivity" (3:274), Urban here envisioned a domain of deliberation apart from the factual realm made explicit by science. He viewed the emergence of this realm as the greatest progressive achievement realized by philosophy since Kant: "the significance of the development of our thought on the value-problem is to my mind so great for the general progress of philosophy" (3:274).

In this regard, "the increasing emphasis on value combined with the revival of realism has made the metaphysical status of values the key problem of our period" (3:275). The progress of science is also crucial in this regard. For while scientific inquiry does not itself teach us about values, it brings before us, via evolutionary theory, the story of the emergence by natural means of a certain (viz. man) capable of gaining insight into the supranatural dimension of values, bringing in its wake a projection of the natural order into the ideal (3:282–283). "The panorama of evolution . . . seems to make our life and the cosmos in which that life is lived, intelligible to ourselves" (3:284). For Urban, this enlargement of intelligibility is the very hallmark of progress.

In his address, "Philosophy and Natural Science," Curt John Ducasse (1939–1940) took for his theme the question of how it is that while the "critical sciences" obviously makes progress, this does not seem to be so in philosophy where "the same problems are ever examined afresh . . . the old problems remain persistently open" (4:596).

As Ducasse saw it, this embarrassing state of affairs can and should be remedied, for it issues from failure to grasp the proper mission of philosophy.

The natural sciences, so Ducasse maintained, properly deal with the observable facts of nature, while philosophy deals with the introspectival facts of mind, and the elucidation of these material facts is normative in nature, a norm being "the sort of form, namely, that an entity of a given sort has when it does satisfy a given sort of desire, or that an activity of a given sort has when it does cause the sort of effects that were aimed at" (4:607).

On this basis the issues of philosophy can and should be treated scientifically, albeit within the scheme of introspective rather than observational science. Take the metaphysical problem of realism, for example:

> for philosophy, the problem of the relation between Mind and Nature is that of describing *without* circularity, that is, *otherwise than in terms of objects of perception*, what exactly the introspectable process called "perceiving an object" consists in. That *this* problem genuinely belongs to the science of Mind is, I submit, evident from the mere formulation of it, irrespective of what in particular the solution of it may be. (4:609)

For Ducasse, then, the problem of philosophical progress is directly solvable. For once it is realized what philosophy really is (viz. the introspectively grounded science of instrospectible phenomena) then there is reason to think that progress in this domain is every bit as achievable as is progress in the sciences of nature.

The Fundamental Theorem of Epistemology holds that the appropriate answer is a function of exactly what it is that the question asks. In this regard, for example, the question, "Does philosophy make progress?" is something quite different from the question, "Can philosophy make progress?" It is this latter issue that pervaded the presidential address of Martin ten Hoor (1945–1946), on "The Role of the Philosopher." As he saw it, the prospect here lies in the democratization of the audience:

> The Greek philosophers did not trouble about the common man; the scholastics were not concerned about him, for they assumed that his eternal destination was otherwise provided for. But the philosophers of democracy have undertaken to show every man the way to the good life. . . . [Here] philosophers have some help to give. (5:386)

As Ten Hoor saw it, a prospect for progress is offered by the potential for constructive insights facilitating an enhancement of the general good. On this perspective, philosophical progress manifests itself less through realizing the idealized aims of the subject, than through its practical applications.

In "The Abdication of Philosophy," Paul Arthur Schilpp (1958–1959) not only did not see philosophy as making progress, but rather envisioned the reverse. His was a *cri de coeur*, lamenting the movement of philosophy away from its traditional search for wisdom that is conducive to the good life. As he saw it, "philosophers have been relegating ethics and political philosophy to the status of data for mere linguistic analysis" (6:532).

After all, any sort of known wisdom, said Schilpp, "presupposes a philosophy of man and an intellectually achieved view of human nature" (6:535). As well, "if the philosopher fails at any one of these points, he . . . abdicates his own essential duty *as* a philosopher" (6:536).

Regrettably, "from the point of view of today's so-called 'philosophers'—anyone venturing to depart so far from linguistic analysis as to concern himself with [developing] a *Weltanschauung* is already a charlatan!" (6:536). As Schilpp saw it, his sort of approach to the subject was not a reconstruction of philosophy but an abandonment of its omission.

To be sure, "the philosopher may not have the answers" (6:544), but he questioned whether this was "a good reason for not pointing out directions and possible consequences to result from different courses of action" (6:544).

All in all, as Schilpp saw it, the trend of contemporary philosophy not only fails to support the idea of philosophical progress, but it abandons the definitive mission of philosophy as a ground to rational thought and action. Moreover, "the philosopher who fails mankind at this point has failed [philosophy itself] . . . . and to the extent that we fail here, it is not merely philosophy which will fail, but mankind itself" (6:546–547).

A variant view on the subject is encompassed in William Thomas Jones's (1969–1970) address, "Philosophical Disagreements and World Views." Different philosophers, so he maintained, develop their thinking in variable orientations to different epistemic desiderata. Thus we find:

> logicians with discreteness-orientation complain that logicians with a continuity-orientation introduce muddle and confusion by refusing to draw sharp distinctions. [By contrast,] logicians with continuity orientation charge that logicians with a distinctness-orientation over-simplify. (7:624)

Some theorists, Kierkegaard for example, orient their thought toward episodic experience (*Erlebnis*). Others, like Kant, orient their thought to systemic answers of experience (*Erfahrung*) (7:625–626).

As Jones saw it, "differences in [orienting] world-view dimensions result in different 'schools of philosophy,'" with the result that "different schools tend to talk past one another" (7:527). The resulting fact that "philosophical theory provides numerous examples of such conflicts in perspectives" (7:628) precludes the linearity of development that would make talk of progress meaningful. The "profound differences in what may be called a pre-cognitive vision of the world" serve to "account for why philosophical disagreements tend to be inconclusive" (7:626).

So regarded, dissonance and disagreement do not betoken a failure of philosophizing, but are inevitable features of the sort of progress that is at issue—the development of positions rationally available relative to different

orientations. Rather than their being some one-size-fits-all doctrine, philosophizing is a matter of working out the rational consequences of one or another of determinately divergent orientations. For Jones, consensus is not something we should be asking for in this domain and progress certainly does not consist in its realization.

In surveying this panorama of views on philosophical progress, one confronts the perhaps not really surprising circumstance of radical dissensus regarding just exactly what the prime mission of philosophy is. Some see it as theoretical in nature greater to the systemic unification of knowledge (for example, Ormond). Others see it in practical terms of conducing to the improvement of man and the life of mankind (for example, Everett).

In the face of such diversity of doctrine, our philosophers also take a different view of the prospect of progress. Some see it as a natural and virtually inevitable development (for example, Ducasse); others are less hopeful and regard it as something deeply problematic—even doubtful (for example, Schilpp). Certainly, if evolving consensus is viewed as the hallmark of philosophical progress, then the very problem-issue before us, that of philosophical progress, is itself just one more token that philosophy is not a markedly progressive enterprise.

The difference between the situation of natural science and philosophy is often not sufficiently appreciated. Natural science constantly addresses new phenomena brought into view by advances in the technology of observation and experimentation. In philosophy, by contrast, one deals in large measure with a range of unchanging phenomena: various fixed constancies in the human condition in matters of personal fate and interpersonal interaction where many of the fundamental realities of the human condition are an ongoingly fixed throughout the ages.

A further disparity between the situation in natural science as compared with philosophy arises from the circumstances that in the former setting we have a theory-external test of acceptability (viz. in application by way of prediction and control), while in the latter setting, the matter is one of theoretical coherency through and through. (As least in the case of practical philosophy it might be tempting to say that living in line with the relevant structures provides a test of their adequacy, but then there are all those theorists who believe, with John Stuart Mill, that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.)

Three further salient considerations come to mind: One is that the question of philosophical progress affords a splendid case study for deliberations of R. G. Collingwood's historic thesis that different thinkers of different eras do not and cannot consider the same question. For here, as elsewhere, the position has to be seen as a compromise. Clearly thinkers of both the pre-World War I era and of the post-World War II era can and do confront and address one and the same question: "Does philosophy make progress?" But it is also clear that when they

do so, they do it very differently. Such variation of perspective has the consequence that they will be talking past one another.

A second consideration relates to the role of fad and fashion. Progress as such calls for movement in a definite direction. However, where the focus of contention changes—where some topics fade from view (the nature of the absolute) and others emerge to specificity from a fog of generality (for example, professional ethics) the concept of progressiveness finds little traction. This phenomenon is exemplified by the very issue at hand—the theme of philosophical progress itself.

In this regard, it would seem that the many-sided deliberations of our Association's presidents do not augur for any hopeful conclusions. Indeed, if Schilpp was right, the increasing technical sophistication and ever-advancing specialization constitutes rather more an obstacle to the consensual mode of philosophical progress than a manifestation of it.

In a way, the ongoing discussion about philosophical progress itself illustrates the nature of the problem. Over the course of time, there is an elaboration of aspects and on accumulation of instructive insights. However, settling questions and resolving problems is something else again. For consensus—even consensus on how the concepts at issue are to be understood let alone on how the substantive doctrine are to be assessed—is something that is to all appearances beyond our reach.

This leads to the further reflection: there is a good reason why the "big questions" of philosophy are, in the final analysis, consensus-precluding. It roots in the observation, already made by Aristotle, the father of logic, that any cogent argument must proceed from premises, and that insofar as reasoning from philosophy's general principles is concerned, any question about a conclusion will redoubt back into the premises that must, therefore, ultimately be grounded in something factual and distinct from considerations of such general principles. What differentiates those big questions from the questions of detail that arise in particular specialized sub-fields is the very comprehensiveness of their range of concern.

Any subfield of inquiry is defined as such by presumptions—presuppositions that define the limits of themselves and which are the concern of that subfield itself. They serve as axioms, as it were, that delimit that issue-range as the problem area it is. They are commitments you have to take on board if you are going to operate in that particular region. However, with the big questions, such quasi-axiomatic presupposition are not to be had. Here, there are no fixed boundaries; relevance is fair game for doubt and deliberation. The range of issues that can be resolved through definitively authoritative resolutions shrinks to a vanishing point. To look for definitively consensual resolutions that can be substantiated on the basis of general principles alone is to enter upon an unrealizable and Quixotic quest.

3. Experiential Contextualism

It seems plausible to regard the insight that philosophical progress is simply not to be assessed by the standard of consensuality as itself constituting a significant item of philosophical progress, rendering obsolete the all-too-common complaints of days past that philosophy—unlike the sciences—affords generally agreed answers to its questions.

In the final analysis, there is no need for uniformity among philosophers regarding answers to the big questions. A good case can be made for the view that evolving consensus is simply not the appropriate standard of progress here. It could be argued that the aim of the enterprise is not to find "the one true answer" to a question but to survey the spectrum of plausible and cogent answers.

An analogy may help in this regard. Philosophy as a whole may be like a high-grade clothier's establishment offering a variety of exquisitely produced suits tailor -made to the requirements of individuals. There is no one-size-fits-all here but a variety of offerings suited to the contextually varying needs of individuals. Here suitability is not, however, a matter of taste but one of the particular contextually differentiated requirements of individuals: a matter not of physical but ideological shape given the differences of condition—of character, disputation, situation, etc.—of particular individuals.

It makes sense to ask where a particular philosophy stands but not where philosophy stands. When P is a thesis of philosophical generality and interest, then anyone who makes statements of the form "Philosophy teaches that P" or "Philosophers have established that P" is bound to be talking nonsense. For as experiential contextualism sees it, all intelligent beings will, in the course of their lives, become equipped with an experientially shaped value orientation that is partly effective but also largely cognitive in nature, geared to a view of what is usual, normal, commonplace, natural, straightforward, efficient, economical, and the like. This experientially shaped perspectival manifold furnishes thinking agents with an evidentially substantive basis for their doctrinal views. As far as the community is concerned, there is thus no one-size-fits-all enforcing resolution. However, for particular individuals there is no choice: here the issue of accommodating one's condition is nowise a matter of personal and indifferent subjectivity. Their value-orientation, like their memory—is an inseparable part of what people are, duly shaped by the course of their experience. On this basis, there can and will be progress as regards the exposition, articulation, and evidentiation of particular philosophical doctrines and positions, but without any convergence to uniformity. At the local level, within a given doctrinal orientation—invariably one among several—there can be progress and indeed emerging agreement, but nevertheless this sort of thing may be absent (and indeed even unavailable) at the global level.

It is possible, and indeed, given the actualities of the situation even likely, that this sort of thing represents the position of philosophy at large and indicates the sort of progress that is achievable in this field.

The representing position is not, however, that of an indifferentist relativism that sees philosophical position-liking as a matter of rational indifference and merely subjective taste—one where you simply "pays your money and takes your choice" among otherwise indifferent alternatives. Instead, the position is one of experiential contextualism, where the given situation of the individual dictates the unique rational appropriateness and viability of a particular resolution. For just as factual beliefs are rationally appropriate (or not) relative to the available evidence, so these ideological beliefs are rationally appropriate (or not) relative to the body of experience available to the individual.

The orientational pluralism at work in such an experiential contextualism does not propose to abandon the pursuit of truth in philosophy. It simply enjoins us to recognize that, short of adopting a probative value posture, there is no way of conducting inquiry in this domain. Of course, since we ourselves do have such a posture—by definition one that we deem to be uniquely right and proper—we need not and should not be intimidated by the fact that others see matters differently. And so, in philosophy—as in morals or politics—the fact that one holds one's position on the basis of one's values certainly does not impede taking the stance that this position is validated through capacity to provide in optimal accommodation for one's basic commitments.[4] Experiential contextualism does not entail indifferentism: I certainly need not see your position as every bit as solid and valued as my own!

4. Technical Progress

One thing is for sure, namely, that the literature of the subject is ever-expanding—indeed has been growing exponentially throughout modern times. Now with respect to the sciences, it has been argued that cognitive progress does not stand proportionate with size of a field's literature but grows only in proportion to the logarithm thereof.[5] It appears plausible to say that the same sort of situation obtains here in philosophy as well, so that the cognitive progress of the field proceeds even more slowly as even the size of its literature expands.

The resolution of issues in a way that exerts rational compulsion over the entire community of investigators represents a mode of progress that is simply not achievable in philosophy. It is not wise to ask for that which cannot possibly be had. And so, the only realistic view of the matter is that the traditional complaints about philosophical disagreement are unwarranted and that the absence of consensus is not a flaw of the enterprise but one of its definitive and unavoidable features.

All the same, it is surely no accident that the question of philosophical progress does not figure significantly in any of the addresses delivered in the last third of the twentieth century. The explanation is perhaps foreshadowed in Schilpp's complaint that philosophers are increasingly disinclined to tackle large and portentous issues. Specialization, division of labor, and fragmentation of focus have taken hold of the field to the extent that wrestling with issues of differently ramified complexity is seen as marks of an amateurism that disqualifies claims to sophistication and expertise.

This phenomenon of specialization has an important bearing on our present theme. For philosophical problems, issues, and questions come at very different levels of scale. At the top of the ladder come those big questions that define the subject itself—the metaphysical mega-issues of truth, value, and morality that probe the fundamentals of "life, the universe, and everything"). Next come the questions that define the branches of the subject—those of logic, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of nature. And so, we move down the successive branchings from fields to subfields, to problem areas, and finally, to particular problems and puzzles. Clearly, the issue of progress figures very differently at the different rungs of this ladder.

As philosophical problems splinter into ever smaller sub-issues of subsidiary detail, definitive solutions become possible. Whether deductive derivation is properly represented by classical or intuitionistic logic is a debatable issue, but whether this or that thesis obtains in one system or the other admits of definitive settlement. Whether there is such a thing as personal as contrasted with natural causality is debatable, but that personal causality's being unreal would endanger moral responsibility is rather more amenable to resolution. The irony is that philosophical issues are the least readily amenable to resolution exactly where their larger imports and significance is the greatest.

Still, what is surprising is the widespread reluctance to accept at face value the enormous progress that has indeed been made throughout the twentieth century in the introducing substantive scientific work into the realm of philosophical deliberation. Thus, the philosophy of physics, biology, and mathematics have all been transformed beyond all recognition both in breadth and depth over this period. Consensual agreement may have proved elusive, but the profundity of our understanding of the issues has advanced beyond measure.

One obvious way philosophical progress can unfold is in relation to the various areas of philosophy-of-X, when X itself develops and grows. Thus, when logic develops, so will (or can) the philosophy of logic; when science develops, so will (or can) the philosophy of science; when art develops, so will (or can) the philosophy of art, and so on. Intra-compartmental progress is certainly practicable. However, translating this into progress on the "big problems" of the field—those larger trans-compartmental issues—would be something else again.

Greater sophistication and subtly is certainly possible in relation to specialized lower level issues. So here, it might be said, there is unquestionably some progress. Local progress, in particular specific issues relating to the matters of detail within a fixed range of assumptions and presumptions, is unquestionably possible. Within such limits, it would even be possible to achieve consensus along the hypothetical lines that if certain commitments are made and certain theses granted, then certain conclusions can plausibly be drawn. However, the question remains whether such progress at the level of detail resonates upward to make for a superior treatment of higher-level issues, or, in a field where we always have it that "the whole is more than the sum of the parts," it will not transpire that superior performance in relation to those specialized matters constitutes superior performance in larger matters of higher generality. For while complexification and sophistication have elaborated the issues, they have not changed the basic agenda. The defining issues of the subject were there from the start. As far as their resolution is concerned, growing sophistication in their treatment added as much confusion as light in their bearing upon these larger issues. The goal of a definitive, compelling, consensus-engendering resolution is as remote as ever.

All the same, the increasingly mannered and sophisticated treatment of issues subordinate and collateral to the traditional big questions of philosophy, and the complex freedom of the issue-agenda within which these questions figure is a striking feature of the sort of progress that the discipline has certainly able to achieve in modern times.

One sort of unquestionable progress in philosophy relates to the technology of exposition. No one can question that over the years, philosophical argumentation has become increasingly subtle and sophisticated, employing even more fine distinctions, complex agents, sharpened logical looks, more elaborate examples, and the like. And yet, another unquestionable mode of progress is the complex taxionomic function of areas of investigation, moving from general ethics, to business ethics and medical ethics, etc., and from medical ethics to ethical issues of access, of modalities of treatment, of modes of research, of informed consent, etc. The range of issues in the agenda of philosophical deliberation has been ever expanding.

5. Present Prospects

No survey of America perspectives on philosophical progress would be complete without taking note of the sea-change under way in regard to philosophy as an academic enterprise.

It should occasion no surprise that philosophical activity flourishes on the American academic scene in a way that reflects wider social concerns. Of the

forty-five thematic sessions on the program of The APA's Eastern Division in 1991, six were devoted to feminist themes and two to issues relating to persons of color.[6] This dedication of some 15 percent of program space to these issues prominent on the agenda of present-day United States politics is clearly not accidental, but it does not reflect a comparable prominence of these topics in the current journal literature on the subject, where (as the Philosopher's Index entries indicate) the aggregate space occupied by these themes is diminutive. To a cynic, it might seem that American philosophers are seeking to offset the underrepresentation of women and blacks in their ranks by throwing words at the issues involved. (In this regard, philosophers are akin to politicians, a consideration that invites second thoughts about Plato's philosopher-kings.)

A century ago, historian Henry Adams deplored the end of the predominance of the great and the good in American politics and the emergence of a new order based on the dominance of masses and their often self-appointed representatives.[7] Control of the political affairs of the nation was flowing from the hands of a cultural elite into that of the unimposing, albeit vociferous, spokespersons for the faceless masses. In short, democracy was setting in. This same transformation from the preeminence of great figures to the predominance of mass movements is now, one hundred years on, the established situation in even so intellectual an enterprise as philosophy. In its present configuration, American philosophy indicates that the "revolt of the masses," which José Ortega y Gasset thought characteristic of our era, manifests itself not only in politics and social affairs but in intellectual culture also and even in philosophy.[8] A cynic might characterize the current situation as a victory of the troglodytes over the giants.[9]

The condition of American philosophy today is a matter of trends and fashions that go their own way without the guidance of agenda-controlling individuals. This results in a state of affairs that calls for description on a statistical rather than biographical basis. It is ironic to see the partisans of political correctness in academia condemning philosophy as an elitist discipline at the very moment when philosophy itself has abandoned elitism and succeeded in making itself over in a populist reconstruction. American philosophy has now well and truly left "the genteel tradition" behind. If democratization is progress, then American philosophy is indeed progressing.

To be sure, there is one respect in which philosophical progress is a very dubious proposition. This relates to its classical role as "a guide to life"—to evoke Phi Beta Kappa's motto: *Φιλοσοφία Βίου Κυβερνήτης* (love of learning is the guide of life). Modern science poses ever more demanding epistemological problems; modern society poses ever and challenging moral problems; modern art poses ever more complex esthetic problems, and so on all along the line. Similarly, the reflections of The APA presidents suggest that the capability of

philosophy to address in a constructive and meaningful way the problems of collective decision and action afforded by modern life has regrettably become ever less obvious in recent years.[10]

Notes

1. René Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, in *Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1911–1912).

2. Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912), pp. 249–250.

3. In an interesting little essay on philosophical progress, Gerhard Enst suggests two possible positions regarding this lack: (1) that philosophy is a matter of knowledge that is a priori and strictly conceptual and experience-independent so that further experience cannot on its issues, (2) that philosophy is so abstract that it operates at a level of generality impervious to that mundane vicissitudes of changing human experience. Neither view seems to do justice to the complex realities of the situation. See "Forschritt in der Philosophy?" [Progress in philosophy?], *Information Philosophie* (March 2013): 8–9.

4. It is a characteristic feature of an axiological relativism in contrast to an evidential one that we are not in a position to concede that someone else's basis of judgment may be superior to our own. I can, quite sensibly, grant that your information may be superior to mine, but not that your values are.

5. Ludwig Wittgenstein is an example. In the Big Typescript he wrote, "I read that 'philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of 'reality' than Plato got'. . . What a curious situation! How remarkable that Plato managed to get that far!—or that we can get no further. Was it because Plato was so clever? (Big Typescript, MS 213, p. 424.) It is ironic that, after having put that question on the table, Wittgenstein just let it sit there.

6. "Eastern Division: Eighty-Eighth Annual Meeting," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 65 (October 1991): 11–46.

7. Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams: An Autobiography* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918).

8. Where Ortega y Gasset did not expect it: "Philosophy needs no protection, no attention, no sympathy, no interest in the part of the masses. It's perfect uselessness protects it"; in *The Revolt of the Masses*, trans. Anthony Kerrigan (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), p. 73. He did not reckon with "applied philosophy."

9. Richard Schlatter, the General Editor of a first-rate survey of American humanistic scholarship, wrote in the Foreword to the volume on philosophy: "Not many of the names mentioned in these pages are recognizable as those of great intellectual leaders, and many are unknown even to an old academic hand like myself who has a fair speaking acquaintance with the various humanistic disciplines in America," cited in Roderick Chisholm et al., *Philosophy: Princeton Studies of Humanistic Scholarship in America* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964), p. x.

10. This chapter is a revised version of "American Philosophy Today," *The Review of Metaphysics* 46 (1993): 717–745. For a fuller contextualization of its concluding observations, see American Philosophy at the Century's End, in *Studies in 20th Century Philosophy* (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2005), pp. 1–26.

PHILOSOPHY MEETS THE SCIENCES

Tibor Solymosi

1. Introduction

The now familiar distinction between philosophy and science was not always easy to make. The Ionian philosophers were as much scientists as they were philosophers given their interest in the natural world. Today we often describe these pre-Socratics as "scientist–philosophers." Socrates hinted at such a description in Plato's attempt in the *Apology* to distinguish Socrates from these natural philosophers. Though Socrates was concerned with the examined life as the ethical life, Plato and his student Aristotle maintained an empirical (if not methodologically experimental) interest in the natural world. The distinction between matters of fact and matters of value, or the natural sciences and the moral sciences, was largely maintained through the rise of modern science. Newton's *Principia* was a work in natural philosophy. Darwin was referred to as a natural philosopher, not as a scientist. Though natural and moral sciences were distinct, both were conceived as parts of philosophy. Only in the nineteenth century did those who engaged in science break away from those who engaged in philosophy, by modeling themselves on those who engaged in art: as art*ists* did art, scient*ists* would do science.[1] The nominal distinction would play a significant role in the professionalization and progress of both science and philosophy. The addresses of The American Philosophical Association (The APA) in the twentieth century illustrate the often anxious concern of philosophers about the relationship between philosophy and science.

My aim here is to review how, as evinced in these addresses, philosophy met the sciences in the twentieth century, after their divorce in the nineteenth century. Specifically, by the sciences, or science generally, I mean the natural sciences, though there are some important exceptions that I note. My approach is neither exhaustive nor definitive. In nearly every address, "science" (or one of its cognates) was used. More often than not, the use was generic or beside the point (for example, the phrase, "arts and sciences"). In other addresses, science was mentioned or discussed, not as a profession, but strictly something about which to philosophize. In some of the addresses, the relationship between science and philosophy as subject matter or profession was discussed, but only as a secondary or tertiary concern. In others, the relationship between science and philosophy was the primary matter of concern.

My concern here is simply to note the historical pattern about this relationship as evinced in presidential addresses of The APA over its first century. I do not draw on other events, addresses, and publications. My reasons are

straightforward. First, several others have taken up such a project,[2] and to go further would require its own lengthy monograph.

Briefly, the century started with anxiety over science taking over philosophy, an anxiety that grew through the 1950s and into the 1960s. However, by the 1970s, the anxiety was largely gone with the rise of linguistic analysis. Still, there remained voices of dissent, as evinced by addresses during the closing decades. After the summary, I provide a chronological survey of the addresses.

2. A Pattern of Anxiety

The addresses given during the first decade varied in focus on the relationship between science and philosophy. Some sought to contrast the two via professional operation, others through definition. In one case, that of George Trumbull Ladd (1904–1905), the contrast was put in Kantian terms (1:119–135), according to which science is conceived as a particular while philosophy the universal. In contrast to that view, John Dewey (1905–1906), in "Beliefs and Realities," and Arthur (Schauffler) Oncken Lovejoy (1908–1909; 1916–1917), in "The Obsolescence of the Eternal," despite their myriad differences, argued that advances in modern science give philosophy cause to take process or temporality far more seriously than it historically has (1:159–171; 1:297–313).

During the second decade, discussion about how science and philosophy relate continued without much explicit consensus. What becomes more apparent in this decade is a growing anxiety that philosophy was losing ground to science. While some addresses made contrasts without such a worry, or used scientific ideas, such as evolution, for philosophical ends, there were several strongly worded addresses that sought to establish both the professional and conceptual separation—if not superiority—of philosophy over science. In hindsight, Lovejoy's "The Obsolescence of the Eternal," as Richard McKay Rorty (1979–1980) later observed in "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism" (8:661), set the challenge to the profession as a choice, in Rorty's terms, between edification or professionalization, but not both.

The anxiety over this challenge continued through the third decade. Previous themes, such as the need of philosophy to adjust to science or that philosophy is somehow over and above science, were reiterated. As well, other themes were introduced and hotly debated. For instance, the role of psychology was introduced, as well as religion and naturalism. Einstein's physics was also considered, as was the very idea of progress—well before Thomas Kuhn—in science or philosophy. The direct contrast between science and philosophy was also developed in novel ways, notably the importance of the individual and contentious philosopher versus the communal consensus of science.

These debates continued through the fourth decade. The pendulum continued its swing from criticism of one while favoring the other, through advocating for friendly relations between science and philosophy, to skepticism about whether either or both are capable of anything resembling truth or progress. Perhaps emblematic of the pendulum swing was the introduction in some addresses of the Unity of Science Movement.

The 1940s saw not only these themes examined but new ones too. From greater concern over perennial issues such as the human spirit and political power, to specifics issues of the time, such as racism and the atom bomb, the decade concluded with a hardening of positions. Between the intimacy and contentiousness of philosophy as described by Cornelius Krusé (1947–1948) and Herbert Wallace Schneider (1948–1949), and the servitude of philosophy to science as advanced by Hans Reichenbach (1947–1948), a clear trend can be discerned from these addresses of where the profession was headed.

The sixth decade of addresses crystallized the relationship between science and philosophy. Not only was there significantly less discussion, the positions were made far clearer. On the one hand, we have the assertion by Ernest Nagel (1954–1955) that the previous twenty-five years made a progressive shift away from grand metaphysical schemes to focus on specific problems whose particularity has no significant bearing on the cosmos. On the other hand, we had the clarion call from Paul Arthur Schilpp (1958–1959) declaring that philosophers were losing the critical and moral ground to scientists, who were rightly concerned about the consequences of their research but were woefully unprepared for the task—yet philosophers were otherwise inexcusably distracted.

The relationship between science and philosophy was barely addressed in the seventh decade. Maurice Henry Mandelbaum (1962–1963) framed the issue in terms of the divide between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy, finding the latter to oppose science while the former was continuous yet distinct from science. Ernest Addison Moody (1963–1964) saw the distinction as a matter of subject matter: science talks about its objects while philosophers use linguistic analysis to talk about how science talks. The professional anxiety of the previous decades was over at last, according to Moody. However, as Edwin Arthur Burtt (1964–1965) noted, this analysis came at the cost of ancient wisdom and the social responsibility therein.

The 1970s saw a dearth of concern about the relationship between science and philosophy as well as the professional status of philosophy. The sole exception was Rorty. He harkened back to the start of the century, framing the profession's choice as the option between William James's (1906–1907) view of philosophy as edification and Lovejoy's view of philosophy as its own professional enterprise. Rorty rightly observed that Lovejoy had won. This observation helps to make sense of the anxiety philosophers felt up until the 1960s

when linguistic analysis became nearly hegemonic in American philosophy departments. However, the cost, Rorty argued, had been great: philosophers were then found stuck in a time warp, reliving the Enlightenment without a care of the present, inside or out of the Academy (8:662). Rorty's revival of pluralism and pragmatism afforded John Edwin Smith (1981–1982) and Richard Jacob Bernstein (1988–1989), in the 1980s, a continued comparison between philosophy and science. What is distinct from earlier comparisons is that the profession believes itself to have become scientific when it had not and should not.

The century closed with addresses—most of which had nothing to say about philosophy and science—with three distinct views. First, Alvin Ira Goldman (1991–1992) argued that the ancient and historical collaboration between science and philosophy is alive and well in cognitive science, where philosophers handle the theoretical, and researchers the experimental. The second view is found in the observation by Stanley Louis Cavell (1996–1997) that philosophy is a part of science (at least in the minds of many philosophers at the time). Finally, Charles Tyler Burge (1998–1999) rejected the old view that philosophy is the queen of the sciences. Nevertheless, he thought that philosophy could be both scientific and useful to science, while remaining unique in that it alone can articulate what makes human beings uniquely valuable.

These three views are all broadly naturalistic and so indicate a departure from the plethora of views espoused earlier in the century. Nevertheless, there was only a mild reprieve from the anxiety that marked those first few decades. Since Rorty's 1979 address, both scientists and philosophers have worked—some struggling for clarity, others overflowing with confidence—on what to do about values and morals in light of the scientific worldview. This perennial problem pervades many of the century's addresses. The difficulty of its articulation is indicative of the value of philosophic and scientific enterprises, regardless of their exact conception.

A. 1901–1910

James Edwin Creighton (1901–1902) examined the relationship between philosophy and science in "The Purposes of a Philosophical Association." On the one hand, Creighton argued that philosophy needs to mature professionally like the natural sciences:

> Nevertheless, I think that it is not too much to say that there does not yet exist in philosophy, either the external organization for cooperation that has already been set on foot in the natural sciences, nor even the intimate feeling of fraternity which binds together the workers in many of these fields. (1:36)

On the other hand, philosophy is not science, which is naturalistic; philosophy, rather, is humanistic. "But philosophy, to be philosophy at all," he continued:

> has to humanize its facts, that is, to look at them from the standpoint of complete and self-conscious human experience, for it is only from this standpoint that a meaning for them can be found. The philosopher is thus essentially a humanist rather than a naturalist, and his closest affiliations are with the sciences that deal with the products of man's thought and purposive activity. (1:41)

Frederick James Eugene Woodbridge (1902–1903; 1911–1912), in "The Problem of Metaphysics," reviewed the history between the subjects and methods of science and that of metaphysics. Despite others' attempts to find continuity, Woodbridge found none. "Science asks for the laws of existence and discovers them by experiment. Metaphysics asks for the nature of reality and discovers it by definition" (1:53). The distinction between existence and reality played a central role for Woodbridge, but not clearly so for others.

Ladd considered "The Mission of Philosophy" by first recognizing the historical difficulty philosophy has had in defining itself. By way of illustration, he compared philosophy to modern science. Aiming to reconcile the Kantian two-world system, he was not intimidated by the long history of confusion over what philosophy is or does, finding it in fact to be just as ambiguous, at least in many ways, as particular sciences are. Undeterred, Ladd nevertheless sought to reconcile the phenomenal and noumenal worlds of Kant while articulating the very mission of philosophy:

> To reveal and defend the Unity of the Spirit, as belonging to the Being of this One World, to bring peace to the conceptions and interests which tend to divide and subdivide and set in antagonism the many manifestations of this One Life, and to exemplify this same Spirit in practical ways—all this may be said to define both the ideal nature and the actual mission of philosophy. (1:135)

In "Beliefs and Realities," Dewey provided an articulation of his reconstructive philosophical project that dismissed the atavistic view of much of his contemporaries. The ancient view rejected the epistemological validity of the particulars of a situated subject. He argued that the commonsensical view of the everyday person and the view of the professional philosopher need not be antagonistic but complementary. Such mutual benefit would only result, however, if the philosopher rejects the individual atomism taken to be the be-all and end-all of epistemology and science. In its stead, the philosopher, Dewey argued, must

recognize that the advances in knowledge made by the sciences have historically been advances made as "a cooperative social achievement . . . that logical thinking is a reweaving through individual activity of this social fabric at such points as are indicated by prevailing social needs and aims" (1:167).

Walter Bowers Pillsbury (1906–1907) continued many of the previous themes in his "The Ego and Empirical Psychology." Like the others, he struggled with the dualism seemingly inherent in relating physical science with an introspective self. "Whether the meaning is one of common sense, of an objective science, or of subjective science, depends upon the purpose you have in mind at the moment and the resulting type to which the experience is referred" (1:220). Hugo Münsterberg (1908–1909) addressed this conflict again in "The Problem of Beauty." For him, we are more "removed from real life when science makes us believe that those other personalities come to us as physical objects, as organisms, into which we introject mental phenomena by analogy with our introspection" (1:281). Indeed, Münsterberg concluded:

> if we raise the natural science of body or of mind to the dignity of a last philosophy, then we can never reach an absolute value, and a conflict must arise. But if we recognize that science itself depends upon an absolute deed and an absolute value, then all conflict disappears. (1:290)

Lovejoy was similarly concerned with the relationship between philosophy and science, but in a fashion that was at once far more worldly in the appreciation of non-Western philosophies all the while being rather dismissive of the import of science. For him, the eternal was a hurdle to future metaphysical work precisely because it was atemporal. In its place, he advocated an evolutionary philosophy: but not one that drew primarily from Darwin's theory. Rather, Lovejoy situated the temporal process Darwinists advocated in the long history of Western and Eastern philosophy:

> Certainly, philosophy will not have learned the primary lesson of modern reflection until, in all its departments, it begins—as it has until lately scarcely ever done—to take the time-process seriously. . . . A thoroughly temporalistic way of thinking has its technical categories for the most part still to forge; it means a profound and difficult reconstruction of our epistemological and ontological presuppositions. (1:311)

In "The Philosophical Aspects of Evolution," John Grier Hibben (1909–1910) was not concerned with any conflict or attempted resolution between science and philosophy, but with the impact Darwin's doctrine of evolution has had on philosophical debates. He not only noted significant influence but anticipated

some of the core questions to be further articulated and examined by philosophers of biology decades later (1:317–335).

B. 1911–1920

Charles Montague Bakewell (1910–1911) continued the concern over the relationship between philosophy and science in "The Problem of Transcendence," in which he argued for an idealist rapprochement:

> What I mean by the objective world is nothing more and nothing less than my own experience locked fast in the principle of identity, and therein, and thereby, being recognized as literally one with the experience of any other conscious being that can plan and strive, or even define its own aims. It is simply the unitary world of science. It is nature run down to mathematics, dealt with quantitatively, and stated in terms of permanence and identity. The philosopher accepts the results of the work of the scientists with as much docility as any layman. There is no collision between science and philosophy. . . . the world which thus viewed has been deprived of certain characters, which are none the less real and of which philosophy must take account. If it be said that the unitary world of science is a construct of human intelligence, and that it presents the objective world not in its full concrete reality, and that consequently it is insofar abstract, this is not in any wise to condemn the scientist. On the contrary, it is to commend him for sticking to his last, for doing precisely what he set out to do. For every scientist begins his work by the adoption of certain points of view toward that region of experience with which he is concerned and the elimination of others which are none the less present, though they do not concern him. (2:16–17)

Woodbridge returned to the subject in his address, "Evolution":

> My purpose is to express the opinion that evolution is history; that antecedents and causes should consequently be historically construed; that evolution is pluralistic, implying many histories, but not a single history of the world; that man writes the history only of his own world; that, however, since he discovers his world to be a history, he may have a science of history or evolution which is universal, and that this science indicates that evolution is progressive. (2:47)

Andrew Campbell Armstrong (1915–1916) discussed the relationships among science, philosophy, and common sense in "Philosophy and Commonsense." While acknowledging historical conflicts among the three, Arm-

strong also found significant confluence between them, particularly with regard to Darwinian evolution:

> the causal process is in neither of these cases pure. In the one science, in the other philosophy, it has been the principal factor. In both, contributory agencies have been associated with the chief generative force. A more complex balance still is found in a third modern instance, the principle of evolution when this is taken in its general sense. In the establishment of this principle Darwin and his co-workers played the leading part. It was through their labors and their success that the evolutionary theory won its place in the consciousness of the age. Their subordinate ideas, moreover, have colored our conceptions of the world. Men talk freely now in terms of environment and the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, even—and this is the final test—when they betray little comprehension of what the phrases mean. Biology has affected all departments of our thinking. Every discipline has felt its power. There is scarcely one which has not responded to the summons, which has not adapted its conclusion to the evolutionary scheme. (2:200)

Alfred Henry Lloyd (1915–1916) sought to establish philosophy's dominance over science in his "The Doctrinaire in Time of Crisis":

> True philosophy, responsible to its great calling, must be more than science, say superscientific; it must in fact be unscientific, but unscientific, not by any means in the sense of ignorance or contempt, but in the sense of free and appreciative use, through the very revelations of science seeing beyond what science itself with the very best instruments and methods sees or ever can see. The *mediation* of science, in other words, not science's immediate form and content or method and vision, is true philosophy as well as—in a real sense—unscientific philosophy. Thus science is for philosophy, not philosophy for science. (2:212)

In "On Some Conditions of Progress in Philosophical Inquiry," Lovejoy asked, "What's the Matter with Philosophy?" (2:225). He subsequently took philosophers to task for their pretense:

> Philosophy has seldom given up the pretension of being in some sort a science among the sciences, even when it has lacked the hardihood to dub itself *scientia scientiarum* [science of sciences]. And so long as we maintain any such pretension of being busied about verifiable truths, of cultivating anything of the nature of science, it is, to speak plainly, sheer dishonesty of

> us not to play *that* game according to the rules, to be content with any lower degree of rigor in scientific method, any smaller measure of established and agreed-upon results, any greater infusion of the idiosyncrasies of our private personalities, than the nature of the case and the imperfections of the human intellect render inevitable. (2:229–230)

He concluded with the following challenge to the profession:

> Unless we are prepared frankly to abdicate our customary pretension to be dealing with objective, verifiable and clearly communicable truths, and are content to acknowledge that all our brave parade of philosophizing is nothing more than an exploiting of our temperamental idiosyncrasies, disingenuously masquerading in the garb of impersonal reason; unless, in short, we philosophers are willing to be classified, not as men of science, but as practitioners of what it would be necessary to call *belles-lettres* if only it were not, on the other hand, usually so sadly lacking in beauty. For the collaborative preparation of such a work as I have spoken of is one of the measures most clearly needful in order to introduce into our reflection proper safeguards against the principal source of error in philosophy—the overlooking of genuine "considerations"; to make the substitution of Mesopotamian phrase-mongering for thinking disreputable in the philosophy of the future; to give to the next generation of philosophers a fairer prospect of a common understanding; and so to give to philosophy itself some hope of attaining the assured and steady march which should characterize a science. (2:251)

Continuing the same theme, in "The Opportunity of Philosophy," Addison Webster Moore (1911–1912; 1917–1918) remarked that Lovejoy:

> must have been impressed with the widespread apprehension that philosophy is in danger of losing its job. This apprehension appears in two forms. One is the fear that philosophy is losing its human, personal, inspirational character and is on the point of capitulating to science. The other is the belief that philosophy is losing its scientific character and is surrendering to inspiration and edification—to religion and art. (2:277)

Moore found opportunity for philosophy in these two opposing beliefs. He argued that the truth in one is a challenge to be met by the other.

Mary Whiton Calkins (1918–1919) was not concerned with the threat to philosophy in "The Personalistic Conception of Nature." Instead, she took recent developments in physics and biology as support of cosmological personalism:

> Two tendencies of modern science . . . seem to favor such an upgrowth of personalistic doctrine. The first of these is the prevalence . . . of dynamic theories in physics. The second is the rising opposition . . . to vitalism in the biologist's sense of the term. . . . But the elimination of biological vitalism opens the way, . . . to psychological vitalism or personalism. (2:336)

C. 1921–1930

Ralph Barton Perry (1920–1921) examined the need for psychology to serve as a bridge for scientists to take up the traditional subject matter of philosophy and religion in "The Appeal to Reason"; he was critical of both science and philosophy:

> Philosophy and religion have had the first opportunity of framing our traditional conceptions of the essential human nature, and yielding to the pressure of sentiment they have so framed them as to remove them from the plane of natural fact. They have so constituted their meaning that the scientist is bound to dismiss them from his calculations as he is bound to dismiss miracles. But though this retaliation is just, it is none the less blind. For it has led the scientist himself to disregard what is novel in the more complex aspects of human life. He has weakened his case by oversimplifying his problem, by claiming too much for his categories, by affecting to despise what he cannot explain in ready-made terms, and by earning the reputation of one who would disparage man by denying or reducing his distinguishing characteristics. Meanwhile the opposing party has suffered an equal loss. Through insisting too much on human superiority, this party has withdrawn the essential man altogether from affairs. Man, in order that he may be qualified for admission to another world, has allowed himself to be reduced to impotence in this. (3:8)

Edward Scribner Ames (1921–1922) took a different perspective on the relationship between science, religion, and philosophy. Where Perry had teamed religion and philosophy in opposition to science, in "Religious Values and the Practical Absolute," Ames paired science and philosophy in contrast to religion. "Religion was therefore conceived as a practical interest as contrasted with science and philosophy which are reflective" (3:81). William Pepperell Montague (1923–1924), in "The Einstein Theory and a Possible Alternative," was the first president of The APA to substantively address Einstein's special Theory of Relativity. He did so with notable humility, saying, "because the errors and misinterpretations of which I may be guilty, and which some of you may share, will perhaps tempt our scientific brethren to come to the rescue with clearer and simpler explanations" (3:148). He went on to conclude, "it is time

that we in philosophy should go back to nature, no matter how steep the path or how hard we fall" (3:165).

In "The Emergence of Naturalism," Roy Wood Sellars (1923–1924) considered the historical development of naturalism alongside the growing success of science. The philosophical enterprise that went along with it was initially difficult, Sellars argued, because of a combination of romanticism and the impotence of modern philosophy to resolve its central problems. Ultimately, philosophy in the nineteenth century:

> marked time while science and industry and politics were undergoing revolutionary changes. Frequently philosophy became retrospective and reminiscent and little else than its own history. But I would be unfair to the philosophy of the nineteenth century if I left the matter here. It was not itself creative, but it served the useful function of criticism. (3:188)

As science progressed and philosophy moved forward, Sellars concluded that philosophical dualism and supernaturalism had become ever more untenable.

Harold Chapman Brown (1924–1925; 1932–1933) shared an attitude similar to that of Montague with a need for philosophy to be responsible to science. His humility was not as strong, but he shared the excitement. In "The Material World—Snark or Boojum?," he argued:

> Philosophy must somehow adjust itself to science. Why must matter be a mere phenomenon just when science is finding it so extremely complex and interesting? What if the philosopher could link up this new knowledge with his own analyses and aspirations? Perhaps he has been misled by conceptions of matter now obsolete. (3:198)

From there, Brown advanced his own "genuine materialism: It asserts the continuity of the processes of life and mind with those of physical matter and grants that the same method of analysis is everywhere valid" (3:211).

Edmund Howard Hollands (1924–1925) advocated a science-friendly but philosophy-supreme view of the relationship in "Nature and Spirit." In that address, Hollands argued:

> we cannot form an adequate philosophy of Nature, either human or physical, by the use of any one type of theory, more particularly of the natural-science type. There are as many valid theories, each in its own way and kind, as there are possible significant orders or patterns. . . . The philosopher must take account of every phase of knowledge and of culture, of the

> products of the arts as well as of those of the sciences, and accord some ontological status to the formative ideas of each and every one of them. (3:246)

Wilbur Marshall Urban (1925–1926) retrospectively examined the senses of progress in both science and philosophy in "Progress in Philosophy in the Last Quarter Century." His analysis yielded a general agreement that both science and philosophy have progressed in the elaborative sense, namely, the technical details and the problems therein had been more clarified than before. However, there is also the sense in Urban's argument that philosophy's progress is not so easily assessed. For philosophy, unlike science, must constantly examine its evaluative assumptions (3:269).

In "Some Reflections on Naturalism," Henry Waldgrave Stuart (1926–1927) contrasted two distinct conceptions of philosophy and the subsequent relations with science. The first, and perhaps older, conception is that philosophy is distinct from science and other arts because of the conviction and strength of the personality behind the philosophy:

> Philosophy, it is declared, if anything worthwhile at all, is a manner of life. Of this life the vital breath is reflection and reflection must be fed by knowledge; but reflection and reflection's quest for knowledge are an idle play unless they express and contribute to a life that knows itself and values itself sufficiently to care in what direction it is moving. To attain such success as men of science, philologists, or historians can show, the philosopher in his field of inquiry must be possessed and carried forward in his endeavors by an eagerness more steadily urgent than theirs. Not mere curiosity or mere fondness for such things as plants or animals or words and for the ways of studying them are the motives which animate him, but the desire of his soul for the harmony and strength that only self-knowledge and knowledge of the world he lives in can establish. Thus, behind every great philosophy there is a great personality showing through. A philosophy may be as true as science or truer but the particular perspectives of truth which it presents center in the philosopher and project his qualities of personality as no science can or should do. (3:328)

Stuart contrasted this view with the growing philosophical position of naturalism, which he described as "charg[ing] philosophy with the task of unifying or harmonizing or systematizing knowledge" (3:327). This "scientist-philosopher" runs the risk, Stuart argued, of becoming "press-agent or, to borrow the gentle suggestion of a scientific colleague of my own—the 'cub-reporter of science'" (3:330).

William Ernest Hocking (1926–1927; 1927–1928), in "What Does Philosophy Say?," examined a common distinction between philosophy and science. He summed up his considerations with the following observation:

> Philosophy—does not speak; and no one can speak for it. It has no corporate voice, because it has no corporate judgment. You may ask what mathematics has to say, or even physics; but not what philosophy says. Philosophers are individuals in their work as scientists are not. You cannot expect an orthodoxy among thinkers who become philosophers because they cannot fall in with current orthodoxies. Their thinking is carried on, in part, in the region of strict logic; but in part in the region of belief, where tests of rightness lack sharp finality. I can tell you what I say, or what various camps of philosophy might say: I cannot tell you what philosophy says. (3:397)

D. 1931–1940

William Briggs Savery (1931–1932), in "Chance and Cosmogony," recalled:

> [hearing a] group of scientists express their dissatisfaction at [philosophers'] not being able to explain the ultimate customs of nature. They had not learned Hume's lesson, which is not that we are unable to explain but that there is no explanation. (4:100)

Albert Perley Brogan (1931–1932) found the relationship between philosophy and science to have less misunderstanding. In "Philosophy and the Problem of Value," he drew this comparison:

> There is no justification for the assertion that philosophy can claim to have knowledge about existence, or reality in this sense, in a way that can be superior to the beliefs of common sense and science. Ultimately, philosophy must take its existential assumptions, as far as it needs them, from the special sciences. There is no royal road to existence. What occurs in the physical, biological, psychological, and social spheres must be determined by the special sciences that deal with these matters. No doubt philosophy must criticize the logic that is used in the sciences, but this criticism cannot give a substitute for the sciences. The categories which seem to give knowledge in the special sciences must have some appearance of validity, and their improvement will come partly from the specialists who are advancing knowledge in the special sciences. What knowledge indicates as the facts of the physical world is found in a laboratory and not in a philosophical library. The philosopher's contribution to this problem can be nothing but the study and valuation of the more or less basic categories and assumptions involved in science and scientific method. (4:120)

In "The Philosopher and His Words," Warner H. Fite (1934–1935) returned to the question of progress first discussed by Lovejoy. Fite began his address comparing philosophy to science:

> If the society to which I have the honor of speaking were a scientific society, the natural topic for a presidential address would be the present situation in the progress of philosophy: a review of the problems solved in the last forty years, a statement of the problems next in order, and a forecast of the future course of the subject. But I doubt whether philosophy is the kind of study to which the idea of progress is applicable. I have seen no problems solved in the last forty years—or in the last twenty-four hundred years. This is not to say, as one is sometimes tempted to say, that in philosophy we are always just where we were before. But whatever be the virtue of philosophy it does not seem to be the practical virtue of progress; philosophy bakes no bread, it likewise solves no problems. (4:281)

Thomas Vernor Smith (1934–1935) took a far more pessimistic perspective about both science and philosophy, particularly with regard to truth, in "'The Tragic Realm of Truth'":

> Intellectual tragedy arises from futile expectation of great things or from trivial fulfillment of great expectation. The first is, in a word, the story of the philosophic quest for truth—futility; the second, the story of the scientific quest—triviality. (4:332)

> Not only will the scientist not piece together his several verified hypotheses into truth, but the philosopher cannot do so. Charmides is doubly answered; not only is there no science of sciences; there is not even an acceptable philosophy of sciences. (4:332–333)

Stephen Coburn Pepper (1935–1936) found no significant difference between science and philosophy. In "The Quest for Ignorance or the Reasonable Limits of Skepticism," he asserted:

> Science involves mathematics and philosophy, and mathematics (perhaps more than it would care to admit) involves science and philosophy, and philosophy involves the other two. Nevertheless, there is a rough separation among them, and certainly a great difference of emphasis. (4:354)

In "Social Ideals and the Law," Edwin Thomas Mitchell (1935–1936) briefly recognized that professional philosophers "have welcomed in recent years the renewal of the ancient alliance between philosophy and the natural

sciences," only to go on "to urge the revival of the equally ancient and honorable alliance between philosophy and the law" (4:389).

Meanwhile, Harvey Gates Townsend (1936–1937) distinguished philosophy from other human enterprises in "On the Possibility of a Better World," saying, "the greatest philosophies are distinguished from the sciences, arts, and religions, by being thus realistic in intention and emphasis. This they cannot escape" (4:436).

Charles William Morris (1936–1937), in his consideration of Charles Sanders Peirce and pragmatism, made mention of the unity of science movement in "Peirce, Mead, and Pragmatism," saying:

> It is true that the logical empiricists have done little with judgments of value or with assessing the cultural implications of science or with the systematization of a cosmology. Here the work of Dewey and [George Herbert] Mead [(1916–1917)] may offer stimulation towards a more exact and systematic formulation of their insights which the newer techniques of analysis make possible. That the unity of science movement . . . will in its development enlarge its considerations to include such matters seems certain. (4:464)

With Morris, George Holland Sabine (1938–1939), in "Logic and Social Studies," further reflected on the unity of science project (4:545–561), while in "Three Windows into Reality," Ralph Tyler Flewelling (1938–1939) compared and contrasted science, philosophy, and religion. He ultimately concluded:

> There is no point therefore to the claim that our opponent has not grasped reality because it doesn't fall in with our own scientific, or philosophic, or religious approach. . . . No one can consistently hold that truths in one realm are at war with truth in another without abrogating his own fundamental thesis. How futile then it is for either philosophy or religion to catch at the coat-tails of passing scientific methods, or for science to deny religious facts because they cannot be measured and weighed, or for religion to anathematize science or philosophy. (4:572)

Curt John Ducasse (1939–1940) returned to the strong contrast between science and philosophy in "Philosophy and Natural Science." He began by stating that the most important philosophical question is the most basic one: What exactly is philosophy as distinguished from other human enterprises?, to which he responded:

> The need to deal with this question much more thoroughly than is customary is forced on our attention today by the glaring contrast between the states of affairs prevailing respectively in philosophy and in the sciences.

> For in the latter, we find a steady progress which has resulted in the accumulation of a vast body of positive knowledge; whereas in philosophy what we find is more babble, confusion, and the fresh re-examination of the same old problems. (4:595)

E. 1941–1950

Charles William Hendel (1940–1941), in "Reflections on the Spirit of Man," found the scientific view of humanity, while inspired, ultimately ignores or excludes "the reality of the spirit," which he argued is better found in the historical sciences, including economics and anthropology as well as history (5:3–4). Recognizing a similar conflict between humanistic philosophy and naturalistic science in "Conviction and Tolerance," Radoslav Andrea Tsanoff (1940–1941) was more optimistic about what science offered:

> So some leading scientific minds today increasingly tend to confront the ultimate issues in scientific theory; they explicitly recognize the philosophical character of their speculation. After several centuries of specialized research and on a higher level of intellectual mastery, the modern mind is once more impelled to its traditional search of cosmic structure. (5:61)

In an exploration of anthropological science, Grace Mead Andrus De Laguna (1941–1942), in "Cultural Relativism and Science," recognized that philosophers other than Platonists were concerned with the relation of knowledge and political power in order to achieve the good. She noted:

> Even those philosophers who, like Bacon, have been most emphatic in the rejection of final causes, have urged, on the one hand, the benefits of science to mankind, and, on the other hand, the need for the establishment of an ideal society in order that science might be successfully carried on. (5:98)

George Perrigo Conger (1944–1945) was quite critical of the state of philosophy of science, specifically its focus strictly on method and not the content of science. In his "Method and Content in Philosophy," Conger struck a contrast with the anti-metaphysical positivism of his day. He argued:

> with all its divergences of methods and contents, philosophy must confront the universe, and never abandon that confrontation, which is our privilege and office. No one else can do that work, no scientist, no religious genius, no artist, no political or economic leader or reformer or organization. At most these can only share, and be welcomed to share the task. Philosophy has to confront the universe, not hide from it, or try to gloss it over, or explain it away, or see it merely through traditional eyes. (5:315)

Victor Fritz Lenzen (1943–1945) drew in part on the historical relationship between science and philosophy, going back to antiquity. In "The Concept of Reality in Physical Theory," he developed an analysis of physical science by first noting:

> scientific constructions have provided problems and points of view for philosophy. . . . In such reflective analysis, which is an integral constituent of scientific creation and distinct from the routine application of concepts in the interpretation of experience, philosophy and science participate in a common task. Furthermore, novel scientific procedures need to be codified by logic. (5:202)

William Ray Dennes (1945–1946) was the first president to discuss the relationship between science and philosophy with regard to race. In "Conflict," he suggested that philosophy is the attempt to resolve conflict through understanding, not violence. Science is contrasted with philosophy in that philosophy seeks to examine the very operant assumptions of scientific activity. To illustrate this point, Dennes recounted:

> In the 1880s and 1890s of the last century, scientifically-minded students of social processes began to urge that the "well-known" intellectual inferiority of Negroes to whites should not merely be asserted but should be carefully measured. As Gunnar Myrdal has remarked, "The history of the measurement of the psychic traits of the American Negro began with attempts to quantify what was already 'known' about him. And usually the scientists found what they were seeking." Now is this an instance of assumptions determining findings which would not be valid except on the assumptions? Is it an instance of the necessity of altering assumptions if men are to secure other findings? Not, I think, for reasonably careful investigators. For we have no grounds for asserting that the students of the decades down to 1920 could not measure as reliably the performance of Negroes as they did the performance of whites in intelligence tests, but instead could only derive their figures from their assumptions. The real fault was the failure to recognize that evidence is needed to support all synthetic propositions; and that such evidence was needed but was largely lacking to support the particular synthetic proposition which asserts, for Negroes *or* for whites, that performance in certain so-called intelligence tests is a simple function of native capacity. The fault lay precisely *in assuming* that this was the case; and the fault would not have been corrected simply by *assuming* that it was not the case. Progress was made, not by veering from one assumption to the other, but by exploring the materials and finding significant cor-

> relations between factors of nurture (as well as of native endowment) and performance in tests. (5:234)

Nevertheless, Dennes argued:

> Conflict develops when partisans neglect logic and science and philosophical distinctions and allow enthusiasm (or inertia) to prompt them to say that qualities or configurations found here and here and here must necessarily be the fundamental (or the really real, or merely the de facto) traits of everything everywhere. (5:242)

William Kelley Wright (1945–1946), in "The End of the Day," made a familiar contrast between philosophy and science. He noted:

> No philosopher should attempt to perform tasks which a scientist can do better than he. The work of the philosopher is more synthetic than analytic. His vocation is to suggest what light scientific discoveries throw upon our relations to one another and to the universe. Any commendable piece of philosophical investigation ought at least to have genuine human significance, and preferably cosmic implications as well. (5:260)

Daniel Sommer Robinson (1943–1944) recognized the significance of the atom bomb, seeking to develop "A Philosophy for the Atomic Age" (5:277–297). He argued that philosophical progress has increasingly become tied to the progress of natural science, in that any philosophy that does not keep up with and avail itself of the advances in natural science becomes obsolete. With the atom bomb, any philosophy that fails to recognize the full metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical implications and considerations is a philosophy doomed to failure.

Despite an early suggestion that idealism and pragmatism were obsolete, Robinson nevertheless aligned strongly with the thought of Alfred North Whitehead (1931–1932) and James as providing the most useful philosophical orientations and tools for navigating the atomic age.

Krusé asked "What Contribution Can Philosophy Make to World Understanding?" In doing so, he related professional philosophy to world affairs and made a telling contrast between philosophy and science:

> A . . . more serious difficulty in philosophy's attempting to meet the request of UNESCO that it "engage upon a world philosophy, a unified and unifying background of thought for the modern world," is the fact that philosophy in its full meaning is so intimate an undertaking that its expression

> seems to be as personal as a work of art. Platonism, Aristotelianism, the philosophy of Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz, and Spinoza, or Bergson, Whitehead, and John Dewey, to mention but a few names in the great roll call of historical masters of philosophy—does not their work in every case bear their peculiar cachet? It is interesting once again to make a comparison with science in order to focus attention upon this more personal characteristic of philosophy. On our program we have given an important place to a consideration of the general characteristics of Ibero-American and North American philosophy. We raised the question, following a popular trend in recent Ibero-American discussions: Is there an Ibero-American—is there a North American philosophy? Whatever the propriety of the titles, could similar questions conceivably even have been proposed for a Congress of Science? It is true that even if the questions expressed in the titles were answered in the affirmative, no one would contend that Ibero-American philosophy had validity for Ibero-Americans only, or that North American philosophy was restricted for North American use. When the question is raised, the real issue is not the restriction of a particular philosophy to regional uses, but rather whether we have come of age after centuries of European tutelage. Have we become philosophically mature enough to initiate ourselves a philosophical tradition? Can we do more than simply appropriate the history of philosophy? Can we also help make it? Are we learners only, or also discoverers and teachers of new philosophical insights, hitherto neglected and unnoticed? Since truth, of whatever nature, has to be discovered by individuals, science, too, has of course discoveries that bear the names of men like Kepler, Galileo, [John] Dalton, Darwin, [Michael] Faraday, and [James Clerk] Maxwell. But even when full allowance is made for this similarity between science and philosophy, one is haunted by the fact that there is a peculiar continuing meaningfulness in British empiricism, and continental rationalism, which seems to go beyond the mere reference to its originators. (5:394–395)

Krusé went on to put the contrast in more concrete terms: "Science without a doubt seems far more sharable, much less colored by local factors than philosophy. On the other hand, science seems to commit a person much less deeply than philosophy" (5:395).

Reichenbach further elucidated the contrast between science and philosophy through his critical analysis of the history of philosophy, especially in the debates between rationalists and empiricists over the status of modern science. In his "Rationalism and Empiricism: An Inquiry into the Roots of Philosophical Error," he jettisoned the historical debate and offered his own novel view:

> What, then, can we do to build up a better philosophy? The study of error should help us to find the truth. Since philosophy is dependent on science, we should make this dependence the conscious condition of our work: we should know that the nature of knowledge can be studied only through analysis of science. The idea of a philosophical theory of knowledge that derives the general outlines of knowledge from the structure of the mind, or from an insight into the nature of being, should forever be abandoned. There is no ontology, no separate realm of philosophical knowledge that precedes science. Theory of knowledge is analysis of science. Philosophy does not contribute any content to knowledge; it merely studies the form of knowledge as exhibited in the work of the scientist and examines all claims to validity. In so doing, the philosopher will know that all he can strive for is a philosophy of the knowledge of his time. (5:429)

The pendulum swung back again with "Metaphysical Vision," given by Schneider. He said:

> I intend to make a distinction between scientific and philosophical knowledge. To make this distinction may seem to be in bad form, coming from an editor of a journal which has long been dedicated to the promotion of scientific philosophy. (5:456)

Addressing the skeptic, who failed to see any cash value in this distinction, Schneider first described any science as "single-eyed or single-minded" by which he meant that there is no "pausing for self-examination" (5:456, 457). Philosophy, Schneider contended, is distinctly different from science:

> For philosophers, unlike scientists, live contentiously, and what they euphemistically call "dialectic" is usually disputation. Their inquiries are not peaceful and cooperative, but rather the occasions where opposites meet, and their "associations" are meetings for exhibiting such oppositions. It is in this environment that at least *modern* metaphysics has chosen to live. It never has both eyes on its own field of inquiry, but always one eye on the other philosopher. It is habitually critical and not merely analytical. It lives by self-criticism, hesitation, evaluation, and complication. To its own particular concern with being it brings the added load of its own history and of human experience in general. Its ambition is not merely to be true but to be empirical as well; not merely to understand how things exist but to report man's experience with existence. Thus it struggles with a double interest in man and in nature. It tries to be scientifically philosophical. Whereas any ordinary philosopher is systematically contentious, the metaphysical philosopher is contentiously systematic, for he insists on putting the whole of

> human experience into scientific form and at the same time putting the whole of science into the form of human experience. (5:458)

This inverse relationship was played up again by Donald Ayres Piatt (1948–1949) in his "Philosophy, Pragmatism, and Human Bondage"; he observed:

> The justification for focusing our attention upon the human situation in terms of the "I" and the "me" is that philosophers have pretty much ignored it to the detriment of philosophy and of human life, and at a time when the fragmentation of human life has become a conscious indictment of philosophy and of scientists and philosophers, such that scientists are tending increasingly to see things in their togetherness while philosophers are tending to see things apart. It is interesting too that in this tendency toward a reversal of roles, the scientist shows little if any regard—in fact, to a large extent complete disregard—for the philosopher, while the philosopher tends increasingly to pride himself on becoming a scientist. (5:469–470)

F. 1951–1960

Nagel, in his "Naturalism Reconsidered," recognized a significant shift among professional philosophers. He observed:

> The past quarter century has been, for philosophy in many parts of the world, a period of acute self-questioning, engendered in no small measure by developments in scientific and logical thought, and in part no doubt by fundamental changes in the social order. . . . there has come about a general loss of confidence in the competence of philosophy to provide by way of a distinctive intellectual method a basic ground-plan of the cosmos, or for that matter to contribute to knowledge of any primary subject-matter except by becoming a specialized positive science and subjecting itself to the discipline of empirical inquiry. Although the abysses of human ignorance are undeniably profound, it has also become apparent that ignorance, like actual knowledge, is of many special and heterogeneous things; and we have come to think . . . that there are a great many things which are already know, or which remain to be discovered, but that there is no one "big thing" which, if known, would make everything else coherent and unlock the mystery of creation. In consequence, many of us have ceased to emulate the great system-builders in the history of philosophy. In partial imitation of the strategy of modern science, and in the hope of achieving responsibly held conclusions about matters concerning which we could acquire genuine competence, we have tended to become specialists in our professional activi-

> ties. We have come to direct our best energies to the resolution of limited problems and puzzles that emerge in the analysis of scientific and ordinary discourse, in the evaluation of claims to knowledge, in the interpretation and validation of ethical and esthetic judgments, and in the assessment of types of human experience. . . . the best minds among us have turned away from the conception of the philosopher as the spectator of all time and existence, and have concentrated on restricted but manageable questions, with almost deliberate unconcern for the bearing of their often minute investigations upon an inclusive view of nature and man. (6:259–260)

Max Harold Fisch (1955–1956) made a further distinction between philosophy and science in his "The Critic of Institutions." He argued that the distinction between philosophy and science is insufficient: one must distinguish first between social and natural science:

> Now, if my conception of philosophy as the critic of institutions is sound, philosophy must stand in a relation to the social sciences very different from that in which it stands to the natural sciences. Philosophy needs the social sciences, and they need it, a great deal more than it needs the natural sciences, or they it. For philosophy, the natural sciences are primarily a set of institutions, institutions of research and teaching, intimately linked with agriculture, engineering, industry, medicine and other technological institutions. Philosophy, as the critic of institutions, is concerned with all of these primarily as objects of value; that is, with reference to the activities to which they give form and direction, and to the value of those activities in the good life as a whole. The objects of the natural sciences themselves are not the philosopher's primary objects. They belong to that side of the nature-institution couplement [*sic*] which concerns him only secondarily. He needs to revise his metaphysics from time to time in the light of general developments in the natural sciences, but he seldom needs a detailed knowledge of their findings. On the other hand, while philosophers of science have doubtless contributed in the past to the understanding the natural scientists have of their own procedures, and have perhaps even contributed some refinements to the procedures themselves, these are now well established and it does not seem probable that in future the natural scientists will greatly need philosophy in their own proper business, though certainly they will need it whenever they attempt to turn science into metaphysics or to erect a metaphysics on the conclusions of science, with an imperfect realization of the institutional character of science, and of the necessity of bringing institutions other than scientific into the metaphysical scheme. (6:337)

In "Talking and Looking," John Herman Randall Jr. (1956–1957) continued to hold a distinction between science and philosophy, arguing:

> For whatever philosophy is, it is clear that it is not . . . "science" or "a science," which must advance by public agreement. Philosophy seems to be at least criticism, which manages to advance by critical disagreement. When once the critics all get together then we really are in a bad way. (6:352)

Schilpp, in "The Abdication of Philosophy," provided a refreshing perspective on the relationship between science and philosophy by comparing their respective involvement in the social issues of the day. Whereas scientists had been becoming ever more reflective and engaged in moral and social questions relating to the consequences of their work, "philosophers have moved [far] from this Socratic ideal" of philosophizing publicly. He lamented:

> My complaint is not to be taken to imply that the philosopher—in having something to contribute to the alleviation of mankind's major contemporary ills—should forsake his field; any more than the scientists ceased to be scientists when they became aware of science's social responsibilities. . . . the philosopher needs to go . . . where the *people* actually live, and where the effect of philosophical contemplation and thinking needs to be made manifest and felt. Are we shrinking from "mingling with such deformity?" Socrates did not! He found the Agora not merely an excellent place to philosophize, but also one where his philosophizing had some visible effects. (6:533)

Schilpp's condemnation of the philosophical practice of the day was very much a clarion call that the work of saving and cultivating civilization that philosophers ought to be doing will be taken up by those less-equipped for the job, the politicians and the natural scientists.

G. 1961–1970

In "Philosophy, Science, and Sense-Perception," Mandelbaum related philosophy and science through a comparison between continental views and Anglo-American analytic ones. He observed:

> a less extreme position is adopted by philosophers of the dominant analytic school in Britain and the United States. Instead of advancing metaphysical and epistemological doctrines which explicitly oppose scientific modes of thought, our philosophers are insistent that the sciences must be allowed

> full freedom and authority. However, boundaries are drawn between science and philosophy, and "No Trespassing" signs are posted: scientists enjoy their authority only so long as they remain on the domain assigned them by philosophers, and other philosophers are warned against poaching on the territories which have been assigned to the sciences. (7:133–134)

Mandelbaum went on to criticize this distinction, particularly with regard to theories of sense perception.

Moody stated the now well-recognized distinction between science and philosophy in "The Age of Analysis." He stated:

> The obvious virtue of defining philosophy as language analysis is that it provides philosophers with a subject matter distinct from those belonging to the special sciences. The subject matter of philosophy is not, as was once thought, the universe, being qua being, God and the soul, or even the good and the bad or the right and the wrong. It is, rather, the language used by those who talk about such matters. This discovery has served to ease some misgivings which we, as professors and presumed experts in something, have had with respect to our calling. We need no longer worry about being in competition with physicists, social scientists, psychologists, or even moralists and theologians, on their own ground. Our job is to talk about the language they use, rather than to use it to talk about their subject matters. Nor is this as much of a surrender of territory as it seems, for although it belongs to them to say what is true about the world and man, it belongs to us to say what their statements mean. So far, so good. (7:228)

Burtt, in "Truth, Understanding, and Philosophy," echoes this contrast between science and analytic philosophy. He argued:

> So philosophy finds itself in a dilemma—to some of us a painful dilemma. Shall we concentrate our powers on detailed questions that are not dealt with by our scientist colleagues but where rigorous standards can be fully respected, or shall we give a major part of our concern to roaming in the wider field that always beckons [viz., where "the ancient ideal of wisdom" still operates], even though we don't know how to measure up to appropriate standards there or even what those standards ought to be? It is not surprising that the former choice strongly attracts, despite the narrow limits to which it confines us. More and more we concentrate on achieving clarity of discrimination and consistency of reasoning in whatever appeals as a topic for analysis, trying to forget the call of any more perplexing responsibility. (7:300–301)

H. 1971–1980

The addresses of the 1970s were very much the consequence of the preceding decades' concerns about the relationship between philosophy and science—especially the dominant analytic philosophical sentiment that there is a strict boundary due to different subject matters. Many of the addresses of this decade said little to nothing about science. Those that did were not concerned about the professional relationship between philosophy and science but were addresses about issues in the philosophy of science. A notable influence in several addresses was the work of Thomas Kuhn. Perhaps befitting the trends of the profession through the 1970s, Rorty's address is worth noting. He returned to discussion the ideas of Dewey and James through his own idiosyncratic pragmatism. On the relation between science and moral philosophy, he asserted:

> For the pragmatists, the pattern of inquiry—scientific as well as moral—is deliberation concerning the relative attractions of various concrete alternatives. The idea that in science or philosophy we can substitute "method" for deliberation between alternative results of speculation is just wishful thinking. (8:656)

In making his observations, Rorty reviewed previous addresses delivered in the early decades of the century. On the question of professionalization of philosophy, Rorty contrasted James's pragmatism to Lovejoy's anti-pragmatism:

> The question of whether philosophy professors should edify agitated our Association in its early decades. James thought they should, and was dubious about the growing professionalization of the discipline. Arthur [Oncken] Lovejoy, the great opponent of pragmatism, saw professionalization as an unmixed blessing. Echoing what was being said simultaneously by Russell in England and by Husserl in Germany, Lovejoy urged the [sixteenth] annual meeting of the APA to aim at making philosophy into a science. He wanted the APA to organize its program into well-structured controversies on sharply defined problems, so that at the end of each convention it would be agreed who had won. Lovejoy insisted that philosophy could either be edifying and visionary *or* could produce objective, verifiable, and clearly communicable truths, but not both. James would have agreed. He, too, thought that one could *not* be both a pragmatist and a professional. James, however, saw professionalization as a failure of nerve rather than as a triumph of rationality. He thought that the activity of making things hang

> together was *not* likely to produce "objective, verifiable, and clearly communicable truths," and that this did not greatly matter. (8:661)
>
> Lovejoy, of course, won this battle. If one shares his conviction that philosophers should be as much like scientists as possible, then one will be pleased at the outcome. If one does not, one will contemplate the APA in its seventy-sixth year mindful of Goethe's maxim that one should be careful what one wishes for when one is young, for one will get it when one is old. Which attitude one takes will depend upon whether one sees the problems we discuss today as permanent problems for human thought, continuous with those discussed by Plato, Kant, and Lovejoy—or as modern attempts to breathe life into dead issues. On the Lovejoyan account, the gap between philosophers and the rest of high culture is of the same sort as the gap between physicists and laymen. The gap is not created by the artificiality of the problems being discussed, but by the development of technical and precise ways of dealing with real problems. If one shares the pragmatists' anti-essentialism, however, one will tend to see the problems about which philosophers are now offering "objective, verifiable, and clearly communicable" solutions as historical relics, left over from the Enlightenment's misguided search for the hidden essences of knowledge and morality. This is the point of view adopted by many of our fellow-intellectuals, who see us philosophy professors as caught in a time-warp, trying to live the Enlightenment over again. (8:662)

I. 1981–1990

Rorty's line of thought was taken up by John Edwin Smith at the start of the next decade (1981). In "The New Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," Smith argued that despite its attempts to be scientific professional philosophy has not come very far:

> The fact remains, however, that for all the talk there has been among philosophers in recent decades about being "scientific" there has been far too little appreciation of the cooperative spirit to be found in the sciences where many inquirers working in concert and sharing results have accomplished what would perhaps elude any single individual. Schopenhauer says somewhere that philosophers invariably claim to be in pursuit of truth, but that it is remarkable how little of it they seem to find in the books of their colleagues. I am not unaware that the analogy between philosophy and the sciences is not exact nor that there is no precise counterpart in philosophical discussion for the experimental procedures in science where

> cooperation and the comparison of results is most evident. Neither am I disregarding the intense intramural discussions that have taken place in recent decades among philosophers who are in agreement about some basic position or way of approach. Too much of this discussion, however, has been insular and has militated against the admittedly difficult but also essential exchange between basically different outlooks and approaches. The unfortunate consequence has been an almost universal failure of anyone to learn from anyone else, or if anyone does, no one will admit it. (9:67–68)

A somewhat contrary view to Smith's came in "On the Problem of Truth in the Sciences" delivered by Joseph John Kockelmans (1986–1987). Kockelmans observed that with regard to truth, philosophers and scientists share a perennial task of re-examination:

> Today many philosophers are, therefore, convinced that the problem of truth in the sciences is a problem that, in principle, is to be discussed time and again. The reason why philosophers must reflect on the meaning and truth of the sciences continually is not only the fact that our world develops constantly, that philosophy itself is equally in a constant development, but also the fact that the sciences themselves develop over time, go through phases of rather drastic changes, and have become one of our most important and influential social institutions. The fact, however, that the problem of truth in science is to be discussed by every generation, does not entail that it is always to be discussed in the same manner and in the same context. On the contrary, in each generation we find the issue raised and discussed from a different perspective, in a different context, with a different concern. (9:450)

In his "Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds," Richard Jacob Bernstein (1988–1989) did not spend much time on the professional relation between science and philosophy. He did, however, continue the pragmatist critique of the profession initiated by Rorty when he offered his own pragmatist philosophical perspective, informed by the classical pragmatists. For Bernstein, these pragmatists:

> all resisted scientism—the conviction that science and science alone is the standard for determining what counts as legitimate knowledge and for determining what is "real"—they were equally strong in their conviction that any responsible philosophic reflection must be responsive to scientific developments and practices (9:603).

This scientism was a dominant characteristic of much of Anglo-American analytic philosophy at the time, making Bernstein's seemingly historical remark a distinct criticism of the profession.

J. 1991–2000

Goldman began his "Empathy, Mind, and Morals" with a historical observation on the relation between science and philosophy. He said:

> Early Greek philosophers doubled as natural scientists; that is a commonplace. It is equally true, though less often remarked, that numerous historical philosophers doubled as cognitive scientists. They constructed models of mental faculties in much the spirit of modern cognitive science, for which they are widely cited as precursors in the cognitive science literature. Today, of course, there is more emphasis on experiment, and greater division of labor. Philosophers focus on theory, foundations, and methodology, while cognitive scientists are absorbed by experimental techniques and findings. Nonetheless, there are sound reasons for massive communication between philosophy and cognitive science, which happily proceeds apace. (10:79)

Cavell, in his "Something Out of the Ordinary," aimed at elucidating the role of experience in philosophy. In his review of the role of experience in his philosophical predecessors, beginning with Nietzsche and Dewey and continuing up to Willard Van Orman Quine (1957–1958), Cavell described the apparent orthodoxy of the day, with regard to philosophy and science.

> May we think as follows? If philosophy of science can be taken to be what philosophy is, that is because philosophy is, and is content to be, recognizable, or practicable, as (a chapter of) science; whereas were philosophy of art to make of itself a chapter of one or more of the arts, it would no longer be recognizable as philosophy. (10:440)

In "A Century of Deflation and a Moment about Self-Knowledge," Charles Tyler Burge (1998–1999) was critical of the state of philosophy, both historically and in the present day—noting the hubris and absurdity of both. He contended:

> The evolution of science has shown that philosophy can no longer see itself as the ultimate synthesis of everything. . . . The rise of psychoanalysis and neuroscience—and to go more basic, the advent of methods of mass destruction and a series of regimes bent on genocide—have made it hard to see human beings as special in anyway worth extolling. . . . they are capable of special

> evil . . . . Unlike the animals, humans can be shallow, calculating monsters of serial betrayal and destructiveness. But these are not recent discoveries.
>
> Philosophy is not the queen of the sciences. But it need not act as a docile slave. Philosophy *can* do science at a specially abstract level, and it can function as midwife. But it does too many things to fit in those boxes. Philosophy opens lines of inquiry, and occasionally provides knowledge, that no other subject is on to. Some of this knowledge is not, and never will be, systematized in any science. Some of it is an instance of part of what is special and valuable about human beings. A central task of philosophy is to articulate this specialness in ways that avoid the inflations of the past while firmly retaining a perspective on the wonder of humankind and its values, intellectual capacities, and institutions. (10:607)

3. Conclusion

Philosophy has been on the ropes from the start. Socrates's defense was not just a defense for his life but his way of life—of the philosophical life. Philosophy, despite the utter lack of consensus about what it is, has historically challenged and been challenged by the status quo. From the Sophists through the Church to scientists (especially physicists) today, philosophers have spent considerable effort in distinguishing themselves from the rest and defending the distinction. In the twentieth century, American philosophy grew up with pragmatism, rejected its social and moral concerns for a while, and then reconsidered their philosophical import.

This reconsideration has been ongoing, particularly with regard to the relationship, conceptually and professionally, between science and philosophy. Undoubtedly, of course, Rorty's influence cannot be overestimated.[3] His voice in favor of a conversational style of philosophy was not the only voice that spoke against scientists who claim that philosophy is no longer worthwhile now that we have science. Of the ongoing chorus, there were also those who value a species of pragmatism different from Rorty's, those who maintain a science-friendly but non-scientistic naturalism, and those who value Plato's continuing influence.[4] The anxiety of much of the addresses of The APA in the twentieth century may not be the only characteristic of the profession during this time, but such anxiety is also indicative of any philosophical enterprise aware of its time and place.

Notes

1. See Laura J. Snyder, *The Philosophical Breakfast Club* (New York: Broadway Books, 2011).

2. These works are typically focused on the philosophy of science or its history, especially at the mid-century with the development of the Unity of Science movement and the Cold War. See John McCumber, *Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001); Don A. Howard, Two Left Turns Make a Right: On the Curious Political Career of North American Philosophy of Science at Mid-Century, in *Logical Empiricism in North America*, eds. Alan Richardson and Gary Hardcastle (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), pp. 25–93; and George A. Reisch, *How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

3. Rorty's criticism and lasting effect on the profession cannot be underestimated; see Neil Gross, *Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

4. See my Neuropragmatism on the Origins of Conscious Minding, in *Origins of Mind in Nature*, ed. L. S. Swan (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), pp. 273–286, 287n1; Massimo Pigliucci, "The Borderlands between Science and Philosophy: An Introduction," *Quarterly Review of Biology* 83 (2008): 7–15; and Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, *Plato at the Googleplex: Why Philosophy Won't Go Away* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2014).

CONTINENTAL THOUGHT AS SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, 1901–1920

Cynthia Gayman

1. Introduction

A few years past mid-point of the last century, in "Talking and Looking," John Herman Randall Jr. (1956–1957) spoke with some urgency to his constituency at the annual meeting of the Eastern Division of The American Philosophical Association (The APA) about a serious problem besetting the profession, a *caecitas philosophica* (philosophical blindness) resulting from the previous decade's "growing spirit of narrow sectarianism" (6:348). This followed the growing popularity in the United States of a distinctive method of philosophy known as "Oxford analysis," which grew out of the combined influences of the Vienna Circle and logical positivism, both of which, in Randall's words, "brought to this country the narrow sectarianism of the warring German schools" (6:349).

While advocates of the earlier movements in linguistic analysis defended themselves in skirmishes on the philosophical battlefield by dismissing opponents' concepts as "meaningless," Randall remarked, "with far greater suavity than the Viennese, the Oxford dons did not brush off what failed to interest them as 'meaningless.' It was just not 'doing philosophy,' that was all" (6:349). Defining the field by delimiting its subject matter and method would fundamentally alter the discipline itself, as Randall foresaw:

> The next step, of course, was to insist not only that an interest in science or in history is not "philosophical," though only slightly discreditable: it was to claim such interests to be actually harmful to the philosopher, destroying the purity of his method. To "do" philosophy adequately you must not "do" anything else. (6:349–350)

Forty years later, David West described how the turn toward pure method followed its own logic to become predominant within academic philosophy:

> Since philosophy is neither a branch of logic or mathematics nor a natural science comparable to physics or biology, it must restrict itself austerely to the careful analysis of concepts. The only scientifically respectable philosophy is henceforth analytical. According to the "linguistic turn" taken by twentieth-century philosophers more generally, this task is then interpreted as involving first and foremost the analysis of language. Michael Dummett's statement is representative: "the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the

> structure of *thought*" and "the only proper method for analyzing thought consists in the analysis of *language*."[1]

The post-war attraction for a "purified" discipline may eventually require analysis beyond the scope of philosophy; but by the early 1960s, this style of philosophy was increasingly preferred—to the point of nearly exclusive domination of the discipline despite countervailing voices. Randall's was not the only protesting voice; other twentieth-century presidents of The APA denounced the narrowing of philosophical interests and lamented the rejection of historical context and human experience. Indeed, their work and research interests remained broadly speculative—an approach to philosophy that include schools of thought linking historical trajectories to contemporary issues, which included the pragmatists, idealists, personalists, ethicists, religious philosophers, process philosophers, and those whose work is the focus here, those of the continental tradition.

Randall urged his American peers in philosophy to study the work of Martin Heidegger, suggesting, "there is actually a great deal from which American philosophers could learn in the phenomenological method and its applications, which dominates continental reflection" (6:350). However, even at mid-century, this appeal to a broader philosophical purview was, to some degree, a cry in the academic wilderness.

The task of the present chapter is to examine the presidential addresses that fall within the framework of continental philosophy throughout the course of the first two decades of the twentieth century. This was not as straightforward a task at it might seem. Continental philosophy neither follows as pure a trajectory of method, nor presupposes a set of shared ideas or principles. Therefore, as a category, it is necessarily broad. Historically speaking, and as noted by Simon Critchley, "continental philosophy is the name for a two-hundred year period in the history of philosophy that begins with the publication of Kant's critical philosophy in the 1780s."[2] Or, more specifically dialectical, in the words of David West, "the genealogy of continental philosophy can, then, be traced to Hegelian and associated responses to Kant."[3] Continental philosophy includes a diversity of thinkers such as:

> Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Arendt, Sartre, Beauvoir, Gadamer, Adorno, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Kristeva, Irigaray, and Badiou. It involves philosophical approaches that include Hegelian idealism, Marxism, the "critical theory" of the Frankfurt School and Habermas, existentialism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, structuralism, poststructuralism postmodernism and some forms of feminism. . . . there is no single, homogeneous continental tradition. . . . rather, there is a

> variety of more or less closely related currents of thought [and] thinkers who in one way or another, work in an identifiable continental mode.[4]

This description is apt with respect to The APA presidents whose addresses are exemplary of a contextualist, historicist, and critical approach to the problems and inquiries related to the life-world, i.e., the world of specifically human experience. However, some interpretive leeway must be taken with respect to consideration of presidential addresses that might justifiably be included within the framework of continental philosophy, particularly since the very term "continental philosophy" is a relatively recent designation, which, in West's words, "began life as a category of exclusion."[5]

Continental philosophy, as a specific subject matter of philosophy courses, did not even exist prior to the 1970s.[6] This reflects the "narrow sectarianism" noted by Randall two decades earlier. West writes, "as recently as the 1970s a course in philosophy that failed to mention Hegel or Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger or Sartre, was not considered in the least deficient."[7] Marginalized but never altogether absent, these thinkers and the trajectories of thought from which they arose and to which they responded could never be erased—for they are bound to the entire history of the Western tradition in philosophy.

Continental themes and thinkers can be identified throughout the twentieth century because continental philosophy is "always already"—a continuation of conversations that, since Plato, have been variously and contentiously concerned with matters of existence, the social world, politics, transcendence, finitude, and the examined life. As Randall had so clearly seen in 1956, blindness to these matters put the relevance of particular inquiries at risk in the twentieth century—especially within the academy. At issue was whether it was any longer the task of philosophy to engage itself with problems of life. Randall bluntly stated, "to make any fresh discoveries or find any new perspectives, I am afraid this cult of 'ordinary language' will never do" (6:357).

The stakes were high and, as it turns out, the perennial questions continued to be asked. The predominance of analytic philosophy in many American institutions of higher learning in the twentieth century is well documented. Today, there is significant resurgence of philosophical pluralism and, in some arenas, a speculative approach to inquiry. However, the previous century of presidential addresses illustrates that, while the domination of philosophy by the "Oxford dons" is an inarguable historical fact, it was never absolute.

2. 1901–1910

During the first decade of the twentieth century, philosophical orientations of The APA presidents were an admixture of influences—from Classical Greek

philosophy to Kant, Hegel, and Darwin, to logical positivism, and to various hybrid strains of American thought, including idealism, personalism, radical empiricism, and pragmatism—with pragmatism being especially strong, holding both academic and popular appeal.

Frank Thilly (1900–1901; 1901–1902; 1912–1913), gave the innaugural address entitled, "The Theory of Interaction," which elucidated a theory of interaction that he characterized as "really the common-sense theory . . . that states of consciousness are causes of changes in the physical world, and physical occurrences the causes of changes in consciousness" (1:3), in contrast to the more widely accepted theory of "parallelism," a positivist theory based on logical principles and causal laws (1:3). Both views were vigorously argued among German philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, but parallelism was held to have a more legitimately scientific basis, at least according to:

> leading authorities, men like [Friedrich Albert] Lange, Wundt, [Aois] Riehlm, [Alexander] Bain, [Harald] Höffding, [Friedrich] Paulsen, [Hugo] Münsterberg [(1908–1909)], and [Friedrich] Jodl [who] accuse their opponents of contradicting the fundamental principles of natural science. (1:3)

The antagonism between interactionism and parallelism resides in competing explanations of the relation of consciousness to the body, and whether the mind or soul can be the source of bodily effects. From the parallelist perspective, a psychical cause cannot have a physical effect. There can be no causal correlation between the mental and physical realms. Indeed, a physical effect can *only* originate from a physical cause (1:3). However, those siding with the interactionist perspective argue that no such causal parallelism is necessary and that to say so does not entail breaking scientific laws (1:5). The interactionist perspective is what Thilly explained in his address, thus linking aspects of continental idealism with early American pragmatism—specifically, William James (1906–1907). German thinkers who argued for this expanded theory of interaction include Christoph Stigwart, Carl Stumpf, Wilhelm Windelband, Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Rikert, and Hermann Lotze (1:12n2). The parellelist explanation to one of the great problems in the history of philosophy—the mind-body problem—provides a materialist or physicalist answer based on laws of logic and empirical laws of nature. Thilly explained the parallelist view, which states that only a physical cause can produce a physical effect:

> There are cases, of course, in which we cannot discover all the causes and effects and measure them—as in the brain—but we assume that the same relation obtains here as in the cases where this can be done. We say that the external stimulus striking the sense organ produces some form of motion in the brain, and that this cannot be converted into anything else. Hence the sensation cannot be the product of the excitation in the brain; to

> say so would mean a break in the physical causal nexus and a violation of the law mentioned above. The same reasoning prevents us from assuming that a psychical state produces a physical effect. (1:5)

Since it could be argued that contemporary elaborations of the mind-body problem—or the mind-brain problem—continue to be dominated by versions of parallelism and buttressed by recent theories in evolutionary biology, psychology, neuroanatomy, and neuroanthropology, Thilly's address remains provocative today. The reduction of culture, history, geography, social structures, and reflection on these matters—in a word, experience (in the broadest, thickest sense)—to biological materiality is nothing new. Responses to those who disagree with this view have not changed much either, it would seem, since, as Thilly asserted, adherents of parallelism "accuse their opponents of contradicting the fundamental principles of natural science" (1:3).

Thilly argued that this accusation is based on a misunderstanding of scientific principles as inherently logical, when, in fact, "the notion of causality does not demand that the effect be identical with the cause"(1:8) and, therefore, there "is no reason on this score why a physical effect should always have a physical cause" (1:8).

Further, nothing in experience shows that a "physical occurrence can take place without being caused by another physical occurrence" (1:9). Thus, "under these circumstances, nothing can hinder us from assuming that states of consciousness are the causes of movements" (1:10). Thilly argued that unless some "firmly established law" contradicted observation, "we have no right to doubt what seems to be an observed fact, and he opposed the parallelist view that such observations contradicted any known law (1:10).

Thilly's argument does not simply aim to call the parallelist's view of causal agency into question; he argued that to the extent that both the older theory of interactionism and the newer theory of parallelism argue from a straightforward theory of cause and effect, perhaps both simplify too much:

> The old-fashioned thinker reasoned by analogy that, because his consciousness caused movements, consciousness was the sole cause of movements in the world. The new-fashioned thinker reasons by analogy that, because physical changes cause movements in the inorganic world, physical changes must be the sole causes of movements in the organic world. (1:12)

As an alternative, Thilly examined a more recent and complex version of causality with respect to the theory of interaction, one that supports the idea that it is not scientifically contradictory to support the view that physical changes can and do occur from mental catalysts. This is not to say, "a state of consciousness cre-

ates a state of movement, or that a movement creates a state of consciousness" (1:11). Thilly's is an argument for a notion of causality that is not unidirectional, but interactive, suggesting, "the state of consciousness is not a cause in the sense of producing or creating anything out of itself" (1:11). It should be understood as "a cause in the sense of being an element without which another element called a physical occurrence cannot take place" (1:11).

In this first presidential address of the twentieth century can be found elements of pluralism and the role of intentionality in consciousness. Thilly's second address, "The Theory of Induction," dealt with whether the inductive process for deriving "a general statement from a particular statement or facts" is justifiable (1:17). He insinuated an incipient phenomenology, emphasizing the role of experience and perspective as they inform expectation:

> Our feeling of expectation here may be called a postulate of thought, and it becomes the psychological ground of our inductive inference. That is, there is no reason for *inferring* that a particular co-existence or sequence of qualities will recur except the *expectation* that it will recur. (1:24)

The third presidential address of the twentieth century also deserves brief mention, since James Edwin Creighton's (1901–1902) "The Purposes of a Philosophical Association" emphasized both the historical and social elements of philosophical discourse among philosophers of the present, in light of the past.

Remarking, "in recent years it has been a frequent reproach that the study of philosophy has reduced itself largely to a study of the history of philosophy" (1:31), Creighton suggested that historical investigation "makes possible a more adequate comprehension of the genesis and meaning of our own problems" (1:31). Contemporary problems must be addressed philosophically—this is precisely the business of philosophers, more than their responsibilities as teachers or administrators, according to Creighton, who remarked:

> it seems to me, then, that it will be an advantage in every way for the members of this Association to forget . . . their profession during the days of meeting, and to come together simply as human beings interested in philosophical investigation and scholarship. (1:38)

He suggested, "it does not seem too much to say that philosophy does not enjoy the general recognition, even among educated men, that is accorded to many of the other sciences" (1:38); still, "philosophy must bake some bread; it must, like the other sciences, minister to human life" (1:39).

Creighton's speculative philosophical leanings made him a thoroughgoing pluralist and inter-disciplinarian, who called for philosophical association with the American Psychological Association, not for scientific reasons, but because:

> philosophy, to be philosophy at all, has to humanize its facts, that is, to look at them from the standpoint of complete and self-conscious human experience, for it is only from this standpoint that a meaning for them can be found. (1:41)

Although academic disciplines were increasingly to define their own distinct and disparate boundaries in the decades following, some, like Creighton, criticized the parsing of intellectual life. Creighton chided his peers to bring philosophy back to its Platonic roots in dialectical and critical questioning (1:34). It is this kind of questioning that lies at the heart of continental philosophy.

Alexander Thomas Ormond (1902–1903), whose "External Point of View Philosophy and its Correlations" argued for the return of relevancy of philosophy to concrete problems and goals, given, "the philosophizing intellect too often yields to the temptation of over-subtlety in its conceptions and distinctions, as well as to over-abstractness in its data and ultimate aims" (1:47). Very early in the twentieth century, the tension between abstraction and lived experience was apparent.

Ormond's specific concern was that the reach of epistemological skepticism extended to skepticism about the value of philosophy itself. Asking, "*how shall philosophy vindicate itself against the scepticism with which its claims are liable in our time to be met?*" (1:48), he responded, "by defining some point of view that is clearly philosophical, so that the complete occupation of this point of view will have the effect of translating an inquiry into one that is distinctly philosophical" (1:48). In other words, Ormond argued for what might be called a radical perspectivism—or, that to which he referred as "the point of view of an investigator who approaches his world *intra-consciously*, as opposed to *extra-consciously*" (1:49), thus effecting a "Copernican revolution which Kant brought about" of consciousness (1:50). The aim of this shift in consciousness "will not be to define the mental in physical symbols, but rather to construe the physical and every other aspect of our world in terms of its significance for mind" (1:50).

Ormond was also after something more radical, something he saw as originating in Plato:

> that a construction of things, in order to be truly entitled to the name philosophical, must take its departure from mind itself and must follow the processes in which mind reduces its world to terms of its own experience. (1:50)

The method by which inquiry proceeds is, in effect, already "affected by the point of view from which the investigation sets out" (1:50). To be aware of this aim of consciousness takes effort and exertion of will. What Ormond proposed

is a synthesis between the Platonic insight of consciousness *as idea* and the Schopenhauerian insight that consciousness *is will*. Ormond proposed:

> I propose here to claim for philosophy the right to avoid partisanship by seeking a synthesis that will be just to both the ancient and modern insights. While it is no doubt true that idea without will is powerless, and will without idea is blind, yet if we include the two terms in a polar synthesis we thus arrive at the notion of the idea as informed with motor energy; or, approaching it from the opposite pole, we arrive at the notion of will or motor energy as informed with ideal insight. Let us then apply to this ideodynamic conception the name "reason"; we will have in reason, which from one point of view is will, while from another it is idea, the central pulse of the inner being of the world. (1:51)

Here Ormond seems to have been arguing for some kind of gestalt as recognition of experience. He called this "reasonableness," although not in view of some shared objective standard of rationality, but like "the test of beauty," something that will be felt in its immediacy, "in our reaction as a whole upon our world or upon our conception of the world" (1:53). Contrasting this with the view of science, for which the world becomes object, Ormond suggested that in philosophy, "the world of the subject looms up and supplies the concepts and analogies that are essential to the philosophical interpretation of the world" (1:53). He sought a "dialectical" approach to philosophy, which embraces both objective reality and the will to seek answers to questions deeply meaningful to human experience—questions Ormond described as being of value to our lives and conduct, and that complete "our ideals of being and of truth and duty, and in making up our minds about freedom, God, and immortality" (1:57). The aim of "knowledge," which is "the whole insight we seek into the meaning of our world" (1:55) must "involve the methods and results of both the scientific and the philosophical investigations" (1:55).

Rejecting the necessity of setting limits to what can be experienced, or reducing knowledge to objective facts, Ormond aimed to return philosophy to its aim of seeking wisdom, which he saw as an endeavor that is subjective, perspectival, and limited—but one that should not be preemptively delimited. The point is that what is known cannot be severed from what is perceived to be meaningful, and meaning itself cannot be reduced merely to utilitarian benefit, for there are also "supra-utilitarian" needs, such as the aesthetic or religious or the ethical—or the desire for "unity in the fragmentariness of our ordinary life" (1:56). What human beings "will to know" makes all the difference in what inquiries will be conducted. Ormond stated, "we will say, then, that while philosophy bakes no bread, it does, in connection with religion and art and science, promote

an ideal of living that makes it very much more worthwhile that bread should be baked" (1:56).

Frederick James Eugene Woodbridge (1902–1903; 1911–1912) presented a sustained critique of Hegel in "The Problem of Metaphysics." He asserted, "the history of philosophy has, in the main, been dominated by two ideas, those of evolution and classification" (1:61). In the realm of knowledge, Woodbridge rejected the model of evolution, although ultimately, his aim was to merge the insights and method of science with those of metaphysics. Rejecting philosophical dualisms, such as the split between "appearance and reality, and the subjective and the objective" (1:62), Woodbridge also rejected the Hegelian dialectical move to transcend these distinctions. Knowledge accumulates but not necessarily progressively—for Woodbridge, no evolution of thought leads toward eventual union with an ideal real. He said:

> recognition of these things is bringing us freedom, so that we no longer find it necessary to regard our work as merely the next evolution out of the unfolding process, or to classify ourselves under some department of the traditional scheme. (1:62)

In Woodbridge's view, the Hegelian dialectic of progress, no less than traditional metaphysics, infers a structure of reality absolutely removed from the phenomenal world, thus seeming "to render reality, as Professor James is fond of pointing out . . . implicitly or explicitly an accomplished fact at one stroke" (1:62). In this single stroke, violence is done to the possibility of novelty or variability within the world of experience, and this "has resulted in our stultification rather than in our enlightenment" (1:62).

Woodbridge parsed the distinctions between scientific inquiry and metaphysics, suggesting that they involve different tasks and different problems, saying, "science asks for the laws of existence and discovers them by experiment. Metaphysics asks for the nature of reality and discovers it by definition" (1:63). If metaphysics is most properly the arena of philosophy, it must be understood differently if it is to be of benefit to scientific inquiry. What Woodbridge meant by metaphysics is not the inference of reality in an ultimate or abstract sense, but rather that which exists on a continuum of "speculative validity" (1:65). Here, there is a "practical import" for any conjecture made about the real, which "validates the purposeful life of man" (1:65). This idea of metaphysics being relevant to lived experience "makes human history worth the reading" (1:65).

In other words, in contrast to Kant's view, "knowledge [is] a regulative and constitutive synthesis in time and space, in the categories, in apperception, and in reason" (1:65). Woodbridge's view suggests that how we experience life is somehow constitutive with how we think about reality. In his words, "if

things-in-themselves will submit to such a synthesis, they cannot be so shut out from our experience as Kant would make them" (1:65). He concluded, therefore, "the absolute separation of knowledge from its object can have, therefore, no metaphysical significance" (1:66).

The move Woodbridge made is ontological. "Whatever may be the nature of reality, it is, in a measure at least, held together in a degree of continuity by the knowing process, and to that extent definitively characterized" (1:66). While this continuity discloses relations between things, thereby giving ontological significance to the general determination of how reality is defined, the knowing process can hardly be said to be continuous, precisely because knowledge "breaks forth into action" (1:66). Reality, then, "admits of numberless changes and transformations" (1:66). He continued, "reality thus not only allows knowledge to synthesize it, but it allows those transformations within it which such knowledge makes possible" (1:66).

What is reality? This classical metaphysical question sets the site of knowledge beyond human experience, but Woodbridge argued that every attempt to answer that question actually informs what reality *is*. Thus, a "positive result" of Woodbridge's thesis is, "reality cannot be defined intelligibly as a system absolutely external to the one who formulates it, nor a system in which the one who formulates it is a mere incident, or of which he is a mere product" (1:66).

In refusing an objectivist and dualistic metaphysics, Woodbridge bypassed solipsism. He said, "reality absolutely external to the metaphysician will give him nothing besides himself" (1:67). Instead, it is the plurality of viewpoints operative as "independent principle" that allow reality to yield itself intelligibly and meaningfully. He argued:

> we should give to this epistemological principle its metaphysical significance, and recognize that the definition of reality involves numberless points of departure from which reality may be grasped, and that each of these points, in its relation to what is thereby defined, is an absolute and undivided individual. (1:67)

In a very real sense, then, reality appears only because individuals engage it:

> Thus we may claim that the problem of metaphysics is fundamentally the problem of individuality, the definition of reality is primarily the definition of the individual. But individuality cannot be defined away or argued out of existence. (1:69)

Transience, growth, and change are fundamental aspects of reality because "all individuals must enter into the determination of the character as a whole"

(1:70)—this is the determining factor in the continuum of reality and is constitutive of its continuity. Continuity is not static, but "progressive, cumulative, purposeful" (1:70). Purposeful life does not lie beyond the phenomenal world; everything hinges on the individual—or, more precisely, on the activity of individuals engaged in knowing:

> if knowledge . . . is a real connection between the elements of reality, and if we are entitled, therefore, to regard knowledge as in any sense the dominating character of the continuum, we may conclude that the individuals who can know are the essentially determining factors. (1:71)

The schema presented by Woodbridge suggests, perhaps, an incipient existentialist metaphysics, whereby reality becomes manifest and meaningful through individual perception and action. There is also a strong pragmatist sensibility here. As Woodbridge put it, "we may ascribe what a priori powers we like to knowledge; but these powers would never receive an atom of significance in experience, if reality did not call them out and fit into them" (1:73). This does not make the rational the real or vice versa, but it does push the Hegelian dialectic into experience in ways that suggests that change, continuity, potentiality, growth, and individuality are metaphysical components of experience made real; for they are, as Woodbridge put it, "the ultimate determinations of the constitution of reality" (1:73).

In "The Obsolescence of the Eternal," Arthur (Schauffler) Oncken Lovejoy (1908–1909; 1916–1917) reviewed the claim, as asserted by J. M. E. McTaggart, for example, "there may be something wrong in our conception of time . . . which renders it unfit, in metaphysics, for the ultimate explanation of the universe, however suited it may be to the finite thought of every-day life"[8] (1:299). Lovejoy asserted:

> Against the evolutional, in short, neo-Kantian idealist metaphysics has usually set the eternal; and it has declared that, although doubtless in some manner both evolution and eternity subsist, the latter is the overriding, ultimate, and truly explanatory notion. (1:299)

In Lovejoy's philosophical corner are the pragmatists, especially John Dewey (1905–1906) and James, but here, too, are portents of continental themes such as an emphasis on time-consciousness.

Lovejoy noted that the theory of evolution came late to the minds of scientists; a century earlier and culminating with Hegel, it was philosophers who did the most to prepare the ground "for a general evolutional way of thinking, especially with relation to man and human society" (1:298). However, superficial

similarities are outweighed by differences between the biological view of evolution and the idealist theory of Hegel and his predecessors. These differences result in an "opposition" that necessitates a "rational adjustment" in thinking about change and progress within the social world (1:298). Lovejoy set the scene for his remarks with the following:

> For the evolutionist in natural science, in the social sciences, in ethics, is concerned with the temporal genesis and growth of things, with a process of Becoming by which new items of reality emerge into existence and the total content of reality is modified or augmented. But the philosophy of both Kant and Hegel implies that the temporal aspect of things is a superficial and in some sense "unreal" one, that even moral and intellectual progress belong to the world of appearance rather than that of genuine reality, and that, in spite of the utility of genetic or evolutional ways of thinking in the abstract realms of the special sciences, they have no pertinency to the ultimate problems, which must be solved by the use of conceptions of quite another type. (1:298)

The question Lovejoy asked was whether belief in the idea (and ideal) of a genuine and eternal reality is compatible with the actuality of evolutionary processes in this, the transitory world.

Evolution itself entails "a process of real temporal Becoming" (1:299), which leads to adaptation and change, as well as emergent coming-into-being of new life and the appearance of new creatures. The very idea of evolution would seem to be antithetical to the Hegelian dialectical progression toward the Absolute—Being as Eternal, having the characteristic of changelessness and timelessness, "being that is without change in itself or in any of its relations" (1:299).

Lovejoy examined the "'supratemporal' realities of the eternalistic idealists," who:

> wished to supplement Becoming by one or many eternals, or to include time *in* eternity. They . . . supposed it possible . . . to find in the consideration of the timeless either theoretical explanations or practical guidance, consolation, or incitement, relevant to the life in time. (1:299–300)

His aim was not the establishment of permanency or "truth," but "only to consider whether real evolution and real eternity can be congruous in the realm of concrete existences" (1:300). Should empirical science influence philosophy?

Lovejoy made his own position clear when he suggested that inferring from the idea of eternity a "scheme of relations constituting the Dialectic" is to acquiesce to a sense of futility regarding individual action and effort (1:305).

This view is, in fact, Hegel's, whom Lovejoy quoted: "all dissatisfaction with the existing state of the universe, and all efforts to reform it, are futile and vain—since reason is already and always the sole reality" (1:305). In Lovejoy's words, this means, "the notion of the eternal perfection or rationality of reality is, in its practical implications, equivalent to fatalism" (1:305).

If reality is at such far remove from the world as we live it and know it, how does this affect how we think of life? Eternality:

> can retain its proper character only by having nothing whatever to do with the empirical; it belongs apart, in a completely "separated," Platonic sort of world, and it cannot remain what it purports to be save by everlastingly keeping there. (1:308)

There is no intelligible way to conjoin the absolute and eternal with the contingent and temporal in "a single human person or a single Absolute Mind" (1:308). Neither can be an aspect of the other, since both would be denied, and to resolve the problem by suggesting that empirical existence is only an "appearance" of the eternal is to deny everyday life its meaning, although Lovejoy suggests this to be "the eternalist's only ultimate way to escape from palpable self-contradiction" (1:308). An existence known to be at irremediable distance from what is true and real and eternal is thus in some fundamental sense absurd, if not altogether meaningless.

Even if time pushes ordinary existence evolutionarily toward an ultimate moment when both time and existence reach their end in absolute reason, the world will "purchase that moment at the price of total and immediate extinction" (1:310). Lovejoy concluded:

> The eternal is, then, I think, the characteristic but not necessarily incorrigible distemper of adolescent metaphysics. So long as the belief in it has prevailed, it has produced in philosophy logical irresponsibility, an unwholesome sort of otherworldliness, and an intellectual priggishness based upon the idea that the philosopher was dealing with a finer, higher, more elegant class of realities than those with which the common man or the scientist were concerned. (1:311)

It is not metaphysics that must be abandoned, but its focus should be on "eternals and immutables" (1:311). What is required, argued Lovejoy, is turning "whole-heartedly to understand the world temporally and evolutionally—*sub species generationis* [in the form of generation], in Professor Dewey's phrase" (1:311). Philosophy must learn to "take the time-process seriously" (1:311), which would entail "hard dialectical work"—including recognizing "the limits

of the reach of dialectic" and a complete reconstruction of epistemological and ontological commitments and suppositions (1:311).

Lovejoy ended his address with a quotation from Schiller: "it is only in the direction of an abandonment of the prejudice against the reality of time that I can descry a future for hope, a future for philosophy, and a philosophy for the future" (1:312).

3. 1911–1920

The second decade of APA presidents had several strongly quasi- or pre-continentalists with pragmatist leanings. Both Charles Montague Bakewell (1910–1911), in "The Problem of Transcendence," and Evander Bradley McGilvary (1910–1911; 1913–1914), in "The 'Fringe' of William James's Psychology: The Basis of Logic" unearthed the Hegelian roots of their philosophical commitments and turn toward James's radical pluralism. Woodbridge returned for another term, again wrestling with evolution against the objective idealist framework in "Evolution." Addison Webster Moore (1911–1912; 1917–1918), in "Bergson and Pragmatism," agreed that there may be some points of "alliance" between the philosopher of creativity and evolutionism and the pragmaticist instrumentalists, although Moore ultimately rejected Bergsonian transcendental dualism in favor of Jamesian pluralism.

Thilly's third address, "Romanticism and Rationalism," recalled that while "modern philosophy began with an enthusiastic faith in the powers of human reason to reach the truth" (2:77), some saw exclusive emphasis on intellection as a danger to human value. Those philosophers saw this shift in thinking, brought about in the modern era and arrived at at the expense of the Aristotelian notion of human purpose and flourishing, as giving rise to the dualist schemas of Malebranche and Berkeley and the idealist pluralism of Leibniz (2:78).

Faith in reason becomes meaningless to the degree reason is tied to the laws of logic in an increasingly mechanized universe (2:78). Yet it was Hume's attack on the reach of reason that prompted a counter-revolution in modern thought—against which "Kant offered a new compromise" (2:78). The Kantian reconceptualization of the role of reason, said Thilly, "would save everything worth saving: rational knowledge, modern science, the basal truths of the old metaphysics, and the most precious human values" (2:78).

Kant bowed to the skeptics in agreeing that mathematics and the sciences cannot reveal to us the true nature of things but instead only show that which is phenomenally apparent. At the same time, he introduced the possibility of transcendent understanding through practical reasoning leading back to the "things themselves" on the moral plane. By Thilly's assessment, Kant destroyed the possibility of gaining absolute, objective knowledge about the world only "to make room for a rational faith in a supersensible world" (2:79). Acknowledging

that science cannot reveal ultimate truths, Kant's metaphysics sidestepped empiricism to argue for "another, deeper source of truth in the practical reason," freeing the human conscience "from the mechanism of nature" (2:79):

> It was Kant's solution of the controversy between the head and the heart that provided an escape from the causal bugbear and made the "new" philosophy spread like wild-fire, winning for its modest author the proud title which he had claimed for himself as "the reformer of philosophy." (2:80)

Via Kant, romantics Fichte and Schelling found freedom from "the terrors of the objective world" (2:80), in Schelling's words, although neither were satisfied with the Kantian resolution making thinking the font of freedom. Instead, they sought perceptual liberation through the power of the will, oriented by yearning to see the thing-itself face to face (2:80). Thilly stated:

> no romanticist of our own day can be more emphatic than [Fichte and Schelling] in accusing the discursive understanding of deadening and mechanizing life and everything that comes within the sphere of its paralyzing influence. (2:81)

> These romantic teachings are symptoms of dissatisfaction with the methods and results of our rationalistic science and philosophy . . . manifesting itself everywhere in modern life. We are dissatisfied; economically, politically, socially, morally, religiously, and intellectually dissatisfied; and our philosophies are mirroring the turmoil of our souls. (2:82)

This tension in the early twentieth century, as described by Thilly, continues into the twenty-first century, although without the elixir of romanticist hope, as the most recent evolutionary-biological accounts of human doing and being seem to minimize the value of questions regarding existential existence, human meaning, and moral choice. In Thilly's words:

> what characterizes the new currents in our contemporary thought is their opposition to any theory that degrades human life to the rôle of an epiphenomenon, that makes man a puppet, that leaves no place for human values. (2:83)

Thilly's work resonates with continental themes and thinkers, although he—along with other philosophers of this particular period who held similar views—finds philosophical home in American pragmatism. For the pragmatist, as for the nineteenth-century romanticist, reality "is not a dead, static thing, not a mere skeleton of bone and sinew, but flesh and blood, full of life and movement and never-ending change" (2:83).

Thilly also admired Bergson, who observed:

> where there is life and movement, conceptual thinking finds its occupation. . . . [which] does not mean that intelligence is without its *raison d'être*, and that the methods and results of natural science are to be abandoned as false trails. (2:83–84)

With Bergson, philosophical dualism re-emerged in a new way, dividing types of thinking. On the one hand, mathematics and science serve a practical purpose but cannot explain life or consciousness, and on the other, creativity is born of "intuition," which is the creative force of life: "intuition is life, real and immediate life envisaging itself" (2:84). Thilly aligned himself with a third view, emphasizing the primacy of experience, as explicated by James:

> Philosophy should seek this kind of living understanding of the movement of reality, not follow science in vainly patching together fragments of its dead results. Radical empiricism makes for pluralism: experience shows us multiplicity, diversity, opposition, and not a block-universe, not the completely organized harmonious system of the Absolutists and Monists in which all differences and oppositions are reconciled. (2:85)

Thilly viewed the "romanticism" or "anti-rationalism" of his contemporary era as a reaction against rationalist or non-Jamesian empiricism tendencies to structure life in accordance with absolute laws or transcendent reason, which diminish the veracity of human experience (2:87). He argued:

> The mind has its ways, and some of these ways, if left to themselves, tend to stretch reality upon a static Procrustean frame to make it fit; there is always danger of one-sidedness in intelligence, that, instinct-like, it will spin the same old web around everything it meets, that it will apply *everywhere* the methods which Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Bergson allow it to use in the dead world, that it will try to handle life and consciousness as it would handle its corpses. There *is* this danger, and the thinker who deals largely in abstract formulas often succumbs to it. But it is just the business of philosophy to avoid this very danger, to apply the methods intelligently; the cure for intelligence is *more* intelligence. (2:89)

Thilly's point was to push against the either-or of rationalist-anti-rationalist dichotomies. He refused to reinforce a rationalist, reductionist, or mechanized view—or a "wooden way" of interpreting what he calls the "categories of cause, purpose, and evolution"—and instead, and in a way that anticipates Husserl,

suggests that reason is neither static nor absolute but can broaden inquiry into "life and consciousness" (2:95).

Notes

1. David West, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), p. 4.
2. Simon Critchley, *Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 13.
3. West, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, p. 4.
4. Ibid., pp. 1–2.
5. Ibid., p. 3.
6. Critchley, *Continental Philosophy*, p. 38.
7. West, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, p. 3.
8. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* (Cambridge, MA: University Press, 1896), p. 166.

CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: IDEALISM AND CRITIQUE, 1921–1940

Cynthia Gayman

1. 1921–1930

Kantian scholar Edgar Lenderson Hinman (1920–1921), in "Modern Idealism and The Logos Teaching," discussed Logos theology, an historical hybrid of ancient Idealism and Christian theology, which was brought to light "by the more deep-thinking representatives" (3:35) of the New Covenant who helped convert Europeans to Christianity. "Logos speculation is simply an attempt to interpret the social and religious idealism of life . . . into terms that were consonant with the intellectual and cosmical idealism implied in a philosophical world view" Hinman explained (3:36). But because Hegelian idealism has all but silenced this perspective, Hinman wanted to address how Hegelian historical/cultural idealism must "bear upon the system of ideas and valuations that were aforetime gathered up into the Logos theology" (3:37). This is a question having to do with the relation of temporality with the eternal or, in Spinozistic terms, how those things that are finite and only apparently real contain or encompass the infinite and truly real. In response, Hinman suggested:

> this, I suppose, was the burden of Hegel's dialectical method, . . . the finite . . . can at best gain its reality only in and through its membership in a larger whole; and indeed this teaching will attach to all genuine idealism, by whatever name it be called. (3:37)

This means that a "spirit of totality" is some fundamental sense an operative aspect of everything within the "world of experience" (3:37).

As Hinman saw the problem, if this "world spirit" was not embodied within the flesh of Christ, the Logos doctrine itself would be tempered by the more temporal Hegelian notion of *becoming*, which would make the Christ—as the manifestation of divine *Being*—"devoid of permanent and intrinsic meaning" (3:37). If this were the case, Hegelian idealism would shift the foundational locus of Christianity from the instantiation of the real into an historical/temporal moment, and thus into an "elevated form of secularism" (3:37). Both of these forms of idealism cannot be true, it would seem, and Hinman asked, in light of Hegelian idealism, "will not the Logos doctrine lose all point and significance?" (3:37).

To undercut the universality of Hegelian idealism, Hinman's approach was to critique the philosophical wing of what he called "the pantheistic editing of modern idealism" (3:38); for example, the views of "Bosanquet and [Sarvepalli]

Radhakrishnan" (3:38) in order to argue for a "*concrete universal*" (3:39). Such a view mirrors a schema elaborated in idealism of Josiah Royce (1903–1904), whose call for "loyalty to loyalty"[1] specified the relation of a "concrete universal" to which "each finite individual is most loyal" (3:39). This loyalty to a universal expresses loyalty not to immediacy, that is, to things as they are, and not even to how they are becoming, but to what they *will* be, "by the Eternal" (3:39).

Hinman described the Logos doctrine as:

> essentially a fixation of the results of this line of reflection, in such wise that the spirit of the Whole is given a determinate interpretation, in accordance with the best ideals that the history of culture has enabled man to state. (3:40)

In other words, his argument was that Hegelian idealism is bereft without a real—existent—absolute, an Absolute that does not merely serve as abstract and unknowable Ideal moving through the historical trajectory of cultures, but is that which orients and directs toward itself each human being. At issue is not whether "the absolute of philosophy can possibly be the God of religion" (3:42) Hinman insisted, but instead:

> if we are led to say that man, by virtue of his membership in the Absolute, finds laid upon him all of that determinate set of cultural values which was historically wrapped up in the conception of the Logos, then, as I see the matter, the Absolute has the Logos imbedded within its life. (3:42)

Hinman's aim was to resituate the personal, the individual, within the absolute movement of temporal reality. He did this by way of an incipient Christian existentialist view, arguing that Christianity—through Logos theology—expresses the temporal reality of the Absolute realized, that is, "exists," and this need not "impair our confidence that the cultural side of the process is of the profounder significance, and is deeply grounded in the real" (3:42). Hinman asserted, "the historic idea of self-realization through self-sacrifice, central to the Christian religion and developed at large in the Logos theology, is as clearly at home in the modern idealism as in any stage of the idealistic tradition" (3:42).

In "Spirit Militant and Spirit Harmonious," Edward Leroy Schaub (1922–1923) discussed how the quest for knowledge in the modern era has sidelined the pursuit of wisdom, and nearly vanished "fear of the Lord" (3:97). In his view, loss of the transcendent means that human life has lost its moorings:

> In the wake of growing knowledge and the resultant power came profound transvaluations. Humility, acquiescence, and resignation, once the evi-

> dences alike of piety and of wisdom, fell into suspicion and were branded as weakness, indolence, folly, or sin. (3:98)

Using Nietzschean language to critique the economic explosion of this early period of the "roaring twenties," Schaub asserted, "humility, acquiescence, and resignation, once the evidences alike of piety and of wisdom, fell into suspicion and were branded as weakness, indolence, folly, or sin" (3:98). What Schaub called the "spirit militant" fuels an "unbroken succession of inventions which have thrilled the minds of men and transformed the very bases of their lives" (3:98). His worry was not societal transformation as such, however, but rather a new valorization of scientific and technological advancements at the expense of history and cultural life, as if the latter has no value in relation to the "rapid shifting of methods and processes throughout the entire economic order" (3:98). This shift in what is valued must lead to a weakening of communal and familial bonds, and "conduces to a general eagerness, if not to a sheer restlessness" (3:98), Schaub warned, "the hold of the past is weakened and the claims of the present are decreasingly heeded" (3:98).

Schaub's critique echoed the spirit of syndicalism[2] and, more broadly, socialism. He continued:

> the machine industry of today, however, and our gigantic economic organizations interpose so many processes and factors between the initiating purpose and activity and the consummation which gives unity and meaning to the whole that the significance of the process is lost to, as well as for, those who are engaged in it. (3:99)

What is lost in the rush to power and gain for the few is meaning, viz. meaningful livelihood and meaningful lives for the many. Instead, "the primary interest lies in the acceleration of production" (3:99) artificially generating new desires and augmenting ever increasing "power and profit" (3:99).

Schaub's response to the spirit militant he criticized was not a return to a nostalgic harmony of old-time religion; if the history of the "deeper religions" teaches that the deepest human need is that of "salvation," the contemporary world, in his view, demands a new socialization of conduct, and focused training of impulse and habit (3:103):

> modern religion, as commonly defined and preached, has become scarcely distinguishable from ethical culture, social service, or humanitarianism. . . . Harmony of spirit is sought, not through a rise to a new plane and the acquisition of a different principle of life, but through struggle for altered

> conditions in that realm of experience in which man finds himself when he awakens to self-consciousness. (3:102–103)

In contradistinction to the militant spirit of the day, marked by an ethos of striving for excellence without end—"the good is the enemy of the better" (3:108)—Schaub used Fichte's perspective to argue that certain kind of "reflection is led beyond the standpoint of militancy" (3:109). It was Fichte who "reached the point of recognizing the deliverances of the mystical consciousness to the extent, at any rate, that he attributed to man a direct experience of possessing God" (3:109), and through this, a moral sensibility, which, by its nature, involves belief in and duty toward the divine.

Schaub asserted, "moral acts, even more than other acts, are performed in an attitude of faith" (3:110) even though educated individuals might think the principles to which they believe themselves beholden are meaningless in the ultimate scheme of things. Not so, according to Schaub, who held that morality springs from "a faith in the spiritual structure of the world" (3:110), carrying with it, "a conviction of servanthood" (3:110) as opposed to an expression of independence and power. This view comes from Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, whose idea of morality is that it arises from "a feeling of absolute dependence" (3:112), a view that may be open to criticism, suggested Schaub, but not because of what it asserts. Moral persons are those who understand themselves *as* dependent, *as* beholden to that which is beyond the self. For Schaub, this servant-morality is "decidedly less self-reliant, distinctly more other-dependent" (3:112) and, therefore, more deeply conscious that the supreme human need is salvation, precisely because the obligation owed another can never be adequately fulfilled.

Schaub distinguished the ethical realm from "mere social experience," and oriented ethical action toward the "spirit harmonious," that is, toward a perfection that is not of this world. He argued that while the militant spirit directed by "the standpoint of the practical consciousness" (3:113) aims for transformation through control and the expression of power, and indeed "contributes to comforts and to improvements in natural and social conditions but, under certain circumstances, proves conducive to a richer personal life" (3:114). He held that it cannot sufficiently recognize or respond to evil in the world, because he perceived evil as a "subordinating factor" relative to what contributes to growth. In other words, the militant spirit is productive, fueled by practical concerns, cultural factors, and scientific knowledge, leaving moral action itself a secondary concern and relative to these factors.

In contrast, "when an individual is inspired by the spirit of essential harmony and of identification with the deepest principle of reality that he with full earnestness attacks those things that impede the progress toward perfection"

(3:114). Here what is contrary to the good is not viewed in relation to what is better, but to perfection, which, albeit unrealizable, refuses to let evil stand in the way to social improvement. How moral life is conceived is the crucial point here—not with respect to ideology, but orientation:

> The nature of a philosophy is controlled in no small measure by the character, range, and intensities of the experiences to which reflection turns. These experiences in our own age have been primarily manifestations of the spirit militant. The outlook which they offer and the doctrines to which they impel are engaging for their relative simplicity. Yet it is inevitable that these will prove transparently unsatisfactory once preoccupation with the instrumentalities of life and with practical accomplishment gives way to a concern for that which will render life at once worthy and harmonious. (3:115)

In "Progress in Philosophy in the Last Quarter Century," Wilbur Marshall Urban (1925–1926) advanced opposition against what he viewed as a naïve optimism regarding advances of science, an optimism shared by as many philosophers as it is by members of the general public. He argued that the endeavors of philosophy must be distinguished from scientific inquiries and hypotheses, in large part because philosophers must consider the effects of scientific advancements—that is, think about whether they constitute progress and what this might mean from a broader perspective. While those who engage in the scientific enterprise may not question the ramifications of their achievements, philosophers must do so. This deeper consideration does not allow the simple anodyne of optimism. The task of philosophy is critique.

Student and scholar of Husserl, Urban's approach was to interrogate assumptive meanings of progress, phenomenologically: "In trying to estimate whether real progress has taken place in any field of human activity, we are immediately faced by a fundamental ambiguity in the very idea of progress itself" (3:269). For example, advancements in scientific discovery and technology may entail a shift from "simplicity to complexity," and this is a progression of sorts, especially if the focus is on what has changed or been discovered as a result. But is this a sufficient criterion for progress? Urban stated that he had "no intention of questioning the right of the sciences to their own estimates of their advances" (3:269), but he also will not "excuse philosophy for its frequent fits of scepticism and self-depreciation" (3:269). Urban suggested that this is the necessary responsibility of philosophy, for consideration of what constitutes progress necessarily requires a broader and more "conscientious" analysis.

Although scientific discovery and "the mechanistic view and method" may seem to infer progress in every step of advancement, Urban argued that developmental advances are not sufficient for understanding what they entail or por-

tend socially and experientially (3:270). He acknowledged that "the development of the mechanical conception [is] progress," but urged a philosophical modification of "both our conceptions of science and of progress" (3:270). It is the task of philosophy to understand and make ideas and practice intelligible; "philosophy is based on the principle of the relevance of all problems . . . no mere elaboration of one problem can constitute certain progress" (3:271).

Urban focused specifically on Darwin's theory of evolution. Acknowledging that the recent half-centennial of Darwinism marks five decades of applying the theory to all phases of life, the task of philosophers in "taking evolution seriously" is not simply to apply an idea but to make it intelligible (3:272):

> The characteristic problems, the *idées mères* [mother ideas] of this epoch, have been problems of Genealogy—the genealogy of morals, or in general of values, and the genealogy of logic and of truth. Philosophy, on any view, endeavors to make knowledge and practice intelligible, and for this epoch, in the main, genealogy and intelligibility were the same thing. The gradual realization that they are not the same thing—the fixation of distinctions between origin and value—have made problems of validity and value the key problems of the last twenty-five years. (3:272–273)

He observed that science seems to being doing the work of philosophy by establishing the "psychological-biological foundation of values" (3:273). However, value does not arise ready-made from scientific discovery; it is "dependent upon the experiences of the affective-volitional life" (3:274).

Urban asserted, "value is neither an empirical existent, nor an essence, neither a quality nor a relation, but a unique form of objectivity" (3:274). Here objectivity is measured against the context and real concerns from which values arise—and here the question is how the conceptual view of progress linked to evolutionary theory arose within the context of a world still reeling from the aftermath of the World War I. Urban observed, "it is the questioning of all values and their transvaluation that started our epoch. The reinstatement of absolute values is one of its most significant conclusions" (3:275).

For if it is reasonable to think that values can exist in a world devastated by the war to end all wars, then it must be the case that certain values must have been present from the beginning. Recalling Nietzsche's "genealogy of knowledge" to suggest that values are historically, contextually discoverable, Urban suggested that logic provides only the "scaffolding of an intelligible world" (3:276). It is the foundation upon which the scaffolding is built that bears the "absolute values which must be acknowledged if truth and existence are themselves to have any communicable meaning" (3:277). To discern these underpinning is to begin to perceive underlying values and "ontological prejudic-

es" (3:277). And through this lens a better understanding and "an intelligible concept of evolution" might be gained (3:281).

The final continental philosopher in this third decade of the twentieth century was David Ferdinand Swenson (1927–1928), scholar of Kierkegaard and Husserl, whose address, "Objective Uncertainty and Human Faith," argued for a way of thinking and philosophizing that both humanizes the activity and turns its focus toward the realities of human life. As he put it, "philosophy has an interest in clarifying its relations with the common life, and it should be concerned to seek its own humanization along a pathway which is not impenetrable" (3:418–419). This is to say that the complexities of life, or those of conceptual thought, should be made clear enough so that common existential concerns might be communicated more clearly, rather than in the typically obfuscating language used by professional philosophers. "Wherever there is life there is uncertainty" (3:420) Swenson observed. He continued:

> I have never been able to understand how it can give a thinker satisfaction to see the delicate ramifications of his thought obscured, its meaning distorted, and its profundity trivialized, in order to gain for it a currency of doubtful import. (3:419)

"Wherever there is life there is uncertainty" (3:420), said Swenson; it confronts the most learned scientist as much as the most ignorant individual. Every gain in knowledge is itself based in uncertainty. Reflection can lead to a variety of possible choices in action, but these choices are contingencies of personal circumstance and perspective. Not only is life uncertain and precarious, every gain in knowledge is itself based in uncertainty. Reflection leads to a variety of possible choices in action, but these choices are contingencies of personal circumstance and perspective. Yet, this does not make all-too-human situation utterly insecure, for it is the case that, "uncertainties which remain after knowledge and reflection have done their best for us, are our tutors and disciplinarians" (3:422). From what we do not or cannot know—the existentially unknowable life-world—we must learn to trust ourselves or, as Swenson put it, have faith, since "without faith the personality cannot express or constitute itself" (3:422).

The faith Swenson described is reminiscent of what William James (1906–1907) meant by the "will to believe"[3]—a faith arising from experience and from our passionate nature, through which can be expressed the desire to fully live. Life does not provide answers ready-made nor bestow objective truth, but the seeming ambivalencies of experience are mirrored by the dynamic tension of consciousness: "the ideal and the real, the logical and the existential," seem to make both "certainty and uncertainty possible" (3:423).

Lived experience is fragmentary, uncertain, ambiguous, and never fully known. "Belief" ultimately bridges the chasm between the contingencies of subjective experience and whatever truths there may be in reality, but belief requires faith, itself a risk, a leap (3:430):

> If none of the more transient and trivial responses to the call of existence can be made without risk, as is indeed generally admitted, it is surely thoughtless to imagine or demand that the fundamental response which we call a view of life, and upon which the others rest, should be found by way of objective certainty. (3:430)

Instead, it is we ourselves, as individuals (as Kierkegaard would insist) that bear the responsibility for "the basic decision of life" (3:430).

Swenson's words echoed Kierkegaard and James and anticipated Sartre, linking the precariousness of experience and the necessity of response, to make choices in action. Sartre saw this necessity as freedom, the burden of being human. Swenson saw response as an act of faith, which is the expression of belief that the choices we make matter and the expression of who we are and become through the act of choosing:

> Uncertainty is the stimulus of interest. If every choice could be objectively determined, it would be reduced to a matter of course, an automatic process lacking in the subjective tension which is the form of appropriation for all genuine happiness. Intensity of pathos is the measure of our capacity for profound joy. Uncertainty throws the individual back upon himself, unlocks the hidden energies of his spirit, and affords him the opportunity to form those ideal resolutions of the will in which the life of the spirit is realized. Strife and struggle, anxiety and hope, fear and trembling, despair and faith, are the disciplinarians that fashion the personality. (3:430)

Although we might think that an experience is an object of interrogation, measured against what we already know, inevitably, " the tables are turned, and reality becomes a cross-examiner, compelling us to answer so as to reveal what there exists or comes to birth within us" (3:433). Swenson reminded his fellow philosophers that this faith "would seem to be inevitable if reason is to retain a foothold in existence, not avoiding its responsibilities by emigrating to a new continent, where existence and non-existence do not matter" (3:432); and later:

> How strange that the highest principles of the reason should appear to be beggarly articles of faith! And yet this would seem to be inevitable if reason is to retain a foothold in existence, not avoiding its responsibilities by

> emigrating to a new continent, where existence and non-existence do not matter. (3:434)

However, neither reason nor science can prove beyond doubt the existence of structural foundations for knowledge or intrinsic meaning to life. Yet saying this, according to Swenson, does not merit concluding that what we feel to be genuine, ethical, or what we count as revelatory in experience is merely illusory. Instead, he espoused:

> Moral science neither creates nor validates this enthusiasm [for morality], but rests upon this consciousness as its underlying presupposition. Where moral passion is lacking, objective reflection cannot produce it. The need for an ethical interpretation of life is not indeed the need for food and shelter; but [it is not] less fundamental to human nature. (3:434)

Swenson's words are as relevant today, in the twenty-first century, as they were when he uttered them in 1925. It remains the task of philosophy, and not science, to examine presuppositions underlying the evidentiary assertions of science, and philosophy should not avoid this undertaking. Swenson continued:

> Without denying the significance of ethical science, it should be clear that the basic attitude of spirit is the essential element of the moral consciousness. And this is not a matter of knowledge, but of depth and specific quality of pathos. (3:434)

It is not science that can satisfy the deepest human need for explanations; rather it is this need that motivates the activity of scientific inquiry in the first place. Thus, in Swenson's words, "passion rather than knowledge is the more adequate and concrete expression of the existential situation, since it is the mark of transition, and human existence is essentially in transition" (3:436). He cited Nietzsche as well instructive on the relation between passions and values, whether in the realm of science or morality or religious belief, "for he grasps the issues essentially" (3:436). He continued, "the criticism of belief is a field only for those thinkers who know how to invest themselves from head to foot in the universal garment of humanity, the pathos of a concrete personality facing the concrete uncertainties of existence" (3:436).

2. 1931–1940

The 1930s heralded a distinct turn in philosophy, despite warnings by some that the turn could limit the scope and method of philosophical inquiry. In this dec-

ade, logical positivism became more popular, and a more "scientific" mode of philosophical discourse began to predominate (although an exception to these trends was the growing interest in process philosophy, exemplified by the work of Bergson and Alfred North Whitehead (1931–1932), and the still-live interest in American pragmatism. Views opposing the increasingly predominate analytic trend were becoming marginalized. The discipline adhered more strictly to the view that philosophy is first and foremost grounded in logical or linguistic analysis, and that it must undertake inquiries in a way aligned with and similar to methods utilized by science.

Charles Bruce Vibbert's (1934–1935) address, "The Perception of Movement in the Philosophies of Descartes and Bergson,"[4] compared Descartes and Bergson with respect to intuition of movement, about which they agree, and to the subsequent perceptual recognition of movement, that is, how movement becomes known, about which they disagree. Vibbert argued against the concept of motion relative to will and intension; instead, and following Bergson, he saw motion as expressive, saying, "no movement can be made to coincide with its trajectory or interpreted as an intellectual relation implied therein" (4:323).

This position is antithetical to the view held by Descartes, whose "laws of motion can express only the *tendency* of motion toward self-conservation, toward exact repetition, toward identity; but all of these are ideal limits with which real motion never coincides" (4:324). Contrarily, Vibbert conjectured that Bergson would claim, "each movement has its own law as each great work of art has its own rules and technique according to which it is created" (4:324).

In "'The Tragic Realm of Truth,'" Thomas Vernor Smith (1934–1935) warned against the growing reliance on science to answer the problems of life and, by extension, the problems of philosophy. Without belittling the spirit or the achievements of science, he admonished that while "science has restirred the hunger and hope of mankind for truth" (4:332), it "cannot appease the hunger it has engendered" (4:332). Descrying the "analytic approach to truth represented by science" (4:333), Smith argued that sole emphasis on the endeavors and approach of science ignores the quest of the human spirit to seek some meaning to what Miguel de Unamuno called "the tragic sense of life"[5] (4:333). Indeed, "*it has made and will make major contributions to minor needs of the human spirit*" (4:333). The fact that philosophy increasingly seems itself in "squatter sovereignty—the occupying and cultivating of the interstices of the several segments of science" (4:333) re-doubles the trivialization of the quest for truth.

Smith argued that the coherence, correspondence, and predictive theories of truth are inadequate because they "merge quietly with common sense and unite in elevating to the supreme test of truth the oldest prejudice of man—the prejudice that what strongly feels or clearly appears so, is therefore so" (4:335). Such, "natural dogmatism is not enough for a scrupulous mind" (4:335).

James Bissett Pratt (1935–1936), in "The Present Status of the Mind-Body Problem," also argued against the reduction of philosophical questions to the limits presupposed by the materialism of scientific inquiries at the expense of consideration of intentionality or what Pratt described as, "the complete denial of all efficiency to consciousness" (4:371). Pratt was concerned with the real differences between psychical and physical states regardless what terms were used for them (4:376). He rejected logical positivism, idealism, vitalism, and even pragmatist meliorism grounded in naturalism; he was suspicious of the "new term 'brain-mind'" (4:383). Instead, he argued for more ambiguity and complexity, and put forth a non-reductionist, pluralistic view of the "interactionism" of "consciousness" as separable from physical or materialist evidence (4:385).

It is clear that in this fourth decade of the twentieth century, views differing from or in argument with the increasingly predominate analytic trend within academic philosophy were becoming marginalized. The discipline itself adhered more strictly to the view that philosophy is first and foremost grounded in logical or linguistic analysis or that it must undertake inquiries in a way aligned with and similar to methods utilized by science.

Edwin Thomas Mitchell (1935–1936), in "Social Ideals and the Law," argued in a somewhat Deweyan vein that logical positivism and science are inadequate to take up the questions intrinsic to social problems and justice, saying, "social philosophy demands as background a metaphysical or religious *Weltanschauung*" (4:389).

Edgar Sheffield Brightman's (1936–1937) "An Empirical Approach to God" began with discussion of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* to put forth the necessity of metaphysics, which, Brightman argued, cannot be derived from science. He noted that the "physico-theological" argument (Kant's term) was a genuine move toward empirical verification (4:416), and "the most satisfactory" way to resolve a broader sense of our own deepest existential experience. Brightman emphasized that values are themselves desires, not things, and therefore not reifiable. Instead, he suggested that ideals must find experiential validation but cannot be scientifically verifiable: "One may purchase certainty by omitting perplexing facts," he writes, "but a certainty purchased at the expense of fact may gain knowledge and lose sight of the goal of truth" (4:427).

Harvey Gates Townsend's (1936–1937) "On the Possibility of a Better World" argued against materialist reductionism and logical positivism to assert the importance of the role of interpretation in assessing what constitutes the very nature of a fact in the first place—a particularly trenchant project at the time of his writing, since the imminent fact of the moment was the very real threat of war:

> Are the facts which we interpret the same as our interpretation of the facts? Are the facts relevant to our action or sentiment the very facts of nature?

> Such questions cannot be set aside for very long. They recur with the pertinacity and the finality of death. Through the lengthening years of man's discourse these questions are pervasive. (4:435)

Townsend's theme was the "ontological status of the possible" (4:437). His focus was on examination of the "given world," a phrase resonant with Husserlian phenomenological inquiry (4:438). His concern was to distinguish reason from rationality and to question the belief that creation of a "better world" is made possible by "bloodless categories" of formal logic (4:444).

During the 1930s, pragmatist and early continental philosophers, as well as historians of philosophy, continued to criticize the rise of the analytic approach. Perhaps the most obvious exemplar of the continental perspective during this early period is that of Gustavus Watts Cunningham (1930–1931; 1937–1931). His second address, entitled, "Meaning, Reference, and Significance," captured the essence of the criticism of the analytic approach of that time:

> The assumption is that the meaningful is a state of affairs, that this state of affairs is indicated by common usage of the word "meaning" and its correlates, and that description of this state of affairs is the task which *ab initio* confronts anyone bent on dealing with the problem of meaning. But the assumption underlying many current discussions of the problem is different from this. For what is there avowedly sought is some criterion whereby the meaningful is to be distinguished from the meaningless, the desiderated criterion being formulable, so to say, by resolution in convention assembled. Thus the meaningful is assumed to be determinable by initial definition and, apparently, only by such definition. (4:467)

Cunningham argued that the noetically meaningful must be expressed differently from what is possible through some "sterile exercise in linguistic dexterity" (4:467). The abundance of experience cannot be clearly and distinctly marked; there remains always the "dim background" (4:482). Meaning is discerned through context and point of view, and clarification of meaning is "achieved by exploration of the significance of reference, that is, the contextual relationship of the referential meaning situation, as it is progressively specified through penetration into the penumbral nature of what is" (4:482).

Joseph Alexander Leighton (1937–1938), in "History as the Struggle for Social Values," emphasized the "givenness of process" (4:513) and that "real existence is individuated" (4:513) against the view of process suggested by Croce and Fichte, whose philosophies, according to Leighton, are a "spiritual immanentism" (4:514). Leighton asserted, "social history arranges the chroniclistic chaos of events in ordered series of history's social values. Nothing

exists but general history" (4:514). By this he meant, *is* ordered by, as opposed to the view that social values come into being through some essential movement of spirit in time. Leighton's argument takes a personalist vein:

> Man lives not in one time but in several times. As an individual he has his own private time which I call *personal* time or *spirit* time. The individual lives his own history. This history is a function of the specious present. My past is actual only in so far as it functions in my living present, which is a pulse of becoming organized into a whole by the experienced continuity of myself. My future is also a function of my present. (4:518)

Leighton argued that Marx, as opposed to Hegel or Bergson, had a better understanding of the generation of social values. By "the present crisis," Leighton was alluding to the United States' involvement in World War II. That required, he opined, more than the "intellectual games" and the "the cool and unhurried satisfactions which come from the contemplative activity of logic, epistemology, and metaphysics" (4:539). He admonished, "if philosophers remain content to pursue the owlish habit of reflection only in the soft evening twilight of abstract speculation, they are in for a long and dreadful night" (4:540).

The decade ended with "Human Nature and the Present Crisis," the address delivered by Edward Octavius Sisson (1939–1940). The crisis of which Sisson spoke was "one that touches every one of us, not only as men and women, but particularly as philosophers" (4:615), and by this, Sisson meant both the crisis of democracy as the encroachment of Hitler and Mussolini was bearing down upon the world and the survival of philosophy itself. It is Nietzsche that Sisson called to mind, since Nietzsche emphasized the necessary distinction between democracy and any ideology, whether that of nationalism or religion:

> Nietzsche, clairvoyant of human nature even though afflicted with an incurable *strabismus* which distorts the picture at every point. Him, I confess, I love dearly, first for his flawless sincerity, and then because he has thundered the most terrible denunciation against one of the two major foes of the democratic idea, that divine state which Hegel preaches. (4:616)

Sisson was a committed pragmatist in the Deweyan sense, that is, he was committed to democracy as ideal and as praxis, but he articulated a Nietzschean criticism against the anti-democratic tendencies within the totalitarian state and, radically, against the corporatization of American society and political landscape as equally dangerous. He asserted, "the true name of the present form of economic order is no longer capitalism, but corporationism" (4:624). His argument was existential, based on the inviolability of the individual:

> This denial of prerogative status to the human individual, to you and me as men or women, this demotion of the human individual to a mere stage in a hierarchical process, and moreover a relatively low stage, seems to me to pose the most profound of all subsidiary questions in that great inquiry which lies behind and conditions all the problems that can concern us, the question "What is Man?" (4:626)

The Kantian question, generalized by Hegelian historicism, is here brought back to its essence, and to what Sisson viewed as the crisis at hand:

> When I contemplate the stupendous historical rôle of corporate dominance over the individual, culminating in our own day in unexampled force, I am then convinced that the question is pertinent and the issue grave; I think, paramount. (4:629)

He concluded:

> The sole sufficing answer, since we do not want to be either God or beast, is a society in which barriers are lowered and communication freed and fostered to the fullest extent, to the end that human nature may bring to full fruition both the common life of the "beloved community" and the precious uniqueness of individual personality. (4:630)

Notes

1. Royce generalized the difference between true loyalty and vicious or "predatory" loyalty as follows: "a cause is good, not only for me, but for mankind, in so far as it is essentially a *loyalty to loyalty*, that is, an aid and a furtherance of loyalty in my fellows. It is an evil cause in so far as, despite the loyalty that it arouses in me, it is destructive of loyalty in the world of my fellows"; see his *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995/1908), p. 56.

2. Syndicalism is a theory and movement of trade unionism, originating in France, in which all means of production and distribution are brought under the direct control of their workers by the use of direct action, and organized through federations of labor unions; direct political and economic democracy in the workplace and community organized through labor unions and federations, including the abolition of capitalism, social classes, parliamentary government, bureaucracy and political parties.

3. Willam James, "The Will to Believe," *The New World* 5 (1896): 327–347.

4. Vibbert was unable to deliver this address due to illness. The paper included in vol. 4 was prepared in 1934 or 1935 for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Western Division of The American Philosophical Association, and was published in this series for the first time as representative of his thought. A typescript of his paper was evidently distributed in his absence (4:324n1).

5. Miguel de Unamuno, *Tragic Sense of Life* (New York: Dover, 1921).

CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: HISTORICISM IN CONTEXTS, 1941–1960

Cynthia Gayman

1. 1941–1950

Heidegger scholar Grace Mead Andrus De Laguna's (1941–1942) address, "Cultural Relativism and Science," echoed several concerns voiced by her contemporaries, especially Charles William Hendel (1940–1941), whose "Reflections on the Spirit of Man" had critiqued incipient Hegelian naturalism, cultural relativism, and the rise of scientific reductionism, and which called for philosophy to attend to things essential to the human spirit. He remarked:

> There is a dispiriting view of history and humanity in the world today . . . Indeed, the [World War II] even appears as a natural occurrence for which there is no human responsibility, no source of its evil in man's own life and purposes. When we have come to this pass, in our reflections, we have reached the stage of disbelief in man; that he is a being who has to choose between good and evil and who is free to do so. (5:3)

The emphasis in Hendel's address was the turn away from any sense of individual human efficacy toward a "story of mankind" that generalizes the movement of history through the "materialistic dialectic" (5:4) of "economic determinism" (5:5). Rejecting this fatalist view of *Historismus* deployed by the powerful, who view their own right to rule as inevitable, Hendel admonished his fellow philosophers "to examine again the nature of history and its meaning for man" (5:6). In his view, "the story of mankind has *meaning* only when it is interpreted by reference to [individual persons] and to the conception of man which is involved in them" (5:19).

De Laguna's argument took on the same theme as Hendel. She asserted:

> it is indeed so easy to show that a complete relativism is impossible because it is essentially self-refuting, that the really perplexing problem is why the doctrine of relativism continues to survive, or to arise like the phoenix from each successive destruction. (5:83)

She examined the concept of "culture," which is what gives rise to the viability of relativism in the first place:

> Just as the meaning of words, the distinction of parts of speech, the function of grammatical forms, are relative to the particular language to which they belong, so the traits of any culture are relative to it. It is not merely that their existence within the culture is causally conditioned by the culture as a whole, but that their nature and significance—their essence, if you please—is involved in the essential pattern of the culture. (5:85)

The inquiries of science also reflect the values of culture, which is not to say that the discoveries of science are without truth, but to ask whether the assumption that science is objective and value-less is, in fact, a dangerous assumption to hold. "In so far as science is such a body of organized doctrine shifting from age to age, the theory of cultural relativism is justified. But science is not revealed by any series of cross-sections; it is a continuous stream of living thought" (5:96). As such, the bedrock of science in the West is comprised of an "underlying faith" that scientific inquiry seeks the truth of things by willingly relinquishing that which is found to be false.

This capability of science to operate from the perspective of "continuous self-transcendence" (5:97) is a *philosophical* perspective that is itself a "cultural phenomenon" (5:88), the locus of which is Western civilization. De Laguna questioned how modes of scientific inquiry are both supported and stymied in Western culture, since:

> if it is only in the mode of science that thought has found a medium for free and unlimited procedure, then we should expect to find in the culture which has produced science, and to which it belongs, a correlative capacity for internal and continuous self-transformation. (5:97)

But this correlative capability is not universally shared within American society, much less the entire Western world.

Those who wish to hamper creative inquiry are also part of culture. De Laguna cited John Dewey's (1905–1906) concern about how "the present crisis in our culture reflects the deep cleavage between the scientific mode of thought and the uncritical and discordant beliefs and standards manifested in our way of life" (5:98). For Dewey, of course, this was the very crisis of democracy; for De Laguna, it was the point of departure for thinking about whether free inquiry itself must be precipitated on "acceptance of universal moral standards"—that is, whether or how the pursuit of wisdom is related to the attainment of the good. De Laguna noted, "it is not only Platonists who have held the two to be vitally connected" (5:98). At issue for her was discerning "necessary conditions" for legitimate anthropological research, which recognize the diversity of values relative to cultures, and to examine these conditions with respect to philosophical

suppositions. While "it may be argued that as a scientist [the anthropologist] makes only judgments of fact, and that such judgments are logically independent of judgments of value" (5:99), De Laguna posited, giving voice to the predominate 1940s perspective, she continued, "to argue in this fashion is indeed to invoke dualism with a vengeance" (5:99).

De Laguna's view was that anthropological research must be phenomenological, that is, it must take place within the context of a given culture, neither from a seemingly "objective" or "valueless" perspective, nor from a sympathetic distance. If the anthropologists are to gain genuine understanding of a particular culture, they must "achieve an imaginative sympathy with their ways of thought and feeling" (5:100) and "must adapt . . . to the ways of the community" (5:101). Such an endeavor will inevitably create internal conflicts: What are the values relative to culture that may cause discomfort that can and should be overcome, and what are values that cannot be compromised? What values are universal? In raising these questions, De Laguna recognized:

> The recognition and acknowledgment of such universal standards and objective values is thus a necessary condition of anthropological research and the understanding of the nature of man. These universal standards are not easy to formulate; perhaps they admit of no final or precise formulation. (5:101)

On the other hand, the values and standards under which scientific research is carried out must not be culturally relative:

> While anthropology is justified in regarding the specific and varying moral standards of different cultures as relative to these cultures, its own scientific procedure involves the acceptance of standards which are universal and objective. (5:101–102)

While it may be obvious to contemporary readers that respect for both persons and cultures is a universal value for ethnological research, De Laguna's more trenchant aim addressed a vital question: Are there grounds for holding the hard sciences to universal moral standards if such standards do not exist within cultures?

> Can it be claimed that the pursuit of physics or chemistry is conditioned upon the acceptance of universal moral standards? Do we not actually see these sciences being carried on with terrifying success by a people openly committed on principle to contempt and disregard of human rights as such? (5:102)

De Laguna summed up as follows:

> Our whole argument has gone to show that . . . the sciences . . . rest upon a common mode of thought. . . . the very nature of science both continuously to transform and regenerate itself, and to expand. . . . As essentially self-critical, science must inevitably concern itself not only with man as a living organism, but with the distinctive forms of human relationship and with the human achievement of culture. It must . . . include itself as a form of being. That it can accomplish this without a correlative development of philosophy as the enterprise which seeks to formulate and thus lay open to criticism the standards and concepts which, as science, it implicitly accepts, is impossible. (5:102)

In "Concerning Philosophy," Elijah Jordan (1941–1943) took Nietzsche's pronouncement that God is dead to oppose the modernist thrust of philosophy as "scientific, analytic, humanistic, naturalistic, antischolastic, 'anthropocentric'" (5:129). Jordan viewed the thrust to make epistemology scientific to be a "monstrosity" appropriately named "atomic mysticism" (5:130). However, this approach veils the essential blindness of its own subjectivist enterprise, making it hard for contemporary philosophers to see "any way out of the pit of subjectivism" (5:140). He argued that the cultural and historical grounds of scientific inquiries must be taken into account, for if the role of science is to be engaged in empirically-based "technical questions," it is "function of philosophy to lay out the primary veins of the world's structure as universals which are to be principle-postulates for the various human spheres of concern" (5:142).

These human spheres of concern become the postulates of ethics, existence, order, and politics. While philosophy itself cannot be reduced to these postulates, it must inform the ground from which they arise. This ground of philosophy is not static but generative, and every generation must philosophize anew, not in the sense "that each should find a new philosophy, but merely that the world of reality that is to be formulated has changed" (5:142). In the final paragraph of his address, Jordan described why the modernist epistemological-cum scientistic approach to philosophy is utterly inadequate to address the realities of the cultural moment of 1942:

> The fundamental fact that meets us now is a world in chaos, a cosmic chaos, a *contradictio in substantia* for which there is no description black enough. Falling into the pit of subjectivism has left us without a morality, no vestige of character remains. For a mess of garbage man has sold his soul to the businessman, and the world of reality is sold out. So there is no obligation, for there is nothing to be responsible *to*. God died, and the world dissolved, when man found his destiny in himself. And the responsibility for the situation is philosophy's. We have furnished no ethical

> foundation for the human world; no principles of order for the political world; no laws for the control of our attitude to existence, nor for the control of the practical activities that depend on these laws. Our ethical endeavors have sought the end within experience, ignoring the fact that for experience there is no end. . . . And while we have in our egoistic stupidity insisted that the world should come to terms with our subjective purposes, the world has laughed in our face and has gone its own way, which is not the way that human wish or subjective motives would have it, but a way determined by its own inertia, and so leads to no end. And our refusal to see and follow the reality to the end that the reality be made conscious of its destiny has left us without a destiny. (5:142)

Donald Sage Mackay's (1942–1943) address, "The Illusion of Memory,"[1] is an example of the kind of modernist epistemology that Jordan criticized. However, Mcakay's point of departure at least acknowledged the phenomenological position that Jordan rejected. Noting the qualitative and temporal aspects of memory that make the past present to consciousness, "as if things past were nevertheless present, or as if there were a consciousness, a direct awareness, of the presence of remembered events, known to have occurred in the past" (5:149), He discounted this phenomenon as mere illusion. Evoking Merleau-Ponty, Mackay noted the seeming contradiction that occurs when the past is more existentially present than the present moment. He noted studies of eidetic images by the Marburg school that demonstrated "perception-like" images are reconciled as illusionary in the adult mind, although the uncanny sense of reality in an illusion may persist (5:150). But, he asserted, "an epistemological analysis, however, finds and does not mistakenly postulate an apparent consciousness or immediate knowledge of the past in memory" (5:150).

Mackay argued against Bergson's position that held "consciousness means memory" (5:152), such that:

> every perception of an object is also an intuitive awareness of a past within the present . . . [and] the inner duration of a life process is a cumulative one . . . and every moment of his conscious experience involves a feeling of continuity with its past duration. (5:152)

Along with Clarence Irving Lewis (1933–1934; 1954–1955), Mackay asserted that similarity of "inference" links experienced memory through "qualitative identity inferred through a more or less complex intellectual construction" (5:154).

This construction is ultimately dependent on the relations perceived through present experience and conjecture about the past. Mackay stated that through habit, as defined by Charles Sanders Peirce, "personal memories are

capable of constituting a knowledge of the past" (5:157). He concluded that this view of habit as conservation of the past through memory, to be, "essentially persistence of relations" (5:167), where "the illusion of memory has tricked us" into believing the "material existence of a past that has perished" (5:167).

A philosophical turning point occurred during this period, as the United States entered World War II and philosophers began turning away from a strongly speculative mode of philosophizing. Pragmatism and the continental focus on the world of experience, history, culture, and the *Lebenswelt*, turned toward analytic epistemology, empirical science, and the operations of reason and logic. For example, Victor Fritz Lenzen (1943–1945) wrote the following in "The Concept of Reality in Physical Theory":[2]

> The new physical theories command philosophical interest for several reasons. Newly formed concepts require reflective analysis in order that their significance may be clarified and their function in a general scheme determined. In such reflective analysis, which is an integral constituent of scientific creation and distinct from the routine application of concepts in the interpretation of experience, philosophy and science participate in a common task. Furthermore, novel scientific procedures need to be codified by logic. (5:201)

William Kelley Wright (1945–1946), in "The End of the Day," stated:

> In sharp contrast to the decline in creative thought in philosophy during the twentieth century, extremely impressive strides have been made every decade in mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology, and substantial although less remarkable progress in the social sciences. (5:256)

However, this might not portend the twilight of philosophy, Wright suggested, because "noteworthy beginnings are being made in the *interpretation of the sciences*" (5:257, emphasis added). For the next several decades, this would seem to become philosophy's predominate role. Conveying just how unpopular European thought has become among American philosophers at this point, Wright defended it nonetheless:

> Many of you probably reject some of the doctrines of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Some of you may believe that they, although possibly unintentionally, did much to prepare the German mind for the advent of Hitler. Nevertheless, all of them taught their students to respect the personal dignity of every individual, to acknowledge the importance of humanity and its

> solidarity with the universe, and to be conscious of their own opportunities and responsibilities as scholars. (5:264)

George Perrigo Conger (1944–1945) addressed this shift in methods and modes of professional philosophy in "Method and Content in Philosophy." He began by stating, "at this first meeting after the interruptions due to the war, it is natural that we try to look once more over the field of philosophy" (5:301). At that time, he understood philosophy to recognize many specialties, including "philosophy of science . . . and sometimes philosophy of life. In each of these specialized and sometimes isolated areas there are local divisions and differences almost without end" (5:301). Broadly speaking, he viewed "the sharpest line dividing contemporary philosophers . . . [to be] the division between the so-called critical and so-called speculative philosophies" (5:301), and based on something more that "mere difference of opinion" (5:302). Conger asserted, "it is a difference of fundamental attitude. It involves basic principles or presuppositions as to what philosophy is and what it is supposed to do" (5:302). He added, "if allowed to go to extremes, it is capable of paralyzing philosophy and rendering it sterile" (5:302).

Conger's position was a call for pluralism, but he recognized the hegemony of the language philosophers even as he asked, "Is there such a difference between the impression of what a man sees and the expression of what a man says?" (5:302). The post-war years in the United States began in the wake of global disruption, but should "the place and function of philosophy" be restricted and made narrow? (5:314).

Despite professional marginalization, the broader concerns of speculative philosophy continued to be addressed. Katharine Everett Gilbert (1946–1947) began "Recent Poets on Man and His Place" saying, "the need for technical philosophy is small. But all things should be studied philosophically" (5:321). Gilbert's theme was the definition of essential traits in poetry, about which she noted, "philosophers have been not so much unmindful of the importance of poetry as impatient with its detail and suspicious of its nimble wit and far ranging" (5:321).

Following a sentiment expressed by Paul Valéry, Gilbert suggested that philosophers "are insufficiently aware of the fine relations of language to thought, and of the interaction of the parts of language with each other" (5:322); this indicated a place philosophy can benefit from the study of poetry. She pointed to Gerard Manley Hopkins's insistence that serious engagement with reality is the "proper virtue of right poetry" (5:323). Further on she posited, "important poetic fiction may, by its apparent intense unreason throw light on those metaphysical first principles that [Alfred North] Whitehead [1931–1932]

says 'mutely appeal . . . for an imaginative leap'" (5:326). She concluded that contemporary poets:

> however incoherent and ironical, have opened new experience to us through linguistic invention and have quickened and intensified the philosophical problem of doing and undergoing. (5:341)

The singular and not easily categorized Charles Hartshorne (1948–1949) referred to the three terms in the title of his address, "Chance, Love, and Incompatibility," as "ultimate principles, applicable to all reality" (5:487) and argued that despite being "interconnected . . . on a common-sense level," they are concepts recently depreciated by philosophy (5:487). Because the meanings of chance, love, and impossibility cannot be logically deduced, shaved sufficiently by the razor of reason, causally explained, or inductively portended, they are considered vague and imprecise and therefore not sufficiently philosophical. But Hartshorne argued that the mutability and precariousness of these concepts are bound to the inter-relational contexts of experience, since "all happenings are to some extent by chance, and that this violates no legitimate ideal of intelligibility or reasonableness" (5:501). He continued:

> By means of love or sympathy, what happens here and now is made relevant to what happens there and then. Human self-identity is merely a particularly important strand of this relevance. Knowledge and all interest in the past or future are forms of sympathy. Because of chance and incompatibility between possibilities, the world is partly wild and ever somewhat dangerous—as William James [(1906–1907)] delighted to note. . . . A chance world, that is, any world, has a tinge of tragedy in its constitution . . . we must break once for all with the confused dream of an existence simply beyond the reach of chance and tragedy. Absolute protection against conflict or suffering is a mirage. (5:501–502)

Neither the laws of logic nor empirical science can resolve the human situation; religion may ameliorate some of its difficulties, but "the Christian idea of the redeemed as wholly happy in the knowledge that others are damned is a tragic renunciation of sympathy which [Nikolai] Berdyaev has gone so far as to term sadistic." (5:502). Any unifying vision of complex experience is equally false: "Buddhism, Stoicism, the Christian and Mohammedan theory of Providence and of heaven as commonly interpreted, the Marxian dream of a practically conflict-free society, all are tinged with this escapism" (5:502). This escapism belies life, "because vitality has been sacrificed to reduce risk" (5:502), and seeking to replace the insecurities of life with any anodyne is to deny that, in some funda-

mental sense, "tragedy is thus inherent in value" (5:502). Hartshorne pointed out that the "secular science" of psychology, particularly the work of Karl Menninger, recognizes the essential truth of the Judaic-Christian idea that "love is the key to life's riddles" (5:503). He called for the day when "theologians and philosophers might well join with Menninger" in recognizing that love is preeminent in the scale of all values (5:503).

2. 1951–1960

The first few addresses in the sixth decade of the twentieth century illustrated post-World War II anxiety over European, especially Hegelian, influence on thought. Therefore, they tended to valorize the objectivity of empirical science. Dilman Walter Gotshalk (1950–1951), in "Twentieth Century Theme," waxed pseudo-nostalgic over the speculative philosophy popular in "the teeming optimistic beginning" of the century, listing thinkers such as Bergson, Whitehead, Dewey, Cassirer, and Croce, only to dismiss their contemporary relevance:

> Yet, as our century has moved ahead from its teeming optimistic beginning to recent times, a note of grimness, harshness, and disenchantment has become more and more evident. The death instinct, a narcissistic enchantment with Nothingness, a desperate craving for absolute freedom, and a utopia of barbarism and bestiality are among the latest figments to haunt the thinking mind, while everywhere a feeling of alarm, anxiety, tension, and dread has been aroused even in the least reflective. In our day, it is as if the revolutionary surge of the whole modern period, appearing in our century in its most heightened form, were about to reach some gigantic and ghastly climax . . . [and] a deep-lying sense of apprehension has now become widely diffused over the planet. (6:41–42)

His answer was that philosophy should re-engage in "critical, reflective self-understanding." (6:51) By this, he did not mean re-engaging with the life-world, but recognizing the "metalogical situation of our times" (6:50).

Gotshalk asserted, "to achieve full strength, to bring the causative analytic resources of philosophy and the purposes now open to philosophy into coherent and fruitful interrelation, the task seems imperative" (6:50). His view of philosophy and what the proper activity of philosophizing entails gives further evidence of the significant shift within the academy resulting in the side-lining of continental thought, American pragmatism, and of speculative philosophy in general, which would prevail for several decades.

Margaret Georgiana Melvin (1951–1952), in "The Legal Norm in Soviet Jurisprudence," gave an historical account of the Hegelian/Marxian link between

Soviet court system and Marxian communism, stating, "the guidance of the Marxist ideology . . . has, for the most part, been consistently and undeviatingly adhered to" (6:55). Her address favored a Marxist reading of the political violence and social upheaval of the Soviet system, which was consistent with the broad acceptability of an anti-continentalist viewpoint prevalant among philosophers of the time. The Soviet system portended the end of freedom and respect for individuals, in favor of a fully planned "entire social system" and "a technically goaled society"—but Melvin offered no reason why this goal should be assessed as Marxist (6:68).

Edward William Strong's (1952–1953) address, "On Judging History," was a prescient analysis of historicity as a philosophical enterprise. He granted that philosophy's traditional role in engaging history had hitherto been confined to the attempt to "transcend historicity—transcend, that is, the situational manyness of purposes and roles in which historians have cast their tasks in the study and writing of history" (6:153). Historically, this reaching toward a transcendent grasp of the past has engaged speculative thought primarily in two ways: (1) by evoking some sort of "Platonic transcendence" or arguing for the unchanging nature of the human being; and (2) by placing transcendence within immanence, and, with Hegel, finding "recourse [in] the doctrine that historical development has come to maturity and can now be comprehended in its reason for being" (6:153). He continued:

> the Hegelian transcendence seeks to save history by philosophy working from within. Platonic transcendence seeks to free philosophy from history, but offers to history an insight from without by which to achieve a timeless unity of consciousness. (6:155)

Strong's approach was that of an "historical relativist," which is not to say that he was relativistic in a perspectival sense (6:153). However, he did recognize that history, as it is written, is comprised of narrative accounts that are themselves relative to the perceived significance of events in relation to place and time since, "none of the historians written about and none of the historians writing possesses vision and measure from a time-free perspective by which to judge histories absolutely" (6:159). Even if history is not the report of objective facts or even a report of the trends of aesthetic values, it is the case that "histories"—in the plural—serve a critical and contextual function for the present because they "are rewritten as questions not hitherto asked arise" (6:159). Thus, not only is history nothing static, but the past—and especially our understanding of the past—alters when new questions are asked. Perspectival shifts change awareness of the past in light of understandings in the present, thus making the interrogation of history vital to concerns of the present and future. Strong asserted:

> [Histories] are rewritten as further consequences continuous with preceding affairs lead to recasting of their role and importance. Need to understand and to appreciate inheritance from the past in the light of a new, a changed, or a cumulative outlook and interest prompts historians to retraverse familiar ground with a fresh purpose. Findings and theories advanced by scientists thought applicable in explanation of known events afford accruing possibilities to be explored. A crisis-situation, a new route of inquiry, a shift in valuation of humanistic in relation to scientific studies, an alteration of worldview, or a cultural revolution can turn men to tasks in historiography not envisaged by predecessors. (6:159)

Following Benedetto Croce, Strong understood the past in view "of present needs and requirements" tempered by the quest for better and truer understanding, which is not to say a final or objective assessment of temporal events (6:159). Renewed critical questioning and exploration do not culminate in some ultimate grasp of the truth perceived fully by the light of time and distance:

> The alternatives in value judging do not reduce to the kinds of transcendence offered by Hegel and Plato, nor to an irrational subjectivism with which historical relativism is often confused by its critics. There is the alternative which historians themselves insist upon . . . residing in the scrupulous differentiation between judging from without and from within. In this lies the impartiality attainable in perspectival valuing. (6:162)

He concluded, "historicity of judging calls neither for attack nor defense but rather for comprehension in theory which accords with evidence and for ideals of task and fulfillment which can be honored in practice" (6:163).

Philip Blair Rice (1952–1953), like Strong, combined continentalist and pragmatist themes in "The Philosopher's Commitment." Acknowledging an "uneasy conscience" about speaking on such a topic, Rice noted that the very question, "What is the philosopher's commitment?" is itself a "question that is a nest of questions" (6:169), the key term of which has become fashionable as a translation of the existentialists' word "engagement." He continued, "the existentialists have raised the question most insistently for current European thought, as have the pragmatists for American" (6:169). In other words, Rice understood the philosophical milieu in the United States during the early 1950s as not particularly friendly to the topic he wished to address.

If Plato might be considered the proto-existentialist, the commitment to return to the cave requires social and political circumstances not completely unfriendly to thought and questioning. However, as Rice put it, "if his society is hopelessly corrupt, and yet he manages . . . to catch a glimpse of the Sun of True Being, he can keep its gleam alive only by taking refuge beneath the shelter of a

wall and philosophizing in solitude" (6:170). Speaking from the perspective of social and political circumstances of the early 1950s, Rice described both "the tragic circumstances" (6:170) of totalitarianism in Europe and "one of the little pockets of militant absolutism in our own culture" (6:170) as alienating to the existentialist thinker, to be sure, but necessary to recognize. In fact, given the circumstances of the time, the philosopher "will be able to practice philosophy at all only by maintaining this alienation" (6:170).

Rice looked to Nietzsche for assistance in examining "the bad conscience of an age recently past, and who, if we read him, can trouble our own complacency" (6:171). Nietzsche reminded philosophers that the philosopher of the future "is, first of all, a philosopher, and cannot find to the legislation of values any short cut which will dispense with the kinds of tasks at which his predecessors called philosophers have toiled" (6:171). These tasks require engagement in the problems of life, in the "anguish" so named by Sartre in facing reality:

> Likewise, the best of our own pragmatists conceive philosophy, in its distinctive role, to be something more than moralizing or social reform or practical politics, however much, of these activities it may include within its scope. (6:171)

This "something more" entails wrestling with problems and with the process of examination: "ideas of method, of meaning, of nature, of value" (6:172).

The focus on method, meaning, nature, and value explored in the work of the American pragmatists and other speculative thinkers is of course also found in the themes and problems covered in the work of continental philosophers. These are the philosophers who see that "no philosophy can wholly escape being of its culture" (6:172), but must "break out of the limitations of that culture as to voice its assumptions" (6:172). In other words, critique of culture is immanent and ongoing—and this includes critique of the present day culture within academic philosophy, which was, at that time, dominated by analytic epistemology and language analysis. Rice voiced the Sartrean perspective: "the special obligation imposed upon both the philosopher and the writer of fiction is 'to rediscover the absolute in the bosom of relativity itself'" (6:173).

Rice acknowledged that he was speaking to a diverse group of philosophers, listing "pragmatists, positivists, emergent materialists, phenomenologists, personalists, neo-Thomists, neo-Kantians, neo-Hegelians, neo-Wittgensteinians" (9:174). He observed that while they could not all be right, some seemed to think that the others among them were absolutely wrong. He admonished:

> not only are there totalitarian regimes that threaten to suppress our commitment to philosophy . . . there are authoritarian influences in our own so-

> ciety seeking to prescribe our conclusions and steer us by a short cut to the final truth. (6:174–175)

On the other hand, he saw potential for compatibility and shared interests between speculative and analytic philosophers, evincing a welcome if premature optimism that would be realized some four or five decades later:

> The current conflict between analysis and speculative philosophy is not correctly identified with the division between the two commitments, the theoretical and the practical. Both "analytic" and "speculative" methods may be a plied to either of the two commitments. It is, perhaps, some of the analysts who in our time have most boldly proclaimed the autonomy of philosophy and its total independence of other human concerns. But the metaphysician can quite as easily withdraw to his model of the ebony tower as the analyst to his. (6:176)

In Rice's view, philosophy should address human concerns. He affirmed that the American pragmatists and existentialist philosophers compel attention in and outside the academy because their "persistent struggle to grasp and to convey the principal dimensions of the human condition" (6:177). Philosophy and philosophers in the United States need not become continental philosophers to commit to exploration of reality, of normativity, of how best to live, but Rice viewed these as the terrain of the philosopher's responsibility, even though in the current climate, "philosophy thrives on the tension between analytic and speculative philosophy" (6:183). Yet, it is also the case that mere thriving is not enough, for philosophy truly "flourishes also on the conflict between the theoretical commitment and the practical commitment" (6:183). Rice posited that philosophers, whatever their methodological commitments, share in common the human condition from which philosophical questions arise in the first place and from which even philosophers cannot escape.

Max Harold Fisch (1955–1956) also criticized the academy in "The Critic of Institutions," arguing, "the diversity of what is now called, and of what calls itself, philosophy" (6:329) should begin to clarify what it means more inclusively. Granting that Wittgensteinian language analysis had instituted a new way of philosophizing, Fisch noted that the now dominate analytic method had not replaced any of the old methods, but had merely been added.

Perhaps unification of aims should not be not the aim of philosophy. Fisch suggested that even Whitehead's seemingly more practical description of philosophy's scope as "the critic of abstractions" (6:330), especially in view of accomplishing some kind of "synthesis and completion of the sciences" (6:330) is too restricting and too limiting for what is actually philosophy's purview. He

proposed "to describe philosophy as the critic, not of abstractions, but of institutions in general, of which the sciences and their abstractions are a quite special kind" (6:331). He defined "institution" as follows:

> By institution, as a first approximation, I shall mean any provision or arrangement of means or conditions for subsequent activity, additional to or in modification of the means or conditions that are already present prior to the institution, whether present in nature prior to all institution or present in nature only as modified by previous institutions. (6:331)

Less abstractly stated:

> The notion of institution, in a closer approximation, involves those of purpose and choice, will and decision; that is, of the arbitrary. It is the notion of what would or might have been otherwise if the purpose had been different, but of what might also have been otherwise to the same purpose. It is the notion of what is subject to criticism in the light of the original purpose if that can be found, or in the light of any purpose that may have taken its place; and of what is alterable by subsequent decisions, but never so alterable as to cease to be arbitrary. (6:331)

In other words, the institution is the manifestation and exercise of power that does not originate from natural or divine or historical-teleological momentum, but from systemic organization:

> In a general way, the purpose is to supply the means for, or to give scope, opportunity, protection, assurance, effectiveness, direction, form or style to future activities of a certain description; or to prevent or discourage activities of other descriptions. (6:331)

Every value is thus conditioned in one way or another by institutions, and "all valuing tends to take on institutional form" (6:332). Fisch's progenitor is Aristotle, for whom "the basic institutions come into being in order that men may live, and they continue in being, and others are added, in order that men may live well" (6:332). But conflicts among institutions arise and place "strains upon individuals" (6:332), out of which arises the necessity of ongoing critique of social and political institutions—and "this continuing critic is philosophy" (6:332).

The task of institutional critique is difficult because institutions are not things nor persons nor behaviors; institutions "are not sensible, but intelligible forms; forms we cannot perceive, but cannot think away without thinking the institutions away; forms, indeed, without which we can scarcely think at all"

(6:334). Institutions, in Fisch's sense, seem to broadly operative in the way Heidegger describes language—as the house of being. How then to achieve critical vantage toward that which one is entirely enmeshed? As Fisch put it:

> The techniques of comprehension may become so specialized to particular institutions or sets or types or aspects of institutions, and so focused on description without reference to the purposes of criticism, that an institutional or social science detaches itself from the critic of institutions. . . . the critic is left without command of the apparatus and techniques of comprehension. (6:335)

At this point in his address, Fisch segued into an interlude—a "three-act skit" called, "The Progress of Philosophy." The first act introduces the present state of philosophy: irrelevant. "Philosophers not wanted" (6:335). Act II begins with what is important, which includes all the sciences, because they have access to the world, albeit institutionally delimited by their disciplinary frameworks. Comprehension of the world occurs through the analyses of physicists and others designated by the labels "CHEMISTRY, BIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY" (6:336). However, philosophers have:

> stationed themselves at knotholes in the fences. . . . Now and then they take peeps to see what the scientists are doing, but for the most part they hold their ears to the holes and listen to what the scientists say, and exchange reports with each other, and critical comments. . . .The refrain is, "Mind your language! Or would you like to have us mind it for you?" (6:336)

Act III, and the final act for philosophy, it turns out, is dire. In losing access to the world, philosophers also seem to have "turned their backs on the sciences and are sitting in two huddles down front . . . playing a game of cards which is supposed to settle the pecking order in philosophy" (6:336). Each player lays down a card, and "one says, 'Object!'; the second, 'Meta-!'; the third, 'Meta-meta-!'; and the fourth, 'Meta-meta-meta-!'" (6:337). But this gets tiresome because those in the sciences do not pay attention to the talk of philosophers, and so the philosophers conclude:

> Since the scientists won't let us mind the world, or them, and they don't much care whether their *language* is minded or not, and we can't mind it very well through the knotholes anyway, why not start minding *ordinary* language? (6:336)

How Fisch's humorous indictment of contemporary analytic philosophy went over among his audience is not recorded; no doubt there was laughter, perhaps not altogether comfortable. However, he was quite serious in his critique of

the contemporary institution of philosophy, although he took pains to say that he believes each of them to be philosophers, and apologized if they concluded otherwise. Nevertheless:

> I do think, however, that a series of developments in academic history has led to concentration on the institution of language, and comparative neglect of many others; and I think that another development in academic history now offers us an opportunity to redress the balance. (6:338)

Fisch made two proposals: First, philosophy students should incorporate into their studies something in the social sciences. Second, philosophy itself, institutionally, should become more diverse and interdisciplinary: "a department with twelve members, for example, might reasonably have an expert in each of the major social sciences and in law" (6:339). His ideas are practical, which makes sense given his affinity for pragmatism. His goal was to re-orient the focus of philosophy toward re-engagement in the world. He concluded:

> The history of philosophy is philosophy itself taking its time, and its way of taking its time includes not merely a continual bringing forth of things new, but a continual review of the old. It continually re-sifts, re-selects, and re-orders its past creations, re-edits, re-translates, re-reads, re-interprets, and criticizes afresh. Its great classics do not diminish but grow in power. The art of teaching is itself often the art of bringing the thoughts of our students back again and again to a sentence of one or another of the great philosophers, until our students grasp the significance which only the entire history of philosophy before and since packs into that sentence, and until they bring to bear upon it all the critical resources which that history affords. Thus the institution which is eminently the critic of all others is also that which, more than any other, is critical of itself. (6:340–341, emphasis added)

In "Concerning a Tendency in French Ethical Thought," John David Goheen (1957–1958) observed, "contemporary French and American philosophers pay very little attention to each other" (6:419). This he found strange given what he saw as their shared interests in "phenomenology, concentration on ethics, and related topics" (419). He focused on "aspects of the phenomenological tradition which are of importance in interpreting French ethical writers, and which tend, incidentally, to question the general view that "French and American thought moves in two essentially different spheres" (6:420).

It was not the American pragmatist tradition to which Goheen referred when he suggested commonalities with European thought, but analytic philosophy. He attributed apathy or antipathy between the two trajectories of philoso-

phy to a "misinterpretation" arising because "the phenomenological tradition rejects a metaphysics of nature rooted in common-sense realism" (6:420). He allowed that a real point of difference between French philosophy and analytic philosophy was the repudiation by continentalists "that philosophy should be preoccupied with the epistemological problems of scientific knowledge, or the 'logic' of science as it is understood among American philosophers of science" (6:420). However, in his view, this did not show the complete picture.

The strength of French thought and phenomenology, suggested Goheen, is the emphasis placed on ethical thought, freedom, and intentionality. He proceeded to articulate the nuanced strengths of Husserl, Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Mikel Dufrenne, and Raymond Polin to argue that, while it is "misleading to give the impression that the French phenomenologists place ethics and science on an equal basis" (6:426), prioritizing moral philosophy doe not entail rejection of the value of empirical knowledge. Nonetheless, he cautioned:

> empirical knowledge of human nature cannot substitute in any way for an intentional description of man. More particularly, it is the ethical outlook, as part of the phenomenological account of man, which is basic to all human endeavors, including science. (6:426)

Goheen's was a more subtle critique of the hegemony of a particular style and mode of philosophizing within the American academy. He cited William Klaas Frankena (1965–1966), who asserted that normative ethics requires "empirical knowledge of all sorts"[3] (6:427), meaning knowledge corroborated by the sciences. He questioned the adequacy of evidence to evaluate and critique ethics, saying, "judgments of value and the criteria on which those judgments are based must have meaning, although perhaps a special meaning of their own; i.e., the intentionality peculiar to valuing or assessing" (6:427). This critical endeavor is phenomenological in nature. "The presuppositions of normative ethics do seem to commit us to a philosophical anthropology or a moral philosophy" (6:427), Goheen suggested, and:

> the French phenomenologists have remained sensitive to the modes of moral discourse, and, in this way, maintained the "autonomy" of ethics. It would appear that the approach to a moral philosophy, in the way in which the French phenomenologists have tried to develop it, is required if we are to take Mr. Frankena's admonition seriously. (6: 427)

He offered Lewis as an analytic thinker whose work "has some important resemblances to the views developed by the phenomenologists" (6:427). Finally,

Goheen admitted that it was the American pragmatist James with whom phenomenologists could find the greatest affinity.

Paul Arthur Schilpp (1958–1959) was even blunter in his stock-taking of American philosophy—the title of his address, "The Abdication of Philosophy," suggested the general direction of his criticism:

> If . . . the moral life is the self-conscious living of life and a necessary prerequisite of morality is to "know what you are doing," certainly it is the philosopher more than anyone else who should be moral: at least in this sense that he should know what he is doing! (6:529)

Yet, Schilpp charged that his contemporaries seemed not to know, that they were even oblivious to the dangers of the age, specifically the possibility of nuclear holocaust and "the annihilation of the human race" (6:530):

> But when I read current philosophical journals, magazines, and books (generally speaking), I would never dream that today's handwriting on the wall may spell *finis* to the human race. Philosophers, by and large, appear to be doing "business as usual," without the slightest awareness of the impending doom. (6:530)

Schilpp was addressing a certain kind of philosopher and a certain mode of philosophizing when he said:

> the big issue which today seems to divide philosophers in the Western world is that between the devotees of ordinary language and those of constructed linguistic systems. Our so-called "lovers of wisdom" appear to think that wisdom applies only to the manipulation of language. (6:530)

The lack and loss of concern for existential life, for the social and political world, for reflection on meaning with respect to how to live, and for the pursuit of wisdom comprise "*the abdication of philosophy*. We will be linguists, semanticists, symbolists, grammarians—yes, and even logicians. But we will *not* be philosophers!" (6:531).

These skills of analysis may be prerequisite for philosophy, but they neither "constitute wisdom nor are they by themselves of much positive help in providing wisdom for man in his present tragic hour" (6:531). Schilpp cited Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler, Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers among those philosophers whose differences made a single commonality stand out: "they seem to be at one in recognizing both the acuteness of Western man's illness and the fact that his problem lies in the realm of values" (6:533).

Dewey exemplified the position that wisdom must be taken up in service of the conduct of life, but, Schilpp asked, "have we relegated him to the position of *ein überwundener Standpunkt* [defeated standpoint] too soon?" (6:535). Already in the 1920s, Albert Schweitzer had warned that in its penchant for rationalism without concern for the world, "*philosophy herself had now become*, for all her insight, *merely a pedantic philosophy of degenerates*"[4] (6:536).

Schilpp's concern about the degeneration of philosophy was neither new nor likely to be heeded. Schweitzer is remembered as a humanitarian, not as a philosopher—"the 'new philosophy' no longer has any truck with questions of 'truth'" (6:538) or concern over matters pertaining to life in the world. Such concerns existed "before grammar and linguistics came to usurp philosophy's functions" (6:539).

Schilpp's was an angry address—he made it clear that those with speculative leanings were battling hard to maintain presence within a discipline that had already marginalized those who were not doing the new philosophy. He quoted from a letter he received from Albert Einstein, who, in declining Schilpp's invitation to contribute to a Library of Living Philosophers volume dedicated to Rudolph Carnap, wrote:

> Dear Mr. Schilpp,
>
> It is a good idea to devote a volume in your series to Carnap's lifework.
>
> But I cannot accede to your request. For I have dealt with this slippery material only whenever my own problems made it absolutely necessary. But even then I studied little of its literature; so that I would not be able to do justice to this swarm of incessantly twittering positivistic birdies. (6:541)

Already in 1935, Whitehead had called the "incessantly twittering positivistic birdies" the "Critical School," as opposed to the "Speculative School," saying the latter "*confines itself to verbal analysis within the limits of the dictionary*"[5] (6:545). Or, further, in the words of Robert Browning, "the habits of contemporary analysis are at best devoted parasitically to what is already achieved in expression; and at worst, these habits place a marked inhibitory hand upon creativity" (6:545). As Dewey said, "*philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men*"[6] (6:546). Finally, Schilpp concluded by summarizing this theme:

> the exigencies of the present world-situation are such that careful factual analysis and even more careful logical analysis and reflective thought are required, if man is to be kept from destroying himself. . . . the problems which mankind faces, all along the line . . . require the very best rational

> intelligence of which man is capable. An intelligence which is not merely solidly grounded in the realms of personal, social, economic, and international facts; but, which in addition, knows where it is going, because it has . . . developed a philosophy of life worthy of man and worthy of the dignity of human personality. Who, except the philosopher, is capable of meeting such requirements—IF HE WILL? Whether or not he wills—this decision each one of us will have to make for himself. One thing, however, is certain: the philosopher who fails mankind at this point has failed—no matter wherein else he may have succeeded. For, to the extent that we fail here, it is not merely philosophy which will fail, but mankind itself. (6:546–547)

Philip Merlan's (1959–1960) "Existentialism—A Third Way" serves as one more exemplar friendly to continental thought in this sixth decade of The APA. Merlan began with a series of allusions to literary figures to illustrate the truth of the relativist perspective, ancient in origin, since it was Herodotus who intoned the words of Pindar, "convention is king" (6:587). The development of the understanding that each age and culture may have "its peculiar standards of taste, of morality, and what is most disturbing, its own ideas about the divine" (6:588). This anthropologically corroborated historicist perspective requires that we "judge these ages by our standards" (6:588). He continued, "there is something liberating in relativism. Perhaps this is nowhere more obvious than in the field of esthetic standards" (6:588).

Acceptance of relativism in moral values is not so celebrated, Merlan acknowledged—"at this point some of us may start feeling a little uneasy" (6:588). Similarly, with regard to religious views, "slowly but inexorably the question emerges: If all standards, including those of religion and morality, are relative, if therefore our own standards are relative—are we still able to take these standards of ours seriously?" (6:588)

Despite a liberating sense of cosmopolitanism, which is a more encompassing moral valuation of understanding, tolerance, and acceptance, Merlan asked, "is it possible to give one's life to what we know to be true and good only here and now?" (6:589). On what principle would one be inclined to make a stand? While there is "there is something sweet in relativism—but at the same time we begin to feel that it may be the insidious sweetness of a poison" (6:589).

Merlan noted that Nietzsche was one of the first to recognize the "paralyzing effects of historicism" (6:589). However, Nietzsche's position was not either/or; instead, he demanded a new kind of historiography:

> He also denied that it was desirable. Objective historiography kills the will to life. What we need, said Nietzsche, is historiography which actually is mythopoeic—the creation of historic myths which have the power of re-

> leasing energies for life. Great deeds should be the product of the study of history. (6:590)

However, this historically rooted and authentic form of relativism does not appease the desire for absolutes. Merlan recounted several approaches that have been taken to appease this desire. One is the proposition by German philosopher Hans Reiner that the Golden Rule is itself a universal moral standard. Another, stranger and perhaps cynical, view is that suggested by playwright George Bernard Shaw, who said, "it does not really matter in what or in whom you believe, as long as your belief is sincere and a motivating force in your life" (6:591). "But is there an alternative escape from the paralysis of relativism?" (6:592). Merlan's answers leaned toward something along the lines of "universalizing oneself" (6:597), which would be the Nietzschean or Schleirmachian approach, or of "depersonalizing oneself" (6:597), which would be the Kantian and, in a differing sense, Kierkegaardian view.

However, Merlan wanted to avoid the perils (and the rejection by American analytic philosophers) of Romanticism, as well as the shortcomings of rationalism. Instead, he suggested a "third way," which he suggested as being offered by existentialism, which recognizes "the contingent character of the content of our consciousness" (6:599). Following a careful explication of Sartrean and Heideggerian thought on being, he summarized:

> man and, by the same token, his knowledge, the content of his consciousness, his commitments are contingent, man's contingency would at the same time be an aspect of the contingent character of being-itself. (6:603)

This point rests on a revised reading of Heidegger, following the latter's revision of his text, such that:

> being-itself, so we now read, never exists without beings, nor are beings ever without being-itself . . . the complete independence of being-itself, and the one-sided dependence of beings on it, seems here tacitly changed to a relation of mutual dependence of the two. (6:603)

Despite its controversial nature, Merlan pointed to corroboration of Heidegger's view from scientific quarters, specifically from quantum physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, "who says that the whole concept of a physical reality existing independently from its being observed has become self-contradictory" (6:604). So much for a metaphysics of essence and stasis! As Merlan stated:

> The insight into the absolute contingence of man seems to leave us with two choices. Either this contingence is accepted as the last word. If this is the case, Macbeth seems to be right when he says that all is but toy. It does

> not matter what we know or don't know. There is not the slightest chance that anything ultimately matters. . . . Or we refuse to accept contingency as the last word. (6:606)

Which shall it be? The fact is, we do not know. Here, Merlan turned again to Kierkegaard, citing his *Fear and Trembling* as an interrogative meditation on the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac.[7] The command of God to Abraham contradicts all demands of love and justice, to commit an act "inhuman and abominable" (6:607). Surely God would never make such demand! "Abraham found himself in absolute solitude, an absolute exception" (6:607).

It is this solitude, this radical and irremediable solitude that Kierkegaard recognizes as "the fundamental situation of man" (6:607); this is the existentialist insight about the human condition, regardless whether human beings are conscious of it (607). The call of conscience singles out each person, and thus, "the exception becomes the rule, without losing its character of being an exception" (607). Merlan concluded:

> This is existentialism's third way. Nobody can tell where it runs. But there can be no doubt that it is there. And on it everything can be lost and everything can be gained. (6:607)

Notes

1. Mackay's address was prepared for the December 1942 Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of The American Philosophical Association, but not delivered because of wartime travel restrictions.

2. Lenzen's address was prepared for the Pacific Division of The American Philosophical Association, but not delivered due to wartime travel restrictions.

3. William K. Frankena, "Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century," *The Philosophical Review* 60, no. 1 (January 1951): 54.

4. Albert Schweitzer, *The Decay and Restoration of Civilization* (London: A & C Black, 1947/1923), chap. 1, pp. 3–13; emphasis added by Schilpp.

5. Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1938), pp. 235ff. (emphasis added by Schilpp).

6. John Dewey, *Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude* (New York: Holt, 1917), p. 65 (emphasis added by Schilpp).

7. Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling: A Dialectical Lyric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939).

CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: FURTHER SPECULATION ON THE LIFE-WORLD, 1961–2000

Cynthia Gayman

1. 1961–1970

John Daniel Wild (1960–1961) began "The Exploration of the Life-World" with the observation that philosophical exploration of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) is disparaged in contemporary philosophy, which is, itself, increasingly "isolated from real life as a special academic discipline with restricted technical concerns of its own" (7:3). But, he pointed out, the dismissal of everyday existence is nothing new in the history of philosophy; after all, the world of impermanence and opinion, of "shadowy" things and mere perception is as old as Plato (7:3). Wild concentrated on the diverse and "disparate" range of philosophers "at the end of the last century, and at the beginning of our own"—among them, "thinkers as [Nikolai] Berdyaev in Russia, Ortega y Gasset in Spain, Husserl and [Max] Scheler in Germany, Bergson in France" (7:4)—who were "bringing their thought into closer touch with human experience as it is lived in the concrete" (7:4). Wild observed that existentialism and phenomenology were the most recent manifestations of speculative thought in philosophy, but emphasized that this trajectory was not new and that it continued to be of vital importance.

Wild argued that these recent movements in speculative thought may have arrived from the Europe, but continental philosophy is not limited by geographic location or even by a commitment to a particular system of thought. Instead, this mode of philosophizing distinguishes itself by its orientation toward the life-world, toward individual existence, social life, and the realities of suffering, loss, death, and transcendence. He observed:

> it is often held that the healthier Anglo-Saxon countries have been free from morbid and exotic symptoms of this kind. But this, I think, is not the case, if we focus the general trend of which I have been speaking. (7:4)

This trend includes American pragmatism. Wild made special mention of William James (1906–1907), who, like others in the pragmatist tradition, also addressed themes raised by continental thinkers.

Wild reminded his peers, "the original aim of academic philosophy was not to replace primary thought by developing special techniques of its own" (7:5), but also advised them to direct reflective thought toward better and more meaningful ways of living. He called this the "therapeutic function" (7:5) of

philosophy, which, he suggested, is "properly regarded as the discipline of freedom," because it dares to ask "basic questions in the face of political and theological tyranny" (7:5). Perhaps, whenever philosophers turn their attention to the life-world, they risk disparagement from other philosophers, particularly those for whom rationality will out. Therefore, an important thrust of these philosophers of the life-world is to critique the philosophical milieu that threatens to vitiate what constitutes the thing itself that is philosophy. Wild quoted from James to make this point:

> *The world* of concrete personal experiences to which the street belongs is multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful, and perplexed. The world to which your philosophy professor introduces you is simple, clean and noble. The contradictions of real life are absent from it. Its architecture is classic. Principles of reason trace its outlines, logical necessities cement its parts. Purity and dignity are what it most expresses. It is a kind of temple shining on a hill.[1] (7:5)

Undoubtedly, Wild was aware that James's view would be met with some degree of skepticism from his peers, few of whom were advocates of existentialist or phenomenological philosophies. But Wild spoke with a generosity that assumed reasonable persons might set aside mere prejudice when they realize that the philosophical interrogation of the life-world is part of philosophy's heritage, broadly speaking, and is part of the tradition of American philosophy specifically. James provided "clues," Wild suggested, that this is so:

> For example, the notion that to be alive is to be concerned, that different ways of understanding the world are subject to choice, that these choices cannot be justified by rational demonstration but are subject to faith and risk, that we are confronted by forced options where not to choose is itself a form of choice, the emphasis on human freedom, and on the individual person as the fragile but creative source of change in human history,—all these ideas are now widely accepted as characteristic existential insights. If this is existentialism, we have had it right here in our very midst! (7:6–7)

Wild argued that the then-contemporary philosophy of linguistic analysis was also born of critique of the philosophy of the day—British empiricism:

> here too we find a deep dissatisfaction with the pretentious system-building of the past, a lack of interest in wholesale explanation, and instead of this, a concern for the meanings enshrined in ordinary linguistic usage. Thus according to Wittengenstein: "philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything."[2] (7:7)

But perhaps the language philosophers have gone too far in rejecting the philosophical import of empirical facts, as if things of the world belong only to science and not to the purview of philosophy, except by way of "reflection on science and its methods, or, as is often said, the study of logic and language" (7:8). Wild asserted, "this, I believe, is a serious mistake which has not only had an unfortunate effect on philosophy but has obstructed the investigation of vast regions of our lived experience" (7:8).

Wild proceeded to distinguish different kinds of facts and realms of meaning, conveying diverse ranges of value relative to place and time (7:12). His aim was to show that even if everything can be reduced to language claims, words themselves are not abstractions of meaning, but signify diverse meanings in different contexts. For example:

> we speak of a doctor as arguing for his diagnosis of a patient, and of a lawyer as arguing out his case, that is, showing that his interpretation alone, against other alternatives, really fits the known world-facts, and places them in the real world, so far as it is globally interpreted. (7:12)

Another way to say this requires differentiating scientific facts from "world facts," the latter "proceed[ing] according to a different mode of understanding" (7:12), which may be discoverable, perhaps, through a phenomenological inquiry. Wild explained how this discovery takes place: by holding one's natural attitude in "abeyance"—the "epoche"—so that perception shifts away from the ordinary prejudices of habitual seeing and discerns anew. In turn, perhaps, this gives way to greater clarity of seeing, understanding, or interpreting, although not in view of definitive knowledge or categorization, which is why outcomes such as "true" and "false" are not part of "world-interpretations" (7:14).

However, even though what we perceive and interpret about the world cannot be measured against some absolute truth does not lead to meaninglessness or entail relativism. For although the perspective of the viewer can never be in a position, *sub species aertinitas*, to "make up propositional meanings, and then to compare them with external facts" (7:15), it is possible to examine things in our experience as "we live through them and then recognize them, see them as fitting into temporal patterns of global meaning" (7:15). This point is both epistemological and moral. Wild asserted:

> Since each of us works out such a world pattern by primary reflection, and since it is involved in all that he feels and thinks and says, its truth will depend in part, as James and Kierkegaard both recognized, on *how* we hold these patterns of meaning and *how* we live them through. We have some-

> thing to do with determining the authenticity or the unauthenticity of our ways of life and understanding, though this is not the same as falling into a closed and untestable "subjectivism." (7:15)

Wild further asserted, "a really radical empiricism is now under way" in philosophy because the "basic data of the sciences are first found in the life-world," and further, "life cannot be lived without overarching philosophic interpretations of the world which are beyond the proper scope of science" (7:18).

Today, over half a century since Wild delivered his address, this latter point continues to be debated—strong is the desire for certainty, apparently. However, as Wild reminded us, "traditional thought was mistaken in thinking that it could pass directly from the objective study of things to the world. Such an objective path leads to the very subjectivism it is trying to avoid" (7:19). The reality of perspectival subjectivity cannot be overcome, although it can be put in perspective. It is the responsibility of philosophy—the discipline of critical and reflective reasoning—to continue to thoughtfully engage in understanding the world, an activity that will not come to a definitive end, since it "must be renewed with each oncoming generation, of stimulating, clarifying, and purifying the spontaneous primary reflection of living men, and in thus helping to keep human freedom alive" (7:19).

In "The Philosophical Interest in Existence," Marvin Farber's (1963–1964) theme was existence, the treatment of which "cuts deeply into philosophical controversy" (7:205). This controversy has to do with the limits of empiricism and the limits of philosophical generalization, and calls into question the legitimacy of speaking about existence as a whole:

> by means of a radical procedure, restricting one's subject matter to the correlates of actual experiences. The legitimacy of such an inquiry will not be denied, provided that the counterfactual nature of the question and the artificiality of the problem are explicitly recognized. (7:205)

Farber was concerned with how to articulate the diverse and multitudinous range of human perceptual experiences, given that perception is a subjective act, which is not universalizable. Although "it is tempting to engage in generic pronouncements concerning the nature of man, once one has left the ground of natural experience and the painstaking work of social scientists" (7:209), and while the adequacy of categorizing according to types, general structures, essences, or ideals may be fruitful, it is entirely dependent on "the activities of experience and knowledge. Such experiences are real whenever they function" (7:210). To put this in a more tangible way, "existentially speaking, there is no ideal of free-

dom, apart from the interest or desire for freedom, in some sense, by human beings" (7:210). Continuing, Farber explained:

> the question of the "existence" of ideals requires first of all that they be assigned to their role as intentional objects of experience; and, secondly that they be recognized as having diversified reality in the experience of different people or groups of people. (7:210)

Apart from these relations they make no sense. He argued against the view that the existential subject is antithetical to the scientific view of the human being (contra Heidegger), and stated:

> the lack of freedom in the world today is not due to science or to a science-oriented philosophy, but to the existing social and economic relations, and to the unsatisfactory ways of using our knowledge and techniques. (7:211)

In Farber's view, observation and analysis must be based upon particular individuals and situations, for "a greater degree of concreteness is needed," which Farber believes phenomenological inquiry is suited.

Thus, it is not science or the scientific method properly engaged that is antithetical to the possibility of gaining deeper knowledge about human beings, but insisting on a "cosmic perspective" (7:211):

> If it is the aim (tacit or explicit) to overcome or transcend the limitations of natural existence and finitude, the opposition to a science-oriented philosophy is surely unavoidable. It then becomes the task of exponents of a science-oriented philosophy to expose and refute errors as rapidly as they are advanced. In the present logic-conscious generation of philosophy, the probable life-expectancy of a fallacious argument is very short. Small wonder, then, that the obscurity of irrationalism and evasions of reason become more popular. (7:211)

More careful analysis is what is called for, since, although human beings are unique and human experience cannot be objectified, "one can speak of events and organizations of events as they are by themselves, apart from the actual process of experience" (7:212).

Farber's view echoed Husserl's cry, "back to the 'things themselves'"[3]—meaning back to the ways things are actually given in experience—but in a more Kantian key. This is a bit misleading, however. On one hand, Farber was not an idealist; inquiry begins in the life-world and proceeds from perspectival experience, but does not result in a relativized perception of the object of conscious per-

ception. On the other, neither was he in any sense an objectivist; for him, there is nothing in-itself that is perceived outside of temporal reality, which means that points of view shift. "If a so-called timeless truth is discerned, for example a formal truth, the discernment of that truth is temporal in character" (7:214). His point is that successive events comprise experience; therefore, "knowing involves various stages of complexity" (7:214).

Out of this complexity patterns may be discerned—"units of perception" that become "bundled" into "complex organizations"—"for example, a person, as an individual knower, as a member of a group, as a complex physical event, with a history and a culture" (7:218). Thus, perceptual acuity is not relative to mere subjective perspective because there is no such thing as an isolate perceiver; each perceiving subject is constituted by and through the shared world. While an "uninterpreted world" (7:218) would lack "conceptual patterns of interpretation" (7:218), this very idea is itself "a limiting case that may be approximated in subnormal individuals or in states of minimal consciousness" (7:218).

Philosophical and scientific inquiry alike must undertake inquiry in a world constituted by and through human perceptual experience. Historically, traditional philosophy has striven to bypass the world in favor of transcendent reality or objective and eternal truth, as opposed to the lived and temporal moment. As Farber put it:

> Rallying cries for philosophic inquiry in the past have included the aim to lay the foundations for a universal science—the dream of the rationalists; the aim to elicit a universal philosophy from the recesses of the subjective self; the aim to restrict philosophical questioning to logic and language; and the aim to construct a consistent theory of the world, of knowledge, and of values on a naturalistic basis. (7:221)

Farber argued against philosophical reductionism in all its forms, past and present, metaphysical or analytic, concluding:

> The self-understanding that a philosopher can be expected to exhibit must be tested by the facts of cultural as well as natural existence, making use throughout of the principles of logic. Nothing less than soundness—and the future of philosophy—are at stake. (7:222)

Ernest Addison Moody's (1963–1964) address, "The Age of Analysis," returned to the earlier nomenclature of speculative philosophy to describe tensions among modes of philosophizing, particularly those left in the wake of the predominance of analytic philosophy. Like many before him, Moody was critical of philosophical approaches that abandon the life-world, but his approach directed

attention not to the continental traditions of existentialism or phenomenology, but to earlier American thought. He aimed to do some speculative philosophizing about then-current analytic philosophy, "to examine the assumption, so generally held, that speculative philosophy, to be of value, must presuppose critical philosophy," asserting, "my own view is that the converse relationship is nearer the truth" (7:227). He described the dominant milieu within philosophy:

> For the past twenty or thirty years philosophy has come to be characterized as the logical analysis of language, the term "logical" being taken in a sense broad enough to include not only the syntactical structure of language, but also its properties of meaning and truth. Syntactical structure, in turn, is taken to include not only the part corresponding to formal logic, but it is taken by many to include also the grammatical syntax of so-called ordinary languages—the *most* ordinary being, apparently, our own English idiom. (7:228)

Establishing philosophy's focus solely on matters of language instead of issues historically considered to be of philosophical importance, such as "the universe, being qua being, God and the soul, or even the good and the bad or the right and the wrong" (7:228), Moody suggested, succeeds in reducing the scope of philosophy—making it into yet another discrete academic discipline unrelated to other disciplines, yet apparently equal to "the special sciences" (7:228). He traced the history of this cataclysmic shift in philosophical reasoning and inquiry, beginning with Frege and Russell, on to the Vienna Circle positivists (especially Carnap), through Wittgenstein, and then to Willard Van Orman Quine (1957–1958). Quine's "logical pragmatism" (7:231), as Moody called it, represents the shift "toward treating language as a self-contained world which cannot be linked, at any particular point, to the external world in which we all believe" (7:231).

Moody's criticism of the situation was itself historical. He called a period of philosophical skepticism during the philosophical reign of Scholasticism:

> A second movement, equally expressive of philosophical scepticism and of reaction against the outcome of the scholastic enterprise, was that which is known as humanism. This was a revolt against the "scientific regimentation" of language by the scholastics, in favor of a philological and grammatical concern with language, and of the use of language for the expression of personal attitudes and human experiences, in biographical writing, poetry, history, and essays like those of [Michel de] Montaigne. The Bible was studied as historical literature, rather than as something to be construed in terms of theological doctrine. All this was the Renaissance return to "ordinary language," and to empiricism without theory. (7:238)

Returning to his current time, "our own Age of Analysis, and viewing the state of philosophy in this year of grace 1963" (7:238), Moody questioned what grounds there might be "for optimism or for pessimism" (7:238) for the future of philosophy. He hoped that "our 'ordinary language' trend should evolve into a new renaissance of literary creativity" (7:239). Meanwhile, perhaps with some degree of irony, he concluded, "if the ontological anxieties of our age of metaphysical scepticism can be relieved by the therapies of existentialism, why should we protest?" (7:239).

William Henry Werkmeister (1964–1965) bemoaned the loss of metaphysics in contemporary philosophy in "Reflections on the Possibilities of Metaphysics." He summed up his view of the state of affairs in philosophy as follows:

> The grand and integrative view of the whole of Reality is not fashionable and, in a very profound sense, man has become a problem unto himself. Positivism, existentialism, linguistic analysis—these, each in its own way, have determined the course of development of contemporary philosophy. (7:279)

He argued that philosophy without metaphysics is not possible—in fact, "ontology, as analysis of categories, is not only possible but is a fruitful and an unavoidable task" (7:288).

To show the unavoidable necessity of ontological analysis and, by extension, metaphysics, Werkmeister wended his way through various strains of metaphysics from Kant to Hegel, then on to the personalists, the process philosophers, and Heidegger, whose use of "*Dasein*" he found to be ambiguous. Pressed for an interpretation of this "to be," Heidegger replied, "*Es ist es selbst*" (it is itself)—an answer Werkmeister found un-illuminating after so "prolonged and tortuous an argument as we encounter in *Sein und Zeit* . . . [or] as reflected in his later works" (8:284).

Werkmeister examined two strains of metaphysical approaches derived from Kant, the first being "conjectural metaphysics," by philosophers such as Schopenhauer, Nicolai von Hartmann, Bergson, and Samuel S. Alexander, who, like pre-Socratic philosophers:

> call the Thing-in-itself Will, the Unconscious, élan vital, or a Nisus toward Deity. In each case the interpretation is a conjecture—a proposal from which, as from a scientific hypothesis, principles explanatory of the facts of experience can be deduced. Only in each case, too, it was bad science; and the conjecture remained—a conjecture. (7:283)

Another metaphysical approach derives from Kant's "personalist metaphysics," albeit "a distortion of what Kant had in mind" (7:283), since:

> Kant's position was that, ultimately, we must come to an understanding of the ontological structure of man.[8] The personalists, however, have made "the person" the key category in our understanding of Reality, thus reversing the Kantian order. (7:283)

Werkmeister looked at other exemplary approaches, among them, the Cartesian account, to establish the ground of certitude or the Hegelian completion of Descartes's "self-certitude of human experience" by the addition of the Real—"knowledge which verifies itself to itself and for itself" (7:283).

Then Werkmeister turned to Heidegger, whose linking of being with existing Werkmeister found unhelpful. But in fact, Werkmeister was not satisfied with any of the "distinct approaches to find metaphysical solutions to . . . problems [that] upon closer analysis, . . . I find that there are problems for which no solution can ever be found" (7:284). These problems exist because the very real questions of metaphysics "remain inherently unanswerable" (7:284). These questions are as follows:

> Why is there something at all and not rather nothing? Why is the nature of Reality what it is, and not something else? Is there a purpose, an ultimate goal, inherent in the processes of nature and, therefore, in the cosmos? Why—more specifically, for what purpose—does man exist in this world? (7:284–285)

One way out of this problem of unanswerability is to focus on language analysis—which leaves unanswerable questions unanswerable but unasked. Ultimately, what Werkmeister proposed was a "meticulous analysis of the categories which are involved in each stratum of the Real" (7:286), the modes of being of which include "differentiation of the inorganic, the organic, the psychological, and the spiritual" (7:286).

Metaphysicians of the past had only begun this work; Wermeister suggested that what was needed now in the study of being is the analysis of ontological categories of which the human being is only a part. As he put it:

> since Reality itself can never be less than its highest or most complex manifestation, in viewing man as the microcosm that he is, we obtain a fair glimpse of the categorical structure and stratification of the Real itself. (7:288)

Edwin Arthur Burtt (1964–1965) also took up the question of the importance of the speculative approach in contemporary philosophy, albeit not metaphysics, in "Truth, Understanding, and Philosophy." He questioned what

form speculation might legitimately take, and noted that those who study Ancient philosophy and examine traditional (metaphysical) philosophical questions are seen as the custodians of history, not as philosophers. But his address was no apologia for speculative thought. Rather, it was a call for the further culling of philosophical discourse:

> The history of analytic philosophy during the last fifty years [illustrates that] each of its influential schools arose, attained a dominant position, and passed away in favor of its successor. Each of them had an over-all perspective which determined what problems it picked for detailed analysis and what it assumed to be the essential conditions of a sound analysis. If I am right, that perspective acted in each case as a confining blinder and as an illuminating selector. (7:300)

He asked, "just what is there about speculative philosophy that arouses our distrust and condemnation?" (7:299), to which he replied, "the best answer I can give is this: It is the blithe habit of speculators in the past to claim truth for their grand systems" (7:300). He suggested that what was needed in philosophy was not more speculative thought, but "a logic of progress in our understanding" (7:307).

In "What are Spiritual Phenomena?," Alfred Stern (1965–1966) returned to the speculative and continental approach in his consideration of philosophical questions. He suggested that the term "manager of the spirit" might be aptly applied to philosophers since "it is the philosopher's task to interpret the world in terms of spirit and to establish a record of the spiritual images of the world that have followed each other in time" (7:353).

A philosopher who succeeds in management of the spirit, according to Stern, is Miguel de Unamuno, for whom the spirit as psyche is identified "with man's intellectual powers, his logical operations, those used in common life, in science and technology" (7:354). Unamuno's approach is exceptional for a philosopher, Stern noted, for while:

> all non-philosophers (including the scientists), and even most philosophers, make a distinction between physical and psychical phenomena, but not everybody—not even all philosophers—distinguishes between the *psychical* and the *spiritual*. (7:354–355)

This leads to confusion, which is most deeply felt in the case of Heidegger, whose verbiage Stern found to be pompous. While popular notions of spirit are too vague, Stern thought Heidegger's view—"spirit is the originally disposed, knowing resoluteness toward the essence of being" (7:357)—to be incomprehensible.

Husserl's phenomenology introduces a division between psyche and spirit that Stern found helpful; Husserl's "anti-psychologism" suggested to Stern a way to side-step the postulation of a necessary spirit (7:355). He contended:

> there is no spiritual *being*, no spiritual *reality*, for it is impossible to find a spiritual phenomenon which, as far as its *being* is concerned, is not either psychical or physical, or both at the same time. (7:357)

For Stern:

> what characterizes the spiritual is not *being*, not *reality*, but *meaning*. As "spiritual," we designate all phenomena which have one thing in common: to *mean* something other than they *are* in their immediate reality. (7:357)

This suggests a temporal approach, in some ways like Husserl's concept of protension, the intentional anticipation of what exists or will be, even if it cannot be directly perceived.[4] "On the other hand," Stern noted, "thoughts, ideas, moral, aesthetic, intellectual, or religious feelings are something psychical, since they are mental experiences which occur only in time and constitute the stream of our consciousness" (7:357). These become spiritual to the extent they point to meanings beyond immediacy, which is why, at the end of his address, Stern could assert that, in this sense, "natural science itself is the product of a spiritual activity, an activity in permanent search for meanings" (7:366).

Paul Weiss (1966–1967) was a speculative philosopher par excellence. In "Separate and Equal, but Integrated," he asserted that philosophers should be "radically critical and creatively considerate" (7:401). He argued for a pluralist approach, crossing factional boundaries within the discipline of philosophy:

> Today the trend, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world, is to emphasize the critical factor. As a consequence, philosophy has become exacting and precise, but without a high degree of generosity. If it is not charged with a genuine magnanimity it will surely lose its sense of wonder and will fail to encompass the richness of the world. (7:401)

This criticism of delimiting philosophy's purview to the analytic realm is now familiar. One might wonder why it was so little heard, much less heeded since it was repeated often in The American Philosophical Association presidential addresses. Weiss had an answer:

> It is such lack of generosity that is behind the present fragmentation of empirical studies into a plurality of specialties, each insisting on its limited set of particulars to the exclusion of any others. Linguists are opposed to

> existentialists, and both stand over against the positivists—and yet all are equally fragmentary and defective. (7:401)

Weiss argued that a "full philosophy" must be empirical and speculative, that it must contain an ontology, it must move to experience, and do so not necessarily from a critical perspective, at least at first, but begin with a generous attitude. In other words, antipathy colors perspective, which a more dialectical approach might begin to address, if not ameliorate. He asserted, "generous creative speculation, the art of extending the vision, must be wedded to careful criticism, the habit of self-denial" (7:412). Perhaps then, "once again men can say, without embarrassment or pretentiousness, that they are philosophers, men who, even while they are thinking, want to be wise" (7:412).

In "On the Meaning of 'You,'" Philip Ellis Wheelwright (1966–1967) embraced continental thought directly. Rejecting the ironies of solipsism, he reminded his audience that the work of Ferdinand Ebner, in 1919, and a few years later, of Martin Buber, recognized the inseparability of the "I" from the "Thou." His aim was to address the "you," not as separable from the I-you relation, but as a subject of his main focus, understood as a single individual, not an abstract subject. To avoid confusion, he confined the focus of his attention:

> to the kind of situation in which the you-member of a relationship is a different person from the I member; that is to say, where there is dialogical relationship but ontological distinction between the I and the you. (7:418)

The first part of Wheelwright's argument was a "meta-grammatical" analysis of the pronoun, "you"; the second half raised the "metaphysical question of aliosubjectivity—the question of the grounds underlying one's belief in the existence of other conscious selves" (7:418). With a nearly Levinasian intimation—or at the very least, a precursor to the Levinasian idea of the primacy of relationship[5]—he asserted, "dialogical aliosubjectivity is prior to conceptual aliosubjectivity—i.e., prior both existentially and epistemologically" (7:418).

Wheelwright fleshed out the concept of aliosubjectivity: it is a relation of minds with each other, it is also the recognition that persons are loci of judgment in and of themselves. This is not something that can be merely empirically verified precisely because it is a relation that must be presupposed. In sum, Wheelwright's project was:

> to point to certain lines of philosophical investigation which are suggested by examining the meaning of "you" and the relations of that fluctuating pronoun-idea to the metaphysical concept of aliosubjectivity and thereby to the concepts of the world and oneself. (7:428)

Vivian Jerauld McGill (1968–1969), in "Scientific Ethics and Negotiation," argued for a "cognitive, naturalistic theory of ethics, which we shall also call pragmatic" (7:513), which should at least point in favor of the argument that American pragmatism and continental philosophy bear thematic, if not stylistic, resemblance, and that both are linked to the speculative enterprise of philosophical inquiry.

Herbert Marcuse (1968–1969) was a student of Martin Heidegger and political philosophy super-star. In "The Relevance of Reality," he argued for the ethical necessity of action as a result of knowledge. Knowledge itself is irremediably contextual, historically linked to place and time:

> All philosophy, no matter how abstract and speculative, constructs its conceptual universe with the material provided by a particular *historical* universe, which remains operative even in the purest abstractions and speculations—not as sociological conditioning "from outside," but as the very stuff of which concepts are made. (7:558)

This means, contra Plato and the entire history of philosophical idealism, that conceptual thinking must confront "the material force of existential conditions which thought can neither master nor change" (7:558). But Hegel gets it wrong, too, according to Marcuse, even if the reconciliation of philosophy with history portends the end of idealism. Hegel's form of idealism, which becomes the Real when reason comes into its own—the rational is the real and the real is the rational—is "the grandiose attempt to read the logic of liberation into the history of servitude" (7:559). However, Hegel's freedom of human beings conforming to the movement of reason as it pertains to the "announcement of the advent of Reason and Freedom in history was wildly premature" (7:559).

And so, asked Marcuse, what "miraculous event has bridged the gap between philosophy and reality?" (7:559), to which he lodged a criticism of the predominance of analytic method in academic philosophy:

> There is a familiar answer: reality has "overtaken" philosophy in a very empirical sense: scientific, technical, material progress has preempted the domain of philosophy, or rather of all "*pure*" philosophy which tried to remove from its concepts their historical denominator. Such philosophy seems to be *reduced* to the order of an intellectual exercise; rather removed from the human condition, and only modestly interested *in* the human condition. (7:563)

What is lost is not only the link with existential life but ethical life. He raised the following questions:

> What is the point in subtle epistemological investigations when science and technology, not unduly worried about the foundations of their knowledge, increase daily their mastery of nature and man? What is the point of a linguistic analysis which steers clear of the transformation of language (ordinary language!) into an instrument of political control? What is the point in philosophical reflections on the meaning of good and evil when Auschwitz, the Indonesian massacres, and the war in Vietnam provide a definition which suffocates all discussion on ethics? And what is the point in further philosophical occupation with Reason and Freedom when the resources and the features of a rational society, and the need for liberation are all too clear, and the problem is, not their concept but the political practice of their realization? (7:559–560)

Marcuse asserted that epistemology and logic are not themselves sufficient to describe the domain of philosophy, but that delimiting philosophy's purview to these fields is in itself a political act. "One's own theoretical house is not necessarily a sanctuary from reality, it may also be a workshop for intellectual weapons offered to reality" (7:561). The political, social exigencies of the day demand more thorough and engaged critique; indeed, "under these circumstances, the analysis and development of a transcending consciousness—the germane task of philosophy—assumes renewed urgency" (7:562). He called for a radical rethinking of various domains in philosophy: epistemology, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy. The aim is to broaden fields of inquiry; for instance, the history of philosophy cannot be studied without understanding political concerns and power relations, as well as the "internal relation between the theory of knowledge and the theory of government, political theory" (7:563). Analysis cannot be discrete or superficial. If what makes philosophy relevant today is action, action itself "presupposes knowledge of the conditions, limitations, and capabilities of change" (7:564). What must be interrogated and known are the structures of existing society, and "action itself—in order to be able to attain its goal—calls for thought, for theory" (7:564). Thus, the relation between action and theory is itself dialectical; each modality depends upon and serves the other:

> To be sure, this dialectic of progress is nothing new; new are the deadly efficient (and comforting) controls which bar its awareness; new is the scope of the false consciousness, its all but immediate, direct coincidence, harmony with reality. (7:564)

Stuart Newton Hampshire's (1969–1970; 1990–1991) "A Kind of Materialism" presented a contemporary reading of Spinoza through the lens of analytic epistemology, which means that the scope of the paper does not quite fit within

the subject matter of speculative philosophy or continental thought despite the geographic and historical context of Spinoza.

In "Philosophical Disagreements and World Views," William Thomas Jones (1969–1970) proposed a hypothesis to account for the fact that concerted effort by "acute minds," produces not consensus, but such diversity that "certain schools of thought find it unrewarding, if not impossible, to communicate with each other" (7:613). He argued that these differences "be it in ethics, epistemology, or metaphysics, can be accounted for, at least in part, by differences in the worldviews of philosophers" (7:613).

Jones's argument rested on the thesis, "differences in worldview also produce inconclusive disagreements in the sciences—in psychological theory and in sociology, for instance—and incompatible styles in the arts and literature" (7:613). The idea that divergence in perspective influences what counts as truth or as real is as old as the philosophical enterprise, but the idea that perspectivalism underlies disciplines that pride themselves on their objectivity remains relevant in the twenty-first century. In Jones's words:

> What I am putting forward is thus an anthropological, not strictly speaking a philosophical, hypothesis; it challenges philosophers to step outside their subject, at least for a moment, and to look at it as a part of the general culture, which includes philosophical thinking among its products, along with religious rituals, kinships, and, even, pots and pans. (7:614)

This metaphilosophical approach—"meta-attitude"—serves to situate the view of a given disciplinary approach or historical event from vantages both imminent and external:

> The German terms *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis* correspond closely to the distinction I am drawing. *Erlebnis* is experience that is *erlebt*, lived through; it is direct, personal acquaintance with. *Erfahrung* is experience also, but it is experience witnessed from outside, rather than lived through from inside—it is knowledge about. (7:621)

Lived experience is subjective, which allows for a felt-sense understanding, as opposed to an abstract or objective view of truth, which Søren Kierkegaard rejected "as worthless" (7:622). Jones described this opposition of the subjective and objective poles within philosophy:

> Generally speaking, as we move towards the *Erfahrung* pole of this dimension, we find philosophers expressing an increasing distrust of feeling and an increasing emphasis on formal proof. . . . If we now move toward the

> other pole . . . toward an increasing *Erlebnis*-orientation, we begin to find a derogation of consciousness and of reason (analysis is now regarded as distorting and falsifying, as in Schopenhauer's and Bergson's epistemology), and insight, intuition, and aperçu are now typically praised as far more reliable cognitive modes. . . . still farther . . . we reach positions just the reverse of that of the Positivists. Here we find philosophers . . . seeking an ideal language, but *their* ideal is not a language in which we communicate neutrally about neutral objects and events over there outside us; it is a language of poetry and mysticism, in which we express our insights and intuitions. . . . still farther . . . we reach positions in which all language fails and must fail: the One is incommunicable, and everything else is illusion. (7:622)

Those holding "extreme positions" cannot understand those holding the extreme opposite perspective, obviously; communication between the two poles is impossible. Further, what counts as justification or corroboration in support of intuitive knowledge, on the one hand, or a general theory, on the other, is quite different and irreconcilable, as well:

> According to those with an *Erfahrung*-orientation, the way to make a case is, naturally, to marshal evidence, to present arguments, to expose the fallacies in opponents' reasoning. But philosophers with an *Erlebnis*-orientation discount this . . . . They make *their* case . . . by aphorism, epigram, and, generally, dark sayings. They do not want to lead us to draw such-and-such a conclusion to which they hold that the evidence points . . . rather, they want, by means of hint, suggestion, and shock, to jolt us into the position they themselves occupy, so that we now see the world with their eyes. Thus what one school regards as presenting an effective case for its position, the other regards as "implausible"—not merely a poor case of the right sort, but a wrong sort of case. (7:623)

Jones argued that these very different worldviews are the reason why different schools of thought can be at such profound communicative impasse philosophically. It is more rewarding to talk with those who speak from the same framework of understanding, and so it might seem as if there would not be a great deal to be gained in speaking across differences without discerning any common ground:

> I have put forward an hypothesis to account for why philosophical disagreements tend to be inconclusive. This hypothesis is that, underlying such inconclusive disagreements, are profound differences in worldview, profound differences in what may be called a pre-cognitive vision of the world. Such differences in vision of course affect disagreements in other

> fields, but they are especially noticeable in philosophy, and philosophical disagreements are therefore a useful case study of the nature of disagreements generally. (7:626)

2. 1971–1980

By the 1970s, academic philosophy was dominated by analytic or linguistic modes of thinking, and other philosophical approaches lying outside this worldview were considered to be the "history of philosophy" or "ethics"—or were largely marginalized. Yet critics remained.

Arthur John Terence Dibben Wisdom (1970–1971) spoke on "Epistemological Enlightenment," arguing for a pluralist acceptance of questions raised by varying philosophical approaches in the pursuit of knowledge, if not wisdom. Using a Berkeleyan dialogic approach, Wisdom stated, not without some degree of wistfulness:

> I hope that someday some philosopher or party of philosophers will write a book about the manifold of types of knowledge, in which examples are so well accompanied by comment and general statements that no one is left in a condition in which he can't see the wood for the trees, and general statements are so well supplemented with examples that everyone understands what those statements do and don't mean and apprehends all the variety in what they cover. (8:47)

Although not a continental philosopher, Henry Babcock Veatch (1970–1971) also argued for pluralism within the academy in "Language and Ethics: 'What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba?'" He addressed the diminishment of philosophical inquiries that relegate philosophers working outside the designated limits of "linguistic philosophy" as either historians of philosophy or as not philosophers at all.

Lewis White Beck (1971–1972) is categorized as a historian of philosophy. His address, "Extraterrestrial Intelligent Life," was an inquiry based on the work of Kant, among others. He asked his audience to "consider a perennial theme in philosophy which is neglected by philosophers at a time when it is most cherished by scientists" (8:73). In other words, he challenged the limits of what is considered philosophically acceptable except *as* history.

In "Sartre and the Other," Marjorie Glicksman Grene (1971–1972) proposed to share "a fragmentary speculation about Sartre and what he has called the problem of the Other, in particular as expounded in *Being and Nothingness*[6] in the two chapters on the Other and the Body" (8:99). But she had misgivings in even taking on this topic, since "it's obscure even to myself in what sense

what I am going to say—and to report Sartre as saying—counts as philosophy" (8:99). First, she had trouble classifying which school of thought under which it should be classified. Her "second reason for self-doubt: *Being and Nothingness* presents a view of man and the world which is, I believe, almost entirely mistaken" (8:99). Grene proceeded, however, because she found *Being and Nothingness* to be an excellent exemplar of the "tradition of Western thought" (8:99).

It is Sartre's dual aspect of the *cogito* that Grene elucidated: the first is prereflective, that is, not properly intentional. In her words:

> It is this non-thetic awareness (of) self, not the pure Cartesian intuition that forms for [Sartre] the unique starting point of philosophy.
>
> To reach the Other, then, Sartre claims, he now needs a second *cogito*, in the move to which he finds a parallel to the movement of Descartes's argument in the *Third Meditation*. (8:100)

Sartre contrasts being and knowing, although his postulation of intentional consciousness neither leads to nor is founded upon the existence of God.

But the revelation of the self-conscious *cogito* is for Sartre, as it is for Descartes, linked to "a second directly apprehended presence" (8:101). Not God, but the Other constitutes this presence, and "the experience through which he apprehends it is the experience of shame" (8:101). The experience of being seen is the catalyst for shame (and fear, jealousy, pride), and is not a problem of knowing or, "as analytical philosophers usually put it, how I know other minds" (8:101), but is a move from "being to being" (8:101). Thus, it is through emotion that "I am" in the world, emotion evoked by the Other's presence:

> This duality of non-thetic consciousness, the way I am in the world through my emotion, so that my emotion is just my way of being-in-the-world and yet at the same time makes the world what it is, makes the grapes sour or my mistress unfaithful: this duality of situation is universal. But there are certain emotions—fear, shame, and pride—which uniquely reveal the Other, reveal him not as a probable object in my world, but as lived by me in his very being. (8:102)

This is to say that Grene viewed the Sartrean self's awareness of the Other as the awareness that, for the Other, "I" am an object in the Other's world, a character in the Other's life, "the target in his sight" (8:102). With this realization comes the loss of the subject's freedom, since "I" do not direct the course of action of the Other. "Thus the Other reveals himself by robbing me of my freedom: it is, suddenly, *his* freedom I have to live, not mine" (8:102).

This second *cogito*, as Grene explained, is on the level of being, not knowing, because what the "I" perceives in view of being perceived by the Other still has nothing to do with knowing or being known as a self. What the Other knows about me has nothing to do with who I am, even if I take on the identity projected by the Other. This identity is not oneself. "It is separated from me by an infinite gap: the gap between my projection of my possibilities and the Other's projection of his possibilities, including this strange double that is 'me'" (8:102). This means that a fundamental fact of being is alienation. Grene continued:

> Moreover, the whole of Sartrean sociality consists in attempts to evade this fate: in ruses to make the Other keep his objectivity in the world of my freedom, and so to prevent *my* relapse into objectivity in the world that *he* freely constitutes. (8:102)

Pride allows a seeming reprieve when in the act of self-assertion against the Other's objectification of the self, but this is illusionary, since, "though I have to be myself alone, there is, against me, an Other who will not let me be—because he would be, instead" (8:104). No wonder we have Sartre's famous dictum, "hell is other people!"

Grene challenged this fundamental and irremediable relational *agon* in Sartre's schema. Relying on the "testimony of experience," she pointed to "the rare but still indubitable experience of mutual understanding, of the reciprocal look of peers or the look of mother and infant, where the one protects and the other is protected" (8:104). Because there seems to be no "internecine warfare" here, she argues three points upon which Sartre's preliminary analyses "clearly goes astray" (8:104).

According to Grene, Sartre's first error "is the confinement of the pre-reflective *cogito* to consciousness (of) self" (8:105), which presupposes a self-consciousness pre-formed and results in a being who is always already at war with the world. This conceptualization is at odds with the phenomenological notion of consciousness developing in relational tension with the world, what Husserl "christened 'protension' and 'retention' the forward and backward aspects of temporal consciousness" (8:106).

Grene also argued against Sartre on the basis of an essential aspect of being oneself, which is "being with others" (8:106). Finally, Grene claimed, "Sartre has taken a fatal misstep" in asserting that the "being-for-Others is not an ontological structure of the For-itself" (8:106). This is:

> what Sartre fails to see, and, given his Cartesian starting point, could not see, is that both the for-itself and the for-others depend for their very possibility on what we may call . . . the among-others. The for-itself and the

> for-others are both expressions, and developments, of the fundamental structure of being-with-others-in-the world. To put it in ordinary . . . language, the human individual is, in his humanity and in his individuality, necessarily and essentially an expression of a social world. (8:107)

It is within the social world that being develops, is expressed, and participates, "however he may rebel against it" (8:107). Crucially:

> Sartre has been operating all along . . . in terms of a strict dichotomy between knowing and being, or knowing and living. Knowing, for him, is a thetic confrontation with the object of thought; contrasted with it is the non-thetic awareness of the fashion in which, the passion by which, I relate myself to myself as knowing that object. (8:111)

Knowing is utterly separate from being—what is known cannot be lived, what is lived, as it is lived, cannot be known—and thus action is in some sense separated from consciousness. Grene rejected this dichotomy, denying any "irreconcilable duality of living against knowing" (8:112). Instead, "it is the unity-in-plurality of lived bodily being as it bears on knowing and, indeed, on all rational action" (8:112). Grene concluded with a further thesis, one deeply resonant with American pragmatism and more recent phenomenological analyses:

> It is only with the others that I can have the breathing space to be myself. Thus however inward and immediate its feelings, the for-itself is not a pure, self-dependent negation of an alien in-itself, but a bodily sedimentation, subjectively experienced, of the among-others. (8:115)

Several presidents following Grene alluded to Descartes to critique "positivist" philosophy, but not until the end of the decade was such a critique done from the continental perspective. In "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," Richard McKay Rorty (1979–1980) argued for a renewed look at continental philosophy, especially the American pragmatist tradition. He emphasized the fundamental link between the individual and the social world, but argued:

> Unlike Nietzsche and Heidegger . . . the pragmatists did not make the mistake of turning against the community which takes the natural scientist as its moral hero—the community of secular intellectuals which came to self-consciousness in the Enlightenment. James and Dewey rejected neither the Enlightenment's choice of the scientist as moral example, nor the technological civilization which science had created. They wrote, as Nietzsche and Heidegger did not, in a spirit of social hope. (8:654)

3. 1981–1990

John Edwin Smith (1981–1982)'s "The New Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," was inspired by the dominance of analytic philosophy in the academy. He argued that a recovery of philosophy demands "a concerted attack upon problems arising from our efforts to define and sustain a life that is human as over against a war between philosophers largely bent on scoring points in an academic intelligence test" (9:67). Although he mainly focused on the American pragmatist tradition, his emphasis on "lived experience" evoked Husserl, Heidegger, and Bergson as much as James. Human life and experience cannot be "objectified," he writes, and "in lived experience the self does not merely look at what it lives through, but is aware of being engaged in it and constituted by it" (9:73).

Smith explained, "to say that philosophy must find a base in crude experience is to insist on the priority of experience as we live through or undergo it" (9:72). This entails dialectical engagement of the personal and the cultural, that is, showing how individual experience:

> "fits into" a larger life pattern. Experience in this sense, as Heidegger, Bergson, James and others have pointed out, is not the same as the objectified experience of the theoretical observer. In lived experience the self does not merely look at what it lives through, but is aware of being engaged in it and constituted by it. (9:72–73)

Philosophy must dare to reengage in "substantive philosophical discussion" (9:78), as opposed to remain preoccupied with "preliminaries" such as fixation on the precise meaning of a concept, which only serves to divert inquiry and understanding from the "relevant human situations" in which a problem might be better understood (9:73).

Smith argued for the embrace of philosophical pluralism, and thereby rejected the claim, "any single approach to philosophy is the only legitimate one" (9:78), as well as the claim that those whose approach to philosophical inquiry in the same way and by the same set of criteria as the dominant mode are "ipso facto not engaged in philosophy at all" (9:78). He urged his fellow philosophers to overcome the factionalizing divisions within academic philosophy:

> If we can recover among ourselves the sense that the baffling character of philosophical problems demands nothing less than a cooperative endeavor instead of partisan strife, we shall have taken an important step forward in the direction of recovering for philosophy itself a more powerful and respected voice in our culture. (9:79)

Adolph Grünbaum (1982–1983), in "Freud's Theory: The Perspective of a Philosopher of Science," presented a strong argument in support of Freud's as-

sertion that psychoanalysis bears the status of a natural science. His argument shared a key feature with continental philosophy in that he found "Freud's criterion of scientificity was methodological and not ontologically reductive" (9:147).

Grünbaum rejected the view of Freud as "having fallen prey to a far-reaching 'scientistic self-misunderstanding'" (9:147)—as Habermas put it—and argued against the claim that Freud "idolatrously endowed the clinical theory with natural science status under the ideological aegis of the metapsychology" (9:147). He noted that Paul Ricoeur, Hans Georg Gadamer, and others joined Habermas in rejecting Freud's work as sufficiently empirical to qualify as science, and clarified their dismissal:

> far from questioning the etiologic and therapeutic hypotheses of Freud's clinical theory, these hermeneuticians claim to take them for granted without ado. What they purportedly tried to controvert are rather the philosophical tenets that, as they see it, Freud had misguidedly grafted onto those hypotheses. Hence in my appraisal of their views, I shall refrain from challenging the credentials of Freud's clinical hypotheses. But, as we shall see thereafter, there are ample grounds for such a challenge. (9:148)

Grünbaum's criticism of the hermeneuticians is itself an hermeneutic analysis of Freud's texts, as well as an argument for the "*cumulativity of historicality*" built into scientific ideas and "physical laws" (9:150). He stated that Habermas and Gadamer "have managed to parlay the severe limitations of their own personal scientific horizons into a *pseudo-contrast* between the humanistic disciplines and the natural sciences" (9:152).

However, Grünbaum was not a pure apologist for Freud's psychoanalytic schema. In his own lengthy and carefully constructed appraisal of "Freud's principal arguments for his monumental clinical theory of personality and therapy" (9:172), he conceded, "insofar as evidence for the psychoanalytic corpus is now held to derive from the productions of patients in analysis, this warrant is remarkably weak" (9:173). On the other hand, this is not to say the Freud's work is without clinical or philosophical import, for as Grünbaum noted, "despite the poverty of the clinical credentials, it may still turn out that Freud's brilliant theoretical imagination was actually quite serendipitous for psychopathology or the understanding of some subclass of slips" (9:172). Finally, he suggested:

> in view of my account of the epistemic defects inherent in the psychoanalytic method, it would seem that the validation of Freud's cardinal hypotheses has to come, if at all, mainly from well-designed extra-clinical studies, either epidemiologic or even experimental. (9:172)

Grünbaum's address, including his 2008 addendum printed in this series, is important to continental philosophy because of its emphasis on the inextricable

bonds between individuality and social relations. While philosophers such as Habermas and Ricoeur reject the Freudian schema, Grünbaum argued that the psychoanalytic relation itself—the relation between analysand and analyst—mirrors a fundamental dynamic of the individual psyche, which is that cognitive consciousness is not autonomous.

Grünbaum's own argument stayed with the psychoanalytic relation, however: "if the analysand were actually the ultimate epistemic arbiter, as depicted by Habermas, then the patients treated by psychoanalysts would have truly formidable cognitive powers" (9:153). This would mean the patient would "be not only the best judge, but ultimately the sole judge of what was in fact the cause of his neurotic disorder" (9:153). He contended, "this epistemic thesis [2008 Addendum: of the patient's cognitive monopoly] is a house of cards, no less than Habermas's two alleged causal dichotomies" (9:154).

Richard Jacob Bernstein's (1988–1989) address, "Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds" resounded the theme of recovery of (and for) philosophy. Acknowledging that philosophy in the United States was represented by a "heterogeneous bunch," Bernstein asserted that American philosophy has been shaped by rival traditions. Drawing on the pragmatic tradition, he aimed to "gain critical perspective on our present situation in philosophy. To do so one must study the past—the traditions that have shaped and still are shaping us" (9:601). This "present situation," to which Bernstein referred, was not only the continuing predominance of analytic philosophy, but the growing antipathy toward "postmodernism" (9:601). Bernstein suggested that the latter a trend anticipated by the pragmatist tradition.

Bernstein criticized the contemporary trends in philosophy that emphasize method over critical and genealogical analysis of ideas and their origins. He presented a case for the philosophical importance of the classical American pragmatists vis-à-vis links with European thought. He connected key figures of American pragmatism such as Charles Sanders Peirce, James, and John Dewey (1905–1906) the historical foregrounding of each saying:

> each drew upon diverse European philosophic traditions, reshaping and criticizing them in distinctive ways. The very idea of an Anglo-American/continental split in philosophy would have made no sense during this creative formative stage of the pragmatic ethos. (9:602)

Bernstein analyzed the speculative philosophy/analytic rift in academic philosophy, noting:

> During the period following the Second World War, when there was an enormous growth of academic philosophy, there was virtually a scurrying

> to refashion graduate schools so that they would become respectable analytic departments. . . . the time when the Anglo-American/Continental split became an almost unbridgeable chasm. What was going on in European "philosophy" was taken to be pretentious, obscure, woolly, and muddled. By the new standards of what constituted "doing philosophy," continental philosophy no longer counted as "serious" philosophy. (9:607)

There were exceptions, of course—"pockets of resistance," in Bernstein's words—but in the main, analytic philosophy, becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex, dominated philosophical discourse within the academy.

Although the view persisted that analytic philosophy continued to dominate philosophy, Bernstein argued that this was no longer the case—and not only because a de facto trait of philosophy in America then was its "sheer heterogeneity and plurality" (9:609), but because problems of the life-world persisted. Or, as Bernstein explained, the philosophical impulse toward dealing with these problems has never entirely abated, despite trends within the academy. This impulse was captured by Dewey, when he spoke of "the need to address the 'problems of men'—the problems of human beings" (9:609).

Part of the break-up of the "ideology" of what properly constitutes philosophy occurred because of what happens socially and politically in the world outside philosophy departments:

> New voices also demanded to be heard—as evidenced by feminist and minority concerns. And as the philosophy curriculum in many prestigious analytic graduate departments began to shrink-excluding or marginalizing philosophers who were no longer to be taken "seriously"—our colleagues in departments of religion and literature began teaching Hegel, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger. (9:609)

Thus:

> The ideological battles of my generation are beginning to seem remote and irrelevant. Scars from the wounds of these battles still remain, but there are encouraging signs of the emergence of a new ethos—one which bears strong affinities with the ethos characteristic of the formative stages of the pragmatic movement. (9:610)

However, the wounds from factionalizing are not fully healed—in part because where one stands within the world of professional philosophy continues to be described "in terms of an Anglo-American/Continental split" (9:614). Nevertheless, the "philosophic interminglings" then taking place rendered this view irrel-

evant. Philosophy was now "decentered." Bernstein asserted, "there is no single paradigm, research program, or orientation that dominates philosophy. The fact is that our situation is pluralistic" (9:614).

Bernstein saw the challenge in philosophy to be how best to respond to and incorporate a plurality of frameworks for analyses in ways that resist "tendencies toward fragmentation" (9:614), allowing for the possibility, instead, to engage in "counter-tendencies" of breaking down disciplinary boundaries:

> The pragmatist legacy is especially relevant, in particular the call to nurture the type of community and solidarity where there is an engaged fallibilistic pluralism—one that is based upon mutual respect, where we are willing to risk our own prejudgments, are open to listening and learning from others. and we respond to others with responsiveness and responsibility. (9:614)

5. 1991–2000

In "The Untruth and the Truth of Skepticism," Panayot Krustev Butchvarov (1992–1993) addressed the skeptic by first raising "the chief problem of epistemology . . . how we can know whether some objects we perceive are real" which will require bypassing epistemology altogether (10:129). While the skeptic's concern is primarily epistemic, having to do with whether we can "know, or at least have evidence, that some of the objects we perceive are real" (10:129), the real question for all, including the skeptic, concerns the relation between our perception of things and the things themselves. This is the problem Kant resolved by separating the phenomenal from the noumenal, and Butchvarov's aim was to again question the being of the object "from the standpoint of metaphysics . . . to understand being qua known or at least knowable, we must first understand being qua being" (10:129).

Butchvarov's approach suggests a kind of hybrid phenomenological inquiry; he began by questioning what it means to perceive an object, using the word "perceive" both in its ordinary usage and in the sense conceived by Husserl, "that of a direct awareness or consciousness of a material object, a sense in which it is perfectly intelligible to speak also of perceiving unreal, nonexistent objects"; for example, Hamlet's dagger (10:129).

Situating his argument within the context of contemporary analytic epistemology, Butchvarov noted:

> in recent discussions of skepticism there is very little said about the concept of reality. The detailed discussions of knowledge, evidence, and justification proceed as if it mattered little what precisely is that of which we

> may or may not have knowledge, or evidentially based or justified beliefs about. (10:130)

—in other words, reality. Historically, philosophers have not shunned this topic:

> In modem philosophy we are familiar with Berkeley's view that in the case of the objects of perception to be is to be perceived, whether by oneself or by another, including God. We are also familiar with John Stuart Mill's view that the reality of a material object is nothing but the permanent possibility of certain sensations. And we know that Heidegger sought an understanding of Being by explicitly denying that it is *a* being and hoped for a very special grasp of it, one grounded in an interpretation of Time. (10:130)

Examining different historical conceptualizations of reality and rejecting the adequacy of each, Butchvarov put forth an idea:

> at the risk of offending the reader's logical sensibilities, I suggest that we replace it with the idea that a thing exists if and only if *there is* an indefinite number of objects each identical with it, whether or not we have ever encountered any of them. (10:132)

The advantage of this definition is that what it implies "two intentional objects may be identical as long as we allow that an intentional object need not be actually intended by anyone" (10:133). In other words, the emphasis is on consciousness of a perceived (or not actually perceived) object:

> In effect, I have offered an account of [reality, or existence] in terms of the concept of identity. But what is the content of this concept of identity? . . . Presumably, if there were such a thing, such a being, as identity, it could only be a relation. So, let us ask ourselves whether the genuine, informative applications of the concept of identity imply that between the so-called two things there is a relation that might be called identity. (10:133)

This relation is not mere "sameness," but neither is it radical unrelatedness, as the Heraclitean or Humean view would have it—a view that Plato showed in the *Thatetus* "entails that no coherent thought or speech is possible" (10:135).

What Butchvarov proposed is a transcendental conceptualization of identity, which means "it stands for nothing in, of, or between objects" (10:135), but is rather the constitutive measure according to which objects in reality are perceived; the measure itself cannot be an object. This is a Kantian point but, Butchvarov insisted:

> one need not be a Kantian to acknowledge that at least with respect to the concepts of identity and reality no explanation of their origin or possibility can be given, since any such explanation must presuppose them. Anyone who thinks that it can be given by science, or by some facts about our language, or about our culture, simply has failed to sense the depth of the issue. (10:136)

As Kant would have it, existence cannot be a property of objects (10:136). Thus, Butchvarov suggested, "we should think of it as the indefinite identifiability of the object to which it is ascribed, in the sense that there is an indefinite number of objects with each of which it is identical" (10:136).

The advantage of Butchvarov's conception over the phenomenological view is that it is closer to a common-sense view of reality, appealing to objects' identities as "things themselves," as opposed to being a product of the machinations of sense data or even perceptual consciousness, emphasizing, "an object exists if and only if there is an indefinite number of objects with each of which it is identical" (10:136).

Identity is neither an object nor a being; neither does it have any status as a relation according to Butchvarov. Rather, it is a concept, and as such, is "the result of a conceptual *decision* by us" (10:136). Therefore, identity "is not something we discover, it is something we decide, or expect to decide, as it should be if what I have said about identity is true and if reality is reducible to identity" (10:137). Based on this "preliminary" work, Butchvarov addressed the skeptic:

> Reality is not an object of knowledge or evidentially based belief, it is an object of decision, and thus the skeptic's question whether we know or even have evidence with respect to any perceptual object that it is real does not even arise, indeed it cannot be sensibly asked. And the skeptic's own answer to that question, namely that we do not, perhaps even cannot, know or even have evidence that the object is real is not false but still it is untrue, for there is no genuine question to which it is an answer. (10:137)

Thus, "indeed there is a sense in which we make the world ourselves" (10:138).

Moreover, the skeptic is likely to raise further questions, the most difficult of which pertains to whether "the identifiability of the objects" (10:140) is indefinite, and if not, why. Butchvarov's answer was existentially pragmatic: "no sense can be given to the idea of an object's being genuinely (i.e., not facetiously or whimsically) identified on one occasion but not being identifiable on any number of other occasions, whether by oneself or by others" (10:140).

Once a decision is made about the identity of an object, a decision itself:

> motivated by our general conception of the world, by how seriously we take our ordinary causal assumptions and what science tells us, by what actual perceptions we find ourselves having, perhaps even our moral concerns, (10:141)

then clearly this decision is not cavalier or fleeting. Such a decision does not "justify" or prove the reality of an object, epistemologically speaking, but *is* the transcendental frame of identification. This is not a matter of mapping or applying concepts to a reality pre-given; it is making a decision that something *is*. But if this is momentous, it is humbling: "to be responsible for the reality of the world is not to have created the world" (10:144). As Butchvarov stated:

> Once our concept of identity is fixed, that is, our habits of employing it are established, the general categorial structure of the world is also fixed, and the adequacy of our statements, theories, and thoughts to it can be determined, in principle, by a comparison with it. We can even describe this adequacy as truth, in some sense of "correspondence." (10:147)

Does this imply a kind of relativism, then? Butchvarov denied that his schema implies "conceptual relativism" (10:147), because "the most important fact about the world is what is identical with what, and what is not, and our view makes this fact merely one about our conceptual habits" (10:148). What he took seriously is what Kant recognized; how we perceive and know the world are "to a large extent a function of our cognitive endowment, whether perceptual or conceptual or logical" (10:148). To recognize this is to see that epistemological analysis misses the point about something of "related but perhaps much greater value" (10:148).

Without understanding that our conceptual recognition of objects is already to have made a decision them is to divide ourselves from reality, as if we were only explorers. If we are implicated, responsible for what we see and know, then the impetus to seek knowledge is great; "without it we can make no sense of the idea of seeking knowledge and thus of our motivation to seek knowledge" (10:148).

Although not usually viewed as a continental philosopher, Peter Guy Winch (1995–1996) deserves mention here. Renowned scholar of Wittgenstein, his "The Expression of Belief" examined Wittgenstein's conception of belief in the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*[7] and *Philosophical Investigations*.[8] Winch stated that there is an "immense gulf . . . between Wittgenstein's conception of the subject and that of the mainstream" (10:389). Wittgenstein's argument for his conceptualization of belief is structured in such a way that makes it altogether different from that "commonly met with in philosophical argument," Winch

writes, "but the difference is certainly not a matter of lower degree of rigor or connectedness" (10:389). Wittgenstein "introduces new conceptions of what these argumentative virtues can amount to" (10:389). These virtues would appear to connect Wittgenstein to philosophers of the life-world as opposed to those for whom argument should be analyzed according to the discursive logic of reference and speech utterances. The most salient divergence from the mainstream found in Wittgenstein's work is that on the problem of belief. Although he contributed greatly to analytic epistemology, he was not focused on the more tradition questions regarding belief, such as: "'What is belief?' 'Is it a state, a process, an activity, a disposition, or what?' 'Is it something psychological or something physiological, or does it partake of both?' 'How are different kinds of belief to be classified?'" (10:389).

Instead, Wittgenstein's main thrust is a "elucidating what it is for a system to be a 'logical' system'" (10:390). Winch explained:

> His point could be put like this: if I say simply "I believe" or "have a belief" [and no completion concerning *what* I believe is supplied by the context], I tell my hearer absolutely nothing about my "state." Insofar as a description is what is in question at all, it is a description *completely* dependent on the report of *what* I believe. (10:393)

There is, then, a transcendent element of communication that can neither be reduced to speech nor, in the case of belief, to the object or inference uttered (or not stated) in any given sentence. Wittgenstein's analysis of the systemic logic of speech is not equivalent to the logic of utterances; language and communication are rooted in the world of contexts and inferential meanings. As Winch put it, "the context which serves to determine the sense of a thought or belief may be as far-reaching as you like; it need not be confined to the immediate circumstances" (10:395). Moreover, these circumstances can be quite nuanced: "There are cases in which my knowledge of the kind of life a person has had will be what makes me able to understand his or her utterance" (10:395).

The upshot of Winch's analysis of Wittgenstein's conceptual framing of belief was a complex emphasis on context, psychology, intention, irony, even Sartrean "*mauvaise foi*" (bad faith)—an indictment that Winch found sufficiently "logical" perhaps, but in "a rather unsavory manner" (10:401). Nevertheless, Wittgenstein referred to the phenomenon of "two people speaking out of my mouth" (10:401) to be something of the essence of belief expression, whether due to the demands of different roles or where there might be a real moral conflict, or perhaps just hypocrisy. Context is crucial to understanding what is being expressed. Winch noted:

> I have spoken of Wittgenstein's contention that in order to understand the intricacies of the ways in which we speak of "believing" we must study the

> intricacies of the different forms of behavior for which these ways of speaking are "an auxiliary and extension." (10:402)

Stanley Louis Cavell's (1996–1997) address, "Something Out of the Ordinary," is exemplary of the century's continental framework of philosophy as speculative philosophy par excellence; it also crosses disciplinary borders with linguistic analysis (specifically, ordinary language philosophy of Ayer and Austin), American pragmatism and continental philosophy, as well as with autobiography, psychology, literature, opera, film, dance, and aesthetic theory. Beginning with a series of quotations from Dewey, Emerson, and Nietzsche, Cavell aims to get at a "feature of the aesthetic claim" (10:436), which he suggests is a "kind of compulsion to share a pleasure" (10:436) a compulsion linked to anxiety, for fear that one's claim and one's pleasure might be rebuked.

Cavell addressed the theme of "experience lost or missed" (10:436)—the inability or fear of talking about an experience or worse, not even grasping what has been experienced:

> To know how to tell such things, it seems, is just to know how to speak. My oblivion of them came to strike me, intermittently, not exactly as revealing my life to be unexamined, but as missed by me, lost on me. (10:437)

Cavell proceeded with his theme of experience missed by proposing to show a brief clip from the film *The Bandwagon* (1955), that illustrates how his "approach to aesthetic matters" (10:437) differs from Kant and Anglo-American philosophy, but is finds compatibility with Hegel, Nietzsche, and "for better or worse, in Heidegger" (10:437). Cavell's focus was "on the criticism, or reading, of individual works of art . . . letting a work of art have a voice in what philosophy says about it" (10:437), which he saw as "a way of testing whether the time is past in which taking seriously the philosophical bearing of a particular work of art can be a measure of the seriousness of philosophy" (10:438).

In proposing the Astaire film as a "checkpoint, or touchstone, of experience" (10:441), Cavell elucidated his idea of "speech as passion" (10:442). He started with the example of speech in opera so that he might set the scene to interrogate or "inspire philosophy's interest in passionate speech" (10:442). Appealing to Austin's ordinary language theory, "specifically its power to reveal the action of speech [(albeit at the expense of feeling)], together with the passion of abandonment in the raised speech of opera," he set the scene for an Astaire dance sequence from *The Bandwagon*.

In the scene, Astaire "stumbles over the outstretched legs of a preoccupied black shoeshine man" (10:448), with whom Astaire begins a kind of pas de deux that introduces the song, "When There's a Shine on Your Shoes" (10:449).

While Astaire was "not exactly an abandoned woman" (10:449) of tragic opera, he was, nevertheless, "an artist whose public has dispersed" (10:449) and is in that sense a quasi-tragic figure. This scene presents as existential loss, which means the Astaire character must make a choice. Cavell noted that this character "discovers that for a comeback it is himself that must be singled out, or re-singled, by himself" (10:449). Cavell continued:

> the discovery of intact existence here expresses itself as ecstasy is linked in my mind with Thoreau's once expressing his recognition of his double existence, say as seer and seen, as a condition of being beside himself, roughly the dictionary definition of ecstasy. (10:449)

Thus what can be captured is the ordinary—that is, non-tragic—sense of ecstasy conveyed within walking and dance, where feet move in "passionate utterance" (10:450). Cavell suggested that if "tragedy is the working out of a scene of skepticism, then comedy in contrast works out a festive abatement of skepticism, call it an affirmation of existence" (10:450). Astaire's scene singles this out, evoking "a response of pleasure" (10:450). Cavell conjectured:

> If philosophy of science can be taken to be what philosophy is, that is because philosophy is, and is content to be, recognizable, or practicable, as (a chapter of) science; whereas were philosophy of art to make of itself a chapter of one or more of the arts, it would no longer be recognizable as philosophy. (10:440)

It is not this viewpoint specifically that Cavell wished to challenge, but rather something larger, which pertains to the philosophical enterprise in the twentieth century, as well as to the human-all-too-human enterprise of living. This is what Cavell called "the transgressions of reason" (10:440) to suggest and include the arts, "beginning with tragedy (or, in Hegel's aesthetics, ending with tragedy)" (10:440), that these expressions of passionate speech "may variously be seen, or claimed, as chapters of the history, or development, of philosophy, hence perhaps of certain of its present manifestations" (10:440–441).

In a way that may speak to what might be called the pluralist turn in philosophy in the twenty-first century, Cavell proposed that the necessary conditions for passionate utterance correspond in some ways to Austin's rules for "the felicity of performative utterance" (10:443). Austin's conditions were:

> (1) there must exist a conventional procedure for uttering certain words in certain contexts, (2) the particular persons and circumstances must be appropriate for the invocation of the procedure, (3) the procedure must be

> executed correctly and (4) completely, (5) where the procedure requires certain thoughts or feelings or intentions for the inauguration of consequential conduct, the parties must have those feelings or thoughts and intend so to conduct themselves, and further (6) actually so conduct themselves subsequently. (10:443–444)

Passionate speech upends these rules; Cavell amends them in the following way:

> There is (as Austin notes) no conventional procedure for appealing to you to act in response to my expression of passion (of outrage at your treachery or callousness, of jealousy over your attentions, of hurt over your slights of recognition). Call this absence of convention the first condition of a passionate utterance; and let's go further. Whether, then, I have the standing to appeal to or to question you—to single you out as the object of my passion—is part of the argument to ensue. Call standing and singling out the compound second condition of passionate utterance. This compound condition for felicity, or say appropriateness, is not given a priori but is to be discovered or refined, or else the effort to articulate it is to be denied. There is no question therefore of executing a procedure correctly and completely, but there are the further unshiftable demands, or rules, (third) that the one uttering a passion must have the passion, and (fourth) the one singled out must respond now and here, and (fifth) respond in kind, that is to say, be *moved* to respond; or else resist the demand. (10:444)

The upshot here is that both types of utterances share a communicative agency but performative utterance operates as an invitation or "offer of participation in the order of law" (10:444)—the law of language and the rules of a given discursive framework. Passionate utterance, on the other hand, "is an invitation to improvisation in the disorders of desire" (10:444).

And so, it is perhaps time for philosophy to reengage passionately, which necessitates suspending judgment about what counts as the proper milieu of the philosophical. Cavell reminded his audience that philosophy in the ancient world was identified by skepticism, and that "skepticism as an instance of philosophy was practiced, as a way of life" (10:451). Are we supposed to live skeptically, then? But without rules of order, and within a complex and multitudinous world, Cavell asked, "is anything else now livable?" (10:451). Then he asked the urgent and more pressing question: "What happens to philosophy?" (10:451). What would it mean to stay passionately engaged and yet skeptical?

Perhaps some preliminary answers to these questions will arrive when the next century of presidential addresses of The American Philosophical Association can be evaluated.

Notes

1. William James, The Present Dilemma in Philosophy, in William James, *A Review of a Course of Eight Lectures before the Lowell Institute of Boston: On What He Calls "Pragmatism" or the Latest Phase in Modern Philosophy* (Boston, MA: Granville, 1907), p. 21.

2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillian, 1953), p. 126.

3. Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 2nd ed., ed. Dermot Moran (London: Routledge, 2001/1900), p. 168.

4. Protension and retension are key concepts in Husserl's phenomenology of temporality. See Edmund Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964).

5. See Emmanuel Lévina*s, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969).

6. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontoloty*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956).

7. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (New York: Humanities Press, 1961/1921).

8. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd ed., trans. Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1958).

DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE: POLITICAL AND LEGAL THOUGHT

Brian E. Butler

1. Introduction

Recounting the first 100 years of presidential addresses of The American Philosophical Association (The APA) that dealt with political philosophy faces the obvious problem of setting boundaries to the project. After all, as Stuart Newton Hampshire (1969–1970; 1990–1991) stated in "Justice is Strife," "it has always been recognized that proposals about the sense of 'Reason' and 'Rationality' will have moral and political implications" (10:21). If this is true of reason and rationality, it is even more so, given some very plausible assumptions, of moral and ethical philosophy. Then there are topics such as animal minds or aging that, even if not foregrounded in contemporary political philosophy, are clearly politically charged issues demanding careful analysis. However, analyzing the addresses with this broad view of politics would necessitate analyzing every address. This is not a very promising strategy for a chapter-length study.

An opposite approach would be to only analyze those addresses that explicitly use the words "political philosophy" enough times that the author's intent to be explicitly positioned as a political philosopher is signaled. This approach seems much too narrow. For instance, by using this selection procedure, the first address analyzed in this chapter, James Hayden Tufts's (1905–1906, 1914–1915; 1934–1935), "Some Contributions of Psychology to the Conception of Justice" would be eliminated (an absurd result).

The selection method I used might be thought of as a "family resemblance" approach, in that I will emphasize the articles more explicitly political in content or more relevant to issues in contemporary political analysis. But even with this selection method, some lacunae will be noticed. For example, Robert Nozick (1997–1998), an important character in contemporary political thought, ignored political issues in his "Invariance and Objectivity." This is not really surprising given the dominant preoccupations of his philosophical career. More frustrating are the decisions by both John Dewey (1905–1906) and John Bordley Rawls (1974–1975) to present on other than explicitly political topics. Their philosophical omnipresence in the field, though, will be felt throughout.

The latter part of this chapter, dealing with the philosophy of law, did not offer the same interpretive difficulties. This, of course, might be thought surprising given the dominance of debate regarding legal positivism versus law as interpretation in contemporary philosophy of law. Contemporary legal philosophy seems to address the conceptual identification of what law is as its primary ques-

tion. But when law was a topic in the presidential addresses, this was not the case at all. Thus, interpretive issues regarding what to put in or leave out were much less pressing.

2. The First Fifty Years: Pluralism, Science, and Democracy

Given the selection criteria for political addresses to be included in this chapter, the first that focused on political content was Tufts's "Some Contributions of Psychology to the Conception of Justice." Quite appropriate from today's perspective, his topic was the proper conception of justice. He began by highlighting the problems that arise from starting analysis from the standpoint of either society as a whole or the isolated individual. If the standpoint of the individual is taken as primary, then rights become central. But these, he claimed, generally privilege the individual to the detriment of group welfare. And yet, giving society precedence would subordinate the individual to the group. Tufts found both of these standpoints to be too narrow, stating:

> an individual, apart from his membership in a social rational order, has no rights. . . . Conversely, a society may not fix its concepts of justice in such a fashion as to deny the worth of personality to any of its members, or to treat them merely as means. (1:175)

Tufts then transitioned to the psychological content of his address. According to him, investigation of psychology is necessary for the understanding of justice because a person's psychology is important to the meaning of individuality. He claimed that properly understood, individual psychology is "complex, not simple" (1:176), encompasses both habits and adjusting activities, develops in response to the environment, and is social in origin and nature. Indeed, for Tufts, "the very idea of 'my' and 'mine'. . . presupposes a 'your' and 'their'" (1:176–177). His ultimate conclusion from analysis of human psychology was, "the individual . . . can no more escape the social than he can escape his own person" (1:177).

From this psychological analysis, Tufts then transitioned to issues of justice. Examples of issues in justice that he highlighted were the distribution of wealth, education, and administration of justice. He explicitly critiqued conceptions of formal or abstract justice. He claimed that formalism in issues of justice abstracts from social reality in a way that renders pursuit of real justice difficult. For instance, "abstract equality often gives real inequality" (1:178). He offered the example of criminal law, wherein the tendency of the tradition is to abstract from issues such as heredity and the environment. In his analysis, he found this

practice to be unfortunate; real progress in law had been made from the introduction of a more concrete psychological standpoint.

Another example examined was the relationship between distributive justice and property. Tufts claimed that these concepts are formed by antique theories of possession and freedom of contract. The problem here is how to apply a theory originally founded upon the needs of agrarian society to an industrial world with wholly different requirements. Empirically, this application of these agrarian rules to industrial capitalism has, he claimed, resulted in vast inequality and poverty. Tufts then offered a thought experiment regarding the justness of the outcome:

> Few would say, if the total wealth of the country were placed in their hands for distribution: We will give the bulk of the whole to a small fraction, we will divide a lesser portion among a great many, and will leave a minute fraction to be distributed among a quarter of the people. The situation certainly seems to demand some justification. (1:180)

Perhaps this is less complex than thought experiments offered today—but hardly less enlightening or relevant.

Tufts then claimed that one way to analyze the issue is to ask whether wealth is justly acquired. Tufts believed that this question reduces to two possibilities. One is whether the wealth acquired is acceptable upon moral principle. The other is whether the wealth is acquired according to accepted economic game rules based upon contract. He found both possibilities too limited. The principle of moral merit abstracts from concrete factors in society such as structural impediments, and the game rules analogy for contract ignores the fact that in systems of wealth distribution there is no choice whether to enter the system. For Tufts, this shows how abstraction can distort our picture of justice. Continuing with the contract view, he asserted:

> To base the justice of our distribution of property upon naked, abstract consent—whether we call it open shop, or freedom of labor, or free contract, or competition—and take no care as to whether there is real freedom, whether there is real respect for personality, is too abstract a procedure to deserve the name of justice. It is more abstract and metaphysical than metaphysics ever was. We must ask: Does the system or law recognize the full individuality of its members, or does it deal only with fictions and abstractions? (1:183)

Tufts ultimately offered the maxim that wealth should be allocated "according to his needs" because this principle "recognizes individuality in its aspect of possibility" (1:182). He concluded that the present distribution of wealth, "evidently

can make no pretence [*sic*] to be a distribution according to merit, effort, or needs. It can, therefore, make no pretence to be just in the sense that it recognizes full personality in determining rights" (1:182). However, he also observed that Americans like a system "designed to give full scope to luck and nerve" (1:183), meaning that Americans, rather than being averse to risk, have a positive view of risk. Ultimately, though, for Tufts, the question of the radically unequal distribution of property precludes the possibility of real democracy. He concluded that the greatest threat of demoralization for his time was caused by:

> to those who sit over-fed and complacent in the supposition that they themselves have alone created what they enjoy. The danger to democracy itself lies not so much in the effort to awaken and satisfy essentially social interests through the common resources, as in the disposition to appropriate common resources to private property. (1:186)

The relevance of Tufts's analysis to present political theory and practice over a century later is quite striking. He analyzed the concept of justice, but did so in a way that actually functions as a critique of the dominant trend, which seems to privilege "ideal theory" over theory on the ground. This is also true of the next address centered upon political philosophy, also by Tufts, delivered seven years later, in 1914. The context for that talk was the start of World War I.

The address, entitled "Ethics of States," investigated what Tufts described as the paradox of the state, which is created because the state both represents some of the highest values of human life and is the single greatest source of real and possible destruction of the very same values.

Tufts noted another paradox, in that the time of war is a time of suppression of freedoms, while the states claim to be fighting for the very same freedoms they are suppressing. He located a third and possibly the most important paradox as rooted in the observation that the ethical acts of individuals, on average, are much higher than those of states. He noted that standard but insufficient answers to this often claim that politics is about power and, therefore, "to apply morals to politics is like appraising electricity in terms of virtue instead of in volts and kilowatts" (2:176). More directly, two arguments seem to cover the possibilities. Either claiming that, in politics, might is right, or taking refuge in the claim that our nation is ethical whereas others are not.

Instead of these simplistic answers, Tufts offered a pluralistic description of morality as a "conglomerate of several codes" (2:176). He listed five specifically: self-interest, honor, legal standards, family, and a realm of broader, higher ideals. He argued that states are strong in pursuit of self-interest and honor. Beyond this, they have a slight interest in legal standards and an even slighter attachment to higher and broader ideals. He further argued that the cause of the

higher levels of accomplishment in individual ethics is due to the fact that individuals are immersed in a web of relations that curbs the extremes of self-interest, whereas states have no such curb. Therefore, in states, self-interest dominates.

What are the causes of this dominance of self-interest in states? First, there are historical causes. Historically, most nations have originated from conquest. This has continued. More recently, there was a newer form of motivation—the pursuit of profit. Tufts used as an example the colonization and continuing exploitation of indigenous American. In addition to the historical explanation, Tufts described an intrinsic factor:

> Intrinsically, organized states, like other corporations, are both more and less than individuals. They are more because they are trustees and protectors of certain interests and values for many members. They are less because in representing certain interests and purposes they take no account of many other interests and purposes. (2:177)

The positive side is that states can do things that individuals cannot do, such as restrain violence, enforce contracts, and protect rights. Therefore, states can be something worth fighting for. But, he continued, self-preservation at all costs loses all ethical justification. Further, efficiency at all costs loses the great value of self-governance—something he claimed to be a central aspect of American identity.

Addison Webster Moore (1911–1912; 1917–1918) also gave an address in the context of World War I. In "The Opportunity of Philosophy," delivered in 1917, he stated, "we are in the midst of a war with the idols of the tribe, tribal politics, tribal religion, tribal art and, yes, tribalized science and philosophy" (2:277). The problem he identified was that of a social "vision" that, because it does not point beyond itself, is blind to other possibilities. As opposed to this type of dogmatism, he argued:

> science as the method of values does not signify that science is to be called to the defense of values born of instinct, custom, and myth. It means—and this is the gist of the whole matter—that scientific intelligence must be operative in the *formation* of the values and purposes of our social life. (2:284)

This for Moore, shows the "universality and democracy of scientific method" (2:285). But the social aspect of knowledge also has implications for science:

> science has no choice whether it shall be affected or not affected by social, political, and religious interests. The only choice is whether this influence shall be frankly the natural and intimate one of subject matter and method, in which case the influence will be from social forces which science itself

> has helped to form; or whether it shall be from social, political, and religious forces in whose formation scientific method has had no recognized part. (2:285–286)

Further, Moore asserted, "the very possibility of experimental method presupposes personality" (2:286). Even the choice of experiment requires an active chooser. The pressing issue then is whether we subject our social, political, and religious values to the same experimental attitude and tests demanded in scientific procedure. He concluded:

> the world can never be made "safe for democracy" so long as tribal survivals can avail themselves of a theory which places values above or below, at any rate beyond, scientific treatment on the ground that they are either "unique" or "universal." (2:287)

With Tufts, Moore treated the issues of democracy, science, and philosophy as inseparable.

One year later, with the world still at war, Hartley Burr Alexander (1917–1918; 1919–1920; 1929–1930) presented another address centered upon democracy. This time, instead of democracy's relationship to science, the topic was "Art and the Democracy." Why talk about art during a war? His answer was that life itself "is a struggle for expression and for the recognition of expression in a world whose one high virtue is fellowship" (2:298). Herein, for Alexander, lies the value of art. Art creates mutual understanding. Further:

> art, if it be the key to man's expression of his humanity and the instrument of its appraisal, can, in its achievements, never be less than an index of his success in the battle for humanity; and its association with this type of political state or that will in some measure be an attestation of political and moral values. (2:302)

Indeed, for Alexander, democracies produce better art because people within such political arrangements are more highly socialized, have a "more generous conception of liberty" (2:303) and allow for "the most complex realization of our social humanity" (2:303). Ultimately, art is described as an expression of human idealism that exists as a mixture of real and ideal and therefore "must represent the problem of human frailty" (2:306).

The feeling of a democratic "call to arms" that the early addresses represented is striking. There is a belief in the construction of democracy attached to scientific methodology. But this democratic life also encourages and respects art. Further, economic issues are analyzed, but with a concern for democratic

control to ensure economic justice. Above all that, there seems to be in the addresses a belief that philosophical analysis in partnership with the empirical sciences has work to do in the world. Moreover, this was a world that was the first to see a world war. Given the challenges that generation faced, their engagement with the issues of the day is touching.

Up until that time, there was no respect given to the fact-value distinction (as would be appropriate from within the pragmatist tradition). The next address shows a distinct positivist turn—more in line with traditional ideas that facts and values should be clearly separated in analysis. But while this change is notable, the address was no less centered upon democracy, and the belief that philosophy matters in the world seems in no sense diminished.

In 1920, with the war ended, Norman Wilde (1919–1920) turned to the identification of the universal and necessary nature of the state. He saw "pluralists," mounting a criticism of state power significant enough to warrant titling his address, "The Attack on the State." He characterized the pluralist idea as the claim that a state is just one social group among many without any essential aspects unique and necessary to it. Because of this, instead of the state being the ultimate location of sovereignty, there are multiple areas of rule, none being supreme. He believed that the theory is confused because it misses the distinction between "the will to organize and maintain the state and the will within the state determining its policy" (2:392). Only the former, the will to organize and maintain the state, is the general will.

Wilde argued that it is in times of crisis that a state shows its real overarching power. Further, analyzing the state when under crisis shows that supreme power within a territory is an essential aspect of a state. Therefore, "taking the term 'sovereignty' in the sense of actual power, then, it seems impossible to admit that the state is subordinate to any power external to itself" (2:396). Wilde concluded from this:

> the very essence of the state is force. If, then, the state is necessary, it is surely not the part of wisdom to attempt to destroy or dilute its essence and thus render it incapable of performing its function. It is not force that is dangerous but the will embodied in it. The problem, therefore, is not that of limiting sovereignty, but of educating the sovereign. (2:398)

Tufts's third address followed fourteen years after Wilde's, and was delivered in the middle of the Great Depression, in 1934. It is difficult not to read Tufts's address as an example of pluralism as Wilde defined it. It is also quite easy to see New Deal type themes coming to the forefront. In "The Institution as Agency of Stability and Readjustment in Ethics," Tufts investigated the question, "How can we come by working standards that offer such stability as we

crave in a changing world?" (4:295). He claimed that the answer would largely come from the analysis of social institutions. For him, such institutions are implicated in both stability and change because, "a characteristic of an institution is that while conserving a large measure of what experience has taught, it also faces new situations and conflicting interests or forces under a necessity of partial readjustment" (4:295–296). He argued that this combination could be seen in cases recently decided by the United States Supreme Court, where farmers were granted relief from foreclosures. In these cases, the Court allowed adjustments to contracts and property law even though a formalist Court might argue that it did not live up to a literal interpretation of the United States Constitution.

However, although law is one example of such an institution that both adjusts to and adjusts social ethics, Tufts gave many other examples as well, two intertwined ones being marriage and the family. He argued more generally that, instead of generally seeing institutional conventions as anti-ethics, the family and marriage are better viewed as conventions that show social agreement, which "presupposes minds in relation to one another" (4:298). Therefore, he argued, they are ethical in nature. Indeed:

> the superiority of an institution is in just this factor of conscious will and concurrent action which both enables and compels it to make readjustment. Only by such readjustment can it survive. In readjustment lies its stability. A standard for ethics in a changing world must be capable of change if it is to continue as standard. (4:298)

However, although this agreement is an ethical virtue of social institutions, Tufts noted that there are also concomitant vices. The main problem is that institutions can be too focused upon single interests to the detriment of other values. Here the central theme of the first fifty years—democracy—recurs once again, because "power of man over his fellows must be coupled with responsibility" (4:299) and "only as power is attended with responsibility is its exercise by mortals safe" (4:299). For Tufts, in this lies the most important difference between democracy, fascism, and communism, and that is how authority for the use of power is justified and granted.

As he did in his first two addresses, Tufts related political power to economic power. He claimed that in the corporate system, property had become a stronger and more concentrated social power at the same time as it had evolved into a power with fewer restraints and less responsibility. For him, this separation of leadership from accountability, in turn, creates segregation of social classes, cycles of depression, and unemployment. Therefore, he concluded, "if Democracy is to keep economic power, the moral prerequisite is that business and property shall both be held, and hold themselves, responsible" (4:300).

With this conclusion, Tufts returned to analysis of some United States Supreme Court cases. He applauded the results in *Munn v. Illinois* (1876) and *Nebbia v. New York* (1934), which attached the right to hold property to considerations of public interest. He saw this result as allowing an ethical critique of the social institution of property, especially important given the great inequalities in American society. He also argued that great inequality is a threat to economic security and social stability. This is, he postulated, is especially important given the economic situation in the United States, a situation "not due to the reprehensible conduct of individuals. It is a consequence of making economic return the necessary measure of standards of living and of moral environment and education for the young" (4:303).

Tufts claimed, however, that noting that the institution of property is engineered and that it is, therefore, to be judged in terms of its ethical effects, opens up a perspective from which to evaluate economic arrangements. This he saw as vital because:

> if we wish to avoid fascism or communism, is it not more reasonable to apply the democratic principle of responsibility to economic institutions than to ignore responsibility, and hope by shouting loudly enough against communism to drown all complaints? (4:303)

Interestingly, Tufts concluded on an important side note. He claimed that the problem seemed to be largely the result of a conception of rights as a zero-sum game rather than a social institution with tools that can, if used properly, bring about mutual enrichment in service of freedom and dignity.

While not a perfect New Deal manifesto, it is easy to see in Tufts's work the construction of ideas that relate to the urgent political issues of the day. His idea of an ethical institution is important, especially if it is thought, like it seems it must be today, that many of our pressing issues are collective action problems.

In his address four years later, Joseph Alexander Leighton (1937–1938) shared Tufts's sense of the desperate and vital need for philosophical analysis of the world's political situation. Indeed, for him, "the fate of universal democratic values hangs trembling in the balance" (4:539). In "History as the Struggle for Social Values," Leighton examined various versions of historicism in political thought and treated them as driving urgent real-world options affecting political choices. Of course, writing from within the Great Depression and on the verge of World War II, with countries arming under the aegis of their various ideologies of history, this urgency made real sense. Leighton's first claim was that all experience is historical. But he immediately went on to claim that there is no fully deterministic history. This, of course, put him at odds with many influential versions of historicism popular at his time.

Leighton supported the claim that history is not fully determined through a survey of "principle factors" in history. Some of those he noted were the physical world, the biotic given, and the human spirit. The human spirit, specifically, was, for Leighton, a social culture. Further, he described human history as being created by human beings who are value-seeking beings. Therefore, social culture functions dynamically in relation to the interests and values of any specific culture. Indeed, he claimed that one can only evaluate human history and any specific culture according to its ruling values.

Leighton then utilized this framework to analyze what he saw as the pressing question of the day: Will totalitarianism or liberal democracy win out in a technological world? Here, the true complexity of the historical/political situation becomes quite threatening because, from Leighton's perspective, all previous cultures and history can only serve as warning; he viewed his technological time as a truly new epoch with no precedent. This raised the question of progress in a historical world where one cannot find philosophical refuge in divine guarantee or mechanical necessity.

The world at that time, as Leighton described it, was the battleground where "fascist ideologies are arming to the teeth" (4:532). However, "this absolutist conception of the State is to me the negation of all genuinely humane and universal morality" (4:532). In the place of fascist ideology and absolutism, he offered a different version of social progress, namely, "a society is progressing provided it is offering increase of opportunity for the harmonious fulfillment of the basic interests or capacities of human personality, in all its members" (4:532). (This can be read as a foreshadowing of the capabilities approach to human development that Martha Craven Nussbaum (1999–2000) proposed, which will be reviewed below.)

Leighton then turned to economic matters to diagnose the attractiveness that totalitarian or fascist ideas have. He believed:

> the present crisis in social culture is the conflict between the ever-growing and socially irresponsible concentration of the control of economic resources in a relatively smaller number of groups (the increased power of the corporation), and the rising demand of the many for decent conditions of livelihood. (4:533)

For him, this ultimately meant the choice between two options, hierarchy or democracy. Fascism offers security and attachment to a cause larger than oneself. He noted that this is an attractive idea to many and, therefore, a real threat. It is a substitute for religion and has its own comforting mysticism. Democracy must answer the challenge. But he believed that faith in "political democracy" (4:533) has been destroyed by the laissez-faire economy. Therefore, there must

be an alternative construction of social democracy based upon the "intrinsic dignity of the human individual" (4:536), empirical psychology, the concrete and diverse aspects of human life, and finally, the rise of democracy as the latest and most important form of society. Leighton concluded:

> democracy does not imply a multitude of short-term elective representatives, judges, and administrators, incompetent to administer the complexities of our great society; and that the "pork barrel" is not an essential attribute of democracy. We must recognize the need of expert diversity and inequality of powers and responsibilities. We must recognize the urgent need both of decent living conditions and of the diffusion of social-minded intelligence, so that the mass of the people are able to see the need of simplifying and concentering responsibilities in fewer expert hands while holding the executives responsible to the sovereign people. (4:538)

This passage perhaps summarizes the dominant political themes of the first fifty years of The APA. Most of the addresses evinced a combination of social democracy, skepticism of free market ideas, and belief in science. Even in the face of a world war and European instability, the belief was held that knowledge could be used to improve the human condition and that economics can be collectively organized with a human face. There was also a sense that these were urgent matters in pressing need of real-world solutions coming from philosophers.

Of course, the urgency that Leighton felt was real, and became even more so for Edward Octavius Sisson (1939–1940), who delivered his address, "Human Nature and the Present Crisis," in 1939—the year World War II started. Sisson poignantly asserted:

> Even though the contemporary Armageddon should bring defeat to the party of my allegiance, I cannot imagine my allegiance to shift to the other side . . . without hesitation I set . . . democracy . . . against the nightmare which now rides the storm in Europe and perhaps most of the rest of the world. (4:615)

Sisson then turned to a fundamental question, "What is Man?" and gave a stunningly unpretentious answer given the context: "I do not *know*" (4:615). However, even though the answer was not certain, he pointed out that there is an overriding necessity to act. He then offered a study of fascism in political philosophy, including and implicating Plato, Hobbes, Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Adolf Hitler as evinced in *Mein Kampf*. In explicit opposition to these philosophers, he described himself as devoted to the justification and protection of democracy. He wanted to disarm two particular types of attack on democracy. The

first is the opinion that only the elite can govern; the second is the opinion that the state is the supreme end.

Sisson argued that the first claim was flawed because of the unsolved and prior question of who decides who the elite are. Further, he noted that it is unclear, even if the elite could be identified, whether they would be able to understand the needs of other classes. The second claim, that the state is the supreme end, Sisson found so incoherent as not to even merit a critique. His claim, in contrast to these ideas, was, "to be self-governing . . . is of the essence of man" (4:619). This, of course, is a recurring theme in the early addresses.

But though self-government is essential, it is not thought to be a simple thing to accomplish. Sisson admitted that democracy is especially visionary given the realities of the actual economic and social order and the state actions of his day. His "campaign advice" for those advocating democracy? "Declare that *democracy makes inordinate demands upon human nature*" (4:620). He continued, "at the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that it is my view that democracy is the sole and only political or social scheme *which does justice to human nature*" (4:620).

Sisson agreed with Dewey in postulating that social arrangements actually create individuals. Therefore, the legitimate fear was that totalitarian states create totalitarian human beings where "the individual is ruthlessly sacrificed to the species" (4:621). But this brought Sisson to consider the threat of corporate control of his own society. Indeed, he was specifically worried about the undesirable effects upon democracy of social theories that rest upon a juridical theory persons rather than a human one, for instance, theories that can view corporations as persons. To the contrary, he emphasized the importance of the imagination only found in the individual. He closed with a description of democracy as:

> a society in which barriers are lowered and communication freed and fostered to the fullest extent, to the end that human nature may bring to full fruition both the common life of the "beloved community" and the precious uniqueness of individual personality. (4:630)

This is easily seen as a distinction between corporate democracy and a preferable social picture of democracy.

Delivered at the start of United States involvement in World War II, Ephraim Edward Ericksen's (1941–1942) "Materialism in Democracy—Democracy in Culture" started with the claim that early on, Greek idealism and Christian theology "misshaped and set askew the philosophy of democracy at its very foundation" (5:110). Yet the Greeks, luckily for us, were not consistent idealists. Because the more fundamental attitude of Greek culture was naturalistic, democracy could flourish. Indeed, for Ericksen, it is the persistent influence of stoic and Roman rationalistic naturalism combined with the tradition of the "life-loving Hebrews" (5:110) that provided the foundations for modern democracy.

Ericksen found, however, that the individualistic ethics of earlier times could not handle the economic developments of the contemporary world. For instance, in capitalism, "men are not persons in the Christian sense of souls to be saved, but competitors to be outwitted, laborers to be exploited, abilities and energies to be utilized" (5:112). For Ericksen, this meant that there needs to be an ethics of the collective rather than the individual. But that collective ethics can go horribly wrong as is seen in "the recent uprising of totalitarian states." This, in turn, shows that there is something wrong with democracy as understood and practiced by his contemporaries:

> Either the salesmanship of democracy is at fault, or the spiritual wares it is trying to sell to the world are unattractive. In any event, the agency through which democracy is carried to the world is one that distrusts democracy and discredits it in its own field. Capitalism, with its world commerce, competitive method, absentee ownership, profit motivation, labor exploitation, does not reflect what is best in America's spiritual tradition. (5:112)

Corporate capitalism, Ericksen claimed, rather than furthering the spread of democracy, actually hinders it because "ideals of freedom, equality, and fraternity . . . are not successfully promulgated in this ironic way" (5:113). In contradistinction to trends in the contemporary world, where ideas of rights are often used to strengthen the independence of private property and corporate independence:

> not until democracy reaches beyond its political stage into industry and culture, guarantees economic security . . . and opens the . . . avenues of civilization to its industrial classes, will it sell at its face value. (5:113)

But he did not limit its reach to those domains. For him, democracy also requires sharing cultural values. Because of this, it is important to ask, "Is it possible to build a democracy of culture?" (5:113). Reflecting on his own time, Ericksen thought that the main currents of thought then would say no. Conceptions of the human being, economics, and property would lead to the conclusion that a real democracy of culture is impossible. To the contrary, he argued that it is possible, but admittedly quite difficult to achieve. Further, the difficulties are both conceptual and institutional. For instance, with regard to institutions, Ericksen believed that schools should explicitly teach democratic values. If they fail to do so, they would probably teach instead "a philosophy of culture for industry" (5:114).

Education for industry would not be essentially democratic. Ericksen asserted that there should be a conceptual movement to humanize economics. He noted that ideas of economics have real social implications. He argued that if, instead of accepting a static natural-law quasi physics ideal of economics:

> the American people should . . . believe that ideas and theories in economics are essentially instrumental . . . economic processes and the material realities are of such [a] nature that human intelligence and effort may actually affect them. (5:118)

Economic assumptions based upon analogies to antiquarian theories from physics would be properly seen as an obstruction to social progress. Rather than naïve mechanistic ideologies of the market, there could, he concluded, be a focus on quality of human life and experience.

The first fifty years of addresses show a quite coherent set of themes. Of course, the most central theme is that of democracy. But quite clearly, the conception of democracy as those philosophers understood it is different from that found in contemporary political theory. Conspicuously missing from their conception was the formalist picture of democracy offered by game theory or social choice. There was very little analysis of voting structures. Indeed, there was very little axiomatic style analysis at all.

Prisoner's dilemmas and tragedies of the commons were noted in their own way, but the strategies offered were quite different. Instead of trying to reengineer situations where isolated, rational, utility-minded individuals could maximize their utility, the baseline situation was social, communicative, and collaborative.

There was also apparent an idea that democracy would be constructed through the empirical sciences. An example of this is the way economics was treated. Instead of graphs and deductions from a priori axioms, or, as Ericksen put it, running economics on analogies to antiquarian physics, economics was treated as an experimental social science amenable to human control in service of humanitarian aims. The amazing thing is that, just when this optimism would seem to have been proven to be well founded, in that the United States survived two world wars and the Great Depression, this optimism in democracy and social progress started to disappear from the addresses.

3. The Second Fifty Years: Justice in a Liberal Society

Optimism in democracy and social progress as dominant themes in the presidential addresses started to change in the latter half of the twentieth century. Democracy figured only in the background of Arthur Edward Murphy's (1950–1951) "The Common Good," set in the context of the Cold War. Murphy investigated use of the term "the common good" in expressions that affirm that the common good warrants some sort of recommended action. It and similar terms are used in contexts where "reasons are asked for and given in support of orders issued, claims presented or policies recommended, and in which a distinction is made between good reasons and bad" (6:23). Its use, therefore, is to mobilize group support. But, as Murphy put it, "there are persuasions and persuasions, and for some of our purposes the difference between them may be at least as important as their similarity" (6:24). He claimed that when the appeal is to the common good,

then the appeal is to reasons that support acceptance of the claim. Therefore, a question regarding a claim's validity can be meaningfully asked. Until the appeal is justified by sufficient reasons, it loses legitimate motivational force.

Appeals to the common good must be directed to shared understandings of "goods which those addressed will recognize as worth having, for whose attainment they acknowledge a shared responsibility" (6:25). Therefore, an appeal to the common good contains a question of what ought to be done and an appeal to shared concerns. "A common good is the ideal content of this presupposed understanding functioning as a standard for the adjudication of conflicting claims and the justification of questionable decisions" (6:26).

It is in the face of disagreement within a group that reasons must be used. In fact, it is the moral appeal to the common good that needs to be reasoned to and agreed upon that makes the group. The common good, therefore, is a:

> level of human behavior at which men ask for justifying reasons, and to the question thus asked nothing but a reason can be an answer. In the asking and answering of such questions they sometimes achieve an understanding that makes moral sense of their social relations. (6:33)

Murphy opposed this process to communist ideology, which, he claimed, uses the language of community but rests it not upon public reasoning but rather upon "only shared subservience to arbitrary power" (6:34). To protect real freedom, we must insure that ideals of the common good are reasoned and grounded in debate. This is a risky process, "but when we call the denial of the exercise of freedom a vindication of the ideal of freedom we cheat ourselves with words which, in this use, have lost their sense as reasons" (6:35).

Cold war preoccupations were also central to Dilman Walter Gotshalk's (1950–1951) address entitled "Twentieth Century Theme," in which he claimed that although the explicit theme of the twentieth century at that time was revolution and transition, there was a different stance underlying it; the underlying aim and structure of thought has been static. His argument started by noting that the modern mind has been centered upon two conceptions, one of unchangeable simple building blocks, and the other of total flux and dynamic change, neither of which can sufficiently handle present events. What he found instead was "a complex interrelational pattern of fluid and control factors, each inter-ingredient in the other, each modified by the other, and neither possible as it is without the other in present existence" (6:43).

As an outlook, this pattern "holds that relation is not a derivative, an offshoot of mind, organism, matter, or, of thinking, evolution, [or] motion" (6:43) as the atomist would have it. Instead, "relation is the basic underivative element within which these other elements . . . have what meaning and being they have"

(6:44). This metaphysics is not reflected in the political theories or realities of Gotshalk's time. Instead of continuities and change, the politics of the twentieth century suffer from a "pathology of fixation" (6:46):

> One political power or bloc is dedicated officially to a way of life that is derived from late eighteenth-century philosophical thought, and that has been developed into a negative defensive containment policy by a large intermingling of later fixations. The other political power or bloc is dedicated officially to a way of life that is derived from mid-nineteenth-century philosophical thought, and that has been taken over by a rigid regime that would grind into dust whatever contradicts or threatens the so-called dialectical necessities of its persistence. (6:45)

Gotshalk claimed that this fixation had kept the world from properly using new production, distribution, and communications technologies. The new tools in these areas demand new understandings. Therefore, as opposed to the fear of change and a fixation on the static and atomistic, "the first business of our times would seem to be to think primarily in inter relational terms" (6:48). Unfortunately, Gotshalk's suggestion to see interrelations where others emphasize separation in social existence was not taken up in later addresses.

In "The Rationale of Political Discussion," Charner Marquis Perry (1954–1955) addressed the theme of democracy, which he characterized as government by discussion. This approach ultimately shows the trend toward a less central place for democratic governance. Limits defined by liberalism are first in importance. At the start of the address, Perry offered some basic political rules of thumb. From Hobbes he got the rule that if government cannot enforce agreements, then discussion is ineffectual due to uncertainty. From the *Federalist* he gleaned the maxim that factions need to be kept small; otherwise, a dominant faction will end discussion or discussion will polarize. Finally, from free-market theorists Perry surmised that political discussion should only be necessary for residual problems that cannot be solved through more stable means. Therefore, democracy is a residual and instable device to be used if other more desirable social institutions, such as the market, are not available.

The now residual area of political discussion itself, Perry believed, depends upon properly formed institutions and habits. This raises the question of optimum conditions for such political discussion. But tellingly, he took these claims as givens. His main question for the address was the different one of what reasons should be used in political argument and how we should evaluate the arguments. Of course, the idea that some reasons are delimited from the public realm is an interesting assumption to start with.

Perry characterized his project as one that starts in the middle rather than one that rests upon a foundational starting point. Further, the project is not one of skepticism (destroy dogmatism and justice will reign) or idealism (create an

ideal and then construct toward it). It cannot be rested upon construction of an ideal from which the real world can be critiqued because, he claimed, "many processes vanish or lose their distinctive characteristics as an ideal limit is reached or approached" (6:276). Importantly, this is true of discussion, which, if "freed of its obstacles . . . would have become useless, or impossible, or both" (6:276). The reasons sought, while not pure or resting upon a certain foundation "have firmness, compounded perhaps of cogency and effectiveness, to support arguments directed to others and to move us toward agreement when presented in arguments of other people" (6:277). These arguments necessarily take for granted much of the situation, ideas and possibilities. Further, the given can be divided into results of past action and principle. Principles "are what our rules and patterns of thinking and action would be if they could be brought completely to explicit statement and abstracted from irrelevant content" (6:278).

This view of political discussion is rooted in practice, and for Perry:

> What we actually do in practice, and should sooner or later recognize in theory, is to cut out and construct reasons, some more, some less compelling, from what lies on either side of political discussion and in the middle of it. (6:280)

He described the process as one that starts within existing institutions. Then, through a process of making aspects of these explicit, we come to principles. From these principles and from the contexts in which the principles have been used, we construct ideals (for example, liberty, equality, justice, democracy). These ideals, he described as "colored by the society" (6:280), yet having persistent aspects. Finally, in the middle there are interests. Interests are described as:

> the channeling of malleable and shifting impulses by custom, precept, example, and previous action. They reflect plans that have been made and are a projection of action into an uncertain future in terms of objectives and means believed useful to attaining the objectives. (6:280)

Perry described reasoning in this realm as involving a movement back and forth between law, interests, and ideals:

> In general, political discussion succeeds by achieving a partial or temporary equilibrium among the three components. The equilibrium is never, or hardly ever, stable; its maintenance always depends at least in part on coercion and the inertia of custom. Unless, however, the equilibrium moves, however slowly and irregularly, toward wisdom and justice, government by discussion is not likely to be a successful experiment. (6:281)

This talk about equilibrium is familiar to contemporary political theory, of course, but this is still different and echoes the addresses from the earlier section, in that this version of equilibrium is progressive and experimental equilibrium rather than just reflective.

Fourteen years later, in 1969, Herbert Marcuse (1968–1969) delivered the next address dealing directly with political issues, appropriately enough, in the year of the "counterculture" Woodstock Festival. In "The Relevance of Reality," Marcuse characterized ancient philosophy as less attached to reality than to "pure thought." But, he claimed, by Socrates's way of thinking, this radical questioning and emphasis upon pure thought becomes a type of civil disobedience because, "to the degree to which philosophy elaborates the universal concepts as against the particular appearance of things, it communicates not only knowledge but also the *imperatif* of *acting* accordingly" (7:561).

Bringing this insight to his present situation, according to Marcuse, the new powers of human production had created a new place for philosophy:

> its capability of changing the world, far from making the theoretical philosophical effort superfluous and a luxury, demands a renewed and restructured theoretical effort. Obviously and inevitably, this statement appears as, and is, a declaration *pro domo*, but one's own theoretical house is not necessarily a sanctuary from reality, it may also be a workshop for intellectual weapons offered to reality. (7:561)

The problem for Marcuse was:

> in the most advanced industrial countries, the political consciousness is suffocated, overpowered by a social reality which, by virtue of its technical and material achievements and capabilities, seems to call for protection, perpetuation, improvement of the status quo rather than for radical change. And yet, critical theory demonstrates the *objective* need for such change. (7:561–562)

Hence, Marcuse saw philosophy "in need for modes of thought which can *counteract* the massive ideological indoctrination practiced by the advanced repressive societies of today" (7:562). So, as opposed to the standard appeal to reality to ground political analysis, Marcuse emphasized the critical insight that what appears to be the reality is often just ossified ideology.

Between Marcuse's 1969 address and "A Good Man is Hard to Find," delivered by Edwin Munson Curley (1990–1991) in 1991, at the approximate end of the Cold War and arguably in the middle of the Reagan Era, no explicitly political issues had been the topic of any of the presidential addresses. Of

course, behind the scenes was the publication of Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*.[1] Indeed, Curley opposed Rawls's political thought. In "A Good Man in Hard to Find," He argued for a realistic as opposed to optimistic stance in political theory. He found this realism in the theories of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Spinoza. He saw the political problem that they faced and that needed to be solved as largely that of the problem of egoism, the over-privileging of one's own interests. So then, what follows from this egoism? Curley argued that for Machiavelli, it followed that Christian morality must be rejected. Hobbes, he believed, thought that the results required are much the same. Spinoza, though, saw the result to be a need to strive for love and justice. This combination of realism and an appeal to love and justice struck Curley as largely correct. He noted:

> the basic reason [Spinoza] gives us for striving to repay hatred with love is not that we are expected to have a disinterested love for our fellow human beings, but that the person who wants to avenge wrongs by hating in return will live miserably. (10:48)

For Spinoza, this also has implications for the values of civil society. Curley applauded Spinoza's emphasis on the economic advantages of civil society based upon freedom of contract. A "realistic" conception of human nature combined with contract can be advantageous to all. But in this case, there is the problem of finding a convincing ground of the duty to accept and act upon the terms of the contract when it does not seem conducive directly to one's own egoistic welfare.

Justification for this allegiance led Curley back to an important, yet once again reduced, place for democratic governance. This is because having everyone be part of decision-making procedures is the best prudential policy, and a process whereby participants have bought in to the contract. Curley's conclusion from this was that Rawls's theory of justice rests upon too optimistic a moral psychology and that Spinoza's system based upon egoistic realism might have better resources to offer modern liberalism to solve the problem of opportunism.

The very same year, in "Justice is Strife," Hampshire also reacted to Rawls. Rather than offer a critique of the psychology upon which Rawls rested his political theory, however, Hampshire argued for a different conception of justice. He began his investigation by asserting, "it has been a misfortune that the term 'reason' was interpreted by Plato and Aristotle as referring to a faculty of the divided soul" (10:21). This manner of thinking projects a presumably prior psychology onto the structure of society. To the contrary, he suggested "we start with natural and universal procedures and institutions which are to be found in all, or almost all, societies" (10:21). The examples he gave, such as adjudicating, cabinet discussions, and diplomacy, are areas where discussion with reasons occurs in an adversarial context. He believed that this shows that "the necessities

of peaceful confrontation of unreconciled enemies entail that the adversary principle is everywhere employed in some accepted conventional clothing" (10:23).

These types of arguments, Hampshire then argued, are duplicated in the individual mind. Therefore, because "rationality in public practical reasoning is the disposition to follow a procedure which is an instance of the adversary principle" (10:24), this must be the same in the individual mind. From this, he then claimed that if you move from public activities to parts of soul, then all the various activities and arguments can be seen as positive diversity.

However, Plato and Aristotle privileged reason because they thought it could create convergence and harmony in this diversity. Hampshire argued that this same assumption is seen in Rawls, but with an important difference:

> Rawls revivified the study of political philosophy by taking one necessary step away from the traditional search for harmony. He declared that his rationally chosen principles of justice must be independent of conceptions of the good. (10:27)

This independence of the just from the good in Rawls is notably limited to liberal societies. Hampshire had two objections to this. First, illiberal and antidemocratic citizens have no reason to accept the limitations. Second, this independence tries to bypass the beliefs of "self-consciously traditional societies" (10:27) that expect religion to determine their way of life.

Instead of this appeal to a prior conception of reason in search of a completed idea of justice, Hampshire offered a different description of the conditions of justice. What really happens is:

> moral enemies are driven finally to come together from their separate corners to build political and legal institutions temporarily acceptable to all of them as arenas for fair negotiation, because they know that the substance of political and social morality can never in principle be melted down into a few self-evident principles. (10:29)

Conceptions of justice are constructed because of the need for agreement. But instead of the Rawlsian hope for a completed theory of justice:

> political prudence, recognized as a high virtue, must expect a perpetual contest between hostile conceptions of justice and must develop acceptable procedures for regulating and refereeing the contest. The contests are unending if only because what is generally thought substantially just and fair today will not be thought just and fair tomorrow. (10:30)

This, of course, is not only a reintroduction of the social into the concept of justice and political liberalism, but also into individuals' thoughts—a move of which Tufts and Mead would approve.

Edmund Lloyd Pincoffs (1992–1993) never delivered a presidential address because he died before assuming office (10:206n1). His "Government and Character"[2] was offered posthumously as a sample of his philosophical thought, and shows the same need to reintroduce the social into the political as that to which Hampshire was responding. The question analyzed was "What defensible interests, if any, does a liberal democratic government have in the fostering of good, or anyway not bad, character in its citizens?" (10:201). First, Pincoffs listed standard reasons against the attempt to foster good character. To begin with, there is Bernard Mandeville's idea: "every part was full of vice/Yet the whole mass a paradise."[3] This sentiment is also seen in Adam Smith's invisible hand.[4] Both follow from Hobbes's contract idea of government wherein self-interest works to organize society. Combine this with the examples from history of governments that did try to cultivate good character such as the governments of Hitler and Mussolini, and governmental concern with individual character seems quite dangerous.

However, Pincoffs noted that there are good reasons for governmental concern as well, since "whatever else liberal democracy may connote, it holds for enlarging and fostering freedom of individual choice" (10:202). This could only mean that government is the "provider or guarantor of the infrastructure of choice" (10:203), such as freedom of speech, religion, and assembly. It seemed to Pincoffs, however, that it must also mean that, given the existence of moral luck, it would also have to ensure "capacities to choose responsibly, judiciously, and reflectively" (10:203). Therefore, the question raised is how to go about serving this aim.

A problem here is that any manner of politically constructing these capacities gets into controversial areas. But, Pincoffs then argued, if there is to be teaching, it is impossible to avoid taking a position because "paradoxically, not to take a position is to take a position" (10:204). For him, it is proper to fear the tyrannies of community and that of the educational establishment. Nonetheless, there is no way out; a culture must transmit values. Therefore, it must decide, because "to distinguish good from bad dispositions is as important a question as a community faces" (10:205).

Line-drawing issues in liberalism also animated "Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious," delivered by Philip Lawrence Quinn (1994–1995). Quinn highlighted the many philosophers who want to exclude religion from political life. Contrarily, many religious persons believe that excluding religion from the public square is unjust. To elucidate the debate, Quinn investigated some philosophical "proposals" that argue for the exclusion of religion

from politics. A reason is secular when it does not depend upon religious grounding. Against Robert Nemir Audi (1987–1988), who had argued in "The Architecture of Reason" (9:541–573) that only secular reasons should be allowed in political debate, Quinn allowed:

> an adequate secular reason to advocate or support a law or public policy is a proposition such that (1) it is evidentially independent of religious reasons and (2) its truth confers justification on the law or public policy. (10:318)

Quinn thought that it was implausible to presume that every religious person would accept the elimination of religious motives from political activity. Further, there might often be reasons for alternative policies in public policy (his example was abortion) where reasons are pretty much equal on both sides. In such a case, it seems unfair not to allow religious reasons to have some weight. Quinn also noted that this exclusion of religious reasons seems to be motivated by the purportedly divisive nature of religious belief. But, he argued, the fear that religious reasons are divisive seems not to be sufficient to exclude them from public debate. First, rigorous debate on these issues is probably healthy. Second, if the reason religious reasons are excluded is that they are divisive, then for the sake of consistency, there appears to be plenty of non-religious yet just as divisive reasons that should be excluded as well. This principle, therefore, seems to arbitrarily exclude the religious.

Audi's reason for excluding religious reasons is different from Rawls's reason for excluding religion. Rawls's distinction was based upon the difference between public and nonpublic reasons. For him, only public reason is limited to the essential questions of basic justice and constitutional design. To argue for such basic aspects of justice and constitutional design, citizens can only appeal to reasoning and beliefs of common sense and noncontroversial science. No disputed comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical, economic, etc., are allowed. Quinn objected that the problem with this is that, after eliminating all comprehensive doctrines—and most religious doctrines are thought of as comprehensive—it is not clear that enough content would remain to actually determine concrete answers.

Another theory comes from Michael J. Perry, who, in *Love and Power*,[5] argued for certain habits in political dialogue. Two important ones are those of fallibilism and pluralism. Sometimes people of sincere religious beliefs disagree on whether a particular act is virtuous. Quinn cited Sanford Levinson, who "proposed a model of ecumenical political dialogue" (10:332). He called Perry's position one of "epistemic abstinence" and noted that this excludes specific beliefs of specific religions and gives no real reason for people of those religions to accept the limits.

Levinson argued that all types of reason should be allowed in the public square with the only criteria being persuasion. This seemed best to Quinn and especially convincing for two reasons. One, it seems implausible that general agreement on a comprehensive ethical theory or theory of justice could be reached. Further, allowing an inclusive realm keeps from excluding possibly unimagined alternatives before they have had proper attention. In addition, this inclusion would possibly allow religious people "to argue for liberal laws and policies from religious premises and thereby show secular liberals that some religious people are their allies" (10:337).

Just as Quinn's address reflected Rawlsian preoccupations with its emphasis upon line drawing, the next address, that by John Madison Cooper (1999–2000), also highlighted the continued dominance of Rawlsian issues and theoretical framing in political thought in the last years of the twentieth century. In "Two Theories of Justice," Cooper argued that Plato's *Republic* offers two distinct theories of justice. First, Socrates claimed that justice is a virtue for individuals that functions within community. Glaucon, to the contrary, used contract-like language of mutual forbearance. He argued that prudence in a situation of uncertainty could make the bargain one of habit. The idea is that human psychology is such that such a habit of forbearance could be part of human nature and, therefore, encourage justice of the forbearance type. Socrates does not accept the mutual forbearance theory of justice or the psychology Glaucon offers.

Cooper argued that Socrates did not accept Glaucon's proffer because his idea of justice was negative. Socrates based his theory of justice on the premise that no one is truly self-sufficient because different people have different talents and society needs specific expertise in various areas. Hence:

> Socrates' basic moral postulate: Justice requires that the citizens shall individually each spend some of their time working for the good of their fellow citizens, in fair exchange for the similar work of each of the others for *their* good. (10:635)

A quite different picture comes from Glaucon's psychology. He started from postulating the sufficiency of the individual: "Glaucon supposes justice is a matter of each person leaving the others alone" (10:635), which is opposite of Socrates, who sees justice as consisting "in people's acting individually so as positively to *benefit* each of the others" (10:635).

What motivates this sense of justice? It is the need to work together in pursuit of the good. Justice requires taking one's turn and not taking advantage of each other. Acting unjustly arises through either directly going against doing one's duty in order to directly get the good or acting upon a distorted picture of the good. Therefore, knowledge of the good is important—hence the need for philosophy. Cooper saw an important point here:

> As a matter of justice, our public institutions should underwrite and foster serious intellectual investigation (not necessarily and certainly not exclusively "academic," and including work in the literary and other arts) that aims at providing well worked out and seriously conceived ways of bringing rational order to human lives—with the conviction that that kind of order, together with the related discipline necessary for it, really do lie at the core of any truly good human life. (10:641)

In the final political address in the first 100 years of The APA presidential addresses, Nussbaum delivered "The Future of Feminist Liberalism" in 2000. She began by noting the relative lack of political philosophy in 1950s. Then she celebrated the resurgence of political philosophy through the work of Rawls and Habermas. But she noted there is also important work in feminist philosophy. (Amazingly, here one must note that the first mention of women's issues in a presidential address of The APA centered upon political thought did not come until eighty years after women got the right to vote in the United States.)

Nussbaum acknowledged then, "on the whole liberalism has not fared well in feminist circles" (10:680). One reason for this is that there are areas of "deep dependency" liberalism tended to ignore. Further, liberals have often ignored the "the political role of the family" (10:680). She aimed to show that a feminist liberalism based upon the protection of central human capabilities can successfully handle these challenges.

One prevalent type of liberalism is based upon the social contract tradition. Social contract theory, though, ordinarily needs to assume free and equal contracting parties. But this is too much of an abstraction for Nussbaum:

> Life, of course, is not like that. Real people begin their lives as helpless infants and remain in a state of extreme, asymmetrical dependency, both physical and mental, for anywhere from ten to twenty years. At the other end of life, those who are lucky enough to live on into old age are likely to encounter another period of extreme dependency. (10:681)

A workable theory of justice must have ways to handle these facts of human neediness and dependency. In American society, of course, women do a lot of the caregiving without pay or recognition. This, in turn, often puts them at a disadvantage in other areas of life. The Kantian dualism, which splits human dignity and moral capacity (the rational) from our animal nature ignores: (1) that human dignity must be embodied in the human animal that is vulnerable and mortal; (2) that animality can have dignity; (3) our own morality and rationality, which are thoroughly material and animal themselves; and (4) it makes us think of ourselves as atemporal.

For Nussbaum, much of this arises from problems that come with the assumptions attached to the social contract beginnings of the traditional theories. She noted that Rawls, to stay within the contract tradition, just relegated dealing with dependencies to an afterthought, one that is postponed until after the basic framework is agreed upon. The problem with this is that "variations and asymmetries in physical need are simply not isolated or easily isolable cases" (10:683). From this stance, aspects of dependency get support only because of their link to "'fully cooperating' adulthood" (10:684). Nussbaum concluded, therefore, that contract theory is not sufficient to provide a complete political theory.

Next, Nussbaum examined Rawls's list of primary goods, noted its heterogeneous quality, and proposed that it might be better to see it as "a list not of things but of basic capabilities" (10:685). Of course, any social contract model would still utilize a conception of the human being "that makes our rationality trustee, in effect, for our animality" (10:687). To avoid this, Nussbaum suggested "we need to adopt a political conception of the person that is more Aristotelian than Kantian, one that sees the person from the start as both capable and needy" (10:687).

As well, this Aristotelian conception of politics, in order to avoid some of the problems with Aristotle's own theory, and in order to be considered liberal, should rest upon the protection and nurturing of capabilities. That is, Aristotle's theory, because it focuses upon proper functioning rather than the capability to function a certain way if desired, fails to allow enough room for individual choice. By focusing upon the capabilities a person has instead, this leaves choice to realize various functions up to each individual. Further, a focus upon capabilities, Nussbaum argued, allows for a feminist liberalism that protects each citizen's "chance to develop the full range of human powers" (10:689).

How does feminist liberalism relate to the family more specifically? Most liberal political theories relegate family issues to the private sphere. Feminists have recognized "the family is one of the most non-voluntary and pervasively influential of social institutions, and one of the most notorious homes of sex hierarchy, denial of equal opportunity, and sex-based violence and humiliation" (10:690). Nussbaum noted that Rawls was not clear about how liberal justice would deal with the family; he seemed ultimately to leave it too much to the whim of choices in the private area.

In reality, the family is a state-created and enforced social institution. From the perspective of the capabilities approach:

> the natural question will be: What forms of state action, and what forms of privilege given to certain groupings, will best protect the liberties and opportunities of women and children, within limits set by the protection of adult freedom of association and other important liberties? (10:693)

This strategy combines the liberal public-private split that emphasizes the limits of government with another underlying bottom-up protection of capabilities that spreads across both domains.

What is striking in the addresses delivered during the second half of the twentieth century is their move from social democracy to liberalism. Nussbaum's address is founded upon a conception of liberal justice and rooted in the Rawlsian framework. Government is tasked with the basic protection of human capabilities. While Nussbaum's approach does not allow the liberal public-private split free reign, in that it demands that both realms protect basic essential capabilities, it rests its justification on the hope for a framework within which all further possibilities must fit. Issues are analyzed within a framework aiming to establish foundational game rules or necessary guidelines that structure the political arena.

In the second half of the century, an analysis of democracy is nowhere to be found. As in Rawls, the priority of the right to the good in issues of justice places democracy in a residual category. The second fifty years might be best thought of as accepting as its underlying assumptions the priority of liberalism to democracy and the priority of foundational analysis to interdisciplinary collaboration.

4. 100 Years of Legal Philosophy

If the Chicago School dominated the The APA's political theory at the start of the last century, it also set the early agenda for the philosophy of law. Just as Tufts used the science of his day to investigate issues of justice and institutional reform, George Herbert Mead (1916–1917), in "The Psychology of Punitive Justice," attempted to apply social science to reform procedures and assumptions in criminal punishment. He investigated the "hostility instinct" in criminal law, explaining that although mitigated in contemporary society, punitive justice embodies a hostile attitude, which justifies inflicting suffering on criminals aimed at destruction of the "criminal as other" (elimination of criminals from society). This form of retributive justice still controls society's forms of punishment:

> It is the assumption . . . that . . . punishment . . . is for the good of society . . . which will outweigh the immediate social evil that may result to him . . . the justification for inflicting the suffering at all is found in the assumption that the criminal owes retributive suffering to the community. (2:216–261)

But this instinct cannot in itself explain the "assumed solemnity" and "supposedly impartial and impersonal character of justice" (2:261); instead, Mead saw the reason as being the affirmation of citizenship:

> The majesty of the law is the dominance of the group over the individual, and the paraphernalia of criminal law serves not only to exile the rebellious individual from the group, but also to awaken in law-abiding members of society the inhibitions which make rebellion impossible to them. (2:263)

Even so, Mead viewed the hostility instinct still largely determining institutional practices. Therefore, he argued, in contemporary America, the means of punishment are not rationally related to any legitimate end. An example he gave of this is how criminal law treats the legal idea of property. First, there is the "positive definition of property" which is formulated "in terms of its social uses and functions" (2:265). He noted that there is wide disagreement what comprises property and to what extent the concept of property is justified. On the other hand, due to the fact that criminal law is largely based upon hostility this disagreement is easy to ignore so as to allow the criminal law to rest upon a negative and simplified idea of the defense of property. Because of this:

> respect for law as law in its positive use in defense of social goods becomes unwittingly a respect for the conceptions of these goods which the attitude of defense has fashioned. Property becomes sacred not because of its social uses but because all the community is as one in its defense. (2:265)

Even, that is, if those rights are antithetical to the freedom and dignity of the citizens. This uncritical dominance of the negative definition of property rights based upon the hostility instinct gives prestige to privilege and "paralyzes the undertaking to conceive our common goods in terms of their uses" (2:266).

Mead's claim is that these abstract attitudes of hostility get in the way of efforts to reform criminal law in the service of greater social good. What would criminal law be like if the aim was to create a healthier society? To answer, Mead illustrated with the example of the juvenile courts—recently instituted during his time. In these courts, the aim is to meet with all the stakeholders, use the best of social science, and attempt to reinstate the child as a healthy and integrated member of society. With this more constructive aim, broader facts are noticed, social situations are investigated, and a forward-looking project is designed to remedy the problem. Further, in the juvenile court, "the genuine effort to deal with the actual problem brings with it tentative reconstructions which awaken new interests and emotional values" (2:271).

Mead aimed to allow social science and useful experiments in the legal system to help inform legal philosophy, and, at the same time, he believed that philosophers could help make law more humane. The same sentiment was true of Edwin Thomas Mitchell's (1935–1936) depression-era address, "Social Ideals and the Law," wherein he argued that philosophy needs an alliance with the law

to show its own usefulness. To further this project, he looked at some problems common to philosophy and law. For instance, he claimed that both philosophy and law need an adequate metaphysics of the will. Further, they both need an adequate causal theory, which should be able to handle the modern problem of "responsibility in cases of concentrated power" (4:391). Along the same lines, he opined that there has been an overemphasis on individual responsibility in law. He suggested that a more adequate theory of causality would not be linear or chain type, but "a type analogous to an implicative system exemplified in the more complex biological and social orders" (4:391).

Mitchell noted a loss of confidence in social progress because of the politics of Germany, Italy, and economic nationalism. But he found solace in the fact that some were still confident that the world could be shaped according to human ideals. For him, this shaping would require not old ideas of reasoning but a drafting of socially progressive acts with "the services of expert engineers, actuaries, economists, etc." (4:393). He saw the real problem as one of method; "we have recognized the need of a direct attack on physical problems, but we hesitate to endorse a similarly direct attack on economic and industrial problems" (4:393). To do so, Mitchell advocated administrative or "constructive legislation," which would, in turn, require a new philosophy of law. He saw the theories of law popular at his time as too attached to an obstructionist natural rights theory or the laissez-faire idea of mechanical economic laws writ into nature. He judged either of these options as hindering more constructive efforts.

One theorist who offered a more positive picture of law was Roscoe Pound, who conceptualized law as being in service of wants and demands. Mitchell thought that Pound's theory did not adequately separate out law from all other social institutions. Further, any institution solely constituted to service the satisfaction of wants and demands could either lead to social arrangements that eliminate desires or that create too many desires of doubtful worth. Instead:

> wants in themselves are impulses to action, not ends of action. They become ends when that which will satisfy them is subject to rational consideration. Ends become public ends, and thus the ends of legislation and judicial processes, when communicated and discussed, when assimilated and adopted, in the thinking of the community. The end becomes an integral part of public policy and constructive legislation when the organization is set up which will achieve its realization. (4:396)

This, of course, sounds like a quotation from Dewey. Indeed, Mitchell ultimately noted that he agreed with Dewey's conception of the highest ideal, that being "the idea of an environment in which all things conspire to the perfecting and sustaining of all values occasionally and partially experienced."[6] For Mitchell, "to achieve such an ideal environment is the function of the law" (4:397).

A constructive idea of law would aim at formulating policy and creating agencies that effectively put this perfecting agenda into practice. Instead of an appeal to static rights, there would be an emphasis upon the centrality of imagination and organic growth, and cooperative enterprises would be emphasized. Such ideals are mostly furthered by establishing independent agencies.

Finally, Mitchell saw the judiciary as evolving from an umpire picture to that of collaborator in the construction of a better society:

> The main function of the judiciary would . . . be the scientific one of enquiry, analysis, and judging. The judges determine whether [the] ideal is being realized . . . . The judicial function is to pass upon . . . the fitness of the means to achieve the end. . . . perform the pressing need of placing responsibility where power is concentrated and of holding power strictly accountable.
>
> [The judge] is not a mere umpire . . . . He is judging the right, . . . he is the representative of the state and gives primary consideration to the social bearings of his decision. . . . he must be guided by the ideals that control public policy. . . . [and] participate in the vision of the future. When the law consists of a clearly enunciated set of rules all the judges can do is to administer them, but this is their administrative rather than their judicial function. In most cases, however, there is room for interpretation . . . by which judges can do their part in realizing the ideals which are taking form in society. (4:401)

As with the ideas in Mead's earlier address, Mitchell's theories nicely justify central ideals of the New Deal. But much in line with the pattern seen in the political addresses, World War II arrived, and with it, addresses started to allude to Nazism and totalitarianism. In "Plato and the Rule of Law," Glenn Raymond Morrow (1939–1940; 1953–1954) began by noting that both the German Third Reich and Russia were claiming Plato as their predecessor, while American theorists were seeing Plato as an absolutist. Morrow argued to the contrary that even if the *Republic* can be read in this way, this cannot be said of Plato in the *Laws*. Morrow argued that in the *Laws*, Plato envisioned the state as one of laws above men. But this, of course, raises the issue of what Plato meant by the rule of law.

According to Morrow, the first thing to acknowledge is that Plato was very much focused upon procedure. In the *Laws*, he created a three-tier system where a neighbor or arbitrator court first tries to settle the dispute. If this does not work, then the disputants could appeal to the popular court, after which, if the issue were still unresolved, parties could then appeal to a smaller court of elected judges, the Court of Select Judges, whose decision would be final (5:639).

In a sense, Plato's procedure would curb democratic rule and insulate legal decision making. This is somewhat mitigated, according to Morrow, by a further procedure in place to keep officials in check. Any official could be sued for abuse of authority, to include the right to sue officials wielding judicial power. Morrow noted that this ability, one disallowed in the United States legal system, allowed a salutary check on judicial tyranny and hubris. Therefore Morrow concludes, "Plato not only conceived the idea of a mixed state, but also anticipated some of the checks and balances necessary to maintain it" (5:645).

Further, Plato allowed for "freedom of prosecution" (5:645) for the private citizen for both private and public harms, therefore protecting against the reliance upon professional prosecutorial decisions. To protect against a flood of suits that this freedom might bring, Plato proposed penalties for "unfounded accusations and for persistent litigiousness" (5:645). Morrow concluded that although there are some interesting positive aspects of Plato's theory of law in the *Laws*, there are also some curious omissions. For instance, there is the lack of independent or professional judiciary. In addition, there is the "absence of any theory or process of legislation" (5:648).

Continuing the comparative analysis in legal philosophy, but in the context of the Cold War, Margaret Georgiana Melvin's (1951–1952) address, "The Legal Norm in Soviet Jurisprudence," offered a sketch of Soviet legal philosophy produced from 1921 through 1950. She started by noting that Marxist ideas animate the Soviet system and that Marx distinguished between the social and economic structure of the state and law—the latter being superstructure and parasitic upon the former. The state was seen as a type of social arrangement necessarily based upon class. Law within this system was a set of rules issued by the ruling class to maintain its status. Therefore, "law is a class monopoly of force" (6:56).

However, this is just simple Marx. Relating the theory to the times, Melvin opined that the most distinctive aspects of Soviet philosophy of law were "a polemic against bourgeois writers on jurisprudence to the effect that they have never treated law theory scientifically" (6:57) and a concern over civil law, recognizing that traditional law was based upon private rights. Therefore, the issue of "group or mass welfare" (6:58) raises problems since it is based in the rights of individuals.

Melvin described how Soviet legal theory had evolved. First, Peter J. Stuchka offered a theory of law based upon class struggle and social relations (6:60). Evgeny Bronislavovich Pashukanis thought this definition too broad and saw law as a retroactive construction resting upon private transactions. Therefore, law is essentially tied to the system of private transactions. In contrast, for the Marxist, law is less the protection of rights than the construction of technical norms for the "conditions of mutual need, and of the functioning of a common enterprise for the fulfillment of that need" (6:62). Further, when technical norms

replace legal norms, the legal norms and the "juristic personality" disappears (6:62). This, in turn, implies that there would be no socialist law.

However, empirically, law was not disappearing in Soviet society. A new legal theory was needed to justify this phenomenon. "[Mikhail Aleksandrovich] Arzhanov emphasized Stalin's teaching that the withering away of the state will not come through the weakening of the political authority, but through its maximum consolidation" (6:64). The function of law would be to apply scientific knowledge as founded in dialectic. According to this theory, law is educative.

Soviet judicial history, Melvin noted, aligns somewhat with Roscoe Pound's jurisprudence. But Pound's is much less sanguine about the virtues of administered codes. Further, Pound's theory of law seems much more static than the Soviet conception. Melvin concluded that Soviet jurisprudence is best analyzed as a theory of personality development "via social roles" (6:67).

Filmer Stuart Cuckow Northrop (1952–1953) offered another address based upon comparative conceptions of law. He assumed that different cultures have different theories of knowledge that, in turn, animate their social institutions. Accordingly, in "The Philosophy of Natural Science and Comparative Law," he argued that different ideas of law rest upon different theories of knowledge. Further, by examining law, a social institution that makes ethical ideas conscious, philosophers can highlight the epistemological or cognitive content in ethical beliefs. Northrop identified three major groups of legal procedures and codes: "(1) the intuitive mediational type, (2) the natural history type, and (3) the abstract contractual type" (6:124).

The intuitive mediational type of legal procedure is found in Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist, and Hindu cultures. These cultures find codified law to be shameful; instead, they rely upon mediation between parties wherein anything may serve as a relevant issue (there is no such thing as irrelevant evidence). This type of procedure rests upon "existential particularity" (6:125). The epistemology upon which it rests emphasizes the direct knowledge of each individual. The natural history type of law, to the contrary, allows for the common-sense universals of social norms. Finally, the abstract contractual type of law creates a unique technical legal terminology and rests upon more universal abstraction. It regards abstract code as good.

The dispute between the mediational and the natural history systems is, according to Northrop, a dispute between nominalism and realism in relationship to universals. The abstract contractual type rests upon the axiomatic scientific method that was started by the Greeks and perfected by modern Western science. This treats universal laws as more real than the individual particulars it measures. This, he claims, shows that ethical theories, at least in part, rest upon epistemological stances. For instance, "the abstract, contractual type of law appeared for the first time in history when this new scientific way of knowing in-

dividuals and events in culture passed over from the ancient Greek mathematical Physicists" (6:133–134). Indeed, "the ethics of the law of contract in society is but the empirically verified epistemology of the law of constructs in natural science applied to the resolution of human disputes and the ordering of human relations" (6:137). Northrop's conclusion from all of this was that law, and more broadly ethics, is, therefore, cognitive, and which is both attached to and determined by theories of knowledge. Of course, it follows from this that different cultures will have quite different legal practices. Therefore, in legal reasoning and law, there will be a resultant pluralism of institutions and procedures.

Morrow's second address, in 1953, revisited Plato on the law. In "The Demiurge in Politics: The *Timæus* and the *Laws*," he asked whether the central thesis of Plato's *Republic*, the rule of philosophy, is rejected in the *Laws*. His answer was no. Instead, "what one finds in the *Laws* is not resignation . . . but rather a more comprehensive grasp of the difficulties that have to be overcome" (6:189). *Laws* is best read as bringing the ideal theory of the *Republic* down into the reality of Greek politics of Plato's day. Therefore, it reflects Plato's desire to influence politics through the academy's training of statesmen and legislators. That is, the Athenian Stranger in *Laws* is making a state as the Demiurge in *Timæus* is making a world from the "stuff that is available" (6:191).

But if *Republic* is about the rule of philosophers, how does this relate to the rule of law in *Laws*? For an answer, Morrow turned to the *Statesman*, explaining that Plato believed that true master of craft sometimes bends ideal rules to get the best result given the material at hand. Therefore, because perfect philosophers cannot be assumed to exist:

> men will need law, to serve both as a standard of conduct and policy, and as a constraining force to protect them in their weaker moments . . . the rule of philosophy becomes the sovereignty of a code of laws devised by a philosophic legislator. (6:195)

Finally, there must be a learned body to interpret and expand the law when needed. This is Plato's Nocturnal Council, which "is a reflection of the philosopher-kings of the *Republic*" (6:197). But this is arguably not really antidemocratic because, as written, the Council is just advisory. Morrow presumed that adoption of their suggestions would come from "assent of the people" (6:198). Therefore, the rule of philosophy is brought down to earth and made workable through the rule of law. For the mature Plato, this means that law and philosophy are virtually identical realms. This is an important conclusion for Americans in the Cold War.

Herbert Fingarette's (1976–1977) "Punishment and Suffering" also addressed the essence of law. He aimed to show the internal necessity of a retribu-

tivist view of punishment for law. Kant tries to show this but fails, in Fingarette's opinion, because his argument from the "universal law of freedom" (8:440) ultimately reduces to the claim that coercion is necessary for conjoined wills which, in turn, is really an argument for deterrence. Further, Kant's "if I steal from others, I steal from myself" (8:440) argument is not attached to any justification for any type of punishment at all. Therefore, Kant's argument really is just an appeal to intuitions. However, as Fingarette noted, intuitions need to be founded upon reasons to function as a convincing argument.

Next Fingarette analyzed Herbert Morris's "balance sheet" version, wherein retribution is necessary for balancing the social books.[7] Fingarette found this to be a weak justification; a proper justification for retribution should be stronger. For instance, a concept such as property needs a stronger type of protection. Indeed, "the intent is precisely to *deny* us a legitimate alternative to paying the storekeeper for what we take" (8:441).

This leads us to Fingarette's thesis that there is something about essence of law that requires retribution. But the requirement is not that of moral justification, rather, it is an institutional justification based upon law's use of power. First, law must both leave the will free and yet make it to comply: "power over the will is a power to constrain our *freedom* to will something, without necessarily denying us the *power* so to will" (8:445). Reparation cannot have this force. The use of retribution is necessary in order to ensure the initial compliance in terms of a requirement. The "humbling of the will" (8:449) is the essential aspect. Therefore, Fingarette concluded that retribution is a necessary evil, a real evil, necessarily attached to the functioning of law. This humbling is morally justifiable, if it is justifiable, because of the results its use makes possible.

Finally, Richard Alan Wasserstrom's (1986–1987) address, "Preferential Treatment, Color-Blindness, and the Evils of Racism and Racial Discrimination" left the realm of essence and arrived at a worldly issue familiar to American politics—race. Therein, Wasserstrom offered a philosophical analysis and defense of limited preferential treatment based on race in selection processes. He also argued against the criticism that the use of race-based criteria replicates the racism. He claimed that the preferential treatment programs are justified because they are helpful in overcoming a system of racial privilege.

Wasserstrom listed four beneficial outcomes of race-based selection processes. First, such a program would offer role models that change role expectations. Second, it would create new relationships of power between groups. Third, preferential treatment would bring people with different experiences into the social mix. Finally, such programs would put representatives of diverse races in positions of power, where they could advocate for important services for their constituencies. Therefore, he concluded that it is rational to presume that such programs can help alleviate or overcome America's racial cast system.

Regarding the fear that preferential treatment replicates the same arbitrary classification based upon race that is wrong with racism, Wasserstrom argued that, as stated, the objection is too abstract. The real problem to be faced and solved is the specificity of a system of race based upon oppression and exclusion. He pointed out that the crudeness of a legal black or white distinction in a society of more varied hues shows that it was created for the purpose of oppression. As opposed to this purpose:

> preferential treatment programs neither subscribe to, nor support, an ideology which regards persons who are black rather than white as those who are least problematically and most assuredly to be counted as the paradigmatically full members of the moral and social community. There is no explicit or implicit ideological commitment to a view of whites as the persons whose membership and standing is diminished, or with whom associations can be degrading or contaminating. (9:483)

From a contemporary perspective, what is most interesting about The APA presidential addresses centering on philosophy of law is their eclecticism. As opposed to the legal positivism versus law as integrity orthodoxy that prevails in philosophy of law today, the addresses of the first 100 years are heterodox. This pluralism of perspectives and methodology is welcome. They are also more comparative than the political addresses were. Of course, there are still patterns where, early on, democracy and social science methods seem presupposed, and later, Cold War positions evinced a dominant "concept based" style of analysis. Overall, however, the trend was toward diversity of topics and methodology.

5. Conclusion

From a survey of the chronological summaries above, certain patterns become quite apparent. Maybe even more obviously, certain areas are almost completely lacking. But before pursuing these avenues, there should be noted the obvious deep problems with drawing any conclusions about professional philosophy in America from an analysis of The APA presidential addresses. Clearly there is the problem of selection bias. It may be that the philosophers more engaged in the political issues of the day were less engaged with membership in or the administration of The APA. Of course, the same might be true of those dealing with law. Then again, it may be that political or legal issues in philosophy were not considered to be as core as epistemological issues or logic. Political philosophy in this picture is not what a "philosopher's philosopher" does. Further, of course, there is the quite different issue of the politics within The APA or amongst philosophers more generally. These and other factors go to support the

position that any conclusions drawn from analyzing the addresses individually or as a group for implications broader than what APA presidents presented should be treated with caution.

That being noted, there are some points that demand attention. First, there are some strange and pretty damning absences. For instance, given the ubiquity of the issue of race in America, especially the centrality of America's slave heritage and the importance of the Civil Rights Movement in United States political history, it is striking that the first address centrally dealing with the issue of race, or really dealing with it at all beyond even a cursory glance, was not given until 1987. It is not as if these issues were invisible in American culture.

Indeed, the race issue has to be faced for any political analysis in the United States to be plausible. Add to this that explicitly women's political issues were only first raised in 2000, eighty years after women won the right to vote in the United States, and it becomes difficult to excuse the profession, issues of selection bias notwithstanding. The excuse that philosophy deals with the "timeless" issues at a higher level of abstraction and therefore cannot notice such issues of the day seems embarrassing and not worthy of a profession that believes itself in ownership of tools of analysis useful, indeed essential, for proper understanding of any topic.

In terms of the manifest content of the addresses, some trends are apparent in both political and legal categories. The most obvious evolution actually present in the addresses was a large shift between the dominance of a background assumption of the value of democracy in the earlier addresses to a dominance of liberal issues in the latter. Further, the earlier addresses also assume an interdisciplinary dialogue in service of their manifestly constructive aims. The latter essays show a turn toward conceptual analysis and what would be thought today as analytical results.

If it is thought important to define disciplinary boundaries and have a specific methodology, then the earlier essays can be read as quite lacking. On the other hand, if the quest for a specific methodology is thought unfortunate and limiting, then the early essays seem more honestly engaged in real world issues. It is ultimately difficult to not read the general evolution from democratic advocacy to issues of conceptual analysis and liberalism as arising from a combination of loss of faith in the masses, Cold War pressures, and professionalization (the need for disciplinary boundaries in the modern academy).

Of course, with Wasserstrom and Nussbaum, we see a return of the world in full force. For those of us who believe philosophy has important tools to offer the real world in solving urgent political and legal issues, this return of the real is encouraging. It is, of course, from another perspective, quite possible to see the turn toward analysis and the construction of liberal government as quite welcome.

The conception of democracy in the early years is often frustratingly vague. Further, there is remarkably little critique of the seemingly uncritical optimism the early essays have for social science as well as social engineering. On the whole, though, the methodological pluralism of the early addresses offered a much more engaged picture of the philosophical profession, one that, once again, seems to be picked up by Wasserstom and Nussbaum at the end of the century.

To return to a point made by Hampshire, different conceptions of reason and rationality have moral and political implications, as do different conceptions of philosophy. But it is important to note a different implication from the need to sort out centrally political addresses from those that just have political import.

One of the more poignant addresses in the 100-year history of The APA is that by Paul Arthur Schilpp (1958–1959). In "The Abdication of Philosophy," he chided the profession for abdicating its responsibility to help society face the urgent and pressing issues of the day. It is not that philosophers are not political. For him, there is no lack of political machinations within the profession of philosophy. Indeed, those most against the possibility of normative judgments at his time were, for him, making the greatest use of them. He pointed out that, at his time, the logical empiricists and Oxford analysts were dogmatic propagandists for the superiority of their philosophical methodology over all others. Of course, he also pointed out that the very same theorists were often making strong value judgments about various styles of philosophical analysis from within a stance that held that value judgments were incapable of reasoned support.

Be that as it may, more important was Schilpp's call for the need to bring philosophical tools to bear on "transcendently urgent human problems" (6:545). Schilpp quoted Dewey as characterizing philosophy as "a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men" and then concludes that philosophers do not have the luxury of being isolated. Indeed, the philosopher should be engaged directly in the task of helping to think out the problems of the world. For, "the philosopher who fails mankind at this point has failed" (6:545).

Sadly, if anything, the distance between philosophical analysis and the problems of the world increased in the years after Schilpp spoke those words. Of course, this was during the Cold War, an important time for political theory if not political philosophy. It is telling and quite disturbing that the next political address did not happen until a decade later. It would take another eight years after that for a legal topic to be addressed.

Whether this omission was the result of a profession being insular, developing its own professional methodology (perhaps to develop boundaries in the post-war professionalism of the academy), or due to Cold War pressures (Schilpp thinks that philosophers felt safely a-political by playing a "harmless

game of playing with precisely defined symbols" (6:531), the silence that greeted Schilpp's call to responsibility is troubling.

As Schilpp noted, if philosophers fail to bring their tools to bear on these issues, other less thoughtful theorists will fill the vacuum (note that economists would be more than willing to fill the void with their insufficiently theorized models of human interaction). Of course, this only highlights the amount of urgent work waiting for philosophers to do.

Notes

1. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).

2. Edmund L. Pincoffs, "Government and Character," *Social Theory and Practice* 17, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 337–344; reprinted this series, vol. 10, pp. 201–207.

3. Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, *or Private Vices*, *Public Benefits* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1926), ll. 6–7; orig. poem, 1714.

4. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1761), bk. 4, chap. 2.

5. Michael J. Perry, *Love and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in American Politics* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 141.

6. John Dewey, *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925–1953*, vol. 10, *1934, Art as Experience* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press), p. 190.

7. See H. Morris, Persons and Punishment, in *On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 31–58.

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ETHICS: PLURALISTIC, PRAGMATIC COHERENCE

Nancy A. Stanlick

1. Introduction

Presidential addresses of The American Philosophical Association (The APA) delivered during the twentieth century that concentrated on theoretical, normative, applied, or metaethics number fewer than two dozen. An overwhelming number of those that did were theoretical or speculative in nature. Given the complexity, importance, and severity of so many problems in the world during the twentieth century, one might think it odd that so few dealt with applied or practical issues. The bulk of them, at least at first glance, seem decidedly "impractical," especially since so many dealt with topics such as critical appraisal of theory or questions regarding naturalism, and issues such as objectivity and rationality in ethics or an inquiry into the independence of ethics from other branches of philosophy. Not one of the twenty-one dealt specifically or exclusively with solving any particular applied ethical problem such as world hunger, animal rights, abortion, or euthanasia, just to name a few potential applied issues. Two presidents concentrated their attention on critical appraisal of utilitarianism; several wrote addresses related to the "is-ought" problem; a few concentrated on a particular philosopher or school of thought, such as Plato or phenomenology, and so on. This, however, does not mean that the ethics addresses from The APA in the twentieth century were not, overall, "practical" in nature.

Generally speaking, the presidential addresses reflect the philosophical interests of the times in which they were written (for example, those whose addresses concern the is-ought problem fell in the middle of the twentieth century), or, they reflected specific philosophical interests of their respective authors. Sometimes, they were even far afield of a primary ethical interest of the time—if, indeed, it is possible to identify anything as a primary interest about ethics of any specific time periods of the twentieth century.

Thus, we find that the interests of the presidents who chose to write their addresses on ethics were many and varied. They ranged from normative and theoretical interests to metaethics and beyond. But while their interests and topics are varied, one of the presidential addresses, "Ethics and Coherence" by Richard Thomas De George (1989–1990), can serve as a backdrop or foundation against which it is possible to conceive of at least most of them.

The argument of this essay is essentially that the ethics-related presidential addresses generally have a practical—or perhaps a better term is pragmatic—focus when understood on the model of De George's position on the pluralistic

nature of ethics. To show that this "pragmatic" tendency exists, I will first provide some introductory comments and an overview of De George's address. Then, an overview of the presidents' main theses will be useful in reaching the third part, which returns to De George's argument. Finally, some specific ways in which other presidential addresses on ethics have a place in De George's coherence argument will be discussed, leading to a conclusion regarding the pluralistic, pragmatic coherence of the ethics addresses of The APA in the twentieth century and perhaps of all ethical reasoning and arguments.

2. Practical and Applied Ethics

To establish my central thesis, which holds that all or most of the ethics-related presidential addresses of The APA delivered during the twentieth century are characterized by what I will call a pluralistic, pragmatic coherence, it is important to define terms specific to the purpose. The term "practical ethics" as I will use it refers to argumentation or theorizing on any topic in ethics in which theories and principles are evaluated with the intent to solve a problem of *any* kind in, about, or regarding ethics. Practical ethics, for our purposes, is, therefore, distinct from applied or professional ethics, which have as their central focus the application of theories, principles, or concepts in ethics to solve "real-life" moral problems, paradoxes, dilemmas, and so on. Applied ethics is therefore a kind of practical ethics, but not all instances of practical ethics are applied to specific, or real-life, moral problems.

To clarify, consider the difference between trying to determine the right or good course of action when faced with a moral problem such as the rightness (or wrongness) of capital punishment or abortion (applied ethical issues) versus trying to determine whether it is possible to derive an "ought" from an "is" (a practical ethical issue). It is possible in the latter case to employ arguments, apply principles or concepts in ethical theories, and attempt to solve the is-ought problem without at the same time trying to solve a practical moral problem such as what to do, say, with respect to Aunt Martha's last wish that we donate all her money and worldly goods to the nuns of St. Mary's after her death rather than to keep them for ourselves. So, while there are many different topics and interests expressed in the presidential addresses, in this essay, those topics and interests will be conceptualized as generally practical in the special sense of that term described above.

Several of the presidential addresses revolved around the is-ought problem. Some were critical evaluations of utilitarianism, another delved into comparisons of Plato's ethical works, and some, among other things, dealt with highly theoretical questions such as "Why be good?" and whether ethics is independent of other branches of philosophy.

It may seem to be a tall order—and perhaps some might even think it impossible—to claim that all such inquiries are inquiries in practical ethics, but using a variation on De George's concept of the coherence of ethics will make it possible. In "Ethics and Coherence," De George argued that there is no reason for us not to be pluralists with respect to ethical theories and there is no reason not to be pluralists regarding morally relevant facts in conceiving of ethics and considering its real-life problems. Using his mode of reasoning, we might also conclude that there is no reason for us not to take a similar look at the ways in which the presidential addresses of the twentieth century having to do with ethics are, in their plurality, means of leading to the solutions to *practical* moral problems.

3. De George on Ethics and Coherence

De George essentially argued that it is neither necessary nor desirable to privilege any theories or principles of ethics. He contended that experience is varied, and acknowledging this means that no single theory of ethics is sufficient for use in solving moral problems. We see this to be the case in the fact that people actually use a combination of principles from various theories or outlooks to solve moral problems. Sometimes, character and consequences, rules and virtues are all used in the attempt to formulate solutions to real-life applied moral problems and issues.

Take, for instance, the fact that, with respect to some particular moral problem—say, something like the morality of in-vitro fertilization (the example De George uses in his address) or abortion—we might use scientific facts and recognize that the changing nature of scientific knowledge may lead us to amend in some way(s) the premises we accept or the conclusions we have reached with respect to the issue. In actual practice, in the attempt to solve moral problems, we normally do not hold steadfastly to statements or claims or facts that are no longer relevant or applicable to a case or issue. Neither should we do this with theories because they are inadequate in themselves to solve all moral problems.[1]

There are times, for example, when our concern in determining a person's responsibility for an action is not adequately addressed by considering duty (in a Kantian sense) by itself, but it is facilitated by also considering consequences (a utilitarian focus) and the character of the actor (a virtue-theoretical concern). In short, De George's position can be understood from an example like that of moral responsibility by seeing that it is possible for many positions to be partially right—or at least partially applicable.

Furthermore, when we consider the potential, far-reaching importance and application of De George's pluralistic approach, the notion of ethics as coherence has international relevance and applicability. De George noted that one of the things that must be done in trying to develop "global morality" is "piecemeal integration of common elements of human experience" (9:731) on an interna-

tional level. If we were to succeed, therefore, in establishing such a global morality, we would have to take into consideration different societies and cultures, not only different individuals, and recognize that "plurality of views and approaches is a virtue, not a defect" (9:727).

In other words, the pluralism expressed in De George's position has value in understanding theories, the relationship of facts (such as scientific facts) to theories, and the application of theories personally, interpersonally, and internationally. De George's work as Director of the International Center for Ethics and Business reflects the pluralistic nature of his presidential address, especially in recognizing the influence of technology, medicine, and other realms in addressing moral problems.

4. Summaries of the Presidential Addresses

Frank Chapman Sharp's (1907–1908) primary interest in ethics revolved around the application of theory to practice. For example, he was one of the first philosophers to inquire into business ethics, and his work on moral instruction was used by the United States Government in 1918 for troop training (1:259). In "The Objectivity of the Moral Judgment," Sharp argued that it is impossible for ethics to generate its own moral code and that such code, instead, must come from God. His argument rested on the notion that an objective theory of morality must satisfy three conditions. First, it must be impersonal, i.e., it must apply to all and not be related only to one's own interests. Second, it must be complete insofar as the addition of more information would not alter one's opinion on the issue. Third, it must be such that a person's moral judgments are consistent, i.e., not incompatible, with each other.

Candidates for objectivity of moral judgment are rationalism and hedonism, but these both fail to satisfy at least one of the conditions. Common sense proposes four potential means to reach objective moral judgment, but each of them also fails to satisfy at least one of the conditions. For example, the eudaimonistic standard requires that we promote the welfare of individuals or the social group; but when put into practice in trying to satisfy the condition that we consider the issue from the point of view of an impartial spectator, it is difficult to determine why we should do so.

Sharp offered as an example the trolley problem: A man discovers that innocent people are in a train and, because of an open switch on the tracks, passengers could be injured or killed. The man is able to save several hundred passengers on the train by flipping the switch, but, much to his distress, he discovers that his own child is on the track in front of the train's engine, and flipping the switch would kill his child. It might seem easy to say that what the man ought to do is to save his own child, but if it is truly the case that we are to take an impersonal, impartial point of view in making moral judgments,

there is no compelling reason to prefer to save one's own child rather than the innocent people on the train.

Due to the failure of all our attempts to find reliable means to make objective moral judgments, Sharp concluded that ethics is not capable of achieving objectivity. What remains, on his view, is the only means to satisfy the conditions—to conceive of ethics on the model of a "spiritualistic metaphysics which conceives of man as made in the image of God" (1:266). The reason for this is, for Sharp, simple. Because objectivity in ethics requires the ability to meet the conditions of impartiality, complete information, and consistency, and this constitutes the foundation of an objective moral code, and because human beings are created in the image of God, it follows that the objective code must be of God. In other words:

> if there is for man but one valid code, and the foundations of this are laid in the very depths of human nature, the identification of such a code with that of God becomes inevitable for any metaphysics that admits the existence of a personal God at all. (1:266)

In 1914, James Hayden Tufts (1905–1906, 1914–1915; 1934–1935), John Dewey's (1905–1906) collaborator in pragmatist ethics, presented "Ethics of States," in which he compared individuals to states, noting that, like individuals, states increasingly seek moral approval. Seeking such approval is important because it indicates "a new stage in the development of a world conscience" (2:188). States seeking international approval for their actions indicates that we have reason to hope that someday, states may turn from exclusive attention to their honor and their preservation to more "encompassing ideals" of "mutual understanding, mutual aid, common sympathy, and common humanity" (2:188).

The most interesting aspect of Tufts's position was his contention that states make possible the development of morality in individuals, guaranteeing agreements and protecting rights of individuals while, at the same time, being either unwilling or unable to conduct themselves in the same way or to provide themselves with the same benefits. For example, while the state makes it possible for individuals inside the state to be confident of the enforcement of contracts, there is no power in force sufficient to compel a state to honor a contract with another state; where individuals inside the state are benefited by protection of their rights and their ability to enjoy peace and freedom from fear, these are benefits that states do not enjoy.

Tufts was hopeful that we might do better than political states actually do. States not only fail to provide peace and freedom from fear for themselves, they persist in spending more money on national defense than they do on maintenance and development of social goods such as health, welfare, and education. It is good, Tufts asserted, that states were moving increasingly toward recognizing that other states evaluate them, and their doing so will help to make pos-

sible states' building up moral consciousness. It will be slow, but it is a hopeful move toward:

> adding to political codes of self-preservation and honor the further codes of justice toward others, of friendly intercourse, and even, remote as it may seem, of devotion to the uniting ideals of mutual understanding, mutual aid, common sympathy, and common humanity. (2:188)

Rupert Clendon Lodge (1926–1927), in "The Platonic Highest Good," provided an analysis of the conception of the good in the work of Plato.[2] Lodge noted that individuals and communities are in almost constant conflict with each other such that between individuals, competition (and thus conflict) is a zero-sum game. Communities, on the other hand, are concerned with preserving themselves and with community goods such as wealth and law. The philosopher, whose job it is to understand, to analyze, and to clarify the good, is tasked with changing the individual human being through understanding the nature of the good in itself. Or at least this is the common story of the concept of the good in the work of Plato.

Lodge, however, noted that Plato's *Philebus* presents a different view of the nature of the good from that which is found in works like *The Republic*. In the *Philebus*, Lodge claimed, the good is expressed in this world. Considering this distinction, Lodge concluded that the *Philebus* tells us something new:

> the abstract, other-worldly contemplation to which the *Phaedo* and, at times, the *Republic* incline, is now definitely rejected as being formal and one-sided, while the concrete idealization of the present world is accepted as the only adequate expression of the highest good. (3:370)

The highest good for the individual, then, is living "to realize his own deepest happiness and well-being" (3:371).

Felix Adler (1928–1929) made a distinction between spiritual and natural equality to explain how we might advance the progress of humankind. Horace L. Friess wrote about Adler's position on this issue:

> It was Adler's belief, which he admitted "could not be empirically verified nor dialectically demonstrated," that "all fellow-beings [should] be viewed and treated, not as alike or equal in their specific qualities, but as potential spiritual companions of one another, equivalent in moral dignity and indispensable to each other because of their unlike excellences."[3] (3:462)

Adler's position was also evinced in his social activism on issues such as child labor and improved housing.

In "The Ethical Problem," Adler argued that reconciling spiritual equality with social inequality is the solution. Saying what the problem is in the abstract (that it is a clash between individual spirit and society) and contending that it is solved by reconciliation does not flesh out the facts and significance of "the ethical problem" on the whole, so consider the following example.

In the United States, where human relationships are governed by economics, people are thought to be excellent human beings when they succeed in obtaining wealth and prestige through their work and initiative. Alternately, those who fail to achieve such goals are thought, on an economic model of relationships, to have failed to achieve them because they are lazy or incapable. This is proof, under this model, that such persons must "be content with lower places in the social scale" (3:465). Adler found this view to be repugnant to the dignity of humanity that is inherent in spiritual equality, and "the genuinely spiritual system has for its hallmark [that] it discards the [economic model's] hierarchical arrangement . . . [and in the spiritual plan all are] spiritually on the same plane" (3:465). Adler is not arguing for "sameness," but instead that people have functions, and their functions are equally "indispensable."

In the spiritual system, there is no need for, or value in, arguing for a rule of ethics that answers all questions. Instead, the spiritual system uses empirical content to admit of change and variation. Rather than to think that the spiritual system is something to be realized some time in the future, it is real now, in lived experience. Adler concluded:

> Thus ethical experience opens out into a religion, and the probing of what is distinctive in ethical experience permits a metaphysical construction, alternative to those that now prevail, and offers, I submit, a new approach to the problem of ultimate reality. (3:476)

Tufts's third presidential address, in 1934, "The Institution as Agency of Stability and Readjustment in Ethics," put forth the distinctive, pragmatic view that we must recognize that we live in a world of change and readjustment. Contingency and change are facts of our lives, and it is in institutions that progress for humanity will be made—by admitting change instead of seeking "changeless essences" (4:295).

Tufts noted that power over others engenders responsibility. We have, he maintained, come to recognize this in the organization of states. There were no contemporary political leaders, he noted, who claimed that it is their right to rule for their personal benefit. Unfortunately, the same could not be said for economic structures. The economic institution recognizes contracts, but it is oblivious to its responsibilities to the public in wielding economic power. The problem stems at least in part from the economic institution considering property to be the source of rights and this is the end of the matter. In fact, however, in industrial American society, inequalities manifest themselves in more than economic

ways, and these affect social stability. For example, our economic system on the whole does not take responsibility for education of children or for care of the elderly. Some people tend to believe, regarding such social goods, that being required to contribute to or participate in them diminishes their freedom. Tufts took exception to this belief, holding instead that the real reason to require responsibility regarding economic power is to increase personal freedom and dignity, in that it claims "for the person protection against abuse of economic power similar to that which an earlier day asserted against political power" (4:303).

In "Recent Shifts in Ethical Theory and Practice," Jay William Hudson (1938–1939) explained the move in ethics from formalism to teleology. He described formalism as the position that in ethics, what one ought to do is the right for right's sake. On the contrary, teleological thinking recognizes duties, but at the same time, it does not consider them rigid or unchanging. The teleological move in ethics includes facing up to contingencies in the world, which will make the absolute claims of formalism untenable.

In this largely expository address, Hudson expounded upon the causes of the shift from duty-based ethics to teleology. He identified four such causes. The first is modern science with special attention to the theory of evolution helping us to realize that change is real. It is no longer justifiable to believe that there is some goal or perfection toward which everything aims. The second cause is recognizing the fact that we are social beings, not isolated, atomistic individuals concerned only with ourselves and our personal good. Instead, the aim of ethics is the common good. The third cause, a historical fact, is people coming to realize that freedom is not negative (a matter of freedom consisting in being unhindered by other people or by society); freedom is, instead, found in achieving a social rather than an individual objective (freedom as the ability to achieve a goal). With this third cause comes the fourth, a shift from the rugged individualism of the past to conceiving of people as social selves.

Noting the causes of the shift from formalism to teleology, Hudson's address was, in some sense, prescriptive with respect to how we should approach teaching and understanding the concepts and theories of ethics. We need to change with the times. We no longer think in terms of goals imposed upon us by God or by some eternal structures, and instead come to see that we can to some extent control our environment, and in so doing, we have the capacity to achieve purposes of our own, not those given to us from an external source.

Hudson noted that the facts surrounding the move from formalism to teleology were also seen in recently published ethics books (such as those of Tufts and Dewey), in which economic problems are connected to ethical problems and questions. He added that obligation had begun to be understood in terms of psychological factors, and this leads us also to recognize the need for a psychology of moral experience. Given the move from formalism to teleology in ethics, there is a corresponding need to recognize and include in our ethical theories

information about the scientific, social, and other developments that have occurred and have led to changes in the way in which ethics is conceived.

John David Goheen (1957–1958), in "Concerning a Tendency in French Ethical Thought," turned from the kind of analysis found in Hudson's explanation of shifts in ethical theory and practice to an analysis of a particular national philosophical tendency and its distinctiveness from another tendency. Specifically, Goheen noted that French philosophy is largely influenced by the phenomenological tradition and its rejection of a metaphysics of nature and epistemological problems related to science. French philosophers, instead, require that ethics make "significant assertions" (6:421). They do so in their concentration on choice and decision.

By contrast, American ethical thought has been dominated by the analytic tradition, and so it does not have a clear affinity to French ethical thought. There is, however, a connection, viz. the human sciences, in which American thought is significantly influential. It is, therefore, not the case that there is an unbridgeable gulf between French and American ethical thought.

During the 1960s, the is-ought problem began to capture the attention of APA presidents. Abraham Irving Melden (1961–1962), in "Reasons for Action and Matters of Fact," apparently had little patience for G. E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy or with the emotivists' conclusion regarding it, such that ethics is about feeling rather than reason. Melden contended that we should realize that whether an ought can be derived from an is is not the proper question to ask in ethics. When we discuss this question, it appears that there is nothing we can say about moral reasons for doing anything because there is said to be an unbridgeable gulf between factual claims and moral claims, the latter of which are expressions of emotion. So, moral reasons seem not able to be both moral claims and truth claims at the same time. Melden's position was that if there are moral reasons for doing anything, that is, if there are reasons that justify morally that one perform any action, the proper question instead is, "How, or in what sense, are we to construe the derivability of an *ought* from an *is*?" (7:64).

Melden made the interesting and important claim that even though moral claims might cause a person to do something or to refrain from doing something, there is a difference between *causing* someone to do something and there actually *being a cause* for it to be done. So, where the emotivist claims that a statement like "I like that man" is just a matter of exclaiming this to be the case for the person who has made the statement, Charles Leslie Stevenson's (1961–1962) belief that exclamations indicating that others ought to do the same (that is, they ought to like that man, too) are unjustified.[4]

Instead, Melden claimed, there is something normative in statements such as "I like that man" that derives from the fact that the speaker is in a position to make the claim authoritative. The utterance has moral force when it is made by a person who has a reliable opinion about the merit of the man in question. Another way to put the case is that "I like x" is "in fact a special way of saying that

x is good" (7:66), such that it provides a reason for others to assent to the notion that x is a good person (or thing, in cases in which persons are not the subject). So, "I like x" has normative force "because and just to the extent that there is the matter of fact circumstance that it is employed by someone reliable and responsible in expressing his estimation of the merit of the object" (7:66).

Authority is the turning point in Melden's argument. It is not simple persuasion that matters, but instead, "the representation that there are facts that establish the persuasion as rational, that does the trick" (7:67). Melden used the analogy of a commander (in the military, for example), who has the authority and ability to command due (we would assume) to the abilities and expertise he possesses. Authority and expertise are the reasons that the commander has the right and the position to command, and this renders his commands imperatives. Therefore, critics of naturalism are right in asserting that there are no *mere* facts that lead to prescriptive statements. But there are facts that are *not mere facts*, and:

> something is a reason for acting precisely because and just to the extent that it refers us to a matter of relevant fact. Accordingly, matters of fact can be good and sufficient justifying considerations. That is to say, matters of fact *as such* can and do fully establish matters of evaluation. It follows that if there are reasons for action, moral or otherwise, an *ought* most certainly is derivable from an *is*. (7:74)

Melden's impatience with emotivism and non-naturalism expresses itself succinctly in his concluding comment:

> It is high time we recognize the transparent absurdity of the notion that no matter of fact can provide any moral reason for doing anything at all. I propose, therefore, that we make a fresh start; that once more we attempt to get our bearings in moral philosophy, this time by taking seriously the notion of a reason for doing and exploring in detail the issues involved in the questions I posed. (7:76)

William Klaas Frankena (1965–1966), in "On Saying the Ethical Thing," was no less concerned than Melden to dissolve the problems engendered by Moore's naturalistic fallacy and the emotivists' reaction to it. Frankena argued that a point of view makes a moral judgment rational. Within a point of view, there are reasons such that a person with that point of view will agree with someone else sharing that same point of view that a moral judgment is an act of approval that is rational. To those who would object that this smacks of relativism, Frankena replied that the objective nature of rationality is connected to a point of view when those who have that point of view are rational, and this results in their agreement. This moves us away from interpersonal validity and authority into a kind of normative metaethics.

Like Melden, Frankena had no patience with emotivists. He noted that their views "strike [him] as being clearly inadequate as accounts of our ethical and value judgments" (7:382). Frankena said that it might just be that what the naturalistic fallacy "really comes to . . . [is] advocating that we . . . use our normative vocabulary simply as an alternative way of formulating constatives" (7:388). They are acts of approval, but they are acts of approval from a certain point of view from which there are reasons offered to convince others who are rational and who take that point of view. Frankena's position, even if it has a hint of cognitivism or a hint of naturalism, is, nonetheless, a way to fight against the tendency to believe that there is no final authority or validity in moral claims. He was arguing against views embedded in cultural relativism, psychoanalysis, and existentialism that move us away from making substantive and true moral claims in ethics.

In "Scientific Ethics and Negotiation," Vivian Jerauld McGill (1968–1969) turned toward science and practical ethics. He presented what he described as a cognitive, naturalistic theory of ethics, "which we shall also call pragmatic" (7:513). His position is cognitive because it deals with truth and falsehood; it is naturalistic because it deals with facts; and it is pragmatic because it deals with give and take as common interest.

McGill invited his audience to consider the fact that very important prescriptive issues have been decided or solved by science and technology, using as his example the comparison of modern medicine with the practices of a witch doctor. Modern medicine has done well in addressing medical problems, while the practices of the witch doctor have not. In other words, there are truth claims that have an effect on what we ought to do. Further, facts tend to be effective in changing a person's attitude about an issue. This is a cognitive claim. McGill admitted that the emotivists are right in thinking that we cannot demonstrate that a moral judgment is true. Neither, however, do we show by this fact that moral judgments cannot be true or false. Our best answer, McGill asserted, is the Deweyan view that the answer to the is-ought problem is the best we have. It is that our "informed desires . . . have weathered the test of inquiry" (7:520).

It is this sort of pragmatic approach that McGill offered with respect to negotiation. Obviously, power struggles occur in negotiations, but if we are to deal adequately with moral problems that are bound up with issues of power, we must take into account not just the claims and desires of those on different sides of the issue, but also their resources and demands. In doing so, we will have the ability to determine what is getting in the way of finding a solution to a problem by the "give and take" (proposals and counter-proposals, different ideas, etc.) and move from there to realize that we need to recognize negotiation as part of our everyday lives. This, McGill believed, will help us in solving moral issues; and, he noted, importantly, that it is more and more the case that negotiation and collective bargaining are the fora in which moral issues are discussed and solutions proposed. Philosophers, McGill suggested, could make contributions in

this realm of negotiation. Unfortunately, philosophers are rarely involved in making such contributions in these contexts.

In "Language and Ethics: 'What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba?,'" Henry Babcock Veatch (1970–1971) contended that we need an ontology of morals. He noted that moral philosophers have been occupied with a study of ethical language, and the result is that, at least since the 1930s, philosophers have tried to remove factual and objective claims from ethics while, at the same time trying to defend the claim that ethics are not relative. Veatch referred to an article by John Rogers Searle (1989–1990), in which he used institutional facts to argue that it is possible to move from an ought to an is.[5]

Veatch claimed, however, that Searle's position leads to arbitrariness in ethics, or to relativism. More specifically, all that Searle's position shows is that we ought to do what we have promised, say, when we are part of or involved in the institution of promise-making and promise-keeping, but when this is not the case, the oughts derived do not apply. In essence, Veatch's suggestion was that if it is the case that prescriptive claims and non-factual claims (supposedly all that ethics involves on the contemporary view) are inconsistent with rationality, then we need to turn to something else. That "something else" is the descriptive and objective nature of ethical judgments. To move to this is to move to an ontology of morals.

Alan Gewirth (1973–1974), in "The 'Is-Ought' Problem Resolved," posited that there are six characteristics of ought-statements. First, they are moral because they take account of the interests of others. Second, they are prescriptive in intent to guide or influence actions. Third, they are egalitarian in requiring distribution of well-being. Fourth, they are determinate in having definite contents. Fifth, they are categorical, not hypothetical. Finally, ought arguments must be non-circular, in that premises and conclusions cannot both be ought statements. He concluded that since agents are purposive, it follows logically that the agent must acknowledge that he ought to act "in basic moral ways" (8:272). Those basic ways are connected to truth and value claims. So, since the moral agent is committed to freedom and endorsement of well-being, ought statements are prescriptive. Since ought statements apply to all moral agents, the judgments are both moral and egalitarian. Further, the requirements of ought statements apply to the agent and to others, so they are general statements. Finally, because ought statements cannot be changeable or based on contingent aspects of the moral agent (such as feelings and desires), "judgments" are determinate and categorical. This, Gewirth concluded, solves the is-ought problem.

John Bordley Rawls (1974–1975), in "The Independence of Moral Theory," argued that ethical theory should be independent of other areas of philosophy. Essentially, he proposed that all the branches of philosophy should have their own subjects and problems. He noted that just as the theory of meaning depends on logic, moral philosophy depends on understanding moral conceptions that are independent of other areas of philosophy. An example is that phi-

losophy of mind cannot help us to decide between moral conceptions; another is that ethics is independent of epistemology because the procedure of reflective equilibrium does not assume that there is only one correct moral conception.[6] In short, "we exaggerate the dependence of moral philosophy, and in particular moral theory, on the rest of philosophy; and we expect too much from the theory of meaning, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind" (8:297).

Joel Feinberg's (1981–1982) "Sentiment and Sentimentality in Practical Ethics" contended that sentiment belongs in moral argumentation. Sentiment is simply an affective state, and, as such, it is, to some extent, passive. We know, then, what sentiments in ethics are; but even knowing this, we cannot determine what is morally right or wrong on the basis of sentiment. Feinberg gave the example of the moral affront abortion is to anti-abortionists. It is certainly more than being offended by abortion that makes abortion morally wrong to them; it is that their "moral sensibility," as Feinberg put it, "is affronted" (9:89).

However, this is not all, since there are other theories of the role of sentiment in ethics. One is that we know that something is morally wrong when the relevant sentiment is produced. Feinberg dismissed this view on the grounds that there are all sorts of negative sentiments that may exist toward actions or occurrences (such as unmarried cohabitation, for example) that do not prove those acts or occurrences to be morally wrong. Another theory regarding sentiment is that it can cause people to change their attitudes or judgments. Even if this were so, however, a feeling does not lead to conclusions about an objective state of affairs. Perhaps, Feinberg conjectured, we should conclude that we need to figure out how to criticize and evaluate sentiments and how they are used in ethics.

In "Utilitarianism and the Virtues," Philippa Ruth Bosanquet Foot (1982–1983), discussed what it is that is appealing about utilitarianism—what draws adherents. She believed that it is its consequentialism that is attractive. Consequentialism, however, is problematic. Foot gave the example of someone losing money in a very downtrodden part of a city, and then finding out that some honest police officer found it. The rightful owner can now get it back.

With respect to consequentialism, we say that want to reach a better state of affairs. The return of the money in the case example seems to fit the description of a better state of affairs, but the fact is that, as consequentialists, we recognize that it would be better if a poor person had found it because that person could make better use of it. From a personal point of view, this seems not to be the best state of affairs, because I lose (if it is my money) while someone else gains. So, perhaps we should think of the issue from an impersonal point of view. We realize, however, that benevolence is not all there is to morality since, for example, inducing cancer in someone else to alleviate the suffering of others would be wrong. Really, then, the consequentialist thinks of good states of affairs not just in terms of outcomes, but in terms of virtue. What this means is that non-consequentialist morality does not present a paradox since:

> it is surely true that morally good dispositions must create or preserve certain human goods such as fairness, cooperation, friendship and mutual respect. It does not follow, however, that there is some state of things which all moral action should try to promote. (9:198)

Joseph Quentin Lauer (1985–1986) in "Why Be Good?," discussed various contenders for an answer. Motives, he contended, fail to adequately answer the question, however, because it turns out that with motives, the good is not the ultimate end, but instead the means to another end. Moving to science for the answer is doomed to failure if science is value-free, and using experimentation in ethics to find an empirical answer would lead us to use people as human subjects in experiments. That, he contended, would be wrong since, for example, doing an experiment to find out what kind of harm might come to persons subjected to x, y, or z, would put persons at risk of harm. These attempts to answer the question, "Why Be Good?," then, fail. So, too, does the attempt to find the answer in religion or in religious practices because it is obvious that there are some religious practices, or at least practices purportedly associated with some religion or other, that are, themselves, immoral. Lauer allowed that the question is complicated. Perhaps, then, this all boils down to saying:

> to be good is to realize in our lives the kind of beings we truly are, i.e., *human* beings in the best sense of that term, the corollary of which is that not to be good is to fail to realize in our lives the kind of beings we really are—and who wants to be a failure, above all a failure at being human? (9:385)

The answer to "Why be good?," Lauer concluded, "is that it is the rational thing to do; to be a human being and not a morally good human being is not to be human, not to be rational" (9:386).

Marcus George Singer (1985–1986) argued that there must be a rational morality in "The Ideal of a Rational Morality." To show that this is the case, he distinguished between positive, personal, and rational morality. Positive morality is customary or conventional, applying to members of a group. Personal morality is what is used to criticize societal standards in positive morality. Rational morality, however, is what is presupposed in criticizing positive morality and personal judgments. It is obvious, Singer contended, that there is a rational or true morality, since it would make no sense that people can or do change their minds on moral issues or matters without it.

Singer noted that someone might object that Hume was right (and that Singer is wrong), because Hume showed convincingly that rules of morality are not based on rationality.[7] Singer turned this objection around, however, in his contention that Hume was referring to positive morality, not to rational morality, because Hume had no conception of rational morality in the first place. It is clearly the case that positive morality is not based on reason, so Hume was right.

However, Singer claimed, things are different with rational morality. Rational morality does not even exist—but it ought to. Rational morality is ideal in that it is better than what does exist (positive and personal morality) even if it does not itself exist. He admitted that there are merits to views such as emotivism, subjectivism, existentialism, and skepticism, in that sometimes, moral judgments are neither true nor false; sometimes, moral judgments are not founded on objective standards; sometimes, we decide moral matters simply by making a decision; other times, we recognize that there is no single right answer to a moral problem, in which case skepticism is justified; and sometimes, judgments are made on the basis of social considerations, rendering relativism justifiable. Singer was offering rational morality as something toward which to strive, and even though we may not get there, it is the ideal toward which ethics ought to move if it is to be more than subjectivism, relativism, existentialism, or skepticism.

Judith Jarvis Thomson (1992–1993), best known for her groundbreaking argument about the morality of abortion, presented the address entitled, "Goodness and Utilitarianism." Like Foot, Thomson found utilitarianism problematic, the problem being focused on consequentialism. She listed three characteristics that mark a modern moral philosopher as a utilitarian. First, utilitarians believe:

> some states of affairs are good and some are bad. Second, he thinks that for every instance in which a person can do such and such, there is such a thing as the total outcome . . . the goodness or badness of that total outcome being a function of the goodness or badness of the states of affairs it is a compound of. Third, . . . what a person ought to do is to choose that act which, of all the acts open to the person, would issue in the obtaining of the best total outcome. (10:157)

Thomson, however, saw "good" differently from many in that it is what she calls "goodness-in-a-way" (10:162). She noted, for example, that Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions is good in one way while chocolate is good in another way, and it makes no sense to ask which one is better than the other. They are good in different ways. Since utilitarians include acts among "states of affairs," consequentialism is not an appropriate name for utilitarianism. It appears from this that acts can be good in different ways; so on Thomson's view, we need principles to connect ways of being good with what we ought to do so that when ways of being good clash, we know what to do.

Richard Henry Kraut (1993–1994), in "Desire and the Human Good," asserted that we are pluralists about the good. Generally, a state of affairs is good when it satisfies one of a person's desires. However, what is ultimately good for a person is not independent of aims. "Our good is invented and constructed rather than discovered; and because of the great variation in our personalities and abilities, we invent different plans of life and our desires are directed at many different kinds of objects" (10:256).

We have to be careful here, because there are desires that are good to satisfy and some that are not. Kraut gave the example of a rather perverse person devoting his life to hitting and knocking down icicles, going so far as to obtain a fleet of trucks to help him in the process of doing so. As a whim, this might be amusingly acceptable, but going this far is perverse. We cannot, therefore, stop and say that it is just satisfaction of desires that constitutes the good because we have to make a distinction between present desires and ones that are desires for the future (such as for children). So, wanting something does not make it good to have the want satisfied. "My response is that what makes a desire good to satisfy is its being a desire for something that has features that make it worth wanting" (10:260). In other words, "the objects we desire must prove themselves worthy of being wanted by having certain characteristics" (10:260).

But this does not mean that we all have to want the same thing:

> for human beings the good is an object of rational choice and its achievement requires the training of desires and emotions so that they take appropriate objects as determined by reason. This is not to deny that we have a nature. Rather, it is to say that it is our nature to be choosers, to be capable of using reason to make choices and to mold our desires and emotions. (10:264)

So, there is "no single master good that measures the worth of all others; . . . there is no specific kind of life that is best for everyone" (10:265). We cannot infer the multiplicity of good by variability of desire. Instead, when we are trying to decide what kinds of lives to live, i.e., which are good to live, we have to evaluate our desires to see whether their objects are worth wanting.

In 2000, Barbara Herman (1999–2000) presented the last of the ethics-related addresses. In "Morality and Everyday Life," she contended that a reasonable morality is part of our ordinary lives rather than, as she put it, "something we are endlessly at war with (like a diet)" (10:657). Further, it is not a distant goal, something in which we put significant time and energy. There are those who might object to this view, saying that if morality is only about our everyday lives, then what of extraordinary times like disasters, wars, terrorism, and other upheavals? To this, Herman answered that contingency is a fact of our lives and everyday morality will include what we need to be able to manage in extraordinary circumstances. It is clear from her position that it does not provide us with some specific means for solving a real problem, such as the problem of aid to distant others in need. She noted, for example, that when it comes to determining what we should do with respect to aid to distant others, our everyday morality guides us toward understanding the socially determined duty to aid those who are closer to us, and it does not tell us what to do about others. This, however, does not mean that we have no obligation to distant others. It is simply that we recognize the limitations of our everyday morality, and those limits lead us to "a

new framework for thinking about the concrete issue" (10:670). In other words, our obligations are part of a "network of political and social institutions" (10:670), and because they are so, we have more resources to use to solve moral problems. Herman concluded that is skepticism is hard to defeat, but "real moral problems are things we can work on" (10:670).

5. Conclusion

So where do we go from here? A summary of the ethics-centered presidential addresses of The APA in the twentieth century has yielded what appears to be a plethora of ideas, positions, arguments, criticisms, and musings on a variety of theories, principles, concepts, and problems that have only that they are about "ethics" in common. But we might look at them more closely to find that there is something else characterizing most of them: for the most part, they tend toward practical application. That seems apt, given that these are addresses of American philosophers presenting ideas about ethics in The APA. American philosophical thought often tends toward practical application. This is no less true in the thought of many non-pragmatists such as Benjamin Franklin, the New England Transcendentalists in their exhortations to courage and models by which human beings ought to live their lives, the early American women's rights activists such as Angelina and Sarah Grimké and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Martin Luther King Jr.'s prescriptions for civil disobedience and social change, bell hooks's feminist activism, and many others.

Remember that De George argued that we would be well advised to think that moral problems of a practical nature are better solved with a coherence view of the application of ethical theories and relevant facts than with steadfast adherence to one theory or type of theory thinking that it will lead us to the solutions to real problems. Life is not like that, and our ordinary ways of trying to solve moral problems—and even many of our philosophical arguments in the sphere of applied ethics—are not like that.

We use different theories and different principles or concepts from a variety of theories in attempts to address real-life ethical problems. De George's position is that we are more likely to be able to account for our moral experience with a pluralistic view of ethics. He argued, in the end, that philosophers should take heed of the ways in which people actually argue to reach social consensus and agreement about ethical issues and problems. The way it is done is to be open to new information, to be open to new arguments, to be willing to use facts and concepts both inside and outside of ethics and ethical theories themselves, to approach pressing moral problems in our personal, social, and international experience. Taking this pluralistic approach means that we need not compromise on our principles, and it does not mean that we must acquiesce to relativism. Instead, we get objectivism, realism, and cognitive content all together.

Using the spirit of De George's argument, it is possible to show that there is a kind of pluralistic, pragmatic coherence to be found among most of the presidential addresses considered in this chapter. The pluralistic, pragmatic coherence of these addresses is not found in all of them being about theoretical or normative ethics (they are not); neither is it about the bulk of them being about metaethics or applied ethics (it is not). It is, instead, that almost all of them have a practical aim—they all aim at, imply, or lead to conclusions about what we ought to do to solve a theoretical conundrum, how we can go about conceiving of a particular kind of theory, how we might understand moral language, or how we might understand the ethical enterprise itself. These concerns converge on how we can appropriately use theories, concepts, principles, sentiments, and identified problems in them to attempt to solve real, applied, and professional ethical issues.

If we take the notion of coherence seriously, and extrapolate from De George's argument that we can profitably use varied theories and facts both inside and outside of ethics to reach toward solutions to moral problems, perhaps something similar can be said about the contents of The APA's ethics-related presidential addresses. Consider the contents and relationships between some of the addresses, such as the following.

The presidential addresses of Melden, Veatch, and Gewirth all centered on the is-ought problem. While that problem may, at first glance, appear to be anything but "practical," take into account Melden's contention that what makes it possible to derive an ought from an is has to do with the authority vested in the person who makes a moral claim or who utters an ought statement. If, according to Melden's argument, having the knowledge and expertise to be in a position to make an authoritative statement about a moral matter is what gives moral oughts meaning and credibility, it is possible, I think, to begin to justify the claim that moral authority depends on disciplinary authority in a relevant realm. For example, a physician with knowledge of both the moral dimensions and the medical dimensions of a difficult decision regarding health care possesses the requisite authority to make a claim to which others ought to listen.

Alternately, applying Melden's argument to the applied or professional moral issues involved in medical decision making would be helpful in actual decision making in helping to inform us that not just any person's opinion on an issue is as good as any other, but that some have authority that others do not possess. The use of this ought statement is to ensure that people with the relevant expertise and experience (authority) make or contribute to making important ethical decisions. The upshot is that while Melden's argument may have at first appeared either highly theoretical or simply esoteric, conceiving of ethics and ethical problems as amenable to De George's ideal of coherence shows it to be *practical* in conjunction with attempts to solve an *applied* ethical problem.

Veatch showed in a section of his address that John Searle's use of institutional facts to show that it is possible to derive an ought from an is leads to rela-

tivism. Again, this may seem to be anything but a practical application of moral reasoning, but that is only the case on first glance. If Veatch is right, then using the concept of "institutional facts" in an applied ethics context may lead to relativism. If the intent of those involved in making a decision on an issue wish to avoid relativism, the practical nature of Veatch's address is to let them know that Searle's paper on the issue will not lead them where they wish to go.

Consider also Hudson's address on the conceptual shift from formalism to teleology in ethics. Hudson argued that the shift is explicable from different points of view or by considering various facts about science or society, and in that regard, one may think that there is no practical application of his presidential address. On the contrary, Hudson noted that recognizing the shift from formalism to teleology helps us to understand that it is necessary to use scientific advances, social developments, and other facts even outside of ethics in conceiving of ethics on the whole. Another way to put it is that Hudson also argued, in a roundabout fashion, for a coherence view similar to that which De George presented in more detail and directly fifty years later.

McGill's presidential address on science and negotiation had a clearly practical (even if not "applied") focus in expressing the idea that in moral matters, it is sometimes the case that different people or groups (whether a single person or a group, both have "power" in some form and in some intensity or strength) experience "power plays" in presenting positions and attempting, especially in realms such as politics and international relations, but certainly not limited to these, to "get their way." Recognizing such power plays, and recognizing also that negotiation involves and requires a "give and take," we might wonder how "dirty tricks" and power plays might play themselves out and how we can guarantee that the stronger of two parties (in whatever way "strength" might manifest itself) cannot fail to engage in fair negotiation rather than intimidation. McGill's answer is surprisingly simple and yet ingeniously practical: make sure that the public is informed about, aware of, and participates in such processes, thereby strengthening the democratic process.

When Foot argued that utilitarianism's problem is its consequentialism, and in conjunction with this claim, she showed that it is not just states of affairs that are important to the utilitarian, but also acts, she provided an argument for the virtues of virtue ethics, even in utilitarian calculations. So what, you might ask, does this have to do with practicality? If Foot is right, then it shows again that there is room for plurality and coherence.

On one hand, Foot and Thomson both admitted that utilitarianism is a very attractive theory, that there is something about it that draws people to it and leads them to accept it. On the other hand, they both showed that if we adhere to utilitarianism as a guide to action, it is necessary to recognize its limitations. For example, Thomson argued that there is not a simple conception of good toward which the utilitarian strives, but instead that there is goodness-in-a-way. If Thomson is right, then it is possible for us to clarify our moral practice in ap-

plied realms by seeing that considering good and combining it with the notion of what one ought to do is a way of determining what to do when any two or more different ways of being good are in conflict with each other.

It would be possible to go on and consider several more of the addresses and how they fit (or perhaps sometimes why they do not) into the category of those that are generally pluralistic, pragmatic, and concerned with coherence. To have shown it to be the case with several of the presidential addresses is enough to get the ball rolling on making a clearer distinction between applied and practical ethics, and in seeing that even metaethical arguments and arguments about fine distinctions between theories can have a practical bearing on our attempts to solve problems in applied ethics.

Notes

1. A useful way in which to conceive of De George's position regarding the fact that people use a variety of theories and concepts in attempting to solve real-life or ordinary moral problems is to consider Emerson's claim, "a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds"; see Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance (1841), in *Essays and Lectures* (New York: Library of America, 1983), p. 265. Nancy A. Stanlick and Michael Strawser note, "each day is different from every other, and just as you don't prefer the same things as an adult that you preferred as a child, and just as you don't rightly limit yourself to one point of view or one approach in attempting to solve other practical problems, it is equally unjustified to limit ourselves to one theory or to one principle to solve complex moral issues." In other words, "while *foolish* consistency is something to avoid, consistency itself is to be embraced, utilized, appreciated, and applied. So even though it is clear that utilitarian moral theory and Kantian deontology are very different theories and come from very different theoretical and moral points of view, there are times when the use of both theories to solve a practical problem is not only acceptable, it may also be useful and efficient in yielding a way to conceptualize and to attempt to solve a moral problem." See Applying Ethical Theories, in *Asking Good Questions: Case Studies in Ethics and Critical Thinking* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2015), chap. 6.

2. W. M. Sibley, a colleague of Lodge, described him as using a "comparative method" in which realism, idealism, and pragmatism were "major modes of thought" and each "had something distinctive to contribute to philosophical vision, and none of which could claim absolute supremacy over its rivals" (see "Rupert Clendon Lodge," Memorial Minute, *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 35 (October 1962): 109; cited in this series at 3:346). Later in the present chapter, the affinity of Lodge's comparative method to De George's coherence view of ethics will become plain.

3. Horace L. Friess, "Felix Adler," *Columbia University Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (June 1934): 134–149.

4. See Charles L. Stevenson, "Relativism and Non-Relativism in the Theory of Value," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 35 (October 1962): 25–44; reprinted this series, vol. 7, pp. 109–125, at 114.

5. John R. Searle, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is,'" *The Philosophical Review* 73 (1964): 43–58.

6. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 48–51; and for a very accessible explanation and critical evaluation of the concept, see Norman Daniels, "Reflective Equilibrium," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/reflective-equilibrium/ (accessed 2/28/2015).

7. See David Hume, Moral Distinctions Not Deriv'd from Reason, in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), bk. 3, pt 1, sec. 1.

THE PROBLEM OF BEAUTY: AESTHETICS IN THE APA ADDRESSES

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1. Introduction

Upon initial inspection, the range of philosophical topics discussed in the presidential addresses to The American Philosophical Association (The APA) seem to confirm the belief that the study of aesthetics was secondary to the primary focus of philosophers in America during the twentieth century, if not to the field of philosophy itself. Historically, it has been claimed that the major figures in the history of aesthetics only turned to the study of the arts to round out their philosophical systems. As such, the aesthetics theories put forth had to conform to the requirements laid out by the more central philosophical fields of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.

This attitude of philosophers toward aesthetics might explain the relative paucity of addresses that directly dealt aesthetics during twentieth century. Presidential addresses delivered to The APA, as the most visible public addresses delivered by and to philosophers, naturally call for only the most interesting and central philosophical problems of the day. Thus, that problems in aesthetics only reached that peak of interest a few times in the history of the organization may be a fair indication of its relative importance to the field of philosophy as a whole. Only eight addresses directly dealt with aesthetics, and those were sufficiently spaced historically as to fail to present a complete picture of the development of aesthetics over the last century. Indeed, they did not reflect the full range of approaches to aesthetics that were prevalent at the time.

The idealism of R. G. Collingwood and Benedetto Croce, so influential in Europe during the first part of the twentieth century, was not mentioned. Neither were later continental approaches to aesthetics and art discussed, whether it be the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, Marxist, feminist, or existentialist aesthetics theories. These addresses are, after all, reflective of the American philosophical scene of the times in which they were delivered.

Nonetheless, although few in number, the presidential addresses on aesthetics dealt with a wide variety of central issues and featured some of the most influential and important philosophers of art of the twentieth century. When taken thematically, they show philosophical convergences from different moments in twentieth-century American philosophy. Topics that directly addressed aesthetics include: Hugo Münsterberg's (1908–1909) "The Problem of Beauty"; the definition of art in Bertram Emil Jessup's (1955–1956) "The Data of Aesthetics"; the distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic in

Henry Nelson Goodman's (1967–1968) "Art and Inquiry"; Isabel Payson Creed Hungerland's (1962–1963) "The Logic of Aesthetic Concepts"; Katharine Everett Gilbert's (1946–1947) "Recent Poets on Man and His Place"; and aesthetic value in Monroe Curtis Beardsley's (1978–1979) "In Defense of Aesthetic Value."

Although many other important topics in aesthetics were not covered, the addresses on aesthetics provide an interesting vantage point from which to survey the problems and progress in aesthetics in the twentieth century. When taken together, the addresses are most interesting in charting the development of analytic philosophy of art from the 1950s onward. This orientation to the study of aesthetics is usually considered to begin with the publication of Beardsley's *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*,[1] which served as the foundation for setting the agenda for analytic aesthetics. Beardsley's address and those of Goodman and Arthur Coleman Danto (1983–1984) are especially important in that they present the aesthetics theories of the three most important philosophers of art in America in the second half of the twentieth century.

Although there are thematic convergences in many of the presidential addresses that discuss aesthetics, this chapter treats the addresses chronologically. This will help to highlight the changing focus of inquiry into aesthetics problems across twentieth-century philosophy and better illustrate the increased interest in aesthetics in the second half of the century. Because many of the addresses discussed are separated by a decade or more, there are often few direct references between them. The exception is the analytic period, where one can discern a similar orientation to aesthetics shared by multiple addresses.

Further, there was a greater sense of discourse during that period, especially between Beardsley and Goodman. As such, the addresses that contribute to an understanding of the analytic approach to aesthetics will be treated in the same section in order to convey a sense of there being, at the time, a discernible *movement* in aesthetics rather than a mere spattering of philosophical interest sprinkled on the field of aesthetics in disparate historical moments.

Finally, I borrowed the title of this current chapter from Münsterberg's "The Problem of Beauty," the first address to deal explicitly with aesthetics. I chose to use his title not only to signal that Münsterberg discussed what was historically *the* problem in aesthetics, but also to suggest that, when taken to refer to the cumulative contribution to aesthetics represented in The APA presidential addresses, we can ask not only what the problem of beauty *in* philosophy is, but also whether philosophy *has* a problem with beauty. Thus, surveying the addresses that pertain to aesthetics is another way to assess the relationship between aesthetics and philosophy as a whole.

A. Münsterberg's "The Problem of Beauty"

It may come as some surprise that it was Münsterberg who delivered the first address to deal directly with aesthetics because he remains best known for setting up psychology laboratories at Harvard to conduct experiments based on the theories of Wilhelm Wundt, and for pioneering the fields of applied and institutional psychology. His interest in the intersection of psychology, philosophy, and aesthetics dates at least to his *The Principles of Art Education*[2] and was delivered in the same year that he published *The Eternal Values*, in which he defended absolute values in the areas of aesthetics, ethics, and religion.[3] As such, his address was part of his larger project of reconciling his training in, and commitment to, experimental psychology with his philosophical preference for absolute idealism, especially as evinced in the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte.

In another sense, it may seem natural that Münsterberg, straddling the border between philosophy and psychology as he did, should be the first to address issues in aesthetics, given that Gustav Fechner's empirical aesthetics had, in the previous century, been the first full throated attempt to ground the science of aesthetics in the new empirical standards of the age. It is for these reasons that Münsterberg's warning to philosophers not to neglect aesthetics and his insistence that philosophy should not leave the final word in aesthetics to psychologists are all the more interesting, and for our age timely, as the sciences of experimental aesthetics and neuroscience again seem to be taking the lead in exploring questions of beauty.

Philosophically, the first decade of the twentieth century seemed to be obsessed with the question of truth, undoubtedly due in part to the debates surrounding the pragmatic conception of truth. For Münsterberg, this resulted in an one-sidedness and partiality that threatened the ability of philosophy to understand the totality of human experience. As he put the point, "American philosophers, with two or three notable exceptions, have not cared to remember that beauty also is interwoven in the life we aim to understand" (1:273). It is telling that this description might be as apt for our own philosophical context as it was at the beginning of the twentieth century, and that, with few exceptions, philosophers still take the study of beauty and art to be secondary to the main problems of philosophy.

Even as Münsterberg's address aimed to rectify the neglect of beauty on the part of philosophers of his own day, his address began by providing a summary of recent psychological theories of aesthetics. Some theories attempt to view aesthetic phenomena in purely physiological terms where: "physical stimuli awaken in us a system of motor responses, and that we feel pleasantness whenever these physiological tensions and excitements and movements harmonize with the structural conditions of the organism" (1:275). Others equated the

aesthetic to psychical factors alone, viewing beauty either as a mental projection of pleasure onto the aesthetic object, or as a state of mind where aesthetic pleasure makes no claims to practical usefulness. Despite their differences in detail and emphasis, psychological theories of aesthetics, according to Münsterberg, all share this common presupposition:

> the works of art or the beauties of nature are physical objects, lights and sounds and so on in a physical world, and they have a certain causal effect in human organisms, they stimulate the sense organs and the brain and awake there a series of physiological and mental phenomena of which the last is a feeling of pleasantness. The various theories disagree as to the most important links in this causal chain between the sensory stimulation of the brain and the feeling of pleasantness, but the principles and the purposes of the theories are, after all, the same throughout. They are fundamentally not different from the psychological explanation of the enjoyment of fruit and coffee and candy. (1:276)

Münsterberg was concerned that the approaches to aesthetics central to the empirical psychology of his day were not only unable to distinguish psychologically between the pleasures afforded by great works of art and candy, but that by extension, things of beauty have no value in themselves. Aesthetics objects, on this view, are merely instrumentally valuable as causes of pleasure in organisms adapted to perceive them. There is no room for beauty to reside in the object, and certainly no room for beauty to be conceived as an absolute value. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, Münsterberg reached the conclusion, "if we really want an aesthetics 'from below,' that is, an aesthetics which begins where no complicated thinking has remolded the facts, then we cannot possibly start from the results of physiological psychology" (1:277).

Given his rejection of empirical psychology as the proper starting point for aesthetics, Münsterberg's argument for understanding beauty as an absolute value was centered on the notion of *will*, especially on the "fulfillments of our own will to have a world" (1:279). The desire for each individual subject to experience the world as coherent unity is the type of satisfaction of will that takes the place of a causal account of pleasure in Münsterberg's aesthetics theory. Beauty is an absolute value because it is characterized by the satisfaction of the will to have a perfect, internally consistent world. Yet, this value is also objective because beauty belongs to "the eternal structure of the only possible world" (1:280) and thus its value is independent of whether this beauty is perceived by a particular subject, or any subject at all. What he called the "aesthetic attitude" (different in usage from the theory of the same name that was popular later in the century) was the ideal of completeness and harmony that brings unity to life

in general and, as such, is not merely confined to works of art but is a basic organizing principle of nature itself. On this view, the aesthetic attitude is perhaps most evident in instances of natural beauty where, according to Münsterberg, our will is in harmony with nature's will. For this to occur, we should not feel threatened by the power of nature. So, Münsterberg's conception of the aesthetic attitude, which results in the harmony of wills, is independent of any practical uses or indeed of whether nature is beneficial or harmful to us. "Beauty demands only that we feel ourselves into the will of nature and that we find a fulfillment of each desire in the agreement which the other parts of nature's offer" (1:282).

When this conception of beauty is extended to art, Münsterberg's notion of the aesthetic attitude takes on the Kantian notion of disinterestedness as central, thus connecting it to later iterations of aesthetic attitude theory. Thus, for Münsterberg, art must be *unreal*—art must be isolated from the expectation that the work of art is connected to the normal course of events in such a way as to not lead us to view works of art as causally connected to anything outside itself:

> To be unreal in the aesthetical sense means that the object of this experience does not transcend itself, does not awake any expectations for future changes or any reminiscences of previous stages. . . . No artistic experience points away from itself. (1:283)

Or again, "the unreal is that which offers itself in its entirety, which is complete in itself and which thus needs no reference to anything beyond itself" (1:284).

Münsterberg's notion of the unreality of art means that the work of art is autonomous. It is distinct from the normal flow of experience in which we naturally make connections to what has come before and what we may expect to follow. For beauty to be an absolute value, it must be separated not only from the practical concerns of the organism, but also from the conception of reality itself that is operative in everyday life. In 1934, John Dewey (1905–1906) had severely criticized this notion in *Art as Experience*.[4] Although Münsterberg was right in warning American philosophers in the early twentieth century not to neglect aesthetics, his theory of beauty owes more to the idealisms of his native Germany rather than being a contribution or forerunner to a uniquely *American* aesthetics theory.

B. Alexander's "Art and the Democracy"

In would be a full decade after Münsterberg's address on the problem of beauty before another address would deal with aesthetics. Hartley Burr Alexander (1917–1918, 1919–1920; 1929–1930) viewed many problems of philosophy from an aesthetic perspective. Although it will not be discussed in detail here,

his 1930 address, "Drama as a Cosmic Category," argued that the then-recent quantum theory, and science more generally, operates through aesthetic categories rather than being irreconcilably opposed to an aesthetic vision of the world.

Alexander's work in aesthetics, in particular the views he presented in his address, "Art and the Democracy," rested on his views of human nature. Rather than presenting a narrow analysis of the relationship between art and politics, he presented art as the condition for achieving a true democracy understood as a fellowship or spiritual communion. This is the case because, from the point of view of his dualist metaphysics, the human being in its physical form is a mere encasement. In our true form, the human soul, aware of its imprisonment, reaches out for communion with fellow souls and it is through art that humankind can secure its "citizenship in a cosmic democracy" (2:298). Alexander saw the essence of human nature as, "mortal men are imprisoned men, and mortal life is a struggle for liberation through fellowship" (2:299). Art, in its broadest sense, is vital because it is the primary mode of communication through which the physically encased souls of human beings can achieve democratic fellowship, and hence liberation. Alexander went so far as to define art as "the communication of imprisoned souls" (2:299).

On this view, the fine arts are art par excellence because they provide the lens through which the various other strivings of human beings can be harmonized and unified. Although Alexander posited this expansive purpose for art, his analysis of the forms of art was confined to those based on vision, hearing, or language—specifically, painting and sculpture, music and poetry (understood broadly to encompass all of the literary arts). This is based on Alexander's view, common to aestheticians from Plato to the thinkers of the eighteenth century, that the senses of taste, smell, and touch are "private" senses and hence incapable of transcending the merely physical aspects of human beings to take on genuine symbolic function. Thus, they contribute to the goal of human fellowship through communication. This refusal to recognize the aesthetic character of the so called "lower senses" should come as no surprise given Alexander's emphasis on the spiritual function of art and his understanding of the human being as a soul imprisoned in a body that can only be transcended through the communicative exchanges with other souls, which is characteristic of art.

If, as Alexander asserted, human life is "a struggle for liberation from the solitary confinement of bodily and animal nature" (2:302), and the purpose of art it is to "symbolize its mutual values" (2:302), then there must be a connection between the forms of political organization and the ability of art to achieve this liberation. Thus, the best art has been produced in periods of political organization when humankind is lifted from the dross of mere physical existence to the attainment of its higher spiritual ends—this is most true in democracies.

Alexander pointed to classical Athens and Renaissance Florence as "two cities [that] not only produced poets and artists, philosophers and saints, that are the very pattern of supremacy, but they also discovered and defined democratic liberty" (2:303). Whether his judgments of Athens and Florence stand up to current historical inquiry does nothing to obscure his view that liberty is necessary for the highest achievement in the arts. As he put the point, "in periods of great political achievement men become highly socialized, that is to say, highly conscious of their human powers; and a great art is the natural consequence of such political greatness" (2:303). This view of the relationship between political and artistic achievement is only possible given his larger commitment to the notion that art is the communication of the highest spiritual ideals of communion and fellowship of which humanity is capable.

That great artistic achievement could issue from the expression of the consequences of human depravity is evidently an idea that Alexander could not have considered, and his inability to countenance such an understanding of art shows an ignorance of the art of the early part of the twentieth century that we now understand as comprising the various movements of European modernism. Like Münsterberg, Alexander's aesthetics rests more comfortably with nineteenth century conceptions of art. It should come as no surprise then that Alexander reserved his highest praise for religious art or that his notion of the relationship between democracy and artistic achievement is itself a religious notion:

> Democracy—not in any narrow political sense, but in that sense in which it means simply men's common faith in the manhood of men—is the inspiration of art; and it is in proportion as the conception of democracy passes outward from the political and onward into the religious—that is, in proportion as it becomes more truly spiritual, and more a communion, that art gains in breadth and vigor. (2:304)

For Alexander, whether art is only inspired by faith in the possibility of the spiritual communion that is constitutive of democracy in the broader sense is dubious in that it narrows the artistic impulse to the religious impulse and, as such, offers a reductive understanding of the communicative power of art. That art is, at root, communicative and reaches out from the existentially lonely vantage of the single human being to speak to our shared humanity is an aspect of art worth glorifying. But to say that the expressive power of art can only serve a spiritual communion at the expense of other meanings is to impoverish the office of art in human life.

This is not to say that Alexander's idealistic vision of art in seeking, as he put it, to "establish the human polity" (2:305) is not a beautiful application of the expressive and communicative potential of art, but surely this is not, after all,

a definition of art broad enough to capture all the diverse functions of art in society. We may agree with Alexander's judgment, "it is in democratically organized societies that science, morality, and art have come to their finest attainment" (307), but for altogether different reasons than he supposes.

C. Gilbert's "Recent Poets on Man and His Place"

Gilbert's address is notable in that it was the first to deal explicitly with the literary arts, in this case, poetry. As a whole, it can be seen as a defense of the claim that all things admit of philosophical treatment, and her treatment of philosophical poets, especially Wallace Stevens, foreshadowed the recent philosophical interest in Stevens's work, especially among those working from with the tradition of pragmatist aesthetics.

Although there have been numerous attempts in the history of philosophy to define poetry, most notably Aristotle's, Gilbert began her address by noting that there seems to be an implicit conceptual division between poetry and philosophy. Whereas poetry is detached from fact and deals in the imagination, philosophy (like science) is concerned with knowledge. Gilbert disagreed, saying, "the systematic distinction of functions, though necessary, draws lines where none exist in nature" (5:322). Her analysis of poetry from the first half of the twentieth century was meant to confirm that there is nothing intrinsic to poetry that precludes it from dealing with philosophical topics, most notable the place of human beings in nature. Commenting on a quotation from Paul Valéry, she noted that philosophers might rightly profit from the study of poetry to better grasp an understanding of the relationships between language and thought.

Gilbert's general orientation to the problem of poetry was to focus on the dual nature of the poet. On the one hand the poet, as the name indicates, is a maker—an active being who brings forth through creative endeavors, new realities. On the other hand, poets are sensitive beings who receive inspiration from nature that is then reflected back through the prism of their words. This dual nature of activity/receptivity also colored Gilbert's choice and analysis of the twentieth-century poets that she discussed. On one hand, she analyzed the work of Thomas Hardy, which she discussed under the category of "Man, the puppet," while on the other, she discussed Yeats' work under the category of "Man, the cutter of agate," which comes from his *The Cutting of an Agate*.[5] The basic tension between these two poetic functions is central to Gilbert's understanding of the poet who "remains suspended, vibrating, between what comes into him and what goes out from him" (5:335). It is in Gilbert's definition of the poet that it is possible to see the only direct influence of the philosophy of Dewey on any of the presidential addresses on aesthetics. Not only does Gilbert use the Deweyan terminology of "doing and undergoing" in her discussion of the nature of the

poet, but her discussion of how the poet interacts with nature as to both receive inspiration from it and also to creatively, and sometimes satirically, mold it, owes much to Dewey's discussion of the structure of the interaction between an organism and its environment. Take, for instance, the following passage from Dewey's *Experience and Nature*:

> If we start from primary experience, occurring as it does chiefly in modes of action and undergoing, it is easy to see what knowledge contributes—namely, the possibility of intelligent administration of the elements of doing and suffering. . . . To be intelligent in action and in suffering (enjoyment too) yields satisfaction even when conditions cannot be controlled. . . . And when we trace the genesis of knowing along this line, we also see that knowledge has a function and office in bettering and enriching the subject-matters of crude experience. We are prepared to understand what we are about on a grander scale, and to understand what happens even when we seem to be the hapless puppets of uncontrollable fate.[6]

Although Dewey was discussing knowledge specifically in this passage, there is much in it that informs Gilbert's analysis of poetry.

Even though human beings may be subject to suffering the uncontrollable ravages of nature, there is a satisfaction that can be obtained by understanding what we cannot control. In this sense, poetry functions like knowledge in enriching the meaning of crude experience. That Dewey discussed this in the context of features of nature that cannot be controlled is parallel to Gilbert's discussion of Hardy's take on man as "the puppet."

This is more than just a convergence of terminology. Rather, in Gilbert's analysis of poetry, she showed how poetry not only expresses genuinely philosophical points, but that the philosophical study of poetry itself enriches our understanding of *philosophy*. As she put it, "recent poets, however incoherent and ironical, have opened new experience to us through linguistic invention and have quickened and intensified the philosophical problem of doing and undergoing" (5:341). That poetry can function in such a way in relation to philosophy shows, as Gilbert suggested at the start of her address, that all things should be studied philosophically, and that the special philosophical study of the arts, is one of the best ways to ensure the continued vitality of philosophy itself.

2. The Analytic Period in Aesthetics: The 1950s and Onward

Although only five addresses on topics in aesthetics were delivered in the second half of the twentieth century, it is possible to discern a general orientation among them that can be characterized as "analytic aesthetics." This is not only the case

in the addresses by the major figures in analytic aesthetics, Beardsley, Goodman and Danto, but also in those of the lesser known figures such as Jessup and Hungerland, who addressed central questions in the philosophy of art such as art's definition and the distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic.

This section treats these five addresses broadly under the characterization of analytic aesthetics. Not only do they share a focus on the language of aesthetics, but they also employ conceptual analysis as a tool to clarify the distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic. As such, the essays on aesthetics from the second half of the twentieth century represent the basic orientation and problems that still characterize the mainstream of aesthetics today.

A. Jessup's "The Data of Aesthetics"

Just as Münsterberg began his lecture on "The Problem of Beauty" by laying out the two faulty extremes of theories in aesthetics—viewing the aesthetic as purely subjective or objective—so too did Jessup begin his address, "The Data of Aesthetics," by observing that the reason many aesthetics theories are deemed unsatisfactory stems from confounding the objective and subjective factors in aesthetic experience. On the one side, some aesthetics theories take subjective factors as essential to the understanding of art as such. Examples of such theories are those that view art as essentially intuition, expression, or as moral or religious. On the objective side, formalist theories of art take some objective feature of the art object and abstract from the context in which it is experienced and enjoyed, a purely objective definition of art. For Jessup, both types of theories not only ignore that aesthetic value is relational, but also fail to take in account the full range of aesthetic data. Accordingly, the first part of Jessup's address was focused on clarifying the nature of "aesthetic data."

For Jessup, the problem of recovering aesthetic data was that, by the time an aesthetic object becomes the topic of philosophical reflection, it is already laden with theoretical and historical baggage. In other words, artworks come to the attention of the philosopher already theorized by the disciplines involved with the creation, appreciation, and criticism of works of art. Even the commonsense experience of aesthetics, Jessup argued, is already so layered with culturally informed meanings that it cannot properly be said to offer access to untheorized aesthetic objects. In short, the data of aesthetics is thoroughly historicized, and recognizing this is necessary to articulate an aesthetics theory that is responsive to the data.

Certainly there are histories of art, histories of taste, and histories of criticism. Does this mean that the aesthetic object itself, which is at least partially a physical object, is also burdened by history? For Jessup, it is not possible to isolate the original work of art because it is the product of a particular historical

moment and, "when we re-examine the datum we must always re-examine it from our history. We see what our historical view shows or makes of the past; we find what our interests and tastes direct us to" (6:313). Seeing is always a historicized seeing; we cannot excavate the original aesthetic object from its history or from ours. To try to do so, Jessup warned, would be to take a purely antiquarian rather than an aesthetic interest in the art object. He continued:

> past art is always for us, in essential part, present art. We can experience it aesthetically as part art strictly only within the severe limits of culturally vicarious experience. The rest of our experience with it as past is cognitive, not aesthetic. (6:313)

If both art and our experience of art, past and present, are both thoroughly historicized, in what position does that put one who is interested in basing an aesthetics theory on *all* of the aesthetic data? For Jessup, what is required is taking into account all the aesthetic data in all of its diversity of form, function, presentation, and material.

According to Jessup, the first thing that strikes one examining the totality of aesthetic data is, as Danto would put it later in the century, that art objects comprise a radical pluralism: "there are symphonies and poems and gravestones, temples and saddle rugs, icons and decorative hangings, talismans, and ceremonial masks, and totems" (6:313). In our own time, we could expand this list to include vacuum cleaners and diamond encrusted skulls, smashed Ming vases and giant balloon dogs as well as photographs, films, and a plethora of digital and performance media.

Further, the complete range of aesthetic objects consists of some objects that have clearly defined uses, others whose original uses have been superseded or forgotten and have becomes objects of aesthetic enjoyment, and still others whose uselessness was taken to be the criterion of their aesthetic merit. The problem with so many aesthetics theories, Jessup argued, is that they take only one interesting subset of the full class of aesthetic objects and build their theories around that to the exclusion of the full range of aesthetic data. But when we take into account the full scope of aesthetic objects, he contended, we are confronted with the ambiguity and historical change central to most aesthetic objects. By drawing on specific examples—the reception of Arthur Miller's *The Crucible* in communist and Non-communist countries, the history of criticism of Richard Wagner, the interpretation of Roman mosaics in Christian and pre-Christian periods—Jessup illustrated that all the physical objects remain more or less the same when viewed from different perspectives (historical, ideological, or political). However, what he calls the "felt character" is significantly changed so that we must accept that we "find in the 'same' work at different times really

different data" (6:317). Not only is there a history of art but there is also a history of seeing and a history of aesthetic data. It is the repercussions of this observation for the definition of art that took up the remainder of Jessup's attention in his presidential address.

From observing the plurality within the class of aesthetic data taken as a whole, Jessup drew some conclusions regarding an appropriate definition of art derived from the data of aesthetics and the subsequent inadequacies of definitions of art that are derived from a subset of the class of aesthetic data overall:

> Everywhere in the store of aesthetic data, if we sample fairly through place and times, we find diversity and mutual opposition of purposes and effects, so that the art of one place and time can seldom be defined, at the level of intention and content, in terms of that of another place or time. But it is exactly from this level, generalized, of course, that most definitions of art have been formulated. . . . They are all theories which in respect to aesthetic data proceed from "some" to "all"—and not in a way which is empirically justifiable. (6:318–319)

Unlike later art theorists, notably Danto, who argued for an essentialist definition of art that holds at all times and all places on the basis of the radical diversity of art across historical periods and cultural units, Jessup drew the conclusion that the art of one period is inadequate evidence for stipulating a definition of art in another period, or, what's more, a definition that holds universally for all art at all times.

What then is the definition of art that Jessup offered? It rested on the distinction between the physical matter or material of a work of art and its form, such that a definition of art must not exclude art possessing any meaning or value that is capable of being transmitted through its physical material. This negative criteria leads to the following formulation of Jessup's definition of art:

> A work of art is a formally satisfying perceptual object the content of which may be either mere physical material or physical material which through representation, or through symbolic, figurative or literal portrayal or statement conveys other values in addition to that found in the formed physical material itself. (6:320)

What Jessup saw as comprising the exact relationship between the physical material of a work of art and the value that it may convey, he did not fully articulate. Further, for him, whether a work of art construed as a perceptual object is reducible to its content (the physical material plus the values or meanings it conveys) is underdetermined, although one might argue that given his analysis

of aesthetic "data," this data was understood narrowly as perceptual data. What is clear about his definition of art is that he avoided the criticism that he offered an essentialist definition of all art by arguing that what is found to be part of an individual work of art is essential to that work. In this way, Jessup was able to observe his condition that an aesthetics theory takes into account the totality of aesthetic data without simultaneously being theoretically required to ignore the plurality of that data. Thus, his definition of art is perhaps best interpreted as a negative definition, since his position on aesthetic data shows, "in matters of art, definitions and generalizations are uncommonly problematic because of the great variety in the data to which they are meant to apply" (6:321).

B. Hungerland's "The Logic of Aesthetic Concepts"

Although Jessup's emphasis on the historicized nature of art is less common in later analytic theories of art, his focus on the relationship between aesthetic data and the definition of art shows that his central concerns were consistent with the general orientation of mid- to late twentieth-century analytic philosophy of art. However, the next presidential address in aesthetics, "The Logic of Aesthetic Concepts," delivered by Hungerland in 1962, was more fully representative of the analytic approach to aesthetics. This may be due in part to the important work in articulating an analytic approach to aesthetics by Beardsley and Frank Sibley[7] that appeared in the late 1950s and early 1960s, after Jessup's address. More importantly, Hungerland's approach to aesthetics is indicative of the linguistic turn in philosophy as she applied the general theory of linguistic analysis to the distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic concepts.

Hungerland began her address by marking the distinction between two types of descriptions that can be given to objects. Whereas aesthetic descriptions ("balanced," "graceful," "garish") are most often employed in evaluative contexts, non-aesthetics descriptions, which might describe the color, shape, and relations of an object, are more useful in identifying, rather than evaluating, an art object. Further, following the common way to draw the distinction at the time, an aesthetic judgment requires the application of sensitivity or training that is taste, whereas a non-aesthetic judgment does not. Yet, despite this distinction the aesthetic properties of an object (or the aesthetic descriptions that may be properly applied to an object) rely in some way other than strict logical dependence on the non-aesthetic. Hungerland identified three prevailing views about the relationship between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic: (1) non-aesthetic descriptions logically entail aesthetic descriptions (2) non-aesthetic descriptions serve as inductive evidence, which support aesthetic descriptions, a view articulated by Monroe Beardsley and (3) Frank Sibley's view that aesthetic descriptions are not rule-governed and thus require the application of taste. The first

two positions for Hungerland are incorrect and Sibley's view requires clarification and amplification from the philosophy of language more generally. It is to this task that Hungerland addressed herself in her presidential address.

Hungerland began her analysis by drawing a distinction between truth conditions, criteria for assertibility, and presuppositions or preconditions. While truth conditions deal with the entailment relations between propositions, assertibility criteria deal with the domain of when it is justified to make a certain speech act. One important difference between the two that Hungerland pointed out is that a justification for asserting *p* is only relevant in a situation where one is challenged to provide supporting reasons for an utterance. In short, assertibility criteria are context sensitive, whereas logical entailment is not. Preconditions of linguistic expression are conditions that a speaker must believe to obtain for the expression or sentence to be asserted correctly, but are not themselves part of the speech act. Armed with these tools from the philosophy of language, Hungerland argued that the distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic descriptions is due to the fact that there are *criteria* for non-aesthetic descriptions, whereas there are none for aesthetic descriptions. It is also important to note that Hungerland's argument rests on the possibility that something may *look N* (where *N* stands for a non-aesthetic ascriptions) without *being N*, but if something *looks* like it possesses some aesthetic property then it actually does. Whether her analysis of the relationship between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic, relying as it does on the distinction between looking and being, could possibly be extended to non-visual art forms is not apparent. In short, the only way to know if what Hungerland called an "A-ascription" is applicable to an object is to look. Something cannot be garish or beautiful without also looking garish or beautiful.

That the very notion of the aesthetic was initially invented to cover the domain of sensory perception broadly conceived reinforces Hungerland's analysis. For her, the distinction between merely *looking* A and *being* A does not hold as it does for non-aesthetic ascriptions, because there is no way to specify what constitutes a normal observation under normal conditions for aesthetic properties as there is for non-aesthetic properties in such a way as to produce intersubjective agreement. Our ability to make N-ascriptions does not lie in any special facts about ourselves (such as a history of connoisseurship or special visual training) other than the basic physiological makeup of our perceptual systems.

Having drawn on an analysis of the linguistic and logical difference between speech acts involving aesthetics ascriptions and those involving non-aesthetics ascriptions, as well as some neglected virtues that Hungerland saw in the sense data theories of the time, she concluded her address by returning to the broader question of the relationship between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic. All three views she previously canvassed are "mistaken in taking the grammatical

similarity of A-ascriptions and N-ascriptions as indicative of logical similarity" (7:165). This point becomes clear when one examines Hungerland's discussion of correctly identifying a portion of a certain painting as being red using N-ascriptions. If one correct ascribes redness to a certain portion of a painting then one is also logically committed to the claim that the same portion of the painting is colored, since being red entails being colored. However, no such logical entailment exists between the non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties of a work of art. One can correctly describe the non-aesthetic features of a work without being logically committed, via either deductive or inductive reasoning, to ascribing any aesthetic features to that work on the basis of the correct identification of the non-aesthetics features.

For Hungerland, the extension of the logic of non-aesthetic concepts to the correct application of aesthetic concepts is *metaphorical* only. How then does this relate to her claim that Frank Sibley's position, that the use of aesthetic predicates is not rule-governed, is in need of amplification rather than refutation? As Hungerland pointed out, the fact that various non-aesthetic features when combined in different contexts will provide *preconditions* for the proper attribution of aesthetic properties provides the necessary extension of Sibley's account. While there is no general rule that can fix the logical necessity of any single non-aesthetic feature as *always and only* being related to a certain aesthetic feature, this does not preclude us from metaphorically extending the logic of statements that something *looks* like it has some non-aesthetic feature to similar claims about the aesthetic. Since, as Hungerland argued, if something looks like it has some aesthetic feature, then we cannot be mistaken in the same way as we can be if we claim that something really does have some non-aesthetic property (where the truth conditions for looking N as opposed to being N makes a difference).[8]

C. Goodman's "Art and Inquiry"

The remaining three presidential addresses on topics in aesthetics were delivered by three of the most important philosophers of art of the second half of the twentieth century: Goodman, Beardsley, and Danto. Although much of the theorizing about the arts that currently takes place in Anglo-American aesthetics is still grappling with and informed by the work of these three thinkers to such an extent that it would be justified to treat their presidential addresses in a separate section, since so much of their contributions determines what it is we mean by "analytic philosophy of art," it is best not to overly lionize their contributions to aesthetics, and philosophy as a whole, by treating them as being distinct from the less remembered figures who shared with them a basic orientation toward thinking about art and aesthetics. This is not to say, as shall become clear in the

discussion regarding the vigorous debate between Goodman and Beardsley, that all of the thinkers that I have grouped under the concept of analytic philosophy of art agreed on even the most basic or central questions in the field. Nevertheless, there is a discernible attitude, if not actual views, that unify these addresses that warrants thinking of Goodman and Beardsley especially as indicative of the analytic approach to aesthetics and the philosophy of art.

Goodman's 1967 "Art and Inquiry" was partially adapted from his then-forthcoming *Languages of Art*[9] and, as such, is representative of his overall views in a much more direct way than the other addresses discussed thus far. In fact, the very title of his address indicates his general orientation in thinking about the relationship between art and knowledge, so-called cognitivism in the philosophy of art.

Like Hungerland, Goodman was concerned with the language of aesthetics; but unlike Hungerland, his approach was derived from a general theory of symbols. As such, he is interested in the structure of symbol systems of which art (or more accurately the various arts) is one instance. Beginning by rejecting the view that aesthetic experience is passive receptivity, marked by a lack of purpose, or subsumed under any theoretical concept, Goodman stated his view in broad outline that aesthetic experience:

> involves making delicate discriminations and discerning subtle relationships, identifying symbol systems and characters within these systems and what these characters denote and exemplify, interpreting works and reorganizing the world in terms of works and works in terms of the world. (7:451)

Already, Goodman was invoking some of the concepts that are central to *Languages of Art*, namely that of the symbol system, denotation, and exemplification.

To set up his position, Goodman first surveyed the various unsatisfactory ways in which the aesthetic has been distinguished from the non-aesthetic, art from science. To start, he argued that to say that art is disinterested does not distinguish artistic activity from scientific activity. To think of science as essentially *interested* in either the practical application of a particular theory, or the control of nature writ large, is to confuse science with technology. As Goodman put it, "disinterested inquiry embraces both scientific and aesthetic experience" (7:451). Neither is it satisfactory to claim that art is "pleasure objectified" or that art aims at mere satisfaction. Nor is it correct to say, "the distinction between the scientific and the aesthetic is somehow rooted in the difference between knowing and feeling, between the cognitive and the emotive" (7:453). Both are cognitive for Goodman, so this distinction falls apart upon closer inspection as well.

Some art, especially modern art, strikes one as being almost exclusively cognitive and no less aesthetic for being so. The trouble with such theories, as

Goodman diagnosed them, is that they hold fastidiously to a rigid dichotomy between the cognitive and the emotive and fail to see, as Goodman did, and which perhaps constitutes his unique contribution to twentieth-century aesthetics, that the emotions have a cognitive function. Goodman put the point:

> On the one side, we put sensation, perception, inference, conjecture, all nerveless inspection and investigation, fact and truth; on the other, pleasure, pain, interest, satisfaction, disappointment, all brainless affective response, liking, and loathing. This pretty effectively keeps us from seeing that in aesthetic experience the *emotions function cognitively*. The work of art is apprehended through the feelings as well as through the senses. (7:454)

Rather than removing emotions from the realm of the aesthetic as might be the worry of some theorists who hold out that what makes the aesthetic distinct from understanding is the unique role that emotions play in the former but not the latter, Goodman urged, "the understanding is being endowed with them" (7:454). Emotions, and even uniquely aesthetic emotions, if such things can be shown to exist, remain what they always were on Goodman's view except that they are now afford a cognitive function. This, as Goodman said, does not diminish the emotions but rather enriches the understanding. Resistance to this view does not rest on any principled objection to the emotions functioning cognitively but rather in that it erodes the traditional way that the distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic has been drawn. One implication of Goodman's aesthetic cognitivism is that it requires that we redraw the distinction between art and knowledge, or look for the difference between aesthetic experience and non-aesthetic experience elsewhere.

Goodman's assault on the idea that the aesthetic can be distinguished from the scientific or non-aesthetic on the basis on the prevalence of emotion in the former but not the latter leads to his general theory of symbols. Since both aesthetic and scientific inquiries are, to a large extent, comprised of the manipulation of symbols, the features of symbol systems that Goodman identified are not markers of the aesthetic as such. Nevertheless, distinctions between different symbol systems can be made by focusing on the following features: syntactic density, semantic density, exemplificational reference, and relative syntactic repleteness (7:457).[10] Further, "an experience is aesthetic if it has all these attributes and only if it has at least one of them" (7:458).

One result of Goodman's account is that by sorting types of experience on the basis of the features of symbol systems, what matters is not whether a singular experience is aesthetic or non-aesthetic in its totality but rather the features or aspects that are usually characteristic of aesthetic or non-aesthetic phases of an experience. Second, Goodman's account sharply distinguishes between evalua-

tive and descriptive uses of "aesthetic." In his words, "density, repleteness, and exemplificationality, then, are earmarks of the aesthetic" (7:458) but this does not constitute an account of aesthetic value. On this view, a poorly painted picture is as aesthetic as a masterpiece. However, aesthetic merit may still be couched in terms of how well a work of art fulfills it symbolic functions within a symbol system as a whole. But what then, Goodman asked, is the purpose of symbolization?

Before providing his own account of the purpose, and therefore the criteria of excellence of symbolization, Goodman recounted three views that, to his mind, capture a partial truth. One view relates the human tendency to symbolize to a practical exercise that improves our ability to deal with the features of reality. On the other end of the spectrum, art and symbols more generally might be thought of as pure play. Goodman summarized this view as the claim, "men go on symbolizing when there is no practical need just because they cannot stop and because it is such fun" (7:459). Finally, a third view claims that the purpose of symbol systems is communicative. On this view, art is mostly expressive of both ideas and emotions, a physical, sensuous medium in which to communicate with other human beings notions that might not lend themselves readily to expression in ordinary language.

Unsurprisingly, the view that Goodman endorsed is that the primary function of symbolization is cognitive, its aim knowledge. "The primary purpose is cognition in and for itself; the practicality, pleasure, compulsion, and communicative utility all depend upon this" (7:460). Further, this account of the function of symbols in turn provides a standard for aesthetic merit. "Symbolization, then, is to be judged fundamentally by how well it serves the cognitive purpose" (7:460).

Goodman's tendency to relate aesthetic merit to how well an aesthetic object serves the symbolic function generally makes his earlier point that the cognitive includes the emotive all the more essential. His move to cognitivize art and the aesthetic erodes the idea that art has a special office and function in the domain of human affairs. Art is just one more way of knowing, and good art fulfills this function well while simultaneously exhibiting features—representation, expression, exemplification, description—that make it aesthetic. Moreover, beauty, that seemingly essential quality of good art, becomes irrelevant in determining if, to what extent, and how well, a work of art fulfills a symbolic function.

In some sense, Goodman can be understood as offering a pragmatist theory of art that shares with Dewey the insistence that art and aesthetic experience is not cut off from the rest of ordinary life by some ontological gulf. By arguing that aesthetic experience is cognitive experience, Goodman pointed out that the value of our encounters with art rests with how those experiences inform our other experiences and how they interact with, modify, and challenge knowledge obtained through other types of non-aesthetic experience. By putting aesthetic

experience on the same cognitive playing field with other modes of knowing, Goodman provided an example how aesthetics theory might go about integrating art with the rest of human experience by showing how art functions symbolically in a way that can be explained by a general theory of symbols. That art and the aesthetic lose their special status, as well as their aloofness in the bargain is, for Goodman, a fair price to pay.

D. Beardsley's "In Defense of Aesthetic Value"

It is hard to overestimate the impact of Beardsley's work on the development of analytic aesthetics in the second half of the twentieth century. He first came to prominence in the mid-1940s, with a series of articles he wrote with the Yale literary critic William K. Wimsatt, most famously "The Intentional Fallacy."[11] From then on, in the sphere of literary criticism at least, Beardsley would be associated with the New Critics and anti-intentionalism.

In the domain of the philosophy of art proper, Beardsley's *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*,[12] would help to establish both the range of philosophical problems in twentieth-century aesthetics as well the terminology and philosophical distinctions that still characterizes much of the field today. It is fitting then that Beardsley's 1978 "In Defense of Aesthetic Value" took up the question of critical appraisals of works of art given his broader understanding of aesthetics as meta-critical discourse that addresses the problems raised by the first order activity of assessing the quality of artworks.

In his address, Beardsley was concerned with defending what he somewhat reluctantly called the "functional account" of art appraisals. In this respect, his approach to criticism is Aristotelian in that the job of the art critic is to assess how well a work of art fulfills its purpose of function. The purpose that Beardsley assigned to works of art as a class is to lead to experiences with a marked aesthetic character. Thus, works that fulfill this function well can be said to possess aesthetic value. Beardsley developed the functional account of art appraisal in six steps or stages.

The first stage begins with the actual statements of critics who assert that one work is better than another. In this context, Beardsley cited Hume's famous claim that Addison is better than Bunyan, Milton better than Ogilby. The second stage consists in stating the manner in which one "artkind-instance" is better than another. As Beardsley put the point, "there must be some limited, discriminable manner of goodness associated with artkind-instances or their kinds: there must be something that can properly be called 'goodness *as* art' or 'goodness *as* literature,' and so on" (8:575). The third stage consists in specifying the manner of goodness identified in the second stage as being the principle upon which judgments of quality can be made of artworks. If, as Beardsley asserted, art-

works are not intrinsically good, then the process of locating artistic goodness resides in providing an account of what art works do or "what can be done with them, that is worth doing" (8:576). Since the sort of changes that artworks can bring about in the world are primarily psychological changes in those who encounter them, the purpose of artworks is primarily to lead to an aesthetic experience. An aesthetic character, Beardsley argued, marks some experiences, and the possession of a high degree of aesthetic character of some experiences elicited by works or art is a sign of the aesthetic quality of that work.

The fourth stage builds on the third by introducing the notion of "aesthetic value" proper. Beardsley defined the aesthetic value of a thing (be it a work of art or natural object) as "its capacity to impart—*through cognition of it*—a marked aesthetic character to experience" (8:576). The fifth stage is essential to the practice of art criticism in that the notion of aesthetic value allows one to make distinctions between statements that give reasons in support of critical appraisals and those that do not. In other words, recognizing that aesthetic value consists in the ability of certain objects to provide an aesthetic component to experience, we can give reasons that are relevant for isolating the features of an object that are significant in accounting for its capacity to provide aesthetic experience.

The sixth and final stage, which Beardsley stated may be considered optional, is to provide a definition of art. Beardsley defined art as:

> an intentional arrangement of conditions for affording experiences with marked aesthetic character. In other words, if and only if the intention to provide an occasion for experiences of this sort plays a notable part in the production of some object, event, or state of affairs will that thing be a work of art. (8:577)

It may come as some surprise that Beardsley invoked intentions in his definition of art, given that he is best known for rejecting the role of intention in the interpretation of art. However, if one observes the distinction that Beardsley drew between evaluative, interpretive, and descriptive statements about works of art, then these views can be reconciled.[13]

Beardsley was careful in addressing various criticisms of the functional account, including Joseph Margolis's "robust relativism," which claims that there can be no truth conditions for aesthetic judgments, and the idea that there can be no types of value, only value as such both of which would undermine the entire justification for the functional account of art appraisals.[14] However, we need not review the criticisms of the various stages of the functional account in detail, since Beardsley did not take them to be damning to his account. For Beardsley, "there is really only one serious alternative" (8:589) to the functional account, that of Goodman. Thus, the debate between Beardsley and Goodman is a debate

about whether the evaluation of works of art is based on the *aesthetic value* of artworks, or the *cognitive value* of artworks. Beardsley's "defense of aesthetic value," seen against this backdrop, can be understood as an attempt at the preservation or the traditional notion of the special character of the aesthetic against the idea that the value art is only to be found in cognition itself.

Beardsley's first line of argument against Goodman's cognitivism disputes that instrumental music and abstract paintings are uncontroversial parts of symbol systems. If Goodman's cognitivism about art requires that art play a role in a symbol system, then leaving out such wide ranges of art-kinds would be detrimental to his theory as a philosophy of art as such. Further, Beardsley continued, an account of art based on aesthetic value can account for the similarity between the value of artworks and the aesthetic value of nature. That the notion of aesthetic value allows for an environmental aesthetics that is continuous with what we find valuable in art is a decided advantage over Goodman's account.

Most significant however, is Beardsley's critique of Goodman's "symptoms of the aesthetic" (8:590). Identifying a symbol system as an *aesthetic* system required, as we saw in the previous subsection, four symptoms: syntactic density, semantic density, repleteness, and exemplificationality. Beardsley was keen to point out that a symbol that is itself aesthetically rich, might actually draw our attention away from what it exemplifies, and hence, for its cognitive function, in such a way as to undermine at least that characteristic as being constitutive of the aesthetic.

Recall though that Goodman argued that an experience is aesthetic only if it has at least one of his symptoms. So, Beardsley's criticism, while questioning the purely cognitive value of exemplification, might not undermine Goodman's account as a whole. As Beardsley conceded, if one is concerned with the use of symbols in art to convey aesthetic value, then Goodman's account is unrivaled. However, if one is interested in the notion of the aesthetic itself, then Goodman's theory lacks the internal resources to clearly articulate a definition of the aesthetic. As Beardsley stated at the very end of his address, "it is, I think, some recommendation of aesthetic value (both of its reality and its importance) that the most powerful effort to dispense with it seems, in the end, to be driven back to reliance upon it" (8:591).

E. Danto's "Philosophy as/and/of Literature"

It is perhaps fitting that Danto's is the last presidential address on aesthetics to be discussed in this chapter. In some ways, his recent passing[15] signals the passing of the high water mark of analytic philosophy of art. His seminal paper "The Artworld,"[16] as well as his masterpiece in the philosophy of art *The Transfigura-*

tion of the Commonplace[17] turned the attention of both the artworld and philosophical aesthetics to questions of ontology.

If a work of art could be perceptually indiscernible from a "mere real thing" Danto argued, then what was needed was a theory of art to tell the difference between art and reality. Danto's address invoked this idea and one can hardly read any work by Danto without bringing to mind his indiscernibility thesis and its influence on twentieth-century philosophy of art. His concern with literature is at least partially a concern about how literature refers, or fails to refer to reality, and as such his views regarding ontology are relevant to his discussion of literature. As he put it:

> the form of a philosophical question is given—I would venture to say always but lack an immediate proof—when indiscriminable pairs with nevertheless distinct ontological locations may be found or imagined found, and we then must make plain in what the difference consists or could consist. (9:237)

Thus, Danto's discussion of literature, like all philosophical problems in his view, takes the form of the indiscernibility problem and connects his reflections here with his broader views of the philosophy of art, and philosophy generally.[18]

In his address, Danto began with the question of why "it seemed imperative to some that philosophy be viewed as literature" (9:227). This, Danto suggested, is unsettling to a philosopher due in part to the tendency to view philosophy as akin to the sciences and in part to the widening hermeneutics that can take *anything* as literature. To view philosophy *as* literature is to take what is secondary as primary, to mistake style for substance, and thus to mistake the very essence of the philosophical task. With his usually wit and literary style, he lamented, "our canon seems suddenly fragile, and it pains the heart to think of them enduring the frivolous sadism of the deconstructionist" (9:228). One might reasonable ask then, what are the *philosophical* merits or demerits of treating philosophy as literature?

The view of philosophy as literature is disturbing because it challenges the idea of philosophy as aiming at the discovery, and transmission of philosophical truth. However, Danto was keen to point out:

> the concept of philosophical truth and the form of philosophical expression are internally enough related that we may want to recognize that when we turn to other forms we may also be turning to other conceptions of philosophical truth. (9:230)

Imagine Plato writing not in dialogues, but in the style of recent analytic philosophy journals. The "dynamite" that is Nietzsche's work would lose its

explosive power if it were to be formalized in first-order predicate logic. The casual style of the public lecture might be an essential part of James's pragmatist theory of truth so that it would lose all of *its* practical effects if it had been expressed in another form. Even if one is inclined to reject the idea that philosophy is merely a form of literature, the notion that philosophical truth is connected to the mode of expression best suited to it is an insight worth a good bit of reflection.

That philosophers have had to invent new forms of philosophical expression to convey new philosophical thoughts is independent from the problems that literature, especially fiction, presents to the philosophy *of* literature. For Danto, that philosophy still struggles with the question of what literature refers to is a credit to philosophy even if philosophy itself has had to invent ontological fictions to explain the how literature refers to reality. This is better than the view expressed by "the referential fallacy" which claims, as Danto summarized it:

> literature does not refer at all to reality . . . but at best to other literature, and a concept of *intertextuality* is advanced according to which a literary work is to be understood, so far as referentiality facilitates understanding, only in terms of other words a given work refers to. (9:233)

As Danto suggested, the kind of literary specialist's knowledge of the references that a certain work makes may have little to do with understanding the meaning of the work.

Danto's positive view of the relationship between philosophy and literature was, at least partially, inspired by Aristotle's claim that poetry is more philosophical than history because the former is universal while the latter is concerned with particulars. For Danto, "philosophy wants to be than universal: it wants necessity as well: truth for all the worlds that are possible" (9:239). Literature, on the contrary, is "true of possible worlds, to lapse into the vernacular, in such a way that it would be history for any of them if actual instead of ours" (9:240). Nevertheless, there is a type of universality that Danto ascribed to literature:

> The thought I want to advance is that literature is not universal in the sense of being about every possible world insofar as possible world insofar as possible, as philosophy in its non-literary dimension aspires to be, nor about what may happen to be the case in just this particular world, as history, taken in this respect as exemplificatory science, aspires to be, but rather about each reader who experiences it. (9:240)

Danto was clear that literature is not about the reader in the sense that a book about reading is about readers. Rather, what he meant to point out is that it is the reader who *completes* the work, a point that Danto also made regarding

interpretation in *Transfiguration of the Commonplace*. Invoking Hegel, Danto said, "the work exists for the spectator and not on its own account: it exists, as he says, only for the individual apprehending it, so that the apprehension completes the work and gives it final substance" (9:240). Each text, he claimed, becomes a metaphor for the reader; this is a type of universality because it holds true *for every reader who reads the work*. It remains only a metaphor, however, because the reader is not literally the subject of the work and yet, "it is literature when, for each reader I, I is the subject of the story. The work finds its subject only when read" (9:241).

This view of literature is another instance of the sort of transfiguration for which Danto's philosophy of art is rightly famous. We see ourselves in literature by being metaphorically transfigured into the subject of the literary work, through the act of reading and identifying ourselves with that subject. How then does this relate to the central question of philosophy *as* literature?

Literature functions as a transfiguration of the reader into the subject of the work completed by the act of reading. Philosophy can also function as literature so construed. Both literature and philosophy engage "with readers in search of that sort of universality I have supposed to characterize literary reference: as being about the reader at the moment of reading through the process of reading" (9:243).

Danto's example of the type of philosophy that best captures the universality that he attributes to literature is Descartes's *Meditations*. Although we might not take Descartes's conclusions to be true, and thus the *Meditations* fail as philosophy in the canonical sense of pursuing philosophical truth, we must, as Danto put it, "co-meditate" with the author and read the text in a way that gives it universality as literature. Thus, the referential fallacy must be false because, in claiming that texts are only about references to other texts, this thesis cuts the text off from referring to the reader and subsequently divorces philosophy from the world.

On this view, as Danto put it "the history of philosophy is then like a museum of costumes we forget were meant to be worn" (9:244). Texts, philosophy texts included, are meant to be read. It is in the act of reading, Danto claimed, that those texts are completed. But is also through our reading that texts "reveal us for what we are in virtue of our reading" and this, for Danto, is not merely a metaphorical revelation, which is why, ultimately, philosophy is not (merely) literature.

3. Conclusion

Although certainly not a comprehensive history of twentieth-century aesthetics, the presidential addresses to The APA on topics in aesthetics represent a compelling picture of the development of the interest in aesthetics. From Münsterberg's rejection of merely psychological approach to the problem of beauty, to Danto's discussion of the relationship between readers and texts, the

addresses that do discuss issues in aesthetics do so with energy and philosophical sophistication.

What emerges from careful consideration of the addresses in aesthetics is a picture of the relationship between aesthetics and other areas of philosophical inquiry, whether it is political philosophy, philosophy of language, or philosophical psychology, which shows how aesthetics informs and is informed by philosophy as a whole. Ultimately, as Münsterberg and Gilbert asserted, the study of the arts is essential for not only the breadth of the philosophical endeavor, but also for capturing the richness of experience in its totality. Whether the beautiful is secondary to the true, the good, or the real, what is clear is that the twentieth century produced a variety of theories regarding the relationship between aesthetics and a well lived human life.

If philosophy is to have any say on what constitutes human goodness, then philosophers must embrace the study of aesthetics as central to the task of philosophy. Philosophers of the twenty-first century would be prudent to avoid neglecting the study of aesthetics. Canvassing The APA presidential addresses on topics in aesthetics is a good beginning; it provides an instructive lesson for how aesthetic inquiry is essential to the further development of philosophy in the future.

Notes

1. Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958).

2. Hugo Münsterberg, *The Principles of Art Education*: *A Philosophical, Aesthetic, and Psychological Discussion of Art Education* (New York: The Prang Educational Co., 1905).

3. Münsterberg, *The Eternal Value*s (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909).

4. John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1934).

5. William Butler Yeats, *The Cutting of an Agate* (New York: Macmillan, 1912).

6. Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (1925), vol. 1 of *The Later Works 1924–1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), p. 29.

7. See Frank Noel Sibley, *Aesthetic Concepts* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959); and See Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts," *The Philosophical Review* 48 (October 1959): 421–450.

8. For further discussion of Hungerland's views on the relationship between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic, see her "Once Again, Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 26 (1968): 285–295.

9. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).

10. For a fuller discussion of these points, see Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976), chap. 4.

11. W. K. Wimsatt Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, in *The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1954).

12. Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, 2nd ed (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1981/1958).

13. Ibid., p. 9.

14. See Joseph Margolis, "Robust Relativism," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 35 (1976): 37–46.

15. Danto died of heart failure on 25 October 2013; see Ken Johnson, "Arthur C. Danto, a Philosopher of Art, Is Dead at 89," *New York Times*, 27 October 2013.

16. Arthur Coleman Danto, "The Artworld*," The Journal of Philosophy* 61, no. 19 (1964): 571–584.

17. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

18. Danto constructs an example of two indiscernible texts, one a novel, the other a history to provide an example from literature that conforms to the general structure of his indiscernibility argument; this series, 9:238–239.

Appendix

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Note

1. During the WWII years, divisional meetings were not held due to wartime travel restrictions; therefore, some presidential addresses listed with presidents' names were not delivered in person at meetings that correspond with their presidential terms. Some were delivered at meetings after the war, and some were never delivered in person at all. Publication of addresses was also delayed, and some officers for some divisions continued their terms into the following year. Brand Blanshard served as a caretaker president of all divisions for most of the war years. Official terms of office are shown in the Table of Contents and in the Chart of Presidents on pp. xv–xvi, but the addresses were printed in Volume 5 in the chronological order in which they were published.

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[1] Names of past presidents of The American Philosophical Association are indicated by bold print.

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