THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF ADDISON W. MOORE

Volume 1

Edited by
John R. Shook
Oklahoma State University

History of American Thought

The Collected Writings of Addison W. Moore

Edited and Introduced by **John R. Shook,** *Oklahoma State University*
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Scott Pratt, *University of Oregon*

Volume 1
Introduction by John R. Shook
Writings, 1896–1910
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Volume 2
Introduction by Scott Pratt
Pragmatism and Its Critics

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Introduction by J. Brent Crouch
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John R. Shook

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

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PREFACE

Our understanding of the pantheon of classical pragmatists should try to better appreciate the supporting figures that shouldered much of the burden of defending pragmatism against its critics. Prominent among these figures was Addison W. Moore (1866–1930) in the first two decades of the 20th Century. Moore was one of Dewey's most outstanding graduate students at the University of Chicago during the mid-1890s. He quickly outgrew the role of student, joining the Chicago philosophy faculty for a thirty-year career. After Dewey, Moore was the chief spokesperson for the Chicago school. Moore's writings offer a creative and persuasive elaboration of the functionalist psychology and instrumentalist pragmatism developed with Dewey, George H. Mead, James R. Angell, James H. Tufts, and Edward S. Ames. After Dewey's departure for Columbia University in 1904, Moore took over Dewey's classes in Logic and Metaphysics. His presence ensured that the Chicago faculty continued to produce first-class graduates who brought pragmatism to numerous philosophy departments across the country.

While Moore has been overshadowed by his fellow pragmatists Dewey and William James, this collection reveals the true philosophical stature that he possessed in his own right. While Dewey and Mead were never eager for controversy, Moore rarely missed an opportunity to engage rivals of every other camp. Among the figures that received Moore's criticisms were foremost proponents of idealism, realism, and naturalism, including F. H. Bradley, Josiah Royce, William Hocking, Warner Fite, George Santayana, James Mark Baldwin, James Pratt, and Henri Bergson. Moore's reputation for incisive arguments and effective polemics is only one side of his impact on his profession, however. He was beloved by his students and colleagues for his superior teaching and service to his department. Furthermore, he was held in esteem by the wider philosophical world, evidenced by his elections as President to the Western Philosophical Association (1911) and the American Philosophical Association (1917).

This complete collection of Moore's publications, along with one essay completed but never before published, brings together dozens of first-rate philosophical articles, essays, and book reviews, together with his dissertation and his 1910 book. Also included are writings by other philosophers to which he replied, reviews of his work, and the memorial

testimonials to his life and career. Moore's writings are reprinted here with only slight editorial modification, limited to spelling and punctuation corrections, to present the texts as close to the originals as possible. The full indexes to each volume were prepared with the generous assistance of Mary Kay Sistine. I am also grateful to Scott Pratt and Brent Crouch for their fine introductions. These volumes will permit the reader to view philosophical debate coming alive, as seen through the work of a powerful philosopher commanding the pragmatic engagement with rival systems of thought. This three-volume set of Moore's writings is a necessary resource for studying pragmatism, and early 20th century American philosophy, in its formative and most active years.

John R. Shook, 2003
Oklahoma State University

INTRODUCTION

Among the many figures that surrounded and supported John Dewey's instrumentalist version of pragmatism, none shone so brightly as Addison W. Moore during the first two decades of the 20th Century. Prior to William James's death in 1910, the triumvirate of James (at Harvard), Dewey (at Columbia), and Moore (at Chicago) animated the pages of the *Journal of Philosophy* with their pragmatic manifestos, defensive responses to criticisms and queries, and brisk rejoinders and re-rejoinders. Upon James's death, philosophers and the wider intellectual world did not have long to wait for another self-proclaimed pragmatist to champion the cause. Surprising many, that champion was not Dewey. Although Dewey did publish a collection of essays in 1910, neither its title, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays*, nor its contents, which defended "experimentalism" instead of "pragmatism," sounded like a rallying cry to the remaining scattered forces. The champion who did step forward in 1910 was also familiar to all: Moore and his *Pragmatism and Its Critics* signaled pragmatism's continued vitality and strength. *Pragmatism and Its Critics* contains five chapters explaining pragmatism's principles, with the remaining chapters consisting of replies to critics that had been published in preceding years.

In subsequent years, Moore continued to answer critics and challenge rival philosophies in the name of pragmatism despite his failing health. In 1916 Dewey did publish two major books that fully elaborated his recognizably pragmatic system of thought, *Essays in Experimental Logic* and *Democracy and Education*, but he was still reluctant to use the "pragmatism" label to designate his views. Ironically, it was to be Moore, Dewey's most committed disciple, who had done the most at a crucial time to keep the pragmatism movement a going concern. The torch was thus passed to the Chicago school and its many members. Among the gifted students at Harvard who wrote dissertations with James's guidance, only Horace Kallen would become a prominent pragmatist, the rest preferring the realist or idealist camps.

Dewey rarely used the term "pragmatism" to apply to his own views, preferring "experimentalism" or "instrumentalism." While gratified by James's acceptance of the Chicago school's work in the 1903 *Studies in Logical Theory*, Dewey was not pleased by James's unrestrained enthusiasm for applying the label of "pragmatism" to philosophies having but

a remote relationship with its core principle: that ideas must guide activity to have any intellectual function. Critics were thus content to attack only the more general and vague formulations of pragmatism, and they mostly ignored detailed analyses of specific philosophical problems, to both James's and Dewey's frustration. In 1905 Dewey admonished Moore, his former student at Chicago and now on its philosophy faculty, for unreservedly accepting the label of pragmatism as standing for the work of the entire Chicago school.

> I have never known a myth grow so rapidly as that of "pragmatism". To read its critics one would think it was a positive system set forth for centuries in hundreds of volumes, & that its critics were the ones engaged in a tentative development of new & undogmatic ideas. But I object root and branch to the term 'pragmatism' (except in its origin limited sense) & would take objection to your article in so far as it seems to admit the label.
>
> Any name can only be onesided, and so it seems a pity to have any. Radical empiricism begs as few as any, tho I should prefer the term experimentalism to empiricism. Philosophy is Functionalism in the sense that it treats only of functions of experience (not of facts, nor of states, ideas, &); it is Geneticism is a mode of analyzing & identifying these functions; it is Instrumentalism as a theory of the significance of the Knowledge-function; it is Experimentalism as a theory of the test of worth of all functions. If I were a German I could stick all these words together and announce a new system. Doubtless. Meanwhile I think there is nothing to do but to peg away at the analyses of particular problems....[1]

In a 1908 article, "What Does Pragmatism Means by Practical," Dewey explains his difficulties with the way that James's pragmatism has confusingly handled the concept of truth. At the conclusion of this article, written on the occasion of James's *Pragmatism*, Dewey stunningly declares that the time has arrived to take down the banner of "pragmatism" and disband the movement. He believes that the different aspects of pragmatism have been "uniquely" united by James, and that further progress lies in "more analytic clearing up and development of these independent elements." Dewey concluded with his suggestion that

[1] John Dewey to Addison W. Moore, 2 January 1905, in *The Correspondence of John Dewey, vol. 1: 1871–1918*, ed. Larry A. Hickman (Charlottesville, Va.: Intelex Corporation, 1999), #01827. Volumes of the Dewey's correspondence are hereafter abbreviated as *CJD*.

"'pragmatism' as a holding company for allied, yet separate interests and problems, might be dissolved and revert to its original constituents."[2]

Dewey's suggestion to Moore and other pragmatists was not taken seriously, and despite his misgivings, he was naturally proud of his former student's accomplishments. In the early years of the pragmatic movement, Moore was universally recognized as the chief prosecutor on behalf of the instrumentalist version of pragmatism developed by Dewey and George H. Mead at Chicago. Unlike Dewey and Mead, who rarely answered the numerous critics of pragmatism, Moore never hesitated to engage idealist and realist challengers in the pages of any journal that would publish the latest news about pragmatism's struggles. Mead himself noted in his memorial address (reprinted in volume three) that after Dewey, Moore was recognized as the most important and authoritative member of the Chicago school. Moore's argumentative and polemical writings earned him the nickname "the bulldog of pragmatism" (a title that later passed to Sidney Hook). Like Huxley's relationship with Darwin, Moore was Dewey's most ardent public defender and professional ally. From his student days with Dewey at Chicago in the mid-1890s, until his death 35 years later, Moore faithfully expounded the Chicago school's variety of pragmatism and staunchly defended it against all rivals. Moore's writings offer an artful and persuasive elaboration of Dewey's philosophy, composed by a clearly original and creative intellect.

Addison Webster Moore was born on 30 July 1866, in Plainfield, Indiana. Moore graduated from DePauw, and after two years of graduate study in philosophy at Cornell, he transferred to Chicago in 1894 upon hearing of Dewey's arrival there. He took part in the ongoing psychological research as James Angell's assistant, and absorbed the developing philosophical speculation of Dewey, Angell, George Mead, James Tufts, and Edward Ames as they laid the foundations of a functional and social psychology, the instrumentalist version of pragmatism, and a progressive democratic liberalism. Moore joined the Chicago philosophy department soon after completing his dissertation in 1898, and took over the Logic and Metaphysics courses after Dewey's departure for Columbia University in 1904. Among the many Chicago Ph.D.s who received Moore's tutelage were William K. Wright (professor at Dartmouth), Douglas C. Macintosh (professor at Yale), Jacob R. Kantor (professor at Indiana), Charles W. Morris (professor at Chicago) Donald A. Piatt (professor at UCLA), Theodore T. Lafferty (professor at University of

[2] John Dewey, "What Does Pragmatism Mean By Practical?" *Journal of Philosophy* 5 (1908): 99. Dewey's difficulties with James's pragmatism are surveyed in John R. Shook, "William James and John Dewey: A Contentious Partnership," *Streams of William James* 3.3 (Fall 2001): 16–19.

South Carolina), and Wayne A. R. Leys (professor at Southern Illinois University). Moore received professional admiration across the country, serving as President of the Western Philosophical Association in 1911, and President of the American Philosophical Association in 1917. Suffering from poor health, Moore retired early in 1929. In 1929 the University of Chicago Press published a volume of *Essays in Philosophy*, composed by former Chicago students in honor of their teachers: James H. Tufts, George H. Mead, Addison Webster Moore, and Edward Scribner Ames. During his trip to England for a philosophy congress, Moore died in London on 25 August 1930. The heartfelt memorials prepared by his colleagues all praised his personal character and professional demeanor, as they admiringly recounted his central role in the department's success. Since these memorials, all reprinted in the third volume, more than adequately recount the details of Moore's academic career and personal character, this introduction will proceed to a discussion of the foundations of his philosophy.

In the 1890s Dewey, Angell, Mead, and Moore were attempting to resolve fundamental difficulties in philosophical psychology. Their efforts were inspired by two distinct research programs that seemed to point in opposite directions. On the one hand, neo-Hegelian idealism led them to the conclusion, against Cartesian and Kantian dualism, that experience is not merely an inner mental copy of external physical realities, but instead an active and creative force in the world. On the other hand, experimental psychology taught them how consciousness was conditioned by the neural processes of a living organism, and so mind seemed to be completely dependent, if not reducible to, physical nature. For nearly all of their contemporaries, these two theories of mind exhausted the alternatives and could not be reconciled; the idealism-materialism split was firmly in place across philosophy departments by 1900, mediated only by various kinds of revived dualisms offering to make everyone happy. But there was a widely-overlooked alternative. Dewey discovered a unique way to combine the best of both theories: to view experience as an active creative force in the world, *and* to view experience as vitally involved with the functions of the nervous system of a living organism. Their combination resulted in functional psychology: experience is a natural function of organic life, and all mental processes transforming experience are phases of goal-oriented behavior. This combination could possibly work only if experience is understood as essentially teleological – the significance of any aspect of experience lies as much in the future as in the past. This teleological understanding of experience contradicted the mechanistic view inherent to physiological psychology. However, the German philosopher Wilhelm Wundt had already realized that treating the living organism as a mechanism could not fully explain complex behavior.

However, the foremost obstacle to understanding mental processes as intimately involved with purposive behavior was the age-old conception of thought as a separate component of life's activities, only contingently involved with sensation (our initial contact with the world) and action (our transformation of the world). When Dewey was a student, this view of mind as a separable component grounded the popular "reflex arc theory" of behavior. The reflex arc brought mind into a relationship between feeling and will by supposing that mental processes accept incoming data, determine what should be done, and send this information on to the will for activating the needed muscles. The reflex arc had its origins in dualistic assumptions, but both idealists and materialists could accept this theory as well, since they could understand mental processes either as metaphysically fundamental or as reducible to physiological processes. Psychologists of both camps tended to suppose that if conscious thought is always a separable component of any behavior, then experiments could be designed to try to isolate the various kinds of mental components and determine their independent contributions. Such experiments, inaugurated by Wundt at Leipzig in the 1870s, were refined in subsequent decades but rarely yielded uncontroversial results. When Dewey and Angell arrived at the University of Chicago to lead the philosophy/psychology department, their own psychological experiments threw previous interpretations, and the original reflex arc theory, into doubt.[3] Furthermore, the Chicago philosophers had a new interpretation of the experimental results that quickly became a major new psychological theory called "functionalism." But their experiments were guided by Dewey's understanding of the role of the mind in human experience, which he had formulated at the conclusion of his early idealist phase in the early 1890s at Michigan.

Although Dewey gradually abandoned the notion of the Absolute Mind, he remained convinced that the idealists had proven sensationalism's inadequacy, since the passive reception of discrete and unrelated sensations could not account for actual human experience. The idealist alternative, which added the hidden inner powers of reason for shaping sensations into ordinary lived experience, still needed the basic correctness of sensationalism – but the rationale for sensationalism had rested on the dualistic notion that an external world is completely responsible for the raw materials of experience. Idealism's destiny, Dewey reasoned, lay in completely eliminating from philosophy and psychology any vestige of

[3] For a close study of the controversy surrounding these origins of "functional" psychology see Andrew Backe's Introduction to *Psychology* by James R. Angell, vol. 3 of *The Chicago School of Functionalism* (Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press, 2000), pp. vii–xxi.

sensations, the mysterious outer world, *and* the transcendental inner mind. Their elimination required two radical innovations: (1) experience could not be analyzed into two separable components of given sensation (caused by outer world) and organizing thought (caused by the inner mind); and (2) the generative potency of mental processes must always reside within lived human experience and thus be observable there. By 1894 Dewey referred to his philosophy as "experimental" idealism and he believed that his was the true empiricism, since all philosophy (thus unified with psychology) could rest on the examination of experience itself and leave behind unnecessary and unverifiable speculations.[4]

While James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) was not responsible for Dewey's turn away from absolute idealism, James had also concluded that a genuine empiricism could find mental processes in lived experience. More importantly for Dewey, James used biological concepts in psychology to stress the teleologically functional role of thought for controlling purposive behavior. Portions of a purposive active experience can be said to function mentally; no separable mental processes really exist. Furthermore, both James and Dewey abandoned "mind" or "experience" as an ontologically distinct type of reality.

Dewey and Angell used James's textbook in their classes, and Moore was quickly indoctrinated into their emerging "functionalism" as he helped to design and conduct new reaction-time experiments. The ongoing debate in psychology over reaction-times exemplified the dubious status of the common assumption that a mental process could be isolated by measuring the "reaction-time" of a subject performing an action upon receiving a stimulus. As the Angell and Moore article "Reaction-Time: A Study in Attention and Habit" explains, the conscious attention given by the subject to this sort of task gradually changes character over time as the habit of reacting gradually forms. Therefore, the "act" performed by the subject cannot merely be the hand reaction itself, but the entire coordinated (more or less) act of listening-anticipating and hand-responding. While the habit forms after repeated trials, attention is present throughout and not merely doing its work only after the stimulus has been registered and before the hand moves. Dewey's 1896 "The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology" argues for these same points and it should be read in conjunction with Angell and Moore's article, since they are mutually dependent on each other. The primary conclusion regarding attentive consciousness is that it is a variably active feature of the sort of purposive behavior which demands novel coordinations producing new habits. In short, attentive consciousness

[4] The evolution of Dewey's thought from absolute idealism to pragmatism is described in John R. Shook, *Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality*. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000.

is created by the tension between competing neural demands and dissolves when it establishes a new habit harmonizing these demands. Since the Chicago philosophers, with James, were already disposed by their acceptance of Darwinian evolution to regard higher organisms as learners establishing new habits to survive, the notion of "problem-solving" quickly served as the prototype of any such habit-forming and reforming process.

The step from a functional psychology of mind to an instrumentalist pragmatism of knowledge was a short and easy step, which the Chicago philosophers made during the years of 1896 to 1903. Since thought should be treated as a crucial phase of a problem-solving experience that culminates in a novel behavior attempting to resolve the problem, the criteria for the objective validity of thought should be the success of that attempt. Despite the endless criticisms of pragmatism as suffering from excessive subjectivity, pragmatists regarded their new theory of knowledge as the only way to rescue rational objectivity and empirical science from the clutches of the principal rivals of the day: sensationalism, dualism, and idealism. Sensationalism was mired in the problem of solipsism, dualism still suffered from the skeptical question of knowing the physical world, and idealism offered purely rationalistic criteria for truth that either ignored or explicitly rejected experimental scientific method. Until logical positivism arrived in the late 1930s, no philosophy rivaled pragmatism's dedication to empirical science. But exactly what might constitute the *empirical* ground of science was a contested matter among the Anglo-American rivals; pragmatists condemned the continued use of outmoded psychological notions to determine the epistemological significance of kinds of experiences. Moore's 1898 dissertation, published four years later, analyzes Locke's epistemology as just such a halting and ineffective compromise between new scientific achievements (Newtonian mechanics) and older scholastic and Cartesian assumptions about the nature of the mind and reality. To Locke's credit, he appeared to recognize the difficulties in locating the allegedly simple ideas caused by the physical world, but he never realized that simplicity, like complexity, is relative to the problem at hand. The rest of Locke's distinctions between kinds of experiences, and his account of the acquisition of knowledge, likewise fail to do justice to such practical contexts. Similar criticisms are directed at the idealists F. H. Bradley and Josiah Royce in Moore's essay "Existence, Meaning, and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology." Science, Moore concludes, cannot aim at duplicating in thought the fixed independent structure of the world; science is only the process of reorganizing more effective experience. Thought is validated only insofar as it assists the reconstruction of an activity that brought it into existence.

With these cornerstone publications in 1902 and 1903, Moore was immediately recognized as a key figure in the new Chicago school of prag-

matism. William James took close notice of these developments, and singled out Moore for comment in a letter to Dewey:

> I have just read, with almost absurd pleasure, A. W. Moore's existence, meaning and reality. I am years behindhand in my reading, and don't know how close you may have come to anything like that since 1898. I see an entirely new "school of thought" forming, and as I believe, a true one. Who and what is Moore, and how old?[5]

In two letters of reply Dewey praises Moore's "flexibility and freedom" in philosophical thinking, and states Dewey's intellectual indebtedness: "Moore has given at least as much as he has received." Dewey also notes that James's own *Principles of Psychology* has been the main inspiration for the Chicago philosophers.[6]

For the rest of his career, Moore continued his unrelenting campaign against any rationalistic epistemology that divorces a conception of independent reality from the conception of the actual practical methods used to attain knowledge. In his next essay, "Some Logical Aspects of Purpose," Moore examines Royce's attempt to prove the existence of the Absolute by using the obvious evidence of the increasing practical harmony of our ideas. Moore credits Royce for agreeing with the Chicago functionalists that human ideas are plans of action for achieving goals. Royce further agrees that the growing coherence of our ideas is but the cognitive aspect of our ability to reduce conflict in our active experience. Ideas will remain fragmentary and incomplete, because complete coherence will never be accomplished. The ideal of complete coherence, Royce asserts, must be accepted in order to account for our ability to increase harmony in our experience. Moore points out the inherent inconsistency in Royce's argument by asking why ideas must be both plans of action towards particular situational goals, and plans that should cohere into some completely systematized plan of action. The nature of ideas cannot be pulled in opposite directions at once. Either they serve individualized and relative purposes, or they serve an objectively coherent purpose, but not both. If the latter, as Royce requires, then only pure metaphysical speculation on transhuman reality could reveal the Absolute. But if the former, which is established by the empirical evidence of human existence, then we are not driven to acknowledge the reality of the Absolute.

[5] William James to John Dewey, 11 March 1903, in *CJD I*, #00798.

[6] John Dewey to William James, ca. 15 March 1903 and 19 December 1903, in *CJD I*, #00797, 00802.

Moore's examination of Santayana's naturalism, in many respects compatible with pragmatism, follows a similar line of criticism. How can Santayana so completely divorce the properties of thought from the properties of the underlying material processes, and at the same time claim that thought is completely dependent on such mechanical processes? Santayana is convinced that the only type of efficacy is the mechanistic causal power of matter, having adopted current science's view that mechanistic causality is the only type of causality. But what of the human effort to realize scientific knowledge through the methods of reasoning? As Moore points out, the auspicious beginning to Santayana's first volume portrays rational thought as applicable for the control of action. To a pragmatist like Moore, this is precisely science's origin, and science's results should not be permitted to contradict the vital grounds of its creation in human experience. Yet Santayana permits scientific conclusions to be erected into an absolute standard of reality, against which thought's seemingly evanescent and ideal qualities fail to compare. And so all experience and thought and ideals ("essences" for Santayana) utterly fail to really possess any efficacy and hence cannot be responsible for any modification to reality whatsoever. Santayana avoids outright dualism only through his assumption that matter alone is real; yet as Moore and many other critics of epiphenomenalism and reductionism have noticed, materialism must either add the qualities of thought to its definition of matter or suffer the fate of making the alleged connection between matter and mind a complete mystery. Moore's examination of James Mark Baldwin's epistemology follows this pattern of criticism as well, exposing the dualistic assumptions infecting Baldwin's understanding of the function of thought.

Moore's suggested resolution to the temptations of dualism is to identify mental processes with portions of interacting natural bodies in their transformative phases: and since the higher human mental processes are social in nature, thought is another name for special kinds of shared social interactions among people that really are creative reconstructions of reality.[7] Because Moore's elaboration of the social nature of thought is found in *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, this introduction should come to a close.

One final observation on the relationship between Moore and Dewey is appropriate, however. Dewey once commented that his intellectual pursuits were largely energized and directed by his interactions with others. When Dewey left Chicago to join the Columbia philosophy department, he

[7] Another graduate of the Chicago school, H. Heath Bawden, similarly developed a variety of pragmatism grounded on the social function of consciousness. See John R. Shook, Introduction to *The Principles of Pragmatism* by H. Heath Bawden, vol. 1 of *The Early Defenders of Pragmatism* (Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press, 2001), pp. ix–xxv.

exchanged a very supportive environment for much more diverse and critical surroundings. Dewey later made some interesting observations on the effects of this drastic change of environment and academic focus. One stands out, in a letter written to Arthur Bentley in 1940. Dewey writes that he had recently come across a passage written by Moore long ago, and quotes this passage for Bentley: "'My' consciousness is a function of a social process in which my body or brain or mind is only one factor… . 'My' thinking and feeling may be as truly a function of 'your' brain or mind as of my own. My thinking of sending for you as a physician to treat my headache is as truly a function of your medically trained brain as of my own aching one." Dewey then tells Bentley, "I don't know how I got so much switched off from following out this line. Partly lack of nerve, partly moving from Chicago to Columbia and getting into a new set of problems that interrupted, I guess… ."[8] In another letter to Sidney Hook, Dewey comments on problems surrounding "experience" and "knowledge" and refers to Moore: "If I had Addison Moore's book (on Pragmatism & its Critics) here I could point out a passage on the knowledge that a certain thing is pain & is the pain of a toothache, & is mine wh. has never been answered as far as I know."[9]

As Dewey himself acknowledged, Moore's philosophy was by no means a mere recapitulation of Dewey's own thought, but a creative development of the functional psychology at the heart of Chicago school of pragmatism. As a genuine and significant type of pragmatism, Moore's work should be brought out from the shadows cast by James and Dewey to be studied for its own sizable contribution to the defense and advancement of classical pragmatism.

John R. Shook, 2003
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[8] John Dewey to Arthur F. Bentley, 24 May 1940, in *John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932–1951*, selected and edited by Sidney Ratner and Jules Altman (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), p. 78. Also in *CJD III*, #15197.

[9] John Dewey to Sidney Hook, ca. 21 July 1945, in *CJD III*, #13128.

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REACTION-TIME: A STUDY IN ATTENTION AND HABIT

James R. Angell and Addison W. Moore. "Reaction-Time: A Study in Attention and Habit." Assisted by J. J. Jegi. *Psychological Review* 3.3 (May 1896): 245–248.

It is not without grounds that experimentation upon reaction-time has been called the *Lieblingsgegenstand* of experimental psychology. The facts appear so simple and the interpretation so illusive that ingenuity has seemed piqued anew each time the matter has been opened. The fact has had its interest recently augmented by Professor James Mark Baldwin's challenge of the results and explanations which have hitherto passed current stamped with the mark of the justly revered Leipzig school. It must often have occurred to many readers following the Leipzig explanation of the alleged fact that the time of the so-called 'motor form' of reaction is faster than the 'sensory' to ask, why a brain-reflex should be established in the former case and not in the latter, or why, if established, it should be so much less effective in reducing the time consumed by the reaction; why occasionally, despite the assertion that such persons did not possess the necessary *Anlage* and so could not be regarded, some persons proved unable to make any distinction whatever in the forms or even showed faster time in the sensory attitude. The fact that these and other questions were left open by the Wundtian explanations appeared to leave room for further investigations.

We set out with the general conception that from the evidence already in hand it was to be anticipated that each individual mind would, from influences already surrounding its growth, show itself possessed of certain coördinations which were customarily employed in the everyday business of life, and that these coördinations would afford pathways peculiarly pervious to rapid nervous discharges, *i.e.*, they would form paths of least resistance; whereas certain other coördinations would be either wholly lacking or much less practiced and much more difficult of employment, yielding when actually pressed into service much slower results. Working under this general conception we had reached results in our experimentation very similar to those of Professor Baldwin, and

we were just ready to publish when his very notable article upon the subject appeared in this REVIEW of May, 1895, showing essentially the same results as we had reached. Not only had Professor Baldwin anticipated our results up to that time; he had also anticipated almost completely our mode of procedure. This full acknowledgment of his priority is due him on every score. Although our time results have continued to confirm those of Professor Baldwin, yet as the investigation proceeded a standpoint of interpretation emerged, differing in some essential respects as much from Professor Baldwin's as from that of the Wundtian school. On the other hand, the interpretation here given on the basis of the interrelation of habit and attention seems to us to combine and reconcile some of the principal contentions of both sides of the 'type' discussion.[1] The explanation we have attempted is 'dynamo-genetic' rather than static as most interpretations appear to us very largely to have been.

The experiments were begun in March, 1895, and have continued, with a two months' summer intermission, up to the present time. While some differentiations have been made, both in the stimulus and the mode of response, the results of these are submitted not so much to establish the characteristics of these differentiations themselves as to furnish cumulative evidence of the general nature of the reaction, and perhaps point the way for more detailed research in the future.

The reagents of this series were the persons whose names appear at the head of the report. J., as indicated by the smaller number of his reactions in some of the series, came into the work recently; A. had taken part in no reactions for several years; M. and J. were entirely unpracticed.

The time was taken with the Hipp chronoscope. The clock was tested at each hour's work, and frequently twice during the hour, by a falling screen whose time was taken from a 1,000 V. König fork. The variable error of the machine for the whole series was .0004 sec.

We may hope to escape the recriminations generally hurled at all users of the Hipp chronoscope, inasmuch as the significance of the figures rests but little upon their time values. As will appear, the essential question is whether certain groups of reaction-time approach or recede from each other. As a matter of fact, however, the accuracy of our instrument permits much more stringent conclusions. But this is all we are immediately concerned in.

[1] The entire discussion referred to includes an article by Prof. Titchener, of Cornell University, on 'Simple Reactions,' *Mind*, N. S., IV., 74–81, Prof. Baldwin's report in this REVIEW, May, 1895, a criticism of the report by Prof. Titchener in *Mind*, IV., 506–514, and Prof. Baldwin's rejoinder, *Mind,* January, 1896.

The experiments include responses by the hand, foot, and lips, to auditory and visual stimulations in both 'sensory' and 'motor' forms. In the auditory series a large number of the hand and foot reactions were further differentiated into those made in the light and those taken in the dark. The auditory stimulation was given in most of the series through a telephone. The visual stimulation was the movement, from a stationary position, of a black screen with a white center.

The hand responses were given by pressing downward with the first finger of the right hand. The foot reactions were made by downward pressure of the toe of the right foot, the foot being supported under the instep to prevent fatigue and complicating strain. The lip responses were given with a special key, the reaction being made by parting the lips.

Most of the visual series were not begun until after the auditory series were completed, and in the latter most of the lip and foot reactions were taken after the hand series had been finished. As the modes of response were the same in both the auditory and the visual series the reactions in the latter had the benefit of the practice secured in the former. This observation is of importance in considerations where the effects of practice are to be taken into account. It also accounts, in some measure, for the time of the visual series being faster than is usually reported. Indeed, if the mean variation had not in many of these cases remained so small, suspicion must surely have arisen as to whether the conditions desired were really being attained, but with small variations (6 to 15%) and clear distinctions in the sensory and motor forms, the figures appear trustworthy. Since the hand responses to sound were taken first, far outnumber the others, and were distributed over a much longer period of time, they are of most value in showing the development under practice.

While the reactions were not all taken at the same hour of day, each period of work was divided between the sensory and motor forms. So that, throughout the course as a whole, each sensory reaction is balanced by a motor under parallel conditions. The number of reactions taken under each mode of response, hand, foot and lips, was about equally distributed between the sensory and motor series. Beside the differentiations above mentioned, several minor ones, such as alterations in the intensity and location of the stimuli, changes in position of body, response with the left instead of the right hand, etc., were made in the course of the work. These variations, to which reference will be made later, simply served to emphasize the importance of habit as a factor in attention.

EFFECTS OF LIGHT AND DARKNESS.

Most of the reactions in the light were taken with the eyes resting upon the responding organ, save of course in the case of reactions to visual stimulus. In its external aspects this form of reaction corresponds to what Prof. Baldwin[2] calls the 'visual motor,' as distinguished from the 'kinæsthetic motor' reaction. In the latter attention is focussed upon the thought of the movement, the responding organ not being seen. He further says: "In subjects of the motor type the 'kinæsthetic motor' is shorter – the 'visual motor' time approximating the sensory reaction time." Taking Prof. Baldwin's definition of 'kinæsthetic motor' in terms of attention, as that form in which the attention is occupied with '*the thought of the movement*,' we found the same results for it, viz.: that in reagents of the 'motor type' it was the fastest form. But the external conditions of this location of attention we found just the reverse of those stated by Prof. Baldwin. Both A. and J. found that the attention could be more completely centered in the reacting organ when the latter was visible. When blindfolded or in a dark room, there was a tendency toward the sensory form; and the time of the reaction was between that of the motor in the light, and the sensory. A.'s and J.'s sensory form was also retarded in the dark. M.'s sensory form was faster in the dark. But the motor was slower and tended very strongly to pass over into the sensory.

EFFECTS OF PRACTICE.

At the outset of the course, it was found in the hand reactions to sound that A. and J. returned the faster time for the motor reactions, and M. for the sensory. The first attempts to react in both ways showed in all the reagents – especially in the cases of M. and J., who were entirely unpracticed, very little difference, save an occasional big jump or total failure to react. This taken with the testimony of introspection showed that most of the reactions still came in the habitual way, the other form of reaction not yet having emerged. Then, as the new form began vaguely to define itself, there arose a large time difference between the two series, and a large mean variation in the series of the new form. At this stage, in the attempts at the new coördination, in spite of the reagent's best effort, attention frequently jumped back into the habitual form. With further practice, however, the confusion began to disappear, the new form coming out clear, with its time and mean variation diminishing. Meanwhile the time of the old form also kept diminishing, but did not make such rapid progress in reduction as did the new one. This continued until, at the close of some of the series, the

[2] *Psychological Review* II., pp. 261 ff.

difference between the two forms was inside the mean variation for each series with perhaps a slight final balance in favor of the motor as the faster time. Thus both A. and M., who had the longer practice in the auditory-hand series, and who started in the one motor, the other sensory, came out at the same point, relative to the two series, *i.e.*, both were a little faster in the motor form. J., who came into the work recently, does not show this outcome so clearly, though in some of his series the approach of the two times is clearly marked. Meanwhile the decreasing time and continued approximation of the times of the two series were accompanied in each series by an ever increasing degree of reflexness. At this stage any extraordinary effort to concentrate on either form resulted in a confused and lengthened reaction.

To sum up the steps in the development, we have (1) different habitual forms of attention at the outset; (2) a period of confusion and wide time difference in evolving the new form; (3) a subsequent reduction of absolute time and mean variations in both forms; (4) an approximation of the time values of the two forms; with (5) a final possibly shorter time for the motor form. In short, to generalize these steps, the conclusion, to which the whole series points, is that continued practice in the two modes of coördination with a constant stimulus, under constant conditions, results in two highly reflexive forms, not of widely different, but of about equal times values. This result receives further confirmation from Professor Baldwin's report of his own case[3] in which he says his reactions "have only changed in that the distinction between the sensory and motor time is less marked than it used to be, and this I explain as probably due to habit and practice, as my theory again seems at least not to contradict."

On the whole, the outcome seems to agree with some of the results on both sides of the 'type' discussion. It indicates with Professor Baldwin's results that "the ground of origin of types is to be found in education, which must necessarily apply to *single functions*"; that, as so defined, in the sensory 'type' the sensory form of the reaction may be shorter than the motor even after the latter has clearly emerged in consciousness. That continued practice does not tend to widen the time difference at first manifest between the two forms, but on the contrary. On the other hand, it finds that when *both* forms have reached a high degree of reflexness, the motor form is probably somewhat faster, though not to the extent reported in the Leipzig results.

The following table shows the effects of practice in the time differences between the first and last thirds of each sensory and motor series. In all, except the hand series of A. and M., the number of reactions is

[3] *Mind*, January, 1896, pp. 85 ff.

very inadequate to show anything like the full effects of practice. But even in the shorter series the drift is clearly indicated. In addition to the general results already pointed out, it further appears from the table, that for all three reagents, the ear-lip coördination is the fastest; also that there is less difference between the sensory and motor reactions at the outset of this series than at the beginning of the others. For A. and J., the reactions at the beginning of the eye-foot series, are the longest

TABLE SHOWING THE RESULTS OF PRACTICE.

Sen. Organ.	Mot. Organ.	Focus of Atten.	Reagents. A No.	A Time in σ. First Third.	A Time in σ. Last Third.	M No.	M Time in σ. First Third.	M Time in σ. Last Third.	J No.	J Time in σ. First Third.	J Time in σ. Last Third.
Ear.	Hand	Sen.	560	195	133	420	163	132	160	185	173
		Mot.	540	149	127	380	178	134	165	169	159
	Foot	Sen.	145	182	168	220	138	133	125	218	208
		Mot.	155	159	150	230	145	134	115	204	196
	Lips	Sen.	130	132	122	125	117	108	160	169	155
		Mot.	120	125	116	125	112	106	140	157	146
Eye.	Hand	Sen.	100	206	173	100	153	125	100	180	173
		Mot.	100	193	150	100	176	130	100	193	165
	Foot	Sen.	100	218	170	110	160	153	125	229	183
		Mot.	100	170	151	115	153	148	125	199	175
	Lips	Sen.	130	141	135	125	144	138	100	193	179
		Mot.	120	133	127	125	136	133	100	166	165

on the record, and show also the widest difference between the sensory and motor forms. A. shows at the beginning of all the series the faster time in the motor form; M.'s reactions are quite divided between the two forms showing the faster time in the sensory form in both hand series, and in the auditory-foot series, but is faster in the motor form for both lip series, and for the eye-foot series. J. is motor throughout except in the eye-hand series. A series of auditory and visual memory tests with nonsense syllables showed A. and J. quicker in the visual, and M. slightly faster in the auditory form.

INTERPRETATION.[4]

Taking the simple reaction as the type of voluntary action in general, and voluntary action as action under the direction of attention, it seemed that the key to any explanation adequate to all the facts, the individual peculiarities and the effects of practice, must be found in the functions of attention and habit in their relations to each other.

Not to go into too great detail, the process of attention in its essential outlines in, say, the auditory-hand reaction, appears something as follows: As the reagent receives his instructions for the reaction, he formulates in imagination what he is going to do. This formulation, the getting in mind what he is to do, is his attention to the act. Whatever may be the detail of imagery involved in this formulation, it involves primarily the coördination of two groups of incoming sensations, one from the ear, the other from the hand, started by the operator's descriptions. From this, two distinctions may be drawn: (1) As related to the act of attention, these two sensation groups are its stimuli; and each group is as much stimulus as the other – the sensations from the hand as much as those from the ear. The 'reaction' as meaning the whole act to be performed is not the mere response of the hand to the ear, but the act of attention in coördinating the incoming stimuli from *both* the hand and the ear. Concerning the 'sensory-motor' distinction it follows that, since the stimulus, *i.e.*, the material for the act, lies in these incoming currents from both hand and ear, as related to the whole act, both 'forms' may be regarded as equally 'sensory' or equally 'motor.' (2) In relation to each other *inside* the act of attention, most discussions of the subject appear to make the ear process merely a stimulus to which the hand adjustment is merely a response. But the question arises, What holds the ear to its work? Why does the reagent maintain his listening attitude? It may be replied that it is 'because he is told to.' But he is not told to listen any more than he is told to move his hand. If the telling suffices in one case it should in the other. Moreover, he is not *merely* to listen, or even to listen just for the click, but to listen for the click *as a pressure signal*. It is this character of the click as a signal for pressure that keeps up the interest in it and the attention to it. (We are assuming here, of course, a case of sensory attention.) The hand therefore is stimulus as well as response to the ear, and the latter is response as well as stimulus to the hand. Each is both stimulus and response to the other. The distinction of stimulus and response is therefore not one of *content*, the stimulus being identified with the ear, the response with the hand, but one of

[4] Under this head we are indebted to Professors Dewey and G. H. Mead, for suggestions without which the following interpretation would not have been reached.

function, and both offices belong equally to each organ. The reason the movement of the hand is so often treated as the *mere* response to the ear as its *mere* stimulus appears to be that the whole act, or 'reaction,' is identified with the movement of the hand. But the entire act is the act of attention in coördinating the two groups of stimuli coming from both hand and ear. To be sure, *in* the act of coördination there is, as we have seen, the interaction of the two elements as stimulus and response each to the other. But it must be kept in mind that this latter is a distinction falling *inside* the act, not *between* the hand movement considered as the act, and the sound considered as its external stimulus or 'cause.' In a word, the reagent reacts as much with his ear as he does with his hand.

With the reaction now interpreted as essentially constituted by the *act of coördinating* the ear-hand activities; with the distinction of 'stimulus' and 'response' interpreted as wholly functional, falling inside the act, the question still remains, – why, in the act of coördination, is attention occupied more immediately with one of these processes than with the other? This question, again, does not ask whether the attention shall be given to the sound *or* to the movement *as such*, but where in the total ear-hand process the focus of attention shall fall. This point, wherever it is, must be determined not by the solicitation of the point in itself considered, but by the demands of the *whole* act of coördination. Whether the attention be 'in the hand' or 'in the ear,' it is 'there' in order to bring off successfully the ear-hand adjustment.

But why is it 'in' one or the other? This leads to the consideration of another function or rather another phase of *the* function of attention, namely, its function as the adjustor, the mediator, of the tension between habitually established coördinations and new conditions under which they have to express themselves. An habitual process, such, *e.g.*, as walking, comes into consciousness as, *i.e.*, under attention, only when some new set of conditions, some obstacle, arises, adjustment to which lies outside the scope of the habit. Then only so much of the process comes into consciousness as needs readjustment to the new conditions. Habit is still left to do all it can, and in every voluntary act there is always something left for it to do. No matter with how minute a portion of a process attention may be occupied, it always will be found giving direction to a *group*, no matter how small, of already coördinated activities. Any attempt, therefore, to leave habit out of the account in voluntary action makes such action impossible. It would be affirming a process of adjustment with nothing to adjust. If attention, *as such*, then, is the process of mediating the tension between habit and new conditions, its focus must be where this tension

is strongest, *i.e.*, where habit is least able to cope with the situation. The position of this point will depend upon the extent to which the different parts of the whole ear-hand process can be left to habit. If the ear element of the process, that is, the sound, be unfamiliar and the movement of the hand be familiar, the point of tension will fall 'in the ear' and *vice versa*. With the sound and movement both familiar or both unfamiliar, the balance between them will be determined by education, inherited structure, etc. Let it be noted again, that in leaving one phase more than the other to habit, the former is not left out of the act, nor out of the process of attention. In attention to the sound, the movement of the hand is present in the character of the sound as a pressure signal; and in attention to the movement, the sound is present in the very fact of its being a movement in response to the sound.

Concerning the process of 'shifting' the attention and the accompanying time variations it follows from the very nature of attention that it is only from an external point of view, the point of view of an observer, that we can speak of 'shifting' the attention in the *same* act. For the reagent a 'shift' of attention is a change in his act; it means a different process of coördination. For him, therefore, the sensory and motor forms of attention are not 'two forms' of attention for the *same* act; they are essentially two different acts; and the time question for him is, which of the two acts is the shorter. Regarding the act, however, in an objective way, we should expect the time of the reaction to be shortest when the attention is upon that part of the process which is least habitual, or in which habit encounters the most new conditions. When one who reacts spontaneously to sound in the sensory way attempts to transfer his attention to the hand, two things are involved: (1) leaving the ear adjustment for habit to take care of; (2) a breaking up, in attending to the hand process, of an already efficiently established coördination. This means that for the performance of the 'act,' regarded objectively, unnecessary work is being done. The focus of the attention upon the more habitual phase of the process means its resolution into elements. Now the moment these elements are called out as unit groups, they bring with them their own train of associated groups, all of which have to be inhibited. This increased and, from the objective view of the act, unnecessary complication, means, of course, an increase in time and mean variation, and accounts for the exceedingly 'artificial' feeling that accompanies the effort.[5]

[5] Here it may be remarked that if the statement of attention as the act of coördinating activities more or less habitual be correct, Professor Baldwin is entitled to say not only that focusing attention upon the more habitual phase of the act 'may' but that it *must* retard the act.

Indeed, whether the attempt succeeds at all, depends upon the extent to which the ear adjustment *can* be left to habit. If the sound be very strange the reagent finds he cannot attend to the hand until, as he says he 'gets used' to the sound, and this 'getting used' to the sound is, of course, the ear adjustment becoming habitual.

This explains why at the outset of the series M.'s reactions were all made in the sensory form. As the ear phase, however, grows more and more reflex the breaking up of the hand process becomes possible and the motor form of attention emerges. A precisely parallel process takes place in the development of the sensory form for a reagent spontaneously motor. Under practice the new form continues, of course, to grow more and more reflex, and its time and mean variation steadily decrease. In the case of M., for whom the new form was the motor, its time kept diminishing in the hand series until, at the close, it was a few sigma faster than the sensory. A similar development occurred in J.'s visual hand series. The sensory was faster at the beginning, the motor at the close. In all the series where the motor was faster at the beginning, it still remained so at the close, though not by nearly so large a margin as reported in the Leipzig tables. In saying that continued practice on both these forms rendered them 'more reflex,' we mean that when at the close the reactions were made in the fastest time it was with a much less amount of tension, and consequently less attention, than at first. Any extraordinary attempt, at this stage, to concentrate upon either form resulted in great irregularity and increase of time, for the reason, as already stated, that all there is for attention to do is to break up and reëstablish processes already unified under habit.

But why even the small margin in favor of the motor time at the close of a course of practice on the two forms? The reason usually given is that 'attention to the movement is the beginning of it.' But if the whole act is not the mere hand movement, but the coördination of ear *and* hand, it is difficult to see why the sensory form is not as much the beginning of the act as is the motor. If attention to the hand is the 'beginning of the hand movement' it is no less true that attention to the ear is the beginning of the sound. And this is not mere 'arm chair' psychologizing, for as a matter of fact, at the beginning of the series, nearly all M's premature responses occurred in the sensory form, and at the close of the series about as many occurred in one form as in the other. When the premature response came, it was always preceded by a feeling of great tension in the ear, and succeeded by a corresponding feeling of relief in the ear, and when in this case the true signal came it was frequently lost entirely by the reagent. Again, it is said, that in attention to the hand a much larger portion of the whole pathway of

discharge is 'innervated' than in attention to the ear. This seems to assume that only that part of the total pathway is 'innervated' which is represented in the focus of attention. But if 'innervation' is necessary to movement, and the focus of attention is necessary to 'innervation,' how, *e.g.*, does walking go on when the focus of attention is elsewhere? The answer is, that we must interpret the focus of attention not as a point of innervation *merely*, but *as a point of conflicting innervations demanding adjustment*. It is not the need of innervation as such, but of *adjustment* of innervations, that determines the focus. But, even supposing that attention means increased innervation, there appears no reason why, assuming the nervous structure homogeneous, and the amount of innervation the same, its application should be more effective at one point than at another. As to the distribution of the innervation over a larger area, if the amount is the same, it must be correspondingly weakened at each point, and so nothing be gained.

It appears, then, that for an explanation of the fact that at the end of the course of practice, when both forms had became highly reflex, the motor form was little the faster, we must appeal again to the relation between Habit and Attention, still regarding, in the objective way, the sensory and motor reactions as 'two forms' of the 'same' act, this fact of the shorter motor time means, (1) in terms of Attention, that the stimulus presented by the ear adjustment affords less material for the continued exercise of attention than that presented by the hand; (2) in terms of Habit it means that the ear process becomes more rapidly and more completely habitual than that of the hand. It takes but a short time to 'get used' to even the strangest sound. After this the character of the sound is comparatively fixed. It cannot be changed through further adjustment. This appears due largely to the more stable character of the inherited ear mechanism. On the other hand, the phase of the stimulus presented by the hand is not nearly so fixed and stable. Here there is much more opportunity for continued variation, hence more ground for the continued exercise of attention. Applying what has already been said, we should, then, expect that act to be faster in which the focus of attention is upon the less stable phase of the hand element of the coördination rather than when it is more 'artificially' occupied in breaking up the more completely established ear adjustment. In a word the time question is not a case of a 'sensory' *vs.* a 'motor' reaction, but of *a sensori-motor less habitual vs. a sensori-motor more habitual*.

As stated at the outset, this interpretation in terms of Habit andAttention seems to us to combine elements from both sides of the 'type discussion.' On the Princeton side it would say: (1) that the 'type' of attention and its accompanying time are determined by the relation

between the individual's stock of coördinations, inherited and acquired, already on hand, and the particular coördination required by the reaction; (2) that the 'sensory form' may still be the faster even after the 'motor form' has clearly emerged in consciousness. On the Leipzig side it would say that under practice, in both forms, upon the same coördination, the sensory phase passes more completely under the control of habit and thus leaves the faster time to the motor form.

THE FUNCTIONAL VERSUS THE REPRESENTATIONAL THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE IN LOCKE'S ESSAY

The Functional versus the Representational Theories of Knowledge in Locke's Essay. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1898. *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902). 67 pp.

NOTE

These comments on Locke's *Essay* are the outcome of work done in Professor Dewey's seminar in advanced logic. The general standpoint of the entire treatment was developed in that course. for interpretations and criticisms of the *Essay*, and for certain elaborations of the general point of view in the course of these criticisms, the writer is to be held responsible.

The treatment does not pretend to cover all the points of doctrine in the *Essay*. It aims to consider only some of the well-known passages, from the standpoint of a conception of the nature and function of knowledge somewhat different from those from which previous criticisms have been made.

In the references to the *Essay* the first arabic figure following the number of the book refers to the chapter, the second to the section.

I
INTRODUCTION

The history of thought shows that every period of great scientific advance, bringing a larger freedom to the practical side of life, has developed at the same time a deep and widespread skepticism in theories of knowledge. As Greek science had its Protagoras and Pyrrho, so modern science has its Hume and Comte. Thus an increasing sense of power in "the conduct of life" and a deepening sense of impotence in the attainment of knowledge have developed side by side. What is the meaning of this paradox?

It is frequently said that this state of affairs is due to the fact that in turning philosopher the "practical man" and the scientist attempt to carry over their standards into the realm of ultimate truth and reality, where

they are inadequate, because applied beyond the limited sphere in which and for which they are created.[1] From this statement it appears that the paradox is due to a difference between the epistemologist's standard of ultimate truth and reality and the everyday working standard; and it is assumed that it is the latter that is inadequate. But the statement suggests also that, formally at any rate, the paradox could as well be stated from the opposite side; that is, as due to the fact that the epistemologist is unable to carry his standard of ultimate truth and reality into the realm of everyday life. In still other words, the paradox may be due, not to the carrying over, but to the failure to carry over, the standard of everyday life into our epistemology. Of course, our epistemology professes to make explicit the standard involved in everyday experience. But the very fact that this explication issues in this paradox suggests that somewhere in the process this standard becomes so changed as to be no longer available for its original purpose.

Very briefly and generally sketched, the transition from the one standpoint to the other is somewhat as follows: The scientist in his laboratory or the workman at his bench is after a certain concrete result. A part of the entire process of reaching this result is thinking – making judgments. And he finds that these new judgments involve apparent rejection of former ones. But from the practical standpoint this matters not so long as the desired result is reached. At this point, however, the epistemologist appears with the suggestion that all this may be very well as a matter of "practical getting along," but where, in such a procedure, he asks, is there any place for truth – for certain and necessary knowledge? "Here you are making judgments one day only to reject them the next. What possible ground is there to expect that you will ever reach a judgment that will stand? What kind of confidence is to be placed in a knowledge process that is constantly rejecting its own products?" Up to this point, the practical man has not considered the problem of knowledge as such. He has been too busy getting results. In getting these results, to be sure, he has made judgments without number, but always as a *means of reaching the result*. So far, the only certainty he has cared for has been the certainty of attaining the result. But now, as an epistemologist, he is asked to abstract the judgment from its function as a part of the process of getting these results, and to pronounce upon its absolute certainty and necessity in itself considered. At the first encounter with the problem, Hume's final verdict, that the judgment has plenty of "practical," but no "absolute" validity, is likely to be the conclusion. But further reflection may make it possible to say: "It is true these judgments are all partial and imperfect; they wait upon a final absolute judgment for their completion; but, as *contributing factors* in this absolute judgment, they share in its absolute truth."

[1] *Cf.* Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. I, pp. 26ff.

But in thus getting clear of Hume's skepticism on one side, the danger of running upon Spinoza's Identity Absolute, in which the distinction between truth and error vanishes, appears on the other. If all these judgments "share" in the absolute *truth,* in what does error consist? If it be said that error lies in the *partial* character of the judgment, and that every judgment is, therefore, partly true and partly false, we still must decide *in what* – that is, in what aspect or direction it is true and in what false. And it would seem that we must first have the whole before even this "partial" truth and falsity can be determined. If (as a matter of *practical necessity,* and using a *practical* standard) we *do* make a discrimination between truth and error, what sort of guarantee is there that, when the judgment takes its place in the whole "system of truth and reality," what has been determined as "true" will maintain its character as such?

Again, if this conception of "degrees of truth and reality"[2] be taken purely *quantitatively,* it would seem that the judgment expressing the higher degree of truth and reality must include those expressing the lower; and, if it is a question of the amount only of truth and reality, the retention of judgments containing the lower degrees would seem to be useless. On the other hand, qualitative differences seem equally difficult to reconcile with the quantitatively complete reality. For here each quality must be a quality of the whole reality. Differences in quality must mean taking the whole reality from different standpoints, from different angles; else we shall have as many different realities as there are qualities. But if the whole must appear in each quality, what can be meant by a judgment expressing a part of, or more or less of, reality? How, for example, shall the quantitative scale be applied to such a pair of judgments as, "The apple is red," "The apple is sweet"? or, "The apple is red," and "Honesty is the best policy"? Here it may be said that it is precisely the category of quality that makes it possible for the whole to appear in the part – that in abstract quantity the whole cannot appear in the part, but the part can have the *quality* of the whole, and the quality of the whole can be expressed in the part. But, even so, if the whole does thus express itself in the quality, why should there be any complaint of incompleteness?

In terms of the relativity of knowledge the problem is: To what is knowledge relative? If we answer that it is relative to more knowledge, to an assumed whole of knowledge, then again we must ask: Whence comes error, and how can we decide on the character of any particular judgment unless we have this whole? If, on the other hand, we say that the whole of knowledge – *i.e.*, knowledge as such – is relative, then the question, "To *what* is it relative ?" seems pertinent.

[2] *Cf.* Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, chaps. xvi and xxiv.

Returning once more to the point where the "plain man" and scientist begin epistemologizing, may not the root of the difficulty lie in the fact that in "turning epistemologist" they "turn" too much, and so get the shop and laboratory completely behind their backs? Do not many of the "metaphysical puzzles," a few of which are suggested above, grow out of the abstraction of the judgment from its function in the laboratory of the scientist and in the larger laboratory of life? In the latter it does yield an ever-increasing sense of power, security, and certainty; as abstracted it appears untrustworthy. Returning to the shop and laboratory with the result of our examination of the judgment as a thing or product apart from its function, we say: "The certainty here is, after all, merely practical. Judgments, to be sure, are quite useful, indeed necessary. But this is quite a different matter from their validity as expressions of ultimate truth and reality." Let it be noted, again, that it is as a partial expression of an assumed whole of truth and reality that the judgment is found wanting. Its value, its validity as a function in the concrete conduct of life, is not questioned.

To sum up thus far: The paradox of increasing practical control and decreasing theoretical certainty suggests that there must be a difference between the standard of knowledge used in the "conduct of life," and the standard used in philosophy. Taking the judgment as the unit of knowledge, we have seen that in the shop and laboratory it is used as a means of getting results valuable in terms of the whole concrete life-process. In philosophy, the realm of decreasing certainty, the judgment is abstracted from this concrete activity. Thus deprived of its native source of value and validity, a basis of valuation is sought for it in some system of absolute reality of which our judgments constitute a progressive revelation. But such a basis appears to offer no criterion for a distinction between truth and error in any particular judgment, and no ground for even a "relative" certainty. The significance of this would seem to be that philosophy is to learn that it is not entitled to a special view of its own of knowledge; that it must take knowledge as it finds it; that it must interpret it on its native heath – the field of the struggles, of the victories and defeats, of concrete living.

II
HISTORICAL

Historically the roots of this paradox of the increasing practical and decreasing theoretical value of knowledge run back finally to the beginnings of Greek reflection.[3] The period of the further development of it to which Locke belongs dates from the movement which began when the fierce, but undefined and undirected, energy of barbarian life came in contact with the ordered and categorized life of the Græco-Roman civilization. Better conditions for developing a thoroughgoing dualism of thought and action can scarcely be conceived. On the one hand is the great tide of barbarian energy crying for direction, for some means of defining and controlling itself. Instead of gradually evolving through toilsome centuries its own formula out of its own life, it suddenly stumbles, in its thrashings about, upon a complete system ready-made to its hand. How could such a system appear to the barbarian other than external, given, and, as compared with his own meager formulations, complete and absolute? What could he do but acknowledge its authority and begin slowly the process of "learning"?

On the other hand, the system itself found that, instead of carrying forward the complex life out of which it had naturally evolved, it had to turn primer schoolmaster. Little wonder that scholasticism grew dogmatic and seemed to itself as well as to the barbarian complete and absolute. Thus the same situation that made the system appear external and absolute to the barbarian made it appear equally so to the Græco-Roman. On the one side was the feeling of need; on the other, the feeling of perfect ability to supply. Both felt that the mastery of the system was all that the barbarian could ever hope to accomplish in this world or the next.

But "what God hath joined" is hard to put asunder. No sooner was this dualism of thought and action set up than the movement toward its removal began. Slowly, awkwardly, and spasmodically the Teutonic hosts set about working out their salvation under the authoritative direction of the Græco-Roman formula. But in working out their own salvation they wrought at the same time the destruction of the system. At first, of course, no discrepancy in the system appeared. So great was the advantage gained in the additional control of action that there was no feeling of the limits of the conceptions which gave it. But in the course of time the gradual development of scientific activity and the accumulation through generations of scientific results began to press

[3] *Cf.* Dewey, *The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge.*

upon the limits of the formulæ that had made them possible. This, as always happens, led for a time to a more vigorous emphasis of the formulæ. With a filial devotion the system which had been of such service in turning barbarism into civilization was bolstered and defended against the "insidious attacks of science." Wherever possible, the recalcitrant results were either ignored or the limits of the system stretched at some point to make room for them. Of course, when such sweeping work as Galileo's had to be dealt with, there was trouble. And, be it noted again, in this very difficulty with such work as Galileo's the bond between the theoretical and the practical was revealed. Galileo was not sent to prison for merely "thinking thoughts" – for entertaining certain mere hypotheses. It was because his thoughts were threatening the whole social structure. Science, art, politics, industrial institutions were all bound up with, indeed were parts of, the dogmas of the Church. Little wonder that, when the latter were flatly contradicted, people instinctively felt that the foundations, not of a belief merely, but of life itself, were threatened.

On the other hand, it was just this opposition that brought the sense of movement into definite consciousness. The rigidity of the scholastic system furnished the fixed object in the field of vision without which the sense of movement – of the march of life – could not have arisen so vividly. But almost in the same breath in which this open opposition between theory and practice was affirmed came the declaration that it ought not to be, and the demand for reunification. The open breach was thus really the culmination of the first stage in the movement, which all the while had been working below the surface, toward the removal of the original dualism of theory and practice set up by the contact of the barbarian and Græco-Roman. The difficulties involved in the assumption of the dualism had to come out before the movement toward unification could begin in earnest. Moreover, as we shall see, the very effort to effect this unification involved the further development of the opposition to its culmination in Hume.

From this point of first revolt against scholasticism down to Hume this development in England maybe divided into three sub-periods:

1. The first period denounces the separation of theory and practice, and affirms the practical function of knowledge, retaining, however, the scholastic conception of knowledge as some kind of a transcript of a system of already constructed reality. In this period there is no doubt as to the possibility of complete and certain knowledge. The contention is that the scholastic system does not furnish it. To this period belong Bacon and Hobbes.

2. The second period is marked by the rise of the tension between the conception of the function of knowledge in relation to practice, on the one hand, and the scholastic conception of it as reporting a completed

system of reality, on the other. The nature of this tension was, of course, not recognized. It was the hidden source of the problems and difficulties of the period. To this stage belong Locke and Berkeley, with Descartes and Spinoza on the continent.

3. It remained for Hume In the third stage to pursue to the last ditch the consequences of the assumption that knowledge must *first* get its validity established from some external source before it can be applied to action. Since Locke fails in the second period of this movement, in order to give him his proper setting, the first period should have a little fuller statement than the merely formal one given above.

Both Bacon and Hobbes start with an arraignment of scholasticism on the charge of divorcing knowledge and action, and with very explicit statements of the practical function of knowledge. Beside the well-known aphorism, "Knowledge is power," which Hobbes quotes, Bacon says:

> In behalf of the business which is in hand, I entreat men to believe that *it is not an opinion to be held but a work to be done, and to be well assured that I am laboring to lay the foundation, not of any sect or doctrine, but of human utility and power.*[4]
>
> The true and lawful goal of the sciences is none other than this: that human life be endowed with discoveries and powers.[5]
>
> Of all signs there is none more certain and noble than that from fruits; for fruits and works are, as it were, the sponsors and sureties for the truth of philosophies.[6]

While Bacon and Hobbes are both so explicit in their declarations that there is *a* connection between knowledge and action, and in their demand that the scholastic *idola* be put away and this connection be made, they do not, as Windelband says of Bacon, "get much beyond this *demand.*"[7] They cannot discover what the connection is. The chief obstacle in the way of this discovery is that the scholastic conception of the *character* of knowledge is still retained. Knowledge is still conceived as reporting a completed system of reality and as influencing action from without. Bacon's objection to the scholastic system is brought, at bottom, not against its essential character in itself considered, but against its *results*. He agrees with the scholastic notion that the great body of truth "is *there.*" The problem is simply to get the *idola* out of the way so that

[4] *Novum Organum*, preface.

[5] *Ibid.*, Book I, sec. 81.

[6] *Ibid.*, Book I, sec. 73.

[7] *History of Philosophy* (Tuft's translation), p. 384.

we may see the truth. It is true, Bacon and Hobbes have much to say about "the deception of the senses" and the need of experiment. But this deception of the senses is due merely to the misuse, or rather lack of use, made of them up to that time. And the demand for experiment is simply a demand for devices for clearing away the débris between the senses and the material, so that the former may get at the "simple natures" of the latter. What is spoken of as "transcendent of sense" is simply something which sense has not transcended, but may, with more careful exercise and the help of experiment in clearing away the obstacles. But of experiment in the modern sense, in which the working hypothesis, *i.e.,* the judgment, becomes part and parcel of the process of experimentation itself, Bacon and Hobbes had no conception. Says Bacon: "For certain it is that the senses deceive. But then at the same time they supply the means of discovering their own errors."[8]

With such conceptions there could be no question for Bacon and Hobbes as to the ultimate possibility of certain knowledge, at least so far as concern affairs of this life. Practical difficulties there were, great and numerous, but there were no theoretical obstacles. Bacon and Hobbes then stand for the formal declaration of, and demand for, the unity of thought and action. But still retaining the scholastic conception of the nature of knowledge, this unity is conceived as external, not organic. Not attempting to work out the nature of this unity in detail, they develop no skepticism concerning the possibility of certain knowledge.

In the second stage of this movement, the period of Locke and Berkeley, we find quite a different state of affairs. Here the paradox of increasing practical efficiency and decreasing theoretical certainty makes its appearance. Here the problem of knowledge begins to emerge, and the epistemologist appears. The assumption is still that knowledge must first find credentials of certainty before it can be a guide to action. But, instead of the naïve assurance of ability to reach this certainty which we find in Bacon and Hobbes, there is doubt and skepticism. What with them was unquestioningly assumed is with Locke and Berkeley the main issue. The outcome we well know. After wrestling with the problem, both were compelled to seek the credentials of knowledge in a source beyond experience – Locke in matter, and Berkeley in the Deity.

[8] Introduction to *Novum Organum*.

III
LOCKE'S PROBLEM

As already stated, Locke's problem springs out of the tension between the conception of knowledge as a part of conduct and the scholastic conception of it as reporting a system of external reality. This antithesis is expressed in the paradox of practical certainty and theoretical skepticism. Two lines of influence conspired to raise this tension and sharpen the paradox in Locke; on the practical side, the rapid advance in scientific and political development; on the theoretical side, the work of Descartes.

Galileo, Newton, Boyle, and Huygens were Locke's contemporaries, and two of them were his countrymen. In the political world the people were fighting and winning their last battle with the tradition of the divine right of kings and popes. Locke wrote the closing paragraphs of his *Essay* as cannon were booming the people's welcome of William and Mary. A sense of growing power, control, freedom was in the very atmosphere. People were beginning to feel that reality did not lie off in some other world, nor in the decrees of king or priest. They were beginning to find it in the movement, the unfolding of their own experience. All this indicated that the old scholastic system of judgments as constituting a fixed body of truth, scientific, political, and religious, was breaking up and that doubt of the possibility, on the old basis, of reaching judgments that would stand was emerging.

Meanwhile this same doubt had already been faced by Descartes from whom, rather than from his predecessors, Bacon and Hobbes, Locke took his cue. For, as we have seen, Locke's English predecessors had no such doubt, hence no such problem. Locke's work, however, is not a development of Descartes's. It simply takes up the same problem and with the same assumption, viz., that the problem of certainty is a problem inside knowledge as such, and must be worked out there. Under these two motives, then, Locke begins his work. As an Englishman and a man of affairs he has the conviction that thought is a part of "the conduct of life"; following the example of Descartes, he takes up the task of investigating certainty, truth, and error as direct attributes of thought considered apart from its function in the conduct of life.

On the function of knowledge Locke has left plenty of statements. A few will suffice to show his attitude:

> The last resort a man has recourse to in conduct of himself is his understanding. For though we give supreme command to the will as

> to an agent, yet the truth is the man determines himself to this or that voluntary action upon some precedent knowledge or appearance of knowledge.[9]
>
> We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us… . The candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes.[10]
>
> Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures whereby a rational creature may and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled that some other things escape our knowledge.[11]
>
> This certainty is as great as our happiness or misery beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be.[12]

With knowledge thus "set on the top of action," the determination of its certainty and validity becomes, as Locke says, all the more necessary. But the very fact that it is so literally "set on the *top* of action" instead of *in* it makes the determination of this certainty a difficult problem. Locke's ambition is to find the same degree of certainty in the theoretical realm as is developing under the advance of science in the practical world. His difficulty is to do this without making it the same in kind as well as in degree. Here it may seem as if we must be misrepresenting Locke when we make him say in one breath that knowledge is for the sake of action and in the next that there is a certainty in the practical realm lacking in the theoretical. But this, as we have seen, was precisely what constituted the paradoxical character of the whole conception of knowledge in his day.

[9] *Conduct of the Understanding*, Introduction, sec. 1.

[10] Book I, 1:6.

[11] Book I, 1:7.

[12] Book IV, 2:14.

IV
Origin of Ideas

Very much of the positive part of what Locke offers in this first account of the origin of ideas is virtually a statement of content. Thus, simple ideas of sensation are "uniform appearances of touch, sight, taste, smell, etc., conveyed into the mind from external objects by the senses." The other group – ideas of reflection – are "ideas of the mind's operations: perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our minds." Taking from these statements the descriptions of content, we have left for the account of origin the simple statement that one group comes from sensation, the other, from reflection. This virtually makes the source simply a quality of the idea turned into a faculty or a process. That is, the distinction of sensation and reflection already existing as one of content, the question of origin is disposed of by referring these two kinds of ideas to two corresponding faculties. Both sets of ideas are thus given outright, one by the process of sensation, the other by the process of reflection. Locke's satisfaction, at this point, with this short and easy disposition of the question of origin is due to the fact that he is here interested primarily in analyzing and describing ideas as the mere materials for knowledge. In Book IV Locke tells us that it is only as combined in the judgment that ideas constitute knowledge. Meanwhile they can be abstracted from the judgment for purposes of analysis and description. As thus abstracted, the idea becomes merely a psychical "thing" – an existence capable of analysis and description, as is a plant or an insect.

From this standpoint the question of origin becomes merely a part of the analysis and description of this material of knowledge. It is not yet so vital as it becomes in Book IV, where this material is to be transformed into knowledge. There the question of origin becomes a part of the problem of validity, and Locke is forced to a much fuller discussion of sensation and reflection as processes than he here gives. There Locke finds that the same processes of sensation and reflection which here somehow produce these two kinds of ideas are also the processes that turn them into knowledge. Hence he has at once the problem of distinguishing between the work of these processes as furnishing material merely, and as converting this material into knowledge. He finds that in knowledge the processes apparently repeat the operations involved in producing the material, and, conversely, in producing the material they also produce knowledge. Thus knowledge is given along with the material. On the other hand, when, feeling this difficulty, Locke insists that these ideas given through sensation and reflection must be regarded as the mere dis-

connected materials for judgment, he yet cannot point out where the processes of sensation and reflection do anything different in turning this material into knowledge from what they have done in producing it. In the process of knowledge, sensation and reflection thus repeat the operations involved in furnishing the material, and in furnishing the material they perform all the operations involved in knowledge.

From the standpoint of validity the same difficulty appears. Thus the problem of the validity of the constructive process in knowledge becomes a matter of the validity of materials used. And the latter is sought, not in a further examination of the processes of sensation and reflection, but in an appeal to the "thing." But the appeal to the "thing," as Green continually points out, is an appeal back to the constructive process.

In one phase of Book IV, as will appear more in detail farther on, Locke attempts to break this circle by making a division of labor between sensation and reflection. Instead of two parallel processes producing the material, he has sensation furnish the material and reflection turn it into knowledge. This is, of course, a foreshadowing of Kant's solution, and it foreshadows, too, in a general way, Kant's difficulty. The difficulty, indeed, is essentially the same as that stated above. The material is found either already connected in sensation, or so disconnected that reflection seems unable to make a connection; or, again, if a connection be made, then the material is so changed and reconstructed that its value as a connecting point with reality is lost.

All this points to the fact that the origin cannot be treated apart from the function of the idea; that the process in which it gets existence is also the process in which it has its meaning and value. This finds a general and indirect recognition from Locke in his stand against innate ideas. In this Locke is really protesting against ideas as mere material. He is insisting that the idea does not get an existence except in and through its functions, viz., indicating an object. Doubtless Locke's ideas, given directly by the thing, are epistemologically as innate as those implanted by the Deity. But the point in favor of Locke's ideas is that they are implanted in the process of *constituting or representing an object*. They are not mere inactive content on the one hand, nor empty capacity on the other.

In this chapter on "Origin" Locke comes closer to the problem on the negative than on the positive side. The latter, as we have seen, consists of little more than a mere description of the ideas as given. Having disposed of origin in this perfunctory way, Locke turns to what, from his standpoint, is the most important distinction of ideas – that of simple and complex.

V
Simple and Complex Ideas

This is the most fundamental of the classifications of ideas which Locke makes when he is attempting to deal with the idea apart from the judgment. Here Locke brings out the function of the idea in both the analytic and synthetic phases of experience. He throws into relief, too, from the standpoint of both these phases, the difficulties in the attempt to interpret the material apart from the process of knowledge. The treatment of this classification shows also how Locke's view of his problem reflects the whole spirit of the movement of the time. Science was trying to get at the ultimate "forms," the fixed elements of the physical world. In politics the revolution issued out of the question as to where lay the final constituents of political power – in the sovereign or in the people. In the world of religion, the reformation involved the question of whether the essential unit was the Church or the individual. Each of these worlds was conceived as a perfectly completed existing order. The problem was to find out what they eternally *are*. "There *is,* existing from all eternity, a true physical order, a true political order, a true religious order." It is there; the problem is to find out by a careful analytic scrutiny the ultimate elements of its constitution. This is to be done by a process of direct observational analysis. Experimentation is to be employed; but, as we have seen, the function of experiment is merely that of bringing the material within range and breaking it up so that the mind can get at it. The act of discrimination itself is simply a matter of straight looking.

While theoretically all this analytic activity was exerted to find out what *is,* practically it was always for the sake of a re-synthesis of the elements found, as a means of reaching certain desired results. Moreover, as we shall see, the real criterion for the true element was always found in these results. From this standpoint of direct observational analysis Locke is viewing his problem. The world of knowledge is there – a perfectly determined system. We have but to look closely enough to find its elements, just as the scientist looks for the elements of a plant or an animal. And this suggests that there is perhaps no better way of bringing out the weakness in this view of knowledge than by a statement of the function of the idea in the work of the scientist.

In looking for the element of the plant or the animal the scientist employs ideas as his instruments of analysis. It would seem, then, that any attempt to isolate the idea from its work in the shop and laboratory, and make it in itself the object of analysis and synthesis, involves a conception of an idea and of analysis and synthesis quite different from that actually employed by the scientist and artisan. If the idea is an *instrument* of, rather than *material* for, analysis and synthesis, any attempt

to make it the latter would seem to be a case of "the psychologist's fallacy." We should expect also that the attempt to apply the categories of simple and complex to ideas in the same way in which they are applied in the shop and laboratory should find itself either without any adequate criterion for the distinction, or turn out to be an account of the shop and laboratory process of analysis and synthesis.

Perhaps the best order of discussion at this point is to survey briefly (1) the laboratory process of analysis and synthesis, showing the criterion for simple and complex, and the function of the idea in the laboratory process; (2) Locke's "simple and complex" compared with that of the scientist, showing the former's lack of an adequate criterion, and the confusion and final desertion of his formal criteria.

As an illustration of the scientific process, we may take the analysis of color. So long as color experience is taken as it comes, as merely given, and no effort is made to reproduce or control it, there will be no "elementary" or "complementary" colors. Green, purple, and white are all on a par. Each is a perfectly unitary experience. It is only in the effort to reproduce white that green and purple are taken as its "elements." As color, they are as unitary as white; as elements, they are the means to a desired color experience. And here we may note, too, that, considered as *elements,* green and purple have no more color value than have the vibrations of ether. As elements, they are simply the stimuli to certain actions, *e.g.*, the turning of a color wheel, which will bring about the experience of white light.

The same is true of the analysis of sound. So long as musical sounds are taken as *given,* there is no basis for analysis. As given, the chord and note are co-ordinate. It is only when some effort is made to control and produce various sound experiences that it is discovered that the activities required to produce some – the notes – are involved as elements in the production of others – the chords. And here, too, the note as a *mere element* has no more sound value than the air waves. It is simply a part of the machinery of producing the desired chord.

The analysis of the shop and laboratory then arises in the process of attempting to reproduce, or in some measure control, experience hitherto taken as *given.* So long as any experience remains merely given, it continues to be a unitary experience. It is neither an element nor a complex. The categories of whole and part, elements and compound, emerge only when it is discovered that in attempting to bring about a desired experience we are forced to employ, as means, activities that hitherto have themselves yielded a total experience.

The scientist's element or simple is, then, simply the stimulus to an act in a series or co-ordination of acts to bring about a desired end. *Any* content serving as such a stimulus is elemental. When, therefore, the scientist analyzes an object or content into its elements, what he does is

to discover the stimuli to acts that will result in its production. As such stimuli, these elements are not themselves taken as qualitative content, but simply as stimuli to such action as will bring about the desired qualitative experience. Strictly speaking, then, the analysis is not of an object or content as such, but of the *activity* necessary to realize an ideal content. And in the shop and laboratory the sole test of the elements is whether they stimulate the acts which will bring about this realization. The object as an attained experience is always unitary; that is unitary in the sense of a *totality.* It is only when it is regarded as something *to be attained* that it is viewed as "having" or as "made up of" simple elements. And these elements, as elements, as we have seen, are valuable, not as content, but as definers of the action, as indicators of what is to be done next to reach the result. Of course, when an experience ceases to be taken as given and becomes an end, and when the steps to its attainment, involving activities that have hitherto yielded complete experiences, have been worked out, we are not to understand that this process has not changed the character of the experience from what it was as previously given. The botanist's primrose is quite a different affair from Peter Bell's. And it is this increased value which the experience acquires, as we discover the process of its production, that is meant when we talk of its being "made up of" elements. After the problem of control has been worked out, we state this increase of value by saying that the object "possesses" all the factors, all the elements, of the activity involved in getting this control. But as they originally emerge the elements are not *in* the object, but are means *to* it. The laboratory element or simple is, therefore, one of function, not of an irreducible and unchangeable content.

On the other hand, the laboratory "complex" is just this content, which is to be worked out into the concrete. That is, the complex is the idealized content projected as an end, demanding certain acts for its realization. These acts, or rather their stimuli, are, as we have seen, the elements in the realization. Recurring to the illustration used above, it is only after white light ceases to be given and becomes a problem – that is, an end, an idea, an ideal – that it is regarded as "having" elements. *Any* content, therefore, which is to be produced or controlled through a series of acts, is complex. On the other hand, *any* content, *e.g.*, green or purple, which is serving simply as a stimulus to an act contributing to the production or control of another content, *e.g.*, white light, is functionally an element – a simple.

Now, Locke's notion is virtually to apply to ideas the laboratory process of analysis. But in such an attempt, the criterion for simple and complex must be one quite different from that used in the shop and laboratory. In the latter, as we have seen, the standard is wholly

functional; simplicity or complexity is not a direct character of the content as such, but of the way it is functioning. But Locke is unable to apply any such criterion to his analysis of ideas. In the laboratory the criterion for simplicity is in the result aimed at. If the series of stimuli selected as elements bring the desired result, they are for that act the *absolutely* simple. But the, only result Locke wants in his analysis is to find elements, whereas elements in science are such only with reference to a further result to which they contribute. Locke's simple and complex, therefore, must be direct atttributes of the ideas in themselves.

We are not to understand, of course, that the science of Locke's time or, for that matter, of our own is fully conscious of its own teleological criterion. Indeed, it is due to the lack of just this consciousness on the part of science that Locke thinks he is following the laboratory procedure. Indeed, Locke's system is the theory of the scientist's procedure, and so reflects the extent – or, rather, lack of extent – to which the practical world had become aware of its own method.

But while in its *theory of knowledge* the science of Locke's time regarded its elements as absolutely given, in its actual procedure its practice was saved from its theory by keeping the latter so abstract that its inconsistency with the former is concealed.[13] On the other hand, when the scientist was interested in formulating his theory of knowledge, he saved it from conflict with his practice by regarding the latter as merely manipulating the material for knowledge. In practice the elements are always brought to the test of results. If the latter are not forthcoming, the elements are repudiated. But in constructing theory, the practice is a mere external aid in getting the elements. The fundamental problem, therefore, for Locke, in this classification, is to find a criterion for the distinction of simple and complex.

His formal criteria of the simple are: (1) that which under the gaze of the mind's eye "presents a uniform appearance"; (2) "that which the mind cannot make for itself."[14] In the first, Locke at once has to face this question: If it is a matter of simply looking, how is it to be determined whether one has looked long enough or carefully enough to bring out all the differences? Might not more prolonged and careful scrutiny bring out more distinctions? The result is that the criterion for simple virtually becomes, instead of that which *cannot* be analyzed further, that which there is *no need of* analyzing further. The same is true of the other criterion – that the simple is that "which the mind cannot make for

[13] *Cf.* Hegel's *Logic* (Wallace's translation), p. 221.

[14] Book II, 1:1, 2.

itself." In the case of the secondary qualities, according to Locke's own statement, the mind does in a sense make them, and even in the case of the primary qualities, of size, figure, and motion, Locke admits that "the mind has to learn to discern them through a process of judgment."[15] With reference to the mind's making them, then, the simple ideas are merely those which *are not being made,* or are not being learned; *i.e.,* they are results of past experience used in constructing a new experience.

Though *formally* maintaining that the mind cannot make its simple ideas, Locke, however, points out that they are often "very difficult to attain," and that some, especially those of reflection, are never attained by many. And in any case it is not "till he applies himself with attention"[16] to it that the simple idea can be obtained. The reason the savage does not see what the trained scientist does, and does not therefore get so many simple ideas, is that he does not attend so well. Thus, so far as the actual amount of work of attention is concerned, the simple ideas are just as difficult to attain, are just as little given, as the complex ideas. On the other hand, in chap. 30, where Locke is discussing the "reality" of ideas, he makes the complex idea of substance virtually as much given as the simple idea. He says: "Those [complex ideas] are fantastical which are made up of such collections of simple ideas as were never found *together* in any substance."[17] Also in the chapter on "Essence" the whole process of constructing the nominal essence is described as one of "leaving out" certain simple ideas from the highly complex ones of a number of given individual objects. But here again these "*practical* difficulties" in getting at the simple ideas are all regarded as wholly external to the process of ideation itself. They are met and overcome wholly apart from, and in order to reach, the idea. When the practical conditions are fulfilled, the idea *somehow* dawns. Even in this account it is to be noted, as showing the intimate connection between the idea and the action in which it arises, that the attainment of the idea marks the solution of the difficulty, and, conversely, the solution of the difficulty is marked by the appearance of the idea.

Turning from Locke's formal account to the way in which these two kinds of ideas actually function, we find that the simplicity and complexity which he formally makes fixed attributes of certain ideas turn out after all to be virtually the simplicity and complexity of the shop and laboratory. Locke's simple idea is always a condition of realizing a desired experience. The latter

[15] Book II, 9:9.

[16] Book II, 1:8.

[17] Book II, 30:5. Brackets mine. Also in Book IV, 4:11. Locke speaks of our ideas of substances "having more or different ideas than are *found* united in the things themselves."

is his complex idea. In other words, the simple idea never is, properly speaking, an idea at all. It is always the direct stimulus to some action which is to realise an idea. The idea proper – that is, the idea as an ideal – is always Locke's complex idea.

All this is implied in Locke's statement, in which he serves notice that he will use simple ideas as meaning "qualities in the object which produces them in us"; and that by "qualities in objects" he means "the power in the object to produce in us the ideas"; and that by "power in the object" he means "the bulk, figure and motion of its insensible parts."[18] This "power in the object" to which the simple idea is referred is, thus, evidently a very complex affair. Indeed, Locke says point blank, as we shall see a little further on, that "these powers considered in themselves are truly complex ideas." Thus, the simple idea "yellow," as an idea, instead of corresponding to *one* quality in the object, corresponds to a number, *viz*, the bulk, figure, and motion of its insensible parts. This means that the moment *any* quality in the object is idealized, that is, is set up as an end, it demands its elements – the means of its production. On the other hand, when yellow is regarded as an element, it is not an idea, but a "*quality in the object*," and as such is a direct and immediate stimulus to some act; *e.g.,* if the aim be that of picking out gold from other metals, it is the stimulus to the act of reaching and grasping.

The simplicity, then, which Locke claims for the ideas "yellow," "sweet," "round," "hard," etc., does not belong to them as ideas, but as qualities of objects, *i.e.,* as direct stimuli to action. On the other hand, all the complexity belonging to the idea "gold" is found to belong to any idea as such. The elements of the idea are in every case the conditions of its realization as a concrete experience. So, if simplicity is used in the sense of unity, the same kind of simplicity as belongs to the idea "yellow" belongs equally to the idea "gold." As ideas both are the goal, the culmination, the unity of all the activities required for their realization. As *elements* both alike are direct stimuli to action.

Locke, then, no less than the scientist and artisan, virtually makes the simplicity or complexity of a content depend upon whether it be regarded as already given and completed, and therefore capable of serving as a stimulus to further operations, or be viewed as a problem, as something yet to be obtained, and as demanding certain "elements" for its attainment.

The functional criterion is not only implied throughout Locke's account, but in many passages he comes very near an explicit statement of it. Thus he says:

[18] Book II, 8:8.

> Our idea therefore of power, I think, may well have a place amongst other simple ideas and be *considered* one of them, being one of those that make a principal *ingredient* in our complex ideas of substances.[19]

Here the formal criteria laid down at the beginning of the treatment of the classification are abandoned outright. Here neither the fact that it cannot be further analyzed, nor the fact that the mind does not make it is the basis of its simplicity, but the fact simply that it is serving as an "ingredient."[20] Again, in the passage above cited, where the simple idea is explicitly declared to be both "a power" consisting of atoms in motion and "a relation to other substances," the simplicity is due entirely to its being an element. More explicit still of the functional character of simplicity is the following:

> For all those powers that we take cognizance of terminating only in the alteration of some sensible qualities in those subjects on which they operate … therefore it is that I have reckoned these powers amongst the simple ideas which make the complex ones of substances, *though these powers considered in themselves are truly complex ideas.*[21]

Still again:

> It is sufficing to the unity of *any* idea that it be *considered* as one representation or picture though made up of ever so many particulars.[22]

Finally, Locke seems to have lost sight entirely of his formulæ where he speaks of the idea of a leopard being composed of "the simple ones of a beast with spots"![23]

Taken out of their connection, one could scarcely ask for a more frank recognition of the practical basis of the distinction. Of course, one is not to read into Locke the consciousness of any such thing. The significance of these passages lies in their showing how inevitably the functional criterion asserts itself.

[19] Book II, 21:3. Italics mine.

[20] This *mere ingredient* character of the simple idea is again mentioned, Book II, 29:121: "The way to prevent it [confusion] is to unite into one complex idea as precisely as possible all those *ingredients* whereby it is differenced from others."

[21] Book II, 23:7. Italics mine.

[22] Book II, 24:1. Italics mine.

[23] Book II, 29:7.

VI
Distinct and Confused Ideas

Nowhere in the first two books does Locke come so squarely face to face with the difficulty of characterizing the idea isolated from its relation to action through the judgment as in treating this classification. The formal statement is:

> A distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from every other; and a confused idea is such an one as is not sufficiently distinguished from another from which it *ought* to be different.[24]

Locke sees the difficulty at once, and his statement of it, immediately following the above, could not be improved upon:

> If no idea be confused, but such as is not sufficiently distinguished from another, from which it *should* be different, it will be hard, may any one say, to find anywhere a confused idea. For let any idea be as it will, it can be no other than the mind perceives it to be; and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas which cannot be other, i. e. different without being perceived to be so. No idea therefore can be undistinguishable from another from which it *ought* to be different, unless you would have it different from itself; for from all other, it is evidently different.[25]

In what, then, does confusion consist? Locke's answer is:

> Every idea a man has being visibly what it is and distinct from all other ideas but itself, that which makes it confused is when it is such that it may as well be called by another name as that which it is expressed by; the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked under those two different names) distinct and makes some of them belong rather to the one, and some of them to the other of those names being left out; and so the distinction which was intended to be kept up by those different names is quite lost.[26]

As illustrations of this "nominalistic" confusion Locke gives the following:

[24] Book II, 294. Italics mine.

[25] Book II, 29:4. Italics mine.

[26] Book II, 29:6.

> He that has an idea made up of barely the simple ones of a beast with spots has but a confused idea of a leopard.[27]

Again:

> There is nothing properer to make us conceive this confusion than a sort of pictures usually shown as surprising pieces of art wherin the colors as they are laid by the pencil on the table itself mark out very odd and unusual figures and have no discernible order in their position. This draught thus made up of parts wherein no symmetry or order appears is *in itself* no more a confused thing than a picture of a cloudy sky; wherein though there be as little order of colors or figures to be found, yet nobody thinks it a confused picture. What is it then that makes it be thought confused since the want of symmetry does not? As it is plain it does not; for another draught made barely in imitation of this could not be called confused. I answer, that which makes it be thought confused is the applying it to some name to which it does no more discernedly belong than to some other; e.g. when it is said to be the picture of a man or Caesar, then any one with reason counts it confused; because it is not discernible in that state to belong more to the name man or Caesar than to the name baboon or Pompey; which are supposed to stand for different ideas from those signified by man or Caesar. But when a cylindrical mirror, placed right, hath reduced those irregular lines, on the table into their due order and proportion, then the confusion ceases, and the eye presently sees that it is a man, or Caesar, i.e. that it belongs to those names; and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a baboon, or Pompey, i.e. from the ideas signified by those names. Just thus it is with our ideas, which are as it were the pictures of things. No one of these mental draughts, however the parts are put together, can be called confused, (for they are plainly discernible as they are) till it be ranked under some ordinary name, to which it cannot be discerned to belong, any more than it does to some other name of an allowed different signification.[28]

Reviewing the above account, we find that the first thing it does is to exclude the character of confusion from all simple ideas. For, while the formal definition given at the start applies to any idea, when he goes on to state what it is that keeps an idea from being "sufficiently different from another idea from which it *ought* to be different," Locke says it is due to "lack of a proper combination of simple ideas under a given name."

[27] Book II, 29:7.

[28] Book II, 29: 8.

There can be, then, no confusion attaching to the simple ideas themselves, since it is their improper combination that gives rise to confusion. Locke nearly recognizes this in saying, parenthetically, that "it is *complex* ideas that are *most liable* to confusion."

Limiting confusion, then, to the complex idea, Locke is still unable to make it an attribute of the idea itself, but must make it a relation of the idea to the name. The reason an idea is not different enough from another idea from which it *"ought"* to be more different is, Locke says, because the *name* of the latter can be applied to the former, or conversely. This is Locke's explanation of the "ought," the naïve use of which at the very start makes his definition thoroughly functional and affords another good illustration of how the functional character of thought finds instinctive expression.

The "ought," then, as indicating that confusion aries in the failure of a response to *some demand,* could not be bettered. But we have to inquire, however, whether the failure is due simply to one's idea not being different enough from another to prevent the *name* of the latter from being applied to it.

Taking Locke's first illustration, he says the idea of a spotted beast is a confused idea of a leopard, since it is not distinguished from several other sorts of beasts that are spotted. From this account the idea must be as much a confused idea of the "several other sorts" as of a leopard. Now, it is to be noted that Locke does not say the idea of a beast with spots is *in itself* confused. He says only that it is the confused idea of a leopard or lynx or panther. That is to say, the idea "spotted beast" is not confusing, so long as that idea is adequate to guide and control action, *i.e.,* so long as the result we are after, for example the animal's skin, demands only that the beast be spotted. But if the result aimed at be more defined, if the skin must be of a certain size and the spots of certain size and arrangement, then the idea "spotted beast" is not confused, but confusing – confusing to the *action; i.e.,* the action cannot proceed under direction of *that* idea. This is what Locke means when he says the idea of a spotted beast is "a confused idea of a leopard." It is confusing to action when the action demands the definite idea of a leopard instead of the more general one "spotted beast."

On the other hand, if the action in order to move forward to the desired result demands only the idea " spotted beast" to guide it, the idea "leopard" would be equally confusing. Thus, to put it in Locke's own terms, confusion may arise in this case as well from the presence of *too many* as of "too few" simple ideas in the complex one. If what is needed is the idea of a beast with spots, any further definition in the idea would tend to switch the action from the main issue, or allow opportunities to go by. Even in this case the idea "spotted beast" is confusing, because it

offers so rich a variety of action – of discharge. Locke says in this case the confusion is due to "too few simple ideas in the complex one"; because in his idea built up from given simples the intention is in inverse ratio to the extension. Locke's concept is merely the abstract phase of the concept substituted for the whole.

Strictly speaking, we are not entitled to say, as we have just said above, in trying to state the case as nearly as possible in Locke's terms, that the idea of a spotted beast is confusing when a leopard or a lynx is what is wanted. For, if the leopard is what is really wanted, then that idea is there, and there is no confusion. The fact is that when there is confusion it is not due to some wrong idea taking possession and keeping the action clogged; it is due rather to the lack of any stable idea. The idea "spotted beast" does not persist and keep up the confusion. There is confusion because no definite idea can stay formed. The moment the ideational process itself comes to a focus, the confusion is ended. Locke comes near to stating this when he says: "A third defect that frequently gives the name 'confused' to our ideas is when any one of them is *uncertain* or *undetermined,*"[29] but adds that this confusion still is due to the idea's relation to the name "because a mutable idea (if we will allow it to be *one* idea) cannot belong to one name rather than another, and so loses the distinction that distinct names stand for." The clause in parenthesis Is the significant one from our standpoint, since it shows that the confusion reigns during, what Locke is almost on the point of calling, the ideating *process*.

Locke's formal definition of confusion as due to application of names is not, then, the one really at work in his further account. This he finds in the relation of the idea to the act. The attributing of confusion to naming simply transfers the problem, or rather restates it in other terms. Why, when we *know* that the term "spotted beast" is applicable to leopard, lynx, and so forth, should it be confusing? The fact is that it would be confusing if it were not so applicable, for that is just what is expected when the idea "spotted beast" is actually in use. Here Locke is finding the source of confusion in the universal character of the idea and name, whereas it is just this character that delivers us from confusion, since it is that which unifies what would otherwise be a chaotic activity, into a definite channel of discharge.

[29] Book II, 29:9. Italics mine.

VII
Adequate and Inadequate Ideas

Locke distinguishes the adequate idea from the real idea. As formally defined, the real idea is one to which there is something corresponding in some way in the world of things. Adequate ideas are "those which *perfectly* represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from, which it *intends* them to stand for, and to which it refers them."[30] An idea way thus be real and still be inadequate. For, while it may *correspond* to something in the world of things, it may not *perfectly represent* it.

First, Locke continues, the simple ideas are adequate "because being nothing but the effects of *powers* in things . . . they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers." Here the adequacy is that of the cause to its effect. It is in no sense adequacy as a copy.

Second, turning to the complex ideas, the modes and relations are all found to be adequate, because they have no archetypes, and consequently, "not being in tended for copies of things really existing but for archetypes to rank and dominate things by, they cannot want anything."[31]

Third, complex ideas of substances are all inadequate. For "desiring to copy things as they really do exist and to represent to ourselves that constitution on which all their properties depend, we perceive our ideas attain not that perfection which we intend."[32]

The problem here once more is to maintain a consiatent standard for adequacy and inadequacy, and the difficulty, as with the other distinctions, lies in the attempt to classify ideas without reference to their function in the judgment. In order to do this, Locke has again to seek some basis intrinsic in the idea as such. And yet, here too, as elsewhere, the functional character of the idea, that is, its character as a part of the process of reaching results, cannot be entirely suppressed. This appears, from the very start, in the part played in Locke's account by "*intention.*" As appears from the passages above quoted, in all three cases – that of the simple ideas, the complex modes and relations, and the ideas of substances – the inadequacy is defined, not as consisting in the mere lack of full agreement with the archetype, but in this lack when the full agreement is "*intended.*" The inadequacy, then, lies in the failure of the idea to do what it is *intended* to do; and agreement with the archetype is sim-

[30] Book II, 31:1. Italics mine.

[31] Book II, 32:2.

[32] Book II, 31:3.

ply a formal statement of *what* is intended. We say a formal statement, for further examination shows that Locke does not adhere to this as a statement even what is actually "intended."

In the first place, no agreement with an archetype is intended in the cases of modes and relations. For these there are no archetypes. True, this is just the ground of their perfect adequacy, according to Locke, but this adequacy is not that of an agreement with an archetype. In default of the archetype, Locke further finds the basis of adequacy in the fact that "the mind acquiesces in them, is *satisfied* in them, finds nothing wanting in them." To be sure, the ghost of the archetype does loom up in the background when Locke says that the reason for our satisfaction with the perfection of the idea "triangle" is that "the mind does not conceive that any understanding hath or can have a more complete or perfect idea of that thing it signifies by the word triangle, *supposing it to exist,* than itself has in that complex idea of three sides and three angles";[33] *i.e.,* there really is no archetype for the idea "triangle," yet we are satisfied with its adequacy, because, *supposing there were* such an archetype, we cannot conceive of a more perfect idea of it. It would seem we must regard this passage rather as a semi-figurative emphasis of the satisfaction felt in the idea than as a serious explanation of it. We shall return to the positive significance of this further on. Suffice it here to say that, had Locke given the matter one more turn, inferring the adequacy from the satisfaction instead of explaining the satisfaction from the adequacy, he would have gotten rid of the archetype altogether.

When we come to the treatment of the simple ideas and the ideas of substance, the agreement with the archetype seems equally unavailable as a standard of adequacy. In the first place, the criteria for the two classes are quite different. For the simple idea the archetype is merely the power in the thing which is supposed in some way to produce the idea in us, and the agreement is a mere correspondence, an abstract parallelism. But for the complex idea of substance, the kind of agreement intended is an exact copy of "things as they really do exist." Thus the simple idea by the *same standard* as the complex one is just as inadequate as the latter; and, conversely, the complex idea judged by the same standard as the simple idea, *i.e.,* that of mere abstract correspondence, is just as adequate. In other words, on the basis of the same "*intention*," both are equally adequate or inadequate. It is only by changing the intention that the one class remains adequate and the other inadequate.

Two further difficulties arise with the archetype as a standard of adequacy, in the case of the ideas of substance: (1) How is it to be known that the idea does not include in itself all the elements in the archetype,

[33] Book II, 31:3.

if there be not present already an idea of all of them? (2) Supposing it can be known in some way that the idea not only does not but cannot possibly agree with the archetype, how could such an agreement, known to be utterly impossible, continue to be "*intended*"?

This question calls for a word concerning the relation between knowledge and will. Professor James says:[34] "I will to write and the act follows. I will that the distant table slide over the floor towards me and it does not"; and yet, he says, "it is as true and good willing as when I will to write." Now, we do speak of willing or intending an event, for example, that the table shall be moved across the floor, without knowing what the steps in accomplishing it are to be; *i.e.,* the means to the end may be very generally and vaguely defined. However, just in proportion as the means are indefinite, the end is also undefined and tentative. To be sure, it is frequently said: "I intend to do so and so; I do not know *how* I am to do it, but I shall do it somehow." Now, an analysis of such a case shows that the very strength of the determination must involve belief in the *possibility* of the act, and therefore a conception of at least the range within which the means are to be found, though not necessarily a conception of their location and relation within that range. When the end begins to involve means outside this range, the act becomes at once, as Professor James defines it in the first part of his chapter on "Will," *wishing,* not willing. The intention of an act believed to be absolutely impossible seems, itself, to be both a logical and psychological impossibility. Professor James goes on to cite the case of the paralytic who intends to move his paralyzed limb. But does not the parylytic, here, forget his paralysis? Does he intend to move while thinking at the same time of the impossibility of the movement? And so does not the lunatic who intends to drink up the ocean think he sees a way to do it? In a footnote on the above passage, Professor James says: "The reason people find themselves unable to will the movement of the table is because they are unable to abstract from the thought of the impossibility of it" – a feat, he says, which he finds easy to perform. But it would seem that the kind of abstraction demanded here would amount to the paralytic's forgetfulness. In *consciously* abstracting from a content, we do not get rid of it as we do in forgetfulness. In conscious abstraction, the disregarding is but another way of regarding, while in forgetting, the content drops out entirely.

The bearing of this upon Locke's statement is as follows: The idea is never *"intended"* to do anything, because the idea *is* itself the intention to do; and the idea as intention is adequate or inadequate according as it is possible or impossible to act under its direction. The moment conflict

[34] *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 560.

occurs within the activity controlled by the idea, both the activity and the idea break down, and this constitutes the inadequacy of the whole act and of the idea as a part of it. Inadequacy cannot, therefore, get attached as an attribute to the isolated idea, for the moment the act breaks down, the idea also disintegrates.

Returning to Locke's example, the reason he finds the idea "gold" less adequate than the idea "triangle" is because the process of producing the full concrete experience "gold" has not been fully ideated, and is therefore not under full control. There are still involved in the experience of gold factors not yet analyzed out and brought to consciousness. The inadequacy of the idea "gold" means, therefore, that the present idea of gold does not include within it all the factors of the process of producing gold. It is only as related to some desired better way of producing the experience "gold" – *e.g.,* its production in the laboratory instead of digging for it – that the idea as at present constituted is inadequate.

Here, too, is the interpretation of the archetype. The archetype is just this unanalyzed part of the activity. It is that part of the process of production as yet uncontrolled by ideas. Let us note, too, that in Locke's account the inadequacy does not lie in the *lack* of correspondence with the archetype, but rather, speaking in Locke's terms, in the correspondence with it, *i.e.,* in the fact that there is an archetype at all for it to correspond with. For, as we have seen, the idea "triangle," which has perfect adequacy according to Locke, has no archetype; that is, there is no unanalyzed, unideated activity involved in it. The ideal and the real, *i.e.,* the archetype, have coalesced. Inadequacy, then, does not belong as a quality to the idea as a substance – as a psychical thing – but to the idea as a process. It means that the ideating process is not yet complete in the act of which it is a part.

VIII
Real and Fantastic Ideas

The treatment of ideas as true and false, real and fantastic, properly belongs, even from Locke's own standpoint, to Book IV, where ideas are treated as knowledge, that is, as elements in the judgment. Locke recognizes this in the case of the classification of ideas into "true and false," making the heading of the first paragraph in this chapter, "Truth and Falsehood. Properly Belong to Propositions." The same is true of "real and fantastic." However, as a sort of introduction to Book IV, we may comment briefly on this latter classification.

The "real" idea is one which conforms to its archetype; the "fantastic" is one which does not.[35] Only two classes of ideas have archetypes: (1) simple ideas must have, because they are not made by us, and therefore must have a source outside; (2) complex ideas of substances have archetypes just because they are ideas of substances; that is, because they are "made, all of them, in reference to things outside."[36] Mixed modes and relations cannot be said to have archetypes in the sense in which simple ideas and ideas of substances have, because they are wholly the work of the mind. Yet there are certain conditions under which they may be pronounced fantastic. These conditions, reversing Locke's order, are as follows: (1) To be real "they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the *name* that is given them, as if a man would give the name 'justice' to that which common use calls 'liberality.' But this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech than to reality of ideas."[36] (2) The simple ideas of which the mixed mode is composed must be consistent. And the standard of consistency Locke makes the "possibility of existing conformable to them."[37]

Once more we see that Locke does not succeed by a simple direct observation of the idea in discovering the attributes "real" and "fantastic" in the idea itself. They turn out to be, even on Locke's own showing, relations of the idea to the whole act in which it functions.

First, what one might call the "nominalistic reality" of the mixed modes, such as justice, liberality, etc., manifestly does not attach to the content, but to the *relation* of the idea to its *name*. The mixed mode in itself considered "is not capable of any deformity, being made with no

[35] Book II, 30:1.

[36] Book II, 30:5.

[37] Book II, 30:4.

reference to anything but itself."[38] Thus, as Green puts it, "in moral and mathematical knowledge, their ideality itself is the reality."[39]

The other test of reality as applied to the mixed mode is that it must be made up of consistent, simple ideas; but the test of consistency between these simple ideas is not found by any process of direct comparison, but is the "possibility of existing conformable to them." And if we apply this to the examples of mined modes which Locke is using as illustrations, viz., justice and liberality, "the possibility of existing conformable to them" seems to translate into "the possibility of using the idea in reaching some result;" *i.e.,* '"the possibility of existing conformable" to it means the possibility of acting conformably to it, and the only conformity there can be between an act and an idea is that the latter be a part of the act.

The meaning of "conformity to existence" comes out more explicitly in discussing the reality of the simple ideas and the ideas of substance. After stating that reality consists in conformity to the archetype, Locke's next step is to interpret this conformity. This implies, not a copy, nor even resemblance, but a mere connection, "a steady correspondence" with the power in the thing which produces the idea. The passage reads:

> … For these several appearances being designed to be the mark whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with, our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters whether they be only constant effects, or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves; the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings. But whether they answer to those constitutions, as to causes or patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by them. And thus our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them in our minds; that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not fictions at pleasure… .[40]

Thus, so far as the simple idea is concerned, the thing is simply a bundle of powers. Elsewhere, to be sure, these powers are reduced to atoms and molecules, but it is interesting to note how ideal the "thing" becomes even in Book II.

[38] Book II, 30:1.

[39] *Works*, Vol. I, pp. 94, 98. See also *Essay*, Book IV, 4:6.

[40] Book II, 30:2.

Now, the only way of knowing with *what* power in the thing the idea corresponds, Locke tells us in the next chapter, is to apply the idea in actual experiment and see how it works.

> We can never be sure we know all the powers in any one body until we have tried [under the direction of the idea] what changes it is fitted to give or receive from other substances in their several ways of application.[41]

This statement virtually transfers the power from the thing to the "real" idea. That is, the "real" idea as distinguished from the mere idea is the idea which will control action. Its reality lies, not in the mere *correspondence* with a power, but in the fact that it is the powerful, the efficient idea. The "real" idea becomes a "mere" idea when, having performed its function, the very action which it has unified and directed results in a new situation to which it is no longer adequate. So witches and goblins, the earth with the sun moving around it, are mere ideas, while the ideas of disease germs and the Copernican system are real ideas.

The reason Locke could not reverse his statement of the real idea, making it the idea which gives power instead of the idea which a power gives, was that the power of the idea was as yet for Locke unconscious power. The power in the Idea had not yet been analyzed out, and so was located externally, just as the baby locates his feet externally until he pushes the analysis of his sensations and movements farther. And the reason the power of the idea had not yet come to consciousness lay in the fact that the new scientific movement had not been in progress long enough to get hold of its own method. Construction was still interpreted as a mere "finding," a mere discovery of facts that had always been lying about, but, hitherto, unnoticed.

Concerning the reality of the complex idea of substance Locke here says:

> Our complex ideas of substance being made all of them in reference to things existing without us, and intended to be representations of substances, as they really are, are no further real, than as they are such combinations of simple ideas as are *really united,* and *co-exist in things* without us. On the contrary those are fantastical which are made up of such collections of simple ideas as were really never united, never were *found together* in any substance.[42]

[41] Book II, 31:8. Brackets mine.

[42] Book II, 30:5. Italics mine.

The full discussion of the psychology of the "thing" in relation to the idea occurs in the treatment of Book IV. It will suffice here to point out a difficulty from Locke's standpoint, and the functional implication. If Locke means here that the combination of simple ideas which make up the complex one is *found* as a *combination* in the thing, then he abandons, as was pointed out in the discussion of simple and complex ideas, his definition of complex idea as a mental construct and makes it as given as the simple idea. Further, Locke, of course, has trouble in testing this agreement of the complex idea with the thing. In the "particular" case the test is "the observation of the senses." In the "general" case it is the necessary connection of the simple ideas themselves constituting the complex one.

> For this co-existence (between the idea and the thing) can be no further known than it is perceived: and it cannot be perceived but either in particular cases, by the observation of the senses, or, in *general by the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves*.[43]

Here, in the "general" case, which is the one for which the appeal to the thing is really made, instead of testing the reality of the idea by the thing, the reality of the thing is tested by character of the idea. This means essentially that "thing" is simply a name for the conditions of an efficient idea – an idea which can direct action to the realization of desired ends.

[43] Book IV, 3:14.

IX
Essence

In Locke's treatment of "Essence" in Book III the functional nature of the idea gets an almost explicit recognition. The chapter abounds in passages which might serve as excellent statements of the thoroughly functional character of thought. Take such a passage as this:

> It is evident then that the mind by its free choice gives a connexion to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no more union with one another than others that it leaves out: why else is the part of the weapon, the beginning of the wound is made with, taken notice of to make the distinct species called stabbing, and the figure and matter of the weapon left out? I do not say this is done without reason, as we shall see more by and by: but this I say, that it is done *by the free choice of the mind, pursuing its own ends;* and that, therefore, these species of mixed modes are the *workmanship of the understanding*: and there is nothing more evident than that, for the most part, in the framing these ideas, the wind searches not its patterns in nature, nor refers the ideas it makes to the real existence of things, but puts such together as may *best serve its own purposes,* without tying itself to a precise imitation of anything that really exists.[44]

It will be observed that it is the complex abstract ideas that constitute the "nominal," *i.e.,* the teleological as opposed to the "real" essence; the simple ideas as the material of the combinations being still given. And this, as Green says, "is what renders the immortal third book such a web of contradictions." In Book II, while the complex ideas are formally defined as those "made by the mind," in the further discussion it turns out that all those of substances "which have most to do with the affairs of life" are "*found* in things." But here the antithesis is sharply drawn. Essence, in the only sense in which we can know or make any use of it, is wholly a construction "made by the mind pursuing its own ends." To be sure, the ghost of the unknown "real essence" hovers in the background, enough to frighten these "ends" from pre-empting the whole field, but it is almost recognized as a ghost. And such recognition is always the beginning of the ghost's end. Further on, it is true, the ghost again assumes decidedly substantial proportions, but that it is not in good standing here is shown in such passages as the following:

[44] Book III, 5:6. Italics mine.

> The supposition of essences that cannot be known, and the making of them, nevertheless, to be that which distinguishes the species of things, is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any part of our knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and content ourselves with such essences of the sorts or species of things as come within the reach of our knowledge.[45]

Such passages show the influence of the scientific movement upon the philosophic thought of Locke's time. But as yet the latter was not conscious of this influence and of its significance. Hence such thoroughly functional characterizations of essence as the one just quoted side by side with the old scholastic interpretations. It is not our purpose here to trace out all these inconsistencies of statement. Green has left very little to be done in that direction. We are concerned with only those contradictions and inconsistencies which show most clearly the outcropping of the teleological vein. We shall not, therefore, follow Locke in all his oscillations between the real and nominal essence, but shall confine our observations to his treatment of the nominal essence as teleological, and its bearings on other parts of the *Essay*.

The passages above quoted show clearly that Locke felt the discrepancy between the old scholastic fixed essences and the kind of essence demanded by life that was moving as life then was. He sees that in order to be an instrument adapted to practical needs the essence must be constructed with reference to those needs. A tool in order to be an efficient instrument of construction must itself be constructed with reference to the particular work it is to do. But while Locke felt the inadequacy of the scholastic essence and the need of a working essence, he was neither able to locate exactly the difficulty in the old conception of essence, nor to realize fully the character and function of the new. This appears in his account of both (1) *why* and (2) *how* the essence is constructed.

As to the motive for constructing the essence, Locke says:

> They [the ideas of essence] are always made for convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language . . . it suffices that men make and name so many complex ideas of these mixed modes as they find occasion to have names for in the ordinary occurrences of their affairs.[46]

[45] Book III, 3:17.

[46] Book III, 5:7.

While the essence is thus made thoroughly functional, it is so, not because it is a part of the functional process of ideation, but as a sort of secondary process, through which ideas already *given* are taken, in order to make them ready for communication. In other words, all the work of abstraction and synthesis takes place, according to Locke, to meet the practical needs of communication only. But even so, they are processes performed *upon* ideas, and are not involved in idealization as such. How this making the secondary process functional virtually carries with it the functional construction of the primary given ideas will be pointed out in the account of the method of constructing the essence.

The significant point in this statement of the motive for constructing essence is the relation of thought to language and communication. As the statement reads, the essence idea is constructed merely as a matter of economy of time and energy in communicating with our fellows. Even for this it does not appear essential. Aside from the use of language as a means of communication, Locke sees no demand for ideas of essence.

Here again, in the external character of the relation between the idea and language, the merely formal character of Locke's functional interpretation of essence appears. Now, perhaps there is a sense in which "communication" may be regarded as creating the *demand* for language as the carrier of thought. But it is a sense which includes communication with one's self, that is, the very process of thinking itself. In this sense thought must be "communicated," that is, embodied in language, as well in one's own thinking as in communing with another. In this connection, Bosanquet says:

> The "convention" or agreement which has been said to give language its meaning, would be the same thing between other persons and me that the employment of significant signs is between me, so to speak, and myself. It is as wonderful and as much a proof of "convention," that is, of the power to "agree" that "goodness" should mean the same to me yesterday and today, as that in this sentence it should mean the same to me and my reader.[47]

In this broad sense, language, therefore, is not the carrier of thought merely as communicated to another, but of thought as thought. If idealization is the process in which a reduced form of an act carries the value, the meaning of the whole, and if language is fundamentally this reduced form, then language is an inherent part of the idealizing process. Usually, even where language is defined as "a reduced form of an act," it is not recognized that it becomes *by that very fact* the carrier of the idea. It is

[47] *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 15.

usually spoken of as if being a survival of past action, and, useless as present action, it were conveniently pressed into service as "a sign of ideas." But the reason it can serve as the sign of an idea, as the carrier of meaning, is just because *the meaning is the value of the whole, of which the sign is the reduced form*. The fact that in even a majority of particular cases now no qualitative similarity between the sign and the meaning directly appears is not against, but rather for, the principle. It means that, in its function as a sign, the less qualitative value an act has in itself, the better sign it is. In so far as it is of interest in itself, it fails to point away from itself, which is just the business of a sign. The arbitrary character of language means, therefore, that these reduced forms have been perfected in their function as *signs* by dropping out their value in themselves. It does not mean a fundamental divorce between thought and language. It is the case again of a greater structural separation for the sake of greater functional unity.

The process of constructing. the nominal (or functional) essence is, Locke says, one of "leaving out those qualities peculiar to each [individual] and retaining a complex idea made up of those that are common to them all."[48] First, we may note again that the simple idea is here practically as much under control, therefore functional, as the essence idea itself. Indeed, it must be so in order that the essence idea may be constructed. In Book II Locke says the simple idea is one the mind cannot make for itself and, cannot help having in the presence of the object. But here the mind leaves it out at will, and thus practically makes and unmakes it. Of course, Locke would say – in fact he has said – that this is merely a matter of shifting attention. The idea is *there* all the time. The individual object, on the other hand, which is here so complex that the complex idea of essence is abstracted from it with all the "peculiar ideas" to spare, is regarded as given! Thus again the simple and complex have changed places, and this because, the distinction of simple and complex being one of use, the same content may function as either simple or complex. Hence the contradiction when the distinction is made one of fixed content.

The main point for us here, however, is the fact that in making the essence, the universal, functional, a functional interpretation of the individual is involved, and in this wise. Locke says that the essence is constructed by leaving out the peculiar and retaining the common qualities of a number of individuals. To know which are common we have but to inspect the individuals and tabulate. Now, this is well enough so long as the group of simple ideas constituting the individual stays

[48] Book III, 6:32.

fixed and given, as they are here regarded as doing. But in chap. 6 Locke insists most strenuously that this group of qualities constituting the individual can be kept fixed *only with reference to this very essence*. The passage should be given in full:

> 4. That essence, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to *sorts,* and that it is considered in particular beings no further than as they are ranked into sorts, appears from hence; that, take but away the abstract ideas by which we sort *individuals,* and rank them under common names, and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly vanishes; *we have no notion of the one without the other,* which plainly shows their relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am; God and nature has made me so; but there is nothing I have is essential to me. An accident or disease may very much alter my colour or shape; a fever or fall may take away my reason or memory or both, and an apoplexy leave neither sense nor understanding, no, nor life. Other creatures of my shape may be made with more and better, or fewer and worse faculties than I have; and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body very different from mine. *None of these are essential to the one or the other, of any individual whatever, till the mind refers it to some sort or species of things*; and then presently, according to the abstract idea of that sort, something is found essential. Let any one examine his own thoughts and he will find that as soon as he supposes or speaks of essential, the consideration of some species, or the complex idea signified by some general name comes into his mind; and it is in reference to that that this or that quality is said to be essential. So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me or any other particular corporeal being to have reason? I say, no; no more than it is essential to this white thing I write on to have words in it. But if that particular being be to be counted of the *sort* man, and to have the name man given it, then reason is essential to it, supposing reasons to be a part of the complex idea the name man stands for; as it is essential to this thing I write on to contain words if I will give it the name treatise, and rank it under that species. So that essential and not essential relate only to our abstract ideas, and the names annexed to them; which amounts to no more than this, that whatever particular thing has not in it those qualities which are contained in the abstract idea which any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that species nor be called by that name, since that abstract idea is the very essence of that species.[49]

[49] Book III, 6:4. Italics mine.

From this it appears that the individuals in order to be constant enough to furnish a group of common attributes must be kept so by this very teleological essence for which they are supposed to be furnishing the elements. Thus the individual is no less and no more functional than the essence – the universal – since each is necessary to the other.

It is the effect of this functional interpretation of the essences or universal upon the individual that finally forces Locke back upon the unknown real essence. In admitting the practical character of the essence idea, Locke has thereby so reduced the individual to a "merely practical" affair that it is about to lose what, theoretically, still constitutes for him true ultimate reality as opposed to merely "practical" reality. It did not, it could not, occur to Locke, with his heritage of scholasticism and his lack of science, in the modern sense of that term, that *the practical reality* might itself be the *ultimate* reality.

X
Locke's View of Knowledge in Book IV

In Book IV Locke comes to close quarters with his problem. The ideas which in Books II and III have been analyzed and classified as the mere material for knowledge are now to be transformed into knowledge. We have seen some of the difficulties Locke encountered in attempting to describe and classify this material apart from its use. In general, this difficulty was the lack of any basis for his distinctions and classifications. Simplicity and complexity, distinctness and confusion, adequacy and inadequacy, were all found to be, not qualities of the ideas as independent existences, but modes of the functioning of ideas in the act of judgment. From this we should expect to find a correlative difficulty in any attempt to transform ideas into knowledge; the difficulty again of finding any criterion of validity for knowledge thus constituted. The process of transforming ideas into knowledge, as Locke first states it, is one of combining these ideas "according as they agree or disagree."[50] However, in the statement of the kinds of agreement and disagreement – viz., identity or diversity, relation, coexistence, and real existence – which Locke at once makes, he introduces in the last class a sort of agreement and disagreement difficult to bring under the general statement. The agreement or disagreement of "real existence" is the agreement or disagreement, not of ideas with each other, but with "things without the mind." To be sure, Locke says that he will use idea as meaning either "an image in the mind" or "qualities in the object." But, as Green observes, this confession of the equivocation does not prevent its consequences, which are nothing less than the entire web of difficulties into which Locke later falls.

We have, then, these two definitions of the judgment to consider: one stating it to be "the agreement or disagreement of ideas with each other" as they are "in the mind," the other defining it as "the agreement or disagreement of ideas" with "things without the mind." The whole of Book IV turns on these two definitions of knowledge and their relations to each other. We shall see how Locke, starting with the conception of knowledge as the agreement or disagreement of ideas with each other, is forced into the other conception, is then driven back to the first, and concludes with an external division of territory between the two conceptions; each conception, however, still denying the claims of the other.

[50] Book IV, 1:2.

Beginning with the definition of knowledge with which Locke starts – "the agreement or disagreement of ideas with each other" – we must ask at once: What is meant by "agreement or disagreement," and what is their criterion? Locke's illustrations are as follows:

> When we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive that these two ideas do not agree? When we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive that equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three angles of a triangle?[51]

If the disagreement here means only that the idea "white" is not the idea "black," but simply that they are different ideas, since judgment, according to Locke, involves two ideas, every judgment would have to express this much and this kind of disagreement. Even the triangle judgment, which is given as example of agreement, must, to have any meaning, possess this much disagreement. Unless the ideas "triangle" and "two right angles" are different ideas, there could be, according to Locke, no judgment. Again, the problem here, as in Books II and III, is: So long as we are considering a set of ideas, regarded as so many psychical "things," what possible basis is there for agreement or disagreement? Each idea is simply there – a definite and fixed existence. White is white; black is black; that is the end of it. There can be no meaning in either opposition or agreement. Here Locke has come upon the problem of "unity and difference," of "the one and the many," essentially in the form in which the Greeks and in which his contemporary, Spinoza, encountered it. And his difficulty is the same as theirs. In any given content, whether conceived as "psychical" or "physical" or as an abstract "substance," which is both or neither, there appears no way of reconciling these categories. Two "things," psychical or physical, cannot become one, nor one become two, nor can they agree or disagree as "things." They can, however, have a functional unity as factors working to a common end.

Locke's acknowledgment of this appears in the conclusion, which he is not long in reaching, that this sort of agreement and disagreement, except in the case of mathematical and moral judgments,[52] yields only "trifling knowledge." It is very "certain" knowledge, to be sure, but it is as "useless"

[51] Book IV, 1:2.

[52] This exception of mathematical and moral judgments Green calls "a special act of grace." It has, however, a positive significance from Locke's own standpoint which will be noted further on.

as it is certain. All judgments concerning substances – and these are the judgments which, Locke says, "have most to do with the affairs of life" – must consist, not merely of a reference of ideas to each other, but of a reference to "real existence" – to "things."

> Gold is malleable is true and certain; but there is here nothing affirmed of gold but that that sound stands for an idea in which malleability is contained and such a sort of truth and certainty as this it is to say a centaur is fourfooted.[53]

And again:

> It will be altogether as true a proposition to say all centaurs are animals, as that all men are animals; and the certainty of one as great as the other. For in both propositions the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds; and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and visible to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man; and so these two propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such truth to us?[54]

It is, then, in the attempt to keep the judgment in its place in "the conduct of life" that Locke is forced to his second statement of it. From his idealistic standpoint Locke might say here that having ideas is a very important part of living. He might go even further and say that all else is for the sake of having ideas. But even so, it still may be that this ideal content, supreme in worth, must get its worth as a part of a larger whole. To use a somewhat Kantian figure, if thought be king, still must the king serve.

The second definition of the judgment to which Locke is driven by this necessity of making thought a factor, a function rather, in larger process, is as follows:

> Wherever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas there is *certain* knowledge; and wherever we are sure those ideas agree with reality of things there is certain *real* knowledge.[55]

[53] Book IV, 6:9.

[54] Book IV, 5:7.

[55] Book IV, 4:18. Italics mine.

As stated above, it is not the aim here to trace up the entire web of internal inconsistencies and difficulties which Locke weaves from this point. It is enough for present purposes to point out some of the well-known problems and their significance from the standpoint of the discussion.

Continuing the sketch of Locke's experience with this second statement of the judgment, an especially acute difficulty arises at once in reconciling it with his previous description of ideas of substances. These have been described as "complex," and, therefore, made by the mind out of given simple ones. Allowing for the moment the simple ideas to represent in some way "real existences," how can these mind-made combinations preserve such a correspondence, to say nothing of being "copies of things as they really are"? Locke begins his treatment of this problem by simply giving up at first the mind-made character of the complex idea.

> Herein therefore is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances that all our complex ideas of them must be such and such only as are made up of such simple ones *as have been discovered to co-exist in nature*. . . . Whatever simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance these we may with confidence join together again; for whatever have once had an union in nature, may be united again.[56]

Taken as they stand, these passages, as many others similar, make the judgment given outright. Locke, too, soon discovers this, and modifies the case by regarding the connection of ideas as given only as a *suggestion* – as an hypothesis, whose complete agreement with things has yet to be found by "further observation of the senses." This, however, brings more difficulties than ever. If this connection of ideas is suggested by the thing, how can there be any need of verification? If the connection be really in the thing, why and how should the thing ever suggest a wrong combination of ideas? And, waiving this, how is it to be known when this connection of ideas has been truly found? How is one to know when one has observed long enough to be sure of it? In other words, what is the test of verification?

These questions do not greatly trouble Locke in what he calls the "present instance" or the "particular case." One who does not know a thing when he sees it is for Locke a subject for psychiatry rather than epistemology. But when he attempts to find the universal in this kind of a particular case, he comes into great difficulty, and ends by pronouncing the discovery impossible. He finds that this verification through sensation yields certainty "only while the sensation lasts."

[56] Book II, 4:12. Italics mine.

> If I saw such a collection of simple ideas as is wont to be called man existing together one minute since and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now since there is no necessary connection of his existence a minute since with his existence now… . And therefore though it be highly probable that millions of men do now exist this is but probability not knowledge.[57]

When we ask after the ground of this probability, Locke refers us, metaphysically, now to the thing as "Real Essence," now to the "uniformity of nature," and finally to the Deity. Psychologically he refers us, in a sort of parenthetical passage, to that which Hume is to make his corner-stone, the principle of habit. But Locke sees that, as he conceives them, all these grounds lie outside the process of knowledge, and hence constitute no logical ground of probability. He concludes by saying that "certainty [*i.e.* logical certainty] in these matters we must not pretend to." There is, however, a "practical certainty" which is "enough for the purposes of life."

The outcome is, then, that the second class of judgments, those which "have most to do with the affairs of life," are not judgments at all in the sense of knowledge. They are guesses which have a practical value guaranteed by some outside power. There is no inner connection between the subject and predicate, such as there must be in a judgment worthy the name of "knowledge." In this conclusion the opposition between theoretical certainty, on the one hand, and efficiency in the conduct of life, on the other, comes into full relief. The judgment that will stand the test of knowledge is, with the exception of mathematical and moral propositions, "trifling." The useful judgment is theoretically uncertain. Most of the affairs of life, then, are to be conducted on judgments which cannot be called knowledge.

> He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him, he that will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do, but sit still and perish.[58]

That is to say, we are willing, nay, we must stake our lives on such judgments as "gold is soluble in aqua regia," but with no more logical warrant than upon the throw of a die. Knowledge is to be sought for the conduct of life. But most of the affairs of life are found to be conducted on probability; and "probability is not knowledge."

[57] Book IV, 11:8.

[58] Book IV, 14:1.

As Kant saw, at the root of all these difficulties and of this final paradox lies, in psychological terms, a lack of organic connection between sensation and ideas; in logical terms, a want of connection between subject and predicate – the lack of an organic copula. The distinction and confusion of simple and complex ideas; Locke's insistence on the "trifling proposition" as the type of knowledge; the uncertainty of the useful judgment; the final appeal to the real essence and the Deity as the ground of probability – these all arise from this lack of connection, and at the same time are attempts to supply it. Thus Locke's first attempt to find knowledge in the connection of ideas is precisely an attempt to establish the connection between subject and predicate by bringing them together in a common process. With the subject given by the thing and the predicate given by the mind, Locke is unable to effect a connection, hence he attempts to state the entire judgment in terms of ideas – *i.e.,* in terms of the predicate only. This is, of course, an attempt to get a unity by leaving out one of the factors to be unified. The result is a "trifling" judgment – "trifling," because it really is not a judgment at all. It is merely a predicate without a subject, a "what" without a "this." Locke felt that by getting both his subject and predicate into terms of the one process of ideation he had the kind of unity demanded in knowledge. He finds instead that he has a unity which will admit of no differences or differences that will admit no unity. That is, once more, if the ideas are really different in meaning, then one can never agree with the other in the sense in which Locke understands agreement – in the sense of one being a copy of the other. If there is no difference in meaning, then the predicate merely repeats the subject. The tenacity with which Locke holds to these "trifling propositions" as the type of knowledge shows an underlying sense of the need of unity with which Locke is not usually credited.

Locke's second statement of the judgment as "the agreement or disagreement of ideas with things" is then his attempt to supply the predicate – the connection of ideas – with a subject. He is taking up again the factor discarded in the first definition. It must be observed here – a point that frequently escapes notice – that in this second statement, as he first makes it, Locke means by this agreement with "things" the reference, in quite the modern fashion, of this entire connection of ideas – "gold-soluble-in-aqua-regia" – as one ideal content to a reality beyond themselves. Locke's ideal content, to be sure, does not have the unity which Mr. Bradley's has in his definition of the judgment as "the reference of an ideal content to a reality beyond the act."[59] Locke's ideal content is still a compound. But in so far as it is a reference to a "reality

[59] *Principles of Logic*, p. 10.

beyond the act" for a subject, the two statements agree. It may be noted that there is also a second statement of the judgment in Mr. Bradley's logic, in which it is defined as "the reference of an ideal content to reality as it *appears* in perception."[60] Here, as in Locke, the change in statement is made in the process of trying to work reality and idea into a closer organic connection. The movement, however, is from the opposite side of the problem. In the second statement Locke is getting his ideas into touch with reality in the form of the "thing" as sensation, while Mr. Bradley is getting reality into touch with the ideas by having it "*appear* in perception."

Forced by the trifling character of the judgment as first defined into seeing the general necessity of getting his ideal content realized – of finding a true subject for the judgment – the details of the problem are now to be dealt with, At this point Locke, also, declares that this reality – the "thing" – must appear in sensation. Here Locke feels, too, though he does not, of course, recognize it, precisely the same problem with which modern logic is wrestling. If the thing *appears* in sensation, it is yet not *known* except through the connection of ideas. Indeed, it cannot get even an appearance, as Kant saw most of the time, except through the ideal content; *i.e.,* through the connection of ideas. Moreover, there is still no connection yet established between the sensation and ideas whereby the interpretation of the former by the latter has any guarantee. The old question of how the connection of ideas is to "represent" this reality appearing in sensation seems still competent.

Locke's procedure at this point is as significant as it is naïve. This is where he discovers that reality – the "thing" – gives not only sensation, but the connection of ideas as well. This is where the ideas are "found together in things." It is significant here that, instead of connecting reality with ideas through sensation, Locke connects sensation and ideas through reality. In other words, reality – the thing – instead of being the subject, is here the copula of the judgment. However, Locke cannot hold this position very long, because, with his conception of reality as an already constructed thing or system of things, he finds that his formulation makes the entire judgment absolutely "found" in the thing, just as the first judgment was found in the mind. That is, Locke finds that he has simply exchanged the "trifling" judgment composed of "ideas in the mind" for another equally "trifling," composed of a connection of ideas "found" in the thing. It is true, Locke does not, as he ought consistently, find this judgment given by the thing "trifling"; but he does find it "uncertain." This, however, shows that he does not continue to regard the ideas as really "found together in the thing." If he did, his problem

[60] *Ibid.,* pp. 50ff. Italics mine.

would be, not to find certainty, but to account for the uncertainty, the doubt, the struggle, involved in the attainment of knowledge. There should be no difficulty in the agreement of ideas with the thing if they really were found in it. What could they do but agree?

Locke's real problem here, therefore, is not to reach certainty on this basis, but to change the basis in order to prevent the judgment from being "found" ready made, either "in the mind" or "in the thing." He must once more introduce the doubt and struggle which so manifestly belongs to the process of knowledge. Locke's way of doing this is very simple. He says in effect that this ideal content is still given by the thing through sensation, but given at first only as a suggestion, as an hypothesis, whose agreement with things must be found through "further observation of the senses." This is, of course, equivalent to saying that it is partly given and partly constructed; which, again, is saying that it is given, yet not given. It opens the old breach between sensation and the ideas, and all the old difficulties at once appear. Even if the sensations, given by the thing, can, in some way, call out or suggest a wrong connection of ideas, there is the further question of what accounts for the appearance of one connection of ideas rather than any other as a "trial predicate." The appeal to past experience does not help; for just *this* sensation and connection of ideas, *i.e.,* "gold-soluble-in-aqua-regia," has never occurred before. On the other hand, if such a connection really has been made hard and fast by habit, then again, whence the uncertainty and possibility of mistakes in the present case?

These difficulties suggest in passing that one source of the ambiguity in passive empiricism, whether of the sensational or rational type, is in making its analysis of experience from the standpoint of the past, or rather from the present looking toward the past; and toward the past regarded as consisting of a series of definite experiences, to terms of which the present can be reduced. Of course, any account of knowledge must appeal to the past; but if the point of view is taken in the present looking to the *future* as well as to the past, one forms quite a different conception of the past, of habit, and its connection with present demands.

These problems involved in Locke's conception of the formation of the hypothesis follow him, of course, in his account of verification. His first statement is that the connection of ideas, "gold-soluble-in-aqua-regia," having been stimulated in some way by reality through sensation, is to be verified by "further observation of the senses." But if sensation begins by stimulating a doubtful connection of ideas, what guarantee is there that more sensation will not make matters worse? Why should it not simply give rise to ideas as doubtful as the first? Or, conversely, if the further sensations reveal reality, why should not the first do so? What is

the difference between the sensations producing uncertainty and those resulting in verification?

Locke, of course, did not raise the question in this form. But he answers it by saying, in effect, that the difference between the sensations producing doubt and those bringing certainty is simply the difference between the incomplete and the complete, between the partial and the whole experience. The reality as it appears in the beginning of the experience is partial; hence the ideas stimulated by it are partial. In the further sensation more reality is given, and the ideas are reconstructed accordingly.

But now comes the question with which passive empiricism, sensational and rational, has so much difficulty; viz., the question of a standard for this completeness. If further sensation keeps on giving more reality and this stimulates further reconstruction of ideas, at what point is verification reached? Locke's feeling of these difficulties finds expression in his confession that this verification is valid only while the sensation lasts; and this, of course, is a confession of no verification at all.

Stating the case in logical terms, Locke here starts by supposing the problem of verification to be all on the side of the predicate. The subject is given in sensation; the problem is to find the predicate for it, just as in the first statement of the judgment the problem was to find the subject. And, as in the latter case Locke found that there was no meaning in or basis for the connection of ideas constituting the predicate apart from the missing subject, so here the subject has no content except through the predicate. Hence Locke is in the position of trying to find a predicate to agree with the subject, which latter cannot be known except through the former. In other words, the subject is just as much in doubt, just as much in need of "verification," as the predicate. Locke's expression of this is found in the fact that about half the time he states the difficulty as one of a want of unity in the ideal content itself, instead of a lack of its connection with things.

> The simple ideas whereof our complex ideas of substance, are made up, are, for the most part, such as carry with them *in their own nature* no visible necessary connection or inconsistency with any other simple ideas whose coexistence with them we would inform ourselves about.[61]

To be sure, this lack of unity in the ideal content is due to lack of agreement of the ideas with things. But even so, this implies that unity of the ideal content, if it could be reached, would mean that the subject

[61] Book IV, 3:9. Italics mine.

had been defined, and that there was no basis for a unity in the ideas, *i.e.*, in the predicate, outside this definition of the subject. Hence Locke's two statements of verification: one, as consisting in an agreement of ideas with each other – that is, in the construction of a predicate; the other, as the agreement of ideas with things – the defining of a subject. He does not see that it is both. Hence he tries alternately to make it one or the other. The reason he cannot make it both is that, with both subject and predicate developing together and with reality lying beyond the act of judging, Locke again has no way of determining when this development has reached a nodal point; no way of deciding when, in a particular case, the judging process has done its work.

Locke's account closes, then, with the confession that verification appears either needless or impossible. The final appeal to probability, based on the Real Essence, Nature, or the Deity, does not, of course, give any help on the logical problem. This Locke recognizes by refusing to call these "judgments of probability" knowledge.[62] They are merely practical devices whose value is guaranteed by some external power. On the other hand, in admitting the practical value of these judgments, Locke is confessing that there must be a kind of connection between the judgment and reality which he has not yet discovered. But it is to Locke's credit that he refused to the last to call judgments in which he could not *discover* this connection "knowledge."

Hume, as well as Kant, saw that in this final appeal to probability Locke's account of the judgment had simply "come full circle." On the supposition that life has something to do with reality, this final paradox of the practical value of the invalid judgment calls for the original question. In terms of Locke's illustration, this question is, again: Just what is the basis of the practical value of the judgment, "gold is soluble in aqua regia"? Whence the "practical" confidence in it? Here we are often warned that we must carefully distinguish between the logical and the psychological problem. We are admonished that confidence and validity are two quite different matters; and that the error of Locke, Hume, and Mill is precisely in mistaking the psychological for the logical ground of probability. Habit, in the sense in which Hume uses it, *i.e.*, as a repetition of instances, is often accepted as a sufficient psychological account of belief and probability, but rejected as a logical ground. But, unless we are to have an impassable dualism between our universal and

[62] In the *Essay* Locke reserves the term "judgment" entirely for these practical judgments as opposed to knowledge. "Thus the mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood: knowledge whereby it *certainly* perceives … the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, and judgment, which is the putting ideas together or separating them in the mind when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived but *presumed* to be so" (Book IV, 14:4).

individual, the considerations which make Hume's account of habit and Mill's multiplication of instances unavailable for logical purposes ought to tell equally against them as adequate psychological explanations. And, conversely, an adequate psychological account of probability ought to give the logical grounds. It is really Hume's psychology as well as his logic of expectation which breaks down. Habit, in the sense of a mere repetition of a given connection, offers no more psychological than logical ground of probability. If there is doubt to start with, repetition can only continue the doubt. Any addition of certainty, as Hume confesses, is a mystery. In what follows, therefore, we shall not be concerned with discriminating the psychological and logical parts of the account.[63]

Beginning with the sensation side of the problem, we find that the psychologist points out, first, that absence of sensation in activity means that the activity is in the habit or relatively mechanical form. By this he means a system of co-ordinated activities in which the activity at any moment seems to be an adequate stimulus to further activity. In this negative statement of sensation is implied its positive significance. As its absence means continuity of stimulation, so its presence means an interruption of this continuity. Here at the very outset we come once more upon Locke's crucial problem – *the source of this interruption.* If it be regarded as coming from without, if sensation means some utterly foreign force breaking in upon this habit system, then there seems to be no escape from the web in which Locke is caught. Whatever further difficulties of detail there may be, it seems that we must conceive this interruption as an inevitable outcome of the habit activity itself. Habit must carry in itself the conditions of its own interruption. But this is equivalent to saying that activity cannot be completely stated in terms of habit as above defined. For, if the very operation of habit results in its own breakdown, there must be another function in activity, namely, that of reorganization – "accommodation," to use Mr. Baldwin's term. And if sensation be regarded as marking the point of the breach and the beginning of this process of reconstruction, then habit cannot be taken as a "form," in the sense of a *kind,* of activity, in distinction from consciousness as another kind. Habit and consciousness must be taken together as the constituent poles of activity; the former as the conserving or materializing, the latter as the reorganizing function. As such, consciousness cannot interfere with mechanism. Nor, to dogmatize a little further, can habit be regarded as that out of which consciousness as a new kind of activity somehow springs. Thus, when sensation is said to mark the point of a breach in the continuity of a

[63] The writer is aware that the reconstructive part of the discussion from this point on contains only an outline, and that very much scattered, of an account of the judgment, the filling in of which would call for a complete logic, and would take us a long way from Locke.

habit, *e.g.,* walking, this cannot mean that the habit is that out of which consciousness as a new kind of activity is evolved. For this very statement of sensation presupposes still other consciousness, *e.g.,* the desire for locomotion, with reference to which the habit can be defined. Apart from such reference, neither habit nor its interruption can have any meaning. Apart from such reference one activity is as continuous or as broken, as good or as bad, as another. But this desire in turn presupposes a breach in some habit, *e.g.*, the process of food assimilation. All of which is saying, once more, that habit *and* consciousness must be taken together from the beginning as the constituent functions of one organic activity.

Returning from these very general and rather dogmatic statements the larger outlines of the problem to Locke's stock illustration, we find that the sensation, announcing the disappearance of the lump of gold in the liquid, marks a break in the chain of habitual visual, tactile-motor activities involved in manipulating gold in liquids. This breach may come at either the visual end of the co-ordination in terms of color, or at the tactile-motor end. But, however involuntary this interruption may be, it must come in terms of a *disturbance of the activities going on.* In this first "shock" of interruption we have the "this"; in logical terms, the subject. But the interruption is not a *mere* interruption; it is a breach in certain specific activities at a certain point. This precise point must be located and defined. Here is the function of the idea – of the predicate. It is to state "what" the "this" *is*. In terms of the illustration the idea locates and defines the shock as an interruption of those activities which mean, when ideated as they are now, "gold-insoluble in liquids." But the very fact that this old co-ordination is ideated as possibly broken, as negated, means that a new co-ordination is forming. Unless experience falls into absolute chaos, one co-ordination cannot be negated except through another. Thus the very process of locating and defining the interruption announced through sensation involves the ideal construction of a new co-ordination – the new predicate "gold-soluble."

Here, in the very formation of the hypothesis, Locke's problem is to get such a connection between the sensation as stimulus and this new ideal construction as response, as will prevent the latter from being a mere repetition of the content given in the former, and yet have connection enough to warrant the acceptance of the latter as a trial construction. But to the end Locke has either too much connection or none at all. The predicate merely copies or represents the subject, or has some unknown and unknowable connection guaranteed by Nature or the Deity. But if this ideal construction be a reconstruction of the very habit activities whose interruption constitutes the sensation, it seems that we have some ground for a connection of the kind, which Locke sought in vain. Here the predicate, the ideal construction, is not called upon to copy or even represent something given in sensation, because nothing is here given in sensation but the demand for re-coördi-

nation. The new ideal construction is trying to "agree with sensation," not in the sense of reproducing something *appearing* in it, but in the sense of responding to its demand for reorganization. Hence the ideas run no risk in advance of being false to the reality which appears in sensation, because the only reality appearing there is this demand for reorganization.

The connection between sensation and idea is, here, not one that has *to be made*. It exists in the very manner of their origin. They are born together out of a common matrix of activity, and with the common function of reconstructing this activity. In a certain sense, however, it may be said that the ideas do have "a reference to a reality beyond" themselves given in sensation, and, from one phase of the process, a reference that seems to mean almost a "copy." Thus the very first step in reconstruction is to locate the disturbance. This means a "reflection," in a sense a mirroring of the habitual activities involved. "In a sense," because, after all, these activities are not reflected merely in their *old* form. Thus the old co-ordination "gold-insoluble" is not only reflected; it is reflected as *broken*. This means that it is reflected as *material* to be reconstructed. This first reflection is then not an image of an already constructed reality at all. On the contrary, it is a reflection of the activities involved in the manipulation of gold in liquids for the purpose of locating and defining the *demand* for, and at the same time the *materials* for, reconstruction.

Before following this process of reconstruction further, it may be asked: If sensation and idea thus have their organic connection through their common matrix of habit and through their common function of reconstruction, what of the other side of Locke's difficulty? Where is there any place for doubt and effort? Why does not the ideal connection take place at once and unequivocally? Why should it present itself merely as an hypothesis? If the ideas are to do nothing but mirror or symbolize some content given in sensation, the question, as we have seen, has difficulty enough. There seems to be either no problem or one impossible of solution. But when the organic relation of sensation and idea to habit is seen, this uncertainty has a basis of explanation. In the account here given, sensation and idea are born in uncertainty, in the uncertainty involved in the breaking up of the habit side of the activity. Of course, this carrying over of uncertainty from the thought side into habit presupposes still other consciousness – some desire, some end behind – with reference to which the habit and its interruption, and hence this "objective" uncertainty itself, can be defined. And this is saying again that sensation and idea – consciousness – is as much the outcome of previous consciousness as of habit; which means again that both the habit and conscious phases develop together and each through the other. While habit must thus refer back to some conscious end for its determination, it is, however, out of its entanglement while in the service of this end that new sensation and ideas, new consciousness, issues.

Now, so long as the work of thought is conceived as that of merely *reporting* the habit activities involved in the interruption, which is virtually what Locke's conception amounts to, there is either no place for uncertainty or no place for anything else. But when it is seen to be also a *reconstruction* of this material, it is not difficult to think of uncertainty in the beginning of this process of reorganization as signifying that a new work has begun, whose value, just because it is a new construction, cannot be given in advance. Doubt, hesitation, means in short, that thought is a *work* to be done, not a mere *reflection* of work already done. It does reflect, and in a symbolic fashion too, the work of past constructions, but it does this in order to locate the materials for new construction, not to reflect an already constructed and unchangeable reality appearing in sensation.

Also is it here apparent that the uncertainty of this new construction is not due, as Locke thought, to its being ideal, as opposed to sensation as real. We have seen that sensation is as much in doubt as the ideas; and that this must be so, since the latter arises with and constitutes the definition of the former. Nor is it because the construction is new that it is doubtful. The old construction "gold-insoluble" is equally in doubt. The doubt, indeed, can be defined as the tension between the old habit co-ordination expressed in "gold-insoluble" and the new expressed in "gold-soluble." The old is questioning whether the "this" is "gold" or "solution," as the new predicate alleges. The new points, in turn, to the inability of the old to interpret the "this." While the doubt expresses this opposition, it is also the demand for reconciliation, for continuity. It is the protest of the old against being displaced by outside material. The old insists that its successor must be its own offspring, not an alien. From the side of the new construction doubt means that it, too, is demanding just this connection. It is seeking to establish its filial relation with the old.

Now, it is this work of resolving this ideal tension, of changing this opposition into co-operation, that constitutes the verification stage of reconstruction. Here again is the basis of Locke's definition of the completed judgment as the agreement of ideas with each other, or as the attainment of a consistent complex idea. Locke saw that this tension must be resolved; that the thought-process must somehow reach a nodal point, if life is to go on. But with the unit ideas given, and being partial copies or symbols of reality, when once the opposition is admitted, he found no way of resolving it. Locke's verification meant establishing the claims of one of these ideal contents against, and to the exclusion of, the other; both at the same time professing to represent reality.

The only hope of resolving this tension would seem to be in some further reconstruction that should be different from either, and yet include both. And if this is to happen, and yet be true reality, it would seem also that the relation of ideas to reality must be other than that of a mere representation

of the latter by the former. In the illustration, this interaction between the new and the old may begin in the form of an appeal of the former to the latter to vouch for its material, to identify the gold and the process of solution. But from Locke's standpoint this identification is impossible. The old content, in its present form, can merely contradict the new and not identify it. For the old knows no gold that is soluble, nor any process of solution including gold. Manifestly, if the new construction is to "find itself in the old," it can be only when the latter has changed its form. And this is just what happens. The old co-ordination "gold-insoluble" at once begins to break up in order that the elements in it entering into the new may be found.

Here again appears the significance of Locke's appeal to "sensation" for verification when agreement of the ideas fails him. Just as sensation announcing the first breach in habit leads to this ideal tension between the old and the new, so now must this tension appeal back to sensation for dissolution. But the appeal is not, as Locke and Hume made it, to sensation as bringing in material from an outside source, nor to sensation as a repetition of the sensation with which the problem starts. This again, as Hume saw, can only continue, not resolve, the tension. This appeal of the ideas back to sensation means the sensation involved in the *further breaking up* of the old co-ordination, just as the sensation in the beginning marks such a breaking up. In logical terms, this means the reaction of the predicate, of the hypothesis, upon the subject. The lack of unity in the predicate demands further analysis in the subject. This means that ideation as the reconstructive function must have more material from the habit side.

At this point comes in the work of the laboratory – of what Locke calls "experimentation." However, Locke does not see, on the one hand, that experimentation really starts, indeed that the very essence of the experiment lies, in the first formation of the new ideal construction. Nor, on the other hand, does he see that experimentation is not a mere experimenting *upon* the hypothesis, but is the process of *completing the reconstruction* which begins in the formation of this hypothesis. To Locke experimentation is a matter of beating about in the hope of "finding" one or the other of these ideal contents "in things." For modern science, however, the laboratory with all its equipment is simply a huge machine for further breaking up the old habit co-ordinations in order to get further material for reconstruction. This means, of course, that analysis is anything but an affair of mere gazing and waiting. Thus, in our example, the tension between the old and the new is demanding that the old co-ordinations expressed in "gold" and "solubility" be broken up and searched for "elements" entering into the new. This means literally a reconstruction of the activities involved in the experiences of gold and solution. It means precisely that the connection between the color, malleability, solubility, etc., of gold which Locke thought must be given, must be constructed.

The lack of "necessary connection" which Locke laments, is thus a matter which primarily meets the physicist and the chemist rather than the analyst of the human understanding. It meets the latter only because it has met the former. Lack of "necessary connection" means for the scientist that the analysis of this habit matrix has not gone far enough to show just what activities are entering into the reconstruction. Hence the latter remains "empirical." Thus again logical uncertainty goes back to practical uncertainty. Locke's lament of the theoretical uncertainty of his useful judgment really means that the practical problem is not yet solved.

Here appears, too, the significance of Locke's exception of ethical and mathematical judgments from the fate of the propositions concerning substances. The mathematical judgment is a statement of the limits of this breaking up of the habit material; that is, it states the limits of the process of getting the "elements" that enter as "units" into the new construction. But for Locke this material is given by the "thing" through sensation, while the method and limits of reconstruction are furnished "by the mind." The mathematical proposition is thus independent of the "thing." It has no external archetype to which it must conform. It is itself a reality, co-ordinate with the reality of the material. Locke, of course, never explains how these two realities, the one of the method, the other of the material, unite in one. It remained for Kant to raise the problem in this form. The reality of the ethical judgment is admitted by Locke on the same general ground as that of the mathematical; viz., that it has no archetype with which it professes to agree. But this absence of the archetype in the ethical judgment has a further significance. In the mathematical proposition this absence is due to the abstraction of the method of operation from the material. In the ethical it is due rather to their synthesis. That is, in the ethical proposition thought is taken as a concrete part of "the conduct of life." As such, it requires no archetype with which to agree. As merely intellectual, thought may need an archetype to which it can be true. But as an act, its sole "object" and criterion are found in this stream of conduct.

Coming back to the process of reconstruction, in speaking of the further breaking up of the old co-ordination in order to find the "elements" of the new, we must again keep in mind that these "elements" are not little ultimate, irreducible unit habits into which these co-ordinations can be resolved. This would carry us back into all Locke's difficulties. The whole of Locke's trouble with his simple ideas is that they are taken as ultimate units of habit entirely apart from any act, in which only such a unit can be defined. The result, as we have seen, is that there is no standard for their simplicity. By "elements," then, must be meant the activities, visual, tactile-motor, etc., that issue out of this breaking up as the materials for the new construction, with the reference to which only are they elements.

Meanwhile it is not only the old co-ordination that is undergoing analysis.

The resolution of the tension involves concessions on both sides. In the first stage of doubt, the old and the new are equally material for the further work of reconstruction. Hence we find the new construction changing from the vague, general form of "gold-soluble," with which the judgment starts, into the definite "gold-soluble-in-aqua-regia-under-certain-conditions-of-temperature,-atmospheric-pressure, etc." At whatever point this process stops, the outcome is a construction different from either of the terms in opposition at the beginning, and yet one to which both have contributed material. "Gold-soluble-in-aqua-regia, etc." is neither "gold-soluble" nor "gold-insoluble," and yet both are included.

It has just been said, "at whatever point this process of reconstruction stops, etc." This brings us to the last, and perhaps the crucial, point of the problem. What determines the stopping-point of this process of interaction? When does the opposition pass into harmony, doubt into certainty? When is the reconstruction true? When is the judgment complete? These questions send us back to our starting-point. Let us recall that back of this process of interaction between the new and the old through sensation lies some need, some interest, involving the manipulation of gold and liquids, and employing the habit activities, whose entanglement calls for this act of reconstruction. In a very general way this indicates at once the answer to these questions. As the interruption of activity involved in the pursuit of this interest constitutes the *demand* for this reconstruction, so the ability to resume operations constitutes the criterion for its completion. Once more, the terms "interruption" and "resume" are not meant to imply that there has been any absolute stoppage on the side of either habit or thought. They mean only a change in the activity which both constitute. They mean that the co-ordinations at work in the service of a certain interest break up and must be reconstructed with refererence to that interest. This involves, too, a reconstruction, an expansion and enriching, of this interest.

Here it may be said that the expression "ability to resume operations" begs the point, since included in this "ability" is a certain confidence in the validity of the work of thought in advance of the practical test. If by this confidence be meant the conviction that thought, as thought, is making an actual contribution, is doing work, there need be no difficulty. But if it mean that thought *apart from the habit side* makes a reconstruction that is to be final, then, once more, whence any doubt and uncertainty? Why does not thought do its work at once and unequivocally, and have done with it? The fact that it does not suggests that the final reconstruction in which this confidence and certainty is felt is not the work of" mere thought" as opposed to habit. The materials for this reconstruction in its final form are already in action. As we have seen, they are found in the process of breaking up habits already *at work*. Hence the materials, thus taken in action, are tested in the very act of selecting them; or, rather, they are selected because they work. The

confidence is not, then, in the work of "mere thought," but in the entire outcome which is the product of thought and habit. Indeed, the stage most nearly approximating "mere thought" – that of the first formation of the hypothesis – is one of doubt. It is not until this hypothesis has been further reconstructed through interaction with the habit matrix that the readiness, including the confidence, for action comes; but when this point is reached, *this* work of reconstruction is done. The judging process is verified in the fact that it has done what it set out to do, namely, reconstruct the interrupted activity.

Essentially the same objection may be put in another form. If the criterion of reconstruction is thus found in the response to the demands of a specific interest, one may ask how this provides for the element of universality in verification. How does it account for the sense of value of the present reconstruction for future experience? How does it meet Locke's problem of probability? Of course, we have been saying ever since Kant that the particular must carry the universal with it; that doubt of the value of the reconstruction for further experience – doubt of the universal – involves doubt of the reconstruction for present purposes – doubt of the particular. Now, so far as the time aspect is concerned, Kant pointed out that no situation, no interest, can be merely present. The present interest dips into the future as it does into the past. But while Kant laid bare this organic relation between the particular and the universal as a general fact, he had great difficulty in getting at the basis and method of it. *That* the one involves the other was always clear. *How* it does it was the problem. We cannot be content with saying that, taking reality as an organic unity, formally, the whole – the universal – must *some*how appear in the particular. The problem is precisely how this takes place; and whether this "organic unity" can be conceived as an already completed system.

Here we must hark back once more to the central fact that this reconstruction made to meet present demands has no other material for its work than the very activities out of which the demand itself has arisen.[64] Sensation, with which this process begins, does not create or import any new material. It is simply the demand for and stimulus to the work of reconstruction. The fact that there is here no other material on which to work than just these visual, tactile-motor, etc., co-ordinations, constructed in the past, means that the form, the method, of experience is just this process of reconstructing the results of its own activity. As the present is a reconstruction of

[64] Having a mind in the doctrine of apperception, some may regard this constant appeal to the results of previous activity as a case of what Mr. James calls "a painful elaboration of the obvious." But in apperception, as usually expounded, this past activity – the "apperceiving mass" – has nothing to do with sensation and the "raw material" of knowledge. The latter is still "given" from some other source, and the dualism between the material and the process of knowledge remains.

the past, so the future must be a reconstruction of the present. Every judgment thus appeals to the future as much as to the past. This does not mean that this reconstruction will continue to be used in just its present form as a hard and fast unit in future reconstructions. Indeed, as material for the future, it must mean just the opposite. It too will be broken up just as in this case the old co-ordination "gold-insoluble" has been. On the other hand, it does mean that there can be no future experience involving gold and liquids into which this co-ordination must not enter as *material.*

From this standpoint the universal in the particular means that there is no material for reconstruction but the results of preceding activity. The particular in the univeral means that this reconstruction is not being made merely for the sake of working up material at large, but that it is made to meet the demands of a specific situation and interest; and that in so doing it is at the same time creating material with which other situations are to be met. In this dynamic unity of development, the universal in the particular, in the sense of "the whole in the part," does not take on the paradoxical form that it assumes where reality is conceived as a completed system. It does not demand that we try to conceive quantitatively a completed whole in a coexisting part of it. It only means that what has been a reconstruction – a whole, a wholling of experience – is now entering as an element, a part, into a new reconstruction, a new whole; and that this latter must in turn become material. Here whole and part do not signify two distinct coexisting contents which yet must somehow be one. They mean different ways in which certain contents, *i.e.,* certain activities, operate. If a certain co-ordination between the eye and the hand is demanded, this co-ordination is projected as an ideal whole into which selections from other co-ordinations, themselves once such wholes, enter as parts.

This account of the universal in the particular is at the same time a statement of that ground of probability, of practical certainty, which Locke to the last sought in vain. Probability, the sense of security, stands again for just this fact, that experience is the process of reconstructing itself out of the results of its own work. There can be, therefore, no future experience into which the present reconstruction shall not enter. Hence there is just as much sense of continuity of the present with the future as with the past. But with the material for construction given from an external source, as it is for Locke, there is no ground for such a sense of continuity. From the other standpoint, however, the future is just as well guaranteed as the present and past. In the future lies the further development of the meaning and value of the present and past. In this sense the future is not only guaranteed by, but is the guarantee of, the present and past; that is, it guarantees the further development of their meaning. The value and meaning of the reconstruction made for present demands gets a further extension when it enters as material into further experience. We cannot, then, speak of the future as contingent,

in contrast with the past and present as fixed and secure. In our illustration we have seen how the old construction "gold-insoluble" falls into doubt and finally disintegrates. In every new construction it is precisely the past that is broken up and rebuilt. Uncertainty of the future occurs then at the point where the work of reconstruction, meeting present demands, is *not complete; i.e.,* complete with reference to this demand. But this involves an equal uncertainty of the past and the present. Doubt, therefore, looks both ways, backward as well as forward.

But this uncertainty, which is a part of the process of reconstruction, is not an uncertainty concerning the possibility of knowledge, that is, concerning the possibility of reaching any reconstruction whatever. The latter, indeed, is wholly inconsistent with the former. It would mean a total paralysis, a cessation of the very activity in which the problem and the doubt arise. On the other hand, the "perfect certainty," the lack of which Locke mourns, would mean that the present reconstruction as material for the future must be used in its present form; that it must remain intact; and this would mean the complete reduction of experience to terms of habit. Probability, then, means that, while the value of the present work as material for further experience is assured, it is assured only as *material.* Just what this value will be when it enters into this further experience cannot, of course, now be determined; else the future would be "present in the instant," and experience be reduced to a vast static system in which there is no place for doubt and struggle; in which development, growth, could have no meaning.

But, granting that the judgment in deriving its materials from the results of previous reconstructions and in constituting material for future experience thus gets a functional sort of universality, how, as a process of constantly breaking up and reconstructing content, can it be true to reality? Here we must again go back to Kant. The very question suggests that we are starting with a certain conception of reality with which our theory of knowledge must be brought into agreement. Kant saw that we must come at the matter from the other side – that we must arrive at our conception of reality from an analysis of the process of knowledge; that is, we must find out to what kind of reality it is possible for knowledge, from its very nature, to be true. From the account of the judgment above given, it seems difficult for thought to be true to reality, if the latter be conceived as an already constructed whole which thought is to, reflect or even symbolize part at a time. For, apart from the difficulties in distinguishing truth and error until this whole is reached, we have found by direct analysis that the reflecting, symbolizing function involves at the same time the disintegration of the material reflected. Where in such a process is there any place for a completed system of reality? Nor does the combination of the conceptions of a progressive representation and some sort of pre-established harmony seem to help. For, if the harmony between our partial representation and the whole be really established,

whence again doubt and error? Does a pre-established harmony imply also a pre-established discord? And, if so, what, again, is to distinguish them?

If, then, we are to look for reality in that to which thought from its very nature can be true, it would seem that we must find it precisely in the process of which thought is an organic constituent function – the concrete process of Experience itself; the process which is ever reconstructing itself out of the products of its own activity. Here reality is not something which thought must reflect or symbolize. It is that which the reflecting, symbolizing activity of thought helps to constitute. Thought, as symbolic, is not symbolic *of* reality, but is the symbolizing function in reality. Thought is "true" to reality, therefore, when it meets the demand of the concrete situation in which it arises; when it brings about the reconstruction of the activity out of which and for whose reconstruction it is born.

Have we here, then, a clue to the solution, or dissolution rather, of the paradox of the useful falsity of knowledge with which we started? This paradox, we have seen, is the outcome of assigning to thought a double rôle. To be useful, thought must reconstruct activity to meet the concrete demands of life; to be "true," it must reflect a system of reality beyond. If there be difficulty in the latter, still must "the affairs of life" go on. They will not wait for the completion of the system of knowledge. Hence we must get on as best we can with our "partial," unverified, and therefore uncertain judgments. But if this "getting on" constitute the verification of the judgment, and if the value of the latter in "the conduct of life" constitute its truth and reality, does not the paradox disappear? But again, and finally, this must not be taken to imply that there is a primary activity called "life," out of which or in which is somehow generated or "evolved" another species of activity called "consciousness," and that the latter is therefore determined by and dependent upon this primary activity. Nor, on the other hand, is consciousness to be regarded as a metaphysical ultimate to terms of which "life" can be completely reduced. As here conceived, "Life"-Experience is the one inclusive activity of which Consciousness *and* Habit – the Psychical *and* the Physical – are, to the last analysis, constituent *functions*.

EXISTENCE, MEANING, AND REALITY IN LOCKE'S ESSAY AND IN PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGY[1]

Addison W. Moore. "Existence, Meaning, and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology." *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, First Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), vol. 3, part 2, pp. 29–51.

To many, anything more than a passing reference to Locke, these days, will appear to be an anachronism. What profit can there be in threshing over straw as old and thoroughly flailed as Locke's theory of knowledge? Why return from the outposts of the epistemological battle to an ancient, deserted, and almost forgotten camp? Those who feel perfectly secure in the present position, who feel that all points in the rear and on the flanks of the advance thus far have been left well fortified, will answer: "Why?" But there are some, and their number is increasing, who do not share this sense of security and who feel that the difficulty is not one of momentary detail merely, but one involving the entire plan and method of the movement beginning in Locke. To these a review of the problem in the elementary and primitive form in which Locke presents it, and a reconsideration of the "common-sense" solution he offers, may not seem to be a case of misdirected effort.

[1] The standpoint from which this paper is written is the outgrowth of work done a few years ago in Professor Dewey's seminar in logic – a seminar remarkable for its development of critical and reconstructive principles. Since this paper was written the collection of Oxford essays edited by Mr. Sturt under the title *Personal Idealism* has come to hand. So marked is the accord of the general principles of this paper with much of the doctrine of this volume – especially with Mr. Schiller's essay on "Axioms as Postulates" and with some parts of Mr. Stout's essay on "Error" – that one might easily infer that they were written within the same "sphere of influence." That two movements so similar in spirit should have been developing, independently of each other in centers four thousand miles apart, is interesting and significant. The extent of the agreement of this paper with Mr. Schiller's essay on "Axioms, etc.," and his paper on "Useless Knowledge" in *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XI, No. 42, offers suggestions for footnote references on almost every page. But there being for the most part, no particular reason for making these references at one place rather than another I have decided to combine most of these possible citations in this one general statement.

Moreover, it may appear to some that the indulgent attitude, which it is the fashion to take toward Locke's epistemology, often has less warrant than is assumed. Locke's pioneer services are of course duly recognized, but his methods and results have long been regarded as having only an historical interest. It has long since been agreed that, instead of finding a path through the epistemological "forest primeval," he completely lost his way. The first "blaze" believed to have been made through that wilderness has, for over a century, borne the name of Kant. That "blaze" has become a great highway, splendidly equipped, and traveled by an innumerable company seeking the realm of truth and reality believed to lie at the terminus. But after more than a century's journeyings, with the promised land still beyond the horizon, some are beginning to wonder whether Kant, after all, really did get through. The highway, broad, magnificent, and thronged as it is, still runs through the wilderness of "appearance." And this doubt is not abated when it is seen that the highway is often crossed and sometimes paralleled no little distance by Locke's old trail. To point out some of these crossings and parallels, and to suggest a few characteristics of what appears to some as a possible way – not *to* reality, but a way *of* reality – is the aim of this paper.

Dropping the venerable and overburdened figure, and passing at once to the technical discussion of the theme, we find that, in terms of present-day logic and epistemology, the problem which Locke faces in Book IV of the *Essay* is that of the relation of existence, meaning, and reality to each other. Locke begins by attempting to identify reality with meaning. Failing in this, he tries to equate it with existence, and in the end attempts to divide the realm of reality between meaning and existence, leaving each, however, disputing the claims of the other.

Locke's first definition of knowledge is as follows: "Since the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings hath no other immediate object but its own ideas…knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas."[2] It may be said, and truly, that Locke's ideas here are not meanings as modern logic understands meaning, but that they are existences – psychical things. But it is precisely in the attempt to cut off these meanings from existence that they become psychical existences. To be sure, present logic tells us that knowledge involves "the loosing of meaning from existence," the severance of the "what" from the "that." But it tells us also that, at the same time, it involves "the reference of meaning to existence." But if the meanings – the "whats" – are taken as entirely loosed, so loosed that they become lost, from their existences,

[2] *Essay*, Book IV, chap. 1, sec. 1.

then they become, what they are here for Locke, a collection of psychical things. Thus does abstract idealism become a sort of psychical materialism.

The difficulty inherent in the attempt to thus state knowledge in terms of these psychical existences comes out at once in Locke's further account of "agreement and disagreement." This is contained in his statement of the four "kinds" of agreement and disagreement, to-wit: (1) identity or diversity; (2) relation; (3) coexistence or non-coexistence of ideas in the same subject; (4) agreement or disagreement of ideas with real existence.[3] The second "kind," Locke says, is really a general form of all the others, and is therefore not co-ordinate with them. In the fourth kind we recognize Locke's second conception of knowledge as the reference of ideas to reality as existence and it is not to be considered, therefore, in the discussion of this first statement of knowledge as consisting in the reference of ideas to each other. The third kind of agreement and disagreement, as will be seen, is a transition statement which includes within it both the first and second definitions of knowledge and serves to break the abruptness of the transition. We have left, then, identity and diversity as the criterion of agreement and disagreement, in this first definition of knowledge.

Locke's illustration is as follows:

> When we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive that these two ideas do not agree? When we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive that equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three angles of a triangle?[4]

Here Locke apparently makes agreement and disagreement mean mere identity and difference. Black and white disagree because one *is* not the other. But the triangle proposition, given as an illustration of *agreement,* must possess this kind of *disagreement.* The ideas in "agreement" must yet be different ideas. On the other hand, in disagreement there must be a common basis; there must be a disagreement about something – color, size, etc. Thus agreement and disagreement each involves both identity and diversity, and the latter cannot, therefore, serve to differentiate them. Here Locke has come upon the old problem of unity in difference, of the one and the many, which so puzzled the Greeks and which was

[3] Ibid., sec. 3.

[4] Ibid., sec. 2.

the crucial question for his contemporary, Spinoza. In a world of givens, whether psychical or physical, meanings or existences, there appears no way of reconciling the demands of unity and difference, nor of finding a basis for agreement and disagreement. Each given is simply there. White is white, black is black; there is an end of it. There is no basis or meaning for either harmony or opposition. As content, a unity of givens appears impossible. As factors, in a *process*, working to some *end*, there could be a unity of *function*. In a world of givens the problem of unity is insoluble.[5]

Locke's tacit recognition of these difficulties is found in his confession, farther on, that agreement and disagreement of this sort, except in the case of certain general mathematical and moral propositions, yields only "trifling" knowledge. In knowledge "which has most to do with the affairs of life," knowledge of substances, this definition of agreement and disagreement will not apply.

> Gold is malleable, is true and certain; but there is here nothing affirmed of gold but that that sound stands for an idea which malleability is contained and such a sort of truth and certainty as this it is to say a centaur is fourfooted.[6]

And again:

> It will be altogether as true a proposition to say all centaurs are animals, as that all men are animals; and the certainty of one as great as the other. For in both propositions the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds; and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and visible to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man: and so these two propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such truth to us?[7]

The attempt to state knowledge in terms of a lot of given meanings has, then, yielded little worthy the name of knowledge. It is Kant's system of concepts, empty without percepts, out of which can come only "analytic," "trifling" propositions. And Locke's problem, too, at this point, is "the possibility of synthetic propositions;" that is, the possibility of finding "real" existences for these divorced meanings. In other

[5] The difficulty is, of course, just as acute on the side of the differences.

[6] *Essay*, Book IV, chap. 6, sec. 9.

[7] Ibid., chap. 5, sec. 7.

words, it is the problem of converting his world of psychical existences into true meanings, by finding something for them to mean.

This is the point at which Locke, like Spinoza,[8] simply shakes the hat, and *presto*! – there is the "real world." Locke tries to lessen the abruptness of this transition to reality by two or three devices. First, as we have seen, this second definition of knowledge is given as the fourth "sort of agreement and disagreement." "The fourth and last sort of agreement and disagreement is that of *actual* and *real* existence, agreeing to any idea."[9] Then he has stated at the outset of the *Essay* that he will use idea as meaning "either image in the mind or quality in the object." Finally he introduces a statement of agreement and disagreement, which he gives as the third "kind" of agreement and disagreement, and which forms a transition from the first to the second general conception of knowledge. This transition statement, indeed, contains one of the best examples of Locke's confessed equivocation in the use of idea and thing.

> The third sort of agreement and disagreement to be found in our ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is coexistence or non-coexistence in the same subject, and this belongs particularly to *substances*. Thus, when we pronounce concerning gold that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, that fixedness or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is *an idea* that always accompanies and is joined with that particular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in *aqua regia*, which make our *complex idea* signified by the word gold.[10]

In the first part of this statement the coexistence is "in the same subject" or "substance." In the last part of it, it is in the "complex idea."

In this transition statement Locke has thus combined his first and second general definitions of knowledge. Taking the "subject" or "substance" as a complex idea, this transition statement can be brought under the first general definition of knowledge as consisting in the agreement or disagreement of ideas. But, then, it shares too its "useless" and "trifling" character. It is precisely of the same kind as the proposition, "gold is malleable," cited above as an illustration of "trifling knowledge." On the other hand, if the subject or substance here means a "reality beyond," which is represented or described by the ideas, then it

[8] Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Prop. XXVIII.

[9] *Essay*, Book IV, chap. 1, sec. 7.

[10] Ibid., sec. 6. The italics are mine.

is essentially the same as the fourth kind of agreement and falls under Locke's second general definition of knowledge.

Passing now to the second statement of knowledge, as consisting in the agreement or disagreement of ideas with "real existence," let us note that it agrees with the statement of modern logic which defines knowledge as "the act which refers an ideal content (recognized as such) to a reality beyond the act."[11] "Gold is soluble," as an expression of knowledge, does not now mean the mere reference of the idea, soluble, to the idea, gold. That would be "trifling knowledge." Here it means the reference of the entire content, "gold soluble," etc., to "real existence," to "a reality beyond." "Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is conformity between our ideas and the reality of things."[12] It is true, Locke's ideal content does not have the unity and solidarity which it has in Mr. Bradley's conception. Locke's ideal content is an aggregation, but, in so far as it is taken altogether as the *meaning* and referred away to a reality beyond itself for its *subject,* it appears to be in essential agreement with Mr. Bradley's statement.

A few points should be noted at the outset of a consideration of this second definition of knowledge. First, whereas, in the first definition, the materials of knowledge were the given ideas, here they are a system of given ideas, on the one hand, and of given existences on the other. They are given in separation; the problem is to effect a unity. Second, reality is identified wholly with the side of existence. That is, the real is entirely and unqualifiedly opposed to the ideal – to meaning. Third, reality as existence is taken as a completed and fixed whole. Movement, development, is all on the side of the ideas – of meaning. Finally, meaning means merely representation, either as a copy or as an algebraic symbol. These are the assumptions which underlie Locke's second definition of knowledge and which are responsible for his subsequent difficulties. It is needless to follow all the tacks of the course which Locke steers through these difficulties. It will be sufficient for our purpose to restate what seem to be the fundamental dilemmas and their significance from the standpoint of this discussion.

The first difficulty, or rather the first form of *the* difficulty, which Locke continually encounters, is the very ancient and obvious; but very persistent and still very pertinent, one, of how, if meaning and existence are given apart, the former gets its reference to the latter. Locke's first attempt to deal with this difficulty, as most attempts before and since, virtually amounts in the end to saying that, while they are given apart,

[11] Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, p. 10.

[12] *Essay*, Book IV, chap. 4, sec. 3.

they are also given in reference. Waiving for the present the paradox in this state of affairs, with the reference as well as the separation given, the problem of "trifling propositions;" on the one hand, and error, on the other; must forthwith be faced. And here it usually happens that in making room for doubt and error the separation is emphasized so much that the problem of reference and connection again becomes acute. The dilemma is a reference given, hence trifling, or a reference which can never be verified, hence uncertain. In the language of modern logic, "thought appears either tautologous or false."

Locke's only solution of the case is an appeal to the Deity or to "nature."

> Herein therefore is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances; that all our complex ideas of them must be such and such only as are made up of such simple ones as *have been discovered to coexist in nature*... . Whatever simple ideas have been found to coexist in any substance, these we may with confidence join together again; for whatever have *once* had an union in nature may be united again.[13]

But after this very simple statement of the ground of the reference of the idea as meaning to existence as reality, Locke at once finds himself on the other horn. If the meaning and existence, the idea and reality, are really "found together," if the reference is given along with the separation, how should there ever be any doubt, and where is there any room for error? How can there be any disagreement? Moreover, what meaning can "agreement" have but mere repetition? And even repetition has no significance where there is nothing else. In other words, Locke finds here that he has simply exchanged his "trifling," "tautologous," "analytic," knowledge, consisting of "the reference of ideas to each other in the mind," for one equally trifling, consisting of a *given* or "found" reference of ideas to an existential reality. Thus Locke's difficulty, all the way through, is not to find certainty merely; this he has with a vengeance, in his trifling propositions. The problem is to find a place for uncertainty and error. There must, of course, on the other hand, be a way out of this uncertainty and error. As a whole, the problem is to reach a theory of knowledge that will square with both the certainty and uncertainty, the truth and error, the struggle and satisfaction, so palpably present in experience. The difficulty is in reaching a statement of one that does not exclude the other.

The persistence of this difficulty is apparent in Locke's further attempt to leave a place for doubt and struggle, by an effort to rescue existence

[13] Ibid., Book II, chap. 4, sec. 12. Italics mine.

and meaning from this pre-established harmony. Locke's procedure at this point again seems very naïve; and yet, if Locke could ask just how far we have advanced beyond it, it might turn out that our patronizing attitude toward his account has less foundation than we could wish. Locke's way of making room for doubt, effort, and error is as follows: while the idea and the reality are thus found together, when they *are* found, yet the finding, after all, involves *searching*. "It is by *trying* alone that I can certainly know what other qualities coexist with those of my complex idea, *e.g.*, whether that yellow, heavy, fusible body I call gold be malleable or no."[14] This searching, "trying," is carried on in the investigation of substances "which have most to do with the affairs of life," by "the further observation of the senses." Now, during this searching there is suspense, uncertainty, and the possibility of error. As a general statement of the location of doubt and error, this, as is the case with most of Locke's general descriptions of experience, leaves very little room for improvement. The difficulty comes, of course, in interpreting it in terms of the rest of his account.

The most immediate and glaring difficulty is that of effecting any kind of a reconciliation of this "trying" with the final givenness of the connection between meaning and reality. It is difficult to see how the searching for this connection between idea and reality, which finally is simply to "appear," can be anything more than mere suspense. How can there be any uncertainty or error if meaning and reality are bound to appear together? The only chance for uncertainty would be merely in regard to the duration of the waiting or "trying." There could be none in regard to the final outcome. Then how can any real error occur? In what is it finally to consist? Locke's answer is, virtually, that we know as a matter of experience that this searching, trying stage is not a mere empty waiting, nor gazing into empty space, but that it is filled with suggestions, guesses, with certain hypothetical connections of ideas and reality which finally, on what ground doth not yet appear, are either rejected as false or accepted as partial revelations, as instalments of the entire fact.

This, of course, still further surrenders the ultimate givenness of the connection between idea and reality, and brings with it a train of fresh difficulties. First, whence come these suggestions, these hypotheses? If Locke dealt with this question explicitly and in this form, he would have answered, of course: "From the continued operation of the senses." And this would again have thrown him upon the other point of the fundamental dilemma of his whole position, viz., the possibility of ever getting rid of the accompanying uncertainty when once it is admitted. For if the

[14] Ibid., Book IV, chap.12, sec. 9. Italics mine.

senses can and do make doubtful and false connections, how is "the farther operation of the senses" to help matters? Or, conversely, if "the further operations of the senses" do somehow make a true connection, why should not the earlier do so? What is the difference between the operation of the senses when they reveal a doubtful or false connection and when they give the true one?

The answer of most epistemology since Kant, and indeed the virtual answer Locke himself makes to this question, is, in its first and most general form, that it is the difference between the *partial* and the *completed* experience. To be sure, we are told in the same breath that a complete completeness can never be reached by human experience; for there is no limit to "the appearances of reality in sensation" and to the consequent reference of ideal constructions to reality. Now, if we are to think of truth in general as consisting in this stream of reference of ideas to reality, what is to break up this stream into specific truths? That is, what is to decide when we have reached *a* truth? The answer to this is that truth, in the particular case, is marked by the appearance of it sense of "harmony," of "satisfaction," or by the appearance of a greater degree of "definition" or "determination" of the idea. But what right have we to any "sense of harmony" and "satisfaction" at any particular time, if the awful gap between our meanings and ultimate reality still yawns? How can we find any "resting" place? Reality, surely, does not give out. And if this suggests that not reality, but *we*, give out, and have to "rest," then shall we say that the point at which we have to stop for breath is where we reach a particular truth, a "relatively" complete and determined experience? And error – what shall it be? A failure to get all the breath we need? "Error is truth, it is partial truth that is false only because partial and left incomplete?"[15] To be sure, we are told further that error is not mere incompleteness; else it would not differ from truth.[16] It is a meaning which "collides with reality," a meaning which reality "rejects," "repulses," "repudiates," etc.[17]

[15] Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 192.

[16] As showing just how much difference between truth and error is left from this standpoint, there is an interesting passage in the last chapter of *Appearance and Reality*, p. 541: "Every finite truth or fact to some extent must be unreal and false, *and it is impossible in the end certainly to know, of any, how false it may be*. We cannot know this, because the unknown extends illimitably, and all abstraction is precarious and at the mercy of what is not observed. If our knowledge were a system the case would then undoubtedly be altered. With regard to everything we should know the place assigned to it by the whole, and we could measure the exact degree of truth and falsehood which anything possessed… . *But any system of this kind seems, most assuredly, by its essence impossible*." Italics mine.

[17] Ibid., chap. XVI.

But what is the sign of this "collision," "rejection," "repudiation," etc.? The first answer is that it is a disagreement, a collision among the ideas themselves.[18] But does not this come near to begging the point? To say that the collision of the ideas with each other is due to a collision with reality, and that we know they have collided with reality because they disagree with each other does not seem to put us very far forward. However, in another connection, we get a very pertinent and illuminating answer. "Where experience, inward or outward, clashes with our views, where there arises thus *disorder, confusion, and pain,* we may speak of illusion. It is the course of events in collision with the set of ideas."[19] To be sure, Mr. Bradley in this passage is defining illusion, not error. Indeed, the quotation is taken from the passage in which the distinction between error and illusion is drawn; but to the writer this distinction, as Mr. Bradley states it, seems to belong to the "without-a-difference" species. How much of a difference there is may be gathered from a comparison of the following with the above quotation: "It [error] is, in other words, the collision of a mere idea with reality."[20] And this, which follows shortly after the passage first quoted above: "Therefore, we must have error present always, and this presence entails some illusion."

Now, the "disorder, confusion, and pain" here appealed to are evidently not of a *peculiar* sort arising from the mere failure of our meanings to copy an external reality. They must be the "disorder, confusion, and pain" of any and every sort that arise in "the conduct of life." And if these are the signs that reality rejects our proffered means – the signs of error – their disappearance and the reinstatement of order, control, and satisfaction, in the conduct of life, must, notwithstanding the formal repudiations[21] of the "practical" criterion, be the signs that reality accepts our suit – the signs of truth. Thus, while for both Locke and Mr. Bradley the formal standard for truth and error is given as the agreement and disagreement of meaning with a world of completed reality beyond, the real criterion is found in the relation of these meanings to the order and disorder, the satisfaction and dissatisfaction, of concrete living.

The teleological character of this relation between meaning and reality is still further deepened as we note that order and disorder, satisfaction

[18] Ibid., p. 190.

[19] Ibid., p. 549.

[20] Ibid., p. 188.

[21] *Cf.* Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, pp. 18–21 and 531.

and dissatisfaction, presuppose some desire, interest, aim. Apart from such an already defined direction of action, order and confusion can have no meaning. And by the time this much is admitted, one begins to wonder whether these harmonies and confusions in the conduct of life be not something more than mere arbitrary *signs* of truth and error.

And when we further seek for some details of the way in which this "disorder, confusion, and pain" is produced through the rejection of our meanings by reality, one meets with very little encouragement. We are told that "the idea collides with reality;" but little is vouchsafed concerning the nature of the idea and of this reality that will show *how* such a collision takes place and why it should be confusing and painful. To be sure, confusion and pain are implied in the ordinary connotation of "collision," but collision in the ordinary sense means more than "the collision of a *mere idea* with a reality beyond." In the first place, it is difficult to see how a "mere idea," as simply an intended copy or symbol of reality, can "collide" with that reality or anything else. And the difficulty grows when it is recalled that this reality which the idea is trying to reflect is itself a completed and static affair. "Nothing perfect, nothing *genuinely real*, can move."[22] Why should there be any "collision" between even the false symbol and the reality which is not moving? If it be said that, while the reality does not move, *we* do, and so run against it, aside from the ever-recurring puzzle of the inclusion of motion even as appearance in a static absolute, one must ask: Why and how do we move? And what connection is there between our movement and these ideas which are partial copies of a static reality? In what way does this idea of a motionless reality produce or influence action? Doubtless it would be answered that our activity is due to the imperfection of the idea. If the copy were perfect, if it fully agreed with the reality, no activity would be needed. Activity is due to the imperfection of our knowledge. Aside from the want of any *modus operandi* in such statements, we are aware of this imperfection of meaning only through the "disorder, confusion, and pain of experience," and, as stated above, this disorder, confusion, and pain presuppose activity already going on in some more or less specific direction. In other words, this disagreement between meaning and reality which is somehow to be the stimulus to movement is known only through the very activity which it is supposed to stimulate.

In Mr. Royce's account one reads:

[22] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 500. Italics mine. *Cf.* also Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 259.

> There is no purely external criterion of truth. You cannot merely look from without upon an ideal construction and say whether or no it corresponds to its object. Every finite idea has to be judged by its own specific purpose. Ideas are like tools. They are there for an end. They are true, as the tools are good, precisely by reason of their adjustment to this end. To ask me which of two ideas is the more nearly true is like asking me which of two tools is the better tool. The question is a sensible one if the purpose in the mind is specific, but not otherwise.[23]

This sounds like the opening of a new chapter in epistemology. Here very little room is promised for the conceptions of a completed immovable reality, or of the merely representative character of meaning. Here the idea is a "tool," and is to have its value defined with reference to the "specific use" to which it is put. But when one reads again that the idea's "specific purpose" is, after all, not to relieve the "disorder, confusion, and pain" of everyday life, but is merely to "correspond," photographically or algebraically,[24] to an object; and when one further finds that this object is fixed eternally in the Absolute, and that this correspondence in human experience must be "partial and fragmentary," one is carried back at once to Locke and his problems. One might begin by asking why the idea seeks this correspondence at all. To this we are told that "what the idea always aims to find in its object is nothing whatever but the idea's own conscious purpose or will embodied in some more determinate form than the idea by itself alone at this instant consciously possesses."[25] Still the questions will not down. Why does the idea want a more determinate form? What is the standard for determination in general? And what decides the degree of increased determinateness it is seeking in the object? And if the idea fixes in advance the degree of determination, how can the object add more determination and still agree with the idea? And if this degree of determination is not fixed in advance by the idea, if there is only "a vague idea," of more determinateness, then what is to decide in favor of one object rather than another as supplying the proper degree of determination? This brings us to the problem of truth and error.

In the definitions of truth and error the same difficulties pursue. "An error is an error about a specific object only in case the purpose imperfectly defined by the vague idea at the instant when the error is made is

[23] *The Word and the Individual*, p. 308.

[24] *The World and the Individual*, pp. 304 ff.

[25] Ibid., p. 327.

better defined, is in fact better fulfilled, by an object whose determinate character in some wise, although never absolutely, opposes the fragmentary efforts made to define them."[26] But what is one to understand by "imperfectly defined" and "better defined," and what is the measure of "better fulfilled"? Of truth the formal definition is as follows: "It is true, this instant's idea, if in its own measure and on its own plan, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own final and completely individual expression. Its expression would be the very life of fulfilment of purpose which this present idea already fragmentarily begins, as it were, to express."[27] But how is the idea to know whether its present degree of determinateness is nearer than any other to its "final and completed form" which is not yet known? And again, what is meant by "in its own measure" and "on its own plan"? How can it have a "measure" of its "own," if this "final and completely individual" form, never reached in finite life, is the standard? And what are the signs of even this "fragmentary" agreement with this final and completed form?

Moreover, if "Every finite idea is, as such, a general type of empirical and fragmentary fulfilment of purpose,"[28] in just what, after all does the difference between truth and error, in any particular case, consist? Every idea falls short of the final and complete form of determination. The true idea is one which comes *nearer* this form than another. But if this final form never appears in this life, what is to decide when one idea is "nearer" than another to this "completely individual" form?

Here it is interesting to turn to Mr. Royce's illustration of the particular case. "Do you intend to sing in tune? Then your musical ideas are false *if they lead you to strike* what are, *then* called false notes."[29] Here surely there is no reference to the absolute idea or absolute object. Here the final degree of determination is just that of the concrete desire. Here it is not the idea's purpose merely to correspond "in a fragmentary way" with an absolute object eternally fixed in the absolute consciousness. It is here the idea's business to help construct an action that shall get rid of the "disorder, confusion, and pain" of singing out of tune. And if we revert to the first passage quoted in which it is stated that every idea "has to be judged by its own specific purpose," we read that "ideas are like tools; they are there for an end." Here, too, surely, the "specific purpose" and "end" of the idea is not a "fragmentary

[26] Ibid., p. 335.

[27] Ibid., p. 339.

[28] Ibid., p. 336.

[29] *The World and the Individual*, pp. 307, 308. Italics mine.

correspondence" with "its own final and completely individual" form unless, indeed, we are ready to say that "its own final and completely individual" form is simply the form that brings the relief from this present pain and confusion of singing out of tune. And if we say this, then the distinction between finite and Absolute truth and reality would seem to disappear.

And this suggests that, notwithstanding Mr. Royce's most telling criticism of Mr. Bradley's divorce of thought and reality, one can but question whether this appeal to a "final," "completed," and "fulfilled" purpose does not, after all, leave us in the same boat with Mr. Bradley. If it is the very essence of thought, of the idea, to embody purpose, and if "The real as such is the complete embodiment in individual form and final fulfilment of the internal meaning [the purpose] of finite ideas,"[30] and if "To be, in the final sense, means to be just such a life, complete; present to experience, and conclusive of the search for perfection which every finite idea in its own measure undertakes whenever it seeks for any object,"[31] how can there be any place for thought "as such" in the ultimate reality? How can a purpose "fulfilled" and "completed" remain as a purpose? Is not this continual existence of "a fulfilled purpose" a paradox? And are we not then face to face with Mr. Bradley's reality in which "thought as such" has no place?

In general, then, the fundamental difficulty for both Locke and present epistemology appears to consist in a discrepancy between the conception of the nature of knowledge and reality in general and the accepted criteria in the particular instance. There is no organic connection between the satisfaction and dissatisfaction, the harmony and disorder, used as a standard of truth and error in the particular case and the general function of knowledge as reporting or algebraically symbolizing a completed and unchangeable reality lying beyond the process of knowledge.

Now, in such case the discrepancy may be charged to either side or both. It is the thesis of this paper that the seat of the difficulty here is in the general conception of knowledge and reality, not in the standard accepted for the particular instance, and that the problem of logic at present is to bring the general conception of knowledge and reality into agreement with these criteria of "order" and "confusion" of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, upon which we fall back in the concrete case. This demands a much further analysis of "the concrete case" than psychology and logic have yet made. Thus far the conceptions of reality as a

[30] Ibid., p. 339. Brackets mine.

[31] Ibid., p. 341.

complete immovable system, and of meaning as merely representative, and as given "loosed from reality," involved in the theories of the general nature and relations of knowledge and reality, have so obscured the situation in the concrete case that the necessity for further analysis of the latter has not been felt. "Disorder, confusion, and pain" have been accepted as merely arbitrary things, that our meanings are not accepted by reality. The present problem of logic is to work out just this connection between our meanings and the harmony and confusion, the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of concrete experience.

To sum up thus far, Locke, as most epistemology since, starts with meaning given apart from reality, the problem being to get them together. But it is found that, with the separation thus given, the connection must be given also. Then comes the difficulty of finding any place for effort, doubt, and error. On the other hand, when this connection is described as not given, but achieved through effort, it turns out that the connection can be made only through achieving the separation as well. For the separation that is achieved cannot be a complete separation. In an achieved separation the separated members are held in leash. It is Hegel's separation together – synthesis through analysis. We have found also that another phase of this same difficulty has been the attempt to confine movement, development, to the side of meaning only. And here the problem has been to see how the moving, shifting, active ideas can reflect a completed, immovable reality. Here, too, it may be remarked that Locke's system of ready-made, unchangeable ideas – direct offprints from the face of reality – seem to possess a decided advantage in such a representation over the "ideal constructions" of present logic. Locke, of course, does not keep consistently to these given, simple ideas for his knowledge of the real world. But the fact that he feels the need of them, when he is trying to bring meaning and reality together, is a point in favor of the consistency of Locke's conception of knowledge with his conception of the nature of ultimate reality. The internal difficulties of a representational epistemology certainly have not diminished since it has been forced by modern psychology to exchange the static for the dynamic idea. It would seem that the root of the central difficulty in present logic might be stated as the failure thus far to work out the implications of the thoroughly teleological and functional idea which it has accepted from modern psychology.[32] The reconstructive implications of the discussion thus far would sum themselves in the following propositions: (1) that reality can be identified with neither

[32] *Cf.* Schiller, "Axioms as Postulates," *Personal Idealism*, secs. 48, 49. *Cf.* also "The Functional *versus* the Representational Theory of Knowledge in Locke's Essay," *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, Vol. III, No. 1.

meaning as such nor existence as such; (2) that meaning is not given in separation from existence regarded as reality; (3) that the distinction of meaning and existence is one falling inside reality; (4) that meaning does not merely copy, symbolize, or report reality, but helps to constitute it; (5) that, as constituted by the meaning and existence, reality is not an immovable and completed system, but essentially dynamic and developmental.

In attempting a more positive statement of the relation between existence, meaning, and reality to which the difficulties encountered by both Locke and current epistemology point, it is to be said that such a statement here can be only a very general and schematic one. As a point of departure, let us take what was given above as one of the ways of stating the central difficulty and problem. The difficulty is that there appears no organic connection between ideas – meanings regarded as copies or symbols of reality conceived as a complete, fixed existence, and the harmony and disorder, the satisfaction and dissatisfaction, of everyday life which are accepted as the working criteria of truth and error in particular cases. What has the reflection of this fixed existence to do with the influence of ideas on our successes and failures? If we are told that our failures are due to "the collision of our ideas with reality," then we must ask for details. Just how does collision of our ideas with this existence beyond affect us? What are the links in the connection? Or, is this "collision with reality" after all but a name for our failures? The problem is, then, to discover some point of contact of ideas with the harmony and disorder, the satisfaction and pain, in the particular case, and to see whether this involves the representation of a complete and immovable reality.

As already remarked, psychology has been at work for some time on the first part of this problem – especially since it has felt the influence of the conceptions of biological evolution. And, as also remarked, it is the opposition between the accepted results of this work of psychology and old conceptions of knowledge and reality still retained that is responsible for the strained relations in the epistemological household. From his work thus far on this problem of the relation of ideas to "the disorder, confusion and pain" of life, the psychologist tells us that, following the method suggested by evolution, we get a great deal of introductory light on the question by noting the conditions under which ideas develop.[33] He points out, first, that activity in which ideas –

[33] Here, of course, we are warned that the existence and meaning of the idea are two quite different matters. The distinction goes without saying, but it is implied in the standpoint from which this paper is written that it is the connection rather than the distinction between these two phases that needs attention nowadays. The attempt to

meanings – are absent is in the relatively mechanical form of habit. By habit he means a co-ordination of activities in which the action at any given moment seems to be an adequate stimulus to further activity. In other words, a habit is a co-ordination of activities that can be wielded as a unit of activity in a larger whole. In such a negative statement of the conditions of ideas the positive side is implied. As this perfect continuity of stimulation, present in the habit form of activity, is marked by the absence of ideas, so we find ideas appearing at the point of interruption of this continuity in habit. And here, at the very outset, we reach again the center of the whole problem, viz., the relation of this appearance of ideas to the interruption of habit. Locke and all his successors virtually agree that the ideas do appear at this point. The question is: What is the significance and the manner of their appearance at this juncture? If it is their business to mirror a reality beyond this process of activity, there appears no particular reason why they should not perform that function as well in some other relation; for example, as an activity merely parallel and independent of habit.[34] In other words, is the "disorder, confusion, and pain" involved in this breach of continuity a mere arbitrary sign of "the collision" of some "mere idea" with "a reality beyond" or is it out of a collision, *within reality*, that the idea springs? From the former standpoint the query constantly arises: Whence and why the idea in the first place? And how and why the "collision?" Does reality impress or stimulate in some way a false idea in order to get up a collision with itself? And this is all aside from the difficulty already suggested as to how an immovable reality can *produce* anything, even a false idea, to say nothing of a "collision."

In attempting to trace in a very general way the connection between ideas and this interruption in the continuity of habit, we need to start with some account of this interruption itself. For if we conceive this interruption as coming from without, *e.g.,* as arising from a collision of habit – not ideas in this case – with an immovable reality, the entire web of Locke's difficulties settles about us at once. Stripped of metaphor,

separate the members of this distinction and farm them out to different disciplines for separate treatment is one way of stating what appears to the writer to be at the bottom of the present confusion between psychology and logic, and what is back of the growing conviction that our epistemology needs to be psychologized and our psychology – *e.g.*, the doctrine of parallelism – epistemologized. *Cf.* Professor Dewey's article on "Psychology as Philosophic Method," *Mind*, Vol. XI, O.S., No. 42.

[34] This is, indeed, to the writer the meaning of the whole paradoxical doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism. It is an expression of the failure to find any connection between the idea's alleged office of reporting a static "reality beyond" and its manifest dynamic relation to habit as revealed by present psychology. *Cf.* Mr. Bawden's article, "The Functional and the Psychical," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XI, pp. 474–84; also Part III of Mr. Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*.

what is the meaning of this "collision"? Just how does habit run against this inscrutable and immovable reality? Moreover, if the collision is to be remedied, it must be in this case by habit "backing out" and reconstructing itself. No concessions can be expected from reality. And if the idea is somehow to be the instrument of this reconstruction, how can it do so by merely "reflecting" the static reality? At any rate, two kinds of ideas would appear to be needed, one to "reflect" the static reality, and another, more flexible and dynamic, to help reorganize habit.

It would seem, then, that habit must be regarded as somehow developing its own interruptions. And, after all, this would not seem to be such a difficult conception. It is scarcely more than the commonplace notion, the philosophical significance of which Hegel perhaps first pointed out, that activity is conceived as constantly producing new conditions of its further ongoing; that in activity there must be a constant reorganization of the results of the activity back into the process. This is, of course, equivalent to saying that, in the last analysis, activity cannot be stated in terms of mere habit. It implies that *activity in any final just sense must include both a mechanical and a reconstructing function.* As habit constitutes the mechanical, the conserving materializing function, so the idea is the radical reconstructing function in activity. Habit and thought are thus constituent poles of experience. As such, neither can be defined apart from the other. Each limits the other in every particular case, but neither can be regarded as "the ultimate" out of which the other is absolutely evolved. Thus neither habit nor its interruption can be defined apart from some desire, some end. Walking or creeping, as a habit, must be defined with reference to some desire, *e.g.*, a desire for food; but this desire is in turn a part of the process of reconstructing a breach in the process of assimilation. While habit must thus refer to some desire, some end, for its definition, it is, in turn, out of the necessity of meeting new conditions *created by its own work* that new ends, new ideas, arise.[35]

From this very formal statement of the relation between ideas and habit it is apparent: (1) that ideas are here regarded, not as merely reflecting or symbolizing a static reality, but *as doing actual work in reorganizing habit,* a work that may involve symbolizing, but a symbolizing that is a part of an actual reconstruction; (2) the materials of this reconstruction are not given from a reality beyond the process. The material is none other than the disorganized habit itself. There is thus perfect continuity between the material and the use to which it is to be put. With the material for the reorganization given from a reality

[35] *Cf.* Professor Dewey, "Reflex Arc Concept," *Psychological Review*, Vol. III.

beyond there can be no assurance that it will answer the purpose. If it does, it is only by the grace of the Deity or the "uniformity of nature."

Such a conception of the logical function of habit makes possible also a consistent view of the place of sensation in knowledge. So far sensation has played a very equivocal role in epistemology. On the one hand, it is that "in which reality is given." It is "the point of direct contact with reality." Locke says his simple ideas of sensation are all true to reality. So far sensationalism. But at this point the rationalist observes that if we really do come into "direct contact with reality" in sensation, if the "simple ideas of sensation" are true to reality, and if it is the business of perception to "report reality," then why go on with thought? Why construct "complex ideas" in which we are all the while getting farther and farther from reality? The fact that we do and must go on thinking and constructing complex ideas – continues the rationalist – shows that sensation, instead of giving us reality, gives us only appearances. And, beside these different views of the relation of sensation to reality, no very consistent view appears, in either camp, of just the nature and function of sensation itself. Now it is stated in almost purely physiological terms, and again it appears to almost usurp the work of thought. But, if we find ideas arising at the point or disintegration of habit, and if we take sensation as the first appearance in consciousness of this breach – to use Mr. James's phrase, "The first thing in the way of consciousness" – it would seem to bring us nearer a much-needed definiteness in the conception of the logical significance of sensation. Here sensation, as the first shock of this interruption of habit constitutes the "this," demanding interpretation – meaning. And this demand for meaning is something more than a demand for more representation; it is a demand for reconstruction.

But before going farther in this very general and dogmatic fashion, let us resort to Locke's favorite illustration of "the solution of gold in *aqua regia*." First let us note that the process of manipulating gold in liquids involves a circuit of visual, tactile-motor habits, serving some aim, *e.g.*, that of cleaning the gold. Now, the rupture of such a circuit may come either as a visual sensation, in the disappearance of the gold from sight, or as a tactile-motor sensation, in the failure to touch the gold on reaching for it. And here again, however "involuntary" this breach may be, it is to be noted that it must come as a break in, and therefore entirely in terms of, *the activities already going on*.[36] If the interruption be due to "a collision with reality," it must be a reality in the form of the visual-tactile-motor processes already involved. How could there be

[36] *Cf.* Baldwin, *Mental Development – Methods and Processes*, 2nd ed., p. 256.

a "collision" with any other reality? The coming to consciousness of the visual-tactile-motor processes means that what has been a circle of mutually stimulating activities is now broken up and is demanding reconstruction. And the first shock of this "break" is felt as the visual or the tactile-motor sensation – the "this" demanding interpretation and reconstruction.

Now, if we regard the "this," *i.e.*, this mass of visual-tactile-motor habit material thrown up into consciousness as the "existence" which the ideas are to *mean,* we have, at any rate, an "existence" not far "beyond," nor one to be merely copied by the ideas, but an existence which constitutes the very material of the ideas. It is, to be sure, a very active existence; but then ideas, according to present psychology, are very dynamic affairs. Besides, we have already seen that the difficulty all along has been to find an agreement between these very active ideas and an inert, static existence. Such a dynamic existence would also seem promising in the effort to overcome the too great "looseness" hitherto necessarily insisted upon between the existence and the ideas. "Necessarily," because it has been only through such a "loosing" from its static existence that the idea could gain freedom and flexibility enough to be of service in "the conduct of life" – though, to be sure, this freedom becomes a serious obstacle to its reunion with existence.

Passing now to the function of *meaning,* it might appear that with "existence" made so dynamic as above, the active ideas as the embodiment of meaning might now be regarded as the mere "symbols" or "representatives" of existence. This, indeed, would seem to be more nearly possible now that the discrepancy between an inert existence and its active representatives is removed. But if this were the sole function of the ideal construction, it is difficult to see how it would help matters. Indeed, it would seem to make matters worse, since all it could do would be to bring the disintegration of habit into consciousness. If the only business of thought were to go on reporting this disintegration of habit, consciousness would soon be reduced to a vast pile of psychical scrap-iron.

It has just been said, if mere reporting or symbolizing existence were "the sole function of meaning," etc., this implies that representation, symbolization, etc., is a part of the process of meaning. When the breach in the visual-tactile-motor co-ordination, as above sketched, comes, the first step in the process of reconstruction is to define and locate the interruption. This involves a symbolizing, a "reflecting" if you please, of the activities concerned. But, once more, even this first process of reflection is not a *mere* reflection. It is a reflection in which the work of reconstruction has already begun. For when this interruption passes beyond the stage of the mere "shock and inarticulate presence" of

sensation, into ideas, into *meaning,* the very fact that the old co-ordination expressed in our illustration, in "gold insoluble" is reported as possibly broken, involves the beginning of the reconstruction expressed in "gold soluble." Unless experience is to fall into absolute chaos, into a state of mere negation, one co-ordination can be disintegrated only through the beginning of its own reconstruction.[37] With absolutely no element of reconstruction present, consciousness would lapse into the mere "shock" of sensation. Meaning, then, in its very beginning, stands for an actual work of reconstruction, not for a mere reflection of the materials to be reconstructed.

With existence interpreted as the material to be reconstructed, and meaning as the process of reconstruction, the question of their relation should have, perhaps, a little special notice. First, it is apparent that the connection here required is of a very different sort from that demanded between a static existence and its representative. Here the relationship is not one of "coexistence" and "correspondence point for point," but is that of the interpenetration of material and process. Nor are existence and meaning here "given apart," the problem being to work them into this relationship. As the interrupted habit is "material" in the process of reconstruction *only*, so there are no ideas, no empty meanings, wandering about unattached to any existence. As there is no mere process of thought, grinding away, as an empty mill waiting for grist, so there is no pile of habit fragments lying about as material waiting to be put into the hopper. Here existence and meaning, the material and the process of reconstruction, develop together as the two complementary, inseparable, and constitutive functions of one inclusive process. In short, the problem of connection with which Locke struggled disappears, simply because there is no such separation of meaning from existence as that with which he started. Meaning here is not "given loosed from existence." From the very outset of the experience, beginning in the visual-tactile-motor sensation interpreted as the "disappearance of gold," existence, as constituted by the activities involved in the habit matrix, is the very *Stoff* and content of the idea, of the meaning; and the latter is simply this material in process of reconstruction.

Locke's unconscious tribute to this organic relation between existence and meaning appears, as has already been noted, in his answering the inquiry after the validity of his simple ideas with an account of their origin; a procedure for which Locke has been much condemned, but which, after all, if he could have freed it from the conception of the

[37] This is, of course, "the positive character of negation" upon which present logic insists. *Cf.* Bosanquet, *Logic*, Book I, chap. vii, and Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, chap. iii.

completed character of existence and of the merely representing function of the idea, would have made impossible the extreme separation of the problems of origin and validity so strenuously insisted upon by most of the neo-Kantian epistemology.

With this very general interpretation of meaning, existence, and reality, and their relation to each other, the question which has been urged so insistently throughout the discussion, upon other views, should be noticed – the question, namely, of a standard of truth and error, including an interpretation of doubt and certainty. If meaning is the reconstructive function of activity, what is to determine the limits of this reconstruction in any particular case? When is the reconstruction "true"? And if meaning is in such close connection with the material habit, if the latter is indeed the very *Stoff* of the meaning, why should there ever be any uncertainty and error?

First, let us recall that the problem of reconstruction is not one of reconstruction of habit at large. It is the reconstruction of a certain set of activities already engaged in a specific work, *e.g.*, manipulating gold in liquids. Here in a very general form our criterion is already in sight. If the disintegration of the co-ordination of eye and hand, activities involved in manipulating gold in liquids, constitutes the *demand* for reconstruction, the restoration of a co-ordination between the eye and hand, *with reference to handling gold in liquids,* must constitute the criterion for the completion, the "truth," of the reconstruction. The conclusion, "gold-soluble-in-*aqua-regia*," means the establishment of a new habit of manipulating gold in liquids. Here "agreement," harmony, between meaning and existence does not mean that one copies the other; on the contrary, it means that the one responds to the demand of the other for *change*, for *reconstruction*. The only way, then, in which the idea can be *false* to "the reality as it appears in sensation" is through its failure – not to copy, but to change it, for the only reality appearing in sensation is just the disintegrated mass of habit demanding reorganization.

If the "truth" of the meaning consists in its being a reconstruction of habit with reference to a certain demand, what shall be said of uncertainty and error? We have already seen that meaning, as a reconstruction, is not a mere reflection of work already done, but is a new work, a new creation achieved. It is the former interpretation, indeed, as has been repeatedly pointed out, that makes it so difficult to account for error and to prevent knowledge from being "trifling." But if thought means an actually new work to be done, manifestly at the outset there must be uncertainty, not of reaching *any* outcome – this would land us in the paralysis of absolute skepticism – but uncertainty concerning the exact character of the outcome. That is, uncertainty means that thought,

instead of being a symbol of an already developed reality, is itself the instrument of development. It means that life is not given, but must be won. On the other hand, the "perfect certainty" for which Locke longed would mean the complete reduction of experience to a mechanism, in which there would be no place because no demand for thought, indeed for consciousness of any kind.

And actual error – failure, what is it to mean? Locke's answer is: "The disagreement of ideas with reality;" Mr. Bradley's: "The collision of a mere idea with reality" – the "rejection," "repudiation" of meaning by reality. And the signs of this "disagreement," "collision," and "rejection" are the "disorder, confusion, and pain" of everyday life. We have already seen how difficult it is to find any connection here between the sign and the thing signified. But if we can regard the "reality" in this case as the mass of disorganized habit demanding reconstruction, and if we can take this "disagreement," "collision," and "rejection" to mean that, the work of reconstruction being an actual work to be done and not being performed at a single stroke, it may therefore at a given stage be incomplete *with reference to what is wanted*,[38] it would seem we should have reached a basis for the conception of error which would make possible some connection between it and its sign. For surely it is not difficult to see the connection between the incompleted reconstruction of these disorganized activities and "disorder, confusion, and pain" as its signs. And at this point it might be said that in a certain sense this "disorder, confusion, and pain" is due as much to a lack of "collision" as to the collision of ideas with reality. That is to say, what is needed at this point is a further working over of the habit material, in a sense more "collision" of habit and ideas. And here, too, we may say of error, as of doubt, that it is not failure in a final sense, it is simply unfinished work.

Here an important objection will be urged to this statement of the meaning of truth and error. It will be said that this conception of the criterion runs into the infinite "regressus." Thus the specific interest, *e.g.*, manipulating gold in liquids, with reference to which the habit, its interruption, and the reconstruction itself are defined, is itself an ideal construction and must in turn be referred to other interests and habits for its definition, and so on without end. It is, indeed, just this everlasting "othering" of thought that is its bane for all representational views

[38] "Truth and error are essentially relative to the interest of the subject. To put a question seriously is to *want* to know the answer. A person cannot be right or wrong without reference to some interest or purpose. A man wanders about a town… . Just so far as he has no definite aim he cannot go astray." – Stout, essay on "Error," *Personal Idealism*, p. 10; *cf.* also same essay, sec. vi.

of knowledge. But let us note first that this "regressus" objection derives its force from the assumption that the thought-habit form of experience is *transitory*; and that it must, therefore, be referred to something "beyond" for a beginning and an end. With this assumption in mind, the reference of a particular work of thought to some interest involving previous thought must appear to be in the elephant-tortoise class. But freed from this assumption, this "regressus" need mean only that we conceive experience as a process the results of which at any given point constitute the material for and stimulus to further activity and that we accept experience thus conceived as our "ultimate reality." It means merely the commonplace enough fact that interest at any given moment is the outgrowth of previous experience, and cannot be defined apart from it, and also that it is the further development of previous experience – a development, not toward an ultimate, fixed goal, taken as a standard, but a development in the sense that the present is built out of the past. Stated from the negative side, it means that the "disorder, confusion, and pain," the relief of which is accepted as the sign of the "truth" of the reconstruction, is not mere "disorder, confusion, and pain" at large, but is always of a certain kind, and that this kind is determined with reference to an interest which is the outgrowth of previous experience. Thus the disappearance of gold in *aqua regia* produces "disorder, confusion, and pain" only to one already manipulating gold in liquid. On the other hand, the fact that the old process of manipulating gold in liquid falls into disorder and confusion means that it reaches no abiding form; that in the very process of its own ongoing it develops new activities which must be reorganized into it. Thus again does experience, as constituted by the interacting functions of thought and habit appear as the process of eternally rebuilding itself out of the products of its own activity.

Another and perhaps more fundamental way of putting the objection just noted is that this statement of the criterion of truth and error, in terms of a concrete interest, does not do justice to the *universality* of meaning. If the work of thought be "true" when it relieves the disorder, confusion, and pain of the situation here and now, whence its universality? Whence the conviction of the value of the work done here and now for other situations? What is the ground of that "probability" to which Locke finally appeals for "practical certainty," but for which he could offer no explanation but the will of the Deity or the uniformity of nature? First, it maybe remarked that all theories of knowledge, from Locke on, holding to an immovable reality and the representational function of thought, have certainly had difficulties enough with this phase of the problem, and whenever they have gone beyond some form of the pre-established harmony view of universality, it appears they have

done so at the cost of either the complete and immovable character of reality, or the merely representative character of thought, or both. We have, of course, for a long time been quite certain that the universal must somehow he present in the particular. Just how this occurs is the problem. We have stood bravely, too, for the "concrete" as opposed to the "formal" universal; yet when one looks for statements of the *method* of this "concrete universal," they turn out to be either little more than formal descriptions of the necessity for it, or statements of it which are hard to reconcile with a static reality and a merely "reporting" knowledge. All accounts of the concrete universal, from Hegel on, which have attempted to do more than point out the demand for it, have based it on the conception of growth, development, involving *purpose*. One or two passages from current literature will suffice for examples:

> In this class of objects (mechanical devices, *e.g.*, a watch) we may fearlessly say that it is the *purpose* which is the essence, and that generic judgment rests on the knowledge of essence. In all other classes of objects such a view has degrees of precariousness, and can only be applied to the purpose as immanent, and therefore as not determinate, and as uncertain in its boundaries. Nevertheless, when we predicate in the organic world "growth," "development," "self-preservation," "irritability," *we are really referring mechanical processes to an idea of life – an idea of self-relation*, of "inner" and "outer," which is *a* higher result, though it *is* a result, of their purely mechanical nature.[39]

We have already seen the part which purpose plays in Mr. Royce's account of meaning. The following passages may be added:

> Universal judgments arise in the realm where experience and idea have already fused into one whole: and this is precisely the realm of internal meanings. Here one constructs and observes the consequences of one's construction. But the construction is at once an experience of fact and an idea; an expression of a *purpose* and an observation of what happens. Upon the basis of such ideal constructions one makes universal judgments.[40]

Again:

[39] Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 237. Italics and parenthesis mine.

[40] *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I, p. 289.

> But what then is the test of the truthful correspondence of an idea to its object, if object and idea can differ so widely? The only answer is in terms of *purpose*. The idea is true if it possesses the sort of correspondence to its object that the idea itself wants to possess.[41]

The significance of these statements of meaning in terms of "purpose" is that it promises an intrinsic basis for universality and unity. Meaning as purpose at once becomes determinative of its own "object." The object it constructs, in realizing itself, must be universally valid for *that* purpose. Material that cannot serve the purpose cannot become its "object." The object is simply the expression of the purpose. Here too we have a basis for a unity of "the many in the one" other than the unity of mere identity. We have already seen the difficulty and failure in the attempt to construct a unity out of entities either physical or psychical, or a composite of both. But the idea as purpose arises out of the demand for a reconstruction of disintegrated habit. As "an embodiment of purpose" it is precisely the business of the idea to reorganize, to unify this manifold of disintegrated habit. As existences, there is no possible way for this manifold to become one. They can be unified only in purpose.

Now it would seem that these statements of meaning in terms of purpose should shut out at once all static conceptions of reality and all conceptions of meaning as merely representative; for it would seem to be of the very essence of a purpose or a plan to be reconstructive. But the force of these implications appears broken when we discover that the "purpose" which the idea embodies is, after all, not that of reorganizing the disintegrated habit to the relief of the "disorder, confusion, and pain" of the present situation, but is that of corresponding in a "partial" and "fragmentary" manner with "its own final and complete form" eternally fixed in the Absolute.

Moreover, such an interpretation of the purpose embodied in the idea seems to offer little basis for that intrinsic and "concrete universality" for which the very appeal to purpose is made. It is very difficult to see what basis this "partial and fragmentary correspondence" with the absolute idea can have other than some sort of a pre-established harmony. And as for the presence of the universal in the particular – the concrete universal – how can the universal, conceived as an "eternal," "completed," and fixed "whole of content," be present in a purpose which is confessedly but a mere shred of the whole? On the other hand, as before observed, if in the universal the particular – the finite, is "completely fulfilled," how can there be left any particular in the

[41] Ibid., p. 306. Italics mine.

universal? The complete fulfilment of the particular finite purpose is its annihilation. And with the disappearance of these finite purposes, have we anything left for our universal but Spinoza's abstract identity?

Now if, instead of regarding the idea as a "having" a purpose, we take it as *constituting* the defined purpose or plan of action, involving the construction of an object, through which some "disorder, confusion, and pain" is to be relieved; and if we further recall that there is no other material for this construction than just the mass of disintegrated habit out of which the purpose itself, under the stimulus of the disorder and pain of the disintegration have sprung, it seems we have a basis for the universality at once intrinsic and concrete. Here the "universal in the particular" means that the particular purpose is the outgrowth of previous experience and has no other material for its realization than the results of this preceding activity; and also it means that this work of reconstruction must in turn become the stimulus to and material for further experience. The "particular in the universal" here means that the purpose is not mere reconstruction at large, but is made in response to a specific demand. The unity here is not the static unity of whole and part, but the unity of *growth*. The necessity and universality of the reconstruction here made in response to a specific need is grounded in the fact that the experience here and now, with gold in liquids, is the inevitable outgrowth of past activity, and that it is also the only basis of any future experience with gold in liquids.[42]

Hence the conviction that the future is as secure as the present and past. It is, indeed, a curious notion that the future alone is "contingent," while the past is fixed and abiding; that "what's done is done." For in every day's work in history and science, in every new problem solved, in every new advance in any direction, it is precisely the *past* that is being reconstructed. In our illustration it is the old construction, "gold-insoluble," that is changed. The past is still in the making. The past, as well as the future, is "contingent." On the other hand, there can be no future experience which is not built on this past and present reconstruction. Whatever future comes must be continuous with the present and past. The world may come to an end; it cannot be turned into absolute chaos. This is, of course, only the Kantian platitude that the future must be "intelligible."

In this evolutional character of experience we find the ground for that "practical certainty" of the connection between meaning and reality which Locke, to the last, could refer only to the Deity or to "the uniformity of nature." With experience conceived as a process of reconstructing itself out of the materials of its own production, there must be

[42] Cf. Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 323 ff.

continuity. But when we say, "The future must be continuous with the past and present," we, of course, cannot mean that the present construction will be maintained in that future in its present form. It too must be disintegrated and serve as "material" for the reconstruction of farther experience. If just when and where and how it is to serve were determined, we should have, indeed, that "perfect certainty" of which Locke dreamed, but we should have too an Absolute in which there would be no future; in which the last reconstruction had been made, the last problem solved, the last battle fought – a "complete," "perfect," Absolute, if you will, but an Absolute which, if we are to construe out of our present psychology, would be merely a vast system of habit, an Absolute in which there would be no place, because no demand, for either thought or feeling. Probability, confidence, faith, hope, all mean that experience is a *re*-construction. Uncertainty, doubt, the problem, the need of reflection, of courage, of work, mean that experience is a re-*construction*.

In this attempt at some very general reconstructive statements no special paragraph has been devoted to the conception of ultimate reality. It has been manifest throughout that reality is here conceived as just this process of experience of which "existence" and "meaning" have been described *as constitutive functions*. Such a reality is, of course, not of "the-same-yesterday-today-and-forever" type. It is not a reality which gathers all truth into one, completed, eternal whole, and in which "all purposes are completed and fulfilled." It is not a reality in which all thought and effort disappear in a vast becalmed sea of everlasting immediacy. It is a reality of activity, of development, whose own very ongoing is ever creating a demand for new purposings, new thought, now effort; a reality that promises – not "eternal rest," but Eternal *Life*.

SOME LOGICAL ASPECTS OF PURPOSE

"Some Logical Aspects of Purpose." In John Dewey et al., *Studies in Logical Theory. Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, Second Series*, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), pp. 341–382.

INTRODUCTORY

Whenever and wherever it was discovered that the content of experience as given in immediate perception could be reconstructed through ideas, then and there began to emerge such questions as these: What is the significance of this reconstructive power? What is the relation between it and the immediate experience? What is the relative value of each in experience as a whole? What is their relation to truth and error? If thinking leads to truth, and thought must yet get its material from perception, how then shall the product of thought escape infection from the material? On the other hand, if truth is to be found in the immediate experience, can it here be preserved from the blighting effects of thought? For so insistent and pervasive is this activity of thought that it appears to penetrate into the sanctum of perception itself. Turning to a third possibility, if it should be found that truth and error are concerned with both – that they are products of the combined activity of perception and reflection – then just what does each do? And what in their operations marks the difference between truth and error? Or still again, if truth and error cannot be found in the operations of perception and reflection as such, then they must be located in the relation of these processes to something else. If so, what is this something else? Out of such questions as these is logic born.

There may be those who will object to some of these questions as "logical" problems – those who would limit logic to a description of the forms and processes of reconstruction, relegating the question of the criterion of truth and error to "epistemology." This objection we must here dismiss summarily by saying that, by whatever name it is called, a treatment of the forms and processes of thought must deal with the criterion of truth and error, since these different "forms" are just those which thought assumes in attempting to reach truth under different conditions.

Certainly in the beginning the Greeks regarded their newly discovered

power of thought as anything but formal. Indeed, it soon became so "substantial" that it was regarded as simply a new world of fact, of existence alongside of, or rather above, the world of perception. But Socrates hailed ideas as deliverers from the contradictions and paradoxes into which experience interpreted in terms of immediate sense-perception had fallen. In the concept Socrates found a solution for the then pressing problems of social life. The Socratic universal is not a mere empty form which thought imposes upon the world. It is something which thought creates in order that a life of social interaction and reciprocity may go on. This need not mean that the Greeks were reflectively conscious of this, but that this was the way the concept was actually used and developed by Socrates.

In attempting to formulate the relation between this new world of ideas and immediate sense-experience, Plato constructed his scheme of substantiation and participation. The Platonic doctrine of substantiation and participation is an expression of the conviction that anything so valuable as Socrates had shown ideas to be could not be merely formal or unreal. Up to the discovery of these ideas reality lay in the "substances" of perception. Hence in order to have that reality to which their worth, their value in life, entitled them, the ideas must be substantiated.

This introduction of the newly discovered ideas into the world of substances and reality wrought, of course, a change in the conception of the latter – a change which has well-nigh dominated the entire philosophic development ever since. Let us recall that the aim of Socrates was to find something that would prevent society from going to pieces under the influence of the disintegrating conception of experience as a mere flux of given immediate content. Now, in the concepts Socrates discovered the basis for just this much-needed wholeness and stability. Moreover, the fact that unity and stability were the actual social needs of the hour led not only to the concepts which furnished them being conceived as substantial and real, but to their being regarded as a higher type of reality, as "more real" than the given, immediate experiences of perception. They were higher and more real because, just then, they answered the pressing social need.

The ideas supplied this unity because they furnished ends, purposes, to the given material of perception. The given is now given for something; for something more, too, than mere contemplation. Socrates also showed, by the most acute analysis, that the content of these ends, these purposes, was social through and through.

From the ethical standpoint this teleological character of the idea is clearly recognized. But as "real," the ideas must be stated in the metaphysical terms of substance and attribute. Here the social need is abstracted from and lost to sight. The fundamental attributes of the ideas

are now a metaphysical unity and stability. Hence unity and stability, wholeness and completeness, are the very essence of reality, while multiplicity and change constitute the nature of appearance. Thus does Plato's reality become, as Windelband says, "an immaterial eleaticism which seeks true being in the ideas without troubling itself about the world of generation and occurrence which it leaves to perception and opinion."[1]

Now it is the momentum of this conception of reality as a stable and complete system of absolute ideas, the development of which we have just roughly sketched, that is so important historically. Why this conception of reality, which apparently grew out of a particular historical situation, should have dominated philosophic theory for over two thousand years appears at first somewhat puzzling. Those who still hold and defend it will of course say that this survival is evidence of its validity. But, after all, our human world may be yet very young. It may be that "a thousand years are but as yesterday." At any rate philosophy has never been in a hurry to reconstruct conceptions which served their day and generation with such distinction as did the Platonic conception of reality. And this is true to the evolutionary instinct that experience has only its own products as material for further construction. On the other hand, the principle of evolution with equal force demands that only as *material,* not as final forms of experience, shall these products continue. Ii may be that philosophy has not yet taken the conception of evolution quite seriously. At all events it is certain that long after it has been found that, instead of being eternal and complete, the concept undergoes change, that it has simply the stability and wholeness demanded by a particular and concrete situation; after it has been discovered, in other words, that the stability and wholeness, instead of attaching to the content of an idea, are simply the functions of any content used as a purpose – after all this has been accepted in psychology, the conception of truth and reality which arose under an entirely different conception of the nature of thought still survives.

This change in the conception of the character of the ideas, with no corresponding change in the conception of reality, marks the divorce of thought and reality and the rise of the epistemological problem. Let us recall that in Plato the relation between the higher and ultimate reality, as constituted by the complete and "Eternal Ideas," and the lower reality of perception, is that of archetype and ectype. Perceptions attempt to imitate and copy the ideas. Now, when the ideas are found to be changing, and when further the interpenetration of perception and conception is discovered, reality as fixed and complete must be located elsewhere. And just as in the old system it was the business of perception to imitate the

[1] *History of Philosophy* (Tuft's translation), p. 117.

"Eternal Ideas," so here it is still assumed that thought is to imitate the reality wherever now it is to be located. And as regards the matter of location, the old conception is not abandoned. The elder Plato is mighty yet. Reality must still be a completed system of fixed and eternal "things in themselves," "relations," or "noumena" of some sort which *our* ideas, now constituted by both perception and conceptional processes, are still to "imitate," "copy," "reflect," "represent," or at least "symbolize" in some fashion.

From this point on, then, thought has two functions: one, to help experience meet and reorganize into itself the results of its own past activity; the other, to reflect or represent in some sense the absolute system of reality. For a very long time the latter has continued to constitute the logical problem, the former being relegated to the realm of psychology.

But this discovery of the reconstructive function of the idea and its assignment to the jurisdiction of psychology did not leave logic where it was before, nor did it lighten its task. Logic could not shut its eyes to this "psychological" character of the idea.[2] Indeed, logic had to take the idea as psychology described it, then do the best it could with it for its purpose.

The embarrassment of logic by this reconstructive character of the idea even Aristotle discovered to some extent in the relation of the Platonic perceptions to the eternal ideas. He found great difficulty in getting a flowing stream of consciousness to imitate or even symbolize an eternally fixed and completed reality. And since we have discovered, in addition, that the idea is so palpably a reconstructive activity, the difficulties have not diminished.

In such a situation it could only be a question of time until solutions of the problem should be sought by attempting to bring together these two functions of the idea. Perhaps after all the representation of objects in an absolute system is involved in the reconstruction of our experience. Or perhaps what appears as reconstructions of our experience – as desiring, struggling, deliberating, choosing, willing, as sorrows and joys, failures and triumphs – are but the machinery by which the absolute system is represented. At any rate, these two functions surely cannot be regarded as belonging to the idea as color and form belong to a stone. We should never be satisfied with such a brute dualism as this.

Without any further historical sketch of attempts at this synthesis, I desire to pass at once to a consideration of what I am sure everyone will agree must stand as one of the most brilliant and in everyway notable

[2] *Cf.* Professor J. R. Angell's article, "Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy," *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, Vol. III, pp. 10–12; also *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XII, No. 3. *Cf.* also Mr Schiller's essay on "Axioms as Postulates" in *Personal Idealism*.

efforts in this direction – Mr. Royce's Aberdeen lectures on "The World and the Individual." It is the purpose here to examine that part of these lectures, and it is the heart of the whole matter, in which the key to the solution of the problem of the relation between ideas and reality is sought precisely in the purposive character of the idea. This will be found especially in the "Introduction" and in the chapter on "Internal and External Meaning of Ideas."[3]

I. THE PURPOSIVE CHARACTER OF IDEAS

With his unerring sense for fundamentals, Mr. Royce begins by telling us that the first thing called for by the problem of the relation of ideas to reality is a discussion of the nature of ideas. Here Mr. Royce says he shall "be guided by certain psychological analyses of the mere contents of our consciousness, which have become prominent in recent discussion"[4]

> Your intelligent ideas of things never consist of mere imagery of the thing, but always involve a consciousness of how you propose to act toward the thing of which you have ideas… . Complex scientific ideas viewed as to their conscious significance are, as Professor Stout has well said, plans of action, ways of constructing the object of your scientific consciousness… . By the word idea, then, as we shall use it, when, after having criticised opposing theory, we come to state in these lectures our own thesis, I shall mean in the end any state of consciousness, whether simple or complex, which when present is then and there viewed as at least a partial expression, or embodiment of a single conscious purpose… . In brief, an idea in my present definition may, and in fact always does, if you please, appear to be representative of a fact existent beyond itself. But the *primary* character which makes it an idea is *not its representative character,* is not its vicarious assumption of the responsibility of standing for a being beyond itself, but is its inner character as *relatively fulfilling the purpose,* that is as presenting the partial fulfilment of the purpose which is in the consciousness of the moment wherein the idea takes place.[5]… . Now this purpose, just in so far as it gets a present conscious embodiment in the contents, and in the form of the complex state called the idea, constitutes what I shall hereafter call the internal meaning of the idea.[6]… . But ideas often seem

[3] From this point on this paper is an expansion of some paragraphs, pp. 11–13, in an article on "Existence, Meaning, and Reality," printed from Vol. III of the First Series of the *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*.

[4] P. 22.

[5] Pp. 22, 23; italics mine.

[6] P. 25.

> to have meaning; yes, as one must add, finite ideas always undertake or appear to have a meaning that is not exhausted by this conscious internal meaning presented and relatively fulfilled at the moment when the idea is there for our finite view. The melody sung, the artist's idea, the thought of your absent friend, a thought on which you love to dwell, all these not merely have their obvious internal meaning as meeting a conscious purpose by their very presence, but also they at least appear to have that other sort of meaning, that reference beyond themselves to objects, that cognitive relation to outer facts, that attempted correspondence with outer facts, which many accounts of our ideas regard as their primary inexplicable and ultimate character. I call this second, and for me still problematic, and derived aspect of the nature of ideas, their apparently external meaning.[7]

From all this it is quite evident that Mr. Royce accepts and welcomes the results of the work of modern psychology on the nature of the idea. The difficulty will come in making the connection between these accepted results and the Platonic conception of ultimate reality as stated in the following:

> To be means simply to express, to embody the complete internal meaning of a *certain absolute system of ideas*. A system, moreover, which is genuinely implied in the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea, however fragmentary.[8]

It may be well to note here in passing that, notwithstanding the avowed subordination here of the representative to the reconstructive character of the ideas, the former becomes very important in the chapter on the relation of internal to external meaning, where the problem of truth and error is considered.

In this account of the two meanings of the idea, which I have tried to state as nearly as possible in the author's own words, there appear some conceptions of idea, of purpose, and of their relation to each other, that play an important part in the further treatment and in determining the final outcome. In the description of the internal meaning there appear to be two quite different conceptions of the relation of idea to purpose. One regards the idea as itself constituting the purpose or plan of action; the other describes the idea as "the partial fulfilment" of the purpose. (1) "Complex scientific *ideas,* viewed as to their conscious significance, are,

[7] P. 26.

[8] P. 36; italics mine.

as Professor Stout has well said, *plans of action.*" (2) "You sing to yourself a melody; you are then and there conscious that the melody, as you hear yourself singing it, *partially fulfils* and embodies a purpose."[9] When we come to the problem of the relation between the internal and external meaning, we shall find that the idea as internal meaning comes into a third relation to purpose, viz., that of *having* the further purpose to agree or correspond to the external meaning. "Is the correspondence reached between idea and object the precise correspondence that the idea itself intended? If it is, the idea is true… . Thus it is not mere agreement, but intended agreement, that constitutes truth."[10] Thus the idea is (1) the purpose, (2) the partial fulfilment of the purpose, and (3) has a further purpose – to correspond to an object in the "absolute system of ideas."

The first statement of the internal meaning as constituting the plan or purpose is, I take it, the conception of the internal meaning as an ideal construction which gives a working form, a definition to the "indefinite sort of restlessness" and blind feeling of dissatisfaction out of which the need of and demand for thought arises.[11] This accords with the scientific conception of the idea as a working hypothesis. If this interpretation of idea were steadily followed throughout, it is difficult to see how it could fail to lead to a conception of reality quite different from that described as "a certain absolute system of ideas."

The second definition of internal meaning is the one in which it is stated as the "partial expression," "embodiment," and "fulfilment" of a single conscious purpose, and in which subsequently and consequently the idea is identified with "any conscious act," for example, singing. The first part of the statement appears to say that the idea of a melody is in "partial fulfilment" of the idea regarded as the purpose to sing the melody. But, as the first statement of internal meaning implies, how can one have a purpose to sing the melody except in and through the idea? It is precisely the construction of an idea that transforms the vague "indefinite restlessness" and dissatisfaction into a purpose. The idea is the defining, the sharpening of the blind activity of mere sensation, mere want, into a plan of action.

However, Mr. Royce meets this difficulty at once by the statement that the term "idea" here not only covers the activity involved in forming the idea, *e.g.*, the idea of singing, but includes the action of singing, which fulfils this purpose. "In the same sense *any conscious act* at the moment

[9] Pp. 22, 23; italics mine.

[10] P. 307.

[11] P. 327.

when you perform it not merely expresses, but is, in my present sense, an idea."[12]

But this sort of an adjustment between the idea as the purpose and as the fulfilment of the purpose raises a new question. What here becomes of the distinction between immediate and mediating experience? Surely there is a pretty discernible difference between experience as a purposive idea and the experience which fulfils this purpose. To call them both "ideas" is at least confusing, and indeed it appears that it is just this confusion that obscures the fundamental difficulty in dealing, later on, with the problem of truth and error. To be sure, the very formation of the idea as the purpose, the "plan of action," is the beginning of the relief from the "indefinite restlessness." On the other hand, it defines and sharpens the dissatisfaction. When this vague unrest takes the form of a purpose to attain food or shelter, or to sing in tune, it is of course the first step toward solution. But this very definition of the dissatisfaction intensifies it. The idea as purpose, then, instead of being the fulfilment, appears to be the plan, the method of fulfilment. The fulfilling experience is the further experience to which the idea points and leads.

To follow a little farther this relation between the purposive and fulfilling aspects of experience, it is of course apparent that the idea as the purpose, the "plan of action," must as a function go over into the fulfilling experience. My purpose to sing the melody must remain, in so far as the action is a conscious one, until the melody is sung. I say "as a function," for the specific content of this purpose is continuously changing. The purpose is certainly not the same content after half the melody has been sung as it is the beginning. This means that the purpose is being progressively fulfilled; and as part of the purpose is fulfilled each moment, so a part of the original content of the idea drops out; and when the fulfilling process of this particular purpose is complete, or is suspended – for, in Mr. Royce's view, it never is complete in human experience – that purpose then gives way to some other, perhaps one growing out of it, but still one regarded as another. A purpose realized, fulfilled, cannot persist as a purpose. We may desire to repeat the experience in memory; *i.e.,* instead of singing aloud, simply, as Mr. Royce says, "silently call and listen to its imagined presence." But here we must remember that the memory experience, as such, is not an idea in the logical sense at all. It is an immediate experience that is fulfilling the idea of the song which constitutes the purpose to recall it, just as truly as the singing aloud fulfils the idea of singing aloud. Shouting, whistling, or listening in memory to the silent notes" may all be equally immediate,

[12] P. 23; italics mine.

fulfilling experiences. Doubtless the idea as purpose involves memory, as Mr. Royce says.[13] But it is a memory used as a purpose, and it is just this use of the memory material as a purpose that makes it a logical idea. In its content the purposive idea is just as immediate and as mechanical as any other part of experience. "Psychology explains the presence and the partial present efficacy of this purpose by the laws of motor processes, of habit, or of what is often called association."[14] Here "idea," however, simply means, as Mr. Royce takes it in his second statement, conscious content of any sort. But this is not the meaning of "idea" in the logical sense. The logical idea is a conscious content used as an organizer, as "a plan of action," to get other contents. If, for example, in the course of writing a paper one wishes to recall an abstract distinction, as the distinction dawns in consciousness, it is not an idea in the logical sense. It is just as truly an immediate fulfilling experience as is a good golf stroke. So in the mathematician's most abstruse processes, which Mr. Royce so admirably portrays, the results for which he watches "as empirically as the astronomer alone with his star" are not ideas in the logical sense; they are immediate, fulfilling experiences.[15] The distinction between the idea as the mediating experience – that is, the logical idea – and the immediate fulfilling experience is therefore not one of content, but of use.

There is a sense, however, in which the idea as a purpose can be taken as the partial fulfilment of another purpose; in the sense that any purpose is the outgrowth of activity involving previous purposes. This becomes evident when we inquire into the "indefinite restlessness" and dissatisfaction out of which the idea as purpose springs. Dissatisfaction presupposes some activity already going on in attempted fulfilment of some previous purpose. If one is dissatisfied with his singing, or with not singing, it is because one has already purposed to participate in the performance of a company of people which now he finds singing a certain melody, or one has rashly contracted to entertain a strenuous infant who is vociferously demanding his favorite ditty. This is only saying that any given dissatisfaction and the purpose to which it gives rise grow out of activity involving previous purposing. But this does not do away with the distinction between the idea as a purpose and the immediate fulfilling experience.

[13] *Cf.* p. 34; also p. 22.

[14] P. 35.

[15] This warns us that in the phrase, "a plan of action," the term "action" must be more inclusive than it is in much current discussion. It must not be limited to gymnastic performance. It must apply to any sort of activity planned for, and which, when it arrives, fulfils the plan. This, I take it, is the import of the paragraph at the top of p. 7 of Professor James's *Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results*.

If the discussion appears at this point to be growing somewhat captious, let us pass to a consideration of the relation between internal and external meanings, where the problem of truth and error appears, and where the vital import of these distinctions becomes more obvious.

II. PURPOSE AND THE JUDGMENT

Mr. Royce begins with the traditional definition of truth, which he then proceeds to reinterpret:

> Truth is very frequently defined in terms of external meaning as *that about which we judge*… . In the second place, truth has been defined as the *correspondence between our ideas and their objects*.[16]… . When we undertake to express the objective validity of any truth, we use judgment. These judgments, if subjectively regarded, that is, if viewed merely as processes of our own present thinking, whose objects are external to themselves, involve in all their more complex forms, combinations of ideas, devices whereby we weave already present ideas into more manifold structure, thereby enriching our internal meaning; but the act of judgment has always its other, its objective aspect. The ideas when we judge are also to possess external meaning… . It is true, as Mr. Bradley has well said, that the intended subject of every judgment is reality itself. The ideas that we combine when we judge about external meanings are to have value for us as truth only in so far as they not only possess internal meaning, but also imitate, by their structure, what is at once other than themselves, and, in significance, something above themselves. That, at least, is the natural view of our consciousness, just in so far as, in judging, we conceive our thought as essentially other than its external object, and as destined merely to correspond thereto. Now we have by this time come to feel how hard it is to define the Reality to which our Ideas are thus to conform, and about which our judgments are said to be made, so long as we thus sunder external and internal meanings.[17]

The universal judgment. – The problem is, then, to discover just the nature and ground of this relation between the internal and external meaning, between the idea and its object. This relation is established in the act of judgment. Taking first *the universal judgment,* we find here that the internal meaning has at best only a negative relation to the external meaning.

[16] P. 270.

[17] Pp. 270, 271.

> To say that all A is B is in fact merely to assert that the real world contains no objects that are A, but that fall to be of the class B. To say that no A is B is to assert that the real world contains no objects that are at once A and B.[18]

The universal judgments then "tell us indirectly what is in the realm of external meaning; but only by first telling us what is not."[19]

However, these universal judgments have after all a positive value in the realm of internal meaning; that is, as mere thought.

> This negative character of the universal judgments holds true of them, as we have just said, just in so far as you sunder the external and internal meaning, and just in so far as you view the real as the beyond, and as the merely beyond. If you turn your attention once more to the realm of ideas, viewed as internal meaning, you see, indeed, that they are constantly becoming enriched in their inner life by all this process. To know by inner demonstration that 2+2=4 and that this is necessarily so, is not yet to know that the external world, taken merely as the Beyond, contains any true or finally valid variety of objects at all, any two or four objects that can be counted… . On the other hand, so far as your internal meaning goes, to have experienced within that which makes you call this judgment necessary, is indeed to have observed a character about your own ideas which rightly seems to you very positive.[20]

This passage deserves especial attention. In the light of Kant, and in view of Mr. Royce's general definition of the judgment as the reference of internal to external meanings, one is puzzled to find that for the mathematician the positive value of the judgment "two and two are four" is confined to the realm of internal meaning. To be sure, Mr. Royce says that this limitation of the positive value of the universal judgment to the world of internal meaning occurs only when the external and internal meaning are sundered. But the point is: Does the mathematician or anyone else ever so sunder as to regard the judgment "two and two are four" as of positive value only as internal meaning? Indeed, in another connection Mr. Royce himself shows most clearly that mathematical results are as objective and as empirical as the astronomer's star.[21] Nor would it appear

[18] P. 276.

[19] P. 277.

[20] Pp. 280, 281.

[21] See p. 256.

competent for anyone to say here: "Of course, they are not internal meanings *after* we come to see, through the kind offices of the epistemologist, that the internal meanings are valid of the external world." We are insisting that they are never taken by the mathematician and scientists at first as merely internal meaning whose external meaning is then to be established. Surely the mathematical judgment, or any other, does not require an epistemological midwife to effect the passage from internal to external meaning. The external meaning is there all the while in the form of the diagrams and motor tensions and images with which the mathematician works. The difficulty here again seems to be that the distinction above discussed between the idea in the logical sense, as purpose, and the immediate fulfilling experience is lost sight of. The relation between two and four is not first discovered as a merely internal meaning. It is discovered in the process of fulfilling some purpose involving the working out of this relation. So the sum of the angles of a triangle is not discovered as a mere internal meaning whose external meaning is then to be found. It is found *in working with* the triangle. It is discovered *in* the triangle. And, once more, it matters not if the triangle here is a mere memory image. In relation to the purpose, to the logical idea, it is as truly external and objective as pine sticks or chalk marks. The streams of motor, etc., images that flow spontaneously under the stimulus of the purpose are just as immediate fulfilling experiences as the manipulation of sticks or chalk lines.

The difficulty in keeping the universal judgment, as a judgment, in terms of merely internal meaning may be seen from the following:

> As to these two types of judgments, the universal and the particular, they both, as we have seen, make use of experience. The universal judgments arise in the realm where experience and idea have already fused into one whole; and this is precisely the realm of internal meanings. Here one constructs and observes the consequences of one's construction. But the construction is at once an experience *of fact and an idea*… . Upon the basis of such ideal constructions one makes universal judgments. These in a fashion still to us, at this stage, mysterious, undertake to be valid of that other world – the world of external meaning.[22]

One is somewhat puzzled to know just what is meant by the fusion "of experience and idea." We must infer that it means the fusion of some aspect of experience which can be set over against idea, and this has always meant the external meaning, and this interpretation seems further

[22] P. 289; italics mine.

warranted by the statement immediately following which describes the fusion as one "of *fact* and idea." The situation then seems to be this: An internal and an external meaning, a fact and an idea, "fuse into one whole" and thus constitute that which is yet "precisely the realm of internal meanings," which aims to be valid of still another world of external meanings. And this waives the question of how experience fused into one whole can be an internal meaning, since as such it must be in opposition and reference to an external meaning; or conversely, how experience can be at once fact *and* idea and still be "fused into one whole."

Nor does the difficulty disappear when we turn to the aspects of universality and necessity. What is the significance and basis of universality and necessity as confined merely to the realm of internal meaning?

> So far as your internal meaning goes, *to have experienced within that which makes you call this judgment necessary* is, indeed, to have observed a character about your own ideas which rightly seems to you very positive.[23]

But what is it that we "experience within" which makes us call this judgment necessary? In the discussion of the relation of the universal judgment to the disjunctive judgment, through which the former is shown to get even its negative force, there is an interesting statement:

> One who inquires into a matter upon which he believes himself able to decide in universal terms, *e.g.,* in mathematics, has present to his mind, at the outset, questions such as admit of alternative answers. "A," he declares, "in case it exists at all, is either B or C." Further research shows universally, perhaps, that No A is B.

The last sentence is the statement referred to. What is meant by "further research shows universally, perhaps, that No A is B"? What kind of "research," internal or external, can show this? In short, there appears to be as much difficulty with universality and necessity in the realm of internal meaning as in the reference of internal to external meaning.[24]

Instead, however, of discussing this point, Mr. Royce pursues the problem of the relation of the external and internal meaning, and finds that regarded as sundered there is no basis so far for even the negative

[23] P. 231; italics mine.

[24] It is worth noting in passing that here the universal appears to be located in finite experience, while the ground of the particular is in the absolute.

universality and necessity in the reference of the internal meaning to the external.

> For at this point arises the ancient question, How can you know at all that your judgment is universally valid, even in this ideal and negative way, about that external realm of validity, in so far as it is external, and is merely your Other, – the Beyond? Must you not just dogmatically say that that world must agree with your negations? This judgment is indeed positive. But how do you prove it? The only answer has to be in terms which already suggest how vain is the very sundering in question. If you can predetermine, even if but thus negatively, what cannot exist in the object, the object then cannot be merely foreign to you. It must be somewhat predetermined by your Meaning.[25]

But in the universal judgment this determination, as referred to the external meaning, is only negative.

The particular judgment. – It is then through the particular judgment that the universal judgment is to get any positive value in its reference to the external meaning.

> As has been repeatedly pointed out in the discussions on recent Logic, the particular judgments – whose form is Some A is B, or Some A is not B – are the typical judgments that positively assert Being in the object viewed as external. This fact constitutes their essential contrast with the universal judgments. They undertake to cross the chasm that is said to sunder internal and external meanings; and the means by which they do so is always what is called "external experience."

It is now high time to ask why the internal meaning seeks this external meaning. Why does it seek an object? Why does it want to cross the chasm? In other words, what is the significance of the demand for the particular judgment? In the introduction we have been told, as a matter of description, that the internal meanings do seek the external meaning, but why do they? We have also been told that universal judgments "develop and enrich the realm of internal meaning." Why, then, should there be a demand for the external meaning, for a further object? The answer is:

> We have our internal meanings. We develop them in inner experience. There they get presented as something of universal value, *but always in*

[25] P. 282.

> *fragments*. They, therefore, so far dissatisfy. We conceive of the Other wherein these meanings shall get some sort of final fulfilment.[26]

It is, then, the incomplete and fragmentary character of the internal meaning that demands the particular judgment. The particular judgment is to further complete and determine the incomplete and indeterminate internal meaning. And yet no sooner is this particular judgment made than we are told that "it is a form at once positive, and very unsatisfactorily indeterminate." Again:[27]

> The judgments of experience, the particular judgments, express a positive but still imperfect determination of internal meaning through external experience. The limit or goal of this process would be an individual judgment wherein the will expressed its own final determination.[28]

Apparently, then, the particular judgment to which the internal meaning appeals for completion and determination only succeeds in increasing the fragmentary and indeterminate character.

This brings us to another "previous question." Just what are we to understand by this "fragmentary" and "indeterminate" character of the internal meaning? In what sense, with reference to what, is it incomplete and fragmentary? Later we shall be told that it is with reference to "its own anal and completely individual expression." This is to be reached in the individual judgment. And if we ask what is meant by this final, complete, and individual expression – which, by the way, no human being can experience – we read, wondering all the while how it can be known, that it is simply "the expression that seeks no other," that "is satisfied," that "is conclusive of the search for perfection."[29] Waiving for the present questions concerning the basis of this satisfaction and perfection, all this leaves unanswered our query concerning the other end of the matter, viz., the meaning and criterion of the fragmentary and indeterminate character of these internal meanings.

If we here return to the first definition of internal meaning of the idea as a purpose in the sense of "a plan of action," such as "singing in tune," or getting the properties of a geometrical figure, it does not seem difficult to find a basis and meaning for this fragmentary and indeterminate

[26] P. 284; italics mine.

[27] P. 283.

[28] P. 332.

[29] P. 339.

character. First we may note in a general way that it is of the very essence of a plan or purpose to lead on to a fulfilling experience such as singing in tune, or reaching a mathematical equation. But here this fulfilling experience to which the plan points is not a mere working out of detail inside the plan itself, although, indeed, this does take place. If this were all the fulfilling experience meant, it is difficult to see how we should escape subjective idealism.[30] We start with a relatively indeterminate idea and end with a more determinate *idea,* though, indeed, there is yet no criterion for this increased determination. To be sure, the idea as a plan of action, as has already been stated, does undergo change and does become, if you please, more definite and complete as a plan; but this does not constitute its fulfilment. Its fulfilment surely is to be found in the immediate experiences of singing, etc., to which the idea points and leads.

The fragmentary and incomplete character of the internal meaning as a plan of action does not, then, after all, so much describe the plan itself as it does the general condition of experience out of which the idea arises. Experience takes on the form of a plan, of an idea, precisely because it has fallen apart, has become "fragmentary." It is just the business of the internal meaning, as Mr. Royce so well shows, to form a plan, an ideal, an hypothetical synthesis that shall stimulate an activity, which shall satisfactorily heal the breach. "Fragmentary" is a quality, then, that belongs, not to the idea in itself considered, but to the general condition of experience, of which the idea as a plan is an expression.

If, now, the fragmentary character of the internal meaning is determined simply with relation to the fulfilling experiences, such as singing in tune, adjustments of geometrical figures, etc., to which it points and leads, it seems as if the completion of the internal meaning must be defined in the same terms. And this would appear to open a pretty straight path to the redefinition of truth and error.

III. THE CRITERION OF TRUTH AND ERROR

At the outset, truth was defined as the "correspondence" or "agreement" of an idea with its object. But we have seen that correspondence or agreement with an object means the completion and determination of the idea itself, and since the idea is here a specific "plan of action," it would seem that the "true" idea would be the one that can complete itself by stimulating a satisfying activity. The false idea would be one that cannot complete itself in a satisfying activity, such as singing in tune, constructing a mathematical equation, etc., and just this solution is very clearly expounded by our author. In the case of mathematical inquiry,

[30] This ghost of subjectivism haunts the entire part of the essay in which the final fulfilment of finite ideas is found in "a certain absolute system of ideas."

> In just so far as we *pause satisfied* we observe that there "is no other" mathematical fact to be sought *in the direction of the particular inquiry in hand*. Satisfaction of purpose by means of *presented fact* and such determinate satisfaction as sends us to no other experience for further light and fulfillment, precisely this outcome is itself the Other that is sought when we begin our inquiry.[31]

So "when other facts of experience are sought," if I watch for stars or for a chemical precipitate, or for a turn in the stock market, or in the sickness of a friend, my ideas are true when they are satisfied with "the presented facts." Again,

> It follows that the finally determinate form of the object of any finite idea is that form which the idea itself would assume whenever it became individuated, or in other words, became a completely. determined idea, an idea or will fulfilled by a wholly adequate empirical content, for which no other content need be substituted or from the point of view of the satisfied idea, could be substituted.[32]

In such passages as these it seems clear that the test of the truth of an idea is its power to bring us to the point where we "pause satisfied," 'where "no other content need be substituted," etc. Nor in such passages does there seem to be any doubt of reaching satisfaction in particular cases. Here, it appears, we *may* sing in tune, we *may* get the desired precipitate, and possibly even interpret the stock market correctly. Of course, the discord, the hunger, the loss, will come again; but so will new ideas, new truths. "Man thinks in order to get control of his world and thereby of himself."[33] Then the control actually gained must measure the value, the truth of his thought. Do you wish to sing in tune, "then your musical ideas are false if they lead you to strike what are then called false notes."[34]

It should also be noticed that here this desired determination does not consist in a further determination of the mere idea as such. It is found in "the presented fact," in the immediate activity of singing, of getting precipitates, etc. As has already been pointed out, it is only by using the term "idea" for both the purpose and the fulfilling act of singing that this "pause of satisfaction" can be ascribed to the further determination of the

[31] P. 330; italics mine.

[32] P. 337.

[33] P. 286.

[34] P. 307.

idea. As such, as also before remarked, the sort of determination that the idea here gets means its termination, its disappearance in the immediate experiences of singing, etc., to which it leads. The "indefinite restlessness" of hunger and cold would scarcely be satisfied by getting more determinate and specific *ideas* only of food and shelter. The satisfaction comes when the ideas are "realized," when the "plans" are swallowed up in fulfilment.

But in all this nothing has been said about "the certain absolute system of ideas," nor does there appear to be here any demand for it. To be sure, in the passages just considered, experience has been found to become "fragmentary," but it has also been found capable of healing, of wholing itself, not of course into any "final whole," but into the unity of "satisfaction" as regards "the particular inquiry in hand." There is of coarse failure as well, but this also is not final. It means simply that we must look farther for the "pause of satisfaction," that we must construct another idea, another "plan of action."

But, after having shown that the idea as a plan of action may lead to satisfaction in the particular case, and that its success or failure so to do is one measure of its truth or falsity, we are now suddenly aroused to the fact that after all thought does not lead us to the completed "absolute system of ideas," to a final stage of eternal unbroken satisfaction.

> But never in our human process of experience do we reach that determination. It is for us the object of love and of hope, of desire and of will, of faith and of work, but never of present finding.[35]

If at this point one asks: Whence this absolute system of ideas? Why have we to reckon with it at all? there appears to be little that is satisfying. Indeed, it seems difficult to get rid of the impression that this "certain absolute system of ideas" is on our hands as a philosophical heirloom from the time of Plato, so hallowed by time and so established by centuries of acceptance that we have ceased to ask for its credentials. To ground it in the "essentially fragmentary character of human experience" appears to be a *petitio,* for experience does not appear "essentially fragmentary" in this sense until after the absolute system has been posited.

And this brings to notice that at this point both the fragmentary and unitary characters of experience take on new meaning. So far this fragmentary character has been defined with reference to "the particular inquiry in hand." Now, since the distinction between absolute and human experience has emerged, the fragmentary character becomes an absolute

[35] P. 297.

quality of the latter in contrast with the former. So, *mutatis mutandis,* of unity. Up to this point unity, wholeness, has been possible within human experience in the case of particular problems, such as singing in tune, etc. But with the appearance of the absolute system of ideas, wholeness is now the exclusive quality of the latter, as incompleteness is of human experience, though of course the *working* unity, the unity resulting in "pauses of satisfaction," must still remain in the latter.

The problem now to somehow work the absolute system of ideas into connection with the conception of the idea as a purpose, as a concrete plan of action. Here is where the third conception of the relation between idea and purpose, described at the beginning, comes into play – the conception in which the idea, instead of being the purpose, or the fulfilment of a purpose, *has* the purpose to correspond with, or represent "its own final and completely individual expression," contained in the absolute system. From the previous standpoint the idea's "own final and completely individual expression" has been found in the fulfilling experiences of singing in tune, getting mathematical equations, chemical precipitates, etc. Here this complete individual experience can never be found in finite, human experience, but must be sought in the absolute system – and this can be only "the object of love and hope, of desire and will, never of present finding."

Notwithstanding the many previous protestations that the purposive function of the idea is its "primary" and "most essential" character, we are here forced to fall back upon correspondence – representation as the primary, the essential, and indeed, it appears at times, as the sole function. For in the attempt to bring these two functions together the purposive function is swallowed up in the representative. The idea still is, or has a purpose, a "plan of action," but this purpose, this plan, is now nothing but to represent and correspond with its own final and completed form in the absolute system. By this simple *coup* is the purposive function of the idea reduced at once to the representative. Nor is it pertinent to urge at this point that every purpose involves representation, that the plan must be some sort of an image or scheme which symbolizes and stimulates the thing to be done. This no one would question, but now the sole "thing to be done" apparently is to perfect this representation of the complete and individual form in the absolute system.[36]

[36] This reduction of the purposive to the representative function carries with it an interesting inplication concerning the whole character and relationship of thought and will. From beginning to end,on almost every page, Mr. Royce insists upon the idea as an expression of will. At the outset we read: "When we try to define the idea in itself, as a conscious fact, our best means is to lay stress upon the sort of will or active meaning which any idea involves for the mind that forms the idea" (p. 22). Again: "The idea is a will seeking its own determination. It is nothing else" (p. 332) – and so

Once more, an array of passages could be marshaled from almost every page refuting any such interpretation as this, but they would be passages expounding the part played by the idea in such concrete experiences as singing, measuring, etc., not in representing an absolute system of ideas. Even as regards the latter one might urge that, by insisting on the active character of the idea, we could after all regard this absolute system as a life of will after the fashion of our own, were it not at once described as "the complete embodiment," "the final fulfilment," of finite ideas. A life consisting of mere fulfilment seems a baffling paradox. And its timeless character only adds to the difficulty. Moreover, if we regard the system as constituted by such concrete activities as measuring and singing, etc., while we have saved will, we shall now have to fall back upon our first conception of truth as found in the idea which unifies the fragmentary condition of experience as related to specific problems, not fragmentary as related to an absolute system.

This brings us to the final and crucial point of the discussion, the part which purpose plays in the determination of *truth* and *error* from the standpoint of "the absolute system of ideas." When is this purpose of the idea to correspond with its absolute, final, and completed form fulfilled, or partially fulfilled? And here at the very outset is a difficulty. We have read repeatedly that the idea is itself "the partial fulfilment of a purpose." It is now to seek an object which shall increase this degree of fulfilment, but still this fulfilment shall be incomplete. And when we come to consider error, it too will be found to consist in a partial fulfilment. So it appears that there are three stages of "partial fulfilment" to be discriminated, one belonging to the idea itself, another to finite truth, and still another to error.

Returning to the problem, from this point on we find the two standpoints, that of the specific situation and that of the absolute system, so closely interwoven and entangled that they are followed with great difficulty. We have already seen that the idea seeks correspondence with its object, because it is "fragmentary," "incomplete," "indetermined." And there we found that this indeterminate and fragmentary character belonged to the idea as a purpose, a plan of seeking relief from some sort of "restlessness" and "dissatisfaction," such as singing out of tune, etc. Here it is the incompleteness of an imperfect representation of its object

on throughout the lectures. And we have already seen how consistently this is worked out in the analysis of concrete acts, such as singing, etc. But now, as related to the absolute system, the will, as embodied in the idea, is to find its final determination in approximating the certain absolute system of ideas. This would seem to make will but little more than the mere form of representation itself. The idea is a will, but in its relation to truth its will is "to correspond even in its vagueness to its own final and completely individual expression."

in the absolute system that is the *motif*, and how it is to effect an improvement in its imperfect condition is now the problem. Here again the appeal is to purpose. Whatever may constitute the absolute system, one thing is assured: nothing in it can be an object except as the finite idea "intends it," purposes it, to be its object. Again must we ask: On what basis is this object in the absolute system selected at all? In general the answer is: On the basis of a need of "further determination"; but when we further analyze this, we find it means on the basis of a specific want or need, such as food, shelter, measuring, singing, etc. The basis of the selection, then, is entirely on the side of the concrete, finite situation.

Here, too, we might ask: Whence the confidence that there will be found something in the absolute system that will fulfil the purpose generated on the side of the finite? Must we not here fall back on something like a pre-established harmony? To this our author would say: "Yea, verily. The fact that the absolute system responds to the finite needs does precisely show that the finite and the absolute cannot be sundered." But when we try to state *how* the purpose generated on the side of the finite can be met by the absolute system, the account again seems to run so much in terms of the finite experience that to call it a system of "final," "completed," and "fulfilled" ideas does not seem accurate. We must note here, too, the shifting in the sense of "purpose." The idea selects its object on the basis of the material needed to relieve the unrest and dissatisfaction of singing out of tune, etc. But now it is to be satisfied by increasing the extent of its representation of its object in the absolute system.

And now, finally, what shall mark the attainment of this purpose of the idea to correspond and represent "its own completed form"? When is the correspondence and representation true? Simply at the point where "we pause satisfied," where "no other content need be substituted, or from the point of view of the satisfied idea could be substituted." That is all; there is no other answer. There are other statements, but they all come to the same thing. For instance:

> It is true – this instant's idea – if, in its own measure, and on its own plan, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own final and completely individual expression.[37]

But the moment we ask what this "final and individual expression" is, and what is meant by "in its own measure," and "on its own plan," we are thrown back at once upon the preceding statement. The next sentence following the passage just quoted does indeed define this "individual expression." "Its expression would be the very life of fulfilment of

[37] P. 339.

purpose which this present idea already fragmentarily begins, as it were, to express." But how can we know that the expression is "fragmentary" unless we have some experience of wholeness?

And here perhaps is the place to say, what has been implied all along, that this absolutely "fragmentary" character of human experience is an abstraction of the relatively disintegrated condition into which experience temporarily falls, which abstraction is then reinstated as a fixed quality, overlooking the fact that experience becomes fragmentary only that it may again become whole. The absolute system, the final fulfilment, is in the same case. It too is but the hypostatised abstraction of the function of becoming whole, of wholing and fulfilling, which manifests itself in the "pauses of satisfaction."

"But," Mr. Royce would say, "the wholeness of the particular instance is after all not a true and perfect wholeness, because we can always think of the fulfilling experience as possibly different, as having a possibly different embodiment." But this implies also a different purpose. Moreover, it abstracts the purpose from the specific conditions under which the purpose develops. Thus in singing in tune one doubtless could easily imagine himself singing another tune, on another occasion, in another key, in a clear tenor instead of a cracked bass, etc. But if on *this* occasion, in *this* song, and with *this* cracked bass voice one, accepting ill these conditions, does, with malice aforethought, purpose to strike the tune, and happily succeeds, why, for that purpose formed under the known and accepted conditions, is not the accomplishment final and absolute? Nor is the case any different, so far as I can see, in mathematical experience. To quote again:

> You think of numbers, and accordingly count one, two, three. Your idea of these numbers is abstract, a mere generality. Why? Because there could be other cases of counting, and other numbers counted than the present counting process shows you, and why so? Because your purpose in counting is not wholly fulfilled by the numbers now counted.[38]

I confess I cannot see here in what respect the purpose is not fulfilled. Doubtless there could be "other cases of counting," and "other numbers," but these may not be included in my present purpose, which is simply to count here and now. In this passage the purpose is not very fully defined. One's counting is usually for something, if for nothing more than merely to illustrate the process. In this latter case one's purpose would be completely fulfilled by just the numbers used when he should "pause satisfied" with the illustration. Or, if I wish to show the properties of

[38] P. 338.

numbers, then the discovery that there can always be more of them fulfils my purpose, since this endless progression is one of the properties. Or yet again, if one should suddenly become enamored of the process of counting, and forthwith should purpose to devote the rest of his days to it, it would still be fortunate that there were always other numbers to be counted. In other words, the idea as a purpose is formed with reference to, and out of, specific conditions. In the last analysis the problem always is: What is to be done here and now with the actual material at hand, under the present conditions? As the purpose is determined by these specific conditions, so is the fulfilment. To say that the fulfilment might be different is virtually to say that the purpose might have been different, or indeed that the universe might have been different.

This necessity of falling back upon the character of the idea as a purpose in the sense of the specific "plan of action" comes into still bolder relief in the consideration of error from the standpoint of "the absolute system of ideas." As already mentioned, the initial and persistent problem here is to distinguish at all between truth and error in our experience from this standpoint. All our efforts at representing the absolute system must fall short. What can we mean, when, by calling some of our ideas true and others false? The definition of error is as follows:

> An error is an error about a specific object, only in case the purpose, imperfectly defined by the vague idea at the instant when the error is made, is better defined, is in fact, better fulfilled by an object whose determinate character in some wise, although never absolutely, opposes the fragmentary efforts first made to define them.[39]

But in relation to the absolute system the later part of this statement holds of all our ideas. There always is the absolute object which would "better define" and "better fulfil" our purposes. Hence it is only in reference to the "specific" instances of singing, measuring, etc., that a basis or the distinction can be found. Here our plan is not true so long as its mission of relieving the specific unrest and dissatisfaction, the specific discord or hunger, is unfulfilled.

The only criterion, then, which we have been able to find for the fulfilment of the purpose, for the truth of the idea as representing an object in the absolute system, is the sense of wholeness, the "pause of satisfaction," which we experience in realizing such specific purposes as "singing in tune." And if it be said again: "Precisely so; this only shows how intimate is the relation between our experience and the abolute system of ideas"; then must it also be said once more, either that the

[39] P. 335.

absolute system can be nothing more than an abstraction of the element of wholeness or wholing in our experience, or that thus far the relation appears to rest upon sheer assumption.

Again, it may be insisted, as suggested at the outset of this discussion, that the idea can well have two purposes: one to help constitute and solve the specific problems of daily life; the other to represent the absolute system. Very well, we must then make out a case for the latter. If the purposes are to be different, the purpose to represent the Absolute should have a criterion of its own. This we have not been able to find. On the contrary, whenever pushed to the point of stating a criterion for the representation of the absolute system, we have had to appeal, in every case, to the fulfilment of a specific finite purpose. And even if this purpose to represent the absolute system had some apparent standard of its own, we should not be content to leave the matter so. We should scarcely be satisfied to observe as a mere matter of fact that the idea has a reconstructive function, and *also* a representative function. Such a brute dualism would be intolerable.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the end, the outcome of the endeavor to establish a connection between the relation of the idea to human experience and its relation to the absolute system does not appear satisfying. The idea is left either with two independent purposes – one to reconstruct finite experience, the other to represent and symbolize the absolute system – or one of these purposes is merged in the other. When the attempt is made from the standpoint of the absolute system, the reconstructive purpose is swallowed up in the representative. When, on the other hand, the need for a basis of distinction between truth and error "here on this bank and shoal of time" is felt, the representative disappears in the reconstructive function. Nowhere are we able to discover a true unification. To be sure, we have been told again and again that the representation of the absolute object, if only we could accomplish it, would be "the final fulfilment," "completion," and "realization" of the human, finite purpose. But besides a confessed impotency at the very start, this involves, as we have seen, either a sudden transformation of the specific purpose of singing in tune, etc., into that of representing the absolute system, or a sheer assumption that the representation of the absolute object does somehow help in the realization of the specific finite purpose. Nowhere is there any account of *how* this help would be given. And this suggests that if the analysis of the idea as purpose, given at the outset of Mr. Royce's lecture, had been developed further, if the conditions and origin of purpose had been examined, it is difficult to see how this discrepancy could have escaped disclosure. Mr. Royce starts his account by simply accepting from psychology a general

description of the purposive character of the idea. Even in the more detailed passages on purpose we have nothing but descriptions of purpose after it is formed. Nothing is said of the origin of this purposiveness. The purposive character of experience is of course very manifest, but what is the signifiance of this purposing in experience as a whole? What is the source and the material of the purposes?

It is this uncritical acceptance of the purposive quality of the idea that obscures the irrelevancy of its relation to the absolute system. If the idea must merely be or have a purpose, then it may as well be that of representing the absolute system as any other. Of course, there are troublesome questions as to how our finite ideas ever got *such* a purpose; but, after all, if it is simply a matter of having any sort of a purpose, representing the absolute system may answer as well as anything. But when now we come to deal with the problem of fulfilment, with the question of truth and error, we have to reckon with this neglect of the source of this purposiveness.

It is this unanalyzed ground of the purpose that makes the matter of fulfilment so ambiguous. Such an analysis, we believe, would have shown that the conditions out of which the idea as a purpose arises determine also the sort of fulfilment possible. There are, indeed, one or two very general, but very significant, statements in this direction, if they were only followed up. For instance:

> In doing what we often call "making up our minds" we pass from a vague to a definite state of will and of resolution. In such cases we begin with perhaps a very indefinite sort of restlessness which arouses the question: "What is it that I want, what do I desire, what is my real purpose?"

In other words, what does this restlessness mean? What is the matter? What is to be done?

Purpose is born, then, out of restlessness and dissatisfaction. But whence comes this restlessness and dissatisfaction? Surely we cannot at this point charge it to a discrepancy between our finite idea and the absolute object, since it is just this restlessness that is giving birth to the purposive idea. One thing, at any rate, appears pretty certan: this "indefinite restlessness" presupposes some sort of activity already going on. The restlessness is not generated in a vacuum. But why should this activity get into a condition to be described as "indefinite restlessness" and dissatisfaction?

Repugnant as it will be to many to have psycho-physical, to say nothing of biological, doctrines introduced into a logical discussion, I confess that, at this point facing the issue squarely, I see no other way. And it appears

to me that just at this point it is the fear of phenomenalistic giants that has kept logic wandering so many years in the wilderness.

What, then, in this action already going on is responsible for this restlessness? First let us note that "indefinite restlessness" and "dissatisfaction" are terms descriptive of what Mr. James calls "the first thing in the way of consciousness." This assumes consciousness as a factor in activity. So that our question now becomes: What is the significance of this actor of restless, dissatisfied consciousness in activity? Now, here appears no way of getting at the part which consciousness plays different from that of discovering the function of anything else. And this way is simply that of observing, as best we may, the conditions under which consciousness operates, and what it does. Here the biologist and psychologist with one voice inform us that this indefinite restlessness which marks the point of the operation of consciousness arises where, in a coordinated system of activities, there develop out of the continuation of the activity itself new conditions calling for a readjustment and reconstruction of the activity, if it is to go on. Consciousness then appears to be the function which makes possible the reorganization of the results of a process back into the process itself, thus constituting and preserving the continuity of activity. So interpreted, consciousness appears to be an essential element in the conception of a self-sustaining activity. This "indefinite restlessness," in which consciousness begins, marks, then, the operation of the function of reconstruction without which activity would utterly break down.

Precisely because, then, the idea, "as a plan" is projected and constructed in response to this restlessness must its fulfilment be relevant to it. It is when the idea as a purpose, plan, born out of this matrix of restlessness, begins to aspire to the absolute system, and attempts to ignore or repudiate its lowly antecedents, that the difficulties concerning fulfilment begin. They are the difficulties that beset every ambition which aspires to things foreign to its inherited powers and equipment.

A detailed account at this point of the construction and fulfilment of the idea as "a plan of action" would contain a consecutive reinterpretation of Mr. Royce's principal rubrics. Such an account the limits of this paper forbid. We shall have to be content with pointing out in a general way a few instances by way of illustration.

In the first place, it is in this matrix of indefinite restlessness out of which the idea is born that the "fragmentary character of experience," of which Mr. Royce is so keenly conscious, appears. But, once more, this fragmentary character is discernible only by contrast with the wholeness on both sides of the fragments; the wholeness that precedes the restlessness, and the new "pause of satisfaction" toward which it points. Nor must we forget that the habit matrix, out of the disintegration of

which the restlessness is immediately born, does not exist as some metaphysical ultimate out of which thought as such has evolved. Back of it is some previous purpose in whose service habit was enlisted. On the other hand, this disintegration means that the old purpose, the old plan, must be reconstructed; that it, along with the disintegrated habit, becomes the material for a new plan, a new wholing of experience.

In the next place, the construction of this new plan of action does involve "re-presentation." The first step in the transition from the condition of "indefinite restlessness" toward a "plan" is the diagnosis, the definition of the restlessness. This involves the re-presentation in consciousness of the activities, out of which the restlessness has arisen. This re-presentation is also the beginning of the reconstruction. The diagnosis of the singing activity as being "out of tune" is the negative side of beginning to sing in tune. It is now a commonplace of psychology that all representation is reconstruction. And this is where Mr. Royce's emphasis of the symbolic, the algebraic, as against the copy type of representation, has its application. All we want here is some sort of an image – visual, auditory, motor, it matters not – that shall serve to focus attention upon the singing activities until they are reconstructed sufficiently to bring us to the "pause of satisfaction."[40] But nowhere in all this is there any reference to the idea's object in the absolute system. Nor does there appear to be any call or place for such reference. The representation here is a part of the very process of forming the plan of further reconstruction out of the materials of the specific situation. Representation is not the plan's own end and aim. This is to stimulate a new set of activities that shall lead out of the present state of unrest and dissatisfaction.

It is also true, as already mentioned, that in the process of fulfilling the plan, of realizing the idea, further determination and specification is produced in the plan itself. The idea as a plan is certainly not formed all at once. Nor does it reach and maintain a fixed content. No purpose is ever realized in its original content. But this does not mean that its realization is, therefore, "partial," "incomplete," or "fragmentary." It is a part of its business to change. The purpose is not there for its own sake. The purpose is there as a means to the reorganization and reconstruction of experience. It exists, as Mr. Royce says, as an instrument, "as a tool" for "introducing control into experience." And as, in the process of use, a tool always undergoes modification, so here, as an instrument for reconstructing habit, the plan, too, undergoes reconstruction. Indeed, as regards its content, it is itself, as Mr. Royce says, as much a habit, as such "the product of association," as any part of experience. The purposing function, the purposing activity, remains; its content is constantly shifting.

[40] *Cf.* Mr. Gore's paper, above.

Here, too, is where "the submission of the idea to the object" takes place. Only, here, it is not a submission to an object already constituted as it is in Mr. Royce's conception of the absolute system. The idea as an hypothetical plan of action, as a trial construction, must be tested by the activities it is attempting to reconstruct. That is to say, at this point the question is: Does the plan apply to the activities actually involved in the unrest? Has it diagnosed the case properly, and is it therefore one in and through which these activities can operate and come to unity again? The "submission" here is the submission of the purpose, the end, to the material out of which it is formed, and with which it must work. But again this material to which the idea submits itself is anything but finally fixed and "complete" in form. On the contrary, as we have seen, it is just the fragmentary and incomplete condition of this material that calls for the idea. Yet the idea as a plan must be true to its mission, and to this material, and in this sense must submit itself to whatever modifications and reconstruction the material "dictates" as necessary in order that it may function in and through the plan.[41]

On the other hand – and this is the point to which Mr. Royce gives most emphasis – it is equally apparent that "the idea must determine its object." On this all philosophy, from Plato down, which approaches reality "from the side of ideas" is at stake. And this does not appear impossible if, again, the object is not already and eternally fixed and complete. If the object is one constructed out of the very mass of habit material which the idea is reconstructing, and if "determination" means not copying, but construction, then, indeed, must the idea "determine its object." Just for that does it have its being. That is its sole mission. Here the determination of the object by the idea is not a mere abstract postulate; it is not based upon a general consideration of the disastrous consequences to our logical and ethical assumptions, if it were not so determined. Here not only the general necessity for it, but the *modus operandi* of this determination, is apparent. But, at the risk of tedious iteration, must it again be said that for the determination of the completed and perfected object in the absolute system not only is there nowhere any *modus* to be found, but, even if there were, it is difficult to see what it would have to do with the kind of determination demanded by such a specific sort of unrest as "singing out of tune," etc. The process of submission is thus a reciprocal one. Neither in the object nor in the idea is there a fixed scheme or order *to* which the other must submit and

[41] *Cf.* Baldwin's *Development and Evolution*, pp. 250, 251, on the necessity of the submission of the "new experience" to the test of its ability to utilize habit. Interpreted broadly, habit might here mean the whole mechanical side, including organism *and* environment, and so include Mr. Baldwin's second or "extra-organic" test.

conform. And this is simply the logical commonplace that submission cannot be a one-sided affair, that determination must be reciprocal.

This brings us to what might as well have been our introductory as our concluding observation. It has just been said that the determination of the object by the idea is a vital matter in any philosophy which approaches reality "from the side of ideas." Such a way of approach must assert "the primacy of the world of ideas over the world as a fact."[42] Mr. Royce thus further states the case:

> I am one of those who hold that when you ask what is an idea, and how can ideas stand in any true relation to reality, you attack the world knot in the way that promises most for the untying of its meshes. This way is of course very ancient. It is the way of Plato… . It is in a different sense the way of Kant. If you view philosophy in this fashion, you subordinate the study of the world as fact to a reflection upon the world as idea. Begin by accepting upon faith and tradition the mere brute reality of the world as fact, and there you are sunk deep in an ocean of mystery… . The world of fact surprises you with all sorts of strange contrasts… . It baffles you with caprices like a charming and yet hopelessly wayward child, or like a bad fairy. The world of fact daily announces itself to you as a defiant mystery.[43]

Here we have concisely stated at the outset of the lectures the position which we have soon to be fraught with so many difficulties: the position, namely, which accepts to start with the opposition of the world as idea and the world as fact, as something given, instead of something to be accounted for; and which assumes that this opposition stands in the way of reaching reality, whereas it possibly may be of the very essence of reality. To be sure, the above statement of this opposition between the world as fact and as idea is but the expository starting-point. And it is true that the rest of the argument is occupied in the attempt to close this breach. But, as we have seen, except where the idea is expounded as a specific purpose, arising out of a specific experience of unrest, such as singing out of tune, etc. – except in this case, the breach is taken as found and the attempt to heal it is made by working forward from the opposition as given instead of back to its source. This opposition, of course, has its forward goal, but the difficulty is to find it without an exploration of its source. It is back in that matrix out of which the opposition has arisen that the line of direction to the goal is to be found.

[42] P. 19.

[43] Pp. 17, 18.

Moreover, in starting from this opposition of fact and idea as given, the only method of quelling it seems to be either that of reducing one side to terms of the other, or of appealing to some new, and therefore external unifying, agency. But if the factors in the opposition are found, not one in submission *to* the other, nor having the "primacy" *over* the other, but as co-ordinate and mutually determining functions, developed from a common matrix and co-operating in the work of reconstructing experience, some of the difficulties involved in the alternative methods just mentioned appear to drop out.[44]

The point may be clearer if we recur to the passage and ask just what is meant by "the defiantly mysterious," "baffling," and "capricious" character of the world as fact – as "brute reality." First, if by the world as "fact," as "brute reality," we mean experience so brute that it is not yet "lighted up with ideas," it is difficult to see how it could be mysterious or capricious, since mystery and caprice appear only when experience ceases to be taken merely as it comes and an inquiry for connections and meanings has begun. That is to say, there can be neither mystery nor caprice except in relation to some sort of order. And order is always a matter of ideas. But it is sufficient to submit Mr. Royce's own statement on this point:

> We all of us from moment to moment have experience. This experience comes to us in part as brute fact; light and shade, sound and silence, pain and grief and joy… . These given facts flow by; and were they all, our world would be too much of a blind problem for us even to be puzzled by its meaningless presence.[45]

If next we take the world of fact as in contrast and coordinate with the world of ideas, mystery and caprice here, certainly, are not all on the side of the fact. Here, again, must they be functions of the relation between fact and idea. We have seen that without thought there is neither mystery nor caprice. The idea then cannot take part in the production of mystery and caprice, and forthwith deny its parenthood. Of course, mystery and caprice are not the final fruits of this co-ordinate opposition of fact and idea. They are but the *first* fruits – the relatively unorganized embryonic mass which through the further activities of the parent functions shall develop into the symmetry of truth and law.

There appears then no ultimate "primacy" of either idea or fact over the other. Nor does either appear as a better way of approach *to* reality than

[44] See, above, Professor Dewey's Study III, pp. 49ff. [Chap. 3 of *Studies in Logical Theory*. – Ed.]

[45] P. 55.

the other. It is only when we say: "Lo! here in the idea," *or* "Lo! there in the fact is reality," that we find it "imperfect," "incomplete," and "fragmentary," and must straightway "look for another." But surely not in "a certain absolute system of ideas," which is "the object of love and hope, of desire and will, of faith and work, but never of present finding," shall we seek it. Rather precisely in the loving and hoping, desiring and willing, believing and working, shall we find that reality in which and for which both the "World as fact" and the "World as idea" have their being.

THE FUNCTION OF THOUGHT

Addison W. Moore. "The Function of Thought." *Journal of Philosophy* 3.19 (13 September 1906): 519–522. Ed. Note: Moore replies to George Santayana's "The Efficacy of Thought," reprinted in this volume. Page numbers are altered where references go to this article.

In a discussion in Vol. III., No. 15, of this JOURNAL, Professor Santayana deals with the complaints of ambiguity in his conception of the function of thought as expounded in his 'Life of Reason.' Professor Santayana's treatment consists in reducing to metaphor all the passages in 'The Life of Reason' which speak of thought as a reconstruction of mechanical processes; and in frankly accepting thought as a mere 'accompaniment,' a 'lyric cry' of the mechanical processes. To many this method, in so far as it succeeds in curing the ambiguity, may seem worse than the original malady.

I say 'in so far,' for even here where the issue is up for explicit discussion, I confess I find that some of Professor Santayana's sentences still puzzle me. Thus in the eighth thesis (p. 224) regarding the function of thought, which Professor Santayana says represents his own view, after reading that 'thought is without efficacy either in its moral or its existential capacity,' we find immediately following that 'thought might still be called efficacious in the only sense, not magical, in which its efficacy would be at all congruous with its intent; namely, *through the natural efficacy* of the creature whose life it expressed.'[1] What do 'through' and 'natural efficacy' here mean? Again, on the following page we read: "It is certain that when a man reflects his action changes in consequence." Yet, in the next sentence, 'the consequences of reflection are due to its causes – to the competitive impulses in the body, not to the wistful lubrication itself.' Here 'consequence' evidently does not mean effect; and mechanical processes appear to have two kinds of effects – thought and other mechanical processes. Now, if there is to be such a distinction and separation of the mechanical and the psychical as to call one 'cause' and the other 'effect,' it is somewhat difficult to see why the causal relation in one direction should be so hospitably received, while

[1] Italics mine.

in the other it is regarded as a 'superstition' of the 'unreconciled childishness of man.' Or if in one direction it is such a superstition, why is it not equally so in the other?

Passing an analysis of cause and effect, which this really calls for, but which is beyond the limits of this note, I should go all the way with Professor Santayana in denying 'mechanical efficacy' to thought. But I should deny it mechanical efficacy just in order to bestow upon it its own sort of *constructive* efficacy. Also, I should be as loth as Professor Santayana to regard thought's function as 'interfering' with mechanical processes. But I should reject this view only to insist on thought's work of 'mediation' when the mechanical processes 'interfere'[2] with each other. In other words, it seems to me that when Professor Santayana is insisting on the 'non-interfering' and purely 'lyric' character of thought, he has in mind that stage of experience where thought has done its work, where mechanism has been established, where, therefore, any further work of thought in that situation would be an 'interference.' But it seems to me also that he is overlooking the situation in which 'interference' has already arisen among the mechanical processes, the habits and instincts themselves, and that the work of resolving this interference *is* the work of thought. Not, however, of thought exclusively, or as an outside force, coming in or added to the mechanical processes, but as a mode which the whole activity takes on and which the conception of 'mechanism' alone does not appear to me to cover.

Again, I think I see how every cause might be regarded as 'mechanical.' In so far as experience can fall into the form of a definite effect with its correlative definite cause, it is in the mechanical form; thought has performed its work. Well-defined causes and effects are simply well-articulated habits. Antitoxine 'causes' immunity from diphtheria. But take the present status of the pneumonia problem where such a cause does not yet exist. Here thought is at work helping to construct a 'cause.' It is, of course, not working in a vacuum. Thought *is* the material of old habits, old causes, undergoing analysis and synthesis. Would Professor Santayana be willing to say that thought is merely predicting or prophesying the antitoxine for pneumonia, that it is having nothing to do in constituting it? If it should be said that 'the elements of the cure already exist, and thought has merely to bring them into relation to the disease,' we must reply: (1) That, even so, this makes thought pretty efficacious in constituting the cure; and (2) that such a statement involves us in the fallacy of elements apart from relations,

[2] I am aware of the 'telic' character of the term 'interfere,' that in a purely mechanical world there would be neither mechanism nor 'interference.' But this only shows how thoroughly mechanical efficiency and constructive efficacy are.

which Mr. Bradley delights in exposing. And if we try to escape this by haying that, 'the elements have always existed, and have always been in *actual* relation to the disease, only thought has not yet discovered it,' how far are we from the condition of the poor fellow who imagined that his toothache had been cured over in another county, but that he still continued to suffer because his enemies prevented the announcement of the cure from reaching him?

Professor Santayana rightly says, that 'no one would care to maintain that poor Malthus's hard thinking caused Israel's fecundity or the congestion in our large cities.' But would he say that Malthus's thinking had nothing to do with certain reform movements of his day, or with Darwin's work which followed? May not thought be really efficacious without creating (wholly) its object, or without committing us to the doctrine, which Professor Santayana imputes to some of his critics, that 'the genesis of knowledge is (wholly) the genesis of things'? Is it not possible to describe experience in terms of thoughts and things generating other thoughts and things without regarding thoughts and things as causing each other?

Professor Santayana's characterization of his critic's view of truth as 'useful illusion' (p. 225), and his counter thesis that 'the true idea is determined by what the environment is, not by the uses which the idea of it might have,' seems to send us back to a purely representative view of knowledge and to raise rather elementary questions – those with which Locke and Berkeley struggled, such as: Just what is included in environment? From the standpoint of one making this statement, is not the environment as responsible for false as for true ideas? How tell when the idea is 'true' to the environment? What is the test of an illusion? Etc.

In conclusion, I would say that I believe that the passages in the 'Life of Reason' giving thought a constructive and constitutive character are so numerous, so convincing, and so vital to so much of his doctrines, that the reader will find Professor Santayana's instruction to take them in a Pickwickian sense a very difficult one to execute.

REVIEWS
BY
ADDISON W. MOORE

REVIEW OF *NATURALISM AND AGNOSTICISM*

"Review of James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*." *American Journal of Sociology* 5.4 (January 1900): 553–556.

In these days the teleological and sociological conceptions are having their innings in the interpretation of experience; and their last and one of their strongest is to be found in Professor Ward's lectures. The first statement of the preface is: "These lectures do not form a systematic treatise. They only attempt to discuss in a popular way certain assumptions of 'modern science' which have led to a widespread, but more or less tacit, rejection of idealistic views of the world." The preface says also: "I take it for granted that till an idealistic (*i.e.* , spiritualistic) view of the world can be sustained, any exposition of theism is but wasted labor." While such statements tend to place the writer somewhat in the attitude of an apologist, and perhaps help to account for what will appear to some an undue polemical spirit in certain passages, they do not, of course, affect the inherent weight of the argument. The limits of this notice will permit mention of only a few central points – especially of those more likely to be of some interest to readers of this journal.

Vol. I is occupied with a detailed account of the difficulties encountered in the attempt to state experience in terms of matter and motion. The conclusion is that the "mechanical theory" is valuable as a descriptive formula of one aspect of experience only – the quantitative one; but utterly inadequate for a description of experience as a whole, since all experience cannot be reduced to quantitative terms. Perhaps the best parts of this volume are the discussions of the conceptions of matter – motion, space, time, mass, energy, and force – rather than the long cross – sometimes very cross – examinations of Mr. Huxley and Mr. Spencer.

In Vol. II, after a thoroughgoing criticism of psycho-physical parallelism as an attempt to escape the difficulties of the mechanical theory, the "previous question" is put in asking how this dualism of the physical and the psychical, which goes to pieces so readily under criticism, ever came about, and what is the significance of its conceptions. The finding is that this dualism does not originate in the individual's perceptual experience of an "external world," but that it is of essentially social origin. "The researches of anthropologists warrant us in assuming that when human intercourse begins there is no

dualism."[1] Dualism comes about in this wise: When L, M, and N look at one object, *e.g.* , the sun, each has his own individual object. "How do they come to know that the actual object of each is the same individual object for all?" The answer is through some common reaction. All point or reach or in some manner react in the same way. This common reaction is at the same time inter-communication, and advances from gesture through exclamation to systematic language. Through this common reaction and inter-communication it is found that there is a common or "transsubjective" object independent of L, M, and N severally. Here, according to Mr. Ward, occurs the first step leading to dualism. Finding the transsubjective object independent of L, M, and N *severally*, it is concluded that it is independent of them *collectively*. To this fallacy is added another, which the author calls the fallacy of "introjection," and which occurs as follows:

> Of my fellow common thought and language lead me to assume, not merely that his experience is distinct from mine, but that it is *in* him in the form of sensations, perceptions, and other internal states… . Thus, while my environment is an external world for me, his experience is for me an internal world in him. And since I apply this conception to all my fellows and it is applied by all my fellow-men to me, I naturally apply it also to myself. Thus, instead of construing others' experience exactly and precisely on the lines of our own – the duality of subject and object – we are induced to misconstrue our own experience on the lines of a false but highly plausible assumption as to others' experience, which actually contradicts our own. With this contradiction and the fallacy of naïve realism just referred to dualism is essentially complete.[2]

Coming to the more distinctively constructive part of the lectures, Mr. Ward finds that the fundamental characteristic of experience is its subject-object form. This character is frankly accepted as given.

> If this duality in unity of subject and object be indeed the fundamental fact of experience present alike in cognition, in feeling, and in volition, then, so far at any rate, there can be nothing to explain. The demand for explanation may be taken as evidence that we have misconceived the facts.[3]

This disposition of the subject-object relation would seem scarcely to be

[1] Vol. II, p. 165.

[2] Vol. II, p. 172.

[3] Vol. II, p. 129.

expected from one who insists, as Mr. Ward does throughout both volumes, that the categorizing of experience is essentially a teleological affair. A little farther on, in treating the subject-object relation in individual experience, the object is found to be of a conative rather than of a cognitive nature.

> Regarding experience in this wise as life, self-conservation, self-realization, and taking conation, not cognition, as its central feature, we must conclude that it is not that "content" of objects which the subject cannot alter, that gives them their place in its experience, but their worth, positive or negative, their goodness or badness, as ends or means to life.[4]

Were this conative nature of the object pursued farther, perhaps the subject-object character of experience would not appear quite so gratuitous. In other words, it seems there is not sufficient justification given for regarding the subject-object character of experience as on an entirely different plane from the psychical-physical. The latter is regarded as a differentiation *within* experience – as conceptions evolved in the development of experience as means to its further progress. In the treatment of the subject-object nature of experience, therefore, it appears that the author's teleology is not quite thoroughgoing. The same appears true of the individual-universal relation. It, too, appears to be given, and to be a differentiation *of* rather than *within* experience.

Noting this latter distinction a little more in detail, we find it is a further differentiation of experience in its subject-object form. Thus giving in the last analysis of experience four terms – the subject and object of individual experience, and the subject and object of universal experience – Mr. Ward discusses the relation of the two subjects to each other and of the two objects to each other, and finds there is perfect continuity between them. But along with this finding he appears also to hold that the universal form of experience has developed *out of* the individual. Thus[5] we find:

> To refute the dualism of ordinary scientific thought, then, it is necessary to show that the generalized or universal experience with which it is immediately concerned has grown out of, depends upon, and is really but an extension of our primary *individual*, concrete experience.[6]

[4] Vol. II, p. 184.

[5] Vol. II, p. 153.

[6] Italics mine.

Were it proposed to show that the individual *and* universal develop *together*, as a polar differentiation, out of a "primary, concrete experience," it would certainly be more nearly in line with what one is led to expect up to this point in the lectures. On their face this and other similar passages look like the old isolated individualism of Hobbes. To be sure, farther on we find this: "Once again I say the subject of universal experience is not numerically distinct from the subject of individual experience"; and many affirmations of their – "organic unity" are to be found. But this "oneness" and "organic unity" appears to exist *after* the universal has developed out of the individual, the individual having been prior to and apparently independent of the universal. No better refutation of such a conception of the individual as this involves could be found than many passages from the lectures themselves. But this only makes the discrepancy the more puzzling.

There appears to be plenty of room, too, for the development of further questions concerning the relation of "the four terms of experience;" *e.g.*, the relation of the universal subject to the individual object, and of the individual subjects to each other and as an "aggregate" to the universal subject. To say nothing of such questions as the relation of the universal subject to "sentience," etc. Such questions, however, reveal the merit rather than a demerit of the lectures. Everywhere they bristle with suggestions. Indeed, frequently the lecturer himself is drawn aside by "suggestions," often enough and far enough to endanger the unity of the lecture. The whole line of discussion running through both volumes, showing the necessity for a closer union between the natural and the philosophical sciences, by pointing out in detail how each breaks down going it alone, is both timely and masterly. Throughout the lectures the influence of Lotze is apparent, and is freely acknowledged. On the whole, Mr. Ward's lectures are likely to be regarded as the most important philosophical contribution since Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. And, owing to its more popular style, its larger use of scientific and sociological material, and its confessed theological interest, it is certain to have a much wider circle of readers than did Mr. Bradley's book.

REVIEW OF *THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY*

Review of John Dewey, *The School and Society*." *Review of Education* 7.1 (June 1901): 31.

This little book contains four lectures, delivered to an audience of patrons and friends of the University of Chicago Elementary School, founded and conducted under Professor Dewey's direction. The first three set forth in terms, such that he who runs may read, Professor Dewey's conception of the general aim and method of Elementary Education. The last lecture is a brief summary of the outcome of the first three years' work of the Elementary School. The subjects of the first three lectures are: "The School and Social Progress," "The School and the Life of the Child," "Waste in Education." Within the limits assigned this notice there is not room for an analysis, much less a discussion of-the argument of these chapters. Only one or two of the more central and distinctive ideas can be mentioned.

One of the most important principles underlying this book is Professor Dewey's conception of the relation between education and instinct. One great line of educational reformers, from Rousseau down, have cried, "Back to the child's instincts." In this Professor Dewey heartily joins. But he insists that this is just the beginning, not the goal, of the educational work. To discover and appeal to certain instincts taken as fixed endowments of the child, is to lay open such education to the charges which its critics have not been slow to make – viz., that it is "pandering," "hedonistic," "backboneless," "chaotic." But Professor Dewey insists that when we have found these "natural instincts" we have just gotten in sight of the real educational problem, which is to get these separate and distinct instincts so woven together into a system of mutually coöperating and checking activities, that no instinct shall be left stark and alone demanding exercise and stimulus solely on its own account. It is just this insistence on the *development* and *systematization* of instinct which constitutes Professor Dewey's contribution at this point and which radically distinguishes the work of his Elementary School from others which it is often, from a superficial observation, thought to resemble.

The central idea with which the book deals directly is that these instincts and the process of their development are concerned with *Social Activities*. In a word, *life* as such is social activity. Hence if the school is to prepare for life it must be social through and through. This means two

things: (1) that the school must be in closest connection with the matrix of the social life about it, a connection that has been broken by the rapid changes in our social and industrial organization on the one hand and by certain abstractions of educational theory on the other; (2) that the school itself must be organized and conducted as a social world. Now the essence of a social world is a system of interacting, cöoperating occupations. Such occupations are then the backbone of school work. Such occupations are sewing, cooking, weaving, work in woods, metals, clays, etc. Thus all the materials of school work – mineral, plant, animal, mathematics, language, history, art – which in the ordinary curriculum are disconnected and often meaningless, here get their meaning and value developed as factors in the process of living. A fact of Botany is not a fact of plant life merely, but of human life. Because the whole meaning and value of a plant is found in the role it plays in social life. It is the vitalizing and humanizing of material so often treated as inert, dead stuff that is the characteristic thing in this school on the side of the curriculum. Thus is the problem of "correlation of studies" solved, not by subordinating the group of studies to some one, but by tying them all directly to these activities of the child. Such are one or two points of Professor Dewey's doctrine. There are many, and the number is rapidly increasing, who believe that, young as the work of the school is, it has already indicated pretty clearly the direction which the next great educational movement is to take.

REVIEW OF *PHILOSOPHIE DE L'EFFORT*

"Review of Armand Sabatier, *Philosophie de l'effort: essais philosophiques d'un naturaliste*." *Philosophical Review* 13.5 (September 1904): 569–572.

As the subtitle indicates, this book may be regarded as an expression of a renaissance of coöperation between scientists, especially biologists, and philosophers. The book is not a systematic treatise, but consists, in the fashion of books nowadays, of an introduction and a collection of essays, some of which have been published before. The headings are as follows: Introduction: Responsabilité de Dieu et responsabilité de la nature; I. De l'orientation de la méthode en évolutionisme; II. Évolution et liberté; III. Évolution et socialisme; IV. La prière; V. Dieu et le monde; VI. Finalisme; VII. Conscience et conscience; VIII. L'instinct; IX. Creation: Rôle de la matière, Immortalité; X. Energie et matière; XI. L'universe materiel est il éternel? XII. Vie et esprit dans la nature.

The unifying ideas of this somewhat heterogeneous collection, as stated by the author (p. 17) are: "There is in nature an ideal which may be stated as the development and perfection of spirit in the form of ever-stronger individualities and ever higher personalities."

"There is in nature a manifest impulse to the pursuit and realization of that ideal and a will which corresponds to that impulse. This evolving impulse constitutes a feeling of biological obligation immanent in nature."

"Effort is the result of this impulse. It expresses the activity of nature … exhibited in realizing this ideal. Effort is omnipresent. It is the '*promoteur par excellence*' of the ascending evolution of the universe.

"The moral ideal as the end of nature, the aspirations and power to realize this ideal, nature owes to its divine origin in the sense that it is precisely the result of the evolution of a germ detached from the Creator, that is, a germ of the supreme Wisdom, of the supreme Love, of the divine Energy."

In view of the present widespread circulation of pragmatic doctrines, the title is likely to arouse in some expectations which the book does not realize. One might expect in a *Philosophie de l'effort* to find some attempt at a 'Logique de l'effort' – at a reinterpretation of some fundamental categories from the standpoint of effort, and thereby a reconstruction and enrichment of the meaning of effort itself. Such a systematic treatment as this would require should, however, scarcely be expected from the

laboratory of a biologist – not that it might not be better done there than in the logician's den, if only the infusoria, etc., did not require too much sensorial attention.

As might easily be anticipated from the statement of the theses given above, much of the book is frankly apologetic in character. This, of course, should not in itself prejudice its philosophic claims, provided the latter are made good. This, in the opinion of the writer, has not been accomplished with great success. Too often rather dogmatic generalities, and, at times, somewhat mystical analogies, take the place of expository and argumentative details. For example, one would expect somewhere, say in the essay on "The Method of Evolution," or in the one on "God and the World," some detailed development of the statement given above that "Nature is precisely the result of the evolution of a germ detached from the Creator." But we find there discussions, supported by plenty of interesting facts to be sure, of such general and now rather familiar considerations as that all life must have its source in other life, that life pervades all matter, and that "*mentalité*" pervades all life, is the essence of all life.

In dealing with the relations between God and the world, which is really the author's central theme, a very old difficulty is encountered. The omnipresence of a rational, patient, powerful, loving effort, *in* the world (p. 224 *et passim*) is taken as evidence of the existence of a certain eternal ideal to the realization of which all this effort is directed. On the other hand, when maintaining and defending the "transcendence and independence" of the source of this ideal, the imperfection, disorder, weakness, and evil of the world (pp. 214, 270) are pointed to as incapable of generating this ideal. The problem of evil, by the way, is not systematically discussed.

In common with many other defenders of a fixed infinite ideal, the author does not seem to feel certain difficulties connected therewith – difficulties especially acute for one who makes the standpoint of evolution so absolute as he does. If evolution is a universal process, how can the ideal avoid participating in it? Must there not be an evolution of the ideal? Yet the author rejects this as degrading to the source of the ideal (p. 214). If effort and development are so glorious in the creature, why should they be degrading to the Creator? Again, if we seek to escape by placing the ideal at an infinite remove from finite activity, how can it be applied day by day to specific cases as a criterion of truth and goodness and as a concrete developmental stimulus in finite life? On the other hand, if it be actually realizable, how is evolution to go on after the realization is accomplished?

The author appeals especially to moral experience (p. 224) as evidence of the existence of this fixed and infinite ideal. He evidently does not see

that the difficulty of applying to changing, finite conduct a fixed infinite standard is just as great in the ethical as in the logical case, – inevitably so, of course, since each is but a different phase of the same situation.

Evolution, as the march toward this eternal ideal, is sharply opposed to the mechanical monism of Haeckel. But it is difficult to see how a process whose goal is definitely fixed, and whose steps are inexorably and transcendently ordered toward it, is itself to escape all suspicion of being mechanical. What could be more mechanical than a system the end and means of which are completely and finally determined?

In the fourth essay, the author offers a 'vibration' theory of prayer that will appear to some grotesque, to others a substantial contribution "to the science of prayer."

The paper on instinct is the best of the more scientific discussions, though it too is written from the speculative standpoint. The 'lapsed-intelligence' theory of instinct is rejected. In its place is offered a general 'biologic' or 'bionomic' consciousness precipitated into the specific forms of the original instincts apparently according to the Creator's original and eternal plan. Some questions concerning the relation between what the author calls '*biologique*' or '*bionomique*' consciousness, the basis of '*individualité*,' and '*psychlogique*' consciousness, the basis of '*personalité*,' remain unanswered.

In his exposition of the significance of consciousness, in explaining the facts of animal, vegetable, and mineral activities, the author works out a pan-psychic conception of the world, interesting and suggestive, but again difficult to connect with the transcendent and independent Creator.

The style is very easy and clear, but suffers from repetition. Some of the essays could be condensed a third or a half without serious damage to the matter.

HUMANISM

Addison W. Moore. "Humanism." Review of F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism*. *Monist* 14.5 (October 1904): 747–752.

It appears that philosophy once more has an "issue." Since the days of T. H. Green's attack upon the fortifications of English empiricism, neo-Hegelian Idealism has held most of the field in England and America. The legends on its banners are: "Reality consists of an absolute system of immutable ideas." "Truth consists in the reflection, representation, or symbolization, by finite ideas of this absolute system." Though, incidentally, thought may perform a reconstructing function in experience, its chief business as the subject matter of logic is to "represent" or "correspond to" the unchanging and unchangeable system of ideas.

The problem set by these conceptions, since the days of Plato, is that of a criterion for truth thus defined. How is this "correspondence," "representation," etc., to be tested? The difficulty is Janus-faced. On the one side we are confronted by the ancient and honorable problem of "The Finite and Infinite"; on the other, by the no less honorable and ancient one of "Permanence and Change." The latter has been rendered particularly acute by the work of psychologists of the last twenty-five years in showing up the dynamic character of ideas. How can anything so flexible, as psychologists have shown ideas to be, reflect or represent an unchangeable reality?

It would seem that the logical and epistemological treatises based on the conceptions embodied in the above "legends" must needs have kept this crucial problem steadily in view. But strangely enough, at any rate certainly enough, such has not been the case. Volume after volume of logical theory has appeared in which the topic of "Validity" appears as an incidental but always a troublesome matter, yet one which, belonging to the field, must be covered. Hence, too, after several hundred pages have been filled with an account of how this correspondence is effected (though it is indeed difficult to recognize much of it as an account of "correspondence") we find the chapter on "Validity" consisting chiefly of a confession that the account of correspondence has ended in failure. It would seem that the necessity of such confessions must long ago have

led to a suspicion of the assumed conceptions upon which such confessed failures are constructed. Instead, it has for the most part only stimulated more subtle and refined analyses within the limits prescribed by these assumptions.

However, these conceptions have meanwhile not gone entirely unchallenged. Over twenty-five years ago, Mr. C. S. Peirce wrote in *The Popular Science Monthly*: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we can see the object of our perception to have, then our conception of these effects is the whole conception of our object." A few years later, the challenge again appears in Mr. William James' chapter on "Reasoning." Although that chapter was bound in a large volume labelled "Psychology" in large gilt letters there were statements in it very important for logic and epistemology. These statements were to the effect that thinking takes place at the point where activity encounters difficulty in going on in a non-thinking fashion; and that the chief business of thinking, from the psychologists' stand-point, at any rate, appears to be that of resolving this difficulty. (Of course it is equally in order to regard the "difficulty" as teleological for thought, *i.e.*, it occurs that thought may go on; each is teleological to the other. Teleology is thus inside, not outside, the process.)

No one who remembers his history of philosophy would think of calling this in either its content or its method a "brand new" discovery. Such a claim would and should quickly be met with such names as Augustine, Fichte, Schopenhauer, to say nothing of the "primacy" of Kant's *Practical Reason.* On the other hand, this same historical sense should make it equally impossible, even from a very superficial survey, to regard the movement as a mere masquerade of some earlier type of voluntarism.

Since the appearance of Mr. James' psychology this instrumental character of thinking has been the dominant standpoint for its treatment by psychologists, and in the meantime the conviction has been growing that this must have its significance for the relation of thought to truth and reality; that if it is sound psychology, it must be good logic and epistemology. Within the past few years, this conviction has found explicit expression to such an extent as to constitute what is now a recognized movement and issue in philosophy. To these expressions Mr. James has continued his contributions in his *Will to Believe*, more explicitly still in his *Philosophical Concepts and Practical Results,* in 1896, and in his more recent *Varieties of Religious Experience.* Much also of Prof. J. M. Baldwin's writings, *e.g.*, his article on "Selective Thinking," is essentially of the same import. The most detailed and articulate contribution to this period of literature, however, is Mr. Dewey's article on "The Reflect Are Concept," *(Psychological Review,*

Vol. III, 1896), the logical implications of which, most readers apparently failed to discover at the time it appeared. This failure is doubtless another witness to the intensity of the ancient prejudice between logic and psychology. Scarcely less significant, if not so explicit, have been many contributions from Germany, and especially from France.

While the literature of the movement clearly shows it to be a general one, the most self-conscious and detailed manifestations of it have appeared within the past two years in America and England, and interestingly enough, almost simultaneously. In England, Mr. F. C. S. Schiller is by far the most thorough-going and militant representative. Mr. Schiller has recently put his contributions to the movement into a volume which he calls "Humanism." By Humanism Mr. Schiller means "the philosophic attitude which, without wasting thought upon attempts to construct experience *a priori,* is content to take human experience as the clue to the world of human experience;…to remember that man is the measure of all things, *i.e.*, of his whole experience-world and that if our standard measure be false all our measurements are vitiated; to remember that man is the maker of the sciences which subserve his human purposes; to remember that a philosophy which analyses us away is thereby merely exhibiting its failure to achieve its purpose;…this is the real root of Humanism."

Mr. Schiller feels that "more than the usual amount of apology" is due for the small proportion of new matter in the volume, all but one of the fifteen essays having appeared in more or less complete form elsewhere. However, I think that Mr. Schiller may be sure that his readers will be glad to have these essays in the revised, permanent and attractive form which they now possess.

Mr. Schiller prefers the term "Humanism" to "Pragmatism" on the ground that the latter "is in reality only the application of Humanism to the theory of knowledge." However valid Pragmatism may be as a method of logic, "we must yet concede that the man is greater than any method he has made and that our Humanism must interpret it." (pp. xxi.) This certainly appears well taken. But some, even of those most in sympathy with Mr. Schiller's general view, may feel that however central human experience may be, it may not after all include all experience and they may continue to long, therefore, for a term that shall express the instrumental, reconstructive character of thought in experience as such.

The most explicit exposition of Mr. Schiller's Humanism is to be found in the essays on: "The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics," "Useless Knowledge," the new essay on "Truth," "The Metaphysics of the Time Process," – an illuminating discussion of that much befogged subject; "Reality and Idealism," "On Preserving Appearances," and Essay XII, on "Activity and Substance."

In the first two essays we get some very general variations of the central *motif* announced in the preface. The theses of "The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics" are: (1) "The purposive character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive activities." (p. 8); (2) Reality is not something which cognition is to merely represent. Hence "is awarded to the ethical conception of good, supreme authority over the logical conception of true, and the metaphysical conception of real. The good becomes a determinate both of the true and the real. For from the pursuit of the latter we may never eliminate the reference to the former." (p. 9)

As an illustration of the competition between old and new habits of thinking, and of the eternal vigilance necessary to a consistent maintenance of the latter, it is interesting to note that even Mr. Schiller's thoroughly sophisticated consciousness of the problem is almost betrayed into an identification of reality with the "objective" as opposed to the "subjective." (Note p. 11.) I say "almost," for the case is perhaps saved by the statement immediately following: "The actual situation is, of course, a case of interaction, a process of cognition, in which the subject and object determine each other and both we and reality are involved, and we might add – *evolved*."

The central theme, – cognition a function in conduct – is further elaborated in the dialogue "Useless Knowledge," which is in Mr. Schiller's most characteristic style and which serves as an excellent introduction to the chapter on "Truth." In the latter, after a negative criticism of the views of truth as: (1) "agreement with reality," (2) "as systematic coherence," Mr. Schiller sets forth his conception of truth as "a form of value" and finds that the logic which expounds this view with truth is hand in glove with psychology. The outcome of Mr. Schiller's analysis is: "As regards the psychical fact of the truth valuation, truth may be called an ultimate function of our intellectual activity." As regards the object valued as true, "truth is that manipulation of them which turns out upon trial to be useful, primarily for any human end, but ultimately for that perfect harmony of our whole life which forms our final aspirations." (p. 61.)

The essay "On Preserving Appearances" is a very telling criticism of "the familiar antithesis between 'appearance' and reality," the vogue of which Mr. Schiller regards as the chief constructive result of the work of Mr. F. H. Bradley. (p.184.) Again we read (p. 199) "our inferences must approve themselves…by the power they give us to *transform* our experiences… . The transmutation of appearances, therefore, must not be represented as an inscrutable privilege of the Absolute; it must be made a weapon mortal hands can actually wield."

The last thesis of this chapter, viz., that Ultimate Reality must be absolutely "perfect" and "harmonious" and the contents of the essay

following on "Activity and Substance" develop a conception of Mr. Schiller's that is likely to give some of his most sympathetic readers pause, and is certain to be seized upon by the critic looking for "internal inconsistencies." The conception is that of an ultimate "changeless activity," and immutable "beatific consciousness" as the goal of thought-burdened experience. The limits of these remarks forbid even an outline of Mr. Schiller's very incisive argument. But it would not be strange if some should have trouble with the conception of "a changeless activity." Not that activity is to be identified with *mere change* (as most of the critics of "Pragmatism" assume) but that it is to be change*less*, that there is to be no change anywhere in it, is surely a hard saying. Some will be puzzled also on reading (p. 105) "if therefore the ultimate explanation of the world is to be in terms of ends, it would seem as though it must be in terms of individual ends realized in and through the time-process"; and then to find (p. 227) that "self realization must assume the form, not of a hideous, barbarous neurotic restlessness, nor of an infinite, and therefore futile struggle, but of an activity, which, *transcending change and time* [italics mine] preserves itself in an harmonious equipoise." Nor is it inconceivable that some one should profess to find in this conception of an "ultimate," "unchangeable" "completely beatific" experience certain features not altogether unlike Mr. Bradley's and Mr. Royce's Absolute. However, one gathers that the conception has an interrogation mark after it in Mr. Schiller's own mind, and its exposition is made in quite an hypothetical spirit. And one is here reminded that the complaints by critics of "lack of system," of "the ignoring of fundamental points," etc., in "Pragmatic" literature is certainly premature. Nothing so far has been put out that pretends to be anything more than prolegomena.

On the whole it is safe to say that whatever becomes of the "Pragmatic movement," when the history of "the revival of Pragmatism" or "Humanism," or "Teleological Empiricism" is written, Mr. Schiller's contributions are certain to have a prominent and permanent place.

REVIEW OF *UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY*

"Review of *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 1." *Psychological Bulletin* 3.1 (15 January 1906): 18–25.

Of this beautiful and stimulating volume, it is perhaps enough to say, in general, that in both form and content it honors the occasion which inspired it.

Professor McGilvary in the first essay discusses 'The Summum Bonum.' After a presentation of various current meanings, Professor McGilvary says, 'The problem before us is to determine whether there is any reasonable highest good for men at large.' Passing over much interesting detail to net results, the solution is found in the conception of 'the common good.' But this common good 'is not a good common to all human beings, but only to a group which constitutes a *community*.' How large the community shall be will depend on various conditions. Further this common good 'is not something ready-made, nor does it need to resort to metaphysical principles or theological considerations' to give an account of itself. A common good, a community ideal, grows out of: (1) the fact that in pursuit of the various individual goods common means such as police protection, etc., are needed; (2) 'the naturally altruistic nature of man – all normal men have at heart the good of some other beings than themselves'; (3) 'the contagion of desires'; (4) 'social pressure in the forms of teaching, preaching, etc.' The common good thus generated, in the constant maintenance and reconstruction of which the individual ultimately finds his own satisfaction, is, then, the Summum Bonum.

'The Essentials of Human Faculty' is the title of an interesting paper by Professor Mezes. On the psychical side the chief human differentia is found in the ability to construct alternatives, to ask double questions, to choose. And this is due: (1) to the development of free ideas, floating adjectives – a world of meanings *consciously* segregated from the world of facts; (2) to the development of the power of voluntary effort, the power of *consciously* reinforcing a weak or mastering a strong impulse. In the opinion of the reviewer voluntary effort is too much abstracted from the cognitive 'self' at whose 'bidding' and 'command' it is. Physically the *differentia humana* is found in erectness, the attainment of which has necessitated changes in the hand, the jaw, the shoulders and spinal column, and the feet. 'Now note that this is a

list that even in popular thought is significantly connected with effort and will power,' as shown in such phrases as 'loosing one's grip,' 'setting one's jaw,' 'having no backbone,' 'weak-kneed, flat-footed,' etc. In short, '*Voluntary effort, which makes possible choice our original differentia, turns out to be the psychic correspondent gradually pruned and organized of the physical strains and stresses incident to erectness which itself conveniently sums up the physical diferentia*.' As the author suggests in a note, there are many points of attachment between the essay and certain doctrines of pragmatism.

In 'Some Scientific Apologies for Evil' Professor Stratton opposes the doctrine of the necessity of evil in experience. The 'contrast' or 'foil' theory demands only 'the idea of evil, not actual evil.' And if it be asked whence comes the idea, Professor Stratton suggests that the conduct of animals might furnish it. These antitheses of ideal and actual evil and animal and human conduct suggest certain difficulties which cannot here be developed.

But Professor Stratton goes further and says that evil is not necessary even in idea, since (1) psychologically and logically the contrasting content necessary for defining the good can be supplied by intellectual and aesthetic experiences. Definition requires not contradictory, but simply different content. [Some logicians will challenge this.] (2) 'From the standpoint of evolution, evil is not a lower level, as viewed from a higher.' The conduct of a tree, a bird, a child, are not bad, because immature. Yet we do condemn the person who, when childhood is passed, refuses to put away childish things. But Professor Stratton thinks, 'It is quite conceivable that life should unfold in such a way that our various instincts should always stand in such right proportion, in such mutual check and adjustment that our character throughout its entire course would give us a sense of perfect symmetry, in that all our powers would unite in work toward an appropriate end.' Why such an evolution if possible is not actual, especially since it is regarded as a revelation of God's character, Professor Stratton confesses still remains 'a mystery' and says we must look for a truer revelation 'in some inner light, some inner voice.'

If the conceptions of pragmatism which appear in Professor Rieber's paper on 'Pragmatism and the *A Priori*' be typical specimens of the fruits of pragmatic teaching thus far, well may the pragmatist despair. Some of the most discouraging imputations run as follows: "The mind of man was *created by phenomena*" (p. 76). "Mind which the pragmatist puts last in the evolutionary series" (p. 77). "Thought being a function in the present situation *exhausts its entire meaning in that situation*." "He (the pragmatist) gives a fundamental place to matter or that which is other than mind, and regards mind as simply episodic, a *mere attendant phenomenon* in the evolutionary scheme" (p. 80). "Following Spencer, those thoughts of ours which seem so irresistible, are simply results of transmitted inheritance." "All professed pragmatists *admit* that it has its roots deep down in *Spencerianism*" (p. 87).

"We pronounce it (thought) true if it contributes *to the existing order*" (p. 82). [Italics mine.] I am sure pragmatists would like to see chapter and verse for these attributions.

On some of these misconceptions, especially those concerning evolution, I have commented in the *Philosophical Review* for May of the current year. The charges of 'materialism' seem so far wide of any pragmatism I have seen or heard that there appears to be scarcely common ground enough to serve as a basis for discussion.

The *a priori,* Professor Rieber defines as "that primary, self-explanatory, category, or system of categories, which we must accept upon their own authentication as justifying all derivative knowledge and preventing its dissolution into universal scepticism." After such a Spinozistic statement it is not strange that Professor Rieber should discover that pragmatism has no *a priori.* It certainly has none of that sort. Indeed one would suppose that since Locke's and Kant's discussion of analytic judgments, it would be difficult to find even among absolutists many who would so frankly give the *a priori* such a character. Of such an *a priori* the pragmatist would at once ask: What can be meant by a category being 'its own authentication'? Does 'authentication' mean anything as applied to a content simply given? Does not 'authentication' require a relation to other experiences? And is not the 'authentication' of any category found not 'in itself' but precisely in the 'derived' experiences? Further, if there be a system of *a priori* truth, which is just all truth and nothing but truth, must there not be also a system of *a priori* error?

Though pragmatism is without *such* an *a priori* it still may have an *a priori.* The pragmatist's *a priori* is not a particular content or system from the womb of which all other knowledge is to be drawn; it is rather a certain *way* in which *any* experience is made to lead to other experience. It is not a divine autocratic prerogative of certain contents of experience to the eternal exclusion of all others; it is a democratic office to which any experience however humble may aspire.

The criticism of pragmatism is continued by Professor Bakewell under the caption, 'Latter Day Flowing Philosophy.' Professor Bakewell, however, sticks much closer to the texts of pragmatism than does Professor Rieber. As the title suggests, the main thesis is that pragmatism leaves no stable element in experience, but resolves it into 'a universal flux, into something 'utterly plastic,' 'something like a kaleidoscopic eye accompanied by a chameleon memory trying to grasp in view a perpetually dissolving field.' The individualistic and subjective characters of pragmatism are also noted as corollaries of its fluctuous nature. In the article above mentioned, I have discussed Professor Bakewell's main contention and have nothing essentially new to add here.

In general it is interesting to note the great difficulty and narrow margin with which Professor Bakewell himself escapes pragmatic conclusions, and that he succeeds only by hobbling pragmatism in certain cases with interpre-

tations of will and desire to which no pragmatist would subscribe, and in others by falling back on an absolute *purpose* after a telling critique of absolutism in other forms.

The great desideratum of all modern voluntarisms, says Professor Bakewell, 'is to find a fixed' (p. 304). This is not to be found in substance regarded as either matter or mind. "Equally vain is it to seek refuge in a world of immutable ideas. Equally vain and verbal is the attempt to find the permanent in some mysterious psychical entity." Again, 'We cannot simply find our desired fixed by defining the nature of the will in terms of some ideal pattern, to which the individual will must conform.' Where, then? Professor Bakewell answers: 'The solvent conception must be sought in the notion of self-activity.' But where in self-activity is the permanent? It is in the element of purpose, plan. Here, however, the reader's perplexity begins. On the one hand we read that 'this is not any static plan, external to the process and constraining us therein.' This would seem to mean that planning, purposing, is a function of self-activity out of which arise specific plans and purposes. Nowhere is there here an absolute plan or pattern – all of which is very orthodox pragmatism. On the other hand, we read of the 'end toward which it (experience) tends' (instead of ends in experience), and 'in so far as that end can, as it were, be appropriated by the life of the individual knower'; and again, 'I must believe that there is a distant scene to which the steps as they come, one by one, are or may be surely leading.' And again we read of 'a system of purposes within which each particular purpose has its fixed place and relative value.' All these passages are quite capable of a pragmatic interpretation. But it is difficult to resist the conviction that Professor Bakewell has no such interpretation in mind; that in these statements the 'end,' the 'distant scene,' the 'system of purposes,' refer to some fixed, final and absolute goal. Professor Bakewell apparently regards the subjective and individualistic characters of pragmatism as obvious corollaries, requiring no exposition.

'Some Problems in Evolution and Education' is the title of an interesting paper by Professor Henderson. Two conceptions, the significance of infancy and the non-inheritance of acquired characters, are especially significant for education. (1) A long period of infancy means the opportunity to acquire, not certain specific adaptations, but the disposition and capacity for adaptation. The supreme adaptation is the tendency to readaptation, to reconstruction. In the helplessness of the infant we find the freedom that is the parent of progress. (2) The non-inheritance of acquired characters is just what we should expect in an organism of long infancy. Infancy would lose its meaning, would be anomalous, if it were loaded with the habits of previous generations. The evolution of the capacity for adaptation means precisely the evolution of the non-inheritance of acquired characters. But as fast as this period of infancy and the non-inheritance of acquired characters develops, we observe the emergence of social heredity or education, which is defined as 'a

process of conscious selection, a process by which whatever is of value in the past for present life may be appropriated without becoming a rigidly fixed habit or instinct.' How to secure in this material of the past such precision and definiteness as to be effective and still keep it open and free to reconstruction as new conditions develop, is just the problem of liberal education.

A paper on 'Philosophy and Science in Education' is presented by Principal Burks, in which he says that there 'cannot be a science of education because the facts involved are too varied in character and too widely separated in their relationships.' Nor can there be a philosophy of education, since its subject matter is a limited field of reality. It is too broad for science and too narrow for philosophy. However, philosophy may render great service by checking the fads and prejudices, the artificial issues, such as 'culture versus utility,' 'special versus general training,' 'interest versus effort,' etc., which the history of education and current discussion everywhere reveal. On the positive side 'the fundamental problems of education are identical with those of life,' and 'the philosophy of education therefore is nothing less than the philosophy of life.'

In a scholarly and well-written essay on 'The Dialectic of Bruno and Spinoza,' Professor Lovejoy traces very clearly the philosophical pedigree of some fundamental difficulties of present-day absolutism. He shows how the attempt, first systematically made by a Neo-Platonism, 'to relate a simple perfect and immutable absolute to the universe of concrete, manifold, temporal experiences' results in a separation between the being, the *esse,* the that of reality, and its attributes, its what – the former being assigned to the absolute, the latter to finite experience. But this only befogged the problem for a time, and resulted in an oscillation continued unto this present day, between mystical appeals to the principle of *coincidentia oppositorum* as in Bruno, and the unmediated parallelism of substance and attributes as in Spinoza, or the degradation of the qualities to the level of an illusory appearance of the substance. Professor Lovejoy shows convincingly that the attempts to make Spinoza consistent by an idealistic interpretation of the attributes only makes him historically inconsistent, that in view of his heritage from Neo-Platonism and Bruno, Spinoza was committed as much to the differentiating substance as to the unified substance; to the substance in the qualities, as to the substance transcending the qualities.

The moral Professor Lovejoy points is the hopelessness of the attempt, not yet wholly given over, to make a metaphysic of an absolute absolute, which at the same time must take up into itself the successive and processive nature of finite experience. "In fine, to assert of an ultimate reality both its *transcendence* as regards its essence or distinctive predicates, and its *inclusion* of the whole *essa* of something defined as having an essence different from those predicates, is to adopt self-contradiction as the method of metaphysics."

Professor Stuart's paper on 'The Logic of Self-Realization' contains an

acute criticism of rationalistic and ontological absolutism and a convincing account of the 'instrumental' conception of the self – of the self as 'an ideal of ethical *method,* not a contentual or descriptive ideal from which either the details or the generalities of right conduct are to be extracted.' After pointing out the value of Green's critique of utilitarianism and evolutionism, he shows how Green 'proceeds forthwith to the other extreme of proposing as an ideal a conception which in the end amounts to a wholesale begging of the question for all cases of true moral difficulty' (p. 180). 'According to Green the moral ideal is the infinite personality of the absolute self.' Therefore it might appear 'that the province of ethical theory should be the description of the content of this ideal.' But 'the expounders of this system insist that all human knowledge of the ideal must be imperfect at any given time.' What then? We must appeal to history 'where the absolute is working out a progressive self-revelation' and where we can at least get the general line of direction. But 'how can we interpret history without that knowledge of the ideal which is declared impossible'? On the other hand, 'if it were impossible, the appeal to history would be superfluous.' Again, even if by faith we insist that history is a revelation, so far, of the absolute, aside from the problem of sin and error involved in such an assumption, how can the past, taken simply as a revelation of the content of the absolute, afford any moral guidance for the future which must bring new conditions? In short, this conception of self-realization is in the end 'but a kind of intuitionism grown self-distrustful.' On the positive side a true theory of self-realization must rest upon the following principles: (1) There is no ultimate ethical ideal admitting either of complete formulation prior to experience or of progressive formulation in the course of experience. (2) The actual co-operating factors in ethical deliberation are, concepts or standards corresponding to particular types of virtue and vice, and concrete particular ends of present desire. (3) The outcome of the process is a purpose or plan reached through a unification of these factors involving in a greater or less degree transformation of them all (p. 188).

But what determines the point at which this process of transformation through analysis and synthesis has reached a goal? Professor Stuart answers: "The formal test of the rightness of an act must be for the agent his own consciously grounded conviction of its *finality*." But this finality is not the mere *de facto* finality of deciding to do or leave off doing. It refers rather to the *method* of decision. It means that the process of deliberation has so taken account of all the known relevant factors in any given case that it can have at the end the *logical* attribute of finality for *that* situation. Whether or not one finds Professor Stuart's account of the criterion adequate, the important thing is his contention that the construction of the moral ideal is a part of the moral act, not given outside and prior to it; and that self-realization is just the entire act of constructing and executing a purpose rather than a

process of analyzing and imitating an archetype set from and to all eternity.

'Utility and the Accepted Type' is the title of Professor De Laguna's paper, in which he discusses the relation between two apparent standards of conduct, (1) 'a more or less definite type of conduct to which the quality of rightness or wrongness belongs and the appropriate ethical feelings are attached, as honesty, courage, chastity, etc.; (2) the other, the probable utility of the act to the agent and society.' After an interesting comparison of aesthetic and ethical judgments, Professor Dc Laguna finds that these two standards are really not distinct and opposed standards at all, but are rather the relatively permanent, the conventional, the conservative and the reconstructive, the individual, the radical factors, present in all moral experience. "Utility and conformity are then alike essential elements in moral life. Whether in any particular moral judgment either is ever active to the entire exclusion of the other is a question which need not detain us." I see, no harm in admitting that the type may act alone. Some readers, however, are likely to find, in view of the preceding discussion, that there is harm in such an admission. The following anti-absolutist passage is worth noting: "The relatively permanent content of the type may pretend to an eternal self-reference until scientific induction shows its genetic dependence upon experienced utility; but the shifting border lines have their distinct external reference. Thus it is found that no moral law, categorical as it may commonly seem, is capable of a valid universal statement, unless indeed the reference to utility be itself formulated as a law" (p. 223).

Those who have encountered pedagogical difficulties in teaching syllogistic logic will find Dr. Dunlap's paper on 'A Theory of the Syllogism' suggestive. Dr. Dunlap attempts to deal with the old subsumptive difficulties, and offers a classification of propositions and a system of symbols which he thinks is able to take care of all possible relationships. Just how far Dr. Dunlap has succeeded could scarcely be expected to appear in a paper which aims to present only an outline with a few illustrations. It is at any rate an interesting attempt at a much-needed reconstruction of the syllogism.

The last paper, by Dr. Overstreet, on the 'Basal Principle of Truth Evaluation' seeks to escape the implicit skepticism of absolutism by an attempt to make out a case for 'a perfectly adequate grasp of a partial truth.' For this adequacy there appear to be two criteria: 'inconceivability of the opposite,' and 'self-maintenance' – the relation between which is not altogether clear. To the reviewer the crux of the paper lies in the attempt to escape the absolutist's difficulty while still holding to the latter's conception of the general nature of truth and reality. Thus the author's conception of completeness is the absolute completeness of a fixed and closed system, instead of completeness as determined by specific purposes, which to the reviewer appears to be the only way of escape from the absolutist's dilemma.

REVIEW OF *THE LIFE OF REASON*, VOLS. 1–4

Addison W. Moore. "Review of George Santayana, *The Life of Reason,*" vols. 1–4. *Journal of Philosophy* 3.8 (12 April 1906): 211–221.

George Santayana. *The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. Vol. I., *Reason in Common Sense*, pp. ix + 291. Vol. II., *Reason in Society*, pp. ix + 205. Vol. III., *Reason in Religion*, pp. ix + 279. Vol. IV., *Reason in Art*, pp. ix + 230.

In the addresses delivered last year at the many memorial celebrations of the late Herbert Spencer's life and work, there was one very common theme: it was the anachronism of such an encyclopedic program as Spencer attempted – an anachronism which even the Hegelians of Spencer's day discovered in the similar ambition of their master, and one, it was said, which Spencer would have avoided had he possessed a larger historical knowledge and appreciation. And it was freely predicted that Spencer's attempt would be the last of the kind to be seen for many generations.

In the face of the extended currency of such comment among philosophers, to say nothing of the cynical attitude of scientists, it must be as significant as it is interesting that one who can not be suspected of any lack of large historical orientation – one, indeed, whose method is historical – deliberately, 'with malice aforethought,' sends through the press within a year a volume of what may be called first principles, a philosophy of society, a philosophy of religion, a philosophy of art and a philosophy of science.

To be sure, we are in the midst of a great revival of metaphysical interest. But the products of this revival thus far, as presented in the works of Mr. Bradley, Professor Royce, Professor Fullerton and Professor Taylor, have been in the main of the systematic formal type inevitable in abstract metaphysics. Professor Santayana's work, however, is of a different character. He is interested in tracing the effect of the method upon the content. He is concerned in showing the connection between the general conceptions of reality, truth and goodness and their conditions and effects in society, religion, art and science. In his own sentences, "The problem is to unite a trustworthy conception of the conditions under which man lives with an adequate conception of his

interest"; again, "Starting with the immediate flux in which all objects and impulses are given, to describe the life of reason; that is, to note what facts and purposes seem to be primary, to show how the conception of nature and life gathers around them, and to point to the ideals of thought and action which are approached by the gradual mastering of experience by reason" (I., p. 32).

And Professor Santayana is fully aware of the proportions of his task. He hastens to nip in the bud any suspicion of quixotism by saying that such a program 'would be beyond the powers of a writer in this age, either to execute or conceive, had not the Greeks drawn for us the outlines of an ideal culture at a time when life was simpler than at present and individual intelligence more resolute and free.'

In general, of course, Professor Santayana's courageous attempt, as all others, must be justified by its fruits. But I can imagine it quite possible for him to say that such an attempt is not only justified but necessitated in advance by his very conception of the place of reason in experience. An inkling of this appears in the subtitle itself, the whole caption being 'The Life of Reason, or the Phases of Human Progress.' The implication is that the character and function of thought is to be discovered not by isolating it and attempting an analysis of it as 'pure' reason, but by observing reason at work in the world, catching it in the act, taking it in its context in the whole concrete stream of experience. The attempt to discover the nature of reason apart from its products leads to a monstrous misconception of it and the proposal to substitute this changeling for normal reason, for reason as it is in operation, is called 'visionary insolence.' "Retrospective self-consciousness is dearly bought if it inhibits the intellect and embarrasses the inferences which in its spontaneous operation it has known perfectly how to make" (I., p. 29). If, then, the nature of reason is to be discovered only by observing it at work in science, in religion, in art and in social organization, is it, after all, presumptuous to propose to describe the processes, the phenomena and the results in which the nature of reason, even for one proposing to give the most abstract account of it, must be revealed?

What, then, is the life of reason, or, conversely, what is the rôle of reason in life? The reviewer has to confess that in the end the answer does not appear so univocal as the introduction promises. The problem centers in the relation of reflection to impulse. In other words, in the sort of 'efficacy' ideals have. In the introduction ideals, ends, constructed in reflection, are apparently regarded as actually organizing the material of habit and instinct. Here reason is defined as 'efficacious reflection.' And the 'efficacy' here consists not merely in an 'added content' which it brings, but in the added *function* of control. Hence we read, "To the ideal function of envisaging the absent, memory and reflection will add…the

practical function of modifying the future. Vital impulse, however, when it is *modified by* reflection and *veers* in sympathy with judgments pronounced on the past, is properly called reason" (I., p. 2). "The life of reason will, then, be a name for that part of experience which perceives and pursues ideals, all conduct *so controlled,* and all sense so interpreted as to perfect natural happiness" (p. 3). Again, "In the life of reason, as it were brought to perfection, intelligence would be the universal *method of practise* and its continual reward. All reflection would then be *applicable in action* and all actions fruitful in happiness" (p. 5, italics mine). Here we are very properly warned that this controlling, instrumental character of thought does not make it a mere means. It does not prevent its having an immediate value of its own. But though reason may in this sense be 'its own excuse for being,' yet in order to *be,* it must *do*; and its 'doing' is just the work of converting isolated impulses and instincts into a mutually stimulating and checking, *i.e.*, controlled, system.

But when we reach the chapter on 'How Thought is Practical,' one is puzzled to find thought losing this character of control and becoming a mere 'expression,' 'effect,' 'register,' 'celebration' of 'mechanical,' 'material' activity, into which now all dynamic efficacy is transferred. We now read, "Thought is nature's concomitant expression or entelechy, never one of her instruments" (I., p. 223). "Consciousness itself is not dynamic… . It is merely an abstract name for the actuality of its random objects. All force, implication or direction inhere in the constitution of specific objects" (I., p. 220). "Preferences are in themselves, if the dynamic order alone be considered, works of supererogation, expressing force but not producing it, like a statue of Hercules" (p. 221). Yet near the close of this puzzling chapter we read that the function of thought is 'to lend utility to its causes' (p. 233), which here are material. "It is potential energy *producing* life and becoming an actual appearance." Again, in Chapter XI., on 'Conditions of the Ideal,' "Reason and the ideal are not active forces, nor embodiment of passion at all" (p. 265). Yet on the same page, "This suggested peace (for the conflict of impulses)…is the ideal which *borrows its practical force* from the irrational impulses which it embodies" (italics mine).

It may be said that the mere appearance of a 'sense of value' in a process 'bestows utility,' simply by giving the process a limit, a *terminus ad quem.* But even so this involves some sort of reaction of this 'sense of value' upon the mechanism, otherwise why should the process not simply go on grinding out 'senses of value,' without using them as limits? It is Aristotle's problem of the unmoved mover.

This discrepancy, as it appears to the reviewer, can be charged to an oversight of the distinction between consciousness in general and reflective, cognitive consciousness. 'Consciousness,' 'thought,' 'mind,'

'reason,' are freely interchanged throughout the chapter. Recognizing that the 'sense of value' belongs to consciousness-mind, it is apparently inferred that this is *all* that belongs to it and that all dynamic efficacy must therefore be referred to material nature, of which thought is the mere 'symbol,' and which even 'can hardly lie in the same plane of reality with the thought to which it appears' (p. 219). Value is obviously a category of conscious activity, and as immediate 'content' is perhaps not dynamic. But is it not just the business of reflection to convert this '*sense* of value' into an ideal, an end? And as an ideal it surely must be regarded as dynamic in the sense of being an essential factor in a system conceived as 'dynamic.'

In its more general form this question which divides the first and the last four chapters of Volume I. is, How can the ideal be both an 'expression' and a reconstruction of instinct and habit? How can it arise out of and yet be the standard for impulse? In logic it would be the old problem of universals. Now one of Professor Santayana's theses, – indeed, one might say, the fundamental one, – is that the ideal, whether in government, religion, ethics or art, must grow out of, must be an 'expression' of, impulse. The clearness and force of his exposition of the vanity of an absolute ideal given to the impulses from without could not be surpassed. "Demands could not be misdirected, goods could not be false, if the standard by which they are to be corrected were not constructed out of them" (p. 258). Again, "Whence fetch this seminal force and creative ideal? It must evidently lie already in the matter it is to organize. Otherwise it would have no affinity to that matter, no power over it, and no ideality or value in respect to the existences whose standard and goal it is to be" (III., p. 88). The ideal, then, must be an expression of the matter, in order that it may have enough 'affinity' with it to organize it; this despite what is said above about thought not lying in the same plane with its material.

Corresponding to these two conceptions of the ideal, the one as an 'expression,' the other as control, there are two conceptions of the 'matter' to be organized. Where the controlling, organizing character of the ideal is emphasized, as in the introduction and in Volume III., impulse, instinct, immediate flux, etc., constitute the 'matter.' But where the ideal is expounded as an 'expression' of impulse, the matter appears as 'physical,' as 'body,' in opposition to consciousness and as the latter's 'cause,' – and this, too, apparently in quite an ontological Cartesian sense. Indeed, the whole treatment of the distinction of mind and body is to the reviewer as equivocal as that of reflection. Sometimes the distinction appears to be a rational construction within a process of experience which can not be described as either or merely both (*e.g.*, I., pp. 39, 234). But again, and perhaps oftener, 'matter' appears as an

existential *prius*, as 'the antecedent of human life' (II., p. 200) to which somehow 'mind accrues.'

The present writer is well aware of the enormous capacity of reviewers' quotations for misrepresentation. He is also aware that there are many passages which could be cited to show that what has been described as different and discrepant conceptions of reason and its place in experience, are simply two supplementary phases of one conception, namely, that reason is *both* an 'expression' and a control, and must be the one in order to be the other. However, the reviewer can only record his impression of ambiguity in the account as it stands.

To many such captious, logic-chopping criticism as this may appear *mal apropos* in a review of a work whose style makes the reader feel much of the time as if he were following a brilliant impressionistic commentary on 'phases of human progress,' rather than a systematic treatise. But Volume I. is obviously intended as an exposition of general principles, and must therefore, be held to the canons of systematic criticism.

Passing to the treatment of reason in society, religion and art, we find that the indigenous relation of the ideal to impulse so forcibly, if not altogether consistently, expounded in the first volume, is the nerve of the doctrine of these volumes. The history of these aspects of human progress is the story of the reciprocal creation and maintenance of impulse and reflection which constitute the process of human life. Accounts of its defeats are invariably descriptions of the failure to maintain an organic relation of these factors, of attempts to appropriate a ready-made ideal in either an absolute or an anachronous historical form.

Thus the ideal side of love does not merely 'add' a larger and more permanent value to the instinctive side, but it constitutes the salvation of the instincts. It is the method whereby any instinctive expression of love can be 'converted' in order to be saved under the new conditions which its own previous activity has created. Instinctive love, therefore, must be reformed in order to survive. This does not mean that it becomes less instinctive. It means only that the instinct shall emerge enriched in quality and extent of its content. When the need of conversion, of idealization is unrecognized, or unheeded, or when the conversion is attempted through extrinsic ideals of another race or clime, or when it becomes virtual annihilation, then all sorts of 'perversions' occur.

Obviously one of the results of immediate, instinctive love, which calls for expansive reconstruction, is the presence of offspring. The family is the ideal construction through which the reproductive impulse is expanded into interest in the protection and development of life. But just because it is thus necessarily one of the earliest organizations of impulse, 'it becomes a point of departure for many other institutions.' And 'it

often assumes offices which might have been allotted to some other agency had not the family preempted them.' The annexing of these adventitious, parasitic functions' to the family so overloaded it that it did none of them well. With more stable occupation of land, the reverse process of unloading these functions on new institutions begins.

Here we face again the perennial problem of balance. On the one hand, the refusal to surrender old prerogatives in the face of a new world, or the attempt to conduct the new family by the rules of the old, leads inevitably to dualism and disintegration. This is a problem for experience to solve. It can not be solved in a Utopia. The statesman in his sphere and the individual in his must find as they go the best practical solution. On the other hand, this unloading upon other institutions, as the school, church, the factory, etc., may go on until the family may be emptied of almost everything but the reproductive function, – bringing up again the problem of maintaining the control and value of the latter. This, perhaps, may be effected by the reaction of these emigrated functions 'in stimulating a larger social, philosophical, scientific and artistic interest.'

In view of what precedes, one is somewhat surprised at the beginning of the discussion of government to find it identified with 'what in physics is inertia, in psychology habit.' "In society it (habit) takes the form of custom, which, when codified in law and when enforced, is government. Government is the political representation of a natural equilibrium of custom, inertia; it is by no means a representative of reason" (II., p. 70). But, the reader may ask, if custom were really effective as a custom, why codify it? And what need to enforce it if it is already enforced as a habit? Codification surely is a process of *re*construction, therefore of idealization. And this is really implied in statements which immediately follow. "But like any mechanical complication it (government) may become rational... . Government can by its existence define the commonwealth it tends to preserve." But if it is government through codification, the 'can' should be 'must.'

This is also implied in an interesting and suggestive discussion of the various forms of government which follows. The problem is presented as just that of the best method of constructing and presenting a social ideal. The answer, as Aristotle saw, depends upon the specific conditions. "All just government pursues the general good. The choice between aristocratic and democratic forms touches only the means to that end. One arrangement may well be better fitted to one place and time than another" (II., p. 121). Where there is stratified stagnation, some form of aristocracy, theocracy, monarchy or oligarchy may be the best means to get reconstructive idealization started. However, history seems to warrant the claim of democracy that these forms of aristocracy

'have been unable to remain representative.' But the inferences which democratic theory often draws, that 'eminence is therefore not representative, and that representative character is bestowed by the mechanical expedient of universal suffrage,' do not follow.

Many stimulating things are said in the discussion of the distinction between 'political' and 'social' democracy. Political democracy is 'a symbolic extension of aristocratic privileges in the form of universal suffrage.' "It is quite compatible with complex government, great empire, and may retain, as in England, many vestiges of aristocratic institutions" (II., p. 115). Social democracy, on the other hand, 'is a general ethical ideal looking to human equality and brotherhood.' "It is the democracy of Arcadia, Switzerland and the American pioneers." Instead of measuring our prosperity by the quantity of wealth produced, as our present system of economy does, it decries this enormous production, demands less labor, a simpler and more rural life. "It would abandon the great cities to ruin, as seats of Babylonian servitude and folly, leaving the railway bridges to collapse, the tunnels to choke and the hulks of steamers to rust in the harbors." In the present high tide of commercialism such anticipations may seem fantastic. "But does any thoughtful man suppose that this commercial tendency will be eternal or that the present experiment in civilization is the last the world will see?" (II., p. 127). If social democracy would take a more liberal form and permit the benefits of civilization to be integrated in eminent men, whose influence should direct and temper the general life, it would become a timocracy and would, in the author's opinion, 'unite the advantages of all forms of government and avoid their respective abuses' (II., pp. 128, 129).

Despite the fact that some readers are sure to renew the complaint of dualism in the character of the relation between the ideal and its material, they may possibly find the author's brilliant power of analogical analysis at its best in the volume on religion. "Another world to live in, whether we expect ever to pass wholly into it, is what we mean by having a religion" (III., p. 6). What, now, is the relation of religion to the life of reason? Let us recall that the essence of reason is the construction of an ideal. And what is the 'other world' of religion but this ideal? "Religion thus exercises a function of reason" (p. 7). What, then, are the differentiæ? First, religion carries over into the ideal a part of the material of experience, while in scientific reason the ideal is conscious of its formal and hypothetical character. Further, in its attempts to carry up the material, the masses of sentiment and ideas, into the ideal, it must construct its ideal through the intuitive instead of the conceptual image. Here lies both the real strength and the historical weakness of religion. The statement of the ideal in terms of the material,

i.e., in terms of instinctive and perceptual imagery, gives a richness and fullness to religious idealization impossible in science where idealization is more abstract. Indeed, 'religion has the same original relation to life that poetry has.' The only difference between poetry and religion, purged of its errors, is that 'religion deals with higher and more practical themes, with sides of life which are in greater need of some imaginative touch than are those pleasant and pompous things which ordinary poetry dwells upon.' Historically, however, 'the religious pursuit of the life of reason has been singularly abortive.' This because it has constantly confused the perceptive instinctive material which it utilizes to embody the ideal with the unidealized, that is, the actual existent material, and has accordingly often tried to usurp the work of science (II., pp. 8–13.)

Here the reader wishes the volume on science were at hand. From what is here said of science, one suspects that in science, at any rate, the ideal constructions of reason are likely to be something more than mere 'additions' of value and 'celebrations' of work done by reflexes. Doubtless they are all this, but one gathers that in science, as in the passages above cited in Volume I., the ideal controls as well as 'celebrates'; that the distinction between 'efficient' and 'final' cause is likely to break down.[1]

The fact that ideal construction in religion, as elsewhere, must, on the one hand, be loyal to the impulses out of which and for the sake of which it arises, and yet can only be loyal by 'remodeling' them, determines the two fundamental phases of religious experience – 'piety' and 'spirituality.' Piety is 'man's reverent attachment to the sources of his being and the steadying of his life by that attachment' (III., p. 179). "It drinks at the deep elemental sources of power and order. It studies nature, honors the past, appropriates and continues its mission." Spirituality is the creative or rather recreative function of the ideal. Piety is retrospective. Spirituality has its face toward the future, while piety dwells in the realms of established order. Spirituality pitches its tent out on the frontier, not in order to gain a worldly advantage over piety, – for 'competitive worldliness is the most deadly foe of spirituality,' – but it abides there by virtue of the demands of its free recreative work. By that same token is its habitation also on the borders of mysticism. Mysticism arises out of the element of failure in the work of recreation. It serves to tide over a period of intellectual arrest until there is recuperation sufficient for the work of reconstruction to again become articulate.

Maintenance of spirituality therefore depends upon a proper balance

[1] The volume on science has appeared since the review went to press.

between impulses and ideal. Hence a too rapid differentiation, multiplication of impulses, or a too great sophistication destroys spirituality. However, some readers may experience difficulty in following Professor Santayana to the conclusion that brute life 'may be as truly spiritual as human,' and that 'the only pure mystics are the brutes.' For, while mysticism is a renunciation of discursive reflection, the latter must after all first be there to be renounced. The neo-platonist reaches the summit of his mount of transfiguration by the tortuous path of discursive intellection. As a preparation for the ecstatic vision he must first experience the impotence and vanity of reflection.

As for individual immortality, Professor Santayana regards most of the empirical evidence as 'beneath consideration.' "The palpitating mood in which it is gathered and received make gullibility and fiction play a very large part in the report; for it is not to be assumed that a man, because he speaks in the first person and addresses a learned society, has lost the primordial faculty of lying" (III., p. 230). Even at their face value these reports show only more subtle and subhuman sensibilities than ordinarily appear. They would show only that the process of dying is more complicated than is supposed, rather than point to the existence of disembodied spirits. "A disembodied life would not betray itself in specters, rumblings and spasms" (p. 234). That operations more subtle than ordinary should occur is entirely consonant with reason and experience. But "only a hankering tenderness for superstition, a failure to appreciate the function both of religion and science, can lead to reverence for such oracular gibberish as these influences provoke" (p. 233).

The moral and metaphysical grounds of individual immortality are but little less convincing to Professor Santayana than the empirical evidence. What reason is there to suppose that more justice or that better fulfillment of ideals can take place in another life than here? If there is any continuity in content and method with this life – and without such continuity nothing remains of individual existence – life elsewhere must involve the same reference of ideals to specific conditions and the same possibility of their lapsing and yielding to others more capable of execution (p. 248). Individual immortality is an hypostasis of 'the vision of eternity in time.' When a fact is idealized through reflection it acquires 'a status in eternity.' But 'having a status in eternity does not mean being a part of an eternal existence petrified and congealed into something real, but motionless.' It means only that 'every fact in being recognized takes its place in that ideal sphere of truth which is the common and unchanging standard for all assertions' (p. 267).

In view of what is said (p. 248) concerning the basis of the ideal in 'a dynamic world,' and more especially concerning its relevance to 'specific tendencies' and the consequent necessity of its 'lapsing and yielding to

others,' some will question this conception of an ideal sphere of truth which is 'the unchanging standard for all assertions,' and wonder whether, despite the illumination which Professor Santayana turns on in his exposition of the indigenous ideal, the ghost of absolutism does not still walk in places.

Following the general plan of the entire work, between the initial chapters of definitions and principles and the closing chapters of general conclusions and applications to current problems, are a number of chapters devoted more conspicuously to historical and genetic interpretation, in which the author's unusual ability in suggestive epigrammatic generalization has large play. Many will find these the most attractive part of the volume. The reviewer would note especially the chapters on 'The Christian Epic' and 'The Christian Compromise.'

It was to be expected that Professor Santayana's volume on art would be authoritative; and in the main this expectation is not disappointed. Especially is this true of the chapters presenting the specific contents of art – 'music,' 'poetry and prose,' etc.; and of the chapters on 'The Justification of Art' and 'The Criterion of Taste.'

In its largest sense, art is simple, practical reason or reasoned practise. "It is plastic instinct, conscious of its aim" (IV., p. 4). But here again we encounter the issue between the epiphenomenal and the instrumental character of consciousness; and again the outcome seems ambiguous. On the one hand, this consciousness of aim 'simply accompanies' instinct (p. 5). It is not an instrument of control. It is a mere 'expression.' "Only by virtue of a false perspective do ideas seem to govern action" (p. 6). "All invention is automatic, ideas come of themselves, dropping in their sudden form from the blue" (p. 7). "All useful things have been discovered as the Lilliputians discovered roast pig" (p. 10). On the other hand, 'art is reason propagating itself' (p. 13) and 'reason with the order in every region it imposes on life is grounded on an animal nature and has no other function than to *serve* the same' (p. 191, italics mine). Also we read of objects of art as 'things which would not only have *betrayed* the agent's habits, but would have *served* and expressed his intent' (p. 4). This seems to make overt action the expression of the intent, instead of the converse.

In view of the remarks already made on this issue in the discussion of Volume I., we must leave it here with these observations: (1) Of course, from the standpoint of experience regarded as a whole, all activity within it, whether viewed as conscious or unconscious, must be 'automatic,' in the sense of being self-active. From this standpoint the operation of ideas is as 'automatic' as that of the heart or lungs. But (2) this does not prevent ideas being 'instrumental' from exercising real control, any more than the automatic action of the heart and lungs

destroys their interaction. One stage of activity may condition another without either becoming thereby less 'spontaneous' in its immediate activity. (3) On Professor Santayana's own most excellent showing, ideas can not quite 'drop from the blue.' They must 'express,' 'grow out of,' be 'relevant to' some instinct or set of instincts. While, in the stock instance, the forgotten name 'just comes' when it does come, yet it would not come even 'in its sudden form' were it not for the want and for the agonizing effort which precedes, fruitless as the latter may appear at the time.

But, after all, this binomial conception of the general relation of art to reason does not seriously affect the rest of the treatment. For in such a case it is always possible when danger threatens from one side to pass instinctively to the other.

Resuming then the account of art in general as activity mediated by an aim, it is evident that contrary to much current opinion, art is not to be defined by mere correlative contrasts with industrial utility, science or morality. Nor is it to be identified with immediate esthetic valuation, which is only a prominent element in 'fine art' as distinguished from 'industrial art.' It is not a specific sort of experience, coordinate with other sorts. It is rather the concrete whole of consciously mediated life of which industry, fine art science, and morality are differentiations.

The general basis of art, then, lies in the fact that in the end an unmediated or a completely mediated activity is an impossible conception. "Activity, achievement, a passage from prospect to realization, is evidently essential to life. If all ends were already reached and no art were requisite, life could not exist at all, much less a life of reason" (p. 28).

In art in this large sense, as the art of living, there are obviously two fundamental factors: the 'material' in the form of the structural products of past activity, which are demanding opportunity for further function; and the 'ideal' which supplies this opportunity. But once more we must beware of an ideal imposed from without. "The ideal is a concomitant emanation from the natural, and has no other possible status" (p. 28).

The organic relation between these two constituent functions of activity furnishes also the basis for the distinction between 'servile' and 'liberal,' or 'fine' art. If the demand of some particular part or organ of the total structure for expression, or for maintenance, is so immediately urgent that a comprehensive organization, *i.e.*, idealization of the response, is impossible, the result is a 'servile' art in the form of the barren automatisms of savage dance and song, or a utilitarian struggle for mere existence. Liberal, or fine art, is the result of a balanced interaction between the activity of that part of the structure calling for expression and maintenance and the idealizing activities of the response. This

means that the demands for expression and maintenance are themselves more ideal, less immediate in their insistence; and, on the other hand, that the ideals are more effective because they embody more material.

From this standpoint it is evident that no impassable distinction can be drawn between 'industrial' and 'fine' art. For, "Every proximate end in being attained, satisfies the mind and manifests the intent which pursued it, while every operation upon a material, even one so volatile as sound, finds that material somewhat refractory… . A certain amount of technical and instrumental labor is thus involved in every work of genius, and a certain genius in every technical success" (p. 33). In so far as the distinction is to be made, it is simply one of stages in one continuous process. The industrial stage is the one 'in which untoward matter is being better prepared or impeding media are overcome.' In the liberal stage, the prepared matter 'is appropriated to ideal uses and endowed with a direct spiritual function' (p. 32).

After this identification of the essential elements of art with those of other rational functions, one is not surprised to find the volume closing with an eloquent arraignment of the modern separation of art from its industrial, moral, religious and social matrix. As usual, Professor Santayana's own words can not be improved, hence I quote freely. "The great obstacle which art finds in attempting to be rational is its function isolation." At present art 'too much resembles an opiate or a stimulant.' Our museums are 'mausoleums in which a dead art heaps up its remains.' "Art whose products are so collected and exhibited is gratuitous and sophisticated and the greater part of men's concern about it is affectation" (p. 209). "Art, like religion, needs to be absorbed in the life of reason… . It needs to have its processes diffused throughout all life activity, instead of being confined to abstract productions called 'works of art'" (p. 208). At present art is symbolic and vicarious and stands in contrast with reality. But if 'it were knit more closely with other rational functions, to beautify things might render them more useful, and to represent them most imaginatively might be to see them in their truth' (p. 213). Then, "No work would be called in a special sense 'a work of art,' for all works would be such intrinsically. There would need to be no division of mankind into mechanical, blind workers and half-demented poets, and no separation of useful from fine art, such as people make who have understood neither the nature nor the ultimate reward of human action. All arts would be practised together and merged in the art of life, the only one wholly useful or fine."

REVIEW OF *THE LIFE OF REASON*, VOL. 5

"Review of George Santayana, *The Life of Reason*, vol. 5." *Journal of Philosophy* 3.17 (16 August 1906): 469–471.

In the various reviews of the previous volumes of 'The Life of Reason' there has been such flattering unanimity of opinion concerning the author's scholarship, the facinations of his style and the rich suggestiveness of his interpretations, that further comment on these features might begin to cloy.

Having discussed Professor Santayana's standpoint and the general outline of his undertaking in a review of the first four volumes of his work in No. 8 of the current volume of this journal, we may pass at once to the contents of this volume. Indeed, so concrete and all-pervasive are Professor Santayana's standpoint and method that each volume and most of the chapters may, like Emerson's paragraphs, stand alone.

Disregarding for the present what appear to the writer as certain discrepancies, some of which will be noted further on, we shall let the author's general 'intent,' to use his own term, speak.

The difference between science and myth does not lie in the fact that one is less speculative than the other, but in the fact that the speculations of science are made to be verified, while a myth is final and absolute. Further, the only kind of verification a myth could have would consist in the accidental discovery of a sense-object corresponding, point for point, with the mythical object. But, "Gravitation and natural selection, being schemes of relation, can never exist substantially and on their own account… . A hypothesis, being a discursive device, gains its utmost validity when its discursive value is established. It *is* not, it merely applies; and every situation in which it is found to apply is a proof of its truth… . To verify a theory as if it were not a method but a divination of occult existences would be to turn the theory into a myth and then to discover that what the myth pictured had, by a miracle, an actual existence" (p. 10).

Nor does this hypothetical procedure of science reduce its results to mere 'appearances' in invidious comparison with something else as reality. Such a conception of science merely convicts its possessor of the elementary mistake of first identifying reality either with the ideal, the hypothetical element, as does the transcendentalist, or with the immediate, the existential element, as does the materialist, and then

regarding the other factor as a foreign, disturbing, vitiating element, with mere 'appearance' as the joint result. But we have only to keep fast hold of the conception of reality, life as consisting of both these elements, hypotheses and the immediate sense experiences to which they lead, and of the fact that this also is just what constitutes science, in its fullest sense, to see that science gives the most adequate conception of reality – all others being abstractions from it. Thus dialectic is the abstraction of the hypothetical, as physics is of the mechanical, the existential element. "If science thus contains the sum total of our rational conviction and gives us the only picture of reality on which we should care to dwell, we have but to consult the sciences in detail to ascertain, as far as possible, what sort of a universe we live in" (p. 319).

Thus speaks Santayana, the pragmatist, the dynamic idealist or empiricist, whatever you will. But, as was pointed out in the discussion of the other volumes above referred to, we have to reckon also with Santayana, the Greek, the perfectionist. This is foreshadowed in the general division of science into physics, which deals with things and events, and dialectic, which deals with the 'forms' of things and events. And when we read (p. 209 *et passim*) that 'these forms are invulnerable, eternal and free' we surely have a confession of Platonism, pure and undefiled. This means, of course, that there is a realm or portion of reality that never undergoes any reconstruction whatever, and if Santayana the pragmatist did not step in, Santayana the Platonist would have to deal with all the old puzzles involved in relating a realm of absolute fixity to one of absolute fluidity.

It is Santayana the finalist also speaking in numerous utterances, beginning, 'When science is perfected,' 'If science were perfect,' etc., who laments the grotesque inadequacy of consciousness to represent its tremendously complex objects (p. 81) as if this very complexity itself were not already in consciousness, otherwise how should we complain of it. The development of this motive is carried so far as to say (pp. 82–83) that the inadequacy of sense-perception 'retards science and renders hypotheses necessary'! as if the author did not elsewhere most convincingly show that it is just the inadequacy of the senses that makes science possible and necessary; that hypothesis is the very soul of science; and that every development of the powers of sense-perception, *e.g.*, the microscope, the telescope, etc., instead of doing away with hypotheses, only creates a new demand for them.

This rivalry of ultimatism and evolutionism is responsible, too, for the ambiguity in the rôle of thought in science. On the one hand, thought seems to effect, to establish relationships between things. On the other, it is the mere 'product,' 'expression,' 'shadow,' 'music,' 'incense,' etc., of a world of things already and independently in relation. Now thought is the

method of experience, again it simply discovers 'the method already existing in the flux of things' (p. 117). Yet again, the edges of this cleavage are so brought together as to form a real circuit in which the reaction of thought upon the things of which it is the expression is clearly recognized; in which thought not only acknowledges its 'natural' parentage, but renders some filial service. Thus, "Thought's rational function consists, as we then perceive, in expressing a natural situation and *improving* that situation by expressing it… . Expression makes thought *a power in the very world* from which thought drew its being, and *renders it in some measure self-sustaining and self-assured*."[1] Here surely no vestige remains of the Aristotelian distinction between efficient and final causes elsewhere so devotedly expounded and defended.

Of the chapters not already mentioned the reviewer finds the one on 'History' and the three on 'Prerational, Rational and Post-rational Morality,' especially stimulating. In the chapters on 'The Nature of Intent' and 'Dialectic,' which deal with logical questions, notwithstanding repeated affirmations of the natural origin of reflection, the account of its operations seems to cut it loose too much from its base. Deduction is given more independence of induction and of hypothesis (p. 97) than many will wish to allow.

But a logic-chopping type of criticism can not do Professor Santayana's work justice. For, despite the discordant note of finalism, it still remains that nowhere has the essentially *vital* character of reason been more clearly, forcefully and gracefully stated than in these volumes. Moreover, the distinctive thing in Professor Santayana's important contribution is that this character of reason has been exhibited, not in a formal and dialectic fashion, but by a scholarly appeal to the various contentual 'fields' of experience.

[1] P. 180. Italics mine.

REVIEW OF *STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY*

"Review of *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology, A Commemorative Volume* by Former Students of C. E. Garman." *Journal of Philosophy* 3.23 (8 November 1906): 631–637.

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

"By their fruits ye shall know them." This volume is the second recent and notable commemorative presentation of 'fruits' by former students to American teachers of philosophy. Professor Garman, like Professor Howison, belongs to that select circle of philosophers who take the teaching of philosophy seriously and who succeed, therefore, in getting students to take philosophy seriously. If, now and then, Professor Garman has been visited with regret that since he found 'that his students would be satisfied with nothing less' than his best and his entire energy in teaching, he dared not 'let down his course and devote himself to publishing,' he must find much in this volume to vindicate his course.

Professor Garman's letter on the purpose and method of teaching philosophy, which forms the excellent preface of the volume, was originally published in the *American Journal of Psychology,* in 1898, and is, therefore, familiar to many. Of this letter it is necessary to say only that it is not difficult for the reader to understand how Professor Garman has succeeded so well in inoculating his students with philosophy and in convincing them of its essentially *vital* character – that it is something more than 'a game.'

The first paper, by Professor Tufts, 'On Moral Evolution,' is so packed with content that any statement of it in a paragraph or two is bound to be very schematic. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the paper from its own inner pressure can escape expansion into a volume. The paper is a reconstructive statement of the factors and processes of moral evolution in the light of recent contributions of the genetic psychology of the individual on the one hand and of social psychology on the other.

In the developed moral experience are found as content: (*a*) 'the development and idealization of powers giving advance in knowledge, in art and in consciousness of rights'; (*b*) regard for others under its various aspects of justice, sympathy and benevolence. On the side of method – of the 'how' – there are: (*a*) the problem of the construction of a standard;

(b) the attainment of unity of motive – of whole-hearted interest; and *(c)* the organization of impulse and ideas into responsible character. The genetic elements are, on the side of the individual, the primitive biological instincts and emotions; on the social side, the various activities of group life.

Part II. of the paper contains a critical discussion of the causal agencies of moral evolution. After pointing out the contributions and the limitations of the 'association' theory, the 'sympathy' theory and Professor Baldwin's 'imitation' or 'polar-self' theory as accounts of how the individual assimilates the culture and morality of society, Professor Tufts shows that 'we need to add social organization as directing the discharge and organization of instincts and impulses.' From the standpoint of individual achievement the chief factors are, objectively, *opposition* in the physical and social environment and, subjectively, *effort*.

Part III. brings together the 'what' and the 'how' of the preceding analysis in the unity of 'The Process of Moral Evolution.' The general law of development is: (*a*) formally, the standard presented, at first, not by itself but in persons, comes gradually to explicit recognition; *(b)* on the side of content, definite and free conceptions of art and science, of self and others, of rights and duties, emerge gradually out of the routine, habitual activities of group life. The real *point d'appui* of this development is found in the fact that organized impulses, habits and customs are constantly developing new relationships of conflict and reinforcement. The account of the stages through which this development passes – especially the passage from the standard of honor to that of right, is illuminating. The illustrative material is abundant and apt.

'The Expansion of Europe in its Influence upon Population' is the caption of Professor Wilcox's paper. Taking his departure from Professor Seeley's lectures upon 'The Expansion of England,' Professor Wilcox asks whether the center of modern history is not to be found in the efforts at expansion, not of England, but of Europe? After the discovery of America and the ocean route to India, did not Europe encounter less resistance in foreign lands than at home? And were not its efforts quite as largely economic as political or military? Did it not strive more or less blindly for the advantage and the increase of the people as much as for the glory and prestige of the state? "To a non-European student of population these questions seem answerable in the affirmative."

Professor Wilcox then takes up the statistics of population and shows that, with a few minor exceptions, the native stocks reached by European powers have increased in numbers much more rapidly than those out of range of European influence. And this increase is not due to any increase in the birth-rate, but to decrease in the death-rate. Mere increase in quantity of human life, however, is not necessarily a good. But this increase in

quantity through a decrease of the death-rate due to the development of science, shows that the expansion of Europe is an expansion of the higher qualities of life, and is a vindication of the agricultural, industrial and political type of civilization.

Mr. Woods contributes a suggestive paper on 'Democracy – a New Unfolding of Human Power.' The paper thinks that the past and perhaps much of the current conception of democracy, with its simple formula of a minimum of administrative machinery and equality before the law, is too negative and formal. Such a formula answers very well for revolutionary periods, but is entirely inadequate for the positive and reconstructive needs of the present. The *laissez-faire,* individualistic conception of government in our present industrial and commercial system defeats its own aim. For combinations of individuals engaged in industry take up functions which this negative conception of government ignores, and the result is an oligarchy sailing under the colors of democracy. Democracy, therefore, must become positive and constructive to save itself. Its administrations must be *by* the whole people and for the whole people – not by private individuals for private individuals.

Yet Mr. Woods says that his essay is by no means exclusively directed toward the extension of a governmental régime to cover all interests of the economic and social world. For the principles of democracy may in many cases be applied by a voluntary community effort without governmental interference. Just how this is to be done without some kind of organization that would in so far very much resemble governmental machinery is not quite clear from the paper. Mr. Woods says through the great principle of 'association,' and argues that as 'the people by cooperation are carrying on the enormous business of government, why not extend this method further into the fields of industry and culture'? But some may think that government is not a special 'field' of activity coordinate with 'culture and industry.' They may insist that government is simply the *method* of applying certain principles in the 'fields' of industry and culture.

Mr. Woods's treatment of the ancient bugaboo of lack of incentive under a cooperative system, though making no pretense to novelty, is well put and well illustrated.

The next paper is 'An Analysis of the Moral Judgment,' by Professor Sharp. The paper aims to exhibit the basis and nature of moral approbation and disapprobation, of the adjectives 'right' and 'wrong' and of the experience of obligation. The inquiry is to be conducted from the standpoint of moral judgments as employed in every-day life.

The differentia of moral approbation is found not in its emotional content, but in its object, which is always a *purpose*. This distinguishes it from esthetic approval or taste, whose objects are given results, and from scientific or intellectual approval, which is directed upon means to ends. Moral

approval must not be confused with habit-custom. For the moral judgment is always *critical* – a judgment of a purpose in relation to other purposes. This makes it always a systematic judgment.

The ground and standard of moral approval the paper finds in the right-wing interpretation of Kant's standard of universality. The moral judgment approves that purpose 'which the person judging approves of every one aiming at under the same conditions' (p. 114). Here some one may ask, as has been asked of Rant: But what is the basis of this universal justification itself?

Some may find the distinction between the content of moral approbation and ' right' in Part II. a little difficult to follow. 'Right' is said to be 'at its lowest,' moral approbation 'purged of all inconsistencies and reduced to a harmonious system' (p. 126). But in the previous analysis approval is not moral except it is critical, and critical approbation surely could not occur so long as consciousness of inconsistencies and lack of harmony remains. Right is the harmonized approbation of my deeper as opposed to the approvals of my surface self (p. 128). But how are we to distinguish the harmony of the deeper self from that of the surface self? If the harmony of the surface self is felt as a 'surface' harmony, if a deeper self is recognized at the time, there could be no surface harmony.

Professor Sharp's criticism of attempts to distinguish and separate motive and intention and formal and material right and wrong, and his analysis of obligation as the tension between the new ideal and old habits undergoing reconstruction, are well taken.

Professor Woodbridge's paper on 'The Problem of Consciousness' is very reconstructive and thought-provoking. The initial thesis of the paper is that the characteristic positions and problems of modern idealism which are now undergoing vigorous criticism and reconstruction have been determined by the conception of consciousness as worked out by Descartes, Locke and Kant, namely, of consciousness 'as an end term of a relation, the other term of which might be an external world, another mind, the Divine Being or some unknown source of excitation.'

The strained and artificial character in which Professor Woodbridge believes idealism has always appeared to the plain man and the scientist, is due to just this mistaking for an end term what is really a relation. This real but unrecognized relational character of consciousness accounts for the fact that in attempting to play the rôle of an end term it has always tended to reach out and appropriate the other term 'until, as in the post-Kantian philosophy, the source of stimulation was brought within the mind itself and assigned to the mind's essential instability.' The logical outcome of this situation is that no meaning is left in either terms or relation, and experience is reduced to simple given immediacy. In attempting to avoid this result and in restoring, in actual operations, the relational function to consciousness

while yet regarding it theoretically as an end term, arise the antinomies of idealism which current criticism is developing.

In the positive part of the paper Professor Woodbridge starts with an analysis of 'the conscious situation,' which he says 'seems resolvable into things related somehow to one another.' Conspicuous among these relations are the spatial and temporal connections. But independently of the space and time relation one thing may *suggest* or *mean* another. "This relation of meaning is just as much a *relation between* them as is space or time."

But just what is this relation of meaning? As Professor Woodbridge observes, the distinction of this relation from others 'must be more than a matter of names.' The author confesses that the paper has not much to answer in a positive way. Its aim is to define the problem. However, there are two or three definite negative statements. (1) It is not to be identified with the so-called quality of awareness. On the contrary, this quality of awareness turns out to be the manifold connections and irresistible meanings which the things in the conscious relation have. (2) On account of its intermittent character it is not a relation from which a system or order of relations could be deduced.

The main questions which, I imagine, most readers will raise are: (1) How can consciousness be a peculiar relation coordinate with and differing radically from the others and yet all be 'within the conscious situation' itself? Perhaps this means simply that every situation is one in which the conscious relation – the relation of meaning – is present somewhere in it; not that the other relations are all inside consciousness, nor that the whole situation is conscious through and through. (2) Some may have difficulty in regarding meaning as an independent relation coordinate with the others. They may insist that one thing can not *just* and merely mean another, but that it always means it in a spatial or temporal or causal way; *e.g.*, a medicine means relief only *through* certain relations of space, time, cause, etc. Thus some may say, space, time, cause, etc., are but the specific modes of the meaning's relation.

Meanwhile the main point of Professor Woodbridge's paper – the conception of consciousness as an actual relating (and, I would add, to that extent a *constructive)* activity – is most promising to any one seeking escape from the toils of absolutism.

Dr. Norton's contribution treats of 'The Intellectual Element in Music.' To the reviewer the point of most general and vital significance is the writer's view of the relation between the logical and the appreciative phases of experience. He evidently does not regard experience as consisting of two worlds, one of logical relations – a world of description – the other a world of appreciation, each in turn serving as an 'appearance' of the other. 'The function of musical ideas is to control musical experience,' and by control of musical experience is meant the further development and enrich-

ment of the immediate, appreciative experience. Hence how futile is the inquiry whether musical experience is purely immediate. Like all other experience, the dominantly appreciative stages develop differentiations in various ways, lose their solid and uniting character and call for analysis, for logical, scientific activity such as the construction of a scale, rhythm, tempo, etc., as means of restoring themselves at will. Of course this discovery of such means of restoring the appreciative experience means that the restored experience will not be the old one. It will be an appreciative experience developed and enriched through the logical and scientific activity which has restored it. The logical and the appreciative are thus mutual stimuli and limits.

The reviewer's lack of technical knowledge forbids discussion of many specific points which are doubtless very suggestive to more technically trained readers.

In an interesting paper on 'Pragmatism and Kantianism' Professor Raub makes a contribution to a much needed line of philosophical work, namely, an exhibition of the historical connections of pragmatism. However, I am sure many pragmatists will file an objection to the statement that the expounders of pragmatism 'treat it as an essentially new position.' A favorite thesis of pragmatists is that whenever the great classic contributors have sought to escape certain contradictions, irrelevancies of the formulation of insoluble problems, they have invariably been forced into pragmatic positions. That there was no clear consciousness of this would, I suppose, be generally admitted, and is moreover abundantly witnessed in the fact that up to the present the major part of philosophic activity growing out of these classics has been given to the development of the absolutism instead of the pragmatism in them.

Whether the rediscovery of this immanent pragmatism and the conscious undertaking of the development of its various implications is sufficient to constitute 'a new era in philosophic thought' is an *ad hominem* question which is not likely to be seriously debated, although the difference between a movement which develops absolutism and one which consciously travels in the direction of pragmatism is after all a rather wide one.

The parallelism which the paper exhibits between what the writer regards as the important features of pragmatism and the main outlines of Kant's first 'Kritik' is suggestive. The author admits that the parallelism breaks at a very crucial point – on the question of the absolute finality and fixity of the categories. The paper does not consider the second 'Kritik' in its relation to the first, which must contain a very rich vein of pragmatism.

One or two points of interpretation should be noticed. If one says with the paper that pragmatism, along with Kant, makes the test of truth 'intellectual harmony,' it must be remembered that for the pragmatist intellectual problems, and, therefore, the intellectual harmony, is not a special field

of isolated and independent operations. The pragmatist regards the intellectual process rather as a stage in the development and dissolution of tensions, the material, source and goal of which can not be described as merely 'intellectual.'

The paper concludes with the popular verdict on the adequacy of pragmatism based upon the equally popular imputation of an atomistic conception of the individual. How – asks the paper – can pragmatism account for the interaction and correspondence between the universes of different individuals? First, in general it might be said, that this does *not* need accounting for. It is that in terms of which everything else is accounted for. A world of individuals in interaction and correspondence is first the world inside of which all problems fall. Of course, if pragmatism in the course of working out solutions of these problems should, in its psychology or logic, conceive the individual in such a way as to make a world of interaction impossible, it must be held to account. But so far as I know, pragmatists hold that the content of each individual's universe, as such, is just the activity of interaction and correspondence with other individuals. Hence there is no general 'problem' of interaction and correspondence, however many specific 'difficulties' and subordinate problems in this process there may be.

The last and one of the best of the philosophical series of papers is by Professor Lyman, on 'The Influence of Pragmatism on the Status of Theology.' If this is a sample of what may be expected from the application of the pragmatic method to theology, both theology and pragmatism are to be congratulated.

The paper begins with the isolation of theology from the other sciences, due to the fact that when the other sciences became empirical theology remained frankly dogmatic in method. It continued to assume that it possessed an infallible canon of truth. Historically there were two reasons for this. First, theology in its practical applications dealt with very important immediate problems that demanded a definite norm. Its error was in mistaking this definiteness for absolute finality. Second, theology claimed to deal with the supernatural. Here the dogmatic method was absolutely indispensable.

But the so-called empirical method of the natural sciences fared little better. For it, too, began to regard the elements into which it analyzed experience for practical purposes as metaphysical ultimates as absolute and final as the deliverances of theological dogmatism. The opposition of natural science and theology was thus due to two forms of absolutism whose content by definition excluded each other.

In the method of pragmatic empiricism which does away with static absolutism in every field, Professor Lyman finds the dissolution of the old oppositon, at any rate, whatever new ones may arise, and the promise of a theology possessing the same general canons as other sciences. Theology

is already well prepared, on its side, for this reconstruction by its translation in recent years of the supernatural into the ethical and by its increasing use of the historical method in interpreting its content.

Applied to the special problems of Christian theology the pragmatic method would say that its 'absoluteness' and 'finality' must be wholly relative to the historical situations in which it functions. It is, of course, conceivable that Christianity may be pointing a direction for religious development which all other religions may eventually take. But, first, this can not be deduced as a metaphysical necessity; and second, even if this should occur we must remember 'that in a world of growing reality new values may arise, and that these may modify the old values or be quite discontinuous with them.'

REVIEW OF *THOUGHT AND THINGS*

"Review of James Mark Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. 1: *Functional Logic, or Genetic Theory of Knowledge*." *Psychological Bulletin* 4.3 (15 March 1907): 81–88.

This is the most comprehensive attempt in Logic yet made in America. Aside from the question of its success which of course cannot be passed upon until the remaining and larger portions of the work appear – the fact that such a program is offered, and the general standpoint and method of the treatment are further evidence that philosophy in America is rapidly passing from the absorbing, translating, albeit necessary, period of German apprenticeship into a free and initiative adulthood.

As has been so repeatedly pointed out by various writers representing the so-called 'pragmatic' movement, the most obvious and immediate field for reconstructive applications of the 'instrumental' view of thought is the field in which the movement started – logic. The view that regards thought as supporting and supported by the other phases of experience, rather than as a wholly independent strand, patently calls for an account of the *way* in which the other 'modes' of experience condition and are conditioned by thought and of the *way* in which the various stages of thought determine each other, – in short, for a 'genetic logic.' This, in general, is the task Professor Baldwin has undertaken.

However, Professor Baldwin wishes it understood at the start – though one would not have to read far to discover the fact for himself – that he is not a 'pragmatist' in any 'alarming' sense of the term. Indeed, 'pragmatism' is freely criticised throughout the volume. Whether in these rejections of pragmatism Professor Baldwin succeeds in avoiding a static absolutism, which he also explicitly disavows, will be clearer in the end.

The scope of the work is not confined to the stages and processes of reflection as such, but aims to follow the entire history of the cognitive function through what are called the 'pre-logical,' 'quasi-logical,' 'logical-proper' and 'hyper-logical' stages. The present volume contains the treatment of the first two of these periods under the general title of *Functional Logic.* Volume II. with the caption *Genetic Theory of Thought or Experimental Logic,* is to deal with the problem of truth and falsity. Volume III. *Genetic Logic of Reality,* will treat of the relation of thought to reality – 'carrying the treatment into the hyper-logical functions – aesthetic, rational, etc., drawing conclusions for real logic and philosophy.'

Even these bare headings, especially those of 'Experimental' and 'Real' logic, tempt one to speculations on the implications of such divisions – speculations which must, however, be suppressed until the appearance of the other volumes. It is indeed difficult enough to interpret justly the immediate contents of the present volume without its complements. The meaning of many terms, especially some of Professor Baldwin's new ones and his new uses of old ones in this first volume, may be clearer when the descriptions of the later stages appear.

Passing to the contents of the volume, perhaps the most significant part of the introduction is the statement of what are called the 'axioms and postulates' of 'genetic science,' and the 'canons' of genetic logic. These contain a recognition of two or three important conceptions. First, that development, evolution, is an actual movement in *reality* – not mere appearance, nor an unrolling of an already determined 'implicit' reality. This is expressed in the 'Canon of actuality' and 'the Fallacy of the implicit' (p. 24), and on page 13 where we are told that explanatory logic 'studies thought as instrumental to a genetically built up and evolving reality' in contrast with 'speculative logic of the metaphysicians' which 'makes the logical nature of reality the prius.' From this it follows that every cognitive content and 'mode' must be evaluated in its own context, and is not to be referred to an ultimate type nor taken as an absolute type for other modes and contents. Yet these thoroughly developmental passages are immediately followed by this: "It [explanatory logic] may find *the* all-inclusive and *ultimate* meaning of experience to be given – not in the thought mode but in a hyper-logical, an aesthetic or even mystical mode of experience" (Italics mine). That the thought 'mode' is ever passing into a mode of the immediate type which may perhaps be called 'aesthetic' has been the nerve of 'pragmatic' doctrines from the beginning. But how, if reality is essentially developmental, can the esthetic be any more 'ultimate' than any other mode and how is there to be found here or anywhere else an 'ultimate' and 'all-inclusive' meaning? This perhaps is one of the questions that should await the other volumes. But there are enough of such passages in this volume to make the reader wonder whether Professor Baldwin's conception of 'a developmental reality' is not still paying tribute to static absolutism.

Returning to the exposition, the cognitive function is traced through the following modes which traverse the four general stages given above: The 'sense-mode'; image-mode, including memory and fancy; play-mode; substantive-mode; subject-mode – reflection; logical-mode, including belief and predication; aesthetic-mode; ethical-mode. Each of these modes has its corresponding content or object – 'sense-object,' 'image-object,' etc.

Professor Baldwin begins with what he calls the 'presentative' or 'projective' as the primitive cognitive content. In the first account this primitive content appears to be absolutely given. It simply appears in

Professor Baldwin's own figure 'as a panorama.' But further along we find that 'selection,' 'discrimination,' and therefore representation are involved. We are told (pp. 132 and 137) that this '*primum cognitum*' must always *mean* something; that in it 'there are always both complications of content and fulfillments of interest.' This means, of course, that this '*primum cognitum*' is as much representative as presentative or 'projective'; that sense perception and memory begin and develop together.

This suggests that in his treatment Professor Baldwin follows what Caird calls the method of 'regression,' in which earlier statements are constantly revised and supplemented by the results of the later exposition. Doubtless for non-absolute beings under the necessity of presenting a simultaneous development in a serial form, this method, to a certain extent, is unavoidable. But, in using it, the earlier statements should be carefully qualified in order to protect the reader from confusion and the author from misinterpretation.

In this account of the primitive object the author criticises 'the writings of Professor Dewey and others,' which have attempted to state the object in terms of the interruption – or, to use Professor Baldwin's term, the 'embarrassment' – of habit and the reconstructive activities of attention. He says this cannot always be done; 'for it often happens that a new and unwelcome object simply forces itself upon us' (p. 50). But why should this 'forced' character prevent a statement of the object in terms of habit and attention? It seems scarcely more than the time-honored statement of apperception to say that, however 'unwelcome' or 'forced' the object may be, it cannot 'get into' consciousness by any other way than the already existing and active system of habits and attention. And that a new object could not be constructed in consciousness without some degree of interruption and reconstruction of the preexisting coördination would seem equally obvious. All this is from the standpoint of the ordinary dualism of organism, including 'a mind,' and environment from which Professor Baldwin seems to write much of the time. But if now we conceive of that activity which *includes* organism and environment as a vast moving complex of habit and attention, then we may state the *entire* nature and significance of the object in terms of those functions. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Professor Baldwin himself finds the *motif* for all his further important differentiations, such as inner-outer, mind-body, subject-object, etc., precisely in the 'embarrassments,' 'failures,' 'ambiguities,' etc., arising in the preceding stages. (Cf. pp. 186–240, 244, 253 ff.)

The account of the 'image-mode' is very suggestive – especially the conception of play as the forerunner of reflection. The free activity of imagery in play is made the analogue of the process of the construction of hypotheses. Whether the reader accepts all of the author's statements of the criteria of the differentiations of inner and outer, fact and fancy, physical

and psychical, object and subject, he must agree that the discussion is timely in view of the constant confusion of these distinctions.

Some readers may feel that after the introduction the author might well have begun with Chapter VII., on 'Meaning.' For it here appears that all cognitive content must be or have meaning. This a1so accounts for the fact that a considerable measure of the preceding exposition is repeated in this chapter. Some readers of this chapter may be confused by the double use of the term *meaning*. In the beginning we are well told that 'It is in the passage from bare recognition of each item as being what it is, to its treatment as being not what it is, but what it *may become or be used as* that psychic meanings as such arise' (p. 131). On the other hand the term 'meaning' is used throughout for simple content of any kind apart from this pointing or referring function which we have read is the very essence of meaning. In this second sense of the term we are told that the content is simply ' found to *be* just *what* it means' (p. 131). Of course a thing can both be and mean at the same time, but that it can be *what* it *means* is quite another and to the reviewer an impossible affair. Professor Baldwin himself explicitly raises the point under the question, 'are meaningless objects possible ?' (pp. 137 and 185). His answer is : 'Theoretically, yes'; 'practically, no,' 'since the changes in the life of concrete thought are so constantly occurring … that such neutrality *is really* never realized' (italics mine) – Now if we believe this is *actually* the case, why this 'theoretical' conception to the contrary? Where we do *not* know what 'really is' we may fill in with hypothetical conceptions. But we surely do not construct hypothetical conceptions of a situation which we *have already accepted* as quite otherwise.

The chapter on 'negative meaning' is one of the best parts of this discussion and also illustrates further the 'regressive' method by carrying back into the preceding stage the needed element of 'embarrassment,' 'ambiguity,' etc. They are here given a central position which they maintain, with occasional lapses, throughout the rest of the volume though apparently without the author's explicit recognition of this position.

The next chapter is on the 'substantive mode,' – the stage in which the mind-body dualism develops. It begins with an account of how this distinction develops from the earlier ones of 'inner and outer' and of 'images and things.' The earlier dualisms belong to the pre-experimental period when experience is relatively uncontrolled, where the 'outer' is simply the sense content into which memory images *happen* to be convertible, the 'inner' being the images which *happen* to be unconverted or unconvertible, *i.e.,* 'images detached from their suggested termini' (p. 88). But as the experimental – the hypothetical – function of imagery develops, there comes to be more and more detachment of these images from immediate fulfillment and consequently more continuity and solidarity in them until they get a substantiation as 'mind.' On the other hand this is

accompanied by a corresponding regularity and dependableness in the sense content into which these images are convertible until it is substantiated as 'body.' Mind-body is then the scientific correlative of the pre-scientific 'inner-outer.'

At this point the treatment takes up the nature of general and universal meaning which is held to belong to this chapter since "Those meanings involve cognition of relation and it is by the progression into the 'substantive mode' that this is first achieved." There is room for discussion of this point but I must pass on to Professor Baldwin's conception of general and universal which, I think, is unusual. He has identified generality and universality with verification, – proof. In the experimental stage of thought certain contents are selected as hypotheses – as 'instrumental.' But 'these are individuated as schematic not as general or universal' (p. 215). 'Schematic' means that a content is serving as a 'schema' for the interpretation and organization of new material. It is hypothetical. Then if this statement – that such a content is not general nor universal – referred to the pre-scientific stage in which a child might call a horse 'a big dog' or expect to be burnt by an orange, thus using dog and the color of the candle flame as 'schemata,' one could readily agree that such a 'schema' is no *logical* general nor universal. But we are explicitly told that this interpretation is to apply to 'the term hypothesis *as scientific thinkers use it*' (italics mine). The distinction is further elaborated as follows: "As meanings the 'schema' and the general or concept are distinguished as one *selective* and *prospective,* the other *recognitive* and *retrospective*… . One is an expectation, the other is a fulfillment. It is, in the latter progression [and this is the scientific stage], the difference between conjecture and truth;… between research and the assertion of proof; between utility and reasonableness" (brackets mine). In passing one wonders what the antithesis between a 'research hypothesis' and reasonableness can mean. One of the 'rules' in the text-books of logic is that 'the hypothesis must be reasonable.' To be sure all utility is not reasoned, *e.g.,* the case of the burnt child, etc. But, to put a scientific hypothesis as a case of mere utility over against 'reasonableness,' seems to imply a 'pure' reason which would seem strange in a 'functional logic.'

Of course a writer is always free to give terms new connotations. But when he does, he must carefully cover the ground of the old connotation. If the 'schema' as a scientific hypothesis is neither general nor universal, what is it? It surely is not 'singular' nor is it 'particular' by the definition of the latter (p. 231). Professor Baldwin says (p. 271) it is 'just a hypothetical meaning' which becomes general when verified. Thus the hypothesis 'horse,' which I apply to an object about which I am uncertain, becomes general when verified; when 'I treat the horse to sugar beware of his legs,' etc. But this reads very much like the usual descriptions of the way in which experience passes out of the 'general' into the specific and concrete where

the general or universal as such ceases to exist. Surely the horse to which I feed sugar etc. is not 'general.' To be sure the material of my hypothesis must have an established character; it must already have definition – otherwise of course it could not serve as an idea – as a 'schema.' But this established, defined character does not in itself make it general. Its generality consists in its *use* to define and further develop new material. In other words, it would seem that the selection, the construction of the hypothesis is the very essence of the act of generalization. Again, the universal is simply a 'general' which: (1) is 'irrevocable'; (2) 'admits of no exceptions' (p. 224). If these statements be applied to the universal as the hypothesis *in* the act of reasoning, meaning thereby that as used *in this problem* the hypothetical content must preserve a steadfast character – must be consistent, there is no difficulty. But if taken absolutely they must make trouble for a 'dynamic view of reality.'

An interesting corollary of this view of 'general' and 'universal' appears in its relation to idealization (pp. 232 ff.). Ideal content is well described as that which serves as an 'aim' – an 'intent' or as the selector and organizer of some other content. Idealization is thus concerned with change – adaptation. But the general and universal are the fixed and the irrevocable. Professor Baldwin does not blink the conclusion which he states thus: 'The general is a finished retrospective, relational meaning from which in its very conception ideal reference is excluded!' (p. 236).

The last chapter, which is one of the most stimulating in the volume, is an account of the genesis of the subject-object dualism and the transition to the logical stage proper. The rise of the subject-object distinction is due to 'embarrassments' arising in the mind-body anti-thesis. My own body is both outer and inner, physical and mental. Nor 'can I treat another's body simply as body, equivalent to thing, for it means to me thing plus the characters of capriciousness, activity etc., which are the essence of my meaning of mind' (p. 253). On the other hand mind is equally ambiguous – is equally inner and outer, whether my own or another's. The solution of these 'ambiguities' with their resulting 'embarrassments' is found by both sides of these antitheses renouncing their substantive character and becoming ideas – free' 'detached,' 'objective' contents in a world of thought, or, as Professor Baldwin calls it, of 'experience.' So that '*on occasion this or that meaning or interpretation may be given the exclusive place which the dominant interest or the germane context of the moment determines*.' This is properly called 'the standpoint of reflection.' For in the stage of forming and testing hypotheses all experience is regarded as *possibly* ideal. Everything is grist for the logical mill.

But Professor Baldwin finds yet another important characteristic of the logical stage. These ideas must be ideas to and for a subject. This subject is constituted by the 'effort' – the 'activity' element (p. 259) which thus

appears, contrary to the doctrine of many psychologists – the author among them – to be taken out of the idea, leaving the latter a mere passive content. To be an idea then means to be an 'experience' of and for a subject. Hence the author's characterization of the logical stage as that of 'experience.'

The reader will probably find 'difficulties' in this chapter. One of the most obvious is that although these ideal contents are supposed to have surrendered their antithetical characters so as to leave them free for determination as the specific occasion may require, – yet we find (p. 268) that *'this entire content is thought as inner content*.' Yet again (p. 270) we read that these ideas 'are represented by the process of thought *as in their original mode*.' Apparently, then, the earlier antithesis of inner-outer still remains and yet is somehow all 'inner.'

There is a similar difficulty besetting the meaning of 'objective' and 'psychic.' There exists apparently a complete subject-object relation between the subject as constituted by 'effort' and the world of ideas, which is described as 'a related whole' (p. 271). Yet there is still another 'extra psychic' world with 'real coefficients' to which the inner 'objective' world of ideas refers and "which holds the entire system [*i.e.,* this 'inner' subject-object system as above described] to its original moorings." "The system is experience and my experience, but the experiences mean existences and the ideas mean things" (p. 262). As above in the case of the 'inner' so here there are apparently two subject-object relationships: one between the inner subject as 'effort and its ideas'; the other between, either these ideas and the things they 'mean' or between this whole 'inner' subject-object 'system' and the world of things.

Doubtless some of these perplexities represent, as usual, the reviewer's 'personal equation' and some may disappear in the other volumes. At all events, as was said in the beginning, the significance of the aim, the stand point and general method of the treatment, together with the suggestive special features mentioned and others unmentioned, make the work a notable one.

REVIEW OF *ANTI-PRAGMATISME*

Addison W. Moore, "Anti-Pragmatisme." Review of *Anti-Pragmatism* by Albert Schinz. *Journal of Philosophy* 6.11 (27 May 1909): 291–295.

It is the contention of some pragmatists that the social and ethical implications of extreme intellectualism are essentially undemocratic and hierarchical. They insist that the conception of thought as a totally distinct species of activity, complete and sufficient unto itself, capable even of "furnishing its own material," leads in social theory to the notion of thinkers as constituting a distinct and "privileged" social class, a sort of priestly "caste" (employing the term frankly used by the author of "Anti-Pragmatisme") whose function is to keep the fires burning on the altar of "Pure Truth." They believe that a "caste" system of psychology and logic involves, both as antecedent and consequent, a "caste" system of society.

And it is to be noted, they add, that this view of thought and the thinker can not plead in its defense the principle of "division of labor." Division of labor means an interdependent differentiation of function in a common process working toward a common end. But by hypothesis pure thought pursues only its own end, by its own method, and acknowledges no dependence upon, nor cooperation with anything else. The thinking class, as such, is a law unto itself. It need render no account to the others. But the others must render an account to the thinker. For the thinker finds it no less difficult to live by thought alone than by bread alone. And somebody must furnish the bread. It has always been the boast of the intellectualist that pure thought "bakes no bread," and many are beginning to doubt whether it procures for us either God, freedom, or immortality. However, these doubters recognize that thought has its *part* in baking bread and in procuring God, freedom, and immortality.

But usually when pragmatists point out these reactionary social "consequences" of extreme intellectualism, they are promptly repudiated. And the vehemence of these rejections would seem to imply that if such "consequences" did follow they would constitute a sufficient refutation (rather "pragmatic" in character to be sure) of the doctrine.

In view of this, it is interesting to open a volume on "Anti-pragmatism" and find that these reactionary social implications are frankly, not to say naïvely, accepted at the outset and preached throughout with evangelical fervor as the only gospel of social salvation.

"*La thèse qui a presidé à la composition de ce livre, à savoir qu'il y a un conflit entre la vérité intellectuelle et la vérité morale, conflit que toutes les ratiocinations du monde ne supprimeront pas, car il est irréductible*." (p. 6.)

"*La vérité n'a rien à faire avec la vie*." (p. 195.)

The subtitle of the volume is: "Examen des Droits Respectifs de L'Aristocratie Intellectuelle et de la Démocratie Sociale." And the reader is not left long in doubt about the author's view of these "Droits Respectifs." The legend for the introduction is: "Odi profanum vulgus et arceo." Of another chapter (p. 195) the prologue is: "La civilisation a été de tout temps une œuvre aristocratique, maintenue par un petit nombre." Again: "l'idéal démocratique … Condamne le race Humaine à se couper la tête." (p. 219.)

If, in these days of mixed motives and crossed wires in philosophic thinking, such simple consistency were found in the premises of a volume by a professor of philosophy it would be regarded with suspicion. The reader would fear a trap. But there is no question of Professor Schinz's ingenuousness. And the pragmatic critic might make short work of comments by saying "Very well, if you want a 'caste' system of society, that's the kind of theory to hold."

This charming absence of "the art of philosophic dissimulation" further appears in much of Professor Schinz's defense of intellectualism, which is openly (what the pragmatist would insist it must be implicitly) pragmatic in its method. Intellectualism is to save us from the "consequences" of pragmatism – especially the American brand of pragmatism – which are: a crass materialism, a charlatanistic "opportunism," and philistinism in general, in which all moral control breaks down, and which is to end in "humanity cutting off its own head."

With a cheerful and jaunty pessimism Professor Schinz confesses that he believes that his defense of pure thought is a forlorn hope. He, too, is persuaded that "pragmatism has come to stay"; not because it is true, "but precisely because it is false," for "from the social standpoint, the false is preferable"! (p. 195ff.) "The victory is not to him who has the better order of syllogisms, but to him who has the best vitality." (p. 209.) "What a beautiful reductio ad absurdum of pure thought!" the pragmatic reader will exclaim. "Is falsehood then more vital than truth? Will humanity have more vitality with its head off than on? Is the syllogism a symptom of general debility? And what of the author's plea for happiness? Is the syllogism the archetype of human bliss? And what shall we say: 'Better fifty years of pure intellect, than a cycle of social-comradeship?'" (Though doubtless the syllogism plays a *part* in social-comradeship.)

As for the general issue of democracy *versus* aristocracy, the democratic reader will probably say that most of Professor Schinz's case for aris-

tocracy rests upon a very antiquated conception of democracy, viz., as "the intellectual and social equality of all individuals." Also they will say that in his analysis of the evils of democracy; *e.g*, bossism, as due to the persistent, but ignored, and therefore mutilated, working of the principle of aristocracy under an attempt at democracy, the author seems blissfully unaware that by the same token these evils, especially that of bossism, might be the symptom of a handicapped and mutilated working of democracy; that by the same logic, bossism might be diagnosed as social appendicitis due to the survival in the body politic of the hypertrophied veriform of an aristocratic regime. And they will add, that the cure for this trouble is now fortunately well recognized.

Of the more technical presentation of the author's standpoint many will not only fail to find anything new advanced in support of intellectualism, but are pretty sure to complain of a lack of anything like an adequate appreciation of the real issue. And in support of this they will cite that the only exposition of the nature and meaning of purely "intellectual" and "scientific" truth as opposed to "social" or "moral" truth, is an appeal to the formal law of contradiction and to Kant's "irreducible" antinomies of space, time and causation. (Though many think that even Hegel made a pretty good "stagger" at their reduction.) But this appeal to the law of contradiction and the antinomies which the author regards as sufficient support for intellectualism brings us only in sight of the real problem, which concerns precisely the *nature* and functions of this law of contradiction and of the antinomies. And doubtless some blasé intellectualists whose minds have been "debauched by learning" may be surprised to find that the discovery of "certain laws of heredity with their fatal consequences," exemplifies the conflict between scientific and moral utility! "Dans de tels cas la Science est mauvaise, et n'est plus utile que dans le sens scientifique"! (p. 50.)

The author attempts to make a test case for his central thesis of Professor Dewey's monograph on "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality." And here again the author's capacity for getting at the problems involved may be judged from the fact that many of his points are based on alleged quotations which completely reverse the meaning of the original. For instance we read on page 86 of Anti-Pragmatisme: "If Dewey declares that while psychology shows that the moral judgment is determined by contingencies, psychology tells us nothing of the content of the moral ideal, and that therefore we must have recourse to transcendental considerations of metaphysics," etc. The original in the monograph of Dewey (p. 21), reads: "Hence it is *futile* to insist that psychology can not give the moral ideal and that consequently there must be recourse, etc." Another illustration: "Anti-Pragmatisme" (p. 80) reads: "He (Dewey) tells us that when the action of character (or of subjectivism) becomes preferential in its effect, then the

judgment by this fact becomes logical. But what then? As this character is not preferential in the scientific judgment, is the scientific judgment no longer logical?" But what Professor Dewey is very careful to tell us in the paragraph (The Monograph, p. 16) referred to in these quotations, is: (1) That character becomes preferential in effect when the situation is such that the part which character plays in the judgment has "*to be recognized*"; when it is such that it "is necessary to take notice of it." (2) That, when the influence of character does *thus* become "preferential in effect," *character* (not the "judgment"), "as a practical condition, becomes logical." (Italics mine.) And here "becomes logical" means passes into, becomes the subject of judgment. Obviously the substitution of the term "judgment" for "character" makes a very pretty case of "contradiction" over which the author grows merry. As a fully guaranteed device for "discovering" contradictions and as a source of self-entertainment for one who enjoys them as much as does the author of Anti-Pragmatisme, this method is commended.

Into the issue itself we can not go. Suffice it to say that Professor Dewey is showing both the connection *and* the distinction, or rather the connection *through* the distinction, between logic and ethics. But his critic's method of thinking can not follow this. For him, if logic and ethics are different they must be independent, or even "opposed."

This lack of recognition of connection and continuity in and through distinctions continues, of course, throughout the discussion of James and Schiller, to whom most attention is given, and accounts for the "captious" character of the criticism. Apparently the author regards it impossible for a pragmatist to use the terms "intellectual," "logical," or "scientific" without "fatal contradiction." But Professor Schinz does not distinguish between "intellectual" and intellectual*ism*, between "rational" and rational*ism*. Intellectualism or rationalism is the doctrine of an independent self-enclosed and self-sufficient world of pure thought. That pragmatism opposes intellectualism and rationalism does not mean that it is opposed to intellect or to reason; nor that is it a substitution of faith, or will or feeling, or anything else for thinking – for "abstract," "logical" thinking. On the contrary it holds that "abstract" thinking is one of the necessary constituents of a rich and efficient type of experience; and that the higher the degree of abstraction of which thought is capable, the richer the possibility of the experience in which it functions. But pragmatism does teach that whatever heights or depths of abstraction thought reaches, it can not finally cut loose from the world of immediate impulse, instinct and feeling, and set up an independent, self-enclosed empire of pure intellect.

REVIEW OF *WHAT IS PRAGMATISM?*

Addison W. Moore, "What Is Pragmatism?" Review of James Pratt, *What Is Pragmatism*? *American Journal of Theology* 13.3 (July 1909): 477–478.

Among the anti-pragmatists Professor Pratt is known as one of the clearest and cleverest writers. On the whole the present volume supports and enhances this reputation. It consists of six semi-popular lectures delivered at the Glenmore Summer School, and published, the author says in the preface, "to show those who did not attend the summer school (and this includes a fairly large portion of the human race) how much they missed."

The subjects of the lectures are: "Meaning and Method in Pragmatism"; "The Ambiguity of Truth"; "The Pragmatic View of the Truth Relation"; Pragmatism and Knowledge"; "Pragmatism and Religion"; "The Practical Point of View."

In the space allotted me I can report only a few general features. Professor Pratt's style is delightfully free and easy, and some readers, especially the pragmatic ones, may find that this applies also to some of his criticisms. This might be charged to the limitations of a popular audience did not the author expressly declare in his preface that he has "nowhere allowed the desire for simplicity and popularity to interfere with thoroughness of treatment."

As an instance of the difference between Professor Pratt's notion of "thoroughness" and theirs on some points, pragmatic readers will probably cite Professor Pratt's "simple" disposition of the "correspondence" view of truth (p. 65ff.), in which he says: "Truth or the relation of correspondence means not copying, but merely this simple thing, that the object of which one is thinking is as one thinks it," and adds a little farther along: "I confess it is impossible for me to see how anything can be simpler than this." And yet philosophers generally, from Plato to pragmatism, seem to have found this problem anything but "simple." Moreover if the relation of correspondence is so "ultimately simple" and "irreducible" that it is "absurd" (pp. 68, 69) to ask a realist to "explain" it, pragmatists will wonder why it is that the capacity of ideas to serve as "instruments" and "guides" of action should be for Professor Pratt such a dark riddle for which he says pragmatists have no solution. Why should not the pragmatist also say that the relation of guidance is an "ultimately simple" and "irreducible" one, needing no explanation?

The pragmatist, however, is not content with so "simple" a solution. And this brings us to the fundamental point, and I would add, weakness, of Professor Pratt's book. It is written from the standpoint of what he calls "the private stream of consciousness," which is so highly private that its ability to "correspond" with "outer realities which never come within that private stream" remains, Professor Pratt confesses, a "mystery," even if a "simple" and "irreducible" one.

Moreover, Professor Pratt also persists in attributing his own standpoint to pragmatists, and so he finds it easy under this attribution to convict them of solipsism. This he does in the face of no end of most explicit and repeated proclamations by pragmatists that their logic and metaphysics assume a *social interpretation* of this "private stream of consciousness"; that it holds that the individual consciousness arises in and remains an organic part of a social world; that it is not a function of an isolated, lonely, windowless "mind" or "soul," or even brain, but always of the total "social situation." An idea, a hypothesis therefore, is never wholly a private monopoly. So far as the individual is concerned there is always an unearned increment in it. Arising out of a social matrix, being a function of it, and being therefore always in vital connection with it, there is for the pragmatist nothing "mysterious" in the efficient relation of ideas to the "outer" world of people and things. It would indeed be a "mystery" if they had no such relation.

This total disregard of the social conception of the private individual consciousness, makes much of Professor Pratt's clever and interesting writing seem to the pragmatic reader wholly beside the mark. But Professor Pratt's book reveals the fact that pragmatists have been premature in their assumption that everyone was prepared to accept and start with this social conception of consciousness, and shows that what is now needed is a return to detailed exposition and applications of this conception.

Such an exposition of the "social situation" will also turn the point of much of Professor Pratt's criticism of the religious bearings of pragmatism. From Professor Pratt's standpoint God, as a working hypothesis, is *nothing but* a mere idea of "a private stream of consciousness." From the standpoint of the social origin and significance of ideas, every *working* hypothesis must have a reality behind it as well as in front of it.

REVIEW OF *SOCIOLOGIE DE L'ACTION*

"Review of Eugène De Roberty, *Sociologie de l'action*." *Philosophical Review* 18.6 (November 1909): 669–672.

The publishers' announcement refers to the author of this volume as "the celebrated founder of the new school of neo-positivism." In the text this soft impeachment is acknowledged. So far as I can learn, however, the author is not so well known among philosophers or sociologists in this country.

Neo-positivism, as all other 'neos,' has discovered certain limits in the Master's system, which it attempts to transcend. The first of these limitations the author finds in the failure of Comte to recognize any genuine distinction between philosophy and science, in his definition of philosophy as "a unification of the sciences." At this the philosophical reader takes hope in these days of scientific scoffers at philosophy. But when he discovers that the substance of this hope consists mainly in the statement that philosophy is 'synthetic,' while science is 'analytic' he loses heart again.

This recognition of the 'synthetic' character of philosophy as opposed to the 'analytic' character of science reveals a second limit of the earlier positivism; namely, its pluralism, which despite the positivist's renunciation and denunciation of metaphysics was as metaphysical as the monism which it opposed. As a substitute for both pluralism and metaphysical monism the author proposes a 'functional' or 'logical' monism (p. 216). Imposing as this sounds, it turns out to mean nothing more than continuity between the stages of development to be mentioned below. Why a process which is described in terms of 'differentiation' and 'coördination' should be set down as 'a functional monism' rather than a functional pluralism, when it is so insistently both, will doubtless puzzle some simple-minded readers.

This volume forms the last of a series of studies on "ethics as elementary sociology." There are two general divisions of the essay under the headings: "The Social Origin of Reason," and "The Rational Origin of Action." Of Part I, the chapter headings are: The Essential Aspects of Mental Interaction; Consciousness and Knowledge; The Social Character of the Idea; the Civilizing Function of Abstraction; Sociology, the Fundamental Science of Mind; Replies to some Objections. The subdivisions of Part II are: Analytic Thought and Action; The Scientific

Postulates of Action; Synthetic Thought and Action; The Philosophical Postulates of Conduct; Symbolic Thought and Action; Psycho-Physical Postulates and Art; Fine Art and Technical Art.

This is an interesting programme, but the promises of the index are scarcely fulfilled in the context. In general, the failure is due to the fact that the author, as so many writers of the positivistic school, is too much interested in formal, architectonic systematization. Instead of detailed analyses of concrete materials which one anticipates from the chapter headings, the pages are consumed with repetitious discussions of classes and terms. The result is that often the positivist falls into the very snare he is striving to avoid, namely, metaphysical hypostatizations. What at the beginning are logical divisions soon begin to figure as ontological 'laws' and 'forces.'

If the author's multiplication of divisions and terms is symptomatic, it would seem to indicate that sociology is still in the Linnaean stage. 'Bio' and 'psycho' are especially hard-worked as prefixes. Notwithstanding a facetious reference (p. 254) to "the pompous terminology of modern sociologists," one soon acquires from the author's own pages a remarkable set of terms: bio-individual, bio-social, bio-concrete, bio-abstract, bio-chemical, bio-physical, psycho-individual, and psycho-social, not to mention *syncritique* and *inorganoleptique*.

The author's world is divided into: I, the inorganic, or physico-chemical; II, the organic, or bio-chemical, which is also bio-individual, bio-concrete, and psycho-physical, being psychical to the extent of immediate feelings of pleasure and pain, and "simple images or representations"; III, The *surorganique,* which is "bio-psychical," "bio-social," and "bio-abstract," and in which abstract ideas, language, judgment proper, philosophy, art and practical thought, arise.

The transition from the second to the third general stage is marked by the distinction between *Conscience* and *Connaissance,* the insistence upon which the author regards as one of his principal contributions. *Conscience,* that is, pleasure-pain, and mere representative images, is a function of the 'bio-individual' organism or brain. But conceptual, judgmental consciousness, – *Connaissance,* – is a function of the interaction of the individual '*consciences*,' of the '*inter-consciental*' and constitutes the *surorganique* stage of development.

While this conception of the superorganic and much of the exposition of the essentially social character of thought is very suggestive, and moves in the general direction of the social psychology and logic of Tarde, Baldwin, Royce, and others, yet some of the psychological and logical crudities of the older positivism still survive. For instance: "Psychical interaction … has for its immediate effect the formation within the brains which it involves of notions more or less general and abstract," etc. (p.

18). Again, "It (Collective experience), deposits in the brain the germ of ideas more and more general," p. 20. The serial character also of the author's conception of psychological and logical development, as shown in his view of the relation of immediate to reflective consciousness, and in his accounts of induction and deduction and of the concrete and abstract, seems out of date. In neo-positivism induction always *precedes* deduction, and thought always moves *from* the concrete *to* the abstract.

In the treatment of the relation between science, philosophy, art, and practical experience, the author finds that there has been much confusion, due to the failure to distinguish between the 'causal' and the 'teleological' series. In the teleological series, the enterprises of practical social life, as ends, come first. But to say with pragmatism, that the 'causal' source or origin of science, philosophy, and art, is in practical life, is to confound the teleological with the causal series. In the causal series, science, the analytic mode, leads to philosophy, the synthetic mode, both of which, however, being abstract, cannot become common property and pass into practical life until their results are 'syncreted' by art. This simply 'happens,' occurs, 'causally,' positivistically. Of course, when through reflection these *de facto* results become 'ends,' we have the 'teleological series' which is the reverse of the 'causal.' And in this series pragmatism holds. But this is only a 'practical,' not an 'explanatory' series.

But if difficulties have arisen from the *confusion* of the causal and the teleological series, many will wonder whether they are reduced either in number or seriousness by this method of separation. Even if they are distinguished they surely must be connected in some way. The author admits this and says he just "couples" them. Aside from the fact that in the super-organic stage the causal process *is* reflective the reader will note that elsewhere the author clearly points out that Spencer's theory of survival holds only for the organic, – the non-reflective stage, not for the super-organic, the reflective stage. This would seem to imply that reflection makes a *real* difference in the 'causal' series.

The author's anti-pragmatism, which is confined mainly to the discussion of the origin and function of art, is based upon a connotation of pragmatism, which makes it impossible to identify his position with what most American readers would recognize as anti-pragmatism. His point is that the art of to-day cannot be regarded as the *direct* descendant of the merely 'useful' acts of primitive times, but is based upon the science and philosophy which have intervened. All of which of course is beside the mark until the function of this intervening science and philosophy is stated. And in the author's system the goal of science, philosophy, and art appears to be in practical social thought *(pensée practique)* which probably is 'pragmatic' enough for most cis-Atlantic pragmatists.

In the author's account of the origin of language he insists that "utility is an effect not a cause of language"; that the "true cause" of language is found in the fact that "abstract ideas formed by collective experience, *spontaneously express themselves in words*"! This scarcely calls for comment.

In their general intent the leading ideas of the volume, – namely, the social character of reflective consciousness, the conception of the super-organic, the rejection of the individualistic theory of evolution, the social function of art, – are valuable and timely, but they are supported by an inadequate psychology and logic.

REVIEW OF *DER PRAGMATISMUS*

"Review of Günther Jacoby, *Der Pragmatismus: Neue Bahnen in der Wissenschafteslehre des auslands*." *Psychological Bulletin* 7.9 (15 September 1910): 301–303.

Time was when for philosophy, as most other things, western civilization went to school to Germany. And indeed we may still go there with great profit. But it is obvious, to most *Ausländer* at any rate, that Germany has not the monopoly of scientific stimulus and initiative she once had. Not that Germany is less productive than then, but that the rest of the western world has become much more so, even as a result of the German tutorship.

But schoolmistress-like it has been difficult for Germany to realize that her one-time protégés have grown up to independent productive capacity. In the natural sciences where results count more quickly in industrial and social life, this recognition bas been forced more rapidly than in the more speculative field of philosophy; hence the provincial character of much German philosophical literature.

However, there are signs that even in philosophy Germany is beginning to sit up and take notice of what is going on elsewhere. Among these signs may be reckoned this well-written and suggestive *brochure,* by Dr. Jacoby. The author frankly confesses at the outset that the pragmatic movement which has been the central issue in England, America, France and Italy for the past ten years, has had very little attention in Germany.

Dr. Jacoby's conception of the movement is a broad one. Its essence he finds in its adoption of the standpoint and method of science as the standpoint and method of philosophy. The controversies over truth, pluralism, humanism, '*die Religionsphilosophie von fames*,' are all '*Beiwerke*.' At the outset the discussion of 'truth' is characterized as a '*Woristreit*.' But further on it seems to get more significance in relation to the essential nature of the movement.

"This '*Woristreit*' the author thinks is due to a confusion of the nature with the function and value of truth. The nature of truth consists in correspondence between ideas and facts. The nature of truth looks backward but its function and value look forward. This latter is '*der springende Punkt*' for pragmatists. The real issue is, not what is truth, but what is its function and value in experience? The insistence on the mediating, instrumental character of the function of knowledge is the contribution of pragmatism. In science this process of mediation becomes very extensive and complex, so extensive

and complex that it often loses sight of its own character. But it must recover this standpoint, else science is without a rudder.

Some readers are pretty sure to find more difficulty in resolving this '*Wortstreit*' over truth by an appeal to the distinction between the nature and the function of truth than does Dr. Jacoby. They will find it more difficult to separate the nature of truth from its function than he does. They will observe that although the difficulties in the conception of correspondence are recognized, yet it is not quite clear to the author that the problem of the correspondence of ideas with facts cannot be solved apart from that of their 'application to problems.' Moreover, if the question of correspondence were soluble wholly on its own ground, we should then have to face the difficulty of making the transition from correspondence, – *i.e.,* from the *nature* of truth to its effectiveness in further experience; *i.e.,* to its *function. After* truth as correspondence is determined, how does it further operate? Obviously an appeal to will at this point, to make truth in further experience after its correspondence character is decided, is merely verbal.

Again, in the midst of excellent expressions of the spirit and method of the pragmatic movement, some will find a discordant note in the author's hope that truth will some day become a perfected system, though he adds: "Vorläufig sind wir von diesem Zielpunkte noch weit entfernt!"

The author points out that the pragmatic movement calls for rewriting of much of the history of philosophy to bring it into closer connection with the "*Gemütsbedürfnisse und Willenbedürfnisse die jenseits des Verstandenslebens liegen.*"

Most of Dr. Jacoby's citations are from the writings of Professor James. His reference to Dewey and Schiller as 'Anhängern' of James raises a smile and verifies the author's confession of Germany's ignorance of the movement.

The style is very simple, clear and fresh.

REVIEW OF *ANTI-PRAGMATISM*

Addison W. Moore, "Review of Albert Schinz, *Anti-Pragmatism: Author's Translation from the English with Appendices.*" *Journal of Philosophy* 7.26 (22 December 1910): 717–718.

This JOURNAL of May 27, 1909, contains my comments on the original edition of these essays. The translation has a brief introduction and a new appendix consisting of "Answers to Some Criticisms."

The author complains now of not having been taken seriously, and again of not having been taken at all. The first point in his "Answers" is that there has not been criticism enough; that there has been too much of "the argument of silence." However, be it said for the author's modesty that he does not charge this "silence" to his own unanswerable argument. He seems to think that his readers could "talk back" if they only would.

As for my own voluminous contribution to "the argument of silence," frankly I must confess that so foreign is the author's whole standpoint and world to, what seems to me, the universe in which we are now living that I am unable to take it very seriously or to deal with it systematically. Historically it is interesting as a specimen of a belated effort at consistent intellectualism. And the clear and vivacious style makes it good reading. But the result is what Professor James calls "a sociological romance." An attempt at general and systematic refutation would be as quixotic as a systematic critique of the *Civitate Dei* or the *Summa Theologia*.

How is it possible to take seriously, however seriously it may take itself, a book which teaches *in this day and part of the world* that "truth has nothing to do with life"; that "knowledge should be kept from the masses" (why so, "if truth has nothing to do with life"?); that "the masses have rights but no duties"; that "from the social point of view the false is preferable to the true" (how so, if "truth has nothing to do with life"?); which sanctions pragmatism as a conception of life but condemns it as philosophy; which believes that the scientific spirit "causes all the actions of men to be seen in a deterministic light; and is therefore capable of destroying the spirit of initiative and renders inconceivable the voice of conscience as it is commonly interpreted"? (p. 205). (Yet "truth has nothing to do with life"!)

How is it possible to deal systematically with writing which after a valorous defense of pure thought, pure truth, and pure science from the attacks of moralists, social reformers, and pragmatists blandly states that

nevertheless "truth is discouraging (though "truth has nothing to do with life") and it is from the outside, from religious revelation alone that comfort can be brought to us"? (This JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 435.) As if this revelation itself could be anything else than additional "truth" in the author's sense of truth; and as if such a statement were not a confession that this pure thought, pure truth, and pure science, whose banner has been so heroically defended, is not only "discouraging," but since it must be supplemented from the "outside" (outside of what?) by "religious revelation" is therefore fragmentary and not strictly pure after all; and as if, since truth *as such* is "deterministic," this supplementary truth revealed from the "outside" could be any less "deterministic" than that we already have; as if, indeed, as coming from the "outside" it must not be much more so.

In the next sentence the author finds comfort in reflecting that while he may be "naïve" (according to some of his readers) he is "at least in good Christian company." Some, however, may wonder how much comfort the company of Christians will take on discovering that one of their number teaches that in so far as their doctrines are "true" they are "deterministic" and "discouraging."

The source of these and any number of other variations of the same fundamental paradox is the total failure to see that the proposed cure for the alleged opposition of scientific truth and morality, namely, "revelation from the outside," is one of the chief causes, indeed a most aggravated form of the disease itself. A purely revealed truth, a science consisting of an accumulation of facts and laws rained down and collected as manna in the wilderness, is indeed "deterministic" and "renders inconceivable the voice of conscience." But how this is to be cured by more of the same thing, except on the homeopathic dogma of *similia similibus curantur*, is difficult to see.

And it would be in vain to protest that this point ignores the assumed essential distinction between scientific and revealed truth, since (1) there is nowhere any attempt at a statement of *what* this distinction is; and (2) in teaching that revelation is to supplement and make good the imperfections of "deterministic" and "discouraging" scientific truth the author himself abandons the distinction since this supplementation implies some sort of connection.

APPENDIXES

Responses to Addison W. Moore 1903–1909

REVIEW OF THE *FUNCTIONAL VERSUS THE REPRESENTATIONAL THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE IN LOCKE'S ESSAY*

F. C. S. Schiller, "Review of Moore, *The Functional versus the Representational Theories of Knowledge in Locke's Essay*." *Mind* n.s. 12.1 (January 1903): 114.

There is a fundamental paradox about knowledge which consists in the fact that in proportion as it becomes practically more reliable it grows theoretically more doubtful. And so we finally have the philosopher, *e.g.*, Mr. Bradley, mournfully deciding that unless we can know everything we can really know nothing, and that strict truth remains the inaccessible preserve of an Absolute. Meanwhile the actual knowers in the workshop and the laboratory are working with the practical knowledge, which the metaphysician finds so indigestible, and ever giving us more and more control over our experience. Prof. Moore finds that the source of this paradox lies in the fact that practical and scientific thinking is purposive, and in aiming at certain concrete results uses its methods as means, whereas in epistemological analysis these processes are taken in abstraction from their actual function and so reduced to inanity. Thus 'analysis' in epistemology becomes something wholly different from what it was in science: in the latter an 'element' was whatever served as a means to get the result; in the former the problem is to find an eternal structure which exists independently of us and our efforts to know it. Only if such a completed system of reality could be found and we could obtain a precise transcript thereof, would our knowledge be valid, certain and necessary. As no knowledge can be found to satisfy these *a priori* demands, such a 'theory of knowledge' is bound to end in scepticism. But the English thinkers, with their healthy sense of fact, always in their practice operated with the 'functional' theory of knowledge, whatever theoretical homage they felt bound to pay to the scholastic ideal of a pure thought divorced from action. Bacon demanded a knowledge which should be power, though he could not disabuse himself of the idea that it was to be had for the mere *looking*. In Hobbes, Locke, Hume this struggle between the antithetical criteria of knowledge continues, and all the contradictions and confusions in Locke's theory in particular are shown to arise from this source. This latter point Prof. Moore studies carefully and in detail, and to my thinking establishes conclusively. Altogether the

clearness with which he makes his point and the pertinacity with which he sticks to it, constitute his monograph a refreshing advance on the ordinary run of Ph.D. theses, and render it a valuable and important contribution to that pragmatist revision of the whole current theory of knowledge which is now beginning, and in which it is satisfactory to find the Chicago philosophers, under the auspices of Prof. Dewey, prepared to co-operate. Prof. Moore gives chapter and verse for Prof. James's dictum that the true critical method can best be found by working out the suggestions contained in the English tradition in philosophy.

REVIEW OF *EXISTENCE, MEANING AND REALITY IN LOCKE'S ESSAY AND IN PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGY*

Henry Sturt, "Review of Moore, 'Existence, Meaning and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology'." *Mind* n.s. 13.1 (January 1904): 130.

Though there are many things to admire in Mr. Moore's essay, his mode of presentation is not one of them. He has too much the air of conducting a clever disputation with Locke, Kant and Prof. Royce, a disputation in which all the transitions are slurred, his opponents' replies conveyed by hints and allusions, and the drift of his own argument concealed until half-way on in the essay. Not for the first time do we trace the baleful influence of Mr. George Meredith on philosophical exposition. The main problem of the essay is to be discovered in an unemphatic sentence on page 14: "It would seem that the root of the central difficulty in present logic might be stated as the failure thus far to work out the implications of the thoroughly teleological and functional idea which it has accepted from modern psychology". To this working out the present essay is a very interesting contribution. Its chief conclusions are that reality and truth are not static and immutable, but always have reference to the needs and interests of the subject; and that thought has as its function not so much the representing of reality as the creating of it. Such speculations as these undoubtedly tend in the right direction. The idea of the creativeness of thought, in particular, has a great future. The only danger is lest those who are pushing forward on this path should tend to forget that thought, however creative, cannot create out of nothing; and that objective reality, though not at all static or immutable, sets definite limits to all human creative activity.

A WORD OF REJOINDER TO PROFESSOR MOORE

James Mark Baldwin. "A Word of Rejoinder to Professor Moore." *Psychological Bulletin* 1.12 (15 November 1904): 424–429. Ed. Note: Baldwin replies to Moore's "Professor Baldwin on the Pragmatic Universal," reprinted as "The Pragmatic Universal" in *Pragmatism and Its Critics*.

The reply which Professor Moore makes above, to my original criticism, allows a word of rejoinder, both from the need of clearing up the point involved, and also from his seeming to convict me out of my own mouth. The latter sort of argument would indeed prove me inconsistent, but would not in itself do much more. I shall, however, first state again the 'limitation of pragmatism' in as objective and plain a way as I can – for I feel that Professor Moore does not meet it – and then take a paragraph to vindicate my own consistency.

1. One of the 'limits of pragmatism' pointed out in my article is, looked at in a broad way, this: A statement, judgment, concept which seems to be and is accepted as being general, or universally valid – in the sense that it allows fruitful deduction and valid argumentation – can not have this value justified or positively tested, or have anything added to its import, by an appeal to cases, that is, by any pragmatic or experimental test. Such an appeal could only show that it was not universally valid, in case it does not work in the concrete[1] situation, or *that it was valid only so long as it did not fail*.[2] For instance, the appeal to consequences might show that two rival concepts both held good, possibly having no difference of result, through certain stages of a research, though both could not be at once logically universal. It follows, then, either that we have no such strictly logical universals, or that they must have other means of hanging together and justifying themselves than that of their experimental results. This leads unavoidably to the query whether there are strictly logical – non-experi-

[1] Concrete in Professor Moore's meaning, if I understand it.

[2] It is in this sense only that it is true that all judgment is a 'development of experience through a universal'; yet I should prefer to call this meaning 'psychically general' rather than 'logical universal.' It is in this sense also that all universals, considered as generals, are hypothetical. In terms of habit, they are preliminary general meanings.

mental, in their use and value to us as now constituted – principles, rules or whatever we may call them, apparent in the organization[3] of the experiences, by which these sorts of concepts, judgments, etc., have been constituted;[4] so that their universality is *ipso facto* just a mark of their nature.

Professor Moore denies such things; but suppose we admit them: what effect does this admission have upon our instrumental theory of the origin of knowledge? As I conceive it, no effect whatever! And it is here that I find the pragmatists 'claiming the earth.' They say that a statement of origin is *ipso facto* an account of nature and validity. This is, so far as the ground given is concerned, a fallacy from several points of view. Logically it is an illegitimate conversion: they say 'all truth has been through processes of selection,' hence, by conversion, 'processes of selection are the only tests and criteria of truth.'[5] On the contrary, the possible and, I believe, the real state of things is that while all truths have their necessary origin in processes of selection, yet once come, they, like every other genetic product, are a *new mode, a new form of reality, something added to the system of things* – as James is fond of insisting – which can be understood only by seeing what it is like and what it claims to be. So when we find a logical whole that seems to be organized by intrinsic rules, and to have certain immanent relational values, and find it pursued by the sort of interest called theoretical – itself selected, no doubt, as a useful variation – what, pray, is the objection, after all is said as to the genetic aspects of it, to giving it a fair chance to stand alone on its own broad and competent bottom? Perchance if the doors be not closed and hermetically sealed to its entrance, an entirely new mode of cosmic being may steal into our mental domicile even while we are unaware! – a mode whose motto is 'objects for objects' sake.' I see no reason that a psychology should, simply because it is genetic, be able to stay the hand of an idealism of thought.[6]

[3] I cannot follow Professor Moore's difficulties in the application of the term 'organization': what I mean is any sort of cognitive construction of data – by association, imitation, etc.

[4] Let us say, indeed, by social intercourse.

[5] 'Pragmatic' literature is full of this fallacy: see it, *e.g.*, in another form in Bawden's exposition of James (*Jour. of Philos.*, I., 16, p. 422): "Beliefs are really rules for action, and the *whole function* of thinking is but one step in the production of habits of action." This passage was brought to my attention by C. Ladd Franklin.

[6] Yet to me the logical is not the final explaining category.

The ethical was put in a similar antithesis by Huxley, only he worked the thing the other way, finding the claim of the moral in some way inconsistent with its natural history origin. It is just this situation that instigated my theory of 'genetic modes,' which recognizes new phases of reality arising and shining at any time, and holds that the genetic conditions are not exhaustive statements of their nature and value, except to a theory which holds to a mechanical equivalence of cause and effect in such a case, and which is therefore not genetic at all, but a-genetic. On any theory of real growth

So I think – to turn the tables on them – the pragmatists are not radical enough; they balk at the postulate of new modes, new revelations in the nature and texture of reality, of a sort which do not carefully refrain from having any but hypothetical and instrumental value!

Of course they say – and here James too seems to be with the others – still these new things are proved by their working, and so alone is nature justified of her children. Again, quite true, things must work – but *ad terminum quem*? To say so much does not tell us what place this use, this function, this phase of reality has in the *tout ensemble*, the *Gesammtbild* that philosophy desiderates. Here is another illegitimate conversion: is this nature's *only* justification of her children? A parent is economically justified of his child, but is that the only justification? If we once recognize the theoretical point of view, as summing up, standing for, and organizing in short-hand, generally applicable, formulas the utilities brought up to date, why may not this be, as it proceeds through the stages of development of thought, just a really inside view of things, a private rehearsal behind the curtain suited to the contemplative eye of reason? Again, I see nothing – except illegitimate conversion – to hinder one from thinking this: the conversion, namely, from 'the thought function is instrumental to practical adjustment,' to 'therefore practical adjustment is the only end of thought.' What indeed I contend for is the 'open-door' policy; and the limitation I aim to point out applies only to a pragmatism which refuses to allow thought to conduct its business in Manchuria by its own methods and rules of work – or allows it only under a special pragmatic *visé*. This Professor James, to refer again to his fine article in the October *Mind*,[7] seems to concede in allowing Royce (and others) to 'throw his own peculiar absolute around' the pragmatic scheme; and I am only interested to say that therein he has accepted a limitation of the pragmatic method necessary by those who crave something less relative. The problem of philosophy is left open.

2. As to my personal inconsistencies, they are of little moment except as the reconciliation of the seemingly inconsistent may involve – as in this case I think it does – an attempt to reach higher ground. The passages cited from me, by Professor Moore, as allowing the pragmatic view of truth, are from my paper on 'Selective Thinking' and the subsequent discussion with Prof. Bosanquet. The general argument, in the latter discussion, is to the

a statement of conditions of origin is in no way a prophesy of all the new thing is to be like or worth.

[7] And how it contrasts with Mr. Schiller's writing! I intentionally said little of the latter's book in any former article because of a certain æsthetic revolt which prevents my reading much of it. I am helpless before the vulgarity of such writing as Mr. Schiller's – using this adjective only after others have. I must wait until Mr. Schiller's thought is filtered by his expositors!

effect that while logic may be allowed to have its province, dealing with wholes which have their own criteria and norms of organization, nevertheless the theory of selective thinking must account for the origin and establishment of all possible marks of such logical wholes, including these criteria and norms.[8] This I maintain in opposition to the view that there is something in the logical so far exempt from selective processes, and so far 'pure' in character, as not to allow of any experimental or instrumental method of establishment.

It is, I freely admit, a rather negative sort of task to attempt to ward off trespassers from both confines of a single plot at one and the same time; but there is more at stake in my own case than the checking of trespassers upon a given territory. In the paper on 'Selective Thinking' it is maintained that there are two tests – to keep to the old terms[9] – of a truth: that of the 'platform' of what is already established, the test of habit; and after that the further 'test of fact.' Prof. Moore seems to think that I am now not holding to this scheme. But in the test of habit – integration in a previously established body of knowledge – it is just in this that the logical as such gets in its criteria, making its demands of consistency, etc. Without this a new item can not get that preliminary *exequatur* which is necessary to any intelligible application of the other test, that of fact. No hypothesis, even of the most inductive sort, can be brought to the bar of fact without first meeting the demands of consistency and inherent reasonableness. And although we hold, as indeed I do, that this antecedent 'platform' has been itself constituted by gradual selections, still, once come, its rules must be taken for what they really are, even though we have to call them by the old-fashioned term 'laws of thought.'

And the issue will be sharpened when I further say, in answer to Professor Moore's charge that I desert the 'test of fact' in certain cases, *that I do!* – not desert it, indeed, but simply recognize that it is not in actual operation. The whole body of sciences of 'abstract relationships,' the deductive and mathematical sciences, dispense with such a test: they reach results which we still have to call truths and reach them just by allowing the claim of true logical universality.[10] Without attempting a positive evaluation of such bodies of science, still it will not do to cut them off with the indirect sort of toleration due to by-products of a function which is in other conditions useful.

[8] That is, 'genetic theory explains by what character judgments are true' – a sentence which I do not find inconsistent with the 'limit' now set up, as Professor Moore seems to.

[9] Although, functionally considered, some of the terms suggested by Professor Moore are no doubt better.

[10] See for example Professor Keyser's formulation of the 'Axiom of Infinity' (*Hibbert Journal*, April, 1904) and the whole literature of the 'new' infinite.

I hold in short that something further in the way of constructive interpretation of the *entire developmental situation* is needed. And the cue should be taken just from the further progress of reflection in actually handling the dualism of thought and action. This is the positive problem before us. And in approaching it I find place for the conception of genetic modes. The test of fact operates in the practical mode, while that of the truth-system invokes the logical mode. I would fain see this recognized before we admit that development lands us in a *cul de sac* for theory, while in life we find no final opposition. And it then remains to find the still more developed psychic mode in which the claims of both are adjusted without favor. I think in the 'semblant' or play mode – broadly and richly defined, *the æsthetic* – this sort of reconciliation actually does take place as a real experience. Instead of reading-back the genetic line and finding neutrality in 'pure experience,' so protoplasmic that the distinction of conscious and non-conscious itself seems to disappear – a reading in which for other purposes one may concur – I am compelled to read the other way, up the genetic line to the fruitful top. The realest experience, the true universal, is one that not only 'secures us God, freedom, and immortality,' but also 'bakes our bread.' So much at any rate in justification of a line of thought which has the appearance of facing two ways at once. I have elsewhere attempted to justify this method from genetic considerations ('Mind and Body,' PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, May, 1903).

I cannot here take space to notice certain interesting points of detail in Prof. Moore's article. But these I note: my expression 'transcends real life' means only having meaning not exhausted by any real situation (as the ethical rule of 'right,' or the general concept of 'horse'). – As to 'nominalism,' my sense of its pertinent application to habit theories of the 'general' as such is sharpened by a discussion of my own view on the subject (in *Mental Development*) by M. Havard of Paris, under the term 'nouveau nominalisme.' – As to 'flawless thinking,' I cannot define it without invoking just the sort of criteria we are discussing – it is 'logical,' 'consistent,' 'valid' thinking; not merely comfortable psychic process! It *is* comfortable, and it *is* social and pragmatic in origin, *but* – Ah! There's the rub of conversion again – is it more? Mr. Peirce's remarks on 'reasonableness,' apropos of pragmatism, are interesting in this connection (*Dict. of Philos.*, 'Pragmatism'). – Why need a system of abstract universals – a deductive science, in short – be merely a 'subjective and atomistic affair' as Prof. Moore claims? 'Twould be so, I conceive, only to a theory that is already subjective and atomistic; not to one that has a critique of the various sorts of reality-coefficients leading up to the 'general.'

THE EXPERIENCE-PHILOSOPHY

Warner Fite, "The Experience-Philosophy." *Philosophical Review* 15.1 (January 1906): 1–16. Ed. Note: Moore replies to Fite in "Pragmatism and Solipsism," reprinted in *Pragmatism and Its Critics*.

The object of this paper is to make clear what I conceive to be the fundamental fallacy of the experience-philosophy. Under 'experience-philosophy' I include all those theories which describe the world as exclusively a 'world of experience.' This, indeed, covers nearly all the philosophy of the present day and recent times, the subjective idealism of Berkeley, the phenomenalism of J. S. Mill, the empiricism of recent science, the present-day theories of pragmatism, humanism, and personal idealism, and the radical empiricism of Professor James. All of these deny that there is a world beyond experience; all, in substance, hold with Berkeley and Schopenhauer, that 'the world is my idea.'

In thus associating pragmatism and subjective idealism, I am conscious of ignoring the protest of those pragmatists who claim that the experience upon which they build is not subjective but prior to the distinction of subjective and objective. As my chief purpose is to show that experience is found only within this distinction, and exists only by virtue of this difference, I must leave the justification of this point to rest upon the argument as a whole. In the meantime, I may point out that, whatever be the distinction between experience and subjective experience, yet in practice, for both pragmatists and subjective idealists, reality is always precisely coextensive with the latter. The chair, when it disappears from thought, ceases also to be. And this limitation is all that preserves pragmatism – which is jealous of its idealism – from falling into the arms of naïve realism.[1]

The fundamental proposition of the experience-philosophy is that experience – and experience only – is 'given' or 'immediately given.' All else, *i.e.*, the world of things in space and time, is derived, inferred, constructed, developed, from experience. It is my purpose to show that this position of the experience-philosophy is its fundamental error; that the thing *in space and time* is as good a *datum* as the experience; that, in fact, neither is an

[1] See A. W. Moore in The Philosophical Review, May, 1905. Mr. Moore wonders why, in the critics' conception of pragmatism, it should be always the object that disappears. This is just one point. The *object in space and time* does disappear and only the *conception* of the object, so far as it is found in some one's experience, remains.

absolute *datum;* and that the search for absolute *data* is not only illusory but logically unnecessary.

I. *The Series of Experiences*. – We may begin with the series of experiences, often described as the 'series of phenomena.' The conception of such a series forms the working-basis of the experience-philosophy. Not, it might seem, the real basis; for how can a *series* be immediately given? Each member of a series is external to the others; it is given immediately to itself, but to the others it is given only representatively and mediately; consequently, we might say, the series as a whole is a construction. But in the practical exposition of the experience-philosophy this consideration is usually disregarded and the series is treated as if it were immediately given as a whole. Two motives may underly this method of treatment: (1) The *series* may be merely a convenient working-basis. It may be admitted that only the present is immediately given; that the past is given only representatively in the relations found within the present; and that, consequently, reality must at each moment be expressed wholly in terms of the present. But since the method of transposition is clear and the result obvious, each is left to make it for himself. (2) But more commonly, I think, the series is assumed to have a certain immediacy (or priority) of its own. Granting that the only strictly immediate *datum* is the present, still experience as a whole is a *datum* prior to the world of things. I cannot doubt that I think at present; I may be compelled, by an argument perhaps academic, to doubt the past; but in any case I am more certain of my experience as a whole than I can be of a world of things.

Accordingly, we have these two questions: (1) Is the present experience immediately given? (2) Is the past experience more directly and immediately given than the world of things? Both of these questions I shall answer in the negative. The second will be dealt with in this section, the first question in the next.

On what ground, then, is the past experience claimed to be given more directly than the fact not in experience? We may answer this question by comparing the two from the standpoint of the present. On the first of the month I wrote a check to pay a certain bill, and I now have the picture of my doing so clearly in mind. Again, I stand before a fallen tree in a forest never before explored, and I know that at some time this tree has stood erect. Here we have a past experience and a past fact not in experience, both arrived at from present *data*. But the former, it seems, is mediated by the subjective method of memory, the latter by the objective method of reasoning, or inference from effect to cause. Now the series of experiences, regarded as an immediately given whole, presupposes a purely subjective connection. It is, indeed, not impossible that past experiences should be arrived at objectively. Thus, I may be unable to remember writing the check, but with the cancelled check before me I shall not

hesitate to accept the experience as real. But, so far as the series is thus constructed, the past experience can claim no priority to the past external fact; for if I accept the cancelled check as evidence of a real fact, I must accept the fallen tree as evidence of a fact equally real.

The priority of the series of experiences presupposes, then, a broad and vital distinction between methods of representation. If this distinction holds, we must, I suppose, grant a certain unity and uniqueness to the series of experiences and a certain priority over the world of things. I shall endeavor, therefore, to show that the distinction will not hold; that the mediation of past experiences through memory, however governed by subjective motives (of which I shall speak presently), is also necessarily an objective process; that it is, indeed, the same process as that by which we infer the past fact not in experience; and that the past experience and the past fact not in experience rest upon precisely the same ground.

I remember an experience, but of course I may falsely imagine it. On what ground, then, is the genuine past experience distinguished from the spurious one, and what in general is the basis of distinction between memory and imagination? To this question the empirical psychology offers, I believe, a fairly unanimous answer: the memory is clear, vivid, intense; the mere image is obscure, faint, weak. But – to resolve these qualities into one – what is clearness? And how does the clearness of a present state point to the reality of a past? Must we, with so many psychologists, accept clearness, with redness, as an unanalyzable quality and its general coincidence with accepted reality as an unexplained fact, or may we attempt a further analysis of clearness which will lay bare its representative authority?

Now 'clearness,' as applied to mental processes, is a metaphor obtained from vision. A visual object – say, a diagram – is clear to the extent that each point is distinguished from and at the same time related to every other point. And so, in general, an experience is clear to the extent that it is definite in detail and coherent as a whole, – or, to the extent that its details form a minutely articulated system. A tone is clear so far as its partials are distinguished and harmonically related. A conception, such as the atomic theory, is clear so far as the details covered by it are so minutely distinct and so intimately related that each of necessity implies all the others.

Let us apply this to memory and imagination. My memory of drawing the check is clear because the circumstances of the action are presented with sharpness, fulness, and consistency of detail. The house in which I have lived is clear because the details, – windows, doors, walls, stairs, passages, – are present in multitude, in distinctness and spatial consistency; and thus it differs from the house that I would build. But this is not all. The memory-picture, to be genuine, must be clear not only in itself but

clearly *(i.e.,* definitely and coherently) related to the whole body of clear experience; that is, it must fit snugly into the system of real things. The house in which I have lived had its definite location in the order of space, time, and cause. The house that I would build has no place on the map; and I cannot give it a place without completely destroying the map.

Now it seems to me that, when we thus analyze the conditions of clearness, we can see why clearness is the mark of a representative state. Were it merely a mysterious, unanalyzable quality, the preference for clearness as a criterion of reality would be purely aesthetic. But when it stands for closeness of articulation, then the relation of any detail to the whole objective system, so far as it is clear, is determined, and the reality of the detail – or the character of the mental state as memory or imagination – stands or falls with the reality of the system.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, then the process of remembering is of the same kind as the process of inference; and the process of mediating a past experience is of the same kind as that of mediating a past fact not in experience; both the past experience and the past external fact are the results of construction.[2] But this of itself might not prove that the results obtained in the two cases rest upon precisely the same ground. To make this clear we must recall the fact that the series of experiences is not merely a time-series but a personal series. And unquestionably it is this personal character of the series that forms the basis of its claim to priority. We have then to ask what there is in the past experience now remembered which makes it mine.

My answer is: the fact that it pictures my body in certain specific relations, which are spatial, temporal, and mechanical, to the object perceived. A fundamental criterion of a genuine experience is that *experience goes with the body.* No experience is accepted as genuine which is not confirmed, or assumed to be capable of confirmation, by correlative neural conditions and corresponding mechanical relations between the body of the experiencing subject and the object experienced. Unless the eye was within sight of the object or the ear within earshot, I did not see or hear the object, and I cannot now *remember* to have seen or heard it. Accordingly, the 'clearness' of the memory is in its last analysis a definiteness of *mechanical* relations between my body and the object perceived through the senses. In every memory-picture the central figure is the body of the subject, and, whether consciously or not, the whole picture is constructed and tested from this point of view. If you ask a plain man, 'Are you sure that you heard Jones make this remark?' his answer will probably be, 'Why, of course, I was in the same room with

[2] This does not deny that the process of construction may be more or less conscious and the terms of the construction more or less explicit.

him when he said it.' The certainty of the mechanical fact guarantees the genuineness of the memory. Now of course it may appear that the conditions are present without the experience; Jones may make the remark while my attention is directed elsewhere. But if he did not make the remark, I did not hear him. In other words, the mechanical possibilities are at any rate limiting conditions. But, in fact, they are not merely limiting but determining; and, so far as strict determination is possible, they furnish the only basis of determination. Suppose it becomes a matter of grave importance that, in testifying from memory to a certain event, I should be certain of my testimony. My whole effort will then be devoted to picturing the scene of the event, and its relations to the events before and after, with such definiteness and fulness of detail that the fact of the event, and the fact of my experience, shall be not merely possible or probable but nothing short of mechanically inevitable. And until I can do this it must remain a question, even in my own mind, whether the memory is genuine.

I have now to meet the following objection. It will be said that the series of experiences is not the bare cognitive series I have so far dealt with, but also a series of motive and feeling; and that the personal element in the series is not the agent's body but the continuity of motive and feeling. Accordingly, the past experience would be represented to the present not, or not only, on the basis of mechanical consistency, as the past external event is mediated, but on the basis of consistency of motive and feeling-attitude. In this objection is presented the genuinely subjective element in the series. But I have at no time denied (though for purposes of argument I have disregarded) either its presence or its influence as a criterion of reality. As in courts of law the question of adequate motive plays a part in determining the probability of an act, so, no doubt, the relation of a given situation to personal character, motive, and interest aids in the determination of the series of personal experiences. But the question is, How far does this criterion prevail? Suppose a case of murder with motive clearly adequate; we should certainly not convict in the face of a clearly established *alibi*. Evidently the subjective criterion prevails only so far as it does not violate the mechanical conditions; and thus the question of genuineness is still, whatever else it may be, a question of mechanical cause and effect. Nor would this be the less true if with the pragmatist, we should regard the whole series of experiences as completely connected by motive, and the conception of the mechanical world as itself the product of motive. The series of experiences is, for every one who assumes such a series to be given, a time-series. As a time-series it stands in the same system of things with external events in time, and thus in the same system with external events in space. An experience must then stand or fall with the possibility of finding a place within this system. In a word,

you cannot have teleological relations without time-relations, and you cannot have time-relations apart from mechanical cause and effect.[3]

It appears, then, that the past experience and the past fact not in experience are reached not only by the same process, but from the same grounds. It is not a matter in the one case of direct recognition, in the other of inference from effect to cause, but in both cases the process is inference and the argument deals with mechanical cause and effect operating in space and time. Consequently, provided the connection between present and past is made in both cases with equal degrees of clearness, the results have the same epistemological value. The tree that stood before it fell, the conversation that I listened to yesterday, are equally certain and equally real. The connection between experience and experience is of the same order as that between one external fact and another, and the series of experiences is in no wise prior to the series of external events.

II. *The Present Experience.* – The second question proposed was, Is the present experience immediately given? It need hardly be observed that, in raising this question, we are attacking a position which the experience-philosophy, heartily supported by the plain man, regards as absolutely impregnable. I shall endeavor to show, then, briefly, that the present is just as much, and just as little, immediate, or given, as the series of experiences, – that, like the series of experiences, it stands or falls with the reality of material things.

The proposition before us is: This (present) experience is given. But what is the present experience? I find myself here writing; but at the same time I can and do think of myself as playing billiards, travelling abroad, listening to the opera, asleep in bed, – or anything whatever. Are all these real experiences? Are they all given? It may perhaps be said that anything found in experience is given. But, if so, how can we construct a world out of the given? How can we distinguish the given from the made, the material from the product? Still, it may be claimed, *something* is given; you cannot deny that something exists, that you have some experience, whatever the nature of it may be. But why not? I may ask. If the given is just given, and is nothing in particular given, – if I may just as well find myself doing anything else as sitting here writing, – then is something given? Can something utterly indefinite be anything whatever? And can you have anything definite without a process of distinction and definition?

But we need not go further in this direction, for, in practice the

[3] The pragmatist, anticipating this implication of the series, would perhaps refuse to stand for the series. Yet, if not in a series, or stream of events, how can the 'activity' be given? And if the activity is not given, and nothing is given, then what of pragmatism? For, in that case, what superior claim to reality is possessed by the activity – by motive and purpose – over other aspects of the world?

experience-philosophy makes a sharp distinction between what is given and what is made, between a 'real' experience upon which we may build an objective world, and an experience which is, by distinction, not real. The given is what is found in sensation, or, say, sense-perception; the not-given is found in imagination, inference, and, perhaps, in memory; and the latter is said to be derived, by a process of association or otherwise, from the former.

The question then is, In the presence of the two sorts of experience, how do I know which is given and which is derived? How do I know that I am 'really' here writing and not playing billiards? Of course, if it could be shown that the derived refers to a previous given, but the given to nothing else whatever, the question might be regarded as answered; but this, if it can be shown at all, cannot be shown within the limits of the present experience. Accordingly, it cannot serve as a criterion for the present distinction. How, then, do I distinguish sense-perception from mere imagination? It will be seen at once that we have here the same sort of distinction as that presented in the last section between memory and imagination; the argument is consequently a repetition, with a change of terms, of the argument presented there. The empiricist holds that sense-perception and imagination are marked by differences of clearness. I maintain that clearness refers to definiteness and consistency of mechanical relations, in the present instance to the place of my body at the present time in the mechanical world. An experience is sense-perception; it is immediately given, only so far as this interpretation is guaranteed by the present mechanical relations between my body and the object of experience. I *see* the paper before me so far as I know that it is there; I *imagine* it so far as I know that it is not there. In other words, I perceive when perception is mechanically inevitable, and I imagine when perception is mechanically impossible. And thus the present experience is, like the past, given when the world of things gives it.

But now it will be asked, What of introspection? The present experience, I may be reminded, is not merely cognitive, but cognitive and affective. It includes motives and feelings which, so far as we know the mechanical conditions, cannot be ascertained to be either mechanically inevitable or mechanically impossible. There are also certain sensations, or what seem to be such, the mechanical conditions of which are far from being definitely known. Are we to treat all this as pure imagination? In other words, are we to ignore the 'results of introspection'?

Now I am not denying that we may make use of the subjective method and standpoint, however strongly I affirm that the objective standpoint is equally fundamental and ultimate. How far either may be regarded as fundamental, will be considered in the next section. In the meantime, it may be noted that, whatever value we place upon introspection where the

physical and physiological conditions of experience are indeterminable, we refuse to stand by it where these conditions are violated. Or, if we still accept it, we do so upon the assumption that after all the violation is only apparent, the conditions not having been correctly determined. A mere feeling is something which, as we all know, no critical mind can, with full conviction, either affirm or deny. It remains, then, not certainly a real experience or an imagined one, but simply undetermined. And if we look over the field of sensation, we find a significant parallelism between the sensations (such as the visual and auditory) that are subjectively distinct and those whose physical and physiological conditions are clearly determined. And with regard to 'introspection,' one who makes a critical examination of the so-called 'results' can hardly fail to note that much of what we are said to find there, especially what we find in sensation, is less what appears on the surface to be there than what, in view of the physical and physiological conditions, *ought* to be there, – such as the oblique-angled image from the rectangular table. It seems, then, that the mechanical conditions are after all the chief instruments in the 'introspective analysis.' In any case, it is clear that, whether, for the moment, we rely upon the subjective or the objective method, it is always with the assumption that, in the end, both must testify to the experience; and if this be so, the subjective experience is not independent of the objective thing.

The mere conception of immediateness is one of space and time relations. The more immediate is that which is nearer to a given point in space and time. In defining immediate experience, the empirical philosopher has before him the following relations. A man sees a tree. The tree sets up ether-vibrations, which cause chemical changes in the retina, which, again, cause physiological changes in the optic nerve, as the result of which the man sees the tree. But now, it is suggested, since the man has only the sensation, and the sensation is separated from the tree by a series of several terms, how can the man be said to know the tree? How can he know anything but the sensation? And since we are all in the position of that man, how can we say that any tree exists? Here, no doubt, is a real difficulty, – nothing less, indeed, than the problem of knowledge. But to solve it by simply throwing away the tree is to stultify yourself. For without the tree, as well as the man, you could never have asked the question. Except for your knowledge of the physical, chemical, and neural concerned in the knowledge of the tree, you could never have known that the tree itself was not immediately given. Nay, except as you place the experience in this space and time series, you could never speak of it as either immediately or mediately given. And since we are able to make this distinction, it seems clear that we are not restricted to the standpoint of the man at the end of the series.

We arrive, then, at what I have called the fundamental fallacy of the

experience-philosophy. The experience-philosopher builds the world upon experience. But, with the rest of us, he derives experience from the world. For experience, whether the present experience or the series of experiences, *goes with the body*; and the body goes with other bodies. Experiences and things are thus inseparably connected. If you cast out the things, in order to derive them later from experience, you have in the same act cast out the experience, and your 'solid foundation' is in reality nothing whatever. This fallacy is found in some form in all the varieties of the experience-philosophy.

III. *The Ultimate.* – If the foregoing is correct, experience is not immediately given. Shall we, then, reverse the relation and say that the external things are given? Or is nothing given? Yet how can we have a world without a *datum?* These are questions that I shall deal with briefly, and perforce somewhat summarily, in this closing section. My point is that nothing is absolutely given, and that, for purposes of knowledge, no absolute *data* are required.

The experience-philosophy, with its given experience, is but one expression of a very wide-spread and deep-lying logical tendency, which may be described as the search for the ultimate. The axioms of the geometer, the 'solid facts' of common sense and empirical science, the first cause of older metaphysics, and the Creator of older theology, all presuppose a conception of the world and a method of knowledge in which some things rest upon others which are ultimate and absolute. Consequently, the first and most important duty of the scientist and philosopher is to find those ultimate facts upon which his world may be surely reared; and his next duty is to see that the structure is solidly erected, each fact resting squarely and surely upon the fact that immediately supports it. This view is clearly presupposed in the current systems of logic. The deductive logic bases facts upon principles and directs our search toward foundation principles; the inductive logic bases principles upon facts and directs us to foundation facts. By both a reversal of the process would be called reasoning in a circle and condemned as fallacious. Both presuppose a condition of one-sided dependence, – a system of foundation and superstructure, in which the latter rests upon the former, but the former is absolutely independent of the latter. The principles support the facts, or the facts the principles, as the case may be, but nothing is supported by that which it supports.

We need not go far in following up the consequences of this one-sided relation to suspect something wrong in the logic which bases all knowledge upon an ultimate. The ultimate is an *ignis fatuus*. If your ultimate is not to be criticised or even defined, it is without character, and hence nothing; and if it is subject to criticism and definition, or even to statement, it is not ultimate. And it is difficult to see why, if *A,* the foundation fact, leads necessarily to *B,* the superimposed fact, we may not by the same road travel from

B to *A*. And, in that case, may we not regard *B* as the foundation of *A*? As a matter of fact we travel quite as often from *B* to *A* as from *A* to *B*. The geometer bases his theorems upon axioms which, somehow or other, are merely postulated; but to one who has mastered the system of geometrical relations the axioms are as necessarily the consequences of the theorems as the theorems of the axioms; and if the theorems were not presupposed in the axioms, it is difficult to see how they could be derived from them. The truth is that no member of a system can be regarded as independently given. For anything that you set out with is bound to owe just as much of its validity and reality to its place in the system derived from it as it imparts to this system.

The history of thought shows no traces of this supposedly 'logical' order of derivation. *Prima facie* it might seem that this order were reversed. The 'phenomena' upon which the fabric of science is supposed to rest are among its latest determinations, and, like the '*data*' of the introspective psychologist, are the product of highly reflective thought. Comparing earlier science with later, or the mind of the child with that of the man, we find nothing that can be expressed by the relation of foundation and superstructure. For, while the later thought refers to the earlier, it also corrects the earlier; and it is difficult to find any feature in the later which was not vaguely apprehended in the earlier. The conception of the conservation of energy may be found in the earliest reflective thought. It would be difficult to state precisely what its development has been, but in general the differences between the later and earlier conceptions seem reducible to those of coherence, definiteness, and thus of fulness and elaboration of detail.

To build upon perfectly solid ground is, accordingly, both impossible and unnecessary. A *datum* is not a finality but a convenient abstraction for purposes of further analysis, depending for its validity upon the results that it yields. Any point of view which makes clear any part of the world may be treated as a *datum*. The task of thought is not to search for exclusively valid *data,* but, using all the *data* at hand, to coördinate them so distinctly – modifying and correcting each by its relations to others – that, in the final determination, each may, through closeness of articulation, necessarily imply all of the others.

Now, in approaching the problems of modem metaphysics, we are confronted with two sets of *data,* or two standpoints, each of which promises an entrance into the maze of relations constituting our world. These are the standpoint of the agent, or percipient subject, and the standpoint of the external observer. These two points of view color, in varying degree, all of our views of mind, of life, and of nature. In our naïve thought they remain indistinct and uncoördinated. When we become metaphysicians and attempt to make them distinct and coördinate, we discover ourselves in the presence of two worlds which apparently refuse to be related. From the

agent's standpoint, his action is free, that is, it is the expression of choice and valuation; from the observer's standpoint, it is mechanically determined. Taking my feeling of activity as the criterion and foundation of reality, I make the world as a whole a living personality; if I survey impersonally the course of events, I make it a dead mechanism. And thus, from the one standpoint, I am an idealist, making the world the product of myself; from the other, I am a realist and materialist, making myself the product of the world.

It may then seem that I am called upon to accept one of these philosophies and to reject the other. But upon what ground? If choice is to rest upon the solidity and independence of the *datum,* then I may reply that in each case the *datum* is an abstraction. If you point to the epistemological priority of the agent's 'experience,' I can show that this experience is determinable only by reference to the scientific system of space, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you point to the 'positive facts' of science, then I can show that these facts are the expressions of conceptions and theories developed by human thought in response to human needs. And if you claim that this combination of arguments involves a contradiction, I may then ask how we can have a contradiction between terms whose relation has not yet been made clear.

It may then be claimed that the *datum* is justified by the system built upon it. But (aside from the inconsistency of the argument) I may reply that in a complete system of philosophy we should have a democracy of *data,* and none would be valid exclusively; for, if your system were complete, you could not only find your way from your *datum* to every other point in the world, but from every other point back to your *datum.* And, in point of fact, how far can this be done? The realist tells us that all activity is subject, say, to the law of conservation of energy. He can carry this into detail and verify it with great (but not complete) exactness in the physical and chemical laboratories, with much less in the biological laboratory, and with hardly any in the laboratories of psychology and neurology. The further we go from the physical laboratory, the more we are asked to take upon faith. Beginning with the conservation of energy, he can readily enough suggest how all consciousness might be subject to this law; but starting from consciousness, he can never find his way back to the conservation of energy. And so of pragmatism. The pragmatist can show you very clearly how these external conditions which apparently obstruct your activity are really nothing but your previously organized habits; he may then go on to show how your individual habits were formed, in response to consciousness and purpose, at an earlier stage of life, again translating the conditions which they met into habits formed at still earlier stages; but at each step his thought becomes vaguer. Starting from the process of consciousness, he can suggest how the world might be interpreted as a unified teleological activity; but starting from the world as it is, for science and common sense, he cannot show why we should choose such a world. The truth is that each point of view is

illuminating as far as it goes, but in neither does the illumination spread over the whole field.

In view of this situation, I believe that we must accept each standpoint for what it gives us without pinning our faith to either. We should then, with the realist, hold that reality is not limited to experience, and that the progress of science represents, not merely the satisfaction of subjective Kantian categories, nor yet merely the demands of practical life, but an advance in genuine knowledge of an external world; and, with the idealist, we should hold that nevertheless *our* objective world is a construction, and, with the pragmatist, that it has been constructed in response to the demands of practical life. We should then use these positions as foundations, more or less firm, more or less temporary and destructible, for further constructive thought. How the foundations are to be built upon, when they are to be regarded as firm, how and when they are to be reconstructed, is a matter for further discussion. But it seems to me that the attitude here proposed is the attitude not merely of practical reasonableness and common sense, but of a truly sound logic. For logic must deal with the conditions under which thought operates, and under which it has operated in arriving at the knowledge so far attained. And thought has never operated by erecting a solid superstructure upon a solid foundation, nor yet by adding new facts perfectly clear to old facts already perfectly clear, but only by working over the world before it into a world more coherent as a whole, more definite and complete in detail.

THE EFFICACY OF THOUGHT

George Santayana. "The Efficacy of Thought." *Journal of Philosophy* 3.15 (19 July 1906): 410–412. Ed. Note: Santayana replies to Moore's review of *The Life of Reason*, reprinted in this volume.

Professor A. W. Moore, in his courteous review of my book on 'The Life of Reason,'[1] has pointed out what he feels to be a discrepancy in my language, and perhaps a difficulty in the subject-matter itself, touching a point of very great importance. This point is the sense in which mental facts may be called influential, may have a function or power.

There are many possible readings of this problem, some of which may be distinguished as follows:

1. It is a function of thought to give an intrinsic value to the moment in which it occurs. Thought has an esthetic or ecstatic quality. This function, inefficacious as it is, would suffice to make thought the most important thing in the world.

2. Thought has the power of asserting ideal verities; it has a contemplative and dialectical function. An ephemeral seraph, alone in the universe, might recite the multiplication table and die. His thought would have possessed two ideal functions, one beatifying, the other self-explicative or discursive.

3. Thought may have a transitive but merely cognitive function; it may represent, and mean to represent, some independent fact, as when I say to myself that Cæsar died on the Ides of March. The eventual test of this truth, its consistency with other judgments, its prevalence, its destiny, or its being a thought that would subsist permanently in an organism usefully adapted to a special environment – all this does not enter into the cognitive pretensions of the thought. These are ideal; but as the truth of the thought hangs on the existence of the external fact to which it refers, its truth remains always an assumption from its own point of vantage; though a third person might perhaps have further means of deciding for himself whether that thought had been true or false.

4. Thought may have prophetic scope: it may foretell what is about to take place. This harmony, purely speculative in itself, would, if at all frequent, very much increase the inner wealth and dignity of thought mentioned in 1 and 3.

[1] This *Journal*, Vol. III., No. 8.

5. Mingled with prophecy may be desire; and if to confident prophecy and eager desire an eventual verification accrues, the result is a sense of power. Thought is then supposed to have brought about its own realization, and to be responsible for it. This felt efficacy is always moral, or rather magical. It is a power attributed to thought, in its ideal capacity and by virtue of its intent, to bring about what it calls for, as an incantation or an exorcism might do, through empty reaches of time and space.

6. Thought, taken as a psychological existence, might have a causal influence on a succeeding state of mind, quite apart from the ideal burden of either. Thus, a dialectical argument might bring on a headache or (if mental association were directly efficacious) hearing others speak with a certain accent might cause me to hear myself later speaking with the same, no physical links intervening.

7. Thought might be carried on for a while by dialectical progression, the meaning constituting an evolutionary 'force.' The thought might then be transformed into another irrelevant state of mind, as in 6; but a moment later this state of mind might become a cerebral process, which, in turn, might be propagated for a while mechanically, but might finally evaporate out of the physical world altogether, the 'force' of it going to constitute a fresh mental event, either irrelevant or, by preestablished harmony, cognitive of the physical fact that caused it; and so on as before.

8. Thought might be without efficacy, either in its moral or in its existential capacity; yet the bodily function, the instinct or habit, which it accompanied, might involve the maintenance of that thought, or its dialectical development in time. In this case the thought would be so grounded as to vouch for its occasional reappearance, whenever the juncture reoccurred at which it was evoked originally. Thus books, customs and works of art insure the perpetuity of spiritual experience as, in a larger sense, do the unchanged face of nature and the hereditary structure of animals. Thought might still be called efficacious in the only sense, not magical, in which its efficacy would be at all congruous with its intent; namely, through the natural efficacy of the creature whose life it expressed.

As to my personal opinion in this matter, which I am sorry to see Professor Moore finds ambiguously expounded in my book, it is probably plain enough from the above statement of the various possibilities. 1, 2, 3 and 4 describe purely ideal functions of thought, all of which it undoubtedly reaches at certain moments, 5, on the contrary, describes a superstition; yet it is this superstition, clung to by the unreconciled childishness of man, that alone induces anybody to defend the extravagances and confusions of 6 and 7. People wish thought to be mechanically efficacious because they think it would be a *better guide* than the cerebral process which underlies it; yet why a better guide, unless it operated

miraculously, by its intent, and not by virtue of some irrelevant evolution of its substance? 8, accordingly, represents the conclusion to which I arrive; and it explains certain phrases which I have not studied to avoid, thinking that their metaphorical character would be obvious to the reader. We all speak of Malthus's ideas 'governing' the movement of population, yet hardly expect to be accused of maintaining that poor Malthus's hard thinking caused Israel's fecundity or the congestion in our large cities. A thought is said to govern those portions of existence the movement of which it serves to predict or to describe. One may well say that 'reason is vital impulse modified by reflection.' It is certain that when a man 'reflects' his action changes in consequence, just as he turns aside when he 'sees' an obstacle in front of him; but as his seeing was an impression on his organs, without which his fancy would have pictured nothing, and as his turning was an instinct or habit of his organism, without which the image would have signified no danger; so the pause in reflection was a physical event, accompanied by an oscillation of projects in the mind (for reflection can not decide when reflection shall arise, nor how long it shall last, nor what course it shall take). The consequences of reflection are due to its causes, to the competitive impulses in the body, not to the wistful lucubration itself; for this is mere poetry. People's thoughts are most inadequate and choked just when their action is most rapid and urgent. That consciousness is a lyric cry, even in the midst of business, is something which must be felt, perhaps, to be understood; and they that have feeling, let them feel it.

I may add that the ambiguity which others as well as Professor Moore find in my book seems to come, at least in part, from their generously attributing to it loftier pretensions than it ever puts forth. They begin by reading into my words two doctrines which perhaps they think highly of, namely, that the genesis of knowledge is the genesis of things, and that truth is useful illusion; but they soon find that my expressions contradict these doctrines, which I not only never entertained, but can not even conceive. For in assigning any origin to nature we assume another nature operating behind, while it is hard to see how one illusion could be more useful than another in a vacuum; yet if a determinate environment existed, the true idea of it would be determined by what that environment was, not by the uses which the idea of it might have. What I can readily conceive, however, is how puzzled and disappointed a reader must be who begins by taking for a complete cosmogony what is merely a biography of human reason, and how miserably this whole drama of thought must seem to him to end, if it ends in discovering what has always been true.

THOUGHT AND THINGS

James Mark Baldwin, "Thought and Things." *Psychological Bulletin* 4.4 (15 April 1907): 123–126. Ed. Note: Baldwin replies to Moore's review of *Thought and Things*, vol. 1, reprinted in this volume.

Professor Moore's remarks upon my book of the above title in the March Bulletin lead me to make certain explanations. I shall refer also to criticisms made by others.

The treatment in my book is a compromise between two methods (as suggested by Professor Russell in the *Journ. of Philos.*). I find it impossible to treat each genetic 'mode' in turn exhaustively, by a method that tries to make out longitudinal 'progressions.' For each topic, a certain before-and-after review is necessary, in order to get the movement of consciousness; and this inevitably requires some repetition and restatement of the main characters of the mode in the interest of the particular problem under investigation. So it becomes a question, in order to reach the most effective exposition, of reducing the retracing to the minimum, without at the same time going over to a barren analytic and structural point of view.

To illustrate: in the second volume I find it impossible to discuss the linguistic embodiment of thought genetically without recurring to the general movement of development of thought, which has already been depicted in earlier chapters.[1]

As to the use of new terms – on that point, I simply take up any glove the critic may see fit to throw down. It all depends on whether the conceptions worked out are worth naming, and have not been named before (granting of course the relative appropriateness of the terms suggested). In this matter, it hardly behooves me to anticipate the verdict of the public; but the opinion of the *Nation's* reviewer is this: "The vocabulary of well-considered new technical terms that this volume expounds is in itself a precious gift to psychological investigation. For with each of these new terms there goes a valuable new conception." This is by C. S. Peirce, whose opinion is of the highest.

As to the 'static absolute' I don't care for it – and who isn't tired of it? – because it is a purely logical resort, reached as a presupposition of an equally 'static' truth. But as to a 'dynamic relative' – to suggest a contrast term – that

[1] I cite this instance since the chapter on 'Thought and Language' is to be printed in the Psychological Review for May, and may be glanced at by the reader.

sounds just now fresh and very modern; certainly it is less hackneyed than the other. But when we look it in the face, what is its complexion? It is a postulate of a *practical dualism,* as *crassly unintelligible* as the other is *logically over-theoretical.* I can't rest content with a 'dynamic' that has nothing outside to move it and no reason inside for moving! If experience proceeds by readjusting to situations, whence comes the situation that 'puts it up' to it to readjust? Why does it grow discontent with its own habit-world? Is a discrete unintelligible dynamic any better than a contentless formal static? To kick where there are no pricks may satisfy a strenuous 'relative,' but beyond endangering our collections of precious antique china, its only result is to strain its own leg-tendons! I'll stake the whole business on Professor Moore's answer to the following two questions:

First, how can experience of the dynamic-relative type secure or utilize knowledge that is socially valid, without at the some time reinstating other things as valid as the social fellows, including the thinker himself?

Second, how can an experience that has no environment save its own habit, and no reality save its present function, get up any 'dynamic' at all?

Or to put these two questions in one: In what sense is the will of the mother spanking the child part of the habit of the child, and why does the child's experience take on this particular phase of 'relative dynamic'? – this occasional and very disconcerting phase of habit?

The 'relative dynamic' is all right in its place; but so is the relative 'static.' To be 'relative,' we must be *dualistic, realistic,* and – 'things are what they seem' becomes the motto of a 'radical empirical' pluralism.

My own view, to be argued fully enough in my later volumes, is that the asthetic is a mode of experience that not only reconciles these dualisms and pluralisms, *content-wise – in a cross-section* – but also continues its mediation *progression-wise, longitudinally*: so that we can fairly say that in its experience has a way of finding its dynamics intelligible as a truthful and so far static meaning, and also of acting upon its established truths as immediate and so far dynamic satisfactions. In short, our relativisms are contrast-meanings, dualisms, instrumentalities one to another, and the mediation and abolishing of these contrasts, dualisms, means to ends, removes the relativities and gives the only tenable 'absolute.' This is the sort of 'absolute' experience is competent to reach. If you ask why this does not develop again into new relativities, I answer, *in fact* it does; but *in meaning* it does not. For the meaning is the universal of all such cases of mediation. If the mediation effected in the æsthetic is one of *typical meaning everywhere in the progression of mental 'dynamic,'* then it is just its value that it discounts in advance any new demands for mediation which new dualisms may make. The æsthetic is absolute then in the only sense that the term can mean anything: it is *universal progression-wise, as*

well as content or relation-wise. It mediates the *genetic dynamogenies as well as the static dualisms.*

The following brief explanations are relevant to certain of Professor Moore's difficulties.

As to 'meaning,' I hold that after meaning arises as over against mere present content, then the content also of necessity and by contrast also becomes meaning; since then consciousness may intend or mean either, or the difference between the two. As I put it in the book, with the rise of meaning there arise *meanings* (in the plural). To hold a content to just its bare presence is to make it a meaning – after consciousness is once able to *mean 'that only and not anything else.'*

As to the distinction between 'general' and 'schematic,' between 'belief' and 'assumption' – that is the radical position of my entire work, and I am glad to have it called attention to. It connects with and carries further the 'assumption' theory of Meinong and the Austrian school. My second volume rests its interpretations directly upon this distinction. To say that 'schematic' meaning, 'assumption,' is not 'general,' nor 'universal,' nor 'particular,' nor 'singular' – all of which I do say – is to say that it is a mode of meaning *sui generis.* It is the *intent of question,* assumption, hypothesis, prospective reading – over against all the other meanings just mentioned, which are those of *belief,* acceptance, retrospective reading, proof. It means that the instrumental intent of a meaning is *not a general meaning, but goes before it.* A meaning can be instrumental *only to a general not yet reached.* And a 'general' meaning, when made instrumental to further discovery, is then not general, but becomes in turn again 'schematic.'

So far from being antagonistic to an instrumental view, this furnishes the clue to it. On this distinction, *and this alone* – one destined I think to prove the most fruitful in the epistemology of modern times – the logical processes can be construed as essentially experimental from start to finish. This is the attempt of my second volume, which is now in press.

In respect to 'effort' and the 'subject,' I do not resort to any hypothesis of 'activity' in a philosophical sense. I find that, for the 'knower' himself, the sense of effort – whatever its mechanism[2] distributed variously as 'efforts' here and there, gets *segregated in a sense of control* which *is* the 'self' of judgment.

As to the 'inwardness' of thoughts – I hold that as thoughts they are in a context of reflection, recognized and intended as such; but that there is always that belief-reference which acknowledges or assumes the original control-sphere. I reflect alike on 'serpents' and 'sea-serpents,' but any intelligible use of them as meanings presupposes the reference to their

[2] The kinæsthetic theory is most likely, to me.

respective existence spheres. This reference is for me the essence of 'truth' as meaning. The serpent idea is 'true' when referred to the proper sphere, and so is the sea-serpent idea. There is always the *matching of experiences* as between *what is true* and what the true *is true to*.

One other point. While saying that the entire world of objects of experience or reflection is such to a self or subject, and is also referred to its original control, which 'holds the entire system to its moorings,' I mean two things besides. First, the original control, the 'moorings,' to which each idea or object of reflection is referred, is itself *the experienced* or made-up set of meanings of that original mode – as the reference of the idea 'horse' to the perceptual horse-experience – the envelope of the developing psychic process *being nowhere ruptured*.[3] The controls, 'foreign' as well as 'inner,' are all psychic meanings. And second, the dualism of controls does, as Mr. Moore suggests, live to the last within the sphere of logical meanings; it will not down; the dualism of reflection itself is a redistribution, *not a mediation,* of the control factors. But my conclusion from this is not a dualistic one, and not one of intellectualism; but one of a-logicism. For the failure of the logical to mediate its own and the earlier dualisms is just the opportunity of a genuine mediating experience. The necessity of logic is the opportunity of æsthetic. It is the cry of embarrassment of logical finality, on the one hand, and of pragmatic relativity, with its cruder dualisms, on the other hand, that has rung down the passage of history, and inspired the various solutions of immediacy, all the way from the logical postulates of pure identity, to the affectivist postulates of mystical contemplation. However ineffective these historical 'immediacies' may have proved, they have recurred and will still recur. My own effort is to find out just what is universal and saving in this recurrent endeavor, seeing that genetic analysis shows the endeavor to be inevitable.

[3] It is however an envelope of inter-psychic or common, in no sense private meaning, as I argue in detail in the forthcoming Vol. II.

COMMENT ON PROFESSOR MOORE'S PAPER[1]

James Mark Baldwin, "Comment on Professor Moore's Paper," *Psychological Review* 14.5 (September 1907): 297–298. Ed. Note: Baldwin replies to Moore's "The Social Character of Habit and Attention," reprinted in *Pragmatism and Its Critics*.

Professor Moore's position assumes 'habit' and 'instinct' and also 'conflict,' and withal 'attention' to 'readjust' them. But genesis must account for all these things; the same question of accommodation *vs.* habit arises in the simplest organism and the 'motivation' of a process is not explained by the assumption of its whole machinery. It is this that leads us – the critics – to say that the scheme is thoroughly individualistic. It would seem necessary to restate it *in social terms*. To this Professor Moore agrees; but then, as I think, he fails to give us a coherent restatement in social terms. The point at which he fails is one indicated in the article above and in detail in my book; in brief, the social process has no 'attention,' the conflict of wills gets no sort of readjustment in such terms as habit and instinct – save by a superficial analogy – and the whole mediation must go back to the individual process again, *dealing now with socially derived and socially valid meanings*. That is, social truth must be rendered in individual judgment – must be what I have called *synnomic*. But just here the individual factors of the whole mode of personal judgment reassert themselves, and *the new dualism of self and things,* knower and known, is constituted. In other words, the factor of foreign control again arises, in the constitution both of things and of the persons of the objective world of reflection.[2]

[1] As it happens a proposed contributor to this issue deferred sending in his paper; and I take the space to print part of a chapter of volume two of the work that called out Professor Moore's remarks. In that article (above, p. 264) I answer both his and Professor Dewey's criticisms (*Journ. of Philos.*, May 9, 1907) more effectively, by expanding my own view, than I could in such more fragmentary discussions as this.

[2] In this connection I may answer Professor Moore's question as to the meaning of 'psychic.' It is as he says "(1) the individual's psychic process, (2) as including other individuals [among *the meanings* it gets and entertains] and (3) as including all 'foreign controls' whether other persons or things [also among the meanings it gets and entertains). My explanations are inserted in brackets. It is all 'psychic' in the one sense; and that hits upon the requirement noted above, that even when the common

I am, as Professor Moore is, seeking for a reconciling mode of experience; I do not, however, find it where he does. I cannot avoid seeing that *for the knower* there is a very compelling and intruding sort of experience – that is what the much criticised sentence about the 'unwelcome presence that rides full-armed through our walls' means, and about all it means. This is *for and by him, the knower*, read as a 'foreign control' over against the tendencies – habits, instincts, volitions, etc. – that come to mean, all the way through, inner control. Judgment bridges this chasm, but opens another one – that of the dualism of reflection. The real mediation is found in the 'semblant' consciousness as I intimated in my closing remarks on Professor Moore's review *(Psychological Bulletin,* April 15, pp. 124–6).

or 'social' point of view is taken, the function of readjustment, of advance, of mediation must be interpreted as going on within the 'psychic-envelope' of the individual's mind.

A FEW WORDS IN REPLY TO PROFESSOR MOORE'S CRITICISM OF "ANTI-PRAGMATISME"

Albert Schinz, "A Few Words in Reply to Professor Moore's Criticism of 'Anti-Pragmatisme'." *Journal of Philosophy* 6.16 (5 August 1909): 434–438.

The interesting discussion of my "Anti-Pragmatisme" by Professor Moore in the issue of this JOURNAL for May 27 calls for a few words in reply.

That the ideas expressed in the work under consideration should not meet with the entire approval of pragmatists was to be expected; and that a critic should not present the author's views just as the latter would have done himself – there is nothing strange in that. This is human nature, and we all have our share of it. I may be justified, however, in asking to be allowed to correct just *one* false impression conveyed to the reader of Mr. Moore's criticism who would not be acquainted with the book itself. Mr. Moore gives it as my claim that: "Intellectualism is to save us from the 'consequences' of pragmatism – especially the American brand of pragmatism – which are: a crass materialism, a characteristic 'opportunism,' and philistinism in general, in which all moral control breaks down and which is to aid in 'humanity cutting off its own head'." I never spoke of "crass materialism"; neither do I believe that pragmatism, as a philosophy, is responsible for those things Mr. Moore has in mind, if they exist. Far from saying that they would be consequences of pragmatic philosophy, I said that pragmatic philosophy would save us from them when they threaten us.[1] I said that, because it is a philosophy which takes into consideration moral consequences, while philosophy – intellectualistic philosophy – aims at truth for the sake of truth only, pragmatism was useful: and I said further that, as, after all, life is more important to us than scientific thought, pragmatism ought to triumph, and probably will triumph, "not because it is true, but because it is false," *i.e*, because scientific truth is sad: if humanity is happier when philosophers conceal truth from their fellow men, then philosophers ought to try to keep truth for themselves and not spread it abroad. What I reproach pragmatists for (and the reason why I call my book "Anti-pragmatisme") is that they try

[1] I even did more: on pages 70–71 I warned myself against those who accused pragmatism of favoring "particulièrement les appétits grossiers." And I wrote: "Nous sommes bien certains qu'avec James le pragmatisme n'aura jamais que de hautes et généreuses visées."

to persuade us that scientific theories agree with pragmatic or useful theories; they take usefulness not only in the logical sense, but also in the social or moral sense, thereby creating a confusion between philosophy and moral philosophy. Thus *against pragmatism I do not protest, but only against pragmatic philosophers*.

Now, in maintaining that truth regarding moral or social life is sad, am I saying something so surprising? I think not; for, is not, for instance, Christianity, which is the religion and belief of the best part of humanity, based on that very idea: truth is discouraging, and it is from the outside, from religious revelation alone that comfort can be brought unto us? So I may be "naïve," but I am at least in good Christian company.

"What a beautiful *reductio ad absurdum* of pure thought," exclaims my critic. No, not of pure thought, but of the gratuitous assumption, shared by pragmatists, that *truth* must necessarily be *good*. It is certainly good – I would rather say useful – to know truth, even if it is bad, so that we may parry its effects; but it remains bad in essence, anyway. It is good that a physician should know that a patient has appendicitis and not pneumonia, for the sake of the treatment of the illness; but it does not mean that any of the diseases is good in itself.

I am very sincerely sorry that I have been so misunderstood by a philosopher like Professor Moore. Such muck-raking criticism of modern society as he finds in my book I abhor as unworthy of a philosopher, who has to understand, not to judge. I had thought, from many accounts elsewhere, that I had succeeded in making myself clear;[2] I had also hoped that some sentences like the following, interspersed, on purpose, all through the book, would protect me against this interpretation, at least with those who, like Professor Moore, surely were not intending to write a sensational article:

"*Nous ne reprochons nullement à la société d'être pragmatique c'est à dire de veiller à ses intérêts; nous trouvons cela parfaitement légitime au contraire, et du reste le mot 'intérêts' peut être pris dans le sens le plus large et si l'on veut le plus élevé. Mais nous reprochons à une école de philosophes modernes de vouloir forcer, pour ainsi dire, la philosophie impersonnelle, la science amorale, la nature indifférente à parler le même langage que nos aspirations et nos passions, – et, même, nous le voulons bien, que nos* généreuses *aspirations, que nos* nobles *passions*" … (pp. 3–4).

Or again: "*Nous sommes en parfaite sympathie avec l'œuvre sociale que se propose le pragmatisme – qui est en somme de rendre l'humanite aussi*

[2] Just as I write this the June number of *Current Literature* reaches me with an article on "Anti-Pragmatisme." Once more an author, though not taking my side, has seen and stated with perfect fairness my point of view.

heureuse que possible – mais nous ne croyons pas que les moyens adoptés … soient les seuls possibles, ou même les meilleurs" … (p. 239).[3]

With regard to "bossism," I agree that there are two explanations possible; either it is a natural and unavoidable product of our modern conception of democracy (which is not the *only* conception, by the way), as I maintain in my book; or it is, to use the picturesque expression of Professor Moore, a case of "social appendicitis" which can be operated upon. The question is: which one of the two explanations is correct? Professor Moore has not shown that mine was not.

Regarding "intellectualism" from the logical point of view, "many will fail to find anything new in support of it." In this Mr. Moore is right; nothing new need be said. My position is simply that pragmatism as an epistemological theory has obscured the philosophical sky, and that a wind of old intellectualism, which means nothing more than plain reasoning, should blow off the clouds. Yes, honestly, I think the "law of contradiction" is a good enough test, and I blame pragmatists chiefly for ignoring it. Now, we all know that some of them say they do not ignore it; and those who admit that they do, are considered "undesirable citizens in the realm of pragmatism" by the others. It is, therefore, a very delicate point; the fact is that when you accuse them of doing it they protest vigorously; but as soon as they are not watched, especially when they attack intellectualism, they advocate it in provoking fashion. I can not see anything except a violation of the principle of contradiction in this sentence of an article which I find in the same issue of the JOURNAL in which appears Professor Moore's criticism of my book; it is signed Helen Thompson Wooley: "Nor is it a damning admission to the pragmatist to agree that a given content of thought may be truth under one set of circumstances and falsehood under another, because for him truth is never inherent in the content of an idea, but always in its function" (p. 301). Do not pass, at your convenience, from the logical to the psychological domain – if you do it, this is enough for me to condemn your philosophy.

As to the "lack of anything like an adequate appreciation of the real issue," I will not discuss it; and this is my reason for it: if we believe pragmatists, not one yet except those who belong to the guild, has been able to understand them. No one criticising them has yet escaped this summary judgment – "You do not see the point"; but they keep on refusing to tell

[3] I know that some pragmatists protest against such "pragmatic" tendencies of their philosophy. That this is, however, if not consciously, at least unconsciously, the origin of this movement among philosophers, I have tried to show in my book. Whether I have succeeded or not, is immaterial for the point under discussion, which is: Have I, or have I not, accused pragmatism of breeding "crass materialism," and so forth?

where exactly they are misunderstood. This they have been told over and over again; but Professor Moore once more adopts this very easy policy: "Into the issue itself we can not go."[4] Why not? When will those who have conscientiously tried to understand – and they are many – ever find light on pragmatism, if the adepts will not tell them? All Professor Moore consents to say is this: "For him [me] if logic and ethics are different, they must be independent, or even 'opposed'." Yes! certainly, if you remain consistently in the domain of epistemology. The whole first part of my book endeavors to prove that, especially against Professor Dewey. There are not two logics, one for ethics and one for other departments of science. I am perfectly ready to let the independent reader decide between Professor Dewey and myself. *But* if this *is* the "point at issue" – as the quoted sentence seems to imply – I really do not see how Professor Moore can tell that I did not appreciate it. I discussed it, although perhaps not in the spirit of pragmatism, for almost 100 pages.

Just one word more: Professor Moore points out two passages where, according to him, I have misinterpreted Professor Dewey's essay. I went over the difficult texts of Mr. Dewey again, and it seems to me that I understand them exactly. In the first one (pp. 293–4 of the criticism) I understand, just like Professor Moore, that *psychology* can not give us the moral ideal. Perhaps my critic was led astray by the French sentence where the negation in the second part of the sentence is not repeated; he translates: "The content of the moral ideal, *and that therefore*." In the article published in English I had written myself, *nor therefore… .*[5] My second misinterpretation, according to Professor Moore, is that I substitute the word "judgment" for "character" to "make a case of contradiction." I do not see that it makes a difference, as judgment (and this is just the originality of pragmatism at this point) is a mere "expression of the character" – so if the character becomes logical, it would seem that the judgment would become so too.

Those are the only two passages where Professor Moore points out with precision that, according to him I did not do justice to Professor Dewey. Of course he picked out the worst … so I do not think that, after all, my criticism is of only a "captious" character.

With the above reservation, I express my thanks to Professor Moore for his criticism.

[4] Cf. Professor Dewey speaking of the chapter of "Anti-Pragmatisme" concerning him: "A becoming modesty forbids my dealing with it"…, in the *Philosophical Review*, July, 1909.

[5] This JOURNAL, Vol. V., p. 624.

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Volume 2

Edited by
John R. Shook
Oklahoma State University

History of American Thought

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Edited and Introduced by **John R. Shook,** *Oklahoma State University*
Additional Introductions by **J. Brent Crouch,** *University of Oregon* &
Scott Pratt, *University of Oregon*

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

Addison W. Moore

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INTRODUCTION

In an ecstatic letter to John Dewey written in March 1903, William James declared his "almost absurd pleasure" in reading A. W. Moore's "Meaning, Existence, and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology."[1] Moore's work heralded a "new 'school of thought'" and "a true one. …. Who and what," James asked, "is … Moore, and how old?"[2] In December of that same year after reading the collaborative volume written by Dewey, Moore, and their colleagues at the University of Chicago, *Studies in Logical Theory*, James remained enthusiastic about the work that the new "Chicago School" had accomplished. "You can't guess the delight with which all of this work fills me," James declared. But then, after pledging his "zealous co-operation" in promoting this "new school," he concludes in a postscript: "I shouldn't have been so excited about Moore last Spring if I had known how much of his thunder was yours."[3] James's reassessment of Moore, combined with the view that much of Moore's published work served to defend rather than advance the philosophical standpoint of pragmatism, suggest that it is right to view Moore as "the bulldog of pragmatism," both positively as a defender of a particular doctrine and negatively as a less than original thinker. In this light it is tempting to read Moore, especially works such as *Pragmatism and Its Critics* republished here, as, at best, the well-crafted dogmatism of a "true believer," and not as work of philosophical importance. Such a conclusion, however, fails to give Moore the credit his work deserves.

Dewey himself challenges James's conclusion about Moore's work in reply to James's December 1903 letter. After acknowledging James's enthusiastic support of the work of the "Chicago School" in *Studies in Logical Theory*, Dewey continues: "I want to add that you have nothing, on my account, to retract in re Moore—By inhibiting publication for a number of years I have funded for my own intellectual capital more of the ideas of other

[1] *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, Second Series, vol. 11 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), pp. 29–51.

[2] William James to John Dewey, 11 March 1903, in *The Correspondence of John Dewey, vol. 1: 1871–1918*, ed. Larry Hickman (Charlottesville, Va.: Intelex Corporation, 1999), #00798. Dewey's correspondence is hereafter abbreviated as *CJD*.

[3] William James to John Dewey, 3 December 1903, *CJD*, #00846.

people—students & colleagues—than I can tell—and Moore has given at least as much as he has received…."[4] Dewey's assessment might have seemed puzzling to James, especially in light of Moore's contribution to the *Studies*, primarily a reply to Royce's notion of purpose in *The World and the Individual* along the lines of Dewey's published reviews from 1901 and 1902. Moore's part in the collaborative work, however, does not present well the focus of his thinking at the time or the ways in which he might have "given at least as much as he received." A better example of his work is found in *Pragmatism and Its Critics*. In fact, much that would later become central to Dewey's own development of pragmatism (as the theory of inquiry and related theories of human nature and valuation) is anticipated in Moore's book and helps to confirm that Dewey did indeed benefit from the "intellectual capital" prepared by Moore and others.

The present volume, *Pragmatism and Its Critics,* appeared at a crucial time in the history of pragmatism. James, then viewed as the leader of the "pragmatist movement," died in August 1910, a few months before Moore's book was published. As one of Moore's reviewers observed, "it may have seemed to those who are acquainted only with the more popular literature of philosophy, that Pragmatism had no longer a representative in this country who could make the new view both intelligible and interesting."[5] Dewey, now working at Columbia University, published his collection *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays* earlier that year, but most of the discussion of pragmatism was dominated by idealist critics on one hand, including F. H. Bradley, J. E. Creighton, Mary Whiton Calkins, and realist critics on the other, including James's former student, Ralph Barton Perry, Arthur O. Lovejoy, and James Bissett Pratt. Paul Carus, founder of The Open Court journal and press, captured the critical atmosphere of the time in the dedication to his 1911 critique of pragmatism, *Truth on Trial*. "To the memory of William James," Carus offered, "who with the very best intentions put TRUTH ON TRIAL and by his very errors advanced the cause of truth."[6] In this context, highly critical of the work of James and the "Chicago School," Moore's book served to reassert and defend the perspective offered by the Dewey and his colleagues in 1903, and by James in 1907 in *Pragmatism* and again in 1909 in *The Meaning of Truth*.[7]

[4] John Dewey to William James, 19 December 1903, *CJD*, #00802.

[5] Anonymous, *Nation* 92.1 (5 January 1911): 13–14.

[6] Paul Carus, *Truth on Trial* (Chicago: Open Court, 1911).

[7] See William James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking & The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975).

As Moore observes in his Preface, *Pragmatism and Its Critics* is a collection of work completed for a variety of audiences. The earliest work in the collection was produced in 1904 (when he published the chapter, "The Pragmatic 'Universal'," in the *Psychological Bulletin*), and the latest in 1909 (when he published the chapter, "Pragmatism and Solipsism," in *The Journal of Philosophy*). The first five chapters of the book were originally presented as a series of "semi-popular" lectures at the University of Chicago in 1908 and provide the most sustained discussion in the volume. Significantly, the themes introduced in these opening chapters serve both as a valuable introduction to pragmatism from the viewpoint of one of its founders and earliest defenders, and, at the same time, a frame for the critical responses presented in the remaining six chapters.

At the center of Moore's collection are what he describes as three "phases" of pragmatism that he thought were being neglected in contemporary discussions of pragmatism. "These phases," he says, "were: (1) the historical background of the movement (this especially in the lectures); (2) the central role of the conception of evolution in the development of pragmatism; (3) the social, or, perhaps better, the 'situational' character of consciousness and *a fortiori* of thinking."[8] The first phase, which might be called the genealogical, focuses attention on the emergence of pragmatism as a response to crises of culture brought about be a failure of the long-dominant philosophies of Europe. The second phase, though a consequence of the Darwinian evolution theory, is fundamentally a logical matter, that is, a concern with the ways that human beings organize their understanding of the world and responses to experienced problems. The third phase, the situational, focuses on the ways in which ontology and epistemology are a matter of particular situations. This last phase is key to understanding the pragmatic response to charges of relativism and solipsism and also serves as the key to the pluralism of pragmatism. The historical significance of Moore's work comes in part in the way that these "phases" anticipate the issues that drive the development of pragmatism, especially by Dewey, over the next forty years. The enduring relevance of Moore's work also turns on these phases since they can be seen as the core issues that re-emerge one hundred years later as philosophers turn pragmatic resources to the problems of a new century and millennium.

The genealogical phase of pragmatism, developed by Moore in chapters 2 and 3, holds that pragmatism is an emergent philosophy born in response to difficulties encountered by earlier dominant views grounded largely in the philosophy of the Greeks. Just as Dewey would later argue, Moore here

[8] A. W. Moore, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, pp. 5. *Pragmatism and Its Critics* is hereafter abbreviated as *PC*.

presents philosophy as a cultural activity born in the face of the failure of established ways of thinking. From Moore's perspective, the Western philosophical tradition began with early Greek thought that was an "attempt to reduce the world of 'things' to a common stuff, 'a common denominator'."[9] At first, this search for a common stuff focused on what we now call the physical or material world. Over time however, satisfying concepts that seemed to unify the material world generated by Greek thinkers became inadequate to new challenges. "[I]n their rapidly increasing interaction with one another and with foreign tribes[,] the Greeks came into contact and conflict with a variety of political, commercial, and religious customs and standards, so that the demand for 'a common denominator' in social and ethical affairs was even more pressing than in the physical world."[10] In an effort to address this conflict within and on the borders of Greek society, the problem of understanding itself—the "problem of knowledge"—and its locus in diverse individuals emerged as a way to understand and potentially to resolve the trouble. "Now, as soon as consciousness and thought are thus regarded as a function of the individual body or soul," Moore concludes, "the differences and disagreements of opinions formerly so puzzling at once seem explained."[11]

While the diversity of individuals became a means of describing differences of opinion, Plato offered a way out of the apparently intractable conflict, that is, by opposing "the transient, shifting, 'psychological' consciousness of the individuals a 'metaphysical' world of universal and immutable reality."[12] Metaphysics, the first philosophy of Plato and Aristotle "might well be defined as *the essence of all attempts to maintain a world of continuity and order in the face of an individualistic theory of human consciousness*."[13] These "essences" that promoted continuity and order became the absolutes of philosophy manifested even in the late nineteenth century by the philosophies of idealism and realism. Pragmatism, then, emerges as an alternative way of thinking that rejects the goal of absolute essences and replaces them with dynamic and instrumental "essences" that bring stability in particular circumstances but demand revision as circumstances change. For Moore, however, the genealogy of pragmatism is not simply part of the history of philosophy, but is also an argument in favor of pragmatism. Regardless of the specific claims made by

[9] *PC*, p. 18.

[10] *PC*, pp. 19–20.

[11] *PC*, p. 20.

[12] *PC*, p. 22.

[13] *PC*, p. 22.

past philosophies, from a genealogical perspective, these philosophies are all attempts to respond conceptually to the problems of particular times and places. In effect, the history of philosophy presents a history of pragmatic, situated thinking. Moore asks, "Is not history a dangerous court of appeal for absolutism? …. The highways and byways of history are strewn with the wrecks of scientific, political, and religious theories. The most cherished conceptions of one century are the superstitions of the next."[14] Pragmatism,[15] on this account, is not some new way of thinking, the pinnacle of some story of human progress, but rather it is a process that undergirds diverse ways of thinking and that, when recognized, can also provide a means for the ongoing reconstruction of human thought in response to continuing change.

Moore's genealogical approach is clearly related to Dewey's initial efforts in his paper, "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge" (1897), which Moore cites briefly.[16] But where Dewey provides a genealogy of the problem of knowledge to make to make a case for "psychology" as "the democratic movement come to consciousness" that will stand as the next stage of human thought, [17] Moore treats the genealogical process itself as evidence for pragmatism as both an old way of thinking (to borrow a phrase from James) and, in light of its history, a new way of thinking as well. Dewey will make essentially the same point in *Reconstruction in Philosophy* in 1920[18] and it becomes a cornerstone of his case for the method of thinking he calls "empirical naturalism" in *Experience and Nature* (in 1925 and 1929),[19] "intelligence" in *The Quest for Certainty* in 1929, [20] and "the standpoint of inquiry" in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* in 1938. [21] While Dewey and Moore may have discussed the importance of the genealogical phase of pragmatism while both were at Chicago, it is interesting that Dewey chose

[14] *PC*, p. 31.

[15] Moore uses the term 'evolutionist' interchangeably with 'pragmatist' here (*PC*, p. 31).

[16] *PC*, p. 26n. References to Dewey's work are found in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., *The Early Works, 1882–1898* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969–1972), *The Middle Works, 1899–1924* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976–1983), and *The Later Works: 1925–1953* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981–1990). These volumes are hereafter referenced by *EW*, *MW*, and *LW*, followed by volume and page numbers.

[17] *EW* 5: 23.

[18] *MW* 12: 94

[19] *LW* 1: 4.

[20] *LW* 4: 160.

[21] *LW* 12: 461.

to include the thirteen year old paper, "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge," as the conclusion of his 1910 collection, *The Influence of Darwin in Philosophy*, two years after Moore presented his genealogy of pragmatism in the Chicago lectures that became the first half of *Pragmatism and Its Critics*.

The second phase of pragmatism, the logical, emerges from the first. The legacy of Greek thought was the view that both the world and ways of thinking about it were fixed and unchanging. Species of plants and animals, categories of thought, principles of purpose and value were given in the fabric of the universe. Such a view provided the means to sort through the diversity of experience in order to find the stable order that could settle conflict and provide direction. The emergence of evolution theory came as a decisive blow to such a view because it demonstrated that the fixed species of the past were not fixed at all but rather were dynamic categories transformed by interaction with changing environmental circumstances. Without fixed species, some (the "absolutist" philosophers of the time and Royce in particular) feared that the world would be mistaken for one of uncontrollable change and so argued that while species change may be correct, changes were ultimately controlled by some overarching purpose. "At this point," Moore says, "the pragmatic movement claims to make its connection with, and its contribution to, the concept of evolution."[22] If the absolutists are correct, then every possible change is "purposed" from the very beginning so that, relative to the "problem of human self-control," the world is necessarily "given and uncontrolled." From a human perspective, if everything that one might do is already consistent with some over-arching purpose, the purpose can provide no guidance at all about what one *ought* to do. As a result, "an all-inclusive purpose is logically the same as caprice."[23] In rejecting the idea of an overarching purpose, Moore argues that evolution makes room for an alternative: controlled change. If evolution supports the idea of variation in all types, then, Moore asks, "must not variation in species admit variation in species of variation as well?"[24] In effect, if the universe is evolving, then that general character makes possible "purposive, ideational control" as one form of change and rules out the possibility of a fixed universal purpose. As Moore concludes his response to Royce and Bradley in the seventh chapter, "Purposes come and purposes go, but *purposing* goes on forever."[25]

[22] *PC*, p. 38.

[23] *PC*, p. 38.

[24] *PC*, p. 38.

[25] *PC*, p. 69.

For Moore, genealogy and evolution identify different aspects of the same process: genealogy identifies the process of change in human thought, and evolution introduces an alternative logic compatible with that process. As a result, the impact of evolution is two-fold. On one hand, it means that logic—the ideas and ways in which humans order and respond to experience—is itself a changing structure. If logic frames how we think, then how we think changes over time and in response to developing circumstances and the purposes with which they are met. The emergence of "working hypotheses" in the practices of science marks just such an evolution in how we think. On the other hand, the theory of evolution itself becomes part of the reconstruction of logic. "Working hypotheses" mark "the appearance of the conception of evolution in logic."[26] Since claims about the world (or rather categories of claims expressed by propositions such as 'All humans are mortal') are subject to change and gain their validity through their ability to "work" in particular circumstances, the claims of science can be seen as working the same way that species work: their members are "proposed" to particular circumstances, where some survive, others do not, with a transformed species taking shape over time. An idea here becomes a "*real variation*" "precisely in the control it introduces into the 'spontaneous' or non-purposive variations."[27] This challenge to traditional logic undermines the idea of fixed and stable relations among claims about the world and sets a new agenda for those who would consider the problems of epistemology and logic. In effect, Moore proposes that the significance of Darwin for philosophy is that evolution calls out a new approach to logic and knowledge even as it forces a new view of what is real.[28]

Moore's view agrees in large measure with Dewey's treatment of the same subject in his seminal essay, "The Influence of Darwin in Philosophy." The essay, given first as an address the year after Moore gave his lectures on pragmatism, suggests that both Dewey and Moore were coming to focus the development of pragmatism not on a theory of truth as James had in *Pragmatism*, but rather on an alternative logic where the old rules, such as those of truth, took on new meaning. While much of Dewey's discussion of

[26] *PC*, p. 38–39.

[27] *PC*, p. 39.

[28] Moore's treatment of purpose in evolution directly relates to recent debates about evolution. Some, like Richard Dawkins, argue that evolution is a process devoid of purpose, even particular ones. At the same time, as David R. Keller and Frank B. Golley observe, there is nevertheless a process of purposing. "To capture the idea that a specific direction is not inherent in evolution but directionality is, we might say that the process of evolution by natural selection in not *teleological* but *teleomatic*." *The Philosophy of Ecology*, eds. David R. Keller and Frank B. Golley, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002), p. 239.

the idea of purpose focuses on a critique of absolutist attempts to secure an ultimate purpose for nature, Moore uses evolution to make a case for the diversity of purpose. Dewey reflects the same conclusion in his theory of inquiry, but without relying on a particular argument to establish the character of purpose in a world understood in terms of evolution.[29] By focusing on the logic of evolution in his presentation and defense of pragmatism, Moore anticipates one of the central components of Dewey's work in the 1930's—the reconstruction of logic.

In the opening essay of *Studies in Logical Theory*, Dewey connects the logical phase of pragmatism and its emphasis on purpose with what Moore calls the situational phase. Describing the "practical" and "scientific" approaches to thinking, he concludes "They both assume that every reflective problem and operation arises with reference to some *specific* situation, and has to subserve a *specific* purpose dependent upon its own occasion."[30] Moore makes the same point in a wider context: "the 'situation' is the pragmatist's absolute."[31] For the absolutists of the time, thinking was ultimately contained within the Absolute, giving limited human thought its resources, its frame of reference, and its standards for truth and error. Moore's equation of the situation and the absolute is significant in that it marks a dramatic reconstruction of absolutist philosophy without abandoning all of its insights. Moore and Dewey agree with those who recognize an intimate connection between knowing and the things known. Knowing, from this perspective is not a passive activity but one that is transformative and directed; things known are in a real sense products of the process, not antecedently given and unchanging. At the same time, however, the powerful act of knowing is not simply an action carried out in service of some over-arching purpose. Knowing, in this way, is a particular action responding to particular circumstances where what it responds to and what constitutes a successful transformation is a matter of the circumstances at hand. Knowing then becomes a kind of action that leads to experimentation, an explicit reliance on experience and an interest in both ideas and the world in which experience goes on. This "situated knowing," to borrow a term from recent feminist theory, is the purposive, ideational control that emerges through evolution and itself becomes a new factor in the process of change.

[29] In fact, Dewey seems to have a very ambivalent stand relative to the implications of purpose as part of nature. See his discussion in "Nature and its Good: A Conversation" (*MW* 4). Here he nearly repeats Moore's conclusions about purpose as presented in *PC*, but appears to use them (in the voice of a character named Arthur) to make an idealist case for nature knowing itself (*MW* 4: 23).

[30] *MW* 2: 301

[31] *PC*, p. 65.

While Moore's exposition of the situational phase of pragmatism mirrors the work of his contemporaries in pragmatism, his presentation includes his explicit recognition of a central criticism of pragmatism, what may be called "the problem of limits." The process of knowing, when understood as an activity framed by a purpose, is in part a process of determining the connections among things and ideas. What a thing is and what it is known as amounts to the connections a thing has with its context. A violin, for example, is a violin through its particular connections with other things and ideas, e.g. its shape and sound, the means of its use, the circumstances that call for it, and so on.[32] Moore observes that this view of knowledge and its attendant problems is not unique to pragmatism but rather has been a "cardinal tradition of idealism since Kant, especially since Hegel."[33] In fact, the central contribution of Hegel to logic, according to Moore, it "the insistence that an idea is not a mere algebraic symbol, but that it is an *act* in which things pass into new interaction"—that is, ideas are transformative acts. If one wishes to know what a thing is from this Hegelian perspective, its definition emerges through a series of connections with what it is not, the process of "othering." But the process, as Moore observes, is one in which every determination necessarily requires a further connection so that one must ask: "Does [this process of connection] mean [connection] to anything else whatever, or everything else, or things else? And if the latter, what determines these certain things?" Moore continues: "As soon as we put these questions to the Hegelian logic, its fundamental difficulty appears, viz., the lack of any principle to limit and to control the 'othering'."[34] The problem, as Moore notes, is not simply a Hegelian one: consider the scope of the situation in which one knows a violin. If one is to know it, one must know it in its connections. So one may know it in connection with things it is not, say with the player and the tune, and with the room in which the performance goes on, and with one's other knowledge of other violins, tuning and playing, and with the impresario who staged the performance, and with the concert hall and its donors listed in the program, and with the trees from which the program was made and the soil on which they depended and so on until one is forced to ask where the situation will stop. Where does a situation stop? What, if anything, prevents a situation from being the universe as a whole?

[32] Attempts to evaluate the violin for tone add another dimension to the connections in which the violin in known. Evaluations require purposes to serve as standards, Moore argues. These further purposes appear to require still "higher" purposes to govern their selection and so the limit problem emerges again. See *PC*, pp. 68–70.

[33] *PC*, p. 40.

[34] *PC*, p. 40.

Moore's answer to this concern on behalf of pragmatism is developed at length in the second half of his book. In simplest terms, he proposes that situations are limited by a number of factors that bind a situation together from the inside. Just as a string limits the flight and return of a yoyo, so the factors within a situation limit its scope. The first factor is purpose, characterized by a felt quality.[35] Knowing a toothache, for example, is to know it in terms of a desire to alleviate the pain, that is, in terms of a purpose. The situation in which the pain occurs then will not include things that do not contribute to ending the ache. This felt quality and the purpose it generates serves as the start of a process of knowing. A second factor might be called the "operational range" or the "spatial" boundaries that emerge as an inquiry progresses.[36] One may not know where one's dentist is, but the situation can be said to encompass the "space" in which one will search for the dentist. Such a boundary limits the situation to the spaces that open up as one searches for the dentist without including any given space proposed (the moon, should it be proposed as part of the situation, would be set aside as not part of the situation). Third, there is a temporal factor that bounds the situation.[37] Situations are sequences of activities and so have a temporal character. As such, they have temporal relations: one may have had dental work in the past and may seek a future in which one will have it again. Such relations are relative to a present binding circumstance, involving, in this case, a toothache and a desire to end it. But situations are not, therefore, connected with all time or even a given past. Neither the distant past nor the distant future are part of the present situation since they fall outside the range of times relevant to the pursuit of a cure. A fourth factor is the limit provided by outcomes. The relief of my toothache marks the end of the situation and, as a result, settles the matter of the purposive, spatial, and temporal boundaries of the situation.

Three other factors also emerge in Moore's discussion as important to limiting situations. One of these limits is formed by the socially gained habits of thought and action that mark the resources with which one can engage the world. Recognizing that the pain is a tooth problem (as opposed to a problem caused by a hex or potion), that one ordinarily consults a dentist for such pain (as opposed to a carpenter, for example), that one can take a pain reliever in the interim, are all patterns of response framed by one's social circumstances. Such habits are within

[35] *PC*, pp. 44–45.

[36] *PC*, pp. 46–47.

[37] *PC*, pp. 48–50.

the situation in that they are a physically embodied part of persons in the situation. They are also limits on the situation itself since they frame the processes of interaction that occur as the situation develops. Significantly, the pressure of the social factor in the form of established habits within a situation also serves as a reply to the criticism that pragmatism is a form of solipsism.[38] Another factor is the "ideational." Ideas emerge in situations and are parts of them even as they provide an aspect of control. As one generates ideas about the relative location of dentist to me, the ideas emerge from within the situation and help to control it. They do not eliminate the toothache, of course, nor do they make the dentist appear, but they do establish links between the other elements of the situation and provide direction for fulfilling the purpose. Last, situations also involve things that, while internal to the situation, nevertheless do not appear to the conscious participants in the situation. Moore calls these things "the permanent." "The permanent," he says, "thus appear as that content in a 'situation' the changes of which are irrelevant to that 'situation'" (65). The coffee table along the wall, the sound of passing cars, the color of the ceiling, are all "content" of a situation, but are not relevant to my quest for pain relief. As limits to the situation, such stable things bound the scope of the situation much as a beige wall makes the green one in the next room beyond the present situation. Although Moore does not develop the point, such stable things may not be limited to physical objects that seem to bound perception, but might properly include social institutions, expectations, economics and technology that, depending upon the situation, are the stable elements within a situation which serve to limit its scope.

Moore developed a more or less systematic treatment of what constitutes a situation in a response to the problem that Hegelian thinkers were unable to answer in contrast to Dewey's effort to develop the logic of the process of inquiry. By assuming that situations could serve as the uncontroversial frame for inquiry, Dewey was able to look closely at the processes of inquiry as they developed. Yet the lack of a well-developed concept of situation continued to be a problem for Dewey so that it remained an open issue even in his extensive treatise on logic (1938). In fact, Bertrand Russell, writing in the first volume of the *Library of the Living Philosophers* in 1939, raises this same problem. Dewey's reply is to reassert that experience is characterized by both "discreteness and continuity" and that little can be said to specify what constitutes situations since they are "immediate" and cannot be fully captured in discourse. That situations do not include the universe as a whole appears

[38] See *PC*, chaps. 10 and 11.

to be a consequence of the fact that experience is discrete as well as continuous.[39] Even now, the problem remains central to anyone of those who would see pragmatism as a pluralist philosophy. As is perhaps clear from Moore's conception of situations, it remains to be seen how the resulting conception of a situation is not one dependent in all significant ways on either a particular inquirer or her social context. In the former case, a new form of solipsism appears to emerge. In the latter case, it appears that Moore tries to reframe situations through habits, making them necessarily social, but this only makes society a potentially relevant factor. While it may be true that one wouldn't have a situation at all without certain habits, it is not clear that a given situation is in any sense shared with someone else, despite common habits. My toothache, like my oppression perhaps, is not necessarily shared by anyone around me. The situation includes others, perhaps as my dentist or my oppressor, but these others are not necessarily conscious of the situation of pain I am in. At best, these others are part of a situation in the same way that my car or my telephone is (though they behave differently, of course). In a world in which some find themselves in situations where their beliefs are challenged and their rights are denied while next door others find the situation pleasant and settled, the limits of the situation seem to call for a permanent plurality of situations with no clear means of connecting them. Disconnect the internal bindings in order to break down the apparent isolation of situations and it is unclear how the problem of limits can be brought back under control.

In the end, contemporary critics of Moore tend to appreciate his "bulldog" qualities even as they tend to dismiss the content of his arguments. The present volume concludes with a series of published reviews of *Pragmatism and Its Critics*. These reviews tend to follow the formula of praise for Moore's tenacious defense of the "movement" and in most cases a critical response based on one of the standard critiques of pragmatism against which Moore argues directly or indirectly in the volume at hand. One critic, Charles Vibbert, writing in the *Journal of Philosophy*, identifies Moore's discussion of situations as central but then concludes that the view "reinstates at the very outset of the discussion the very group of distinctions which pragmatism has eliminated as inadequate." (124). Thought "arises and operates in total situations" but operates in an individual mind "inside the situation." "And the situation, it need hardly be added, is out and out objective, the very

[39] See *LW* 14: 30–31. Dewey concludes his reply by dismissing Russell's concern. "Any one who refuses to go outside the universe of discourse—as Mr. Russell apparently does—has of course shut himself off from understanding what a 'situation,' as directly experienced subject-matter, is" (*LW* 14: 31). A few paragraphs later Dewey returns to the issue and replies again saying that he has already denied accepting anything like a Bradleyian idealism (*LW* 14: 33).

type of independent world" the pragmatists reject. So situations adopt a distinction between a knower and the situation known. Such a reading overlooks nearly everything Moore says about the way that knowers are necessarily within situations, ruling out the claim that Moore's view brings us back to dualism. In short, Vibbert grasps the terms of Moore's argument but fails to understand them in their reconstructed context. If the review demonstrates nothing else, it demonstrates that Moore is offering not a new treatment of objectivity, truth, or consciousness, but rather is offering an alternative way of thinking in which the old terms of the "cardinal tradition" must be reconstructed. This recalls the *Nation* review that concludes "In fact, after finishing the last seven chapters of Mr. Moore's book, the reader will probably concede that all but the pragmatists have misunderstood Pragmatism, and that nearly all the criticisms of it rest ultimately on misunderstanding. And he will probably close the book with the wonder why all non-pragmatists are so dense…"[40] But such is the challenge of Moore's demand for a reconstruction of how we think about the world.

In another review, Mary Whiton Calkins, a student of Royce and professor at Wellesley College, offers a somewhat different assessment of Moore's work from the perspective of a "personalistic absolutist." Calkins argues in general that Moore has not provided an accurate treatment of the variety of absolutisms under discussion. She observes, for example, that Moore identifies all ideas with a form of Platonic intellectualism that leads, on the one hand, to a "copy-theory" of knowledge where ideas can only "point beyond" to some independent reality and, on the other, to the claim that absolutism is purely cognitive. To the first, Calkins replies that such an interpretation is mistaken for some absolutists and that Royce, for example, argues just the opposite, that knowing is not a matter of copying but is rather "direct and not mediate—a sharing, not an imitation or copy." (143). She dismisses the second in the light of her reply to the first, since Moore, she thinks, is simply identifying all absolutism with intellectualism. The real distinction between pragmatism and absolutism, according to Moore, is that the absolutist "holds that there exists eternal and immutable reality; [while] the pragmatist holds that reality is purely in the making." (142) Calkins argues that the force of the absolutist claim is that "Unquestionably the absolutist believes that there exists reality other than that of the purely human experience—even other than of the aggregate of human experiences." Such other experience, she grants is "more than temporal" but it "is *also* temporal." (143) This form of absolutism is not the sort that Moore condemns and in fact, while pragmatism may make a case for itself, "this

[40] *Nation*, p. 14 [p. 123].

personalistic form of absolutism challenges the pragmatist's claim to exclusive rights in the conceptions of change and of progress." (143)

In the end, Calkins's review seems to affirm the same concern raised by Dewey years earlier when he wrote to Moore: "I have never known a myth grow so rapidly as that of 'pragmatism.' …. But I would object root and branch to the term 'pragmatism' (except in its original and limited sense) & would take objection to your article in so far as it seems to admit the label."[41] By focusing so much on the defense of pragmatism, it sometimes appears that Moore misses opportunities to benefit from the insights of other approaches to the same questions. While Moore seeks to ground situations in the social framework of habit and human society, for example, he does not consider philosophers such as Royce and Calkins who attempt to find both a social context and a broader ground for the situations in which human thought goes on. Moore's critique of absolutism illustrates the point in his conclusion "that there is no connection between the absolutist's general definition of truth and error and the standard actually employed in testing any particular judgment."[42] Calkins responds: "[the absolutist] claims that this conception [of truth and error], empty as it is in its bearing on the special case, has a unique value as an essential factor of the general view of the universe as more-than-human reality." (144) It is possible that absolutism had something to contribute to the discussion, if only to argue that the three phases of pragmatism may lead beyond pragmatism itself. In *Experience and Education* (1938) Dewey summarized his concerns about the sort of narrowness Calkins identifies in Moore's work: "For in spite of itself any movement that thinks and acts in terms of an 'ism becomes so involved in reaction against other 'isms that it is unwittingly controlled by them. For it then forms its principles by reaction against them instead of by a comprehensive constructive survey of actual needs, problems, and possibilities."[43]

Despite its limits, however, Moore's work provides the reader with a valuable starting point for understanding the philosophy of pragmatism as it developed in the early twentieth century. At the same time, Moore's work also provides a starting point for new investigations of pragmatism as a kind of pluralism that in the end may be expanded through its engagement with still other ways of understanding the world and human experience.

Scott L. Pratt, 2003
University of Oregon

[41] John Dewey to Addison W. Moore, 2 January 1905, *CJD*, #01827.

[42] *PC*, p. 59.

[43] *LW* 13: 4.

PRAGMATISM AND ITS CRITICS

To

JOHN DEWEY

Teacher and Friend

PREFACE

The "proximate cause," as the Schoolmen would say, of the appearance of this little volume was a short course of semi-popular lectures on "The Origin and Meaning of Pragmatism," delivered at the University of Chicago in the series of "Open Lectures" of the Summer Quarter of 1908.

When, at the close of the course, the publication of the lectures was suggested, I hesitated, recognizing, as I still do, that the time had come in the development of the pragmatic movement for systematic and detailed applications of pragmatic conceptions and methods to specific problems, rather than further discussion of general principles. But as the general discussion went on with unabated fervor, much of it appeared to neglect some phases of the movement which the lectures and some published papers had especially emphasized. These phases were: (1) the historical background of the movement (this especially in the lectures); (2) the central role of the conception of evolution in the development of pragmatism; (3) the social, or, perhaps better, the "situational" character of consciousness and a fortiori of thinking. The neglect of the last point seemed especially vital. In view of this I persuaded myself that the emphasis of these features by the lectures and papers gave them relevance and unity enough to justify their publication together.

The material of the lecture course is contained in the first five chapters. If any who heard the lectures should chance to see this volume, they will have difficulty in recognizing some parts of the course. The revision consists largely in the introduction of some technical considerations, omitted from the spoken lectures. This is especially the case in the fifth chapter on "How Ideas 'Work,'" which is almost entirely new.

The historical treatment does not attempt, as some may expect, an enumeration and appraisement of personal contributions to the movement, but confines itself to an account of the connections of certain ideas.

My obligations are indeed "too numerous to mention." Not the least of these is to writers, especially Bradley and Royce, with whose teachings the doctrines of this volume are often in conflict. No one, of course, in these days or in days to come, could write on pragmatism without confessing the influence of William James. But my greatest debt in the way of content and standpoint is to Professor Dewey, to whom these unworthy pages are inscribed. For indulgent patience in reading and listening to

many of the papers, and for subsequent valuable suggestions, I am indebted to my wife and to my colleagues, Professor J. H. Tufts, Professor G. H. Mead, and Professor J. R. Angell.

For permission to use material already published, I wish to thank the editors of the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods,* the *Philosophical Review,* and the *Psychological Bulletin.*

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I
THE ISSUE

A few years ago "pragmatism" was a technical term known to a small circle of metaphysicians and makers of philosophical dictionaries. Now, it is a sweet morsel in the mouth of the undergraduate, a favorite theme of "culture" clubs and "advanced" pulpits, and a "feature" of the Sunday paper and the popular magazine. Hunting for new species of pragmatism is now a favorite diversion of some philosophers. Not long since Professor Lovejoy announced that he had discovered thirteen varieties, but as some pragmatists deny belonging to any of these, it seems certain that there are more.

If we begin with appreciative general statements, doubtless many of us will first think of the subtitle of Professor James's brilliant lectures on "pragmatism." The entire caption is: *Pragmatism – a New Name for an Old Way of Thinking*.

At once someone will ask: "Can it be possible that the only or the fundamental issue at stake in Professor James's book is merely that of *a new name* for an old way of thinking?" It may be that much philosophic discussion, possibly more than other sorts, turns out to be about names. Still, a philosopher could hardly be expected to confess that his subject has come to a pass where the question whose discussion has filled most of the space in philosophical periodicals for the past ten years is merely that of a *name*. And we do not read far before we discover that Professor James means that while pragmatism is "an old way of thinking" in science and practical life it has not been the conscious and avowed method in philosophy, and that the present pragmatic movement is precisely an attempt to bring this "old way of thinking" in science and practical social life into philosophy, and to this extent, therefore, is a new way of thinking – in philosophy.

Many critics have been quick to concede that pragmatism is an "old way of thinking" – so old, indeed, they say, that it is a pathetic exploitation of a truism. But the pragmatist rejoins that all the critics' instances of the antiquity and ubiquity of the pragmatic method are taken precisely from the history of science and of industrial and social life, not from the history of philosophy, and are therefore beside the mark. In the development of science and of concrete practical life pragmatism is an old

and universal way of thinking; as a *conscious and acknowledged method in philosophy* it is neither so "old" nor so "universal."

The term "pragmatism" raises lively anticipations of a doctrine in which the conception of *conduct* would be central. Obviously it belongs to the same word-family as our "practice" and the Greek *praxis*. Philologically a pragmatist might be expected to agree with Matthew Arnold that life is three-fourths conduct, and perhaps to add that the remaining fourth is very like the other three. Etymologically "pragmatism" might well mean "practicism."

The terms "conduct," "practice," "action," etc., have indeed become pragmatic shibboleths – so much so that many suppose pragmatism to be the prescribed philosophy of "the strenuous life." The pragmatist's motto is, often, taken to be, "Keep going, no matter where, so you are going; and the faster the better." But a little acquaintance with the beginnings of the pragmatic movement would show both the origin and the fallacy of this notion. The present pragmatic movement began in a discussion of the nature and function of *thinking* in "experience" – or, if we prefer the more cosmic term, in the "world." In that discussion, the pragmatist's thesis was and is, not that *experience* is nothing but conduct; but that all *thinking* – that is, reflective, deliberative thinking – is a mode or a stage of conduct. And by "conduct" the pragmatist means action which is seeking to maintain and develop that which is satisfying or "valuable," or to get rid of that which is dissatisfying and worthless.

Now, in these experiences of "worth" and "value" the pragmatist obviously recognizes a phase of experience that we do not include under the term "conduct." It would seem quite possible, therefore, to be a pragmatist without believing that life is nothing but "conduct." So far, indeed, a pragmatist might well go on and insist that conduct is merely secondary, existing only for the sake of maintaining or getting rid of these experiences of value, and that pragmatism is a philosophy in which "value" rather than "practice" is the fundamental category.

However, any such sharp separation of "conduct" from, or its subordination to, "value" soon encounters a difficulty in the fact that what we immediately value depends much upon the conduct involved in getting it or in getting rid of it. We are prone to value highly that which costs much to attain or avoid. On the other hand, "the game must be worth the candle." Moreover, we have all experienced the fact that in the process of maintaining or getting rid of or altering values *new* values emerge. So in the end, it seems, we must say that conduct is not merely instrumental *to*, but *creative* or re-creative of, values. At all events, the belief that thinking is a mode or stage of conduct does not warrant us in calling pragmatism "mere practicism."

Coming back to the original issue between pragmatism and its critics,

namely, whether thinking is a part of conduct, the critic is waiting to say: "Granting that the above definition of conduct is the common-sense one, yet is it either common, or sense, to make thinking a part of conduct? Do we not everywhere insist on the distinction between knowing and doing, between theory and practice? Moreover, do not knowledge and truth belong among those direct immediate 'values' which we have said it is the business of conduct to maintain and develop? Is there not a special instinct for knowledge as much as there is for food or shelter or art or friends?" In this introductory paper our purpose is to state some of the principal aspects of the issue between pragmatism and its critics, rather than to discuss them in detail. But we may observe, what we shall see more fully later,[1] that whenever this special instinct view of thought goes on to describe the specific object of the thought-instinct and the conditions under which the instinct is satisfied or dissatisfied it invariably ends, the pragmatist says, in statements which make the relation of thought to the other instincts different from that of a mere fellow-instinct. In other words, if we insist that thought is or has a value of its own we have still to state just *in what* that value consists.

Meanwhile let us note, says the pragmatist, that our common consciousness, to which the objector has appealed, is not so unambiguous on this point as he assumes. There is, to be sure, the ancient and honorable, not to say sacred tradition – ever a favorite theme of the poets and orators – of "truth for truth's sake"; of "science pure and undefiled by any contact with a base utility"; of the scientist as a high priest whose laboratory is his temple wherein he makes offerings to the goddess of Pure Truth. This is our heritage from the Greek conception of the intellect as the mark of an immortal, as the only thing that survives the wreck of our bodies, and of heaven as an eternity of cognitive bliss.

On the other hand, we quite as religiously believe that "as a man thinketh in his heart, so he is"; and "as a man is, so he does"; and "as the wish is father to the thought, so the thought is father to the deed." And though we may ask, "Who by taking thought can add a cubit to his stature?" still we find it difficult to believe that all the thinking going on throughout the world is just a panorama of photographic or algebraic representations of an eternally fixed world. We find ourselves inveterately assuming that thought is in some way an efficient and organic part of our efforts to bring things to pass. And if we cannot merely by thinking instantaneously add a cubit to our stature, yet in this Burbank-age we may well believe that by taking enough and the right kind of thought, along with the indicated practice, our ancestors might easily have added a cubit to our stature and that we may do the same for our children.

[1] See chap. 6.

And despite our conception of the scientist or philosopher as the high priest and of his laboratory as "the temple of pure truth," we find the suspicion will not down that when the priest enters his "temple" he does not leave the world of the other human instincts, needs, and interests entirely behind. First, there is the priest himself, who after all is human. "Hath not a scientist or a philosopher hands, eyes, organs, dimensions, affections, passions? Is he not fed with the same food, hurt by the same weapons? If you prick him does he not bleed? If you tickle him [enough] does he not laugh?"

Again, what are regarded even by the scientist himself as the important problems of his subject? Are not these, one and all, in the end, questions which primarily concern directly or indirectly the increase of control over the subject-matter of his science? And this would not imply that the important discovery is always the one most heavily headlined in the newspapers. It may be recognized only by the members of the "inner shrine" of fellow-workers. But what is the basis of their recognition? Is it not in the fact that the discovery either brings a new content into experience, which is felt as directly valuable and desirable, or that it points the way to new "explanations" and therefore new "control" of our desirable and undesirable experiences?

And we hold all this without believing that we are in the least invading the tradition of *wissenschaftliche Freiheit*, or that we are substituting "a philistine opportunism" for "the scientific spirit." We insist that this doctrine does not call upon the scientist to turn out every week a new flying machine or a new breakfast food. It has nothing but approval for the investigator who shuts himself up with his "biophors," his "ions" and "electrons," provided only he *finally* emerge with *some* connection established between these "idols of the den" and the problems of life and death, of growth and decay, and of social interaction.

Furthermore, it asserts that if we follow the scientist into his laboratory we shall find that this connection is not something outside but a part of the method of science itself; that "biophors," "ions," etc., have no *scientific* meaning or value, no *scientific* truth, except in their relation to an actual efficient control of these experiences. This doctrine recognizes that science should indeed be free from the pressure of *immediate* response to current wants and problems, but only in the belief that ultimately its response may be larger and more effective. It freely concedes the "impersonal" character of the scientist's work. But again, it is with the understanding that this is only an immediate impersonalism, for the sake of a larger personalism in the end. Like the impersonalism of the just judge, it takes the impersonal standpoint in order the better to serve all persons.

In the more specific and technical terms of the psychologist these

general considerations of the relation of thinking to the rest of experience involve, first, the problem of *the connection* between our thinking and our willing or purposing. We often speak as if we *first* do our thinking, *then* make our choice, or form our purpose. On the other hand, we also observe that thinking is a process of "making up our minds." And when our minds are "*fully* made up" we find our "choice" is made, and our "purpose" formed. This would indicate that we are willing, choosing, purposing, all the while we are thinking; that thinking is just the detailed process or *method* of willing and purposing; that when *all* the thinking is done on a given problem there seems to be nothing left over for a special faculty of will or choice to perform.

This is the doctrine of most present-day psychologists. To those who make a sharp separation between thinking and willing, this appears at first to be a decapitation of will. But the expounders of the doctrine reply that on the contrary it is the "capitation" of will; it is literally putting a head on what would otherwise be a miserable *torso* of instinct and impulse. It is therefore those who sharply separate thinking and willing who are the real decapitators. On the other hand, those who hold this conception of the continuity of willing and thinking insist that it is just as truly a volitionizing and vitalizing of thought. If all willing, choosing, is thoughtful impulse, it is equally true that it is impulseful thought.

But even if we agree that all willing and purposing has thought as its *modus operandi*, does it follow that *all* thinking must be purposive? May not our thinking have two functions: one, as the method of purposing – its "practical" function; the other as merely the expression of the specific and independent instinct to know – its intellectual function?

In the period immediately preceding the present pragmatic movement this duplex conception of thinking was expounded by both idealists and realists. The challenge of this conception marks the beginnings of the pragmatic movement. Some pragmatists confess that their dissatisfaction with this account began in a predilection for continuity, engendered in biological and sociological studies, where they found that pronounced differences of function – differentiations of labor – develop in some kind of organic relations with one another. And when they turned to this question of the function of thought, they found that their general bias in favor of continuity was supported by a number of observations: (1) When all suggestions of conduct are removed from even our most general ideas, such, e.g., as justice, essence, matter, liberty, etc., there is left only an empty verbal husk, often full of sound and fury, but signifying nothing. (2) Even those who hold the duplex view admit a one-sided dependence; they insist that the value of an idea for conduct depends upon its *first* being true "in itself." Value thus depends on truth, but truth confesses no dependence upon value. But, (3), when they began to inquire, *in what* this

independent truth consists, and how it may be tested and distinguished from error, the pragmatist says that he found the trail of the answer to these questions leading straight back to the purposive, volitional character of the idea. (4) If we strip an idea of all its volitional, purposive character, it is difficult to see what we can mean by its truth or falsity. Imagine a "cosmic" stroke of paralysis that should reduce our activity to a mere stream of images; on what possible basis could we call some of these images "true" and others "false"? And if we reply: But ideas are not *mere* images, the pragmatist answers: Precisely so; then what else are they?

But here we can only state, not discuss in detail, these issues between pragmatists and nonpragmatists. Suffice it to say, therefore, that concerning the place and function of thinking in experience (or in the world) the pragmatist became convinced that not only do all will and purpose involve ideas, but that all ideas are volitional and purposive, and therefore ideas cannot be "true" or "false" entirely independent of their purposive and volitional character.

If at this point we should be tempted to identify pragmatism with what is often called "Kantian (or post-Kantian) voluntarism," many pragmatists would at once protest. They would insist that most historic voluntarism, despite its name, is still non-pragmatic in its conception of the nature and function of thinking; that it believes that thought in its own independent character and right makes demands and sets up "ideals" which in the same breath it admits cannot be realized. Thus, following Kant's account, thought demands that science should discover elements that are absolutely "simple" and "ultimate"; that we should be able to reach a completed explanation of everything; that is, an explanation that would have no assumptions, no unanalyzed "elements" in it. Finding these demands or "ideals" of knowledge unrealizable, we turn for relief from this intellectualistic *impasse* to "conduct." And this "turn," the pragmatist would say, is indeed in the right direction. But he would also observe, and would insist upon its importance, that there should be a return to, and a reconstruction of, logic and metaphysics so as to bring them into line with the conception of thought as inside and not alongside conduct, and with the method by which science, in spite of an intellectualistic psychology and logic, makes its actual advances. But this, voluntarism has thus far failed to do. The result is that voluntarism is voluntaristic in aspiration only. In its psychological and logical theory it is still intellectualistic. It regards thought as that special and unfortunate part of our experience whose powers are unequal to its demands. Most voluntarism is thus a defeated and impotent but still unregenerate intellectualism.

It is just this logical regeneration of voluntarism that the pragmatic movement is seeking to bring about. How it proposes to do this we shall

see in some measure farther on. It is enough here to make this general distinction in view of the frequent statement that pragmatism is only another edition of historic voluntarism. If it be allowed indeed that it is a *revised* edition with sufficient emphasis on "revised," doubtless most pragmatists would accept it. Pragmatists are not averse, some critics to the contrary, to acknowledging their historical connections. Indeed, they profess to trace the roots of their family tree much farther back than Kant.

And this suggests that in current discussion we frequently see both pragmatists and idealists setting pragmatism and idealism in opposition to each other. But if by idealism we mean a doctrine which believes in the real power and efficiency of the ideas and ideals with which we are trying to work out our salvation, we may discover, as we proceed, good ground for thinking that pragmatists are better idealists than many who sail under that name. For we shall find that some who profess to be "soldiers of the ideal" and "defenders of the faith" harbor grave doubts of the competency of our ideas to lead us to truth and goodness. The more we think over it the stranger it grows that a philosophy which teaches the impotence and untrustworthiness of our ideas should call itself "idealism," while those who fervently believe in the real efficacy of ideas, even of "our" ideas, should be accused of undermining "the inspirational power" of idealism. True, pragmatic idealism is a militant idealism. It does not find its inspiration in ideas and ideals handed down from some other sphere, either metaphysical or social, in whose construction it has had no part. The ideas and ideals to which it pins its faith, and from which it draws its "inspiration" are those which are wrought out and tried out in our world of struggle, of defeats and victories. They are

> As iron, dug out from central gloom
> And heated hot with burning fears
> And clipped in baths of hissing tears,
> And battered with the shocks of doom.

Meanwhile, so long as the beginnings of the pragmatic movement were confined simply to a "psychological" discussion of the connection between thinking and willing, it attracted little attention. It is interesting to note in passing what unlimited license the psychologist holds. Under the aegis of psychology one apparently may preach any sort of doctrine on any subject without being taken very seriously. So long as pragmatism was in its "psychological" stage and contented itself with observing that all ideas are purposive, we merely exclaimed, "How interesting!" But when some adventurous souls began to carry the implications of this psychology over into logic and ethics, into metaphysics and theology, and to point out the discrepancies between it and the current conception of

truth and error, of right and wrong, and of God, the plot began to thicken; alarums were sounded; signals were hoisted; cobwebbed armor and weapons were seized, and the most active campaign in philosophy since Kant was on.

Here the pragmatist asks us to observe that no better general confirmation of his conception of thinking as an organic part of conduct could be asked than is found in the basis of the opposition to it when its implications for logic, metaphysics, ethics, and religion are developed. As psychology it is just an interesting subject for a lecture or a laboratory demonstration. As a view of truth, of good and evil, and of religion, it lays hold at once of the whole structure and content of life. If thinking is inside and part of conduct, what then becomes of truth as "our contact with" an "eternal" and "immutable" world of reality? Where, indeed, in this view is there any place for such a world? And if there be no such world, how can there be any truth or falsity? And how may we talk of moral progress or regress unless there be an absolutely fixed goal or order toward which, or away from which, we are moving? And if God be not "the same yesterday, today and forever," what is to become of religion? And if our faith in the foundation (the conception of an immutable world) of these distinctions between truth and falsity, right and wrong, moral progress and regress, religion and irreligion be thus undermined, how shall we maintain faith in one another, and without faith in one another, what is left of life?

How social, ethical, and religious interests became bound up with the conception of the world as completed and changeless will be considered in our next discussion. Meanwhile, it is the pragmatist's contention that it is precisely this conception of a finished and immutable world that has led to the divorce of the theoretical and practical functions of thinking, which in turn is responsible for the obscuration of the distinctions between truth and error, right and wrong, and that he is trying to save these distinctions by restoring thought to its place in "conduct," that is, in a process of self-supporting and self-propelling activity.

Briefly summed, the important aspects of the issue between pragmatism and its critics are:

1. Psychologically, is thinking the expression of a separate and independent "side," "aspect," or "instinct" of our nature – co-ordinate with other instincts, as those of food, sex, etc. – whose satisfaction consists in setting up algebraic, psychical symbols of an immutable world, or is it just the process of the interaction and consequent development of our instincts and appreciations?

2. Logically, is an idea a mere psychical x for a world which remains unaffected by our algebra, or is an idea a perfectly organic part of the process of real change of a developing world?

3. Ethically, does moral conduct consist in merely executing, "carrying out," eternally given ideals and plans, or does it demand a conscious participation in the *creation* of these ideals?

4. Politically, if moral responsibility demands conscious participation in the *creation* as well as in the execution of the community ideal and program,[2] must not the social organization be essentially (whatever its name) that of a social democracy as against all forms of hierarchism?

5. Metaphysically, the issue is whether movement, change, evolution are "real" or only "apparent" characters of the world.

6. Theologically, (5) would read: Does the concept "God" mean an eternally completed, all-inclusive, unmoved, and immovable sum or unity of being, or does it mean active, working being engaged in real struggles with real problems?

[2] For expansion and applications of this principle, cf. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, Part III.

II
THE RISE OF ABSOLUTISM

As we turn the rapidly multiplying pages of pragmatic literature we may notice that the terms "absolutism" and "intellectualism" occur about as frequently as "pragmatism." And if the writer happens to be a pragmatist, these are likely to be terms of "invidious comparison." The pragmatist appears to be constantly defining his own doctrines by contrasting them with what he calls "intellectualism" and "absolutism." The historical significance of this is that pragmatism has in fact developed out of continued attempts to escape a number of difficulties into which it believes absolutism and intellectualism have always fallen. To get at the historical roots of pragmatism we should, then, understand something of what the pragmatist means by these terms.

Let us recall that the philosophic development of which we are the direct heirs began among the Greeks in an attempt to reduce the world of "things" to a common stuff, "a common denominator." One sought it in water, another in air, another in fire, another in the "infinite." For reasons which will appear more clearly as we proceed, the pragmatic historian of philosophy says it is important to note that these first "philosophers" were also the first physicists, the first chemists, the first biologists, and the first sociologists. He also suggests that no better illustration of the difference between intellectualism and pragmatism can be found than in the interpretations of this attempt to find a common denominator of things. The intellectualistic historian says that the effort was due simply to the "large and free intellectual speculative interest of the Greek mind, to its great passion for unification which the existing and pre-existing theology or mythology did not satisfy." And here the intellectualistic account is prone to stop. But if the pragmatic historian insists on asking: "Why this search for unity?" the intellectualist is ready to reply that it is just the nature of an intellectual being to find a common ground, a common denominator for things; that an intellect simply cannot "sleep o' nights" until this is done. "But if that be all," says the pragmatist, "why is not one common denominator as good as another? If it is a matter of just *thinking* things into a unity, what difference does it make whether the unifying conception be fire, air, water, the "infinite"? And why were not the Greeks satisfied, as is the Oriental, with just the abstract conception of unity?" If the rejoinder be that our intellect is just so constituted that

it cannot be satisfied with a mere carry-all kind of unity but wants to see things connected with one another as well, the pragmatist will then ask: But just what does this mean? If connection with one another does not mean merely being together in a common bag or bin of being, what is it to mean? Doubtless the reply will be that it is a connection in which the being of one thing depends upon and in turn conditions that of another or others. And why, continues the intellectualist, may not the intellect as such simply demand all this? And if we next ask how the intellect can be sure when it has reached this sort of connection between things, doubtless we shall be told in the language of science: When our conception of this connection is such that it enables us to reproduce or anticipate the reproduction of things or of changes in things.

But now observe, says the pragmatist, that by a most interesting coincidence this statement of what the intellect, as such, demands, is a statement of just what is involved in the control of experience. And here the difference between the intellectualist and the pragmatist emerges. The intellectualist insists that this agreement between intellectual demands and the conditions of control of experience is either a happy coincidence or a "pre-established harmony" between the demands of the intellect and our "practical" interests, and that the intellect makes its demands independent of the control-interest. But the pragmatist cannot get over the feeling that this is something more than a mere coincidence or a *pre*-established harmony. He is haunted by the notion that there must be an organic connection between the intellectual and the "practical" interest; that *the significance, the value, and the test of each is found in its relation to the other*; that the Greeks found the concepts of air, water, etc., more *intellectually* satisfying because they promised – however much they may have failed for the Greeks in the fulfilment of that promise – more control over the changes of things than the whims of the denizens of Olympus.

Returning to our historical sketch, let us recall that in this search for a common denominator the Ionians were not very successful. The investigation ended with a number of rival conceptions. And the atomists, who followed, succeeded only in adding another "opinion," because, as even the non-pragmatic historians confess, scientific technique was not sufficiently developed *to put their conceptions to the test of control*. In short, the unity these conceptions expressed was too purely, too successfully intellectual. It was a "speculative" unity. As a formula for a purely intellectual unity why is not water or fire as good as the "infinite"?

Meanwhile, in their rapidly increasing interaction with one another and with foreign tribes the Greeks came into contact and conflict with a variety of political, commercial, and religious customs and standards, so that the demand for "a common denominator" in social and ethical affairs was even more pressing than in the physical world. But the

outcome of the search for it was much the same – a mass of rival and conflicting conceptions with no conscious method of testing them.

But while this first search for a common *Stoff* of things and a common social standard failed in its own object, it had another outcome, the historical importance of which can scarcely be overstated. As the differences between these rival conceptions grew they soon became so great that they drew attention from the original problem and centered it upon the fact of the lack of agreement itself. "How does it happen," they said, "that we Greeks, the most intelligent people on earth, living here in what purports to be a common world, should have such differing and conflicting ideas of it? What is the source of this difference, and how can we determine which of these ideas or 'opinions' are true and good? Clearly, these are questions that should be discussed before continuing farther the hunt for the ultimate elements of matter, politics, art, or religion. Before further search in these directions we would better examine the search-light."

In this wise does philosophy at last get a problem and a standing of its own. Up to this time the problems of philosophy have not been set apart from those of physics and social science. But in this general problem of knowledge, in the demand for a standard for the distinction between truth and falsity, it acquires a realm of its own, independent, it believes, of the problems of physical science, politics, art, and religion. The process of knowing *an sich*, not the knowledge of earth, fire, air, water, etc., now marks the special field of philosophy.

We hear much of over-specialization in present-day investigation. But there are some who think that here at the beginning of philosophy this isolation of the problem of knowledge from the concrete problems of science and social life is one of the most far-reaching cases of over-specialization in the history of thought, and subsequently the source of innumerable philosophic woes. At any rate, we may observe what immediately follows. Thinking is now to be regarded as a special process co-ordinate with other processes, as those of fire, air, water, etc. As such a special process, it must have a *locus*, it must be a function of some specific and assignable machinery. This seemed obviously to be our individual bodies or souls; logically it does not much matter which, as the Greek soul was but a more ethereal body. Now, as soon as consciousness and thought are thus regarded as a function of the individual body or soul, the differences and disagreements of opinions formerly so puzzling at once seem explained. They are just what should be expected. So obvious did this seem, once it was stated, that with a sudden but epoch-making shift the problem falls on the other side and the question now becomes: "How can there be any *agreement?* How can ideas as functions of different bodies or souls possibly agree except by coincidence? Is it not

clear that there can be no common truth or error, no common right and wrong? Each individual can have only his own truth and error, his own good and bad. The individual is the measure of all things."

Here perhaps is the place to note the remarkable fact that not only were the Greeks unable to meet this individualistic psychology of the sophists directly, but that it stood unrefuted on its own psychological ground for twenty-three hundred years. For it is only within our own generation that we have begun to treat the consciousness of each one of us as a function, not merely of our individual bodies or "souls," but of the entire community life in which it has its existence.

But if no one was able to meet the sophists' psychology on its own ground, it did not follow that the social and ethical implications of that psychology were accepted. As Socrates pointed out, the sophists' psychology applied to society was a polite invitation to general suicide. But society was in no suicidal mood, even if at times it was a little discouraged. It did not propose to shut up shop and go out of business at the point of a psychological theory. If it could not refute the sophists' premises, it could shrug its shoulders at the conclusions and go on about its affairs. In all of which the pragmatist finds support and comfort in his view of the organic connection between thinking and practical social life.

Socrates made no attempt to deal directly in its own terms with the individualistic psychology of the sophists. He was content to show that whenever the sophist went to the shoemaker or tried to convert anyone to his own view, his doctrine of a merely individualistic truth or good was doubly refuted: (1) He refuted it himself in assuming that the shoemaker could understand his order; (2) The shoemaker refuted it in showing him that he had understood him by filling his order. But how this social co-operation could exist with ideas generated in individual bodies or souls, Socrates did not attempt to make out. Like Kant in his treatment of moral freedom, he could show *that* agreement existed but not *how* it existed. But so long as the *how* of social interaction remained in the dark the sophist would continue to be a social menace, or at least a social irritation. While the sophist could not practice his own theory, much less hope to convert the community to it, it would still be a nonsocial and disintegrating tendency.[3]

To Plato, then, fell the task of supplying the "how" of Socrates' "that," but Plato was quite as unable as Socrates to grapple directly with the sophists' psychology. What, then, was to be done? This truly is a crisis in

[3] When we are told that the sophistic movement was due to the prostitution of philosophy to "practical" ends, we may reply: (1) that it could quite as well be said to be the result of "pure" and "free" speculation uncontrolled by social applications, and (2) that the ground of its rejection was precisely its social consequences.

the history not merely of philosophy, but of civilization. It is of course utterly idle to speculate on what would have been the course of the history of philosophy and society if Plato had been able to make a direct analysis of the individual consciousness in social terms. At all events, Plato's method of meeting the sophists' conclusion and of explaining social interaction has in essence been the dominant one ever since. And little wonder, for so long as we accept the sophists' account of consciousness and ideas, no other method is possible. This method is simply to oppose to the transient, shifting, "psychological" consciousness of the individual a "metaphysical" world of universal and immutable reality. Plato was the real inventor of metaphysics proper – that is, of "metaphysics" as opposed to "psychology." In the historic sense of the term, metaphysics might well be defined as *the essence of all attempts to maintain a world of continuity and order in the face of an individualistic theory of human consciousness.*

The system of eternal and immutable "Ideas" is then Plato's answer both to the sophist and to Socrates. The shoemaker and his customer understand each other, because, although they are different "organisms," "minds," or "souls," yet both have a "recollection" or "reminiscence" of an eternal or "celestial" shoe which each has apprehended in a previous supernal existence, and of which all "terrestrial" shoes are "imitations" or "shadows."

Just how this does anything more than transfer the problem from the terrestrial to the celestial sphere, and what, if this explains agreement and co-operation, is to account for disagreement and opposition, are questions – not to mention many others – which Plato himself raises, and which were soon to become very acute.

But all these particular difficulties grow out of the fundamental one of attempting to overcome anarchical change with absolute fixity. It is the immutability and perfection of the celestial archetypes that precipitates the fundamental issue between absolutists and pragmatists, the issue namely between those who regard the universe in the last analysis as absolutely complete and perfected, and those who regard it as still developing – the issue of a static versus an evolving universe. To be sure, Heraclitus and the Eleatics had already held a sort of country-school debate over being and becoming, discussing them in terms of physics and mathematics. But now the issue appears to Socrates and Plato with the content and fate of our entire social life bound up with it. It is no longer merely an academic question. It is literally a matter of life and death. It was in defense of social order and values that Plato – not Moses, nor Parmenides – fixed "real species" with a fixity that has held for twenty-three centuries.

We have just said "fixed *real* species." This is in view of the fact that

many "absolutists" or "perfectionists" will strongly protest this statement of the issue. They profess to be perfectly orthodox evolutionists, and easily grow eloquent over the work of Darwin. But the pragmatist observes that when we follow up the writings of the absolutist we soon discover that what he gives out with his right hand he takes back with his left; that when he declares that he is an "evolutionist" it is, as our theosophic friends would say, "in his *scientific*, not his *philosophic* personality." As a scientist he subscribes freely to the doctrine that all *terrestrial* trees, dogs, shoes, etc., undergo changes which, as we view them, we may call an evolution of species; as a philosopher he believes all these terrestrial changes are only poor "imitations" – to use Plato's term – of a system of Ideas or "species" that itself undergoes no change nor shadow of turning. For the absolutist as a *philosopher*, the "origin of species" can mean only the origin in some way of *individuals* by or within or under a species or an Idea that is eternally fixed. If it be asked whether a new species or type can originate in the universe, whether, in theological terms, God could have a new idea, he is bound to answer, "No." And it is difficult to see, says the pragmatist, how in its relation to evolution modem absolutism or perfectionism has made any logical advance upon that of the Greeks. Plato and Aristotle allowed plenty of room in the world of "imitation" and "participation" for the origin and development of individuals; nor were the difficulties in explaining the origin of such individuals under fixed species any greater then than now.

For the perfectionistic evolutionist, then, there can be no "origin of *species*." Evolution belongs to the world of "shadows" and "imitations"; or in more modern terms to the world of "appearances," not to the "real" world. In Mr. Bradley's famous phrase, "Nothing real can move."

How such an immutable world can be "purposive" – a character of which absolute idealism is often supposed to be the special guardian – is indeed a problem, as we shall see in the next discussion. The very presence of active purpose in the world is prima-facie evidence that the world is not completed. And in a genuine philosophical evolutionism the purposive element must also share in the evolution. Indeed, the actual form which the issue between evolutionists and perfectionists takes in discussion is not whether there is movement or no movement but whether development takes place throughout the universe, or whether there is some part or phase or element which remains eternally immune to change. More specifically, it is the question whether in science the species, in logic the universal, in ethics the ideal, in theology God, participate in development or whether they stand as Aristotle's unmoved mover entirely aloof from the process which they are supposed somehow to keep going.

But let us not forget the original *motif* of this fixation of the "real" world. Let us remember that it is Plato's answer to the challenge of the

sophist to show how there can be any common truth or common good as a basis for social agreement and co-operation. To be sure, this ignores the fact that disagreement and opposition are as obvious and pervasive as agreement and co-operation. On the other hand, it will have to face those who will ask what place is there for truth, goodness, and selfhood in a changeless universe. And it overlooks also possibility of there being a *via media* between absolute fixity and absolute dissolution. Greek absolutism, not to say absolutism in general, has great difficulty in using the conception of "between" and "degrees." Its thought is polarized. It tends to move only in leaps from one conception to its opposite. There is no *Haltestelle* between. It is the "either or," "all or none" way of thinking. It fails to recognize, in Professor James's phrase, "the legitimacy of the word *some*."

In Greek thought this was a symptom of the unanalyzed and therefore relatively uncontrolled condition of the newly found power of abstraction. Jowett remarks:

> The discovery of abstraction was the great source of all mental improvement in after ages. But each of this company of abstractions, if we may speak in the metaphysical language of Plato, became in turn the tyrant of the mind, the dominant idea, which would allow no other to have a share in the throne… . Nor did this lead to any difficulty or perplexity so long as the mind, lost in the contemplation of being, asked no more questions and never thought of applying the categories to mind or opinion or practical life.[4]

But having reached and accepted this conception of the absolute completeness and fixedness of the real world as the basis of our social agreement and co-operation, we have now to ask: "About what are we seeking to agree and co-operate?" It cannot be to effect any change in the "real" world, for that is impossible. The celestial Ideas are already complete and perfect. What then is left, but just to "know" this world of Ideas? For surely, assumed Plato, quite in the spirit of present realism, a thing may be "known" without suffering alteration. Thus did the cognitive function come to dominate all the others. And little wonder; for it was the one direct connection with the "real" world. It was the only function in our experience whose activity was supposed to be consistent with the completeness and perfection of that world.

Thus also began the ever-widening *psychological* breach between thought and the other activities. Thought soon becomes a "form" or "side" or "phase" of experience alongside other "forms," having its own

[4] *Introduction to Sophists*, sec. 3.

special function, namely, the cognition of the absolute world, which it exercises under its own laws.

But what now becomes of that social co-operation for the sake of which the appeal to the completed, perfected, celestial world was made? Obviously it has to be "reinterpreted" as a process of falling away from and returning to the experience of celestial contemplation. Social agreement and co-operation at bottom must now mean agreement and co-operation in regaining or losing the celestial vision. Whatever else it may *appear* to be we must remember that this "else" is *but* "appearance." Our impulses, instincts, desires, emotions, volitions, are all mere symptoms of the distortion of the celestial vision, or of attempts at its restoration.

Such is the paradoxical *finale* of Plato's doctrine. Plato begins and indeed remains a social reformer. His absolute system of Ideas was conceived precisely as a basis for our "terrestrial" social interaction. And in the *Republic* he follows this up with a marvelously wrought picture of that social life. Yet the *goal* of it all is to be an experience of eternal contemplation of the ineffableness of the immutable world.

Owing to the organization of Greek society this "reinterpretation" of social life necessary to bring it into line with Plato's absolutism and intellectualism was much easier in Plato's day than it was later. Indeed, the pragmatic historian would tell us that Plato's absolutism and intellectualism are but reflections of that social system in which thinkers formed a select and "privileged" class, standing with other "privileged" classes on the backs of slaves.

Such in brief is the historical genesis and the connection of that absolutism and intellectualism in opposition to which pragmatism has developed. We have here exhibited these conceptions in wantonly naked abstraction. And doubtless it will be difficult to find absolutists or intellectualists who will stand sponsor for them in that condition. It is indeed one of the pragmatic historian's favorite conceits, that, however numerous absolutistic and intellectualistic philosophers may be, there are few absolutistic or intellectualistic citizens. And philosophers have sometimes been good citizens. In the case of Plato, especially, we feel that his absolutism and intellectualism do not express his real spirit and intent. They are the "accidents," however tremendous in historical import, of Plato's attempt to turn the flank of the sophists' individualistic psychology by metaphysical maneuvers instead of meeting it face to face on its own ground.

III
SOME DIFFICULTIES

How long would the absolutism and intellectualism of Plato and Aristotle have survived, had Greek social life and science run a longer continuous course? Would they have struck deeper root, or would they have disappeared more rapidly? Both Plato and Aristotle were fully aware of the difficulties in their doctrines and stated them very clearly. Would social and scientific development have gone on increasing these perplexities to the point where they would have forced a radical reconstruction of the system, or would the influence of these conceptions have kept social and scientific theory within their limits? These have long been favorite, if idle, speculations of historians. At all events, in what actually did happen it would be difficult to conceive, as Professor Dewey has pointed out,[5] conditions more favorable for the continuation of Greek absolutism and intellectualism. Instead of gradually evolving through toilsome centuries his own indigenous principles of control out of his own tribal experiences, the barbarian found in the Graeco-Roman civilization a ready-to-wear system for organizing and directing his vast but relatively uncontrolled energy. Compared with his own crude formulations, the Graeco-Roman system, especially as edited by the church, seemed to him complete and absolute. And by the same token it seemed no less so to the system itself. In proportion as the pupil became docile the system grew dogmatic. Nevertheless the difficulties which Aristotle and Plato had themselves clearly seen and stated had to be constantly faced by the teachers of the system throughout the whole of the "dark" and "mediaeval" periods. And as fast as the pupils mastered the system they too fell heir to these problems. And as the greater diversity of content and conflicts of the modern period developed, these difficulties became constantly harder to manage.

Turning now to some of these perplexities which finally issued in the pragmatic movement: we find, first, and in general, that the burden of the necessity for constantly "interpreting" the whole process and content of life as just a departure from and return to an experience of "celestial contemplation" became more and more intolerable. Even the marvelous

[5] *The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge.*

institutionizing of Plato's doctrines by the church could not prevent the "interpretation" of the problems and projects of social life as due to the loss or attempts to regain the celestial vision from becoming more and more unreal and artificial. It disfranchised too much of life. Ideals, visions, to be sure, we must have. But people came more and more to feel that we cannot live by visions alone any more than by bread alone. The belief grew that these visions should be experiences which point or lead the way to other experiences which should *fulfil* them; not that the visions may not be of as great worth as the fulfilling experience, but, as Kant saw later (though he could not fully apply it), people began vaguely to feel that *the value of each depends largely upon its relation to the other.*

In psychological terms, the difficulty was that the steps in the passage from these visions to the life of impulse and feeling which they were expected to direct could not be made out. The method by which ideals control experience remained hidden. But for *thinking* beings the continued efficacy of a controlling conception depends upon the recognition of its method. Hence life had to be reduced to a process with which these celestial visions could be connected – a process, namely, of simply identifying objects as "imitations" or "shadows" of the eternal Ideas.

But the instincts and desires, emotions and volitions are not so easily read out of court. Even monasteries and nunneries could not get rid of them. The result was a sense of cleavage, of division, and finally of hypocrisy, which deepened and widened as new problems developed. The conception of the end and goal of experience was defeating its own aim. It took away meaning and value where it meant to bestow it. The principles which were to control and order experience swallowed the experiences they were to order.

But if we ignore this protest of the rest of experience against being reduced to cognition and suppose the reduction accomplished and accepted, are our difficulties at an end? If we accept the immutable world as the basis of our social agreement and co-operation, and if we concede that the content of this agreement and co-operation consists in "imitating" or representing in some way the eternal world, what now are we to do with our disagreements and antagonisms? If we agree and co-operate because we have all stood in the presence of the eternal archetypes, how then should we ever disagree or refuse to co-operate?

And we should note that we gain nothing over Plato by substituting for Plato's immutable archetypes the more nebulous conceptions of "absolute reality" of present-day absolutism. For the seat of the difficulty we are here facing lies in the *static* character of the reality. Whether reality consists of Platonic "Ideas," mediaeval "Essences," or Bradleyan "sentience," if it is the basis of agreement and co-operation, and if it is perfect, complete, coherent, and all-inclusive, whence then come

disagreement and antagonism? Apparently our absolutistic solution of the problem of a basis for social agreement and co-operation works too well; it proves too much. For disagreement and antagonism, alas, seem to be quite as much in evidence as agreement and co-operation.

As Plato and Aristotle both saw, this is the crucial problem for all static absolutism. In ethical and theological terms it is the ancient and perennial "problem of evil." In logic it is the problem of error. These problems form the nerve of the history of philosophy since Plato. With them the early church Fathers wrestled; about them the scholastics spun endless webs of speculation. At the beginning of the modern period they are the rock on which the doctrines of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz split. They are the motive of the movement from Locke to Hegel. And in our present-day absolutism, as represented by Bradley and Royce, they are the central issues.

Many and heroic have been the attempts to meet this problem of disagreement, error, and evil, from the standpoint of static absolutism. The church Fathers' struggle with it ended in the confession that if the ground of agreement – the ground of common truth, of common good – is perfectly complete and fixed, then error and evil must have a basis of their own, which they found in the Devil. To be sure, the Devil is a "fallen angel." But for the Fathers he was beyond redemption.

This form of solution, while retaining the element of fixity, surrenders outright the conception of absolutism. Doubtless most of us cherish a somewhat patronizing attitude toward this solution of the Fathers. Yet if we place it alongside some later accounts of how error and evil can be parts or elements of a perfect and unchangeable world, it may seem less naïve than we have hitherto regarded it.

Turning now to the later philosophical treatments of the difficulty, all, past and present, whether of the mystical or rationalistic type, agree, as we might expect, that change, error, evil, must be "de-realed," or illusionized. They must be reduced to the status of "appearances" or mere "phenomena." This is attempted in various ways. The mystic tells us that we have but to take "the standpoint of eternity," to see all change, error, and evil disappear. As we move out to sea from the wharfs of a great city, the confusion of sound, smell, and motion gradually subsides until at last the whole "booming, blooming, buzzing confusion" becomes a hushed and motionless vision. Even so must we push out on the sea of eternity to the point where time and change, error and evil disappear. Here the cynic may suggest that at about the point where we are far enough out to attain this hushed and motionless vision we usually begin to have misgivings about the absolutely immutable character of the sea itself. And if we plead a little license for our homely figure, he will say: Even so, are you not then in the plight of the ancient mariner "in a painted ship on a painted

ocean"? And how long, he adds, do you think it would be before you too would long for sight of "the rocky shore," "the kirk," "the weather-cock," and "the wood which slopes down to the sea"?

But apart from this longing, which after all might only show how deeply rooted were the seeds of earth and finitude in us, and apart from the suggestion that this taking to sea seems like running away from the problem instead of meeting it, does not this fashion of getting rid of change, error, and evil also get rid of truth and right? How can an eternal vision or contemplation be either true or false, right or wrong? Or, if the vision be plural, what can we possibly mean by calling *some* true and some false, or *some* good and some evil? How may we test these distinctions in any particular case?

But the method of the more discursive and rationalistic-minded absolutist of "de-realing" error and evil has always been and still is to "interpret" error and evil as "partial," or "incomplete" truth and goodness. As the ethical problem will be discussed later, we shall here consider the absolutist's account of error.

Probably most of us first heard of pragmatism as a doctrine of the nature of truth and error; or, if we first heard of it through some of its critics, as the doctrine that there isn't any truth or error. At any rate it is a fact that the form of the issue with which the present pragmatic movement started was that of the nature and criterion of truth and error.

Once more let us recall that the fixation of the real world took place precisely for the purpose of maintaining, not of getting rid of, this distinction. But no sooner was this conception of fixed reality born than it began, as we have seen, not only to demand the reduction of experience to contemplation and cognition, but to make knowledge nothing but an algebraic symbol – or at best a mere "imitation" or "shadow" – of the immutable reality. But what, now, do we mean when we say that sometimes our symbols or "imitations" are "true" or "adequate" and sometimes not? The absolutist's answer is interesting and perplexing. The reply is that our representations or "imitations" are true just in so far as they include and coincide with the whole of reality.[6] To be perfectly true, an idea must completely include and coincide with its object. But such inclusion and co-incidence obviously mean identity. To be completely true an idea must not merely point at, or "imitate," but must *be* the whole of reality. In so far as it is not the whole, it is false.

Behold now, says the pragmatist, in what a web we are caught. (1) It is obvious that if there were any possibility of thought being true it would all have to be concentrated in a single idea or judgment. There is no possibility of ideas (plural) being true since *an* idea obviously can be but part

[6] Cf. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 366, 549.

of the whole. (2) But even this one all-inclusive thought or idea can never be true so long as it remains truly an idea. For as an idea it must be *different* from the reality and therefore false. Thought is thus incurably tragic. It "desires to be true" but is condemned by its nature to be false. We may well wonder how it can even "desire" to be true if its very essence is such that it must be false.

Note now how the difficulty has suddenly shifted. A few moments ago, with a complete and immovable reality as the ground of truth, the problem was how to account for error. Now the difficulty is to discover any truth in sight. In making room for error, it appears, we have crowded truth out. Have we not here a real crisis? And as absolutists, how can we meet it? As good absolutists we must admit that so far no thinking can be true. But may we not avoid complete shipwreck at this point by reflecting that, while no idea can be *wholly* true, some may be more nearly true than others? When we speak of an idea or judgment as "true" and another as "false," we really mean that one is more nearly true or less false than another. This is the famous doctrine of "Degrees of Truth and Reality" which Mr. Bradley has so brilliantly expounded.

Now, there is no doubt that this conception of degrees of truth and error is good commonsense, and equally good science; but is it good absolutism? How, from the absolutist's conception of the relation between thought and reality as above sketched, is the truer of two ideas to be distinguished? The general and formal response comes very easily: The truer idea is the one which would require the least revision, the least change to make it coincide or become identical with the immutable reality. This answer is of course only a restatement of the absolutist's general conception and standard of truth. But our question asks how we can apply it in any particular case. How are we to tell which of two ideas, for example, the "corpuscular" or "wave" conception of sound and light, would require the least revision in order to coincide with the absolute reality? The case seems desperate, and doubtless calls for desperate measures. And this may account, says the pragmatist, for the bold move which the absolutist makes at this point. He calmly, as if no one in the world had ever dreamed of a changeless reality, appeals to the "facts." What facts? Why just the plain everyday facts of *history* and *science!* If we wish to know what ideas would suffer the least revision by the absolute reality, we have simply to go to history and science and observe, "as a matter of fact," what ideas and judgments have been and are being revised the least.

But, says the evolutionist, however much we may admire this *coup* for its daring, after all does it succeed? Is not history a dangerous court of appeal for absolutism? First, unfortunately for such an appeal, history does not seem to be all in. It still appears to be in the making and that

very rapidly.[7] And probably no one would care to say that there is not as much history yet to be made as has been made. Moreover, it is difficult to see how from the history that has been made we can expect much aid and comfort. The highways and byways of history are strewn with the wrecks of scientific, political, and religious theories. The most cherished conceptions of one century are the superstitions of the next. Ideas and ideals for which one generation is willing to go to the stake are patronizingly characterized by the next as of "historic value" only. Scientific propositions that have stood for centuries as axioms are constantly being "reconstructed"; this too in mathematics where, if anywhere, we should expect to find some unalterable ideas. Most of the present frontier work in mathematics is precisely on the axioms, the "foundations." And if there be ideas that so far have undergone little or no reconstruction, how in the light of the history of axioms can we assert that they never will?[8] Finally, if history did show that there were ideas which had so far undergone no revision and if we should further concede that they never would or could be changed, we must remember that from the absolutist's standpoint they could not be "true," for they must still fall short of being the whole of reality and therefore in so far must be false.

Behold once more the mockery of the situation! The absolutely immutable world was to be the ground of a common truth and a common good, yet here we are not only without any perfect truth, but unable to say which of our ideas are *more nearly* true than others. The conception which was to maintain the distinction of truth and error seems to have ended in its obliteration. We have consented to the reduction of our life to the one business of knowing the absolute reality only to find now that this is impossible; only to discover that knowing is a process whose very constitution and method are inherently opposed to its aim.

And what an anomaly this latter seems to be. Ordinarily we suppose that desire indicates the possession of some capacity, of some equipment, either capable, or capable of becoming capable, of realizing the aim. To be sure, a disappointing quantitative discrepancy between our ambitions and achievements is, alas, common enough. But we do not attempt to run without some kind of legs or fly without some kind of wings. We do not try to turn up the light to look at the dark or to escape death by committing suicide – all of which seem very much like what ideas are attempting in the absolutist's world.

As we further contemplate the confessedly hopeless opposition between

[7] Cf. Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*, chaps. 7 and 19.

[8] Developments of the present generation in mathematics would seem to justify the boy who, upon being told that a certain proposition was "axiomatic," replied: "That may be, but is it true?"

thought's ambition, and its ability, we marvel at the persistence of the tragedy. Why, after thought discovers the futility of its effort, does it not throw up the game? To be sure, the continued failure of thought serves to emphasize the absoluteness of the absolute, and perhaps as loyal absolutists we should be willing to be intellectually damned for the glory of the absolute. Indeed the older and in some respects more consistent absolutism virtually rested its case here. But at this point the modern absolutist begins a new attack on the problem by making a most important and significant concession – one which, some think, marks the first step in the abandonment of his position, and the definite beginning of the present pragmatic movement. This is the admission that, although thought may fail in its attempt to represent or become the absolute, it still is of indispensable service in constituting and maintaining our "practical" social life.

The social value of thought was precisely what Plato's absolute was invoked to defend. But we must remember also that, *Χρόνος*-like, it then turned and devoured the reality of everything in that life except contemplation and left even that, as we have seen, in a very precarious condition. When, now, we begin to speak again of the value of thought in constituting and maintaining social life, this must mean that the instinctive, impulsive, emotional, volitional elements of this life have some worth of their own and are no longer to be regarded merely as signs of the fall from cognitive grace. They must now have at least enough reality and value to account for the persistence of thought in the face of its continued failure in its primary aim of attaining the absolute.

But can we make this reinstatement of the reality of these instinctive, emotional, and volitional elements of experience, and still hold fast to the conception of a changeless reality? Doubtless this restoration makes absolutism more human and hospitable, but by even so much does it not make it less absolute? Metaphysically these "practical" elements obviously cannot be left out of the absolute. On the other hand such things as impulse, volition, emotion are very embarrassing things to put inside a static absolute. They are redolent of movement and change, and are lacking in proper respect for absolute unity and completeness.

Heroic efforts have been made to relieve this situation by overhauling and reconstructing the conception of the absolute. The most notable of these attempts are those of Mr. Bradley and Professor Royce. For Plato's absolute system of ideas Professor Bradley proposes, as a substitute, a "whole of sentience." This sounds promising; it looks like a substantial recognition of the disfranchised elements of experience. But when we find that the fundamental attributes of this "whole of sentience" are logical consistency and completeness, the substance of the recognition melts away. And this disappearance testifies again to the difficulty of divorcing

absolutism and intellectualism. It is the difficulty in retaining a conception of a changeless reality that shall not be something simply to be cognized.

Professor Royce's metaphysical revision is at once less and more radical than Mr. Bradley's. Professor Royce retains the Platonic form of a changeless "system of Ideas" for his conception of the absolute. So far it appears to be metaphysically more orthodox than Mr. Bradley's "whole of sentience." But the more radical nature of Professor Royce's revision appears in his introduction of *purpose* into the absolute. Now the difficulty of investing a changeless reality with purpose scarcely calls for elaboration. But if we say reality is not "invested with" but *is* the one all-inclusive purpose, and if it is to be nothing but purpose, we have then the anomaly of a reality which is yet purpose only. And if we try to avoid this, as Professor Royce does, by thinking of this purpose as "completely fulfilled," we seem only to repeat the paradox in reverse and aggravated form.

As we should expect, precisely the same difficulties are encountered from the logical standpoint. If thought, while failing in its attempt to reach the absolute, is yet indispensable for constituting and maintaining our social life, are we then to regard thought as having two separate and independent functions: first, and primary, to continue forever its hopeless attempt to become the absolute; second, to help constitute and maintain our social life? And shall we have then two criteria of truth – one which is "strictly logical," and which consists in the identity of thought with the changeless reality; the other consisting in the success of thought in its rôle in social life, whatever that shall be found to be? But no absolutist can tolerate such sheer and brutal dualism as this. He must therefore make the attempt to establish the connection between the work of thought in social life, and its ever-failing attempt to become one with the absolute. Prima facie, the project does not look encouraging. To make out an organic connection between the logical failure and the practical success of thought seems a big undertaking. To set out to show how theoretical failure is to bring practical success may well raise misgivings at the start. On the other hand, if thought did succeed in reaching the absolute, it would certainly be useless for purposes of social life.

To be sure we may recall here, first, that a difference in degree has been claimed for these "logical" failures of thought; and second, that thought has its *defeats* as well as its triumphs in the "practical" realm. As for the degrees of success and failure in reaching absolute truth, we have already encountered the "difficulties" in that doctrine. We have seen how impossible it is to distinguish the greater from the less degree of absolute truth without assuming that these are identical with the greater and less degree of practical, social truth. And even if we allow ourselves this assumption, which seems to beg the whole point, we still must show just what *kind* of

intrinsic connection exists between thought's attempts to become the absolute and its rôle in social life.

Here again Professor Royce is the central figure, and again as in the metaphysical problem he seeks this connection in "purpose." Professor Royce begins by contrasting the "representative," or "correspondence" character of the idea with its "purposive" nature. He says that modern psychology has discovered that the "primary" character of an idea is not that of algebraically representing or corresponding to something beyond itself (though this may be involved), but consists rather in the fact that every idea is first and fundamentally "an embodiment of purpose," "a plan of action."

> Your intelligent ideas of things never consist of mere imagery of the thing, but always involve a consciousness of how you propose to act toward the thing of which you have ideas… . Complex scientific ideas are, as Professor Stout has well said, plans of action, ways of constructing the object of your consciousness… . The primary character which makes it an idea *is not its representative character* … but is its inner character as relatively fulfilling the purpose … which is in the consciousness of the moment wherein the idea takes place.[9]

But how now does this purposive character of ideas in our finite social life make connection with the relation between ideas and the absolute world? In substance the answer is: The idea in its relation to the absolute is also a purpose; or rather in this case *has* a purpose. Both are thus connected with purpose. But after all, just how close a connection is this? First, there is certainly a considerable difference between *being* a purpose and *having* a purpose. But more important is the difference between the purpose which the idea *is* in its finite practical function and the purpose it *has* in relation to the absolute. The purpose which the idea *is* in its practical function has the character of an ideal or "plan of action." But the purpose which the idea *has* in relation to the absolute is that of algebraically corresponding to it. "It is true, this instant's idea, if in its own measure and on its own plan it corresponds even in its vagueness to its own final and completely individual expression."[10]

At the outset the purposive function of ideas is sharply contrasted with the representative function, and is expressly made their "primary" character. But now this contrast disappears. As in Greek and mediaeval absolutism, life had to be reduced to contemplation, so here the attempt

[9] *The World and the Individual*, 22–24. The italics are mine.

[10] *Ibid.*, 330.

to recognize purpose and still retain the conception of a changeless reality ends in the reduction of purpose to representation or "correspondence." An idea is or has a purpose. But that purpose is just to correspond with its eternal and immutable form in the absolute. At the beginning the primary and fundamental character of ideas is that they are acts of will; in the end this will is just the will to correspond to the absolute system. And with this we have come full circle; for we must forthwith start again at the task of distinguishing truth and error; that is, of distinguishing between correspondence and lack of correspondence, or between a greater and less degree of correspondence.

Once more the dilemma is: In order to effect a real connection of the absolute with human experience, purpose must be filled with all the rich content of human impulses, wants, and all the machinery of social organization for controlling and satisfying and developing these. But in order to preserve the changeless perfection of reality, purpose can have for its content only an algebraic correspondence with the absolute system of ideas which makes it even more vacuous than Plato's "contemplation."

IV
THE RISE OF PRAGMATISM

If the pressure of the difficulties which we have considered in the previous discussion, increasing with each generation, was the negative stimulus to the development of the pragmatic movement, there were correlative, positive forces equally powerful.

In general, the pragmatist believes that his doctrines constitute a substantial part of the advance of the whole modern period. That march he believes has been – with of course the usual amount of countermarching – in the direction of a self-supporting, self-controlling, self-propelling experience. Whether political or philosophical, scientific or religious, always and everywhere the issue has been essentially the same, namely, whether experience can stand and go upon its own legs; whether it can supply its own motor; whether it can find within itself the source and support of its values of truth and error, right and wrong.

Let us recall with what high hopes and enthusiasm this expedition of the modern spirit toward freedom and self-determination began. With a confidence as sublime as it was naïve, each of the early leaders, whether in philosophy, politics, science, or religion; whether empiricist or rationalist, materialist or idealist, believed he had discovered the entire way. But when "natural rights" became as tyrannous as "divine rights," and Luther's Bible as infallible as the pope, and when in philosophy Locke reached the frontier of Bacon and Descartes' advance, and Hume confessed that he had completely lost his way, people began to realize that the pilgrimage was to be long and difficult.

But whatever the differences between empiricist and rationalist, sensationalist and idealist, materialist and spiritualist, one common aim stands out – all alike were seeking to escape a world which is merely *given*, which we must take just as it comes. The modern spirit is bent on helping to make it come. The very essence of modern humanity is the desire and determination to have a voice and a vote in the cosmic councils. It is, again, the spirit of democracy.

Such ambition assumes, of course, that the world has, or can be given, (1) plasticity, and (2) continuity enough for the operation of will and purpose. Hence we find the rival doctrines charging each other either with too great rigidity or with discontinuity, or both; and this often in quite a paradoxical fashion. The idealist professes to find the world of the

empirical naturalist on the one hand too inexorably rigid for freedom, and on the other, too discontinuous for order and law. Nature, he complains, will not guarantee one of her so-called laws for an instant. That water now seeks its level is no guaranty that it will the next minute. The empirical naturalist can have only lively hopes of the future, but no logical confidence in it. Only in case the world is so organized that we can, through ideas or categories, "lay down laws to nature," as Kant says, have we any basis for certainty.

Very similar are the indictments which the empirical naturalist brings against the rational idealist. What boots it, he asks, to rescue the world from chance or from the clutches of an inexorable system of natural laws, if it is at once delivered over to an equally inexorable system of "ideas" or "categories"? And is not this indeed just what Kant discovers when he faces the problem of morality at the close of the *Critique of Pure Reason?* He finds that he has only substituted one rigid system for another; that instead of having laid down laws to nature, he has only translated nature's laws into other terms, but without any real reconstruction of them. There is no real gain in plasticity. The certainty of the categories is even more fatally "universal" than the tides or eclipses. As there was yet no evolution of species in the "nature" of Kant's day, so there is no evolution in the world of Kant's categories.

To be sure, starting from the apparent discontinuity of Hume's world, Kant's aim was to re-establish continuity, but it still remains that the continuity he reaches is precisely of the type of the fixed laws and species of the naturalism of his time – a type which can maintain unity only at the expense of plasticity. On the other hand, when to secure plasticity we appeal from the ridigity of the system of categories to "will," the empirical naturalist says we are again "out of the pan into the fire." We have only exchanged the caprice of nature for an even greater psychical caprice.

The next notable attempt at the problem is Hegel's. He heroically attacked the rigidity of Kant's world, and some of his ardent followers believe to this day that he succeeded in breaking it up. But there have always been too may doubters of this to leave Hegel a clear title to the claim.

But now comes one whose contribution toward the solution of this problem is unmistakable. And lo! he is not a philosopher, but a naturalist. We may debate whether Hegel really destroyed the fixity of the Platonic ideas and Kantian categories, but no one doubts that Darwin shattered the rigidity of the naturalism of his day. One wonders that there was not a general holiday in celebration of this event. Was not this what the whole modern world – empiricist and rationalist, naturalist and spiritualist – had been struggling toward? If it should be true that not only biological

species, but all species – chemical, physical, geological, astronomical, mathematical, political, and religious – are mutable, and therefore amenable to manipulation and control, what possibilities loom! But no holiday was declared. On the contrary, Darwin's doctrine, as we know, met a very cool reception. And a second thought shows the reason. First, mere "mutability of species" as a general conception was not new, and it was not known in just what respect Darwin's view differed from what had preceded. Moreover, what was wanted was not "mere mutability," but a mutability that was connected with, and responsive to, will and purpose. And people were not sure that Darwin's mutability was of this sort. And this is not strange, since Darwin himself was uncertain. Indeed, Darwin's conception of natural selection of accidental variations seemed to point the other way. It looked, as absolutists said, as if Darwin's mutability might be just another exchange of uncontrollably fixed species for equally uncontrollable change. But Darwin, as all great explorers, went farther than he knew.

At this point the pragmatic movement claims to make its connection with, and its contribution to, the conception of evolution. Up to this time the problem of the connection of the mutability of species with purpose or design was always made the question of whether all possible changes were already included in one all-embracing purpose. But here the pragmatists, or those who were to become pragmatists, observed that, if all possible changes were already purposed, our experience is again just as given and uncontrolled as in the system of natural selection of accidental variations. That is, an all-inclusive purpose is logically the same as caprice so far as the problem of human self-control is concerned.

But, waiving this, does not the conception of the mutability of species at any rate make an opening for purposive, ideational control as a type of change? Whether or not *all* changes are already purposed, does not the simple recognition of the variation of types open the way for any type of variation that may be efficient, and therefore possibly of the ideational, purposive type of variation? That is, must not variation in species admit variation in species of variation as well? The admission of variation of types, with the limitation of the type of variation to merely "natural," that is, non-purposive selection, seems dogmatic, to say nothing of the facts. Variation in species implies at least the possibility of a purposive species of variation.

Meanwhile, the technique of the actual operation of such teleological variation was gradually being worked out in different directions: (1) logically, in the recognition of the control value of the working hypothesis in science; (2) psychologically, in the detailed analysis (*a*) of the volitional, purposive character of ideas, (*b*) of their social character.

The working hypothesis, as employed in modern science, marks the

appearance of the conception of evolution in logic. As it is the logical expression of mutation of species, so, on the other hand, it marks the appearance of ideas in the process of evolution. As it is an evolutionizing of logic, of science, so it is a logicizing of evolution. The working hypothesis is the recognition of the efficiency of "final" causes – the rather does it abolish the metaphysical character of the distinction between "efficient" and "final" causes. It means that an idea is itself a *real variation,* not merely a record or algebraic symbol *of* a "spontaneous" variation. It is a variation whose value consists precisely in the control it introduces into the "spontaneous" or non-purposive variations. The working hypothesis means, in short, that thought is an actual manipulation of our "spontaneous" experiences, e.g., of motion, light, sound, our pains and joys, our loves and hates, in which these are brought to bear upon one another in such wise as to lead to the control of these spontaneous variations, and to the introduction of new variations. Consider, for instance, the enormous consequences of *thinking of* – of getting an *idea* of – motion as gravitation; of physical things as made up of atoms or electrons or ions; of light as propagated through the ether.

But this conception of ideas as "real variations" was being worked out more fully in fresh psychological investigations of the volitional or purposive character of ideas. It was the results of these investigations, together with the development of the conception of the working hypothesis, that finally forced the hands of the absolutistic logic and metaphysic.[11] The difference between the idea of the psychologist and scientist, and the idea of current logic and metaphysics, became so glaring that it was fast becoming a "scandal." We have seen how absolutism attempted to hush it by recognizing the purposive character of thinking. But we have also seen that this recognition was little more than a social amenity, since it reduced purpose to mere representation – the very conception which the purposive character of ideas was supposed to replace.

In these investigations the issue was, once more, whether thinking is only a process of forming symbols of things, or whether it is a process in which things pass into new interactions, and therefore new mutual modifications of one another. If we hear a sound or have an ache and form an idea of it or about it, is the idea nothing but a mental *x* or *y,* a psychical John Doe for the ache, or is it an act through which the ache or sound comes into connection with something else? If the idea of the ache is that it is a "tooth-ache," this, surely, is something more than a mere algebraic symbol for the ache. Obviously it connects the ache with a tooth

[11] On "The Relations of Psychology to Philosophy," see Angell's monograph, *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, Vol. III.

and the tooth with the ache. The ache is thus idealized, not by setting up some sort of an algebraic, psychical symbol for it, but by connecting it with something else. If we say, "Yes, but still are we not, after all, just finding out what the pain is?" we must still insist that it is significant that we take this view of what it "is" – that we should make the is-ness consist *in part* in its connections with other things.

This conception of ideation as consisting in a connection of things, in its general form, is not new. It has been a cardinal tradition of idealism since Kant, especially since Hegel. Hegel's constant appeal to the process of "othering" has its counterpart in English philosophy in T. H. Green's apotheosis of "relations." This, I take it, is the essential contribution of Hegelianism to logic – the insistence that an idea is not a mere algebraic symbol, but that it is an *act* in which things pass into new interaction. And no one is likely to overstate the importance of this insistence. But in the form in which Hegel leaves it, there are serious difficulties. If having the idea of a thing means referring it to something else, what is this something else to be? Does it mean to anything else whatever, or everything else, or to a certain thing, or things else? And if the latter, what determines these certain things? As soon as we put these questions to the Hegelian logic, its fundamental difficulty appears, viz., *the lack of any principle to limit and to control the "othering."* There is nothing to determine whether the ideaizing of the ache shall connect it with one thing rather than another. So far as Hegel's general principle goes, anything would do – the moon quite as well as a tooth.

And obviously, with nothing to set any limits to, or to determine the direction of, this "otheration," there is no basis for distinguishing between a true and a false "othering." If knowing is just referring anything to *some* "other," then any "other" is as true or as false as any other "other."

Recognizing the absurdity of this, but with no method or principle of selection and limitation, the Hegelian logic, in spite of its vehement emphasis of the importance of "limit" and "concreteness," is forced finally to maintain that a true idea of a thing must consist in connecting it with *everything* else. Once start to define your ache and as a logician you dare not stop short of the universe, even if, as a suffering mortal, you do stop at the dentist's.

To be sure, Hegel, perhaps even more frequently than many of his followers, insists upon the thing and "*its* other," and upon the necessity for selection and specification. But nowhere does he lay down the principle – the basis for it. He recognizes that science consists in the connections of things, but with no basis for limiting the process of connection, it runs into endless regression, and forthwith must be pronounced, and properly, "appearance." In the toils of this dilemma,

says the pragmatist, the Hegelian logic languishes unto this day. As a finite sufferer seeking relief, or as a physician seeking to relieve, I cannot go on to connect my ache with the entire universe, but as a logician I cannot stop short of this, though, as Mr. Bradley has shown so tragically, there is no more hope of succeeding in this than of curing the ache by it.

Now the pragmatist believes that there is an efficient limiting principle for this "othering" process, and that it is to be found in the fact that this "othering" does not take place wholly on its own account, just as the expression of a separate self-contained and independent instinct for "othering." He finds that it is connected with our direct experience of the value of the sound or ache, and with our desire or purpose to retain and develop that value, or to get rid of it. If the experience is of such a character that we have not already an acquired, habitual method of holding fast to it or getting rid of it, or such that we cannot operate upon it directly through a shift of attention, we then seek its control through something else as its "condition" or "cause." For a pragmatist, the "other" of a thing – "*its* other" – is just that thing (or things – "content" if we prefer a little more idealistic term) which helps to retain or get rid of – in short to control – that thing, and an idea is just the act by which a thing is brought into relation and interaction with its controlling "other."

Little wonder that Hume felt that the whole problem of knowing – i.e., of synthetic, valuable knowing – is bound up with the relation of cause and effect. Hume's emphasis of cause and effect is his half-conscious recognition that knowing is purposive and not a mere connection of things in any and every way. I say half-conscious recognition – for his failure to carry this element of purpose and desire over into the *process* of the connection, his leaving it as a process of mere association and habit, shows that the recognition was very vague.

Now, if an idea is something more than a mere algebraic symbol, if it is the essence of an idea to *so* connect one experienced thing, or *quale*, or content, with another, that it may be maintained or eliminated, or in some degree altered, it would seem to follow that the chief difference in the character of ideas would be the difference in efficiency in effecting this kind of connection, and if "true" and "false" are the positive and negative terms for this primary character of ideas, the "true" idea of the ache or sound will be the idea in which it is brought into connection with something, with an "other," which, directly or indirectly, conditions its alteration or maintenance.

This brings us to the much-discussed and much-misunderstood definition of truth as the "working" quality of an idea, about which the earlier discussions raged.

V
HOW IDEAS "WORK"

When true ideas were said to be the ideas which "work," the loose and very general phrase "which work," taken out of its connections, was an easy mark for the critic, who lost no time in reminding us that false ideas seem to be as industrious as true ones, that error gets up as early and stays up as late as truth, and often appears to work overtime.

But the pragmatist hastened to point out that these shafts lose most of their point and force as soon as the phrase is put back into its context, where it clearly means "which work in the way they set out to work." The idea of an ache as the ache of a certain tooth is true, if an operation on the tooth alters the ache. If "pulling" the tooth does not stop the ache, the idea is not true, even though it bring some other, and possibly greater, satisfaction, e.g., the restoration of eyesight. If Saul goes to seek asses and finds a kingdom, while the kingdom may be a very satisfactory substitute for the asses, it does not make the idea of the whereabouts of the asses true. The idea is a proposed connection of things for a specific end, and is true when it works in the way proposed. But it is important, says the pragmatist, to keep in mind that the proposed working means, in the end, control of the original experience which is the "subject" of the idea. If having an idea of a thing means only the possession of some sort of a psychical symbol for it, why should there ever be any failure? Anything will do for a symbol. Every idea would work. There could be no error.

The critic next propounds what he regards as a far more crucial question, namely: "Are ideas true because they work, or do they work because they are true?" Must not the ache be related and connected, *realiter,* with the tooth *in advance* of the idea of this connection, in order that the idea may work successfully and so be true? Is not therefore the entire preceding account of the idea of the ache, as an act of connecting the ache with the tooth, up-side-down in so far as it speaks of the idea as if it were *making* a connection? Is not this connection simply *found,* and are we not therefore thrown back again upon the strictly representative function of the idea?

This objection is credited as the special contribution of the "neo-realist" critic who defends the thesis that *thinking makes no "essential" difference to the things thought of or about.* Verily it is not politics only that makes strange bed-fellows. Here, in the face of his tradition of the "active"

character of thought, of the essence of thinking as consisting in a relating activity, the absolute idealist joins with the realist in maintaining against the pragmatist that our ideas can only *find*, not *make*, connections between the ache and the tooth. However, we have only to recall our earlier discussion of absolutism to see that this alliance is, after all, quite consistent. We there saw that the "active," "relating," "connecting," "constitutive" character of thought, of which historic idealism makes so much, applies, in the end, only to the ideas of the absolute, not to ours. In its conception of finite thought, absolute idealism is as realistic as any arch-realist could wish. And as it is precisely finite thought that is under discussion, the absolutist finds himself shoulder to shoulder with the realist against the pragmatic contention that finite thought, *our* thought, makes a difference in the "things thought of."

Returning to our particular case, suppose we agree that there exists a connection, objective and *realiter*, between the ache and the tooth *before* there is an idea. It surely does not follow that this connection must remain the same *after* the idea arises, or that all the idea can do or aims to do is algebraically to symbolize this connection. Nor does it follow, as some critics have assumed, that, if the situation is objectively altered in and through the act of ideation, the idea is therefore the creator of *all* the connection there is, and even of the "things themselves."

But, says the realistic-idealistic critic, We admit that ideas make a difference. They make just the difference of the *addition* of thought. The ache and tooth are now objects of thought, whereas before they were not; but the only difference is just this *addition* of ideas to the situation.

But, returns the pragmatist, if thought is something merely added to the situation, without making any "essential" alteration, (1) why is it added? (2) how are we to tell whether it is rightfully or wrongfully, i.e., truly or falsely, added? (3) if the ideation of the ache as toothache is merely an addition of a factor which makes no "essential" difference in the situation, again, why not refer the ache to the phase of the moon, the day of the week, or anything else we may fancy?

Let us consider further the situation before and after the idea. We have agreed that before the idea the tooth and ache are "objectively" connected. Indeed, in one sense there is too much connection. They are so merged that mutual reference and mutual control are impossible. What is needed is a certain amount of disconnection, of disentanglement, and of re-articulation. If we wish to say that before the idea the tooth is the "cause" of the ache, after the idea it certainly is something more. The moment the pain is referred to the tooth, the tooth ceases to be *merely* the cause of the pain. Indeed, it then *begins* to cease being the cause of the pain. It now *begins* to be the cause of the pain's cessation. From being a mere condition of the pain, it *begins* to be through the ideating process a

condition of not-pain. As Hegel would say, it is now *aufgehoben*, and passes into its opposite. Here, indeed, is the source of Hegel's riotous dialectic, but here also is the principle for the control of that riot. For Hegel, this passing of a thing over into "its other" is just a peculiar and ultimate effect of thinking. Think about anything, and presto! it begins to become something else. And so it does. This, indeed, is just the pragmatic thesis. But *what* it becomes depends on the problem and interest. Let us suppose there were no desire to get rid of the pain, and that in some way – as an act of an "ideational instinct" – the pain should be connected with the tooth. What transformation of the tooth or the pain would there be? Nothing would be *aufgehoben* in this case. The whole dialectic would be stopped in its tracks. Is it not clear that the reason that there is a dialectic of *thought* is because at bottom *thought is a part of the total process of an efficient desire and effort to effect a change in experienced values?*

But our realistic critic will still insist that this reference of the pain to the tooth is not the "real" beginning of a new interaction between the tooth and the ache. It is just a *preliminary,* a getting ready for the beginning of such an interaction.[12] The tooth doesn't "really" take on any new relation to the ache until the dentist gets hold of it. But how does the dentist come to get hold of it? Is it not precisely because the tooth has been actually operating as a guide to both the patient and the dentist from the moment the pain is ideated as pain-of-a-tooth?

But what now, says the critic, of the case in which the pain is referred to the *wrong* tooth, or to the ear, or a demon, instead of to the right tooth? Is this, too, a "real" and objective transformation of a "real" situation? "Verily," rejoins the pragmatist. "Is not an act which culminates in 'pulling' the wrong tooth, or the treatment of the ear instead of the tooth, or in making a libation instead of a potation, a very 'real' alteration of a very 'real' situation?"

But, rejoins the critic, the pain after all *doesn't* belong to the other tooth, nor to the ear, nor to a demon, and *does* continue to belong to "its" tooth after the idea, whether true or mistaken, as before. If this were the case, rejoins the pragmatist, it would not be to the point, which is – not that nothing remains after the idea as it was before, but that the idea marks the initiation of a *new* connection between things, which, even if it occurs through an idea, is none the less real. As a matter of fact, after the ideation the ache not only "belongs" to the tooth as it did before, but through its reference to the tooth by the idea, whether this be true or false,

[12] The question of where a beginning begins should have no terrors for the pragmatist. Greek discussion showed once for all that the only method for the solution of that and all other questions of the kind is the "teleological," i.e., the "practical" one.

it is put into connection with other agencies such as the dentist, or a potation, or a libation, etc.

Nor does the fact that the new relation and interconnection may be false or wrong, i.e., not effective for removing or altering the ache, make it any the less "real." Once more, the "pulling" of the wrong tooth is certainly no less "objective" than "pulling" the right one. In short, error, says the pragmatist, is just as strong a witness as truth for the contention that thinking is a process in which things enter into new and "real" interaction.[13]

To the question, What of the madman's ideas? the pragmatist says that the guards, the barred cells, the taxes ought to be a sufficient answer. If a madman thinks you are his enemy and therefore to be destroyed, you will scarcely feel safe on being told that you are "really" not his enemy and that his idea is false. And, to be sure, safety does not arrive *merely* by thinking of having the madman shut up, but it *starts* with some such idea.

Another way of stating the source of the difficulties in the realist's position, says the pragmatist, is that the realist thinks of the situation which precedes and leads up to thinking, wholly in *existential* terms. He omits the elements of motion, of impulse, and of desire in it. Thus in the instance cited he thinks of the "real" situation preceding thought as made up of the "fact" of the pain, the "fact" that, entirely independent of any ideas, it is already connected with a certain organ; and, if we extend the boundaries of the case a little, the "fact" that the physician is in a certain place, whatever the patient's or anybody's else ideas about his location may be. This, with as much more of detail as one wishes, is the objective "real" situation which it is the business of thought merely to represent or point at.

But this is a very incomplete statement of the *whole situation*. First, there is the *desire to get rid of the ache*. It is this desire indeed that develops into ideas of the location of the ache and the physician. These ideas are but this desire getting into definite, efficient working form. And, as we have seen, this stops with no mere process of algebraic symbolization. The idea of the ache is of it as a "toothache" or "earache," or ache to be cured by the physician and of the physician as the curer of the ache.

Further, there is the "fact" that, however certain, definite, and complete may be the physician's location from the standpoint of those to whom the

[13] If anyone complains that the toothache-case is one which offers the least resistance to the pragmatist's interpretation since in it the thinker is the one who has the pain, the pragmatist will reply: (1) that "the toothache case" is not of his own choosing but one selected by the critics as a "poser" for pragmatists; and (2) that in principle it makes no difference whether the pain is "in the same head" with the idea or in another.

finding of the physician is no problem, it is no less a "fact" from the standpoint of the patient that his location is "uncertain" and "indeterminate." And if the patient's standpoint is as important in the situation as the physician's – and it would be hard to convince the patient that it isn't – what right have we to state the fact of the physician's location *entirely* from the standpoint of those who happen to be in an unproblematic space relation to him and call his location fully and completely determined, when for the patient and perhaps for many others it simply is not? Isn't this sheer superstition? Whatever the physician's space situation, it is "such that," to use a favorite phrase of the mathematician, although it may be determined for A, it is just *as* undetermined for B.

Here we shall doubtless be told that this problem of "location" is a *space* problem, and that space relations at all events are not dependent on ideas; that the space relations of the patient and physician are perfectly definite and determinate and wholly independent of the "aches" and "wants" and "ideas" of either the patient or the physician; that an object in space cannot be both determinate and indeterminate, or determined on one side and not determined on the other. Surely, it will be said, it is just the essence of the space world to be completely defined. Every object in space must be a perfectly definite and determinate relation to every other, entirely independent of wants and ideas.[14]

First, we should observe that for the mathematician this conception of complete and independent determination of the space relations of objects applies not to such "objects" as a person with a pain or a physician seeking patients. The only "object" whose location for the mathematician is so completely determined is just a *point* of space itself, not an *object in* space. The moment we apply this complete determination to an object *in* space we land at once in the Eleatic's motionless world and have on our hands all of Zeno's puzzles. The conception of complete spatial determination will not apply to a *moving* object. A moving object is *as much* undetermined as determined. Any attempt to include motion itself in the complete determination reduces it to space, for in the conception of completely determined motion, all possible motions must already have taken place – all aching teeth must have been eternally "pulled." The objector will doubtless admit that there is the pain of the patient and his uncertainty of the whereabouts of the dentist, but these – well, they just belong to the *patient*, not to the real and objective situation. In short, the

[14] This objection suggests that this conception of space may be the prototype, not to say parent, of the whole realistic conception of "independence." The realistic does not, to be sure, speak of his world of "independent things" explicitly, in terms of space relations, but the problems it presents are so homologous to those of space that it suggests a close kinship.

location of the physician *as a physician*, in Plato's phrase, not a mere "point" in space, depends in the last analysis upon his *operative* relations to the patient; and uncertainty and ambiguity in this relation – no matter how unambiguous may be the relations of points in abstract space, and no matter whether the ambiguity is at the patient's or physician's end of the relation or both – are "real" characters of the situation to be overcome with the help of ideas, if so be.[15]

No doubt the realist will still insist that this ambiguity and indeterminateness of the physician's location is all in the patient's "mind," not in the world of "things," but the pragmatist persists (and here he would side with the idealist, *if* the idealist would only include *our* ideas in his idealism) that this indeterminateness and uncertainty of mind is an indeterminateness in the "real" *operative* (not the abstractly spatial) relations of things. The location of the physician – as a physician – not as a point in space – is determined surely by the part he can play in altering aches and pains. Space is not something *in* which the physician merely *is*; it is a relation in and through which he *operates*. Take away this element of operation and there is nothing left with which to determine either distance or direction. The final test, as it is the final source of all determinations of space and motion, is the capacity for the maintenance or alteration of such values as our long-suffering and suffered toothache, the sound of a symphony, the imagery of a poem, the love of a friend, etc.

But the difficulty which the realistic critic regards as the most crucial for the pragmatist's thesis – that thinking is a perfectly continuous part of the real interaction of things – is knowledge of the past. However it may be with present and future things, the past surely undergoes no alteration in "being known." It can only be represented, symbolized, pointed at. "What's done's done." "Banquo's dead and cannot come out on's grave." Yet what say we of Macbeth's miserable cry, "If 'twere done when 'tis done," and of Brutus' "Thou art mighty yet"? Are they after all "mere rhetoric"?

In general it is difficult for the pragmatist to see how pastness can be a special or specially difficult case of knowledge since from his standpoint it is involved in *every* act of thinking. For him thinking is just a process in which "things" produced in the past recombine or interact to produce new "things." It is to be noticed that the crucialness of these cases of the past seems to be greater in proportion to the amount of the pastness. Hence we find the instances usually selected from the remote past; "Caesar's passage of the Rubicon," and "The discovery of America" are the well-worn citations. And yet perhaps some who would at first be

[15] Of course, no situation is *wholly* indeterminate; the ache is already defined as the "ache of the tooth *or* of the ear," and the physician as "somewhere in town," etc.

disposed to agree with the realist that our knowledge of Caesar's passage of the Rubicon makes no difference in it *now,* might hesitate to say that its "being known" by the Senate and populace of Rome, and its being expected by Caesar to be so known made no essential difference in it then. But in principle the case is the same, whether the pastness be a second or a century. To be sure, the present operations of Caesar's act *through acts of knowledge* are doubtless less extensive and important than they were 50 BC. But whatever the character of its operations, even if they are confined to the second year of high school, the method of operation, that is, through the process of knowledge, is still the same. And it would not seem to be a great strain upon the imagination to think that a man of affairs in time of a crisis might still be influenced by Caesar's example. But whatever the extent or the nature of the operation as a matter of fact may be, Caesar's act, like John Brown's, "goes marching on." Like all other *historic* acts, it is not yet finished, and never will be so long as it continues, through acts of knowledge, to produce new "results."

Let it be remembered, insists the pragmatist, that this doctrine of the real efficiency of thought does not teach that thinking undoes or reverses or blots out any thing or event that has happened. It insists only that in becoming known or entering into knowledge a past act is altered in the sense that it takes on additional functions and consequences.

This last statement will doubtless suggest to the realist: (1) that the pragmatist is entirely overlooking the distinction between a thing or an act and its "consequences"; that being known does not add anything to the past act itself, but only to its "results"; (2) that the thing or act must *first* be "known" before the "real consequences" can occur, in so far as they occur through knowledge.

The first point precipitates the ancient metaphysical puzzle of the possibility of separating a thing from its effects, its is-ness from its does-ness. It is the old problem of the thing-in-itself. The realist's objection implies that the line between a thing and its consequences can be drawn ontologically and existentially, and is a fixed one. Yet when we apply this distinction to a specific case we are forced to make it a "working," not a metaphysical one. That is, we find that its location varies with our problem. Where, for instance, are we to draw the line between the "thing" typhoid fever, and its "effects"?

This of course does not mean that the making of this distinction is a matter of the arbitrary whim of the moment, as some have imagined. It means, only, that it shifts with the analysis and development of the problem. Nor must this "functional" interpretation of the distinction be considered, as it often is, as an attempt to abate or cheapen its importance and reality. It intends only to state in *what* this importance and reality consists.

However, the essence of the pragmatic view does not depend on this distinction. Whether we say the change is in the "thing" or "event" or only in its "consequences," the pragmatist's contention is that this change actually *begins* in the act of thinking. And this brings us to our critic's second point, namely: Granting that things and events acquire new consequences or new functions as a result of acts of knowledge, yet even so they must be known *before* these new consequences or functions can begin. The general form of the problem here is the same as in the first point, viz., the problem of introducing an ontological separation into a continuous process without destroying continuity. If by "first being known" is meant that the thing or event enters into a relationship of a unique self-contained character called "knowledge," and is not even the beginning of the process of "real interaction," then we must ask: When does this "real interaction" begin? If the interaction "depends" upon knowledge and yet is no *part* of it, how then is this state of just "knowing" or "meaning" or "pointing at" a thing transformed into "real interaction"? Psychologically it is the old question of the connection between cognition and will. *If knowing is so qualitatively and functionally different from alterative action, how do we make the transition from it to efficient action?*

These are some of the questions[16] which the realistic critics have not yet met, and it is the pragmatist's belief that when we come to deal in detail with such problems, we are forced to transform a "representative" into "operative" realism.

For the pragmatist, knowledge is the beginning of new interactions or, if we prefer, of new consequences. But the beginning of a new interaction is always to *some* extent ambiguous and confused. This first stage of new activity, therefore, is occupied with getting rid of this confusion and this process the pragmatist calls "thinking." On this view we do not have to jump out of a unique and separate and self-sufficient state of knowing into "real" activity. The knowing is our desire, our will, our "practical" interests getting out of ambiguity and confusion into order and efficiency. If, as a matter of terminology, we wish to say that the "real interactions" and the "real consequences" do not begin until *after* this confusion is cleared up, then we may say that the thing must *first* be known before, or in order that, "real" consequences may occur. But the process is a *continuous* one; it is all of a piece; it is not split into parallel strands of "thought" and "will."

[16] For additional questions and a keen analysis of the realistic position, read Schiller's discussion of Nunn's paper on "The Independence of Secondary Qualities on Perception" in the current volume of *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*.

Concerning the way ideas "work," the case then between the pragmatist, the realist, and the idealist stands thus:

The pragmatist agrees with the realist (1) that the "world" or "experience" (the term does not matter here) does not consist of "a system of ideas"; (2) that ideas do not aim or "desire" to absorb, or be absorbed by, the rest of the "world" (or "experience"); (3) that at any given time some of the world (or experience) may be "independent" of knowledge in the sense that it is not then "being known," that is, it is not in the knowledge mode or stage of action. But at the next step, where the "unknown" part of the world (or experience) passes into knowledge, the pragmatist and realist part company. For the realist this passage occurs with no "essential" alteration in the material which enters into knowledge; while the pragmatist believes knowing to be a part of the process in which the world of "things" or "events" or "experience" brings forth new "things" or "events" or "experiences."

Between pragmatism and idealism there would be a vital point of agreement in the conception of the "active," "constitutive" character of thinking if it did not turn out that for most idealists this character does not belong to "our" thinking, but only to the absolute thought. Here the pragmatist declares that the idealist's faith in the fundamental article of his own creed falters, and that pragmatism in teaching the efficiency of "our" thinking is saving idealism from its own unbelief.

Owing to this lack of faith, idealism agrees with realism that *our* ideas can only algebraically represent or "mean" or "point at" a world of reality "beyond." The disagreement consists in the fact that while the realist's ideas are quite content with this rôle, the ideas of the idealist long to swallow, or be swallowed by, the rest of the world.

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VI
TRUTH-VALUE[17]

As I read the note of the committee on program inviting me to present a paper on "Truth-Value" I thought at first: How delightful to have a subject so free from the "dust and blood of the arena." For however much we may disagree, about the nature and the criterion of truth, we are all sure of its great "value." We are all prepared to say, as one of Professor Angell's elementary pupils once said of the nervous system, "What should we do without it!"

But, alas for him who reckons without the guile of the program committee! That committee knew full well that it might have difficulty in finding someone – even a pragmatist – willing to talk further at this time on the "nature" or "criterion" of truth. And it knew equally well that any attempt to expound the "value" of truth, apart from its nature, could end only in pious exclamations. It knew that every attempt to describe truth-value and to discriminate it from other values, must be a description of its nature. So when the familiar refrains and the old shibboleths sound in your ears, I hope you will remember who is responsible. Not that the last word has yet been spoken on the nature and criterion of truth, but that so much has been said in the search for that word that I fear many of you would fain turn awhile to other problems.

If we begin with the most general and formal phase of the subject, the usual statement is that truth and error are values belonging to the experience of judging. But such a statement is obviously verbal until we go on to state *what* the value of this judging experience is. And this brings upon us at once the entire problem of the place and function of judging in the whole process of experience, and with it the issue between logical-absolutism and certain forms of realism, on the one hand, and "instrumentalism" on the other.

The contention of the logical-absolutist is that truth and error values are the satisfaction and the dissatisfaction of a special and independent "want" or "side" or "aspect" – using Mr. Bradley's phrases – of our nature. In his article on "Truth and Practise" (*Mind*, 1904), Mr. Bradley

[17] One of a series of papers read at a symposium on "Value" held at the meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, in Chicago, January, 1908, and afterward published in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*.

says: "Reality is the satisfaction of all the wants of our nature, and theoretical truth is those perceptions and ideas which directly satisfy *one* of those wants." Thinking, then, appears to be the operation of a specialized instinctive want co-ordinate with the other instincts, as eating, drinking, reproduction, etc. Indeed Mr. Bradley comes near to saying this in so many words, albeit somewhat facetiously, when he says: "Metaphysics is a finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct – but to find these reasons is no less an instinct."[18]

With truth-value thus based on a special and independent instinctive need, an uninitiated observer might at first sight wonder that the supporters of this view are so shocked at Professor James's metaphysical pluralism, for this conception surely appears pluralistic enough. But a second look dispels the wonder. For with so much logical and psychological pluralism as this instinct-view of thought involves, nothing short of an omnipotent metaphysical absolute can save unity and continuity. On the other hand, Professor James can revel freely in his metaphysical pluralism just because he has so fortified his logical and psychological continuity in human experience that he can rest assured that no pluralistic metaphysical horde, however great, can ever destroy it. In general it appears that what we neglect in our psychology and logic we try to make up in our metaphysics. Metaphysics seems to be a sort of clearing-house for the accounts between our logic and unreflective experience.

And while we are about it another paradox or two in the situation may be worth a glance. Behold the immediate-empiricist, Dewey, insisting upon the mediate, instrumental character of thought, while the absolutists are contending for its independent immediacy. Again, the logical-absolutist not only professes to accept the instrumentalist's doctrine of the relativity of truth and error to need, want, and purpose, but characterizes it as a "truism." In the article above cited, Mr. Bradley says: "To me it seems obvious that if some function belongs to our nature there will be a need and a desire which correspond to that function. Hence if the free use of the intellect is really one aspect of our being, we shall in consequence have a need and a desire for that use." Likewise we find the absolutists, Royce and Taylor, and the realist, Perry, all agreeing that *true* judging is the satisfaction of a want – a purpose – namely, the purpose to judge *truly!*

The instrumentalist's reply is that *this* is indeed not only a truism, but an unblushing *petitio* of a real issue, and that to him the truly pathetic thing is his critics' complacent satisfaction with it. Suppose we say:

[18] In his paper which followed this at the symposium, Professor McGilvary frankly states and defends the special-instinct view of thought, using eating and drinking as analogues.

"Truth is what satisfies the cognitive need." "How trifling!" Locke would say, until we go on to show *what* the cognitive need is, *how* it differs from other needs, and *how* it goes about satisfying itself. In such questions as these the real issue between the absolutist's and the instrumentalist's logic is defined.

If truth be the satisfaction of a special instinct co-ordinate with the other instincts, obviously we must at once ask: What is this instinct's peculiar satisfying material or object? And here we seem halted; for there appears to be no special object analogous to those of the other instincts. The content of any thought always turns out to be the material of some other instinct. Besides, if thought has its own special material, what becomes of its universality?

"Universality"! That word gives us a new cue and suggests that we may have been on the wrong scent for the object of the cognitive instinct. For does not universality belong to such things as major, minor, and middle terms? Here, then, perhaps, is to be found thought's satisfying portion. The cognitive need is a hungering for universals and particulars, a thirsting after subjects and predicates, a yearning for syllogisms and episyllogisms; while negatively it is a congenital horror of such things as illicit majors and minors and undistributed middles.

This gentle mockery, I am sure, cannot give offense, for nothing could surpass the contempt with which absolutists themselves have rejected formal logic – for instance, the hilarious scorn which Mr. Bradley heaps upon the devoted head of the syllogism. The reasons for this repudiation are familiar. I need mention only a few of them. First, if the formal processes were the satisfying content of thought, the material ought to be perfectly indifferent. The length of the Devil's tail or the color of Eve's eyes should be as satisfying material as anything else. Again, if the material be indifferent and thought goes on according to its own independent and immutable laws, where is there any place for error, for dissatisfaction? Once more, if dissatisfaction does *somehow* arise, what is to determine when truth is reached again? If we answer: "Simply the sense of *consistency* peculiar to the cognitive instinct," what saves thought from the subjectivism alleged to characterize the other instincts, as hunger, thirst, etc.?

The situation at this point is, then, that, if the formal processes are rejected, thought, though a special and independent instinctive need co-ordinate with the other instincts, has yet no corresponding peculiar satisfying material. What is to be done? What *has* been done so far in history of logic is to compromise by admitting the dependence of thought for its *material* upon the other instincts, but still clinging to its independence as a *process*. The consequence of this compromise has been the train of incurable "contradictions" and "antinomies" which have harassed the

entire history of logic, and which end in the confession that so long as the cognitive instinct must be dependent on the other instincts for its materials no "perfect" satisfaction, no genuine truth value is possible. The indispensable condition of reaching such a state, says Mr. Bradley, in effect, is that thought should be independent, not only as a process, but in its material as well. That it should, in short, produce its own material.[19]

We all know how, at this point, Professor Royce came valiantly to the rescue with his famous map of England and the self-representative number-series as illustrations of how thought could produce its own material. But many think: (1) that even in the self-representative number-series the contributions of the other instincts are discoverable; and (2) that, as an illustration of what thought can do in the way of producing its own differences when the other instincts are shut out as far as possible, the result is not very promising in the way of variety.

At about this stage of affairs the "instrumentalist," "pragmatist," or "evolutionist" (whatever you will) came into the discussion. He began by agreeing with Bradley and Royce that the one thing needful is continuity between the process and the content of thought. But the attempt to secure this by having thought produce its own material had, in his opinion, failed. Falling back, then, upon Bradley's position that thought draws its materials from the other instincts, and groping about for a new clue, he kept putting such questions as these: What determines *when* thought draws upon the other instincts for material? And what determines *what* material it selects and just *what* it is to do with them? Observations in response to these inquiries seemed to show: (1) that the materials selected are always those of instincts which have come into conflict in the process of satisfying or "expressing" themselves; (2) that it seems to be the work of thought to deal with this conflict; (3) that it sets about this through analysis and synthesis; (4) that success or failure in effecting the resolution of the conflict marks the limits of this process of analysis and synthesis, i.e., determines specifically truth and error. Concerning truth *value* he could say, so far, at least this much: that thought's satisfaction is not independent of the satisfaction of the other instincts. Rather does it seem to find its satisfaction precisely in quelling the dissatisfaction due to the conflict of the other instincts. Their extremity is thought's opportunity.

Still the breach between the process and the material of thought remained. But, said the instrumentalist, there is yet an alternative, namely, the reverse of Royce's experiment. That is, instead of attempting to meet Bradley's demand for continuity by having thought produce its own material, why not have *the material produce its own thought?* The term

[19] *Appearance and Reality*, 2d ed., Appendix, 562ff.

"produce," however, leaves the connection still too loose. Rather, why not regard these instincts in conflict *as developing into both the process and the content of thinking?* Just as the contents of the conflicting instincts are not left behind when thought begins, but go on over *into* the thinking as *its* content, so, on the other hand, there is no thought machine or faculty already there *in advance* waiting to receive the material of these instincts. The process of thought is just the process of this conflict of instincts working itself out through interaction with other and *for the present purpose* more stable values. Here no specter of the "given" need haunt our logic. For this ghost pursues only that logic which assumes a *pre*-existent, purely cognitive faculty, or machine, or agent, or entity of some sort, to which this instinctive material is to be "given."

It should be understood that we are not speaking here, as so many have supposed, of an absolute origin of thought in the universe. The instrumentalist may readily agree that as this conflict of instinctive values has always existed, so thought has always existed. And that as this previous thinking results in reconstructed instincts, so any present conflict is, in this sense and to this extent, an outcome of previous thinking. But he insists that this previous thinking, as the present, was not performed by a purely cognitive agent, or faculty, or instinct, *upon* a material "given" to it by the other instincts.

Also this view does not mean, from the standpoint of value, that this readjusting, revaluing stage into which the contents of the conflicting instincts pass has not its own peculiar value; nor that it may not be regarded as an immediate" value, as all value, in a sense, must be. But it insists that we must keep in mind that the *content* of this "immediate" value is just this entire experience of conflicting instinctive values undergoing *mediation* and revaluation. It is the value of experience as undergoing control in contrast with experience in chaotic conflict; but not control *by* a special faculty or instinct of control. Control is a "stage" of experience, not a "part," or "side," or "phase" of it.

There is, to be sure, always in this revaluation or control stage some value (or values) that serves as the end or purpose. But the control is not *all* lodged in the purpose. The end is only one pole of the whole process of gaining control. In this sense the *end* is a *means* of control. But, again, the main point here is that the end is not furnished by an outside, independent faculty or instinct which operates as a special "end-factory," whose business it is to keep a supply ahead or, failing this, to make one "while you wait." This end is born of the conflicting instincts. It is bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh.

The implication is, then, that truth-value is not the satisfaction of a special instinct coordinate with the other instincts, but that it is the value of the entire experience of readjusting conflicting values through the

process of redistribution of values effected by interaction with a wider and more permanent range of relevant values.[20]

I am painfully aware of the extremely general character of all this; that it gives no details of this revaluating stage; that it leaves unnoticed the different elements in the constitution of truth-value out of which spring the ambiguities of the term "truth," in which it is identified now with the subject, now with the predicate, of the judgment; now with what we *have* attained, again with what we are *seeking*. I am mindful that we have not touched that old, but ever-perplexing, tangle of relationships between truth-value on the one side, and ethical, aesthetic, and economic values on the other. We say in one breath that truth is a value belonging to judgment as such, and in the next we speak of ethical, aesthetic, and economic "judgments." Does truth, then, belong only to one kind of judgments? Or are ethical, aesthetic, and economic judgments special forms of truth? Or are they all coordinate values belonging to every judgment? Or are they stages through which every judgment passes? And if so, what determines these stages? But in the time allowed for the paper much must be sacrificed, and I wish in the minute or two left to anticipate two or three general objections.

The first is likely to be the usual challenge of this whole conflict-mediational view of thought and its value. "How," it will be asked, "can it apply at the level of perceptual judgments?" e.g., "This is paper," or "This paper is white." Where is the conflict here? "Well," the instrumentalist will answer, "there may not be any conflict. But *if* there is not, then there is no judgment." And he will declare that here, as so often in philosophy, language bewrayeth us. We assume that, because we repeat the words that *have* expressed, or *might* express a judgment, they do now. And he will suggest that a simple but effective way to test the presence of a real "live" judgment, to use Dr. Thompson's term, is to preface the alleged judgment with the term "I think," or "I judge," or "I have an idea." If the statement "This is paper" means "I think," or "I judge," or "I have an idea" that it is paper, then it is a real judgment. If it does not mean this, it is merely a direct articulatory response to the visual and tactual stimulations, and is no more a judgment than tearing it, or poking it, or setting a match to it. Once more, judging means *inquiry*; inquiry means *doubt*; and doubt means *conflicting impulses*.

Again, it may be said even if conflict in immediate experience does lead to thinking, it is no less obvious that thinking leads to conflict.

[20] One of the best papers I know of on the relations of thought and value is Professor H. W. Stuart's paper on "Valuation as a Logical Process" in *Studies in Logical Theory*, 227ff.

What experience more common, alas! than to find that the more we think the worse the tangle becomes. But this is only the familiar paradox of "fighting for peace" or a "painful cure of a pain." Obviously, as the conflict develops into the thinking stage it may prove to be much more far-reaching and deep-seated than it was immediately *felt* to be. Fortunately, on the other hand, it often, if not so often, turns out the other way.

Admitting once more the conflict character of knowledge, it will be said, as it has been said, that this problem is not experienced as a conflict of *instinctive* values, but is experienced from the very start *as* a cognitive problem, as a problem of knowledge. The answer is: Of course it is. For when the conflict in immediate values has gone beyond the blind pull-and-haul, thrashing-about stage, and has developed into the problem form, it is already in the cognitive stage, and is, of course, so experienced.

As for the objection that this view of thought value "subordinates" the intellectual "side" or value to the other "sides" or values, I confess I am unable to see how the conception of thought as the experience in which already constituted values are reconstituted, revalued, makes it subordinate to these values. The converse would be as true – and as false. As true and as false as to say: "Speaking is subordinate to words or painting to colors."

Finally, it may be said that this "instrumental" view of thought destroys the character of immediacy which is fundamental in value. This assumes that the value of an instrument must itself be instrumental. But this is akin to the psychologizing that regards a perception of a heap as a heap of perceptions. The mediating character of thought no more conflicts with the immediacy of its value than the movements of a horse conflict with its color.

VII
PRAGMATISM AND ITS CRITICS[21]

Since Professors Royce, Creighton, and Baldwin, at the Princeton meeting of the Philosophical Association, started the American reaction against a philosophical movement variously known as "pragmatism," "humanism," "instrumentalism," and "radical empiricism," reinforcements for the reaction in great numbers and under many different colors, "absolutist," "realist,"[22] "personal idealist,"[23] etc., have appeared in every direction. While there is yet no decisive outcome, there has been enough "skirmishing" to warrant a general canvass of the situation.

In the first general survey, perhaps the most noticeable and interesting feature is the bold move of the absolutists in abandoning at many points the defense of their own camp for a flank movement upon their opponents. The pragmatist's main point of attack has been on the absolutist's criterion of truth and error. Instead of defending this point, the forces of absolutism have largely moved out upon the pragmatist's flanks, attacking his incomplete, diffused, and often crudely fortified positions. So general and well executed has been this movement that, as one has put it, "One would think pragmatism a complete system set forth for centuries in hundreds of ponderous volumes, and that its critics were engaged in a tentative development of new and undogmatic ideas."

Not only has the pragmatist been thus suddenly flanked, but he finds himself confronted with his own weapons, some of which, at any rate, he fondly supposed his opponents could not wield. The pragmatist could scarcely ask for a better tale of his own shafts than Professor Creighton's summary of his objections to pragmatism, which runs as follows: (1) ambiguity in the use of the term "practical purpose"; (2) the necessary subjectivity and relativity of the position; (3) the lack of any principle by means of which experience can be unified; (4) the sharp opposition amounting to a real dualism between thought and the antecedent experience out of which it is said to arise; (5) the fact that the position

[21] Published in the *Philosophical Review*, XIV.

[22] Cf. Professor Woodbridge on "The Field of Logic," *Science*, XX, 587ff.

[23] Cf. articles by Professors Bakewell and Rieber in *University of California Publications*, I.

presupposes as its indispensable background a logical and ontological system very different from that to which it explicitly appeals.[24]

However, it could bring the pragmatist little but ridicule to complain that his opponents had stolen his weapons and countered upon his works before they were completed. If the pragmatist regards his constructions as strong enough to serve as a base of operations, he must expect them also to become an object of counter-attack. At any rate, the point of interest is: What has come of it thus far? How have the pragmatist's positions stood the test? And has any inroad been made upon the works of absolutism? For even if the pragmatist's constructions may be found demolished at some points, it still may be that some breach has been made in the walls of absolutism – especially at the point of the criterion of truth and error.

Dropping the martial figure, which after all is of doubtful aptness in philosophic discussion, let us recall that the point which the pragmatist has constantly pressed, and to which there has been so little direct response, is that *there is no connection between the absolutist's general definition of truth and error and the standard actually employed in testing any particular judgment.* There is no relation between his metaphysical and his instrumental logic. There is not so much obvious contradiction as simple irrelevance. The general statement is that truth, or "the degree of truth" which any particular thought has, consists in the extent to which it "agrees with" or "expresses" or "touches reality."[25] But when now we further define reality as fixed, as unmoving and unmovable, whether it be a "system of immutable ideas," a "fixed purpose," or a "changeless sentiency," and then pass to the decision of the degree of truth or error in any specific case, it appears that our actual tests have no discoverable connection with the general definition.

The critics of pragmatism seldom face this issue squarely. Both Mr. Bradley and Professor Royce deal with it rather indirectly, and Professor Pringle-Pattison, in his otherwise admirable review of the *Studies in Logical Theory,* overlooks it entirely.[26] One of the most direct attempts to meet this difficulty is Professor Creighton's paper on "Purpose as Logical Category."[27] This I wish to examine briefly before passing to a consideration of the "objections" to pragmatism.

If we say with Professor Creighton that "every real thought has some degree of truth," we imply that it also may have some degree of error. If

[24] *Philosophical Review*, XIII, 295ff.

[25] *Ibid*., 291.

[26] *Op. cit*., 666ff.

[27] *Ibid*., 284ff.

it "touches reality" at some point, it also may fail to "touch" at others; and the problem is: How are we to tell when, where, and to what extent it "touches" and fails to "touch" reality? In Mr. Creighton's words, "The real problem in any given case, therefore, is to determine which of two or more possible ways of judging about reality is truer and more adequate."[28] Here, he says, "the appeal is to experience itself, but to experience as systematized by thought." This last clause is of course intended to reserve a place for the absolute system, though it does not follow that this systematization must be of the absolute, static sort. Continuing the account of the experience to which any thought appeals for verification:

> It is to be noted that the system to which we appeal is not a fixed circle of abstract ideas that have the power of determining truth through their own internal consistency. It is rather the concrete and fluid process of thinking, in which the nature of reality functions effectively, both as something already partially determined, and also as that which sets the ideal for further determination. As thus an active process of transformation directed toward the realization of an ideal, thought seeks to extend and supplement its present content. It looks before and after, and seeks guidance and direction from every quarter. To this end, it appeals to direct perceptive experience, and makes use of trial and experiment as its instruments… . It makes use of the opinions of other men, testing and correcting its own conclusions by the light which these results afford.

So far as it goes, no pragmatist could ask for a better statement of his own doctrine. For all that is here said, the very ideal itself is open to reconstruction, although this possibility is soon cut off when we read that this ideal, "though a part of present experience, points always to a system of reality in which it is completely fulfilled and realized."[29] I have just said, "so far as it goes"; for there still appears no satisfactory answer to "the real problem" of determining "which of two ways of judging about reality is truer and more adequate." For this "active process of transformation" must be in some direction and to some extent true and to some extent false. What determines this? How shall we decide where it "touches" and where it falls short of reality? In seeking to "extend and supplement its present content," there must be some success and some failure. How shall we distinguish? In "looking before and after," in

[28] *Ibid.*, 291.

[29] *Op. cit.*, 293.

"making use of trial and experiment" and of "the opinions of other men," there is some true and some false "looking" and "using." Again, what is the criterion?

The difficulties here are: First, that the account consists of a general description of thought-processes in which the point at issue, viz., the criterion of truth and error *in* this process, is overlooked. Second, the issue is further obscured by neglecting the negative side of thought. It is assumed that it is "the very nature of thought" to "touch" reality, or, as Professor Creighton quotes from Hegel, "to shut us together with things."[30] Hence all we have to do is simply to think and describe how we think, in order to see how we reach truth. But this forgets that thinking generates error as well as truth; that it is also "its very nature to shut us together" with illusions as well as with things; and that our problem is to distinguish one from the other. So far, then, it still seems that the connection between our criterion for truth and error, or for "degrees of truth and error in any given case," and a completed fixed absolute has not appeared. But the end is not yet.

We are told that, "if the nature of a larger whole does not function constitutively within it [any particular experience], then all tests of truth are impossible, theoretical no less than practical."[31] To this all pragmatists would freely subscribe. But the question is, What is the *nature* of this "larger whole"? It surely does not follow without more ado that this "whole" must be an absolute system "completely fulfilled and realized." If it be said, "If not, then there is no whole," we must rejoin that the conception of a dynamic whole, e.g., a living organism or a society, is of as good repute and service as "wholes" of the static, geometric type.

Nor is the whole made absolute, static, and complete, if we admit with Professor Creighton that "the appeal is to experience, but to experience as systematized by thought"; or that the conditions under which the practical test is applied "presuppose logical thinking as their necessary framework and background." On the contrary, it is just the contention of the pragmatist that the sole material of experience is the outcome of previous experience including all the results effected by previous thinking. But what puzzles the pragmatist is to see why we should still be working at this organization, if it were absolutely complete and final. To answer by an appeal to "the finite standpoint" seems a *petitio* of the simplest type.

Still no obvious connection between the absolute system and the test of truth and error "in any given case" appears. Nor do I see that, in the next

[30] *Ibid.*, 291.

[31] *Op. cit.*, 290.

and final stage of Professor Creighton's presentation of the case, we get any nearer such a necessity. To the pragmatist's contention that "present ideas must be tried by their future results," Professor Creighton says:

> But we can maintain with equal reason that the present system of knowledge furnishes the standard by means of which we must judge of the future… . Now this reciprocal implication and determination of parts presupposes that these parts are elements of a rationally co-ordinated system. It follows, therefore, that the so-called practical test that judges of the truth of an idea by its results is applicable only when it is used within a rationally determined system of thoughts that contains as immanent ideal its own principles of criticism.[32]

Now, anything like an adequate consideration of this passage calls for an analysis of the whole time character of experience in its relation to thought. This would carry us beyond the range of this very general discussion. But a few things may be said without such an analysis. (1) Here "rationally co-ordinated system" must mean an absolutely fixed and completed system, else the whole passage is thoroughly pragmatic. But (2) such a system does not appear to follow *merely* from a reciprocal relation between present and future. Geometric determination is surely not the only and possibly not the fundamental form of reciprocity. The mutual determination may (in fact, I think, must) be of such a character as to *change* both interacting contents, and issue either in a state of immediate satisfaction in which the particular contents in tension disappear, or in a new problem requiring new determination. Thus, when "the future looks back to what for it is the past" (I confess this is somewhat puzzling), it does not merely "look" but "strikes" back. The past is constantly changing character under this back-striking (of the future). (3) Once more, if the system is absolutely complete, how can there be any "present looking forward to the future for correction and completion"? And what can be meant by its "containing its own principles of criticism"? Criticism, surely, has to do with change, and if these "principles" belong to the system as a whole and not merely to the finite part of it, the reconstruction must be *real*. (4) Finally, the negative side confronts us again. The present "looks to the future for its completion and correction." But once more, the future brings some things that succeed and some that *fail* in "completing and correcting." What distinguishes these? Everything cannot simply "complete" and "correct" everything else without failure anywhere; for the very continued need of completion and correction implies failure somewhere, and without failure the whole problem disap-

[32] *Op. cit.*, 292f.

pears. Doubtless failure is no more final than success, but it is also no less real. If it be said that it is not as the immediate criterion itself, but as the postulate of the possibility of such a criterion, that the absolute system functions, the reply must be again, that the account thus far shows only that the specific case must occur in some sort of a larger matrix, and this the pragmatist daily preaches. But nowhere is there any detail to show that this larger whole must be an absolute, static system "completely fulfilled and realized."

At the close of this part of the discussion the conviction still abides that whatever troubles of its own pragmatism may have, (and it has its share) static absolutism has so far not disposed of the difficulty in the statement of which the present pragmatic movement started, viz., that there appears no necessary connection between the absolute system and the determination of truth and error "in any given case."

It would be both proper and interesting at this point to give a pragmatic reinterpretation of some of the fundamental categories of Professor Creighton' s account, such as, "rationally co-ordinated system," "completion and correction," "necessity and universality." But I am under bonds in this discussion to consider some further "objections" developed by the critics of pragmatism.

Perhaps the charge most universally and conspicuously brought is that of "subjectivism." This, of course, is the time-honored objection to any theory of knowledge. It seems to be the general formula for epistemological breakdown. And yet one may justly wonder just why it should always be the "object" that disappears in an inadequate epistemology. Surely Hume and Kant long since pointed out that in this case the "subject" also vanishes. Perhaps, however, it is because this is taken for granted that "subjectivism" is used as a general term for failure. At any rate, it may be interesting to know that it was the prediction of some pragmatists that, when the returns should come in from the critics, it would be found that instead of the old objection its opposite would be urged. It was surmised that, when it should be discovered that "fact and idea," "existence and meaning," "subject and object," "purpose and means" were regarded as functions in experience, the alarm would spread that the self had disappeared; that for warm, intimate, vital personalities had been substituted a cold, mechanical *objectivity*, more uncanny, if possible, than Mr. Bradley's celebrated "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." The author of this prophecy now consoles himself for its pathetic failure with the reflection that, at any rate, there is just so much the more hope that pragmatic doctrines may be more hospitably received when they are better "understood."

A canvass of the passages in which the charge of subjectivism is set forth shows that the charge rests upon the assumption that "specific,"

"definite," "need," "present," "immediate" are all purely subjective categories – an assumption somewhat difficult to understand in view of the assurances of Mr. Bradley, Professor Bosanquet, Professor Taylor, and others, that it is in the immediate perceptive experience that we "come in contact with reality"; indeed, that the very nature of the Absolute is "immediate sentient experience." In view of assurances also, on the other hand, that it is just the universal, the general, that is "hypothetical," "merely ideal," and belongs to "the world of internal meanings."[33]

"Need" may appear to some to be in a different case on account of its close connection with feeling. But I see no ground for regarding feeling as merely subjective, especially in view again of Mr. Bradley's and Professor Taylor's exposition of the immediate "sentient" character of the Absolute! Again, mere immediate feeling can scarcely be called a "need." A "need" must have some definition and therefore some idealization. The critics grant that the "need" arises in, and is relative to, what Professor Dewey calls the "situation," though they do not agree among themselves in their interpretation of the "situation." On the one hand, it is regarded as itself a merely "present" momentary individual, and therefore "subjective" affair. On the other hand, e.g., Professor Pringle-Pattison views it "as the very type of an independent world"; but he at once charges the pragmatist with inconsistency in appealing to it. At any rate, on this interpretation "need" as arising in, and relative to, the "situation" cannot be considered "subjective."

As for the subjective interpretation of the "situation," it is difficult to avoid the suggestion that it is a case of *imputatur quod putatur.* Starting with thought relative to "need," and "need" as arising in a "situation," the "situation" is, without any attempt at justification so far as I can discover, forthwith written down by the critics as itself "merely present," "momentary," and "subjective," and this presumably with such passages as the following before them.

> *The situation as such is clearly objective.* It is there; it is there as a whole; the various parts are there; and their active incompatibility with one another is there… . *Every reflective attitude and function, whether of naive life, deliberate invention, or controlled scientific research, has arisen through the medium of some such total objective situation.* The abstract logician may tell us that sensations or impressions or associated ideas, or bare physical things, or conventional symbols, are antecedent conditions. But such statements cannot be verified by

[33] Royce, *The World and the Individual*, I, chap. 7.

> reference to a single instance of thought in connection with actual practice or actual scientific research.[34]

Are not such passages as this, I submit, sufficient ground for the prophecy above mentioned, and enough also to make the pragmatist a little hard of faith regarding the kind of reading some of his doctrines have received?

But after all, it may be said, does not the pragmatist regard "situation" as something occurring in an "individual mind" or "consciousness"? On the contrary, *the individual consciousness is regarded as an element inside the "situation."* The "situation," if you will, is the pragmatist's absolute. Just how the individual is constituted, just what is his rôle in the situation, are questions demanding more serious attention from pragmatists and absolutists alike than they have so far received. The array of assumptions, masked behind the lines of personal pronouns thrown up on every page of philosophic writing, is, in Mr. Bradley's phrase, "scandalous." Meanwhile will not the critics look more carefully into the pragmatist's view of the "situation"?

As already remarked, Professor Pringle-Pattison's review is an interesting exception to this subjective interpretation of the "situation." He finds it to be "the very type of an independent world." In so far as this recognizes the thorough objectivity of the "situation," the reviewer here, as in most of his statements, reflects truly the pragmatist's view. But in so far as he would make thought external to, and independent of, the "situation," in so far as he would interpret the whole "situation" as a fixed "nature of things *to* which our ideas have to adapt themselves"; or as "a real world independent of our ideas and unmodified by what we think of it,"[35] the pragmatist could not follow. The pragmatist's "objective" is not that which is indifferent to, "independent of," and "unmodified [at least in the sense of unmodifiable] by," thought. There is, to be sure, and this is the reason for the parentheses just used, in every situation a content which from the standpoint of the purpose or problem now at issue is unchanging. From the standpoint of certain problems of the physicist and chemist, the table upon which I now write is conceived as undergoing violent changes. In my present situation, it is stable. *The permanent thus appears as that content in a "situation" the changes of which are irrelevant to that "situation"* – not the absolutely unchangeable, nor yet that which is independent of, and indifferent to, thought.

[34] Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, 38–39 (italics mine).

[35] *Op. cit.*, 669–70.

Even so, it will be said, "the nature of things" must be such that these changes *can* be irrelevant, can be ignored, in some cases, and cannot in others. To all of which the pragmatist cheerfully assents. Far be it from the pragmatist, of all men, to question the presence of "the stubborn grain" in experience of which the critics make so much. Indeed, this "stubborn grain in things" is fundamental to the whole position of the pragmatist, as should be apparent to the most casual reader, in the central rôle which *habit* everywhere plays in the pragmatist's accounts of the "situation." It is just the stubbornness of habit that constitutes half the stimulus to thought – the other half consisting in the fact that, however stubborn it may be, habit is after all plastic. While a stimulus involves resistance, the resistance must not be absolute, else hope yields to despair, and despair to paralysis. If habit, then, be stubborn, thought can be correspondingly strenuous. But it is a far cry from this "stubborn grain in things," which constitutes the very stimulus of thought, to an absolute fixity which defies thought. Indeed, the latter should not be called "stubborn," for stubbornness implies the possibility of change, if only the effort be great enough.

This suggests as next in order the Eleatic objection, to which Professor Bakewell devotes special attention in his article on "Latter-Day Flowing-Philosophy" in the recent interesting volume of *California Contributions to Philosophy* – the objection, namely, that pragmatism resolves the world into sheer flux. Professor Bakewell himself, however, thinks that there is a "necessity of a revision of the conception of the fixed"; that "the fixed itself must be conceived dynamically."[36] "The permanent shall not be found in a world of immutable ideas, nor in some mysterious psychical entity," nor yet in "a static plan external to the process and constraining us therein; but rather the solvent conception must be sought in the nature of "self-activity."[37] And yet, after this and much more excellent pragmatism, when Professor Bakewell comes to point out specifically where the permanent lies, he finds it in "*the* end toward which it [experience] tends, in so far as that end can be, as it were, appropriated by the life of the individual." Or in "a system of purposes within which each particular purpose has its place and relative value."[38] And, finally, he can write: "I may not, in the words of the familiar hymn, 'ask to see the distant scene' … but I must believe that there is a distant scene to which the steps as they come one by one are, or may be, surely leading."[39] But

[36] P. 106.

[37] P. 112.

[38] Pp. 109f. (italics mine).

[39] P. 113.

if this "end, this "system of purposes," and this "distant scene" are absolutely fixed, as they appear to be, it is hard to see how they have any *logical* advantage over "a static plan," a fixed "psychical entity," or the "world of immutable ideas," the difficulties in which Professor Bakewell seems to appreciate.

This apparent failure to "conceive the fixed dynamically" seems to be due to two things: First, and less important, the inference that, if thought is to change the "situation" at all, it must change *everything* in it, and must change everything *at once;* either of which suppositions annihilates both change and permanence. Second, and more fundamental, permanence is still sought as a *quality* of a certain content. Then forthwith appears the problem of getting it into any connection with the *moving* content without itself being drawn into the stream – a world-old puzzle the changes on which have been rung from Zeno to Bradley. But if, instead of a fixed *quality* of an immutable content, we make permanence a true *category*,[40] a *function* of experience, some of the puzzles would seem to disappear. Permanence now becomes the function of *making* permanent. As such, it is a form of *activity*, instead of a form of inactivity correlative with change as the form of activity. It is as *active* as change. Permanence and change are thus correlative functions of that self-activity which, as Professor Bakewell says, constitutes "the solvent conception." But, again, we must beware of translating these correlative functions into fixed *qualities* of unchangeable contents. Between these functions there is a constant interchange of content as in the case of the table above cited. In some such direction as this, it seems to me, we must reach the "dynamical conception of the fixed" which Professor Bakewell so much desiderates.

One may think, as apparently most of the critics do, that we escape the difficulties of an absolutely permanent content by giving the permanent the form of a *purpose*. But, again, if this purpose be absolutely final, the old objections seem as competent as ever. No one professes to have discovered what this final purpose is. And if we say: "Ah, but we are finding it out little by little"; what, again, are we to do with our mistakes? Professor Bakewell says: "In so far as that end can be, as it were, appropriated by the life of the individual."[41] But what are we to do with the misappropriations? Shall we simply close our eyes to mistakes and failure, and dream that *everything* we know and do is an "appropriation" of this final purpose? And it affords no relief from this difficulty to say that the purpose "functions implicitly," for whether it controls implicitly or

[40] Kant's difficulties with his categories are due to the fact that he takes them now as functions and now as qualities, and then confuses these.

[41] *Op. cit.*, 109.

explicitly there is still no room for mistakes; and another difficulty is added in that it seems as if a *standard* as such must be explicit. But even if this final purpose be explicit, if it be simply "appropriated," what guaranty is there of its relevancy to the material which it is to organize? In the form of an antinomy, the case is this: The ultimate purpose as a standard must be appropriated; it cannot be constructed; for if it be constructed, there must be a standard for this construction, and so on in infinite regression. On the other hand, the standard must be constructed; it cannot be simply "appropriated," else there is no guaranty that it will apply to the situation; its relevancy will be wholly a matter of chance.

We cannot here deal in detail with this antinomy. The key to it appears to lie in the failure to see that in every situation the purpose *is* the standard. Purpose and standard are not two things. When we ask for the purpose of a purpose, it is equivalent to asking for a standard of a standard. Though we may tolerate this in words, yet in fact when we ask for the purpose of a purpose, this last purpose is really no longer regarded as a purpose. It is either an incomplete purpose, of which the other "purpose" is simply the completion, or it is some immediate activity seeking a purpose, i.e., an outlet which carries over the name "purpose" from a previous situation in which it did function as such. Of course, these really are not two distinct cases, but different stages of the same development. If we say the standard of a violin is the sort of tone it gives, and then ask what is the standard of tone, we are not here appealing to *another* purpose, to another standard. We are simply trying to *complete* the statement of *the* purpose, *the* standard. We may still loosely call the first statement a "purpose," since it may previously have sufficed as such. But here it needs further definition.

Moreover, the question will again be raised: "How does the purpose, the standard, complete itself?" First, it is significant to note again that it *does* complete itself – enough, at any rate, to stimulate the manufacturing and playing of violins. The terrors of the infinite regress appear reserved for logicians and metaphysicians. Artists, artisans, and scientists do not seem to be seriously disturbed by it. The purpose can attain completion just because here its completeness does not consist in an abstract point-for-point participatory correspondence with an absolute purpose, but in the *way* in which it gives *outlet* to the activities, in this case the musical activities, which it serves. In this sense, the means justifies the end; in this sense, the purpose is itself a "means." The purpose is not trying to complete *itself* as an independent thing; it finds its completion as it provides an outlet for the activities which are seeking expression through it.

But, one may say, the case here is too simple. Suppose the actions seeking expression in violin making and playing are in conflict with other

activities. How shall this conflict be decided, if not by an appeal to an *ultimate* purpose? As for simplicity, of course, unless there is *some* conflict, *some* resistance, the whole affair becomes automatic. Nor in the case of conflict can there be any doubt that an ultimate purpose (i.e., ultimate for that problem) must be *reached*. To say, however, that there must be an appeal *to* an ultimate purpose implies a purpose ready made for the case, which is just the point in dispute. Now the very insistence upon conflict seems incompatible with such a conception of the ultimate purpose. For, waiving the question of relevancy already mentioned, if the purpose were really complete and ready made for the situation, it would apply itself just as fast as the least need of it developed, which would keep conflict at the minimum, and, pushed to the limit, run again into automatism. The very presence of conflict involves the absence of any complete purpose. A part of the whole struggle is to *construct* a purpose, not to decide between purposes already formed. But how, after all, is this to be done? Here is where the "looking abroad and before and after," the recalling of the contents of other purposes, the remembering of one's largest life plans, perhaps even the formation of a hierarchy of ends, takes place. But all this is in the process of gathering *material* for *the* purpose through which the conflicting activities must be unified *here and now.* Even our most cherished ambition is to be considered rather as material for further purposes than as a completed, final purpose.[42] At all events, such an ambition is of a very different type from the unchangeable absolute purpose; for it is usually a gradually matured *construction* out of a wide range of social material, and the constant *modification* of such general ideals is notorious.[43]

But after all, just what marks the completion of the purpose? Here it would seem as if there should be no great difficulty with the answer, since absolutist vies with pragmatist in insisting that the purpose through which this conflict finds its solution is that plan which gives the "freest" and most "harmonious" outlet to the conflicting activities. But when such a purpose is reached – and obviously it is reached – it is for *that* situation complete, final, and absolute. Purposes come and purposes go, but *purposing* goes on forever. The absolutely permanent in the form of

[42] For an excellent detailed statement of teleological as opposed to absolute finality, and the nature of a standard, cf. Professor H. W. Stuart's articles on "The Logic of Self-Realization," in the *University of California Contributions to Philosophy*, I.

[43] And here let it be noted also, that, instead of begetting a spirit of resignation to the passing moment, instead of preaching *laissez faire*, this conception of purpose places a premium upon the farthest reach into the past and future, since this is a part of the process of surveying and analyzing the scope of the activities involved in the conflict. As a basis for resignation, this view of purpose cannot hope to compete with the ready-made unchangeable absolute purpose.

purpose turns out to be the hypostatized abstraction of the function of purposing. The poet should have written: "For I doubt not through the ages one increasing *purposing* runs."

And yet, someone may say, however unanimous may be this appeal to the "sense" of freedom and harmony as the test of the finality of purpose, does not this "sense" bring again the taint of "subjectivism"? The answer is: Yes; if we gratuitously separate this "sense" of freedom and harmony from the thinking and purposing out of which it issues, and take it alone and in its naked immediacy; and if we equally gratuitously suppose that *all* the factors of the original situation, the feeling, and thinking, and purposing, are located in an individual mind, then we may indeed have what it is the fashion to call subjectivism. But if we say – as we must say, if we are to deal fairly with the whole matter – that this "sense" of freedom and harmony to which we last appealed is not any bare, detached, unmediated fragment of feeling that we may happen to find, but is the issue of a process of purposing and thinking, including "experimentation and verification" based on results of previous thought and action, involving as many individual minds and as much of the "material" world as you will – if we remember, in short, that this *mediated* "sense" of harmony and freedom issues from a "situation" having all the objectivity of the whole world of reality in it – the last suspicion of subjectivism disappears.

This intimate relationship of thought and sense brings us to the next count against the pragmatist, viz., "dualism." As already indicated, with "concreteness and continuity of experience" as his watchword, this was the last charge the pragmatist expected to meet. According to the critics, the pragmatist is afflicted with dualism in two forms: (1) a genetic dualism due to his alleged conception of thought as "a product of evolution,"[44] as arising as a "variation" of an antecedently existing matrix;[45] (2) a dualism in the immediate operations of mental functions, found in the sharp "opposition" and "subordination" of thought to immediate experience.[46]

Even if these passages correctly reported the pragmatist's views of the relation of thought and evolution, it is not clear how the genetic dualism is made out. Suppose thought did appear as a "variation" of a pre-existing non-thinking "prius," how would that prevent it from being "in any sense organic" when it did appear? That would seem to be the best guaranty of its "organic" character. But, says Professor Creighton, "it comes not as the development of a principle already immanent in, and

[44] Professor Royce in *Philosophical Review*, XIII, 127.

[45] Professor Creighton, *ibid*., 286–87, 297.

[46] *Ibid*.

constitutive of, the earlier stage, but as a variation, or *deus ex machina,* that introduces something entirely new."[47] But as a "variation" *of* the prius, how can it be anything but a development of something *in* it? What else can vary? And how can development fail to produce variation? Development, surely, is not a mere quantitative expansion of some unchanging quality. But, on the other hand, how can a *variation* introduce something "*entirely* new"?[48]

But the statements above quoted by no means represent the views of any pragmatist whom I know regarding the relation between thought and evolution. The following passages illustrate:

> Since Reality must be defined in terms of Experience, judgment appears as *the medium through which the consciously effected evolution of reality goes on.*[49]

Again:

> In self-activity there must be a constant reorganization of the results back into process… . This implies that (self) activity involves both a mechanical and a reconstructive function… . Habit is the conserving … thought the reconstructing function. Habit and thought are thus constituent poles (functions) of experience (of self-activity). As such neither can be regarded as an ultimate (or prius) out of which the other is evolved.[50]

The radical misapprehension of the pragmatist's view of evolution is due apparently (1) to the critics having overlooked the fact that the pragmatist's conception of evolution differs in some rather important respects from that of Herbert Spencer, which is evidently the one from which the criticisms are made. For the pragmatist, thought is not a "product" but an organic factor in the *process* of evolution. (2) The misinterpretation is further due to the fact that the critics have mistaken descriptions of the "conditions and antecedents" of *particular* acts of thought for accounts of the absolute origin of thought, and statements of the antecedents of *reflective* thought for antecedents of all thought. Thus, the descriptions of the "conditions and antecedents" of thought, as contained in the first two chapters of the *Studies in Logical Theory,* are

[47] *Ibid*., 296.

[48] Italics mine.

[49] Professor Dewey in Preface to *Studies in Logical Theory*. Italics mine.

[50] The writer's *Existence, Meaning, and Reality*, 16–17.

simply statements of the conditions under which the reflective function operates, or rather, in which experience passes into the reflective form, since the function of reflection exists only as it operates. Such an interpretation of thought in relation to its antecedents should be evident from the repeated description of the relation between reflection and immediate experience as one of "rhythm." "We recognize a certain rhythm of direct practice and derived theory; of primary construction and of secondary criticism." Again: "Having busied itself to meet the special difficulty, thought releases that topic and enters upon further more direct experience."[51] Many other passages could be cited.

If thought is thus spoken of as derived and as secondary, the direct experience is no less secondary and derived, since it is held to be just the business of reflection to develop new content in immediate experience. "Secondary" and "derived" here mean only, in Professor James's words, that "one part of our experience leans on another part to make it what it is."[52] Thus, there is no more a "pure" emotional and impulsive prius than there is "pure" thought. Emotions and impulse are permeated with the results of previous thinking. Indeed they *are,* in large measure, its results. "Doubtless many and many an act of thought has intervened in effecting the organization of our commonest practical – affectional – aesthetic region of values."[53] If these citations and comments suffice to remove the misapprehension of the pragmatist's general conception of evolution and of the relations of reflection and immediate experience, there would seem to be little foundation left for the charge of genetic dualism.

As for dualism in the *de facto* working relations between thought and immediate experience, due to the "sharp opposition" and "subordination" of the former to the latter, it would be difficult to imagine a finer instance of historic irony than this: That those who hold with Mr. Bradley that thought is a special impulse,[54] that it satisfies itself in complete independence of the feelings and impulses, that "in its actual exercise [it] takes no account of the psychological situation,"[55] or with Professor Royce that it is the purpose of thought to attain "a certain absolute system of ideas"[56] – that these should accuse of "dualism" those whose creed is: "Since the act of knowing is intimately and indissolubly

[51] Professor Dewey, *op. cit.*, 2–3.

[52] "The Essence of Humanism," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, II, No. 5.

[53] Professor Dewey, *op. cit.*, 43.

[54] *Appearance and Reality*, 153.

[55] *Mind*, N.S., No. 51, p. 309, note.

[56] *The World and the Individual*, I, 36, *et passim*.

connected with the like yet diverse functions of affection, appreciation, and practice, it only distorts results reached to treat knowing as a self-inclosed and self-explanatory whole – hence the intimate connections of logical theory with functional psychology."[57] And the irony continues in the present interesting spectacle of James, the pluralist, defending the unity of experience against the pluralizing attacks of Bradley, the absolutist.[58]

A quotation of such general character as the one just given, of course, proves nothing in detail. It states only a standpoint which should be kept in mind by the critics in interpreting other passages. It seems, indeed, as if this objection of dualism grows largely out of the fact that, in the very effort to get this "independent," "self-sufficient," and "self-inclosed" thought back into organic connection with immediate experience, the pragmatist has been obliged to bring out the *differences* between it and the more direct forms of experience – differences which expositions of "pure thought" have little occasion to mention, and which, when brought out by the pragmatist, are taken as symptoms of dualism instead of real bonds of connection as they are intended, and as they really are. Of course, if mere difference of function as such be regarded as dualism, then we must all be, not dualists, but pluralists. The question is, however, what, in spite, of, or by *means* of these differences, is the kind of *connection* between reflective and "direct" forms of experience. Mr. Bradley says: "I agree that there is no such existing thing as pure thought." But he adds: "On the other side, if in the end there is to be no such thing as *independent* thought, thought, that is, which in its actual exercise takes no account of the psychological situation, I am myself in the end led inevitably to skepticism."[59]

But is it not clear that, just in so far as thought in its operation "takes no account" of its relation to other experience, it is functionally as "pure" as any of which Plato ever dreamed? Thought now simply goes on alongside feeling and impulse. This, then, joins the issue squarely. The pragmatist contends that the relation between thought, on the one hand, and feeling and impulse, on the other, is something more than that of mere parallelism in somebody's head. He insists that thought and feeling and habit are mutually conditioning processes; that, in Professor James's phrase, they "lean on" each other; that each receives from the other its stimulus, its material, and its limits, and that *without* this interrelationship *he* "is inevitably led to skepticism." The pragmatist admits the

[57] *Studies in Logical Theory*, Preface, x.

[58] *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, II, No. 2.

[59] *Mind*, No. 51, p. 309, note (italics mine).

difference between thought and the other moments of experience, but denies that this difference means "independence." He grants, too, that thought has its own technique of operation, and that this has its own immediate felt value. But he denies that its whole operation is in "independence" of the other processes. From them thought receives its problem and its material; to them, as its goal and its test, thought returns.

In an appeal, at this point, to what Mr. Bradley calls "the plain [?] facts," Professor Baldwin cites the time-honored instance of mathematics as the type of "pure" and "independent" thought – of thought that "dispenses with the test of fact."[60] Now even so thoroughgoing an idealistic absolutist as Professor Royce admits that mathematical thinking must find its "satisfaction" in "presented fact";[61] and, we must add, its origin also. First, the problem must be a certain *kind* of mathematical problem; it must arise out of a certain kind of immediate data and must look forward to a specific sort of result. This means that the problem originates in some kind of a tension or discrepancy between certain immediate data in the form of imagery of some sort and certain other imagery equally immediate. Furthermore, the process of mediating, of amalgamating these conflicting data involves, as Professor Royce shows, hypothesis and experimentation as truly as does the work of the chemist. In other words, no matter how deeply involuted the process of reflection may become, there will always be in it some content *serving* as fact and other serving as idea.[62] Finally, what shall determine when the process of mediation, of working back and forth between the conflicting elements, reaches its goal? "When it reaches fact," says one. But it has had some fact all along. "When it reaches a harmonious, a satisfactory idea," says another. But if it ends in a mere idea, we still have the opposition of idea and fact, and the need, therefore, of further mediation. The goal, then, must be the amalgamation of the conflicting activities into a new immediacy in which the opposition between fact and idea disappears.

By this time there should hardly be any necessity for a paragraph on the "subordination" of thought, if subordination is taken as a category of value. One might as well speak of the subordination of the heart to the lungs. Yet, on this same point of "subordination," the position of the critics does not appear altogether univocal. On the one hand, thought is

[60] *Psychological Bulletin*, I, No. 12, p. 427.

[61] *The World and the Individual*, I, chap. vii.

[62] By way of a "sweeping" generalization at this point, I would say that no other one thing has been so productive of criticisms that seem to the pragmatist beside the mark as the failure of the critics to see, or at least to continue to see, that for the pragmatist the distinction of "fact" and "idea" is a distinction of *ways* in which a content functions – not an odor or color of the idea.

to be "independent" and "self-sufficient"; on the other, it must be dependent on, and conformed to, the facts, to the "stubborn grain in things."

Concerning ambiguity in the use of the terms "practice" and "practical purpose," there seems to be some ground for complaint on both sides.[63] Yet in some cases the allegation is due to a real difference between the author and the critic in the meaning of the terms. Everyone now recognizes that it profits nothing to say that thought is true when it "works," since it must "work" in some way for absolutist and pragmatist alike. All now see that the issue concerns the *kind* of work it is to do. But when the pragmatist is charged with ambiguity because he uses "practical purpose," now to denote "material ends for the sake of which physical movements are necessary," and now to denote "purely theoretical problems,"[64] he must reply: (1) that an "end" cannot as such be "material"; as end it must be ideal; and (2) that "purely theoretical" begs the issue, since it is just the pragmatist's contention that, *in so far as both involve thought,* there is no generic difference between starting a fire and manipulating mathematical equations. Indeed, the latter may easily be a part of the former, and even in its most ideal stages depends at every point on the "physical" side of the machinery of visual, motor, etc., imagery.[65]

It would be a grateful task, did space permit, to turn from these "differences," which a paper of this nature necessarily emphasizes, to the constantly enlarging "common ground." As Professor Bakewell points out, there is marked agreement in the common emphasis of the volitional character of thought and feeling. To this might be added a general agreement as to the mediating character of thought – though for the absolutist this is only *one* of its functions – and further an agreement that thought finds its limit and standard in a "harmonious experience," though again there is disagreement concerning the character and significance of this harmony. Fortunately the differences are still numerous enough, if I may close with a Hegelism, to insure a long period of fruitful co-operation in philosophic development.

[63] Cf. Dr. Schiller's account of Mr. Bradley's offense in this direction, *Mind*, N.S., XIII, No. 52; and see also the writer's paper in *Studies in Logical Theory*, 349, on Professor Royce's uses of "purpose."

[64] Professor Creighton, *Philosophical Review*, XIII, 181.

[65] Mr. Bradley thinks this sort of "alteration of existence" is irrelevant for logic, which is again one way of stating the whole issue. Cf. *Mind*, N.S., No. 51, p. 319.

VIII
THE PRAGMATIC "UNIVERSAL"[66]

In a suggestive article on "The Limits of Pragmatism"[67] Professor Baldwin finds, as do many others, one of the chief "limits" to be the inability of pragmatism to make universal judgments. He finds it "interesting to note that the word 'general' does not occur in the rather full index to the Chicago *Studies in Logical Theory*," which is freely cited as representative literature of pragmatism. Now if Professor Baldwin had but recalled what he must well know, that even an index – especially a philosophical one – has to be "interpreted," he would have turned to "universal," especially as he interchanges this term with "general," under which he would have found eight references, some of them with "ffs." And in my monograph on *Existence, Meaning, and Reality*, to which he also refers, there is space to the amount of five octavo pages given almost entirely to the discussion of "universality." Indeed it is difficult to see how one could go through the "Chicago Contributions" and emerge with an impression that this topic had been overlooked.

As there is a conception of abstract universality, which is difficult to reconcile with any sort of pragmatism, so there is current, largely among its critics, a conception of pragmatism which is difficult to square with any kind of universality. So far as I have seen, the imputations of "Atomism," "Nominalism," etc., are based, not on a criticism of the fundamental conceptions of pragmatism, but on an atomistic interpretation of Professor James's pluralism. I say "an atomistic interpretation," for it seems to me that it does not require a second look to discover that Professor James's pluralism is not atomism. Everywhere there is "interaction," "stimulus and response," "generation," "continuity," and "growth." The emphasis of the pluralistic character is simply a reaction against a lust for a unity so absolute that there is no room in it for any movement of differences. And here, again, we touch the "metaphysical" nerve of the whole pragmatic movement. Pragmatism is not concerned primarily with the question of unity and plurality, although experience is as manifestly a plurality as a unity. Its chief metaphysical problem is that

[66] Published in the *Psychological Bulletin*, I, No. 12.

[67] *Psychological Review*, XI, No. 1.

of change, of development. It is an attempt to reach such a conception of unity, *and* differences, as shall permit of "real" movement. It is a crusade to release change from the limbo of "appearances," and reality from the stocks of a changeless unity. This "metaphysical" problem is for the pragmatist, of course, but a part of the larger ethical and social problem of thinking of the world (or experience) in such a way as to leave the individual a chance to be truly and therefore responsibly efficient.

Seeing that the champions of unity have almost with one voice insisted that the unity of reality involves its unchangeableness, some, who cherish convictions against such cashiering of change, have apparently accepted this verdict of absolutism and said in effect: "If the choice is between absolute unity with absolute fixity on the one hand, and pluralism with movement, development, on the other, we accept the latter." But the pluralist at once restores unity by his categories of "interaction," "stimulus and response," etc.; only now he has a dynamic instead of a static unity. It is quite possible, then, that one may be a pragmatist and insist emphatically upon this moving unity. At all events, the critic's plea to take the pragmatist's case away from the jury at the start on the charge of "atomism" is certainly not to be allowed.

Returning to Professor Baldwin's "limit", he finds that pragmatic logic, while perfectly capable of making particular judgments, is impotent when it attempts to deal with the "universal" (pp. 50, 52 ff.). Now most modern logicians, including perhaps most pragmatists, would say that such an indictment could be drawn only on the conception of a separate and independent relation between the particular and the universal. They would insist that it is impossible to have a valid logic of particular judgments apart from a logic of universals. For every judgment is a development of experience *through* a universal. A standpoint, therefore, which is able to construct a valid logic of the particular judgment must be, at the same time, a logic of the universal.

In Professor Baldwin's account of the universal it seems to play, as in the statements of Professor Royce and Mr. Bradley, two quite different rôles, and the relation between them is very difficult to discover.[68] (1) "It is just

[68] As another illustration of the strange *tête-à-tête* a philosophical discussion may bring about, the following is interesting: On p. 53 Professor Baldwin says: "This may be a way of saying with many modern logicians, that only particular, not universal judgments carry the affirmation of reality: if we limit ourselves to pragmatic tests, available only in concrete experience, I see no way of avoiding such a view. But such a position it seems to me allies pragmatism with extreme nominalism." But what about the "many modern logicians" holding this view, who are not pragmatists? (Indeed I know of no pragmatist who holds it.) It is, in fact, just the absolutists who are the chief expounders of this view. Behold, then, according to our author, the pragmatist and the absolutist sitting together in the tent of nominalism!

the meaning of a general mode of thought that it stands for the particular case in the sense of organizing it with other experiences" (p. *53)*. (2) On the other hand, "the general concept pretends to be valid as a vehicle of the real apprehension of the world." Now this latter is capable of an interpretation quite in agreement with (1); and indeed Professor Baldwin comes near giving it such a meaning on the page cited, as will be shown below. But on the very next page we read that this world, the real apprehension of which it is the business of the universal and normative aspects of experience to give us, is one that transcends the experiences of real life. "How can practical life adequately test the validity of modes *which essentially claim to transcend the experiences of real life?*" "How indeed?" responds the pragmatist.

On the test of the universal Professor Baldwin says (p. 53):

> No appeal to a concrete situation can validate an aspect of reality which is *ipso facto* a systematization of various such situations or cases. There must be, therefore, if such thinking is to have any control or positive validation, certain principles of logically apprehended reality as such. This would throw us back upon the traditional "laws of thought," I suppose, or some analogous self-applying criteria of sound thinking.

At the risk of appearing captious, the discussion at this point will have to run somewhat to an exposition of terms. If we take "concrete" etymologically it should mean the unified harmonious grown-together stage of experience which does not need "systematizing." It is the immediate outcome or forerunner of systematization. It is only when experience ceases to be "concrete" in this sense that organization is required. The general, therefore, is not a system "of various concrete experiences as such." It is only when experience is broken up and becomes material, a "matrix," a "platform," to use a term of Professor Baldwin's, for *further* experience, that it needs organization.

The point can be stated in terms of the conception of "system." Why should various "concrete" experiences need systematizing anyway? And in just what does the systematization consist? And how is it known when systematization is reached? Professor Baldwin says that systematization consists in "organizing a particular case with other experience." Here, of course, we have only exchanged terms. For we have forthwith to answer for "organization." Nor are we much better off in the next sentence. "It introduces organization, relationship and systematization into experience just to the dropping off of those aspects which are individual." Thus, experience becomes general by being organized with other experiences, and it is organized by becoming general, that is, by "leaving off the individual aspect." And what, by the way, are these individual aspects?

Does every experience have a certain quality that is in itself individual and a certain other that is in itself universal? But of this more below. So far, at any rate, we have made little progress in finding a criterion of organization and system. And the difficulty in starting out to systematize and organize experiences just as large is very great. None of this is intended to call in question the fact of system and organization in experience. It desires only to call for an interpretation instead of a mere assumption of them.

And what do we gain by "falling back upon the traditional laws of thought" – consistency, contradiction, etc.? For we must at once face the question: What is the meaning of "consistent," or, as Professor Baldwin calls it, "flawless" thinking, in terms simply of the process itself? Professor Baldwin does not explicitly deal with this question, but I imagine the only answer he could make is the one generally made, viz., that it is simply "the sense of a harmonious, unified, unimpeded flow of the thought-process within itself." If so, are we not caught on the very sands of "subjectivism" and "atomism" from which we have been so frantically warning the pragmatist? If the test of thinking is consistency and the mark of consistency is simply the immediate sense of harmony and freedom in the process in itself, apart from any limit in further experience, and if we take this as in itself yielding truth, reflecting reality, is not this the very essence of subjective atomism? *The abstract universal is thus just as subjective and atomistic as the abstract particular.* Nor can we escape by an appeal to "the essential uniformity of intelligence as such." This is as gigantic a *petitio* – to say nothing of the facts – as its "empirical" correlative, "the uniformity of nature."

There appears, then, to be need for some further analysis of "system," "organization," "consistency," "contradiction," etc. Roughly sketched, the pragmatist's contribution to this demand runs somewhat as follows: he points out that every experience (and the distinction between "experience in general" and "my experience" matters not just here) has two values: (1) it has a unique value of its own as immediate experience; (2) it has a value as the basis, the "platform," of further experience. And it is to this latter function that the categories of "organization," "consistency," "universality" and "particularity," "validity," "truth" and "error" belong. Taken in its bare immediacy, experience is neither valid nor invalid, true nor false, systematic nor chaotic, consistent nor inconsistent. It is only as a means to, or as an outcome of, other experience that any content takes on these characteristics. Of course the process of systematizing has its own immediate sense value. But the point is that when we get at the conditions and significance of this "sense" we find that they lie in *its relation to further experience*. Shorn of this developmental character, organization, system, validity, etc., are indeed left without any

"limits" by which to define them. They remain terms referring to immediate qualities of experience offering and requiring no credentials of any sort.

If we pass now to the process of systematization itself, Professor Baldwin says that it proceeds by "dropping off those aspects which are individual." Taken as it stands, this certainly has in it a suggestion of old-time "realism." It reads as if there were in experience something *per se* individual and something else *per se* universal. But even if this were the case, why should the "dropping" of the individual characteristics produce system or organization? Why would not the individual aspects themselves make as good a system as the universal? Now I do not think that anyone who has read Professor Baldwin's most suggestive chapter on "Selective Thinking"[69] and his debate with Mr. Bosanquet[70] about it could regard any such statements as the above as representing his "settled views." Just as we there are taught that a content of experience "is not selected because it is true, *but is true because it is selected*," so, while the point is not explicitly treated, the whole trend and tenor of "selective thinking" would lead us to say that systematization is not something determined wholly in and to itself, but is a process which is relative to, and has its goal in, a further concrete experience.[71] The doctrine of that chapter, also, would lead us to say, not that certain elements of experience are "dropped" because they are *per se* particular, and others are retained because *per se* general, but the rather that they are particular because they are dropped and general because they are retained. It is just the fact that a certain content persists as the basis, the "platform," the *point d'appui,* of further concrete experience, that makes it general. Also since Locke's analysis of essence it has been well understood that what is "dropped" as particular in one situation is retained as general in another. Generality, therefore, is not a kind or quality of content, but is the relation which any content bears to the further development of experience. In short, universality does not mean an absolutely changeless possession of all intelligence. It means rather the *continuity* of experience – the fact that experience is a self-developing process.

If this be the meaning of universality, and if by "concrete" we mean just the further experience in which both the general and the particular disappear, then what else but the "concrete" can be the "test" of the

[69] *Psychological Review*, January, 1898, and chap. 17 of *Development and Evolution*.

[70] *Psychological Review*, X.

[71] Here it must be remembered that "concrete" is used, not as the correlative of universal, i.e., not in the sense of particular, but as meaning that stage or "aspect" of experience to which the universalizing and particularizing process leads and in which they, as such, disappear.

universal? To be sure, it cannot test it as a representation or reflection of a reality which "transcends all real life." But it can test it as a developmental device *inside* the process of "real life." It is when we lose sight of this productive, developmental, this forward-moving function of the universal, that we have nothing left but to "fall back on the traditional laws of thought" for the test of its validity.

Now, pragmatism is not an attempt to sponge these "traditional laws of thought" from the statutes. It simply insists that in themselves they do not constitute the final test of truth. *They constitute the cues and guides of the generalizing process.* They are part of the *technique* of thinking. In terms of habit they are, as Professor Baldwin well shows, part of the machinery whereby a hypothetical selection of material for adjustment is made. Here is where the so-called "universal judgment" appears with its technique of "consistency," "contradiction," etc. The universal judgment is an expression of the habit elements involved in *every* judgment.[72] Hence, indeed, its "hypothetical" character. But again not "hypothetical" *in itself*. As an immediate experience it is as "categorical" and "real" as any other. It is "hypothetical" only with reference to further experience, only because *it is not only an immediate but at the same time a mediating experience*. And in this latter rôle, the test of its validity cannot lie merely "within itself."

And this suggests that the solution of the different views of the function of the universal in "real life" is perhaps to be found in the avoidance of a confusion of the immediate and mediating values of experience. The critics of pragmatism insist that thought is just as "good" and "real" and "true" an experience as any other; to all of which the pragmatist enthusiastically subscribes. Aye, an intellectualistically bred pragmatist (parodoxical as this may sound to some) might go further and say that all the rest of experience is just to furnish material for thought.

But even so, this yields the pragmatist's whole contention, namely: *that thought is not sufficient unto itself*. It must have "means." It can renew and feed itself only in and through the great stream of instinctive, emotional, and volitional content. It too must lose its life to find it. In insisting on the "real," "true," valid-in-itself character of thought, the critic is taking thought in its immediate character. But this is not thought as a logical process; and "true," "real," "valid" are here not logical categories. It is the mediating function of thought that gives it its logical

[72] Here may be the place to remark that it is possible that the treatment in the logics of the universal judgment as a *kind* of judgment, apparently complete in itself, tends – despite subsequent qualifications – to nourish the notion that there must therefore be a special kind of reality corresponding to it – which, not being found of course in "real life," must exist in a "transcendent" realm.

quality, and to speak here of "truth" and "validity" with no reference to the goal of the mediation is surely a flagrant case of *Hamlet* without the Prince.

Such an omission too would seem to be pretty nearly equivalent to cutting off the second part of what Professor Baldwin in his "Selective Thinking" gives as, "The test of truth in the external world."[73] "The first test is that of assimilation to established habits." [Instead of "test," etc., I should prefer to say, "step toward constructing truth," and instead of "assimilation to" I should prefer "response of."] Professor Baldwin continues: "This is the test of the general character of a new experience." [Again, instead of "test of" I should write "constitutes."] Second, "there is the environmental test or test of fact." That is, "there is a further selection from these established habits of those which work in the specific environment." [Here, for "selection from," etc., I should prefer "reconstruction or modification of."] At any rate it is here clearly recognized that there may be an internal technique of generalization that does not as such give truth. Thought does not become "true," is not "validated," until it is tested by its results under the specific conditions. "A truth is an item of content which is expected when issuing in a movement to work under the exactions of fact." Again: "There is no question of truth until *both* these selective functions have been operative."[74] Here it is certainly implied that in the first "test" alone we get only the abstract, formal universal – the mere statement that whatever the outcome is to be, it will be some kind of a reconstruction of certain established habits.

But from the standpoint of his paper on "The Limits of Pragmatism" Professor Baldwin might be expected to reply: "Ah, but you have been quoting from my account of 'tests of truth *in the external world*,"[75] whereas my point here is that there is a realm of purely universal truth as expressed in the universal judgment, which is independent of 'the test of fact' or environment." The rejoinder obviously would repeat the burden of the whole preceding discussion, the net outcome of which is that when thought is thus cut off from the rest of "real life" and is regarded as a self-sufficient, self-perpetuating process, it becomes essentially a subjective and atomistic affair. Truth and error consist merely in an immediate sense of harmony or contradiction unchecked by any "limits" in further experience.

As already intimated, this consequence is masked under the assumption of "the essential unity of intelligence as such." This really is a back-door

[73] Sec. 6 of the chapter.

[74] *Development and Evolution*, 251 (italics mine).

[75] Italics mine.

resumption of the social and other "real-life" tests and checks of thought denied in the premises. For this means that the established habits which are the basis of the universal judgment have been developed, as Professor Baldwin has long contended, in a thoroughly social matrix. Hence we can trust the sense of consistency, in the responses of these habits, for a working hypothesis in the world of "real life" – the world in which the habits grew and to which therefore they are relevant.

To this Professor Baldwin could say that he has freely admitted that in a social pragmatism (and who has ever preached any other?) "a *strain* of universality and generality is imparted to knowledge in the aspect which constitutes it public to a social group." "But," he adds, "the limitation remains that such a theory would give a logic of a stage of cognitive process, that at which pragmatic tests are transferred to the social group, rather than a philosophy of the entire movement of reality."[76]

Now, in his logic, the pragmatist does not profess to state *all* the content of "the entire movement of reality." The business of logic is to discuss the part thought plays *in* reality. This, of course, cannot be done without giving a general statement of one's view of the nature of reality. Hence, any logic seems bound to this extent "to blow itself up into the dimensions of a philosophy."[77] However, it is true that in so far as he is thus forced to state his view of reality the pragmatist confesses that the only reality he can find in which thought is playing a discoverable part is just the world of instinctive, emotional, volitional, social, "real life," and this he says too without prejudice to the conviction that this world of "real life" may have in it things not yet dreamed of in our philosophies. And he would insist that when thought is thus placed in such a world it can claim not a mere "strain" of universality but all it is capable of – all it can use and verify.

Elsewhere it seems to me Professor Baldwin has regarded this sort of verification as quite sufficient, not merely as a confirmation of a theory of the "genesis" of thought, but as *logical* verification – as a criterion of truth. In his effective rejoinder to Dr. Bosanquet[78] he says: "Genetic theory therefore explains both under what influence we have come to hold (often wrongly) certain judgments to be true and *also by what character judgments are true*."[79] To be sure this is prefaced with such statements as, "I agree with Dr. Bosanquet in confining genetic theory to questions of genesis… . Personally I am not a pragmatist… . I think

[76] *The Limits of Pragmatism*, 51.

[77] *Ibid*., 48.

[78] *Psychological Review*, July, 1903.

[79] Italics mine.

pragmatism is not able as such to explain the general or universal aspects of reality." But if it is valid as a theory of genesis and if genetic theory can explain "*just by what character judgments are true*," it has gone beyond the question of *mere* genesis. It is in the thick of logic. And if truth involves universality, and if truth must be conceived in some sort of intelligible relation to reality, it is difficult to see just what there is left to be explained or interpreted by some other *kind* of logic.

IX
PROFESSOR PERRY ON PRAGMATISM[80]

In the innumerable replies and rejoinders of pragmatists to their critics there has been a pretty constant and often plaintive contention that much of the critic's case against the pragmatist is due to the fact that the critic at some point attributes his own conceptions to the pragmatist and then exhibits in triumph the impossibility of harmonizing these conceptions with other pragmatic doctrines.

In his interesting and able review of pragmatism,[81] Professor Perry has obviously aimed to avoid this. And in a larger measure than usual among the critics he has succeeded. However, it seems to me that in spite of this good intention there are some passages that are likely to call out the old complaint.

Professor Perry's interpretation of the factors involved in the pragmatist's view of the logical process is:

1. *Reality, or beliefs already fixed.* – This element of experience is the object (this term now appearing for the first time) in so far as already known. The pragmatists would seem to disagree among themselves as to whether sensation belongs to this category or to the next. Let us designate this factor of the situation by the letter *M*.

2. *The object as problematic.* – This is the disturbing factor, consisting in a sensation as yet unresolved, or in a general discord which makes the situation practically unworkable. Let us designate this factor as *X*.

3. *Ideas, or,* to quote Professor Moore's phrase, "*Instruments of reconstruction.*" – These elements, which we may designate as *a', b', c',* are tentative interpretations of *X* and mark the period of deliberative hesitation.

4. *The noetic interest.* – Herein appears for the first time the subject or the knower himself, experienced as a particular need actively attempting to relieve itself. Let us designate this as *S*. *S* is not to be identified through its content so much as through its "polar" relation to *0*.

With the understanding that, in equating the datum or fact element with reality, the latter must be taken in a strictly logical, not a

[80] Published in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, IV.

[81] *Ibid*., Nos. 14, 16.

metaphysical, sense (since metaphysically the ideas are as real as the reality in paragraph 1), and with the agreement that the fixity of this reality is not absolute, most pragmatists would, I think, accept the essence of the first three paragraphs. But the fourth is pretty sure to raise a protest at once. Here, it will be said, is where the imputations begin. First, the protestor will say, the very heading of the paragraph, especially since it appears independent of the ideas in the third paragraph, suggests an anti-pragmatic view – that of a pure, isolated, and sufficient-unto-itself noetic interest. The pragmatist speaks freely of interest *as* noetic, but he is likely to shy a little at the noetic interest when it appears as something over and above ideas. He is likely to say that one form of the issue between pragmatism and its critics is precisely whether the noetic activity is a special and original form of interest or only a function *of* or *in* interest.

On the relation of the noetic interest to the ideas in the third paragraph, the objector will probably insist that the noetic interest, or, rather, the noetic phase *of* interest, is carried by the ideas, and will inquire how there can be a noetic interest outside of ideas.

But if there is any question about the anti-pragmatic character of the heading of the fourth paragraph, many pragmatists will be sure that there is none in what follows about the necessity of a subject or knower over and above or under, at any rate in addition to, the ideas in the logical process. On the preceding page Professor Perry quotes from Professor Dewey's article[82] on "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge" and presumably must have read the entire article. In that article is the following: "The second [referring to the view that the object is immediately known by a subject] is a pseudo-immediacy, which in the same breath that it proclaims its immediacy smuggles in another term (and one which is unexperienced both in itself and in its relation), the subject, or consciousness, to which to relate the immediate." Again: "It is the identification of presence in consciousness with knowledge as such that leads to setting up a mind (ego, subject) which has the peculiar property of knowing (only so often it knows wrong!)." To this might be added: "The moment it is recognized that the logical fact-meaning duality is not to be identified with the technological object-agent duality, a large part of the present confusion of logic and of psychological epistemology clears itself up – it simply evaporates."[83] Yet in the face of this, we find the "polar relation" between a subject, on the one hand, and an object, on the other, set forth as the pragmatist's own view of the noetic process!

To be sure, pragmatists do not all state the logical process alike. It is

[82] *Mind*, N.S., XV, No. 59.

[83] *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology*, etc., IV, 255.

described now "as a relation or interaction between ideas and things," and again "as a relation or interaction between things *through* ideas." Whether in the end these two statements come to the same thing, they certainly do not regard a subject or knower in *addition* to ideas as necessary *to the logical process as such*. This does not say that there is no knower, nor does it imply that there is no self. It means that whatever of a self there is, it appears *in* the logical process only as the ideating activity. The idea is the self *as* knower. And in support of this the objector would probably ask: "Just what logical function does this extra-ideational subject or knower perform which the idea does not?"

That this is one of the cases of attribution of the reviewer's own ideas of which the pragmatist has so often complained, seems clear from the identity between the conception of knowledge attributed to the pragmatist in this paragraph and that upon which Professor Perry bases his objections to pragmatism throughout the discussion. The principal theses of Professor Perry's own view appear to be: (1) that truth must "envisage" or "coincide" with or be "identical" with reality (pp. 372, 374, 422); (2) that the object "is the element which plays the determining part in the constitution of truth" (p. 374); and (3) that the only purpose or intention to which truth is relative is just "the intention to know … not the intention to put the knowledge to some use" (p. 368). So here in this interpretation of the pragmatist's view the subject or knower is further described: (1) as "a particular need" or interest which is satisfied when the object as problematic is "assimilated to" or "becomes homogeneous with" *M*, which is reality as fixed; (2) at the close of the paragraph the noetic problem appears also as that of overcoming the "objectivity or difference" of the object from *S*, the subject. In his summary at the close of his second article Professor Perry speaks of the problem entirely in terms of the relation between the knower, not the idea, and the object.

At any rate, pragmatists will hardly accept either of these statements as they stand. They will insist that the essence of the logical problem does not lie in the opposition between a self and an object, nor does the process of solution consist in "assimilating" the object as unknown "to beliefs or reality already fixed." In all the accounts I have read, pragmatists teach that knowing consists as much in the assimilation of the already known to the new as the reverse; that the already known is not finally known once and forever; that in new situations it has to be re-known. But still, since the new develops out of the old, the old is sufficient to serve as a base for further operations. But while a base is the *relatively* fixed element, it must nevertheless be movable unless our march is to be ever in a circle. Over and over pragmatists have insisted that "the given" is a point of *departure* rather than a fixed stake to which we are bound hard and fast. Of course, after the departure there is a return to the given, but

only to discover that the work done during the departure necessitates a reconstruction of the given with which or from which we started.

The same point is raised at the beginning of the second paper, where Professor Perry says: "According to the pragmatist's own analysis, the satisfaction is legitimate and sound *when a judgment has been found which is consistent with that which is accepted as real*." Now it is quite possible to interpret this pragmatically. But it is quite certain from the context that Professor Perry does not so interpret it. For by "that which is accepted as real" Professor Perry means that which is accepted as unalterably real *before* the judgment is made. And for "consistent with" he uses elsewhere "coincident," "identical," and "homogeneous" with. But for the pragmatist "that which is accepted as real," i.e., as *logically* real, is one factor *in* the judging process, not something *outside* to which the whole judgment must conform. Moreover, that which is accepted as real in the *beginning* of the judging act is so accepted *provisionally*, and may be quite different from that which is accepted as real at the *end* of the process. And if Professor Perry should say that it is this latter which he has in mind, the rejoinder would be that the judgment is no more made to consist with this than this is made to consist with the judgment; for this reality at the *end* is a reality with all the work of judging in it and never could be experienced without this operation. An ox or a monkey may die of tuberculosis, but he does not *experience* tuberculosis. That is reserved for a being who can *through* science, *through* thought, make a connection between the pains, fever, etc., and a certain kind of bacteria.

Passing from Professor Perry's exposition of pragmatism to some of his criticisms: his first point is that while he accepts the pragmatist's doctrine that truth and error are always relative to some intention, yet we must remember that that intention is nothing but *the intention to know.* This reminds one of Bradley's, Royce's, and Taylor's treatment of the categories of "consistency," "harmony," "unity," etc. They tell us that the meaning of these categories is "always relative to some particular problem and purpose," but when we ask to *what* particular purpose their application to absolute reality is relative, we are told simply to "the purpose to be consistent, harmonious, unified, etc." So also the idea is a form of will, but its only will is to know, that is, to be an idea. Formally this looks suspiciously like the "vicious circle."

But, formalities aside, as above the issue was between the noetic interest and interest *as* notice, so here it is between the intention to know and knowing *as* intention. In short, we are back to the original question – just what *is* the process of knowing, and what *is* an idea? There is very little directly on these questions in Professor Perry's papers. Perhaps he thinks the announcement of his standpoint as "realism" should be sufficient. But there are so many brands of realism these days that one must have some

details.[84] However, the following general statements may give a line on Professor Perry's position. In the concluding paragraph of the first paper he says: "In this criticism I have not resorted to a general and vague insistence that true knowledge must 'correspond' to its object. I agree with the pragmatist that this is to take refuge in confusion." Yet elsewhere we find the following: "A judgment is true in so far as it *coincides* with a proposition or complex entity which is found with its distinguishing character upon it and its consistency about it" (p. 379; italics mine). "So far as truth is concerned, the important element of the situation is identity or consistency with reality" (p. 422). "For realism truth consists in an experience of identification, such as, 'Here is *a* or *M*+*a*.' … Because it is truth it must envisage reality" (p. 374).

But if to state the relation between the idea and the object as one of correspondence "is to take refuge in confusion," it is difficult to see how a substitution of "coincidence," "identity," or "envisaging" for "correspondence" mends the matter. Most of those who think "correspondence" confusing are likely to find in "coincidence" and "identity" confusion doubly confounded. At any rate, it seems to me that in spite of Professor Perry's disavowal of correspondence, it is difficult to see what these passages mean if not a good old-fashioned envisaging, photographic realism.

Now, there is a realism, a functional, a dynamic or "operative" realism, which has very close affiliations with pragmatism – a realism, namely, which teaches that ideas lead into, and help bring about, other experiences different from themselves. In this difference between the ideas and the other experiences which yet allows a free passage from one to the other consists the realism. With the old realism it holds to the difference between the idea and its realization, but it contends that this difference consists in something more than that one is an envisager of the other.

If Professor Perry's realism is of the photographic, envisaging type, it seems in order to recall once more the questions which pragmatists from the beginning have been urging – questions which no one so far has dealt with directly and specifically – such questions as: If truth consists in identity and coincidence between an idea and reality, just what then is the significance of the *difference* between an idea and reality? Why when we have one do we want the other? And if there is a difference, must not truth be defined as much in terms of this *difference* as of the identity? Again, when there is *doubt* about the correspondence or coincidence or identity of the idea with reality, how is the doubt resolved? What is the criterion of successful identification? Yet again, if the object is the deter-

[84] It would be interesting to "match up" the varieties of realism with Professor Lovejoy's "thirteen varieties of pragmatism."

mining factor and the object is always there, how can there ever be any uncertainty? How can there be any *problem* of knowledge, to begin with? Why should the object ever fail to determine, or determine falsely? And if the object is not always there, how can it always be the determining factor?

There is a proneness on the part of the critics to confine the discussion to the nature of truth as a *product,* whereas the pragmatists insist on the problem of *doubt*, *inquiry*, and *error.* This tendency to take truth as a product only, appears in Professor Perry's interpretation of the pragmatist's view of the relation between truth and use. Professor Perry speaks of the pragmatist's appeal to "the use of truth" in a way which makes the use begin *after* the truth is reached. But the "use" with which the pragmatist is concerned is the use of an *idea* which *constitutes* its truth. The pragmatist could readily agree that *after* the truth of an idea is established the continued use of it in *similar* situations would not affect its truth.

The meaning of this may become clearer if we follow Professor Perry's illustration. He says (p. 368):

> I may intend to vote for the man with the cleanest record, and proceed to discover him; but it is the latter intention alone, the intention to discover that one among the candidates who has the cleanest record, to which my ensuing belief is relative as respects its truth or error.

Now I think a little analysis shows that the relation between the intention to discover the cleanest candidate and the intention to vote, and, therefore, the relation between the truth of the idea of who is the cleanest and the intention to vote, is closer than Professor Perry allows. Of course, Professor Perry would grant that there is a pretty intimate relation of *motivation* between the intention to vote and the intention to find the cleanest candidate, but he will insist that the content of the latter is already there as a separate and independent affair "with its distinguishing characters upon it." But is it? What is the meaning of the cleanest candidate? Suppose there were no voting, no office-holding, no political party, would there be a cleanest candidate? It probably would be quibbling to insist that in such a case there could be no "candidate" at all. So let that be waived and let the question be, Would there be any cleanest man in the sense here meant, that is, *politically* cleanest? Does not the concept "clean" here mean a man to be voted for, to be put into office, to be intrusted with funds, etc.? Again, Professor Perry's conception of the cleanest man is different from that of the ward-heeler; for the latter the cleanest man is the one who will be "white" to his friends. However, in either event, Professor Perry's case rests upon the assumption that the

cleanness is there quite independent of the voting, and that the voting occurs because of the cleanness. But once more, suppose the whole voting system, with all that it implies, never to have started, would the *kind* of cleanness here sought still be there? If not, is it not just as obvious that political cleanness exists because of the voting, as the voting because of the cleanness? However, neither of these antithetical statements of the situation does it justice, for the quality of cleanness and the activity of voting develop together as mutually conditioning differentiations within what Professor James calls the same social *"fundamentum."*

Following the illustration into the question of use raised above, suppose we have reached the point where the idea of *A*-as-a-clean-man emerges. In so far as there is only an idea there is not certainty. We "think" *A* is a clean man. How is this hypothesis to be verified or rejected? How, indeed, except by *using*, by following, this idea until it leads or fails to lead to further experiences of *A*'s cleanness sufficient to satisfy the demands of the original problem of whom to vote for.

No pragmatist has ever held that the transition from one experience to another, or, if the word experience is objectionable, the movement from one reality to another, takes place in a vacuum. He has never taught, as one might gather from some of the critics, that ideas create new reality out of the void. He speaks of the further development and reconstruction of experience or reality *through* ideas; of the idea as the form reality or experience takes to maintain and further itself. Of course the idea cannot lead to a new experience unless the *material* for the experience exists. But the pragmatist holds, on the other hand, that, before the appearance of the *idea* of a-politically-clean-man (still keeping to the illustration), whatever quality men as husbands, fathers, merchants may have, these qualities are yet only possible *material* for political cleanness and become the "real" political cleanness as they are transformed through the *idea* of political cleanness. The idea of political cleanness converts this material into political cleanness by bringing to it, or bringing it to, the demands of a new problem. And the pragmatist holds that this is a *real* transformation, that the idea brings things, i.e., already organized activities, into new relations of interaction which result in a new reality. No doubt the paper with which I have just kindled the fire was already there, but it was not there *as kindling* until the *idea* of kindling appeared. It was through this idea that it came into relation with my hands, with the match, the wood, etc. So it is through the idea of political cleanness that *A*'s qualities as husband, father, merchant, etc., are turned into a new direction and thereby undergo some actual qualitative change. The *real* political cleanness, then, is not there independent of and determining the *idea* of political cleanness. It is there only in *relation* to this idea. The idea is as much a determinant of the reality as is the already existing material. The

whole of the matter is that the idea *and* the already existing material, the habits of father, husband, merchant, etc., are together working out a new reality.

But, it may be said, granting that prior to the idea of political activity there is only the material for political cleanness, even so this material must be recognized as material for that end and not some other, and this in a purely envisaging, photographic fashion. In other words, there must be the direct identification of the material. But the pragmatist could not allow the begging of this point under the term "identification." He will ask once more: What is identification? And will insist that it does not consist in an experience of identity between the idea and the thing, but that the material is identified *as* it is found to *satisfy* the demand which the idea expresses. It is no more "identical" with the idea than food is identical with hunger. The relation is one of stimulus and response rather than one of identity, unless, indeed, we are willing to interpret identity as that which responds to and satisfies the demand which the idea defines and makes specific.

Professor Perry thinks that whatever strength the pragmatist's position has is due largely to the fact that he has selected for his illustration what he calls "truths of use" to the neglect of "simple perception," "in which the cognitive moment is seen to the best advantage" (p. 373). "To know," says Professor Perry, "is to see, whether with the bodily eye or with the eye of the soul" (p. 366). But is the case so simple as this? If knowing is just seeing, where does error come in? What distinguishes good from bad seeing? And is the reply of the Greeks to this, that the seeing is bad only in so far as it is not-seeing, sufficient? Also does not this conception of knowledge sink the distinction between immediate realizing experience and the mediating knowing experience? Surely there is a seeing that is not knowing. My seeing of a sun-lit cloud usually is not primarily cognitive. As I thread my way through a crowded street I am "seeing," but unless we are to abandon the distinction between practical and cognitive experiences the seeing here is a form of doing just as much as the walking. For the pragmatist seeing is knowing *only* when it occurs in connection with an *inquiry.* It seems impossible for the critic to *keep* in mind that for the pragmatist *knowing is inquiring; and knowledge is the result of inquiry.*

In this sense of belonging to a process of inquiry all truths, or, rather, all ideas, are "ideas of use." *If* sense perception can be simply given out of all connection with any sort of inquiry, it is not, as such, for the pragmatist cognitive. It is then directly practical or aesthetic. Once more, suppose there is *doubt* and consequent inquiry about a case of sense perception, what would be Professor Perry's account of its resolution?

The crucial thesis in pragmatism, Professor Perry says, is this: "*The mark of the truth of knowledge is the satisfying character of the practical*

transition from cognitive expectation to fulfilment, or of the resolution of doubt into practical immediacy" (p. 371). In spite of the care which Professor Perry says he gave to phrasing this, the term "mark" still appears ambiguous. Ordinarily it means criterion, sign, or test. In this sense the thesis would be a familiar enough pragmatic doctrine. But then it would lose its crucial character for Professor Perry. The crucial character appears in Professor Perry's revision of the thesis a little farther on, in which he says: "The essence of the matter is the degree to which the satisfying character of the crucial moment *constitutes* its truth." Here, "mark" means "constitution," which is quite a different affair from "criterion" or "test," and is one for which Professor Perry should have given chapter and verse, for I am sure no pragmatist will own it. For the pragmatist, the truth of an idea consists in its capacity to "lead" to the experience which it promises. And as stated above, in discussing Professor Perry's illustration, this capacity is neither a matter of chance nor by the grace of the absolute, but is due to the fact that the idea is born out of that very *"fundamentum"* of "reality" or "experience" (what you will) in which it works. Professor Perry well says: "There must be a ground for this satisfaction." It is just this ground which, absolutism having failed to supply, the pragmatist has sought in the immediate activities of social life.

Professor Perry's remarks on the last topic – "Knowledge Modifies and Adds to Being" – have perhaps been sufficiently anticipated. However, the issue between Professor Perry's realism and pragmatism is here very sharply drawn and calls for an additional word. Professor Perry's point is, of course, that objects known are "not essentially modified" by the act of knowing. I wonder just how much reservation the qualifier "essentially" carries. Professor Perry would grant, I suppose, that if the act of knowing as such does not essentially modify the object known, it in some mysterious way *leads* to acts that do. But if the alteration does not begin in the knowing process, where does it begin? In what way does the knowing lead to the activity that does alter the object? If I am hungry and bethink me of a sandwich on the sideboard, and if I say that the act of thinking does not essentially modify the sandwich, where does the "essential" modification begin? When I reach for it? When I touch it? At the first bite, or the second?[85]

Professor Perry here appeals to knowledge of past and future objects and events as the crucial support of his denial of the real efficacy of thought. At the same time he contends that past and future objects and

[85] These questions bring up the entire subject of qualities and relations, into which there is not time to go here. But it is interesting to note that Mr. Bradley finds and envisaging knowledge of reality impossible just because the establishing of new relationships is the beginning of "essential" modifications.

events have as real an existence as the present. I am not prepared to discuss this point in detail here,[86] but shall say that, *if* they do so exist and can enter into new relation with each other and with the present, then they must be subject to modification in the same sense as the present.

In concluding, Professor Perry says: "It seems absurd to contend that knowledge makes the world." But who has so contended? The pragmatist's contention is that knowledge *helps* to make, in the sense of assisting in remaking, the world. Professor Perry concedes, however, that "knowledge does make *its* world." "It may even be said to make *our* world. But there is a tremendous significance, practical, philosophical, and religious, in this difference between our world and *the* world." In appreciation of this "tremendous significance" the pragmatist would yield to no one. Indeed, it was just this "tremendous significance" that started the pragmatic movement. But for the pragmatist this "tremendous significance" consists in the belief that in so far as the distinction between *our* world and *the* world is widened by just so far the abyss of phenomenalism and skepticism is opened.

[86] See V.

X
PRAGMATISM AND SOLIPSISM[87]

However astonished were the expounders of pragmatism at the indictments of "subjectivism" and "solipsism" returned by the critics in the early days of the movement, on reflection these charges were not difficult to explain. In general the explanation was that pragmatists had assumed, prematurely, as it now appears, that the specter of solipsism had been laid. For more than a decade preceding the beginning of the pragmatic movement, philosophers, especially in America and France, were busy expounding the social character of consciousness – of the "private," "individual" consciousness – both in its origin and function. The outcome of this exposition seemed to be that the consciousness of an individual was not to be considered a function, or a correlate of his "organism" or "mind" *only*, but that both the organism and "its" mind were to be thought of as arising in and belonging to a "social situation."

This conception apparently was generally accepted. And this acceptance would seem to have warranted the assumption that solipsism was dead. It appeared that everyone was ready to start with our everyday neighborly world of social intercourse and to regard individual consciousness as an organic function of that world. It seemed as if philosophy might now go on to a fruitful, detailed study of this social process, and might talk of consciousness, of ideas, needs, purposes, yea, even of "my" or "your" ideas, needs, and purposes without danger of solipsistic interpretations.

At any rate, this was the supposition of pragmatists whose writings followed close upon these studies of the social nature of consciousness. They assumed that solipsistic, windowless, monadic conception of the individual was a thing of the past. But alas, as the returns from the critics began to come in they discovered how ill they had reckoned. They found that the critics, many of whom[88] had themselves done yeoman service in developing this social conception, either attached no such significance to the results of these investigations or refused to allow pragmatists to do so. It was evident that, for some of the critics, the chief value of the social

[87] The materials of this paper appeared in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, VI, and in the *Philosophical Review*, XV.

[88] Cf., e.g., the contributions of Professors Royce and Baldwin to the social conception of the individual and solipsistic assumptions in their criticisms of pragmatism.

conception of consciousness was its supposed service in clearing up the conception of the relation between the finite and the absolute, though to pragmatists it seemed to "muddle," rather than clarify, that conception. For by just so much as this exposition of the social character of consciousness made the relation of the finite to the absolute conceivable, by even so much did it make it unnecessary. Hence the absolutist was obliged to *nolle pros.* his part of the case and to resolipsize the individual in order to preserve the necessity for the absolute. The dilemma was: if finite experience is such that the conception of the absolute is possible, it is such that the latter is useless; if finite experience is such as to need the conception of the absolute, it is such as to make that conception impossible.

For others, the results of these investigations into the social character of the individual were regarded as having special value for ethical theory. For still others, they were just interesting psychological "discoveries" whose logical and metaphysical consequences either were of no interest or were unappreciated.

Now the pragmatist confidingly took this conception of the perfectly objective and social character of consciousness at its full face value, with no discounts or rebates in favor either of absolutism or of intellectual realism, and set out to develop a logic and a metaphysics on that basis. Hence it seemed to him, at first, that the critics must be joking when they cried "solipsism." But as soon as it was clear that they were desperately in earnest, the pragmatist hastened to explain why he had put up no special guard against such an interpretation. Again and again he proclaimed that he had only accepted in good faith the social evaluation of consciousness, which the critics had themselves, in many instances, helped to make. Over and over he "explained" that he had supposed this view of consciousness had settled forever that ideas, hypotheses, are no more "subjective" because they are constructed in or through individual minds or brains than a house is subjective because constructed by individuals.

In the face of these specific, repeated, and vociferous protestations from pragmatists, it is difficult to comprehend how anyone, without at least discussing this social conception of consciousness, could blandly reiterate the solipsistic objection. And yet in the latest anti-pragmatist volume (Professor Pratt's *What Is Pragmatism*? – in many respects a keen and stimulating book), this is just what has happened. Professsor Pratt says: "It is interesting to note … that all Professor Dewey's and Professor Moore's contributions to studies in logical theory … could perfectly well have been written from the standpoint of solipsism – and in fact it is difficult to see how some of them could have been written from any other" (p. 123).

And the wonder grows when one reads again Professor Dewey's explicit and, one would think, completely destructive answer to this same statement when it previously appeared in a "discussion" by Professor Pratt.[89] In his reply, Professor Dewey points out that Professor Pratt's whole discussion is based on his conception of truth as a "correspondence" between an idea in "a private stream of consciousness" and "outer realities which never come within one's own private stream of consciousness." Professor Dewey then goes on to show how completely mythical such "a private consciousness" and "outer realities" are on his view of the judgment. Without even discussing this explicit and complete repudiation of "the private stream of consciousness," to say nothing of equally specific rejections by others, Professor Pratt reprints in his book his private-consciousness-outer-reality view of thought, and his charge of "solipsism" *based on the attribution of this view to pragmatists!*

It is difficult to see how philosophy is to go forward at this rate. Had Professor Pratt given what he regarded as a vindication of his "private-consciousness" theory, he might then have appropriately reaffirmed his indictment, even though it precipitated the dilemma, that in the degree to which his vindication was successful, the indictment would return upon his own view. In a footnote (p. 123) Professor Pratt does quote a passage from Professor Dewey's refutation of "the private-consciousness" view, but instead of dealing with this he drops it and goes on to answer certain questions which Professor Dewey had put. And these "answers" show not only that Professor Pratt still holds his "private-consciousness" view as if it had never been challenged, but that he still assumes that the pragmatist also is talking from this standpoint. Thus after granting that "certainly hypotheses and theories serve to direct observation and guide experimentation," he adds: "But the fundamental question is, how is it possible for them to be instruments and what is it that makes some successful guides, and some unsuccessful? So far as I can see, the pragmatist has no answer to this." But the pragmatist's "answer" has been there, life-size, from the beginning. The reason Professor Pratt cannot "see" it, is that he is still shut up, and is trying to shut up the pragmatist with him, in his windowless "private consciousness."

Before passing to the pragmatist's answer, Professor Pratt's own solution should be noticed. He says: "The non-pragmatist's answer of course is, that hypotheses succeed in guiding experimentation in so far as they correspond to the already existing reality which is their object and which they mean."

Elsewhere Professor Pratt intimates that he finds pragmatists, as one might expect, somewhat naïve in matters of formal logic. How naïve he

[89] *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology*, etc., V, 375.

regards them may be imagined if he expected that pragmatists would not see that his "answer" merely shifts the problem from that of "guidance" to that of "correspondence" and that they would not ask how "correspondence" is possible on the "private-consciousness" view of judgment. This is the pragmatists' "prior and fundamental question" to the intellectual realist. Professor Pratt's answer to this (pp. 68-69), is that correspondence is an ultimately simple," "irreducible," and "mysterious" relation, incapable of explanation, and that, therefore, the question "how it is possible" is "absurd."

In passing, the pragmatist will wonder, if correspondence is so "simple" as to make the demand for explanation "absurd," why "guidance" should be such a burning question for which the pragmatist has no answer. And he might also observe, that if he has found no answer to the question on "guidance" up to this time, surely with the model of Professor Pratt's answer to the "correspondence" question before him he need be no longer dumb. He would have only to say: Guidance is an "ultimately simple" and "irreducible," even if "mysterious," relation. Perhaps the pragmatist's naïve logical sense might suffer some misgivings that such a solution begs the whole problem, to say nothing of its depragmatizing tendency, but – that is another story.

It is already obvious that the pragmatist's "explanation" of how it is possible for ideas of a "private consciousness" to be "instruments" and "guides" lies in his view of the social origin, nature, and function of this "private consciousness." This, of course, is but another way of saying that while consciousness doubtless is in some sense "private," it after all is not so *"awfully"* private. Surely we are all prepared to grant that however "private" consciousness may be it is somehow born of a thoroughly social, objective world. So much I suppose would not be questioned. But at this point our ways of thinking begin to diverge. Some apparently believe that although the individual consciousness is born of our social world, it is either born blind or, as soon as it is born, it is cast into a solipsistic outer darkness, so dense that the possibility of its ideas or hypotheses agreeing with "things" becomes indeed a "mystery"; and a mystery which presupposes another equally dark, namely, how this outcast, abandoned "private consciousness" comes by its ideas.

Now the pragmatist, at least that "variety" of pragmatist with which I am acquainted, thinks of this "private consciousness" not only as born of, but as growing up in, and, therefore, continuing all the while vitally and organically related to, its matrix. *Not only in its origin, but in its continued development and operation must it always be a function of the whole social situation of which it is born.* However "private" or "individual" consciousness may be, it is never to be regarded as *merely* the function of an individual "mind" or "soul" or *of a single organism or*

brain. I have just italicized the phrase: "of a single organism or brain." By this I wish to emphasize the fact that much of our "biological" and "functional" psychology, which often speaks so patronizingly of the old soul-psychology, is logically just as solipsistic as the latter. If consciousness is wholly a function of a single organism or brain, how much better off are we so far as the logical problem is concerned than we are with consciousness a function of a single soul or mind.

This "subcutaneous" conception of consciousness, as Professor Perry aptly calls it,[90] has its correlate in the equally "subcutaneous" and solipsistic view of the nervous system which regards it as merely the "co-ordinator" of the rest of the functions of the organism *only*. The environment, to be sure, figures dimly in the background as that "to" which the organism is to adjust itself, whatever this can mean. With this belongs also the no less solipsistic conception of the activity of the organism as consisting merely in a competitive "struggle for existence" with other organisms.

How grotesquely inadequate these conceptions are, becomes apparent the moment we try to apply them to the concrete activity of a physician, a lawyer, an architect, or any other expert to whom I delegate the adjustment of "my" troubles. While the cure of the toothache, if the quarrel, of the house is "my" problem, it is also and no less and at the same time "his." Conversely his effort is as truly and as much to adjust me as to adjust himself. His thinking is as literally a function of my organism as his own. *His* effort is *my way* of making *the* readjustment, which belongs equally to both of us. When the pragmatist, therefore, talks of attention and thought as arising at the point of a need for readjustment, this need must not be taken to mean the need of some one, lone, marooned organism or mind *only*. The readjustment is always in and of a "social situation."

Now when one fully accepts, and *steadily holds on to*, this notion of the social origin and function of consciousness, it ought not to be difficult to understand why for *him* the question of the possibility in general of ideas and hypotheses of a private consciousness serving as "instruments" and "guides" would not arise. From this standpoint the presumption is all the other way. The question might much more intelligibly be: How ideas ever *fail* to guide? And indeed they never do fail to "guide" in *some* way. They are never absolutely impotent. They always effect *some* transformation.

This brings us around again to the problem of truth and error, which is a question not of the *complete* efficiency or impotence of ideas, but of the *kind and degree* of efficacy they have. At this point it is clear from the

[90] Cf. Professor Perry's very suggestive paper on "The Mind Within and the Mind Without," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology,* etc., VI, 169.

amount of writing which continues from the standpoint of "the private stream of consciousness" that there is need of a return to a direct discussion of the "social nature" of consciousness and to the judgment[91] and of its application to the supposedly difficult "headache and toothache" cases.[92]

Another interesting imputation of subjectivism is contained in the very suggestive paper of Professor Fite on "The Experience Philosophy" in the *Philosophical Review,* XV. Professor Fite's arraignment is especially interesting and somewhat puzzling in view of the striking similarity between his conclusions and those of the standpoint which he criticizes.

Professor Fite allows that the pragmatist makes the distinction between "experience and subjective-experience." But he finds that, while the pragmatist thunders this abstractly in the index, in his context "reality is always precisely coextensive with subjective-experience." But nowhere does Professor Fite point out where and how and for what end this substitution occurs. The only direct evidence for the charge is the very brief statement that for the pragmatist "the chair when it disappears from thought ceases also to be" (p. 1). But even in this statement, as it stands, experience must be reduced (1) to mere thought-experience, and (2) to *my* thought-experience before it becomes subjective. And I do not see that Professor Fite's observation in his footnote on my statement in the *Review* of May, 1905, offers any further support to the case. It simply reaffirms that the pragmatist has discarded the world of space and time for a "conception" in "some one's experience." My statement was to the effect that, *if* the pragmatist really does discard the objective world (not the world in space and time merely), there can be, as Kant taught, no mere subject left to have a concept, and that the critics therefore should include in their charge the destruction of the subject as well as the object.

Returning to the pragmatist's countercharge of his critics' own inherent and subjective bias, evidence of this appears at the very outset in the easy way in which Professor Fite brackets "the subjective idealism of Berkeley, and the phenomenalism of J. S. Mill" with "pragmatism, humanism, and radical empiricism of Professor James." "All of these," says Professor Fite, "deny that there is a world *beyond experience*; all in substance hold with Berkeley and Schopenhauer that *the world* is *my idea*" (p. 1, italics mine). Apparently these two clauses are equipollent in Professor Fite's

[91] The article by Professor G. H. Mead in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology*, etc., of March 31, 1910, on "What Social Objects Must Psychology Presuppose?" is a fine illustration of the sort of detailed analysis here needed.

[92] My treatment of these cases which I "hoped" in this paper to "take up later" will be found in chap. 5.

thought. This, of course, assumes again (1) that experience is *my* experience and (2) that it consists of ideas only – is merely cognitive. If Professor Fite should say "the equipollence is not mine but one to which the various parties charged in the indictment are themselves forced in 'practice'," then, in the case of the pragmatist at least, since he is the one under direct examination, this should be shown in detail, and reinforced by citations.

Nor do I see that Professor Fite succeeds in showing *where* or *how* pragmatism is forced from the conception of "experience" to that of "subjective-experience" in his next point, which is: "The fundamental position of the experience-philosophy is that experience and experience only is *'given'* or 'immediately given'; all else, i.e., the world of things in space and time, is derived, inferred, constructed, developed, *from* experience" (p. 2, italics mine). The words "given" and "immediately given" are in single quotation marks. This may simply indicate that they are terms current in present discussion. If it means, however, that they are applied by pragmatists to the entire world of experience, as they are here, it would be interesting to have "chapter and verse" for this.

As for regarding the world of experience as I do not see how anyone, Professor Fite especially, could have read, for instance, Professor Dewey's chaps. ii and iii, in the *Studies in Logical Theory,* without discovering that in pragmatism "given" has no meaning applied to experience as a whole; for the pragmatist "given" is a logical category applied only to some *specific* content in experience in its *logical* operations. If experience as such, as a whole, were "given," it is difficult to see how there could be any possibility of derivation, inference, construction, etc. Conversely, how could the given *"from which"* something further is to be derived or inferred be a whole? Some things in space and time may be inferred from others, *taken* as "given," but no pragmatist ever dreamed of "inferring" the world of space and, time from another world of "experience." The world of space and time is part and parcel of the pragmatist's world of experience. What Professor Fite says of "the things in space and time" being "as good a datum" as any other experience, and of "neither as absolute," and of "the search for absolute data as not only illusory but logically unnecessary" (p. 2), – these are the first principles of the pragmatist's logic.

Conceding, however, for the moment, that the world of space and time is "derived from" experience, it is still a far cry to subjectivism. (1) *If* space and time are necessary to objectivity, they are equally necessary to the subject. Hence, in a world "prior" to space and time, the distinction of subject and object would not exist. I say "*if*," for (2) some may hold that "things in space and time" constitute only *one* phase of both objectivity and subjectivity; that the distinction of subject and object does not

depend on space and time as such, but is a differentiation running across the space and time world. This alleged "prior world," then, might be one in which the distinction of subject and object did not appear; or it might be one in which it did not have a spatial and temporal character. In neither case are we warranted in calling it "subjective."

Although in the first formulation this alleged "datum" of pragmatism is "prior" to the world of space and time, in the next paragraph it is described as a "series" with distinctions of present and past (why not future also?) in it. To be sure, Professor Fite says the pragmatist "in his practice" attempts to ignore the time distinctions, and to treat the series "as if it were immediately given as a whole." Once more, the first thing is to ask: From what writings are such doctrines as these gleaned? Or, if they are not directly expressed anywhere, where are they implied, and what interest of the pragmatist standpoint do they serve? Professor Fite says the series may be, for the pragmatist, "merely a convenient working basis." But he does not show in what way it is "convenient," or for what it is a basis.

The next point the pragmatist would make is that if the attribution were correct it would still not bring us in sight of "subjectivism." What is there necessarily "subjective" in the conception of a series conceived as a whole? Even if it exclude the space-world (and that is all it does exclude here since differences of time are admitted), that does not make it "subjective." Space surely is not the criterion of objectivity. Where, then, is this notorious "subjectivism"? Thus far it has not shown itself in Professor Fite's own version of "the fundamental position of the experience-philosophy." It is, however, now ready to appear. And *how?* It simply appears. There is no introduction, not even a warning knock. It is quietly left on the pragmatist's doorstep without a syllable of explanation, clad in the scant but inevitable garb of the pronoun "my." Throughout the entire page two the conception of "experience as a whole," or as "a series taken as a whole," has appeared with no "subjective" qualifications. But in the last sentence of the page, with no word of comment or of qualification, it appears as "*my* experience as a whole" (italics mine). It may be said: "At any rate, the bundle is left where it belongs." But in the face of the pragmatist's repeated and vehement disavowals of the contents, some more substantial evidence must be submitted.

If it should be asked: "If not 'my' experience, whose then?" the question would only show how deep-rooted and ineradicable is the subjectivism of the asker. The inquiry assumes that the world of experience must belong, as a hat or a coat, *to* some particular individual, instead of being itself the world-process *in* which individuals, along with other "things in space and time," live and move and have their being. Doubtless much needs to be said from the pragmatist's standpoint of the nature and rôle of the

individual in such a world. Meanwhile, aside from the bearing of pragmatists' discussions of other points on this question, it would seem that the repeated statements even of the bare outlines of the conception should be sufficient answer to charges of subjectivism equally bare and unsupported.

Most of the remaining portion of Professor Fite's article is an excellent refutation of the subjectivism and absolutism charged to the pragmatist in the introduction, with some additional imputations in detail (e.g., p. 8, on the basis of the pragmatist's distinction between "real" and "not-real") which the pragmatist could not accept. It is, therefore, in essence, first-class pragmatism. I say, "in essence," for owing to the subjective meaning given to "experience" in the first two pages, it has to appear in the further discussion in correlative contrast with "fact" and "thing"; whereas the pragmatist's correlative of "fact" is "idea," experience being the process within which these correlatives operate. Throughout much of this part of the paper one feels as if the whole issue, as Professor Fite draws it, were almost verbal. In the concluding paragraph of the paper, Professor Fite says: "We should then hold with the realist that reality is not limited to experience." Most assuredly if "experience" is regarded simply as "*my* idea," and if in this statement of Professor Fite's we substitute "experience" for "reality" and insert "*cognitive*" before the word "experience," we have good pragmatic doctrine and one which meets the essential point realism is contending for. I cannot here stop to argue why "experience" seems a better term than "reality." One obvious reason is that the latter has a classic logical use as the correlative of "illusion" which "experience" has not.

What Professor Fite says of the "present," as "no more given than the past," and of the present or past as internal, being no more given than external things, and practically all of what he says in sec. iii on the vanity of an "absolute datum," pragmatism has zealously preached from the beginning. Thus we read (p. 11): "My point is that nothing is absolutely given and that for purposes of knowledge no absolute data are required." Again (p. 13): "A datum is not a finality, but a convenient abstraction for purposes of *further* analysis, depending for its validity upon the results that it yields." Compare these statements with the following:

> The data are in truth precisely what is selected and set aside *as* present, as immediate. Thus they are *given* to *further* thought. [Again:] The datum is given *in* the thought-situation, and *to* further qualification of ideas or meanings… . To take what is given *in* the thought-situation … as if it were given *absolutely,* or apart from a particular historical situs and context, is the fallacy of empiricism [of the Mill type]… . To regard the thought-forms of conception, judgment, and inference as qualifica-

> tions of "pure thought apart from any differences in objects" … is the fallacy of rationalism.[93]

If, again, it be said, it is not by what it abstractly preaches but by what it "practices" that pragmatism is to be judged – a criterion to which pragmatists should be the last to object – then yet again, the pragmatist must rejoin that this "practice" of subjectivism has not yet been exhibited.

[93] Dewey in *Studies in Logical Theory*, pp. 57ff.

XI
THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF HABIT AND ATTENTION [94]

In my discussion of Professor Baldwin's *Thought and Things,* Vol. I, in the *Psychological Bulletin* for March of this year, I referred to Professor Baldwin's criticisms of the attempt to state cognitive experiences as a part of the whole process of the readjustment of conflicting habitual and instinctive activities through attention. Professor Baldwin's objection was that such an account cannot take care of the case of "a new and unwelcome object which simply forces itself upon us, … which rides full armed through our walls and compels its recognition." My reply was to the effect that this very "new," "unwelcome," involuntary, "forced" character of the object, when *analyzed* instead of being accepted as ultimate and quasi-miraculous, turns out to be just as much a function of habit and attention as the "voluntary" cases.

Without any further attempt at analysis, Professor Baldwin in the May number of the *Bulletin* reaffirms his objection and adds another edition of it, from the standpoint of volitional instead of cognitive experience, to the effect, that in such a conception of experience there is no 'motivation." He says, "I can't rest content with a dynamic that has nothing outside to move it and no reason inside for moving." This sounds wonderfully like an appeal to an outside "unmoved mover," the insoluble difficulties with which our Greek forebears, to say nothing of Locke, Hume, Kant, *et al.,* discovered. To rehearse these would, I take it, be an unpardonable anachronism. As for "no reason inside for moving," what better reason could there be than the conflict of habitual and instinctive activities with its accompanying dissatisfaction?

Again, Professor Baldwin asks: "If experience proceeds by readjusting *to* situations, whence comes the situation that 'puts it up' *to* it to adjust" (italics mine)? Now the use of the preposition "to" both locates and at the same time begs the whole issue. In the view which Professor Baldwin criticizes, experience proceeds by situations *of* readjustment, not by adjustments *to* situations. The situation to be readjusted is one *in* and *of*

[94] Published in the *Psychological Bulletin*, IV, under the title "Experience, Habit, and Attention."

experience, not one which is "put up" to it from without. That Professor Baldwin must be aware in some measure of this view seems implied in his next question: "Why does it [experience] grow discontent with *its own* habit world" (italics mine)? This certainly assumes that somebody regards the readjusting situation as made by the discontent of experience with "*its own* habit world."

As for the answer to the question: "How this discontent can arise," that is not far to seek. As has been pointed out again and again, it is due to the fact that habits are constantly *coming into conflict*. In more general form experience has constantly to face the results of its own work and utilize them as the material of its own further development. And if it be further asked how this conflict reveals itself, the answer is: through dissatisfaction and pain.

The same point is involved in the following questions on my answer to which Professor Baldwin says he "will stake the whole business":

> First. How can experience of the dynamic-relative type secure or utilize knowledge that is socially valid without at the same time reinstating other things as valid, as the social fellows, including the thinker himself?
>
> Second. How can an experience that has no environment except its own habit and no reality, save its present function, set up any dynamic at all?
>
> Or to put these two questions in one: In what sense is the will of the mother spanking the child part of the habit of the child, and why does the child's experience take on this particular phase of relative dynamic – this occasional and very disconcerting phase of habit?

In this last inclusive and very concrete form of his question I assume that Professor Baldwin does not intend to put me at any empirical disadvantage by having the "mother" instead of the father do the spanking – an arrangement which, personally, both as a child and as a parent, I have always favored. As for "staking the whole business on my answer," that happily is not necessary, as that is a responsibility already shared by many others.

In general, Professor Baldwin's questions all reveal the chronic and apparently incurable determination of most critics of pragmatic doctrines to take, at any rate in their criticisms, the terms "experience," "consciousness," "habit," "attention," etc., in the sense of the "experience," "consciousness," "habit," and "attention" of some *one* individual. Whereas all these terms, when they are used without explicit reference to a particular individual, refer to the *entire world of activity* in which the experiencing individuals have their being – "experience" being

the general term for that world of activity, the other terms meaning particular modes or functions of that activity.

This does not mean that these particular modes or functions, such as habit and attention, may be regarded as some sort of disembodied "things in themselves," capable of an existence apart from individuals. They are the modes *of* the activity of *social* individuals – habit being the conserving, the mechanical, the structural mode, attention the reconstructive, reforming, readjusting activity. While this conception does not then in any sense attempt to substitute experience, habit, or thinking in general or at large for the experiences, habits, and thinking of individuals, it does protest just as insistently against regarding these activities as shut up within the epidermic confines of some one individual. However much John Smith's habit and ideas belong to him, they belong *also* to the whole community in which he lives and which is affected in any way by them, be that as large or small as it may. Conversely, just this community center of habits and ideas *is* John Smith. That this is to be taken literally and not figuratively, Professor Baldwin himself shows in his volumes on *Mental Development*.

Now if this conception of the habits and ideas of the individual as *also* functions of the whole community life be kept steadily in view, it would seem that the impossibility of framing such questions as the above is as obvious as their answer.

Turning to the first question, Why should anyone speak of "reinstating social fellows" and "other things"? Who has turned them out? Surely not those who teach that problems arise, run their course, and find their solution, not in the solipsistic realm of John Smith's habits and ideas as a complete world in itself, but in the habits and ideas of John Smith as a conserving and reconstructive agent of the whole community life.

As for the second question, in view of what has already been said of the place of habit in experience, it seems redundant to add: (1) that habit cannot be regarded as an external environment *to* experience, or (2) that experience does not have to "get up" any dynamic. The "dynamic" is already there: (*a*) in the obviously active character of the habits; (*b*) in their coming into conflict; and (*c*) in the reconstructive work of attention.

Professor Baldwin's putting of the "spanking" case lends itself somewhat temptingly to facetious treatment, but as the matter is really a serious one for all parties concerned, I prefer to treat it so and to observe: first, that in urging the distinction between the experience of the mother and that of the child, the question seems irrelevant to the original issue, which is the possibility of stating the *whole* situation, whether it involves one person or a thousand, few or many things, in terms of a conflict of habitual activities resolved through attention. It insists that the *whole* situation, including the mother, the child, and the spanking, whether

regarded from the standpoint of the mother, the child, or both, is a system of conflicting activities undergoing reconstruction. And from this standpoint there is no more need for identifying the ideas or will of the mother and the habits of the child in the sense of making them the *same* thing or making one a "part" of the other, than of identifying habit and will in the mother, or in running together distinguishable functions or aspects of any other process.

Admitting *freilich,* then, the distinction between the activities of the mother and those of the child, we must yet keep hold of the fact that if they are not "parts" of each other, yet *they are "parts," in the sense of constituent interacting activities, of one situation.* This is reflected, in general, in the very terms in which we state the case. The performance as a whole may be stated either as "the mother spanking the child," or "the child being spanked by the mother." It depends on the point of view. Again, the term "mother" implies that one of the individuals is the *kind* of an individual that has the habit, the attitude of caring for "her child." And the term "her child" implies that the other is the *kind* of an individual that is to be protected by the mother even to the extent of being spanked, if need be.

Following the analysis still farther, and still speaking from the standpoint of the *entire* situation, how can "the will to spank" be regarded as the exclusive work of the mother? It surely is the outcome of the conflict between the mother-attitude of perceiving and keeping the child in safety and the child's present activity of, say, playing with the fire. It is a joint product of these two sets of activities, and one is as essential as the other. The attempt to regard the willing as the exclusive production of the mother alone transforms the concrete will to-spank-this-child-now-playing-with-the-fire into an abstract "will to spank" *überhaupt,* with nothing particular to spank – the essence of a profoundly tragic situation.

But Professor Baldwin may say, after all "the spanking" is "forced" on the child as the perception of the-child-playing-with-the fire is forced on the mother, to which I would rejoin: (1) Even so, this but sustains the original contention that however "new" or "forced" or "unwelcome" the experience may be, it still is statable in terms of the readjustment of conflicting habitual activities through attention. And even if for any reason one wished to state the case from the standpoint of the mother or the child alone, there are no other terms so far as I can see for the statement. (2) The spanking is no more "forced" on the child than on the mother. In fact, psychically it may be much less so. However skeptical we may have been about it as children, we have since learned that our mothers spake truly when they said: "I am sorry that I am 'forced' to punish you." (3) For both, neither "the spanking" nor the playing-with-the-fire viewed as *an occurrence* is any more "forced" than anything else

that may have preceded, as running, talking, sewing, etc. Even the image of the child playing with the fire is no more forced upon the mother than "her own" breathing, *her* impulse to rescue the child, or *her* will to spank it. In this sense, all those activities which constitute the "self" of the mother, upon which other things are said to be "forced," is as much "forced" as the other things. In this sense everything is "forced." "Forced" here means simply "happens." And in this sense things are no more and no less "forced" upon us than we are "forced" upon things, or "forced" upon ourselves. What goes on *within* our "walls" is as much "forced" as the thing "which rides full armed through them." As a matter of fact, this mere happening of things, however "new" or "sudden," e.g., Professor James's classic thunder-clap, is not experienced as "forced" *unless it conflicts* with activities or attitudes already going on.[95] And even then the "force" obviously is not all on the side of the "new" factor. It is met by the force of the activities already there. Pursuing the figure, the forces behind the "walls" are not asleep waiting to be aroused from without. They. are already active. And if the new factor be recognized as an improvement, it may be made the basis, the ideal, of the reorganization, in which case the old habits, instead of the "new" content, will appear as the "opposition." It is, then, only when there is *a conflict* of happenings and some content is selected as the *end,* that the other activities, the readjustment of which this "end" demands, seem "opposed" and "external" to the *end.* But they are not "opposed" or "external" to the *whole situation* nor to "experience."

[95] Cf. Angell, *Psychology*, 51, 371, 372.

XII
THE ETHICAL ASPECT[96]

If in the midst of the present division, not to say confusion, of tongues in the philosophical camp, a general password had to be selected which all could speak "trippingly on the tongue," doubtless that word would be "purpose." Absolutist, pragmatist, and realist, idealist and empiricist, intellectualist and voluntarist, all make fervent appeals to "purpose"; sometimes in reverent capitals; often in frantic italics; otherwise in humble lower case.

So at last it would seem that the philosopher might fairly meet the philistine's challenge to point to anything settled in philosophy by citing the ancient issue between mechanism and teleology. Whatever our differences, we are all professed teleologists. Prima facie the teleological problem is no longer that of teleology or no teleology. It is a question of the kind of teleology. But any fond hopes which the reader may harbor, on his first glance at the pages of current discussion, that "purpose" is to be a beautiful Hegelian synthesis of all philosophical differences, are doomed. He soon discovers that within this camp of professed teleologists the differences are as great as elsewhere; so great, indeed, that at the extreme each party regards the other's teleology as mechanism masquerading as purpose. Like the disputing theologians, each says: "Your God is my devil." In fact he finds that the issue here is the same as it is elsewhere; namely, the issue between absolute perfectionism, completionism, and developmentalism – evolutionism.

It may be said that this statement begs the issue at the outset, since many absolutists are also professed evolutionists. And indeed it has been long since even Mr. Bradley has repeated his famous Eleaticism, "Nothing real can move." Let, then, the statement of the problem be: Can absolute perfectionism be reconciled with the conception of evolution as an essential character of reality? Can an absolutist be an evolutionist except in a very Pickwickian, not to say Spencerian, sense?

In metaphysical terms the problem is: Are there laws or forms of development which themselves do not participate in the development? In

[96] Read at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association held at Baltimore, December, 1908, and afterward printed in the *Philosophical Review*, XVIII, No. 3, under the title "Absolutism and Teleology."

logical terms, it is the question which Hegel raised. Is there a real evolution of categories? In Hegel's attempt to answer this in the affirmative many believe that the reality of Hegel's evolution of the categories vanishes in his timeless absolute. From the biological standpoint the problem is that of the relation of structure and function. Can there be a development of function with no corresponding development in structure, or conversely? Putting it again from the standpoint of permanence and change, and granting the equal claims of each, the issue is: Can these claims be met by dividing up the world into laws and facts, categories and phenomena, structure and function, and assigning all the permanence to one side and all the change to the other?

In ethical terms the problem is: Whether the ideal in conduct can be absolute, all-inclusive, fixed, and given, or whether it must be constructed in the process in which it functions.[97] So far, the logical and epistemological implications of the question have held the center of the stage in current discussion. We shall therefore pass to the ethical aspects where the issue is as crucial as it is in logic. The aim of this paper is not so much to develop new criticism, as to state the present situation in the hope that such a statement may help to start the discussion in the ethical direction.

Whatever may be the difficulties which the conception of an all-inclusive fixed purpose encounters in logic, in science, or in a metaphysics based on scientific concepts, it is supposed to come into its own in the field of ethics. If it has no place in science, that only shows, it is said, the abstract character of the "mechanical" standpoint of science. "Waiving the formal consideration that, if the scientific standpoint be abstract, it must leave that from which it is abstracted equally abstract, let us note," says the anti-absolutist, or "evolutionist" as we shall call him in this discussion, "what is of more interest and effect; namely, the historical fact that ever since the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, science has become more and more teleological." The significance of this is that Darwin's work in science, as Hegel's in logic, revealed a new type of teleology – a dynamic, evolutional teleology which made it possible to introduce teleological conceptions into science without committing it to the absolute teleology which seemed to it more mechanical than its own "mechanism," from which it was all the while trying to escape. The mechanical character of pre-Darwinian science was therefore but the counterpart of the absolute type of teleology of which science was indeed very shy. But as soon as science found that it could talk of "wants" and "needs" and "purposes," without committing itself to the determinism of

[97] A much more concrete and effective statement of what I am saying here will be found in Professor Tuft's address on "The Present Task of Ethical Theory," *International Journal of Ethics*, XX, 141–52.

an all-inclusive and absolutely fixed purpose, it rapidly lost its teleophobia. For it found these categories of "want," "desire," "purpose" very serviceable, especially in biology.

"And it is interesting further to note," says the evolutionist, "that the development of this dynamic type of teleology in science since Darwin, has encountered its strongest opposition, not from scientists, as might have been expected, but from philosophers, who still insist that the method of science must be abstractly mechanical in sharp antithesis to the teleological character of ethics. And the implication of this would seem to be that an absolute teleology in ethics must maintain itself as the correlate of an equally absolute mechanism in science. In what respect this position is beyond that of Kant's second *Critique* is difficult to see. Perhaps it doesn't pretend to be beyond it."

Before passing to the more directly ethical considerations there is time only to mention two general psychological questions which meet us at the threshold. First: How can the absolute purpose be "all-inclusive" and still be *selective*, as psychologically a purpose must be? We are assured by Professor Royce[98] that, although it is inclusive of all possible purposes, it is still selective. And this assurance certainly is from the very highest authority on the absolute. But there are probably very few psychologists with sufficient reverence for metaphysics not to ask *how* this can be. Second: This all-inclusive purpose is also, at the same time, its own complete fulfilment. This raises another nice psychological problem which we cannot here discuss.

Striking now into the well-known course of the ethical argument, we come at once upon what is most often urged as the crucial support of the absolutist's teleology – that, unless there is an all-inclusive fixed purpose, end, or goal, there is no standard for moral progress. Even if we admit for the moment that consciousness might possibly have a social character without such an absolute, and that there might therefore be a certain *degree* of objectivity in a social purpose, yet how, in the case of a community, a national, or even an international ideal, are we to tell whether it spells moral advance or retreat? Without such a fixed and final goal is not the world a huge chartless craft, hailing from no strand, bound for no port – a vast derelict adrift on a shoreless sea?

But, asks the evolutionist: "After all, how much of a chart does the absolutist's conception furnish? Does it point the direction of the absolute goal? Does it show the rocks and shoals?" "No," confesses the absolutist himself, "it contains only the assurance that there *is* such a final goal, though its direction is known and can be known to no finite being." "How then," again asks the evolutionist, "shall we tell when we are

[98] Cf. *The World and the Individual*, I, 460ff.

headed toward or away from it?" Mr. Bradley says frankly that we cannot, and that therefore moral experience does not belong to reality, but to "appearance."

If the rejoinder be that this poor figure, taken from the world of space and time, is utterly inadequate for the conception of the absolute goal; that it is no particular "where" because it is everywhere; that it is at no particular time, because it is not in time but in eternity; the rejoinder is: What then from *this* standpoint do progress and regress mean? If the harbor is so infinitely extended that no voyage in time is necessary to make it; if, more technically, the absolute purpose is so all-inclusive that it has already determined and included all the *means*, how can we here talk of advance and retreat? Has not our conception, which was to be the standard of progress and regress, swallowed them both?

And more acute, if possible, grows the issue when we approach the problem of *responsibility* and *freedom*. As absolutists we must believe that only in the form of a fixed and all-inclusive purpose can the ideal have that kind and degree of objectivity and categorical authoritativeness which moral experience demands. On the other hand, the evolutionist insists that if our goal is already determined and if it is so "all-inclusive" that no matter in which direction we are headed we are bound to make it, or are always in it, then why be concerned at all? Why do we grow excited and rush into civic federations, labor unions, peace congresses, and suffragette crusades? Why should not our legend be, in the vernacular, "What's the use?"

"Why?" repeats the absolutist. "How utterly vain the question when you come to see that your getting excited and rushing into federations, and unions, and crusades, and refusing to adopt 'What's the use?' as your legend, are all included in the absolute plan."

"But," returns the evolutionist, "what then becomes of *responsibility?*" Waiving at present the problem of the *relevance* of an ideal not constructed in the process in which it functions, is not participation in the construction of the plan we are to help carry out the very basis of moral responsibility? How is it possible to feel responsible for the mere executing of a purpose which we have not helped to form? And is it not strange that a plan which we have helped to construct should have any less authority and binding force than one ready made and given?

"And here," continues the evolutionist, "we reach the heart of the ethical significance of the whole anti-absolute movement. It is the democratic movement in morals; it is the demand for the *full* conditions of moral responsibility. It is the claiming of the moral franchise – the right to participate in the *construction* as well as the execution of the ideal. In terms of our familiar figure, it means that if there is to be such a thing as moral experience aboard our craft we must have a real part, not only in

hoisting sail and washing down the decks, but in laying the course of the ship. And, as a *moral* experience, 'this laying the course' means more than running for a harbor already built from all eternity. It means nothing less than that our moral craft carries within her the material and the machinery for the building of *new* shores.[99] And this material is simply the entire world of organized habits and institutions; and the machinery, the method, is thought – science.

But long before this the absolutist is impatient to say: "First, all you have said about the necessity of participation in the construction of the ideal, and about the impossibility of the ideal being given to the agent, is entirely beside the mark so far as our position is concerned. For since the days of Plato have we not continually taught that, although all our efforts here on this bank of time do *not* alter by the least jot the absolute purpose, yet what you now *seem* to be doing for the first time is from the beginning (using "beginning" as a mere figure) an *eternal part* of the all-inclusive plan. The absolute purpose is, therefore, not formed independent of, and given to, the world of individuals in time; it is formed *of* all possible individual purposes. Hence, the thinking or planning of every individual or community is a contribution to the absolute purpose in the sense that it is an eternal part of it. What you are doing here in time is simply finding out what you have already contributed in eternity. Plato's doctrines of reminiscence and transmigration are, to be sure, awkward expressions of this conception due to his inveterate temporal imagery, which is the bane of all discussions of the absolute, including the present one."

"Second, when you speak of moral responsibility as involving the capacity for 'building new shores' once more, what is to determine when and where? Why in one direction rather than in another? Why now rather than then?"

To the static, timeless, geometric conception of participation in the absolute purpose, the evolutionist's answer is first of all a direct appeal to moral experience. He complains that he cannot square this account with moral responsibility as directly *experienced*. "I feel," he says, "as if I were, here and now, 'in my weak and feeble way,' helping to create plans and ideals of society, of education, of art, that are *somewhat* new – *somewhat* different from any ever wrought before. And all the experimentation and deliberation through which I make my contribution – they

[99] Of course it would be easy for a captious critic to break down this already overloaded metaphor by asking. What about the sea and the ship itself? For it is obvious that they too must be included in the process of reconstruction.

simply do not feel like, in the language of the radical empiricist, are not *'experienced as'* a mere bringing to the surface of present temporal consciousness parts of a purpose made in 'eternity.' On the contrary, just in so far as this timeless conception fills my mind, in so far do I find myself falling back into a 'what's the use' attitude." That this attitude does not characterize the absolutist any more than the anti-absolutist in practical life, the latter takes as evidence – not so much that he has misinterpreted the effect of the conception, as that it is not the one with which the absolutist actually operates – except in his discussions with evolutionists and pragmatists.

"But," returns the absolutist, "grant for the moment that you help to work up new *content* for the ideal, yet the *goodness* of it you surely do not even assist in creating. That you can only recognize, even as Plato taught, for it simply *is*." But the evolutionist is still obdurate or dense. He professes that he cannot strain out or skim off or otherwise separate the goodness as a special essence from the rest of the content and assign it to a world of different dimensions of being. And, moreover, if the goodness simply *is* and has only to be recognized, why is it that we have so much difficulty in the recognition? "No," confesses the evolutionist, "so far as I can see, goodness is perfectly concrete and is wrought out and *comes into being* along with every reconstruction of the ideal. Thus the goodness of honesty comes into being along with the *ideal* of honesty."

But this brings us to the absolutist's second point: that, in all this demand for participation in the reconstruction of the ideal, the problem of the *standard* for this construction is again overlooked. What is to determine *when*, in what direction, and in what material new goals, new ideals are to be constructed? This is, of course, only a little more specific form of the problem of progress which we left with only a negative outcome. The evolutionist's answer to this question is bound to seem to the absolutist very naïve, for he says simply: "First, whenever the old plans, the old ideals become inadequate, that is, unsatisfying; and second, in the direction and in the manner which, in view of all the material and the machinery available, promises the largest satisfaction." This, when sufficiently defined and formulated to become a working plan, *is* the ideal, *is* the standard, and *is* progress. It is the outcome of a genuinely creative process, Fichte's "fact-act" in its evolutional form-with all the results of the past as the material, and thought as the method. "And, after all," continues the evolutionist, "what higher consecration, or what greater claim to our allegiance, could it have than that it is a plan for a larger satisfaction which we have helped to create? To ask for a *further* standard for this ideal, which is thus intrinsically worked out *as* the standard, is to go straight into an endless regress, or to make the ideal again external and given."

To all of which the absolutist again observes: First, that absolutists evidently have not a monopoly of hortatory philosophizing. Further, that, in the foregoing, two important points are overlooked: first, when it is said that the ideal is that which promises relief from dissatisfaction, is not the real situation reversed? Does not the dissatisfaction arise from the condemnation of the present status *by* the ideal, which therefore must exist in advance of and independent of the dissatisfaction? And again, we must ask, after all, just *whose* dissatisfaction is to be relieved and by *whose* thought are the ideals to be constructed?

Of the ideal as the basis for, and therefore independent and in advance of, dissatisfaction, the evolutionist observes, interestingly enough, that it was that arch-absolutist Hegel who first called attention to the fact that the dissatisfaction and the ideal are correlative parts of one process; that the idealizing activity arises *with* the dissatisfaction as its positive reconstructive correlate. In logical terms, this means that the judgment is not a process of applying ready-to-wear predicates, but is one of constructing new predicates out of old ones as material. And this applies with as much force to the moral as to the scientific judgment. As we have seen, this is just the meaning of responsibility and freedom. "And once more," adds the evolutionist, "if the ideal is there independent and in advance of all dissatisfaction and if it is infinite in power and all-inclusive in extent, how in the name of the absolute does any dissatisfaction ever arise?"

To the other question, "Whose dissatisfaction is to be relieved, and by whose thought is the ideal to be reconstructed?" the evolutionist's answer again appears unsophisticated. To "whose dissatisfaction?" he replies: "everyone's." "By whose thought?" He answers: "Any thought that can contribute to a plan." "But" objects the absolutist, "there will be conflict in the planning itself." "Then," says the evolutionist, "there will be more planning, more investigation and experimenting, more getting together, until *that* conflict is settled." And he adds: "Are conflicts, as a matter of fact, ever settled in any other way? However much the absolute solution is already there, we must make the fight just '*as if*,' in Kant's phrase, there were no solution but the one we help to reach."

All this, of course, ignores the implication of "subjectivism" in these questions, of which so much was made in the earlier discussions of truth. It assumes that the "dissatisfaction" and the "thought" of which we have been speaking are not functions of a particular body or brain or mind *only,* any more than my standing here is a function of my legs *only.* It assumes that "my" consciousness is a function of a social process in which my body or brain or mind is only one factor. It presupposes that "my" thinking and feeling may be as truly a function of "your" brain or mind as of my own. My thinking of sending for you as a physician to treat my headache is as truly a function of your medically trained brain as of

my own aching one. And "your" thinking as you diagnose my case is no less obviously a function of my head than of your own. You are thinking not merely of, or about, but *for* me – in my place. Your thinking literally "belongs" to me. You are in fact renting me for a few minutes your thinking apparatus, the which if I do not now appreciate I shall when your bill comes in. But the headache – surely that is *all* "mine." And yet do I not in a very true sense "turn it over" to you? And even before your arrival I *experienced it as* something *related* to you as truly as to myself. And you regard it and talk of it as "your" case. At any rate after your arrival it seems clearly to "belong" to *both* of us. And we both may then regard it quite objectively and speak of what "we" can do to get rid of "it."

With this conception of the *ganz und gar* social character of consciousness constantly in mind, is it strange that the evolutionist should find his explanation of the charge of subjectivism in the critic's own subjective conception of consciousness?

"With the limits and nature of the constituents of this social process," says the evolutionist, "the general principle of this discussion is not concerned. It may include infra- and superhuman agencies; it may have all the unity consistent with development and all the differences possible with continuity. The principle insists only that the social process be real and that reality be a social process."

"But do you not see," asks the absolutist, "that this appeal to the social process begs the point of my whole contention, which is precisely that the social character of experience is impossible without the absolute? I, too, am a 'socialist,' but even *therefore* am I an absolutist. Without the conception of the absolute I confess I am a subjectivist. With no absolute the social process is to me one of the blind leading the blind." "But," returns the evolutionist, "if *we* do not know even the direction, much less the nature, of the goal to which we are being led by the absolute, while this may not be a case of 'the blind leading the blind,' it still is the blind being led; *our* blindness still remains." And when the absolutist devoutly responds: "Yea, verily, our blindness remains," "Then," says the evolutionist, "absolutism must content itself with being simply a religion and a gospel of resignation, not a call to works, much less an ethical theory of responsibility and freedom."

As for "the blind leading the blind," the evolutionist believes that it is just by this process of mutual leading – whatever the agents involved in it – that light and sight are *created*. And when the absolutist again asks: "Leading where?" the evolutionist's answer still is: "In the direction of the ideal worked out in and by the social process in order precisely *to give itself* a direction – a 'where.'"

REVIEWS OF *PRAGMATISM AND ITS CRITICS*

REVIEW BY ANONYMOUS

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When Professor James died, last August, it may have seemed to those who are acquainted only with the more popular literature of philosophy, that Pragmatism had no longer a representative in this country who could make the new view both intelligible and interesting. Readers of the more technical journals of course, knew better; and Professor Moore of the University of Chicago, by the publication of his new book, has shown to all who will read it that Pragmatism has still a champion who can defend and expound her doctrines, not indeed with the grace and charm of style of her lost leader, but in a manner that is almost always clear and is often captivating.

The book consists really of two parts, the first (chapters one to five) being in substance the course of lectures on "The Origin and Meaning of Pragmatism," which Mr. Moore delivered at the University of Chicago in 1908; while the second part is made up of a number of papers, written and published at various times, in answer to various critics. These papers ore here printed with but little change, and this is unfortunate, for the result is that the book, in spite of its pleasant style, is notably lacking in unity. The first five chapters form a unitary whole and presuppose in the reader little or no previous knowledge of the subject; but the last seven jump from topic to topic in bewildering fashion, determined only by the chance happenings of that external environment of whose influence the pragmatist is, in theory, so skeptical. Moreover, most of these answers to critics presuppose for their thorough comprehension a considerably more detailed statement of the criticisms in question than the limitations of his space allowed the author to give.

Mr. Moore's presentation of Pragmatism differs from that of most of his predecessors in saying relatively little on the threadbare topics of truth and knowledge, and in emphasizing chiefly the three following points: "(1) the historical background of the pragmatic movement; (2) the central rôle of the conception of evolution in the development of pragmatism; (3) the social, or perhaps better, the 'situational' character of consciousness and *a fortiori* of thinking."

The story telling how Pragmatism came to be needed and how it actually arose is among the best things in the book. It all started (what did not?) with the Greeks. Their early ways of viewing things did not "work,"

and these failures of theirs and their general lack of unanimity, therefore, constituted a new problem. The existence of such a problem led to the view that knowledge was something *an sich* – a special sort of instinct, quite as separate and distinct as the others. Starting with this supposition, the sophists proposed as a solution of the problem their subjective, almost solipsistic view of the individual consciousness. But if the sophists were right, how could there be any such thing as agreement between different "minds"? Hereupon Plato, accepting the sophists' psychology, came to the rescue with his, intellectualistic metaphysics, which has been the basis of all metaphysics ever since. This postulated the existence of an absolute and static Reality which should give truth to our ideas and righteousness to our ideals. Unfortunately, however, after this hypothesis had been tried for some few thousand years, with no great success, it became more and more apparent that the assumed absolute Reality gave, and could give, no actual help to either our ideals or our ideas. Hence, at last, the rise of Pragmatism, or that general tendency in modern thought which assumes no static reality (because it finds and needs none) and which points out that there is no datum in our experience which our ideas do not help to make.

For Pragmatism insists that we shall be thoroughgoing with our conception of evolution and not half-way believers. Not only forms and species have been evolved, but the very laws of evolution themselves. In short, according to the pragmatic view, there is not a single part or phase or element of the universe – whether a material being or a moral purpose – which remains eternally immune to change.

The great and determining element in this evolution, so far as we are concerned, is thought. All the reality that we can ever know is influenced by thought; and, conversely, all thought is a way of actively influencing reality. Ideas are not static and representative; they are dynamic, functional, tools for readjustment, "plans of action." Pragmatism is thus a part of the modern advance and a product of the modern spirit which refuses to be dominated by mere brute fact and external authority. "The very essence of modern humanity is the desire and determination to have a voice and a vote in the cosmic councils." And the progress which modern humanity has made has been everywhere through the use of ideas as its tools.

So repeatedly and ardently does Mr. Moore impress upon us the power of ideas in altering reality that the reader is likely to get the impression that this is a newly discovered fact just patented by the pragmatists and denied by every one else. And yet one can hardly suppose that Mr. Moore really thinks any one could be found who would seriously question it. Surely it is not here that the pragmatists and their opponents part company. The crux comes only with the further question, *Why* do ideas

work? – or, to be more exact (since all ideas work somehow), Why do some ideas work "in the way they set out to work," while others fall to do so? Is not the only satisfactory answer to be sought in the fact that some ideas are *true*, while others are not? And if you completely identify the truth of an idea with its successful working, have you not made an answer to the above-raised question forever impossible?

In other words, from the very fact that some ideas work so much better than others, it should seem that the conditioning environment, which thought does not make, is of considerably more importance than one would judge on reading Mr. Moore's book Possibly the influence of thought needed to be emphasized more than that of the environment; but by putting all the emphasis in one place our author has certainly given us a rather one-sided view of the nature of things.

Organically connected with this inability to see both sides is the chronic pragmatic blindness toward the representative nature of ideas, and from this Mr. Moore suffers no less than do his brothers. All will admit that ideas are functional; but are they only functional? In certain relations they may be regarded as "plans of action," but are they not also representative? Is it really good description to call the judgment, "America was discovered in 1492," a "plan of action"? If all ideas are functional, is not representation at least one of their functions? And if so, does not this representation depend for its truth on something more immediate than the question how, later on, they succeed in working?

Doubtless the pragmatist will have his reply to these, as to all other criticisms: "You don't really understand." In fact, after finishing the last seven chapters of Mr. Moore's book, the reader will probably conclude that all but the pragmatists have misunderstood Pragmatism, and that nearly all the criticisms of it rest ultimately on misunderstandings. And he will probably close the book with the wonder why all non-pragmatists should be so dense – or perhaps with the suspicion that there may be something a little wrong with a doctrine which seems so incapable of making itself clear even to specialists, and which only the initiate can comprehend.

But let not these remarks, in their turn, be misunderstood. Mr. Moore's attitude toward his critics is never one of complaint, but is always courteous, self-respecting, and sportsmanlike. He neither whines nor rages, but is ever good-natured and fair-minded. And his critics he everywhere treats not as adversaries, but as co-workers in the search for truth.

REVIEW BY CHARLES B. VIBBERT

Journal of Philosophy 8.17 (17 August 1911): 468–471.

The general standpoint of the present volume is not far to seek. Written by one of the contributors to "Studies in Logical Theory," and dedicated to Professor Dewey, it will be welcomed as a further elucidation of the particular brand of pragmatism professed by the so-called "Chicago school." And it is perhaps not too commendatory to say that no other volume, representing this standpoint, of equal authority and importance has appeared since the publication of the manifesto of 1903 – unless we except Professor Dewey's recent book "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays."

The contents of the book fall into two parts: (1) a condensed statement of a course of lectures on the "Origin and Meaning of Pragmatism," delivered at the University of Chicago in the series of "Open Lectures" of the summer quarter of 1908; (2) seven articles on various phases of pragmatism which have been read before the various philosophical societies and later published in the *Philosophical Review*, the *Psychological Bulletin*, and this Journal. In spite of the diversity of origin, the various chapters constantly keep in the foreground certain common problems which give unity to the volume as a whole: "(1) the historical background of the pragmatic movement; (2) the central rôle of the conception of evolution in the development of pragmatism; (3) the social, or, perhaps better, the situational character of consciousness and *a fortiriori* of thinking."

This last point, so much neglected so far, is clearly and persistently set forth throughout the volume and constitutes one of its main claims to novelty. Herein is to be found the key to the refutation of the most persistent charge brought against pragmatism, viz., subjectivism or solipsism. When the pragmatist insists upon the mediating, reconstructive function of reflective thought, this thought is immediately identified by the critics with the analytic product of physiological and structural psychology, that is, the thought processes corresponding to the brain of some socially isolated individual. But such an identification reinstates at the very outset of the discussion the very group of distinctions which pragmatism has eliminated as inadequate. "The situation is the pragmatist's absolute." Consequently, if we would understand aright the nature and function of reflective thought, we must note how it arises and operates in total situations. Then we should discover, not that thought occurs in an individual mind, but that the

individual mind and thought are functions only distinguished and distinguishable *inside* the situation. And the situation, it need hardly be added, is out and out objective, the very type of an independent world.

Not only is reflective thought thoroughly social in its function – first misunderstanding of pragmatism; but not all experience is reflective or rational. So that neither is the world *idea* nor is it *my* idea.

Just what, then, is the nature and function of thinking, interpreted in this social rôle and operating in an experience which is not rational in the sense of being constituted through and through by the distinctions of reflective thought? In answering this question we shall at the same time explain what pragmatism is and how it arose. And this answer is unequivocal. All thinking is a mode or stage of conduct; and if it be objected that conduct is subordinate to the maintenance of values, still it must be admitted that conduct is creative or recreative of such values. In fact, the materials of thought are precisely these immediate, non-rationalized values which have fallen into conflict with one another; and it is just this conflict which thought attempts to mediate or resolve. Therefore, thought is not a special instinct alongside of others, one value among other values, but the instrument for getting control over instincts and values. But how about scientific thinking? Surely this is an illustration of a special instinct finding its own special satisfaction and value in scientific knowledge, apart from and without any reference to conduct. Quite the contrary. Not only is science always pursued by men with human instincts, needs, and interests, bat scientific concepts and formulae have no meaning except in their relation to an actual efficient control of experience.

To say that all thinking is a mode or stage of conduct is only another way of saying that thinking and purposing are inseparably related to one another. Thinking is the process of "making up our minds." And if we can not go so far as to say that every judgment is a decision, at least we may say that it is a factor involved in coming to a decision. Is not pragmatism, then, only a reaffirmation of the older voluntarism growing out of Kant's "Critique of the Practical Reason"? By no means, inasmuch as pragmatism not only denies the sharp distinction between the theoretical and the practical reason, but also insists that thought's powers are equal to its demands. On the denial of this latter point all the older forms of voluntarism go to pieces.

But if this close relation of reflective thinking to concrete acting be so simple and evident, how account for the rise and supremacy throughout a goodly part of history of absolutism, especially in its rationalistic form? In order to answer this question let us appeal to history and see just how the philosophical problem was posed among the Greeks. Did systematic, reflective thought arise as a pure intellectual demand for unity? Was it not rather motivated by a demand for social control over a world whose

various aspects no longer offered a stable basis for social cooperation? To this demand for unity responses were numerous. Unfortunately scientific technique was not yet sufficiently developed to put these responses to a thorough test; and in the very plethora of suggestions the basis of efficient social cooperation, the organized social world, bade fair to evaporate. At this point arose the question of the procedure and worth of knowing in and for itself, with a view to determining more effectively a set of methods for resolving the conflict and establishing again a basis of cooperation.

Now right at this point was made the fatal mistake which prepared the way for the reign of absolutism. The logical problem was ranged alongside the problems of science and social life. "Thinking is now to be regarded as a special process coordinate with other processes, as those of fire, water, etc. As such a special process it must have a locus, it must be a function of some assignable machinery. This seemed to be individual bodies or souls, logically it does not matter much which, as the Greek soul was but a more ethereal body. Now as soon as consciousness and thought are thus regarded as a function of the individual body or soul, the differences and disagreements of opinion formerly so puzzling at once seem explained." But how can these different processes of thinking going on in isolated individuals discover or construct a basis of agreement, of social cooperation? Only by appeal to a system of rational archetypes which each has beheld in a previous vision. Thus the basis of social cooperation and the methods of maintaining it are taken entirely out of social life; and thinking takes on the peculiar function of reproducing the celestial vision. Thus was absolute rationalism enthroned and the problem of metaphysics in the historical sense posed, viz., how to maintain a world of continuity and order in the face of an individualistic theory of human consciousness.

Certain fundamental difficulties have ever beset this doctrine. In the first place, the whole process and content of life is reduced to a departure from and a return to an experience of celestial contemplation. But why the departure? How are error and evil possible in a complete, unchanging reality? To hypostatize them or to reduce them to the unreal or the illusory is not to explain them. Again, suppose that knowledge, regarded as a symbolic reproduction of an immutable reality, be accounted true when it coincides with, is identical with, or *is* reality; how is truth possible where this identity is declared unattainable? Again, how can such uneliminable ingredients of social life as instinct, impulse, emotion, and volition, to guarantee which reflective thought was invoked, find a place in a complete, unchanging reality? The failure of both Mr. Bradley and Professor Royce to solve this problem shows how hopeless is any attempt of this kind.

Now it is precisely these difficulties to which absolutism gives rise which became the negative stimulus to the development of the pragmatic movement. The positive stimulus is to be found in the exacter determination

of the concept of a self-supporting, self-controlling, and self-propelling experience, made possible by the Darwinian theory of mutability; a mutability which pragmatism has conceived as responsive to human will and purpose, not set by some absolute purpose. Meanwhile the technique of the actual operation of such teleological variation was gradually being worked out in different directions: (1) logically, in the recognition of the control value of the working hypothesis in science; (2) psychologically, in the detailed analysis (*a*) of the volitional, purposive character of ideas, *(b)* of their real social character. This latter doctrine, which develops into the conception of ideation as consisting in a connection of things, is traceable back to the Hegelian process of "othering," which insists that an idea is not a mere algebraic symbol, but that it is an act in which things pass into new interactions. But unfortunately the Hegelian logic lacks any principle to limit or control this "othering." Such a principle pragmatism discovers in the fact that this othering is connected with our direct experience of the value of the sound or ache or whatever other content it be, and with our desire or purpose to retain and develop that value, or to get rid of it.

How, then, do ideas "work"? Ideas mark the initiation of new connections between things. Thinking makes an essential difference to, adds something to, the things thought of or about. Even a so-called past act, in becoming known, is altered in the sense that it takes on additional functions and consequences. Knowing *is* the beginning of new interactions and new consequences, it does not simply prepare the conditions for the beginning. Knowing is our desire, our will, our practical interests getting out of ambiguity and confusion into order and efficiency.

Thus the pragmatist agrees with the realist that the world is *not* my idea, but disagrees with him and shows his sympathy with the idealist in insisting that every phase of it may be mediated *through* ideas. But when the latter maintains that thought is absolute and constitutive of all experience, the pragmatist demurs, contending that it is always and only our finite, particular, specialized thought which is operative.

Such, in brief, is the argument of the course of lectures. To outline the content of the various papers which follow were superfluous, inasmuch as three of them are reprinted verbatim from this Journal and the others are equally available in the journals above indicated.

This volume is not likely to silence all the objections to pragmatism nor to convert any one with whom the spirit is not already wrestling. Strenuous as is the attempt to present reflective thought as an instrument of control and mediation in a plastic, social world, still the problem of "responsibility to the objective" does not evaporate. About this old problem of the *objective* the entire pragmatic controversy turns. Convince one that the social situation is the absolute, and that objectivity is only a distinction arising within it and applicable to some of its contents – then that other

pragmatic doctrine, the purposive nature and test of truth, follows easily enough. But has Professor Moore convinced us of his first and fundamental assumption?

REVIEW BY DAVID L. MURRAY

Mind 20.4 (October 1911): 566–570. Ed. Note: Page references are to this volume.

Prof. Moore's book gives what has long been wanted, a simple and straightforward account of the theories of the 'Chicago' school, of which Prof. Dewey (to whom the work is dedicated) was the founder. Prof. Dewey himself is often very difficult reading, and it is therefore a godsend to receive a small volume, written in a clear and interesting style by one of his most talented disciples, which is devoted to the elucidation of the 'Deweyite' philosophy.

The most important section of the book is the first five chapters which reproduce in substance a lecture-course given by Prof. Moore at Chicago in 1908. The groundwork of his doctrine is contained here, and the remaining chapters are composed of replies to critics and developments of various aspects of Chicagoan pragmatism, including a brief but interesting study of its ethical bearings (ch. xii.).

Prof. Moore gives a general definition of his attitude at the beginning of his first lecture, where he lays it down that "all thinking – that is reflective, deliberate thinking – is a mode of conduct. And by 'conduct' the pragmatist means action which is seeking to maintain and develop that which is 'satisfying' and 'valuable,' or to get rid of that which is dissatisfying and worthless" (p. 2). This does not mean that philosophy is reduced to "a philistine opportunism" (p. 4), it only insists that abstract cogitation shall in the end make a connexion with the world of ordinary life. "It freely concedes the 'impersonal' character of the scientist's work. But, again, it is with the understanding that this is only an immediate impersonalism for the sake of a larger personalism in the end. Like the impersonalism of the just judge, it takes the impersonal standpoint in order the better to serve all persons" (p. 4). Thinking is thus a means to the satisfaction of human instincts, not an independent instinct aiming at a gratification of its own. This, the rival view of Intellectualism, the notion that thought is "merely the expression of the specific and independent instinct to know" (p. 5), Prof. Moore rejects as unworkable. "If we strip an idea of all its volitional, purposive character, it is difficult to see what we can mean by its truth or falsity. Imagine a cosmic stroke of paralysis that should reduce our activity to a mere stream of images; on what possible basis could we call some of these images 'true' and others false?" (p. 6).

Intellectualism, it is argued in lecture ii., was the work of Plato, who formulated his conception of an ideal world of immutable Reality in order to evade the individualistic psychology of the sophists, which threatened to make common knowledge impossible. This method of regarding knowledge outlived the classical epoch, and lasted into the Middle Ages, because just such a rigid doctrine was required by the Church, which had to act as school-mistress to ignorant barbarians. But none the less the theory is beset with hopeless difficulties. If reality is an absolute, complete, and enclosed system, then not only is it obvious that "if there were any possibility of thought being true, it would all have to be concentrated in a single idea or judgment" (p. 21), but as Bradley saw, even such an idea cannot be true, "for as an idea it must be different from the reality, and therefore false" (*ib.*); to be completely true, it would have "not merely [to] point at, or imitate, but … [to] be the whole of reality" (*ib.*). Neither will the device of "Degrees of Truth" help, for how are the degrees to be measured without access to the absolute standard? (p. 22). The time has come then for the pragmatic theory of truth which taking its cue from the Evolutionism of the nineteenth century (pp. 29–30), adopts a view of reality as in process of change, and treats thinking not as "a process of forming symbols of things" (p. 31), but as one in which "things pass into new interactions, and therefore new mutual modifications of each other."

We are here in presence of a remarkably clever and ingenious attempt to outflank the old and tiresome epistemological problem, "How can a thought which claims truth be known to correspond with a reality external to thought?" There is no direct answer to this difficulty, and to maintain that there is any to be found in terms of the "correspondence theory" is a mere sophism. None the less if scepticism is to be avoided, some means of meeting the objection must be discovered, and this has been done by ordinary pedestrian Pragmatism, as the present writer understands it, in three ways.

(1) By bringing out the distinction between a correspondence within experience, which presents no difficulty, and one which transcends it. (2) By showing on analysis that a number of 'truths' hitherto thought to involve correspondence, really only involve a 'manipulation and classification of the data of experience, as in the case of many scientific laws, and conceivably also in such notions as those of "substance" or "matter". (3) By advising that where a transcendent correspondence is ineluctable, the truth of judgments which assert it should in practice be measured by their fruitful consequences within experience.

Now it is just on this last point that Deweyism seems to wish to improve. Inasmuch as ordinary pragmatism is left with an indirect reply, and a risk of error, Prof. Moore endeavours to eliminate the conception

of 'correspondence' or 'representation' *in toto* from his theory of ideas, and to treat the whole problem in terms of activity. Building upon the facts that in actual life ideas are always sought in response to some purpose, and always issue in some course of action, he proposes to treat the part played by the idea itself in terms of pure activity (pp. 32–33). Ideation is simply the making of a change in reality. Thinking is the beginning of an operation upon an object which is continued by further action upon it resulting from the process of thought (pp. 35–37). 'Truth' or 'falsehood' in an idea is just its success or failure to make *satisfying* changes in reality.

That is the theory in brief, sublimely audacious. It does not seem to me, however, that it will work, and I will shortly state the objections to it. Granting fully that 'ideas' are part of our schemes of action, and that their practical consequences are the test of their truth which we have to use, it seems undeniable that in a number of cases there is a moment in the process where the idea claims to correspond with an existing reality, a claim which would be defeated if it did not. Its intention just then is precisely not to change its object but to reflect it. It is purposive, but its purpose is at that moment just to be representative. This no doubt is not its ultimate end. It seeks to locate its object in order to operate upon it, but such preliminary "photographing" is a necessary step in its plan of action. This objection is identical with that which Prof. Moore calls the objection raised by his "Neo-Realistic" critics (p. 35). It seems to me, however, that Prof. Moore fails to take up a consistent position in regard to it. Thus on p. 31, when it is suggested that in the judgment 'This ache is a tooth-ache' we are after all "just finding out what the pain is," he replies that "it is insignificant that we take the view of what it 'is' – that we should make the is-ness consist in part in its connexions with other things" (p. 32), apparently admitting the objection, though treating it as trivial. And again on p. 83 answering Prof. Perry he concedes that "of course the idea cannot lead to a new experience, unless the material for the experience exists." Thus "establishing a correspondence between idea and fact" seems to re-appear under the new title "discovering material upon which to effect an operation." To speak of first knowing a thing and then acting upon it implies to Prof. Moore "that the line between a thing and its consequences can be drawn ontologically and existentially and is a fixed one" (p. 40). When the Realist urges that "objects known are not 'essentially' modified by the act of knowing" (p. 85), Prof. Moore asks, "If the alteration does not begin in the knowing process, where does it begin? … . If I am hungry and bethink me of a sandwich on the sideboard, and if I say that the act of thinking does not essentially modify the sandwich, where does the essential modification begin? When I reach for it? When I touch it? At the first bite or the second?" (p. 85). This seems

to me an endeavour to reduce knowing to terms of physical movement and impact, which ignores the very meaning of thought. The judgment "There is a sandwich on the sideboard" prescinds in intention from being interpreted as a change made in the sandwich. "To know" is as distinct from 'changing' as 'reaching' is from 'biting'. This may sound dogmatic, but it seems to me we have reached an ultimate mental attitude which cannot be defined. The attitude may be a mistake, but if it is adopted it cannot be equated with a totally different one, *viz.,* that of operating on a thing. The only way I can approximate to Prof. Moore's view is by putting the case in this way. Granted that knowing is an act, call it, if you like, a change made in an object. Are there not, cases in which this act, or change, consists simply in the idea endeavouring to represent or mirror its object? What else can be meant by Prof. Moore's own doctrine that material for the change made by knowing must pre-exist? To discover this material do we not need to represent it in idea? Prof. Moore denies this. In one place he says that at this stage the relation between idea and object is analogous to that between hunger and food, one of stimulus and response (p. 84). This seems to me entirely misleading. If a physical metaphor must be used it resembles much more the relation between a camera and the scene it photographs.

On p. 41 Prof. Moore tries to eliminate the idea of 'representation' in thought by the following explanation: "Knowledge is the beginning of new interactions… . But the beginning of a new interaction is always to some extent ambiguous and confused. The first stage of new activity, therefore, is occupied with getting rid of this confusion, and this process the pragmatist calls thinking." The meaning of the judgment "The South Pole exists" would seem then to be that a confusion in my thought is cleared up, this confusion of my thought being yet at the same time a property of the real object, the South Pole Now it appears obvious that, on the one hand, in this judgment I do not mean that I manipulate the South Pole,[1] and equally obvious that to explain the judgment in terms of inter-action omits its essence, *viz.,* the *assertion* that the South Pole *exists*, an act which is *toto genere* distinct from *changing* the South Pole. Really, if we are not allowed to treat knowing as in this sense a unique activity, we might as well demand to have 'changing' reduced to 'eating' or some other disparate mode of conduct.

The Chicago Pragmatists have been accused of solipsism precisely because they have sought thus to eliminate the 'transcendent' element in knowing and to explain the cognitive function entirely in terms of the knower's experience. Who does not see, however, that when we assert the

[1] If I 'inter-act' with it in my judgment, that is a formal statement. The mode of interaction is *sui-generis*, *viz*., judging, just as the mode of interaction implied in reaching it in a boat is *sui generis* and irreducible.

existence of minds other than our own, our judgment deals essentially with what lies beyond our own experience and never can enter into it? We may have to accept its consequences in that sphere as a *test* of its truth, but such consequences do not *constitute* its truth. The dualism may be puzzling but it cannot be eliminated. Prof. Moore's attempt in chapter x. to evade the whole problem by asserting that 'Solipsism' is discredited by psychology and science is a sheer paralogism. We cannot base pragmatism or any other theory of knowledge on 'science'. It is science itself which stands at the bar.

Suppose a man enters the gloom of the Chamber of Horrors at Mme. Tussaud's waxworks. He sees around him rows of figures. Suddenly he starts at observing one of them move his head. "It's a real man," he declares after a little internal debate. But then the monotonous turning of the head perturbs him again. He revises his opinion. "It is a figure with a clock-work head after all," he concludes. Suddenly the figure turns and walks towards him laughing. "Why," he cries, "it's my friend Smith trying to frighten me with one of his practical jokes!" Now can it be seriously maintained that what happened was that the judger twice turned a waxwork into a man and *vice versâ?* Only if 'man' meant nothing but a phenomenon of his own experience, *i.e.* if he were a Solipsist. But taking man in its proper sense must we not say that the object of his judgments, true and false, was *really all the time* a man and that his last judgment was taken as true because it seemed to correspond to this fact? The 'Deweyite' theory, if I understand it, explaining everything in terms of change experienced by the judger and dismissing altogether the ideas of 'correspondence,' 'representation,' or 'transcendence of the object,' must ultimately resort to the other explanation suggested above, an evident *reductio ad absurdum.*

I have examined Prof. Moore's views thus fully in order to draw attention to one of the cleverest and subtlest theories of knowledge which has ever been evolved in philosophy, and also in the hope that some further explanation may be forthcoming from their author to show more, precisely how far he identifies the contents of private consciousnesses with the world of real objects. The familiar 'Deweyite' disclaimer, 'We do not believe in private consciousnesses,' can hardly be accepted as an *a priori* solution of the difficulty. Inasmuch as it is possible actually to doubt whether experiences other than my own exist, the logician must show how he arrived at his disbelief in the privacy of consciousness. I think it will be hard to explain this judgment in the familiar 'Deweyite' terminology.

REVIEW BY LIONEL DAURIAC

Revue Philosophique 72.5 (November 1911): 546–552. Ed. Note: Page references are to this volume.

Voulez-vous sortir du corridor imaginé par Papini sur lequel donnent quinze chambres, ou même un peu plus, occupées, chacune, par un pragmatiste, et par un pragmatiste, seul de son église? On aspire dans ce corridor un air impur. Allons donc sur le palier respirer à notre aise. Nous y trouverons M. Moore qui nous aidera à rédiger un *credo* commun à nos quatorze ou quinze hérétiques. – Et donc M. Moore est un orthodoxe! – S'il ne l'est pas, il a toujours écrit pour s'en donner l'air. Laissons donc parler M. Moore.

Il va diviser son discours – ou plutôt sa plaidoirie – en douze chapitres. Les plus intéressants, en seront, les premiers riches. Parmi les derniers j'en souligne un très court, au titre significatif: *Caractère social de l'habitude et de l'attention.* Ce titre va loin. Il rompt le lien que certains aperçoivent ou feignent d'apercevoir entre le pragmatisme et le solipsisme. De plus, il met l'accent sur les éléments de provenance sociale qui entrent dans le pragmatisme. Nous sommes dans l'ère de la Sociologie. Nous sommes dans l'ère du Pragmatisme. Donc le mouvement sociologique et le mouvement pragmatiste se correspondent. Ne prenez point cela pour un syllogisme. Je me défends en effet de conclure. M. Moore, d'ailleurs, n'a jamais fait pareil raisonnement. Encore est-il qu'en nous conduisant à rattacher le mouvement pragmatiste au mouvement sociologique, ce philosophe se montre singulièrement avisé. On soupçonnait les adversaires du pragmatisme d'avoir cru reconnaître sous un masque nouveau le scepticisme des successeurs de Platon. Il fallait leur répondre. Il fallait leur faire voir qu'une philosophie de l'action ne considère point, nécessairement, chaque individu comme un miroir indépendant de l'univers. Chacun ne peut regarder qu'à travers ce miroir: c'est chose jugée. Mais d'où lui vient son miroir? Et si le milieu social a influé sur la confection du miroir c'est que l'individu n'est vraiment maître, ni d'agir à sa guise, ni de faire « travailler » ses idées selon son caprice. Je ne suis pas sûr que M. Moore ait prouvé sa thèse. Il a certes eu cent fois raison de la poser. La divinité qui veille aux destinées du Pragmatisme ne saurait manquer de lui en tenir compte.

M. Moore est donc, pour la cause pragmatiste, un avocat d'une ardeur sans pareille, d'un zèle aussi avisé qu'ardent. Je veux dire qu'il voit les difficultés de la position et qu'il y pare. Donnons une preuve de son zèle et de

son ardeur. M. Moore n'aime pas – nous nous en doutions d'ailleurs – qu'on vienne déprécier la doctrine pour cause d'ancienneté. M. James voit dans le pragmatisme une vieille chose « anabaptisée », autrement dit, revêtue d'un nom nouveau? Oui, et non, répond M. Moore. Oui car dans la vie de l'homme d'affaires qui n'est pas pragmatiste? Dire que les « affaires sont les affaires » cela veut dire qu'en affaires il faut regarder droit devant soi: jamais à ses pieds, encore moins au ciel, ni à gauche ni à droite. Autant dire que nous naissons tous pragmatistes, ce qui est un truisme, et donc, n'est pas intéressant du tout. – Non, car il n'y a jamais eu de philosophie pragmatiste avant le siècle où nous sommes. « Le pragmatisme, en tant que méthode philosophique, est tout autre chose qu'une émouvante exploitation d'un truisme. » En tant que méthode consciente et préméditée le pragmatiste n'est, ni si vieux, ni si généralement répandu qu'on voudrait le croire et surtout le faire croire.

Sa thèse n'est pas que l'on ne pense que pour agir. Sa thèse n'est pas que « l'idée naît de l'action et retourne à l'action ». Je rappelle en passant que cette formule bien frappée est de Proudhon et que Proudhon l'a fort éloquemment développée dans le célèbre livre de la *Justice*. Mais la thèse pragmatisme (à moins que ce ne soit, exclusivement celle du philosophe pragmatiste Moore) est que la pensée . . . c'est de l'action. – M. Moore ne va point jusque-là – Il ne va point jusqu'à l'écrire en propres termes. Et encore, de cela je ne suis pas sûr.

Posons donc, en commençant, que la pensée est une étape de l'action, un *modus operandi* (p. 4). Il y a *connection* entre notre pensée, notre volonté, notre intention. Nous nous exprimons souvent, comme si, *d'abord*, nous formions notre pensée, et qu'*alors* nous fissions notre choix ou prissions conscience de notre dessein. Nous prétendons, nous (nous, c'est-à dire M. Moore) que nous sommes en train de vouloir, de choisir, de former un dessein tout le temps que nous sommes en train de penser. Donc, outre la pensée, en dehors de la faculté de penser, il est inutile de doter l'homme d'une faculté spéciale de vouloir, de choisir, de se proposer une fin. Quand je disais que M. Moore identifiait la pensée et l'action, je ne disais vraiment pas si mal! Et nous ne sommes pas au bout de l'argumentation. Je regrette davoir à écrire « argumentation » car si M. Moore puise à pleines mains dans l'expérience pour en extraire des faits, il argumente à perte d'haleine. Vous souhaiteriez peut-être en M. Moore un observateur? Prenez-en votre parti: c'est un dialecticien.

En voici la preuve. Pour donner raison à la thèse pragmatiste, pour la rendre inattaquable, il faut préalablement rendre inattaquable cette affirmation hardie, téméraire, j'ai bien peine à ne point ajouter « énorme », à savoir que ni la pensée, ni la vérité n'ont de valeur par elles-mêmes. Comme si l'on ignorait que le désir est le père de la pensée, que la pensée est la mère de l'action! Je veux bien m'en souvenir, mais je n'y vois point

de raison d'escamoter l'enfant. J'entends que les raisons m'échappent d'inviter la pensée à s'évanouir sous prétexte qu'elle ne serait rien sans ses deux causes: l'efficiente et la finale. – Elle est quelque chose puisqu'elle est un « plan d'action ». – Dans ce cas, elle serait si peu de chose, qu'en dehors de l'action qu'elle dessine, on ne verrait plus ce qu'elle est.

Mais cessons d'interrompre M. Moore. Donc M. Moore a beau s'entendre objecter que le désir est une impulsion, que l'action est un agent de transformation tandis que la pensée reste ce qu'elle est, sans changer ni la nature de celui qui pense ni la nature de la chose pensée, il est résolu à ne point se rendre. La pensée, lui dit-on, n'ajoute pas un coude à notre taille. Si nous avons grandi, répond-il, c'est parce que nos ancêtres nous en ont fourni les moyens par la bonne conduite de leur pensée.

Les adversaires du pragmatisme insistent. Ils comparent le penseur à un prêtre officiant dans le temple de la vérité. Soit! Ce prêtre est un homme qui a des mains, des yeux, qui a ses affections, ses passions. « Si vous le piquez, il saigne; si vous le chatouillez, il rit. » Tant y a qu'impersonnelle à son point de départ, la science est l'oeuvre de personnes se proposant pour fin le salut et le bien-être des autres personnes!

– Ce n'est point là chose à contester. Mais le problème est celui-ci: devons-nous identifier la pensée à ce que, jusqu'à ce jour, on lui a opposé? Ou même, si l'on tient à rapprocher la pensée de l'action, doit-on renoncer à la distinction permise et, à la rigueur, justifiable, entre la pensée théorique et la pensée pratique?

Il y faut renoncer si l'on veut adhérer à l'opinion de M. Moore. M. Moore soutient que la valeur théorique de nos idées générales est nulle. Que valent ces notions de matière, d'essence, de liberté, prises en elles-mêmes, isolées de tout rapport avec l'action? On prétend que la valeur d'une connaissance est liée à sa vérité? Mais en quoi consiste cette vérité, si l'on n'a égard à rien de ce que l'on peut vouloir ou se proposer en suite de cette vérité? Nos pensées ne sont pas de pures images. Si elles ne sont pas de pures images, il reste qu'elles soient des sources d'action. Nous ne nous trompions vraiment pas tout à l'heure en annonçant un « escamotage » de la pensée.

Car c'est à la pensée que M. Moore s'attaque. Il lui porte des coups répétés, mais tous ces coups répétés sont des coups droits. Et qu'il a conscience de prendre vis-à-vis de la pensée, son ennemie, une attitude entièrement nouvelle dans l'histoire! Ne disons, ni que le pragmatisme est vieux, ni même que Kant en est le père. Il en est à peine le précurseur. Le kantisme est à la fois intellectualisme et volontarisme. D'une part, la pensée échoue dans son entreprise: elle manque l'absolu qu'elle cherche. De l'autre, elle ne renonce à aucun de ses privilèges. La raison pratique n'y détrûne pas la raison pure ainsi que, selon M. Moore, cela aurait dû arriver. C'était pour que cela arrivât que le mouvement pragmatiste s'est

produit, mouvement, encore une fois, peut-être « préparé » mais nullement commencé par Kant.

Je recommande au lecteur les chapitres II, III, IV. Non que M. Moore y ait fait preuve de connaissances précises. C'est assez le contraire. M. Moore y « corrige » l'histoire de la pensée humaine. Je ne lui en fais pas un reproche. Il rend le pragmatisme d'autant plus intéressant que, pour en plaider la nouveauté, d'une part, et de l'autre, reconnaître à cette philosophie le droit de se donner pour la vérité, le pragmatisme est obligé de regarder l'histoire à traveis ses lunettes, et je vous prie de croire, qu'il n'a chargé personne de les lui fabriquer. Déjà les chapitres historiques de M. W. James dans son beau lîvie sur le Pluralisme donnaient à penser: à penser et à sinquiéter. Car on eût dit, à lire ces chapitres, que le rationalisme ne s'était jamais distingué du monisme, entendons également du déterminisme radical. Or si le rationalisme ne pouvait revêtir d'autres formes que celles décrites par M. W. James, nous célébrerions ses funérailles avec la plus insolente allégresse.

Mais que dirons-nous du rationalisme contre lequel s'est escrimé M. Moore! Ah le piteux adversaire et qu'il ferait bon vivre chez les pragmatistes, si les infirmités que ceux-ci croient apercevoir chaque fois qu'ils rencontrent un rationaliste étaient des infirmités incurables! Incurables, elles le sont, sans aucun doute, étant imaginaires. Car on ne peut décidément pas imiter, sans quelque risque d'erreur, la désinvolture avec laquelle M. Moore se divertit à ne voir dans le rationalisme contemporain qu'une prolongation ou même une stérile survivance du platonisme et de l'aristotélisme.

Certes, il n'est pas faûx de prétendre que Platon ait cherché, ainsi que plus tard Aristote, d'ailleurs, la raison de la fixité dans le changement. C'est que, peut-être, l'idée de changement ne se conçoit qu'en face de son opposée, c'est que si le monde est un système d'idées, les notions antithétiques sont indispensables, elles aussi, à l'explication de ce monde. Je me garderais bien de faire la remarque, si M. Moore n, avait pour Hegel des indulgences surprenantes et s'il n'avait oublié qu'il est presque défendu de pardonner à Hegel quand on vient de condamner Platon. Ce qui déplaît à M. Moore c'est l'immobilité des « idées » de la dialectique platonicienne. Ce qui plaît à M. Moore c est le mouvement dont Hegel, anime ses idées. Ce qui déplaît à M. Moore, chez Platon et chez Hegel, c'est la dialectique. Et nous voici en mesure de comprendre ce qui déplaît à notre auteur dans la thèse de la pensée en tant que source originale d'activité spéculative. C'est que pour saisir la pensée dans son exercice, il faut recourir à une méthode d'analyse et de réflexion dont les démarches, en plus des difficultés rencontrées, ne se font pas au grand jour, devant témoins... Tranchons le mot: ce qui déplaît aux pragmatistes dans l'intellectualisme, c'est que l'intellectualisme n'est praticable qu'en raison d'efforts et d'apti-

tudes, non pas exceptionnels, non point même si rares qu'on le pense, mais qui détournent de l'action et rendent les pratiquants de la spéculation de moins en moins familiers aux choses de la vie quotidienne. La raison et la vie, choses différentes et donc incompatibles! Tel est le premier article de la foi pragmatiste.

Il n'en résulte pas, cependant, que le rationalisme ait toujours été confiné dans une impossible recherche de l'absolu, ni que tous ses partisans aient poussé l'illusion jusqu'aux abords du mensonge, si l'on ne péut, sans se presque mentir à soi-même, faire descendre le mal et l'erreur à la condition de pure apparence. Je demande donc à M. Moore s-il ne connaît décidément pas, dans l'histoire de la pensée, d'autre rationalisme que le rationalisme statique. Peut-être il me répliquera que j'oublie, à mon tour, sa mention de Hegel. Non, je ne l'oublie pas, cette mention: je m'étonne seulement qu'un penseur tel que Hegel, rencontré par M. Moore, ait été presque aussitôt écarté que rencontré. . .

Ou plutôt je ne m'en étonne point. Car Hegel serait pour les pragmatistes un adversaire sinon invincible, à tout le moins redoutable. Avec lui, c'est qu'il faut oser regarder la pensée en face. Cette pensée est mouvante, donc elle est vivante! Donc elle est réelle et c'est ce dont le pragmatiste ne veut pas.

Ainsi, rien n'est curieux, rien n'est plus intéressant que le prisme à travers lequel les pragmatistes regardent l'histoire des doctrines . . . si ce n'est la manière dont ils s'y prennent pour escamoter la pensée, autrement dit, l'absorber dans l'action.

Le chapitre de M. Moore*: How ideas « work »* est, si l'on peut le dire, le sommet de son argumentation. On a démontré, ou l'on est censé avoir démontré que la thèse d'une pensée pure, purement représentative est insoutenable, pis que cela: insaisissabie. Et donc on a étranglé la pensée. Parlons-en mieux : on l'a fait évanouir par persuasion. Mettons-nous donc en face de la pensée pragmatiste et voyons l'idée à l'oeuvre.

Une idée n'est à l'oeuvre qu'à la condition d'agir dans une direction définie et de procurer une satisfaction définie.

« J'ai mal aux dents. » Voilà l'exemple sur lequel va « oeuvrer » la pensée de M. Moore. L'idée de ma douleur est présente à ma conscience. Est-ce une idée vraie? Je suppose, par impossible, qu'en cherchant à me débarrasser de ma douleur, je recouvre la vue dont j'étais privé. J'en serai plus que satisfait: heureux. Pareillement Saül cherche un âne et trouve un royaume. C'est plus qu'il ne demandait. Il n'importe. Si l'idée aboutit à un résultat non prévu, elle n'est pas vraie. Si la douleur de dent aboutit à la cessation d'un mal autre que le mal de dent, c'est que mon idée de cette douleur a « mal travaillé ». Donc je me trouve en présence d'une idée fausse. Du point de vue pragmatiste, convenons-en, le raisonnement est correct.

Une difficulté s'élève. J'ai mal aux dents. Je rapporte ma douleur à une dent. J'ai donc l'idée d'un lien entre la douleur que je souffre et la dent qui me la fait souffrir. J'affirme ce lien. Donc je le « pose ». Donc je me le représente. Je le « découvre ». Je ne l'invente point ». Je ne le produis point. Je n'introduis aucune différence, aucun changement dans la réalité.

M. Moore ici proteste. Si nul changement ne s'est produit, je ne puis qualifier l'idée ni de vraie ni de fausse. Et l'on ne doit pas dire que le mal de dents auquel je ne pensais point tout à l'heure continue à être ce qu'il était maintenant que je l'ai pensé. Il est si peu ce qu'il était, qu'aussitôt converti en objet de pensée, il se convertit en un projet: celui d'aller chez le dentiste. Osez donc dire qu'il n'y a rien de changé, comme si la résolution d'aller se faire arracher une dent était chose de petite et même de négligeable importance!

L'adversaire insiste: Soit. Il y a quelque chose de changé. Avant que l'idée ne s'éveille, il y a le mal de dent. Après qu'elle s'est éveillée il y a le projet d'opération. D'accord! – Mais entre l'*après* et l'*avant*, il y a le *pendant,* qui *précède* la formation du projet.

Là est le nerf de l'objection. Je n'irais pas chez le dentiste si je ne m'étais *représenté* l'opération, si je ne l'avais *jugée* nécessaire. Donc l'idée est représentative, et la pensée est une forme d'activité originale.

– Pas du tout, réplique M. Moore, Dès que la pensée se représente, le dessein a lieu. Ce n'est pas assez dire, les deux faits ne sont pas distincts. En effet, quand je sens la douleur de dent, je me lève, je m'habille, je vais chez le chirurgien. Où ai-je pris le temps d'établir un lien entre la douleur et la nécessité de l'opération? Où et quand me le suis-je représenté? On crie: au feu! dans la rue. Je me réveille. Je saute du lit. Où et quand me suis-je représenté le danger que je courais? La représentation du danger est-elle distincte du mouvement accompli pour m'y soustraire? Je suis contraint de rétablir cette représentation par un travail consécutif de mon esprit: travail imaginaire et qui ne prouve rien.

« Travail imaginaire »: je viens d'écrire cela pour faire plaisir à M. Moore. Ce travail n'a pas lieu « il n'a *plus* lieu », devrait-on dire. Donc il a eu lieu. Nous n'avons plus besoin de « faire poser » la douleur pour en tirer une épreuve au sens photographique du terme. Il ne nous est plus nécessaire de réfléchir pour penser à nous en débarrasser. M. Moore a donc raison de prétendre qu'entre la douleur et la volonté de s'en délivrer, aucun acte représentatif ne s'intercale, ainsi les choses se passent-elles *maintenant*. Mais se sont-elles toujours passées ainsi? M. Moore sait bien que non, et qu'il y eut jadis un intermédiaire représentatif, passé aujourd'hui du conscient à l'inconscient par l'efficace de l'habitude.

Changeons d'exemple. Au cas du mal de dents, substituons celui du *cogito*. Il y a là ai je ne me trompe, un acte de représentation pure, dont la durée se prolonge, et dont la perception se maintient pendant un temps

facile à évaluer. Les actes qui suivent immédiatement cette aperception, ses conséquences, ne nous font point davantage sortir de la représentation. Pourquoi? parce que l'attention est là qui veille. Elle lutterait, au besoin, cette attention, contre l'influence déprimante de l'habitude. Et donc, tant que durera l'effort auquel s'est soumis Descartes, c'est-à-dire tant que la dernière ligne des *Méditations* ne sera point écrite, nous traverserons une suite de moments dont pas un seul ne sortira de la sphère de l'intelligence pure.

Il est donc certains moments dans la vie de l'esprit où l'homme pense et ne fait que penser. J'accorde qu'ils sont rares. Ils sont néanmoins. Et comme ces moments se rencontrent au cours d'un grand nombre d'existences, le Pragmatisme pourrait n'être pas encore sorti de la phase critique, et n'avoir pas encore désarmé ses adversaires.

REVIEW BY MARY W. CALKINS

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Professor Moore's study of pragmatism is characterized by a moderate temper and a clear style. Its distinctive features, as the preface suggests, are the sketch of the historical antecedents of pragmatism, the emphasis on the central "*rôle* of the conception of evolution in the development of pragmatism," and the insistence on the social character of experience. The book is made up of five chapters embodying a relatively untechnical exposition of pragmatism (originally given as 'semi-popular lectures'), followed by a collection of papers, already published in different journals, each in response to some critic of pragmatism. One hopes that Professor Moore will sometime give us a constructive treatise subordinating criticism to a discussion of pragmatism as complete system.

The comment on the book which follows is written from the standpoint of personalistic absolutism, and therefore concerns itself chiefly with the issue between pragmatism and this form of absolutism. Moore's consideration of the opposition of pragmatism to mere intellectualism and to thorough-going realism must, however, be noticed. (I.) In its effort to bring about the 'logical regeneration of voluntarism' pragmatism achieves its most important success. Its emphasis on the 'doctrine of the real efficiency of thought' (p. 103) is its central teaching. Dr. Moore admirably states the pragmatist's contention, that pure thinking is no end in itself, though he does not prove that pragmatism is the only system reconcilable with this view. (II.) So far as pure realism is concerned, Moore certainly shows that it denies the essential efficiency of thought. Realism of this type is a defence of the thesis that "*thinking makes no 'essential' difference to the things thought of or about,*" and that ideas make only "the difference of the *addition* of thought" (pp. 34–35). Pragmatism, on the other hand, holds that the addition of thought makes an 'essential alteration in the situation,' that thought is, indeed, 'a part of the total process of an efficient desire and effort to effect a change in experienced values' (p. 36; *cf.* p. 47). It should be added that Moore, in spite of his reiterated statement of this grave difference between realism and pragmatism, none the less recognizes a basal likeness of the one to the other. "The pragmatist," he says, "agrees with the realist that … at any given time some of the world (or experience) may be 'independent' of

knowledge in the sense that it is not then 'being known' …" (p. 42). This makes of pragmatism a dualistic doctrine. Moore, to be sure (in reply to Creighton), argues that pragmatism is not dualistic in that it teaches the temporal continuity of non-thinking with thinking reality (p. 54); but the qualitative duality remains in spite of the temporal continuity.

(III.) With the pragmatist's opposition to absolutism, this review, as has already been suggested, will deal in greater detail. Moore's criticisms reduce to five which will be discussed in an order different from his own. (1) The first to be considered is introduced by Moore in reply to the critics who object to pragmatism as subjective. Professor Moore has no trouble in showing that contemporary pragmatists (notably Dr. Dewey and those of his school) regard experience from a social, not from an individualist standpoint, that they take for granted 'the perfectly objective and social character of consciousness' (p. 88) and assume that "consciousness is somehow born of a thoroughly social and objective world" (p.90). In this assertion of the social character of consciousness (so Moore argues), the pragmatist makes absolutism unnecessary; and if, on the other hand (he continues), consciousness were not social, only a single self, and no Absolute, could be proved to exist (pp. 87–88). Students of Fichte and Royce do not need to be reminded of the answer which the absolutist will make to this criticism. He will claim that the pragmatist too naïvely and "confidingly took this conception of the perfectly objective and social character of consciousness at its full face value" (p. 88). For such an inter-related society of finite selves is only possible, he will contend, on the supposition that the finite selves are all parts of the one, absolute self.

(2) A criticism more frequently repeated saddles upon absolutism the difficulties inherent in any 'copy-theory' of knowledge, – the doctrine that "ideas can only algebraically represent or 'mean' or 'point at' a world of reality 'beyond'" (p. 42). This criticism, it should be noted, identifies absolutism with the Platonic theory of 'universal and immutable Ideas' existing distinct from the individual consciousness. The absolutist is well within his rights when he objects to this identification. Conceived after Lutoslawski's fashion, the Platonic theory so far from being absolutist is a pluralistic spiritualism which subordinates ideas to souls; and according to the traditional interpretation, which sets the ideas as ultimate realities over against the souls, Platonism is at best one form of absolutism among others. But Moore uses 'Platonic Ideas' almost as a synonym for 'the Absolute,' and even attributes to Professor Royce the conception of the Absolute as 'system of ideas.' He nowhere takes account of the personalistic view of the Absolute as concrete thinking and willing self, of the finite selves as genuine parts of the absolute self, and of knowing as direct not mediate – a sharing, not an imitation or copy.

(3) In the third place, the pragmatist finds fault with the absolutist for

conceiving reality as purely cognitive. Royce, to be sure, – as Moore notes, – attempts to introduce purpose into the Absolute (p. 25), but the effort is foredoomed to failure, since "to preserve the changeless perfection of reality, purpose can have for its content only an algebraic correspondence with the absolute system of ideas which makes it even more vacuous than Plato's 'contemplation'" (p. 27). This criticism recurs again and again. Absolutism is, in truth, equivalent for Moore with intellectualism (*cf.* pp. 10, 17, *et al.*). Evidently this objection is based in part on the assumptions already challenged, that the Absolute is a system of Platonic ideas and that absolutism involves a copy-theory of knowledge, but it is still more deeply rooted in the pragmatist's opposition to the absolutist doctrine of the permanence of reality.

(4) To this, the strongest reaction of pragmatism against absolutism, we must now turn our attention. All the foregoing criticisms are indeed outgrowths from this. The absolutist (whether his Absolute be impersonal or personal, system of ideas or absolute self) holds that there exists eternal and immutable reality; the pragmatist teaches that reality is purely in the making. Absolutist doctrine, so the pragmatist believes, tells against the reality of change; "pragmatism … is a crusade to release change from the limbo of 'appearances' and reality from the stocks of a 'changeless unity'" (p. 69).

We have reached at length the crucial point of divergence between the two systems. Unquestionably the absolutist believes that there exists reality other than that of the purely human experience – even other than that of the aggregate of human experiences. But he may appeal, if he will, from the Bradleian Absolute for whom change is mere appearance, and from the Platonic Absolute, 'a whole of the static, geometrical type,' to the Hegelian or Roycian Absolute for whom change is real, although subordinately real. The absolute self, as thus conceived, though *more than* temporal, is *also* temporal. And the development of human individuals constitutes a reality which (to the human consciousness, shared though transcended by the absolute self) is constantly changing. In a word, this personalistic form of absolutism challenges the pragmatist's claim to exclusive rights in the conceptions of change and of progress.

(5) The last of these criticisms, the pragmatist's objection to the absolutist conception of truth, is a corollary to the criticism just outlined. For the absolutist, truth is the agreement of individual experience with reality; for the personalistic absolutist, from whose standpoint this review is written, this means that truth is the correspondence of the individual with the absolute experience, – of the part, with the whole. The pragmatist objects "that there is no connection between the absolutist's general definition of truth and error and the standard actually employed in testing any particular judgment" (p. 51), or, that "there appears no

necessary connection between the absolute system and the determination of truth and error in any given case." To this statement, modified a little, I think that the absolutist must agree. In other words, I believe that the absolutist is logically certain of truth only when he asserts his own existence and that of the absolute self. Of course he admits with Baldwin (quoted on p. 74) that the most convenient 'test' of the truth of an idea is its agreement with a purpose of which it is a constituent part. The pragmatist calls this agreement 'truth,' the absolutist regards it as an indication of the truth which he cannot define otherwise than as 'the fulfillment of an absolute purpose.' And he claims that this conception, empty as it is in its bearing on the special case, has a unique value as an essential factor of the general view of the universe as more-than-human reality.

A word may be added concerning the supposed advantage of the pragmatist conception of truth. Moore admits that the older pragmatist definition of true ideas as ideas which work "was an easy mark for the critic, who lost no time in reminding us that false ideas seem to be as industrious as true ones." Accordingly, he modifies the original definition so that it reads: ideas "which work in the way they set out to work … are true" (p. 34). To the form of this statement it must be objected that only persons, not 'ideas,' can 'set out to work' or 'purpose' anything. But, waiving this point, one cannot fail to see that this pragmatist conception of the true idea, as that which fulfills a purpose, is definite only in so far as it is individualistic. For it is practically no more difficult to describe the purpose of the Absolute in a given case than to estimate the relation of a given idea to the 'total objective situation.' Either the pragmatist's conception, like the absolutist's, must have no 'necessary connection' with a given case, or the pragmatist must consent to be called a subjectivist.

REVIEW BY E. D.

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M. Moore a réuni dans ce volume quelques conférences faites pendant l'été de 1908 à l'Université de Chicago sur l'origine et la signification du pragmatisme, avec un certain nombre d'articles d'un caractère surtout polémique, parus dans la *Philosophical Review,* le *Journal of Philosophy,* etc. … L'auteur, un des plus brillants disciples de M. J. Dewey, s'était fait connaître déjà par une profonde critique de l'épistémologie de J. Royce et par deux monographies sur la théorie de la connaissance de Locke.

Dans la première moitié du présent travail, M. Moore campe en face l'un de l'autre absolutisme et pragmatisme dans leurs positions essentielles. Il définit ainsi (pp. 8–9) les principales alternatives débattues:

1° « Psychologiquement, est-ce que la pensée est l'expression d'un « côté », d'un « aspect », d'un « instinct » indépendant et séparé (coordonné avec d'autres instincts comme ceux de la nutrition, de la reproduction, etc.), instinct qui se satisferait en faisant correspondre a un monde immuable des sortes de symboles algébriques, ou bien est-ce qu'elle est précisément le processus de l'interaction de nos instincts et de nos appreciations?

2° « Logiquement, une idée est-elle un pur X psychique pour un monde qui reste étranger à notre algèbre; ou bien est-ce qu'une idée est une partie parfaitement organique d'un processus de changement réel dans un monde qui se développe?

3° « Éthiquement. la conduite morale ne consiste-t-elle qu'à exécuter des idéals ou des plans donnés, ou bien demande-t-elle une participation consciente à la création de ces idéals?

4° « Politiquement, si la responsabilité morale demande une participation consciente à la création de l'idéal et du programme de la communauté, ne faut-il pas que l'organisation sociale soit essentiellement une démocratie?

5° « Métaphysiquement, le problème est de savoir si le mouvement, le changement, l'évolution, sont des caractères réels ou seulement apparents, du monde.

6° « Au point de vue théologique on demanderait si le concept de Dieu signifie une somme ou unité d'être compléte, éternellement fixée, immuable, ou bien s'il s'applique à un être actif, engagé dans des luttes réelles avec des problèmes réels. »

M. Moore explique quel besoin de fonder notre accord et notre consensus

social a donné naissance aux philosophies de l'absolu; mais il nous les montre impuissantes à rendre compte de nos désaccords et de nos antagonismes, arrêtées devant le fait avéré de l'erreur. « Moquerie de la situation! Le monde absolument immuable devait être le fondement d'une vérité commune et d'un bien common; et voilà que nous sommes, non seulement sans aucune vérité parfaite, mais incapables de dire lesquelles de nos idées sont plus près de la vérité que d'autres. Ce qui devait maintenir la distinction de la vérité et de l'erreur a pour résultat de les confondre. Nous n'avons consenti à réduire toute notre vie à la seule tâche de connaître la réalité absolue que pour trouver cette tâche irréalisable; que pour trouver finalement que la connaissance est un processus dont la constitution et la méthode sont incompatibles avec son but! » (23).

La voie a été enfin ouverte au pragmatisme quand Darwin eut introduit dans le monde l'idée d'une mutabilité des espèces, d'une variation. Il est vrai que la variation darwiniste se présentait d'abord comme accidentelle, soustraite au contrôle; mais, comme tous les grands explorateurs, Darwin alla plus loin qu'il n'a eu conscience d'aller. Comment aurait-on pu longtemps refuser une place, parmi les types de variation, à la variation intentionnelle (*purposive*)? Cette variation téléologique a été graduellement mise en évidence dans des directions variées: la logique a reconnu la valeur de contrôle de l'hypothèse active (la *working hypothesis*) dans la science. « La *working hypothesis* marque l'apparition des idées dans le processus de l'évolution: elle attribue une efficacité aux causes finales, ou plutôt elle abolit le caractère métaphysique de la distinction entre les causes efficientes et les causes finales. » La psychologie, d'autre part, a complètement transformé l'ancienne conception des idées; elle a fait apparaître leur caractère intentionnel, leur relation avec la volonté. Ce sont les résultats de ces investigations, en même temps que le développement de la notion de la *working hypothesis* qui ont finalement triomphé de la logique et de la métaphysique absolutiste.

Dans la partie polémique du livre (réponses à MM. Creighton, Bakewell, Perry, Baldwin), M. Moore repousse vigoureusement l'accusation de subjectivisme et de solipsisme portée contre la doctrine de Dewey. Elle a sa source dans un contresens, – en ce qui concerne du moins l'école de Chicago, – car, sur ce point, Dewey demande à ne pas être confondu avec Schiller. Dewey se sentait même si innocent de cette tare qu'il avait prévu, nous dit M. Moore, un reproche tout contraire: « Quand on s'apercevrait que fait et idée, existence et signification, dessein et moyens étafent regardés comme des fonctions dans l'expérience, l'alarme se répandrait que la personnalité avait disparu. » La critique a complétement méconnu (à l'exception de M. Pringle-Pattison) le caractère de cette « situation » à laquelle Dewey ne manque jamais de rapporter le « besoin » et l' « intérêt ». La « situation » est quelque chose de parfaitement objectif; bien loin qu'elle soit intérieure à une conscience, à un esprit individuel, c'est au contraire la conscience individuelle qui est regardée comme un élément à l'intérieur de la situation.

REVIEW BY THEODORE DE LAGUNA

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Of the twelve chapters which this little volume contains, the first five are based upon a series of popular lectures on *The Origin and Meaning of Pragmatism* while the remainder are reprints of controversial articles. The book is distinctly a school production. Needless to say, it has the independence that belongs to thorough intellectual honesty. But the author writes always as a member of a group, with the consciousness that the whole group speaks through him.

The elementary part is noteworthy for its attempt to 'place' pragmatism with reference to the historical systems of philosophy, as well as present-day absolute idealism and realism, and also with reference to functional psychology and to evolutionary science in general. No student is likely to read these chapters without receiving valuable help. The last chapter of this group, "How Ideas Work," is especially noteworthy as containing one of the most attractive and forcible presentations of the pragmatist theory of truth and error. The case of a sufferer from toothache is taken as an example; and the manner in which the man's ideas function in the 'reconstruction of the situation' is most effectively shown. For the elementary student this chapter should serve most admirably as a supplement to the second lecture of James's *Pragmatism*.

Nevertheless this part of the work does not seem to me to be a complete success. In the first chapter ("The Issue") especially, there is much in the exposition that strikes me as vague or even seriously inaccurate. Thus the reader is told – as if this were a chief point of contention – that the opponents of pragmatism generally hold that thinking is the expression of a special 'side' or 'instinct,' "coördinate with other instincts, as those of food, sex, etc." (pp. 3, 8). Elsewhere this is supported by a reference to Mr. Bradley and another to Professor McGilvary. But the chief sinner – if sin it is – in this respect was no other than William James; and, indeed, it is one of the striking peculiarities of his doctrine, that, in the determination of the truth or falsity of beliefs, intellectual satisfaction or dissatisfaction is simply *summed up* with other satisfactions and dissatisfactions. On the other hand, pragmatism is said to hold that thinking is "just the process of the interaction and consequent development of our instincts and appreciations." But this is not a bad

statement of the Hegelian view of the dialectical relation of thought to the lower conscious processes. Again, no realist (or absolute idealist either) holds that an idea is a mere psychical *x* for a world which remains unaffected by our algebra." The realist is well aware that ideas are real events, and that, as elements in human progress, they are important causes of other events. His contention simply is that the true judgment produces no *immediate* change in the *specific relation* which it affirms. Again, few thinkers of any importance now hold that moral ideas are "eternally given." For the Hegelian the terms are, if strictly taken, an express self-contradiction; and he further holds, very much as the pragmatist does, that good men participate in the "creation" *(i.e.,* the development) of such ideals. Finally, it is altogether misleading to suggest that the chief opponents of pragmatism are united in the belief that evolution is unreal, or merely apparent. Many thinkers, indeed, hold to a distinction between phenomena and eternal realities; but they are far from the Eleaticism of identifying the phenomenal and the unreal.

Chapter II ("The Rise of Absolutism"), which is a bird's-eye view of Greek philosophy from the cosmologists to Plato, also contains inaccuracies which call for comment. Can the reader think of any historical basis for the following statement? "He [Socrates] was content to show that whenever the sophist went to the shoemaker or tried to convert anyone to his view, his doctrine of a merely individualistic truth was doubly refuted: (1) He refuted it himself in assuming that the shoemaker could understand his order; (2) The shoemaker refuted it in showing him that he had understood him by filling his order" (p. 13). But the following is, if possible, even more reckless. "This method [Plato's method of meeting the sophistic individualism] is simply to oppose to the transient, shifting, 'psychological' consciousness of the individual a 'metaphysical' world of universal and immutable reality" (p. 14). The truth, of course, is that from the *Gorgias* to the *Timaeus* Plato's uniform point of departure is the assumption of a hard and fast distinction between 'knowledge' and 'opinion.' The existence of a world of reality as distinct from the phenomenal world is an *inference* which he draws from the observed differences between these two types of cognition. It is because these are distinct that their objects must be distinct. So far from its being true that his metaphysical procedure consisted in an attempt "to maintain a world of continuity and order in the face of an individualistic theory of human consciousness," that he assumes that world in order to account for the fact that human consciousness is not wholly individual.

I have gone into detail in these matters, partly because such a charge as I have brought can only be substantiated by detailed examples, and partly because, as it seems to me, this sort of inaccuracy is symptomatic of what has been one of the chief weaknesses of the work of the Chicago School

as a whole. They are a band of men enthusiastically engaged in the construction of a widely ramified system of philosophy. They are possessed of a set of working principles that have shown the richest promise wherever they have been applied. They have felt themselves pioneers on a new frontier of speculation. Under such conditions a premium is laid upon suggestiveness at the expense of clearness and accuracy. The thought that 'seems to explain so much, is eagerly welcomed in the confidence that whatever little defects it may contain are of no account, or can easily be removed by later reflection. Meanwhile the serious difficulties of the position are hidden by catch-phrases, which to the initiated seem full of meaning, but which convey no clear sense to the outsider to whom they are addressed.

Consider, for example, Professor Dewey's famous avoidance of the problem of the relation of mind and body as it is rendered in Chapter X of this book. Here (with the original italics) is the critical passage. "*Not only in its origin, but in its continued development and operation must it* [the individual consciousness] *always be a function of the whole social situation of which it is born.* However 'private' or 'individual' consciousness may be, it is never to be regarded as *wholly* or *merely* the function of an individual 'mind' or 'soul' or *of a single organism or brain.*" The trick is turned by the words "wholly or merely." The individual consciousness is not *merely* a function of a "single organism or brain," because it varies with variations in the physical and social environment. But it *is* (so far as we know) *wholly* a function of the "single organism or brain," inasmuch as no change in the environment affects it except as the organism or brain is simultaneously affected in a completely parallel fashion. And again the individual consciousness is not *merely* a function of a single "mind or soul," because of our sympathy and suggestibility. But it is *wholly* a function of a single "mind or soul," because only the experiences of the single "mind or soul" are combined, associated, and recalled. And the pragmatists were outraged because social psychologists were unwilling to give their countenance to this confusion!

For a second characteristic example of loose thinking, consider the treatment of the relationship of Darwinism to teleological explanation. Of the following passages, the first is from Chapter IV ("The Rise of Pragmatism"); the other is from the last chapter ("The Ethical Aspect"). "… Does not the conception of the mutability of species at any rate make an opening for purposive, ideational control as a type of change? Whether or not *all* changes are already purposed, does not the simple recognition of the variation of types open the way for any type of variation that may be efficient, and therefore possibly of the ideational, purposive type of variation? That is, must not variation in species admit variation in species

of variation as well" (p. 30). "… Darwin's work in science, as Hegel's in logic, revealed a new type of teleology – a dynamic, evolutional teleology… . But as soon as science found that it could talk of 'wants' and 'needs' and 'purposes,' without committing itself to the determinism of an all-inclusive and absolutely fixed purpose, it rapidly lost its teleophobia. For it found these categories of 'want,' 'desire,' 'purpose' very serviceable, especially in biology." The question in the first passage is so vague that one can scarcely essay to answer it, except perhaps by another. If the human species were *not* now undergoing any sensible variation in its congenital characters, would purposive conduct be *excluded*? Or – a second question – is it possible that the writer wishes to imply that the purposive control of the evolution of the human species (eugenics) is the only purposive control that is really worth while? With reference to the second passage it need only be remarked, that 'wants' and 'needs' and 'purposes' may be treated in as strictly 'mechanical' a fashion as sensations or images, or even as molecules or atoms, and that they have been so treated by Darwinists everywhere. For that matter, not even Hobbes or Spinoza dreamed of doubting the actuality and efficacy of human purposes. They simply regarded them as a type of efficient causes, leaving the universal mechanism undisturbed; and Darwinism does the same.

The indubitable strength of the book lies mainly in its controversial character. A counter-attack is the best defense, as chessplayers say; and Professor Moore is a master of this sort of tactics. I have left myself no space to dwell upon this feature of the book. But readers will not have to go farther than Chapter VII (which gives its title to the whole) to find abundant illustration of the writer's remarkable vigor and resourcefulness.

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THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF ADDISON W. MOORE

Volume 3

Edited by
John R. Shook
Oklahoma State University

History of American Thought

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Edited and Introduced by **John R. Shook,** *Oklahoma State University*
Additional Introductions by **J. Brent Crouch,** *University of Oregon* &
Scott Pratt, *University of Oregon*

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

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INTRODUCTION

On the occasion of Addison W. Moore's burial on September 10, 1930 in Plainfield, Indiana, Moore's birthplace, Edward Scribner Ames spoke the following words:

> Such souls do not pass away. They enter deeply into other lives and continue their influence into the far future. They contribute to the genuine spiritual quality of life, that is, to wisdom, moral courage and sincerity. They radiate profound appreciation for the diviner traits of human life and help to overcome the baser, transient, elements of the world. Our friend lived outwardly the quiet, unostentatious life of the scholar, but within he followed with a venturesome and creative spirit the opening and deathless ways of expanding thought and radiant beauty.[1]

Such was the life of Addison Moore. To the touching and heartfelt words of Ames I must quickly add, however, that within the professional academic world itself Moore was anything but quiet and reserved, instead arguing boldly and skillfully, but tempered by characteristic good humor, against the major philosophical schools of his time. The following essays, articles, and reviews are an ample testament to this fact. But despite Moore's dialectical polemics, his life's work, to echo Ames, was grounded in a unshakable desire to educate, liberate, and enrich the life of not just the professional philosopher, but of humanity itself and in spite of rising nationalism and world war. In his Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association in 1917, Moore asks "[W]hat could be more edifying than the prospect of substituting reason for shrapnel as the method of dealing with the problems involved in the formation and in the conflicts of our human values and purposes?"[2] Nothing irritated him more than the 'ivory tower' conception of philosophy – of philosophy and the world of reflection as divorced from

[1] Edward S. Ames, "Memorial Address," in *Addison Webster Moore: A Memorial*, [n.p., n.d.] p. 10.

[2] Addison W. Moore, "The Opportunity of Philosophy," *Philosophical Review* 27.2 (March 1918): p. 133.

the travails of life and action, values and goals. It was this conception of philosophy that brought out the "bulldog" in him.

True to the goal of introducing a new way of thinking about values, science and philosophy and their organic relation to lived experience to the general public, education accordingly became central in Moore's life, as the meager corpus of published works and the large amount of unpublished work emerging from his seminars attests. After finishing his dissertation under John Dewey at the University of Chicago, Moore joined the faculty at Chicago and, in 1904, took over the courses in Logic and Metaphysics when Dewey resigned in a dispute with the university's president. Both subjects were considered to be the foundation of the philosophy program. Moore was, and remained, fundamentally a logician his entire life. In addition to these courses, his favorite was the history of Greek philosophy, a course he planned to teach even after his retirement in 1929. He was making his way back from Europe to instruct the course when he died in London of complications ensuing from a severe stroke. Of his teaching, his former student Matilde Tufts writes:

> Following his students' trial-and-error thinking with animated attention and unfeigned interest, he gave them the full benefit of his own acute and pliant dialectic. Growing by what it fed on, his mental suppleness, his fine-grained sensitivity, his almost intuitive appreciation of situations, in short, his ability to live imaginatively and responsively in the thoughts and feelings of others showed through the pattern of his character as a dominant trait, and made him a great teacher.[3]

Moore's published work reveals much the same character as his teaching, though, perhaps because directed to colleagues instead of students, it is colored by fervent philosophical argument and laced with occasional sarcasm. Mostly polemical in character, the works in this volume represent a sustained assault from the position alternately named 'pragmatism' or 'instrumentalism' on the dying philosophical school of absolute idealism, represented most forcefully by F. H. Bradley in England and Josiah Royce in America, and the emerging realisms of such philosophers as Bertrand Russell at Cambridge and Ralph Barton Perry at Harvard. Unfortunately, poor health, the trauma suffered after his wife's death in 1924, and his commitment to teaching, restricted Moore's publications during this period. After 1924, he published only one article,

[3] Matilde Tufts, "Addison W. Moore as Teacher," *The University [of Chicago] Record* 17.1 (January 1931): p. 50.

"Subsistence and Existence in Neo-Realism," and reviewed just one book, Max C. Otto's *Things and Ideals*.

Moore's philosophical position matured, however, long before the 1920s. Constructed through detailed readings in the history of philosophy and close interaction with Dewey, Moore's philosophy is grounded in a theory of experimental logic, or inquiry, which in turn is based in a novel conception of experience. The predominant view of the structure of experience during this period, a view that originated in Descartes and Locke, conceived it as disjointed, subjective sense-impressions, whose only function is to be present-at-hand for a mind whose only function is to know them. Experience so conceived is primarily cognitive, and knowledge of the external world was thought to arise either directly in immediate presentation, or mediately through representation. William James in his monumental *Principles of Psychology* (1890) exploded this notion of experience, substituting a continuous, temporal stream for the static disjuncts comprising the modern view. Moore and Dewey elaborated James's radical new conception, and argued that experience is both objective and subjective, that is, constituted by complex and continuous interactions between human and world. The pragmatism of James, Dewey, and Moore took experience in its immediate thickness, with all of its consummations and tensions, its tragedies and triumphs, its beauty and ugliness, and its truths and errors. Experience so conceived is active and live, in continuity with the world it reveals and through which it moves, and the cognitive element is nestled within a wider fringe of aesthetic quality. For them, experience forms both the ground and the end of all thinking, philosophical, scientific or otherwise.

Moore's central essay, "Reformation of Logic" (1917), develops this theme. Reflection is a part, or phase, within the ebb and flow of experience, and its function is to reconstruct the course of conflicted interactions between humans and nature, between the subjective and the objective. Inquiry is cast as a special kind of conduct whose function is to order other, non-logical conduct, such as experiencing a work of art, or making friends, conduct that in certain situations disintegrates without the help of reflective control. Inquiry is therefore 'instrumental' in the reconstruction of experience. Moore conceives of the science of logic as the description of operations within the materials of experience that reconstruct it successfully: logic, in this sense, is an experimental theory of inquiry modeled after the method of the sciences.[4] And, despite

[4] For a more detailed interpretation of the entire corpus of Moore's work, one should turn to Benjamin Wolstein's article, "Addison W. Moore: Defender of Instrumentalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 10.4 (October 1949): 539–566, contained in this volume.

pragmatism's treatment of the things of experience as real, its position is different from the theories of the realists of the period considered generally, all of whom isolated and reified the "knowing relation" and set it between an independent, static reality and experience conceived purely subjectively. As noted above, Moore's most vigorous argumentation during the latter half of his life was directed at just this isolation.

In order to fully grasp these arguments, which make up the central works of this volume, more needs to be said regarding the changing philosophical landscape of this period and Moore's primary interlocutors. In the first decade of the 20th century, the dominant idealism of Josiah Royce and F. H. Bradley came under full attack, by the pragmatism of James, Dewey, and Moore, but also by an emerging school of realism. James's book *The Meaning of Truth* (1909), and R. B. Perry's paper "The Ego-Centric Predicament," presented at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association in 1909, marked the death of idealism in America.[5] Even Royce had begun to search for a new social and naturalistic foundation for his philosophy. The central problem with idealism, from the perspective of both realists and pragmatists, was its failure to adequately conform itself to the procedures and premises that guided the sciences. The massive advances of science and the concrete manifestation of its progress in the rapid expansion of technology simply flew in the face of a philosophy which placed the claims of science somewhere below the threshold of an absolute knowledge possessed by an enigmatic absolute knower.

The story of the interaction of realism and pragmatism in America centers around an argument over two fundamental issues. First, what exactly are the procedures and premises that actually constitute science? And second, does science require a philosophical foundation that will ensure the status of the knowledge it generates, or, can the methods of science in turn penetrate and reconstruct philosophy itself? The realists began to solidify their position immediately after the 1909 meeting of the APA and opted for the modern project of securing stable foundations for the sciences, a project later taken over the Critical Realists and the Logical Positivists. By 1910, Perry, together with William P. Montague, Walter B. Pitkin, Walter T. Marvin, Edward G. Spaulding, and Edwin B. Holt, published their "Program and First Platform of Six Realists," which outlined their position and began to elaborate their

[5] James's book, though not nearly as aggressive or influential as Perry's article, was intended to answer mainly idealist critics of pragmatism. See the "Preface" to *The Meaning of Truth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Perry's ego-centric predicament argument is more fully developed in *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912), where Perry criticizes both idealism and pragmatism.

relation and commitment to science. They soon followed the "Program" with a book, *The New Realism*, in 1912. Montague, looking back in 1937, described the two fundamental tenets of the New Realism. First, the proper method of philosophy, following the example of science, is to analyze and separate problems and then inquire into them individually. For example, in epistemology, inquiry into the constitutions of the knower and the known is irrelevant; it is rather the relation between them that is of concern. And such a relation, they argued, made no essential difference to the object known, meaning that objects of knowledge could be studied without concern for the effects that the process of knowing might have on them. This belief was the core of the New Realism, which in all important aspects was an epistemological theory.[6] Second, the New Realists held that the knowing relation is not one of representation, but rather of direct presentation. This belief separated the New Realists from earlier empiricists such as Locke and Hume, and the later Critical Realists, all of whom held that knowledge is generated through representation. The New Realists argued that their direct realism, by brushing aside all psychological concerns, provided science with the ground that they felt it needed.

Even the disintegration of the accord between the New Realists by the middle of decade over internal difficulties with their doctrine did not slow the steady expansion of realism in America. In 1916, at yet another APA meeting, a new group of like-minded philosophers banded together and in 1920 published the collaborative effort *Essays in Critical Realism*. This new group consisted of Durant Drake, Arthur O. Lovejoy, James B. Pratt, Arthur K. Rogers, George Santayana, Roy W. Sellars, and C. A. Strong, and though each differed in their metaphysical views, they were, like the New Realists before them, all united epistemologically and in their desire to secure scientific knowledge. As noted above, the central disagreement with the New Realists lay in their presentation theory of knowledge, and specifically its inability to account for error. New Realism and its claim that objects are known simply be being "grasped" without mediation led the Critical Realists to think of the earlier group as more aptly labeled the "naïve realists." The Critical Realists, for all their metaphysical differences, unanimously advocated a representational theory of knowledge related in some respects to the epistemology of Locke. Nevertheless, both groups of realists, New and Critical, were united in their belief in an independent reality that is set over and against experience, and were committed to analyzing philo-

[6] William Montague, "The Story of American Realism," in *Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements*, vol. 1, eds. George Adams and William P. Montague (New York: Macmillan, 1930), p. 143.

sophical problems in isolation from the wider processes of life. And this they did in the name of grounding science.

Yet science, from the point of view of pragmatism, neither presents an objective world directly, nor represents one mediately. Instead, it sets out to solve certain problems that fragment the course of experience by fashioning theoretical and practical tools. Furthermore, science needs no philosophical foundation to secure its knowledge claims, for it is obvious that science functions quite well without one. The task of a philosophy that takes science seriously is to learn from it by studying its procedures and to develop a generalized, experimental theory of inquiry that may be used to address problems outside of the domain of the empirical sciences. Moore, along with Dewey and their colleagues at Chicago, initiated such a theory in 1904, and Moore addressed it at length in 1910 in his volume, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*.

Much of Moore's work from 1910 until his death is a sustained attack on both the New and Critical Realists from this position, with the names of many dotting the lines of the essays and articles in this volume. His "The Aviary Theory of Truth and Error" (1913), for example, is a close examination of Montague's seminal essay in *The New Realism*. After arguing that truth is property adhering to actual things in the world, not beliefs about things, Montague's presentational epistemology committed him to locating error in the presentation of unreal objects in the mind. False beliefs, also presentations, must therefore be the direct grasping of unreal objects. Notwithstanding the counterintuitive notion that there are actually existing objects that are nonetheless unreal, Moore is quick to point out that there is no way of knowing what objects are unreal or which are real, and therefore no way of distinguishing truth and error. This failure, argues Moore, is devastating to the New Realism, and locates the source of the problem in the complete isolation of the act of knowing from the objects known. Truth is neither the property of an independent object nor of an independent belief concerning an object; it is, rather, located in the process of interaction and movement between subject and object and denotes those "working hypotheses" that actually succeed in reconstructing these interactions.

Moore takes on the New Realist's theme of isolation directly in his "Isolated Knowledge," (1914). The paper is a thorough deconstruction of Bertrand Russell's theory of knowledge as presented in his *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912), and succeeds in laying bare the antinomies that result from isolating and reifying the knower and the known.[7] Though Russell was not a member of the New Realists, Moore

[7] I use the term "deconstruction" because Moore explicitly describes the essay as follows: "I hope that what follows is not over-captious. It is frankly an attempt to

connected his philosophy to the New Realists directly through his epistemology and therefore considered a refutation of Russell to be equivalent to a refutation of New Realism He was undoubtedly correct in his assessment of Russell's relation to the New Realists, as both were committed to the method of analysis and the concomitant isolation of philosophical problems from their wider contexts. This essay also marks the first full-scale investigation of a pragmatic thinker into Russell's philosophy, a continuing and laborious task that Dewey would assume in 1915 with his "The Existence of the World as a Logical Problem,"[8] and continue for the following 30 years.

"Reformation of Logic" (1917) is perhaps the most important essay of Moore's later period. Moore sets his experimental logic within the context of the history of logic, as well as present trends in the field, most notably the emerging "analytic logic" of Russell and other realists. He constructs a genealogical map of the development of logical theory since Aristotle and of the problems that emerge from separating and "ontologizing"[9] the various logical functions in experience. The New Realists and Russell had first isolated and reified both the knower and the known, and then they purged logic of the act of knowing and confined it to the study of merely the formal relations between logical entities which they conceived not as operations of reflection that control the flow of experience, but rather as independently subsisting objects, divorced from their possible instrumental characteristics.

Unfortunately, the critique of analytic logic comprises only the last few pages of the essay, the bulk of which is devoted to the genealogy of logic. This is somewhat surprising given the abstract that was to serve as the basis of "Reformation of Logic." Titled "Neo-Realistic Logic and Science," the abstract gives the impression that a sustained critique of analytic logic would appear in the near future. Moore's shift in focus may be explained by the publication by Dewey in 1916 of *Essays in Experimental Logic*, which included Dewey's essays from *Studies in*

develop some of the antinomies, the 'inner dialectic', if one pleases, of the conception of knowledge as an external relation between a 'mind' and other things, with the mind regarded as something whose 'essential character' is just to be in this relation." This method of reading a text bears a strong resemblance to the late 20th century approach termed deconstruction. Moore, "Isolated Knowledge," *Journal of Philosophy* 11.15 (16 July 1914): p. 395, footnote 3.

[8] John Dewey, *The Middle Works, 1899–1924*, vol. 8, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979), pp. 83–97.

[9] Moore's use of the term "ontologizing" is synonymous to Dewey's "hypostatizing," and my use of "reifying." All three terms refer to the process of selecting certain portions experience and making them into permanent objects absolutely distinct from other objects and functions in experience.

Logical Theory (1904) and other essays by Dewey on logic. In the introduction to this volume, Dewey argues forcefully against analytic logic as formulated by Russell and presents the critiques that he and Moore were developing in tandem. What remained for Moore in "Reformation of Logic," published in *Creative Intelligence* the following year, was to set his and Dewey's logic in a wider, historical context, something Dewey would do in detail only years later in his *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*.

Moore's last critiques against the sundry realisms are "Some Logical Aspects of Critical Realism" (1922) and "Subsistence and Essence in Neo-Realism" (1927). The 1922 piece continues the argument from "Reformation of Logic" by once again displaying the problems attendant upon the confusion and reification of "logical and non-logical experience, or …logical and non-logical things or affairs,"[10] and the failure to adequately conceptualize the relation between them along functional and instrumental lines. The 1927 essay is a very short examination of Montague's book *Ways of Knowing* (1925), which is significant because Moore borrows an argument from Alfred North Whitehead against the notion of "simple location." Whitehead argues in *Science and the Modern World* (1925) that the modern conception of existence is based upon the idea that objects possess a "simple location," that is, determinate place within space and time that can be defined without reference to its relations to other objects and other regions of space and time.[11] Whitehead's book is, in part, a detailed examination of why this assumption is mistaken, and what follows from adopting a theory which holds that "in a certain sense, everything is everywhere and at all times."[12] Moore, along with Whitehead, argues that each experience gathers together objects in a specific field of interaction, and these objects have no "simple location" outside the particular experience at hand. They do not exist, for example, in a realm of "subsistence." As Moore writes,

> The perceptions of the stick in the water or through a refracting lens are "perspectives on a level with the perspectives we get through the air or through touch. There is an indefinite number of these "perspectives" – "modes of location."[13]

[10] Moore, "Some Logical Aspects of Critical Realism," *Journal of Philosophy* 19.22 (26 October 1922), p. 594.

[11] A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Free Press, 1925), p. 58.

[12] *Ibid*., p. 91.

[13] Moore, "Subsistence and Existence in Neo-Realism," in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, ed. Edgar S. Brightman (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927), p. 284.

Moore argues that Montague reifies one of these "perspectives" and names it the world of "subsistence" and then cannot explain the relation of the realm of "subsistence" to the realm of "existence," where subsistent essences are instantiated in our many experiences. The idea of "simple location" is explored in further detail in Moore's *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, where he argues that space is not a container in which objects are located, but rather a relation through which objects interact, or operate. Moore concludes: "Take away this element of operation and there is nothing left with which to determine either distance or direction."[14]

To sum up the debate between Moore and the realists, the central point of contention is centered around the notion of continuity. On the one hand, the realists of all stripes held to a metaphysics of discrete and independent entities that stand in various logical and epistemological relations to one another. Science is simply the report that some of these objects, humans, produce by standing before and viewing the nature of other objects, and this reporting is external to both human purpose and the nature of the objects. Philosophy's job is to give this reporting certainty by providing it with a foundation. On the other hand, Moore's pragmatism, as well as Dewey's, fundamentally rests on a notion of continuity between interacting entities. Experience itself is continuous with nature, not set opposite it, and the various parts of experience, the logical, and the non-logical are continuous with one another and are to be distinguished functionally rather than ontologically. Scientific inquiry is simply the reconstruction of these continuous interactions, and philosophy need not ground it, but rather can learn from it.

A detailed analysis of continuity, however, is lacking both in Moore's and in Dewey's published writings. This is rather surprising given the work the concept does in their experimental logic. However, another philosopher, Josiah Royce, was busily working out a similar logic based on continuity by drawing on the work of the American philosopher, mathematician, and logician, Charles. S. Peirce. Royce's later logical writings, from 1905 to his publication of his *Principles of Logic* in 1914 were almost universally ignored, presumably because Royce was viewed by his colleagues as something of an old-fashioned idealist left over from the 19th century, a view certainly shared by Moore.[15] Nonetheless, a return to Royce's logic could provide the resources to develop more fully

[14] Moore, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, p. 101.

[15] For an introduction to Royce's later logic see *Royce's Logical Writings*, ed. Daniel Robinson (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown and Co., 1951), particularly the third and last section of "The Principles of Logic," and the essays "Order," "Hypotheses and Leading Ideas," and "Mind."

Moore's and Dewey's theory of inquiry, particularly with regard to the concept of continuity and the nature of situations, a problem that Moore attempted to solve in *Pragmatism and Its Critics* and that later plagued Dewey after the publication of his *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. Royce understood continuity as analogous to something like a dense series in mathematics, but he used the principle fundamentally to describe a field of actions. Experience as it is conceived by pragmatism can be roughly understood as such a field of actions, and accordingly a study of Royce's logic could provide a point of departure for specifying the meaning of continuity. The problems attending the nature of situations, particularly with regard to the relations between people who are experiencing the world in a radically different manner, may also be addressed with a Roycean logic. Since his logic is based in a triadic, social relation he called interpretation, a situation defined with reference to the interpretative relation would make it a fundamentally social unit, instead of the primarily solipsistic entity Moore once called "pragmatism's absolute."[16]

The remainder of the publications in this volume, excluding the book reviews, are predominantly defenses and clarifications of pragmatism prompted by published criticisms of various philosophers, such as James B. Pratt and Warner Fite. Readers should find no trouble following these responses because of the inclusion of the relevant criticisms in this volume. However, three essays, two of which were originally delivered as addresses, deserve special attention. In "Bergson and Pragmatism" (1912), Moore attempts to differentiate Bergson's evolutionary philosophy from pragmatism. Prior to this publication, the view generally held within philosophical circles placed Bergson and pragmatism close together, particularly with regard to anti-intellectualism and evolutionism, a view that was promulgated by James himself. Moore, however, highlights Bergson's failure to understand inquiry as anything but devastating to the continuity of experience. Bergson places reflection in opposition to the continuous flux of immediate experience and argues, reminiscent of F. H. Bradley, that all it can do is destroy this continuity by analyzing distinct parts from the whole, thereby shattering the salutary power of the immediate. Contrary to pragmatism, which is of the opinion that reflection may reconstruct experience and therefore increase its continuity, Bergson can only see the activity of intellect as pure negation. Moore's essay is another close reading of a philosophy that becomes entangled in aporias the moment it begins to set different portions of experience over and against one another, instead of specifying their interrelations functionally.

[16] Moore, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, p. 146.

"Pragmatism and Immortality" is a major shift away from Moore's polemics against non-experimental logics. It was initially delivered to the Western Philosophical Association in 1917, and contained, though in a truncated form, a succinct statement concerning the relation of desire and reflection. Moore writes, "In relation to any particular form of desire it is the teaching of pragmatism that the business of thought is, in old-fashioned phrase, to 'rationalize' it."[17] Reflection must not only seek to realize desires in experience, but must also penetrate into desires and reconstruct them if they cannot be rendered congruent to other experiences. Inquiry is self-reflexive, demanding a transformation of the subject as much as a transformation of the world; it is not merely a utilitarian calculus wielded by a fully constituted subject. The desire for immortality, for example, is one desire that cannot be "rationalized;" that is, it cannot be rendered congruent with other experiences, particularly the experience of science. Moreover, as Dewey will argue later in *A Common Faith*, the very desire to continue living outside of the world tends to drain meaning, purpose, and vitality from our everyday experience. The desire for immortality therefore conflicts with other desires that we may hold to be more important.

Brief though it is, this essay reveals the distance that separates pragmatism from utilitarianism and Humean empiricism which holds reason to be "slave to the passions." Moore correctly points out that had earlier statements of pragmatism been careful to state this part of the theory, much misunderstanding would have been avoided. Many of the criticisms leveled at Moore and pragmatism contained in this volume are based on a misunderstanding of the relation of desire and thought, as are many of the criticisms brought to bear on pragmatism currently.

Moore's presidential address to the APA in the same year continues this thread. The main argument put forth by Moore was that science, the prime instance of experimental logic, must be allowed to construct values. His point here is equivalent to his earlier plea for reflection to "rationalize" desires. Values and desires, according to Moore, are already at work in science, and as long as science remains bound to them uncritically and is dictated by them, social turmoil is the inevitable result. The ravages of World War I provided the setting for this address. The deeply ingrained humanism of Moore's philosophy is revealed in this address and it was the courage to speak out in the midst of a bloodthirsty world that led to Ames's powerful eulogy quoted at the beginning of this introduction. Most importantly, however, Moore's plea to let "reason replace shrapnel" contrasts markedly from state-

[17] Moore, "Pragmatism and Immortality".

ments from Dewey with respect to the war. While Dewey himself argues in many publications later in his life that science must be allowed to determine values, as for example in *Freedom and Culture* (1939), in the essay "Force and Coercion," (1916) he preaches the value of efficiency as the standard which determines the legitimate use of force and claims that force manifests itself as violence only when it is used "wastefully."[18] The use of shrapnel, then, is only violent insofar as it is less efficient than the use of communication to effect certain ends. Surprisingly, Moore's position is diametrically opposed to Dewey's. From Moore's perspective, it is just such a desire as efficiency that needs to be rationalized, not set up as an *a priori* principle that must govern all experiential reconstructions.

Moore's break with his mentor over this issue and World War I ensures his place within the great, but dwindling, tradition of socially-minded, humanist philosophers, and the recovery of his work is a step towards restoring his position within one of the most important periods in the history of American philosophy. Clearly, his collaboration with Dewey to develop a truly American philosophy, together with his fiery interactions with competing views in the kaleidoscopic world of philosophy, mark the presence of a genuine intellect and a passionate character. George H. Mead, the founder of America social psychology and Moore's colleague at Chicago, wrote of Moore shortly after his death:

> There have been philosophers whose daily walk and conversation have been living epistles expressing, in the full dimensionality of space and time, the ideas which their published writings have expounded.... [Moore's] philosophy was his inner and outer life writ large. He was no Epimetheus. He began his speculative thinking with a world which was there, a world that put up to our intelligence the precarious task of living within it, and he refused to arrest action in order to prove the existence of that world.[19]

J. Brent Crouch, 2003
University of Oregon

[18] John Dewey, *The Middle Works, 1899–1924*, vol. 10, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), p. 249.

[19] George H. Mead, "Memorial Address," in *Addison Webster Moore: A Memorial* [n.p.,n.d.], pp. 29–30.

REPLY TO PROFESSOR PRATT

"Reply to Professor Pratt." *Journal of Philosophy* 8.15 (20 July 1911): 403–407. Ed. Note: Moore replies to Pratt's "Peter's Toothache Once More," reprinted in this volume.

Since Professor Pratt has failed to discover in my book, to which he courteously refers, anything relevant to his difficulties with Peter's toothache, I have little hope that he will find "help" in what I say here. This failure is symptomatic of the entire situation between Professor Pratt and the pragmatists. It means that Professor Pratt sees no connection between the origin, intent, and nature of ideas or judgment and the problem of truth. For the pragmatist the problem of the truth of ideas is bound up with that of their origin, nature, and intent. The result is that throughout the discussion the terms "idea," "judgment," "thinking," etc., mean one thing for the pragmatist and quite another for Professor Pratt. Hence each party seems to the other to be constantly begging the question. And it is futile to go on discussing the truth of ideas as if it were a perfectly distinct and separate problem until we are agreed upon what an idea *is*. And if we were so agreed there would be little room left for disagreement about truth and error.

By "idea" and "judgment" Professor Pratt apparently means a "mental state" or "image" which through a relation *"not experienced by any of us human beings"* corresponds (or fails to correspond) to an object. (Italics mine.) For the pragmatist an idea or judgment is a form of interaction between beings that are *already* in some *other* (non-ideational, *e.g.*, instinctive, or perceptual) form of interaction which has fallen into conflict and uncertainty. To relieve this uncertainty the interaction assumes the reflective, judging form. For the pragmatist the entire origin, nature, intent, and verification of the judgment is defined with reference to this uncertainty in the already existing interactions. It is obvious that this kind of judgment does not require a relation "unexperienced by any of us mortals" to hitch it to its object. It emerges out of the *preceding* interaction already hitched to it. It is because John and Peter are already in some sort of interaction that John is capable of making any judgment whatever about Peter. If the relation between John's idea and Peter's pain is one outside the experience "of any of us human beings," how "on earth" – whatever it might do in this extra-human world – can John's idea aim at Peter at all?

So far as I can see, on Professor Pratt's view, if any one – sane or insane – should happen to have a mental image expressing itself in the words, "Peter Doe's eyes are green," and if, entirely apart from the origin and intent of this image, there happened to be somewhere, anywhere, in the universe, even beyond the experience "of any of us humans," a being with green eyes called by his co-beings "Peter Doe," we should have a judgment, according to Professor Pratt, and the judgment would be true. Now of course, as Professor H. W. Stuart has observed, there is nothing to prevent any one from cherishing this view of the judgment, if some sort of esthetic satisfaction is to be got from it; but what logical use is to be made of it is difficult to discover.

Proceeding with this notion of the judgment, Professor Pratt says that pragmatists have never met his difficulty of "a true but unverified judgment." And he might well have added, "And they can not meet it." They can not, that is, on its own terms. It is one of those surds which intellectualistic realism has in common with intellectualistic idealism and which the pragmatic movement "meets" by abolishing. It does this by finding that the judgment is an act *which includes verification in its intent*. Hence to submit the problem of "a true but unverified judgment" is, as Schiller says, to beg the whole issue. For the pragmatist no such case exists.

So, too, when Professor Pratt says that James and Schiller would deny him "the right to suppose, at the same time, a Tom with his idea and a Peter with his ache," he again overlooks the immense difference between his and James's and Schiller's conception of Tom's idea. What James and Schiller would deny is, not Tom with his idea, but Tom with *Professor Pratt's kind* of idea – *e.g.*, an idea consisting of an image whose relation to its object is "not experienced by any of us human beings," to say nothing of Tom.

Passing to the case of Peter, John, and Tom, Professor Pratt finds that in discussing, in my book, Peter's idea of his own ache, I have substituted "a perfectly new case" which "completely avoids all the difficulties" of the Peter-John and the Peter-John-Tom cases. Here I can only insist upon the identity in logical type, to which I called attention in a footnote, between Peter's judgment of his own ache and John's and Tom's judgments of it. Surely Peter is quite as likely to misdiagnose his own ache as is John or Tom – perhaps more so if John and Tom happen to be good physicians. Peter may think that a certain tooth is the cause of the ache, when it is not, just as John or Tom may think Peter has the toothache when he hasn't. Peter's difficulty and liability to error in judging his own ache are, in principle, just the same as John's and Tom's, and have to be met in the same way. Peter's ache and tooth are just as much (and as little) "realistically" related to his own ideas as to John's and Tom's.

If what I have just said about the identity in type of Peter's judgment about his own ache and John's and Tom's judgments about it holds, it ought to be sufficient to point Professor Pratt, in his difficulty with the latter, to the method which he admits works "so triumphantly" in the former. He would then find that there is no more difficulty with the opposed judgments of John and Tom, *provided they are taken pragmatically*, than with the different and opposed hypotheses which any one makes in his own mind in the course of an investigation. John's and Tom's judgments are but parts of a process of *interaction*, just as are the competing hypotheses in the thinking of any single investigator.

If Professor Pratt says: "But the judgments of John and Tom are not mere hypotheses; they are 'verified' judgments and John and Tom are 'satisfied' with them," the reply is: (1) these judgments are not "verified" – they are not even judgments unless they are expressions of uncertainty in interaction between John and Tom; (2) if they are such expressions and if the contradiction is *known* to John and Tom, obviously the verification and satisfaction can not be complete; (3) if the investigation of each is independent of and unknown to the other, even so, if John and Tom are good pragmatists, their "verification" and "satisfaction" will still be a "working" verification and satisfaction, and as such will always be open to reconstruction. In other words, the difference between hypothesis and verification is again a relative – a "working" one. Hypothesis and verification are not absolute and exclusive qualities, but developmental stages of the judgment. The hypothetical judgment expresses the ambiguous and conflicting, the verified judgment the unified and definite *response*, to Peter's actions. Verification marks the passage from the thinking, judging form of *response* to the stage of preparedness to act. If the response from the beginning is perfectly definite and unquestioned, then it is not, for the pragmatist, a judgment. It is simply some form of a direct, unreflective reaction.

Doubtless Professor Pratt will say, "Admitting the element of intent and response in the judgment, is not the intent of this response an intent to correspond to the object 'as it really is'?" But just what does this mean? (1) The "correspondence" must stop short of identity with the object. It can not even pretend to "copy" it. This being the case, what *kind* of verification can it possibly have other than finding that when Peter is treated as having a toothache he responds (co-responds) in a certain way? Is not this all the correspondence and verification the idea expects or wants? And speaking of solipsism, would not a demand for the other sort of correspondence and verification mean a desire to *be* Peter's toothache, and end in a complete absorption of Peter and finally of everything else into the idea? Does not a purely *intellectualistic* realism inevitably end in the same solipsism, and by the same token, in the same absolutism, as intellectual-

istic idealism? (2) "The object as it really is" – what is this? Is it the pain as it is for Peter, or as it is for John, or as it is in the interaction between Peter and John? The pragmatist's answer is that the latter is what the object "really is" *in the judgment*. What it is for Peter alone may be just as "real" – only it is not *that* reality that is undergoing judgment.

Doubtless Professor Pratt will find that all this "shifts the ground." And so it does. I see no way of meeting Professor Pratt's difficulties "on their own ground." And I wonder if Professor Pratt does. How does *he* settle the contradiction between John and Tom? For the experimental theory, these opposing judgments, *so long as they are opposed*, are still working hypotheses, and as such are subject to further experimentation. What are they for Professor Pratt? How does Professor Pratt decide between John and Tom? For let us remember that he can not here appeal to "what works." That already stands condemned by his entire article. What then? The only passage in the above of Professor Pratt's which bears on this is interesting. In answer to the question, "How do you know that Peter has a toothache?" Professor Pratt says: "The answer is, I don't. I only suppose he has," and then he says, "You are bound to tell me how Tom's verified idea that Peter had no toothache was true, when *as a fact* [italics mine] Peter did have a toothache." Apparently Professor Pratt regards it as impossible to "know" whether Peter has the toothache, but easy to tell when "it is a fact."

THOUGHT AND ITS FUNCTION

"Thought and Its Function." *Mind* 21.2 (April 1912): 233–237.

In a discriminative and courteous review of *Pragmatism and Its Critics* (Mind, N.S., 80) Mr. Murray finds the theory of knowledge there set forth more "sublimely audacious" than convincing. Its "audacity" consists, according to Mr. Murray, in attempts (1) to exclude representation from the process of knowledge; (2) to eliminate or ignore the distinction between the physical and the psychical; (3) to get rid of "the transcendent element in knowledge." Each of these points, of course, involves the others, the last especially being at the bottom of the other two.

Looking up the passages in the volume under review, in which the "representative" theory of knowledge is discussed, they seem to be, so far as I have found, to the effect that thought is not "merely" or "only," nor "primarily" representative; that whatever representative character thought has, is but a part of the technique of its general function, which is to help to maintain or alter or develop experiences of direct and immediate value. There *is* an elimination of the representative character of thought in the "mirroring," "photographic" sense in which Mr. Murray takes it. Of this more farther on. But if representation be taken in the sense of "pointing at," "leading to," and if it be conceded that this "pointing" and "leading" constitutes an alteration of the previous status of the things concerned, there is, as doubtless Mr. Murray would concede, no elimination of representation.

On the second count it must also be confessed that there is an elimination of the *kind* of distinction between the physical and the psychical which Mr. Murray makes. Mr. Murray finds in the view he is criticising an attempt to establish a continuity between thinking and such activities as "reaching," "biting," etc., which he thinks amounts to a reduction of thought to physical terms (p. 569). Here Mr. Murray obviously assumes that thought is purely "psychical" and that "reaching" and "biting" are purely "physical." But the rejection of precisely this assumption is a fundamental position of the standpoint which Mr. Murray is criticising. It equally rejects the idealist reduction of such actions as reaching, etc., to "psychical matters of fact." For Pragmatism, the problem of knowledge is concerned primarily – not with the relation between the two metaphysical worlds of the physical and the psychical, but with the relation between immediately experienced things and values and the reconstruction of these through reflexion. These directly

experienced things and values are as little purely "physical" as thought is purely "psychical."[1]

Facing the issue squarely, would Mr. Murray be willing to describe reaching, biting, etc., as "purely physical"? May not such activities, from a certain standpoint, be interpreted as just as much "psychical," if not in the same way, as thought? On the other hand, is thought in its first intention *(i.e.,* as a way of dealing with things, not thought dealing with thought) experienced as something purely psychical? If the reply be that neither reaching nor thought can be *described* at all except in a psychological reflexion, still we shall find in this appeal to psychology little support for a metaphysical distinction between physical and psychical. For a psychological statement of reaching includes such terms as sensation, impulse, pleasure and pain, just as its account of thought includes "motor strains," "localisation," etc. Meanwhile, if we insist on equating thought with "the psychical," and such experiences as reaching with "the physical," how are we to escape "the old and tiresome epistemological problem," the futility of which Mr. Murray seems at times fully to appreciate (pp. 567-568)?

"If a physical metaphor for thought must be used," says Mr. Murray, "it resembles much more the relation between a camera and the scene it photographs than the relation between stimulus and response." It is difficult to read such passages as this and avoid the conviction that at the bottom of much realistic criticism of Pragmatism is not only a psycho-physical, but a visio-spatial epistemology. Perhaps one of the simplest ways of meeting this is to substitute a case of visionless judgment. Suppose, in an instance where there has never been vision, an odour "means," "points," "leads" to experiences of touch, taste, etc., called "orange." How appropriate is the mirror-photograph metaphor here? Does the odour photograph the taste?

On the question of the kind of change effected by thought, Mr. Murray says (p. 569): "To know is as distinct from changing as reaching is from biting." Enormously more so, it should be said, if knowing is purely "psychical," and reaching is purely "physical." On the other hand, if such a statement intends to concede that there is as *much* continuity and likeness between thought and change as between reaching and biting, any Pragmatist ought to be satisfied.

Continuing the subject of change Mr. Murray says: "The judgment, 'there is a sandwich on the sideboard,' prescinds in intention, being interpreted as making any change in the sandwich." Does it so "prescind," any *more* than

[1] *The Deftnition of the Psychical,* by my colleague Prof. G. H. Mead, in the decennial publications of the University of Chicago, will be found very relevant and illuminating to the entire current discussion – especially to the issue between realists and anti-realists.

does reaching for it or biting it? Doubtless any process of change requires resistance and continuity (in this sense identity) in its material. There obviously could be no change if *any* change whatever meant annihilation or complete transformation of the material involved. Would Mr. Murray concede that identity is consistent with *some* change? If so, is not such identity all that judgment, or any other act, requires? Why should thought demand any more rigid identity in its material than reaching does in the thing reached for?

However, when it is said: "thought makes no change in the material undergoing judgment," perhaps what is meant is that any specific judgment doesn't change its *own* meaning, that is, its own act; just as reaching or pulling, while producing changes, are not at the same time something else, though obviously these also run their course and lead into something else. If this be what is meant, I cheerfully subscribe. But this is far from saying that thought effects *no* change in the things thought of. Doubtless also, the change which thought makes, and intends to make, precludes in intention any *other* changes that *would interfere with the change it is making*, just as reaching precludes in intention other changes that would make reaching impossible.

Mr. Murray's attempt (p. 570) at a *reductio ad absurdum* of the view that thought effects alteration in things, again rests upon the assumption that the change which thought makes in things must be identical with the changes involved in thought itself as it goes on. But this hardly follows. Whether an object is judged to be a wax figure or my friend Smith, using Mr. Murray's illustration, may well make a difference to the object as well as to the one judging, without the difference being that of changing from wax to Smith or from Smith to wax. If when I tell Smith he is a hero, Smith grows red, and when I tell him he is a coward he becomes white, are we to say that the change from red to white is identical with the difference between the words "hero" and "coward"? I am of course aware that all this assumption of continuity between thought and such actions as reaching, speaking, etc., is precisely one of the points challenged by the reviewer. But that challenge, as I have already pointed out, rests upon the conception of reaching, etc., as purely "physical" and thought as purely "psychical" – a conception which pragmatism utterly rejects.

After finding most of the review, and indeed the immediately preceding paragraph, devoted to a refutation of the position that knowledge is a real alternative interaction between beings, "a form of stimulus and response," etc., one is a little surprised, not to say amazed, to see the last page of the review open with the statement: "The Chicago Pragmatists have been accused of solipsism *because* they have *thus* sought to eliminate the transcendent element in knowledge and to explain the connective function entirely in terms of the knower's experience" (italics mine). Probably the

term "because" and "thus" in this statement are meant to refer only to the supposed elimination of transcendence in general. But if "thus" refers to the *way* in which "The Chicago Pragmatists" have eliminated transcendence it is difficult to see how they are to be accused of solipsism "because" they have "thus" eliminated transcendence; "thus," *i.e. by* making thought a factor in real alternative (even "physical" according to Mr. Murray) activity. "Materialism" instead of "solipsism" would be a charge much more in accord with the reviewer's previous criticism of pragmatism, though equally far from the fact.

The Pragmatist's appeal to the social character of immediate unreflective experience the reviewer thinks is "sheer paralogism"; the paralogism being that it begs the whole problem of knowledge. "The repeated disclaimer, we do not believe in a private consciousness," says Mr. Murray, "can hardly be accepted as an *a priori* solution of the problem of knowledge." Again, and finally: "Inasmuch as it is possible actually to doubt whether experiences other than my own exist, the logician must show how he arrives at his disbelief in the privacy of consciousness" (p. 570).

When a discussion reaches the point where each side accuses the other of begging, this indicates that there is disagreement about what the problem really is, and this means in turn that there is disagreement about the data, the "matters of fact." And such is clearly the case here. No Pragmatist finds it any more possible "actually to doubt" the existence of other beings than himself than to doubt his own existence. And if the test of "actually" has some connexion with conduct, he is hard of faith regarding the "actuality" of this doubt in others – except possibly in pathological cases. In the history of philosophy, this doubt is never the starting point of reflexion. It is a methodological assumption *in* reflexion; and judging from results, not a very successful one. Its chief function seems to have been to keep "the old and tiresome epistemological problem" going. Assume, with Descartes, such a doubt, can "the logician," in Mr. Murray's terms, cure it? The record of the attempts does not appear very encouraging. Witness the "logic" of Descartes' attempt in his Third Meditation, and the "logic" of the various subsequent solutions *via* pre-established harmony. What more eloquent testimony to the utter futility of trying to deduce existence of other beings from one's own existence as the sole datum? And note that there can be no appeal here to induction, as against pure deduction; for by the assumption no fresh data can come in. Hence the begging to which "the logician" is inevitably forced in his solutions; hence the well-worn saws: "the only escape from solipsism is not to get into it"; "at the entrance to the cave of Solipsism all tracks point one way," etc. Hence also the Pragmatist's refusal to accept a statement of the problem of knowledge as one which starts with "my own existence" as the *sole* datum. In a sense this does "beg." It "begs" to be excused from embarking on an epistemological enterprise foredoomed to

failure. But it does not beg in the sense that it first *agrees* that the problem of knowledge is the problem of solipsism and then begs it in the process of solution. It is precisely because he sees that if he did so state the problem of knowledge, he would as a "logician" have to beg the solution that the Pragmatist refused to start with solipsistic statement of the problem. And if by an "*a priori* solution" we should mean a "solution" by conceptions which steer clear of insoluble difficulties and which are "workable" in science and social intercourse, this "solution" might even be rather *a priori.*

In view of this interpretation of the difficulties Mr. Murray has encountered in my book, I fear that it neither claims nor possesses the "sublime audacity" which he has ascribed to it.

The apparent inconsistency, to which Mr. Murray calls attention (pp. 80, 81), of the volume reviewed, is due to bad proof-reading which failed to delete the prefix "in" before the word "significant."

BERGSON AND PRAGMATISM

"Bergson and Pragmatism." *Philosophy Review* 21.4 (July 1912): 397–414. Ed. Note: Moore's presidential address to the annual meeting of the Western Philosophical Association of Chicago, 5 April 1912.

In view of the differences of opinion among the increasing number of expounders of Bergson, and with Professor Lovejoy's "Thirteen Pragmatisms" still in mind, one may well have misgivings about an attempt to discuss the relations between Bergson and pragmatism within the traditional limits of the period allotted to this paper.

As for Bergson, I think most of us will agree that "the elements are so mixed in him" that one may well say that he bids fair to become a mild rival of Kant in commentary possibilities. A Bergsonian Caird or Vaihinger will have no difficulty in pointing to a regress in Bergson which, if not quite so 'transcendental' as in Kant, is no less 'regressive'. And sooner or later, some one is sure to suggest that Bergson, like Hegel, should be read backwards.

The doctrines of Bergson's philosophy which are commonly supposed to contain its chief points of contact with pragmatism are: first, its instrumental theory of Knowledge; second, its anti-intellectualism which is a corollary of the instrumentalism; third, its evolutionism.

Of these proposed articles of alliance between Bergson and pragmatism, most attention has been given to the first two; to the instrumentalism, and the anti-intellectualism; – to the latter especially by James. But, in my opinion, it is Bergson's evolutionism which pragmatism may receive with the most unhesitating hospitality, while it is precisely his instrumentalism and anti-intellectualism that diverge most widely from what I understand pragmatism to be. It is these two doctrines, therefore, which I wish particularly to discuss.

I.

When we read in the second sentence of the introduction to *Creative Evolution* that the understanding is "an appendage of the faculty of action," that sounds indeed very much like pragmatism. And when further on we are told that one great stumbling block in the way of philosophy in the past has been the assumption that knowledge must be coexistent with the whole of reality,[1] that sounds like more pragmatism; and hereupon

[1] P. 190.

many pragmatists have hastened to extend to Bergson the right hand of fellowship, feeling that in view of so much apparently fundamental agreement, whatever differences remain could be easily adjusted. And if this agreement were as extensive and fundamental as these and many similar passages taken out of their connection indicate, this action would be justified. I say 'out of their connection', for as we follow up the context of these statements, doubts of their pragmatic character begin to haunt us.

The proposition that thinking is an "appendage" or even an organic part of action, is far from constituting a pragmatic declaration of faith. 'Action' is not the pragmatic password, much popular belief to the contrary. Not until one states first what he means by 'action', and what he considers its place in the rest of experience can his pragmatism be judged.

What, then, for Bergson, is the nature and function of this action to which or in which knowledge is instrumental? Is this action itself instrumental? If so, to or in what? Bergson's responses to these questions are, as he says, "frankly dualistic."[2] The action of which all reflective thinking is a part is the action of spirit on or through matter. Bergson hastens to let us know at once that he is aware of the difficulties which, as he says, have always beset this dualism. But he confides to us that he hopes to greatly lessen, if not to overcome them.

Now the fact that here at the outset Bergson is apprehensive of the historical difficulties of this dualism shows that it is for him an ontological one. For if he held this opposition as an instrumental, a logical one, there would be no fear of the sort of difficulties which he here anticipates. From the instrumental standpoint, this sort of dualism has no terrors. Instrumentally, there is a dualism for every pair of correlative categories. Whatever then may turn out to be the nature of Bergson's instrumentalism, it is apparent from the beginning that it cannot be what pragmatism means by instrumentalism.

Returning to our inquiry as to the character of the action of spirit on matter, of which thinking is a part, it is obvious that we can make little headway until we know something of what Bergson means by 'spirit' and 'matter'. In the large, this is of course a problem for some Bergsonian commentator, and I shall have to treat it here very summarily. At the outset, the opposition between spirit and matter appears to be very similar to the later scholastic antithesis of pure activity and an external,

[2] *Matter and Memory*, p. vii.

inert, purely negative, resistance. As we seek for a general characterization of this pure activity of spirit – which in *Creative Evolution* is real or pure duration – we are confronted, for reasons which we shall presently see, with two accounts of it: When he is trying to draw action and its resistance as closely together as possible, Bergson speaks of this activity as unconscious. The other and the characteristic view is that "consciousness is the best term we have for it." To be sure it is not satisfactory. But if consciousness be purged of all perceptions, specific memories, and conceptions, what is left will approximate the activity of real duration. Psychologically, the content of real duration oscillates between a cognitive and a volitional character. But it is contact with matter which slows up, condenses, and precipitates this pure activity, the imageless consciousness of real duration, into the imaged world of space and spatialized time.

But before long Bergson begins to feel the pressure of some of those difficulties which he anticipated at the start. Besides the obvious strain in the conception of the 'action' of pure activity *upon*, or its 'contact with', anything, there are all the troubles that belong to the metaphysical dualism of matter and resistance. If spirit is really metaphysically independent of matter, why must it act upon or make its way through matter at all? Why may it not turn its back on matter and go on its way rejoicing? The only answer Bergson makes is that whichever way spirit turns it finds itself "confronted with matter." But if spirit is *always* thus confronted with matter, how can we say that this opposition is not essential to the very nature of spirit itself? This and the closely related difficulty in the conception of an activity without resistance, which real duration is if it can go on without matter, force upon Bergson the necessity for making a closer connection between the conceptions of activity and resistance. Hence the first statement of action must be revised. We are no longer to think of the action of which thought is an 'appendage' as due to the collision of pure spirit or pure duration with an external matter already there in advance. We must now see that matter *is* nothing but the stoppage, the relaxation of the activity of pure duration, and its condensation and preciptation into the imagery of the spatial and temporal world. This revision Bergson calls "the ideal genesis of matter."

Though this amendment succeeds "in lessening," as Bergson says, the metaphysical chasm between pure duration and its resistance, the comfort, if any, is short-lived. For the revised conception has now to face the question: Whence this stoppage, why this relaxation and condensation of the continuity of real duration? Whatever the other difficulties, the first account of action had an answer to this question. It is matter already there which somehow (just how is not altogether clear) inhibits real duration and condenses it into a world of imagery. But now this condensation, this

imagery *is* matter, and there is nothing here to account for or give meaning to the inhibition itself. Whenever the exposition reaches the point where this situation becomes acute, Bergson simply falls back upon the first position. Matter is thus by turns a prior condition of, and then identical with, the condensation of real duration into images. The full significance of this circle will be considered a little later. What I wish here to notice is, that in the opposition between the intellect and the imageless consciousness of real duration, we have the correlative of what is perhaps the fundamental antithesis in pragmatism, namely, the distinction between *immediate* and *reflective* or *logical* experience. Not that the basis or the content of the terms of the distinction are the same in Bergson and in pragmatism. Far from it. Yet there is the common distinction of immediacy and reflection. But while reflection for Bergson is 'instrumental' in the sense of being a part of action, this action, on either of the above interpretations of matter, is itself *accidental*. It stands in no vital relation to 'real duration' as such. The imageless consciousness of real duration goes on not by the help of, but in spite of, reflection. In relation to Bergson's immediate experience reflective thought is therefore not an instrument, but an accident.

Here, then, is the first radical divergence between Bergson and pragmatism. For the pragmatist, the action of which thought is a part is no cosmic accident; it is not a fall from a beatific Eden of pure duration. The pragmatist's version of Eden is that the fall happens before the apple of knowledge is eaten; that before the visit to the tree, the serpent of conflict and discord has already done his work; that in fact the eating of the apple, instead of the cause is an attempt to cure the fall – the fall, namely, of unreflective experience into conflict and consequent woe. Now the first effect of a cure often is to exaggerate the symptoms of the malady it treats. And this may well happen here. For the remedy, being knowledge, will isolate and emphasize the elements in conflict, and this might easily be mistaken for the original trouble, as it apparently is by Bergson. But the pragmatist believes that the original sin is to be found in the conflicts of immediate experience.

But when pragmatism says intelligence finds its material in the conflicts of immediate experience this does not mean that immediate experience is always and as such, in a state of conflict and disintegration. This, as Professor Bode has pointed out in his interesting article on immediacy,[3] was Kant's mistake. Bergson's, we may observe, is just the opposite. Immediate experience as such has perfect continuity while intellect is a disintegrating, instead of a synthetic activity.

[3] *Journ. of Philos., etc.*, Vol. IX, p. 141.

Here, perhaps, some or all of you are demanding that something should be said about the meaning of 'immediate experience'. The point is well taken. And this brings us to a second important difference between Bergson and pragmatism, – the difference in their views both of the basis and the content of the distinction between immediacy and reflection. For Bergson, immediacy is a quality attaching to a certain fixed kind of content, namely, the imageless experience of real duration. For pragmatism, immediacy is a character of any and every sort of experience – impulse, feeling, imagery, will, action of all kinds, *in so far as they are not under doubt and inquiry.* Immediacy is not a property belonging to one particular part or content of experience. It is the functional, the relational property of being free from doubt. To call a character 'functional', however, does not mean that it may not in itself be perfectly specific and unique. 'Over' and 'under' are as specific as a color of the spectrum, though I suppose we should all agree that they are functional. So long as it is assumed that when a pragmatist speaks of 'immediate experience' he has in mind 'sensations or 'mental states' or even 'action', the 'misunderstandings' that have been so much complained of are sure to continue. It is true that in the early days of the pragmatic movement, so much was said of thought arising out of and returning into action that it is little wonder that immediate experience was taken to mean something called 'action', into which it was about as difficult to get content as into Bergson's real duration. But as the exposition continued, it was soon made clear that mere action was neither the origin nor the goal of thought; that the action of which thought is a part, arises in response to the demand of conflicting immediate experience for reorganization; this immediate experience including unreflective actions along with things and qualities of every sort, personal and impersonal.

This functional character of the distinction between immediate and reflective experience implies that our instrumentalism must be reciprocal. This brings into view a third difference between Bergson and pragmatism. If thought is instrumental to the reorganization of immediate experience, its demand for this reorganization is equally instrumental to thought. Instrumentalism is still for many an invidious term. To say intelligence is instrumental seems to many zealous defenders of the independence of thought to make intellect subordinate and in some way inferior in status to the rest of experience. The parallogism in this is, of course, elementary. So far as status is concerned, "let him that would be greatest be the servant of all." Besides, if we may indulge in a bit of Bergsonian animism, it is in the hour of sore distress that immediate experience comes supplicating the throne of intelligence. On the other hand, if we crown intellect lord of all, still even a lord must find it up-hill work trying to lord it all by himself, which is very much what a certain type of intellectualism

seems to make intellect try to do. Now, if it be a fact that in our scientific and practical procedure we are obliged to treat the distinction and relation between immediate and reflective experience, not as ontological, accidental, and as moving in one direction, but as functional, indigenous and reciprocal, we should not be surprised to find that an exposition setting out with the former should find itself obliged to substitute the latter. And just this is constantly occurring in Bergson and is the explanation of the double rôle which nearly every important category in Bergson is forced to play. Let us examine a few instances. I am aware that what follows will appear to a Bergsonian to be the lowest dregs of intellectualism and to offer the best possible justification of all the hard things Bergsom has said about the intellect. To this, I can only offer a denial of all captious intentions. I wish only to show the difficulties in the attempt to carry out the spirit and intent of an evolutional standpoint in philosophy, which Bergson undoubtedly represents, with a 'non-evolutionary' logic.

We may begin with the antithesis of matter and what is variously called spirit, life, real duration, will, intuition. As we have already seen, matter is presented as sheer external resistance; or as the 'inhibition' and 'reversal' of pure duration or life; as something from which the latter is struggling to get free. But we do not go far in *Creative Evolution* before we read that "life *is* more than anything else a tendency to act on inert matter."[4] What then would life or spirit do or be if it really succeeded in getting rid of matter? Here, perhaps, is the place to note in passing that Bergson's substitution in *Creative Evolution* of the term 'life' for 'spirit', which is generally used in *Matter and Memory*, does valiant service in the work of getting rid of the ontological dualism. For in the former the term 'life' has two meanings. One is identical with spirit, real duration, and is in direct opposition to matter; the other meaning is that of a living organism, in which of course matter is included.

But not only is there a recognition of a general dependence of spirit upon matter, but this dependence is specified, and it turns out to be for no less a matter than the individuation of spirit or 'life' itself. "Regarded in itself, it (life) is an immensity of potentiality, thousands and thousands of tendencies which nevertheless are thousands and thousands only when specialized by matter. Contact with matter is what determines this dissociation. Matter divides actually what was but potentially manifold."[5] … "The matter that life bears along with it and into the interstices of which it inserts itself, alone can divide it into distinct individualities. The sub-

[4] P. 96.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 258.

division was vaguely indicated (in life itself), but never could have been made clear without matter."[6]

Another phase of this dialectic appears in its relation to the notion of movement. On the one hand, matter *is* the stoppage, the cessation, of movement. It is sheer position in contrast with life as pure movement. On the other hand, life is one movement and matter another co-ordinate with it, but in opposition to it. "In reality life is a movement, materiality is the inverse of movement, and each of these two movements is simple, the matter which forms a world being undivided, also the life that runs through it cutting out living beings all along its track." "Of these two currents," continues Bergson, "the second runs counter to the first, but the first obtains, all the same, something from the second. There results a *modus vivendi* which is organization. This organization takes for our senses and our intellect the form of parts external to other parts in space and time."[7]

It is obvious that such a passage, and it is one of a series, surrenders even as it proclaims the opposition of life and matter. For how could life cut living beings out of matter, if matter were nothing but the reverse movement of life? As such a movement, it would have to reverse this movement of cutting out living beings. But, on the contrary, it aids and abets it, not only so far as to secure a *modus vivendi*, but to the extent of real organization.

The oscillation in the treatment of instinct and intelligence is perhaps even more striking. At the outset, instinct and intellect are presented as two co-ordinate, radically divergent, yet "equally fitting" reactions of the life impulse on or through matter. Instinct which works only with living organs is much closer to the nature of life and real duration than intelligence which fashions its tools from inert matter. But soon we find that "it is the function of consciousness and especially of human consciousness to introduce into matter indetermination and choice," which are of the very essence of spirit. But "choice involves the anticipatory idea of several actions,"[8] and this is intellectual consciousness. Again, it is at the point of human consciousness *only* that spirit breaks through its prison walls of matter to freedom. But "consciousness in man is preeminently intellect."[9] Again, though both instinct and intelligence are, in Bergson's words, "equally fitting solutions of one and the same problem," the problem, viz. of action on or through matter, yet in the same paragraph we read: "that

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 269.

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 249.

[8] *Ibid.* p. 96.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 266–267.

nature must have hesitated between two modes of psychical activity, instinct and intelligence, one, assured of immediate success, but limited in its effects, the other hazardous, but whose conquests, if it should reach independence might be extended indefinitely," and, continues Bergson, "*the greatest success* was achieved on the side of the greatest risk"[10] (though "both are equally fitting"). Also in this passage there is another illustration of the workings of Bergson's metaphysical logic, in the way in which the immediate certainty of instinct and the larger range of intellect are set over against each other as fixed but mechanically compensating possessions. He overlooks the fact that the instinct's lack of range may at any moment destroy its immediate certainty. The instinctive strike of the fish, which in the depths of an undiscovered mountain pool makes it immediately certain of a dinner, makes it equally certain to be a dinner for someone else, when man and his spoon hooks arrive. If there is hazard in widening the range there may be greater hazard in not widening it. If instinctive food and shelter are nowhere to be found, there is no doubt a hazard in substituting something else, but it is a hazard of life against the certainty of death if we stick to the instinctive form.

Of the dialectic in the treatment of consciousness, I will only point out that consciousness appears at one time as a function of the action of spirit or real duration, on matter. At another it is the best term we can get for the nature of real duration itself, which is struggling to get through and through with matter. In many passages in *Creative Evolution*, this ambiguity might be charged to a use of the term 'consciousness' where *intellectual* consciousness is meant.[11] But it is difficult to continue this interpretation where, in *Matter and Memory*, we are explicitly told that pure memory, which there is the term for real duration, is *unconscious*; that it is precipitated into consciousness only by contact with matter, and where the conception of unconscious psychical states is defended with true Herbartian fervor.[12]

And this brings us to Bergson's reconciliation of matter and spirit. Now a reconciliation of two conceptions which are in as sharp metaphysical opposition as matter and spirit or real duration, is a serious undertaking. So long as the opposed concepts are kept busy with specific problems, this opposition gets little chance to know itself. But when a deliberate reconciliation is proposed, this means that the members of the opposition are to be brought face to face with nothing on hand but just the business of reconciliation. And this is always an awkward situation. From Bergson's

[10] *Op. cit.,* p. 143.

[11] This we may note is still a source of confusion in current discussion.

[12] Chap. III.

standpoint, there can be only one method of effecting this sort of abstract reconciliation. That is simply to persuade the parties to the opposition that they are, after all, very much alike; that there is, in fact, only a difference of degree, not of species, between them. Hence, the necessity for the operation of anaesthetizing life into unconsciousness, galvanizing matter into life. Matter is suddenly awakened from its inertness and begins to vibrate in rhythms much more rapid than those of consciousness, and therefore really nearer the continuity of pure duration than is consciousness itself. Instead of matter being a condensation of consciousness, consciousness appears to be a condensation of matter.[13] "The qualities of matter are just so many static views we take of its instability."[14] Finally, the only difference that remains is just the difference in the rhythms of motion – a difference of degree, not of kind.

But this reconciliation has a brief existence. For the moment Bergson starts to use these concepts of physical and psychical, in the discussion of a concrete problem, he discovers that there is more than a difference in degree between them. The difference between a physical and a psychical rose is primarily not one of degree. The physical rose is not redder or sweeter than the psychical one, neither is it merely more vivid and lively. This, as Bergson himself very clearly expounds at length, was the mistake of English sensationalism. There must be, as Bergson is here forced to say, a difference in kind; but (and this is the crucial question) what *kind* of a difference in kind? The only *kind* of a difference in kind which Bergson can assign is just a difference of ontological species, and when this in turn breaks down as we have seen, Bergson falls back again upon the difference of degree.

Here we have again, and perhaps in sharper outline than we have had before, the generic difference between Bergson and pragmatism. Bergson finds no alternative between a mere difference of degree and a difference of ontological species. For instrumentalism there is an alternative. It is that the difference in kind between physical and psychical is a difference in *the kind of function* which any content otherwise recognized as the same may perform. It is obvious that what for our purpose is *otherwise* the same is now psychical and now physical just as it may be now under, then over; here good, there bad.[15]

[13] *Creative Evolution*, p. 301.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

[15] For a detailed treatment of this distinction, see G. H. Mead's monograph on *The Definition of the Psychical*, and Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, pp. 53–54.

If there are ardent Bergsonians present, some of you perhaps are saying: What a caricature of Bergson is this! As for instrumentalism, where, you will ask, can be found any more explicit recognition and use of instrumental logic than in Bergson's treatment of the categories of order and disorder, laws and genera, of being and nothing, and of the negative judgment? And the answer must be freely: Here is indeed such an extensive and systematic application of instrumental method that we marvel as we read how Bergson could have escaped feeling the necessity for returning and reconstructing the rest of his work so as to bring it into line with the treatment of these conceptions. As he does not do this, we can only conclude that Bergson simply does not appreciate the importance of what he is here doing. The fresh enthusiasm with which Bergson in these passages expounds the positive basis of the negative judgment, makes one wonder if Bergson has followed the work of modern English logicians, not to mention Hegel.[16]

II.

Bergson's type of anti-intellectualism and his opposition of science and philosophy are of course but further consequences of the attempt to expound an evolutionary philosophy with a non-evolutionary logic. When he encounters the limitations and failure of this logic, instead of reforming it, he throws logic and the intellect over and takes his stand on pure immediacy.

Perhaps a Bergsonian would reply that there are some things that are past reforming. And to talk of reforming the intellect through what you call 'instrumental logic' is like proposing to reform a liar by having him lie 'functionally', or a burglar by teaching him 'instrumental' burglary. The gist of Bergson's indictment of the intellect is briefly this: All intellection consists in treating objects as consisting of units or elements. We do this because we find that by so doing we can reproduce or destroy or alter or in some way control the object as a whole or ourselves in relation to the object. This succeeds (when it does succeed) in accomplishing the particular purpose for which we desire this control. But, though we may call this 'knowing' or 'thinking' the object, in this *kind* of knowing we do not experience the object in its unity, because we experience it in units. We know in part because we know in parts. Knowing fails in two ways: first, it destroys the integrity of the object, which otherwise we might experience through sympathetic intuition or intuitional sympathy;

[16] So far as I know, Hegel's name does not occur in Bergson's works – though Kant is frequently in evidence. Yet there are passages in Bergson that might well pass for "Hegelisms"; *e.g.*, "Consciousness in shaping itself into intellect, in concentrating itself on matter, seems to externalize itself in relation to itself."

second, it does not even get at the parts themselves. For the moment we regard things as mere units or elements of something else, we disregard and ignore all the properties which these elements have except just those that make them elements in the thing we want. If we are hungry and seek the elements of bread, we ignore the properties in these units that might make them elements in painting a picture or in running an engine, unless we should happen to want to eat and to paint and to run an engine at the same time. Even then, we should pass over innumerable other possibilities.

We have tried, but in vain, as Bergson thinks, to remedy this, by attempting to find elements that have no other properties except just to be elements. These are the mathematical and spatial unit. But, says Bergson, and rightly, we never actually work with these units unless we are pure mathematicians, and even a pure mathematician must now and then do something besides counts. The moment we set about any other specific project than one in pure mathematics, we must operate with definite things as units and elements, and then begins again our process of ignoring and leaving out everything in the units except that which concerns our little enterprise. Intellectual analysis, therefore, is doomed by its essential nature to mutilate, and therefore to be untrue to reality.

Observe in passing that this from the author of *Creative Evolution* sounds strangely like a passage from Bradley's *Appearance and Reality.* But what now from Bergson's standpoint can be done? Doubtless as matter-encumbered beings we must go on acting, therefore we must go on with our unitizing, spatializing science. But, we must remember that we are also members of the world of real duration – even as for Kant we are members of the "intelligible world." And with this in mind and by a special, not to say mystic, effort we may succeed in shutting out the world of action and its machinery of units and space, of causes and effects, and find ourselves in the world of real duration, and our experience in the form of intuition, which is the method of philosophy.

Still the inexorable dialectic pursues us. At one time this philosophical intuition seems to be cognitive. "As it is the business of science to act," says Bergson, "it is the business of philosophy to see, to speculate." But 'seeing', 'speculating' – these are visual terms, at least visual analogies, and vision, says Bergson, "*is* nothing but anticipated action." So we swing again to the side of feeling and impulse, and so far do we go in this direction that the creative impulse and intuition of the painter and the poet is contrasted with its 'interruption' and 'congealment' into lines and colors, words and letters. Whereupon we find ourselves wondering if we are to say that the creative intuition of the physician is interrupted by his patients; that of the lawyer by his clients; and the shop-keeper's by his customers.

Bergson seeks to avoid this absurdity by saying that the reason this congealment of the creative intuition into specific forms is felt as an inter-

ruption is because it has to use old material, old colors, old words, etc. If it could only completely create new material along with the new form, there would be no sense of interruption. But, aside from all the difficulties in the conception of a creation that is not a re-creation, if both the form and the matter must be wholly new, how then are we to keep hold of *all* the past which Bergson so often insists is an essential character of real duration?

But supposing that in the experience of real duration we get rid of the unitizing method of the intellect, from the standpoint of Bergson's interest in not leaving out anything, are we any better off? For now we are missing all the images and qualities which the condensing intellect produces.

Instrumentalism quite agrees with Bergson that when, in science and practical procedure, we use some things as units or elements of something else, we do pass over possibilities in these elements which are not relevant to our purpose. But there is a consideration here which Bergson overlooks – one which measures the distance between a metaphysical and a functional logic. This is, that in the very process of unitizing, the intellect *may recognize* that its units are selected and constituted to control a certain object or class of objects.[17] It may freely see and confess that it is here "passing over" properties in the "elements" that are to be reckoned with at other times and places, and for other purposes. And where this is the case, how much basis then remains for the charge of omission and mutilation? Here, the very act of ignoring involves a recognition and acknowledgment of that which is ignored, the positive side of the exclusion is the *recognition* that what is here passed over may be of value in other situations, and may *acquire* value for situations similar to this. As against a logic which does not recognize this, Bergson's indictment of the intellect stands good. But his substitution of pure immediacy falls straightway into the same ditch from the other side.

Here, doubtless, a Bergsonian will say: "Do you not see that when you talk of excluding something as even temporarily irrelevant, you completely miss Bergson's conception of intuition, and pure duration? Suppose you do recognize that you are ignoring something or pushing it into the background, this does not alter the fact that it is being ignored and passed over. If you ignore my presence it is small comfort to be told that you *know* you are ignoring me, and if you apologize by saying it is only temporary, that my turn will come soon, still as a logician, not to say as a mere human being, I am bound to recognize that some one else must then be left out and so on endlessly. And does not all this confirm Bergson's contention that action and intellect are necessarily mutilative,

[17] Cf. Professor Perry's "Notes on the Philosophy of Henri Bergson." *Jour. of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods,* Vol. VII, No. 25, p. 677 ff.

and that if we are to experience reality in its unbroken continuity it must be done in an experience in which nothing is even temporarily irrelevant or in the background?"

Noting, once more, how similar to Bradley's absolute "sentience" this would be and how it would raise again the problem of individuality, let us observe further that in terms of attention it abolishes the distinction and interaction between the focus and the fringe. And it is difficult to say whether for Bergson what we have left is all focus or all fringe, or a combination of both. Sometimes it is one and again the other – depending on whether real duration is construed cognitively, or volitionally. In terms of art, it removes the distinction between foreground and background. Some have characterized Bergson's work as an attempt to carry over into Philosophy the standpoint and method of art. But in art the organic relation between focus and fringe, foreground and background, is fundamental.

But what I wish particularly to urge at this point is that Bergson does not see that the selection and construction of units and elements in the procedure of science involves the very sort of intuitive appreciation for which he is contending and which he is seeking elsewhere. In one of his 'reconciling' passages, Bergson goes so far as to say that "Intellect and Intuition though opposed are yet *supplementary* processes," the first, as he says, retaining only moments – that which does not endure – the other bearing duration itself.[18] But while this is quite different from the negative opposition with which we began, it is still far from an organic relationship. There is no statement of *how* they supplement each other. The supplementation seems to consist of one furnishing something which the other does not in making up the content of real duration. But in scientific procedure there is a real supplementation. It is precisely the presence of a fringe of intuitive appreciation of the continuum from which the 'elements' are taken and of the ignored characters of the elements themselves, that constitutes the sensitive alertness of the successful scientist. Not only as the immediate form of the 'inspired' invention or discovery, but as a part of the more plodding process of verification is intuition as indispensable in science as in art.

Again it would be easy to cite passages from Bergson in which this is recognized: – passages in which he speaks of the spontaneous and unpredictable character of the unitizing action of the intellect. But this spontaneity is not brought into any kind of organic connection with the results of the unitizing work of the intellect. It is simply a bit of real duration lodged in the interstices of the scientific process, saving science from a wholly unregenerate materialism.

[18] *Creative Evolution*, p. 344.

In making intuition the method of philosophy, it is one of Bergson's cherished convictions that he is 'saving' philosophy from the dogmatism of the realist on the one side, and the transcendentalism of the idealist on the other. And it is indeed true that, for Bergson, real duration is not merely a presupposition of moral experience. He is not obliged, as was Kant, to be content with saying: "we know *that* real duration is, but not *what* it is." In moral and artistic experience, real duration is directly present. "The Grail in my castle here is found." And yet it seems that it is only when we close our intellectual eyes to the castle and its contents, or fuse them into a unity of impulse and feeling that we get – we cannot say a glimpse, for a glimpse is an image, and an image is anticipated action – shall we say, then, a *sense* – or using Bergson's own term, an *intuition* of the Grail of reality. But after all, is not this the very essence of transcendentalism – namely, an attempt to find reality in or with some part or function of experience to the exclusion of the rest? Logically are not the difficulties the same whether transcendentalism appeals to a superempirical process or to some one process or experience as against the others? Logically is not the crassest sensationalist as much of a transcendentalist as the absolute idealist? So it will not be strange if, as transcendentalism has appeared to some to be a bashful intuitionalism, Bergson's intuitionalism should seem to others to be a shy transcendentalism.

I am aware that I have dwelt far more on the differences than upon the large common ground between Bergson and pragmatism. My excuse must be that the latter has been emphasized so much, that it has seemed to me important differences were being overlooked and that a canvass of these would make for a better understanding both of Bergson and pragmatism.

PROFESSOR DE LAGUNA ON "THE CHICAGO SCHOOL."

"Professor De Laguna on 'The Chicago School'." *Philosophical Review* 21.5 (September 1912): 627–629.

In his review of *Pragmatism and its Critics* (No. 2 of the current volume of this Review) Professor de Laguna finds that the constructive part of the book, while possessing some commendable features, is seriously vitiated by the "loose thinking" and "inaccuracies" which he says are "symptomatic of what has been one of he chief weaknesses of the Chicago School as a whole" (p. 236).

Here let it be remarked that this segregating phrase, "The Chicago School", was not invented by nor has it been adopted or encouraged by any one who might be supposed to be a 'member' of the "School."

On reading the above statement of the reviewer concerning "the Chicago School," a friend dryly remarked that he fancied that if 'the Chicago School' or any other 'school' or person should confess to any 'weaknesses' whatever, "inaccuracy" and "loose thinking" would doubtless be considered the "chief" ones. And he imagined, therefore, that the statement did not quite accurately express the reviewer's meaning which apparently was that the 'members' of 'The Chicago School' are more seriously afflicted than others with these universal frailties.

As for the book, the author is keenly aware of its short-comings and might even accept the reviewer's estimate of the extent, if not the particular instances, of them. But he is loathe to believe that "The Chicago School as a whole" is so deeply stricken with 'loose thinking' and 'inaccuracy' as Professor de Laguna believes. And it may be that further scrutiny of some of the instances of the 'symptoms' noted by Professor de Laguna discovers ground for hope that he may be mistaken in his diagnosis of "the School as a whole."

First let me agree that the criticism (p. 237) of the phrase "wholly or merely," as a piece of "loose" writing, is entirely justified. However, the laxity has no such deep and dark design as the reviewer detects, namely, "to avoid the problem of the relation between mind and body." The word 'wholly' was here carelessly used pleonastically with 'merely' and should be deleted. The passage would then express the meaning intended and the subtle evasion which the reviewer finds would disappear.

Concerning most of the other "inaccuracies," in general one might question the accuracy of the application of the term 'inaccuracy' to statements involving issues about which there is as much room for difference of opinion as there is over the connection between Hegel's Absolutism and his Ethics; the relation of Plato's Metaphysics to his Psychology and to that of the Sophists; and the bearing of Darwin's work on Teleology.

Taking first the case of alleged historical 'inaccuracy', Professor de Laguna asks: "Can the reader think of any historical basis for the following statement?" "He [Socrates] was content to show that whenever the Sophist went to the shoemaker or tried to convert any one to his own view his doctrine of a merely individualistic truth was doubly refuted. (1) He refuted it himself in assuming that the shoemaker could understand his order; (2) the shoemaker refuted it in showing that he had understood him by filling his order."

Now if the 'reader' is still unable to think of "any historical basis" for this passage, (1) let him observe that the statement does not pretend to quote but to express only the spirit and result of the Socratic teaching; (2) let him recall that Socrates, as his opponents complain is forever talking of cobblers and cooks; and then (3) let him read the following: (Socrates speaking) "Oh Callicles, if there were not some community of feeling among mankind, however varying in different persons, I mean to say if every individual had a private feeling which was not shared by the rest of his species, I do not see how we could communicate our impressions to one another." (Gorgias, Jowett's Translation, marg., p. 481.)

"But the following," Professor de Laguna finds, "is if possible even more reckless": "This method (Plato's method of meeting the Sophistic individualism) is simply to oppose to the transient, shifting psychological consciousness of the individual a metaphysical world of universal and immutable realities"; and this: "Metaphysics might well be defined as the essence of all attempts to maintain a world of continuity and order in the face of an individualistic theory of human consciousness." Of these passages Professor de Laguna says: (1) "The truth, of course, is that from the *Gorgias* to the *Timerus* Plato's uniform point of departure is the assumption of a hard and fast distinction between knowledge and opinion. The existence of a world of reality different from the phenomenal world is an *inference* which he draws from the observed differences between these two types of cognition… . (2) So far from its being true that his metaphysical procedure consisted in an attempt to maintain a world of continuity and order in the face of an individualistic theory of human consciousness, that he assumes that world in order to account for the facts that human consciousness is not wholly individual."

In going over again the paragraph from which these "reckless" statements are taken, I am unable to see how anything but a recklessly "loose"

reading of the paragraph, taken with the one preceding and the one following, could have achieved the misunderstanding upon which the criticisms are based. The first sentence of the paragraph in which these statements occur reads: "To Plato then fell the task of supplying the 'how' [the explanation] of Socrates 'that' ('that' social interaction exists in contradiction of the Sophistic theory of consciousness). And the second sentence before the reviewer's first citation speaks of Plato's method as "explaining [the fact of] social interaction."

What other meaning could these statements have than that Plato's metaphysical world was an "inference" in explanation of the fact of 'knowledge' [as against mere 'opinion'] as evidenced in social interaction? But the point urged in the book is that this sort of 'inference' did not meet and defeat on its own ground the Sophistic theory of consciousness which 'remained to plague the inventors', as well as others, even to this day.

Again it is difficult to see how the inversion of "the truth" which Professor de Laguna portrays in his statement beginning: "so far from its being true, etc.," can be anything but another case of 'loose' reading. The inversion is obtained by making the phrase, "a world of continuity and order," refer to Plato's Metaphysical World of Ideas, whereas in conncetion with what precedes, parts of which I have quoted above, it would seem obvious that it could not refer to anything but the world of *social* continuity and order.

There is not space to go over all the allegations of "looseness" and "inaccuracy." So far as I can see these terms have no more warrant in the other cases than in those here discussed. It is enough if the examination of these instances suffices to call in question Professor de Laguna's sweeping and surprising characterization of "The Chicago School" as a whole.

ABSTRACT OF "OBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH AND ERROR"

"Abstract of 'Objectivity and Truth and Error'." *Journal of Philosophy* 10.12 (5 June 1913): 323–324. Ed. Note: An abstract of a paper, an earlier version of the next paper, read at the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, 21–22 March 1913.

The neo-realistic account of truth and error in Professor Montague's interesting paper takes the position that "true and false" are attributes of the *objects,* not of the *act* of "belief or judgment." The objections urged against "true and false" as attributes of a contentless, "subjective," "psychological" action are convincing. But does not their transference to an actionless and merely "existent" or "subsistent" object make the same assumption and encounter the same difficulties as the other view – the difficulties, namely, that grow out of the assumption that "belief or judgment" can be dissected into a contentless act on the one side and an "existent" or "subsistent" object on the other?

Some of these difficulties appear at once in the relation between the definitions of belief and of the distinction between truth and error. "Truth and error are respectively belief in the real and the unreal." But belief "is the attitude we take toward any proposition that *appears* to be true and real and carries with it a tendency to act on that proposition."

But (1) if the object of belief must always "appear *true* and *real*" (italics mine), how is belief in the unreal and untrue possible? (2) If, on the other hand, the phrase, What "*appears* true and real" means that, *from the believer's standpoint*, the object only *appears* (*i.e.,* may or may not be) true and real, then the object of every "belief or judgment" must always be an "appearance" and never the "real and true."

The only escape from this dilemma is *viâ* the assumption, which the account seems to make, that these definitions are made – not from the standpoint of the believer or judger, but from the standpoint of what Professor Bode calls an "innocent bystander."

THE AVIARY THEORY OF TRUTH AND ERROR[1]

"The Aviary Theory of Truth and Error." *Journal of Philosophy* 10.20 (25 September 1913): 542–546.

Socrates: "Let us suppose that in the mind of each man there is an aviary of all sorts of birds . . . some flocking together apart from the rest, others in small groups, others solitary, flying anywhere and everywhere – and let us suppose that the birds are kinds of knowledge."

Theætetus: "Granted."

Socrates: "We have determined … that a man can not fail to possess that which he possesses; therefore in no case can a man *not* know that which he knows. But still he may get a false opinion about it. Thus when the various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about in the aviary and one takes out a particular one for use, he sometimes takes out the wrong one; (thus) when he thought eleven to be twelve he got hold of the ring dove when he wanted the pigeon."

Theætetus: "Yes, that is quite reasonable."

Socrates: "But when he catches the one he *wants* – then he is not deceived and thus false and true *opinion* may exist … for we are not (here) driven to the inference that a man does not possess that which he possesses, whether he is deceived or not, and yet I fear a greater difficulty is looking in at the window."

Theætetus: "What is that?"

Socrates: "How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion?"

Theætetus: "Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in thinking only forms of knowledge for our birds. Perhaps there ought to have been forms of ignorance as well, flying about (with the forms of knowledge) and he who sought to take one (of the birds) may sometimes have caught a form of knowledge and then a form of ignorance and then he will get a false opinion from ignorance and a true one from knowledge."

Socrates: "I can not help praising you, Theætetus, and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words. Let us grant what you say. Then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion. Am I right?"

[1] Read at the meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, April, 1913.

Theætetus: "Yes."

Socrates: "But he will certainly not think he has a false opinion."

Theætetus: "Of course not."

Socrates: "Then he will think he has captured knowledge and not ignorance."

Theætetus: "That is clear."

Socrates: "And, thus, after a long journey we come around to our final perplexity. The accuser will retort upon us 'Oh my excellent friends,' he will say, laughing, 'If a man knows ignorance and knows knowledge can he think one of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or if he knows neither of them can he think the one he does not know is another he does not know? or if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one he does not know is the one he knows?' … What are we to say to this, Theætetus?"

Theætetus: "Indeed, Socrates, I know not what to say."[2]

The first division of Professor Montague's most interesting essay on "A Theory of Truth and Error" in the volume "The New Realism" deals with the meaning and locus of truth and error. The most general form of the thesis of this section is that "true and false" are attributes of the *objects* of belief or judgment, not of the *act* or *process* of belief. They have been attached to the latter, by "the verbal fallacy of metonomy." When we say: "What a fine sight," we do not mean that the act or process of seeing is fine. We mean that the thing seen is fine. So when we speak of beliefs or judgments as true or false – we mean that the object or content of the belief or judgment is true or false. "There would be no sense," continues Professor Montague in "calling an act of belief *as such* either *true* or *false*." An act of belief is a *mental* process and as such belongs to psychology, not to logic. "If any one has any doubt on this point," says Professor Montague, "let me put this question" (which is evidently regarded as conclusive): "If we wished to know whether certain beliefs that we held about the properties of triangles were true or false whom should we consult? The psychologist? Certainly not. We should go to the mathematician. But why? … If the adjectives true and false applied to the beliefs and mental processes, he should be the one to settle our difficulties." That true and false apply to the objects and not to the act of belief will appear more clearly if we remember that "other adjectives apply to beliefs in the *subjective* sense. If, for example, instead of being interested in the truth or falsity of a belief we were interested in whether it were comforting, inspiring, or healthy we should then very likely go to

[2] Jowett's translation.

the psychologist."[3] So much for the locus of the "true" and the "false." It is obvious that they dichotomize "all possible objects of thought" just as knowledge and ignorance divide the birds in the aviary.[4]

With the adjectives "true" and "false" assigned to the *objects* as distinguished from the *act* of belief, we pass to the definition of the distinction between truth and error. "I hold (says Professor Montague) that the true and false are respectively the real and unreal considered as the objects of a possible belief or judgment."[5]

"Truth and error are respectively belief in what is real and unreal."[6] Now observe that no matter what the distinction between real and unreal may turn out to be it is here assumed that it is entirely independent of belief. When we take this in connection with the definition of belief we have a difficulty which should be disposed of before we go on to define the difference between the real and unreal, and this difficulty looks very like the one which Socrates and Theætetus encountered with the aviary. "Truth and error are respectively belief in the real and the unreal." But belief is defined as "the attitude we take toward any proposition that *appears* to be true or real and carries with it a tendency to act on that proposition."[7] Do not these two definitions constitute a dilemma in which "the object of belief" must be either all truth or all error? If we can believe only that which "*appears* to be true or real" whence comes a belief in the unreal – which constitutes error? If here we appeal to the term *appears*, which, indeed, boldly appears in italics, we encounter, first, the ambiguity of the term, and next, the question whether either connotation of the ambiguity can save us. If "what *appears* to be true or real" means "what we *believe* to be true or real" then all we have accomplished is a

[3] "The New Realism," pages 256 and 257.

[4] Two points are suggested here, which bear only indirectly upon the rest of the discussion. First, if the "act" of belief "as such" be a case of consciousness and if consciousness is an external relation, then we have the interesting situation of terms that are "objective" and "true or false," joined by a relation that is "subjective" and neither "true nor false." Second, is it not disconcerting to find a realist characterizing "comfort" and "health" as "subjective"? (1) In the realistic world of objective "simple entities and complexes" comfort and health, whether simple or complex (what is the realistic criterion of simple and complex?), must be as objective as any other entity? (2) More empirically, how in these days of bacteriological diagnosis can "health" be "subjective"? And if there is a question of "comfort" it must always be the comfort of eyes or digestion or social, financial, etc., comfort.

[5] *Ibid*., page 252.

[6] *Ibid.,* page 262. Although the adjectives "true" and "false" do not belong to the *act* of belief, yet it is only as objects of belief that the real and the unreal are true or false. And it is worth while to note also what havoc these statements make of the doctrine of external relations.

[7] *Ibid.,* page 255.

tautology, and there is still no belief in the unreal in sight. If "that which *appears* real" means that the object of belief is only an "appearance," that is, that it has the character of "appearance" to the believer, then it only remains for Mr. Bradley to offer the right hand of fellowship.

Must we not conclude, then, that the use of the term "appears" in the definition of belief is a case of what Bode calls "the fallacy of the innocent bystander"? When belief is said to be an attitude toward what "appears" real – we are speaking not from the believer's standpoint, but from the standpoint of an external, and, we may add, omniscient observer, who is looking on and comparing what is now going on with what is to come later.

With truth and error as belief respectively in the real and the unreal, and with the real and unreal determined entirely outside belief and judgment, and given to the latter ready made, as, indeed, they must be according to the doctrine of consciousness, as "an external relation," how are mistakes possible except from the standpoint of the omniscient bystander? For belief in the unreal *as unreal* is no more a case of error than is belief in the real as real. The only possibility of error is that the unreal shall "appear" as real. For though *error* is defined as belief in the unreal, *belief* is so defined that the unreal can not be an object of belief except in the disguise of the real. In the words of Socrates "even if he has captured ignorance he will think he has captured knowledge." If the only object of belief is that which appears real, how is one to believe that he ever has believed in the unreal? So long as we stick strictly to the above neo-realistic definitions of belief of truth and error, must we not answer with Theætetus: "Indeed, Socrates, I know not what to say"?

Perhaps the discussion thus far will appear to some to be very appropriately prologued by "a piece of Socratic quibbling." As for Socrates, no doubt he sometimes, perhaps often, quibbled, but not always; and this was one of the times when he did not. The difficulties we have encountered are far more than verbal. In general they are the outcome of an attempt to substitute for the alleged "subjectivism" of absolute idealism an objectivism equally absolute. Again they are the difficulties that pursue any attempt to convert one term of a logical distinction into an ontological absolute. An embarrassing feature of these difficulties is that they always seem to be essentially the same as those of the directly opposite position. Also, it seems impossible to avoid an outcome that differs in little but name from that of the opposition. What important difference is there between the "subsistence of realism as the all-inclusive and absolute *summum genus*"[8] of being and "the all-inclusive system of ideas" of absolute idealism?

[8] *Ibid.*, page 253.

Returning to our particular case, we can cordially agree with Professor Montague that "there is no sense in calling a (contentless) act of belief as such true or false." But by the same token should we not say the same thing of the kind of "objects" we get by this partition of belief? For the reason, namely, that a mere actionless object "as such" no more exists than does a contentless "act" or "process" of belief "as such."

The immediate source, then, of the troubles above recounted lies in the partition of belief into a contentless "subjective" "mental" act on the one hand and an actionless content or "object" on the other. And is not this a case of the sort of abstraction that has kept the "epistemological problem" going so long? What, when, or where is there just an "act" or "process" as such? Is there a "process" of brickmaking without bricks, of talking without language, of hearing without sounds?

No doubt the statement that truth and falsity are "attributes of the real and the unreal as possible objects of belief," taken out of its context might well be used to turn the edge of the above charge of vicious partition. But also, there can be no doubt that the point of the argument of neo-realism as a whole is to show that "true" and "false" are qualifications of the "objects" as distinguished from and wholly independent of the "act" of belief which is made a merely "psychological" and "subjective" affair.

ISOLATED KNOWLEDGE

"Isolated Knowledge." *Journal of Philosophy* 11.15 (16 July 1914): 393–408.

Perhaps the most general form of objection which those who have been variously labeled "instrumentalists," "experimentalists," and even "pragmatists" have brought against other theories of knowledge – idealistic and realistic, monistic and pluralistic – is that their treatment of knowledge has over-isolated it. The history of epistemology, say these critics, is a long, sad tale of futile struggles with difficulties arising from the failure to treat the problem of knowledge as a part of the bigger problem of living, while recognizing at the same time that knowing as a *part* of living is also a part of *living*. They insist that this isolation makes the treatment of knowledge similar to an attempt to give an account of the action of the brain, of the sun, or of any other thing without connecting it with the action of anything else. In the course of such isolated treatment a point is reached sooner or later where these neglected activities have to be reckoned with. They then may be "externally" attached to the process of knowing – "realism"; or be declared to have been "implicitly involved" and recognized (if somewhat algebraically) all along, – "idealism." But a tardy, half-hearted, exotic recognition of these connections complicates rather than solves the difficulties which have forced it. The result is that these outstanding activities keep asserting themselves in the theories which have ignored them in the form of antinomies and of frequent forced appeals from each side to the other for assistance.

The general form which this isolation takes in all theories infected by it is, as Dewey has pointed out, the conception of knowing as an act of something whose nature it is just to perform this act.[1] In a scholastically abstract and formal way the difficulties begin to show at once. For if knowing is an act of a being whose sole or essential nature is to know, how can that being be and fail to know, or fail to know and be? And we can not dispose of this by an admission on the side, *e g.,* as a psychologist or sociologist or as just a plain human being, that as a matter of fact this knowing being *has* some other characteristics, if in our theory of knowledge we attempt to ignore them or treat them as mere "accidents" of his character as a knowing being. I say "attempt," etc., for now as in

[1] *Cf.* Dewey's "Brief Studies in Realism," this Journal, Vol. VIII., pages 393 ff., 496 ff.

the palmiest days of scholasticism these other characters force our recognition whenever we assume that the knower does not know everything or know all the time, or that he may fail to know and still be. For it is precisely these other characters, these "accidents" that give the knower his being when and in so far as he fails to know.

Nor, so far as this difficulty is concerned, does it make any difference whether this knowing being is called "a mind" or "a being with a nervous system," if, in our theory, we treat the knower as a being whose only or essential nature is to know – especially if we have defined knowing as an "external relation" in which this being stands to something else. In this event the being with a nervous system finds itself in the same embarrassments as a "mind." It is doubtless more difficult consistently to treat a red-blooded being with a nervous system as a mere knower than a "mind" but in so far as it is so treated, or mistreated, the difficulties are the same.[2]

One of the most valiant attempts to meet these difficulties without the recognition of isolation as their source is to be found in Mr. Bertrand Russell's "The Problems of Philosophy," most of which is devoted avowedly to the theory of knowledge. It is not to be supposed that because this volume appears in "The Home University Library" series and is written in a charmingly direct and simple style that it is not to be taken seriously by "technical" readers. If the constant use and careful definition of such terms as "sensation," "sense-data," "mind," "particular," "universal," "judgment," "truth," "error," etc., be "technical" the technical reader has little cause for complaint.

The book is also noteworthy as an exposition of the philosophical ideas of a renowned mathematician, which does not resort, at crucial points in the argument, to formulæ of the highly specialized discipline of mathematical logic. Mr. Russell has beautifully shown that it is not only possible, but easy for a mathematician to set forth his philosophical notions in simple, vivid, current English.

There are some who have high hopes that the present alliance between mathematics and philosophy is to introduce greater "logical rigor" into philosophical thinking. It is possible that this overlooks the consideration that the "precision" of mathematics is in proportion to the degree of its abstractness; and that unless the subject-matter of philosophy can be reduced to the same degree of abstractness as mathematics, the concepts

[2] Professor Perry, speaking for the "Platform" realists says: "The realist grants that 'one who is knower is in relation to objects something else than their knower'." "Neo-realism," page 135. And elsewhere he makes the knower a being with a nervous system. But the question is: how far in his theory of knowledge he makes a *connection* between the knower as knower, and the knower as something else.

and methods which secure precision in the latter may produce only confusion in the former. However, those who cherish this expectation will be the first to agree that if difficulties are encountered in an exposition which has the mathematical training of Mr. Russell behind it, they must be charged to the standpoint itself, not to mistake in its applications.[3]

Mr. Russell's account does not begin, as some might expect, with the general character of knowledge. It assumes that we understand what knowledge means and strikes at once into the distinction between knowledge which admits of no doubt and knowledge which has the possibility of error. The former is "immediate" knowledge or knowledge by "acquaintance"; the latter is mediate or "derived" knowledge and is in the form of judgments and inferences. As to the general character of immediate knowledge, "we shall say we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware without the intermediary of any process of inference or knowledge of truths."[4] And "knowledge of truths" is defined as knowledge "in the sense which applies to our beliefs and convictions; that is, to what are called judgments."[5]

As for *what* is known – the "objects" of knowledge – in immediate knowledge there are: (1) the sense-data, "such things as colors, sounds, smells, hardnesses, etc.," which are produced by the action on "us" of "physical" objects existing in "physical" space; (2) memories, psychological processes, known by introspection, and "probably," not certainly, a knowledge of the self; (3) some universals and the content of intuitive judgments. Through mediate knowledge are known: (1) the "physical" or "real" objects corresponding to and "producing" the sense-data; and (2) "everything which can be deduced from self-evident truths by the use of self-evident principles of deduction."

[3] I hope that what follows is not over-captious. It is frankly an attempt to develop some of the antinomies, the "inner dialectic," if one pleases, of the conception of knowledge as an external relation between a "mind" and other things, with mind regarded as something whose "essential character" is just to be in this relation. And if part of the discussion is reminiscent of Green's criticism of Locke it should be said that the similarity between some of Mr. Russell's ideas and those of Locke calls for some of the sort of negative criticism Green leveled at Locke, even if one believes that much of Green's reconstruction is involved in the same difficulties.

[4] Page 173.

[5] In the formal classification there is a difficulty in completely identifying mediate and doubtful knowledge with judgments when, further on, we encounter "intuitive" and "perfectly self-evident" knowledge of "truths" after knowledge of truths has been defined (page 69) as knowledge "which applies to our beliefs and judgments," and after we have been told that it is precisely in beliefs and judgments that the possibility of error is found. This discrepancy is largely nullified, however, by so emasculating these perfectly certain judgments that they merely state "what is given in sense" (page 171) or the universals given in "acquaintance."

Meanwhile throughout this attractive presentation of these kinds and objects of knowledge one is haunted by the question: What is meant by "knowing," mediate or immediate? Turning the pages again with this in mind, we find that the first statements about knowing in general identify it with such "acts" as seeing, hearing, touching, or believing[6] – acts which "we" perform on something or toward something called the "objects of the act."[7] If we begin at once to raise such questions as: What is the nature of this "act"? what is the "we," and what is the character of the "object," – let it not be said that this betrays at the start a carping critic, until we see how far the argument turns on the ambiguities of these terms.

The first of anything like explicit responses to these queries appears in the criticism of Berkeley. Mr. Russell finds the weakness in Berkeley's position is revealed when we detect the equivocation in the term idea which is used to mean: (1) the "act" of knowing which Mr. Russell agrees is "undoubtedly mental" and "in" the mind; and (2) the "object" which is never "in," but only "before" the mind.[8] The "act" of knowing, then, is "mental"; and the "I" or "we" which knows is something called "a mind." Obviously we look at once for something more about this "mental act" and the nature of "mind." And on the next page[9] we find that "the main characteristic of a mind is the faculty of being acquainted with *(i.e.,* of immediately knowing) things other than itself"; and that "acquaintance with objects consists in a relation between the mind and something other than the mind; it is this that constitutes the mind's power of knowing things." Observe that in the last statement the mind's "act" of knowing has been reduced to a "relation between" the mind and something else. When we reach the treatment of judgment and the problem of truth and error, we shall find this "relation" becoming an "act again."[10] But for the present let us accept this reduction and follow its lead. Our net result so far is: immediate knowing is a relation – and I suppose we must say "external" – between other things and a "mind"

[6] Pages 10 ff.

[7] Here the discussion could be given a very different direction by challenging at once the assumption that such acts as seeing, hearing, and touching are acts of *knowing.* They may easily *become* part of a process of knowing, but are they *per se* knowing? But this discussion is committed to the enterprise of following the lead of Mr. Russell's conceptions and theses.

[8] The application of this to the mind's knowledge of (or "relations to") itself is not discussed.

[9] Page 66.

[10] I am aware of the doctrine of "motion" as a transitive asymmetrical relation, but – not presuming to question its value elsewhere – I doubt if even the most hardy mathematical realist would attempt to apply it in detail to the kind of action involved here.

whose essential character is just to be in this relation. The questions here are: What more is to be said of this relation? And if it is the essential nature of a mind to be in this relation of immediate knowing with other things, why has it, confessedly, this relation with so very few things? And just what is meant by the "certainty" of this relation?

As for the nature of the relation, there is the name "acquaintance." But that does not carry us very far. However, one other thing may be said of it for whatever it is worth. The relation is such that the "other things" are *immediately* "before" the mind. Further than this, apparently, we can not go. "Correspondence," which is treated in the chapter on Truth and Falsehood, does not apply here. Correspondence is not a relation between the mind and the things immediately "before" the mind, but between those things immediately "before" the mind, sense-data and certain universals, and things not immediately "before the mind," such as "physical" objects and other minds.

But once more, if this immediate relation of the mind to the "other things" is thus taken as an indefinable, and if it is the essential character of a mind to be in this relation, then such questions as: Why is it in this relation with so few things, and why, therefore, is not a lack of this relation (*pace* the objection of negative definition) as essential a character as its possession, become at once relevant and important? And they get added force when we find that this limitation is not the merely negative one of capacity, but that the whole world of "physical" objects and other selves – truly a large area – are, by their nature, shut out beyond all "hope" from this relation.

Here, possibly, some one may suggest that if one were to say, "the essential nature of the eye is to see other things than itself, this would not imply that the eye must see everything or see all the time." To which the reply would be: The analogy breaks; for "seeing" is far from being an indefinable, not to say "external," relation "between" the eye and other things. We can at once show how and why the eye can see some things and not others. On the other hand, if we start by defining "seeing" as an external relation "between" other things and something called an eye, about which we can say nothing except that its essential nature is to be in the relation of seeing to these other things, then the question: "Why does it stand in this relation to some things and not to others," is in order. And it surely would be too palpably mendicant to suggest that we must simply accept the empirical "fact" of this limitation.

Moreover, as we pass to the account of the certainty of the knowledge of the sense-data this limitation is far from being taken as empirically given. Here there is plenty of explanation of this certainty. And if some of the explanation is difficult to reconcile with knowledge as an "external" and indefinable relation, other parts of it are equally difficult to square

with the conception of the "act" of knowing as something "mental." Taking first the certainty of the sense-data, we have the following: "Although we are doubting the existence of the physical table, we are not doubting the existence of the sense-data which made us think there was a table. We are not doubting that while we look a certain color and shape appear to us, and while we press a certain sensation of hardness is experienced by us. *All this which is psychological* we are not calling in question."[11] Here not only the "we," but the sense-data and everything included in such processes as "looking" and pressing, are "all psychological." The term "psychological," to be sure, covers a multitude of things these days; but if there be any question of its "mental" connotation here, a few pages further on the whole case for immediate certainty is summed up in this way: "Thus it is our particular thoughts and feelings that have primitive certainty."

But these passages occur before the issue between realism and idealism is explicitly raised. Turning now to the explanation of the certainty of the sense-data given in the midst of the criticism of Berkeley's idealism, Mr. Russell finds that while Berkeley was wrong in identifying the thing known (here the sense-data) with the "act" of knowing which "is undoubtedly in the mind," "he was right in treating the sense-data which constitute our perception of a tree as subjective in the sense that they depend on us as much as upon the tree."[12] Follow now the phrase "depends on us." With immediate knowing defined as an "act" of a "mind" or as "a relation between" a mind and other things there surely is ground to expect that "us" here means us as "minds." Doubtless this makes an odd-looking realism; and as we are here in the midst of an explicit defense of that doctrine we should not, perhaps, be so surprised to find that "depends on us" is at once made to mean "depends on our sense organs." "Our previous arguments concerning color did not prove it to be mental; they only proved that its existence depends *on the relation of our sense organs to the physical object*."[13]

Aside from the striking difference between this and the other account of the sense-data where the "us" and the "looking" and "pressing" were "all psychological," are we not entitled to wonder how an interaction between "physical" bodies in "physical" space (for the sense organs are of course in "physical" space along with all other "physical" bodies) none of which is "immediately before" the mind, produces a third sort of thing, sense-data, which is "immediately before" the mind? And in the face of the

[11] Page 27, italics mine.

[12] Page 30.

[13] Page 65. Italics mine.

admittedly hypothetical inferential character of "physical" space we could scarcely be asked to take this "empirically." Behold then our dilemma: To maintain realism "us," in the phase "depends on us," must mean "our sense organs": to save immediacy and certainty it is taken as "minds." But to take it "as sense organs" leaves the object still in the hypothetical region of "physical" space not "immediately before the mind"; to take it as "mind" makes a realism that is in anything but name difficult to distinguish from idealism.

Possibly some one may here propose that in taking "us" both as body and mind one is simply recognizing the given dual character of the self. The reply would be: first, that the self is not here so treated. It is not taken in each case as *both* "mental" and "physical"; but is first one then the other. If the distinction between the "physical" and the "psychical" were consistently taken as falling inside the self or selves we should get a different type of realism. Second, it is again difficult to see how the "physical" body which dwells in the outer darkness of "physical" space where it can never hope to be immediately "before," much less in "contact," with the mind, can be a very intimate part of the self. Verily Berkeley has his revenge; not that his difficulties are any the less; but that the embarrassments of both spring from the common conception of knowing as an external relation between other things and a mind whose essential nature is just to be in this relation. Berkeley's God, the Bradleyan absolute, and Mr. Russell's "physical" object are epistemologically in the same case.

On the side of *what* is known of the "objects," the discussion, so far, has dealt chiefly with the sense-data. But equally interesting problems arise in connection with the other contents of immediate knowledge. First, is it not paradoxical that immediate knowledge should be "absolutely certain" and yet it be uncertain whether there is this immediate and perfectly certain knowledge of the self? If it is possible and even "probable" that we have this immediate and certain knowledge of the self, may we then *have* it and still be uncertain that we have it?

In the account of the immediate knowledge of universals we observe first that these immediately known universals in no sense "depend on us" as do the sense-data. They are strictly non-mental. Like the "physical" object, they are in a different plane of being from that of the knower. Yet some[14] of them are "immediately before" the mind, while the "physical" object can never hope to be in this position. Why this is so is not clear. There is here no technique of the immediacy of the universals as there is for the sense-data. Doubtless this is much more congruous with the

[14] It is admitted (page 171) that "among universals there seems to be no principle by which we can decide which can be known by acquaintance."

conception of immediacy; but it leaves the exclusion of the "physical" object from immediacy more of a mystery.

Although these universals are immediately before the mind, yet they have to be discovered, "derived" by a process of abstraction from particulars, and in some cases with great difficulty. Obviously this abstracting must be done by the mind itself. Does this mean that what is immediately given to the mind is only "given" after the mind works for it? Again, in this process of abstracting, which is often long and difficult, must there not be possibilities of error? And finally what is to test the completion of the abstraction?

A reconciliation of the immediacy of these universals with their "derivation" may be offered thus: "Certain preliminary and conditioning processes are presupposed in any sort of immediate knowledge. In order immediately to see anything the seer must first be awake and looking. If such preliminary activities are to destroy immediacy, where then is immediacy to be found?" To which the reply is: "*freilich* – nowhere." That is to say, nowhere is *such* an immediacy of the absolute and final sort to be found, where it is an outcome, an outgrowth of antecedent processes. The immediacy of seeing, hearing, which has been achieved in and is still in a process of development is not final; it is always open to disruption and therefore to the need of fresh mediation. How is it possible to admit that things and functions have *grown* and in the same breath make some of them intrinsically "immediate" and others "derived"? All of which is saying, not that there is no distinction between mediate and immediate, but that it is not one of fixed properties belonging each to different sorts of functions and contents. So long as seeing or hearing, or, perhaps better, their results can *be taken for granted* in any act or process they are immediate; the moment they themselves become a part of the problem they lose their immediacy. Again, the appeal to these preliminary activities in the case of seeing presupposes that the "seer" is a being who has some other activities which constitute his being when he is not seeing. But the immediate seer of these universals and sense-data is a "mind" whose essential nature is to see these other things. Where then shall we locate these preliminary activities and how are they to be *connected* with the seeing?

Finally, should not a theory of knowledge which frankly accepts the platonic conception of universals as entities whose character is that they are "shared by" other entities called "particulars," make some disposition of the serious difficulties which the Greeks themselves recognized, and serenely bequeathed to later generations? Even Aristotle found the notion of "sharing" mysterious enough. But perhaps the most fundamental of these difficulties is the dilemma of simple and complex universals which was precipitated by the discovery that these universals "share in," "overlap" each other. The universal triangle "shares in" the universal

"line," "angle," and "threeness" as much as does the particular triangle. On the basis of "sharing" what, then, is the difference between the "universal" and the "particular" triangle? When this question of the difference becomes acute, what usually happens is that the basis is suddenly shifted and the particular is distinguished from the universal as a temporal, terrestrial precipitation of the latter. But the universal, celestial, and the particular, terrestrial triangle are the same "complex" of universals in different planes of being. If, on the other hand, we seek escape by way of the "simple" universals, *i.e.,* of universals as ontologically simple entities, we have to face the queries: In what sense can anything absolutely "simple" be "shared by" anything else? And what then is a particular? And if the latter is a temporal complex of these simple universals, have we not, then, to face all the difficulties of atomism?

II

In the treatment of mediate knowledge – knowledge by way of judgment or belief – especially in dealing with the problem of truth and error, the conception of knowledge as an external relation between a mind and other things, and of a mind as something whose nature it is to be in this relation encounters its crucial test. In the account of immediate knowledge the pressure of the question, "how can such a mind be and fail in the relation" is partly relieved by the supposition that it does not fail. But in mediate knowledge we have to face, not merely negative limitation, but positive blunder and failure.

That the general conception of knowledge developed in the account of immediate knowing is to be carried over if possible into mediate knowing is clear from such general statements as this:

"What is called belief or judgment is nothing but this relation of believing or judging which relates a mind to several other things than itself."[15] Formally, this of course agrees with the external-relation conception; materially, all depends on what this "relation of judging" turns out to be.

The first point in which the relation of judging differs from the relation of immediate knowledge is that it is a "plural" relation. That is, in judging, the mind must be related to more than one other thing. This is to pave the way for the possibility of error. If a "mind" called "Othello," should judge *falsely* that Desdemona loves Cassio, "this judgment can not consist in the mind's relation to a single object; for if there were such an object the belief would be true."[16] This means that since knowing so far

[15] Page 197.

[16] Page 194.

consists in an undefined relation of the mind to something else if the mind *is* in this relation, it is *in* it, and there can be no error.

However, before considering the problem of truth and error, the distinction between the "single" object of immediate knowledge and the "plural" object of the judgment should be noticed. When we "see" *(i.e.,* immediately know) "a round red patch" – and we might add, "between two trees at the edge of the meadow" – the object is "single"; it is "complex" to be sure, but still "single." But when the mind "judges" that "there is a round red patch," etc., or that "the patch is round and red," the object is more than one. This at once raises the question: is the "singleness" or "plurality" there, in the object, in advance of and independent of the relation to the "mind"; or is it dependent on the relation? Is not "a round red patch between two trees, etc.," "single" because this content is "seen as" single? What can possibly be meant by calling it ontologically "single"? If the "singleness" does mean that it is "seen as" single, then are we to say that in immediate knowledge the mind is related to a "single object" whose "singleness" the mind first makes? On the other hand, if the "singleness" is a property of the object as independent of the relation, we are in trouble with plurality; for this class of judgments – "there is a red patch" or "the patch is red" – are (part of the time) purely "analytic"; "they merely state what is given in sense."[17] In this case are we to understand that the mind, again by a mere act of its own, first bestows upon the object the plurality which the object must have in order to be the object of the mind's act of judgment? And if so, is not the idealist ready to offer the hand of fellowship?

This problem of singleness and plurality is typical of the difficulties which have always beset a logic which starts by dividing *knowledge* into "immediate" and "mediate." Mill's logic is the classic instance. In general the problem is to make the transition from immediacy to mediacy, or the reverse. The result usually is the production of a third hybrid species of knowing which tries to be both and suffers all of the embarrassments of a dual life. The connecting form in Mr. Russell's system is this analytic judgment of the type – "the patch of red." The difficulty of its position is clearly reflected in the passages concerning it. On the one hand, these judgments are purely "analytic." They "merely state what is given in sense" and therefore have "absolute self-evidence" and "must be true." "In all cases where we know by acquaintance (*e.g.*, by "seeing") a complex fact consisting of certain terms in relation *(e.g.*, "a round red patch," "the shining sun," etc.) we say the truth that these terms are so related has the first or absolute kind of self-evidence, and in these cases the judgment that

[17] Page 171.

the terms are so related *must* be true."[18] On the other hand, all judgments in order to be judgments "must be different from the sense-data from which they are obtained"[19] and must be "liable to error."[20] Hence we find the above passages affirming the absolute self-evidence and truth of these judgments followed at once by the statement that nevertheless any given judgment, *e.g.*, "the sun is shining," "in passing from the perception *(i.e.*, from what is given in sense to the judgment) has to separate out the "sun" and the "shining" as constituents of the fact *(i.e.*, of the perception), and in this process it is possible to commit error."[21] But how does this error occur if the judgment is "merely stating what is given in the perception"? The answer is: "Even where a *fact* has the first or absolute kind of self-evidence, a judgment believed to correspond to the fact may not really correspond to the fact."[22] But we have just been assured that "in these cases," that is, where the judgment is "merely stating what is given in sense," it can not fail to correspond to the "fact." The discrepancy obviously turns on the ambiguity in the term "fact." Where the judgment has "absolute self-evidence" and "must be true," the "fact" corresponding to the judgment is simply the sense-data – "the round red patch." But where there is the possibility of error, the "fact" is not the sense-data, but the "physical" object to which the sense-data are supposed to correspond. But where this latter is the object or "fact" with which the judgment means to correspond, obviously the judgment is not confining itself any longer to stating "what is given in sense." Once more the dilemma: to have perfect self-evidence the judgment of perception can only repeat what is already given in the sense-data: but to be a judgment with a judgment's possibility of error, it must go beyond the sense-data.

This brings us to the judgments which frankly profess to transcend the sense-data and to the account of error. We have already seen that the possibility of error is said to rest upon the fact that the mind is in relation to more than one object. But how does mere plurality of objects lead to error? Why should not more than one object be as "immediately before" the mind as one? And in fact it turns out that the mind's relation to a plurality of objects does not in itself contain the possibility of error. This plurality of objects simply prepares the way for the next step in which the real judgment with its liability to error occurs. Having before it a plurality of objects consisting in the simplest cases "of two terms and a relation"

[18] Pages 213–14. The parentheses are mine; the italics are Mr. Russell's.

[19] Page 178.

[20] Page 212.

[21] Page 214. Parentheses mine.

[22] *Ibid.*

the mind can put these objects in an "order" and "direction" of relationship which may or may not correspond to an order and direction of the terms which exists (or subsists) outside the act of judging and may be accordingly true or false. "Thus in every act of judgment there is a mind which judges and there are terms concerning which it judges."[23] Thus the mind "Othello" may judge, *i.e.*, may arrange the terms Desdemona, Cassio, and the relation "loving" in the order and direction of relationship "Desdemona loves Cassio" or "Cassio loves Desdemona." And if the terms are united outside the judgment in the same order and direction of relationship as they have in it, the judgment is true; if not, it is false.[24]

How the conception of judging as a relation "between" the mind and other things is to emerge alive from this account is indeed an interesting question. But our main concern now is with the possibility of truth and error. First, we observe that this account makes the judgment an act of *relating* merely. It reads as if the "real" objects were directly before the mind and as if the only business of the judgment were to put them in the true "order" and "direction" of relationship. The close of the summing up reads: "If the two terms (Desdemona and Cassio) in that order *(i.e.*, the order in the judgment) *are* united by the relation *(i.e.*, *are* united *outside* the judgment) the belief is true."[25] This reads as if the "terms" in the judgment are the same as those outside; as if the "real" Desdemona and Cassio are immediately known; the thing to be judged being the *relation*. But as soon as we recall the chapters on immediate knowledge we see that the "terms" which are directly before the mind in the judgment and which it is relating are not the "real" Desdemona and Cassio, whether taken as body or soul, but certain sense-data "caused by" the "real" objects. The word "terms" has here the same ambiguity noted above in the word "fact." It covers both the sense-data and the "real" objects.

But it may be said that this ambiguity is harmless since it has already been shown that on pain of subjectivism,[26] we must suppose that the sense-data are caused by and correspond to the "real" objects. But an appeal in the midst of the judgment to the principle of immediacy is perilous. Once admitted, it is difficult to get rid of before it has devoured

[23] Page 197.

[24] Page 201.

[25] *Ibid.* Parentheses and italics mine.

[26] Although subjectivism gets us into all kinds of practical absurdities, such as supposing that a patch of color is hungry, angry, etc., yet there is no "logical absurdity" in it (page 34). To many this will seem to constitute sufficient *reductio ad absurdum* of the meaning of "logical" in an isolated logic.

the whole judgment. Thus at once it will be asked how it happens that the "real" objects in producing the sense-data which corresponds to themselves, produce no corresponding relations. The "real" objects surely do not act out of all relation to one another, nor can their action be unaffected by these relations. How then do the relations escape? And sure enough, when we turn to the statement of the nature of the immediate correspondence between the sense-data and the real objects we find that they do not escape. This correspondence is described as precisely a correspondence of *relations*. It is a correspondence between the relations of the sense-data and the relations of the "real" objects. The account of this correspondence is summed up thus: "We find that although the *relations* of physical objects have all sorts of knowable properties derived from their correspondence with the *relations* of the sense-data, the physical objects remain unknown in their intrinsic nature, so far at least as can be discovered by means of the senses."[27] Taken at its face, this surely says that the given relations between the sense-data already correspond to relations between the physical *(i.e.,* the "real") objects. And just this correspondence is all the judgment ever hopes to make. There is no correspondence of qualities. What, then, is there left for the judgment to do? All the correspondence possible seems given; the judgment is out of employment; and the possibility of error has vanished.

But suppose we say that this and other similar passages must not be taken to mean that this correspondence between the relations of the sense-data and the relations of the real objects is complete; they mean only that there is a partial and general correspondence – enough to say that any shift in the relations of the sense-data means some sort of change in the relations of the real objects; but it remains for the judgment to further specify this correspondence. I do not know how mathematical logic handles the case of "partial" or of "general" correspondence of relations, but in terms of ordinary discourse such a statement as the above would mean that the relations between the sense-data, as they are immediately known, do, and do not, correspond to the relations between the real objects and the "do not" is as obvious and important a feature as the "do." But if absence of correspondence with the relations of the real objects is as patent a character of the relations of the sense-data as its presence, what has become of immediate knowledge? Thus it is the turn of mediacy and judgment to devour the whole of knowledge.[28]

[27] Page 54. The first italics are the author's, the second mine.

[28] Nor would it be in order to appeal, at this point, from "dialectics" to the "fact" that there is immediacy and that there is judgment and inference. The matter in question is not this "fact," but the basis of the distinction and connnection between immediacy and judgment.

Finally, supposing that the correspondence between the relations of the sense-data and those of the real objects is "partial" or "general," and that it is the judgment's work to further specify this correspondence, and that in our illustration the judgment declares that the relations between the sense-data mean that "Desdemona loves Cassio," how is this judgment to be verified? In view of what has preceded, we should not be surprised to find that the answer is that this judgment can be completely verified only in the mind of Desdemona herself.[29] That is to say, the only "mind" that has a strictly "logical"[30] right to the judgment is the one who has no need to make it, – the one to whom the content of the judgment is already given; while the one who needs to make it must claim his right to do so on some other than purely "logical" ground. But let not the idealist mock until he can show how a judgment, which aims to arrange or to "reconstruct" sense-data so that they will correspond with the absolute's system of ideas, can be verified in any mind but that of the absolute. That the mind is the absolute's instead of Desdemona's does not alter in principle the difficulty from the standpoint of Othello who must judge at the risk of both logical certainty and his wife.

How near idealism and this type of realism are to each other at this point also appears in the way each deals with this difficulty. From the impossibility of verification of this type of judgment by the finite mind, idealism turns for consolation to the conception of "Degrees of Truth and Reality" which is the epistemological form of the doctrine of "Emanations." In Mr. Russell's exposition, the section which finds that Desdemona's is the only mind which can verify the judgment concerning her passion for Cassio is immediately followed by the doctrine of "degrees of self-evidence,"[31] which, as it is expounded, means "degrees of evidence" or "degrees of verification." But how are these "degrees" to be judged? What is the standard? The answer reveals more common ground. For both, the "criterion" for these "degrees" is something different from the "nature" of truth itself. For idealism, of Professor Royce's type, it is the extent to which the judgment assists in fulfilling some specific finite enterprise, such as the attempt to "sing in tune," etc. For Mr. Russell, the only criterion mentioned for these judgments which deal with particulars is "coherence" which has been explicitly rejected as constituting the "meaning" of truth.[32] The first, and apparently chief reason for the rejection is that "coherence" is relative to difference in point of view

[29] Page 213.

[30] "Logical," that is, from the standpoint of a purely representational logic.

[31] Page 218.

[32] Page 191.

resulting in different "systems of coherence," different hypotheses for the same facts.[33] Thus "it may be that with sufficient imagination a novelist might invent a past for the world that would perfectly fit on to what we know and yet be quite different from the real past."[34] But does not this disqualification of coherence for expressing the nature of truth also disqualify it as a criterion? If there may be any number of "inventions" all of which may "perfectly fit onto," *i.e.,* perfectly cohere with, "what we know"[35] and still be mere fictions of the imagination, how can coherence possibly serve as a criterion of truth, *i.e.,* of correspondence with the real facts? To say that while certain judgments may cohere and still be false the probabilities are that they are not, would seem to beg the point. If this means that though cohering judgments may not correspond to "the real facts," all judgments which do so correspond must cohere, some explanation is needed. If we may have perfect coherence without correspondence *how* does correspondence guarantee coherence? Indeed would not the presumption be that where there is an "invention" in perfect coherence with everything we "know," but not corresponding with the facts, a judgment or set of judgments which did correspond would break up the coherence?

More could and should be said about the distinction, rather the lack of distinction, between correspondence of qualities and correspondence of relations and about the whole subject in general of the separation of the "criterion" and "nature" of a thing. But I am already over the limits of this paper. I am keenly aware of the highly "negative" character of this criticism and I realize that many of the questions here proposed could not have been treated in Mr. Russell's book. But if they represent genuine difficulties in the central doctrines of the volume they ought to be raised and discussed somewhere.

[33] The other objection to coherence as expressing the nature of truth is that "it presupposes the laws of logic" – especially the law of contradiction. But doesn't "correspondence" also presuppose the law of contradiction, from Mr. Russell's standpoint?

[34] Page 191.

[35] This must mean with *all* that we know. Also it assumes that it is easy to tell where the perfectly cohering fiction ends and "what we know" begins.

PRAGMATISM, SCIENCE AND TRUTH

"Pragmatism, Science and Truth." *Philosophical Review* 24.6 (November 1915): 631–638. Ed. Note: Page references have been changed to Fite's reprinted articles in this volume.

A few years ago, in discussing an article by Professor Fite on "The Experience Philosophy,"[1] I concluded in effect that he had saved himself from pragmatism only by so defining this doctrine that, in excluding himself, he excluded many if not all pragmatists. Much the same thing might be said of the Professor Fite's highly stimulating papers on "Pragmatism and Science" and "Pragmatism and Truth"[2] were it not that he here assumes the rôle of the evangel of a newer pragmatism – the voice of one crying in the wilderness of a mechanistic materialism calling upon pragmatists to repent and be baptized into a more "human" and a more "spiritual" pragmatism. Professor Fite's own figure for the function of these papers is that of the midwife assisting a half-born, half-strangled pragmatism into the world.

The first article begins with the observation that if pragmatists had been less interested in their 'new name' for old ways of thinking and more in the 'old ways' they would not have failed to see that "the first and greatest of their school" was Kant. Yet, in the paragraphs immediately following, Professor Fite points out differences between Kant and pragmatism so fundamental that it would seem they might well constitute sufficient reason for not reckoning Kant as "the first and greatest of the school." Especially is this true of the difference between the teaching of Kant and that of pragmatism concerning the relation between reason and desire, to say nothing of Kant's fixed categories. Upon just this difference hang the law and the prophets of pragmatism.

At all events, on this point of difference between Kant and the pragmatists Professor Fite stands with the pragmatists in holding that what is reasonable and what is true cannot be determined apart from human wants and needs. But now follows what to me is an amazing statement concerning the pragmatic conception of 'needs' – imputed in particular to American pragmatists and still more in particular to Professor Dewey and myself. "I think I am not wrong," says Professor Fite, "in saying that our

[1] The Philosophical Review. Vol. XV.

[2] *Ibid*., Vol. XXIII.

American pragmatism is disposed to emphasize the need of bread and butter and to hold that spiritual needs are only bread and butter needs in disguise"! "Why do we need to look upon nature as a succession of cause and effect? Their answer is because we need it in our business; or better perhaps, because we need it in our factory. For the term by which they [Professor Dewey and myself] prefer to name their special brand of pragmatism is *instrumentalism*. Instrumentalism teaches that the categories of science are but so many tools or instruments … for gratifying our needs. And what needs? So far as I can see the only needs to be gratified by such instruments are the needs of bread and butter."

This last sentence might mean that since pragmatists emphasize science, and since, on Professor Fite's view – a startling one surely – the only needs which the categories of science serve are bread and butter needs, therefore the only needs that pragmatists *should* recognize are bread and butter needs. But Professor Fite has already gone further than that. He has said that for them "spiritual needs are only bread and butter needs in disguise." In the former discussion, to which I have referred, I complained of the lack of citations in support of Professor Fite's interpretations, and when one turns from the statements I have just quoted to such passages as the following the complaint again seems justified.[3] "The antecedents of thought (that is the 'needs' to whose problems thought is a response) are our universe of life and love, of struggle and appreciation." The passage then specifies such things as "snow on the ground"; "The Monroe Doctrine"; "the relation of art to industry"; "The poetic quality of a painting of Boticelli"; "The best way to reduce expenses"; "Whether and how to renew the ties of a broken friendship" (Professor Fite's typical instance of a 'spiritual' need). Again; "Anything – event, act, value, ideal, person, or place may be an object of thought. Reflection busies itself alike with physical nature, the record of social achievement, and the endeavors of social aspiration."[4] And again: "Thinking is a mode or stage of Conduct. And by 'conduct' the pragmatist means action which is seeking to maintain and develop that which *(i.e.,* anything which) is satisfying or to get rid of that which is dissatisfying."[5] Do not such statements, and there are many similar, to say nothing of innumerable implications of the same meaning, justify the exclamation marks I have placed after Professor Fite's 'bread and butter' interpretation. And Professor Fite himself appears visited with some misgivings; for he says that he is convinced that

[3] Professor Dashiel in his recent admirable discussion of these papers in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* makes the same point.

[4] Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory,* Chap. I, pp. 1–2.

[5] *Pragmatism and its Critics*, p. 4.

his interpretation will be called 'vulgar'. But he does not give the reason for this conviction.

But the diagnosis of such glaring discrepancies as we have here, calls for something more deep-seated than careless reading. And this I think is to be found in certain dichotomies which Professor Fite retains and which pragmatism believes should be 'superseded'. One of these is the antithesis of 'the practical' and 'the spiritual'. For Professor Fite, 'practical' needs are bread and butter needs; the need for 'understanding,' for 'communion,' 'fellowship,' is 'spiritual'. For pragmatism, every need, whether for bread and butter or for companionship, in so far as its satisfaction presents a *problem,* is 'practical', and as calling for specific means for its realization, it is 'material'; in so far as the process of satisfying the need reacts into the need, affecting both its content and value, it is 'spiritual'. How to proceed in establishing communion and fellowship with a human being is quite as 'practical' and may be a much more difficult problem than getting bread and butter from him. That every 'need' has its *Stoff,* its material, both on the side of its content and its 'instruments' seems equally clear. 'The communion and fellowship of the saints' could not be conceived, even by the saints themselves, without a 'spiritual body'. Spirits are kindred if their embodiments are kindred. And this is implied in Professor Fite's statement that the only way we can understand the solar-system is by construing it in terms "of our own human motives for action" (p. 159).

In the further development of this antithesis of the 'practical' and the 'spiritual,' mathematical and mechanical science is accepted as sufficient for 'practical,' *i.e.,* for bread and butter needs, but as quite foreign to 'spiritual needs.' "To look upon nature as a mechanism after the fashion of physics and chemistry does indeed satisfy the need for bread and butter… . But I cannot conceive any one to be satisfied with this mechanical view who feels that his need of living with her, or even upon her, is also a need for understanding and fellowship" (p. 156).

Here the pragmatist would reciprocate Professor Fite's midwifely services, by pointing out that even his humanism is not yet fullborn, that it concedes too much to mechanism on the one side and too little on the other. The process of getting bread and butter is not only an affair of mathematical, physical, and chemical analysis – but of 'intuition' both of persons and things. It is 'practical' but it is neither purely mechanical, nor purely spiritual but social, 'human'. Moreover, the *problem of acquiring* understanding, whether of nature or of persons, always involves some sort of mechanism in its solution, *i.e.,* some kind of an equation of means and end which, I take it, is the essence of mechanism. The pragmatist is haunted by no terrors of mechanism – not because he has relegated mechanism to a realm of merely 'practical' or 'bodily' needs, but because

he makes mechanical formulations 'instrumental' in the most 'spiritual' enterprises. And this suggests the query: Whether this recognition of the instrumental function of mechanics in the conduct of the most spiritual interests is not possibly a more plausible explanation of the pragmatists' "strange reverence for science" than Dr. Fite's suggestion that it is a case of the frailty that "likes to be seen on the arm of a Duke!"

The pragmatists' 'reverence for science' might indeed seem strange if it were true, as Professor Fite thinks it is, that pragmatism has accepted modern science without criticism (p. 164). But pragmatism is no less a critique of science than of philosophy. If it has insisted on the standpoint and method of science in philosophy, it has stood equally for the 'human', if you please the 'spiritual', element in science. Its doctrine is that the concepts and theories of science have validity so long, and in so far as they are of value in dealing with problems that are more than problems of mere bread and butter on the one hand, and more than purely intellectual problems on the other.

If it be true that modern science has taken some of its concepts as metaphysically final, it is difficult to see how we are to say, as Professor Fite does, that pragmatism takes the theories of science 'instrumentally' and yet without criticism. And, *a fortiori*, how can it be said that "the very name 'instrumentalism' means that the instrument, now *once for all accepted as such*, stands as a barrier to any deeper or more human interpretation of our needs?" The whole meaning of 'instrumentalism' is that no instrument *can* be accepted once for all except for the specific problem or problems for which it is forged. Instruments are forged for the specific work they are to do, and as the problems change the instruments must change.

It is puzzling also to read that pragmatism is guilty of "accepting the instrument once for all," and at the same time is "justly open to the charge of creating a subjective and fictitious world by constantly speaking as if an invention *(i.e.*, an instrument') were invented out of nothing," and by "determining truth by our specific and transient needs" and thus making truth "artificial and capricious." Pragmatism is thus by turns or at the same time, according to Professor Fite, too scientific to be human and too human to be scientific. But this, I think, is due to failure to see that pragmatism hath joined what Professor Fite still keeps asunder – mechanism and humanism. In this union, to be sure, both have surrendered their old metaphysical status in which, of course, no coöperation was possible.

The problem of truth Professor Fite poses as follows: "When the pragmatist asserts that the truth is what he finds useful to believe, the realist or natural scientist meets him with the question: But what of the facts? and the pragmatist then retorts by saying that any unwelcome

experience he will decline to treat as a fact. But this only means, so far as I can see, that the distinction between truth and fiction is thoroughly artificial and capricious, and this is the charge which is most frequently, and, I should say, most justly laid at the pragmatist's door" (p. 166). This means, I suppose, that if a pragmatist should awake to the "unwelcome experience" of finding his room ablaze, he would, or according to his theory he should, "decline to treat it as a fact."

First we may note the difficulty of squaring this account of the pragmatist's attitude toward 'unwelcome' experiences with the 'bread and butter' interpretation. In the latter, the pragmatist was portrayed as doing all his thinking, including the use of all the categories and mechanism of science, in order to get rid of the 'unwelcome experience' of hunger. Here he is supposed to decline to recognize hunger as a fact. And after having credited, or discredited, pragmatism with "a strange reverence" for the methods of modern science, Professor Fite could not retort that the only thinking the pragmatist should do is to think that the hunger does not exist. On the other, hand, how strange it sounds to hear a philosophy that declines to recognize "unwelcome experiences" such as hunger, called a bread and butter philosophy! And when pragmatism thus turns its back on "unwelcome experiences," what is its motive to thinking? Or, have we another paradox of bread and butter thinking, to satisfy purely intellectual needs?

In the treatment of 'the independence of truth', much of the discussion is about the independence of the 'fact', of the 'object', of 'reality', and of the 'knower'. And one wonders if these are to be substituted in turn for truth, and if not, what the bearing of their independence is upon the independence of truth. Professor Fite's definition of truth would seem to preclude substitution. He conceives truth to be an 'agreement,' reached as a result of a process of 'bargaining', of negotiation, between two beings whether these beings are persons or persons and things. However, the main constructive feature of Professor Fite's papers is the suggestion that the kind of knowing that occurs when one person knows another should be taken as typical, rather than the judgment about a table or even a green tree. And the next interesting point in his exposition is that in this process of 'bargaining', between the knower and the thing known, *"all is being made – not only the agreement which constitutes truth, but the terms between which the agreement is formed, the knower as well as the object of his knowledge."*[6]

But what now of independence? In view of the passage just quoted Professor Fite's reply again presents difficulties. The answer is that, while in order to escape a world of 'hard' facts in which no bargaining would

[6] pp. 175–176. Italics mine.

be possible we must recognize that in the process of bargaining, that is of knowing, not only truth but the knower and the object are being made, yet in order to be independent realists (which Professor Fite thinks we must be in any case), we must hold that in knowing "I am not made by the object, neither is the object of my knowledge made by me" (p. 176). Now there would be no difficulty here if in the first passage we understand by 'being made', what evidently is intended, viz., being modified in some specific way, not created *in toto*; and if likewise in the second passage we understand that neither the knower nor the object is made *in toto*. All of which would seem to reduce to a favorite thesis of pragmatism that the knower is something more than a knower, and that the object is something more than a thing to be known. But Professor Fite seems to mean something different from this in the second passage as he further expands it. That the object is not made by the knower, means in the case of one person knowing another, *e.g.*, Plato, that "there is a certain unity of personality which is Plato's and which is not made by the way he is taken." And this unity may have "a consistency equal to that of the law of gravitation." Moreover, notwithstanding all that has been said about 'bargaining', we are to understand that "the final agreement which we call truth is no mere adjustment, no mere compromise effected by rounding the corners of a square peg to make it fitter for a round hole, at the same time squaring somewhat the hole. So far as the agreement is a matter of compromise, thus far it is false." Again, if the meaning of this is that in any particular case of 'bargaining' the unity of personality is altered only in some specific manner, there is no difficulty. But if it means, as it appears to mean, that there is a core of personality which remains untouched and untouchable by this or any other 'bargaining', then are we not in trouble? For we must now take the first passage in which both "the knower and object are being made" to mean that they are 'being made' in certain external and superficial aspects, while the "inner unity of personality" remains unaffected. Furthermore, we shall have on our hands in this inner unity of personality precisely one of those 'hard' facts which Professor Fite has convincingly shown must be rejected. On the other side, if Professor Fite disclaims this interpretation of the independent unity of personality, how then will his view of it differ from that of the pragmatist – even of the instrumentalist? For, as already indicated, the instrumentalist cannot even get his bargaining started without assuming as 'the antecedents of thought' beings of all kinds in interaction. But none of these are 'hard' beings, nor do they conceal a hard unchangeable core of personality under a soft exterior. There is no part or character of them that may not be modified in 'bargaining' with other beings.

But whatever the kind and amount of independence the knower and the object may have, what is the bearing of this upon the independence of

truth? For neither the knower nor the object is truth. Truth, as Professor Fite says, consists in the agreement reached through bargaining between the knower and the object; furthermore, this truth is "all made" in the bargaining process. Of what then is it independent? And in what way has it more independence than instrumentalism gives it? Whether the bargaining is for friendship or for bread and butter, the 'agreement which constitutes truth' is reached in response to a need which is personal, human, and equally objective in both cases.

But what meaning is there now in calling this agreement, after it has been reached, either dependent or independent. From the standpoint of the question of its origin it may be said to be dependent upon all the elements in the 'bargaining' process. But as an achieved reality, – and to be truth the agreement has to be achieved, – what can its dependence or independence mean? The dependence or independence of things and persons that are or may become parties to the agreement is quite a different matter. But even these are not to be classified as dependent or independent, or as of varying degrees of dependence or independence at large, as one would classify things as round or square. The dependence or independence of things and persons is on *one another*, and is for specific matters in some specific enterprise. But dependence and independence in this sense can not be predicated of an achieved agreement. And if not in this sense then in what significant sense do they apply? It is Professor Fite's complaint that pragmatism has ignored the problem of "the independence of truth." The explanation of this ignorance is that for pragmatism there is no such problem.

NEO-REALISTIC LOGIC AND SCIENCE

"Abstract of 'Neo-Realistic Logic and Science'." *Journal of Philosophy* 13.14 (6 July 1916): 384. Ed. Note: An abstract of a paper, which became a portion of the next essay, that was read at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, at Washington University, 21 and 22 April 1916.

Expounders of the analytic logic of neo-realism hold two very different views of its relation to science, viz., (*a*) that analytic logic is not a methodology, but is a special science, with its own special interest, subject-matter, and method; and (*b*) that it effects a long-needed reform in scientific logic by excluding the "psychological," "subjective" process of knowledge and by furnishing science with its long-sought "simple" elements. Its difficulties may be summarized as follows: (1) It accepts from epistemological logic the "subjective" character of the *act* of knowing; (2) in excluding from logic the act of knowing it breaks with science, as is seen particularly in its view of hypotheses; (3) it is unable to make a workable distinction between truth and error; and (4) the simple elements which it proposes to furnish to science are the hypostatized acts of knowing which were previously rejected and which are neither simple nor of value for science.

REFORMATION OF LOGIC

"Reformation of Logic." In John Dewey et al., *Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1917), pp. 70–117.

I

In a general survey of the development of logical theory one is struck by the similarity, not to say identity, of the indictments which reformers, since the days of Aristotle, have brought against it. The most fundamental of these charges are: first, that the theory of logic has left it formal and with little significance for the advancement of science and the conduct of society; second, that it has great difficulty in avoiding the predicament of logical operations that are merely labored reproductions of non-logical activities and therefore tautologous and trifling, or of logical operations that are so far removed from immediate, non-logical experience that they are irrelevant; third, that logical theory has had trouble in finding room in its own household for both truth and error; each crowds out the other.

The identity of these indictments regardless of the general philosophical faith, empiricism, or rationalism, realism, or idealism to which the reformer or the logic to be reformed has belonged, suggests that whatever the differences in the doctrines of these various philosophic traditions, they possess a common ground from which these common difficulties spring.

It is the conviction of a number who are at present attempting to rid logic of these ancient disabilities that their common source is to be found in a lack of continuity between the acts of intelligence (or to avoid the dangers of hypostasis, intelligent acts) and other acts; between logical conduct and other conduct. So wide, indeed, is this breach, that often little remains of the act of knowing but the name. It may still be called an act, but it has no describable instruments nor technique of operation. It is an indefinable and often mystical performance of which only the results can be stated. In recent logical discussion this techniqueless act of knowing has been properly enough transformed into an indefinable "external relation" in which an entity called a knower stands to another entity called the known.

For many centuries this breach between the operations of intelligence and other operations has been closed by various metaphysical devices with the result that logic has been a hybrid science, – half logic, half

metaphysics and epistemology. So great has been the momentum of the metaphysical tradition that long after we have begun to discover the connection between logical and non-logical operations its methods remain to plague us. Efforts to heal the breach without a direct appeal to metaphysical agencies have been made by attempting a complete logicizing of all operations. But besides requiring additional metaphysics to effect it, the procedure is as fatal to continuity as is an impassable disjunction. Continuity demands distinction as well as connection. It requires the development, the *growth* of old material and functions into new forms.

Driven by the difficulties of this complete logicization, which are as serious as those of isolation, logical theory was obliged to reinstate some sort of distinction. This it did by resorting to the categories of "explicit" and "implicit." All so-called non-logical operations were regarded as "implicitly" logical. And, paradoxically, logical operations had for their task the transformation of the implicit into the explicit.

An adequate account of the origin and continuance of this isolation of the conduct of intelligence from other conduct is too long a story to be told here. Suffice it to recall that in the society in which the distinction between immediate and reflective experience, between opinion and science, between percepts and universals was first made, intelligence was largely the possession of a special and privileged class removed in great measure from hand-to-hand contact with nature and with much of society. Because it did not fully participate in the operations of nature and society intelligence could not become fully domesticated, i.e., fully naturalized and socialized in its world. It was a charmed spectator of the cosmic and social drama. Doubtless when Greek intelligence discovered the distinction between immediate and reflective experience – possibly the most momentous discovery in history – "the world," as Kant says of the speculations of Thales, "must suddenly have appeared in a new light." But not recognizing the full significance of this discovery, ideas, universals, became but a wondrous spectacle for the eye of reason. They brought, to be sure, blessed relief from the bewildering and baffling flux of perception. But it was the relief of sanctuary, not of victory.

That the brilliant speculations of Greek intelligence were barren because there was no technique for testing and applying them in detail is an old story. But it is merely a restatement, not a solution, of the pertinent question. This is: why did not Greek intelligence develop such a technique? The answer lies in the fact that the technique of intelligence is to be found precisely in the details of the operations of nature and of human conduct from which an aristocratic intelligence is always in large measure shut off. Intelligence cannot operate fruitfully in a vacuum. It must be incarnate. It must, as Hegel said, have "hands and feet." When

we turn to the history of modern science the one thing that stands out is that it was not until the point was reached where intelligence was ready (continuing the Hegelian figure) to thrust its hands into the vitals of nature and society that it began to acquire a real control over its operations.

In default of such controlling technique there was nothing to be done with this newly found instrument of intelligence – the universal – but to retain it as an object of contemplation and of worshipful adoration. This involved, of course, its hypostasis as the metaphysical reality of supreme importance. With this, the only difference between "opinion" and "science" became one of the kind of objects known. That universals were known by reason and particulars by sense was of little more logical significance than that sounds are known by the ear and smells by the nose. Particulars and universals were equally given. If the latter required some abstraction this was regarded as merely auxiliary to the immediate vision, as sniffing is to the perception of odor. That universals should or could be conceived as experimental, as hypotheses, was, when translated into later theology, the sin against the Holy Ghost.

However, the fact that the particulars in the world of opinion were the stimuli to the "recollection" of universals and that the latter in turn were the patterns, the forms, for the particulars, opened the way in actual practice for the exercise of a great deal of the controlling function of the universals. But the failure to recognize this control value of the universal as fundamental, made it necessary for the universal to exercise its function surreptitiously, in the disguise of a pattern and in the clumsy garb of imitation and participation.

With perceptions, desires, and impulses relegated to the world of opinion and shadows, and with the newly discovered instrument of knowledge turned into an object, the knower was stripped of all his knowing apparatus and was left an empty, scuttled entity definable and describable only as "a knower." The knower must know, even if he had nothing to know with. Hence the mystical almost indefinable character of the knowing act or relation. I say "almost indefinable"; for as an act it had, of course, to have some sort of conceptualized form. And this form vision naturally furnished. "Naturally," because intelligence was so largely contemplative, and vision so largely immediate, unanalyzed, and diaphanous. There was, to be sure, the concept of effluxes. But this was a statement of the fact of vision in terms of its results, not of the process itself. Thus it was that the whole terminology of knowing which we still use was moulded and fixed upon a very crude conception of one of the constituents of its process. There can be no doubt that this terminology has added much to the inertia against which the advance of logical theory has worked. It would be interesting to see what would be the effect upon

logical theory of the substitution of an auditory or olfactory terminology for visual; or of a visual terminology revised to agree with modern scientific analysis of the *act* of vision as determined by its connections with other functions.

With the act of knowing stripped of its technique and left a bare, unique, indescribable act or relation, the foundations for epistemological and metaphysical logic were laid. That Greek logic escaped the ravages of epistemology was due to the saving materialism in its metaphysical conception of mind and to the steadfastness of the aristocratic régime. But when medieval theology and Cartesian metaphysics had destroyed the last remnant of metaphysical connection between the knowing mind and nature, and when revolutions had torn the individual from his social moorings, the stage for epistemological logic was fully set. I do not mean to identify the epistemological situation with the Cartesian disjunction. That disjunction was but the metaphysical expression of the one which constitutes the real foundation of epistemology – the disjunction, namely, between the act of knowing and other acts.

From this point logic has followed one of two general courses. It has sought continuity by attempting to reduce non-logical things and operations to terms of logical operations, i.e., to sensations or universals or both; or it has attempted to exclude entirely the act of knowing from logic and to transfer logical distinctions and operations, and even the attributes of truth and error to objects which, significantly enough, are still composed of these same hypostatized logical processes. The first course results in an epistemological logic of some form of the idealistic tradition, rationalism, sensationalism, or transcendentalism, depending upon whether universals, or sensations, or a combination of both, is made fundamental in the constitution of the object. The second course yields an epistemological logic of the realistic type, – again, sensational or rationalistic (mathematical), or a combination of the two – a sort of realistic transcendentalism. Each type has essentially the same difficulties with the processes of inference, with the problem of change, with truth and error, and, on the ethical side, with good and evil.

With the processes of knowing converted into objects, and with the act of knowing reduced to a unique and external relation between the despoiled knower and the objects made from its own hypostatized processes, all knowing becomes in the end immediate. All attempts at an inference that is anything more than an elaborated and often confused restatement of non-logical operations break down. The associational inference of empiricism, the subsumptive inference of rationalism, the transcendental inference of objective idealism, the analytical inference of neo-realism – all alike face the dilemma of an inference that is trifling or miraculous, tautologous or false. Where the knower and its object are so

constituted that the only relation in which the latter can stand to the former is that of presence or absence, and if to be present is to be known, how, as Plato asked, can there be any false knowing?

For those who accept the foregoing general diagnosis the prescription is obvious. The present task of logical theory is the restoration of the continuity of the act and agent of knowing with other acts and agents. But this is not to be done by merely furnishing the act of knowing with a body and a nervous system. If the nervous system be regarded as only an onlooking, beholding nervous system, if no connection be made between the logical operations of a nervous system and its other operations, a nervous system has no logical advantage over a purely psychical mind.

It was to be expected that this movement toward restoration of continuity made in the name of "instrumental" or "experimental" logic would be regarded, alike, by the logics of rationalism and empiricism, of idealism and of realism, as an attempt to rob intelligence of its own unique and proper character; to reduce it to a merely "psychological" and " existential" affair; to leave no place for genuine intellectual interest and activity; and to make science a series of more or less respectable adventures. The counter thesis is, that this restoration is truly a restoration – not a despoliation of the character and rights of intelligence; that only such a restoration can preserve the unique function of intelligence, can prevent it from becoming merely "existential," and can provide a distinct place for intellectual and scientific interest and activity. It does not, however, promise to remove the stigma of "adventure" from science. Every experiment is an adventure; and it is precisely the experimental character of scientific logic that distinguishes it from scholasticism, medieval or modern.

II

First it is clear that a reform of logic based upon the restoration of knowing to its connections with other acts will begin with a chapter containing an account of these other operations and the general character of this connection.[1] Logical theory has been truncated. It has tried to begin and end in the middle, with the result that it has ended in the air. Logic presents the curious anachronism of a science which attempts to deal with its subject-matter apart from what it comes from and what comes from it.

The objection that such a chapter on the conditions and genesis of the operations of knowing belongs to psychology, only shows how firmly

[1] Cf. *Studies in Logical Theory,* Chs. I and II, by Dewey; also "Epistemology and Mental States," Tufts, *Phil. Rev*., Vol. VI, which deserves to rank as one of the early documents of the "experimental" movement.

fixed is the discontinuity we are trying to escape. As we have seen, the original motive for leaving this account of genesis to psychology was that the act of knowing was supposed to originate in a purely psychical mind. Such an origin was of course embarrassing to logic, which aimed to be scientific. The old opposition between origin and validity was due to the kind of origin assumed and the kind of validity necessitated by the origin. One may well be excused for evading the question of how ideas, originated in a purely psychical mind, can, in Kant's phrase, "have objective validity," by throwing out the question of origin altogether. Whatever difficulties remain for validity after this expulsion could not be greater than those of the task of combining the objective validity of ideas with their subjective origin.

The whole of this chapter on the connection between logical and non-logical operations cannot be written here. But its central point would be that these other acts with which the act of knowing must have continuity are just the operations of our unreflective conduct. Note that it is "unreflective," not "unconscious," nor yet merely "instinctive " conduct. It is our perceptive, remembering, imagining, desiring, loving, hating conduct. Note also that we do not say "psychical" or "physical," nor "psycho-physical" conduct. These terms stand for certain distinctions in logical conduct,[2] and we are here concerned with the character of non-logical conduct which is to be distinguished from, and yet kept in closest continuity with, logical conduct.

If, here, the metaphysical logician should ask: "Are you not in this assumption of a world of reflective and unreflective conduct and affection, and of a world of beings in interaction, begging a whole system of metaphysics?" the reply is that if it is a metaphysics bad for logic, it will keep turning up in the course of logical theory as a constant source of trouble. On the other hand, if logic encounters grave difficulties when it attempts to get on without it, its assumption, for the purposes of logic, has all the justification possible.

Again it will be urged that this alleged non-logical conduct, in so far as it involves perception, memory, and anticipation, is already cognitive and logical; or if the act of knowing is to be entirely excluded from logic, then, in so far as what is left involves objective "terms and relations," it, also, is already logical. And it may be thought strange that a logic based upon the restoration of continuity between the act of knowing and other acts should here be insisting on distinction and separation. The point is fundamental; and must be disposed of before we go on. First, we must observe that the unity secured by making all conscious conduct logical turns out,

[2] Cf. "The Definition of the Psychical," G. H. Mead, *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago.*

on examination, to be more nominal than real. As we have already seen, this attempt at a complete logicizing of all conduct is forced at once to introduce the distinction of "explicit" and "implicit," of "conscious and unconscious" or "subconscious" logic. Some cynics have found that this suggests dividing triangles into explicit and implicit triangles, or into triangles and sub-triangles.

Doubtless the attempt to make all perceptions, memories, and anticipations, and even instincts and habits, into implicit or subconscious inference is an awkward effort to restore the continuity of logical and non-logical conduct. Its awkwardness consists in attempting to secure this continuity by the method of subsumptive identity, instead of finding it in a transitive continuity of function; – instead of seeing that perception, memory, and anticipation *become* logical processes when they are employed in a process of inquiry, whose purpose is to relieve the difficulties into which these operations in their function as direct stimuli have fallen. Logical conduct is constituted by the coöperation of these processes for the improvement, of their further operation. To regard perception, memory, and imagination as implicit forms or as sub-species of logical operation is much like conceiving the movements of our fingers and arms as implicit or imperfect species of painting, or swimming.

Moreover, this doctrine of universal logicism teaches that when that which is perfect is come, imperfection shall be done away. This should mean that when painting becomes completely "explicit" and perfect, fingers and hands shall disappear. Perfect painting will be the pure essence of painting. And this interpretation is not strained; for this logic expressly teaches that in the perfected real system all temporal elements are unessential to logical operations. They are, of course, *psychologically* necessary for finite beings, who can never have perfectly logical experiences. But, from the standpoint of a completely logicized experience, all finite, temporal processes are accidents, not essentials, of logical operations.

The fact that the processes of perception, memory, and anticipation are transformed in their logical operation into sensations and universals, terms, and relations, and, as such, become the subject-matter of logical theory, does not mean that they have lost their mediating character, and have become merely objects of logical contemplation at large. Sensations or sense-data, and ideas, terms and relations, are the subject-matter of logical theory for the reason that they sometimes succeed and sometimes fail in their logical operations. And it is the business of logical theory to diagnose the conditions of this success and failure. If, in writing, my pen becomes defective and is made an object of inquiry, it does not therefore lose all its character as a pen and become merely an object at large. It is *as* an instrument of writing that it is investigated. So, sense-data,

universals, terms, and relations as subject-matter of logic are investigated in their character *as* mediators of the ambiguities and conflicts, of non-logical experience.

If the operations of habit, instinct, perceptions, memory, and anticipation *become* logical, when, instead of operating as direct stimuli, they are employed in a process of inquiry, we must next ask: (1) under what conditions do they pass over into this process of inquiry? (2) what modifcations of operation do they undergo, what new forms do they take, and what new results do they produce in their logical operations?

If the act of inquiry be not superimposed, it must arise out of some specific condition in the course of non-logical conduct. Once more, if the alarm be sounded at this proposal to find the origin of logical in non-logical operations it must be summarily answered by asking if the one who raises the cry finds it impossible to imagine that one who is not hungry, or angry, or patriotic, or wise may become so. Non-logical conduct is not the abstract formal contradictory of logical conduct any more than present satiety or foolishness is the contradictory of later hunger or wisdom, or than anger at one person contradicts cordiality to another, or to the same person, later. The old bogie of the logical irrelevance of origin was due to the inability to conceive continuity except in the form of identity in which there was no place for the notion of *growth*.

The conditions under which non-logical conduct *becomes* logical are familiar to those who have followed the doctrines of experimental logic as expounded in the discussions of the past few years. The transformation begins at the point where non-logical processes instead of operating as direct unambiguous stimuli and response become ambiguous with consequent inhibition of conduct. But again this does not mean that at this juncture the non-logical processes quit the field and give place to a totally new faculty and process called reason. They stay on the job. But there is a change in the job, which now is to get rid of this ambiguity. This modification of the task requires, of course, corresponding modification and adaptation of these operations. They take on the form of sensations and universals, terms and relations, data and hypotheses. This modification of function and form constitutes "reason" or, better, reason*ing*.

Here some one will ask, "Whence comes this ambiguity? How can a mere perception or memory as such be ambiguous? Must it not be ambiguous to, or for, something, or some one?" The point is well taken. But it should not be taken to imply that the ambiguity is for a merely onlooking, beholding psychical mind – especially when the perception is itself regarded as an act of beholding. Nor are we any better off if we suppose the beholding mind to be equipped with a faculty of reason in the form of the principle of "contradiction." For this throws no light on the origin and meaning of ambiguity. And if we seek to make all perceptions

as such ambiguous and contradictory, in order to make room for, and justify, the operations of reason, other difficulties at once beset us. When we attempt to remove this specific ambiguity of perceptive conduct we shall be forced, before we are through, to appeal back to perception, which we have condemned as inherently contradictory, both for data and for verification.

However, the insistence that perception must be ambiguous to, or for, something beyond itself is well grounded. And this was recognized in the statement that it is equivocal as a stimulus in conduct. There need be no mystery as to how such equivocation arises. That there is such a thing as a conduct at all means that there are certain beings who have acquired definite ways of responding to one another. It is important to observe that these forms of interaction – instinct and habit, perception, memory, etc. – are not to be located in either of the interacting beings but are functions of both. The conception of these operations as the private functions of an organism is the forerunner of the epistemological predicament. It results in a conception of knowing as wholly the act of a knower apart from the known. This is the beginning of epistemology.

But to whatever extent interacting beings have acquired definite and specific ways of behavior toward one another it is equally plain – the theory of external relations notwithstanding – that in this process of interaction these ways of behavior, of stimulus and response, undergo modification. If the world consisted of two interacting beings, it is conceivable that the modifications of behavior might occur in such close continuity of relation to each of the interacting beings that the adjustment would be very continuous, and there might be little or no ambiguity and conflict. But in a world where any two interacting beings have innumerable interactions, with innumerable other beings and in all these interactions modifications are effected, it is to be expected that changes in the behavior of each or both will occur, so marked that they are bound to result in breaks in the continuity of stimulus and response – even to the point of tragedy. However, the tragedy is seldom so great that the ambiguity extends to the whole field of conduct. Except in extreme pathological cases (and in epistemology), complete skepticism and aboulia do not occur. Ambiguity always falls within a field or direction of conduct, and though it may extend much further, and must extend some further than the point at which equivocation occurs, yet it is never ubiquitous. An ambiguity concerning the action of gravitation is no less specific than one regarding color or sound; indeed, the one may be found to involve the other.

Logical conduct is, then, conduct which aims to remove ambiguity and inhibition in unreflective conduct. The instruments of its operation are forged from the processes of unreflective conduct by such modification

and adaptation as is required to enable them to accomplish this end. Since these logical operations sometimes fail and sometimes succeed they become the subject-matter of logical theory. But the technique of this second involution of reflection is not supplied by some new and unique entity. It also is derived from modifications of previous operations of both reflective and non-reflective conduct.

While emphasizing the continuity between non-logical and logical operations, we must keep in mind that their distinction is of equal importance. Confusion at this point is fatal. A case in point is the confusion between non-logical and logical observation. The results of non-logical observation, e.g., looking and listening, are direct stimuli to further conduct. But the purpose and result of *logical* observation are to secure data, not as direct stimuli to immediate conduct but as stimuli to the construction or verification of hypotheses which are the responses of the *logical* operation of imagination to the data. Hypotheses are anticipatory. But they differ from non-logical anticipation in that they are tentatively, experimentally, i.e., logically anticipatory. The non-logical operations of memory and anticipation lack just this tentative, experimental character. When we confuse the logical and non-logical operations of these processes the result is either that logical processes will merely repeat non-logical operations in which case we have inference that is tautologous and trifling; or the non-logical will attempt to perform logical operations, and our inference is miraculous. If we seek to escape by an appeal to habit, as in empiricism, or to an objective universal, as in idealism and neo-realism, we are merely disguising, not removing the miracle.

It may be thought that this confusion would be most likely to occur in a theory which teaches that non-logical processes are carried over into logical operations. But this overlooks the fact that the theory recognizes at the same time that these non-logical operations undergo modification and adaptation to the demands of the logical enterprise. On the other hand, those who make all perceptions, memory, and anticipation, not to speak of habit and instinct, logical, have no basis for the distinction between logical and non-logical results; while those who refuse to give the operations of perception, memory, etc., any place in logic can make no connections between logical and non-logical conduct. Nor are they able to distinguish in a specific case truth from error.

In all logics that fail to make this connection and distinction between logical and non-logical operations there is no criterion for data. If ultimate simplicity is demanded of the data, there is no standard for simplicity except the *minimum sensible* or the *minimum intelligible* which have recently been resurrected. On the other hand, where simplicity is waived, as in the logic of objective idealism, there is still no criterion of logical adequacy. But if we understand by *logical* data not anything that

happens to be given, but. something *sought* as material for an hypothesis, i.e., a proposed solution (proposition) of an ambiguous object of conduct and affection, then whatever results of observation meet this requirement are logical data. And whenever data are found from which an hypothesis is constructed that succeeds in abolishing the ambiguity, they are simple, adequate, and true data.

No scientist, not even the mathematician, in the specific investigations of his field, seeks for ultimate and irreducible data at large. And if he found them he could not use them. It is only in his metaphysical personality that he longs for such data. The data which the scientist in any specific inquiry seeks are the data which suggest a solution of the question in which the investigation starts. When these data are found they are the "irreducibles" of that problem. But they are relative to the question and answer of the investigation. Their simplicity consists in the fact that they are the data from which a conclusion can be made. The term "simple data" is tautologous. That one is in need of data more "simple" means that one is in need of new data from which an hypothesis can be formed.

It is true that the actual working elements with which the scientist operates are always complex in the sense that they are always something more than elements in any specific investigation. They have other connections and alliances. And this complexity is at once the despair and the hope of the scientist; his despair, because he cannot be sure when these other connections will interfere with the allegiance of his elements to his particular undertaking; his hope, because when these alliances are revealed they often make the elements more efficient or exhibit capacities which will make them elements in some other undertaking for which elements have not been found. A general resolves his army into so many marching, eating, shooting units; but these elements are something more than marching, shooting units. They are husbands and fathers, brothers and lovers, protestants and catholics, artists and artisans, etc. And the militarist can never be sure at what point these other activities – I do not say merely external relationships – may upset his calculations. If he could find units whose whole and sole nature is to march and shoot, his problem would be, in some respects, simpler, though in others more complex. As it is, he is constantly required to ask how far these other functions will support and at what point they will rebel at the marching and shooting.

Such, in principle, is the situation in every scientific inquiry. When the failure of the old elements occurs it is common to say that "simpler" elements are needed. And doubtless in his perplexity the scientist may long for elements which have no entangling alliances, whose sole nature and character is to be elements. But what in fact he actually seeks in every specific investigation are elements whose nature and functions *will not interfere* with their serving as units in the enterprise in hand. But from

some other standpoint these new elements may be vastly more complex than the old, as is the case with the modern as compared with the ancient atom. When the elements are secured which operate successfully, the non-interfering connections can be ignored and the elements can be treated as if they did not have them, – as if they were metaphysically simple. But there is no criterion for metaphysical simplicity except operative simplicity. To be simple is to serve as an element, and to serve as an element is to be simple.

It is scarcely necessary in view of the foregoing to add that the data of science are not "sense-data," if by sense-data be meant data which are the result of the operations of sense organs alone. Data are as much or more the result of operations, first, of the motor system of the scientist's own organism, and second, of all of the machinery of his laboratory which he calls to his aid. Whether named after the way they are obtained, or after the way they are used, data are quite as much "motor" as "sense." Nor, on the other hand, are there any purely intellectual data – not even for the mathematician. Some mathematicians may insist that their symbols and diagrams are merely stimuli to the platonic operation of pure and given universals. But until mathematics can get on without these symbols or any substitutes the intuitionist in mathematics will continue to have his say.

Wherever the discontinuity between logical operations and their acts persists, all the difficulties with data have their correlative difficulties with hypotheses. In Mill's logic the account of the origin of hypotheses oscillates between the view that they are happy guesses of a mind composed of states of consciousness, and the view that they are "found in the facts" or are "impressed on the mind by the facts." The miracle of relevancy required in the first position drives the theory to the second. And the tautologous, useless nature of the hypothesis in the second forces the theory back to the first view. In this predicament, little wonder Mill finds that the easiest way out is to make hypotheses "auxiliary" and not indigenous to inference. But this exclusion of hypotheses as essential leaves his account of inference to oscillate between the association of particulars of nominalism and scholastic formalism, from both of which Mill, with the dignified zeal of a prophet, set out to rescue logic.

Mill's rejection of hypotheses formed by a mind whose operations have no discoverable continuity with the operations of things, or by things whose actions are independent of the operations of ideas, is forever sound. But his acceptance of the discontinuity between the acts of knowing and the operation of things, and the conclusion that these two conceptions of the origin and nature of hypotheses are the only alternatives, were the source of most of his difficulties.

III

The efforts of classic empiricism at the reform of logic have long been an easy mark for idealistic reformers. But it is interesting to observe that the idealistic logic from the beginning finds itself in precisely the same predicament regarding hypotheses; – they are trifling or false. And in the end they are made, as in Mill, "accidents" of inference.

The part played by Kant's sense-material and the categories is almost the reverse of those of data and hypothesis in science. Sense material and the categories are the given elements from which objects are somehow made; in scientific procedure data and hypothesis are derived through logical observation and imagination from the content and operations of immediate experience. In Kant's account of the process by which objects are constructed we are nowhere in sight of any experimental procedure. Indeed, the real act of knowing, the selection and application of the category to the sense matter, is, as Kant in the end had to confess, "hidden away in the depths of the soul." Made in the presence of the elaborate machinery of knowing which Kant had constructed, this confession is almost tragic; and the tragic aspect grows when we find that the result of the "hidden" operation is merely a phenomenal object. That this should be the case, however, is not strange. A phenomenal object is the inevitable correlate of the "hidden" act of knowing whether in a "transcendental" or in an "empirical" logic. In vain do we call the act of knowing "constructive" and "synthetic" if its method of synthesis is hidden. A transcendental unity whose method is indefinable has no advantage over empirical association.

It was the dream of Kant as of Mill to replace the logics of sensationalism and rationalism with a "logic of things" and of "truth." But as Mill's things turned to states of consciousness, so Kant's are phenomenal. Their common fate proclaims their common failure – the failure to reestablish continuity between the conduct of intelligence and other conduct.

One of the chief counts in Hegel's indictment of Kant's logic is that "it had no influence on the methods of science."[3] Hegel's explanation is that Kant's categories have no genesis; they are not constructed in and as part of logical operations. As given, ready-made, their relevance is a miracle. But if categories be "generated" in the process of knowing, says Hegel, they are indigenous, and their fitness is inevitable. In such statements Hegel raises expectations that we are at last to have a logic which squares with the procedure of science. But when we discover that instead of being "generated" out of all the material involved in the scientific problem Hegel's categories are derived from each other, misgivings arise. And

[3] Cf. *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. Wallace, p. 117.

when we further learn that this "genesis" is timeless, which means that, after all, the categories stand related to each other in a closed, eternal system of implication, we abandon hope of a scientific – i.e., experimental – logic.

Hegel also says it is the business of philosophy "to substitute categories or in more precise language adequate notions for the several modes of feeling, perception, desire, and will." The word "substitute" reveals the point at issue. If "to substitute" means that philosophy is a complete exchange of the modes of feeling, perception, desire, and will for a world of categories or notions, then, saying nothing of the range of values in such a world, the problem of the meaning of "adequate" is on our hands. What is the notion to be adequate to? But if "to substitute" means that the modes of feeling, perception, desire, and will, when in a specific situation of ambiguity and inhibition, go over into, take on, the modes of data and hypothesis in the effort to get rid of inhibiting conflict that is quite another matter. Here the "notion," as the scientific hypothesis, has a criterion for its adequacy. But if the notion usurps the place of feeling, perception, desire, and will, as many find, in the end, it does in Hegel's logic, it thereby loses all tests for the adequacy of its function and character as a notion.

In the development of the logical doctrines of Kant and Hegel by Lotze, Green, Sigwart, Bradley, Bosanquet, Royce, and others, there are indeed differences. But these differences only throw their common ground into bolder relief. This common ground is that, procedure by hypotheses, by induction, is, in the language of Professor Bosanquet, "a transient and external characteristic of inference."[4] And the ground of this verdict is essentially the same as Mill's, when he rejects hypotheses "made by the mind," namely, that such hypotheses are too subjective in their origin and nature to have objective validity. "Objective" idealism is trying, like Mill, to escape the subjectivism of the purely individual and "psychical" knower. But, being unable to reconstruct the finite knower, and being too sophisticated to make what it regards as Mill's naïve appeal to "hypotheses found in things," it transfers the real process of inference to the "objective universal," and the process of all thought, including inference, is now defined as *"the reproduction, by a universal presented in a content, of contents distinguished from the presented content which also are differences of the same universal."*[5]

It need scarcely be said that in inference thus defined there is scant room for hypotheses. There is nothing "hypothetical," "experimental," or

[4] *Bosanquet's Logic*, 2nd Ed., p. 171. The identification of induction and procedure by hypothesis occurs on p. 156.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 14 (italics mine).

"tentative" in this process of reproduction by the objective universal as such. As little is there any possibility of error. If there is anything hypothetical, or any possibility of error, in inference, it is due to the temporal, finite human being in which, paradoxically enough, this process of "reproduction" goes on and to whom, at times, is given an "infinitesimal" part in the operation, while at other times he is said merely to "witness" it. But the real inference does not "proceed by hypotheses"; it is only the finite mind in witnessing the real logical spectacle or in its "infinitesimal" contribution to it that lamely proceeds in this manner.

Here, again, we have the same break in continuity between the finite, human act of knowing and the operations that constitute the real world. When the logic of the objective universal rejects imputations of harboring a despoiled psychical knower it has in mind, of course, the objective universal as knower, not the finite, human act. But, if the participations of the latter are all accidents of inference, as they are said to be, its advantage over a purely psychical knower, or "states of consciousness," is difficult to see. The rejection of metaphysical dualism is of no consequence if the logical operations of the finite, human being are only "accidents" of the real logical process. As already remarked, the metaphysical disjunction is merely a schematism of the more fundamental, logical disjunction.

As for tautology and miracle, the follower of Mill might well ask: how an association of particulars, whether mental states or things, could be more tautologous than a universal reproducing its own differences? And if the transition from particular to particular is a miracle in which the grace of God is disguised as "habit," why is not habit as good a disguise for Providence as universals? Moreover, by what miracle does the one all-inclusive universal become *a* universal? And since perception always presents a number of universals, what determines which one shall perform the reproduction? Finally, since there are infinite differences of the universal that might be reproduced, what determines just which differences shall be reproduced? In this wise the controversy has gone on ever since the challenge of the old rationalistic logic by the nominalists launched the issue of empiricism and rationalism. All the charges which each makes against the other are easily retorted upon itself. Each side is resistless in attack, but helpless in defense.

In a conception of inference in which both data and hypothesis are regarded as the tentative, experimental results of the processes of perception, memory, and constructive imagination engaged in the special task of removing conflict, ambiguity, and inhibition, and in which these processes are not conceived as the functions of a private mind nor of an equally private brain and nervous system, but as functions of interacting beings, – in such a conception there is no ground for anxiety concerning the simplicity of data, nor the objectivity of hypotheses. Simplicity and

objectivity do not have to be secured through elaborate and labored metaphysical construction. The data are simple and the hypothesis objective in so far as they accomplish the work whereunto they are called – the removal of conflict, ambiguity, and inhibition in conduct and affection.

In the experimental conception of inference it is clear that the principles of formal logic must play their rôle wholly inside the course of logical operations. They do not apply to relations *between* these operations and "reality"; nor to "reality" itself. Formal identity and non-contradiction signify, in experimental logic, the complete correlativity of data and hypothesis. They mean that *in* the logical procedure data must not be shifted without a corresponding change in the hypothesis and conversely. The doctrine that "theoretically" there may be any number of hypotheses for "the same facts" is, when these multiple hypotheses are anything more than different names or symbols, nothing less than the very essence of formal contradiction. It doubtless makes little difference whether a disease be attributed to big or little, black or red, demons or whether the cause be represented by a, b, or c, etc. But where data and hypotheses are such as are capable of verification, i.e., of mutually checking up each other, a change in one without a corresponding modification of the other is the principle of all formal fallacies.[6]

With this conception of the origin, nature, and functions of logical operations little remains to be said of their truth and falsity. If the whole enterprise of logical operation, of the construction and verification of hypothesis, is in the interest of the removal of ambiguity, and inhibition in conduct, the only relevant truth or falsity they can possess must be determined by their success or failure in that undertaking. The acceptance of this view of truth and error, be it said again, depends on holding steadfastly to the conception of the operations of knowing as *real acts*, which, though having a distinct character and function, are yet in closest continuity with other acts of which indeed they are but modifications and adaptations in order to meet the logical demand.

Here, perhaps, is the place for a word on truth and satisfaction. The satisfaction which marks the truth of logical operations – "intellectual satisfaction" – is the satisfaction which attends the accomplishment of their task, viz., the removal of ambiguity in conduct, i.e., in our interaction with other beings. It does not mean that this satisfaction is bound to be followed by wholly blissful consequences. All our troubles are not

[6] Perhaps the most complete exhibition of the breakdown of formal logic considered as an account of the operation of thought apart from its subject-matter is to be found in Schiller's *Formal Logic*.

over when the distress of ambiguity is removed. It may be indeed that the verdict of the logical operation is that we must face certain death. Very well, we must have felt it to be "good to know the worst," or no inquiry would have been started. We should have deemed ignorance bliss and sat with closed eyes waiting for fate to overtake us instead of going forward to meet it and in some measure determine it. Death anticipated and accepted is *realiter* very different from death that falls upon us unawares, however we may estimate that difference. If this distinction in the *foci* of satisfaction is kept clear it must do away with a large amount of the hedonistic interpretations of satisfaction in which many critics have indulged.

But hereupon some one may exclaim, as did a colleague recently: "Welcome to the ranks of the intellectualists!" If so, the experimentalist is bound to reply that he is as willing, and as unwilling, to be welcomed to the ranks of intellectualism as to those of anti-intellectualism. He wonders, however, how long the welcome would last in either. Among the intellectualists the welcome would begin to cool as soon as it should be discovered that the ambiguity to which logical operations are the response is not regarded by the experimentalist as a purely intellectual affair. It is an ambiguity in conduct with all the attendant affectional values that may be at stake.[7] It is, to be sure, the fact of ambiguity, and the effort to resolve it, that adds the intellectual, logical character to conduct and to affectional values. But if the logical interest attempts entirely to detach itself it will soon be without either subject-matter or criterion. And if it sets itself up as supreme, we shall be forced to say that our quandaries of affection, our problems of life and death are merely to furnish occasions and material for logical operations.

On the other hand, the welcome of the anti-intellectualists is equally sure to wane when the experimentalist asserts that the doctrine that logical operations mutilate the wholeness of immediate experience overlooks the palpable fact that it is precisely these immediate experiences – the experiences of intuition and instinct – that get into conflict and inhibit and mutilate one another, and as a consequence are obliged to go into logical session to patch up the mutilation and provide new and better methods of coöperation.

At this point the weakness in Bergson's view of logical operations appears. Bergson, too, is impressed by the break in continuity between logical operations and the rest of experience. But with Mr. Bradley he believes this breach to be essentially incurable, because the mutilations and disjunctions are due to and introduced by logical operations. Just why the latter are introduced remains in the end a mystery. Both, to be

[7] Cf. Stuart on "Valuation as a Logical Process" in *Studies in Logical Theory.*

sure, believe that logical operations are valuable for "practical" purposes, – for action. But, aside from the question of *how* operations essentially mutilative can be valuable for action, immediate intuitional experience being already in unity with Reality, why should there be any practical need for logical operations – least of all such as introduce disjunction and mutilation? The admission of a demand for logical operations, whether charged to matter, the devil, or any other metaphysical adversary, is, of course, a confession that conflict and ambiguity are as fundamental in experience as unity and immediacy and that logical operations are therefore no less indigenous. The failure to see this implication is responsible for the paradox that in the logic of Creative Evolution the operations of intelligence are neither creative nor evolutional. They not only have no constructive part but are positively destructive and devolutional.

Since, moreover, these logical operations, like those of the objective universal, and like Mill's association of particulars, can only reproduce in fragmentary form what has already been done, it is difficult to see how they can meet the demands of action. For here no more than in Mill, or in the logic of idealism, is there any place for constructive hypotheses or any technique by which they can become effective. Whatever "Creative Evolution" may be, there is no place in its logic for "Creative Intelligence."

IV

The prominence in current discussion of the logical reforms proposed by the "analytic logic" of the neorealistic movement and the enthusiastic optimism of its representatives over the prospective results of these reforms for logic, science, and practical life are the warrant for devoting a special section to their discussion.

There are indeed some marked differences of opinion among the expounders of the "new logic" concerning the results which it is expected to achieve. Some find that it clears away incredible accumulations of metaphysical lumber; others rejoice that it is to restore metaphysics, "once the queen of the sciences, to her ancient throne."

But whatever the difference among the representatives of analytical logic all seem agreed at the outset on two fundamental reforms which the "new logic" makes. These are: first, that analytic logic gets rid entirely of the *act* of knowing, the retention of which has been the bane of all other logics; second, in its discovery of "terms and relations," "sense-data and universals" as the simple elements not only of logic but of the world, it furnishes science at last with the simple neutral elements at large which it is supposed science so long has sought, and "mourned because it found them not."

Taking these in order, we are told that "realism frees logic as a study of

objective fact from all accounts of the states and operations of mind." … "Logic and mathematics are sciences which can be pursued quite independently of the study of knowing." "The new logic believes that it deals with no such entities as thoughts, ideas, or minds, but with entities that merely are."[8]

The motive for the banishment of the act of knowing from logic is that as an *act* knowing is "mental," "psychological," and "subjective."[9] All other logics have indeed realized this subjective character of the *act* of knowing, but have neither dared completely to discard it nor been able sufficiently to counteract its effects even with such agencies as the objective universal to prevent it from infecting logic with its subjectivity. Because logic has tolerated and attempted to compromise with this subjective act of knowing, say these reformers, it has been forced constantly into epistemology and has become a hybrid science. Had logic possessed the courage long ago to throw overboard this subjective Jonah it would have been spared the storms of epistemology and the reefs of metaphysics.

Analytic logic is the first attempt in the history of modern logical theory at a deliberate, sophisticated exclusion of the act of knowing from logic. Other logics, to be sure, have tried to neutralize the effects of its presence, but none has had the temerity to cast it bodily overboard. The experiment, therefore, is highly interesting.

We should note at the outset that in regarding the act of knowing as incurably "psychical" and "subjective" analytic logic accepts a fundamental premise of the logics of rationalism, empiricism, and idealism which it seeks to reform. It is true that it is the bold proposal of analytic logic to keep logic out of the pit of epistemology by excluding the act of knowing from logic. Nevertheless analytic logic still accepts the subjective character of this act; and if it excludes it from its logic it welcomes it in its psychology. This is a dangerous situation. Can the analytic logician prevent all osmosis between his logic and his psychology?[10] If not, and if the psychological act is subjective, woe then to his logic. Had the new logic begun with a bold challenge of the psychical character of the act of knowing, the prospect of a logic free from epistemology would have been much brighter.

With the desire to rid logic of the epistemological taint the "experi-

[8] *The New Realism*, pp. 40-41.

[9] Cf. Montague, pp. *256–57;* also Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 27-65-66, *et passim*; and Holt's *Concept of Consciousness*, pp. 14ff., discussed below.

[10] Cf. Angell, "Relations of Psychology to Philosophy," *Decennial Publications of University of Chicago*, Vol. III; also Castro, "The Respective Standpoints of Psychology and Logic," *Philosophic Studies, University of Chicago,* No. 4.

mental logic" of the pragmatic movement has the strongest sympathy. But the proposal to effect this by the excision of the act of knowing appears to experimental logic to be a case of heroic but fatal surgery. *Prima facie* a logic with no act of knowing presents an uncanny appearance. What sort of logical operations are possible in such a logic and of what kind of truth and falsity are they capable?

Before taking up these questions in detail it is worth while to note the character of the entities that "merely are" with which analytic logic proposes exclusively to deal. In their general form they are "terms" and "propositions," "sense-data" and universals. We are struck at once by the fact that these entities bear the names of logical operations. They are, to be sure, disguised as entities and have been baptised in a highly dilute solution of objectivity called "subsistence." But this does not conceal their origin, nor does it obscure the fact that if it is possible for any entities that "merely are" to have logical character those made from hypostatized processes of logical operations should be the most promising. They might be expected to retain some vestiges of logical character even after they have been torn from the process of inquiry and converted into "entities that merely are." Also it is not surprising that having stripped the act of knowing of its constituent operations analytic logic should feel that it can well dispense with the empty shell called "mind" and, as Professor Dewey says, "wish it on psychology." But if the analytic logician be also a philosopher and perchance a lover of his fellow-man, it is hard to see how he can have a good conscience over this disposition of the case.

Turning now to the character of inference and of truth and falsity which are possible in a logic which excludes the operation of knowing and deals only with "entities that are," all the expounders seem to agree that in such a logic inference must be purely deductive. All alleged induction is either disguised deduction or a lucky guess. This raises apprehension at the start concerning the value of analytic logic for other sciences. But let us observe what deduction in analytic logic is.

We begin at once with a distinction which involves the whole issue.[11] We are asked to carefully distinguish "logical" deduction from "psychological" deduction. The latter is the vulgar meaning of the term, and is "the thinker's name for his own act of conforming his thought" to the objective and independent processes that constitute the real logical process. This act of conforming the mind is a purely "psychological" affair. It has no logical function whatever. In what the "conforming" consists is not clear. It seems to be merely the act of turning the "psychological" eye on the objective logical process. "One beholds it (the logical

[11] I am here following, in the main, Professor Holt because he alone appears to have had the courage to develop the full consequences of the premises of analytic logic.

process) as one beholds a star, a river, a character in a play… . The novelist and the dramatist, like the mathematician and logician, are onlookers at the logical spectacle."[12] On the other hand, the term "conforming" suggests a task, with the possibilities of success and failure. Have we, then, two wholly independent possibilities of error – one merely "psychological," the other "logical"? The same point may be made even more obviously with reference to the term "beholding." The term is used as if beholding were a perfectly simple act, having no problems and no possibilities of mistakes – as if there could be no mis-beholding.[13]

But fixing our psychological eye on the "logical spectacle," what does it behold? A universal generating an infinite series of identical instances of itself – i.e., instances which differ only in "logical position." If in a world of entities that "merely are" the term "generation" causes perplexity, the tension is soon relieved; for this turns out to be a merely subsistential nontemporal generation which, like Hegel's generation of the categories, in no way compromises a world of entities that "merely are."

Steering clear of the thicket of metaphysical problems that we here encounter, let us keep to the logical trail. First it is clear that logical operations are of the same reproductive repetitive type that we have found in the associational logic of empiricism, and in the logic of the objective universal. Indeed, after objective idealism has conceded that the finite mind merely "witnesses" or at most contributes only in an "infinitesimal" degree to the logical activity of the objective universal, what remains of the supposed gulf between absolute idealism and analytic realism?

It follows, of course, that there can be no place in analytic logic for "procedure by hypotheses." However, it is to the credit of some analytic logicians that they see this and frankly accept the situation instead of attempting to retain hypotheses by making them" accidents" or mere "auxiliaries" of inference. On the other hand, others find that the chief glory of analytic logic is precisely that it "gives thought wings"[14] for the free construction of hypotheses. In his lectures on "Scientific Methods in Philosophy" Mr. Russell calls some of the most elemental and sacred entities of analytic logic "convenient fictions." This retention of

[12] *The Concept of Consciousness*, pp. 14-15.

[13] It is interesting to compare this onlooking act with the account of consciousness further on. As "psychological" this act of onlooking must be an act of consciousness. But consciousness is a cross-section or a projection of things made by their interaction with a nervous system. Here consciousness is a function of all the interacting factors. It is in the play. It *is* the play. It is not in a spectator's box. How can consciousness be a function of all the things put into the cross-section and yet be a mere beholder of the process? Moreover, what is it that makes any particular, spectacle, or cross-section "logical"? If it be said all are "logical" what significance has the term?

[14] Cf. Russell's *Scientific Methods in Philosophy*, p. 59.

hypotheses at the cost of cogency is of course in order to avoid a break with science. Those who see that there is no place in analytic logic for hypotheses are equally anxious to preserve their connections with science. Hence they boldly challenge the "superstition" that science has anything to do with hypotheses. Newton's *"Hypotheses non fingo"* should be the motto of every conscientious scientist who dares "trust his own perceptions and disregard the ukase of idealism." "The theory of mental construction is the child of idealism, now put out to service for the support of its parents." "Theory is no longer regarded in science as an hypothesis added to the observed facts," but a law which is "found in the facts."[15] The identity of this with Mill's doctrine of hypotheses as "found in things" is obvious.

As against the conception of hypotheses as "free," "winged," constructions of a psychical, beholding, gossiping mind we may well take our stand with those who would exclude such hypotheses from science. And this doubtless was the sort of mind and sort of hypotheses Newton meant when he said *"Hypotheses non fingo."*[16] But had Newton's mind really been of the character which he, as a physicist, had learned from philosophers to suppose it to be, and had he really waited to find his hypotheses ready-made in the facts, there never would have been any dispute about who discovered the calculus, and we should never have been interested in what Newton said about hypotheses or anything else. What Newton did is a much better source of information on the part hypotheses play in scientific method than what he said about them. The former speaks for itself; the latter is the pious repetition of a metaphysical creed made necessary by the very separation of mind from things expressed in the statement quoted.

Logically there is little to choose between hypotheses found ready-made in the facts and those which are the "winged" constructions of a purely psychical mind. Both are equally useless in logic and in science. One makes logic and science "trifling," the other makes them "miraculous." But if hypotheses be conceived not as the output of a cloistered psychical entity but as the joint product of all the beings and operations involved in the specific situation in which logical inquiry originates, and more particularly in all those involved in the operations of the inquiry itself (including all the experimental material and apparatus which the inquiry may require), we shall have sufficient continuity between hypotheses and

[15] Holt, *op. cit.*, pp. 128–30.

[16] In fact, Newton, in all probability, had the Cartesian pure notions in mind.

[17] Holt, *op. cit.*, p. 118 (italics mine). Cf. also Perry's *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 108 and 311.

things to do away with miracle, and sufficient reconstruction to avoid inference that is trifling.

It is, however, the second contribution of analytic logic that is the basis of the enthusiasm over its prospective value for other sciences. This is the discovery that terms and propositions, sense-data, and universals, are not only elements of logical operation but are the simple, neutral elements at large which science is supposed to have been seeking. "As the botanist analyzes the structures of the vegetable organism and finds chemical compounds of which they are built so the ordinary chemist analyzes these compounds into their elements, but does not analyze these. The physical chemist analyzes these elemental atoms, as now appears, into minuter components *which he in turn must leave to the mathematicians and logicians further to analyze*."[17]

Again it is worth noting that this mutation of logical into ontological elements seems to differ only "in position" from the universal logicism of absolute idealism.

What are these simple elements into which the mathematician and logician are to analyze the crude elements of the laboratory? And how are these elements to be put into operation in the laboratory? Let us picture an analytic logician meeting a physical scientist at a moment when the latter is distressed over the unmanageable complexity of his elements. Will the logician say to the scientist: "Your difficulty is that you are trusting too much to your mundane apparatus. The kingdom of truth cometh not with such things. Forsake your microscopes, test tubes, refractors and resonators, and follow me, and you shall behold the truly simple elements of which you have dreamed."? And when the moment of revelation arrives and the expectant scientist is solemnly told that the "simple elements" which he has sought so long are "terms and propositions," sense-data and universals, is it surprising that he does not seem impressed? Will he not ask: "What am I to do with these in the specific difficulties of my laboratory? Shall I say to the crude and complex elements of my laboratory operations: 'Be ye resolved into terms and propositions, sense-data and universals'; and will they forthwith obey this incantation and fall apart so that I may locate and remove the hidden source of my difficulty? Are you not mocking me and deceiving yourself with the old ontological argument? Your 'simple' elements – are they anything but the hypostatized process by which elements may be found?"[18]

The expounders as well as the critics of analytic logic have agreed that it reaches its most critical junction when it faces the problem of truth and

[18] The character of elements and the nature of simplicity have been discussed in the preceeding section.

error. There is no doubt that the logic of objective idealism, in other respects so similar to analytic logic, has at this point an advantage; for it retains just enough of the finite operation of knowing – an "infinitesimal" part will answer – to furnish the culture germs of error. But analytic logic having completely sterilized itself against this source of infection is in serious difficulty.

Here again it is Professor Holt who has the courage to follow – or shall we say "behold"? – his theory as it "generates" the doctrine that error is a given objective opposition of forces entirely independent of any such thing as a process of inquiry and all that such a process presupposes. "All collisions between bodies, all inference between energies, all process of warming and cooling, of starting and stopping, of combining and separating, all counterbalancings, as in cantilevers and gothic vaultings, are contradictory forces which can be stated only in propositions that manifestly contradict each other."[19] But the argument proves too much. For in the world of forces to which we have here appealed there is no force which is not opposed by others and no particle which is not the center of opposing forces. Hence error is ubiquitous. In making error objective we have made all objectivity erroneous. We find ourselves obliged to say that the choir of Westminster Abbey, the Brooklyn bridge, the heads on our shoulders are all supported by logical errors!

Following these illustrations of ontological contradictions there is indeed this interesting statement: "Nature is so full of these mutually negative processes that we are moved to admiration when a few forces cooperate long enough to form what we call an organism."[20] The implication is, apparently, that as an "opposition" of forces is error, "coöperation" of forces is truth. But what is to distinguish "opposition" from "coöperation"? In the illustration it is clear that opposing forces – error – do not interfere with coöperative forces – truth. Where should we find more counterbalancing, more starting and stopping, warming and cooling, combining and separating than in an organism? And if these processes can be stated only in propositions that are "manifestly contradictory," are we to understand that truth has errors for its constituent elements? Such paradoxes have always delighted the soul of absolute idealism. But, as we have seen, only the veil of an infinitesimal finitude intervenes between the logic of the objective universal of absolute idealism and the objective logic of analytic realism.

It is, of course, this predicament regarding objective truth and error that has driven most analytic logicians to recall the exiled psychological,

[19] *Ibid*., p. *275*.

[20] *Ibid*., p. *275*.

"mental" act of knowing. It had to be recalled to provide some basis of distinction between truth and error, but, this act having already been conceived as incurably "subjective," the result is only an exchange of dilemmas. For the reinstatement of this act *ipso facto* reinstates the epistemological predicament to get rid of which it was first banished from logic.

Earnest efforts to escape this outcome have been made by attaching the act of knowing to the nervous system, and this is a move in the right direction. But so far the effort has been fruitless because no connection has been made between the knowing function of the nervous system and its other functions. The result is that the cognitive operation of the nervous system, as of the "psychical" mind, is that of a mere spectator; and the epistemological problem abides. An onlooking nervous system has no advantage over an "onlooking" mind. Onlooking, beholding may indeed be a part of a genuine act of knowing. But in that act it is always a stimulus or response to other acts. It is one of them; – never a mere spectator of them. It is when the act of knowing is cut off from its connection with other acts and finds itself adrift that it seeks metaphysical lodgings. And this it may find either in an empty psychical mind or in an equally empty body.[21]

If, in reinstating the act of knowing as a function of the nervous system, neo-realism had recognized the logical significance of the fact that the nervous system of which knowing is a function is the same nervous system of which loving and hating, desiring and striving are functions and that the transition from these to the operations of inquiry and knowing is not a capricious jump but a transition motived by the loving and hating, desiring and striving – if this had been recognized the logic of neo-realism would have been spared its embarrassments over the distinction of truth and error. It would have seen that the passage from loving and hating, desiring and striving to inquiry and knowing is made in order to renew and reform specific desires and strivings which, through conflict and consequent equivocation, have become fruitless and vain; and it must

[21] This lack of continuity between the cognitive function of the nervous system and its other functions accounts for the strange paradox in the logic of neo-realism of an act of knowing which is "subjective" and yet is the act of so palpably an objective affair as a nervous system. The explanation is that the essence of all deprecated subjectivity is, as before pointed out, functional isolation. That this sort of subjectivity should be identified with the "psychical" is not strange, since a living organism is very difficult to isolate, while the term "psychical," in its metaphysical sense, seems to stand for little else than just this complete isolation. Having once appealed to the nervous system it seems incredible that the physiological continuity of its functions with each other and with its environment should not have suggested the logical corollary. Only the force of the prepossession of mathematical atomism in analytic logic can account for its failure to do so.

have seen that the results of the inquiry are true or false as they succeed or fail in this reformation and renewal.

But once more, it must steadily be kept in view that while the loving and hating, desiring and striving, which the logical operations are reforming and renewing, are functions of the nervous system, they are not functions of the nervous system alone, else the door of subjectivism again closes upon us. Loving and hating, desiring and striving have their "objects." Hence any reformation of these functions involves no less a reformation of their objects. When therefore we say that truth and error are relevant to desires and strivings, this means relevant to them as including their objects, not as entitized processes (such are the pitfalls of language) inclosed in a nervous system or mind. With this before us the relevance of truth and error to desires and strivings can never be made the basis for the charge of subjectivism. The conception of desires as peculiarly individual and subjective is a survival of the very isolation which is the source of the difficulty with truth and error. Hence the appeal to this isolation, made alike by idealism and realism, in charging instrumental logic with subjectivism is an elementary *petitio*.

Doubtless it will be urged again that the act of knowing is motived by an independent desire and striving of its own. This is of course consonant with the neo-realistic atomism, however inconsonant it may be with the conception of implication which it employs. If we take a small enough, isolated segment of experience we can find meaning for this notion, as we may for the idea that the earth is flat and that the sun moves around the earth. But as consequences accrue we find as great difficulties with the one as with the other. If the course of events did not bring us to book, if we could get off with a mere definition of truth and error we might go on piling up subsistential definitional logics world without end. But sublime adventurers, logically unregenerate and uninitiated, will go on sailing westward to the confusion and confounding of all definitional systems that leave them out of account.

The conclusion is plain. If logic is to have room in its household for both truth and error, if it is to avoid the old predicament of knowledge that is trifling or miraculous, tautologous or false, if it is to have no fear of the challenge of other sciences or of practical life, it must be content to take for its subject-matter the operations of intelligence conceived as real acts on the same metaphysical plane and in strictest continuity with other acts. Such a logic will not fear the challenge of science, for it is precisely this continuity that makes possible experimentation, which is the fundamental characteristic of scientific procedure. Science without experiment is indeed a strange apparition. It is a λόγος with no λέγειν, a science with no *scire;* and this spells dogmatism. How necessary such continuity is to experimentation is apparent when we recall that there is no limit to the

range of operations of every sort which scientific experiment calls into play; and that unless there be thoroughgoing continuity between the logical demand of the experiment and all the materials and devices employed in the process of the experiment, the operations of the latter in the experiment will be either miraculous or ruinous.

Finally, if this continuity of the operations of intelligence with other operations be essential to science, its relation to "practical" life is *ipso facto* established. For science is "practical" life aware of its problems and aware of the part that experimental – i.e., creative – intelligence plays in the solution of those problems.

PRAGMATISM AND IMMORTALITY

"Abstract of 'Pragmatism and Immortality'." *Journal of Philosophy* 14.15 (19 July 1917): 406–407. Ed. Note: An abstract of a paper read at the Seventeen Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, at the University of Michigan, 6 and 7 April 1917.

The beginning of the pragmatic movement witnessed the paradox of apologetics based on pragmatism, some of whose representatives had characterized other philosophies as disingenuous apologetics. The paradox was due, first, to the desperate situation of apologetics. Kant had destroyed immortality as a logical postulate and the Hegelians had demolished it as an ethical postulate. But this destruction was not a matter of mere dialectic. The dialectic was an expression of the fact that the new demands of logical, *i.e.*, scientific, and ethical, *i.e.*, social problems could no longer tolerate the limitations which it was necessary to place on the formulation of the problems of science and society in order that they should require the postulate of immortality.

In this situation apologists seized eagerly upon the rumor that pragmatism taught the subordination of truth and thought to desire. But this was based on a misconception of the pragmatic doctrine concerning both thought and desire. In relation to any particular form of desire it is the teaching of pragmatism that the business of thought is, in old-fashioned phrase, to "rationalize" it. This means the reformation and remolding of desire so that (1) intelligent steps for its realization may be taken; (2) that it shall be made to cooperate and not conflict with other forms of desire. On this basis the question is, Can the desire for immortality be "rationalized," or is it a dumb longing and hope which can not be organized scientifically with other desires?

Except by the psychical researchers, the problem of immortality is not taken as a genuine problem involving a genuine future, *i.e.*, a problem for whose solution we definitely set about, projecting hypotheses and attempting verifications. Speculations concerning the qualitative and quantitative limits of our bodies based on the maintenance of personal continuity through mutilations and transformations of the body do not operate as scientific hypotheses nor do they involve a disembodied existence. But this does not justify the dogma that immortality may never attain the status of a genuine problem.

PRAGMATISM AND IMMORTALITY

"Pragmatism and Immortality." Manuscript contained with the deposit of Moore's papers at Dartmouth Library, Department of Special Collections.

Editor's Note: This manuscript is an expansion of the paper read at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, at the University of Michigan, 6-7 April 1917. The first sheet of the mss. has only the title at top right and beneath the title appears the word unpublished. Words within brackets are the editor's insertions for grammatical consistency.

When Pragmatism – some of whose representatives had genially referred to other philosophies as "disingenuous apologetics," was itself hailed as a new defender of the faith once delivered to the saints, the spectacle added greatly to the gaiety of our supposedly somber philosophical world.

The paradox is not difficult to understand, however, when we recall on the one hand, the desperate situation of apologetics, and the other hand, the popular conceptions of pragmatism at the beginning of the movement.

It was no other than Kant, himself a frank apologist and the greatest of them all, who had destroyed apologetics based upon the logical postulate which had been a rock of defense since the day of Plato. Kant no more than Laplace needed either God or immortality in his science.

Having been thoroughly terrified by this exhibition of teutonic ruthlessness and *gelenkigkeit*, the souls of the rationalistic apologists were properly prepared for the joys of salvation through the ethical postulate.

But this joy was short-lived. Scarcely were they comfortably settled in the new defenses, when they were mercilessly *enfiladed* by the Hegelians who had no difficulty in showing that the very arguments by which Kant reduced science to appearances, consigned morality to the same fate. (Bradley)

However, this attack of the Hegelians had the possible merit of cleverly linking science and morality if only by the fellowship of appearances (of postulation proper).

But the reduction of both science and morality to appearances by the Hegelians did not mean that they renounced the method of postulating for the world of appearances – not any particular Reality – but just the postulation of Reality, Reality when thought and Absolute.

But as for God, freedom, and immortality, apologists were soon going to find that the absolute must not be confused with God – nor did it guarantee

immortality. If either God or the human individual were to have any abiding place in the universe they must first make their peace with the absolute. Whether this could be done was not certain, for there was nothing absolutely certain but the absolute. But some hints as to the method by which it might be done in the case of the human being was given by Bradley-Bosanquet and others. It consists of stripping off associationist logics of portion and finitude until the individual is reduced to the point where the apologists throw up their hands and exclaimed, what doth it profit a man to save his soul and lose the whole world!

In anticipation of this protest Mr. Bradley characteristically observed that of course some people would not be happy in heaven if the dog were not there. And the apologists who understood their business answered, "in principle – yes verily when one talks seriously of immortality he means no pickwickian rat-souls *aufgehoben* affair." But the continuation of an existence after the death of the body shall have at least as much continuity of memory and perception and affection with the life in the body as any period of that life has with another. As versus the immortality of a completely sterilized soul the resurrectionists certainly have the best of it.

But we must not think of the breakdown of the postulating type of apologetics as due merely to bad dialectics. For, assuming an elementary knowledge of formal logic, dialectics as such never breaks down. Formally any object of desire may be made a postulate of anything else provided proper care is taken in formulating the latter (that so that the former is required as a postulate). The only thing that ever overthrows a postulate is that new conditions of life render the limitations on the problems necessary to require the postulate so unsatisfactory that we are gradually forced by these new conditions to exchange theory for more empirical effectiveness.

At a time when neither modern science nor the modern individualism of society was yet mature enough to be aware of its own nature and method, the limits on the problems of logic and ethics necessary to the requirements of the postulate of immortality could be imposed, with relatively little embarrassment – indeed with positive value. Immortality was a general and formal assertion of the individual at a time and under conditions when he had relatively little capacity and opportunity for substantial and concrete assertion. It was a measure of self-promotion. Thence also the demand for apodictic certainty. The individual must be preserved at all hazards. The demand for a priori certainty is always in inverse ratio to the amount of empirical control. Hence also the favorite thesis of a priorism that the only thing that is apodictically certain is the existence of God or later, of the absolute.

But as modern science grew apace, and with it the problems of modern society, the limitations on the theory of logic and ethics necessary to the postulate of immortality were more and more a handicap in scientific and

social operations. This increased to the point when the individual at last felt required to exchange the comforts of the a priori system of postulation for more empirical freedom. In its early stages this exchange began in a surrender of the details of the future world and details of the elaborate scheme of salvation. In the last stage there is left the absolute of which we can say only that it is not what it is. Here no postulated detail is left to embarrass either science or social experiment. Perhaps after all too much of a logic has been made of the absolute. He is but the empty shell – the ghost of Scholasticism. But even as such it has nobly served its day and generation. It removed from the scholastic system all details embarrassing to the programs of science and society – and broke the shock of the transition from the scholastic to modern scientific method.

Such was the situation at the beginning of the pragmatic movement. Little wonder apologists were ready to grasp at any straw, and they thought they had found one in the alleged doctrine of pragmatism that thought is subordinate to desire and practice and that the satisfaction of any existing ready-made desire is the criterion of truth.

As I remarked at the outset this pragmatic apologetics was an easy mark for the critics who lost no time in pointing out that if absolutism was a "disingenuous apologetics," this was guilty of a far deeper philosophical crime – it was disingenuous immortality as trickier simplicity. The elaborated apologetics of [*illeg*] logic and ethics postulation could not compete with a doctrine that blandly avows that the wish is father not only to the thought but to the truth.

And so far as my understanding of pragmatism goes, all that has been said and more if possible, about this type of pragmatic apologetics is fully justified. But it is indeed true that pragmatism did and does teach that the nature and criterion of thinking, and of truth, can not be defined apart from desire, and conduct. That there is no such thing as a purely intellectual problem. But this thesis involves not only a theory of knowledge and truth but what is equally important – though it generally has been overlooked – a theory of desire. Had the pragmatist in the early days of the movement been at as much pains to expound his views of desire along with his exposition of the nature of thought and truth, we might have been spared a vast amount of misunderstanding and plaintive charges of obscurity on both sides.

As it was, nearly everybody was trying to hitch up the pragmatists' account of thought and truth to an unpragmatic notion of desire – the latter being usually his conception of a set of ready-made physical, social, aesthetic-intellectual, religious desires each with its definite object, – thought being called in according to the supposed pragmatic doctrine to assist in the satisfaction. On this showing thought becomes indeed, as was so often charged, a mere handmaid of desire. However, even on this interpretation, the desire must be such that intelligence can assist it, can plan some steps

towards its fulfillment, can project hypotheses, and make some attempt at verification.

But the relation between desire and intelligence is much more intimate and organic than this. Thus in its ethical form the problem of desire is never that of simply satisfying an existing form of desire. It is always the problem of getting and constructing some definite desire out of a number of conflicting desires as material (realizing of course the reconstruction of the object of desire). This calls for the highest possible exercise of intelligence. In [an] old fashioned phrase the problem is the rationalization of desire. This does not mean, however, as it was often taken, of old, to mean, that pure reason is to be substituted for desire. It means that the work of intelligence is precisely the reconstructing, the pruning, the chastening and remoulding of desires so that the particular modes of it may constitute a mutually cooperating, instead of a conflicting, mutually inhibiting, system. Intelligent thinking is thinking that effects this.

But this is anything but a subordination of intelligence and truth to desire. It is more nearly a subordination of desire to intelligence, though this again would not be correct. Intelligence is the reflective reconstruction of the objects of desire. This implies that there are true and false forms of desire as well as true and false ideas. As false thinking is that which fails to so reform and remould the objects of desire that a cooperating satisfaction is possible, so a false desire is one which cannot be so remoulded or is one for whose fulfillment intelligence can inaugurate no definite procedure – no plan.

In terms of problems – this implies that as there are true or false ideas and desires, so there are genuine and psuedo problems. In a genuine problem we can take steps towards a solution, we can propose hypotheses, and attempt verification. A genuine problem is one which involves a real future, *i.e.* a future expounded in a more or less definite experimental program of solution. A psuedo problem is one for the solution of which we can devise no specific procedure, for which we can propose no hypothesis which we can take steps to verify. Its future is simply algebraic – we cannot translate it into terms of our present materials and technique.

But we must beware of construing these definitions to narrowly. First, in the beginning of the pragmatic movement there were many who believed – and there are still a few *e.g.* Prof. Fite – who held that the only sort of problem a pragmatist can recognize is of the type of finding something to eat or climbing a fence. But the rumor has gradually gained credence that by a problem a pragmatist means what any undebauched mind means – anything from climbing a fence to – shall we say immortality – if the latter be indeed a genuine problem as above defined.

Second, when insisting on a problem with a genuine as opposed to a merely algebraic future we must remember that the future may still be very dimly attained. Progress in most great problems – of [the] source and maintenance

of social justice, of [the] art of world peace – begins in dreams. But these dreams however dimly lived, are not of a Bergsonian future in general, nor on the other hand, of a future questioning of *e.g.* logicians in Barbara or of *haus* and *intraus*, symbol and argument-relations. These dreams brood over the waters, they clear the air – they conquer dialectics and infinities. They dip into the fountain far as human eyes can see. Still it is a future which is seen and seen as a development of the materials and techniques of the present.

This brings us to close quarters with the question – which is how far does the existence of the human person independent of his organism and environment represent, at present, a rational desire, a genuine problem, and a real future. Is it a desire for the attainment of which we can at present plan any definite procedure? The psychical researchers of course have no difficulty with this question. But the smallness of their numbers and the fact that they are taken seriously by so few except themselves shows how very formal at present the problem is for most of us. So far it seems to be only an unconditionalized desire and hope.

To be sure when we observe how continuity of personality may be maintained through astonishing mutilations and transformations of the immediate bodily organism, when we recall the marvels of radiant energy, when we are reminded of the extent to which, in James' phrase, our empirical self becomes knit up with and dependent upon a wide range of objects in addition to the mere body, with all of these before us we may easily indulge in fancies over the qualitative and quantitative limits of the body of the human person. And taking flight with the good Bishop of Cloyne, we may extend the limits of the body to the "whole furniture of earth and choir of heaven." But is this more than fancy? Is it an image that, at present, has the status either of fact or a genuine hypothesis whose verification we can set about. Moreover, even in this fancy, the person would not be without a physical body. Indeed, he has so much body that the difficulty is even to fancy him as human. I very much doubt if any one ever succeeded in envisaging a disembodied person. Even for Paul, who was ever urging the antithesis of the natural and the spiritual, there is a material body and a spiritual body.

Here some modern Cartesian may suggest that while we cannot envisage a disembodied person – we can think it – and he will propose imageless thought, *i.e.* disembodied thought, as the proper means of thinking disembodied persons. This may be a pleasing rhetorical conceit but I doubt if it has any more force than the proposal of blonde and brunette ideas with which to think of light and dark persons.

For the summary, the net result are these:

1) That immortality as a postulate of logic and ethics depends on so formulating the logical and ethical problem as to demand the postulate.

2) When this is done the limitations placed on logic and ethics so handicaps them in meeting the growing demands of science and society that modern logic and ethics have been forced to give up the limitations and with them the postulate.

3) The pragmatic apologetics was conceived in innocence of the real import of the pragmatic teaching conceiving the relation between thought and truth, and desire and conduct.

4) At present, immortality for most of use does not possess the status of a real problem. It does not figure either as itself an hypothesis for the control of specific immediate experiences or as an end for the realization of which we can take definite steps. At present, it remains an unrationalized object of desire and hope.

But,

5) This does not warrant the dogma that it never can attain the status of a genuine hypothesis or even of verification.

Meanwhile we cultivate our garden, in the belief that if in the course of this cultivation immortality should be brought to light – devoted and intelligent labor in the garden, for results that we can foresee and pursue, guarantees the best possible prepardness for any immortality which could have any meaning or value for us.

THE OPPORTUNITY OF PHILOSOPHY[1]

"The Opportunity of Philosophy." *Philosophical Review* 27.2 (March 1918): 117–133. Ed. Note: Moore's presidential address at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association held at Princeton University, 27–28 December 1917.

Those who have followed recent philosophic discussion, including the symposium[2] on the brilliant address of my predecessor in office, must have been impressed with the widespread apprehension that philosophy is in danger of losing its job. This apprehension appears in two forms. One is the fear that philosophy is losing its human, personal, inspirational character and is on the point of capitulating to science. The other is the belief that philosophy is losing its scientific character and is surrendering to inspiration and edification – to religion and art.

In the midst of these alarums, it may be reassuring to recall how often in its history the fate of philosophy has 'hung in the balance'. So frequently has this occurred that we may well take courage from the suggestion that philosophy has become accustomed to that position and indeed does not seem to be quite comfortable in any other. Certain it is that the times in which philosophy has been supposed to be about to quit the world have been the times in which philosophy has renewed its youth and started a fresh career. Such apprehensions are the inevitable accompaniment of any period of pronounced reconstruction such as that through which philosophy is now passing and should be hailed as sure signs of life. My own conviction is that philosophy has never shown greater vitality nor had a greater opportunity than now. A statement of the nature of this opportunity requires some sketching of historical background.

It is now more than twenty-three centuries since the redemption of humanity from the bondage of tribal custom and myth was proclaimed in the name of philosophy. Yet at this moment we are in the midst of a war with the idols of the tribe, tribal politics, tribal religion, tribal art and, yes, – tribalized science and philosophy – a war in comparison with which all others have been mere skirmishes. And we exclaim: "How long, oh, Lord, how long!"

[1] Read as the President's address at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association held at Princeton University, December 27–28, 1917.

[2] *Cf. The Philosophical Review* for May, 1917.

To be sure, many cherish the hope that this is the war of final liberation, that the universal extent of it means that the source and nature of our woe is being revealed to all the world at once. They find comfort in the reflection that it was necessary that all suffer together the pangs of the survival of these tribal vestiges in the body of our common life before we could reach a proper diagnosis and agree on effective treatment. But others will say, the cry of 'How long, oh, how long!' betrays the voice of time and of finitude, the voice of an infant crying in the night. Such terrestrial desires and hopes, we are told, entirely mistake the nature of the salvation originally proclaimed by philosophy. It was not a salvation of the world but from it. The world of becoming was by nature irredeemable. The life of reason was another life, a refuge from the brutalities of existence.

This conception of the life of reason is one to which many world-sick souls, to the end, will doubtless turn. But whether it cures more ills than it causes has ever been the question. It requires us to be in the world but not of it. How difficult, how impossible, this is, appears in the experience of all monastics. Indeed, it is urged by some that this very impossibility testifies that the conception has never been taken seriously by any but the monastics, least of all by the Greeks. They will remind us of Plato's explicit statement that his portrayal of the city-state 'is no mere dream'. But others will recall that it was possible only on condition that in that state philosophers should be kings, – a condition which finally proved too great a strain even for Plato's imagination. For he concludes that only the little bald, tinkering imitators of philosophers could hope to be kings in any terrestrial city; and that if anyone claiming to be a philosopher should be chosen king, his selection would be conclusive evidence against his claim. As we know, the portrayal closes with the statement that "whether there really is or ever will be such a city is of no importance to the philosopher, for he will live according to the laws of the city." But even so, the laws of the city were such that in order that some might participate in the life of reason it was necessary for a multitude to remain in the bonds of myth and custom. The hosannas of the redeemed fell mockingly on the ears of a larger host of the unredeemed.

Here it will be said that we are inexcusably confusing the essence of Plato's plan of salvation with the accidents of the social and political system of his day. It is only necessary, we hear, to introduce the conception of democracy to bring Plato down to date. This sounds plausible. But when we pass to details, we are soon confronted with the question whether a conception of the life of reason which frankly accepted the irredeemable bondage of the mass of mankind can be democratized without changing, not only its extension, but also its intention.

It is indeed not strange that on the first emergence of reason from that vast matrix of tribal myth and custom, it should have seemed so different in nature that another myth was invented to account for its origin. Nor when

we survey the extent of the tribal life by which the precious infant reason was surrounded, do we marvel that the redemption of that world seemed too huge a task. But a sympathetic understanding should not close our eyes to the consequences of this situation.

In tracing these consequences, we should have in mind the main features of this original plan of salvation. As liberation from custom and habit, from what is called in the Gorgias, 'routine' or 'mere experience', we might expect that the life of reason would have been found lighting up with anticipation and direction the world of becoming. For it was not from change as such, but from blind, brute, uncontrolled change, that escape was sought. But since on its social side the actual operations of the world of becoming were carried on by those who moved under custom and 'routine', becoming was identified with custom; hence visions of the eternal as the content of the life of reason. But we know how these visions soon became systems of glorified custom and despite the name 'vision' were no less blind. A 'vision' that does not point beyond itself is as blind as any other experience.

It is also important to remember that the organ of these visions of the life of reason was the eye of pure, detached, passionless intelligence. When we complain, on the one hand in the name of impersonal fact, on the other in the name of impersonal reason, that philosophy has become infected with mundane and supra-mundane desires and hopes, it would be interesting and possibly enlightening to recall that this same passionless, impersonal intelligence originated as the means of escape from the world of fact, and has been from the beginning, however paradoxically, the chief speculative support of the hope of personal immortality.

If from the vantage point of the ordered life of Athens and Rome, the redemption of the vast wastes of myth and custom appeared impossible, we should scarcely expect any increase of optimism when the tribal tides from the north swept over the Eternal City and The Islands of the Blest. We do not wonder that when Stoic philosophy saw its celestial forms filled by the church with all sorts of tribal myth and finitude, it passionately reaffirmed the passionless character of the life of reason. But the medieval church was too deeply intrigued with the world, the flesh and the devil, to be a mere kindergarten for Graeco-Roman philosophy. If officially its kingdom was not of this world, it nevertheless had this world very much on its hands. In all history there is no more sublimely pathetic spectacle than the heroic attempt of the medieval church to transform a world of tribal custom into a life of reason with the concepts and methods of a philosophy conceived and fashioned as an asylum from that world. It is easy to patronize the casuistry of the church. But we should first assure ourselves that our complacency is due to an essential difference in method, and not to the fact that we have possibly acquired more skill in its use, though that may well be doubted, or to the fact that the life of a celestial philosophy is now very simple as

compared with its responsibilities in the days of the church. The medieval church, like our frontier household, was the center of all mundane activities. But one by one these activities have been transferred to scientific 'butchers and bakers and candlestick makers', so that a transcendental philosophy can now sit comfortably by the fireside disturbed by no embarrassing household problems.

This introduces a period of great importance, the period in which occurs the differentiation of philosophy and science or, if we are jealous of the term 'science', of philosophy and the other sciences, which, when referred to in the remainder of this paper in distinction from philosophy will, for sake of brevity, be called 'science'. So far as any such differentiation appears before the modern period, it is to be found in the fact that while philosophy was occupied with the analytic and systematic relations between its universals and categories, science was engaged in finding instances of the universals furnished by philosophy, – not, however, for the purpose of testing these universals but of illustrating them. To assume that they needed testing would have been sacrilege. Philosophy and science had the same conception of the nature and function of reason, which was to behold universals either face to face as in philosophy, or through the veil of particularity as in science.

But this search for new instances was full of peril for the unity of the household of reason, a peril which steadily increased as the scope of the search widened with the new process of the suns, with the appearance of new continents, and with new political, industrial and commercial problems. How the universals of the church, already loaded with a strange mixture of celestial and terrestrial materials of the early centuries, were soon swamped by this flood of new things and events is a familiar story.

Familiar also is the fact that modern history has spoiled the dramatic contrasts between the scholastic and the modern periods which earlier historians were so fond of portraying. Nowhere is the continuity on which modern history insists more palpable than in the development of science and philosophy. If the scholastic system of categories had collapsed, its spirit went marching on in the efforts of the renaissance to find, ready-made, another to take its place. And if the modern period turned its back on all systems of the past, we know the adolescent enthusiasm with which a new and saving system was believed to be at hand and the modest but firm conviction of each philosopher that he could furnish it.

However, from its experiences in the periods of scholasticism and the renaissance, philosophy had by this time grown wary of the happenings and becomings of the temporal, spatial world. Hence its readiness to get rid of that world and wish science joy of it. Contrary to much received opinion, the essential criticism of scholasticism by the modern period is not that it was too other-worldly, but that it was too this-worldly. It had failed of universality because it was too terrestrial. In order to be re-universalized, phi-

losophy had to be re-celestialized and thus leave the world of existences to science.

To such a division science was even more eager than philosophy to consent. For if philosophy had been embarrassed by the existences of science, science had been no less troubled by its failures to discern the features of the universals of philosophy in the new instances which it constantly encountered. Also it was growing more and more interested in the existences themselves and in their temporal, spatial, causal connections with one another. Science was therefore more than willing to accept the despised and barren field of existence for its patrimony if it could work it unmolested by the religious and political tribal teleology in whose bonds Galileo even then languished. For this freedom it was willing to bear the opprobrious brand of 'materialism,' and 'mechanism'. Indeed, the time soon came when it hung these shibboleths ostentatiously over its door to frighten away all teleological bogies.

This period of differentiation is full of interesting and instructive ironies. Tragic as are some of the consequences, it is difficult to suppress a smile, when science, on taking possession of its rocky wilderness of existence, solemnly announces as its instrument of cultivation the pure, passionless, impersonal intelligence!

There is also the beautiful historic irony of pure intelligence, originally invoked as the way of escape from this wilderness, now made an indispensable qualification for entrance to it and for residence in it. No less *piquant* is the spectacle of philosophy announcing with renewed emphasis the world of values as its domain, and proclaiming the same pure impersonal reason as its method.

Here I cannot refrain from turning aside for a moment to observe that in the current discussion, referred to at the beginning, between those who fear the influence of science and those who warn us against the dangers of edification, each side describes knowledge as merely a *seeing* process, and each proclaims the organ of vision to be pure, detached intelligence. At first it seems as if this common conception of knowledge were promising for our efforts at coöperation in philosophy. But reflection reveals difficulties. For even if we agree that these visions of truth are to be submitted to discussion and tests, what tests can be applied to 'detached' visions? The appeal to 'consistency' is vain. How can a vision as such be inconsistent, either with itself or another vision? No amount of color blindness could ever be detected by comparing visions with one another. *Non-disputandum* is as true of detached vision as of detached tastes. But it is true of neither visions nor tastes because neither are detached. And this difficulty is not manufactured by taking an unfair advantage of a metaphor. It is not a vicious pun, but sober statement to say that the uncritical conception of knowledge in terms of vision is largely responsible for visionary philosophy. By 'uncritical' I

mean the conception of knowledge in terms of immediate, detached, finished vision. If knowledge were formulated in terms of attached vision, that is, of the whole *process* of vision including its stimulation, its limitation, its checking and testing by other functions, we should get rid of many of the misleading features of the analogy. But our vocabulary concerning knowledge is so saturated with the implications of this analogy of immediate vision that it is impossible to talk or even think and avoid them. But we must return to our story.

The handicap under which science labored at the beginning of its independent career was due to its acceptance of the characterization of its subject matter as merely existential and its methods as visionized intelligence – a characterization that after Darwin and after the extension of its field into problems of individual and social behavior became grotesque. The artificial and shifting character of the distinction between the scientific world of existence and the world of values appears in the reversal of the form of this antithesis which occurred after *The Origin of Species*. Before Darwin the judgments of science were regarded as too analytic and mathematical to deal with values – especially with the value of an act. But when science began to deal in earnest with origins and with conscious behavior and to become truly experimental in method this form of opposition was destroyed. Philosophy saw the danger and met it by the simple strategem of occupying the abandoned position of science. It re-converted its values into eternal and immutable entities, and declared the methods of science to be now too hypothetical and unstable to deal with things eternal, leaving open to science the retort that the methods of philosophy were now too rigid and mechanical to deal with things temporal – even a moral act. And in fact the sequel was that this conversion of values into eternal entities made it necessary for philosophy, as Hegel and his followers saw, to reduce morality to 'appearance'.

But in the earlier stages of this period of differentiation which we are here tracing, science was still haunted by dreams of unconditioned universality and necessity – reminiscences of its previous existence with philosophy. It did not yet realize that universality of that sort was part of the price it had paid for the independence of its existential domain. Hence, when a philosopher, *e.g.*, Hegel, pointed his schoolmaster's finger at science and called it 'hypothetical' and 'contingent', and other hard names, instead of replying with Zenobia of our school days, "the charge is true, and I glory in its truth," science felt the sting and made pitiful attempts to defend the absolute universality and necessity of its categories, and to set them up as rivals of the universals of philosophy. But the categories of science cut a sorry figure as candidates for the crown of universality in competition with those of philosophy, fashioned by experts of long experience precisely for the purpose of being universal, – not to 'fetch and carry' in a world of existence.

But as science was losing its grip on the kind of universality which it had in the days when it dwelt with philosophy, it found itself coming into the possession of a new sort of universal, – the universal of law, quite different in type from the universals of essence and species. A law is not a universal form into which particulars shall fall when they chance to appear; a law is not satisfied to say that whatever happens will be a temporal, spatial or causal affair. It is concerned with specific relations between the times, the spaces, the causes, and the consequences of things and events. The defect of the Kantian "anticipations of experience" was that they did not anticipate, just as the failure of the 'analogies' was that they were not 'analogous'. They could yield a cosmic vision of all possible events as caused; but, as Hume saw in advance, they gave no clue to any particular cause. All of which means that the failure of *apriorism* was due to its helpless and hopeless empiricism. It could solemnly say: "All happenings must be temporal"; but concerning specific times it was as impotently 'empirical' as the newest infant. A type of universality therefore that was to deal with specific antecedents and consequents, was something new under the sun.

In spite of the fact that officially this new type of universal could have no commerce with values, interest in it rapidly increased. Philosophy, secure in the possession of social and religious values as its 'sphere of influence', was at first indifferent, then complacent, then interested and finally anxious. Historians easily grow sentimental over the wistful eye with which Kant watched the career of this new universal. They are fond of portraying his fleeting hope that it might bolster up the tottering metaphysics upon which social and religious values then leaned. We know the outcome. Instead of reviving the old metaphysic, the new universal, at Kant's own hands, gave it its *coup de grâce*. Nevertheless the new type of universal was not allowed to usurp the place of the old metaphysic. The tradition of the existential character of science and the super-existential character of values was still too powerful. So the new, ambitious, and doubtless often bumptious, universal was re-branded with 'mechanism' and 'materialism' and sent back to its existential habitation, while the function of the old metaphysic as the support of moral and religious values was assigned to faith.

Here my Hegelian auditor will ask: "Why not spare us this old trick of a cheap and easy victory over Kant." I am aware that in Hegel's *History of Philosophy* Kant was a voice proclaiming the advent of a greater, of whose identity Hegel had no doubt. But how much better off values were in the fold of the 'Concrete Universal' than in the hands of Kant's 'faith' may be judged when we recall how moral values, as we have seen, were reduced by Hegel to 'appearance'. Of this reduction of morality to 'appearance', we might indeed say 'what's in a name', if it really effected a working connection of values with scientific method. But the only connection it secures is their union in the fellowship of appearances of the Concrete Universal

whose concreteness and universality are as much matters of faith as Kant's moral law.

Left thus without method, values became again celestial existences, – objects of detached impersonal vision, none the less existential because celestial; while on the social and practical side they were left to the play of tribal survivals, again none the less tribal whether labelled 'divine' or 'natural'. On the other hand, scientific method divorced from participation in the formation of values became equally 'metaphysical'. It set up altars to its laws, its atoms, and later to its biophores and ions. And when it reached the point where it included trans-finite numbers and logical entities in its subject-matter, these were hailed as signs that science, at last, had transcended its existential sphere and could now be welcomed back into the fold of philosophy. Once back, as little reference as possible was made to the existential past of these entities – to the fact that they had all developed directly or indirectly out of problems of continuity arising in the necessity, often the tragedy, of adapting old materials and instruments to new purposes, and of constructing new purposes in order to utilize the results of past experiences.

Many cherish the conviction that when philosophy received unto itself these scientific concepts not only was science redeemed from materialism, but philosophy thereby became scientific. They believe that these concepts are purging philosophy of the infections of edification and of mundane and supra-mundane interests. And yet, perhaps the most edifying portrayal in all literature of the visions of pure intelligence as a refuge from the ruthlessness and *schrecklichkeit* of existence – one of the earliest themes of edification – is from the pen of the most distinguished representative of this mathematical school, Mr. Bertrand Russell.[3] On the other hand, so long as the defenders of personality and values make values the content of visions of an impersonal intellect, it will be as difficult to escape the snares of existence – no matter if the name be carefully avoided – as for the mathematical school to avoid all taint of edification. As objects of detached intellectual vision, values and ions and the entities of analytic logic are in the same case. Which is the truest or the most edifying is a matter of taste.

Nevertheless, with all its present confusion and paradoxes, the importation of these conceptions of scientific method into philosophy is to be hailed as a bright omen. But it does not signify that philosophy is to be made more scientific and science more philosophic by substituting mathematical and logical conceptions for eternal values as the objects of philosophic vision. Its proper import will appear when, instead of attempting to substitute scientific concepts for values, or conversely, philosophy shall proclaim science as the method of its values.

[3] "A Free Man's Worship," *Philosophical Essays*.

To some this will sound solemnly platitudinous. They will ask: "Is not science already the method of values? What else is the meaning of the present world-mobilization of science?" Nevertheless, it does not mean that science is the method of values. On the contrary, it means that science, forced by the old tradition to expend its energies in developing a purely existential and physical world, is now called in as a mercenary to furnish so much hired force in the form of high explosives, barbed-wire, and poisoned gas, to serve values and purposes that, by the same tradition, have been formed largely by more or less sublimated survivals of tribal custom – the traditions of dynasty, of shining armor, of suspicion of other tribes, of right as the might of the tribe, of my tribe, right or wrong. Science as the method of values does not signify that science is to be called to the defense of values born of instinct, custom and myth. It means – and this is the gist of the whole matter – that scientific intelligence must be operative in the *formation* of the values and purposes of our social life. It must be the method not only of maintaining but of obtaining them. It need scarcely be said that this does not call for the abolition of instinct and custom – a vain call surely. James was ever fond of reminding us that the being having the most intelligence has also the most instinct, intelligence finding its work not in noting and classifying instincts and customs as final and self-enclosed values, but in using them as *material* for new values. Such an attitude toward instinct and custom is no less the essence of morality than of intelligence.

What the full frank employment of scientific intelligence in the *formation* of values would mean, may be brought home if we ask, what if the conceptions of science were constituted after the fashion of our values? We should then have American, British, French, German and Russian, mathematics, physics, biology, etc. Each science would have its diplomatic corps, its secret service, its army and navy. And when word should come that an hypothesis was in peril from a tribal rival, the army and navy would be mobilized and the proclamation go forth, "*Vorwaerts mit Gott* until all opposing hypotheses are *spurlos versenkt*." Or, if our tribe were seized with a decimating pestilence, it were better that all should perish than resort to an antitoxin 'made in Germany'. For the positive side of the picture, – what if the same tolerant, coöperative, experimental attitude, the same international range of observation and consideration, the same exquisite refinement of technique, the same devoted patience in its employment were present in the formation of our values? What if the methods and technique of scientific intelligence had been mobilized earlier in the service of our legislation and diplomacy? Should we now be under the necessity of such frenzied appeals to science to undo with shrapnel the mischief caused by neglect of intelligence?

Again, what irony that it should be in the despised and barren field of existence, excluded by common consent from all communication with real universality, that the universality of coöperative method has actually been

achieved. While we stand gazing into heaven, universality appears among men. We go on celestial crusades while the Grail is within our terrestrial walls. To be sure, this universality and democracy of scientific method has not yet its proper power and authority. For we still look for another. It has come unto its own and its own has received it not. "How," we ask, "can reality come out of existential Nazareth?" The very fact that this experimental universality of science has so much *achieved* reality, prevents its acceptance. It is too real to be true; or too true to be real. In the same breath in which we pray that the kingdom of God may come on earth, we so define that kingdom in terms of 'absolute universality', 'eternity', 'subsistence', etc., that its coming on earth is impossible. So long as we continue thus to conceive the world of values science will continue to expend its energies in building up a merely existential and physical world and to be regimented and mobilized as so much brute force drafted for the service of tribally-formed ends. The real materialist and mechanist is he who conceives the subject matter of science as existential and physical in contrast with supra-existential values.

But the redemption of science from materialism and of values from tribalism will not be achieved by searching out in science certain conceptions – mathematical or logical – that are supposedly less existential and more spiritual than the others, nor yet by setting up these conceptions as visions of a pure intelligence in which to find refuge from existence. As a matter of asylum merely, it makes little difference whether we find it in mathematical concepts, theosophy or the movies; – in Bentham's phrase, in pushpin or poetry. Science will be spiritualized not by turning either its subject matter or its method into spirits; but by utilizing both its subject matter and its method in the formation of our terrestrial values and purposes.

This means, of course not only that values acquire method but that scientific method acquires values as part of its recognized subject matter. I say 'recognized' for in some disguise or other values have always been present in the 'objects' of science. Something more than staring about, like the bear that went over the mountain, to see what we can see, determines the selection, direction and importance of scientific activity. To have this brought to light, given its proper place and limits, instead of being left to work under ground, in ways dark and devious, would be here, as everywhere, a great gain.

"But," exclaims some one," this will put science back under the yoke of religious and political interests." With the document of the famous 'ninety-three' before us, in the presence of our own vacated desks and laboratories, how naïve is this future tense! Science has no choice whether it shall be affected or not affected by social, political, and religious interests. The only choice is whether this influence shall be frankly the natural and intimate one of subject matter and method, in which case the influence will be from social

forces which science itself has helped to form; or whether it shall be from social, political and religious forces in whose formation scientific method has had no recognized part. In comparatively ruminant periods, the conception of science as existential and physical, and of values as supra-existential and spiritual, may conceal their underlying connection and produce an appearance of independence. But when the crisis comes, the concealed affinity asserts itself with an explosion that wrecks all our *camouflage*.

On the other hand are we still pursued by fears of the effects of scientific method on personality? Perhaps it is too much to expect that we, with friends, brothers and children in the trenches, shall see the cruel joke in this. But the Devil will see it and hugely enjoy it, as he recalls how all of us are now reduced to so many foot pounds of energy, to so many food-producing, food consuming, marching, shooting, bombing, thrusting units, counted and tagged. If we fear to submit our precious personalities to experimental treatment, which can not be 'mechanical' in the old sense, we shall soon have something which we may well fear. We shall soon find ourselves units of a process that is 'mechanical' with a vengeance.

This mechanico-phobia simply means that we do not yet understand or we do not take seriously the statement to which we all nonchalantly subscribe, namely, that 'Science is experimental'. To say this is to say first that its mechanism, *i.e.*, its elements and units, are experimental. And this is to say that they are relevant and relative to problems which are always, in the end, problems of personality and value. Moreover, the very possibility of experimental method presupposes personality.[4] The appearance of the modern self-conscious person contemporaneous with the rise of modern experimental science is no mere coincidence. The tribal, custom-made self is afraid, in the presence of strange things and events, of things to which he can not react in the old ways, whereas the modern personality in possession of itself, not only is not shocked by such experiences but is constantly seeking them. They are its meat and drink. To be sure, it seeks at the same time new categories and universals. But this is to say that the whole process of scientific discovery and experimentation presupposes and depends on a self-possessed personality. How strange, then, this antithesis of experimental method and personality! It is a Freudian survival of the timid, half-formed tribal self.

But so long as this survival continues we shall never be able really to understand and take seriously the experimental method of science. Still clinging to ultimatism in our treatment of values and personality, we shall inevitably take the same attitude toward the elements and units of science. The corespondent of ultimatism in science is ultimatism in values. The conception of absolute elements is the tribal conception of values and personal-

[4] *Cf.* G. H. Mead, chapter IV, *Creative Intelligence*.

ity carried over into science. Our theoretical difficulties with the experimental method have their source in the fear to apply it to values. Once take the experimental attitude toward values and personality, the appropriate theory of knowledge follows. On the other hand, if we profess an experimental theory of science while holding a tribal conception of values and personality, our profession is academic and vain and sooner or later will betray us.

This, then, is the issue: Are we ready to take toward our social, political and religious values the same experimental attitude subjecting them in principle to the same tests of international scrutiny and criticism, which we demand in our scientific procedure? It is the issue of the democratization of values. And it is neither sentimentalism nor demagoguery to say that it is at bottom the issue of the world war. The world can never be made 'safe for democracy' so long as tribal survivals can avail themselves of a theory which places values above or below, at any rate beyond, scientific treatment on the ground that they are either 'unique' or 'universal', – which some tell us are the same thing. What Lincoln said of the nation is now true of the world. That it cannot exist half slave and half free means at bottom that it can not go on with an alleged free science and a tribal morality. If either is not free, neither is free.

Here, then, lies the present problem and the present opportunity of philosophy. What the ultimate problem of philosophy is, I do not profess to know. But here is a great and worthy task – very specific, very present and very pressing, – namely, the abolition of the esoteric attitude, the attitude of the tribal medicine man, toward our social values and purposes, which of all things should have the most delicate and patient ministrations of intelligence. On all sides, philosophers complain of inability to keep up professional interest. One complains that "no philosopher in his official capacity has been called to the nation's councils." But in teaching and preaching the necessity for this change of attitude toward personality and values, and by the same token toward science, the philosopher as such will do his bit not only in the present world crisis but much more in preventing the recurrence of such crises, which indeed is the issue of the present crisis.

And I do not see that identification with a school – idealism, realism, pragmatism – need prevent coöperation in this undertaking. It implies, to be sure, an idealism that is more than a sanctuary, a realism whose reals are more than mathematical and logical entities, and a pragmatism whose practice is not confined to 'bread and butter needs'. But it is not difficult to find idealists, realists, and pragmatists who are ready to fill these specifications so long as they are not called upon to square them with a general theory.

To all who fear that philosophy is in danger of being permanently interned, not to say interred, this offers philosophy at least another opportunity for active service. Those who believe that philosophy should be made more scientific should find the enterprise congenial, for its aim is precisely to

make more scientific the philosophy of values. Those who feel specially called to guard the claims of personality should have no misgivings in joining an undertaking which proposes to liberate the factors and processes most directly concerned with personality from the survivals of tribal myth and custom, and place at their service the methods of experimental intelligence – a method which as we have seen presupposes personalities for its operation. Finally, what could be more edifying than the prospect of substituting reason for shrapnel as the method of dealing with the problems involved in the formation and in the conflicts of our human values and purposes?

ABSTRACT OF SOME LINGERING MISCONCEPTIONS OF INSTRUMENTALISM

"Abstract of 'Some Lingering Misconceptions of Instrumentalism'." *Journal of Philosophy* 17.12 (3 June 1920): 318–319. Ed. Note: An abstract of a paper read at the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association in April 1920.

The justification of a discussion under this heading is found in the fact that recent important literature revives certain misconceptions of instrumentalism, which a year ago one would have said had been finally disposed of. These misconceptions arise from unauthorized extensions of the meaning of the term "instrumental." In all authorized versions of instrumentalism the term refers to the instrumental character of *reflective*, inferential consciousness. In the misconceptions it is made to apply to *all* consciousness with the result that *immediate* experience to which reflection is instrumental is reduced to mere physical motion, and when applied to values the misconceptions result in the absurdity, which the perpetrator of the misconstruction delights to point out, of making all values instrumental to a process which is devoid of value.

References to repeated explicit statements by instrumentalists of what they mean by "immediate experience" show how unwarranted this misuse of the term instrumental is and how grotesque the notion that instrumentalism has no place for the values of appreciation, contemplation and adoration which are precisely the things to which, in instrumental doctrine, *reflective* consciousness is instrumental.

Some of the sources of the misconceptions are: (1) The term "instrumentalism" which as an "ism" is, with some justification, taken to mean a universal character; (2) the habit common to all of us of thinking and talking of consciousness in *cognitive* terms; (3) failure to note that the biology to which instrumentalists appeal is a glorified biology loaded with all the conscious values – social, æsthetic and religious – of which it is stripped by those who find it a stumbling-block; (4) the confusion of the question of the *nature* and function of reflective consciousness with the irrelevant psychological matter of the division and specialization of interest.

SOME LINGERING MISCONCEPTIONS OF INSTRUMENTALISM[1]

"Some Lingering Misconceptions of Instrumentalism." *Journal of Philosophy* 17.19 (9 September 1920): 514–519. Ed. Note: Read at the annual meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, 16–17 April 1920.

We are all agreed, I take it, that cooperation in philosophy does not require that we be all of one mind, any more than cooperation in other matters requires that we be all of one vocation. However, in philosophy as elsewhere, if great waste is to be avoided, there must be as much mutual understanding as possible. What I have to say aims to promote such cooperative understanding by attempting to clear up some lingering misconceptions of instrumentalism.

I must confess that I have used the term "lingering" with malice aforethought, fully aware of the fact that if anything is said to be "lingering" we understand it is staying overtime. Indeed, a year ago I should have said what perhaps some of you may still say when I have finished, that this discussion is another sad instance of belated industry. I should have said that if the misconceptions to be discussed still "lingered" it was only in a few unlighted by-ways and corners; that in all quarters that really counted instrumentalism had lived down these misconceptions even as it had survived its early reputation of "subjectivism." But during the past year a revival of these misconstructions has appeared in such high places, that any complacency that instrumentalism may have begun to feel over the supposition that it had at last outlived the rumors of its alleged youthful indiscretions, has been rudely shaken, and it finds itself obliged to enter upon a "drive" of refutation.

My present interest in this revival was first aroused by a lecture on science and pragmatism by my good friend Professor Fite, in which to my great astonishment he affirmed the major premise of instrumentalism to be that all *consciousness* is instrumental to merely physical behavior, a doctrine which easily lends itself to many variations of the *reductio ad absurdum* refutation, of which you may be sure Professor Fite was not slow to take full advantage to the great entertainment of his audience. He had no difficulty in showing that such a doctrine makes all conscious experience

[1] Read at the annual meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, April, 1920.

valuable in proportion as it is instrumental to a process that is wholly without value; *i.e.,* the instrumental theory exhibits consciousness as possessed of a chronic suicidal mania.

At the close of the lecture I entered a protest to the effect that instrumentalism is not a doctrine of the instrumental character of consciousness as such, but of *reflective,* logical, inferential consciousness, and that this instrumental character belonged, therefore, to a very limited and specific phase of conscious experience. In support of this I referred to the numerous explicit statements of Dewey, who I assume is generally accepted as the most authoritative expounder of instrumentalism. Over and over Dewey reiterates that what reflective thinking is instrumental *to*, is the resolution of the conflicts of immediate experience and its consequent development and enrichment. And "immediate" experience here includes the whole of non-reflective, non-inferential experience. He frequently generalizes this as a world of "action and appreciation." Note the term "appreciation." But as if to guard against any possible misunderstanding, he often specifies such things as "going to business," "greeting a friend," "contemplation of a sunset, a painting, watching a play, reading a poem, *etc.*" How in the name of common speech should such things as these be confused with merely physical behavior?

Similarly, in Professor Adams's treatment of instrumentalism and values[2] his constant complaint is that in instrumentalism there is no place for the non-instrumental values or objects of contemplation, adoration, love and worship; that in instrumentalism not only reflective thought, but all *values* are instrumental to merely vital processes of the organism. Again, I submit that this is not merely an exaggeration, but a complete subversion of the instrumental doctrine of values. Not only is there room in instrumentalism for these non-instrumental values, but they have *most* of the room, since they occupy it all except the value of inferential operations whose main business it is to keep these non-instrumental values going. So far as I can see, there is no reason whatever why any one who is temperamentally contemplative and appreciative may not be a perfectly good instrumentalist, provided he recognize that the course of contemplation and true love is not *always* smooth, and that it is the function of analytic reflection to make smooth the paths of contemplation and affection.

It is not difficult to discern some of the sources of these misconceptions. Among the more superficial is the term "instrumentalism" itself. As it has turned out, it seems unfortunate that the instrumental theory of knowledge and logic became an "ism," for an ism is supposed to state a universal character. Now, I do not wish to imply that the instrumental theory of knowledge does not carry with it an interpretation of other things than

[2] *Cf. Idealism and the Modern Age*, *a* stimulating volume by George Plimpton Adams.

knowledge, and if any one pleases, he can call this interpretation "metaphysics."

But it scarcely follows without more ado that because something, for example knowledge, is held to be instrumental, that something else, for example values, must also be instrumental. On the contrary, when it is said that reflective thinking is "instrumental" there surely is some presumption that what it is instrumental *to* is not itself instrumental. The term "immediate experience," of course, makes this presumption explicit. But this only makes it the more ironical that a philosophy in which immediate experience is so fundamental should bear the name "instrumentalism."

But a more indigenous and prolific source of these misconceptions is the habit which all of us have more or less of thinking and talking of consciousness in cognitive terms. Hence, when knowing is proclaimed to be instrumental, it is very easy to slip over to the assumption that this carries the whole of consciousness with it. The basis of this habit is not difficult to see. It lies in the fact that so much of the weal and woe of the rest of conscious experience turns on the success and failures of knowing. Hence, the importance of the technique of knowing; hence, the fact that it is the focus of most of the discussions of consciousness. It is the part of consciousness that has a technique that can be discussed and reconstructed.

Again, there can be no doubt that the notion that reflective consciousness is instrumental to merely physical behavior has found aid and comfort in the frequent appeals of instrumentalists to biology. This is very obvious in the discussions of Fite and Adams. The key to the misunderstanding growing out of this appeal to biology, lies in the fact that those who find this appeal a stumbling block always assume that the biology to which instrumentalism refers is biology as it has long been conceived when stripped of all conscious and social characters – the biology that has constituted historic "naturalism" which has always evoked a correlative supernaturalism as its answer. But just a modicum of attention, in reading these references to biology, should have made it clear that the biology to which instrumentalists so often refer is a transfigured and glorified biology, loaded with all the conscious and social values which are denied to it by those who find it such a bugbear. Of course, if one first carefully removes all conscious and social character from nature, it requires no very daring inference to conjecture that they must be looked for elsewhere.

Of a piece with the misconstruction of instrumentalism's doctrine of biology and nature are the misunderstandings of its conceptions of conduct and behavior. Now there certainly has been considerable ambiguity in the use of these terms. Sometimes reflection is made instrumental *to* conduct or behavior, in which case conduct and behavior obviously mean simply non-reflective experience, including as much appreciation and contemplation as you like. At other times, reflection is made instrumental *in* conduct and

behavior. Here these terms are used in a very broad sense, akin to "the conduct of life." Yet again, reflection is spoken of as a *part* of conduct, conduct being explicitly defined as the process of reconstructing and developing conflicting values. Conduct here means the whole mediating process. – But in none of these cases does conduct or behavior mean mere motion. A part of the time, indeed, Professor Adams does concede that in instrumental logic reflective thought is instrumental to something more than a merely physiological process – namely to the satisfaction of desires. But these desires are at once limited to the expression of instinctive needs of the body determined entirely by its past history. Reflection is thus tied to the past. It can be only a memory of the movements involved in satisfying fixed instinctive needs. Elsewhere, to be sure, when contrasting instrumental interests with the values of "possession, contemplation, and worship," instrumentalism is portrayed as a lusty and rather impious philosophic Bolshevik devoid of all reverence for the past, having for its motto "Accept no world presented to you as something to possess and contemplate and worship. Make your own world; live only in a world you create or control."

In protesting these misconceptions, not to say caricatures, of instrumentalism, I do not wish to leave the impression that no real issue remains. So long as there are those who hold that reflection and truth are wholly self-contained and in nature independent of and irrelevant to the world of social, esthetic and religious values, there will be an issue. This issue is at bottom, I think, the issue between formal thought and truth and material, *i.e.,* applied thought and truth. A wholly autonomous thought and truth must in the end be formal. This is why those who cling to this view lean so heavily on formal mathematics.

This statement of the issue suggests yet another and the last of the sources of misunderstanding to be considered. This is to be found in the confusion of the issue between formal and instrumental thought and truth with the psychological question of division and specialization of interest. So far as I can see, the fact that an individual or a number of individuals may take special interest in the problem of the technique of thinking, or the supposition that all thinking has its own immediate value does not affect in the least the theory of instrumental logic. Let one be a hopelessly besotted intellectualist, let him say that "nothing can possibly be conceived in the world or out of it which is so good as a good thought," and let him believe that the sole justification of the whole furniture of earth and choir of heaven is that they furnish material and occasions for thought – still if he find that some thinking is good and some bad, and if in separating the good from the bad he is obliged to appeal to results in the rest of the world, he would still be an instrumentalist in good standing. The issue of instrumental or non-instrumental thinking is not the question whether any or all of us believe thinking to be the greatest thing in the world – it is simply a question of

what thinking is and does in the world, and how it gets its character of truth and falsity, wherever it occurs, and however much a matter of specialized personal interest it may be.

One who makes wheels for automobiles (I assume the time-honored watch wheels are now out of date as illustrations) may come to feel about wheels as James's hen about the eggs, that wheels are the most utterly fascinating and precious, and never-too-much-to-be-turned-out things in the world. But if he distinguishes between *good* and *bad wheels* and finds that he makes this distinction on the basis of their relations to automobiles, or watches, or wagons, he will still qualify as an instrumentalist. If, however, his enthusiasm for wheels takes the form of contemplation and adoration of the celestial essence of circularity, then of course, we are in the realm of immediate non-instrumental values, but note that we are also beyond truth and error and goodness and badness. As for the goodness, or badness, truth or falsity of the particular *instances* of circularity, how as objects of contemplation merely can they be good or bad, true or false? They are simply circles or not circles. Indeed, as a matter of contemplative value, why bother with the "instances" after we have reached the point where we can focus the mind's eye on the subsistential essences? But, if, empirically, one finds, that the maintenance and renewal of the contemplation and adoration of the essence of circularity depend on experiences of particular instances, and if he finds that the discovery and production of these instances are somewhat of a *problem* requiring conduct and behavior which involves the operations of reflection, then he is again face to face with an instrumental logic. But whether we happen to be more interested in the values of contemplation or appreciation or in the processes by which they are sustained, developed and enriched, is irrelevant to the nature of the instrumental function of reflective thinking.

Finally, the instrumental character of reflection is not adequately conceived if it be thought of merely in the policeman's rôle of quelling conflicts among our contemplative and appreciative values by suppressing some and giving others free course. In every thoughtful settlement of such conflict there is a revision and reconstruction of those values which is genuinely *creative*. And "*this* function of reflection" – says Dewey – "is incomparably more valuable for living a life than is the primary result of *control*, essential as that is, for having a life to live."

SOME LOGICAL ASPECTS OF CRITICAL REALISM

"Some Logical Aspects of Critical Realism." *Journal of Philosophy* 19.22 (26 October 1922): 589–596.

In isolating the logical aspects of "Critical Realism" as set forth in the recent volume of essays under this caption, certain obstacles are early encountered. First, there are numerous and important differences of opinion among the writers which makes it difficult to reach a common doctrine. Second, the discussions of knowledge are confined almost entirely to perception. Keeping strictly to perception, we could hardly expect it to carry us very far into logical operations. Still, for critical realism perception is knowledge; and though it involves no inference, it has the character of "truth," or "error," to which a special chapter is devoted. In the rôle of knowledge and with the capacity for truth and error, perception, while held to be "immediate," gets to be a very highly mediated case of immediacy, requiring a lot of logical machinery to run it.

Indeed, to my mind we have here that first disobedience, which is the source of so much subsequent logical and epistemological woe; namely, the confusion of the entities and machinery of logical operations with the familiar things of immediate experience. It is the old, old sin of the reflective fallacy, the logician's vanity, which has dogged philosophy from the beginning. As soon as we acquire a little reflective capacity and machinery we are like a farmer with a new grinding machine, who wants to run everything on the place through it, until even the members of the family are in danger.

This generates a double set of difficulties. It reduces immediate experience, or, to use the critical realist's term, the given, to the impoverished state of an hypostatized logical function called "essence," with the result that this emaciated given has to be surreptitiously fed up as the exposition proceeds. On the other hand, it forces logical operations and categories in their attempt to play the rôle of immediate experience to become a hybrid sort of metaphysical entity, half subsistent and half existent, with little prospect of ever reaching their *own* goal of truth and error.

In perceptual knowledge, we are told, there are three fundamental factors. First, the given, the datum. This can not be an existence, physical

or psychical, else, so runs the tale, there is no place for error. It must then be a subsistential, logical essence. Second, there is an existential "mental state" which is the "carrier," the "vehicle" of the essences. In passing, we may note that the critical realist does not seem at all disturbed by the troubles which the Greeks encountered in thinking of a subsistential essence as a passenger in an existential taxi. Third, there is the physical object of which essences are "instinctively" and "irresistibly" affirmed.

Such is the official cast of the characters in the drama of perceptual knowledge. Whereupon someone may say that so simple a plot for a one-act play scarcely warrants the charge of complications and entanglements. But those of you who have followed the text will agree, I think, that we do not get very far before we discover that the official cast and plot is really only a part of one scene. For it becomes evident, at once, that one of the star performers – it is a little uncertain whether it is the hero or the villain – is left out of the official cast altogether; namely, the *bodily organism* of the knower. For we are told that not only do mental states, but the very constitution of the given essence, depend on the bodily organism. As the plot thickens, we note, too, that some of the other characters begin to assume new rôles. The mental states which at the beginning are simply "vehicles" for the essences soon, like Locke's cabinet and sheet of paper, begin to do strange things for vehicles. They perform operations which the authors call "associating," "willing," "having an interest," "turning the attention," *etc.* One writer speaks of turning on and off the searchlight. The image of a psychical taxi turning its own headlights on its own passengers is engaging. Whether the lights are properly dimmed is not stated: but it doesn't stop with turning on and off the lights. It begins to take liberties with its subsistential passenger. For we are told that the total character of the passenger (the essence) depends on associative operations of the vehicle *(i.e.,* mental states) as well as on the constitution of the bodily organism.

Not to overwork the figure, it is obvious, I think, that the various problems of this account of perceptual knowledge center about the origin and nature and function of these essences in their relation to the other three main factors, the mental states, the bodily organism, and the physical object. On the one hand, in many statements, especially of Santayana, to whom Professor Strong says he owes the "precious" conception of essence, these data seem to be detached, floating, subsistential essences quite in the Platonic and neo-realistic sense. They include all possible qualities and complexes of qualities, primary, secondary, and tertiary. These seem to appear in the mental state on the *occasion* of certain activities of the bodily organism, which may or may not be a response to the stimulus of the physical object perceived according as the perception is veridical or illusory. When the perception is "true," the

essence given in the mental state is identical with the essence of the physical object. Thus, in the case of veridical perception, the essence has two loci, it rides simultaneously in two "vehicles," the mental state and the physical object.

On the other hand, we find such statements as this: "Perceptual error is possible because data, that is the essences, are directly dependent on the individual organism, not on the external object, varying in their character, with the constitution of the sense organs, and the way in which these are effected." Such passages might be charged to careless composition, the meaning intended being that the *appearance* of the essence depends on the organism. But there is the phrase, "varying in their *character* with the constitution of the sense organs." Moreover, three of the group, Lovejoy, Pratt, and Sellers, insist that the essences are not floating, nomadic entities, but are the characters of the mental states themselves, and as such are existential, not subsistential.[1]

But how far is this determination of essence by the bodily organism and the mental states to be carried? and just what then is to be their relation *as so constituted* to the physical object? In the first essay, Drake says, "It is the thesis of this volume that in so far as perception gives us accurate knowledge, it does so by causing the actual characteristics of objects to appear to us." "In so far as," but how far is this? Drake's answer is that the essences which we refer to the world about us, are not really there, except in so far as they really were there before perception took place. And (this is the interesting clause) "so far as secondary and tertiary qualities and most of the primary qualities, they are never there at all!" One may well rub his eyes over this passage. It is certainly queer-looking realism. Over and over we are told that it is the heart of the doctrine of realism that the *what* of the object, that is, its qualities and character, are given in the essences. But when all the secondary and tertiary, and most of the primary qualities are thrown out of the what, we begin to wonder just what "what" is left. The situation recalls a scene in the play "Happy-go-lucky" in which a tipsy English constable is making an invoice in bankruptcy of dilapidated furniture. Standing before an unusually rickety piece, he makes this entry, "One wot-not, more not than wot." Drake doesn't say what this poor remnant of a "wot" is. Sellers, who is less cautious, ventures to give a list. He says that "time, space, structure, causal relations, behavior, are the only essences which *can* belong to the object in case of veridical perception." This is a fairly substantial list. But as Drake doubtless foresaw, its difficulties are proportionately numerous. First, it is important to observe that Sellers puts time as well as space into

[1] Professor Sellers' repeated references to the essences as "subjective," must be a source of great distress to Santayana.

the essence, into the content, of the physical object, as distinguished from its existence. With time and space and all the primary qualities put into the "essence," what is left to constitute the "existence" of the object? The neo-realists have always carefully, if somewhat dogmatically, reserved space and time, as – to speak in a paradox – the essence of existence. But what is an existence that is neither of nor in time and space? How does it differ from subsistence? Further, if time and space, and the primary qualities are essences, what is the difference between the physical object as physical, and the mental state? The difference can't lie in existence, for the mental state is as much an existence (whatever that now means) as the physical object. If it be said that, while the primary qualities are given in the mental state, they are not given as *its* essence but as the essence of the physical object, we can only ask again since time and space have been transferred to essence, what constitutes the "physicality" of the physical object?[2]

But, conceding a physical object of some sort, and essences that may somehow "belong" to the physical object, how do we determine when they do and when they do not belong. This is of course the question of truth and error. Next to the longest chapter in the book is devoted to error. But most of the chapter is occupied with difficulties in other theories, a little of it to the formal definition of truth as consisting in identity of the essence *in* mental states with the essence *in* a physical object, and practically none to the question of how we find out whether and when these objects do really have them. In view of all the hard things said by critical realists about the "copy-theory" of naïve realism and the "identity" theory of neo-realism and idealism, the definition of the nature of truth as consisting in identity of essences, or of the reproduction in a mental state of the essence of the physical object, has a queer look. To be sure, we are assured early and often that the true and proper object of perception is not the essence, but the physical object, which is not to be thought of as at all "like" the essence. But while the object of perception must remain unlike the essence we get truth only in so far as the latter "reproduces" and is identical with the essence of the physical object. The essence must be unlike its object, but it can be true only as it is not only like but identical with the essence of the object. This implies that the

[2] In the midst of such questions as these the reader is obliged to return often for reassurance to the closing sentence of the preface, which says, "We have found it entirely possible to isolate the problem of Knowledge" *(i.e.,* from metaphysics). In the midst of his struggle with these questions, which multiply at a terrific rate, in dealing with the problem of introspection, Drake wistfully says, "The writer has his own ontological views, the exposition of which *would clear up this whole situation!*" For this boon I am sure most readers would gladly absolve Professor Drake from his oath, however solemn, to avoid metaphysics. (Italics mine.)

"object" is different from its own qualities, which means that, throughout the entire discussion the term "physical object" should stand for nothing but the bare and empty concept of existence – an existence which has not even spatial or temporal character – since these belong to essence.

It is as easy to lay down a formal definition of truth as of anything else. It is quite another matter to show what we can do with it, and how the requirements of the definition can be met. If we search elsewhere than in the essay on "error" for an answer to these questions, we get this meager response from Pratt: "When the question of veridical or illusory perception arises, first of all, one appeals from one of the senses to the others to see whether they confirm one another. Second, we may appeal to other persons; third, we may watch the supposed object function. If it works out consistently with our own experience, and the experience of others, we may conclude that there is a real object." How far this is short of an answer to the problem appears when we recall that these formulæ are used by all theories alike and mean nothing until we go on to show in detail how they can be *applied* to the particular definition and description of knowledge which we have laid down. In the case of critical realism, the question is how can these three tests be applied to knowledge defined as identity of essence appearing in a mental state with the essence of a physical object. Take the first test – the appeal from one sense to others. Keeping in mind that sense qualities are essences, when we pass to another sense, we simply pass to another essence. Now how can piling up any number of additional essences establish the existence of any one of them, if there is no existence to start with? When Pratt speaks of appealing from one sense to another, he, along with us, has in mind the ordinary and salutary experiences of appealing from our ears and noses to our eyes, from our eyes to our hands, and so on. But we have to remember that in the theory we are discussing "all the secondary qualities" and "most of the primary qualities" are out of court on this appeal, since they never are existential. The appeal to other senses and other persons must then be confined to a remnant of the primary qualities. For example, in the case of appeal from our noses to our eyes, we should first have to filter out all of the secondary qualities, that is, the quality and intensity of the odor and reduce the smell to its spacial and temporal form, whatever that would be, and then repeat the performance with vision to which we appeal. How far this is from what actually occurs when we make these appeals is, I take it, sufficiently obvious. It is equally obvious that the appeal to other persons does not touch the real question at issue, which is, how they and we alike reach a decision on this question of the identity of essences. As for the third test, consistency with the rest of experience, this, for critical realism, can scarcely be more than a summary of the other two – that is, the appeal to the other senses and to

other persons. And even if it involves anything more than this, the question is what *kind* of consistency can furnish evidence for this identity of essences? Once more in raising these difficulties, I am not challenging these time-honored tests. On the contrary, assuming their value, the challenge is on the definition of knowledge which it is supposed they can test; it is on their availability as tests of truth defined as identity of essences.

As said at the outset, all these difficulties flow from the initial mistake of confusing logical and non-logical experience, or if you shy at the term "experience," let us say logical and non-logical things or affairs. The theory starts with the thesis that what is given is simply a bare subsistential essence. Then we find: that the essence is domiciled in an existent mental state; that it is conditioned by the constitution of the bodily organism; that it is affirmed – (Sellers) – "through the very pressure and suggestion of experience," and – (Santayana) – "through the assault, the strain, the emphasis, the prolongation of our life toward the not given," – involving such things as interest and will and other persons, and yet none of these things are supposed to be given. No existence can be given. There is no doubt that this situation is "critical"; but is it "realistic"?

It is of course this complete evisceration of the given, this reduction of it to a pale, impalpable essence that still leaves critical realism in the toils of the epistemological problem, which is just the problem of the "leap," to use Santayana 's term, from subsistence to existence. But why set the stage for this spectacular "leap." Realism, "neo-" and "critical," needs to become more realistic; it needs to make a truly realistic start with existence. In so doing, it would at once be on good terms with that "common sense" *to* which it appeals when it talks of "the physical object," and *from* which it appeals when it talks of "essences." That it really does start with existences, such as bodily organisms, mental images, urges, strains, other persons and things, as given, must be, I think, now perfectly obvious. In an astonishing passage, in his section on the biological truths of critical realism, Santayana explicitly utters this. He says: "That this object – (that is, the physical object) – exists in a known space and time, and has traceable physical relations with all other physical objects, *is given from the beginning*. It is given in the fact that we can point to it."[3] How can the official doctrine of the volume stand alongside this passage, indeed, alongside the whole section? Yet at the close of the next section, on "the logical proof," Santayana writes: "Knowledge has two stages or leaps, one the leap of intuition, from the state of the living organism, to the consciousness of some essence; and second, the leap of faith and action from this essence to some ulterior

[3] Italics mine.

existing object." But in the passage just quoted the second "leap" comes first; and wipes out the first "leap"; for the physical object in space and time "is given from the beginning."

But some one may ask, if we begin with existence as given, where is the place for error? Now, if we were supposed to begin with all existence, or with a static, fixed existence, the question would be pertinent and embarrassing. But if we assume that we begin only with some existence which is also a changing existence, and that we as also existents have the capacity to determine in some measure the direction and character of this change, we need not be alarmed at the prospect of losing the possibility of making mistakes. It should go without saying that these existencies with which we begin are not the ultimate elements of physics, or biology, or psychology, or any other particular science, nor are they "physical" or '"mental," or "true" or "false." So to take them, is again to fall into the reflective fallacy. But whenever any given existence is used to get some other existence, then it begins to take on the character and function of a logical essence. It no longer exists for itself as the object of admiration or fear or love or hate. It no longer holds the center of the stage, but has become now a means, a basis of inference, to another existence. This sudden change in the status of the thing, from existing "for itself," from its position in the spot light, will seem to some a surrender or at any rate a degradation of its former existential glory. A good rationalist will of course say that, on the contrary, this is a promotion of the thing. It is thus lifted from the pit of existential particularity into the glorious light of universality.

This change of status is further enhanced by the fact that usually it is only a small fragment or quality of the original thing that is used for this purpose of getting other things. And even this fragment gets a new incarnation in words and other symbols and in the nervous system of beings who continue to use it. But nowhere in all this is there a detached, floating essence. Always there is some remnant of the old existence, functioning in a new and wonderful way, but existence, none the less. Freely conceding that in reflective inferential operations specific qualities of given things may be "detached" by attention to serve as logical data and *as thus serving* may appropriately be called "essences," yet, if we are good realists, "critical" or otherwise, we shall not *begin* by converting the perfectly good "things and folks" of immediate experience into Bradley's celebrated "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories."

SUBSISTENCE AND EXISTENCE IN NEO-REALISM

"Substance and Existence in Neo-Realism." In the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, at Harvard University, 13–17 September 1926, ed. Edgar S. Brightman (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927), pp. 278–284.

We are all familiar with the appealing recital which Socrates in his last hours, gives of his own youthful search through preceding philosophy and science for help in the midst of the moral, political, and religious confusion in which he and all other thinking Greeks found themselves. We recall also the pathetic failure of the search, – how nothing could be found that would explain why, for example, he should be sitting there awaiting the poison with the prison doors open and why his legs should not be well on their way to Megara with him, as, "by the dog," they would have been if they had got their way.

The import of this failure of Socrates's search is that pre-Socratic even as pre-Einsteinian, science was unable to deal with what we call by the much used and abused term – "Values." The explanation of this disability was then, and in many quarters still is, that science deals with existence, with the world of "becomings," while values are "eternal." Such an explanation overlooks the possibility that values may have been forced into a non-existential realm because science, ancient and modern, has been operating with an inadequate conception of existence based upon what Professor Whitehead has happily called "the fallacy of simple location."

If the helplessness of pre-Socratic science in the presence of values appeared to call for the conception of a supra-existential world, this conception was further strengthened by the mistaken support of the ancient and still powerful religious interest in the possible survival of the self beyond its apparent termination with the body. We all know how soon the new capacity for abstraction in which Greek science began was turned upon this problem – how the abstracted patterns and relations of existence were transmuted into a subsistent abode for a subsistent self. We know too how this failed. We recall Mr. Bradley's famous footnote to the effect that "for many souls heaven will be a failure if the family dog is not there." On the other hand, Mr. Bradley was no less facetious about a

heaven of "bloodless categories." Historically what always happens is, – the "bloodless categories" are used in the formal proof of a subsistent world which as soon as formally established is promptly refilled with the existential, terrestrial qualities discarded for purposes of the proof.

Another circumstance that made this early hypostasis technically easy was the fact that an important part of the existential mechanism of abstraction was overlooked. This is not strange as we are only beginning to discern the importance of it. Aforetime when we have talked of abstraction the best we could do was to refer to a "faculty" or "power" of attention. But thanks to the work that has been done on "the significant symbol," notably by Mead, we know that language is not a tag attached to the results of abstraction but that it is a necessary part not only of the act of abstraction, but of the experience of an object and the existence of a self. Dewey goes so far as to say: "That any event that can be psychic, that is, anything more than a diffused consciousness of pain or comfort, has language as one of its necessary conditions." This suggests that in the midst of neo-realisms, neo-rationalisms, and neo-idealisms, it is about time for the appearance of "neo-nominalism."

The conditions, then, under which the early doctrine of subsistence developed were: (1) a science based on the fallacy of simple location; (2) the consequent divorce of science from values; (3) the interest in the continuance of the self; (4) the ignorance of the fundamental importance of "the significant symbol" as the existential instrument and locus of meanings. All these conditions have played their part in the formation of the modern theory of subsistence, with the additional influence of the use by modern mathematicians of the blessed term "entity."

The official point of departure for the present doctrine is a challenge of the subjectivism which is alleged to infect other theories of knowledge, particularly the *objects* of knowledge. The boldness and simplicity of the *coup* by which this subjectivism is eliminated, commands our admiration. The elimination is effected by the simple device of a "true *summum-genus*" defined as "the possible objects of thought" or "the objects of possible thought."

Once upon a time in writing on some logical aspects of subsistence I began a paragraph with the words, "we shall steer around the dialectical thicket that here confronts us." But I now propose to plunge into the thicket at the risk of never getting out and it is no trivial risk. In the discussion I have followed largely Professor Montague's exposition, in his interesting and important book on *Ways of Knowing*, as the clearest and most comprehensive statement.

At the outset we encounter some old difficulties. First, it is obvious that the *summum-genus* is a class of all classes, and this Mr. Bertrand Russell with all his dialectical virtuosity had finally to give up, because such a

class could not include itself. The same point, of course, is involved in the question, Can "the objects of thought" include the thought of which they are objects? We are properly told that if we think of anything as excluded it is thereby included. And it is obvious that any thought may be thus included by a succeeding thought. But is the succeeding thought itself ever included? If we try to capture it by spreading our net still wider and announcing, in terms of the lawyers, that all possible succeeding thoughts are hereby and herein expressly referred to as objects, – still the thought that spreads this net is not itself caught in the net. And Professor Montague, himself, clearly concedes this, I think, when he says, "That a brain state can never be conscious of (that is, have as its object) itself, but only the state preceding."

But we have not reached the thickest of the thicket until we get into the internal structure of the *summum-genus* itself. We first note that while all illusions and contradictions are "objective," it is a highly dilute non-existent, unreal, objectivity they enjoy. Now the fact that this kind of objectivity is just what previous theories had called "subjective" puts us on guard for the possible reappearance of the old difficulties in new guise inside the *summum-genus*. And we do not go far, before signs that all is not well in the all-inclusive household of subsistence begin to appear. We read that "The *summum-genus* includes existence as relations include their terms or the sea its waves." In the first simile surely we cannot argue from the way relations in general include their terms to the inclusion or exclusion of one term by another. If we suppose that "democrats exclude republicans," we may say, though I doubt the wisdom of it, that the relation of exclusion "includes" its terms, but it includes them as excluding each other. It only includes them as terms in discourse. But when it is said that subsistence includes existence more is meant than that it is included as terms in discourse. The inclusion of existence by subsistence is not a merely logical but an ontological inclusion. This is indeed the cornerstone of neo-realisms. Its ontological character is further evident from the fact that the inclusion of the waves by the sea is offered as an equivalent simile and also from a later appeal to a cosmic will to effect the inclusion – an appeal which would not be necessary if inclusion meant only inclusion in discourse.

Passing to the second simile, – the inclusion by the sea of its waves, – given a good breeze or a lively earthquake the emergence of existential waves from an existential sea puts no great strain, I take it, on our imagination or powers of inference. But in the emergence of an existential sea and its waves from a subsistential sea and its waves there appears nothing – as yet – to take the place of the wind and the earthquake. However, such a hiatus, which strongly resembles the old subject-object disjunction, cannot be left open indefinitely. It must be closed somehow. And ironically

enough it is closed as both rationalists and empiricists, Descartes and Leibniz, Locke and Berkeley, closed it – by an appeal, in Professor Whitehead's frank terms, to God; in Professor Montague's phrase, to a "Cosmic will." Hence when we are watching the waves we should not say: "where there is a wind there is a wave," but "where there is a will there is a wave." To be sure, in days of old, God was wont to appear in whirlwinds and earthquakes. But if in the teeth of a spanking gale we are to say that the waves are due to the emergence of subsistential waves, "waiting from all eternity" to be miraculously transmuted into existence, why not return to good old Neptune?

Another phase of the difficulties in the relation of subsistence to existence appears in the treatment of possibility. On the one hand the locus of possibility seems to be in the realm of eternal subsistence. We read that "a couple could not be two unless there were a subsistent two waiting from all eternity for it to be." By the same token we must say that nothing could be hot or disgusting unless there were a subsistent hotness or disgusting unless waiting from all eternity for it to be. But, on the other hand, we are told that an egg is a possible chicken because it is an actual space-time egg. This has a comforting sound, but it leaves us in a dilemma. If the actual egg is the possibility of a chicken, where does the eternal egg come in? On the other hand, if the possibility resides in the eternal egg "waiting from all eternity," where does the actual egg come in?

In the discussion of possibility I wonder how much we have been betrayed and betrayed by the phrase, "a possible object." On its face, and after the traditional grammar, the term "object" looks substantival and the term "possible," adjectival, but the real meaning is just the reverse. The phrase, "a possible object," means the possibility of an object in which, of course, possibility is the substantive and "of-an-object" the adjective. "A possible chicken" means "the possibility of a chicken." And this is not a possible possibility. It is an actual, existent character of the egg as truly as its shape, color, or weight. The egg is not a collection of essences "occupying" space-time, on the principle of "simple location." The egg is an event with a drift or direction, denoted by the term "chicken." This *drift,* this direction, is the possibility.

A parallel confusion is to be found in the use of the terms "things" and "objects" as equivalents. We may cordially agree with the realist in his contention that "things" are not dependent on thought for existence and at the same time cheerfully subscribe to the doctrine of the idealist that "objects" are dependent on thought for their existence. "Things" not dependent on thought for existence are converted into "objects" by thought. But, failing to make the distinction, the independence of "things" is extended by the realist to "objects" and the dependence of "objects" is extended by the idealist to "things."

There is another matter that troubles me even as it did the Fathers. The essences, redness and hotness, are neither red nor hot. And all that is required to make them existent is that they be given position in the space-time order. But how does bare position in space-time order make an unhot hotness actually hot? However the question is beside the mark. For a cosmic will that can give it position can surely make it hot. Having already appealed to miracle, one more or less should not matter.

The main feature of the treatment of truth and error in the theory of subsistence is that the characters "true" and "false" are transferred from the acts to the objects of knowledge. Such a disjunction between the act and the object of knowledge and between the organism and its world is ominous. Error consists in perceiving a false, that is, an unreal, object. There is no bad or erroneous act of knowing. In general appearance, this resembles, as I have said elsewhere, the "aviary" theory of truth and error tried and found wanting in the *Theaetetus*. Other comparisons suggest themselves. On this theory a poor marksman should say in his defense, "There is nothing wrong with my shooting, the bullets simply persist in hitting the wrong 'objects'." And a lazy school boy should say, "My spelling is perfect, it's the words that are wrong and that is no fault of the spelling."

Another difficulty appears in the relation of these "false," "unreal" objects to existence. On the general theory they should have been patiently and watchfully waiting from all eternity to trip us up. But in the more detailed account we are told that they are *produced* by distortions of ether waves, brain processes, etc. – all perfectly good orthodox existences. There are two questions here: (1) how do these existent, real, space-time processes produce unreal, nonexistent objects? Again we need our cosmic magician but this time for a task just the reverse of the former one. There he had to produce existent objects from non-existent subsistence. Here he is to conjure non-existent and unreal objects out of very existent and very real refractions of ether waves and variations of brain processes. The second question is: if error be entirely a property of the unreal objects, what do we mean by "distorted" processes? "Distortion" certainly is reminiscent of error. But perhaps this is another case of fallacious metonymy.

However, I find myself in hearty agreement with that part of the exposition which teaches that the characters "true" and "false" do not belong to processes of perception. In Professor Montague's account these processes consist of ether waves, organic variations, etc., for which the characters "true" or "false" have no meaning. But on what basis are we to separate the existential processes of perception which are neither true nor false from the subsistential products which are either true or false? No knife falls or bell rings in the existent series of vibration and organic

changes to mark the separation of the products from the processes. The poor stick bent with refraction and age, the two fingers, the converging tracks, etc., are obviously continuous with, and as existent as, the processes which produce them.

There is neither time nor need to review details of alleged incompatibility of the bent stick, etc., with scientific and public space, and the consequent necessity of finding a habitation for them in a non-spatial-temporal realm. I think Professor Whitehead has given the *coup de grâce* to this doctrine by showing, in his explanation of mirror space, that it rests again on the fallacy of "simple location." The perceptions of the stick in the water or through a refracting lens are "perspectives" on a level with the perspectives we get through the air or through touch. There is an indefinite number of these "perspectives" – these "modes of location." To select the particular "perspective," – the particular "mode of location," – that happens to occur most often, because things are most often seen and handled in the air, as the "real" perspective, is to identify space and reality with our particular visual-motor habits – a rather subjective procedure for a hardy realism. These various "perspectives" are all equally "real." But when one of these perspectives takes on the function of signifying another, then "true" and "false" as characters of that function emerge. "True" and "false" are characters of the *act* of inference not of the "perspectives" as such. Once more I agree with Professor Montague that the treatment of truth and error has suffered from misplaced metonymy. But the misplacement I find in the reverse of the one Professor Montague deplores.

In this discussion on the terms "miracle" and "magician" have been used somewhat invidiously. From this some may gather that in the view of the paper nothing in the world is strange or marvelous. On the contrary, it holds that in the end everything is marvelous in the sense that it has a uniqueness, not of mere position in space-time, but of quality to which our "significant symbols" may point but cannot imitate. But this, I take it, does not call for a return to magic. In the presence of things which overflow our equations we may still behold, wonder, and often rejoice.

REVIEWS
BY
ADDISON W. MOORE

REVIEW OF *UN ROMANTISME UTILAIRE*

"Review of René Berthelot, *Un Romantisme utilitaire: Étude sur le mouvement pragmatiste*. Vol. 1. *Le Pragmatisme chez Nietzsche et chez Poincaré*." *Philosophical Review* 21.6 (November 1912): 707–709.

In the introduction, the author, following James, finds that pragmatism may mean any or all of three things: (1) an attitude of mind toward life and the world – the ethical aspect; (2) a conception of truth and error – the logical side; (3) a view of the world – the metaphysical meaning. The second of these aspects the author regards as the newest and most characteristic and is the one selected for discussion in this volume. After this announcement the reader may be surprised at the amount of space devoted to the other phases, and to many other things besides and may often find himself more impressed by the erudition than the cogency of the discussion.

As the title of the volume suggests, its thesis is that pragmatism is the offspring of the union of German Romanticism and English Utilitarianism. It exhibits the marks of the anti-intellectualism, mysticism, vitalism and voluntarism of the Romantic movement combined with the scientific interest of 'biological', 'psychological', and 'sociological' utilitarianism. The different degrees of completeness of the amalgamation of these various 'determinants' account, of course, for the 'varieties' of pragmatism, from the pure and radical type of Nietzsche to the very 'fragmentary' and 'limited' scientific type represented by Poincaré. These two representatives are selected for study as 'limiting cases', which assumes that all the other variations represented by James, Schiller, Bergson, socialism [in a series with Nietzsche!] neo-catholicism and neo-protestantism will fall somewhere between. Of the two cases studied it is Nietzsche however who is supposed to illustrate the thesis that pragmatism is a combination of Romanticism and Utilitarianism. Poincaré's pragmatism is, indeed, so 'mitigated' and 'fragmentary' as to be scarcely worthy the name.

In general I believe most readers will feel that, with the exception of some parts of the discussion of Poincaré, the volume is made up too largely of general historical analogies which are interesting and often instructive, but do not reach the inside of the pragmatic movement. As symptomatic of the lack of close acquaintance with the details of the movement one may note the reference to James' California address as "The Will to Believe," and the dismissal, in the historical sketch, of Dewey's contributions, with the bare mention of his name. Such an omission as the latter is vitiating to the point of

absurdity in a treatment pretending to give any account whatever of the English and American development of pragmatism.

From the beginning of the pragmatic movement critics have been fond of 'hitting off' pragmatism as a revival and recombination of this, that and the other group of elements of former systems. It is neo-sophisticism, neo-mysticism, neo-Romanticism, neo-Voluntarism, neo-Positivism, etc. This pigeonholing method of criticism assumes that there are certain eternal species of philosophical standpoints and *motifs* and that all philosophical development must be merely variations on these fixed themes. This assumption is of course quite consistent with the Platonic Hegelianism or Hegelian Platonism which M. Berthelot explicitly professes; but it is sure to miss important, perhaps the most important things in most philosophic movements, as indeed, it does in pragmatism.

But even proceeding on this assumption it would seem necessary somewhere in the course of the argument to dispose of the pragmatists' contention that between pragmatism and the mysticism, voluntarism and intuitionism of previous anti-intellectualisms there is this important difference: these anti-intellectualisms not only retained but were based upon the intellectualistic conception of the intellect, viz., that it is a self-enclosed function, quite independent in its operation of the other functions. For mysticism, voluntarism, etc., are all attempts to escape the difficulties of a segregated intellect by substituting an equally segregated will or feeling or intuition. Pragmatism on the other hand has tried to maintain some kind of organic connection between intelligence and the other functions.

But the author is either unaware of, or ignores all this. Nor does he come to close quarters with the problems which have been acute in the English and American discussion. There is frequent appeal to 'necessity' and 'consistency' without sufficient criticism of these concepts. The laws of number and of pure geometry are regarded as 'necessary laws of the movement of thought'. But applied mathematics, which is the realm within which the scientific pragmatism represented by Poincaré plays its rôle, is experimental and has only a 'limited necessity'.

The most general form of the author's indictment of pragmatism is that it ignores and consequently confuses and confounds the distinction between psychological and logical necessity. Here again no account is taken of the extended discussion of this point which has gone on from the beginning of the movement.

Perhaps some of the neglected issues are reserved for another volume which is to follow. But it is difficult to see how any one who has followed closely the discussions of pragmatism during the last ten years could proceed on assumptions which have been constantly in question in these debates without more recognition, if only in footnotes, of the unsettled status of these presuppositions than is given by M. Berthelot.

REVIEW OF *WILLIAM JAMES AND HENRI BERGSON*

"Review of Horace M. Kallen, *William James and Henri Bergson*." *International Journal of Ethics* 25.4 (July 1915): 554–556.

This brilliantly written little volume is a timely and able discussion of some questions that have needed sifting ever since James' rhapsodic introduction of Bergson to English readers. By many, even among the initiated, that famous introduction has been taken for much more than it was worth as an index of the agreement between James and Bergson. It is well, therefore, to have these matters set out by one in every way so well qualified for the enterprise as the author. It is also fortunate that the presentation of two such masters of expression as James and Bergson does not subject the reader to painful contrasts between the style of the treatment and that of the material treated.

The basis for the entire discussion of the relation of James and Bergson to each other is found in their relation to what Dr. Kallen calls the "philosophical tradition," or better the "metaphysical tradition" in philosophy. In its most general character this tradition has expressed itself in the "compensatory" conception of the world. My recollection is that this term is of Dr. Kallen's own mintage. By it he means that metaphysics has consisted in the main of "a substitution of desiderates for data, of ideals for facts." It has been essentially "a vicarious fulfillment of unsatisfied desire, a compensation in discussion for a disappointment in reality." In method the metaphysic tradition is marked by "the hypostasis of the instrument." "Philosophy has fallen into the position of the toper whose first drink is taken to save his life and who ever after lives to drink."

In computing the latitude and longitude of James and Bergson in relation to this "metaphysical tradition" the author is led to canvass the relation of idealism and radical empiricism, neo-realism and pragmatism to this conception. The author's verdict in the end is that all have sinned and come short of the glory of the God of things as they are; but that James, pragmatism, and radical empiricism – one gathers that the last is the designatory legend preferred by the author – have at all events accepted in principle the world at its "face value" and have in fact been fairly successful in so taking it. Traditional idealism is, of course, *durch und durch* compensatory. Neo-realism has tried to be radically empirical. "But by

using formal logic and external relations as a measure of existence it has secured an unchallenged place among the protagonists of the compensatory tradition." Even some pragmatists, *e.g.*, Papini, have not escaped "hypostasizing the instrument." As for Bergson, he is a prince of the compensatorists albeit he finds his compensatory reality in change instead of in eternal visions.

It is in the exposition of the agreement and disagreement, especially of the disagreement, between James and Bergson that the volume makes perhaps its most valuable contribution to current discussion. As before remarked, James' fervid introduction of Bergson misled many. Even in their anti-intellectualism, which is the one thing most readers would say James and Bergson have in common, Dr. Kallen points out a fundamental difference. Bergson teaches that intellection is essentially mutilative. James says it is so *only* when the results of its operation are hypostasized into metaphysical entities. "For James, falsification belongs to metaphysics; for Bergson, to the realm of cognition as such."

But after all the real basis of philosophic difference between men is to be found not so much in doctrines of method as in beliefs about such matters as "the origin and destiny of man," the nature and meaning of goodness and divinity. And here the chasm between James and Bergson yawns wider than ever. For Bergson, goodness and immortality are metaphysical implications; for James, the one must be created, the other discovered or perhaps also achieved if so be.

As an avowedly sympathetic reader of this volume I find in my notes the following questions on some points of doctrine:

First, is there danger of pushing too far the opposition between man and the world? (pp. 2, 207). While there is opposition, is there not also co-operation?

Second, must not radical empiricists be careful to keep mediation and stability, that is, whatever mediation and stability is found or effected, on a level with the immediacy and the flux of experience? (p. 27 *et passim*.)

Third, I have not been able to see the internal coherence in Bergson's system – for paradoxical enough it is a system – which Dr. Kallen finds (pp. 112, 210 ff.). I have pointed out elsewhere (*Phil. Rev.*, 21, No. 4) that Bergson's attempt to expound an evolutional philosophy with a nonevolutional logic produces a series of antinomies in which every important category plays opposite and from Bergson's standpoint contradictory rôles.

All in all the verdict must be that Dr. Kallen has done well something well worth doing.

REVIEW OF *DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION*

"Review of John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*." *International Journal of Ethics* 26.4 (July 1916): 547–50.

The thinking world has long since learned to expect from Professor Dewey matters of prime importance. Of the general significance of this volume it is perhaps enough to say that, in the reviewer's opinion, it is the most important of Professor Dewey's productions thus far. In defiance of possible imputations of chauvinism, the reviewer will also say that it would be difficult to overstate its import and value for all students of education, philosophy, and society.

The sub-title of the volume is "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education." Most books that have appeared under that caption have left recollections either of an external, mechanical application to education of a philosophy fashioned for other purposes; or of a conception of the philosophy of education in which the philosophical element is regarded as a particular 'part' or 'phase' or 'kind' of philosophy concerned with the particular problems of education. But the thesis of this volume is that all philosophy is, at bottom, social philosophy; and all social philosophy is the philosophy of education. Hence the significant, not to say startling, statement: "The most penetrating definition of philosophy which can be given is that it is the theory of education, in its most general phase."

William James was fond of quoting Chesterton's statement, "The most important thing about a man is his philosophy." It may be added that the most important thing about a man's philosophy is its conception of philosophy – its opinion of itself, of its origin, and its mission. A philosophy, therefore, which believes that the 'most penetrating' definition of itself identifies it with the philosophy of education and in the end with the philosophy of democracy is something that demands attention. There is no doubt of the 'penetrating' character of this definition. It quickly penetrates all conceptions of philosophy which find its origin in a 'pure reason' or a pure 'sentience' that by some inexplicable cosmic accident or 'fall' is in but not of our human world; and it penetrates all theories of education which are *a priori* deductions

from ready made systems of such philosophy. In this brief notice only the main headlands of the argument can be pointed out.

In the face of the 'ineluctable fact' of the death of its individuals, life in all its phases and contents has to perpetuate and develop itself by transmission, by communication. It must then to some extent be social in character. And the more complex the life-bearing being, the more communicatory, the more social it is obliged to become. This social process of transmission by which life maintains and develops itself *is* education. Education is then no mere 'auxiliary'; it is literally a matter of life or death.

The point at which ideas, the capacity for reflection, appear in this process marks a great epoch in its development. It means the inestimable power of remembered successes and failures, and the capacity for utilizing them in future operations. And with a little further development, it means a theory of education, a deliberately planned inquiry and experimentation. Here is the point at which philosophy gets its identity with the theory of education, and at which the whole method of Professor Dewey's treatment appears. If we take seriously the view that ideas, theories, have their origin in and their operations determined by this process of perpetuating life through education, philosophical ideas and theories can be no exception. But, if this were all, it could be said: "Neither can any other ideas be excepted; and if all ideas are 'educational' the meaning of the term 'educational' becomes too diffused and thin to be useful." Professor Dewey's exposition goes on to show (1) how in point of content, philosophical problems, like the problems of education, are more directly concerned with active 'attitudes' and 'dispositions' than are the sciences which deal with specific fields of nature and society; and (2) how, historically, 'the fact that the stream of European philosophical thought arose as a theory of educational procedure, remains an eloquent witness to the intimate connection of philosophy and education.'

But all this is 'instrumental' to the matter which Professor Dewey has particularly at heart in this volume, and indeed everywhere, – namely, 'the implications of democracy in human association' and therefore, as we have seen, in education and philosophy. "In all social life whatever, even in a gang of thieves, we find (1) interests held in common and (2) interaction and cooperation with other groups." "How numerous and varied are the interests which are commonly shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?" – these are the test questions for every society; and they both point to democracy. The first means "not only a mutual sharing of interests but a reliance upon the recognition of these mutual interests as the chief factor in social control." The second demands "not only free interaction between social

groups but the continuous readjustment of social habits in meeting the new situation produced by varied intercourse."

With inexorable continuity the pedigree of the 'problems' of government, of education, and of philosophy is traced back to the disjunctions and conflicts due to the failure to recognise both these 'criteria of human association'. When the social, human aim of education is prostituted to exclusive, aggressive national interests, division, confusion, and strife enter. "Art, science, and commerce are international both in quality and method. But with national sovereignty regarded as the basic conception and motive of government each nation lives in a state of hostility and incipient or actual war with its neighbors." The antitheses of educational aims, of subject matter and methods; the problems of 'interest and discipline', of 'efficiency and culture', of 'labor and leisure', of 'naturalism and humanism', are all shown, with convincing detail, to be symptoms of social cleavage. To the same source are traced the issues of philosophy. The problems of 'mind and matter', of 'body and soul', of 'the world and the individual', of 'knowledge and practise', of 'truth and goodness', – all these 'record the main lineaments and difficulties of contemporary social practice'.

Within the present generation we have seen departments and schools of education grow shy of the 'philosophy of education'. There are schools of education that even boast the absence from the curriculum of any such thing as 'the philosophy of education'. The reason is not far to seek. When 'the philosophy of education' consists, as it so often does, of the antinomies of transcendental metaphysics, translated into educational terms, thus tending to fix in education the very disjunctions it should heal, or when it consists, on the other hand, of a collection of theorems and rules – a sort of pedagogical Euclid, little wonder departments of education feel they can get on without it. But if the conception of 'the philosophy of education' be one in which 'the most penetrating definition' of the philosophy in it is that it is 'the theory of education in its most general phases' and one in which the theory of education is conceived as an account of the actual operations whereby human society is perpetuated in the world then no department or school of education which pretends to touch bottom can ignore it. The attempt to do so is quite analogous to the attempt of a well known school of philosophy to construct a new logic which excludes the act of knowing, because, forsooth, the act of knowing has been regarded in the past as 'subjective' and has kept logic in the throes of epistemology. As logic has been in need of a different conception of the act of knowing, so the philosophy of education has been in need of a new conception of philosophy. This need "Democracy and Education" supplies. The subtitle of this volume might well be "The Restoration of the Philosophy of Education" – its

restoration – not only to students of departments and schools of education – but to all who have any interest in the problems of our common life and in the future of democracy in our world.

REVIEW OF *HUMAN NATURE AND ITS REMAKING*

"Review of William E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*." *International Journal of Ethics* 29.2 (January 1919): 230–232.

This is an instructive and stimulating book abounding in wide learning, genial wisdom, and shrewd insights, set forth in unusually clear, graceful and forceful English.

The title suggests a study in social psychology, and so it is. But this is auxiliary to the chief concern, which is with religion. The volume is the outcome of lectures delivered in 1916 before the School of Religion at Yale University.

The standpoint is frankly, that of the Neo-Hegelian absolutism of the general type of Bosanquet and Royce. But its method is much more effective than the procedure of most teachers of absolutism. It does not stake the case of the absolute on a mathematical or logical theorem. The concreteness of the "Concrete Universal" shall be exhibited. Our instincts shall declare it. There shall be no language where its voice is not heard. This is, of course, the thesis of all absolutism. But most attempts, from Hegel on, to exhibit its detail have ended in appeals to the principle of logical contradiction, even while professing to find the unique character of the absolute in Art, in "Sentience," or in Religion. This is not to say that Professor Hocking's method avoids all of the ancient difficulties of absolutism. On the contrary it means that it confronts them and grapples with them at points where they are most acute and where others have avoided them.

The "original" "primitive" human nature, which is to be remade is accepted "for the sake of the argument as a group of instincts." The most general form of the remaking agency is Conscience. And this agency, while it may appear now as *vox naturœ,* now as *vox familiœ,* or *vox populi,* is always at bottom *vox Dei.*

At the outset the argument encounters the old question, is this agency of remaking a part of "original" human nature or is it outside and independent of it? This antithesis appears early in the argument where Professor Hocking says (p. 99), "My own view is that conscience stands outside the instinctive life of man not as something separate, but as an awareness of the success or failure of that life in maintaining its status and its growth." On the other hand, one of the distinctive and most important

features of the volume is the emphasis placed on the existence of a pervasive *central instinct*, best, but imperfectly, described as "the will to power." Here conscience appears (p. 115 and elsewhere) as the conflict of the specific peripheral instincts with this central instinct. Here the remaking agency is as instinctive as the material to be remade.

Human life is then the remaking and sublimation of specific instincts by the central instinct of "the will to power" which seeks its realization in nature, society, and art, but finds it completely in religion. Religion alone "is the satisfaction of the whole will, the will to power in its inclusive form." "In religion the will of man seeks direct union with the simple center of power which is beyond and within the world as the will of the world."

The account of the transformation of instinct through society, art, and Christianity betrays a rich acquaintance with material and a fertile power of interpretation. In reading this volume as in reading others written from the same standpoint, *e.g.*, Bosanquet's logic, so long as the exposition is occupied with specific, scientific or social problems the non-absolutist reader finds himself jotting the margin with approving and admiring comments. But when the attempt begins to connect up scientific procedure with the absolute, or to portray the sort of remaking of instincts required by the absolute, the character of the marginal notes changes. The notes are now full of such interrogations as the following: If religion provides a direct and adequate supernatural, super-social, super-artistic realization of "the will to power" why retain the indirect and inadequate forms? What is the relation of the direct and adequate to the indirect and inadequate forms of realization? What is the content of this direct and adequate realization? Or, must we here be frankly mystics? Again, if access to the direct and adequate source of power must be affected by that source itself, by "The Divine Aggression" (Chaps. 44-46), does the divine attack always succeed? If not, why not? If so, what is the evidence? May not "the will to power" after all mean just the capacity which we have for conceiving a better state of nature, art, or society than the present and of taking steps to bring it to pass? And may not the recognition and celebration of this capacity, and devotion to its operation, be truly religious? And how (p. 415) does this conception "cut us off from the higher reaches of sympathy" or from the vision of "an endlessly progressive humanity"? Are not these the very essence of such a religion?

Professor Hocking is clearly aware of the fundamental social danger of the conception of absolutism, namely, that in the hands of any but the most sophisticated expert the finality and authority of the absolute is certain to be imputed to specific and finite social orders and programs with political and religious autocracy as the outcome. He recognizes that it puts a severe strain on human nature to ask it to refrain from justifying the detail of its

procedure by its ideal. Nevertheless we must refrain; we must see (p. 315) that "the detail of the law like the detail of science has to be built with the aid of pragmatic considerations" of "social expediency… . Religion must content itself with giving to these pragmatic considerations their final meaning." Again our margin asks, what is the content of this "final" meaning? and what is its relation to the "pragmatic" meanings? Is it merely additive? Is there no organic relationship?

These questions may exhaust the patience of the author as they do our allotted space for this notice. He may refer us to the final chapter on "The Last Fact" which proclaims that the content of this final meaning cannot be rendered conceptually even by philosophy. In it meaning and fact are one and must be directly and uniquely experienced by the individual. Still the questions haunt us.

REVIEW OF *STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS*

"Review of *Studies in the History of Ideas* by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University, vol. 1." *International Journal of Ethics* 30.2 (January 1920): 226–228.

The authors of these studies say that the volume expresses their desire to encourage research and the exercise of historical imagination and to contribute something to the work being done in this department of human interest.

The table of contents shows thirteen essays. In traditional terminology four of the essays would be called 'metaphysical', three 'logical', and three 'politico-ethical.' A note on "Dr. Thomas Brown's contribution to Aesthetics" by Mr. Jones, a paper on "Francis Bacon and the History of Philosophy" by Mr. Coss, and a discriminating study by Mr. Balz of "The Psychology of Ideas in Hobbes" complete the list.

As the space of this review has very definite limits and as most of the readers of this Journal are presumably more interested in the politico-ethical discussions, the other essays will have to be noticed 'by title'. The metaphysical papers include a suggestive interpretation of "Spinoza's Pantheistic Argument" by Mr. Cooley, a discussion of the meaning of φύσις in early Greek philosophy by Mr. Veazie, and an essay on "Appearance and Reality in Greek Philosophy" by Mr. McClure, who shows very clearly the difference in meaning and function of these categories as they are employed in the different interests of science, of religious mysticism and of ethics and politics. The last of the metaphysical essays is on "Berkeley's Realism." This is by Mr. Woodbridge whose thesis is that Berkeley's Realism is the controlling motive in his philosophy and that this has been obscured by interpreting Berkeley through Locke. Needless to say the thesis is ably defended.

"Truth and Error" in Descartes by Mr. Owen, "The Antimony and Its Implications" by Mr. Montague and "Old Problems with New Faces in Recent Logic" by Mr. Costello constitute the contributions to logical theory and are among the most stimulating essays of the volume. I hope to discuss them elsewhere.

Passing now to the Ethical and political studies, in "The Attempt of Hobbes to Base Ethics on Psychology" Mr. Lord points out that Hobbes is the founder of modern social psychology, and that in basing his ethics on this type of psychology, his procedure was sound. His limitation lay in

his inadequate conception of the factors involved in human motivation and in the artificial results of his geometrical method.

The interpretative canon, which Mr. Bush effectively uses in his discussion of "Greek Political Philosophy" is that philosophy celebrates, not what a period or a group possesses, but what it needs. The political philosopher that takes his business seriously is likely to be impressed not so much with the achievements as with the shortcomings of his time. And if he writes in the form of universal propositions it is because that is often the most economical way of writing in the imperative mood. The ethical and political ideals of Plato and Aristotle represent not actual accomplishment, but the weapons with which they combatted the disintegrating survivals of tribalism in Greek society. The array of historical material and neglected considerations, which Mr. Bush marshals in support of his interpretation, is impressive and persuasive.

The purpose of Mr. Dewey's study in Hobbes' *Political Philosophy* is to correct the 'illusion of perspective', which attends more or less all history of thought, but has been especially prominent in interpretations of Hobbes'. This displacement is due to the tendency to read earlier thought in terms of the problems of a later period, especially of those of our own day. The main problem of social philosophy, for over a century, has centered in the conflict between individual freedom and public control. The prominence of the theory of sovereignty in Hobbes' has made it easy to translate his political philosophy into terms of this conflict. But the real issues of Hobbes' day which furnished the chief motivations of his political doctrine, were the divided sovereignty of church and state, and the conflict between the authority of traditional law, the law of custom and precedent – lawyers' law, and the reconstructive influence of science and reason, expressed through legislation and equity. Whatever the limitations in Hobbes' conceptions of human nature and of scientific method, his primary motive was to identify morals with politics and to place both on a scientific basis. This meant rescuing morals and politics, on the one hand, from the domination of supernaturalism represented by the Church, and on the other, from the irrational naturalism of custom and precedent. There doubtless remains in Hobbes the paradox of the sovereign's arbitrary authority in matters of right and wrong, and the doctrine of the scientific character of morals and politics; but it is Mr. Dewey's contention that it is the latter that is fundamental in Hobbes. The former is the accident of Hobbes' inability to work out the requirements of this fundamental interest, an inability due to the inadequacy of his psychology and of his mathematical logic.

I think many, if not most readers will agree that Mr. Dewey's study has succeeded in shifting the emphasis in Hobbes' political philosophy, and that future historians of philosophy must take account of this essay

in evaluating Hobbes' contribution to the development of modern thought.

The authors express the hope that the volume will be received as a manifestation of the wish to co-operate with similar enterprises elsewhere in the endeavor to increase America's contribution to the history of culture, – a wish which should, and doubtless will meet with a cordial response.

REVIEW OF *STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICS*

"Review of R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*." *International Journal of Ethics* 31.4 (July 1921): 441–443.

The subjects discussed in these "Studies" are: The Philosopher's Quest; The Idol of Scientific Method in Philosophy; Philosophy of Nature at the Crossroads; On Doubting the Reality of the World of Sense; "Saving the Appearances" in the Physical World; Mechanism and Vitalism; Theories of Mind; The Self in Self-Consciousness; Religion and Philosophy of Religion.

Professor Hoernlé refers to these "Studies" as "chips or blocks from a Metaphysician's workshop" and as "sketches" and "rough modellings" which precede finished work. And he promises a second volume which "will expand and defend" some of the positions taken in this volume.

In these days of numerous "schools" of philosophy, it means something to have at the outset a statement of the author's point of view. This Professor Hoernlé frankly avows as the standpoint of "Idealism," particularly the edition of it represented by Bosanquet, to whom, he says, "more than to any other single writer," he owes "the essential framework" of his own philosophical thinking. From this announcement some might expect to encounter what James called the "Barbaric Hegelian style" in these *Studies*. In this he will be pleasantly disappointed. Professor Hoernlé's writing is clear, stimulating, and graceful. One might expect also to meet "The Absolute" frequently in these pages. But not once from cover to cover, so far as I can recall, does it appear. It does not get even a perfunctory recognition in the statement of the general standpoint. Still good absolutists will be consoled for this lack of explicit recognition of the absolute when they find that by "Idealism" Professor Hoernlé means "The point of view of the whole."

A philosophy committed to this point of view has its main job cut out for it, or, viz., "the saving of appearance." As a salvager Professor Hoernlé is perhaps more successful than most perfectionists. Yet he too "has his troubles," as who has not.

The ordered harmonious whole as the object of philosophy must meet the demands of logic (p. 18), yet as the basis of religion it is an object of immediate experience, against doubts of which proofs of God's existence are powerless (p. 305). Again, this ordered, harmonious world, which is

the object and ideal of both philosophy and religion, becomes, as the alleged goal of pragmatic moral reformers, not only impossible, but undesirable. "It may well be asked whether any world in which it is fundamentally worth while to live can be really conceived as 'Safe', … because the forces which would endanger and overthrow these values are once for all destroyed?" (p. 46). But is not just this "safety" supposed to be the state of affairs in a completely unified and harmonious world?

Professor Hoernlé's presentation of the positions he criticises is most admirably objective and sympathetic. In his discussion of Instrumentalism and Pragmatism, however, he, in common with most critics, assumes that instrumentalism ignores contemplation, because it does not recognize it in its theory of *knowledge*. This assumption overlooks the fact that instrumentalism gives no place to contemplation in *knowledge* precisely because it gives it a place of honor in immediate, æsthetic and social experience. Bring it into knowledge and you have on your hands two independent and unrelated species of knowledge, each with its own standard and method, and at once trouble begins with the conflicts and confusions of the rival claims.

The limits assigned to these comments allow no indication of the discriminating analyses and defining of issues which make up the body of the *Studies*. The treatment of the mind-body problem, of mechanism and telology, of the weaknesses of traditional science and of Neo-Realism deserve special mention.

The title page of the volume reads: "R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Harvard University." I am sure I speak for all "on this side" who have known Professor Hoernlé either by "acquaintance," with his genial and stimulating personality, or by "knowledge about" him through his writings, when I say that it is with deepest regret that we are obliged to say that the words "Harvard University" have now only an historical reference. Professor Hoernlé's return to England leaves a big gap in the ranks of the American division of philosophers. But I think every student of contemporary philosophy will agree that however it may be in politics, in philosophy, the difference in longitude between England and America counts for very little – and we may hope through Professor Hoernlé's international experience it will count for even less.

REVIEW OF *A STUDY OF REALISM*

"Review of John Laird, *A Study of Realism*." *International Journal of Ethics* 32.2 (January 1922): 215–218.

Both for its matter and its manner this book should have a wide circle of readers. It is a shining example of how even in the midst of the most technical philosophical subtleties grace and wit may survive without any sacrifice of clearness and force. However the author may be physically constituted, he is mentally eupeptic, and he has been nourished evidently on a well-balanced diet. The resulting sense of reserve and poise adds greatly to the comfort of the reader.

The author would probably resent being tagged with the label of any of the pre-existent species of Realists. He has points of agreement and disagreement with all of them. From the introduction I suspect the author would least resent the label of Neo-Reidism. He says: "If the shade of Reid could visit these regions to-day, it would greet Mr. Prichard of Oxford, but it would be startled by Mr. Alexander, bewildered by Mr. Russell, and distressed by Mr. Holt."

The fundamental thesis, that knowledge is of things as they really are, will hardly be satisfied with the essences which the critical Realists offer. His "are" includes existence as well as essence, the "that" as well as the "what." This is further implied in his criticism of Meinong's propositional objective as the subject matter of judgment. While the American Neo-Realists have neglected the subjective factor in knowledge, Russell, on the other hand, has given it too much of a rôle in his accounts of sense data.

The chapter headings are: Things We Perceive, Things Remembered and Expected, The Stuff of Fancy, The World of Common Belief, Principles, Values, The Mind, The Larger Outlook, and a well-done philosophic-literary "epilogue" on The Vision of Thales.

The assumptions of Professor Laird's Realism as he gives them are: (1) and most important, that "Things can be known as they really are," (2) and scarcely less important, "Matter is precisely what it appears to be when sufficient precautions have been taken to avoid confusion between the actual genuine appearances and the spurious. It follows, (3) that genuine appearances cannot contradict one another, and things cannot contradict one another. To say that things can be known means, of course, (4) that they can be known by us. But (5) as we are finite we can hope to know but a small part of the infinitude of existence. (6) We have no right

to deny the assumption of psychology that any piece of thinking is a subtle web whose pattern was woven long before the days of our neolithic ancestors, and whose yarn even now is three parts spun in the blind loom of lines of branching nerves." So if we know anything "as it really is," we know it "despite the fact that we do not know much that pertains to its conditions and connections." A "thing" is "any entity whatsoever that can be apprehended by the mind." "Knowledge" is "a kind of discovery in which things are directly revealed or given to the mind." And "the mind" – there is an entire chapter devoted to "the mind." But the reader will find some difficulty in squaring the contents of that chapter, and what is said of it in the chapters on the "World of Common Belief" and "Principles," with the above statement of knowledge which, however, is frankly admitted "not to be very precise."

The task and problems of the rest of the book consist, of course, in trying to state our world and experience in terms of these assumptions and definitions. If in knowledge things are directly revealed or presented "to the mind," the only cognitive character and business of the mind is simply to receive these revelations and presentations. But it turns out, inevitably, that these "revelations" and "presentations" of things are very Pickwickian. For, before the mind can "directly receive" the presentation, it must for "most of our knowledge" work like the dickens for it with all the machinery of observation, inference, experimentation, etc. It is very much as if one should say: "Dear Mind: As a slight token of friendship, I present you with the largest diamond in South Africa. To be sure, I do not know where it is, and I am not sure just how you can be sure that you have found the really largest one, and of course somebody else may claim the ownership of it, but these are little minor details which I am sure will not be taken too seriously between friends."

And this recalls that Professor Laird finds that the Pragmatists do not "take knowledge seriously." To one with as keen a sense of humor as Professor Laird's, the Pragmatist's reply must be obvious. For of course what this charge amounts to is that the Pragmatist does not take the presentative Realist's conception of knowledge seriously. His own, indeed, he takes seriously enough. And if he does not take the presentative Realist's conception seriously it is because he finds that knowledge as a direct presentation and revelation does not take itself and its task "seriously." This lack of seriousness shows in the treatment or lack of treatment of error, always a crucial topic for presentational Realism. When, after trenchantly criticising the Neo-Realistic explanation, he faces the problem for himself, Professor Laird simply throws up the sponge in the statement (p. 103) that "it is impossible to explain error. We must simply accept this eternal possibility, and try to be as careful and consistent as we can." There is, of course, a sense in which error cannot

be explained, the sense in which we cannot say why the universe is "such that" it or anything else should occur. But this is not the author's difficulty. He throws up his hand on error simply because he has no adequate working criterion for it.

In perceptive knowledge those perceptions are better intrinsically which are focal as compared with marginal percepts. But Professor Laird sees that "better" cannot be equated with truer (cf. the Theætetus), since false perceptions are as focal as true ones. In judgmental and inferential knowledge the problem is to remove contradiction from appearances, for "things cannot contradict each other." There is much to be desired here on the meaning of "contradiction" in mere appearances. How can mere presentations as such be in contradiction? Suppose the stick looks crooked and feels straight, what possible contradiction in this as mere presentation, unless one wishes to use the looks of the stick as a means to handling it.

At one or two points hopes are aroused in the reader that some additional light is to be thrown on that Cimmerian region of the relation of subsistential entities to existential things. But so far as I can see, these hopes are disappointed. We are assured that subsistential entities "hold of, apply to, are valid of," etc., existential things. But just what these phrases mean of one presentation as such in relation to another still seems a dark matter. They are left just where Plato left them in the Parmenides. But this is to be said, that Professor Laird is everywhere frankly conscious and vocal of these difficulties.

The limits of this notice forbid more than mere mention of the stimulating discussion of values. If the author should chance to see this notice, and should be oppressed by a sense of the futility of discussion within such limits, I assure him I share this feeling. I wish to say in closing, as I began, that this is a book which makes the reader hope for others from the author.

REVIEW OF *THINGS AND IDEALS*

"Review of Max C. Otto, *Things and Ideals*." *International Journal of Ethics* 35.3 (April 1925): 310–312.

This book places the author in the front ranks of present writers on philosophy. This, not because it sets out a new philosophical system or advances new special theses, neither of which it claims, but because of its brilliant and inspiring reinforcement of a view of "things and ideals" that is steadily making its way in the world. In the author's own words, "The twelve essays of this book are devoted to a cause. They are intended to help make articulate a social philosophy which recognizes equally the reality of things and ideals and which aims to further their reciprocal interpenetration in the interest of human happiness."

Further specification of the nature of this relation between things and ideals is forecast in the warning that those "who absolutely refuse to seek in the world of change for the means of its redemption as well as those who are set in their denial of the reality or efficacy of anything but things, will do well to save themselves the irritation of reading the pages that follow." That there would be "irritation" is not to be doubted, for the author does not mince matters.

The chapter headings are: "Philosophy and Life," "Two Ideals," "Right for Right's Sake," "Might makes Right," "Right by Agreement," "The Sell," "Science and the Higher Life – the Renewal of Warfare," "Science and the Higher Life – the Issue Developed," "Science and the Higher Life – Looking Towards Harmony," "The Soul," "The War and the God-Makers," "The Hunger for Cosmic Support."

The keynote of the book is sounded in the last phrase of the first of the above quotations: "Their (things and ideals) reciprocal interpenetration in the interest of human happiness." Taking its cue from the *de facto* failure of this interpenetration in the past and the consequent failure of human happiness, philosophy has too often celebrated and confirmed this failure by translating it into impassable metaphysical, logical, moral, and religious dualisms, which it has then attempted to heal by taking one member of the division as "real" and the other as "appearance," or by taking both as "appearances" of an inscrutable, nominal unity. In either case we are left with a number of disastrous splits in our world, such as materialism and idealism, terrestrialism and celestialism, science and values, a morality of might, of possession, and a morality of pure duty (or impure pleasure), a

religion with a monarchical, imperialistic, tribal god of conquest or a religion with an algebraic deity which cannot be translated into any specific known values.

All these "cuts" have the common premise that ideals and values cannot be realized in a world of things, and that things are hopelessly alien to ideals and values, the realization of which has been postponed to another world – an arrangement which has always played beautifully into the hands of those who have no concern for human destiny in this world or any other. To secure the social conditions which enable them to procure terrestrial success at the expense of others, they are quite willing, like Macbeth, to "jump the life to come." And the fundamental social condition of this success is that most of us shall continue to believe that ideals and values cannot be realized in the world of things. Hence we are encouraged "to fasten our eyes upon the sky that they may the more readily relieve us of things we would not otherwise surrender voluntarily and deliberately."

In this state of affairs Professor Otto finds the great opportunity and business of philosophy; namely, to teach and preach the condition of the Great Society to come on earth, where "sanctity of life, beauty of surroundings and creative opportunity shall be a general fact." The advent of such a society means that the morality of abstract duty – of "right for right's sake" – which can always be exploited to the ends of those who know exactly what they want (e.g., Bernhardi's appeal to Kant), and the "morality of might," which is the residuary legatee of the morality of "right for right's sake," must both be superseded by "the morality of agreement," of adjustment, and of co-operation, which aims, not at an absolute good, but at the best that we can see with the best eyes science can give us.

In the admirable chapters on "Science and the Higher Life" it comes out that one of the main things that has hindered "the interpenetration of things and ideals" is the fact that science has developed and stated itself exclusively in terms of "things" – things as metaphysically different from and independent of values and ideals. This leaves a dehumanized and mechanized "realm of nature," and throws ideals and values, i.e., the "higher life," into the supernatural. Science is left valueless and values scienceless. Hence "the adjective 'higher' in the term Higher Life is made synonymous with 'obscurer', and the whole subject of ideals becomes a phase of obscurantism." Witness the popular method of disposing of the conflict between science and ethics and between science and religion by making the parties to the conflict "wholly incommensurable." By driving home this solution, Professor Otto shows that ethics and religion bereft entirely of things are left with nothing but empty concepts. He then shows (one could wish a little more fully) that science, ethics, and religion in their actual procedure constantly flout this "incommensurability." No teacher of ethics or religion can possibly stick to the empty abstractions. The values

of integrity, courage, friendship, devotion, beauty – all are distilled from the world of things and persons in mutual interaction. And further analysis shows that the things which constitute the subject-matter of science are *selected* and their laws formulated with reference to the various problems encountered in our efforts to attain a better life.

But until this is explicitly understood and recognized, until there is a change in the prevalent notion of both science and the higher life, until each ceases to cling to a sovereignty fatal to the other, the enterprise of building a better life will be heavily handicapped. With this recognition "the self" and "the soul" will cease to be indefinable, metaphysical entities to be saved (though as such they are not worth saving), and become centers of activity which from the world of things through the methods of science will create and enjoy, not primarily a world of private property, but the priceless values of companionship and art in which *all* shall share. With this recognition, the vague "hunger for cosmic support" – the central theme of all religion – will be seen as

> a deflection of the desire for fellowship with our kind. We shall turn from our sense of cosmic isolation to a new sense of human togetherness and so discover in a growing solidarity, in a progressively ennobled humanity, in an increasing joy in living the goal we have all along blindly sought and shall build on earth the fair city we have looked for in a compensatory world beyond.

For clarification of ideas and for renewal of courage, this book should be read by all – "professionals" and "laymen" – who are interested in the building of this City.

APPENDIXES

Responses to Addison W. Moore 1911–1950

PETER'S TOOTHACHE ONCE MORE

James B. Pratt, "Peter's Toothache Once More." *Journal of Philosophy* 8.15 (20 July 1911): 400–403. [Moore responds in "Reply to Professor Pratt.]

The non-pragmatist who, in spite of his unregenerate condition, still has an open mind and a real sympathy for the pragmatic spirit, will find much that is helpful in Professor Moore's recent and brilliantly written book, "Pragmatism and Its Critics." There are, however, a few questions – and among these some which he has been accustomed to consider rather crucial – concerning which he will come away from his reading with no great increase of comprehension. One of these questions, which Professor Moore evidently considers already so completely thrashed out as to need no further treatment from him, is the pragmatic meaning of "truth." In two or three passages he incidentally reaffirms the old formulas, but nowhere does he make any considerable effort to throw new light on the subject or to explain any of the difficulties connected with that much-debated term. This is unfortunate for a few of us who, in spite of sincere study upon many pages of pragmatic writing, still have to admit that there is at least one difficulty outstanding, the explanation of which has never been made completely clear. The difficulty, in short, is this: If it be meaningless to define a true judgment as "one which represents its object as it really is," and if truth, therefore, is not to be conceived as correspondence, but identified, rather, with the process of verification, lying wholly within experience, what shall we do with the case of a judgment which is never verified but yet corresponds with its object – a judgment, that is, whose object is as the judgment thinks it? But perhaps, to make my meaning clear, I had best revert to an illustration which I used some time ago in this Journal.[1]

The illustration was briefly this: Peter has a toothache, and John thinks Peter has a toothache. Now according to pragmatism, as I understand it, the truth of John's judgment does not consist in the correspondence between it and its object, but in the "experienced process" of its verification. So far all is clear. But now arise two possible difficulties. In the first place, let us suppose that John verifies his judgment only after Peter has cured his toothache. The state of things is then at least a little queer. For, according to the pragmatic view, John's judgment, "Peter has a toothache," was not true so long as Peter had the toothache, and became true only when Peter ceased

[1] Vol. IV., pp. 322–24. It also appears in "What is Pragmatism?" pp. 70, 117–121.

to have the toothache. A more serious difficulty is the following: A third boy, Tom, thinks Peter has *not* a toothache. He tries to find out, but misinterprets Peter's words and actions, and finally concludes that he was quite right and thereafter lets the matter drop. His process of verification was perfectly satisfactory to him. His idea "worked" "in the way it set out to work." Was it therefore true? If not, why not? And if it was true, then were not two contradictory opposites both true at the same time and in the same sense?

In an article which appeared in this Journal a year ago last July, Professor Moore promised to take up this toothache case "in another paper." I have been waiting for this "other paper" ever since. And to my disappointment, neither in Professor Moore's recent article in this Journal on "How Ideas Work," nor anywhere in his new book, do I find any slightest attempt to help me out of my difficulties. Instead of keeping his promise, he proposes a perfectly new toothache case, about a man who had an ache and thought it was in his tooth and so went to the dentist and had it out. Here, of course, the pragmatist has no difficulty in demonstrating triumphantly that the idea, "The tooth is the cause of the pain," led the man to the dentist's, and so was verified. Of course this is all true, but it so completely avoids all the difficulties of my toothache case that I am quite as much in the dark as ever.

As Professor Moore refuses to help me in this matter, I have searched for what help I could get from the other pragmatists. Professor James has this much to say that is revelant to Peter's toothache: "The critic's trouble seems to come from his taking the word 'true' irrelatively, whereas the pragmatist always means 'true for him who experiences the workings'. 'But is the object *really* true or not?' the critic then seems to ask – as if the pragmatist were bound to throw in a whole ontology on top of his epistemology and tell us what realities indubitably exist. 'One world at a time', would seem to be the right reply here."[2]

In similar fashion Dr. Schiller writes: "The argument about 'correspondence', 'Peter', etc., seems to me to beg the question, because you *assume* that one can know what the reality, or the real truth, is apart from our human modes of getting at it. But this is just the crux. Our systematic challenge is – What right have you to take for granted the reality of what you have no means of knowing? It is so far just the Kantian question, How know? applied consistently. The only inference you are entitled to draw from your example is that Peter *may* have a toothache but there is a dispute about it."[3]

[2] "The Meaning of Truth," p. 177.

[3] From a personal letter which Dr. Schiller permits me to quote. For a somewhat similar criticism see H. V. Knox in *Mind*, Vol. XVIII., p. 599.

If these criticisms are to be taken as in any sense answers to my difficulty and as explanations of the toothache case, it must be simply because they deny my right to suppose at the same time a Tom with his idea and a Peter with his ache. "How do you *know* that Peter had a toothache?" ask Dr. Schiller and Professor James. And the answer, of course, is: I don't; I only *suppose* he has. That was my *hypothetical case*. Now if you grant that I have a right to my illustration and that it is a possible case, then you are bound to tell me how Tom's verified idea that Peter had no toothache was true when as a fact Peter did have a toothache. And if my case is impossible, and it is altogether uncertain whether there be anything outside of Tom's own experience to which it is bound to conform in order to be true, then are we not heading straight for solipsism? If there are other sentient beings beside myself concerning whose experiences I may form judgments, then the relation of those experiences to my judgments about them, although itself not experienced by any of us human beings, is certainly an important element in the problem whether my judgments are true. And if there be no such relation it must be because there is *no other term* to which my judgment is related.

Now, lest I should be misunderstood by my pragmatist friends, let me hasten to explain that I have never for a moment believed that they were really solipsists, nor do I suppose that they seriously question my existence or each others'. I wish merely to point out that if one persists in holding to principles which are consistent only with solipsistic presuppositions, one can not get fully free from solipsism even by proclaiming upon the housetops one's enthusiastic adherence to the "social consciousness" view. It is all very well to insist that consciousness is social and public, and that self-consciousness arises only *pari passu* with consciousness of other selves. As Professor Moore points out, "My consciousness is a function of a social process in which my body or brain or mind is only one factor." This is all perfectly true. And yet, however interdependent our experiences may be, there is a sense in which my thought *is* private – *my* thought and not yours. As Professor James puts it, the breaches between "thoughts belonging to different personal minds . . . are the most absolute breaches in nature."[4] And if I deny the existence of an unexperienced relation between my thought and your experience and the relevancy of this relation to the truth of my thought, I certainly seem so far forth to be denying your experience.

In all which I may be completely mistaken. And if I am, will not some kind pragmatist friend take pity on me, and explain to me at last the real nature of truth as applied to Peter's toothache?

PRAGMATISM AND SCIENCE.[1]

Warner Fite, "Pragmatism and Science." *Philosophical Review* 23.4 (July 1914): 410–429.

Professor James has called pragmatism a new name for some old ways of thinking." But pragmatists as a rule have been interested more in the new name than in the old ways. This must explain why they have generally failed to see that the first and greatest of their school was Immanuel Kant. For it was Kant who, more than any other, established the great Copernican revolution – the humanistic revolution, as I should call it – in which the center of reference in the interpretation of scientific knowledge was shifted from the world that is known to the mind that knows it. Since Kant it has been scarcely possible to conceive of a science which should fail to reflect the character of the scientific mind. Yet it seems curious that Kant should have associated the name of Copernicus with a movement that transferred the center of reference from the world to man; for Copernicus, you will remember, removed the center of our planetary system from the earth to the sun and thus gave to our world a more foreign aspect than it had worn before.[2] In point of fact Kant does something of the same kind. His world of nature is not a humanistic world in any very personal sense. Kant lived in an age whose ideal of science was still patterned exclusively after the astronomical achievements of Newton, and for which, accordingly, the type of science *par excellence* was mathematical physics. For Kant himself the two most sublime objects of thought were "the moral law within" and "the starry firmament without." And for Kant the beauty and sublimity of the celestial system lay in its eternal and unchanging regularity. To the thought of the eighteenth century this seemed to realize the perfect consistency of the divine reason. Now I suppose that there is no part of our world which is more discouraging to a humanistic interpretation, and certainly there is none less amenable to human will and desire, than this "starry firmament without." No department of nature offers a more striking contrast to the unpredictable variability of most of our human thinking. And yet, in Kant's view, this inflexible regularity of the heavenly bodies was the reflection of

[1] The first of two lectures given before the Philosophical Union at the University of California on December 5, and 12, 1913.

[2] This was written before I had seen Norman K. Smith's interesting explanation of the 'Copernican' revolution in *Mind*, Oct., 1913.

our human reason. How did Kant unite these seemingly incongruous elements? The answer is simple; he united by separating. To Kant we owe the rigid separation, still more or less current in psychology, of knowledge, feeling, and will. In Kant's psychology all of the processes of scientific knowledge, or reason, take place in a compartment of the mind which is assumed to be inaccessible to the contaminations of personal desire. By this device he preserves the inflexible necessity of scientific law while making science the reflection of the human mind.

This means that Kant's humanism was far from complete. Kant's philosophy was a humanism modified to satisfy the authority of the Newtonian physics; and it did not occur to him, as it seems not yet to occur to his pragmatic successors, that the claim of science to deal with an independent reality might be satisfied by a theory of knowledge in which knowledge is determined by desire. I might point out, indeed, that Kant's humanism is not so imperfect as it seems, even in the *Critique of Pure Reason* – for the *Practical Reason* is clearly a humanistic document. But I prefer to let the statement rest where it stands in order to bring out more clearly the meaning of that later humanism which is called pragmatism.

For the difference between Kantian criticism and modern pragmatism centers precisely upon the question of the relation between reason and desire: are they dependent or independent? Kant's humanism is made awkward by the fact that in his psychology reason is independent of desire. For pragmatism reason and desire are at least mutually dependent – if, indeed, we are not to say that pragmatists adopt the opposite extreme and make reason *dependent upon* desire. This central issue is nowhere more boldly stated than in the chapter on "Reasoning" in William James's *Psychology*. To grasp James's point I will ask you to put before you the image of an old-fashioned reasoner – the reasoner as Kant would have described him. You will find his type in the figure of Justice blind-folded. For the first duty of the old-fashioned reasoner was to be strictly 'impartial' – to decide the case upon the basis of the evidence furnished him, and upon that alone: to all else he was supposed to be 'blind'. And he cared not what result was reached, provided only that it was reached in accordance with the laws of logic. In a word, his ideal was to be as impassive, and at the same time as coldly accurate, as an adding machine. A mere suspicion of bias, or even of personal interest, would vitiate his conclusions. Now, in contrast to all this, James maintains that reasoning is guided from first to last by a subjective and personal interest. Reasoning begins with an hypothesis to be tested; in other words, not with evidence, as the older view asserted, but with conclusions. For the matter of that, until you have first set up a theory, an hypothesis, a conclusion to be tested, there will be no evidence forthcoming. To the impartial seeker after facts the world is mere vacuity. No man of science is ever thus impartial; scientific facts are

discovered because of their bearing upon interesting problems. Accordingly, in James's view, reasoning begins with a desire or purpose, with something that you wish to prove or establish; and the facts are gathered with a view to this purpose. The same purpose then determines the analysis of the facts, their definition and classification. At every step the qualities and relations among your data which you count as real are those which have a bearing upon your purpose. And, in the end, the only properly 'logical' conclusion – the only conclusion that gives truth – is that which satisfies your purpose and yields the desired result.

This gives us the essence of pragmatism. In the ordering of philosophical theories pragmatism is the enemy both of realism and of absolutism. In the vocabulary of pragmatism all vice is "absolutism." Now, realism and absolutism both teach that reality is independent of our human grasp of it; that nothing is made true by being known, much less by being desired. According to Kant, a proposition is made true by being known, if known in accordance with the rules of human reason; but, according to him, reason, though a part of human nature, is independent of desire. For the pragmatists reason and desire are one; and perhaps we should say that desire is the one. Hence, a rational, or true, statement is the statement which satisfies our desire. A real object is an object in the existence of which we find it useful to believe. Truth is not already made, as the realists hold, but is always being made by us for purposes of our own. To be true, then, is to satisfy our purposes – that and nothing more.

For a convenient illustration of the logic of pragmatism we may take the Copernican theory of the heavens. This formulation, according to which the planets revolve about the sun, is viewed by men of science as a modern discovery; by this they mean that this relation of the planets and the sun was at least not created by Copernicus. For the pragmatists the Copernican theory would be, not a discovery, but an invention. By them a theory of the heavens would be regarded as one of the necessities, let us say, of navigation. The older Ptolemaic theory, according to which the sun revolved about the earth, had reached a stage of complexity which rendered it no longer available for purposes of calculation; and the Copernican theory was devised to take its place. A second example would be the assumption of a universal law of cause and effect. James tells us that the question of cause and effect is suggested by the attempt to discover who is responsible for a given result. But I fancy that most pragmatists would prefer to point to the practical necessity of assuming an order of cause and effect if we are to set out to accomplish any purpose whatever; if planting is not to be followed by harvest it will not be worth while to plant. Voltaire said that if God did not exist we should find it necessary to invent him. By a similar necessity, according to pragmatism, we have invented the law of cause and effect.

One of the most striking illustrations of the theory is an example which James quotes from Ostwald. "Chemists have long wrangled over the inner constitution of certain bodies called tautomerous. Their properties seemed equally consistent with the notion that an instable hydrogen atom oscillates inside of them, or that they are instable mixtures of two bodies." But both views lead to the same *practical* result. Now, a realist would hold that this is a case *either* of the instable atom *or* of the instable mixture. One or the other must be true – we simply cannot say which – but both cannot be true, unless it can be shown that the two phrases have theoretically the same meaning. But, according to James both are equally true because, in practice, both lead to the same result. For pragmatism this is all that 'truth' can ever mean. The complex laws of science are, therefore, only so many human inventions. Each of them has a practical meaning, and the practical meaning is the sole meaning.

Thus far the meaning of pragmatism seems definite and clear. But now we are to see that what appears to be clear upon the surface may turn out to be vague underneath. Suppose, then, that we put the question, What are the human needs? Are they needs only for bread and butter or have we also intellectual and spiritual needs? Or shall we say that intellectual and spiritual needs are only disguised needs for bread and butter? On the other hand, may we not ask whether, as conscious beings, we have any need for bread and butter except as we need to eat it self-consciously? In a word, can science be satisfied with a world which as a brute fact does yield bread and butter? I need hardly remind you that these are questions of first importance; for, if we become pragmatists, they are the questions which will determine for us what kind of a world we shall take to be true; and in the meantime they must determine for us what pragmatism really means. They may convince even the pragmatist that his world is very different from what he now takes it to be. For suppose it should turn out that even the bread and butter needs are of the same type as the need of sexual gratification; that, for example, while appearing to be merely needs for physical satisfaction, they are at the same time needs for physical satisfaction in a relation of spiritual fellowship. A world which satisfied this need would be very near the world of objective idealism.

Now I think I am not wrong in saying that our American pragmatism is disposed to emphasize the need of bread and butter and to hold that spiritual needs are only bread and butter needs disguised. At least I feel compelled to say this of the pragmatism of my friends, Professor Dewey and Professor Moore, although I am convinced that they would call the interpretation vulgar. When I endeavor to state for myself their conception of the categories of science, I seem to find but one phrase suitable. Why do we need to look upon nature as a regular succession of cause and effect? Their answer seems to be: because we need it in our business; or, better perhaps,

because we need it in our factory. For the term by which they prefer to name their special brand of pragmatism is *instrumentalism*. Instrumentalism teaches that the categories of science, such as the law of cause and effect, are but so many tools or instruments – though, indeed, highly complex instruments – for gratifying our needs. And what needs? So far as I can see, the only needs to be satisfied by such instruments are the needs of bread and butter. As I have already pointed out, there must be a direct relation between the kind of world that a pragmatist takes to be true and the kind of need that he wishes to satisfy. Now, to look upon nature as a mechanism, or an instrument, after the fashion of the physicists and the chemists, does indeed satisfy the need for bread and butter. So far, it matters not whether the bread comes from a machine or from the hands of a human baker. In the words of James, both views would be equally true. And if the need is above all for a strictly calculable source of supply, then doubtless the machine view is truer. But I cannot conceive any one to be satisfied with this mechanical view of nature who feels that his need of living with her, or even upon her, is also a need for understanding and fellowship.

The question before us is therefore the question of the logic of our needs. Pragmatism, instrumentalism, humanism – in all of these views the basis of logic is human nature, and in all of them truth (whatever else it may turn out to be) is an expression of human need. Now it would be false to deny that we find it useful to treat nature as a system of mechanical causation or that this treatment is dictated by a need for bread and butter. But is this the whole story – the whole story of our needs? Of this very need a different version is suggested by Bergson, who has also been called a pragmatist; and to my mind his analysis is far more penetrating and illuminating. Bergson agrees with the instrumentalists in holding that the mechanical conception of nature is the outcome of our need for bread and butter, but according to him it is at the same time the expression of another need. The mechanical conception enables us to have practical dealings with nature. But why? Bergson's reply is: because, to a prevailing type of mind, the mind of the natural scientist, this conception renders nature more intelligible – or, as he would prefer to say, more amenable to intuition. In a word, while the mechanical view of nature does indeed supply us with bread and butter, it is at the same time a reflection of the fact that man himself is a machinist.

To see what this means let us suppose that we are seeking an explanation of animal life. I need hardly remind you that, in spite of the vitalism of Driesch, the main endeavor of biologists to-day is to explain the life-process in terms of mechanism; and this means that a process which on its face appears to express a unity of purpose when taken as a whole is analyzed into a series of temporally independent operations each of which introduces its successor by the blind force of mechanical necessity. Bergson points out, then, that this method of producing a result is precisely what you find in a

factory. For example, a kid glove which we might well suppose to be formed by the manual skill of a few persons, passes through no less than fifty or sixty hands, each of which performs a single mechanical act. The fact is that we men are unable to produce a glove as nature produces an organism, in a single and continuously coordinated act. The form and purpose of the glove are in no wise logically implied in the act of slaughtering the animal for his skin; and, though the skin be stripped, or even tanned, it is not yet determinately the embryo of a glove. In our human industry, and especially in organized industry, it seems necessary to divide the operation into a number of successive and virtually independent stages. Accordingly, says Bergson, when we seek to understand nature we read our own necessities into her. Our immediate intuition of life tells us, indeed, that the growth of an organism must be something very different from the manufacture of a glove; yet when we attempt to bring nature to terms of practical clearness, we seem almost compelled to impose upon her the routine of the factory.

Bergson uses this illustration as an argument against 'intellectualism' and in defense of what he calls 'intuition'. In his view, what is chiefly demonstrated is the fatal mendacity of intellectual analysis, or, for the matter of that, of all analysis. But I believe that we may ignore his condemnation of intellectualism even while accepting the doctrine of 'intuition'. For my own part, I should say that it is just the intellectual, if you please to call it so, that constitutes the superiority of human life to that of the animals. It is the intellectual that elevates the enjoyment of Beethoven or of Tschaikowsky above the enjoyment of a good dinner, and it is the intellectual that transforms erotic gratification into a relation of personal loyalty and gives to this side of our nature a moral value and nobility. When Bergson calls a man an intellectualist, he means, I fancy, that the man has the soul of a mechanical engineer; and he points to the mechanical theory of nature as a depressing illustration of the engineering philosophy of life. I should prefer to point to Bergson's analysis of the engineer's point of view as true type of intellectual analysis.

What, then, is the significance of this analysis? To see its point for ourselves let us return for a moment to the instrumentalist. Instrumentalism, you remember, is the school of pragmatism which holds that the categories of science, and in particular the mechanical category, are so many instruments, or tools, for the satisfaction of our practical needs. And the instrumentalist himself, as you may now see, is none other than Bergson's intellectualist – the man who looks at the world from the standpoint of the engineer. For the instrumentalist the world is an engine; this embodies his conception of what we need. If, however, we accept Bergson's analysis, we shall say – shall we not? – that, even granting this instrumental view of science, what the scientist really seeks here, in the mechanical theory of nature, is not so much an engine as an engineer. We look upon nature as a mechanism, not because,

in some opaque fashion, the view 'works', or yields results – what is there, in the first instance, to suggest that such a conception would work? – but because, in more intelligible fashion, this conception of *the working of nature* enables us to come to terms with her, to make arrangements with her, to anticipate her in somewhat the same way in which we anticipate the intentions of our fellow-man. All of this means that, upon any deeper analysis of motives, instrumentalism must turn out to be a form of anthropomorphism. This does not mean that I condemn it; on the contrary, I propose to defend it. Meanwhile I have suggested that the kind of pragmatism a pragmatist stands for must depend upon his conception of our human needs; and further that, as conscious agents, our need is not merely to consume bread and butter but to consume it self-consciously. Shall we not say, then, that, in the scientific construction of our world, our deepest need is for a world that shall be from our human standpoint intelligible?

To suggest that a need of this kind is in fact embodied in the formulations of science I shall ask you to recall once more the contrast between the Ptolemaic and the Copernican theories of the heavens. According to positive science the Copernican conception was nothing more than a late discovery of an eternal fact; according to the pragmatist, the Copernican conception was an invention for satisfying practical needs. But I think that the pragmatist is in danger of weakening his point, and that he lays himself justly open to the charge of creating a subjective and fictitious world, by speaking constantly as if an invention were invented out of nothing – as if, in the present case, there were no order in which the Ptolemaic and the Copernican views are definitely related. Accordingly, I shall propose the question, If the earth goes around the sun, must not the sun also go around the earth? When the question is thus stated, you perceive at once that it all depends upon which of the two you choose to regard as stationary; and then you reflect that a stationary point anywhere in the universe is just the most arbitrary of all assumptions. Why, then, do we now choose the sun to remain stationary? The pragmatist tells us that this conception is more convenient. But then we are obliged to ask him how a conception can be more convenient except as it renders the object more intelligible; and this is to ask what it is that renders the heliocentric system more intelligible.

Suppose we put the question to the positive scientist. We receive the same answer in somewhat different terms. The preference of the positive scientist for a system which has the sun for its center is based upon the claim that this conception is 'simpler'; and for him, very curiously, the simpler conception always represents the positive outer fact. "Very curiously," I venture to say; for your positive scientist prides himself upon nothing more than upon his entire freedom from anthropomorphic superstitions. Could there be more naïve anthropomorphism than the assumption that nature always works with the fewest possible general principles? Or, in more

technical terms, that she is guided by the law of parsimony? It is quite clear that we should be so guided ourselves. But this only serves to remind us that 'simplicity' is a matter of personal point of view. It is a common remark that all things are equally simple to him who understands. Your gasoline engine is complex only so long as it is imperfectly mastered. The advanced mathematician finds it simpler to deal with special problems by means of highly generalized theorems; but his mode of approach is anything but simple to a child. Now, for the older, or Ptolemaic, astronomy it was simple enough to think of the sun as revolving about the earth; but when it came to the other planets it was found necessary, upon more exact observation, to introduce subsidiary movements, or forces, in the form of epicycles; and these epicycles became so many as to render it impossible to form a single clear picture of the planetary situation. Yet, for all this, are we to suppose that a geocentric formulation is once for all impossible? That no mind could be conceived for which this formulation should not, after all, be simpler? Once more we may put the question, If any member of the solar system moves with reference to the other members, must not all the other members move with reference to this? And then will not any member serve as a center? Why then, is the heliocentric conception simpler? For no other reason, it seems, than that this view of the situation renders the working of the system more easily conceivable and intelligible from the human, or at least from our present human, point of view.

And renders it intelligible, we may go on to say, from the standpoint of our human motives for action. For if we now inquire more closely into the advantages of taking the sun as the center of our system, we shall find that they consist chiefly in the fact that upon this assumption we may resolve the motion of each of the planets into two rectilinear forces, the attraction between the planet and the sun and the tendency of the planet to "fly off at a tangent." But what advantage do we gain by translating a curvilinear motion into two motions in a straight line? I am inclined to think that when children are told that, if the sun's attraction should cease, the earth would move off into space in a straight line, they often wonder why it should not just as well continue to move in a curve. Why must a body moving of its own momentum follow a straight line? For an answer to their question they are referred to Newton's first law, which reads: "Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion *in a straight line*, except in so far as it may be compelled by force to change that state." In other words, free motion is never circular, or elliptical, or what not, but always rectilinear. And this rectilinear character, we are told, is a logical and impersonal necessity of thought. Thus the advantage of the heliocentric system seems to be that it more easily enables us to conceive the movements of the planets in terms of logical necessity – as formulated in Newton's law.

Yet I think that only a little reflection is needed to see that this seemingly most impersonal of scientific laws is really far from impersonal. A body in motion will move until stopped, a body at rest will remain at rest until moved. Why? we venture to ask. My answer is, Because this is precisely how we ourselves should behave. Newton's law simply reads into the universe that aspect of motive which makes our own action intelligible. But why must free motion be rectilinear? Again, it seems to me that (following a suggestion of Poincaré), we should say: because our own free motion is rectilinear – because, owing to the transverse symmetry of our bodies, it is easier for us to walk in a straight line than to follow the path of a curve. True, it is not quite easy to follow a perfectly straight line. When we close our eyes in walking, we may find that, owing to an imperfect symmetry of our bodies, or at least to a difference in the natural stride of the two legs, we tend to turn to the left. But this only serves to suggest that, if we were markedly asymmetrical, the shortest distance between two points might lie in the path of a rather sharp curve. In that case, we could scarcely continue to say that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points; nor again, that a body freely moving must move in a straight line.

All of this may serve to suggest that the aim of science is not merely to find in nature an opaque and unintelligible instrument, still less to record a set of positive and absolute facts, but rather to discover in nature an activity intelligibly motived in like fashion with her own. And when our attention is once directed to this aspect of science, we find the evidences forthcoming on every side. For one more illustration I shall make use of Weissmann's theory of heredity. Looking at evolution in an obvious and popular way, we should be tempted to say, with the Lamarckians, that evolution takes place through the inheritance in the offspring of characters acquired in the life-experience of the parent. But when we try to figure to ourselves any method – that is to say, any mechanism – by which such inheritance could be accomplished, the result seems all but miraculous. That cutting off the tail of a white rat must remotely have an effect upon its offspring seems probable enough; but that it should have just the effect of producing a tailless offspring seems most extraordinary. For this reason Weissmann makes it a point to deny that the experience of the parent is responsible, in the offspring, for any positive character whatever. According to him, all the characters of the offspring are due to what he calls the germ-plasm, which in some way remains independent of the body-plasm and has been passed from parent to child unaltered since the beginning of life.[1] That some characters appear and others fail to appear is due to the selective effect of the environment. But the point of the theory is that no new character is created. The germ-plasm, then, is a mechanism – for Weissmann is careful

[1] That is, according to the earlier and simpler form of the theory.

to insist that his is a mechanical theory of life – which, through all the changes and chances of the environment, keeps the species true to itself.

By this interesting device the Weissmannians conceive that the explanation of the life-process is freed from any implications of purpose or motive. Yet we have only to reflect upon the results accomplished by the germ-plasm to have the question suggested whether these results are not themselves, like the inheritance of acquired characters, all but miraculous. Those who take satisfaction in a mechanical view of nature seem often to forget that, as Bergson reminds us, the type for all mechanical explanations is the activity of man the machinist; and then they forget that in our human world the most automatic machine accomplishes nothing whatever without human guidance. The germ-plasm of Weissmann is supposed to guide the development of the organism automatically in a certain given direction amidst the countless variations of a complex environment. When I try to conceive this in terms of any ordinary mechanical analogy I find myself driven to think of a steamship leaving Sandy Hook with the wheel lashed in the direction of Liverpool. Any one familiar with the operation of steering a ship will know that, in the absence of the constant readjustments made by the man at the wheel, the chances are even that the ship will land upon the coast of South America or of Australia. In biological terms this would mean that what sets out to be a mouse might just as well end in a cow. But in point of fact the language of the mechanical biologists suggests that they too have placed a man at the wheel. For they speak constantly of the 'control' exercised by the germ-plasm, or by the determiners of heredity. Not long ago I ventured to point out to a biologist the teleological implications of that word 'control'. His reply was that biologists must make use of the words that the language affords them. But words stand for conceptions, and conceptions reveal the character of the mind. If our language refuses to lend itself to the description of a purely mechanical universe, it then becomes a question whether a mechanical universe is humanly conceivable and whether, in fact, the universe is actually conceived as such by men of science.

Hence, I say that the need of a machine for practical purposes, which underlies the logic of instrumentalism, is at the same time a need for a world that shall be humanly intelligible. Remember that I do not reject the practical need; I say only that for a self-conscious being any practical need must be also intellectual. But this is not all. For what our previous analysis shows us is that our needs, though practical and intellectual, are, even in their most practical aspect, *social*; in other words, the mere need of dealing understandingly with nature is a need of dealing with a fellow. To make the point clear let us suppose, in pragmatic fashion, that marriage is an instrument for gratifying the bodily need for sexual intercourse. That this is a practical need, like the need for bread and butter, I think that no honest

man can deny. Yet any deep analysis of this need shows us that, even in the coarsest of men, it is a need for fellowship, for the willing response of an 'other', and that this need survives after the bodily need has grown faint. But the same thing may be shown of the need for bread and butter. At first glance you may be disposed to say that you have no real need for social relations with a baker, but only for a machine which will supply bread. But this, you will doubtless admit, is a reflection of the distracting influences of our modern life, which, by its vastly enlarged means of communication, imposes upon each of us a larger set of social relations than he can properly assimilate. Unless you are a housekeeper, you have probably no dealings with the baker, but receive your bread from the hands of your wife or your household servants. But this only serves to remind us how vital is the need of having our practical wants satisfied by those who are personally interested in us. And if you had to deal personally with the baker, day by day, you could not but feel the need of making your communications cordial; they could hardly remain merely impersonal. Now, it seems to me that a motive of just this kind is implied, only more remotely, in the attitude of the scientist towards nature. It was clearer in the older scientist, before a convention of respectable impersonality, or a superstition about working for humanity, had forbidden the scientist to be at the same time a poet and a lover of nature. Yet I think it fair to say that the successful men of science are still generally those who select for their scientific study the objects that personally appeal to them. The botanist is a lover of plant life, the physicist a lover of machines. James quotes a saying of the French artisan about his favorite tool, *ça me connait*, it recognizes me; or, it speaks to me. May we not say that the deepest need of the natural scientist in dealing with nature is the need of having nature speak to him? Call this superstition, if you please, but what other motive will you invoke to explain his genuine personal absorption, what other motive will sustain his unwearied pursuit, and how else may we justify his enthusiasm for science as transcending the considerations of practical and social utility?

I hold, then, that if we accept the pragmatic doctrine that truth is determined by our needs and then undertake to make an analysis of our needs, we can find no halting-place for pragmatism short of a complete humanism. This term has been applied to the doctrine both by James and by Schiller. But by 'humanism' I mean a more thorough realism than either seems willing to avow; or, if apologies are due, they are due to Mr. Schiller. I find myself unable to justify the position – to me lackadaisical and skeptical – that pragmatism is merely a 'method' for dealing with experience; for I cannot conceive a method of investigation which does not imply a theory of the nature of what is to be investigated. And to me both 'pragmatism' and 'humanism' imply, even as methods, that we are

dealing with a world assumed to be motived in like fashion – as remotely like as you please, yet in like fashion with ourselves. This I take to be the meaning of any wholehearted humanism. But if this be its meaning, then we are obliged to ask why the teaching of pragmatism falls short of this; why does pragmatism take refuge in instrumentalism? This question brings to our attention the strange reverence of the instrumentalists for the point of view of 'modern science'.

When we venture to suggest that truth is something that is always being made – and in what sense we may say this I shall ask in the next lecture – we are at once confronted with the fact that in 'modern science', so called, there is something peculiarly absolute and final. The attitude of modem science is well expressed in Comte's theory of the three stages in the history of thought: first the stage of theological superstition; then the stage of metaphysical abstraction – for Comte not less superstitious; and now, finally, the stage of positive fact. Positive and hard fact – like Mr. Gradgrind, your modem scientist is above all things a man of fact. In this final revelation, human thought, groping through the ages, has found at last its solid basis. In the strictest sense, however, modern science is a matter of the last sixty years. Its gospel of method is to be found in John Stuart Mill's *Logic*. And the peculiar thing is that while Mill and Comte were founding a science of positive fact, Darwin and Spencer and Wallace were introducing a method for the transmutation of all fact under the name of 'evolution'. The theory of evolution suggests clearly that 'modern science' is only one of the stages in a never-ending process. But scientists in general appear to be blind to the implication. And nothing is more offensive to a man of science than to suggest that future ages may look upon our modern science as we now look upon mediaeval scholasticism, simply as one stage in the history of thought.

In the theological and metaphysical stages the world was interpreted from a human point of view. The positive stage appears to have discarded all points of view. Your modern scientist claims to look at facts with the naked eye, and I dare say that, to avoid possible distortions, he would prefer to discard the eye. At any rate he is firm in holding that his thought is in no wise colored by human motives; and to make his point clear he is never weary of a humorous reference to the older days when nature 'abhorred' a vacuum. In his view all humanistic interpretations of nature are anthropomorphic or animistic; and all animism is primitive animism. They belong to that stage of thought in which, for example, the West African negro explains the drowning of his brother on the ground that the river bore him a grudge. In the eye of the man of science, the purpose of science is to free our thought from all motives whatsoever, to disentangle the fact from the mental processes of the knower and to see it as it is, uncontaminated, dry, hard, cold, and absolute.

Now, I have no wish to suggest a disrespect for science; indeed, such a wish would be rather futile. But I think that respect may always fall short of stupefaction. Much of our recent philosophy seems to have forgotten that one function of philosophy with relation to science is that of an interpreter and a critic. The new realism, of which so much is heard at present, seems to have repeated the experience of Saul on the way to Damascus, but without a corresponding revelation. The same influence has been at work upon the pragmatists, in which, again, they repeat the story of Kant. We have seen how Kant's humanism was cut short by a blind reverence for the Newtonian physics; and how, in his psychology, this resulted in an illogical and wholly artificial separation of reason and desire. In like fashion the logic of pragmatism is cut short at the point of instrumentalism. Like Kant himself, the pragmatist wishes to be in good repute among natural scientists. Which of us, asks Thackeray, would not like to be seen on the arm of a duke? Or, in the present case, on the arm of a millionaire? Yet, as it happens, the scientist of to-day is the typical absolutist. Nothing is so absolute as the absolute fact, and no theory of nature is so rigid in its demands as the mechanical theory. Perhaps we may say that this mechanical logic is just the essence of all absolutism. Yet at the same time it is true that no intellectual movement in the history of the race has been so brilliantly successful in producing tangible results. In the presence of this dilemma the pragmatist demonstrates his regard for modern science by taking the mechanical theory without criticism; and then he makes peace with himself by interpreting the mechanism as an instrument for the satisfaction of practical needs. The result is instrumentalism. By this compromise the path is closed to any further development of a humanistic logic. The very name means that the instrument, now once for all accepted as such, stands as a barrier to any deeper or more human interpretation of our needs. In instrumentalism, as Bergson would say, thought and logic have congealed. From the standpoint of a pragmatic logic, instrumentalism is an unholy alliance with absolutism.

Now, it seems to me quite possible to suggest a more honorable agreement which will better satisfy both the realistic claims of natural science and the humanistic demands of pragmatism. The terms of this agreement will be outlined in the next lecture. In the few minutes that now remain to me I shall endeavor to show how we may meet some of the objections that lie in the way of a whole-hearted humanism. First we may meet the charge that such a view of the world must be condemned as anthropomorphic by asking how any view of the world which is possible for human beings could fail to be anthropomorphic. How are men to know the world except just in the way that men can know it? How are they to conceive of God except in their own likeness? If the world is wholly foreign to themselves, then how can it be known at all? If it be objected that, at any

rate, knowing should be independent of desire, then we may appeal to all human experience to show that knowing is impossible without the illumination of desire. Take any situation you please. Let it be the family dinner-table. Apart from the sympathetic interpretation of personal desire, that scene would be wholly unintelligible; as formless as the arrangement of the stars in the heavens; as meaningless to you as the most mysterious of the ceremonies of primitive life. For the matter of that, you could not even discover the facts. It would not occur to you to suppose that the act of raising the cup to the lips meant the passage of the liquid down the throat. Accordingly, when the modern scientist tells us that he has discarded all points of view and has dispensed with all human interpretations, we may reply by telling him that his position is incomprehensible and absurd; he might as well boast of having discarded his eye. Knowledge, we shall tell him, transcends everything, but discards nothing. Man is a far more independent animal than the lion or the horse, though physically far weaker – not because he ignores the limitations of his physical organism, but because he so thoroughly understands them. In like manner we transcend the prejudices of our human point of view by becoming aware of them. No error lies in the operation of motives; in an unmotived world there could be no truth. Error arises when the motive is blind to itself.

And therefore when we are charged with 'primitive animism' we shall reply by gently suggesting that there is a difference – a difference as wide as the world – between a primitive animism and an intelligent animism. And the difference is logically of the same order as the difference between a provincial point of view and that of a cosmopolitan and humane culture. The primitive animist corresponds to the provincial American who regards the Frenchman as a monkey, the German as a pig, and the Englishman as a roaring bull, but who is most of all unable to characterize himself. Yet he cannot learn to know the alien races by ignoring his own race or nationality, or by forgetting himself, but only by interpreting their behavior in the light, extended through reason and imagination, of his own motives. To be able to do this is the first sign of intelligence in social life. Why should it not be a sign of intelligence in dealing with nature? It is true that nature, and especially inanimate nature, is inconceivably more remote a neighbor than any of our human fellows. A humanistic philosophy is in no wise logically bound to make the universe smaller or less impressive. It can quite freely admit that there are more things in heaven and earth than are even dreamt of in our philosophy. Let it be so. If we are to have a philosophy, if the universe is to be known, a relation of intercourse must be established between the knower and the known; and no intercourse will be established except so far as the universe can be made in human terms intelligible.

But now there is a more fundamental objection, the consideration of which I have reserved for the next lecture; yet I prefer not to close without

a preliminary announcement of the issue. When the pragmatist asserts that the truth is what he finds useful to believe, the realist, or natural scientist, meets him with the question, But what of the facts? And the pragmatist then retorts by saying that any unwelcome experience he will decline to treat as a fact. But this only means, so far as I can see, that the distinction between truth and fiction is thoroughly artificial and capricious; and this is the charge which is most frequently – and, I should say, justly – laid at the pragmatist's door. The realist will then meet him with the following disjunction: either, he will say, truth is a matter of your needs; and then you will be unable to distinguish truth from fiction – for how could you need anything but truth? Or truth is independent of your needs; and then your needs have nothing to do with it. For only by a miraculously preestablished harmony could you expect that what you need to have true would at the same time be independently true. This disjunction appears to me to be palpably false. Yet it seems to be accepted both by pragmatists and by realists; by the pragmatists when they refuse to discuss the question of independent truth, by the realists when they deny that truth is in any way created by being known. I hold that truth may be both the satisfaction of our needs and independent of our needs; and that unless it is both of these it is not truth. How this may be I shall endeavor to show in the next lecture.

PRAGMATISM AND TRUTH.[1]

Warner Fite, "Pragmatism and Truth." *Philosophical Review* 23.5 (Sept 1914): 506–524. Ed. Note: Moore replies to Fite's articles in "Pragmatism, Science and Truth," in this volume.

Following the example of Socrates, who conceived his social function to be that of a midwife, I endeavored in my former lecture to perform this service for pragmatism. Pragmatism holds that the world as conceived by natural science is the expression of human needs. The pragmatism of Dewey and Moore, called instrumentalism, teaches that the conceptions of science are so many instruments for the acquisition of worldly goods. My criticism of the theory endeavored to show that our deepest needs, even in making a practical use of nature, are for intercourse with a fellow; that these needs are implied in the very fact of treating nature as a mechanism; and therefore that pragmatism in its ultimate significance stands for the interpretation of nature from the standpoint of our human motives – in other words, for humanism. At the close of our argument, however, we faced the problem of making a humanistic philosophy true. What if the facts refuse to respond to our needs? May we then simply dismiss any such rebellious item from the world of facts? That, I should hold, in common with most of the critics of pragmatism, is to create an arbitrary distinction between truth and fiction and to make truth a matter of caprice. On the other hand, how may we say that science is both a representation of an independent reality and a fulfilment of our needs – how without assuming a miraculous coincidence between the world and our needs? If truth is always being made, how can it be independently true? These are the questions to be considered in the present lecture.

In the last lecture I pointed out that the founder of the humanistic philosophy was Kant. We shall therefore do well to ask how this same problem presented itself to Kant; and we shall see that in the most important points the problem has not changed from Kant to the present day. The fundamental question, let us remember, is this: How can I, the knowing person, know an object which is other than myself? Now, Kant's humanism consisted in affirming that I can know nothing except in my own way; nothing can be real for me which does not satisfy my criterion of reality. How,

[1] The second of two lectures on pragmatism given before the Philosophical Union at the University of California on December 5 and 12, 1913. The first lecture was printed in the *Philosophical Review* for July, 1914.

then, shall we adjust the rights of the criterion with those of the reality itself? Kant answered this question by a reconstruction of the ancient Aristotelian distinction of form and matter. The distinction is in general a familiar one. Even our scientific friends are disposed to admit that, while experience contributes the material of facts, it is the scientist who builds them into the form of laws. But Kant's view was not quite so simple as this. According to him the forming process was at work in the very reception of the facts. Positive science assumes that the facts are furnished ready-ordered in relations of space and time, and that the work of the scientist is confined to the determination of cause and effect. According to Kant the scientist is responsible for both processes. That is to say, Kant distinguishes two stages of form, the forms of perception, space and time, and the forms of understanding, or of scientific reason. The real world, the world of things in themselves, is in neither space nor time. It is we who give it a spatial or temporal character in the act of taking it. If, following James, we venture to speak of the "Kantian machine-shop," we shall say that in the factory of science as conceived by Kant, the material supplied by nature is met at the very door by a machine which converts it into an order of facts in space and time. From the space-and-time department the facts, now empirically ordered, are passed to the understanding-room to be reconstructed into an order, let us say, of cause and effect; or, in other words, to be transformed from mere perception of fact into knowledge of an objective world. This is a very summary statement; but it may be sufficient to suggest how, in Kant's view, the knower handles the known.

But now we face the question, How is the knower so fortunate as to find a material that he can handle? With this question we are in the midst of Kant's difficulties – difficulties which seem to have made his thinking ever uneasy and in the solution of which he was never quite clear. As formulated by Kant, the problem of scientific knowledge is to explain how we can make predictions which are afterwards verified. In 1846, after many years of work on the part of himself and of others, Leverrier calculated that an unseen planet, afterwards named Neptune, must exist at a certain spot in the heavens, and the astronomers at Berlin, having been notified, directed their telescope to that spot and verified the calculation. How could Leverrier expect that his calculation would be verified? This is Kant's question, to which in his complicated and repeated discussions of the problem he seems to offer two different answers. His first and clearest answer is that such a calculation is bound to be verified because the calculator had the conditions of verification all in his own hands. For the ground of the prediction, we must remember, was the form – in other words, the assumption – of a universal law of cause and effect. If the observation failed to verify the prediction it could be put down as false, on the ground that such an observation was opposed to the law of cause and effect; that no planet exist-

ed at the given point in the heavens was simply not a fact. Kant's first answer, then, is this: the knower procures verification for his prediction, or hypothesis, by selecting from the mass of experience the items that would verify and treating only these as facts. In this answer verification is procured by selection.

Now, while 'selection' may explain how our predictions are guarded against disproof, it fails to explain how we happen to get the facts that will positively verify. If I step into the hatter's and ask for a certain size of hat, there is nothing strange in the fact that I find it. But it would be indeed strange if I could step into a photograph gallery and find a ready-made photograph of myself. Now, the facts required by science for purposes of verification are like photographs rather than like hats – highly particularized facts. Science is a finely articulated system, in which the facts, if they are to fit at all, must fit exactly. A planet discovered somewhere in the region of the point indicated would, strictly speaking, verify nothing; at best it could only suggest an error in calculation. How, then, does it happen that even by selection science is able to find the fact that fits? At this point we are referred to Kant's second answer. In the first answer his facts were hard and served only as a basis for selection; in the second they are soft and plastic. Now he tells us that the scientific understanding finds material suited to its purpose because the forms of perception – the forms that put the material into an order of space and time – have already moulded the facts for just this purpose.[2] In other words, the original material as it first reaches the mind is so indefinitely plastic as to be available for any categories whatsoever. I need not carry the point further. Standing before a block of marble Michael Angelo exclaimed, "I see an angel in the marble." Of course he might just as well have seen a devil. In like manner, according to Kant's second answer – and James gives the same answer – the scientist sees a system in the world. But his system has just the same measure of truth as Michael Angelo's angel.

And so Kant leaves us the problem: if the facts of the world are hard, how does it happen that science is able to satisfy its needs? But if the facts of the world are soft, does not the scientist really create a world of science?

I have put the question in this form to call your attention to the fact that the problem of the interpretation of science as conceived by Kant is still the problem that confronts us to-day. Some years ago M. Le Roy raised the question, Does the scientist create science? And Poincaré's *Science and Hypothesis*, the most brilliant and original contribution in recent years to

[2] See Kant's reply to Eberhard's criticism of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, quoted and translated by Caird in his *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, I, 357. Here Kant states that the *Critique of Pure Reason* asserted a pre-established harmony between sensibility and understanding.

the theory of science, is an attempt to answer his question. No one who follows Poincaré's argument and notes the difficulties into which he has fallen can fail to see that it is Kant's problem again, only at a more advanced stage. The main difference is that in the later discussion Kant's form and matter are replaced by hypothesis and fact. A clearer psychology, a psychology enlightened by the conception of evolution, has shown that we do not approach our world with a set of fixed *a priori* forms, but rather that the work of the scientist is a never-ending activity of forming and reforming hypotheses. It is now reasonably clear that an hypothesis of some sort is represented in every statement of fact. For the matter of that, some particular hypothesis of cause and effect is implied in any ordering of facts in time. Men of science sometimes tell us that an order of cause and effect is given with the facts. But you have only to consult a day's experience to see that only in the fewest of that day's happenings do you perceive either cause or effect. Most of them pass without raising the question. Others are of the sort in which you hear your door-bell ring but see no one press the button. You may take the trouble to ascertain from your visitor that he really did press the button; but then you make use of an hypothesis to put his experience in the same order as your own. Often you experience the effect before you experience the cause. But in most cases the cause, or the effect, is simply inferred. When you do experience both it is because your mind is definitely prepared to expect a specific effect – as when you press the button at your neighbor's door and listen for the sound of the bell. I could carry the analysis much further. But the last example will be sufficient to mark the point. For the main difference between scientific investigation and the observations of ordinary life lies only in this: that the scientist makes a more deliberate search for his facts and makes his search with a more definitely formed hypothesis of what he is to expect. Yet at the same time he is suspicious of facts that are discovered as the result of expectation. How, then, are we to conceive the relation between the scientist and his facts – or better, between the scientist and his object? What is it that distinguishes truth from an illusion of expectation and yet responds to the expectation? This is our problem.

I may begin, then, by announcing that, in the treatment of the problem, we shall put the natural scientist and his object in the background and study their relations in the light of what at first glance appears to be a totally different situation, namely, the personal relation in which one man deals with another. We shall see, I think, that the same logic rules the two situations. But first I must say a word or two to justify this mode of procedure. And first of all I wish to call your attention to the fact that the discussion of knowledge is beset throughout by the crudest sort of metaphor. Not that we can dispense with metaphor. But it should seem that the philosopher, at least, might be able to handle his metaphors critically, and that he, of all per-

sons, should not forget that his choice of metaphor indicates infallibly his attitude towards his object. The figures applied to knowledge seem to me to be almost without exception vulgar; and intellectually vulgar. Kant's exposition of the relations of form and matter is a constant struggle to escape the consequences of supposing that the human mind is literally a mould into which experience is being poured. At the same time he is endeavoring to see how a mould can handle a solid and hard fact. More, but not much more, refined is the metaphor implied in holding that the relation of knowledge and fact is a relation of 'one to one correspondence'. Mr. Bertrand Russell reveals the figure when he tells us that this is the sort of correspondence which a catalogue bears to the things catalogued. The scientist uses the same figure when he speaks of nature as 'a great storehouse of facts' – in other words, as a huge library in which each book has its eternally determined place upon the shelves and of which knowledge is a card-catalogue, a 'one to one correspondence'. Such a correspondence may have various forms; the facts may be catalogued for various needs. But so long as the facts remain hard, eternal, and unalterable, it is always a matter of question whether a given need can be satisfied by even the most ingenious arrangement of the catalogue, and nothing short of a miracle when the needs are as fastidious as those of exact science. In the meantime we do maintain an even finer correspondence with our fellow-man; and yet it is only a caricature to call him either a storehouse of facts or a card-catalogue of ideas.

This leads me to a second observation. Our post-Kantian psychology has dispensed with the Kantian moulds and discarded the Kantian machine-shop. It has even here and there suggested that science is an activity of persons. But on the side of the object it has preferred to stick to facts that seem distinctively hard. When you ask the philosopher for a concrete illustration of the process of knowing, almost invariably he presents you with the case of knowing an inanimate object – preferably a table or a chair; something objective and 'solid'. At best he will compromise in favor of a green tree. This sort of knowing he conceives to be typically 'simple'; and from this sort of knowing he derives his ideas regarding knowledge in general. Now we have just noted that the apparent hardness of these natural facts is the source of all the difficulty. And in the meantime we are not limited in our knowing to the facts that are hard. For the truth is that a great part of our knowledge, and perhaps the most interesting part, is occupied with such relatively flexible and approachable facts as our fellow-men. Let us not forget that, whether or not we love our fellows, we do know them. And perhaps we know them much more intimately than we know the tables and chairs. At any rate, I think that this field of knowledge is sufficiently interesting, and sufficiently unexplored, to warrant the question whether a study of the process of knowing our fellows may not throw a new light upon our knowledge of nature.

But this introduces a third observation. For as soon as we speak of knowing our fellows, we are confronted with the vast activities of the so-called 'social' sciences, anthropology, psychology, sociology, economics, all of which purport to deal with our fellows, and among which economics in particular would seem to rank, in mathematical exactness, with the science of physics. And at first glance this comparison seems to tell us that the knowing of our fellow-man makes no difference in the process of knowing and throws no new light upon the relation between the scientist and his object. For there is perhaps none of the sciences which claims to view its object with so sublime a detachment, so complete a divorce between theoretical truth and practical desire, as the science of economics. Among those who deal with the problem of human life no one surpasses the economist in asserting that our conduct is regulated by laws which bid defiance to personal desire. In other words, in economics the object is as hard a fact as it is in physics.

This, however, would seem only to prove my point, namely, that knowledge of our fellows is a higher grade of knowledge. For the truth is that the economist is dealing specifically with those men whom, relatively speaking, he does not know; or, to state the point differently, he is describing the conduct of men in those relations in which they know one another least intimately. In gathering his facts about the world of commerce, the economist prefers to assign a secondary rôle to personal acquaintance and observation in favor of economic statistics. His economic laws describe the conduct, not of Peter or Paul – not of any real or particular person, but only of the average man, – who is always the distant man. For it would never occur to you to conduct a statistical inquiry or to consult a scientific law, to discover whether your wife liked her roast-beef rare or well-done. Nor, in a transaction with a friend concerning a horse or a motor-car, would you care much about the market-prices; the main question would be whether the bargain was mutually satisfactory. But the economist is not interested in a transaction purely personal, whether it be a 'friendly transaction between gentlemen' or primitive barter. It must never be forgotten that economics is both logically and historically the science of *modern* commerce; of commerce on a large scale, in which the ultimate producer and the ultimate consumer are widely separated. This fact of distance is directly responsible both for the 'scientific' aspect of commercial transactions and for the impersonal character of economic science. The economist describes the distant man. And the economic man, whose actions are determined by economic laws, is hardly more of a person than the billiard-balls which move in accordance with the laws of mechanics. At best we can say that he holds a half-way position between a person and a thing. I need hardly state the implication. If our human fellows tend to become hard and impersonal facts in proportion as they are distantly known – in proportion as they are known, not as

Peter or Paul, but simply as capital or labor, demand or supply – may we not suppose that the impersonal and very hard facts of the physical world are connected with their being still more distantly known? And then must we not say that the true type or example of knowing is to be found where one person joins hands – or joins issues, as the case may be – with another and deals with him face to face? At any rate, I propose to examine this personal relation as a type, let us remember, of knowing in general.

Among the motives implied in the personal relation, I hold that an indispensably important motive is that of satisfying yourself. In terms of pragmatism, this is the need or the self-interest of the knower. I am aware that the doctrine is unfashionable; and that the conventional view is that which bids us sacrifice ourselves for the larger good of others. Virtue, which formerly stood for a willingness to be damned for the glory of God, still asks us to be damned for the glory of society. Yet, even from among the most insistent advocates of self-sacrifice, I could summon a cloud of witnesses. Even so 'disinterested' a moralist as Kant finds it necessary to affirm that no moral law can be binding upon me which does not satisfy myself. Every theory of moral obligation refers to some kind of self-interest, however unsubstantial. If God has nothing for me, then I can have no obligation towards him. If my fellow has nothing to say to me, then I can have nothing to say to him. If he cannot interest me, I cannot know him – there is no basis for a personal relation.

But now, just because I am bound to satisfy myself, it is indispensably important that I should satisfy my fellow; certainly the fellow from whom I expect a service. I cannot expect him to serve me unless I offer him an inducement. Again, I am aware that many persons will claim that this is quite unnecessary; that I may compel him or deceive him into serving me while leaving his own interests out of consideration. But I think that this view fails to consider the conditions of getting the best that your fellow has to give. From the greater number of our fellows we cannot expect to get the best. To get their best we should have to know them well; and our powers of attention and of imagination, our capacity for life itself is too limited for the task. And if we do not deliberately deceive or coerce them, we at least cheerfully profit by their misfortunes; when a merchant has overestimated the market we are ready to buy below cost. But this is all in the direction of the distant economic world. In the world of personal relations it is still true that when I set out deliberately to cultivate one of my fellows and to procure for myself the best that he has to give, I can only enjoy his best by a careful consideration of his needs and by doing my best to satisfy him.

This gives us the terms of our problem. In any statement of the situation there are two demands to satisfy, my own and those of my other. In the scientific situation there are two similar terms: the scientist's demand for intel-

ligibility, and his obligation to satisfy the object. Nothing will solve the problem which fails to fulfil both demands. Any mere compromise, however justified by the necessities of immediate action, will fall just so far short of truth. By what process, then, is the solution to be reached? Looking once more at the personal relation, we may see that the ordinary process of solution – and I shall call this the logical and moral process – is a process of bargaining or, if you please, of negotiation. And again I expect to encounter the objection that bargaining is the method of small minds whose object is to get the best of one another. But this, I should say, is the bargaining of the mean and stupid whose imagination is too torpid to demand an exchange of the best that they have to give. Or perhaps it refers to an economic situation in which the only question is a question of price. So far as this is the case there is really no opportunity for a bargain. Bargaining presupposes the possibility of receiving from your fellow an alternative proposition in which the demands are, not necessarily lower in amount, but different in kind; in which, for example, I refuse to give you my horse for your cow but may offer you a few sheep. This opens the way for further discussion. And when we look at the matter in this light we see that the conception of a bargain applies to all of our personal relations, from the most material to the most spiritual; and further that a truly satisfactory bargain, in which the demands of both sides are finally fulfilled, is both a triumph of intelligence and a work of art. But truth is precisely such a bargain. When, after a process of experimentation, you can say, 'This is the positive fact; and this is, moreover, just the fact that my hypothesis demands' – then you have the perfection of truth.

Suppose, then, that you have begun by making a demand upon your neighbor, and suppose that your demand has been flatly refused. At this stage you are confronted with what we may call the brute fact. You are in the case of the scientist whose hypothesis has been blankly contradicted. But in dealing with your human fellow – unless he be an economic fellow, a merchant whose price is fixed – you never accept an unwelcome fact as finally and absolutely 'hard'. For such a fact is wholly unsubstantial and characterless apart from its motive or meaning. To refuse your son the price of a bicycle may have any of a dozen meanings, from a careful regard for your own pocket-book to a fear of his breaking his neck; and a properly alert lad would treat the refusal only as an invitation to 'try it again'.

Hence, you try it again. But here I may remark that, except in the economic world, where prices are fixed, your first offer is not likely to encounter an absolutely flat refusal. It is more likely, for example, that an invitation to luncheon will be declined with the statement from your friend that his work will not permit him to accept an invitation for the middle of the day. Now, if you were not yourself a working man, the statement would excite a feeling of wonder; as if a man should tell you that he never thought

of sleeping at night; or the sort of wonder with which astronomers first regarded the spots on the sun. As it is, the statement enables you to interpret the refusal; and at the same time his refusal ceases to be an inflexibly hard fact and becomes a suggestion of a counter-offer: perhaps he would be glad to come to an evening dinner. Or, if this is impossible, then, better still, perhaps he would join you for a Sunday in the country. I need not carry the illustration further. In more important matters a personal negotiation may assume the dimensions of an extended scientific investigation, even with all the advantages afforded by ready communication. What I wish to note here is that the logic of the two processes is the same. The scientific method of trial and error is only another case of negotiation. But in the personal relation the possibility of a new trial, after a first trial has resulted in error, depends wholly upon this: that you may interpret your failure, not as a hard fact, but as a new suggestion, because of the light afforded by your own motives. This important point I shall recall later.

Perhaps you may object that all of this refers to practical life rather than to knowledge, to ethics rather than to logic. But one of the great advantages of this personal relation is that it so clearly illustrates the pragmatist's doctrine of the identity of doing and knowing. The process of bargaining seems at first glance to be only a crossing of swords or a trial of strength; but a trial of strength between intelligent men is only another name for the process whereby they arrive at a sympathetic understanding and mutual independence. This trial of strength is the very life of the process even in theoretical knowing. It is no mere accident of literary fashion which puts Plato's philosophy in the form of dialogue; nor does mere imitation account for the fact that others have vainly tried to follow him. The dialogue is an attempt to present what may properly be called the living truth, or truth in the making; and the art of dialogue is just as fine an art as that of presenting a living form upon canvas. The getting of truth, in other words, is a process of conversation, of question and answer; or, if you please, of dialectics. Mere reading of a book will never give you the ideas of the author. You must have a question to ask and a position to defend if you are even to read him. But when you have put your question, then the reading becomes a process of conversation. The first question brings out an answer and the answer a new question, and so it goes, back and forth, until at last you are able to say where you and your author stand with relation to one another – and the satisfactory determination of this point is truth.

With this personal relation now before us, let us note how the logic of the relation fulfils the demands both of the pragmatic theory that truth is always being made and of the realistic theory that truth is independent. First, you must have noted that in the personal relation all is being made – not only the agreement which constitutes the truth, but the terms between which the agreement is formed, the knower as well as the object

of his knowledge. Only in the process of making your object clear do you bring to clearness the needs and demands for which you are ready to stand. In no other way can you arrive at this knowledge of yourself. Suppose that some one asks me, Are you a realist? How do I know if I have never seen a realist? Let me make the acquaintance of Mr. Russell, Mr. George Moore, Mr. Perry, Mr. Montague, or perhaps of Mr. Santayana, and then I shall hope to tell you both whether I am a realist and what kind of a realist I am.

Yet in any case I shall try to be an independent realist. For once more I may remind you that the final agreement which we call truth is no mere 'adjustment', no mere compromise effected by rounding the corners of a square peg to make it fitter for a round hole and at the same time squaring somewhat the shape of the hole. So far as the agreement is a matter of compromise, thus far is it false. And this we must hold to the extent of admitting that truth in its perfection is rarely or never attained. It may indeed be said, then, that in entering a negotiation I cannot yet say precisely what I want; that, for example, I cannot choose my gloves until I have tried them on. It is none the less true that the gloves that I choose are the gloves that *I* want, and even, if you please, the gloves that I set out to buy. The realism that I adopt is a realism defined after a process of objective investigation. To me the whole question of realism may be more or less new. But it is not my realism unless it reveals itself as the philosophy which I have all the while been seeking. In a word, then, there is no truth unless each party to the transaction remains true to himself. In a satisfactory agreement both the knower and the object must be independent beings.

And since the independence is mutual, let us not forget to mark the independent object. In this personal relation truth is being made; but if I am not made by the object of my knowledge, neither is the object of my knowledge made by me. To Walter Pater, Plato is a lover of beauty, to Mr. Russell he is an abstract realist, to Professor Paul Shorey a man of critical common sense, like John Stuart Mill. Plato may (or may not) be any or all of these; and it is certain that Plato has given no finally consistent response to all ways of taking him. Nevertheless, amidst all the variety of response there is a certain unity of personality which is Plato's, and which is not made by the way he is taken. Granting that every fact about a man is a function of the demands made upon him, it is still true that throughout the widest variety of replies he may be personally consistent. He may even realize the Kantian ideal of a consistency equal to that of the law of gravitation. So far as he shows any self-consistency whatever, he is an independent being.

This brings us to the heart of the problem, – the problem of truth, which, as I have pointed out, is the problem of Kant, of the pragmatists, and of the contemporary logic of science. How can there be a relation of agreement between independent beings? How can truth satisfy human needs and yet have an independent value? How can the work of science be creative and

yet a true account of the world? My answer is that the problem is insoluble if the world is presented to us in the form of absolute and hard facts; it is insoluble if we may not interpret the facts as expressions of *motives* resembling our own.

I have pointed out that the process of bargaining, or negotiation, by which you come to terms with your fellow, is paralleled in scientific method by the process of trial and error. But the scientific method leaves one important point obscure, namely, when your first trial has resulted in error, or failure, how do you set about trying it again? Upon what ground do you expect better results from another hypothesis, and upon what will a correction of your hypothesis be based? So far as I can see, no answer can be given to this question if the fact that repulsed the first hypothesis was absolutely hard. In that case there is nothing more to be said, and any new hypothesis will be simply a leap in the dark. And yet, in the practice of scientific method new hypotheses are being constantly suggested which come ever nearer the truth. How can this be? In the personal relation the point is quite clear. When your first offer is declined you follow it with a second and better offer which is suggested by your neighbor's reply; but the reply suggests nothing whatever except as it may be interpreted through a sympathetic exercise of your own imagination; except, in other words, as you can put yourself in his place. Or again, except as his behavior may be assumed to be, not a set of hard facts, but the expression of motives akin to your own. This is the assumption that succeeds in the knowing of persons. Must we not suppose that, in more obscure fashion, it is the same assumption that succeeds in the field of natural science? If we may not interpret facts by motives then what ground have we for refusing to accept any negative result as final?

If we put the question to an empirical scientist, he will doubtless tell us that his method of getting around a fact is to seek for its cause; and that the cause is discovered by recalling the circumstances by which the fact was attended in past experience. These circumstances supply the suggestion for a new hypothesis. But any attempt to put the method into practice will show that this is more easily said than done. Let us apply it to the personal relation. Suppose that A has declined my invitation to luncheon and that he has done so once or twice before. What in each case were the attendant circumstances? The moment you ask the question you discover that the attendant circumstances were nothing less than the whole sum of activities in the universe at those moments; and further, that, even within your own experience of the universe at those moments, the sum of attendant circumstances was inconceivably vast. It may be, for example, that when A now declines your invitation he is resting the weight of his body mainly upon his right foot. Is it worth while to ask whether this circumstance was common to all his refusals and would therefore explain them? The mere question is sufficient to show that an eternity of statisti-

cal investigation unillumined by any suggestion of motive will hardly give you the truth. The empiricist himself will admit that investigation must be guided by a suggestion of probable cause or effect. But what is a probable cause? From an impersonal standpoint one cause is as probable as another. Viewing the universe as a plurality of facts, it is neither probable nor improbable that the sun will rise tomorrow. An assertion of probability means that you are interpreting nature in the light of your own point of view, as a coherently motived activity. A probable cause will then be a cause that renders a given effect humanly intelligible.

The time is too short for any really adequate discussion of the problem. I shall therefore devote the few minutes remaining at my disposal to what seems to me to be the central question, namely, whether in the logic of science there is any justification for the absolute and hard fact. Remember that I do not deny the existence of facts. A fact, however, as I understand it, is a term of agreement between a knower and his object, an element of achieved truth. Such a fact is a function of the object's being known; it cannot be said to exist before the object is known, just as a question cannot be said to be answered until it has been asked. The facts that I wish to question are those implied in the conception that nature is 'a storehouse of facts' – facts which are supposed not only to exist before they are known but to remain unaltered by the process of knowing.

Suppose we ask why the man of science thinks it necessary to hold that the facts of nature are all 'there', eternally formed and waiting only to be discovered. The answer is obvious. Science must stand for truth rather than fiction; hence the world that is known must be a world of independent beings. But your fellow-man is an independent being; he is independent because, and so far as, his responses to the various demands made upon him are marked by a personal self-consistency. Does scientific truth require any other sort of independence than the independence that you have of me? Yet your fellow-man is in no sense a storehouse of facts. He is not a card-catalogue of ready answers to all possible questions. If that were the case, we should have to wonder how it happens that he is ready for so many questions – just as we do wonder when we find a man whose mind seems to be made up in advance on all possible points. Our wonder shows that we do not expect him to have his answers ready made. In the case of your fellow, then, the facts are all created; cooperatively created; created by him in his reply, created by you in your formulation of the question. In a word, they are not facts, but *responses*. Now, in just the same sense are the facts of science responses; they are created by nature in reply to your hypothesis; and nature, like your fellow, is an independent being, or, better perhaps, a society of independent beings.

Upon what ground may it be affirmed that in nature the facts are merely discovered? The man of fact will doubtless tell you that whenever he

approaches nature in a given way he gets always the same result – the same fact. By this he means that to obtain the same facts from repeated experiments proves that the facts are always there. But of course it proves nothing of the kind. Apply the test to your fellow: on Wednesday he is a realist; on Thursday he replies, 'Yes, I am still a realist'; yet it does not follow from this that he has dreamed of realism all of Wednesday night. And as a matter of fact neither nature nor your fellow gives the same answer to your question on Thursday that he has given on Wednesday. Nature is not as dull a companion as some scientists would have us believe. The truth of the matter is rather that nature never repeats herself. No storm is the precise duplicate of any previous storm, no animal the duplicate of any other animal, no rock the duplicate of another rock. Search the world carefully. You will find, I think, that man the machinist is the only duplicating agent; and in matters of scientific fact, man the laboratory scientist. For in the strict, yet still not the strictest sense, facts repeat themselves only under the careful manipulation of the scientific laboratory, only in response to a carefully formulated 'hypothetical question'. In the laboratory alone is the conservation of energy an eternal and unchanging law. Yet many of your fellows are equally unchanging if you take them in the same way. All that you can assert in either case is that you get the same response in reply to the same question.

Perhaps, however, your man of science will take his stand upon the accumulation of corroborative evidence in favor of some broadly comprehensive scientific theory, such as the theory of evolution. Perhaps he will claim that the elaborateness and the nicety of the corroboration prove that the order of evolution in nature is an eternal order, irrespective of any hypothesis suggested by man; and therefore that the facts of evolution are absolute and hard facts; in other words, that the order of nature is and can be nothing else. To this I should reply that the evidence certainly proves that nature is a process of evolution, in the sense that every one who approaches her with an evolutionary hypothesis will receive an affirmative reply. And in this sense nature is eternally a process of evolution, as she is also eternally many other things. The experiment by which Newton proved that the light of the sun is a combination of the many prismatic colors (so far as this may be said to be the point proved) would have been just as successful if it had been performed by Aristotle. But no amount of articulate coherence in the answer that nature makes to the evolutionist will prove that this is the only answer that nature has to give. It will not prove this any more than the rounded completeness of the Eroica symphony will prove that this is the only symphony that Beethoven could write. Nature might still reply with equal definiteness to some other hypothesis, not less comprehensive than the hypothesis of evolution, the meaning of which is beyond our power to grasp; and her various replies need be none the less consistent. Kant makes this point clear enough when he tells us that the system of nature according to which

she is an order of space, time, and causal dependence is only one of the many ways in which nature might be taken; and the logic of the situation admits of nothing else. To claim that our human science is the only way is to commit the crass anthropomorphism of supposing that the powers of nature are limited to those of our human imagination. I have already referred to the various interpretations, all possibly true, that are made of Plato. It seems to me that a natural scientist might well allow to nature both a richer variety of attitudes and a finer consistency than we may expect of even the greatest human being.

In conclusion, I will state once more the substance of the argument. At the close of the last lecture I said that the pragmatists had steadily avoided coming to terms with the question of the independence of truth, or reality. Both they and their critics seem to have halted in the presence of the following disjunction: either truth is determined solely by our needs – and then how shall we distinguish truth from fiction? or truth is wholly independent of our needs – and then how can it be true for us? As against this I made the claim that truth must be both the satisfaction of our needs and at the same time independent of our needs; and the present lecture was to show how this can be. The answer that I have now given amounts to this: If the facts of science are in themselves absolute and hard, then any agreement what ever between the objects of science and the mind of the scientist is nothing short of miraculous. But if the facts of science are simply the expression of underlying motives, if they are simply responses, like the facts that we get from our fellows, then, while the objects of science remain independent, we may come to agreement with them, just as we come to agreement with our fellows. And then I have endeavored to show that the facts of science are nothing but responses.

DEATH OF PROFESSOR ADDISON WEBSTER MOORE

Department of Public Relations, University of Chicago. "Death of Professor Addison Webster Moore." 25 August 1930.

Death of Professor Addison Webster Moore, a member of the philosophy faculty at the University of Chicago since 1895, was reported yesterday in press dispatches from England. The report was not unexpected at the University, since the department of philosophy had received two cablegrams from London last week revealing Dr. Moore's grave condition following a paralytic stroke induced by cerebral thrombosis.

Because of ill-health Professor Moore resigned his chair in logic and metaphysics in the University last year and was made professor-emeritus. He left for Europe in March of this year, and after completing a 6,000 mile motor tour, arrived in London two weeks ago to attend the International Philosophical Congress which opens at Oxford next week.

He is survived by one daughter, Mrs. Maurice Picard, wife of a philosophy professor at Dartmouth College. She will arrive in London today, after losing in an attempt to reach his bedside.

Professor Moore was awarded the A. B. at De Pauw University in 1890 and the A. M. in 1893. He became an assistant in philosophy at Chicago in 1895, received the doctorate in philosophy in 1898, and rose to a full professorship in 1909. He was born in Plainfield, New Jersey, July 30, 1866.

Among his publications are several books on philosophy, including "Pragmatism and Its Critics," "Existence, Meaning and Reality," "Studies in Logical Theory" and "Creative Intelligence," and a series of monographs on logic. In 1917 he was president of the Western Philosophical Association.

No memorial service will be held at the University until after next month because of the approaching close of the University term, according to Professor James H, Tufts, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, but plans will probably be made for a service in the autumn.

"Professor Moore was an unusually fine teacher, and he preferred stimulating his students to think rather than simply lecturing them," Professor Tufts said yesterday. "His classes were always open for argument and discussion. For many years he gave the course which was the backbone of our graduate students training in logic and metaphysics. As a man he was very friendly and lovable."

MEMORIAL ADDRESS

Edward S. Ames, "Memorial Address." In *Addison Webster Moore: A Memorial* [n.p., n.d.], pp. 5–10. Ed. Note: The four addresses in this memorial pamphlet are prefaced by a Note on p. 4: The words of Mr. Ames were spoken at the service in Plainfield, Indiana, September tenth, nineteen hundred and thirty. Those of Mr. Tufts, Mr. Mead and Mr. Hilton were spoken at the memorial service at the University of Chicago, November ninth, nineteen hundred and thirty.

We are gathered here as relatives and friends of Addison W. Moore. We have come to remember at its close a life that was blended with our own in comradeship, and work, and insight. Our memories today are in a mood of celebration of the fine qualities which marked his spirit, and of the achievements wrought through his personality. The sense of loss in his going is tempered by the living reality of his mind and heart continuing with us beyond the event of death.

From these scenes and surroundings of his boyhood his life reached out through college days at De Pauw, in Cornell, Chicago, and Europe, into the main streams of the intellectual life of mankind. He was a student to the last and worked in his own class room as much with the spirit of the student as of the teacher. This is one secret of his great success as a teacher. Although he had already retired from his professorship, on account of poor health, before the usual retiring age, he had planned to return to the University of Chicago this autumn to give the course in Greek philosophy. This was a course he particularly enjoyed. He was always a stimulating and inspiring teacher, but there was something in the development of Greek philosophy particularly congenial to his mind. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the Greeks were themselves the earliest philosophers, and that reliving their groping efforts to understand the world and their attainments of systematic methods and definition of problems still offer a natural experience in which the mind of youth may find philosophical awakening. His own method of teaching was definitely Socratic, seeking by eliciting questions and discussions to bring ideas to birth. He had a rare kindliness and sympathy with his students and he gave very freely of his time and energy to personal conference and direction.

He attained distinction in the philosophical movement led by Professor John Dewey with whom he was many years a student and colleague. His writings contributed to the development and elucidation of that movement and he was everywhere known as a keen and forceful interpreter of its

insight and spirit.

But he was more than a philosopher. Indeed it was of the genius of philosophy as he saw it to impel the philosopher beyond the realm of reflective thought and to lead him into very practical interests and living human relations. He had very vital interest in the great educational, social and political movements of the time. His capacity for intimate and understanding friendship is evidenced by the close ties which bound him not only to his professional associates but to men in business and in other professions. This ability to share without affectation in the lives of all kinds of people was particularly manifest in his moods of relaxation, in social gatherings and in vacations.

He spent a summer at Pentwater, Michigan, where I saw him often enjoying a small row boat to which he had attached a little motor. He quickly made friends of the townspeople and was soon entirely at home in the shops and on the beaches. His kindly wit and lively humor made him a charming companion. He had the gift of entertaining conversation and on occasion could illustrate a story with an amusing song or limerick. He never lost his youthful spirit nor his responsiveness to the needs or joys of those about him.

During practically all of his mature years he labored under the hardship of ill health, especially of insomnia. His strength of body was seldom equal to the intellectual tasks which he desired to accomplish, and it was not easy for him to relinquish those ambitions. Recent years were shadowed by deep bereavement in the loss of his life companion. Mrs. Moore was his other self intellectually, emotionally and socially. Without her his inner world was shaken and desolate, yet he did not reveal to many his unhealed wound. He kept to his work with courage and cheerfulness.

Now, at its close, we see his life as a whole and as one which has been useful and fine in rare degree. He has made a deep and lasting impression on many students through the thirty years of teaching and writing. He has left quickening words for those who come after him. He lived a beautiful life in his home, among his friends, and in the open places of the world's serious thought.

Such souls do not pass away. They enter deeply into other lives and continue their influence into the far future. They contribute to the genuine spiritual quality of life, that is, to wisdom, moral courage and sincerity. They radiate profound appreciation for the diviner traits of human life and help to overcome the baser, transient elements of the world. Our friend lived outwardly the quiet, unostentatious life of the scholar, but within he followed with a venturesome and creative spirit the opening and deathless ways of expanding thought and radiant beauty.

MEMORIAL ADDRESS

James H. Tufts, "Memorial Address." In *Addison Webster Moore: A Memorial* [n.p., n.d.], pp. 11–23. Ed. Note: Portions reprinted in "Doctor Moore as Student and Teacher" in *The University* [of Chicago] *Record* 17.1 (January 1931): 45–47.

When John Dewey came to the University of Chicago in 1894 one of several students attracted by his coming was Addison Webster Moore. From that Autumn of 1894 he had been one of us for thirty-six years.

He was known to us as a son of Indiana. He was born July 30, 1866, at Plainfield in the middle region of the state, just west of Indianapolis. His Moore ancestors had come from Virginia by way of Kentucky, except that his father's mother was a Connecticut school teacher who had married the grandfather in Kentucky and made with him the pioneer journey to Danville, Indiana. John Sheldon Moore, the father of Addison, was one of the first to enlist in the Civil War, and the four years of service made a deep impress upon his character. He was according to his son's tribute, a clean, stalwart, vigorous man, a successful farmer, a staunch and active member of the Methodist church, a highly respected citizen. Moore's mother, Adaline Hockett, came likewise from Southern stock. The Hocketts were among the company of Quaker families that migrated from North Carolina because of the slavery issue. The historian, F. J. Turner, quotes an estimate that in 1850 one third the population of Indiana had come from the Carolinas or were the children of such emigrants. In a memorial address given at the time of his mother's death, Moore notes that the Hocketts had come originally from Guilford County, North Carolina, which in turn got its name from Guilford, England, and that the township in Indiana where the Hockett family settled was likewise named Guilford.

John Sheldon Moore and Adaline Hockett, who had met while attending the academy at Danville, were married at the close of the Civil War. They settled on the old Hockett place in Plainfield. Here, and in the larger homestead to which they moved when Addison was ten, they carried on a large farm. Their home was spacious and attractive. Six children grew to maturity, of whom Addison was the oldest.

Life on a farm is often associated with hardships and isolation, but I never gathered that in Moore's home there was this atmosphere. Hard

work there was to be sure, but of a sort to favor initiative, resourcefulness, and a generous habit of mind and heart. I quote from Moore's address in memory of his father: While it was a busy life, full of the work and the savor of the soil, it was never sordid. The work itself was diversified and was made interesting by the large use of the newest farm machinery – there were books and papers and magazines, and always music. The range of interests was always wide. Important items of news, poetry, editorials, and articles on a great variety of subjects, including local and national political questions, were read aloud at the evening fireside and discussed at the table where often sat interesting visitors." Contacts with neighbors also were well adapted to encourage such an open hearted and friendly disposition as made Moore a delightful companion and neighborly spirit through life. Home conditions put no obstacle in the way of carrying out an ambition for an education. He attended Plainfield Academy, taught school, and at the age of twenty entered the nearby De Pauw University.

De Pauw in the eighties was especially interested in public speaking, and the various lines of training which were contributory to success in the collegiate and intercollegiate contests. Beveridge, who had graduated from the college a year before Moore entered, had left a brilliant record in this field. A course in freshman year taught by Professor Carhart nominally was a course in English, but actually embraced logic, rhetoric, and critical analysis. Discussion of large themes was encouraged. In this course, I am told by his classmate, Mr. West, Moore soon took a prominent place, and was recognized as a leader among the men. Another classmate, Ella Adams, who likewise had the advantage of previous experience as a teacher, took a similar position among the women in the course. In the earlier years of his college life this field held Moore's chief interest. His classmates thought of him as likely to enter the ministry. Both gifts of mind and qualities of character promised large usefulness and success in this calling. But in his senior year, work in philosophy under Professor De Voll opened a new window.

At that time the more intellectual students were likely to be strongly interested in philosophical studies. Here, if anywhere in the college curriculum there seemed hope of light upon the problems of the world and of human life, as these were raised in literature and religion. At any rate, Moore found here the incitement to what was to be a life long quest. After graduation he taught English literature for a short time but as soon as he felt able, he entered Cornell University for graduate work in philosophy. He was accompanied by his wife whom, as Ella Adams, he had come to know in college, and whom he had married in 1891, a year after graduation. She was to work at Cornell in the field of liter-

ature while he studied philosophy. But when in the following spring they read of the coming of John Dewey to Chicago they felt that this would afford an opportunity which must not be missed. They decided to leave very favorable prospects at Cornell and stake all on the new venture.

Professor Dewey was at that time working at a reconstruction of philosophical method which was eventually to have wide and fruitful influence upon both philosophy and education. It does not fall within the scope of this sketch to dwell upon the content of this reconstruction. But it is appropriate to note that the contact with Professor Dewey's thought at just this stage proved extraordinarily stimulating to a mind so quick to see the significance of a new approach to old problems, so sympathetic with Dewey's intellectual pioneering, so prepared by experience and studies to appreciate the larger bearings upon life, as was Addison Moore's. The doctoral dissertation published in 1902 reflects the first application of the method. His approach to other philosophical problems and his method of teaching were to reflect the influence of the critical and reconstructive temper. Every proposition, whether of classic philosophy or of an uncritical and perhaps naive and dogmatic student in his classroom, was to him a challenge. He brought a penetrating analysis to bear upon classical doctrines. But in the case of the student he aimed rather to provoke or elicit an analytic process in the student's own thinking. It was difficult for any intelligent student to sit long in that class-room without responding to so keen a challenge coming from so persuasive and friendly a spirit.

In his earlier years with the Department he met chiefly college classes in psychology and philosophy, but in consequence of the going of Professor Dewey in 1904 he was placed in charge of the seminars in logic and metaphysics in which the student was to be brought into critical contact with ultimate problems and stimulated to think and to defend his position. These courses formed a sort of backbone of graduate work, and the student felt strongly their value. I do not think that any teacher of philosophy in the country brought to his seminar such a union of keen critical acumen, sound knowledge, power of clear exposition, and persuasive enthusiasm.

So, interrupted by a semester at Harvard as Visiting Professor, and by several longer or shorter visits to Europe, came and went the years. His keen critical temper, combined with unusual power of statement and personal charm, made him a prime favorite among his colleagues of the Philosophical Associations. Everyone was at attention when he rose to present a paper or to discuss the position advanced by another. The invariable question which greeted me at such gatherings, if I arrived first, was, "Is Moore coming?" The esteem of his colleagues was shown by his election as President of the Western Philosophical Association in

1911, and of the American Philosophical Association in 1917. Working at high tension as he did, it was perhaps not surprising that Moore found difficulty in securing sufficient sleep. The sudden death of his wife in 1924 was a blow from which he did not recover. He was chosen to contribute to the volumes of *Contemporary American Philosophy*, and was among the first to suggest and plan the volume of *Essays in Honor of John Dewey*, but was compelled reluctantly to abandon the contributions undertaken for both publications. His physician advised rest and at last his colleagues yielded to his desire for retirement. In 1929 he became Professor Emeritus, although he had fully expected to conduct his favorite course in Greek Philosophy this autumn, just from sheer love of teaching.

The end came suddenly in London after five months on the continent with friends during which frequent messages had told of scenes and experiences enjoyed.

Another will speak of our colleague as friend, but I cannot forego entirely the privilege of alluding to his rare gifts in this respect. Of his father Moore wrote: "He had a genius for friendship. His spontaneous responsiveness to every human being without distinction of race or rank was perhaps his most outstanding personal trait." The son seemed to inherit this trait. He, too, had a genius for friendship. He could meet a total stranger and in a short time would know more about him than some of us would learn in a life time. And this, not because he asked questions but because he was so genuinely interested in his fellow travelers along life's road that they were almost irresistibly drawn to tell him of their doings and often of their troubles.

But he did not need to be told. He seemed to have a positive genius for discovering the troubles of others and taking their burdens on his shoulders. Characteristic was his thoughtfulness and promptness of action in the case of a former teacher of his college who was facing old age without adequate means. Moore suspected the truth and proceeded at once to organize the Joseph Carhart Association of former students of that teacher, each of whom pledged a yearly sum. Every year Moore sent out his notice of membership dues, and secured the means of comfort for his old friend.

This story of events and certain aspects of character cannot assume to tell what Addison Moore meant to his colleagues and friends. It belongs necessarily to the world of description; not to the world of appreciation. The generations come and go, in the University as in the history of mankind. As members of a faculty or as units of humanity men play their part, make their contribution, and give place to others who enter into their labors. But in the inner world of intimate life and personal affection no one takes another's place. There is no common measure by

which to compensate for loss. Each choice spirit is a unique and priceless value. To have acquaintance with such through the give-and-take of days and years is to have what to its possessor gives to living its present charm and its dearest memories.

Two thousand years have not dimmed the contrast which the apostle discerned, between the transient and the abiding. Indeed the rapid shifts in the picture which the world presents to science make even more impressive his insight: whether there be knowledge it shall vanish away. But every so rarely vital and life-kindling a personality as that of Addison Moore gives deeper meaning to the apostle's three which abide, "and the greatest of these is love."

MEMORIAL ADDRESS (3)

George H. Mead, "Memorial Address." In *Addison Webster Moore: A Memorial* [n.p., n.d.], pp. 24–32. Ed. Note: Reprinted as "Doctor Moore's Philosophy" in *The University* [of Chicago] *Record* 17.1 (January 1931): 47–49.

Like many young men of his period Addison Moore inherited his philosophic problem from an evangelical home, community and college; but the problem was rather social than theological. He did not question the scientists' findings nor their interpretation of nature nor was he loth to reconstruct the documents of the church by the aid of the historian's method. But the inner flame of spiritual life which the church had sheltered and nourished, her great affirmations of a truth to be tested by devotion to the welfare of the human soul and of human society; these had to be brought into intellectual accord with the scientist's nature and the historian's past. While as a youth he had looked toward the ministry the whole set of the intellectual life of the larger community into which he entered inevitably carried so vivid a mind and emotional nature as his to philosophy. For philosophy promised to reach the profounder meaning of dogma, to discover why its doctrines had expressed men's inner moral life, and why they had been the custodians of the spiritual goods of human communities.

At Cornell University an idealistic philosophy taught an evolution of mind that was also an evolution of nature and an evolution of history. It was an alembic within which the oppositions of creeds and doctrines, the clash of institutions, the warfare between ecclesiastical inquisition and the scientists' laboratory disappeared as moments in the dialectic of an absolute mind. To an eager speculative spirit, this Hegelian philosophy was perhaps the most fascinating resolution of all antimonies that philosophic genius has ever exhibited. It fed upon conflicts and its syntheses undertook to distill out and preserve on higher levels the values which conflicting ideas defended against each other. It was the same philosophy of the Absolute which Josiah Royce was expounding with a different intonation at Harvard University. In contrast with the traditional philosophy of the American college, that Scottish School, the philosophy of so-called Common Sense, which evaded problems and discouraged speculation, it was profound, adventurous and armed with a dialectic that could cope with any contradiction. It was peculiarly facile in its subsumption of the past while it failed to provide a method for present and future conduct. In England and America Neo-Hegelianism was a cultural philosophy rather than a philosophy of action.

At Cornell University then Mr. and Mrs. Moore – for they were already joined in that companionship of all their varied interests, which lasted, becoming steadily more profound, throughout her life settled for graduate study, and Mr. Moore eagerly plunged into Absolute Idealism. In the following year they came to the University of Chicago. I do not know whether Mr. Moore then felt at all the dissent from Absolute Idealism which he afterwards so vigorously expressed. He came to Chicago to study with Professor Dewey, who had been bred in the same philosophic faith; but whose writings in Philosophic Journals and especially in the field of Ethics already showed that he had broken with the Absolutism of Idealism and that he insisted upon a doctrine that should be a method of conduct.

Mr. Moore lived through the years here in Chicago, during which Professor Dewey worked out his philosophy of thought, which was also a philosophy of action. He was a member of that historic Seminar whose papers were joined with Professor Dewey's exposition and appeared as the first edition of "Studies in Logical Theory," as a part of the Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago. It placed thought definitely within the act, and dealt in a masterly fashion with the logical problems which this orientation carried with it. In this work Mr. Moore was an enthusiastic collaborator. He published an important study of Locke from the standpoint of Pragmatism and became in the philosophic world after Mr. Dewey the most important and most authoritative member of the so-called Chicago School. The publication by which he was known was his "Pragmatism and its Critics" together with numerous articles in the Journals in which he brilliantly countered the assaults of the Idealists and the Realists upon the Pragmatic position. The profound work, which he accomplished in metaphysics and logic was carried on in his seminars, which was never fully published but has borne its fruit in the stimulation and training of the long line of University of Chicago doctors who have taken their degrees in philosophy. For years these seminars were the core of the training for those that were going on to the degree in the department.

We speak of the philosophy of a man's life, with the sure feeling that back of his conduct through the years lies some consistent attitude toward society and the world about him which, if made articulate, would reveal the man to the world and to himself. There have been philosophers whose daily walk and conversation have been living epistles expressing, in the full dimensionality of space and time, the ideas which their published writings have expounded. William James was such a Philosopher whose pages are the transcript of the direct impact of systems of thought and of events and people upon a profound and passionate nature. Spinoza and Kant, at the opposite pole of personality only thought out and wrote down themselves reflecting the universe that confronted them. And then, on the other hand, there was Hume whose systematic doctrine issued in a scepticism which his own genial

life belied, and a Josiah Royce whose life-long speculative engagement was a conflict between the finality of his absolute idealism and the contingency of human experience. Addison Moore comes under the first of these categories. His philosophy was his inner and outer life writ large. He was no Epimetheus. He began his speculative thinking with a world which was there, a world that put up to our intelligence the precarious task of living within it, and he refused to arrest action in order to prove the existence of that world. For him the epistemological problem was an unreal problem. His logic was a running back of all the intricate processes of thought to the competent statement of the problem of life – life in its deepest sense – and of the conditions of its solution, and his ethics was the restatement of the conflicting values, which are there, as means of reaching a larger good which must envisage them all, if the problem of life is to be solved. The relation of thought to life he found in evolution. Evolution was the process of the universe, and thought was the development of intelligence within the struggle for existence of living beings with increasing social organization. And so his philosophy was a social philosophy. It was through communication that social organization appears, and it was through communication that self-consciousness arises with all the intricate apparatus of thinking in its analysis and in its hypothetical rebuilding.

His philosophy was no ponderous armor, whose whole task is to defend its own right to existence, and though he was never more brilliant than in the bright sword play of polemics, his philosophy never justified itself by the skill of his fence, or the technical defeat of his adversary. It was, what he maintained thought to be, a means of action. He was the fortunate man whose inner and outer life was all of a piece. And the most abstruse of his professional undertakings were but parts of the common task of socially constituted and socially organized minds, that of stating their problems in terms of the means of their solution. He went from his seminar to the study of issues national or international, to the political meeting, to the appeal of the oppressed and defeated, to the club and to the theater and to the golf links with the same apparatus of intelligence. He did not sacrifice life to be a philosopher, nor was it necessary to address to him the admonition, *non propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*.

Addison Moore had something of that unusual combination of lively imagination with acuity and subtlety of analysis which characterized Bradley and of that full blooded vivacity of expression which belonged to James. His very style advertized the fact that the whole man passed into his thought, and that his thought was an integral part of the life which we have lost.

MEMORIAL ADDRESS (4)

Henry H. Hilton, "Memorial Address." In *Addison Webster Moore: A Memorial* [n.p., n.d.], pp. 33-36.

Some people are so constituted that they make neither friends nor enemies. Others make strong friends but create antagonisms. Addison Moore made strong friends and so far as I observed, had no enemies. His was a winsome personality.

He was my friend of twenty-five years standing. I considered him one of my inner circle. Gandhi says that "nobody has lived who has not suffered." We both had had our sorrows and perhaps that common experience helped to cement our friendship. Addison Moore received a crushing blow from which he never recovered in the death of his beautiful and accomplished wife, but it was only his intimate friends who fully appreciated the extent of his loss. He did not carry his mourning on his sleeve but went bravely on with a smile for the world.

Everybody needs a father-confessor. He was such a man to me. He spent part of two summers at my house in the absence of my family, and in the long talks we had together he gave me sympathy, consolation, and new courage.

He was a man of enthusiasms and they never waned. His enjoyments were keen. He liked his books, liked his friends, liked all sorts of sports. He played golf to the limit of his strength. At a football game he cheered his team with the spirit of a freshman. He was happy in driving his automobile. He and I played checkers together with much the same thrill that we had fifty years ago when we were playing the game with our fathers. Whatever he did was done with a zest. When his brother-in-law was incapacitated two years ago he went to his farm and led the workers in the hayfield as he did when he was a young man.

He was an admirable companion either alone or in any company. He had a fine sense of humor and told a story very well.

He was generous. Marcus Aurelius described such a generous man who might have been Addison Moore. He said:

> "One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it down to his account as a favor conferred. Another is not ready to do this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor and he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know what

> he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit. As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tackled the game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act does not call out for others to come and see but he goes on to another act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season."

I attended the funeral of Addison Moore in Indiana. One picture which I shall carry in mind I wish to share with you: He was buried beside his wife on a peaceful tree-crowned hillside, far from the tumult of the city and near the scene of their youthful experiences.

ADDISON W. MOORE AS A TEACHER

Matilde Castro Tufts, "Addison W. Moore as Teacher." *The University* [of Chicago] *Record* 17.1 (January 1931): 49–50.

Mr. Moore was my first instructor in psychology as well as in philosophy when he was a junior member of the Philosophy Department. Although I cannot separate entirely from my recollections of that early day the significance which certain of his qualities have acquired for me in the retrospective years since, I retain a vivid memory of some first impressions. Chief among them is the sense of his being fully aware of his class both as a group and as individuals. He went along with them from the beginning of the hour to the end, and I never knew him to miss the point of a student's questions, so willing was he to listen, and so flexible to follow the reasoning of even the immature. He was refreshingly alive to all that was going on, and his adroit handling of the artful dodger, his whimsical good humor in parrying the thrusts of an aggressive blusterer, his genial persistence in prodding the indolent to some response less nonchalant than the "Don't know," or "Not prepared, Professor," were a delight to the class. Psychology was a human as well as an academic subject, and the hour passed too soon. As one who later specialized in psychology somewhat extensively, I was grateful that I had my introduction to it under the influence of a mind with Mr Moore's philosophical bias; keenly analytical, yet searching always for relationships and the meaning of parts with reference to a larger whole. Such training in perspective was an asset to me in dealing even with problems of laboratory psychology.

From my experience as a graduate student I select a memorable instance. The class had for two quarters taken a course in logic with Professor John Dewey, in which they had had the rare privilege of witnessing a thinker building the structure that was to furnish a new philosophical viewpoint. Mr. Moore was asked to continue the course in the third quarter. His modest, almost self-deprecatory statements about the contrast, and the worth of what he had to give, did not lessen the apprehension already vaguely in the air. But before the course was over there was difference in attitude. Not a few felt that it was a valuable complement to the preceding work, enlarging its significance for them because of their surer grasp and more intimate possession of its content. Mr. Moore's fresh perception of students' difficulties, his vivifying and

clear exposition, his constant encouragement to discussion, contributed largely to this result.

In subsequent courses I was repeatedly impressed by what Mr. Moore accomplished with a class. Receiving a number of students uneven in preparation, and unequal in calibre, he soon had a group working together, able to follow where the argument led, and in practically every case maturing in capacity in the give-and-take of the class hour. Later, looking on from the sidelines, I marked astonishing changes in the development of individual students in so brief a period as that of one seminar; changes from inarticulate fumbling to effective to effective speaking and cogent thinking.

The secret of Mr. Moore's success as a teacher lay perhaps in the fulfilment of that earlier promise. Following his students' trial-and-error thinking with animated attention and unfeigned interest, he gave them the full benefit of his own acute and pliant dialect. Growing by what it fed on, his mental suppleness, his fine-grained sensitivity, his almost intuitive appreciation of situations, in short, his ability to live imaginatively and responsively in the thoughts and feelings of others showed through the pattern of his character as a dominant trait, and made him a great teacher.

Quickened in philosophical vision by the stimulating speculative thought of one course, or nourished by the abundant erudition of another, it was yet under Mr. Moore's tutelage that many a student came into the fullest employment of his philosophical resources; added a visible cubit to his intellectual stature.

MEMORIAL RESOLUTION OF THE A.P.A.

William K. Wright, "Addison Webster Moore." Memorial resolution of the American Philosophical Association. *Philosophical Review* 40.2 (March 1931): 178–179.

Addison Webster Moore, after a brief illness subsequent to a long period of ill health, died in London on August 25, 1930. After graduating from De Pauw University and teaching history far a short time, he studied philosophy at Cornell in 1893–94 and then went to the University of Chicago as an assistant in philosophy in 1895. He became a full professor there in 1909, and remained a member of the department until his death. He was a visiting lecturer at Stanford University in 1911 and at Harvard in 1918. He was President of what was then known as the Western Philosophical Association in 1911, and of the then American Philosophical Association – now this Division – in 1917. He was the author of a monograph on *Existence, Meaning and Reality*, which was one of the early definitive expositions of Instrumentalism, and of *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, a series of essays in defence of Instrumentalism. He contributed to *Studies in Logical Theory* and *Creative Intelligence*, and wrote numerous other papers in interpretation of Instrumentalism. Coming into the Instrumentalist school, as he did, from a previous training in neo-Hegelianism, he always retained a keen appreciation of the life of the spirit, and his great concern, as is illustrated by his Presidential Address to this Division in 1917, was to keep values from becoming divorced from existence, and to make philosophy a constructive influence in the transitional period through which we are now passing. Primarily concerned with logic and metaphysics, he ever sought to make them instrumental and organic in human affairs.

As a teacher, Professor Moore was notably successful in provoking vigorous and fruitful discussion. A seminar with him was a delightful experience, ever after to be treasured in the memories of those who had participated. Whether the particular philosopher under consideration happened to be Plato or Bradley, Kant or Hegel, James or one of the new realists, Professor Moore made him a vital defender of real issues of entrancing interest. In contrast he brilliantly set forth and defended Professor Dewey's opposing standpoint. His classes thus learned to appreciate the fundamental differences between contemporary schools. Each pupil was encouraged to state and to defend his own opinions. Lively as

discussions ever were, they were always free from rancor or intolerance, either on the part of the members of the seminar toward one another or toward the eminent philosophers whose books they criticized. A man of lovable personal qualities and of rare social gifts, Professor Moore developed the better natures of those who studied under him and he inspired in them a devotion to scholarship in the service of mankind; for, as he believed, the mission of the philosopher is to illuminate the problems of men.

ADDISON WEBSTER MOORE: DEFENDER OF INSTRUMENTALISM

Benjamin Wolstein, "Addison Webster Moore: Defender of Instrumentalism." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 10.4 (October 1949): 539–566.

Among the leaders of the pragmatist attempt to capture the intellectual frontier of America at the turn of the century, there is one little known and less read. The St. Louis Hegelianism and the transcendental idealism of New England began to lose their sway because of men of the high calibre of William James who had the imaginative daring to raise the intellectualist curtain hiding the so-called immutable Real from the ephemeral living, and John Dewey whose lucid insight into the fallacies of absolute idealism was supported by keen, methodic analysis. Yet the revolutionary import of instrumental pragmatism for the philosophy of experience, for ethical science, and ways of knowing was vigorously and forthrightly analyzed by one who has escaped the attention of contemporary naturalists. Among the most forceful and strenuous defenders of pragmatism in the polemics of yesteryear is Addison Webster Moore, a clear analyst of ideas with a strange gift for anticipating critics.

Despite current oblivion, Moore had attained distinction in the Chicago branch of the pragmatic movement led by Dewey, his teacher, colleague, and co-worker. His meagre writings were, in the main, polemical. Contributing much to the growth and wide acceptance of the new school of thought, they were considered brilliant interpretations of its insight. Staunch protagonist that he was, Moore was not merely a spirited expounder of ideas. For if his rejection of absolutism were taken as an intellectualizing, logic-chopping affair, it would remain neither understood nor appreciated. Moore's anti-idealism stemmed rather from the faith that philosophy is not simply a pigeonholing device to be imposed upon the stream of experience *ab extra*; instead it had as its task the painstaking organization of generalized results obtained from inquiring into specific subject-matters, an overarching synthesis of subject-matters, as it were, for their mutual improvement.

His philosophic materials obviously came from beyond the walls of mere speculation *in vacuo*; they were firmly rooted in the practical business of day-to-day existence, in the interpersonal relations that bound men together into social groupings, and in the concrete achievements of the experimental laboratories. This predisposition for the concrete, factual, and empirical in the science of society gained support from vital interests in the progressive edu-

cational and political movements that were going concerns in the Chicago of his day.

I

Addison Webster Moore was born July 30, 1866 on a typically mid-western farmstead in Plainfield, Indiana to John Sheldon and Adaline Hockett Moore.[1] Their ancestors had come from Virginia by way of Kentucky. An active and highly respected member of his community, John Moore supported the Methodist church strongly, and tilled the soil industriously and successfully; his wife was of Quaker stock that moved north because of the slavery issue. They had met while attending the academy at Danville and were married upon his return from the Civil War where he had fought with the union forces nearly four years. About a year after they settled down on the old Hockett place in Plainfield, Addison Webster was born, the first of six children.

By the time the oldest son was ten, the Moores, running a large and lucrative farm, had already prospered. Life on the farm was busy and wholesome, shot through with the savor of good earth. Keeping abreast of the times, J. S. Moore purchased the most modern in farm machinery and had the latest periodicals and outstanding books at his farmstead. The important items of political news in the township, controversies over crucial social issues, debates on dominant national questions, and religious disputations all found their way into the evening fireside discussions in which the immediate family and friends from surrounding farms took part; and the days spent at the Plainfield Academy were as stimulating. It was a cordial, open-hearted environment conducive to cooperative and unfettered thought, doubtless leaving its mark on the young Moore.

After completing the prescribed course at the Academy, he was invited to teach. But, at the age of twenty, he decided to further his own education and entered the nearby DePauw University. In a freshman English course which actually embraced logic, rhetoric, and criticism, Moore was outstanding, already manifesting the makings of intellectual leadership and considered a good bet for the ministry. Three years later, however, he encountered Professor DeVoll and was irretrievably caught up in the philosophic enterprise. Whatever theological tenets howsoever retained had now to stand up before the exacting scrutiny of the new-found wisdom.

Desiring to pursue graduate studies in philosophy, Moore entered Cornell in 1892 where he found a unique blend of neo-Kantian criticism and Hegelian absolutism flourishing. His bride of a year, a fellow student at

[1] The major source of this biographical material was the privately printed brochure, Moore *Memorial Addresses*, obtained through the kindness of Professor C. W. Morris.

DePauw, Ella Adams, accompanied him to Cornell to study literature. But, two years later, when he heard that Dewey was coming to Chicago, he unhesitantly switched to the University of Chicago. Dewey's emphasis on the new psychology as philosophic method and Augell's work in the experimental laboratories converged at an opportune stage of Moore's development. Having just left the academic headquarters of speculative idealism, he could readily grasp the significance of a new approach to old problems; besides, an experimental idealism with practical bearings could not but strike a responsive chord in the mind of one raised on a farm. The fruit of his work in the laboratory and seminar, directed and influenced by both Dewey and Angell, first appeared in his doctoral dissertation of 1902, "The Functional and The Representational Theories of Knowledge." It reappeared the following year with some changes as "Existence, Meaning and Reality," evoking much favorable comment.

Moore's writing during the next eight years was mainly of a polemical character, being published in various journals as short, spirited defenses of instrumental pragmatism. In 1910, he collected the best of them and combined them with four lectures delivered at the University of Chicago to put out his only volume, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*. That he was held in high esteem by his colleagues is demonstrated by his election to the presidency of the Western Philosophical Association the following year, and of the American Philosophical Association six years later. His contribution to *Creative Intelligence*, a preface to the "Reformation of Logic," was a further application of the principles reached in the 1902 dissertation. Later he was invited to contribute to the *Contemporary American Philosophers* volume, and was among the first to suggest a volume of essays in honor of John Dewey. But he had worked hard all of his life under unusual tension and strain, suffered from insomnia throughout the latter part of his career, and above all lost his life's companion, his 'other self', as he was wont to refer to her, in 1924. This unfortunate concurrence of circumstance compelled him to abandon, albeit reluctantly, all intentions of contributing to either volume.

Retiring in 1929 as professor emeritus, he still wished to continue his favorite course in Greek philosophy out of the sheer love of teaching. As fate would have it, this spirited expounder of instrumental pragmatism was destined to reside in the Platonic heavens and hold converse with the gods even before he might once have lectured as professor emeritus. The end came in London, August 25, 1930.

II

Moore inherited his philosophic problem from an evangelical home, community, and college. At the close of his student days at DePauw University, the problem had already become social rather than theologic, and experimental philosophy held out more promise for resolving it.

Philosophy promised to yield the more profound meaning of dogma, and, with the tools of psychology, to lay bare the incorporation of social beliefs in human personality. It would show why certain beliefs expressed man's innermost strivings, and how they guarded, when socially institutionalized, the spiritual goods of mankind.

At Cornell, he was assuredly stirred by James E. Creighton's objective idealism. To an eager and speculative young mind, this dialectical intermixture of polar opposites in a consummate Absolute must have been a fascinating business. It fed upon an unhalting processional of conflicting theses and issued in binding syntheses, an irrepressible struggle to preserve on more comprehensive levels those values that were threatened by the conflict. Indifferent to the new experimental psychology and factual only in the retrospective accommodation of social institutions by a spiritualized historical teleology, Creighton's 'objective mind', the divine manifest in history, was to be studied by categorial criticism. An ahistorical logic plus a philosophy of history, an unholy alliance that requires much dialectical skill and even more intellectual tact to keep it from falling apart, probably became the training ground for Moore's exceptional mental agility. Perhaps the major thesis which he acquired at Cornell was the social nature of human life and thought; although never acknowledged, this acquisition held the center of Moore's philosophic outlook, being strengthened by his later contact with George H. Mead at Chicago.

Whether he then felt at all the dissent from absolutism which he so resolutely proclaimed at Chicago is not known. Yet we do know that Moore came to Chicago because of Dewey who, though bred in the same tradition, had already broken through the prefixed shackles of eternal completeness. His "Moral Theory and Practice" article of 1891 and the *Ethical Syllabus* that followed within three years, were sufficient evidence of that break with neo-idealism in ethics as well as the philosophy of experience. Because of this general similarity of backgrounds, Dewey's insistence upon an integrated theory of experience and a philosophy that would render a method of conduct compatible with that theory, did not prove alien to Moore.

It seems that Moore did not begin his work at Chicago as an academic philosopher. Although the original attraction was the new head professor of philosophy, he started out as an assistant to James R. Angell in experimental psychology. The results of his laboratory investigations were published, in collaboration with Angell, under the title "Reaction Time: A Study in Attention and habit," in 1896. In passing, we might note that this study, defending the dynamic theory of habit, appeared some twenty-five years before Dewey proferred the theory in *Human Nature and Conduct;* we make this notation in order to circumvent the suggestion that Dewey's theory had to wait some twenty-five years after the reflex-arc concept was

rejected, to show that the Chicago School of which Dewey was the acknowledged leader had already begun working at a new theory in the middle nineties.[2]

Moore and Angell tried to discover why "…the time of the so-called 'motor form' of reaction is faster than the 'sensory'…why the brain reflex should be established in time former but not in the latter, or why, if established, it should be so much less effective in reducing time consumed by the reaction."[3] After the experiments were completed, Dewey and Mead offered suggestions "…without which the following interpretation could not have been reached."[4] The function of habit in relation to attention served as the principle of reinterpreting the data and resolving the difficulty. A theory of habit based upon the psychobiological continuity of the human organism, served to overcome this split between the 'motor form' and the 'sensory' reaction. "In a word, the time question is not a case of 'sensory' versus a 'motor' reaction; but of a sensori-motor less habitual versus a sensori-motor more habitual."[5] The simple reaction was taken as the typical voluntary action, governing directly the attention exerted. Thus the explanation was found in the related functions of attention and habit in a sort of inverse proportion to each other; it satisfied all the facts, the actual course of human practice and the multitude of individual contingencies.[6]

Angell continued his experimentation in the Psychological Laboratories in order to work out the new functionalism, and, with the publication of his *Psychology* in 1904, was soon recognized as the leader of the psychological phase of the Chicago School of thought. But Moore switched back to philosophy again to incorporate his findings into the logical and epistemological aspects of the new standpoint. His doctoral dissertation on Locke, which F. C. S. Schiller called "…a refreshing advance on the ordinary run of Ph.D. theses…"[7] came out in 1902. The next year there followed another essay on Locke, achieving wide recognition and finally James's accolade. He participated in that historic seminar the papers of which were joined with Dewey's four essays and appeared as *Studies in Logical Theory.* His offering in this collection was a scorching critique of Royce's *The World and The Individual.* After a few introductory pages, Moore tells us that "from this point on this paper is an expansion of some paragraphs, pp. 11–13, in an

[2] *Cf.* Professor Allport's "Dewey's Individual and Social Psychology," *Schilpp,* I, 270.

[3] *University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy,* I, 1, 1.

[4] *Ibid.*, 8f.

[5] *Ibid.*, 14.

[6] *Ibid.*, 14.

[7] *Mind*, n.s. XII, 114.

article 'Existence, Meaning, and Reality'."[8] And "Existence, Meaning and Reality" was that second essay on Locke of 1903.

In his review of the *Logical Studies*, Schiller considered Moore's essay "…one of the ablest in the volume…"[9] while James went all out for that second essay on Locke which served as the basis for analyzing Royce in the *Logical Studies*.[10] At thirty-seven, Moore had become, after Dewey, the most widely accepted and highly articulate member of the Chicago School. The most aggressive pragmatist of the group, he was prevented by ill-health from fulfilling the promise of these early papers, never fully realizing the abilities to which they gave witness.

We have selected "Existence, Meaning and Reality," that second essay on Locke, for special attention here, as it is doubtless the most comprehensive and least polemical of the threesome. In virtue of it, Moore became a ranking pragmatist, one with whom Schiller reckoned and James became enamoured. The latter wrote the following to Dewey about it in 1903:

> I have just read with almost absurd pleasure A. W. Moore's *Existence, Meaning and Reality.* I am behindhand in my reading and don't know how close you may have come to anything like that since 1898… . Who and what is Moore and how old?[11]

To this Dewey replied that Moore had been teaching at Chicago since about 1895. "The flexibility and freedom of his mental operations I needn't speak of – his articles do that. He hasn't had fair play…[and] has been loaded down with sections."[12] Before the year was out, Dewey spoke of Moore again.

> For a number of years, I have funded for my own intellectual capital more of the ideas of other people – students and colleagues – than I can tell, and Moore has given at least as much as he has received.[13]

[8] *Logical Studies*, 346f.

[9] *Mind*, n.s., XIII, 104.

[10] Obviously those three essays put out during 1902 and 1903 made Moore famous as a brilliant pragmatist. He is one of those rare people in the history of modern philosophy who reached his philosophic position in a doctoral dissertation and spent the rest if his life analyziing and expanding that original view.

[11] R. B. Perry's *Thought and Character of William James*, II, 519.

[12] *Ibid*., 520.

[13] *Ibid*., 525.

To see what 'Moore has given' and 'received' we could not do better than turn our attention directly to that important essay which had evoked all this favorable comment. His position was

> …the outgrowth of work done a few years ago in Professor Dewey's seminar in logic – a seminar remarkable for its development of critical and reconstructive principles.[14]

After analyzing the problem of reference in Locke's epistemology, that is "…of how, if meaning and existence are given apart, the former gets its reference to the latter…,"[15] Moore had probably realized that the analysis could not have been performed without Dewey's functionalist view of intelligence as firmly moored in a moving stream of experience.

The problem in Locke, according to Moore, was to find a way to reunite meaning with existence, a reunion necessitated by the initial assumption that they are separate and disparate. Once the separation of meaning from existence had been assumed, then the twin assumption of representational reference became inevitable if there was to be even a possibility of knowledge. Moore found this twin assumption to be "…trifling…because it can never he verified…,[15a] to be as artificial as the question it was supposed to answer. Why Locke did assume these two complementary assumptions, or why he atomized sensations and then associated them, or why he assumed the existence of a mythical natural man and socialized it with a mythological social contract – these questions were not all given full treatment by Moore except implicitly. For if any one link in the chain of reciprocal assumptions could be destroyed, the entire chain would fall to pieces since it would be but a question of time before the critical and reconstructive principles were applied to the various links. Moore chose to hammer away at the epistemological link in this chain of artificial, double assumptions.

The difficulties besetting representationalism were not at all dissolved when Kant introduced the active theory of mind; in fact they drove him to an unnatural bifurcation of nature. For this meeting of continental rationalism and British empiricism was but a half-hearted one, since two incompatible notions – an active theory of mind and a formal conception of experience – were unsuccessfully joined.

[14] "Existence, Meaning and Reality," *University of Chicago Dicennial Publications*, f.s., III, 29. Although Moore was indebted to Dewey for logical principles which turned out to be the working principles that he always maintained, it was in their application that he made his unique contribution.

[15] *Ibid*., 33.

[15a] *Idem*.

In his attack on the spectator theory, Moore might have found support in the variety of German idealisms, but he didn't because all of them since Kant continued in the Lockean tradition of discrete sensory experience; besides, after the James-Dewey advance in the philosophy of experience, an appeal to idealism would have been superfluous. For the old-line idealisms, from the Kantian juxtaposition of the phenomenal and the noumenal to their post-Kantian and neo-Kantian renditions, from their unificatory *Aufhebung* by Hegel's addition of a third phase, the dialectical synthesis, to the orthodox, right wing, left wing, and young Hegelianisms, experience was construed as atomized into impressional particles; the fallacy of misplaced concreteness moved from the Lockean theory of mind over into the formalist conception of experience. Side by side with an activist epistemology was espoused a static and wholly structuralized experience; knowing was an active, moving process, experience, a formal, static receptacle of sense data.

This patent contradiction went unnoticed until the sensational psychology of thought was so brilliantly crushed by William James, and finally brushed aside when Dewey read the mechanical reflex arc, a relic of idealist psychology, out of the new experimental science and secured a firm foothold for an active, functioning experience. Not only human thinking but intelligently guided conduct also streamed. Now the dynamic theory of knowledge long affirmed by the modern critical philosophies could rest securely in a dynamic, fluent bed of experience.

Here in the new James-Dewey philosophy of experience, Moore had all the tools he needed to bypass both the initial empiricist difficulties and the difficulties arising from their critical resolutions. And, instead of reworking the resolutions, he went back to the original source of the difficulties, to those self-supporting artificial assumptions, showing how neither was tenable, how the active stream of experience dispensed with both mirroring minds and elements associating according to set laws.

The satisfaction and dissatisfaction, harmony and order, prizings and sufferings which humans experience had to make a difference in the knowing process; if not, the copy theory of knowledge, intransitive and sterile, reporting an unchanging, unchangeable world lying outside and external to the 'reflective'[16] process, would go unchallenged. Its persistence would only eventuate in an impossible state of affairs where the passive spectator might know just what he has done but never what to do – and

[16] One of the chief sources of confusion and misunderstanding has been the difficulty which contemporary naturalists, especially Dewey, found in trying to say new things despite the impediments of a terminology that was created for different purposes. Reflection is one of those terms made prominent by a mirror psychology, and its co-partner, the spectator theory of knowledge.

this against a whole array of predictive sciences that deal mainly in hypotheses to be verified by future action. Moore displaced the static conception of nature and human nature, with one which agreed with the "…criteria of 'order' and 'confusion', of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, upon which we fall back in the case."[17] He sought a new intellectual concordance in which the theory of knowledge, the functional criteria of judgment in the concrete instance, and the newer views as to the nature of experience would all jibe.

This self-propelling, stream conception of experience agreed with, in fact depended upon, the theory of habit first formulated in barest outline in that 1896 article, "Reaction Time: A Study in Attention and Habit," appearing the same year as Dewey's rejection of the mechanical reflex arc. This theory of habit provided a solid underpinning for the dynamic reunion of existence and meaning as distinctions within a larger natural process which Moore called reality in the language of the older idealisms but meant experienced nature in the spirit of present-day naturalism. Just as knowing was not first cut off from an unknowable world which was, in turn, sent through a categorial sieve called mind, so human behavior was not to be ground up into a series of discrete stimuli and their proper responses; neither could have the static bliss which only the dead enjoy; neither could be described in terms of merely perfunctory push-pull or atomistic mechanisms. In its final sense, all of human behavior, whether predominantly thinking or doing, must be viewed as a system of habit-formings capable of reconstruction and performing a reconstructive function in the given situation.

Thinking, or 'reflective' experience as Moore sometimes had it, arose when and where a habit broke down and did no longer cope with the system of relations in and through which it was integrated. If we take sensation as the first appearance in consciousness of this breach of habituated promise, urged Moore, then "…sensation, as the first shock of this interruption of habituated activity, constitutes the 'this' demanding interpretation – meaning."[18] And this demand for new meaning, he continued, is something more than a demand for the mere representation of the 'this' to consciousness; it is a demand for the reconstruction of habitual behavior

[17] *Ibid*., 40.

[18] *Ibid*., 43. The consistent working out of this theory of habit would have required a revision of the associationist notion of 'sensory perception', the 'sensory' being but the instrument or avenue by which the materials for 'perception' are transferred to the seat of perception. One of the means of perception is sensory awareness, but this does not determine the character of the perceptive act entirely, since all the material of any specific thought situation is not gathered by means of the senses. On this note, see Dewey's "The Naturalistic Theory of Perception by the Senses," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXII (1925), 596–605.

within the situation engendering the novel, strange 'this' in idea, a reconstructed meaning that takes shape as the idea is acted upon. The ineffectiveness of representational and spectator theories of knowledge is almost self-evident at this point. If the mind were but a mirror and thinking could but reflect the external world, the appearance of a new obstacle would make matters immeasurably complex. The 'tabula' would record the appearance of the obstacle and note the failure of the habitual response without being able to do anything at all about it, except possibly re-record the disintegrated habit and the cause of its disintegration ad infinitum. "With absolutely no element of reconstruction present, consciousness would lapse into a mere 'shock' of sensation…" said Moore, and, continuing in apt metaphor, "…[it would] soon be reduced to a vast pile of psychical scrap iron."[19]

Locke's epistemology had to be discarded because it had no room for the creative, reconstructive function of the thought process. "Meaning, then, in its very beginning, stands for the actual work of reconstruction," Moore maintained, "not a mere reflection of the materials to be reconstructed."[20] The materials to be reconstructed, to be endowed with new meaning, he called existence; meaning was the process of reconstruction; and reality, the product or objective of processing the materials. In our current terminology, 'intelligence', 'nature', 'experience' would approximate Moore's 'meaning', 'existence', 'reality.'[21] Meaning and existence are no longer assumed as ultimately dissevered, and it is, consequently, no longer necessary to get them back into working agreement by making a second assumption of reference.

That the distinction of meaning and existence is one falling inside reality, that meaning does not merely copy a record reality symbolically, that reality, a compound of meaning and existence, is essentially dynamic and developmental, that it can never be identified with meaning as such or existence as such – these considerations made the Kantian bi-worldliness impermissible and impossible for Moore. Material and process do not exist in two block universes, waiting for judgment to effect their interlocking

[19] *Ibid.,* 44.

[20] *Ibid.*, 45.

[21] Since Dewey's conception of experience is interpreted as embracing within the unity of its process the bipolar distinction of nature and intelligence, then 'reality' and 'experience' may be used interchangeably, as Moore's conception of reality had just exactly this interpretation. In tracing all meaning and the existent back to their common matrix, reality, he had stated in germ what Dewey later enlarged upon in *Experience and Nature*. In those last years at Chicago, Dewey never developed these ideas because his interests lay elsewhere. But this development by Moore was supported by principles acknowledgedly Dewey's; he found what Dewey probably would have found had the latter done it then.

and agreement. In fact, they 'exist' only during the judgmental phase of experience, for such a distinction, analytic and purposive, would not have been necessitated without the incidence of judgment. Accordingly, it is the function of judgment to analyze the particular problem objectively for the further control of the situation carrying the problem to be overcome, and, then, to transcend that particularity by an active commencement of a new continuity in which those distinctions, becoming functionless, become obsolete and disappear.

There is no question of an unbridgeable gap, of predicating noumenal materials for the phenomenal processes, of qualifying existence by an unheralded intrusion of intent. Just as a specific existent-in-relation may have been the outcome of past construction, so the meaning may be the ideal outpost of future reconstruction, the converse being true. As distinctions within reality, meaning and existence, material and process, thought and thing, object and idea are all differentiated simultaneously with reference to future behavior. To discover just what material remains hard and fast and irresistible, what processes may be mastered, maneuvered, and manipulated, to what extent, for which intent, is the focal terrain of logical inquiry; its nature Dewey considered at length in the third of those early logical essays.[22]

And this notion of material-in-process is no longer encumbered by the two empiricist assumptions that sidetracked modern philosophy into the dead-end called epistemology. Modern philosophy folded up with the close of that modern miracle play whose plot was constructed simply by assuming an unfeasible separation that may possibly be traced to the transcendent other-worldliness of medieval theology, and rendering it plausible with a connective assumption, itself resembling a relic of divine immanence. In accepting the fact that intelligence confers meaning directly upon existence during the judgmental phase of experience, Moore was able to free himself from the snares of modern philosophy, and leave the pitfalls of epistemology to the blind.

The double movement of two interpenetrating strands was, ultimately, a single, unified reality; meaning is not the exclusive monopoly of either the inner experience or the external situation; it is neither subjective nor objective, neither a mere representation of work already done, nor an instinctual vector of work to be done. A meaning is itself a new work, a new achievement, an ideal reorganization of a confused situation belonging no more to the inner life of the individual than to the public situation *sans* individual.

On this theory of meaning, the notion that only future existents are contingent, and, therefore, the proper subject-matter of inquiry, while past

[22] *Studies in Logical Theory*, Chap. III, esp. 61.

events are fixed and abiding, becomes a questionable one. In every new advance toward whatever goal, Moore insisted that "…it is precisely the past that is being reconstructed…, the past is still in the making."[23] The sum total of existentials or meaningful existents – reality, is just this ongoing process in which the past is caught up in the present, where the remolding of things to be remolded take place, and then projected into the future, shot through with a new meaning. Moore's advocacy of the continuity of analysis, of the view that human intelligence, as a transitive process interrelated with other natural processes, runs parallel with the continuity of reality, gained for it a leading role in the development of the Chicago School.[24]

To sum up, then, "Existence, Meaning and Reality" had one central position – that reality is existence 'and' meaning, or, as we should prefer to put it, existence-meaning.[25] We prefer to hyphenate the terms this way in order to anticipate any semantic distortion, suggesting the representationalism and epistemological dualisms of the seventeenth-century mirror psychology. The introduction of the hyphen may help to clear away somewhat the vestigial innuendoes of dualism that still persist after all the pragmatist polemic and protest to the contrary.

Despite the English tendency toward the use of the conjunctive in philosophic discourse, implying that the subjects to be conjoined are really disjoined, Moore was able to lay bare the erroneous roots of dualistic analysis. The task of overhauling philosophic discourse to keep apace with the changing conceptions in science is a mammoth, staggering one; both Moore and Dewey were aware of its importance, and yet, in those years, neither attempted it, striking out on the new frontiers with the older vocabularies instead. This unrefined terminology was undoubtedly one of the great sources of continual misunderstanding, because the critics, still adhering to the old concepts, read the old words and felt, quite naturally, that the Chicagoans were wrong. Fortunately, neither was backward when it came to dialectical disputation, and Moore's polemic was even clearer, sharper and more strenuous than Dewey's. Both had been raised in the

[23] *Ibid*., 50.

[24] When Dewey wrote his first article on valuation in 1915, he recalled Moore's almost dramatic insistence on the transitive character of knowing, saying, "The anti-pragmatists have been asked (notably by Professor A. W. Moore) how they sharply distinguish between judgment – knowledge – and act, and yet freely admit and insist that knowledge makes a difference in action and hence in existence." ["The Logic of Judgments of Practice," *Journal of Philosophy*, XII (1915), 522].

[25] This joining of judgmental phases might be rendered just as satisfactorily in other ways, for example, meaningful existence or existence that means. Any of these convey what is intended; we chose existence-meaning simply because it is the nearest to Moore's own usage.

philosophic tradition holding dialectics to be the proper method of philosophy, and Moore was such a good student that nearly all of his writing aimed at a polemical defense rather than a consistent elaboration of the position taken in the 1902 dissertation.

III

In the years that followed the publication of "Existence, Meaning and Reality," Moore occupied himself constantly with explaining and defending the Chicago standpoint. His only volume, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, came out seven years afterward. It was directed at those critics of pragmatism who either found fault with an old universe of discourse without grasping the new universe of thought, or took the liberty of throwing stones even though their own philosophies lived in glass houses. It was a strong counter-attack especially against those who avoided the original criticisms by pragmatists by raising new criticisms about pragmatism; instead of understanding the problems pragmatists grappled with, they had attacked the pragmatism from the very points of view found wanting and problematic.

Written with the adroitness and skillfulness of one of the most adroit and resourceful of the Chicago School, the volume, together with its author, goes practically unmentioned today. Inscribed to "John Dewey, Teacher and Friend," the book was quite favorably received back in 1910 as a further elucidation of instrumental pragmatism. Aside from Dewey's *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* and *How* We *Think* it was the most authoritative volume to have come from the Chicago School since the publication of the *Logical Studies*. Of interest is the strikingly similar format of two of these first three books since 1903; both Moore's *Pragmatism and Its Critics* and Dewey's *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* were collections of essays that appeared in the arena of philosophic controversy where the finer points were hammered out in the heated disputes of those intervening seven years.

The contents of *Pragmatism and Its Critics* fall into two parts: a condensation of a course of popular lectures on the "Origin and Meaning of Pragmatism" delivered at the University of Chicago in the summer of 1908, and seven articles on various phases of pragmatism which had been read before professional societies and/or published in academic journals. Despite this apparent diversity, the book was unified by its constant concern with the central emphases of pragmatism under contention. Its intellectual binding was supplied by the following considerations:

> …(1) the historical background of the movement… (2) the central role of the conception of evolution in the development of pragmatism; (3) the social, or perhaps better, the 'situational' character of consciousness and,

a fortiori, of thinking. The neglect of the last point seemed especially vital.[26]

The 'situational' character of the thought process was kept in the foreground throughout the entire volume, and this persistent emphasis, even more than the other two, gave it the necessary cohesiveness. In this principle, Moore had found the best way of refuting the most vitiating charge leveled against both pragmatism and instrumental pragmatism, namely, subjectivism. The refutation was based on Dewey's discussion of the total objective situation in his contribution to the *Logical Studies*. His statement was clear and unequivocal.

> The situation as such is clearly objective. It is there; it is there as a whole; the various parts are there… . Every reflective attitude and function whether of naive life, deliberate invention, or controlled scientific research has arisen through the medium of some such total objective situation. The abstract logician may tell us that sensations or impressions or associated ideas or bare physical things, or conventional symbols, are antecedent conditions. But such statements cannot be verified by reference to a single instance of thought in connection with actual practice or scientific research.[27]

[26] *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, vii–viii.

[27] *Studies in Logical Theory*, 38–39; cited by Moore, 145. An undying thorn in the side of instrumental pragmatism, the 'problem-situation' has become, after forty years, a stereotypical shibboleth of anti-instrumentalist polemics. Witness F. H. Bradley's imputation of 'psychical' to it in his *Essays in Truth and Reality*, 74; Bertrand Russell's almost mechanical reiteration, after the fashion of sensational empiricism, of the same queries only to get the same answers for about thirty years now, from his review of Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic*, *Journal of Philosophy*, XVI (1919), 5–26, to his discussion of warranted assertability in *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 400–410; and most recently Professor Mackay's strictures in the *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXIX (1942), 141–148. Bradley found the 'situation' to be wholly psychical, the existential as well as the doubtful being mentalistic, while Russell and Mackay find it impossible to say that a situation could be doubtful since only persons actually doubt. On the first interpretation, the existential world would locate in the mind of the doubter, while the other two consider doubt to be exclusively and precisely a function of human consciousness, and, therefore read it out of the existential situation. Now, obviously, both criticisms of the same theory could not be right at the same time, for both are directed against different theories. It is equally obvious that instrumentalists did not actually want to put molecular entities *into* qualitative experience or find qualitative experience *within* the brute stuff of existence. But they did mean to say that a doubtful (perhaps *doubtable* would be the happier descriptive) situation can and does exist without a personal doubter. It seems that a fresh start would be more fruitful than continuing along the old lines of controversy, expecially since the theory has been dogged with such contradictory interpretations. Unfortunately, we can neither analyze the queries and strictures nor make that fresh start here.

And Moore cited this passage as a flat contradiction to the careless imputation of 'subjective', 'momentary', 'psychical', and 'merely present' to instrumental pragmatism. When the pragmatist said that the function of the thought process was situational and reconstructive, his critics, after a none too sympathetic reading, lost little time in analyzing this conception back into their own psychologic and philosophic frame of reference, and destroying it; naturally, the intended meaning was destroyed in the translation precisely because the new conception depended upon the rejection of just that frame of reference. The reading of instrumental pragmatism through associationist spectacles, immediately reinstated the very analysis of the thought process, with its static-structuralist theory of experience which had been abandoned by the experimental psychology as inadequate.

More important than just reading the pragmatic views sympathetically was giving the cognitive function, an "…element inside the 'situation' …,"[28] its due as a leading principle. The situational character of the thought process, when spelled out, means that specific subject matter always entails specific thinking; and doubtfulness, as part of the inquiry process, is legitimized by the doubtable traits of the situation in which it transpires. If the specific subject matter lacked these publicly definable traits, thinking would not ensue, there being neither need nor possibility of it. If thinking did ensue where no such traits were obtainable, it would have no way of getting in touch with the subject matter for verification, there being again neither need nor possibility of establishing contact. Inquiry, to bring systematically verifiable results, must follow the lead of its subject matter; on this there seems little room for dispute; surely the doubt initiating the inferential inquiry must also be governed by the same consideration.

The controversy, to which reference has already been made, seems to revolve about the following question: do doubt, ambiguities, conflict characterize the subject matter at least potentially, that is, even before the matter is subjected to inquiry, and would those characteristics still obtain whether or not the subject matter had come under the purview of human experience? Do we doubt what is actually there to be doubted, or does human experience go on in a self-imposed vacuum removed, if not divorced, from reality?

To hold that these characteristics are introduced wholly from the side of consciousness leaves us without any possible means of checking our results with existential conditions, and, incidentally, revives a whole host of philosophies that now rest peacefully in the history books – solipsism, metaphysical and epistemological dualisms, spectator theories of knowledge and practically every brand of idealism – philosophies which

[28] *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, 146.

had been superseded by the dynamic philosophy of experience and its cognate theory of inquiry. Again the *Erkenntnissproblem* would be resurrected to bedevil philosophers and make ashes of philosophy. It is difficult to see why 'modern' philosophers still refuse to relinquish this problem, and why they cannot, by the same token, start with the proposition that man can think fruitfully about the world he inhabits and desires to know. For he seems certainly to do just that.

What was a problem for the 'modern' became a fact for the contemporary. How man can possibly know an external world, became a supernumerary ritualistic question when confronted with the various bodies of knowledge which are going concerns. On the newer theory, intelligence, in natural exchange with its materials through the medium of doubt or, more generally, affectivity, had its genuine problem of knowledge in the problem of acquiring more knowledge, the way of knowing as much a subject of inquiry as any other natural event. Mind is not a mirror reflecting and associating sense impressions, but an active reconstructive guide in action, the better to realize the needs, desires, and impulses of the total organism.

In the course of affecto-intelligent experience, the doubt-inquiry process discerns the right way of behavior. There is no actually doubtful situation, no situation for that matter, if there are no human beings capable of having doubts and resolving them. This is an obvious truism, but even truisms have some right to the light of day, especially when their implications are important. For it means that inference must break through the walls of egocentricity and make its way to existence, and the existential subject matter must be potentially open to the doubt-inquiry of an affecto-intelligent organism. We cannot doubt what is existentially trustworthy, since, if we did, we would be caught up in a frustrating predicament of ever fondling doubts *ad libitum psychopathologicum,* and never discovering, or being able to discover, whether they were worthy of the exertion.

Experience has been termed, to parallel the doubt-inquiry process, affecto-intelligent. The empirical continuity of affectivity and intelligence has them as thoroughly interpenetrating strands, even though discursive analysis must distinguish them. Moore averred:

> If willing, choosing is thoughtful impulse it is equally true that it is impulseful thought… . To those who make a sharp separation between thinking and willing, this appears at first to be a decapitation of the will…on the contrary it is a 'capitation' of the will; it is literally putting a head on what would otherwise be a miserable torso of instinct and impulse.[29]

[29] *Ibid*., 12.

While the analysis of thoughtful impulse does not exhaust the analysis of conduct, every stage or mode of human conduct, properly called human, contained the thoughtful impulse in combination, and, at least, in germ. Perhaps the tender-minded would insist upon subordinating conduct to the maintenance of values even at the cost of 'decapitating' the will; yet it must be admitted from all sides that human values are instituted by human doings, since only the disembodied logos may enjoy values without concrete deeds. Until men are logoi that value without acting, until they can think unfeelingly or feel unthinkingly, the divorce of value from conduct must be recognized for what it is – a vestigial remain of psycho-physical dualism.

To state, then, that thinking is a mode of conduct, a kind of doing, means that it fuses with desiring, purposing, prior valuings into a series of links, comprising the continuous chain of stages in experience. Thinking is that phase during which we 'make up our minds' about those desires, purposes and values involved. And although every judgment may not end in a decision about the action to be taken, yet every action must be governed by judgment, if the ensuing action is to accomplish the task for which it was patterned. This may sound like a simple truism to which even the plain man would readily admit, but not the critics of pragmatism. Moore was so characteristically emphatic on this point that we have been tempted to quote him at length. On

> …the original issue between pragmatism and its critics, namely, whether thinking is a part of conduct…the critic is waiting to say: 'Granting that the above definition of conduct is the common-sense one, yet is it either common, or sense, to make thinking a part of conduct? Do we not everywhere insist on the distinction between knowing and doing, between theory and practice? Moreover, do not knowledge and truth belong among those direct, immediate 'values' which we have said is the business of conduct to maintain and develop? Is there not a special instinct for knowledge as much as there is for food or shelter or art or friends?[30]

The point at issue was stated quite squarely here, and if these had not been rhetorical questions, Moore would surely have answered them in the negative.

In our discussion thus far, his third consideration, the situational character of thinking, has been dealt with at length as primary for the volume; we began with it because of its importance not only for Moore's *Pragmatism* but for the entire position.

[30] *Ibid*., 6.

In his analysis of the historical background of pragmatism, Moore faced an obviously inescapable problem. If the setting of creative intelligence within the concrete act were so simple and self-evident, then how did the pragmatist account for the rise and long run supremacy of transcendentalist absolutism, especially in its dualistic form? There were at least two ways open to him, namely, to select certain great systems of the past and demonstrate the large measure of their pragmatic intent, or to show how all post-Grecian philosophy was working with an epistemological theory that lost both its prestige and troublesomeness when illumined by the findings of the new experimental and social psychology. And Moore chose the latter course, a choice carrying all the liabilities of geneticism and none of the assets of James's 'new name for old ways of thinking'. Yet the presentation was brilliant.

To answer this problem, Moore turned his attention to Greek philosophy straightaway, to lay bare what he considered the roots of this dichotomy of thought and act, the roots of the epistemology plaguing modern philosophy. It all happened, he found, because the Greek polity was beginning to become insecure, diffident and disintegrated.

> 'How does it happen', they said, 'that we Greeks, the most intelligent people on earth, living here in what purports to be a common world, should have such differing and conflicting views of it? What is the source of this difference, and how can we determine which of these ideas or 'opinions' are true and good? Clearly, these are questions that should be discussed before continuing farther the hunt for the ultimate elements of matter, politics, art, or religion. Before further search in these directions we would better examine the search-light'.
>
> In this wise does philosophy at least get a standing of its own… . The process of knowing *an sich*, not the knowledge of earth, fire, air, water, etc., now marks the special field of philosophy.[31]

Whether Moore was correct in ascribing this train of thought to Greek philosophy may be questioned but this line of questioning does not concern us here. This was Moore's account of the rise of the epistemological problem. He felt that both Plato and Kant had the same problem, and that neither faced it successfully. Finding that "…social co-operation could exist with ideas generated in individual bodies or souls…," both "…could show *that* agreement existed but not *how* it existed."[32]

[31] *Ibid*., 28–29.

[32] *Ibid*., 32.

Transcendental metaphysics was essentially this attempt to get a cosmic grounding for social order and continuity in the face of an individualistic psychology. Plato's problem was to construct and maintain an assured basis of agreement and social co-operation among isolated individuals with apparently separate thought processes. Only by an appeal to the realm of rational archetypes beheld in absolute vision could Plato have avoided the quicksands of sophistic relativism and the world of change; thus, according to Moore, the birth of idealistic metaphysics. And it became obsolete and superfluous only with the emergence of the new social psychology of the Chicago School.[33]

When James called pragmatism an old way of thinking, he was referring to that whole line of thinkers who clearly saw the insurmountable problems begotten of absolutistic metaphysical doctrines; they saw the shortcomings of absolutism, but, lacking as they did a social theory of human consciousness, could never get at its root error. Those problems were raised most forcefully, and finally resolved most adequately by the pragmatists, and this newfound force, Moore contended, came from the

[33] *Ibid*., 34. The entire second chapter, "The Rise of Absolutism," is a defense of this thesis. It is somewhat strange that Moore should have been so antagonistic to the main currents of of Greek thought in this interpretation, when his own theory of reality in the "Existence, Meaning and Reality" essay was strikingly confluent with those philosophic currents. If we could but take a cursory glance backward, freed from the polemical demands facing the Chicago School, we would see how remarkably close Moore's theory of reality was to the Greek notion of 'physics'. On this worldview, human intelligence had access to an intelligible world, this unified process being what the Greeks called 'physics', and Moore, reality. The natural materials, existence, could be rendered intelligible, practical, by human intelligence, meaning, in an ongoing process, reality; the parallel seems to be complete, at least *prima facie*, but whether it would hold upon closer scrutiny might be argued according as one interpreted these various categories. As with Moore, so with the Greeks, human intelligence and the intelligible world were not assumed to be radically separate kinds or discretely isolated emphases of reality; the distinction was one of degree and not a difference in kind. Both are analytically distinct aspects of the all inclusive process, 'physics', but the fact that this was a logical distinction rather than a metaphysical bifurcation must be kept clearly in mind. Moore reaffirmed an old Greek position, unwittingly perhaps, because he had to combat ideas that claimed to be rooted in Plato and Aristotle but were, in fact, the legacy of neo-Platonized versions of Plato; the world of purely formal ideas were not of Plato's creation. Whatever the reasons for biworldly philosophizing, probably the 'original' failure of nerve, intelligence for the Greeks, was the human way to control the intelligible world, and the intelligized world, meaningful existence, did not wait upon a union of presumably separate branches of 'physics'. This similarity makes that second chapter a rather paradoxical one, attacking the one tradition in the history of philosophy most congenial to instrumental pragmatism. See G. S. Morris's article on A. F. Trendelenburg, *The New Englander*, XXXIII, 287–336, for a good account of the anti-Hegelian return to the original sources of classical philosophy for support and substance at the middle of the nineteenth century, especially since Morris's dynamic idealism was the *fons et origo* of instrumental pragmatism.

scientifically established view that consciousness and judgment were social in nature.[34] The old difficulties, how evil and error were possible in a completely rationalized, unmoving reality, or how such dynamic elements of human experience as impulse, desire, thinking and movement could ever be staticized into an eternal nutshell of cognitive completion with the proviso that the shell must never be broken – these were no longer real difficulties. Among Moore's contemporaries, Royce had to perform all sorts of intellectual acrobatics, preserving his absolutism, only by making room for the instrumentalism;[35] while the great dialectician, Bradley, finally took the tumble toward the end of his philosophic career, recognizing that the difficulties were as unreal as the absolutism which gave them rise.[36]

Another of the main reasons why this unmoving, timeless encrustation on reality fell to pieces is the third consideration of Moore's *Pragmatism*, the central rôle of evolutionism in the growth of pragmatic thought. The idea of some absolute Super-will, Over-self or -soul became an intellectual anachronism, when the evolutionary theory threw its full weight behind the theory of a self-controlling, self-propelling and self-supporting social experience. Moore pointed out two sources of

[34] *Ibid*., 233. In a footnote, one of Mead's articles on social psychology is mentioned as "…a fine illustration of the sort of detaied analysis here needed." Mead supplied the Chicago School with its conception of social mind, although Moore may have acquired a predilection for the social nature of thinking from J. E. Creighton while still at Cornell. See Creighton's *Essays in Speculative Philosophy*, 7 and 50–51, and Professor H. W. Schneider's discussion of objective idealism at the Sage School of Philosophy in his *History of American Philosophy*, 469–473.

[35] *William James and Other Essays*, IV, esp. 222. Dewey wrote what was for him an unusually witty rejoinder in which he refused to lease a mansion in the house of the Absolute, or even to lend out his instrumentalism for such accommodation. "A Reply to Professor Royce's Critique of Instrumentalism," *Philosophical Review*, XXI (1912), 69–81.

[36] We have decided to quote Bradley at length to anticipate the incredulity on the part of some readers that has already been encountered in private discussions. Bradley finally admitted that "…between such a 'pragmatist' as Prof. Moore and myself, the points of difference (as I said before) in comparison with the amount of agreement, seem very small. And again with regard to Prof. Dewey the same remark, I think, would hold good." *Essays in Truth and Reality*, 347, f.2. 'Pragmatist' is in quotation marks to set off Moore and Dewey of the Chicago School from James's will-to-believe type of pragmatism. One of Bradley's criticisms of Moore is significant in this connection. "In his interesting book, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*," Bradley commented, "…Prof. Moore states that the doctrine that the individual consciousness is a function of the 'community life', has appeared only within our generation. Such a statement surprizes me.…I, for instance (if I may mention myself), following Hegel, fought for it in 1876." Ibid., 327, ff. What Moore meant, of course, was a theory experimentally investigated as part of the new psychology.

> …the radical misapprehension of the pragmatist's view of evolution… (1)…the critics having overlooked the fact that the pragmatist's conception of evolution differs in some rather important respects from that of Herbert Spencer, which is evidently the one from which the criticisms are made. For the pragmatist, thought is not a 'product' but an organic factor in the *process* of evolution (2). The misinterpretation is further due to the fact that the critics have mistaken descriptions of the 'conditions and antecedents' of *particular* acts of thought for accounts of the absolute origin of thought, and statements of the antecedents of *reflective* thought for the antecedents of all thought.[37]

Aside from his own statements concerning the relation of thought and evolution his "Existence, Meaning and Reality," Moore cited Dewey's statement in the preface to the *Logical Studies,* that "…judgment appears as the medium through which the consciously effected evolution of reality goes on."[38]

From this conception of evolutionism, 'cognitive evolution' as it were, the anti-absolutists gained new strength with which to break through the notion of prefixed immutable forms of thought; species underwent changes, having origins, growths and obsolescences. When the pragmatist now entered the polemical arena with the absolutists, he had with him this conception of thought as controlling and inhering in the evolutionary process of variation. This theory of cognitively directed change, related to Darwinism and markedly similar to the Hegelian *Änderung,* surpassed both in supplying a means for controlling and a matrix for grounding this evolutionary process – a new logical theory in a dynamic philosophy of experience.

The creation of techniques for controlling change was coming about in the laboratories of natural science, while the Chicago School, interpreting the findings of Angell's Experimental Laboratories and the results at Dewey's Progressive School, set forth the instrumentalism for social science and philosophy. The Chicago School was the first to recognize the control value of thought in the situation where it arises, analyzing the volitional, directive, and social traits of ideas. An idea has as real a status for logic as psychology can give it, and this is what Moore meant when he talked about 'psychology epistemologized and epistemology psychologized'. Moore's discussion of 'How Ideas Work', the fifth chapter, was perhaps the most attractive and compelling presentation of the pragmatic conception

[37] *Ibid*., 162–163.

[38] Cited by Moore, 161.

of truth to have appeared. It compared most favorably with the second chapter of James's *Pragmatism*.[39]

As all pioneers on a new frontier, Moore proved himself here to be a master of counterattack, and that chapter on how ideas work is a good sample of his analytic vigor and polemical prowess. There is no better way to appreciate these qualities than actually reading that chapter. As for the subject matter which Moore presented, it has by now become an almost unquestioned premise of contemporary naturalism. In short, an idea is a proposed relation or re-membering of things for a specific purpose, and it is true, if it works out as proposed when regulating that activity. The idea-in-act makes a difference in the grouping of the existents-in-relation; hence the view of the idea as an instrument.

In holding that reality is not only a system of pure thought, that brute existents have eluded and still do elude human experience, that the possibilities of deeper, new-dimensional experience abound, that a fact of experience may be independent of knowledge, in the sense that it is not at that time known, Moore agreed within the neo-realists. But they parted company when that experienced fact passed into the sphere of knowing. For then he inclined toward the idealists, that is, with those idealists who didn't reserve this power for some Absolute Knower, and held thought to be creative of new meanings. In this manner, instrumentalism became a via media between neo-realism and idealism, affirming and reconciling the valid insights of both, but rejecting the sterile epistemological hypothesis around which the idealist-realist controversy turned. In maintaining the effectiveness and transitivity of human intelligence, Moore, intentionally or unwittingly, skirted around the skepticism implicit in idealism, and relieved the neo-realist from a merely reflective theory of knowledge, an unbridled individualism, and the mirror psychology. Thus, to the latter he conceded that the world was not his personal whim, will or idea, but insisted with the former on the creative power of ideas in every phase of it.

IV

Such was the position taken in 1903 and successfully defended in *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, some seven years later. The defense was an ebullient one, able, compact and incisive, driving home the ultimacy of the total situation for the thought process; this principle had been the major bond which held the various essays together in a cohering, unified volume.

[39] Especially 58. "Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak…is true just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally. This is the 'instrumental' view of truth taught so successfully at Chicago, that view that truth in our ideas means their power to 'work'." In approving the instrumentalist theory, James was unaware, or better still, didn't want to be aware of the differences that set that theory apart from his; for example, the social character of consciousness.

Because instrumental pragmatism was this via media between neo-realism and idealism, the Chicago pragmatists had to counter assaults from both sides, and Moore was in the thick of it, resolute and unflinching. Ever since the thesis that thinking was lodged securely with the act had been reached in the 1902 dissertation, he dealt with the logical problems which the position entailed in a masterly fashion.

Moore carried on his work in logic and ethics in the seminars at the University of Chicago. Though never fully published, it has wielded a powerful influence over a long line of students and teachers of philosophy. His logic was a tracing back of all the intricate processes of thinking to a competent statement of the problems of life and the conditions requisite for their solution; and his ethics was preeminently bound up with that logic, geared to the elimination of conflict from human values, critically sought and consciously wrought.

In the Socratic tradition of the highest type, Moore found the examined life, the ethical category, the primary source and ultimate goal of all philosophizing, with logic furnishing the tools to examine and the proper means to construct the good life; hence, the relation of thought and act writ large is the relation of logic and ethics. From an evolutionist's perspective, intelligence may be seen as the highly intricate, institutionally organized instrument forged by mankind in the struggle for well-being, the quest for a human culture suffused with ethical quality; as a means, it was inseparable from the end – the good life, which is its reason for being. Moore's philosophy was, quintessentially, this examination of the good life in the course of human events; it justified itself by neither the resolve of his defense nor the technical defeat of his critics, but in what he maintained it to be – a way of ethical behaviour.

Any further attempt to evaluate what Addison Webster Moore has done would be difficult and tenuous for at least two reasons. First, there are probably large and wealthy batches of lecture notes, unpublished manuscripts, and letters which have, unfortunately, not been made available to us. And the second reason follows from the first: in view of the predominantly polemical character of his published writings, whatever abiding vitality they can conceivably enjoy will depend upon the durability of the position, defended only in its infancy by Moore, and since worked out into a full-fledged philosophy by John Dewey. His place in American philosophy, when assessed by his meagre writings, definitely hinges upon what becomes of the experimental naturalism of which he was a founding father.

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ON ADDISON W. MOORE

Carl F. Taeusch, "On Addison W. Moore." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 11.4 (October 1950): 490.

I was very happy to read the article on "Addy Moore" in the October issue.[1] Like Mead, he has begun to be fully appreciated only tardily. Woistein has done an excellent interpretative job and is to be congratulated on it.

On page 541, near the top, the reference to "Professor De Voll" obviously is intended for Professor Emeritus Duvall (Trumbull G.), who is, I think, still living at Delaware, Ohio, or at Winter Park, Florida, at least until recently. I heard the story from Professor Duvall himself. Moore was teaching English at De Pauw University, when Duvall told him: "See here, young man, you're teaching Philosophy, not English." And it was then that Moore was urged to enter his graduate study at Cornell.

I was a bit confused by the second full paragraph on page 543. I heard Moore himself refer to Dewey's article on the Reflex-arc Concept as a landmark in the development of Pragmatism at least at Chicago, as well as on his own thinking. In the absence of the reference material, I'm hazarding that the article was written before 1890. And I was under the impression that the point of the article was the argument against the "'sensory' versus 'motor' reaction"; that Dewey anticipated Sherrington's integrative interpretation of the reflex are. I am puzzled, therefore, by the phrase "after the reflex arc was rejected"; certainly this does not refer to the physiological concept.

I am not so much concerned about the second observation. But I do want to call attention to the proper spelling of the name of "Addy" Moore's philosophical godfather.

[1] Benjamin Wolstein, "Addison W. Moore: Defender of Dewey's Instrumentalism," this Journal, X (1949), 529f.

A NOTE ON THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF HABIT

Benjamin Wolstein, "A Note on the Functional Theory of Habit." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 11.4 (October 1950): 490–492.

Dr. Taeusch's remarks on Moore's career are a welcome addition to the very meagre primary sources. The only one available to me on this early period of his life was the privately printed brochure, *Moore Memorial Addresses* (cf. *JHI,* X [1949], 540). "De Voll" was given as the name of his teacher at De Pauw University and I had no way of knowing that it was actually Prof. Duvall whom he encountered there. This error is regrettable and I hasten to correct it with sincere apology to Prof. Duvall.

I want to discuss Dr. Taeusch's other comments a bit further. The Angell-Moore study on attention appeared the same year as Dewey's paper on "The Reflex Are Concept in Psychology" (*ibid.,* 548). The reading in the original, then, was intended: "this study, defending the dynamic theory of habit, appeared some twenty-five years before Dewey proffered the theory in *Human Nature and Conduct.*" This is quite evident from the interpretation Angell and Moore placed on the timed difference between the "motor" reaction and the "sensory" reaction (*ibid.,* 544). Dewey's view was obviously useful to them, but I wanted to suggest that the Chicago School of which he was the acknowledged leader had collaborated in its construction and also that it was not constructed *de novo* some twenty-five years after his rejection of mechanistic psychology. My reference in footnote 2 is to Allport's statement that habit was proposed by Dewey as the unit most suitable for psychology to employ twenty-six years after his attack on the reflex arc (*ibid.,* 543). But the unit to which the term referred, the specific integrated ''interaction," was not new in Dewey's thinking, and even the term, as Allport points out, was no recent innovation. It is certainly clear that the newer conception of habit had come into its own at the Chicago School seven years after the paper on reflex psychology and the functional interpretation of the reaction time problem. Because of limitations of space, the evidence in the literature will not be cited.

To recognize that the roots of the theory which Dewey proffered in 1922 reach back to those collective efforts at Chicago and even at Michigan does not undermine the finality with which he rejected mechanism in psychology; nor does notice of the creative contributions of

his co-workers detract from the significance of his own intellectual activity. I wrote "proffered" to indicate that the theory had been worked over for some time before 1922.

Generally speaking, Dewey's paper on the reflex are concept was a critique of the atomistic philosophy of experience. "What we have is a circuit, not an arc or a broken segment of a circle," he had written in 1896. He criticized reflex psychology, and, by implication, reflex physiology. Though Sherrington retained the reflex arc as the unit mechanism for defining activities of the nervous system, he may have been influenced by Dewey in his view that the neuro-physiological arc did not have to be broken down into its constituent parts. But Dewey was equally interested in locating and integrating qualitative experience within the total act; and he also reinterpreted the stimulus and response of associationism as functional distinctions with reference to reaching and maintaining consciously desired goals. What Sherrington did for the action of the nervous system by construing the reflex arc as a unit mechanism, Dewey had already done for the complete act, and this without leaning heavily on the conceptual scheme of associationism.

The phrase, "after the reflex arc was rejected," then, does refer to the mechanistic and physiological concept in terms of which the psychical, sensory, and motor forms were considered as discrete, isolated, and independently operating parts. Angell and Moore had used the newer integrated concept to work out the inconsistency in the reaction time experiment; they developed the idea of an habitual and unified sensori-motor reaction with the help of Dewey and Mead (*ibid.,* 544). And it should be noted again that their study and Dewey's important article appeared during the same year.

I hope this note will clarify the meaning which my cursory statement of the matter unintentionally obscured. In a short study on Moore, it is difficult to say everything there is to be said even in the footnotes.