

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OF PRAGMATISM

Volume 1

Edited by
John R. Shook
Oklahoma State University

History of American Thought

The Chicago School of Pragmatism

Edited and Introduced by **John R. Shook**, *Oklahoma State University*

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Volume 1

Introduction by John R. Shook

The Development of Instrumentalism: Experience, Knowledge,
and Reality

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THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INSTRUMENTALISM:
EXPERIENCE, KNOWLEDGE,
AND REALITY

With an Introduction by
John R. Shook



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PREFACE

The Chicago school of pragmatism was one of the most controversial and prominent intellectual movements of the late 1800s and early 1900s. Spanning the ferment of academic and social thought that erupted in those turbulent times in America, the Chicago pragmatists earned widespread attention and respect for many decades. They were a central force in philosophy, contesting realism and idealism for supremacy in metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory. Their functionalist views formed the Chicago school of religion, which sparked intense scrutiny into the real meaning of theism, religious experience, and the role of religious values in society. Their social standpoint on psychology generated the Chicago school of sociology, social psychology, and symbolic interactionism. Their educational philosophy was a major component of progressivism, aiming to make schools more responsive to the democratic and industrial character of the country. In economics, labor issues, civil rights, and liberal politics, the Chicago school was also impossible to ignore.

This four-volume set focuses on the cornerstones of their thought grounding such intellectual activism: their philosophies of human nature, intelligence, values, and social purpose. While other collections of the writings of the most prominent Chicago pragmatists (John Dewey, George Mead, and James Tufts) offer some of their own individual work, no other collection captures the entire breadth and depth of the movement as a whole. Key writings of these major philosophers are here set in their proper context of important writings of James Angell, Edward Ames, Addison Moore, and of many of their graduates who had significant careers, including Ella Flagg Young, H. Heath Bawden, Arthur Rogers, Irving King, Kate Gordon, Douglas Macintosh, William Wright, and Charles Morris. Also included are their debates with many critics, such as James Mark Baldwin, George Santayana, William Montague, Roy Wood Sellars, and William Hocking, and their commentary on fellow pragmatists Charles S. Peirce, William James, and F. C. S. Schiller. Spanning roughly fifty years, the 137 pieces are brought together from several dozens of now obscure and increasingly rare books, journals, and archival sources. Editorial modifications are limited to spelling, punctuation, and footnote corrections, to keep as

close to the original as possible. This collection will be indispensable for the study of American intellectual history, and especially the evolution of American philosophy, psychology, sociology, religion, education, social thought, and politics.

INTRODUCTION

The Chicago school of pragmatists was appropriately baptized and formally announced to the world upon the occasion of its manifesto's publication. Intellectual movements do not typically receive this honor, as recognition of a birth date often requires many years or decades of perspective. Early recognition may bring no honor either, since it can be signaled by a misleading label bestowed by friends or a scornful epithet branded by enemies. The Chicago pragmatists had the good fortune of a timely and accurate identification by their physical location and their philosophical allegiance. These two factors explain more than just the given name. They account for the very serious attention that the Chicago pragmatists received for many decades by their academic colleagues and intellectuals around the world.

At the start of the twentieth century the city of Chicago was boldly proclaiming itself as a new world capital of agriculture, industry, finance, technology, and intellect. As a fitting capstone for Chicago's course of progress into maturity, the University of Chicago had quickly arisen from the desolate south marshes and recruited many of the finest scholars in the United States. In just ten short years, from 1892 to 1902, many professors built world-class careers and academic programs. They edited several leading journals across the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences, and kept the University of Chicago Press busy publishing their research. Students flocked to its doors, seeking the highly respected B.A. degree or the Ph.D. from its prominent departments. In celebration of these stunning accomplishments the University published its *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago* in 1902–3. Its twenty-eight volumes gather together essays presenting the work of every department, nearly all of its professors, and many of its graduates. The wider academic realm obligingly took close notice of these very significant proceedings.

The Chicago philosophy department at that time encompassed not only the traditional subjects of philosophy but also psychology and education. Its members were well-represented in the *Decennial Publications*, publishing seven essays on a variety of topics in volume three of the first series.¹ But these writings were relatively ignored in

¹ Six of these seven essays are reprinted in *The Chicago School of Pragmatism*. The seventh, Angell's psychological study of the localization of sounds, will appear in a companion set titled *The Chicago School of Functionalism*.

comparison with the attention given to the department's other volume for the second series, the *Studies in Logical Theory*.² Two professors, John Dewey and Addison Moore, along with five graduates from the philosophy department and one from the Greek department, presented their work on various aspects of logic, including inference, judgment, belief, and knowledge. Their choice of topic was hardly unusual for the philosophical climate of their day or the present, but the standpoint taken on these central matters was revolutionary. In Dewey's words, the philosophical stance of the *Studies in Logical Theory* (and indirectly, the stance of the seven essays in the other volume) is as follows:

All agree, the editor takes the liberty of saying, that judgment is the central function of knowing, and hence affords the central problem of logic; that since the act of knowing is intimately and indissolubly connected with the like yet diverse functions of affection, appreciation, and practice, it only distorts results reached to treat knowing as a self-enclosed and self-explanatory whole – hence the intimate connections of logical theory with functional psychology; that since knowledge appears as a function within experience, and yet passes judgment upon both the processes and contents of other functions, its work and aim must be distinctively reconstructive or transformative; that since Reality must be defined in terms of experience, judgment appears accordingly as the medium through which the consciously effected evolution of Reality goes on; that there is no reasonable standard of truth (or of success of the knowing function) in general, except upon the postulate that Reality is thus dynamic or self-evolving, and, in particular, except through reference to the specific offices which knowing is called upon to perform in readjusting and expanding the means and ends of life. And all agree that this conception gives the only promising basis upon which the working methods of science, and the proper demands of the moral life, may cooperate.³

The contributors, aware of their controversial stance, stood with the rest of the department as a group to stand or fall together. After outlining the general approach taken by the contributors for analyzing logical

² The *Studies in Logical Theory* is the inaugural document of Chicago pragmatism, but it is also a culminating product of the preceding ten years of psychological and philosophical research. This research grounded the psychological functionalism promulgated by Dewey, Mead, and Angell. The *Studies* will accordingly appear in the companion set, *The Chicago School of Functionalism*.

³ John Dewey, et al., *Studies in Logical Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), p. x.

theory, Dewey particularly thanked his colleagues who did not contribute to the *Studies* (these were George H. Mead, James H. Tufts, James R. Angell, and Edward S. Ames). Finally, speaking for all, Dewey singled out William James as the chief inspiration for their common standpoint and method.

The connection between the general approach to logic taken by the *Studies* and William James of Harvard University would not have been easily grasped by a contemporary reader of this new book. But this expression of appreciation was no insincere or timid attempt to place some responsibility on the broader shoulders of a more prominent philosopher. First, William James's reputation at that time primarily rested on his earlier work in psychology, although by 1903 his appointment was in philosophy. Only those who had closely studied James's 1890 *Principles of Psychology* or followed James's few philosophical publications from 1897 to 1903 had a chance to surmise the real nature of the Chicago philosophers' genuine debt to James. James published his own completed theory of consciousness and knowledge later on, in a series of articles from 1904 to 1906 and the 1907 *Pragmatism*. Even James himself didn't quite see the full scope of his influence, but he was very pleased to welcome these new converts to his ever-expanding corps of pragmatists.

Chicago has a School of Thought! – a school of thought which, it is safe to predict, will figure in literature as the School of Chicago for twenty-five years to come. Some universities have plenty of thought to show, but no school; others plenty of school, but no thought. The University of Chicago, by its Decennial Publications, shows real thought and a real school. Professor John Dewey, and at least ten of his disciples, have collectively put into the world a statement, homogeneous in spite of so many cooperating minds, of a view of the world, both theoretical and practical, which is so simple, massive, and positive that, in spite of the fact that many parts of it yet need to be worked out, it deserves the title of a new system of philosophy. If it be as true as it is original, its publication must be reckoned an important event. The present reviewer, for one, strongly suspects it of being true.⁴

James approvingly outlined the basic tenets of the *Studies*: its evolutionary and empirical foundations, the functionalist theory of thought as a process of reconstructing failed activity, and the notion that

⁴ William James, "The Chicago School," *Psychological Bulletin* 1.1 (15 January 1904): 1.

knowledge and truth is forever in the making as human experience grows and adjusts. The attentive reader would have heard James's own emerging philosophical views in these few tenets. James concludes by pointing out the remarkable convergence of the Chicago school with the movement of "pragmatism" led by James himself, and with the "humanism" of F. C. S. Schiller at Oxford. Schiller also wrote a congratulatory review of the *Studies* and remarked on their convergence. Even Charles S. Peirce, credited by James for the first formulation of pragmatism, chimed in with a review. Peirce characteristically complained about the Chicago school's departure from his strict path of scientific logic (on other occasions he even faulted James for this error), but this sour note did not detract from the obvious significance of this new and very potent version of pragmatism.

Instrumentalism

The Chicago pragmatists rarely referred to themselves as pragmatists, although they warmly acknowledged the welcoming arms of the pragmatic philosophers who had preceded them into the bright spotlight of philosophical attention. When labeling themselves, the preferred term was usually "instrumentalist." When the history of this term is understood, its significance for the Chicago philosophers is revealed and their relationship with the other versions of pragmatism is clarified. Instrumentalism is essentially the philosophical application of the work done by functional psychology, a theory also originating with the Chicago philosophers. As seen in his quotation above, Dewey stressed that the understanding of human knowledge requires an adequate logical theory, and that logical theory should use the methods of functional psychology. The background empirical assumption is that philosophy strays into sterile transcendentalism unless its discourse is concerned solely with reality and truth as manifested in human experience and knowledge. This empiricism, together with the functional approach to knowledge, implies that philosophy must use the methods of functional psychology to make any progress. It was precisely this revolutionary conclusion that excited James, for he found that the Chicago school had somewhat independently arrived at his own position. His own *Principles of Psychology* advocated a biological and functional approach to thought, although James did not publish its full philosophical implications until years after the Chicago school had already established its instrumentalism. The Chicago philosophers did not have to wait for James, since they were not exclusively reliant on James's work.

As James himself noticed, the Chicago school's methods and terminology had their origins as much in Hegelian idealism as James's own

empiricist and evolutionary psychology. The complex route by which Dewey and Mead, principally, had taken during the late 1880s and early 1890s in order to synthesize idealism with the novel psychologies such as James's can only be briefly recounted here.⁵ They began their philosophical careers as Hegelian idealists, but took the opportunity to study the new psychology chiefly promulgated by Wilhelm Wundt. This physiological and experimental psychology held out the possibility of scientifically studying thought and its work, if only one could surrender the notion that thought rested in a metaphysical realm aloof from the base physical world of the human body in its environment. The common ground between idealism and the new psychology lay in this repudiation of metaphysical dualism and an adoption of a voluntaristic stance on the nature of thought. Far from just mysteriously interacting with feelings or desires on the one hand, and behavioral activity on the other, thought is inseparably and organically one with them. By denying the independence of thought, stressed by older dualistic psychologies and intuitionist sensationalisms, Dewey and Mead could treat thought as just a biological phase of the organism's experience. They were prepared by their idealism to subsume reasoning under the wider category of the will, because their study of idealism persuaded them that only in our purposive activity can thought be detected. Reason, intelligence, thought – by whatever name, our rational ability is manifested only as an aspect of our goal-directed interactions with the environment, primarily aimed at survival and the enjoyment of goods in nature. The stages of thought are just functional aspects of practical problem-solving as humans find better instruments for interacting with nature. This accounts for the occasional use of the label “experimentalist” by the Chicago philosophers.

This functionalist view of thought as essentially learning through practical problem-solving united the philosophies of the Chicago pragmatists. They agreed that the technological mode of human life is so fundamental that even thought itself has its origins and proper function only within this technological mode of life. The instrumental metaphor is thus extended to thought's workings: all aspects of thought, from terms and concepts, judgments and inferences, to knowledge and truth, are but instruments used to better our lives. And like all instruments, these things are in a sense just human artifacts which can be created, improved, ignored, or abandoned. Human rationality is possible only where self-conscious control of the tools of thought is encouraged and exercised. Other animals are observed using technologies, but humans

⁵ See John R. Shook, *Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000).

appear to be unique in their developed ability to treat the process of inference itself as a technology that can be improved. The Chicago philosophers understood scientific progress as exactly this improvement. Better technologies are surely a sign of scientific progress, but exclusive focus there misses the essential advances in scientific reasoning that make all other technologies possible. The study, at once philosophical and psychological, of scientific reasoning and the potential for its improvement, is exactly what Dewey and his colleagues understood by logical theory. Advancements in logic drive progress in scientific reasoning, which in turn can produce new technologies. Alternatively, viewed from the perspective of humans pressured by an uncertain and difficult environment, the need for improved technologies encourages experimentation with new modes of scientific inference, which in turn encourages the undertaking of logic. Logic is our creation, our tool, and our responsibility.

Opposition philosophies, whether under the banners of realism, phenomenalism, rationalism, or absolutism, are oblivious to logic's contingent, historical, and refinable status. Preferring to hold that logic is Platonically enshrined above us or hard-wired within us, these rationalistic philosophies likewise carry away knowledge and truth to a realm aloof from pedestrian and parochial concerns, such as mere human life and happiness. Absorbed in spinning out cobwebs of systems composed of arbitrarily defined concepts resting comfortably in *a priori* judgments, these philosophies are irrelevant to actual human concerns. Of course, rationalism never fails to assert that only it can satisfy the essential human need for purely intellectual speculation on the "true" nature of reality. The opinion of pragmatists on such speculation's actual value can be easily surmised.

The *Studies in Logical Theory*, and the other writings of the Chicago school at that time, display this instrumentalist theory of intelligence across a wide spectrum of philosophical topics. In possession of a radical and penetrating method, applicable to every philosophical concern, the Chicago pragmatists overturned established platforms on experience, knowledge, truth, and reality. Their method just as inevitably carried them to fruitful advancements in aesthetics, ethics, education, religion, and social theory. The Chicago philosophers inspired two other widely heralded movements, the Chicago school of religion and the Chicago school of sociology. They were also very influential in social issues and politics, and largely through Dewey, promoted the ideals of progressive education. This volume and volume two collect many of their central philosophical writings on these issues from the decade subsequent to the *Studies*, to around 1912. Other forthcoming

sets of volumes will be specifically concerned with the pragmatists' participation in these fields in later decades.

Before proceeding to a discussion of their writings, the full list of the primary members of the Chicago school should be provided. This list omits many graduates of Chicago influenced by pragmatism, colleagues in other departments who could be called pragmatists, and a wider circle of intellectuals and social leaders that may be justifiably classified as pragmatic in outlook and method.

Professors at the University of Chicago

John Dewey. Ph.D. Johns Hopkins 1884. Professor of Philosophy, Psychology, and Pedagogy, 1894–1904.

James H. Tufts. Ph.D. Albert-Ludwigs-Universität 1892. Professor of Philosophy, 1892–1930.

George H. Mead. B.A. Oberlin 1883, graduate work at Harvard, Leipzig, Berlin. Professor of Philosophy, 1894–1931.

James R. Angell. B.A. Michigan 1890, graduate work at Harvard, Berlin, Halle. Professor of Psychology, 1894–1909.

Edward S. Ames. Ph.D. Chicago 1895. Professor of Philosophy, 1900–1935.

Addison W. Moore. Ph.D. Chicago 1898. Professor of Philosophy, 1900–1929.

Harvey A. Carr. Ph.D. Chicago 1905. Professor Psychology. 1908–1938.

Ella Flagg Young. Ph.D. Chicago 1900. Professor of Pedagogy, 1900–1904.

Ellsworth Faris. Ph.D. Chicago 1914. Professor of Sociology.

Clarence E. Ayres. Ph.D. Chicago 1918. Professor of Philosophy.

Charles W. Morris. Ph.D. Chicago 1925. Professor of Philosophy, 1931–1958.

Selected Philosophy Graduate Students at Chicago, 1894–1910

Simon F. MacLennan. Ph.D. Chicago 1897. Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, Oberlin College.

- Addison W. Moore. Ph.D. Chicago 1898. Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago.
- Amy E. Tanner. Ph.D. Chicago 1898. Professor of Philosophy, Wilson College.
- Arthur K. Rogers. Ph.D. Chicago 1898. Professor of Philosophy, Yale University.
- Henry W. Stuart. Ph.D. Chicago 1899. Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University.
- H. Heath Bawden. Ph.D. Chicago 1900. Professor of Philosophy, Vassar College.
- Helen B. Thompson (Woolley). Ph.D. Chicago 1900. Professor of Psychology, Mount Holyoke College, Professor of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Professor of Education, Columbia University Teacher's College.
- Myron L. Ashley. Ph.D. Chicago 1901. Professor of Philosophy, American Correspondence School.
- Willard C. Gore. Ph.D. Chicago 1901. Professor of Psychology, University of Chicago.
- Kate Gordon (Moore). Ph.D. Chicago 1903. Professor of Psychology, Bryn Mawr, Carnegie Institute of Technology, University of California at Los Angeles.
- Irving King. Ph.D. Chicago 1904. Professor of Education, State University of Iowa.
- Irving E. Miller. Ph.D. Chicago 1904. Professor of Psychology and Pedagogy, State Normal School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
- William K. Wright. Ph.D. Chicago 1906. Professor of Philosophy, Dartmouth University.
- Matilde Castro (Tufts). Ph.D. Chicago 1907. Professor of Philosophy and Education, Mount Holyoke College, Vassar College, Rockford College, Bryn Mawr College. Married James Tufts in 1923.
- Anna L. Strong. Ph.D. Chicago 1908.
- Douglas C. Macintosh. Ph.D. Chicago 1909. Professor of Philosophy, Yale University.

Psychology and Philosophy

For several years prior to and after the publication of the *Studies in Logical Theory* the Chicago pragmatists published articles that explicitly applied the methods and results of functional psychology to philosophical questions. In the first section of this volume Dewey, Mead, and Bawden focus on the topic most intimately linking psychology and philosophy: the nature of consciousness. Functional psychology, by denying dualism, finds a role for the “mental” in the natural world as it is actually experienced. But this role cannot expand to overtake experience completely, since functionalism does not fly to the opposite error of idealism. Functionalism would largely agree with a popular alternative of the day, subjective idealism or phenomenism, save for one major difficulty. Phenomenism finds a place for the distinction between the natural objective world and the mental subjective worlds by claiming that the members of the two worlds can be clearly demarcated by their divergent traits. The Chicago functionalists could not find any clear demarcation. Dewey’s famous manifesto, “The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology,”⁶ concluded that the proper understanding of the nervous system as a continuous organic whole implies that experience is not manifestly divided into natural objects given as experienced stimuli on the one hand and mental thoughts consequently aroused within experience on the other.

This rejection of phenomenism in turn implies that anything experienced can, depending on the situation, play either role as needed. The functionalists’ biological study of the human being as an organism attempting to adapt to its environment casts the physical/mental distinction as one arising within problematic experience. In unproblematic experience, where the organism’s habits are sufficiently adaptive, no objective/subjective division arises, since thought is not necessary. In this “immediate experience,” to use Dewey’s phrase, all things are just as they are experienced to be, and the human being proceeds unreflectively and successfully through the actions bringing enjoyment of goods. This is possible because the needed objects triggering the appropriate habits are always at hand. But in problematic situations the needed stimulus is missing, and habitual activity must temporarily halt. The instrumental resources of thought are now brought into play. Where attention selects out some things for re-consideration, only there do they play a role as mental. While a problematic situation lasts, physical objects are distinguished from mental states. Physical objects are those

⁶ *Psychological Review* 3.4 (July 1896): 357–70.

not under reflective consideration, and they function as a given backdrop of assured things, which however do not provide the needed stimulus to action. Of course, should attention swing their way, they may become mental. Mental states by definition are not assured but doubtful: they are mental precisely because they are not taken to be just as they experienced.

The three-fold distinction between immediate (unproblematic) experience, physical experience, and mental experience can be expressed in terms of meaning. In immediate experience all things are sufficiently meaningful for successful action, and hence their meaning is not questioned. All things are as they appear to be, which is another way of trying to say that there is no distinction between appearance and reality, or between a thing and its meaning. In problematic experience a division arises between those objects whose meanings are not questioned and those whose meanings are questioned. The former suffer no alteration in the transition from unproblematic experience, except that they now explicitly stand as objective things in contrast to those mental things who have had their meanings torn from them. Mental experience is characterized by this phenomena/meaning gap, where we attentively ask whether a thing really has that meaning or perhaps a different meaning. The functional distinction between the phenomenal and meaningful aspects of a mental experience is the basis for the traditional distinction between the “idea” as an individual percept of experience, and the “idea” as a universal concept in experience. Rejecting both nominalistic and idealistic psychologies which elevate one aspect or the other as the genuine and original foundation of experience, functionalism understands both aspects as instruments permitting reflective thought to transform the things in problematic experience so that the stimulus needed to re-start successful habitual activity can be found. If re-started, habitual activity is the return to immediate experience, collapsing all distinctions between percept and concept and between physical and mental things.

Functional psychology therefore reconstructs or demolishes all of the philosophical apparatus that has separated philosophers into opposed schools: nominalist and realist, materialist, dualist, and idealist, and so forth. The early writings of the Chicago pragmatists display an eagerness to attack all other philosophical camps at once, and an awareness that all fields of philosophy must be powerfully affected by their methodology. Dewey’s essay “Psychology and Philosophic Method” is a paradigmatic example, when he declares that psychology is a political science. When psychology investigates the experience of the individual person, it must understand “individual” according to whatever prevailing social conditions dictate. Since the significance of

the “individual” is quite different across autocratic, aristocratic, and democratic societies, for example, we should expect that psychology might proceed differently and reach different results accordingly. Therefore, psychology and political science are intimately related, notwithstanding the psychologist’s protest that only scientifically motivated methods are used. Dewey examines current psychology in the context of the extremely individualist notions of the person that he sees prevailing in his own country. Just as current democracy treats persons as something over and apart from their ethnic, religious, family, or business commitments and duties, so too does current psychology attempt to examine scientifically the individualized and compartmentalized “consciousness” of persons as something over and apart from their social relations. Based on this analysis, Dewey offers several criticisms of current philosophy insofar as it has heedlessly adopted this extremely individualistic psychology as its own. First, there is no place for social psychology and its understanding of experience as primarily social, shared experience. Psychology should examine consciousness, but with the full awareness that this examination cannot take the experiences of persons as given data for exclusive study but rather as clues taken as meaningful for understanding of people’s actual social behavior. Second, in the absence of the corrective pull of social psychology, philosophy is drawn into the error of supposing that psychology and the mental realm it treats is positively irrelevant to any purely philosophical issues like logic, knowledge, truth, moral principles and values, and the nature of reality. Third, as a result of this notion of “pure” philosophy, philosophers are absorbed in the futile task called epistemology of trying to figure out the conditions for knowledge of reality only after the experience of the individual is ruled out of court. Fourth, by treating knowledge and value as matters independent of anyone’s actual experience, thought, and behavior, philosophy has wrongly declared that actual human behavior and the discernment of knowledge and values has nothing to do with the real, prior, and independent existence of the True and the Right. Functionalism and pragmatism quickly deflates this artificial and sterile rationalism.

Like Dewey, George Mead redraws the boundaries between disciplines according to their dominant interest in the phases of human experience. “Suggestions Toward a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines” proceeds from Dewey’s theory of the reflex arc to offer a functionalist account of experience and thought, as already described above. Metaphysics is the statement of a problem, deductive logic idealizes the past meaning of the object, psychology takes up the subjective immediate experience, and inductive logic forms new meanings of objects. Ethics is the application of these methods to conduct, and

aesthetics treats the representations of the object. In "The Definition of the Psychical," Mead expounds at length the complete reconstruction of psychology demanded by functionalism and contrasts its achievements with the difficulties inherent in other contemporary psychologies. Mead also foreshadows his intense interest in the meaning and genesis of the "self" in this piece.

H. Heath Bawden also challenged the philosophical surrender to individualistic and dualistic psychology, locating the central point of dispute at whether the dominant parallelism can withstand functionalism's critique. "The Functional View of the Relation between the Psychical and the Physical" argues that the many paradoxes and unresolvable mysteries generated by ontological parallelism evaporate when the psychologist's terms are instead taken as indicating teleological entities. In "The Meaning of the Psychical from the Point of View of the Functional Psychology," Bawden clarifies how consciousness, or thought, originates as that tension created within experience during problematic situations. This theory of consciousness permits psychology finally to join the rest of the natural sciences, since it accounts for psychology's ability to scrutinize scientifically its conditions and explains why its activity does not violate the law of conservation of energy. This naturalizing of psychology demands that the notion of individuated and separated "minds," assumed by dualistic and introspectionist psychologies, must be surrendered. The philosophical distinction between the public and the private must accordingly be understood in socially functional terms.

Dewey's "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism" was written as a reaction to the criticisms from all sides, psychological and philosophical, of the efforts of the Chicago philosophers. This article also explicitly aligns their efforts with those of James and Schiller. Dewey explains the standpoint taken on experience, which Dewey calls "immediate empiricism," that critics have failed to appreciate. Realists and idealists alike assume that what things really are is never identical with what they appear to be in experience. Functional psychology recognizes that in problematic situations some things' features are questioned. Unfortunately, the category of the mental has expanded in psychology and philosophy to encompass all human experience, which in turn has caused philosophers to locate all appearance and error in experience and all reality and truth in a realm distinct from human experience (either a transcendent physical world or a transcendent absolute mind, according to taste). Dewey complains that this dualism establishes knowledge as the only means of human contact with reality. Anything short of knowledge is thus an experience of only one's own mind. The only alternative to this rationalism is immediate empiricism: that anything is what

it is experienced as. This applies to things in problematic experience just as in unproblematic experience. When a thing is experienced as doubtful or frightening, then it really has these traits. The thought that it is just “myself” which is doubtful or scared may arise in time, but that object/subject distinction only arises within such later reflective experience. Other philosophies falsely assume that all experience is accompanied by the “I” or “self” because they set up reflective experience as the only mode of experience. Importing such notions into their reading of the pragmatists, they mistakenly see only subjective idealism or outright solipsism, and ignore actual human experience at their own peril.

Logic and Epistemology

The instrumentalist’s complaints against any philosophy which denies the postulate of immediate experience can be examined from the side of knowledge as well as experience. As mentioned above, philosophies that purport to deal with realities as they are transcendent of all human experience must treat knowledge as a singular relationship standing between experience and reality. Thus modern philosophies have transformed the correspondence theory of knowledge and truth into a metaphysical principle that is better called, as James Tufts does in “Can Epistemology Be Based on Mental States,” the copy theory of knowledge. The knowing experience is mental, but because it is a case of knowledge, this experience must refer to and in some way copy the reality that it knows. It should be to no one’s surprise that a philosophy based on this copy theory of knowledge creates a skeptical threat, since the criterion of knowledge stands forever beyond the reach of humans, preventing any ascertainment that a putative knowing is really knowledge. The inevitable and interminable controversy that proceeds between skeptics and rationalists is based on their common premise, that the criterion of knowledge, the reality, is never present in human experience. But functional psychology reveals that the criterion of knowledge is immanent in experience, because the test of the adequacy of a putative knowing is whether it works in future social experience.⁷ Arthur Rogers in “Epistemology and Experience” proceeds from Dewey’s work to develop the instrumentalist approach to knowledge as an experience that culminates in action. Rogers is specially concerned with the difficulties inherent in accounting for the ability of knowledge to refer beyond present experience. Granting that knowledge requires an

⁷ John E. Russell responds to Tufts in “Epistemology and Mental States,” *Philosophical Review* 7.4 (July 1898): 394–96. Tufts replied, *Philosophical Review* 7.4 (July 1898): 396–97.

alteration, a growth of experience, the object known cannot be just this new experience, lest the object known come into existence only with the knowing. Common sense and science demands that a knowing refers to an existing object beyond both the present experience and the future confirming experience. While this object cannot be completely transcendent of experience, its relative independence cannot be denied.

The Chicago instrumentalists also treated knowledge in terms of its emergence from successful reflective thought. John Dewey, in "Some Stages of Logical Thought," explains that when thought is examined as an historical phenomenon, it can be viewed as progressing through four stages: fixed social attitudes, reflective reconstruction, the Aristotelian quest for first premises, and finally inductive and empirical research. Aristotelianism, empiricism, and transcendentalism all confine inquiry's material and extent, and hence fail to capture modern science's instrumental aims. A new practicality theory of thought would reinterpret the terms of thought as "divisions of labor within the doubt-inquiry process." Simon MacLennan's "Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment" distinguishes three phases of judgments that can issue from thought. The "impersonal" judgment simply makes a statement of present experience, while the "reflective" judgment results from analyzing and re-synthesizing the meanings of things during problem-solving. Where problem-solving in a particular type of situation has become habitual, reflection can shrink to an "intuitive" judgment of what must be done. Addison Moore's "Existence, Meaning and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology"⁸ locates in Locke's theory of knowledge the same difficulties created by current epistemologies. If knowledge consists of an agreement between an idea's meaning and its object, the object may be within experience or not. If it is not, reference is a mystery, but if it is, then error is impossible. Any workable criterion to determine actual knowledge must be a teleological criterion that requires an idea to serve the purpose of enlarging cohesive experience. Arthur Rogers's "Rationality and Belief" stresses that the knowledge growing in human experience cannot be identified with the objective truth of all reality. The former is taken by us to be reality as known because it has satisfied our activities so far, while the latter is reality as it would be known as satisfactory to any and every activity possible.⁹

⁸ This essay is a condensed version of his 1898 dissertation, *The Functional versus the Representational Theories of Knowledge in Locke's Essay*, later published in *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902).

⁹ This article should be read together with his review of *Studies in Logical Theory*,

The instrumentalists realized that a major obstacle to grasping their theory of knowledge is the widespread notion that meaning is the ability of a mental idea to refer to an object beyond experience. We have discussed the functionalist approach to meaning briefly above. John Dewey in "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge" expands on this approach. A feeling is an experience distinct from being knowingly conscious of something. We can further distinguish (1) the cognitive experience of feeling-movement-gratification, and (2) the cognitional experience (knowledge as acquaintance) in which a recurrent cognitive experience is supplemented by the feeling anticipating the gratification. Such anticipation, an experience of "present-as-absent," is the meaning. A "knowledge as assurance" experience is marked by the possession of two elements, the first meaning the second, and the second fulfilling the intent of the first. A cognitional experience could, alternatively, end in disappointment, infecting the first element with doubt instead. Truth and falsity are properties only of specific knowledge attempts, but modern epistemology fruitlessly searches for the conditions of knowledge by reference to a subjective mind separated from extra-empirical reality.

Addison Moore also stresses in "Truth Value" how thought attempts to satisfy far more human needs than the bare "intellectual need" postulated by rationalists. Thought is no separate function operating apart from the natural process of our ordinary drives trying to achieve satisfactions from the environment, but rather it is a phase of that process. Where values are uncertain or conflict, thought is the adjustment of values and habits in problem-solving, and truth is the successful adjustment. Truth has no value or significance in itself; nor does thought independently supply ends or values to the process of adjustment.

John Dewey's "The Problem of Truth" places the value of truth in an explicitly social setting, claiming that truth basically consists of those social principles regulating community understanding and action. The principles ask our allegiance to "correct representation," where correctness is determined by the conduciveness to communal understanding. Far from supplying any ground of certainty, an individual's private experiences and thoughts are properly neither true or false at all. While custom is the origin of the notion of "truth," the diversity and divergence of custom raises the philosophical question of trans-cultural truth. This question can be answered by that Platonic Truth idealized

published in the same year (reprinted in vol. 3 of *The Chicago School of Pragmatism*). This review, highly critical of the instrumentalists' failure to recognize the independent role of reality in the process of knowledge, presages Roger's departure from the pragmatic school by 1910 and later membership in the Critical Realist group in the 1910s and 1920s.

above and apart from all human practice, or by that relativistic truth locating truths in the reigning social principles of each and every culture. The first option denigrates all actual human thought as error while the second elevates all human thought to truth. Both options eliminate the distinction in human life between truth and error and thus destroy thought's function for discriminating them. The current idealist-realist debate avoids relativism only by vainly trying to pull apart the idealized knower from the idealized known in order to "prove" the one's dependence on the other. Neither recognizes the third possibility, taken by modern science, which inquires into social principles aiming at their improvement. Genuine inquiry requires what idealism and realism denies, that intellectual propositions only propose hypotheses about future conditions and do not merely assert antecedently existing states of affairs. Scientific methodology cannot be isolated from social problems and goals, but their relationship demands that social principles are just hypotheses developed to resolve social difficulties. Pragmatic, scientific truths are the creation of a progressive and adaptive society aimed at the general welfare of all. The objectivity of science is precisely its relative freedom from the fixed and final ends of society's past and its tentative commitment to the experimentally attained control of nature. Science is not separate from human goals and requires no supervision from values obtained elsewhere. Science is just the intelligent inquiry into the possible attainment of any and all values, and its truths are the pragmatic results of this inquiry.

Experience and Metaphysics

The combination of two central instrumentalist tenets, the limitation of philosophy to lived experience and the essentially social nature of lived experience, implies that philosophy's inquiries must deal directly with social experience. Furthermore, the instrumentalists understood experience as continually growing, both in expanse and complexity, like an organism itself. For example, if metaphysics is the most general examination of being, and being is found directly and fully in growing social experience, then only there will the basic traits of existence be discerned. The same goes for aesthetic, psychological, and logical inquiries. "On the Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories" displays how aesthetics in the hands of James Tufts looks first to evolving social experience. The aesthetic consciousness arises not from nature, but from social relations of artistic productivity, which in turn originate in the social "struggle for existence." Typical categories that characterize the aesthetic experience, its objectivity, freedom, and widening of sympathies, are best explained in reference to aesthetic experience's origins in social functions and attitudes. Kate Gordon's "Pragmatism in

Aesthetics” agrees with this social nature of the aesthetic and stresses the forward-looking aspects of artistic production. The genuine artist’s intent is to inspire new experiences shared with observers who are adventurously drawn out of their own familiar ways. Art is fundamentally a working of practical materials and tools designed for shared purposes. It can become a self-conscious questioning of these purposes, as with modern art, but the essentially social nature of art remains.

Some metaphysical implications of functional psychology have been suggested already in articles discussed above. H. Heath Bawden explicitly describes an instrumentalist metaphysics in “The Necessity from the Standpoint of Scientific Method of a Reconstruction of the Ideas of the Psychical and the Physical.” Aligning functionalism with recent scientific advances, he points out that science has replaced matter with energy and that biological evolution sees the universe as a dynamic whole with progressive degrees of organization. Dualism is scientifically ruled out, since mind must shape matter, just as matter shapes mind. Functional psychology understands that consciousness is not some entity among others, but rather functional significance for an organism as displayed in its activity. There is no reason to assume that consciousness is limited to human beings; any sufficiently organized and tensional part of the universe, or even the universe itself, can be conscious in its functioning. Simon MacLennan’s “Two Illustrations of the Methodological Value of Psychology in Metaphysic” points out the special dangers from ignoring the functional nature of thought. Bradley, for example, holds that thought aims at establishing more harmonious relations (ideas) between discrete and discordant elements analyzed out of continuous experience. Ideal truth and reality is thus the final complete harmonization of experience, transcendent from all actual human experience which is condemned as appearance and error. This transcendence insures that thought cannot actually discriminate progress toward truth from dissolution into error, since the standard of progress lies beyond human experience. Royce is similarly trapped and cannot see that his accusation that pragmatism reduces reality to subjectivity only assumes that transcendence of truth and reality which pragmatism expressly denies. Functionalism finds thought’s proper role in the projection and achievement of human aims, and its relationship to reality is constructive, not replicative. The fragmentary and discordant nature of experience is reality, not appearance, and the growth of harmonious experience created by knowledge is likewise genuinely real.

The functionalist’s appeal to a kind of immediate experience lacking any subject-object divide and revealing the actual traits of things was very difficult to grasp by other philosophers. Aiding such misunderstanding, as Dewey complains in “Does Reality Possess Practical

Character?” is the assumption on the part of critics that practical traits of things are only subjectively mental. The practical, which for Dewey encompasses the full range of traits that make things fearful, surprising, novel, pleasant, doubtful, tragic, and so forth, are unfortunately considered to be exclusively classified as transient, variable, and hence personal. Philosophical tradition takes reality to be fixed and finished, incapable of truly bearing such traits, so those traits must be features of ourselves. If knowledge’s aim is to represent static reality, then knowledge must have nothing to do with the personal, and hence with the practical, according to critics. However, the empirical study of the process of knowledge shows that knowledge is concerned with the practical affairs of life and is generated by intelligent activities which create real differences and novelties in reality. The object of knowing is a prior existing thing which has been practically altered, taking into consideration its features and behaviors, for human advantage.

William Wright grapples with the pragmatic theory of intellectual categories and their origin and role in social human experience in “The Genesis of the Categories.” While many fundamental ways of organizing experience, like space, time, thing, object, person, etc., have an evolutionary origin as successful biological adaptations, they are not categories in the genuine sense. Humans can imaginatively manipulate and transform ideas for practical purposes, and thus have developed useful categories such as the animate and inanimate, cause and effect, and truth and falsity. Their social origins imply that categories are not just subjectively mental, but categories do not describe reality “in itself” either, since knowledge can only understand reality to the extent that humans interact with it.

APPENDIX
Selected Philosophy Publications
by the University of Chicago, 1896–1910

The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy

James R. Angell et al. *Studies from the Psychological Laboratory: The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1896). 52 pp. This first issue consists of offprints of articles published in *Psychological Review*, using the journal's plates suitably altered. The journal's pagination is replaced by headers with pagination starting from number one, and the type is reset in order to string together the articles continuously. James R. Angell and Addison W. Moore, "Reaction-Time: A Study in Attention and Habit," *Psychological Review* 3.3 (May 1896): 245–58 [pp. 1–14]; Louis G. Whitehead, "A Study of Visual Aural Memory Processes," *Psychological Review* 3.3 (May 1896): 258–69 [pp. 14–25]; James R. Angell and Simon F. MacLennan, "The Organic Effects of Agreeable and Disagreeable Stimuli," *Psychological Review* 3.4 (July 1896): 371–77 [pp. 25–32]; Amy Tanner and Kate Anderson, "Simultaneous Sense Simulations: Practice Study," *Psychological Review* 3.4 (July 1896): 378–83 [pp. 32–38]; John Dewey, "The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology," *Psychological Review* 3.4 (July 1896): 357–70 [pp. 39–52].

William A. Heidel. *The Necessary and the Contingent in the Aristotelian System: The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1896). 46 pp.

John Dewey. *The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge: The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897). 20 pp.

Simon F. MacLennan. *The Impersonal Judgment: Its Nature, Origin, and Significance. The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 4 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897). 49 pp. MacLennan's 1896 dissertation.

Tufts, James H. and Helen B. Thompson: *The Individual and His Relation to Society as Reflected in British Ethics. Part 1: The Individual in Relation to Law and Institutions. The University of Chicago*

Contributions to Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1898). 52 pp.

Tufts, James H. *The Individual and His Relation to Society as Reflected in British Ethics*. Part 2: *The Individual in Social and Economic Relations*. *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 6 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1904). 58 pp. This issue containing Part Two, despite its publication six years after Part One, was assigned no. 6 for continuity.

Arthur K. Rogers. *The Parallelism of Mind and Body from the Standpoint of Metaphysics*. *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1899). 64 pp. Roger's 1898 dissertation. Also published separately as a monograph (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1899) using the same plates.

James Angell et al. *Studies from the Psychological Laboratory*. *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1899). This issue consists of three essays and three offprints of articles published in *Psychological Review*. Angell provided the "Introductory Note" on pp. 5–6. Albert F. Buck, "Observations on the Overestimation of Vertical as Compared with Horizontal Lines," pp. 7–11. Daniel P. MacMillan, "A Study in Habit," pp. 11–19. James R. Angell and Helen B. Thompson, "A Study of the Relations Between Certain Organic Processes and Consciousness," *Psychological Review* 6.1 (January 1899): 32–69. James R. Angell, "Habit and Attention," *Psychological Review* 5.2 (March 1898): 179–83. James R. Angell, Jessie N. Spray, E. W. Mahood, "An Investigation of Certain Factors Affecting the Relations of Dermal and Optical Space," *Psychological Review* 5.6 (November 1898): 579–95. Myron L. Ashley, "Concerning the Significance of Intensity of Light in Visual Estimates of Depth," *Psychological Review* 5.6 (November 1898): 595–615.

Amy E. Tanner. *Association of Ideas: A Preliminary Study*. *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 2, no. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1900). 62 pp. A revised version of Tanner's 1898 dissertation, "Imagery, with Special Reference to Association of Ideas."

Willard C. Gore. *The Imagination of Spinoza and Hume: A Comparative Study in the Light of Some Recent Contributions to*

Psychology. *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 2, no. 4 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902). 77 pp. Gore's 1901 dissertation.

Addison W. Moore. *The Functional versus the Representational Theories of Knowledge in Locke's Essay*. *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902). 67 pp. Moore's 1898 dissertation.

James R. Angell et al. *Studies from the Psychological Laboratory*. *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 3, no. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903). This issue consists of offprints of articles published in *Psychological Review*, using the journal's plates suitably altered to replace the journal's pagination with pagination starting from number one. James R. Angell and Warner Fite, "The Monaural Localization of Sound," *Psychological Review* 8.3 (May 1901): 225–46 [pp. 1–22]; James R. Angell and Warner Fite, "Further Observations on the Monaural Localization of Sound," *Psychological Review* 8.5 (September 1901): 449–58 [pp. 23–32]; James R. Angell and Warner Fite, "New Apparatus," *Psychological Review* 8.5 (September 1901): 459–67 [pp. 33–41]; James R. Angell, "A Preliminary Study of the Significance of Partial Tones in the Localization of Sound," *Psychological Review* 10.1 (January 1903): 1–14 [pp. 42–55] and also published in *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*; C. R. Squire, "Fatigue: Suggestions for a New Method of Investigation," *Psychological Review* 10.3 (May 1903): 248–67 [pp. 56–75]; Kate Gordon, "Meaning in Memory and Attention," *Psychological Review* 10.3 (May 1903): 267–83 [pp. 75–91]; Myron L. Ashley, "An Investigation of the Process of Judgment as Involved in Estimating Distances," *Psychological Review* 10.3 (May 1903): 283–95 [pp. 91–103]; Haywood J. Pearce, "Experimental Observations upon Normal Motor Suggestibility," *Psychological Review* 9.4 (June 1902): 329–56 [pp. 104–31].

Helen B. Thompson. *Psychological Norms in Men and Women*. *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903). 188 pp. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1900.

Other Dissertations

Ames, Edward S. *Modern Agnosticism: An Historical and Critical Study*. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1895.

MacMillan, Daniel P. *The Negative Judgment*. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1899.

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Ashley, Myron L. *The Origin, Structure, and Function of the Hypothesis*. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1901. Portions later published as "The Nature of Hypothesis," Chap. 7 of *Studies in Logical Theory, Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, Second Series, vol. 11 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), pp. 142–82.

King, Irving. *The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness*. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1904. Published as *Psychological Review* Monograph supplement vol. 6, no. 4 (1905).

Carr, Harvey A. *A Visual Illusion of Motion During Eye Closure*. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1905. Published as *Psychological Review* Monograph supplement vol. 7, no. 3 (1906).

Wright, William Kelley. *The Ethical Significance of Pleasure, Feeling, and Happiness in Modern Neo-Hedonistic Systems*. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1906. Published as *Philosophical Studies of the University of Chicago*, No. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1907).

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Volume 3 of the first series of the *Decennial Publications* is titled *Investigations Representing the Departments. Part 1: Systematic Theology, Church History, Practical Theology. Part 2: Philosophy, Education*. Each part has its own page numbering. The first part consists of four essays on religion. The second part consists of seven essays on philosophy, psychology, and education. Volume 11 of the second series of the *Decennial Publications* is titled *Studies in Logical Theory*, by John Dewey with the cooperation of Members and Fellows of the Department of Philosophy.

James H. Tufts. "On the Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories." *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, First Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), vol. 3, part 2, pp. 5–14. Published separately in 1903 as a monograph (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903) using the same plates but bearing a 1902 copyright. Reprinted in *Philosophical Review* 12.1 (January 1903): 1–15.

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PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHIC METHOD

John Dewey. "Psychology and Philosophic Method." *University of California Chronicle* 2.3 (August 1899): 159–79.

Address before the Philosophical Union, May, 1899, by Professor John Dewey, Ph.D., Head Professor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago.

Every science in its final standpoint and working aims is controlled by conditions lying outside itself – conditions which subsist in the practical life of the time. With no science is this as obviously true as with psychology. Taken without nicety of analysis, no one would deny that psychology is specially occupied with the individual; that it wishes to find out those things that proceed peculiarly from the individual, and the mode of their connection with him. Now, the way in which the individual is conceived, the value that is attributed to him, the things in his make-up that interest, are not due at the outset to psychology. The scientific view regards these matters in a reflected, a borrowed, medium. It is in the light of social life that they are revealed. An autocratic, an aristocratic, a democratic society propound such different estimates of the worth and place of individuality, they procure for the individual as an individual such different sorts of experience, they aim at arousing such different impulses and at organizing them according to such different purposes, that the psychology arising in each must show very different tempers.

In this sense, psychology is a political science. While the professed psychologist, in his conscious procedure, may easily cut his subject-matter loose from these practical ties and references, yet the starting point and goal of his course are none the less socially set. It is in this conviction that I venture to introduce to an audience that could hardly be expected to be interested in the technique of psychology, a technical subject, hoping that the human meaning may yet appear.

Put briefly and as clearly as may be in advance of detailed argument, the point is this: There is at present a strong, apparently, a growing tendency to conceive of psychology as an account of the consciousness of the individual, considered as something in and by itself;

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consciousness, the assumption virtually runs, being of such an order that it may be analyzed, described, and explained in terms of just itself. The statement, as commonly made, is that psychology is an account of consciousness, *qua* consciousness, just as consciousness; and the phrase is supposed to limit psychology to a certain definite sphere of reality which may receive adequate discussion for scientific purposes at least, without troubling itself with what lies outside. Now, if this be true, I hardly need point out that the question concealed in my title, is already answered in the negative. There is no intimate, no important connection of psychology and philosophy at large. That philosophy whose range is comprehensive, whose problems are catholic, should be held down by a discipline whose voice is as partial as its material is limited, is obviously out of the range of intelligent discussion.

But there is another possibility. If the individual of whom psychology treats be, after all, a social individual, any absolute setting off and apart of a sphere of consciousness as, even for scientific purposes, self-sufficient unto itself, is condemned in advance. All such limitation, and all the inquiries, descriptions, explanations that go with it, are preliminary and instrumental only. We have here but a symbol having its translation in social activity; an anatomy whose life is in its social operation. To know the symbol, the psychical letter exactly, is important; but its necessity lies not within itself, but in the need of an understood language for reading the things signified, the social spirit. In this case, we cannot be so sure that psychology is without large philosophic significance. Whatever meaning the individual has for the social life that he both incorporates and animates, that meaning has psychology for philosophy.

It is clear that this problem is too important and too large to suffer attack *in toto* in an evening's address. Yet I have ventured to consider a portion of it, hoping that such things as may appear will be useful clues in entering wider territory. We may ask what is the effect upon psychology of considering its material as something so distinct as to be capable of treatment without involving larger issues of reality. In this inquiry we take as representative some such account of the science as this: Psychology deals with consciousness 'as such' in its various modes and processes. It aims at such isolation of each as will permit accurate description: at such statement of its place in the serial order as will enable us to state the laws by which one calls another into being, or will give us the natural history of its origin, maturing and dissolution. It is both analytical and synthetic – analytic in that it resolves each into its constituent elements; synthetic in that it discovers the processes by which these elements combine into complex wholes and series. It leaves alone – it shuts out – questions concerning the validity, the ultimate import of these modifications: of their value in conveying truth, in

effecting goodness, in constituting beauty. For it is just with such questions of worth, of validity, that philosophy has to do.

Some such view as this is held by the great majority of working psychologists to-day. A variety of reasons have conspired to bring about this general acceptance. Such a view seems to enroll one in the ranks of the scientific men rather than with the metaphysicians – and there are those who distrust the metaphysicians. With others it is desire to take problems piecemeal and in detail, avoiding that excursion into ultimates, into that never-ending panorama of new questions and new possibilities that seems to be the fate of the philosopher proper. While no temperate mind can do other than sympathize with this view, it is hardly more than an expedient. For, as Mr. James remarks, after disposing of the question of free-will by relegating it to the domain of the metaphysician: – “Metaphysics means only an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistently” – and clearness and consistency are not things to be put off beyond a certain point. When the metaphysician chimes in with this new-found modesty of the psychologist, so different from the disposition of Locke and Hume and the Mills, salving his metaphysical conscience with the remark – it hardly possesses the dignity of a conviction – that the partial sciences, just because they are partial, are not expected to be coherent with themselves nor with one another; when the metaphysician, I say, praises the psychologist for sticking to his last, we are reminded that another motive is also at work. There is a half-conscious irony in this abnegation of psychology. It is not the first time that science has assumed the work of Cinderella; and, since Mr. Huxley has so happily reminded her, she is not altogether oblivious, in her modesty, of a possible future check to the pride of her haughty sister, and of a certain coronation that shall mark her coming to her own.

But, be the reasons as they may, there is little doubt of the fact. Almost all our working psychologists admit, nay, herald this limitation of their work. I am not presumptuous enough to set myself to do battle against this array. I too proclaim myself of those who believe that psychology has to do (in the first place, that is) with ‘consciousness as such.’ But I do not believe that the professed limitation follows. Quite the contrary: if ‘consciousness’ or ‘state of consciousness’ be given intelligible meaning, I believe that this conception is the open gateway into the fair fields of philosophy. For, note you, the phrase is an ambiguous one. It may mean one thing to the metaphysician who proclaims: Here finally we have psychology recognizing her due metes and bounds, giving bonds to trespass no more. It may mean quite another thing to the psychologist in his work – whatever he may happen to say about it. To come to the point, it may be that the psychologist deals with states of consciousness as the objective, the analyzable and describable form, to

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which he reduces the Reality he is studying. Not that they *are* that Reality, but that they are its indications, its clues, in shape for handling, for treatment by scientific methods. So, for example, does the paleontologist work. Those curiously shaped and marked forms to which he is devoted are not life, they are not the literal termini of his endeavor; but through them as signs and records he construes that life. And again, the painter-artist might well say that he is concerned only with colored paints as such – or, to go a step beyond, with shaded colors as such. Yet none the less through them as registers and indices, he reveals to us the mysteries of sunny meadow, shady forest, and twilighted wave. These are the things-in-themselves of which the oils on his palette are the phenomena.

So, to return to our problem, the preconception of the psychologist with states of consciousness may signify that they are the media, the concrete conditions to which he purposely reduces his Reality in order *through them*, as methodological helps, to get at and understand that which is anything but a state of consciousness. But he who insists upon the fixed and final limitation of psychology must interpret this preoccupation in quite another sense. To him the state of consciousness is not the shape some fact takes from the exigency of investigation; it is literally the full fact itself. It is not an intervening term; it bounds the horizon. Here then the issue defines itself. I conceive that states of consciousness (and I hope you will take the phrase broadly enough to cover all the specific data of psychology) have no existence ‘as such’ – to employ the favorite term once more – before the psychologist begins to work. He brings them into existence. In asking a certain question, he operates to secure the media of answering it, and this medium is ‘consciousness’ as the psychologist treats it. What we are really after is the process of experience, the way in which it arises and behaves. We want to know its course, its history its laws. We want to know its various typical forms; how each originates; how it is related to others; the part it plays in maintaining the inclusive, expanding, connected whole of experience. Our problem as psychologists is to learn its *modus operandi*, its method.

An illustration may save argument and condense reasons. The paleontologist is again summoned to our aid. In a given district he finds a great number and variety of footprints. From these he goes to work to construct the structure and the life habits of the animals that made them. The tracks exist undoubtedly; they are there; but yet it is not as existences he deals with them but as signs, phenomena in the literal sense. Imagine the hearing that the omnipresent critic would receive who should inform the paleontologist that he is transcending his field of scientific activity; that his concern is with footprints as such, aiming to

describe each, to analyze it into its simplest forms, to compare the different kinds with one another so as to detect common elements, and finally, thereby, to discover the laws of their arrangement in space.

Yet the immediate data are footprints, and footprints only. The paleontologist does in a way do all these things that our imaginary critic is urging upon him. The difference is not that he arbitrarily lugs in other data; that he invents entities and faculties that are not there. It is just in the standpoint. The interest is in the animals, and the data are treated in whatever way seems likely to serve this interest. So with the psychologist. He is continually and perforce occupied with minute and empirical investigation of special facts – states of consciousness, if you please. But these neither define nor exhaust his scientific problem and interest. They are his footprints, his clues through which he places before himself the life-process he is studying – with the further difference that his footprints are not after all given to him, but are developed by his investigation.¹

The supposition that these states are somehow existent by themselves and in this existence provide the psychologist with ready-made material is just the supreme case of the “psychological fallacy”: the confusion of experience as it is to the one experiencing with what the psychologist makes out of it with his reflective analysis.

The simple fact is that the psychologist always begins with certain operations, acts, as his data. If these fall out of sight in the course of discussion, it is only because having been taken for granted, they remain controlling the whole development of the inquiry, and affording the sterling medium of redemption. It is such acts as perceiving, remembering, intending, loving, that give the points of departure; they alone are concrete experiences. It is to understand these experiences, under what conditions they arise and what effects they produce, that the analysis into states of consciousness occurs. And the modes of consciousness that are figured remain unarranged and unimportant, save as they are translated back into such experienced realities.

To remember is to do something, as much so as to shoe a horse, or to cherish a keepsake. To propose, to observe, to be kindly affectioned, are

¹ This is a fact not without its bearings upon the question of the nature and value of introspection. The objection that introspection “alters” the reality and hence is untrustworthy, most writers dispose of by saying that, after all, it need not alter the reality so very much – not beyond repair – and moreover, that memory assists in restoring the ruins. It would be simpler to admit the fact: that the purpose of introspection is precisely to effect the right sort of alteration. If introspection should give us the original experience again, we should just be living through the experience over again in direct fashion; as psychologists we should not be forwarded one bit. Continued reflection upon this obvious proposition may bring to light various other matters worthy of note.

terms of value, of practice, of operation; just as digestion, respiration, locomotion express functions, not observable objects. But the comparison suggests its own extension. There is an object which may be described: lungs, stomach, leg-muscles, or whatever. Through these structures we present to ourselves the function; it appears laid out before us, spread forth in detail – objectified in a word. The anatomist who devotes himself to this detail may, if he please (and he probably does please in concentrating his devotion) ignore the functions: to discover what is there, to analyze, to measure, to describe, gives outlet enough. But nevertheless it is the function which fixed the point of departure, which prescribed the problem and which set the limits, physical as well as intellectual, of subsequent investigation. It is reference to function which makes the details discovered other than a jumble of incoherent trivialities. One might as well devote himself to the minute description of a square yard of surface of desert soil were it not for this translation. Even a puzzle assumes some point, some possible interpretation, in the seeming mass of blind and brute circumstance. Even so states of consciousness are the morphology of certain functions.² What is true of analysis, of description, is true equally of classification. Knowing, willing, feeling, name states of consciousness not in terms of themselves, but in terms of results readied, the sorts of value that are brought into experience.³

Explanation, even of an ‘empirical sort’ is as impossible as determination of a ‘state’ and its classification, when we rigidly confine ourselves to modifications of consciousness as self-existent somethings. Sensations are defined, classified, and explained by reference to conditions which, according to the theory, are confessedly extraneous – sense-

² Thus to divorce “structure psychology” from “function psychology” is to leave us without possibility of scientific comprehension of function, while it deprives us of all standard of reference in selecting, observing, and arranging or explaining the structure.

³ The following answer may fairly be anticipated: “This is true of the operations cited, but only because complex processes have been selected. Such a term as ‘knowing’ does of course express a function involving a system of intricate references. But, for that very reason, we go back to the sensation, which is the genuine type of the ‘state of consciousness’ as such, pure and unadulterate and unsophisticated.” The point is large for a footnote, but the following considerations are instructive: (1) The same psychologist will go on to inform us that sensations, as we experience them, are networks of reference – they are perceptual, and more or less conceptual even. From which it would appear that whatever else they are or are not, the sensations, for which self-enclosed existence is claimed, are *not* states of consciousness. And (2) we are told that these are reached by scientific abstraction in order to account for complex forms. From which it would appear that they are hypothecated as products of interpretation and for purposes of further interpretation. Only the delusion that the more complex forms are just aggregates (instead of being just acts in experience, like seeing, hoping, etc.) prevents recognition of just the point in question – that the ‘state of consciousness’ is an instrument of inquiry or methodological appliance of reflection.

organs and stimuli. Indeed the whole physiological side assumes a ludicrously anomalous aspect.⁴ While experimentation is retained, and even made much of, it is at the cost of logical coherence. To experiment with reference to a bare state of consciousness is a performance of which one cannot even imagine the nature, to say nothing of doing it; it is as meaningless as to experiment with reference to acts and the conditions of their occurrence, is natural and straightforward. Such simple processes as association are concretely inexplicable when we assume states of consciousness as existences by themselves (not as forms which the process of experience assumes when examined with reference to the genesis of its various modes.) As recent psychology testifies, here again we have to resort to conditions which have no place nor calling on the basis of the theory – the principle of habit, or else of some connection in the content or object, thus admitting in either case that it is neither the states which are associated (habits connect acts, not states; content belongs to the things associated, not to the states) nor are they the means by which the association is effected.⁵

We have only to note that there are two opposing schools in psychology to see in what an unscientific status the whole subject is. We have only to consider that these two schools are the result of assuming states of consciousness as existences *per se* to locate the source of the scientific scandals. No matter what the topic, whether memory or association or attention or effort, the same dualisms present themselves, the same necessity of choosing between two schools. One, lost in the distinctions which it has developed, denies the function because it can find objectively presented only states of consciousness. So it abrogates the function, regarding it as a mere aggregate of such states, or as a purely external and factitious relation between them – forgetting that the origin and *raison d'être* of the state of consciousness was but to define and get hold of the act or operation as experienced. The other school, recognizing that it is to explain away, rather than to explain, the values of experience, attempts to even up by declaring that these functions are themselves also immediately given data of consciousness, existing side by side with the 'states,' but indefinitely transcending them

⁴ On the other hand, if what we are trying to get at is just the course and procedure of experiencing, of course any consideration that helps distinguish and make comprehensible that process is thoroughly pertinent.

⁵ It may avoid misunderstanding if I anticipate here a subsequent remark: that my point is not in the least that 'states of consciousness' require some 'synthetic unity' or faculty of substantial mind to effect their association. Quite the contrary; for this theory also admits the 'states of consciousness' as existences in themselves also. My contention is that the 'state of consciousness' as such is always a methodological product, developed in the course and for the purposes of psychological analysis. In this particular case 'states' and 'habits' are the correlative factors appearing when we analyze a series of experiences of a certain type.

in worth, and apprehended by some higher organ. So against the elementary states and external associations of the sensationalist school in psychology, we have the complicated machinery of the intellectualist school, with its pure self-consciousness as a source of ultimate truths, its hierarchy of intuitions, its ready-made faculties. To be sure, these are now largely classified and reduced to some comprehensive form – Apperception, or Will, or Attention, or whatever the fashionable term may be. But the principle remains the same; the assumption of some function as a given existent, distinguishable in itself and acting upon other existences – as if digestion and vision as functions were regarded as separate from the activity of each constituent organic structure, somehow acting upon these from the outside so as to bring cooperation and harmony into them! This division into psychological schools is as reasonable as would be one of botanists into rootists and flowerists; of those proclaiming the root to be the rudimentary and essential structure, and those asserting that since the function of seed-bearing is the main thing, the flower is really the controlling ‘synthetic’ principle. The difficulty is that both sensationalist and intellectualist suppose that psychology has some special sphere of reality or of experience marked off for it within which the data are just lying around, self-existent and ready-made, to be picked up and assorted as pebbles await the visitor on the beach. Both alike fail to recognize that the psychologist has first experience to deal with; the same experience that the zoologist, geologist, chemist, mathematician, and historian deal with, and that what characterizes his specialty is not some data or existences which he may call uniquely his own; but the problem raised – the problem of the course of experiencing as such as distinct from its special contents.

Here psychology gets its revenge upon those who would rule it out of possession of important philosophical bearing. As a matter of fact, the larger part of the questions that are being discussed in current epistemology and in what is termed metaphysic of logic and ethic arise out of (and are hopelessly compromised by) this original assumption of ‘consciousness as such,’ as material by itself – in other words, are provoked by the exact reason which is given for denying to psychology any essential meaning for epistemology and metaphysic. Such is the irony of the situation. The epistemologist’s problem is, indeed, usually put as the question of how the subject can so far transcend itself as to get valid assurance of the objective world. The very phraseology in which the problem is put reveals the thoroughness of the psychologist’s revenge. It is just because the psychical as such has been reduced to ‘states of consciousness’ as independent existences, that the question of self-transcendence is raised. It is hardly too much to say that the entire epistemological industry is one – shall I say it – of a Sisyphean nature.

Mutatis mutandis, the same holds of the metaphysic of logic, ethic, and aesthetic. In each case, the basic problem has come to be how a mere state of consciousness can be the vehicle of a system of truth, of an objectively valid good, of beauty which is other than agreeable feeling. We may, indeed, excuse the psychologist for not carrying on the special inquiries which are the business of the logical, ethical, and aesthetical philosophy; but can we excuse ourselves for forcing his results into such a shape as to make these special problems soluble only either by ignoring them entirely or else by arbitrarily wrenching them?

Undoubtedly we are between two fires. In placing upon psychology the responsibility of discovering the method of experience, do we not destroy just that limitation to concrete detail which now constitutes it a science, and not a piece of cloudy metaphysic? Will not the psychologist be the first to repudiate this attempt to mix him up in matters philosophical? But we need only keep in mind the specific realities in the term Course or Process of Experience and not lose ourselves in its mere generality. The immediate preoccupation of the psychologist is with very definite and empirical sorts of facts – questions like the limits of audition, of the origin of pitch, of the structure and conditions of the musical scale, etc. Just so the immediate affair of the geologist is with particular rock-structures, of the botanist with particular plants, and so on. But through the collection, description, location, classification of rocks the geologist is led on to the splendid story of world-forming. The limited, fixed, and separate piece of work is dissolved away into the fluent and dynamic drama of the earth. So, the plant leads with absolute inevitableness into the whole process of life and its evolution.

In form, the botanist still studies the genus, the species, the plant – hardly, indeed, that; rather the special parts, the structural elements, of the plant. In reality, he studies the life itself; *they* are the indications, the signatures through which he renders transparent the mystery of life growing in the changing world. It was doubtless necessary for the botanist to go through the Linnean period – the period of engagement with rigid detail and fixed classifications; of tearing apart and piecing together; of throwing all emphasis upon peculiarities of number, size, and appearance of matured structure; of regarding change, growth, and function as external, more or less interesting, attachments to form. Examination of this period is instructive; there is much in contemporary investigation and discussion that is almost unpleasantly reminiscent in its suggestiveness. The psychologist should profit by the intervening history of science. It exhibits, to be sure, an accumulation of information, of knowledge of this and that; but the important matter is the change in attitude and method – in interest. The conception of evolution is not so much an additional law as it is a face-about. The fixed

structure, the separate form, the isolate element, is henceforth at best a mere stepping-stone to knowledge of process, and when not at its best, marks the end of comprehension, and betokens failure to grasp from the inside.

With the change in standpoint from self-included existence to including process, from structural unit of composition to controlling unity of function, from changeless form to movement in growth, the whole scheme of values is transformed. Faculties are definite directions of development; elements are products that are starting-points for new processes; bare facts are indices of change; static conditions are modes of accomplished adjustment. It is not that the concrete, empirical phenomenon loses in worth, much less unverifiable metaphysical entities are impertinently introduced. It is that our aim is the discovery of the process in its various adaptations to circumstance, and success is measured by our ability to place each special fact in the particular position it occupies. If we apply this evolutionary logic in psychology, where shall we stop? Questions of limits of stimuli in a given sense, say hearing, are in reality questions of temporary arrests, adjustments making the favorable equilibrium of the whole organism; they connect with the question of the import of sensation in general and auditory sensation in particular with reference to life-habits; of the origin and use of localized and distinguished feeling, or perception; and this, in turn, involves within itself the whole question of space and time consciousness; the significance of the thing-and-quality experience, and so on. And when we are told that the question of the origin of space experience has nothing at all to do with the question of the nature and significance of the space experienced, the statement is simply evidence that the one who makes it is still at the static standpoint; he believes that things, that relations, have existence and significance apart from the particular conditions under which they come into experience, and apart from the special service rendered in those particular conditions. But to return; the question of perception passes insensibly into that of attention, into that of interest and will, and so carries with it inevitably the whole problem of the part played by individuality in constituting the objective world of things and events.

Of course, I am far from saying that every psychologist must cover the whole journey. Each individual may contract, as he pleases, for any section or subsection he prefers; and undoubtedly the well-being of the science is advanced by such division of labor. But psychology goes over the whole ground, from the detection of every distinct fact of experiencing, to seeing what need calls it out as the special organ fitted to cope with the situation, and the discovery of the machinery through which it operates in keeping agoing the whole course of experience.

But, I shall be told, the wall that divides psychology from philosophy cannot be so easily treated as non-existent. Psychology is a matter of natural history, even though it may be admitted that it is the course of experience itself whose history is to be written. But philosophy is a matter of values; of the criticism and justification of certain validities. One deals with genesis, with conditions of temporal origin and transition; the other with analysis, with eternal constitution. I shall have to repeat that it is just this rigid separation of genesis and analysis that seems to me to survive from a pre-evolutionary, a pre-historic age. It is not so much the assured barrier between philosophy and psychology as it is the sign of the distance dividing philosophy from all science. For the lesson that mathematics first learned, that physics and chemistry pondered over, in which the biological disciplines were finally tutored, is that sure and delicate analysis is possible only through the patient study of conditions of origin and development. The method of analysis in mathematics is the method of construction. The experimental method is the method of making, of following the history of production; the term 'cause' which has (when taken as an existent entity) so hung on the heels of science as to impede its progress, has universal meaning when read as condition of appearance in a process. And, as already intimated, the conception of evolution is no more the discovery of a general law of life than it is the generalization of all scientific method. Everywhere analysis that cannot proceed by examining the successive stages of its subject, from the beginning up to its culmination, that cannot control this examination by discovering the conditions under which the successive stages appear in their simplicity and purity, is only preliminary. It may further the invention of proper tools of inquiry, it may help define problems, it may serve to suggest most valuable hypotheses. But as science it breathes an air already tainted. There is no way, in the results reached, to sort out those flowing from the subject matter itself, and those introduced by the assumptions and presumptions of our own reflection. Not so with natural history when it is worthy of its name. Here the analysis is the unfolding of the reality itself. Its distinctions are not pigeon-holes of our convenience; they are stakes that mark the parting of the ways in the process itself. Its classifications are not a grasp at factors resisting further analysis; they are the patient tracings of the paths pursued. Nothing is more out of date than to suppose that interest in genesis is interest in reducing higher forms to cruder ones. It is interest in locating the exact and objective conditions under which a given fact appears, and in relation to which it accordingly has its meaning. Nothing is more naive than to suppose that in pursuing 'natural history' (term of scorn in which yet resides the dignity of the world-drama) we simply learn something of the temporal conditions

under which a given value appears, while its own eternal essential quality remains as opaque as before. Nature knows no such divorce of quality and circumstance. Things come when they are wanted and as they are wanted; and their quality is precisely the response they give to the conditions that call for them, and the furtherance they afford through being the one event that is meet and fit to the movement of the whole. This severance of analysis and genesis, instead of serving as a ready-made test by which to try out the empirical, temporal events of psychology from the rational abiding constitutions of philosophy is just a brand of the dualism of the philosophy that conceives it: the supposition that values are somehow externally obtruded and statically set in irrelevant rubbish.

Here we strike a deeper level. There are those who will admit that 'states of consciousness' are but the cross-sections of the arrested flow of experience, and made in order that we may reconstruct it in its life-history through studying the organs, the structures, by which it executes its habits and realizes its aims. Yet in the knowledge of the course and method of our experience, they will hold that we are far from the domain proper of philosophy. This experience is just the historic achievement of finite individuals; it tell the tale of approach to the treasures of truth, of partial victory, but larger defeat, in laying hold of the treasure. But the reality is not the path to it, and record of devious wanderings in the path is hardly a safe account of the reality. Psychology, in other words, may tell us something of how we mortals lay hold of the world of things and truths; of how we appropriate and assimilate its contents; and of how we react. It may trace the issues of such approaches and apprehensions upon the course of our own individual destinies. But it cannot wisely ignore nor sanely deny the distinction between these individual strivings and achievements and the Reality that subsists and supports its own structure quite outside these finite futilities. The processes by which we turn over the Reality into terms of our fragmentary unconcluded, inconclusive experiences are so extrinsic to the Reality itself as to have no revealing power with reference to it. There is the *ordo ad universum*, the subject of philosophy; there is the *ordo ad individuum*, the subject of psychology.

It is some such assumption as this that lies latent, I am convinced, in all forswearings of the kinship of psychology and philosophy. Two conceptions hang together. The opinion that psychology is an account only and finally of states of consciousness, and therefore can throw no light upon the realities with which philosophy deals, is twin to the doctrine that the whole conscious life of the individual is something not organic to the universe itself. The philosophic basis and scope of this doctrine lie outside of examination here. But even in passing one cannot

avoid remarking that the doctrine is almost never consistently held; the doctrine logically carried out leads so obviously to intellectual and moral scepticism that the theory usually prefers to work in the dark background as a disposition and temper of thought rather than to make a frank statement of itself. So it usually gives back through some round-about method or special organ a part of what it takes away from the every-day, straightforward experience of man. But it is more pertinent upon this occasion to dwell upon the fact that even in the half-hearted expositions of the process of human experience as something merely annexed to the reality of the universe, we are brought face to face to the consideration with which we set out: the dependence of theories of the individual upon the position of which at a given time the individual practically and socially has possession. This doctrine of the accidental, futile, transitory significance of the individual's experience as compared with the eternal realities; this notion that at best the individual is simply realizing for and in himself what already has fixed completeness in itself is congruous only with a certain intellectual and political scheme and may modify itself as that shifts. When such rearrangement comes, our estimate of the nature and importance of psychology will mirror the change.

When man's command of the methods that penetrate to the truths of experience was precarious and disturbed; when the tools that subject the world of things and forces to use and operation were rare and clumsy, it was unavoidable that the individual should submit his consciousness and purposes blankly to the blank reality beyond. Under such circumstances, seemingly external authority must reign; the belief that human experience in itself is approximate, not self-contained, is inevitable. The worth of experience is measured by no self-set standard; its ideal is no reflection of its own process; its success is through no assured method of its own. Under such circumstances, reference to the individual, to the subject, is a resort only for explaining error, illusion, and uncertainty. Individuality, the self-functioning and the self-culmination of experience, is lacking. The necessity of the external control and redemption of experience reports itself in the low valuation of the self, and of all the factors and phases of experience that spring from the self. That the psychology of mediaevalism should appear only as a portion of the theology of sin and salvation is as obvious as that it should be simply a part of cosmology with the Greeks – an account of how the fixed world of reality is shared.

As against all this, I hope it will not seem just braggadocio if the assertion is ventured that psychology as supplying us with the knowledge of the behavior of experience and thus with the general method of philosophy, is a conception of democracy. Its postulate is that

since experience fulfills itself in individuals, since it administers itself through their instrumentality, the account of the course and method of this achievement is the most complete and centred statement of reality open to us.

Democracy is possible only because of a change in intellectual conditions. It implies tools for getting at truth in detail, and day by day, as we go along. Only such possession justifies the surrender of fixed, all-embracing principles to which, as universals, all particulars and individuals are subject for valuation and regulation. Without such possession, it is only the courage of the fool which would undertake the venture to which democracy has committed itself – the ordering of life in response to the needs of the moment in accordance with the ascertained truth of the moment. It is the deification of the here and the now; of the specific, the particular, the unique, that which happens once and has no measure of value save such as it brings with itself. Such deification is monstrous fetishism, unless the deity be there; unless the universal lives, moves, and has its being in experience as individualized.⁶ In this conviction of the value of the individualized, it finds its further expression in psychology, which undertakes to show how this individualization proceeds, and in what aspects it presents itself. It is the theoretical counterpart of the will to exhibit in action the complete connectedness, the full organic quality, of every human being.

Of course, such a conception means something for philosophy as well as for psychology; possibly it involves a larger measure of transfor-

⁶ This is perhaps a suitable moment to allude to the absence, in this discussion, of reference to what is sometimes termed rational psychology – the assumption of a separate, substantialized ego, soul, or whatever, existing side by side with particular experiences and ‘states of consciousness’, acting upon them and acted upon by them. In ignoring this and confining myself to the ‘states of consciousness’ theory and the ‘natural history’ theory, I may appear not only to have unduly narrowed the concerns at issue, but to have weakened my own point, as this doctrine seems to offer a special vantage ground whence to defend the close relationship of psychology and philosophy. The ‘narrowing,’ if such it be, will have to pass – from limits of time and other matters. But the other point I cannot concede. The independently existing soul restricts and degrades individuality, making of it a separate thing outside of the full flow of things, alien to the realities experienced and consequently in mechanical relations to them. From the standpoint of the discussion, it is vitiated by just the quality constantly objected to – that psychology has a separate piece of reality apportioned to it, instead of occupying itself with the manifestation and operation of any and all reality in concrete experiencing. From this point of view, the ‘states of consciousness’ attitude is a much more hopeful and fruitful one. It ignores certain considerations to be sure; and when it turns its ignoring into denial, it leaves us with curious hieroglyphics. But after all, there is a key; these symbols can be read; they must be translated into terms of the course of experience. When thus translated, selfhood, individuality, is neither wiped out nor set up as a miraculous and foreign entity; it is seen as the unity of reference and function involved in all reality when fully experienced – the pivot about which it turns – and the value in which it culminates.

mation. It involves surrender of any claim on the part of philosophy to be the sole source of some particular set of truths, or the exclusive guardian of some fixed set of values. It means that philosophy be a method; not an assurance company, nor a knight errant. It means an alignment with science. I certainly would not sacrifice the depth and comprehensiveness of genuine philosophy to the partial and superficial clamor of that which sometimes officiously and pretentiously exhibits itself as Science. But there is a sense in which philosophy must go to school to the sciences; in which it must have no data save such as it receives at their hands; and be hospitable to no method of inquiry or reflection not akin to those in daily use among the sciences. As long as it claims special territory of fact for itself, or peculiar modes of access to truth, so long must it occupy a dubious position. Yet this claim it has to make until psychology comes to its own. There is something in experience, something in reality, which the physical and the biological sciences do not touch; something, moreover, which is not just more experiences or more realities; but without which their materials are inexperienced, unrealized. For such sciences deal only with what might be experienced; with the content of experience, provided and assumed there be actual experience. It is psychology which tells us how this possible experience loses its barely hypothetical character, and is stamped with categorical unquestioned experiencedness; how, in a word, it becomes here and now in some uniquely individualized life. Here is the necessary transition of science into philosophy; a passage that carries the verified and solid body of the one into the large and free form of the other.

Must I say, need I say, in concluding, that I have not this evening attempted to argue, but only to propose? Would that I had such clearness that I might say, expose! My intention is not to convince, but to utter a conviction. Such an evening's address as I could make, even to this audience, might have only the semblance of logically demonstrative discourse, and at best it should develop only the emotion of persuasion. But if I may show you an attitude which it is possible to take; if I can acquaint you, even at a distance, with a certain spirit in which it is possible to pursue psychology; if I can loosen somewhat of the rigidity which perhaps the bounds and metes of the philosophic disciplines have assumed; if I can suggest that all these technical divisions and definitions are at the mercy of our historical life, and must dissolve and re-form at its human touch, I shall have abundantly satisfied my most ardent desire. To this end, I bespeak the hospitality of your thoughts.

SUGGESTIONS TOWARD A THEORY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCIPLINES

George H. Mead. "Suggestions Toward a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines." *Philosophical Review* 9.1 (January 1900): 1-17.

In the *Psychological Review* (Vol. III, pp. 357-70), Professor Dewey maintains in his discussion of the Reflex Arc that the sensation appears always in consciousness as a problem; that attention could not be centered upon a so-called element of consciousness unless the individual were abstracting from the former meaning of the object, and in his effort to reach a new meaning had fixed this feature of the former object as a problem to be solved. The illustration used is the well-worn one of the child and the candle. He has burned his fingers before in dealing with a moving bright object, and he has played with bright objects. There are then at least two tendencies to action, that of withdrawing the hand from the object that burns, and that of reaching out for a plaything. In the conflict between these two tendencies the bright yellow dancing something is shorn of its objective meaning in the child's former experience, and he is trying to learn what it is. While it is thus deprived of its objective value, while it is no longer a stimulus to action, it may become a sensation. But with knowledge of its real nature it ceases to appear in this form in consciousness. It can be sensation no longer until it again becomes the center of a problem episode in experience. I may have carried Mr. Dewey's doctrine beyond the statement given in the article on the Reflex Arc, but I think that the statement represents what Mr. Dewey would admit. At least such a statement is possible from the standpoint which Mr. Dewey takes, and admitting it for the sake of discussion, I wish to point out what its bearing upon the different philosophical disciplines may be.

The assumption made here is that all analytical thought commences with the presence of problems and the conflict between different lines of activity. The further assumption is that it continues always to be an expression of such conflict and the solution of the problems involved; that all reflective thought arises out of real problems present in immediate experience, and is occupied entirely with the solution of these problems or their attempted solution; that this solution finally is found

in the possibility of continuing the activity, that has been stopped, along new or old lines, when such reflective thought ceases in the nature of the case. I shall not attempt to prove this to be true, but simply try to see where metaphysics, psychology, deductive and inductive logics (I refer here to the procedures of these sciences, not their general theories), ethics, æsthetics, and the general theory of logic would fall within a reflective process so stated.

The order of the disciplines stated above implies a dialectic within the act, which I wish to confess to at once. Metaphysics I wish to identify with the statement of the problem. It may take psychological form or not. If the result of the recognition of the problem is only to bring to consciousness the meaning of the object in terms of past experience, we get the universal – the ideal – and the use of the object thus defined can be systematized in a manner which is described in deductive logic. If, on the contrary, we abandon the old universals – the interpretations involved in the objects as we have constructed them – and frankly look forward to a new meaning, the immediate experience can claim only subjective validity, and we have the subject matter with which psychology deals. The use of this material to reach the new universal is evidently the procedure of inductive logic. The application of either of these methods to conduct as a whole, in their relation to the ideal or to the larger self to be attained, fulfils the function of ethics, while æsthetics deals with the artistic representations of the object either as ideal or as a phase in the process of development. Finally, the general theory of the intelligent act as a whole would fall within that of logic as treated in works such as that of Hegel.

Where our conscious activity finds itself unable to pass into an objective world on account of the clash between different tendencies to action, we are thrown back upon an analysis of these spontaneous acts and therefore upon the objects which get their content from them. I wish to emphasize this latter assumption which is indeed in accord with some of the best psychological analysis of the present time. It is otherwise stated as the teleological nature of the concept, and affirms that the meaning of the object is derived entirely from our reaction upon it, or, in other words, our use of it.¹

It would follow from this recognition of the nature of the known object that the conflict of two uses or reactions in the same instance would inevitably lead to an analysis of the activities themselves, if a complete abandonment of the action did not take place. However, the analysis would not at first be of the activity as a psychical state. The question would be what the real nature of the object is. A case of doubt

¹ James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 332.

as to the identity of a person just met, representing conflicting tendencies to greet him as an acquaintance and to treat him as a simple passer-by, does not at once suggest to us his form with its color and other qualities as a series of sensations, though this is implicitly involved. We are busy in the study of the object, finally perhaps placing him as one whom we have not met before, but who bears a striking resemblance to some one of our acquaintance. This involves the bringing to consciousness the idea of the friend, his form and features, gestures and bearing, while the more or less unsuccessful attempt to make this image coalesce with the form before us, tends to emphasize the points of contrast, that is to form another image which is not able to represent the object before us satisfactorily. While we do not question the objective validity either of our mental pictures of the friend, or yet of the reality of the impression of the man whom we are in the presence of, there is little tendency to advance to the subjective character of the state of consciousness. Furthermore, if the image which is called up is one which represents fixed habits, especially those bearing pronounced moral sanction, we may affirm the reality of these ideas as over against the seeming contradiction before us. Such instances are found often enough in our lives. Every question of expediency is apt to lead to such a result. A moral line of conduct has become identified with certain objects. For example, the right to the use of what is termed property being once fixed, the expenditure of it in luxuries while others may be starving arouses, when the problem is felt, first of the idea of property itself as it is represented in all the business transactions of life. This may be affirmed in spite of the contradiction between it and the tendencies to demand assistance for the suffering. The presence of such conflicts, between habitual interpretations of the meaning of the goods of life, and opposite lines of conduct with reference to them, tends to the conscious formulation by most of us of a moral code in more or less abstract terms. If we are able to live pretty consistently up to such a code, and to ignore the contradictions that persist, we have not yet reached the point of metaphysics.

A metaphysical situation implies that the problem persists and cannot be ignored. To affirm the reality of the idea, *i.e.*, the meaning of the object in terms of past experience – our own or that of the community – we must deny to certain elements of experience, interpreted also in terms of the past activity, the like reality. A theological dogma may, for example, affirm the reality of our teleological interpretation of experience, and at the same time deny reality to the mechanical interpretation which the physical sciences suggest. Or, in the type of metaphysical thought found in Plato, the reality of the idea may be affirmed at the expense of that of our entire sensuous experience.

Metaphysics is then a statement of an essential problem in permanent form, in terms of the reality of an idea or system of ideas and the unreality of that which conflicts with it. The solution of the problem carries with it the disappearance of the problem and the metaphysical system at the same time. The conception of an immanent deity, making possible, for example, the harmonizing of the teleological and mechanical interpretations of nature, up to that point solves the problem and banishes the metaphysical *deus ex machina* from the system of thought. Of course this change will not necessarily affect other metaphysical features of theology. But in case it is accepted, special providences would be no longer necessary to explain what happens. Our modern teleological psychology which finds the unity of the object and of the world in our own activity, dissipates the conflict between the one and the many which lies at the bottom of the problem with which Plato was struggling. A psychological interpretation of experience makes it possible to affirm both the reality of the one, and the reality of the multitudinous elements that go to make up the object, and in so doing deprives the metaphysical system of its *raison d'être*.

The presence of such an idea, whose reality is maintained over against conflicting elements in experience, requires that we should rigidly distinguish in experience what is real and what is to be ignored or denied. We must be able to apply the idea, and the dominance of the idea cannot but bring to consciousness the method by which this must be done. Deductive reasoning is nothing but the organization of one's world upon the basis of certain ideas, implying that we either deny the existence of that which does not accord therewith, or else ignore it. When, however, the technique has in this manner been made conscious, it may be used to aid us in the application of universals which are not necessarily metaphysical. Thus while deductive logic had its rise as the organon of a metaphysical system, and served to separate the real from the unreal, it becomes a general organon that is applied universally, serving to separate not the real from the unreal but the known from that which is to be ignored for the time being only.

The next step in the dialectic of reflective consciousness is found in the conscious solution of the problems which are registered and systematized in metaphysics. A successful solution implies the recognition of the reality of all elements that enter into the experience. Such reality implies further, in logical terms, that all elements shall fall under universals whose validity is recognized; for all our knowledge is through universals and must be through universals. In psychological terms, it implies that the concepts of the object, representing the values of past reactions, though they are now in conflict, shall be so harmonized that the values of each may appear in a new concept, that each type of

reaction shall be represented in the new activity. For example, if the problem, which is implied in the essentially metaphysical substance of imponderable ether, is to be solved, both the elements which are implied in the energy of mass (which should appear in any medium as physics has defined media, but which is denied in imponderable ether) and that of vibration must receive universal validity, or otherwise stated, and assuming that a theory of energy could solve the problem, a new method of treating all physical phenomena, a new reaction which involves all that is true in all our processes of physical measurement and determination must take the place of those which have come into conflict in this instance. If the conflict is not a mere mistake, and if it is necessary within our known world, it can be overcome only by the appearance of a new universal or habit of reaction. In the second place, the solution of a metaphysically stated problem can be achieved only by admitting, at least for the time being, the inadequacy of the old and so its lack of objective validity, and advancing toward a new universal whose objective validity cannot yet be recognized, with the hope that in this way a new known world shall arise in the place of the old. This, of course, holds only for the conscious solution of the problem. Countless necessary problems have arisen in the history of human society that have reached solution in the gradual appearance of new conceptions and the adaptation of old methods of action, which have thus become equal to situations in which irrepressible conflict first existed. The solution that we are referring to here is not this unconscious change by which one generation differs from the next with no historical sense of wherein this difference lies and with no anticipation of further fundamental change. It is the consciousness of the change that is the essential step in the dialectic of reflective consciousness. Furthermore, just as the metaphysical situation has given a technique in the statement of the problem, with the inestimable advantage that flows from it, so the consciousness of the process by which we change from the old universal to the new carries with it the acceleration which always accompanies the addition of reflection to any instinctive activity.

As indicated above, the necessary result of consciously advancing to the solution of an inevitable problem in human experience is the acceptance of a position midway between the old universals, whose validity is abandoned, and the new universal, which has not yet appeared. And this is a result that affects implicitly the whole world of knowledge; for that world is an organic whole in which no necessary part can be changed without involving all the rest. To assume the attitude, therefore, of solving a necessary problem, implies a willingness to completely invalidate one's known world. I am willing to admit that, in age of conscious progress, such an attitude is not explicitly taken by very many who are

honestly attacking problems in a scientific spirit, that they not only make many reservations within which they do not expect scientific inquiry to reach, but also that they fail to recognize their known world as an organic whole which cannot be changed in essential parts without changing *in toto*. However, within the province where they do apply the scientific method they are ready to make the Cartesian clean sweep of all objective validity, and having adopted the method they cannot consistently hesitate to continue it as fast as they recognize that the province affects the whole.

In the third place, in the presence of the conflict we reach universals which are the result of abstraction from the immediate conflicting elements. The child has before him that which is neither the object which burned nor yet the plaything. It is something behind each and true of each – a bright moving object we will say. It carries with it a certain amount of the reality of each. It is in so far objectively valid. A primitive metaphysical attitude may maintain itself here as it did among the early Greek thinkers. It is that out of which they both or all spring, if the young child could only become metaphysical (and there is an early period within which the child is markedly so and is in search of pure being). But if he wishes to know, not that out of which they both spring, but which of the two it is, and if he insists on finding out how he can distinguish between the two, he makes the bright moving object merely the starting point of a scientific investigation. In doing this he must ascribe to it, hypothetically, different values for which he has as yet no sufficient objective validity. He knows that it is more than a bright moving object, but he is not sure that it is something that has burned him, nor yet that it is a possible plaything. If he could turn his attention upon it, he would have to say that it is for the time being simply an experience of his own that is confined to his consciousness, that represents experiences that have been objectively valid in the past and a possible future object. In a word, the result of consciously attempting to solve a necessary problem is to render one's world, in so far as it is affected by the problem, psychical, and the technique of the solution is psychology. I wish to insist that this consciousness does not become psychical with the mere abstraction resulting from the conflict of reactions. The bright moving object is objective. And it is conceivable that the analysis may stop here and go no further. It is only when the child refuses to accept the abstraction, and insists that his tendencies to action shall not be checked, but have the larger field for expression which will come with the new object, that the experience necessarily becomes psychical. And it becomes psychical, therefore, because the tendencies to action assert themselves, seeking to adjust themselves to each other. It is this process that falls peculiarly within the phase of

attention. There is the hesitating movement of the finger toward the flame representing both tendencies, that to grasp and that to withdraw, but it is more than either. There is involved the assumption that the hand can be used to deal with hot objects, not simply to get out of their way. It is a hypothesis tested with fear and trembling. It includes both elements, both the readiness to withdraw from danger and to manipulate the distant object revealed by the eye, reacting upon each other so as to produce the action of dealing with an object in an entirely new way, and thus producing for the child a new object. Here we have the characteristics of attention, not simply the absorption in the bright moving object, but the control of different reactions upon it by each other² in the production of a new type of activity including both. One finds in attention not only concentration, but that which concentration implies, control, and control can exist only where there is something definite to be done which is consciously involved in the whole doing of it. This does not take place through a statement of what the ultimate meaning of the act is to be. The child cannot say to himself, 'I must learn to handle a hot bright object.' For to him there has been no element of handling in his experience of hot objects whether bright or not. The hot object was one to be withdrawn from. And in his manipulation of playthings there had been nothing to be avoided. The two activities are here quite distinct, as therefore are the objects. The control lies in the fact that both reactions are excited at the same moment and must in some way both reach expression. The old world contained objects to be withdrawn from and those to be manipulated in play, the new world is to contain objects that are to be so manipulated that he does withdraw from the danger connected with them. Just what that object is to be, depends upon the result of the investigation. It cannot therefore serve as control. It is only the necessity of bringing both tendencies to expression in their interaction upon each other that does and can exercise such control. There is of course no place in this paper for an adequate analysis of attention. I wish only to point out that, in the attentive processes which arise at these problematic points in experience, the control which is an essential part of attention cannot be found in a world of objective validity – for, so to speak, the old is abandoned and the new is not yet in existence – but is found in the relation to each other of different tendencies to act which have been forcibly divorced from the old objects and can only find expression through the mediation of a new object. Both the subject matter of the experience and the process by which the new arises, are necessarily subjective.

² Angell and Moore, "Reaction Time: A Study in Attention and Habit," *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1896), p. 8.

We have identified the formation of the hypothesis with the psychical state. It is necessary to distinguish here between the psychical state, as it actually appears in the presence of problems, and the ghost of it which we deal with in psychological textbooks. In experimental psychology, for example, we generally deal with states of consciousness which do not appear as psychical to us in the slightest degree. What actually is taking place is the recognition of things whose objective reality we do not contest, and which we have no motive to state in terms of our own consciousness as distinct from that of anyone else, or in a state of consciousness which is distinguished from every one that has taken place before. The peculiarity of a psychical state is that it is absolutely *sui generis* in our life. It has elements of the immediate present that mark it off from any that has gone before or will come after. From all these peculiarities we necessarily abstract in objective knowledge. When, however, that objective knowledge is at fault and we are forced to correct and feel our way to something new, we bring out vividly the peculiar marks of the immediate experience and are in the presence of that which is psychical – as that of the individual and of a particular moment in his life to the complete distinction from every other moment present or past. It is evident that in the psychological experiment we are dealing with what is generally perfectly objective. It is only by an inference that we can go from this to the psychical, and that inference is too often one that rests upon an epistemological basis not distinguishable from Hume's or Berkeley's: to wit, that we can reduce all experience to states of individual consciousness in which form we may recognize their ultimate validity. To do this, however, is to objectify the psychical state, and deprive it of the very elements that have rendered it psychical.

The marks of the psychical state are not such that they can be universalized to form a concept in the sense here implied. The peculiar content of them resists all such generalization. What can be generalized is their position in the act, the when and the how of their appearance. What we generally refer to, when we are speaking of psychical states, are elements of the objects which are simply abstracted from the objects themselves. I speak of the color 'red,' and in so doing have in mind something that I have abstracted from certain red objects. To get a concrete picture of this I call to mind the visual picture of the object, if I do not look at the object itself. In either case the object is itself known as objective; for even the picture of the imagination is objective so long as it is dealing with the elements of an objective world, which is not questioned, however fantastically it is put together. What fascinates is the presence of such a picture in the midst of such an unquestioned world. The red of a sunset never seen on sea or land is not one that is necessarily psychical,

but one that is replete with the emotional value which is absolutely merged in the outer world. Our world is at best one of consciousness, and no amount of analysis of this world into elements will get to the psychical state unless the conditions out of which the psychical arises are present. Elements of consciousness are not as such elements of a psychical character. Nor yet are those which can be definitely connected with particular nervous phenomena of the individual psychical states. It is not the identification of the state with the individual that makes it psychical, but it is his recognition of it as his own, his attention to those peculiarities which mark it off not only from the consciousness of any one else but also from any other state of his own life, that render it psychical. The parallelistic theory sets up the individual of experience and compares the world as he sees it with the world which our science assumes to exist free from all individual error, and tries to combine the two series. It is not denied that the individual's experience is entirely objective in its character. We are merely comparing the object of his perception with that which the scientist's methods of exact measurement reveal. I see a red house which is for me an object in a real world and in no sense psychical. The scientist measures the vibrations of light represented in that red, and shows that there is a complete gulf between the red of perception and the red of certain vibrations. He may call the one psychical and the other objective. But his observations are no more objective than is the original perception of the red house. He has taken a part of his experience which is more reliable than another and has shown that the two stand in a certain relation to each other, though it is not possible to carry this relation throughout. That one set can be related to his nervous states, or at least that its errors are more completely stated in certain nervous conditions than in the other, throws no light upon the case. An engineer who estimates from a glance the grade of a hill and then corrects his judgment from the tracing of the leveler, is not entering into a distinction between a psychical and a physical world. He is comparing two elements of his conscious world together and selecting that which experience has shown to be more reliable. Parallelism is pure epistemology, and does not get within the realm of the psychical. The distinction between the immediate content of the world of perception, and the physical theory of these perceptions, does not touch that distinction which lies between the world of unquestioned validity, and the state of consciousness which supervenes when it has lost that validity and there is nothing left but the subjectivity out of which a new world may arise. This seems to indicate that there are in reality two tasks which psychology has taken up, one that of analysis of the objective world in terms of the consciousness of the objective individual – suggested in Hegel's *Phænomenology of the Spirit* – and the

other, the analysis of the situation within which the subjective consciousness arises and the process by which it advances to the formation of the new universal. To the former class most of the psychological work that has been done belongs. It is indeed not different in purpose from that undertaken by Kant, being the study of the structure of experience as necessarily found within the consciousness of an objective individual. The other type is represented in James' chapter on the Stream of Consciousness and in some of the work that has gathered peculiarly around the process of attention.

The typical situation is found in the attitude of the inductive scientist in the presence of a problem. The conflict of given concepts has led to the abstraction, already described, in which what lies behind the conflict comes out as the fact of observation. I may refer again to the instance of ether, the fact of observation here being the actually given movements of heavenly bodies, with evidences of retardation or the opposite, and the transference of vibratory energy. The psychical phase appears when the scientist attempts to consciously solve the problem. This involves, first of all, the flexibility of movement by which he brings all his actual reactions into relation with each other. This freedom of movement, in which all the activities and tendencies to activity which have been confined by definite theory play without resistance into each other, seems to me the essence of subjectivity. A grouping takes place, now here and now there. To return to the illustration, the processes of exact determination of energy are stripped of the concepts of matter in terms of molecule and atom. There stands before the scientist only the multiple determinations. Energy of mass, vibration, etc., are represented only by the measurements that he undertakes to determine. Now the way in which these shall come together is not dependent upon any objective law. The only control lies in the necessity of bringing them all together. Only after they have been harmonized can the grouping take objective value. For the time being, the man is dependent upon the spontaneity of his own impulses – the genius for suggestion to which Whewell refers. This may lead, in this case, to the positing of our own measuring processes as the substantial element about which all the facts of energy shall gather. As the result of physical science has been to state, not the movement in the terms of the body, but the body in terms of the movement, we may find the ultimate motions in which bodies are to be defined in our own reactions which we recognize as giving the content to the objective world. But the point which I wish to make clear is that we have here these various motions free from any bodies objectively determined, and are free to organize them at will if we only include them all. Another illustration may be found in the attitude of the inventor, who, facing a particular problem, is left to a constructive

power proportional to the freedom with which the forces abstracted from their customary objects can be combined with each other into a new successful whole. It is the power of subjectivity that comes nearer answering to what we term genius than anything else.

The technique of the process, so far as it goes beyond this perfect freedom, lies in attention, in other words, in the control which arises through the interplay of the different activities. One must feel, in that which he does, not only the immediate action, but also all the others that are involved. In the case of the child he must grasp so as to avoid the burn. I am referring to so-called voluntary attention. In involuntary attention we have simply the process already become a habit and objectified. Perhaps the most primitive illustration can be found in the mutual control of the distance sense and the contact sense in the primal intelligent act. Here the fixing of the eye and its direction are continually determined by the process of locomotion and that of manipulation, while as obviously the manipulative and locomotive processes are controlled by the eye process. In this, as in the case of the child we have not reached consciousness of what we are doing – not reflective consciousness. This statement also does justice to the modern psychological position that the stimulus, as psychology studies it, does not set off the activity, but is the sought occasion for activities that are demanding expression.

In this spontaneity and control we have the essential characteristics of the will, and when we pass beyond the limits of scientific investigation to conduct as a whole, we enter the field of ethics. Purely metaphysical ethics would carry us back to the promulgation of old universals with the ascetic demand that we ignore or suppress all tendencies to action, that do not fall under them, as interpreted by deductive logic. As in this situation we recognize the validity of only one set of impulses, and set them in hostile array against the other, there is no escape from a doctrine that action will be determined by the comparative strength of the two factions – determinism – unless we posit a will which is not represented in any of these impulses to action – an indeterminate will. Over against these positions, it becomes possible, from the standpoint taken above, to define freedom in terms of the identification of the self as a whole with the problem and its solution. The forces are not hostile if the aim is to represent all tendencies to action in the final act. The self is not identified with one tendency or any one set of tendencies more than with another, and the problem is recognized not as one that arises simply through the imperfect character of the self, but as one that springs from the essentially inadequate nature of the world of ends presented in knowledge. It is not a conflict between the good and bad elements of our nature, but between values and the impulses that these represent,

meeting on a plane of absolute equality. Obligation lies in the demand that all these values and impulses shall be recognized. The binding nature of obligation is found in the necessity for action, and in the claim made by the whole self for representation within the action; while the consequences of failure to meet the obligation are found in the sacrifice of certain parts of the self which carries with it the friction and sense of loss that is characteristic of the immoral attitude. The ideal can be defined, not in the old universal nor in attempted delineation of what the future situation should be, for in advance of the solution such a delineation is quite impossible, but in the method of meeting the problem, in the statement of all that must be recognized in the solution to be attained; as the ideal of the scientist is found in the complete statement of the various conditions that must be recognized and met in any possible hypothesis. Finally the motive, as distinguished from the mere impulse, is found in the tendency to action when brought into conscious relation with the other conflicting tendencies, striving to estimate itself over against all. As the solution is one that arises from an unpredictable suggestion from within, the spontaneity of the individual is preserved beyond all question. The so-called moral struggle is found in the identification of the self with one set of tendencies to the exclusion of others. I do not mean by this statement that the self is something standing apart from the tendencies to conduct, but that it arises through the organization of these tendencies or impulses. Such an organization as is onesided, leaving parts of the nature unrepresented, naturally leaves behind the continuous conflict which thus becomes chronic and destructive instead of being a moment in a process of natural development. The moral struggle always implies that an organization has been in some sense accomplished or, better, that a working hypothesis or line of conduct has been adopted which is felt to be inadequate. The struggle does not lie in the process of forming the hypothesis, but in the friction in acting upon it. If the step has been in some sense irrevocable, the feeling of loss remains in the so-called emotional state of remorse. The natural trend is, however, forward, and looks to the reconsideration of the line of conduct adopted. It is only from the deterministic standpoint that retribution is called for. For in this case there is a hostile force that must, so to speak, be reduced.

Within such a conflict, even if it is not brought clearly to consciousness, and whether the result is simply the recognition of the old universal, or the conscious organization of the new world through the psychical phase, the sensuous objects – answering to the facts of scientific observation – take on a new form or meaning. They are the stimuli to, or occasions for, activities, for the time being abstracted therefrom by the conflict itself. But they stand for these activities, are the reposi-

tories of their meaning and value. In scientific observation, they are simply the conditions for the formation of the new universal, and we lose sight of the inherent value of these objects. But, where we are unable to reach the new universal, and are obliged to remain with the elements of the problem and to express our feeling for that which is not yet attained through the statement of these objects, they gain again this representative value. This representative value of the object resulting from conflict seems to me to be æsthetic. The term 'conflict' may seem to be at variance with many features of æsthetic consciousness, but we must notice that within the attempted solution the hostility has ceased; for overt action has stopped and the state is preëminently one of calm, the absence of prejudice and rancorous feeling. We must remember also that it is by no means necessary that the conflict should take on the scientific form. The only element that comes above consciousness may be the new value of the object. This will depend upon the nature of the individual. The artist states the conditions for the solutions of his problems in terms of the sensuous objects of experience. The solution may be attained, supposing that it is attained, more or less unconsciously. Furthermore, there are certain problems that, like the poor, are always with us; for example, that between the mechanical and teleological statements of the world and its physical objects. Out of this springs decorative art and all the artistic representation of nature. In the utilitarian control of the world we lose sight of the end of this control. We fail to see the forest for the very trees. There are others connected with the primitive impulses of love and contest which are always with us; and, finally, the great moral problems never lose their eternal identity in whatever state of society they appear. The religious consciousness is preëminently one that recognizes in life a fundamental problem, while it clings to the reality of the great representative objects of conduct which the conflict has abstracted and set before us. In fact, it is allowable to define the religious object as one which, while transcending through its universality the particular situations of life, still is felt to be representative of its meaning and value. There is here indicated another characteristic of the object held in the abstraction of the unsolved problem. In so far as it carries the meaning and value of the activity which it represents in actual conduct, it calls forth as emotions the feelings that accompany such activity. The subject is much too complex to be dealt with adequately here. I wish merely to indicate that the object that stands out in the midst of the problem, not only as a condition of its solution, but also, for the time being, as representative of the meaning and value of the act, would naturally gather about itself the emotional content that is so characteristic of æsthetic and religious experience.

Finally, the dialectic of this whole process of conscious analysis and reconstruction may be passed in review and be reduced to a technique, or at least be so treated that it tends to become such eventually. This science – the general theory of logic – does not deal with the statement of the problem as does metaphysics, nor with the immediate application of the abstracted universal – deductive logic – nor with the immediate formation of the hypothesis and its verification – inductive logic – but with the whole appearance of the objective world in thought terms and its passage into unanalyzed reality again. It deals therefore with the judgment and the different moments in the development of the judgment.

THE DEFINITION OF THE PSYCHICAL

George Herbert Mead. "The Definition of the Psychical." *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, First Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), vol. 3, part 2, pp. 77–112.

There is greater uniformity in the use of the term objectivity than in that of the corresponding term subjectivity. We know what we mean when we assert that we have, an object before us, for the simple reason, if for no other, that we can act with reference to it. Objectivity is the characteristic of a cognitive process which has reached its goal. The success of the cognitive act furnishes the criterion of objectivity, and that without even defining what the nature of the category is. In contrast with the unequivocal character of objectivity stand the various significations attached to subjectivity. Historically it has completely boxed the compass. It meant some centuries ago what objectivity now connotes. The change is one that is parallel with the appearance of the modern individual, with the ascription of logical values to his peculiar consciousness which had belonged to the *mundus intelligibilis*.

Today subjectivity may connote that which is *not objective* in the sense given above, that in whose regard one cannot or may not or should not act. Again, it may rather imply emotional coloring. It may be used with reference to psychical consciousness, and swallow up into itself all consciousness from the standpoint of a subjective idealism. To the dualist of one school it includes all that is conscious, and is contrasted with extended substance whose existence is largely an inference. Again, there is a subjectivity that is ascribed to the teleology of the acts of a person; thus the state of immediate purposeful consciousness would be subjective, while the abstract things of reflective scientific thought would be objects. Here subjectivity connotes immediacy, while objectivity means abstraction. Finally subjectivity may be found among the abstractions, belonging to the peculiar contents of a scientific psychology.

While many roads to objectivity may be taken by different types of thought the goal reached is identical. For practical purposes the object is recognizable, and the philosophical standpoint cannot affect its nature. But there is no such criterion of subjectivity, and its nature varies with

the standpoint and system. There is, however, one constant characteristic which is a part of most definitions given it: the subjective is that which is identified with the consciousness of the individual *qua* individual. But the recognition of this does not locate subjectivity as the value of the object for action fixes objectivity. The process of reflection has ceased when action is reached, and no theory of reflection can change the object; but the peculiarities of individual consciousness lie well within the process of knowledge. Action takes place in a common world into which inference and interpretation have transmuted all that belonged solely to the individual subjectively considered. As subjectivity refers to the consciousness of the individual, and as the phase of consciousness which is peculiar to individual as such is generally placed within the process of reflection, the definition of subjectivity will depend upon the function which a theory of logic ascribes to the individual consciousness in the formation of the judgment. I can see no escape from this for our modern psychology, recognizing as it does that the subject-matter of its science is abstracted from concrete experience. Only an empiricism that assumes to start from sensations as concrete elements of reality can escape the necessity of accounting for the abstraction by which it obtains its material and of relating that process to the whole cognitive act of which reflection is a part. And yet modern psychology, that seeks to free its skirts from metaphysics, assumes that it may take its object as it finds it, and that it is given in the same sense and same general form as the object of the other sciences. While the relation of psychology to the other philosophical disciplines is undetermined, or, what is the same thing, while the peculiar abstraction which gives us the psychical content is not organically related to the other abstractions within the process of reflection, we shall have no certain criterion for recognizing the subject-matter of psychology. By way of illustration of this situation it is worth while to consider certain definitions of the "psychical" which are made the basis of our present psychological analysis.

Wundt¹ states that psychology "investigates the whole content of experience in its relation to the subject and in its attributes directly derived from the subject." "Psychology has as its subject of treatment the total content of experience in its immediate character."² "Psychology investigates the contents of experience in their complete and actual form, both the ideas that are referred to objects, and all the subjective processes that cluster around them. Its knowledge is, therefore, *immediate* and *perceptual*: perceptual in the broad sense of

¹ C. H. Judd, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

the term in which not only sense perceptions, but all *concrete reality* is distinguished from all that is abstract and conceptual in thought.”³ It would, however, be a mistake to assume that this statement implies a psychical content which is not the result of an abstraction. For the author says distinctly that the attitudes of the physical and psychical sciences take “two points of view of the same unitary experience,” and it is impossible to look at anything from one point of view rather than another without abstracting from that other. Furthermore, to quote from the *Logik*:⁴ “The reality of the object consists in this, that it can be thought of as abstracted from the psychical experiences of him who presents it... .” It is, of course, impossible for the physical sciences to abstract part of the content of consciousness without leaving an abstraction behind. If we examine Wundt’s theory of the psychical more narrowly we find that he assumes that naive unreflective consciousness may be considered as both subjective and objective. Subjectivity is represented by the phases of emotion and volition, and objectivity by the presentation (*Vorstellung*). This subjectivity is as yet, as I understand the author here, not synonymous with the psychical. Reflection starts with the attempt to deal with the contradictions which appear in our immediate presentations. These contradictions have reference, not to the existence of the object which is given with the same immediacy as the subject, but to the “how” of its appearance. The effect of this attempt to explain the contradictions in the “how” of immediate existence is to withdraw into the subject the object of presentation (*Vorstellungs-object*), which becomes then subjective as well as feelings and volition. In the place of the object of presentation appears the mediate or conceptual object and the sensuous presentation which has become subjective is now only a symbol of this concept. “Subjective and mediate knowledge are in this wise correlative ideas, in that, exactly in proportion as certain elements of perception are withdrawn into the subject, the remaining elements are regarded as parts of a mediate knowledge, *i.e.*, a knowledge brought about by a previous logical correction.”⁵ In this fashion, also, a complete gulf has been placed between these two parts of consciousness, which it has not been possible to bridge. Another expression for the same situation is found in the statement that the object of the mediate sciences – the physical sciences – is a concept, whose content is not given but constructed, and whose existence, therefore, is subject to doubt. The object as content of the immediate science – of that of inner experience, of psychology – is, on

³ Ibid., p. 5.

⁴ Bd. II.2 Abth., p. 263.

⁵ Wundt, *System der Philosophie*, p. 143.

the contrary, given and not constructed. Its existence is never subject to doubt, and the only treatment to which it is subject is that of analysis. Its objects are always particular in their content and universal concepts in psychology have no place except to enable us to review and hold together a mass of instances.⁶ Still another statement of the same relation between the two types of experience is found in the analysis of the category of substance. This is defined as "that which everywhere denotes an object, to which the objects of sense-perception refer symbolically, but which can itself be only conceptually determined."⁷ Now this category is a necessary part of the apparatus of the physical sciences on account of their mediacy, while it is not only unnecessary but impossible in psychology because, so far as the content of experience is concerned, there is no reference to something beyond. In psychology substantiality is replaced by actuality, and substance is replaced by the subject that is known only as an activity.⁸ The final result of this standpoint is something as follows: In naive consciousness a predicate of subjectivity is given to the contents of emotion and volition, but the division between physical and psychical is not made, since every phase of consciousness can under varying conditions be both subjective and objective. In fact, in immediate consciousness every phase has these two sides. When we are forced to a rational or mediate explanation of our world the elements of presentation or idea which have been predominantly objective are withdrawn into the subject – the sphere of the emotions and the will which now must become entirely subjective. They are so withdrawn simply because they fail any longer to explain our experience, and this explanation can take place only by the assumption of mediate objects that we can present in conceptual form. These contents of presentation, however, continue to function as symbols, since our thought is both intuitive and discursive at the same time. They have, however, no other function than that of providing the necessary sensuous element which is symbolic of the mediate object – the concept. For this purpose the memory image is especially adapted, because in it the elements which our apperception selects stand out more distinctly, and the other elements retreat more completely behind them than in the presentations of immediate perceptions.⁹ They still, however, serve only the purpose of symbolizing the object of mediate knowledge. There seem to be, then, two types of psychical contents, that which has always been

⁶ Ibid., pp. 142ff.

⁷ Ibid., p. 163.

⁸ *Logik*. Bd. II.2 Abth., p. 247.

⁹ *Logik*. Bd. II., p. 31.

predominantly subjective – the emotional and volitional phase of consciousness – and that which is withdrawn into this subjective field because of the necessity of mediate knowledge which is after all forced to use immediate presentations.

One cannot but be struck by the functional difference between these two contents of the psychical world. Emotion and volition retain their primitive value and validity. They have lost nothing by the passage from the immediate perception to knowledge. On the other hand, the presentations (*Vorstellungen*) are but the shattered ranks of a defeated corps that has collapsed in its attempt to explain the objective world. Giving place to the concepts they become but tags and signs of their successors. The justification for treating as identical in nature two series that have appeared as the results of such different processes is to be found presumably in the fact that our mediate knowledge involves, not only abstraction from the presentative phases of consciousness, but also from the feelings and the will. There is, however, this great difference, that when the process of reflection is completed and by means of conceptual knowledge we have attained to an explanation of our world, the emotions and the will in evaluation and apperception enter into their original heritage. The world continues my world and valuable for my ends find my conduct just as it was before the reconstruction became necessary. But the presentation is forever deprived of any but symbolic function. The content of the world can never again be immediate – colored, sounding, feeling. Before this garden of sensuous content stands the angel with the flaming sword of logical abstraction. We have eaten of the tree of knowledge, mediate and immediate, and though the world remains for feeling and action, it is no longer good for food nor a delight to the eyes. The psychical has two very different functions. In the realm of the feelings and the will it offers a field in which our values and ends may be analyzed and reconstructed so that they may appear again with added reality and content. The other function is that of offering a refuge for former real objects which are now but ghostly symbols of the reality which they once constituted.

Kölpe defines subjectivity as the “dependency of facts of experience upon experiencing individuals”¹⁰ and recognizes that the value of the definition depends upon the further definition of the individual. This is identified as the corporeal individual – the individual known to physical, especially physiological, science. The ground for this identification is found partly in the fact that there is nothing about this individual, and partly in the recognized dependence of various phenomena which are generally admitted to be psychical upon physiological conditions.

¹⁰ *Grundriss der Psychologie*, trans., p. 2.

Extend this dependence to all so-called psychical experience and assume that every such state has a corresponding physical condition and we have at least great definiteness in the definition. Such a treatment has the advantage of being unquestionably scientific in the accepted sense. It finds certain data with which it deals as simply given. It defines the field within which these data may be found, by perfectly comprehensible criteria, and limits its inquiry to this field. The especial boast of this scientific psychology is that it may be experimental, for confining its data to correspondents of physiological processes the experimental determination of these conditions must have definite bearing upon the parallel psychical events.

Of course, this type of psychologist is little interested in the function which the psychical phase of consciousness has in the whole process of knowledge. But it is permissible to inquire if it does fulfil any function and what this is. One function indicated almost at its birth is that of determining the error of observation. This error of observation implies that the observing and experimenting scientist is an instrument played upon by the physical universe of which he is a part. His observation is the effect which the physical outer event has upon this mechanism. The result of the observation is a further external physical event. Between the two outer events fits the inner process. The peculiarity of this inner process lies in the facts that besides being a part of this larger physical complex it presents certain parallels to the outer so-called stimuli or physical forces acting upon the organism. That is, light and sound and pressure and taste and odor not only arouse certain effects in the mechanism of the animal form, but these effects within the animal form become in turn forces which are in some degree proportionate to these outer forces, and which operate in the nervous system in some sense as these forces operate in the environment of the form. It is the relation of microcosm to the macrocosm in wholly physical terms. This is the first parallelism. To return to the experiment, when the scientist observes a star we note two occurrences. There is the neural occurrence in which the light of the star is represented by retinal and central nervous processes that associate themselves with others which stand for factual, temperature, spatial, and an indefinite number of other events on the outside. Besides this representation of the star light in its connection with other forms of outer energy there is the outer registration by the scientist of the light, its time, its color, its surroundings, etc. Here is a second parallelism dependent upon the first, but both are referred to the first series. This second parallel series serves as a complex of stimuli for the human organism in the place of the original complex of forces. Now the error of observation lies in the inaccuracies of this second complex which should take the place under various circumstances of the original

complex. And these inaccuracies are the result of the intermediacy of the first parallel complex between the original and its external representative. That is, physically we construct a complex of recorded data and description which have the effect of an original physical complex – have that result upon the physiological mechanism. This construct is what we call scientific material and even science. From this scientific standpoint the animal organism is simply a fearfully and wonderfully complicated piece of apparatus whose numerous mean variations must be determined. When apperception is denominated the inhibitory action of certain frontal tracts in the brain, and feeling is called the reaction of these centers upon the sensational processes, and emotions the fusion of the feelings and the sensations, and the will apperception, and reasoning nothing but a more or less complicated series of reproductions associatively originated, it is evident that we have reduced this mechanism to the level of the apparatus and theoretically can determine not only the accuracy of the observation but also of the scientific reasoning.

This materialistic psycho-physical parallelism is dominated by the methods of the physical sciences not only in its own method but also in its selection of material. Of course this statement has left out the subject-matter of the science – the psychical series. But the interesting fact is that it can be left out. If we recognize only those psychical states which have physical counterparts we will be more scientific the less we say about anything but the counterparts. Unfortunately we can lay our hands only on the psychical states throughout a large part of the domain of psychology and we are forced to make these do for the corporeal elements. Thus the answer to the question we put above, is that the function fulfilled by the psychical in this type of psychology is that of giving the mean variation of the individual who is (perhaps unfortunately) a necessary part of the scientific machinery. We start from certain data and arrive at certain more or less accurate reproductions of the data from which we start, *i.e.*, the physical universe. If our reproduction of it were quite accurate and adequate we might quite overlook the apparatus by which it was made and there would be no scientific psychology. But unfortunately for science and fortunately for psychology, or perhaps the psychologists, there is the error of observation. The psychical will have no greater functional value in the universe of knowledge than the imperfect photo-chemical processes of the eye have in a given universe of energy. However, they have not even the interest which the eye presents to the scientific observer, for to science it will always be better represented by the corporeal individual and his states. The psychical is nothing but the imperfect or individual statement of the universe and all the import which this imperfection has is better stated in the theoretically given corporeal counterpart. Actually

there are two reasons for considering it. In the first place, the corporeal counterpart is only theoretically there for the most part and we must make the best of a bad bargain, using the psychical which is there for the corporeal which isn't, and, in the second place, the generosity of scientific curiosity may be counted upon to interest itself in anything that it meets. And these are precisely the grounds which Münsterberg gives for the existence of psychology as a science.

Münsterberg recognizes an original condition of actuality in which subject and object are given, but no reflection and no science. Here reign only the categories of validity and value; that of existence is not found, being operative only in the field of reflection.¹¹ The problem of science is practical. It is the determination of that which is to be expected.¹² The method of science is the separation of the object from the subject. In this way we abstract the processes of the universe from the teleological construction of actuality, and are able to determine what is likely to happen irrespective of the end and purposes of the subject. This process is now one that is not only distinct from the original purposeful act, but one whose subject is equally abstract and colorless. Instead of being a controlling, determining agent who fashions a universe of means, it is now but an observer carefully ignorant of any end which he may have in the future, necessarily so, lest his wishes may cloud his observation and vitiate his science. This *ego – das Vorfindende Ich* – is then carefully to be distinguished from the actual *ego – das aktuelle Ich*. It is also to be distinguished from the subject or subjects given in social consciousness – *der vorgefundene Subject*.¹³ The aim of science is to find necessary relations among these abstract objects, or better, necessarily determined systems. We find two of these, that of the physical sciences and that of the social sciences. The first are causally and the second teleologically organized. Now in neither of these does the psychical appear. It does not form a part of the mathematically determined order of nature nor is that which the social sciences treats psychical. These sciences treat the whole individual and his methods of conduct. The psychical is simply what is and must be abstracted by the cognitive processes of the *vorfindendes Ich* in its presentation of the known world of science. It is the error of observation again. Every theoretically perfect statement of that which is to be expected will be stated in physical terms. "In order practically to determine the connection of things [*Zusammenhang*] we have abstracted the object from the subject [*das aktuelle Ich*] and have divided the object into its related part, the physical, and the unrelated part, the psychical

¹¹ *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, p. 56.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 59ff.

[belonging to *das vorfindende Ich*], and in this way have logically constituted the physical and psychical as such; the psychical as unrelated (*nichtzusammenhängende*) does not serve directly the end out of the logical pursuit of which its existence sprang. After it has once been conceptually obtained and recognized in its scientific reality, it will become of course also an object of scientific theory, and must therefore in some way be described, ordered, simplified, and explained. It arose logically out of the search for relation, as soon as it is determined it must be scientifically treated, without reference to the question whether the results serve the purpose, whose accomplishment was the motive for its original appearance. The theoretical interest in the unrelated [the psychical] harmonizes entirely with the fact that it was the treatment of the related [the physical] which brought the unrelated [the psychical] to light. That every result of this theoretical work actually serves the practical purpose of making the physical result more comprehensible from the psychical side, is for theoretical psychology secondary.”¹⁴ As was said before, the interest in psychology is an unmotivated scientific curiosity plus the secondary desire to get the psychical links which will replace the physical ones which are missing.

If we turn to another group of thinkers, and select Bradley as the first exponent, we meet the following definition of a “psychical fact.” “A psychical fact is anything which is immediately experienced and has duration, quality, intensity; or is any one of these aspects, as a mere distinguishable aspect – so far, that is, as one aspect is taken as belching to something that possesses the other aspects also; or, again, is any relation existing between any facts as previously defined.”¹⁵ This definition needs further elucidation. In the first place, Bradley regards the object of psychology as the “facts immediately experienced in a single organism or soul, and those facts regarded merely as events which happen.”¹⁶ He regards the soul as a mere “totality of immediate experience.” The point that needs emphasis is that, for the author in question, psychology deals merely with events that happen. He is as eager as the others to get metaphysics out of psychology, though perhaps more for the sake of the metaphysics than for the sake of psychology. “If this can be done in other sciences, it surely can be done in psychology too. In the other sciences the so-called principles that explain the facts are working hypotheses, which are true because they work, but which need not be considered as a categorical account of the

¹⁴ *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, p. 91.

¹⁵ *Mind*, Vol. XLVII, p. 355, note.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

nature of things. The physicist, for example, is not obliged to believe that atoms and ether do really exist in a shape which exactly corresponds to his ideas. If these ideas give rational unity to the knowledge which exists, and lead to fresh discoveries, the most exacting demand upon the most exact sciences is fully satisfied. The ideas are verified and the ideas are true, for they hold good of the facts to which they are applied. And to suppose that the metaphysician should come in, and offer to interfere with the proceedings of the physicist, or to criticize his conclusions, is in my judgment to take a wrong view of metaphysics. It is the same with psychology. There is no reason why this science should not *use* doctrines which, if you take them as actual statements of fact, are quite preposterous. For the psychologist, as such, is not interested in knowing if his principles are true when taken categorically. If they are useful ways of explaining phenomena, if they bring unity into the subject and enable us to deal with the fresh facts which arise, that is really all that, as psychologists, we can be concerned with. Our principles are nothing but working hypotheses: we do not know and we do not care if they turn out to be fictions, when studied critically.”¹⁷ As an illustration of this method in psychology take the author’s “law of individuation,” whose working he defines as follows:

Each element tends (that is, moves unless prevented) by means of fusion and reintegration to give itself a context through identity of content... . The reader may dismiss this statement as mere “transcendentalism;” but until my error is shown me I shall believe that it is strict empirical psychology, a mere statement the way in which events do happen. We may call it, if we please, the law of Individuation, and should find that thought and will are each one case of it, made distinct by the different fields in which particularization is worked out. But we must remember that our law perhaps to solve extent uses a scientific fiction. It is convenient to speak of the movement of each element, but we must not assert (or deny) that in reality the element can do or be anything – unless, indeed, we are prepared to make psychology a battlefield for metaphysicians.¹⁸

There are two “scientific fictions” here – the elements themselves and their operation by means of “identities of contents.” If we return now to our definition we find there these elements and the relations by means of which we can think these elements in the bare happenings. First, in regard to their abstractness, which renders them fictions, they are

¹⁷ *Logic*, p. 316.

¹⁸ *Mind*, loc. cit., p. 360, 1.

immediate – a term which “negatives and excludes phenomena so far as their content is used beyond their existence.”¹⁹ That is, as mere immediate experience they are events which cannot in this character ever become knowledge or thought. They may provide the material for thought, the presentations, but as psychical they can never become thought. The characteristics which render them fit material are duration, quality, intensity. Without discussing these categories, it is evident that they are chosen as giving the basis for the relational thought-process. Each psychical fact or element is a content that is undeveloped thought, but as psychical it must remain such, or else its content would inevitably get beyond its existence. Besides providing the material of thought, psychology provides also the machinery. That is, this material must arrange itself and change itself by redintegration and fusion in such a fashion that in its structure it needs only the interpretation of “individuation” to become thought. But these laws or relations can only be introduced into this psychical structure by a scientific fiction. For laws are not facts and relations are not events. Our scientific procedure, however, allows their introduction as a mere statement that the psychical material is organized in such and such a way, or, as the author states it, “the above relations are not facts, save and except so far as they exist between facts as previously defined.”²⁰ The psychical fact is a statement of experience so far as it may be regarded as a series of events, which have no reference beyond themselves as mere events, and their arrangement may be recognized simply as a resultant fact while it is merely psychical; and we may even talk of the laws of individuation as operating within these limits, if we only remember that we are using scientific fiction. This is my humble interpretation of Bradley’s position. The statement may be given in Bradley’s own terms. “To thought realized as thought, its psychical existence is something necessary, but still *per accidens*... . And as thought cannot make phenomena, it contents itself without them, and is therefore symbolic and not existential. And, aiming at totality which events never give, it converts their degradation to its ideal uses, while it builds its own world out of them, and lives both in them and apart.”²¹

There is but one point in this presentation that is of importance to this discussion; and that is the logical position of the psychical. Wundt, as indicated above, finds in the psychical that which has been withdrawn from the object, when this is subjected to epistemological criticism. The

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 354, note.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 355.

²¹ Ibid., p. 381.

psychical, however, maintains the immediate character of unreflective experience, its reality, or rather its actuality. It is not an event; it is a piece of immediate experience which has been, it is true, condemned, but which has still the quality of actuality. Just as in immediate unreflective experience we distinguish between our volition and much of our emotion, on the one side, and the object, on the other (though from Wundt's standpoint this is a distinction of aspect and not of things), so, after reflection has abstracted the idea or presentation (*Vorstellung*) from the object and thought has substituted the conceptual object for the object of sensuous experience, we distinguish this subjective phase of consciousness from the object. It is true that this body of remains has another content or function in the formation and mediation of the concept. It provides the image which is, after all, in the most abstract thinking a necessity in the presentation of the most general object. But its constitution is not determined by this function. In Wundt's statement it is because the memory image is peculiarly susceptible to symbolic use that it serves as impulse for the concept.²² The memory image has not this susceptibility because it serves this function, but it serves the concept in this capacity because it has this susceptibility. In contrast with this conception of the psychical is that which Bradley partly states and partly implies above. The situation is not fundamentally different from that presented by mathematical theory of physics and physics itself. The logical problem of these sciences is the presentation of the experiences of the physical environment in terms of quantitative identity. Physics in accomplishing this end is justified in assuming and constructing any objects which it wishes. If the mathematical theory of vibration demands a molecule which shall be a system of a certain number of elements, there is no reason why physics should not assume such a system. In other words, the method of thinking the physical experience will determine what material and what structure of that material will be presented by the physical sciences. And, as Bradley says metaphysics would be officiously meddlesome if it undertook to pass upon the formal legitimacy of these objects before physics might use them, he claims the same privileges for the theory of knowledge which he grants so openhandedly to the physical theory. Logic may order from the psychological machine shop just such objects as she wants. They are to be, not "*Vorstellungen*," but "*Bestellungen*." What Bradley resented in the traditional doctrines of the associationalist was not that his psychical atoms were metaphysical monstrosities, but that they were logical monstrosities. Call them events or aspects of events, and let them fuse and reintegrate as per the law of individuation, and Bradley will

²² *Logik*, p. 46.

be before anyone in showing the door to critical metaphysics as a hyper-critical old woman. The psychical from this standpoint is the raw material whose form and structure will depend upon the theory of thought. The great advantage of this treatment of psychology is that the science is freed from all dependence upon the corporeal individual. All questions as to the where and how of these psychical events are ruled out as not pertinent. Such questions amount to the demand that they prove their reality independent of their legitimacy as working hypotheses. The psychical contents are then the bases for the working hypotheses of logical and ethical theories. One further advantage of the attitude is that it is not even bound to regard the psychical as peculiarly the consciousness of the empirical individual. That is, this type of consciousness is not psychical because it is that of the individual as such, but under certain conditions the particularity of the individual is expressed by the fact that for the time being he identifies his consciousness with these psychical contents. Finally immediacy, being defined as mere deprivation of reference beyond existence, has no function beyond that of stripping the content of experience of all relations that might interfere with perfect freedom in forming hypotheses. To present this same point in a different way, the conflicts and collisions in experience which are responsible for its development cannot be conceived of as taking place in a consciousness which had not reached the stage of reflection. The reflection is essential to the existence in consciousness of the conflict. The reflection does not arise from the conflict. As Bradley states it, "the image is not a symbol or idea. It is itself a fact, or else the facts eject it."²³ Images as images could not come into conflict with each other, and fuse and reintegrate so as to bring out the identical meaning or content, unless the thought-process were there to control what takes place. "The conclusion I would add is that the intellect would never have appeared upon the scene, if it had not been present and active from the first."²⁴

If we turn now to Ward and Stout, we get the following definitions: "The standpoint of psychology, then, is individualistic; by whatever methods, from whatever sources, its facts are ascertained, they must – to have a psychological import – be regarded as having a place in, or being a part of, *some one's consciousness*... . The problem of psychology, in dealing with this complex subject-matter, is, in general, first, to ascertain its constituent elements, and, secondly, to ascertain and explain the laws of their combination and interaction."²⁵ Psychology investigates the

²³ *Logic*, p. 35.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 460.

²⁵ Ward, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed., Vol. XX, p. 38.

history of individual consciousness, and this coincides with the history of the process through which the world comes to be presented in consciousness.²⁶ "What is throughout distinctive of psychological method is that it is not concerned with the validity of individual judgment, or with the worth of individual volition, but only with their existence and genesis."²⁷ "Psychology is the science of the processes whereby an individual becomes aware of a world of objects and adjusts his actions accordingly."²⁸ In these definitions we have the recognition of the individual as the peculiar habitat of the psychical. From this standpoint we may proceed phenomenally, and simply undertake to find our elements, or we may determine these in some sense in advance by making the genesis of knowledge and conduct in the individual out of this type of consciousness the peculiar interest of psychology. This standpoint is open to a criticism which we have indicated earlier, that the individual here considered is an empirical fact which must be determined psychologically as well as any other characteristic of psychical states. The reply is that the individual as subject is always there over against his states of feeling, and psychology must recognize this presence.²⁹ But this reply does not do away with the ambiguity involved in the use of the term "individual" or "subject" or "self" or *ego*. Bosanquet says that knowledge is never a development from the subjective to the objective, but a development within the objective,³⁰ and this must be the position of these authors as long as the individual as "subject" is simply an implication of the known object. In so far as states of consciousness are referred to the subject as distinct from the object they cannot be cognitive. The psychological individual then never does attain to knowledge. As long as the states of consciousness may be termed subjective, he does not know, and when they become objective, he is no longer the individual with which psychology deals. Are we dealing, then, with an abstract individual, such as Bradley refers to as simply one mass of elements of feeling? In that case its presence, however universal, is not the criterion for a selection or abstraction that has been made before we find it. We need a psychology to present this individual. He cannot be a presupposition. If it is the real individual of unanalyzed experience, and our psychology deals with the genesis of his knowledge and conduct, there is a passage from the subjective to the objective, and the canons of logic and ethics will have forced their way

²⁶ Stout, *Analytical Psychology*, p. 7.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²⁸ Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, p. 4.

²⁹ Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

³⁰ *Essentials of Logic*, p. 22.

into psychology, even if metaphysics is not introduced with them. And this cannot be avoided by prefacing that psychology deals with these processes simply as data, not with their validity.³¹ For the nature of the steps is going to be determined by the goal toward which they are moving, and no treatment of the steps will be adequate which overlooks this relation. Furthermore, if it is a development, no sharp line can be drawn between the genesis and the result. The phases and the sciences that treat them will shade into each other as do morphology and general biology. These authors slur over a difficulty with which Bradley has dealt with subtlety and acumen.

James treats the consciousness with which psychology deals as efficacious, as a selective agency that actually operates in the control of the physical system.³² He also regards it as conditioned in a causal sense by the physical, more especially the nervous system. He finds the simplest method of stating this to be the soul-theory:

If there be such entities as souls in the universe, they may possibly be affected by the manifold occurrences that go on in the nervous centers. To the state of the entire brain at a given moment they may respond by inward modifications of their own. These changes of state may be pulses of consciousness, cognitive of objects few or many, simple or complex. The soul would be thus a medium upon (to use our earlier phraseology) the manifold brain-processes *combine their effects*. Not needing to consider it as the "inner aspect" of any archmolecule or brain-cell, we escape that physiological improbability; and as its pulses of consciousness are unitary and integral affairs from the outset, we escape the absurdity of supposing feelings which exist separately and then "fuse together" by themselves. The separateness is in the brain-world, on this theory, and the unity in the soul-world; and the only trouble that remains to haunt us is the metaphysical one of understanding how one sort of world or existent thing can affect or influence another at all. This trouble, however, since it exists inside both worlds, and involves neither physical improbability nor logical contradiction, is relatively small. I confess, therefore, that to posit a soul influenced in some mysterious way by the brains-states and responding to them by conscious affections of its own, seems to me the line of least logical resistance so far as we have yet attained.³³

I have quoted the passage because it shows admirably how much ease and gratifying elbow-room introspective psychology of the present time

³¹ Stout, *Analytical Psychology*, p. 12.

³² *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 138.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

finds in the statement. If one only pushes aside for the moment the militant phenomenalism of the day and abandons the exacting formulæ of an external scientific method into which our expressions are so painfully drilled, how much more readily we can express very much that the psychologist has to express by talking freely of the soul and nervous system, as interacting agents! But there is something more in evidence than the ease which comes with abandoned full-dress uniform and court etiquette; there is a clear intimation of James's "pluralism" – what may be almost called a working-pluralism. If ease and fulness of description and resuscitation of psychical states can be obtained by the assumption of a soul, of a nervous system and soul existing in relations of mutual causal influence, in the assumption of a process of knowledge that is simply there for recognition, not for explanation, there is no reason for the psychologist's not assuming them. But whether they do assume them or not depends, of course, on what the psychologist is trying to do. The background and environment of thought into which the psychology of Wundt, of Külpe, of Ward, of Bradley, must fit is in each case almost *sui generis*. I am not referring simply to those individual differences which are characteristic of any thinker, and which distinguish his work from that of another in the same field, though the results are for all purposes of scientific use of the same sort. It is still true in psychology that these individual differences have a further value, which reaches deeper than the personal equation and interest and style of, say, two astronomers. For example, the discussion over the psychological category of activity which raged in *Mind* some years back has reference to the recognition or denial of recognition of an element in the material of the science. As long as the discussion deals with the interpretation only of the material, the different scientists stand upon the same ground and may safely and profitably discuss their respective plans of the structure to be raised there. But Mr. Bradley is perhaps not going too far when he intimates that this discussion is a scandal in contemporary psychology, since it has to do with the question of the reality of the very ground upon which the science is supposed to be built.

To return to the position taken at the opening of the paper, the attitude of the psychologist determines his definition of the psychical, and with that the very material with which his science is to deal. It is an old maxim that one can find only what he is looking for. If the introspecting psychologist is looking only for a psychical state which can be correlated with nervous currents, and indeed only with the incoming nervous currents, he will see but elements of presentation. If the psychical image serves only the purpose of functioning for conceptual objects through emphasis upon their distinguishable phases, and then is lost in the limbo of cast-off abstraction, then he will see only abstrac-

tions that stand and wait outside the constructive process of knowledge although he may usher in above a constructive principle of apprehension. If his theory of knowledge relegates the psychical to the dumpheap in mining for the universal and the necessary, he will find only scraps of consciousness, interesting as indicating that from which they have been or should be wrested, but especially because their very lack of meaning leaves the elementary psychologist the happiest freedom to produce elements by the hundreds of thousands. We may say that any point of view in the theory will have in a certain sense its own psychical content. It is this fact that lends peculiar interest to the generous welcome which James extends to so many points of view. It is certainly much easier to conceive the unity of consciousness from the standpoint of a soul. The category of personality enters much more readily, and the references of such states as those of pleasure and pain are more readily made to a soul. In the meantime the soul is not used except when needed. Otherwise the phenomenalist point of view is maintained with the advantage of the actuality of psychical experiences. Thus, while other psychologists are compelled to get the psychical by stripping it off from experience by logical criticism, or to define it by its correlation with certain physical states, James's view is as broad in its sweep as that of the psychologist of the old Scottish school. All consciousness as mind comes within his scope. The position is on all fours with his theory of cognition; that "the psychologist's attitude toward cognition...is a thoroughgoing dualism. It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known, and treats them as irreducible."³⁴ From this standpoint the whole content of consciousness is given in psychical form. It is not that the whole furniture of earth and hierarchy of heaven³⁵ may be psychical, but that it *is* so regarded, that is the result of this attitude. Of course, this attitude is not a metaphysical one, but a working hypothesis; but its effects for the psychologist are identical, so far as the content is concerned with which he deals, and is vastly superior to a metaphysical position in that the epistemological problem is shoved to one side. Thus the relations, presenting so many difficulties to the psychologists, become simply other irreducible feelings. "If there be such things as feelings at all, then so surely as relations between objects exist in *rerum natura* so surely do feelings exist to which these relations are known... . If we speak objectively it is the real relations that appear revealed; if we speak subjectively, it is the stream of consciousness that matches each of them by an inward coloring of its own."³⁶ In fact, the

³⁴ *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 218.

³⁵ See Ward, *op. cit.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

whole magnificent chapter on “The Stream of Thought” is a monument of the success of the method. For James everything that could be conceived of as a state of a soul, did such a soul exist, is psychical. But while this is a brand by reference to which the psychical herd may be rounded up, it is no description of their peculiar quality, and could not be such unless it became a metaphysical term.

James gives five characters of thought, *i.e.*, the psychical:³⁷

1. Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness.
2. Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing.
3. Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous.
4. It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself.
5. It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects – *chooses* from among them, in a word – all the while.

The standpoint here is entirely phenomenalist. The data are assumed as given, and there is no interest save in the description of them as they appear to the dispassionate observer. All of these characteristics mark the thought as distinct from the object which it may know. Its personality, incessant change, sensible continuity, invariable reference to an object, and selective interest in its object, characterize the subject side of the conscious process. An object is impersonal, may be persistently identical in its content, may be discontinuous and discrete, may be known, but has no necessary reference to a subject – at least not from the standpoint of James’s psychology – and does not change its structure and nature in answer to our shifting interest. This contrast, however, is all with reference to the thing which exists outside, not to the reproduction of it which the mind makes, and necessarily makes, in its process of cognition. The object in this sense is nothing but the entire meaning of the thought or cognitive state of consciousness.³⁸ The object is constructed, and what it is to be is entirely dependent upon the selective interest of thought.³⁹ If we take this description of the mind which presents outer reality and does so much more, building up by comparisons what is certainly not to be found in a world simply of things that are independent of such processes as comparisons, we have by all odds the richest statement of the psychical consciousness that philosophic literature has yet presented, though it would be difficult to maintain all the characteristics of the psychical suggested in the chapter

³⁷ Ibid., p. 225.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 275.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 11, 333, 634, note 2.

on "The Stream of Thought" for these inner reproductions and amplifications of outer reality. Certainly in these amplifications through processes that give us the pure sciences we reach the height of impersonality and objects which exist for our thought *sub specie æternitatis*. It is true, on the other hand, that we have but to retrace the steps of the pages that lie behind to see how in the stream of thought they have again the characteristics that James has endowed them with. It is certainly true that, as James presents them, all the furniture of earth and the hierarchy of heaven are psychical, and yet that much becomes not only more than psychical, but quite the opposite of psychical, without losing its habitat in the human mind.

In these presentations of current doctrines of the psychical, which are not intended to be fully adequate to their authors, but simply to indicate how profoundly their methodological presuppositions affect their conception of the subject-matter of the science, I trust the assertion that psychology is bound to determine the functional value of its abstraction in the process of reflection has been strengthened.

The problem may be now stated in the following form: Shall we assume, with Wundt, that the psychical elements arise from the analysis of reflection and that the result of that reflection is to substitute for the original object, first, a conceptual physical object which never may be actual – may never be presented – and, second, a still actual psychical content which has been withdrawn from the object (Münsterberg's position here is methodologically the same); or, shall we say with Külpe, that in a unitary experience reflection reveals a mechanical and an associative order, of which the mechanical or physical statement is methodologically the determining side, by relation to whose elements all the associative or psychical elements must be determined as correspondents, recognizing further that reflection reveals – does not create – this distinction, since "images," feelings, and volitions have always been necessarily subjective;⁴⁰ or with Bradley and Bosanquet, shall we consider the psychical merely the phenomenal appearance of the material which, to be cognized or rationally used in conduct, must cease to be psychical and become universal,⁴¹ and maintain therefore that reflection does not create or reveal the psychical, but ceaselessly transforms it, and that the psychical is an abstraction which can never appear in its own form in a cognitive consciousness, but must remain simply a

⁴⁰ *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, English translation, pp. 59, 205, note 6.

⁴¹ "It is agreed on both sides that, as psychical existences, ideas are particular like all other phenomena. The controversy is confined to the use we make of them. I should maintain that, so far as they remain particular, they are simple facts and not ideas at all, and that, where they are employed to extend or modify experience, they are never used in their particular form." Bradley, *Logic*, p. 37.

presupposition of the theory of the attainment of knowledge by the individual; or with Ward, shall we assert that the subject of psychical experience and of objective experience are the same, that the transcendental *ego*, who has masqueraded in ethereal clothes in a world all his own, is nothing but the everyday *ego* of psychology; above all, that he is to be unquestioningly accepted as one phase of the subject-object form of experience, although he is neither the empirical self of psychology which can be an object, nor yet a mere "function of unity," and although, further, this pious refusal ever to put asunder subjectivity and objectivity is in crying opposition to the fact that half the time subjectivity signifies the denial of objectivity, and although it is not possible consistently to define the psychical by its reference to the subject end of a polarized experience when the subject is hardly more than an assertion which perpetually dodges definition; or, with James, shall we take up again with the soul and a dualistic theory of knowledge, in order that the psychical may mirror the whole possibly known reality, and when we have entered into this rich heritage, shall we promptly send the soul to another and a metaphysical world and politely dismiss the dualistic theory of knowledge as a great mystery, while we dally with plural selves and spend our psychical substance in phenomenalist analyses and teleologically constructed objects; or shall we attempt some other definition of the psychical which will orient it with reference to immediate experience, to reflection, and the objects and conduct that arise out of reflection, and which will vindicate the relation of the psychical to the individual and that of the individual to reflection? I think this would involve the recognition of a cognitive value in the individual *qua* individual over and above the "function of unity" and that function implied in the mere ascription of activities (identified in one way or another with attention) to the subject. Is it possible to regard the psychical, not as a permanent phase, nor even a permanent possible aspect of consciousness, but as a "moment" of consciousness or in a conscious process, and which has therefore cognitive value for that process? It is this suggestion that I wish to consider and discuss.

A variety of assumptions as to the existence of the psychical, some of which have been discussed, suggest themselves at once. We may assume that our consciousness is always psychical in content – that we can always reveal by analysis the psychical constituents, that the mind either adds meaning to these, and so makes knowledge out of them, or that this meaning arises simply through the fusing and assimilating of different states of consciousness by each other; or we may assume that the unitary character of consciousness involves the presence of both the subjective and objective as in some sense parallel, though our analysis reveals these as separate phases whose distinction appears only in the

analysis. The difference between these points of view does not turn upon the question of the presence in psychical form of contents, but upon the question as to the way in which they appear – the question of elements, for example, and as to the fashion in which this psychical content becomes knowledge and the assumption of other processes of thought. Or a point of view may be taken which assumes that the psychical is a result of the analysis, not a discovery of it. And then the question may still further arise as to the destiny of this psychical content; does it disappear or does it persist as a necessary part of the more complex character of the analytical consciousness? Another aspect of this latter question would involve the theory of reflection itself. May this persist as an ultimate phase of consciousness, *i.e.*, one that carries its own satisfaction within it; or does it necessarily lead up to a consciousness which is not reflective; or may it do either under different circumstances? The same question might be put in the form: Can reflection be conduct, or is it necessarily a phase in the preparatory stage of conduct? And having met the question as to the value of the psychical for knowledge, we could go on indefinitely asking questions. It is not my purpose to answer any of these questions dogmatically, but to take a point of view which seems to me to be involved in that of a number of thinkers, and which seems also to be peculiarly promising.

It is assumed, then, that the psychical does not appear until critical reflection in the process of knowledge analyzes our world. Up to this point the volition and emotions are not psychical, nor subjective in the sense of psychical. I do not mean that they are not recognized as such, but that their nature is not subjective in a psychical sense. With Wundt this position recognizes that the entire content of consciousness is subjective and objective at once in this unreflective stage. The world and the individual stand upon the same basis of reality. The distinction is one that is made within the universe of reality, not with a view to interpreting reflectively this reality. The analysis of this consciousness would not reveal a psychical, any more than it would reveal a conceptual atom or molecule. It does not seem to me that Wundt has consistently maintained this position, for he says that the presentation is withdrawn to the subjective phase of consciousness as a result of analysis, and that it – the presentation – continues to exist with the same immediacy that it had before, though without its objective reference, thus implying what he has explicitly denied, that the volitional and emotional phase is subjective in the sense that it is not also objective. We have already seen that this Wundtian analysis leaves us with elements which have only symbolic value in the statement of the reality of experience. On the other hand, he has emphasized the constructive phases of psychology

over against certain parallelists, insisting that psychology must recognize in perception and conception a result which is qualitatively different from the mere mass of elements which an analysis shows to have entered into the constructs of cognition. But though we seem to have our hands upon immediate psychical experience here, we find that it is only by a method of residues that he reaches this conclusion, comparing the elements of the analysis with the object which was dissected, and this is after all only an indirect analysis. His voluntaristic psychology suffers from the impossibility of getting anything more than the results of apperception into psychical consciousness. Before advancing to the consideration of Dewey's position, we must see whether his voluntaristic psychology introduces immediacy into the statement of the psychical.

There is a contradiction here between Wundt's theory, noted above, that the volitions and emotion have retained the original immediacy of unanalyzed experience, and the actual treatment in terms of presentation they have received at his hands. If these states of consciousness have been psychical from the start, if our logical criticism has simply withdrawn the presentation (*Vorstellung*) into a field of unquestioned subjectivity, it is strange that psychology has extended such a tardy recognition to this field. Why is it that the will has remained so long in the gall of metaphysics and the bonds of ontology, while the ideas have been psychologically studied for centuries? The fact of the case is that, historically considered, instead of the presentation becoming psychical by being withdrawn into the field of the unquestioned subjectivity of the will and the emotions, the will and the emotions have received psychological treatment in so far as they have been drawn or withdrawn into the field of the presentations. But even the treatment of attention in terms of results, and the description of the will in terms of the sensations of muscular contractions and joint movements, and of the emotions in terms of the feel of characteristic attitudes and visceral disturbances, are not immediate presentations of these phases of consciousness, but a reference to elements that answer to the conditions under which the feelings arise; and as the complete tale of these conditions includes a number of groups, some selection must be made. The most tempting group is that of the physiological organism and its physical environment. But the psychologist is as clearly justified in selecting another group, such as that which determines the appearance of the judgment. It is just as true that all our experience can be presented in the form of the judgment, as it is that it can be stated in the shiftings of the strains and stresses of the physical system made up of the animal and his surroundings. If the sociologist succeeds in analyzing the social objective content of experience into elements which he can show are conditions

for social conduct, he will be at liberty to indicate the psychical correspondents of these elements and have his own parallelistic system of psychology for strictly private consumption.

In all these methods we start with the analysis of given experiences and obtain a statement of elements that must answer to the conditions of the experience. To obtain a psychology of the process the method is very simple. Find in each case the psychical element that corresponds to the objective condition, and there arises a complete psychological theory of the experience. It should be added, to show the perfection of the method, that the psychologist recognizes the psychical element by simply noting and picking up what he has stripped off from the original object in his scientific analysis, as unessential because purely individual. For instance, take emotion presented as an object in conduct. Secure a clever and accommodating actor, whose business it is to present this emotion. Analyze his conduct into its essential elements, which will then be the conditions for the appearance of the emotion as a part of social experience. These conditions will be a series and combination of characteristic attitudes and much less definitely determined vaso-motor upheavals. The states assumed to correspond to these are the psychical elements of the emotion. Finally, what is it that you have neglected in order to recognize that you have shaken your fist in the most terrifying manner of the profession? Obviously the feel of the emotion. In like manner attention as an object means the perception of certain things in some particular relation and the ignoring of other things. The objective analysis gives these certain things clear and distinct, and the rest vague, and certain connections or relations between these clear and distinct things in the events of experience. This may be translated into terms of the tensions of sense-organs and the postures of the body that make the sensing possible and of the functioning of the association fibers of the central nervous system. Even the recognition, that psychical elements corresponding to these elements are something less than the actual experience, and that there is an activity implied in the feelings of activity, does not bring this something more into the field of the psychical with which the science is occupied. The assertion that the subject to which these activities are referred along with other states is there because it must be there, or because the subject-object relation can't be got rid of, does not enable us to materialize anything more than corresponding elements. In a word, if the volitional and emotional phases of experience can be presented by the psychologist only in certain effects, we are forced to deal with these effects, after the fashion of the consistent parallelist, as elements corresponding to the conditions under which they arise. In general, the attempt to seize a psychical content which is only a by-product of an analysis undertaken in the search for

an objective reality, results necessarily in a parallelistic statement – a statement in terms of the reality sought. This is as true of the older associationist and the modern logical school as of the physiological psychologists. One can see only that which he is looking for, and what else comes within the field of vision must be seen in terms of this. Sensations and other presentations rejected in the hunt for the reality of sensuous experience are no more positive psychical contents than the detected misstatements in a historical document are positive accounts of the process of consciousness by which they were introduced. If we have no direct knowledge of their appearance in the documents, we are helpless in our attempt to interpret them. It has been the acquaintance with the history, with the growth and decay, of the religious and political institutions of the Greek and Hebrew peoples that has made positive data out of the products of destructive higher criticism. Nor are the emotional and volitional rejects more direct and immediate material, as long as we deal with them in terms of that which does and does not make up the object of knowledge. This whole type of psychology can do no more than state the objective conditions under which the criticized act of cognition with its content of feel, emotion, and effort took place. That these psychologists have not confined themselves to this is undoubtedly true, but their scientific method can only assume psychical elements that correspond to definite conditions of objective experience.

The principal reason that one can be led astray in this matter is found in the fact that the statement of the logical analysis is not made in terms of an immediate experience. We transfer ourselves bag and baggage to the world of conceptual objects, recognizing the sensuous object only as something abstracted from. And yet we know that controlled sensuous experience is the essential basis of all our science. Even the most abstract speculation must have some point of sensuous contact with the world to render it real. We criticize various sensuous experiences in their representative character, and substitute for them the atoms and molecules of exact science. This is done, however, upon the basis of experiences in the laboratory, which are as sensuous as the experiences which we criticize. To be sure, we generalize our criticism and so bring the experiences in the experiment under the same statement, and this subsumption as a later act is theoretically correct. What is not legitimate is to assume that in the immediate experiment, the unquestioned data of the senses occupy logically the same position as those which we have criticized. In all our modern inductive science we deal with certain objects which are not analyzed in our analysis of other objects. The *ex post facto* legislation by which we transfer this analysis back to the objects, whose immediacy was a precondition to it, is certainly out of place in a science which is supposed to deal with immediate experience. That is, it is not

justifiable to demand of psychology that it regard all sensuous contents as psychical because analysis has shown certain of them not to be objective, while in the same experience other sensuous contents are necessarily regarded as objective. It would not be profitable here to enter into the logical question of the relation of the subject to the predicate, but it may be assumed that any theory of the judgment will imply the reality of some element of sensuous experience which is the contact point of the subject with the world. The reality of the sensuous “this” and “now” in any judgment, in any analysis, makes it impossible to present any immediate experience, however abstract, in which the sensuous content is entirely stripped off and relegated to the objectively unreal. Psychology cannot, then, pretend to be both a theory of perception by sensuous contents that can be only representative of the outer real object, themselves confined to the consciousness of the individual *qua* individual, and at the same time a theory of immediate experience. It is certainly curious that, while the long struggle of modern reflection has brought the world of knowledge into the experience of the self, the theory of the peculiar experience of that self should have no place in the doctrine of reflection. But how can one dodge this conclusion if his psychology deals only in rejects? For it cannot get its material till the reflection is complete, and an attempt to restate the process of reflection in the psychological terms which the reflection has furnished must presuppose the reflection itself. If we start our psychology with rejects, there is no stopping-point short of the dumpheap. And an immediacy which is left over from an original immediate situation is a contradiction, since it has been confessedly obtained by a process of mediation.

For purposes of definition here “immediacy” implies the coincidence of presence and meaning, and “mediacy” means reference to something beyond. If the psychical is then to be immediate, it must be a part of the consciousness of the moment to which belongs the unitary act. It cannot be later discovered to have been a part of that moment, nor arise as a product in a reproduction of that unitary act or state. The individual must be conscious directly of all the predicates by which the psychical is defined before it can exist as such in his consciousness. Merely to demonstrate that there must be a psychical content is to take one’s stand within the fallacy of the Cretan who affirmed the mendacity of all Cretans. Hence, if the psychical in this sense exist at all, there must be states of consciousness in which what is peculiar to the individual and a moment of his existence finds its meaning in these very peculiarities – not simply as contents which can be investigated because they happen to be there – but as contents whose very limitations make them organic phases in the cognitive act. They must be deprived of their reference to

anything beyond, else they would not be peculiar to the individual and the moment; for if the momentary refer to that which transcends it, its presence is no longer coincident with its meaning. A reject has no meaning, even if we admit that it is present; or, if meaning is given to it – as that of the image providing content for the concept, or serving as representative of a neurological element which cannot yet be found – its meaning goes entirely beyond itself, and it ceases to be psychical at all. Unless we can show that the psychical as such is normally functional, we certainly can never produce it in the very peculiarities by which we must define it.

This is the position taken by Dewey in the article on “The Reflex Arc Concept.”⁴² He approaches the position from the discussion of the reflex-arc concept, but his quarrel with the psychologists he criticizes is in the end the same as that which I have endeavored to present as inevitable – the quarrel with the doctrine that sensation is an isolated content analyzed out through its correspondence to an outside element.

The result is that the reflex-arc idea leaves us with a disjointed psychology... . Failing to see the unity of activity, no matter how much it may prate of unity, it still leaves us with sensation or peripheral stimulus; idea or central process (the equivalent of attention); and motor response, or act, as three disconnected existences, having somehow to be adjusted to each other, whether through the intervention of an extra-experimental soul, or by mechanical push and pull.⁴³

And his proof of the futility of this psychology is that no such psychical elements answering to physical counterparts exist. Instead of a psychical state which is dependent upon a physical excitation, investigation shows in every case an activity which in advance must determine where attention is directed and give the psychical state the very content which is used in identifying it. In the simplest cases it is the direction of the sense-organs and their co-ordination in larger acts that is responsible for the actual contents of color, sound, odor, etc., which the psychologist treats as dependent only upon external physical conditions. To a reply that the psychologist assembles a complex co-ordinated nervous mechanism, with its inherited adaptations, over against which the outer physical stimulus is the only variable that needs to be taken into account, Dewey responds that either the physical mechanism must be taken as a bare system of motions, whose procedure is nothing but a

⁴² *Psychological Review*, Vol. III, p. 358.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

shifting of stresses, in which case there is no such thing as stimulus and response at all, or else we must make our statement of the physiological system in terms of the same activity as those demanded for the psychological process. In the end what we see, hear, feel, taste, and smell depends upon what we are doing, and not the reverse. In our purposively organized life we inevitably come back upon previous conduct as the determining condition of what we sense at any one moment, and the so-called external stimulus is the occasion for this and not its cause. If we ask now for the results which such a disjointed psychology is actually able to present, the answer is that, just as the physical stimulus is reduced to nothing but a system of masses in motion in which the stimulus as such completely disappears, so the so-called psychical elements reduce to nothing but a series of sensations in which the character of response is as effectually destroyed as was that stimulus in the abstract physical world. We have sensations of motions as well as of colors, and nothing but sensations. Putting, then, the two parts of the argument together, in the first place, this disjointed psychology gives us nothing but sensations which cannot even be got into a sensory-motor arc, but are doomed to remain forever in their own abstract world of registration; and, in the second place, no such elements of sensations are found to exist, and what we have been pleased to call such have in them the whole content of the act of which we were supposed to make them a part.

The author concludes that the distinction between stimulus, whether psychologically or physiologically investigated, and response is not one between pre-existent elements; that any phase of the act which could be obtained by analysis may be regarded as stimulus or response. The decision between the two predicates depends upon the direction in which the attention shifts. A type of analysis which follows in the wake of logical and physical sciences, gleaning that which they have dropped, harvests only unreal abstractions. Instead of attempting to identify elements, it is the duty of psychology to look upon these predicates as tools of interpretation. Which is another way of saying that sensation does not serve as a stimulus because of what it is as an independent content, but that it is a sensation because it serves as a stimulus. It is evident, then, that the definition must be made in terms of the act, not in terms of a content; and the following are the definitions given:

Generalized, the sensation as stimulus is always that phase of activity requiring to be defined in order that a co-ordination may be completed. What the sensation will be in particular at a given time, therefore, will depend entirely upon the way in which an activity is being used. It has no fixed quality of its own. The search for the

stimulus is the search for the exact conditions of action; that is, for the state of things which decides how a beginning co-ordination should be completed. Similarly, motion, as response, has only functional value. It is whatever will serve to complete the disintegrating co-ordination. Just as the discovery of the sensation marks the establishing of the problem, so the constitution of the response marks the solution of this problem.⁴⁴

And a little farther on:

The circle is a co-ordination, some of whose members have come into conflict with each other. It is the temporary disintegration and need of reconstitution which occasions, which affords the genesis of, the conscious distinction into sensory stimulus on the one side and motor respond on the other. The stimulus is that phase of the forming co-ordination which represents the conditions which have to be met in bringing it to a successful issue; the response is that phase of one and the same forming co-ordination which gives the key to meeting these conditions, which serves as an instrument in effecting the successful co-ordination. They are therefore, strictly correlative and contemporaneous. The stimulus is something to be discovered; to be made out; if the activity affords its own adequate stimulation, there is no stimulus save in the objective sense already referred to. As soon as it is adequately determined, then and then only is the response also complete. To attain either means that the co-ordination has completed itself.⁴⁵

There are two situations suggested here – that in which the co-ordination is broken up by conflict between its members, and the other that in which the activity in its original form determines its own adequate stimulation. In the first case we have the presentation and solution of a problem, in terms of sensation and response. In the second instance, the author states that “there is no stimulus save in the objective sense.” These so-called stimuli are further defined “as minor acts serving by their respective positions to the maintenance of some organized co-ordination.”

Although the author has definitely postponed the application of this doctrine to the distinction between sensational and rational consciousness, and to the nature of the judgement, there seem to be some fairly evident conclusions that may be drawn. In the first place, there are presented here certain situations in which the psychical is the

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 370.

nature of consciousness, not because any analysis, or even introspection, produces or, catching our thought as it disappears, reveals a phase of which we were not conscious before, but because the inevitable conflicts of conduct deprive us of the stimuli which further action requires; in other words, deprive us of the objective character of some part of our world. If we compare this position with Wundt's, the following distinction appears at once: Wundt assumes that the logical criticism arises when our anticipations are not satisfied and the interpretations of former experiences are contradicted. The result of this logical criticism, however, is simply to dislodge our objects from their objective position and relegate them to a subjective world, just as they are, deprived only of their validity. And their places are filled by the conceptual objects which a scientific imagination fashions out of figments light as air. That is, Wundt assumes that the criticized object may retain its organized content and yet lose its validity. He denies the mutual dependence of the validity and the form of the content. Dewey assumes that the object or stimulus loses its form in losing its validity. Furthermore, during this state the whole effort is toward a constitution of the object or stimulus again. The object loses its validity and organization as object at the same moment, and at the same moment it becomes psychical, but not as the shade of an object done to logical death, and doomed henceforth to haunt the shadows of a subjective Sheol. The illustration which is given in the article on the reflex arc is of the child of our modern psychology – not the child of the associational period, that meditative *Bambino* of the Milanese school with the orange in his hand; but that somewhat ponderously curious child with the candle, who seems to be taken out of a Dutch interior. Of this child and his candle the author says: "The question whether to reach or abstain from reaching is the question: What sort of a bright light have we here? Is it one which means playing with one's hands, eating milk, or burning one's fingers? The stimulus must be constituted for the response to occur."⁴⁶ Now, if these questions are the stuff that the psychical is made of, we are dealing with states which do not have to be caught from behind, as they whisk around the corner, and studied in the faint aromas which they leave behind them. We are very frankly conscious of our problems and the hypotheses which they call forth, and the problems are not coy visitors that will not remain to be interrogated. We are not dealing with images that have to be cautiously dissected out of our objects, nor even with fancies that vanish as soon as we show an interest in their pedigree and visible means of support. Other theories of the psychical imply an analysis which preserves the content of the criticized object as subjective

⁴⁶ *Psychological Review*, Vol. III, p. 367.

experience. But at once the difficulty arises of presenting this content. What the psychologist has actual recourse to is the abstraction of qualities from objects which have not been criticized. For example, in dealing with color as psychical we assume at first that, if we had not to distinguish the colored object as it appears to us from that object as our physical theory defines it, it might never have been possible to separate the color from the so-called real thing. But, in the second place, when we ask for the color which has been stripped off from the object, and which has in the process become psychical and subjective, what is offered to us is the logical abstraction of color from objects that remain objects for all the abstraction, under the assumption that it must be the same as that which this critical experience found on its hands when the object evanesced; while the reject itself would be most difficult to reproduce, and only the professional gymnastics of the trained introspectionist would be at all equal to the task, and he comes off with aromas and suggestions, fearfully avoiding the Jabberwocky of the psychological fallacy. We deal with substitutes and correspondents in the place of the psychical material which is too subtle for our grasp. And this holds not only for the psychical derived from criticism of physical experience, but also for that which comes to us from the criticism of thought and imagination. Thought maintains its objectivity as proudly as does sense-perception and the analyst who tries to separate thought from the thing is apt to come off with all the object or nothing according to the school that he patronizes. But it is not difficult, of course, to abstract thought in logic, and it is easy to set up these abstractions as the psychical content, or, more correctly, the same thing as the psychical content which an epistemology has shown must be subjective purely.

The position taken by Dewey is that in this psychical situation the object is gone, and the psychical character of the situation consists in the disintegration and reconstruction. The question then arises: In what form do these contents appear when this disintegration and reconstitution takes place? It does not appear in the form of an object, for it is just this character that it has lost, and consciousness here certainly does not consist in the presentation of copies of objects that will not serve as stimuli, but in their analysis and reconstruction. An answer may be found in that classical description of psychical consciousness, James's chapter on "The Stream of Thought." Are there any of the characteristics of the stream which are not unmistakably present when we face any problem and really construct any hypothesis? The kaleidoscopic flash of suggestion, and intrusion of the inapt, the unceasing flow of odds and ends of possible objects that will not fit, together with the continuous collision with the hard, unshakable objective conditions of

the problem, the transitive feelings of effort and anticipation when we feel that we are on the right track and substantive points of rest, as the idea becomes definite, the welcoming and rejecting, especially the identification of the meaning of the whole idea with the different steps in its coming to consciousness – there are none of these that are not almost oppressively present on the surface of consciousness during just the periods which Dewey describes as those of disintegration and reconstitution of the stimulus – the object. No person who bemoans insoluble difficulties in front of him that does not paint the same picture, though with no such brilliant brush. No scientist who describes the steps of a dawning and solidifying hypothesis who does not follow in the same channel, with the same swirl and eddy of current, and the same dissolving views upon the shores. If there is ever a psychical feeling of relation, it is when the related object has not yet risen from the underworld. It is under these circumstances that identities and differences come with thrills and shocks. Most of the persons who bore us with themselves, and the novelists who bore us with others, are but dilating upon the evident traits of such phases of our life, and they need lay no claim to professional skill of the trained introspectionist to recognize these traits. Let me add also that James's account of the hunt for the middle term in the reasoning process, and much that he writes of the concept, fit perfectly into this phase of experience, and that here as well the psychologist's fallacy seems to have become perfectly innocuous. Consciousness here cannot help being psychical in its most evident form, and the recognition of it is unavoidable under whatever terminology, technical, or non-technical, we may cover it.

The real crux of the situation is to be found in the feelings of activity. Are they reduced to simple sensations of motion and effort, or may the activity appear directly, without representation? Can we psychically be consciously active, or is psychical consciousness confined to the results of activity? As long as the analysis is logical, *i.e.*, as long as we simply abstract various characteristics of the objects and ascribe to the self assumed psychical elements corresponding to these, changes or motions will be inevitably translated into answering bodily changes or motions, and the only psychical elements that can be attained will be those presumed to accompany them. When psychology attempts to present these elements, it refers to certain feels, as we indicated above. We are now in a position to see where these contents come from. They cannot be the rejects, for reasons already adduced, but they may be the really psychical states forced into an integral act for purposes of interpretation. A successfully thrown ball means to us distance covered, weight of the ball, momentum attained, an entire objective situation. A mistake in the weight of the ball will give rise to a disorganized phase of consciousness,

which will be subjective or psychical until it is readjusted. Here the efforts in their inhibition of each other provide us with states of feeling which we assume to be those which accompanied the coordinated process, though we could not detect them. This I take to be the real psychologist's fallacy, the attempt to introject a psychical state into a process which is not psychical. We assume that the individual who did move had an unanalyzed consciousness which contained the motion and this feeling of effort, whereas the feeling of effort belongs to a state in which the individual is not able to move, or in which at least the effort and the motion are in inverse proportion to each other. It is not the individual who could build up a world of masses and momentums, of carrying distances and varying velocities, that has feelings of effort. He has a universe of life and motion instead. Force these elements however, into this universe by a reflective process, and the only statement you can make about them is that they are feelings *of* those motions. To generalize this statement: the psychical contents which belong to these phases of disintegration and reconstitution, if referred to physical or logical objects that belong to other phases of consciousness, can be only representative, can be only sensations of something. They inevitably lose their immediacy. To present a concrete instance: the man who hesitates before a ditch, which he is not sure that he can jump, is conscious of inhibited activity. If he were sure of his ability to jump it, in the place of that consciousness he would have an estimate of the width of the ditch and the spring as an objective motion. If now we say that the sense of effort which comes with the inhibition is the subjective side of that which is objectively expressed as motion, we introduce into the original process a complexity which was not there for our consciousness. We were consciously moving. But we are told that beside this conscious motion there was this feeling of effort which has been borrowed from the subjective phase. This is not the motion. At most it can be but a feeling of motion. We carry over as an element a content whose peculiar quality depends upon its functional value in one phase of consciousness into another, and insist that it exists there as the subjectivity of this second phase. Under these circumstances it is reduced to the position of standing for something, and this so-called subjective consciousness is made of nothing but sensations of registrations.

I should add that the experimental psychologist is apt to trouble himself comparatively little about this or any other content of subjectivity. He assumes its existence answering to the physical situation, and confines himself to determining these physical situations with reference to the conditions under which this subjectivity is supposed to appear.

If we do not confuse these two phases of consciousness, I see no more difficulty in the immediate consciousness of activity in the subjective

situations than of the motion in the objective. It appears primarily in the shifting of attention in the adaptation of habitual tendencies to each other, when they have come into conflict within the co-ordination. They involve effort in the stresses and strains of these different activities over against each other. I cannot go into the discussion of the interpretation of attention in terms of the innervation of the muscles of the sense-organs and of the head and chest. I must confine myself to the demand that we leave different stages of conscious processes to themselves – to their immediacy – and to the assertion that, when we do this, no one phase can be made merely cognitive of another, whether we have reference to contents or activities.

The conclusion was reached above that psychical consciousness could be immediate only in so far as it was functional. We may go a step farther and add that, in so far as the psychical state is functional, it cannot be a sensation of something else that is not in that state. Its functional character confines its reference to this function, which is that of reconstruction of the disintegrated co-ordination.

The discussion so far has considered the immediate characteristic of the psychical. The other element in the definition is its identification with the experience of the individual *qua* individual. The implication of the functional conception of the psychical is very interesting. If the psychical is functional and the consciousness of the individual at the same time, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this phase of our consciousness – or, in other words, the individual *qua* individual – is functional in the same sense. This individual cannot be the empirical “me” that exists in such profusion in the modern genetic and pathological psychologies; nor yet can it be the transcendental self that is nothing but the function of unity; nor the self whose realization is the goal of the ethics of Green and his ilk; nor the individual whose whole content is the other way of stating the knowable universe. For this individual cannot be an object; and yet it must have a content, but that content cannot be an ideal either of conduct or of knowledge. It cannot be an object, because, for many reasons, some of which will be developed later, it belongs to the subject end of the polarized process of cognitive experience; it must have or be a content, because psychical consciousness does not belong to the normative phase of reflection, and deals therefore with relations and laws only in their appearance within certain fields of experience; it cannot be an ideal, because it must be immediate, and therefore its reference, so far as it is psychical, must lie within its own phase of consciousness.

There is nothing that has suffered more through loss of dignity of content in modern positivistic psychology than the “I.” The “me” has been most honorably dealt with. It has waxed in diameter and interest,

not to speak of number, with continued analysis, while the "I" has been forced from its metaphysical throne, and robbed of all its ontological garments; and the rags of "feelings of effort about the head and chest," of the "focalization of sense-organs," the "furlrowing of the eye-brows" seem but a sorry return for the antique dogmas. But the greatest loss is the constant drain from the "I" to the "me." No sooner is a content of subjectivity made out than it is at once projected into the object world. This is the peculiar theme of our social psychology.⁴⁷ The recognition of the social character of the self, that the *alii* of our experience are not secondary inferred objects with which our reason endows directly perceived physical things, but construct whose content is derived from subjective consciousness – this recognition involves the objectifying of a content which used to belong to the subject. In Baldwin's address before the Yale Philosophical Club, upon "Mind and Body from the Genetic Point of View,"⁴⁸ this exhaustion of the subjective content in socially organized and therefore objective, minds is shown in a series of "progressions." Starting with a presumed "protoplasmic" condition of consciousness, out of which arise first the "projections," answering to persons and things, there appear next the "progression" of persons into selves, the *ego* and *alii*; and finally the recognition of the body, answering to the mind of the other and the corresponding relation of mind and body in the *ego*. In the final reflective attitude there is left nothing but mind and body. The subjectivity is entirely exhausted. The author is strictly logical in demanding that we recognize the completely correlative positions of mind and body in this position. Attempted reduction of the one to the other is a denial of their mutual dependence not only in their genesis, but in their functions in the reflective process. But this striking application of the results of genetic and social psychology to the epistemological problem leaves the same irreducible parallelism which we have discussed, and surrenders the problem of transcending this dualism to some other philosophic discipline.

The interesting situation suggested here is that, if we do accept this dualism for psychology, we do it at the sacrifice of a subject that is anything more than an assumption – possibly an assumption of some particular psychical processes such as attention, apperception, but still a subject that can never appear *in persona* within the domain of psychology. It is all very well to send a sergeant-at-arms into the fields of the transcendental *ego* after him. If it actually appeared, its presence would, according to Baldwin, act like the nymph's magic kiss and

⁴⁷ See Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, chap. 11, and *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chap. 1.

⁴⁸ Published in the May, 1903, number of the *Psychological Review*.

reduce the whole experience to "protoplasmic" babyhood. That is, from this genetic standpoint the subject as a conscious stage must disappear before the reflective stage can arise. It must disappear in order that the contents of mind and body may arise. It is as much a presupposition here as it is over against the processes of attention or the activities in general; which is tantamount to saying that the relation of the psychical to the subject cannot be made a characteristic in the definition of the psychical. For the relation to an empirical "me" cannot be made particular. We inevitably generalize the experiences of these "me's" so that what belongs to one may belong to another. To say, with Wundt, that our concepts are used merely for the purposes of classification and arrangement, implies that we can present the material outside of the conceptual formulation. We have already seen that this is Wundt's assumption, but that it is an assumption which is hopelessly unproductive of any psychical content. These contents turn out to be nothing but the rejected elements of the object when it is subjected to logical analysis, and therefore stated in terms of the conceptual object in whose interest the abstraction is made. We have also seen that there is a phase that is not stated in terms of such an analysis, one that arises in the period of disintegration and reconstitution of the stimulus-object; that the content in this period is not what is abstracted from the former object when the conceptual object is erected in its place, but the content that appears when experience has lost its objectivity because of the conflicting tendencies to react, and that, instead of its being a reject, for the time being it includes all that is given at all. Not only this, but it is characterized by the consciousness of the reconstruction, of activities of attention and organization. We have seen that, as long as the activities of experience are present only in terms of their results, they can only appear in the form of sensations of the activities, but that in this stage the directing attention is immediately given. Thus, in the theories we have criticized the subject is represented in two aspects, neither of which can presumably be present in the material with which the science deals; first as a content, the original subjectivity out of whose "projection" or "imitative introjection" arise not only the others' selves, but reactively our own, and second the "activities" that answer to attention or apperception; but in this phase of disintegration and reconstruction both these aspects *are* immediately given. The disintegration of the object means a return, with reference to a certain field, to the original phase of protoplasmic consciousness, and within these limits there is neither mind nor body, only subjectivity. The reconstruction is the immediate process of attention and apperception, of choice, of consciously directed conduct.

This stage of disintegration and reconstruction requires a more detailed description and analysis. The characteristics which identify it

with the reflective consciousness are the sharp definition of the problem within one field of consciousness and the forms which the other contents of consciousness take in the statement and solution of the problem. The assumptions made in this description are: (1) that consciousness is so reorganized with reference to conduct that the objects in cognitive experience may all be regarded as means to the accomplishment of the end involved in that conduct; (2) that this end may be stated in psychological terms as the expression of an impulse; (3) that when the co-ordination is unbroken the stimulus is the object determined by the preceding processes of the act; and (4) that the rest of the field of consciousness is organized with reference to this object, and may be stated either in positive or negative terms of it; (5) that, in so far as the co-ordination is unbroken, the end is for the time being adequately expressed in terms of the means, *i.e.*, the object and its background which provide an adequate stimulus for continuance of the activity, and thus the distinction between the act and the conditions of the act does not appear; (6) that when the co-ordination is broken up – or, in other words, when an adequate stimulus for the expression of the impulse is not given, but the conflicting tendencies to act deprive the object of its power as a stimulus – then consciousness is divided into two fields: that within which the new stimulus or object must be constructed, and the rest of experience which with reference to the new possible object can have no other content than that of conditions of its formation. An illustration of these characteristics can be found in social experiences in which we are forced to reconstruct our ideas of the character of our acquaintances. As long as we can act with reference to them successfully that which we later consider our ideas of them constitute their characters as persons. That the organization of these characters springs from our mutual relations, and that the psychological statement of these relations would be found in our social impulses or activities, the analysis of social objects since Hegel, and the results of genetic and social psychology have, I think, abundantly demonstrated. It would also be admitted that the particular form which that character took on, in any instance, depends upon what particular social activity we are engaged in, and that the whole social environment would be more or less definitely organized as the background and sustaining whole of the individual or individuals who were the immediate stimuli of our conduct. If we assume now that some experience should run quite counter to the nature of an acquaintance as we have known him, the immediate result would be that we would be nonplused and quite unable to act with reference to him for the time being. The immediate result would be a state of consciousness within which would appear mutually contradictory attitudes toward the acquaintance which would

inevitably formulate themselves in a problem as to what the real nature of the man was, and over against this a mass of data drawn from our experience of him and of others that would constitute the conditions for the solution of the problem. The contradictory attitudes of approval and abhorrence include in their sweep not only the man in question, but also ourselves in so far as mutual interrelationship has helped to form our selves over against his. Or, in other words, we should be as uncertain of our own capacity of judging him as of the man himself. In so far the subject and object relation, the *ego* and *alter*, would have disappeared temporarily within this field. The situation may be of such hopeless perplexity that consciousness in this regard could be well called protoplasmic; or at least would be of the same nature as the original subjectivity due to checks and inhibitions out of which is projected the other selves of a social consciousness.

There follows the definition of the problem, the delineation of which would be a task for logic. But there is a phase of the process with which logic does not deal or has not dealt; not because logic is a normative, while psychology is an explanatory and descriptive science simply, but because in that phase the content and the procedure cannot be distinguished. It is the hunt for a hypothesis, when the consciousness is more or less incoherent or, in other terms, the distinction between subject and predicate cannot be made. To return to the illustration, we are uncertain whether the conduct of our acquaintance is abhorrent, being logically a predicate and psychologically a stimulus to action, that of repulsion; or whether this possible predicate is not a prejudice of our own, being therefore subject. Given either alternative, and it takes its logical position, but for the time being it is actually neither, and cannot become such but by a further reconstruction in which there will emerge subjects and predicates which were never there before. Modern logic is ready enough to admit that the judgment is a process of reconstruction, by which, through ideal interpretation of our world, it becomes another world, but what it does not seem to me to recognize is that the idea has to arise, and that while it is arising it is not idea and cannot function as such; that the ideas we have are abstracted from our old world and cannot reconstruct it; and that we must allow for the situation in which what is essentially novel emerges before it even takes on the form of a hypothetical predicate. What I wish to insist upon is that, while we have not as yet a predicate, we also have no subject; that, while the negative statement of the problem clears the ground for its solution, it does not give that solution; and that the statement of the rest of experience in terms of the conditions of the solution of the problem, the gathering of data, does not give the positive touch of reconstruction which is involved in the presentation of a hypothesis, however slight and vague it

may be; that this step takes place within the field of subjectivity, which in so far is neither me nor other, neither mind nor body. And it is in this phase of subjectivity, with its activities of attention in the solution of the problem, *i.e.*, in the construction of the hypothesis of the new world, that the individual *qua* individual has his functional expression or rather is that function.

To appreciate this we need to consider this situation in consciousness from another point of view – that of the relation of the conditions for the solution, reflectively presented, to the problem itself. From the standpoint of science, these conditions are the data of investigation. They are abstractions which arise through the conflict. In the illustration used above the conduct is abstracted from the particular person and particular situation within which it appeared. This abstraction is due to our inability to treat the person as an acquaintance and continue our relations with him, or, on the other hand, to surrender him and pass judgment upon his conduct as we would but for our past knowledge of his character. This datum is therefore strictly correlative to the psychical consciousness of the conflicting tendencies and the disintegration of the object, but the ability to present this reflective content is due to the integral character of the rest of our world. This forms the basis upon which the reconstruction can take place. Not that this world will not eventually be brought within the reconstruction, at least by implication, but that for the time being the world and the individual have sufficient coherence to give the conditions under which the problem may be solved, representing, as they do, the organized system which remains the criterion of the reality of the result. The individual corresponding to the world of data or conditions is that given in the state of subjectivity. But it is evident that, as the function of the world is to provide the data for the solution, so it is the function of the individual to provide the hypothesis for that solution. It is equally evident that it is not the individual as a “me” that can perform this function. Such an empirical self belongs to the world which it is the function of this phase of consciousness to reconstruct. The selves of our scientific theory are part of the data which reflection presents to us. We have already seen that the content which is ascribed to them cannot be immediate. Furthermore, one of the results of the reconstruction will be a new individual as well as a new social environment. The reference which is made of this state of subjectivity to the presented self is therefore only in the sense of a statement of the conditions under which the new self is to be organized. In the meantime the experience in this psychical phase is not a presentation, but an immediate and direct experience. That is, this is the self in the disintegration and reconstruction of its universe, the self functioning, the point of immediacy that must exist within a mediate

process. It is the act that makes use of all the data that reflection can present, but uses them merely as the conditions of a new world that cannot possibly be foretold from them. It is the self of unnecessitated choice, of undreamt hypotheses, of inventions that change the whole face of nature.

If we ask now what sort of scientific treatment this phase of consciousness may receive, we find the reply already given. It cannot be a presentation of contents. These presentations all take their place among the data or conditions of this activity. On the other hand, there is nothing mysterious about its flow. It may be as vividly and definitely described as any immediate experience, but it is not the content as content that constitutes the scientific character of the description, but its definition in terms of the laws of analysis and construction. It will not be a statement of the laws of these processes. This statement would belong to general logic, but the formulation of psychical experience in terms of those laws. The theory of the conflict within an organized universal whole is logical, but the statement of the conflict of an impulse with a co-ordination of impulses and the inhibition of these impulses will be a scientific treatment of the psychical. The theory of the reconstruction of a given world as, subject through the interpretation of a hypothetical idea or predicate lies in the sphere of logic, but the shifting of attention in the re-co-ordination of the impulses, the control of the outgoing activities by the sense-processes during this co-ordination, and the like, will fall within the science of the psychical.

There appears to be, therefore, a field of immediate experience within reflection that is open to direct observation, that does not have to be approached from the standpoint of parallelism, but which is a presupposition of that parallelism, as it is of all presentation of data, which voluntaristic psychology presupposes, but does not directly deal with, and for which there is arising the modern discipline of functional psychology. Over against this would still stand the parallelistic psychology as presenting the conditions under which empirical bodies and minds must act in the reconstructions arising within the field of the psychical. For this functional psychology an explicit definition of its subject-matter seems highly important. That suggested in this paper is as follows: that phase of experience within which we are immediately conscious of conflicting impulses which rob the object of its character as object-stimulus, leaving us in so far in an attitude of subjectivity; but during which a new object-stimulus appears due to the reconstructive activity which is identified with the subject "I" as distinct from the object "me."

There are two illegitimate transfers in modern psychology upon

which we have commented. In the first place, the psychologist who is interested in so-called psychical elements has abstracted the *quales* of sensation from the object of reflection by a process of simple analysis, and has assumed that he may transfer them in this form to the domain of the psychical (p. 59). In the second place, the voluntaristic psychologist has recognized the feelings of stress and strain that belong to the psychical phase of consciousness, and has transferred them to unanalyzed experience and its movements, where they are assumed to be the sensations of these movements (p. 60). It would be a mistake, however, to leave these treatments without some indication of their proper function, especially when an attempt is being made to relate psychical consciousness to other phases of the process of reflection.

The position of the "elements" is indicated at once by their origin. They are part of the data which define the conditions under which the immediate problem is to be solved. What distinguishes them from the data of the other sciences is their relation to the individual through physiological psychology. This science enables us to state all the data of the physical sciences in terms of the individual – the "corporeal individual." Their logical function must then be the same as that of the data of the other sciences, that of stating the conditions of the solution – the function of the subject of the judgment when the problem is as yet only stated. Now the hypothesis which is to arise must make its appearance in the individual *qua* individual. The general statement of conditions which are valid for all is not adequate for this situation. There must be a statement which will translate these into the conditions of this individual. The difficulty with the customary psychological statement is that they are not treated as conditions, but as contents which existed in advance of the appearance of the problem. It is, then, not remarkable that these so-called elements which have in reality been simply abstracted from scientifically determined objects do not appear in psychical consciousness at all, as introspection abundantly shows. What appear are the emerging objects, indistinct and still subject to the disintegration of conflicting impulses. But the conditions of the problem stand there as the form, so to speak, to which the hypothesis must conform itself. The attempt to give these conditions content apart from the immediate psychical experience inevitably drives the psychologist to borrow a filling from the abstractions of the outer scientific world – the "elements." Apart from the particular problem of constructing a sounding, colored, felt world, there is a certain legitimacy in referring to these conditions of individual reconstruction as sensations of color, sound, etc. But to assume that this content is determinable independently of the problem is utterly false. The only thing that is determinable

in advance is the *function* of seeing, of hearing, and of feeling. What the content of this function is going to be is dependent upon the character of the process.

The legitimate result of this type of "elemental" psychology is found, not in the psychical correspondents of the physical originals, but in the physical statement itself. All the value of the study of so-called *qualies* of sensation is to be obtained eventually in the statement of the nervous mechanism. And this mechanism is only a series of paths. It is impossible to isolate anything in the nervous system except processes unless one arbitrarily assumes physical elements to answer to arbitrarily assumed psychical elements. To repeat the statement made above, the logical function of physiological psychology is to give a statement of the world of the physical sciences in terms of the individual so that the conditions of the hypotheses that can arise only in psychical consciousness may be so stated that they will hold for that consciousness. In my judgment, however, we must recognize not only a corporeal individual, but a social and even logical individual, each of whom would answer to the translation of the results of the social and logical sciences into terms of psychical consciousness. That is, if we find it convenient to set up a social environment or an epistemological environment in which we abstract from the physical statement, we must state the laws of these environments in terms of the individual, to put them at his disposal. In any case, such a statement is the subject-function of the judgment.

If we seek a psychological expression for the actual use of these conditions in experience we will find it in the term "image." However unfortunate the historical implications of the term may be, there is no other expression that answers to such an organization of a subjective state that it may become objective. The unfortunate implication of the term is still maintained in much of the psychological doctrine of the memory. The implication is that the memory image depends for its organization upon past experience, that the selection and ordering of its content looks back and not forward. There can be, however, no question that the activities with which psychology deals find their expression in the formation of the image, and that these activities are essentially forward-looking. The fallacy of referring these activities backward as the sensations of unanalyzed movements we have already commented upon at length (p. 60). As the statement in terms of elements stands only for the conditions of reconstruction, so these activities presented in the image stand only for the direction of the reconstruction. A psychology which assumes that these images are registrations of past experiences which exist ready to hand in some storehouse of the mind is as illegitimate as a psychology of "elements," even if it bring in attention

or apperception as a force from the outside to order the material. For it has a material which is only made up out of logical abstractions. The ordering of this material by laws of the association of ideas or by attentive processes is unreal as long as these forces operate upon material which is quite separate from the immediate problem of consciousness. The image whose meaning alone makes association conceivable, and which can only arise through its successful reconstruction of the object, can no more be separated from the psychical state as a content than can the conditions discussed above. The image stands for the predicate as the *quales* stand for the subject.

The image is the suggested object-stimulus, adapting itself to the conditions involved in the problem. It interprets the conditions as the predicate interprets the subject. But neither the subject nor the predicate is there in fixed form, but are present in process of formation. The value and content of the conditions is continually changing as the meaning of the problem develops, and this meaning grows as it recognizes and accepts the conditions that face it. It is evident that in this state of reflection it is impossible to present the elements out of which the new world is to be built up in advance, for disintegration and analysis of the old is as dependent upon the problem that arises as is the reconstruction. It is equally impossible to state the form which the world will take in advance. Neither elements nor image can be given in advance of the actual problem or, what is the same thing for psychology, in advance of the psychical state. For this psychical state they are reciprocal functions which have now this expression and now that. What this expression is depends upon the selective activity of attention or apperception – an activity that is practically co-terminous with the psychical state as such.

The logical correspondent of this psychical state can be no other than the copula phase of the judgment; that in which subject and predicate determine each other in their mutual interaction. The subject and predicate – the conditions or elements and the images – may be reduced as contents to zero in the equation and be present only as felt functions. In this case we have the limit of subjectivity. Or we may have definite conditions and a working hypothesis, and then the state approaches objectivity. Here the elements of sensuous experience fit into the structure of the world perfectly under the interpretation of the image.

One word of recognition is due the types of psychology which have been criticized. If we wish to make a symbolical statement of the conditions of organizing or co-ordinating experience, it may be legitimate to take colors, sounds, feels, and odors by logical abstraction from the objects around us, and if we wish to present the image symbolically it may be legitimate to use logical abstractions from our thought-objects – the ideas – as contents for this function. In actual psychical experience

the material in which these functions express themselves are the disintegrating and reforming objects of the changing universe. The only justification, however, for these symbolical presentations must be found in their interpretation of actual psychical processes, and they can be properly used only as this function is kept in mind, and when the assumption is avoided that they offer a real account of what transpires in subjective consciousness.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ It would be impossible for me to indicate in detail my obligations to Professor Dewey in the development of the thought of this paper, but the reference of the psychical phase of consciousness to the copula stage of the judgment, and its elaboration in the last three pages, should be credited directly to him.

THE FUNCTIONAL VIEW OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE PSYCHICAL AND THE PHYSICAL

H. Heath Bawden. "The Functional View of the Relation between the Psychical and the Physical." *Philosophical Review* 11.5 (September 1902): 474–84.

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In order to get the problem clearly before us, it will be well briefly to summarize the various types of theory that have been held in explanation of the relation between the psychical and the physical. There are two general types of explanation: the ontological, and the teleological. The ontological theories are either causality theories, or theories of parallelism. According to the causality theories, mind and matter are either causally interactive, now the one, and now the other, being cause or effect (interactionism); or matter is the cause of mind (materialism), or mind is the cause of matter (spiritualism). According to theories of parallelism, mind and matter are either two independent orders of existence which stand side by side, parallel and concomitant without being causally related (a sort of pre-established harmony), or they are parallel and concomitant manifestations, sides, or aspects of one underlying reality which is unknown and unknowable (agnosticism).

The teleological or functional theory approaches the matter from an entirely different point of view. It regards the psychical and physical as functional distinctions within the one concrete knowable reality of experience. In what follows, I shall endeavor to show that both the historical evolution of the distinction, and an analysis of the concrete process of experience, lend support to the functional interpretation.

The clear distinction between the psychical and the physical came relatively late in human development. The child makes no such distinction at first. Man in the beginning made no such distinction. And when he did begin to make it, it was made hesitatingly, confusedly, and

inconsistently. In the beginning, mental states were treated simply as so many more physical objects; or, physical objects on certain occasions were sublimated into psychical abstractions.

To the savage, and even to the Greek sage, the symbol, instead of representing the object, seems to have contained its essence. This is the significance of Plato's hypostasization of ideas or concepts. The ancient idealist swept all reality into his conceptual forms, without feeling the ontological incompatibility of mind and matter. On the other hand, by the ancient materialist the soul was not conceived as a phosphorescence or epiphenomenon: he had no difficulty in conceiving both body and soul as material in their nature.

When mental states began to be described, it was in terms of physical objects and processes. No new language was invented, but old words were broadened to cover the new phenomena. Thus the mind came to be viewed as a substance or entity like matter, except that it was less palpable and visible, more ethereal, shadowy, and vaporous. The soul was represented as breath, as fire, as motion. It has been suggested that man's knowledge of his psychical self or soul, as distinguished from his body, may have first come from seeing his image in the water, or from a reification of his dream life. However that may be, we know that this shadowy dream-world in the course of time came to be given a separate existence, and even to take precedence, in thought, of the material world. The motive for this was doubtless a religious one. This spirit world was the abode of good and evil demons, the abode of deities and devils. It was also the place to which at death the spirits of men and animals were translated. Even in the Middle Ages, after the dawn of Christianity, the Kingdom of Heaven, the spiritual world, was conceived as a supra-mundane sphere, for which this world was only a preparation and half-way house.

Modern pan-psychism, however, must not be confounded with primitive animism. The animism and hylozoism of primitive humanity represent simply the unreflective anthropomorphizing of non-human objects. Early fetishism, sorcery, zoölatry, and witchcraft represent no reflective distinction of a spiritual world, since the shadows, ghosts, or spirits supposed to people Hades have largely the same characters as living men. It was only very slowly, out of this pre-reflective, undifferentiated matrix, that the realism and idealism of later thought developed. The souls of living things became more and more detached from organisms, and more and more used as abstract principles, until in the so-called idealism of a Plato we get the abstract universal idea hypostasized as the essential reality. But this idealism is not idealism in the modern sense: the ideal is not as yet identified with the psychical.

The evolution of the psychical in the psychological sense of the term is

a comparatively modern achievement. According to the Greek, the real is the universal; the particular is in so far forth the unreal. But in the evolution of the individual, as seen first in the undercurrent of revolt against authority in the Middle Ages, and later in the assertion of the intellectual and moral freedom of the individual in the Renaissance and Reformation, we find that what the Greeks regarded as the illusory and unreal is taken as the most certain basis and starting-point of philosophical thought. The consciousness of the individual in Greek life was not differentiated from that of the community life. It was only through Christianity, which brought the Semitic inwardness into contact with the Greek ideas of objectivity, and through the invasion of Græco-Roman civilization by the northern tribes of Europe, with their insistence on personal freedom, that the individual came to be set over against the institution as in himself embodying reality as truly, and, it came even to be asserted, more truly, than the State or Church. This is the philosophical significance of the Renaissance, of the Reformation, of the Protestant political revolutions, of the rise of the free cities, and the fall of feudalism, and, in reflective thought, of nominalism as over against the realism and conceptualism of the mediæval period. Especially do we see the evolution of the individual in the political and industrial history of England, and there also, significantly, we get the greatest development of the empirical or psychological philosophy, which adopts essentially the standpoint of the individual consciousness, making fundamental and thoroughgoing the principle that was only hinted at in Descartes's *Cogito, ergo sum*.

Realism and conceptualism both hypostasized the concept. Realism asserted that the concept was real objectively; *i.e.*, that besides this and that horse there was 'horse' in general. Conceptualism said that the concept was real, but only subjectively; *i.e.*, the conceptual horse was real as a mental state though not as a physical existence. Nominalism maintained in essence, though not consistently, that the conceptual is not a separate realm of reality, but simply reality as problematic, or doubted, or ideal, as over against reality as certain, or given, or actual. That is, for nominalism the conceptual horse has only a symbolic reality.

Now just as the Middle Ages hypostasized the abstract ideas or universals of the Greeks, or carried on the process which was begun by the Greeks, so modern thought has hypostasized the psychical individual as a separate self over and above the physical or bodily self, at the same time incorporating into this conception certain ideas from the Greek notion of the real ideal, as over against the illusory phenomenal world. The psychical, thus, at first, is conceived as immaterial, unextended, and simple, as contrasted with the complexity of the extended material world. Then, later, as the facts of localization of the psychic functions in

the nervous system became developed, the psychical was conceived as a spiritual being, with certain faculties or powers corresponding to certain parts of the brain. In its latest phase, in pan-psychism, we get the psychical clearly hypostasized as a separate realm of being coextensive and equally complex with, though causally independent of, the whole physical world. Moreover, under the influence of the doctrine of evolution, the animal soul and the rational spirit, which even Descartes carefully distinguished, come to be identified; and man is viewed dichotomously (as body and mind, soul, or spirit) instead of trichotomously (as body, soul, and spirit). The transformation from the ancient point of view is complete. Instead of the world of ideas being a fixed and static world, it is viewed as in continual flux, as a stream of conscious states. And, just as the conception of inert matter has given place to the doctrine of energy on the physical side, so the conception of fixed ready-made faculties has given place to the doctrine of psychic functions. It is but a step further to say that these functions are the functions of this energy, that the function is but the meaning of the structure, that the psychical is but the significance of the physical. Professor Münsterberg says the following things of the psychical: that it is observable by but one subject, that it is non-spatial and timeless, that it is merely qualitative or non-quantitative, and that it is without causal interconnection, each element being unique. Why not go the whole way and say that the psychical has no *existence as such* at all, but is simply an expression for the *meaning* of existence.

In the evolution of the distinction between the psychical and the physical we see, then, that what was at first a purely practical distinction was gradually transformed into an ontological distinction, the psychical being hypostasized in one form or another as a distinct order of existence. It is here suggested that the solution of the problem lies in getting back to the principle involved in the practical attitude, though now, of course, in a reflective, conscious way instead of the immediate, instinctive, primitive attitude.

Science has practically handed over the problem to philosophy as insoluble. This is shown in the postulate of parallelism which most scientists adopt, with the distinct consciousness that it is no solution but simply a formulation of the facts. For the philosopher, however, the parallelism of mind and body is no postulate. It is rather a problem, a subject for further reflection. A doctrine of absolute parallelism, with all that such a doctrine implies, would mean the abandonment of all metaphysics. It would be to give up the problem at the start. To say that the psychical and the physical are parallel in the sense of being absolutely disparate and independent is not only a self-contradictory use of the term 'parallel,' but it is to prejudge the whole controversy – as much

so as to say with the materialists that the psychical is simply an epiphenomenal effect of the physical, or with the spiritualistic idealists that matter is but a lower manifestation of mind. The real problem lies within this word 'parallel.' In what sense are the psychical and physical parallel?

The time has come when what professedly has been but a working hypothesis of science should be either established as a law, or rejected as a false formulation of the facts. Strenuous efforts have been made so to modify the hypothesis of parallelism as to make of it a solution, and not simply a restatement of the old problem of mind and matter. But these efforts have served only to point out the futility of the hypothesis as a statement of the problem, and its absurdity as a solution. The difficulty of the problem of parallelism lies, not upon the surface, but in the underlying assumption that there are two orders of *reality* capable of being thus related. Parallelism, in other words, is an insoluble enigma, because, like all the greatest problems in the history of philosophy, it presupposes a certain answer in the very form of statement of the question.

As a recent writer has said, if the question were properly stated, it might better be called non-intersecting perpendicularism than parallelism. Parallelism is not a solution at all. It is simply a restatement of the problem in an unsolvable form. In the very statement of the question, it has already committed itself to a theory of the relations involved. All the fantastic constructions of hylo-idealism, pan-psychism, the mind-stuff theory, the theory of conscious-automatism, the doctrine of psychical causality, the identity hypothesis, and the universal parallelism of the psychical and the physical as complementary aspects or sides of an unknowable *tertium quid*, grow out of the attempt to state a teleological distinction in ontological terms. They grow out of the attempt to state a relative, a fluid, or functional division of labor in terms of absolute, fixed, structural elements.

As contrasted with all the ontological theories, the functional view would hold that all our reflective distinctions arise within the life of action. We begin with immediate experience, and within this emerges the distinction between means and ends. That part of our experience which is already under control, in the form of available habits, becomes *means*. That part of the experience which is in process of being brought under control or is still beyond definite control, our ideas and ideals, presents unrealized values or *ends*. This is a distinction which any person can understand, since every person constantly makes it in some form or other in his everyday life. In spite of our metaphysical prejudices or religious beliefs, which may seem to favor other distinctions, this is the distinction to which we always come back in our practical life, in

our activity experience. Is it too much to affirm that this is also the essence of the distinction between the physical and the psychical, that, after all, the difference between the physical and the psychical is not one of existence, but one simply of use or function in experience?

According to this view, the physical would represent the given means, or that part of the experience which is taken as given. The psychical, on the other hand, would represent the ends or values which are to be realized, or which are in process of realization in and through the means. It is a purely instrumental or teleological distinction; instrumental, if you view it from the standpoint of the means; teleological, viewed from the standpoint of the ends; functional, viewed in relation to the process of experience as an interaction of means and ends.

Reality or experience is physical or psychical only in and through our manipulation of it. It is physical as a tool or means. It is psychical as a value or end. As Edward Caird says: "The advance of scientific thought, which teaches men to distinguish one form of reality from another, is apt to make them lose hold of a truth which was contained in their primitive anthropomorphic view of the world. For, in that view, every thing and being was taken as at once material and spiritual, at once as an object in space and time, and as a being gifted with life and will."¹ The distinction of psychical and physical is purely instrumental in thought, and when the univense is regarded thus as organic throughout, the dualism in the ontological sense passes away. The dualism is not absolute, but relative in the sense of functional.

We say of a visionary that his schemes are mere ideas: they are only hypothetical or problematic. They are ideal rather than actual. They are real, but they are real only as ideas, not as actual existences in space and time. A house while it is simply a plan in the architect's head is ideal or psychical only. When it is realized in brick and stone and mortar we call it an actual house, the house as a physical reality. It is the same house and it is a real house all the time, when it is in the architect's mind, on the architect's paper, or physically realized in brick and stone. But in the first case it is only ideally or psychically real, while in the second and third cases it is actually or physically real as well.

The direct experience of the child or animal, or even of the human adult when he is not thinking, is made up of a series of states or acts which present no conscious distinction between subject and object, between psychical and physical. But if some uncertainty or doubt or difficulty arises, this experience is broken up so that a duality appears within it – a duality of function which serves to dichotomize the

¹ *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. II, p. 369.

experience into a part which is regarded as uncertain and problematic, and another part which is taken as certain or given.

For example, my experience of the temperature in this room up to the present moment has been neither physical nor psychical, neither objective nor subjective. All at once I become conscious, let us suppose, of the fact that it has been growing colder and colder. I feel a draft. But I see no open window, no open door. What can be the cause of it? Here is a polarizing, a bifurcation, in my experience. There is something which is uncertain – the cause of this chilling atmosphere. This occupies the foreground in consciousness: it is the salient, the absorbing content of this experience. And in addition there is the general background of things in the environment, which, being irrelevant in this situation, are simply taken for granted, the chairs, the desk, the blackboard, etc. The door, the windows, the draft, are in the focus of consciousness: they are psychical. My overcoat hanging on the hat-rack is on the border-line: it is in a fair way to become psychical if it grows cold enough, and I am not able to discover the cause of the draft. That is, the overcoat, in such a case, passes into the foreground – and this is what we mean by the functionally psychical aspect of the experience. The draft, the door, the windows, and the overcoat will, then, remain the psychical aspect of *this* experience until I locate and remove the cause of the discomfort. Then the experience will lapse back again to the former level of direct stimulus and response, at least so far as temperature is concerned.

In another instance, instead of being the temperature which is brought into the psychical focus of experience, it may be the light. Dusk may come on gradually while I am reading, so that finally I am unable longer to pursue my work. Then the whole situation of insufficient illumination comes to consciousness, *i.e.*, becomes psychical, and remains so while I seek around for a light. But when I strike a match and light the gas and resume my reading, the light situation retreats from the focus of consciousness just as did the temperature situation. Thus what is psychical or focal in consciousness at one time or in one situation may be taken for granted as irrelevant, as physical in another situation. And when we say that the physical is irrelevant, we mean simply that it is taken, in *that* situation, as given. It is irrelevant simply because it is so thoroughly taken for granted, so completely assumed as there: it is not the particular phase of the experience which is undergoing reconstruction.

Take one more illustration, which I adapt from Professor Dewey (though he does not use it to illustrate this point). Suppose I am threading a needle. There is little doubt of what in psychological terms I mean by 'threading.' It involves the coördination of the eye and hand, or of the functions represented by these organs. But what is the 'needle' psychologically? It may be all of the following things in relation to the

attempt to do the act represented in threading the needle: (1) The needle is a part of the sense factor or stimulus; (2) it defines the end of the activity; (3) it locates the problem to be solved; (4) consequently it is in the focus of attention; (5) it may be one of the means for the solution of the problem; (6) it may suggest the mode of the activity to be employed in solving the problem.

If I already have the needle sufficiently well in hand to be able to thread it without any trouble, the needle-threading situation soon comes to a conclusion. But if the eye of the needle is very small, or my eyesight poor, or the room too dark, then the needle, or to be more accurate, the eye of the needle, is kept in the focus of consciousness until I secure the means of getting the thread through the hole. Perchance I take the needle to the window where I can see more plainly. Another person, it is true, might keep his eyes on the tip of the thread and only incidentally on the eye of the needle, but the principle involved would be the same. The eye of the needle or the tip of the thread is psychical, if and in so far as it is in the focus of the attention. It is not that I, or my act of seeing, or my act of threading, is psychical, and the needle is physical or material. If I am out of the focus of the situation, I am just as physical as that bit of steel that I call the needle. What constitutes the psychical quality is not some ontological distinction of substance – the needle being material and these other things mental. The difference is a functional one only, a teleological or instrumental distinction. Reality and experience are one organic whole. There are no ontological chasms in reality.

All experience, just because it is a living reality, is capable of growth or transformation. It is not an externally fixed entity, but a changing, expanding life with a developmental history. This experience is psychical when and where it is growing, just as a plant is green and tender at its growing-points – at its rootlets which push their way into the soil, and in its buds which seek the light and air. Experience is psychical where it is undergoing reconstruction. Experience is not psychical all the time and everywhere, but only at these nodal or critical points, at the points of transition and adaptation in the process of growth. It is a purely methodological distinction, in which we return, in a sense, though in a new sense, to the primitive and common-sense view, not of a material body *and* an immaterial soul, but rather of an acting, feeling, thinking body – a psychophysical organism.

I think I am safe in saying that most of the discussions of the subject of the relation of the psychical to the physical proceed upon the assumption, implicit if not expressed, that there are two kinds or existence, two orders of reality, though this assumption is often obscured by the use of the ambiguous terms 'sides' or 'aspects.' In some

cases, the physical and psychical are spoken of as different forms or modes of energy. Oftener, the psychical is vaguely treated as a mode or aspect of reality without any clear definition of its nature, except that it is very different form, if not quite independent of, the physical.

Without here going into the reasons for thinking so, two things seem clear in these discussions: first, that the law of the conservation of energy, upon which the parallelist bases his argument, cannot be overthrown – the various arguments advanced by its opponents serving only to define it more adequately, rather than to refute it or limit its application; and yet, secondly, that there is a truth, nevertheless, for which the interactionist stands, which may be summed up in what has here been called the functional theory – the truth, namely, that the relation between the psychical and the physical is an intimate one, the relation of fact to the significance of the fact, the relation of existence to meaning.

The apparently even balance of arguments presented by the interactionists and the parallelists would suggest, if nothing else did so, that the truth in some form or other lies between the two extremes.

In conclusion, I would suggest that this is what Huxley and Hodgson really have in mind in their theory of conscious automatism, and it is what I have interpreted Professor Dewey to mean when he says in the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*: “The distinction between the ‘physical’ and ‘spiritual’... is one of interpretation, of function, rather than of kind of existence;”² and in another article where he says: “The fundamental distinction between physical facts and psychical facts is not that the former exist in space, the latter in time, or any other specific distinction or mode of appearance. It is that physical facts as such are facts of existence; psychical facts are facts of meaning. Physical facts have meaning, but they have it as psychical, in relation to intelligence; psychical facts have existence, but the existence does not constitute their express value in human experience.”³

² Vol. VI, p. 44.

³ *Mind*, Vol. XII, p. 384.

THE MEANING OF THE PSYCHICAL FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

H. Heath Bawden. "The Meaning of the Psychical from the Point of View of the Functional Psychology." *Philosophical Review* 13.3 (May 1904): 298–319.

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In two papers previously read before this Association,¹ I have maintained that the distinction of the psychical and the physical represents simply a functional division of labor in the statement of experience. There is no such distinction, or it is inoperative (which amounts to the same thing), so long as experience flows on smoothly, so long as in the midst of our action we do not 'stop to think.' It is the purpose of the present paper to consider somewhat more closely the meaning of the psychical in relation to that process of tension in experience which we have defined as the condition of consciousness.

I

With the advance of a science we naturally expect to find a reconstruction of the meaning of its fundamental concepts. This is true in psychology of the concept of the psychical. The most important recent advances in this science are those along the lines of genetic and social psychology. A genetic and functional mode of viewing experience has been taking a more and more prominent place in psychological discussions in the past few years, as contrasted with the analytic and structural, which still is the prevailing standpoint. By this is meant that experience is viewed as a process, with moments or functional phases, rather than as an entity or thing capable of analysis into structural elements or units. The structural analysis of experience is not denied value in its proper place, but, from the standpoint of method, it is

¹ Published in the *Philosophical Review*, September, 1902, and May, 1903.

shown to be instrumental to this functional view. Cross-sections of the process are taken at different points, and an analysis is made of the elements found in these cross-sections. But the section and the analysis are ultimately for the sake of getting more efficient control of the process.

No one has made this clearer than Professor Royce in his critique of the doctrine of conscious elements in his recently published *Outlines of Psychology*. It is here shown that the element obtained by this analysis (for example, the sensation) is as much an artifact as is the atom in physical science. It is brought into existence as such for the first time in the act of analysis. Hence its only use is one similar to that of the atom in physics. It is a convenient tool in explaining the actual facts of the stream of consciousness. The justification of the whole range of analysis in the structural psychology can be found only in its methodological utility in explaining the concrete process of experience.

We may ask, then, how experience is viewed from the functional standpoint. From this point of view, experience is regarded primarily as a process. This is simply carrying over into psychology the general dynamic standpoint common to all science at the present time. By process here is meant activity, without specifying that it is either physical or psychical. The most fundamental statement that we can make about experience is that it is action. It is as much action when it is conscious as when it is unconscious, but the conditions of conscious action are different from the conditions of unconscious action.

What are the conditions of consciousness? What are the laws which determine when an act becomes conscious or ceases to be conscious? These are: the law of tension or obstruction in activity, and the law of habit or facilitation in coördination.

By the law of tension is meant simply this, that consciousness appears only when the process of action is relatively impeded or interrupted. Action is going on all the time, in tropism, reflex, and instinct. But these become consciously performed acts when there arises stress in adjustment, whether the focus of the tension be intra-organic or extra-organic.²

The whole of psychophysics is but an illustration of this law of

² Why there ever should be resistance or obstruction in action is an ultimate question here as much (and as little) as in physics. The Hegelian doubtless would say that pure spontaneity posits resistance as its own other. The evolutionist is apt to attribute it to the environment. But the scientific psychologist no more asserts that he has accounted for the presence of this element of opposition which polarizes consciousness than the biologist accounts for the principle of variation in evolution or the physicist for the collision of atoms which is one of his fundamental postulates. It may be that tension or opposition is a necessary implication of the idea of activity or process.

tension. What is the significance of the determination of thresholds, of the lag of sensation behind stimulus, of the summation of stimuli in order to produce a given sensational effect, of the Weber-Fechner law, unless it is this, – that tension is the condition of consciousness, and that there can be no tension unless there is not only a tendency in the organism in one direction, but also an inhibitory tendency operating with reference to this in the opposite direction? Lag of sensation, or summation of stimuli (which are simply obverse sides of the same fact), represent the limits within which operates that tension which is the condition of consciousness. The Weber-Fechner law marks the working limits of this tension.

But why just this relation, it may be asked? Why this particular law, that sensation increases as the logarithm of the stimulus? It may be replied that investigation has shown that this ratio is not a constant one for all intensities of stimulus; the formula holds only for stimulations of moderate intensity. It does not hold for either maximal or minimal ranges of stimulation. Moreover, Heymans³ has restated the law so that it reads simply that sensations increase in direct proportion to the increase of the stimulus. That is, if we rule out the influence of disturbing or inhibitory stimuli, the Fechner part of the statement of the law is not true, but only the original formulation of Weber, that the increase of sensation is proportional to the increase of intensity of the stimulus. The Fechner formulation holds only of a stimulus operating in the presence of innumerable other stimuli whose inhibitory effect upon the operation of this stimulus is thus roughly expressed.

The tension (and thus the consciousness) lasts as long as the dominance of the relevant stimulus over the competing stimuli. It ceases (and consciousness lapses or begins to lapse) as soon as it succumbs to these. This succumbing to these other stimuli is just what we mean by the facilitation of a coördination, the lapsing into an habitual mode of reaction. Differences of reaction-time mean differences in facilitation or habituation of organic circuits (sensorimotor coördinations). This marks the time limits of the tension, as psychophysics marks the limits of intensity and extensity.

The whole study of sensation in modern structural psychology, especially in psychophysics, is really a technical investigation of the nature and limits of this tension. Genetic psychology is a study of the types of experience within which tension arises and of the changes which one type of experience (such as instinct) undergoes in the process

³ "Untersuchungen über psychische Hemmung," *Z. f. Psych. u. Phys. der Sinnesorgane*, Bd. xxi., Heft 3, pp. 321–59; Bd. xxvi., Heft 5 u. 6, pp. 305–82. Cf. Stratton, *Experimental Psychology and Culture*, p. 13.

of the emergence of consciousness (in impulse), and its transformation into another type of experience (habit). The so-called functional psychology is simply an attempt to relate the results of both these forms of psychological investigation to the process of reconstruction of experience as a whole; it interprets structure in terms of function, and function in terms of the genesis and growth of structure.

Biology and psychology state the same tension, but in terms of different techniques. Both the psychologist and the neurologist state the tension in terms of action; but they start from such diverse standpoints and their technique and terminology (because of purely historical conditions) are so different, that we have a problem, or think we have a problem, of conflict between them which does not really exist, – the problem of the psychical and the physical, so transparently masqued in the current hypothesis of parallelism.

The relatively tensional phase of action is continuous with the relatively stable phases preceding and succeeding. There is no infringement of the law of conservation of energy. We simply have one name (the term ‘consciousness’ or ‘psychical’) for describing action when it is tensional, and another name (the term ‘habit’ or ‘physical’) when it is relatively stable.⁴

The distinction is confessedly a practical or teleological one, a distinction which holds for the situation or problem only; but it is no less valid as a distinction because it is relative only to a given type of situation and only under a given set of conditions.

A contribution has recently been made to the understanding of this problem in a paper by Professor George H. Mead, on the “Definition of the Psychical,” in the *University of Chicago Decennial Contributions to Philosophy and Education*, Volume I. According to Professor Mead, my experience, as I am at this moment experiencing it, the actual process of my being my present conscious self, is psychical. My feelings, ideas, volitions, as I now am having them, are psychical. But the moment I reflect upon these experiences as mine, as soon as I make this feeling or idea or volition the subject-matter (the object-matter) of my thought, it ceases as process and becomes content. It may become an ethical, an economic, a political, a scientific content, according to my purpose or interest in studying it. It may become a psychological content, *i.e.*, it may become a datum of the science of psychology. But if we use the term ‘psychical’ in describing this datum, we must recognize that this use of the term is a very different one from that indicated above. *We must distinguish the*

⁴ Professor Ostwald (“The Philosophical Meaning of Energy,” *International Quarterly*, June, 1903) is on the right track in attempting to fuse the ideas of ‘psychical’ and ‘energy,’ but he fails to distinguish the respective functions of these important aspects, the relatively stable and tensional, phases of action.

*true psychical of immediate experience from the psychical as an object of psychological retrospection.*⁵ The true psychical, according to Professor Mead, is the immediate fact of experiencing. Any experience is psychical if, and in so far as, it is not the content of reflection, but at the time being experienced, *i.e.*, is the process of reflection itself. As soon as we turn back upon this experience to analyze it or to reflect upon it in any way, it ceases to be the process of my experience and becomes a content in my experience, a content treated either as something to be explained (in logical terms, the subject of the judgment) or as the explanation of something else (the predicate of the judgment). In order actually to explain this content or actually to use it in explanation of another content, there must, of course, be a new judgment; the process of experience must be resumed, it must become psychical again. This is the copula of the judgment. *The psychical is the copula.* Thus experience grows out of one content into another content in and through the process – which is the psychical. New social, political, ethical, economic, æsthetic, scientific, philosophic, psychological values or contents are achieved only in and through psychical individuality. The psychical is experience as process, and psychology is the science of the content of experience with the reference to this process of reconstruction made explicit. As Külpe puts it, it is the dependence of facts of experience upon the experiencing process which makes them psychological data.

This thought is worked out from a different point of view by the late Professor Adamson in his *Development of Modern Philosophy*.⁶ “Facts of mind, psychical states ... can never be directly presented as objects.” “When we describe the facts of mind as a series of events in time, we are vainly trying to regard them from the point of view of an outside observer. We are not describing them as they are for the consciousness they compose. There they are not objects *of* which the subject is aware, but ways *in* which he is aware. ... It seems more true to say that the subject *is* his mental states than that he *has* them.”⁷

Strangely enough, Professor Adamson makes this the basis for rejecting “the conception of psychology as a kind of natural science.”⁸ The truth would seem to be rather that this is just what furnishes the basis for conceiving psychology as a natural science, since if there can be no science of the psychical as such, psychology must deal with phenomena on the same level with the other natural sciences. We can

⁵ Cf. Professor Baldwin’s distinction between the ‘psychic’ and the ‘psychological,’ discussed below.

⁶ Vol. II, chap. iv, “Psychology and Epistemology,” especially pp. 56 f.

⁷ Pp. 58–59.

⁸ P. 60.

have a science only of an objective content; in truth, content as such is by its very nature objective. The peculiarity of psychological science is simply the closeness of the reference of the content to the process from which it is an abstraction.

In psychology we treat one content as the means for getting another content. This involves reference to the mediation of one content by another, *i.e.*, it involves reference to the process of the reconstruction of experience. We cannot directly state this process. To state it would be to stop it; it would convert process into content. The psychological is a good deal like the histological procedure in biology. You have to stop the dynamic life functioning and cut the specimen into thin sections, artificially distorted by hardening reagents and staining fluids, in order to analyze its structure. You have to kill it in order to state it. "Our meddling intellect misshapes the beauteous forms of things. It murders to dissect." Yet we recognize that there is a life process, and we attempt to interpret this structure in terms of its functional importance in carrying on that process.

Ultimately, every content, every datum of science, would have to be stated in terms of every other content, in terms of the data of every other science, before the scientific statement would be complete, and this would involve comparison of the contents in terms of their different degrees of mediation in experience; that is, it would involve reference to the process of experience, to the psychical. The content of physics or chemistry or biology, as truly as the content of psychology, would have to be brought back to this ultimate test (its availability or serviceability for getting further experience) before it could be said to be scientifically (philosophically) complete.

The distinctions between the sciences, in the last analysis, are only divisions of labor, and, thus viewed, we may even agree with a recent writer that "our mental life must be interpreted ultimately in relation to the physical world," that "the ideal psychology is a physiological psychology."⁹ This does not mean that psychology reduces to the physiology of the nervous system, as the latter is ordinarily conceived. But it does mean that the data of psychology are as truly objective as those of any other science. Both psychology and physiology are ultimately a study of the reactions of the organism, and both must be brought back to the process of experience before their statements can be made wholly adequate. The difference is that this reference is more implicit and remote in physiology than in psychology. Psychology as a science is but one step removed, while physiology is two steps removed, from the process of experience. It is this difference in the remoteness of the

⁹ W. T. Marvin, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 176.

reference to the psychical which constitutes the lines of division between the various sciences.

It is only recently that psychology has been generally conceded this place among the natural sciences. The concession has grudgingly been made, and many who by the logic of events have been forced to make the concession are not even yet willing to abide by all its implications. One of these implications is this fact that the data of psychology are as objective as those of any other science. As Professor Baldwin puts it in his latest book,¹⁰ this concession means that the data of psychology are "viewed from the outside; that is, viewed as a definite set or series of phenomena...recognized as 'worth while' as any other facts in nature." "The occurrence or a psychological change in an animal is a fact in the same sense that the animal's process of digestion is." "For science all facts are equal."¹¹

But many who would agree with Professor Baldwin on this point do not seem to realize that this necessitates a reconstruction of the very idea of psychology and of the psychical. Of psychology, because it has been supposed that the data of psychology are unique and that psychology on this account is fundamental to all the other sciences, while this view places it alongside of the other natural sciences with no special privileges. Of the psychical, because it has been supposed that psychology deals with the psychical as its datum, while on this view the data of psychology are objective and not subjective, are 'psychological' and not 'psychic,' to use Professor Baldwin's terms.¹²

II

Now what, from this point of view, is the true meaning of the psychical regarded as content and as the datum of psychology? We are accustomed to think of the psychical as belonging exclusively to the individual. We hear much concerning the impossibility of constructing a psychic series for other minds than our own, that no one can get beyond the pale of his own consciousness, that his own consciousness is the only consciousness of which he has any direct knowledge, and so on.

¹⁰ *Development and Evolution*, pp. 4 f.

¹¹ Whether Professor Baldwin consistently adheres to this point of view in his subsequent statements, is a question which has been discussed by the present writer in a review of the book in the *Journal of Comparative Neurology*, Vol. xiii, No. 4 (Dec., 1903).

¹² This would seem to be the thought expressed by Professor Royce and by Professor Münsterberg in the distinction between the world of 'appreciation' and the world of 'description.' There is no science of appreciation as such, because it is process and not content. The same thought is expressed also in the common statement of the impossibility of studying the feelings without transforming them. In studying them we make them objects of thought, and thus no longer process but content.

That there is a fallacy here somewhere has long been suspected, but it is difficult to lay one's finger upon the source of the error. A number of writers have insisted that introspection, strictly speaking, is an impossibility. Its validity has been called in question by such writers as Comte, Lange, and Maudsley. Others insist that all introspection is really retrospection, *i.e.*, not *introspection* at all. But, it will be replied that, even if introspection does reduce to retrospection, we have in the latter an immediate type of experience differing from all other experience. Is this true?

If there were a perfect mirror at the end of the room in which I am sitting, and I had never tactually explored that end of the room, I should be unable to distinguish (visually) between the actual room and the reflected image of the room in the mirror. Suppose, as Gustav Spiller puts it, "I now shut my eyes, and redevelop the sight of the room. Does this image fundamentally differ from the object and the looking-glass picture?" "Except for unimportant circumstances, the primary and secondary visual worlds, or the visual worlds of sense and imagination, are one."¹³ This certainly is in line with other similar explanations of psychic phenomena in physiological psychology. It is in harmony with the tendency in recent years to explain all images as simply prolonged after-images (more properly called after-sensations).

Now does not this suggest that what we call this unique, inner, immediate, direct, unsharable experience is, after all, arrived at as inferentially as any other experience, that there is no essential difference in principle between the so-called external mirror and the internal mirror, that the image in the mirror of memory is not essentially different from the image in the looking-glass? The more will this appear to be true, when we recall the tendency in recent psychology to conceive of memory (Hering) and association (James) in terms of habit and in terms of physiological traces in the brain. In principle, as a mirror for reflecting objects, the brain does not differ from the silvered square of glass or from the photographic plate.

If, then, memory (retrospection) is essential to any introspection, and the brain (the organ of memory) does not differ essentially from the physical mirror, how do the reflected phenomena in one of these mirrors differ *in principle* from the reflected phenomena in the other?

Is this, perchance, the real solution of the old puzzle of subjective idealism? Is the distinction between the introspective world (the world of consciousness revealed through memory) and the external world, in the last analysis, simply another illustration of a self-made problem, – a problem arising out of the scientific abstraction of things that in reality

¹³ Spiller, *The Mind of Man*, p. 322.

(i.e., in concrete experience) are not thus separated? And is this, perhaps, the core of meaning in the insistence by certain recent writers on the fact of 'inter-subjective intercourse' and the essentially social character of consciousness?

From this point of view there is no mysterious uniqueness about consciousness. A great deal has been written about the unsharability of consciousness. The statement has repeatedly been made that one can never really get into the mental life of another person, that one cannot get at another person's consciousness directly. But this is not in any sense a unique phenomenon in nature, if we take an organic view of the relation of the individual to society. The mere fact that, in the case of human beings, the so-called individuals are separated from one another by a certain distance in space, rather than constitute a colony or so-called compound individual, as in the case of the sponge, does not render it any less true that they really all form one organic whole. Society is an organism in the same sense that the human body is an organism. "The cell, the individual, and the race, are merely units of different order in the world of living substance."¹⁴ Individuals in human society are most of the time separated physically by inches (Siamese twins), by feet (members of the same family), by miles (friends and acquaintances), by a hemisphere (races on different sides of the globe). The individuals of a sponge are separated only by a cell-wall. In both cases the real biological connection is the reproductive nexus, the germinal substance. What is the fact of a micromillimeter or of a mile? If you could look at the body with a microscope of sufficient magnifying powers, it would be seen that its molecules are relatively as far apart as the different individuals which make up society. What we call the individual organism is a fragment arbitrarily torn from nature, a part distinguished simply for convenience from the rest of the universe. It is a scientific fiction, an abstraction from the whole. The individual organism, except for practical purposes, does not stop with the cuticle. At what point does the air that is breathed or the food that is eaten cease to be a part of the environment and become a part of the organism? Any line that you draw, from a scientific point of view, is an arbitrary line, a mere practical working device or make-shift in explanation of the facts (though not on that account any less valuable methodologically).

From this standpoint, the so-called individual simply represents a fragment of the whole universe, or, taking society as the true human individual, the so-called individual man would represent simply a member or organ of this greater (social) organism. Now if an

¹⁴ C. B. Davenport, *Psych. Rev.*, Nov., 1897, p. 673.

adjustment is being made in the universe, and I happen to be in the focus of that adjustment (and myself, as a part of the whole, coöperating in that adjustment), then, of course, every other part of the universe, every other part of the great human organism (*i.e.*, every other individual in society) will be out of that focus, in the margin somewhere. And if consciousness is simply the process of the universe where and when it is tensional, then it is no marvel that no other part of the universe feels *this tension* just as I do. I *am* this tension, this focus of adjustment, and, as such, the whole system is represented there; the focus is the focussing *of* the entire system of the universe. (This is the infinite background of self-activity about which the idealists speak.) Each particular adjustment has but one point of highest tension (my consciousness), but there can be an infinite number of adjustments in the infinite system of the universe.

Now it is only this highest center of stress and strain that is not shared, and that is saying no more than that a thing is itself and not everything else. In a certain sense, it is true that everything is identical with everything else; but if it were absolutely identical with everything else, there would be just one 'Thing' in the universe; there would be no 'things.' Identity, so far from being inconsistent with diversity, is just the unity which runs through the diversity of things which make up the universe. To apply this to the question of consciousness, apart from the reservation just made, it simply is not true that another person cannot and does not share in my struggles. In many cases, indeed, where the individual organism seems to be in the focus of the adjustment, the real center of tension is outside. For example, a person is ill. *He* really may be suffering very little; the focal point may be in the consciousness of the friends. They suffer for him. If the focal point in that situation is there in the consciousness of those friends, it is not in the man who is ill, that is all! There cannot be two tensions unless there are two adjustments, two situations; and in that case, of course, there are two consciousnesses. Suppose that my tension did get over into yours somehow, then they would merge into one tension. If I ever did get a direct knowledge of your consciousness, then it would no longer be your consciousness but mine. This problem of the supposed uniqueness of the introspective consciousness is no greater than the problem of the uniqueness of every leaf and blade of grass in nature. Consciousness is not another realm of reality; it is simply the one world that we know in its process of reconstruction. The individual represents a node or *nisus* of energies.

Under the influence of the individualistic or introspective psychology, we have become so accustomed to regard consciousness as the private possession of the individual, that we have failed fully to appreciate the very obvious fact that consciousness is essentially social in its nature,

that there is such a thing as "inter-subjective intercourse," to use Professor Stout's term.¹⁵ Perhaps its very obviousness has retarded insight into its significance, on the principle of what one writer has called the "illusion of the near." Consciousness is no more confined to the individual than is tension. It is focussed in the individual, but just as the so-called individual organism is simply one part of the greater human organism, so what we call individual consciousness is essentially social in character. It is focussed here and there in what we call individuals, but it is the focussing of the whole system.

The child is not introspective; he may almost be said at first to have no consciousness of his own, as is shown by his extreme suggestibility. So with the hypnotic patient. So with the consciousness of primitive man and of savages. Anthropologists tell us that in early stages of social evolution the individual is still merged in the tribe; his acts are the expression, not of any individual initiative, but of the tribal consciousness.¹⁶

But the essentially social character of consciousness can be shown even in terms of our modern highly differentiated and individualistic social life, for, after all, we are more social than we are individualistic. Let us take a concrete case. Here is a saintly mother and her profligate son. The wicked acts of the wayward son may not be focal in his own consciousness (focal morally, that is), but they may be keenly felt, with shame and sorrow, by the devoted mother. Often a person is more sensitive to slander directed against the good name of another person than if directed at himself. Persons who have grown into one another's lives in an intimate way frequently become so dependent each upon the other, that neither can long outlive the other. In such cases the psychological center of gravity of each, falls outside of himself, as it were, and within the life of the other.

It is an historical accident, one might say, that my consciousness is so peculiarly mine. It may be a sign of my limitation. Instead of being a mark of my superiority, it may be rather a sign of my unsociality. The

¹⁵ Cf. his *Groundwork of Psychology*, Chap. xiv.

¹⁶ It may be that consciousness began in this generic way, that, just as the human individual consciousness emerged by slow degrees out of a sort of group consciousness, so the lower forms of consciousness first represented the tensional stress of some life problem of the species rather than any specific crisis in the life of any so-called individual organism. And, ultimately, on this principle, mental life would have begun in one great cosmic throb of feeling or pulse of cognition. But, of course, all our ordinary categories break down when we attempt to state the origin of anything. The most that we can do is to analyze our experience as we find it nearest home in our human consciousness, and then extend the explanation as far as possible, on the principle of continuity, to the lower organisms.

real genius is not only a striking individual moulding his age; he is likewise a representative man, the product of his age. Extreme individuality or uniqueness we treat as a form of insanity. The perfect type of consciousness towards which the race is moving is one in which the individual will become increasingly more dependent, not less dependent, upon the social whole. One need only mention industrial organizations as illustrations of this tendency. Individuality is coming to be conceived, not as uniqueness, unlikeness, isolation, the possession of unsharable consciousness, but as the ability to bring to a focus the greatest range of social influences. Consciousness is the interaction of persons in society. *Con* + sciousness originally meant two-persons-knowing-together. Individuals are nodes, so to speak, in the social progress, pivots upon which (social) experience turns, *loci* into which consciousness converges and whence again it irradiates, finite centers of tension in adaptation whereby and wherein the universe is reconstructed. The psychical individual is the medium or channel in and through which experience is handed on from one member of society to another. Each member of society, from this point of view, is an organ of the social whole for thus transmitting experience. And psychology, from this point of view, "is the attempt to state in detail the machinery of the individual as the instrument and organ through which social action operates."¹⁷

III

From this point of view, it will be instructive to criticize the views of certain writers who have written suggestively on the subject of the psychical and the physical in recent publications.

The view outlined above is consistent with certain arguments urged by Mr. Morton Prince¹⁸ and by Professor C. A. Strong¹⁹ concerning the relation between brain and consciousness, though not with the panpsychism which they base upon these arguments. The argument of Mr. Prince is as follows: Your brain state is a part of my experience; it is an object of my perception, not of yours. For you this brain state *is* consciousness; for me it is an object or process of change in what I call the material world, *i.e.*, in the objective world of my perception. "In other words, a mental state and these physical changes which are known in the objective world as neural undulations are one and the same thing, but the former is the actuality, the latter a mode by which it is presented

¹⁷ "Significance of the Problem of Knowledge," *University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, p. 19.

¹⁸ Summarized in the *Psych. Rev.*, Nov., 1903, pp. 650-58.

¹⁹ In his book entitled *Why the Mind has a Body*.

to the consciousness of a second person.”²⁰

This seems to be a true statement of the relation between the psychical and the physical, except that it is difficult to see why the brain process, when thus experienced from within, should be called “the actuality,” while the same brain process when viewed by a second person is only “the symbol of it.” The focus of a system is no more real than the margin or context; each is essential to give the other its reality; in truth, each is necessary in order that the other should have any existence at all.

The problem of “how a subjective fact comes to be perceived as an objective fact; or how a feeling comes to be presented to us as a vibration”; *i.e.*, the problem of why the focus of this system appears as a marginal element in some other system is a problem, to be sure. It is the fundamental problem of why Being is such as it is. But it is no more of a problem here than it is elsewhere. Why what is mental for me is physical for you, is no more of a problem than why the leaf on the tree is different from the blade of grass.

With Dr. Prince’s statement that “there is only one process,”²¹ and that that process, *as process*, is “psychical,” we may fully agree; but this process has also a content, not only when viewed by another person, but when introspectively (retrospectively) viewed by myself. Thus viewed *as content*, it is physical (it may be social, ethical, economic, psychological, etc.). It is not a different reality when viewed thus as content, any more than the context of a dynamic system is a different system from the focus. Why should we attempt to reduce the context to terms of the focus any more than the reverse? Why, that is, should we seek to reduce the physical to the psychical, as does Dr. Prince?

Dr. Prince’s illustration of the kaleidoscope is admirably adapted to show, not the exclusive reality of the “wonderful variegated mosaic” seen within, but the reality equally of the “little pieces of colored glass thrown higgledy-piggledy together” which are seen from without. The one is as true and as real a view as the other. Why should we attempt to reduce what we see from the outside to terms exclusively of what we see on the inside?

Another interesting phase of the argument presented by Dr. Prince is that embodied in the following supposititious case, which is here modified slightly for the sake of simplification. Let us suppose two persons, by means of some X-ray appliance, to be perceiving each other’s brain states. Then, according to the theory propounded by both Dr. Prince and Professor Strong, the reality is the consciousness which each has. The brain state which each perceives is simply a symbol of the

²⁰ P. 651.

²¹ P. 653.

reality in the consciousness of the other.

But now suppose, by some device, that one of these persons turns his instrument upon his own brain state. He still, on the theory propounded by these writers, would see only brain state. His own brain state, in this case, would likewise be only a symbol. But a symbol of what? A symbol of his own consciousness, of course. But, by hypothesis, this symbol is a part of his own consciousness.²² The symbol must then be as real as his consciousness, which, according to Dr. Prince, is the only reality. Reality, then, includes both the psychical and the physical, both the consciousness and the brain state. How, then, can consciousness or the psychical be the only reality, *i.e.*, how can panpsychism be true?

Professor Strong uses the following illustration: Let us suppose that some future physiologist finds means "to isolate the brain and keep it artificially alive, and then, connecting his instruments with the stumps of the cerebral nerves, impart to them impulses so like those they have been accustomed to receive from the eye, the ear, and the skin that the brain's possessor...will see, hear, and feel like a normal person, and never know what had happened to him."²³ "We have only to suppose, after the laying-bare of the brain-tissue and the application of the hyper-microscope, an arrangement of mirrors to be brought to bear, in such wise as to reflect the light-rays traversing the microscope into the subject's eyes. This happy mortal would then...be simultaneously conscious of a feeling and of the accompanying brain event. This suggests a curious deduction. Suppose the feeling happened to be a perception, and the perception that of the very brain event in question; then mental state and correlated brain-event would apparently for that mind be fused into one."²⁴

This "curious deduction," which Professor Strong rejects, would seem rather to be the true one. He rejects it on the ground that the object of perception always follows and is the effect of the consciousness in which it is a perception. In this case, he maintains that the brain state would be subsequent to the mental state, *i.e.*, to the consciousness of the brain state. But, waiving the question of the validity of psychical causality, and waiving the question of how the content could be temporally subsequent to the process of a perception, is not this an indefensible position even on the basis of his own theory of consciousness? He has at considerable length defended the doctrine that "consciousness is correlated, strictly speaking, with a process occupying the entire sensory-motor arc and extending from the sense-organs to the muscles."²⁵ How, then, in

²² "That which we call the physical brain-process is my consciousness or perception of it." P. 652.

²³ P. 41.

²⁴ Pp. 339-40.

this instance, could one part of the organic circuit, or sensori-motor arc, be subsequent to another, if consciousness is correlated only with the whole circuit? How could my brain state, which, in this supposititious case, is the object of my perception, be subsequent to my consciousness of that brain state, if that consciousness is the correlate, not of any part, but only of the whole circuit, – not only of brain states, but of sense organs and muscles?

Of course, to have a complete perception of this brain state, it would be just as incumbent upon me to *touch* this cerebral tissue with the finger or dissecting needle as to *see* it with the retina and microscope. In this case, the two portions of the organic circuit (brain tissue and finger, let us say) would be immediately adjacent, and the illustration becomes even more suggestive, and the absurdity even more apparent, of supposing that the perceived object (the brain state) could be subsequent in time to the perceiving subject.

The psychical and the physical, consciousness and brain state, thus are one, as Professor Strong says, but not in the sense that the brain state reduces to a mode of consciousness, not in the sense of panpsychism. Consciousness and brain state are one reality, but this reality is no more truly expressed in the consciousness than in the brain state, in panpsychism than in pan-physicism. There is a difference between consciousness and brain state, but it is not the difference of one being more real than the other. It is the difference between that reality when in a tensional phase and when in a state of relative equilibrium. It is a distinction of function or meaning rather than of structure or existence.

Professor Royce, in his *Outlines of Psychology*, distinguishes between the physical (or ‘public’) and the psychical (or ‘private’) kinds of experience. “Physical facts are... ‘public property,’ patent to all properly equipped observers... . But psychical facts are essentially ‘private property,’ existent for one alone.” “The mental life of each one of us can be directly present, as a series of experienced facts, to one person only.”²⁵ “The fact that other persons cannot directly watch our inner physiological processes, is itself something relatively accidental, dependent upon the limitations of the sense organs, or upon the defective instrumental devices, of those who watch us. But the fact that our mental states are incapable of observation by anybody but ourselves seems to be not an accidental, but an essential character of these mental states. Were physiologists better endowed with sense organs and with instruments of exact observation, we can, if we choose, conceive them as, by some now unknown device, coming to watch the very molecules

²⁵ Pp. 46–47.

²⁶ P. 2

of our brains; but we cannot conceive them, in any possible case, as observing from without our pains or our thoughts in the sense in which physical facts are observable... . No microscope could conceivably reveal them. To me alone would these states be known. And I should not see them from without; I should simply *find* them, or *be aware* of them. And what it is to find them, or to be aware of them, I alone can tell myself."²⁷

In *The World and the Individual*,²⁸ Professor Royce suggests that the difference between the psychical and the physical is simply a difference in time-span, "that we have no right whatever to speak of really unconscious nature, but only of uncommunicative nature, or of nature whose mental processes go on at such different time-rates from ours that we cannot adjust ourselves to a live appreciation of their inward fluency."²⁹

It may be pointed out, in the first place, that these two views of the relation between the psychical and the physical, are scarcely consistent. If the difference is simply one of time-span, then the two would seem to belong to a continuous series of phenomena, their difference being one of degree rather than of kind. The problem would here be as to why just this rather than that time-span is accompanied by the particular kind of consciousness which we know in ourselves. A very important point in the dynamic theory would be the determination of the temporal limits of the tension which is the condition of consciousness.

But, according to the view set forth in the *Outlines*, the difference is one of kind. "Mental life has thus been defined by pointing out its contrast with all that is physical."³⁰ "How shall psychology progress, if, in our various mental lives, no two observers can ever take note of precisely the same facts?"³¹ The answer finally is that "psychology is concerned with what is common to many or to all human minds,"³² the position taken being the same as that of Professor Baldwin in his *Development and Evolution*, when he says that the data of psychology are psychological, not psychic. But, if this is true, then psychology is on no different basis methodologically from biology or physiology; they are equally objective sciences.

What, then, is the significance of this discussion of the psychical and the physical as 'private' and 'public,' respectively? The psychical as such

²⁷ Pp. 4–5.

²⁸ Vol. ii, pp. 211–42.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22–56.

³⁰ P. 5.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² P. 17.

is never the datum of psychology. Psychology is “concerned with what is common to many or to all human minds.” But the only thing that is common or public is physical, not psychical. Hence, as a science, psychology no more deals with the psychical than does physics or biology. If by the psychical is meant my own private mental states, as Professor Royce insists at some length, then we are forced to one of two conclusions: either there can be no science of psychology (since there can be no science of the individual, of the particular), or the psychical is not the datum of psychology. But neither he nor we would be willing to accept either of these conclusions in this unqualified form. What is the truth in the matter?

The truth lies in seeing that this distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ is a functional, not a fixed one. A psychical fact is no more private than any other fact, except as it is taken as such; it is its being taken as such that makes it psychical. This Professor Royce has himself well illustrated in his critique of the doctrine of conscious elements already mentioned,³³ where he shows that the element or unit with which psychological analysis operates is not a preëxistent conscious state, but is brought into being in the act of analysis; the element *is* only as it is thus constructed. It is a fact only in the sense in which every scientific construct, such as the atom or the electron, is a fact.

‘Public’ and ‘private’ are relative or functional terms. There is no experience which is absolutely public or absolutely private. To recur to the illustration of the focus and marginal context, there is nothing which is absolutely focus and the rest context; it is a matter of the interest or purpose of the situation whether the focus be taken as a mathematical point, as a spot, or as a smaller within a larger area. This is more consistent with Professor Royce’s statement that the distinction is “only a relative distinction due to the special conditions to which our human knowledge or both these worlds is subject.”³⁴ The implication of this, as well as of much that he says in *The World and the Individual*, is that for a higher intelligence the psychical and the physical would be seen to be one, but that to our finite minds there are two worlds, an internal and an external, a private and a public, a psychical and a physical.

But it is just the contention of the functional view that these two are, under certain conditions, one in *our* experience as truly as in the experience of a transcendent intelligence. Psychical and physical are a unity in every act; the duality is the duality of consciousness, of thought. Of course, the unity of action is not a bare unity; it is a unity of the differences represented in consciousness. So, on the other hand, the

³³ Pp. 97 f.

³⁴ P. 2, note.

duality or diversity of consciousness is not a bare diversity; it is a diversity, a duality, set up within the unity of action, and is thus itself a phase of activity.

Like Dr. Prince and Professor Strong, Professor Royce uses the illustration of the brain states. "Were my body as transparent as crystal, or could all my internal physical functions be viewed and studied as easily as one now observes a few small particles eddying in a glass of nearly clear water, my mental states could not even then be seen floating in my brain."³⁵ But let us suppose, as before, that I turned the instrument upon my own brain, and upon the very brain state concerned in my present state of consciousness. Here it would appear that this brain state is at once 'public' and 'private,' since it is at once a presentation in my consciousness and at the same time a neural state observable by another. What, then, here becomes of the distinction between the psychical and the physical? If it be objected that the brain state as presented in my consciousness is not the consciousness of the brain state, that the content of perception is not the same as the process of perception itself, it may well be asked how a perception of a brain state would, in that case, differ from any other perception. It is just the content which makes one state of consciousness different from another state of consciousness.

The analysis of this supposititious case suggests two important conclusions: first, that consciousness is to be correlated with nothing less than a complete organic circuit, involving the whole context of external nature as truly as the internal mechanism of the nervous system; second, that the condition of consciousness is a certain tension within this system or organic circuit, and that where this is absent (as in the supposititious case, where the object of the perception, – the brain state, – is itself the organic circuit) the psychical and the physical merge, consciousness vanishes.

That the time-span is an important condition of consciousness is not only probable but demonstrable. Experimental psychology has for one of the chief objects of its investigation the measurement of the temporal limits of the organic tension which finds its expression in consciousness.

THE POSTULATE OF IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM

John Dewey. "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism." *Journal of Philosophy* 2.15 (20 July 1905): 393–99. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 3 (1977), pp. 158–67.

The criticisms made upon that vital but still unformed movement variously termed radical empiricism, pragmatism, humanism, functionalism, according as one or another aspect of it is uppermost, have left me with a conviction that the *fundamental* difference is not so much in matters overtly discussed as in a presupposition which remains tacit: a presupposition as to what experience is and means. To do my little part in clearing up the confusion, I shall try to make my own presupposition explicit. The object of this paper is, then, to set forth what I understand to be the postulate and the criterion of *immediate empiricism*.¹

Immediate empiricism postulates that things – anything, everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term ‘thing’ – are what they are experienced as. Hence, if one wishes to describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as being. If it is a horse which is to be described, or the *equus* which is to be defined, then must the horse-trader, or the jockey, or the timid family man who wants a ‘safe driver,’ or the zoologist or the paleontologist tell us what the horse is which is experienced. If these accounts turn out different in some respects, as well as congruous in others, this is no reason for assuming the content of one to be exclusively ‘real,’ and that of others to be ‘phenomenal’; for each account of what is experienced will manifest that it is the account *of* the horse-dealer, or *of* the zoologist, etc., and hence will give the conditions requisite for understanding the differences as well as the agreements of

¹ All labels are, of course, obnoxious and misleading. I hope, however, the term will be taken by the reader in the sense in which it is forthwith explained, and not in some more usual and familiar sense. Empiricism, as herein used, is as antipodal to sensationalistic empiricism, as it is to transcendentalism, and for the same reason. Both of these systems fall back on something which is defined in non-directly-experienced terms in order to justify that which is directly experienced. Hence I have criticized such empiricism (*Phil. Rev.*, Vol. XI., No. 4, p. 364) as essentially absolutistic in character; and also (‘Studies in Logical Theory,’ p. 30, 58) as an attempt to build up experience in terms of certain methodological checks and cues of attaining *certainty* in knowledge.

the various accounts. And the principle varies not a whit if we bring in the psychologist's horse, the logician's horse or the metaphysician's horse.

In each case, the nub of the question is, *what sort of experience* is meant or indicated: a concrete and determinate experience, varying, when it varies, in specific real elements, and agreeing, when it agrees, in specific real elements, so that we have a contrast, not between *a* Reality, and various approximations to, or phenomenal representations of Reality, but between different reals of experience. And the reader is begged to bear in mind that from this standpoint, when 'an experience' or 'some sort of experience' is referred to, 'some thing' or 'some sort of thing' is always meant.

Now, this statement that things are what they are experienced to be is usually translated into the statement that things (or, ultimately, Reality, Being) *are* only and just what they are *known* to be or that things are, or Reality *is*, what it is for a conscious knower – whether the knower be conceived primarily as a perceiver or as a thinker being a further and secondary question. This is the root-paralogism of all idealisms, whether subjective or objective, psychological or epistemological. By our postulate, things are what they are experienced to be; and, unless knowing is the sole and only genuine mode of experiencing, it is fallacious to say that Reality is just and exclusively what it is or would be to an all-competent all-knower; or even that it *is*, relatively and piecemeal, what it is to a finite and partial knower. Or, put more positively, knowing is one mode of experiencing, and the primary philosophic demand (from the stand-point of immediatism) is to find out *what* sort of an experience knowing is – or, concretely how things are experienced when they are experienced *as* known things.² By concretely is meant, obviously enough (among other things), such an account of the experience of things as known that will bring out the characteristic traits and distinctions they possess as things of a knowing experience, as compared with things experienced esthetically, or morally, or economically, or technologically, etc. To assume, because from the standpoint of the knowledge experience things *are* what they are known to be, that, therefore, metaphysically, absolutely, without qualification, everything in its reality (as distinct from its 'appearance,' or phenomenal occurrence) is what a knower would find it to be, is, from the immediatist's

² I hope the reader will not therefore assume that from the empiricist's standpoint knowledge is of small worth or import. On the contrary, from the empiricist's standpoint it has *all* the worth which it is concretely experienced as possessing – which is simply tremendous. But the exact *nature* of this worth is a thing to be found out in describing what we mean by experiencing objects as known – the actual differences made or found in experience.

standpoint, if not the root of all philosophic evil, at least one of its main roots.

For example, I start and am flustered by a noise heard. Empirically, that noise *is* fearsome; it *really* is, not merely phenomenally or subjectively so. That is *what* it is experienced as being. But, when I experience the noise as a *known* thing, I find it to be innocent of harm. It is the tapping of a shade against the window, owing to movements of the wind. The experience has changed; that is, the thing experienced has changed – not that an unreality has given place to a reality, nor that some transcendental (unexperienced) Reality has changed,³ not that truth has changed, but just and only the concrete reality experienced has changed. I now feel ashamed of my fright; and the noise as fearsome is changed to noise as a wind-curtain fact, and hence practically indifferent to my welfare. This is a change of experienced reality effected through the medium of cognition. The content of the latter experience cognitively regarded is doubtless *truer* than the content of the earlier; but it is in no sense more real. To call it truer, moreover, must, from the empirical standpoint, mean a concrete *difference* in actual things experienced.⁴ Again, in many cases, it is only in retrospect that the prior experience is cognitively regarded at all. In such cases, it is only in regard to contrasted contents *in* the subsequent experience that the determination ‘truer’ has force.

Perhaps some reader may now object that as matter of fact the entire experience *is* cognitive, but that the earlier parts of it are only imperfectly so, resulting in a phenomenon which is not real; while the latter part, being a more complete cognition, results in what is relatively, at least, more real.⁵ In short, a critic may say that, when I was frightened

³ Since the non-empiricist believes in things-in-themselves (which he may term ‘atoms,’ ‘sensations,’ transcendental unities, *a priori* concepts, *an* absolute experience, or whatever), and since he finds that the empiricist makes much of change (as he must, since change is continuously experienced) he assumes that the empiricist means that *his own* non-empirical Realities are in continual flux, and he naturally shudders at having his divinities so violently treated. But, once recognize that the empiricist doesn’t have any such Realities at all, and the entire problem of the relation of change to reality takes a very different aspect.

⁴ It would lead us aside from the point to try to tell just what is the nature of the experienced difference we call truth. Professor James’s recent articles may well be consulted. The point to bear in mind here is just what sort of a thing the empiricist must mean by true, or truer (the noun Truth is, of course, a generic name for all cases of ‘Trues’). The adequacy of any particular account is not a matter to be settled by general reasoning, but by finding out what sort of an experience the truth-experience actually is.

⁵ I say ‘relatively,’ because the transcendentalist still holds that finally the cognition is imperfect, giving us only some symbol or phenomenon of Reality (which *is* only in the

by the noise, I *knew* I was frightened; otherwise there would have been no experience at all. At this point, it is necessary to make a distinction so simple and yet so all-fundamental that I am afraid the reader will be inclined to pooh-pooh it away as a mere verbal distinction. But to see that *to the empiricist* this distinction is not verbal, but real, is the precondition of any understanding of him. The immediatist must, by his postulate, ask what is the fright experienced *as*. Is what is actually experienced, I-know-I-am-frightened, or I-am-frightened? I see absolutely no reason for claiming that the experience *must* be described by the former phrase. In all probability (and all the empiricist logically needs is just one case of which this is true) the experience is simply and just of fright-at-the-noise. Later one may (or may not) have an experience describable *as* I-know-I-am- (-or-was) and improperly or properly, frightened. But this is a different experience – that is, a different *thing*. And if the critic goes on to urge that the person ‘*really*’ must have known that he was frightened, I can only point out that the critic is shifting the venue. He may be right, but, if so, it is only because the ‘*really*’ is something not concretely experienced (whose nature accordingly is the critic’s business); and this is to depart from the empiricist’s point of view, to attribute to him a postulate which he expressly repudiates.

The material point may come out more clearly if I say that we must make a distinction between a thing as *cognitive*, and one as *cognized*.⁶ I should define a cognitive experience as one which has certain bearings or implications which induce and fulfill themselves in a subsequent experience in which the relevant thing is experienced *as* cognized, *as* a known object, and is thereby transformed, or reorganized. The fright-at-the-noise in the case cited is obviously *cognitive*, in this sense. By description, it induces an investigation or inquiry in which both noise and fright are objectively stated or presented – the noise as a shade-wind fact, the fright as an organic reaction to a sudden acoustic stimulus, a reaction which under the given circumstances was useless or even detrimental, a maladaptation. Now, pretty much all of experience is of this sort (the ‘*is*’ meaning, of course, is experienced *as*), and the empiricist is false to his principle if he does not duly note this fact.⁷ But he is equally

Absolute or in some Thing-in-Itself) – otherwise the curtain-wind fact would have as much ontological reality as the existence of the Absolute itself: a conclusion at which the non-empiricist perhorresces, for no reason obvious to me – save that it would put an end to his transcendentalism.

⁶ In general, I think the distinction between *-ive* and *-ed* one of the most fundamental of philosophic distinctions, and one of the most neglected. The same holds of *-tion* and *-ing*.

⁷ What is criticized, now as ‘geneticism’ (if I may coin the word) and now as ‘prag-

false to his principle if he permits himself to be confused as to the concrete differences in the two things experienced.

There are two little words through explication of which the empiricist's position may be brought out – '*as*' and '*that*.' We may express his presupposition by saying that things are what they are experienced *as* being; or that to give a just account of anything is to tell what *that* thing is experienced to be. By these words I want to indicate the absolute, final, irreducible and inexpugnable concrete *quale* which everything experienced not so much *has* as *is*. To grasp this aspect of empiricism is to see what the empiricist means by objectivity, by the element of control, a principle of guidance and selection, the normative or standard element in experience. Suppose we take, as a crucial case for the empiricist, an out and out illusion, say of Zöllner's lines. These are experienced as convergent; they are 'truly' parallel. If things are what they are experienced as being, how can there be the distinction that we draw between illusion and the true state of the case? There is no answer to this question except by sticking to the fact that the experience of the lines as divergent is a concrete qualitative thing or *that*. It is *that* experience which it is, and no other. And if the reader rebels at the iteration of such obvious tautology, I can only reiterate that the realization of the *meaning* of this tautology is the key to the whole question of the objectivity of experience, as that stands to the empiricist. The lines of *that* experience *are* divergent: not merely *seem* so. The question of truth is not as to whether Being or Non-Being, Reality or mere Appearance, is experienced, but as to the *worth* of a certain concretely experienced thing. The only way of passing upon this question is by sticking in the most uncompromising fashion to *that* experience as real. *That* experience is that two lines with certain cross-hatchings are apprehended as convergent; only by taking that experience as real and as fully real, is there any basis for or way of going to an experienced knowledge that the lines are parallel. It is in the concrete thing *as experienced* that all the grounds and clues to its own intellectual or logical rectification are contained. It is because this thing, afterwards adjudged false, is a concrete *that*, that it develops into a corrected experience (that is, experience of a corrected thing – we reform things just as we reform ourselves or a bad boy) whose full content is not a whit more real, but which is experienced as true or as truer.

If *any* experience, then a *determinate* experience; and this determinateness is the only, and is the adequate, principle of control, or

matism' is, in its truth, just the fact that the empiricist does take account of the experienced 'drift, occasion and contexture' of things experienced – to use Hobbes's phrase.

'objectivity.' The experience may be of the vaguest sort. I may not see any thing which I can identify as a familiar object – a table, a chair, etc. It may be dark; I may have only the vaguest impression that there is something which looks like a table. Or I may be completely befogged and confused, as when one rises quickly from sleep in a pitch-dark room. But this vagueness, this doubtfulness, this confusion is the thing experienced, and, *qua* real, is as 'good' a reality as the self-luminous vision of an Absolute. It is not just vagueness, doubtfulness, confusion, at large or in general. It is *this* vagueness, and no other; absolutely unique, absolutely what *it* is.⁸ Whatever gain in clearness, in fullness, in trueness of content is experienced must grow out of some element in the experience of *this* experienced *as* what it is. To return to the illusion: If the experience of the lines as convergent is illusory, it is because of some elements in the thing as experienced, not because of something defined in terms of externality to this particular experience. If the illusoriness can be detected, it is because the thing experienced is real, having within its experienced reality elements whose *own mutual* transcendence effects its reconstruction. Taken concretely, the experience of convergent lines contains within itself the elements of the transformation of its own content. It is *this* thing, and not some separate truth, which clamors for its own reform. There is, then, from the empiricist's point of view, no need to search for some aboriginal *that* to which all successive experiences are attached, and which is somehow thereby undergoing continuous change. Experience is always of *thats*; and the most comprehensive and inclusive experience of the universe which the philosopher himself can obtain is the experience of a characteristic *that*. From the empiricist's point of view, this is as true of the exhaustive and complete insight of a hypothetical all-knower as of the vague, blind experience of the awakened sleeper. As reals, they stand on the same level. As trues, the latter has by definition the better of it; but if this insight is in any way the truth of the blind awakening, it is because the latter has, in its *own* determinate *quale*, elements of real continuity with the former; it is, *ex hypothesi*, transformable through a series of experienced reals, without break of continuity into the absolute thought-experience. There is no need of logical manipulation to effect the transformation, nor *could* any logical consideration effect it. If effected at all it is just by immediate experiences, each of which is just as real (no more, no less) as either of the two terms between which it lies. Such, at least, is the meaning of the empiricist's contention. So, when he talks of experience, he does not

⁸ One does not so easily escape medieval Realism as one thinks. Either every experienced thing has its own determinateness, its own unsubstitutable, unredeemable reality, or else 'generals' are separate existences after all.

mean some grandiose, remote affair which is cast like a net around a succession of fleeting experiences; he does not mean an indefinite total, comprehensive experience which somehow engirdles an endless flux; he means that *things* are what they are experienced to be, and that every experience is *some* thing.

From the postulate of empiricism, then (or, what is the same thing, from a *general* consideration of the concept of experience), nothing can be deduced, not a single philosophical proposition.⁹ The reader may hence conclude that all this just comes to the truism that experience is experience, or is what it is. If one attempts to draw conclusions from the bare concept of experience, the reader is quite right. But the real significance of the principle is that of a method of philosophical analysis – a method identical in kind (but differing in problem and hence in operation) with that of the scientist. If you wish to find out what subjective, objective, physical, mental, cosmic, psychic, cause, substance, purpose, activity, evil, being, quantity – any philosophic term, in short – means, go to experience and see what it is experienced *as*.

Such a method is not spectacular; it permits of no offhand demonstrations of God, freedom, immortality, nor of the exclusive reality of matter, or ideas, or consciousness, etc. But it supplies a way of telling what all these terms mean. It may seem insignificant, or chillingly disappointing, but only upon condition that it be not worked. Philosophic conceptions have, I believe, outlived their usefulness considered as stimulants to emotion, or as a species of sanctions; and a larger, more fruitful and more valuable career awaits them considered as specifically experienced meanings.

⁹ Excepting, of course, some negative ones. One could say that certain views are certainly *not* true, because, by hypothesis, they refer to nonentities, *i.e.*, non-empiricals. But even here the empiricist must go slowly. From his own standpoint, even the most professedly transcendental statements are, after all, real as experiences, and hence negotiate some transaction with facts. For this reason, he can not, in theory, reject them *in toto*, but has to show concretely how they arose and how they are to be corrected. In a word, his logical relationship to statements that profess to relate to things-in-themselves, unknowables, inexperienced substances, etc., is precisely that of the psychologist to the Zöllner lines.

CAN EPISTEMOLOGY BE BASED ON MENTAL STATES?

James H. Tufts. "Can Epistemology Be Based on Mental States?"
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A long-suffering public is not unjustly shy of polemics upon the theory of knowledge. If the age of Kant had become weary of "dogmatism, which teaches us nothing, and scepticism, which does not even promise us anything," our own time has reason, it must be confessed, to be wary of criticism which does not always seem to settle anything.

On the practical side there is no difficulty. Modern science has found a method which works. Abandoning the search for forms and essences, separating and abstracting precisely those aspects of experience with which it wishes to deal, natural science has analyzed these and resolved them in terms of its chosen unit. The social sciences, with greater or less degrees of clearness, are abstracting their aspects of experience, and seeking the unit in terms of which they may formulate their analyses. But the theory of knowledge still suffers from failure to recognize just what aspect of experience it is to study, what the terms are in which it would state its problem, and what the end is which human knowledge must set before itself as its goal. Two hundred years of epistemology¹ find the doctors still at issue as to its first principles, and employing methods and conceptions which either explicitly or implicitly make doubtful or impossible the very existence of knowledge itself.

No better illustration of this lack of clearness could be cited than the comparatively recent discussion in the pages of this REVIEW and of *Mind* over the problem of epistemology. The protagonist in the discussion, as was evident from his explanations and replies, was actuated by essentially the same epistemological motive as the other participants, namely, to show the fallacies of subjective idealism and agnosticism. He took as his data, however, the subjective 'ideas' or 'states of consciousness' of

¹ Professor Ladd speaks of his *Philosophy of Knowledge* as a 'pioneer work,' but it would be as true to say that since Locke nearly all English writing on theoretical philosophy has dealt with the theory of knowledge, and this is conspicuously true of work since T. H. Green's *Introduction to Hume*.

the individual with which Locke attempted to start; asserted that the reality to be known was 'existentially outside of consciousness'; stated that the problem is how to bridge this epistemological 'chasm'; and found the root of subjective idealism to be the failure to recognize a 'trans-subjective reference' on the part of the mental states to a reality outside of them. It was, then, comparatively easy for one critic to find that the problem, when thus stated, made knowledge impossible, and agnosticism unavoidable; while another critic found in the implicit contradictions of the problem an evidence that there is no such science as epistemology.

As further illustration, so keen a writer as the author of *Appearance and Reality*, in spite of his brilliant chapter on "Things-in-Themselves," maintains that "our experience where relational is not true." He seems to imply by oft-repeated emphasis that because the 'what' of knowledge and the 'that' of reality are not to be identified, we are thereby deprived of something which we want, and that this deprivation is not merely quantitative, but qualitative, so that knowledge is not merely limited in range, but so 'infected' by the fact that it is thought and not being that, in the words of Dr. Ward, the author seems to be "hounding it on to a happy suicide by taunting it with being false thought so long as it remains thought at all."

If agnosticism can be detected as implicit in the conceptions of its most strenuous critics, it is not surprising that the non-professional mind should be subject to some misgivings as to the possibility of any certainty in knowledge, or even of any foundations of belief. I think that the general attitude of our age toward its doctors of philosophy and religion is well expressed in the question of an intelligent woman, who knew neither Comte nor Spencer, had perhaps never heard in set terms of the 'relativity of knowledge,' and yet felt the temper of our literature and life: "You talk about 'truth,' and 'good,' and 'right,' but how do you *know* anything about them? How can you be sure that it isn't all just our point of view? How do you know that the *reality* may not be entirely different?" The central problem of the theory of knowledge could scarcely be more sharply formulated, and the presuppositions with which the problem has usually been approached by the philosopher, and is still approached by the common mind, could scarcely be more clearly expressed. These presuppositions are those underlying a theory which takes ideas or mental states as its starting-point, and really involves a 'copy' theory of knowledge.

A 'copy' theory proceeds as follows. It is assumed that there is one thing called 'reality' and another thing called 'thought,' and that in knowledge the second thing tries to do something to the first thing. Just what this something is maybe variously conceived. The mind not

'debauched by metaphysics' considers that thought is to 'copy' or 'be like' reality. A true idea is one that resembles its object. The metaphysician may state in more attenuated language that thought is to 'represent' or 'stand for' or 'refer to' reality. He may resent the charge that he is to be classed with those who naively use the first set of expressions, and may even assert that his language implies that thought does not copy, but the fundamental attitude is really the same. Reality is 'there'; the table, one portion of reality, is 'outside my consciousness.' We want to know reality as it 'is,' not as it appears. In every case, reality is more or less consciously assumed to be external. This assumption carries with it as necessary consequences the following positions: -

First, if reality is external, then our criterion of truth must be external also. For, if it be the business of thought to copy or represent reality, the test of the accuracy of the copy must be found in some imagined comparison of the copy with the original, of the 'idea' with the reality, and thought itself can never make this comparison, can never get 'outside' consciousness to see whether its representation is adequate, or whether the reality to which it 'refers' is really out 'there.' Secondly, an external criterion of this sort makes the very conception of truth and knowledge a contradiction in terms, since it is obvious that no one can ever know that his copy is like, his idea true, his signs adequate representations. In the language of the question cited above, it is certainly impossible to "know that the reality is not entirely different," if by 'reality' we mean something 'outside consciousness,' or outside experience. Nor will it help us to set up the criterion of logical consistency, for if our reality is external to the 'state' which knows it, no consistency within that state will afford any guarantee for the reality without. We may 'reckon with signs,' but we have no external check upon our conclusion. Thirdly, the copy-theory has often, though not always, implied that the more passive the mind is in the reception of this copy, the better the copy. Just as realism in art has often insisted that the artist must copy nature without intruding any of his own interpretation or point of view, so this theory of knowledge, which might fittingly be called 'realism,' maintains that if the mind adds anything to its photograph, anything 'general' or 'relational,' it is spoiling the work and infecting the result with 'universality,' or 'relativity,' or subjectivity, in some form. It is natural, therefore, that any view of knowledge which employs all or any of the foregoing presuppositions as its data, should find its logical outcome in agnosticism, however strenuously its upholders may protest against any such intention, or deny any such doctrine.

It is not necessary for our purpose to recapitulate in detail the history of this 'way of ideas' or copy-theory. Plato's conception of reality as

constituting a world by itself which the soul had seen in a previous state of existence, Democritus' theory of the *eidola*, Aristotle's doctrine that the knowing subject takes the 'form' of the object though not its matter, – all these blended in mediaeval psychology,² and gave the concept of 'species' and its modern counterpart 'idea,' which soon assumed a foremost place, and as 'idea' (or in slightly different guise as 'mental state') has not yet ceased to vex psychology and epistemology. Modern writers who begin with the 'existence' of ideas or 'mental states,' and attempt to argue to some other trans-subjective or extra-mental reality, are really struggling with their problem in terms similar to those of Descartes when he argues that the cause of an idea must have as much formal reality as the idea has 'objective' or representative reality. Their task is beset by the same difficulties which Kant experienced, who worked out 'refutation of idealism' after refutation to the number of six, and even then was not clear as to what sort of 'things' he had really proved to exist, and as to 'where' the *Ding ausser mir* really was.

The problem as commonly stated is, in fact, very similar to the puzzle which for a time every psychologist felt bound to solve, namely, the puzzle of erect vision in spite of the inverted image upon the retina. Assuming the reality of this image we have a question admirably adapted to exercise the ingenuity. But the problem ceased to be so baffling when at last it was remembered that there is no image on the retina – except for the physicist or physiologist. The psychologist, in his problem of vision, has nothing to do with this 'fiction' which the other sciences find a convenient construct. The 'idea,' or 'state of consciousness,' is for the epistemologist precisely what the retinal image is for the psychologist, – a fiction with which he has nothing to do. To assume its reality is 'realism' in the scholastic sense.

It may help to make clear the ambiguity involved, if we ask what is meant by the subject, or the individual, or the self, outside of which the reality is supposed to 'exist' or 'stretch away.' It must be (a) the self of common life, or (b) the self of the psychologist, or (c) the mere 'subject' of all cognitive states, or (d) the self or individual of metaphysics.

As to (a), it is perfectly true that there is something outside this self, because *this self is itself an object in space and time*. It includes my interests and purposes, but it includes also my body or, at the very least, the upper part of my head. Common life, including courts of law and most of the sciences, deals with this objective self, and here it is perfectly true that the table is outside of me, because 'me' has certain spatial limits.

² H. Schwarz, in *Die Umwälzung der Wahrnehmungshypothesen*, gives an instructive account of this.

This objective character of the self of common life is simply repeated in other terms in (b), the self of the psychologist. For, though we frequently speak of this self as subjective, it is really a bodily self, and so just as objective as the body, – or just as subjective, according to our standpoint. In any case they stand or fall together. The psychologist's self is, as James points out, largely made up of certain bodily 'feels,' and is probably never detached from certain cerebral sensations. This self or subject is just as frankly outward as anything else. If it be objected that the 'feels' or sensations are still surely 'feels' and not things, and therefore are subjective, the reply is they are just as much feeling as the other 'things,' – tables and chairs, – and *not a whit more*. The table for the empirical psychologist is just as 'subjective' as the self, and this was the exact point of view of Berkeley and Hume. It was easy for them to show that things are subjective just because their subject was not a subject at all, but a certain group of their sensations or, as Hume said, "some particular perception of heat or cold, pain or pleasure." The criticism usually passed on these authors that they ignore the trans-subjective reference of ideas, or the extra-mental reality, seems to me to miss the point absolutely. The essence of their position is that their subject is never anything but an object, and from the psychologist's standpoint which they assume, all objects, whether of the more intimate sort called 'self,' or of the less intimate sort called 'things,' are alike external to each other, and alike 'internal and perishing existences.' In brief, it is perfectly consistent to talk about things or reality being extra-mental, or trans-subjective, or outside of consciousness in this sense, because both terms are here on the same level, both are objective, the consciousness just as truly as the things, – perfectly consistent, but hardly worth while except for the empirical psychologist analyzing these objects, or the man of practical life relating them.

Let us turn now to (c), the self as logical subject, the self with which it would seem that the theory of knowledge might properly have to do. Here, it may be said, we get that separation between subject and object which constitutes the epistemological chasm, for here of course subject is just not-object, and object is what is set over against subject. Here, then, it would seem, lies the epistemologist's problem and opportunity, but I venture to assert that there is no intelligible meaning in talking about a trans-subjective reality in this sphere. For what are subject and object in this sphere? Object is simply the counterpart of subject, and subject the correlate of object. More precisely, if we start from the point of view of the preceding sphere, objects are feelings categorized, constituted as things or events, including myself as one of them; the subject is the 'I' which is always identical just because it is the correlate of a unified world of objects. To start, and more properly, from the other

end, object and subject are for the theory of knowledge simply the abstractions of the whole of conscious experience. They are poles *within* consciousness, and the object, reality and all, is just as much within as the subject. To ask for a reality which shall be outside consciousness or extra-mental in this sense, is to ask for a something outside of knowledge, a thing-in-itself in the sense of an unknown and unknowable because a contradiction in terms.

This seems to be the place to consider the judgment which is supposed to mark off thought from reality in its very form. But surely it is not a reality outside consciousness which is indicated. When I say "This is a table," the 'this' is just as much in consciousness as the 'table.' What I have before me is a certain content which I proceed to define by my analysis and judgment. But, it is objected, even Kant recognized that the judgment had an objective reference. True, but objective in what sense? "A judgment is nothing but the mode of bringing given cognitions into the objective unity of apperception." The reference is to something objective in the sense of universal, as opposed to subjective in the sense of peculiar to individual imagination or memory. It is, therefore, to *the whole sphere of reality* as contrasted with a portion of that sphere, not to reality as opposed to thought. Least of all is it to reality outside of consciousness or outside the self. For the self, merely as correlate of the object, is as universal as the object, and is nothing individual at all. It is, in other words, a logical abstraction.

There remains the self of metaphysics, the individual. Is this the self that is referred to in the phrases 'trans-subjective,' 'outside of consciousness,' and 'extra-mental'? There does not seem to be complete consistency on this point. Professor Seth³ speaks of 'states of the individual,' and says: "The individual stands related to his own experience." From this we might suppose that he did not mean to identify the individual with his 'states' or his experience. But he goes on to explain: "He is that experience or process: these states are his existence." Is it possible that a critic of idealism can mean to identify the *real individual* with a series of states? Could Hume ask anything more? In fact, if we look at the 'he' which is the subject in the sentence, we see at once that it must mean the object studied by the empirical psychologist; and to identify this abstract and mythical 'he' with the individual who is the goal of metaphysics is the height of confusion. The abstractness of such a statement is clearly suggested in the immediately following illustration where the individual, or these particular states of which he consists, is compared to a focus in which the universe burns. Professor

³ *Mind*, N.S., vol. iii, pp. 17 ff.

Seth adds: "This is our one point of contact with reality, or, to put it otherwise, we exist and know at all just because reality lives in us in this series of experiences, focusses itself in the continuously moving-point of life which constitutes our self-existence." Now here we have two or three possible views of the self. It is a focus, a moving-point. But what is a focus? It is merely a point in which certain rays converge. In itself it is absolutely a construct of the mathematical physicist, and has just as much 'existential' or 'ontological' reality as any other mathematical point, *i.e.*, none at all. To speak, then, of the universe of light or reality of any kind as existentially outside this point would be like saying that they are existentially outside of any other abstraction. If, however, by the 'focus' is meant, not the point considered abstractly, but *the reality or universe as burning in this point*, then I submit that it is impossible to maintain that this reality is a particular individual, 'ontologically distinct' from the universe which burns or the reality which is known. Metaphysically, then, unless we are to hold to an absolute particularism which would make any knowledge not merely mysterious but unthinkable, and solipsism the only position, we cannot speak of reality as extra-mental or outside consciousness.

My conclusion is that there is no proper sense in which we can speak of reality as extra-mental or trans-subjective or outside consciousness. To say that a table is outside of an idea or mental state is to mingle common sense with a psychologist's abstraction; the common man means at least the intelligible statement that the table is outside his head, or such part of it as he conceives his mind to occupy. The epistemologist who uses the expressions cited, is really adopting psychological abstractions as metaphysical reality, and reinforcing his confusion by the purely abstract distinction between subject and object, – a distinction which is in no wise the same as that between self and not-self in psychology, common life, or metaphysics.

But surely, it will be urged, any one in his senses must admit that 'all knowledge takes place in individuals,' that the individual is a particular process of events, a series of states. This may well seem 'so obvious' that one may 'hardly know how to argue it.' "Subjectivism and relativism would not be so persistently put forward and so widely accepted if they did not embody some aspect of the facts." What is to be said, then, in view of these patent facts? Simply that they are facts in exactly the same sense as the atoms and molecules of the physicist are 'facts,' that the image on the retina is a 'fact.' They are nothing more nor less than the constructions of the psychologist, useful for his purpose perhaps, but no more to be taken as real than the hypothetical and abstract units of any other abstract science. The fact that subjectivism and relativism have been so persistently put forward and so widely accepted is just as much

and just as little a guarantee of the reality of these 'mental states' or 'ideas,' as the prevalence of materialism is a guarantee of the reality of atoms. The two theories rest upon the same fallacy, the acceptance, without criticism, of the abstractions of a special science as the 'facts' of metaphysics. When Tyndall stated that "the passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable," it was soon pointed out that this was due to the abstract terms in which the problem was stated. The passage from the mental states of a particular individual to the knowledge of reality is just as unthinkable, and for the same reason; we are attempting to reconcile implicitly contradictory conceptions. The way out of our difficulty is not by injecting a trans-subjective reference into our hypothetical abstractions called 'states of consciousness,' but by criticising the abstractness of the conceptions employed. The problem of the theory of knowledge will then lie, not in bridging a self-created chasm, but in criticising the categories which give rise to the confusion.

The psychological root of the confusion, so far as it is based on the dualism which is characteristic of knowledge as distinct from mere feeling, seems to lie in the facts so well stated by Mr. Stout:

"The object as we mean or intend it cannot be a modification of our own consciousness at the time we mean or intend it. In the process by which we take cognizance of an object, two constituents are distinguishable: (1) a thought reference to something which, as the thinker means or intends it, is not a present modification of his individual consciousness. It is better to say that it [the object as contrasted with a presentation] is presented *to* consciousness than that it is presented *in* consciousness. In the perception of a tree the reference to an object is circumscribed and directed by a plexus of visual and other presentations. The object thought of is there by made determinate. It is a material thing, not a mental occurrence; a tree, and not a stone."⁴

The object is determined to be 'a material thing, not a mental event,' in precisely the same way in which it is determined to be 'a tree, not a stone,' viz., 'by a plexus of visual and other presentations.' A mental event is just as much objective as a tree. The thought reference is not from a mental state to a reality which is not a mental state. It is to a content qualified or categorized as object. "It may be said that the object must always exist as such; *but the existence of the object as such is*

⁴ *Analytic Psychology*, vol. i, pp. 45 ff. I am indebted to Professor Dewey for calling my attention to the passage.

precisely the same as the existence of the thought of it."⁵ The difficulty of the subjective idealist, and just as truly of the epistemologist who attempts to start from the former's premises, seems to arise from identifying the 'object' here referred to with reality, and the present modification of consciousness as such with the subject.

It is now time to ask what should be substituted for this view of thought which regards it as referring to an external reality, and I must beg permission to refer again to Kant, for in Kant we have both the copy-theory and its antithesis.

In the first place, it is not usually recognized that the 'thing-in-itself' without which we cannot enter into the Kantian system is by no means the same as that with which we cannot remain in it. The things-in-themselves with which we enter the system are a synonym for reality, are conceived in a positive sense, and when thus used in the plural seem without much doubt to have been conceived as Leibnizian monads.⁶ This is quite a different sort of 'realism' from that of the ordinary realist. The thing-in-itself which finds no place in the system is the wholly negative *Unding*, to which every attribute is denied. And why denied? Because attributes, categories, are mental. "Space and time are not properties of things in themselves, or determinations which would remain even though all subjective conditions of the perception were abstracted." Of course not. This would be the same as to say that things as they do appear, are just the same as things as they do *not* appear. "Nor have the categories any application except to objects of experience." But surely it is to experience that we want to apply them, so this does not seem so terrible. But, Kant insists, experience is only appearance, only phenomenal. Well, why is it any the worse for that? Because, comes the final rejoinder, appearance is not only not reality, but cannot even tell us of reality. Reality as it does appear, cannot possibly be anything *like* reality as it does *not* appear, and of course (so the theory implies) it is this latter kind of reality that we really want to know. Any elements which we put into the picture, such as forms or categories or relations, ruin the picture and shut us off from any glimpse of true reality.⁷

Ruin the picture, but for what? As a copy, doubtless. But suppose we are not looking for a copy of an external reality, but for an interpre-

⁵ Stout, *op. cit.*, i, 46. I have supplied italics.

⁶ See Riedel, *Die monadologischen Bestimmungen in Kants Lehre vom Ding an sich: and Reflexionen Kants*, Herausg. Von B. Erdmann, vol. ii, p. 323.

⁷ Volkelt's exposition of the consequence of Kant's separation between thought and reality is admirable; see I. *Kants Erkenntnisstheorie nach ihren Grundprincipien analysiert*.

tation of the reality which is present in experience? This is the other aspect of Kant's thought which struggles with the old copy-theory. For the 'Copernican revolution' really goes much deeper in its implications than the doctrine that we may find a basis for the *a priori* principles of physical science. It really means the transfer of criterion from outer, external reality to be copied, to inner, immanent experience to be rationalized, *i.e.*, interpreted. The only criterion of truth by which we can hypothetically test knowledge is: "Does reality appear to me as it would appear to an intelligence that knew all instead of only a minute part?" And so far as I can see this would mean not less but more relations, not the absence of 'universality,' which is said to be the bane of knowledge, but a universal which is all-comprehensive and perfectly defined.

Further, this Copernican revolution implies, not merely a transfer of criterion, but a change in view as to what is really the excellence, the distinctive end of knowledge. In the copy-theory we noted that this end is to reproduce reality as it 'is,' things as they 'are,' and hence that the more thought contributes the farther we get from reality. But if the very meaning and aim of knowledge is not to represent a reality without, but to interpret an experience within consciousness, then the more categories the better. Through space and time we distinguish experiences; through substance and cause we yet retain identity in difference, unity in change. These are fundamental to the very conception of interpretation, which means putting one part of experience beside another so as to discover the unity amid variety, translating the first into terms of the second, and by implication referring the second back to the first for better definition.

It is in this sense that the judgment is interpretation; interpretation of one part of reality in terms of another. To find fault with knowledge on the ground that the subject is not the predicate, that the 'that' is not the 'what,' is to forget that interpretation implies two aspects of reality, one distinguished from the other in order that it may nevertheless be interpreted in terms of the other.

The question may arise: If knowledge is merely interpretation, how can I be sure that my interpretation is the right one? The only answer in my opinion is: "Does it work?" I think I detect a unity in two apparently isolated experiences; I call one cause, the other effect. Have I given the right interpretation? I confirm my result by verifying my interpretation in other instances. Finally, to eliminate the personal equation or the possibility of error due to my own bias or negligence, I seek further confirmation in the verifications of other observers.⁸ In any case the

⁸ This work of confirmation seems to me to be the significance of the demand for verification by others. Professor Royce (*Mind*, July, 1897) maintains that since the category

appeal is always to the interpretation given by other intelligence, never to a supposed reality apart from intelligence.

If this be the true standard of reference, Kant was perfectly right in excluding the alternative that the categories might be both subjective and objective, if by 'objective' is meant 'true of things apart from thought.' To admit such an alternative, to speak of laws of thought *and* laws of things, is possible only on the copy-theory. The validity of the categories consists, not in their supposed inherence in things, but in that they are the conceptions in which all intelligence interprets experience. Other validity than this can never be obtained, nor has it any meaning. Truth is immanent in experience. An omniscient intelligence must still be conceived as intelligence if words have any meaning at all, and the universe to such an intelligence would still be an interpreted universe if it were a *known* universe.

We can now see what justification there may be for the statement that knowledge is not reality. Certainly not. It is only an interpretation of reality or, better, reality interpreted. Nor is it even the only interpretation. There is another interpretation of reality in terms of feeling which yields the aesthetic judgment, and another in terms of desire or activity which yields the ethical judgment. In the case of these latter judgments, as in the case of the logical or scientific judgments, it would be easy to show that the interpretation must always be immanent, the criterion within experience. In the terms of our problem, as stated at the outset, truth, beauty, and goodness *are* our points of view; our points of view not as individualistic, particular mental states, but as social intelligence, social appreciation, social will. It is the distinctive prerogative of the spiritual that it can attain this threefold interpretation and appreciation of reality; and the conception of an Absolute, so far as I can pretend to understand it, seems to me not to exclude but rather to embrace this threefold interpretation.

I have spoken of the mediaeval origin of the copy-theory, and of the separation which it implied between thought and reality. There was, however, a deeper reason for the doubt and distrust which gradually emerged in the Middle Ages, and became so definite in Occam. Reality

of causation is social in its genesis, it cannot be applicable to any fact which, like a supposed connection in consciousness, is not open to universal observation and verification, for the very conception of causation implies a connection *conceived as* universally verifiable. But if the categories themselves are social, it would seem that the individual of to-day might without violence conceive himself as by this time a fairly social being, and *as observer* consider himself social. From another point of view, indeed, every connection, in physics as truly as in psychology, is absolutely a matter of individual consciousness, and hence unverifiable. To say that because a conception is socially conceived it must be observed by two or more persons, seems to me to make 'social' a purely numerical conception.

to the mediaeval mind meant God; it meant the divine law, the divine purpose; it meant the other world. This reality was in a very great degree external to thought and experience.⁹ It was brought to the Germanic peoples from without. It was not a case of "whom ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you," but rather of a more majestic deity, system of thought, and ecclesiastical organization, displacing the more homely and familiar if less powerful pantheon. The movement usually called Nominalism, but better styled Individualism, had at least this much of truth and psychological justification: it was the explicit recognition of the externality of that which was then regarded as the preëminently real. One has not to read far in Occam to see that the fundamental problem which lent significance to all his inquiries about genera and species, universal and particular, was, "Can we know God?" and the almost inevitable inference from the *Centilogium Theologicum* is that the God of revealed religion, with all his attributes, is an 'unknowable,' of whom any contradictions may be true. The spiritual reality has become a thing-in-itself.

I can but think that much of the positivism of our own generation has a similar root. Back of all the technical theory of knowledge, deeper than any supposed chasm between subject and object, lies the vague unformulated conviction that the reality which theology teaches, the reality which the church sets in the forefront, the reality which for preceding centuries has animated the moral life and given supreme worth to human existence – is in some sense external. It comes to many as a tradition across the ages rather than as an ever new discovery, vital in the experience of the hour. Many seem to feel that the spiritual, like Plato's world of ideas, must maintain its value by its separateness from the world of actual life, and its detachment from the moving forces of nature and society. Professor Huxley's assertion of the opposition between the cosmic and the ethical process is hailed with great satisfaction, as if the foundations of religious belief were in some way strengthened by a demonstration of the unmoral or even immoral character of the cosmos. Naturalism is again, as in the Renaissance, opposed to religion.

Is this, after all, the surest guarantee of the reality of the moral and spiritual? May it not be that the best mode of dealing with agnosticism and positivism is found in discovering and interpreting the moral and spiritual value of the nature which is so real to the scientist, of the history and society which are so real to the sociologist, of the daily life

⁹ For a broader treatment of the implications of this fact, see *The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge*, by John Dewey, University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy, No. 3.

which is the ever-present reality to the common man? Nature *as studied* by the scientist, society *as viewed* by the economist, daily life *as considered* by the common man, may have little or none of this value, either from the intentional abstractness of the standpoint, as in the two former cases, or from negligence or blindness, as often in the latter. But it is the business of philosophy to restore the concreteness, the vitality, the values, the full reality, excluded by the abstractness of scientific method; it is the task of religion to quicken the appreciation for that which is none the less real because its reality is experienced within consciousness, and not located outside of it.

EPISTEMOLOGY AND EXPERIENCE

Arthur K. Rogers. "Epistemology and Experience." *Philosophical Review* 7.5 (September 1898): 466–84.

We are never sure in philosophy just where we are going to be tripped up on our postulates, but, on the whole, it is probably safe to assume that there is such a thing as a knowing experience, and that this experience may be objective in the Kantian sense of the word, that it may present features, namely, which mark it off clearly from other experiences which we call subjective. Knowing is thus a process within experience, and for the present we may waive the question whether we ought to go on and ask whose experience this is. We are able to do this for the reason that each philosopher can philosophize only on the basis of a single experience, which for him is a unity, and so he naturally comes to speak of experience in general, without specifying what experience he means; and he can be intelligible because each of his hearers, too, has his own unity of experience, which for him again is experience pure and simple.

Taking, then, experience, which for the philosopher is one, we find that it breaks up for thought into a great variety of elements. There is, indeed, nothing whatever belonging to experience which cannot thus be made an object of thought. And we soon find that there are certain typical forms of thought, certain rubrics under which the world of experience gets placed, and which, indeed, constitute its objectivity as a world. But we are still, it is to be noticed, strictly within experience; nothing external or transcendent has yet been taken into account. Moreover, these categories, we find, do not arise in a merely haphazard way, but each has its place fixed with reference to the whole process of experience in which it arises. It ought to be possible, therefore, to introduce order among these forms of thought; and, instead of taking each isolatedly, and on the credentials with which it first presents itself to us, to define it with reference to the one process from which it springs, and so with reference to all its fellow categories. This is the work which Hegel undertook to do.

Now, if the problem, as it has just been stated, is the ultimate one for philosophy, there can hardly be said to be any longer a place for episte-

mology in the more common meaning of the term. When we have assumed the knowing process as a fact – and we can hardly avoid doing this – the question, ‘How is knowledge possible?’ ceases to possess much interest. If it is actual, why should we concern ourselves about its possibility? The real center of interest now lies in its nature and function. If, indeed, knowledge referred to something outside experience, then the question as to how such a transcendence could be rendered conceivable, would be very much to the point; but the recognition that we are dealing with a process entirely within experience, and having its value with reference to experience, puts the whole problem out of court.

But now if we do examine more closely the function of knowledge, we are led, I think, a step beyond Hegel’s position, without, however, giving up his fundamental presuppositions – to the recognition, namely, that within experience knowledge is not an ultimate resting place, but that it has its value with reference to something beyond itself, to action. It is this thought which Professor Dewey has worked out in a convincing way, and without going into the details of his reasoning, I may briefly state his position: So long as activity is unimpeded, we have what is in itself neither subjective nor objective, but just a bit of experience. But let us suppose that there comes a break in activity, and we are brought to a standstill. Now, in the first place, this brings to consciousness the value of the activity; and that value, if it is sufficiently great, is projected as an end. The end or ideal thus grows out of what we are already doing. The real, on the other hand, the object, is that which can be utilized as a means to reach this end. It represents past ends, the organization of past experience, which is real, in that it is there to be utilized, and so can be taken for granted, but which is yet not sufficiently real to function, to overcome the break, and so has to be made over. Over against this, the end, the idea, the concept, is projected as ideal; but the two, the real and the ideal, the particular and the universal, are entirely relative to one another, since both grow out of the break in experience, and have for their purpose to overcome this break. The object is the means to be used, the concept is the method for controlling the means; and it is the interaction between the two, by which they mutually define each other, and which is represented in the types of judgment, that finally issues in the reconstruction of activity in a more complete way. Reality, therefore, is neither the given of sense, nor the concept, but is the living activity of growth in experience, for whose reconstruction object and idea both have their functional part to play.

This is, of course, not a proof of Professor Dewey’s theory, nor even, I am afraid, a very intelligible statement of it, but perhaps it will serve for the present purpose. And I find myself very largely in agreement with it, so that in fact it will form the basis of what I am going to say. It seems

to me undeniable that thought is relative to growth in experience, to activity. But have we really exhausted the problem of philosophy, when we confine it to what, in this somewhat vague way, has been called experience? That there is no reality for us which does not bear directly on the value of life, I am ready to admit, and I think the admission is of great philosophical importance. But is it not possible that the existence of realities beyond anything that we in this immediate and undefined way can call experience has a very definite meaning for activity itself? This will depend somewhat on what we mean by activity. If we mean overt action in the bare sense and nothing more, then thought remains outside the action to which it leads. Knowledge, on this showing, is simply a method which puts the means of physical livelihood more completely within our control, and life approximates to a consciousness of physical actions. But if this is not the whole of life – and probably no one would assert that it is – the question arises, whether there is not involved in the larger meaning that is given to activity, precisely the reference to realities lying beyond it, and not simply beyond in the past and future, but existing contemporaneously with it. Social and religious experience certainly seems to me to involve that the experience stands in relation to larger realities, which are not itself; although they are represented within it, and are essential to its value. The grief of my friend is in a way an element in experience such as I can speak of as a unity; but it ceases to have meaning, if it is exhausted in the part it plays in that experience, and has not also a reality of its own, which can never enter into this unity of experience directly. So in the religious consciousness, the meaning of an activity comes out, only as that activity takes up into itself the value of its place as an element in a reality which immeasurably transcends it. Accordingly, we seem justified in recognizing a possible distinction between thought as a tool for reconstructing our experience, and knowledge, or external reference, as an element in the immediate value of reconstructed experience itself. I shall return to this again; at present, it is enough to point out that, if the distinction be admitted, the problem as to how this external reference is possible, the problem, namely, of epistemology, thereupon reappears again.

The same result seems to emerge in a different way. We have been talking about the characteristics of experience, on the assumption that we know approximately what we are talking about. But we cannot talk about the experience which we are now actually undergoing; we can only experience it. To talk of past experience involves two things: it involves that there is a present experience, and that this experience has a meaning that transcends itself. The past experience must be regarded as at one time a reality, not as a mere functional aspect of our present thought, or else I do not see but that our philosophizing leaves us in

mid-air; but if a reality, it is a reality beyond the experience which is now in question, and which knows it. We are able, that is, to *mean* in experience a reality which is not, as a fact of existence, the experience in which this meaning plays a functional part; the experience as a meaning, and the experience which is meant, are existentially not the same. For, of course, I admit that the memory is not exhausted in its past reference, and that it never would arise unless the past had a value for some present use. I maintain only that there are both these aspects, that the memory has a value for the present, but that it can have this value only as it takes us out of the present to a reality which, in point of existence, lies beyond the knowing experience. And this again brings up the whole problem of epistemology, how such a transcendence is possible. And if it is possible here, if memory of a past real experience is a act, is there in principle any difficulty in admitting, if it seems demanded, that, through an experience of our own, we may know a reality which exists beyond any experience that we can interpret as a unity, the separate reality of another man's experience, or even the reality of the external world?

Suppose I pass the judgment: 'This tree has fruit on it.' Now a statement, which would appeal to ordinary common sense, of what is involved in this judgment, would run, I think, something as follows: There is a fact in the world of reality, a tree with fruit upon it, existing quite apart from my process of judgment. This reality is brought home to me in some way through sense perception, and by a subjective process I qualify my knowledge of the tree by the further circumstance that it bears fruit, always with the understanding that the quality of fruit-bearing belongs to the real tree, not to my idea of it, and that the change has been a change in my knowledge, not a change in the reality known. But now difficulties may be raised about this. It would seem, on such a statement, that the real subject of which we assert the quality, lies wholly outside the judging experience, and that what we have within the judgment is only a copy or representation of this. But if we never can get hold of the original, how are we to compare the copy with it to know that it is true? or how can we even know it is a copy? Furthermore, to raise a question of fact, is it true that in judging we do actually think of two things, an original and a copy? If, however, we do not put the real beyond the judging experience, and make our judgment merely a subjective knowledge about it, we are involved in other difficulties. If the subject within experience is the real, the relation of the predicate to it is ambiguous. If the judgment is to be true, the predicate must belong to the subject already, and then our judgment is simply analytic, *i.e.*, tautologous. And if it does not belong to the subject already, we have changed the subject by adding to it, and our judgment is false. Then there is the whole question as to how the predicate, which is ideal, gets

itself attached to the real subject, how the ideal and the real can come together. And if, as it is possible to do with good show or reason, we claim that the subject itself is ideal, that it is constituted by thought relations, we have at least to ask how the apparent difference comes about, while the whole set of difficulties that attaches to the notion of thought as reality comes at once to the front.

These last difficulties have already had an answer suggested in the theory of Professor Dewey. The real and the ideal emerge only with reference to each other, and both have their justification through the part they play in the reorganization of experience. And, from the same standpoint, the difficulty about the possibility of a synthetic judgment also receives an answer. We were stopped from saying that the predicate adds something to the subject, by the recognition that the process of judgment would thus bring about a change in the real. But why may this not be the very function of judgment? Indeed, if reality is experience, then judgment undoubtedly does change the real; it is the process by which there is effected a growth in experience, and so a growth in reality.

Grant then that the standpoint which the theory represents is a final one, and we must admit that judgment effects an actual change, a reconstruction of reality. For the reasons which have already been suggested, however, I do not find it possible to stop with this; and I certainly do not think it represents an opinion which commends itself to the natural man. It is, I feel sure, an essential element in our ordinary conception of the judgment, that it does not change the reality about which the judgment is made, but that this reality must already have been there complete, in order for the judgment to be true. And so, again, if we reject this, and still are to save the judgment from tautology and uselessness, we shall have to distinguish between the judging process, which is a growth, and the reality about which the judgment is made, a reality beyond the judging process itself; as well as beyond the new experience to which the judging process leads up. Is it possible now to retain this standpoint, and yet give due weight to the objections which have been raised?

We are familiar nowadays with the thought that in the predicate of the judgment we have meaning which is divorced from existence. Now in a similar, though not an identical way, I think that we must recognize in the subject also a divorce between meaning and existence. We have, that is, a perception, the sight of an object, as a fact within experience; but as the particular image is lost sight of in its conceptual use, so the sense perception as an element of experience loses itself in its reference to a reality beyond experience – the real object. There is nothing in this, to repeat, which we are not in principle compelled to admit in the case

of memory. The memory is itself an experience, an existence, but at the time it is not thought of as an experience; it loses itself in the past experience which is remembered. By the object of perception accordingly, we should not mean any phase whatever of an experience such as in any sense we can call our own, though our seeing the object can be explained psychologically only by reference to such an experience; but, instead, an abiding reality which existed before we saw it, had its own existence as we continued to look at it, and was quite unaffected when we turned our eyes away. And so far as the facts of ordinary interpretation go, this is exactly what we do mean.

But now a difficulty may suggest itself. There certainly is a difference between subjective and objective experience, or we should not all the time be talking about it; and yet, on this showing, all experience whatsoever of which I can take immediate account is subjective, that is, it is merely mine. But how can an objective experience be subjective at the same time? Or, to put it in another way, if one particular kind of experience is subjective, how can all experience whatever be subjective also? I think that we can answer this by taking note of a distinction. We must distinguish, that is, between experience as it is, and experience as it is for knowledge. Immediate activity as such is felt neither as objective nor as subjective; it is experience pure and simple. It is only when activity is checked, that the kind of experience which we call objective or subjective arises in the form of the knowing or judging process. Now thought itself is, of course, an activity, but it is a sort of activity which involves a reference to a reality beyond. That reality may be an experience which is connected in a more or less continuous way with the knowing experience itself; and then we say that the knowing experience is subjective. Or it may be a reality which has never directly been an experience of our own, as in perception, and then the knowing experience is objective. But the point to be noticed is that the sort of experience which we denominate subjective or objective, in the sense in which these terms are opposed to each other as marking distinctions in experience, is a thought or judging experience, an experience which is employed in working out the solution of some difficulty, rather than the consciousness of an immediate and unimpeded activity. But this very distinction implies a second difference, the difference, namely, between the set of experiences which our thought recognizes as having a certain continuity with itself, and which we call ours, and the reality which thought recognizes as never having formed part directly of the continuous unity of our own conscious life. Accordingly, in a somewhat different sense, we can apply the term subjective to all experience whatever that comes to us, meaning not that it has the peculiar differentia of subjectivity actually going along with it (it may have this or it

may not), but simply that it has a certain unity of its own such that we can call it ours, without thereby supposing that it exhausts the sum total of reality.

If this analysis is correct, it follows that there is no insuperable difficulty in the fact that we are not conscious in perception of two things, an original and a copy. The object as reality, and the object as my subjective apprehension of reality, are not one experience but two; they depend upon two distinct acts of thought. The process, on the view I have been taking, would be as follows: In the original naïve perception (as subsequent reflection informs us) there is a fact of experience, the perception of an object, whose function, however, it is to lose its character as a part of experience in its meaning, its reference to a reality which is not within our experience at all, but which can be utilized for the furthering of our own ends. But on this very account, it does not exist for naïve perception in the former sense, but only in its meaning, as a real thing. Moreover, naïve perception cannot even say 'a reality beyond experience,' for such a phrase would imply the second thought process as already performed, by which we recognize the existence of experience as such. The naïve man can only say 'real thing.' But when we have once recognized the experience of seeing the object as a reality, then common sense has no hesitation in saying that this is not the whole fact, and that the reality which is seen has an existence of its own beyond experience. The (properly) subjective thought experience by which we recognize a previous experience as our own, tells us at the same time that our meaning in that experience was something, not a part of experience, but outside of it; not in the sense that we must have had a direct consciousness of this at the time, but in the sense of telling us something new *about* the previous experience, which we recognize as consonant with the experience itself. It may very well be that for ordinary purposes this knowledge plays no immediate part in our consciousness. We may continue in the path of naïve perception, and let the object simply perform its function in our activity, without distinctly recognizing its separateness from our own conscious life, unless our attention is directly called to it. But again, and especially in so far as the world of reality enters into our religious consciousness, just this recognition may be of the profoundest value. The stars are undoubtedly excellent guides for the sailor, and they may serve indifferently to light us home on a dark night, and for our ordinary consciousness this reference to practical activities may be enough. But who does not feel that Kant, as with immeasurable awe he gazes into the starry heavens, represents a truth of experience which also has its value, and which we could ill afford to lose?

And now I think we are perhaps in a position to give some sort of

answer to the objection that our original never can be gotten hold of to compare with the copy. We certainly cannot, and do not, reason from an original to a copy; but I do not see any inherent absurdity in supposing that the nature of knowledge is precisely such that certain elements of our experience come to us originally with the claim that they represent a reality beyond, a claim which we simply have to accept as an ultimate datum. And I see the less reason to deny this, since a claim which is essentially similar is admitted by nearly all philosophers. It is supposed that memory somehow gives us a hold on real past experience, but that our experience *when* we remember, is not the experience *which* we remember. We have, that is, in memory, an experience which professes to take us beyond itself, to mean a reality which is quite other than its own reality. But here also it may just as well be asked: 'How do we know that memory truly represents the past, since we cannot get at the past to compare it?' And the answer is: 'Certainly we cannot demonstrate it, we simply take it on trust' On the assumption that memory in general is to be relied on, we may erect a practical test for this or that memory. It is true, if, when we act on it, it sufficiently serves our purpose. If, on the contrary, it brings us into conflict with the rest of reality, the presumption is that it is false. But because we find that some memories do play us false, we do not thereupon at once doubt memory altogether; we assume in each case that the claims of memory are true, and doubt only when we have some reason to doubt. There is, however, no possible way of proving that memory as such presents true claims, apart from the fact that the claim is made, and that, on the whole, there is no reason which compels us to discredit it. Now I do not see that the case is very much different in perception. It would be foolish to insist much on the fact that the past experience which memory recalls was once *our* experience; the important thing is that at least the past experience is not here now. And in the case of perception again, whether this particular perception truly represents reality or not, it is possible, assuming that perception on the whole is what it claims to be, to submit to the practical test of action; that perception in general is justified in its claims, we cannot possibly demonstrate. But, on the other hand, if the claim is made, the balance of proof lies with him who denies it.

Perhaps it will be well before going further to sum up now in a general way the criticism of experience contained in the foregoing pages. The assertion that reality is experience, and that all the categories of reality are distinctions within the process of experience, may be said, I think, to represent the fundamental thought of that whole philosophical standpoint which in the broad sense may be termed Hegelian. Now I am also willing to say that there is no reality which is not experience, but I should like to define the terms a little more exactly. For experience,

without further qualification, is a pure concept, which has no more place in the world of reality than any other concept has. And it seems to me that the Hegelian tends to use experience in this abstract way. Accordingly it is not strange that the distinction between your experience, and mine, and the experience of God, should be difficult to define, for in experience as abstract no such distinction exists. The concept is not and does not pretend to be individual. I should maintain, on the contrary, that reality is *definite, concrete* experience; not experience, *i.e.*, but *experiences*, such experiences as I can look back on and call my own. And with this the peculiar advantage which is claimed for the theory seems to me to disappear. What it is after is some larger whole within which the apparently isolated factors of self and not-self, God and the world, you and me, may be reconciled. And in experience this is what we seem to have; for it is in experience that all things come to us. But if experience falls apart into concrete experiences, we are as far from a unity as ever. The question now is how we are to get the experiences together. Admitting that the serial order of experience which I interpret as my own life is an inclusive unity, which undoubtedly in some sense it is, in what sense can we bring into a unity, experiences that are going on side by side? We might solve the difficulty by saying that only such experiences as we can actually succeed in bringing into a certain unity, that comparatively meagre string of them which I can think of as mine, are to be accounted real; but only at the expense of landing in solipsism, a solipsism none the less real, I think, because the experience contains among its elements other men as well as myself. And if we are not content with this, then I say that our transparent unity has broken down. A single experience may be such as contains myself, and other men, and God. A single experience, such at least as I know, can never be one that contains my *experience*, and other men's *experience*, and God's *experience*, as concrete realities. I think the distinction is a valid one. I myself, my neighbor, God, in so far as they come within experience, are mere ideal points of reference; but the realities to which they point are concrete activities which do not merge in one. My neighbor, as a factor within a unity of experience, is not the concrete life of conscious experiencings which I *mean* by my neighbor; a part of these may indeed be represented within such a unity, but it is only a part, and only a representation. Just as soon, then, as we make experience concrete, we either have the one experience which I can call mine, or we have a host of experiences going on together, myself, my neighbor, millions of Indians and Chinamen, and, it may be, God. For, once started on this road, there is no limit to the reality one may be driven to admit, outside that reality which I can call experience for myself. And to say that all these experiences are brought together in the unity of

experience is either to make experience perfectly abstract, or else it is, so far as I can see, simply an act of philosophic faith.

If now the view which I have been trying to present has been made fairly clear, I should like to say a few words about its application to some of the difficulties which pertain to the relation between thought and reality, with especial reference to Mr. Bradley.

I think that a large part at least of the difficulties which Mr. Bradley finds in the thought-form may safely be admitted. But according to the theory of Professor Dewey, which is adopted here, thought is by no means the ultimate form of reality, even for us, but is distinctly a tool, not an end in itself. And the question accordingly is, whether there is any other form of experience accessible to us which satisfies the conditions more truly than does thought, or whether we shall have to take refuge in an unscrutable. To me there seems to be no insurmountable difficulty in supposing that what is in a real sense a type of absolute reality, is actually given in the form of conscious activity, that immediate experience where we do not have to 'stop and think,' and which has been described as neither subjective nor objective, in the ordinary sense of the terms as they are contrasted. Such an experience is not mere feeling; for we are perfectly aware of what we are doing and of the meaning of our act. It is not a compound of things and of relations; for it is its very nature to be felt as a (for-the-time-being) perfect and transparent unity, with a definite value of its own, in which each element exists only as an expression of the activity as a whole. In other words, we get the true nature of reality in self consciousness, understood not as a thinking about oneself, but as a full and unimpeded flow of all our powers, in the clear consciousness of what we are about in all of its relations. I wish now to develop this a little more in detail.

The first difficulty which suggests itself may be disposed of briefly. It may be asked whether thought itself is not just as truly an activity as any experience can be, and, therefore, if it is not also real. I should say so, by all means. And thought, as an activity, is as free from contradictions, as truly a unity, as any activity is; it only presents contradictions, as it in turn is thought about. If it is borne in mind that the contradictions of thought are always in the object which is thought about, as an object of thought, and not in the thought activity as an immediate experience, I do not think the objection will be found serious.

But there is another question which seems at first sight to be a more puzzling one. If thought does not adequately represent reality, how, it may be asked, does it represent it at all, and what is our criterion for discounting its imperfections? The reality lies beyond thought, and yet for metaphysics thought is the only instrument we have for getting at it. Except as it is reached by thought, the reality vanishes as it ceases to be

experienced; we might live it, but we could not philosophize about it. Since, however, thought is inadequate, how can we meet the demand of metaphysics that our thought be free from contradiction?

In order to get a clearer notion of the relation of thought to reality, I think it is necessary to make another distinction. It seems impossible to come to a clear understanding of what we mean by the reproduction of the real in thought, until we distinguish between thought as the process of judging still incomplete, and thought as the completed judgment. Now of the judgment process as an actual instrument for action a brief account has already been given, and it appeared that the subject represents the reality which we have at hand, a reality which is unsatisfactory and so in need of change, but which, since it is all we have got, must be used as the means of its own reconstruction; and that the predicate, on the other hand, represents the end of action, which in the form of the concept serves as the method of reconstruction, the instrument by which the means are controlled, and the action is confined to the channels that will really satisfy the present need. So in the judgment, 'This tree has fruit on it' the concept first of all is represented, we may say, by the interest connected with the need of satisfying the eating impulse, without which there is no reason why I should not just as well have judged, 'This tree has green leaves;' and, as this becomes defined, it takes the form of the concept 'fruit' by which I am led not merely to look at the tree at large, but to hunt for certain definite characteristics. But now, according to Professor Dewey's theory, the judgment exists as a judgment only so long as the subject and predicate are in a certain amount of tension, so long as we have not yet found what we are after. When once they are brought together, and the judgment is made, we no longer have the judgment, but something quite different, viz., action. For instance, in the present case, I stop saying, 'This tree has fruit on it,' and go to eating. And in the case of our practical judgments there seems to be no doubt that this very frequently is true. But it also is very frequently not the case, and in scientific judgments it is even the exception. No doubt every judgment ultimately, if it is to be justified, must contribute to life; but the fact that it often does not pass at once into action, gives rise on the face of it to a certain problem. If the judgment ceases to be a judgment, and still fails to pass into action, how does it exist? As we certainly can complete a judgment, and in some way recognize this completion, without immediately acting upon it, our attitude in such a case calls for explanation.

The answer must, I think, recognize a quite distinct meaning of the word thought. More exactly, perhaps, we must recognize three meanings. First there is thought in the sense of the judging process, where a tension still exists between the subject and predicate. Or, again,

we may mean the ideal, the abstract element within this process – the predicate or concept. In neither of these meanings can thought be said strictly to represent reality; for reality is concrete and is a unity, while it is the very essence of the judgment to hold things apart. But now we must recognize that this unity can be reached, not simply by overt acting, which intellectually is of no value, but also by acting in the *ideal* realm, by a purely intellectual representation of the act. Reality, that is, is conscious activity, and can be conceived as nothing else without contradiction. But it is the nature of thought, in these first two meanings, to take reality as static. It has to do this if it is not to commit suicide by having things change in its hands. And so long as we regard the real as actually static, so long as we hold that reality exists as it is for the process of thinking, I confess I do not see how the elements which it is the nature of thought to hold apart, and from one of which it passes to the other, can form any real unity, or how we can avoid taking refuge in an unknowable. But, if we hold that in conscious activity the unity is a real one, then thought can represent reality only as it ceases to hold its elements as fixed things, and passes over into a representation of concrete conscious action. Accordingly, here I think, we have a third use of the term thought, in which it ceases to be abstract or relational, and becomes an ideal reproduction of the reality of action; a function which comes out most unambiguously, perhaps, in remembering an experience of our own. I start to pass the judgment, ‘This tree has apples on it’ and when it is actually made, at once I go to eating. But in this activity, the tree and the apples and the relation between them do not necessarily pass from consciousness; they may cease to be external and separate, but, in so far as I am clearly conscious of what I am doing, they still exist as elements in my action, though as elements which enter indissolubly into the unity of my experience as a whole. Now my point is, that it is only as thought can reproduce to some extent such reality as this, that it can be said adequately to represent (not to be) reality, and that we actually get this third meaning of thought when a judgment is completed, and subject and predicate flow together in a unity.

Before applying this to external reality, it may be better to consider it with reference to a past experience of our own, some definite experience in which I did not have to ‘stop and think,’ but in which there was present a clear consciousness or what I was about. Taking this simply as an experience, and not with reference to what it may imply for subsequent thought, it has a very decided unity and completeness of its own. But now if for any reason I want to think about it, I am compelled probably to construct it piecemeal, to split up into a number of elements what in the actual experience was united. And so long as I forget the original unity, I seem to have a lot of separate elements on my hands,

held together in some way by relations. I can get back my unity only when I remember that this isolation is simply a thought device, and that the reality is not the isolated parts stuck together, but the active experience out of which the parts were differentiated.

In order to apply this to perception, it is only necessary to introduce again the factor which I have called the external reference, the reference to a reality which never by any possibility can be called a part of my experience. Admitting this reference in perception, how are we to say that the attribute 'red,' *e.g.*, belongs to the rose? Essentially in the same way, I should answer, as that in which a red rose may enter into our own experience. Because we can have a unity of active experience in which all the relations of the elements within our consciousness are transparent to us through their connection with a comprehensive end, or at least can approximate such a unity, and because we can reproduce this ideally in memory, we are able to know the nature of absolute reality, *provided, of course, that the reality which the world represents is a conscious experience*. This is a very large assumption no doubt, and could be defended only by a complete metaphysic; but I think it is legitimate to use it as an hypothesis, if it is necessary in order to account for the apparent nature of our actual assumptions when we attempt to judge about reality. We get at the rose, it is true, not as an element in an absolute experience, but as a separate thing. Regarded as a separate thing, it can be connected only artificially with other things by means of relations, and the thought categories are simply the instruments, by which this analysis and the consequent synthesis which it makes necessary, are performed. But there is, we may suppose, a reality, a real experience, for which that world process whose elements we pick out and put together painfully and inadequately is a unity. Because we can ourselves act, and can realize the meaning of our act, we can know what, formally, the nature of the absolute reality is; in so far as, through our experience, we get at what we call the objective facts of the world, we are beginning to know the positive nature of this reality. That experience of the absolute into which the red rose enters, will not, of course, be just what my experience of the rose is. My activities are limited, and, for the most part, it is but a very few qualities of any object which enter as a constituent part into a single experience for me. That I should experience other qualities, as opposed to merely thinking of them in the form of a list, requires a second experience. But the more meaning we get into life, the more the objects which enter into our experience may become many-sided; and we can conceive of an activity in which the whole nature of an object should be exhausted.

We are consequently led to a conclusion which seems to me an important one, and it furnishes an answer to the difficulty as to the

connection between the ideal and the real. For the distinction between the ideal and the real, the object and the concept, has validity only so long as the judgment is in process, and ceases when it is completed, when we actually get truth as opposed to the process of searching for it. The concept has existence only as a tool, a method. It is not any element of experience as an existence, but simply the way we use that particular element which we call the image. Accordingly, the concept, the universal as such, does not enter into reality at all except in its functional use. It is quite impossible that anything should exist in general. Nevertheless the concept always implies concrete reality back of it; it could serve no purpose in experience if it were not based on actual experience in the past. But now when the judgment is brought to a climax, the state of affairs is different. The red which I am using as a concept is one thing, and cannot form a part of concrete reality at all; the red which I actually see in the rose, and which I must see in a single undivided experience before I can say finally, 'The rose is red,' is quite another. That red is a particular red, which, taken as an element in the experience of the red rose, has as true an existence as anything can have, not of course by itself, but simply as an element. The difficulty in recognizing this comes about partly by reason of the nature of language, and partly through the nature of thought itself. Language is made to serve the purposes of judgment, and all its words are universals. So we cannot say, 'The rose is red,' without having the rose and the quality red, each in itself a concept. And so, too, we cannot go through the thought process without separating and distinguishing; and the elements, as separate, are by that very fact abstract and unreal. But, as I have tried to show, thought to some extent overcomes its own fault; and by passing into a reproduction of concrete activity, it restores the unity which it had broken up. The process in judgment, therefore, is as follows: The subject of the judgment is that which we can take as given. It is such portion of reality as past activity has worked into our experience, so that we do not need to state its relations in detail. It involves, accordingly, just the same function of thought, as a representation of reality, which appears in the completion of the judgment, only that it represents reality less adequately. As I say, this function of thought can grow up psychologically only in connection with our past activities; but, since the same object enters into a great variety of experiences, it ceases to have a connection with any one in particular. The unity of the object, which can be taken for granted in perception, is therefore based simply on the possibility, from the psychological standpoint, of entering into experience in general. But since, for some reason, the object is unsatisfactory for our present purpose, we need to reconstruct it; and the concept, determined in each particular case by the end we then have in

view, is our tool for doing this. But when the reconstruction is effected, and the judgment passed, we have not tacked on our concept to a reality which before was without it; we simply have been able, by means of the concept, to discover that an element which we had not recognized before in the unity of reality was really there; and this recognition of the already existing unity must precede, or, better, coincide with, the completion of the judgment, not follow it. The proposition is simply a statement of this recognition. How the quality could be there, we understand again from the analogy of our own active experience. And if we still think of the quality as somehow requiring to be fitted into its place, it is only because it is difficult altogether to heal the wounds which analyzing thought has inflicted. In reality the quality was there all along; but it was not, and is not now there as a quality, for the semi-isolation which the word suggests almost inevitably is in reality wholly fictitious.

SOME STAGES OF LOGICAL THOUGHT

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The man in the street, when asked what he thinks about a certain matter, often replies that he does not think at all; he knows. The suggestion is that thinking is a case of active uncertainty set over against conviction or unquestioning assurance. When he adds that he does not have to think, but knows, the further implication is that thinking, when needed, leads to knowledge; that its purpose or object is to secure stable equilibrium. It is the purpose of this paper to show some of the main stages through which thinking, understood in this way, actually passes in its attempt to reach its most effective working; that is, the maximum of certainty.

I wish to show how a variety of modes of thinking, easily recognizable in the progress of both the race and the individual, may be identified and arranged as successive species of the relationship which doubting bears to assurance; as various ratios, so to speak, which the vigor of doubting bears to mere acquiescence. The presumption is that the function of questioning is one which has continually grown in intensity and range, that doubt is continually chased back, and, being cornered, fights more desperately, and thus clears the ground more thoroughly. Its successive stations or arrests constitute stages of thinking. Or to change the metaphor, just in the degree that what has been accepted as fact – the object of assurance – loses stable equilibrium, the tension involved in the questioning attitude increases, until a readjustment gives a new and less easily shaken equilibrium.

The natural tendency of man is not to press home the doubt, but to cut inquiry as short as possible. The practical man's impatience with theory has become a proverb; it expresses just the feeling that, since the thinking process is of use only in substituting certainty for doubt, any apparent prolongation of it is useless speculation, wasting time and diverting the mind from important issues. To follow the line of least

resistance is to cut short the stay in the sphere of doubts and suggestions, and to make the speediest return into the world where one can act. Of course, the likely result is that difficulties are evaded or surmounted rather than really disposed of. Hence, in spite of the opposition of the would-be practical man, the needs of practice, of economy, and efficiency, have themselves compelled a continual deepening of doubt and widening of the area of investigation.

It is within this evolution that we have to find our stages of thinking. The first is where the doubt is barely endured but not entertained; it is no welcome guest but an intruder, to be got rid of as speedily as possible. Development of alternative and competitive suggestions, the forming of suppositions, of ideas, goes but a little way. The mind seizes upon the nearest or most convenient instrument of dismissing doubt and re-attaining security. At the other end is the definitive and conscious search for problems, and the development of elaborate and systematized methods of investigation – the industry and technique of science. Between these limits come processes which have started out upon the path of doubt and inquiry, and then halted by the way.

In the first stage of the journey, ideas are treated as something fixed and static. To those who are using them they are simply another kind of fact. They are used to settle doubts, but the doubts are treated as arising quite outside the ideas themselves. Nothing is further from consciousness than that the ideas themselves are open to doubt, or need criticism and revision. Indeed, the one who uses these static ideas is not even aware that they have originated and been elaborated for the sake of dealing with conflicts and problems. The ideas are just ‘there,’ and so may be used like any providential dispensation to help men out of the troubles into which they have extraneously fallen.

Words are generally held responsible for this fixation of the idea, for this substantiation of it into a kind of thing. A long line of critics has made us familiar with the invincible habit “of supposing that wherever there is a name there is some reality corresponding to it”; of supposing that the general and abstract words have their equivalent objects somewhere in *rerum natura*, just as have singular and proper names. We know with what simplicity of self-confidence the English empirical school has accounted for the ontological speculation of Plato. Words tend to fix intellectual contents, and give them a certain air of independence and individuality. That some truth is here expressed there can be no question. Indeed, the attitude of mind of which we are speaking is well illustrated in the person who goes to the dictionary in order to settle some problem in morals, politics, or science; who would end some discussion regarding a material point by learning what meaning is attached to terms by the dictionary as authority. The question is taken

as lying outside of the sphere of science or intellectual inquiry, since the meaning of the word – the idea – is unquestionable and fixed.

But this petrifying influence of words is after all only a superficial explanation. There must be some meaning present to the mind or the word could not fix it; there must be something in the psychology of the mind itself which accounts for the disposition to use terms as a medium of fossilization. There is, in truth, a certain real fact – an existent reality – behind both the word and the meaning it stands for. This reality is social usage. The person who consults a dictionary *is* getting an established fact when he turns there for the definition of a term. He finds the sense in which the word is currently used. Social customs are no less real than physical events. It is not possible to dispose of this fact of common usage by reference to mere convention, or any other arbitrary device. A form of social usage is no more an express invention than is any other social institution. It embodies the permanent attitude, the habit taken towards certain recurring difficulties or problems in experience. Meanings, or ideas as fixed in terms, show the scheme of values which the community uses in appraising matters that need consideration and which are indeterminate or unassured. They are held up as standards for all its members to follow. Here is the solution of the paradox. The fixed or static idea is a fact as expressing an established social attitude, a custom. It is not merely verbal, because it denotes a force which operates, as all customs do, in controlling particular cases. But since it marks a mode of interpretation, a scheme for assigning values, a way of dealing with doubtful cases, it falls within the sphere of ideas.

Turning to social psychology, we find an apt illustration of fixed ideas in the rules prevalent in primitive communities, and which minutely determine all acts in which the community as a whole is felt to have an interest. These rules are facts because they express customs, and carry with them certain sanctions. Their meaning does not cease with their judicial statement or utterance. They are made valid at once in a practical way against the one who departs from them. Yet as rules they are ideas, for they express general ways of defining doubtful matters in experience, and of reestablishing certainty. For one who has lost himself in a notion of ideas as *merely* psychical and subjective, I know of no better way to appreciate the real significance of an idea than to consider that a social rule is, after all, nothing but a certain way of viewing or interpreting facts, and as such is an idea.

The point that is of special interest to us here, however, is that these ideas are taken as fixed and unquestionable, and that the cases to which they are to apply are regarded as in themselves equally fixed. So far as concerns the attitude of those who employ this sort of ideas, the doubt is simply with reference to what idea should be used in a particular case.

Even the Athenian Greeks, for instance, long kept up the form of indicting and trying a tree or implement through which some individual had been killed. There was a rule – a fixed idea – for dealing with all who offended against the community by destroying one of its supporters. The fact that it was an inanimate object, a thing without intention or volition, which had offended, was not a material circumstance. It made no difference in the case, that is, there was no doubt as to the nature of the fact. It was as fixed as was the rule.

With advance in the complexity of life, however, rules accumulate, and discrimination – that is, a certain degree of inquiring and critical attitude – enters in. It is expressed, however, in seeking from among a collection of fixed ideas just the one to be used, rather than in directing suspicion against any rule or idea as such, or in an attempt to discover or constitute a new one. It is hardly necessary to refer to the development of casuistry, or to the multiplication of distinctions within dogmas, or to the growth of ceremonial law in cumbrous detail, to indicate what the outcome of this logical stage is likely to be. The essential thing is that doubt and inquiry are directed neither at the nature of the intrinsic fact itself, nor at the value of the idea as such, but simply at the mode in which one is attached to the other. Thinking falls outside both fact and idea, and into the sphere of their external connection. It is still a fiction of judicial procedure that there is already in existence some custom or law under which every possible dispute – that is, every doubtful or unassured case – falls, and that the judge only declares the one which is applicable in the particular case. This point of view has tremendously affected the theory of logic in its entire historic development.

One of the chief, perhaps the most important instrumentalities in developing and maintaining fixed ideas is the need of instruction and the way it is given. If ideas were called into play only when doubtful cases actually arise, they could not help retaining a certain amount of vitality and flexibility; but the community always instructs its new members as to its way of disposing of such cases before the latter present themselves. Ideas are proffered, in other words, quite separate from all doubt, and remote from all application, in order to escape future difficulties and the need of thinking. In primitive communities this is the main purport of instruction, and it still remains such to a very considerable degree. There is pre-judgment rather than judgment proper. When the community uses its resources to fix certain ideas in the mind – that is certain ways of interpreting and regarding experience – ideas are necessarily formulated so as to assume a rigid and independent form. They are doubly removed from the sphere of doubt. The attitude is uncritical and dogmatic in the

extreme – so much so that one might question whether it is to be properly designated as a stage of thinking.

In this form ideas become the chief instruments of social conservation. Judicial decision and penal correction are restricted and ineffective methods of maintaining social institutions unchanged, compared with instilling uniform ideas – fixed modes of appraising all social questions and issues. These set ideas thus become the embodiment of the values which any society has realized and intends to perpetuate. The fixation supports them against dissipation through attrition of circumstance, and against destruction through hostile attack. It would be interesting from the side of social psychology to follow out the ways in which such values are put under the protection of the gods and of religious rites, or themselves erected into quasi-divinities – as among the Romans. This, however, would hardly add anything to the logic of the discussion, although it would indicate the importance which may be attached to the fixation of ideas, and the thoroughgoing character of the means used to secure their immobilization.

The historic conserving value of the dogmatic attitude, the point of view which takes ideas as fixed, is not to be ignored. When society has no methods of science for protecting and perpetuating its achieved values, there is practically no other resort than crystallization. Moreover, with any possible scientific progress, some equivalent of the fixed idea must remain. The nearer we get to the needs of action the greater absoluteness must attach to ideas. The necessities of action do not await our convenience. Emergencies continually present themselves where the fixity required for successful activity cannot be attained through the medium of investigation. The only alternative to vacillation, confusion, and futility of action is ascription to the ideas of a positive and secured character, not in strict logic belonging to them. It is this sort of determination that Hegel seems to have in mind in what he terms *Verstand* – the understanding. “Apart from *Verstand*,” he says, “there is no fixity or accuracy in the region either of theory or practice;” and, again, “*Verstand* sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctions from one another; it treats every meaning as having a subsistence of its own.” In technical terminology, also, this is what is meant by ‘positing’ ideas – a certain hardening of meaning.

In recognizing, however, that fixation of intellectual content is a necessary pre-condition of effective action, we must not overlook the modification that comes with the advance of thinking into more critical forms. At the outset, fixity is taken as the rightful possession of the ideas themselves; it belongs to them and is their ‘essence.’ As the scientific spirit develops, we see that it is we who lend fixity to the ideas, and that

this loan is for a purpose to which the meaning of the ideas is accommodated. Fixity ceases to be a matter of intrinsic structure of ideas, and becomes an affair of security in using them. We *take* the idea as if it were fixed, in order to secure the necessary stability of action. The crisis past, the idea drops its borrowed investiture, and reappears as surmise.

When we substitute for ideas, as uniform rules in deciding doubtful cases, a making over of the ideas such as is requisite to make them fit into one another, the quality of thought alters. We may fairly say that we have come into another stage. The idea is now regarded as essentially subject to change, as a manufactured article needing to be made ready for use. To determine the social and psychological conditions of this transition lies beyond my purpose, since I have in mind only a descriptive setting forth of the periods through which, as a matter of fact, thought has passed in the development of the inquiry function, without raising the problem of its 'why' and 'how.' At this point we shall not do more than note that, as the scheduled stock of fixed ideas grows larger, their application to specific questions becomes more difficult, prolonged, and roundabout. There has to be a definite hunting for the specific idea which is appropriate; there has to be comparison of it with other ideas. This comes to involve a certain amount of mutual compromise and modification before selection is possible. The idea thus gets somewhat shaken. It has to be made over so that it may harmonize with other ideas regarded as possessing equal worth. Often the very accumulation of fixed ideas commands this reconstruction. The dead weight of the material becomes so great that it cannot sustain itself without a readjustment of the center of gravity. Simplification and systemization are required, and these call for reflection. Critical cases come up in which the fiction of an idea or rule already in existence cannot be maintained. It is impossible to conceal that old ideas have to be radically modified before the situation can be dealt with. The friction of circumstance melts away their congealed fixity. Judgment becomes legislative.

Seeking illustrations at large, we find this change typified in Hebrew history, in the growing importance of the prophet over the judge, in the transition from a justification of conduct through bringing particular cases into conformity with existent laws, into that effected by personal right-mindedness enabling the individual to see the law in each case for himself. Profoundly as this changed conception of the relation between law and particular case affected moral life, it did not, among Semites, directly influence the logical sphere. With the Greeks, however, we find a continuous and marked departure from positive declaration of custom. We have assemblies meeting to discuss and dispute, and finally, upon

the basis of the ideas thus brought to view, to decide. The man of counsel is set side by side with the man of deed. Odysseus was much experienced, not only because he knew the customs and ways of old, but even more because from the richness of his experience he could make the pregnant suggestion meet the new crisis. It is hardly too much to say that it was the emphasis put by the Greek mind upon discussion – at first as preliminary to decision, and afterwards to legislation – which generated logical theory.

Discussion is thus an apt name for this attitude of thought. It is bringing various ideas together; shaking one against another and the tearing down their rigidity. It is conversation of thoughts; it is dialogue – the mother of dialectic in more than the etymological sense. No process is more recurrent in history than the transfer of operations first carried on between different persons, into the arena of the individual's own consciousness. The discussion which at first took place by bringing ideas from different persons into contact, by introducing them into the forum of competition and by subjecting them to critical comparison and selective decision, finally became a habit of the individual with himself. He became a miniature social assemblage, in which pros and cons were brought into play struggling for the mastery – for final conclusion. In some such way we conceive reflection to be born.

It is evident that discussion, the agitation of ideas, if judged from the standpoint of the older fixed ideas, is a destructive process. Ideas are not only shaken together and apart, they are so shaken in themselves that their whole validity becomes doubtful. Mind, and not merely ideas, becomes uncertain. The attempt to harmonize different ideas means that in themselves they are discrepant. The search for a conclusion means that accepted ideas are only points of view, and hence personal affairs. Needless to say it was the Sophists who emphasized and generalized this negative aspect – this pre-supposition of loss of assurance, of inconsistency, of subjectivity. They took it as applying not only to this, that, and the other idea, but to ideas as ideas. Since ideas are no longer fixed contents, they are just products of an individual's way of thinking. Lacking inherent value, they merely express the interests that induce the individual to look this way rather than that. They are made by the individual's point of view, and hence will be unmade if he can be led to change his point of view. Where all was fixity, now all is instability: where all was certitude, nothing now exists save personal opinion based on prejudice, interest, or arbitrary choice.

The modern point of view, while condemning sophistry, yet often agrees with it in limiting the reflective attitude as such to self-involvement and self-conceit. From Bacon down, the appeal is to observation, to

attention to facts, to concern with the external world. The sole genuine guarantee of truth is taken to be appeal to facts, and thinking as such is something quite different.

If reflection is not considered a merely variable matter, at least it is considered as an endless mulling over of things, taking us further and further away from reality into what is merely subjective. It is the futile attempt to spin truth out of one's own inner consciousness. It is introspection, and theorizing, and mere speculation.

Such wholesale depreciation ignores the value inherent even in the most subjective reflection. It takes the settled estate which is proof either that thought is not needed, or that it has done its work, as if it supplied the standard for the occasions in which problems are hard upon us, and doubt is rife. It takes the conditions which come about after and because we have thought, as measuring the conditions which call out the thinking. Whenever we really need to reflect, the point is that we cannot appeal directly to the 'fact'; for the simple reason that the very stimulus to thinking has arisen just because 'facts' have slipped away from us. The fallacy is neatly embodied by Mill in his discussion of Whewell's account of the need of mental conception or hypothesis in 'colligating' facts. He insists both that the conception is "obtained" from the "facts" in which "it exists," is "impressed upon us from without," and that it is the "darkness and confusion" of the facts that makes us want the conception in order to create "light and order."¹ Subjective reflection involves running over various ideas, sorting them out, comparing one with another, trying to get one which will unite into itself the strength of two and avoid their incompatibilities, searching for new points of view and developing new suggestions, guessing, suggesting, selecting and rejecting. The greater the problem, the greater the shock of doubt and consequent confusion and uncertainty, the more prolonged and more necessary is this process of 'mere thinking.' It is a more obvious phase of biology than of physics, of sociology than of chemistry; yet it persists in established sciences. If we take even a mathematical proposition, not *after* it has been demonstrated – and thus capable of statement in adequate logical form – but while still in process of discovery and proof, the operation of this subjective phase is manifest, so much so, indeed, that a distinguished modern mathematician has said that the paths which the mathematical inquirer traverses in any new field are more akin to those of the experimentalist, and even to those of the poet and artist, than they are to those of the Euclidean geometer.

What makes the essential difference between modern research and the reflection of, say the Greeks, is not the presence or absence of 'mere

¹ *Logic*, Bk. IV, ch. ii., § 2.

thinking,' but the conditions for testing the results of the latter, the elaborate system of checks and balances found in the technique of modern experimentation. The thinking process does not now go on endlessly in terms of itself, but seeks outlet through reference to particular experiences. It is tested by this reference; not, however, as if a theory could be tested by directly comparing it with facts – an obvious impossibility – but through use in facilitating commerce with facts. It is tested as glasses are tested; things are looked at through the medium of ideas to see if thereby they assume a more orderly and clearer aspect, if they are less blurred and obscure.

The reaction of the Socratic school against the Sophistic may serve to illustrate the third stage of thinking. This movement was interested not in the *de facto* shaking of received ideas and consequent discrediting of all thinking. It was concerned rather with the virtual appeal to a common denominator involved in bringing different ideas into relation with one another. In their comparison and necessary mutual modification it saw evidence of the presence of an arbiter passing judgment upon their conflict, and revealing a common principle and standard of reference. It dealt not with the shaking and dissolution which were going on, but with the comprehensive permanent idea finally to emerge. Controversy and discussion among different individuals may as a matter of fact result in extending mere doubt, by manifesting the incoherency of accepted ideas, and thus throwing the individual into an attitude of distrust. But it involves also an appeal to a single thought to be accepted by both parties, and thus puts an end to the dispute. It was this appeal to a higher court, this possibility of attaining a total idea, which should bring into relief the agreeing elements in contending thoughts, and banish the incompatible factors, that animated the Socratic search for the concept, the elaboration of the Platonic hierarchy of ideas in which the higher substantiate the lower, and the Aristotelian exposition of the systematized methods by which general truths may be employed to justify propositions otherwise doubtful. At least this historic development will serve to illustrate what is involved in the transition from the second to the third stage; the transformation of discussion into reasoning, of subjective reflection into method of proof.

Discussion, whether with ourselves or others, goes on by suggestion supplying clues, and as the uppermost interest opens a way here or there. It is discursive and haphazard. This gives it the devious tendency indicated in Plato's remark that it needs to be tied to the post of reason. It needs, that is, to have the ground or basis of its various component statements brought to consciousness in such a way as to define the exact value of each. The Socratic contention is the need of compelling the common denominator, the common subject underlying the diversity of

views, to exhibit itself. It alone gives a sure standard by which the claims of all assertions may be measured. Until this need is met, discussion is a self-deceiving play with unjudged, unexamined matters, which, though confused and shifting, yet impose themselves upon us.

We are familiar enough with the theory that the Socratic universal, the Platonic idea, was generated by an ignorant transformation of psychological abstractions into self-existent entities. However strong and finally unresisted may have been this tendency, to insist upon it as the key to the Socratic logic is mere caricature. The objectivity of the universal stood for the sense of something decisive and controlling in all reflection, other than just futile manipulation of personal prejudice. This sense is certainly as active in modern science as it was in the Platonic dialectic. What Socrates felt was the opinionated and conceited quality of the terms used in the moral and political discussion of his day, as contrasted with the assured subject matter, which, if rightly grasped, would put an end to merely personal views and argumentation.

By Aristotle's time the interest was not so much in the existence of standards of decision in cases of doubt and dispute as it was in the technique of their use. The judge was firmly seated on the bench. The parties in controversy had recognized his jurisdiction, and their respective claims were submitted for adjudication. The need then was for rules of procedure by which the judge might, in an obvious and impartial way, bring the recognized universal or decisive law to bear upon particular matters. Hence the elaboration of those rules of evidence, those canons of demonstrative force, which are the backbone of the Aristotelian logic. There was a code by which to decide upon the admissibility and value of proffered testimony – the rules of the syllogism. The figures and terms of the syllogism provided a scheme for deciding upon the exact bearing of every statement propounded. The plan of arrangement of major and minor premises, of major, minor, and middle terms, furnished a manifesto of the exact procedure to be followed in determining the proving force of each element in reasoning. The judge knew what testimony to permit, when and how it should be introduced, how it could be impeached or have its competence lessened, and how the evidence was to be arranged so that its summary would also be an exhibit of its value in establishing the conclusion. Hence the possibility of forming a scheme for defining the exact mode of credibility attaching to any proposition.

This means that we have now a distinctive type of thinking quite marked off from mere discussion and reflection. It may be called either reasoning or proof. It is reasoning when we think of the regularity of the method for getting at and employing the unquestioned grounds which give validity to other statements. It is proof as regards the degree of

logical desert thereby measured out to such propositions. Proof is the acceptance or rejection justified through the reasoning. To quote from Mill: "To give credence to a proposition as a conclusion from something else is to reason in the most extensive sense of the term. We say of a fact or statement, it is proved, when we believe its truth by reason of some other fact or statement from which it is said to follow."² Reasoning is marshalling a series of terms and propositions until we can bind some doubtful fact firmly to an unquestioned, although remote truth; it is the regular way in which a certain proposition is brought to bear on a precarious one, clothing the latter with something of the peremptory quality of the former. So far as we reach this result, and so far as we can exhibit each step in the nexus and be sure it has been rightly performed, we have proof.

But questions still face us. How about that truth upon which we fall back as guaranteeing the credibility of other statements – how about our major premise? Whence does it derive its guarantee? *Quis custodes custodiet?*

We may, of course, in turn subsume it under some further major premise, but an infinite regress is impossible, and on this track we are finally left hanging in the air. For practical purposes, the unquestioned principle may be taken as signifying mutual concession or agreement – it denotes that as a matter of fact its truth is not called in question by the parties concerned. This does admirably for settling arguments and controversies. It is a good way of amicably arranging matters among those already friends and fellow citizens. But scientifically, the widespread acceptance of an idea seems to testify to custom rather than to truth; prejudice is strengthened in influence, but hardly in value, by the number who share it; conceit is none the less self-conceit because it turns the heads of many.

Great interest was indeed soon taken in the question of the range of persons who hold truths in common. The *quad semper ubique, omnibus*, became of great importance. This, however, was not, in theory at least, because common agreement was supposed to constitute the major premise, but because it afforded confirmatory evidence of its self-evident and universal character.

Hence the Aristotelian logic necessarily assumes certain first or fundamental truths unquestioned and unquestionable, self-evident and self-evidencing, neither established nor modified by thought, but standing firm in their own right. This assumption is not, as modern dealers in formal logic would sometimes have it, an external psychological or

² *Logic*, Bk. II, ch. I, §I. I have changed the order of the sentences quoted, and have omitted some phrases.

metaphysical attachment to the theory of reasoning, to be omitted at will from logic as such. Without such truths we are still in the bonds of uncertainty. We are still within the play of subjective, arbitrary, futile opinion. *Judgment* has not taken place, and assertion is still without warrant. Hence the scheduling of first truths is an organic part of any theory of reasoning which is occupied with securing surety of assent, or valid conviction. To deny the necessary place of ultimate truths in the logical system of Aristotle and his followers, is to make them not philosophers, but players in a game of social convention. It is to overlook, to invert, the fact that they were sincerely concerned with the question of attaining the grounds and process of assurance in cases of doubt. Hence they were obliged to assume primary intuitions, metaphysical, physical, moral, and mathematical axioms, in order to get the pegs of certainty to which to tie their bundles of otherwise contingent propositions.

It would be going too far to claim that the regard for the authority of the church, of the fathers, of the scriptures, of ancient writers, of Aristotle himself, so characteristic of the Middle Ages, was the direct outcome of this pre-supposition of truths fixed and unquestionable in themselves. But the logical connection is sure. The supply of absolute premises that Aristotle was able to proffer was decidedly scant. In his own generation and situation this paucity made comparatively little difference; for to the mass of men the great bulk of values was still carried by custom, by religious belief, and social institution. It was only in the comparatively small sphere of persons who had come under the philosophic influence, that the need of the logical mode of confirmation was felt. In the mediæval period, however, customs were dissipated through their mutual clash, and hence ideas required to be concentrated by some fixed principle giving them stay and power. The situation was exactly such as to call into active use the Aristotelian scheme of thought. Authority compensated for the meagerness of the store of universals known by direct intuition, and the Aristotelian plan of reasoning afforded the precise instrumentality through which the vague and chaotic details of life could be reduced to order by subjecting them to the terms of authoritative rules.

It is not enough, however, to account for the ultimate major premises, for the unconditioned grounds upon which credibility is assigned. We have also to report where the other side comes from: matters so uncertain in themselves as to require having their grounds supplied from outside. The answer in the Aristotelian scheme is an obvious one. It is the very nature of sense, of ordinary experience, to supply us with matters which in themselves are only contingent, unstable and divagating. The doubt attaching to them is in no sense a result of the

thinking process; it does not arise organically within the latter, but is rather its external precondition. There is a certain portion of the intellectual sphere, that derived from experience, which is infected throughout because of its unworthy origin. In itself it stands forever condemned to be merely empirical – particular, more or less accidental, inherently irrational. You cannot make gold from dross, and the best that can be done for and with material of this sort is to bring it under the protection of truth which has warrant and weight in itself.

We may now characterize this stage of thinking with reference to our original remark that different stages denote various degrees of the evolution of the doubt-inquiry function. As compared with the period of fixed ideas, doubt is awake, and inquiry is active but in itself, it is rigidly limited. On one side it is bounded by the fixed ultimate truths, whose very nature is that they cannot be doubted, that they are not products or functions in inquiry, but bases that investigation fortunately hits upon. In the other direction doubt is itself arrested. All ‘matters of fact,’ all ‘empirical truths’ belong to a particular sphere or kind of existence, and one intrinsically open to suspicion. The region is condemned in a wholesale way. In itself it exhales doubt; it cannot be reformed; it is to be shunned, or, if this is not possible, to be escaped from by climbing up a ladder of intermediate terms until we lay hold on the universal. The very way in which doubt is fixed, taken all in a piece, marks its lack of vitality. It is objectified, and thereby arrested and cooped up in a particular place. As with any doubtful character, the less had of its company the better. Uncertainty is not realized as a necessary instrument in compelling experienced matters to reveal their own meaning and inherent order.

This limitation upon inquiry settles the interpretation of thought possible at this stage – it is of necessity merely connective, merely mediating. It goes between the first principles – themselves, as to their validity, outside the province of thought – and the particulars of sense – also, as to their status and worth, beyond the dominion of thought. Thinking is subsumption – just placing a particular proposition under its universal. It is inclusion, finding a place for some questioned matter within a region taken as more certain. It is use of general truths to afford support to those otherwise shaky – an application, however, that improves their standing, while leaving their content quite unchanged. This means that thought has only a formal value. It is of service in exhibiting and arranging grounds upon which any particular proposition may be acquitted or condemned, upon which it may be assented to, or upon which belief may reasonably be withheld.

The metaphor of the law court is apt. There is assumed some matter to be either proved or disproved. As matter, as content, it is furnished. It

is not to be found out. In the law court it is not a question of discovering what a man is, but simply of finding reasons for regarding him as guilty or innocent. It is not an all-around play of thought directed to the institution of something as fact, but just a question of whether grounds can be adduced justifying acceptance of a proposition already set forth. The significance of such an attitude comes into relief when we contrast it with what is done in the laboratory. In the laboratory there is no question of proving that things are just thus and so, or that we must accept or reject a given statement; there is simply an interest in finding out what sort of things it is that we are dealing with. Any quality or change that presents itself may be an object of investigation, or may suggest a conclusion, since it is judged, not by reference to preëxistent truths, but by its suggestiveness of what it may lead to, and thus the mind is open to inquiry in any direction. Or we may illustrate by the difference between the auditor and the expert in an insurance company. One simply passes and rejects, issues vouchers, compares and balances statements already made out. The other investigates any one of the items of expense or receipt; inquires how it comes to be what it is, what facts, as regards say length of life, condition of money market, activity of agents, are involved, and what further researches and activities are thereby indicated.

The illustrations of the laboratory and the expert remind us of another attitude of thought in which investigation attacks matters hitherto reserved. The growth, for example, of freedom of thought during the Renaissance was a revelation of the intrinsic momentum of the thought-process itself. It was not a mere reaction from and against mediæval scholasticism. It was the continued operation of the machinery which the scholastics had set a-going. Doubt and inquiry were extended into the region of particulars, of matters of fact, with the view of reconstituting them through discovery of their own structure, no longer with the intention of leaving that unchanged, while transforming their claims to credence. Thought no longer found satisfaction in appraising them in a scale of values according to their nearness to, or remoteness from, fixed truths. Such work had been done to a nicety, and it was futile to repeat it. Thinking must find a new outlet. It was out of employment, and set to discover new lands. Galileo and Copernicus were travelers – as much so as the crusader, Marco Polo, and Columbus.

Hence the fourth stage – covering what is popularly known as inductive and empirical science. Thought takes the form of inference instead of proof. Proof, as we have already seen, is accepting or rejecting a given proposition on the ground of its connection or lack of connection with some other proposition conceded or established. But inference does not terminate in any given proposition; it is after precisely

those which are not given. It wants more facts, different facts. Thinking in the mode of inference insists upon terminating in an intellectual advance, in a consciousness of truths hitherto escaping us. Our thinking must not now 'pass' certain propositions after challenging them, must not admit them because they exhibit certain credentials, showing a right to be received into the upper circle of intellectual society. Thinking endeavors to compel facts, as they present themselves, to yield up something hitherto obscure or concealed. This advance and extension of knowledge through thinking seems to be well designated by the term inference. It does not certify what is otherwise doubtful, but 'goes from the known to the unknown.' It aims at pushing out the frontiers of knowledge, not with marking those already attained with sign posts. Its technique is not a scheme for assigning status to ideas already possessed, but a method for making friends with facts and ideas hitherto alien. Inference reaches out, fills in gaps. Its work is measured not by the patents of standing it issues, but by the material increments of knowledge it yields. *Inventio* is more important than *judicium*, discovery than 'proof.'

With the development of empirical research, uncertainty or contingency is no longer regarded as infecting in a wholesale way an entire region, discrediting it save as it can be brought under the protecting ægis of universal truths as major premises. Uncertainty is now a matter of detail. It is the question whether the particular fact is really what it has been taken to be. It involves contrast, not of a fact as a fixed particular over against some equally fixed universal, but of the existing mode of apprehension with another possible and better apprehension.

From the standpoint of reasoning and proof, the intellectual field is absolutely measured out. Certainty is located in one part, intellectual indeterminateness or uncertainty in another. But when thinking becomes research, when the doubt-inquiry function comes to its own, the problem is just: What is the fact?

Hence the extreme interest in details as such; in observing, collecting, and comparing particular causes, in analysis of structure down to its constituent elements, interest in atoms, cells, and in all matters of arrangement in space and time. The microscope, telescope, and spectroscope, the scalpel and microtome, the kymograph and the camera, are not mere material appendages to thinking; they are as integral parts of investigative thought as were *Barbara*, *Celarent*, etc., of the logic of reasoning. Facts must be discovered, and to effect this the apparent facts must be resolved into their elements. Things must be readjusted in order to be held free from all intrusion of impertinent circumstance and misleading suggestion. Instrumentalities of extending and rectifying research are, therefore, of themselves organs of thinking. The special-

ization of the sciences, the almost daily birth of a new science, is also a logical necessity – not a mere historical episode. Every phase of experience must be investigated, and each characteristic aspect presents its own peculiar problems which demand, therefore, their own technique of investigation. The discovery of difficulties, the substitution of doubt for quiescent acceptance, are more important than the sanctioning of belief through proof. Hence the importance of noting apparent exceptions, negative instances, extreme cases, anomalies. The interest is in the discrepant because that stimulates inquiry, rather than in the fixed universal which would terminate it once for all. Hence also the roaming over the earth and through the skies for new facts which may be incompatible with old theories, and suggest new points of view.

To illustrate these matters in detail would be to write the history of every modern science. The interest in multiplying phenomena, in increasing the area of facts, in developing new distinctions of quantity, structure, and form, is obviously characteristic of modern science. But we do not always heed its logical significance – that it makes thinking consist in the extension and control of contact with new material so as to lead regularly to the development of new experience.

The elevation of the region of facts – the formerly condemned region of the inherently contingent and variable – to something that invites and rewards inquiry, defines the import, therefore, of the larger aspects of modern science. This spirit prides itself upon being positivistic – it deals with the observed and the observable. It will have naught to do with ideas that cannot verify themselves by showing themselves *in propria persona*. It is not enough to present credentials from more sovereign truths. These are hardly acceptable even as letters of introduction. Refutation of Newton's claim, that he did not make hypotheses, by pointing out that no one was busier in this direction than he, and that generally scientific power is in direct ratio to ability to imagine possibilities, is as easy as it is irrelevant. The hypotheses, the thoughts, that Newton employed, were or and about fact; they were for the sake of exacting and extending what can be apprehended. Instead of being sacrosanct truths affording a redemption by grace to facts otherwise ambiguous, they were the articulating of ordinary facts. The notion of law changes. It is no longer something of superior kind governing things and events, it is the statement of their own order.

Thus the exiling of occult forces and qualities is not so much a specific achievement as it is a demand of the changed attitude of thought. When thinking consists in the detection and determination of observable detail, then forces, forms, qualities at large, are thrown out of employment. They are not so much proved non-existent as rendered nugatory. Disuse breeds degeneration. Their service is dependent upon the assumption of

fixed universals as real essences; since their business is the ceremony of bringing these essences down into facts, the universal becomes the established order of the facts themselves, and then the mediating machinery disappears along with the essences. There is substituted for the hierarchical world, in which each degree in the scale has its righteousness imputed from above, a world homogeneous in structure and in the scheme of its parts; the same in heaven, earth, and the uttermost parts of the sea. The ladder of values from the sublunary world with its rectilinear extravagant, imperfect motion up to the stellar universe, with its self-returning perfect order, corresponded to the middle terms of the older logic. The steps are graduated, ascending from the indeterminate, unassured matter of sense up to the eternal, unquestionable truths of rational perception. But when interest is occupied in finding out what anything and everything is, any fact is just as good as its fellow. The observable world is a democracy. The difference which makes a fact what it is, is not an exclusive distinction, but a matter of position and quantity, an affair of locality and aggregation, traits which place all facts upon the same level, since all other observable facts also possess them, and are, indeed, conjointly responsible for them. Laws cannot be edicts of a sovereign binding a world of subjects otherwise lawless; they are the agreements, the compacts of facts themselves, or, in the familiar language of Mill, the common attributes, the resemblances.

The emphasis of modern science upon control of experience flows from the same source. Interest is in the new, in extension, in discovery. Inference is the advance into the unknown, the use of the established to win new worlds from the void. This requires and employs regulation – that is method – in procedure. There cannot be a blind attack. A plan of campaign is needed.

Hence the so-called practical applications of science, the Baconian “knowledge is power,” the Comteian “science is prevision,” are not extra-logical addenda or supererogatory benefits. They are intrinsic to the logical method itself, for that is just the orderly way of approaching new experiences so as to grasp and hold them.

The attitude of research is necessarily towards the future. The application of science to the practical affairs of life, as in the stationary engine, or telephone, does not differ in principle from the determination of wave-lengths of light through the experimental control of the laboratory. Science lives only in arranging for new contacts, new insights. The school of Kant agrees with that of Mill in asserting that judgment must, in order to be judgment, be synthetic or instructive; it must extend, inform, and purvey. When we recognize that this service of judgment in effecting growth of experience is not accidental, but that judgment means exactly the device and use of instrumentalities for this

end, we also remark that the so-called practical uses of science are only the further and freer play of the intrinsic movement of thought itself.

We began with the assumption that thought is to be interpreted as a doubt-inquiry function, conducted for the purpose of arriving at that mental equilibrium known as assurance or knowledge. We assumed that various stages of thinking could be marked out according to the amount of play which they gave to doubt, and the consequent sincerity with which thinking was identified with free inquiry. Modern scientific procedure, as just set forth, seems to define the ideal or limit of this process. It is inquiry emancipated, universalized, whose sole aim and criterion is discovery, and hence it makes the terminus of our description. It is idle to conceal from ourselves, however, that this scientific procedure, as a practical undertaking, has not as yet reflected itself into any coherent and generally accepted theory of thinking, into any accepted doctrine of logic which is comparable to the Aristotelian. Kant's conviction that logic is a "complete and settled" science, that with absolutely "certain boundaries it has gained nothing and lost nothing since Aristotle," is startlingly contradicted by the existing state of discussion of logical doctrine. The simple fact of the case is that there are at least three rival theories on the ground, each claiming to furnish the sole proper interpretation of the actual procedure of thought.

The Aristotelian logic is far from having withdrawn its claim. It still offers its frame-work as that into which the merely 'empirical' results of observation and experimental inquiry must be fitted if they are to be regarded as really 'proved.' Another school of logicians, starting professedly from modern psychology, discredits the whole traditional industry, and reverses the Aristotelian theory of validity; it holds that only particular facts are self-supporting, and that the authority allowed to general principles is derivative and second hand. A third school of philosophy claims, by analysis of science and experience, to justify the conclusion that the universe itself is a construction of thought, giving evidence throughout of the pervasive and constitutive action of reason; and holds, consequently, that our logical processes are simply the reading off or coming to consciousness of the inherently rational structure already possessed by the universe in virtue of the presence within it of this pervasive and constitutive action of thought. It thus denies both the claim of the traditional logic, that matters of experienced fact are mere particulars having their rationality in an external ground, and the claim of the empirical logic, that thought is just a subjective gymnastic by which we vault from one presented fact to another remote in space and time.

Which of the three doctrines is to be regarded as the legitimate exponent of the procedure of thought manifested in modern science?

While the Aristotelian logic is willing to waive a claim to be regarded as expounder of the actual procedure, it still insists upon its right to be regarded as the sole ultimate umpire of the validity, or *proved* character of the results reached. But the empirical and transcendental logics stand face to face as rivals, each asserting that it alone tells the story of what science does and how it does it.

With the consciousness of this conflict, discussion in its present, or descriptive, phase must cease. Its close, however, suggests a further question. In so far as we adopt the conception that thinking is itself a doubt-inquiry process, must we not deny alike the claims of all three doctrines to be the articulate voice of the methods of experimental science? Do they not all agree in setting up something fixed outside inquiry, at once supplying its material and its limit? That the first principle and the empirical matters of fact of the Aristotelian logic fall outside the thinking process, and condemn the latter to a purely external and go-between agency, has been already sufficiently descanted upon. But it is also true that the fixed particulars, given facts, or sensations – whatever the empirical logician starts from – are ready-made material given to the thought process, and, therefore, that they externally limit inquiry, instead of being distinctions arising within and because of investigation or search for truth. Nor, as regards this point, is the transcendental in any position to throw stories at the empirical logic. Thought in itself is so far from a process of doubt or inquiry that it is the eternal, fixed structure of the universe; *our* thinking, involving doubt and investigation, is due wholly to our ‘finite,’ imperfect character, which condemns us to the task of merely imitating and reinstating ‘thought’ in itself, once and forever complete, ready-made, fixed. It is *per accidens* an object of inquiry, but not its organic content.

The practical procedure and practical assumptions of modern experimental science, since they make thinking essentially and not merely accidentally a process of discovery, seem irreconcilable with both the empirical and transcendental interpretations. At all events, there is here sufficient discrepancy to give occasion for further search: Does not an account or theory of thinking, basing itself on modern scientific procedure, demand a statement in which all the distinctions and terms of thought – judgment, concept, inference, subject, predicate and copula of judgment, etc. *ad indefinitum* – shall be interpreted simply and entirely as distinctive functions or divisions of labor within the doubt-inquiry process?

TYPICAL STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT

Simon F. MacLennan. "Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment." Chap. 6 of *Studies in Logical Theory* by John Dewey et al., *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, Second Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), vol. 11, pp. 128–42.

Logic aims at investigating the general function of knowing. But knowing, it is commonly asserted, is constituted as judgment. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that judgment undergoes well-marked changes in its development. Consequently, an understanding of the judgment-function and of its epochs in development is of prime importance. In carrying through the investigation we shall endeavor, first, to state and to defend a certain presupposition with reference to the character of the judgment-function; second, to exhibit the application of this presupposition in the typical stages of judgment.

I

Judgment is essentially *instrumental*. This is the presupposition which we must explain and make good. And we shall accomplish this by way of an analysis of judgment as meaning.

It cannot be denied that what we call knowledge is concerned with the discrimination of valid meaning. To know is to appreciate the *meaning* of things and the meaning of *things* is the same with valid meaning. Judging determines knowledge, and in the same act develops meaning. To put it otherwise, knowledge is a matter of *content*; *content* is *meaning*, and we have knowledge when we have meaning satisfactorily determined. It is evident, therefore, that if we would understand the judging-function, we must first make clear to ourselves the nature and rôle of *meaning*.

Meaning is universally embodied in *ideas*. To know, to understand the meaning, to get ideas, are the same. Now, in ideas two factors may be distinguished. First, every idea has as its base an image or emphasized portion of experience. In some forms of ideation we are more immediately aware of the presence of images than in others, but no idea – even the most abstract – can exist apart from an ultimate base. Second, every

idea is equally a function of *reference* and *control*. As *reference*, the idea projects in the mind's view an anticipation of experiences and of the conditions upon which these experiences depend for their realization; as *control*, ideas are agencies in turning anticipations into realizations.¹

To be more specific on both points: Since the days of Galton it has been almost a commonplace in psychology that ideas are embodied in forms of imagery which vary for and in different individuals. It has been maintained, it is true, that in abstract forms of thought, imagery disappears. This objection is met in two ways. For one, words – the vehicle of many abstract ideas – involve imagery of a most pronounced type: for another, every idea, when examined closely, discloses an image, no matter how much for the time being this has been driven into obscurity by the characteristics of reference and control. Furthermore, when we examine the anticipatory aspect of ideas, the presence of imagery both with reference to outcome and to conditions is so evident that its presence will scarcely be denied.

The second point may be illustrated in several ways. In everyday life anticipation and realization are inseparable from the nature and use of ideas. "Hat" means anticipation of protection to the head and the tendency toward setting in motion the conditions appropriate to the realization of this anticipation. The same factors are evident in the boy's definition of a knife as "something to whittle with." Again it is maintained that intelligence is an essential factor in human self-consciousness. By this is meant that human beings are universally aware in some degree of what they are about. And this awareness consists in understanding the meaning of their actions, of forecasting the outcome of various kinds of activity, of apprehending beforehand the conditions connected with determinate results. Within this sphere we speak of certain men as being pre-eminently intelligent, meaning that for such men outcomes are previewed and connected with their appropriate conditions far beyond the range of ordinary foresight. Finally, scientific intelligence is essentially of this kind. It aims at understanding the varying types of process which operate in nature and thus at possessing itself of information with reference to results to be expected under determinate conditions. For example, the knowledge acquired in his researches by Louis Pasteur enabled him to predict the life or death of animals inoculated with charbon virus according as they had or had not been vaccinated previously. His information, in other words, became an

¹ It is worth considering whether this may not be the reality of Royce's distinction between outer and inner meaning. An anticipation of experience is the working prerequisite of the control which will realize the idea, *i.e.*, the experience anticipated. One is no more "inner" or "outer" than the other.

instrument for the control and eradication of the disease. And what is true of this case is true of all science. To the scientist ideas are "working hypotheses" and have their value only as they enable him to predict, and to control. And while it is true that the scientist usually overlooks the so-called *practical* value of his discoveries, it is none the less true that in due time the inventor follows the investigator. The investigator is content to construct and show the truth of his idea. The inventor assumes the truth of the investigator's work and carries his idea as a constructive principle into the complications of life. To both men "knowledge is power," although the "power" may be realized in connection with different interests. But if this be true, ideas can no longer be regarded as copies in individual experience of some preexisting reality. They are rather instruments for transforming and directing experience, by way of constructing anticipations and the conditions appropriate to their realization. Herein also consists their truth or falsity. The true idea is reliable, carrying us from anticipation to realization; the false idea is unreliable, and fails in bringing the promised result.

Now, in the development of instruments generally, we may distinguish a rule-of-thumb or more or less unreflective stage of construction, and one entirely reflective. As to use there is the distinction of inexpert and expert control. This leads us to expect that in the thought-function also certain typical stages of construction and of control may be found. To the investigation of this point we shall next direct attention.

II

In its development from crude to expert forms judgment exhibits three typical stages – *the impersonal*, *the reflective*, and *the intuitive*. These we shall consider in order of development. But first it is to be noticed that these stages of judgment are not to be regarded as hard and fast distinctions of the kind that no indications of the higher are to be found in the lower types, but rather as working distinctions within a process of continuous development.

1. The impersonal judgment. – Ever since the days of the Greek grammarians the impersonal judgment has been considered an anomaly in logic. And the reason is not far to seek. From the time of Aristotle it has been customary to maintain that judgments, when analyzed, disclose a subject and a predicate. Logically considered, these appear to be entirely correlative, for, as Erdmann puts it,² "an event without a substrate, a quality without a subject, is altogether unrepresentable." But there is in all languages a class of judgments, such as, "It rains," "It

² *Logik*, p. 304.

snows," "Fire!" in which no directly asserted subject is discoverable. To these the name impersonal and subjectless has been given. Here then is the difficulty. If we admit that the impersonal expression involves predication, we must, in all consistency, search for a subject, while at the same time the subject refuses to disclose itself. In ancient days the orthodox logician confined his search to language and to the spoken or written proposition. The unorthodox critic maintained, in opposition to this, that a subject was provided only by warping and twisting the natural sense of the impersonal expression. And thus the matter stood until the development of modern comparative philology. It was then demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt that the "it" (or its equivalent) of the impersonal is a purely contentless form word. Language provides no subject whatsoever. So strong, however, is the hold of tradition that the search has been renewed. Attention has been turned upon the mental processes involved, and this time with more apparent result. Although there has been no general agreement with reference to the subject, a classification of the different views may still be made. (a) The subject is universal and undetermined; (b) it is individual and more or less determined; (c) between these extremes lies almost every intermediate degree conceivable.

Ueberweg maintains that the subject of the impersonal is the actual totality of present experience. When we ask, "What rains?" we must understand a reference to our general environment, in which no special element is singled out. Sigwart, on the other hand, maintains that the subject can be construed only as the actual sense-impression. This diversity of opinion might seem to indicate that, were it not for the constraining power of theory, a subject would scarcely be thought of for the impersonal. Still it must be admitted that when we examine the impersonal expression closely we can discover a sense-impression, whether definite or indefinite, combined with an idea. This would seem to give the case to the orthodox logician, for he will at once claim the sense-impression as the subject and the idea as the predicate of the judgment. But we must have a care. Predication is usually held to consist in a *reference* of predicate *to* subject. The factors of the judgment are, as it were, held apart. In the impersonal no such thing as this can be discovered. The meaning is so close a unity that impression and idea are entirely fused. We may analyze the expression and find them there, but by so doing we destroy the immediacy which is an essential characteristic of the impersonal. In other words, the impersonal does not analyze itself. It is entirely unconscious of its make-up. And yet it is definite and applies itself with precision: If I am in a lecture-hall and hear the fire-alarm, the thought "Fire!" which enters my mind leads to an immediate change in my conduct. I arise, move quietly out, and prepare for duty.

If, on the other hand, I open the street door and the rain strikes my face, I ejaculate "Raining!" turn, reach for my umbrella, and pass out protected. In both cases I act *knowingly* and with *meaning*, but I do not analyze the movement either of thought or of action. A correlate to the unreflective impersonal judgment is found in early custom. Custom embodies social ideas and is an instrument for the determination and control of action. Individuals moved by custom know what they are about and act with precision according as custom may demand. But it is notorious that custom is direct and unreflective. It represents social instruments of control which have grown up without method and which represent the slow accretion of rule-of-thumb activities through many ages. So in the impersonal judgment we have a type of intellectual instrument which has been brought to a high degree of precision in use, but which still retains the simplicity and certainty of an unquestioned instrument of action. For this reason, whatever complexity of elements the impersonal may present to a reflective view, it does not contain to itself. Consequently it may be best to say that to the impersonal there is neither subject, predicate, nor reference of the one to the other. These are distinctions which arise only when the instrument of action has been questioned and the mind turns back upon the meaning which it has unhesitatingly used, analyzing, investigating, constructing, laying bare the method and function of its tools. Thus arises a new and distinctive type of judgment, viz., the reflective.

2. *The reflective judgment.* – By the reflective judgment is to be understood that form of meaning whose structure and function have become a problem to itself. The days of naïve trust and spontaneous action have gone by. Inquiry, criticism, aloofness, stay the tendency to immediate action. Meaning has grown worldly wise and demands that each situation shall explain itself and that the general principles and concrete applications of its own instruments shall be made manifest. Hence in the various forms of reflective thought we find the progressive steps in which meaning comes to full consciousness of its function in experience.

The demonstrative judgment (the simplest of the reflective type) carries doubt, criticism, construction, and assertion written on the face of it. For example, in the expression, "That is hot," we do not find the directness and immediacy of response characteristic of the simpler impersonal "hot." Instead, we note a clash of tendencies, a suspension of the proposed action, a demand for and a carrying out of a reconsideration of the course of action, the emergence of a new meaning, and the consequent redirection of activities. An iron lies upon the hearth; I stretch out my hand to return it to its place; I stop suddenly, having become conscious of signs of warmth; the thought arises in my mind, "That is hot;" I experiment and find my judgment correct; I search for a

cloth, and thus protected carry out my first intention. Again, a hunter notes a movement in the thicket, quickly raises his gun, and is about to fire. Something in the movement of the object arrests him. He stops, thinking, "That is a man, perhaps." What has caught the eye has arrested his action, has become a demand, and not until the situation has become clear can the hunter determine what to do. In other words, he must reflectively assure himself what the object is before he can satisfy himself as to how he should act. Subject and predicate have arisen and have consciously played their parts in the passage from doubt to decision.

Under the heading "individual judgments" are classed such expressions as, "That ship is a man-o'-war," "Russia opposes the policy of the open door in China." In both these cases it is evident that an advance in definiteness of conception and of complexity of meaning has been made, while at the same time we recognize that the instrumental characteristics of the thought-movement remain the same. In considering the subject of the judgment we note that the stimulus presents itself partly as a determinate factor and partly as a problem – an insistent demand. The expression, "That ship is a man-o'-war;" might be written, "That is a ship and of the kind man-o'-war," and it thus constitutes what Sigwart calls a "double synthesis." As used in actual judgment, however, the two are held together and constitute the statement of a single stimulus of which a certain portion is evident and a certain portion is in doubt. The working out of the difficulty is given in the predicate "is a man-o'-war," in which we at once detect the instrumental characteristics fundamental to all judgment. To illustrate: At the close of the battle of Santiago, in the Spanish-American war, smoke appeared upon the horizon revealing the presence of a strange ship. Instantly attention was directed to it, and it became a problem for action – a demand for instrumental information. Soon it was identified as a man-o'-war, and the American ships were cleared for action. Closer approach raised a further question with reference to its nationality. After some debate this also was resolved, and hostile demonstrations were abandoned.

The universal judgment is sometimes said to exhibit two distinct forms. Investigation, however, has proved this statement to be incorrect. Instances taken in themselves and apart from their character are of no logical significance. Advance is made by weighing instances and not by counting them. In short, the true universal is the hypothetical judgment, and the reason for this may be readily shown. The hypothetical judgment is essentially double-ended. On the one hand, it is a statement of the problem of action in terms of the conditions which will turn the problem into a solution. On the other hand, it is an assertion that once the conditions of action have been determined the result desired may be

attained. Here we note that the judgment has come to clear consciousness of itself and of the part which it plays in experience. It has now obtained an insight into the criterion of its legitimate employment, i.e., of its truth and falsity. And this insight makes the justification of its claim almost self-evident. For, inasmuch as the hypothetical judgment says, "If such and such conditions be realized, such and such a result will be obtained," the test of the claim is made by putting the conditions into effect and watching whether the promised experience is given. And further, since it has been found that the judgment formulated as a hypothesis actually accomplishes what it promises, we must admit that the hypothetical judgment is also categorical. These two factors cannot be separated from each other. It is true that the hypothetical judgment reduces every valid meaning to the form, "*If* certain conditions be realized," but it as plainly and positively asserts, "such and such results *will* be obtained." When we grasp the absolute correlativity of the hypothetical and categorical aspects of judgment, we realize at once the essentially instrumental character of judgment, when it comes to consciousness of its structure and function. It arises in the self-conscious realization of a problem. This it reflects upon and sizes up. When the difficulty has been apprehended, the judgment emerges as the consciousness of the conditions which will attain the desired end of action freed and unimpeded. This may be illustrated by reference to the work of Pasteur cited above. His investigations began in a problem set for him by agricultural conditions in France. A certain disease had made the profitable rearing of sheep and cattle almost an impossibility. After long and careful examination he discovered the beneficial effects of vaccination. To him the conditions which governed the presence of the disease became apparent, and this knowledge furnished him with an instrument by means of which one difficulty was removed from the path of the stock-raiser. In this illustration we have an epitome of the work accomplished everywhere by the scientist. It is his task to develop and to reduce to exact terms instruments of control for the varied activities of life. In its parts and as a whole each instrument is intelligently constructed and tested so that its make-up and function are exactly known. Because of this, reasoned belief now takes the place of unreflective trust as that was experienced in the impersonal stage of judgment. What at first hand might appear to be a loss was in reality a gain; the breakdown of the impersonal was the first step in the development of an instrument of action conscious of its reason for being, its methods and conditions of action. These latter constitute the distinctive subject and predicate of the reflective judgment.

This brings us to the connection between the hypothetical character of

this form of judgment and its universality. And this perhaps will now be quite apparent. The reflective judgment lays bare an objective connection between the conditions and outcomes of actions. It proves its point by actually constructing the event. Such being the case, universality is no more than a statement of identical results being predictable wherever like conditions are realized. If it be true that "man is mortal," then it is an identical statement to insist that, "Wherever we find men there we shall also find mortality."

And this point brings us naturally to the treatment of the disjunctive judgment: "A is either B or C or D." In the disjunctive judgment the demand is not for the construction of a reliable instrument of action, but for the resolution of a doubt as to which instrument is precisely fitted to the circumstances. In fact, the disjunctive judgment involves the identification of the practical problem. When we say of a man, "He is either very simple or very deep," we have no doubt as to our proper course of action in either case. If he is simple, then we shall do so and so; if he is deep, then another course of action follows. We can lay out alternative courses beforehand, but the point of difficulty lies here: "But just which is he?" In short, the disjunctive judgment is the demand for and the attempt at a precise diagnosis of a concrete problem. To illustrate: A patient afflicted with aphasia is brought to a physician. The fact that the trouble is aphasia may be quite evident. But what precisely is the form and seat of the aphasia? To the mind of the educated physician the problem will take on the disjunctive form: "This is either subcortical or cortical aphasia. If subcortical, intelligence will not be impaired; if cortical, the sensor and motor tracts will be in good condition." Appropriate tests are made and the subcortical possibilities are shut out. The disjunction disappears and the judgment emerges: "This is a case of cortical aphasia." But now a new disjunction arises. It is either the sensory or motor form of cortical aphasia, and, whichever one of these, it is again one of several possibilities. As the alternatives arise, the means for discriminating them arise also; determinate symptoms are observed, and in due time the physician arrives at the final conclusion: "This is sensory cortical aphasia of the visual type." Having determined this, his method of action is assured, and he proceeds to the appropriate operation. Thus, finally, we are brought to a form of judgment aware not only of its motive, method, and justification, but also to one aware of its specific application to individual cases. Thus it would seem as though judgment had returned upon itself and had completed the determination of its sphere of action. And in one sense this is true. In the disjunctive judgment, as inclusive of the motives of the hypothetical and categorical forms, the reflective judgment would appear to have come to

its limit of development. One thing, however, remains to be considered, viz., the development from crude to expert uses of intellectual instruments.

3. The intuitive judgment. – As stated above, the intuitive type of judgment depends upon efficiency in the use of judgment. In this regard there is a great similarity between the impersonal and the intuitive judgments. Both are immediate and precise. But there is a radical and essential difference. The impersonal judgment knows nothing of the strict analysis, insight, and constructive power of the reflective judgment. The intuitive judgment, on the other hand, includes the results of reflection and brings them to their highest power. Paradoxically put, in the intuitive judgment there is so much reflection that there is no need for it at all. To the intuitive judgment there is no hesitation, no aloofness. Action is direct, but entirely self-conscious. That such a type of judgment as the intuitive exists there can be no doubt. There is all the difference in the world between the quality of consciousness of a mere layman and that of an expert, no matter what the line. The layman must size up a situation. It is a process whose parts are successive, whether much or little difficulty be experienced. For the expert situations are taken in at a glance, parts and whole are simultaneous and immediate. Yet the meaning is entirely exact. The expert judgment is self-conscious to the last degree. While other individuals are thinking out what to do, the expert has it, sees the advantage, adjusts, and moves. Demand and solution jump together. How otherwise can we explain, for example, the action of an expert ball-player? Witness his rapid reactions, his instantaneous adjustments. Mistakes of opponents which would never be noticed by the average player are recognized and seized upon. On the instant the new opening is seen, the adjustment is evident, the movement made. Illustrations to the same effect could be drawn from other modes of life, *e.g.*, music, the military life, etc. That intuitive judgments are not more common is a proof in itself of their distinctive character and value. Only in so far as we become experts in our special fields of experience and have reduced our instruments of action to precise control, can we expect the presence of intuitive judgments. They remain, therefore, as the final outcome of the judgment-function made perfect in its technique and use.

In conclusion we shall make a brief summary of our investigation and a criticism of certain current theories of judgment.

Judgment is essentially instrumental. Its function is to construct, justify, and refine experience into exact instruments for the direction and control of future experience through action. It exhibits itself first in the form of instruments developed unsystematically in response to the hard necessities of life. In a higher stage of development the instrumental

process itself is taken into account, and systematically developed until in the methodical procedure of science the general principles of knowledge are laid bare and efficient instruments of action constructed. Finally, constant, intelligent use results in complete control, so that within certain spheres doubt and hesitancy would seem to disappear as to the character of the tools used, and remain only as a moment in determining their wisest or most appropriate employ.

The criticism indicated is based upon the instrumental character of judgment and is directed against all theories which contend that knowledge is a "copying" or "reproducing" of reality. In whatever form this "copy" theory be stated, the question inevitably arises how we can compare our ideas with reality and thus know their truth. On this theory, what we possess is ever the copy; the reality is beyond. In other words, such a theory logically carried out leads to the breakdown of knowledge. Only a theory which contains and constructs its criterion within its own specific movement can verify its constructions. Such a theory is the instrumental. Judgment constructs a situation in consciousness. The values assigned in this situation have a determining influence upon values further appreciated. The construction arrived at concerns future weal and woe. Thus gradually a sense of truth and falsity attaches to the construing of situations. One sees that he *must* look beyond *this* situation, because the way he estimates *this* situation is fraught with meaning beyond itself. Hence the critically reflective judgment in which hesitancy and doubt direct themselves at the attitude, elements, and tools involved in defining and identifying the situation, instead of at the situation itself *in toto*. Instead of developing a complex of experience through assigning qualities and meanings to the *situation* as such, some one of the *quales* is selected, to have *its* significance determined. It becomes, *pro tempore*, the situation judged. Or the same thing takes place as regards some "idea" or value hitherto immediately fastened upon and employed. In either case we get the reflective judgment, the judgment of pure relationship as distinct from the constructive judgment. But the judgment of relation, employing the copula to refer a specified predicate to a specified object, is after all only for the sake of controlling some immediate judgment of constructive experience. It realizes itself in forming the confident habit of prompt and precise mental adjustment to individualized situations.

EXISTENCE, MEANING, AND REALITY IN LOCKE'S ESSAY AND IN PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGY¹

Addison W. Moore. "Existence, Meaning, and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology." *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, First Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), vol. 3, part 2, pp. 29–51.

To many, anything more than a passing reference to Locke, these days, will appear to be an anachronism. What profit can there be in threshing over straw as old and thoroughly flailed as Locke's theory of knowledge? Why return from the outposts of the epistemological battle to an ancient, deserted, and almost forgotten camp? Those who feel perfectly secure in the present position, who feel that all points in the rear and on the flanks of the advance thus far have been left well fortified, will answer: "Why?" But there are some, and their number is increasing, who do not share this sense of security and who feel that the difficulty is not one of momentary detail merely, but one involving the entire plan and method of the movement beginning in Locke. To these a review of the problem in the elementary and primitive form in which Locke presents it, and a reconsideration of the "common-sense" solution he offers, may not seem to be a case of misdirected effort.

¹ The standpoint from which this paper is written is the outgrowth of work done a few years ago in Professor Dewey's seminar in logic – a seminar remarkable for its development of critical and reconstructive principles. Since this paper was written the collection of Oxford essays edited by Mr. Sturt under the title *Personal Idealism* has come to hand. So marked is the accord of the general principles of this paper with much of the doctrine of this volume – especially with Mr. Schiller's essay on "Axioms as Postulates" and with some parts of Mr. Stout's essay on "Error" – that one might easily infer that they were written within the same "sphere of influence." That two movements so similar in spirit should have been developing, independently of each other in centers four thousand miles apart, is interesting and significant. The extent of the agreement of this paper with Mr. Schiller's essay on "Axioms, etc.," and his paper on "Useless Knowledge" in *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XI, No. 42, offers suggestions for footnote references on almost every page. But there being for the most part, no particular reason for making these references at one place rather than another I have decided to combine most of these possible citations in this one general statement.

Moreover, it may appear to some that the indulgent attitude, which it is the fashion to take toward Locke's epistemology, often has less warrant than is assumed. Locke's pioneer services are of course duly recognized, but his methods and results have long been regarded as having only an historical interest. It has long since been agreed that, instead of finding a path through the epistemological "forest primeval," he completely lost his way. The first "blaze" believed to have been made through that wilderness has, for over a century, borne the name of Kant. That "blaze" has become a great highway, splendidly equipped, and traveled by an innumerable company seeking the realm of truth and reality believed to lie at the terminus. But after more than a century's journeyings, with the promised land still beyond the horizon, some are beginning to wonder whether Kant, after all, really did get through. The highway, broad, magnificent, and thronged as it is, still runs through the wilderness of "appearance." And this doubt is not abated when it is seen that the highway is often crossed and sometimes paralleled no little distance by Locke's old trail. To point out some of these crossings and parallels, and to suggest a few characteristics of what appears to some as a possible way – not *to* reality, but a way *of* reality – is the aim of this paper.

Dropping the venerable and overburdened figure, and passing at once to the technical discussion of the theme, we find that, in terms of present-day logic and epistemology, the problem which Locke faces in Book IV of the *Essay* is that of the relation of existence, meaning, and reality to each other. Locke begins by attempting to identify reality with meaning. Failing in this, he tries to equate it with existence, and in the end attempts to divide the realm of reality between meaning and existence, leaving each, however, disputing the claims of the other.

Locke's first definition of knowledge is as follows: "Since the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings hath no other immediate object but its own ideas...knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas."² It may be said, and truly, that Locke's ideas here are not meanings as modern logic understands meaning, but that they are existences – psychical things. But it is precisely in the attempt to cut off these meanings from existence that they become psychical existences. To be sure, present logic tells us that knowledge involves "the loosing of meaning from existence," the severance of the "what" from the "that." But it tells us also that, at the same time, it involves "the reference of meaning to existence." But if the meanings – the "whats" – are taken as entirely loosed, so loosed that they become lost, from their existences,

² *Essay*, Book IV, chap. 1, sec. 1.

then they become, what they are here for Locke, a collection of psychical things. Thus does abstract idealism become a sort of psychical materialism.

The difficulty inherent in the attempt to thus state knowledge in terms of these psychical existences comes out at once in Locke's further account of "agreement and disagreement." This is contained in his statement of the four "kinds" of agreement and disagreement, to-wit: (1) identity or diversity; (2) relation; (3) coexistence or non-coexistence of ideas in the same subject; (4) agreement or disagreement of ideas with real existence.³ The second "kind," Locke says, is really a general form of all the others, and is therefore not co-ordinate with them. In the fourth kind we recognize Locke's second conception of knowledge as the reference of ideas to reality as existence and it is not to be considered, therefore, in the discussion of this first statement of knowledge as consisting in the reference of ideas to each other. The third kind of agreement and disagreement, as will be seen, is a transition statement which includes within it both the first and second definitions of knowledge and serves to break the abruptness of the transition. We have left, then, identity and diversity as the criterion of agreement and disagreement, in this first definition of knowledge.

Locke's illustration is as follows:

When we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive that these two ideas do not agree? When we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive that equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three angles of a triangle?⁴

Here Locke apparently makes agreement and disagreement mean mere identity and difference. Black and white disagree because one *is* not the other. But the triangle proposition, given as an illustration of *agreement*, must possess this kind of *disagreement*. The ideas in "agreement" must yet be different ideas. On the other hand, in disagreement there must be a common basis; there must be a disagreement about something – color, size, etc. Thus agreement and disagreement each involves both identity and diversity, and the latter cannot, therefore, serve to differentiate them. Here Locke has come upon the old problem of unity in difference, of the one and the many, which so puzzled the Greeks and which was the crucial question for his contemporary, Spinoza. In a world of givens,

³ Ibid., sec. 3.

⁴ Ibid., sec. 2.

whether psychical or physical, meanings or existences, there appears no way of reconciling the demands of unity and difference, nor of finding a basis for agreement and disagreement. Each given is simply there. White is white, black is black; there is an end of it. There is no basis or meaning for either harmony or opposition. As content, a unity of givens appears impossible. As factors, in a *process*, working to some *end*, there could be a unity of *function*. In a world of givens the problem of unity is insoluble.⁵

Locke's tacit recognition of these difficulties is found in his confession, farther on, that agreement and disagreement of this sort, except in the case of certain general mathematical and moral propositions, yields only "trifling" knowledge. In knowledge "which has most to do with the affairs of life," knowledge of substances, this definition of agreement and disagreement will not apply.

Gold is malleable, is true and certain; but there is here nothing affirmed of gold but that that sound stands for an idea which malleability is contained and such a sort of truth and certainty as this it is to say a centaur is fourfooted.⁶

And again:

It will be altogether as true a proposition to say all centaurs are animals, as that all men are animals; and the certainty of one as great as the other. For in both propositions the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds; and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and visible to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man: and so these two propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such truth to us?⁷

The attempt to state knowledge in terms of a lot of given meanings has, then, yielded little worthy the name of knowledge. It is Kant's system of concepts, empty without percepts, out of which can come only "analytic," "trifling" propositions. And Locke's problem, too, at this point, is "the possibility of synthetic propositions;" that is, the possibility of finding "real" existences for these divorced meanings. In other words, it is the problem of converting his world of psychical existences into true meanings, by finding something for them to mean.

⁵ The difficulty is, of course, just as acute on the side of the differences.

⁶ *Essay*, Book IV, chap. 6, sec. 9.

⁷ *Ibid.*, chap. 5, sec. 7.

This is the point at which Locke, like Spinoza,⁸ simply shakes the hat, and *presto!* – there is the “real world.” Locke tries to lessen the abruptness of this transition to reality by two or three devices. First, as we have seen, this second definition of knowledge is given as the fourth “sort of agreement and disagreement.” “The fourth and last sort of agreement and disagreement is that of *actual* and *real* existence, agreeing to any idea.”⁹ Then he has stated at the outset of the *Essay* that he will use *idea* as meaning “either image in the mind or quality in the object.” Finally he introduces a statement of agreement and disagreement, which he gives as the third “kind” of agreement and disagreement, and which forms a transition from the first to the second general conception of knowledge. This transition statement, indeed, contains one of the best examples of Locke’s confessed equivocation in the use of *idea* and *thing*.

The third sort of agreement and disagreement to be found in our ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is coexistence or non-coexistence in the same subject, and this belongs particularly to *substances*. Thus, when we pronounce concerning gold that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, that fixedness or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is *an idea* that always accompanies and is joined with that particular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in *aqua regia*, which make our *complex idea* signified by the word gold.¹⁰

In the first part of this statement the coexistence is “in the same subject” or “substance.” In the last part of it, it is in the “complex idea.”

In this transition statement Locke has thus combined his first and second general definitions of knowledge. Taking the “subject” or “substance” as a complex idea, this transition statement can be brought under the first general definition of knowledge as consisting in the agreement or disagreement of ideas. But, then, it shares too its “useless” and “trifling” character. It is precisely of the same kind as the proposition, “gold is malleable,” cited above as an illustration of “trifling knowledge.” On the other hand, if the subject or substance here means a “reality beyond,” which is represented or described by the ideas, then it is essentially the same as the fourth kind of agreement and falls under Locke’s second general definition of knowledge.

⁸ Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Prop. XXVIII.

⁹ *Essay*, Book IV, chap. 1, sec. 7.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, sec. 6. The italics are mine.

Passing now to the second statement of knowledge, as consisting in the agreement or disagreement of ideas with "real existence," let us note that it agrees with the statement of modern logic which defines knowledge as "the act which refers an ideal content (recognized as such) to a reality beyond the act."¹¹ "Gold is soluble," as an expression of knowledge, does not now mean the mere reference of the idea, soluble, to the idea, gold. That would be "trifling knowledge." Here it means the reference of the entire content, "gold soluble," etc., to "real existence," to "a reality beyond." "Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is conformity between our ideas and the reality of things."¹² It is true, Locke's ideal content does not have the unity and solidarity which it has in Mr. Bradley's conception. Locke's ideal content is an aggregation, but, in so far as it is taken altogether as the *meaning* and referred away to a reality beyond itself for its *subject*, it appears to be in essential agreement with Mr. Bradley's statement.

A few points should be noted at the outset of a consideration of this second definition of knowledge. First, whereas, in the first definition, the materials of knowledge were the given ideas, here they are a system of given ideas, on the one hand, and of given existences on the other. They are given in separation; the problem is to effect a unity. Second, reality is identified wholly with the side of existence. That is, the real is entirely and unqualifiedly opposed to the ideal – to meaning. Third, reality as existence is taken as a completed and fixed whole. Movement, development, is all on the side of the ideas – of meaning. Finally, meaning means merely representation, either as a copy or as an algebraic symbol. These are the assumptions which underlie Locke's second definition of knowledge and which are responsible for his subsequent difficulties. It is needless to follow all the tacks of the course which Locke steers through these difficulties. It will be sufficient for our purpose to restate what seem to be the fundamental dilemmas and their significance from the standpoint of this discussion.

The first difficulty, or rather the first form of *the* difficulty, which Locke continually encounters, is the very ancient and obvious; but very persistent and still very pertinent, one, of how, if meaning and existence are given apart, the former gets its reference to the latter. Locke's first attempt to deal with this difficulty, as most attempts before and since, virtually amounts in the end to saying that, while they are given apart, they are also given in reference. Waiving for the present the paradox in this state of affairs, with the reference as well as the separation given, the problem of "trifling propositions;" on the one hand, and error, on

¹¹ Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, p. 10.

¹² *Essay*, Book IV, chap. 4, sec. 3.

the other; must forthwith be faced. And here it usually happens that in making room for doubt and error the separation is emphasized so much that the problem of reference and connection again becomes acute. The dilemma is a reference given, hence trifling, or a reference which can never be verified, hence uncertain. In the language of modern logic, "thought appears either tautologous or false."

Locke's only solution of the case is an appeal to the Deity or to "nature."

Herein therefore is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances; that all our complex ideas of them must be such and such only as are made up of such simple ones as *have been discovered to coexist in nature*... . Whatever simple ideas have been found to coexist in any substance, these we may with confidence join together again; for whatever have *once* had an union in nature may be united again.¹³

But after this very simple statement of the ground of the reference of the idea as meaning to existence as reality, Locke at once finds himself on the other horn. If the meaning and existence, the idea and reality, are really "found together," if the reference is given along with the separation, how should there ever be any doubt, and where is there any room for error? How can there be any disagreement? Moreover, what meaning can "agreement" have but mere repetition? And even repetition has no significance where there is nothing else. In other words, Locke finds here that he has simply exchanged his "trifling," "tautologous," "analytic," knowledge, consisting of "the reference of ideas to each other in the mind," for one equally trifling, consisting of a *given* or "found" reference of ideas to an existential reality. Thus Locke's difficulty, all the way through, is not to find certainty merely; this he has with a vengeance, in his trifling propositions. The problem is to find a place for uncertainty and error. There must, of course, on the other hand, be a way out of this uncertainty and error. As a whole, the problem is to reach a theory of knowledge that will square with both the certainty and uncertainty, the truth and error, the struggle and satisfaction, so palpably present in experience. The difficulty is in reaching a statement of one that does not exclude the other.

The persistence of this difficulty is apparent in Locke's further attempt to leave a place for doubt and struggle, by an effort to rescue existence and meaning from this pre-established harmony. Locke's procedure at this point again seems very naïve; and yet, if Locke could ask just how

¹³ Ibid., Book II, chap. 4, sec. 12. Italics mine.

far we have advanced beyond it, it might turn out that our patronizing attitude toward his account has less foundation than we could wish. Locke's way of making room for doubt, effort, and error is as follows: while the idea and the reality are thus found together, when they *are* found, yet the finding, after all, involves *searching*. "It is by *trying* alone that I can certainly know what other qualities coexist with those of my complex idea, *e.g.*, whether that yellow, heavy, fusible body I call gold be malleable or no."¹⁴ This searching, "trying," is carried on in the investigation of substances "which have most to do with the affairs of life," by "the further observation of the senses." Now, during this searching there is suspense, uncertainty, and the possibility of error. As a general statement of the location of doubt and error, this, as is the case with most of Locke's general descriptions of experience, leaves very little room for improvement. The difficulty comes, of course, in interpreting it in terms of the rest of his account.

The most immediate and glaring difficulty is that of effecting any kind of a reconciliation of this "trying" with the final givenness of the connection between meaning and reality. It is difficult to see how the searching for this connection between idea and reality, which finally is simply to "appear," can be anything more than mere suspense. How can there be any uncertainty or error if meaning and reality are bound to appear together? The only chance for uncertainty would be merely in regard to the duration of the waiting or "trying." There could be none in regard to the final outcome. Then how can any real error occur? In what is it finally to consist? Locke's answer is, virtually, that we know as a matter of experience that this searching, trying stage is not a mere empty waiting, nor gazing into empty space, but that it is filled with suggestions, guesses, with certain hypothetical connections of ideas and reality which finally, on what ground doth not yet appear, are either rejected as false or accepted as partial revelations, as instalments of the entire fact.

This, of course, still further surrenders the ultimate givenness of the connection between idea and reality, and brings with it a train of fresh difficulties. First, whence come these suggestions, these hypotheses? If Locke dealt with this question explicitly and in this form, he would have answered, of course: "From the continued operation of the senses." And this would again have thrown him upon the other point of the fundamental dilemma of his whole position, *viz.*, the possibility of ever getting rid of the accompanying uncertainty when once it is admitted. For if the senses can and do make doubtful and false connections, how is "the farther operation of the senses" to help matters? Or, conversely, if "the

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Book IV, chap. 12, sec. 9. Italics mine.

further operations of the senses" do somehow make a true connection, why should not the earlier do so? What is the difference between the operation of the senses when they reveal a doubtful or false connection and when they give the true one?

The answer of most epistemology since Kant, and indeed the virtual answer Locke himself makes to this question, is, in its first and most general form, that it is the difference between the *partial* and the *completed* experience. To be sure, we are told in the same breath that a complete completeness can never be reached by human experience; for there is no limit to "the appearances of reality in sensation" and to the consequent reference of ideal constructions to reality. Now, if we are to think of truth in general as consisting in this stream of reference of ideas to reality, what is to break up this stream into specific truths? That is, what is to decide when we have reached *a* truth? The answer to this is that truth, in the particular case, is marked by the appearance of it sense of "harmony," of "satisfaction," or by the appearance of a greater degree of "definition" or "determination" of the idea. But what right have we to any "sense of harmony" and "satisfaction" at any particular time, if the awful gap between our meanings and ultimate reality still yawns? How can we find any "resting" place? Reality, surely, does not give out. And if this suggests that not reality, but *we*, give out, and have to "rest," then shall we say that the point at which we have to stop for breath is where we reach a particular truth, a "relatively" complete and determined experience? And error – what shall it be? A failure to get all the breath we need? "Error is truth, it is partial truth that is false only because partial and left incomplete?"¹⁵ To be sure, we are told further that error is not mere incompleteness; else it would not differ from truth.¹⁶ It is a meaning which "collides with reality," a meaning which reality "rejects," "repulses," "repudiates," etc.¹⁷

But what is the sign of this "collision," "rejection," "repudiation," etc.? The first answer is that it is a disagreement, a collision among the

¹⁵ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 192.

¹⁶ As showing just how much difference between truth and error is left from this standpoint, there is an interesting passage in the last chapter of *Appearance and Reality*, p. 541: "Every finite truth or fact to some extent must be unreal and false, and it is impossible in the end certainly to know, of any, how false it may be. We cannot know this, because the unknown extends illimitably, and all abstraction is precarious and at the mercy of what is not observed. If our knowledge were a system the case would then undoubtedly be altered. With regard to everything we should know the place assigned to it by the whole, and we could measure the exact degree of truth and falsehood which anything possessed... . But any system of this kind seems, most assuredly, by its essence impossible." Italics mine.

¹⁷ Ibid., chap. XVI.

ideas themselves.¹⁸ But does not this come near to begging the point? To say that the collision of the ideas with each other is due to a collision with reality, and that we know they have collided with reality because they disagree with each other does not seem to put us very far forward. However, in another connection, we get a very pertinent and illuminating answer. "Where experience, inward or outward, clashes with our views, where there arises thus *disorder, confusion, and pain*, we may speak of illusion. It is the course of events in collision with the set of ideas."¹⁹ To be sure, Mr. Bradley in this passage is defining illusion, not error. Indeed, the quotation is taken from the passage in which the distinction between error and illusion is drawn; but to the writer this distinction, as Mr. Bradley states it, seems to belong to the "without-a-difference" species. How much of a difference there is may be gathered from a comparison of the following with the above quotation: "It [error] is, in other words, the collision of a mere idea with reality."²⁰ And this, which follows shortly after the passage first quoted above: "Therefore, we must have error present always, and this presence entails some illusion."

Now, the "disorder, confusion, and pain" here appealed to are evidently not of a *peculiar* sort arising from the mere failure of our meanings to copy an external reality. They must be the "disorder, confusion, and pain" of any and every sort that arise in "the conduct of life." And if these are the signs that reality rejects our proffered means – the signs of error – their disappearance and the reinstatement of order, control, and satisfaction, in the conduct of life, must, notwithstanding the formal repudiations²¹ of the "practical" criterion, be the signs that reality accepts our suit – the signs of truth. Thus, while for both Locke and Mr. Bradley the formal standard for truth and error is given as the agreement and disagreement of meaning with a world of completed reality beyond, the real criterion is found in the relation of these meanings to the order and disorder, the satisfaction and dissatisfaction, of concrete living.

The teleological character of this relation between meaning and reality is still further deepened as we note that order and disorder, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, presuppose some desire, interest, aim. Apart from such an already defined direction of action, order and confusion can have no meaning. And by the time this much is admitted, one begins to

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 190.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 549.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 188.

²¹ Cf. Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, pp. 18–21 and 531.

wonder whether these harmonies and confusions in the conduct of life be not something more than mere arbitrary *signs* of truth and error.

And when we further seek for some details of the way in which this "disorder, confusion, and pain" is produced through the rejection of our meanings by reality, one meets with very little encouragement. We are told that "the idea collides with reality;" but little is vouchsafed concerning the nature of the idea and of this reality that will show *how* such a collision takes place and why it should be confusing and painful. To be sure, confusion and pain are implied in the ordinary connotation of "collision," but collision in the ordinary sense means more than "the collision of a *mere idea* with a reality beyond." In the first place, it is difficult to see how a "mere idea," as simply an intended copy or symbol of reality, can "collide" with that reality or anything else. And the difficulty grows when it is recalled that this reality which the idea is trying to reflect is itself a completed and static affair. "Nothing perfect, nothing *genuinely real*, can move."²² Why should there be any "collision" between even the false symbol and the reality which is not moving? If it be said that, while the reality does not move, *we* do, and so run against it, aside from the ever-recurring puzzle of the inclusion of motion even as appearance in a static absolute, one must ask: Why and how do we move? And what connection is there between our movement and these ideas which are partial copies of a static reality? In what way does this idea of a motionless reality produce or influence action? Doubtless it would be answered that our activity is due to the imperfection of the idea. If the copy were perfect, if it fully agreed with the reality, no activity would be needed. Activity is due to the imperfection of our knowledge. Aside from the want of any *modus operandi* in such statements, we are aware of this imperfection of meaning only through the "disorder, confusion, and pain of experience," and, as stated above, this disorder, confusion, and pain presuppose activity already going on in some more or less specific direction. In other words, this disagreement between meaning and reality which is somehow to be the stimulus to movement is known only through the very activity which it is supposed to stimulate.

In Mr. Royce's account one reads:

There is no purely external criterion of truth. You cannot merely look from without upon an ideal construction and say whether or no it corresponds to its object. Every finite idea has to be judged by its own specific purpose. Ideas are like tools. They are there for an end.

²² *Appearance and Reality*, p. 500. Italics mine. Cf. also Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 259.

They are true, as the tools are good, precisely by reason of their adjustment to this end. To ask me which of two ideas is the more nearly true is like asking me which of two tools is the better tool. The question is a sensible one if the purpose in the mind is specific, but not otherwise.²³

This sounds like the opening of a new chapter in epistemology. Here very little room is promised for the conceptions of a completed immovable reality, or of the merely representative character of meaning. Here the idea is a "tool," and is to have its value defined with reference to the "specific use" to which it is put. But when one reads again that the idea's "specific purpose" is, after all, not to relieve the "disorder, confusion, and pain" of everyday life, but is merely to "correspond," photographically or algebraically,²⁴ to an object; and when one further finds that this object is fixed eternally in the Absolute, and that this correspondence in human experience must be "partial and fragmentary," one is carried back at once to Locke and his problems. One might begin by asking why the idea seeks this correspondence at all. To this we are told that "what the idea always aims to find in its object is nothing whatever but the idea's own conscious purpose or will embodied in some more determinate form than the idea by itself alone at this instant consciously possesses."²⁵ Still the questions will not down. Why does the idea want a more determinate form? What is the standard for determination in general? And what decides the degree of increased determinateness it is seeking in the object? And if the idea fixes in advance the degree of determination, how can the object add more determination and still agree with the idea? And if this degree of determination is not fixed in advance by the idea, if there is only "a vague idea," of more determinateness, then what is to decide in favor of one object rather than another as supplying the proper degree of determination? This brings us to the problem of truth and error.

In the definitions of truth and error the same difficulties pursue. "An error is an error about a specific object only in case the purpose imperfectly defined by the vague idea at the instant when the error is made is better defined, is in fact better fulfilled, by an object whose determinate character in some wise, although never absolutely, opposes the fragmentary efforts made to define them."²⁶ But what is one to under-

²³ *The Word and the Individual*, p. 308.

²⁴ *The World and the Individual*, pp. 304 ff.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 327.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

stand by “imperfectly defined” and “better defined,” and what is the measure of “better fulfilled”? Of truth the formal definition is as follows: “It is true, this instant’s idea, if in its own measure and on its own plan, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own final and completely individual expression. Its expression would be the very life of fulfilment of purpose which this present idea already fragmentarily begins, as it were, to express.”²⁷ But how is the idea to know whether its present degree of determinateness is nearer than any other to its “final and completed form” which is not yet known? And again, what is meant by “in its own measure” and “on its own plan”? How can it have a “measure” of its “own,” if this “final and completely individual” form, never reached in finite life, is the standard? And what are the signs of even this “fragmentary” agreement with this final and completed form?

Moreover, if “Every finite idea is, as such, a general type of empirical and fragmentary fulfilment of purpose,”²⁸ in just what, after all does the difference between truth and error, in any particular case, consist? Every idea falls short of the final and complete form of determination. The true idea is one which comes *nearer* this form than another. But if this final form never appears in this life, what is to decide when one idea is “nearer” than another to this “completely individual” form?

Here it is interesting to turn to Mr. Royce’s illustration of the particular case. “Do you intend to sing in tune? Then your musical ideas are false *if they lead you to strike* what are, *then* called false notes.”²⁹ Here surely there is no reference to the absolute idea or absolute object. Here the final degree of determination is just that of the concrete desire. Here it is not the idea’s purpose merely to correspond “in a fragmentary way” with an absolute object eternally fixed in the absolute consciousness. It is here the idea’s business to help construct an action that shall get rid of the “disorder, confusion, and pain” of singing out of tune. And if we revert to the first passage quoted in which it is stated that every idea “has to be judged by its own specific purpose,” we read that “ideas are like tools; they are there for an end.” Here, too, surely, the “specific purpose” and “end” of the idea is not a “fragmentary correspondence” with “its own final and completely individual” form unless, indeed, we are ready to say that “its own final and completely individual” form is simply the form that brings the relief from this present pain and confusion of singing out of tune. And if we say this,

²⁷ Ibid., p. 339.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 336.

²⁹ *The World and the Individual*, pp. 307, 308. Italics mine.

then the distinction between finite and Absolute truth and reality would seem to disappear.

And this suggests that, notwithstanding Mr. Royce's most telling criticism of Mr. Bradley's divorce of thought and reality, one can but question whether this appeal to a "final," "completed," and "fulfilled" purpose does not, after all, leave us in the same boat with Mr. Bradley. If it is the very essence of thought, of the idea, to embody purpose, and if "The real as such is the complete embodiment in individual form and final fulfilment of the internal meaning [the purpose] of finite ideas,"³⁰ and if "To be, in the final sense, means to be just such a life, complete; present to experience, and conclusive of the search for perfection which every finite idea in its own measure undertakes whenever it seeks for any object,"³¹ how can there be any place for thought "as such" in the ultimate reality? How can a purpose "fulfilled" and "completed" remain as a purpose? Is not this continual existence of "a fulfilled purpose" a paradox? And are we not then face to face with Mr. Bradley's reality in which "thought as such" has no place?

In general, then, the fundamental difficulty for both Locke and present epistemology appears to consist in a discrepancy between the conception of the nature of knowledge and reality in general and the accepted criteria in the particular instance. There is no organic connection between the satisfaction and dissatisfaction, the harmony and disorder, used as a standard of truth and error in the particular case and the general function of knowledge as reporting or algebraically symbolizing a completed and unchangeable reality lying beyond the process of knowledge.

Now, in such case the discrepancy may be charged to either side or both. It is the thesis of this paper that the seat of the difficulty here is in the general conception of knowledge and reality, not in the standard accepted for the particular instance, and that the problem of logic at present is to bring the general conception of knowledge and reality into agreement with these criteria of "order" and "confusion" of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, upon which we fall back in the concrete case. This demands a much further analysis of "the concrete case" than psychology and logic have yet made. Thus far the conceptions of reality as a complete immovable system, and of meaning as merely representative, and as given "loosed from reality," involved in the theories of the general nature and relations of knowledge and reality, have so obscured the situation in the concrete case that the necessity for further analysis of the latter has not been felt. "Disorder, confusion, and pain" have been

³⁰ Ibid., p. 339. Brackets mine.

³¹ Ibid., p. 341.

accepted as merely arbitrary things, that our meanings are not accepted by reality. The present problem of logic is to work out just this connection between our meanings and the harmony and confusion, the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of concrete experience.

To sum up thus far, Locke, as most epistemology since, starts with meaning given apart from reality, the problem being to get them together. But it is found that, with the separation thus given, the connection must be given also. Then comes the difficulty of finding any place for effort, doubt, and error. On the other hand, when this connection is described as not given, but achieved through effort, it turns out that the connection can be made only through achieving the separation as well. For the separation that is achieved cannot be a complete separation. In an achieved separation the separated members are held in leash. It is Hegel's separation together – synthesis through analysis. We have found also that another phase of this same difficulty has been the attempt to confine movement, development, to the side of meaning only. And here the problem has been to see how the moving, shifting, active ideas can reflect a completed, immovable reality. Here, too, it may be remarked that Locke's system of ready-made, unchangeable ideas – direct offprints from the face of reality – seem to possess a decided advantage in such a representation over the "ideal constructions" of present logic. Locke, of course, does not keep consistently to these given, simple ideas for his knowledge of the real world. But the fact that he feels the need of them, when he is trying to bring meaning and reality together, is a point in favor of the consistency of Locke's conception of knowledge with his conception of the nature of ultimate reality. The internal difficulties of a representational epistemology certainly have not diminished since it has been forced by modern psychology to exchange the static for the dynamic idea. It would seem that the root of the central difficulty in present logic might be stated as the failure thus far to work out the implications of the thoroughly teleological and functional idea which it has accepted from modern psychology.³² The reconstructive implications of the discussion thus far would sum themselves in the following propositions: (1) that reality can be identified with neither meaning as such nor existence as such; (2) that meaning is not given in separation from existence regarded as reality; (3) that the distinction of meaning and existence is one falling inside reality; (4) that meaning does not merely copy, symbolize, or report reality, but helps to constitute it; (5) that, as constituted by the meaning and existence, reality is not an

³² Cf. Schiller, "Personal Idealism," *Axioms as Postulates*, secs. 48, 49. Cf. also "The Functional *versus* the Representational Theory of Knowledge in Locke's Essay," *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, Vol. III, No. 1.

immovable and completed system, but essentially dynamic and developmental.

In attempting a more positive statement of the relation between existence, meaning, and reality to which the difficulties encountered by both Locke and current epistemology point, it is to be said that such a statement here can be only a very general and schematic one. As a point of departure, let us take what was given above as one of the ways of stating the central difficulty and problem. The difficulty is that there appears no organic connection between ideas – meanings regarded as copies or symbols of reality conceived as a complete, fixed existence, and the harmony and disorder, the satisfaction and dissatisfaction, of everyday life which are accepted as the working criteria of truth and error in particular cases. What has the reflection of this fixed existence to do with the influence of ideas on our successes and failures? If we are told that our failures are due to “the collision of our ideas with reality,” then we must ask for details. Just how does collision of our ideas with this existence beyond affect us? What are the links in the connection? Or, is this “collision with reality” after all but a name for our failures? The problem is, then, to discover some point of contact of ideas with the harmony and disorder, the satisfaction and pain, in the particular case, and to see whether this involves the representation of a complete and immovable reality.

As already remarked, psychology has been at work for some time on the first part of this problem – especially since it has felt the influence of the conceptions of biological evolution. And, as also remarked, it is the opposition between the accepted results of this work of psychology and old conceptions of knowledge and reality still retained that is responsible for the strained relations in the epistemological household. From his work thus far on this problem of the relation of ideas to “the disorder, confusion and pain” of life, the psychologist tells us that, following the method suggested by evolution, we get a great deal of introductory light on the question by noting the conditions under which ideas develop.³³ He points out, first, that activity in which ideas –

³³ Here, of course, we are warned that the existence and meaning of the idea are two quite different matters. The distinction goes without saying, but it is implied in the standpoint from which this paper is written that it is the connection rather than the distinction between these two phases that needs attention nowadays. The attempt to separate the members of this distinction and farm them out to different disciplines for separate treatment is one way of stating what appears to the writer to be at the bottom of the present confusion between psychology and logic, and what is back of the growing conviction that our epistemology needs to be psychologized and our psychology – e.g., the doctrine of parallelism – epistemologized. Cf. Professor Dewey's article on “Psychology as Philosophic Method,” *Mind*, Vol. XI, O.S., No. 42.

meanings – are absent is in the relatively mechanical form of habit. By habit he means a co-ordination of activities in which the action at any given moment seems to be an adequate stimulus to further activity. In other words, a habit is a co-ordination of activities that can be wielded as a unit of activity in a larger whole. In such a negative statement of the conditions of ideas the positive side is implied. As this perfect continuity of stimulation, present in the habit form of activity, is marked by the absence of ideas, so we find ideas appearing at the point of interruption of this continuity in habit. And here, at the very outset, we reach again the center of the whole problem, viz., the relation of this appearance of ideas to the interruption of habit. Locke and all his successors virtually agree that the ideas do appear at this point. The question is: What is the significance and the manner of their appearance at this juncture? If it is their business to mirror a reality beyond this process of activity, there appears no particular reason why they should not perform that function as well in some other relation; for example, as an activity merely parallel and independent of habit.³⁴ In other words, is the “disorder, confusion, and pain” involved in this breach of continuity a mere arbitrary sign of “the collision” of some “mere idea” with “a reality beyond” or is it out of a collision, *within reality*, that the idea springs? From the former standpoint the query constantly arises: Whence and why the idea in the first place? And how and why the “collision?” Does reality impress or stimulate in some way a false idea in order to get up a collision with itself? And this is all aside from the difficulty already suggested as to how an immovable reality can *produce* anything, even a false idea, to say nothing of a “collision.”

In attempting to trace in a very general way the connection between ideas and this interruption in the continuity of habit, we need to start with some account of this interruption itself. For if we conceive this interruption as coming from without, *e.g.*, as arising from a collision of habit – not ideas in this case – with an immovable reality, the entire web of Locke’s difficulties settles about us at once. Stripped of metaphor, what is the meaning of this “collision?” Just how does habit run against this inscrutable and immovable reality? Moreover, if the collision is to be remedied, it must be in this case by habit “backing out” and reconstructing itself. No concessions can be expected from reality. And if the

³⁴ This is, indeed, to the writer the meaning of the whole paradoxical doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism. It is an expression of the failure to find any connection between the idea’s alleged office of reporting a static “reality beyond” and its manifest dynamic relation to habit as revealed by present psychology. Cf. Mr. Bawden’s article, “The Functional and the Psychological,” *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XI, pp. 474–84; also Part III of Mr. Ward’s *Naturalism and Agnosticism*.

idea is somehow to be the instrument of this reconstruction, how can it do so by merely "reflecting" the static reality? At any rate, two kinds of ideas would appear to be needed, one to "reflect" the static reality, and another, more flexible and dynamic, to help reorganize habit.

It would seem, then, that habit must be regarded as somehow developing its own interruptions. And, after all, this would not seem to be such a difficult conception. It is scarcely more than the commonplace notion, the philosophical significance of which Hegel perhaps first pointed out, that activity is conceived as constantly producing new conditions of its further ongoing; that in activity there must be a constant reorganization of the results of the activity back into the process. This is, of course, equivalent to saying that, in the last analysis, activity cannot be stated in terms of mere habit. It implies that *activity in any final just sense must include both a mechanical and a reconstructing function*. As habit constitutes the mechanical, the conserving materializing function, so the idea is the radical reconstructing function in activity. Habit and thought are thus constituent poles of experience. As such, neither can be defined apart from the other. Each limits the other in every particular case, but neither can be regarded as "the ultimate" out of which the other is absolutely evolved. Thus neither habit nor its interruption can be defined apart from some desire, some end. Walking or creeping, as a habit, must be defined with reference to some desire, e.g., a desire for food; but this desire is in turn a part of the process of reconstructing a breach in the process of assimilation. While habit must thus refer to some desire, some end, for its definition, it is, in turn, out of the necessity of meeting new conditions *created by its own work* that new ends, new ideas, arise.³⁵

From this very formal statement of the relation between ideas and habit it is apparent: (1) that ideas are here regarded, not as merely reflecting or symbolizing a static reality, but *as doing actual work in reorganizing habit*, a work that may involve symbolizing, but a symbolizing that is a part of an actual reconstruction; (2) the materials of this reconstruction are not given from a reality beyond the process. The material is none other than the disorganized habit itself. There is thus perfect continuity between the material and the use to which it is to be put. With the material for the reorganization given from a reality beyond there can be no assurance that it will answer the purpose. If it does, it is only by the grace of the Deity or the "uniformity of nature."

Such a conception of the logical function of habit makes possible also a consistent view of the place of sensation in knowledge. So far

³⁵ Cf. Professor Dewey, "Reflex Arc Concept," *Psychological Review*, Vol. III.

sensation has played a very equivocal role in epistemology. On the one hand, it is that "in which reality is given." It is "the point of direct contact with reality." Locke says his simple ideas of sensation are all true to reality. So far sensationalism. But at this point the rationalist observes that if we really do come into "direct contact with reality" in sensation, if the "simple ideas of sensation" are true to reality, and if it is the business of perception to "report reality," then why go on with thought? Why construct "complex ideas" in which we are all the while getting farther and farther from reality? The fact that we do and must go on thinking and constructing complex ideas – continues the rationalist – shows that sensation, instead of giving us reality, gives us only appearances. And, beside these different views of the relation of sensation to reality, no very consistent view appears, in either camp, of just the nature and function of sensation itself. Now it is stated in almost purely physiological terms, and again it appears to almost usurp the work of thought. But, if we find ideas arising at the point or disintegration of habit, and if we take sensation as the first appearance in consciousness of this breach – to use Mr. James's phrase, "The first thing in the way of consciousness" – it would seem to bring us nearer a much-needed definiteness in the conception of the logical significance of sensation. Here sensation, as the first shock of this interruption of habit constitutes the "this," demanding interpretation – meaning. And this demand for meaning is something more than a demand for more representation; it is a demand for reconstruction.

But before going farther in this very general and dogmatic fashion, let us resort to Locke's favorite illustration of "the solution of gold in *aqua regia*." First let us note that the process of manipulating gold in liquids involves a circuit of visual, tactile-motor habits, serving some aim, *e.g.*, that of cleaning the gold. Now, the rupture of such a circuit may come either as a visual sensation, in the disappearance of the gold from sight, or as a tactile-motor sensation, in the failure to touch the gold on reaching for it. And here again, however "involuntary" this breach may be, it is to be noted that it must come as a break in, and therefore entirely in terms of, *the activities already going on*.³⁶ If the interruption be due to "a collision with reality," it must be a reality in the form of the visual-tactile-motor processes already involved. How could there be a "collision" with any other reality? The coming to consciousness of the visual-tactile-motor processes means that what has been a circle of mutually stimulating activities is now broken up and is demanding reconstruction. And the first shock of this "break" is felt as the visual or

³⁶ Cf. Baldwin, *Mental Development – Methods and Processes*, 2nd ed., p. 256.

the tactile-motor sensation – the “this” demanding interpretation and reconstruction.

Now, if we regard the “this,” *i.e.*, this mass of visual-tactile-motor habit material thrown up into consciousness as the “existence” which the ideas are to *mean*, we have, at any rate, an “existence” not far “beyond,” nor one to be merely copied by the ideas, but an existence which constitutes the very material of the ideas. It is, to be sure, a very active existence; but then ideas, according to present psychology, are very dynamic affairs. Besides, we have already seen that the difficulty all along has been to find an agreement between these very active ideas and an inert, static existence. Such a dynamic existence would also seem promising in the effort to overcome the too great “looseness” hitherto necessarily insisted upon between the existence and the ideas. “Necessarily,” because it has been only through such a “loosing” from its static existence that the idea could gain freedom and flexibility enough to be of service in “the conduct of life” – though, to be sure, this freedom becomes a serious obstacle to its reunion with existence.

Passing now to the function of *meaning*, it might appear that with “existence” made so dynamic as above, the active ideas as the embodiment of meaning might now be regarded as the mere “symbols” or “representatives” of existence. This, indeed, would seem to be more nearly possible now that the discrepancy between an inert existence and its active representatives is removed. But if this were the sole function of the ideal construction, it is difficult to see how it would help matters. Indeed, it would seem to make matters worse, since all it could do would be to bring the disintegration of habit into consciousness. If the only business of thought were to go on reporting this disintegration of habit, consciousness would soon be reduced to a vast pile of psychical scrap-iron.

It has just been said, if mere reporting or symbolizing existence were “the sole function of meaning,” etc., this implies that representation, symbolization, etc., is a part of the process of meaning. When the breach in the visual-tactile-motor co-ordination, as above sketched, comes, the first step in the process of reconstruction is to define and locate the interruption. This involves a symbolizing, a “reflecting” if you please, of the activities concerned. But, once more, even this first process of reflection is not a *mere* reflection. It is a reflection in which the work of reconstruction has already begun. For when this interruption passes beyond the stage of the mere “shock and inarticulate presence” of sensation, into ideas, into *meaning*, the very fact that the old co-ordination expressed in our illustration, in “gold insoluble” is reported as possibly broken, involves the beginning of the reconstruction

expressed in "gold soluble." Unless experience is to fall into absolute chaos, into a state of mere negation, one co-ordination can be disintegrated only through the beginning of its own reconstruction.³⁷ With absolutely no element of reconstruction present, consciousness would lapse into the mere "shock" of sensation. Meaning, then, in its very beginning, stands for an actual work of reconstruction, not for a mere reflection of the materials to be reconstructed.

With existence interpreted as the material to be reconstructed, and meaning as the process of reconstruction, the question of their relation should have, perhaps, a little special notice. First, it is apparent that the connection here required is of a very different sort from that demanded between a static existence and its representative. Here the relationship is not one of "coexistence" and "correspondence point for point," but is that of the interpenetration of material and process. Nor are existence and meaning here "given apart," the problem being to work them into this relationship. As the interrupted habit is "material" in the process of reconstruction *only*, so there are no ideas, no empty meanings, wandering about unattached to any existence. As there is no mere process of thought, grinding away, as an empty mill waiting for grist, so there is no pile of habit fragments lying about as material waiting to be put into the hopper. Here existence and meaning, the material and the process of reconstruction, develop together as the two complementary, inseparable, and constitutive functions of one inclusive process. In short, the problem of connection with which Locke struggled disappears, simply because there is no such separation of meaning from existence as that with which he started. Meaning here is not "given loosed from existence." From the very outset of the experience, beginning in the visual-tactile-motor sensation interpreted as the "disappearance of gold," existence, as constituted by the activities involved in the habit matrix, is the very *Stoff* and content of the idea, of the meaning; and the latter is simply this material in process of reconstruction.

Locke's unconscious tribute to this organic relation between existence and meaning appears, as has already been noted, in his answering the inquiry after the validity of his simple ideas with an account of their origin; a procedure for which Locke has been much condemned, but which, after all, if he could have freed it from the conception of the completed character of existence and of the merely representing function of the idea, would have made impossible the extreme separation of the

³⁷ This is, of course, "the positive character of negation" upon which present logic insists. Cf. Bosanquet, *Logic*, Book I, chap. vii, and Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, chap. iii.

problems of origin and validity so strenuously insisted upon by most of the neo-Kantian epistemology.

With this very general interpretation of meaning, existence, and reality, and their relation to each other, the question which has been urged so insistently throughout the discussion, upon other views, should be noticed – the question, namely, of a standard of truth and error, including an interpretation of doubt and certainty. If meaning is the reconstructive function of activity, what is to determine the limits of this reconstruction in any particular case? When is the reconstruction “true”? And if meaning is in such close connection with the material habit, if the latter is indeed the very *Stoff* of the meaning, why should there ever be any uncertainty and error?

First, let us recall that the problem of reconstruction is not one of reconstruction of habit at large. It is the reconstruction of a certain set of activities already engaged in a specific work, *e.g.*, manipulating gold in liquids. Here in a very general form our criterion is already in sight. If the disintegration of the co-ordination of eye and hand, activities involved in manipulating gold in liquids, constitutes the *demand* for reconstruction, the restoration of a co-ordination between the eye and hand, *with reference to handling gold in liquids*, must constitute the criterion for the completion, the “truth,” of the reconstruction. The conclusion, “gold-soluble-in-*aqua-regia*,” means the establishment of a new habit of manipulating gold in liquids. Here “agreement,” harmony, between meaning and existence does not mean that one copies the other; on the contrary, it means that the one responds to the demand of the other for *change*, for *reconstruction*. The only way, then, in which the idea can be *false* to “the reality as it appears in sensation” is through its failure – not to copy, but to change it, for the only reality appearing in sensation is just the disintegrated mass of habit demanding reorganization.

If the “truth” of the meaning consists in its being a reconstruction of habit with reference to a certain demand, what shall be said of uncertainty and error? We have already seen that meaning, as a reconstruction, is not a mere reflection of work already done, but is a new work, a new creation achieved. It is the former interpretation, indeed, as has been repeatedly pointed out, that makes it so difficult to account for error and to prevent knowledge from being “trifling.” But if thought means an actually new work to be done, manifestly at the outset there must be uncertainty, not of reaching *any* outcome – this would land us in the paralysis of absolute skepticism – but uncertainty concerning the exact character of the outcome. That is, uncertainty means that thought, instead of being a symbol of an already developed reality, is itself the

instrument of development. It means that life is not given, but must be won. On the other hand, the "perfect certainty" for which Locke longed would mean the complete reduction of experience to a mechanism, in which there would be no place because no demand for thought, indeed for consciousness of any kind.

And actual error – failure, what is it to mean? Locke's answer is: "The disagreement of ideas with reality;" Mr. Bradley's: "The collision of a mere idea with reality" – the "rejection," "repudiation" of meaning by reality. And the signs of this "disagreement," "collision," and "rejection" are the "disorder, confusion, and pain" of everyday life. We have already seen how difficult it is to find any connection here between the sign and the thing signified. But if we can regard the "reality" in this case as the mass of disorganized habit demanding reconstruction, and if we can take this "disagreement," "collision," and "rejection" to mean that, the work of reconstruction being an actual work to be done and not being performed at a single stroke, it may therefore at a given stage be incomplete *with reference to what is wanted*,³⁸ it would seem we should have reached a basis for the conception of error which would make possible some connection between it and its sign. For surely it is not difficult to see the connection between the incompleting reconstruction of these disorganized activities and "disorder, confusion, and pain" as its signs. And at this point it might be said that in a certain sense this "disorder, confusion, and pain" is due as much to a lack of "collision" as to the collision of ideas with reality. That is to say, what is needed at this point is a further working over of the habit material, in a sense more "collision" of habit and ideas. And here, too, we may say of error, as of doubt, that it is not failure in a final sense, it is simply unfinished work.

Here an important objection will be urged to this statement of the meaning of truth and error. It will be said that this conception of the criterion runs into the infinite "regressus." Thus the specific interest, e.g., manipulating gold in liquids, with reference to which the habit, its interruption, and the reconstruction itself are defined, is itself an ideal construction and must in turn be referred to other interests and habits for its definition, and so on without end. It is, indeed, just this everlasting "othering" of thought that is its bane for all representational views of knowledge. But let us note first that this "regressus" objection derives its force from the assumption that the thought-habit form of experience

³⁸ "Truth and error are essentially relative to the interest of the subject. To put a question seriously is to *want* to know the answer. A person cannot be right or wrong without reference to some interest or purpose. A man wanders about a town... . Just so far as he has no definite aim he cannot go astray." – Stout, essay on "Error," *Personal Idealism*, p. 10; cf. also same essay, sec. vi.

is *transitory*; and that it must, therefore, be referred to something “beyond” for a beginning and an end. With this assumption in mind, the reference of a particular work of thought to some interest involving previous thought must appear to be in the elephant-tortoise class. But freed from this assumption, this “regressus” need mean only that we conceive experience as a process the results of which at any given point constitute the material for and stimulus to further activity and that we accept experience thus conceived as our “ultimate reality.” It means merely the commonplace enough fact that interest at any given moment is the outgrowth of previous experience, and cannot be defined apart from it, and also that it is the further development of previous experience – a development, not toward an ultimate, fixed goal, taken as a standard, but a development in the sense that the present is built out of the past. Stated from the negative side, it means that the “disorder, confusion, and pain,” the relief of which is accepted as the sign of the “truth” of the reconstruction, is not mere “disorder, confusion, and pain” at large, but is always of a certain kind, and that this kind is determined with reference to an interest which is the outgrowth of previous experience. Thus the disappearance of gold in *aqua regia* produces “disorder, confusion, and pain” only to one already manipulating gold in liquid. On the other hand, the fact that the old process of manipulating gold in liquid falls into disorder and confusion means that it reaches no abiding form; that in the very process of its own ongoing it develops new activities which must be reorganized into it. Thus again does experience, as constituted by the interacting functions of thought and habit appear as the process of eternally rebuilding itself out of the products of its own activity.

Another and perhaps more fundamental way of putting the objection just noted is that this statement of the criterion of truth and error, in terms of a concrete interest, does not do justice to the *universality* of meaning. If the work of thought be “true” when it relieves the disorder, confusion, and pain of the situation here and now, whence its universality? Whence the conviction of the value of the work done here and now for other situations? What is the ground of that “probability” to which Locke finally appeals for “practical certainty,” but for which he could offer no explanation but the will of the Deity or the uniformity of nature? First, it maybe remarked that all theories of knowledge, from Locke on, holding to an immovable reality and the representational function of thought, have certainly had difficulties enough with this phase of the problem, and whenever they have gone beyond some form of the pre-established harmony view of universality, it appears they have done so at the cost of either the complete and immovable character of reality, or the merely representative character of thought, or both. We

have, of course, for a long time been quite certain that the universal must somehow be present in the particular. Just how this occurs is the problem. We have stood bravely, too, for the "concrete" as opposed to the "formal" universal; yet when one looks for statements of the *method* of this "concrete universal," they turn out to be either little more than formal descriptions of the necessity for it, or statements of it which are hard to reconcile with a static reality and a merely "reporting" knowledge. All accounts of the concrete universal, from Hegel on, which have attempted to do more than point out the demand for it, have based it on the conception of growth, development, involving *purpose*. One or two passages from current literature will suffice for examples:

In this class of objects (mechanical devices, *e.g.*, a watch) we may fearlessly say that it is the *purpose* which is the essence, and that generic judgment rests on the knowledge of essence. In all other classes of objects such a view has degrees of precariousness, and can only be applied to the purpose as immanent, and therefore as not determinate, and as uncertain in its boundaries. Nevertheless, when we predicate in the organic world "growth," "development," "self-preservation," "irritability," *we are really referring mechanical processes to an idea of life – an idea of self-relation*, of "inner" and "outer," which is *a* higher result, though it is a result, of their purely mechanical nature.³⁹

We have already seen the part which purpose plays in Mr. Royce's account of meaning. The following passages may be added:

Universal judgments arise in the realm where experience and idea have already fused into one whole: and this is precisely the realm of internal meanings. Here one constructs and observes the consequences of one's construction. But the construction is at once an experience of fact and an idea; an expression of a *purpose* and an observation of what happens. Upon the basis of such ideal constructions one makes universal judgments.⁴⁰

Again:

But what then is the test of the truthful correspondence of an idea to its object, if object and idea can differ so widely? The only answer is

³⁹ Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 237. Italics and parenthesis mine.

⁴⁰ *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I, p. 289.

in terms of *purpose*. The idea is true if it possesses the sort of correspondence to its object that the idea itself wants to possess.⁴¹

The significance of these statements of meaning in terms of “purpose” is that it promises an intrinsic basis for universality and unity. Meaning as purpose at once becomes determinative of its own “object.” The object it constructs, in realizing itself, must be universally valid for *that* purpose. Material that cannot serve the purpose cannot become its “object.” The object is simply the expression of the purpose. Here too we have a basis for a unity of “the many in the one” other than the unity of mere identity. We have already seen the difficulty and failure in the attempt to construct a unity out of entities either physical or psychical, or a composite of both. But the idea as purpose arises out of the demand for a reconstruction of disintegrated habit. As “an embodiment of purpose” it is precisely the business of the idea to reorganize, to unify this manifold of disintegrated habit. As existences, there is no possible way for this manifold to become one. They can be unified only in purpose.

Now it would seem that these statements of meaning in terms of purpose should shut out at once all static conceptions of reality and all conceptions of meaning as merely representative; for it would seem to be of the very essence of a purpose or a plan to be reconstructive. But the force of these implications appears broken when we discover that the “purpose” which the idea embodies is, after all, not that of reorganizing the disintegrated habit to the relief of the “disorder, confusion, and pain” of the present situation, but is that of corresponding in a “partial” and “fragmentary” manner with “its own final and complete form” eternally fixed in the Absolute.

Moreover, such an interpretation of the purpose embodied in the idea seems to offer little basis for that intrinsic and “concrete universality” for which the very appeal to purpose is made. It is very difficult to see what basis this “partial and fragmentary correspondence” with the absolute idea can have other than some sort of a pre-established harmony. And as for the presence of the universal in the particular – the concrete universal – how can the universal, conceived as an “eternal,” “completed,” and fixed “whole of content,” be present in a purpose which is confessedly but a mere shred of the whole? On the other hand, as before observed, if in the universal the particular – the finite, is “completely fulfilled,” how can there be left any particular in the universal? The complete fulfilment of the particular finite purpose is its annihilation. And with the disappearance of these finite purposes, have

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 306. Italics mine.

we anything left for our universal but Spinoza's abstract identity?

Now if, instead of regarding the idea as a "having" a purpose, we take it as *constituting* the defined purpose or plan of action, involving the construction of an object, through which some "disorder, confusion, and pain" is to be relieved; and if we further recall that there is no other material for this construction than just the mass of disintegrated habit out of which the purpose itself, under the stimulus of the disorder and pain of the disintegration have sprung, it seems we have a basis for the universality at once intrinsic and concrete. Here the "universal in the particular" means that the particular purpose is the outgrowth of previous experience and has no other material for its realization than the results of this preceding activity; and also it means that this work of reconstruction must in turn become the stimulus to and material for further experience. The "particular in the universal" here means that the purpose is not mere reconstruction at large, but is made in response to a specific demand. The unity here is not the static unity of whole and part, but the unity of *growth*. The necessity and universality of the reconstruction here made in response to a specific need is grounded in the fact that the experience here and now, with gold in liquids, is the inevitable outgrowth of past activity, and that it is also the only basis of any future experience with gold in liquids.⁴²

Hence the conviction that the future is as secure as the present and past. It is, indeed, a curious notion that the future alone is "contingent," while the past is fixed and abiding; that "what's done is done." For in every day's work in history and science, in every new problem solved, in every new advance in any direction, it is precisely the *past* that is being reconstructed. In our illustration it is the old construction, "gold-insoluble," that is changed. The past is still in the making. The past, as well as the future, is "contingent." On the other hand, there can be no future experience which is not built on this past and present reconstruction. Whatever future comes must be continuous with the present and past. The world may come to an end; it cannot be turned into absolute chaos. This is, of course, only the Kantian platitude that the future must be "intelligible."

In this evolutionary character of experience we find the ground for that "practical certainty" of the connection between meaning and reality which Locke, to the last, could refer only to the Deity or to "the uniformity of nature." With experience conceived as a process of reconstructing itself out of the materials of its own production, there must be continuity. But when we say, "The future must be continuous with the past and present," we, of course, cannot mean that the present

⁴² Cf. Baldwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 323 ff.

construction will be maintained in that future in its present form. It too must be disintegrated and serve as "material" for the reconstruction of farther experience. If just when and where and how it is to serve were determined, we should have, indeed, that "perfect certainty" of which Locke dreamed, but we should have too an Absolute in which there would be no future; in which the last reconstruction had been made, the last problem solved, the last battle fought – a "complete," "perfect," Absolute, if you will, but an Absolute which, if we are to construe out of our present psychology, would be merely a vast system of habit, an Absolute in which there would be no place, because no demand, for either thought or feeling. Probability, confidence, faith, hope, all mean that experience is a *re*-construction. Uncertainty, doubt, the problem, the need of reflection, of courage, of work, mean that experience is a *re*-construction.

In this attempt at some very general reconstructive statements no special paragraph has been devoted to the conception of ultimate reality. It has been manifest throughout that reality is here conceived as just this process of experience of which "existence" and "meaning" have been described as *constitutive functions*. Such a reality is, of course, not of "the-same-yesterday-today-and-forever" type. It is not a reality which gathers all truth into one, completed, eternal whole, and in which "all purposes are completed and fulfilled." It is not a reality in which all thought and effort disappear in a vast becalmed sea of everlasting immediacy. It is a reality of activity, of development, whose own very ongoing is ever creating a demand for new purposings, new thought, now effort; a reality that promises – not "eternal rest," but *Eternal Life*.

RATIONALITY AND BELIEF

Arthur K. Rogers. "Rationality and Belief." *Philosophical Review* 13.1 (January 1904): 30–50.

The purpose of this article is to attempt an adjustment of the relative claims of the logical and the extra-logical factors in belief, along the lines of certain recent discussions. In order to do this, it will be necessary to take more or less for granted certain views about the nature of knowledge which cannot be adequately defended in so brief a compass, but which, it may be assumed, are familiar. The endeavor will be to give a general survey of the field, in order to show more clearly some of the bearings of these views, and, possibly, to recommend them by guarding against certain misunderstandings.

And the first point I should make is this: that the fundamental basis of the sense of reality, as attaching to anything whatsoever, lies in the relationship to some personal need or demand. The 'real' is that which enables us to satisfy our active impulses. That is accepted as real which can be used as a means for doing whatever our nature impels us to do. And this is as true of what we call physical things as of any other object of belief. If we could conceive the animal consciousness as starting out with a purely disinterested attention to whatever turned up, backed by no outgoing tendencies to serve, such a consciousness, even if it were possible at all, could hardly be called a consciousness of reality. It would take the form at best of mere floating images, something of the nature of that with which the older sensationalism sets out. But if we regard the animal as from the beginning active, as groping more or less blindly for satisfaction, the sense stimulus which represents the satisfaction of this need has the possibility of quite another value. In other words, what we call real things are things which stand for the satisfaction of the organic will. They are the means to the realization of the bodily life, which have reality just because we demand that they should be real. It is the insistence of the need which lends reality to that which will satisfy it. And when for any reason this insistence fails, – if, for example, a great grief deadens the springs of action, – that moment we begin to lose our grip on the actuality of things, and they become strange to us, far away, and unsubstantial. So any philosophy which, like that of the East, maintains

as a tenet the utter unreality of the world, grows out of, and necessarily depends upon, a starving of the active nature; and it attains the goal of conviction, to the extent in which it is successful in crushing out desires, and in cultivating a state of quiescence and indifference. In general, conviction is apt to fluctuate with the strenuousness of our mood, and the pressure of active needs. As Montaigne remarks: "After dinner a man believes less, denies more. Verities have lost their charm." This is why, of course, as a final criterion of the reality of a thing, we appeal to the sense of touch, rather than of sight or hearing. It is only in connection with active touch that the thing comes to perform that actual service for the bodily needs, which is the final basis of its reality.

But now, while this seems to furnish a necessary basis for any doctrine of reality, I do not mean, of course, that it is in itself a sufficient account of how, psychologically, we come consciously to recognize a physical object as real, in its distinction from other realities, and, especially, from the reality of the self, and of consciousness. Immediate sense of reality is not necessarily identical with objectivity. A thing might play a part in our experience, and in so doing be present to feeling as in some sense actual, while yet it acted so smoothly and inevitably as never to call attention to itself, or be marked off as in any degree separate. The *recognition* of reality implies the relation to needs, but it also demands other special conditions beside. And in order to avoid misunderstanding, I may, before going further, indicate briefly what seem to me these further steps in the process. And, in general, the special conditions may be summed up, I think, in the failure of things to perform their function easily and smoothly. In other words, it is due to the fact that there are recalcitrant elements in experience. We do not find it the case that a need has only to assert itself to be gratified. A special stimulus is required to set off the activity; and this stimulus does not always stand ready to perform its duty. We have to look about us, and exercise more or less coercion upon the means which are to serve for the attainment of our ends. Now it is this check upon the perfect freedom of our self-assertion, which is the starting point for our consciousness of the separation between ourselves and the world. The failure to get satisfaction brings up a dim consciousness of the need that is demanding expression. And, at the same time, there comes a reference to that which will serve to set free again our checked self-expression, and enable the impulse to carry itself out. In psychological terms, it is the sensation, or perception, which plays this part. The sensation stands for our contact with what we afterwards learn to call the real world. But it is the sensation with two special aspects or characteristics. In the first place, it stands as a means for gratifying an end more or less clearly present to consciousness, and as in some degree, therefore, distinguished from this

end. And, in the second place, it stands as a means not wholly under control, a means with a will of its own, which has to be in a measure compelled to serve its purpose. It is a means, therefore, which we begin to feel as independent of those ends which we recognize, at first blindly, but afterwards with more and more distinctness, to be identical with our own life. Between the consciousness of our needs or ends, which maintains itself through the changes of bodily position, and certain other groups of experiences, we realize gradually that there is a difference. These last are not constant, but variable. Nor are they like the bodily movements which we can depend on for the attainment of our end. They are not dependable in anything like the same degree. And so the bodily self, as a system of active needs expressing themselves in movements bearing a relatively direct and constant relation to ends as realized in consciousness, comes to stand over against the objects which it has to utilize.

It is, therefore, I should say, the restraints upon the free exercise of our impulses, which lead to the growing separation between ourselves and the external world. It is the multiform experience of the uncertainty of the world of things, which provides the occasion for setting them off as things by themselves. I do not see that we need to appeal exclusively to cases of physical exertion against opposing force. Probably this plays a considerable part in stamping the distinction upon consciousness. The sense of effort against resistance is one characteristic form of the realization of an end to be attained, which we identify with ourselves; and the attribution of this same active force to the objects which resist us, helps, by personalizing them, to sharpen the distinction between them and ourselves. But it is never the mere exertion of force which brings about this result. It must be force exerted for an end, and an end at least dimly felt in consciousness. Otherwise we have just a blind feeling, with no objectivity at all emerging.

There is one further step of importance in the growth of the recognition of objectivity. We have the object now set over against the self and the ends at which the self aims. But the self is largely in terms of the body and the realization of bodily activities. External things are those which lie outside the body in space, and which are not immediately under control, as the body itself is. We still do not have the object distinguished clearly from the inner life of consciousness, and, especially, from the conscious state which represents it – the objective thing from the sensation. Evidently, for this to come about, an occasion must arise for the clear recognition of the state of consciousness as such. Heretofore this has simply been absorbed in its objective reference or meaning. And here, again, the same principle may be utilized as before. The recognition will not come about, until attention to the mental state as such is

demanding by some need which the recognition will satisfy. In general terms, such a recognition may be said to go back to periods when for any reason the customary external motives fail to work. We are forced, then, to a closer examination of the mechanism of the conscious process itself, in order to get at the cause of the trouble, and, if necessary, to discover substitutes for the old stimuli. There is a temporary inversion of the real order of things. Subjectivism for the time being gets the upper hand; the inner world acquires a new sort of reality. It is not when life yields most pleasure that a pleasure philosophy comes to the front. Then it is *things* which men value. The consciousness that pleasure alone is worth while marks a failure in pleasure getting, and an attempt at the discovery of an artificial stimulus. So it is not when the emotional life is at its height that we have a deification of the emotions. Then men are religionists, artists, patriots. It is because the occasion for emotions is failing, that their reality as things and ends in themselves begins to stand out. As regards the special recognition of sensational and perceptual facts, the chief occasion would appear to be the occurrence of perceptual error and illusion. The fact that two apparently similar experiences have different results, one that for which we are looking, and the other puzzling and disappointing, grows gradually into the recognition of the subjective fact, – the element of identity in the two different situations, – as having an existence of its own. So, historically, sensationalism has been the outgrowth of scepticism; and scepticism is the acute recognition of the fact of error. And now, when we do once recognize the sensation as such, we feel sure that our meaning with reference to it is not the same as our meaning when it is directed towards the object. It is not the sensation itself which enables us to carry out our ends. The sensation is a state of ours. It simply stands to us as a representative of that active agent – the real object – which has a direct causal relationship to our lives, and on which we are dependent.¹

¹ This implies that there is a sense in which the reality, or objectivity, of any fact of knowledge, involves its correspondence to our idea of it. This is often objected to on the ground that the words 'real,' 'objective' mean simply inclusion within a system of thought, and that a thing, accordingly, is real, not as it is correctly copied in our subjective ideas, but as it enters into relationships to other things. But this latter conception might very well be true, without excluding the other. In thinking of the objective world, we usually abstract from our act of knowledge. And when we do this, what we mean by the reality of a thing does involve its relation to the other contents of knowledge. We call a thing real, when it enters into this complex of relationships; unreal, when they refuse to accept it. And if we could always ignore the specific faculty of human knowing, this might be a sufficient account. But when we also have occasion to think of the experience of knowing, we have added another fact to be brought into relation; and the particular relation which this bears to the object known is just the relation of correspondence.

There is one other thing which plays a large part in the development of our final conception of the objective world, and that is the social experience. This has been emphasized strongly in recent years, and undoubtedly it needs to be reckoned with continually in any complete account of the way in which our present notion of reality has grown up. Our relationships to other men supply, in one way or another, a large part of the content which enters into the conception for any one of us. Social contrast enters largely into the bringing to consciousness of the ends which we identify with ourselves. The fact of social agreement is one of the very most important tests for determining what particular contents shall permanently be accepted, and what shall be rejected as illusory. Probably, also, disagreement between different people has a great deal to do with bringing about a recognition of the subjectivity of sensation. But when one goes on to hold that social agreement is the *source* of our whole idea of the external world, it does not seem to me that the position is justified. This, as I understand it, is what Professor Royce maintains. We react, in the first place, by way of imitating other persons. In these imitative reactions, we get certain experiences by means of which our conceptions of these other selves, and then, in contrast with these, of our own self, are gradually built up. And it is only when we have come to recognize that, in the experiences of these different selves, there are certain similar contents, that the similarity leads us to postulate a single, separate, real 'thing,' to which they all alike refer.

I find it difficult to make this conception clear to myself. It seems to make an unwarranted distinction between certain material things and others; and to hold that recognition of these two parts of the same

There is, no doubt, reason for the discredit into which the copy theory of knowledge has latterly fallen. If we take this as the whole or the problem of knowledge, it is obviously insufficient. There is a sense, certainly, in which the very process of human knowing itself is part of the process of reality, and not merely a pale copy or reflection of reality. Knowledge does not simply stand off and look at the world, repeating in less glowing colors what it finds there. There would be neither rhyme nor reason in that alone. Thought lies within, not outside, the charmed circle of existence; and this is richer with every new achievement of reason. But surely there is another side also, according to which reality and the process of human thought are not identical. And it is easily possible, if we interpret reality in terms of life, to combine the two demands – that growing knowledge should have a reference to reality beyond itself, and yet that it should be necessary to the constitution and meaning of this reality to which it looks. Our lives enter into the great unfolding drama of the universe; and so our growth in knowledge, and the action to which it leads, form a real step in the progress of the whole, and a constitutive part of the real world. And yet the part we have to play requires a knowledge of the situation in which we are placed, an acquaintance with the larger reality beyond us; and, therefore, the representative aspect of knowledge is also essential to its whole meaning.

world is brought about in essentially different ways. I cannot understand what form the recognition of a person would take, which was not also the recognition of the reality of a body. If the belief in the substantial, and in some sense independent, existence of the body, as a part of the physical world, follows in point of time not only the recognition of persons, but the discovery of an agreement in the matter of common sensations, the early stages of experience, it seems to me, are hard to state intelligibly. If, however, the bodily organism, as a part of our idea of a person, stands out as real, it does not seem plausible to make it stand alone, in sharp distinction from all other physical facts. Why would it not be simpler to keep more closely to the apparent facts of experience, as they are ordinarily understood? No doubt persons are especially interesting objects to the young child. But they are not the only interesting things. And if we grant the direct postulation of persons as real, on the basis of social needs, I see no difficulty in granting a direct postulating of the reality of things, on the equally immediate basis of their relation to more physical needs. All physical objects which are recognized at all would thus be on an equality. We should not have to suppose that we notice first the similarity of perceptual experiences, and then, to explain this, infer a distinct and identical object. If we think of the matter at all, we assume from the start that everyone must see the object as we do. And the fact that they do not always see it thus, comes with a shock of surprise, and is one of the things that first lead us to think about our experience as such.

Now the outcome of the whole matter is, once more, that reality is at bottom a postulate of the will, or, if one prefers, of life. The whole concrete content of knowledge is an assumption, – a well-grounded assumption, it may be, but still an assumption. In the ultimate sense, I cannot demonstrate æsthetic truth, for example. I take it as true because it appeals to certain demands of my nature. But it is equally impossible to demonstrate the simplest object of sense, or the most fundamental physical law. Of course, there is a sense in which physical beliefs have a certain practical and historical advantage over the spiritual. As Mr. Balfour has said, they are more absolutely essential to our existence, and, consequently, have become more firmly organized. A man may disbelieve in beauty and goodness and still maintain an existence; he cannot disbelieve that food will nourish, and that fire will burn. This necessary relation to the lowest conditions of existence has brought about, by the process of selection, a uniformity in physical beliefs which is lacking in others. Every man believes his senses, but not every one believes his higher instincts. But, nevertheless, at bottom, the evidence is the same in nature. We believe the evidence of the senses, not because we can prove it, but because we have to accept it as true if life is to go

on. We accept the validity of the spiritual values of life for precisely the same reason – because we find ourselves so constituted that we demand their validity. To reduce human nature to mere physical life, shows a glaring insensitivity to the most obvious facts. And, logically, there is no reason why certain particular impulses in the nature of the self should be selected out, as alone having objective validity.

Now this involves a reference to another aspect of the conscious life. It is not only as the demand of will that the so-called spiritual facts are accepted; it is as the demand of feeling even more obviously. Indeed, it is only at the behest of emotion that the assertion of the impulses normally takes place in the realm of the spiritual life. And there is perhaps an even greater unwillingness to admit that feeling has any rights in the search for truth. The whole business of thought, it is said, is to free us from the enthrallment of feeling. It tries to look upon the world with the eyes of cool unprejudiced reason, leaving behind all endeavor to find things as we want to find them. We are learning to recognize that the truth is not necessarily agreeable; that the world is not built to meet our personal demands upon it. And it is the part of the wise man to school himself to discredit the demands of feeling, and to expect but little from life.

To this attitude I wish to demur. It is no doubt true that emotions are often dangerous to thought. Certainly it is not to be recommended that, when we sit down to philosophize, we should be in a highly wrought emotional mood. But, on the whole, I do not know that emotions are more likely to lead us astray than a highly cultivated emotional indifference. Such an indifference is as abnormal as it is impossible of complete attainment. It is not well for us to make too slight demands upon the universe – in knowledge, any more than in action. Now it is at least to be noticed that, if there is any validity at all in the world of values, emotion must have some place in knowledge. It is emotional feeling which creates values. It creates them, that is, as conscious values, though in another sense values are presupposed by feeling. For if what has been said is true, facts are also values. They are facts because they meet a need, because they are worth something to us. The only difference between facts and values in the ordinary sense is that due to the presence or absence of the feeling, or emotional, realization. ‘Facts’ simply represent certain values for the physical life that have got themselves so well established that they ordinarily stand in no need of special conscious realization in feeling terms.

Now the nature of emotional feeling, and its part in experience, is still somewhat obscure, notwithstanding the large amount of attention that has been given to it in recent years. The following account does not pretend to be a complete psychological statement, but only a suggestion of certain aspects which bear more directly on its relation to knowledge.

And two characteristics of emotion would perhaps be generally accepted. In the first place, it represents an active disposition; it is not merely passive and acquiescent. Furthermore, it has a more or less definite objective reference. It is feeling directed towards some object; and therefore it involves the cognitive side of experience, not mere feeling, or mere impulse. It is a feeling disposition, connected primarily with the conscious recognition of something.

Before considering the next characteristic, it seems to me necessary to make a distinction between two different classes of emotional experience. The characteristic itself is this: That emotion, as we are apt to think of it, is tumultuous, disturbing, a hinderer of normal and rationally effective action. As I shall indicate presently, I do not think that this is true of all emotional feeling. Nevertheless, it is a noteworthy aspect of emotion in its most striking form, – the form which most easily compels attention to itself; and therefore we naturally tend to think of it as a normal mark of the emotional experience. It is this feature, in particular, which is responsible for the ill-repute that emotion has among philosophers, as a disturbing element in the process of thought.

But now, in the first place, just this tumultuousness, and apparent interference, may be held to have a real importance even for the process of knowledge. To put it roughly, it stands for an instrument of discovery, a means of bringing to consciousness the value of our native impulses, or tendencies, or powers, to which, as I have maintained, the life of knowledge goes back. In this particular aspect of it, emotion would seem to depend, almost certainly, on bodily processes, largely organic, which stand in a close relation to instinctive activities. It is not, however, the free expression of these instinctive reactions which constitutes the typical emotional disturbance, but rather the checking of such free expression. Unchecked, the instincts simply carry themselves out; we act, rather than feel. Checked, the outgoing current is thrown back upon itself. As organic, it attains to a heightened consciousness. As both organic and overt, it overflows into those relatively unorganized bodily changes which enter largely into the feel of the ordinary emotion. But now this gets its completion only as we keep clear its relation to the whole process of which it is a part. Apparently unmeaning, such a feeling may be of the greatest importance, if it forces on our consciousness a realization of the significance of these impulses which are checked, and which might never have been valued justly had they not been forced to struggle for expression. The great problem of rational life is to adjust our originally chaotic impulses. Asserting themselves too easily, they pass and are forgotten; and when the day of deliberation comes, of taking account of stock, they fail of their right estimate. Or, blocked by more imperious needs, they simply subside, and do not get

expression at all. But, pushing out blindly and tentatively, and in their struggle to assert themselves bringing about the upheaval of our whole nature in an emotional crisis, they not only force us to attend to them, but at the same time they give a rough measure of the real importance we should assign them in the economy of life. Thus the emotional feeling of grief, *e.g.*, is one of the surest revelations of the worth that things really possess for our lives. A great grief often results in overthrowing our conventional estimates completely, and giving us a wholly new outlook upon experience.

Once more, then, the world which we accept is the world which our self-expression demands – there is no other ground of acceptance. Growing knowledge is thus the instrument of self-realization; it is the satisfaction of the will. But the process of self-discovery, as a coördination of powers, is a long and tedious one. And a very essential step in the process, and so in knowledge, is the emotional disturbance to which the struggle for expression gives rise. It may be useless while life is under the dominance of unswerving instincts. But when the pause of deliberation, on which the rational life is based, once enters in, it seems to be a necessary accompaniment, to give both force and direction to the continuance of the act, and, especially, to relate it to the rest of our lives. It is this originally vague feeling which gives our first clue to the importance of the impulse. Of course, the claim is not final. It has to be scrutinized and criticised. No doubt it often leads us astray. But an emotional claim which is persistent, and which is a human claim, rather than my peculiar private experience, is *prima facie* justified in being taken very seriously. It not only will induce belief; it has a right to do so. Emotions have dangers of their own. In the form that has been so far considered, they belong to periods of readjustment, of coming to self knowledge, rather than to the period of full fruition, when we have entered on the heritage of ourselves. The period of great emotional intensity is thus the period of youth, when habits are in the process of formation. The same degree of emotional disturbance later on, when our lives are supposedly set in definite channels, would be only a hindrance to our efficiency. And the fact that thus they often are designed to bring to light some value unrecognized, or in danger of being forgotten, makes it necessary that they should have an imperiousness and one-sidedness which are likely to result in over-emphasis. And yet if we did not trust them, we should be quite at a loss to estimate the relative weight of the various impulsive sides of our nature, except as we could reduce them to terms of their contribution to our mere physical existence; in other words, there would be no means of attaining to a knowledge of our spiritual selves, and of the spiritual world.

But now is this a complete account? Can emotion be reduced wholly

to the bodily sensations which are aroused in connection with instinctive tendencies to action? Is its function merely a preliminary one, as a means for bringing about a proper adjustment of our activities; and does it therefore lapse, when these activities actually become effective and issue in free expression? I think that these questions are to be answered in the negative. That the emotion is not wholly identical with organic sensations, seems to be the conclusion toward which psychology is tending. To me it appears that there is a special *qualé*, which cannot be reduced to anything more simple and elementary. It would take too much space to discuss the point adequately. In so far, however, as it is involved in an answer to the second question, the matter is less complicated, and it is easier to appeal to the testimony of experience. And I think that without doubt there is a deeper and steadier quality of emotional feeling, which not only is not prejudicial to immediately effective action, but which is an essential element in all our higher active experience. Even Spinoza, with all his hostility to emotion, has to admit the metaphysical validity of the emotion of intellectual love. There is, it is true, a constant tendency in human life for action to become automatic and merely habitual, a tendency, therefore, for us to lose the realization of its meaning. And by reason of this deadening effect of habit, we never wholly outgrow the need for what I have called the emotional disturbance, to break through the crust of indifference, and call us back to a conscious realizing of ourselves, and of what we are doing. But just so far as this benumbing influence of custom gets the upper hand, we fall short of the truest and highest kind of experience. Experience that is real and spiritual does not stop with mere doing. Our true lives are lived only as action carries with it the full consciousness of its end and relationships. But now, furthermore, this is no merely intellectual consciousness. It involves also, and necessarily, a feeling attitude towards the objects which are represented in our consciousness on its cognitive side. What would social life be worth, that did not carry with it the continued presence in our social activities of those human feelings which are evoked by our relationships to our fellows? How vastly less significant would be our dealings with the objective world of nature, were we to lose from our experience the pervading sense of the beauty of this world. Such feelings are not merely incidental, merely preliminary. They do not involve any let up in the efficiency of action. They are, rather, inseparable aspects of the spiritual, or significant, side of active experience itself.

Accordingly, the function of the emotional disturbance, in bringing values in experience to light, presupposes this other and deeper aspect of emotion. As a feeling attitude toward the objects of our experience, it is an original demand of man's nature, and points to that which we may

regard as entering into the constitution of the real nature of the world. It postulates, indeed, not primarily what we are accustomed to think of as the existence of things or events, but certain relationships which have to do with their value and meaning. It attaches itself commonly to facts of which some knowledge already is assumed; it interprets its object, rather than creates it. It is, consequently, different in this respect from the immediate physical demand on the basis of which we posit the world of things. And yet in both cases, – the practical need and the emotional need, – we have what is equally a demand of our active nature, a requirement of life. And if we have a right to believe that things exist on the basis of the physical demand, we have just the same right to believe that they have, objectively, the direct value for consciousness which alone will satisfy the needs of feeling. And, furthermore, if there are persistent and universal emotional needs which, apparently, will only be satisfied by attaching themselves to a particular objective fact of a certain kind, these may fairly be given some weight in any reasonings about the probable truth and reality of that fact, and of whatever it involves.

I do not wish to be understood, however, as holding that this is a complete statement of the matter. The impression which the advocates of the claims of will or feeling sometimes leave, is that a man has a right to believe what he wants to, undeterred by the claims of logic. Now, as I have indicated, there does seem to me to be a sense in which we may say, with Hume, that reason is the slave of the passions. Reason is mediate. It does not furnish us the matter of knowledge; this we have to postulate on the basis of fundamental needs. But this does not mean that reason has nothing more to do than find for us the way in which we may gratify our desires. It is not a slave, but a trusted servant, – a servant who oftentimes knows his lord's will better than that lord himself. For the higher task of reason is to assist in self-knowledge; to teach the impulse, often blind and isolated, to understand itself, by showing its relation to the rest of life. Reason is the adjusting, the harmonizing factor in life. It takes the data which the assertion of the will supplies. But it transforms these data essentially, by removing them from their isolation, and throwing on them the light of a larger experience.

This makes it possible to place the so-called sentiment of rationality, in a way to do justice both to reason and to feeling. It is the impulse to harmonize our experience. Even the claim of reason is, again, at bottom practical. If a man does not want to be rational, no power on earth can make him admit the necessity of not contradicting himself. But if we are in any sense unitary in our natures, this impulse must be ultimately a necessary one. As philosophers, we cannot without self stultification

deny its ideal claim. Still, practically, we may be perfectly justified, on occasion, in postponing its satisfaction to some more imperious need. And, theoretically, its satisfaction may easily be premature and empty. For rationality is in itself an abstraction. There must first be something to rationalize, to harmonize. A harmony may be won on too easy terms, by ignoring part of the data. And it is primarily to our willing and feeling selves that the content of thought goes back. Thought and feeling are thus alike necessary and interdependent. We must harmonize all the facts, *and* we must have all the facts to harmonize. It is perhaps unfortunate that a defect of logic should come to stand so exclusively to the philosopher as the unpardonable sin. Consistency is, in a way, his special business. But, after all, philosophy is more than mere logic or methodology; it stands for content as well. Whatever growth in knowledge may be, growth in wisdom is most assuredly no mere record of logical analysis. Great changes in belief, epochs in our intellectual history, are seldom due primarily to mere argument, but, rather, to the half unconscious ripening of experience, the transforming, and suffusing with new meaning, of the old facts, brought about by processes lying back of anything we can put, at the time, in syllogistic form. What Newman says of his own development is true normally: "For myself, it was not logic that carried me on; as well might one say that the quicksilver in a barometer changes the weather. It is the concrete being that moves; paper logic is but the record of it."

As I have said, therefore, an emphasis on the abstract need of harmony may sometimes be a mistaken one. And when in any downright and general way reason is opposed to the claims of feeling, I think such will be found to be the case. The appeal to reason which the scientist, *e.g.*, makes, may often involve the assumption that the sort of harmony which has already been brought into a certain group of facts – physical facts – is final, and a refusal to take the trouble to go back of this. And so whatever will not find its place within this particular synthesis, is for that reason to be rejected. In the face of such an attitude, a man has a perfect right to say, if he chooses: I am not able to see just where the reconciliation lies. But, meanwhile, there are requirements of my nature which your particular synthesis does not satisfy; and I shall continue, in spite of argument, to hold that these stand for reality and truth. Intellectual consistency is a jewel which may be purchased at too dear a rate. And, on the whole, this is a rational position to take. If it is a question of giving up a good share of the content of life, in the interests of a formal consistency, it may be the part of wisdom to take the content. Better a fulness of life which outstrips the logical insight, than an intellectual satisfaction won by reducing life to Procrustean limits. This ought to mean no disrespect to logic or to reason. It ought

not to deny the possibility of attaining to a harmonious insight, nor the desirability of this. But it may well be the wiser part to regard this as provisionally an unattained ideal; and to prefer a temporary defeat of reason, if it leaves room for a richer harmony in the future, to a present, but barren, victory.

However, it is not well to give the impression of trying to shelter a weakness in logic under the protection of a demand of feeling. The philosopher cannot possibly abdicate the task of striving for consistency. And, in the long run, a belief which persistently refuses to fall in line with the less emotional aspects of truth, – scientific truth, in particular, – will inevitably suffer. Sooner or later, any remnant of blind feeling and aspiration, any mere setting of the will, must be beaten in the contest with the leadings of the rational insight. Present satisfactoriness to feeling alone is no ultimate test. Man cannot get away from the fact that he is a rational being, a searcher for truth; and in Plato's words, "a measure of such things which in any degree fails short of truth, is not fair measure." I only insist that feeling sets a real problem for reason, which is entitled to serious consideration. Other things being equal, an intellectual construction to which feeling can attach itself; – the feeling of mankind, and not simply of the individual, – has a big lead in the struggle for survival. It is to the other side, however, that I wish now to devote a few words in conclusion, – the side which has to do with the testing of truth. And what must in one sense be the final test, is already implied in the statement of the point of view. For if belief depends upon the needs of life, if reality is a postulate, then that in the end will be accepted which actually *works*, which gives the possibility of free and harmonious self-expression. And, accordingly, there is continually in operation in the realm of our beliefs this checking and selective force. We have not the right to believe everything to which we may feel inclined. It is not enough that we should make the demand; in addition, reality must stand ready to meet the demand, to honor our drafts upon it.² To the holding of a rational belief, it is quite essential that we should have done this active experimenting, and should have been willing,

² We can, of course, actually *reconstruct* reality to an extent; and this needs to be insisted on in its place. But it does not seem to me to help us much, if we over-emphasize it and take the position that we can in any thoroughgoing way make reality what we please; that the truth which the act accepts is really created by the act. It is true that our lives enter into the complex of the world, and contribute something to the process of reality. Our acts *make* certain results true. But they can do so only as they presuppose a certain determinate system of reality, conducive to this result which they did *not* make. Moreover, we have to accept not merely a certain general character of the world, but a vast number of specific truths which we cannot make or unmake, and within which the possibilities of our action are definitely limited. We never can tell, it is true, what things are possible, except by assuming at the start that everything is

moreover, to accept the results. The recognition of this qualification will take a good deal of the force from protests against the general point of view, on the ground that it makes no distinction between believing a thing true because we wish it so, and because we actually find that it is so. The former attitude we do condemn. But our condemnation is not due to the fact that the belief is a postulate. We condemn it, because it stops with a mere passive acquiescence in the first vague and half-formed desire, – which may or may not be a real and permanent demand, – without recognizing the need of a further test; or, because it persists stubbornly in its first opinion, in the face of new and conflicting results of experience that ought to be taken into account. Experiment, then, is essential to rationality; and, along with the demand, there must go the willingness of the universe to meet it. And here, again, physical and spiritual beliefs are on no different footing. Both are capable of being tested, though not, of course, in precisely the same way. We do not have to take our spiritual beliefs wholly on trust, and we ought not to do so, any more than we take a scientific law wholly on trust. Just as science puts all sorts of tests to the universe, in order to verify its laws, so life makes its experiments to verify its intuitions of meaning. And until the experiments have somehow worked, we cannot rest with any assurance that this particular demand is justified. History is strewn with ideals, just as it is strewn with scientific hypotheses, which further experience has had in some measure to discard as inadequate.

In the large sense of the word, therefore, the consistency which truth demands is a practical, rather than a *merely* theoretical one. It is consistency, not of facts simply, but of the concrete flow of life. The intellect is not a thing by itself, which can be satisfied independently of life as a whole. The attempt to take it so, inevitably leads to an abstract, contentless, static conception of reality, which meets no need except the need of bare logical unity. On the other hand, there seems to be an obvious sense in which, at any given time at least, the final test is the test of intellectual consistency, – the inclusiveness of the system of related facts, in terms of a thought content. In conclusion, I wish to consider briefly the relation between these two things, – intellectual consistency and practical consistency.

An objection may be brought against the statement that, for us truth is

possible, and then trying to make it go. But we do not get very far before we discover that everything is distinctly *not* possible; and, moreover, we cannot succeed in the *real* possibilities, save as we recognize clearly the limits which experience discloses, and mould our desires into harmony with the real. We have scant reason to believe in, most certainly we have no reason to hope for, the existence of a being at the center of things whose nature is so indeterminate as to present no bar to the satisfaction of any and every wish we may happen to form.

that which will work. We make a distinction, it is said, between what is practically useful, and what is true. Even more sharply do we distinguish between truth, and that which merely satisfies our feeling. As Sir Leslie Stephen says: "The fact that I act upon a belief; and am satisfied with my action, proves that it is in harmony with my emotions, not that it is a true statement about facts." Is there no ground for these distinctions?

Undoubtedly, of course, there is. And a somewhat closer examination of what their justification really is, will serve to bring out the point I wish to emphasize. And first, on the negative side, I would repeat once more that, in the largest and most ultimate sense, we cannot dissociate truth from practical sufficiency or usefulness. 'Facts' come themselves to be facts, for us, by their relation to active demands. And logical proof always involves a body of facts already accepted. It cannot move in a vacuum, or create its own subject matter.

What, then, is the justification for contrasting a merely useful belief with a true belief? It goes back, I think, simply to the distinction between that which is justified by its practical success in a single limited experiment or group of experiments, and that which would conceivably give a satisfactory outcome in the case of *every* activity, actual or possible, that enters into experience in its widest sense. A certain crude hypothesis which the scientist calls erroneous, will, in a given class of instances, work out practically all right. He nevertheless regards it as erroneous, because there are other cases in which, if it were acted upon, it would fail to get the desired results. The 'true' hypothesis of the scientist does not, at bottom, rest upon evidence different in kind. The only difference is that it is successful in a greater number of cases. If he believes that it will apply in all cases, then he holds it to be true; and he contrasts it with the less universally successful hypotheses which are only 'useful' in a practical way.

If a given man's experience were absolutely a unit, if it could be summed up in a single act, in which all the elements that ever enter into his life were consciously present, then immediate practical sufficiency, as opposed to intellectual consistency, would be for him the final statement of 'truth.' But obviously this is not the case for human beings, whatever it may be for a higher intelligence. Our life is a string of active experiences, or experiments, of a widely varied sort. Each has to recognize conditions of its own. For no one of them is it necessary, or possible, to take into account all the facts which the more inclusive stream of experience has been the means of revealing to us. On the other hand, any one of these facts may prove to be needed at almost any moment; and therefore it is desirable to bring them into some sort of permanent unity for our thought. Since, then, no single practical experience can ever hope to utilize the whole mass of them together, the test of truth

lies, after all, at any given time, in a real sense in the realm of intellectual consistency, rather than of immediate practical success. Not that practical success is irrelevant to logical consistency. Any fact that logic has a right to assume in its attempt at harmonizing, had its justification originally in some particular practical experiment, and was demanded by some particular need of life. But, nevertheless, the only way in which to get the complete process of experience into a unity, and avoid the risk that practical success in any particular case should usurp the right to legislate for reality as a whole, is to leave the immediately practical sphere, and turn to the work of intellectual or logical construction.³ Any given 'belief' stands not simply for the statement that a certain plan of action will in this particular instance work. Such a result tests the belief; and it takes its place in the system of facts which the belief represents. But this system involves much which cannot enter directly into any experiment by which the probability of the truth of the belief is increased; and the only way in which this can all be brought within an inclusive unity is through the medium of thought. The data, once more, are tested by experiment; but the unity of the data as a whole can only exist for us in the intellectual realm. Even the testing experiment has *validity*, a *rational* value, not as the mere brute fact of success, but as its result enters for our consciousness into a far wider system of related fact.⁴

And this involves also the relative, though not the absolute, justification of Sir Leslie Stephen's condemnation of emotional tests. I have tried to show that emotions have their rights in knowledge. But when they are taken in an isolated way, they are very likely, as experience shows, to prove misleading. In particular, they need to respect the claims of that great section of experience which has to do with the external world, and whose basis is so deep-seated in our nature that we can hardly avoid the compulsion to take it as 'fact' in a peculiar sense. Before it can really justify emotional beliefs in detail, a philosophy is

³ Unless, of course, we hold that the validity of knowledge is *absolutely* exhausted in its functional use in particular experiences. I have assumed throughout that 'truth' has the meaning it is commonly taken to have, – that it refers to an objective system of reality, to be utilized in our experience, but having also a relative independence of existence. I trust I shall not be understood as meaning that this intellectual construction, and, indeed, the very aspect of it according to which it represents the whole of things, does not have its practical value for further experience. I only mean that no single experiment can test its value so completely as to enable us to sink the intellectual in the practical statement of the criterion.

⁴ 'Facts,' as they form the basis of our intellectual construction, and are distinguished from hypotheses, might be defined as postulates which are based upon a need in so far as it can find expression in a single act, and which do not look beyond this single act for their immediate test.

bound to have some way of showing that the two sides of experience can consistently be thought together, without prejudice to either. The logical problem is the main problem for the philosopher, and can never be put by him in the background.

THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

John Dewey. "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge." *Mind* n.s. 15.3 (July 1906): 293–307. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 3 (1977), pp. 107–27.

It should be possible to discern and describe a knowledge as one identifies any object, concern or event. It must have its own marks; it must offer characteristic features – as much so as a thunder-storm, the constitution of a State, or a leopard. In the search for this affair, we are first of all desirous for something which is for itself, contemporaneously with its occurrence, a cognition, not something called knowledge by another and from without – whether this other be logician, psychologist or epistemologist. The 'knowledge' may turn out false, and hence no knowledge; but this is an after-affair; it may prove to be rich in fruitage of wisdom, but if this outcome be only wisdom after the event, it does not concern us. What we want is just something which takes itself as knowledge, rightly or wrongly.

I

This means a specific case, a sample. Yet instances are proverbially dangerous – so naïvely and graciously may they beg the questions at issue. Our recourse is to an example so simple, so much on its face as to be as innocent as may be of assumptions. This we shall gradually complicate, mindful at each step to state just what new elements are introduced.

Let us suppose a smell, just a floating odour. This odour may be anchored by supposing that it moves to action; it starts changes which end in picking and enjoying a rose. This description is intended to apply to the course of events witnessed and recounted from without. What sort of a course must it be to constitute a knowledge or to have somewhere within its career that which deserves this title? The smell, *imprimis*, is in consciousness; the movements that it excites are in consciousness; the final plucking and gratification are experienced. But, let us say, the smell is not the smell *of* the rose; the resulting change of the organism is not a sense of walking and reaching; the delicious finale

is not the fulfilment of the movement, and, through that, of the original smell: 'is not,' in each case meaning is 'not experienced as'; is not so directly in consciousness. We may take, in short, these experiences in a brutally serial fashion. The smell, *S*, is replaced (and displaced) by a felt movement, *K*, this is replaced by the gratification, *G*. Viewed from without, as we are now regarding it, there is *S-K-G*. But from within, for itself, it is now *S*, now *K*, now *G*, and so on to the end of the chapter. Nowhere is there looking before and after; memory and anticipation are not born. Such an experience, neither is, in whole or in part, a knowledge, nor does it anywhere exercise a cognitive function.

Here, however, we may be halted. If there is anything present in consciousness at all, we may be told (at least we constantly are so told) there must be knowledge of it as present – either in a world of things, or, at all events, in 'consciousness'. There is, so it is argued, knowledge at least of the simple apprehensive type, knowledge of the acquaintance order, knowledge *that* even though not knowledge *what*. The smell, it is admitted, does not know *about* anything else, nor is anything known *about* the smell (the same thing, perhaps); but the smell is known, either by itself, or by the mind, or by some subject, some unwinking, unremitting eye. No, we must reply; there is no apprehension without some (however slight) comprehension; no acquaintance which is not either recognition or expectation. Acquaintance is presence honoured also with an escort; presence is introduced as familiar, or an associate springs up to greet it. Acquaintance always implies a little friendliness; a trace of re-knowing, of anticipatory welcome or dread of the trait to follow.

This claim cannot be dismissed as trivial. If valid, it carries with it the immense distance of being and knowing: and the recognition of an element of mediation, that is, of art, in all knowledge. This disparity, this transcendence, is not something which holds of *our* knowledge, of finite knowledge, of relative knowledge, just marking the gap between our type of consciousness and some other with which we may contrast it after the manner of the agnostic or the transcendentalist (who hold so much property in joint ownership!), but holds because knowing is knowing, that way of bringing things to bear upon things which we call reflexion – a manipulation of experiences in the light one of another.

"Feeling," I read in a recent article, "feeling is immediately acquainted with its own quality, with its own subjective being."¹ How and whence

¹ I must remind the reader again of a point already suggested. It is the identification of presence in consciousness with knowledge as such that leads to setting up a mind (*ego*, subject) which has the peculiar property of knowing (only so often it knows wrong!), or else that leads to supplying 'sensations' with the peculiar property of surveying their

this duplication in the inwards of feeling into feeling the knower and feeling the known? into feeling as being and feeling as acquaintance? Let us frankly deny such monsters. Feeling *is* its own quality; is its own *specific* (whence and why, once more, *subjective*?) being. If this be dogmatism, it is at least worth insistent declaration, were it only by way of counter-irritant to that other dogmatism which asserts that being in consciousness is always presence for or in knowledge. So let us repeat once more, that to be a smell (or anything else) is one thing, to be *known* as smell, another; to be a 'feeling' one thing, to be *known* as a 'feeling' another.² The first is thinghood; being, absolute, indubitable, direct: in this way all things *are* that are in consciousness at all.³ The second is reflected being, things indicating and calling for other things – something offering the possibility of truth and hence of falsity. The first is genuine immediacy; the second is (in the instance discussed) a pseudo-immediacy, which in the same breath that it proclaims its immediacy smuggles in another term (and one which is unexperienced both in itself and in its relation) the subject, or consciousness, to which to relate the immediate.⁴

But we need not remain with dogmatic assertions. To be acquainted with a thing or with a person has a definite empirical meaning; we have only to call to mind what it is to be genuinely and empirically acquainted, to have done for ever with this uncanny presence which, though bare and simple presence, is yet known, and thus is clothed upon and complicated. To be acquainted with a thing is to be assured (from

own entrails. Given the correct feeling that knowledge involves relationship, there being, by supposition, no other *thing* to which the thing in consciousness is related, it is forthwith related to a soul substance, or to its ghostly offspring, a 'subject,' or to 'consciousness' itself.

² Let us further recall that this theory requires either that things present shall be already psychical things (feelings, sensations, etc.), in order to be assimilated to the knowing mind, subject to consciousness; or else translates genuinely naive realism into the miracle of a mind which gets outside itself to lay its ghostly hands upon the things of an external world.

³ This means that things may be present *as* known, just as they be present as hard or soft, agreeable or disgusting, hoped for or dreaded. The Mediacy, or the art of intervention, which characterises knowledge, indicates precisely the way in which known things as known are present.

⁴ If Hume had had a tithe of the interest in the mode and operation of the *flux* of perceptions (that he carelessly proclaimed and then abandoned as a merely negative thing, useful to drown dogmatists in), which he had in distinct and isolated existences, he might have saved us both from German *Erkenntnisstheorie*, and from that modern miracle play, the psychology of elements of consciousness, which under the agis of science, does not hesitate to have psychical elements compound and breed, and in their agile intangibility put to shame the performances of their less acrobatic cousins, physical atoms.

the standpoint of the experience itself) that it is of such and such a character; that it will behave, if given an opportunity, in such and such way; that the obviously and flagrantly present trait is associated with fellow traits which will show themselves, if the leadings of the present trait are followed out. To be acquainted is to some extent, on the basis of prior experience, to anticipate. I am, say, barely acquainted with Mr. Smith: then I have no extended body of associated qualities along with those palpably present, but at least some one suggested trait occurs; his nose, his tone of voice, the place where I saw him, his calling in life, an interesting anecdote about him, etc. To be acquainted is to know what a thing is *like* in some particular. If one is acquainted with the smell of a flower it means that the smell is not just smell, but reminds one of some other experienced thing which stands in continuity with the smell. There is thus supplied a condition of control of or purchase upon what is present, the possibility of translating it into terms of some other trait not now sensibly present.

Let us return to our example. Let us suppose that *S* is not just displaced by *K* and then by *G*. Let us suppose it persists; and persists not as an unchanged *S* alongside *K* and *G*, nor yet as fused with them into a new further quale *J*. For in such events, we have only the type already considered and rejected. The new quale might be for an observer more complex, or fuller of meaning, than the original *S*, *K* or *G*, but might not be experienced *as* complex. We might thus suppose a composite photograph which would suggest nothing of the complexity of its origin and structure. In this case we should have simply another picture.

But we may also suppose that the blur of the photograph suggests the superimposition of others and something of their character. Then we get another, and for our problem, much more fruitful kind of persistence. We will imagine that the final *G* assumes this form: Gratification terminating movement induced by smell. The smell is still present; it has persisted. It is not present in its original form, but is represented with a quality, an office, that of having excited activity and thereby terminated its career, in a certain quale of gratification. It is not *S*, but is Σ ; that is *S* with an increment of meaning due to maintenance and fulfilment through a process. *S* is no longer just smell, but smell which has excited and thereby secured.

Here we have a cognitive, but not a cognitional thing. In saying that the smell is finally experienced as *meaning* gratification (through intervening handling, seeing, etc.) and meaning it not in a hapless way, but in a fashion which operates to effect what is meant, we retrospectively attribute intellectual force and function to the smell – and this is what is signified by ‘cognitive’. Yet the smell is not cognitional, because it did

not knowingly intend to mean this; but is found, after the event, to have meant it. Nor again is the final experience, the Σ or transformed S , a knowledge.

Here again the statement may be challenged. Those who agree with the denial that bare presence of a quale in consciousness constitutes acquaintance and simple apprehension, may now turn against us, saying that experience of fulfilment of meaning is just what we mean by knowledge, and this is just what the Σ of our illustration is. The point is fundamental. As the smell at first was presence or being, less than knowing, so the fulfilment is an experience which is more than knowing. Seeing and handling the flower, enjoying the full meaning of the smell as the odour of just this beautiful thing is not knowledge because it is more than knowledge.

As this may seem dogmatic, let us suppose that the fulfilment, the realisation, experience, is a knowledge. Then how shall it be distinguished from and yet classed with other things called knowledge, *viz.*, reflective, discursive cognitions? Such knowledges are what they are precisely because they are not fulfilments, but intentions, aims, schemes, symbols of overt fulfilment. Knowledge, perceptual and conceptual, of a hunting dog is prerequisite in order that I may really hunt with the hounds. The hunting in turn may increase my knowledge of dogs and their ways. But the knowledge of the dog, *qua* knowledge, remains characteristically marked off from the use of that knowledge in the fulfilment experience, the hunt. The hunt is a *realisation* of knowledge; it alone, if you please, verifies, validates, knowledge, or supplies tests of truth. The prior knowledge of the dog, was, if you wish, hypothetical, lacking in assurance, in categorical certainty. The hunting, the fulfilling, realizing experience alone *gives* knowledge, because it alone completely assures; makes faith good in works.

Now there is and can be no objection to this definition of knowledge, *provided it is consistently adhered to*. One has as much right to identify knowledge with complete assurance, as I have to identify it with anything else. Considerable justification in the common use of language, in common sense, may be found for defining knowledge as complete assurance. But even upon this definition, the fulfilling experience is not, as such, complete assurance, and hence not a knowledge. Assurance, cognitive validation, and guarantee, follow from it, but are not coincident with its occurrence. It *gives*, but *is not*, assurance. The concrete construction of a story, the manipulation of a machine, the hunting with the dogs, is not, so far as it *is* fulfilment, a confirmation of meanings previously entertained as cognitional; that is, is not contemporaneously experienced as such. To think of prior schemes, symbols,

meanings, as fulfilled in a subsequent experience, is reflectively to present to oneself in their relations to one another both the meanings and the experiences in which they are, as a matter of fact, embodied. This reflective attitude cannot be identical with the fulfilment experience itself. It occurs only in retrospect when the worth of the meanings, the cognitive ideas, is critically inspected in the light of their fulfilment. Or it occurs as an interruption of the fulfilling experience. The hunter stops his hunting consciousness as a fulfilment to reflect that he made a mistake in his idea of his dog, or again, that his dog is everything he thought he was – that his notion of him is confirmed. Or, the man stops the actual construction of his machine and turns back upon his plan in correction or in admiring estimate of its value. *The fulfilling experience is not of itself knowledge*, then, even if we identify knowledge with fullness of assurance or guarantee. Moreover it gives, affords, assurance only in reference to a situation which we have not yet considered.⁵

In other words, before there can properly be use of the idea of confirmation or refutation, there must be something which *means* to mean something and which therefore can be guaranteed or nullified by the issue – and this is precisely what we have not as yet found. We must return to our instance and introduce a further complication. Let us suppose that the smell quale recurs at a later date, and that it recurs neither as the original *S* nor yet as the final Σ , but as an *S* which is fated or charged with the sense of the possibility of a fulfilment like unto Σ . The *S'* which recurs is aware of something else which it means, which it intends to effect through an operation which it incites and without which its own presence is abortive, and, so to say, unjustified, senseless. Now we have an experience which is *cognitional*, not merely cognitive; which is contemporaneously aware of meaning something beyond itself, instead of having this meaning ascribed by another or at a later period. *The odour knows the rose; the rose is known by the odour; and the import of each term is constituted by the relationship in which it stands to the other*. That is, the import of the smell is the intentionally indicating and demanding relation which it sustains to the enjoyment of the rose as its fulfilling experience; while this enjoyment is just the content or definition of what the smell consciously meant, *i.e.*, meant to mean.

The spectator or critic may decide that the smell is a feeling or state of consciousness or idea – but in this case he is talking about smell in a different context, another thing, having another meaning in another situation – his own cognitive problem as psychologist or whatever. But

⁵ In other words, the situation as described is not to be confused with the case of hunting on purpose to test an idea regarding the dog.

for itself the smell is a definite thing or quale which identifies itself with its intention – securing another thing as its own fulfilment. And the enjoyed rose is not that of the artist or the botanist – it is not the object of some other intention and problem, but is precisely the qualities meant or intended by this particular smell. *Subsequent* fulfilment may increase this content, so that the object or content of the rose as known will be other and fuller next time and so on. But we have no right to set up ‘a rose’ at large or in general as the object of the knowing odour; the object of knowledge is always strictly correlative to that particular thing which means it. It is not something which can be put in a wholesale way over against that which cognitively refers to it, as when the epistemologist puts the ‘real’ rose (object) over against the merely phenomenal or empirical rose which *this* smell happens to mean. As the meaning gets more complex, fuller, more finely discriminated, the object which realizes or fulfils the meaning grows similarly in quality. But we cannot set up a rose, an object of fullest, complete and exhaustive content as that which is really meant by any and every odour of a rose, whether it consciously meant to mean it or not. The test of the cognitional rectitude of the odour lies in the *specific* object which it sets out to secure. This is the meaning of the statement that the import of *each* term is found in its relationship to other. It applies to object meant as well as to the meaning. Fulfilment, completion are always relative terms. *Hence the criterion of the truth or falsity of the meaning, of the adequacy, of the cognitional thing lies within the relationships of the situation and not without.* The thing that means another by means of an intervening operation either succeeds or fails in accomplishing the operation indicated, while this operation either gives or fails to give the object meant. Hence the truth or falsity of the original cognitional object.

Let us return to the situation in which a smell is experienced to mean a certain fulfilment through an operation. Both the thing meaning and the thing meant are elements in the same situation. Both are present, but both are not present in the same way. In fact, one is present as *not-present-in-the-same-way-in-which-the-other-is*. It is present as something to be rendered present in the same way through the intervention of an operation. We must not balk at a purely verbal difficulty. It suggests a verbal inconsistency to speak of a thing present-as-absent. But all ideal contents, all aims (that is things aimed at) are present in just such fashion. Things can be presented as absent, just as they can be presented as hard or soft, black or white, six inches or fifty rods away from the body. The assumption that an ideal content must be either totally absent, or else present *in just the same fashion* as it will be when it is realized, is not only dogmatic, but self-contradictory. The only way in which an ideal content can be experienced at all is to be presented as

not-present-in-the-same-way in which something else is present, the latter kind of presence affording the standard or type of *satisfactory* presence. When present in the same way it ceases to be an ideal content. Not a contrast of bare existence over against non-existence, or of present consciousness over against reality out of present consciousness, but of a satisfactory with an unsatisfactory mode of presence makes the difference between the 'really' and the 'ideally' present.

In terms of our illustration, handling and enjoying the rose is presented, but it is not present in the same way that the smell is present. It is presented as *going* to be there in the same way, through an operation which the smell stands sponsor for. The situation is inherently an uneasy one – one in which everything hangs upon the performance of the operation indicated; the adequacy of movement as a connecting link, or real adjustment of the thing meaning and the thing meant. Generalizing from the instance, we get the following definition: An experience is a knowledge, if in its quale there is an experienced distinction and connection of two elements of the following sort: *one means or intends the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself already present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same fashion, must become so present if the meaning or intention of its companion or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through an operation it sets up.*

II

We shall now return briefly to the question of knowledge as acquaintance, and at greater length to that of knowledge as assurance, or as fulfillment which confirms and validates. With the recurrence of the odour as meaning something beyond itself, there is apprehension, knowledge *that*. One may now say I know what a *rose* smells like; or I know what *this* smell is like; I am acquainted with the rose's agreeable odour. In short, on the basis of a present quality, the odour anticipates and forestalls some further trait.

We have also the conditions of knowledge of the confirmation and refutation type. In the working out of the situation just described, in the transformation, self-indicated and self demanded, of the tensional into a harmonious or satisfactory situation, fulfilment *or* disappointment results. The odour either does or does not fulfil itself in the rose. The smell as intention is borne out by the facts, or is nullified. As has been already pointed out, the subsequent experience of the fulfilment type is not primarily a confirmation or refutation. Its import is too vital, too urgent to be reduced *in itself* just to the value of testing an intention or

meaning.⁶ But it gets *in reflexion* just such verificatory significance. If the smell's intention is unfulfilled, the discrepancy may throw one back, in reflexion, upon the original situation. Interesting developments then occur. The smell meant a rose; and yet it did not (so it turns out) mean a rose; it meant another flower, or something, one can't just tell what. Clearly there is *something else* which enters in; something else beyond the odour as it was first experienced determined the validity of its meaning. Here then, perhaps, we have a transcendental, as distinct from an experimental reference? *Only if this something else makes no difference, or no detectable difference in the smell itself.* If the utmost observation and reflexion can find no difference in the smell quales which fail and those which succeed in executing their intentions, then there is an outside controlling and disturbing factor, which since it is outside of the situation, can never be utilised in knowledge; and hence can never be employed in any concrete testing or verifying. In this case, knowing depends upon an extra-experimental or transcendental factor. But this very transcendental quality makes both confirmation and refutation, correction, criticism, of the pretensions or meanings of things, impossible. For the conceptions of truth and error, we must, upon the transcendental basis, substitute those of *de facto* success or failure. Sometimes the intention chances upon one, sometimes upon another. Why or how, the gods only know – and they only if to them the extra-experimental factor is not extra-experimental, but makes a concrete difference in the concrete smell. But fortunately the situation is not one to be thus described. The factor which determines control of intention as to its success or failure, does institute a difference in the thing which means the object, and this difference is detectable, once attention, through failure, has been called to the need of its discovery. At the very least, it makes this difference: the smell is infected with an element of uncertainty of meaning – and this as a part of the thing experienced, not for an observer. This additional *awareness* will at least bring about an additional *wariness*. Meaning is more critical, and operation more cautious.

But we need not stop here. Attention may be fully directed to the

⁶ Dr. Moore, in an essay in *Contributions to Logical Theory* has brought out clearly, on the basis of a criticism of the theory of meaning and fulfilment advanced in Royce's *World and Individual*, the full consequences of this distinction. I quote one sentence (p. 350): "Surely there is a pretty discernible difference between experience as a purposive idea, and the experience which fulfils this purpose. To call them both 'ideas' is at least confusing." The text above simply adds that there is also a discernible and important difference between experiences which, *de facto*, are purposing and fulfilling (that is, are seen to be such *ab extra*), and those which are meant to be such, and are found to be what was meant.

subject of smells. Smells may become the object of knowledge. They may take, *pro tempore*,⁷ the place which the rose formerly occupied. By reason of disappointment, the person may turn epistemologist. He may then take the discrepancy, the failure of the smell to execute its own intended meaning, as a wholesale, rather than as a specific fact: as evidence of a contrast in general between things meaning and things meant, instead of as evidence of the need of a more cautious and thorough inspection of odours and execution of operations indicated by them. One may then say: Woe is me; smells are only *my* smells, subjective states existing in an order of being made out of consciousness, while roses exist in another order made out of a radically different sort of stuff; or odours are made out of 'finite' consciousness as their stuff, while the real things, the objects which fulfil them, are made out of an 'infinite' consciousness as their material. Hence some purely metaphysical tie has to be called in to bring them into connexion with each other. And yet this tie does not concern knowledge; it does not make the meaning of one odour any more correct than that of another, nor enable us to discriminate relative degrees of correctness. As a principle of control, this transcendental connexion is related to all alike, and hence condemns and justifies all alike.⁸

It is interesting to note that the transcendentalist almost invariably first falls into the psychological fallacy; and then having himself taken the psychologist's attitude accuses the empiricist whom he criticises of having confused mere psychological existence with logical validity. That is, he begins by supposing that the smell of our illustration (and all the cognitional objects for which this is used as a symbol) is a purely mental

⁷ The association of science and philosophy with leisure, with a certain economic surplus is not accidental. It is practically worth while to postpone practice; to substitute theorising, to develop a new and fascinating mode of practice. But it is the excess achievement of practice which makes this postponement and substitution possible.

⁸ The belief in the *metaphysical* transcendence of the object of knowledge seems to have its real origin in an *empirical* transcendence of a very specific and describable sort. The thing meaning is one thing; the thing meant is another thing, and is (as already pointed out) a thing presented as not given in the same way as is the thing which means. It is something *to be* so given. No amount of careful and thorough inspection of the indicating and signifying things can remove or annihilate this gap. The *probability* of correct meaning may be increased in varying degrees – and this is what we mean by control. But absolute certitude can never be reached except experimentally – except by performing the operations indicated and discovering whether or no the intended meaning is fulfilled *in propria persona*. In this experimental sense, truth or the object of any given meaning is always beyond or outside of the cognitional thing which means it. Error as well as truth is a function of knowing. But the non-empirical account of this transcendent (or beyond) relationship puts *all* the error in one place (*our knowledge*), and all the truth in another (absolute consciousness or else a thing-in-itself).

or psychical state, so that the question of logical reference or intention is the problem of how the merely mental can 'know' the extra-mental. But from a strictly empirical point of view, the smell which knows is no more merely mental than is the rose known. We may, if we please, say that the smell when involving conscious meaning or intention is 'mental,' but this term 'mental' does not denote some separate type of existence – existence as a state of consciousness. It denotes only the fact that the smell, a real and non-psychical object, now exercises an intellectual function. This is, as James has pointed out, an *additive* relation – a new property possessed by an non-mental object, when that object, occurring in a new context, assumes a further office and use.⁹ Will not some one who believes that the knowing experience *is aborigine* a strictly "mental" thing, explain how, as matter of fact, it does get a specific, extra-mental reference, capable of being tested, confirmed or refuted? Or, if he believes that this way of viewing it as merely mental, does not express its own experienced quality, but only the form it takes for psychological analysis, will he not explain why he so persistently attributes the inherently "mental" characterisation of it to the empiricist whom he criticises? An object *becomes* meaning when used empirically in a certain way; and, under certain circumstances, the exact character and worth of this meaning *becomes* an object of solicitude. But the transcendental epistemologist with his purely psychical "meanings" and his purely extra-empirical "truths" appears to assume a *Deus ex Machina* whose mechanism is preserved a secret.

Observing the futility of such a method, one may turn scientist, and then epistemologist only as logician, only, that is, as reflecting upon the nature and implications of the scientific process. One might, that is, observe the cases in which odours mean other things than just roses, might voluntarily produce new cases for the sake of further inspection, and thus come to account for the cases where meanings had been falsified in the issue; to discriminate more carefully the peculiarities of those meanings which the event verified, and thus to safeguard and bulwark to some extent the employ of similar meanings in the future. The presupposition here is clearly that odour, person and rose are elements in one and the same real world (or, what is the same thing, of the constitution of one object), and that accordingly specific and determinable relations exist among the elements. The smell will present itself indifferently as a condition of the organism or as a trait of some other

⁹ "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, vol. i., p. 480. The whole article should be consulted. It has, of course, attracted much attention; but its full logical bearing, in cutting under the charge of psychologism as mere subjectivism, does not seem to me to have been appreciated as yet.

object, the rose; or, in exceptional cases, to be referred exclusively to the organism, as initiator of the operations indicated by the odour and terminated in the rose, while as defining the goal of operations and fulfilment of meaning it is a property of the object. To smells as themselves objects of cognition, many other traits and relations similarly attach themselves – all having reference, sooner or later, to the more effective and judicious use of odours as cognitively significant of other things.

In this reflective determination of things with reference to their specifically meaning other things, experiences of fulfilment, disappointment and going astray inevitably play an important and recurrent rôle. They also are realistic facts, related in realistic ways to the things that intend to mean other things and to the things intended. When these fulfilment and refusals *are reflected upon* in the determinate relations in which they stand to their relevant meanings, they obtain a quality which is quite lacking to them in their immediate occurrence as just fulfilments or disappointments; *viz.*, the property of affording assurance and correction – of confirming and refuting. Truth and falsity are not properties of any experience or thing, in and of itself or in its first intention; *but of things where the problem of assurance consciously enters in. Truth and falsity present themselves as significant facts only in situations in which specific meanings and their already experienced fulfilments and non-fulfilments are intentionally compared and contrasted with reference to the question of the worth, as to reliability of meaning, of the given meaning or class of meanings.* Like knowledge itself, truth is an experienced relation of characteristic quality of things, and it has no meaning outside of such relation, any more than such adjectives as comfortable applied to a lodging, correct applied to speech, persuasive applied to an orator, etc., have worth apart from the *specific* things to which they are applied. It would be a great gain for logic and epistemology, if we would always translate the noun ‘truth’ back into the adjective ‘true,’ and this back into the adverb ‘truly.’¹⁰

So far as this type of reflexion supervenes, we have knowledge of the critical or scientific type. We have things which claim to mean other experiences; in which the trait of meaning other objects is not discovered *ab extra*, and after the event, but is part of the thing itself. This trait of the thing is as realistic, as specific, as any other of its traits. It is, therefore, as open to inspection and determination as to its nature, as is

¹⁰ It is the failure to grasp the coupling of truth of meaning with a *specific* promise, undertaking or intention expressed by a cognitional thing which underlies, so far as I can see, the criticisms passed upon the experimental or pragmatic view of truth. It is the same failure which is responsible for the wholly *at large* view of truth which characterises the absolutists.

any other trait. Moreover, since it is upon this trait that assurance (as distinct from accident) of fulfilment depends, an especial interest, an absorbing interest, attaches to its determination. Hence the scientific type of knowledge and its growing domination over other sorts.

We employ meanings in all intentional constructions of experience – in all anticipations, whether artistic, utilitarian or technological, social or moral. The success of the anticipation is found to depend upon the character of these meanings. Hence the stress upon a right determination of these meanings. Since they are the instruments upon which fulfilment depends *so far as that is controlled* or other than accidental, they become themselves objects of surpassing interest. For all persons at some times, and for one class of persons (scientists) at almost all times, the determination of the meanings employed in the control of fulfilments (of acting upon meanings) is central. The experimental or pragmatic theory of knowledge expands the dominating importance of science; it does not depreciate it or explain it away.

Possibly pragmatic writers are to blame for the tendency of their critics to assume that the practice they have in mind is utilitarian in some narrow sense, referring to some preconceived and inferior use – though I cannot recall any evidence for this admission. But what the pragmatic theory has in mind is precisely the fact that all the affairs of life which need regulation – *all values of all types* – depend upon utilisations of meanings. Action is not to be limited to anything less than the carrying out of ideas, than the execution whether strenuous or easeful, of meanings. Hence the surpassing importance which comes to attach to the careful, impartial construction of the meanings, and their constant survey and resurvey with reference to their value as evidenced by experiences of fulfilment and deviation.

That truth means *truths*, that is, specific verifications, combinations of meanings and outcomes reflectively viewed, is one may say the central point of the experimental theory. Truth, in general or in the abstract, is a just name for an experienced relation among the things of experience: that sort of relation in which intents are retrospectively viewed from the standpoint of the fulfilment which they secure through their own natural operation or incitement. Thus the experimental theory explains directly and simply the absolutistic tendency to translate concrete true things into the general relationship, Truth, and then to hypostatise this abstraction into identity with real being, Truth *per se* and *in se*, to which all transitory things and events – that is, all experienced realities – are only shadowy futile approximations. This type of relationship is central for man's will, for man's conscious endeavour. To select, to conserve, to extend, to propagate those meanings which the course of events has confirmed, to note their peculiarities, to be in advance on the alert to

note them, anxiously to search for them to substitute them for meanings which eat up our energy in vain, defines the aim of all our rational effort and the goal of all legitimate ambition. The absolutistic theory is the transfer of this moral or voluntary law of selective action into a quasi-physical (that is, metaphysical) law of indiscriminate being. Identify metaphysical being with adequately *significant excellent* being – that is, with those relationships of things which, in our moments of deepest insight and largest survey, we would continue and reproduce – and the experimentalist, rather than the absolutist, is he who has a right to proclaim the supremacy of Truth, and the superiority of the life devoted to Truth for its own sake. But to read back into the order of things which exists without participation of our reflexion and aim, the quality which defines the purpose of our thought and endeavour is at one and the same stroke to mythologise reality and deprive the life of thoughtful endeavour of its reason for being.

TRUTH VALUE

Addison W. Moore. "Truth Value." *Journal of Philosophy* 5.16 (30 July 1908): 429–36.

One of a series of papers read at a symposium on value held at the holiday meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, in Chicago, December 31, 1907, and January 1, 1908.

As I read the invitation of the program committee to prepare a paper on "Truth-Value" I thought at first: "How delightful to have a subject so free from the dust and blood of the arena." For however much we may disagree, and however little we may know about the nature and the criterion of truth, we are all sure of its great "value." We are all prepared to say, as one of Professor Angell's elementary pupils once said of the nervous system, "What should we do without it!"

But, alas for him who reckons without the guile of the program committee! That committee knew full well that it might have difficulty in finding some one – even a pragmatist – willing to talk further at this time on the "nature" or "criterion" of truth. And it knew equally well that any attempt to talk about the "value" of truth, apart from its nature, could end only in pious exclamations. It knew that every attempt to describe truth value and to discriminate it from other values, must be a description of its nature. So when the familiar refrains and the old shibboleths sound in your ears, I hope you will remember who is responsible. Not that the last right word has yet been spoken on the nature and criterion of truth, but that so much has been said in the search for the right word that I fear many of you would fain turn awhile to other problems.

If we begin with the most general and formal phase of the subject, the usual statement is that truth and error are values belonging to the experience of judging. But such a statement is obviously verbal until we go on to state *what* the value of this judging experience is. And this brings upon us at once the entire problem of the place and function of judging in the whole process of experience, and with it the issue between logical-absolutism and certain forms of realism, on the one hand, and "instrumentalism" on the other.

The contention of the logical-absolutist is that truth and error values are the satisfaction and the dissatisfaction of a special and independent "part" or "side" or "aspect" – using Mr. Bradley's phrases – of our nature. In his article on "Truth and Practise" (*Mind*, 1904), Mr. Bradley says: "Reality is the satisfaction of all the wants of our nature, and theoretical truth is those perceptions and ideas which directly satisfy *one* of those wants." Thinking, then, appears to be the operation of a specialized instinctive want coordinate with the other instincts, as eating, drinking, reproduction, etc. Indeed Mr. Bradley comes near to saying this in so many words, albeit somewhat facetiously, when he says: "Metaphysics is a finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct – but to find these reasons is no less an instinct."¹

With truth-value thus based on a special and independent instinctive need, an uninitiated observer might at first sight wonder that the supporters of this view are so shocked at Professor James's metaphysical pluralism, for this conception surely appears pluralistic enough. But a second look dispels the wonder. For with so much logical and psychological pluralism as this view of thought as the expression of an independent instinct involves, nothing short of an omnipotent metaphysical absolute can save unity and continuity. On the other hand, Professor James can revel freely in his metaphysical pluralism just because he has so fortified his logical and psychological continuity in human experience that he can rest assured that no pluralistic metaphysical horde, however great, can ever destroy it. In general it appears that what we neglect in our psychology and logic we try to make up in our metaphysics. Metaphysics seems to be a sort of clearing-house for the accounts between our logic and unreflective experience.

And while we are about it another paradox or two in the situation may be worth a glance. For instance, we see the immediate-empiricist, Dewey, insisting upon the mediate, instrumental character of thought, while the absolutists are contending for its independent immediacy. Again, the logical-absolutist not only professes to accept the instrumentalist's doctrine of the relativity of truth and error to need, want, purpose, but characterizes it as a pathetic case of exploiting a truism. In the article above cited, Mr. Bradley says: "To me it seems obvious that if some function belongs to our nature there will be a need and a desire which correspond to that function. Hence if the free use of the intellect is really one aspect of our being, we shall in consequence have a need and a desire for that use." So we find the absolutists, Royce and Taylor,

¹ In his paper which followed this at the symposium, Professor McGilvary frankly states and defends the special-instinct view of thought, using eating and drinking as analogues.

and the realist, Perry, all agreeing that *true* judging is the satisfaction of a want – a purpose, namely, the purpose to judge *truly*!

The instrumentalist's reply is that *this* is indeed not only a truism, but an unblushing *petitio* of a real issue, and that to him the truly pathetic thing is his critics' complacent satisfaction with it. Suppose we say: "Truth is what satisfies the cognitive need." "How trifling!" Locke would say, until we go on to show *what* the cognitive-need is, *how* it differs from other needs, and *how* it goes about satisfying itself. In such questions as these the real issue between the absolutist's and the instrumentalist's logic is defined.

If truth is the satisfaction of a special instinct coordinate with the other instincts, the first question is: What is this instinct's peculiar satisfying material or object? And here we seem halted. For there appears to be no special object analogous to those of the other instincts. The content of any thought always turns out to be the material of some other instinct. Besides, if thought has its own special material, what becomes of its universality?

"Universality." That word gives us a new cue and suggests that we may have been on the wrong scent for the object of the cognitive instinct. For does not universality belong to such things as major, minor, and middle terms? Here, then, perhaps, is to be found thought's satisfying portion. The cognitive need is a hungering for universals and particulars, a thirsting after subjects and predicates, a yearning for syllogisms and episyllogisms; while negatively it is a congenital horror of such things as illicit majors and minors and undistributed middles.

This gentle mockery, I am sure, can not give offense, for nothing could surpass the contempt with which absolutists themselves have rejected formal logic, "as witness the hilarious scorn which Mr. Bradley has leaped upon the devoted head of the syllogism." The reasons for this repudiation are familiar. I need mention only a few of them. First, if the formal processes were the satisfying content of thought, the material ought to be perfectly indifferent. The length of the Devil's tail or the color of Eve's eyes should be as satisfying material as anything else. Again, if the material be indifferent and thought goes on according to its own independent and immutable laws, where is there any place for error, for dissatisfaction? Still again, if dissatisfaction does *somehow* arise, what is to determine when truth is reached again? If we answer: "Simply the sense of *consistency* peculiar to the cognitive instinct," what saves thought from the subjectivism *supposed* to characterize the other instincts, as hunger, thirst, etc.?

The situation at this point is, then, that, if the formal processes are rejected, thought, though a special and independent instinctive need coordinate with the other instincts, has yet no corresponding peculiar

satisfying material. What is to be done? What *has* been done so far in history of logic is to compromise by admitting the dependence of thought for its *material* upon the other instincts, but still clinging to its independence as a process. The consequence of this sort of compromise has been the train of incurable "contradictions" and "antinomies" which have harassed the entire history of logic, and which end in the confession that so long as the cognitive instinct must be dependent on the other instincts for its materials no "perfect" satisfaction, no "real" truth-value, is possible. The indispensable condition of reaching such a state, says Mr. Bradley, in effect, is that thought should be independent, not only as a process, but in its material as well. That it should, in short, produce its own material.²

We all know how, at this point, Professor Royce came valiantly to the rescue with his famous map of England and the self-representative number-series as illustrations of how thought could produce its own material. But many think (1) that even in the self-representative number-series the contributions of the other instincts are discoverable; and (2) that as an illustration of what thought can do in the way of producing its own differences when the other instincts are shut out as far as possible, the result is not very promising in the way of variety.

At about this stage of affairs the "instrumentalist," "pragmatist," or "radical empiricist" (whatever you will), came into the discussion. He began by agreeing with Bradley and with Royce that the one thing needful is continuity between the process and the content of thought. But the attempt to secure this by having thought produce its own material had, in his opinion, failed. Falling back, then, upon Bradley's position that thought draws its materials from the other instincts, and groping about for a new clue, he kept putting such questions as these: What determines *when* thought draws upon the other instincts for material? And what determines *what* material it selects and just *what* it is to do with them? Observations in response to these inquiries seemed to show: (1) that the materials selected are always those of instincts which have come into conflict in the process of satisfying or "expressing" themselves; (2) that it seems to be the work of thought to deal with this conflict; (3) that it sets about this through analysis and synthesis; (4) that success or failure in effecting the resolution of the conflict marks the limits of this process of analysis and synthesis, *i.e.*, determines specifically truth and error.

Concerning truth-*value* he could say, so far, at least this much: that thought's satisfaction is not independent of the satisfaction of the other instincts. Rather does it seem to find its satisfaction precisely in quelling

² "Appearance and Reality," 2d ed., appendix, pp. 562 ff.

the dissatisfaction due to the conflict of the other instincts. Their extremity is thought's opportunity.

Still the breach between the process and the material of thought remained. But, said the instrumentalist, there is yet an alternative, namely, the reverse of Royce's experiment. That is, instead of attempting to meet Bradley's demand for continuity by having thought produce its own material, why not have *the material produce its own thought*? The term "produce," however, leaves the connection still too loose. Rather, why not regard these instincts in conflict *as developing into both the process and the content of thinking*? Just as the contents of the conflicting instincts are not left behind when thought begins, but go on over *into* the thinking as *its* content, so, on the other hand, there is no thought machine or faculty already there *in advance* waiting to receive the material of these instincts. The process of thought is just the process of this conflict of instincts working itself out through interaction with other and *for the present purpose* more stable values.

Here no specter of the "given" need haunt our logic. For this specter pursues only that logic which assumes a *preexistent*, purely cognitive faculty, or machine, or agent, or entity of some sort, to which this instinctive material is to be "given."

Here it should be understood that we are not speaking, as so many have supposed, of an absolute origin of thought in the universe. The instrumentalist may readily agree that as this conflict of instinctive values has always existed, so thought has always existed. And that as this previous thinking results in reconstructed instincts, so any present conflict is, in this sense and to this extent, an outcome of previous thinking. But he insists that this previous thinking, as the present, was not performed by a purely cognitive agent or faculty, or instinct, *upon* a material "given" to it by the other instincts.

Also this view does not mean, from the standpoint of value, that this readjusting, revaluing stage into which the contents of the conflicting instincts pass, has not its own peculiar value; nor that it may not be regarded as an "immediate" value, as all value, in a sense, must be. But it insists that we must keep in mind that the *content* of this "immediate" value is just this entire experience of conflicting instinctive values undergoing *mediation* and revaluation. It is the value of experience as undergoing control in contrast with experience in chaotic conflict. But not control *by* a special faculty or instinct of control. Control is a "stage" of experience, not a "part," or "side," or "phase," of it.

There is, to be sure, always in this revaluation or control stage some value (or values) that serves as the end or purpose. But the control is not *all* lodged in the purpose. The end is only one pole of the whole process of gaining control. In this sense the *end* is a *means* of control. But,

again, the main point here is that the end is not furnished by an outside, independent faculty or instinct which operates as a special "end factory," whose business it is to keep a supply ahead or, failing this, to make one "while you wait." This end is born of the conflicting instincts. It is "bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh."

Our outcome thus far is, then, that truth-value is not the satisfaction of a special instinct coordinate with the other instincts, but that it is the value of the entire experience of readjusting conflicting values through the process of redistribution of values effected by interaction with a wider and *relatively* more permanent range of relevant values.

I am painfully aware of the extremely general character of all this; that it gives no details of this revaluating stage; that it leaves unnoticed the different elements in the constitution of truth-value out of which spring the ambiguities of the term "truth," in which it is identified now with the subject, now with the predicate, of the judgment; now with what we *have* attained, again with what we are *seeking*. I am mindful that we have not touched that old, but ever perplexing, tangle of relationships between truth-value on the one side, and ethical, esthetic, and economic values on the other. We say in one breath that truth is a value belonging to judgment as such, and in the next we speak of ethical, esthetic, and economic judgments. Does truth, then, belong only to one kind of judgments? Or are ethical, esthetic, and economic judgments special forms of truth? Or are they all coordinate values belonging to every judgment? Or are they all stages through which every judgment passes? And if so, what determines these stages? But in fifteen minutes much must be sacrificed, and in the minute or two left I wish to anticipate two or three general objections.

The first is likely to be a challenge of this whole conflict-mediational view of thought and its value. "How," it will be asked, "can it apply at the level of perceptual judgments?" *e.g.*, "This is paper," or "This paper is white." Where is the conflict here? "Well," the instrumentalist will answer, "there may not be any conflict. But *if* there is not, then there is no judgment." And he will declare that here, as so often in philosophy, language bewrayeth us. We assume that because we repeat the words that *have* expressed, or *might* express a judgment, that they do now. And he will suggest that a simple but effective way to test the presence of a real "live" judgment, to use Dr. Thompson's term, is to preface the alleged judgment with the term "I think," or "I judge," or "I have an idea." If the statement "This is paper" means "I think," or "I judge," or "I have an idea," that it is paper, then it is a real judgment. If it does not mean this, it is merely a direct articulatory response to the visual and tactual stimulations, and is no more a judgment than tearing it, or

poking it, or setting a match to it. Once more, judging means *inquiry*. Inquiry means *doubt*, and doubt means *conflicting impulses*.

Again, it may be said even if conflict in immediate experience does lead to thinking, it is no less obvious that thinking leads to conflict. What experience more common, alas! than to find that the more we think the worse the tangle becomes. But this is only the familiar paradox of "fighting for peace" or a "painful cure of a pain." Obviously, as the conflict develops into the thinking stage it may prove to be much more far-reaching and deep-seated than it was immediately *felt* to be. Fortunately, on the other hand, it often, if not so often, turns out the other way.

Admitting once more the conflict character of knowledge, it will be said, as it has been said, that this problem is not experienced as a conflict of *instinctive* values, but is experienced from the very start *as* a cognitive problem, as a problem of knowledge. The instrumentalists reply: Of course it is. For when the conflict in immediate values has gone beyond the blind pull-and-haul, thrashing-about stage, and has developed into the problem form, it is already in the cognitive stage, and is, of course, so experienced.

As for the objection that this view of thought value "subordinates" the intellectual "side" or value to the other "sides" or values, I confess I am unable to see how the conception of thought as the experience in which already constituted values are reconstituted, revalued, makes it subordinate to these values. The converse would be as true – and as false. As true and as false as to say: "speaking is subordinate to words or painting to colors."

Finally, if it be said that this "instrumental" view of thought destroys the character of immediacy which is fundamental in value, the answer is: This objection assumes that the *value* of an instrument must itself be instrumental. But this is no more the case than a perception of a heap must be a heap of perceptions.

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH

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I. Why Is Truth a Problem?

To the lay mind it is a perplexing thing that the nature of truth should be a vexed problem. That such is the case seems another illustration of Berkeley's remark about the proneness of philosophers to throw dust in their own eyes and then complain that they cannot see. It is evident enough to the plain man that it takes character to tell the truth habitually; and he has learned, through hard discipline, that it is no easy matter to discover what the truth is in special instances. But such difficulties assume that the nature of truth is perfectly well understood. To be truthful is to make our statements conform to our sincere beliefs, and our beliefs to the facts. Only, so it would seem, some zeal for sophistication can make a topic for philosophic dispute out of such a straightaway situation as this. Whence and why the pother? Before our inquiry ends we may find reason for thinking that some of the difficulties attending the debate are gratuitous. But we must begin by indicating that the conditions which make the nature of truth a problem are found in everyday life, in common sense, so that if to take truth as a problem be a crime, common sense is accessory before the act.

The *prima facie* meaning of truth – of seeing things as they are and reporting them as they are seen – is acceptance of the beliefs that are current, that are authoritative, in a given community or organization. A year or so ago, in reading an article directed against our public and secular schools, I came upon a passage which read substantially as follows: "The child has a right to the Truth, to knowledge of himself, his nature, his origin and his destiny. That Truth the catechism provides." The passage struck me as containing much instruction regarding the popular force of the term truth. There might indeed be serious debate as to whether the residence of the truth is rightly located

when it is put in the catechism, but the notion that the truth is the body of beliefs which are of peculiar importance for the guidance of life would go unchallenged. One would not deny that truth might appertain to the enumeration of what one ate for breakfast or the number of flies caught on a piece of fly-paper, or the statement of the distance of London from New York, but that sort of thing is not what is popularly meant by truth unless an influencing of the conduct of others is included. It is somewhat forced, from the common-sense point of view, to include such purely descriptive, such as it were, external and irrelevant, matters in a term so dignified as Truth. After all a catalogue is not the truth of things.

At all events, the strong tendency of men to identify truth in the concrete – whatever it may be in the abstract – with beliefs that are so current as to command allegiance and as to place whoever deviates from them under suspicion, may serve as a starting point for our inquiry. One does not require much anthropological lore or much acquaintance with the uncultured portions of present society to perceive that when Truth is, so to say, individualized, when it is spoken of as an integer, dominant political, moral and religious beliefs are indicated. When definitely scientific statements, purely intellectual proportions, come within the scope of the term, it is because, having gained social currency, they are more or less bound up with the collection of authoritative traditions by which the community lives, or because some moral issue is thought to hang upon their acceptance. When a man is not satisfied, in ordinary intercourse, with saying that two and two make four, but finds it necessary to honor this formula with the title of Truth, we have, as a rule, good grounds for believing that the man is speaking neither as a business man nor as a mathematician, but as a preacher, or at least as an educator. And when we hear not that the assassination of Caesar by Brutus was an historic event, but that it is an historic truth, we may safely prepare for the enforcement of a moral, not for the noting of an incident. A popular audience that would be bored by a discussion of truth as a logical or intellectual concept, and that would be chilled and hurt if it realized that such a treatment excluded the ordinary moral associations of the term will – provided of course the proper tone of voice be used – rouse to warmth and to a sense of personal betterment if the Truth is enthusiastically lauded, and it is intimated that this mysterious thing is almost within its own possession. Fantastic popular movements are often instructive as reflexes of matters that are not crude in themselves – that “new-thoughters” and their like play chiefly with the notion of Truth as their fundamental end is as suggestive regarding the popular meaning of the term, as their conjuring with Vibration is indicative of current physical science.

My illustrations may not be very convincing, but, aided by your imaginations, they may remind you that the Truth, as a noun singular, practically always means to the common man a conclusion to which one should pay heed, a general view of things upon which one should regulate one's affairs. Things that are urged upon our attention as the proper objects of attention and as standards of valuation are what we call principles; for all ordinary purposes truths and principles are synonymous terms. And the nature of Principles is evidently an important problem even to the lay mind.

The notion of a comparatively modern moralist that all virtues are a form of regard for truth, or for the logical relationships of things, and that parricide is a violent way of denying the true relation of the case, is no further removed from the attitude of the ordinary man than is the notion that truth is a purely cogitative relation between intelligence and its object. Truth is the sum of beliefs whose acceptance is necessary to salvation, rather than a logical distinction.

If we turn from Truth as a noun singular and absolute to truth as a noun common and distributive, the case is not so different. We forget – I mean philosophers forget – that truth in this aspect is first of all truthfulness, a social virtue, meeting a demand growing out of intercourse, not a logical, much less an epistemological, relation. When mere matters of fact and mere happenings are promoted from the status of fact and event to the category of truth it is because some social consequence is seen to depend on their mode of presentation. The opposite of truth is not error, but lying, the wilful misleading of others.

Since the assigning of blame and liability and the awarding of credit and compensation are among the chief businesses of social intercourse, and since they depend upon the reports of events which men proffer, the ideal of truth, of a certain way of representing facts and occurrences, is bound to arise. Not only is the notion social, rather than logical, in motive, but it is such also in content and criterion more than we are apt to think. Telling the truth, telling a thing the way it is, means designating things in terms that observe the conventions of proper social intercourse. I do not tell the truth to the man about town by addressing him in the formulae of higher mathematics. As it is not the object pictured, but aesthetic custom, which decides whether correct pictorial representation shall or shall not be in terms of perspective, – whether a picture shall be in Chinese or in European symbols – so the genius of the language, reflecting a vast network of social traditions and purposes, enters quite as much as the thing told about in deciding whether what is told is a truthful representation. In spite of the claims of ethical rigorists to the contrary, truth telling has always been a matter of adaptation to a social audience. Not even Plato's identification of Truth as the rational

intuition of Pure Being prevented him from recognizing not merely the rightfulness, but the nobility of the lie in communications from superior to inferior. And I imagine that if the enlightened average attitude of to-day has changed, it is not because we have eliminated the socially purposive reference from the meaning of truth, substituting for it a pallid logical or epistemological content, but because we are less sure than was Plato of just who is superior and who inferior.

I do not offer these remarks as a decisive contribution to the problem of what meaning ought to be assigned to the term truth in philosophic analysis, nor even as an account of the entire denotation of the term. On the other hand, I do not regard them as so irrelevant as to require apology. I feel quite sure that these considerations supply the atmosphere which still bathes the concept of truth in philosophy – that it still owes its potency and its supreme interest to its early association with beliefs possessed of social authoritativeness and hence exacting acceptance as principles of conduct. However little the considerations adduced have to do with the real meaning of truth, they have a great deal to do with the fact that we consider it so important to find out what its meaning is. Furthermore, an intelligent discussion of the changed denotation of the term truth, of our present unwillingness to accept “current belief” as an equivalent of truth and of our effort to substitute something more “objective,” as we say – less a matter of brute custom – must at least set out from the fact that authoritative belief was once all that truth designated. These two topics shall form, then, the subjects of the remainder of this hour’s discussion.

First, then, as to the attitude of plain man as affording the background of the importance of the idea of truth – important far beyond the confines of the logician. Even when we disregard the obvious moral associations with truth, its identification with the virtue of truthfulness, the import of the term remains socially determined. To represent things as they are is to represent them in ways that tend to maintain a common understanding; to misrepresent them is to injure – whether wilfully or no – the conditions of common understanding. An understanding is an agreement; a misunderstanding a disagreement, and understanding is a social necessity because it is a prerequisite of all community of action. It is no accident that the terms communication and community lie so near together; or that intercourse means equally speech and any intimate mode of associated life. Were I to say that representation of things as they are denotes report conforming to current conventions, the phrase would probably give offense. But when I say that it denotes reporting them in accord with the requirements of that mutual understanding which conditions living together I convey the same meaning in a wording that is perhaps less obnoxious. Unless people understand each

other, they cannot coadjust their respective acts and offices; all assignment of task, all distribution of labor and cooperation is impossible. To misrepresent is not then to distort or disfigure a thing – which may be funny or may be sacrilegious but which as mere distortion has nothing to do with falsity – but to distort or pervert the conditions of intercourse. To deface a sign-board may involve falsification – but that is because it is a sign-board or social index. A certain representation of a signature may be falsification, or forgery; but it is not false because of any inaccuracy in likeness – on the contrary, the greater the accuracy the worse the falsification. Only through its function of social direction and instigation, is any report of a thing anything more than just another thing; a discharge or explosion like the report of a cannon. But as things are unless a man reports himself and his acts, from time to time, society cannot keep track of him or utilize him.

To arrive at an understanding is to come to likeness of attitude; or to agreement as to proper diversity of attitude. To create a misunderstanding is to create the probability of action at cross-purposes. And such probability is a quarrel in embryo, for a misunderstanding presumes an understanding, and hence suggests a wilful violation of good faith on the part of somebody. In short, so far as any proposition puts the one to whom it is addressed into the same attitude that his own perception of what is reported ought, according to current prescriptions, to put him, that proposition is true. Similarly error, misrepresentation, is fooling others, or calling out the type of response which current understandings regarding practice frown upon in a given situation. There is a time and a place to see ghosts and there is a time to see the scouts of the enemy; and the great thing is to observe the conveniences about the proper time and place. To think of things rightly or wrongly is to think of them according to or contrary to social demands. Grote's words about "Nomos, King of All," are worth quoting in spite of their familiarity. "The aggregate of beliefs and predispositions to believe...this is an established fact and condition of things, the real origin of which is for the most part unknown, but which each new member of the group is born to and finds subsisting... . It becomes a part of each person's nature, a standing habit of mind, or fixed set of mental tendencies, according to which particular experience is interpreted and particular persons appreciated." There is no danger of exaggerating the literal force of these words. There is danger that we restrict their application to the particular concerns that we now mark off as moral and political in distinction from those marked off as intellectual. But their meaning is that from the point of view of Nomos the distinction of the intellectual as a separate region, with its own marks and measures, simply has no

existence. Either there is no rule about observation and judging, and correctness and incorrectness have no application, or else *Nomos* and *Ethos* are the rule.

How different, then, is any question which may arise regarding the relation of individual mind, or "consciousness," to an object, from the problem – verbally the same – with which the contemporary student is familiar under the name of epistemology! The discipline termed Epistemology assumes, rightly or wrongly, a self-enclosed island of mind on one side, individual and private and only private; over against this is set a world of objects which are physically or cosmically there – and only there. Then it is naturally worried about how the mind can get out of itself to know a world beyond, or how the world out there can creep into "consciousness." But to common sense, the mind of the individual means those attitudes of observance – or acknowledgment – and of reaching conclusions which have an effect, through intercourse, upon common practice and welfare. And objects mean only the materials, the tools and obstacles, which are familiar in this practice.

If the individual's state of mind comes into play at all, it is only on the practical basis. One man's perceptions communicated in reports afford reliable signs; he is a social asset. Another man's perceptions yield reports that are confusing and harmful; he is a social liability. But the difference is the same in kind as between a skillful tracker and a poor one; between one whose eyesight makes him a good pilot and one whose eyesight is so defective that he is to be avoided as a lookout. State of mind, in other words, means a practical attitude or capacity of the individual judged from the standpoint of definite social use and results. So far as a person's way of feeling, observing and imagining and stating things are not connected with social consequences, so far they have no more to do with truth or falsity than his dreams or reveries. A man's private affairs are his private affairs, and that is all that there is to be said of them. Being nobody else's business, it is absurd to regard them as either true or false.

If we shift the question from the relation of individual mind to the world of objects, over to the logical relation which propositions as propositions sustain to each other, the contrast of the presuppositions of the contemporary student of logic with those of the layman is almost equally marked. It is a demand of common sense that statements hang together, that they give a consistent report or narrative. But to hang together denotes nothing of a uniquely intellectual nature; it denotes the reinforcement which statements furnish one another in calling out a certain attitude of practical response. To give an incoherent account of anything is to prompt a number of incompatible and mutually

destructive reactions. When a man's statements contradict one another, he contradicts himself and thereby destroys his social utility; he is divided against himself and therefore unreliable.

This exposition involves more than acknowledging that representation is primarily – from the common-sense standpoint – a fact of social intercourse, or that truth is important because of social interests. The bearing of social interests does not cease with making truth valued and an object of demand. They affect also the proper subject-matter of correct representation. To say, as I have said (speaking, of course, from this particular point of view), that a given statement is true when it throws its hearer into the same disposition toward behavior that his own observation or opinion of the same matter ought, according to current prescription, to throw him, is to proclaim that these prescriptions, not the things themselves, furnish the standard of truthful representation. How, indeed, could it be otherwise? The report, the communication, is not the thing over again; it is an account, a taking stock, of the thing. This story, or elucidation, must necessarily be in terms of something beyond the thing itself; this something beyond is the place the thing occupies in the current scheme of social customs. It is not, so to say, the object alone which decides what is the proper and authorized account of itself; but the object as a term and factor in established social practice. To observe a thing rightly is perforce to observe social prescription; that “observe” is used in both senses may be a poor philosophic pun but is nevertheless a description of a basic fact.

If a plant is tribally tabu, then the truth about that plant is that it is unfit, even a poisonous, article of diet. Supernatural vengeance will overtake the one who slyly partakes of it – not because the gods have chosen to attach evil consequences to a plant which “in itself” is innocent and nutritious, but because this is the sort of consequence that does as matter of fact follow upon eating poisonous food. To say that the plant “in itself” is edible means only that it tempts a hungry young man to eat it. No matter how much a given noise tends to excite fear and flight in a young man, if social custom decrees that that noise ought not to frighten the warrior class to which the youth is destined, the truth about that object is that it is indifferent or contemptible. The scope of these illustrations is, I think, unlimited. Either there is no social way in which it is fitting to conceive and state to others and hence to oneself objects, and then the matter is wholly outside the sphere of truth and falsity; or the objects have a social status and office, which are authoritative for all statements about them. If, in other words, it be objected that our illustrations owe their force to the fact that we have cunningly selected instances where social valuations of conduct are implied – such as the right to eat or the virtue of bravery – the objection, when

analyzed, confirms the point made. To common sense there is absolutely no such thing as being a plant or noise, only that and nothing more. The plant, the noise, is a thing of a certain kind, a thing of traits and qualities; and what we might and should mark off as traits belonging to the thing as thing, in contrast to traits belonging in virtue of social custom, blend indissolubly into each other. To make this distinction between the plant or noise as physical, or even natural, and the plant or noise in some relation is to take precisely the step that carries us out of and to conduct beyond the common-sense point of view into an abstract and scientific view. To my mind, Mr. Santayana simplified, instead of complicating, philosophic discussion, when he added tertiary qualities to things over and above the conventionally recognized primary and secondary qualities; tertiary qualities being, you will recall, the pleasant or sad or feeble or splendid or wicked traits of things. Well, the introduction of another distinction may also tend to clarification: we may speak of quaternary qualities, meaning the qualities that custom prescribes as properly belonging to objects in virtue of their being factors in a social life that is naught but the maintenance of custom. Now these qualities interfuse the others. Just because observation has been socially trained, fixed by education, and because classifications and appraisals deposited in language have, from the very beginning, woven themselves into every perception and opinion, socially determined qualities are an inextricable part of any object. And whenever the notion of truth or falsity comes into play, the socially prescribed feature stands out as the rightful, the authoritative, definition of the object, in contrast with the tendency of the individual to regard it in an interest which is not merely private, but, according to current convention, illicit – anti-social. From the standpoint of practical common sense, to say that truth involves a distinction of the thing as it is in itself, the “real” thing, from the thing as it appears or is merely conceived to be, is to insist precisely upon the contrast between a social prescription as authoritative and a personal regard as tempting but forbidden.

I will venture to sum up this account in a series of formal statements: First, Representation of a thing denotes, to the plain man, presenting a thing from the standpoint of its meaning, not copying the thing, as a thing. Secondly, Meaning is conceived in terms of social procedure and social consequences. Thirdly, Right or correct meaning is that which social custom prescribes and sanctions. In fulfilling one part of our original undertaking – that of finding out what representing things as they are means to common sense – we have also, if I mistake not, virtually carried out our implied promise to show that the conception of the plain man carries within itself the conditions which make the meaning of truth a general and urgent problem. If representation of

things in accordance with their own nature denotes in effect representation according to the requirements of social traditions, then as soon as the validity of these traditions is seriously called into question, we are committed to a search for the nature and standard of truth. And it is obvious to us, with the advantage of a historic perspective, that to find the ultimate authority as to truth in institutions as they exist is to locate truth in a territory bound to become the focus of hostile attack. Who shall guard the guardian? What guarantees the guarantee? What so sanctifies custom that custom may shed sanctity upon special ways of regarding and reporting things? From the standpoint of custom itself, of tradition, the question is easy to answer. Custom is divine, supernatural in origin and ultimate intent. But the moment custom is suspected and criticized, this answer fails to be satisfactory just because it so flagrantly expresses just the customs that are doubted.

The situation regarding truth and its standard is aggravated, moreover, because, as soon as men permit themselves to look at custom with a questioning eye, custom undergoes such a tremendous shift of value. When it ceases to be the authoritative guardian of truth, it becomes the reservoir and responsible author of error. For the essence of a critical attitude towards custom is the perception that custom not only includes absurd and evil methods of overt action, but that it involves corruption of men's modes of viewing and valuing things; any way you take it, once you venture to criticize it at all, it is irrational in itself, and tends to pervert rationality in all specific cases of belief.

In effect then, to query the worth of custom as a standard of action and judgment is to seek beyond custom for a measure of custom. But where and how shall the required measure be found? How in the world shall accepted beliefs be corrected, once we regard them as incorrect? Where is the point of truth? What is there to which to appeal? We cannot recur to objects just as they present themselves, for these objects are thoroughly infected with the influence of just those customs which have become suspected. They, so to speak, only exhibit in detail, or specify, what the questioned beliefs convey in collective fashion. If we retain our notion of truth as conformity of belief to objects as they really are, the essential point, hereafter, is to discover that type of object of which it may be said that it "really" is. The situation in which custom is seriously questioned as a final authority of behavior thus admits of alternative treatments. Perception of the conflict, the incompatibility, of customs and conviction that their opposition is hopeless beyond remedy, may induce wholesale scepticism. Truth is not, or if it is, it is unattainable. And this scepticism may take the form of an easy poise, of suspense, as to all beliefs, a condescending superiority and tolerance; or of an arbitrary seizure upon some one tradition which is to be asserted

as truth – that form of scepticism which goes currently by the name of “faith.” Or, seeing that the difficulty resides in the faculty of statement, in the function of viewing and regarding objects, men may decide to avoid error by abrogating this function and relapsing into sheer acceptance of things as they come. Or men seek for an object which, transcending the sources of error that attend the objects implicated in customary belief, is finally and indubitably “Real” so that it may stand as adequate measure of the truth of all other perceptions and beliefs. Such a “Real Object” and such a truth must transcend experience.

I hope it will already have occurred to you that the situation which I am setting forth in abstract terms is the situation which meets us historically and dramatically in Greek philosophy. Philosophy was born out of the inability of custom to maintain itself as a final standard of life, and out of the attempt to do by reflection the work previously done by tradition. The classic form which its questions took was “Is this, that and the other thing so by nature or by convention and institution?” Now whatever else nature may mean, it means at least that which contrasts with custom and hence affords a standard that custom cannot supply.¹ It is “The Real Object,” of which we have been speaking, as the final, authoritative measure of beliefs and institutions. Some there were who took an absolutely nihilistic position regarding the existence, the knowability or the communicability of any such Nature, seeing that all of these pre-suppose the world of intercourse and speech.² Others fixed on the clash of traditions about nature and its constitution as evidence that real “truth” was as inaccessible in the case of “Nature” as it was in the case of human institutions; and found the part of wisdom in a mild scepticism. Others, fired with a genuine enthusiasm for the possibilities

¹ It is significant that when Democritus wished to distinguish between the authoritative status of atoms, of what Locke called “primary qualities,” as furnishing the valid criterion of beliefs and the negligible status of those qualities that Locke called secondary, he had no way of stating the inferior position of the latter except to say that they are by custom. I know of no passage in the whole of Greek thought which is more conclusive that the breakdown of the authority of custom and the needs of finding a substitute formed the background of Greek philosophy. There is also no passage which brings out more conclusively the difference in presupposition between ancient and modern philosophy. That which Locke, following Hobbes, Descartes and Galileo, attributed to an effect upon individual mind, Democritus, in harmony with his culture, attributes to a social institution. However metaphorical the expression, it is none the less significant that he could find no better way of conveying the difference between the sort of thing that has only illicit intellectual authority and that which has proper authority than to say the former, even in the case of sensory qualities, is by established custom.

² It is instructive to note that the assumed circumambience of social custom plays the same part in antique “subjectivism” that an analogous pervasiveness of individual consciousness does in its modern counterpart.

of human intercourse as revealed in the best of culture, proclaimed the supremacy of a clarified civilization; that Man himself is, after all, the adequate, as well as the only available, measure of things – Humanity itself, in its interests, the sought – for Truth. Still others felt that the desired standard must be found in something so direct and immediate as to exclude all custom and all report – something in which existence and representation were so at one as to cancel all distinction between them. And this something is the particular event just as it is to the particular person at a particular moment.

The Platonic view of truth was, however, the most searching and the most influential product of the crisis provoked by the failure of custom any longer to fulfill its authoritative function of directing action and belief. Just why the Greeks were the first to turn seriously and systematically upon their own traditions and institutions and subject them to criticism; the first to uphold the authority of the rational life over the life of custom, we cannot say – cannot at least, in adequate detail. None the less the Platonic system is the most splendid fruit of this revolution of attitude. Its legitimate outcome is the exaltation of the lover of wisdom, the seeker for True Being, over Nomos, as rightful lord of all things of human institution and report. Custom had been the standard of Truth in detail as regarded the proper way of regarding and representing things. To say that it was dogmatic is just to say that it was custom. When, then, criticism supervenes, and the standard of belief and action wavers to its fall, there is but one alternative to social anarchy and chaos: The determination of a standard as fixed, as unalterable, as externally dominating over individual conception and action, as custom had seemed to be and had claimed to be. The necessity of a standard authority and sanction for individual belief being conceded, a standard for all customs and institutions must be found, for they have shown themselves to be simply cases of the particular beliefs that need regulating. Proximately and practically, it may be held that institutions and social regulations determine rightfully enough the beliefs of the great mass of men, but the rightfulness of this approximate control depends upon the institutions themselves having already undergone criticism, and having been overhauled on the basis of a standard of reality beyond themselves. This reality, as the final and eternal measure of truth in the laws by which men are immediately governed, and the measure of truth for all personal observation and opinion, may well be called The Truth.

To common sense there is an important distinction, as we have seen, between the *de facto* view of itself, which a thing directly suggests, and the legitimate or *de jure* view, which ought to be held to. The *de facto* view is that which accords with personal inclination and seduces to

action for a private good. The authoritative or true view is that which social customs and common interests authorize and demand. This distinction repeats itself, on a changed plane, in the Platonic theory. All things and events just as they occur, in contrast to the unchanging standard, are merely *de facto*, without authority, and in so far as instigating belief are illicit and private invitations to deviate from the Truth. Note, if you please, the implied revolution in the conception of truth as representation of things as they are. Since common sense is itself formed, for the most part (apart from the occasional temptations to private rebellion) on the model of custom, to represent things as they are means to follow the habitual way of representing them – its own way, the way of common sense. The attitude is one that we may call highly realistic; and even when the combination of perception with appetite makes the object seem different from what custom declares it really to be, the standard of its truth is still realistically coercive custom. But how different the situation when the standard shifts from custom to a reality beyond custom. Things and events as they show themselves are themselves now merely “shows”; and they exhibit their showiness to the thoughtful mind by their transitoriness and their seductiveness. Things, events, in their *prima facie* existence, are just the source of individual opinion in all its error and also of that collective wrong opinion embodied in existing law. They are not true things, but just the “looks” of things. They are private – particular. Beliefs are wrong, not in failing to conform to their direct objects but in virtue of their literalness of representation. The things are really to blame; the matter is with them. They fail to report their ultimate object stably and consistently. Things are representations. They promise and do not fulfill; things are incompatible, and, therefore, falsifying; they threaten, but are too empty and vain to harm one who rates them at their true worth. They bedeck themselves with flowers, and the flowers disguise a rotting corpse. In short, things are appearances, shadows, seemings, imitations and misrepresentations, falsifications of what they purport faithfully to represent. They are, to use the Greek word for these functions, *phenomena*. No matter how technical, how removed from moral associations, the words *Noumena* and *Phenomena* have become in modern discussion, with Plato they denote, inevitably, the contrast of the genuine and the counterfeit: the true, the final and authoritative, and the spurious, the unreliable and illicit. That truth, true Truth, real Reality, is transcendent is not then an arbitrary creation of a philosopher’s fancy, but a natural, almost inevitable outcome of the failure of Wont to exercise its wonted control of life, and of the effort to find a substitute Being that will actually perform the operations that *Nomos*, the usurping pretender, has so flagrantly failed to perform. May I again ask

the aid of your sympathetic imagination in realizing that the identification of Truth with a peculiar type of eternal, absolute and comprehensive Reality follows from the common-sense notion of Truth as correct representation, because common sense had made the standard of correct representation some belief or tradition accepted without question. In some quite genuine way common-sense realism – if we may venture to introduce such a term at this stage of the discussion – carries within itself the promise and potency of Platonism, of transcendental realism.

We are far, however, from having exhausted the alternative possibilities of the course of events consequent upon questioning Custom as a final authority in matters of belief. At the same time that some metaphysicians and theologians were shocked into revolutionary impatience at the spectacle of dissolving authority, humbler and less exacting men were moved by the reciprocal attrition of institutional habits to try to discriminate the particular beliefs that maintained themselves most efficiently and to use different and differing beliefs as modes of correcting one another, and, thereby, through a certain reflex effect, themselves. For dogmatic insistence upon certain beliefs as standards and for a flight to a reality beyond all human institutions, they substituted an attempt to improve instituted beliefs: for conformity to tradition and for the aesthetic vision of the eternal pattern in the heavens, they substituted an idea of this world bettered by a revision of the tradition which should be handed on. To speak less abstractly, some men devoted themselves to the office of developing a technique for criticising and correcting in detail special beliefs. This procedure contrasts with the attitudes already considered in ways sufficiently fundamental to involve a further and distinctive reference for the term truth. It agrees with the common-sense attitude in that it accepts current beliefs; but it disagrees in the mode of its acceptance. It accepts them piecemeal and tentatively, not rigidly and systematically – that is, as absolute principles. It agrees with the Platonic or transcendental attitude in declining to regard current beliefs, either in whole or in particular portion, as final. But it disagrees in that it never rejects them wholesale in behalf of something different in kind. A rejection is a replacement, attained or contemplated. In the end, the making over often amounts to destruction, but the destruction has occurred in a series of steps, each of which by itself has been simply a correction of some detail of what is currently accepted. That branch of philosophy already mentioned that takes for its problem the question of how a self-contained consciousness may achieve recognition of a world beyond itself may conclude that science must begin with sensations or with innate ideas or with categories, but as a matter of historic fact science does begin in each

specific field with what already passes current in that field. The observations a scientific man resorts to, the classifications he employs, are never original nor isolated; they spring out of and assume a context of accepted beliefs.

In short, from the standpoint of scientific inquiry, truth indicates not just accepted beliefs, but beliefs accepted in virtue of a certain method. Without trenching, at this point, upon recent controversy as to the relation of truth and verification, one may fairly say that, to science, truth denotes verified beliefs, propositions that have emerged from a certain procedure of inquiry and testing. By that I mean that if a scientific man were asked to point to samples of what he meant by truth, he would pick out neither dogmas, no matter how strong their hold, nor transcendental beings no matter how esthetically sublime, but beliefs which were the outcome of the best technique of inquiry available in some particular field; and he would do this no matter what his abstract conception of the Nature of Truth. The effect of this new method of designating truth upon the social, or common-sense, conception of truth is worth noting. To the person equipped with the tools of experimental inquiry, truth designates not the object asserted or content believed in just as object or content, but that object asserted or believed on account of the prior employ of a certain method. To the layman in that field, not acquainted with the dependence of that proposition upon a technique of science, the belief itself is the truth. Common sense, by education and like methods, takes up into itself the results of scientific inquiry quite apart from what gives them their authority to the scientific man. Moreover, by all kinds of applications and inventions, the results of these methods become an integral part of current social practice; the bridge, the railway, the light, the loom, embody scientific verifications into the very substance of common sense itself. By assimilating in such ways the fruits of inquiry into its own beliefs and standards, common sense has no great difficulty in maintaining unchanged its own complacently dogmatic view of truth as a fixed body of authoritative doctrines. And it should not be forgotten that pretty much everyone is a layman in every field but his own specialty. The philosopher who is quite aware that his truths denote only the best results that he has been able to get by the best methods at his command, accepts the results of the physicist on faith, and treats them as truths because of their own inherent content. The experimental physicist, aware of the provisional, because experimental, nature of his truths, gladly hands over truth absolute and unalloyed to the keeping of the pure mathematician, who perhaps completes the circle by accepting the trust, because he in turn takes on authority the results of some transcendental philosopher.

Occasionally, of course, the popular mind has forced upon it the fact

that the scientific truths of a prior generation are no longer as true as they were. To the scientific man, this means, of course, that methods of inquiry have been improved. So far as recognition of the change affects him at all, it is as an encouraging promise of still further improvement. To the mind which has identified truth with some fixed content of belief and statement, this change comes, however, as a disagreeable shock. From this point of view, the only logical conclusion is thoroughgoing scepticism. But a compromise between common sense and Platonism affords a happy way out. The form of truth is fixed and authoritative beyond change; in this eternal mold successive generations pour their contributions which receive, therefore, for the time being the sanctifying seal royal of truth absolute and unchanging.

I point out these confusions of the scientific denotation of truth with other incompatible meanings partly to prepare the way for further discussion, in which I shall try to show that three typical conceptions of truth in general correspond to the three ways of designating and getting at truths in the concrete. But here I wish to suggest that our ordinary social practice holds out against definite recognition of the change which scientific method makes in the criterion of the authority of truths, because of a half-conscious instinct that full recognition of the new way of specifying truths would mean a tremendous revolution in its own standards of practice. May I suggest the nature of this transformation by contrasting with the passage quoted at the beginning of the hour regarding the child's right to the truth, a passage from one of Ibsen's dramas? A physician, a representative of science, has made a discovery whose acknowledgment would further the health of the community, but at the expense of the wealth of many leading citizens. Exasperated by difficulties that in his innocence he had not anticipated, having indeed supposed that the community would rush to welcome his salubrious "truth," he exclaims: "Truths are by no means the wiry Methuselahs most people take them to be. A normally-constituted truth lives about seventeen or eighteen years, possibly a score, seldom longer. And truths as old as that are always emaciated. But only then does the majority take them up and recommend them to society as wholesome food."

I do not regard the sentiment of this quotation as a fair representation of one attitude any more than I regard reference to the catechism an adequate specimen of the other. But extremes point the contrast. One element is common to both statements. Truth is not a colorless intellectual matter in either case; it is the principles by which men direct their lives. The difference is that one standard looks backward and the other forward. One assumes a society bent on preserving and enforcing a truth it already has, the other projects a society that makes its own progressive change, change even of its own ideals and standards, an

integral part of its conception of itself. So long as the ethos of a community can maintain the conception that truth means its own customary standards, it can assimilate and bring under this conception any special "truths" with which science may present it. Science then remains a purely technical matter, without any fundamental, that is to say moral or practical, meaning. When however, scientific methods affect men's habits of thought in respect to practices that are most important to them, the scientific way of designating truth becomes a matter of general, or philosophic, importance. If the pragmatic idea of truth has itself any pragmatic worth, it is because it stands for carrying the experimental notion of truth that reigns among the sciences, technically viewed, over into political and moral practices, humanly viewed.

II. Truth and Consequences

Plato represents Socrates asking for the nature of virtue and his companions replying by mentioning particular virtues: modesty in youth, good house-keeping in woman, valor in the soldier. Socrates says he has inquired what is a bee, and has been presented with a swarm of bees. Possibly the procedure Plato rejects is, in the end, the only sensible mode of procedure; but his criticism none the less indicates a distinction of points of view. We may approach a meaning on the side of its reference or application in existence, or we may be concerned with the meaning itself – its nature, its definition. At the last hour our concern was of the former sort; we discriminated three kinds of things that, under different conditions, are pointed at as truths. Our task to-day is more complicated; it is busied with the nature or meaning of truth. In the prior discussion we had usages of speech and some fairly obvious historical facts by which to be guided; to-day we enter upon a field of philosophical battle, with corpses strewn, ghosts hovering and living beings contending, one of the things in contention being how to distinguish what is alive from what is dead and from what is ghostly.

The first definition to take the philosophic field was that of Plato, one aspect of which we had occasion to refer to at our last hour, namely, its identification of Truth with real, or genuine, Being. The peculiar relation that existence and meaning bear to each other struck Plato, as it must strike every thoughtful person. That the meaning of things is what gives them meaning, value, is self-evident. Nowhere in the direct events of nature and society, however, is there any lasting specimen of complete identification of existence and value. The phenomena of the world and of social institutions suggest, point to, meanings which they do not embody. Meaning is integral, single. Phenomena are plural, separate; they try, as it were, to supplement one another's defects by their plurality, but the result is a patchwork which makes confusion worse

confounded. The things are unstable, they come and go; they are born and they decay. But meanings abide, unaffected by their flux. It is as eternal as they are transitory. The special way in which Plato formulated these conceptions is none of our present concern. His standpoint and method furnish, however, the elements of a typical and enduring definition of truth: the idealistic notion of truth as the complete, comprehensive, self-consistent meaning of existences. This conception was carried over into scholastic philosophy, and through its consequent influence upon theology was embodied in tradition and current opinion far beyond the limits of technical philosophy. To-day it is a presupposition of many who would reject the notion as absurd if it came to them as a logical concept. Aside from Plato's own influence and statement, it affords a type of definition which the predicaments of experience are recurrently bound to generate. For since the value of things resides in their meaning, and since things in their ordinary existence are inadequate and fugitive exemplifications of meaning, a type of True Being in which meaning and existence are absolutely and eternally at one is inevitably conceived. This thought has its direct translation in logic. Opinions, beliefs, statements – everything intellectual in nature – carry with them an assertion of their own truth. Yet since many of them are subsequently demonstrated to be false, and since none of them carry with them on their face any sure stamp and seal of truth (for if they did, falsity would be impossible) all human judgment and cognition are self-contradictory, if implying in their very self-contradictoriness, however, an absolutely consistent truth as their aim and standard. Moreover, the way in which logic is bound up with universality, order, system, the generic and the comprehensive, as marks of knowledge, points, when its implications are worked out, to internal coherence or complete rationalization as the mark of truth.

Since Aristotle inherited from Plato his thoroughgoing intellectualism, but without the interest of Plato in the application of philosophical results to the control of social life; and since Aristotle reacted in the direction of regard for achieved objects and customs against Plato's contempt for the sensibly and currently existent, Aristotle proceeded to abstract the intellectual content out of existing beliefs and institutions, supplementing the net outcome, when necessary, by going farther in the exact sense of things as they already were. Very naturally, then, he formulates the definition of truth in terms of accepted belief; the representation of things in conformity with their own nature; while he also gives the definition a purely intellectual turn, without regard to its popular social background and criterion. More specifically, Aristotle said that truth was not a property of existence, but of judgments or propositions; the latter being true if the relation asserted between their

terms agreed or corresponded with the relations between the things to which the propositions refer. This definition is sufficiently bromidic to be acceptable to common sense; ever since Aristotle's time correspondence has been the defining trait of truth to the realistic school, in opposition to the notion of consistency which is inherently idealistic because it locates truth in meaning, in the rational or intellectual by itself.

A bald, raw statement of the peculiar difficulties attaching to both the consistency and the correspondence definitions of truth will at least prepare the way for understanding why a third party has finally been rash enough to intervene. The difficulty with the consistency notion stands out in its very statement. A cognitive presentation means that the presentation is concerned with something beyond itself; the proposition is about something, not about itself. This something which it states is accordingly the measure of its truth. It is, of course, desirable that propositions should be self-consistent; that they should be general in scope and should be systematized. But even maximum internal coherence and universalization is at most but a *sine qua non* of truth: its formal mark. Material truth means that the consistent idea or judgment states something existing, outside its own existence, in the way that thing actually is. Dreams are none the less dreams if they happen to be self-agreeing; the crucial thing is whether they agree with hard facts. The most hopeless form of insanity is that in which the various factors of the delusion are most systematically rationalized with reference to one another. When every new and seemingly opposed fact is brought into logical consistency with the other factors there is no leverage by which to convict the insane man of his delusion. This is precisely the sort of situation that exists when truth is equated to a self-enclosed property of the idea or meaning. Enlarge the mental factor as you will; give it the utmost self-consistency of which it is capable; you have increased, doubtless, the chances of its being true, but to say that truth itself lies that way is to make fancy the measure of reality.

Thus we are forced back upon the common-sense notion of correspondence or agreement: truth is the agreement, by way of proportion, of the constitutive parts of the proposition with the constitutive parts of the objects that furnish its subject-matter. This definition, however, has its own troubles. The definition seems so conclusive, so satisfactory, just because it assumes all there is at issue. It assumes that we have already got truth, or that some propositions do surely agree. The moment we subject this assumption to the least suspicion, behold we are in a dilemma. To be sure, a statement is true if it states things as they "really are," but how are they "really"? The difficulty belonging to the "truly" of the proposition is just shifted to the "really" of the thing, plus the

difficulty of enclosing the “really” within the net of a proposition, when the attempt at such enclosure seems to be the cause of error and falsity. To tell whether a proposition reflects a thing as it really is, we seem to require a third medium in which the original proposition and its object are surveyed together, are compared and their agreement or disagreement seen. Now this is either itself a proposition or it is not. If it is a proposition, it claims to be true or to agree with its object; this object is beyond itself, and hence another proposition is required for its comparison, and so on *ad infinitum*. If it is not a proposition, then what is it? If it be some kind of an object, what kind? And whatever the kind of object, truth or agreement is no longer a trait of a proposition but of this object. Either way out is fatal to the original definition.³

Consider, then, how easily the orthodox notion of correspondence falls a prey to the idealistic dialectic. A realistic friend of mine is fond of using the following illustration: A has a map of the country before him; not seeing the country he may assert truth or falsity of the map, but he cannot be certain. B sees both, and knows whether the map is correct or not. Hence my friend’s inference was an antecedent property of the map and that all that subsequent verification means is a recognition of this pre-existing quality. Note, however, the wily turn the idealist gives the illustration. Yes, he replies, the situation is just as you have stated it. What, however, has actually taken place? Just an appeal for a smaller and therefore less consistent knowledge to a completer and more coherent one. For a seer of little scope, a seer of wider vision has been substituted. Analyze your own case, and you will see that you have gone, for truth, not from an idea to an object, but from a partial idea to one more genuinely whole. To say that the first representation, or map, is true or false is simply to assert, therefore, the existence of another knower – or knowledge – which includes both the original assertion and its object in such a way as to apprehend directly the relation they sustain to each other. This granted, there is no end save in a knowledge which is completely consistent or self-contained.

Having gained this advantage, the idealist naturally presses further.

³ Were it not too remote from my immediate topic, it could be shown, I think, that Aristotle himself engages in shifting about in precisely the way indicated here. He begins by denying that truth and falsity are metaphysical, that is, traits of existence. But he has to give some account of what proportioning the terms of a proposition to the elements of existence means. This he does either in terms of the inclusion in a universal of a particular, or – the same conception more exactly elaborated – in terms of genus, species and difference. These distinctions being bound up absolutely with his metaphysical distinctions of matter and form, potentiality and actuality, his ultimate differences from Plato (as so often when he criticizes his master) are more verbal than significant. Truth finally denotes that realization of potentiality in actuality of which the whole matter of genus and species, logically taken, is one case.

Since every statement means, intends, claims to be true, any statement which does not carry with it its own credentials for determining its own truth, is not a statement in the strict and full sense of the term; it is a fragment of a statement which, since a fragment, contradicts any claim to be true by itself. Only a true proposition is truly a proposition at all. The very fact that a proposition must be referred beyond itself to have its truth disclosed is proof that it is not as yet really a proposition or knowledge, but only the hint of a proposition, an intimation of a knowledge.

So much for the quarrel between the idealistic definition by consistency and the realistic definition by correspondence. And if I have left the idealist with the last word, it is not because I am not aware that the realist can begin the quarrel over again by pointing out that in the end the idealist has no truth, but only a bigger and more systematized "idea" which, for all he can tell, may be only a systematized delusion. Because of this endless quarrel many a student of the philosophic discussion of truth has, like jesting Pilate, not stayed for an answer to the question "What is Truth?" He has felt sure that no matter how long he stayed, he should still see philosophic lay figures chasing one another around in their endless carousel.

The deadlock does not prove the truth of any third theory, say the pragmatic. But it does prove an irresistible temptation for another theory to enter the field. It is extremely difficult to give an account of this third theory which shall not be technical, for the essence of the theory consists in going back of the assumption regarding the nature of a proposition common to both realism and idealism; it consists in raising a previous question: the question as to what any logical proposition, any intellectual judgment, is. And since, for ages, the discussion of the nature of truth has gone on in terms of an unquestioned assumption regarding what it means to be a judgment, the chief difficulty of the pragmatist theory is that the unfamiliarity of the point of view renders its opponents unable and unwilling to take the primary step in criticism of their own, namely: That of asking what is to be a proposition or statement. I must request then, your most sympathetic hearing for the following discussion, inevitably over-technical.

In the first place, the primary common assumption of both realistic and idealistic conceptions is that a statement by its nature implies an assertion of its own truth. No, replies the pragmatist, a statement, a proposition, in just the degree in which it has a genuinely intellectual quality, implies a doubt concerning its own truth and a search for truth, an inquiry for it. The proposition which asserts or assumes its own truth is either a sheer prejudice, a congealed dogmatism; or else it is not an intellectual or logical proposition at all, but simply a linguistic

memorandum to serve as a direct stimulus of further action. When I tell my neighbor his house is afire, or when the mathematician uses the formula for the value of $\{p\}$ in his further calculations, there may once have been a genuinely logical proposition involved, but what we have at this time is just a way of directing further action. Now the plausibility of the realistic definition, its bromidic character, is precisely that it falls back on the dogmatism of common sense, so far as that is an embodiment of custom and tradition; or, it falls back on statements that have been so completely and repeatedly verified in the past they have no longer intellectual or logical quality at all. They are truisms, tautologies, trivialities, intellectually considered, however momentous they may be as stimuli to further direct action. Accordingly when we are told that the essence of truth is correspondence of an idea (a meaning or judgment) with fact, that for example my idea that my friend is in Constantinople is true if he is really there, our first inclination may be to exclaim: A Daniel come to judgment! But our second, is to note that either I am already sure that he is there, in which case the "judgment" is no judgment, but a mere putting in words of an established fact, (involving no more "mind" than is necessary to control the organs of speech). Or else I do not know that he is there, and hence to assert as a truth that he is there, is a piece of presumption on my part, indicative not of "truth," but of my dogmatic attitude toward truth. If there is a proposition, intellectually speaking, then the fact is that I have reason to infer that he is there, and that I believe that that inference would be borne out if certain further inquiries were undertaken, there being legitimate doubt pending their execution.

Note the position of the idealist in this matter. He agrees that any assertion or proposition implies the assertion of its own truth; but he recognizes that unless the subject-matter of the assertion is already there, unless one making the assertion already has certain knowledge (i.e., previously verified conclusions), this implication is by way of intent, not by way of achievement. Hence the judgment which still has its subject-matter outside of itself can only point to another fuller judgment as its own consummation. Like the pragmatist, he notes the future reference, but, unlike the pragmatist, he holds the appeal is to another judgment, and so he is pre-committed to an endless circle.

The first step in the pragmatic criticism of both realistic and idealistic notions is, then, questioning the idea that every statement by its own nature implies an assertion of its own truth. For that conviction, it substitutes the hypothesis that every proposition (so far as genuinely intellectual in quality, not mere dogmatic prejudice or memorandum for further guidance) is a hypothesis concerning some state of affairs; that it is of its nature to be doubtful, not assured, of truth; and that its

assertion of its own truth is only conditional: that it is a means of setting on foot activities of inquiry which will test the worth of its claim. Truth, then, can exist only in the testing of the claim, in making good through the subsequent acts it prescribes. The pragmatic theory thus claims faithfully to represent the spirit, that is the method, of science, which (1) regards all statements as provisional or hypothetical till submitted to experimental test; (2) endeavors to frame its statements in terms which will themselves indicate the procedures required to test them; and (3) never forgets that even its assured propositions are but the summaries of prior inquiries and testings, and therefore subject to any revision demanded by further inquiries.

Our second step is to recognize that with this change propositions get a future outlook and reference, while the orthodox notion makes them refer to antecedent conditions. To realist and idealist alike truth (or falsity) is a property which exists ready-made in the intellectual assertion. What is done with the proposition, what happens from its use, the differences it makes in further experience – these are all irrelevant. The pragmatist says that since every proposition is a hypothesis referring to an inquiry still to be undertaken (a proposal in short) its truth is a matter of its career, of its history: that it becomes or is made true (or false) in process of fulfilling or frustrating in use its own proposal. No one who has genuinely taken the first step – that of apprehending that an intellectual statement, in proportion to the degree of its being genuinely intellectual, is hypothetical and tentative – will have any difficulty with this second step. Once say *a* and *b* follows naturally enough.

But the necessity of the step may be independently shown by considering the dilemma regarding falsity in which both realism and idealism are caught. Every statement, every idea, every belief, every perception, is and must be exactly the same in its truth or falsity value from the standpoint of its reference to the past. The needle that by some accident points due south, the watch that says seven, the watch that says eight and the watch that says nothing, are all equally true or equally false from the standpoint of a reference to the past. They are equally faithful, or equally faithless, transcripts of their own generating conditions. Insanities, stupidities, ignorances, lies, errors, dreams, hallucinations not only exist, but all look precisely alike if we conceive their scope exhausted in their reference to the past. Henry James's *Liar* is so perfect, esthetically, just because he reflects with such exquisite accuracy his own producing conditions and because his lies are all so "true" to his own antecedent character.

Take the report of the watch as a reinstatement of the past, and it cannot be false. Take any human report or representation of events and they are in the same case. The same world that produced the event has

produced the report; if the latter is true or false then so is the former. Each repeats or summarizes its own antecedents in the same absolute sense as the other. For this reason, consistent realists, with a serious sense of their own logic, have always introduced into the very nature of Being itself some inherent factor of falsity – the Greek non-being, the Aristotelian potentiality as a static trait of objects (not a trait of action facing the future), the Scholastic original sin and objective corruption of intelligence; the modern “finitude” – the exact counterpart, but in a much more confused style, of the Greek non-being. So far as realism has taken this course it has necessarily moved to a position where its differences from idealism are largely verbal; to all intents and purposes truth and falsity become traits of objective subject-matter. And now we are taken to the opposite extreme. Before nothing was false; now nothing is true; there is no proposition of which we can say that it is any truer than any other, save of the one proposition that absolute truth, absolutely unlike any of our so-called truths, exists.⁴ For all we can tell any particular assertion is infected by the wrong kind of intervening condition (whether this wrong kind is defined in terms of finitude, of an intervening refracting consciousness, being an irrelevant detail).⁵ Since the quest for truth is intimately bound up with the difference between the true and the false in individual cases, any definition of truth that commits us to the conclusion that all special beliefs and propositions are either all alike true or all alike false, certainly suggests the necessity for some other way of defining truth.

Consider how completely the difficulty vanishes when we recognize that the meaning of propositions is not exhausted, or even contained, in their reference to what is past; that, on the contrary, the point of a proposition is to take something past, something done, in its bearings upon the future consequences which making the proposition helps us to reach. Because the further course of a ship depends upon the way the compass-needle points, its direction is no mere brute fact, indifferent to a distinction of truth and falsity. The needle may be right or wrong, because something depends upon the particular way it is used, how it is employed as a means to an end. Antecedent conditions equally account for its pointing north, whether the pointing is due to magnetic attraction or to a defect in its own mechanism. But since the way the ship goes –

⁴ This interpretation could easily be borne out by quotations from typical modern idealists.

⁵ It is thus naïve to suppose that idealism has any easier problem in dealing with hallucination and error, than realism. Because the mind or consciousness which it introduces is a constant and uniform condition, it cannot be resorted to as accounting for the difference between a concrete falsity and a concrete truth. “All or nothing” is its motto.

and all the consequences that flow from this – is influenced by the needle's record, its position gets an entirely new type of value. It is no longer a mere effect of its past, but the effect is a sign of a possible future belonging to something else beside and beyond itself, namely: the ship. It is the sign of the progress of events toward their termination, their fulfilment, their consequences.

Presentation, representation, proposition, judgment – it makes no difference what name is used provided some intellectual or cognitive force is attached – means then not a bare existence, but an existence in use; an existence performing a special office. Here is a man; here is a photograph; a lock of hair; a poem; a set of Bertillon measurements; a signature. What is meant by calling any one of them a sign, or presentation, or representation, of the man? Under what conditions could we say that any one of them is of the nature of a statement or proposition? And what would be meant by saying that any one was a true presentation? When a question of further use, of reference to future consequences enters in, we are inevitably concerned with the fitness, the adaptability, of the thing for the use intended. It stands for a result to be attained; and since the way it stands for the result affects the result finally attained, its worth as representative is a genuine matter. To the banker, payment of money depends on the signature; to him then it represents or stands for the man, and the question of whether it is true or false is a genuinely significant question. Now the question of its relation to its generating becomes fraught with a burden for the determination of its future use and hence relevant to its truth or falsity – which it could not do were it the nature of the proposition simply to reinstate its own generating antecedents. And so in each of the cases; in each there is a special end or purpose, in each, there is therefore a special office or use; in each accordingly the matter of right or wrong use is crucial; and in each any inquiry into past conditions that will throw light on the probability of right use is of utmost import. Action once overtly performed is in so far irrevocable; a proposition or judgment (intelligence in short) is the temporary suspense of the irretrievable pending a consideration of whatever bears upon the likelihood of success in securing the end.⁶ Since then the representation has intrinsi-

⁶ Nothing is said or implied here about psychic or mental states, because what is said holds in such a generalized way as to apply to them also in case they exist, which I much doubt, for I think that what we ordinarily call "mental" is precisely things in the office described above, or that the term denotes a function of things, not a special structure. Even if there are psychic ghosts, or reduplicates, of things, they are not cognitive in their existence, but in their use, so that the entire problem of knowledge is the same as if there were none, and as if the whole cognitive enterprise were carried

cally and necessarily reference to a future,⁷ its truth or falsity is a matter of failure or success in performing its mission. The good minister is the one who gets the results his country sent him to secure. The piece of paper is good money whose exchange for a beefsteak can be enforced. A good watch is the watch that runs well, and the watch that runs well is the watch that enables people to do the things whose doing depends upon considerations of time. Handsome is that handsome does. The association of "tried and true" is not a mere piece of literary alliteration.

A consideration of the peculiar way a proposition or representation performs its office is the third step on the pragmatic road. Somehow or other, the thing that is representative acts as a substitute for something else in the effort of securing a certain end. But how? Let us go back to the ship's compass and needle. The voyage is uncertain as to its issue or termination. The ship is not expected just to go anywhere at random; one landing place is not as good as any other; no landing at all is not as good as a port. But it being uncertain whether the desired haven will be reached, improved control of the means of assuring the end is a desideratum. In such a condition any device that brings the desired end into the means and enables it thereby to function as one of the means of its own attainment is an extraordinary gain. This is precisely what the needle does. What it "presents" is not its own antecedents; what it "presents" is the port that is to be attained. And it presents this in terms of the existing movement of the ship, thereby making the end a present factor in facilitating the gaining of the desired haven. So far as the needle of this compass has proved itself in its past workings, so far as it has been tested in previous use, has successfully stood the test of accomplishing what it was employed to do, so far it is trustworthy, reliable, true. Henceforth, it is simply used as a direct factor or agency. In proportion to his personal skill, the helmsman responds to its every fluctuation by a corresponding turn of his wheel. But the compass is itself a manufactured article; it has been shaped by a long series of past uses with the tests and rectifications they involved for precisely the sake of helping in this sort of a situation. It is an outcome, a deposit of intel-

on through the machinery of words, dumb vocalizations and other organic reactions and attitudes.

⁷ That the standpoint and reference are future, does not mean that the content is future. Failure to note this simple distinction has been the cause of a lot of futile criticism of the pragmatic notion. The point of judgment is precisely taking, using something antecedent as bearing on a future. Since this future is not yet certain, this way of turning the existent gives it a problematic or hypothetical quality. No matter how fixed and unalterable the past as a past, the moment it enters knowledge at all, that moment it becomes uncertain because functioning with reference to a possible but insecure future.

lectual propositions; it has no longer, as a direct means of or stimulus to action, an intellectual quality. Imagine the steersman trying to read the compass in order that he may make the response calculated to attain the desired consequences, and you have precisely the situation in which occur propositions (statements, reports, judgments) having a vital intellectual quality. The point and reference of the statement is in the use to which the thing is to be put; the matter of the statement is some existing fact or antecedent. The report, the proposition, is stating this antecedent existence, as having a bearing and a certain kind of bearing upon the attaining of an end. It is inevitably an estimate, an interpretation, an appraisal, just because it is concerned with the existence in the bearing it has upon an end as yet uncertain and unattained. This is the reason of our original assertion that no genuinely intellectual proposition implies an assertion of its own truth, but is only an anticipation of becoming true through the search which its own doubtfulness exacts. To state anything as involved in the reaching of an end not yet certain is, perforce, to render the statement somewhat hypothetical, somewhat tentative. We may imagine a state of affairs in which the adequate means for every end are at hand ready-made; they are directly used as stimuli, as factors, and the end comes in its season. In such a condition there would not be genuinely intellectual reports or statements. We may imagine a state of affairs in which the future is uncertain, and in which we must wait helpless on the course of events to produce the better or the worse. Here, again, intellectual propositions would be non-existent. Given a situation the outcome of which is doubtful, and in which the final result may be modified by viewing some of the antecedent factors from the standpoint of a future result, and we have precisely the state of affairs in which there are judgments or propositions, and in which the worth of the proposition in respect to its use in getting the end is a crucial matter. Just because we are so familiar with this situation, an analytic account of it is unfamiliar and technical. We so constantly anticipate the future outcome of a prior situation, we so constantly utilize this anticipation as itself a definite factor in securing a desirable and avoiding an undesirable result, that we fail to note the extraordinary character of the performance – the capacity to make an unachieved future a present factor in its own determination – and we fail to note that this peculiar function is precisely the situation of knowledge (that is, in its discursive or propositional form), and that it precisely describes “consciousness” in the sense of awareness.]

That I have made wholly clear to you my conception of what it means to be a representative, intellectually speaking, I cannot hope; the point is too unfamiliar to be readily understood by those whose mental habits

have been formed in alien terms. It requires a distinct effort of the imagination to look at a situation which is so familiar, so taken for granted, in every movement of our intellectual life. But my present purpose does not depend for its realization upon your accepting my analysis, nor even upon its being wholly clear to you. We are concerned with the definition of truth; we have seen how the orthodox consistency and correspondence theories break down at just the critical points where the theory ought to be of use. If the account of the nature of a proposition, just given, leads to an account of truth which includes all that recommends the two opposed orthodox theories and escapes the factors that bring them to a deadlock, we shall at least have reason for accepting this account of truth as compared with either of the others, no matter how much may remain undone in its development on its own account.

Note, first, then how adequately the theory in question locates and describes correspondence as a mark of truth. Just because the compass, for example, is a device for bringing down a desired future end into the present so that it may operate as a factor in its own attainment; or (otherwise put) just because it presents other efficiently operating means in their active bearing on the achieving of the desired end, the compass is responsible; it answers to something; it answers to a need, and also to other and antecedent conditions. Being itself used as a factor in reaching the desired end, the way it fits into, or corresponds with, other factors is a matter of prime moment. Were it not a factor at all (as it is not on either the consistency or correspondence theories) or were it the only factor, it would not be liable to correction or to verification; there would be no intelligible sense in which it would correspond.⁸ Having an office to perform, an office which is specific, and therefore depending upon cooperation with the activities of other independent factors, its own use is the way it corresponds with the other efficient conditions involved. It is brought to bear by the agent interested upon these other factors; it reacts upon them; they in turn act differently than they otherwise would (that is, than they would if it were not there as cooperating), and their reactions to it at once confirm, strengthen it, or nullify, frustrate it; or, more likely, do both and so modify it by reconstruction. In short, our definition of truth through reference to consequences, uses correspondence as a mark of a meaning or proposition in exactly the same sense in which it is used everywhere else; in the sense in which two friends correspond, that is, interact as checks, as stimuli, as mutual aids and mutual correctors, or as the parts of a machine correspond. The

⁸ Recall the prior discussion about the meaninglessness of truth and falsity on the basis of reference to the past alone.

orthodox realistic theory, on the contrary, has to invent a unique and undefinable meaning for this particular case of correspondence.⁹

The things to which the meaning or statement is applied, upon which it is used, therefore constitute an indispensable factor in the way it works out, whether to failure or success, and so of its being made true or false, instead of remaining doubtful or conditional. Truth as a positive, achieved thing simply means that use has tested and has approved what was an intellectual, and so problematic affair, and thereby has given it an assured status in further effort. It operates, henceforth, just as directly as any thing would operate. It now is true, not a claim and a search for truth. To call a compass, otherwise than prophetically, a good compass, is to speak of its approval by the test of past use. It is to designate it as proved to be trustworthy. It does not require further scrutiny; to "state" or interpret it before using it would be a waste of time. So far as there are methods, formulae in existence which have undergone repeated trial in use, under critically testing conditions, the pragmatist is no more chary of referring to truths as having certain objective existence than is anybody else. He only reminds himself, when theories are advanced (say in philosophy) which do not proffer any credentials of this nature, but which claim truth as part of their own absolute structure, that to be a truth means to have been verified by use under test conditions. And he reminds himself that only

⁹ The ordinary misconception of pragmatism (repeated so constantly, in spite of reiterated correction by pragmatists that it would almost seem as if the critics had a subconscious realization that the misconception was necessary to maintaining their own view) is that it neglects entirely the other or antecedent factor of existent conditions. On the contrary, pragmatism holds that the idea or proposition is framed with reference to them; but with reference to using them in a certain way, not with reference to reduplicating them in a knowledge order separate and ultimate. Some reference to the historic development may help clear up the matter. Mr. Peirce's original contribution was to the theory of meanings or definitions. He asked what is the way to arrive at the meaning, the conceptual significance, of anything. His reply was: "Consider the consequences that that thing produces; the specific differences its existence will make in other things." Clearly the existence of the thing defined and the existence of its mode of efficiency are presupposed. Mr. James then used the method (in his famous California address) as a way of getting at the meaning (not the truth) of philosophic concepts, and especially as a way of finding out the significance (or whether there is any question save a verbal one) of philosophical disputes. Independently, and by a different route, "the Chicago School" advanced the theory that meanings are actually formed (judgments made) only when the issue of a situation is still indeterminate or problematic; that meaning (or judgment) introduces a method of dealing with this situation so as to try to guide or shape it in a desired direction, and that the success of the meaning or judgment in performing this office (which of course is a matter in actu), constitutes the worth or truth of the meaning or judgment. As respects then both the formation of the "idea" and its testing, antecedent and "external" subject-matter is involved and required.

in the simplest cases (and one can easily take things to be simple when they are not) one can make sure of adequately testing conditions, and consequently one has to bear in mind that under some novel and complex condition, the "truth" may not work in the way expected and will then require revision. Such considerations being included, the pragmatist has no occasion to blush when he meets a true poem, a true man, plants that breed true, a true formula of algebra or of physics. He may even accept the verbal statement of Hegel that truth is complete identification of existence with meaning; but he will recall that such equivalence is not born, nor thrust upon an existence by accident, but is achieved. Blood will tell, but the blood that surely tells right is the blood of the strain that embodies the selective influence of long testings through struggle. He will not only accept but he will explain the belief that "truths present things as they really are"; for he can define what the phrase means: Namely, that way of presenting things which is actually, not merely potentially, effective in securing the consequences with reference to which the things are causes. For purposes of knowledge, things "as they really are" are things as they-are-in-the-securing-of-projected-ends. Thus pragmatism gives to the favored phrase of realism a meaning which is neither a fatuous truism nor a dogmatic prejudice.

The definition of truth through reference to consequences explains and places consistency with equal ease. No one can deny that a tool must be self-consistent. In the case of a tool it is evident that to be self-consistent is to be well adapted to its end. If the structure of the tool is inherently such as to defeat reaching the end for which it is used, there is an intelligible sense in which the tool contradicts itself. Its inner inconsistency, or tendency to frustrate its own purpose in use, means some division or split in its own structure. It professes, as it were, to be one and single; but since in action it tends to produce two results of opposed values, it is somehow two in its own structure. We have only to bear these facts in mind to realize that there is no antagonism between the pragmatic definition of truth and any amount of insistence upon consistency, generalization, order and system in propositions. But this is too mild a statement. Just because a proposition is something to be used in a certain way in order to get ends that are desirable (or avoid those that are undesirable) its inherent structure is important. The more fully its hypothetical nature and its practical reference are apprehended, the greater care will be taken in regard to all those formally logical traits of knowledge upon which the idealist builds his doctrine. How, then, urge these traits of identity, contradiction and excluded middle, as if somehow they were objections to the pragmatist's definition? The pragmatist will only insist, along with common sense, that these traits, as long as they remain exclusively intellectual, are preliminary to truth.

They are marks not of truth but of the pains taken with the instrument of the search for truth. They increase the probability of making a truth in the future, because even when the "idea" does not work its coherence as a method facilitates use of the consequences to correct and improve the idea. But as intellectual these traits are still "mental"; they still have to be applied to the world of conditions to see if they will work to secure the valued end. Even the absolute consciousness of the modern idealist or the Aristotelian deity of pure intellect, would, if they exist, be indeed important esthetic additions to the scenery of the universe, but they would be without any cognitive standing or worth.

Would that we might leave the matter here! But sad experience has shown that at the end both idealist and realist return to the charge with what seems to them an unanswerable finality. The realist says: "You are either asserting a mere truism, something which no intelligible person has ever denied, or you are asserting an obvious absurdity. Of course, intellect has an office; of course, knowledge has an office. Each has, then, some reference to consequences. But the office of intellect is to intelligize, of knowledge to know. The consequences of knowledge are knowledge consequences; of truth are truths. Either you mean this truism, or you are engaged in denying that the intellect is the intellect, knowledge is knowledge."

What is our reply? That intellectual representation is intellectual representation is at least as certain as that digestion is digestion, speech is speech. One who denies these truisms is certainly rash and I, for one, would not intervene to save him from the fate which he has so rashly braved. But what then? Is not the vital question, the question upon which all turns, only the more emphatically shown to be: What is digestion? What is speech? What is intellectual representation? And when one asks this question seriously, and is not content to take his prejudice for an answer, one perceives that not digestion, but the stomach digests; and that digestion means a set of consequences produced beyond the stomach in the tissues of the body; that not speech, but organs of throat and mouth talk, and that speech is an act of consequences effected beyond these organs; that not representation, but something else represents. To common, or practical, sense, to name what a thing does beyond itself is the natural way of naming the thing. To give the thing the name of its most significant office is its natural baptism. But to treat this function as the thing, or as one of the elements out of which the thing is constituted, or as an antecedent property of the thing, is what goes in philosophy by the evil name of hypostatizing. To translate the truism that the intellect is the intellect, that representation is representation, into the assertion that the function of intellect is to intelligize, of representation to represent, is to declare that the effects

which a thing produces are an antecedent and structural property of the cause of those effects. Upon a figure of speech, upon metonymy, natural and inevitable from a practical point of view, rest the current psychology and logic of representation, ideas, propositions!

When common sense hears that knowing things is getting at them just as they are, that for "mind" to make any difference in them is to vitiate knowledge, it is attracted. When common sense hears that truth is representing things as they are, in conformity with their own nature, it is attracted. When it is told that knowledge is just reduplicating in consciousness or in a series of otiose propositions something already having a complete and good existence in itself, it is perplexed. When it is told that the truth of an idea or proposition is an inner mysterious static and unspecifiable property of the mental thing, it is perplexed. This double-mindedness leads the plain man to accept the realistic formulation in virtue of what it means to him, and to treat the part that is characteristic of the realistic theory (and that would be intolerable to him, if he understood it) as an example of the deplorable tendency of philosophers to put plain matters in queer language. In short, the orthodox theory of correspondence borrows the language of ordinary life which is inevitably practical, where to represent things as they really are means to represent them in reference to ends desired, and first ignores and then denies its practical connotations. It gets all the advantage of the ordinary practical connotations of its terms in the very act of excluding them. Knowledge for knowledge's sake, truth for truth's sake, are the glorious things that they are just because knowledge and truth are surcharged with a unique, an irreplaceable office, in the struggle of man to conserve and extend and make secure the values attendant upon living.

The last stand of the idealist takes the following form:

He addresses us in this wise: "You say that your own doctrine of truth is true. Well, consider what that implies. You perforce appeal in this very assertion of the truth of your account of truth to a consciousness, to a knowledge, which includes both your account and the whole set of objects and considerations with respect to which your account asserts truth. Only such a comprehensive knower, or knowledge, has all the terms before it and can tell the truth of the matter. Thus, in denying the idealistic theory you affirm it; in asserting your own, you contradict your own." Why is it that this argument produces so little terror in the bosom of the pragmatist? Not, I reply, his obtuseness to logical considerations, but his sense of the logic of the positions – a sense none the less logical because tinged with humor. Naturally, if he be logical, the pragmatist applies his own doctrine to his own doctrines; only in virtue of obtuseness to logic will he apply his opponent's doctrine. Accordingly

when he says that his account of truth is itself a truth, he means that (short of verification in terms of its own canons) it presents a theory, a hypothesis about the nature of intellect and intellectual statement, which, having reference to specific consequences, is to be tested and is to be made true (or false) by producing (or failing to produce) those consequences. And one consequence (which is of consequence) he claims the theory will produce when acted upon is the clearing away of the artificial problems that arise from isolating the notions of statement, correspondence and consistency from their only significant context – the context of use and office.

There is, then, if you please, a deadlock between pragmatism and idealism; there is, however, no logical submergence of the pragmatic definition in the idealistic. It is not a fish that must come to the idealistic net; for it is only from the standpoint of idealism that it is a fish for the intellectual net. Note also that, after all, the deadlock itself exists only from the idealistic side; the pragmatic theory, as I have indicated, claims to cover and include within itself every significant element in the conceptions of consistency and comprehensiveness. From its standpoint the idealistic fish has never existed anywhere except at a specifiable juncture of the pragmatic net. Again, deadlock between the claims of the two, if you will, and no possibility of deciding between them unless one adopts the criterion of the other, or gives itself away in advance. But there is a formal advantage on the side of the pragmatic definition. If the pragmatic definition be correct, this deadlock is bound to occur. Consistency, not being a mark of truth but only a mark of the elaboration of the instrument of truth, cannot possibly serve to decide between rival claims to truth; but the pragmatic trial is open to all alike; and since it is, by common confession, at least a method of search for truth, may be employed by all to settle the dispute.

The pragmatist is, I think, quite entitled to all the advantages his purely formal superiority carries with itself. As a pragmatist, he will not, however, take these advantages too seriously; or as conclusive except with reference to a formal difficulty raised against him. He will look around for some material concrete consequence which matches this formal superiority. And what he finds is, I think, a matter of vital importance to philosophy itself. Philosophy, if it has a distinctive problem and purpose of its own, is not called upon to accept in a servile fashion the materials handed over by common sense and by natural science. If it have any claim to exist at all, it will have a distinct purpose of its own to serve, and will be free to reshape the materials it accepts in the interests of its own purpose. But for philosophy to claim some unique or superior type of reality for its field (instead of a special end for which it employs common, everyday, existences); for philosophy to

claim for itself a unique criterion of truth and a separate method of reaching truth, is an infinitely serious matter – for philosophy anyway. And this is just what happens when philosophy claims to be able to fall back upon a way of reaching and substantiating its conclusions which is not that of working under experimental conditions. It makes no significant difference whether its method of evading responsibility is by appeal to innate ideas, a priori categories, considerations of formal logical consistency, or doctrines of mathematical physics; as long as a philosophic theory claims substantiation by appeal to antecedent “proofs,” so long will it isolate itself from contact with the conditions which have introduced growth and fruitfulness into everyday beliefs and science. For these appeal to their working, to their testing through production of consequences, for their validity. Ordinary life appeals in a more or less crude but vital way; science appeals in a critical but technical way; both use the experimental method; and hence both stand or fall with the capacity of their beliefs and statements to take part in the work of producing significant differences in the course of experience. So far as philosophy is marked by aloofness, by irresponsibility, by pompous futility, so far philosophy cries aloud of the evils due to its departure from the common method and test. Having repudiated as a test of its truths the test of use and practice, it can hardly be surprised if it find itself in a state of “splendid isolation,” where the isolation is most evident and the splendor depends upon the point of view.

III. Objective Truths

Man, as Aristotle said, is a political animal. Unfortunately, the statement is usually made in the context where it is least fruitful: namely, in the context of politics. For, when politics are under discussion, what is said about man as a political animal and what is said about politics are identical – and hence nothing follows from the proposition. The effective import of the statement is to be sought in regions not usually thought of as political – in art, religion and science. Man’s intellectual life, in particular, has been so segregated from social problems and ends that in it more than elsewhere resides the significant application of the remark. The Greeks’ sense for fact compelled them to give the names logic and dialectic to the theory of man’s intellectual life; but they straightway discharged intercourse and dialogue of any social reference. Ignoring that meanings, ideas, are at once the obvious method and reward of social intercourse, they located them in a transcendental heaven. This disregard subsequent philosophy has only too faithfully imitated. Even the nominalists, with all their recognition that signs are the heart of reflective knowledge, omitted from notice the social origin and purport of signs and so introduced into philosophy a lot of theories

as paradoxical as those against which they contended. It would have been as sensible to treat the breath – the *flatus vocis* that figures in their discourse – as an outright creation, instead of a redirection of pervasive air, as to regard the meanings fixed in vocalization as arbitrary individual pronunciamentos instead of readaptations of social institutions.

The social matrix and outlook of man's intellectual life focuses in the existence of objective truths. That there are truths independent of individual wish and learning; that these truths are so graded as to supply rules by which individuals may regulate the formation of their private judgments and conclusions – these facts stare us in the face. They are as influential in every phase of experience as they are in the region which, more or less arbitrarily, we mark off as moral. Education – indirect as well as direct – is a fundamental category of knowledge, a fact that Kant forgot to mention, a lapse which frequently vitiated his treatment of those he remembered to catalogue.

One cannot say such things, however, without being conscious that one lays one's self open to serious objection. Truths are objective, it will be said, exclusively because of what they are in relation to strict logical consideration – namely in their relation to the intellect. Doubtless it is desirable that truths acknowledged on an exclusively intellectual ground should also be socially recognized, should become current in social life and instruction. But to identify these two modes of objectivity is precisely that equating of the intellectually satisfactory with the personally agreeable, or of the authentic with what happens to be authorized, of the legitimate with the legal, which is the defining vice of a pragmatic philosophy.

If we take this criticism to raise the question of how far social consequences, especially how far socially desirable consequences, are bound up with the matter of truth, we are face to face with a serious question – in my own judgment the only serious question, as to principle, a wisely pragmatic philosophy need fear. It is so serious that with your indulgence, I shall turn aside from its direct consideration long enough to point out that the hope of finding an affirmative solution is the only thing that confers human significance upon the problem of objective truth. If there be truth eternal and absolute, and yet that truth cannot become operative in human affairs so as to extend and secure their prosperity, the existence and nature of absolute truth may be of interest to discarnate angelic beings, but not to man as human, to him only as sharing in the angelic essence. Contemporary transcendentalism is the sole form of transcendentalism that has failed to provide machinery for bringing its absolute truth to earth in a way that makes it concretely regulative, in definite directions, of concrete affairs. The chief Platonic

treatise in ontology goes by the name of *Republic* or *Common Weal*, just because his interest in absolute truth is an interest in discovering a method of legislation and education. The Christian church had not only its logos incarnate in flesh, but a special and vast institution for carrying Truth Absolute over into the regulation of the details of human conduct. When the modern transcendentalist shares in the characteristic modern aversion to the supernatural; when he declines to accept the authority of a miraculously founded and sustained institution as promulgator of the contents of absolute truth, one wonders whether after all we are confronted with anything more than an attenuated survival of the supernatural, shorn of the sole factor that made it humanly significant. Meantime to accept transcendentalism because it shows that the specific mistakes, failures and evils of life are only "appearances" already forever overcome in an absolute truth, is to resort to a pragmatic criterion in its crudest and most emotional form; and is to come close to a cynical indifference to specific efforts to make things specifically better. Moreover it places the vogue of the doctrine at the mercy of whatever makes life here and now more satisfactory, more conclusively valid.

However all this may be, noting it serves to bring out the human scope of the problem of objective truths. Can truth intellectually *de jure* and truth socially *de facto* move towards an equivalency? If so, under what conditions? To contemporary apprehension, the saliency of the issue is sharpened because the progress of natural science has created a conception of the content of objective truth which, while opposed to the transcendental conception, is equally indifferent to the concrete human needs and human purposes that determine socially current beliefs. The 17th and 18th centuries saw a crowding out of primary causes by secondary; a substitution, through an alliance of deism with rising physical science, of natural law for supernatural. The tale is historically fascinating; here we are concerned however only with its bearing upon the notion of objective truth. I am interested to note that the rigidity, the ready-made character, the indifference to humanistic concern implied in the conception of objective truth supposed to flow from natural science, was in reality carried over from absolute, supernal law to natural laws. Natural laws were conceived by every typical 18th-century philosopher as a type of truth that possessed all the fixity, the eternalness, and the irrelevance to human purpose belonging to the old transcendental and supernatural truth. This was what was meant by calling them objective. The new claimant to the abode of objective truth prided itself upon wearing the mantle of the dispossessed occupant. A mechanistic absolutism was, in short, substituted for a transcendental absolutism.

Our prior discussion has clearly committed us to the scientific, as

distinct from the transcendental, way of arriving at and specifying objective truths. It therefore becomes a vital question whether we are also committed to a mechanistic disregard of social practice, social purposes, and social weal. Accordingly it is with the notion of objective truth which has the supposedly scientific sanction that we must reckon. If we can see how the scientific way of conceiving objective truth is compatible with the social way, we can afford, from our standpoint, to disregard the transcendental way. Especially so, since I do not see how anybody can deny that the final hold of idealistic transcendentalism upon the contemporary world lies in the fact that it seems to afford a due place to science and yet preserves an inviolate fortress intact for the ideal and moral values of humanity. If there is a naturally humanistic interpretation of the same situation, transcendentalism, idealism may be trusted to die, in course of time, of inanition. Anyway our problem, on the basis of the results of our two previous discussions, is to offer a hypothesis concerning scientific truths which is reasonably compatible with a projection of human purpose and human consequences into the conception of the standard and methods of science itself.

Our descriptive account of truths ended with the idea that truths, denotatively taken as the logicians say, designate those beliefs which have been accepted (and, indeed, more or less formed) because of a certain critical process of testing: so many truths, so many verifications. The conclusion of our analytic account of truth – truth in its connotation as the logicians say – was that truth means fulfillment of the consequences to which an idea or proposition refers. The problem that confronts us to-day, stated with reference to these prior discussions, is the possibility of reconciling the material and the formal accounts of truth when socially important consequences are introduced as integral elements in the notion of truth. If we slip the notion of working toward social prosperity or good into the idea of truth as verification of a hypothesis by production of results under conditions of control, do we not vitiate the essential thing in the latter idea? What becomes of the traits of impartiality, of exclusion of preference for a special conclusion, of the impersonal outlook of science and its intellectual objectivity? And if we do not introduce the element of general or social value into our notion of consequences, do we not, for all practical purposes, just come back to knowledge-consequences – to intellectual results as the sole mark of truth? Just here, in my conviction, is the debatable ground in the evolution of a pragmatic philosophy. Were I an opponent of that philosophy, I do not think I should waste my energy butting my head against an impregnable stone wall: the identification of truth, both descriptively and analytically, with working towards the concrete production of specific consequences. I should press the charge of oscil-

lating between two kinds of consequences: the intellectually objective and the socially controlling.

In any case, I can only present a hypothesis; and, as I shall point out later, the history and present state of society is such that the verification of the hypothesis must be largely a future work. My hypothesis is that the standpoint and method of science do not mean the abandonment of social purpose and welfare as rightfully governing criteria in the formation of beliefs, but that they signalize a profound transformation in the nature of social purpose and social welfare. The role of scientific truth in the social medium is an emancipation of goods, purposes and activities, producing the transition from a stationary society to a progressive society. Science is at once the symptom and the weapon of the transformation of a society whose purpose is to repeat its own past – to be “true” or loyal to what is already established – into a society whose purpose is that its future shall be a variation of its past, a society whose interest is in fostering and subjecting novelty. What seems to be the abandonment by science of reference to social purpose and prosperity is but the abandonment of a fixed cast-iron scheme of purpose and good; the hospitable opening of the doors to new untried purposes and goods.

That uncritical custom swallows its beliefs whole; that it is not interested in unravelling their complications into simpler propositions; that it considers but a narrow scheme of consequences, letting most go by unnoted and grasping those it does lay hold of in a gross lump; these traits go together, and they go with the fact that the rule of custom is the rule of custom. When both beliefs and their consequences are taken in this style, at once too narrow because too rigid, and too wide because too unanalyzed, it is hopeless to try to connect beliefs with their consequences so that the latter will have any genuine testing power as respects the former. Only when the belief is very simple and the issue at stake is definite and recurrent will the pragmatic criterion be effectively applied: in such cases, say, as fire burns, water quenches thirst, stones kill birds and birds are good to eat. But since the burning of fire sometimes does good and sometimes evil; since water drowns as well as satisfies thirst; since stones often miss and food often sickens, it is not, after all, sure how far the fire, water, stone or food is responsible for the consequences and how far some intervening ritualistic observance, some unseen force or some attending spirit. In other words, since there are no strictly simple cases there are no strictly constant cases, and the use of the experimental method is, at its best, loose.

Now this vagueness, this looseness, combined with stiff-necked dogmatism, are inseparable from the use of custom as the norm of belief. If (as we said at our last hour) to be a proposition means enter-

taining some proposal as respects a future, and proposals are few and meagre, the store of intellectual conceptions will be correspondingly scant. And purposes will inevitably be meagre when only those are legitimate which the past has sanctioned. To be curious, to be interested in things that vary received beliefs, means to consider aims which society does not tolerate; it is to be anti-social, even sacrilegious. Purposes being as wooden as they are sparse, intellectual beliefs will necessarily be taken just as they are delivered, in toto, as institutions transmit them. Individuals that criticise them, that dissect and pick at them are, ipso facto, heretics, or promoters of social divisions. Intellectual incapacities are not the cause of the régime of custom: – there is no evidence of any marked intellectual differences between savages and civilized men. They are not mere by-products of the rule of nomos; they are the domination of custom in operation. Where habit reigns, purposes are scanty, and so the store of knowledge is slight; purposes are rigid and so beliefs are not to be questioned: – and where custom does not enter all is incredibly loose, floating and irresponsible. Genuine or critical testing is quite out of the question; the dice are too heavily loaded. Custom having decided in advance what consequences are valuable and just how valuable they are, appeal to the ordeal of trial by consequences is a sham; if they are noted in the relation they bear to the belief from which they flow, it is only for the sake of getting confirmation; the conclusion is foregone.

Not even past experience – the seeming intellectual stronghold of the reign of habit – can be fruitfully used. History, whether in its general or social form or in its biographic form of memory, is barren and short when there is not a varied and complex future in which it may function. History itself testifies that only when men became seriously interested in their future did they turn a curious and wide-roving gaze to their past. As long as the ideal is imitative reproduction of the past, there is of necessity little to imitate, for conditions that would enrich the model have been excluded by the nature of the model.

Did time permit, I should be tempted at this point to make an excursion in order to clinch some of our prior conclusions. I should like to show that the notion of reduplication of an already existent world – the notion which realism and idealism have in common – is a survival in generalized form of exactly that criterion of what is legitimate in belief which obtains in societies based on custom: – that is, in the societies in which mankind has spent over ninety-nine onehundredths of its life. But I must not thus depart from my immediate topic. The question I wish to press is whether we can recognize the close connection existing in customary society between its social institutions and its narrow substance and harsh criteria of belief, and then be prepared to deny offhand the possibility of a like close connection between progressive

society and scientific subject-matter and method? Is there not some presumption in favor of the idea that the introduction of scientific experimental inquiry marked not the elimination of social aims and interests, but their emancipation from bondage to routine? It is, indeed, out of the question to offer a demonstrative reply; but there is something immensely suggestive in a fact which can be made evident: namely, that the conditions of a progressive society and of the experimental formation of beliefs fit each other as if by pre-established harmony; that just the traits of scientific inquiry that are most cited as proofs of its depersonalized character – its impartiality and its mechanical content – are the traits in which fitness for a progressive social life vividly comes out.

To be intellectually objective is to be impartial; to have no ax to grind; no preconceived purpose to maintain at any cost; no particular consequence to insist upon at any hazard. Now if one has already identified the legitimacy of purpose with the pre-established, if aim and prejudice are synonymous, any departure from cast-iron rigidity, any throwing open of the doors, will seem, of course, an abandonment of the life of purpose itself. The result will seem to be an object, a set of objects or a world, de-anthropomorphized, indifferent to human purpose. But shift the angle of vision, cease to identify purpose with preconceived purpose, and the whole situation looks radically different. Emancipation from the fixity of precommitted purpose affords an occasion for freely varied and multiplying purposes. Progress is not adequately conceived when we regard it as merely a greater command of the means for realizing ends with which we are already familiar. You may, if you please, say there is but one end, which you may call virtue, or happiness or life – whatever you please. But unless you pay yourself with words you must recognize that a desirable virtue, a desirable happiness, a desirable life, is one that makes provision for continual enrichment of its own substance, and that this is impossible without continuous variation of its concrete aims. No matter what the formula for the end, and no matter how monistic its verbal statement, desirable progress means, as a matter of fact, constant diversification; multiplication of ends that evoke interest and endeavor. If we admit this fundamental differentia of progress, we shall see that the conception of progress as mere increase of means for approximating one static goal is itself a hypnotic after-image of the régime of custom; when we realize this, we shall also realize that the heart of progress is emancipation of purposes from conformity to a routine and unscrutinized past. It is no accident, I think, that the idea and ideal of progress did not dawn upon antiquity or upon the Middle Ages, which were not lighted up by a single gleam of the conception of a steadily increasing control of nature in the interests of human happiness, or by a

conception of a happiness in which variation of ends is a constant function. Only when experimental science broke the bondage of man to his animal past (embodied in his sense perceptions) and to his human past (embodied in his political and religious institutions) did progress become at once an idea and an ideal.

Curiosity set free is discovery systematized. But curiosity is not an absolute static possession of pure intellect or of mind operating toward knowledge for the sake of knowledge; it is an original practical or biological aptitude that has come to operate under social conditions so as to emancipate purpose and multiply beliefs. The hunger and thirst for discovery that are the life blood of science are but symptoms of the increasing energy of man's interest in the future and in the unachieved, as contrasted with the inertness of an interest in the past and the accomplished. The difference between a science whose nature is to reduplicate something already fixed and fastened down, and a science whose nature is to inquire, is the difference between an interest turned backward and one turned forward. To treat the supreme evidence of man's courage, his conviction of the congeniality of nature to human aspiration, as a sign that man has supinely abandoned in science his humanity, is a mark of immaturity. If at a particular moment there had dawned upon humanity the ideal of its own indefinite progress, its first step in moving upon that ideal would have been to strip itself of prejudged purpose; and the most effective method it could have devised for bringing this to pass would have been to open up the hidden places of the soul to every conceivable stimulus. The spirit of genuine science – what is it save to make the secret chambers in which purposes generate as accessible and as sensitive as possible to every breath that stirs, every ray that gleams, every hand that beckons? What freedom is comparable to this freedom? How, then, can the intellectually objective of science and the practically objective of social life be independent of each other?

If we turn from the animating spirit of science to the special way in which by preference it states its own special contents, we find again a significant adaptation to the furtherings of new purposes and the enhancement of security in attainment. I refer to the scientific method of eliminating from consideration qualitative distinctions, whether sensory or moral, in order to further the ideal of description in terms of direction and deflection of motion, stated in terms of space and time units – that is of homogeneous elements of structure. If we look at this movement from behind, from the past that is surrendered, the elimination of quality and value from the world is of ill omen for human happiness. But if we regard this deliberate neglect from the side of what it makes possible, of the future which it introduces, we see a clearing of the decks of the ends that are consecrated by habit, in order that the

world may be restated in those terms in which it is most manageable for new and varying ends. Let us ask ourselves what sort of a world would be most apt for the generation of new purposes and for the facilitation of the transfer of energy from absorption in old effects to new uses. Would not the answer be found to be in a world very like the world of the mechanical ideal (for it is an ideal) of modern science? Somehow I cannot free myself from the belief that the association of the mechanical with the machine is not a matter of merely verbal significance. The machine conception as an ideal of natural description means a wondrously flexible machine, a mechanism capable of being switched off and on for this or that use as the exigencies of the occasion may suggest. For it means not merely a world of efficiencies, but a world of readily transferable efficiencies. Just in the degree in which the experienced world has been stripped bare of its possessed qualities and values, it has indeed lost its traditional teleological attributes; but it has gained a new teleological potency. For we refuse to note (almost wilfully it would seem) that the teleology of Greek and medieval science was descriptive merely, not operative. It took note simply of achieved consummations which it defined and classified. Its ends were essentially what had happened; it inevitably looked backward. And this is really to admit that it was not genuinely concerned with purposes at all, but simply (in the case of the Greek) with a scene of immense esthetic worth, or (with the medievalist) of a world which showed signs of an intelligence that had once created it. As this external and pseudo teleology disappeared, human intelligence – that is to say the procedure of critical knowing – becomes an infinitely more effective weapon of ends and aims than had been that old world saturated as it was with qualitative values.

We insisted at the last hour that to a being whose fate and good are bound up with the future consequences of his present acts, intelligence can be a natural use or good only if intelligence itself takes as its centre of organization and point of reference the as yet unrealized consequences of the objects through which it acts. The correlative of this principle is that effective and secure control of the means of human good can be attained only as the content of intellectual statements and systems is in terms of means and conditions vouched by past experiences. What does this content or structure in terms of indifferent, colorless means signify save a mechanical ideal? For to realize the past as past, as dead and done with, is precisely to apprehend it as without quality or value or purpose. Just because the future with its possibilities is always at hand, is always involved in every breath that intelligence draws, science can unreservedly devote all its attention to working out its ideal of a depersonalized “objective” world.

Hence the explanation of the apparent paradox of modern theory and modern practice. According to the professed terms of scientific theory man and all his affairs are caught within a net of steel whose meshes, though infinitely fine, are as rigid as steel – nay, as the ether. Practically, the advance of the mechanical theory has coincided with the liberation of human energy and increase of operative freedom. And this emancipation, I repeat, has consisted not merely in setting free energy for application to old ends, but even more in liberating power to project new ends. It certainly looks as if the generalized mechanical ideal of nature were but the point by point counterpart of the generalized ideal of emancipation of social purpose. Objects that are fully clothed with qualitative traits are objects that correspond to habits, biological and social, already formed. The protest of the Scholastics and the Aristotelians of the Renaissance against the violent hands laid by Galileo, Hobbes, Descartes and their followers upon the intrinsic qualities and values of objects, was, from the side of loyalty to the existent or achieved, a natural and an honorable protest. But the stubbornness, the courage, the fanatic zeal with which the new science pressed forward, in spite of its readily demonstrable philosophic absurdity, showed that a new society was arriving; a society interested in being different, in changing its habits, and hence in defining objects in ways that would contribute to its aim of progress. This practical momentum prevailed over the entire institutionalism, religious and political, of the day. Hence all the traits that things (perceived, observed things) most indubitably possess were ruthlessly declared to be unreal – for science at least – ; abstraction being made, in wholesale fashion of them, the object was then defined in terms of its readiest substitution for another object – space terms – or in terms of its easiest, less wasteful, conversion into other objects – terms of abstract or generalized motion. The circle of modern scientific definitions – the reciprocal definition of matter and motion in terms of each other – however absurd abstractly viewed, is none the less the secret of its working power. Statements on the basis of resistance to redirection of energy, and of capacity for effective working when redirected, these are the essentials of a world that shall be turned to account most economically and most freely for any purpose as occasion requires.

But we have not yet faced the full meaning of the objectivity of physical science. We have to note more explicitly the feature of its method already repeatedly alluded to: its experimental character. If we accept the contents, the objects, of science as an adequate and full account of “truth,” the method of the very sciences that purveys these contents becomes an inexplicable anomaly. No matter how comprehensive, how accurate and how accordant with established laws a scien-

tific formulation may be, a man fired with the scientific spirit always has recourse to what, upon a strictly intellectualistic basis, is at best irrelevant and arbitrary, and at the worst, "subjective" and "unreal." He insists upon doing something. He insists upon using his intellectually adequate formula as but, after all, a formula for trying an experiment; as but a method for calling into being, under specified conditions and by specified steps, certain consequences. Only when his principle "works" to produce differences in accord tific formulation may be, a man fired with the scientific spirit always has recourse to what, upon a strictly intellectualistic basis, is at best irrelevant and arbitrary, and at the worst, "subjective" and "unreal." He insists upon doing something. He insists upon using his intellectually adequate formula as but, after all, a formula for trying an experiment; as but a method for calling into being, under specified conditions and by specified steps, certain consequences. Only when his principle "works" to produce differences in accord with the demands of the formula does he take his principle to be intellectually true. In other words, the scientific man acts – no matter what he says – as if his intellectual statement were not the truth of the matter, but a formula for reaching a truth. The mineralogist may personally be as convinced as you please that a given mineral originated under certain conditions of heat and pressure, out of certain prior constituents; but till he has made a similar specimen, under conditions like those hypothesized in his theory, he holds his "truth" hypothetically, not categorically. Not till he has delivered the goods does he claim full scientific objectivity. That philosophers are still so indifferent to the bearing of the experiment, the doing, upon the construction of scientific objects and the securing of truths, is an evidence that even the most "scientific" of philosophers are still half-hearted in their appeal to science.

Worse, however, is still to come; worse, that is, from the standpoint of the intellectualistic abstraction. The final affirmation of truth even by the scientist, is in terms of things that are not even real, provided the terms of the physical formulation be a final measure of what it is to be "real." The experimental verification consists in producing a situation marked by certain immediate qualities, by certain immediate values: qualities that appeal to the hand, the eyes, the nose, and to the emotions. When the decisive event comes, it comes arrayed in a panoply of qualities that, taking the testimony of the physical formula exclusively into account, are human.

If this be humanism, let us at least make the most of it, to paraphrase the old saying about treason. And the exclamation is both a warning and an encouragement. A warning: for it points to the danger that if we do not "make" in a context of life activities, we shall make only our own abstractions. A promise: for what humanity has already achieved in

its quite incidental and inarticulate endeavor to direct its own fate by the use of its best tool – intelligence as method of action – is an earnest of what may be accomplished by more sincere and unreserved confidence in its own purposes, pursued by its own characteristic means.

Before I close, I must remind you that in spite of the language which I have used – language which is positive because my own convictions are positive – I do not profess to be offering more than an hypothesis, an hypothesis worth careful attention and worth trying. Its hypothetical character is not a matter of my choice, or of my manner of expression, or of my inability to demonstrate adequately, great as are these deficiencies. Its status is socially determined. The conception of objective truth which I am proffering – that objective truth means interpretations of things that make these things effectively function in liberation of human purpose and efficiency of human effort – has not itself been yet subjected to the tests of social use, which it exacts as the measure of any truth. Progress is too recent and too inchoate an ideal, science is too new and too unutilized a resource for the hypothesis to have made itself a home in the bosoms of men. Were not such the case, the ground we have so laboriously traversed would be the congenial and fructifying soil of all our activities. Were not this the case, our social undertakings would be so obviously functions of experimental inquiry, and experimental inquiries so obviously the reward of past social activities and the methods of future social endeavor, that efforts to expound the equivalence of the intellectual and the social meaning of truth would be like demonstrating light to the eye.

Humanity as yet apprehends its changed purpose fitfully; it wields the tools of its realization awkwardly. Science is still technical, specialized, that is, abstract and uncouth. And therefore the applications of science are still external, economic, utilitarian, rather than artistic or moral and humane. The industrial arts flourish beyond the control of just use; the humane arts of social equity and direction are still to find. Our scientific “truths,” in other words, are not themselves yet verified fully, for they stop short and look askance even at the idea of full human application. Not till tested in the satisfaction of the most intimate and comprehensive of human needs will they be fully tested, and hence be fully true. There is something of the barbaric ages surviving in the superstition that the place to look for truest truths is where all is most divorced from concrete or social bearing and context: as in the abstract formulae of mathematics. So long as the applications of science are in the laboratory alone, or in extensions of the laboratory into the technique of the factory, it will remain possible to pit scientific truth and human purpose against each other. And as long as the two modes of truth are separated, each is lacking in itself. Social control is despotic and hence wasteful;

science has not attained to wisdom. No truth of mathematics is true as long as it is only a mathematical truth – for this isolation, this specialization, means that its adequately testing consequences have not worked themselves out. No truths of physics, of chemistry, of biology are true in their own terms – not, indeed, that they are false, but that man is a political animal, and that all truths not tested in the conduct and fruitful control of his affairs are as yet hypothetical, formulae for producing truths; universal, but not individual, truths; truths of method, not of substance.

I recall the saying of a man unschooled, but the wisest of men that it has been my lot to meet. Speaking of one of the mysteries of life he said, “Some day it will be found out; and it will not only be found out, but it will be known.” I had been a student of philosophy and of the “problem of knowledge” so-called for many years; but this was the first time I had observed that “finding out” is not after all the same as knowledge; that the thing found out is truly known only when published, spread abroad, communicated, made effective in the common life, a bond of union among men.

We come back, whether we would or no, to the primitive, the human, sense of truth: truthfulness – generous, frank efficiency of communication. Truth, in final analysis, is the statement of things “as they are,” not as they are in the inane and desolate void of isolation from human concern, but as they are in a shared and progressive experience. Friends, said the Greek proverb, have all things in common. Truth, truthfulness, transparent and brave publicity of intercourse, are the source and the reward of friendship. Truth is having things in common. Just because nature is, it is not on nature’s account that we know her. Just because the past as the past is unchangeable or of science and irretrievable, it is not for the sake of the past that we build our temples of science with blocks quarried from the unchangeable. To know is the characteristically human enterprise—a thing for men, not for gods or beasts. And since the good of humanity has ever to be secured anew in an untried and precarious future, knowing is not the condescension of reduplicating a nature that already is, but is the turning of that nature to account in behalf of consequences. And objective truth is the free outworking of nature so interpreted into an intercourse more secure, more varied and more free.

ON THE GENESIS OF THE AESTHETIC CATEGORIES

James H. Tufts. "On the Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories." *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, First Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), vol. 3, part 2, pp. 5-14.

The purpose of this article is to consider some of the generally accepted æsthetic categories in the light of social psychology. The thesis to be maintained is that the distinctive characteristics of æsthetic feeling or of the æsthetic judgment (æsthetic value) are due, in part at least, to the social conditions under which the æsthetic consciousness has developed. This thesis may be presented in three parts:

I. The æsthetic consciousness in its beginnings is connected with art rather than with nature.

II. The relation of the æsthetic (appreciative) consciousness to art is not that of cause, but that of effect. Art has not arisen primarily to satisfy an already existing love of beauty. It has arisen chiefly, if not wholly, from other springs, and has itself created the sense by which it is enjoyed.

III. Art has its origins, almost without exception, in social relations; it has developed under social pressure; it has been fostered by social occasions; it has in turn served social ends in the struggle for existence. In consequence, the values attributed to æsthetic objects have social standards, and the æsthetic attitude will be determined largely by these social antecedents. Or, in other words, the explanation of the æsthetic categories is to be sought largely in social psychology.

Before considering the propositions *seriatim*, it will be convenient to note briefly what the characteristics of the æsthetic consciousness are. In this the aim will be, not to present an exhaustive list, but rather to indicate categories which have been generally and widely recognized as distinguishing the æsthetic from other values, such as the ethical, logical, or economic, or from other pleasures, such as the agreeable. And amid the seeming multiplicity of such marks or differentia which have been put forth by writers on æsthetics there is, after all, a considerable degree of uniformity.¹ They may be grouped under three heads:

¹ J. Volkelt, *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Vol. CXVII, pp. 161 ff.

1. The aesthetic judgment (a) expresses a value, and hence implies a subjective element; but (b) this value is not apprehended *as* subjective, private, and relative, but rather as objective, independent of personal states or conditions, and hence as appealing actually or normally to others.

This characteristic has found various terms. Volkelt² denotes it as a fusion of feeling and contemplation (*schauen*), or as the association of an element besides sense-impression, or as the unity of form and content corresponding to percept and feeling respectively. Santayana³ defines it as "objectivity," or "pleasure regarded as the quality of a thing." Home uses the phrase "spread upon the object." Kant employs the terms "universality" and "necessity." By "universality" he has sometimes been supposed to mean that all agree in their æsthetic judgments. This is analogous to supposing that when Kant asserts the universality of *a priori* judgments in pure physics he means that a savage and a Newton would agree on the causes of eclipses. Kant means rather that the judgment, "This is beautiful," as contrasted with the judgment, "This pleases me," implies an elimination of the subjective attitude, just as in the judgment, "This body is heavy," there is an elimination of the subjective as contrasted with the statement, "If I carry this body, I feel the pressure of its weight." That such is the correct interpretation, and that by "universality" Kant is giving in the terms of the critical philosophy the equivalent of Santayana's "objectivity," is evident from Kant's own words: "He will speak of the beautiful as though beauty were a quality of the object."⁴ To avoid the misunderstanding to which the term "universality" is liable Cohn⁵ would substitute the term *Forderungscharakter*. The æsthetic value appeals to us with a demand for recognition. It may be actually realized by few, but this does not detract from its imperative character. It is "super-individual." Further, when Bain names "sharableness" as characteristic of æsthetic feelings, we have a recognition of the same attitude. It implies that my attitude toward the æsthetic object is not individual, but is possible for any of my fellows.

2. A second widely recognized characteristic of the æsthetic attitude is expressed negatively as a detachment, or freedom from desire, and positively as an immediacy, or purely intensive quality, in the pleasure experienced. The value does not call us to go farther for its full

² In the essay cited above.

³ *The Sense of Beauty*, 1896, pp. 44-49.

⁴ *Kr. der Urteilkraft*. § 6.

⁵ *Allgemeinde Aesthetik* (Leipzig, 1901), pp. 37-46.

attainment, and hence that deepest feeling of reality is absent which arises in the actual strain of effort, or in the clash of conflicting wills and egoistic appropriation. This characteristic appears under diverse names: in Plato as the pure pleasures independent of desire; in Schopenhauer as the stilling of the will; in Kant as disinterestedness, or a contemplative attitude; in Schiller as play. In recent writers who, I think, tend to magnify one of the means of this detachment – it is semblance, imitation, conscious self-illusion, or make-believe. Cohn prefers the term “intensive” or “immanent” value; the former as opposed to the “consecutive” value of the useful which is valued as a means to an end; the latter as opposed to the “transgredient” value of the true and good which point beyond themselves for significance or achievement. The work of art is a closed unity. The frame of the picture has an important function. The æsthetic object or world is a world apart.⁶

3. A third characteristic of the æsthetic is that stated by Volkelt as “widening of our life of feeling toward the typical, comprehensive, and universal.” This characteristic may not be equally evident in all grades of æsthetic feeling. It is more conspicuous in the art of poetry than in that of architecture. Aristotle and Hegel emphasize the universality of the æsthetic object. It expresses the idea. It gives the human and not merely the particular. An allied principle appears in Tolstoy’s requirement that art shall stimulate human sympathy. Kant does not admit it among the marks of pure, *i.e.*, formal, as contrasted with dependent beauty, but it is widely recognized.

There are other marks which have been held to characterize æsthetic value; but as the purpose of the paper is not to enumerate these categories exhaustively, but to explain certain of the more generally accepted of them, the three already mentioned will suffice.

Assuming, then, that universality or objectivity, disinterestedness or detachment from reality, and a widening of sympathy or an apprehension of the broadly significant, characterize the æsthetic, can we go back of these categories to seek any explanation for their genesis? Such an explanation may be sought in three fields: (a) in biology; (b) in psycho-physics; (c) in social psychology.

A convenient illustration of (a) is offered by the theory of Groos regarding play and the arts which grow out of play. Play, with the psychological attitude of make-believe, is a practice by the young of activities which are to be of use in the struggle for existence later on. Illustrations of (b) are furnished by the usual explanations for universality and objectivity. In many cases æsthetic pleasure is due to ease of

⁶ For a forcible illustration of this in the principles of tragedy see Lipps, *Der Streit über die Tragödie*, 1891.

adjustment, which, in turn, is favored by unity, symmetry, rhythm, etc. Hence, as the minds of men are similarly constituted in this respect, it may be presumed that objects in which these qualities are conspicuously present will give pleasure to all. As regards objectivity, it may be pointed out that the eye and the ear are the pre-eminently æsthetic senses. But these are just the senses which objectify all their qualities – color, form, sound – and do not demand private appropriation of the object.

Santayana offers a more detailed psycho-genetic explanation. The tendency to regard our emotional reaction as the quality of a thing “is the survival of a tendency, originally universal, to make every effect of a thing upon us a constituent of its conceived nature.” Emotions, pleasures, pains were thus all regarded as objective by an animistic and primitive consciousness. We have now transferred most of these elements to the subjective side of the account, but the æsthetic pleasures are still objectified. The reason for this survival is easy to discover. For whereas in eating or touching we may first perceive the object, and then later, when we taste or manipulate it, get a new and distinct sensation of pleasure, in the case of the purely æsthetic pleasures, on the other hand, the pleasure arises right in the act of perception, and hence is naturally regarded as inseparable from the object.⁷

It is not necessary, for the purpose of this paper, to deny that each of the explanations cited may furnish elements toward a complete account. But there is a fact not explained by them, and it was reflection upon this which led in the first instance to the theory presented in this paper. The fact in question is this: *Æsthetic pleasure is not always objectified, but under certain conditions wavers between the subjective and the objective*. When I see a new picture, or hear a new piece of music, or attend the presentation of a drama, particularly if I distrust my judgment in the special field in question, I am very apt to express my first judgment in the form, “This pleases me,” or, “I like it.” What kind of pleasure does it give me? It would seem very difficult to maintain that the pleasure is not æsthetic. And yet it is not objectified. But, as I continue to look or to listen, if I find that the work not only gives a superficial and momentary thrill, but rouses a deep and lasting emotion; if it appeals, not merely to a passing mood, but to the wider reaches of thought and feeling; in a word, if it appeals, not to the more particular, but to the more universal within me, my attitude changes. Instead of, “I like it,” it becomes, “This is fine!” instead of, “It impresses me,” it becomes, “This is sublime!” instead of, “I admire that character,” it becomes, “That is heroic!” How is this process of wavering and final fixation of attitude to be interpreted? It cannot be explained upon the

⁷ *The Sense of Beauty*, pp. 44–49.

basis that eye and ear are the universally objectifying senses, for it is not possible to make my judgment as to color waver between the subjective and the objective attitude. Upon Santayana's hypothesis, we should be obliged to say that in passing from "I like it" to "It is beautiful" we are falling back into a more naïve attitude. The explanation which I desire to submit is that in making this change we pass from a private or individual to a social standard of value. The elimination of a personal and subjective attitude is equivalent to the substitution of a social and objective attitude, and, so far as I can analyze my own processes, the universalizing or socializing of the standard is the ground, rather than the consequent, of the objectifying. I do not mean by this that I look around to see how the rest of the company are affected. I may do this. But it might be that, while all the company approved, I should yet fail to sympathize with them or *vice versa*. The community of sentiment to which my standard refers may not be that of my actual spectators. It is, of course, that of real or supposed experts. It is this which gives it the normative or imperative character. The basis for this social reference, and for the distinction between the numerical and a really social universality will be shown in the exhibition of the three parts of the thesis announced at the outset of the paper, which we may now consider.

I. That the æsthetic consciousness is at the beginning connected with art rather than with nature requires no proof here. Admiration of natural scenery is relatively late in the development of child or race. Even the art which "imitates nature" by reproducing animal or plant form in carving or color, by no means presupposes an æsthetic appreciation of the objects reproduced. The animal or plant may be the ancestral totem, or the prized article of food, or the religious emblem. Nor does the impulse to imitate or reproduce depend upon the discovering of beauty in the object. It is in its beginnings quite independent.

II. The second proposition may receive fuller statement, although the evidence on which it rests has appeared in print. The proposition is that art production is prior to art appreciation, and is its cause rather than its effect. This is a reversal of the usually assigned or implied order. Text-books on æsthetics generally begin with the analysis of beauty or æsthetic appreciation, and treat art production as subsequent, or at least as not determining the sense of beauty. This is probably due to the fact that until recently the art which was studied was the art of peoples at the period of the highest artistic development. Recent work on the origin and history of art affords the basis for a different interpretation. It has been shown that art has its origin, not in any single impulse, much less in any desire to gratify an already existing æsthetic demand for beauty, but rather in response to many and varied demands – economic, protective, sexual, military, magical, ceremonial, religious, and intel-

lectual. Some illustrations of these varied origins may be briefly considered.

The geometric patterns found extensively on pottery might seem to be evidently intended to gratify the æsthetic sense by the "ease of apprehension." But Holmes has shown these to be due to the conservatism of the savage, who preserves thus the pattern of the basket in which his clay pottery was formed and "fired."⁸ Another illustration of conservation of technical motive which becomes æsthetic in another stage of art is seen in the survivals in Greek architecture of the forms of wooden rafter-ends as ornamental features of the stone construction.

Another slightly different motive appears clearly in the drinking-vessels of the early American Indians, which are exhibited in the Field Columbian Museum, Chicago. The Indians naturally used as drinking-vessels the various forms of gourds which were ready to hand. When they began to make pottery vessels, these were at first made in imitation of the gourds. The series of forms on exhibition shows all stages, from the complete reproduction of the gourd form to the retention of only a few conventionalized features. Animal decorations on pottery cannot be accounted for in this way, but we know that in many cases the reproduction has religious or magical significance.

The palaces and sculptured reliefs of Assyria tell the story of the king's achievements in war and chase, and sprang from the desire to commemorate his glory and minister to his pride. The great achievements of Greek art, in temple, in sculpture of the gods and heroes, and in tragedy, were in source and purpose chiefly religious, although, no doubt, the keen æsthetic sense developed rapidly in appreciation of the qualities of line and measure due originally to constructive or other demands, and became a stimulus and reinforcement of the original purpose.

Self-decoration, whether in the form of dress, ornament, or tattooing, is due to a variety of motives. To show that the wearer belongs to a group or an order is one of the most common, which appears even today in military or other uniforms and insignia. Religious or other ceremonial or historic motives are prominent in the decorations with totemic emblems or for festal occasions. Protective or erotic purposes are served by special articles of dress.⁹

The marvelous development of realistic sculpture in Egypt was due, according to Perrot and Chipiez,¹⁰ not to any æsthetic motive, but to the magical or religious belief that by providing a statue which should be the exact likeness of the deceased, the "ka" or "double" would find in it

⁸ Report, Bureau of Ethnology, Vol. VI, 1884-5, pp. 195 ff.

⁹ Schurtz, *Urgeschichte der Kultur*. 1900, pp. 380-411, is a convenient recent account.

¹⁰ *History of Ancient Egyptian Art*, chap. iii.

a second body or dwelling, when the embalmed body should have perished. The beautiful painting on the walls of the Egyptian tombs owed its existence to the connected belief that the "doubles" of the slaves and of the food there portrayed would be at the service of the deceased in the other world.

In the arts of motion the influence of magical, military, erotic, and religious motives is also prominent. The dance before the chase or battle, the mimes at agricultural festivals, or at initiation ceremonies, which seem to the uninstructed onlooker crude forms of art, are to the mind of the actors entirely serious. They give success in the real activities which follow these symbolic acts. They bring the rain or sunshine or returning spring. The stimulating effect of music for the warrior, the influence of sex in dance or song, the influence of the desire to convey information upon pictorial art, the influence of the desire to commemorate the orator's deeds, or those of a patron, upon the development of epic and ballad, need no illustration.

No allusion has been made in the above to the play factor which, from Plato to Schiller, Spencer, and Groos, has been found in art. But, as a result of the studies of Groos and other recent writers, it is now possible to place this play factor in closer relation to the serious activities than was formerly the case. It has been shown that the play of children as of animals is largely an experimentation with instinctive activities. It is as real to them as anything which they do. On the other hand, the interest felt is immediate, not remote, as in the case of most employments of adult civilized life. It is this which gives play its sense of freedom. And it is the sense of freedom and of power which finds added enhancement in the make-believe activities of certain of the arts, and hence gives to drama and music a part of the fascination which makes them enjoyed for their own sakes, though originated for other ends. Moreover, just as many of the games of childhood, and as the hunting, races, and sports of men represent former serious activities of the hunting stage, when the elements of hazard and tension and immediate interest were present, which have now disappeared from the commercial and agricultural life, so the arts of civilization, many of them, reproduce, in elaborated and refined form, the emotions of stress and contest and victory, which belonged to the earlier life. In any case, for the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to note that art, as giving expression and reinforcement to the sense of freedom, has been a powerful factor in the development of the appreciative feeling.

Granted, however, that, as regards its end and content, art has sprung into being, not for its own sake, but from the various motives noted, is not all this beside the mark as regards the essentially artististic element – the form? Granted that primitive man wished to propitiate the deity, or

gain the favor of the opposite sex, or heighten his courage, or relate the deeds of himself or his clan, why need he do it in dance or music, in epic or lyric, and not in less artistic form? The answer to this has already been given in part. In the case of magical representations and conventional reproductions from conservative tendencies the end determines the form. Secondly, it is freely admitted that the principles of ease of apperception and of heightening or stimulating the consciousness – principles of individual psychology – may be used successfully to explain part of the artistic development and æsthetic delight. But for still other factors we must seek an explanation in the third proposition stated at the outset, viz.: Art is essentially social in its origins and development. Before considering this, however, we may sum up the significance of the second proposition in the statement that the value of early art was not distinctively isolated and differentiated as æsthetic. Such distinct emergence was the outcome, not the origin, of artistic production.

III. The third proposition, concerning the social origin of art needs no proof. Grosse, Bücher, Brown, Wallaschek, Hirn, Gummere, and others have brought together the evidence from a multitude of observers, as well as from historic examples. Dance, song, and mime have always been social expressions and implied attendant social satisfactions and pleasures. Decorations, ceremonials, temples, pictures, and stories have evoked social feeling, and have been created and developed with constant reference to social approval.

But, while it is unnecessary to repeat here the evidence for this, it is necessary to analyze what is denoted by the term “social” in this connection. To say that art is social in origin means –

(a) First and least important, that it arises – whether as dance, song, drawing, decoration, recital, or mime – when several people are together. Hence, by the simplest law of contagiousness, or “imitation of the emotions,” its effect is not only shared by all, but is strengthened and reinforced, both by the infection from the joy or grief of others, and also by the mere social or gregarious feeling itself. These effects are experienced even by such a merely numerical group as now assembles to hear a concert or see a play. Even this measure of sociability goes beyond a numerical multiplication of the feeling experienced by an individual. It transforms its quality as well as increases the quantity.

(b) More important than the sociability resulting from contiguity and imitation is the social consciousness of a group bound together by ties of a common blood or common interest. In the first place, the art expresses the joy or grief or pride or heroism, not of an individual, nor of an indifferent person, but of a member of a group. Before any of the group can enter into the art and experience the emotion, he must be a member of the group; *i.e.*, he must know the ideas and imagery, must cherish the

beliefs and ideals, must share the common interest, and hence be in a condition to feel as a social consciousness. In the second place, the member of a group of this sort has his feeling reinforced, not merely by imitation of the emotions of others, but by the constraining and compelling group authority. For the Hebrew not to join in the song of praise to Jehovah, or for the Australian at an initiation ceremony to decline to play his part, would mean, not merely æsthetic indifference, but disloyalty to the group. The quality of the æsthetic feeling is further heightened and transformed, not only by gregariousness, but by the joys of common glory, common victory, and common possession, or by the grief of common loss.

This second and higher kind of social consciousness is very commonly the condition under which primitive art is exercised. The festal observances celebrated at birth, marriage, and death, at initiation into manhood or in connection with change of seasons; the celebrations of victories in chase or war; the recitals and chorals; the work-songs and war-dances; the temples and emblems – all appeal to such a social consciousness.

A peculiarly striking example of this group-influence is seen in certain phases of the comic. It is not necessary to accept in its entirety Bergson's thesis that the comic is the equivalent of the strange or the odd, to recognize that at least this is often the case, and that the weapon of ridicule is one of the most potent in the armory of the group for enforcing the group standards upon the would-be individualist. The man who "doesn't see anything to laugh at" is usually the subject of the joke, and therefore, temporarily at least, out of the group. The ingenuity which groups of children display in controlling the new scholar by ridicule is well known. Aristotle's definition of the comic as a species of the deformed is thus given a more social standard by which the deformity is estimated.

(c) Yet a third aspect of the social origin of art is the relation between the artist and the spectator or hearer. Even more palpably in primitive art, and in the child, than in the artist of maturity, is the expressive function of art and its appeal to social judgment apparent."¹¹ Any inter-communication presupposes certain social standards and may be held to lead to the categories of the "world of description."¹² Communication intended to kindle the emotions or voice the purposes of others, as in military, religious, erotic, or magical performances, must necessarily imply a more intimate identification of the parties, and an emotional, as well as ideational, community attitude.

¹¹ Cf. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 147–53.

¹² Cf. Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 397 ff.

This aspect of the social character of art becomes identified with that under (b) above in many forms of primitive art. For in the dance, the corroborree, the Dionysus choral out of which grew the Greek drama, the religious or military chant, the funeral wailings, and the labor songs, the artist was not the individual, but the communal group. Hence the influence of the social upon the whole æsthetic consciousness was the more direct.¹³

The influence of the social origin upon the form as well as upon the content is also apparent in at least one of the most important elements of art-form, viz., rhythm, which Plato regarded as a distinctive mark of human art in contrast with the play of animals. Allowing any physiological basis we please for rhythmic action and its enjoyment, we must in any case recognize that any act performed in common by a group takes on naturally, if not necessarily, a rhythmic form. The sculptured figures of Egyptian laborers, with the præsul clapping his hands to mark time for their efforts, the sailors on the ship, the section hands on the railway, the mourners expressing grief, college students in a college yell, the pack of children deriding some unfortunate with their chanted "cry ba-by, cry ba-by" – all testify that, if people would do an act together, whatever it may be, or whatever their grade of culture may be, they fall rhythm.¹⁴ In common rhythmic action the stimulus and reinforcement of sympathy and social accord are felt, and whatever of pleasure there may be in the physiological process is immensely strengthened by this action of social forces.

We come now to the inferences as to æsthetic feeling and the æsthetic judgment which may be drawn from the above considerations.

1. The universality and objectivity of the æsthetic judgment. Universality means as we have seen, the elimination of the personal, individual, subjective attitude. Now this is precisely what is required by a consciousness in the attitude analyzed under (b) and (c) above. My attitude, when I hesitate to say positively and impersonally, "This is beautiful," and venture only to assert, "I like it," may be due in part to a query as to how far I am really viewing the object as an expert; *i.e.*, how far I am aware of its full purport, and also able to estimate the efficiency and appropriateness of the means to express the end; but, in addition to this, it is due to the query as to whether the object stirs a genuinely social feeling, and as much has normative and objective value. The conviction that the object is really appealing to a social standard finds expression in an objective judgment. In pronouncing the judgment I do not consciously appeal to the actual spectators, the "man without

¹³ On this see especially Gummere. *Beginnings of Poetry*.

¹⁴ See especially Büchner, *Arbeit and Rhythmus*.

the breast," of Adam Smith. Universality of this merely numerical form may belong much more to a judgment respecting strawberries than to judgments respecting Wagner. The æsthetic universality is qualitative and internal, not quantitative and external. It means that I judge as from a standpoint that is *allgemein-menschliches*, and that this *allgemein-menschliches* has been created and developed within me largely by the social experience and expression. An illustration of the extent to which a social attitude may transform even the most non-æsthetic of senses is seen in the difference between eating alone and sitting at a banquet. The music, the decorations, and the conversation are not merely æsthetic additions, which comprise the whole æsthetic value of the occasion; even the attitude toward the viands is affected until it becomes at least *quasi-æsthetic*.

2. The second category of the æsthetic was stated as disinterestedness or detachment and freedom. There are several aspects of this category to be distinguished. The "disinterestedness" or "immediacy" of æsthetic value may refer to its quality as pleasure. This would be a matter of individual psychology. It may also, however, have reference to a certain absence of egoistic desire, and this quality stands in direct relation to the social origins of art. Whatever is to be enjoyed in common and without egoistic appropriation must, almost necessarily, be enjoyed by contemplation ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ. And while we may not convert this simply, and assert that all pleasure of contemplative quality is due to social antecedents, it is obvious that nothing could conduce more effectually to the creation and development of a taste for such pleasure than the social attitude involved in the festivals and other fostering occasions of primitive art.

There remains to be noted under this category the aspect of freedom, of detachment from reality, or "make-believe." It is evident that this, as an aspect of æsthetic appreciation, is fostered, if not wholly created, by the social aspect of artistic production. Whether the work of art owed its origin to economic, or religious, or magical, or military purposes, on the one hand, or grew more directly out of the instincts which at an earlier period show themselves in what adults call play, – in either case the imagination of spectator as well as of artist must widen beyond the present reality. As the magical performance takes the actor and spectators into the unseen world, as the recited deed of prowess, or the carved or painted form revives the past, as the festival of victory enables all the tribe to live over the triumphs of the warriors, as the ceremonials of initiation, or marriage, or funeral, or of religion, project the imagination into the future, the range of conscious freedom is broadened, and the broadening process, although due to other forces, brings with it a thrill and satisfaction of its own. It is not, of course, claimed that the

child does not find instinctive delight in the free play of imagination, with all its flight of make-believe. The claim is, that the various forms of art have been the most effective means of developing this free-play and the attendant delight. Further, in certain of the arts, notably the drama, we find a form of tension and excitement which, like certain of the games of childhood, or certain of the sports of maturer life, suggests previous periods in the race-history when life itself, as maintained by fishing or hunting, in battle or strategy, was a process containing far more of emotional strain and stimulation than the life of civilization.¹⁵ May not the tingle in the nerves of the romance reader or the theater goer, like that of the gambler or the hunter, be reminiscent of the time when capacity for such tension was bred into the race by the struggle for existence?

3. The third category of the æsthetic was given as a widening of sympathy and an appreciation for the broadly significant. The bearing of the social origin of art and of the æsthetic sense upon the genesis of this category is too obvious to require any detailed statement.

¹⁵ W. I. Thomas, "The Gaming Instinct," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. VI, pp. 750 ff.

PRAGMATISM IN AESTHETICS

Kate Gordon. "Pragmatism in Aesthetics." In *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James*, by His Colleagues at Columbia University (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908), pp. 461–82.

The argument of this paper is that æsthetic experience illustrates and confirms the teachings of pragmatism. It is stated that (1) the work of the artist is to objectify new or striking emotions, that (2) the subject of the æsthetic enjoyment accepts these emotions and acts out their meaning, and that (3) the ultimate meaning of beauty is to be found in concrete acts, and the function of art is to produce new experience.

Pragmatism has been defined as: "The doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true; which consequences would be different if it were untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed. If a second conception should not appear to have other consequences, then it must really be only the first conception under a different name. In methodology it is certain that to trace and compare their respective consequences is an admirable way of establishing the differing meanings of different conceptions."¹ For pragmatism, as I understand it, "significance" is a much more engrossing category than is "existence." The pragmatist looks to the event, the outcome, the result in experience of a conception or of a thing. Dewey² says that "things...are what they are experienced as." Thus, the writing pad is the to-be-written-upon; a mountain is the looked-up-at, the driven-over, the to-be-tunnelled-through, etc. To put it negatively, that which amounts to nothing for experience is nothing; that which is somehow "there" but never by any chance "here" for anybody is pure fiction.

Perhaps the difference between pragmatic and other attitudes can be illustrated by the type of reality and worth which they would assign, let us say, to the character assumed by an actor on the stage. There is a

¹ Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (1902), p. 321.

² *Journal of Phil. Psy. and Sci. Method*, Vol. II., No. 15.

popular opinion that the actor who is playing a part is less himself at that moment than one who assumes nothing, the part is regarded as something foreign, which more or less obscures the real character. The pragmatist would hold that assuming a character is as good as being it if one assumes it thoroughly, and the more parts one undertakes the more is one a personality. In "The Tragic Muse" the young actress said to her interlocutor: "And do you think I've got no character?" to which he, pragmatically, replied: "Delightful being, you've got a hundred!"

Significance and meaning are terms which have no place in a purely mechanical conception of the world; in nature one thing does not "mean" another; things do not "signify" except in a purposive order. All things, according to pragmatism, are either hindrances or furtherances to some purpose. (It should not be necessary to add that in making all things relative to purpose one is not reducing everything to psychology. Certainly there are purposes in ethics, in logic, in æsthetics, in sociology, and in what not?) Given a purpose or an activity, it is possible to analyze in it certain termini, an end towards which, and one from which, the process moves, but it would be quite perverse to say that these points "determine" the process in the sense of being independent objects which exert compulsion upon it. Rather is it true that the process is the ground or determining source of the termini. Instead of two points determining a line it is the line which determines the points. This is in harmony with the assertion that objects are constituted by purposes.

This brief statement about pragmatism is not intended for an argument, for I do not understand that an ultimate philosophical attitude can be argued. Pragmatism is the *disposition* to look for final explanations in terms of purpose, and for reality in experienced satisfactions. With this disposition I should like to approach the field of æsthetics. Æsthetic discussion may be classified for this purpose under three general heads: (1) the artist's standpoint; what are the motives to art production? what is meant by "self-expression," and by "objectification of emotion"? in what way does art "relieve" emotion? (2) the standpoint of the appreciator or admirer of art; what is the nature of æsthetic enjoyment? what is the meaning of "internal imitation" and the motor elements in æsthetic consciousness? the significance of "disinterestedness," "objectivity," "immediacy," "absorption of subject in object"? (3) the origins and functions of art. These questions can here be touched of course only in the most summary way.

I

The term "artist" should not be limited, in æsthetic discussion, to mean merely the acknowledged masters or even the whole professional class,

but should include everybody who has seriously tried to express his emotion through one of the recognized media of artistic production. Hirn³ says: "If the notion of art is conceived in its most general sense, every normal man, at some time of his life at least, is an artist – in aspiration, if not in capacity." The standpoint of the aspirant must indeed have something in common with that of the successful master, for the latter is considered to have expressed not only his own feeling but also that of others.

The motives to art production may be extremely varied, the artist may work for money, for love, out of emulation, or fear, etc. (just as among primitive people arts were practised for the sake of conveying information, of stimulating fighting and working power, of exercising magic influence, etc.), without having the product necessarily vitiated as a work of art. Yet the genuine art motive, that which is there apart from any specific external pressure, is somewhat different from any of the motives mentioned. The art-impulse has been derived, according to different authorities, from the tendency to imitate, the tendency to attract by pleasing, to employ surplus energy; from the desire for self-exhibition, for self-expression to relieve emotion, and to objectify feeling. It is allied to the instincts of play and of sociability. These tendencies overlap each other and probably all are operative in artistic activity, but the categories of self-expression and objectification of emotion give perhaps the most comprehensive and just characterization of the meaning of the art-impulse. When one experiences great pleasure or joy, the first wish is to keep it up just as it is, but that failing one is impelled to express the experience by portrayal, to seek an image which will revive the feeling. Not only, however, is this true of joy; for when an uncommon terror, or a peculiar grief, has been endured there is a wish not to let the memory of it wholly die, we want to record the fact in order sometime to find the interpretation of it. We may say in general that whenever there is a striking emotional experience, or a feeling not fully grasped, there is a desire to express, fix, and objectify that feeling, to put it into permanent and appealing form.

There is always a social reference in this desire for expression. Often this reference is patent, so much so that one writer makes the desire "to attract by pleasing" the basis of art. The desire for permanence and objectivity is, however, itself ultimately social; for only that which makes an impression on the social order is truly rendered objective., or permanent, only that which appeals deeply to people is the monument more lasting than bronze. The artist in working for others need not mean by society any definite living person or group of persons, he may

³ "The Origins of Art," Chap. II.

figure it as posterity, an ideal group or an ideal person, or even himself in the character of critic, but the reference is there nevertheless and remains social in its essence. With a sincere artist this wish to impose his experience on others is not an undue exaltation of himself but is the legitimate and normal desire to establish and preserve whatever novel emotions or supreme moments his experience may have held. When these moments are once translated into a medium which will, as it were, be responsible for them then an important part of the artist's desire is accomplished. He may rest relieved by his work of art. The art-impulse is imitative in the sense that it tends to reproduce or iterate an experience which the artist has had; it is self-expressive and self-exhibitive in that the artist stamps his idea upon society; it works off surplus energy in the sense of relieving emotional pressure. Its spontaneity together with its constructive and its imitative elements suggest the play-instinct, while the instinct of sociability is at the bottom of the social reference mentioned. The complete objectification of emotion is an end and a satisfaction of the art-impulse, but, as we have seen, this very end implies that the emotion felt by the artist is to be taken up into the social process and lived out.

II

The second group of questions involves a discussion of the standpoint of the observer, or better, the admirer of art. The generally current descriptions of his state of mind say that his pleasure is disinterested, objective, and universal, that æsthetic value is immediate rather than discursive or "consecutive," that art widens the sympathies, that it has the form of purposiveness but represents no purpose. Some writers add that an element of pain or melancholy is aroused by beauty.

The disinterestedness of æsthetic enjoyment is expressed also as a detachment from desire, as a stilling of the will, impersonal contemplation. The immediacy of æsthetic value is supposed to distinguish it from ethical or logical or economic values; for these latter may be means to an end, they may be valid *because* they contribute to some other thing than themselves, whereas in beauty there is no ulterior ground, no reference which accounts for the value. Further, the admirer of beauty feels the value to be objective and universal, that is, he feels his pleasure to be "the quality of an object." Beauty he holds to be sharable, and to be addressed normally to a group rather than to an individual. The sensuous element in beauty is also some guarantee of its objectivity; the beautiful is always something which we may see or hear or touch, which gives resistance and stimulation to the senses. The fact that art widens the sympathies follows from its universal character.

It is not, I think, sufficiently dwelt upon in æsthetics that every moment of æsthetic susceptibility is to some extent a risk and an adventure. The absorption of the subject in the beautiful object is a subjection of mind analogous to a mild hypnosis. Our motor responses and “internal imitations” are often, possibly always, the basis of our interest, the means to our emotional appreciation, and by these we accept and realize the suggested feelings. Unlike a logical, an ethical, or an economic absorption in which propositions and plans of action are considered, and a judicial attitude preserved, æsthetic absorption is in a *thing*, an object whose dynamic possibilities are not clearly known, it is more of an unconditional surrender, and more like encountering a person than a principle. The work of art may stimulate interests and reactions which are most unlooked for. That is where the adventure comes in.

The characteristics of the æsthetic consciousness, then, are a remoteness from immediate self interests, a suggestible and imitative attitude towards the object, and an allegiance to a reality felt to be independent of oneself. But back of the producer’s desire to objectify emotion and back of the admirer’s acceptance of it after it is objectified is the desire of both for the emotion itself. In every normal person there is an instinct for excitement, a curiosity about the untried and a liking for whatever is novel and stirring. It is this which sets the artist hunting for new emotions to objectify, and this which first draws the observer into the neighborhood of the work of art.

III

Mediating between the producer and the admirer stands the work of art itself. It is the end term of two processes, being the goal or ending point of the artist’s endeavor, but the starting point or at least the point of redirection for the activity of the admirer. An inquiry concerning origins and functions of art is an inquiry for the other two termini of the art process – the beginning of the art-producing and the end of the art-enjoying emotion. If art production is based on emotion we have first to ask where the emotion comes from. We may distinguish a psychological and a social origin for it, though we recognize that for primitive mind the individual and social interests were not clearly differentiated.

The theory of emotion⁴ which regards it as a phenomenon of interrupted habit, states that emotion is the consciousness of conflicting impulses. Impulses which meet with no resistance get carried smoothly into action, and the rule is that their owner knows and feels very little about them; but let an impulse be checked, or rather – since only an

⁴ Dewey, *Phil. Rev.*, Vols. I. and III. Cf. also Angell, *Psy.*, Chap. XIX.

impulse can check an impulse – let there be a conflict between impulses and the affair appears in consciousness and appears an emotion. In feeling, at least, the theory would say that strife is the father of things. Imagine a primitive man approached by an enemy; his fighting instinct is aroused and he starts forward to make an attack. If resistance is feeble the act of destruction is shortly completed and does not rise far into the emotional or ideational level. But if the enemy assumes a terrible and threatening air the act of destroying him is at least postponed a little. The instinct of fear is touched in the aggressor and the impulse to cower and run tends to check his attack. At once there is emotional stir, the fighting impulse reined-in becomes conscious anger, the overt act thus blocked remains a mere attitude, and the result is an angry man in a fighting posture. The most desirable thing at that moment in the world would be some means of fixing his resolution and augmenting his strength. Now the primitive person who wants to do something but dares not, finds a satisfaction in going repeatedly as far as he does dare. Repeated threats and feints and posturings thus take the place of a real fight. I believe that such a situation would account psychologically for the origin of that fundamental form of art – the dance. When an act has been intercepted the actor records that moment, and in a sense objectifies his emotion, by the repetition of that part of the act which he is able to perform, namely the attitude. If the posture were repeated often enough to fall into a rhythm it would then constitute a dance – a work of art. According to this account, the objectification of emotion is an objectification of conflict, and whoever preserves an emotion preserves an ungratified impulse, a problem unsolved or a purpose unfulfilled. The performance of mimetic dances *after* a deed is complete, a victory won, we may, it is true, ascribe to the desire to revive and prolong the joy of success, but this type of commemoration also has a reference to the future. The memory of one feat is kept as a stimulus to the next, and also as a means of attaining social consequence.

As to the social origins of art, we are told that the different forms of art were evolved as useful accessories to certain definite ends, that the function of the artist was to direct and incite the efforts of a social group. The praesul or group leader in beating out the rhythm for concerted action, and in performing a pantomime of the movements to be made, furnished concrete imagery for his group – the stimulus of a literal example. In their historical beginnings the arts were useful devices for attaining success in specific types of activity. In the interests of the fight and the hunt, of love and religion, of magic and work, wherever, in a word, primitive man wanted to exert his power the arts came in to stimulate and enhance it. The status of art seems to have been purely

instrumental. Bücher⁵ says that if one asks a Bulgarian laborer to sing a harvest-song in winter time the answer is sure to be: "Es sei eine Schande, ein solches Lied zu singen, wenn nicht die Zeit dafür sei." The function of art, then, was not at first so much a stilling as it was a prodding of the will.

The function of modern art is of course a separate question. With the big changes that have come in our social economy, one would not expect to find so important a function wholly unchanged. In the modern social order occupations and ideas are much more numerous in kind. With the division of labor has come the multiplication of types, and the more democratic ideal. Our ideal community is not one in which every man is a hunter or a warrior with the biggest one as leader, but rather a community in which every person is doing something a little different from every other, one in which each member holds a position and performs a service which is unique, and therefore one in which every one leads in something. Now in such a society of individuals what place would there be for an artist of the primitive sort? With everybody wanting to do a different thing it would be impossible to be a praesul and to give to each a literal example of what he was to do. As a matter of fact the modern artist works as a rule for a public not present to him in the flesh, and often for persons whom he will never see. This, added to the fact that his public represents widely divergent interests makes the notion of personal example quite remote. And yet I believe that with one very important difference the function of modern art is essentially the same with that of primitive art. The difference is that modern art instead of giving a stimulus to a specific act gives a stimulus of a much more general kind, and leaves each individual to live out for himself the meaning and the end of it.

To assert that the function of art is to stimulate to ends, of whatever sort, is, on the surface anyway, a direct contradiction of the idea that art quiets the will and absolves from desire. Now the terms "disinterestedness" and "freedom from desire," and the notion that certain values are immediate and not grounded on absent things do stand unquestionably for a certain truth; but, if I understand what that truth is, they express it badly. Literal disinterestedness is an artifact. What the term is used to signify is that some interests (not all) are in abeyance. The whole point for *æsthetics* is to distinguish which interests are ignored and which are thereby fostered when one contemplates beauty. The difference seems to be one of small present interests as against larger and more remote ones. Art, though it no longer sets one on to instant deeds,

⁵ "Arbeit u. Rhythmus."

has yet a far-reaching influence upon action. Thus there is no one particular act which a plaintive melody could be relied upon to stimulate, but it might very well induce a mood of tenderness or pity, the results of which, though not known, we must not suppose lost. A beautiful object, even a familiar one, has something in it always novel and re-creative, and in this sense represents a change from preceding experience and interests, so that the beauty seems not to depend upon the preceding interest for its value. It is not apparently mediated or arrived at but given, is not like an "answer" in arithmetic which, insignificant by itself, needs the preceding problem which it answers to give it a meaning. To say, however, that beauty is really an "immediate value," or that its meaning is completely expressed in its form is a contradiction in terms, and a denial, it seems to me, of the most vital element in all æsthetic moments. Value, meaning, significance, these must always by definition imply a standard or involve a reference. The pragmatic attitude on the subject would be that the meaning of a beautiful object is to be sought not in itself but in its final reference to concrete acts; that the æsthetic moment, like any other, must be placed in a purposive order, that there is no such thing as a completely given value.

Evidence is not wanting that the person going through the æsthetic experience demands a reference to some purpose. Recent theories regard æsthetic consciousness as a consequent rather than a cause of art production; they say that æsthetic appreciation of natural beauty is developed by first appreciating art. The æsthetic consciousness would thus be a moment not given by nature but determined by art, that is, developed within a human process. Again, in modern theory, the conception of the characteristic or the significant is given chief place in the definition of beauty, and the categories of congruity and fitness are also considered relevant. Now nothing is merely characteristic, etc., it is characteristic or significant *of*, congruous *with*, fit *for*. All those notions involve a reference. Finally, it comes out in experimental tests on æsthetic problems that the isolation of the æsthetic object is a source of disturbance to the subject. Persons asked to choose the more beautiful of two colors, the more pleasing of two circles of different size, and the better of rectangles of different proportions often find it unnatural and difficult to make a choice irrespective of some use to be made of the color or the form. Some say that they have no "favorite" color in the abstract, but have different favorites for different purposes. One person among my subjects who had been trying to choose among rectangles (including the golden section) at last exclaimed: "Heaven knows I would be glad to yearn for one of those things to please you," but declared it impossible to like them apart from some imagined purpose (*i.e.*, as used

for a picture-frame, a book-cover, etc.). My experience has been that questions like "Which is longer, or darker, or bluer," etc., are accepted and answered as a matter of course, but that the questions "Which is better or more beautiful, which do you prefer," are troublesome and often call out the demand for further explanation. Another fact which suggests the dependent nature of beauty is the part sometimes played by the object's position in a series of objects. Martin⁶ found that changing the relative position of simple curves could change their relative æsthetic value. In unpublished tests of my own on circles of different sizes and rectangles of different proportions the same point came out, the choice seemed to be affected by the position which the figure held in the series presented. For example, in a graduated series lettered a, b, c, d, etc., figures a, b, and c were shown together and the subject chose *b* as most pleasing; then b, c, and d were presented and the subject chose *c*. Now since b and c were together for comparison both times it would seem that it was not the figure itself but its position which determined the preference. In this example the middle figure was chosen both times.⁷ These facts point to the conclusion that æsthetic experience is less able to stand by itself than has been supposed.

If it were granted, however, that the æsthetic moment did derive its value from a purpose and was not in any literal way free from desire, there would still remain to be explained that feeling of freedom which is so often observed as accompanying the appreciation of beauty. Freedom, as any one would agree, rests upon the power of choice, hence there is no freedom unless there are at least two things to choose from. And, conversely, the person who has possible alternatives is a free agent, and the broader the field of his possibilities the greater his sense of freedom. According to the theory of emotion cited above every emotion represents more than one possible action – is in fact the consciousness of conflicting impulses. The very presence of emotion is therefore an appropriate situation for the sense of freedom, being a moment of suspended choice, or balance of alternatives.

If art is stimulative is it possible to name some of the concrete acts which it instigates? If it has meaning, exactly what does it mean to have us do? It is not, I think, possible always, or even often, to name the precise outcome in action of a work of art. It has already been said above that the stimulus of art is generic rather than specific, and I should like to dwell a little at this point on that distinction. The works of Millet and Breton must certainly modify the attitude of many people towards the laborer of the field, yet it is impossible to say exactly what

⁶ *Psy. Rev.*, Vol. XIII, No. 3.

⁷ Cf. also Witmer, *Phil. Stud.*, IX, p. 128, for a like result.

acts those pictures inspire; acts of charity perhaps, but they certainly do not solicit gross and obvious charities, nor would these express the intention of the pictures. The picture of the Man with the Hoe inspired Markham's poem, and picture and poem inspire their public with a sense of social responsibility and a feeling of awful compassion. The result of this should be, some bettering of social conditions, that is, better social conditions would express the ultimate intention of such works of art (whether that were consciously intended by the *artist* or not), but just how to get better conditions, exactly what to do we must find out not from the work of art but rather from social science. Art inspires merely the emotional stage of the reform. To take another illustration, martial music is believed to have an effect upon the action of soldiers, but while it may inspire courage it takes the intelligence of military science to narrow the emotion into the effective and desired concrete act. Here, too, art carries the actor only as far as the emotional stage of action. He feels urgently *that* he must do something, but art furnishes only in a general way the notion of *what* he shall perform.

The meaning of art is thus a felt meaning not a definitely known one. This is the striking difference between æsthetic appreciation and logical judgment. Every judgment is something of an equation, a balancing process in which a certain equivalence is predicated. One thing is said *to be* another, that is, every subject about which anything is judged is in a manner balanced by its predicates. Now with æsthetic appreciation there is not just that kind of balance present; the beautiful object is there as the subject about which one's feeling hangs, but its precise valuation in the way of definite predicates is wanting. It deserves predicates but they are at the moment unknown quantities. The work of art has a weight and a meaning, but at the moment of felt effect it has not yet been fully translated into that meaning. It is this felt but undefined significance which makes the mystery of great art – the face of Mona Lisa so full of significance, is equally full of mystery and of things unknown; one is not sure even whether her smile is sinister or benign – if indeed it is a smile.

The function of art, then, is to preserve and present meanings at their emotional stage, before they have become explicit, definite, or solved. Since every emotion is an unsolved problem or a conflict, the artist is he who discovers and finds problems, and his business is to put them into persistent form. The artist part of each of us is the part which leads us into emotional complexities and hazards, and this impulse is satisfied only when we are involved in an objective situation. This impulse is at bottom very much the same as that which leads one in any sport to wish for a hard game. It is the experimental or adventurous side of our nature, and the satisfaction of the impulse is reached when one is

confronted by a stiff opposition. As some one has said, “On ne reste que sur ce qui resiste.” On the intellectual level this desire seems to me no other than the desire for an objectively real world in which to think and feel and act. Every one can at times sympathize with Rasselas in his wish to escape from the Happy Valley.

Much of the criticism of pragmatism rests upon the feeling that pragmatism does not do justice to the difficulties of the human situation, does not recognize the stubborn character of objects and oppositions. We may answer this (aside from the answer that nowhere is opposition more difficult or real than between different purposes) by saying that one may recognize opposition itself as part of a purpose and as satisfaction of an impulse.

Finally, the pragmatic view of æsthetics recognizes the æsthetic moment as a problem, not as a solution, a beginning rather than an end. The pragmatic view of art, I should say, is this, that art is not essentially an imitation of life – a copy of something done and finished before art took it up, but that life is a copy and imitation of art. If art is the “image of life” it is more a prophetic than an historic image. Thus, Henry James has created for us many situations, put things in our lives that were not there before; and Meredith has made persons. After seeing a Turner one sees more form and color in a sky. We see beauty in nature because we see it as a picture. The *genre* in art has given us an interest in common things, we can see them at last because we see that they are a pageant. In other words, art if it is stimulative and instrumental must be prior to that which it effects. Life and nature are in a vital sense experienced as products of art.

THE NECESSITY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE IDEAS OF THE PSYCHICAL AND THE PHYSICAL

H. Heath Bawden. "The Necessity From the Standpoint of Scientific Method of a Reconstruction of the Ideas of the Psychical and the Physical." *Journal of Philosophy* 1.3 (4 February 1904): 62–68.

Science is the attempt to give a rational explanation of the universe. Its earliest systematic statement is that of the so-called physical sciences – astronomy, physics, chemistry – in which the world is interpreted in purely mechanical terms. Nature is a mechanism. The concepts with which science operates in this stage are matter and motion. The material units, atoms, which make up the universe, are in constant movement. There is an extended substance, and this substance is in process of universal change. Ultimately, reality consists simply of atoms and their movements. There may be all sorts of combinations of these atoms; they may stand in all sorts of relations by reason of their ceaseless change; but ultimately there is conceived to be a substance, called matter, lying back of the changes. Matter is the permanent core of reality which runs through the changes, which underlies the movements of the atoms and makes them possible. This is the philosophical postulate of the earliest scientific physics – the existence of matter in motion. Inasmuch as matter is made fundamental in the conception, and this matter is conceived as given in little bits or units called atoms, this may be called the static conception of the universe, the lump theory of reality. The view has been held by mechanical scientists and philosophers from the time of Democritus. And it must be said that great fundamental principles have been established from this standpoint, which more recent science has restated rather than overthrown.

But, with the progress of scientific inquiry, especially with the advance of experimental investigation, the fact of change, of motion, has become more and more prominent, while the conception of an abiding substance postulated as underlying the changes has receded from view. The existence of matter has not been disproved, but its utility as a concept in

its old static form has vanished in the light of a new understanding of the nature of motion. In place of dead inert matter have been put the positive conceptions of energy and force. Motion was formerly regarded simply as the phenomenal manifestation of some real entity – matter – lying behind, or it was conceived as a force operating upon matter from without. Under the name of energy, motion is now regarded as itself the essence of reality, and the idea of brute, lump matter drops away. In place of the static we get a dynamic theory of the nature of reality. *Substance c'est l'action*. What was formerly called the material object or thing is now regarded as simply the latent or potential as contrasted with the active or kinetic form of energy. Instead of speaking of the indestructibility and homogeneity of matter, science now speaks of the permanence of force and the interconvertibility of energy. An atom is a center of motions, a vortex ring, the focus of a system of forces, an equilibrium of opposing energies. This is the dynamic or energistic view quite generally held by philosophical physicists to-day.

But while this dynamic view is transforming physics, another group of sciences – the biological – is coming into prominence. Biology existed alongside of physics, of course, from the first. But the nineteenth century is the epoch of the great development of the sciences of life. The statements of physics and chemistry are not the whole story. Nature is not only a mechanism. It is an organism. The biological categories do not negate those of physical science. On the other hand, the tendency of biological science has been steadily opposed to vitalism with its doctrine of occult force. It makes the fullest use of chemical and physical laws in explaining organic phenomena. At the same time, it recognizes that the organism is not a mere machine, as that term is customarily used; it is a living machine.

Here, again, we see progress from a static to a dynamic conception of life. Early biology was content with a doctrine of special creation, of fixed species, of a special vital force. Morphology in the modern sense was unknown. But with the rise of the genetic and comparative methods in science, biology has come to see the essential unity and continuity of all organic processes. The concepts of heredity and transmission, of variability and selection, of development and evolution, emphasize the idea of growth, as physical science has emphasized the idea of ceaseless change or motion. And here, as before, scientific thought does not rest until it generalizes the idea. Evolution becomes a universal law of nature. The universe is a vital, living whole. It is organic. There is a cosmic life and a cosmic evolution; the principle of continuity requires it.

At first the conception of growth was restricted to a certain sphere called the organic realm. But investigation showed that the vital is built upon the basis of the mineral world, that the organic actually assimilates

and incorporates the inorganic, building it into its tissues. The difference between the inorganic and the organic seems to reduce simply to a difference in organization. The difference is not a difference in kind, but only in degree or complexity of organization. This is shown, indeed, by the fact that the biologist falls back upon the chemicophysical laws for the explanation of vital processes. From this point of view, therefore, the universe may rightly be called an organism, without departing from the biological definition of an organism as a self-perpetuating system or mechanism in which the constituent parts are related reciprocally as means and ends. The evidence tends increasingly to show that the universe is an organic, and not merely a mechanical, whole. If the chemicophysical categories are to be carried up throughout the world of life, the biological categories must be carried back to the interpretation of the world of matter and motion. Either the chemicophysical laws do not hold in the biological sphere – in which case there is a distinct vital force, and this contradicts the law of the conservation of energy – or they do hold in the biological sphere, in which case the idea of mechanism must be extended to cover the phenomena exhibited by organic life. And if the organic differs from the inorganic simply in degree of organization, then, on the same principle, it is not only legitimate, but distinctly illuminating, to carry back the biological categories to correct the inevitable abstractions made in the physical sciences.

This sufficiently meets the arguments of those who, like Professor Ostwald, would subordinate psychical phenomena to the idea of energy. The bare concept of energy, even when interpreted from the modern standpoint of dynamism in physics, is too poor to express the contents of the ideas of life and mind. Unquestionably, these latter concepts, as they are at present used, will have to be modified before they will form a continuous series with the concept of energy. The only point here urged is that the modification can not be all on the side of the biological and psychological categories. The concepts of biology and psychology must reconstitute the concepts of physical science as truly as the converse. Indeed, is not the modern concept of energy itself a good illustration of the idealization of a material category, of the spiritualization of matter? Psychical phenomena are not to be 'subordinated' (the term is Professor Ostwald's) to the concept of energy, but both concepts are to be reconstituted, each in terms of the other. Viewed in this light, one may even accept the words of the writer just mentioned, when he says: 'In all that we know of intellectual processes, there is nothing to hinder us from regarding them as a particular form of energetic activity.'¹ Indeed, this is

¹ Ostwald, 'The Philosophical Meaning of Energy,' *International Quarterly*, VII., No. 2, June, 1903, p. 313.

just the present tendency of a certain school of psychology – to interpret all psychical phenomena functionally, *i.e.*, in terms of action, activity, energy, if you please.

As has just been intimated, another step remains to be taken beyond the physical and the biological standpoints. Besides the physical and the biological there are the psychological sciences. Besides matter and motion, besides the organism and life, there is consciousness and personality. The twentieth century bids fair to be the epoch of scientific psychology. The greatest theoretical problem of the science of the present day is as to what it is going to do with consciousness. On the one side, science is inclined to regard consciousness as simply one phase, and that a comparatively recent phase, of evolution. But is consciousness, in this case, to be interpreted solely in terms of the physicochemical, or even in terms of the biological, categories? If so, then these categories will have to be so revised as to do justice to the new facts.

On the other side, scientists, as well as metaphysicians, have not been slow to see that there is a sense in which the very existence of the external world, and the science of this world, are conditioned upon consciousness. An object, or a universe, that appears to no one, that is not present to some consciousness, that is not an object of knowledge by some intelligent being, would seem to be simply nonexistent. There appears to be a sense in which the system of the universe has been built up in the scientific consciousness of the race, analogous to the way in which the world of space and time is built up in the consciousness of the child. From this point of view consciousness seems to condition the very possibility of science. How, then, can consciousness be simply a relatively late product of biological evolution? If time (including the historical development of science) has been built up in consciousness, how can consciousness be an evolution in time?

The solution of this apparent paradox lies in seeing that consciousness, taken apart from the organism which is conscious, is not an entity or thing or even a process; it is simply meaning or significance. Consciousness, taken in abstraction from body, is like what you get when you attempt to conceive function abstractly, apart from the organ or structure which functions. Function, thus conceived, signifies no more than a sum of relations or meanings.² The enigma reduces, therefore, to a mere verbal fallacy. After abstracting the psychical, by definition, from the physical, there still cling to our psychological statements of the nature of consciousness traces of our conceptions of material objects.

² Cf. Bawden, 'The Functional Theory of Parallelism,' *Philos. Rev.*, May, 1903, 299–301, on this point.

There is no actual consciousness apart from an organism. But in our thinking and speaking concerning consciousness we split apart these two aspects of the psychical and the physical for purposes of discussion. They are one, but in the very act of saying it we make them two. Any thinking or speaking is a polarizing into two aspects in thought of what is an undivided unity for action. This, of course, is a methodological, not an ontological dualism; hence is paradoxical only for him who forgets its methodological origin.

Psychology illustrates this split in scientific thinking. And psychology too often fails to remember that its abstractions are simply methodological devices or instruments and not an actual duality of existences. If this important point is kept in mind, the paradox of psychophysical parallelism disappears, and this apparent contradiction between time and consciousness is cleared up. Consciousness is in time, of course, when consciousness is regarded as it actually exists, as functioning of the nervous system. Time is in consciousness just as truly, however, when consciousness is regarded as the bare significance or meaning, in abstraction from its existential or physical basis, the body; for time, from this standpoint, is just one meaning among others. The solution of the antinomies which arise in the conflict of the different sciences is to be found in interpreting them always in terms of the methodological abstractions with which these sciences operate.

Here, then, as in the previous cases, the truth lies in generalizing, in universalizing, the laws of the new science. The conception of consciousness must be extended to the entire universe. The universe is a mechanism. It is an organism. The universe is also a conscious personality. Whether or not this is to become mere metaphysical verbiage will depend upon one's conception of consciousness and of personality.³ Certain it is that this is the only escape from the blind alley into which modern science has brought us in its doctrine of psychophysical parallelism, which insists at once that consciousness is the universal accompaniment of the material body, yet has absolutely nothing to do with the continued existence of that body. This absurdity can only be escaped by revising our conceptions of consciousness and the self. Consciousness is not a thing, an entity, a force, any more than the function of an organ is a part of its structure. The function of an organ is the activity of that organ, its orderly and continuous operation with reference to an end or norm. Consciousness, or the psychical, in the same sense, is the functioning of the material or physical universe. Consciousness is not an entity, a thing; it is a function, a meaning. There is no more reason for

³ See a forthcoming article in the *Philosophical Review* on the 'Meaning of the Psychical from the Standpoint of the Functional Psychology.'

making an entity out of consciousness than out of habit. We no longer speak of mind *and* its faculties, of functions and that which *has* the functions. The mind does not *have* functions; it *is* the functions. It is real only in its activity, or rather, its activity, its functioning, is its reality. Its various 'faculties' – sense-perception, memory, imagination, etc. – do not 'belong to' the mind; they *are* the mind. Each factor is the function of a common activity, a moment in the single process.

Now just as an organ may be relatively at rest or in active operation, so the universe, or any portion of it, such as the organism itself, may be in a relatively stable or in a relatively tensional state. An experience is psychical in so far as it is being made focal. Any experience is psychical in so far as it is treated as having been modified, as being modified, or as capable of being modified, in consciousness. That is, its psychical quality depends upon its relation to the process of tension or reconstruction. And the only sense in which there is any meaning in the concept of 'unconscious mental states' is that certain phases of experience are what they are because of their having been or their capacity for being thus mediated. Consciousness is not something which belongs exclusively to you or to me. It is simply our name for tension, for variation, for progress, of the whole system of reality. This is the general principle. Whether and how consciousness appears in any given focus of forces in tension is an empirical problem upon which physiological and comparative psychology are beginning to throw some light.

When tensional, reality bifurcates or polarizes into the psychical and the physical; this tension, this polarity, is consciousness. When reality is in relative stability or equilibrium, this distinction does not emerge; this is the relative unconsciousness of primary and secondary automatism. Consciousness is thus generalized for the whole of nature, and the physicochemical and the biological are in turn sublated by the psychological categories. From this point of view we may even agree with Mr. Maudsley when he says that 'in the order of nature mind is not something detached, proceeding not from it, independent of its laws...it is itself nature in process of becoming' ('Problems of Life and Mind,' p. 205).

TWO ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGICAL VALUE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN METAPHYSIC

Simon F. MacLennan. "Two Illustrations of the Methodological Value of Psychology in Metaphysic." *Journal of Philosophy* 1.15 (21 July 1904): 403–11.

The doctrine which I wish to illustrate admits that psychology and metaphysic represent distinguishable points of view in philosophy, and asserts that their distinctness must be kept in mind in the treatment of either. It maintains, however, that such a relation exists between the two as permits psychology to play the important rôle of furnishing clues to metaphysic for the statement and solution of its problems. As an example of the difficulties into which metaphysic inevitably runs through failure to adequately appreciate the methodological value of psychology, I shall take Mr. F. H. Bradley's 'Appearance and Reality.' On the other hand, Professor Royce's article, in the March (1904) number of the *Philosophical Review*, furnishes a good illustration of a misapprehension which is likely to arise as to the outcome of a philosophy employing psychology in the determination of its metaphysical insight, if the distinction between the view-points of the two disciplines be not clearly recognized.

The controlling conception of Mr. Bradley's essay both as to method and problems is to be found, I believe, in Chapter XV., entitled 'Thought and Reality.' Having concluded, as the outcome of the criticism embodied in the first part of his volume, that reality must, ultimately, be interpreted in terms of experience, having defined experience, carefully, in an objective manner, *i.e.*, as the common denominator of all things real, and having, by this means freed his theory from possible subjective idealistic and solipsistic (pp. 145–146), Mr. Bradley proceeds to the investigation of the part played by thought in experience. To the methods and results formulated in this analysis he constantly returns in the remaining sections of the book. What, then, is thought, and how is it related to reality? In answer to this question Mr. Bradley distinguishes three fundamental phases of experience. First,

there is sensibility with its potentially infinite but totally undefined content. Second, experience reflectively mediated and defined in determinate but abstract and fragmentary existences and contents. Third, an all-inclusive absolute experience in which all possible characterization in terms of existence and content is exhausted in an immediate reality which transcends the reflective form. Thought occupies, accordingly, a mediating position between reality conceived as immediate but undefined experience and reality conceived as immediate and exhaustively defined experience. The metaphysical bearing of this conviction appears in Mr. Bradley's treatment of truth and reality. To both there are degrees varying indefinitely from the merest transformation of sensibility to the all comprehensiveness of the absolute. In each we must accordingly distinguish a proximate and an ultimate form. Truth, as proximate, consists of the fragmentary existences and contents in which the discrepancy of finite ideas to reality is embodied. As ultimate, truth consists in the essential harmony of idea and reality in the absolute unity where all discrepancy is overcome. Reality taken in its proximate form turns out to be appearance. Everything is real but not everything is self-consistent and able to stand on its own foundation. Whatever leads beyonds itself, by way of either internal or external complement, is appearance. Its value and standing, as reality, are determined by the amount of transformation or complement it must undergo before it could become self-consistent and independent. True or ultimate reality consists in an all-inclusive absolute experience which unifies and brings to rest, in an immediate way, all finite strivings by way of ideas and appearances. Taking truth and reality together, as results mediated by a single process, we are brought to the following conclusion. Thought is a reflective endeavor to exhaust and to reconstruct ideally the richness of sensibility. On its analytic side this process gives rise to a system of existences or differences: as synthesis it produces a system of unifying relations or meaning. The differences and relations, however, transcend themselves both in principle and in detail. The more we discriminate, the more we find there is to discriminate: the more we coordinate, the more complex the relationships appear. Furthermore, existence and content collide as such, and demand a larger whole in which they may be included and their mutual discrepancies set aside.

Consequently, a two-fold difficulty awaits Mr. Bradley's system in its final result. First, it provides no criterion for the discrimination of truth from falsity in the fabrication of ideas. According to it, the standard of validity for proximate truth is to be found in ultimate truth. Proximate truth consists in the partial correspondence of finite ideas with infinite truth; proximate error in the lack of correspondence between the two. But in the nature of the case, the comparison of finite idea with infinite

truth is impossible. The inevitableness of this result as to his method in general, Mr. Bradley perceives, and hastens to counteract, by bringing forward a practical criterion for the evaluation of ideas. Harmony and discrepancy furnish a working basis sufficient to the needs of relative truth. Wherever ideas harmonize there is consistency, unity, truth; wherever they collide there is inconsistency, discrepancy, error. This departure from his strict doctrine does not advantage Mr. Bradley much, however, for when we examine into the nature of harmony and discrepancy, we soon discover that they are formal principles, and depend ultimately upon a positive character in ideas determined and validated some other way. Thus even relative truth must be denied to the fabrications of thought on Mr. Bradley's basis, and the conclusion reached that reflection is diseased through-out.

The second difficulty may be stated as follows. Even though truth could be relatively determined, and the appropriate degrees of reality made out for each appearance, we should still have to face the final result, that in the absolute, every truth and every appearance is so transformed and complemented as to lose its own distinctive character. The absolute contains every appearance, but in such a manner as to possess in itself a quality inaccessible to reflective thought. How then, we may ask, is the amount of transformation requisite to the determination of the comparative values of appearances to be made out? Without such determination higher and lower can, in fact, mean nothing. We have now seen, if our interpretation be correct, that Mr. Bradley's metaphysic ends in a veritable cul-de-sac, and that the root of the difficulty is his conviction as to the character and function of thought. The analysis which led up to his conviction, he conceives to be essentially logical, and the resulting metaphysical difficulties to be inherent. As a matter of fact, his metaphysical insight is conditioned by a psychological result with reference to the nature and function of ideas. Given his views of images and ideas as psychic events, and it is not difficult to trace their determining influence upon the logical *existence* and *content*, or the metaphysical *immediate* and *reflective* phases of activity, which play the controlling parts in his system.

For Mr. Bradley, the primary form of mental activity is a species of 'undifferentiated sensory continuum' in which event succeeds event without any interruption to the continuity of the activity, or any awareness of the discreteness which the successive events exhibit. Into this continuity discreteness creeps as the expression of unknown conditions. The effect is two-fold. The continuity of psychic events is broken up into a series of discordant factors, and a response is called forth on the part of the psychic process as a whole by way of reorganization. The discordant factors are what we know as images, their attempted reorga-

nization into a stable whole, what we know as ideas. The psychic origin of thought, consequently, is to be found in the diremption of the original sensory continuum and its objective in the reestablishment of a continuum like unto the first. Inasmuch, however, as new factors are constantly being discriminated, the hope of reaching the goal of a completely unified experience seems unattainable. It remains, therefore, as an ideal which guides the progressive development of thought.

The logical outcome of this psychological conviction is the contention that the development of the subject and predicate of the finite judgment exhibits the general forms through which we become aware of the features of the all-inclusive judgment or completely organized meaning which constitutes the true objective and ideal of thought. Metaphysically, we have traced its influence in the conception of thought as the mediator of varying degrees of truth and reality lying between an undifferentiated sensibility, upon the one hand, and a completely differentiated absolute experience, upon the other.

If, then, it be true that, despite Mr. Bradley's warnings to others, the cast of his own metaphysical doctrine has been fundamentally influenced by his psychological convictions, it may also be true, that the clue to the solution of his difficulties may be found in psychology. With this in mind, we shall, *first*, replace his psychological analysis of the nature and function of thought by another which seems more true to fact, and, *second*, enquire what metaphysical value this insight has.

Briefly stated this conception is – thought is the form of reaction which any moment of experience exhibits in stimulating, predicting and realizing a further moment of experience. This process may be regarded from two points of view: first, as a set of factors coordinated in effecting a specific result, second, as the single experience to whose realization the factors are coordinated. For example, I judge that a piece of paper is before me. The activity of seeing stimulates a further set of experiences (memory images) which react into it after such a manner as to project in my mental view an anticipation of the experiences of touching, seeing, etc., possible to be realized through the active cooperation of experiences of movement as to arms, fingers, eyes, etc. The test of the validity of my judgment and the objectivity of my supposed knowledge consists, in the nature of the case, in the possibility or impossibility of realizing the specified experiences as anticipated. This result holds whether the moment of experience be relatively simple or complex. At one moment, my activities may be concentrated in a very narrow focus, at another, their sweep may be broad. In either case, knowledge exhibits its method and function in the transformation of one moment of experience into another.

The essential differences of this conception of thought from that of

Mr. Bradley are two: (1) The objective of ideas is not a whole which lies outside the range of the momentary needs and activities of psychic life, but one so specified and defined as to be capable of attainment. (2) The test of the validity of conceptions, consequently, lies within and not without their function: it is material and not formal.

If, next, we enquire into the origin of knowledge, we find its source in the fact that psychic experience is in constant process of transformation. What Mr. Bradley takes to be a misfortune of psychic states, is really their normal condition. A pure, undifferentiated continuum there appears to be none, but rather a process, in which forms of coordinated experiences tend constantly to take on other forms. In thought this process is consciously controlled. And what is meant by the words 'consciously controlled' is, that, in the function of knowledge, experience is able to predict and to direct the character of the transformations which it undergoes. These transformations exhibit two general forms: first, those in which the psychic moments utilize idea-instruments already fashioned and adjusted to the realization of specific experiences; second, those in which psychic instruments are constructed to meet the demands of novel situations. And the second of these forms appears to be the more fundamental; consequently, knowledge may be said to arise out of an inherent tendency of psychic activities to differentiate novel situations. The presence of these novel situations constitutes the problem of knowledge. Their resolution into factors and results consciously controlled, is its objective. We may emphasize this latter point by noting an objection which might be brought against this point of view. It might be contended that, on the analysis given above, thought arises out of a coordination which, by that fact, must lie and continue to lie outside the range of thought. Such a contention would involve a misconception of the whole point of view. The relation of thought to the coordination out of which it arises, is such as to turn that coordination inside out, and to bring to light its innermost character. Furthermore, this thought enters into the coordination so intimately as to make it anew into a whole whose nature is definitely forecast both in general and in detail. This essential feature of thought is marked, psychologically, by the fact, that, in reflection, the tendency toward differentiation in the psychic process itself becomes self-conscious, and constitutes the possibility of the free expansion of psychic life in intelligently controlled action. This transformation of experience into a self-conscious process through the constructive activity of thought we shall find to be of essential value in the metaphysical reconstruction to which we now turn.

In indicating the metaphysical value of our psychological analysis of thought, I shall take for granted the general standpoint of objective idealism as formulated by Mr. Bradley. Everything that can be called

real is, at bottom, a form of experience. And experience must not be regarded as subjective idealism and solipsism regard it, but as the common denominator and constituent of all things real. Of it, subjective and objective are alike real forms, and the distinction of subject and object is not one, which, as a limit, is brought to knowledge, but rather one which, objective as it is, is developed in and through the process of knowledge. Assuming this general standpoint, we shall endeavor to indicate briefly the gains made for metaphysical method by our previous psychological analysis. First, we are enabled to appreciate the true objective of knowledge. It does not consist, as Mr. Bradley supposes, in an all-inclusive experience into which the passing moment may potentially be transformed, but in the determination of the character of the further experience into which and the conditions through which, respectively, any given moment of experience may be transformed. This holds true whether we regard the moment of experience as all-inclusive or as some fleeting factor within it. In other words, knowledge would mean just the same thing for an absolute as it does for the finite. The fact that an inclusive experience is complex, and the fleeting factor simple, makes no difference so far as the function and validity of knowledge are concerned. In either case, this objective of knowledge consists in the projection of a new situation for realization, and its validity lies in the accomplishment of the aim. Second, for this view, the dualism of idea and fact is overcome, and Mr. Bradley's various problems are set aside. We no longer deal with a whole of reality which lies beyond the determination of knowledge, but with one whose nature it is the function of knowledge both to determine and to construct. Every idea, therefore, which reaches its aim, and the various ideals which embody, in an organized way, the tested conceptions of men, are true of the innermost natures of the specific forms of reality which they profess to mediate. Third, the distinction of relative from absolute truth must vanish. The question of adequacy in ideas is not one pertaining to comparison by way of correspondence and complexity between finite and infinite conceptions. It is one of efficiency in realizing experiences desired. Fourth, the origin of knowledge consists, ultimately, in the fact that reality differentiates, but does so in such wise that its transformations are consciously controlled. This tendency towards differentiation must be regarded as constitutional. The significance of this result is that the differentiation of new situations within the process of reality becomes the limit of ideas instead of the reverse being true. The upshot of the matter is that in the one case we are enabled to conceive of reality as continually and continuously differentiating and that in the other the exhaustive character of the closed system of ideas imposes a limit of such a character as to force the dilemma – either the system of ideas is

not eternally realized in fact or if eternally realized there is no room for change and the world of events. Fifth, in knowledge, reality becomes conscious of its own character and method. Consequently for the conception of a blind pressure toward change we must substitute a constantly differentiating but controlling purpose. If, then, we view reality as an all-inclusive experience, we rise to the conception of a process which inherently takes on new forms, in which, however, these forms are not the expression of haphazard change but of change intelligently mediated in every detail and as a whole. The process, accordingly, must be defined as essentially purposeful or self-conscious. And we may delay here a moment longer in order to emphasize a point of distinction from Mr. Bradley. Because finite ideas, according to his theory, have their objective in a whole which if attained would engulf and transform them, he was forced to conceive the self-consciousness of the finite process as something which must also be amended and overridden in reality. On the other hand inasmuch as we have found that ideas maintain their identity with reality by actively constructing it we must hold that for knowledge self-consciousness can never be transcended, but must ever be emphasized.

We must now turn to a very brief consideration of what I believe to be Professor Royce's misconception of pragmatism. Perhaps the term is ill advised. If pragmatism can not possibly mean more than Professor Royce says it does, then a more truthful label should be devised for the so-called pragmatists. And so far as the label is concerned, I am not aware that, on this side of the water at least, it was self-imposed by the representatives of the way of thinking under consideration. However this may be, it appears to me that the label is not so opprobrious, if a few distinctions be kept in mind. And at this point, perhaps, I should say that I hold no brief for any man's point of view other than my own. I may have failed entirely to understand what the pragmatists have been aiming at, and I certainly do not care to burden any one but myself with what I have formulated above. This, however, I must say, that, whether for good or for bad, I have conceived myself to be working on lines similar to those followed by the pragmatists or instrumentalists, and that unless I have been thinking entirely beside the mark, the conception of pragmatism given by Professor Royce is not adequate to the movement assailed. Speaking bluntly, he has demolished a man of straw, and this for the reason that he has failed to keep in mind the distinction between the psychological and the metaphysical viewpoints. Moreover, I do not mean that, for his own philosophy, Professor Royce fails to make the distinction; simply that, in his criticism of pragmatism, he does not credit its exponents with the distinction. Doubtless for an objective idealism which takes on pragmatic form, the distinction is more than

usually difficult to make and to maintain. But so far as I can see, the instrumentalists have made and maintained it. I am the more sure of this inasmuch as it is easier to perceive the distinction as made by another, than to make it oneself, as I must now attempt to do.

For the idealist, reality is constituted as experience. But experience may be viewed from many points and have many different values correspondingly. For us the main points of distinction are those between a psychological and a metaphysical treatment of experience. By *psychology*, experience is investigated in the immediacy of its concrete fleeting moments as these reconstitute themselves in novel situations, and are examined without regard to the more permanent values which are exhibited by the process that mediates them. By *metaphysic*, on the other hand, experience is taken in a more permanent sense, as the common denominator and ultimate factor in all forms of reality, be their character or value what it may. So taken, experience is essentially objective, and the values which attach to it in knowledge must be taken as equally objective. Hence, when the pragmatist maintains that knowledge provides the conscious method or formula for transforming experience, he is not called upon to limit the result to inner or 'subjective' experience so-called. Such a contention fails to see that all distinctions (and among them the varying forms of subject-object reality) fall within the objective movement of experience, and are dependent for their origin and maintenance upon the objective function of knowledge. The critic of the pragmatic idealist appears to be full of the conviction that the pragmatist must set up psychic experience as a sort of entity, and must then confine knowledge within the magic limits of psychical insufficiency. He fails to see that experience, as psychic, is a form which it assumes only in and through the knowledge process. How, then, the pragmatist can fairly be accused of limiting reality to one of the factors which exist within its own complex movement is somewhat difficult to see.

Another objection which Professor Royce makes to pragmatism may be formulated in the question: How can ideas arising in different minds have a common value and an objective basis? In answer to this, it may be contended that the pragmatist does not deny the complexity of the objective process of experience, or the presence within it of self-conscious factors. For each of these, the truth of its knowledge must consist in the attainment of its aims. Inasmuch, however, as all are organically related within a single process, the results attained under similar conditions must have a common value. Furthermore, this result does not necessitate that either the process or the ideas which intelligently direct its transformations should be static or eternally fixed.

We may conclude, therefore, that although psychology and meta-

physics represent differing points of view in philosophy, none the less, their relations are such that, while inevitable confusion must result from a failure to keep their distinctness in mind, nevertheless, if we turn distinction into separation, and refuse to advantage ourselves of psychology in determining our metaphysical insight, we are sure, on the other hand, to suffer shipwreck.

DOES REALITY POSSESS PRACTICAL CHARACTER?

John Dewey. "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?" In *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James*, by his Colleagues at Columbia University (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908), pp. 53–80. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 4 (1977), pp. 125–42.

I

Recently I have had an experience which, insignificant in itself, seems to mean something as an index-figure of the present philosophic situation. In a criticism of the neo-Kantian conception that *a priori* functions of thought are necessary to constitute knowledge, it became relevant to deny its underlying postulate: viz., the existence of anything properly called mental states or subjective impressions precedent to all objective recognitions, and requiring accordingly some transcendental function to order them into a world of stable and consistent reference. It was argued that such so-called original mental data are in truth turning points of the readjustment, or making over, through a state of incompatibility and shock, of objective affairs. This doctrine was met by the cry of "subjectivism"! It had seemed to its author to be a criticism, on grounds at once naturalistic and ethical, of the ground proposition of subjectivism. Why this diversity of interpretations? So far as the writer can judge, it is due to the fact that certain things characteristic of practical life, such things as lack and need, conflict and clash, desire and effort, loss and satisfaction, had been frankly referred to reality; and to the further fact that the function and structure of knowing were systematically connected with these practical features. These conceptions are doubtless radical enough; the latter was perhaps more or less revolutionary. The probability, the antecedent probability, was that hostile critics would have easy work in pointing out specific errors of fact and interpretation. But no: the simpler, the more effective method, was to dismiss the whole thing as anarchic subjectivism.

This was and remains food for thought. I have been able to find but one explanation: In current philosophy, everything of a practical nature is regarded as "merely" personal, and the "merely" has the force of denying legitimate standing in the court of cosmic jurisdiction. This

conception seems to me the great and the ignored assumption in contemporary philosophy: many who might shrink from the doctrine if expressly formulated hang desperately to its implications. Yet surely as an underlying assumption, it is sheer prejudice, a culture-survival. If we suppose the traditions of philosophic discussion wiped out and philosophy starting afresh from the most active tendencies of to-day, – those striving in social life, in science, in literature, and art, – one can hardly imagine any philosophic view springing up and gaining credence, which did not give large place, in its scheme of things, to the practical and personal, and to them without employing disparaging terms, such as phenomenal, merely subjective, and so on. Why, putting it mildly, should what gives tragedy, comedy, and poignancy to life, be excluded from things? Doubtless, what we call life, what we take to be genuinely vital, is not all of things, but it is a part of things; and is that part which counts most with the philosopher – unless he has quite parted with his ancient dignity of lover of wisdom. What becomes of philosophy so far as humane and liberal interests are concerned, if, in an age when the person and the personal loom large in politics, industry, religion, art, and science, it contents itself with this parrot cry of phenomenalism, whenever the personal comes into view? When science is carried by the idea of evolution into introducing into the world the principles of initiative, variation, struggle, and selection; and when social forces have driven into bankruptcy absolutistic and static dogmas as authorities for the conduct of life, it is trifling for philosophy to decline to look the situation in the face. The relegation, as matter of course, of need, of stress and strain, strife and satisfaction, to the merely personal and the merely personal to the limbo of something which is neither flesh, fowl, nor good red herring, seems the thoughtless rehearsal of ancestral prejudice.

When we get beyond the echoing of tradition, the sticking point seems to be the relation of knowledge to the practical function of things. Let reality be in itself as “practical” as you please, but let not this practical character lay profane hands on the ark of truth. Every new mode of interpreting life – every new gospel – is met with the charge of antinomialism. An imagination bound by custom apprehends the restrictions that are relaxed and the checks that are removed, but not the inevitable responsibilities and tests that the new idea brings in. And so the conception that knowledge makes a difference in and to things looks licentious to those who fail to see that the necessity of doing well this business, of making the right difference puts intelligence under bonds it never yet has known: most of all in philosophy, the most gayly irresponsible of the procedures, and the most irresponsively sullen, of the historic fruits of intelligence.

Why should the idea that knowledge makes a difference to and in things be antecedently objectionable? If one is already committed to a belief that Reality is neatly and finally tied up in a packet without loose ends, unfinished issues or new departures, one would object to knowledge making a difference just as one would object to any other impertinent obtruder. But if one believes that the world itself is in transformation, why should the notion that knowledge is the most important mode of its modification and the only organ of its guidance be *a priori* obnoxious?

There is, I think, no answer save that the theory of knowledge has been systematically built up on the notion of a static universe, so that even those who are perfectly free in accepting the lessons of physics and biology concerning moving energy and evolution, and of history concerning the constant transformation of man's affairs (science included), retain an unquestioning belief in a theory of knowledge which is out of any possible harmony with their own theory of the matters to be known. Modern epistemology, having created the idea that the way to frame right conceptions is to analyze knowledge, has strengthened this view. For it at once leads to the view that realities must themselves have a theoretic and intellectual complexion – not a practical one. This view is naturally congenial to idealists; but that realists should so readily play into the hands of idealists by asserting what, on the basis of a formal theory of knowledge, realities must be, instead of accepting the guidance of things in divining what knowledge *is*, is an anomaly so striking as to support the view that the notion of static reality has taken its last stand in ideas about knowledge. Take, for example, the most striking, because the extreme case – knowledge of a past event. It is absurd to suppose that knowledge makes a difference to the final or appropriate content of knowledge: to the subject-matter which fulfils the requirements of knowing. In this case, it would get in its own way and trip itself up in endless regress. But it seems the very superstition of intellectualism to suppose that this fact about knowledge can decide what is the nature of that reference to the past which when rightly made is final. No doctrine about knowledge can hinder the belief – if there be sufficient specific evidence for it – that what we know as past may be something which has *irretrievably* undergone just the difference which knowledge makes.

Now arguments against pragmatism – by which I mean the doctrine that reality possesses practical character and that this character is most efficaciously expressed in the function of intelligence¹ – seem to fall

¹ This definition, in the present state of discussion, is an arbitrary or personal one. The text does not mean that "pragmatism" is currently used exclusively in this sense;

blandly into this fallacy. They assume that to hold that knowledge makes a difference in existences is equivalent to holding that it makes a difference in the object to *be* known, thus defeating its own purpose; witless that the reality which is the appropriate object of knowledge in a given case may be precisely a reality in which knowing has succeeded in making the needed difference. This question is not one to be settled by manipulation of the concept of knowledge, nor by dialectic discussion of its essence or nature. It is a question of facts, a question of what knowing exists as in the scheme of existence. If things undergo change without thereby ceasing to be real, there can be no *formal* bar to knowing being one specific kind of change in things, nor to its test being found in the successful carrying into effect of the kind of change intended. If knowing be a change in a reality, then the more knowing reveals this change, the more transparent, the more adequate, it is. And if all existences are in transition, then the knowledge which treats them as if they were something of which knowledge is a kodak fixation is just the kind of knowledge which refracts and perverts them. And by the same token a knowing which actively participates in a change in the way to effect it in the needed fashion would be the type of knowing which is valid. If reality be itself in transition – and this doctrine originated not with the objectionable pragmatist but with the physicist and naturalist and moral historian – then the doctrine that knowledge *is* reality making a particular and specified sort of change in itself seems to have the best chance at maintaining a theory of knowing which itself is in wholesome touch with the genuine and valid.

II

If the ground be cleared of *a priori* objections, and if it be evident that pragmatism cannot be disposed of by any formal or dialectic manipulations of “knowledge” or “truth,” but only by showing that some specific things are not of the sort claimed, we may consider some common sense affiliations of pragmatism. Common sense regards intelligence as having a purpose and knowledge as amounting to something. I once heard a physicist, quite innocent of the pragmatic controversy, remark that the knowledge of a mechanic or farmer was what the Yankee calls *gumption* – acknowledgment of things in their belongings and uses, and that to his mind natural science was only *gumption* on a larger scale: the convenient cataloguing and arranging of a whole lot of things with reference to their most efficacious services. Popularly, good

marks the sense in which it *is* used in this paper; and the pragmatic movement is still so loose and variable that I judge one has a right to fix his own meaning provided he serves notice and adheres to it.

judgment is judgment as to the relative values of things: good sense is horse sense, ability to take hold of things right end up, to fit an instrument to an obstacle, to select resources apt for a task. To be reasonable is to recognize things in their offices as obstacles and as resources. Intelligence, in its ordinary use, is a practical term; ability to size up matters with respect to the needs and possibilities of the various situations in which one is called to do something; capacity to envisage things in terms of the adjustments and adaptations they make possible or hinder. Our objective test of the presence or absence of intelligence is influence upon behavior. No capacity to make adjustments means no intelligence; conduct evincing management of complex and novel conditions means a high degree of reason. Such conditions at least suggest that a reality-to-be-known, a reality which is the appropriate subject-matter of knowledge is reality-of-use-and-in-use, direct or indirect, and that a reality which is not in any sort of use, or bearing upon use, may go hang, *so far as knowledge is concerned*.

No one, I suppose, would deny that all knowledge issues in some action which changes things to some extent – be the action only a more deliberate maintenance of a course of conduct already instinctively entered upon. When I see a sign on the street corner I can turn or go on, knowing what I am about. The perceptions of the scientist need have no such overt or “utilitarian” uses, but surely after them he behaves differently, as an inquirer if in no other way; and the cumulative effect of such changes finally modifies the overt action of the ordinary man. That knowing, *after the event*, makes a difference of this sort, few I suppose would deny: if that were all pragmatism means, it would perhaps be accepted as a harmless truism. But there is a further question of fact: just how is the “consequent” action related to the “precedent” knowledge? When is “after the event”? What degree of continuity exists? Is the difference between knowing and acting intelligently one of kind or simply one of dominant quality? How does a thing, if it is not already in change in the knowing, manage to issue at its term in action? Moreover, do not the changes actively effected constitute the whole *import* of the knowledge, and hence its final measure and test of validity? If it merely *happens* that knowing when it is done with passes into some action, by what miracle is the subsequent action so pat to the situation? Is it not rather true that the “knowledge” is instituted and framed in anticipation of the consequent issue, and, in the degree in which it is wise and prudent, is held open to revision during it? Certainly the moralist (one might quote, for example, Goethe, Carlyle, and Mazzini) and the common man often agrees that full knowledge, adequate assurance, of reality is found only in the issue which fulfils ideas; that we have to do a doctrine to *know* its truth; otherwise it is only dogma or doctrinaire

programme. Experimental science is a recognition that no idea is entitled to be termed knowledge till it has passed into such overt manipulation of physical conditions as constructs the object to which the idea refers. If one could get rid of his traditional logical theories and set to work afresh to frame a theory of knowledge on the basis of the procedure of the common man, the moralist and the experimentalist, would it be the forced or the natural procedure to say that the realities which we *know*, which we are sure of, are precisely those realities that have taken shape in and through the procedures of knowing?

I turn to another type of consideration. Certainly one of the most genuine problems of modern life is the reconciliation of the scientific view of the universe with the claims of the moral life. Are judgments in terms of the redistribution of matter in motion (or some other closed formula) alone valid? Or are accounts of the universe in terms of possibility and desirability, of initiative and responsibility, also valid? There is no occasion to expatiate on the importance of the moral life, nor upon the supreme importance of intelligence within the moral life. But there does seem to be occasion for asking how moral judgments – judgments of the would and should – relate themselves to the world of scientific knowledge. To frame a theory of knowledge which makes it necessary to deny the validity of moral ideas, or else to refer them to some other and separate kind of universe from that of common sense and science, is both provincial and arbitrary. The pragmatist has at least tried to face, and not to dodge, the question of how it is that moral and scientific “knowledge” can both hold of one and the same world. And whatever the difficulties in his proffered solution, the conception that scientific judgments are to be assimilated to moral is closer to common sense than is the theory that validity is to be denied of moral judgments because they do not square with a preconceived theory of the nature of the world to which scientific judgments must refer. And all moral judgments are about changes to be made.

III

I turn to one affiliation of the pragmatic theory with the results of recent science. The necessity for the occurrence of an event in the way of knowledge, of an organism which reacts or behaves in a specific way, would seem to be as well established as any scientific proposition. It is a peculiar fact, a fact fit to stir curiosity, that the rational function seems to be intercalated in a scheme of practical adjustments. The parts and members of the organism are certainly not there primarily for pure intellection or for theoretic contemplation. The brain, the last physical organ of thought, is a part of the same practical machinery for bringing about adaptation of the environment to the life requirements of the organism,

to which belong legs and hand and eye. That the brain frees organic behavior from complete servitude to immediate physical conditions, that it makes possible the liberation of energy for remote and ever expanding ends is, indeed, a precious fact, but not one which removes the brain from the category of organic devices of behavior.² That the organ of thinking, of knowledge, was at least originally an organ of conduct, few, I imagine, will deny. And even if we try to believe that the cognitive function has supervened as a different operation, it is difficult to believe that the transfiguration has been so radical that knowing has lost all traces of its connection with vital impulse. But unless we so assume, have we any alternatives except to hold that this continual presence of vital impulse is a disturbing and refracting factor which forever prevents knowledge from reaching its own aim; or else that a certain promoting, a certain carrying forward of the vital impulse, importing certain differences in things, is the aim of knowledge?

The problem cannot be evaded – save ostrich wise – by saying that such considerations are “merely genetic,” or “psychological,” having to do only with the origin and natural history of knowing. For the point is that the organic reaction, the behavior of the organism, affects the *content* of awareness. The subject-matter of all awareness is thing-related-to-organism – related as stimulus direct or indirect or as material of response, present or remote, ulterior or achieved. No one – so far as I know – denies this with respect to the perceptual field of awareness. Pains, pleasures, hunger, and thirst, all “secondary” qualities, involve inextricably the “interaction” of organism and environment. The perceptual field is distributed and arranged as the possible field of selective reactions of the organism at its centre. Up and down, far and near, before and behind, right and left, hard and soft (as well as white and black, bass and alto), involve reference to a centre of behavior.

This material has so long been the stock in trade of both idealistic arguments and proclamations of the agnostic “relativity” of knowledge that philosophers have grown weary of listening. But even this lethargy might be quickened by a moderate hospitality to the pragmatic interpretation. That red, or far and near, or hard and soft, or big and little, involve a relation between organism and environment, is no more an argument for idealism than is the fact that water involves a relation between hydrogen and oxygen.³ It is, however, an argument for the

² It is interesting to note how the metaphysical puzzles regarding “parallelism,” “interaction,” “automatism,” the relation of “consciousness” to “body,” evaporate when one ceases isolating the brain into a peculiar physical substrate of mind at large, and treats it simply as one portion of the body as the instrumentality of adaptive behavior.

³ I owe this illustration to my colleague, Dr. Montague.

ultimately practical value of these distinctions – that they are *differences* made in what things would have been without organic behavior – differences made not by “consciousness” or “mind,” but by the organism as the active centre of a system of activities. Moreover, the whole agnostic sting of the doctrine of “relativity” lies in the assumption that the ideal or aim of knowledge is to repeat or copy a prior existence – in which case, of course, the making of contemporaneous differences by the organism in the very fact of awareness would get in the way and forever hinder the knowledge function from the fulfilment of its proper end. Knowledge, awareness, in this case suffers from an impediment which no surgery can better. But if the aim of knowing be precisely to make *certain* differences in an environment, to carry on to *favorable issue*, by the readjustment of the organism, certain changes going on indifferently in the environment, then the fact that the changes of the organism enter pervasively into the subject-matter of awareness is no restriction or perversion of knowledge, but part of the fulfilment of its end.

The only question would then be whether the *proper* reactions take place. The whole agnostic, positivistic controversy is flanked by a single move. The issue is no longer an ideally necessary but actually impossible copying, *versus* an improper but unavoidable modification of reality through organic inhibitions and stimulations: but it is the right, the economical, the effective, and, if one may venture, the useful and satisfactory reaction *versus* the wasteful, the enslaving, the misleading, and the confusing reaction. The presence of organic responses, influencing and modifying every content, every subject-matter of awareness, is the undoubted fact. But the significant thing is the *way* organic behavior enters in – the *way* it influences and modifies. We assign very different values to different types of “knowledge,” – or subject-matters involving organic attitudes and operations. Some are only guesses, opinions, suspicious characters; others are “knowledge” in the honorific and eulogistic sense – science; some turn out mistakes, blunders, errors. Whence and how this discrimination of character in what is taken at its own time to be good knowledge? Why and how is the matter of some “knowledge” genuine-knowing and of other mis-knowing? Awareness is itself a blanket term, covering, in the same bed, delusion, doubt, confusion, ambiguity, and definition, organization, logical conclusiveness assured by evidence and reason. Any naturalistic or realistic theory is committed to the idea that all of these terms bear impartially the same relation to things considered as sheer existences. What we must have in any case is the same existences – the same in kind – only differently arranged or linked up. But why then the tremendous difference in value? And if the unnaturalist, the non-realist, says the difference is one of existential kind, made by the working here malign, there benign, of “con-

sciousness," "psychical" operations and states, upon the existences which are the direct subject-matter of knowledge, there is still the problem of discriminating the conditions and nature of the respective beneficent and malicious interventions of the peculiar "existence" labelled consciousness.⁴ The realness of error, ambiguity, doubt and guess poses a problem. It is a problem which has perplexed philosophy so long and has led to so many speculative adventures, that it would seem worth while, were it only for the sake of variety, to listen to the pragmatic solution. It is the business of that organic adaptation involved in all knowing to make a *certain* difference in reality, but *not* to make any old difference, any casual difference. The right, the true and good, difference is that which carries out satisfactorily the specific purpose for the sake of which knowing occurs. All manufactures are the product of an activity, but it does not follow that all manufactures are equally good. And so all "knowledges" are differences made in things by knowing, but some differences are not calculated or wanted in the knowing, and hence are disturbers and interlopers when they come – while others fulfil the intent of the knowing, being in such harmony with the consistent behavior of the organism as to reinforce and enlarge its functioning. A mistake is literally a mishandling; a doubt is a temporary suspense and vacillation of reactions; an ambiguity is the tension of alternative but incompatible mode of responsive treatment; an inquiry is a tentative and retrievable (because intra-organic) mode of activity entered upon prior to launching upon a knowledge which is public, ineluctable – without anchors to windward – *because* it has taken physical effect through overt action.

It is practically all one to say that the norm of honorable knowing is to make no difference in *its* object, and that its aim is to attain and buttress a specific kind of difference in reality. Knowing fails in its business if it makes a change in its *own* object – that is a mistake; but its own object is none the less a prior existence changed in a certain way. Nor is this a play upon the two senses – end and subject-matter – of "object." The organism has its appropriate functions. To maintain, to expand adequate functioning is its business. This functioning does not occur *in vacuo*. It involves co-operative and readjusted changes in the cosmic medium. Hence the appropriate subject-matter of awareness is not reality at large, a metaphysical heaven to be mimeographed at many removes upon a badly constructed mental carbon paper which yields at best only fragmentary, blurred, and erroneous copies. Its proper and

⁴ Of course on the theory I am interested in expounding, the so-called action of "consciousness" means simply the organic release in the way of behavior which are the conditions of awareness, and which also modify its content.

legitimate object is that relationship of organism and environment in which functioning is most amply and effectively attained; or by which, in case of obstruction and consequent needed experimentation, its later eventual free course is most facilitated. As for the other reality, meta-physical reality at large, it may, so far as awareness is concerned, go to its own place.

For ordinary purposes, that is for practical purposes, the truth and the realness of things are synonymous. We are all children who say "really and truly." A reality which is so taken in organic response as to lead to subsequent reactions that are off the track and aside from the mark, while it is, existentially speaking, perfectly real, is not *good* reality. It lacks the hallmark of value. Since it is a certain *kind* of object which we want, that which will be as favorable as possible to a consistent and liberal or growing functioning, it is this kind, the *true* kind, which for us monopolizes the title of reality. Pragmatically, teleologically, this identification of truth and "reality" is sound and reasonable: rationalistically, it leads to the notion of the duplicate versions of reality, one absolute and static because exhausted; the other phenomenal and kept continually on the jump because otherwise its own inherent nothingness would lead to its total annihilation. Since it is only genuine or sincere things, things which are good for what they pretend to in the way of consequences, that we want or are after, *morally* they alone are "real."

IV

So far we have been dealing with awareness as a fact – a fact there like any fact – and have been concerned to show that the subject-matter of awareness is, in any case, things in process of change; and in such change that the knowing function takes a hand in trying to guide it or steer it, so that *some* (and *not* other) differences accrue. But what about the awareness itself? What happens when it is made the subject-matter of awareness? What sort of a thing is it? It is, I submit, mere sophistication (futile at that), to argue either that we cannot become aware of awareness without involving ourselves in an endless regress, or that whenever we are aware of anything we are thereby necessarily aware of awareness once for all, so that it has no character save this purely formal and empty one. Taken concretely, awareness is an event with certain specifiable conditions. We may indeed be aware of it formally, as a bare fact, just as we may be cognizant of an explosion without knowing anything of its nature. But we may also be aware of it in a curious and analytic spirit, undertaking to study it in detail. This inquiry, like any other inquiry, proceeds by determining conditions and consequences. Here awareness is a characteristic fact, presenting to inquiry its own characteristic ear-marks: and a valid knowledge of awareness is the

same sort of thing as valid knowledge of the spectrum or of a trotting horse; it proceeds generically in the same way and must satisfy the same generic tests.

What, then, is awareness found to be? The following answer, dogmatically summary in form, involves positive difficulties, and glides over many points where our ignorance is still too great. But it represents a general trend of scientific inquiry, carried on, I hardly need say, on its own merits without respect to the pragmatic controversy. Awareness means *attention*, and attention means a crisis of some sort in an existent situation; a forking of the roads of some material, a tendency to go this way and that. It represents something the matter, something out of gear, or in some way menaced, insecure, problematical and strained. This state of tension, of ambiguous indications, projects and tendencies, is not merely in the "mind," it is nothing merely emotional. It is in the facts of the situation as transitive facts; the emotional or "subjective" disturbance is just a part of the larger disturbance. And if, employing the *language* of psychology, we say that attention is a phenomenon of conflicting habits, being the process of resolving this conflict by finding an act which functions all the factors concerned, this language does not make the facts "merely psychological" – whatever that means.⁵ The habits are as biologic as they are "personal," and as cosmic as they are biologic. They are the total order of things expressed in one way; just as a physical or chemical phenomenon is the same order expressed in another way. The statement in terms of conflict and readjustment of habits is at most one way of locating the disturbance in *things*; it furnishes no substitute for, or rival of, reality, and no "psychical" duplication.

If this be true, then awareness, even in its most perplexed and confused state, a state of maximum doubt and precariousness of subject-matter, means things entering, *via* the particular thing known as organism, into a peculiar condition of differential – or additive – change. How can we refuse to raise and consider the question of how things in this condition are related to the prior state which emerges into it, and to the subsequent state of things into which it issues?⁶

⁵ What does it mean? Does the objectivity of fact disappear when the biologist gives it a biological statement? Why not object to his conclusions on the ground that they are "merely" biological?

⁶ It is this question of *the relation to one of different successive states of things* which the pragmatic method substitutes for the epistemological inquiry of how one sort of existence, purely mental, temporal but not spatial, immaterial, made up of sublimated gaseous consciousness, can get beyond itself and have valid reference to a totally different kind of existence – spatial and extended; and how it can receive impressions from the latter, etc., – all the questions which constitute that species of

Suppose the case to be awareness of a chair. Suppose that this awareness comes only when there is some problematic affair with which the chair is in some way – in whatever degree, of remoteness concerned. It may be a wonder whether that is a chair at all; or whether it is strong enough to stand on; or where I shall put it; or whether it is worth what I paid for it; or, as not infrequently happens, the situation involved in uncertainty may be some philosophic matter in which the perception of the chair is cited as evidence or illustration. (Humorously enough, the awareness of it may even be cited in the course of a philosophic argument intended to show that awareness has nothing to do with situations of incompleteness and ambiguity.) Now what of the change the chair undergoes in entering this way into a situation of perplexed inquiry? Is this any part of the genuineness of that chair with which we are concerned? If not, where is the change found? In something totally different called “consciousness”? In that case how can the operations of inquiry, of observation and memory and reflection, ever have any assurance of getting referred back to the *right* object? Positively the presumption is that the *chair-of-which-we-are-speaking*, is the chair of *which-we-are-speaking*; it is the *same* thing that is out there which is involved also in the doubtful situation. Moreover, the reference to “consciousness” as the exclusive locus of the doubt only repeats the problem, for “consciousness,” by the theory under consideration, means, after all, only the chair as concerned in the problematical situation. The *physical* chair remains unchanged, you say. Surely, if as is altogether likely, what is *meant* by physical is precisely *that part* of the chair as object of total awareness which remains unaffected, for certain possible purposes, by entering for certain other actual purposes into the situation of awareness. But how can we segregate, *antecedently* to experimental inquiry, the “physical” chair from the chair which is now the object to be known; into what contradictions do we fall when we attempt to define the object of one awareness not in its own terms, but in terms of a selected type of object which is the appropriate subject-matter of some other cognizance!

But awareness means inquiry as well as doubt – these are the negative and positive, the retrospective and the prospective relationships of the thing. This means a genuinely *additive* quale – one of readjustment in prior things.⁷ I know the dialectic argument that nothing can assume a new relation, because in order to do so it must already be completely related – when it comes from an absolutist I can understand why he

impressions from the latter, etc., – all the questions which constitute that species of confirmed intellectual lock-jaw called epistemology.

⁷ We have arrived here, upon a more analytic platform, at the point made earlier concerning the fact that knowing *issues* in action which changes things.

holds it, even if I cannot understand the idea itself. But apart from this conceptual reasoning we must follow the lead of our subject-matter; and when we find a thing assuming new relations in the process of inquiry, must accept the fact and frame our theory of things and of knowing to include it, not assert that it is impossible because we already have a theory of knowledge which precludes it. In inquiry, the existence which has become doubtful always undergoes experimental reconstruction. This may be largely imaginative or "speculative." We may view certain things *as if* placed under varying conditions, and consider what then happens to them. But such differences are really transformative so far as they go, – and besides, such inquiries never reach conclusions finally justifiable. In important and persistent inquiry, we insist upon something in the way of actual physical making – be it only a diagram. In other words, *science*, or knowing in its honorific sense, is experimental, involving physical construction. We insist upon something being *done about* it, that we may see how the idea when carried into effect comports with the other things through which our activities are hedged in and released. To avoid this conclusion by saying that knowing makes no difference in the "truth," but merely is the preliminary exercise which discovers it, is that old friend whose acquaintance we have repeatedly made in this discussion: the fallacy of confusing an existence anteceding knowing with the object which terminates and fulfils it. For knowing to make a difference in its own final term is gross self-stultification; it is none the less so when the aim of knowing is precisely to guide things straight up to this term. When "truth" means the accomplished introduction of certain new differences into conditions, why be foolish enough to make other and more differences, which are not wanted since they are irrelevant and misleading?

Were it not for the teachings of sad experience, it would not be necessary to add that the change in environment made by knowing is not a total or miraculous change. Transformation, readjustment, reconstruction all imply prior existences: existences which have characters and behaviors of their own which must be accepted, consulted, humored, manipulated or made light of, in all kinds of differing ways in the different contexts of different problems. Making a difference in reality does not mean making any more difference than we find by experimentation can be made under the given conditions – even though we may still hope for different fortune another time under other circumstances. Still less does it mean making a thing into an unreality, though the pragmatist is sometimes criticised as if any change in reality must be a change into non-reality. There are difficulties indeed, both dialectic, and real or practical, in the fact of change – in the fact that only a permanent can change and that change is alteration of a

permanent. But till we enjoin botanists and chemists from referring to changes and transformations in their subject-matter on the ground that for anything to change means for it to part with its reality, we may as well permit the logician to make similar references.

V

Sub specie aeternitatis? or *sub specie generationis?* I am susceptible to the æsthetic charm of the former ideal – who is not? There are moments of relaxation: there are moments when the demand for peace, to be let alone and relieved from the continual claim of the world in which we live that we be up and doing something about it, seems irresistible; when the responsibilities imposed by living in a moving universe seem intolerable. We contemplate with equal mind the thought of the eternal sleep. But, after all, this is a matter in which reality and not the philosopher is the court of final jurisdiction. Outside of philosophy, the question seems fairly settled; in science, in poetry, in social organization, in religion – wherever religion is not hopelessly at the mercy of a Frankenstein philosophy which it originally called into being as its own slave. Under such circumstances there is danger that the philosophy which tries to escape the form of generation by taking refuge under the form of eternity will only come under the form of a by-gone generation. To try to escape from the snares and pitfalls of time by recourse to traditional problems and interests – rather than that let the dead bury their own dead. Better it is for philosophy to err in active participation in the living struggles and issues of its own age and times than to maintain an immune monastic impeccability, without relevancy and bearing in the generating ideas of its contemporary present. In the one case, it will be respected, as we respect all virtue that attests its sincerity by sharing in the perplexities and failures, as well as in the joys and triumphs, of endeavor. In the other case, it bids fair to share the fate of whatever preserves its gentility, but not its activity, in descent from better days; namely, to be snugly ensconced in the consciousness of its own respectability.

THE GENESIS OF THE CATEGORIES

William K. Wright. "The Genesis of the Categories." *Journal of Philosophy* 10.24 (20 November 1913): 645-57.

I

Pragmatists have always contended that the categories, the general and basic principles of thought in terms of which all our experience is organized, such as space, time, thing, person, number, identity, contradiction, substance, causation, and truth, are at bottom instrumental and functional. They have come into existence, persisted, and come to dominate all our thought and to appear as self-evident principles simply because they have been so eminently successful in organizing human experience and making possible the carrying-out of human purposes and solution of human problems that it now seems impossible that man ever could or would dispense with them.¹ While, however, pragmatists have always thought of the categories as instrumental and functional in the biological, and more particularly the psychological sense, they have hitherto been forced to describe them schematically in the terminology of formal logic as "postulates" or "hypotheses," expressions never intended to be taken literally, and merely employed in default of knowledge of the historical details of their actual psychological development.²

Recent developments in psychology and sociology have now rendered it possible to trace some of the main features of the psychological evolution of the categories from a pragmatistic standpoint. In outlining these, the writer can hardly hope that all of what he has to say will accord with all of the divergent opinions of individual pragmatists, but he trusts that it will indicate a general method of treatment of this problem that will meet with their approval. In avoiding polemic, he does not wish to convey the impression that he regards pragmatism as an

¹ This common pragmatistic doctrine is found in James's "Pragmatism" and "Meaning of Truth," and, though less explicitly, it appears in connection with the discussion of hypothesis in Dewey's "Studies in Logical Theory" and "Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy." Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, however, deserves the credit for developing this side of pragmatism most fully, in "Axioms as Postulates" (an article in a volume of essays edited by Sturt and entitled *Personal Idealism*), and in his recent "Formal Logic."

² Schiller, "Axioms as Postulates," pages 122-24.

established doctrine, but rather that constructive exposition is probably at the present time the better way of winning converts to the pragmatic faith.

It is now safe to say that before *Pithecanthropus alalus* evolved into primitive man by learning to speak and to think, and by devising categories to assist him in the process, he already possessed anticipations of some of our categories in the organizations of his sense percepts. Many animals discriminate accurately and precisely the positions of different objects, and find their way home over long distances of space and during considerable time intervals. As no one would credit animals with the possession of the categories of thought, this capacity must be attributed to the nature of their sense percepts and coordinated motor responses. We must also credit to animal perception the capacity to discriminate between animate and inanimate objects, since they manifest a mechanical mode of behavior toward the latter which is in sharp contrast with the anthropopathic behavior exercised toward other animals and toward human beings.³ In a certain sense, therefore, the distinctions involved in some, at least, of the categories, *viz.*, space, time, thing, and person, are present in the sense percepts of animals. It is reasonable to suppose that if it were possible to eliminate the thought elements that are fused with immediate sense perception in human adult experience that we should find similar qualities or relations or elements or functions – call them what you will – in the pure percepts of human beings. However this may be, it is clear that historically and phylogenetically perceptual elements anticipatory of some of the categories existed prior to the genesis of thought.

What is the functional significance of these perceptual elements from the point of view of pragmatism? It is clear that their pragmatic significance is different from that of the categories. Though instrumental, they are so in a different sense. These perceptual elements have persisted because they are functional in a strictly biological sense. Due originally to spontaneous or Mendelian variations or what you will, the individuals whose behavior was perceptually organized in terms of them were better equipped in the struggle for life, and so survived as a result of natural, or perhaps of organic, selection. The perception of things or objects is functional in a second sense, also. What, for the same animal, would be one object upon one occasion might be several objects upon another occasion. For instance, a bunch of grapes might be perceived as a single object by a hungry monkey if he could grasp them all at once, whereas they would be separate objects if he could only pluck them one

³ J. H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, New York: 1912. Chap. III., and the literature therein cited.

by one through the bars of his cage. What will be perceived as a thing or object, therefore, varies according to the practical demands of a situation.

These perceptual anticipations as they exist in animals differ from the categories of human thought in two very important respects. In the first place, while the animal can pass successively from one place to another in the direction of home, guided by successive sense stimulations, and in this sense the space of its past experience is organized for it into a system, this system is probably never present before its imagination in ideas subject to its control, so that it can pass freely from one image or idea to another.⁴ Still less, in the second place, can it communicate or cooperate with others, except to the extent that they are likewise stimulated by successive sense stimuli evoking similar reactions. Animals do not form societies in the human sense.

Men, then, notably differ from animals in the possession of free images and ideas and in the capacity for social life. When primitive men first came into possession of free images and ideas, and, as gregarious animals, felt the impulse to use these images and ideas to serve the purposes of their social life, they were confronted by the problem that provoked the formation of categories.

The most convenient example for us to consider first is the category of space. Newly possessed of free images and ideas, primitive men were conscious, not only of the objects of immediate sense perception at a given moment, but also of images of all sorts of other objects which they had perceived before, or only dreamed of or otherwise imagined, but which had spatial characteristics like perceived objects. Hence, some method of control of these images, so that they be consciously thought of in relation to objects immediately perceived, became necessary. Moreover, this method of control must be some common standard or medium, the same for every one in the tribe, so that all could understand one another and cooperate for common purposes. The most available cognitive material which they had was utilized for the purpose, and, in the case of various native races reported to us, this was the tribal camp. If the camp consisted of four divisions, each allotted to a clan or phratry, the rest of space was divided into four grand divisions, each beginning with the space occupied by one of the clans and extended outward indefinitely, and associated in some sense with the clan totem.⁵

⁴ At least beyond a very limited extent. Cf. S.J. Holmes, *The Evolution of Animal Intelligence*, Chaps. XII. and XIII.; M. F. Washburn, *The Animal Mind*, Chaps. XI. and XII.

⁵ Durkheim and Mauss, *Année Sociologique*, VI., page 47 ff.; E. Durkheim, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (Paris: Alcan. 1912), pages 15–17.

The Zuñi Indians have a very elaborate conceptual space divided into seven divisions corresponding to the original seven clans of their pueblo.⁶ When the tribal camp is circular in form, as among the Zuñis, the whole of space is an immense circle. The original significance of the Latin *mundus* and the Greek *κοσμος* seems to have been similar in principle.⁷

The differentiation of numbers above three or four is preceded by the use of concrete objects and portions of the body in calculations, a fact indicating that numbers are devices invented after men already knew how to calculate in order to facilitate the process.⁸ Both localities and numbers begin by being discrete, each with its own sacred and magical attributes, and space and numbers only become abstract and homogeneous media of thought with later evolution. So we may claim that the evolution of these categories has gone on strictly in accordance with pragmatic principles. As situations and emergencies arose out of the conditions of social life, the categories were revised and further differentiated in order more effectively to solve social problems and realize social ends. Their thoroughly functional and instrumental nature is evident.

The social and instrumental origin of the categories explains why the evolution of some of them was retarded in a manner that would otherwise be unaccountable. Animals consistently distinguish between animate and inanimate objects in their perception, and adopt different modes of behavior according. Why was primitive man unable to maintain this distinction in his sense perception, and to extend it to his free images and ideas, and organize his categories to that end? The problem of utilizing memory images of objects in their absence from perception would seem at once to have suggested comparison, and to have developed the laws of identity and contradiction. Such would doubtless have been the case had the evolution of the categories come directly from mechanical behavior, as we should logically suppose to have been the case. But, as a matter of fact, the evolution of the categories came rather illogically, following a devious route beginning with anthropopathic behavior. This was because primitive man's chief interest and attention was not so often directed towards inanimate as

⁵ Durkheim and Mauss, *Année Sociologique*, VI., page 47 ff.; E. Durkheim, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (Paris: Alcan, 1912), pages 15–17.

⁶ F. H. Cushing, "Zuñi Creation Myths," in 13th Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology.

⁷ F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, page 53.

⁸ L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, Chap. V. Paris: Alcan, 1912.

towards animate objects. The latter affected him in more different ways, and more intensely. Had interests involving mechanical behavior prompted man to attend chiefly to inanimate objects he would soon have learned to reckon upon the constant appearance of the same properties of objects under the same conditions, and to expect these to reappear to all other persons under the same conditions. Animate objects, however, do not reveal any such uniformities in so obvious a manner. There is not perfect uniformity in their behavior; their moods change, and some persons know things that others do not. So savages believe in metamorphoses, and in the existence of properties and objects that can be perceived only by certain persons, or by none at all.⁹

This explains why many savages, if they possess them at all, do not employ the principles of identity, contradiction, and causation in a manner at all comparable with ourselves. Instead, they make very large use of another category which Professor Lévy-Bruhl calls "the law of participation"¹⁰ – a kind of mystical category, partly cognitive, but partly affective, which it is difficult for us with our more differentiated and better controlled cognitive and affective states to understand. It is perhaps better to describe this law than to attempt to define it. Totemism furnishes illustrations of it. The Bororó of Brazil identify themselves with their totem, and see no difficulty in affirming that they are at the same time human beings and araras, a species of birds with red plumage. The *intichiuma* ceremonies of the Australian tribes reported by Spencer and Gillen imply a communion of essence in which the actual individual, the ancestral being which lives in him, and the animal or vegetable species which is his totem, participate. Whereas for our mentality these are necessarily three distinct realities, for the Australian the three are one only at the same time that they are three. The very word "to be" has a different meaning at this stage of culture from what it has for us.¹¹ For these savages it envelopes representations and the consciousness that experiences them in a kind of participation *felt* and *lived* rather than thought. It renders it possible for objects to be, in a manner hard for us to grasp, at the same time themselves and something other than themselves. The opposition between one and many, the same and the other, does not at this level impose the necessity of affirming one of these terms if one denies the other. At a higher level, after the felt unity of the tribe with the totem group has become less intense, and the principles of identity and contradiction more as we

⁹ Lévy-Bruhl, *op. cit.*, pages 40–45; 58–67.

¹⁰ Idem, Chap. II., and *passim*.

¹¹ Idem, page 94.

understand them, begin to emerge, we find tribes reported that are unable to believe that they can at one and the same time be men and totemic plants and animals.

For them the totemic emblem has become symbolic rather than literal and some sort of intermediaries must effect the union. The participation, in other words, is *represented*, and no longer immediately felt. When the Bororó reach this stage, Lévy-Bruhl predicts that they will no longer say that they are araras, but that their ancestors were such, that they are of the same essence with the araras, that they will become araras after their death, etc.¹²

The functional nature of the categories is evident in this. At the lowest level, savages employ the category of participation because it meets the needs that they consciously feel, and is serviceable in satisfying them. The individual is hardly conscious of his individuality as such, but he very vividly feels his unity with his clan and totem, and the law of participation expresses his feeling vividly and completely; it "works" in the pragmatic sense. At higher levels, where use is made of representative imagery, instead of mystical feeling to express the unity of the tribe with its totem, the explanation probably is that individualism is beginning to emerge. In many relations of life individuals have now become conscious of their separate interests, while in other relations they still feel the need of vivid appreciation of their tribal and totemic unity. Representative imagery and the higher level of analytic and synthetic thinking that accompanies it can distinguish between, and at the same time conserve, diverse values that immediate feeling could only fuse and confuse. So that in changed conditions, in response to changed demands, new thought categories, like identity and contradiction, "work" better because they can organize representations, and, therefore, supplant the felt category of participation.

The social and pragmatic origin of the category of cause and effect is equally evident. At the lowest level this category is so undifferentiated that it is impossible to identify antecedent and consequent and lines of necessary connection with any certainty. A chief in the Torres Straits could not understand why, one day, he was unsuccessful in fishing. Three or four days afterward an infant and two women in the village died. In his mind this explained the matter fully, and cleared him of all blame. As Lévy-Bruhl points out, it would be impossible in this case to say which was cause and which effect, since the unsuccessful fishing was explained by the deaths, and so you might say was the effect of them, while on the other hand it preceded them as if it were cause.¹³ All kinds

¹² Idem, page 431.

¹³ Op. cit., pages 333 ff.

of metamorphosis and action at a distance are believed in. Men can be born of rocks, stones can speak, the dead can become alive.¹⁴ At this level we have to do with a felt or confused force, sometimes called by name, *mana*, *wakonda*, *orenda*, indicating a stage in which the category of causation has not yet become clearly differentiated from the law of participation.¹⁵ Professor Durkheim maintains that this felt and at the same time impersonal force must be the collective force of society projected into physical objects, – or, as I think we might put it, it is anthropopathic behavior attributed to physical objects. His argument is as follows. (1) Such an idea of force could only come from felt inner experience, since the only forces that we can experience are those that we feel inwardly. The senses only reveal phenomena that succeed or follow one another, not force passing from one phenomenon to another. (2) This felt inward force can not be the individual's feeling of his own volition, for that would not seem to him to be an impersonal force. It therefore must be the feeling of social force or pressure, which would seem to the individual to be impersonal, since it is not due to any one in particular. When the category of cause and effect finally became differentiated, antecedent and consequent became discriminated, together with force and some sort of necessary connection. The last was the authority of society over the individual. When we think how the individual in the lower races is dominated by tribal customs at every band, customs handed down from time immemorial for which nobody is responsible, we realize that the notions of force and necessary connection could arise in this way, and make possible the notion of causation.

We may, therefore, claim that the evolution of cause and effect has been what the pragmatist would expect, – a gradual development prompted by human needs and purposes, of devices for the explanation and control of the outer world. When the race was young it devised tools from the vague feelings that constituted most of its inner experience, and invented the category of participation, which satisfied its desires for the time; when it had become more individualistic and discriminated better its representative images, it learned to distinguish antecedent and consequent and connected the two by the only impersonal tie of relationship that it knew, and this “worked” for a long time, and still “works” for ordinary men today. Finally, as a feature of the exact methods of modern natural science, highly abstract quantitative conceptions have supplanted the anthropomorphic notion of a causal

¹⁴ Idem., pages 518–28.

¹⁵ Cf. also Irving King, *The Development of Religion*, Chap. VI., and R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, Chap. IV., and *passim*.

force or efficacy, because the former furnish simpler and more effective tools for solving scientific problems. Nothing could be more thoroughly pragmatic than this evolution.

Space does not admit the discussion of other categories, such as time, substance and attribute, genus and species, which Professor Durkheim and his school have analyzed along similar lines. Enough has been said to show their general implications. It should be noted that in the use that I have made of their investigations in outlining the character of the psychological genesis of the categories from the point of view of pragmatism, I have carefully avoided making the account in any way dependent upon certain of the more controverted positions of these writers, like the doctrine of collective representations, Lévy-Bruhl's theory of a pre-logical mentality fundamentally different from our own, and Durkheim's theory that the categories are of religious origin. I have also avoided every implication of the doctrine of a social mind or consciousness existing in any sense independent of individual minds as a separate entity. Whatever may be the fate of such doctrines, the evidence that the categories have had a social origin, and that they have varied greatly in different societies and different stages of culture, seems incontrovertible. That the categories should be interpreted therefore from the pragmatistic standpoint as instrumental and functional in their nature, serving to control and govern human experience and accomplish human purposes, seems almost a corollary.

II

It is now necessary to consider the category of truth. For, from the point of view of pragmatism, truth must also be regarded as a category. It is a schema or concept by means of which we organize our perceptual and imaginal experience in order to accomplish our ends. Its genesis can be outlined in a manner similar to the categories already discussed. Like causation, and unlike space and time, the distinction between truth and error is a purely thought distinction, not anticipated in sense perception. To be sure, animals sometimes experience perceptual illusions, but the distinction between truth and error implies some sort of norm or standard that could only have occurred to man after he was able to form judgments and make comparisons. When he was puzzled whether he could safely act upon a memory image, and decided whether or not to do so, he was consciously facing the problem of truth and error.¹⁶ If the image led him to the results he desired, satisfied him, it was true; if it did

¹⁶ Before the problem became so explicit as this, the formation of meanings must have begun in the manner described by Professor G. H. Mead, *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. VII., pages 397-405.

not, it was false. *Any* sort of satisfaction following the acceptance of an idea probably made it true in the beginning.¹⁷ Very soon, however, man must as a rule in various fields of his conduct have learned to become more particular as to the kind of fulfillment an idea ought to have in order to be satisfactory. The physical environment is somewhat stiff and unyielding. Social requirements also bear heavily upon savages. The satisfaction requisite must soon have been referred to a social standard, and this must have included the other categories in the form that primitive men then possessed them. An idea to be true upon this second plane had to be verified by realizing its own intention and implications. Only on the first and lower plane can it be strictly said that "truth happens to an idea." On the higher plane the relation between an idea and its fulfillment must be more close and intimate.¹⁸

While truth, as it has been said, makes its appearance only with reflective thought, it has rather a definite instinctive foundation, more so than any of the other categories that we have considered. This is chiefly found in the instinct of curiosity and its accompanying emotion of wonder, which are prominent in the animals nearest to man.¹⁹ They delight in watching whatever is strange and novel in their perceptual experience, when not restrained by some conflicting instinct, like fear. Primitive man's curiosity, no doubt, was also evoked by whatever was strange and novel in the free play of his newly acquired free images and ideas; to him, as to us, reverie must have been a source of delight, and reverie I take to be the manifestation of curiosity with reference to the free play of images and ideas.²⁰ To employ the categories in the organization of novel perceptual and imaginal material, to work out *liaisons* and participations between things, to compare one idea with another and find points of identity and contrast, to devise causal explanations of

¹⁷ Perhaps savages who reply to a traveler's inquiry with the answer that they think will please him, regardless of the facts, imagine, for the time being, that they are telling him the truth? The honest but over-enthusiastic salesman and the passionate but fickle lover are analogous cases.

¹⁸ Professor Dewey's test of truth seems to me to be that of the second plane, while James's looser use of the pragmatic method corresponds to the more primitive plane. This latter has always survived to some extent, especially in the field of religion, where beliefs that would have been erroneous if tested by the standards of the higher plane have often survived, and in a sense "worked" by performing some social service. (Cf. Dewey, "What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical?" *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. V., pages 85-99).

¹⁹ W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, pages 57-59; *Body and Mind*, page 266.

²⁰ Professor Graham Wallas has convinced me of the very great importance of reverie in this connection, but it seems to me to be a mode of curiosity, and not a separate instinct or innate disposition.

things (at first no doubt as myths) – all such manipulation of images and ideas in terms of the categories must have been a delightful sport.

To be sure, most thinking done by individuals was and is prompted by other instincts than curiosity. All human instincts and sentiments on occasion demand the acquisition of knowledge (*i.e.*, the organization of percepts and images into an intellectual system by means of the categories). Very often curiosity is only the servant or auxiliary of other instincts, and, being evoked only to aid in their gratification, is easily satisfied with whatever thought material satisfies them. Such other instincts we call “practical” or “interested,” in contrast with curiosity which is “disinterested.” Probably there is no field of scientific knowledge or speculative thought in which the organization of images and ideas has not gone beyond the satisfaction of “practical” interests. Such truth, like all other, is instrumental and functional, – satisfying, as it does, human instinct. It is teleological in the sense that the instinct that prompts man to desire it for its own good, and makes for his own survival; but the man devoted to research is often as unconscious of this fact as he is of the teleology of the sex instinct when he falls in love. It is “disinterested” only in the somewhat Hibernian sense that it does not subserve “practical” interests.

Since, like the other categories, truth is a social creation, it is probably safe to say that most of the content of ideas organized by modern social groups under the category of truth owes its origin to the “disinterested” instinct of curiosity. Beliefs whose origin is more “interested” as a rule are not trustworthy and do not long survive. They either bump up against stubborn perceptual facts, or they twist the categories so badly out of shape (by straining the laws of identity, contradiction, causation, etc.), that it costs too much to maintain them. So that while the thinking of most individuals at any given moment is prompted by other motives than “disinterested” curiosity, the content of the judgments that they utilize in their thinking is for the most part drawn from the storehouse of the accepted truths of their social group, and this storehouse is chiefly stocked with truths that in the first instance were the fruit of “disinterested” curiosity.

The impulse to seek the gratification of curiosity in isolation from other impulses has become fortified by a certain moral sanction. Man has learned that the sort of cognitive material that satisfies the instinct of curiosity independently can be relied on, as a rule, in the long run to satisfy other interests and impulses most completely and most socially. He therefore sometimes hypostasizes this kind of truth as “disinterested truth,” “absolute truth,” and “truth for its own sake.” Wisdom, the mental habit or sentiment that prompts some men to seek such satis-

faction along definite lines and makes them efficient in so doing, early in moral evolution became a socially recognized virtue.²¹

The fact that truth is a social creation²² explains various of its features. It explains why it is seemingly universal, objective, necessary, and sometimes sacred in character. It appears to the individual to be universal because it is a social possession, not his private property and not different for him from what it is for the other members of his group. It is no respecter of persons. It is objective to him for much the same reason. He has not made it; and only to a slight extent can even the greatest scientist hope to change it. It is necessary because it has all the authority of the group behind it, and the individual must submit to it, for society will tolerate no one that disregards many of its truths. Another reason why it is necessary is because most of the beliefs thought by individuals to be true have been half unconsciously assimilated by them through imitation and suggestion; and, to those who have never considered the reasons why they were incorporated into the social body of truth, they seem self-evident because no one has ever questioned them. They are often sacred, because they are assimilated under religious, patriotic, and other associations that involve deep emotional feeling and sentiment. How many Americans to-day in ordinary ranks of life know why they believe in monogamy and a republican form of government! To how many do these beliefs seem necessary and sacred truths about which it would be distasteful to argue in cold blood! Yet each of these truths is limited in its acceptance to certain social groups of a national character.

Truth to-day is of many kinds. As we have seen, it may or it may not be the satisfaction of a specific instinct or group of instincts.²³ There are truths and truths. In a broad way, a truth may be declined as any cognitive material that is affectively satisfying to a social group so that it may be employed as an instrument to action. Where the affective pull of "interested" impulses is strong, any cognitive material is liable to be satisfactory in this sense if it is agreeable to these impulses, and does not obviously resist organization under the categories or patently contradict sense perception. Such a social group as the Christian Scientists appears

²¹ I have discussed the psychology of this and other virtues very summarily in an article in the *Philosophical Review*, July, 1918.

²² The evidence that all the objects of thought, physical as well as mental, are social in their origin may be cited in the support of the view that truth is a social creation. Cf. George H. Mead, *op. cit.*; E. S. Ames, "Social Consciousness and Its Object," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. VIII., pages 407-11.

²³ For a different view on this point, cf. Professor A. W. Moore, "Truth Value," *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. V., pages 429-36.

to be able to maintain beliefs that render them impermeable to a good deal of conflicting sense experience, and that probably come under the hoary law of participation, since they are irreconcilable with later categories. Such instances lie at one pole. At the opposite pole are the accepted principles of the more exact natural sciences, which have been clearly thought out in terms of the categories in their latest and most highly evolved forms, and have been thoroughly subjected to numerous perceptual and experimental tests. All of the accepted truths of modern society lie at one or the other of these poles or somewhere between. An adequate definition of truth must recognize these varying types. We can only deny the name truth to any accepted belief that satisfies a considerable social group by referring the belief to the standards of some other social group which we regard as superior. We may choose to reject the beliefs of the Christian Scientists because they conflict with natural science. In this case we identify ourselves with the natural scientists, choose to think in terms of their categories, and in consequence find the doctrines of Christian Science untrue. Truth, therefore, in the last analysis is what is thought to "work" because it satisfies the requirements of the highest social group to which we can appeal.

The categories, including under this term truth, have been treated as functional devices arising in human experience and aiding human societies to gain control of situations in which they find themselves so as to secure their ends. Is this not subjectivism?

It may be replied that if this conception deserves the name subjectivism, it is at least not individual, but social subjectivism. It is not solipsism, unless the Leviathan is the solipsist! The categories, as we have seen, are not the constructions of individuals. They are the accepted fundamental conceptions of an age, and only very gradually change from one age to another. They are the most permanent elements in human thought, and come to the individual with much of the universality and necessity that Kant attributed to them. It may therefore be said that the categories are real, if anything human is real. By means of them the members of human societies are able to adjust themselves to one another and to their physical environment, and to realize their purposes. They are real because they are effective instruments to action. This does not merely mean, as it seems to me, that they are real because they are postulates so valued by human beings that the latter would maintain their belief in them at whatever empirical cost, although it includes this. It further means that our experience has taught us that we may positively affirm that the universe, whatever its nature may be apart from us, is such that when human organisms come into experiential relations with it, their percepts and categories are fairly efficient in enabling them to effect an adjustment with it. It would be too bold,

however, to maintain, except as a postulate of faith (similar in principle to those of religion, though, perhaps, on the whole more consistently workable) that the categories in any constitutive or representative fashion interpret the universe as it exists apart from its interaction with human organisms. Surely the social subjectivism, if such it be, of this form of pragmatism deserves commendation for honestly confessing that there are limits to possible knowledge, and for not, like certain rival forms of contemporary philosophy, advancing specious arguments based on the impossibility of doubt, the ego-centric predicament, and the like, and claiming that our human categories are laws of things in themselves.

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INTRODUCTION

The instrumentalist philosophy of the Chicago pragmatists¹ was distinctively shaped by their social activism. John Dewey's involvement and leadership in a wide variety of regional and national organizations for education, labor, civil rights, and liberal politics elevated him as the most prominent figure of the movement. But all of the Chicago philosophers made significant contributions to their city's welfare. Dewey's University Laboratory School was a paradigm for improvements to Chicago city schools and for the progressive-education movement, and he and Mead championed industrial education. Dewey, Mead, and James Tufts wrote extensively on educational issues, and Tufts was an editor of *The School Review*. They also worked for better schools as members of the City Club, which Edward Ames joined as well. The City Club not only fought for more democratically controlled schools against political autocracy, but also took stands against corruption by party bosses, the hardships of poverty, and unfair labor practices. Jane Addams and Ella Flagg Young worked closely with the other pragmatists on these efforts. After many years of service as District Superintendent of Chicago Schools, Young joined the faculty of the Department of Pedagogy at Dewey's invitation. She subsequently became the President of the Illinois State Teachers' Association and the National Education Association, and the Superintendent of Education in Chicago (for each position, Flagg was its first female officer). Addams's Hull House inspired a generation of social workers for the Settlement House movement, applying Christian ethics and democratic principles to the problems of the working poor. Dewey served on the Hull House's first board of trustees, and Mead, Tufts, James Angell, and Addison Moore all sat on the board of directors of the University Settlement.

Labor relations were naturally at the heart of educational and political issues in Chicago. Dewey, Mead, and Tufts were the most involved, characteristically siding with labor in the expectation that unions and

¹ The introduction to the first volume of *The Chicago School of Pragmatism* outlines the school's instrumentalist version of pragmatism, its primary members, and their academic careers.

contractual negotiations were a stage necessary for the closer integration of economic decisions with all other social issues deliberated by a democracy. The City Club with Mead's leadership in the early 1900s investigated labor disputes and disruptions, publicized the worker's complaints, offered arbitration, and pressured owners to heed public sentiment. Tufts subsequently took leadership roles in labor issues, chairing the garment industry arbitration board and becoming president of the Illinois Association for Labor Legislation and chairman of the Illinois Committee on Social Legislation. His later writings were focused on the moral obligations of social cooperation and justice, and he edited *The International Journal of Ethics* for seventeen years. Edward Ames, in his additional capacity as minister of the Hyde Park Church for most of his adult life, also explored social values in the context of formulating a liberal and undogmatic theology. His pragmatism was reflected in his experimental church school curriculum and his aim to help his congregation integrate religion, as highest expression of community values, into all aspects of their lives.

All of the Chicago pragmatists exemplified the proper experimental relationship between philosophical reflection and social activism. They agreed that social conflicts are a natural stage of progress toward a greater harmonious coordination of individual aims and efforts. This progress can be mediated, they believed, by philosophical reflection toward new hypotheses suggesting more effective social relations and hence novel moral obligations. New social relations must respect present conditions and older relationships, looking only for gradual adjustment without absolute breaks in some vain leap toward a worshipped ideal. Ethical theory is transformed by this scheme of social progress, from a fixation on present morality or ideal morality, toward the production of new moralities. Democracy alone is capable of providing the conditions necessary for intelligent public participation in social conflict and progress. Social progress is not the responsibility of a few visionaries or autocrats, since practical hypotheses for change must originate from those people whose lives are most affected and whose experience will supply the test. Therefore, public education is the lifeblood of democracy, and education itself must be as progressive as the society it hopes to shape. The churches' traditional dominance over social virtue must be replaced by public education's responsibility for the civic virtues. Religion itself, as the repository of the deepest values binding together a society, cannot be replaced. Its value for human progress is only strengthened if it is purged of the institutional authority that typically resists social evolution.

Ethical Theory

John Dewey's essay, "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality," portrays moral thinking as the deliberate control and modification of moral ideals, which are those ideals used to make practical judgments of what ought to be done in actual situations. Moral thought has three phases. First, the discernment of the possibility of moral thought focuses on our ability to judge critically the value and priority of ideals. This phase is called the science of ethics or the logic of conduct. Second, since moral thought can be viewed as an actor's deliberate active experience, psychology can be brought to bear on discerning the factors of that intentional experience. Third, since moral thought can be viewed as a type of experience occurring within environing conditions and having a certain kind of social value, sociology and all the other special sciences can be brought to bear on discerning the organic relationships between the actor and his environment. Dewey's conception of philosophy is precisely the coordinated pursuit of these three phases of moral/practical thought. This conception of philosophy accounts for Dewey's claim that scientific inquiry is relevant to the ideals of moral conduct.

James Tufts agreed that the inherent sociality of human activity must affect the philosophical conception of morality. "The Social Standpoint" is a brief manifesto declaring that genuine sociality is no mere matter of relationships between individuals, but rather the phenomenon of group activity. Sociality must become the starting-point for investigations not only into ethics, but also into economic, political, and religious activities. Tufts was a life-long student of the history of culture and morality. "On Moral Evolution" offers a historical explanation of present social relations and morality which serves as a key component of Dewey's third phase of moral thought.² Social institutions are composed of rules controlling instinctive interests for group success. The historical progress from rules imposed by culture or autocrat toward rules thoughtfully adopted by cooperating individuals is mirrored in the maturity of the moral self out of childish dependency. Values such as "honor," "justice," and "responsibility" developed out of this process, and continue to progress today. George Mead's "The Philosophical Basis of Ethics" exemplifies Dewey's second stage of moral thought by portraying moral consciousness as the most concrete and inclusive

² Tuft's contributions to *Ethics*, co-written with Dewey, expand on these themes in rich detail. Dewey's portion of the *Ethics* should also be read in light of the essays collected here.

experience. The pragmatic grounding of metaphysics on ethics is one corollary, but two other implications are explored: The moral motive is the recognition of purpose in consciousness, and “the moral interpretation of our experience must be found within the experience itself.” Moral conduct therefore cannot be dependent on ideals external to one’s own life.

Dewey’s essay *Ethics* pulls together these observations to proclaim a new ethical theory. Greek philosophy stressed personal character and intelligence in its conducive role for a free, stable society; its limitations lay in the uncritical acceptance of the Greek division between the wise (contemplating fixed, eternal reality) and the ignorant (working with mutable, impermanent material). Moral philosophy has only recently freed itself from transcendent norms, just as science has; this “revolution...of the applied and experimental habit of mind” deals only with the present possibilities of social life. True democracy will rely on this moral psychology. Utilitarianism and German idealism have taken steps toward placing moral reason within the struggles of life. A sufficient moral theory will use physiology, anthropology, and psychology to make law, education, economics, and political science more intelligent instruments for the public good.

Society, Democracy, and Education

George Mead highlights the failure of those reformers promoting social ideals either to take into account present social conditions or to accurately predict the future evolution of social conditions. “The Working Hypothesis in Social Reform” suggests that reforms must be proposed as working hypotheses that offer specific solutions to actual problems in light of our best understanding of the social forces operating now. Social reforms are thus testable, falsifiable, and revisable, becoming genuine scientific hypotheses. John Dewey’s “Psychology and Social Practice” focuses on the misuse of ideals in education and the utility of hypotheses in that field. He complains that education assumes that the child’s psychology is fundamentally different from adults, and supposes that schooling should impart to the child those specialized skills of adulthood. Instead, psychology should use the school to test developmental theories of social personality. Psychology can thus contribute to an ethical understanding of that institution. Similarly, psychology should study all social institutions in their relations of value to all members of society, providing a democratic alternative to aristocratic and hierarchical control of the schools. Dewey’s “Democracy in Education” pursues these themes by portraying democracy as grounded on freedom of intelligence, not just freedom of unreflective action. For the educational system to perpetuate and

improve our democracy, it must practice freedom of intelligence, both for teachers and students. The ideal of the rote drilling of information for student recitation is based on false psychology. Teachers must be allowed to experiment with teaching methods, for only they actually do the teaching and hence only they could learn how to improve teaching. Learners too must have environments providing opportunities for using their intelligence to actively experiment with the material, natural, and social operations of the world.

Ella Flagg Young further outlines Dewey's educational philosophy in "The Philosophy of Education, 1895-1902. John Dewey." Her own work, exemplified by "Scientific Method in Education" expands on the concept of educational reform as the scientific practice of problem-solving through hypotheses. This practice must take into account new psychological discoveries about the growth and maturity of the human mind. The mind grows by attention, not on information presented to a mind for concentrated focus and memorization, but on those things selected out by a mind for unification with learning already gained. Teachers should neither try to control the child's passive concentration to produce conformity with adult standards, nor to release the child's instinctive fascination to promote spontaneous freedom from all standards. The teacher should rather try to structure the child's activities with environments stimulating their own abilities toward control and understanding.

Jane Addams illustrates the failures of the educational system in "Educational Methods" with particular regard to its treatment of immigrants. It inefficiently produces adults capable of working in factories or business offices, and completely fails to create genuine citizens, capable of knowing their social value or purpose. Ironically, despite its explicit aim to make an adult fit for a life of work, education cares nothing for an individual's own cultured life, relationships with others, or abilities to grasp the larger significance of his work. Education is presently centered on forging human machinery, not citizens intelligent enough to contribute to the evolution and progress of their society. As George Mead recounts in his appreciative review of *The Newer Ideals of Peace*, Addams identifies the larger American ideal of militarism as dictating the role of government in society. Its quest to uphold law and order to preserve existing institutions prevents it from constructively mediating or resolving the actual ongoing struggles inherent in the progress of industrial society. Addams understands the real social environment for the young adults of an industrial city, Tufts proclaims in a review of *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets*. Tufts recommends this book particularly to teachers for a better grasp of the adolescent's perspectives on the adult world. Tufts's review of *Twenty*

Years at Hull House also commends Addams for her insights into the real lives of the city's inhabitants. The autobiographical story illustrates her personal growth into convictions that have been successfully applied in her social work.

In "The Bearings of Pragmatism upon Education," Dewey explicitly describes the usefulness of the pragmatic theory of intelligence to the problems of democracy. Education has been dominated either by a rationalistic emphasis on theoretical knowledge for its own sake (aimed at educating the leisure class), or an empiricist emphasis on obedient and uniform acceptance of facts (aimed at educating the working class). Intelligence for pragmatism is the instrument of social coordination, and education accordingly must be based on social activity, observation, and experimentation, in a context of practical occupations. Lacking citizens capable of social intelligence, society will only perpetuate social stratification and conflict. As Dewey explains in *Moral Principles in Education*, the moral character of the student is a significant aspect of social intelligence, and hence education should aim at its growth. But just as sheer recitation of information will not create a genuinely intelligent adult, neither will the direct exhortation of moral rules create a genuinely ethical adult. While society should set the goals of schools and judge its success, only educators should control specific pedagogical techniques. All studies should aim at developing self-control, responsibility, and leadership skills in the context of interacting with actual social conditions in the community. Students would then realize the present value of their activities, both for themselves as worthy individuals and for society as needing their contributions. Moral character arises through this educational process, since moral ideals are not just external standards to be dutifully obeyed but instead the self-motivation toward socially cooperative conduct.

George Mead focuses on the crucial relationship between the teacher and the student in "The Psychology of Social Consciousness Implied in Instruction." Where the teacher and student are sharing their work and experiences as a team, the student's attention is not divided. If the teacher imposes the work to be done with the threat of punishment for lack of attention, then attention will surely be divided between the artificial threat and real natural interests. The lived experience of the child must be foremost, in order to establish real social relationships and communication. Mead's many explorations into the nature of social relationships find their culmination in his path-breaking article, "The Social Self." When absorbed in the objective world there is no self, but only a "me" which acts. The social self arises in reflection on how one's past conduct has been in turn affected by the conduct of others. Such reflection permits not only role playing but self-conscious role

adaptation and experiment, in turn permitting moral conduct. This brings the possibility of conflicting voices, roles, values, ideals – demanding a reconstruction of the social self to restore harmony.

Religion

In keeping with his principles of the psychology of education, Dewey's "Religious Education as Conditioned by Modern Psychology and Pedagogy" states that religion must not be taught in the form that adults find conclusive and satisfactory, but in a manner relevant to the actual emotions, interests, and responsibilities of children. The authority of the religious institution should not simply instruct the child in some watered-down versions of the dogmas that adults can understand. Psychology should study children's experiences across a variety of social and religious environments. Dewey's "Religion and Our Schools" emphasizes that religion, like morality, should require no distinct or separate curriculum, but be infused into the entire educational experience. Tradition and authority, claiming a monopoly over the supernatural source of religious inspiration, naturally fears scientific and democratic progress and its control of public education. But those who agree that the universality of the spiritual life demands no breaches or barriers should instead favor the control of education by the whole community. The separation of church and state originated in a time of social and political conflict among powerful dogmatic churches, and remains a useful reminder that no particular dogma should usurp the state's authority. Current conflict among religious moralities is primarily a matter of class conflict, where social factions cannot agree on public morality, which only the rule of popular sovereignty can reconcile. The public's satisfaction in greater harmony and unity must be the only test of virtue. Surrendering religious education to the exclusive preserve of divergent sects will never pass this test. Religious virtue is social virtue, and hence the separation of church and state cannot also require any separation of religion from state. Public education will not and should not teach organized and institutional religion. Far from promoting irreligion, this refusal may complete the disintegration of the historic churches that is required for the maturity of a genuinely public religion.

Simon MacLennan likewise approves of science's dominance over the tradition of authority in "The Fundamental Problem of Religious Belief and the Method of Its Solution." Far from trying to eliminate religion, science should respect and seek to understand the authenticity and pervasiveness of religion across humanity. But science (and religion) should avoid the metaphysical interpretations of naïve realism, dualism, or idealism, which cannot offer a criterion of knowledge. Only "objective idealism" or "experimentalism" can offer a criterion of

knowledge by stipulating that conscious experience is metaphysically ultimate. Since knowledge transforms experience, and experience is fundamentally personal, knowledge of reality can neither lose the character of the personal nor fail to satisfy the criterion of personal growth. Unlike Bradley's absolute idealism, which sets the absolute reality beyond possible human knowledge, objective idealism defines the growth of experience as the reality, without anything beyond human experience to stand against it. Science for objective idealism will never contradict the experience of God as the ultimate personality.

Irving King also links the proper understanding of religion to the study of the growth of human experience in "The Pragmatic Interpretation of the Christian Dogma." Pragmatism takes immediate experience to be primary, and finds that objects of knowledge are portions of experience abstracted and transformed in order to resolve particular crises. Religious beliefs do not truly refer to realities beyond human experience, but to successful modifications of social relations. Their novelty is forgotten as they become culturally rigid dogmas, but they remain meaningful only insofar as they direct the lived values of people. Taken as facts merely to be respected and obeyed, dogmas cannot infuse lived experience and hence appear all the more empty even as they stand ever higher above the human realm. Dogmas also can be conservative obstacles to future social progress.

Edward Ames agrees that a religion should not stand in the way of the process of cultural progress that originally called it into existence. His essay "Theology from the Standpoint of the Functional Psychology" emphasizes that the inquiries of functional psychology into religious experience cannot stop short of examining the value and meaning of theological principles. Human religious development follows the course of actual cultural progress. Primitives focus on the immediate environment and its spiritual denizens. The rise of nations and monarchy brought a consolidation of divine power toward monotheism. The modern collisions between civilizations and the rise of democracies is now replacing arbitrary authority (both political and divine) and its attendant theological systems with the intelligent self-control of socially responsible citizens. Public authority demands that religion serve its practical needs of lived experience. The teachings of Jesus, freed from theological dogma, likewise demand that the individual's religious experience produce virtuous conduct. Theology could become scientific by treating rituals of worship and rules of conduct as reformable and testable means to social ends.

Anna Strong echoes in "Some Religious Aspects of Pragmatism" the close relationship between religious belief and practical conduct in the history of religion. By relating reason and faith in the view that

knowledge serves conduct, pragmatism overcomes the rationalism of dogmatic theology and absolutist philosophy. God is a dynamic reality altering through time, although pragmatists differ on whether God is the whole of reality or just a portion of reality. Tufts agrees that neither dogmatic theology nor rationalistic philosophy can provide "The Ultimate Test of Religious Truth." Both reduce belief to lifeless fact and forbid God any participation in the moral struggle. Only a philosophy respecting the limitations and needs of human experience can treat religious beliefs scientifically as working hypotheses to be revised and tested in our experience.

Douglas C. Macintosh's answer to the question "Can Pragmatism Furnish a Philosophical Basis for Theology?" is affirmative, so long as pragmatism's thesis is understood. Far from arguing that all useful beliefs are true, or that all true beliefs are useful (both are easily refutable notions), pragmatism states that the criterion of a belief's truth lies in its working in experience. This pragmatic test of belief is the most rigorously intellectual test possible.³ Furthermore, pragmatism's scientific conception of the hypothetical and fallible nature of meaningful beliefs is compatible with the existence of universal theological truths. Such compatibility is possible only if some of the more extreme versions of pragmatism are set aside. For example, it must be denied that truth and reality does not transcend the human realm of experience.

William Wright argues in "A Psychological Definition of Religion" that psychology can give a scientific treatment of religion only by (1) defining religion impartially and objectively, (2) differentiating religion from morality, magic, aesthetics, and other subjects, and (3) studying only the practitioner's attitude toward a religion without importing the investigator's own opinions. Two recent definitions, locating religion in the adherence to social values and in the belief in superhuman spirituality, are incomplete. Wright proposes this functional definition: religion attempts to conserve social values through specific actions engaging a more powerful non-human agency upon which humans are dependent. The study of religion can ask the sociological and historical question of how a religion has succeeded in its aim. The metaphysical question of religion's validity is not a psychological issue, although pragmatism is closest to functional psychology's viewpoint.

Frederick Henke's "Advantages Accruing from the Functional View of Religion" argues that religion should contribute to the ongoing evolution of society and human experience. This pragmatic criterion can

³ Macintosh also applies the pragmatic test to religious morals in "The Pragmatic Element in the Teaching of Paul," *American Journal of Theology* 14.3 (July 1910): 361-81.

be satisfied if religion is viewed functionally. Five specific advantages are enumerated. Legalism and authoritarianism is replaced by a responsiveness to present social concerns. The teachings of Jesus can be best understood as revolutionary advances on older customs and morals. The church's value is not established by faith in historical mysteries, but by its concern for the good of people today. Moral revelations of the past can be superseded by new visions of morality relevant to present social conditions. Last, only a functional view of religion can overcome the hopeless conflict between dogmatic religion and scientific discovery. Henke concludes by optimistically predicting that functionalized religion can serve as a mediating and coordinating systematizer of human experience guiding society toward righteousness.

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LOGICAL CONDITIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC TREATMENT OF MORALITY

John Dewey. "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality." In *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, First Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), vol. 3, part 2, pp. 115–39. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works* vol. 3 (1977), pp. 3–39.

§1. The Use of the Term "Scientific"

The familiar notion that science is a body of systematized knowledge will serve to introduce consideration of the term "scientific" as it is employed in this article. The phrase "body of systematized knowledge" may be taken in different senses. It may designate a property which resides inherently in arranged facts, apart from the ways in which the facts have been settled upon to be facts, and apart from the way in which their arrangement has been secured. Or, it may mean the intellectual activities of observing, describing, comparing, inferring, experimenting, and testing, which are necessary in obtaining facts and in putting them into coherent form. The term should include both of these meanings. But since the static property of arrangement is dependent upon antecedent dynamic processes, it is necessary to make explicit such dependence. We need to throw the emphasis in using the term "scientific" first upon methods, and then upon results through reference to methods. As used in this article, "scientific" means regular methods of controlling the formation of judgments regarding some subject-matter.

The transition from an ordinary to a scientific attitude of mind coincides with ceasing to take certain things for granted and assuming a critical or inquiring and testing attitude. This transformation means that some belief and its accompanying statement are no longer taken as self-sufficing and complete in themselves, but are regarded as *conclusions*. To regard a statement as a conclusion, means (1) that its basis and ground lie outside of itself. This reference beyond itself sets us upon the search for prior assertions which are needed in order to make this one, *i.e.*, upon inquiry. (2) Such prior statements are considered with reference to their bearings or import in the determination of some further statement, *i.e.*, a consequent. The meaning or significance of a given statement lies, logically, in other statements to which we are

2 The Development of Instrumentalism II

committed in making the one in question. Thus we are set upon reasoning, the development of the assertions to which a particular assertion or view commits and entitles us. Our attitude becomes scientific in the degree in which we look in both directions with respect to every judgment passed; first, checking or testing its validity by reference to possibility of making other and more certain judgments with which this one is bound up; secondly, fixing its meaning (or significance) by reference to its use in making other statements. The determination of *validity* by reference to possibility of making other judgments upon which the one in question depends, and the determination of *meaning* by reference to the necessity of making other statements to which the one in question entitles us, are the two marks of scientific procedure.

So far as we engage in this procedure, we look at our respective acts of judging not as independent and detached, but as an interrelated system, within which every assertion entitles us to other assertions (which must be carefully deduced since they constitute its meaning) and to which we are entitled only through other assertions (so that must be carefully searched for). "Scientific" as used in this article thus means the possibility of establishing an order of judgments such that each one when made is of use in determining other judgments, thereby securing control of their formation.

Such a conception of "scientific," throwing the emphasis upon the inherent logic of an inquiry rather than upon the particular form which the results of the inquiry assume, may serve to obviate some of the objections which at once suggest themselves when there is mention of a science of conduct. Unless this conception is emphasized, the term "science" is likely to suggest those bodies of knowledge which are most familiar to us in physical matters; and thus to give the impression that what is sought is reduction of matters of conduct to similarly physical or even quasi-mathematical form. It is, however, analogy with the method of inquiry, not with the final product, which is intended. Yet, while this explanation may preclude certain objections, it is far, in the present state of discussion, from removing all objections and thus securing a free and open field. The point of view expressly disclaims any effort to reduce the statement of matters of conduct to forms comparable with those of physical science. But it also expressly proclaims an identity of logical procedure in the two cases. This assertion will meet with sharp and flat denial. Hence, before developing the logic of moral science, it is necessary to discuss the objections which affirm such an inherent disparity between moral judgments and physical judgments that there is no ground in the control of the judging activity in one case for inferring the possibility of like control in the other.

§2. The Possibility of Logical Control of Moral Judgments

In considering this possibility, we are met, as just indicated, by all assertion that there is something in the very nature of conduct which prevents the use of logical methods in the way they are employed in already recognized spheres of scientific inquiry. The objection implies that *moral* judgment is of such character that nothing can be systematically extracted from any one which is of use in facilitating and guaranteeing the formation of others. It denies, from the logical side, the continuity of moral experience. If there were such continuity any one judgment could be dealt with in such a way as to make of it a conscious tool for forming other judgments. The ground of denial of continuity in moral experience rests upon the belief that the basis and justifying principle of the ethical judgment is found in transcendental conceptions, viz., considerations that do not flow from the course of experience as that is judged in terms of itself, but which have a significance independent of the course of experience as such.

The assertion of such logical disparity assumes a variety of forms, all coming back to pretty much the same presupposition. One way of putting the matter is that ethical judgments are immediate and intuitive. If this be true, an ethical judgment cannot be considered a conclusion; and hence there can be no question of putting it into orderly intellectual (or logical) relations with other like judgments. A merely immediate judgment is, by the nature of the case, incapable of either intellectual rectification or of intellectual application. This view finds expression in popular consciousness in the notion that scientific judgments depend upon reason, while moral valuations proceed from a separate faculty, conscience, having its own criteria and methods not amenable to intellectual supervision.

Another way of affirming radical disparity is that scientific judgments depend upon the principle of causation, which of necessity carries with it the dependence of one phenomenon upon another, and thus the possibility of stating every fact in connection with the statement of some other fact; while moral judgments involve the principle of final cause, of end and ideal. Hence to endeavor to control the construction and affirmation of any content of moral judgment by reference to antecedent propositions is to destroy its peculiar moral quality. Or, as it is popularly expressed, ethical judgment is ethical just because it is not scientific; because it deals with norms, values, ideals, not with given facts; with what *ought* to be, estimated through pure spiritual aspiration, not with what *is*, decided after investigation.

Pretty much the same point of view is expressed when it is said that scientific judgments, as such, state facts in terms of sequences in time

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and of co-existences in space. Wherever we are dealing with relations of this sort it is apparent that a knowledge of one term or member serves as a guide and check in the assertion of the existence and character of the other term or member. But moral judgments, it is said, deal with actions which are still to be performed. Consequently in this case characteristic meaning is found only in the qualities which exist *after* and by means of the judgment. For this reason, moral judgment is thought essentially to transcend anything found in past experience; and so, once more, to try to control a moral judgment through the medium of other judgments is to eliminate its distinctive ethical quality. This notion finds its popular equivalent in the conviction that moral judgments relate to realities where freedom is implicated in such a way that no intellectual control is possible. The judgment is considered to be based, not upon objective facts, but upon arbitrary choice or volition expressed in a certain sort of approval or disapproval.

I have no intention of discussing these points in their full bearing. I shall reduce them to a single logical formulation, and then discuss the latter in its most general significance. The justification of the single statement as a formulation of the objections just set forth (and of other like ones) will not be attempted, for further discussion does not turn upon that point. When generalized, the various statements of the logical gulf between the moral judgment and the scientific reduces itself to an assertion of two antinomies: one, the separation between the universal and the individual; the other, between the intellectual and the practical. And these two antinomies finally reduce themselves to one: Scientific statements refer to *generic conditions* and relations, which are therefore capable of complete and objective statement; ethical judgments refer to an *individual act* which by its very nature transcends objective statement. The ground of separation is that scientific judgment is universal, hence only hypothetical, and hence incapable of relating to acts, while moral judgment is categorical, and thus individualized, and hence refers to acts. The scientific judgment states that where some condition or set of conditions is found, there also is found a specified other condition or set of conditions. The moral judgment states that a certain end has categorical value, and is thus to be realized without any reference whatsoever to antecedent conditions or facts. The scientific judgment states a connection of conditions; the moral judgment states the unconditioned claim of an idea to be made real.

This formulation of the logic of the problem under consideration fixes attention upon the two points which are in need of discussion. First: Is it true that scientific judgment deals with contents which have, in and of themselves, a universal nature – that its whole significance is exhausted in setting forth a certain connection of conditions? Secondly: Is it true

that the attempt to regulate, by means of an intellectual technique, moral judgments – which, of course, are thoroughly individualized – destroys or in any way lessens distinctively ethical value?

In discussing the two questions just propounded, I shall endeavor to show: First, that scientific judgments have all the logical characteristics of ethical judgments; since they refer (1) to individual cases, and (2) to acts. I shall endeavor to show that the scientific judgment, the formulation of a connection of condition, has its origin, and is developed and employed for the specific and solo purpose of freeing and reinforcing acts of judgment that apply to unique and individual cases. In other words, I shall try to show that there is no question of eliminating the distinctive quality of ethical judgments by assimilating them to a different logical type, found in so-called scientific judgments; precisely because the logical type found in recognized scientific judgments is one which already takes due account of individualization and activity. I shall, then, secondly, endeavor to show that individualized ethical judgments require for their control generic propositions, which state a connection of relevant conditions in universal (or objective) form; and that it is possible to direct inquiry so as to arrive at such universals. And finally, I shall briefly set forth the three typical lines along which the construction of such generic scientific propositions must proceed, if there is to be a scientific treatment of ethics.

§3. Nature of Scientific Judgments

The proposition that scientific judgments are hypothetic because they are universal is almost commonplace in recent logical theory. There is no doubt that there is a sense in which this proposition states an unquestioned truth. The aim of science is law. A law is adequate in the degree in which it takes the form, if not of an equation, at least of formulation of constancy, of relationship, or order. It is clear that any law, whether stated as formulation of order or as an equation, conveys, in and of itself, not an individualized reality, but a certain connection of conditions. Up to this point there is no dispute. When, however, it is argued that this direct and obvious concern of science with generic statements exhausts the logical significance of scientific method, certain fundamental presuppositions and certain fundamental bearings are ignored; and the logical question at issue is begged. The real question is not whether science aims at statements which take the form of universals, or formula of connection of conditions, but *how* it comes to do so, and *what it does with* the universal statements after they have been secured.

In other words, we have, first, to ask for the logical import of generic judgments. Accordingly, not questioning the importance of general formula as the objective content of the sciences, this section will

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endeavor to show that such importance lies in the development of “sciences” or bodies of generic formulæ as instrumentalities and methods of controlling individualized judgments.

1. The boast and pride of modern science is its distinctly empirical and experimental character. The term “empirical” refers to origin and development of scientific statements out of concrete experiences; the term “experimental” refers to the testing and checking of the so-called laws and universals by reference to their application in further concrete experience. If this notion of science be correct, it shows, without further argument, that generic propositions occupy a purely intermediate position. They are neither initial nor final. They are the bridges by which we pass over from one particular experience to another; they are individual experiences put into such shape as to be available in regulating other experiences. Otherwise scientific laws would be only intellectual abstractions tested on the basis of their own reciprocal consistencies; and the trait which is supposed to demarcate science from mediæval speculation would at once fade away.

Moreover, if the generic character of propositions of physical and biological sciences were ultimate, such propositions would be entirely useless from a practical point of view; they would be quite incapable of practical application because they would be isolated from intellectual continuity with the particular crises to which application is sought. No amount of purely deductive manipulation of abstractions brings a resulting conclusion any nearer a concrete fact than were the original premises. Deduction introduces in regular sequence new ideas, and thus complicates the universal content. But to suppose that by complicating the content of a universal we get nearer the individual of experience is the fallacy at once of mediæval realism and of the ontological argument for the existence of God. No range of synthesis of universal propositions in chemistry, physics, and biology would (if such propositions were logically self-sufficing) assist us in building a bridge or in locating the source of an epidemic of typhoid fever. If, however, universal propositions and their deductive synthesis are to be interpreted in the sense of the manufacturing and employing of intellectual tools for the express purpose of facilitating our individual experiences, the outcome is quite other.

The empirical origin, the experimental test, and the practical use of the statements of science are enough of themselves to indicate the impossibility of holding to any fixed logical division of judgments into universal as scientific, and individual as practical. It suggests that what we term science is just the forging and arranging of instrumentalities for dealing with individual cases of experience – cases which, if individual, are just as unique and irreplaceable as are those of moral life. We might

even say that the very fact which leads us upon a superficial view into believing in the logical separation of the generic judgment from the individual, viz., the existence of a large and self-contained body of universal propositions, is proof that as to some individual experiences we have already worked out methods of regulating our reflective transactions with them, while for another phase of experience this work remains to be done; *i.e.*, is the problem of current ethical science.

The consideration of the technique by which the desired end of control is accomplished does not belong here. It suffices to note that the hypothetic judgment is a most potent instrumentality. If we inhibit the tendency to say, "This, *A*, is *B*," and can (1) find ground for saying, "Wherever there is *mn* there is *B*," and can (2) show that wherever there is *op* there is *mn*, and (3) have a technique for discovering the presence of *op* in *A*, we shall have warrant for identifying This, *A*, as *B*, even if all the outward and customary traits are lacking, and even if This, *A*, presents certain traits which, without the mediation of a generic proposition, would have inevitably led us to identify it as *C*. Identification, in other words, is secure only when it can be made through (1) breaking up the analyzed This of naïve judgment into determinate traits. (2) breaking up the predicate into a similar combination of elements, and (3) establishing uniform connection between some of the elements in the subject and some in the predicate. All judgments of everyday life, and indeed all judgments in such sciences as geology, geography, history, zoölogy, and botany (all sciences that have to do with historic narration or with description of space coexistences), come back ultimately to questions of identification. Even judgments in physics and chemistry, in their ultimate and concrete form, are concerned with individual cases. Of all the sciences, mathematics alone¹ is concerned with pure general propositions – hence the indispensable significance of mathematics as a *tool* for all judgments of technology and of the other sciences. It also is true in all the arts, whether commercial professional, or artistic, that judgments reduce themselves to matters of correct identification. Observation, diagnosis, interpretation, and expert skill all display themselves in transactions with individual cases as such.

2. Thus far we have seen that the importance of generic statements in science is no ground for assuming a disparity in their logic from that of a scientific treatment of conduct. Indeed, since we have found that generic propositions originate, develop, and find their test in control of

¹ If it were necessary for the purpose of this argument, it could of course be shown that reference to individual cases is involved in all mathematics. Within mathematical science, symbols (and diagrams are symbols) are individual objects of just the same logical nature as are metals and acids in chemistry and as are rocks and fossils in geology.

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individual cases, the presumption is of similarity rather than of dissimilarity. Can we extend the parallelism farther? Does it apply equally well to the other characteristic trait of ethical judgment, viz., its reference to an act?

Just as modern logic has seized upon the hypothetic and universal character of scientific statements, relegating their bearing upon individual judgments into the background (but in truth so relegating them only because that bearing is always taken for granted), so modern logic has emphasized the aspect of content in judgment at the expense of the act of judging. I shall now try to show, however, that this emphasis also occurs because reference to act is so thoroughly taken for granted that it is possible to ignore it – that is, fail to give it explicit statement. I shall try to show that every judgment must be regarded as an act; that, indeed, the individual character of judgment proper, which has just been brought out means, in final analysis, that the judgment is a unique act for which there is no substitute.

Our fundamental point is the control of the content or meaning which is asserted in any given judgment. How can such control be obtained? So far we have spoken as if the content of one judgment might be elaborated simply by reference to the content of another – particularly as if the content of an individual judgment, a judgment of identification, might be secured by reference to the content of a universal or hypothetic proposition. In truth, there is no such thing as control of one content by mere reference to another content as such. To recognize this impossibility is to recognize that the control of the formation of the judgment is always through the medium of an act by which the respective contents of both the individual judgment and of the universal proposition are selected and brought into relationship to each other. There is no road open from any generic formula to an individual judgment. The road leads through the habits and mental attitudes of the one concerned in judging. The universal gets logical force, as well as psychical reality, only in the acts by which it is invented and constructed as a tool and then is employed for the purpose for which it was intended.

I shall accordingly try to show that activity shows itself at every critical point in the formation of judgment: (a) that it shows itself in the genesis of the generic or universal employed; (b) that it shows itself in the selection of the particular subject-matter which is judged; and (c) that it shows itself in the way in which the validity of the hypothesis is tested and verified, and the significance of the particular subject-matter determined.

a) So far we have assumed the possibility of building up and selecting for use some generic principle which controls the identification reached

in an individual case. We cannot, that is to say, regulate judgments of the type, "This is typhoid," or, "That is Bela's comet," unless we have certain generic concepts, which are defined as connection of particular conditions, and unless we know when and how to select from the stock of such concepts at our disposal the particular one required. The entire science considered as a body of formulæ having coherent relations to one another is just a system of possible predicates – that is, of possible standpoints or methods to be employed in qualifying some particular experience whose nature or meaning is not clear to us. It furnishes us with a set of tools from which choice has to be made. The choice, of course, depends upon the needs of the particular facts which have to be discriminated and identified in the given case – just as the carpenter decides, on the basis of what he is going to do, whether he will take a hammer, a saw, or a plane from his tool-chest. One might as well suppose that the existence of possible candidates for office, plus the mathematically possible combinations and permutations of them, constitutes an election of one of them to office, as to suppose that a specific judgment follows from even an ideally exhaustive system of general principles. The logical process includes, as an organic part of itself, the selection and reference of that particular one of the system which is relevant to the particular case. This individualized selection and adaptation is an integral portion of the logic of the situation. And such selection and adjustment is clearly in the nature of an act.

Nor must we fail to make clear that we are concerned, not with selecting and adapting a ready-made universal, but with the *origin* of the universal absolutely for the sake of just such adaptation. If individual cases in experience never gave us any difficulty in identification, if they never set any problem, universals would simply not exist, to say nothing of being used. The universal is precisely such a statement of experience as will facilitate and guarantee the valuation of individualized experiences. It has no existence, as it has no check of validity, outside of such a function. In some case where science has already made considerable headway, we may, without error, speak as if universals were already at hand, and as if the only question were which one of them to pick out and employ. But such a way of speaking must not blind us to the fact that it was only because of the need of some more objective way of determining a given case that a universal ever originated and took on form and character. Did not the universal develop as medium of conciliation in just the same sort of situation of conflict as that in which it finds its use, such use would be absolutely arbitrary, and consequently without logical limit. The activity which selects and employs is logical, not extra-logical, just because the tool selected and employed has been

invented and developed precisely for the sake of just such future selection and use.²

b) The individualized act (or choice) in judgments of identification shows itself not only in selection from a body of possibilities of the specific predicate required, but in the determination of the "This," or subject, as well. Students of logic are familiar with the distinction between the fact of particularity and the qualifications or distinguishing traits of a particular – a distinction which has been variously termed one between the "That" and the "What," or between "This" and "Thisness,"³ Thisness refers to a quality which, however sensuous it be (such as hot, red, loud), may yet in its own meaning belong equally well to a large number of particulars. It is something a presentation *has*, rather than what it just *is*. Such a variety of applications is involved in the very notion of quality. It makes all qualities capable of consideration as degrees. It is responsible for the ease with which names of qualities transform themselves into abstract terms, blue into blueness, loud into loudness, hot into heat, etc.

The particularity, or better, singularity, of the judgment is constituted by the immediate demonstrative reference of the "This."⁴ "This demonstrative character means a preferential selection; it is a matter of action. Or, from the psychological side, the sensory quality becomes specific only in motor response. Red, blue, hot, etc., as immediate experiences, always involve motor adjustments which determine them. Change the kind of motor adjustment and the quality of the experience changes; diminish it and the quality relapses more and more into indefinite vagueness. The selection of any particular "This" as the immediate

² The point of view which is here presented is, of course, distinctly pragmatic. I am not quite sure, however of the implications of certain forms of pragmatism. They sometimes seem to imply that a rational or logical statement is all right up to a certain point, but has fixed external limits, so that at critical points recourse must be had to considerations which are distinctly of an irrational or extra-logical order, and this recourse is identified with choice and "activity." The practical and the logical are thus opposed to each other. It is just the opposite which I am endeavoring to sustain, viz., that the logical is an inherent or organic expression of the practical, and hence is fulfilling its own logical basis and aim when it functions practically. I have no desire to show that what we term "science" is arbitrarily limited by *outside* ethical considerations; and that consequently science cannot intrude itself into the ethical sphere; but precisely the contrary, viz., that just because science is a mode of controlling our active relations with the world of experienced things, ethical experience is supremely in need of such regulation. And by "practical" I mean only regulated change in experienced values.

³ This distinction in recent logic has been brought out with great force and clearness by BRADLEY, *Principles of Logic* (London, 1883), pp. 63–67.

⁴ It is hardly necessary to point out that the article "the" is a weakened demonstrative, and that the pronouns, including "it," all have demonstrative reference.

subject of judgment is not arbitrary, however, but is dependent upon the end involved in the interest which is uppermost. Theoretically, any object within the range of perception, or any quality or any element of any one object, may function as the "This," or the subject-matter to be determined in judgment. Purely objectively, there is no reason for choosing any one of the infinite possibilities rather than another. But the aim in view (which, of course, finds its expression in the predicate of the judgment) gives a basis for deciding what object or what element of any object is logically fit. The implication of selective activity is thus an organic part of the logical operation, and not an arbitrary practical addition clapped on after the logical activity as such is complete. The very same interest which leads to the building up and selection of the universal leads to the constructive selection of the immediate data or material with reference to which the universal is to be employed.⁵

c) The experimental character of all scientific identification is a commonplace. It is so commonplace that we are apt to overlook its tremendous import – the unconditional necessity of overt activity to the integrity of the logical process as such. As we have just seen, an act is involved in the determination of both the predicate, or the interpreting meaning, and of the "This," or fact to be identified. Were not both of these acts correlatives in a larger scheme of change of value in experience, they would both be arbitrary; and their ultimate appropriateness or adaptation to each other would be a sheer miracle. If one arbitrary act of choice reached forth to lay hold of some predicate from out the whole system of possible qualifications, while another act of choice, entirely independent in origin reached out to seize a given area from the whole possible region of sense-perceptions, it would be the sheerest accident if the two selections thus made should fit into each other, should play into each other's hands.

But if one and the same end or interest operates in regulating both selections, the case stands quite otherwise. In such case, the experimental activity of verification is the carrying on of precisely the same purpose which found expression in the choice of subject and predicate respectively. It is in no sense a third process, but is the entire activity which we have already considered in two partial but typical aspects. The

⁵ Hence in accepting Bradley's distinction between "This" and "Thisness" we cannot accept the peculiar interpretation which he gives it. According to his way of looking at it no strictly *logical* connection is possible between "This" and "Thisness." "Thisness" alone has logical significance; the "This" is determined by considerations entirely beyond intellectual control; indeed, it marks the fact that a reality lying outside of the act of judging has broken in upon, or forced itself into, a region of logical ideas or meanings, this peculiar and coercive irruption being an essential attendant of the *finite* extremely limited character of our experience.

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choice of meaning or predicate is always made with reference to the individual case to be interpreted; and the constitution of the particular objective case is always colored throughout by the point of view or idea with reference to which it is to be utilized. This reciprocal reference is the check or test continuously employed; and any particular more obvious experimental activity of verification means simply that conditions are such that the checking process is rendered overt.

I have now endeavored to show that if we take scientific judgment in its only ultimate form, viz., that which identifies or discriminates an individualized portion of experience, judgment appears as an act of judging; the act showing itself both in the selection and determination of the subject and the predicate, and in the determination of their values with reference or in respect to each other, and hence in deciding as to truth and validity.

Since in the discussion I have used a terminology which is hardly self-explanatory, and have introduced a variety of statements which to many will appear, in the present state or condition of logical discussion to need rather than to afford support, I may point out that the force of the argument resides in matters capable of complete empirical confirmation. The truth or falsity of the conclusion reached depends upon these two notions:

First, every judgment is in its concrete reality an act of attention, and, like all attention, involves the functioning of an interest or end and the deploying of habits and impulsive tendencies (which ultimately involve motor adjustments) in the service of that interest. Hence it involves selection as regards both the object of attention and the standpoint and mode of "apperceiving" or interpreting. Change the interest or end, and the selected material (the subject of the judgment) changes, and the point of view from which it is regarded (and consequently the kind of predication) changes also.

Second, the abstract generalizing propositions of science have developed out of the needs of such individualized judgments or acts of attention; they have assumed their present form – that is, developed their characteristic structures or contents – as instrumentalities for enabling an individual judgment to do its work most effectively; that is to say, to accomplish most surely and economically the end for which it is undertaken. Consequently the value of validity of such concepts is constantly checked through a use which, by its success and failure, passes upon the competency of general principles, etc., to serve the regulative function for which they are instituted.⁶

⁶ It might check the prevalent tendency to draw sharp lines between philosophy as merely normative and the sciences as merely descriptive to realize that all generic sci-

So far as the scientific judgment is identified as an act, all *a priori* reason disappears for drawing a line between the logic of the material of the recognized sciences and that of conduct. We are thus free to proceed, if we can find any positive basis. The recognition that the activity of judging does not exist in general, but is of such a nature as to require reference to an initial point of departure and to be a terminal fulfilment, supplies exactly this positive ground. The act of judging is not merely an active experience at large, but one which requires specific motivation. There must be some stimulus which moves to performing this particular sort of act rather than some other. Why engage in that particular kind of activity that we call judging? Conceivably some other activity might be going on – the sawing of wood, the painting of a picture, the cornering of the wheat market, the administering of reproof. There must be something outside the most complete and correct collection of intellectual propositions which induces to engage in the occupation of judging rather than in some other active pursuit. Sciences furnishes conditions which are to be used in the most effective execution of the judging activity, *if* one means to judge at all. But it presupposes the If. No theoretical system can settle that the individual shall at a given moment judge rather than do something else. Only the whole scheme of conduct as focusing in the interests of an individual can afford that determining stimulus.

Not only must a practical motive be found for the use of the organized scientific system, but a similar motive must be found for its correct and adequate use. The logical value of any intellectual proposition, its distinctively logical significance as distinct from existence as mere *ens rationis*, depends upon practical, and ultimately upon moral, considerations. The interest must be of a kind not only to move the individual to judge, but to induce him to judge critically, bringing into use all necessary precautions and all available resources which may insure the maximum probability of truth in the conclusion. The systems of science (employing the term “science” to mean an organized intellectual content) is absolutely dependent for logical worth upon a moral interest: the sincere aim to judge truly. Remove such an interest, and the scientific system becomes a purely æsthetic object, which may awaken emotional response in virtue of its internal harmony and symmetry, but which has no logical import. If we suppose, once more, that it is a case

tific propositions, all statements of laws, all equations and formulæ, are strictly normative in character, having as their sole excuse for being, and their sole test of worth, their capacity to regulate descriptions of individual cases. And the view that they are shorthand registers, or abstract descriptions, confirms instead of refuting this view. Why not make a shorthand and unreal statement if it does not operate instrumentally in first-hand dealings with reality?

identification of typhoid fever, it is the professional, social, and scientific interests of the physician which lead him to take the trouble and pains to get all the data that bear upon the forming of judgment, and to consider with sufficient deliberateness as to bring to bear the necessary instrumentalities of interpretation. The intellectual contents get a logical function only through a specific motive which is outside of them barely as contents, but which is absolutely bound up with them in logical function.

If the use made of scientific resources, of technique at observation and experiment, of systems of classification, etc., in directing the act of judging (and thereby fixing the content of the judgment) depends upon the interest and disposition of the judger, we have only to make such dependence explicit, and the so-called scientific judgment appears definitely as a moral judgment. If the physician is careless and arbitrary because of overanxiety to get his work done; or if he lets his pecuniary needs influence his manner of judgment, we may say that he has failed both logically and morally. Scientifically he has not employed the methods at command for directing his act of judging so as to give it maximum correctness. But the ground for such logical failure lies in his own motive or disposition. The generic propositions or universals of science can take effect, in a word, only through the medium of the habits and impulsive tendencies of the one who judges. They have no *modus operandi* of their own.⁷

The possibility of a distinctively moral quality attaching to an intellectual activity is due to the fact that there is no particular point at which one habit begins and others leave off. If a given habit could become entirely isolated and detached, we might have an act of judging dependent upon a purely intellectual technique, upon a habit of using specialized skill in dealing with certain matters, irrespective of any ethical qualifications. But the principle of the continuum is absolute. Not only through habit does a given psychical attitude expand into a particular case, but every habit in its own operation may directly or indirectly call up any other habit. The term "character" denotes this complex continuum of interactions in its office of influencing final judgment.

⁷ So far as I know, MR. CHARLES S. PEIRCE was the first to call attention to this principle, and to insist upon its fundamental logical import (see *Monist*, Vol. II, pp. 534–36, 549–56). Mr. Peirce states it as the principle of continuity: A past idea can operate only so far as it is psychically continuous with that upon which it operates. A general idea is simply a living and expanding feeling, and habit is a statement of specific mode of operation of a given psychical continuum. I have reached the above conclusion along such diverse lines that without in any way minimizing the priority of Mr. Peirce's statement, or its more generalized logical character. I feel that my own statement has something of the value of an independent confirmation.

§4 The Logical Character of Ethical Judgment

We now recur to our original proposition: Scientific treatment of any subject means command of an apparatus which may be used to control the formation of judgments in all matters appertaining to that subject. We have done away with the *a priori* objection that the subject-matter to which recognized scientific judgments apply is so unlike that with which moral judgments are concerned that there is no common denominator. We are now free to revert to the original question: What are the differentiating logical conditions of a scientific treatment of conduct? Every sort of judgment has its own end to reach; and the instrumentalities (the categories and methods used) must vary as the end varies. If in general we conceive the logical nature of scientific technique, of formulæ, universals, etc., to reside in their adaptation to guaranteeing the act of judging in accomplishing a purpose, we are thereby committed to the further proposition that the logical apparatus needed varies as the ends to be reached are diverse. If, then, there is anything typically distinctive in the end which the act of ethical judging has to subserve, there must be equally distinctive features in the logic of its scientific treatment.

The question thus recurs to the characteristic differential features of the ethical judgment as such. These features readily present themselves if we return to those cases of scientific identification in which ethical considerations become explicit. There are cases, we saw, in which the nature of the identification – and its consequent truth or falsity – is *consciously* dependent upon the attitude or disposition of the judger. The term “consciously” differentiates a peculiar type of judgment. In all cases of individual judgment there is an act; and in all cases the act is an expression of motive, and thus of habit, and finally of the whole body of habit or character. But in many cases this implication of character remains a presupposition. It is not necessary to take notice of it. It is part of the practical conditions of making a judgment; but is no part of the logical conditions, and hence is not called upon to enter into a content – a conscious objectification in the judgment. To regard it as a practical instead of a logical condition means that while it is necessary to *any* judgment, the one act of judgment in question requires it no more than any other. It affects all *alike*; and this very impartiality of reference is equivalent to no reference at all as regards the truth or falsity of the particular judgment. Judging in such cases is controlled by reference to conditions of another quality than those of character; its presented data are judged in terms of objects of the same order or quality as themselves. Not only is there no conscious inclusion of motive and disposition within the content judged, but there is express holding off, inhibition, of all elements proceeding from the judger. From the standpoint of

judgments of this type, such elements are regarded as logically merely subjective, and hence as disturbing factors with respect to the attainment of truth. It is no paradox to say that the activity of the agent in the act of judging expresses itself in effort to prevent its activity from having any influence upon the material judged. Accordingly through such judgments “external” objects are determined, the activity of the judger being kept absolutely neutral or indifferent as to its reference. The same idea is expressed by saying that the operation of motive and character may be presupposed, and hence left out of account, when they are so uniform in their exercise that they make no difference with respect to the *particular* object or content judged.

But whenever the implication of character, the operation of habit and motive, is recognized as a factor affecting the quality of the specific object judged, the logical aim makes it necessary to take notice of this fact by making the relationship an explicit element of content in the subject-matter undergoing judgment. When character is not an indifferent or neutral factor, when it qualitatively colors the meaning of the situation which the judger presents to himself, a characteristic feature is introduced into the very object judged; one which is not a mere refinement, homogeneous in kind with facts already given, but one which transforms their significance, because introducing into the very content judged the standard of valuation. In other words, character as a practical condition becomes *logical* when its influence is preferential in effect – when instead of being a uniform and impartial condition of any judgment it is, if left to itself (or unstated), a determinant of *this* content-value of judgment rather than that. Put from the other side, in the “intellectual” judgment, it makes no *difference* to character *what* object is judged, so be it the one judged is judged accurately; while in the moral judgment the nub of the matter is the difference which the determination of the content as this or that effects in character as a necessary condition of judging *qua* judging.

The conscious reference to disposition makes the object an active object, viz., a process defined by certain limits – given facts on one side and the same facts as transformed by agency of a given type on the other. The object judged is active, not “external,” because it requires an act of judging, not merely as antecedent, but as a necessary element in its own structure. In judgments of the distinctively intellectual type, the assumption is that such activity as is necessary to effect certain combinations and distinctions will keep itself outside the material judged, retiring as soon as it has done its work in bringing together the elements that belong together and removing those that have no business. But in the ethical judgment the assumption is in the contrary sense; viz., that

the situation is made what it is through the attitude which finds expression in the very act of judging. From the strictly logical standpoint (without reference, that is, to overtly moral considerations) the ethical judgment thus has a distinctive aim of its own: it is engaged with judging a subject-matter a definitive element in whose determination is the attitude or disposition which leads to the act of judging.

It follows immediately that the aim of the ethical judgment may be stated as follows: Its purpose is to construct the act of judgment as itself a complex objective content. It goes back of the judging act as that is employed in distinctively intellectual processes, and makes its quality and nature (as distinct from its form – a question for psychology) an object of consideration. Just because character or disposition is involved in the material passed in review and organized in judgment, character is determined by the judgment. This is a fact of tremendous ethical significance; but here its import is not ethical, but logical. It shows that we are dealing, from the strictly logical point of view, with a characteristic type of judgment – that in which the conditions of judging activity are themselves to be objectively determined. The judger is engaged in judging himself; and thereby in so far is fixing the conditions of all further judgments of any type whatsoever. Put in more psychological terms, we may say the judgment realizes, through conscious deliberation and choice, a certain motive hitherto more or less vague and impulsive; or it expresses a habit in such a way as not merely to strengthen it practically, but as to bring to consciousness both its emotional worth and its significance in terms of certain kinds of consequences. But from the logical standpoint we say that the judger is consciously engaged in constructing as an object (and thereby giving objective form and reality to) the controlling condition of every exercise of judgment

§5. The Categories of a Science of Ethics

The ethical judgment is one which effects an absolutely reciprocal determination of the situation judged, and of the character or disposition which is expressed in the act of judging. Any particular moral judgment must necessarily reflect within itself all the characteristics which are essential to moral judgment *überhaupt*. No matter how striking or how unique the material of any particular ethical experience, it is at least an ethical experience; and as such its consideration or interpretation must conform to the conditions involved in the very act of judging. A judgment which institutes the reciprocal determination just described has its own characteristic structure or organization. The work that it has to do gives it certain limiting or defining elements and properties. These constitute the ultimate Terms or Categories of all ethical science.

Moreover, since these terms are reflected in every moral experience that is in course of judgment, they do not remain formal or barren, but are instruments of analysis of any concrete situation that is subjected to scientific scrutiny.

The distinctively intellectual judgment, that of construing one object in terms of other similar objects, has necessarily its own inherent structure which supplies the ultimate categories of all physical science. Units of space, time, mass, energy, etc., define to us the limiting conditions under which judgments of this type do their work. Now, a type of judgment which determines a situation in terms of character, which is concerned with constructing what may be termed indifferently an active situation or a consciously active agency, has a like logical title to the standpoints and methods; the tools, which are necessary to its task. Ethical discussion is full of such terms: the natural and the spiritual, the sensuous and the ideal, the standard and the right, obligation and duty, freedom and responsibility, are samples. The discussion and use of these terms suffer, however, from a fundamental difficulty. The terms are generally taken as somehow given ready-made and hence as independent and isolated things. Then theory concerns itself, first, with debating as to whether the categories have validity or not; and, secondly, as to what their specific significance is. The discussion is arbitrary precisely because the categories are not taken as limiting terms; as constituent elements in a logical operation which, having its own task to perform, must have the means or tools necessary for its successful accomplishing. Consequently the primary condition of a scientific treatment of ethics is that the fundamental terms, the intellectual standpoints and instrumentalities, used, be discussed with reference to the position they occupy and the part they play in a judgment of a peculiar type, viz., one which brings about the reciprocal objective determination of an active situation and a psychical disposition.

When the categories receive the fate which is meted out to them in current discussion, when they are taken up in accidental because isolated ways, there is no method of controlling formation of judgment regarding them. Consequently other judgments which depend upon their use are in an increasing measure uncontrolled. The very tools which are necessary in order that more specific judgments may work economically and effectively are only vaguely known as to their own structure and modes of operation. Naturally they are bungled in employ. Because categories are discussed as if they had some ready-made independent meaning, each of its own, there is no check upon the meaning which is assigned to any one of them, and no recognized standard for judging the validity of any. Only reference to a situation within which the categories emerge and function can furnish the basis for estimation of their value

and import. Otherwise the definition of ultimate ethical terms is left to argumentation based upon opinion, an opinion which snatches at some of the more obvious features of the situation (and thereby may always possess some measure of truth), and which, failing to grasp the situation as a whole, fails to grasp the exact significance of its characteristic terms. Discussion, for instance, about what constitutes the ethical standard – whether conduciveness to happiness, or approximation to perfection of being – must be relatively futile, until there is some method of determining by reference to the logical necessity of the case what *anything* must be and mean in order to be a standard at all. We lack a definition of standard in terms of the essential conditions of the ethical judgment and situation. Such a definition of standard would not indeed give us an off-hand view of the make-up of moral value such as might be utilized for forming moral precepts, but it will set before us certain conditions which any candidate for the office of moral standard must be capable of fulfilling; and will thereby serve as an instrument in criticising the various claimants for the position of standard, whether these offer themselves in generic theory or in the affairs of concrete conduct. Similarly, theorists have been attempting to tell what the ideal of man is, what is *summum bonum*, what is man's duty, what are his responsibilities, to prove that he is possessed or not possessed of freedom, without any regulated war of defining the content of the terms "ideal," "good," "duty," etc. If these terms have any verifiable proper meaning of their own, it is as limiting traits of that type of judgment which institutes the reciprocal identification of psychological attitude in judging and subject-matter judged. An analysis of the make-up of judgment of this type must reveal all the distinctions which have claim to the title of fundamental ethical categories. Whatever element of meaning reveals itself as a constituent part of such a judgment has all the claim to validity which moral experience itself possesses; a term which is not exhibited within such an analysis has no title to validity. The differential meaning of any one of the terms is dependent upon the particular part it plays in the development and termination of judgments of this sort.

§6. Psychological Analysis as a Condition of Controlling Ethical Judgments

If it be true that a moral judgment is one in which the content finally affirmed is affected at every point by the disposition of the judge (since he interprets the situation that confronts him in terms of his own attitude), it follows at once that one portion of the generic theory necessary for adequate control of individual moral judgments will consist in an objective analysis of disposition as affecting action through the medium of judgment. Everyone knows, as simple matter of fact, that

a large part of existing treatises on morals are filled with discussions concerning desirable and undesirable traits of character – virtues and vices; with conscience as a function of character; with discussions of intention, motive, choice, as expressions of, and as ways of forming, character. Moreover, a concrete discussion of freedom, responsibility, etc., is carried on as a problem of the relationship of character to the media of action. The reciprocal determination, already set forth, of character and the content judged shows that such discussions are not mere practical desiderata, nor yet a mere clearing up of incidental points, but integral portions of any adequate ethical theory.

If character or disposition reflects itself at every point in the constitution of the content finally set forth in judgment, it is clear that control of such judgment depends upon ability to state, in universalized form, the related elements constituting character an objective fact.⁸ Our particular judgments regarding physical things are controlled only in so far as we have, independent of and prior to any particular emergency in experience, a knowledge of certain conditions to be observed in judging every physical object as physical. It is through reference to such laws, or statements of connected conditions, that we get the impartiality or objectivity which enables us to judge in a particular crisis unswerved by purely immediate considerations. We get away from the coercive immediacy of the experience, and into a position to look at it clearly and thoroughly. Since character is a fact entering into any moral judgment passed, ability of control depends upon our power to state character in terms of generic relation of conditions, which conditions are detachable from the pressure of circumstance in the particular case. Psychological analysis is the instrument by which character is transformed from its absorption in the values of immediate experience into an objective, scientific, fact. It is indeed, a statement of experience in terms of its modes of control of its own evolving.

Even popular consciousness is aware of many wars in which psychical dispositions modify judgment in a moral sense; and is accustomed to take advantage of its knowledge to regulate moral judgments. A score of proverbs could be collected expressing ways in which psychological attitudes affect moral valuation. The ideas in such statements as the following are commonplaces to the plain man: Habit, wont, and use dull the power of observation; passion blinds and confuses the power of

⁸ Of course, the terms “object” and “objective” are used in a logical sense, not as equivalent to “physical,” which denotes simply one form which the logical object may take. DR. STUART’S article on “Valuation as a Logical Process” in *Studies in Logical Theory* (The University of Chicago Press, 1903) may be referred to for a discussion of the study of the logical significance of the term “object” and its bearing upon the objectivity of economic and ethical judgments.

reflection; self-interest makes the judge alert to certain aspects of the situation judged; impulse hurries the mind on uncritically to a conclusion; ends, ideals, arouse, when contemplated, emotions that tend to fill consciousness, and which, as they swell, first restrict and then eliminate power of judgment. Such statements, which might be indefinitely increased, are not only popularly known, but are commonly used in formation of a kind of hygiene of moral action.

Psychology proper differs from the aggregate of such statements through setting forth *how* various dispositions operate in bringing about the effects attributed to them. Just what are the various distinguishable psychical attitudes and tendencies? How do they hang together? How does one call forth or preclude another? We need an inventory of the different characteristic dispositions; and an account of how each is connected, both in the way of stimulation and inhibition, with every other. Psychological analysis answers this need. While it can answer this need only through development of scientific constructs which present themselves in experience only as results of the psychological examination, yet it is true that the typical attitudes and dispositions are familiar as functions of every-day experience. It is equally true that even the most atomic psychology employs generalized statements about the ways in which certain "states of consciousness" or elements (the constructs referred to) regularly introduce certain other "states." The theory of association is, indeed, just a generalization concerning an objective sequence of elements which reflects to the psychologist the sequence of attitudes or dispositions which are found in the immediate course of experience. In particular the sensationalists not only admit but claim that the association of other states of consciousness with states of pleasure and pain have uniform tendencies which may be reduced to universal propositions; and which may be employed to formulate principles exhibited in all conduct. If such is the case with psychological atomism, every step toward recognition of a more organized, or inherently complex, mental structure multiplies the number and range of possible propositions relating to connection of conditions among psychic states – statements which, if true at all, have exactly the same logical validity that is possessed by any "physical law." And in so far as these "states" are symbols of the attitudes and habits which operate in our immediate experience, every such proposition is at once translatable into one regarding the way in which character is constituted – just the type of generic statement required by a scientific ethics.

Psychology of course does not aim at reinstating the immediate experience of the individual; nor does it aim at describing that experience in its immediate values, whether æsthetic, social, or ethical. It reduces the immediate experience to a series of dispositions, attitudes, or

states which are taken as either conditions or signatures of life-experience. It is not the full experience-of-seeing-a-tree it is concerned with, but the experience reduced by abstraction to an attitude or state of perception; it is not the concrete getting angry, with all its personal and social implications, but anger as one species of a generic psychic disposition known as emotion. It is not concerned with a concrete judgment as such – to say nothing of moral judgment. But psychological analysis finds in experience the typical attitudes it deals with, and only abstracts them so that they may be objectively stated.

Every statement of moral theory which purports to relate to our moral consciousness sets forth relations whose truth must ultimately be tested through psychological analysis – just as every judgment regarding a specific physical phenomenon must finally satisfy certain generic conditions of physical reality set forth in physical analysis.

Psychological analysis does not, for example, set before us an end or ideal actually experienced, whether moral or otherwise. It does not purport to tell us *what* the end or ideal is. But psychological analysis shows us just what forming and entertaining an end means. Psychological analysis abstracts from the concrete make-up of an end, as that is found as matter of direct experience, and because of (not in spite of) that abstraction sets before us having-an-end in terms of its conditions and its effects, that is, in terms of taking other characteristic attitudes which are present in other experiences.

Hence purely psychologic propositions are indispensable to any concrete moral theory. The logical analysis of the process of moral judgment, setting forth its inherent organization or structure with reference to the peculiar logical function it has to accomplish, furnishes the categories or limiting terms of ethical science, and supplies their formal meaning, their definition. But the logical category, say, of end or ideal becomes concrete only as some individual has actually experience of and with ends – and this involves the act or attitude of forming and entertaining them. So the category of standard becomes more than a possible intellectual tool only as some individual actually engages in an experience concerned with right and wrong, and which, when viewed objectively, is regarded as a judgment. The entertaining of ends, the adjudging of values – such acts are character-phenomena. Considered in abstraction from their immediate matter in experience, viz., just as acts, states, or dispositions, they are character-phenomena as these present themselves to psychological analysis. Even to consider any experience, or any phase of an experience, an ideal is to reflect upon that experience; it is to abstract and to classify. It involves passing judgment *upon* an experience; something beyond the concrete experiencing. It is,

as far as it goes, psychological analysis – that is, it is a process of exactly the same order and implying just the same distinctions and terms as are found in psychological science. But the latter, in making abstraction and classification conscious processes, enables us to control them, instead of merely indulging in them.

Hence it is futile to insist that psychology cannot “give” the moral ideal, and that consequently there must be recourse to transcendental considerations – to metaphysics. Metaphysics, in the sense of a logical analysis of that type of judgment which determines the agent and the content of judgment in complete reciprocity to each other, may “give” the ideal – that is, it may show how the form or category of ideal is a constitutive element in this type of judgment, and hence has whatever of validity attaches to this mode of judging. But such a logical analysis is far from transcendental metaphysics; and in any case we thus obtain only the category of ideal as a standpoint or terminus of a *possible* moral judgment. There is no question here of ideal as immediately experienced. Only living, not metaphysics any more than psychology, can “give” an ideal in this sense. But when ethical theory makes statements regarding the importance of ideals for character and conduct, when it lays stress upon the significance of this, rather than that kind of ideal, it is engaged in setting forth universal relations of conditions; and there is absolutely no way of testing the validity of such statements with respect to their claim of generality or objectivity save by an analysis of psychic dispositions which shows what is meant by having-an-ideal in terms of its antecedents and consequences. If any general statement whatsoever can be made about ideals, it is because the psychic attitude corresponding to conceiving an ideal can be abstracted, and placed in a certain connection with attitudes which represent abstracts of other experiences. To have an ideal, to form and entertain one, must be a fact, or else ideals are absolute non-existence and non-sense. To discuss what it is to have an ideal is to engage in psychological analysis. If the having-an-ideal can be stated in terms of sequence with other similar attitudes, then we have a psychological generic statement (or law) which can be employed as a tool of analysis in reflecting upon concrete moral experiences, just as the “law” of falling bodies is of use in controlling our judgment of pile-drivers, the trajectory of shells, etc. The possibility of *generalized propositions* regarding any character-phenomenon stands and falls with the possibility of psychological analysis revealing regular association or coordination of certain tendencies, habits, or dispositions with one another. Hence the continued reiteration that psychology as a natural science deals only with facts, while ethics is concerned with values, norms, ideals which *ought* to be whether they exist or no, is

either aside from the point, or else proves the impossibility of making any general statements, metaphysical as well as practical and scientific, about such matters.

§7. Sociological Analysis as a Condition of Controlling Ethical Judgments

We revert once more to our fundamental consideration: the reciprocal determination in moral judgment of the act of judging and the content judged. As we have just seen, adequate control of an act as determining a content involves the possibility of making character an object of scientific analysis – of stating it as a system of related conditions or an object complete in itself – a universal. We have now to recognize the converse, viz., that we can control the judgment of the act, hence of character as expressed in act, only as we have a method of analyzing the *content* in itself – that is, in abstraction from its bearings upon action.

The ethical problem needs to be approached from the point of view of the act as modifying the content, and of the content as modifying the act; so that, on one hand, we require, prior to a particular moral crisis, a statement in universal terms of the mechanism of the attitudes and dispositions which determine judgment about action; while, on the other hand, we need a similar prior analysis and classification of the situations which call forth such judgment. Which portion of the scientific apparatus we bring most prominently into play in any given case depends upon the circumstances of that case as influencing the probable source of error. If the situation or scene of action (by which we mean the conditions which provoke or stimulate the act of moral judging) is fairly familiar, we may assume that the source of error in judgment lies in the disposition which is back of the experience – that if we can only secure the right motive on the part of the judger, the judgment itself will be correct. In other cases circumstances are reversed. We can fairly presuppose or take for granted a right attitude on the part of the judger; the problematic factor has to do with the interpretation of the situation. In this case what is needed for right judgment is a satisfactory knowledge of the “facts of the case.” Given that, the existing motive will take care of the rest. It is this latter aspect of the matter that we now have to discuss.

The only way in which the agent can judge himself as an agent, and thereby control his act – that is, conceive of himself as the one who is to do a certain thing – is by finding out the situation which puts upon him the necessity of judging it in order that he may decide upon a certain course of action. As soon as a conclusion is reached as to the nature of the scene of action, a conclusion is also reached as to what the agent is to do, and this decides in turn what sort of an agent he is to be. The

merely intellectual judgment may be marked off as one in which a content or object is fixed in terms of some other object or content, homogeneous in worth, and where accordingly it is a necessary part of the procedure to suppress participation in judging of traits which proceed from, or refer to, the disposition of the judger. But judgments which are ethical (not merely intellectual) make no such abstraction. They expressly and positively include the participation of the judger in the content judged, and of the object judged in the determination of the judger. In other words, the object judged or situation constructed in moral judgment is not an external object, cold, remote, and indifferent, but is most uniquely, intimately, and completely the agent's own object, or is the agent *as object*.

Such being the case, what is required in order to form such a judgment of the scene or conditions of action as will facilitate the most adequate possible construing of the agent? I reply: A social science which will analyze a content as a combination of elements in the same way that psychological analysis determines an act as a set of attitudes. It is assumed that the situation which calls forth distinctively moral judgment is a social situation, which accordingly can be adequately described only through methods of sociological analysis. I am aware that (even admitting the necessity of some sort of scientific interpretation of the scene of action) it is something of a jump to say that such science must be sociological in character. The logical gap could be covered only by carrying the discussion of the categories of moral judgment to the point where their social value would explicitly show itself. Such analysis is apart from my present purpose. Here I need only recur to the proposition of the reciprocal determination, in the ethical judgment, of the judger and the content judged, and suggest that this idea requires in its logical development the conclusion that, since the judger is personal, the content judged must ultimately be personal too – so that the moral judgment really institutes a relationship between persons, relationship between persons being what we mean by “social.”

But in any case, some way of getting an objective statement of the situation, a statement in terms of connection of conditions, is necessary. Certain descriptive sciences are necessary and in many cases no one would deny that elements of associated life enter into the facts to be described. But even if it be admitted that the scene is social, this characterization does not exhaust the description. Any scene of action which is social is *also* cosmic or physical. It is also biological. Hence the absolute impossibility of ruling out the physical and biological sciences from bearing upon ethical science. If ethical theory require, as one of its necessary conditions, ability to describe in terms of itself the situation which demands moral judgment, any proposition, whether of

mechanics, chemistry, geography, physiology, or history, which facilitates and guarantees the adequacy and truth of the description, becomes in virtue of that fact an important auxiliary of ethical science.

In other words, the postulate of moral science is the continuity of scientific judgment. This proposition is denied by both the materialistic and transcendental schools of metaphysics. The transcendental school draws such a fixed line between the region of moral and of cosmic values that by no possibility can propositions which refer to the latter become auxiliary or instrumental with respect to the former. The fact that advance of physical and biological science so profoundly modifies moral problems, and hence moral judgments, and hence once more moral values, may serve as an argument against transcendental ethics – since, according to the latter, such obvious facts would be impossibilities. Materialism denies equally the principle of continuity of judgment. It confuses continuity of method, the possibility of using a general statement regarding one object as a tool in the determination of some other, with immediate identity of subject-matter. Instead of recognizing the *continuity* of ethical with other forms of experience, it wipes out ethical experience by assimilating it not simply with reference to logical method, but in its own ontological structure, to another form of objects defined in judgment – that is, the physical form. If it is once recognized that *all* scientific judgments, physical as well as ethical, are ultimately concerned with getting experience stated in objective (that is, universal) terms for the sake of the direction of further experience, there will, on the one hand, be no hesitation in using any sort of statement that can be of use in the formation of other judgments, whatever be their topic or reference; and, on the other hand, there will be no thought of trying to explain away the *distinctive* traits of any type of experience. Since conscious life is continuous, the possibility of using any one mode of experience to assist in the formation of any other is the ultimate postulate of *all* science – non-ethical and ethical alike. And this possibility of use, of application, of instrumental service, makes it possible and necessary to employ materialistic science in the construction of ethical theory, and also protects in this application ethical values from deterioration and dissolution.

In conclusion, it may avoid misapprehension if I say that the considerations set forth in this paper do not involve any pedantic assumption regarding the necessity of using science, or logical control, in any particular instance of moral experience. The larger part, infinitely the larger part, of our concrete contact with physical nature takes place without conscious reference to the methods, or even the results, of physical science. Yet no one questions the fundamental importance of physical science. This importance discovers itself in two ways:

First, when we come to peculiarly difficult problems (whether of interpretation or of inventive construction), physical science puts us in possession of tools of conscious analysis and of synthesis. It enables us to economize our time and effort, and to proceed with the maximum probability of success to solution of the problem which confronts us. This use is conscious and deliberate. It involves the critical application of the technique and already established conclusions of science to cases of such complexity and perplexity that they would remain unsolved and undealt with, were it not for scientific resources.

In the second place, physical science has a wide sphere of application which involves no conscious reference whatsoever. Previous scientific methods and investigations have taken effect in our own mental habits and in the material dealt with. Our unconscious ways of apprehending, of interpreting, of deliberating, are saturated with products of prior conscious critical science. We thus get the benefit, in our intellectual commerce with particular situations, of scientific operations which we have forgotten, and even of those which we individually have never performed. Science has become incarnate in our immediate attitude toward the world about us, and is embodied in that world itself. Every time that we solve a difficulty by sending a telegram, crossing a bridge, lighting the gas, boarding a railroad train, consulting a thermometer, we are controlling the formation of a judgment by use of so much precipitated and condensed science. Science has pre-formed, in many of its features, the situation with reference to which we have to judge; and it is this objective delimitation and structural reinforcement which, answering at every point to the conformation of habit, most assists intelligence in the details of its behavior.

There is every reason to suppose that the analogy holds with reference to a science of conduct. Such a science can be built up only through reference to cases which at the outset need conscious critical direction in judgment. We need to know what the social situation is in which we find ourselves required to act, so that we may know what it is right to do. We need to know what is the effect of some psychical disposition upon our way of looking at life and thereby upon our conduct. Through clearing up the social situation, through making objective to ourselves our own motives and their consequences, we build up generic propositions: statements of experience as a connection of conditions, that is, in the form of objects. Such statements are used and applied in dealing with further problems. Gradually their use becomes more and more habitual. The "theory" becomes a part of our psychical apparatus. The social situation takes on a certain form or organization. It is pre-classified as of a certain sort, as of a certain genus and even species of this sort; the only question which remains is discrimination of the

particular variety. Again, we get into the habit of taking into account certain sources of error in our own disposition as these affect our judgments of behavior, and thereby bring them sufficiently under control so that the need of conscious reference to their intellectual formulation diminishes. As physical science has brought about an organization of the physical world along with an organization of practical habits of dealing with that world, so ethical science will effect an organization of the social world and a corresponding organization of the psychical habits through which the individual relates himself to it. With this clearing up of the field and organs of moral action, conscious recourse to theory will, as in physical cases, limit itself to problems of unusual perplexity and to constructions of a large degree of novelty.

Summary

1. By “scientific” is meant methods of control of formation of judgments.

2. Such control is obtained only by ability to abstract certain elements in the experience judged, and to state them as connections of conditions, *i.e.*, as “objects,” or universals.

3. Such statements constitute the bulk of the recognized sciences. They are generic propositions, or laws, put, as a rule, in the hypothetic form if *M*, then *N*. But such generic propositions are the instruments of science, not science itself. Science has its life in judgments of identification, and it is for their sake that generic propositions (or universals, or laws) are constructed and tested or verified.

4. Such judgments of concrete identification are individualized, and are also acts. The presence of action as a logical element appears indirectly in (a) the selection of the subject, (b) the determination of the predicate, and (c) most directly in the copula – the entire process of the reciprocal forming and testing of tentative subjects and predicates.

5. Judgments are “intellectual” in logical type so far as this reference to activity may be presupposed, and thereby not require to be consciously set forth or exposed. This happens whenever the action involved is impartial in its influence upon the quality of the content judged. Judgments are “moral” in logical type so far as the presence of activity in affecting the content of judgment is seen consciously to affect itself – or whenever the reciprocal determination of activity and content becomes itself an object of judgment whose determination is a prerequisite for further successful judgments.

6. Control of moral judgment requires ability to constitute the reciprocal determination of activity and content into an object. This has three phases: First, a statement of the limiting forms of that type of judgment which is concerned with construing an activity and a content in terms of

each other. The limiting terms of such a type of judgment constitute the characteristic features, or categories, of the object of ethical science, just as the limiting terms of the judgment which construes one object in terms of another object constitute the categories of physical science. A discussion of moral judgment from this point of view may be termed "The Logic of Conduct." Second, an abstraction of the activity, which views it as a system of attitudes or dispositions involved in having experiences, and states it (since a system) as an object constituted by definite connections of diverse attitudes with the attitude of judging – viz., the science of psychology. Third, a similar abstraction of the "content," which views it as a system of social elements which form the scene or situation in which action is to occur, and with reference to which, therefore, the actor is to be formed – viz., sociological science.

7. The whole discussion implies that the determination of objects as objects, even when involving no conscious reference whatever to conduct is, after all, for the sake of the development of further experience. This further development is change, transformation of existing experience, and thus is *active*. So far as this development is intentionally directed through the construction of objects as objects, there is not only active experience, but *regulated activity*, i.e., conduct, behavior, practice. Therefore, all determination of objects as objects (including the sciences which construct physical objects) has reference to change of experience, or experience as activity; and, when this reference passes from abstraction to application (from negative to positive), has reference to conscious control of the nature of the change (i.e., conscious change), and thereby gets ethical significance. This principle may be termed *the postulate of continuity of experience*. This principle on the one hand protects the integrity of the moral judgment, revealing its supremacy and the corresponding instrumental or auxiliary character of the intellectual judgment (whether physical, psychological or social); and, upon the other, protects the moral judgment from isolation (i.e., from transcendentalism), bringing it into working relations of reciprocal assistance with all judgments about the subject-matter of experience, even those of the most markedly mechanical and physiological sort.

PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

James H. Tufts. "The Social Standpoint." *Journal of Philosophy* 1.8 (14 April 1904): 197–200.

The social standpoint is not wholly a recent discovery. Not to refer to ancient thought, Leibniz constructed a universe on the analogy of a 'kingdom.' Kant, by his transfer of the categories from the sphere of pure ontology to that of validity (Royce), made an important step in the direction of a social standpoint, for although his 'universality' was not based on the number of observers and reasoners, he did, in the case of esthetic universality at least, distinctly raise the question how an '*allgemeine Sinn*' could be formed, and sought an answer in the fact of social conversation. We should naturally think also of the British moralists and the German idealists. The 'herding instinct' of Shaftesbury, the 'pliability' assigned by Mandeville as the medium for social influence, the 'sympathy' of Hume and Smith, the 'imitation' of Hartley – all suggest present terminology as well as present problems, although the analytic method of mathematics and physics determined in some cases the mode of approach. The German idealists, starting from the problem of freedom, went on to consider the development of the individual mind and of human institutions as the logical moments in the unfolding of complete freedom – of absolute mind; but the social causes of the process were not studied; psychology had not freed itself sufficiently to be able to take up its own problems, nor had the utilitarian and later ethical movements added their content to the conception of social welfare.

The present prominence of social problems, social categories and social standards is doubtless due, to a considerable extent, to an increasing appreciation of an even more rapidly increasing influence of the social medium, whether of the past, through tradition education and the other media of 'social heredity,' or of the present through the greater massing of humanity and through the increased facilities for interchange of persons, goods and ideas. The pressure toward cities is economic as well as gregarious in its motives. But the economic wants themselves which urge toward city life are largely created by social suggestion, the means for satisfying them exist largely because of the presence of masses

of people living together and because of a more democratic diffusion of opportunities for education and amusement, and finally the possibility of satisfying these wants is brought more vividly to general attention through present agencies. The economic, while it *may* be 'egoistic' in its aim, is social in cause and content. Economic standards of value are determined less and less by the organic wants for food, shelter and clothing, more and more by social suggestion and demand. Economic value is given to land by the very residence of large numbers in its vicinity; it is given to certain commodities by the elevation in standard of living due to greater intelligence and other social causes; and the owner of the land or the producer of the other commodities may not have contributed in the slightest toward the value of which he receives the benefit.

The bearing of these facts upon economics and ethics is apparent, although it has by no means received full recognition as yet. The bearing upon the psychology of the self is no less obvious. The increasing social influence, both from past and from present agencies, is not only enlarging and strengthening what James calls the 'social self' (it would have saved us from ambiguities if James had used a different term for this, so that the term social might have been left free for application to certain aspects of all the 'selves'), it is also transforming the content of material and spiritual selves – of the material self along lines already indicated, of the spiritual self along lines to be suggested below. The mode of functioning as well as the content is also affected, as Baldwin and others have shown. Perhaps the present danger is that we take the processes of imitation and social influence too simply, as Locke took his processes of sensation. Is there not to be worked out in detail a theory of apperception in the relation of the individual to the social influences, just as we have gradually worked out such a theory in the case of visual perception?

An ambiguity in the use of the term social calls for notice. In the looser sense social may be applied to relations between individuals. Any interchange of ideas, any influence of one by another, implies some ultimate community of intelligence, interest or sphere, and may, therefore, be loosely termed social, and studied by 'social psychology.' But in a more restricted sense the term may be limited to the activity of a group as such. The group may be a group of two, and but of momentary duration, but there is for the time some unity of interest or sentiment which makes the group as such a force in the life of each member. The psychology of this group influence is highly significant for ethics and the philosophy of law. For the individual, having developed as a member of a group – clan, family, state, village or religious community – has constant experience of group standards and group authority, and feels

the stress of group motives, simply because a large part of his activities are for common or group ends, and are performed in ways prescribed or suggested by the tradition or opinion of the group. From conflicting interests and under highly complex forces emerge the consciously selfish or altruistic purpose, the asserted or recognized rights, the reflective jealousy or sympathy, but in them all is the pressure of a more than individual authority or claim which asserts its power ultimately as moral control.

In applied ethics the influence of the social upon theory as well as upon practice is no less marked. The old virtues of thrift and clarity are rudely challenged. Trades-unions form groups which present ethical phases strikingly analogous to political groups at the tribal stage – or, indeed, to our present states in their international relations, which are confessedly only very partially moral. Within the union there is a ‘loyalty,’ a solidarity, and a genuine self-sacrifice on the part of the naturally capable members, which are entirely comparable to the patriotic devotion of clansman or citizen. The man who seeks to better himself by leaving the union, or who actively or passively interferes with union success, is regarded very much as were the ‘tories’ and ‘copper-heads.’ The study of group ethics in economic as well as in political groups helps to a juster estimate of the values and limitations in each. The question ‘what virtue is of most worth’ is brought forcibly to consciousness by present conditions.

The conception of justice is also in a state of flux. When thrift was regarded as an unquestionable if not a supreme virtue, any possible acquisition not involving violence or fraud was accepted as a just reward. By giving a portion in charity the acquirer could experience joyously how much better it is to give than to receive. Now that the social factor in the production of wealth is being dimly recognized, the masses feel the inequality as well as the discomfort; the conscientious man of privilege feels a scruple about accepting education, art, wealth, opportunity of every sort, in such superlative measure. It is not merely that he feels bound to devote them to public service as his own immediate way of paying his debt; he wonders whether, if justice prevailed, some of the others might not have the opportunity for serving the public in such wise, and of enjoying the experience of personal independence in greater degree.¹ I have noted in the *American Journal of Sociology* for January an interesting attempt to give the new conception of justice a form capable of legal use. The suggestion is to give the concept ‘social debt’ a legal as well as an ethical standing.

¹ On the relation between social and individual ethics, Jane Addams, ‘Democracy and Social Ethics’: Compare chap. v. in Armstrong’s ‘Transitional Eras in Thought,’ New York, 1904.

The philosophy of religion has been similarly affected. If the distinguishing mark of religion as contrasted with magic is found in the social relation between gods and people, we are in a position to interpret ancestor worship and similar facts in a way to show their ethical significance. The religious sanction of morality is seen to be rooted in intrinsic relations. The distinctive religious attitudes and sentiments may be analyzed and interpreted in a manner which supplements the classic interpretations of Kant, Schleiermacher and Hegel.

Of the social standpoint in esthetics I have written elsewhere.² Metaphysics might seem at first blush an unpromising field, but since Kant we have learned that reality, if known at all, must be known through categories; and if certain of these categories which give us a 'world of description' are themselves due to social influence, as Royce has maintained, the theory of knowledge is affected by the social standpoint in a fundamental manner. Accepting as in some sense true Kant's principle that the unity of self-consciousness is the ultimate principle of logic, we have still to ask how that demand for unity has been developed to the height found in the scientific mind. Assuming also with Kant that an irreversible sequence is the cue on the basis of which the mind interprets a connection as objective, we may yet seek additional factors in the consciousness of objectivity. The elements of objectivity in logical, ethical and esthetical judgments have their sources, in part at least, in the pressure of a social environment or the necessity of social communication.

² *Philosophical Review*, January, 1903

ON MORAL EVOLUTION

James H. Tufts. "On Moral Evolution." *In Studies in Philosophy and Psychology by Former Students of Charles Edward Garman* (Boston: Houghton, 1906), pp. 3–39.

I. Introductory

The advances in general and genetic psychology on the one hand, and in social psychology on the other, give the point of view for attempting an outline of the development of the moral self. The more important results from these disciplines, as regards the explanation of the moral life, are the following: –

1. The conception of mental development as a process that starts with certain instincts and impulses which have biological explanations. The rise to active, intelligent personality takes place largely on occasion of reactions with environment, in which the simple discharge of impulse is blocked, and the longer way of thinking and planning is forced if the being or the race is to survive. Gradually ideas, which at the outset were evoked by impulse and environment, assert more power, until they create in large measure the environment, and remake the impulses.

2. The recognition that the self is many as well as one. It is many before it is one. It is long before its acts are connected by habit and memory into one morally responsible agent; it is longer before its many interests and impulses – egoistic and generous – are all brought into one spiritual unity.

3. The conception of the self as always a *socius*. As the coming to consciousness of the self implies a world to struggle with, so it also implies other persons, other selves. As in law the conception of a person implies the idea of rights, and rights imply a relation to other persons, so an ego cannot exist in a vacuum. He can say "my" only as over against a "your," and "I" only as he contrasts or implies a "you" or a "they." Man is always a member of some social group. The primitive man, the little child, is relatively not detached from his group as an independent individual. Only gradually does the individual conceive and organize his own separate interests. Unconscious solidarity is the status at the outset; conscious individuality and conscious social interests are the final outcome.

To these three concepts – of the mental life as a growth from impulse, of the complexity of content, and of the social character of the self – we may add one general principle of method. It must be kept in mind that what is true of mental process in general is preëminently important in the moral life: the process of development and growth is always synthetic in the sense that a given stage is never simply the sum of past factors and agencies. The conception of the self as moral involves the constant process of a dynamic unfolding and reconstructing agency, which pushes on to higher levels and judges or evaluates the past.

After a brief preliminary statement of (1) the chief factors in the developed moral self – the goal of the process, and (2) the genetic elements which are postulated as the beginning of the process, I shall discuss under II the causal agencies in moral evolution, and under III outline certain important phases of the process.

1. The Chief Factors in the Moral Self

When we speak of a moral man we imply, broadly, both that he has character and that he has a certain kind of character. Moralists distinguish the same aspect as a form and a content. Aristotle speaks of a “how” and a “what.”¹ Broadly speaking, this has its basis in the twofold aspect of mental life. On the one hand it is a process of subjective control, purpose, feeling, and habit. On the other, it is an adjustment to an environment physical and social, a mastery of environment, a development of capacity by the actual struggle with objective conditions, and by the actual performance of function in a social organism. Psychologically the phrases attitude and content bring out much the same.

On the side of the “how” the important aspects are:

(a) The setting up and recognition of some standard, which may arise either as a control in the guise of “right” and “law,” or as measure of value in the form of an ideal to be followed or a good to be approved.

(b) Purity and sincerity of motive, whole-hearted interest in the end.

(c) Organization of impulse and ideals into responsible character.

On the side of the “what,” there are two aspects:

(a) The development and refinement or idealization of powers, giving advance in knowledge, in art, and in the consciousness of rights.

(b) Regard for others under its various aspects of justice, sympathy, and benevolence.

2. The Genetic Elements

What we postulate as the elements of the moral process will evidently

¹ *Ethics*, bk. ii, ch. 4, § 3.

depend somewhat on where we assume the process to begin. It is in some sense arbitrary where we make our first cross-section; for it is evident that any conscious control of action is in the line of preparation, at least, for moral action. Nevertheless, on the psychological side, we have a natural starting-point in the instincts. The instincts, accompanied in some cases by emotions, are of biological ancestry. They are selected in the struggle for existence because they are modes of action favorable to the organism or to the species or the group. They are not themselves psychical products. They form the beginnings, and later, rationalized and idealized, they remain the driving forces of the process. It is from the instincts making for the advantage of the individual that the self of material interests, of personal ambitions, of assertive rights, is gradually organized. It is from the instincts selected by the welfare of the group that the self of justice, sympathy, and love is brought to conscious life. Intelligence brings wider range of experience to bear upon the present; in feeling the self values its experience, and thus may find new motives to action; but as it is will which forms the centre of interest for morality, so it is the instinctive, impulsive tendencies which form the point of departure.

On the objective side we take for our starting-point man in group life. We find him here engaged in the various occupations – seeking food and shelter; making tools, fighting, wooing, caring for children, defending his group, seeking companionship and help, seen and unseen – which correspond to the various instincts. Here are present for the first time all the elements which give the possibility of full moral development.

II. Causal Agencies in Moral Evolution

The moral consciousness and character of a man or a generation may be attributed broadly to three sources: (1) Nature, or physical constitution; (2) Society or social heredity; (3) Original achievement, or the formation of character in dealing with the problems and situations of physical and social environment.

(1) Under “nature” we may distinguish the conservative factor of heredity, which would tend to continue the race at about the same level, and the factors making for progress. Progress through biological agencies is probably limited to what James calls the “back-door method” – accidental variation, although a given variation may be preserved by either natural or social selection; the wise may be both better able to cope with nature and also given special care by his group.

Acquired morality is probably not transmitted by physical heredity. It can only give the physical factors a better chance, by supplying conditions favorable for the emergence and preservation of desirable variations in offspring, or in general for the young of the group.

But acquired morality may be and is transmitted by (2) social heredity, by which we mean the transmission from generation to generation of certain standards, ideals, and implications of authority embodied in tradition, custom, language, and institutions. The new generation or individual learns these in a way sufficiently distinct from the independent formation of standards and character to make a distinct treatment desirable.

(3) Deliberate, conscious choice and action is undoubtedly the basis of full moral consciousness and character. Nevertheless it is relatively a small factor in the early stages of moral evolution, and in the development of the child up to the adolescent period.

When we ask how much moral progress is due to each of the three agencies named, we are largely in the air. No one doubts that reaction to a peculiar condition in politics and society develops a Socrates or a Lincoln; that a religious conflict gives deeper meaning to the moral life of a Paul; that abuses rouse a Voltaire or a Bentham to criticism and reform. But no one can tell just how much was due to their physical heredity. Why did the situations provoke them to action and not others? Was it because of birth or of training? In the case of a man who opposes current ideals it might seem that it could not be training. But even here a conscientious attitude may be cultivated which may later turn upon the contents of its teachers' morality.

Again, is there any real advance which so registers itself in the physical organism as to be hereditary? No doubt the modern European or American child has greater capacities than the pithecanthropos, but it would be bold to affirm that the infant of to-day is notably superior in moral traits and capacities to the infant of our ancestors of two thousand years ago, or that the Jew of the Christian era was naturally superior to the Jew of the day of Nathan the prophet. It is seemingly impossible to devise any accurate way of measuring an assumed advance in the hereditary basis. The test cannot be applied to the child at birth, or even in early childhood, for several of the instincts and factors in the moral self cannot be looked for until at least the adolescent period. But by this time the second and third agencies – society and the child's own reflective action in the presence of problems – have been at work, and it is impossible to separate their respective contributions.

But while individual tests may be difficult or impossible, we may attempt some general inferences as to the *operation of natural and social selection* upon variations. We undoubtedly have certain individuals varying in the line of greater intellectual activity, stronger instinct for mastery and gain, greater sensitiveness to ideal beauty, greater parental or social sympathy. It is obvious that natural selection will favor certain of these variations, which help the individual in the struggle for

existence; that the struggle between groups will likewise favor those groups with social instincts, whose mutual aid makes them strong. Social selection will reinforce natural selection in many cases. It might seem then that the cosmic process is in the service of the moral. But a serious obstacle to progress along this line presents itself in the apparent collision between the two sets of instincts. Idealization and individuality seem fatal, if not to parental affection, at least to that regardlessness in the exercise of sex and parental instinct which results in a large number of offspring. If not an absolute "race-suicide," there is undoubtedly a relative failure to increase among individuals intellectually, artistically, or economically exceptional.

Is it true that moral progress is handicapped by breeding from the "lower" strata? Perhaps the case is not so bad as it appears. The kind of ability which results in economic success is often connected with a certain hardness of temper. Even intellectual acuteness may mean an abstraction from family or political interests which is useful for science, but on a large scale would be injurious to public welfare. If the well-to-do and the intellectual are too selfish or too abstract in interest or too anæmic to want children, it is better for the race that they should not have them. Individuality and ideality are desirable, but to propagate them at the expense of the parental and social instincts would be to pay too high a price. The greatest single factor – not by any means the only factor, as Sutherland would make it² – in the development of the social and emotional aspects of morality is the natural selection of stocks which show increasing care for off-spring. The statistics show impressively that the birthrate in the animal world is of almost trivial importance in comparison with the elements of intelligence and care.³ Professor Willcox's paper in this volume shows analogous results for human increase. But when it comes to a choice between the individualizing and refining process, on the one hand, and the sex, parental, and social instincts on the other, nature will not hesitate. And in the interests of moral progress is not nature's choice the wise one? Is it not easier – if the alternative is thus set – for society by its agencies to cultivate the individual's development mentally than to cultivate the generous and sympathetic disposition?

It would seem, then, that as regards the factor of natural selection, we can trust nature to keep up the level of strength in the sex and parental, and perhaps also in the sympathetic instincts, and to maintain so much of the intellectual progress and self-assertion as does not interfere with these.

² *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct.*

³ Given in Sutherland, vol. i.

The significance and method of the social agency need further analysis. How does society communicate its moral content to successive generations, or to put it from the standpoint of the learner, how does a generation or a child assimilate the culture and morality of society? He learns both consciously and unconsciously.

Moral *content*, the “what,” is taught by society with full consciousness. So far as this is an idea or intellectual material it can be and is taught like other information. Just because the “how,” or moral attitude, is not information or knowledge, but a habit, a valuing, a disposition, the problem is more difficult. So far as the attitude consists in the careful weighing and measuring of seeming standards and values, *i.e.*, in so far as all virtue can be reduced to wisdom, Plato faced the issue squarely. For this there must be not only the emotional culture of the sentiments through music, art, and literature, but also a training in analysis and reasoning. These are to give the reason skill as an instrument, and power as a mental constituent, so that it may be able to assert its own needs as best and most satisfying. Here we are of course on the border line between education by society and education by self.

But does society have any direct influence on the “moral sentiments?” Does it help in making ideas of right into ideals for action? in giving authority to the right? in fostering sympathy, justice, and benevolence?

Three answers have been given, which need to be supplemented in certain details by a fourth.

(1) *The Association Theory* of social influence. This may take two forms.

(a) Direct association of values with words and ideas. Parents and society utter certain words of approval or condemnation with tones which carry pleasant or unpleasant associations. The child may not have the slightest intellectual conception of “horrid,” “nasty,” “disgusting,” “mean,” “wicked,” “good,” “fine,” but he senses a decided emotional value as these are pronounced by an earnest parent. Nor does the social influence stop with infancy. Society uses certain epithets, such as “vulgar,” “heretic,” “anarchist,” in a purely emotional sense and exercises considerable pressure thereby. This sort of direct association is combined in Mandeville’s theory with appeals to pride, but the essential character of it is the direct association of value with certain moral terms.

(b) The association of pleasant or painful *consequences* with certain acts. This as developed by Bain and Spencer has been so often criticised that it need not be analyzed here. It is unquestionable that society and parents must sometimes use such associations to check the thoughtless or lawless, but the associations of this class, as of (a), will sooner or later seem artificial if they conflict with powerful interests. Duties based on them will appear mere “conventions.” We therefore are forced to

inquire whether society has any mode of teaching the intrinsic as *versus* the external obligation and respect for authority.

(2) *The Sympathy Theory*. This has two applications. Plato holds that emotional influences in childhood, rhythm and harmony, Apollo and the Muses, begin the education of the young and teach them, without conscious purpose on their part, to find pleasure and pain in the right objects. There is no doubt of the importance of this in race heredity. The agencies of art, music, and literature have been widely and effectively used to inculcate values, and give power to ideals honored by the older generation.

The second application is to the specific case of valuing the interests of others. Here belong all such institutions as family, clan, men's houses, clubs, in which a group acts directly on the individual's feelings, accustoming him to feel, not as an individual, but as a member of a group, and therefore as having common interests and common sentiments with others. Further, in judging as well as in valuing, he is on a sympathetic basis, using a common standard of honor. There is no question of the immense importance of this factor. But it does not seem to provide for the duty or "ought" aspect, and hence we have

(3) *The Imitation and Polar-self Theory*. This has been most fully developed by Baldwin. The valuation of action from a social standpoint is based on the social nature of the self; but as contrasted with the previous view, this social nature is given a basis on the knowing side of our nature, rather than on the feeling side. The self, it is held, is formed largely by imitating the persons in its environment. The child copies father, mother, playmate, and therefore is for the time being father, mother, playmate. It commands, threatens, sympathizes, feels as its models command, threaten, sympathize, or feel. It in turn practices these attitudes or selves on others, but it is always some *socius*, never an isolated self. It is also a different *socius* according as it is playing the rôle of learner in the presence of father, tyrant when with a younger child, or equal with a fellow playmate. Consequently its interests are as varied as its rôles, and its standards of valuation as broad as its interests.

This theory has an explanation also for the origin of the attitude of duty, the feeling of respect for authority. The child as learner is made conscious of his limitations; he feels that he cannot copy all of his father or teacher or ideal person. He recognizes superiority; yet as the superior person is not exclusively an outsider, but is rather, as *socius*, a part of himself in the largest sense of the term self, the feeling is one of respect, not of fear. It prepares for full autonomy. Here, then, is an answer to the old question, "Can virtue be taught?" which would make the teaching of αἰδώς, as well as αἰσχύνη, possible, though by example rather than by precept.

How far is this a satisfactory account of the genesis of the social sentiments and of the sense of duty? There is no doubt that it contributes an important factor – more important for the genesis of these sentiments in the child than for their evolution in the race. If we state it in terms of the dual nature of the self set forth above, the theory might run: Granted that the “ought” rests upon a tension between impulse and reason, or impulse and habit, or habit and reason, the child is at first largely impulse, and the two other aspects, viz. habit and reason, are represented in his consciousness by parent or other superior person. The question that arises as to its adequacy in the case of the child springs from the fact that by it the sense of duty is derived largely from the cognitive process. The parent is wiser; yes, but if this were all, the moral conflict would be less passionate, and authority would less often win. The controlling agency needs reinforcement by all the impulses and emotions which appear on the instinctive basis, or which can be kindled on the sympathetic basis, and needs beside the reinforcement of direct appeal to such impulses as that of receiving public approval, to make it fully effective. And this explains why it is relatively less important in the race evolution. The social-self idea is fundamental. The cognitive aspect of it, the element of mystery in the presence of the unknown, is also present in race evolution, particularly in religious cultus or initiatory ceremonial. But the process of learning is here less a process of imitation, more a process of direct appeal to impulses, or of pressure by the social, as organized in customs and institutions, upon the private self.

On the other hand, it has been questioned whether the imitation theory has any application to the social process. The accounts given by Spencer and Gillen of the deliberations of the old men upon the question of changing or adopting a custom would certainly tend to minimize the influence of this method of social heredity, and to give a much larger share to the moralizing agency of conscious choice. The really important rôle of imitation as compared with conscious volition in the case of adults and even of children would seem to lie less in the adoption of ends than in the adoption of technique. In the case of language, for example, it is an instinctive matter that the child begins to babble sounds; it is a volitional matter that the child comes to control gesture and sound to gain the ends he desires; but it is a matter of social heredity through imitation that he uses the particular sounds and the particular syntax of English or Chinese. So in customs of moral significance: the mediæval knight and the Japanese Samurai alike desire to maintain honor; the one challenges his insulter, the other commits harakiri. The passion is instinctive, the end is volitional, the method is imitative. Jewish and Greek idealist both seek a better social order. For

the Jew it is a kingdom of God, for the Greek a state controlled by wisdom.

The three agencies noticed above do not provide for all the lines of social influence. Neither associations, nor contagious sympathy, nor presentation of "copies" as models for imitation, does justice to all the facts. We need to add

(4) *Social Organization* as directing the discharge and organization of instincts and impulses.

This may be stated both socially and psychologically. Socially it means that the child or primitive adult has various impulses, – to eat, to hunt, to attack, to satisfy the opposite sex, to company with others, to assert control. Society, however, by its very organization makes it necessary for the child to eat with others, to live with a family or clan, to hunt with a group, to satisfy sex impulse under certain limits, to company with certain men, to revenge himself only in certain ways. Or it gives definite scope for what would otherwise remain inchoate; the institution of property develops the instinct to possess; the religious cultus the instinctive reactions toward the unknown; the political or industrial organization the impulse to rivalry and mastery; the festival the impulse to rhythmic expression. So far as the social side of the case is concerned, I regard this as the most important of the agencies for control and for development.

What of the psychological side? How does the individual react to this organization? Is it not by one of the three processes already noted, viz. association, sympathy, or imitation? He learns something by each; but in this case he learns also (a) by suggestion and (b) by independent observation and adoption. In suggestive learning the individual neither intentionally copies, nor unconsciously plays the rôle of another. He is himself all the time, but he adopts such ideas, habits, or methods as he likes. In (b), independent volition, we are already in the field of the third agency of moral growth. But while it is psychologically not a single process, this fourth agency is socially distinct, and as such deserves explicit emphasis.

A brief notice will suffice for the factors in the *third agency*, viz. *the individual's own volition*.

The first and chief factor in this process, stated objectively, is *opposition* in the physical and social environment; stated subjectively, *effort*.⁴

Opposition of the physical environment, including the difficulties of erect stature, prevents immediate gratification of impulse; it thus

⁴ Cf. Mezes, *The Essentials of Human Faculty*, University of California Publications, Philosophy, I.

occasions the comparison of goods, the process of valuing; it throws the individual back upon himself, and provokes reflection; it heightens emotional tension, and through the process of the work necessary to gain the end, organizes character. For as will be pointed out in more detail later, the very nature of work, at first as effort, provoked by immediate necessities and impulses, and later as elicited and diverted by a remoter end set up by thought, is that it implies and strengthens the capacity to *take* an interest, to control impulse by idea, and to connect a series of acts into a continuous whole, the counterpart of a continuous self.

The fact of physical opposition or resistance to the wants is, further, the objective occasion for social coöperation and mutual aid. That man cannot supply his own wants forces him to seek the coöperation of others. But mutual service, or service for a common end, is the most effective positive agency for promoting social will, as distinct from social sympathy. To make the ends of others one's own, even from motives of physical necessity, is the most valuable method of preparing the way for a social will of a completely voluntary sort.

Finally, the opposition of interests which arises between individuals because of mutually exclusive ends, forces conscious choice between selfish and generous conduct.

Next in importance to opposition is an environment, – a muscular system, wood, clay, stone, metal, fibre, air as medium for sound, – in which purpose and skill may find objective embodiment. Psychologically stated, ideal volitions must be actualized and carried out if thought is to grow and character to form. Constructive production in all the crafts and fine arts has given power and permanence to the mental, and in so far to the moral life. The consciousness of personality, of agency, may owe its rudiments to the processes of imitation of other personalities, or to suggestion from them. Its deepest root, however, is probably this successful producing of objective results. The self as a creator or maker is a real self.

Nor is the influence of this active construction and expression limited to the formal sides of character. The reflex effect upon the artist or workman himself of handling color and sound, of producing form and rhythm, the social effect of presenting to others ideas and stirring their emotions, the refining and elevating influence of giving objective embodiment to the ideals of the most gifted, – all this belongs to the moral value of “manual training,” of music, of literature, and every art!

III. The Process of Moral Evolution

In this section we bring together the aspects and agencies which have been separated in the preceding analysis. We show the intimate interde-

pendence of form and content; the interaction of physical, social, and volitional agencies.

The general law of progress on the formal side is: The rational, which in full morality is standard, law, and ideal, is at first presented, not by itself, but embodied in persons. Gradually it works free and comes to explicit recognition. Similarly character is organized at first by social pressure, later by self-directed work.

On the content side the law is: Idealization of life is possible only through the processes of control and selection just stated. Here too, therefore, the social embodiment of ideal ends is primary, the more definitely rational valuation of science and art is later. The other phases of content, viz. individuality and sociality, pass through the following process: Society begins with no sharp distinction between self and others, with no definite rights, no personal duties, no positive freedom, no strictly personal responsibility. As rational standards are gradually set up and brought to bear upon the conflicting claims of individuals, or upon the conflicts between individuals and the group, all these positive factors in individuality and social obligation assert their value and gain explicit recognition.

Finally, as the result of this twofold development of form and content, the full moral consciousness is born. This has standard and motive and authority all within the self; and yet since the moral self is completely rational, completely social, it has a standard and motive and authority which are universal.

Starting with the instincts and impulses bred into the race, we notice first of all as a basis for the future complex consciousness that these impulses, quite apart from any other controlling influences, tend to check, modify, or reinforce each other. For example, the impulse to satisfy hunger is liable to be checked often by parental impulse, while the impulse to resent attack may be greatly reinforced, as in the "bear" robbed of her whelps. Rivalry or emulation is immensely strengthened by sociability with its attendant love of praise. Sex impulse is profoundly modified by parental impulse, as the latter gains in force by the lengthening of infancy, keeping the parents together for a longer time, and tending to supplement the physical sex impulse by feelings of sympathy and common interest. The impulse toward appropriation, which later develops into desire of property, has also influenced the sex relation, and seems to have been an important agency in bringing about permanence and exclusiveness. The "neighbor's wife" is not to be coveted, "nor anything that is thy neighbor's." These illustrations show that even as endowed with these competing instincts the individual is bound to develop a complex self, in which ideas of others play their part as truly as ideas of bodily or more exclusive and private interests.

But in group life the self is not a complex of interests which borrow their strength solely from the physical constitution. The process of organization begins and goes forward, not with reference solely to a private, personal focus, but with reference to some group, or to the tension between some group interest and some private interest. The primitive man finds most of the technique of life – his occupation, his lodging, his costume, his fighting, his religion – all set for him. In all these he thinks and speaks less as “I” than as “we.” The Arabs never say, “The blood of M. or N. has been spilt,” naming the man; they say, “Our blood has been spilt.” Or, if as “I” in marriage, in food supply, it is often not “I” as a person with hopes and purposes, but I as a member of the wolf totem; I as the mother of heroes; I as head of the clan. The child in like manner begins to organize his interests not from a single, permanent, exclusive centre; he is rather, as Baldwin has pointed out, now the learner, now the teacher, now the dependent, now the aggressive tyrant, because he not only works out his own instincts, but also on occasion plays the rôle of various personalities of his group.

Neither in the case of man in group life nor in the case of the child is there complete individuality. But the cases are otherwise not identical. The child’s lack of individuality signifies rather an incomplete organization of interests about any single centre; he plays many rôles. This plurality is due, on the one hand, to the great variety of impulses pressing for expression, and on the other to imitation or suggestion, and on this second side is relatively more connected with the nature of the learning or cognitive process. The lack of individuality in primitive man is rather a positive solidarity of interest, a habit of working, feeling, and living as part of a group. This is due, not to the imitation or suggestion of other persons, but rather to the objective organization of his life.

Two tensions are soon set up. (a) The group self is not all. Specific impulses – notably those for food, possession, emulation – provoke the individual either to separate his interests or to use the group instead of merely identifying himself with it. (b) At the same time there is another tension set up, – that between the simple, immediate satisfaction of impulse or desire and the more remote or complex good. Various factors may contribute to this: physically there is the appearance and selection of variations in the line of greater intelligence; socially there is the machinery of exchange, and the premium placed on property or other product of forethought; individually there is the satisfaction felt or anticipated in an expanding self.

The distinction between these two tensions is not usually felt. The control of the remote over the present is presented to the primitive man in group life as a control by the old men, by the customs which represent the ways of the forefathers, by the clan heads, the kindred

gods – totem, ancestral, or covenant. Reverence for law is, at first, respect for personal representatives of the social order. It begins when the parent, who embodies superior power and knowledge, brings these to bear *sympathetically* upon the child's problems, or conduct, in such wise that the child sympathetically takes a similar attitude of control. It develops as larger groups always are found to involve the same dual aspect, by which every member is both sovereign and subject. It is especially fostered by ceremonies of initiation and religious mystery.

Spencer makes similar distinction of the two antitheses in moral conduct, – immediate (or simple) *versus* remote (or complex), and private *versus* social control; but the whole point of the present view as against Spencer's is that the antithesis is not between the self as a separate person, and the other – society, rulers, gods – as separate persons. The separation, unless in the case of violence, is the *end* of the process, not the beginning. The "visible ruler," the "invisible ruler," the "public opinion" all belong to the group. Sometimes they threaten or punish, but more often they coöperate with the member. They aid him with food or with water; they fight for him and against his enemies; they avenge his wrongs. The "spirit" of the deity comes upon a Samson or a Jephthah in time of personal or tribal crisis.

The evolution of honor and justice illustrates conspicuously the fusion, in early stages, of the social and rational controls; at the same time it shows the process or the formation of standards and the evolution of individuality.

Honor implies, first, a common group sentiment and a sensitiveness to this sentiment. The group opinion is the standard for conduct. This is so far social, in a rather external sense. But the standard and the motivation imply more than the externally social, as is manifest when we ask, On what basis does a group praise or blame? In giving that sort of praise or approval which belongs to honor, the members of the group do not react as individuals merely, praising what pleases them as individuals. They react more or less completely from the group point of view, for they do not honor the man who is definitely seeking their applause and that alone, *i.e.* the man who seeks to please them as individuals; they honor the man who embodies the group ideal of courage or other admirable and respected qualities. In like manner a "sense of honor" in the individual implies more than a desire to receive the praise and avoid the blame of other. It implies a desire to be *worthy* of the praise or blame; this means a desire to act as a true social individual, for it is only the true member of the group – true clansman, true patriot, true martyr – who appeals to the other members when they judge as members, and not selfishly.

But the distinctions between "seeking honor" and seeking to be "worthy of honor" provoke naturally another question. What is the true interest of the group? Is there any rational basis for this idea rather than that? So the Greek asked for the meaning of the *καλόν*. The way is thus open to the transition from honor to "right" as standard, and "duty" as motive. Honor means psychologically (1) that the *ego* pole in the developing self must measure its values by the *alter's* standards, and (2) in order to gain value in the *alter's* eye must cease to be mere ego and broaden itself to the aims and values of the whole social self.

Right or law (the word is the same in Greek, Latin, German, French) begins likewise, as will appear, with a personal edict or decision, and gradually loses this personal character to become objective and rational. Psychologically, it is therefore the recognition of the standard presented by the *alter* pole with the backing of the whole self. What, then, are the differences between honor and right? Four may be noted: —

1. Honor is fixed rather by the traditions or sentiments of a group than by reason or principle. It is thus better fitted to hold the undeveloped man or the boy until reason can make stronger appeal; often, of course, it holds him against reason.

2. It is more limited in reference. It always implies the group. Right may start with a limited vision, but its very logic forces it to become general. To give a reason implies an appeal to a universal standard, and law has attempted to give reasons. Honor implies some specific class: the honor of a gentleman, of a king, of a college student, of a soldier, of a woman, is each a distinct code. The soldier may be impure, he may not show fear, the woman may show fear, she must be chaste.

3. It has a more personal, concrete support, since it dwells constantly in the minds of the persons of the group, who enforce it with praise or ridicule. The conception of what is right is not so constantly supported and reinforced.

4. It does not involve so sharply defined a personal responsibility as the conception of right and wrong. An erring son may bring shame upon his parents; a wife's act may injure her husband's honor (although it would probably not be considered that a husband could injure a wife's honor in the same way). The conception accords in this with what has been noted as to the lack of personal responsibility in group life.

The standard and sentiment of honor may therefore be regarded as a preparation for the more definitely rational conceptions of right and duty. It marks also an earlier stage in the evolution of individuality. For the self of honor is more completely immersed in the group self. The individual has less opinion and principle of his own. He is "with the gang." The "gang" or the "union," or the less organized but no less

influential class based on wealth or respectability, decides for its members which laws they will keep, and which they may break without loss of standing, and – so far as they are in this stage of moral evolution – without scruples of conscience.

Personality reaches a clearer definition, the self rises to new strength and becomes at the same time more completely socialized and rational, when it reaches the level of *rights*. In correlation with this comes recognition of the rights of others, or *justice*, and as determining and guaranteeing such rights a *law* or standard which claims respect and fixes duty. All this seems a somewhat complicated and difficult process, but in the evolution of law, which, we must remember, is not distinct from morality until a later stage, we can see the steps so clearly as to make the psychological interpretation easy. Above all, the historical material shows with complete evidence the fusion of the rational and social factors, and makes any such separation as that of Spencer or of Kidd, untenable.

Carrying out the figure of a bi-polar self, rights represent the *ego* pole reinforced by the consciousness of identity with the whole; justice, or recognition of rights of others, represents the recognition of the *alter* pole as reinforced by the whole; law or right is the whole social self viewed as standard and authority; duty is either personal as directed toward the *alter*, or impersonal and rational as directed toward the whole self as law or right.

First, consider rights. Rights grow out of the self-assertive instincts, in so far as these are both reinforced by social aid and transformed by being viewed and asserted from a social standpoint. To get social reinforcement the private claim to life or liberty or property must pay the price. And the price is some socializing of the claim. But to socialize is to rationalize as well; the group will assist only what is in some sense “fair,” and fairness involves a rational, as opposed to a merely impulsive or passionate standard. Other claims must be heard, counted (in early law), or weighed. Shares must be equalized, and consistency in successive or simultaneous distributions observed. Fairness can be claimed only as it is recognized; a standard thus gains recognition which involves in germ all the moral elements. It grows, not by spontaneous generation, but out of the necessity on the part of the group to control conflicting interests.

The evolution of law and justice illustrates these steps in detail. First, the beginnings of rights to property in both Roman and Germanic law are in possession or seisin. But this is not yet ownership. For this idea there is needed first a conflicting claim. In Germanic law, says Pollock,⁵

⁵ *The Expansion of the Common Law*, p. 12.

"The notion of ownership as the maximum of claim or right in a specific thing allowed by law is not primary, but developed out of conflicting claims to possession and disposal." The next step is the social support of witnesses, and if necessary the reference to some umpire. Similar steps can be traced in Roman law.

But while "personal power of act" is declared by Ihering to be "the mother and legitimate protector of right," this personal power is not naked physical strength, but the real manifestation and assertion of personality, a power active in the service of the idea of right.

Similar steps of (1) assertion of impulse, (2) social support, (3) social standard can be traced in criminal law. The first step is the impulsive reaction of resentment and revenge. But in group life unity of blood enlists the support of the kin. Even against outsiders, however, some check is felt, for a feud which may involve the whole clan in war, or require a *Wergeld* levied on all, must claim some social and reasonable justification. An offense against a fellow member of the group requires still more an adjustment of penalty, – a decision from the old men or the rulers. The application of this standard and control gives at first a sort of duel under public supervision. Greater solemnity may invest the duel when it is conceived that the divine decision is given through the issue. All ordeals and oaths assume such a divine oversight. There is here a social standard, but (a) it is irregular and likely to fluctuate according to the power and position of the offender, or the sympathies of the judges; (b) it permits the individual to be the agent in carrying out the judgment, and therefore it only limits passion and does not give the process a completely judicial form.

Advance takes place in both directions. (a) Instead of deciding each case by itself, when the temptation is to invent a principle *ad hoc*, the ruler or judge follows past precedents or customs. A legal tradition is thus established, which, however imperfect, is likely to be more impartial than decisions growing out of the specific circumstances. The generality, though numerical, is in the making. (b) The group inflicts the penalty through a public official; although it is instructive to note, as illustrated by the "police" among the American Indians, that official character is a matter of degree. The warrior of sufficient age and distinction becomes by this fact invested with group authority. The generality of the standard demands a general agent.

It is possible to trace also a quantitative growth in the idea of rights and law. At first a man has rights only as he belongs to some group. If none but his kin support him, how should the conception of a general claim, a general right, come to consciousness? A man without a group is an outlaw, and for Greek or Jew the barbarian or gentile has no rights. So a "peace" is a local and limited sphere of rights. Householder,

church, sheriff, each has his or its peace of graded worth, and the king's peace, most extended and most costly to break, is at the head of the list.⁶

Finally, we have the conception attained of a universal standard, but this is nevertheless first symbolized in ideal personalities. A divine law, a divine king who as judge of all the earth must do right, whose throne is habited by justice and judgment, a judgment of Osiris or Rhadamanthus where there is no respect of persons, or – where a religious philosophy has replaced personal by impersonal conceptions – a law of nature represents this final stage.

Hand in hand with the evolution of the conception of honor, law, and right goes the evolution of the moral sentiments of reverence and duty. First comes no doubt the sense of honor and shame in response to social judgments. But as we have seen, sensitiveness to these involves a capacity by the self to judge socially. When now we pass from the more or less partial spectator of group membership to the "impartial spectator" involved in right and conscience, and from the authority of a limited group to the authority of duty, we find that duty long continues to present itself in personal form. Authority is not of the pure reason but of the group, visible and invisible. But this is not a heteronomy. The sentiment felt – in so far as it is in any sense moral – is not fear, but respect, αἰδώς. It involves kinship as well as superiority.

The process of organizing impulsive activity into a reliable and responsible character has its chief development through the two agencies of social pressure and self-directed work. As civilization advances and gets a stronger leverage in the individual motives, work becomes more and more significant as an organizing agency. Work implies an end more or less remote. The present activity need not be positively unpleasant and without any interest, as in drudgery, but on the other hand the interest is not chiefly immediate, as in play. Therefore in work the mind must project itself into the future, and thus organize activity with reference to this future. Continuance of work means continuity of the self as will. Common life constantly bears witness to the moralizing effects of work.

But in formation of character, as in formation of a standard, the ideal content comes at first in personal embodiment. The little child will not work long. The savage, aside from the irrelevant complaints of white men that he does not gladly exhaust himself for their benefit or for the – to him – worthless inducements they offer, is also less capable of long-

⁶ Pollock and Maitland, *History of English Law*, ii, 454; *Expansion of the Common Law*, p. 152.

continued work than the civilized man. In both child and primitive man social support is necessary. Custom embodied in institutions and modes of life holds primitive man, and the child as well, to a certain measure of stability on the one hand, while the consciousness of responsibility is evoked by more positive social pressure. This latter holds the doer vigorously to account for his deed and for that of his whole group as well – and visits him and his with heavy penalty if it be injurious.

In early society and early law, and likewise in childhood, the conception of responsible personality is undeveloped in two respects: (a) the group rather than the individual is conceived as responsible; (b) intention is not necessary, and hence even animals or inanimate things are regarded as responsible, and little or no distinction is made between accidental and malicious mischief. Illustrations of the first aspect are afforded by the theories of blood revenge,⁷ and of clan or family responsibility in all peoples; the emergence to a conception of individual responsibility is finely argued against a conservative theory of solidarity by Ezekiel (ch. xviii). Illustrations of the transitional stages in the second aspect are found in the Hebrew cities of refuge for the accidental homicide.

Both aspects are conspicuous in the development of Germanic and English law.⁸ In early Germanic law the doer was responsible whether he acted innocently or inadvertently; the owner of an instrument which caused harm was responsible because he was the owner, though the instrument had been wielded by a thief; the owner of an animal, the master of a slave, was responsible because he was associated with it as owner or master; the oath-helper who swore in support of the party's oath was responsible without regard to his belief or his good faith; one who merely attempted an evil was not liable, because there was no evil result to attribute to him; where several coöperated equally, a lot (frequently) was cast to select which one should be amenable; while the one who harbored or assisted the wrong-doer, even unwittingly, was guilty because he had associated himself with one tainted by the evil result. The development of responsibility passes in general through three stages: (1) The idea of misadventure is hazily evolved and facts of the sort are regarded as ground for an appeal to mercy; the blood feud cannot be started. (2) The offender must pay a fine, or in the case of an injury by his animal he may free himself by handing over the animal, or later, by turning it loose and disavowing it; or in the case of injury done

⁷ Steinmetz, *Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe*.

⁸ The researchers of Grimm and Bruner are summarized, and related to the English development by I. H. Wigmore, in *Harvard Law Review*, vol. vii.

by an inanimate thing, by surrendering it or abstaining from using it. The thing, animate or inanimate, which caused the death of a human being was even so late as 1846 in theory "deodand,"⁹ to be handed over to the king for pious uses, "for the appeasing of. God's wrath. (3) Finally, an oath that the owner or master was not privy to the crime, or later, not. aware, was received as exculpation.¹⁰

All these facts show the early social tendency to require responsibility; but where one was held responsible always and only for results, without regard to intention or motive, it was natural to try to shift responsibility. The scapegoat of Israel has become proverbial. In the case of the child, ruling out the cases where there is a deliberate and intelligent purpose to escape responsibility, there is yet an instructive remainder of cases in which the child finds a real satisfaction in saying, "I didn't break the window, the stone did it;" "I didn't knock off your hat, my hand did it." The conception of personal agency is still sufficiently fluid to afford him a plausible make-believe.

A more advanced and fruitful mode of developing responsibility is that of voluntary contracts or promises. A conspicuous illustration of the moral possibilities in this process is the appeal to the covenant with Jehovah which the prophets of Israel continually made, and it is certainly psychologically sound to see in this one important source for the ethical development of Israel's religion.

Sincerity, or to speak psychologically, directness and undivided interest, is at the outset spontaneous. The problem here is rather that of the development of a more conscious singleness of aim, "purity of heart," or psychologically, the full enlistment of the self in the aim, so as to yield emotional satisfaction.

"He who abstains . . . and rejoices in the abstinence is temperate." This mature and consciously maintained purity of motive implies previous conscious recognition of other ends and their deliberate rejection. The temptation to indirection or hypocrisy comes ordinarily either from fear of social penalties, from desire to conform to social standards and at the same time not fully socialize the self, or, finally, to gain more definitely egoistic results by exploiting one's fellows. Children's lies or insincerity are more likely to fall under one of the first heads, but it is significant that craft and the opposite of single-

⁹ Pollock and Maitland, *History of English Law*, ii, 473.

¹⁰ The Code of Hammurabi recognizes intent to some degree (§ 206, p. 75, Harper's Translation), but on the other hand the surgeon who by an unsuccessful operation caused death or loss of an eye must himself have his fingers cut off (p. 79). Similarly the American Indians were quicker to plead absence of intent than to admit the plea. Eastman, *Indian Boyhood*.

mindfulness have a place in the folk-tales of many peoples. Jacob and Ulysses used their cleverness chiefly against those of another clan, it is true, and in diplomacy and international relations generally we are still too crudely moral – or immoral – to throw any stones; but the Greeks deified duplicity in Hermes, and the fact that Jacob is represented as deceiving both father and brother and at the same time as the especial favorite of Jehovah shows that the time was yet far when the psalmist could cry, “Thou desirest truth in the inward parts.” Experiences of marital infidelity¹¹ seem to have borne a prominent part in the Hebrew evolution of the supreme value of faithfulness. In Greece, on the other hand, the æsthetic ideal of manly strength as portrayed in the Achilles of the Iliad, or in Pindar’s Apollo, aided later by the scientific spirit of philosophers and historians, scorned deception as weakness or found it incompatible with the very essence of scientific pursuits.

Sincerity and truthfulness as purely formal virtues, or duties to self, do not, however, flourish without the aid of the social feeling. Sympathy likewise is at the outset instinctive. But as such it is only the basis for moral sympathy; it is not itself moral. To become complete it needs (a) intellectual widening through the growth of imagination, enabling the individual to enter into the experience of others; this has been emphasized by Adam Smith and recently by Cooley; (b) volitional strengthening through conscious purpose to make others’ good one’s own. It is not enough that I put myself in another’s place, although this is the first requisite; I must also face the fact that to sympathize with him involves pain for me, and must nevertheless continue to sympathize. His good must form part of my good, and must be valued in itself, not merely as a means to my comfort or pride.

This conscious issue between self and others is raised by the growth of individuality in any form. Economic differentiation of interest is the most powerful agent – particularly the advance of private property; but the assertion of self interest in any form – political independence, rivalry in all its forms, sex jealousy, or desire to be free from parental control – may bring it to the front and point the diverging paths of selfishness or a more completed social self. But before the day of crisis comes the individual’s instinctive sympathy has been powerfully reinforced by a multitude of social agencies. The constant companionship of the family circle, the atmosphere of tenderness which the parental care affords; the association with the clan in the thrilling experiences of war and chase, where a common cause evokes not only like feelings, but a will and therefore emotion for a good which is not private but common; the

¹¹ Hosea, Ezekiel.

festivals which by dance and song give each his share in common service and celebration of tribal god or tribal victory; the solemn or joyous participation by the group in the significant experiences of birth and marriage and death; the embodiment of clan or ancestral achievement in poetry whose recital causes the group to live over with common pride or common suffering the glories and calamities of other days until every one feels that the clan's history is his history, the clan's blood his blood, – all this deepens and strengthens the bonds between man and man. This is one great function of art in moral evolution.

The other is that of embodying the ideals and value of rare moments in permanent form; of presenting to the many the visions of the few; of lending all the thrill and power of emotion to the conceptions of the spirit.

The emotional forces are reinforced, and, as civilization advances, largely superseded by volitional forces. The fact of a common end is by far the greatest socializing tie when once it asserts itself. The coöperation of the savage tribe in the hunt gives place to the more indirect but far more intricate mutual interdependence of various industries. Exchange and commerce break down clan barriers. The successive creation or emergence under social advance of new wants which can be satisfied only through common action or reciprocal service, is itself the strongest socializing force. Social humanity continually provides new ends and therefore new motives for socialization. If any institution resists the process, it must conform or give way.

Idealization of ends and individualization of character go on in conjunction with the formal and socializing processes. The great agency here also is the transforming influence of social forces upon the primal impulses.

To satisfy hunger and thirst and protect from cold are necessary, but if the process is purely individual it has little moral significance. But under social organization and especially under the extension of the group to include invisible members, the common meal, the festal celebration, the family hearth become fruitful not only for promoting sympathy and piety, but also for teaching man that he does not live by bread only.

Resentment and anger are likewise necessary, but as private impulses may be brutal. Given the social pressure of the kinship bond, and note the idealizing effect. Sympathy, loyalty to the interests of the group, courage in its cause, celebration in dance, song, and epic, in stone and color, lend first social and then ideal interest to those impulsive activities. A conception of the "goël" or next-of-kin, who is at first primarily the helper in defense or attack, may become idealized as the "Redeemer" to become the bearer of the highest spiritual meaning.

The impulse of sex, likewise essential to the race, is also so instinct with passion as often to be regarded rather as enemy than as ally to moral progress. But under social pressure it is likewise transformed. Prescribing who shall not marry, and often more positively who must marry, celebrating nuptials with solemn or festal ceremony and with all the aids of art, controlling to some degree the conduct of the parties after marriage and the conditions under which they may be dissolved, the social group has coöperated with the parental instinct and the instincts of possession, in transforming the sex relation from one of transient, and often utterly regardless, passion to one of thoughtful, permanent, tender union of ideal interests and reciprocal service.

The *division of labor* is a notable factor contributed by social organization to the idealizing and individualizing process. If all must do the same thing, individuality has relatively little opportunity. It is when the Beethoven finds his music, the Sophocles his stage, the Alexander his army, the Hildebrand his church, the Newton his study, that the capacity and individuality of the man shows itself. Group life in its simplest phases has little differentiation except "for counsel" or "for war." But with metal working and agricultural life the field widens. At first the specializing is more largely by families than by individual choice. Castes of workmen may take the place of mere kinship ties. Later on the rules of caste in turn become a hindrance to individuality, and must be broken down if the individual is to emerge to full self-direction.

The lines of development traced thus far would fall for the most part within the period prior to the emergence of the full and clear consciousness of the moral as such. Particular things are approved or condemned; standards adequate to this are set up; responsibility is demanded and in a measure attained; social control is recognized and social sympathy felt. But the questions, What do right and wrong mean? What is the basis of authority? What is the real or supreme good, as contrasted with the seeming or partial goods? How is one to determine moral laws? What is the necessity for "disinterested benevolence" or purity of motive? – in a word, all the questions involved in the fully conscientious attitude are not raised in their general significance. This stage in primitive life corresponds in general, as has often been remarked, to the period of childhood prior to adolescence, although in many respects it has of course marked differences. The broader and deeper view of the significance of conduct is evoked when the self rises

¹² The questions may be asked whether the self would develop except under the conditions names in (b). In the case of races the answer may very likely be negative; we see numerous races which have never risen to the level indicated. In the case of the

to a higher level, either (a) by its own inherent development¹² or (b) under the strain of meeting new situations, physical or social, for which old habits and methods prove inadequate. The process in question involves, in psychological terms, the breaking down of old habits which obstruct growth, the formation of new ideals and standards of valuation, and the reconstruction of the self. We note briefly some of the experiences which bring this about:

(a) Changes in industrial and economic conditions may compel or induce such reconstruction by abolishing older social and religious sanctions connected with the older form of industry, or positively by affording new opportunity and incentive to individual as *versus* social development. Grosse¹³ has shown the intimate relation between clan organization and the various types of industry. The change from nomadic to agricultural life led to such change in Israel's organization that the historian declared, "Every man did that which was right in his own eyes," nevertheless it ultimately gave opportunity for great moral advance. It was the spirit of the old Japan which furnished the morale of the late war. It will be interesting to see what the new industrial order will bring about.

(b) The growth of knowledge, with its connected comparison and criticism, may condemn the old. This is too familiar, both in the development of the young and in the historic instances of the Greek and the modern epochs of enlightenment and emancipation, to need further comment.

(c) Calamities or painful shocks may shatter old habits and ideals, or change the valuations. This again is a familiar experience. The problem of evil, whether national or personal, may substitute spiritual for temporal values as supreme.¹⁴

(d) More general, perhaps, than any of the foregoing is the *expansion of the self due to emotional tides*, either natural or induced. The adolescent period is one world-wide illustration. But the almost equally universal phenomena of ecstatic or mystical religious rites and experiences are equally in point. From Hebrew prophecy, Greek mysteries, and Buddhist or Neo-Platonist contemplative ecstasy, down to the ecstatic states of American Indians or African negroes, emotional experiences have functioned as agencies for lifting the worshiper into union

individual, however, we may distinguish for purposes of analysis (a) such growth as is due to the normal increase in intelligence, and to the general emotional changes due, for example, to the adolescent period, and (b) changes due more directly to physical or social stimulus.

¹³ *Die Formen der Familie*.

¹⁴ Cf. Job, Habakkuk.

with his God, and thus, temporarily at least, of raising him to a new level. The modern theory of emotion as representing pent-up impulse and deeper reverberation gives the psychological interpretation for the mystic elevations, and moral reformations thus made possible.

The new significance of the religious ritual, religious belief, and religious emotion after such processes of moral deepening deserves special mention. Religion is immensely important in the early stages of moral evolution; but its significance there is chiefly of two sorts: (1) It means a widening and strengthening of the social group, and therefore a reinforcement of whatever influences the visible group asserts. (2) The superior and mysterious nature of the deities or other unseen beings, manifested through such conceptions as taboos, cleanness and uncleanness, holiness and sin, gives to conduct in its relations to the gods a peculiar and extraordinary enhancement. This does not mean any distinctively moral quality – on the content side, at least. The religious is largely confined to ritual, and concerns itself little with the relations of man to his fellows. The conceptions are moreover largely external and magical rather than internal and ethical. Taboos, cleanness, uncleanness, holiness were all contagious. Contact with birth or natural death polluted as truly if not so deeply as the shed blood which cried aloud from the ground. The women who were “holy”¹⁵ to the gods at the Canaanite shrines were not, even by the standards of the time, of any distinctively moral quality. Sacrifice, prayer, and other acts of ritual were in part an expression of community with kindred gods, but were also the means for gaining favor or averting wrath. Even the poignant consciousness of sin manifested in the Babylonian psalter is largely without moral quality, and the ascetic rites of various primitive peoples are comparable to rites of “purification” in the externality of the underlying ideas. Nevertheless even here there was far more than the bare fear which some have found as the sole content of primitive religion, even if there was not as yet possible the complete reverence which has within it the element of ethical respect. For in ritual and cultus man was acknowledging a higher order, powerful and permanent; in the mysterious there is something which lures and challenges, and in its developed phases makes the mystic feel at one with his object; in the feeling of dependence there is the docility which works against self-sufficiency and stagnation; in the consciousness of sin as a failure, a missing of the mark, there is implied failure to measure up to a standard, an implied inadequacy of the present self, and consequently the stimulus to reconstruction.

But when once a distinctively moral function or social relationship has been incorporated into the conception of the deity, – when the god is

¹⁵ Gen. xxxviii, 12–23.

protector, judge, father, husband, or redeemer of kin, all the added sacredness of religious conceptions is transferred to the moral. Wrong becomes sin; iniquity becomes impurity; the awfulness of Sinai invests the moral law; the mystic vision, the emotional seizure; become the initial impulse to a life of moral enthusiasm and spiritual power.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF ETHICS

George H. Mead. "The Philosophical Basis of Ethics." *International Journal of Ethics* 18.3 (April 1908): 311–23.

The evolutionary point of view has had more than one important result for philosophical thought. Not the least important among these has been the conception of the evolution of evolution. Not only can we trace in the history of thought the evolution of the conception of evolution, but we find ourselves with a consciousness which we conceive of as evolved; the contents and the forms of these contents can be looked upon as the products of development. Among these contents and forms are found the temporal and spatial qualities of things, of the world. The very time process as well as the space of the universe lies in experience which is itself presented as the result of an evolution that arises in and through spatial conditions, which is first and foremost a temporal process.

The peculiarity of this situation lies in the fact that the involution appears in the immediate findings of science. Our geological and biological sciences unhesitatingly present epochs antedating man in terms of man's consciousness, and biology and scientific psychology as unhesitatingly present that consciousness as an evolution within which all the distinctions must be explained by the same general laws as those which are appealed to to account for animal organs and functions. It is true that occasionally a scientist such as Poincaré recognizes that even the number system, as well as Euclidean space, is but a construction which has arisen and maintained itself because of its practical advantages, though we can draw no conclusions from these practical advantages to their metaphysical reality. If this position be generalized, there results the conception of an evolution within which the environment – that which our science has presented as a fixed datum in its physical nature – has been evolved as well as the form which has adapted itself to that environment; that the space within which evolution has taken place has arisen by the same laws; that the very time which makes an evolution presentable has arisen in like manner. Now, to a certain extent the conception of an evolution of environment as well as of the form has domesticated itself within our biological science. It has become evident

that an environment can exist for a form only in so far as the environment answers to the susceptibilities of the organism; that the organism determines thus its own environment; that the effect of every adaptation is a new environment which must change with that which responds to it. The full recognition, however, that form and environment must be phases that answer to each other, character for character, appears in ethical theory.

In a certain sense this is found in the statement which genetic psychology makes of the development of the consciousness of the individual. Here there can be no evolution of the intelligence except in so far as the child's world answers to increased powers of conscious control. The world and the individual must keep pace with each other in the life history of the individual. But the child comes into a world which receives him as a child. The world of the adult, from the point of view of descriptive psychology, is an independent environment within which the child and his world evolve. Within the field of ethics, on the other hand, the moral individual and his world cannot consistently be presented as themselves lying inside another moral field. The growth of moral consciousness must be coterminous with that of the moral situation. The moral life lies in the interaction of these two; the situation rises up in accusation of the moral personality which is unequal to it, and the personality rises to the situation only by a process which reconstructs the situation as profoundly as it reconstructs the self. No man has found moral power within himself except in so far as he has found a meaning in his world that answered to the new-found power, or discovered a deeper ethical meaning in his environment that did not reveal new capacities for activities within himself. Moral evolution takes place then as does that of the child; the moral personality and its world must arise *pari passu*, but, unlike the psychologist's statement of the development of the child, it does not lie inside a larger determining environment.

I am not ignorant of evolutionary ethics, nor that every type of ethical theory in these days has felt itself bound to interpret the development of moral consciousness in terms of custom and institutions. Thus we seem to postulate not only a community moral consciousness, a moral world which determines the growth of the moral consciousness of the individual, but also we imply that this determining moral environment goes back into a past that antedates moral consciousness itself. From this point of view, morality, *i.e.*, control by community habit, has determined the development of individual moral consciousness as tyrannically as the intellectual world has controlled the growth of intelligence in the members of society. But this paradox disappears when we recognize that this control by the community over its members provides indeed the

material out of which reflective moral consciousness builds up its own situation, but cannot exist as a situation until the moral consciousness of the individual constructs it.

It is another statement of the same thing that moral consciousness is the most concrete consciousness – the most inclusive statement which can be given of immediate experience. There is no phase of activity, intellectual or physical, no type of inner experience, no presentation of outer reality, which does not find its place within the moral judgment. There is nothing which may not be a condition or an element of conduct, and moral consciousness reaches its climax in the estimation of every possible content of the individual and his situation. There is no other type of consciousness which must not abstract from other phases to assure its own existence. One cannot carry out an acute analysis and respond to the beauty of the object of analysis, one cannot swell with emotion and dispassionately observe. But we place every phase of our experience within the sweep of conscience; there is no one of these phases of consciousness which has not its legitimate function within the activity when viewed as moral. It is but a step further to claim that the abstractions of science and the expressions of the emotion and the direction of attention in perception and inference must find their functions, and hence their reason for existence, in the act; and that morality inheres in the act alone, but in none of these functions of the act (if I may be allowed two meanings of function in the same sentence).

It is, of course, possible to make this a metaphysical doctrine. If one finds reality in immediate experience and admits that the various intellectual, æsthetic, and perceptual processes exist only as parts and functions of an act which is the ultimate form of immediate experience, then the recognition of the ethical statement of this act as its fullest statement would found metaphysics upon ethics. The presentation of such a doctrine, however, would demand first of all a discussion of the meaning of the terms "immediate experience," of "reality," and the "cognitive state" that answers to it. I have no wish to enter this debatable field, that is loosely defined by the term pragmatism.

There are, however, certain implications of modern ethical doctrine which fall within the lines which I have indicated above; that are of interest quite apart from their relation to metaphysical and logical speculations. The implications to which I refer are those that flow from evolutionary doctrine on the one side and from the identification of purposive activity with moral activity, and the recognition that our intelligence is through and through purposive. The first implication that flows from this position is that the fundamental necessity of moral action is simply the necessity of action at all; or stated in other terms,

that the motive does not arise from the relations of antecedently given ends of activities, but rather that the motive is the recognition of the end as it arises in consciousness. The other implication is that the moral interpretation of our experience must be found within the experience itself.¹

We are familiar with three ethical standpoints, that which finds in conscious control over action only the further development of conduct which has already unconsciously been determined by ends, that which finds conduct only where reflective thought is able to present a transcendental end, and that which recognizes conduct only where the individual and the environment – the situation – mutually determine each other. In the first case, moral necessity in conduct, for the conscious individual, is quite relative. It depends upon the degree of recognition which he reaches of the forces operating through him. Furthermore, the motive to act with reference to the end of the fullest life of the species is one which is primarily quite narrowly individualistic, and depends for a social interpretation upon the community of which the individual is a member. Moral necessity in conduct from this point of view is quite independent of the activity itself. So far from being the most fundamental reality it is a derivative by which, through what it is hard not to call a hocus pocus, the individual acts, for what is only indirectly his own – a distant end, through a social *dressur*. It is, of course, natural that this point of view should mediate the process of training by which men are to be led unwittingly to socially worthy action, rather than the immediate conduct of the individual who finds himself face to face with a moral problem. It is the standpoint of the publicist and the reformer of social institutions.

But if we admit that the evolutionary process consists in a mutual determination of the individual and his environment – not the determination of the individual by his environment, moral necessity in conduct is found in the very evolutionary situation. The possibility of intelligent action waits upon the determination of the conditions under which that action is to take place. The statement of these conditions becomes the end, when it is recognized that the statement is in terms of the activities that make up the personality of the individual. The content of the end is the mutuality of statement of personality, *i.e.*, the tendencies to activity, in terms of the personalities who make up the environment, *i.e.*, the conditions of the expression of the activities. It is because the man must recognize the public good in the exercise of his powers, and state the

¹ The full analysis of position assumed here has been given by Prof. John Dewey in his article, "The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality," in Vol. III, of the Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago.

public good in terms of his own outgoing activities that his ends are moral. But it is not the public good which comes in from outside himself and lays a moral necessity upon him, nor is it a selfish propensity that drives him on to conduct.

It is inconceivable that such an outside end should have any but an extraneous position. It could never come into a personality except by the door of its own interest. The end could not be a social end. Nor could a purely individual propensity through the agency of community training become social. The moral necessity lies not in the end acting from without, nor in the push of inclination from within, but in the relation of the conditions of action to the impulses to action. The motive is neither a purely rational, external end, nor a private inclination, but the impulse presented in terms of its consequences over against the consequences of the other impulses. The impulse so conditioned, so interpreted, becomes a motive to conduct. The moral necessity is that all activity which appears, as impulse and environment should enter into the situation, and there is nothing which ensures this completeness of expression except the full interrelationship of the self and the situation. That one fully recognized the conflict which the impulse involves in its consequences with the consequences of all the other social processes that go to make him up, is the moral dictum. From the reconstructions that this recognition involves the immediate statement of the end appears. To enforce this dictum is simply to live as fully and consciously and as determinedly as possible.

The moral necessity for education is not an ideal of intelligence that lies before us of the clear refulgence of the intellect. It is the necessity of knowledge to do what is trying to be done, the dependence of the uninformed impulse upon means, method, and interpretation. The necessity of uprightness in public affairs does not rest upon a transcendental ideal of perfection of the self, nor upon the attainment of the possible sum of human happiness, but upon the economy and effectiveness, and consistency demanded in the industrial, commercial, social, and æsthetic activities of those that make up the community. To push reform is to give expression to all these impulses and present them in their consequences over against those of all the other social impulses out of which an organism of personalities arises.

There is abroad a feeling of lack of moral force; we look before and after – to our ancestors, our posterity – for incentive to right conduct, when in fact there is no moral necessity which is not involved in the impulses to conduct themselves. To correct one abuse we must emphasize the interests it jeopardizes. There is no reservoir of moral power, except that which lies in the impulses behind these interests. To correct the sin of the individual is to awaken through the consequences

of the sin the normal activities which are inhibited by the excess. It is this healthful, aggressive, moral attitude, which it seems to me is encouraged by the recognition that moral consciousness is the most concrete, the most inclusive of all. Here we must abstract from nothing, and here we cannot appeal from ourselves to a power without ourselves that makes for righteousness. In the fulness of immediate experience, with the consciousness that out of the struggle to act must arise all power to mediate action, lies salvation. In like manner evolution in moral conduct can appeal to no environment without to stamp itself upon the individual; nor to him to adapt himself to a fixed order of the universe, but environment as well as individual appears in immediate experience; the one coterminous with the other, and moral endeavor appears in the mutual determination of one by the other.

Nowhere is this point of view more needed than in the struggles which fill our industrial and commercial life. The individual is treated as if he were quite separable from his environment; and still more is the environment conceived as if it were quite independent of the individual. Both laborer and the society which employs him are exhorted to recognize their obligations to each other, while each continues to operate within its own narrow radius; and because the employer regards the labor union as a fixed external environment of his activity, and would have all the relations between laborer and employer determined by the method in which he bargains and does business, he becomes a narrow individualist; and because the laborer would determine these same relations by the methods which he has used in building up this union, he becomes a socialist. What will take that and other allied problems out of the vicious circles in which they are at present found, is the recognition that it is the incompleteness with which the different social interests are present that is responsible for the inadequacy of the moral judgments. If the community educated and housed its members properly, and protected machinery, food, market, and thoroughfares adequately, the problems at present vexing the industrial world would largely disappear. We resent the introduction of the standard of life into the question of the wages; and yet if the social activities involved in the conception of the standard of life were given full expression, the wage question would be nearly answered. Every such problem is the inevitable indication of what has been left undone, of impulses checked, or interest overlooked. We turn back to history and talk about the evolution of man as if his environment were not the projection of himself in the conditions of conduct, as if the fulfillment of the Law and the Prophets were not the realization of all that is in us. The sources of power lie in that which has been overlooked. Again and again we are surprised to find that the moral advance has not been along the straight line of the

moral struggles in which a sin seemed to be faced by righteous effort, but by the appearance of a novel interest which has changed the whole nature of the problem. If we were willing to recognize that the environment which surrounds the moral self is but the statement of the conditions under which his different conflicting impulses may get their expression, we would perceive that the reorganization must come from a new point of view which comes to consciousness through the conflict. The environment must change *pari passu* with the consciousness. Moral advance consists not in adapting individual natures to the fixed realities of a moral universe, but in constantly reconstructing and recreating the world as the individuals evolve.

The second implication to which reference has been made, is that we must find the interpretation of moral consciousness within the act. The appeal to a moral order which transcends either metaphysically or temporally the moral situation; the besetting assumption of the moralist that a moral reconstruction can be made intelligible only by a perfect moral order from which we have departed, or toward which we are moving, have very grave practical consequences which it becomes us to consider. In the first place these assumptions rob our moral consciousness of the intellectual interest which belongs to them of right. If morality connotes merely conformity to a given order, our intellectual reaction is confined to the recognition of agreement and disagreement, beyond that the moral reaction can be only emotional and instinctive. There may be, indeed, intellectual processes involved in stating this moral order, but such statement is confined, in the nature of the case, to apologetic and speculative thought to thought which cannot be a part of the immediate moral consciousness.

A moral order to which we must conform can never be built up in thought in the presence of an exigency. There are only two types of reaction in a practical situation. One may respond to well-recognized cues by well-formed habits, or one may adapt and reconstruct his habits by new interpretation of the situation. In the first instance we have habitual conduct, in the second that type of reaction which has been most explicitly worked out by the natural sciences. Most of our action, of course, falls within the first category, and involves no moral struggle. The second type, on the other hand, is that in which practically all our moral issues arise. If a practical scientific problem arises, such as the engineering problems in constructing railroads or driving tunnels, we recognize that the intellectual process by which the problem is solved cannot be a mere reference to a perfect model of conduct already in existence. On the contrary, just because the engineer is face to face with a real problem he must find in the physical situation facts of which he is at present ignorant, and at the same time readjust his habits; in fact, it is

the possible readjustment of the habit that directs his attention in investigating the situation, and, on the other hand, what is discovered serves to mediate the formation of the new habit. In a word, there is the typical play of attention back and forth between perception and response. In any such process the criterion which governs the whole and its two phases – three phases if we distinguish between perception of the new data and the formation of the hypothesis by which they are interpreted and mediated in the response – can never be external to the process. There exists as yet no plan of procedure which the engineer discovers or receives as a vision in the mount. The control is found in the relation of the different phases of the act which have been sketched above. It is the possibility of reaction to a stimulus that holds the reaction in the field of investigation and it is the continued investigation of the field of stimulus which keeps the reaction continuous and pertinent. The control is then that which was earlier referred to as the process of evolution in which individual and environment mutually determine each other. It is the criterion of action, which uses working hypotheses, but which cannot possibly be identified with an external ideal. This process, whether met in the field of mechanical invention, or the range of engineering, or that of scientific research, is recognized as the most absorbing, most interesting, most fascinating intellectually with which the mind of man can occupy itself, and this interest belongs legitimately to the solution of every moral problem, for the procedure is identical intellectually.

Yet we succeed in robbing our reflective moral consciousness of a great part of this interest. For there is and can be no interest in merely identifying certain types of conduct with those found in a given theory. For example, there is no intellectual interest involved in merely identifying the control exercised by a financier over an industry with the concept of property, and justifying him in doing what he will, within the limits of the law, with his own. There may be a very vigorous emotional reaction against the suggestion that he be interfered with in these vested rights; or, on the other hand, against an institution of property which permits such individualistic exploitation of social values, but there is no intellectual interest except that which is either apologetic or purely speculative. It does not come into the moral reaction to the situation. And yet the enormous content of interest which does attach to these moral questions is attested by the social sciences which have sprung up and expanded in every college and university.

It is interesting to compare the intellectual treatment which such problems receive at the hands of the scientific investigator and the pulpit. In the latter there is at present no apparatus for investigation. The pulpit is committed to a right and wrong which are unquestioned, and from its point of view unquestionable. Its function then is not the

intellectual one of finding out what in the new situation is right, but in inspiring to a right conduct which is supposed to be so plain that he who runs may read. The result has been that in the great moral issues of recent industrial history, such as the child labor, woman's labor, protection of machinery, and a multitude more, the pulpit has been necessarily silent. It had not the means nor the technique for finding out what was the right thing to do. The science of hygiene threatens the universal issue of temperance, while we can look forward to the time when investigation may enable us to approach understandingly the prostitute and her trade, and change the social conditions which have made her possible instead of merely scourging an abstract sin.

The loss to the community from the elimination of the intellectual phase of moral conduct it would be difficult to overestimate and this loss is unavoidable as long as the interpretation of conduct lies outside the immediate experience, as long as we must refer to a moral order without, to intellectually present the morality of conduct.

In conclusion may I refer to another loss which moral conduct dependent upon an external ideal involves. The interpretation of sin and wrong with reference to a moral order external to the conduct fails to identify the moral defect with the situation out of which it springs and by whose reconstruction it may be eliminated. An illustration will at once indicate, I think, what I have in mind. The responsibility for death and accident upon our railroads cannot be laid at the doors of the system and those that work it, if an abstract doctrine of property and contract is used to judge the conduct of railroad managers and directors. The imperative necessity of the situation is that responsibility should be tested by the consequences of an act; that the moral judgment should find its criterion in the mutual determination of the individual and the situation. As it is, men who would risk their own lives to save a drowning man, regard themselves as justified in slaughtering others by the thousand to save money. Abstract valuations take the place of concrete valuations, and as the abstract external valuations are always the precipitations of earlier conduct, they are pretty uniformly inadequate.

But not only does an external moral ideal rob immediate moral conduct of its most important values, but it robs human nature of the most profound solace which can come to those who suffer – the knowledge that the loss and the suffering, with its subjective poignancy, has served to evaluate conduct, to determine what is and what is not worth while.

ETHICS

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“Except blind forces of nature,” said Sir Henry Maine, “nothing moves in this world which is not Greek in its origin.” And if we ask why this is so, the response comes that the Greek discovered the business of man to be pursuit of good, and intelligence to be central in this quest. The utmost to be said in praise of Plato and Aristotle is not that they invented excellent moral theories, but that they rose to the opportunity which the spectacle of Greek life afforded. For Athens presented an all but complete microcosm for the study of the interaction of social organization and individual character. A public life of rich diversity in concentrated and intense splendor trained the civic sense. Strife of faction and the rapid oscillations of types of polity provided the occasion for intellectual inquiry and analysis. The careers of dramatic personalities, habits of discussion, ease of legislative change, facilities for personal ambitions, distraction by personal rivalries, fixed attention upon the elements of character; and upon the valuation of the functions of individuals with respect to their effect upon social vitality and stability. Happy exemption from ecclesiastic preoccupations, susceptibility to natural harmony, and natural piety conspired with frank and open observation to acknowledgment of the rôle played by natural conditions. Social instability and shock made equally pertinent and obvious the remark that only intelligence can confirm the values which natural conditions generate, and that intelligence is itself nurtured and matured only in a free and stable society.

In Plato the resultant keen analysis of the mutual implications of the individual, the social and the natural, converged in the ideas that morals and philosophy are one: – the love of that wisdom which is the source of secure and social good; that mathematics and the natural sciences focussed upon the problem of the adequate perception of the good furnish the methods of moral science; that logic is the vital method of the pregnant organization of social materials with respect to good; that

politics and psychology are sciences of one and the same human nature, taken first in the large and then in the little. So far that large and expansive vision of Plato.

But projection of a better life must be based upon reflection of the life already lived. The inevitable limitations of the Greek city-state were as inevitably wrought into the texture of moral theory.

The business of thought was to furnish a substitute for customs, which were then relaxing from the pressure of contact and intercourse without, and disintegrating from strife within. Reason was to take the place of custom as a guide of life; but it was to furnish rules as final, as unalterable as those of custom. In short, the thinkers were themselves fascinated by the afterglow of custom. They took for their own ideal the distillation from custom of its essence – ends and laws which should be rigid and invariable. Thus Morals was set upon the track which it dared not leave for nigh twenty-five hundred years: search for *the* final good, and for *the* single moral force.

Aristotle's assertion that the state exists by nature, and that in the state alone does the individual achieve independence and completeness of life, are indeed pregnant sayings. But as uttered by Aristotle they meant that, in an isolated state, the Greek city-state, set a garlanded island in the waste sea of *barbaroi*, a community indifferent when not hostile to all other social groupings, individuals attain their full end. In a social unity which signified social contraction, contempt and antagonism, in a social order which despised intercourse and glorified war, is realized the life of excellence!

There is likewise a profound saying of Aristotle's that the individual who otherwise than by accident is not a member of a state is either a brute or a god. But it is generally forgotten that elsewhere Aristotle identified the highest excellence, the chief virtue, with pure thought, and identifying this with the divine, isolated it in lonely grandeur from the life of society. That man, so far as in him lay, should be godlike, meant that he should be non-social, because supra-civic. Plato the idealist had shared the belief that reason is the divine; but he was also a reformer and a radical and he would have those who attained rational insight descend again into the civic cave, and in its obscurity labor patiently for the enlightenment of its blear-eyed inhabitants. Aristotle, the conservative and the definer of what is, gloried in the exaltation of intelligence in man above civic excellence and social need; and thereby isolated the life of truest knowledge from contact with social experience and from responsibility for discrimination of values in the course of life.

Moral theory however accepted from social custom more than its cataleptic rigidity, its exclusive area of common good and its unfructified and irresponsible reason. The city-state was a superficial layer of

cultured citizens, cultured through a participation in affairs made possible by relief from economic pursuits, superimposed upon the dense mass of serfs, artisans and laborers. For this division, moral philosophy made itself spiritual sponsor, and thus took it up into its own being. Plato wrestled valiantly with the class problem; but his outcome was the necessity of decisive demarcation, after education, of the masses in whom reason was asleep and appetite much awake, from the few who were fit to rule because alertly wise. The most generously imaginative soul of all philosophy could not far outrun the institutional practices of his people and his times. This might have warned his successors of the danger of deserting the sober path of a critical discernment of the better and the worse within contemporary life for the more exciting adventure of a final determination of absolute good and evil. It might have taught the probability that some brute residuum or unrationalized social habit would be erected into an apotheosis of pure reason. But the lesson was not learned. Aristotle promptly yielded to the besetting sin of all philosophers, the idealization of the existent: he declared that the class distinctions of superiority and inferiority as between man and woman, master and slave, liberal-minded and base mechanic, exist and are justified by nature – a nature which is embodied reason.

What, finally, is this Nature to which the philosophy of society and the individual so bound itself? It is the nature which figures in Greek custom and myth; the nature resplendent and adorned which confronts us in Greek poetry and art: the animism of savage man purged of grossness and generalized by unerring æsthetic taste into beauty and system. The myths had told of the loves and hates, the caprices and desertions of the gods, and, behind them all, inevitable fate. Philosophy translated these tales into formulæ of the brute fluctuation of rapacious change held in bounds by the final and supreme end: the rational good. The animism of the popular mind died to reappear as cosmology.

Repeatedly in this course we have heard of sciences which began as parts of philosophy and which gradually won their independence. Another statement of the same history is that both science and philosophy began in subjection to mythological animism. Both began with acceptance of a nature whose irregularities displayed the meaningless variability of foolish wants held within the limits of order and uniformity by an underlying movement toward a final and stable purpose. And when the sciences gradually assumed the task of reducing irregular caprice to regular conjunction, philosophy bravely took upon itself the task of substantiating, under the caption of a spiritual view of the universe, the animistic survival. Doubtless Socrates brought philosophy to earth; but his injunction to man to know himself was incredibly compromised in its execution by the fact that later philoso-

phers submerged man in the world to which philosophy was brought: a world which was the heavy and sunken centre of hierarchic heavens located in their purity and refinement as remote as possible from the gross and muddy venture of earth.

The various limitations of Greek custom, its hostile indifference to all outside the narrow city-state, its assumption of fixed divisions of wise and blind among men, its inability socially to utilize science, its subordination of human intention to cosmic aim – all of these things were worked into moral theory. Philosophy had no active hand in producing the condition of barbarian in Europe from the fifth to the fifteenth centuries. By an unwitting irony which would have shocked no one so much as the lucid moralists of Athens, their philosophic idealization, under captions of Nature and Reason, of the inherent limitations of Athenian society and Greek science, furnished the intellectual tools for defining, standardizing and justifying all the fundamental clefts and antagonisms of feudalism. When practical conditions are not frozen in men's imagination into crystalline truths, they are naturally fluid. They come and go. But when intelligence fixes fluctuating circumstance into final ideals, petrification is likely to occur; and philosophy gratuitously took upon itself the responsibility for justifying the worst defects of barbarian Europe by showing their necessary connexion with divine reason.

The division of mankind into the two camps of the redeemed and the condemned had not needed philosophy to produce it. But the Greek cleavage of men into separate kinds on the basis of their position within or without the city-state was used to rationalize this harsh intolerance. The hierarchic organization of feudalism, within church and state, of those possessed of sacred rule and those whose sole excellence was obedience, did not require moral theory to generate or explain it. But it took philosophy to furnish the intellectual tools by which such chance episodes were emblazoned upon the cosmic heavens as a grandiose spiritual achievement. No; it is all too easy to explain bitter intolerance and desire for domination. Stubborn as they are, it was only when Greek moral theory had put underneath them the distinction between the irrational and the rational, the divine truth and good and the corrupt and weak human appetite, that intolerance on system and earthly domination for the sake of eternal excellence became philosophically sanctioned. The health and welfare of the body and the securing for all of a certain and a prosperous livelihood were not matters which medieval conditions much fostered in any case. But moral philosophy was prevailed upon to damn the body on principle, and to relegate to insignificance as merely mundane and temporal the problem of a just industrial order. Circumstances of the times bore with sufficient

hardness upon successful scientific investigation; but philosophy added the conviction that in any case truth is so supernal that it must be supernaturally revealed, and so important that it must be authoritatively imparted and enforced. Intelligence was diverted from the critical consideration of differences of better and worse in their natural sources and social consequences, into the channel of metaphysical subtleties and systems, acceptance of which was made essential to participation in the social order and in rational excellence. Philosophy it was which bound the erect form of human endeavor and progress to the chariot wheels of cosmology and theology.

Since the Renaissance, moral philosophy has repeatedly reverted to the Greek ideal of natural excellence realized in social life, under the fostering care of intelligence in action. The return, however, has taken place under the influence of democratic polity, commercial expansion and scientific reorganization. It has been a liberation even more than a reversion. This combined return and emancipation, having transformed our practice of life in the last four centuries, will not be content till it has written itself clear in our theory of that practice. Whether the consequent revolution in moral philosophy be termed pragmatism or be given the happier title of the applied and experimental habit of mind is of little account. What is of moment is that intelligence has descended from its lonely isolation at the remote edge of things, whence it operated as unmoved mover and ultimate good, in order to take its seat in the moving affairs of men. Theory may therefore become responsible to the practices which have generated it; the good be connected with nature, but with nature naturally, not metaphysically, conceived, and social life be cherished in behalf of its own immediate possibilities, not on the ground of its remote connexions with a cosmic reason and an absolute end.

There is an idea, more familiar than correct, that Greek thought sacrificed the individual to the state. None has ever known better than the Greek that the individual comes to himself and to his own, only in association with others. But Greek thought subjected, as we have seen, both state and individual to an external cosmic order; and thereby it inevitably restricted the free use, in doubt, inquiry and experimentation, of the human intelligence. The *anima libera*, the free mind of the sixteenth century, of Galileo and his successors, was the counterpart of the disintegration of cosmology and its animistic teleology. The lecturer on political economy reminded us that his subject began, in the middle ages, as a branch of ethics, though, as he hastened to show, it soon got into better associations. Well, the same company was once kept by all the sciences, mathematical and physical as well as social. According to all accounts it was the integrity of the number one and the rectitude of

the square that attracted the attention of Pythagoras to arithmetic and geometry as promising fields of study. Astronomy was the projected picture book of a cosmic object lesson in morals, Dante's transcript of which is none the less literal because poetic. If physics alone remained outside the moral fold, while noble essences redeemed chemistry and occult forces blessed physiology, and the immaterial soul claimed psychology, physics is the exception that proves the rule: matter was so inherently immoral that no high-minded science would demean itself by contact with it.

If we do not join with many others in lamenting the stripping off from nature of those idealistic properties in which animism survived, if we do not mourn the secession of the sciences from ethics, it is because the abandonment by intelligence of a fixed and static moral end was the necessary precondition of a free and progressive science; because the emancipation of the sciences from ready made, remote and abstract values was necessary to make the sciences available for creating and maintaining more and better values here and now. The divine comedy of modern medicine and hygiene is one of the human epics yet to be written; but when composed it may prove no unworthy companion of the medieval epic of other worldly beatific visions. The great ideas of the eighteenth century, that expansive epoch of moral perception which ranks in illumination and fervor along with classic Greek thought, the great ideas of the indefinitely continuous progress of humanity and of the power and significance of freed intelligence, were borne by a common mother – the development of experimental inquiry.

The growth of industry and commerce is at once cause and effect of the growth in science. Democritus and other ancients conceived the mechanical theory of the universe. The notion was not only blank and repellent, because it ignored the rich social material which Plato and Aristotle had organized into their rival idealistic views; but it was scientifically sterile, a piece of dialectics. Contempt for machines as the accoutrements of despised mechanics kept the mechanical conception aloof from these specific and controllable experiences which alone could fructify it. This conception, then, like the idealistic, was translated into a speculative cosmology and thrown like a vast net around the universe at large, as if to keep it from coming to pieces. It is from respect for the lever, the pulley and the screw that modern experimental and mathematical mechanics derives itself. Motion, traced through the workings of a machine, was followed out into natural events and studied just as motion, not as a poor yet necessary device for realizing final causes. So studied, it was found to be available for new machines and new applications, which in creating new ends also promoted new wants, and thereby stimulated new activities, new discoveries and new inventions.

The recognition that natural energy can be systematically applied, through experimental observation, to the satisfaction and multiplication of concrete wants is doubtless the greatest single discovery ever imported into the life of man – save perhaps the discovery of language. Science, borrowing from industry, repaid the debt with interest, and has made the control of natural forces for the aims of life so inevitable, that for the first time man is relieved from overhanging fear, with its wolflike scramble to possess and accumulate, and is freed to consider the more gracious question of securing to all an ample and liberal life. The industrial life had been condemned by Greek exaltation of abstract thought and by Greek contempt for labor as representing the brute struggle of carnal appetite for its own satiety. The industrial movement, offspring of science, restored it to its central position in morals. When Adam Smith made economic activity the moving spring of man's unremitting effort, from the cradle to the grave, to better his own lot, he recorded this change. And when he made sympathy the central spring in man's conscious moral endeavor, he reported the effect which the increasing intercourse of men, due primarily to commerce, had in breaking down suspicion and jealousy and in liberating man's kindlier impulses.

Democracy, the crucial expression of modern life, is not so much an addition to the scientific and industrial tendencies as it is the perception of their social or spiritual meaning. Democracy is an absurdity where faith in the individual as individual is impossible; and this faith is impossible when intelligence is regarded as a cosmic power, not an adjustment and application of individual tendencies. It is impossible when appetites and desires are conceived to be the dominant factor in the constitution of most men's characters, and when appetite and desire are conceived to be manifestations of the disorderly and unruly principle of nature. To put the intellectual centre of gravity in the objective cosmos, outside of men's own experiments and tests, and then to invite the application of individual intelligence to the determination of society is to invite chaos. To hold that want is mere negative flux and hence requires external fixation by reason, and then to invite the wants to give free play to themselves in social construction and intercourse is to call down anarchy. Democracy was conceivable only with a changed conception of the intelligence that forms modern science and the want that forms modern industry. It is essentially a changed psychology. The substitution, for *a priori* truth and deduction, of fluent doubt and inquiry meant trust in human nature in the concrete; in individual honesty, curiosity and sympathy. The substitution of moving commerce for fixed custom meant a view of wants as the dynamics of social progress, not as the pathology of private greed. The nineteenth century indeed turned sour on that somewhat complacent optimism in which the eighteenth

century rested: the ideas that the intelligent self-love of individuals would conduce to social cohesion, and competition among individuals usher in the kingdom of social welfare. But the conception of a social harmony of interests in which the achievement by each individual of his own freedom should contribute to a like perfecting of the powers of all, through a fraternally organized society, is the permanent contribution of the industrial movement to morals – even though so far it be but the contribution of a problem.

Intellectually speaking, the centuries since the fourteenth are the true middle ages. They mark the transitional period of mental habit, as the so-called medieval period represents the petrification, under changed outward conditions, of Greek ideas. The conscious articulation of genuinely modern tendencies has yet to come, and till it comes the ethic of our own life must remain undescribed. But the system of morals which has come nearest to the reflection of the movements of science, democracy and commerce, is doubtless the utilitarian. Scientific, after the modern mode, it certainly would be. Newton's influence dyes deep the moral thought of the eighteenth century. The arrangements of the solar system had been described in terms of a homogeneous matter and motion, worked by two opposed and compensating forces: all because a method of analysis, of generalization by analogy, and of mathematical deduction back to new empirical details had been followed. The imagination of the eighteenth century was a Newtonian imagination; and this no less in social than in physical matters, Hume proclaims that morals is about to become an experimental science. Just as, almost in our own day, Mill's interest in a method for social science led him to reformulate the logic of experimental inquiry, so all the great men of the Enlightenment were in search for the organon of morals which should repeat the physical triumphs of Newton. Bentham notes that physics has had its Bacon and Newton; that morals has had its Bacon in Helvétius, but still awaits its Newton; and he leaves us in no doubt that at the moment of writing he was ready, modestly but firmly, to fill the waiting niche with its missing figure.

The industrial movement furnished the concrete imagery for this ethical renovation. The utilitarians borrowed from Adam Smith the notion that through industrial exchange in a free society the individual pursuing his own good is led, under the guidance of the "invisible hand," to promote the general good more effectually than if he had set out to do it. This idea was dressed out in the atomistic psychology which Hartley built out from Locke – and returned at usurious rates to later economists.

From the great French writers who had sought to justify and promote democratic individualism, came the conception that, since it is perverted

political institutions which deprave individuals and bring them into hostility, nation against nation, class against class, individual against individual, the great political problem is that reform of law and legislation, civic and criminal, of administration, and of education which will force the individual to find his own interest in pursuits which conduce to the welfare of others.

Tremendously effective as a tool of criticism, operative in abolition and elimination, utilitarianism failed to measure up to the constructive needs of the time. Its theoretical equalization of the good of each with that of every other was practically perverted by its excessive interest in the middle and manufacturing classes. Its speculative defect of an atomistic psychology combined with this narrowness of vision to make light of the constructive work that needs to be done by the state, before all can have, otherwise than in name, an equal chance to count in the common good. Thus the age-long subordination of economics to politics was revenged in the submerging of both politics and ethics in a narrow theory of economic profit; and utilitarianism, in its orthodox descendants, proffered the disjointed pieces of a mechanism, with a monotonous reiteration that if looked at aright they form a beautifully harmonious organism.

Prevision, and to some extent experience, of this failure, conjoined with differing social traditions and ambitions, evoked German idealism, the transcendental morals of Kant and his successors. German thought strove to preserve the traditions which bound culture to the past, while revising these traditions to render them capable of meeting novel conditions. It found weapons at hand in the conceptions borrowed by Roman law from Stoic philosophy, and in the conceptions by which protestant humanism had re-edited scholastic catholicism. Grotius had made the idea of natural law, natural right and obligation, the central idea of German morals, as thoroughly as Locke had made the individual desire for liberty and happiness the focus of English and then of French speculation. Materialized idealism is the happy monstrosity in which the popular demand for vivid imagery is most easily reconciled with the equally strong demand for supremacy of moral values; and the complete idealistic materialism of Stoicism has always given its ideas a practical influence out of all proportion to their theoretical vogue as a system. To the Protestant, that is the German, humanist, Natural Law, the bond of harmonious reason in nature, the spring of sociable intercourse among men, the inward light of individual conscience, united Cicero, St. Paul and Luther in blessed union; gave a rational, not superrational basis for morals, and provided room for social legislation which at the same time could easily be held back from too ruthless application.

Kant clearly saw the mass of empirical and hence irrelevant detail that

had found refuge within this liberal and diffusive reason. He saw that the idea of reason could be made self-consistent only by stripping it naked of these empirical accretions. He then provided, in his critiques, a somewhat cumbrous moving van for transferring the resultant pure or naked reason out from nature and the objective world, and for locating it in new quarters, with a new stock of goods and new customers. The new quarters were particular subjects, individuals; the stock of goods were the forms of perception and the functions of thought by which empirical flux was woven into durable fabrics; the new customers were a society of individuals in which all are ends in themselves. There ought to be an injunction that Kant's saying about Hume's awakening of him should never be quoted save in connexion with his other saying that Rousseau brought him to himself, in teaching him that the philosopher is of less account than the laborer in the fields unless he contributes to human freedom. But none the less, the new tenant, the universal reason, and the old homestead, the empirical tumultuous individual, could not get on together. Reason became a mere voice which having nothing in particular to say, said Law, Duty, in general, leaving to the existing social order of the Prussia of Frederick the Great the congenial task of declaring just what was obligatory in the concrete. The marriage of freedom and authority was thus celebrated with the understanding that the sentimental primacy went to the former and the practical control of the latter.

The effort to force a universal reason which had been used to the broad domains of the cosmos into the cramped confines of individuality conceived as merely "empirical," a highly particularized creature of sense, could have but one result: an explosion. The products of that explosion constitute the Post-Kantian philosophies. It was the work of Hegel to attempt to fill in the empty reason of Kant with the concrete contents of history. The voice sounded like the voice of Aristotle, Thomas of Aquino and Spinoza translated into Swabian German; but the hands were as the hands of Montesquieu, Herder, Condorcet and the rising historical school. The outcome was the assertion that history is reason, and reason is history: the actual is rational, the rational is the actual. It gave the pleasant appearance (which Hegel did not strenuously discourage) of being specifically an idealization of the Prussian nation, and incidentally a systematized apologetics for the universe at large. But in intellectual and practical effect, it lifted the idea of process above that of fixed origins and fixed ends, and presented the social and moral order, as well as the intellectual, as a scene of becoming, and it located reason somewhere within the struggles of life.

Unstable equilibrium, rapid fermentation and a succession of explosive reports are thus the chief notes of modern ethics. Scepticism

and traditionalism, empiricism and rationalism, crude naturalisms and all embracing idealisms, flourish side by side – all the more flourish, one suspects, because side by side. Spencer exults that natural science reveals that the rapid transit system of evolution is carrying us automatically to the goal of a perfect man in a perfect society; and his English idealistic contemporary is so disturbed by the removal from nature of its moral qualities, that he tries to show that it makes no difference, since nature in any case is known through a spiritual principle which is as permanent as nature is changing. An Amiel genteelly laments the decadence of the inner life, while his neighbor Nietzsche brandishes in rude ecstasy the banner of brute survival as a happy omen of the final victory of nobility of mind. The reasonable conclusion from such a scene is that there is taking place a transformation of attitude towards moral theory rather than mere propagation of varieties among theories. The classic theories all agree in one regard. They all alike assumed the existence of *the end*, the *summum bonum*, the final goal; and of *the* separate moral force which moves to that goal. Moralists have disputed as to whether the end is an aggregate of pleasurable state of consciousness, enjoyment of the divine essence, acknowledgment of the law of duty, or conformity to environment. So they have disputed as to the path by which the final goal is to be reached: fear or benevolence? reverence for pure law or pity for others? self-love or altruism? But these very controversies imply that there was but the one end and the one means.

The transformation in attitude, to which I referred, is the growing belief that the proper business of intelligence is discrimination of multiple and present goods and of the varied immediate means of their realization; not search for the one remote aim. The progress of biology has accustomed our minds to the notion that intelligence is not an outside power presiding supremely but statically over the desires and efforts of man, but that it is a method of adjustment of capacities and conditions within specific situations. History, as the lecturer on that subject told us, has discovered itself in the idea of process. The genetic standpoint makes us aware that the systems of the past are neither fraudulent imposture nor absolute revelations; but are the products of political, economic and scientific conditions whose change carries with it change of reflective formulations. The recognition that intelligence is properly an organ of adjustment in difficult situations makes us aware that these past theories were of value so far as they helped carry to an issue the social perplexities from which they emerged. But the chief impact of the evolutionary method is upon the present. Theory having learned what it cannot do, is made responsible for the better performance of what needs to be done, and what only a broadly equipped intelligence can do: to study the conditions out of which come the

obstacles and the resources of adequate life, and to develop and test the ideas which, as working hypotheses, may be used to diminish the causes of evil and buttress and expand the sources of good. This program is indeed vague, but only unfamiliarity with it could lead one to the conclusion that it is less vague than the idea that there is a single moral ideal and a single moral motive force.

From this point of view there is no separate body of moral rules; no separate system of motive powers; no separate subject-matter of moral knowledge, and hence no such thing as an isolated ethical science. If the business of morals is not to speculate upon man's final end, and upon an ultimate standard of right, it is to utilize physiology, anthropology and psychology to discover all that can be discovered of man, his organic powers and propensities. If its business is not to search for the one separate moral motive, it is to converge all the instrumentalities of the social arts, of law, education, economics and political science upon the construction of intelligent methods of improving the common lot.

If we still wish to make our peace with the past, and to sum up the plural and changing goods of life in a single word, doubtless the term happiness is the one most apt. But we should again exchange free morals for sterile metaphysics, if we imagine that "happiness" is any less unique than the individuals who experience it; any less complex than the constitution of their capacities, or any less variable than the objects upon which their capacities are directed.

To many timid, albeit sincere, souls of an earlier century, the decay of the doctrine that all true and worthful science is knowledge of final causes seemed fraught with danger to science and to morals. The rival conception of a wide open universe, a universe without bounds in time or space, without final limits of origin or destiny, the universe with the lid off, was a menace. We now face in moral science a similar crisis and like opportunity, as well as share in a like dreadful suspense. The abolition of a fixed and final goal and causal force in nature did not, as matter of fact, render rational conviction less important or less attainable. It was accompanied by the provision of a technique of persistent and detailed inquiry in all special fields of fact, a technique which led to the detection of unsuspected forces and the revelation of undreamed of uses. In like fashion we may anticipate that the abolition of *the* final goal and *the* single motive power and *the* separate and infallible faculty in morals, will quicken inquiry into all the diversity of specific goods of experience, fix attention upon their conditions and bring to light values now dim and obscure. The change may relieve men from responsibility for what they cannot do, but it will promote thoughtful consideration of what they may do and the definition of responsibility for what they do amiss, because of failure to think straight and

carefully. Absolute goods will fall into the background, but the question of making more sure and extensive the share of all men in natural and social goods will be urgent, a problem not to be escaped or evaded.

Morals, philosophy, returns to its first love; love of the wisdom that is nurse, as nature is mother, of good. But it returns to the Socratic principle equipped with a multitude of special methods of inquiry and testing; with an organized mass of knowledge, and with control of the arrangements by which industry, law and education may concentrate upon the problem of the participation by all men and women, up to their capacity of absorption, in all attained values. Morals may then well leave to poetry and to art, the task (so unartistically performed by philosophy since Plato) of gathering together and rounding out, into one abiding picture, the separate and special goods of life. It may leave this task with the assurance that the resultant synthesis will not depict any final and all inclusive good, but will add just one more specific good to the enjoyable excellencies of life.

Humorous irony shines through most of the harsh glances turned towards the idea of an experimental basis and career for morals. Some shiver in the fear that morals will be plunged into anarchic confusion – a view well expressed by a recent writer in the saying that if the *a priori* and transcendental basis of morals be abandoned “we shall have merely the same certainty that now exists in physics and chemistry!” Elsewhere lurks the apprehension that the progress of scientific method will deliver the purposive freedom of man bound hand and foot to the fatal decrees of iron necessity, called natural law. The notion that laws govern and forces rule is an animistic survival. It is a product of reading nature in terms of politics in order then to turn about and read politics in the light of supposed sanctions of nature. This idea passed from medieval theology into the science of Newton, to whom the universe was the dominion of a sovereign whose laws were the laws of nature. From Newton it passed into the deism of the eighteenth century, whence it migrated into the philosophy of the Enlightenment, to make its last stand in Spencer’s philosophy of the fixed environment and the static goal.

No, nature is not an unchangeable order, unwinding itself majestically from the reel of law under the control of deified forces. It is an indefinite congeries of changes. Laws are not governmental regulations which limit change, but are convenient formulations of selected portions of change followed through a longer or shorter period of time, and then registered in those statistical forms which are amenable to mathematical manipulation. That this device of shorthand symbolization presages the subjection of man’s intelligent effort to fixity of law and environment is interesting as a culture survival, but is not important for moral theory.

Savage and child delight in creating bogeys from which, in concealing their origin and interesting thrills and shudders may be had. Civilized man in the nineteenth century outdid these bugaboos in his image of a fixed universe hung on a cast-iron framework of fixed, necessary and universal laws. Knowledge of nature does not mean subjection to predestination, but insight into courses of change; an insight which is formulated in "laws," that is, methods of subsequent procedure.

Knowledge of the process and conditions of physical and social change by experimental science and genetic history has one result with a double name: increase of control and increase of responsibility; increase of power to direct natural change, and increase of responsibility for its equitable direction toward fuller good. Theory located within progressive practice instead of reigning statically supreme over it, means practice itself made responsible to intelligence; to intelligence which relentlessly scrutinizes the consequences of every practice, and which exacts liability by an equally relentless publicity. As long as morals occupies itself with mere ideals, forces and conditions as they are will be good enough for "practical" men, since they are then left free to their own devices in turning these to their own account. As long as moralists plume themselves upon possession of the domain of the categorical imperative with its bare precepts, men of executive habits will always be at their elbows to regulate the concrete social conditions through which the form of law gets its actual filling of specific injunctions. When freedom is conceived to be transcendental, the coercive restraint of immediate necessity will lay its harsh hand upon the mass of men.

In the end, men do what they can do. They refrain from doing what they cannot do. They do what their own specific powers in conjunction with the limitations and resources of the environment permit. The effective control of their powers is not through precepts, but through the regulation of their conditions. If this regulation is itself to be not merely physical or coercive, but moral, it must consist of the intelligent selection and determination of the environments in which we act; and in an intelligent exaction of responsibility for the use of men's powers. Theorists inquire after the "motive" to morality, to virtue and the good, under such circumstances. What then, one wonders, is their conception of the make-up of human nature and of its relation to virtue and to goodness? The pessimism which dictates such a question, if it be justified, precludes any consideration of morals.

The diversion of intelligence from discrimination of plural and concrete goods, from noting their conditions and obstacles, and from the task of devising methods for holding men responsible for their concrete use of powers and conditions, has done more than brute love of power to establish inequality and injustice among men. It has done

more, because it has confirmed with social sanctions the principle of feudal domination. All men require moral sanctions in their conduct: the consent of their kind. Not getting it otherwise, they go insane to feign it. No man ever lived with the exclusive approval of his own conscience. Hence the vacuum left in practical matters by the remote irrelevancy of transcendental morals has to be filled in somehow. It is filled in. It is filled in with class-codes, class-standards, class approvals – with codes which recommend the practices and habits already current in a given circle, set, calling, profession, trade, industry, club or gang. These class-codes always lean back upon and support themselves by the professed ideal code. This latter meets them more than half-way. Being in its pretence a theory for regulating practice, it must demonstrate its practicability. It is uneasy in isolation, and travels hastily to meet with compromise and accommodation the actual situation in all its brute unreasonality. Where the pressure is greatest – in the habitual practice of the political and economic chieftains – there it accommodates the most.

Class-codes of morals are sanctions, under the caption of ideals, of uncriticized customs; they are recommendations, under the head of duties, of what the members of the class are already most given to doing. If there are to obtain more equable and comprehensive principles of action, exacting a more impartial exercise of natural power and resource in the interests of a common good, it will be because members of a class can no longer rest content in responsibility to a class whose traditions constitute its conscience, but are made responsible to a society whose conscience is its free and effectively organized intelligence.

In such a conscience alone will the Socratic injunction to man to know himself be fulfilled.

THE WORKING HYPOTHESIS IN SOCIAL REFORM

George H. Mead. "The Working Hypothesis in Social Reform," *American Journal of Sociology* 5.3 (November 1899): 367–71.

There are some consequences that follow from the attempt to establish the theory of social reform among the inductive sciences that need emphasis. That to which I wish to refer is the implication of the hypothesis.

Socialism, in one form or another, lies back of the thought directing and inspiring reform. While socialistic utopias have been recognized as impotent to lead to better conditions, and opportunists have succeeded to the programists, the assumption that it will be possible to effect by constructive legislation radical changes that will lead to greater social equality is still very widely present. The success of municipal ownership, in means of transportation and various common necessities within cities, has aroused the expectation that this success can be achieved in other industries as fast as they are so organized as to become so-called natural monopolies. I think that a great deal of this confidence is inspired by the socialistic schemes of an essentially *a priori* character, rather than by a study of the conditions which these municipal concerns represent. We fail often to notice that government as an institution has essentially changed its character in so far as it has assumed these new functions. The government has become a business concern, which enters into the business world on a basis that is determined by the latter. It has assumed a certain amount of invested capital, where business risk has ceased, in the interests of its members, and has undertaken to carry on an enterprise that has already been worked out as regards its methods and technique. In a word, the municipality has become a business body operating for the benefit of those that make it up, and is therefore not different in principle from any stock company. The number of enterprises that such a body could undertake as a commercial body are, so far, necessarily small, and we have no reason to assume that in the end anything but business conditions will determine what the municipality may successfully manage. There is no reason why the German government, as a social individual, should not buy up and manage such

a business as the railroad; only so far as the business itself is concerned it must conduct it upon the principles which control the industrial world as a whole. It may introduce such reforms into it as are demanded by the public sentiment that finds expression in legislation, sooner than they will be introduced into other concerns. But it becomes at once in tendency as conservative as other great concerns, and must adapt itself to the demands of the business world of which it is a part. The government has then separate functions. On the one side, it formulates and brings to a focus public sentiment in so-called legislation, and conducts a police activity, national and international, over against classes of society and human impulses which are as yet not so socially organized as are the bulk of its members with their dominant impulses. On the other side, being an institution which is as definitely independent as other corporations within the community, it may undertake a very limited number of industrial and commercial concerns, which business evolution has carried to such a point of perfection that they lie safely within its domain.

While we recognize this possibility, we must, on the other side, recognize with equal distinctness that the functions of government, as an institution, are merging with equal rapidity into the industrial world which it is supposed to control. The whole work of legislation is not only dependent upon public sentiment, at least in democratic countries, but it is finding constantly fuller expression in other channels of publicity. The newspaper, in its various forms of journal and magazine, is effecting changes that are assumed to be those which follow governmental action. If only it becomes possible to focus public sentiment upon an issue in the delicate organism of the modern civilized community, it is as effective as if the mandate came from legislative halls, and frequently more so. This is true, not simply in the public reaction upon the justice of movements like those of great strikes and lockouts, but even in the interpretation of the methods of industrial and commercial activity. What the court does in reinterpreting laws is being done in increasing extent by simply closer organization of the business world – an organization that depends most immediately upon growing publicity. The study of the criminal and defective classes, as an expression of the conditions of the social body in which they are found, and their treatment from this new standpoint, as well as the movement toward arbitration for the solution of international differences, all point to the passing of functions which are supposed to inhere in the government into activities that belong to the community simply through its organization apart from government as a separate institution. On the other hand, certainly one of the most important so-called governmental functions, that is characteristic of the time, is the committee work,

which is but a part of the general process of gaining publicity as regards what is going on in the country and the world. This is often done, not by a legislative commission, but by the university as well as the newspaper. In attempting to forecast what is to be the result of the movement of municipal ownership, we have to consider therefore, not only the development of the municipal corporation and the industry that it conducts, but also that of a government that is changing fully as rapidly as the industrial and commercial world.

I have adduced this as an illustration of the attitude which social reformers must assume toward their problems. It is impossible to so forecast any future condition that depends upon the evolution of society as to be able to govern our conduct by such a forecast. It is always the unexpected that happens, for we have to recognize, not only the immediate change that is to take place, but also the reaction back upon this of the whole world within which the change takes place, and no human foresight is equal to this. In the social world we must recognize the working hypothesis as the form into which all theories must be cast as completely as in the natural sciences. The highest criterion that we can present is that the hypothesis shall *work* in the complex of forces into which we introduce it. We can never set up a detailed statement of the conditions that are to be ultimately attained. What we have is a method and a control in application, not an ideal to work toward. As has been stated, this is the attitude of the scientist in the laboratory, whether his work remains purely scientific or is applied immediately to conduct. His foresight does not go beyond the testing of his hypothesis. Given its success, he may restate his world from this standpoint and get the basis for further investigation that again always takes the form of a problem. The solution of this problem is found over again in the possibility of fitting his hypothetical proposition into the whole within which it arises. And he must recognize that this statement is only a working hypothesis at the best, *i.e.*, he knows that further investigation will show that the former statement of his world is only provisionally true, and must be false from the standpoint of a larger knowledge, as every partial truth is necessarily false over against the fuller knowledge which he will gain later. Even the axioms of Euclid are not true now in the sense of Euclid. In a word, our confidence in the results of science and the general application of intelligence to the control of the physical world is based, not upon a knowledge of the whole universe as it is, but upon a faith in its general rational character, that is perhaps best stated in the success of working hypotheses.

In social reform, or the application of intelligence to the control of social conditions, we must make a like assumption, and this assumption takes the form of belief in the essentially social character of human

impulse and endeavor. We cannot make persons social by legislative enactment, but we can allow the essentially social nature of their actions to come to expression under conditions which favor this. What the form of this social organization will be depends upon conditions that lie necessarily beyond our ken. We assume that human society is governed by laws that involve its solidarity, and we seek to find these out that they may be used. In the same way the natural scientist assumes that the world is as a whole governed by laws that involve the interaction of all its forces, and that he may find these laws out, and use them for the further organization of his world, so far as he is a part of it:

There is here, however, a distinction that is of considerable importance. In the, physical world we regard ourselves as standing in some degree outside the forces at work, and thus avoid the difficulty of harmonizing the feeling of human initiative with the recognition of series which are necessarily determined. In society we are the forces that are being investigated, and if we advance beyond the mere description of the phenomena of the social world to the attempt at reform, we seem to involve the possibility of changing what at the same time we assume to be necessarily fixed. The question, stated more generally, is: What is the function of reflective consciousness in its attempt to direct conduct? The common answer is that we carry in thought the world as it should be, and fashion our conduct to bring this about. As we have already seen, if this implies a "vision given in the mount" which represents in detail what is to be, we are utterly incapable of conceiving it. And every attempt to direct conduct by a fixed idea of the world of the future must be, not only a failure, but also pernicious. A conception of a different world comes to us always is the result of some specific problem which involves readjustment of the world as it is, not to meet a detailed ideal of a perfect universe, but to obviate the present difficulty; and the test of the effort lies in the possibility of this readjustment fitting into the world as it is. Reflective consciousness does not then carry us on to the world that is to be, but puts our own thought and endeavor into the very process of evolution, and evolution within consciousness that has become reflective has the advantage over other evolution in that the form does not tend to perpetuate himself as he is, but identifies himself with the process of development. Our reflective consciousness as applied to conduct is, therefore, an identification of our effort with the problem that presents itself, and the developmental process by which it is overcome, and reaches its highest expression in the scientific statement of the problem, and the recognition and use of scientific method and control.

PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL PRACTICE

John Dewey. "Psychology and Social Practice," *Psychological Review* 7.2 (March 1900): 105–124. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 1 (1976), pp. 151–74.

Address of the President before the American Psychological Association, New Haven, 1899.

In coming before you I had hoped to deal with the problem of the relation of psychology to the social sciences – and through them to social practice, to life itself. Naturally, in anticipation, I had conceived a systematic exposition of fundamental principles covering the whole ground, and giving every factor its due rating and position. That discussion is not ready to-day. I am loath, however, completely to withdraw from the subject, especially as there happens to be a certain phase of it with which I have been more or less practically occupied within the last few years. I have in mind the relation of Psychology to Education. Since education is primarily a social affair, and since educational science is first of all a social science, we have here a section of the whole field. In some respects there may be an advantage in approaching the more comprehensive question through the medium of one of its special cases. The absence of elaborated and coherent view may be made up for by a background of experience, which shall check the projective power of reflective abstraction, and secure a translation of large words and ideas into specific images. This special territory, moreover, may be such as to afford both sign-posts and broad avenues to the larger sphere – the place of psychology among the social sciences. Because I anticipate such an outcome, and because I shall make a survey of the broad field from the special standpoint taken, I make no apology for presenting this discussion to an Association of Psychologists rather than to a gathering of educators.

In dealing with this particular question, it is impossible not to have in mind the brilliant and effective discourses recently published by my predecessor in this chair. I shall accordingly make free to refer to points, and at times to words, in his treatment of the matter. Yet, as perhaps I hardly need say, it is a problem of the most fundamental importance for

both psychology and social theory that I wish to discuss, not any particular book or article. Indeed with much of what Dr. Münsterberg says about the uselessness and the danger for the teacher of miscellaneous scraps of child study, of unorganized information regarding the nervous system, and of crude and uninterpreted results of laboratory experiment, I am in full agreement. It is doubtless necessary to protest against a hasty and violent bolting of psychological facts and principles which, of necessity, destroys their scientific form. It is necessary to point out the need of a preliminary working over of psychological material adapting it to the needs of education. But these are minor points. The main point is whether the standpoint of psychological science, as a study of mechanism, is indifferent and opposed to the demands of education with its free interplay of personalities in their vital attitudes and aims.

I.

The school practice of to-day has a definite psychological basis. Teachers are already possessed by specific psychological assumptions which control their theory and their practice. The greatest obstacle to the introduction of certain educational reforms is precisely the permeating persistence of the underlying psychological creed. Traced back to its psychological ultimates, there are two controlling bases of existing methods of instruction. One is the assumption of a fundamental distinction between child psychology and the adult psychology where, in reality, identity, reigns; viz.: in the region of the motives and conditions which make for mental power. The other is the assumption of likeness where marked difference is the feature most significant for educational purposes; I mean the specialization of aims and habits in the adult, compared with the absence of specialization in the child, and the connection of undifferentiated status with the full and free growth of the child.

The adult is primarily a person with a certain calling and position in life. These devolve upon him certain specific responsibilities which he has to meet, and call into play certain formed habits. The child is primarily one whose calling is growth. He is concerned with arriving at specific ends and purposes – instead of having a general framework already developed. He is engaged in forming habits rather than in definitely utilizing those already formed. Consequently he is absorbed in getting that all around contact with persons and things, that range of acquaintance with the physical and ideal factors of life, which shall afford the background and material for the specialized aims and pursuits of later life. He is, or should be, busy in the formation of a flexible variety of habits whose sole immediate criterion is their relation to full growth, rather than in acquiring certain skills whose value is measured

by their reference to specialized technical accomplishments. This is the radical psychological and biological distinction, I take it, between the child and the adult. It is because of this distinction that children are neither physiologically nor mentally describable as 'little men and women.'

The full recognition of this distinction means of course the selection and arrangement of all school materials and methods for the facilitation of full normal growth, trusting to the result in growth to provide the instrumentalities of later specialized adaptation. If education means the period of prolonged infancy, it means nothing less than this. But look at our school system and ask whether the 3 R's are taught, either as to subject matter or as to method, with reference to growth, to its present demands and opportunities; or as technical acquisitions which are to be needed in the specialized life of the adult. Ask the same questions about geography, grammar and history. The gap between psychological theory and the existing school practice becomes painfully apparent. We readily realize the extent to which the present school system is dominated by carrying over into child life a standpoint and method which are significant in the psychology of the adult.

The narrow scope of the traditional elementary curriculum, the premature and excessive use of logical analytic methods, the assumption of ready-made faculties of observation, memory, attention, etc., which can be brought into play if only the child chooses to do so, the ideal of formal discipline – all these find a large measure of their explanation in neglect of just this psychological distinction between the child and the adult. The hold of these affairs upon the school is so fixed that it is impossible to shake it in any fundamental way, excepting by a thorough appreciation of the actual psychology of the case. This appreciation cannot be confined to the educational leaders and theorists. No individual instructor can be sincere and whole hearted, to say nothing of intelligent, in carrying into effect the needed reforms, save as he genuinely understands the scientific basis and necessity of the change.

But in another direction there is the assumption of a fundamental difference: Namely, as to the conditions which secure intellectual and moral progress and power.¹ No one seriously questions that, with an adult, power and control are obtained through realization of personal ends and problems, through personal selection of means and materials which are relevant, and through personal adaptation and application of what is thus selected, together with whatever of experimentation and of testing is involved in this effort. Practically every one of these three

¹ I owe this point specifically (as well as others more generally) to my friend and colleague, Mrs. Ella Flagg Young.

conditions of increase in power for the adult is denied for the child. For him problems and aims are determined by another mind. For him the material that is relevant and irrelevant is selected in advance by another mind. And, upon the whole; there is such an attempt to teach him a ready-made method for applying his material to the solution of his problems, or the reaching of his ends, that the factor of experimentation is reduced to the minimum. With the adult we unquestioningly assume that an attitude of personal inquiry, based upon the possession of a problem which interests and absorbs, is a necessary precondition of mental growth. With the child we assume that the precondition is rather the willing disposition which makes him ready to submit to any problem and material presented from without. Alertness is our ideal in one case; docility in the other. With one, we assume that power of attention develops in dealing with problems which make a personal appeal, and through personal responsibility for determining what is relevant. With the other we provide next to no opportunities for the evolution of problems out of immediate experience, and allow next to no free mental play for selecting, assorting and adapting the experiences and ideas that make for their solution. How profound a revolution in the position and service of textbook and teacher, and in methods of instruction depending therefrom, would be effected by a sincere recognition of the psychological identity of child and adult in these respects can with difficulty be realized.

Here again it is not enough that the educational commanders should be aware of the correct educational psychology. The rank and file, just because they are persons dealing with persons, must have a sufficient grounding in the psychology of the matter to realize the necessity and the significance of what they are doing. Any reform instituted without such conviction on the part of those who have to carry it into effect, would never be undertaken in good faith, nor in the spirit which its ideal inevitably demands; consequently it could lead only to disaster.

At this point, however, the issue defines itself somewhat more narrowly. It may be true, it is true, we are told, that some should take hold of psychological methods and conclusions, and organize them with reference to the assistance which they may give to the cause of education. But this is not the work of the teacher. It belongs to the general educational theorist: the middleman between the psychologist and the educational practitioner. He should put the matter into such shape that the teacher may take the net results in the form of advice and rules for action; but the teacher who comes in contact with the living personalities must not assume the psychological attitude. If he does he reduces persons to objects, and thereby distorts, or rather destroys, the

ethical relationship which is the vital nerve of instruction (*Psychology and Life*, p. 122, and pp. 136–138).

That there is some legitimate division of labor between the general educational theorist and the actual instructor, there is of course no doubt. As a rule, it will not be the one actively employed in instruction who will be most conscious of the psychological basis and equivalents of the educational work, nor most occupied in finding the pedagogical rendering of psychological facts and principles. Of necessity, the stress of interest will be elsewhere. But we have already found reason for questioning the possibility of making the somewhat different direction of interest into a rigid dualism of a legislative class on one side and an obedient subject class on the other. Can the teacher ever receive ‘obligatory prescriptions’? Can he receive from another a statement of the means by which he is to reach his ends, and not become hopelessly servile in his attitude? Would not such a result be even worse than the existing mixture of empiricism and inspiration? – just because it would forever fossilize the empirical element and dispel the inspiration which now quickens routine. Can a passive, receptive attitude on the part of the instructor (suggesting the soldier awaiting orders from a commanding general) be avoided, unless the teacher, as a student of psychology, himself sees the reasons and import of the suggestions and rules that are proffered him?

I quote a passage that seems of significance: “Do we not lay a special linking science everywhere else between the theory and practical work? We have engineering between physics and the practical workingmen in the mills; we have a scientific medicine between the natural science and the physician” (p. 138). The sentences suggest, in an almost startling way, that the real essence of the problem is found in an *organic* connection between the two extreme terms – between the theorist and the practical worker – through the medium of the linking science. The decisive matter is the extent to which the ideas of the theorist actually project themselves, through the kind offices of the middleman, into the consciousness of the practitioner. It is the participation by the practical man in the theory, through the agency of the linking science, that determines at once the effectiveness of the work done, and the moral freedom and personal development of the one engaged in it. It is because the physician no longer follows rules, which, however rational in themselves, are yet arbitrary to him (because grounded in principles that he does not understand), that his work is becoming liberal, attaining the dignity of a profession, instead of remaining a mixture of empiricism and quackery. It is because, alas, engineering makes only a formal and not a real connection between physics and the practical workingmen in

the mills that our industrial problem is an ethical problem of the most serious kind. The question of the amount of wages the laborer receives, of the purchasing value of this wage, of the hours and conditions of labor, are, after all, secondary. The problem primarily roots in the fact that the mediating science does not connect with his consciousness, but merely with his outward actions. He does not appreciate the significance and bearing of what he does; and he does not perform his work because of sharing in a larger scientific and social consciousness. If he did, he would be free. All other proper accompaniments of wage, and hours, healthful and inspiring conditions would be added unto him, because he would have entered into the ethical kingdom. Shall we seek analogy with the teacher's calling in the workingmen in the mill, or in the scientific physician?

It is quite likely that I shall be reminded that I am overlooking an essential difference. The physician, it will be said, is dealing with a body which either is in itself a pure object, a causal interplay of anatomical elements, or is something which lends itself naturally and without essential loss to treatment from this point of view; while the case is quite different in the material with which the teacher deals. Here is personality, which is destroyed when regarded as an object. But the gap is not so pronounced nor so serious as this objection implies. The physician after all is not dealing with a lifeless body; with a simple anatomical structure, or interplay of mechanical elements. Life functions, active operations, are the reality which confronts him. We do not have to go back many centuries in the history of medicine to find a time when the physician attempted to deal with these functions directly and immediately. They were so overpoweringly present, they forced themselves upon him so obviously and so constantly that he had no resource save a mixture of magic and empiricism: magic so far as he followed methods derived from uncritical analogy, or from purely general speculation on the universe and life; empiricism so long as he just followed procedures which had been found helpful before in cases which somewhat resembled the present. We have only to trace the intervening history of medicine to appreciate that it is precisely the ability to state function in terms of structure, to reduce life in its active operations to terms of a causal mechanism, which has taken the medical calling out of this dependence upon a vibration between superstition and routine. Progress has come by taking what is really an activity as if it were only an object. It is the capacity to effect this transformation of life activity which measures both the scientific character of the physician's procedure and his practical control, the certainty and efficacy of what he, as a living man, does in relation to some other living man.

It is an old story, however, that we must not content ourselves with

analogies. We must find some specific reason in the principles of the teacher's own activities for believing that psychology – the ability to transform a living personality into an objective mechanism for the time being – is not merely an incidental help, but an organic necessity. Upon the whole, the best efforts of teachers at present are partly paralyzed, partly distorted, and partly rendered futile precisely from the fact that they are in such immediate contact with sheer, unanalyzed personality. The relation is such a purely ethical and personal one that the teacher cannot get enough outside the situation to handle it intelligently and effectively. He is in precisely the condition in which the physician was when he had no recourse save to deal with health as entity or force on one side, and disease as opposing agency or invading influence upon the other. The teacher reacts *en bloc*, in a gross wholesale way, to something which he takes in an equally undefined and total way in the child. It is the inability to regard, upon occasion, both himself and the child as just objects working upon each other in specific ways that compels him to resort to purely arbitrary measures, to fall back upon mere routine traditions of school teaching, or to fly to the latest fad of pedagogical theorists – the latest panacea peddled out in school journals or teachers' institutes – just as the old physician relied upon his magic formula.

I repeat, it is the fundamental weakness of our teaching force to-day (putting aside teachers who are actually incompetent by reason either of wrong motives or inadequate preparation), that they react in gross to the child's exhibitions in gross without analyzing them into their detailed and constituent elements. If the child is angry, he is dealt with simply as an angry being; anger is an entity, a force, not a symptom. If a child is inattentive, this again is treated as a mere case of refusal to use the faculty or function of attention, of sheer unwillingness to act. Teachers tell you that a child is careless or inattentive in the same final way in which they would tell you that a piece of paper is white. It is just a fact, and that is all there is of it. Now it is only through some recognition of attention as a mechanism, some awareness of the interplay of sensations, images and motor impulses which constitute it as an objective fact that the teacher can deal effectively with attention as a function. And, of course, the same is true of memory, quick and useful observation, good judgment and all the other practical powers the teacher is attempting to cultivate.

Consideration of the abstract concepts of mechanism and personality is important. Too much preoccupation with them in a general fashion, however, without translation into relevant imagery of actual conditions is likely to give rise to unreal difficulties. The ethical personality does not go to school naked; it takes with it the body as the instrument through which all influences reach it, and through control of which its

ideas are both elaborated and expressed. The teacher does not deal with personality at large, but as expressed in intellectual and practical impulses and habits. The ethical personality is not formed – it is forming. The teacher must provide stimuli leading to the equipment of personality with active habits and interests. When we consider the problem of forming habits and interests we find ourselves at once confronted with matters of this sort: What stimuli shall be presented to the sense organs and how? What stable complexes of associations shall be organized? What motor impulses shall be evoked, and to what extent? How shall they be induced in such a way as to bring favorable stimuli under greater control, and to lessen the danger of excitation from undesirable stimuli? In a word, the teacher is dealing with the psychical factors that are concerned with furtherance of certain habits, and the inhibition of others – habits intellectual, habits emotional, habits in overt action.

Moreover, all the instruments and materials with which the teacher deals must be considered as psychical stimuli. Such consideration involves of necessity a knowledge of their reciprocal reactions – of what goes by the name of causal mechanism. The introduction of certain changes into a net-work of associations, the reinforcement of certain sensori-motor connections, the weakening or displacing of others – this is the psychological rendering of the greater part of the teacher's actual business. It is not that one teacher employs mechanical considerations, and that the other does not, appealing to higher ends; it is that one does not know his mechanism, and consequently acts servilely, superstitiously and blindly, while the other, knowing what he is about, acts freely, clearly and effectively.²

The same thing is true on the side of materials of instruction – the school studies. No amount of exaltation of teleological personality (however true, and however necessary the emphasis) can disguise from us the fact that instruction is an affair of bringing a child into intimate relations with concrete objects, positive facts, definite ideas and specific symbols. The symbols are objective things in arithmetic, reading and writing. The ideas are truths of history and of science. The facts are derived from such specific disciplines as geography and language, botany and astronomy. To suppose that by some influence of pure personality upon pure personality, conjoined with a knowledge of rules formulated by an educational theorist, an effective interplay of this body of physical and ideal objects with the life of the child can be effective, is, I submit, nothing but an appeal to magic, plus dependence upon servile

² That some teachers get their psychology by instinct more effectively than others by any amount of reflective study may be unreservedly stated. It is not a question of manufacturing teachers, but of reinforcing and enlightening those who have a right to teach.

routine. Symbols in reading and writing and number, are both in themselves, and in the way in which they stand for ideas, elements in a mechanism which has to be rendered operative within the child. To bring about this influence in the most helpful and economical way, in the most fruitful and liberating way, is absolutely impossible save as the teacher has some power to transmute symbols and contents into their working psychical equivalents: and save as he also has the power to see what it is in the child, as a psychical mechanism, that affords maximum leverage.

Probably I shall now hear that at present the danger is not of dealing with acts and persons in a gross, arbitrary way, but (so far as what is called new education is concerned) in treating the children too much as mechanism, and consequently seeking for all kinds of stimuli to stir and attract – that, in a word, the tendency to reduce instruction to a merely agreeable thing, weakening the child's personality and indulging his mere love of excitement and pleasure, is precisely the result of taking the psycho-mechanical point of view. I welcome the objection for it serves to clear up the precise point. It is through a partial and defective psychology that the teacher, in his reaction from dead routine and arbitrary moral and intellectual discipline, has substituted an appeal to the satisfaction of momentary impulse. It is not because the teacher has a knowledge of the psycho-physical mechanism, but because he has a partial knowledge of it.

He has come to consciousness of certain sensations, and certain impulses, and of the ways in which these may be stimulated and directed, but he is in ignorance of the larger mechanism (just as a mechanism), and of the causal relations which subsist between the unknown part and the elements upon which he is playing. What is needed to correct his errors is not to inform him that he gets only misleading from taking the psychical point of view; but to reveal to him the scope and intricate interactions of the mechanism as a whole. Then he will realize that while he is gaining apparent efficacy in some superficial part of the mechanism, he is disarranging, dislocating and disintegrating much more fundamental factors in it. In a word he is operating not as a psychologist, but as a poor psychologist, and the only cure for a partial psychology is a fuller one. He is gaining the momentary attention of the child through an appeal to pleasant color, or exciting tone, or agreeable association, but at the expense of isolating one cog and ratchet in the machinery, and making it operate independently of the rest. In theory, it is as possible to demonstrate this to a teacher, showing how the faulty method reacts unhappily into the personality, as it is to locate the points of wrong construction, and of ineffective transfer of energy in a physical apparatus.

This suggests the admission made by writers in many respects as far apart as Dr. Harris and Dr. Münsterberg – that scientific psychology is of use on the pathological side – where questions of ‘physical and mental health’ are concerned. But is there anything with which the teacher has concern that is not included in the ideal of physical and mental health? Does health define to us anything less than the teacher’s whole end and aim? Where does pathology leave off in the scale and series of vicious aims and defective means? I see no line between the more obvious methods and materials which result in nervous irritation and fatigue; in weakening the power of vision, in establishing spinal curvatures; and others which, in more remote and subtle, but equally real ways, leave the child with, say, a muscular system which is only partially at the service of his ideas, with blocked and inert brain paths between eye and ear, and with a partial and disconnected development of the cerebral paths of visual imagery. What error in instruction is there which could not, with proper psychological theory, be stated in just such terms as these? A wrong method of teaching reading, wrong I mean in the full educational and ethical sense, is also a case of pathological use of the psycho-physical mechanism. A method is ethically defective that, while giving the child a glibness in the mechanical facility of reading, leaves him at the mercy of suggestion and chance environment to decide whether he reads the ‘yellow journal,’ the trashy novel, or the literature which inspires and makes more valid his whole life. Is it any less certain that this failure on the ethical side is repeated in some lack of adequate growth and connection in the psychical and physiological factors involved? If a knowledge of psychology is important to the teacher in the grosser and more overt cases of mental pathology is it not even more important in these hidden and indirect matters – just because they are less evident and more circuitous in their operation and manifestation?

The argument may be summarized by saying that there is controversy neither as to the ethical character of education, nor as to the abstraction which psychology performs in reducing personality to an object. The teacher is, indeed, a person occupied with other persons. He lives in a social sphere – he is a member and an organ of a social life. His aims are social aims; the development of individuals taking ever more responsible positions in a circle of social activities continually increasing in radius and in complexity. Whatever he as a teacher effectively does, he does as a person; and he does with and towards persons. His methods, like his aims, when actively in operation, are practical, are social, are ethical, are anything you please – save merely psychical. In comparison with this, the material and the data, the standpoint and the methods of psychology, are abstract. They transform specific acts and relations of individuals into a flow of processes in consciousness; and these processes

can be adequately identified and related only through reference to a biological organism. I do not think there is danger of going too far in asserting the social and teleological nature of the work of the teacher; or in asserting the abstract and partial character of the mechanism into which the psychologist, as a psychologist, transmutes the play of vital values.

Does it follow from this that any attempt on the part of the teacher to perform this abstraction, to see the pupil as a mechanism, to define his own relations and that of the study taught in terms of causal influences acting upon this mechanism, are useless and harmful? On the face of it, I cannot understand the logic which says that because mechanism is mechanism, and because acts, aims, values are vital, therefore a statement in terms of one is alien to the comprehension and proper management of the other. Ends are not compromised when referred to the means necessary to realize them. Values do not cease to be values when they are minutely and accurately measured. Acts are not destroyed when their operative machinery is made manifest. The statement of the disparity of mechanism and actual life, be it never so true, solves no problem. It is no distinction that may be used off-hand to decide the question of the relation of psychology to any form of practice. It is a valuable and necessary distinction; but it is only preliminary. The purport of our discussion has, indeed, led us strongly to suspect any ideal which exists purely at large, out of relation to machinery of execution, and equally a machinery that operates in no particular direction.

The proposition that a description and explanation of stones, iron and mortar, as an absolutely necessary causal nexus of mechanical conditions, makes the results of physical science unavailable for purposes of practical life, would hardly receive attention to-day. Every sky-scraper, every railway bridge is a refutation, compared with which oceans of talk are futile. One would not find it easy to stir up a problem even if he went on to include, in this same mechanical system, the steam derricks that hoist the stones and iron, and the muscles and nerves of architect, mason and steel worker. The simple fact is still too obvious: the more thorough-going and complete the mechanical and causal statement, the more controlled, the more economical are the discovery and realization of human aims. It is not in spite of, nor in neglect of, but because of the mechanical statement that human activity has been freed, and made effective in thousands of new practical directions, upon a scale and with a certainty hitherto undreamed of. Our discussion tends to suggest that we entertain a similar question regarding psychology only because we have as yet made so little headway – just because there is so little scientific control of our practice in these directions; that at bottom our difficulty is local and circumstantial, not intrinsic and doctrinal. If our

teachers were trained as architects are trained, if our schools were actually managed on a psychological basis as great factories are run on the basis of chemical and physical science; if our psychology were sufficiently organized and coherent to give as adequate a mechanical statement of human nature as physics does of its material, we should never dream of discussing this question.

I cannot pass on from this phase of the discussion without at least incidental remark of the obverse side of the situation. The difficulties of psychological observation and interpretation are great enough in any case. We cannot afford to neglect any possible auxiliary. The great advantage of the psycho-physical laboratory is paid for by certain obvious defects. The completer control of conditions, with resulting greater accuracy of determination, demands an isolation, a ruling out of the usual media of thought and action, which leads to a certain remoteness, and easily to a certain artificiality. When the result of laboratory experiment informs us, for example, that repetition is the chief factor influencing recall, we must bear in mind that the result is obtained with nonsense material – i.e., by excluding the conditions of ordinary memory. The result is pertinent if we state it thus: The more we exclude the usual environmental adaptations of memory the greater importance attaches to sheer repetition. It is dubious (and probably perverse) if we say: Repetition is the prime influence in memory.

Now this illustrates a general principle. Unless our laboratory results are to give us artificialities, mere scientific curiosities, they must be subjected to interpretation by gradual reapproximation to conditions of life. The results may be very accurate, very definitive in form; but the task of re-viewing them so as to see their actual import is clearly one of great delicacy and liability to error. The laboratory, in a word, affords no final refuge that enables us to avoid the ordinary scientific difficulties of forming hypotheses, interpreting results, etc. In some sense (from the very accuracy and limitations of its results) it adds to our responsibilities in this direction. Now the school, for psychological purposes, stands in many respects midway between the extreme simplifications of the laboratory and the confused complexities of ordinary life. Its conditions are those of life at large; they are social and practical. But it approaches the laboratory in so far as the ends aimed at are reduced in number, are definite, and thus simplify the conditions; and their psychological phase is uppermost – the formation of habits of attention, observation, memory, etc. – while in ordinary life these are secondary and swallowed up.

If the biological and evolutionary attitude is right in looking at mind as fundamentally an instrument of adaptation, there are certainly advantages in any mode of approach which brings us near to its various

adaptations while they are still forming, and under conditions selected with special reference to promoting these adaptations (or faculties). And this is precisely the situation we should have in a properly organized system of education. While the psychological theory would guide and illuminate the practice, acting upon the theory would immediately test it, and thus criticize it, bringing about its revision and growth. In the large and open sense of the words psychology becomes a working hypothesis, instruction is the experimental test and demonstration of the hypothesis; the result is both greater practical control and continued growth in theory.

II.

I must remind myself that my purpose does not conclude with a statement of the auxiliary relation of psychology to education; but that we are concerned with this as a type case of a wider problem – the relation of psychology to social practice in general. So far I have tried to show that it is not in spite of its statement of personal aims and social relations in terms of mechanism that psychology is useful, but because of this transformation and abstraction. Through reduction of ethical relations to presented objects we are enabled to get outside of the existing situation; to see it objectively, not merely in relation to our traditional habits, vague aspirations and capricious desires. We are able to see clearly the factors which shape it, and therefore to get an idea of how it may be modified. The assumption of an identical relationship of physics and psychology to practical life is justified. Our freedom of action comes through its statement in terms of necessity. By this translation our control is enlarged, our powers are directed, our energy conserved, our aims illuminated.

The school is an especially favorable place in which to study the availability of psychology for social practice; because in the school the formation of a certain type of social personality, with a certain attitude and equipment of working powers, is the express aim. In idea at least no other purpose restricts or compromises the dominance of the single purpose. Such is not the case in business, politics, and the professions. All these have upon their surface, taken directly, other ends to serve. In many instances these other aims are of far greater immediate importance; the ethical result is subordinate or even incidental. Yet as it profiteth a man nothing to gain the whole world and lose his own self, so indirectly and ultimately all these other social institutions must be judged by the contribution which they make to the value of human life. Other ends may be immediately uppermost, but these ends must in turn be means; they must subserve the interests of conscious life or else stand condemned.

In other words, the moment we apply an ethical standard to the consideration of social institutions, that moment they stand on exactly the same level as does the school, viz.: as organs for the increase in depth and area of the realized values of life. In both cases the statement of the mechanism, through which the ethical ends are realized, is not only permissible, but absolutely required. It is not merely incidentally, as a grateful addition to its normal task, that psychology serves us. The essential nature of the standpoint which calls it into existence, and of the abstraction which it performs, is to put in our possession the method by which values are introduced and effected in life. The statement of personality as an object; of social relations as a mechanism of stimuli and inhibitions, is precisely the statement of ends in terms of the method of their realization.

It is remarkable that men are so blind to the futility of a morality which merely blazons ideals, erects standards, asserts laws without finding in them any organic provision for their own realization. For ideals are held up to follow; standards are given to work by; laws are provided to guide action. The sole and only reason for their conscious moral statement is, in a word, that they may influence and direct conduct. If they cannot do this, not merely by accident, but of their own intrinsic nature, they are worse than inert. They are impudent impostors and logical self-contradictions.

When men derive their moral ideals and laws from custom, they also realize them through custom; but when they are in any way divorced from habit and tradition, when they are consciously proclaimed, there must be some substitute for custom as an organ of execution. We must know the method of their operation and know it in detail. Otherwise the more earnestly we insist upon our categorical imperatives, and upon their supreme right of control, the more flagrantly helpless we are as to their actual domination. The fact that conscious, as distinct from customary, morality and psychology have had a historic parallel march, is just the concrete recognition of the necessary equivalence between ends consciously conceived, and interest in the means upon which the ends depend. We have the same reality stated twice over: once as value to be realized, and once as mechanism of realization. So long as custom reigns, as tradition prevails, so long as social values are determined by instinct and habit, there is no conscious question as to the method of their achievement, and hence no need of psychology. Social institutions work of their own inertia, they take the individual up into themselves and carry him along in their own sweep. The individual is dominated by the mass life of his group. Institutions and the customs attaching to them take care of society both as to its ideals and its methods. But when once the values come to consciousness, when once a Socrates insists

upon the organic relation of a reflective life and morality, then the means, the machinery by which ethical ideals are projected and manifested, comes to consciousness also. Psychology must needs be born as soon as morality becomes reflective.

Moreover, psychology, as an account of the mechanism of workings of personality, is the only alternative to an arbitrary and class view of society, to an aristocratic view in the sense of restricting the realization of the full worth of life to a section of society. The growth of a psychology that, as applied to history and sociology, tries to state the interactions of groups of men in familiar psychical categories of stimulus and inhibition, is evidence that we are ceasing to take existing social forms as final and unquestioned. The application of psychology to social institutions is the only scientific way of dealing with their ethical values in their present unequal distribution, their haphazard execution and their thwarted development. It marks just the recognition of the principle of sufficient reason in the large matters of social life. It is the recognition that the existing order is determined neither by fate nor by chance, but is based on law and order, on a system of existing stimuli and modes of reaction, through knowledge of which we can modify the practical outcome. There is no logical alternative save either to recognize and search for the mechanism of the interplay of personalities that controls the existing distributions of values, or to accept as final a fixed hierarchy of persons in which the leaders assert, on no basis save their own supposed superior personality, certain ends and laws which the mass of men passively receive and imitate. The effort to apply psychology to social affairs means that the determination of ethical values lies not in any set or class, however superior, but in the workings of the social whole; that the explanation is found in the complex interactions and inter-relations which constitute this whole. To save personality in all, we must serve all alike – state the achievements of all in terms of mechanism, that is, of the exercise of reciprocal influence. To affirm personality independent of mechanism is to restrict its full meaning to a few, and to make its expression in the few irregular and arbitrary.

The anomaly in our present social life is obvious enough. With tremendous increase in control of nature, in ability to utilize nature for the indefinite extension and multiplication of commodities for human use and satisfaction, we find the actual realization of ends, the enjoyment of values growing unassured and precarious. At times it seems as if we were caught in a contradiction; the more we multiply means, the less certain and general is the use we are able to make of them. No wonder a Carlyle or a Ruskin puts our whole industrial civilization under a ban, while a Tolstoi proclaims a return to the desert. But the only way to see the situation steadily, and to see it as a whole, is

to keep in mind that the entire problem is one of the development of science, and of its application to life. Our control of nature with the accompanying output of material commodities is the necessary result of the growth of physical science – of our ability to state things as interconnected parts of a mechanism. Physical science has for the time being far outrun psychical. We have mastered the physical mechanism sufficiently to turn out possible goods; we have not gained a knowledge of the conditions through which possible values become actual in life, and so are still at the mercy of habit, of haphazard, and hence of force.

Psychology, after all, simply states the mechanism through which conscious value and meaning are introduced into human experience. As it makes its way, and is progressively applied to history and all the social sciences, we can anticipate no other outcome than increasing control in the ethical sphere – the nature and extent of which can be best judged by considering the revolution that has taken place in the control of physical nature through a knowledge of her order. Psychology will never provide ready-made materials and prescriptions for the ethical life, any more than physics dictates off-hand the steam-engine and the dynamo. But science, both physical and psychological, makes known the conditions upon which certain results depend, and therefore puts at the disposal of life a method for controlling them. Psychology will never tell us just what to do ethically, nor just how to do it. But it will afford us insight into the conditions which control the formation and execution of aims, and thus enable human effort to expend itself sanely, rationally and with assurance. We are not called upon to be either boasters or sentimentalists regarding the possibilities of our science. It is best, for the most part, that we should stick to our particular jobs of investigation and reflection as they come to us. But we certainly are entitled in this daily work to be sustained by the conviction that we are not working in indifference to or at cross-purposes with the practical strivings of our common humanity. The psychologist, in his most remote and technical occupation with mechanism, is contributing his bit to that ordered knowledge which alone enables mankind to secure a larger and to direct a more equal flow of values in life.

DEMOCRACY IN EDUCATION

John Dewey. "Democracy in Education," *Elementary School Teacher* 4.4 (December 1903): 193–204. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 3 (1977), pp. 3–39.

Modern life means democracy, democracy means freeing intelligence for independent effectiveness – the emancipation of mind as an individual organ to do its own work. We naturally associate democracy, to be sure, with freedom of action, but freedom of action without freed capacity of thought behind it is only chaos. If external authority in action is given up, it must be because internal authority of truth, discovered and known to reason, is substituted.

How does the school stand with reference to this matter? Does the school as an accredited representative exhibit this trait of democracy as a spiritual force? Does it lead and direct the movement? Does it lag behind and work at cross-purpose? I find the fundamental need of the school today dependent upon its limited recognition of the principle of freedom of intelligence. This limitation appears to me to affect both of the elements of school life: teacher and pupil. As to both, the school has lagged behind the general contemporary social movement; and much that is unsatisfactory, much of conflict and of defect, comes from the discrepancy between the relatively undemocratic organization of the school, as it affects the mind of both teacher and pupil, and the growth and extension of the democratic principle in life beyond school doors.

The effort of the last two-thirds of a century has been successful in building up the machinery of a democracy of mind. It has provided the ways and means for housing and equipping intelligence. What remains is that the thought-activity of the individual, whether teacher or student, be permitted and encouraged to take working possession of this machinery: to substitute its rightful lordship for an inherited servility. In truth, our public-school system is but two-thirds of a century old. It dates, so far as such matters can be dated at all, from 1837, the year that Horace Mann became secretary of the state board of Massachusetts; and from 1843, when Henry Barnard began a similar work in Connecticut. At this time began that growing and finally successful warfare against all the influences, social and sectarian, which

would prevent or mitigate the sway of public influence over private ecclesiastical and class interests. Between 1837 and 1850 grew up all the most characteristic features of the American public-school system: from this time date state normal schools, city training schools, county and state institutes, teachers' associations, teachers' journals, the institution of city superintendencies, supervisory officers, and the development of state universities as the crown of the public-school system of the commonwealth. From this time date the striving for better schoolhouses and grounds, improved text-books, adequate material equipment in maps, globes, scientific apparatus, etc. As an outcome of the forces thus set in motion, democracy has in principle, subject to relative local restrictions, developed an organized machinery of public education. But when we turn to the aim and method which this magnificent institution serves, we find that our democracy is not yet conscious of the ethical principle upon which it rests – the responsibility and freedom of mind in discovery and proof – and consequently we find confusion where there should be order, darkness where there should be light. The teacher has not the power of initiation and constructive endeavor which is necessary to the fulfilment of the function of teaching. The learner finds conditions antagonistic (or at least lacking) to the development of individual mental power and to adequate responsibility for its use.

1. *As to the teacher.* – If there is a single public-school system in the United States where there is official and constitutional provision made for submitting questions of methods of discipline and teaching, and the questions of the curriculum, text-books, etc., to the discussion and decision of those actually engaged in the work of teaching, that fact has escaped my notice. Indeed, the opposite situation is so common that it seems, as a rule to be absolutely taken for granted as the normal and final condition of affairs. The number of persons to whom any other course has occurred as desirable, or even possible – to say nothing of necessary – is apparently very limited. But until the public-school system is organized in such a way that every teacher has some regular and representative way in which he or she can register judgment upon matters of educational importance, with the assurance that this judgment will somehow affect the school system, the assertion that the present system is not, from the internal standpoint, democratic seems to be justified. Either we come here upon some fixed and inherent limitation of the democratic principle, or else we find in this fact an obvious discrepancy between the conduct of the school and the conduct of social life – a discrepancy so great as to demand immediate and persistent effort at reform.

The more enlightened portions of the public have, indeed, become aware of one aspect of this discrepancy. Many reformers are contending

against the conditions which place the direction of school affairs, including the selection of text-books, etc., in the hands of a body of men who are outside the school system itself, who have not necessarily any expert knowledge of education and who are moved by non-educational motives. Unfortunately, those who have noted this undemocratic condition of affairs, and who have striven to change it, have, as a rule, conceived of but one remedy, namely, the transfer of authority to the school superintendent. In their zeal to place the center of gravity inside the school system, in their zeal to decrease the prerogatives of a non-expert school board, and to lessen the opportunities for corruption and private pull which go with that, they have tried to remedy one of the evils of democracy by adopting the principle of autocracy. For no matter how wise, expert, or benevolent the head of the school system, the one-man principle is autocracy.

The logic of the argument goes farther, very much farther, than the reformer of this type sees. The logic which commits him to the idea that the management of the school system must be in the hands of an expert commits him also to the idea that every member of the school system, from the first-grade teacher to the principal of the high school, must have some share in the exercise of educational power. The remedy is not to have one expert dictating educational methods and subject-matter to a body of passive, recipient teachers, but the adoption of intellectual initiative, discussion, and decision throughout the entire school corps. The remedy of the partial evils of democracy, the implication of the school system in municipal politics, is in appeal to a more thorough-going democracy.

The dictation, in theory at least, of the subject-matter to be taught, to the teacher who is to engage in the actual work of instruction, and frequently, under the name of close supervision, the attempt to determine the methods which are to be used in teaching, mean nothing more or less than the deliberate restriction of intelligence, the imprisoning of the spirit. Every well graded system of schools in this country rejoices in a course of study. It is no uncommon thing to find methods of teaching such subjects as reading, writing, spelling, and arithmetic officially laid down; outline topics in history and geography are provided ready-made for the teacher; gems of literature are fitted to the successive ages of boys and girls. Even the domain of art, songs and methods of singing, subject-matter and technique of drawing and painting, come within the region on which an outside authority lays its sacrilegious hands.

I have stated the theory, which is also true of the practice to a certain extent and in certain places. We may thank our heavens however, that the practice is rarely as bad as the theory would require. Superintendents

and principals often encourage individuality and thoughtfulness in the invention and adoption of methods of teaching; and they wink at departures from the printed manual of study. It remains true, however, that this great advance is personal and informal. It depends upon the wisdom and tact of the individual supervisory official; he may withdraw his concession at any moment; or it may be ruthlessly thrown aside by his successor who has formed a high ideal of "system."

I know it will be said that this state of things, while an evil, is a necessary one; that without it confusion and chaos would reign; that such regulations are the inevitable accompaniments of any graded system. It is said that the average teacher is incompetent to take any part in laying out the course of study or in initiating methods of instruction or discipline. Is not this the type of argument which has been used from time immemorial, and in every department of life, against the advance of democracy? What does democracy mean save that the individual is to have a share in determining the conditions and the aims of his own work; and that, upon the whole, through the free and mutual harmonizing of different individuals, the work of the world is better done than when planned, arranged, and directed by a few, no matter how wise or of how good intent that few? How can we justify our belief in the democratic principle else where, and then go back entirely upon it when we come to education?

Moreover, the argument proves too much. The more it is asserted that the existing corps of teachers is unfit to have voice in the settlement of important educational matters, and their unfitness to exercise intellectual initiative and to assume the responsibility for constructive work is emphasized, the more their guiding souls appears. If this body is so unfit, how can it be trusted to carry out the recommendations or the dictations of the wisest body of experts? If teachers are incapable of the intellectual responsibility which goes with the determination of the methods they are to use in teaching, how can they employ methods when dictated by others, in other than a mechanical, capricious, and clumsy manner? The argument, I say, proves too much.

Moreover, if the teaching force is as inept and unintelligent and irresponsible as the argument assumes, surely the primary problem is that of their improvement. Only by sharing in some responsible task does there come a fitness to share in it. The argument that we must wait until men and women are fully ready to assume intellectual and social responsibilities would have defeated every step in the democratic direction that has ever been taken. The prevalence of methods of authority and of external dictation and direction tends automatically to perpetuate the very conditions of inefficiency, lack of interest, inability

to assume positions of self-determination, which constitute the reasons that are depended upon to justify the régime of authority.

The system which makes no great demands upon originality, upon invention, upon the continuous expression of individuality, works automatically to put and to keep the more incompetent teachers in the school. It puts them there because, by a natural law of spiritual gravitation, the best minds are drawn to the places where they can work most effectively. The best minds are not especially like to be drawn where there is danger that they may have to submit to conditions which no self-respecting intelligence likes to put up with; and where their time and energy are likely to be so occupied with details of external conformity that they have no opportunity for free and full play of their own vigor.

I have dwelt at length upon the problem of the recognition of the intellectual and spiritual individuality of the teacher. I have but one excuse. All other reforms are conditioned upon reform in the quality and character of those who engage in the teaching profession. The doctrine of the man behind the gun has become familiar enough, in recent discussion, in every sphere of life. Just because education is the most personal, the most intimate, of all human affairs, there more than anywhere else, the sole ultimate reliance and final source of power are in the training, character, and intelligence of the individual. If any scheme could be devised which would draw to the calling of teaching persons of force of character, of sympathy with children, and consequent interest in the problems of teaching and of scholarship, no one need be troubled for a moment about other educational reforms, or the solution of other educational problems. But as long as a school organization which is undemocratic in principle tends to repel from all but the higher portions of the school system those of independent force, of intellectual initiative, and of inventive ability, or tends to hamper them in their work after they find their way into the schoolroom, so long all other reforms are compromised at their source and postponed indefinitely for fruition.

2. *As to the learner.* – The undemocratic suppression of the individuality of the teacher goes naturally with the improper restriction of the intelligence of the mind of the child. The mind, to be sure, is that of a child, and yet, after all, it is mind. To subject mind to an outside and ready-made material is a denial of the ideal of democracy, which roots itself ultimately in the principle of moral, self-directing individuality. Misunderstanding regarding the nature of the freedom that is demanded for the child is so common that it may be necessary to emphasize the fact that it is primarily intellectual freedom, free play of mental attitude, and operation which are sought. If individuality were simply a matter of feelings, impulses, and outward acts independent of intelligence, it

would be more than a dubious matter to urge a greater degree of freedom for the child in the school. In that case much, and almost exclusive, force would attach to the objections that the principle of individuality is realized in the more exaggerated parts of Rousseau's doctrines: sentimental idealization of the child's immaturity, irrational denial of superior worth in the knowledge and mature experience of the adult, deliberate denial of the worth of the ends and instruments embodied in social organization. Deification of childish whim, unripened fancy, and arbitrary emotion is certainly a piece of pure romanticism. The would-be reformers who emphasize out of due proportion and perspective these aspects of the principle of individualism betray their own cause. But the heart of the matter lies not there. Reform of education in the direction of greater play for the individuality of the child means the securing of conditions which will give outlet, and hence direction, to a growing intelligence. It is true that this freed power of mind with reference to its own further growth cannot be obtained without a certain leeway, a certain flexibility, in the expression of even immature feelings and fancies. But it is equally true that it is not a riotous loosening of these traits which is needed, but just that kind and degree of freedom from repression which are found to be necessary to secure the full operation of intelligence.

Now, no one need doubt as to what mental activity or the freed expression of intelligence means. No one need doubt as to the conditions which are conducive to it. We do not have to fall back upon what some regard as the uncertain, distracting, and even distressing voice of psychology. Scientific methods, the methods pursued by the scientific inquirer, give us an exact and concrete exhibition of the path which intelligence takes when working most efficiently, under most favorable conditions.

What is primarily required for that direct inquiry which constitutes the essence of science is first-hand experience; an active and vital participation through the medium of all the bodily organs with the means and materials of building up first-hand experience. Contrast this first and most fundamental of all the demands for an effective use of mind with what we find in so many of our elementary and high schools. There first-hand experience is at a discount; in its stead are summaries and formulas of the results of other people. Only very recently has any positive provision been made within the schoolroom for any of the modes of activity and for any of the equipment and arrangement which permit and require the extension of original experiences on the part of the child. The school has literally been dressed out with hand-me-down garments – with intellectual suits which other people have worn.

Secondly, in that freed activity of mind which we term "science" there

is always a certain problem which focusses effort, which controls the collecting of facts that bear upon the question, the use of observation to get further data, the employing of memory to supply relevant facts, the calling into play of imagination, to yield fertile suggestion and construct possible solutions of the difficulty.

Turning to the school, we find too largely no counterpart to this activity. Just because a second-handed material has been supplied wholesale and retail, but anyway ready-made, the tendency is to reduce the activity of mind to a docile or passive taking in of the material presented – in short, to memorizing, with simply incidental use of judgment and of active research. As is frequently stated, acquiring takes the place of inquiring. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the sort of mind-activity which is encouraged in the school is a survival from the days in which science had not made much headway; when education was mainly concerned with learning, that is to say, the preservation and handing down of the acquisitions of the past. It is true that more and more appeal is made every day in schools to judgment, reasoning, personal efficiency, and the calling up of personal, as distinct from merely book, experiences. But we have not yet got to the point of reversing the total method. The burden and the stress still fall upon learning in the sense of becoming possessed of the second-hand and ready-made material referred to. As Mrs. Young has recently said, the prevailing ideal is a perfect recitation, an exhibition without mistake, of a lesson learned. Until the emphasis changes to the conditions which make it necessary for the child to take an active share in the personal building up of his own problems and to participate in methods of solving them (even at the expense of experimental and error), mind is not really freed.

In our schools we have freed individuality in many modes of outer expression without freeing intelligence, which is the vital spring and guarantee of all of these expressions. Consequently we give opportunity to the unconverted to point the finger of scorn, and to clamor for a return to the good old days when the teacher, the representative of social and moral authority, was securely seated in the high places of the school. But the remedy here, as in other phases of our social democracy, is not to turn back, but to go farther – to carry the evolution of the school to a point where it becomes a place for getting and testing experience, as real and adequate to the child upon his existing level as all the resources of laboratory and library afford to the scientific man upon his level. What is needed is not any radical revolution, but rather an organization of agencies already found in the schools. It is hardly too much to say that not a single subject or instrumentality is required which is not already found in many schools of the country. All that is

required is to gather these materials and forces together and unify their operation. Too often they are used for a multitude of diverse and often conflicting aims. If a single purpose is provided, that of freeing the processes of mental growth, these agencies will at once fall into their proper classes and reinforce each other.

A catalogue of the agencies already available would include at least all of the following: Taking the child out of doors, widening and organizing his experience with reference to the world in which he lives; nature study when pursued as a vital observation of forces working under their natural conditions, plants and animals growing in their own homes, instead of mere discussion of dead specimens. We have also school gardens, the introduction of elementary agriculture, and more especially of horticulture – a movement that is already making great head-way in many of the western states. We have also means for the sake of studying physiographic conditions, such as may be found by rivers, ponds or lakes, beaches, quarries, gulleys, hills, etc.

As similar agencies within the school walls, we find a very great variety of instruments for constructive work, or, as it is frequently, but somewhat unfortunately termed, “manual training.” Under this head come cooking, which can be begun in its simpler form in the kindergarten; sewing, and what is of even greater educational value, weaving, including designing and the construction of simple apparatus for carrying on various processes of spinning, etc. Then there are also the various forms of tool-work directed upon cardboard, wood, and iron; in addition there are clay-modeling and a variety of ways of manipulating plastic material to gain power and larger experience.

Such matters pass readily over into the simpler forms of scientific experimentation. Every schoolroom from the lowest primary grade up should be supplied with gas, water, certain chemical substances and reagents. To experiment in the sense of trying things or to see what will happen is the most natural business of the child; it is, indeed, his chief concern. It is one which has largely either ignored or actually suppressed, so that it has been forced to find outlet in mischief or even in actually destructive ways. This tendency could find outlet in the construction of simple apparatus and the making of simple tests, leading constantly into more and more controlled experimentation, with greater insistence upon definiteness of intellectual result and control of logical process.

Add to these three typical modes of active experimenting, various forms of art expression, beginning with music, clay-modeling, and story-telling as foundation elements, and passing on to drawing, painting, designing in various mediums, we have a range of forces and materials which connect at every point with the child's natural needs and powers,

and which supply the requisites for building up his experience upon all sides. As fast as these various agencies find their way into the schools, the center of gravity shifts, the régime changes from one of subjection of mind to an external and ready-made material, into the activity of mind directed upon the control of the subject-matter and thereby its own upbuilding.

Politically we have found that this country could not endure half free and half slave. We shall find equally great difficulty in encouraging freedom, independence, and initiative in every sphere of social life, while perpetuating in the school dependence upon external authority. The forces of social life are already encroaching upon the school institutions which we have inherited from the past, so that many of its main stays are crumbling. Unless the outcome is to be chaotic, we must take hold of the organic, positive principle involved in democracy, and put that in entire possession of the spirit and work of the school.

In education meet the three most powerful motives of human activity. Here are found sympathy and affection, the going out of the emotions to the most appealing and the most rewarding object of love – a little child. Here is found also the flowering of the social and institutional motive, interest in the welfare of society and in its progress and reform by the surest and shortest means. Here, too, is found the intellectual and scientific motive, the interest in knowledge, in scholarship, in truth for its own sake, unhampered and unmixed with any alien ideal. Copartnership of these three motives – of affection, of social growth, and of scientific inquiry – must prove as nearly irresistible as anything human when they are once united. And, above all else, recognition of the spiritual basis of democracy, the efficacy and responsibility of freed intelligence, is necessary to secure this union.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Ella Flagg Young. "The Philosophy of Education, 1895-1902. John Dewey." Chap. 5 of *Some Types of Modern Education Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902), pp. 53-67.

There is a typewritten edition of Mr. Dewey's lectures presenting his philosophy of education, but that text is not in the hands of the public, and therefore is not available as the basis of this study. There are, however, books and many articles which have appeared in journals and magazines, and these furnish a rich mine in which to delve; but so difficult is it for readers to consult a large magazine list that only a small part¹ of the varied material at hand will be used. That selected small part contains, however, the essentials which determine Mr. Dewey's philosophy of education and make it typical of the modern movement which endeavors to found educational theory and practice on those vital functions of feeling, thought, and activity which make the life of the individual and of the race one of growth, of development. This, however, does not mean that the modern movement is destructive of all that is old in education. "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, and eternal care and nurture are the price of maintaining the precious conquest of the past - of preventing a relapse into Philistinism, that combination of superficial enlightenment and dogmatic crudity. If it were not for the work of an aristocracy of the past, there would be but little worth conferring upon the democracy of today."²

In taking a general view of Mr. Dewey's attitude toward the subject of education, one is impressed from the outset with the fact that nothing is presented in an isolated, unrelated condition; that everything is viewed as one of a great complex of forces. But the investigation of the laws of the complexity which is called life is not begun in a hit-or-miss fashion; the attitude and the approach toward the subject of inquiry are those of the modern scientist. Instead of drawing up a scheme, a theory, to which

¹ *The School and Society*; "The Interpretation Side of Child Study," *Transactions of the Illinois Society for Child Study*, vol. II, No. 2; "Principles of Mental Development as Illustrated in Early Infancy," *ibid.*, Vol. IV, No. 3; "Interest as Related to Will," *Herbartian Yearbook*, 1895, 2d supplement; *Elementary School Record*.

² "Current Problems in Secondary Education," *School Review*, January, 1902.

all facts and conditions in school life must conform, he seeks a working hypothesis and tests it by its efficiency in explaining the familiar and the unexpected which are projected into the foreground of the field of observation and practice in which the teacher operates. The hypothesis gives a method of investigation, not a fixed ideal.

An illustration of the working hypothesis as a means to the control of forces, a control which has made the past century famous in the history of invention might make the above clearer: The invention of the means of protection against lightning did very little toward recognizing the possibilities of electricity as a great social force. Although new inventions did follow the invention of the lightning rod, yet the wave that has within fifty years changed the habits and customs of modern domestic and commercial life by the introduction of the telegraph, the telephone, the automatic fire-alarm, the electric bell, the electric lamp, the electric motor, the electric furnace, and the wireless telegraph, did not appear until the scientist began working upon the hypothesis that electricity is a mighty force which might be made an agent of great practical and social value. When electricity acts in an unexpected way in a new type of machine, the hypothesis sets the minds of inventors at work devising means whereby this new feature in the force may be made to serve, not to destroy, the new invention which might be an aid to the comfort and progress of humanity. It would help to clarify thought on educational theory and practice if we should come to a realization of the value of the working hypothesis as exemplified in the hypothesis of evolution, the conservation of energy, the undulatory movement of light, and others with which man has organized the world of nature as his aid in his world of thought and action

In taking up his investigation, Mr. Dewey has back of this particular inquiry the fruits of his research and thought on the all-comprehensive question of philosophy: What is the *meaning* of life? Not life here only, nor life hereafter; not organic life only, nor mental life; but life as presented in all phases of existence in the universe as known to man, is the something whose meaning is sought by philosophy. To narrow this question to a special subject, and ask what is the *life-process* of a soul, is for the time being to place the question of education in the field of that science whose particular problem is mental development – psychology. As life is treated in Mr. Dewey's psychology from the functional standpoint, his hypothesis, as one has a right to expect, is based on some form of continuous activity that works for a definite end, develops because of its striving, and stands also for the method or way in which power is developed in other modes of mental functioning.

In the study of the phenomena of infant life Mr. Dewey states his working hypothesis as follows: "The principle of co-ordination or

sensori-motor action supplies us with a centralizing principle – a principle which can be employed equally on the physiological and the psychological side.”³

Although the principle of co-ordination is freely referred to in the discussions of teachers, yet in the common conception of the term “co-ordination” or “sensori-motor action” there is lacking one point which is fundamental in Mr. Dewey’s conception. In the common conception, “the sensory stimulus is one thing, the central activity, standing for the idea, is another thing, and the motor discharge, standing for the act proper, is a third.” To illustrate: High C is sounded on a piano as the initial tone in a piece which you are about to sing. In accordance with the conception stated, the sensation of sound is a stimulus which is made over by the central activity into an idea and is discharged by the vocal apparatus as high C. Now, if you will attend to your conduct in co-ordinating your hearing and singing sensations, you will see that from *ear* and *vocal apparatus* there are sensations to which you attend, and when you have co-ordinated these two sets of sensations with the birth of the child as “it comes into the world with a *tendency* to see, hear, reach, grasp, strike, and so on, but with a ready-made ability to do none of these things;” he works from the tendency condition; through the independent development of eye co-ordination, ear co-ordination; through the development of larger co-ordinations which involve the establishment of relations between the earlier independent co-ordinations; through the dawning of intelligence when cross-reference is made between the established co-ordinations; through the experimental adjustments to the intentional adjustments of movements to gain experience; to the development of the image, the mental construction, and the co-ordination of the present with the past which culminates in the beginnings of language. The reconstruction of the adjustments made, the organization of the different co-ordinations – the seeing, the hearing, the touching, the moving – by the infant working in its environment, are necessarily reviewed here because of the hypothesis on which the philosophy rests. In this study of the first year in the life of the human being there are implied those conditions on the mental side which obtain so long as his education continues. In its broad sense, education continues so long as readjustments are made to the environment, physical and social.

There is a most important element in this conception of growth that deserves special attention. The non-recognition of it is the greatest weakness in present-day educational theory. It is the return of the circular activity into the impulse in which it originated, and the four

³ “Principles of Mental Development as Illustrated in Early Infancy.”

effects resulting from this return: (1) an interpretation of the impulse as to its meaning and its worth; (2) an increasing definiteness of the impulse in its aim; (3) a greater certainty in its expression ; (4) a development of its activity into a habit whose flexibility partakes of the nature of intelligence. Here is a crude suggestion as to the above: A person has an impulse to swing something, an Indian club. If, after he strives to co-ordinate his arm, wrist, and hand muscles with his image of the club swinging gracefully, easily, and forcefully, when he rejoices over the gratification of his impulse, he evaluates the impulse in terms of his arm, wrist, and hand muscular possibilities; he feels more definitely what it can do; he knows more certainly in what way the impulse will work out; he repeats the swinging from time to time, realizing that he is nearer and nearer to a developing of the swinging habit as one means of command of the marvelous God-given instrumentality through which he works – the body. This also illustrates the idea of technique. The development of the recognition by the mind of difficulties which are subject to control through a knowledge of ways of manipulating material makes technique something more than the mere expression of the image; it is also the beginning of the idealization of the material and the body as the tools or means of attaining a distant and at first somewhat indefinite aim.

The discussion of attention is different from that given by other writers on education, but it is in harmony with the psychologic theory under consideration. Reflective attention is treated as a marked intellectual advance, not because of the development of the power to make one's self follow the questions raised by another, but because of the acquirement of the ability, not only to raise problems, but to raise problems requiring power to hold them, to deliberate, to reason upon them, to seek material that is relevant, so that it, attention, becomes a "habit of considering problems."⁴

The principle on the psychologic side which runs all through this theory – the principle of growth through the evolution of a complexity in the aim that is set by the mind itself, and also a certainty in the control of means by the mind because of the return of the movement by which technique is developed – finally is tersely expressed in a discussion on the training of the will: "Any way we take it, there is only person – man or child – at the bottom of it all, and whatever really trains that person, *which brings order and power, initiative, and intelligence into his experience, is most certainly training the will.*"⁵

In all of Mr. Dewey's writings on education two factors are implied in

⁴ *Elementary School Record*, No. 4.

⁵ *Interest in Relation to the Will.*

the evolution of the life-process of a soul: "Individuals physiologically and psychologically capable of education; social habits and ideals whose application to the individual constitutes the process of education." This makes the vital functions of feeling, thought, and activity by means of which the race has wrought and developed in its environment, and through which the child today lives and moves and has its being in the occupations in its environment – the home and the neighborhood – the second of the two factors, and furnishes the material for work in the school.

The subject-matter of the course of study necessary in a theory which makes growth of mind synonymous with power to command the situation, must be subjected to as rigid an analysis, and must finally in its content be as true to life, as the psychologic strand which we have just been considering; hence, while the material used in the school would be such as to give the stimulating environment, it would be impossible at the same time to make it so profuse as to overload rather than give play to powers. This study of the way in which the child gets command of himself is carried over into the question of his relation early in life to society: We do not and cannot know what a child's life will be, either industrially or in its social quality. To attempt to educate him upon the basis of custom means to educate him for the present, and then when the future comes upon him leave him either stranded or wrecked. The only way to educate him for the flexible future is to give him the utmost command of himself and of the methods of civilization. Only, in other words, by giving the child command of himself now, and by giving him command of that self through the command of the fullest, most complete existing tools by which civilization makes progress, can we prepare the child for his future place, his future work.⁶

The idea of continuity in mental growth through a developing rather than a completed subject of study is brought out very fully in the argument for occupations: "An occupation is of necessity a continuous thing. It lasts, not only for days, but for months and years; it represents, not a storing of isolated and superficial energies, but rather a steady and continuous organization of power along certain general lines. The occupations articulate the vast variety of impulses otherwise separate and spasmodic into a consistent skeleton, into a firm backbone."⁷

The qualifications and method of the teacher are very closely connected with the subject-matter. The teacher must have such an insight into and command of the subject that it would be impossible to prepare lessons which would be presented to the children. The emphasis

⁶ *The Interpretation Side of Child Study.*

⁷ *Elementary School Record*, No. 3.

that is so generally laid upon the presentation of a carefully planned lesson distracts attention from the necessity for that knowledge of the subject which can be attained by thorough and careful investigation only. As to the method of the teacher, that involves both the command of the content of the subject and a psychologic insight into the stimulation and response of subject-matter and child-mind; equipped in both of these lines teachers could not revel, as many do, in making a sharp distinction between the form and content values of a subject. Form and content are only "an adjustment of means involved in social action and a reference to the realized ends."

The community ideal which is worked out in *School and Society* does not posit an organization of which the children are definitely conscious. Subject-matter is dealt with in a way which necessitates a harmonious working together of teacher and children, so that the community idea is developed through the exigencies of the school work. The children are members or citizens in the community because the method of work obliges them to be citizens; there is not consciously first the community, then citizens, and then work as citizens; but there is work, community of work involving rights and duties in the community. Through the forms of active occupation, "the school has a chance to affiliate itself with life, to become the child's habitat, where he learns through living."⁸

Life is the subject with which this philosophy of education is concerned. Its every principle rests upon the truth that out of the *life of today* develop the weakness and ugliness, or the strength and beauty, of the *life of tomorrow*; that the life of the child in its own time and strength is the hope and promise of the life of the adult; that a growing sense of the worth of his own feelings, thoughts, and deeds is always back of the individual's appreciation of the feelings, thoughts, and activities of others; that this appreciation is developed as his relationship to others and that of others to him is made more true to life – and in this appreciation is the hope and promise of the life of society.

⁸ *The School and Society.*

SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN EDUCATION

Ella Flagg Young. "Scientific Method in Education," in *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, First Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), vol. 3, part 2, pp. 141–55.

Science cannot complain of neglect by modern society. Her methods, her discoveries, her inventions, are greeted with appreciative applause. Even her terminology, technical and complicated as it may be, is rapidly absorbed into the popular phraseology of the day. In truth, scientific terms often supply for many a speaker, befogged in his own rhetoric, a happy explanation of the complex and problematical, and a short cut to the conclusion of a controversy. This ready use of the language of science is not, however, all gain, for the very ease with which scientific terms are made to do service helps obscure those implications which are vital to the subject.

So rapidly do new terms crystallize into symbols for that which is explicit only, that the implicit elements soon cease to be included in the meaning of the symbols. In this tendency toward a limitation of the meaning of a comprehensive term, a remarkable retroaction sets in; for that which is ignored because not expressed, there is substituted a phase of traditional belief which the new, rightly understood, negates. This substitution is well illustrated in the application of the theory of evolution. That great theory of life implies more than mere continuity or succession – something like growth or definite change from form to form under the action of immutable laws¹ – "laws of nature." The ideas involved in the term the "laws of nature" have not received the attention and thought which would give to the popular mind a comprehension of their full significance; but the change which may be effected in opposition to conditions which would obtain if the species were immutable is accepted as possible and supposed to include the natural forces acting in inducing modification. Having ejected immutable from the conception of species, the ready recipient of new scientific terms rushes on to the conclusion that nothing in the being is immutable, hence the immutability is in an external force. The result is a re-estab-

¹ Wallace, "Evolution," *The Progress of the Century*, p. 4.

lishment of the conception of external causation, and a change induced by an external force.

It would be a delicate task to attempt a comparison of the retarding influence of opposition to the acceptance of a great theory of life, and the reactionary tendency in a ready acceptance based on a misconception of those conditions which are implied. Tradition is an effective factor in making human society stable. It is active in both attitudes toward the new, but with this difference: in that of opposition, it is a recognized authority; in that of ready acceptance, it is an unseen power supposed to be deposed when in reality it is merely in a new dress.

Few minds are competent to weigh the meaning of that which has been handed down with the meaning of that which is animated by the new spirit. The incompetency lies not so much in the inability to note the facts involved as in the lack of scientific method in interpreting the underlying principles. The failure to search for and find an hypothesis that makes the life-process basic results in long-continued efforts to include the traditional in the new theory, for tradition deals with facts, not with principles. Pressed for an explanation of the significance of evolution, the advocate who accepts facts without searching for the underlying law falls back upon Darwin's *Descent of Man*, gathering it up in three words: monkey, evolution, man. There is the poor monkey, then the law of evolution seizing him and molding him whether he will or no, and at last man, the outcome of that mighty force working on monkey. It is this reduction of the history of man to that of a unit of a given type, acted upon by an external force and transformed into a new type that gives rise to the question, Why do not monkeys continue to become men? The effective force is to the popular mind very like the jackknife in the transformation of a goose-quill into a pen.

Juggling with theories which have been so long accepted as to take on the authority of established truth is not peculiar to the popular mind. Philosophers and scientists have through like confusion retarded the advance of new ideas. It is not, therefore, strange that teachers and writers on education have halted on the same plane with them, and defined the new in scientific terms freshly coined but with the old significations embodied therein.

It is needless to state that the misconception of evolution which established external causation in full control of the monkey has been equally active in the generally accepted theories of the education of the human being. Naturally, it was agreed that the force which was effective in the evolution of the species must be effective in the development of the individual. That is sound doctrine, but when its advocates proceed to interpret without investigating, to rehabilitate old notions which the

investigation would show hostile to the new, the soundness counts for little in the outcome. Although "development" is a word to conjure with in educational circles, the men and women who use it substitute, as a rule, external causation for the law of nature; and change induced by action of the external power, for growth through the activity of nature working in accord with its unchanging law.

The great advance of science which has brought the modern world to her feet, has been due to a habit of mind that subjects all facts to an impartial, sympathetic investigation called scientific. The attitude of the scientist is that of the intelligent seeker after truth. This attitude cannot be taken by one whose premises are false, or whose conclusions are biased by individual likes and dislikes. Scientific method is the method, the attitude of mind, that makes a search for the principle under which facts observed may be explained in their relations and made significant. The principle or "natural law" sought is a statement or formulation worked out by the scientific imagination in getting at the relations and meanings of conditions and sequences observed. It is a law controlling the procedure of the investigator and the practitioner. "We should hold fast to it until either the results to which it leads and verbal language, art and utilitarian productions through which the self-active being makes itself known to the world. It is by observation of the second, the objective, sequences that the desired information about the subjective sequences of another being is obtained. The scientific imagination can get at the relations and meanings of the subjective data, in so far as it interprets and unifies the objective in a coherent whole.

To this position, as indicative of a demand for a knowledge of psychology on the part of every teacher some psychologists would seem to take exception; but a careful reading of all they have written on the question shows them fearful that the machines of the experimental-psychological laboratory may become a part of the equipment of the schoolroom, and the theories of the speculating psychologist be incorporated in the educational theory of the teacher of boys and girls.² I know of no psychologist of recognized standing who dissents from the opinion that there are some psychological conceptions which should be a part of the mental equipment of the teacher.³ In all walks and stations in social life we meet persons not supposed to have either a well-developed scientific imagination or an interest in the conceptions of psychology, and yet who evidence the possession in a high degree of the power of observation of the objective signs, and of interpretation of the subjective data from which their significance is derived; and also a scientific imagination

² Münsterberg, *Psychology and Education, Psychology and Life*.

³ James, *Talks to Teachers*, I.

which evaluates and unifies the activities of the person observed. The expressions in which they sum up their failure to construct a satisfying, coherent being behind the mental phenomena are familiar – “I can’t understand him; his ways are too much for me;” “I can explain to my satisfaction everything she has done thus far, but I have no idea as to what she will do next.” These homely remarks are repeated, to remind the reader of the almost general possession of the gift to read the meanings of the acts of others and to project their future acts.

It must be conceded, however, that in observation of the development of mind there is not so general power. It is possible that the doctrine of original sin has made it more difficult to grasp the idea of development as a growth of inherent tendencies in the case of man than in the case of animals and plants. Many approach the study of a developing mind with the accepted formula that it is by inhibition of its natural tendencies and the substitution of other modes of activity that mind grows. No one would attempt to repress the action of the law of its nature in a kitten or a hyacinth bulb and expect a normal cat or plant. As one’s conception of the native equipment of the human being, and the development of the impulses⁴ and instinctive tendencies becomes clear and definite, there is a comprehension of the idea of the order of growth in power within the subjective sequences.

In educational method there is a common mistake which originates in the perception that the fact or perceptual phase of an object or action is more apparent to a child than is the truth or conceptual phase. The resulting mistake lies in the teaching of children in the kindergarten and the primary grades as if the percept were developed in advance of the concept. If the method were psychologic in its premises a conception of the development of the percept and concept together would be active instead of the perception only. Reflection on Baldwin’s second element in attention⁵ shows easily the beginnings of conceptual activity in the earliest movements of mind.

Educational method has ever recognized attention as the cardinal virtue in the school. It has not, however, defined it as “a function of organization, a function which grows with the growth of knowledge, reflects the state of knowledge, holds in its own integrity the system of data already organized in experience.”⁶ It has defined attention as concentration only, and that as concentration *upon* a presentation rather than concentration *of* the selected data of the presentation and the data of experience. It has been so oblivious to the unifying activity of

⁴ Dewey, *The Study of Ethics*, chap. iii, secs. ix–xii.

⁵ Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, chap. xi, sec. 2.

⁶ Idem, *Development and Evolution*, p. 252.

attention as to suggest among “exercises for the culture of attention: spelling, by having each child in succession name one letter of the word; pronouncing sentences or lists of unrelated words, and having children reproduce them orally and in writing.”⁷ The narrow idea of attention embodied in the “suggestions” brings forward the cause of more than half the dulness and inability in children to understand the subject of the recitation; it is the non-recognition of the difference in the dominant types of imagery in children who are of a different type from that provided for by the author of the method, or that of the teacher. This, however, is not the place for an exposition of the specific lines in which educational methods have failed because of their narrow range and unscientific attitude.

Educational method to be of worth should be scientific method applied to the art of teaching. The method of the teacher is simply an attitude of mind like that of the scientist. There are two elements involved, the learning mind and the subject-matter or environment. To have an intimate acquaintance with each, to appreciate the expectant longing of mind, to interpret its responses to stimuli, to form valid conceptions of the activity and assimilating power of each child in the environment made by the subject, is to have a method in teaching which covers the entire range of that great art. It is to have the method of science applied to education. This means that the teacher should have *a* method applicable to every subject, in every division of the school beginning with the kindergarten and extending through the graduate school. A distinct method for every subject is not necessary any more than a special scientific method for each branch of science would be necessary. Whatever be the subject one is teaching the aim is identical with that of all other subject taught: to determine how mind is working with the material in its environment, what nourishment it is selecting and assimilating.

The two elements involved cannot be passed by with so slight attention as is given by specifying them as children and subject-matter. To teach children necessitates a knowledge of the method of mind, the laws of mental activity which are invariable in normal beings – but there is no word which the modern teacher in the elementary school fears more than law thus applied. This fear rests largely upon the interpretation given the meaning of natural law. With a vivid recollection of the logical method of the schools in the past, a method which imposed upon the child and the student the summing up of the adult’s conclusions, it has come about that law of mind refers to this logical order, that is, that the term is used in the juridical sense. Because there has been a misun-

⁷ *Systematic Methodology*, p. 95.

derstanding about the meaning of the law of the mental life or of mental activity, it does not follow that we must be so restricted as to forego forever the use of the word as well as ignore the idea for which it stands. We might illustrate this in the formation of habit: If children try to form certain habits because of a feeling of obligation which has been reasoned out – possibly on the ground that it is their duty to get from the teacher all they can because their parents are trying to give them an education, or because the teacher is put over them and therefore is superior to them – then attention to the formation of habits is the result of obedience to parental or school law. On the other hand, if the material which they have in mind and their interests cause them to attend to the various stimuli coming from the object, and repeat the responses until they are easy, automatic, then the children are following the law of their being and the attention is given and the habit formed because of obedience to natural law. Only a Rousseau would say that because the principle of habit has been, and still is, generally misunderstood as regards its mode of action, mind should be developed without acquiring habits.

The teacher with the grasp of the subject-matter and a knowledge of the laws that underlie mental activity and growth has, as has been suggested before, this end in view: to keep track of the way in which the different minds in the class act upon the stimuli presented. If images and ideas germane to the subject, but not necessarily involved in the perceptions which mind constructs at the first blush, are not projected by the motor activity of attention into the stream of consciousness, then the teacher knows that the stimuli are not stimulating, or that old presentations did not become a part of the capital of the children. Much has been written on the subject of the value of educational psychology to the teacher of mathematics, reading, history, or languages, both pro and con. Great emphasis has been thrown upon the merits of the born teacher, and very properly too. Speaking from the standpoint of the science of education, the born teacher is one who has an inherent tendency to observe and interpret the activity of mind in the early stages of its growth. This inherent tendency gives command of a large amount of unclassified data, just as the interest of the child in animals or plants gives an absolutely necessary accumulation of material with which to proceed in the study of pure science, the pure science of botany or zoology. As one does not become a botanist or zoologist by beginning with the principles and data of pure science, so one cannot understand the life-process of the soul if there be no original observation of the activity of mind preceding the study of psychology. As in the other sciences, the purely scientific study must be followed by a return to such material as formed the basis of observation and experience in the first stage, so in psychology the applied science must follow the pure science.

In the study of psychology the teacher must go through three stages: first, the observational and introspective; second, the purely scientific and experimental; third, the applied, which is generally termed educational psychology. He does not go through the third, he enters into it. Unfortunately, many who have passed through the first two stages, although they are teachers, do not advance into the third. The majority try to pass from the first to the third, omitting the second. It is the failure of the first class to pass into the third stage and the omission of the second stage by the second class that lie at the bottom of the mistaken reasoning of both classes concerning the methods of the primary grades. It is not difficult for one with an agreeable personality to command the attention of children between the ages of five and ten years by means of a stimulus emanating from that agreeable personality; this possibility has developed a method which might be termed the kindergarten and primary method. It gives certain uniform results without friction.

It is not uncommon to hear the philosophical psychologist who lacks a thoroughgoing acquaintance with educational psychology say that the primary grades are taught intelligently and successfully, but the grammar grades are not taught satisfactorily. It is not unusual to hear the teacher of young children, the teacher destitute of the knowledge of the pure science of psychology, say that she loves to teach young children, that they learn so much more easily when in the primary grades of work than in the grammar grades.

A supervising teacher of drawing in a system of city schools expressed himself very forcibly one day to the principal of one of the large grammar schools in that city. They had both been in one of the primary rooms of the principal's school. Upon leaving the room the supervisor said: "I cannot understand your tolerating such mediocre work in the lower grades when you have such superior work in the upper grades." The principal replied by asking which the supervisor considered the best grade in that school. The supervisor answered: "The eighth is the best," and added: "As regards merit, the work goes down hill in regular order from the eighth to the first." The principal then said: "Supposing you reverse your statement and begin by mentioning the poorest grade, will you then say the poorest is the first or lowest, and the grades improve in regular order as they ascend from the lowest to the highest?" The supervisor, after glowering for a few moments in thought, said: "Yes, I should be willing to say that but it indicates a wrong condition; the work should be excellent all along the line." The principal assented, adding, "provided the standard of excellence for each grade is correct." Later on the principal said: "I wish you would think of the four best primary departments in drawing that you supervise." After a few moments the

supervisor said: "I have them in mind." The principal then remarked: "I will tell you something about the grammar departments in those four schools; not one of them ranks among your fifteen best grammar departments." The supervisor was indignant, and accused the principal of having listened to gossip about the work of the drawing department. The principal said: "I do not know which schools you have in mind. I base my statement on an understanding of educational method. If those children we saw in the lower room had been indifferent, unresponsive to the material supplied by the teacher, I should say they were not growing mentally in that environment. If the teacher had dictated the drawing of the lines so that their seeing was largely auditory, or if she had drawn for them so that their seeing was largely through her eyes, even though the results had been excellent reproductions, I should say that the natural law of mental development was unknown to her, and that the children were not doing good work. As it was, each child was intent on seeing for himself the group of objects and producing on paper a sketch of what he saw. The teacher was working on the evidences which each child gave of his seeing power, and of his power to co-ordinate the eye and the hand, the image and its expression. Judged by my standard the work was excellent; the dictation for each child was from within; the criticism was based on the understanding by the teacher of the within activity, as shown by the drawing. Judged by your standard it was a failure; the results should have been strikingly uniform, and more like those of advanced pupils; but the insurmountable difficulty in that kind of work is the exorbitant price paid by the children for their early acquisition for that which would gratify your and their teacher's vanity. The plasticity of the nervous system, a distinguishing characteristic of the human being, is ignored, and humanity is reduced to the level of the bee and the bird with their equipment of instincts."

In this explanation was an interpretation of the meaning of development in harmony with the idea of law in evolution. The terms were (a) children equipped with impulses to act on stimuli in their physical and social environments, (b) the inherent impulses and tendencies of each child working on an environment which necessitated refining and defining the tendencies; (c) children growing in command of themselves and their environment. The law of nature was understood as originating in the spontaneity of each child, and the activity a resulting in something stronger and better than that which acted at the beginning, and which was an enlargement of experience.

Knowledge of the individual is not based on those data alone which are obtained by study of him at the beginning and end of a given series of acts. There are other data: the images and general notions which work in the process of thought, their clearness, their growth in

complexity; the habit of mind, its quality, that is, its rigidity or its flexibility; the attention, the way in which it moves as it searches for and combines facts; the judgment, its dependence or independence. The first element, the children, necessitates a readiness on the part of the teacher in interpreting the contents of mind, clear vision as to their method, and a sympathetic understanding of general conditions which are indicated not only by language expression, but also by bodily expression. For the parent this may be enough of the psychological element, but for the teacher there must be the scientist's acquaintance with the life-process of the human being. This is necessary for a classification of data in accord with the principle of growth.

The second element involved in teaching is the subject-matter. There should be an acquaintance with this which has been obtained by the psychologic method, that is, through investigation, through observation of sequences, and also by the logical⁸ method, that is, through making conscious standards, or norms, of the ends toward which the psychological material points. The two aspects of a subject gained by these two lines of approach put a person in command of what may be called the method of the subject.

It is safe to say that since the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, every subject within the wide domain of knowledge has been reviewed and revised from a new standpoint, and presented anew to the world. Foremost in this new approach to science, art, and literature, is the effort to co-ordinate the development of the science, the theory, or the art with the evolution of the race. The fact that one is not considered a scholar in his chosen subject unless he knows something about the beginnings of the attack of the human mind upon it, and can trace the gradual rise of the race in acquaintance with it and control of it, shows easily how much broader and better fitted is the scholar of today to teach his subject than was the scholar of yesterday. One of the causes of surprise among the unscholarly is the simplicity with which the erudite man talks upon his speciality; it is he that knows only a limited section of his subject who is restricted to the technical vocabulary and the single point of view. The simplicity of the scholar's standpoint indicates the necessity for a broad scholarship on the part of the teacher. Unless the teacher knows the progressive growth of the subject-matter, it is impossible that the material with which he deals in the recitation shall be the images and ideas of the members of the class.

The assertion is made sometimes, that the theory of evolution naturally and rightly throws the emphasis upon method rather than upon fact. Undoubtedly in former times too great stress was laid on fact.

⁸ Dewey, unpublished lectures on logic.

To differentiate method and fact so that the emphasis shall be thrown upon either, to the neglect of the other, is to continue the errors of the past. It is highly probable that writers on evolution who assert that the significant question is one of method rather than fact do not mean to separate, to divorce, the two; but, having made the positive assertion, they force themselves to desert the post of the scientist. The same may be said of teachers and writers on education who say the significant question in education is how children learn and not what they learn. If mind learns the new by the functioning of that which it has learned before then it must be most important that the old be not only true, but have a working, a functioning, value also. One who says the aim of the teacher is to discover the method of the growing mind, must make the explanation that the material and its assimilation in the past are always indicated in the attack at the present moment; this shows the fact side of the lesson to be as important as the method side. On the other hand, that idea of educational method which would make the material of the teacher the perceptions, images, concepts, and judgments of the learner would require so intimate an acquaintance with the subject-matter as to make unconscious a close following of its development.⁹ It is generally dangerous to make use of analogies between the mind and the body, yet it is safe here to parallel the two. No one would be so rash as to claim that it makes no difference what food a child has, that the only question is how does its stomach attack the food. If the digestive apparatus that once functioned well becomes unable to make the food into chyme, chyle, and blood, we know that the food in the past has not contained elements nutritious for that child.

There are other directions in which evolution has contributed toward a higher ideal of education than in the one of method. When the theory was first offered to the reading public many feared it as an attack upon religion; its entrance into the field of education was neither feared nor desired. As was pointed out in the beginning of this paper, the import of the term was generally accepted by teachers as mechanical change, not as change resulting from the law of being. Slowly but surely the appreciation of natural law as the activity of the inherent tendencies has wrought a marked change in the school in the interpretation of the relation between man and nature. They are no longer treated as opposing forces. They are seen as two activities in the dynamic process of the unity called the world. It is but a short step from a conception of man and nature as parts of the same system, to a conception of the relation between mind and body. The generalizations of the evolutionist are proving efficient forces in educational theory. They are more stimu-

⁹ Tompkins, *Philosophy of Teaching*, pp. 5-7.

lating to teachers when they form the material with which the educational thinker reaches the conclusions which he formulates in his particular subject. The return to old methods of instruction and school management, the repudiation of the theories which have issued from the investigations of biologists and psychologists have sometimes indicated that the theories have been found wanting because of the readiness with which they were constructed from a few facts. A higher degree of sensitiveness to new facts must mark the teacher if educational method is ever to have that flexibility and constant approach to truth that characterize scientific method. The rapidity with which the conceptions of a great mind are crystallized in educational formulæ by those who accept the gospel as presented by the larger mind indicates the failure to be on the alert for facts that cannot be explained under the law as interpreted. Fluidity of mind does not mean a constant change in mental movement; it means a playing about and around everything that is involved in or is germane to the particular subject of thought. With an enlarged perception of the relation of mind and body the idea of the primary activities has undergone a great change. The conception of habit as an established way of doing something that is of use, not because it is established permanently, but because it will be useful in the effort to do new things, necessitates a right-about-face in what is called the training of children.

Helpful as is a conception of the dynamic relations between mind and body in the development of the method of the school, it could never give that upward propulsion which has come through the theories of the sociologist. In the effort to collect and interpret the facts in the social history of man the physical environment is necessarily analyzed, but the stress is laid upon the acts – the life of man. It is in the recognition of the influence of this inheritance that the social surrounding will be elevated and purified because it supplies those stimuli which are destined to develop or warp the life which begins merely with the tendencies to reach out for and react on stimuli. The conception of education which makes the social environment the all-comprehensive factor while prospective in its aim is necessarily retrospective in its search for material. If mankind has made an upward march in the centuries past and in so doing has retained some forms of social life, has changed some and has wholly rejected others, then to feel the movement of intelligence is to project the progressive steps which have been taken in the centuries past.

The history of education brings out in bold relief the tendency of humanity to establish its advances in dogmatic form. This leads us, on the one hand, to a confusion of the experience of the race in the past with the possibilities of experience for the individual in the present; or,

on the other hand, to a rejection of the traditions embodied in the rich and varied life of thought and action by means of which mankind has acquired its social heritage, for the ideas of the present only, as embodied in the expressions of the limited range of thought and action of the individual. In educational practice, the outcome of that marvelous revival of learning, that inquiry into the history of man's thoughts and achievements, called the Renaissance, was the setting up for study the verbal expression of the culture of Greece and Rome. The culture of which the Greek and Latin literatures were the embodiment was left for study in later years by the few who attained ripe scholarship. But again, in educational practice, the outcome of reformations founded on the effort to begin the training of mind through activity with subject-matter has been the restriction of the survey to the few phases deemed valuable in the narrow experience of the reformer. The vernacular which is symbolical of the limited experiences of the reformer-teachers and the children rarely develops through their usage in beauty or vigor. They need it to express a small fraction only of the thoughts, emotions, and deeds of the race.

The defects of the conservative or cultural school which in its empiricism neglects the study of mind in its unfolding of power in discrimination and definiteness in the use of the symbols of thought must disappear under the application of the method of science to education. The defects of the radical, or rational, school which in its individualistic trend ignores the movements of human society in the past, undergoing changes in its form and constitution through the action of the immutable laws of its nature, must also disappear through the application of the method of science to research in the social heritage of the child of today.

Education has always recognised the fact that the past is involved in a cultivated present; the mistake has been that it has considered information about the past rather than activity in the progress of the past as fundamental. The lesson taught by evolution – that life is movement, not rest – has been interpreted as meaning movement in a fixed stage of development, not as movement from simple to complex conditions. With this understanding the theory of the social environment as the true stimulus for consciousness has resulted in the attempt to project the life of the child into a social, ethical, and civil environment which is simply a reduced copy of the life of the present century. This withholds from him those simpler modes of activity which would be the stimuli adapted for the early years of life. For example, it begins the work in manual training with the perfected tools and exact geometrical designs of the skilled mechanic, and so in that development which should be progressive from the early years – as soon as the child has learned to

walk and to handle things – constructive activity is deferred until he reaches the higher grammar grades. Nothing can more painfully and perfectly illustrate the failure of this idea of progression in educational theory than the action taken through the suggestions of leaders in education all over the country, action which delays manual and constructive work until children have reached the sixth or seventh grade. Growth from the simple to the complex, and not growth beginning in the complex, is the fundamental in the natural law of life.

Although the theory of the experience of the recapitulation of the race by the individual has been held for centuries, yet it is within very recent years that the element of his activity has been recognized in the word “recapitulates.” This is illustrated in the fact that Herbart, who first formulated the “culture epoch” theory as a fundamental in education, refused to apply it to the learning of the sciences. His refusal to permit in education the possibility of the blundering and absurd theorizing of the past shows that in the main he entertained merely a logical presentation of the history of different peoples. Unwillingness to permit the application of the scientific method in the beginning of the study of science – in that term we include nature study, physics, chemistry, and mathematics – shows scientific method to be least regarded in the domain in which it originated.

There is no subject in which there has been less satisfactory advance than in that of science learned in accordance with its own method. It was but yesterday that science gained recognition as a culture element in education. The long debate that was carried on in considering the relative titles of literature and science to rank and standing necessarily delayed the introduction of the study of science by the scientific method, and now that she and her method are established it comes about that she prefers to linger in the halls of the colleges and universities instead of seeking her own in every department of that great organization known as the school. A growing understanding of the method by which mind works and develops shows it to be the inductive method of the scientist. An acquaintanceship with nature is now being established between the children and the environment, with spontaneous reaching toward her as the beginning, investigation and selection as the advance, and assimilation, nutrition, growth, power – in short, love and knowledge of nature – as the culmination.

The history of the social evolution of the race should be a history of what the race has done, rather than a compilation of its theories; hence the great problem in educational method today is to determine the conditions under which the race has worked in the past and which of those conditions, if reinstated, will develop in consciousness a feeling of upward movement. That conception of evolution as a vital force in

education which leaves the child a barbarian at the mercy of the rude and vicious forces in modern civilization has no part in educational method which is scientific. The rudeness of manner, the self-assertion which characterize the American child are a result of his reaction to social stimuli in which social ethics are confused, in which adults are themselves pausing in the early stages of the ethical life and its expression through a mistaken notion that they must pause with the child. When Froebel said, "Let us live with the child," he did not mean the life and experience of the adult should be overwhelmed by the child's life and experience.

There must be thinking in the attitude of the intelligent seeker after truth if there is to be a clear understanding of the problem of the future, and this problem can be faced intelligently only as one has command of the resources and forces which have been evolved out of the past, and knows their natural law. To learn these things one must use the method of science. If the teacher as student can gain an intimate acquaintance with nature and humanity through the attitude of science only, then must the special problem, the development of the individual, be solved only by the use of method called in its specific application educational method.

On every hand is a growing recognition of the possibilities of scientific method in education. Many individual teachers in the schools of this country are in intelligent sympathy with the aims and ways of scientific method as applied to education. They can, however, accomplish little that will be of permanent value to educational theory and practice, while they work in schools in which the method is hostile to the new spirit, or in systems of schools in which the administration is so mechanical as to safeguard them against that fluidity and at the same time definiteness that characterize mind in its development.

The work of investigation carried on in schools that are facing, throughout their organization, the questions of education with the attitude of the scientist is valuable beyond compare. Not facts alone, not laws alone are sought. The facts and the laws of nature that explain the marvelous beauty and power of the life-process of the soul, and also those that belong to the world that affords nutrition to the race and the individual, are the material which the educational laboratory investigates.

EDUCATIONAL METHODS

Jane Addams. "Educational Methods," Chap. 6 of *Democracy and Social Ethics* (New York: Macmillan, 1902. Reprinted, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 178–220.

As democracy modifies our conception of life, it constantly raises the value and function of each member of the community, however humble he may be. We have come to believe that the most "brutish man" has a value in our common life, a function to perform which can be fulfilled by no one else. We are gradually requiring of the educator that he shall free the powers of each man and connect him with the rest of life. We ask this not merely because it is the man's right to be thus connected, but because we have become convinced that the social order cannot afford to get along without his special contribution. Just as we have come to resent all hindrances which keep us from untrammelled comradeship with our fellows, and as we throw down unnatural divisions, not in the spirit of the eighteenth-century reformers, but in the spirit of those to whom social equality has become a necessity for further social development, so we are impatient to use the dynamic power residing in the mass of men, and demand that the educator free that power. We believe that man's moral idealism is the constructive force of progress, as it has always been; but because every human being is a creative agent and a possible generator of fine enthusiasm, we are sceptical of the moral idealism of the few and demand the education of the many, that there may be greater freedom, strength, and subtilty of intercourse and hence an increase of dynamic power. We are not content to include all men in our hopes, but have become conscious that all men are hoping and are part of the same movement of which we are a part.

Many people impelled by these ideas have become impatient with the slow recognition on the part of the educators of their manifest obligation to prepare and nourish the child and the citizen for social relations. The educators should certainly conserve the learning and training necessary for the successful individual and family life, but should add to that a preparation for the enlarged social efforts which our increasing democracy requires. The democratic ideal demands of the school that it shall give the child's own experience a social value; that it

shall teach him to direct his own activities and adjust them to those of other people. We are not willing that thousands of industrial workers shall put all of their activity and toil into services from which the community as a whole reaps the benefit while their mental conceptions and code of morals are narrow and untouched by any uplift which the consciousness of social value might give them.

We are impatient with the schools which lay all stress on reading and writing, suspecting them to rest upon the assumption that the ordinary experience of life is worth little, and that all knowledge and interest must be brought to the children through the medium of books. Such an assumption fails to give the child any clew to the life about him, or any power to usefully or intelligently connect himself with it. This may be illustrated by observations made in a large Italian colony situated in Chicago, the children from which are, for the most part, sent to the public schools.

The members of the Italian colony are largely from South Italy, – Calabrian and Sicilian peasants, or Neapolitans from the workingmen's quarters of that city. They have come to America with the distinct aim of earning money, and finding more room for the energies of themselves and their children. In almost all cases they mean to go back again, simply because their imaginations cannot picture a continuous life away from the old surroundings. Their experiences in Italy have been those of simple outdoor activity, and their ideas have come directly to them from their struggle with Nature, – such a hand-to-hand struggle as takes place when each man gets his living largely through his own cultivation of the soil, or with tools simply fashioned by his own hands. The women, as in all primitive life, have had more diversified activities than the men. They have cooked, spun, and knitted, in addition to their almost equal work in the fields. Very few of the peasant men or women can either read or write. They are devoted to their children, strong in their family feeling, even to remote relationships, and clannish in their community life.

The entire family has been upheaved, and is striving to adjust itself to its new surroundings. The men, for the most part, work on railroad extensions through the summer, under the direction of a *padrone*, who finds the work for them regulates the amount of their wages, and supplies them with food. The first effect of immigration upon the women is that of idleness. They no longer work in the fields, nor milk the goats, nor pick up faggots. The mother of the family buys all the clothing, not only already spun and woven but made up into garments, of a cut and fashion beyond her powers. It is, indeed, the most economical thing for her to do. Her house-cleaning and cooking are of the simplest; the bread is usually baked outside of the house, and the macaroni bought prepared for boiling. All of those outdoor and

domestic activities, which she would naturally have handed on to her daughters, have slipped away from her. The domestic arts are gone, with their absorbing interests for the children, their educational value, and incentive to activity. A household in a tenement receives almost no raw material. For the hundreds of children who have never seen wheat grow, there are dozens who have never seen bread baked. The occasional washings and scrubblings are associated only with discomfort. The child of such a family receives constant stimulus of most exciting sort from his city street life, but he has little or no opportunity to use his energies in domestic manufacture, or indeed, constructively in any direction. No activity is supplied to take the place of that which, in Italy, he would naturally have found in his own surroundings, and no new union with wholesome life is made for him.

Italian parents count upon the fact that their children learn the English language and American customs before they do themselves, and the children act not only as interpreters of the language, but as buffers between them and Chicago, resulting in a certain almost pathetic dependence of the family upon the child. When a child of the family, therefore, first goes to school, the event is fraught with much significance to all the others. The family has no social life in any structural form and can supply none to the child. He ought to get it in the school and give it to his family, the school thus becoming the connector with the organized society about them. It is the children aged six, eight, and ten, who go to school, entering, of course, the primary grades. If a boy is twelve or thirteen on his arrival in America, his parents see in him a wage-earning factor, and the girl of the same age is already looking toward her marriage.

Let us take one of these boys, who has learned in his six or eight years to speak his native language, and to feel himself strongly identified with the fortunes of his family. Whatever interest has come to the minds of his ancestors has come through the use of their hands in the open air; and open air and activity of body have been the inevitable accompaniments of all their experiences. Yet the first thing that the boy must do when he reaches school is to sit still, at least part of the time, and he must learn to listen to what is said to him, with all the perplexity of listening to a foreign tongue. He does not find this very stimulating, and is slow to respond to the more subtle incentives of the schoolroom. The peasant child is perfectly indifferent to showing off and making a good recitation. He leaves all that to his schoolfellows, who are more sophisticated and equipped with better English. His parents are not deeply interested in keeping him in school, and will not hold him there against his inclination. Their experience does not point to the good American tradition that it is the educated man who finally succeeds. The richest

man in the Italian colony can neither read nor write – even Italian. His cunning and acquisitiveness, combined with the credulity and ignorance of his countrymen, have slowly brought about his large fortune. The child himself may feel the stirring of a vague ambition to go on until he is as the other children are; but he is not popular with his schoolfellows, and he sadly feels the lack of dramatic interest. Even the pictures and objects presented to him, as well as the language, are strange.

If we admit that in education it is necessary to begin with the experiences which the child already has and to use his spontaneous and social activity, then the city streets begin this education for him in a more natural way than does the school. The South Italian peasant comes from a life of picking olives and oranges, and he easily sends his children out to pick up coal from railroad tracks, or wood from buildings which have been burned down. Unfortunately, this process leads by easy transition to petty thieving. It is easy to go from the coal on the railroad track to the coal and wood which stand before a dealer's shop; from the potatoes which have rolled from a rumbling wagon to the vegetables displayed by the grocer. This is apt to be the record of the boy who responds constantly to the stimulus and temptations of the street, although in the beginning his search for bits of food and fuel was prompted by the best of motives.

The school has to compete with a great deal from the outside in addition to the distractions of the neighborhood. Nothing is more fascinating than that mysterious "down town," whither the boy longs to go to sell papers and black boots, to attend theatres, and, if possible, to stay all night on the pretence of waiting for the early edition of the great dailies. If a boy is once thoroughly caught in these excitements, nothing can save him from over-stimulation and consequent debility and worthlessness; he arrives at maturity with no habits of regular work and with a distaste for its dullness.

On the other hand, there are hundreds of boys of various nationalities who conscientiously remain in school and fulfil all the requirements of the early grades, and at the age of fourteen are found in factories, painstakingly performing their work year after year. These later are the men who form the mass of the population in every industrial neighborhood of every large city; but they carry on the industrial processes year after year without in the least knowing what it is all about. The one fixed habit which the boy carries away with him from the school to the factory is the feeling that his work is merely provisional. In school the next grade was continually held before him as an object of attainment, and it resulted in the conviction that the sole object of present effort is to get ready for something else. This tentative attitude takes the last bit of social stimulus out of his factory work; he pursues it merely as a ne-

cessity, and his very mental attitude destroys his chance for a realization of its social value. As the boy in school contracted the habit of doing his work in certain hours and taking his pleasure in certain other hours, so in the factory he earns his money by ten hours of dull work and spends it in three hours of lurid and unprofitable pleasure in the evening. Both in the school and in the factory, in proportion as his work grows dull and monotonous, his recreation must become more exciting and stimulating. The hopelessness of adding evening classes and social entertainments as a mere frill to a day filled with monotonous and deadening drudgery constantly becomes more apparent to those who are endeavoring to bring a fuller life to the industrial members of the community, and who are looking forward to a time when work shall cease to be senseless drudgery with no self-expression on the part of the worker. It sometimes seems that the public schools should contribute much more than they do to the consummation of this time. If the army of school children who enter the factories every year possessed thoroughly vitalized faculties, they might do much to lighten this incubus of dull factory work which presses so heavily upon so large a number of our fellow-citizens. Has our commercialism been so strong that our schools have become insensibly commercialized, whereas we suppose that our industrial life was receiving the broadening and illuminating effects of the schools? The training of these children, so far as it has been vocational at all, has been in the direction of clerical work. It is possible that the business men, whom we in America so tremendously admire, have really been dictating the curriculum of our public schools, in spite of the conventions of educators and the suggestions of university professors. The business man, of course, has not said, "I will have the public schools train office boys and clerks so that I may have them easily and cheaply," but he has sometimes said, "Teach the children to write legibly and to figure accurately and quickly; to acquire habits of punctuality and order; to be prompt to obey; and you will fit them to make their way in the world as I have made mine." Has the workingman been silent as to what he desires for his children, and allowed the business man to decide for him there, as he has allowed the politician to manage his municipal affairs, or has the workingman so far shared our universal optimism that he has really believed that his children would never need to go into industrial life at all, but that all of his sons would become bankers and merchants?

Certain it is that no sufficient study has been made of the child who enters into industrial life early and stays there permanently, to give him some offset to its monotony and dulness, some historic significance of the part he is taking in the life of the community.

It is at last on behalf of the average workingmen that our increasing democracy impels us to make a new demand upon the educator. As the political expression of democracy has claimed for the workingman the free right of citizenship, so a code of social ethics is now insisting that he shall be a conscious member of society, having some notion of his social and industrial value.

The early ideal of a city that it was a market-place in which to exchange produce, and a mere trading-post for merchants, apparently still survives in our minds and is constantly reflected in our schools. We have either failed to realize that cities have become great centres of production and manufacture in which a huge population is engaged, or we have lacked sufficient presence of mind to adjust ourselves to the change. We admire much more the men who accumulate riches, and who gather to themselves the results of industry, than the men who actually carry forward industrial processes; and, as has been pointed out, our schools still prepare children almost exclusively for commercial and professional life.

Quite as the country boy dreams of leaving the farm for life in town and begins early to imitate the travelling salesman in dress and manner, so the school boy within the town hopes to be an office boy, and later a clerk or salesman, and looks upon work in the factory as the occupation of ignorant and unsuccessful men. The schools do so little really to interest the child in the life of production, or to excite his ambition in the line of industrial occupation, that the ideal of life, almost from the very beginning, becomes not an absorbing interest in one's work and a consciousness of its value and social relation, but a desire for money with which unmeaning purchases may be made and an unmeaning social standing obtained.

The son of a workingman who is successful in commercial life, impresses his family and neighbors quite as does the prominent city man when he comes back to dazzle his native town. The children of the working people learn many useful things in the public schools, but the commercial arithmetic, and many other studies, are founded on the tacit assumption that a boy rises in life by getting away from manual labor, – that every, promising boy goes into business or a profession. The children destined for factory life are furnished with what would be most useful under other conditions, quite as the prosperous farmer's wife buys a folding-bed for her huge four-cornered "spare room," because her sister, who has married a city man, is obliged to have a folding-bed in the cramped limits of her flat. Partly because so little is done for him educationally, and partly because he must live narrowly and dress meanly, the life of the average laborer tends to become flat and monot-

onous, with nothing in his work to feed his mind or hold his interest. Theoretically, we would all admit that the man at the bottom, who performs the meanest and humblest work, so long as the work is necessary, performs a useful function; but we do not live up to our theories, and in addition to his hard and uninteresting work he is covered with a sod of contempt, and unless he falls into illness or trouble, he receives little sympathy or attention. Certainly no serious effort is made to give him a participation in the social and industrial life with which he comes in contact, nor any insight and inspiration regarding it.

Apparently we have not yet recovered manual labor from the deep distrust which centuries of slavery and the feudal system have cast upon it. To get away from menial work, to do obviously little with one's hands, is still the desirable status. This may readily be seen all along the line. A workingman's family will make every effort and sacrifice that the brightest daughter be sent to the high school and through the normal school, quite as much because a teacher in the family raises the general social standing and sense of family consequence, as that the returns are superior to factory or even office work. "Teacher" in the vocabulary of many children is a synonym for women-folk gentry, and the name is indiscriminately applied to women of certain dress and manner. The same desire for social advancement is expressed by the purchasing of a piano, or the fact that the son is an office boy, and not a factory hand. The overcrowding of the professions by poorly equipped men arises from much the same source, and from the conviction that, "an education" is wasted if a boy goes into a factory or shop.

A Chicago manufacturer tells a story of twin boys, whom he befriended and meant to give a start in life. He sent them both to the Athenæum for several winters as a preparatory business training, and then took them into his office, where they speedily became known as the bright one and the stupid one. The stupid one was finally dismissed after repeated trials, when to the surprise of the entire establishment, he quickly betook himself into the shops, where he became a wide-awake and valuable workman. His chagrined benefactor, in telling the story, admits that he himself had fallen a victim to his own business training and his early notion of rising in life. In reality he had merely followed the lead of most benevolent people who help poor boys. They test the success of their efforts by the number whom they have taken out of factory work into some other and "higher occupation."

Quite in line with this commercial ideal are the night schools and institutions of learning most accessible to working people. First among them is the business college which teaches largely the mechanism of type-writing and book-keeping, and lays all stress upon commerce and

methods of distribution. Commodities are treated as exports and imports, or solely in regard to their commercial value, and not, of course, in relation to their historic development or the manufacturing processes to which they have been subjected. These schools do not in the least minister to the needs of the actual factory employee, who is in the shop and not in the office. We assume that all men are searching for "puddings and power," to use Carlyle's phrase, and furnish only the schools which help them to those ends.

The business college man, or even the man who goes through an academic course in order to prepare for a profession, comes to look on learning too much as an investment from which he will later reap the benefits in earning money. He does not connect learning with industrial pursuits, nor does he in the least lighten or illuminate those pursuits for those of his friends who have not risen in life. "It is as though nets were laid at the entrance to education, in which those who by some means or other escape from the masses bowed down by labor, are inevitably caught and held from substantial service to their fellows." The academic teaching which is accessible to workingmen through University Extension lectures and classes at settlements, is usually bookish and remote, and concerning subjects completely divorced from their actual experiences. The men come to think of learning as something to be added to the end of a hard day's work, and to be gained at the cost of toilsome mental exertion. There are, of course, exceptions, but many men who persist in attending classes and lectures year after year find themselves possessed of a mass of inert knowledge which nothing in their experience fuses into availability or realization.

Among the many disappointments which the settlement experiment has brought to its promoters, perhaps none is keener than the fact that they have as yet failed to work out methods of education, specialized and adapted to the needs of adult working people in contra-distinction to those employed in schools and colleges, or those used in teaching children. There are many excellent reasons and explanations for this failure. In the first place, the residents themselves are for the most part imbued with academic methods and ideals, which it is most difficult to modify. To quote from a late settlement report, "The most vaunted educational work in settlements amounts often to the stimulation mentally of a select few who are, in a sense, of the academic type of mind, and who easily and quickly respond to the academic methods employed." These classes may be valuable, but they leave quite untouched the great mass of the factory population, the ordinary workingman of the ordinary workingman's street, whose attitude is best described as that of "acquiescence," who lives through the aimless

passage of the years without incentive "to imagine, to design, or to aspire." These men are totally untouched by all the educational and philanthropic machinery which is designed for the young and the helpless who live on the same streets with them. They do not often drink to excess, they regularly give all their wages to their wives, they have a vague pride in their superior children; but they grow prematurely old and stiff in all their muscles, and become more and more taciturn, their entire energies consumed in "holding a job."

Various attempts have been made to break through the inadequate educational facilities supplied by commercialism and scholarship, both of which have followed their own ideals and have failed to look at the situation as it actually presents itself. The most noteworthy attempt has been the movement toward industrial education, the agitation for which has been ably seconded by manufacturers of a practical type, who have from time to time founded and endowed technical schools, designed for workingmen's sons. The early schools of this type inevitably reflected the ideal of the self-made man. They succeeded in transferring a few skilled workers into the upper class of trained engineers, and a few less skilled workers into the class of trained mechanics, but did not aim to educate the many who are doomed to the unskilled work which the permanent specialization of the division of labor demands.

The Peter Coopers and other good men honestly believed that if intelligence could be added to industry, each workingman who faithfully attended these schools could walk into increased skill and wages, and in time even become an employer himself. Such schools are useful beyond doubt; but so far as educating workingmen is concerned or in any measure satisfying the democratic ideal, they plainly beg the question.

Almost every large city has two or three polytechnic institutions founded by rich men, anxious to help "poor boys." These have been captured by conventional educators for the purpose of fitting young men for the colleges and universities. They have compromised by merely adding to the usual academic course manual work, applied mathematics, mechanical drawing and engineering. Two schools in Chicago, plainly founded for the sons of workingmen, afford an illustration of this tendency and result. On the other hand, so far as schools of this type have been captured by commercialism, they turn out trained engineers, professional chemists, and electricians. They are polytechnics of a high order, but do not even pretend to admit the workingman with his meagre intellectual equipment. They graduate machine builders, but not educated machine tenders. Even the textile schools are largely seized by young men who expect to be superintendents of factories designers, or manufacturers themselves, and the textile worker who actually "holds

the thread" is seldom seen in them; indeed, in one of the largest schools women are not allowed, in spite of the fact that spinning and weaving have traditionally been woman's work, and that thousands of women are at present employed in the textile mills.

It is much easier to go over the old paths of education with "manual training" thrown in, as it were; it is much simpler to appeal to the old ambitions of "getting on in life," or of "preparing for a profession," or "for a commercial career," than to work out new methods on democratic lines. These schools gradually drop back into the conventional courses, modified in some slight degree, while the adaptation to workingmen's needs is never made, nor, indeed, vigorously attempted. In the meantime, the manufacturers continually protest that engineers, especially trained for devising machines, are not satisfactory. Three generations of workers have invented, but we are told that invention no longer goes on in the workshop, even when it is artificially stimulated by the offer of prizes, and that the inventions of the last quarter of the nineteenth century have by no means fulfilled the promise of the earlier three-quarters.

Every foreman in a large factory has had experience with two classes of men: first with those who become rigid and tolerate no change in their work, partly because they make more money "working by the piece," when they stick to that work which they have learned to do rapidly, and partly because the entire muscular and nervous system has become by dairy use adapted to particular motions and resents change. Secondly, there are the men who float in and out of the factory, in a constantly changing stream. They "quit work" for the slightest reason or none at all, and never become skilled at anything. Some of them are men of low intelligence, but many of them are merely too nervous and restless, too impatient too easily "driven to drink," to be of any use in a modern factory. They are the men for whom the demanded adaptation is impossible.

The individual from whom the industrial order demands ever larger drafts of time and energy, should be nourished and enriched from social sources, in proportion as he is drained. He, more than other men, needs the conception of historic continuity in order to reveal to him the purpose and utility of his work, and he can only be stimulated and dignified as he obtains a conception of his proper relation to society. Scholarship is evidently unable to do this for him; for, unfortunately, the same tendency to division of labor has also produced over-specialization in scholarship, with the sad result that when the scholar attempts to minister to a worker, he gives him the result of more specialization rather than an offset from it. He cannot bring healing and solace

because he himself is suffering from the same disease. There is indeed a deplorable lack of perception and adaptation on the part of educators all along the line.

It will certainly be embarrassing to have our age written down triumphant in the matter of inventions, in that our factories were filled with intricate machines, the result of advancing mathematical and mechanical knowledge in relation to manufacturing processes, but defeated in that it lost its head over the achievement and forgot the men. The accusation would stand, that the age failed to perform a like service in the extension of history and art to the factory employees who ran the machines; that the machine tenders, heavy and almost dehumanized by monotonous toil, walked about in the same streets with us, and sat in the same cars; but that we were absolutely indifferent and made no genuine effort to supply to them the artist's perception or student's insight, which alone could fuse them into social consciousness. It would further stand that the scholars among us continued with yet more research, that the educators were concerned only with the young and the promising, and the philanthropists with the criminals and helpless.

There is a pitiful failure to recognize the situation in which the majority of working people are placed, a tendency to ignore their real experiences and needs, and, most stupid of all, we leave quite untouched affections and memories which would afford a tremendous dynamic if they were utilized.

We constantly hear it said in educational circles, that a child learns only by "doing," and that education must proceed "through the eyes and hands to the brain"; and yet for the vast number of people all around us who do not need to have activities artificially provided, and who use their hands and eyes all the time, we do not seem able to reverse the process. We quote the dictum, "What is learned in the schoolroom must be applied in the workshop," and yet the skill and handicraft constantly used in the workshop have no relevance or meaning given to them by the school; and when we do try to help the workingman in an educational way, we completely ignore his everyday occupation. Yet the task is merely one of adaptation. It is to take actual conditions and to make them the basis for a large and generous method of education, to perform a difficult idealization doubtless, but not an impossible one.

We apparently believe that the working-man has no chance to realize life through his vocation. We easily recognize the historic association in regard to ancient buildings. We say that "generation after generation have stamped their mark upon them, have recorded their thoughts in them, until they have become the property of all." And yet this is even

more true of the instruments of labor, which have constantly been held in human hands. A machine really represents the "seasoned life of man" preserved and treasured up within itself, quite as much as an ancient building does. At present, workmen are brought in contact with the machinery with which they work as abruptly as if the present set of industrial implements had been newly created. They handle the machinery day by day, without any notion of its gradual evolution and growth. Few of the men who perform the mechanical work in the great factories have any comprehension of the fact that the inventions upon which the factory depends, the instruments which they use, have been slowly worked out, each generation using the gifts of the last and transmitting the inheritance until it has become a social possession. This can only be understood by a man who has obtained some idea of social progress. We are still childishly pleased when we see the further subdivision of labor going on, because the quantity of the output is increased thereby, and we apparently are unable to take our attention away from the product long enough to really focus it upon the producer. Theoretically, "the division of labor" makes men more interdependent and human by drawing them together into a unity of purpose. "If a number of people decide to build a road, and one digs, and one brings stones, and another breaks them, they are quite inevitably united by their interest in the road. But this naturally presupposes that they know where the road is going to, that they have some curiosity and interest about it and perhaps a chance to travel upon it." If the division of labor robs them of interest in any part of it, the mere mechanical fact of interdependence amounts to nothing.

The man in the factory, as well as the man with the hoe, has a grievance beyond being overworked and disinherited, in that he does not know what it is all about. We may well regret the passing of the time when the variety of work performed in the unspecialized workshop naturally stimulated the intelligence of the workingmen and brought them into contact both with the raw material and the finished product. But the problem of education, as any advanced educator will tell us, is to supply the essentials of experience by a short cut, as it were. If the shop constantly tends to make the workman a specialist, then the problem of the educator in regard to him is quite clear: it is to give him what may be an offset from the over-specialization of his daily work, to supply him with general information and to insist that he shall be a cultivated member of society with a consciousness of his industrial and social value.

As sad a sight as an old hand-loom worker in a factory attempting to make his clumsy machine compete with the flying shuttles about him, is

a workingman equipped with knowledge so meagre that he can get no meaning into his life nor sequence between his acts and the far-off results.

Manufacturers, as a whole, however, when they attempt educational institutions in connection with their factories, are prone to follow conventional lines, and to exhibit the weakness of imitation. We find, indeed, that the middle-class educator constantly makes the mistakes of the middle-class moralist when he attempts to aid working people. The latter has constantly and traditionally urged upon the workingman the specialized virtues of thrift, industry, and sobriety – all virtues pertaining to the individual. When each man had his own shop, it was perhaps wise to lay almost exclusive stress upon the industrial virtues of diligence and thrift; but as industry has become more highly organized, life becomes incredibly complex and interdependent. If a workingman is to have a conception of his value at all, he must see industry in its unity and entirety; he must have a conception that will include not only himself and his immediate family and community, but the industrial organization as a whole. It is doubtless true that dexterity of hand becomes less and less imperative as the invention of machinery and subdivision of labor proceeds; but it becomes all the more necessary, if the workman is to save his life at all, that he should get a sense of his individual relation to the system. Feeding a machine with a material of which he has no knowledge, producing a product, totally unrelated to the rest of his life, without in the least knowing what becomes of it, or its connection with the community, is, of course, unquestionably deadening to his intellectual and moral life. To make the moral connection it would be necessary to give him a social consciousness of the value of his work, and at least a sense of participation and a certain joy in its ultimate use; to make the intellectual connection it would be essential to create in him some historic conception of the development of industry and the relation of his individual work to it.

Workingmen themselves have made attempts in both directions, which it would be well for moralists and educators to study. It is a striking fact that when workingmen formulate their own moral code, and try to inspire and encourage each other, it is always a large and general doctrine which they preach. They were the first class of men to organize an international association, and the constant talk at a modern labor meeting is of solidarity and of the identity of the interests of workingmen the world over. It is difficult to secure a successful organization of men into the simplest trades organization without an appeal to the most abstract principles of justice and brotherhood. As they have formulated their own morals by laying the greatest stress upon the largest morality, so if they could found their own schools, it is doubtful

whether they would be of the mechanic institute type. Courses of study arranged by a group of working-men are most naïve in their breadth and generality. They will select the history of the world in preference to that of any period or nation. The “wonders of science” or “the story of evolution” will attract workingmen to a lecture when zoölogy or chemistry will drive them away. The “outlines of literature” or “the best in literature” will draw an audience when a lecturer in English poetry will be solitary. This results partly from a wholesome desire to have general knowledge before special knowledge, and is partly a rebound from the specialization of labor to which the workingman is subjected. When he is free from work and can direct his own mind, he tends to roam, to dwell upon large themes. Much the same tendency is found in programmes of study arranged by Woman’s Clubs in country places. The untrained mind, wearied with meaningless detail, when it gets an opportunity to make its demand heard, asks for general philosophy and background.

In a certain sense commercialism itself, at least in its larger aspect, tends to educate the workingman better than organized education does. Its interests are certainly world-wide and democratic, while it is absolutely indiscriminating as to country and creed, coming into contact with all climes and races. If this aspect of commercialism were utilized, it would in a measure counterbalance the tendency which results from the subdivision of labor.

The most noteworthy attempt to utilize this democracy of commerce in relation to manufacturing is found at Dayton, Ohio, in the yearly gatherings held in a large factory there. Once a year the entire force is gathered together to hear the returns of the business, not so much in respect to the profits, as in regard to its extension. At these meetings, the travelling salesmen from various parts of the world – from Constantinople, from Berlin, from Rome, from Hong Kong – report upon the sales they have made, and the methods of advertisement and promotion adapted to the various countries.

Stereopticon lectures are given upon each new country as soon as it has been successfully invaded by the product of the factory. The foremen in the various departments of the factory give accounts of the increased efficiency and the larger output over former years. Any man who has made an invention in connection with the machinery of the factory, at this time publicly receives a prize, and suggestions are approved that tend to increase the comfort and social facilities of the employees. At least for the moment there is a complete *esprit de corps*, and the youngest and least skilled employee sees himself in connection with the interests of the firm, and the spread of an invention. It is a crude example of what might be done in the way of giving a large

framework of meaning to factory labor, and of putting it into a sentient background, at least on the commercial side.

It is easy to indict the educator, to say that he has gotten entangled in his own material, and has fallen a victim to his own methods; but granting this, what has the artist done about it – he who is supposed to have a more intimate insight into the needs of his contemporaries, and to minister to them as none other can?

It is quite true that a few writers are insisting that the growing desire for labor, on the part of many people of leisure, has its counterpart in the increasing desire for general knowledge on the part of many laborers. They point to the fact that the same duality of conscience which seems to stifle the noblest effort in the individual because his intellectual conception and his achievement are so difficult to bring together, is found on a large scale in society itself, when we have the separation of the people who think from those who work. And yet, since Ruskin ceased, no one has really formulated this in a convincing form. And even Ruskin's famous dictum, that labor without art brutalizes, has always been interpreted as if art could only be a sense of beauty or joy in one's own work, and not a sense of companionship with all other workers. The situation demands the consciousness of participation and well-being which comes to the individual when he is able to see himself "in connection and cooperation with the whole"; it needs the solace of collective art inherent in collective labor.

As the poet bathes the outer world for us in the hues of human feeling, so the workman needs some one to bathe his surroundings with a human significance – some one who shall teach him to find that which will give a potency to his life. His education, however simple, should tend to make him widely at home in the world, and to give him a sense of simplicity and peace in the midst of the triviality and noise to which he is constantly subjected. He, like other men, can learn to be content to see but a part, although it must be a part of something.

It is because of a lack of democracy that we do not really incorporate him in the hopes and advantages of society, and give him the place which is his by simple right. We have learned to say that the good must be extended to all of society before it can be held secure, by any one person or any one class; but we have not yet learned to add to that statement, that unless all men and all classes contribute to a good, we cannot even be sure that it is worth having. In spite of many attempts we do not really act upon either statement.

REVIEW OF *THE NEWER IDEALS OF PEACE*

George H. Mead. "Review of Jane Addams, *The Newer Ideals of Peace*," *American Journal of Sociology* 13.1 (July 1907): 121–28.

The congestion of our great cities has been generally regarded as an unmitigated evil. We condemn the movement of population from the country to the city. Especially we condemn the perversity of the immigrant which leads him to herd with his kind in the city slums while the great harvest of our western plains are crying for labor; and condemnation passes over into indignation when the inevitable appeal is made to charity and conscience to cope with the suffering and vice that seem to be the sole fruit of these "plague spots" in our municipalities. This attitude has become fixed and almost traditional, because it is entrenched behind what we regard as the most admirable responses of human nature – its charity and conscience. We accept it as our interpreters either the interested politician or the moral reformer, and the actual human experience that exists in these proscribed localities is separated from our vision by spiritual distances which dwarf the physical stretches these immigrants have covered to reach America.

Pre-eminent among those who have traversed these distances and have come into understanding contact with these social groups stands Miss Jane Addams, whose interpretation of the men and women who live in the congested districts of our cities, and of the conditions out of which they have arisen, and of the conditions of the whole social life which they determine, is again presented us in the *Newer Ideals of Peace*.

The immediate theme of the book is the inadequacy of a governmental order that has arisen out of, and is still unconsciously dominated by, military ideals to express the democracy of an industrial community. For these military ideals Miss Addams substitutes those springing from actual human relationships, which do in fact surreptitiously dominate the government of the slums by its police and aldermen. The political corruption and protection of vice that ensue Miss Addams traces to the helplessness of outworn political conceptions and the worse practice they involve. And finally the author affirms that our highest form of social emotion – patriotism – because it is dominated by warlike

impulses and tradition is quite unable to sweep into itself the "finer spirit of courage and detachment" belonging to modern industrial struggles, although we defend warfare because it engenders these very qualities.

To seek our patriotism [in] some age other than our own is to accept a code that is totally inadequate to help us through the problems which current life develops. We continue to found our patriotism upon war and to contrast conquest with nurture, militarism with industrialism, calling the latter passive, and inert, and the former active and aggressive, without really facing the situation as it exists. We tremble before our own convictions, and are afraid to find newer manifestations of courage and daring lest we thereby lose the virtues bequeathed to us by war. It is a pitiful acknowledgment that we have lost them already, and that we shall have to give up the ways of war, if for no other reason than to preserve the finer spirit of courage and detachment which it has engendered and developed. (P. 217.)

The movement which would slough off warfare and usher in universal peace is perhaps more aggressively international than any other, unless it is the socialistic labor movement. It is then natural that a contribution to that movement should find its immediate motive in the international complex of our great city population, and of the laboring force of our great industries. Still, when the reader of Miss Addams' book recognizes the wide range of topic there considered, not simply the third chapter on the failure to utilize immigrants in city government, but the others ranging over the survivals of militarism in city government, militarism and industrial legislation, group morality and the labor movement, protection of children for industrial efficiency, utilization of women in city government, and the passing of the war virtues, one is struck by the constant appearance of the immigrant at the center of the author's treatment of nearly all these subjects. The conflict between the doctrinaire eighteenth-century ideals of government and present conditions, and the consequent reversion to the repressive measures of a military community, is illustrated by the immigration problem. While immigration began in response to political impulses, and these still play some part, it has become in the main an industrial movement. The immigrant is imported to provide that fund of unskilled labor upon which our industries may draw at will. He comes ignorant and helpless before the system of exploitation which enwraps him before he leaves the old country and may last for two generations after he enters our gates. Our government has nothing to offer him by way of protection but the doctrine of the abstract rights of man, a vote he cannot intelli-

gently exercise, and the police to hold him in his place. But in the cosmopolitan mass of which he becomes a part he enters into human relations with neighbors in the same uncomprehended struggle, with the alderman who can use his human needs and response to kindness, with the policemen who depend upon this alderman and have some comprehension of his daily life. All this social organization lies hopelessly outside of the governmental ideas and institutions. The so-called intelligent community, in its pity as well as its prudence, takes necessarily the attitude of the conqueror toward the conquered, because its government is purely repressive and legal. Our unconsciously military attitude prevents us from making any use of the actual social organization that is going on, and in fact this healthful process leads by its very human vitality to connivance with legal wrong, to protection of vice and municipal corruption.

The author does not, however, rest with this negative phase of the immigrant's condition. She sees the great positive losses to the community which its lack of comprehension of him entails. Just because the immigrant has torn himself loose from the old soil and comes with hope and fear to the new land, he brings with him a fund of emotion which is the precious material out of which social values and ends are built up. There are in addition the valuable habits, representing often the selective development of many centuries that our external repressive government is utterly unable to utilize. There is no encouragement for the combination of community life with agricultural occupations, which exists among Italian peasant groups. The Doukhobors have occasioned endless complications with the Canadian government because its fixed and inflexible legal and property concepts could not adapt themselves to the common ownership of land that represent the inherited morale of these people. Apart from the organized habits of these immigrants, there is their native readiness to assist each other, to co-operate in human fashion in meeting the exigencies that surround them, that would be of enormous value if an intelligent government could recognize these possibilities and use the social materials already there. But our municipal governments offer only repression, or the extra-legal or illegal assistance of the politician who finds in the human situation his stock-in-trade. What might be done toward building up, out of social habits already there and their human social instincts and susceptibility, a deeper and more organic community control, if our government had other ideas and methods than those of police to repress crime and courts to protect vested rights! Even the more frankly military governments of Europe have made longer strides in this direction than we. Their legislation not only protects, where ours ignores, but takes positive steps toward better housing, toward health, and insurance, that our democratic community

is helpless as yet to imitate.

In discussing militarism and industrial legislation, Miss Addams gathers her argument about two recent strikes – that in the anthracite coal-fields and the Chicago Stock Yards strike. She shows that a purely repressive government which is unable to reinterpret its legal conceptions from a larger industrial point of view, is quite outside the real struggle for social control. The actual process of government takes place in the two camps of the employers and the employed. Representation, legislation, and executive administration, even the referendum, appear in these groups. And here the real issues appear – the issues of the standard of life, of economic efficiency – and actually control conduct. When, as in the anthracite coal-fields strike, the deadlock between the contending forces became unendurable, when the central government was forced to intervene and bring the issues before competent judges, the questions that were discussed were not simply those with which the military and legal type of government has concerned itself. On the contrary, the real questions, that everybody knew underlay the controversy, inevitably appeared in court:

Did the union encourage violence against non-union men, or did it really do everything to suppress violence? Did it live up to its creed, which was to maintain a standard of living, that families might be properly housed and protected from debilitating toil and disease, and that children might be nurtured into American citizenship? Did the operators protect their men as far as possible from mine damp, from length of hours proven by experience to be exhausting? Did they pay a wage to the mine laborer sufficient to allow him to send his children to school? Questions such as these, a study in the human problem, invaded the commission day after day during the sitting. One felt for the moment the first wave of a rising tide of humanitarianism, until the normal ideals of the laborer to secure food and shelter for his family, a security for his own old age, and a larger opportunity for his children, became the ideals of democratic government (Pp. 98 f.)

In the case of the Stock Yards strike in Chicago, the issue was found in the reduction of the wage of the unskilled and unorganized labor. Organized skilled labor attempted to fight the battle, with the mixed motives that always arise – the fight against a movement to reduce wages which would inevitably reach them, and a fight for the weak and socially less effective by the stronger and better-organized. False steps early in the contest, the unwieldy body of men to be controlled, endangered the hold which the labor-union strike managers had upon their men. The contest was a genuine one; the issue in terms of humanity took

hold upon the Stock Yards community. The politician who understands dealing in human issues as the basis for his City Hall pull, tried to get possession of this struggle for the betterment of the condition of the underpaid unskilled labor. The real issue in terms of actual human conditions came to the surface, confronted the policemen on duty, the political leaders who controlled the repressive function of government. It was so real, this issue, that the strike managers almost lost it, so eagerly did the politician want to make his use of it.

The moral is evident that as long as the government remains within its military attitude, as long as the policeman, its soldier, is its sole executive, and its arbiter courts which will admit to consideration only the abstract and property rights which hide the vital issues, its legislation cannot deal with the actual social forces out of which social control must arise. It cannot identify with itself the social organization which arises in the labor union, nor draw out in patriotism the devotion with which the laborer responds to its call. Actual social control and social emotion are lost to this government.

Again, it is the immigrant that forces this problem upon us. The anthracite coal-field strike was but the climax of the long-drawn-out fight between the employer's power to import unskilled cheap labor, and the employee's power to assimilate him and identify him with the interests of his American fellows. In the Stock Yards strike, skilled organized labor found the lower unskilled positions being given to the immigrants from among the most oppressed peasantry of Europe. Identification of their interests with those of these Slovaks and Lithuanians was the price of their position. It is the immigrant who comes in response to the call of our feverish industry and our innumerable machines, that is forcing the deepest problems of social organization and evaluation upon us. It is the humblest and the stupidest among our foreign-born citizens that are forcing upon us the problems of our industrial, non-military community. And those who meet them in their real human form are not the legislators nor the executives nor the judiciary of our government. They have in a large degree isolated themselves in outworn categories, though they are still powers to be used by those who are face to face with the real problems. The employer to whom the immigrant is an economic possibility, and the laborer to whom he is a threat of a lower wage, and a different and often a lower standard or life – they are face to face with the problem. The problem grows rapidly with its human content. It involves the whole question of wage, standard of life, education, and insurance against sickness and old age. It involves protected machinery, control of dangerous callings, hygiene in the factory and home and city. All these pressing questions come in the train of the immigrant.

In dealing with group-morality in the labor movement, Miss Addams emphasizes the shortcomings of the unions which arise from their own isolated character. They are as handicapped in meeting the social exigencies as is any small group within a larger one, which must still maintain itself over against the larger whole of which it is a part. Thus the labor union arrays itself as the enemy of the employers' association, and their contacts naturally become those of warfare until common interests bring them close enough to each other to force to the surface the principle of common action, until the employer backs up his control by the judgments of the industrial expert, and the union comes forward with the consistent demand for collective bargaining in their commodity – labor and skill. Meanwhile the very human interests and impulses which make the labor union possible compel its earlier history to be that of effervescence and conflict. Because our outworn governmental conceptions make it impossible to the community to recognize and frankly deal with the human problems that face the laborer, he must attack them from the limited point of view of his group. Thus the machine is a social product for which no individual can claim complete responsibility. Its economic efficiency is as dependent on the presence of the laborer and the market for its products as mechanical structure is dependent upon the inventor, and its exploitation upon the capitalist. But the group-morality under which the community suffers, recognizes no responsibility of the exploiter to the laborer, but leaves him free to exhaust and even maim the operator, as if the community had placed a sword in his hand with which to subjugate. On the other hand, the laborer turns upon the machine with a hostility which assumes that there are no interests involved beyond his own which he is bound to recognize.

It is but natural that we should feel the loss, which a merely crime-preventing and contract-enforcing government entails upon society, most vividly in the case of the children; but the situation is rendered absurd as well as horrible by the fact that the community claims the right to give a certain education to the child, but regards itself as perfectly helpless over against the exploitation of the same child the moment he steps from the school. The very form of the machine has been adapted to this exploitation of the child as well as of the immigrant. This exploitation leaves the child worn out, and deprives not only him, but the community, of his inheritance of play, of imagination, and in so far of the great spiritual products of the play-impulses – art and aesthetic appreciation, with the life that depends upon them.

An equal inconsequence Miss Addams brings to light in the attitude of the state toward woman. Because our more or less unconscious defin-

ition of citizenship includes only the warrior who will defend the community on the battlefield, woman is politically irresponsible; and yet the whole industrial nature of the community relates her and her interests as closely to the process of social control as the man. Indeed, the fields within which municipal inefficiency is most pronounced and corruption most rank are those whose functions have been the province of woman from the beginning of society.

Over against the outworn conceptions of government which date from the military organization of society, Miss Addams places these ideals of social control arising out of the industrial nature of our community. It is the contrast of nurture with repression; of the living social relation with the abstract formula; the instinct for workmanship with the drudgery of unrelieved factory toil; the standard of life with an economic wage; the value of the child to the community with his legal right to freedom of contract; the intelligence born of social function with the use of doctrinaire concepts in the service of special interests. These ideals spring from the very industrial character of the community. To recognize them is to come socially to consciousness. On the other hand, the whole process and paraphernalia of warfare are outworn and antiquated means of interpreting the social situation.

One does not feel, in reading Miss Addams, the advance of an argument with measured tread. I think in logical organization this book suffers more than her earlier writing. On the other hand, perhaps, nowhere can one find the social point of view, which we must assume, presented with so much inherent necessity as here. It is not the necessity of a deduction, but the necessity of immediate reality. It is not burdened with a creed nor with socialistic dogma. It is the expression of enlightened social intelligence in sympathetic contact with men, women, and children whose reality is all the more impressive because our eyes have been holden from them by economic and political abstractions. The thesis of the book is that social control, that government, must arise out of these immediate human relations.

REVIEW OF *THE SPIRIT OF YOUTH AND CITY STREETS*

James H. Tufts. "Review of Jane Addams, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets*," *School Review* 18.6 (1910): 428–29.

To most teachers there must come occasionally a vague sense of society's failure to realize all it might from the aspirations and generous impulses of successive generations of young people. To many come also a more definite feeling when this or that boy or girl goes wrong. We know well enough that boys and girls are imprudent, heedless, and unstable, but the very spontaneity and emotional susceptibility and variability, yes, even the impatience of tradition and authority which excite by turns our affection and our disapproval are among nature's choicest assets. It is doubtful if the race would be continued if youth were as prudent as age; it is probable that many of humanity's great causes would never have been championed and carried forward if the spirit of adventure had not lured men on against odds; it is certain that without the joy and overflowing spirits of youth this whole business of living would be so sober as to be often dreary. But with most of us these feelings are vague and inarticulate. It is because Miss Addams has so large and sane a vision for the real values of human life, penetrates with such intimate sympathy into the various springs of boy and girl nature, and knows so thoroughly the actual conditions of the modern city as they exist for boys and girls, that she has written such a significant book. Because of its style, of the humor and pathos of its numerous concrete examples, no less than for the weight of its subject-matter, it is likely its place among educational classics. Its six chapters may be read in an evening, but, read once, they are likely to be re-read several times.

The first chapter outlines the general situation which the modern city presents: "Industrialism has gathered together eager young creatures from all quarters of the earth as a labor supply"; numbers of young girls suddenly released from the protection of the home; numbers of young boys earning money independently of the family life, and feeling free to spend it as they choose in the midst of vice deliberately disguised as pleasure. To these boys and girls from the age of fourteen, when most leave school, on to the time when business or independent home life

furnish normally sufficient interests, the city offers on the one hand the monotonous labor factory or shop, on the other the commercialized forms of recreation in dance halls, "places," and nickel theaters. Successive chapters on "The Wrecked Foundations of Domesticity," "The Quest for Adventure," "The House of Dreams," "Youth in Industry," and "The Thirst for Righteousness," deal more specifically with the impulses and emotions which are most in need of guidance.

Youth is the time for friendship and love; it is eager for adventure, and the court records cited show how many boys get into trouble for lack of any innocent outlet; it needs recreation, especially after the monotonous rigor of modern machine industry, and our cheap theaters offer almost the only way of meeting this need; industry itself is so conducted and education lends so little human significance to the factory processes that artistic and human interest revolts; finally, and perhaps oftener than we realize, the spirit of youth has a "divine impatience with the world's inheritance of wrong and injustice" which we allow to grow cold or even to take unsocial forms because of failure to enlist it in active campaigns for needed improvements.

The teacher who has any interest in the larger meaning of his work will find stimulation; the teacher who takes up the book primarily for its interpretation of boy and girl life will be likely to gain more insight and sympathy.

REVIEW OF *TWENTY YEARS AT HULL HOUSE*

James H. Tufts. "Review of Jane Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull House*," *School Review* 19.3 (1911): 207-8.

This story of Miss Addams' manifold and wide-reaching activities in connection with Hull House is introduced by an account of her early years, her studies in school and college, and her years of endeavor to find her field of work. It is all told with rare directness, and interspersed with philosophic and humorous comments, which make it not only a personal narrative of deep interest but a stimulating account of the development of many important civic movements. The early chapters for a human document of singular value for those engaged in education. We have much more biographical material for the lives of men than for those of women. And no one, so far as I now, of the women who have engaged in educational work has told her story in so frankly and intimate fashion. Miss Addams early resolved to "live with the poor," but it was long before she found the way to do this. The account of her studies, and travels, and mental processes while she was making up her mind will appeal to a multitude of eager young people and reveal the thoughts of many hearts. While, however, the democratic convictions and passion for justice seem to have been present almost from the beginning, the author's constant sense of humor keeps the story a genuine record of a sympathy and sound intelligence which in later years refused to find a panacea for social ills in any "ism," were foreshadowed in some early decisions, but Miss Addams refuses to take herself too seriously, and hence we enjoy going along with her. One might easily find here one reason for the continually growing success of Hull House. With all the seriousness with which it has faced the almost overwhelming odds of its environment, there have been flexibility in methods, readiness to recognize mistakes and try other means, ability to see the bright side, and as much sensitiveness to humor as to the pathos found in all sorts of human conditions. Indeed, when a teacher has read between the lines of this book he will perhaps find himself nearer the secret of success in all work with young people than he has been before.

While the personal interest is the chief one there is also an account of the various educational experiments that Hull House has tried, and of the other ways in which its residents have sought to meet the needs of their neighbors. No teacher seeking either knowledge of city problems or guidance in making his school useful in the largest way can fail to find suggestions.

THE BEARINGS OF PRAGMATISM UPON EDUCATION

John Dewey. "The Bearings of Pragmatism upon Education," *Progressive Journal of Education* 1.2 (December 1908): 1-3; 1.3 (January 1909): 5-8; 1.4 (February 1909): 6-7. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 4 (1977), pp. 178-91.

First Paper

According to pragmatism, intelligence or the power of thought is developed out of the struggles of organic beings to secure a successful exercise of their functions. The doctrine may be compared to the theory of "economic interpretation of history," taken in its broad sense. According to this theory, the main features of the structure of any particular society are best understood by looking first into how that society went at the problem of maintaining itself in existence – how it undertook the primary business of "making its living." Similarly, the transformation and evolution of successive social states depend upon the introduction of new factors and forces into industrial production and exchange, so that men's points of view – judgment of values – and the location of power – of control of nature and hence of others – are changed. Now, in a somewhat analogous way, pragmatism holds that all the higher achievements of individual organic life result from the stress and strain of the problem of maintaining the functions of life. For life can be kept going only as the organism "makes its living," by proper manipulation of the environment and adjustment of the latter to its own vital ends. Reduced to their simplest terms, the biological problem of the individual and the economic problem of society are exactly the same. In each case the aim is to subordinate the materials and forces of the natural environment so that they shall be rendered tributary to life-functions.

Now, while this requires direct contact with things in seizing, digesting, etc., the limitations of the direct method of subjugation of materials to function are very great. The evolution of the nervous system represents the discovery of the advantages of indirect control by manipulation of the present environment on the basis of the past and future, of the felt and seen on the basis of the remote and foreseen.

On this basis, it is not the business of thought to mirror with

theoretical or speculative exactness an outside world. It is its business to select whatever is relevant to the most effective carrying on of life functions, and to arrange what is selected, not on the basis of some outside pattern, but with reference to facilitating the complete practical performance of all the activities possible to an organic being. Knowledge, accordingly, is not an attempt to copy, after the fashion of an encyclopaedia, all the facts of the universe. It is the expression of man's past most successful achievements in effecting adjustments and adaptations, put in a form so as best to help sustain and promote the future still greater control of the environment.

This theory of the nature of intelligence and knowledge is contrasted with the two other theories which have practically divided the field between them in the past. One, which may be called the transcendental theory of pure rationalism, is that the mind is an immaterial entity, temporarily housed in a material organism, having thought or reason as its own independent or *a priori* power, and creating knowledge by the exercise of its faculties, just because it is the very nature of thought to produce knowledge. Knowledge, on this view, is an end complete in itself. It simply represents the deposit that results from the exercise of a purely theoretic faculty. It may possibly have some useful application in activity, but that is purely accidental – it is an afterthought. Knowledge is complete in itself just as soon as the purely theoretic capacity of reason has expressed itself.

The other contrasting view is that mind is a blank piece of paper, or a passive waxlike something on which objects impress themselves, and the accumulation of the records left behind constitutes knowledge. This view underlies, for example, Spencer's theory of evolution, according to which mental forms and powers have been developed by the constant impact of environmental forces, the more transient features obliterating one another's effects, while the more permanent have molded intelligence into their own likeness. Knowledge, on this view, is a replica or duplicate edition within consciousness of what already exists ready-made without.

Now the pragmatic view of mind and knowledge agrees with this latter account in that it regards mind as a development and lays a great stress upon the relation between organism and the environment. But it regards the evolution of mind as a growth out of the constant tendency of life to sustain and fulfill its own functions through subordinating environment to itself rather than by passively accommodating itself to a coercion working from without. It does not regard intelligence, therefore, as merely a result of evolution, but as also a factor in guiding the evolutionary process; for it regards intelligence as an evolution of the functions of life to the point at which they can be performed most effec-

tively. Similarly, knowledge, on this view, is not a copy whose truth is to be judged by its fidelity to an original; it is an instrument or organ of successful action.

We do not judge the value of the hand or eye on the basis of their being copies of something previously existing in the environment, but on the basis of their worth as instrumentalities of adjustments. On the pragmatic view, the case is the same with knowledge. What measures its value, its correctness and truth, is the degree of its availability for conducting to a successful issue the activities of living beings.

What we call "theory" and pure science are not then academic exercises of an isolated or transcendental reason, working according to its own a priori laws. They are simply the product of an unbiased, unprejudiced view of the conditions and consequences of the most efficient and fruitful action. For the success of an activity may be judged from either a narrow or a wide standpoint. When the individual views everything with reference to his ends and needs in isolation from the society of which he is a member, we do not get scientific knowledge, but knowledge in the form of opinion and dogma. When the individual considers the conditions and results of his activities from the standpoint of their bearing on the successful issue, or welfare, of the activities of the community, he gets the broadest, most general (or objective) point of view possible for human beings from which to know. The result of taking this social, instead of the purely personal, point of view is knowledge in its best sense – namely, science. And history shows that the advance of science represents the gradual victory of the more generic, or social point of view over purely individual points of view, opinions, and merely class points of view – dogmas. Pure knowledge, in short, is knowledge on the basis of the widest and most effective application or service in social progress instead of that of individual advantage secured at the expense of others. It is therefore not properly opposed to applied or useful knowledge.

Since one of the main offices of education is the training of mind – since, indeed, this is the only office of education when we consider mind in its organic connections with character – a changed view of the nature and purpose of mind carries with it a very great change in educational ideas and practices. Education in the past has been dominated almost entirely by a combination of the two older views of mind which I have noted – that of a pure reason or of a purely passive and receptive vessel. In general, the education of the "leisure class," the prevalent idea of "culture," is based on the notion of a mind separate, so far as possible, from material conditions and soiled by contact with them, a mind whose highest end is production of knowledge for its own sake. On the other hand, education for the "masses" has been considered a process by

which certain features of their environment were ground in upon them, till their minds were molded into passive and obedient conformity to the existing type about them. The distinctive and contrasted bearings of the pragmatic view of mind upon education must be for a further paper.

Second Paper

In the December number of this journal I showed that in the past educational theory and practice have been associated with two different theories of the nature of mind. One theory is that the highest faculty of mind is reason or pure thought, whose exercise results in knowledge. This view goes along with the notion that knowledge is an end in itself, apart from social uses and applications; it results in a theoretic type of education, one which its opponents condemn as scholastic and academic, while its upholders always defend it on the ground of "culture" and a "liberal," "humanistic" education. This type of education has prevailed almost entirely in the schools aiming to produce "gentlemen" in the English conventional sense – that is, members of the ruling and leisure class.

Another philosophy of mind has regarded mind as something purely passive, to be impressed from without by sensations and images which are then arranged to produce knowledge and beliefs. This notion has had its practical vogue mainly in education of the masses or "lower classes," with the effect, more or less consciously designed, of making them the passive and willing upholders of the existing order. For the things that were impressed upon the children of the lower schools were not, for the most part, natural objects and events; but the symbols of knowledge and of the art of calculation – the written and printed forms of language and the rudiments of arithmetic. The effect was two-fold. On the one hand, it developed mental dependency and submissiveness. Docility, or obedient absorption of material presented by school teacher and text-book, has been the traditional and conventional virtue of the schools. On the other hand, the social and economic conditions of elementary education have been such as to invite and to compel the great bulk of elementary school children to leave school at the point where they had enough reading, 'riting and 'rithmetic to make them more useful in subordinate economic positions, but not enough to encourage or enable them (save in rare instances) to rise to the point where they were masters of the direction of their own physical and mental powers.

Now, as was suggested in my prior article, the pragmatic theory of mind and of knowledge is adapted both to a different scheme of educational practice and to a different social aim for it. The pragmatic view of mind is that intelligence has developed primarily as an organ of readap-

tation and readjustment amid the needs of active functions that are continually increasing their complexity. The amoeba has little need of mind and knowledge. Its functions are simple, largely undifferentiated, and exercised in a medium which is simple, mainly all of one kind. Man lives in a highly differentiated environment, a natural and social world in which there is an endless diversity of factors to be taken account of; and where the maintenance of life and the successful achievement of ends depends upon delicate and far-reaching combinations of various factors. Every advance in civilization, every progressive social change, increases the number of factors at work and also the difficulty of keeping them balanced up (or coordinated, as we say, technically) with one another. The meal of the savage, his clothes, his shelter, bring into relation to one another only a scanty number of elements, existing at most over a short period of time, covering only a few square miles of space, and involving the cooperation of but a few score of people at most. The corresponding satisfactions of a modern denizen of a city, even of the poorest, are syntheses or coordinations of factors that operate almost over the entire world, cover a period of some years of successive activities and require the coadjustments of thousands of people.

Now this is only one illustration of a general law of development. The modern astronomer or chemist not only has thousands of facts to deal with where his ancestor had one, but he also has the problem of classifying, grouping each new fact; of fitting in with other facts, a process which perhaps requires the correction and reclassification of old facts as well as the interpretation of new ones. In this way, for example, the new facts discovered by Darwin were not merely added to old ones, but their discovery compelled a thorough re-examination and restatement of every previously known detail of botany and zoology. Wherever we look we find organic evolution both multiplying the number of details or elements that enter in, and also increasing the problem and the task of keeping these all properly balanced up with regard to one another. Otherwise, the mere increase in number and the unlikeness of parts would lead to utter confusion and a breakdown from dead weight. Because the human organism has so many more specialized parts or organs than the amoeba or the oyster, it is exposed to the danger of thousands of maladjustments and failures of cooperative activities which do not confront the other animals. And the same is true in comparing modern societies with savage groups.

The pragmatic theory points out that mind or intelligence is an accompaniment of just this process of organic growth in nature and in society. Mind is, so to speak, a device for keeping track of the increased differentiation and multiplication of conditions, and planning for, arranging for

in advance, ends and means of activity which will keep these various factors in proper adjustment to one another. This explains the fact that all intelligence involves a peculiar combination of the sensory and receptive factor (emphasized by the passive theory of education) with the active, intellectual factor – emphasized by the theory of pure rational activity. The function of sensation is to afford stimuli to properly directed behavior – i.e., to behavior which will keep the life functions properly adjusted. With respect to knowledge, sensations indicate the condition of things with respect to which the organism has to act. The object of sensations is not to mirror or even register the whole external world, but simply to make the individual agent aware of those things in the environment which threaten its welfare or which afford the resources needed at the given time in the life adjustments of the individual. If we regard sensations as intended to give knowledge of the external world in its entirety they are ludicrously incompetent to the end. If we regard them as devices for warning an agent of threatening dangers and for calling out responses which will enable the agent to protect himself and to avoid or destroy the obstacles, they are admirably fit for the purpose.

When, however, situations are complicated, the reports that come to an organism of the state of things that require attention if the organism is to hold its own are very diverse and incompatible. It would be impossible for the organism to react to them all at once; but it might be fatal for it arbitrarily to select one or a few, and ignore the others. A mistake in the selection must destroy the organism. Thinking develops accordingly as a method of valuing the importance of the various stimuli that demand attention. Judgment, in the popular usage, is precisely power to estimate the relative value of things as claimants for notice and responsive behavior. A faint sound may be of more importance in the long run than a loud one; a dim light more fraught with consequence upon the welfare of the organism than a bright one. Thought is required to discount their immediate strength, and to interpret them on the basis of their indirect and remote consequences. The power of imagination weighs the various stimuli that are struggling to control action up against one another; devises a method for discounting those which may be only momentarily more violent, and works up seemingly insignificant reports. Thus imagination and thought are processes of estimating observed objects in the light of their possible future consequences. They are forecasts, tentative predictions or conjectures as to what present conditions indicate or prophesy regarding future developments. All ideas are of the nature of what the scientist calls “working hypotheses”; forecasts of what will happen under future conditions; forecasts employed moreover to guide and direct activities so that if possible the

desirable conditions will be realized. Those ideas that really “work”; the forecasts that future events verify when they arrive; the plans and methods of behavior which successfully modify conditions in the direction desired, are true; and the term truth as applied to judgments and ideas has no other meaning than this.

I now touch briefly upon the bearings of this conception of mind upon the question of educational method, reserving for a later paper its bearings upon the subject-matter of study, and upon the social or moral basis and aim of schools:

1. Every educative process should begin with doing something; and the necessary training of sense perception, memory, imagination and judgment should grow out of the conditions and needs of what is being done. The something done should not be of the nature of an arbitrary task imposed by a taskmaster; but something inherently significant, and of such a nature that the pupil appreciates for himself its importance enough to take a vital interest in it. This is the way the child gets all the first training of his powers and all his first knowledge of the world. In carrying out his instinctive tendency to reach, handle, throw, a baby learns to know his own limbs and their capacities, and becomes acquainted with the properties of things – their hardness, colors, form, size and a thousand and one properties. He did not start to know these things, nor did any teacher set him the lesson of finding out about them. He started to do something, and these results came necessarily.

For a few years of his life, the first few, a child’s instinctive eagerness and the natural environment are so well adjusted that this educative training goes on at a very rapid rate and, relatively speaking, almost without oversight or guidance. There comes a time when a richer, fuller and more carefully selected and arranged environment is required to afford the stimuli and conditions of the most educative activity – an environment more varied than that of the ordinary home, and yet one not so varied, disorderly, overpowering and overspecialized as that of social life in general.

Conscious education begins at this point. If it were what it ought to be and what it may become, it would consist in the selection and arrangement of an environment of materials and tools, with models of the best artistic achievement of such a nature as to call out and exercise the child’s life functions – to suggest to him, in other words, things worth doing and to keep him engaged in doing them. Teachers would be present, more competent, more experienced members of a society; but they would be present as fellow-workers and fellow-players – comrades in carrying on the scheme of play and work activities, and in building up, along with the children, a miniature world as the obvious result and reward of their joint activities.

2. Sense training would inevitably result from engaging in these various activities. The boy who plays marbles and ball, the girl who dresses and undresses her doll and makes clothes for her, gets a training of the senses which is all the more effective because it is incidental to the carrying on of some line of action, and is not set up as a special task or end in itself. Clay modeling, gardening, shop-work in wood or metal, cooking, weaving, etc. – these are the normal methods for cultivating power of observation and accurate interpretation of sensations. The race did not acquire its original store of information for the sake of knowledge, nor yet by having natural objects impress themselves on the mind. It learned about plants, animals, stones, metals, weather, etc., because a knowledge of these things was required to solve problems of food, shelter, clothing, social cooperation and defense and so on.

3. The more intellectual side of education, the store of general ideas and principles, the requisition of habits of reflection and deliberation, should be placed on the same basis. All thinking at its outset is planning, forecasting, forming purposes, selecting and arranging means for their most economical and successful realization. Comparatively little opportunity is afforded in our present school systems for the practical activities which are necessary to develop this type of thought. Opportunities for independent manipulation of materials, initiative and responsibility for getting results, for detecting and correcting errors, are few and far between. As a result, the power of thinking remains comparatively undeveloped except in the few who are naturally adapted to more specialized and purely theoretic interests – children and youth whose thinking clusters about the symbols for things, rather than things themselves. Such persons get specialized naturally into an academic class of investigators and speculators. The world doubtless owes a great deal to its pure “researchers” and scholars; but it would owe a great deal more still to them if they had been educated into habits of thinking out the bearings of their abstract ideas upon social matters. As it is, they have been largely shunted off into an isolated and remote class – isolated and remote socially, that is – where the results of their thinking are quite “safe,” because not translated from symbols into the facts of action.

In an educational scheme which should embody practically the pragmatic conception of thought, intellectual instruction would have then the following traits: (a) It would grow – all of it – out of the needs and opportunities of activities engaged in by the students themselves. This principle would be universal. At present it is expressed sporadically; to some extent in the kindergarten at the lower end, in the scientific laboratories at the upper, and in the manual and occupational activities of shop-work, cooking, etc., along the line. (b) Information would not be amassed and accumulated and driven into pupils as an end in

itself, but would cluster about the development of activities. Some information is immediately required in order to do anything successfully; a child cannot garden intelligently without learning about soils, seeds, measures, plants and their growth, the facts of rain, sunshine, etc. Interest in the continuous carrying on of such an activity would, however, generate curiosity and openness of mind about many things not directly related to the immediate needs. Methods of agriculture in this and other lands, the historic evolution of this occupation, the social and economic problems connected with it, have a natural interest and avenue to the mind of one who has developed personal interest in a similar activity which they cannot have for one who merely hears or reads about them second hand. One great object then in having school work organized mainly about certain continuous lines of occupation is that these afford natural axes for the collection and organization of all kinds of facts and ideas. (c) Instruction carried on upon this basis would teach the mind that all ideas, truths, theories, etc., are of the nature of working hypotheses. One of the chief obstacles to the progress of the race has been the dogmatic habit of mind, the belief that some principles and ideas have such a final value and authority that they are to be accepted without question and without revision. The experimental habit of mind, that which regards ideas and principles as tentative methods of solving problems and organizing data, is very recent. An education based upon the pragmatic conception would inevitably turn out persons who were alive to the necessity of continually testing their ideas and beliefs by putting them into practical application, and of revising their beliefs on the basis of the results of such application.

Concluding Paper

Having spoken of the pragmatic theory in general and of its special bearings upon educational method, I propose to speak briefly of its connection with educational subject-matter, or the material of the course of study. For the last two or three centuries educational reformers have protested against the conventional scheme of studies on the ground of its artificiality and remoteness from life. At first they protested against its verbal and linguistic character, against the fact that it was devoted so exclusively to symbols of learning. This protest has been more or less effectual and material from nature (the sciences) and from the life of man (history) introduced into the schools. Then there was a protest against the exclusively informational character of these studies – against the emphasis upon memorizing and the accumulation of knowledge – and a demand for what would connect more directly and more usefully with contemporary social requirements. Industrial drawing, manual training, the rudiments of various arts have been intro-

duced in response to this demand. If we add to the list of studies finally pursued in the schools the subjects of music and the other "fine" arts, we do not wonder that there has grown up an outcry against an overloaded curriculum, lacking in unity and concentration, scattering and overstraining the activities of both teachers and children. There has even been a cry for a return to the simplicity of the meagre fare of the old-fashioned three R's. But is there not some other way of securing organization of material and unity of purpose?

The education of the human race, upon the whole, has been gained through the occupations which it has pursued and developed. The vocations, the professions, the lines of activity which have been socially evolved, have furnished the social stimuli to knowledge and the centres about which it has been organized. If occupations were made fundamental in education, school work would conform to the natural principles of social and mental development. The beginnings of this reform have already been introduced. Froebel got a glimpse of this conception in his scheme of education for infancy, though his policy was too romantic and symbolic to permit the idea to get adequate expression. Engineering and technical schools, in which the sciences are pursued in reference to their social uses, illustrate, at the upper end of the school ladder, another aspect of the same principle. The increasing emphasis upon gardening, horticulture, cooking, weaving, shop-work in wood and metal in the elementary and secondary schools is another symptom of the same movement. The ultimate value and (let us hope) destiny of the present movement toward industrial education will depend upon whether it becomes switched off into a method of class-education – in which case it would be better for it to perish immediately – or whether it recognizes the fundamental importance of training in typical and continuous lines of activity, which are of social value for everybody.

It is a serious error to think of occupational activities as if they were merely of prosaic and utilitarian, or even commercial, worth. Their primary value is educational. It consists in training the thinking of the boys and girls in connection with things that appeal to them as worth doing, instead of training thought-power by partly formal tasks and gymnastic exercises. It does not exclude, but includes a broad and liberal scheme of knowledge. All typical social occupations rest upon scientific insight and information. One of the chief values of shop-work, weaving, gardening, etc., even in elementary schools, is that they introduce the pupil to natural facts and forces and give him a motive for becoming thoroughly acquainted with the concrete facts and laws of nature. The historic development of the occupations by which men have subjugated nature by learning its secrets, and have learned how to cooperate with

another for common ends, gives the key to the study of history; it indicates what is important and what is trivial in the mass of facts that has come down from the past. An adequate mastery of typical occupations brings the pupil to a study of the social conditions and aims of the present; to facts which, when classified, form sociology, political economy, civics and politics. The fine arts are naturally included; for, as Morris and others have pointed out, all embodiment of ideas in external form, when done freely and with joy in the activity, tends to gain an artistic quality. In short, there is nothing of science, history or art which the educational experience of the past has shown to be of worth which an occupational education would not include. Old values would be conserved, but would be centralized about a new principle and acquire the vitality of a new motive.

Finally, such an education would change the morale of the school. Since the activities of the latter would be continuous with the interests and activities of men and women at large, the school would lose the special code of ethics and moral training, which must characterize it as long as it is isolated. It would take up into itself the moral aims and forces of social sympathy, cooperation and progress. Occupations bring people naturally together in groups, develop a group of consciousness and power to divide and yet cooperate harmoniously. Knowledge, scholastic attainments, aesthetic culture, pursued, as at present, with only personal ends in view, tend to egoism, social stratifications and antagonisms.

MORAL PRINCIPLES IN EDUCATION

John Dewey. *Moral Principles in Education*. Edited and introduced by Henry Suzzallo. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909). Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 4 (1977), pp. viii–x, 1–61. **NB: not the page #s given to me, but these are correct**

Introduction

The discussion of moral education and illustration of mistake views of laymen

Nowhere is the validity of this distinction between education as a public business and education as an expert professional service brought out more clearly than in an analysis of the public discussion of the moral work of the school. How frequently of late have those unacquainted with the special nature of the school proclaimed the moral ends of education and at the same time demanded direct ethical instruction as the particular method by which they were to be realized! This, too, in spite of the fact that those who know best the powers and limitations of instruction as an instrument have repeatedly pointed out the futility of assuming that knowledge of right constitutes a guarantee of right doing. How common it is for those who assert that education is for social efficiency to assume that the school should return to the barren discipline of the traditional formal subjects, reading, writing, and the rest! This, too, regardless of the fact that it has taken a century of educational evolution to make the course of study varied and rich enough to call for those impulses and activities of social life which need training in the child. And how many who speak glowingly of the large services of the public schools to a democracy of free and self-reliant men affect a cynical and even vehement opposition to the “self-government of schools!” These would not have the children learn to govern themselves and one another, but would have the masters rule them, ignoring the fact that this common practice in childhood may be a foundation for that evil condition in adult society where the citizens are arbitrarily ruled by political bosses.

One need not cite further cases of the incompetence of the lay public to deal with technical questions of school methods. Instances are

plentiful, to show that well-meaning people, competent enough to judge of the aims and results of school work, make a mistake in insisting upon the prerogative of directing the technical aspects of education with a dogmatism that would not characterize their statements regarding any other special field of knowledge or action.

A fundamental understanding of moral principles in education

Nothing can be more useful than for the public and the teaching profession to understand their respective functions. The teacher needs to understand public opinion and the social order, as much as the public needs to comprehend the nature of expert educational service. It will take time to draw the boundary lines that will be conducive to respect, restraint, and efficiency in those concerned; but a beginning can be made upon fundamental matters, and nothing so touches the foundations of our educational thought as a discussion of the moral principles in education.

It is our pleasure to present a treatment of them by a thinker whose vital influence upon the reform of school methods is greater than that of any of his contemporaries. In his discussion of the social and psychological factors in moral education, there is much that will suggest what social opinion should determine, and much that will indicate what must be left to the trained teacher and school official.

I

The Moral Purpose of the School

An English contemporary philosopher has called attention to the difference between moral ideas and ideas about morality. "Moral ideas" are ideas of any sort whatsoever which take effect in conduct and improve it, make it better than it otherwise would be. Similarly, one may say, immoral ideas are ideas of whatever sort (whether arithmetical or geographical or physiological) which show themselves in making behavior worse than it would otherwise be; and non-moral, ideas, one may say, are such ideas and pieces of information as leave conduct uninfluenced for either the better or the worse. Now "ideas about morality" may be morally indifferent or immoral or moral. There is nothing in the nature of ideas *about* morality, of information *about* honesty or purity or kindness which automatically transmutes such ideas into good character or good conduct.

This distinction between moral ideas, ideas of any sort whatsoever that have become a part of character and hence a part of the working motives of behavior, and ideas *about* moral action that may remain as inert and ineffective as it they were so much knowledge about Egyptian

archæology, is fundamental to the discussion of moral education. The business of the educator – whether parent or teacher – is to see to it that the greatest possible number of ideas acquired by children and youth are acquired in such a vital way that they become *moving* ideas, motive-forces in the guidance of conduct. This demand and this opportunity make the moral purpose universal and dominant in all instruction – whatsoever the topic. Were it not for this possibility, the familiar statement that the ultimate purpose of all education is character-forming would be hypocritical pretense; for as every one knows, the direct and immediate attention of teachers and, pupils must be; for the greater part of the time, upon intellectual matters. It is out of the question to keep direct moral considerations constantly uppermost. But it is not out of the question to aim at making the methods of learning, of acquiring intellectual power, and of assimilating subject-matter, such that they will render behavior more enlightened, more consistent, more vigorous than it otherwise would be.

The same distinction between “moral ideas” and “ideas about morality” explains for us a source of continual misunderstanding between teachers in the schools and critics of education outside of the schools. The latter look through the school programmes, the school courses of study, and do not find any place set apart for instruction in ethics or for “moral teaching.” Then they assert, that the schools are doing nothing, or next to nothing, for character-training; they become emphatic, even vehement, about the moral deficiencies of public education. The school-teachers, on the other hand, resent these criticisms as an injustice, and hold not only that they do “teach morals,” but that they teach them every moment of the day, five days in the week. In this contention the teachers *in principle* are in the right; if they are in the wrong, it is not because special periods are not set aside for what after all can only be teaching *about* morals, but because their own characters, or their school atmosphere and ideals, or their methods of teaching, or the subject-matter which they teach, are not such *in detail* as to bring intellectual results into vital union with character so that they become working forces in behavior. Without discussing, therefore, the limits or the value of so-called direct moral instruction (or, better, instruction *about* morals), it may be laid down as fundamental that the influence of direct moral instruction, even at its very best, is *comparatively* small in amount and slight in influence, when the whole field of moral growth through education is taken into account. This larger field of indirect and vital moral education, the development of character through all the agencies, instrumentalities, and materials of school life is, therefore, the subject of our present discussion.

II

The Moral Training Given by the School Community

There cannot be two sets of ethical principles, one for life in the school, and the other for life outside of the school. As conduct is one, so also the principles of conduct are one. The tendency to discuss the morals of the school as if the school were an institution by itself is highly unfortunate. The moral responsibility of the school, and of those who conduct it, is to society. The school is fundamentally an institution erected by society to do a certain specific work, – to exercise a certain specific function in maintaining the life and advancing the welfare of society. The educational system which does not recognize that this fact entails upon it an ethical responsibility is derelict and a defaulter. It is not doing what it was called into existence to do, and what it pretends to do. Hence the entire structure of the school in general and its concrete workings in particular need to be considered from time to time with reference to the social position and function of the school.

The idea that the moral work and worth of the public school system as a whole are to be measured by its social value is, indeed, a familiar notion. However, it is frequently taken in too limited and rigid a way. The social work of the school is often limited to training for citizenship, and citizenship, is then interpreted in a narrow sense as meaning capacity to vote intelligently, disposition to obey laws, etc. But it is futile to contract and cramp the ethical responsibility of the school in this way. The child is one, and he must either live his social life as an integral unified being, or suffer loss and create friction. To pick out one of the many social relations which the child bears, and to define the work of the school by that alone, is like instituting a vast and complicated system of physical exercise which would have for its object simply the development of the lungs and the power of breathing, independent of other organs and functions. The child is an organic whole, intellectually, socially, and morally, as well as physically. We must take the child as a member of society in the broadest sense, and demand for and from the schools whatever is necessary to enable the child intelligently to recognize all his social relations and take his part in sustaining them.

To isolate the formal relationship of citizenship from the whole system of relations with which it is actually interwoven; to suppose that there is some one particular study or mode of treatment which can make the child a good citizen; to suppose, in other words, that a good citizen is anything more than a thoroughly efficient and serviceable member of society, one with all his powers of body and mind under control, is a hampering superstition which it is hoped may soon disappear from, educational discussion.

The child is to be not, only a voter and a subject of law; he is also be a

member of a family, himself in turn responsible, in all probability, for rearing and training of future children, thereby maintaining the continuity of society. He is to be a worker, engaged in some occupation which will be of use to society, and which will maintain his own independence and self-respect. He is to be a member of some particular neighborhood and community, and must contribute to the values of life, add to the decencies and graces of civilization wherever he is. These are bare and formal statements, but if we let our imagination translate them into their concrete details; we have a wide and varied scene. For the child properly to take his place in reference to these various functions means training in science, in art, in history; means command of the fundamental methods of inquiry and the fundamental tools of intercourse and communication; means a trained and sound body, skillful eye and hand; means habits of industry; perseverance; in short; habits of serviceableness.

Moreover, the society of which the child is to be a member is, in the United States, a democratic and progressive society. The child must be educated for leadership as well as for obedience. He must have power of self-direction and power of directing others, power of administration, ability to assume positions of responsibility. This necessity of educating for leadership is as great on the industrial as on the political side.

New inventions, new machines, new methods of transportation and intercourse are making over the whole scene of action year by year. It is an absolute impossibility to educate the child for any fixed station in life. So far as education is conducted unconsciously or consciously on this basis, it results in fitting the future citizen for no station in life, but makes him a drone, a hanger-on, or an actual retarding influence in the onward movement. Instead of caring for himself and for others, he becomes one who has himself to be cared for. Here, too, the ethical responsibility of the school on the social side must be interpreted in the broadest and freest spirit; it is equivalent to that training of the child which will give him such possession of himself that he may take charge of himself; may not only adapt himself to the changes that are going on, but have power to shape and direct them.

Apart from participation in social life, the school has no moral end nor aim. As long as we confine ourselves to the school as an isolated institution, we have no directing principles, because we have no object. For example, the end at education is said to be the harmonious development of all the flowers of the individual. Here no reference to social life or membership is apparent, and yet many think we have in it and adequate and thoroughgoing definition of the goal of education. But if this definition be taken independently of social relationship we have no way of telling what is meant by any one of the terms employed. We do

not know what a power is; we do not know what development is; we do not know what harmony is. A power is a power only with reference to the use to which it is put, the function it has to serve. If we leave out the uses supplied by social life we have nothing but the old "faculty psychology" to tell what is meant by power and what the specific powers are. The principle reduces itself to enumerating a lot of faculties like perception, memory, reasoning, etc., and then stating that each one of these powers needs to be developed.

Education then becomes a gymnastic exercise. Acute powers of observation and memory might be developed by studying Chinese characters; acuteness in reasoning might be got by discussing the scholastic subtleties of the Middle Ages. The simple fact is that there is no isolated faculty of observation, or memory, or reasoning anymore than there is an original faculty of black-smithing, carpentering, or steam engineering. Faculties mean simply that particular impulses and habits have been coördinated or framed with reference to accomplishing certain definite kinds of work. We need to know the social situations in which the individual will have to use ability to observe, recollect, imagine, and reason, in order to have any way of telling what a training of mental powers actually means.

What holds in the illustration of this particular definition of education holds good from whatever point of view we approach the matter. Only as we interpret school activities with reference to the larger circle of social activities to which they relate do we find any standard for judging their moral significance.

The school itself must be a vital social institution to a much greater extent than obtains at present I am told that there is a swimming school in a certain city where youth are taught to swim without going into the water, being repeatedly drilled in the various movements which are necessary, for swimming. When one of the young men so trained was asked what he did when he got into the water, he laconically replied, "Sunk." The story happens to be true; were it not, it would seem to be a fable made expressly for the purpose of typifying the ethical relationship of school to society. The school cannot be a preparation for social life excepting as it reproduces, within itself typical conditions of social life. At present it is largely engaged in the futile task of Sisyphus. It is endeavoring to form habits in children for use in a social life which, it would almost seem, is carefully and purposely kept away from vital contact with the child undergoing training. The only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life. To form habits of social usefulness and serviceableness apart from any direct social need and motive, apart from any existing social situation, is, to the letter, teaching the child to swim by going through motions outside of the water. The most indis-

pensable condition is left out of account, and the results are correspondingly partial.

The much lamented separation in the schools of intellectual and moral training, of acquiring information and growing in character, is simply one expression of the failure to conceive and, construct the school as a social, institution, having social life and value within itself. Except so far as the school is an embryonic typical community life, moral training must be partly pathological and partly formal. Training is pathological when stress is laid upon correcting wrong-doing instead of upon forming habits of positive service. Too often the teacher's concern with the moral life of pupils takes the form of alertness for failures to conform to school rules and routine. These regulations, judged from the standpoint of the development of the child at the time, are more or less conventional and arbitrary. They are rules which have to be made in order that the existing modes of school work may go on; but the lack of inherent necessity in these school modes reflects itself in a feeling, on the part of the child, that the moral discipline of the school is arbitrary. Any conditions that compel the teacher to take note of failures rather than of healthy growth give false standards and result, in distortion and perversion. Attending to wrong-doing ought to be an incident rather than a principle. The child ought to have a positive consciousness of what he is about, so as to judge his acts from, the stand-point of reference to the work which he has to do. Only in this way does he have a vital standard, one that enables him to turn failures to account for the future.

By saying that the moral training of the school is formal, I mean that the moral habits currently emphasized by the school are habits which are created, as it were, *ad hoc*. Even the habits of promptness, regularity, industry, non-interference with the work of others, faithfulness to tasks imposed, which are specially inculcated in the school, are habits that are necessary simply because the school system is what it is, and must be preserved intact. If we grant the inviolability of the school system as it is, these habits represent permanent and necessary moral ideas; but just in so far as the school system is itself isolated and mechanical, insistence upon these moral habits is more or less unreal, because the ideal to which they relate is not itself necessary. The duties, in other words, are distinctly school duties, not life duties. If we compare this condition with that of the well-ordered home, we find that the duties and responsibilities that the child has there to recognize do not belong to the family as a specialized and isolated institution, but flow from the very nature of the social life in which the family participates and to which it contributes. The child ought to have the same motives for right doing and to be judged by the same standards in the

school, as the adult in the wider social life to which he belongs. Interest in community welfare, an interest that is intellectual and practical, as well as emotional – an interest, that is to say, in perceiving whatever makes for social order and progress, and in carrying these principles into execution – is the moral habit to which all the special school habits must be related if they are to be animated by the breath of life.

III

The Moral Training from Methods of Instruction

The principle of the social character of the school as the basic factor in the moral education given may be also applied to the question of methods of instruction, – not in their details, but their general spirit. The emphasis then falls upon construction and giving out, rather than upon absorption and mere learning. We fail to recognize how essentially individualistic the latter methods are, and how unconsciously, yet certainly and effectively, they react into the child's ways of judging and of acting. Imagine forty children all engaged in reading the same books, and in preparing and reciting the same lessons day after day. Suppose this process constitutes by far the larger part of their work, and that they are continually judged from the standpoint of what they are able to take in in a study hour and reproduce in a recitation hour. There is next to no opportunity for any social division of labor. There is no opportunity for each child to work out something specifically his own, which he may contribute to the common stock, while he, in turn, participates in the productions of others. All are set to do exactly the same work and turn out the same products. The social spirit is not cultivated, – in fact, in so far as the purely individualistic method gets in its work, it atrophies for lack of use. One reason why reading aloud in school is poor is that the real motive for the use of language – the desire to communicate and to learn – is not utilized. The child knows perfectly well that the teacher and all his fellow pupils have exactly the same facts and ideas before them that he has; he is not *giving* them anything at all. And it may be questioned whether the moral lack is not as great as the intellectual. The child is born with a natural desire to give out, to do, to serve. When this tendency is not used, when conditions are such that other motives are substituted, the accumulation of an influence working against the social spirit is much larger than we have any idea of, – especially when the burden of work, week after week, and year after year, falls upon this side.

But lack of cultivation of the social spirit is not all. Positively individualistic motives and standards are inculcated. Some stimulus must be found to keep the child at his studies. At the best this will be his affection for his teacher; together with a feeling that he is not violating

school rules, and thus negatively, if not positively, is contributing to the good of the school. I have nothing to say against these motives so far as they go, but they are inadequate. The relation between the piece of work to be done and affection for a third person is external, not intrinsic. It is therefore liable to break down whenever the external conditions are changed. Moreover, this attachment to a particular person, while in a way social, may become so isolated and exclusive as to be selfish in quality. In any case, the child should gradually grow out of this relatively external motive into an appreciation, for its own sake, of the social value of what he has to do, because of its larger relations to life, not pinned down to two or three persons.

But, unfortunately, the motive is not always at this relative best, but mixed with lower motives which are distinctly egoistic. Fear is a motive which is almost sure to enter in, – not necessarily physical fear, or fear of punishment, but fear of losing the approbation of others; or fear of failure, so extreme as to be morbid and paralyzing. On the other side, emulation and rivalry enter in. Just because all are doing the same work, and are judged (either in recitation or examination with reference to grading and to promotion) not from the standpoint of their personal contribution, but from that of *comparative* success, the feeling of superiority over others is unduly appealed to, while timid children are depressed. Children are judged with reference to their capacity to realize the same external standard. The weaker gradually lose their sense of power, and accept a position of continuous and persistent inferiority. The effect upon both self-respect and respect for work need not be dwelt upon. The strong learn to glory, not in their strength, but in the fact that they are stronger. The child is prematurely launched into the region of individualistic competition, and this in a direction where competition is least applicable, namely, in intellectual and artistic matters, whose law is cooperation and participation.

Next, perhaps, to the evils of passive absorption and of competition for external standing come, perhaps, those which result from the eternal emphasis upon preparation for a remote future. I do not refer here to the waste of energy and vitality that accrues when children, who live so largely in the immediate present, are appealed to in the name of a dim and uncertain future which means little or nothing to them. I have in mind rather the habitual procrastination that develops when the motive for work is future, not present; and the false standards of judgment that are created when work is estimated, not on the basis of present need and present responsibility, but by reference to an external result, like passing an examination, getting promoted, entering high school, getting into college, etc. Who can reckon up the loss of moral power that arises from the constant impression that nothing is worth doing in itself, but only as

a preparation for something else, which in turn is only a getting ready for some genuinely serious end beyond? Moreover, as a rule, it will be found that remote success is an end which appeals most to those in whom egoistic desire to get ahead – to get ahead of others – is already only too strong a motive. Those in whom personal ambition is already so strong that it paints glowing pictures of future victories may be touched; others of a more generous nature do not respond.

I cannot stop to paint the other side. I can only say that the introduction of every method that appeals to the child's active powers, to his capacities in construction, production, and creation, marks an opportunity to shift the centre of ethical gravity from an absorption which is selfish to a service which is social. Manual training is more than manual; it is more than intellectual; in the hands of any good teacher it lends itself easily, and almost as a matter of course, to development of social habits. Ever since the philosophy of Kant, it has been a commonplace of æsthetic theory, that art is universal; that it is not the product of purely personal desire or appetite, or capable of merely individual appropriation, but has a value participated in by all who perceive it. Even in the schools where most conscious attention is paid to moral considerations, the methods of study and recitation may be such as to emphasize appreciation rather than power, an emotional readiness to assimilate the experiences of others, rather than enlightened and trained capacity to carry forward those values which in other conditions and past times made those experiences worth having. At all events, separation between instruction and character continues in our schools (in spite of the efforts of individual teachers) as a result of divorce between learning and doing. The attempt to attach genuine moral effectiveness to the mere processes of learning, and to the habits which go along with learning, can result only in a training infected with formality, arbitrariness, and an undue emphasis upon failure to conform. That there is as much accomplished as there is shows the possibilities involved in methods of school activity which afford opportunity for reciprocity, coöperation, and positive personal achievement.

IV

The Social Nature of the Course of Study

In many respects, it is the subject-matter used in school life which decides both the general atmosphere of the school and the methods of instruction and discipline which rule. A barren "course of study," that is to say, a meagre and narrow field of school activities, cannot possibly lend itself to the development of a vital social spirit or to methods that appeal to sympathy and coöperation instead of to absorption, exclusiveness, and competition. Hence it becomes an all important matter to

know how we shall apply our social standard of more value to the subject matter of school work, to what we call, traditionally, the “studies” that occupy pupils.

A study is to be considered as a means of bringing the child to realize the social scene of action. Thus considered it gives a criterion for selection of material and for judgment of values. We have at present three independent values set up: one of culture, another of information, and another of discipline. In reality, these refer only to three phases of social interpretation. Information is genuine or educative only in so far as it presents definite images and conceptions of materials placed in a context of social life. Discipline is genuinely educative only as it represents a reaction of information into the individual’s own powers so that he brings them under control for social ends. Culture, if it is to be genuinely educative and not an external polish or factitious varnish, represents the vital union of information and discipline. It marks the socialization of the individual in his outlook upon life.

This point may be illustrated by brief reference to a few of the school studies. In the first place, there is no line of demarkation within facts themselves which classifies them as belonging to science, history, or geography, respectively. The pigeon-hole classification which is so prevalent at present (fostered by introducing the pupil at the outset into a number of different studies contained in different text-books) gives an utterly erroneous idea of the relations of studies to one another and to the intellectual whole to which all belong. In fact, these subjects have to do with the same ultimate reality, namely, the conscious experience of man. It is only because we have different interests, or different ends, that we sort out the material and label part of it science, part of it history, part geography, and so on. Each “sorting” represents materials arranged with reference to some one dominant typical aim or process of the social life.

This social criterion is necessary, not only to mark off studies from one another, but also to grasp the reasons for each study, – the motives in connection with which it shall be presented. How, for example, should we define geography? What is the unity in the different so-called divisions of geography, – mathematical geography, physical geography, political geography, commercial geography? Are they purely empirical classifications dependent upon the brute fact that we run across a lot of different facts? Or is there some intrinsic principle through which the material is distributed under these various heads, – something in the interest and attitude of the human mind towards them? I should say that geography has to do with all those aspects of social life which are concerned with the interaction of the life of man and nature; or, that it has to do with the world considered as the scene of social interaction.

Any fact, then, will be geographical in so far as it has to do with the dependence of man upon his natural environment, or with changes introduced in this environment through the life of man.

The four forms of geography referred to above represent, then, four increasing stages of abstraction in discussing the mutual relation of human life and nature. The beginning must be social geography, the frank recognition of the earth as the home of men acting in relations to one another. I mean by this that the essence of any geographical fact is the consciousness of two persons, or two groups of persons, who are at once separated and connected by their physical environment, and that the interest is in seeing how these people are at once kept apart and brought together in their actions by the instrumentality of the physical environment. The ultimate significance of lake, river, mountain, and plain is not physical but social; it is the part which it plays in modifying and directing human relationships. This evidently involves an extension of the term commercial. It has to do not simply with business, in the narrow sense, but with whatever relates to human intercourse and intercommunication as affected by natural forms and properties. Political geography represents this same social interaction taken in a static instead of in a dynamic way; taken, that is, as temporarily crystallized and fixed in certain forms. Physical geography (including under this not simply physiography, but also the study of flora and fauna) represents a further analysis or abstraction. It studies the conditions which determine human action, leaving out of account, temporarily, the ways in which they concretely do this. Mathematical geography carries the analysis back to more ultimate and remote conditions, showing that the physical conditions of the earth are not ultimate, but depend upon the place which the world occupies in a larger system. Here, in other words, are traced, step by step, the links which connect the immediate social occupations and groupings of men with the whole natural system which ultimately conditions them. Step by step the scene is enlarged and the image of what enters into the make-up of social action is widened and broadened; at no time is the chain of connection to be broken.

It is out of the question to take up the studies one by one and show that their meaning is similarly controlled by social considerations. But I cannot forbear saying a word or two upon history. History is vital or dead to the child according as it is, or is not, presented from the sociological standpoint. When treated simply as a record of what has passed and gone, it must be mechanical, because the past, as the past, is remote. Simply as the past there is no motive for attending to it. The ethical value of history teaching will be measured by the extent to which past events are made the means of understanding the present, – affording

insight into what makes up the structure and working of society to-day. Existing social structure is exceedingly complex. It is practically impossible for the child to attack it *en masse* and get any definite mental image of it. But type phases of historical development may be selected which will exhibit, as through a telescope, the essential constituents of the existing order. Greece, for example, represents what art and growing power of individual expression stand for; Rome exhibits the elements and forces of political life on a tremendous scale. Or, as these civilizations are themselves relatively complex, a study of still simpler forms of hunting, nomadic, and agricultural life in the beginnings of civilization, a study of the effects of the introduction of iron, and iron tools, reduces the complexity to simpler elements.

One reason historical teaching is usually not more effective is that the student is set to acquire information in such a way that no epochs or factors stand out in his mind as typical; everything is reduced to the same dead level. The way to secure the necessary perspective is to treat the past as if it were a projected present with some of its elements enlarged.

The principle of contrast is as important as that of similarity. Because the present life is so close to us, touching us at every point, we cannot get away from it to see it as it really is. Nothing stands out clearly or sharply as characteristic. In the study of past periods, attention necessarily attaches itself to striking differences. Thus the child gets a locus of imagination, through which he can remove himself from the pressure of present surrounding circumstances and define them.

History is equally available in teaching the *methods* of social progress. It is commonly stated that history must be studied from the standpoint of cause and effect. The truth of this statement depends upon its interpretation. Social life is so complex and the various parts of it are so organically related to one another and to the natural environment, that it is impossible to say that this or that thing is the cause of some other particular thing. But the study of history can reveal the main instruments in the discoveries, inventions, new modes of life, etc., which have initiated the great epochs of social advance, and it can present to the child types of the main lines of social progress, and can set before him what have been the chief difficulties and obstructions in the way of progress. Once more this can be done only in so far as it is recognized that social forces in themselves are always the same, – that the same kind of influences were at work one hundred and one thousand years ago that are now working, – and that particular historical epochs afford illustration of the way in which the fundamental forces work.

Everything depends, then, upon history being treated from a social

standpoint; as manifesting the agencies which have influenced social development and as presenting the typical institutions in which social life has expressed itself. The culture-epoch theory, while working in the right direction, has failed to recognize the importance of treating past periods with relation to the present, – as affording insight into the representative factors of its structure; it has treated these periods too much as if they had some meaning or value in themselves. The way in which the biographical method is handled illustrates the same point. It is often treated in such a way as to exclude from the child's consciousness (or at least not sufficiently to emphasize) the social forces and principles involved in the association of the masses of men. It is quite true that the child is easily interested in history from the biographical standpoint; but unless "the hero" is treated in relation to the community life behind him that he sums up and directs, there is danger that history will reduce itself to a mere exciting story. Then moral instruction reduces itself to drawing certain lessons from the life of the particular personalities concerned, instead of widening and deepening the child's imagination of social relations, ideals, and means.

It will be remembered that I am not making, these points for their own sake, but with reference to the general principle that when a study is taught as a mode of understanding social life it has positive ethical import. What the normal child continuously needs is not so much isolated moral lessons upon the importance of truthfulness and honesty, or the beneficent results that follow from a particular act of patriotism, as the formation of habits of social imagination and conception.

I take one more illustration, namely, mathematics. This does, or does not, accomplish its full purpose according as it is, or is not, presented as a social tool. The prevailing divorce between information and character, between knowledge and social action, stalks upon the scene here. The moment mathematical study is severed from the place which it occupies with reference to use in social life, it becomes unduly abstract, even upon the purely intellectual side. It is presented as a matter of technical relations and formulæ apart from any end or use. What the study of number suffers from in elementary education is lack of motivation. Back of this and that and the other particular bad method is the radical mistake of treating number as if it were an end in itself, instead of the means of accomplishing some end. Let the child get a consciousness of what is the use of number, of what it really is for, and half the battle is won. Now this consciousness of the use of reason implies some end which is implicitly social.

One of the absurd things in the more advanced study of arithmetic is the extent to which the child is introduced to numerical operations which have no distinctive mathematical principles characterizing them,

but which represent certain general principles found in business relationships. To train the child in these operations, while paying no attention to the business realities in which they are of use, or to the conditions of social life which make these business activities necessary, is neither arithmetic nor common sense. The child is, called upon to do examples in interest, partnership, banking, brokerage, and so on through a long string, and no pains are taken to see that, in connection with the arithmetic, he has any sense of the social realities involved. This part of arithmetic is essentially sociological in its nature. It ought either to be omitted entirely, or else be taught in connection with a study of the relevant social realities. As we now manage the study, it is the old case of learning to swim apart from the water over again, with correspondingly bad results on the practical side.

In concluding this portion of the discussion, we may say that our conceptions of moral education have been too narrow, too formal, and too pathological. We have associated the term ethical with certain special acts which are labeled virtues and are set off from the mass of other acts, and are still more, divorced from the habitual images and motives of the children performing them. Moral instruction is thus associated with teaching about these particular virtues, or with instilling certain sentiments in regard to them. The moral has been conceived in too goody-goody a way. Ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more or less than social intelligence – the power of observing and comprehending social situations, and social power – trained capacities of control – at work in the service of social interest and aims. There is no fact which throws light upon the constitution of society, there is no power whose training adds to social resourcefulness that is not moral.

I sum up, then, this part of the discussion by asking your attention to the moral trinity of the school. The demand is for social intelligence, social power, and social interests. Our resources are (1) the life of the school as a social institution in itself; (2) methods of learning and of doing work; and (3) the school studies or curriculum. In so far as the school represents, in its own spirit, a genuine community life; in so far as what are called: school discipline, government, order, etc., are the expressions of this inherent social spirit; in so far as the methods used are those that appeal to the active and constructive powers, permitting the child to give out and thus to serve; in so far as the curriculum is so selected and organized as to provide the material for affording the child a consciousness of the world in which he has to play a part, and the demands he has to meet; so far as these ends are met, the school is organized on an ethical basis. So far as general principles are concerned, all the basic ethical requirements are met. The rest remains between the individual teacher and the individual child.

V

The Psychological Aspect of Moral Education

So far we have been considering the make-up of purposes and results that constitute conduct – its “what.” But conduct has a certain method and spirit also – its “how.” Conduct may be looked upon as expressing the attitudes and dispositions of an *individual* as well as realizing social results and maintaining the social fabric. A consideration of conduct as a mode of individual performance, personal doing, takes us from the social to the psychological side of morals. In the first place, all conduct springs ultimately and radically out of native instincts and impulses. We must know what these instincts and impulses are, and what they are at each particular stage of the child’s development, in order to know what to appeal to and what to build upon. Neglect of this principle may give a mechanical imitation of moral conduct, but the imitation will be ethically dead, because it is external and has its centre without, not within, the individual. We must study the child, in other words, to get our indications, our symptoms, our suggestions. The more or less spontaneous acts of the child are not to be thought of as setting moral forms to which the efforts of the educator must conform – this would result simply in spoiling the child; but they are symptoms which require to be interpreted: stimuli which need to be responded to in directed ways; material which, in however transformed a shape, is the only ultimate constituent of future moral conduct and character.

Then, secondly, our ethical principles need to be stated in psychological terms because the child supplies us with the only means or instruments by which to realize moral ideals. The subject-matter of the curriculum, however important, however judiciously selected, is empty of conclusive moral content until it is made over into terms of the individual’s own activities, habits, and desires. We must know what history, geography, and mathematics mean in psychological terms, that is as modes of personal experiencing, before we can get out of them their moral potentialities.

The psychological side of education sums itself up, of course, in a consideration of character. It is a commonplace to say that the development of character is the end of all school work. The difficulty lies in the execution of the idea. And an underlying difficulty in this execution is the lack of a clear conception of what character means. This may seem an extreme statement. If so, the idea may be conveyed by saying that we generally conceive of character simply in terms of results; we have no clear conception of it in psychological terms – that is, as a process, as working or dynamic. We know what character means in terms of the actions which proceed from it, but we have not a definite conception of it on its inner side, as a system of working forces.

(1) Force, efficiency in execution, or overt action, is one necessary constituent of character. In our moral books and lectures we may lay the stress upon good intentions, etc. But we know practically that the kind of character we hope to build up through our education is one that not only has good intentions, but that insists upon carrying them out. Any other character is wishy-washy; it is goody, not good. The individual must have the power to stand up and count for something in the actual conflicts of life. He must have initiative, insistence, persistence, courage, and industry. He must, in a word, have all that goes under the name "*force of character.*" Undoubtedly, individuals differ greatly in their native endowment in this respect. None the less, each has a certain primary equipment of impulse, of tendency forward, of innate urgency to do. The problem of education on this side is that of discovering what this native fund of power is, and then of utilizing it in such a way (affording conditions which both stimulate and control) as to organize it into definite conserved modes of action – habits.

(2) But something more is required than sheer force. Sheer force may be brutal; it may over-ride the interests of others. Even when aiming at right ends it may go at them in such a way as to violate the rights of others. More than this, in sheer force there is no guarantee for the right end. Efficiency may be directed towards mistaken ends and result in positive mischief and destruction. Power, as already suggested, must be directed. It must be organized along social channels; it must be attached to valuable ends.

This involves training on both the intellectual and emotional side. On the intellectual side we must have judgment – what is ordinarily called good sense. The difference between mere knowledge, or information, and judgment is that the former is simply held, not used; judgment is knowledge directed with reference to the accomplishment of ends. Good judgment is a sense of respective or proportionate values. The one who has judgment is the one who has ability to size up a situation. He is the one who can grasp the scene or situation before him, ignoring what is irrelevant, or what for the time being is unimportant, who can seize upon the factors which demand attention, and grade them according to their respective claims. Mere knowledge of what the right is, in the abstract, mere intentions of following the right in general, however praiseworthy in themselves, are never a substitute for this power of trained judgment. Action is always in the concrete. It is definite and individualized. Except, therefore, as it is backed and controlled by a knowledge of the actual concrete factors in the situation in which it occurs, it must be relatively futile and waste.

(3) But the consciousness of ends must be more than merely intellectual. We can imagine a person with most excellent judgment, who yet

does not act upon his judgment. There must not only be force to insure effort, in execution against obstacles, but there must also be a delicate personal responsiveness, – there must be an emotional reaction. Indeed, good judgment is impossible without this susceptibility. Unless there is a prompt and almost instinctive sensitiveness to conditions, to the ends and interests of others, the intellectual side of judgment will not have proper material to work upon. Just as the material of knowledge is supplied through the senses, so the material of ethical knowledge is supplied by emotional responsiveness. It is difficult to put this quality into words, but we all know the difference between the character which is hard and formal, and one which is sympathetic, flexible, and open. In the abstract the former may be as sincerely devoted to moral ideas as is the latter, but as a practical matter we prefer to live with the latter. We count upon it to accomplish more by tact, by instinctive recognition of the claims of others, by skill in adjusting, than the former can accomplish by mere attachment to rules.

Here, then, is the moral standard, by which to test the work of the school upon the side of what it does directly for individuals. (a) Does the school as a system, at present, attach sufficient importance to the spontaneous instincts and impulses? Does it afford sufficient opportunity for these to assert themselves and work out their own results? Can we even say that the school in principle attaches itself, at present, to the active constructive powers rather than to processes of absorption and learning? Does not our talk about self-activity largely render itself meaningless because the self-activity we have in mind is purely “intellectual,” out of relation to those impulses which work through hand and eye?

Just in so far as the present school methods fail to meet the test of such questions moral results must be unsatisfactory. We cannot secure the development of positive force of character unless we are willing to pay its price. We cannot smother and repress the child’s powers, or gradually abort them (from failure of opportunity for exercise), and then expect a character with initiative and consecutive industry. I am aware of the importance attaching to inhibition, but mere inhibition is valueless. The only restraint, the only holding-in, that is of any worth is that which comes through holding powers concentrated upon a positive end. An end cannot be attained excepting as instincts and impulses are kept from discharging at random and from running off on side tracks. In keeping powers at work upon their relevant ends, there is sufficient opportunity for genuine inhibition. To say that inhibition is higher than power, is like saying that death is more than life, negation more than affirmation, sacrifice more than service.

(b) We must also test our school work by finding whether it affords the conditions necessary for the formation of good judgment. Judgment as the sense of relative values involves ability to select, to discriminate. Acquiring information can never develop the power of judgment. Development of judgment is in spite of, not because of, methods of instruction that emphasize simple learning. The test comes only when the information acquired has to be put to use. Will it do what we expect of it? I have heard an educator of large experience say that in her judgment the greatest defect of instruction to-day, on the intellectual side, is found in the fact that children leave school without a mental perspective. Facts seem to them all of the same importance. There is no foreground or background. There is no instinctive habit of sorting out facts upon a scale of worth and of grading them.

The child cannot get power of judgment excepting as he is continually exercised in forming and testing judgments. He must have an opportunity to select for himself, and to attempt to put his selections into execution, that he may submit them to the final test, that of action. Only thus can he learn to discriminate that which promises success from that which promises failure; only thus can he form the habit of relating his purposes and notions to the conditions that determine their value. Does the school, as a system, afford at present sufficient opportunity for this sort of experimentation? Except so far as the emphasis of the school work is upon intelligent doing, upon active investigation, it does not furnish the conditions necessary for that exercise of judgment which is an integral factor in good character.

(c) I shall be brief with respect to the other point, the need of susceptibility and responsiveness. The informally social side of education, the æsthetic environment and influences, are all-important. In so far as the work is laid out in regular and formulated ways, so far as there are lacking opportunities for casual and free social intercourse between pupils and between the pupils and the teacher, this side of the child's nature is either starved, or else left to find haphazard expression along more or less secret channels. When the school system, under plea, of the practical (meaning by the practical the narrowly utilitarian), confines the child to the three R's and the formal studies connected with them, shuts him out from the vital in literature and history, and deprives him of his right to contact with what is best in architecture, music, sculpture, and picture, it is hopeless to expect definite results in the training of sympathetic openness and responsiveness.

What we need in education is a genuine faith in the existence of moral principles which are capable of effective application. We believe, so far

as the mass of children are concerned, that if we keep at them long enough we can teach reading and writing and figuring. We are practically, even if unconsciously, skeptical as to the possibility of anything like the same assurance in morals. We believe in moral laws and rules, to be sure, but they are in the air. They are something set off by themselves. They are so very "moral" that they have no working contact with the average affairs of every-day life. These moral principles need to be brought down to the ground through their statement in social and in psychological terms. We need to see that moral principles are not arbitrary, that they are not "transcendental"; that the term "moral" does not designate a special region or portion of life. We need to translate the moral into the conditions and forces of our community life, and into the impulses and habits of the individual.

All the rest is mint, anise, and cummin. The one thing needful is that we recognize that moral principles are real in the same sense in which other forces are real; that they are inherent in community life, and in the working structure of the individual. If we can secure a genuine faith in this fact, we shall have secured the condition which alone is necessary to get from our educational system all the effectiveness there is in it. The teacher who operates in this faith will find every subject, every method of instruction, every incident of school life pregnant with moral possibility.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IMPLIED IN INSTRUCTION

George H. Mead. "The Psychology of Social Consciousness Implied in Instruction," *Science* 31.10 (May 1910): 688–93.

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I have been asked to present the social situation in the school as the subject of a possible scientific study and control.

The same situation among primitive people is scientifically studied by the sociologist (folk-psychologist). He notes two methods in the process of primitive education. The first is generally described as that of play and imitation. The impulses of the children find their expression in play, and play describes the attitude of the child's consciousness. Imitation defines the form of unconscious social control exercised by the community over the expression of childish impulse.

In the long ceremonies of initiation education assumed a more conscious and almost deliberate form. The boy was induced into the clan mysteries, into the mythology and social procedure of the community, under an emotional tension which was skilfully aroused and maintained. He was subjected to tests of endurance which were calculated not only to fulfil this purpose, but also to identify the ends and interests of the individual with those of the social group. These more general purposes of the initiatory ceremonies were also at times cunningly adapted to enhance the authority of the medicine man or the control over food and women by the older men in the community.

Whatever opinion one may hold of the interpretation which folk-psychology and anthropology have given of this early phase of education, no one would deny, I imagine, the possibility of studying the education of the savage child scientifically, nor that this would be a psychological study. Imitation, play, emotional tensions favoring the acquirement of clan myths and cults, and the formulation of clan judgments of evaluation, these must be all interpreted and formulated by

some form of psychology. The particular form which has dealt with these phenomena and processes is social psychology. The important features of the situation would be found not in the structure of the idea to be assimilated considered as material of instruction for any child, nor in the lines of association which would guarantee their abiding in consciousness. They would be found in the impulse of the children expressed in play, in the tendency of the children to put themselves in the place of the men and women of the group, *i.e.*, to imitate them in the emotions which consciousness of themselves in their relationship to others evoke, and in the import for the boy which the ideas and cults would have when surcharged with such emotions.

If we turn to our systems of education we find that the materials of the curriculum have been presented as percepts capable of being assimilated by the nature of their content to other contents in consciousness, and the manner has been indicated in which this material can be most favorably prepared for such assimilation. This type of psychological treatment of material and the lesson is recognized at once as Herbartian. It is an associational type of psychology. Its critics add that it is intellectualistic. In any case it is not a social psychology, for the child is not primarily considered as a self among other selves, but as an *apperceptionsmasse*. The child's relations to the other members of the group, to which he belongs, have no immediate bearing on the material nor on the learning of it. The banishment the traditional school work of play and of any adult activities which the child could have a part as a child, *i.e.*, the banishment of processes in which the child can be conscious of himself in relation to others, means that the process of learning has as little social content as possible.

An explanation of the different attitudes in the training of the child in the primitive and in the modern civilized communities is found, in part, in the division of labor between the school on the one side, and the home and the shop or the farm on the other. The business of storing the mind with ideas, both materials and methods, has been assigned to the school. The task of organizing and socializing the self to which these materials and methods belong is left to the home and the industry of profession, to the playground, the street and society in general. A great deal of modern educational literature turns upon the fallacy of this division of labor. The earlier vogue of manual training and the domestic arts before the frank recognition of their relation to industrial training took place, was due in no small part to the attempt to introduce those interests of the child's into the field of his instruction which gathers about a socially constituted self, to admit the child's personality as a whole into the school. I think we should be prepared to admit the implication of this educational movement that however abstract the material

is which is presented and however abstracted its ultimate use is from the immediate activities of the child, the situation implied in instruction and in the psychology of that instruction is a social situation; that it is impossible to fully interpret or control the process of instruction without recognizing the child as a self and viewing his conscious processes from the point of view of their relation in his consciousness to his self, among other selves.

In the first place, back of all instruction lies the relation of the child to the teacher and about it lies the relations of the child to the other children in the school-room and on the play-ground. It is however, of interest to note that so far as the material of instruction is concerned an ideal situation has been conceived to be one in which the personality of the teacher disappears as completely as possible behind the process of learning. In the actual process of instruction the emphasis upon the relation of pupil and teacher in the consciousness of the child has been felt to be unfortunate. In like manner the instinctive social relations between the children in school hours is repressed. In the process of memorizing and reciting a lesson, or working out a problem in arithmetic a vivid consciousness of the personality of the teacher in his relationship to that of the child would imply either that the teacher was obliged to exercise discipline to carry on the process of instruction, and this must in the nature of the case constitute friction and division of attention, or else that the child's interest is distracted from the subject matter of the lesson, to something in which the personality of the teacher and pupil might find some other content; for even a teacher's approval and a child's delight therein has no essential relation to the mere subject matter of arithmetic or English. It certainly has no such relationship as that implied in apprenticeship, in the boy's helping on the farm or the girl's helping in the housekeeping, has no such relationship as that of members of an athletic team to each other. In these latter instances the vivid consciousness of the self of the child and of his master, of the parents whom he helps and of the associates with whom he plays is part of the child's consciousness of what he is doing, and his consciousness of these personal relationships involves no division of attention. Now it had been a part of the fallacy of an intellectualistic pedagogy that a divided attention was necessary to insure application of attention – that the rewards, and especially the punishments, of the school hung before the child's mind to catch the attention that was wandering from the task, and through their associations with the schoolwork to bring it back to the task. This involves a continual vibration of attention on the part of the average child between the task and the sanction of school discipline. It is only the psychology of school

discipline that is social. The pains and penalties, the pleasures of success in competition, of favorable mention of all sorts implies vivid self-consciousness. It is evident that advantage would follow from making the consciousness of self or selves which is the life of the child's play – on its competition or cooperation – have as essential a place in instruction. To use Professor Dewey's phrase, instruction should be an interchange of experience in which the child brings his experience to be interpreted by the experience of the parent or teacher. This recognizes that education is interchange of ideas, is conversation – belongs to a universe of discount. If the lesson is simply set for the child – is not his own problem – the recognition of himself as facing a task and a task-master is no part of the solution of the problem. But a difficulty which the child feels and brings to his parent or teacher for solution is helped on toward interpretation by the consciousness of the child's relation to his pastors and masters. Just in so far as the subject matter of instruction can be brought into the form of problems arising in the experience at the child – just so far will the relation of the child to the instructor become a part of the natural solution of the problem – actual success of a teacher depends in large measure upon this capacity to state the subject matter of instruction in terms of the experience of the children. The recognition of the value of industrial and vocational training comes back at once to this, that what the child has to learn is what he wants to acquire, to become the man. Under these conditions instruction takes on frankly the form of conversation, as much sought by the pupil as the instructor.

I take it therefore to be a scientific task to which education should set itself that of making the subject matter of its instruction the material of personal intercourse between pupils and instructors, and between the children themselves. The substitution of the converse of concrete individuals for the pale abstractions of thought.

To a large extent our school organization reserves the use of the personal relation between teacher and taught for the negative side for the prohibitions. The lack of interest in the personal content of the lesson is in fact startling when one considers that it is the personal term in which the instruction should be given. The best illustration of this lack of interest we find in the problems which disgrace our arithmetics. They are supposed matters of converse, but their content is so bare, their abstractions so raggedly covered with the form of questions about such marketing and shopping and building as never were on sea or land, that one sees that the social form of instruction is a form only for the writer of the arithmetic. When further we consider how utterly inadequate the teaching force of our public schools is to transform this matter into concrete experience of the children or even into their own experience,

the hopelessness of the situation is overwhelming. Ostwald has written a text-book of chemistry for the secondary school which has done what every text-book should do. It is not only that the material shows real respect for the intelligence of the student, but it is so organized that the development of the subject matter is in reality the action and reaction of one mind upon another mind. The dictum of the Platonic Socrates, that one must follow the argument where it leads in the dialogue, should be the motto of the writer of text-books.

It has been indicated already that language being essentially social in its nature thinking with the child is rendered concrete by taking on the form of conversation. It has been also indicated that this can take place only when the thought has reference to a real problem in the experience of the child. The further demand for control over attention carries us back to the conditions of attention. Here again we find that traditional school practise depends upon social consciousness for bringing the wandering attention back to the task, when it finds that the subjective conditions of attention to the material of instruction are lacking, and even attempts to carry over a formal self-consciousness into attention, when through the sense of duty the pupil is called upon to identify the solution of the problem with himself. On the other hand, we have in vocational instruction the situation in which the student has identified his impulses with the subject matter of the task. In the former case, as in the case of instruction, our traditional practise makes use of the self-consciousness of the child in its least effective form. The material of the lesson is not identified with the impulses of the child. The attention is not due to the organization of impulses to outgoing activity. The organization of typical school attention is that of a school self, expressing subordination to school authority and identity of conduct with that of all the other children in the room. It is largely inhibitive – a consciousness of what one must not do but the inhibitions do not arise out of the consciousness of what one is doing. It is the nature of school attention to abstract from the content of any specific task. The child must give attention *first* and *then* undertake any task which is assigned him, while normal attention is essentially selective and depends for its inhibitions upon the specific act.

Now consciousness of self should follow upon that of attention, and consists in a reference of the act, which attention has mediated, to the social self. It brings about a conscious organization of this particular act with the individual as a whole – makes it his act, and can only be effectively accomplished when the attention is an actual organization of impulses seeking expression. The separation between the self, implied in typical school attention and the content of the school tasks, makes such an organization difficult if not possible.

In a word attention is a process of organization of consciousness. It results in the reinforcement and inhibitions of perceptions and ideas. It is always a part of an act and involves the relation of that act to the whole field of consciousness. This relation to the whole field of consciousness finds its expression in consciousness of self. But the consciousness of self depends primarily upon social relations. The self arises in consciousness *pari passu* with the recognition and definition at other selves. It is therefore unfruitful if not impossible to attempt to scientifically control the attention of children in their formal education unless they are regarded as social beings in dealing with the very material of instruction. It is this essentially social character of attention which gives its peculiar grip to vocational training. From the psychological point of view, not only the method and material but also the means of holding the pupils' attention must be socialized.

Finally a word may be added with reference to the evaluations – the emotional reactions – which our education should call forth. There is no phase of our public school training that is so defective as this. The school undertakes to acquaint the child with the ideas and methods which he is to use as a man. Shut up in the history, the geography, the language and the number of our curricula should be the values that the country, and its human institutions have that beauty has in nature and art; and the values involved in the control over nature and social conditions.

The child in entering into his heritage of ideas and methods should have the emotional response which the boy has in a primitive community when he has been initiated into the mysteries and the social code of the group of which he has become a citizen. We have a few remainders of this emotional response, in the confirmation or conversion and entrance into the church, in the initiation into the fraternity, and in the passage from apprenticeship into the union. But the complexities of our social life, and the abstract intellectual character of the ideas which society uses have made it increasingly difficult to identify the attainment of the equipment of a man with the meaning of manhood and citizenship.

Conventional ceremonies at the end of the period of education will never accomplish this. And we have to further recognize that our education extends for many far beyond the adolescent period to which this emotional response naturally belongs. What our schools can give must be given through the social consciousness of the child as that consciousness develops. It is only as the child recognizes a social import in what he is learning and doing that moral education can be given.

I have sought to indicate that the process of schooling in its barest form can not be successfully studied by a scientific psychology unless

that psychology is social, *i.e.*, unless it recognizes that the processes of acquiring knowledge, of giving attention, of evaluating in emotional terms must be studied in their relation to selves in a social consciousness, So far as education is concerned, the child does not become social by learning. He must be social in order to learn.

THE SOCIAL SELF

Read at the Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, March, 1913.

George H. Mead. "The Social Self," *Journal of Philosophy* 10.14 (3 July 1913): 374–80.

Recognizing that the self can not appear in consciousness as an "I," that it is always an object, *i.e.*, a "me" I wish to suggest an answer to the question, What is involved in the self being an object? The first answer may be that an object involves a subject. Stated in other words, that a "me" is inconceivable without an "I." And to this reply must be made that such an "I" is a presupposition, but never a presentation of conscious experience, for the moment it is presented it has passed into the objective case, presuming, if you like, an "I" that observes – but an "I" that can disclose himself only by ceasing to be the subject for whom the object "me" exists. It is, of course, not the Hegelism of a self that becomes another to himself in which I am interested, but the nature of the self as revealed by introspection and subject to our factual analysis. This analysis does reveal, then, in a memory process an attitude of observing oneself in which both the observer and the observed appear. To be concrete, one remembers asking himself how he could undertake to do this, that, or the other, chiding himself for his shortcomings or pluming himself upon his achievements. Thus, in the redintegrated self of the moment passed, one finds both a subject and an object, but it is a subject that is now an object of observation, and has the same nature as the object self whom we present as in intercourse with those about us. In quite the same fashion we remember the questions, admonitions, and approvals addressed to our fellows. But the subject attitude which we instinctively take can be presented only as something experienced – as we can be conscious of our acts only through the sensory processes set up after the act has begun.

The contents of this presented subject, who thus has become an object in being presented, but which still distinguish him as the subject of the passed experience from the "me" whom he addressed, are those images which initiated the conversation and the motor sensations which

accompany the expression, plus the organic sensations and the response of the whole system to the activity initiated. In a word, just those contents which go to make up the self which is distinguished from the others whom he addresses. The self appearing as "I" is the memory image of the self who acted toward himself and is the same self who acts toward other selves.

On the other hand, the stuff that goes to make up the "me" whom the "I" addresses and whom he observes, is the experience which is induced by this action of the "I." If the "I" speaks, the "me" hears. If the "I" strikes, the "me" feels the blow. Here again the "me" consciousness is of the same character as that which arises from the action of the other upon him. That is, it is only as the individual finds himself acting with reference to himself as he acts towards others, that he becomes a subject to himself rather than an object, and only as he is affected by his own social conduct in the manner in which he is affected by that of others, that he becomes an object to his own social conduct.

The differences in our memory presentations of the "I" and the me are those of the memory images of the initiated social conduct and those of the sensory responses thereto.

It is needless, in view of the analysis of Baldwin, of Royce and of Cooley and many others, to do more than indicate that these reactions arise earlier in our social conduct with others than in introspective self-consciousness, *i.e.*, that the infant consciously calls the attention of others before he calls his own attention by affecting himself and that he is consciously affected by others before he is conscious of being affected by himself.

The "I" of introspection is the self which enters into social relations with other selves. It is not the "I" that is implied in the fact that one presents himself as a "me." And the "me" of introspection is the same "me" that is the object of the social conduct of others. One presents himself as acting toward others – in this presentation he is presented in indirect discourse as the subject of the action and is still an object, – and the subject of this presentation can never appear immediately in conscious experience. It is the same self who is presented as observing himself, and he affects himself just in so far and only in so far as he can address himself by the means of social stimulation which affect others. The "me" whom he addresses is the "me," therefore, that is similarly affected by the social conduct of those about him.

This statement of the introspective situation, however seems to overlook a more or less constant feature of our consciousness, and that is that running current of awareness of what we do which is distinguishable from the consciousness of the field of stimulation, whether that field be without or within. It is this "awareness" which has led

many to assume that it is the nature of the self to be conscious both of subject and of object – to be subject of action toward an object world and at the same time to be directly conscious of this subject as subject, – “Thinking its non-existence along with whatever else it thinks.” Now, as Professor James pointed out, this consciousness is more logically conceived of as sciousness – the thinker being an implication rather than a content, while the “me” is but a bit of object content within the stream of sciousness. However, this logical statement does not do justice to the findings of consciousness. Besides the actual stimulations and responses and the memory images of these, within which lie perforce the organic sensations and responses which make up the “me,” there accompanies a large part of our conscious experience, indeed all that we call self-conscious, an inner response to what we may be doing, saying, or thinking. At the back of our heads we are a large part of the time more or less clearly conscious of our own replies to the remarks made to others, of innervations which would lead to attitudes and gestures answering our gestures and attitudes towards others.

The observer who accompanies all our self-conscious conduct is then not the actual “I” who is responsible for the conduct in *propria person* – he is rather the response which one makes to his own conduct. The confusion of this response of ours, following upon our social stimulations of others with the implied subject of our action, in the psychological ground for the assumption that the self can be directly conscious of itself as acting and acted upon. The actual situation is this: The self acts with reference to others and is immediately conscious of the objects about it. In memory it also reintegrates the self acting as well as the others acted upon. But besides these contents, the action with reference to the others calls out responses in the individual himself – there is then another “me” criticizing, approving, and suggesting, and consciously planning, i.e., the reflective self.

It is not to all our conduct toward the objective world that we thus respond. Where we are intensely preoccupied with the objective world, this accompanying awareness disappears. We have to recall the experience to become aware that we have been involved as selves, to produce the self-consciousness which is a constituent part of a large part of our experience. As I have indicated elsewhere, the mechanism for this reply to our own social stimulation of others follows as a natural result from the fact that the very sounds, gestures, especially vocal gestures, which man makes in addressing others, call out or tend to call out responses from himself. He can not hear himself speak without assuming in a measure the attitude which he would have assumed if he had been addressed in the same words by others.

The self which consciously stands over against other selves thus

becomes an object, an other to himself; through the very fact that he hears himself talk, and replies. The mechanism of introspection is therefore given in the social attitude which man necessarily assumes toward himself, and the mechanism of thought, in so far as thought uses symbols which are used in social intercourse, is but an inner conversation.

Now it is just this combination of the remembered self which acts and exists over against other selves with the inner response to his action which is essential to the self-conscious ego – the self in the full meaning of the term – although neither phase of self-consciousness, in so far as it appears as an object of our experience, is a subject.

It is also to be noted that this response to the social conduct of the self may be in the rôle of another – we present his arguments in imagination and do it with his intonations and gestures and even perhaps with his facial expression. In this way we play the rôles of all our group; indeed, it is only in so far as we do this that they become part of our social environment – to be aware of another self as a self implies that we have played his rôle or that of another with whose type we identify him for purposes of intercourse. The inner response to our reaction to others is therefore as varied as is our social environment. Not that we assume the rôles of others toward ourselves because we are subject to a mere imitative instinct, but because in responding to ourselves we are in the nature of the case taking the attitude of another than the self that is directly acting, and into this reaction there naturally flows the memory images of the responses of those about us, the memory images of those responses of others which were in answer to like actions. Thus the child can think about his conduct as good or bad only as he reacts to his own acts in the remembered words of his parents. Until this process has been developed into the abstract process of thought, self-consciousness remains dramatic, and the self which is a fusion of the remembered actor and this accompanying chorus is somewhat loosely organized and very clearly social. Later the inner stage changes into the forum and workshop of thought. The features and intonations of the *dramatis personæ* fade out and the emphasis falls upon the meaning of the inner speech, the imagery becomes merely the barely necessary cues. But the mechanism remains social, and at any moment the process may become personal.

It is fair to say that the modern western world has lately done much of its thinking in the form of the novel, while earlier the drama was a more effective but equally social mechanism of self-consciousness. And, in passing, I may refer to that need of filling out the bare spokesman of abstract thought, which even the most abstruse thinker feels, in seeking

his audience. The import of this for religious self-consciousness is obvious.

There is one further implication of this nature of the self to which I wish to call attention. It is the manner of its reconstruction. I wish especially to refer to it, because the point is of importance in the psychology of ethics.

As a mere organization of habit the self is not self-conscious. It is this self which we refer to as character. When, however, an essential problem appears, there is some disintegration in this organization, and different tendencies appear in reflective thought as different voices in conflict with each other. In a sense the old self has disintegrated, and out of the moral process a new self arises. The specific question I wish to ask is whether the new self appears together with the new object or end. There is of course a reciprocal relation between the self and its object, the one implies the other and the interests and evaluations of the self answer exactly to the content and values of the object. On the other hand, the consciousness of the new object, its values and meaning, seems to come earlier to consciousness than the new self that answers to the new object.

The man who has come to realize a new human value is more immediately aware of the new object in his conduct than of himself and his manner of reaction to it. This is due to the fact to which reference has already been made, that direct attention goes first to the object. When the self becomes an object, it appears in memory, and the attitude which it implies has already been taken. In fact, to distract attention from the object to the self implies just that lack of objectivity which we criticize not only in the moral agent, but in the scientist.

Assuming as I do the essentially social character of the ethical end, we find in moral reflection a conflict in which certain values find a spokesman in the old self or a dominant part of the old self, while other values answering to other tendencies and impulses arise in opposition and find other spokesmen to present their cases. To leave the field to the values represented by the old self is exactly what we term selfishness. The justification for the term is found in the habitual character of conduct with reference to these values. Attention is not claimed by the object and shifts to the subjective field where the affective responses are identified with the old self. The result is that we state the other conflicting ends in subjective terms of other selves and the moral problem seems to take on the form of the sacrifice either of the self or of the others.

Where, however, the problem is objectively considered, although the conflict is a social one, it should not resolve itself into a struggle

between selves, but into such a reconstruction of the situation that different and enlarged and more adequate personalities may emerge. Attention should be centered on the objective social field.

In the reflective analysis, the old self should enter upon the same terms with the selves whose rôles are assumed, and the test of the reconstruction is found in the fact that all the personal interests are adequately recognized in a new social situation. The new self that answers to this new situation can appear in consciousness only after this new situation has been realized and accepted. The new self can not enter into the field as the determining factor because he is consciously present only after the new end has been formulated and accepted. The old self may enter only as an element over against the other personal interests involved. If he is the dominant factor it must be in defiance of the other selves whose interests are at stake. As the old self he is defined by his conflict with the others that assert themselves in his reflective analysis.

Solution is reached by the construction of a new world harmonizing the conflicting interests into which enters the new self.

The process is in its logic identical with the abandonment of the old theory with which the scientist has identified himself, his refusal to grant this old attitude any further weight than may be given to the other conflicting observations and hypotheses. Only when a successful hypothesis, which overcomes the conflicts, has been formulated and accepted, may the scientist again identify himself with this hypothesis as his own, and maintain it *contra mundum*. He may not state the scientific problem and solution in terms of his old personality. He may name his new hypothesis after himself and realize his enlarged scientific personality in its triumph.

The fundamental difference between the scientific and moral solution of a problem lies in the fact that the moral problem deals with concrete personal interests, in which the whole self is reconstructed in its relation to the other selves whose relations are essential to its personality.

The growth of the self arises out of a partial disintegration, – the appearance of the different interests in the forum of reflection, the reconstruction of the social world, and the consequent appearance of the new self that answers to the new object.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AS CONDITIONED BY MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY

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So far as I see, psychological theory at present simply emphasizes and reinforces some general principles which accompany a practical movement that is already going on, deriving its main motives from general considerations. Psychology has no peculiar gospel or revelation of its own to deliver. It may, however, serve to interpret and illuminate some aspects of what is already going on, and thereby assist it in directing itself.

I shall endeavor to present simply one principle which seems to me of help in this interpretation: the stress laid in modern psychological theory upon the principle of growth and of consequent successive expansions of experience on different levels. Since the mind is a growth, it passes through a series of stages, and only gradually attains to its majority. That the mind of the child is not identical with the mind of the adult is, of course, no new discovery. After a fashion, everybody has always known it; but for a long, long time the child was treated as if he were only an abbreviated adult, a little man or a little woman. His purposes, interests, and concerns were taken to be about those of the grown-up person, unlikenesses being emphasized only on the side of strength and power.

But the differences are in fact those of mental and emotional standpoint, and outlook, rather than of degree. If we assume that the quality of child and adult is the same, and that the only difference is in quantity of capacity, it follows at once that the child is to be taught down to, or talked down to, from the standpoint of the adult. This has fixed the standard from which altogether too much of education and instruction has been carried on, in spiritual as well as in other matters.

But if the differences are those of quality, the whole problem is transfigured. It is no longer a question of fixing over ideas and beliefs of the grown person, until these are reduced to the lower level of childish apprehension in thought. It is a question of surrounding the child with such conditions of growth that he may be led to appreciate and to grasp the full significance of his own round of experience, as that develops in living his own life. When the child is so regarded, his capacities in reference to his own peculiar needs and aims are found to be quite parallel to those of the adult, if the needs and aims of the latter are measured by similar reference to adult concerns and responsibilities.

Unless the world is out of gear, the child must have the same kind of power to do what, as a child, he really needs to do, that the mature person has in his sphere of life. In a word, it is a question of bringing the child to appreciate the truly religious aspects of his own growing life, not one of inoculating him externally with beliefs and emotions which adults happen to have found serviceable to themselves.

It cannot be denied that the platform of the views, ideas, and emotions of the grown person has been frequently assumed to supply the standard of the religious nature of the child. The habit of basing religious instruction upon a formulated statement of the doctrines and beliefs of the church is a typical instance. Once admit the rightfulness of the standard, and it follows without argument that, since a catechism represents the wisdom and truth of the adult mind, the proper course is to give to the child at once the benefit of such adult experience. The only logical change is a possible reduction in size – a shorter catechism, and some concessions – not a great many – in the language used.

While this illustration is one of the most obvious, it hardly indicates the most serious aspect of the matter. This is found in assuming that the spiritual and emotional experiences of the adult are the proper measures of all religious life; so that, if the child is to have any religious life at all, he must have it in terms of the same consciousness of sin, repentance, redemption, etc., which are familiar to the adult. So far as the profound significance of the idea of growth is ignored, there are foisted, or at least urged, upon the child copies of the spiritual relationships of the soul to God, modeled after adult thought and emotion. Yet the depth and validity of the consciousness of these realities frequently depend upon aspirations, struggles, and failures which, by the nature of the case, can come only to those who have entered upon the responsibilities of mature life.

To realize that the child reaches adequacy of religious experience only through a succession of expressions which parallel his own growth, is a return to the ideas of the New Testament: "When I was a child I spoke as a child; I understood – or looked at things – as a child; I thought – or

reasoned about things – as a child.” It is to return to the idea of Jesus, of the successive stages through which the seed passes into the blade and then into the ripening grain. Such differences are distinctions of kind or quality, not simply differences of capacity. Germinating seed, growing leaf, budding flower, are not miniature fruits reduced in bulk and size. The attaining of perfect fruitage depends upon not only allowing, but encouraging, the expanding life to pass through stages which are natural and necessary for it.

To attempt to force prematurely upon the child either the mature ideas or the spiritual emotions of the adult is to run the risk of a fundamental danger, that of forestalling future deeper experiences which might otherwise in their season become personal realities to him. We may make the child familiar with the form of the soul’s great experiences of sin and of reconciliation and peace, of discord and harmony of the individual with the deepest forces of the universe, before there is anything in his own needs or relationships in life which makes it possible for him to interpret or to realize them.

So far as this happens, certain further defects or perversions are almost sure to follow. First, the child may become, as it were, vulgarly blasé. The very familiarity with the outward form of these things may induce a certain distaste for further contact with them. The mind is exhausted by an excessive early familiarity, and does not feel the need and possibility of further growth which always implies novelty and freshness – some experience which is uniquely new, and hitherto untraversed by the soul. Second, this excessive familiarity may breed, if not contempt, at least flippancy and irreverence. Third, this premature acquaintance with matters which are not really understood or vitally experienced is not without effect in promoting scepticism and crises of frightful doubt. It is a serious moment when an earnest soul wakes up to the fact that it has been passively accepting and reproducing ideas and feelings which it now recognizes are not a vital part of its own being. Losing its hold on the form in which the spiritual truths have been embodied, their very substance seems also to be slipping away. The person is plunged into doubt and bitterness regarding the reality of all things which lie beyond his senses, or regarding the very worth of life itself.

Doubtless the more sincere and serious persons find their way through, and come to some readjustment of the fundamental conditions of life by which they re-attain a working spiritual faith. But even such persons are likely to carry with them scars from the struggles through which they have passed. They have undergone a shock and upheaval from which every youth ought, if possible, to be spared, and which the due observance of the conditions of growth would avoid. There is some

danger that we shall come to regard as perfectly normal phenomena of adolescent life certain experiences which are in truth only symptoms of maladjustment resulting from the premature fixation of intellectual and emotional habits in the earlier years of childhood. Youth, as distinct from childhood, is doubtless the critical time in spiritual experience; but it would be a calamity to exaggerate the differences, and to fail to insist upon the more fundamental principle of continuity of development.

In other cases there does not seem to be enough fundamental seriousness; or else the youth lives in more distracting circumstances. So, after a brief period of doubt, he turns away, somewhat calloused, to live on the plane of superficial interests and excitements of the world about him. When none of these extreme evils result, yet something of the bloom of later experience is rubbed off; something of its richness is missed because the individual has been introduced to its form before he can possibly grasp its deeper significance. Many persons whose religious development has been comparatively uninterrupted, find themselves in the habit of taking for granted their own spiritual life. They are so thoroughly accustomed to certain forms, emotions, and even terms of expression, that their experience becomes conventionalized. Religion is a part of the ordinances and routine of the day rather than a source of inspiration and renewing of power. It becomes a matter of conformation rather than of transformation.

Accepting the principle of gradual development of religious knowledge and experience, I pass on to mention one practical conclusion: the necessity of studying carefully the whole record of the growth, in individual children during their youth, of instincts, wants, and interests from the religious point of view. If we are to adapt successfully our methods of dealing with the child to his current life experience, we have first to discover the facts relating to normal development. The problem is a complicated one. Child-study has made a beginning, but only a beginning. Its successful prosecution requires a prolonged and cooperative study. There are needed both a large inductive basis in facts, and the best working tools and methods of psychological theory. Child-psychology in the religious as in other aspects of experience will suffer a setback if it becomes separated from the control of the general psychology of which it is a part. It will also suffer a setback if there is too great haste in trying to draw at once some conclusion as to practice from every new set of facts discovered. For instance, while many of the data that have been secured regarding the phenomena of adolescence are very important in laying down base lines for further study, it would be a mistake to try immediately to extract from these facts a series of general principles regarding either the instruction or education of youth from the religious point of view. The material is still too scanty. It has not as

yet been checked up by an extensive study of youth under all kinds of social and religious environments. The negative and varying instances have been excluded rather than utilized. In many cases we do not know whether our facts are to be interpreted as causes or effects; or, if they are effects, we do not know how far they are normal accompaniments of psychical growth, or more or less pathological results of external social conditions.

This word of caution, however, is not directed against the child-study in itself. Its purport is exactly the opposite: to indicate the necessity of more, and much more, of it. It will be necessary to carry on the investigation in a cooperative way. Only a large number of inquirers working at the same general question, under different circumstances, and from different points of view, can reach satisfactory results. If a Convention like this were to take steps to initiate and organize a movement for this sort of study, it would mark the dawn of a new day in religious education. Such a movement could provide the facts necessary for a positive basis of a constructive movement; and would at the same time obviate the danger of a one-sided, premature generalization from crude and uncertain facts.

I make no apology for concluding with a practical suggestion of this sort. The title of my address, "The Relation of Modern Psychology to Religious Education," conveys in and of itself a greater truth than can be expressed in any remarks that I might make. The title indicates that it is possible to approach the subject of religious instruction in the reverent spirit of science, making the same sort of study of this problem that is made of any other educational problem. If methods of teaching, principles of selecting and using subject-matter, in all supposedly secular branches of education, are being subjected to careful and systematic scientific study, how can those interested in religion – and who is not? – justify neglect of the most fundamental of all educational questions, the moral and religious?

RELIGION AND OUR SCHOOLS

John Dewey. "Religion and Our Schools.," *Hibbert Journal* 6.4 (July 1908): 796–809. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 4 (1977), pp. 165–77.

I

A learned and self-conscious generation has fittingly discovered religion to be a universal tendency of human nature. Through its learning, anthropology, psychology, and comparative religion have been summoned to give this testimony. But because of its self-consciousness the generation is uneasy. As it surveys itself it is fearful lest, solitary among the ages, it should not be religious. The self-same learning which has made it aware that other times have had their life permeated with religious faith is part of the conditions which have rendered the religions of those periods impossible. The dilemma is striking and perplexing. Shall the very circumstances which convince us that religion is necessary also make it impossible? Shall the evidence that it is a universal tendency make those who are aware of this tendency the flagrant exception to its universality? We have learned so much about religious "instincts": shall we therefore lose them?

It indeed seems hard that a generation which has accumulated not only material wealth, but intellectual riches, to the extent that it is compelled to pull down its barns – its systems of philosophy and doctrine – and build greater, should be lacking in just that grace and sanction of life which ignorant and poor people have possessed as matter of course. But our learnedly self-conscious generation is also mechanical. It has a tool for everything, and almost everything has become for it a tool. Why, then, should we longer suffer from deficiency of religion? We have discovered our lack: let us set the machinery in motion which will supply it. We have mastered the elements of physical well-being; we can make light and heat to order, and can command the means of transportation. Let us now put a similar energy, goodwill, and thoughtfulness into the control of the things of the spiritual life. Having got so far as to search for proper machinery, the next step is easy. Education is the modern universal purveyor, and upon the schools shall rest the responsibility for seeing to it that we recover our threatened religious heritage.

I cannot expect that those who are now especially concerned with the maintenance and the spread of conscious and explicit religious instruction (for the time being one must use this question-begging epithet) will recognize their attitude or intention in what I have just said. And it has no application to those who are already committed to special dogmas of religion which are the monopoly of special ecclesiastic institutions. With respect to them, the fight for special agencies and peculiar materials and methods of education in religion is a natural part of their business: just as, however, it is the business of those who do not believe that religion is a monopoly or a protected industry to contend, in the interest both of education and of religion, for keeping the schools free from what they must regard as a false bias. Those who believe that human nature without special divine assistance is lost, who believe that they have in their charge the special channels through which the needed assistance is conveyed, must, naturally, be strenuous in keeping open these channels to the minds of men. But when the arguments for special religious education at special times and places by special means proceed from philosophic sources – from those whose primary premiss is denial of any breach between man and the world and God, then a sense of unreality comes over me. The arguments perforce translate themselves ironically. They seem to say that, since religion is a universal function of life, we must particularly safeguard it lest it disappear; that since religion is the consciousness of the spiritual import of experience, we must find mechanical appliances for developing it.

Those who approach religion and education from the side of unconstrained reflection, not from the side of tradition, are of necessity aware of the tremendous transformation of intellectual attitude effected by the systematic denial of the supernatural; they are aware of the changes it imports not merely in special dogma and rites, but in the interpretation of the world, and in the projection of social, and, hence, moral life. It testifies to the current unreality of philosophy (itself probably a product of that forced idealism in which modern thought has taken refuge) that philosophers should seem to think that great intellectual generalizations may be, as it were, plastered over life to label its contents, and not imply profound practical alterations within life itself. In no other way is it easy to account for the attitude of those who are convinced of the final departure of the supernatural interpretation of the world and of man, and who yet think that agencies like the church and the school must not be thoroughly reconstructed before they can be fit organs for nurturing types of religious feeling and thought which are consistent with modern democracy and modern science.

That science has the same spiritual import as supernaturalism; that democracy translates into the same religious attitude as did feudalism;

that it is only a matter of slight changes of phraseology, a development of old symbolisms into new shades of meaning – such beliefs testify to that torpor of imagination which is the uniform effect of dogmatic belief. The reconstruction of the Church is a matter which concerns, indeed, the whole community so far as its outcome is concerned; while the responsibility for its initiation belongs primarily to those within the churches. The burden of conducting the development, the reconstruction, of other educational agencies belongs, however, primarily to the community as a whole. With respect to its intellectual aspect, its philosophy, it belongs especially to those who, having become conscious in some degree of the modern ideas of nature, of man and society, are best able to forecast the direction which social changes are taking. It is lucidity, sincerity, and the sense of reality which demand that, until the non-supernatural view is more completely elaborated in all its implications and is more completely in possession of the machinery of education, the schools shall keep hands off and shall do as little as possible. This is indeed a *laissez-faire* policy. It is frankly, avowedly so. And, doubtless, *laissez-faire* policies are not in favor in self-conscious and mechanical days. One of the further ironies of our time is that, having discovered the part played by unconscious, organic, collective forces in the processes of human development, we are possessed by a great eagerness, a great uneasiness, consciously to foster and to guide these forces. We need, however, to accept the responsibilities of living in an age marked by the greatest intellectual readjustment history records. There is undoubted loss of joy, of consolation, of some types of strength, and of some sources of inspiration in the change. There is a manifest increase of uncertainty; there is some paralysis of energy, and much excessive application of energy in materialistic directions. Yet nothing is gained by deliberate effort to return to ideas which have become incredible, and to symbols which have been emptied of their content of obvious meaning. Nothing can be gained by moves which will increase confusion and obscurity, which tend to an emotional hypocrisy and to a phrasemongering of formulae which seem to mean one thing and really import the opposite. Bearing the losses and inconveniences of our time as best we may, it is the part of men to labor persistently and patiently for the clarification and development of the positive creed of life implicit in democracy and in science, and to work for the transformation of all practical instrumentalities of education till they are in harmony with these ideas. Till these ends are further along than we can honestly claim them to be at present, it is better that our schools should do nothing than that they should do wrong things. It is better for them to confine themselves to their obviously urgent tasks than that they should, under the name of spiritual culture, form habits of mind which

are at war with the habits of mind congruous with democracy and with science. It is not laziness nor cynicism which calls for the *laissez-faire* policy; it is honesty, courage, sobriety, and faith.

If one inquires why the American tradition is so strong against any connection of state and church, why it dreads even the rudiments of religious teaching in state-maintained schools, the immediate and superficial answer is not far to seek. The cause was not, mainly, religious indifference, much less hostility to Christianity, although the eighteenth-century deism played an important role. The cause lay largely in the diversity and vitality of the various denominations, each fairly sure that, with a fair field and no favor, it could make its own way; and each animated by a jealous fear that, if any connection of state and church were permitted, some rival denomination would get an unfair advantage. But there was a deeper and by no means wholly unconscious influence at work. The United States became a nation late enough in the history of the world to profit by the growth of that modern (although Greek) thing – the state consciousness. This nation was born under conditions which enabled it to share in and to appropriate the idea that the state life, the vitality of the social whole, is of more importance than the flourishing of any segment or class. So far as church institutions were concerned, the doctrine of popular sovereignty was a reality, not a literary or legal fiction. Upon the economic side, the nation was born too soon to learn the full force of the state idea as against the class idea. Our fathers naïvely dreamed of the continuation of pioneer conditions and the free opportunity of every individual, and took none of the precautions to maintain the supremacy of the state over that of the class which newer commonwealths are taking. For that lack of foresight we are paying dearly, and are like to pay more dearly. But the lesson of the two and a half centuries lying between the Protestant revolt and the formation of the nation was well learned as respected the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the state as against all divisive ecclesiastical divisions. Doubtless many of our ancestors would have been somewhat shocked to realize the full logic of their own attitude with respect to the subordination of churches to the state (falsely termed the separation of church and state); but the state idea was inherently of such vitality and constructive force as to carry the practical result, with or without conscious perception of its philosophy. And any general agitation in the United States of the question of religious instruction in the schools could have but one explanation. It would mean that, from economic segregation and unassimilated immigration, the state-consciousness of the country had been sapped by the growth of social factions. I write, then, from the standpoint of that country with whose traditions and tendencies I am directly acquainted. But so far as it is true that circum-

stances have permitted the United States merely to travel a certain course more rapidly than other contemporary nations (save France), what is based upon American conditions must apply, in its measure, to the conditions of education in other countries.

II

As I recall, some of the Platonic dialogues discuss the question whether virtue can be taught, and all of them contain overtones or reminiscences of the topic. For the discussion led a long way. What is virtue? That is not an altogether easy question; and since to answer it we must know virtue and not merely have opinions about it, it will be well to find out what knowledge is. Moreover, teaching implies learning, and learning is coming to know, or knowledge in process of learning. What then is the connection of the becoming of knowledge with the being of knowledge? And since the teaching of virtue means, not getting knowledge "about" virtue, but the conversion of character to the good, what, after all, is the relation between becoming good and that becoming wise which is the result of learning?

Somehow, I am more aware that Plato discusses all these questions than I am certain of any final answer to the question whether virtue may be taught. Yet I seem to recall some hypothetical suggestions for an answer. If, as we have reason to believe, the soul of man is naturally akin to good – if, indeed, it truly is only through participation in the good – then may various objects, also in their measure expressions of good, serve to remind the soul of its own or original nature. If these various reminders may be organized into a comprehensive scheme, continuous and continual in operation – if, in other words, there may be found a state organized in righteousness – then may the soul be finally brought to the apprehension of its own being or good; and this coming to know and to be we may term learning. But, if I remember rightly, Plato always classed endeavors to teach virtue apart from an accompanying thorough reorganization of social life and of science as a piece of confused and self-contradictory thinking – as a case, that is, of sophistic.

Have we any reason for taking the present problem of teaching religion to be simpler in conception or easier in execution? The contemporary problem appears, indeed, to be more intricate and difficult. Varied and conflicting as were the views of Plato's Greek contemporaries as to what things should be included and taught under the head of virtues, the question of just what concretely comes under the caption of religion to-day is as much harder to decide as our social life is more heterogeneous in origin and composition than was the Athenian. We certainly cannot teach religion as an abstract essence. We have got to teach something as religion, and that means practically some religion.

Which? In America, at least, the answer cannot be summarily given even as Christianity in general. Our Jewish fellow-citizens not only have the same "hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions" as the Christians, but, like them, they pay taxes, vote, and serve on school boards. But we should not be very much better off even if it were a question of Christianity alone. Which Christianity? Oriental in its origin, it has been since Latinized and Germanized, and there are even those who have dreamed of humanizing it.

The problem of to-day is more complex as respects also the process of learning, of coming to know. In the day of Plato, art and science, skilled practice and theory, were only beginning to be separated. Just as a man learned shoemaking in process of becoming a shoemaker, so might a man learn virtue in becoming a member of a good state – if such a thing could be found. To-day knowledge is something specialized, and learning does not consist in intelligent mastery of an activity, but in acquiring a diversity of information about things, and control over technical methods for instituting symbolic references to things. Knowledge to Plato was the sort of thing that the forefathers of some of us called "getting religion." It was a personal experiencing and a vital realization. But what shall knowledge of religion as an outcome of instruction mean to-day? Shall it mean the conversion of character into spirituality? Shall it mean the accumulation of information about religion? Or are there those who still believe in some magic power resident in memorized words, phrases, and facts of transmuting themselves into personal insight, the development of fundamental mood and the formation of permanent attitudes towards experience?

When we consider knowledge from the side of its method and from the standpoint of what it takes to get something really worthy to be called knowledge, the problem increases in difficulty. As yet, the standpoint of science, its spirit, has not of course leavened very adequately our methods of teaching. From the standpoint of those methods of inquiry and testing which we call science, much, perhaps most, of what passes for knowledge is in reality what Plato called opinion. Our science is still an outward garb more or less awkwardly worn rather than a habit of mind. But none the less the scientific norm of mental activity presses daily more close upon life and upon the schools. We are getting daily further away from the conditions in which one subject more or less taught by dogmatic, catechetical and memoriter methods was of slight consequence. We are becoming aware of the absurdity implied in calling things which happen to be studied and learned in school "knowledge," when they have been acquired by methods frequently at odds with those necessary to give science. Can those who take the philosophic and historic view of religion as a flower and fruition of the human spirit in a

congenial atmosphere tolerate the incongruity involved in “teaching” such an intimate and originally vital matter by external and formal methods? And can those who hold that true religion is something externally imported tolerate any other methods? Is it not confusion to seek a reconciliation of two such disparate ideas?

Already the spirit of our schooling is permeated with the feeling that every subject, every topic, every fact, every professed truth must submit to a certain publicity and impartiality. All proffered samples of learning must go to the same assay-room and be subjected to common tests. It is the essence of all dogmatic faiths to hold that any such “show-down” is sacrilegious and perverse. The characteristic of religion, from their point of view, is that it is – intellectually – secret, not public; peculiarly revealed, not generally known; authoritatively declared, not communicated and tested in ordinary ways. What is to be done about this increasing antinomy between the standard for coming to know in other subjects of the school, and coming to know in religious matters? I am far from saying that the antinomy is an inherent one, or that the day may not come when religion will be so thoroughly naturalized in the hearts and minds of men that it can be considered publicly, openly, and by common tests, even among religious people. But it is pertinent to point out that, as long as religion is conceived as it now is conceived by the great majority of professed religionists, there is something self-contradictory in speaking of education in religion in the same sense in which we speak of education in topics where the method of free inquiry has made its way. The “religious” would be the last to be willing that either the history or the content of religion should be taught in this spirit; while those to whom the scientific standpoint is not a merely technical device, but is the embodiment of integrity of mind, must protest against its being taught in any other spirit.

As Plato brought out with reference to the teaching of virtue, there is one other factor in coming to know – the teachers. Plato was quite sure that, whether or no virtue might be taught, it might not be taught by its professed teachers – the sophists. I express my appreciation of Plato rather than my lack of appreciation of the professional teachers of our own day, when I say that if Plato were to return to take part in the current discussion, he would raise questions about those who were to teach religion analogous to those he brought up about the teachers of his own time. It is not that those into whose hands the giving of instruction would fall are so irreligious or so non-religious as to be unfitted for the task. The sophists were doubtless superior rather than inferior in personal virtues to their average neighbor. It is one thing to be fairly or even exceptionally virtuous; it is another thing to command the conditions and the qualifications for successful importation of virtue

to others. Where are the experts in religion? and where are the authoritative teachers? There are theologians: do we want theology taught? There are historians, but I fear the day has not come when the history of religion can be taught as history. Here precisely is one of those fields of clarification and criticism where much labor needs to be done, and where the professional religionist is one of the most serious obstacles to reckon with, since a wider and deeper historic knowledge would overthrow his traditional basis.

There are preachers and catechists, but, unless we are committed to some peculiar faith or institution, it is not exhortation or discipline of this sort that constitutes religious instruction. There are psychologists: but is introspection our aim? There remains, indeed, the corps of faithful, more or less well-prepared, hard-working and hard-worked teachers. This brings us to the crux of the whole matter. Is religion a thing so specialized, so technical, so "informational" that, like geography or history or grammar, it may be taught at special hours, times, and places by those who have properly "got it up," and been approved as persons of fit character and adequate professional training?

This question of the mode, time, and stuff of specific instruction trenches indeed upon a question in which national temper and tradition count for much. I am quite aware that upon this subject it is almost impossible for an Englishman and an American whose actual intellectual attitude in general is very much the same to understand each other. Nothing, I think, struck the American who followed the debates on the last English Educational Bill with more emphasis than the fact that even the more radical upon the Liberal side disclaimed, almost with horror, any intention of bringing about the state of things which we, upon this side, precisely take for granted as normal – all of us except Lutherans and Roman Catholics. I have no right to suppose that these protests and disclaimers were discreet concessions to political expediency. We must assume a profound difference of attitude and conviction. Consequently what I have now to say is conceived so definitely from the American point of view that it may not be intelligible in a different situation. But we do not find it feasible or desirable to put upon the regular teachers the burden of teaching a subject which has the nature of religion. The alternative plan of parcelling out pupils among religious teachers drawn from their respective churches and denominations brings us up against exactly the matter which has done most to discredit the churches, and to discredit the cause, not perhaps of religion, but of organized and institutional religion: the multiplication of rival and competing religious bodies, each with its private inspiration and outlook. Our schools, in bringing together those of different nationalities, languages, traditions, and creeds, in assimilating them together upon the basis of what is

common and public in endeavor and achievement, are performing an infinitely significant religious work. They are promoting the social unity out of which in the end genuine religious unity must grow. Shall we interfere with this work? shall we run the risk of undoing it by introducing into education a subject which can be taught only by segregating pupils and turning them over at special hours to separate representatives of rival faiths? This would be deliberately to adopt a scheme which is predicated upon the maintenance of social divisions in just the matter, religion, which is empty and futile save as it expresses the basic unities of life. An acute English critic has recently called us, with much truth, a "nation of villagers." But in this matter of education at least we have no intention or desire of letting go our hard-won state-consciousness in order to relapse into divisive provinciality. We are far, indeed, from having attained an explicit and articulated consciousness of the religious significance of democracy in education, and of education in democracy. But some underlying convictions get ingrained in unconscious habit and find expression in obscure intimation and intense labor, long before they receive consistent theoretic formulation. In such dim, blind, but effective way the American people is conscious that its schools serve best the cause of religion in serving the cause of social unification; and that under certain conditions schools are more religious in substance and in promise without any of the conventional badges and machinery of religious instruction than they could be in cultivating these forms at the expense of a state-consciousness.

We may indeed question whether it is true that in any relative sense this is a peculiarly irreligious age. Absolutely speaking, it doubtless is so; but have superficiality, flippancy, and externality of life been such uniformly absent traits of past ages? Our historic imagination is at best slightly developed. We generalize and idealize the past egregiously. We set up little toys to stand as symbols for long centuries and the complicated lives of countless individuals. And we are still, even those who have nominally surrendered supernatural dogma, largely under the dominion of the ideas of those who have succeeded in identifying religion with the rites, symbols, and emotions associated with these dogmatic beliefs. As we see the latter disappearing, we think we are growing irreligious. For all we know, the integrity of mind which is loosening the hold of these things is potentially much more religious than all that it is displacing. It is increased knowledge of nature which has made supra-nature incredible, or at least difficult of belief. We measure the change from the standpoint of the supernatural and we call it irreligious. Possibly if we measured it from the standpoint of the natural piety it is fostering, the sense of the permanent and inevitable implication of nature and man in a common career and destiny, it would

appear as the growth of religion. We take note of the decay of cohesion and influence among the religiously organized bodies of the familiar historic type, and again we conventionally judge religion to be on the decrease. But it may be that their decadence is the fruit of a broader and more catholic principle of human intercourse and association which is too religious to tolerate these pretensions to monopolize truth and to make private possessions of spiritual insight and aspiration.

It may be so; it may be that the symptoms of religious ebb as conventionally interpreted are symptoms of the coming of a fuller and deeper religion. I do not claim to know. But of one thing I am quite sure: our ordinary opinions about the rise and falling off of religion are highly conventional, based mostly upon the acceptance of a standard of religion which is the product of just those things in historic religions which are ceasing to be credible. So far as education is concerned, those who believe in religion as a natural expression of human experience must devote themselves to the development of the ideas of life which lie implicit in our still new science and our still newer democracy. They must interest themselves in the transformation of those institutions which still bear the dogmatic and the feudal stamp (and which do not?) till they are in accord with these ideas. In performing this service, it is their business to do what they can to prevent all public educational agencies from being employed in ways which inevitably impede the recognition of the spiritual import of science and of democracy, and hence of that type of religion which will be the fine flower of the modern spirit's achievement.

THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND THE METHOD OF ITS SOLUTION

Simon F. MacLennan. "The Fundamental Problem of Religious Belief and the Method of Its Solution," *American Journal of Psychology* 9.1 (January 1905): 46–75.

It will scarcely be doubted that religious belief is undergoing modification. It will, perhaps, not be admitted so readily that this modification reveals a crisis in religious faith and involves in doubt the essential religious object – God. Yet such is the case. One need but regard the distribution and direction of social activities to realize that a large and ever-increasing proportion of our best trained and most serious-minded men and women are convinced that religion is an outworn belief. And this contention holds good despite the fact that the recent decades have witnessed a widespread revival of intense religious activity. It is the presence of this crisis and the demand for its resolution which constitute the fundamental problem of religious belief today.

I

Every worthwhile attempt at solving problems must commence by resolving them; i.e., by setting before our minds their determining features and principles. In the present instance, accordingly, we must begin our inquiry with the question: "What causes have led up to the present religious crisis?" In answer, I would indicate, first and in general, that the main source of intelligent religious indifference today is not, as has been too commonly supposed, an inherent antagonism between religion as such and the modern mind, but rather one between what may be called authority-religion and the modern mind as expressed in scientific and philosophic method. This antagonism we shall indicate, to begin with, in a general way, and follow with a more specific indication of its form and method as exhibited by Christianity.

Authority-religion maintains that, of himself, man is incapable of knowing truth, and consequently that it must be determined for him by processes other than his own. To such a method science and philosophy

are inherently and necessarily opposed. For if human intelligence cannot determine of itself the truth or falsity of its opinions, science and philosophy are vain. And so vigorous has been their opposition that authority-religion has relinquished its pretensions to jurisdiction in every sphere but that of religion. Even here its claims have been greatly modified and the vehicle or authority constantly changed. Its spirit, however, remains the same as in the days of its more absolute sway, and it is this spirit to which the modern mind is unalterably opposed.

For Christianity, authority-religion has had two distinct sources – Jewish religion and Greek philosophy. Although separate in the beginning, these were ultimately amalgamated and constituted the imposing fabric of mediæval religion against the spirit of which modern science and philosophy have constantly directed their attacks whether in the person of Roman Catholic or of Reformed theology.

As an offshoot from Jewish religion Christianity inherited an all-controlling faith in authority and revelation. This faith, however, it concentrated in the personality of a single individual – Jesus of Nazareth – whom it consequently regarded as the ultimate standard of manhood and the ultimate revelation of God. And so unique and powerful was the result that the Christian view of God and of man dispossessed from their holdings the religions and philosophies of Hellenistic-Roman civilization and itself became the controlling factor in molding the future of western European life. But, while it is true that Christianity infused a refined and intrinsically dynamic ideal into Græco-Roman society, and thereby won fairly the preeminence which it attained, it must not be forgotten that Christianity accomplished this result, in part, by means of Greek thought and Roman social organization. It is without doubt a profitless use of time to speculate what might have been the fate of Christianity and the course of European life had the triumphant religion not been able to avail itself of the results of Greek and Roman experience. As matters stand, however, we can with some clearness discern the influence of both civilizations upon the new religion. To Rome, Christianity is indebted for its early organization; to Greece, for its intellectual formulation. It is to the latter influence as bringing out the implications of authority-religions and as developing their theological forms that we must confine our attention. And it is strikingly illustrative of the practical character of the religious movement which stirred Græco-Roman life to its depths in the early days of the Roman Empire that Christianity should, in its defense and exposition, borrow so largely from the armory of Greek intellectual life. In the principles of Aristotelian logic it soon discovered an instrument precisely adjusted to the formulation of its own authoritative beliefs. And it is thus not a matter of accident or prejudice that mediæval theology, whether taken

in its scholastic or in its mystic form, was, in method, Aristotelian to the core. Both Christian religion and Aristotelian philosophy rested in a basis of authority and revelation. It was natural, therefore, that, although their contents were concretely different, the two should in the course of time be brought into closest contact, and that in their amalgamation Christianity should supply the controlling faith, while Aristotelian logic provided its expository forms. Indeed, we can now see that Aristotelian logic furnishes the essential principle for the formulation and exposition, not merely of the Christian religion, but of all religions in that period of their development in which they take on a predominantly authoritative cast. From this it follows that, if we set carefully before ourselves the characteristics and implications of Aristotelian methodology, we shall come into possession of the key to authority-religion and to the antagonism which science and philosophy inevitably develop to it, whatever its concrete form.

Aristotle conceived of knowledge as a process which moves within two fixed limits. On the one hand is the individual object immediately revealed to sense – the material of knowledge. On the other hand is the universal principle immediately revealed in reflection – the organizing agency in knowledge. Knowledge itself is obtained when the individual mind succeeds in subsuming the materials of sense under their appropriate principles. Human reflection thus rests in and gains its validity from facts and principles given by revelation and received upon authority. This method, assimilated by the church and applied to its own authority-faith, gave rise first to Christian apologetics and ultimately to mediæval theology. Hence, when scientific and philosophic thought had, toward the close of the great mediæval period, developed into the consciousness that knowledge can be obtained only by means of a process of human investigation whose criteria lie within and not without the process, it was natural that they should come into direct conflict with Christianity. This opposition to authority-religion was felt at first by science as an infringement upon the right to investigation in special fields, and by philosophy as indicating the necessity for making a distinction between natural and revealed forms of knowledge. Today the opposition is exclusive and universal. Religion no more than botany or physiology can be validated upon the basis of authority and revelation. Opposition or indifference to authority-religion, consequently, is not the passing mood of a restless hour, but a settled conviction fostered and determined by our whole modern method of investigation. The days of twofold truth are past and gone, and the intelligent world has come to believe unshakably that we cannot admit the competency of the human mind to determine its beliefs in the major part of its experience and to deny its power in the remaining portion of the field. For this reason the

modern mind is led to believe that every adjustment of authority-religion to the newer order of things has been but an additional step toward its final undoing and a further exhibition of the essential untenability of its method. Thus it is convinced that, when the reformed churches substituted the authority of the Bible for that of the Roman ecclesiastical hierarchy, they gained no logical advantage. Nor did the various denominations with their various confessions. Nor do those who, influenced by the decay of confessional theology and the transformation which science and historical criticism have wrought in our attitude to the Bible, fall back upon the consciousness of Jesus as the center of authority-religion. So surely as we rest in any of these as sources of truth directive of, and not determined by, the ordinary methods of investigation, the conviction is ultimately borne in upon us that our beliefs are but examples of the fallacy of the *petitio principii*.

The decay of authority-religion has thus forced the question whether religion in every form is outworn; and, if not, how we can make good such a contention.

One method of solution is of the following character, and has been suggested by the development of the comparative study of religions. Instead of attempting to validate religion in opposition to scientific method, it has been asked: Why not apply the method itself to religious facts? For it cannot be doubted that religion has always existed among men, that it has grown and differentiated in a highly complex manner, and that its influence upon life and mind has been fundamental. Let us then take religious facts as we would any others; let us see what they have to say for themselves and add their contribution to the sum total of knowledge. Such a point of view is entirely legitimate, and there can be no doubt that for the future it will be one of the greatest instrumentalities in bringing us to sane, large-minded, and natural conceptions of religion. But, although the science of comparative religion is of great importance in determining descriptively the content of religion, one is led to doubt its sufficiency for resolving the present crisis and of furnishing us with validated religious beliefs. For the fundamental question arises: In what sense does a scientific study of religion determine the character of religion's ultimate object – God? As this form of apologetic runs, it is maintained that the religious consciousness reveals immediately a supersensible reality, and that through the development of religion man comes to the conviction that the object of religion is ultimate and personal. Now, laying on one side the fact that science cannot lead us farther than to partial views of things, and that in religion, consequently, it can only bring us face to face with a spiritual agency active among other agencies, objections of several kinds rise to mind. First, the contention that the religious consciousness intuits or

reveals a supersensible reality throws the argument back upon the authority-religion basis and is open to all the objections raised against that form of belief. Second, for science no belief can be taken at its face value. Each must be grounded and validated. Third, inasmuch as religious belief implies the reality of an ultimate being, that discipline alone whose business it is to treat of ultimates – viz., metaphysics – can pass in judgment upon the point. Lastly, if we determine to maintain a purely scientific standpoint, there is much reason to believe that we shall find that our conception of God will turn out to be the projection of the social ideal, and not the directly revealed entity that we might desire it to be.

Science, therefore – even the science of comparative religions – cannot lead us to a satisfactory solution of our problem. If, then, religion is to remain as a justified consciousness of the eternal, there is but one way open to us. We may raise the question whether philosophy, as metaphysic, in its treatment of ultimate problems has any place for religion, and more especially for a religion such as Christianity which would determine the ultimate as personal; that is, not as an Absolute to whom personality is a mere incident, but as a God who is personal in the most real sense of the term. This, I take it, is the fundamental problem confronting the religious thinker today. Beside it all other religious questions, however important, become secondary; for with its solution the life or death of religion for the world of today as anything more than ethics is bound up. Let it be solved positively, and we have in it the principle for a reconstruction of religious beliefs in such form as to place them side by side with scientific and philosophic convictions. Moreover, allied with and resting upon the science of comparative religion for its concrete material, it would emerge in a new systematic theology which might reconstruct our practical religious life in accord with all that is most natural, sane, deep, and broad in the ideals and activities both of ancient and modern times. To such an attempted metaphysical solution of the problem we now turn.

II

In proceeding to the metaphysical investigation of the theistic problem it is necessary for us first to clear our minds on the following question: What is the nature of metaphysic, and how does it operate?

Professor F. H. Bradley has humorously defined metaphysic as “the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct;” and there are those who believe seriously that it can go no farther. To such, metaphysic is either impossible or useless. This is especially the attitude of those who would contrast science with metaphysic. According to their way of thinking, science is the occupation of minds that keep close

to facts, and that by slow labor and toilsome processes derive general principles which permit of verification by further application to facts. Metaphysic, on the contrary, is the vain occupation of misguided or incapable minds – misguided in so far as they seek truth outside of or beyond experience; incapable inasmuch as they deal in vague abstractions and generalizations which are never brought to the test of concrete discriminating experience. As a consequence, thinkers of this school, seriously and with a sympathetic desire to save their fellows from useless expenditure of energy and the bitterness of future disillusionment, counsel us to refrain from reckless *a priori* constructions of what is or is to be, to confine our activities in the main to the well-charted portions of reality, and for the rest to voyage into the beyond only in so far as we can avail ourselves of the compass provided by the methods of previous experience. It is true, they admit, that science can unveil to us but small fragments of the true nature of things. Around, above, and beneath is mystery. The farther science proceeds and the greater its conquests, the more insignificant its results appear in comparison with what remains to be investigated. Granting this much, the scientist maintains, however, that what he knows, *he knows*. There are a solid basis and an ever-increasing range to his knowledge. Furthermore, the scientist's agnosticism with reference to the ultimate nature of things, and his skepticism with reference to all attempts at prejudging the character and course of experience, are complemented by assured gnosticism with reference to results obtained and obtainable by scientific methods. In contrast with such modest, yet convincing, aims, the methods of metaphysic appear to many minds to be extravagant and absurd.

Now, did metaphysic endeavor to usurp the rôle of science, and to construct either the facts or the laws of reality by the specious play of abstract concepts, intelligent people would have a right to regard it as a mental aberration, to pity its devotees, and to avoid it. But when we consider the fact that many of the world's keenest minds were metaphysicians, and that they were not behind their age in appreciation of science, a doubt arises as to whether the scientist has quite understood the metaphysician and his problem. Add to this the fact that, although metaphysic might gain scientific favor by confining itself to the task of synthesizing the results of the various sciences, it feels, instinctively, that by so doing it would be untrue to itself. Wherever metaphysic has understood its calling (and, on the whole, it has been fairly conscious of its true position) it has endeavored neither to push or forestall, nor to be the mere stenographer and summarizer of, science. Its position has rather been that of an independent critic and ally of the scientific worker. Professor F. H. Bradley has expressed this by defining the metaphysical standpoint as the critical investigation of first

principles. The metaphysician, accordingly, never interferes with the practical scientist, but examines into and tests the principles or assumptions upon which scientific procedure rests. The relation of the two is precisely that of the economist to the practical business man. The former does not enter into the whirl and strife of business, nor does he, after an *a priori* manner, prophesy the course of coming events. Instead of such folly, he investigates the principles upon which business procedure rests, brings them out into clear light, exhibits their laws, and by so doing enlightens the practical man. In like manner, while science exploits the concreteness of the phenomena of the world and their laws, metaphysic investigates the presuppositions of science, their validity and their implications. By so doing it enlightens the procedure of science and frees it from false or inadequate conceptions. For, as will soon be seen, science can neither avoid assumptions and first principles, nor the framing of notions concerning them. Hence, when science has scorned metaphysic, it has either fallen back upon the crudities of common-sense or upon some outgrown or hybrid metaphysic. Metaphysic it cannot avoid and, if this be so, the intelligent scientist should prefer a trained metaphysic to one crude or bastard, once he perceives the true character of the discipline. As to first principles, it may be said, therefore, that science *assumes*, whereas metaphysic *investigates*. Metaphysical method, accordingly, is neither blind nor arbitrary. Again, the investigator of first principles does not endeavor to get away from, but closer to, facts and their laws. From Thales downward, every metaphysician has conceived his problem as that of getting closer to the world which is. The distinction between the metaphysician and the scientist, as that between the economist and the business man, is one made by a difference of interest and point of view – a difference occasioned by the necessities of the division of labor. The scientist is interested in the individual features and laws of phenomena, their groupings, etc. He takes for granted that there is a cosmos or interrelated system of events governed by laws, that the character of the world's facts and laws are discoverable piecemeal by him, and that his method of observation, explanation, and experiment furnishes the means to such a desirable end. Whether these things are, or are not, true, how they are true, and what such truth implies, are questions which he does not raise. And yet it does not require a vast amount of intelligence to perceive, once attention is directed to the matter, that the scientist assumes general views of the world and of knowledge which, if true, would destroy his science. The discrepancy between his general beliefs and his practical method is not apparent to him, because he has not considered the two in relation to each other. Indeed, the practical scientist is the last man we need ask for a critical account or justification of the method which he applies. For this reason

there is imperative need for an investigation of the scientist's first principles before the full benefit of his method can be obtained. And such an investigation is undertaken by metaphysic.

Science and religion have thus a common interest in the investigation of first principles – an interest whose worth and form metaphysic alone can determine. Science is interested in the outcome of the inquiry because of its bearing upon the possibility of human knowledge. Religion is interested in the result because of its significance for human life as a whole. As a consequence, the interest of each may be best served, first, by a critical analysis of the ordinary presuppositions of science, and, second, by an equally critical reconstruction of scientific first principles based upon the results of the earlier analysis.

III

Scientific presuppositions, as ordinarily stated, are the expression of the doctrine known as naïve realism. Outside and independent of the individual mind are "things" woven together into a most complex world. This world we appreciate by way of sense-perception. Eye, ear, skin, etc., reveal to us realities beyond themselves. Sensations may come and go, but each in its momentary career carries us out from itself to the permanent quality which constitutes a part of the real essence of the "thing." This relation of sensation to quality is thought to be so close that, although the sensation is in the mind and the quality in the external thing, it is only by a process of reflection that the mind can disengage the one from the other. To the scientist as well as to the plain man the mind appears to be dealing at first hand with the objective qualities of things, and not merely with his own sensations. It is only when the scientist begins to philosophize that the sensation is distinguished from the quality and the former as a mental reality conceived as the medium for the revelation of the latter. But, again, sensations in their frequent repetition are found to group themselves in ordered fashion. By attending to the varied forms of this grouping the mind (so thinks the naïve realist) is enabled to build up its perception of a complex world. The smaller groups of sensations whose concomitant appearance and disappearance are constant are unified into perceptions of individual "things." The relations of the groups, taken contemporaneously and successively, form the basis for the mind's perception of the real relations of the object. Finally, the unification, in the mind's view of its actual or possible experiences constitutes its perception of the existing world. And, as we have seen, the relation between the mind and its object is taken to be so close that the fragmentary and momentary nature of our perception is swamped in the completeness and permanence of the world which is perceived. The process of knowledge,

accordingly, is that of discriminating and relating properly the qualities which sensations directly and immediately reveal. In knowing, the mind must add nothing of itself. Its function is limited strictly to describing and construing its experiences. And it is as efficient aids in this process that the method and instruments of science have their place. The scientific investigator observes and discriminates as carefully and widely as trained and active sensory processes aided by instruments of precision will permit. By slow and carefully taken steps he determines in thought the character and interrelations of his sense-impressions, and tests his conceptions by constant reference to their sense-originals. The result, when confirmed by the experience of others, is regarded, not as the consciousness of a mere series of definite and interrelated psychic events, but as the exact knowledge of the real essence of external things.

Such a conception, at once simple and direct, commends itself to the mind at first view, and until the assumptions upon which it rests are closely examined. From the analysis made above the following points should be clear: (1) Naïve realism postulates an original existential dualism between the mind and its object. Each is real apart from the other, and their knowledge relations are representative. Subject and object, consequently, are terms between which knowledge moves, and not factors which fall within the activity of knowledge. (2) Naïve realism assumes the possibility of a validated correspondence of mental states to the objects which they represent. This correspondence of internal idea to external fact is knowledge, and it presents the following forms: the agreement (*a*) of sensation with quality, (*b*) of percept with object, (*c*) of the conscious unity of mental presentations with the objective unity of nature. Against such views the following fundamental and decisive objection has been raised: Naïve realism must forfeit any claim to the possession of a reflective criterion for the discrimination of truth from falsity, and for the determination of knowledge. As a consequence, it must either admit the bankruptcy of its doctrine, or must unreasonably, and therefore uselessly, assume the validity of its assumptions. For, by hypothesis, knowledge is to consist in the correspondence of mental states, whether sensation, percept, or world presentation, with a reality which exists outside and independent of the aforesaid mental states. But how can correspondence or lack of correspondence be determined unless we actually compare both terms; and, in the nature of the case, we do and can possess only one term, viz., the subjective? For the naïve realist knowledge must remain forever an impossibility. Although Locke was partially aware of this unfortunate outcome of his realistic hypothesis, as is evidenced by his recognition that sensitive knowledge is fundamentally necessary and inherently uncertain upon his principles, we have to thank Berkeley and Hume for carrying the doctrine to its

necessary conclusion. In his contention that "an idea can be like nothing but an idea," Berkeley cut the ground away from realism, and in his convincing proof, first, that the manipulation of mental states can never provide us with objective relations, and, second, that sense impressions cannot lead us validly beyond themselves, Hume finally destroyed the assumption of naïve realism and demonstrated, what Plato had taught long before, that sensationalism, the ultimate source of realism, when reduced to consistency, is absolutely speechless.

Thus naïve realism, considered as a satisfactory postulate for science, fails signally when put to the test. Is the result otherwise with the transfigured realism which is adopted by the philosophic scientist as a substitute for naïve realism?

The essential feature of transfigured realism, and that which distinguishes it from naïve realism, is a philosophical formulation of the scientific distinction between primary and secondary qualities. As has been seen, the naïve realist (and with him the scientist in his practical moods) considers qualities to be external essence. In his more theoretical frame of mind, however, the scientist discriminates more closely among qualities, referring certain of them – the secondary – to the mind, and certain others – the primary – to the external object. Or, speaking more specifically, sensations with their accompanying abstract ideas are considered by the transfigured realist to be secondary qualities having a purely mental existence, whereas the external bases of these are denominated primary qualities. Thus we get a distinction between the object as it appears to us and the object as it is in itself; that is, between its phenomenal and noumenal aspects.

Immediately the question arises: How are these two aspects of the object related the one to the other, and in what way do they provide a sure basis for science? In answer to the first part of the question we are indebted to the transfigured realist himself for a clear statement. For John Locke and Herbert Spencer alike science touches only the phenomenal aspect of the object; its noumenal side being entirely unknowable. And this frank statement answers (although in the negative) the second part of the question. On such a conception science disappears, for it can never be the union of contradictory terms. Knowing the unknowable is absurd, whichever way we take it. The scientist believes that the appearances which he observes and describes are representations of an object whose structure or essence really manifests itself in them. Transfigured realism, on the contrary, furnishes the scientist with subjective appearances which manifest nothing that is objective. As a consequence, knowledge and science are supposed to rest in a relation whose terms are mutually contradictory; which is absurd. And still this result seems inevitable to the transfigured realist on the

basis of the scientist's first principles. Plain man and scientist alike start with the assumption: Here is mind; there, outside, is the world of things. These operate upon mind and produce effects by means of which the object is cognized. If, now, we subtract from our total perception the factors which are exclusively mental, what remains must constitute the essence of the extra-mental thing. Such a process leaves us (so says the transfigured realist) with the recognition of an external cause for our experience – a cause, however, of which we can say only that it is the source of our experiences. For the remainder it is essentially unknowable. To determine it further would mean to read into it qualities which, as has been seen already, have a purely mental existence.

It is at this point that the ideal-realist, or the trans-subjective realist as he sometimes calls himself, takes issue with the transfigured realist. It is the aim of the ideal-realist to maintain the standpoint of the naïve realist, and yet to save science and knowledge from the destruction wrought by transfigured realism. The ideal-realist admits the distinction made between primary and secondary qualities, but contends that the external cause of our perceptions cannot legitimately be regarded as unknowable. Every sensation, and every relation of sensations, he maintains, is determined by an external cause, but by a cause which is correspondent in each concrete detail with the effect produced by it. Hence for the unknowable noumenon of the transfigured realist must be substituted an intelligible object whose inner character corresponds to and represents itself in every detail of perception. True, the real object is extra-mental, trans-subjective; but it is now so conceived that, instead of being intrinsically opaque, it is intrinsically transparent. Hence, although the plain man and the scientist deal at first hand simply with their mental states, they are now free to regard them as the exact correlates of real existences. And what is true of objects in their isolated capacity is also true of them in their relations one to another. Thus we are led finally to the conception of a real, but intelligible, extra-mental world – a world in which there is nothing intrinsically opaque, and consequently a world which is ultimately ideal. In such fashion the ideal-realist believes that he meets the demand of the plain man for an extra-mental world, of the scientist for an intelligible independent world of things, and of the metaphysician for a sound theory of knowledge.

Yet, despite its plausibility, ideal-realism is no more satisfactory as a scientific postulate than naïve realism. Indeed, it rests upon the same foundations and treats its problems by identical methods. The difficulties encountered are consequently the same. Ideal-realism as truly as naïve realism lacks a criterion for the discrimination of truth from falsity, and for the determination of its intelligible object. The extra-

mental object may be existent, but how do we know when we have reached a correct statement of its structure? Our sole basis for judgment is sensation and the perceptions framed thereon. But these are affairs of the mind, and we deal with no other counters. If a picture be a photograph, we know that it must have an original. But if the original never comes within our view, we can never identify the photograph. In like manner we must insist that while the ideal realist may treat his *intra-mentem* perceptions as copies of *extra-mentem* realities, he can never demonstrate his point and can never identify his concrete experiences. As a matter of fact, the ideal-realist endeavors to utilize the scientific method as a concrete instrument for discriminating truth from falsity. He thus gains prestige for his system from his ally. He fails, however, to see that, if his conception of knowledge and reality be true, science is forever impossible.

There is one further objection which applies equally to the three forms of realism. They alike maintain that we must go beyond the individual mind for an explanation of its momentary experiences. And why? Because forsooth, our concrete experiences come and go, they originate and disappear. The law of causation assures us that every event must have a cause; consequently our momentary experiences must be depended upon something else, and therefore upon an extra-mental reality. But why extra-mental? Hume demonstrated that sense-experiences furnish no ground for the perception of causation as an extra-mental principle. And realism must ultimately derive all its conceptions from sense. Causation consequently, in so far as we can know anything about it, is an affair of the interrelations of our mental states, and not the executive agent of an extra-mental reality. Sensations as sensations are, therefore, dumb, so far as the revelation of trans-subjective realities is concerned. With this result realism in its various forms comes to the ground, and we are brought face to face with solipsism; for if the world of concrete objects can be reduced to a system of appearances within the individual mind, I must include my fellows among the list of appearances, and regard myself and my experiences as the sole reality.

It might seem as though our criticism should rest with this result, absurd as it appears. But we have not yet learned the full extent of the absurdities to which realist metaphysic leads us. Having demolished the *extra-mentem* object, Hume next turned his attention to the self implied in every realistic theory of knowledge. This self has always been regarded by the naïve realist as an activity other than the concrete conscious states, and operating upon them. It is, in fact, a mental "thing," having the same sort of primary and substantial qualities as are attributed to the external "thing," the difference being that the self is conceived as a mental substance, whereas the external thing is regarded

as a material substance. And although transfigured realism and ideal-realism are more cautious in their definition of the self than naïve realism, they do not entirely avoid the implications and difficulties of the earlier view. Now, against the substantial doctrine of the self Hume raises two objections: first, we know nothing of reality except in terms of experience; second, we have no more right to apply causation to the proof of a noumenal spiritual ground of conscious states than we have to the proof of a noumenal material ground of the same. We have a right only to conceive of a concrete conscious self constituted of conscious experiences. But we have a right to conceive of a physical object in exactly the same manner. One is just as much or as little objective as the other.

It would appear at first view as though metaphysic had led us to a veritable cul-de-sac, and had, therefore, justified the unfavorable opinion that many have formed concerning it. Such a cul-de-sac was, indeed, the result to which Hume in his own opinion was brought. Thorough-going skepticism with reference to the possibility of rationally demonstrating the extra-mental existence of an independent external world, of the soul, of God, is the last word of the great Scotch metaphysician. It is true that we may treat Hume's result as a *reductio ad absurdum* of his philosophy, and may maintain that it is unreasonable to suppose that men have been universally mistaken in the character of their fundamental beliefs. We may, with Reid and the Scottish school of common-sense philosophy founded by him, postulate the validity of our beliefs in extra-mental realities, and advance a pre-established harmony between mental conception and extra-mental reality. Such a method, however, is inadmissible metaphysically, for we can never solve the doubts which investigation raises by crying absurdity and avoiding the real point at issue. Nor will it do to say that, unless we are prepared to assert the irrationality of the universe, every need must have its real object of satisfaction, and as a consequence we have a right to assert the truth and objectivity of our fundamental beliefs. The "rationality of the universe" is a large question, and we cannot frighten the skeptic away by means of a bogie argument which, when clearly seen, is nothing other than a bare-faced *petitio principii*. And as to needs and their satisfaction, it is sufficient to state that it may be admitted that needs are true, and that their satisfaction may be true, whereas our notions of both may be utterly false. And to determine the true relation of both is just the point at issue. Kant's retort to Reid was, therefore, perfectly just when he intimated that the common-sense philosophy consisted in very ordinary density. There is no way of avoiding the negative results of skeptical analysis except by digging deeper into the nature of things than the skeptic himself. If we apply this principle to the

point at issue, we note that the real meaning of Hume's destructive analysis, and the consequent answer to the same, are to be found, not by endeavoring to avoid his argument, but by turning attention to his presuppositions. On doing so we perceive that his contribution to metaphysic is equally positive and negative. Like all great critical philosophers, he unmasks the insufficiency of previous conceptions and lays the foundations for future advance. Hume's skepticism was not an exhibition of the impossibility of metaphysic as such, but rather of the untenability of the various forms of realistic method. And this may be shown in two ways. First, as was indicated above, Hume demonstrated that a consistent sensationalism is dumb, and that, instead of sensation providing infallible information concerning extra-mental qualities, objects, or world, it is unaware even of its own nature and origin. Secondly, and even more importantly, inasmuch as the point is constantly overlooked, Hume demonstrated that every theory of knowledge which existentially severs mind from its object seals its own doom; for of necessity knowledge thus conceived must be a representation within the mind of realities without the mind. And inasmuch as mind is confined to representation by means of its own mental states, it can never make a comparison of its copy with the extra-mental original. Put otherwise, Hume's essential metaphysical message is that, if we hypostatize mind, conceive it as an entity, and draw a magic circle round about it, we shall find in time that we have raised a devastating metaphysical spirit whose destructive work we cannot stay until we have learned the word which will remove the spell. That Hume himself was not fully aware of the positive value of his own contribution is evidenced by the fact that he was content to leave his philosophy in the negative form of a solipsism. What he really accomplished was something quite different. He was the first among modern philosophers to bring to clear consciousness the ultimate factor in, and the general expression for, reality which metaphysic demands. For it is not the function of metaphysic, as some have supposed, to construct the concrete content of ultimate reality, but to lay bare the intrinsic nature which real things everywhere display. Hence Hume's rejection of an unknowable and of extra-mental realities, together with his reduction of every phase of reality to experiential terms, is not to be understood in a psychological, but entirely in a logical, sense. The former interpretation, would reduce reality to the momentarily changing stream of consciousness; the latter requires us to take experience in an objective or ultimate sense. Or, in other words, Hume's result, taken metaphysically and not psychologically, denies no reality and no claim that any form of reality makes, but simply insists that every reality at bottom is a form of experience. The characteristic of realism is not that it insists that

"things" are real, but that it insists upon their reality as consisting in independence as extra-mental realities. And the characteristic of idealism is not that it would deny the "objective" reality of things, but that it would ask in what such objective reality can consist. Consequently, objective idealism does not remove the real world either of plain man or of scientist, but points out that the world which is has a common nature and is of a common stuff with that experience which he calls his own. The greatest difficulty in appreciating the standpoint of objective idealism or experientialism is that many people persist in returning to the realistic psychological point of view. And this not because of the inherent force of the realist position, but because of their own lack of metaphysical insight. Subject and object, the self and the world existent in space and time, as well as the system of which these are but functional parts, must be given adequate consideration by a developed metaphysic. This, however, must not blind us to the objectivity of the result which we obtain when we discover that the reality, whether of subject, object, or system, has no meaning except in terms of experience. Experience, therefore, must be regarded as the universal denominator and constituent of reality. So taken it is absolute. Further metaphysical advance is to be made by investigating the various forms in which experience expresses itself, and the important question for us is whether by metaphysic we can obtain an insight into the ultimate character of reality as experience, and whether its ultimate characteristic is of a personal order.

IV

The outcome of our metaphysical investigation, so far, has thus been positive and fundamental. But it has also been partial and, for the interest of religion, quite incomplete; for while we have been brought into touch with reality, and have been enabled to form a significant conception of its inner structure, this result has been presented merely in terms of a least common denominator of things real. Religious belief, however, demands an understanding, not of the lowest, but of the highest, form of reality. Once we realize this we appreciate the fact that, although our previous investigation may have led us to the threshold of a solution, it has led us no farther, and that perhaps the most difficult, as it is the most vital, problem of religious philosophy falls within rather than without idealism. For contemporary idealism is by no means convinced that personality in any of its definitions can be raised to the commanding plane of a true exhibition of the ultimate form of reality. Yet it is just this result that positive religion finds essential to its vitality.

Now, it might seem at first sight that, although reality is knowable, and although every form of experience is a true exponent of the nature

of things, any attempt at determining ultimate reality must end in failure. From such an abrupt termination of our investigation we are saved by the controlling influence of the theory of knowledge. For, as has been emphasized by the development of modern philosophy in its entirety, it is in the function of knowing that reality takes on determinate form for us. This is true whether reality be manifested in science, art, morality, or religion. Remove knowledge and at once the determinateness of reality fades away. Its function, therefore, is central. For this reason the modern philosopher is convinced that, if he can but understand the nature and forms of knowledge, he will attain a satisfactory insight into the ultimate characteristics of reality. In this section of our essay we must inquire, consequently, whether a positive theory of knowledge carries our insight to an outline view of the final form which reality exhibits, and whether this form is personal.

As a consequence of the analysis made in section iii, we may eliminate at once those conceptions of knowledge which would define its function as a representation by experience of something beyond itself. Having found experience to be the common denominator and constituent of reality, it is evident that the knowledge-function must fall within experience. Our problem consequently becomes: What function within experience is performed by knowledge? The solution stated in the form to which direct analysis of the knowing function leads me runs thus: Knowledge is the formula for constructively transforming experience. This solution we must explain, justify, and interpret. And, by way of explanation, it is to be noted that this conception of knowledge has nothing whatsoever to do with copying or representing reality in a mediate and indirect way. Its connection with reality is direct and immediate; for, as has been seen, experience and reality are coincident. To say, therefore, that knowledge is the formula for transforming experience is the same thing as to say that knowledge is the function in and through which one determinate form of reality is transmuted into another. As will be seen more fully in what follows, the "objectivity" of knowledge consists in the adequacy of this function to the work undertaken, and not the comparison of experience with something other than itself which we choose to call reality. Reality is in every experience, and the "subjectivity" of our ideas consists in their demonstrated inadequacy to exhibit the character of some phase of experience, and their consequent failure to bring about the transformations which they attempt. It is the function of objective or true ideas, on the contrary, to determine precisely the character of experience, to describe its possible forms of transformation, and to accomplish these transformations as desired. In other words, knowledge analyzes present experiences into conditions for the realization of future experiences, and these future experiences appear

as ends which inaugurate and complete the function of knowing. Hence knowledge finds its origin in a phase of experience taken to be undesirable, and its controlling aim in a future experience thought of as desirable, and into which the undesirable experience may be transformed. In brief, it is an active constructive process, which determines the limits and methods of its own activity, and exhibits its truth and objectivity by constructing the reality which it defines.

To illustrate: During the latter half of the nineteenth century the attention of the French government was called to the fact that the disease known as charbon had so decimated the flocks, herds, and droves of the French farmers as to make a continuance of the industry impossible under the conditions. Pasteur, the chemist, was directed to inquire into the difficulty and to provide a solution, if possible. Here we find the limits of an investigation, and of what is to be knowledge, set in an undesirable condition of agricultural activities and in the desire to change these conditions in such a way as to make agricultural pursuits profitable and satisfactory. To accomplish this result, it was necessary for Pasteur to determine the character of the interfering agency and to provide means for its elimination. Only when he had done so could he feel that his work was complete and that he knew the charbon disease. Following clues suggested by previous investigations, Pasteur demonstrated two things; viz., (a) the disease was caused by the presence of certain bacteria; (b) its virulent and fatal form could be prevented by vaccination, i.e., by inoculation with an attenuated form of the charbon virus. In determining each point Pasteur was led to perform a long series of experiments. His experiments, however, were not haphazard, but such as to commend their scientific value by their ability to accomplish results. The point pertinent to the present investigation is that the knowledge which Pasteur obtained in its origin, development, and application, had its entire being in the recognition of a problem and in its solution. The problem presented an undesirable set of conditions; the solution lay bare their character, their operation in livestock, and the means for transforming them into desirable activities. In each step of the process the objectivity and truth of Pasteur's conceptions were tested by experiment, i.e., by the actual power to construct the reality conceived. And this result of Pasteur's is but a single example of the work accomplished everywhere by science. To it knowledge arises in the endeavor to turn problems into solutions. It accomplishes this by a constructive experimental process in which analysis and synthesis play complementary parts. As analysis, knowledge consists in the resolution of the problem into operative conditions or determining factors; as synthesis, in the presentation of the solution or whole which may be produced through the co-operation of the factors determined; as experiment, in

the realization of its constructive power through the process of production. It is because of its character as a constructive agency that knowledge combines the apparently contradictory values of relativity and absoluteness. Knowledge is relative, inasmuch as its results are dependent upon determinate conditions; it is absolute, inasmuch as it demonstrates that, given the appropriate conditions, the results follow. This state of affairs merely indicates that reality is constructively transformed and controlled in knowledge, and that in this process we may distinguish the means to be employed and the end to be obtained. It is of essential importance, however, to note that the process of transformation is determinate and individual. It is determinate, inasmuch as the conditions and results are not haphazard, but exhibit a preciseness of character and relation which fit them for the specific work which they accomplish. It is individual, inasmuch as the actual process of knowledge is essentially concrete, arising out of, and terminating in, situations which in themselves are diverse one from another, i.e., unique. This fact is emphasized by the distinction commonly made between particular and universal. Ideas embody knowledge, and accordingly are to be considered as constructive formulæ. As such they must be specifically adapted to the individual situations which they control. In other words, ideas in actual function are individual, having in each situation unique characteristics. But if this alone were true, every situation would require an absolutely new idea, and knowledge would constantly begin *de novo*. Such an embarrassment is obviated by the custom of applying old thought-instruments to new situations. By this means previous gains are conserved and the process of knowledge advanced. This application of the old to the new implies three things at least: first, the process of experience is continuous; second, in the diverse moments of experience, however individual they may be, there are certain similarities or factors which submit themselves to exact control by instruments originally adapted to other moments of experience; third, the old instrument must be adapted to the unique factors of the new situations. If, then, we take into account the fact that an idea-instrument can be adjusted to diverse individual situations, we give to it a universal value; if, on the other hand, we take into account the series of situations to which a given idea may be adjusted, we speak of the particulars which fall under control of the ideas taken as a universal. The distinction of universal (unity) and particular (difference) is consequently a functional and not an existential difference, depending upon the known fact of the adjustability of old ideas to new situations. Moreover, this functional distinction is most acutely felt in our review of a situation preliminary to the exact determination of its individual features. Our thoughts revert first to principles (previous idea-instruments), and we settle upon the one applicable to the

present situation. We examine it carefully as a principle and refresh ourselves upon its method of operation. Next we call to mind the previous instances of its application, their specific features, etc. Imbued with the wider knowledge which a larger range of vision gives, we finally apply ourselves to the specific situation with its unique features. When reflection is complete, and knowledge established, what emerges is an individualized idea controlling an individualized reality. With this result we revert to the thought from which we started, that knowledge reveals the innermost nature of the real to be both determinate and individual.

If, then, we are convinced that knowledge is the formula for the transformation of experience, the crucial question arises as to how this affects personality, and more especially the possibility of predicating personality of the Absolute in any final way.

And first we must note that the development of knowledge transforms experience in an essentially personal way. This may be shown generally and specifically. Taking knowledge generally, we found that in its origin and function it was essentially teleological. A closer examination of this teleological function brings to light its necessary development of experience into personal form. Every idea is twofold in its fundamental characteristics. It is the presentation of an end constituted of anticipations of definite experiences. It also exhibits the means requisite to the realization of these experiences. Again, ideas are constructive agencies, and the means and ends embodied in them constitute a single active process. But such a means-ends process is personal. Consequently the more determinate and complex knowledge becomes, the more definitely must the experience which is the medium of all knowledge take on self-conscious form. And, finally, inasmuch as knowledge originates and ends in the realization of a purpose, the development of knowledge must ever accent, and can never transcend, the self-conscious form of experience.

Turning to detail, our problem involves the origin and nature of the subject-object consciousness and its relation to reality conceived as absolute experience. In its lowest form, knowledge appears as a process in which experience passes from indeterminate to determinate form. And with this simplest process there arises a set of values which, although their antagonism is constantly resolved, cling to knowledge without abatement up to the final moment of its development. These correlative terms are the finite and infinite. They are factors within knowledge, and not independent realities between which knowledge moves. As to the finite, its reality consists in a recognition of the fact that experience tends to pass from indeterminate to determinate form through a process whose course is not immediately completed, and in

which inhibition and limitation assert themselves. It is the function of knowledge to recognize and to remove this inhibition. The greater the inhibition and the more pressing the desire for its removal the keener the sense of finitude becomes. As complementary to this the infinite is the formulation of the result to be reached through removal of inhibition and the realization in free movement of the desired course of experience. Finite and infinite thus stand over against each other as urgent problem and necessary solution in the process of knowledge. They are not fixed entities, but fluent values. For experience facing the problem of a resisting factor in its movement cannot think of this but as a limit, a finitude to be transformed into a means of further movement, into an infinitude. So long as the tension remains, the thought of reality and unreality is bandied from one term to the other, and may even be formulated in mutually destructive and dependent philosophies such as the Eleatic and Heraclitean. It is sufficient, but essential, for us to note that they are correlative values which arise and pass away in the determination of experience; for when the aim of knowledge has been attained, the distinction of finite and infinite lapse in the experience of reality which as true is absolute. And with this we are brought to another noteworthy point. It must now appear that the characteristic of absoluteness is something which attaches to every idea which realizes its aim. This holds whether the idea be simple or complex. Thus we find that the knowledge-process in its development accomplishes a twofold result. It progressively differentiates what we may perhaps call a local experience, and at the same time lays bare a richer and more definitely organized experience within whose activity itself and its differentiation are factors. And at this stage of our argument certain things must not be forgotten. First, we have already taken experience as absolute – i.e., as a process in terms of which everything may be explained, and consequently a process which itself must be self-contained. This self-containedness does not appear to be characteristic of a process which passes from the indeterminate to the determinate and experiences a constant eruption of inhibitions within its activity, especially as these are inhibitions which it undergoes, but does not create. The more natural conception would appear to be that the differentiating point of experience is a factor in a larger experience whose richer content supplies the principles and circumstances of its development. Secondly, the previous point is emphasized by the fact that knowledge is held to determinate lines in the development of its ideas. Not any form of conditions nor any form of aim is possible, but only such as are found to suit the objective circumstances. Consequently it would appear that knowledge must be formed on lines determined by the immanent presence of an inclusive experience. Thirdly, we must be careful not to determine this

inclusive experience in any fixed or static manner, but to leave its determination open to such modifications as subsequent investigation may deem necessary.

With these cautions in mind, we may pass to the direct investigation of the subject-object consciousness. The origin of these forms of reality rests in the transformation of experience from an indeterminate to a determinate form. The early consciousness of the child, although only relatively indeterminate, at the earliest stage in which we become acquainted with it knows as yet no distinction of subject or object, nor indeed any very definite distinctions of any kind. Barring the fact that certain rough distinctions of sense-qualities have already been made, and that as regards touch these are relatively advanced as compared with other senses, the child-consciousness at birth is more nearly what Professor Baldwin calls an "undifferentiated continuum" of activities. Gradually differentiation is pushed forward, and the continuum becomes a vast system of discriminated active points, each of which serves as the prophet and executive of other determinate experiences. The continuum has been modified in two distinct ways. It has developed into a system of stimuli to determinate experiences, and it has come to realize its own inclusive unity as the vehicle and medium of this differentiated system. Into the nature and characteristics of these distinctions we must now look more closely. The system of stimuli, with their suggested possible experiences, is the known world of objects, using the word "objects" in the broad sense of the term. This known world then includes everything experienced from "things" to "persons." Each of these resolves itself into a group of stimuli prophetic of determinate realizable experiences. In method of approach there is absolutely no difference between experience of a "thing" and experience of a "person." The point of distinction lies within this, and consists entirely in a difference by way of reaction on the part of each. In Kantian terminology, a "thing" is a form of reality which permits itself to be used as a mere means to purposes not its own, whereas a "person" is a form of reality which refuses to lend itself to such treatment, and insists upon the recognition of its own ends and purposes as essential factors in the construction of other purposes. But, admitting this distinction, the prior point remains true, and the world of knowledge becomes a world of differentiated activities whose teleological significance is stamped in the structure of everyone. It is impossible to find an "object," be it person, thing, or some intermediary between the two; which is not the determinate condition of a determinate experience or series of experiences. Professor James insists that the essence of things is teleological, and the more we inquire into how objects have come to be discriminated in experience, and the part which they actually perform in experience, the

more are we convinced that they are the expression of the differentiation of experience in the forms of a process which is fundamentally and essentially a means-ends process – i.e., a process which must necessarily emerge and maintain itself in self-conscious form wherever the unity and principle of its nature is brought definitely to view. And this we find to be fact when the system of experience is considered on its side of unity. The world of experience appears therein as a self whose concrete nature is constituted of the very system of experiences which we found to constitute the world of real objects. And this absolute identity of the concrete self, in content, with the world of objects or not-self leads us to the recognition of the same point which we insisted on above, viz., the differentiation of a local or partial experience in and through the activity of an inclusive experience which sets its principles and circumstances. There can be no doubt that the distinction of self from not-self is a distinction, not of material or content, but of function and significance. Analyze the self, and at once its content becomes identical with the not-self. On the other hand, analyze the not-self, and you are brought face to face with the immediacy of the self. Observe, however, that every experience which determines itself in knowledge bears the mark in its determinateness of an immanent ground expressed in the knowledge-movement, and at once the difficulty disappears. Self and not-self have alike objective value and are both true to the real nature of things. And at this point we must press home another phase of the same problem. Self and not-self – myself, other selves, and the world of things – are alike true of reality and constituents of it. But what are “things” more than forms of experience which have no unity of their own – mere means to the realization of aims of which they have no conception? Their reality then becomes subservient to and mere content of the reality of selves. From this standpoint, therefore, our interpretation of experience as absolute and as inclusive of the reality of the self and the not-self must be in terms of a form of experience at least as elaborate as the self. Whether it must not be more than self is a further question which remains to be asked. So far as we have gone, granted an inclusive experience of the form of a self which recognizes and maintains its own unity in the diversity of its activities; granted an indefinite number of developing experiences, some of which clearly recognize their own unity and some of which do not – we have fulfilled all the demands which knowledge and experience can make of us. In the interactivity of developing experiences one with another, and with the richer inclusive experience, we have an adequate basis alike for the origin and complexity of knowledge, and for the objective forms which the worlds of the self and the not-self take on. On the other hand, in the constant activity of the inclusive experience of which every other experience is

but a phase we have an adequate basis for the permanence and universality of those laws of nature and mind which all science presupposes. And this result is sure aside from the question as to whether absolute experience itself differentiates. We must now face the difficulty which Professor F. H. Bradley develops with such inexorable logic in his *Appearance and Reality*. Formulated after the manner which is crucial for the present investigation, the question becomes: Can personality be predicated of the Absolute as Absolute? Professor Bradley answers "No!" and for very definite reasons. He admits that the self is the essential vehicle of reflective experience, but for the very reason that it is so insists that it is convicted of inadequacy. Reflection can never determine truth as absolute; it must content itself with the relative. Consequently, when reflection realizes its own impotency, it perceives that truth and reality in any absolute sense must lie beyond reflective construction in a unity whose necessity we can demonstrate, but whose character we can never determine. With the inadequacy of reflection is involved everything the recognition of whose positive character depends upon reflection. Chief in this respect is the self. It is a form of dominating importance in the scale of realities, but it must be cast aside as mere appearance when considered in the light of absolute requirements. It will be evident from the above that the motif of Professor Bradley's criticism is to be found in his conception of knowledge, and that any attempt to overturn his contention must first measure his fundamental principles. According to him, knowledge is essentially a process of reflection. It arises out of the diremption of sensible experience in a process in which self-consciousness and articulate expression are attained at the cost of inner unity and consistency. Sensible experience is a unity within itself, but a unity in which every feature is blended in the indistinctness and blindness of mere feeling. By an inner impulse this unity is broken and reflection begins. Its aim is to comprehend the direct experience from which it emerged. But now difficulties meet it on every hand. It must examine experience piecemeal and in an abstract way. The concrete content is too rich for handling in concrete terms. The abstract must, accordingly, be substituted for it. Knowledge, consequently, transforms what it touches, and by so doing mutilates it. But even so abstracted sensible experience is found to be infinitely rich and leads to an unending process of analysis. The same result is reached from the synthetic side. Every fragment determined is found to have innumerable relations to every other fragment and to lead hopelessly beyond itself. On both sides knowledge leads beyond the given and the concrete to the thought of a determining whole in which every detail of experience is exhausted and adequately defined. It is, finally, this exhaustive and adequate definition of each and every detail of experience which alone

constitutes truth. Any definition which falls short of, or is other than, the definition of elements in the absolute whole is false. From this it is evident that Professor Bradley proceeds upon a conception of knowledge and of truth which not merely makes a *final* solution of his various problems impossible, but which in all strictness shuts him out *from any solution whatsoever*. For we must press the question and ask Professor Bradley how he obtains a criterion for the determination of any truth. According to his analysis, absolute truth is for the Absolute alone and not to be obtained by us. We must be content with a constantly expanding relative truth. But what do we mean by "relative truth"? Assuredly, truth obtained *in so far*, but inadequate and subject to indefinite modification. But on what basis can we assert that any idea is true in so far? Every finite idea, whether taken as subject or as predicate, is, according to Professor Bradley, merely proximate. Truth, whether as real subject or as real predicate, exists as the organization of the Absolute. Finite truth, therefore, can be truth in so far only as it corresponds with the Absolute. Agreements or disagreements of this order the Absolute alone could determine. Professor Bradley, therefore, supplies no criterion for the discrimination of the only ideas which can convey distinctions of true from false for us. And this holds despite his endeavor to supply a working criterion by insisting that truth consists in consistency and falsity in discrepancy. Consistency and discrepancy can be applied only on a positive basis, and such a positive basis as we have seen presumes correspondence between the finite idea and the appropriate phase of absolute experience. But such correspondence cannot possibly be made out by the finite.

The breakdown of Professor Bradley's theory of knowledge, accordingly, frees us from the difficulties determined by it and leaves the question of the ultimate characteristic of reality open for reflective consideration. And at the stage to which we have now advanced this consideration concerns a single point. Professor Bradley's contention throughout was that reflection dirempts the unity of experience and never succeeds in restoring it. We have found, however, that in every objective movement of thought the union of idea with reality is realized constructively. Every truth, every idea which realizes its aim, is objective, and there is no distinction between relative and absolute truth. Truth is absolute in every case, or it is no truth at all. Consequently, we have a right to maintain that the vehicle in which reflection develops itself (i.e., the self) also expresses the unity of thought with reality. Such being the logical situation, the developing character of human thought acts rather as an aid than as a hindrance in determining the real as a self-conscious activity. For the more adequate knowledge becomes, the more definitely must its essential characteristics as a means-ends process

(and with it the self-consciousness of the process) be brought into clearness.

Hence, taking the various implications of the theory of knowledge into account, it would appear that we have now the right to predicate personality of ultimate experience, and thereby to pass from the conception of the Absolute to that of God. With this result our inquiry comes naturally to a close. What remains by way of elaborating the dynamic character of the Absolute and its relation to developing centers of experience is an essential for any adequate presentation of a philosophy of religion, but is not required of such a methodological outline as has been attempted here. It is sufficient for us to emphasize, by repeating, that the modern world cannot be content with a presentation of religious belief which is not determined by the intellectual instruments that have given reliable results in other fields. And of these instruments the determining ones for religion must be metaphysical, for the conception of God is that of an ultimate being. Let this point once be determined in a manner which satisfies both science and religion in their respective interests in first principles, and the way is made clear for the concrete formulation of religious beliefs and activities in a form which may be essentially modern and still true to all that the past of religion has to give.

THE PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CHRISTIAN DOGMA A SUGGESTION AS TO THE NATURE OF REALITY

Irving King. "The Pragmatic Interpretation of the Christian Dogma,"
Monist 15.2 (April 1905): 248–61.

While the pragmatic point of view is suggestive to many as a working hypothesis, it seems that there is much uncertainty as to the consequences if it is taken as an ultimate statement of reality. It is felt to be a view of things that has a measure of truth but which is at the same time subject to serious limitations. In a word, it is doubtful what sort of a reality it presupposes and with what sort of a reality it is able to satisfy those who follow it consistently. I do not presume to hold any of the illustrious ex-pounders of pragmatism responsible for the interpretation here offered. It is simply an attempt to explain what pragmatism means to me. It is no doubt an inadequate and one-sided statement, but this is an evil inherent in all our philosophy and from which there is not the slightest possibility of our escaping. If there is any one point that seems to be a fundamental one pragmatically it is that every thing and all things that we can possibly say are essentially abstractions from and hence inadequate to the reality of what we know in immediate experience.

As a philosophical method pragmatism seems to be primarily an attempt to interpret consistently the world of experience, its movement and its moments. It is thus that it is distinguished from science, which is concerned with the contents of experience. It is distinct from previous philosophy in that it does not seek to construct by logical processes a reality that lies partially or completely beyond the world of experience. In so far as philosophy has been concerned with things or contents, as such, its field has not been different in kind from that of science. It has been rather mediæval science, vaguely guessing at what science failed to discover, and finding, as science extended its outposts, that its only ultimate and secure ground was in the sphere entirely beyond all

possible experience. It is needless to say that the pragmatist stands for something radically different from this. He proposes to deal with a reality but not one that the progress of science will eventually take from him. His realities are the moments and movements of experience as it deals with the realities of science.

As suggested above, the real, whatever it is, is a great deal larger than can be stated in any formula or series of formulas. Our philosophies as well as our sciences are abstractions, and are therefore true only relatively. We shall try in this paper to illustrate by means of a particular abstraction, the nature and limitations of the real that a pragmatic view of things seems to afford us, and further to show that it is a case typical of all our attempted formulations of experience. By experience we mean not that of the empiricist, nor something present to some absolute consciousness after the manner of the idealist, but rather experience as it is naively understood when one says he knows that this task is hard because he has tried it, or as when one says that he can sympathise with us because he has already experienced sorrow. It may roughly be called the world that appeals to us directly, the world in which are our values and in which we work, struggle, aspire, win and fail. No philosophic system or science has ever given us an adequate description of it, nor have they ever stated its meaning as a whole. When the last word has been said we feel that it has all been extremely inadequate as compared with concrete experience. The condition under which alone a scientific or philosophic statement can appeal to us with any force is that it be taken in a context similar to that in which it arose. To take an extreme case, the theory of Thales that all things are made of water, would not seem as unilluminating to us as it probably does, if we could reproduce a concrete situation similar to the one that led him to make his famous hypothesis. Philosophic and scientific systems are then simply formulations of some particular aspects of experience that have for some reason come acutely to attention. The reality of immediate experience seems to fall apart, its elements to be in conflict. We seek a statement to bring together the conflicting elements and the statement is valid in so far as it does this and no farther.

It is a matter of indifference what we have to say about the more ultimate meaning of our working hypotheses. We may say, if we choose, that because this or that hypothesis works, in so far it is a correct statement of the nature of the ultimately real. Functionally the working hypothesis has no claim to being a statement of ultimate reality beyond its meeting this crisis or others similar to it. It may also be noted that there is no appeal from immediate experience or from that which resolves its tensions. The only way to discredit the former is to bring forth another experience that is more immediate or of wider extent.

Suppose for a moment we assume that there is a reality beyond that of our stream of experience, or possible experiences; a reality that is supernatural or at least greater than our experience but of which our experience is in some way a part. Concerning this hypothetical larger reality we may make a certain supposition on the basis of which there is sought a control of some present tension. It is assumed that there is something real that does not fully enter into experience but which must nevertheless be acted upon if that which is in experience is to be dealt with adequately. The theories of atoms and their modes of combination within the molecule are illustrations of the legitimacy and necessity of this type of assumption in physical science. The religious consciousness furnishes a similar illustration. Here also there is the hypostatizing of an order of existence that does not enter into immediate experience. There is a supposition of a universal moral order, of a supernatural being or beings that have some connection with the process of our experience. Particular things are undertaken on the strength of such moral order or of such a supreme being. A crisis or problem arises which to the religious consciousness seems inexplicable except on the supposition of a God who is just, or jealous, or loving. It is clear that the only basis for such an assumption is the presence of a real experience which seems to demand some hypothesis to make it intelligible. All may not agree that the particular hypothesis offered is a satisfactory one, but that is immaterial here. Manifestly the point of emphasis is the experience that is to be made intelligible and only secondarily is a more ultimate form of existence implied. It is because the emphasis is where we have indicated that it is maintained that the true function of philosophy is to attempt a description, not of some more ultimate reality than that present in our finite experience, but rather the exact and objective conditions under which hypotheses appear and their relation to the onward movement of experience. Strictly speaking, aside from our world of experience and its successful hypotheses there is no more ultimate existence as far as philosophy is concerned. We may here recur to the fundamental limitation of all thinking to which reference was made above. Restated briefly it is this: thought and the products of thought are to be interpreted, and hence are valid only, with reference to certain crises or tensions that arise in action. It is not permissible to take the conceptual machinery thus evolved and hold that it gives us a cue to the construction of a reality beyond experience. The concepts of the chemist are true because they enable him to control his reactions, but he has not the least right to assume that he has therefore in them an account of the ultimate nature of matter. They give an account of it only as it is concerned in practical experiences of the sort with which the chemist deals. It is an almost universal tendency, however, to take these state-

ments that seem to give us definite control under specific conditions and to generalise them into dicta about absolute existence. As opposed to this tendency it is here maintained that our concepts are only functionally valid and do not refer to ontological realities. All our realities are of the functional variety. They *are* realities *because* they serve these definite functions, and for no other reason. Some of them have a wider variety of uses than others and hence appear in a greater number of our practical experiences. As such they seem to have a high degree of objectivity. "Objective reality" is in fact our name for those elements which appear in the greatest variety of situations and mediate the most varied experiences. Such a statement does not dispute the reality of the world but simply tells in what it consists. It amounts simply to this, that whatever else reality may be, as far as we are concerned, it is something involved in the onward movement of our experience and all our descriptions of it are with reference to its function in this onward movement.

This functional view of reality is very suggestive when applied to the facts of the religious consciousness. The religious attitude is of all others pre-eminently a practical one, that is, it is primarily concerned with the conduct of life. An examination of it, from this view-point, should be practically suggestive in these days of religious reconstruction. It should throw light upon the vexed question as to the place and authority of the dogmas of past ages in the modern religious consciousness. It is worth while to inquire whether they should be rejected *in toto* as false or whether they have a certain validity, and if so, what. Does the dogma of the Trinity, for instance, have any claim from this point of view to being a valid statement of the being of God? We should note first the context in which some of these dogmas originated.

It is well known that New Testament Christianity was not dogmatic but practical. That is, it did not promulgate the dogmas of a system of religion but was the exponent of a certain manner of life. "The teachings of Jesus do not appear in a systematic form, but in terms of life and social relations. It requires laborious research and reconstruction to formulate them into scientific statements. Neither do the apostles present the Gospel in a theology, although doubtless they come nearer to it than Jesus does, and that is why theology took its point of departure from them rather than from Christ. But still, even with them, while the theological material is more accessible, there is no systematic arrangement nor attempt at true philosophical explanation. They wrote for specific practical purposes, and always massed their teachings so as to bear upon the end in view. . . . The New Testament is a book of religious truth, not of theological science; and it is content to state this

truth in its practical aspects, upon the sole authority of Jesus Christ, and not because its philosophical foundations have been worked out and approved.”¹

“The distinctively theological interest which first began to make itself strongly felt in the church during the second century centered immediately in Christology and the doctrine of the Trinity. These doctrines were converted into dogmas by the first six general councils. . . . They are justly called the Greek contribution to Christianity, for they were born of the Greek spirit, and their form and development were decisively determined by Greek philosophy. That these dogmas soon ceased to be living issues and to find a place in the interests of men, did not disturb their theological authority, but rather strengthened it. The fact that they became petrified made them all the more satisfactory, because unshakable, foundation for a church that was built upon the traditions of the past.”²

It is this development of practical belief into dogmas that we wish to examine. There are a number of problems involved in such an examination. One of them is our tendency to generalise our practical concepts into statements of ultimate reality. Does such a procedure render them of more practical significance, or does it rather indicate that the practical need that called them forth has vanished, and that new needs have taken their place? We hold that it was not merely because the Church came into contact with Greek thought that its practical concepts were turned into dogmas but that it was due to a certain peculiarity of the development of experience. Another problem is as to the legitimacy of such a generalisation and the implication as to the reality of the resulting concepts.

We may use the doctrine of the Trinity as our first illustration. As we have seen, it does not appear as a dogma in the New Testament, for primitive Christianity was concerned with the concrete problems of life. Thus the concepts on which the dogma was later founded and which are to-day interpreted in the light of the dogma, were essentially the expression of definite practical situations and problems. It is true the idea of the Trinity was present, but purely as a practical concept. It had developed in the centuries immediately preceding the Christian era under the influence of Greek thought. It grew out of the notion that God could not act directly upon the world but only through certain intermediaries, as angels, his word, his spirit, etc. Hence when anything occurred which seemed to demand the explanation of supernatural

¹ Osborn, *The Recovery and Restatement of the Gospel*, pp. 171, 172.

² Osborn, p. 75.

influence, it was natural to attribute it to the spirit of God or to his angels. In this form it is not a dogma but simply a working concept that is in harmony with the current notion of God.

This is certainly the context of its appearance in the New Testament. Wherever the Spirit is mentioned it is with reference to just such practical problems or crises within experience, problems that demanded some sort of explanation. For example the mysterious conception of Mary is explained thus. The baptism of Jesus differs from that of John by the presence in it of this divine element. Certain peculiar states of mind, or changes of mental attitude that seem to transcend experience come to attention, and these are interpreted as caused by the Holy Ghost.³ That it is essentially a practical concept comes out most clearly when Jesus seeks to allay the sorrow of the disciples over his departure by promising the Holy Ghost as a comforter in his place. In no case do we find reference to the Spirit except when some real or conceived situation of life is in the foreground. If with their peculiar heritage of thought these practical situations were met in the light of such a concept of the relation of God to man, we shall certainly not wish to deny its validity, but to maintain that it was essentially illogical to turn this doctrine into a dogma and postulate as ontologically real what had reality only as it served certain functions in concrete life. How could its practical significance be enhanced by its being generalised into an ultimate view as to the nature of the person of God? Every thinker must feel that the reality of God is far greater than can be crystallised in any such relation of son, spirit, and father. Such concepts are simply ways of making his infinitude come into working contact with our life. If the concept is recognised as a working one then succeeding generations with a different intellectual heritage and a different practical conception of God are not so likely to have the older point of view forced upon them. As we change, and our problems with us, it certainly is by all means likely that our interpretations of events should change also.

As with the question of the spirit of God, so with that of the Son. His significance was certainly a functional one. Whether we take the standpoint of those of his time who expected a Messiah or that of the Christian world of today, we must admit that he was significant to them

³ As examples not the case of Zacharias cited in Luke i. 15, 35; that of Elizabeth in the same chapter, 41, 67; that of Simeon, Luke ii. 35. So also through the concept of the Holy Ghost is explained the state of mind that lay back of otherwise unaccountable actions. Thus in Acts iv. 31, "They were all filled with the Holy Ghost." It is a means by which one may be endowed with wisdom, Luke xii. 12; an assistance in defending the faith, Mark xii. 36. It is the agency by which one's entire mental attitude may be changed, as in Acts viii. 15, 17, 18, 19; x. 44, 45, 46; xi. 15-16; xv. 8; xix. 2-6; Titus iii. 5. Prophetic power is to be explained by its presence, Luke ii. 26; iii. 22. Our own attitude of life is modified by it, Romans xiv. 17; xv. 13; 1 Thes. i. 6.

and is significant to us primarily because he is conceived as the mediator of certain definite experiences. With the modern Christian the significance of Christ is certainly as an interpreter of God. The phrase, "What would Jesus do," however objectionable it may be, is at least evidence of this attitude. The dogma as to his metaphysical relation to God is meaningless except in so far as he is also functionally real. If the orthodox could only realise that this is the point of primary import, there would be less useless controversy with the more liberal believers. On the other hand, the liberal needs to realise that this tendency to crystallise a functional reality into a dogma is not mere perversity but itself needs to be explained and located and is no doubt an unavoidable peculiarity of the movement of thought.

In the New Testament times it is of course true, as every one knows, that the followers of Christ conceived him rather in terms of a definite earthly mission, more or less, of course, in the light of the earlier Jewish notions, and by no means as bearing a certain metaphysical relation to God. He bore a definite relation to the glory of Israel, if not temporarily, at least in a spiritual sense. The conclusion is then that both the son and the spirit were originally the embodiments of certain practical attitudes related in a certain way to the tendency that became prominent among the Alexandrian Jews to exalt God infinitely above all that is earthly, human, and imperfect, even above all human conception. "From the idea that God is absolutely incomprehensible and infinitely exalted flows the other that man cannot enter into direct relations with him, that he can neither know nor tell what he is."⁴

"This idea that God is infinitely exalted above the world and without direct relations with it, necessarily led to the recognition of intermediate beings, through whom relations might be made possible."⁵

The point of the whole discussion is simply that there existed at that time a certain attitude of mind that could best view its onward movement in terms of son and spirit, and God himself could likewise be best conceived, and no doubt always can be for that matter, as a father. It is further held that these concepts interpreted to the believer certain practical situations, gave him their value, so to speak, and hence freed him for further action in similar directions. We do not question but that such an attitude may still exist and hence demand such concepts for its expression. But the point of emphasis, in any case, is upon the tension within a certain type of experience, rather than upon any reality outside this tension. It is only when the specific need has passed, or at least is no longer realised acutely that the conceptual tools are brought into clear

⁴ Piepenbring, *Theology of the Old Testament*, p. 250.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

consciousness and come to be regarded as having a reality of their own. It is then that the functional reality ceases and the dogma takes its place. If a certain type of mind finds the concept of the Trinity significant, it is certainly a significant point of view but it does not follow, as has already been said, that because it is true functionally it is also true without reference to any function, that is, ontologically. To hold that it is, is to commit, as it seems to me, a supreme philosophical fallacy. Our only realities are functional realities. If there are others we know not of them.

This point of view may be applied with profit to a number of other Christian doctrines. I quote directly from an article by H. Barker in the eleventh volume of the *Intern. Journal of Ethics*. Traditional religion embodied "a great religious or ethical conception, that of a suffering saviour-god. Such a conception appealed directly to faith; it was a gospel of salvation that told of a divine love and pity greater than it was possible to hope for, and summoned men to strive with all their energies to be worthy of their God. Such a gospel was worth believing. It was a true object of faith, and its moral grandeur was a legitimate motive for faith. On the other hand the traditional creed set forth certain miraculous or supernatural facts which guaranteed the reality of its ethical conception." Barker illustrates the above point as follows: The essence of the belief in the resurrection of Christ on the religious side is the conviction that the personality of Christ has a spiritual value which constrains us to think of it as eternal. A universe in which it passed away and lesser things remained, would for the Christian be irrational. Now this conviction can as little be proved by any ghost-like appearances of Christ after his death as it can be refuted by their absence. If such appearances counted for anything they would be as important in the case of any other man of whom they have been asserted. . . . The truth is that the Christian's religious conviction about Christ craves for some visible sign and confirmation of its truth, and the resurrection seems to faith to be such a sign. The error lies in turning a symbol which only faith can apprehend into the very premise by which the faith itself is proved. . . . Thus when the symbol begins to be used as a logical premise we may be sure that the faith has lost its intrinsic certainty and is seeking to quiet itself in some outward and inferior guarantee." Putting this point in the terms that we have been using, we shall say that when the practical situations cease to be acutely felt the mental attitude that belonged with them in a manner holds over and finds its guarantee, no longer in its practical efficiency in a certain type of experience, but in the unconditioned reality of that which before had been real only because it had proved itself practically valuable. The intrinsic certainty

referred to in this statement of Barker's is the same point we have made regarding all practical attitudes. Intrinsic certainty is the fundamental characteristic of all practical experience. Abstract the experience from the situation that caused it to differentiate and these specialised parts are left as it were in the air. Hence the attention is fixed upon them and they are held to be valid in themselves. This attitude is represented in many types of emotional experience. The virtuoso in the sphere of emotion has abstracted his feelings from the situations in which they belong, in which they have been in consciousness only as contributing to an end toward which the whole experience is moving. He has abstracted them, we repeat, and brought them to the focus of attention, in other words given them a validity of their own. It seems to me that this procedure is strictly parallel to the one we have been discussing in the religious sphere.

Barker continues, "Consider the belief in the miraculous birth of Christ. The absence of any strictly logical relation between the supernatural event and the religious doctrine which is connected with it is here more patent than ever. That Christ was born into the world in a preternatural way is in itself no proof at all that he was an incarnation of the deity, although, of course, to one already convinced of his divinity the miraculous birth has a certain fitness as a symbol." As Barker further points out the symbol has a certain function, for faith comes in pulsations, that is the practical situations in which the symbol is significant are not always at hand, but the attitude of readiness to meet them must be preserved intact and this is the more possible if the tools of the attitude can continue to be held in the foreground. The mind is thus kept accessible to the influences by which faith can be revived. "The Christian whose faith had grown weak attributed the lack of faith to himself as a fault, because he did not doubt that the objects of faith were there to be apprehended, although he could no longer feel their reality and truth for himself." In other words, we represent the values of our past experiences by means of the conceptual machinery they involve, apparently because it can be most easily isolated. The mental concomitants of a practical attitude can never be isolated and still be expected to retain their original nature. It may be the only way we can represent to ourselves that we have had the experience but we must nevertheless not forget that this conceptual framework is not the original experience. The only reality the conceptual structure or system of dogmas has, its only validity is, in pointing to a time when practical situations *were* very acutely felt.

The significant characteristic of the practical situation is that it is immediate and its reality needs no logical proof. No theory of the

universe, no philosophy, can disprove this fact of the immediate appeal of the practical crisis, and its total independence of the necessity of any logical support. As soon as there is felt to be necessity for proving the attitudes involved, the situation itself has passed away. The whole force and significance of the concepts and attitudes depended upon the undisputed presence of the practical situation. Thus "the supernatural facts embodied in the creed do not need to be *disproved* to lose their peculiar value. This value is already lost when they can be reasonably *doubted*. Their peculiar function is gone from the moment they appear to be doubtful."⁶ That they are doubted means that they are isolated from their functional place in experience, that practical needs have changed, and hence that different systems of concepts are now needed. The only way to prove any claim of theology is to show its vital relation to the crises of life. No one was ever convinced of the truths of religion in any other way, nor has any one who has believed them from this side lost his faith by mere ratiocination. If such an one has lost his faith, it has been because its vital contact with his life has had ceased and the work of reason is simply to show that what is left was dead. Our point, in a word, is this, that the reality of a practical situation is recognised immediately, and its tools are in the same immediate manner regarded as valid solely because of their functional connection with the situation. There is no other way to prove their truth and to attempt to do it otherwise is to admit that they have lost their functional value and hence are false.

It is suggestive to apply this point of view to the doctrine of the second coming of Christ. There is no question but that the expectation of this had a very important place in the thought of New Testament times. It is an excellent illustration of the evolution of a belief according to the theory here presented. The Church of today, obliged to admit that the early Church was mistaken in the particular form in which it held to this belief, holds it now in a modified form. But in a sense the early Church was *not* in error. This belief in the second coming of Christ was a part of a more general attitude toward the world and human conduct, and as such it served to mediate a definite practical attitude which was then significant. When this appropriate context disappeared the belief was left stranded and in the eyes of later ages it was manifestly a mistaken one as far as ontological fulfilment went. But the conviction that it stood for an ontological reality has led each generation to reconstruct the belief on a basis that at least offered a possibility of fulfilment. What is true of this particular belief is true of all others referred to above, except that in this one its falsity when taken out of its context was so self-

⁶ Ibid., Barker.

evident that it had to be reconstructed if it were to continue to be believed. Of the other dogmas it was not so evident that they were meaningless when thus isolated, and hence they were more easily adhered to in unreconstructed form.

It is likewise as regards the doctrine of inspiration. The individual who finds in the Scriptures a key that interprets his ethical life asks for no other proof that they are inspired. But the so-called logical proofs of inspiration never convince any one because when such proofs are offered it is evidence that inspiration is now taken as a fact out of connection with the actual unfolding of experience. It is notorious that no argument for the inspiration of the Scriptures, for immortality, or for the divinity of Christ is convincing to any one who does not believe in them already as facts of immediate experience.

In conclusion we may repeat what was stated at the outset, that there is a fundamental limitation to all our thinking. This limitation, however, in no wise invalidates it as some have assumed. There is no better proof of the validity of thinking than that it *does* solve the crises that arise within experience, and that experience does move on. Thinking is for no other purpose. There is no such thing as absolute thought, for thought is essentially a process of abstraction from an undefined matrix of possible experiences for the solution of particular crises. It means by its very nature that some things are slighted and some overemphasised, but it is justifiable because of the particular tension of the situation that demands solution. If this is the nature of thought it is manifestly invalid to hold that the tools that it creates for the solution of this tension are valid instruments for reality as a whole. That which relieves the tension is undoubtedly an aspect of reality, but it is true of the whole only as the whole is in contact with the particular. We have illustrated this limitation by the evolution of some of the Christian dogmas. The field of religion offers excellent material for such illustration because its attitude is primarily so immediate and practical, and because in it more than in any other there has been a tendency to give the conceptual machinery of this practical attitude an independent validity, thus imposing upon one age the tools that were useful only in ages long past. The evil of such a procedure is, of course, that the new generation mistakes the meaningless intellectual machinery for the essence of religion itself and is in danger of rejecting both together. Respecting this view of truth in its general significance, the words of Barker are significant. "It will hardly be disputed that whatever may have been the shortcomings of primitive Christianity, it was sufficient for the needs of the early Christians.⁷ This is the most that can be said of any attitude of mind, of any system of

⁷ Ibid.

concepts, of any theory of things, and this only can be said. If we attempt more, we drift into speculations of which it can only be said, "They may be true, for aught we know, but we certainly do not know."

THEOLOGY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

Edward S. Ames. "Theology from the Standpoint of the Functional Psychology," *American Journal of Theology* 10.2 (April 1906): 219–32.

"Functional psychology" is the designation given to the present tendency to treat consciousness from the biological standpoint, and with particular reference to its functions in the total life-process.¹ It is contrasted more or less sharply with "structural psychology," which undertakes an analysis of mental life in terms of its characteristic states and forms, without specific reference to their origin in the needs of the organism, or to their service in determining its adaptation to the environment.² The functional psychology is thoroughly evolutionary. As Professor James puts it: "Mind and world in short have been evolved together, and in consequence are something of a mutual fit."³ And in the course of this evolution mental life has developed as the chief instrument in the process of adapting the psycho-physical organism to its physical and social environment. Our minds are therefore practical affairs, useful in satisfying the needs of our nature. "Mental life is primarily teleological; that is to say that our various ways of feeling and thinking have grown to be what they are because of their utility in shaping our *reactions* on the outer world."⁴ Great importance, in this view, attaches to the genesis of the different forms of consciousness, and a general formula is offered concerning the origin of consciousness itself.⁵ This placing of consciousness and all its "states" in a larger life-process deter-

¹ Angell, *Psychology*, pp. 6, 7, 64; James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology*, p. 24.

² Serviceable statements of the functional psychology will be found in the following articles: Angell, "The Relations of Psychology to Philosophy," *University of Chicago Decennial Publications*, pp. 5–8; Dewey, "The Reflex-Arc Concept ion Psychology," *Psychological Review*, Vol. III, pp. 357–70. For the structural psychology see Titchener, "The Postulates of a Structural Psychology," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. VII (1898), pp. 449–65.

³ James, *Psychology, Briefer Course*, p. 4.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Angell, *Psychology*, p. 50.

mines the functional psychology to the use of dynamic, rather than static, conceptions. It maintains that the fundamental characteristic of the organism is activity. In the lowest forms of life there are spontaneity and internal co-ordination in the maintenance of adjustment to environment. The child, with a few reflexes and a great wealth of uncontrolled energy, is primarily a "behaving organism," as Professor James expresses it.⁶ Certain forms of this behavior are native, and others acquired. There is in reality no mere passivity. In the course of its reflex and instinctive movements the organism is continually developing new "situations" and "problems," in reference to which constant adjustment is made. Abounding energy, issuing in impulsive movements, which bring in return a wealth of sense-impressions through hands, eyes, ears, and muscles, is the original possession of the child. These impressions lead in turn to modifications in the movements; and thus a circuit of reactions is maintained. The organization of his efforts in order to make his activity most effective, and to attain the fullest satisfaction of his various needs, is the one great concern, psychologically expressed, of the human being.

This explanation of the different phases of consciousness with reference to the concrete life-conditions which call them forth, and with reference to their service in the ultimate control of those conditions is extended over the whole scope of the mental life. Not only the mental activity of the savage and of the child has its value as a means of furthering their welfare, but also the abstract thinking of civilized man roots itself at last in practical needs, and is estimated by the degree to which it serves them. The "truth" of science and of metaphysics is tested at last by the success with which they aid the life-processes. Every hypothesis of science stands ready at any moment to submit to actual tests, and every system of philosophy in the last resort is judged by the results which follow from it. In this way functional psychology extends its claims over the whole domain of experience and philosophy. The problems of ethics are involved in the psychology of desire and volition, and it is only a matter of convenience that the field of ethics is separated from psychology. In the same way logic and æsthetics are elaborations of the psychology of judgment and feeling. Metaphysics is granted a distinct field, in the same provisional and practical way, only as a means of specializing the problems for convenience in treatment. Any thorough handling of the psychological problems of cognition takes one straight into the midst of metaphysics without any break or leap. The philosophical sciences are all, in the words of Professor Angell, "organic developments of a common root and represent phases, or stages, in the

⁶ James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology*, chap. 3.

solution of a single complex problem" – "the problem of the structure and function of consciousness." Accordingly, "when psychological study is interpreted in a functional, as well as a structural, sense, the theoretical distinctions between psychology and philosophy have ceased to exist."⁷

Theology stands in essentially the same relation to psychology. A thorough consideration of the concepts of theology, their origin, development, and significance for man's life, requires a psychological study of the religious consciousness. On the other hand, if one starts with the psychology of religion, and pursues it to the full extent, it is found to involve the recognition and investigation of the ultimate problems of theology. Any demarkation of the spheres of the psychology of religion and of theology is therefore just as arbitrary, and is to be held just as lightly, as that between psychology and metaphysics. If this relation is not so clear between psychology and theology as it is between psychology and other metaphysical sciences, it may be due to the present undeveloped state of the psychology of religion, and to the tendency of theology to cultivate its field in greater isolation from the influence of the natural sciences.⁸ There are some results already at hand which indicate in a general way the significance of functional psychology in the domain of theology.

This psychology has fruitfully employed the genetic and historical method, by which developed forms of consciousness are investigated through their earlier stages, and, if possible, in their very beginnings. Pursuing this method, it is pertinent to inquire what place was held in primitive religions by the intellectual processes which, in the developed forms of religion, have given rise to theology.

The study of the beginnings of the religious consciousness has greatly lessened the claims of the intellectualists as to the character, function, and importance of specific religious ideas. It is no longer claimed by the best authorities that all peoples possess a definite idea of God. Many primitive forms of religion, and others which have reached a high state of development, are quite without the conception of a personal deity. The Blackfellows of Australia,⁹ for instance, do not get beyond spirit ancestors and other spirit individuals. Even these are involved in their

⁷ Angell, "The Relations of Psychology to Philosophy," *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, Vol. III, pp. 20, 21.

⁸ Of the works in the psychology of religion only Professor James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* indicates the import of such studies for theology. Investigations in this field have been limited mainly to the gathering and classification of material concerning certain phases of the religious history of individuals, particularly during the period of conversion.

⁹ Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 207.

explanation of practical needs. The absorbing interest with these races is the immediately practical and social character of their ceremonies and activities. The mainsprings of these ceremonies are the elemental life-interests – birth, youth, marriage, food, war, death. For instance, among the Malays of Malacca there are elaborate ceremonies accompanying the planting and harvesting of rice, hunting, fishing, and mining. The object is to make sure the results of such activities. In the totemism of the tribes of central Australia, where each group of people identifies its life and welfare with those of a certain class of animals or plants, the purpose of the ceremonies is to increase the number of the totemic animals or plants; and often this means provision for the food supply; but their performance of ceremony is not associated in the native mind with the idea of appealing to the assistance of any supernatural being.¹⁰ The conception of “spirits” and of the supernatural, where it does arise, is therefore not fundamental in the development of religion, but is rather secondary and incidental.¹¹ “Mere animism can hardly be called primitive religion more than primitive science. It is simply a postulate from which to explain things, a principle of which one may take advantage in many practical problems.”¹²

Further evidence that an exaggerated importance has been attached to reflection and conscious control of religious activities is found in the domination of imitation and custom. The force of social habits is tyrannical in the extreme, in spite of the fact that they are often due to the most trivial, accidental causes. Among the Malays “another tribe on undertaking to mine tin would imitate every detail in the method of those who first did it, even to such irrelevant details as those of language and dress.”¹³ It is the old fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, and is due not so much to incorrect thinking as to the influence of unreflective imitation. How far these customs are from being the expression of definite ideas is shown in the explanations given of them. Among the Australians the reason for performing the ceremonies as they do is that their ancestors did so. If any further explanations are sought, the inquiry appears to the natives ridiculous and incomprehensible.¹⁴

The priority of practical, social activities, and the secondary character of the ideas which later arise in explanation of them, are well illustrated in the field of aesthetics. “The dance before the chase or battle, the mimes at agricultural festivals or at initiation ceremonies, which seem to

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 170.

¹¹ Irving King, *The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness*, p. 28.

¹² Ibid., pp. 28, 38, 48; cf. Brinton, *Religion of Primitive Peoples*, p. 84.

¹³ King, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁴ Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 136f.

the uninstructed onlooker crude forms of art, are to the minds of the actors entirely serious. They give success in the real activities which follow these symbolic acts. They bring the rain or sunshine or returning spring."¹⁵ Art is here the state or attitude of consciousness which is built up in these activities; and which results from them. This state may eventually be cultivated on its own account, and may be employed as a test of the artistic character of other activities; but the view that the dances or ceremonies arose in the first instance in order to give expression to the already existing art-consciousness, or art-ideas, is discarded. "Art has not arisen primarily to satisfy an already existing love of beauty. It has arisen chiefly, if not wholly, from other springs, and has itself created the sense by which it is enjoyed."¹⁶ In the same way it may be said that the religious consciousness is built up in the course of certain activities performed by the social group with reference to needs which are often of a very material kind. Gradually this attitude is detached from the setting in which it arose, and becomes in turn a standard and test by which to determine whether other given experiences are religious or have religious value. This agrees also with the increasing evidence of the priority of ritual over moral or theoretical teaching.¹⁷

Direct confirmation of the source and character of the first stages of the religious consciousness is found in the experience of the child. His interest in religion is chiefly concerned with its forms and ceremonies. He is little interested in the meaning which older persons attach to them, and he participates in them either in the imitative spirit or with reference to the securing of his personal ends. His prayers are for the most part repetitions of words with scrupulous regard for the precise order in which they have been learned; or, where they are spontaneous, usually express petitions for the objects which he most craves. It is only in late adolescence that there comes to consciousness any deep questioning concerning the meaning and value of the religious exercises. And even then it is only in exceptional cases extended beyond the conventional, and it may be rather simple, forms of thought in the social group of which he is a part.¹⁸

The functional treatment of developed theological conceptions keeps in view their genesis and growth in actual experience, and tests their

¹⁵ J. H. Tufts, "On the Genesis of the Æsthetic Categories," *The University of Chicago Decennial Publications*, Vol. III, Part 2, p. 8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁷ Henry Preserved Smith, *Old Testament History*, p. 68; William Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 16, 20.

¹⁸ Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, chap. 15, especially p. 194.

truth and value in terms of the control and guidance of conduct. Conceptions are shorthand symbols for summarizing and unifying experience. They involve images, sensuous and detailed, or schematic and symbolic. There is always imagery in the most abstract concept. The distinguishing feature of the conception, however, is the element of meaning, the expression of relations. Both constituents are subject to change. The images may be now visual, now auditory or again motor; and the meaning may gradually become larger, finer, and more ideal. This growth of conceptions is dependent upon experience, for they are at last just the registrations of experience. Every different use of an object involves a new mode of conceiving it. "There is no property absolutely essential to any one thing."¹⁹

The significance of this psychology of conception for all theological ideas may be illustrated in terms of the most fundamental and central conception, the conception of God. This idea is not innate. It arises with the power of generalizing and unifying experience, and under the practical demand for such generalization, in the maintenance and furtherance of practical interests. When the idea does appear it bears the impress of the social and material conditions of the community which formulates it, and with the growth of society the conception changes both as to its imagery and its meaning. Among the early Semites, for example, the thought of the deities was evidently determined by the natural conditions under which the people lived. Living water, whether from springs or running streams, formed the basis for community life by creating vegetation for food and trees for shelter. On this account the springs and rivers were sacred. The water was itself the deity or his abode. The land which it fertilized was holy ground, clearly distinguished by the growth of vegetation, and all things within the sacred precincts were guarded by tabus. When life was nomadic, and herds and flocks were the chief forms of wealth, the gods were often conceived as animals, such as the sacred bull or goat. When agriculture was cultivated, the natural elements which conditioned the growth of harvests determined the idea of the deities.

The growth of the idea of God reflects also the development of the social organization. Each tribe or social group had its own gods, expressing, and in turn strengthening, certain characteristic phases of its life. As the tribes enlarged and took on new activities, the deities evidenced corresponding growth. On the other hand, if a tribe was exterminated, or lost its identity, its god reverted to the lower condition of demons, whose chief characteristic was that they were without

¹⁹ James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 333.

worshippers. The success of a particular group in conquest meant the subjugation of the conquered gods, and finally their extinction. Yahweh was originally the god of a single Semitic tribe. He gained power and significance with the leadership and conquest which his subjects were able to accomplish, so that in the end, with the organization of the nation, the ancient name of the deity was retained for the God of the whole people. This correspondence between the stage of social development and the nature of the gods is still further illustrated by the significant fact that, when the mother was the head of the family, the deities were goddesses.²⁰ Later, when the father became the recognized head of the family, the deity became masculine, and took on the attributes and characteristics of paternal authority. Among the Hebrews, to whom has been ascribed an ethical monotheism derived in a unique, supernatural way, the development of monotheism was coincident with, and apparently dependent upon, the rise of the monarchy. The coalescence of smaller social groups into larger unities was reflected in the fusion of the gods themselves, until, in the attainment of the kingdom centering in the person of the king, the basis was laid for the idea of one God, which obviously was closely fashioned, though in heroic proportions, upon the model afforded by the earthly monarch. The heavenly king, like the earthly, gradually developed a court with angelic messengers and numerous cohorts ready at command to execute the sovereign will. Another stage was reached for the Hebrews during the exile. That great strain upon their social institutions and the enforced removal of many people from Jehovah's land magnified their sense of his distance from them and emphasized the idea of his transcendence. To the sensitive minds of the great prophets the contact with other peoples gave rise also to the conception of Jehovah as the God of all nations, though this idea was evidently born of patriotism and hope rather than of actual political supremacy. This feeling of the greatness and the transcendence of Jehovah, in connection with their national distress, resulted with the Hebrews, as it has with other peoples, in the need of mediation and in the hope of a savior. Their Messiah, under the stress of the national humiliation, took the form of a suffering servant. It is an impressive fact that the two typical Jewish conceptions of the redemptive work of Jehovah were the counterparts of two contrasted periods of the national life. One was projected from the background of the golden age of the monarchy under King David. As he put to silence his enemies and established a glorious kingdom, so God would some day, by another mighty one, deliver his people and make them supreme.

²⁰ W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, pp. 58 ff.

The other view of divine deliverance was an expression of the humbled and chastened national spirit in the period of oppression and exile. Humility and suffering innocence were its central elements. In the end, when his life was completed, the character and work of Jesus conformed best to the latter type, while his own experience and powerful personality added vividness and strength to the ethical, social conception of God as a loving Father.

In the same way the thought of God has been various and changing as it reflected the life of different peoples. The temper, culture, and social customs of the Greek, Roman, and Teutonic peoples have reacted vitally upon the Christian conception of God. The process still continues. The idea of God is now undergoing perhaps the profoundest transformation in history. The forces accomplishing it are not vagaries of speculative philosophy, but the tremendous influences of modern civilization. The change is from the transcendence to the immanence of God. It is due to the rise of democratic institutions and the birth of an intense social consciousness. The old notion of transcendence was the reflection of the monarchical form of government which has prevailed in all the great nations from antiquity to the modern era. The king or emperor was far above the people. He was surrounded by vast estates, by castle walls, and by large armies. He could be approached only through mediators and subordinates. His arbitrary will was law. His ways were full of secrecy and mystery. The corresponding characteristics of his subjects were implicit faith, unquestioning obedience. They sang his praises, and most humbly offered before him their gratitude and petitions. Could anything describe more exactly than such terms the conception of a transcendent God, and the relations men sustain to him? On the other hand, nothing could be farther from the spirit of democracy. In a democracy the chief concern with reference to the leader or ruler is not his lineage or inheritance, but his own personality and efficiency. His will is not arbitrary, but justifies itself in experience, and is held to the standard of law and consistency. The citizens feel themselves one with their leader. They share in the exercise of sovereignty, and in its responsibilities and dignity. The inmost reality and significance of the state is found in the individual citizens. They are mutually dependent, interrelated, and conditioned. In such a society the old conception of a transcendent God is out of place, just as much as is the idea of an autocratic, arbitrary monarch. The great awakening of the masses of men in all nations to self-government through the exercise of intelligent self-control; the emancipation of slaves; the elevation of women; the humane care of the dependent, defective, and criminal members of

society; the great constructive organizations of labor; efforts toward the purification of politics; popular education; various world's congresses for the promotion of science, art, and religion – all these are the expressions of a growing social consciousness, stronger, more enlightened, and more determined than mankind has ever before experienced, and they are also the causes and the justification of the conception of the immanence of God.

Such a statement of the evolution of the conception of God involves also the question of the truth and validity of that conception. Here the relation in which the functional psychology conceives itself to stand to metaphysics has the utmost importance. In this psychology the statement of the genesis and development of an idea carries its own indication of the truth or reality of the idea. The historical survey reveals the function of the idea and its value in experience. In so far as it aids and furthers experience, it is true. It is always relative, always conditioned. But just on this account is it real. Psychology does not then merely lead up to the boundary of metaphysics, at which point it is compelled to transfer its problem to a different kind of inquiry. Metaphysics is only the more detailed and persistent investigation of the psychology of conception. The theological problem is therefore radically changed. The question heretofore, from the standpoint of transcendence, has been: Does a supreme, absolutely perfect being exist? Is there an actual, objective reality corresponding to the subjective idea of God? No one has ever been able to produce any adequate answer to that question.

The question itself has fallen under suspicion. There is no criterion by which it can be judged. It is impossible to get outside of experience to investigate the assertion that something exists there. The attempts to do this, and the dogmatic insistence upon "faith" in such a transcendent existence, have been the most fruitful sources of skepticism. The implications of present knowledge may point to further related experience, but it is difficult to realize how they could prove the existence, truth, or objective reality of anything beyond experience. The alleged "proofs" of the being of God give the impression of purely formal, abstract circles of reasoning. They were given up long ago by Kant on the ground of the impotence and futility of such "pure reason." He boldly declared the idea of God to be a "regulative" conception, justified by the practical way in which it served to unify and guide experience.

This did not mean for Kant, and it does not mean for modern pragmatism, that the idea of God is false and meaningless. It does involve, however, a different conception and criterion of "truth." In functional terms truth means value. The question, Is the idea of God

true? means: Is the idea of God of value in actual experience? Does it serve to organize the highest interests of life, and to vitalize them with dynamic power in eliciting and controlling efficient reactions of the will? If the idea of God has these values and performs these functions, it is true. Without these, it is irrelevant and untrue. By the same criterion, that conception of God is truest which aids most in guiding, ennobling, comforting, and strengthening man in his devotion to moral ends. The idea of God in this view becomes the great "working hypothesis" of religion. It corresponds precisely to the hypothesis of natural science. It guides activity and is progressively modified by the results. That eminent pragmatist, Professor William James, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* has graphically described the process in these words:²¹ "The deity to whom the prophets, seers, and devotees who founded the particular cult bore witness, was worth something to them personally. They could use him. He guided their imagination, warranted their hopes, and controlled their will; or else they required him, as a safeguard against the demon and a curber of other people's crimes. In any case they chose him for the value of the fruits he seemed to them to yield. So soon as the fruits began to seem quite worthless; so soon as they conflicted with indispensable human ideals, or thwarted too extensively other values; so soon as they appeared childish, contemptible, or immoral when reflected on, the deity grew discredited, and was ere long neglected and forgotten. When we cease to admire or approve what the definition of a deity implies, we end by deeming that deity incredible."²²

So far from being incompatible with Christianity, such a view finds many confirmations in the teaching of Jesus. He taught that what one is and does determines the truth for him. The pure in heart see God. Those who hunger and thirst after righteousness attain the great satisfactions and insights of religion. He who "wills to do" is able to know. The summons of Jesus was to service – to a way of living. He himself was the example of religious faith, not because of his demonstration of the existence of a God, but because in the unfolding of his will there appeared the fullest exhibition of the meaning and power of his conception of God.

The same principles may be applied to all other theological conceptions. The place and function of various ideas are instructively

²¹ James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 29.

²² In an article entitled, "The Pragmatic Interpretation of the Christian Dogma," by Irving King, in the *Monist*, XV, pp. 248–61, the functional of psychology is applied to the conception of the Holy Spirit, the Son of God, the second coming of Christ, and the inspiration of Scripture. He says: "Our concepts are only functionally valid and do not refer to ontological realities. All our realities are of the functional variety."

presented in the history of Protestant denominations. Here religion confronts the individual in the form of certain doctrines. The prominence of creeds and the refinements of religious controversies have given religious bodies the appearance of being primarily intellectual movements. But it is becoming clear that such bodies took their rise in great practical issues, in support and defense of which they elaborated special theological systems. The creeds have been results rather than causes, and have come to their final formulation only when the circumstances out of which they sprang have become quiescent, and when the habits of the social group were becoming fixed and rigid. The great causes which produced the Reformation were moral, social, political, and commercial. The practical motives in Luther's work are well recognized. In the same way every reformer was possessed by some great humanitarian purpose. With Calvin it was the freeing and elevating of the individual. His efforts to emphasize the dignity and worth of man led him to exalt the principles of man's immediate relationship to God. It is God, and not the church, who orders the life of man. Hence no church or state has the right to assume to mediate between them. This spirit of independence has worked itself out in various forms – in congregational polity, and in political freedom advocated by many religious societies. The practical impulse is still more prominent in such bodies as the Methodist, the Salvation Army, and Christian Science.

In all communions changes in statements of doctrines are gradually forced by the development of social conditions and the progress of culture. Within the short time since his day, the theological views of Jonathan Edwards have been outgrown by the devout New Englanders themselves. Even when, as in the early stages of a denomination, the problems are most acute, it is doubtful whether the intellectual views are conspicuous in the minds of many besides the clergy and a few official leaders.²³ The masses of every communion are held to it primarily by the practical values of religious living and by family traditions, social influence, and force of habit. Even doctrinal statements often have more practical than intellectual significance. For instance, the confession in terms of the creed may be as much an act of worship, or an emotional reaction, as an exercise of reason. These forms of worship and ordinances are also subject to social and cultural changes. They must be submitted to the final test of their influence and fruitfulness in the lives of those who employ them. If they further and enrich the spiritual nature, they establish themselves with increasing spontaneity, and their

²³ James H. Lueba, *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, Vol. I, p. 162.

value is continually self-evidencing. But if they are maintained only by an appeal to authority, or to the precedent of earlier and very different religious experiences, then they show themselves in the process of becoming mere survivals and vestiges of past conditions.

The acceptance of the functional psychology means, then, for religion the recognition and justification of the gradual and continuous modifications of doctrines. It does not mean that these doctrines are inherently false, illusory, or useless.²⁴ Heretofore doctrinal changes have gone on either unconsciously, and therefore in a random way, or they have been opposed by the established habits of thought known as orthodoxy, often in blind prejudice and with tragic results. If, on the other hand, changes in theology were understood to be the marks of growing religious life and real aids in such growth, theology would come to take its place among the sciences. It would in that case surrender its claim to any unique authority, but it would gain the dignity and the working authority which the natural sciences now possess. These sciences do not claim any infallible knowledge or methods. Their conclusions have no finality. They are always subject to revision, and yet they are respected and employed in affairs of the greatest moment. Moreover these sciences possess the fundamentally important dispositions of inquiry, of investigation. Nothing is exempt from questioning. Doubt is in a true sense the instrument of scientific progress. But theology has labored under the assumption of infallible elements or sources, and therefore, at certain points, has felt compelled to raise the red flag against any critical inquiry. Nothing more characteristically indicates the difference between theology and science than the way in which the one has feared, and the other favored, free investigation. The psychology of religion bids fair to point the way to a less pretentious, but really greater, service to religion than theology has ever before been able to perform. Working in the spirit and with the methods of modern science, recognizing the tentative nature of its principles, and setting itself patiently but bravely to practical experiments, religion may yet hope to enter upon more secure

²⁴ Neither does it mean that religious knowledge is to be sought through some unique experience. The suggestion of Professor James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 431, elaborated by Professor Starbuck, in support of the view that the feelings may furnish an avenue of religious knowledge, has not commended itself to many scholars. For instance, F. M. Davenport, in the discussion of the passional and rational in religion, says: "I would take straightforward issue with those who still hold that the subconscious, the imperfectly rational, the mystically emotional in spite of all its vagaries, is *par excellence* the channel of the inflow of divine life" (*Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, p. 279). E. D. Starbuck, "The Feelings and Their Place in Religion," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, Vol. I, pp. 168 f.

and substantial progress, just as education and other forms of social activity have done.

SOME RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF PRAGMATISM

Anna L. Strong. "Some Religious Aspects of Pragmatism," *American Journal of Theology* 12.2 (April 1908): 231–40.

There exists in many quarters a more or less defined opinion that the growth of the pragmatic movement implies a danger to the religious interests. Just why this opinion should be held it is at first sight a little difficult to see, unless for the reason that all philosophies with a favor of newness are looked upon as dangerous. Added to this is the fact that pragmatism is showing itself most hospitable to science, and that science and religion are rather popularly supposed to resemble the lion and the lamb before they had decided to lie down together. Moreover, absolutism seems to offer a fairly well-fixed conception of God, and one which absolutists claim to be in fairly close agreement with that demanded by the common religious consciousness.

Thus it happens that a philosophical friend of mine asks: "I wonder what these pragmatists are going to do with God," and that another friend remarks: "We scientists couldn't ask anything better for our purposes than pragmatism gives us. But I rather hope that the absolutists will keep up their end of the fight a little while longer, if only to supply us with some of the inconsistently mystical variety of satisfaction in off hours," (a delightfully pragmatic justification of absolutism, by the way).

Now this short-sighted criticism of pragmatism entirely overlooks the fact that the kind of satisfaction which pragmatism offers to science – an assurance of the right to try an hypothesis and to find its validity in its results – is exactly the kind of satisfaction which the historical religious consciousness has always demanded. Whatever dogmatic theology may have said concerning doctrines, religion has been for the popular mind a sort of trial and error process, not so different in principle from science. From the Psalmist's "taste and see that the Lord is good," and the New Testament "if a man willeth to do His will, he shall know of the teaching," and "I will prove my faith by my works," down to modern revival methods, good and bad, with their emphasis on "experience,"

religion has been largely a matter of verifying an hypothesis by acting on it.

From this point of view, assuredly, religion has everything to gain from pragmatism, if, as Schiller holds, pragmatism has succeeded at last in overcoming the old antithesis between reason and faith. Pragmatism claims to do this, "on the one hand, by showing that faith must underlie all reason and pervade it, nay, that at bottom rationality itself is the supremest postulate of faith, and on the other hand by enabling us to discriminate between the spurious faith which shuns the warmth of action and the genuine faith which is an ingredient in the growth of knowledge." The pragmatic emphasis on faith, "where faith in a fact can help create that fact" is so notorious that when Dr. Russell sneers at pragmatism for offering, not an intellectual compulsion, but an exhortation, like that of the revivalist, to "try this experience which we are all enjoying," one is forced to recognize the justice of the comparison, albeit a very distant one, even if one resents the injustice of the sneer.

But if one phase, at least, of the ordinary religious consciousness has always been thus "scientific" in the broad sense, the case is somewhat different when we come to theology proper. For theology has shown a tendency to follow a very rationalistic philosophy, taking its materials indeed from the religious consciousness of certain famous leaders, but working them up into an abstracted "system" which made up for its failure to take account of the concrete whole of experience by an excessively dogmatic emphasis on those details of which it did take account. And being very conservative (excusably so, on account of the value of its material), it has maintained almost to this day the old Platonic view of the concept and of ideas and of the function of knowledge, as sufficient unto itself and unto its own pet purpose, which was the copying of reality. Hence, theology has dealt, not so much with the functioning of the religious consciousness as with the intellectual interrelations of certain concepts.

Theology, however, is not the only sinner in this regard. Philosophy itself has pursued an exactly similar course, and has only been aroused by the growth of the scientific conception of the meaning of truth, and (possibly) by the great emphasis on action in this strenuous century, to a more "pragmatic" interpretation of its material. And in the change which seems to be coming over philosophy, theology will doubtless participate.

The discussion of the theological side of pragmatism will fall naturally into two divisions: first, a consideration of the place allotted by a pragmatic philosophy to theology, and second, a view of the effect which pragmatism must have on the categories of theology itself.

The first of these topics I shall treat very briefly, as it has already been hinted at in this paper, and as it has been explicitly treated in Dr. Ames's paper, "Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology," and in Dr. Lyman's essay in the Garman Commemorative Volume, entitled "The Influence of Pragmatism on the Status of Theology." The resultant view of both these articles is that theology must become more "scientific" and historical. This means, according to Dr. Ames,

the recognition and justification of the gradual and continuous modifications of doctrines. Heretofore, doctrinal changes have either gone on in a random way or they have been opposed by the established habits of thought. If changes in theology were understood to be the marks of growing religious life and real aids to such growth, theology would come to take its place among the sciences. These sciences are always subject to revision and yet they are employed in affairs of the greatest moment.

Practically the same view is taken by Dr. Lyman, though, as a theologian, he declines to give up altogether the "absoluteness" of the Christian religion. He does not hold this *a priori*, he carefully explains, nor will he assert that it is yet proven, but he thinks it not inconsistent with pragmatism to discover some "absolute" religion. He means by this a religion which will subordinate to itself the norms of all other religions and thus satisfy all the religious needs of life. Taken with several grains of salt, in the form of conditions which Dr. Lyman imposes, this is not impossible. But Dr. Lyman is a good enough pragmatist to admit that there always remains the possibility that "in a world of growing reality new values may arise and that these may modify the old values or be quite discontinuous with them."

There seems to be a little looseness of statement in this conclusion of Dr. Lyman's. In a world of growing reality new values *must* arise, and must modify old values. On the other hand, they can *not* be discontinuous with them, since they arise out of them. And the religion which accommodates itself to these new values will change along with them, but not necessarily with such rapid change that it need ever vary in name. Such a phenomenon is indeed a very common one, for who will say that any of the great religions of the world are the same now as when they were founded. And what has happened to diverse religions would happen to Dr. Lyman's "absolute" religion, if it ever comes to exist. That is, while it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that one religion should come to satisfy the varied needs of all mankind, that very religion would be a changing religion, changing not only in time but also

in every individual application. It might be called "one" by courtesy: it might be "one" in fellowship: it could not be "one" in any absolute sense.

In addition to the scientific character which pragmatism would impose on theology, it has one other marked influence on the status of that branch of study – an influence brought out by Dr. Lyman's article and also in several suggestions by Professor Schiller. This influence lies in the fact that "the pragmatic form of empiricism can do what the old empiricism could not, namely, recognize the ethical life as an integral and constitutive part of reality. And furthermore it is able to regard the specifically religious needs and reactions as means of attaining rationality that are as rightful as those which are more definitely of an intellectual sort. Thus at length empiricism takes on a form which does not in principle rule out the truth of religion." The pragmatic "justification of faith," as Schiller calls it, this founding of metaphysics, not indeed, as Kant did, on ethics, but, in a broader way, on conduct, of which ethics deals with a most important part, is bound to give to ethics, and to theology in so far as it is related to ethics, a status refused to it by the older empiricism, and demanded but not obtained for it by the older rationalism.

In these two ways, then, pragmatism must influence the status of the theology, first, by making it a science as other sciences, second, by giving it, in so far as it remains a science, an honored place among other branches of study.

Passing now to a consideration of the effect of pragmatism on current theological doctrine, I shall limit the subject in a most arbitrary way, not merely to the three conceptions of God, freedom, and immortality which have always been the chief fighting ground of the theologians, but to a discussion of the first of these – the effect of the pragmatic movement on the conception of God. The reasons for this particular delimitation may be briefly stated as follows:

First, the question of freedom, while undoubtedly an important, (probably the most important) question of ethics, is for that reason not the chief question of theology. If there is to be any separation of the fields at all for the sake of convenience, it is as well to let each field take care of its own most characteristic problem. Moreover, the effect of pragmatism on ethics has already been somewhat more thoroughly studied than its effect upon theology. And, according to Schiller, this influence is to be very great and very beneficial. It is to free us from the paralyzing horror of an "indifferent universe." Nature "may be hostile; it may be friendly; it *must* respond in various ways to our various efforts." And moreover, pragmatism is to stimulate our feeling of moral

responsibility and to sweep away the stock excuse for fatalism, by proving that "human action is always a perceptible factor in the ordering of nature." This involves more danger, but one might well be willing to accept these in order to escape from the "weary grinding out of a predetermined course of things."

Second, the conception of immortality, as influenced by pragmatism, I shall omit even more entirely, largely because, while a bona-fide, theological question, it does not seem to me to be its chief question, and partly because Professor Schiller has given three chapters of his *Humanism* to the subject. In this discussion he founds a belief in immortality on the ethical postulate, the only really firm ground which has ever been found for the belief, from the time of Kant down. And the effect of pragmatism is here manifest in the validity which it gives to ethical demands in its emphasis on conduct.

Turning now to the third of the "ideas of reason," the question becomes: "What effect does pragmatism have on the idea of God?" And of course the most general answer, the one which immediately comes to mind, is that pragmatism would make any reality, God included, a dynamic rather than a static reality.

The ordinary religious person is quite accustomed by this time to the statement that the *idea* of God changes throughout the ages. He will follow without shock the skilful sketch of this development given by Dr. Ames in his paper on "Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology," showing how the tribal religions of the Semites developed into an ethical monotheism at the rise of the Jewish monarchy, how the idea of God's transcendence was emphasized by the exile, and produced, under the stress of national humiliation, the idea of a suffering reconciler, and how finally, the modern forces of democratic feeling are changing the old monarchical view of God the ruler into a conception which shall emphasize the immanence of God in his world. This history is quite acceptable to the average religious person, as long as it is only the "idea of God" which is changing. But as soon as to the question: "How could David be called a 'man after God's heart,' when he did so many wicked things?" one makes the answer: "Perhaps God wasn't as good in those days, or as particular," then there is apt to be some objection raised. And yet what does this statement mean except that in that time, there did not exist *anywhere*, in the whole of experience, the same ideals that exist today. This contention granted, the validity of all that pragmatism has to say on the subject is granted also. And if the pragmatic tendencies in philosophy gain ground, as they seem to be doing at present, this contention will inevitably be accepted for theology as well as for philosophy.

Under this general conception of a dynamic God, there are opportu-

nities for many differing views, depending not so much on the theologian's conviction concerning the nature of reality, as upon the particular phase of this reality which he is inclined to dignify with the name of God. And here much depends on temperament. Throughout the history of theology there have been two conflicting tendencies, one desiring a God who should include as much of reality as possible, the other a God who should be as responsive as possible to man's needs and desires. These two tendencies should not be confused with the absolutistic and pragmatic interpretations of reality, though there is a certain similarity in the difference of temperament which calls them forth. For both views of God exist among absolutists and pragmatists alike. In the one case, God is identified with reality, be it static or dynamic; in the other, with a part of reality.

It is not always recognized that this difference of opinion exists in absolutism as well as in pragmatism. The friend mentioned above, who inquired: "What are these pragmatists going to do with God?" took it for granted that the absolutists had no such difficulty, but identified God with the Absolute once and for all. But this is not the case. Some absolutists, like Mr. Bradley in one passage, expressly do not; others, like Mr. Royce, expressly do; and many, as indeed Mr. Bradley himself does in many places, shift back and forth between an Absolute which shall satisfy the religious need of unity, and a finite being of some sort who shall satisfy the demand for personality. It is the same with pragmatism. Viewing reality as a process, it becomes possible to regard God as the entire process or as a part of it. And the second of these views is given, with accompanying pluralistic hallmarks, in the well-known passage in James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, in which is summarized what Mr. James considers the philosophic outcome of the book:

We have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it goes.

This of course does not dismiss polytheism from the rank of a very possible theory, as James takes pleasure in announcing, but it obtains the "personality" which is such a precious part of the religious consciousness. And in other essays (notably that on "Reflex Action and Theism,") James goes even farther in this direction, asserting that God is a personality like us in the sense that "both have purposes for which they care and each can hear the other's call."

It does not seem to me likely that the theologian will rest content with

James's conception of God. It leaves out of account the demand for a certain unity and persistence which is felt by pragmatists as well as absolutists. It seems much more probable that the theologian will prefer to give the name "God" to the entire process of reality, and will mean by religion either, like Höffding, a "faith in the persistence of value," although a changing value, or a faith in a personality like ours, meaning by personality simply, as a writer in the *Hibbard Journal* puts it, "a unifying power which in some way binds our experiences into a continuous (changing) whole which we call our life, and which gives our life an inner aspect or meaning." For if we are to agree to call the entire process "God," when speaking in terms of the religious consciousness, the question which at once arises is: "Can the process be called 'conscious' or not?" If not, there will undoubtedly be some who will prefer to revert to Professor James's view and apply the term "God" to that "wider self from which saving experiences come," thinking thus to gain in personality what they lose in inclusiveness. If on the other hand, the process can be said to be "conscious," the religious person feels that his needs will be met to the full – to a much fuller extent; indeed, than he usually expects to find them met in this world.

Of course the word "consciousness" is a very ambiguous term. If we are using it in the sense in which Woodbridge and James have been using it in their most recent articles, then we must admit at once that the process of experience cannot be proved "conscious." This use of "consciousness" identifies it with the cognitive processes, and then proceeds quite conclusively to deny it any continuous existence, asserting that it is merely a function of experience, sometimes operative, sometimes not. With this view, it would of course be impossible to predicate consciousness (at least in any dogmatic way) of the entire process of experience; it would even be impossible to affirm a priori that there might not be moments in which no consciousness existed in any individual anywhere in the universe.

But this view of consciousness seems at best a partial view, if we have any regard at all for the general usage of a term. Shall we then define consciousness more broadly as psychical or mental experience? And shall we predicate consciousness in this sense of God? At once we are reminded of certain contentions of Professor Baldwin, which seem to carry conviction, to the effect that the conception of mental versus physical is a dualism springing up in the process of experience. And although Professor Baldwin does not always stick to this position, and is even willing to write the term "psychical" over his first undifferentiated experience, still we cannot rid ourselves of the feeling that his first criticism was well founded, and that if the term "psychical" is to be used in this all-inclusive sense, it must be forced from its customary meaning.

What term then can be used? Well, "experience" is a broad word; it has been used to cover a multitude of sins and may perhaps avail for one more. But it brings us back to our starting-place. God is to be the process of experience. This seems at first sight quite vague and unsatisfying. And yet, why? If we have reached the stage where we can look upon ourselves quite comfortably as a "stream of consciousness" (or, if James wants to restrict that word now, a stream of experience), why should we feel lost when told that the most we can think of reality is that it is also such a stream? We find no difficulty in concrete cases in calling a process a "person," provided there is in this process a certain dynamic unity.

To the statement that such a form of unity is hard to comprehend, I should answer that such is simply not the case. It is the one form of unity, and indeed the one form of experience, that we do know. Or, if "know" has too exclusively a cognitive significance, then say that we *are* it, we live it, we (to use again the much-abused word) experience it. And our experience is the key to all other experience in relation to which we can have the slightest cognition or feeling or volition. Take it all in all, the particular process we know will be found our best analogy for the total process.

At this point some critic, pragmatist or absolutist, will be tempted to say: "Your 'pragmatic' view of God sounds suspiciously like certain passages in Royce about the Self, and Royce, you know, is an absolutist." I confess the indebtedness. There are many passages in Royce to which the most ardent pragmatist could offer a smiling assent. And there is no reason why a perfectly good "Self" should be monopolized by the absolutists, and then, by a manipulation of the time category, turned into a timeless Absolute which is really not a self at all. In short, from one point of view, the chief quarrel a good pragmatist would have with Royce would be merely on this question of time. Once grant the reality of a process in time, that is, a process which really proceeds, and there is very little further trouble.

And just here some absolutist will ask: "Are you going back to pre-Kantian days to affirm the existence of time, as a thing through which reality moves?" Not at all. A pragmatist would be the last to assert, if I understand pragmatism at all, the existence of a long stretch of empty time, in which experience does not yet exist, but will exist some day. A pragmatist would merely assert that time and experience have the same limits, neither being "inside" the other. Sufficient unto the evil is the day thereof. The pragmatist would simply hold Kant's point logically and consistently, that time does not indeed apply to anything outside of experience (which statement would have no meaning), but that it is a form of all experience. And experience being the ultimate category in the

pragmatist's world, time thus becomes "real" not only for us, but for any God or Absolute we may postulate.

A pragmatist need offer this conception of God to the ordinary religious consciousness with no apologies or excuses of any kind. For it satisfies this religious consciousness better than any absolutist view possibly could. The only demand made by this consciousness which would seem to prefer an absolutistic solution, the demand for a God who shall be "one yesterday, today, and forever," is simply the requirement of relaxation, of rest in an experience which shall be in some way larger than ours. And I see not why this need is not met by pragmatism as easily as by absolutism. Moreover, this demand has, in my opinion, been unduly exaggerated in comparison with other demands which are for the natural religious consciousness just as insistent. Chief among these is the demand for a God who is not the same yesterday, today, and forever, a God whom our finite struggles can in some way advance or retard. Only so does our striving seem anything more than a mocking pretense. Going farther, the demand is for what Fiske calls a "quasi-human God," a God who is to our minds really in some sense understandable. The timeless Absolute furnishes no such God. We cannot understand it in any possible sense of the word. We cannot know it; we cannot act it; we cannot even grasp it in Mr. Bradley's "immediate feeling."

Now of course I am not insisting that all these religious views are of necessity bound up with pragmatism in just this form. The contrary views of many pragmatists would be a sufficient answer to such an assumption. The religion of a pragmatist is the result of many conditions, one and only one of which is his pragmatism. His pragmatism will undoubtedly determine the form of his belief, but he may not be temperamentally inclined toward the holding of any religious belief at all. The categories of the religious experience may not be vital for his use. My point is this: for a person to whom such categories *are* vital, pragmatism furnishes a completer and more consistently satisfactory response to his needs than absolutism possibly can.

THE ULTIMATE TEST OF RELIGIOUS TRUTH: IS IT HISTORICAL OR PHILOSOPHICAL?

James H. Tufts. "The Ultimate Test of Religious Truth," *American Journal of Theology* 14.1 (January 1910): 16–24.

A discussion at the Commencement of the Yale Divinity School, May 31, 1909.

Truth in any sphere implies two things: On the one hand we have some experience, some immediately sensed or felt reality, and on the other hand we bring some other experience to put with it, some meaning, some idea, some purpose or emotion. If we select for our meaning some other partial aspect of experience, then we have the various kinds of knowledge used in common life, or, if more highly defined, that of the sciences. If we try to look at our part in the light of the whole, we have philosophy.

It is by this process of enlarging our impulses that we rise from the life of an animal or infant, to the life of the man who looks before and after, to the life of the scientist who, by selecting the aspects of experience that he will consider, is able to describe and predict, to the enhanced thought values of beauty, and finally to the life of the moral person who shapes his conduct by the ideas and meanings he sets up.

No mental or moral life is possible except with both these factors – the immediate experience on the one hand, the meaning or purpose which interprets it for science or shapes it for conduct on the other.

It is evident that in the world of intelligence and morality it is impossible to divorce these two aspects of truth, but it is convenient to lay emphasis for special purposes on one or the other. If we leave out of account for the moment all conscious reference to meaning and interpretation, to purpose and self, we have an abstraction which we call facts. If we leave out all the immediate, the real, we have another abstraction which we call ideas. We then by another artificial separation which is useful for the division of labor say that we can study each of these abstractions by itself. We assume to study facts and call this history; we

assume to study the meanings, the relations, the values of these facts, and call this study science or philosophy. Instead of appealing to one wise Daniel to supply both the dream and the interpretation, modern life finds it more expedient to divide these functions. Historical research or observation tells the dream; reflection or philosophy essays its interpretation. Evidently, however, what we usually call history is three-fourths philosophy. For it speaks of men's purposes and plans not merely as facts, but as though they effected something; it speaks of causes and results, and these are never, and can never be, observed; it approves or condemns; it constructs far more than it records.

Philosophy, it must be confessed, has been more successful in its abstractions. It has at one time seized upon the spatial aspect of things and, forgetting all else, built a world of materialism. Again, fascinated by the power of thought in ignoring the here and now, and framing laws of universal scope, it has built a world *sub specie aeternitatis*, of eternal ideas, of a timeless, changeless absolute, or of eternal and immutable morality.

Against this abstractness of a rationalistic philosophy there have, indeed, been protests. The empirical Locke and Hume, Mill and Adam Smith, have taken their stand upon what is present and immediate. But they for the most part have made the opposite abstraction. They have failed to read the part in the light of the whole, and so have served rather to brush aside the airy cobwebs spun by the metaphysicians than to build a house for the soul of man.

Religious truth starts with three or perhaps four aspects of immediate experience, perceptions, needs, impulses, emotions. It gives these an interpretation, just as do science and philosophy. In which aspect is that peculiar character which marks the truth off as religious? Is it in the immediate impulse, feeling, sensation, or act on the one hand, as was held by Schleiermacher, and by those who talk of a religious instinct, or is it in the interpretation, on the other, as Hegel thought? Does it belong to history, or to philosophy? Let us postpone this until we notice briefly what these experiences are and what is the interpretation. The facts are of three or four kinds. The interpretation, however it differs in detail, has one common character: it seeks to read the facts in social or personal terms.

1. Simplest and crudest of these experiences, no doubt, but nevertheless the most vital to primitive man, is the bodily life with its urgent needs pointing beyond with the organism. Food supply, involving in most cases attention to the animating and reproductive powers of nature, the avoidance of mysterious dangers, the cure of disease, plays a large rôle. Cults with ritual, prayer, taboos, and magic rites, embody interpretations of these needs. Plenty and famine, rain and harvest,

sickness and cure, are explained by divine agency on the one hand, and over against it is conceived a human breath, "double," *anima*, or ghost, which is only a more tenuous and subtle body. Is our religious element here to be sought in fact, or in interpretation? The facts do indeed signify that man and nature, organism and environment, grow up together, and that it is abstract to consider man by himself. But later religion is apt to turn its back upon these simpler experiences, or assign them to science or to poetry, and to find a more congenial center in other phases of life.

2. The life in groups – clan, family, tribe – is both cause and effect of impulses and needs for companionship, sympathy, and protection. These are idealized in terms of Protector, Father, Redeemer, or Next-of-Kin, while the self becomes the group-member, continuing perhaps in the company of ancestral spirits. Here again there is an experience which points beyond itself, but it is only in the interpretation that it gets what can be properly called religious truth.

3. The perceptions of change and movement, of life, of order, and of might in the world awaken wonder and awe. Myths of the growth of creation gradually merge into the declaration that "The heavens declare the glory of God," on the one hand, or into the design arguments of philosophy, on the other, while the soul begins now to be conceived in terms of thought or reason. Decidedly, again, we have an unfolding of consciousness which suggests interpretation in terms of God and self, but the dream without the interpretation is not religion.

4. The moral experiences. These are of two sorts: those of inner life, of conscience and inner struggle, and those of outer act, of making the purpose effective. They are both an overcoming of the world – the world of evil within and without. These experiences are not so primary as the others. They arise as man begins to choose and value, to read his acts as a member of a social order, of a clan or family, and of the mysterious whole of which he is a part. The twofold aspect of conscious experience which in the previously described cases man finds pointing beyond himself to a helper or companion or creator, now calls for a new interpretation: man feels that this choosing and approving, this law and ideal, are not merely a private and individual matter. He views himself as a member of a larger, and ideal order. As a member of such an order he is now a person, and the order is likewise personal. The larger life into which he is thus born is at once his accuser and his helper. Sin and redemption are the interpretations of this new life within; a kingdom of God is the response to the demand that moral salvation shall mean not merely inner feeling and purpose, but outer act and a world of other moral beings.

Every great religion illustrates these facts and interpretations with

varying fulness. In the Hebrew and Christian religion we recognize the Protector and Provider in war and peace; the personal Companion and Fountain of life, the Father and Creator who has clothed the heavens with beauty, the divine Sovereign whose love assists, the Messiah who is to secure the triumph of right and justice. Conversely man knows himself first as a creature of bodily wants, then as capable of friendship, and intellectual vision; finally as a soul with capacity for both good and evil, for the prophet's ideal, and for the messianic hope. We often read the Scriptures as though we were reading facts. But a moment's reflection tells us that the whole life of prophet and priest and psalmist, of Jesus and Paul, was lived in and through, not the immediate facts but the ideals and visions, the faith and the hopes, of Israel's religion. And conversely, these ideals and hopes, these poignant judgments of sin and punishment, were not framed in the world of pure thought or of separate detached values. They were forced into consciousness and brought into the heart of a David or an Isaiah or a Jeremiah as he confronted plenty or famine or pestilence, victory or defeat, murder or adultery, injustice or persecution, and refused to go down in surrender to evil within or without.

Can the test of religious truth be historical? If we mean, Can it be found in facts divested of any interpretation? the answer is plain: The bare facts of sensation, feeling, doing, or of outer succession of events, are not religious truth. Taken merely as facts they neither are, nor can they disclose, God or soul, sin or redemption, guilt or forgiveness, divine love or divine justice. None of these can ever be proved by any historical test. For these simply are not facts. These are in every case interpretations which go beyond any immediate experience. But, I suppose, those who would stand for the historical test would have in mind not the bare particular, immediate facts, but the doctrines proclaimed by Jesus and Paul and John and other founders of Christianity. Jesus and Paul, it may be thought, were witnesses, not philosophers. They testified to God's love and forgiveness. The death on the cross was an event which itself made things different ever since. Here was not a mere philosophy; here was a fact.

But I need not say that two difficulties at once confront us in adopting this standpoint advocated so impressively by some: (1) Shall we accept unquestioningly everything which we find ascribed to Jesus and uttered by Paul as being not only their belief but as objective fact? If so, what can we do with their views as to demons and the Second Coming? If we hesitate on these matters we are employing some criterion other than that of bare authority. (2) And again, does anyone know exactly what Jesus and Paul meant? Whatever their experience, or their knowledge,

they had to express it, if they expressed it at all, in language. And this language was the language of other men. Its symbols and conceptions are borrowed from the experiences and ideas which Jews and Greeks had had. If Jesus and Paul had a new revelation it could be made known only so far as it could gradually induce new experiences in others and thus give a new meaning. The new bottles must be provided for the new wine, and the bottles could not be made at once. It seems impossible to sever what in the consciousness of Jesus and Paul was temporal and of their age and time, from what was for all time and all men, unless we take some standpoint outside history by which to test what was the divine and what the human. The test of religious truth for any man who questions an infallible book, a wholly magical view of revelation, and an external authority, cannot be historical in the narrow sense.

Can the test of religious truth be philosophical? There are two conceptions of philosophy and philosophical truth: According to one of these conceptions philosophy is to start with certain definitions and conceptions, as does the mathematician. It is then to develop these and test any proposed idea or proposition by its conformity to these premises. Its logic is that of identity and contradiction. This method as we all know has been a favorite in theology. You start with God as Substance, or First Cause, or Perfect Being, or Infinite, or Absolute, and you deduce the consequences with logical consistency. This gives indeed a world of reason, but it evidently proves nothing as to the world in which we live. Consistency is a necessary element in a world of rational beings, but as the modern mathematicians show us we may have many a consistent world which is not real. The other conception of philosophy is that it is to view all its interpretations, its conceptions, as merely experimental, and partial, as ways of reading new meaning into the crude, bare facts of feeling and impulse, perception and emotion – as means of transforming the natural into the spiritual. On this basis the test of philosophy is not: Does my conclusion square with my definitions? but, Does my conclusion enable me to forecast nature, to guide my life into larger achievement, to disclose new values, and bring about a better world?

Can religious truth be tested by either philosophic method? Evidently not by the first. Religion must come to men with more than a consistent series of deductions from definitions. And if we turn to the second method, and ask, Has philosophy yet furnished an adequate interpretation of religious experience? I should answer unhesitatingly "No!" Various philosophies have helped man to understand more fully his life and his world, but only the complacent metaphysician of bygone days could suppose he had illumined more than a small circle in the

unexplored and boundless ocean whose tides wash the shores on which we stand.

The Hebrew philosophy gave a profound meaning to one aspect of the moral life; but its philosophy of nature does not satisfy our present science, while its doctrine of the triumph of good through the sudden presence of God or his Messiah is not our working plan of life.

The Greek and the modern rationalist have had their philosophy. Fixing on the timeless procedure of thought they have made the religious world a timeless, eternal realm of lifeless being. God has been essence and substance, being and cause, changeless, infinite, and absolute. Moral struggle and victory find no place in such a being. They, like all finiteness and imperfections, must belong to appearance, not to reality.

Now, however well this may express certain intellectual and mystic longings of the religious consciousness, I believe that it is utterly inadequate as an interpretation of the moral life. It does not offer the redemption, nor the companionship, nor the actual making of new moral reality which the religious experience of today demands. The God who works in us and in whom we trust must in some sense be with us in the fiery furnace; must know struggle and purpose as reality, unless we dismiss the whole moral side of life as a dream battle.

Philosophy indeed took one great step in advance a century ago when Kant attempted to shift the center of philosophy from intellect to will. But, in the first place, the will with Kant was still too much the reason under another form. It had no place for sympathy and love as motives. And in the next place it shared the defect of all philosophy, which has lasted even to this day; it was individualistic, not social. The philosophy which is to test religious truth must be social. If the very essence of religious truth is a social, a personal interpretation of the world and of the inner life, then only a philosophy which employs social categories can meet the religious demand half-way. This gap has long been recognized. It has frequently been assumed that the situation is met by saying that man creates his gods according to his needs or his desires. Or it is said that religion uses the language of imagination, philosophy that of thought. But to take one's stand on the private, subjective, individual half of this world of conscious experience; to assume that this is real, independent, self-sustaining, and that the Other, the Socius, the Over-Soul, the God, the Not-ourselves, is only a fancy, a fiction, a creation – this is sheer abstraction. In our social psychology we are learning that the individual comes to intellectual and moral birth only in a social world of fellow-men. Must not philosophy carry this insight as it essays to read the depths of human life, of conscience, of beauty, and of science, of spiritual power and spiritual achievements.

It has been a true instinct therefore which has led religion to refuse to trust its truth to philosophy for decision. There are more things in heaven and earth than have been dreamed of in the philosophies of Judea or Greece, of Germany or England. Our Systems are still "but broken lights."

The historical – the fact – means nothing except as it is viewed in the light of other experiences, of some larger whole, but in turn these larger wholes need to return again and again to earth to renew their strength. A great soul like that of Jesus – who shall sound its depths? Who shall say whence he drew inspiration, and in what strength he overcame the world? Certainly no doctrine of associational psychology, no doctrine of the soul as a simple substance. who shall explain what difference his life and death did make in the actual universe? – certainly no doctrine of an eternal essence, or of a legal expiation. And what shall guarantee the triumph of good? What shall assure the soul, as baffled and perplexed by mystery and evil it cries in the *Te Deum* of the ages, "O Lord, in thee have I trusted, let me never be confounded!" Certainly no past can demonstrate *this* future. It is – and must be so long as moral life demands resolution – a supreme venture of faith. But if anything can give not only emotional cheer and contagious hope, but also the rational basis for this venture, it is the experience, the struggles, the serene calm, the confidence, the actual achievement of the world's great spirits. "Be of good cheer, for I have overcome the world" is the historic note which tells of reality – not only the reality of actual deeds, but as well the reality of a kinship of spirit that promises similar victory.

The vital religious truth underlying the views presented is this: Our theologies are none of them more than working hypotheses. They are all certainly inadequate. Nevertheless, just as in science every hypothesis helps us on, so without ideas and interpretations there is no growing life of the mind or of the spirit. We gain new glimpses into religious truth only as we bring to the great souls the new interpretations which their lives and teachings beget in us. In this sense the full interpretation of religious experience can come only when the kingdom of God has itself become a reality. Just because the philosophies of the past are thus inadequate I conceive it our duty to rethink God and the religious Life in new categories. Neither sovereignty nor fatherhood seems an adequate interpretation of the social conscience of today any more than the first chapter of Genesis is an adequate theory of evolution. Neither Legal theories of atonement, nor timeless being, nor an absolute which knows no struggle, is adequate to our conviction of the reality of evil and the duty of overcoming it.

If we leave the shore and launch out upon the deep, what shall

guarantee that here we shall find truth? We certainly cannot demonstrate the new by history or by philosophy. But religion is after all a venture of the soul, a venture of faith. If God and eternity were immediately present there were then, as Kant has taught us, no room for high resolve – no room to make the great decision to leave all and follow Him. But in spite of failures and shipwrecks, humanity has moved upward as it has made such ventures of faith. We cannot test *our* truth by the “experience” of the child or the savage. We have moved on, and found a new evidence in the larger life of the spirit. If the humanity of a later time is to have a larger vision, a larger and richer revelation, it must test this by its own higher life. It must find God and soul, redemption and the divine kingdom, in new ways. It must not fear to leave its outgrown shell: but it will never outgrow the need of studying those profound and priceless experiences and deeds through which the divine has been revealed.

CAN PRAGMATISM FURNISH A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR THEOLOGY

Douglas C. Macintosh. "Can Pragmatism Furnish a Philosophical Basis for Theology?" *Harvard Theological Review* 3.1 (January 1910): 125–34.

A paper read before the Baptist Congress, at New York, Nov. 9, 1909.

In order to establish a negative answer to this question, one would simply have to show either that pragmatism itself is not tenable, or else that it can afford theology no adequate support. To establish the affirmative, however, it would be necessary to show in the first place that pragmatism is in itself tenable, and in the second place that it is compatible with and gives some real support to theology. But for the would-be theological pragmatist himself neither of these positions can be readily accepted as established without the other. On the one hand he cannot say that pragmatism supports theology unless it is itself tenable, for, if untenable, so far from being the philosophical basis of theology, it cannot be a real basis for anything. On the other hand the person who finds religion essential cannot, on pragmatic principles, accept pragmatism. if it is not at least compatible with the fundamentals of religion and theology – unless, indeed, he needs pragmatism more than he needs religion. While beginning, then, by inquiring whether pragmatism is tenable or not, it must be recognized that a final affirmative answer cannot be given until we have considered the question of the bearing of pragmatism upon the essential affirmations of religious faith.

The investigation of the question, Is pragmatism tenable? involves, of course, the preliminary inquiry, What is pragmatism? To answer this question fairly is no small task in itself.

A common attitude toward the whole pragmatist movement is expressed in the criticism, "If it is new, it is nonsense; if it is old, it is obvious."¹ When it is affirmed that true judgments must be ultimately satisfactory, and that none but true judgments can be really satisfactory as working principles in the service of legitimate human interests; that

¹ E. E. Slosson, *The Independent*, Feb. 21, 1907.

indeed all true judgments about reality are actually or potentially useful, so that the experienced usefulness of a belief indicates with more or less probability its truth, – most thinkers agree that this is obviously true. There is an intimate relation between the truth and the practical utility of judgments, but the truth, they say, is something to be established independently of the usefulness; we test the truth first and find it useful afterwards. Such a position may be called semi-pragmatism, but it is not pragmatism proper.

Many of those who criticise pragmatism seem to regard it as the doctrine that all satisfactory judgments are true, simply by virtue of their giving satisfaction to some particular desire; that all judgments found useful in the realization of purposes are, to the extent of their usefulness, true. Now it is undoubtedly true that much of the popular so-called pragmatism is of this sort. And Professor James himself often uses such unguarded expressions that he has to complain, in spite of his popular style, that he is very generally misunderstood as teaching some such doctrine. For example, in his book entitled *Pragmatism* he says, "Truth is only the expedient in the way of our thinking" (p. 222), and again, "On pragmatic principles we cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it" (p. 273). And yet in his latest work, *The Meaning of Truth*, he characterizes as "silly" and "an obvious absurdity" the view attributed to him "that anyone who believes a proposition to be true must first have made out clearly that its consequences *are* good, and that his belief must primarily be in that fact" (pp. 272f.), or "that whatever proves subjectively expedient in the way of our thinking is 'true' in the absolute and unrestricted sense of the word" (p. 231). Now this doctrine which Professor James seems at times to teach, but which he strenuously repudiates, is very evidently, as it has been characterized, nonsense. It is what the newspaper wit had in mind when he wrote, "The Eskimos would seem to have a strong natural leaning toward pragmatism." This may fairly be called pseudo-pragmatism, for it would be a very superficial judgment which would identify the essence of the whole pragmatic movement with this absurd doctrine.

But if the essential nature of pragmatism consists neither in the doctrine that all true judgments are useful, nor in the doctrine that all useful judgments are true; if it must be differentiated from semi-pragmatism, which is obvious, and from pseudo-pragmatism, which is nonsense, just what, then, is it? What escape is there from the horns of this dilemma? Now it is the fault of the typical absolutist critic of pragmatism that he has a passion for expressing every movement and tendency in the form of a universal principle, and it is his mistake to

suppose that when he has refuted the principle he has virtually annihilated the movement. And it may very well be that the proper pragmatist easily avoids both horns of the intellectualist's dilemma.

The fairest way to answer the question, What is Pragmatism? is to settle it pragmatically. In pragmatism, then, what is the practical attitude? What does it really propose to do? To this the answer is that it proposes, in any crisis in which a judgment is demanded, to take the most promising suggestion as a working hypothesis and test its truth by the way it *works*. If the hypothesis has been thoroughly tested and has worked satisfactorily, it is properly called not only useful but true. Thus usefulness is taken as a mark of truth, although it is not claimed universally that all judgments that are subjectively useful or temporarily satisfactory are objectively true. But further, pragmatism taken as its working hypothesis that every test there is for truth can be stated as a test of working, and that the results of speculation are problematic until verified in the experiences of life.

It will be seen, then, that pragmatism proper does not make for a greater laxity of thought, but rather for a more rigorous and extensive application of the principles of scientific method. Now in all scientific judgment the predicate is regarded as a mere trial-predicate and the judgment is made purely hypothetically at first, in order that by acting as if it were true it may be shown by the manner of its working whether the best hypothesis was used, that is, whether the best trial-predicate was employed. And pragmatism, as we have intimated, does not propose to find a substitute for science in the study of nature or history, nor to change scientific procedure, nor to discredit in any way the results of scientific investigation. On the contrary it establishes scientific procedure as its model, and undertakes to make philosophy, with which it is chiefly concerned, more scientific. If there is to be thinking about any reality beyond the reach of the phenomenal sciences, that thinking must imitate those sciences as far as possible, it must refer to experience wherever it is able to do so and find truth only through some kind of verification of working hypotheses. This surely is a tenable position.

But pragmatism is young and vigorous, and it has exhibited a good many overgrowths and excrescences that will doubtless be pruned away in time. To some extent this is already taking place. Early pragmatism tended to discredit system, consistency, and the so-called theoretical interest. Schiller of Oxford was especially pronounced in this respect. But now it is more usual to find the practical set forth, not as opposed altogether to the theoretical, but as including it as a special type of the practical. Science was described by Professor Dewey six years ago as "just the forging and arranging of instrumentalities for dealing with

individual cases of experience."² But what shall we say about the pursuit of science as something interesting apart from its further application; what about the interest in truth for its own sake? This is now interpreted as an instance of the shift of interest whereby the process of securing means to possible practical ends becomes interesting and an end in itself, the original practical purpose being lost sight of, and this new purpose being now itself an active principle, organizing other activities into its service as means.

It is to be expected also that pragmatists will give up the somewhat dogmatic assertion that any particular truth has only temporary value. There is a manifest contradiction, as has been repeatedly pointed out, in stating universally that there is no universal truth, assuming that it will be permanently satisfactory to hold that no truth will permanently satisfy, that all things else are in a flux and only pragmatism has come to stay. To guard his position the pragmatist must say that it is simply his working hypothesis that all truths will prove ephemeral; but as a matter of fact he tacitly assumes that some truth at least will be permanently valid, and he might more consistently adopt as his working hypothesis that some human judgments will be abidingly true.

Again, there is a decided tendency among pragmatists to go beyond the hypothesis that the only way to test truth is by an experience of its working, and to assert that truth is a species of utility. Of course this does not necessarily involve the crass utilitarianism that has been charged against pragmatism, but which really belongs to what we have styled pseudo-pragmatism. And yet, for the following reasons, it is questionable whether pragmatists may not prematurely identify their position with this doctrine. In the first place the doctrine that truth can be accurately and adequately defined in terms of utility can be established, if at all, only after a thorough analysis of the psychology of meaning and of the judging process, and after an adequate examination of the representational theory of truth. Again, the statement lends itself very readily to misinterpretation on the part of critics, thus hindering the acceptance of what truth there is in pragmatism. In addition to this, when taken as a principle it tends to lead one into making statements which come dangerously near to pseudo-pragmatism. And, lastly, since one can set forth, as above, the essence of pragmatism without making use of this disputed principle, on the pragmatic ground that no difference should be recognized unless it *makes* a difference, the pragmatist should perhaps content himself with the irreducible minimum definition of pragmatism as the hypothesis that there is no test of truth which is not essentially a test of usefulness in some concrete

² *The Logical Conditions of Scientific Treatment of Morality*, p. 8.

situation. The necessary – that is, what man really needs to believe in order to live as he ought – is true. And this fundamental hypothesis of pragmatism is still a working one; it has not been shown to be scientifically untenable.

But even if one should accept the essential postulate of pragmatism, it does not follow that he must accept all that can truly call itself pragmatism. For even in essential pragmatism wide is the gate and broad is the way that leads to theological destruction, and many are they that enter in thereby.

At the very gateway of pragmatism there is an obvious downward path whose finger-post points in the direction of animalism. It is undoubtedly true that originally consciousness and in man the judging process were valuable chiefly as means of better adjusting the animal organism to its environment, so that the physical life might be preserved and propagated. In that primitive situation the biological function of judgments, that is, the way in which they functioned in the service of the physical life of the individual and of the race, was, roughly speaking, an index to their truth. But when it is assumed that not only then but now and always the only test of truth is its function in man's struggle for physical existence, we have an animalistic pragmatism which cannot be adequate to the demands of man unless he is satisfied to live simply as an animal. In criticism or this type of pragmatism attention may be called to the notorious fact that in conscious life new interests are constantly developing, many of which are not centred in the fate of the physical organism at all. Moreover, these new interests peculiar to man as a spiritual personality may lead to a transvaluation of all former values, so that instead of life's being interpreted in its lowest terms, as the physical existence of the individual and of the race, it is interpreted in its highest terms, as the spiritual development and efficiency of the individual and society. Then, instead of consciousness and judgments being regarded as mere means for the promotion of the physical life, the physical life is regarded as simply or chiefly instrumental in the promotion of the conscious life in its spiritual aspects. The ideal interests no longer exist for the sake of the physical, but the physical life for the sake of the ideal. Or, as Professor Montague puts it, "Man began to think in order that he might eat; he has evolved to the point where he eats in order that he may think."³ Instead of the animalistic type, then, we are led to a humanistic pragmatism, in which the truth of judgments is tested by their utility in the service of that life of the individual and of society in which all the peculiarly and legitimately human interests are recognized as being of primary importance. Once the ends in view are

³ *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. vi, p. 489.

thoroughly accredited, it may be assumed that those judgments that are ultimately necessary for the achievement of these ends are valid. Thus, in the sense of what is humanly necessary, necessity remains the test of the truth of judgments.

But sometimes humanistic pragmatism presents itself in an extremely individualistic form. That Dr. Schiller does not entirely escape this is shown by his assertion that two men "with different fortunes, histories, and temperaments, ought not to arrive at the same metaphysic, nor can they do so honestly."⁴ But over against individualistic pragmatism which would make usefulness or necessity for the individual the sole criterion of truth, pragmatism is coming to state more clearly that it is the function of ideas in the social situation that is the test of their truth. For example, Professor A. W. Moore says, "When the pragmatist talks of attention and thought as arising at the point of a need for readjustment, this need must not be taken to mean the need of some one lone, marooned organism or mind only. The readjustment is always in and of a 'social situation.'"⁵ The humanistic pragmatism, then, to be defensible, must be of the social rather than of the individualistic type. It is not in merely individual but in social utility and necessity that truth is assuredly to be found.

But, once more, even this type of humanistic pragmatism may vary according to the interests which are recognized as genuinely and legitimately human. For example, there may develop on the one hand a positivistic pragmatism in which the distinctly religious interest is repudiated, and on the other hand a religious pragmatism in which, along with the social, scientific, aesthetic, and moral interests, the distinctly religious interest is recognized as essentially human and valid, so that judgments which are really indispensable to the promotion of the highest type of religious life are regarded as validly claiming our acceptance as true.

Just here is the crux of the question as to the relation of pragmatism to theology. There are some with whom pragmatism is a methodological principle for accrediting the postulates of religious faith with regard to realities that transcend phenomenal experience. There are others who employ their pragmatism to discredit speculation and assertions about transcendent reality generally; they do not recognize as legitimate and significant for philosophy the religious interest which requires to express itself theologically. But theistic religion must accept, and, I take it, is ready to accept, the challenge of pragmatism. Any pragmatic philosophy which is to satisfy the whole man at his highest and best, and the race at

⁴ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 18.

⁵ *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. vi, pp. 382-3.

its highest and best, cannot afford to ignore a religion which meets fundamental spiritual need with abiding satisfaction, and which necessarily expresses itself in a theology for which it just as necessarily claims objective validity.

Now pragmatism in alliance with religion is not a new thing under the sun. Exactly that which gave to the Ritschlian theology its vitality and appeal was its religious pragmatism. But the Ritschlian pragmatism was partial; it was applied to religious judgments only, leaving scientific and philosophical judgments apparently on an entirely different footing. In keeping with this absolute distinction between theoretical and value-judgments, it refused to mediate philosophically between its dogmatics on the other hand and the sciences and philosophy of nature on the other. Its pragmatism was thus dualistic in its tendency. It encouraged the impression that certain judgments were valuable and valid in theology, but not in philosophy. The outcome in many cases was that instead of being a thoroughgoing religious pragmatism to the exclusion of positivism, Ritschlianism became a partial and dualistic pragmatism, religious in theology and positivistic in philosophy. This ignoring of the logical principle of contradiction is a characteristic of pseudo-pragmatism. Ritschlianism began well in its pragmatic doctrine of religious value-judgments; it should have gone further and recognized the pragmatic character of all real live judgments as opposed to fossilized propositions, and then, instead of keeping the religious value-judgments in unhealthy solitary confinement, it should have brought them out into the philosophical arena to try conclusions with other judgments about reality. In other words, Ritschlianism made its chief mistake in not seeking to mediate between the scientific and religious views of the world, taking the essential ideas of religion as working hypotheses in philosophy.

But it is not to philosophy alone, but to life generally, that we must look for the solution of our ultimate problems. The lack of finality in speculation is due to the limitations of philosophy when abstracted from life. With regard to the most fundamental convictions, what is lacking in philosophical demonstration is to be made up by the demonstration of life. Reflection can never furnish a philosophy of reality which can afford to dispense with its bearing upon the moral well-being of society as a test. And, indeed, a philosophy that settled all problems apart from life would be no servant of life, but a substitute therefor, such as mediaeval scholasticism often tended to be.

Still it must be equally emphasized that it is not to life without systematic reflection, such as philosophy is, that we must look. That would not be fulness of life which ruled out philosophy. Life is to be guided by reflectively developed hypotheses which subsequent life-

experience either confirms or rejects. Or, to state it differently, the verification of consistency is to be regarded as an essential part of the verification of life, for, after all, the interest in consistency or rationality is the interest in harmonizing the various practical interests recognized as valid.⁶

Thus it will be seen that the kind of use one makes of pragmatism in philosophy depends upon the kind of interests and purposes one has, and so, ultimately, upon the kind of man one is. He who uses pragmatism – or pseudo-pragmatism, to speak accurately – in order to justify the rejection of scientifically obtained results in any department of human investigation, is dishonest at heart. And on the other hand, as Dr. Schiller significantly says, “A perfect and complete metaphysics is an ideal defined only by approximation, and attainable only by the perfecting of life. For it would be the theory of such a perfect life.”⁷ And, we may add, philosophy must make room for a saving gospel for the individual and society, if it is to be pragmatically verified.

So much, then, may be expected to result from pragmatism in epistemology; religious knowledge must be integrated with other knowledge in the final philosophy. If we turn now to a very brief consideration of the bearing of pragmatism upon ontology, we find that the standing of ontology is in dispute among pragmatists; there are some who profess to dispense with it altogether as either unimportant or impossible or fictitious. Nevertheless it must be evident that wherever there is room for epistemology there is room for ontology; if there is knowledge, there must be reality known.

Professor Dewey has indicated what he conceives to be the pragmatist theory of reality in two articles entitled respectively “The Postulates of Immediate Empiricism”⁸ and “Does Reality Possess Practical Character?”⁹ In the former he says that if we want to know what anything is we must go to immediate experience and ask what the thing in question is experienced as. In the latter essay he says that pragmatism means the doctrine that reality possesses practical character; that knowing reality changes it; that, in fact, knowledge is reality changing itself in a definite way. Now it would be very easy to interpret this in terms of a solipsistic pragmatism, according to which reality would be just what the individual takes it to be, and individual psychology would be the only possible ontology.

⁶ Cf. A. K. Rogers, *The Religious Conception of the World*, p. 71, a suggestive book in connection with our present topic.

⁷ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 21.

⁸ *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. ii. no. 19.

⁹ *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James*, pp. 53–80.

But the charge of solipsism pragmatists meet with a vigorous disclaimer,¹⁰ and we are given to understand that it is to social psychology that we are to make our ultimate appeal in order to know what reality is. The ideas we use are social products; the realities we recognize are social achievements, and they are what they are to the social consciousness.

But are we to understand, then, that this exhausts their whole reality? What about realities which we know to exist, but of which humanity has never had immediate experience? What about the centre of the earth, the other side of the moon, and the south pole, for instance? Is their whole reality their existence in human minds as mathematically deduced hypotheses? It is evident that the postulate of immediate empiricism, while valuable as far as it goes, is not a sufficient criterion for the definition of reality so long as it does not recognize an experience which transcends not only the individual man, but all humanity. Common sense and pragmatism are both right in affirming that we know reality, and that we know it as it is, in immediate experience. But it is equally compatible with common sense and pragmatism to say that we do not and cannot know reality completely, because we do not experience it fully. But we have to think about this reality which transcends immediate human experience, and as it matter of fact we do think of it and have to think of it as it would be to some one to whose experience it was immediately present. Why not assume, then, according to pragmatic principles, that this necessary way of thinking of it indicates the true way, and that in reality although not present to immediate human experience it is immediately present to some experiencing subject?

To sum up, then: we have criticised pragmatism as it is, and attempted to depict it as it might be and ought to be. Our main results are two. Pragmatic epistemology, to be consistent, must make room in its philosophy for the essential postulates of the religious consciousness. Pragmatic ontology, with its postulate of immediate empiricism, to be consistent, must make room for an experiential (spiritualistic) philosophy of reality including but transcending all human experience. These are two points. Taking the shortest distance between these two points we get a straight line indicating that pragmatism can furnish a philosophical basis for theology.

¹⁰ See, for example, the article by A. W. Moore in *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. vi, no. 14.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFINITION OF RELIGION¹

William K. Wright. "A Psychological Definition of Religion," *American Journal of Psychology* 14.3 (July 1912): 385-409.

Portions of this paper were read at a joint session of the Western Philosophical and Psychological associations at the University of Chicago last April.

No scientific discipline can be credited with much accuracy until it has succeeded in defining its principal terms. While recent contributions to the still youthful field of the psychology of religion have made the problems clearer, and at least partially solved some of them, no definition that has yet been proffered has met with wide acceptance. It is the purpose of this paper to suggest a working definition which, it is hoped, will prove to be reasonably satisfactory. It will be claimed that the definition adequately covers the established facts in regard to religion, that it furnishes a clear line of demarkation between religion and related fields, and that it is serviceable as a preliminary step toward the solution of the more difficult questions of the social significance and metaphysical validity of religion.²

An adequate definition of religion must satisfy two prerequisites. The first of these is that, to meet the requirements of logic, it must be exactly coextensive with the term defined.³ It must include all varieties of all religions in the past as well as the present, and all of the logically possible forms that religions may conceivably assume in the future, no matter whether we believe these forms to be desirable or undesirable,

¹ The writer is indebted to Professors Lindley and Haggerty of Indiana University, Professor McGilvary, Dr. Kallen, and Dr. Otto of the University of Wisconsin, Professor Mead of the University of Chicago, and Rev. John R. Ellis of Bloomington, Ind., for suggestions, partly of a negative character, that have helped to define his positions.

² The worthlessness for psychological purposes of the older definitions, advanced by philosophers and philologists, is patent. Cf. James H. Leuba, *Monist*, XV.

³ Those acquainted with the literature will see the reason for emphasizing this truism. Professor George M. Stratton, in his valuable *Psychology of the Religious Life* (pp. 1-3), clearly states the proper psychological attitude, and admirably maintains it.

uplifting or degrading, true or false. It must be thoroughly impersonal and descriptive, not normative. And it must avoid confusing religion with morals, magic, ethics, aesthetics, and other subjects that have borne in the past, or now bear, close relationship to it.

The second desideratum in a preliminary definition of religion for the purposes of functional psychology is that it should be an accurate description of the subjective attitude of the practitioners of religions, and not an assertion regarding the actual function of religion in human society, as determined by the objective observer. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, prudence demands that a functional psychologist make his definition frankly subjective in order to avoid the suspicion of being implicated in the psychologist's fallacy, a suspicion often, and perhaps not without reason, felt against investigators of his ilk. Secondly, it will be much easier to secure agreement upon the facts. The precise influence of any religion in social and moral evolution, complicated as is its interaction with other forces, is extremely difficult to determine. At the present time, there would be great difficulty in ascertaining the precise influence that Christianity has had upon European history,⁴ and it would be yet more difficult to make a general statement that would apply to all religions. Personally I believe that it is possible to arrive at conclusions unambiguously favorable to Christianity as a factor of genuine and great service and importance in moral and social development, and I think that, to a less degree, this may be claimed of religion in general. In fact, a few points in regard to the social function of religion from the objective viewpoint will be mentioned toward the close of this paper; but the extreme difficulty of the subject makes it clear that it will be much easier to secure agreement upon the facts if a frankly subjective definition alone is attempted as a preliminary step toward the solution of the larger sociological and historical problem.

To meet these desiderata, therefore, I propose to set forth, in a manner that possibly may appear a little formal and pedantic, but will, I believe, make for accuracy, a definition of religion by genus and differentia. The genus will have to be broad enough to include within its bounds every conceivable form of religion. The differentia will need to be sufficiently

⁴ The conclusions of Lecky, who attempted to estimate the influence of the Christian religion in certain periods of European history, and who still is our chief authority on this subject, are often delivered with hesitation (*A History European Morals*). Westermarck's theory of the subjectivity of moral judgments apparently excludes a consideration of their objective function (*The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*). Hobhouse limits his conclusions to a few important but restricted details (*Morals in Evolution*, II, 155-59, and *passim*).

narrow and specific to exclude from the species of religion everything included within the genus that is not properly religious. By thus seeking for breadth in our genus, and for narrowness and definiteness in our differentia, we ought to be able to satisfy all requirements and to secure a logical definition.

Of the various attempts to define religion psychologically, two types of definition are probably regarded at the present time, at least in this country, with most favor. One of these is the definition in terms of the conservation of values, which originated with Höffding,⁵ and has recently been brilliantly defended by Irving King⁶ and Edward S. Ames.⁷ While most reviewers have recognized the merit of this definition in promoting the search for data and discovery of valuable psychological principles, many of them have criticised it as too broad and indefinite – as including more within the species of religion than properly belongs there. On the other hand, so far as I can recall, no critic has charged this definition with being too narrow in its scope. The other type of definition most in favor has been presented in various forms by a variety of writers, but has been most accurately stated by James H. Leuba,⁸ who defines religion as belief in a “psychic, superhuman power.” This definition, I believe, is usually thought to be the more clear-cut and definite, but to lack the breadth and suggestiveness of the former definition. It is more accurate, but less fruitful in stimulating to further investigation. In other words, it is too narrow in its scope, just as the first definition is too broad.

If, then, we proceed to seek the genus of our definition in the conception of religion as concerned with the conservation of values, we shall be reasonably sure to obtain enough breadth and suggestiveness, and if we seek our differentia along the lines indicated by Professor Leuba, we shall be able to find a differentia accurate and specific enough to avoid the danger of confusing religion with related subjects.

The genus of the definition proposed is therefore this: *the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values*. This definition is broad enough, it is believed, to bring religion under a genus that includes every type of it. Of course the genus includes many other things besides – some phases, at least, of morals, ethics, art, science – but that

⁵ *Philosophy of Religion*.

⁶ *The Development of Religion*.

⁷ *The Psychology of Religious Experience*.

⁸ *The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion*, chap. vi; “Religion as a Factor in the Struggle for Life,” *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, II. The quoted phrase appears only in the latter article.

is not our present concern; the differentia, later to be discussed, will exclude these.

Each expression in the genus has been chosen advisedly. "Endeavor" makes it clear that the attempt to secure the conservation of values need not prove successful, even in the subjective belief of the follower of the religion. If he is making the endeavor he is making use of religion, though he do so with little faith, and afterward fully recognize the futility of his attempt. Thus Clovis may have had little faith in his gods before he ceased praying to them, and his confidence in the Christ of Clotilda may have barely been enough to make it seem worth while to try upon the battle-field the experiment of praying: "Clotilda says that Thou art the Son of the living God, and that Thou dost give the victory to those that put their trust in Thee. I have besought my gods, but they give me no aid. I see well that their strength is naught. I beseech Thee, and I will believe in Thee, only save me from the hands of mine enemies."⁹

The genus states that religion is the endeavor to secure the conservation of *values*. These may of course be of any conceivable sort. They have included almost everything that is a conscious object of desire. Food, the scalps and heads of enemies, deliverance from pestilence and disaster, riches, long life, posterity, counsel as to the future, fame, courage, wisdom, justice, forgiveness from sin, regeneration, Nirvana, blessedness, are only a few of the many values, private and public, that human beings have sought to conserve through religious means. As civilizations progress and moral insight advances, the values sought through religion become more moral and spiritual; and to an increasing extent values involving self-feeling and other self-conscious attitudes become prized more highly than those that refer exclusively to external objects and conditions.¹⁰

Our genus further asserts that values, in order to become religious, must be *socially recognized*. By this expression full recognition is accorded to the evidence given by W. Robertson Smith regarding the Semites,¹¹ and extended by Professor King to other races, that practices, if really religious, conserve values that the tribe recognizes, and are at least not inimical to its interests. On the other hand, the more vague and unqualified term "social values" is avoided. Properly understood, the

⁹ Munro and Sellery, *Mediaeval Civilization*, p. 80.

¹⁰ Cf. Lovejoy, "The Desires of the Self-Conscious," *Columbia Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, etc.*, IV, 29-39; and Coe's review of Ames's book in the *American Journal of Theology*, XV, 305.

¹¹ *The Religion of the Semites*.

adjective "social" can here only mean what is more precisely described as "socially recognized." To be sure, there is a sense in which language is of "social" origin, and probably all conceptual thinking; and according to Baldwin¹² and others even the self is a "social" construction. Cooley¹³ has shown that private reflection is often "social" in the sense that in our own private thought we often carry on imaginary conversations with ourselves. A bomb-throwing anarchist in the course of his own private and intensely anti-social thinking may make use of word imagery and concepts, carry on imaginary conversations with himself, and be keenly aware of his own personal identity as opposed to other *alteri*: shall we therefore call his thinking "social"? Used in this very broad sense, of course all religious values, and all values of every sort, even the most egoistic and anti-social, can be dubbed "social"! But surely such instances as an African native's prayer to the river-spirit to upset his enemy's canoe and destroy him,¹⁴ and Hannah's prayer that she might bear a son are to be interpreted as cases in which the worshipers are thinking of what they regard as their own private desires, and not as matters of any great concern to their tribes.¹⁵ It would therefore be misleading to call such values social from the subjective viewpoint of our definition. However, it is true that such values are socially recognized. Vengeance is legitimate and commendable according to West African ethics; to bear children was a great blessing, and to be barren a great misfortune in the opinion of Hebrew women of Hannah's time. Religious values, therefore, may be either personal or social in the thought of a worshiper; but they are always values of which his group approves, and in this sense "socially recognized."

Moreover, the endeavor is to secure the *conservation* of socially recognized values. The word "conservation" is not very satisfactory, but is the best that has yet been suggested. A person first recognizes something as a value, and then seeks to conserve it through religious means. Religion is thus thoroughly instrumental, a means to an end; it is not the discoverer of new values, but the conservator of values already appreciated. So while Todas seek the welfare of the buffalo cows and the purity of their milk through a ritual, and native Australians seek to conserve the lore of their fathers through initiation ceremonies, and

¹² *Social and Ethical Interpretations*.

¹³ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 52 ff.; 539 ff.

¹⁴ Mary H. Kingsley, *West African Studies*, p. 359.

¹⁵ In this connection Professor Fite's protest, "The Exaggeration of the Social," *Columbia Journal of Philosophy, etc.*, IV, 393 ff., and the systematic treatment in his *Individualism* deserve careful attention.

American parents dedicate their children to the Christian faith at their baptism, the values implied in these practices were first recognized as values before the ceremonies properly became religious.

The definition here defended is entirely in agreement with Professor King's probable theory that religious ceremonies have often arisen from actions that originally were performed instinctively or habitually, without conscious values being attached to them.¹⁶ In such cases three stages are distinguishable: (1) the habitual, unappreciated action; (2) the action, perhaps as a result of inhibition, becomes an object of general conscious attention and effort, and hence involves a socially recognized value; (3) the endeavor to conserve this socially recognized value through religious means, as set forth in our definition as a whole. If the Eucharist developed from an original social meal, as is sometimes conjectured, it became a religious sacrament only when it reached the third stage. Professor King's theory of the origin of value, and the manner in which it becomes self-conscious, and, as I should say, socially recognized, can therefore be accepted, and the differentiation between religious values and other kinds of socially recognized values can be regarded as appearing after the emergence of socially recognized values in general. My differentia, later to be explained, will show the difference between religious values and other socially recognized values. Perhaps an imperfect comparison will make my position clearer. William James has somewhere said that "truth happens to an idea," that ideas first come into existence, and later sometimes become true. In a somewhat similar way I should say that socially recognized values first come into existence, and later some of them become religious. Religiosity "happens" to them when endeavor is made to conserve them in the manner set forth in our definition as a whole.

From the fact that religion is conservative of values already recognized, it does not follow that it is necessarily reactionary, though perhaps its chief peril is the danger of becoming so. It is possible for a religion to be progressive and constantly to endeavor to conserve new values. Values need only become socially recognized before a live and growing religion can adopt them, impart to them its sanction, and so afford them increased strength and stability. Christianity in ancient times assimilated and so conserved many of the best features of Greek philosophy and Roman law; it conserved and elevated what was best and most manly in mediaeval warfare through the institution of chivalry; in modern times the disciples of Luther, Calvin, and Loyola each in their own way have conserved the independent worth of the individual man; and in our own day there are indications that it is

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, chaps. iii-v.

already beginning to throw the protection of its conserving mantle around the newly discovered categories of social justice with a celerity that is surprising when we consider how very recently these values have come into social recognition, and how radically opposed they are to the individualism of the century immediately preceding us.

Again, while strongly sympathizing with Professor Ames's¹⁷ desire that religion shall conserve all the *highest* values, and while believing that this is the conception of religion which it is everyone's duty to seek to make a reality both in his own private life and in society, yet this seems to me to be a norm or an ideal for present endeavor and future attainment, and not a descriptive statement unqualifiedly applicable to all religions of the past and present. Istar, the primitive Semitic goddess, seems to have been thought to require of all women the sacrifice of their chastity as a religious duty long after womanly purity had come to be appreciated as a higher moral value.¹⁸ The Olympian gods must have ceased to stand in the Hellenic mind for the highest values long before they ceased to be worshiped, or a more spiritual religion, able to assist in conserving their highest moral values, had become known to them. Even today many a Protestant minister may feel it to be his religious duty to preach vehemently against prize-fights in Nevada and Sunday baseball games, who would not use his pulpit to denounce the election of Senator Lorimer or to plead for higher wages for shop girls in city department stores. This may not at all mean that purity in politics and living wages for working girls do not seem to him the higher values; but because they are not values with which religion has been concerned in the past, he feels that they are secular matters involving political and economic questions in regard to which the minister of religion should be neutral. That we believe the minister to be mistaken in his judgment is irrelevant. His religious attitude is a fact, of which a subjective definition must take account.

If, then, our genus is sufficiently broad to cover all varieties of religion, we are now ready to consider the differentia, and to decide whether the latter is narrow enough to distinguish religion from all *other* endeavors to secure the conservation of socially recognized values.¹⁹ The differentia is, *through specific actions that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or*

¹⁷ Op. cit., *passim*.

¹⁸ W. Robertson Smith, op. cit., 2d ed., p. 59.

¹⁹ Other endeavors are made through science, law, government, art, literature, etc. I recognize the existence of secular agencies, and that they are often successful and commendable.

from other merely human beings, and that imply a feeling of dependence upon this agency.

Each term in the differentia is necessarily employed with a wide denotation, but will not seem vague when explained. No one can be more painfully aware of the ponderousness of the differentia than the writer, but he feels that it is less serious for a definition to be clumsy and technical than for it to be illogical by failing to mark off the precise boundaries of the term defined. That the definition is of practical value will be shown later, but first the terms of the differentia require explanation in detail.

"Specific actions" rather than ritual has been employed in order to make it clear that it includes any kind of act whatsoever that has been employed to serve the purpose – whether a dance about an arrow, a magic spell or incantation, an initiation or *Intichiuma* ceremony, counting the beads of a rosary, repeating the mystic word "Om," or the sacred *Allah il Allah*, or purely mental acts like concentrating one's thought upon the eightfold path of the Buddha, thoughtful meditation upon the meaning of life or the sublimity of nature, or the silent prayer a Christian might momentarily make when confronted by a sudden emergency. Such an action, whatever it may be, is always, in the mind of him who makes it, definite and specific. *It is a distinct act of his consciousness, enlisting in his service an agency other than the ego of that moment of his consciousness for the purpose of securing a value.* This characterization applies to all religious actions, and effectively differentiates them from non-religious actions.

The differentia proceeds to describe the agency employed. It is "some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings." This is only so general as is necessary to cover all the facts. The agency greatly varies in different religions, and is variously regarded by different individuals of the same religious faith. It may be some mysterious impersonal power in things known as *manitou*, or *wakonda*, or *mana*,²⁰ it may be a totem pole or a fetich or a charm or an amulet, a dead or living animal; it may be the visual image of *Humanité* in the features of one's own wife or mother;²¹ it may be the Blessed Virgin Mary or one of the saints; it may be Nature as conceived by a romantic poet like Shelley or a philosopher like Marcus Aurelius; it may be the deceased spirit of one's father, or it may be some other spirit or god or God; or it may simply be the reserve outlooks and vistas

²⁰ King, op. cit., chap. vi.

²¹ Graham Wallas has given an interesting psychological explanation of this feature of Comte's religion, *Human Nature in Politics*, pp. 69 ff.

furnished by one's own subconscious self as the result of mystic trance or rational meditation. The agency may even be a human being like an Egyptian king or a Roman emperor provided he is believed to be not *merely* human, but in some respect divine.²² The expression as stated in the definition is believed to be broad enough to include every agency through which the conservation of values has been sought, or conceivably could be sought, in a manner that the seeker himself would regard as religious.²³

While it is my own belief that the agency tends to be thought of as personal, and that a personal monotheistic God is both intellectually and morally the most satisfying way to conceive of this agency, and that in the religion of the future the agency will so be conceived, it is impossible to ignore the well-established fact that not only have there been highly developed atheistic and pantheistic religions in the past, but that at the present time the conception of a personal God is not at all prominent or important in the minds of a few sincerely devout and profoundly religious people.²⁴ Consequently it is impossible to describe the agency as necessarily personal in a psychological definition that is descriptive and not normative.

The last clause of the differentia is intended to complete the differentiation of religion from science, and also to emphasize an important aspect of the religious attitude. The scientific attitude toward nature always, as Professor Leuba has shown,²⁵ reveals a mechanical exploitation of nature. Nature is inert, passive, and man may bend and manipulate it according to his needs if he discovers the "laws" of nature, which are of course only descriptive formulae of the succession of phenomena. On the other hand, the religious attitude always implies a "feeling of dependence" toward power greater than our ordinary selves,

²² Frazer gives numerous instances of the worship of living human beings, *Golden Bough*, I, 139-66.

²³ The very wide denotation of the differentia is illustrated by the following incident. While I was writing this paper, a friend came into my office, and remarked that he did not know if he was religious or not, that he is not sure whether he believes in the existence of a God at all, and that this question does not interest him; but that he does not believe that society is now advancing toward higher things, and that the universe is so organized as always to make a forward progress possible provided we do our part. In answer to my question, he added that he likes to meditate upon society and the world in this way, that it gives him confidence and a better grip upon himself. We decided that his deliberately putting himself in this contemplative attitude for the purpose of moral reinforcement is an instance of religion, and is included by the definition.

²⁴ J. H. Leuba, "The Contents of Religious Consciousness," *Monist*, XV, 536-73.

²⁵ *The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion*, chap. ii.

and not an attempt to exploit this power.²⁶ As religions evolve, the affective attitude toward the agency is vastly enriched, and tends to become a feeling, not only of dependence, but also of obligation, admiration, love, and spiritual aspiration.

The important aspect of the religious attitude emphasized in this last clause is that of feeling. The very great importance of this has been eloquently set forth by Auguste Sabatier,²⁷ and, with more accurate psychological analysis, by Professor Starbuck²⁸ and Professor Pratt.²⁹ Not only does all valuation involve feeling, but this phase is more prominent in religion than in morals or ethics, or perhaps even aesthetics. The richness, warmth, and depth of religious feeling in its real worth and inner meaning can never be justly interpreted by the intellectual categories of the psychologist – thin, cold-blooded, and abstract as they necessarily are. As no one but the lover can describe his affection for his beloved, and his language conveys only to other lovers any comprehension of what he really feels, so only the saint and mystic can interpret the love of God, and they only to those who have experienced like rapture. While all psychologists must confess that intellectual analysis cannot penetrate and much less appreciate the mysteries of the heart, nevertheless most of them would probably refuse to accept as established fact the claim of Professor Starbuck that feeling is an independent source of knowledge, notwithstanding the circumstance that such a claim seems to have been favored by the high authority of William James.³⁰ While this claim certainly deserves careful consideration, it is much more prudent for a definition of religion at present to view feeling exclusively in its affective function as a phase of the general conative attitude that has been described.

Although the differentia has largely been derived from a study of Professor Leuba's contributions,³¹ his expression "psychic, superhuman power" has been avoided. The instances cited by Professor King and Professor Ames of religion prior to the recognition of psychical agency, the difficulty of bringing esoteric Buddhism under this head, and the

²⁶ Malebranche speaks as if man may exploit God temporarily, but of course he does not think of this as religious. *Recherche de la vérité*, chap. ii, p. 76. Cf. W. K. Wright, *The Ethical Significance of Feeling, etc.*, p. 19.

²⁷ *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*.

²⁸ "The Feelings and their Place in Religion," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, I, 168–86.

²⁹ *The Psychology of Religious Belief*.

³⁰ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, concluding chapters.

³¹ See footnote 8, above.

contemporary "religion of science"³² furnish good reasons for avoiding the term "psychic." "Superhuman" seems hardly a correct description for cases where individuals admit that they may be drawing upon their own subconscious or other reserve powers, and that while they know that they are drawing upon an agency other than the conscious ego of the moment, they are not sure that they are going outside the total sum of their own psychical resources.³³ The term "anthropopathic" seems unexceptionable as employed by Professor Leuba, but would be a dangerous term if it came into general use, and became adopted by less careful writers. It suggests too much affinity with "anthropomorphism" and the "pathetic fallacy," which though often found in religion are by no means universal properties of it.³⁴

The present definition is compatible with Professor Coe's very suggestive conception of religious value: "Something like this is characteristic of the religious attitude universally. Through all the differentiations and enrichments of human purpose, a god, or some functional equivalent, has served as a concrete expression of a tendency to subsume particular values in a single type in such a way that they are not only included within it, but also raised, so to speak, to a higher power of themselves."³⁵ According to this theory, religion evidently seeks the conservation of value through an agency other than the individual's ordinary ego, and therefore our definition regards a part of Professor Coe's interpretation of religious value as a descriptive statement of fact. Undoubtedly too, as religions have advanced, the tendency for these values to be raised "to a higher power of themselves" has increased. And all must agree that his noble conception of religious value as a summation or synthesis of all values in a unitary whole indicates what at any rate ought to be the line of present religious endeavor, and consti-

³² I think that Haeckel's "natural religion," *The Riddle of the Universe*, pp. 300, 306, chap. xviii, etc., and even the forlorn but resolute attitude toward the universe expressed in Huxley's *Romanes Lecture* are religious.

³³ Professor Leuba's own articles mention instances. The most striking case which I have seen reported is given by Miss Tanner, *Psychological Bulletin*, 1907, pp. 33-36.

³⁴ That is, if these terms are used with reproach. If a realist chooses to use these terms so broadly as to regard the individual's belief in other personalities, when he can only see the bodies of other men, as "anthropomorphic," or "pathetic," we can hardly object to his describing religion thus. It is obviously no reproach to religion to be classified as coming under the sole process by which any of us can escape solipsism! Professor R. B. Perry makes a good working distinction when he says that, though the religious consciousness creates a working relationship between man and the universe, this is not a case of the pathetic fallacy unless it incorrectly *reckons with* the inner feeling which it attributes to the universe (*Approach to Philosophy*, p. 111).

³⁵ *Columbia Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, etc.*, 1908, p. 253.

tutes a splendid ideal which the influence of such inspiring prophets as Professor Coe is doing much to make an actuality.

The various religious phenomena which the psychologist interprets can all be brought under our definition. Prayer, for instance, whenever it is clearly distinguishable from the spell, is the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through "an imaginative social process"³⁶ or conversation between the ordinary ego of the individual and the agency invoked. Sacrifice is the offering of gifts to propitiate the agency. All religious ceremonials consist chiefly in elaborations of prayer and sacrifice. Sacraments are rites which are believed either spiritually or magically to effect some desired change in the believer by means of the agency invoked. The evangelical revival or mission is a different device to secure a similar purpose; and conversion and sanctification are changes in the personality of the individual attributed to a divine agency. Myths, whenever they have religious significance at all,³⁷ are naïve attempts to account for the origin and validity of practices employed in religion, while doctrines and creeds are more elaborate rational and philosophical explanations and justifications. Institutions, like the church or synagogue, are organizations for the purpose of preserving and propagating methods of religious endeavor for the conservation of socially recognized values. The central feature of all religion is this endeavor, as set forth in our definition; and the various details of sacrifice, prayer, and other ritual, and the rise of myths, dogmas, and institutions are incidents that appear in the carrying-out of the endeavor.

In the next place let us consider whether our definition has succeeded in differentiating religion from the terms with which it is most often confused: animism and magic, in the case of primitive religions, and morals, ethics, and aesthetics, in the case of higher religions.

Animism and magic may or may not be religious. They become religious when employed in the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values. Otherwise they are non-religious and on occasion they may become anti-religious. Magic employed in Buddhist prayer wheels and the Christian sign of the cross is religious; while witches' charms used to secure what the individual's conscience regards as wrong³⁸ because it is inimical to the recognized social values of his

³⁶ Anna L. Strong, *The Psychology of Prayer*; Ames, op. cit., chap. viii; Farnell, *The Evolution of Religion*, Lecture IV.

³⁷ Myths are often, of course, aesthetic or speculative descriptions of the unknown, having nothing to do with religion as here conceived.

³⁸ The clearest statements of this view of conscience are by Mezes, *Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory*, pp. 130-33; 163-84; and Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, part I.

tribe is black magic, and anti-religious. The simple belief in spirits about one is animism, and may be entirely non-religious. The endeavor to induce these spirits by means of offerings to adopt a desired attitude so as to conserve socially recognized values, is a religious use of animism.³⁹

This definition therefore renders possible a clearer-cut statement of the relationship between animism, magic, and religion than has characterized most of the literature of the subject. Of course it must be frankly admitted that any definition of religion will necessarily appear somewhat artificial when applied to primitive peoples who often do not have these words in their vocabularies, and do not distinguish religion in their own minds from magic and morals. But the distinction as here given can be successfully employed wherever it is practicable to employ the term religion at all in interpreting their subjective attitudes.

The distinction between religion and morals is not to be made in terms of the content of judgments of good and evil. There is no moral content that is always religious, and none that is always non-religious. The values of religion are all in some sense moral values, though they are occasionally outworn moral values that have survived from a bygone age. What furnishes the differentia of religious from merely moral value is the peculiar nature of the *agency* through which the religious value is conserved. As our definition states, the religious agency involves a power different from ordinary human activity, evoked through some peculiar and specific act that partakes more or less of the nature of ritual. Which of the values of a tribe will be attached to this agency and so become religious depends in part upon what other agencies are also open to them, between which they can make a selection. In the case of a primitive people the values which they cannot otherwise secure are likely to be those which will become religious. Food, and protection from, and victory over, enemies are primitive religious values when food is scarce and enemies numerous and dangerous. With advance in civilization the values sought to be conserved through religion become limited, both by the experience that some things desired cannot be obtained in this way, and also by the rising conviction that religious worship should be confined to higher and more spiritual values, and not cheapened by the search through it for more sordid and material advantages.⁴⁰

The distinction between religion and ethics is similar. Ethics is the attempt to put morals upon a systematic basis by philosophically defining and defending its principles. Religion is one of the agencies

³⁹ This is true, even if the attitude desired is the simple departure of the spirits, which Jane E. Harrison believes to have been the chief religious motive of most Greeks in the sixth century B.C., *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, pp. 7 ff.

⁴⁰ Strong, *op. cit.*, chap. ii.

available for conserving some of the values recognized by ethics. As society advances the general tendency is for religion increasingly to conserve the more important ethical values. This tendency, already marked in the nature religions, becomes the rule in the ethical religions. The chief exception to this general tendency is due to the conservatism of religion, which causes it sometimes to remain attached to less important ethical values than those for which contemporary moral reformers and ethical philosophers are contending. The exponents of religion were thus on the side opposed to the best ethical thought of their times in ancient Israel in the period preceding the exile and in Athens in the time of Socrates. It would, however, be incorrect to say that in a conflict between religion and ethics the latter is always right and religion always wrong. A modern instance to the contrary would be the somewhat shallow and over-rationalized sophistication of certain eighteenth-century philosophers in contrast with the religious thought of their times.

The differentiation of religion from aesthetics is also provided for in our definition by the emphasis upon the *agency* employed. The religious endeavor is never an end in itself. Religious interest is always mediated. Aesthetic contemplation is interesting on its own account; it is an end in itself. Religious meditation and prayer are always for the sake of conserving socially recognized values important to the believer at other times even more than at the moment of worship. Religious values are always deadly earnest, and there is genuine faith in the agency invoked. True, religion may make use of aesthetic agencies in order to impress its values, and make them more attractive. But in this case the position of art is very humble. She is only the handmaiden of religion, who herself is the servant employed by humanity in the most serious business of life. And as the lot of the slave is seldom enviable, the position of art in religious worship has frequently been undignified, and very poor art has often met with more favor on the part of religion than its exclusively aesthetic value could have warranted. Moreover, ages of comparative religious shallowness like the Italian renaissance have often produced the finest religious art; while, as in the case of the Puritans, movements of deep religious earnestness have sometimes rejected the services of art altogether. The differences between religion and aesthetics are so great, and the resemblances so superficial, that one wonders how the two could ever have been confused. The blunder could have been made only by chance tourists who have visited the temple of religion, admired the splendid statues and altars, sniffed the incense, listened to the music, gazed at the beautiful frescoes, and gone away fancying that these features, the merest external adornments and veriest accidents of religion, constituted her heartfelt purpose.

Nor is the religious symbol a case of make-believe in the playful, aesthetic sense. Religious symbols vary infinitely. Within Christianity symbols have been partly material – images and pictures – and partly verbal figures of speech, such as characterizing God as a “King” or “Father,” and Christ as an “elder brother.” Whether material or mental, the function of the symbol is to furnish more concrete and tangible imagery for profound and perhaps otherwise inexpressible meaning. In this sense the symbol is a representative device, just as a national flag is a representative device, though in reality only a piece of bunting; and, like the flag, the religious symbol gets its significance from values believed to be genuine and existential.⁴¹

Far from being sportive or playful in character, symbolism is one of the most important and serious instruments through which religion achieves its purpose. By means of symbolism, religion conserves moral values by representing them, not in coldly intellectual form, but embodied in powerful emotional imagery so earnest and so affecting as to grip the hearts and transform the inner lives of all men. Noble-minded Pharisees and Stoics had long preached to Hebrew and Graeco-Roman civilizations nearly all the moral values which the new Testament contains. Only, however, when the conceptions of Messiah and Logos could be recognized concretely and humanly in the person of the infant Jesus borne by a virgin mother in Augustus’ time, grown into manhood to be the forgiving Christ that had suffered and died upon a cross in Tiberius’ time,⁴² and still operating in the vividly concrete and tangible baptismal water and eucharistic bread and wine, could these conceptions become in any sense vital in the inner feelings and experiences of all classes of men, and cause to be assimilated such inestimably rich but theretofore external moral values as universal human brotherhood, self-sacrifice, and charity.

Though religious worship and sociability are often combined, the two interests are quite distinct. Thus many primitive feasts and dances are seasons of playfulness, and yet have a religious aspect, and are institutions of social control.⁴³ At the present time many American Protestant churches make so much of social entertainments that European visitors have called them “social clubs.” A little reflection will convince the reader, however, that the entertainments are valued by primitive priests

⁴¹ In an ontological sense, so far as the worshiper is capable of such a conception.

⁴² It seems to me that one of the main psychological advantages that Christianity had in its contest with Mithraism for supremacy was the immeasurably more concrete and human appeal of a symbolism grown up about the incident of Golgotha than any that could grow up about the killing of a bull.

⁴³ King, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 f.

and modern religious workers, not primarily because they afford amusement, but for serious ulterior purposes. So far as such entertainments are religious at all, it is because they appeal to a mediate interest.⁴⁴

Our subjective definition of religion has now been set forth, and it has been shown that it is successful in revealing the relationships and differences between religion, magic, morals, ethics, and aesthetics. However, perhaps the reader now feels that after all the definition merely affords a descriptive formulation of religion and assists in placing it in a classification with other disciplines, but that it does not throw much light upon the questions in which he is most interested. He perhaps protests: What light does this subjective definition throw upon the actual function of religion in human society? Does it throw any light upon the still more important question whether religion is merely imaginative suggestion and superstition, or a veritable source of knowledge about the universe?

These two questions, which for convenience may be called the socio-logico-historical and the metaphysical, are of course extremely difficult, and within the limits of this paper can only briefly be touched upon. However, it can be shown that our definition is of some assistance in defining both of these problems, and in affording some hints as to their solution.

To consider the sociologico-historical problem first. The investigator of this problem will first need to know what actions, customs, beliefs, rites, and institutions in any society are to be classified as religious. Our definition will serve as a guide in ascertaining this. Having accomplished this classification, the inquirer will be ready to face the question: How far do these religious acts succeed in conserving values? He will at once discover that sometimes the religious endeavor is successful, and sometimes it is not. The Australian initiation ceremonies undoubtedly do make the boys feel manly responsibilities, and they do promote goodwill and solidarity within the tribe. They thus really serve the social function aimed at. On the other hand, the religio-magical ceremonies for increasing the supply of totemic plants and animals obviously are not successful; we must regard them as mere superstition. Again, sometimes the religious acts are successful, but for other reasons than the worshipers suppose. For instance, Miss Kingsley says that in some African tribes spirits act as the police force:

You will see this strikingly illustrated when, as you walk along a bush path far from human habitation, you notice a little cleared space

⁴⁴ For the distinction between mediate and immediate interest and the identification of the latter with play, see Dewey's pamphlet, *Interest as Related to Will*, pp. 15 ff. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1903).

by the side of the path; it is neatly laid with plantain leaves, and on it are various little articles for sale – leaf tobacco, a few yams, and so on, and beside each article are so many stones, beans, or cowries, which indicate the price of each article, and you will see, either sitting in the middle of the things, or swinging by a bit of Tie Tie from a branch above, Egba or a relation of his – the market god – who will visit with death any theft from the shop, or any cheating in price given, or any taking-away of sums left by previous customers.⁴⁵

While it is clear that religion effects the security of a socially recognized value in this last instance, it does so by means of suggestive fear, and not through the spiritual agency imagined by the natives.

In all cases of religious endeavor the investigator will find, I believe, that, whether the socially recognized value directly aimed at in the religious act is conserved or not, and whether it is conserved in the way worshipers imagine or in some different way, religion always performs one function. This function is to effect a certain amount of social and moral solidarity and conservatism within the group of worshipers. Furthermore, an empirical study will show that as a rule this function of religion is beneficial. Society needs a strong conservative, centripetal agency to solidify its forces and keep it from losing the values it has learned to recognize and appreciate. In performing this socializing and conserving function, religion is comparable to political, moral, and economic forces as a factor of prime importance and value in the evolution of the human race. The great service of religion in knitting men together and keeping them loyal to the achievements of past generations (which in any age must be immeasurably greater than whatever new ideas religion has not yet had time to assimilate) is so great that one wonders why it has not been more emphasized. In comparison with other religions, one great point of superiority on the part of Christianity is that it has performed this function more effectively and more in adjustment with the other factors that make for progress. In the Occident at least, Christianity has never for any great length of time been a drag upon real progress, while it has conserved and heightened moral consciousness in every age, and several times has probably saved civilization from serious disaster.⁴⁶

That Christianity has, however, sometimes been more effective as a conservator of socially recognized values than at others is illustrated by

⁴⁵ Op. cit., p. 408.

⁴⁶ E.g., at the fall of the Roman empire. The development of rationalism and free scientific inquiry and criticism, which began to be destructive with the modern Enlightenment period, was not attended by the irresistible moral and social decay of the Greek enlightenment, in consequence of Christianity.

a comparison between the religious history of France and England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Within the state church in France Ultramontanist secured a complete triumph during the reign of Louis XV, with the consequence that, thenceforth it could conserve only those values already recognized, or such new values as could win the approval, not only of the French clerics, but also of the foreign Curia at Rome. No merely national movement of moral revival or enthusiasm that in any way conflicted with the established inheritance of the past could receive religious sanction. Consequently eighteenth-century reformers in France sprang up entirely without the church, and felt that religion was their bitterest enemy, and Voltaire's epithet *l'infame* expressed their general attitude. Since the Revolution, the divergence between religious faith and political and social progress has widened, and the inadequacy of the Roman Catholic religion as a conserver of modern French values has become more and more painfully apparent. The condemnation of such a socially and morally helpful and seemingly theologically harmless organization as the Sillon is a recent illustration of the complete hopelessness of the present situation. With the church ineffective as a centripetal force, the centrifugal forces broke all bounds during the Revolution; and, since, the nation has had to develop as best it could, handicapped by the ineffectiveness of what normally should have been a conservative without being an obstructive force in its life. Notwithstanding its deplorable maladjustment, however, the church has doubtless on the whole exercised a beneficent influence in all periods of French history, including the present.

On the other hand, though the Church of England contained about the same abuses as the French church at the opening of the eighteenth century, it was English to the core, and an organic part of the national life. The latitudinarian policy of its rulers did much to win the good-will of dissenters, and to render all classes contented, and loyal to the reigning dynasty. Dead as the early eighteenth-century church seemed to be, as a consequence of perhaps exaggerated anxiety to avoid the follies and extravagances of the "enthusiasm" of the previous century, the fires of religion were only slumbering, and quickened to new life in the mid-eighteenth-century evangelical and early nineteenth-century tractarian movements. One of the forces that helped to save England from turbulent revolutions like those across the Channel was the healthfully conservative but not excessively reactionary influence of religion.

To make it clear that the comparison just given is not intended to be a partisan brief for Protestantism, one might add that in the seventeenth century conditions were reversed. Catholicism was then a healthy factor in the French national life; while prior to 1688 religion had been out of adjustment in England. The emphatic nationalism of the last century has

probably been the chief reason for the maladjustment of the Ultramontane Roman church in many Latin countries. With the growth of internationalism, which seems likely to be a characteristic mark of our century, as illustrated just now in the peace and labor movements, it is quite possible that the universal Roman Catholic church, if reasonably modernized, may through its cosmopolitan character and spirit do much to bind the nations together, and to conserve the moral values of international concord, good-will, law, and justice. Modern Judaism has admirably performed the conserving functions of religion, and held before its worshipers lofty moral and spiritual ideals: until recently its chief limitation, now showing signs of happily being overcome, has been an inclination to confine somewhat the extension of its socially recognized values to those within its own communion.

No student of American history can fail to recognize the immense value of religion as a factor in our national development, keeping us in some measure true to the ideals of our fathers, sobering our consciences, and preventing us from becoming wholly sordid in the tremendous industrial and commercial expansion through which we have passed. The fact that our moral conceptions have at all stood the strain of this rapid material development, and that political and social corruption and decay in America today are not hopeless and irremediable as they were in Rome during the last century of the Republic, is due, I believe, chiefly to the vitality of religion among us as a factor effectively conservative of our socially recognized values. So far as this is not fully appreciated, the explanation probably is that the very great diversity of confessions in America, due to our diverse origin, has kept religious bodies from cooperating as effectively as they should to further their common purposes. There has also, of course, been a failure to conserve religiously the newly found, but in our present conditions supremely important, values of social justice,⁴⁷ such as equality of opportunity, just wages, sanitation, pure food, suppression of white slavery, honest stocks and bonds, conservation of national resources, and the like. But all indications point to the not far-distant overcoming of both of these defects.

In estimating the social function of religion the immense value of its apparently more individual aspects, like the expansion and enrichment of one's personality through meditation, prayer, and conversion, should also be taken into account. Spatial limitations permit only a reference here, however, to this side of religion, which, besides, has been psycho-

⁴⁷ Cf. James H. Tufts, "The Adjustments of the Church to the Psychological Conditions of the Present," *American Journal of Theology*, 1908, pp. 177-88, for constructive suggestions.

logically treated in the well-known works of James, Starbuck, Coe, Cutten, and others. Its supreme importance is illustrated by the decline of the ancient Roman religion, largely due, as Professor William Warde Fowler⁴⁸ believes, to its too exclusive concern with the interests of the family and state, and consequent neglect of the inner life experiences and needs of individuals.

No psychological interpretation can of course claim to settle the question of the metaphysical validity of religion. However, if religion as here defined has performed the social function claimed for it, most philosophers will admit that any adequate conception of reality must afford it some recognition, although, of course, they may believe that theological structures cannot in the nature of the case be more secure than the philosophical foundations on which they are erected. The three philosophical schools of our generation that have the largest following in America are those of absolute idealism, realism, and pragmatism. While the absolute idealist may hesitate to accord religion a place fully equivalent with philosophy as an interpretation of the Absolute, he will at least regard it as one of the very highest orders of appearance;⁴⁹ and science, we must remember, for him is no more. The younger realists have not yet so fully developed their philosophy as to make its religious implications clear. However, the definition here advanced in its emphasis upon religion as a practical attitude bears a good deal of resemblance to Professor Perry's interpretation, although it puts more emphasis upon conation and less upon belief.⁵⁰ Of course the definition of religion here defended being functional, has most affinity to the pragmatism of the Chicago school. From their point of view, if it be conceded that religion has played the functional part in social evolution here claimed for it, this fact would seem to warrant full recognition of its claims to metaphysical validity, the only qualification possibly being, as Professor King remarks, "If the question of the reality of the order of existence postulated by religion is raised, we should have to say that probably all the concepts of religion fall *short* of an adequate account of experience rather than that they attribute too *much* to it."⁵¹ Our interpretation furnishes support to such defenses of religion as Professor Foster's.⁵² It is also in accordance with those features in the philosophy

⁴⁸ *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, pp. 287, 340 f., 358, and passim.

⁴⁹ Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, pp. 381-407; *Problem of Conduct*, chap. viii; Royce, *World and the Individual*, passim; Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 2d ed., pp. 438-54, 531-33.

⁵⁰ *Approach to Philosophy*, pp. 53-114; *Harvard Theological Review*, II, 183-85.

⁵¹ Op. cit., pp. 340 f.

of William James that have been accepted by other pragmatists, without being committed to his bolder speculations upon mysticism, telepathy, the subconscious, and the like.⁵²

The upshot of the matter, as is known to the sober student of the history of philosophy who does not allow his perspective to be lost in the cloud of dust that always accompanies contemporary controversies, is that every system of metaphysics is an attempt to interpret the implications of the experience of the age. If religion is a vital factor in this experience, as I believe sociological and historical investigations must show it always is, metaphysicians will be only too glad to afford religion as much validity as is necessary to insure its intelligent and effective employment for the phases of experience in which it is found to be practically useful. In a word, the social and personal usefulness of religion once established, the question of its metaphysical validity will largely take care of itself.

In conclusion, then, it is claimed that the subjective definition of religion formulated in the earlier part of this paper has proved adequate to cover the facts, and to differentiate religion from related subjects; that the definition is of further practical value in furnishing a preliminary step toward the solution of the problem of the social function of religion, and indicates that religion, at least when rightly adjusted, has performed an important and valuable function in modern life; and, if this last claim is accepted, that the validity of religious faith can be successfully defended upon the ground of contemporary metaphysics.

⁵²*The Finality of the Christian Religion; The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence.*

⁵³Two valuable theological estimates of pragmatism are: Lyman's *Theology and Human Problems*; and D. C. Macintosh, "Can Pragmatism Furnish a Philosophical Basis for Theology?" *Harvard Theological Review*, III, 126-35.

ADVANTAGES ACCRUING FROM THE FUNCTIONAL VIEW OF RELIGION

Frederick G. Henke. "Advantages Accruing from the Functional View of Religion," which journal? 40.12 (December 1912): 366–73.

The functional view of religion represents an attempt to relate religion in all its varied manifestations to the total life-process. It is a direct outgrowth of the point of view employed in biology and functional psychology.¹ Religion is not a something that has been conferred upon mankind, but is itself a type of activity whereby man seeks to adjust himself to his social environment and his social environment to himself. Its *raison d'être* is in the fact that human groups have found and still find it necessary to promote their highest social values. Religion thus becomes an intensely practical affair. It has emerged out of the life-process in the attempt to make life fuller and richer, and finds its place in the life-process because it continues to minister to man's needs.

The functional view of religion is thoroughly evolutionary. According to it, religious practices and ideas reflect the customs and thought of the groups to which they belong. This implies that changes in the social consciousness of any group tend to register themselves in its religion. The Todas, a people who subsist largely on the produce of the dairy, deify the buffalo. The god of the warlike Israelitish tribes is a great warrior. In a monarchy the great god is a king or emperor, while in a democracy there is a growing tendency to consider the deity as the embodiment of the highest social ideas that obtain among the people. According to the functional point of view, ritual and myth, liturgy and dogma, in fact all manifestations of religion must be evaluated by the actual contribution they make toward the ongoing of human progress. If at any time they become predominantly retrospective and retrogressive, their usefulness is *ipso facto* terminated, for the tide of normal human progress has left them in its wake.

It has been frequently urged that such interpretation involves the surrender of that authority in religion which is indispensable to the

¹ See Edward Scribner Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, chap. ii; also "The Psychological Basis of Religion," *Monist*, XX, 242–62.

upkeep of its vitality and that thereby religion becomes little more than a reed wafted by every wind of public opinion. In contrast to this, the thesis here advocated is that specific advantages accrue from the functional view of religion, whereby religion is given the place in human activities that really belongs to it and whereby its usefulness is materially enhanced.

I. The functional view frees religion from the trammels of legalism and external authority and opens the way for a religion of the spirit. It does this by maintaining that the real function of religion consists in ministering to the ongoing of the highest social process and by insisting that everything that fails to meet this criterion should be expunged. Externalism and legalism are restrictions which present-day denominational religion finds it very hard to cast off. A more or less individual interpretation – at least in the first place – has been codified and made the criterion whereby the denomination judges whether a man is a true Christian or not. Thus with certain denominations baptism is held to be indispensable to salvation; with others some particular type of emotional experience is the *sine qua non* of entrance into the kingdom, while baptism is relegated into the background. The former forget that the religious attitude finds expression in concrete everyday acts quite independent of baptism, and the latter that the type of emotional experience demanded is perhaps a psychological impossibility in the instance of many individuals.

Logically, we have here instances in which an accident is made of first importance at the expense of the genus. If the Christian religion is to be open to humanity at large, if it is to be more than the idiosyncrasy of a few, it must be liberated from legalism and external authority and made the actual expression of life that has freely and willingly adapted itself to the highest social values.

At this point the objection may possibly be raised that law is as indispensable in matters of religion as in any other aspect of human experience. To this the functional student responds with a hearty, "Yes." But the law here as elsewhere in human experience must be vital and real. It must take the form of a principle which manifests itself in higher and higher forms in the growing stages of culture. Human experience is not static. The ideals of the savage – whether in commerce, religion, or what not – are not those of the cultured European. In culture, the civilized man has outlived and overcome much that is primitive. There is a law of love. Men have always loved. But the connotation of love has changed greatly. Customary authorized love among the savages may for a higher stage of culture be licentiousness.

The religion of the ancients – Hebrews or others – is inadequate for modern conditions, and the dogmatism of scholasticism is no less so.

Their inadequacy is to be found in the fact that they represent an adjustment to different social conditions. The thus-saith-the-Lord, or the Pope, or the Bible, may sound imposing today, but it soon loses its religious value when it results merely in bringing the individual into outward conformity with certain precepts. To coerce a man into performing certain so-called religious acts may result in a religious attitude; more frequently, however, it fails. Here, for instance, we find a partial explanation of the fact that many young men from Christian homes have a positive dislike for conventional religion. They have been made to think that religion is identical with some specific type of emotional experience or some particular religious act. For them this means simply that religion is legalistic and external. If that is religion the youth prefers not to be religious.

The functional view of religion recognizes the fact that religion is the result of the progressive effort of humanity to meet its elemental needs. It insists that religion should be as near life, as spontaneous an expression of life, today as it was in olden times. To coerce or overpersuade an individual into becoming religious is simply to invite superficiality. The functional view commends and inculcates religious principles that have been or are being functionally established, but refuses to subscribe to any absolutely determined and fixed type of religious experience or to isolate sacred from secular acts. One of the most convincing pieces of evidence for the correctness of this standpoint is the essential difference in the point of emphasis in the various branches of the Christian church. Within any single church the lines may be drawn close and tight, but taking all as a whole, religion is an exceedingly broad and penetrating phenomenon.

The functional view places religion on the footing on which it really belongs and in so far as this view frees religion from legalism, formalism, and externalism it represents a substantial advance.

2. This view of religion is in essential harmony with the view entertained by Jesus. He stood for a complete socialization of the idea of God, and thus brought himself into direct conflict with the *lex talionis* as it was given in Leviticus and Exodus.² The crude conceptions of the ancients should be a thing of the past. The world must move on to greater and better things, especially in matters of religion. "Ye have heard," he announced, "that it was said An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth."³ The conspicuous thing is that he did not say, "Jehovah said," but simply asserted, "Ye have heard that it was said." Is it not likely that he considered the law of retribution but the statement of

² Lev. 24:19, 20; Exod. 21:24.

³ Matt. 5: 38.

ancient custom, and saw room for a higher conception? He represented his Father as being kind toward the unthankful and evil,⁴ and asked his followers to emulate that example. For religion this signified that the *lex talionis* had been superseded by the law of love. A principle adjustable to advancing stages of culture had thereby taken the place of an unpliable rule. This is certainly functional, and entirely in accord with the modern point of view. It is hardly necessary to call attention to the fact that it meant better religion, and that it is essentially an evolutionary attitude.

Moreover, Jesus viewed himself as fulfilling the law and the prophets.⁵ We naturally ask, Did he believe himself to be absolutely fulfilling all, or did he think of himself as furthering a great movement which was eventually to spread over the whole earth and accomplish great things for righteousness? But one answer seems reasonable. Jesus conceived of himself as making a contribution to a great movement which had its beginning in the law and the prophets and was to be in no wise completed at the time of his departure. "He that believeth on me," he said, "the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do."⁶ Jesus was an optimist with a vision. He never deceived himself into believing that past religious customs had final authority in matters of religion. Past customs were to be followed in so far as they contributed to the ongoing of the kingdom of righteousness; all others were fearlessly discarded even though they appeared most sacred and had been inculcated with a thus-saith-the-Lord.

3. This brings us face to face with the problem of the best type of religion. Is the one to be preferred which can stand only when it is bolstered up by means of a definite historical setting, or is it the one that comes with authority because by its very nature it appeals to life and ministers to its needs?

There is a period in the evolution of society when the strange and the marvelous make a profound impression upon men and are regarded with awe. In that period religion has within its borders a mass of awe-inspiring material. Both cult and myth are pregnant with mystery and magic. Religion finds its authority in wonder-working and in being able to point back to a miraculous past – a past replete with magic and wonder. In this stage a thus-saith-the-Lord, a burning bush, a demon exorcised, a dead man raised to life, are facts of supreme religious importance, while the everyday facts, the ordinary events, the normal tide of progress, are thought to be secular rather than religious. God is

⁴ Luke 6:35.

⁵ Matt. 5:17.

⁶ John 14:12.

believed to be transcendent rather than immanent. Under such circumstances religion, to be religion at all, must bear evidence that a transcendent God has actually intervened in the affairs of men and established it. Without a definite historical setting of this type it lacks appealing force, and if this setting is reduced to modern terminology and thereby shown to conform to well-established laws, religion is forthwith believed to lose its authority.

If human society were not a developing organism, if it did not outgrow old conceptions, ancient religion abounding in magic and miracle once satisfactory would be always satisfactory. But there is an ongoing of the social process. Enlightenment and law are inseparable. The path of human progress is out of the undifferentiated, indiscriminated experience into law and order. Religion is a part of the process and must be brought within the pale of law. Loose ends within the realm of experience mean chaos. Religion must be a part of the continuum if it is to be real and vital. We cannot hope to succeed in living ancient or mediaeval religion when we are modern in every other aspect of human experience. Religion needs the definite past historical setting less than the warmth of living contact with modern life and modern problems.

At this point the advantage of the functional view emerges, for it insists that the test of the highest and most valuable type of religion is not to be found in a past miraculous setting, but in the actual contribution religion makes toward the betterment of human conditions now. The test of religion is not to be found in mere conformity to the Bible, but in the ability to make better men and women and thereby to hasten the coming of the kingdom. This implies that the test of real religion must itself be true to the actual modern needs of life. In so far as the Bible inculcates principles that have vital application to present-day conditions, it has the same right to a hearing that all goodness has. In so far as it fails to do this it may furnish very instructive historical data, yet as a norm of life it should be no criterion.

4. The functional view bids a welcome to the evolution of religious thought, practice, and principles. If God has spoken to man in the far past, if he has sought to reveal himself to humanity in olden times, why should he not do so now when man has reached greater intellectual and moral heights? It would hardly seem probable that he would have nothing further to contribute in matters of religion, while he is making so many contributions in other aspects of human experience.

We may assert definitely that there has been a real evolution of religious thought and practice, and that by virtue of this fact the hypothesis of a closed revelation is shown to be inadequate. Slavery affords an example of a practice which has been outgrown. The Old

Testament frankly allows it. Neither Jesus nor the apostles inveighed against it. No serious moral problem seems to have arisen in their minds regarding it. In the modern world, however, the situation is reversed. In the United States slavery became one of the most important causes of a long and bloody war, which resulted in the emancipation of the slave and thereby sounded the death-knell of the institution. The Golden Rule, it may be urged, actually covers that case and others that are at hand for citation. While this is true, it also remains a fact that the process whereby potentiality becomes actuality, the undifferentiated differentiated, and the implicit explicit, is precisely what is meant by evolution.

It is interesting in this connection to note that many modern conservative theologians are writing profusely on matters of religion. Great quantities of devotional literature have been and are being published. Why? If it be because the Bible is difficult to comprehend, then manifestly there must be an evolution of exposition, and revelation as such is not closed. Again, if it be because the Bible presentation is inadequate for modern needs, then the necessity of making new contributions is avowedly admitted. These and similar difficulties are avoided by taking a functional view of religion and frankly admitting that religion must be progressive, that there must be an evolution of religious thought and practice with advancing stages of culture.

5. The functional view of religion is a great systematizing and coordinating agency in human experience. The modern scientific attitude and the so-called orthodox religious attitude are in conflict. The modern scientist can be orthodox in religion only by entertaining an inconsistency. The situation is not unlike trying to mix oil and water. The foundation of modern science is the uniformity of the laws of Nature. The God of the scientist is a law-abiding, orderly being. The God of orthodox religion is in last analysis arbitrary; for orthodoxy has not realized the ideal given by Jesus of a completely socialized God, nor does its God act solely according to law. Magic, wonder, and the cultivation of abnormal experiences are alien to the ideals of science. In the instance of orthodoxy these are highly cherished and cultivated. Orthodoxy seeks for the special presence of God in the unusual. This seeking for the greatest values of life in the realm of abnormal experiences rather than in the ordered, systematic realm of reason is foreign to science.

The functional criterion of the best and truest religion is, as we have seen, strictly pragmatic. It asks whether the religion under consideration fits into the rest of human experience, whether it is making a real contribution to the ongoing of the social process. Not dualism of experience, not conflict within experience, but systematic continuous experience is its ideal. The God of religion and the God of science dare not be in

eternal conflict with one another. This systematization of experience is achieved by recognizing that the religious idea of God must grow with the discoveries of natural science and the progressive ideals of the social sciences. The idea of God advances apace with culture and becomes a systematizing co-ordinating factor in experience.

If, now, it is a fact that the functional view frees religion from the trammels of legalism and external authority, brings it into essential harmony with the religious principles of Jesus, makes the criterion of religion the actual contribution of religion to the ongoing of the highest social process, opens the way for the evolution of religious thought, practice, and principles, and gives religion the place of a great systematizing, co-ordinating agency in experience, it is manifest that, far from detracting from religion, the functional view really adds materially to its life and usefulness. While the dispelling of naïvete may appear to be a grievous loss, the contrary is actually true. If religion is obliged to take refuge in ignorance and naïvete in order to subsist, it is doomed before the mighty strokes of science. The functional view of religion comes in the capacity of an enlarging, fulfilling factor. It means better, larger, more vital religion. He who holds to this live and growing conception will advance into a broader, higher liberty than dogmatism knows, and will take his place as a potent factor in the uplift of humanity. Applied functional religion means a more speedy coming of the kingdom of righteousness.

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OF PRAGMATISM

Volume 3

Edited by
John R. Shook
Oklahoma State University

History of American Thought

The Chicago School of Pragmatism

Edited and Introduced by **John R. Shook**, *Oklahoma State University*

Additional Introductions by **Frank X. Ryan**, *Kent State University, Ohio*

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EARLY DEBATES ON
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INTRODUCTION

Most prestigious American universities were well entrenched when the University of Chicago opened its doors in 1892. But with the help of Rockefeller's millions and a philosophy more than merely ceremonious, founding President William Rainey Harper defined Chicago's role as an agency "for resolving the problems of civilization." Almost immediately the university helped redefine higher education in America. Harper created an authentic German-style graduate research institute staffed with a preeminent faculty. Its commitment to the "problems of civilization" was anchored in the union of philosophy and psychology first known as the "functional" school of psychology, which later became "instrumentalism." Committed to the integral unity of meaning and action, this version of pragmatism assailed the citadels of "academic" philosophy with an agenda that was progressive, cross-disciplinary, and truly "scientific" in its adherence to cooperative problem-solving.

The pilot of this dynamic force was John Dewey, who chaired the Department of Philosophy, Psychology, and Education from 1894 until 1904. At Chicago, Dewey honored Harper's commitment to community service by opening, in cooperation with Chicago School officials Francis W. Parker and Ella Flagg Young, his legendary "Laboratory School." He also supported Jane Addams's Hull House in its fight to eradicate the social and economic conditions of poverty. In theory and practice, Dewey relied upon Herbert Mead and James Hayden Tufts, who had been his colleagues at Michigan. These three, plus their junior colleagues Edward S. Ames, James Angell, and Addison W. Moore, constituted the nucleus of what William James immortalized in 1903 as "The Chicago School." Notable among others associated with Dewey's group were H. Heath Bawden, Irving King, Arthur Kenyon Rogers, and Douglas C. Macintosh.

That year Dewey, Moore, and several graduate students published their "manifesto" as *Studies in Logical Theory*, a volume in the university's Decennial Publications. James was quick to endorse enthusiastically this "new system of philosophy," a world view "massive" in implication yet disarmingly "simple" in its basic adherence to pluralism, ideas as problem-solving tools, and the social dimension of experience.

The excitement was palpable, and in the early years Moore admits he and his colleagues assumed nearly “everyone” would be won over.

This volume traces the development of Instrumentalism in the decade following the *Studies*. As we shall see, and as Moore himself later acknowledged, the obstacles to be encountered were neither simple nor easily surmounted. At the outset, functional psychology faced the task of distinguishing itself from both the logical and cosmological “pragmatism” of Charles Sanders Peirce¹ and the personalism of James and F. C. S. Schiller. It also faced internal challenges from Rogers and Mackintosh, who felt Dewey, Moore, and Mead were insufficiently appreciative of “external reality.” With these growing pains the Chicago pragmatists discovered, as had James a decade earlier, that even in straightforward empirical psychology “the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint.” As functional psychology became a full-fledged philosophy, as Dewey and Company broke new ground beyond Peirce’s theory of meaning and James’s theory of truth, they increasingly found themselves confronting the perplexities of the psychical and physical, experience and whatever is “beyond” experience, the immediate and the mediate. On these and other issues, Instrumentalism was caught in the crossfire between fading idealisms and emerging realisms, each claiming pragmatic virtues were its own and pragmatic vices the cost of collusion with the enemy.

The forty-five essays and reviews collected in this volume capture the Chicago pragmatists defending and refining their views against a slew of critics. Many questions are astute: concerns about, e.g., primary experience, “external reality,” metaphysics, and values pushed Dewey, in particular, into projects not completed for decades. Others border on the burlesque, as in claims that pragmatism is only a “practical” philosophy or that it promotes egoism, subjectivism, and even solipsism – notions that would be laughable were they not still circulated today.

Chicago Pragmatists and Other Pragmatisms

The Chicago pragmatists began to receive critical notice at a time when most people associated pragmatism with the philosophy of William James. A pioneer in the fledgling field of empirical psychology, he forged a union of psychology and philosophy that challenged the idealist metaphysics of self-consciousness and the associationalist psychology of traditional empiricism. James realized that consciousness was neither a cognitive “searchlight” that reveals objects by its own luminescence nor the passive reception of sense impressions, but a succession of noncognitive “perchings” and cognitive “flights” undertaken when settled

¹ See Volume 4 of this series for the discussion between Dewey and Peirce.

beliefs become conflicted. Such perchings, moreover, constitute a unity of “pure experience” where subject and object, thought and thing, are still undifferentiated. The profound problem of how mind can grasp physical realities intrinsically beyond itself is undercut with this “double-barrelled” conception of experience, where thought and thing are not ontological primitives, but *functional* distinctions that guide cognitive “flights” to secure new “perchings.”

This leads to a radical revisions reality and truth. Since “things” are functional utilities, there is literally *nothing* “in itself” behind or beyond pure experience. “Reality,” then, is more aptly described as whatever can possibly make a difference in our lives. For James, this is liberating and pluralistic, for in making such differences relations, mythical characters, illusions, and even errors are as real as catamarans and kangaroos. And with no “in itself” reality, truth is no longer the correspondence between a subjective idea and this ersatz “reality.” An Idea is not just “in a head,” for it too is distinguished by its functional role in resolving conflicting beliefs – it advances a hypothesis or proposed solution which, when successfully realized, establishes its *truth* in the only sense significant to human experience.

The Chicago pragmatists thanked James for inspiring their collective vision. But even as James himself was still sketching out his views in the first five years of the century, they launched a concerted effort to rectify misconceptions that, whether or not actually attributable to James, had circulated as pragmatism’s “fatal flaws.”

In “Pragmatism as a Philosophic Method,” then-Chicago graduate student Irving King warns of the danger of portraying pragmatism as a merely “practical” philosophy that refers everything to “concrete experience” and thus avoids “the vagaries of theoretical speculation.” This might bolster its short-term popularity, but astute critics are already asking whether “thoughts” or “things” are the “controlling factor” in experience. In the absence of a pragmatic metaphysics, they will surely superimpose their own, and thus concoct a dualism of thought and thing that are only “externally related” by action. To prevent this, King advocates closer scrutiny of the *functional* role of thought in the reconstruction of experience, in contrast to the *structural* alternative that seeks diverse “orders or existence within reality as a whole.” Pragmatists are further advised to look beyond James’s notion that the worth of ideas is solely in their *present* value to produce future outcomes; good ideas look to the past so as to predict the future, hence the genetic factor in inquiry should not be overlooked.

In “What Is Pragmatism,” Chicago product H. Heath Bawden shares King’s concerns but points to positive measures already taken to overcome them. Irreverent opponents, to be sure, delight in reducing

pragmatism to a handful of pat slogans: “we must ‘will to believe;’” “man is the measure of all things, so want only what you can get;” “it’s true if it works;” and even “lies are not false if unless they are discovered!” But James’s appropriation of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim – our conception of a meaning is ultimately determined by the possible consequences of acting upon it – is as applicable to philosophical disputes as it is to practical affairs. And James himself has extended this maxim to philosophical issues with remarkable results, demonstrating not just the vapidness of “in itself reality” and “absolute truth,” but the paucity of such slogans to capture pragmatism’s real objectives. Bawden also agrees with King that James is too narrowly focused upon the present and immediate future. Fortunately, however, Dewey’s “genetic method” corrects this flaw: the nature of a thing cannot be disassociated from an account of its origin; validity cannot be disassociated from history. For this Dewey stands accused of turning pragmatism into a “history of the world,” i. e. a cosmography. But Dewey stands with James by insisting that pragmatism’s prime directive is not to examine the *structure* or content of nature, but to formulate a *functional* methodology – a *logic* of experience that avoids the “deadlock of the epistemological antinomies.”

In “The Logical Distinction between the True and the Real,” Bawden’s associate C. L. Herrick probes the ontology of “pure” experience, perhaps the most puzzling and controversial aspect of James’s philosophy. Borrowing from the aesthetic idealism of Schelling and Lotze, Herrick asserts “nothing can be real apart from a realizer,” and casts this fundamental unity as a “primary feeling” where reality is the “affirmation of attribute.” Thus, e.g., the bare sensation of “light is” affirms the existence (“is”) of an attribute (“light”). Though it is the “ultimate of experience,” the affirmation of attribute expresses only its subjective phase. The objective phase consists of cognitive relations we impose upon pure experience: When, e.g., we impose a coherent order upon mere feelings of brightness, heat, weight, color, etc., “candle” emerges as an object in the “independent” world. Whereas the noncognitive affirmation of attributes delimits the realm of *reality*, the cognitive affirmation of relations establishes the realm of *truth*.

Broadly speaking, this notion of pure experience has been sympathetically received by pragmatists who interpret it in terms of James’s “buzzing, blooming, confusion” or Peirce’s “anteceptive pulsations” that expresses the “brute presence” of an “independent otherness.” Bawden, however, is suspicious of the underlying world view of those who accept such explanations. Whether idealistic or realistic, an ontology “fixed” in noncognitive “feeling” undermines the “cycle” of nonreflective and reflective experience that for Dewey is the funda-

mental “double-barrelledness” of experience. In a cycle, of course, there are perspectives, but no ultimate point of origin. To assert one in “feeling,” to the contrary, invites inevitable questions about what is beyond feeling – the wellspring of feeling to which feeling itself has no access. This version of pragmatism thus teeters on the brink of the dreaded “veil” between sensation and the “really real” it had claimed to dissolve. According to Bawden, this mistake can be avoided by treating pure experience as a *function* and not as a primordial *stuff*.

Dewey’s own assessment of James’s contribution is characteristically generous, and is summarized in his review of the *Essays in Radical Empiricism* published shortly after James’s death in 1910. James’ greatest legacy, predicts Dewey, will lie not in his popular works on pragmatism but in his radical empiricism. Traditional empiricism was not sufficiently empirical, for it exceeded the evidence of sense to affirm insular “simples” and wholly external realities. The “radical” element in James’s empiricism is his claim that ideas are *hypothetically* related to facts: They link concrete means to prospective ends that, if actually attained, fulfill every expectation about being “real” or “true.” James’s credo, “everything real is experienceable, and everything experienceable is real,” inspires a healthy pluralism that defeats both 1) nominalism, by affirming the full reality of relations and universals, and 2) ethical relativism and nihilism by affirming the objectivity of values.

James Angell was less comfortable with the possible specter of Hegel in the reciprocity of “real” and “experienceable.” Among the inner circle of the Chicago School, Angell placed less emphasis on “philosophers’ problems.” In focusing his efforts upon functional psychology and education, he combined pragmatism with common-sense realism. His 1908 review of James’s *Pragmatism* contests the notion that truth is “made” in the course of experience. To be sure, truth is a function of our beliefs about facts, but the controlling feature must not be what *we* think about things, but what things *are* – the “core of reality” upon which truth rests. Thus we must distinguish “pragmatic truth” that depends upon us from genuine truth grounded in facts.

Outside of Pierce, James, and Dewey, the most visible pragmatist of the period was the English philosopher F. C. S. Schiller, who called his philosophy “humanism.” Schiller’s distaste for idealism, outspoken support of James, and acerbic wit earned him the reputation of a maverick at Oxford, where Bradley vilified his work. Schiller leaned even harder than James on the “will to believe” and “personal reality,” and as such the Chicago School had much to protest. But perhaps aware of Schiller’s embattled position, Dewey brushes past points of dissent in his review of the collected essays released as *Humanism* in 1903. Schiller appalled the Oxford idealists by resurrecting Protagoras’ dictum, “man

is the measure of all things.” Dewey, however, finds this “sure and sensible,” even “inevitable.” It becomes subjective and egoistic, he continues, only when human nature is so narrowly construed. But what man “measures” is as deep as the human community and as vast as the horizons of the natural universe. If not for his spite of the Oxford idealists, says Dewey, Schiller might see he is on the threshold of an “experimental” idealism where the static “unity of experience” gives way to the realization that *knowing* is a kind of *acting* that can disclose the continuity in scientific, ethical, social, and aesthetic pursuits. In his review, Moore agrees that Schiller is insufficiently experimental; despite his railings at the idealists, he ultimately joins them in the quest for an “ultimate reality” that is “perfect and harmonious.”

Eight years later Dewey also favorably reviewed the highly contested *Formal Logic*, where Schiller dismisses the venerable tradition from Aristotle to Russell as “nonsense fortified by technicality.” Thought cut off from concrete fact, claims Schiller, is neither an account of actual human reason nor even self-consistent. Here too Dewey, who never rejected formalism per se, appeals to the vision behind the vitriol. Dewey wryly allows that the only folks who remember college logic are those who have to teach it, but its pedantry and irrelevance to life is a tolerable annoyance. The real issue is not whether logic can be detached from fact, but whether its “seat of intellectual authority” lies in pure abstraction or, as Dewey and Schiller assert, in the concrete operations of life.

In the aftermath of the *Studies* it was common to hear the Chicago School referred to as “Dewey’s disciples.” But Angell, as we’ve seen, did not share Dewey’s “Hegelian deposit,” and in the case of Chicago graduate turned Yale professor Arthur Kenyon Rogers, the “disciple” soon confronted the master. Rogers’s 1904 essay, “The Standpoint of Instrumental Logic,” is the “confessions of an unconverted realist.” Rogers accuses functional psychology of trying to make itself supreme by reducing all reality to “tensions” within experience. James’s and Dewey’s “double-barrelledness” of thing and thought within experience is a “new positivism,” for it denies outright “an independent world of things to which thought points.” It proposes an outrageous ontology, for if reality is *made* in inquiry then “the stars, e. g. and every reality for which the stars stand, come into existence with the human need which leads to their discovery.”² Instrumentalism, claims Rogers, defies common sense, depersonalizes the individual to a “unity of social experience,” and ultimately falls into solipsism.

² Arthur K. Rogers, “The Standpoint of Instrumental Logic,” *Journal of Philosophy* 1.8 (1904) 207; 208.

Douglas Macintosh followed Rogers to Yale a decade later, and his 1912 essay "Representational Pragmatism" is a sophisticated combination of pragmatism and realism that reflects the intervening years of discussion. For Macintosh, the flaw in both idealism and realism is revealed in their criteria for truth. Idealism, which ultimately demands the identity of truth and reality, is at a loss to explain how anything can be false. Realism, which requires the correspondence of an idea to a reality inherently other than itself, justifies no claim as true. Pragmatism has the ability to resolve this impasse, but only if we discard James's notion that "truth is what satisfies," an agreement of ideas where idealism lurks. We require, consequently, the sturdier base of "representational pragmatism," which asserts 1) that meaning is ultimately in *practices* established as ideas achieve ends, and 2) truth is the successful correspondence between ideas and such practices. The appeal to practices banishes the "in itself," yet tests truth in the world, not in ideas. And since many such correspondences are "practically permanent," "permanent truth" supplants the "revisable" truth of James.

The connection between meaning and practices is highly insightful, and in fact announces a theme Dewey would develop thoroughly in later years. But in "Pragmatism and Mysticism," Macintosh pushes "permanent truth" to risky heights. Citing Dewey's alleged efforts to "eradicate the religious view of the universe," Macintosh recommends a fusion of pragmatism and mysticism, where the "permanent truth" of a vital personal religion is achievable by submitting mystical claims to practical tests.

Disputes over Psychology

The Chicago School championed functional psychology, we recall, in hopes of undercutting both the atomistic empiricism of sense-data and the idealistic appeal to mind-stuff and a priori categories of consciousness. At the turn of the century traditional empiricism was out of favor, and had not yet been rehabilitated by the rising crest of realism. As such, the first significant protests came from idealists who regarded functional psychology as ambiguous and inadequate – caught between the idealist truth that mind conditions reality and the illusive attempt to reduce consciousness to biological processes. The next section explores broader disputes between pragmatism and idealism; our present concern is limited to interpretations of "mind" or "consciousness" in the philosophy of psychology.

Prominent psychologist and evolutionary theorist James Mark Baldwin taught at Johns Hopkins and edited the *Psychological Review*. In "The Limits of Pragmatism" (1904) he lauds pragmatism for its

psychological orientation, its affirmation of scientific evolutionism, and its denial of an ultimate breach between thought and reality. But pragmatism too hastily assumes the thought-reality gap is closed merely by limiting reality to the “real postulates of practical life.” For if an “environment” merely supplies data for inquiry, if it is not inherently “other” than our ideas about it, then it cannot *oppose* thought in what we commonly call “error,” though error is the flywheel of pragmatic fallibilism. The pragmatist thus waffles between a monism that brings the environment within consciousness, and a covert return to dualism to account for error. Baldwin dubs this a classic example of the *genetic fallacy* – the joint appeal to two conflicting genetic progressions. To escape this we must find a robust *other*, a firm *ground* for the psychology of experience. Obviously, this cannot be the “in-itself” reality that doomed empiricism, thus we must look for a priori and *universal* structures that, though not directly experienced, make empirical experiences possible. As such, functional psychology must be supplemented by an instrumentalist logic that identifies “the structural principles of thought.” With maturity, Baldwin predicts, such a logic will discover that knowledge is inherently *social*.

This essay is compelling. Despite his archaic idealistic terms, Baldwin foresees the development of a general logic of experience related to, yet conceptually distinct from, the biological and psychological dimensions of pragmatism. By 1938, Dewey would distinguish *generic* propositions denoting empirical matters from *universal* propositions stating general “ways of being.” He would further articulate the “way of being” objectivity itself in terms of a “pattern of inquiry,” where “objects” are uniformly “objectives of inquiry.”³ And he would vindicate Baldwin’s prediction that the “ultimate philosophical category” is *social*.⁴ Equally fascinating, however, is Moore’s early anticipation of these developments. He opens “Professor Baldwin on the Pragmatic Universal” by pointing out that the “universal” is already well represented in Instrumentalism. It would be unthinkable to offer a theory of particular judgments without a logic of universals, for the former is realized solely through the latter. The question is not, therefore, whether pragmatism should accept general “rules of thought,” but how to interpret these rules. Moore agrees with Baldwin that, e.g., contradiction, validity, and identity are indeed “conditions” of cognitive experience. But this does

³ See John Dewey, *The Later Works, 1925–1953, Vol. 12: 1938*, Ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986) 122. 369–90. (Hereafter references to *The Later Works* (LW), *The Middle Works* (MW), and *The Early Works* (EW) in the Southern Illinois University Press Series are abbreviated as indicated.

⁴ John Dewey, “The Inclusive Philosophical Idea, LW 3: 50.

not make them abstract “forms of judgment” culled from dusty logic books. Quite to the contrary, such rules are habituated or dispositional modes of response to encountered problems. Early in life we learn to accept and reject, to infer, to recognize sameness. Once mastered these basic abilities become part of the noncognitive background of experience. They are indeed general, for they express “the habit elements involved in every judgment.” Far from being intellectual givens applied externally to experience, however, these rules are dynamic tools for transformation and growth within cognitive experience. And since their worth lies not merely in self-consistency but in real-life engagements, Instrumentalism celebrates the robust “otherness” of environmentally posed problems and opportunities. Here the social ground of rules of thought is obvious and inevitable, for they arise and are tested within a matrix of social relations. It is Baldwin, concludes Moore, who fails to explain how the purely formal finds fruition in the social.

In “A Word of Rejoinder to Professor Moore,” Baldwin agrees that rules of thought may well have a genetic origin. But by refusing to admit anything other than the role of thought in “practical adjustments,” pragmatists fail to see that intelligence eventually rises to “stand on its own.” Instead of burying thought in the murky depths of primary experience, it is far more illuminating to follow it “up the genetic line to the fruitful top.” The true universal “not only ‘secures us God, freedom, and immortality,’ but also ‘bakes its own bread.’”

Despite Baldwin’s reputation as the leading American evolutionist of his generation, phrases such as intelligence “standing on its own” gave the functional psychologists reason to pause. In his review of the *Development of Evolution*, Angell worries that consciousness shrugs its biological tethers in Baldwin’s account. Whereas reputable biologists agree that natural selection advances by blind and accidental forces, Baldwin seems to echo the Lamarckian heresy of creatures “learning” to adapt by appeal to a consciousness not simply reducible to physiological processes.

Baldwin deflects this charge in “Development and Evolution.” What is now known as the “Baldwin Effect” merely claims that “mental characters” can produce patterns of adaptability just as nonmental characters do. An intelligent creature may adapt its environment so as to favor its survival; others lacking this trait may mimic this behavior, and thus enhance the survivability of the group. But, cautions Baldwin, no particular conception of mind or mind-body is advanced here – mental characters contribute to adaptability regardless of their ultimate ontological status.

Where Baldwin’s idealism leaves him curious about instrumentalist logic, Grace Mead Andrus of Cornell deems functional psychology

incoherent to the core. In "Professor Bawden's Interpretation of the Physical and the Psychical," Andrus discerns four incompatible claims about the relation of mental cognition to physical existence: 1) as functional correlatives in primary experience, 2) as biological "organisms" in physical "environments," 3) as a psychical account of the *meaning* of physical existence, and 4) as psychical and physical "energy" in cosmic processes. To cite just one of many conflicts: How can nature be both wholly physical and a combination of physical and psychical energy? There are also internal inconsistencies, e.g. primary experience and the "things" discerned from it lay equal claim to "reality." Indeed, the functional psychologists can't even agree upon a definition of "function!": Is it an logical meaning or a physical activity? Are the "tensions" it resolves psychological, biological, or cosmic? Acceptable as an empirical methodology, concludes Andrus, functional psychology lost its footing when it dared to dabble in metaphysics.

Bawden's brief reply, "The Physical and the Psychical," agrees that functional psychology needs some terminological reform, though its basic viewpoint is sound. Experience is actually broad enough to encompass *all* of Andrus's distinctions. She perceives inconsistencies because she ultimately appeals to a reality or cosmos *beyond* experience, when in fact experience is "identical with the whole of reality." Experience is not just the psychical, nor is the psychical just a manifestation of the physical; instead both are correlative functions of experience, where *function* denotes "orderly, continuous activity with reference to an end."

Disputes with Idealists

Needless to say, Bawden's contention that experience is identical to reality raised more questions than it answered. Whatever the merit of her charges, Andrus was undoubtedly right to claim the Chicago pragmatists had gone far beyond a model of psychology, a criterion of meaning, or even a theory of truth. Pragmatism was now a full-masted philosophy, with a concomitant obligation to propound an ontology, metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and ethics. The Chicago School had formerly been perceived as elusive; now their adversaries finally had a solid target. Given their fondness for foundations, idealists focused upon two tenets they regarded as central to the ontology of Instrumentalism: 1) Bawden's definition of function as activity and 2) Dewey's postulate of immediate empiricism – "what *is* is what it is experienced *as*."

California professor Charles Henry Rieber picks up Baldwin's argument in "Pragmatism and the A Priori." Though pragmatism feigns to disavow ontology, there is no "arriving" without a "starting," and thus it advances categories such as activity, interest, and purpose. But

these categories are decidedly “second rate.” As Kant taught, “activity” cannot be delineated without appeal to a priori categories of mind such as “time” and “causality,” for activity presupposes recognition of these deeper a priori structures. We cannot, of course, directly examine these conditions of experience as empirical facts, but their necessity is manifest in their application to empirical content. Thus in idealism the constructive function of thought is clear. Whenever pragmatists speak of the generation of thought by “activity” in “nature,” however, they reveal an epiphenomenalism where thought is merely attendant to mechanical processes.

In “Objective Idealism and Revised Empiricism,” John E. Russell also evokes Kant to demystify and humanize idealism. Dewey had warned that ideas “ride in a cosmic automobile to pre-destined ends”⁵ when their proper function as *methodological tools* is superseded by a *content* that, being intellectual rather than empirical, is deemed “otherworldly.” Whatever the excesses of later idealists, replies Russell, Kant does not confuse method with content, for his intellectual conditions are specifically detached from empirical content. Nor does a priori mean “Infallible”: It simply posits secure elements upon which empirical advances are possible. Dewey decries “ultimate” ends. But to affirm ideal ends and values, even if these are called “absolute” or “Divine,” does not require us to deny that they are *our* values or *our* ends, or that *our* efforts are required to achieve them.

Cornell philosopher James E. Creighton joins his colleague Andrus in accusing Dewey of presumptively dismissing “philosophical problems” while surreptitiously making metaphysical assumptions to advance his naturalism and Instrumentalism.

Apparently preoccupied on other fronts, Dewey did not directly answer these charges, and the best available reply is Bawden’s review of Rieber’s essay. Pragmatism does not deny that experience has a ground or structure, but this is social and genetic instead of static and formal. Any absolutely “fixed” point of view is “no view at all.” Ideas are dynamic and directive – formed in response to *needs*, not categories of reason. They are “relatively fixed” as reliable guides in a given situation, but they continually evolve with experience. Because of this genuine directive function, pragmatism is clearly not a “veiled materialism” that regards thought as merely “attendant” to physical processes.

In 1905 Dewey published “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,”⁶ a short piece that nonetheless offered a breathtaking synthesis of James’s three central tenets: 1) the notion of “pure experience” where “thing”

⁵ John Dewey, “Experience and Objective Idealism,” MW 3: 143.

⁶ See Volume 1 of this Series, pp. 0000.

and “thought” are undifferentiated, 2) a broad pluralism where whatever makes a difference in experience is fully *real*, and 3) a radical empiricism that rejects “ultimate reality” beyond such experienced reals. Dewey’s postulate, “what *is* is what it is experienced *as*,” was greeted by friends and foes alike as the long-awaited credo of a pragmatic ontology. Dewey explains that any “thing,” in its ordinary sense, is just what it is experienced *as*. Thus the accounts of a horse by a jockey, a trader, and a zoologist are all equally real, though different due to the interests of the reporters. There is not, then, “a Reality,” and various approximations of it, but only different reals of experience. This is especially significant in what Dewey calls “primary” experience. The preoccupation with a scary novel on a dark night admits no conscious differentiation of “thing” and “thought” – no express distinction between “that window” and “myself,” and this organic unity *is* the reality experienced. When disrupted by a sudden noise, however, it passes from settled to problematic; the experience of “frightful noise” *really is* frightful, not just apparently so. Only then are thought and thing discriminated to resolve the problem at hand: *I must know* what’s happening with *that window*. Experience is now reflective, not primary, and when inquiry determines it was merely a shade tapping in the wind, that too signifies a factual reality. And though reflective analysis may go back and “fill in” or “correct” a nonreflective precursor (“I was sitting next to the window all along;” “there was no cause for fright”) it does not thereby challenge the reality of that experience *as* it was experienced.

Dewey’s revolutionary thesis undermines the traditional dualism of thought and thing that, in multiple manifestations, sustains the fatuous war between various realisms and idealisms. He believed he was appealing to common sense, to everyday (as opposed to “philosophical”) ways we experience the world, and as such his radical empiricism would be easily understood and widely embraced. Clearly, however, Dewey initially underestimated both the depth of entrenched preconceptions among even sympathetic readers and the effort required to overcome them. Charles Bakewell’s “Open Letter to Professor Dewey concerning Immediate Idealism” sounds an early warning. The Yale idealist wonders how a mere tautology – “we experience things as we experience them” – grows monstrous ontological fangs wherein *things are* as we immediately experience them. If each experience beholds a complete truth and reality, no experience could ever be in error. Dewey rejects this, of course, so he must grant some “permanent objective reality” against which immediate beliefs may be tested. And since he regards experience as self-rectifying, obviously he requires some form of idealism.

Dewey's brief reply, "Immediate Empiricism," states that his postulate is only 1) a "method of philosophical analysis," not a claim about the content or nature of what is experienced. And to say immediate experience is rectified by mediation means only that 2) mediation, too, is experientiable and thus real. In upholding "permanent objective reality" as *unmediated content*, Bakewell is wrong on both counts.

"The Issue between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism" finds Bakewell unrepentant. Hasn't Dewey identified full reality with *immediate* experience? If immediacy is his ultimate ground, then he cannot also consistently affirm the full reality of mediation. Ironically, Dewey insists upon this absolute immediacy, yet decries it as the great sin of idealism! The idealist, quite to the contrary, denies absolute or "simple" immediacy: mediacy and immediacy are equally fundamental; in knowledge, as Kant taught, immediate percepts are always mediated by concepts.

The mediated character of immediacy also dominates two 1905 essays contributed by Wisconsin's Boyd H. Bode. In "The Concept of Pure Experience," Bode offers the dubious premise that pragmatism reduces all thought to primary experience, which he interprets as pure, homogenous, and subjective. But if this is so, he asks, why are percepts and concepts so different? Why can some persons visualize images where others cannot? The heterogeneous yet cohesive character of experience can only be explained by an underlying mediating structure "beyond" present experience itself. In "Cognitive Experience and Its Object," Bode also notes that Dewey's "pure" immediacy in fact has two distinct elements, a *noncognitive* phase where, e.g., I am oblivious to the window, and a *cognitive* awareness of frightful-noise.

In "The Knowledge Experience Again," Dewey denies that he rejects the integral connection immediacy and mediacy, but regards Bakewell's and Bode's interpretation of it as inadequate. Anything *known*, to be sure, is immediately grasped only in relation to mediating elements admittedly "beyond" it. But where idealism recognizes only formal conditions, pragmatism insists upon a wide palate that is also aesthetic and moral.

It is not surprising that this reply won few converts, for Dewey's critics wanted to know about immediacy in *primary*, rather than reflective, experience. With no explanation of the *origin* of primary experience, they were quick to assume it was purely intuitive or otherwise "occult." Many dismissed Dewey without waiting to hear his mature assessment that the "immediate" in primary experience is best expressed as *settled meaning*. Reflective outcomes of problematic situations ("objects") return to and enrich the vast nonreflective "background" of habits and dispositions that 1) safeguards the

immediacy of routine and aesthetic activities and 2) provides secure tools for the resolution of future problematic situations.⁷

Disputes with Realists

Throughout the nineteenth century, idealism dominated American academic circles. What realism could be found followed the tradition of Scottish common sense. But the ascendance of natural science, particularly in physics, biology, and psychology, inaugurated a new scientific realism that would rise to prominence in the new century. And though the Chicago pragmatists were first preoccupied with surpassing idealism, they soon could not ignore the hoof beats of realism.

Where idealists cultivated an air of indulgence toward pragmatism, realists generally expressed puzzlement. After all, Dewey was an avowed empiricist and realist with deep roots in biological naturalism. Why, then, declare that reality is coextensive with experience? Was his genuine realism obscured by archaic idealistic terminology? Was he an aspiring realist who, due to his early training, occasionally lapsed into idealism? Or was he something else?

Dewey was, indeed, something else, and the Chicago School's engagements with the realists remain fascinating to this day. This section reviews confrontations with three forms of realism: George Santayana's historical naturalism, Evander McGilvary's intuitionistic realism, and E. G. Spaulding's new or direct realism.

Vast in scope yet luxuriant in detail, Santayana's five-volume *The Life of Reason* (1905–6) is a landmark in the philosophy of history. Santayana's premise is thoroughly naturalistic and realistic: Human reason arises from instinctive biological impulses from which an organizing pattern emerges and becomes aware of itself as valuable. With this the "life of reason" begins its restless pursuit of the good: Family, culture, religion, science, and ultimately art are expressions of this quest.

Dewey hails Santayana's opus for its sensitivity to "the reality of human experience." Despite its metaphysical pretensions, the life of reason is easily interpreted as experience in pursuit of human ideals – a survey by intelligence of its successes and failures. One drawback is an inconsistent treatment of the relation between art and science. In places Santayana realizes that science is a facilitator of art – viewed broadly as practices that embody a happy and moral life; here he achieves "a noble and significant pragmatism." Elsewhere, however, he suggests that "science suffices for the life of reason," which tends to reduce human worth to physical and biological properties alone.

⁷ See MW 4: 122; MW 6: 47; MW 13: 51–52; LW 1: 58, 183, 203, 236; 379; LW 3: 87; LW 4: 150; LW 5: 215; LW 10: 263–64; LW 14: 46–48.

Moore traces Dewey's concern to a fundamental ambiguity about "reason" itself. For pragmatism, we recall, to be *real* is to make some concrete *difference* in experience. Santayana seems sensitive to this when he says "reason has its own excuse for being, but to be it must *do*." Because reason directs materials and ideas into concrete patterns of organization, its *real* instrumentality is manifest in the construction of good. Yet at times Santayana apparently denies this functional reality: reason becomes a mere "expression" of nature, the product of something wholly physical and mechanical. Moore confesses he cannot decide whether Santayana is a pragmatist or an epiphenomenalist.

In reply, Santayana positions himself between the "childish" notion that thought causally affects matter and the nominalism that denies thought any efficacy at all. In his naturalism thought is maintained by bodily processes, specifically instincts and habits. Thought acts, then, "through the natural efficacy of the creature whose life it expresses." This efficacy is not directly causal, but descriptive and predictive.

Moore's rejoinder, "The Function of Thought," declares the ambiguity resolved, but unfortunately in favor of epiphenomenalism. For if thought is the mere expression of biological processes, its efficacy is ultimately theirs, and thus allusions to thought as a "lyric cry" or "accompaniment" to mechanical forces are no mere metaphors.

On the occasion of Dewey's eightieth birthday in 1939, Wisconsin realist Evander Bradley McGilvary expressed his "immeasurable debt" to the venerated philosopher. Their professional relationship was not always so cozy. McGilvary's expansive imagination, and a tendency to see pragmatism through Locke's spectacles, generated a "novel" interpretation that is often quite hilarious. For McGilvary in "Pure Experience and Reality," Dewey's credo is simple: "no experience, no reality." This means, of course, that pre-cognitive reality cannot be really real – experience must mold it into something "perfect and entire, wanting nothing;" and when no longer experienced, reality slips back into its inchoate state. Dewey thus also denies the reality of the past. Finally, pragmatic truth is made, not discovered about preexisting things. Thus when the Copernican system replaced the Ptolemaic, the earth and sun obligingly exchanged orbits!

To overcome such absurdity, McGilvary offers, existence must have priority over thought. We must realize that we directly *intuit* in-itself realities, but retain representational images of these intuitions after the fact. Truth emerges as these images, and the ideas they generate, are tested against reality. McGilvary illustrates his intuitionistic realism in "The Chicago 'Idea' and Idealism." We directly experience the front side of the moon as a bright orb of light – a "givenness of givens" which thought has no part in constructing. But from this direct intuition an

idea may be formed about the never experienced far side of the moon. When that side is eventually experienced, the match between that “givenness” and the idea will be its test of truth.

In Roy Wood Sellars’s alternative version, we experience not realities *per se* but “appearances” that nonetheless guide us directly back to the object without the “intervention” of sense impressions. Nonetheless, Sellars agrees that most people are “practical realists.” We believe our ideas are pitted not against “projected outcomes” but against a physical, impersonal world. When things work out, we say our hypothesis *was* true, not that it *became* true.

McGilvary returns with what he thinks is a *coup de gras* for immediate empiricism in “Pure Experience and Reality, A Reassertion.” Take Dewey at his word – “what *is* is what it is experienced *as*.” Well, *I* experience immediate empiricism as *wrong*, he crows, therefore it *is wrong*!

The mild-mannered Dewey is moved to brand McGilvary’s statements an “extreme misconception” of his views. In “Pure Experience and Reality: A Disclaimer,” he flatly denies saying “something is real only when experienced.” His actual claim is that all philosophical claims must answer to experience. Furthermore, McGilvary seems to think “experience” is some “stuff” or “content,” when for Dewey it only indicates a “method of procedure and recourse.” And because we experience things *as* existing at times and places other than the immediate present, it is inane to hang on Dewey the notion that physical realities slip into an inchoate state or magically transform themselves to suit our determinations about them.

In “Objects, Data, and Existences,” Dewey returns to the moon example to express his disagreement with McGilvary. If we simply intuit things as they really and fully are, if knowledge *par excellence* is just “looking at things,” then science is pointless. But there is no raw empirical fact *per se*. The value of a sensation or quale such as McGilvary’s “bright shining orb” is not its own intrinsic character, but what it *does* within a system of accepted facts, where it *calls out thought* to help resolve problems or uncertainties. In McGilvary’s case, where the uncertainty involves the far side of the moon, the quale engages a system of known facts about, e.g. features on the visible and the probability of their distribution elsewhere. We thus form a hypothesis about the far side that, with eventual empirical confirmation, becomes a new fact about the moon. But this is emphatically not, as McGilvary supposes, a problem of comparing two orders of existence – an “immediately given reality” versus “fainter” images and ideas. Instead, it is the matter of seeing how a nonreflective stimulus prompts reflective thought.

But what about McGilvary's charge that Dewey is an idealist who includes all reality within experience? This reply is of signal importance; had it been fully understood much misunderstanding might have been avoided. First, says Dewey, we must disambiguate the question. If "experience" means some *existential* thing or stuff, then the notion that reality is within it is emphatically rejected. On the other hand, if "experience" is taken in a *methodological* sense in which to be *real* is to be a possible verifiable outcome or objective of inquiry, then the answer "might be affirmative," with the proviso we can only know experienced realities, not "all reality."⁸

Despite the efforts of individuals such as Santayana, Sellars, and McGilvary, American realism had no clear focus or direction prior to 1910, when "The Program and Platform of Six Realists" was published. In keeping with a fully "scientific" realism, the participants imitated the natural sciences by working cooperatively and pooling their results.⁹ The central claim of this "new realism" is that though things are known only through a knowing experience, that experience is *eliminable*, thus the entity is known as it would be if no knowing occurred. The act of cognition is thus "transparent:" things are "exhibited" to a perceiver just as they are in themselves, without "conditioning of any kind." In support of this position they advanced the theory of external relations, which held that relations are not a constitutive part of things that are related. Though not a founding member, James Bissett Pratt was an enthusiastic supporter of new realism. In a collection of essays published as *What is Pragmatism?*, Pratt recasts the traditional notion of "correspondence" between mental idea and physical object as "the object of which one is thinking is as one thinks it." This openness to the world is strikingly simple, and far preferable to both the veil of perception that blinds traditional empiricism and the tangled web of experience pragmatism spins about reality, for either alternative is ultimately solipsistic.

In review of Pratt's book, Moore remarks that philosophers from Plato to the present have found the correspondence between mind and reality anything but "simple," and he cites Pratt's own admission that the transparency of perception is ultimately an "irreducible mystery." He is forced to this, says Moore because he still accepts the dualism of a private stream of consciousness set up against outer realities intrinsically

⁸ MW 4: 154.

⁹ The participants were W. P. Montague and Walter B. Pitkin of Columbia, Ralph Barton Perry and Edwin B. Holt from Harvard, Walter T. Marvin from Rutgers, and E. G. Spaulding from Princeton. Each wrote a statement that, though separately signed, represented the same doctrine. See MW 6: 472–82.

other and external to itself. With no *possible* empirical justification for the claim of transparency, only an “irreducible mystery” can keep the solipsistic wolf from his door. Pratt is mistaken, however, to think the pragmatist shares his straw hut: He fails to see that in pragmatism the ultimate ground of “consciousness” is *social* – facts are determined not in souls, minds, or even brains, but in a social matrix from which “escape” only generates “philosophical” quagmires.

After a skirmish with Ralph Barton Perry, in 1910–1911 Dewey and E. G. Spaulding exchanged five essays, including an eventual “Joint Discussion with Articles of Agreement and Disagreement.” At the outset, Dewey’s view of the new realists was almost as skewed as their view of Instrumentalism. He seemed to equate their existences with Leibnizian monads: self-contained realities incapable of interaction yet magically “exhibiting” essences – God’s mediation merely replaced by equally ad hoc external relations. In discussions with Spaulding, however, Dewey learned that new realism is compatible not only with physical interaction, but with the efficacy of ideas as well. Broadly speaking, Dewey and Spaulding ultimately agree that philosophy should be 1) empirical and pluralistic, 2) committed to an enhanced place for the logic of inquiry in the investigation of nature, and 3) able to affirm realities, and not merely appearances modified by the “knowing experience.”

Still, crosscurrents roil beneath this surface of amity, for Dewey and Spaulding have no common conception of the “reality” science should investigate. Spaulding claims we must accept, as a priori “givens,” both “brute existences” and logical patterns independent of each other *and* of inquiry. For Dewey, this is but another noxious dualism, and he reminds Spaulding that the logical patterns which help us see how things “hang together” are themselves derived from natural and social interactions. To suppose that logical forms are externally imposed upon inquiry weds new realism to Platonic idealism!; the same claim for brute existences regenerates the “mystery” of how inquiry has access to something inexorably beyond itself. Instrumentalism does not deny the conceptions of independence, externality, or even the a priori, but it does contend that these are originally 1) determined within inquiry and 2) are meaningful only to the extent that they facilitate transformations in inquiry. As such, Dewey insists that their function is *teleological* rather than *foundational*.

PRAGMATISM AS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

Irving King. "Pragmatism as a Philosophical Method." *Philosophical Review* 12.5 (September 1903): 511–24.

The recent redefinition of pragmatism by Professor James and C. S. Peirce in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, and its application afresh in the *Varieties of Religious Experience*, raises again the question as to the extent to which it can really be regarded as a distinctive philosophic method. We propose to note briefly how pragmatism is defined by its two chief exponents, attempting to get as clearly as possible its face value and its implications. We shall then be in a position to decide whether, taking it as it stands, it admits of thoroughgoing application; and, if not, in what respect it demands modification, or in what respect its possible ambiguities can be cleared up by a more careful psychological interpretation of its presuppositions.

The pragmatic standpoint is without doubt an attractive one. It seems to offer a criterion of truth that is both easy of application and certain in its results. It appeals to the practical mind, impatient with the subtleties of metaphysics, as the only real basis for philosophy. Under the heading "Pragmatism" in the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, C. S. Peirce says: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical hearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." Professor James maintains that pragmatism is "the doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences," either conduct to be recommended or experiences to be expected, if the conception is true, which would be different if it were untrue.

James also says: "In methodology it is certain that to trace and compare their respective consequences is an admirable way of establishing the differing meanings of different conceptions." Peirce maintains that as James works out and applies the doctrine in *The Will to Believe and Other Essays*, it seems to assume that the end of man is action, a thesis that Peirce himself does not find as credible at sixty as at thirty.

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He refers to pragmatism as a “practical maxim”; and it seems that he really intends it as such, rather than as a thoroughgoing philosophic method.

As to the *kind* of effects that the pragmatist has in view when he insists on the test of practical consequences, Peirce says: “The only ultimate good which the practical facts to which it [the pragmatic procedure] directs attention can subserve is to further the development of concrete reasonableness; so that the meaning of the concept does not lie in any individual reactions at all, but in the manner in which those reactions contribute to that development.” “The ultimate good lies in the evolutionary process in some way.”

In the *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Lecture XVIII, James discusses the principle in some detail with reference to its use in the philosophy of religion. This book as a whole furnishes an excellent example of the application of the method, and in it we should look to find many doubtful points cleared up, not because the method itself is here any more explicitly stated than elsewhere, but because in the wealth of concrete detail which it presents, we may judge its meaning better than through the more abstract statement. We must here confine ourselves to the generalizations that the book offers us. The following is condensed from pages 442 ff. Continental philosophy has too often overlooked the fact of the organic connection of thinking and conduct. British philosophy has, on the other hand, been guided by the principle that every difference must make a difference, and that the best method of discussing points of theory is to begin by ascertaining what practical differences would result if one alternative or the other were true. What is the cash value of a particular truth in terms of particular experience? This is illustrated in the attitudes of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. The problems of philosophy presented themselves in some such form as this: What is the cash value or personal identity, of matter, of cause, etc.? Peirce’s position is summarized thus: “Thought in movement has for its only conceivable motive the attainment of belief, or thought at rest. Only when our thought about an object has found its rest in belief can our action on the subject firmly and safely begin. Beliefs, in short, are rules for action; and the whole function of thought is but one step in the production of active habits. If there were any part of thought that made no difference in the thought’s practical consequences, then that part would be no element of the thought’s significance.”

Professor James next applies the principle to the question of which attributes of God are really any more than merely verbal ones, with the result that such attributes as aseity, necessariness, simplicity, etc., are condemned as meaningless, because there is no assignable way in which we can modify our action in order to adapt ourselves the better to these

characteristics. Likewise God's simplicity does not tend to produce in us any specific acts. On the other hand, the moral attributes, such as holiness, omniscience, justice, etc., clearly determine in us fear and hope and expectation, and are the foundation in us of a particular sort of life. These pragmatically justifiable characteristics, especially that of punitive justice, are incapable of logical proof. No scholastic argument regarding them has ever been satisfactory to other than a few philosophers, and no one has ever changed his life as a result of such arguments.

In *The Will to Believe and Other Essays*, still further implications of pragmatism are worked out. As we have already seen, the most characteristic doctrine of the method before us is that the meaning of an idea, or concept, comes out only as it modifies activity or conduct. The question arises as to the relation of this principle to the doctrine that the desire for a certain kind of truth brings about that special truth's existence. It seems to be a psychological fact that the holding in mind of certain kinds of beliefs tends to produce results of such a nature that the belief may be said to have become valid, or to have objectified itself. On the surface, this seems to conflict with the pragmatic principle. Pragmatism says: If a concept or notion refers to a real difference in things, it must be possible to point out that it has some effect in concrete life. Psychology, on the other hand, says: Let a concept of *any* kind be present in consciousness and it will result in some modification of action. This theory of the relation of consciousness to movement, James generalizes into an account of the way in which the world of fact is built up. Faith in a fact helps create the fact. Contesting beliefs are really half formed facts struggling for existence; At least, such seems to be the doctrine of *The Will to Believe*. The success of these struggling beliefs is, of course, dependent on the sort of practical effects that they are able to bring forth. But every belief, by hypothesis, tends to realize itself. There seems to be nothing inherent in the idea itself that determines whether its effects will be of one kind or another. We can only say of it that, if it remains a vital mental content, it will have some sort of overt consequences. All such contents apparently stand on the same level in so far as they are merely beliefs, or opinions.

It would seem from this that the real world might be considered a resultant of the various beliefs that men have held, and yet not merely a resultant, inasmuch as some agency over and above the contending mental attitudes had to determine which effects were most fit. In other words, just as Nature is conceived as a selective agency reacting upon the infinite variations of animal and vegetable life, so there is an objectified system of beliefs, the result of previous selection and survival, and in this every new idea must be able to vindicate its worth if it is to endure. In fine, James seems to hold that our world of fact is in some

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measure conditioned by previous beliefs, and the order that has once got established reacts back on the ideas that have not as yet emerged into full fact. The test of the reality of an idea is its power to influence conduct, and the way in which any sort of conduct comes into existence is through the instrumentality of the idea or belief that it should be so. The ambiguity here might also be stated thus: Our conscious attitudes are naturally organized with reference to action; hence they are meaningless unless they in some way produce or modify activity. But the very presence of an idea in the human consciousness is *ipso facto* evidence that there will be some difference in the way of overt consequences, so that it would seem that all mental activity has some meaning, if meaning is to be determined by external effects. But this inherent tendency of ideas to get objective expression is never fully realized in practice, because the previously objectified system of ideas reacts on the vanguard of new beliefs as it emerges into being. It is thus not the essential worth of the idea, but its ability to produce change in the objective order, that establishes its truth; and this capacity to produce change seems to be conditioned entirely by what is already objectively real.

It is impossible, without giving pragmatism a broader statement than either James or Peirce have bestowed upon it, to see the exact relation of these two lines of thought – the one that every concept to be true must make a difference in conduct, and the other that every concept or belief, if it is a part of one's mental equipment, *does* make a difference. The connecting link between them, as James has left the matter, seems to be that, while every mental content is potentially connected with overt activity, it does not necessarily possess validity unless it can in some measure fit into the existing organization of objectified beliefs. Every concept does *tend* to make a difference; but all do not succeed in doing so, simply because the real world happens to be what it is. It is no doubt true that the original statement of pragmatism has been modified in this fashion to render it more available as a philosophic method.

It is accordingly clear that it is not mere working, but working of a certain kind, that is required to establish the validity of any theory or concept. James emphasizes this necessity in various ways. For instance, a true philosophy must be more than a logical one. It must also be able to awaken active impulses or satisfy æsthetic demands.¹ There are, however, various *kinds* of active impulses, and therefore we have to look still further for a standard; that is, a thing is not rational *merely* because it makes a difference in conduct. James finds this further criterion in the familiarity of the action that is aroused by the thought;

¹ *The Will to Believe*, p. 76.

that which suggests customary movements in which we can easily pass from out thing to another, we regard as rational. The suggested activity must further be congruous with our spontaneous powers, must not baffle or contradict our active propensities.

It is somewhat difficult to determine whether the pragmatist would hold that some ideas are essentially irrational, or whether some are merely remotely connected with practical needs, though ultimately arising out of them. In the essay entitled "The Sentiment of Rationality," p. 85, James says: "Later mental development...gives birth to a vast amount of theoretic activity over and above that which is immediately ministerial to practice, yet the earlier claim is only postponed, not effaced, and the active nature asserts its rights to the end." According to this, much vague theoretical matter can be justified on even pragmatic grounds. We may ask the pragmatist, however, if there is, over and above these ideas, another class of speculations that have absolutely no claim upon rationality because they have not even remote bearings on conduct. If such a class exists, it would at any rate be difficult to distinguish it from the class which has remote practical bearings. It is possible that pragmatism in its original form would condemn all systems of thought that have no immediate practical consequences, even though these systems had their origin in concrete problems.

However this may be, we probably get here James's concept of a rational philosophy as over against a merely logical one. We have in the assumption that thought may be logical and yet not reasonable, a radical difference from dialectical philosophy. The point of interest now, however, is as to what sort of conduct it is that we have in mind when we say a thing is practical, or that it 'works.' We may assume that James would characterize it in a manner similar to his description of thought that is rational as over against the merely logical. That is, it is conduct that is familiar, customary, or congruous with the other elements of our world. The rest of the world of activity, by the very fact of its existence, is valid. Hence congruity of the new with the old is the test of the rationality of the new. But it must not only be congruent with the existing world of conduct, it must also be in accord with the spontaneous tendency of the individual to activity. The rationality of an act, then, depends on its harmony with the individual and with the world, in the same way that a thought comes to be true, first, by the faith of some individual, and secondly, by its own practical efficiency.

In summary, we may say of pragmatism that it is, as first proposed by Peirce, primarily a *practical maxim*, to the effect that the consequences in action or conduct of any concept or idea are really all there can be to the *meaning* of the concept. It is not, however, mere consequences that

concern the pragmatist. There is a 'concrete reasonableness' over and above all concepts, an objective system of which they are to become a part if they refer to real differences in the ultimate constitution of things. The emphasis of both James and Peirce is essentially on the practical. The theoretical is constantly to submit to the test of the concrete. There can be no doubt but that it is this that makes pragmatism an attractive doctrine. The man who is impatient with metaphysics feels that here at last he can escape the vagaries or theoretical speculation by referring everything to concrete experience. By adhering rigidly to the test of overt consequences, James holds that the pragmatic method is not concerned with any questions of origin. That is, the practical bearings of a fact are what they are, and it is getting at them in a very roundabout fashion, he seems to think, to investigate them through the genesis of the fact itself. At least this is the position taken in the *Varieties of Religious Experience*. The origin may throw light on present workings, or it may not; in any case, it is necessary to recur to the present to substantiate the assumptions based upon the nature of the origin. He thus explicitly excludes from his evaluation of a religious experience any implication that may be suggested by the nature of its origin. The practical workings of any religious attitude, such as the state of trance, mysticism, Christian Science, etc., are all to be judged pragmatically by their current effects upon conduct, and without any reference to possible pathologic or neurotic causes behind them. Perhaps this does not add anything to our previous exposition, aside from emphasizing the fact that with pragmatism the standard is *always* the concrete present, in which the opprobrium of the past must show itself if it is worth being considered at all. It does not, of course, deny that there may be such stigmata; but, if they do exist, they must show themselves in present effects. Condemnation merely because of past record is invalid if the present is satisfactory. We shall attempt to show presently that it is these very considerations of genesis that pragmatism needs to take into account to render itself truly useful. An inquiry into the origin of a fact is by no means an attempt to prejudice its present value. It is rather undertaken in order that we may understand the present value more adequately. If genetic inquiries mean anything, they mean that through them we can the more accurately locate the "exact and objective conditions under which a given fact appears."² It is the weak point of pragmatism that it does not recognize that no effects can be evaluated out of relation to the conditions with reference to which they have occurred.

We may turn now, after this descriptive statement, and take a critical view of the subject. The fundamental ambiguity in pragmatism seems to

² Dewey, *Psychology and Philosophical Method*.

be due to the manner in which it conceives thought as in some way external to both the world of action and the world of things. This objection at first seems paradoxical. It is true that thought may modify action, but it is not through any functional relation that it bears to it, but simply because it happens to represent some ontological difference. This externality of thought to activity is in a measure overcome by the doctrine that *all* thought *tends* to pass over into overt reality. But this does not really solve the difficulty; for, as thus conceived, a given thought makes a difference in action not because of its possible connection with the ultimate constitution of things, as we had been led to suppose from the original pragmatic doctrine, but through the world of concrete reality in which it occurs. It is, therefore, the objective order that simply selects certain of the thoughts that are conceived as projected into it, and rejects others. There is here no organic connection between thought and action. Thought just happens to be; and, owing to a purely external relation to reality, it is true or false.

The strong point of pragmatism is, however, that it does assert a connection between thought and action. Its greatest weakness is, that it does not give an adequate account of just what this relationship is. Thought seems, on the one hand, to be more or less a copy of the reality to which our conduct must conform, and, in so far as it is a true copy, it does affect conduct. But, on the other hand, it seems that the world of action is the only reality in which thoughts of otherwise apparently equal validity must prove their worth.

If the pragmatist would conceive of thought as arising out of definite sorts of crises within activity, and as having a determinable function to perform with reference to further action, he would find that his ambiguities would largely disappear. Thought is organic with action in its origin as well as in its effects. The real question to raise regarding it is not whether it has effects or not, or whether it makes a difference in practice, but *what* effects it has, and to what sort of a concrete situation it owes its origin. Ideas are merely phases or stages within a single process. Their value does not depend upon their corresponding to supposed real differences in the constitution of things, but rather upon their efficiency in solving the difficulties in the experience that produced them. Every concept or notion is to be interpreted with reference to a certain kind of experience. By such a view of thought the pragmatist will in no wise lose a whit of what he has insisted upon from the start. He may still hold that thought is connected with action; but instead of holding to a connection of a more or less external kind, he can go further and insist that thought is a part of action, that it *is* action with the emphasis on the process of effecting new adjustments. In fact, it has no meaning except with reference to tensions within experience, on the one

hand, and adjustments on the other. Pragmatism has neglected to take account of the former, and has thus been obliged to force an artificial treatment of the latter.

With such a reinterpretation of the fundamental pragmatic doctrine, *i.e.*, the connection of thought with action, the consequences or effects of thought can be dealt with more intelligibly. If thought is taken as having only an external relation to action, it becomes necessary to postulate over against it some sort of a coherent order of which thought is either a copy, or which selects what happens to be in accord with itself. But if thought is interpreted with reference to action on the side of origin as well as on that of consequences, the problem regarding it shifts from that of its relation to an external order of things, to an inquiry into the sort of needs that produced it, and the degree to which it is effective in bringing about the required readjustments. We are not concerned to find whether our mental contents do or do not correspond with an external order, but to discover the exact nature of the relation that we take it for granted does exist.

Pragmatism, by neglecting to analyze completely the relation of mental activity to the larger whole of experience, really loses all the advantage it claims to have over the traditional philosophical modes of procedure. It falls into the very difficulty of which it accuses the latter. It involves itself in the necessity or defining a coherent order of things in and of itself, precisely the pitfall of the philosophical vagaries that it intended so astutely to avoid. To hold that the idea which has arisen out of a vital difference in the constitution of things may be distinguished by its effects, is to assume a knowledge of a coherent order of objective reality; for, without such a knowledge, how could the proper effects be known as such? It is certainly as necessary for us to be able to distinguish between good and bad effects as it is to distinguish between efficiency and non-efficiency. We want to be able to say what kind of a difference in action is desirable and what kind is not. Such a problem is surely a pertinent one but pragmatism, by failing to analyze fully this relation of thought to action in its solution of the problem, gives up its distinctive position as a philosophical method. That is, it postulates a coherent order of things in which ideas, acts, and feelings have values according to their efficiency in promoting this coherency, or in fitting into it. It presupposes a reality that is already rationalized, and its test for new matter is: Does it promote the rational process in which it claims to exist? There would be less ambiguity if it held to the bald assertion that "every difference must make a difference"; but such a philosophical method, however logical and easy of application, would be, to say the least, a very inadequate one. It is not strange, then, that pragmatism seeks to define differences, and in the way pointed out

above. In so doing, it is logically involved in all the complications of previous philosophy; for the rational order itself cannot be used without definition, and to define it surely requires a whole system of speculative thought. Even if it were to supplement its theory or the relation of thought to action by a theory of a rational order that could be clearly defined, it seems still that its problem would be full of difficulty; for it could never be sure that even apparently the most barren ideas might not eventually have some influence upon conduct. Even the pragmatist admits that there is a vast amount of theoretic activity that is not "immediately ministerial to practice," but which *is* ultimately so. How, then, shall we draw the line between that which is remotely connected with conduct and that which is merely verbal? Does not the assumption of the organic relation of thought and action preclude the possibility of the absolutely meaningless? Pragmatism is here, as we have said, involved in a difficulty that the traditional philosophy escapes. The latter assumes from the start that everything will in some fashion conform with the system that it presupposes. Hence it has nothing to do but to describe its system.

Pragmatism is, however, under the necessity of deciding which mental contents will, and which will not influence conduct, and which influence it in the right way, and which in the wrong way. We hold that it is absolutely impossible for pragmatism, without a further definition of its terms, to throw the slightest light upon either problem. If it proposes to distinguish different kinds of effects, it is evident that it must be able to determine what sort of an objective system is most desirable to have perpetuated; or, in other words, it must use as its criterion the function of the facts under consideration, their function in relation, not to an established order of existence within reality as a whole, but to clearly defined situations. By defining mental contents through their place in a process of reconstruction of experience, by making the question regarding reality one as to the functions of its elements rather than as to its structure, pragmatism would be susceptible of a far more satisfactory application; and it would, moreover, sustain its claim to be a real philosophic method. Its problem would then be not as to whether an idea has or has not effects, but rather as to what its function is within the sort of experience in which it arose. This, of course, involves an analysis of experience, and of the possibility of its being modified in certain definite ways.

It is from a failure to analyze adequately the psychological postulate, that consciousness leads to some sort of movement, that pragmatism is involved in the apparent ambiguity of holding, on the one hand, that every true difference in thought must make a difference in action, and, on the other hand, that every mental content does tend to make a

difference. We have an essentially inadequate view of thought if we regard it as related to action only on the side of effects. The larger view is that it bears a functional relation to experience both preceding and following; and hence that it necessarily has some sort of effects, but only such as can be estimated by taking into account the entire situation both before and after. The two sides of pragmatism may thus be brought into organic relation. We may judge of effects in terms of experience, recognizing that, while all thought serves a definite function, differences are verbal or apparent only in case the actual function is the same.

We can apply this larger conception to James's criticism of certain of the traditional attributes of the deity. If he fails to find any way in which aseity, necessariness, or simplicity modify action, it must be because he has sought for the wrong kind of effects. The problem is not whether these are really God's attributes or not, but rather what attitude toward him led the School-men to postulate these attributes. They were certainly produced by some sort of a situation that either directly or indirectly had practical connections. If this is true, they can be explained only as we find out what that situation was. They become verbal and meaningless when they are abstracted from their true setting and set up as valid in themselves. The reason, on the other hand, that no scholastic argument can offer satisfactory proof of the so-called real attributes of the deity, is that such an argument, also, attempts to prove them out of the connection in which they have meaning. They are convincing to the ordinary man because he takes them where they belong, *i.e.*, with relation to certain aspects, or problems of his practical experience. They may be said to be functionally related to particular crises, or tensions within his everyday life. If the philosopher would demonstrate them in this way, he might stand some chance of convincing others than himself of their truth.

All philosophy would probably admit that concrete practice is the ultimate ground out of which our problems arise, and that it is for the clarification of these problematic situations that we put forth our theoretical efforts. The difference between the pragmatic philosophy and the other types of thought should be found in the way in which it seeks to solve this common problem. If pragmatism attempts to do this by introducing a concept of concrete reasonableness, it involves itself logically in the most theoretical speculations. All science and philosophy, though differing in all other particulars, agree in the endeavor to present a coherent statement for the world of their experience. They may feel it necessary, in order to accomplish this, to postulate a world beyond experience; but in any case the aim is to get an ultimate and consistent view that will serve as a setting for, and will give validity to, concrete experience. In so far the purpose of pragmatism

reduces to something not materially different from that of the more speculative philosophies, namely, to the evaluation of every detail or fact that can possibly present itself by a scheme of previously constructed rationality. It may be urged that, even if pragmatism rests with this programme, there is nothing ambiguous about it; that being essentially practical, it escapes these theoretical difficulties into which other philosophy has fallen. It concerns itself with the obvious fact that some ideas have good effects while others do not, and that some have apparently no effects at all. The only reply that should be necessary to this plea is, that if pragmatism begins to define what it means by kinds of effects, it is driven into the theoretic statement with all its difficulties, or it must admit the thoroughgoing functional relationship of thought and action. In other words, the test of feasibility is not something that can be applied off-hand. It is legitimate only when it is preceded by a genetic and sociological statement of the conditions within which the term to be evaluated appears.

Thought is an organic part of experience as a whole, considered as an active process; and hence, the question as to *mere* effects is, to say the least, unnecessary. The real point of interest is the relation of the consequences of any thought to the larger whole of experience, the sort of situations that produced the thoughts and the function of the latter in the onward movement of the process. There is really no ultimate statement to which the particular can be squared, aside from its function in the development of experience. The single act is not interesting as a mere act or as a part of a static system, but only as accomplishing something that is related to other acts.

We will not deny to pragmatism its right to define what is real and vital, and what is false; we simply maintain that it must make a preliminary investigation of what it is that we can rightfully assume as real, or what is subject to any statement that we can legitimately try to make. For one thing, we cannot state *our* experience in terms of any more ultimate reality. If it cannot itself be made consistent, there is no consistency for us anywhere. The problem of philosophy is to explain the particular by locating it in its context. There is no such thing as a merely verbal concept, nor a meaningless or erroneous idea. Whatever exists has meaning and validity, if not in one context in another; and the task for philosophy is not one of selecting and rejecting, but of finding the setting of that which is.

THE STANDPOINT OF INSTRUMENTAL LOGIC

Arthur K. Rogers. "The Standpoint of Instrumental Logic." Review of John Dewey, et al., *Studies in Logical Theory*. *Journal of Philosophy* 1.8 (14 April 1904): 207–12.

The recent Logical Studies from the University of Chicago represent a somewhat notable contribution to American philosophy on several accounts. I wish here to consider the philosophical standpoint of the book from one side simply, in so far as it represents a protest against realism and ontology.

Briefly speaking, this standpoint makes, apparently, functional psychology supreme, for logic, and for philosophy in general. Thinking arises in a given psychological situation, and its relevancy is entirely limited to that situation. Thing and idea are reducible to the phases in this tensional experience which we call thinking, relative to one another, and to the situation in which they appear. Truth is to be put in terms wholly of the success which thinking has in leading up to a new experience, no longer torn by internal dissensions, but marked by immediacy of satisfaction. On the negative side, this denies outright any validity to the conception of an independent world of things to which thought points. The question of the relation of thought to reality in the traditional sense is entirely unmeaning. The material of our thought looks back to nothing save to the preceding experience out of which the difficulty that leads to thinking originates. The reference of thought is to nothing save the new integrating experience to which it leads. Objectivity is only a peculiar constitutive aspect attaching to a special stage of experience, at the period when experience is being reconstituted. The whole point of view represents a new positivism – not, of course, that the name condemns it – simplified by the abandonment as unmeaning of any unknown universe against which as a background human life is set.

It is not necessary to deny the relative value of this point of view. And the truth there is in it makes a polemic against the position more or less difficult to carry out. Every distinction that an objector may introduce can be shown to have a psychological genesis. And so if one simply

sticks to the assumption that pointing out the teleological function of anything in the psychological process is the final word of explanation, he has an answer to make to every possible objection, which is satisfactory to himself, and fits perfectly into his own point of view. But the defect of the book, from the standpoint of convincing doubters, is just this, that it fails to address itself to, or even recognize the least plausibility in, the reasons which may lead to the questioning of its whole assumption. The only justification of the assumption which it attempts takes the form of showing how it simplifies the answers to certain logical questions. This is, of course, good so far as it goes. But if it simply involves throwing out of court as illegitimate most of the questions which have represented difficulties in the past it may easily appear to be a purely artificial simplification. Of course if it could be shown that the problems were set merely by a logical entanglement, a failure to see clearly the abstract bearings of one's assumptions, there would be nothing to say. But I venture to think it goes back of this – that the difference lies in certain estimates based on prejudices that are too obstinate for mere logical analysis to reach effectively, and that are supposed to have a real value for life.

Of course the most obvious difficulty to be brought up in the way of holding that there exists no problem about the relation of thought to reality, is due to the persistence of the common-sense belief that there is a real world of some sort prior to human experience, on which this depends. I shall only stop to assert, in the first place, that the discrepancy really is there, in spite of attempts to obscure it. And furthermore, when one really sets before him the alternatives, I must confess, at the risk of appearing unphilosophical, that I can not understand at all how anybody, however indoctrinated in modern critical idealism, can fail to feel the burden of the problem, or to recognize that his results, no matter how well fortified by argument, are out of line with our whole natural instincts of belief. I submit that no ingenuity can make such a belief seem to our natural thinking a mere logical absurdity, and the problem which it involves an unreal one. And to have been so sophisticated as to be no longer able to appreciate the force which it has to the natural mind is a philosophical loss. A theory which holds that the stars, *e.g.*, and every reality for which the stars stand, come into existence with the human need which leads to their discovery, or that the earth really was flat, in any valid sense of the word real, so long as men found it satisfactory to believe it so, which denies, in a word, any meaning to the reality of an encircling universe in which our human experience and our human thought are set, may represent the fact, but it has no right to minimize its paradoxical character. And the time has not yet come to take it as an assured result of philosophy. It

may be perfectly true that there is a teleological aspect in our perception of the thunder whose sound breaks in upon us, or of the wild beast which suddenly confronts our path. But that the intrusion is a mere outgrowth of the previous experience, I for one find it quite impossible to realize. Of course one may say that this is simply an ultimate mystery of experience, which, overweighted somehow, has the power of budding forth in these unexpected ways. And it is true that difficulties which call for the thought process do sometimes arise, *e.g.*, in ethical situations, largely after this fashion, as the outcome of the development of experience itself. But it is another thing to apply this explanation to the newly appearing physical facts, particularly those which come upon us unexpectedly. In their ease, I find it vastly more natural to suppose, with the common run of men, that the intrusion actually does arise from some outside source, which had as such no definite relationship in psychological terms to the previous flow of my life, although doubtless the *recognition* of it involves some activity of mine.

Now this may be merely the instinctive prejudice of the unconverted realist; even then it merits, it appears to me, a more sympathetic treatment. However, it may be said that, apart from the difficulty of getting away from it, the belief represents no special value for life. I do not think this is true. When we bring this conception of a real world into connection with the religious attitude, its possible value is not hard to see; and I think it could be shown to possess, similarly, a value for less ultimate experiences. But it is, at any rate, not difficult to understand that one might find a loss of value in giving up the independent reality of persons. This, however, seems to follow equally. If a thing has no reality apart from the function it plays in leading to some experience, so a person is nothing save as he helps to a unitary social experience of mine. I use the last two words because personally I do not see any other outcome; but I will speak further of this presently. Now I seem to myself, on the contrary, to believe that my friend has, at the time of the very stage in experience when I am thinking of him, a reality of his own apart from the thought which, referring to him, makes him useful in a further immediate experience of mine, and apart from this later experience as well. I seem to myself to know what this independent reality is to which my thought only refers, and I most emphatically seem to find this independence essential to the value of the social experience.

However much this issue may be beclouded, it appears to me perfectly clear and straightforward. I suppose that the way in which it would be met would be by denying that the experience is merely mine. I have only space to make a very brief comment on this solution. To repeat, in the first place, the problem. If I look back to something that I call a social experience – say, a tennis match – I find myself necessarily interpreting it

in terms of a number of psychological series. Each person engaged has his own experience, which differs in part from that of any one else. If now I take some single common feature of the game, it is indeed capable of a functional psychological explanation. But the trouble is that it is capable of four such explanations, one in the case of each player. The recognition of a certain situation enters at one and the same moment into four psychological experiences, and grows out of conditions which are in each case at least partially different. If this way of looking at the matter is a delusion, at least it is a singularly insistent one. And accordingly, a theory such as I am considering can not be held to have justified itself, at least it will never convince doubters, until it has a clear answer ready for this question: how, if the final explanation of any fact is in terms of a functional psychology, are we to break the force of this common-sense belief that a psychological experience is always the experience of an individual. Just how are we to understand the way in which what we look back upon as different experiences can be united in a single psychological experience, and so become only aspects or stages of experience in the large, when they started out by seeming to be parallel series?

Since the theory in question has no disposition to make the common appeal to a *deus ex machinâ* in the shape of a supposed absolute experience, the possibilities of a solution are narrowed down. And the only understanding I can get of an answer is this: Every phase of experience is itself simply. It is not to be identified with any other phase. This of course necessarily follows from the psychological point of view. The perception of an axe is not as experience, the axe as used. The perception of the friend is not the experience of the friend in social intercourse. The thought of the game is not the experience of playing. Now the real characteristics of a given reality are only its characteristics as experienced. We can not attribute to it the characteristics of a different phase of experience, just because it is different. So the fact that when we think of it, the game of tennis falls into a group of distinguished phases, need not mean that the game itself was not felt as a psychological unity; it was so felt. Similarly of the assigning of any experience to a self. The self psychologically is only a peculiar aspect of experience, when we make a certain special reference. But this reference itself is intended to lead to a further experience in which the subject-object relation is overcome; and therefore this later experience – illustrated by the active playing of the game – is not *my* experience at all. This, as I understand it, is the way in which the theory would escape the charge of solipsism.

I have only two things to say of this attitude. In the first place, I can not at all understand how the position is to be carried out consistently, without destroying the possibility of thinking altogether. Of course my

thought of a past experience is not itself the past experience. But unless I can in my thought really refer to the experience now past, and recognize characteristics that actually belonged to it in itself, I fail to see how I am to get ahead at all. Of course this would involve the same transcendence in thought, and the same problem of a relation of thought to a reality in some sense outside it, that is denied to be possible. The validity of the present thought is, according to the theory, absolutely exhausted in its present functional value. The past experience was psychologically quite distinct, and therefore I can not now know it, but can only pass through a present thinking experience which is simply itself functioning. But I can not make it clear to myself that this is not the abandonment of philosophy. To state the theory intelligibly, it is constantly necessary to assume that I can thus refer back to past experiences as real, and know what they contained. I never could say that thought leads to an immediate active experiencing, if I did not assume it possible for thought to get away from itself as a special phase of experience, and to postulate a real identity between the past experience which it thinks, and the reference in the present thinking experience. Otherwise, since the immediate experience is not itself a knowing experience, it never could be known or talked about. And if I can know certain characteristics as really present in another past experience, although my present knowing experience does not possess them, so, on the other hand, a characteristic which I find no way of ignoring when I think of such a past reality, I must suppose really belonged to it – the complex of experiences in the tennis game was, *e.g.*, a real fact, and sets a real problem not yet met.

The other point is this, once again: The whole force of the answer depends upon assuming the point at issue. The reply to the charge of solipsism is only good on the supposition that the psychological standpoint is supreme; if one is unable to accept this as a complete statement, it will still seem to him that the reply evades the whole point of the difficulty which he feels. The experience in which thought plays a part still appears always as the experience of a single person, beyond whom there are other persons having their experience at the same time. To show how in the experience of any one of us there arises the recognition of ourselves and of other persons is a legitimate inquiry; but it fails to touch what is the important point. Common sense still believes that persons are real, not as aspects of experience (unless the word ‘experience’ loses its significance by being made to stand simply for ‘reality’), but as the relatively independent centers of experience; and it sees no obvious way of getting them together in an experience at large. Until the difficulty is met, and met in a way which does not reduce itself to what can be interpreted as merely the psychology of an individual life experience – no less mine because I do not happen to be thinking of it as

mine at the time – those who feel the difficulty must believe that the relation of thought to reality is a real problem, and that the attempt to solve it by denying its meaning is premature.

Of course the difficulties in the way of understanding the relation still remain. But I believe that the difficulties which the present volume canvasses are largely due to the fact that the writers whom it criticizes are only half-hearted in their recognition of the externality of reality to the judging thought. To be sure, the correspondence of our thought with reality always thus remains a postulate, an act of faith. In concrete terms, there is always the possibility, *e.g.*, that I may misconstrue another person's feelings; and even the continual working success of my interpretation does I not do away with a final abstract possibility of scepticism. But we have to take things as we find them. If reality actually were what it seems to be, if, that is, it were made up at least in part of personal experiences which, as facts of immediate experiencing, are mutually exclusive, then there is no conceivable way in which a given conscious unity, if it knew what lay beyond itself at all, could avoid having to take things ultimately on trust. Of course this involves something like a preexisting – not necessarily a preestablished – harmony. But we surely should not be any better off if we were to suppose that there was *not* any harmony existing between the parts of the world; and why not the harmony of knowledge as well as of anything else? The mystery is no more than the mystery involved in anything being what it is; it certainly is no more mysterious than the conception of an experience such as we are acquainted with, giving rise from within itself to all those casual variations which we call external happenings.

THE LOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TRUE AND THE REAL

Clarence L. Herrick. "The Logical and Psychological Distinction between the True and the Real." *Psychological Review* 11.3 (May 1904): 204–10.

It was Mrs. Carlyle (was it not?) who said that 'mixing things is the Great Bad.' To the writer it seems that there is a peculiarly injurious variety of the 'Great Bad' in much of our recent psychological logic. It is because that sort of philosophy which the writer for over fifteen years has been calling 'dynamic' and which now seems to have come to its own under the name 'functional' – it is because, we say, that this kind of dynamic philosophy and functional psychology is peculiarly adapted to correct this 'mixing of things' that the writer offers a few words upon the distinction between the 'real' and the 'true.'

This sounds like a question of definition and a matter for logic to dispose of, but we submit that it is also a question of psychology, and that psychology has already made a distinction (also a matter of definition, to be sure, the facts having been understood from time immemorial) peculiarly adapted to explain the logical distinction here required.

It is remarkable that recent writers seem not to have been aware of the ambiguity arising from the identification of the real with the true. The present writer has elsewhere defined reality as 'affirmation of attribute' and this dynamic statement may usefully be contrasted to Lotze's descriptive definition that 'reality consists in standing in relation.' Upon critical analysis the two statements come to the same thing, but our present method in both metaphysic and psychology requires the dynamic form. Nothing can be real apart from a realizer. As Höffding says, 'The real is what we apprehend as real – which, in spite of all effort to the contrary, we must ultimately leave as it is – which we cannot but recognize,' though he at once goes on to confuse this real with what is true.

It may be assumed that all will agree with our definition of simple reality as a statement of metaphysical reality. Dewey says: 'The copula

gives the statement of being, asserts the reality.' But he, too, goes on to discuss truth as relational. In our own extended discussion we endeavor to point out the union of subjective and objective in this identification of essence and attribute, which is only possible in an active percipient.

The logical abstraction of 'pure being' as the activity of the subject apart from the content (meaning – *i.e.*, attribute) is possible, but it involves, as Hegel abundantly showed, the loss of reality. Pure being and non-being were in this sense the same, both being all one to the subject who demands the *act* of asserting or identifying as well as the *mode* asserted.

Professor Baldwin has made, as we intimated above, the important distinction between psychic and psychological, and both Professor Bawden and the writer have shown that the psychic cannot become the subject of scientific analysis. Nevertheless it does afford the foundation on which science (the psychological) must rest. The predicate of reality pertains and can pertain only to the psychic. We do not construct reality but simply perceive (affirm) it. This ultimate fact in experience is reality. The opposite to real is not false, it is non-existent or unreal.

If it be objected that this limitation does violence to common usage it must be replied that any necessary logical distinction may do the same. The distinction between psychic and psychological traverses ordinary usage from end to end but if it expresses a true distinction it is well worth while to reconstruct terminology. In fact, it may well be that any further great advance in psychology must wait for a wholesale reformation of terminology.

The point is that we must have a word for this primary feeling-cognition which we have called reality. Reality is not something we say about experience but a *quale* of experience itself. We ascribe truth to *relations* of things or events among themselves, or ultimately as parts of a universe of things and events. Any reality would be no less real if it existed alone. If we must use Lotze's definition of reality as a 'standing in relation' we should say reality grows out of a relation to the subject alone, but this is a metaphysical after-thought.

When the naked fact of experience comes to be thought about or, in Baldwin's language, becomes psychological, we begin to develop relations which are true or false in so far as they do or do not cohere in an organized whole. The whole duty of science is so to cause the facts thought of to cohere in an organization. This is the sphere of truth.

There is a sense, however, in which reality escapes from the limitation of the psychic and sits enthroned over all thinking. In last analysis elements of our thinking have to be verified by reference to real experience. Sometimes we get a long way from such experience in abstract thinking. We keep building one set of relations upon another,

trying with all our powers, meanwhile, to keep these relations true among themselves, much as one might work out the orbit of a comet, but at last the test is whether things in experience stand back of the true relations – whether the comet can be really found in this orbit.

When Höffding says: “The evidence of reality is given, then...in the firm connection of percepts. We can never be so strongly convinced of the reality of single things and occurrences, as of connected series of things and occurrences,” he has confused reality and truth. Compared with the earlier statement quoted above, the incongruity appears grotesquely. He said that, ‘in spite of all effort’ we ‘can’t help’ recognizing reality, and that there can be no question of any other than this subjective criterion, and now he proposes to add to this once-for-all reality greater reality by multiplying relations. But this is just the difference between truth and reality. Reality, once realized, can by no possibility be improved upon or made more real, while, on the contrary, truth grows more certain the more nearly all known relations are found to cohere with the given relation.

It is not meant by this, of course, that the truth increases with the number of instances, as in the common logical fallacy, but truth becomes more convincing the greater the scope of interaction discovered. The truth that all *Felidæ* are carnivorous is not greatly increased by observing one cat repeatedly to eat meat nor by seeing that one kind of cat always eats meat, but the finding that a different species of animal combines feline dentition with a carnivorous habit adds greatly to the evidence by proving that certain combinations are non-essential and throwing into prominence the organic or genetic relations.

Bosanquet seems to state the law of reality in the definition: ‘Logic treats of the mental construction of reality,’ ‘the world which surround him is there only as an idea, *i.e.*, only in relation to something else, the consciousness which is himself.’ But immediately and, indeed as in duty bound (his subject being logic) he proceeds to discuss the true. For him the objective world is ‘what we are constrained to think in order to make our consciousness consistent with itself.’ In other words, reality consists in consistence of relations, which is precisely truth. Logic might be defined as the science of truth.

Perhaps the discrimination of reality from truth may even help in the much discussed problem of the subjective and objective. For example, when we discover (by a round-about means) that a presentation has been made to consciousness we also get directly (subjectively) an affirmation of attribute. This is an ultimate of experience. It does not make an external world. ‘Light is,’ and that is all there is about it. But when I, psychologically, accumulate a lot of data and construct the concept of

substance, this is a matter of relation. The brightness, heat, weight, etc. are made to cohere in the substance, 'candle,' a thing projected out of self and, by implication at least, contrasted to self, as an object. All these relations of activities are true to the extent that they cohere in one system or organism. When the question arises in our metaphysics as to the truth of the objective world as a whole, as it will when we become aware of the subjectivity of all knowledge, there is but one answer – the one already used. The objective world is true because it is in one organism with the subjective mind. Just as our partial judgments are true or false as they prove to be founded on relations in one whole, organically, not to say causally, connected, so the larger judgment 'there is a true external world apart from the mere act of perceiving it' is true only if the percipient or perceiving force be organically part of the same universe. No other criterion is possible.

The feeling of reality comes from the immediateness of the elements of experience.¹ It defies analysis and requires no definition and yet is implicit in all practical life. The judgment of truth, on the other hand, is a fluctuating evaluation based on relations which are known rather than felt. The weight of evidence forces me to believe what is true, I require no evidence to cause an experience to be real nor will any amount of evidence lessen its reality.

The old illustration of the inability of the blind to realize visual data though they may weave about them all sorts of relations, of the truth of which they are fully convinced, may not be realizable by the non-blind. To this end let us take another example.

A friend of mine who is expert in both physics and physiology, informs me seriously and in detail that he has discovered that by using the radium waves β , and passing them through a set of refracting appliances, he is able to produce a series of irritants which, when applied to the sensitive nerve plexus in the hollow of the human foot, give rise to sensations unlike any other. They possess a great keenness and penetrating force and seem to vibrate throughout the organism by a process of excessive irradiation. Each of these sensations has the peculiarity of localization in certain parts of the body. One 'wavelength' causes irritation at the root of the tongue and marked increase of blood supply. Each is also accompanied by its own emotional response, so that one kind of stimulus predisposes to religious fervor and exalted egoism and the other causes morose and turbulent passions. One even produces a violent desire for something of which no concept can be formed. Now

¹ Cf. Baldwin's explicit treatment of 'Reality-feeling' in distinction from 'Belief' in his *Feeling and Will*, Chap. VII.

I may believe all these as true statements of fact but they do not nor can they produce in me any sense of reality such as five minutes of actual experience might produce.

The writer believes that a consistent limitation of these words to the spheres respectively indicated will lighten the burden of the student of metaphysics as well as of psychology.

The loose use of the words real and true in psychology coupled with clear consciousness of the distinctions involved is encountered in James' Psychology. "The sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come when the thing is contradicted by some other thing of which we think. *Any object which remains uncontradicted is ipse facto believed and posited as absolute reality.*" But the only thing that can never be so contradicted is immediate experience. A subsequent experience may *explain*, it can never *annul* it. The only things that can be contradicted are judgments of relations. The presentation 'rain-bow' is real, but the judgment 'rain-bow now in the sky' can be proven untrue.

If the word 'real' be considered to have too strongly intrenched itself in the wide sphere in which it has been used so carelessly, surely a new word is required for the primary affectation of consciousness called 'sense of reality' and 'reality-feeling.' The further characterization 'a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than anything else' may, perhaps better apply to the recognition of truth. The reason for this relation to the feelings will be found in the nature of feelings. The writer in his inhibition-irradiation theory of pleasure-pain (which has theory) has attempted to derive all emotional acts, physiologically considered, from resistance, obstructions, depletion, or other interference with the flow of nervous impulses, so that there is irradiation or inhibition respectively. If this derivation be correct it will follow that all acts of identification must share in this peculiarity. The new concept meets a barrier at the threshold of recognition which is finally thrown down and the wave of thought finds outlet in a path of least resistance, it is identified with previous acts. This release affords the recently received a psychological restatement by Fite² as 'resistance condition for pleasure.' Identification in one form or another, is back of nearly all intellectual pleasures. Discovery of a true relation is accompanied by pleasure, failure to identify is painful.

It is not without interest in this connection to observe how easily and satisfactorily the dynamic (functional) psychology disposes of the confusion expressed in the classical discussion between nominalism, realism, and conceptualism. So long as precepts, receipts, Anschauungen, concepts, and the like, are conceived as possessions or contents of the

² *Psychological Review*, X., 6.

mind this discussion is inevitable, but when we become fully aware that these are names for acts or parts of processes the difficulty disappears.

When a mode is perceived there is a simple psychic act, even though the stimulus be of the most varied character. Here we have to draw a line as important as any in psychology. We, from the outside as observers, say that a stimulus has been perceived, but what we actually did was to affirm a mode (quality, attribute). Subsequent (psychological) activities consist in combinations of this material into relations. The act of perceiving does not posit any relation (unless the implicit relation to the subject be so considered, and this is thought back into the psychic and is a matter of metaphysic and not of psychology). Psychological work is all apperceptive; its processes are all synthetic (even its analyses). What Romanes calls a 'recept' is a thinking together of percepts. This unifying work of consciousness is a function of its unity which, as an equilibrium, is organically necessary. All organization must unify.

Here, for example, is a roll of paper passing through a ruling machine armed with many pens. I load one pen with blue ink and from that time forward a blue trace moves along the paper along with the red, green, and black traces. I may shift the adjustment here and there and these traces are brought into various relations, forming patterns, etc. The initial inking is the perceiving. This process adds to the activities in the mind a new one which may be shifted, combined, and modified in various ways but never thereafter will the mind-process-group be the same as it would have otherwise been. The psychic equilibrium has been changed. The relations between the several percepts is infinite but some of these are employed instead of others in our constructive thought. Out of activities, all of which cohere in an organism, our selection of part and our conception or thinking together is more or less an act of violence and must always so remain. In so far as a teleological nexus is formed the thinking together is true, in so far as the union is a purely arbitrary one or non-teleological, it is false.

For example, in our classification I have a concept, 'gopher-genus *Geomys*.' Another naturalist has another idea of the limits of the genus. Our concepts may be equally true but this truth consists in both cases in the recognition of a teleological bond. He perhaps includes more of the segment of evolution or career of the 'gopher movement' in nature than I do. The difference is nominal, the agreement is conceptual. We may not say in either case that *Geomys* is a *real* thing but it does in both these cases represent a *true* concept. Let the generic limits of *Geomys* once be set and agreed to, I then place in the genus an animal proving to belong to another line of descent, the reference is false. It is a question of relation.

It is wrong to say that a concept is only a name. It does exist in nature as the subjective expression of the truest thing we know and the most important. It is a 'genetic' verity. It is a career – a doing, in relation with all doing. It is a teleological verity.

But, it may be said, we are only holding a mirror up to nature and see the trajectory of a flying bird, for example, momentarily depicted thereon, or we are but exposing a sensitive plate in a telescope and get only a bright trace thereon. But these illustrations do not go far enough. In order that the plate may receive the star trace correctly, the mechanism of the telescope must follow the path of the star. There must be coördination. So our concept is a conceiving or following of the trajectory of nature. The proof of correctness is exactly the interaction. Our conceptualism has, therefore, a link to realism in that only upon the assumption that we are part of the organism from which the stimulus comes could these correspondences become intelligible. When we no longer find the trace on our photographic plate we adjust the movement. The feeling of reality and the conviction of truth have their justification in the monistic construction of organism.

WHAT IS PRAGMATISM?

H. Heath Bawden. "What Is Pragmatism?" *Journal of Philosophy* 1.16 (4 August 1904): 421–27.

The word pragmatism and the mode of thought for which it stands seem to have come to stay. However 'habitual' humanism may have become with Mr. Schiller, it still seems too 'sporadic and inchoate' with most of us, even after having read his book, to supplant the concise and persuasive term made current by Professor James. It is not, of course, a matter of words merely, but of the type of thought which they represent. For this reason it seems better to employ the term which seems most likely to become common as the designation of the point of view in question. Mr. Alfred Sidgwick in his review of Mr. Schiller's book¹ objects to the name pragmatism as unattractive, but it at least is distinctive, while, as Mr. Sidgwick himself says, "the essence of 'humanism' is not quite easy to find."

Pragmatism seems to appeal to the sense of humor of most of its critics. And the pragmatist is in no way disposed to object to this. As 'a critical study of first prejudices,' it is bound to elicit emotion of some sort, and it were better the feeling of the ludicrous than a more violent emotion. To some of its irreverent opponents, pragmatism seems to stand for the simple principle that any philosophy is better than none, since truth, after all, is simply what we need to live by. And the following are samples of its fundamental concepts: The test of truth is utility: it's true if it works. Hence the final philosophic wisdom: if you can't have what you want, don't want it. For man is the measure of all things. The universe ultimately is a joint-stock affair: we participate in the evolution of reality. Our action is a real factor in the course of events. In the search for truth, we must run the risk of error. Lies are false only if they are found out: a perfectly successful lie would be tantamount to absolute truth. We must 'will to believe.'

It is not the purpose here to examine the truth of any of these statements, but to indicate in a general way what, in recent discussions, the word 'pragmatism' seems to be coming to mean. It has seemed possible to talk glibly about pragmatism without any very clear idea of what it is.

¹ *Mind*, April, 1904, p. 262.

For most persons, who have not made a special study of the subject, the word appears to stand for any practical tendency in philosophy, any tendency of philosophy to conform to the needs and utilities of life in its fundamental principles. And, in a general way, this is a correct idea of what it represents. But to leave the matter thus is to leave it vague and obscure. Pragmatism already is beginning to have a history.

The term for Mr. Schiller in his 'Axioms as Postulates' and in his 'Humanism' seems to refer to any practical, useful or teleological reference in experience. In his conversations with Plato and Aristotle² Mr. Schiller credits the origin of pragmatism to a hyperatlantean god by the name of James. But he also reminds us that, in some of its basic principles, it is as old as Greek philosophy. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were pragmatists in certain of their teachings. Like the theory of evolution, it has had its advocates from the time of the Greeks to that of Professor James. But it is only in recent years that this mode of thought has come into prominence as a philosophic method. The best brief characterization of pragmatism in Mr. Schiller's book is this: 'Science subordinates itself to the needs and ends of life alike whether we regard its origin – practical necessity, or its criterion – practical utility.'³ Mr. Schiller thus uses the term in a more comprehensive sense than does Professor James.

According to the original statement of professor James,⁴ pragmatism is a principle of method for estimating the practical value and results of philosophical conceptions. The soul and meaning of thought, he says, can never be made to direct itself towards anything but the production of belief, belief being the demicadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life. Thought in movement has, thus, for its only possible motive the attainment of thought at rest. But when our thought about an object has found its rest in belief, then our action on the subject can firmly and safely begin. Beliefs, in short, are really rules for action; and the whole function of thinking is but one step in the production of habits of action. If there were any part of a thought that made no difference in the thought's practical consequences, then that part would be no proper element of the thought's significance. Thus the same thought may be clad in different words; but if the different words suggest no different conduct, they are mere outer accretions, and have no part in the thought's meaning. If, however, they determine conduct

² Chapter II. on "'Useless' Knowledge" in 'Humanism.'

³ 'Humanism,' p. 105.

⁴ 'Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,' Address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, published in *The University Chronicle*, September, 1898.

differently, they are essential elements of the significance... . Thus to develop a thought's meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance. And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought distinctions is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve – what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, then, is for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all. This is the principle of pragmatism.

Professor James applies this principle as follows: Suppose there are two different philosophical definitions, or propositions, or maxims, or what not, which seem to contradict each other and about which men dispute. If, by supposing the truth of the one, you can foresee no conceivable practical consequence to anybody at any time or place, which is different from what you would foresee, if you supposed the truth of the other, why then the difference between the two propositions is no difference – it is only a specious and verbal difference, unworthy of further contention. There can be no difference which does not make a difference. There is no difference in abstract truth which does not express itself in a difference of concrete fact, and of conduct consequent upon the fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere, and somewhen. It is true that a certain shrinkage of values often seems to occur in our general formulas when we measure their meaning in this prosaic and practical way. They diminish. But the vastness that is merely based on vagueness is a false appearance of importance, and not a vastness worth retaining.

Doctor King, in his article on 'Pragmatism as a Philosophic Method,'⁵ has criticized Professor James for not extending his pragmatism to the question of the genesis and evolution of knowledge in response to needs, as well as to the question of the validity of knowledge, the test of truth, the worth of the processes set up for supplying those needs. He maintains, virtually, that Professor James had only half done his work in stating the principle of pragmatism. A pragmatic philosophy, he declares, must have a chapter on the genesis and growth of knowledge, as well as on the criteria or tests of its validity.

But now, by a curious and amusing confusion, this which Doctor King criticized pragmatism for lacking is assumed by Professor Dewey's critics to be the essence of the doctrine and is regarded as the main purport of the 'Studies in Logical Theory' of the latter. Here are two

⁵ *Philosophical Review*, September, 1903.

assumptions: First, that Professor Dewey is a pragmatist. Second, that pragmatism means something quite different from that which Professor James, as the originator of the view, says that it means.⁶ Both of these assumptions may prove to be true. But surely it is rather early in the controversy to assume that they are true, as Professor Dewey's critics have done.

We have seen that for Professor James pragmatism means a theory of the test of philosophical conceptions, a theory simply of the practical validation of knowledge. But pragmatism, by these writers, is interpreted to mean that all truth and validity is in response to needs; not only that a thing is true if it works, but because it satisfies a need or demand. That is, pragmatism now seems to mean, in the opinion of its critics, just what Doctor King criticized it for not meaning.

Doctor Sheldon, in his review of the book,⁷ assumes that the purport of the 'Studies' is a genetic account, a genetic functionalism. But this misses the whole point of the book. No one as yet has criticized the book from the point of view of that which it sets out to do. Assuming the continuity of experience and the specific reconstructive utility of thinking in the process of experience, the problem is to interpret antecedents, data, forms of thought, entities, existences, realities, from the standpoint of their definition in and through this process of transformation. It, indeed, asserts that the problem of the origin can not be dissociated from the problem of the nature of a thing, that questions of history and questions of validity presuppose one another. But it does not set out to give an account of the origin of anything. It is not a cosmology, as Professor James remarks.⁸ Starting with experience as we daily live it, it asks after the law of transformation or reconstruction of that experience. And having found a statement of the process which is, at least measurably, true, it seeks to show what is involved in this way of looking at experience, especially what it suggests with reference to the interpretation of logical categories in terms of the psychology of thinking. It is simply an attempt to get a method which will enable us to state the logic of experience so as to avoid the deadlock of the epistemological antinomies.

Professor Baldwin, in his article on the 'Limits of Pragmatism,'⁹ also

⁶ Professor James credits Mr. Peirce with the original statement of pragmatism, but the former first gave currency to the term.

⁷ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, February 18, 1904.

⁸ 'The Chicago School,' *Psychological Bulletin*, January 15, 1904.

⁹ *Psychological Review*, Vol. XI., No. 1, January, 1904.

assumes that Professor Dewey is a pragmatist, and makes the further assumption that pragmatism takes one term (the needs) as fixed, and then proceeds to criticize this view for not taking the needs as functional. But this is just Professor Dewey's whole point in the first chapter of the 'Studies.' Professor Baldwin is using Professor Dewey's principle to knock over a hypothetical 'pragmatism' attributed to the latter. Indeed, it appears to the present writer that the defect of Professor James's pragmatism and of Professor Baldwin's æsthenomic idealism is just this which is attributed to Professor Dewey, viz., the setting up of a certain stage or phase of experience (the practical in Professor James's view and the æsthetic in Professor Baldwin's view) as fixed, instead of recognizing that both these belong to the cycle of experience and have existence in this cycle of experience only in a functional sense. Professor Dewey himself insists that the needs are not to be taken as fixed. They require to be explained as much as anything else.

The point of view of Professor Dewey's philosophy, happily, has received no single title up to the present time. One is not quite sure but what it is unpragmatic for its defenders to seek to name the 'new philosophical movement' so soon. There is always a suspicion that when a point of view becomes a school of thought with a definite name, its work is done, and it is on the decline. When it is precipitated and crystallized in specific terms, it is apt to be classified and laid away on a shelf in the museum of the historic systems. Certainly it is the very spirit of the new movement to keep all its categories organic and functional, and this, indeed, is one stumbling-block to many of its critics. They regard this as simply a screen for all sorts of obscurities, ambiguities and confusion. Nor can it be denied that this is a real danger. But when it comes to a choice between accurately classified fossils and the living organism of truth, some prefer the latter, even though it does demand some reconstruction of formal logic.

Pragmatism, through this very criticism of pragmatism, thus seems to be coming to be used in a more inclusive sense, and, in this sense, it seems to be fairly just to regard many writers, in spite of all their differences, as striving for a common goal – what may in general be called a pragmatic theory of experience.

That the word is coming to be used in this larger sense is borne out by the character of the discussions at the recent meeting of the American Philosophical Association at Princeton, where the general subject was one of the prominent topics under consideration. As the term was used on this occasion, it was taken to include in a general way the so-called instrumental or functional point of view of what Professor James has

called the 'Chicago school.' Professor Creighton in a paper on 'Purpose as a Logical Category'¹⁰ expressed the opinion that this movement, in late years, had assumed proportions that must be reckoned with, and, from the standpoint of analysis of the teleological arguments and the arguments from evolution advanced by certain of these writers, undertook to point out certain inadequacies and inconsistencies in the pragmatic standpoint. Among other things, he said that pragmatism does not do justice to the thought element in experience, and does not give adequate recognition to the category of self-consciousness. He further maintained that pragmatism is essentially individualistic.

The address of the President, Professor Josiah Royce, on 'The Eternal and the Practical',¹¹ criticized the general standpoint of the pragmatist from much the same point of view, dealing particularly with the pragmatic test of truth and with the pragmatist's conception of the genesis and function of judgment. In a very interesting way and with much dialectic skill 'pure' pragmatism was shown to be inconsistent and even suicidal. It was admitted, however, that it is doubtful whether such a pure pragmatism anywhere exists. Of more weight was the able critique of the pragmatist's use of the evolutionary argument in support of his position. It was shown that the biological argument from evolution, upon which the pragmatist implicitly relies, is not the real basis of pragmatism but rather a corollary from it. This Professor Royce adduced as an illustration of the inconsistency of the pragmatic scheme. But doubtless, the pragmatist would accept the alternative, and reply that evolution is simply an illustration of the pragmatic nature and development of experience. With the main thesis of pragmatism as an empirical philosophy of life, that thinking or judgment is the expression of a need, and its function that of working out a solution of the problem presented by this need, Professor Royce expressed himself in hearty agreement. It is only when the attempt is made to generalize this empirical and utilitarian method that he opposes it. As a practical working device for meeting particular situations, he granted it a certain intelligibility and efficiency. But, he said, pragmatism, thus conceived, is purely individualistic. It yields assurance and individualistic success, but it guarantees no objective or social certainty. Its standards are lacking in the essential character of a standard – transgredient reference and verifiability. Thus the consciousness of the 'ought,' Professor Royce maintained, implies and demands an objective, a social, indeed an eternal, consciousness to give the particular and individual judgment that authority which it is the very nature of every judgment to express.

¹⁰ Since published in the *Philosophical Review*, May, 1904.

¹¹ *Philosophical Review*, March, 1904.

For this eternal consciousness and standard of reference pragmatism leaves no place, hence its judgments are merely ephemeral and personal reactions to particular situations, lacking in that universality and necessity which give objectivity to the typical scientific or ethical judgment.

Both papers elicited considerable discussion and the presence of several representatives of the Chicago faculty of philosophy led to the discussion of a number of points raised in the two papers. The main points in this discussion made by those who, in a general way, defended the pragmatic standpoint, were to call attention to the tendency to conceive pragmatism in too narrow a way, in which thought and action (or conduct) are brought into opposition as two distinct spheres, instead of being merely relatively distinct moments or stages in a common process. And instead of being forced by the nature of judgment to postulate an absolute or eternal consciousness in order to give authority to individual judgments, a true view of the really social nature of consciousness (and thus of judgment) shows the necessity of stating the absolute itself in pragmatic terms.

In conclusion, a few things seem clear. The general movement which rightly or wrongly is coming to be designated as pragmatism is away from an intellectualistic and transcendental, toward a voluntaristic and empirical metaphysics. It is thoroughly evolutionistic in its general presuppositions, though critical in its exposition of details of this doctrine. And, finally, it seeks to interpret in dynamic and functional terms the valuable results of the analysis of consciousness which the structural psychology has given us, and turns, for its basic principles of interpretation, to psychogenetic science.

The movement in its broader scope thus includes not only the 'pragmatism' of Professor James and the 'Humanism' of Mr. Schiller, but also the 'functional view' of the representatives of the 'Chicago school,' the 'geneticism' of Professor Baldwin and the 'dynamic realism' of Doctor C. L. Herrick, which is being set forth systematically now for the first time in the pages of this JOURNAL. Mr. Stout's essay on 'Error,' in Sturt's 'Personal Idealism,' also contains much that is in sympathy with a pragmatic point of view.

HUMANISM

John Dewey. "Review of F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism*." *Psychological Bulletin* 1.9 (15 September 1904): 335–40. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 3 (1977), pp. 312–18.

Review of *Humanism: Philosophical Essays*. F. C. S. Schiller, M.A. London, Macmillan & Co. 1903.

A reviewer of *Humanism* has an unusually hard task set him and one whose accomplishment he is bound to view with dissatisfaction. For he must either sacrifice its rich variety of concrete content to a statement of a few generalized features; or he must, in behalf of a scheduling and summarizing of detached essays on a multitude of different subjects – as different as ‘Mephistopheles,’ ‘Non-Euclidean Geometry,’ ‘Darwinism and Design,’ ‘Lotze’s Monism,’ etc. – forego a consideration of what gives the book a claim to be a representative of a single philosophic point of view, the herald of a philosophic system which, if not so new nor yet so unformed in the ages from Plato to Hegel as Mr. Schiller seems to suppose, yet issues in fresh, clarion tones from his trumpet. And in this dilemma the present reviewer elects to stand with the Schiller of the title-page and the preface rather than with the Schiller who in the dozen years between 1892 and 1902 wrote fifteen interesting and most suggestive, but somewhat detached, essays. In a word, it is the general tone and temper of the book that seem to me significant, and to which I shall devote myself, even at the expense of inevitable passing over of pages of fresh and pregnant philosophic construction and criticism – even at the cost (to which it is somewhat harder to reconcile myself) of not recording my almost total dissent from the positions taken in the essays entitled ‘Activity and Substance’ and ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Investigation of a Future Life.’

First, then, as to Humanism itself – not the name, but the fact. What is that attitude which as Mr. Schiller naïvely says – for as even Homer nods, so a sense of humor occasionally fails even Mr. Schiller – he ‘knows to be habitual in William James and in myself, and which seems to be sporadic and inchoate in many others?’ The answer is that as a philosophic standpoint and method it “takes Man for granted as he

stands and the world of man's experience as it has come to seem to him. This is only the starting point, from which we can proceed in every direction, and to which we must return, enriched and with enhanced powers over our experiences from all the journeyings of Science" (pp. xvii–xviii). Or again, Humanism is "content to take human experience as the clue to the world of human experience, content to take Man on his own merits... . To remember that Man is the measure of all things, *i.e.*, of his whole experience world, and that if our standard measure be proved false all our measurements are vitiated; to remember that Man is the maker of the sciences which subserve his human purposes; to remember that an ultimate philosophy which analyzes us away is thereby merely exhibiting its failure to achieve its purpose...is the real root of Humanism" (pp. xix and xx).

Humanism thus conceived seems to me a method not only sane and sensible, but inevitable almost to the point of the truistic, and it required the chorus of objections in which a dozen critics have joined in the last few months to persuade me that there was, as a standpoint, as a method, anything particularly novel, not to say revolutionary, involved. But the critics with one voice have acclaimed this point of view as subjective, irretrievably so, as individualistic, as solipsistic. When Mr. Schiller remarks that if Man as the standard measure he proved false all further measurements are thereby vitiated, he has, to my mind, answered the critics by anticipation. The standpoint cannot fairly be labelled as per the above, unless the human nature which is taken as furnishing the key and clue to human experience be purely subjective, be enclosed within an exclusively psychical individuality. And if such be the case, it is clearly impossible for this individual to transcend these limits in his philosophizing any more than in any other of his industries or pursuits. The critic has indeed, in such case, the right to condemn 'Humanism' as sceptical and solipsistic in tendency; but his right is earned and maintained only at the cost of putting his own critique and his own philosophizing in the same boat. He has pursued the expensive process of fatally disparaging the organ and medium of all science and philosophy in order to put in an unfavorable light a particular method which he does not like.

But surely a thinker may freely avow that he is going to take Man as he finds him, rather than as he might fix him up to be, and is going frankly to recognize that Man so taken is the measure of experience, without thereby having committed himself to 'finding' Man made of stubble blown together on a quicksand. Even the Scriptures give us the right to think of Man as composed of a substance as tough, even if as plastic, as clay. It is not clear to me why it is not as open to Schiller, to James, to myself (it is the critics who embolden me to this temerity), as

to others to make use of whatever universal and objective factors enter into the human make-up. But as for building upon a hypothetical universality which exists not in everyday concrete human nature, as observation and description, history and analysis reveal that human nature; which exists only in projections which are the special monopoly of philosophy, and which turn out to be projected by a humanity which in its immediately present constitution is only subjective and individualistic – that is a flight which I am willing to deny myself. Meantime there are those who do not share in these pessimistic views of human nature, even ‘as it is,’ those who take a more generous view not merely of its possibilities, but of its actualities; who, indeed, are loath to speak of its possibilities save as there is found for them a basis in the actualities.

Humanism necessarily assumes a sympathetic, not an antagonistic attitude towards all the natural sciences. This is not because it reduces philosophy to naturalism, but because it finds it can draw freely upon the methods and results of the sciences in forming its conception of Man as the Measure, or in applying this measure to this or that realm of experience. It is no surprise accordingly to find where Professor Schiller stands as regards the contemporary *crux*: the relation of philosophy to psychology. At many points, most notably throughout the important essay on Truth, he shows himself a thorough disbeliever in that modern revival of the old time heresy of two-fold truth, which holds that something may be true for psychology, and false or else meaningless for logic (and *vice versa*); while he insists upon the renascence of logic which is bound to come when thinking, when truth seeking and testing, is considered in its concrete implications with the emotive and voluntary life. And when the critics object that we have here confusion of merely descriptive science with normative and evaluative science, they make their point (as in the case already noticed) by first ignoring the real position of those whom they criticize, and then by attributing to them the critic’s own beliefs.

For the contention of the humanist is precisely the unreality of the separation from each other of describable facts and normative values. The humanist really believes that values *are* normal, even to the extent of being current in life itself. Hence, aims, ideals, standards, are a part of the facts which psychology itself has to reckon with. The factual continuity of biological function and psychological operation with logical norm is one of the most significant things to be noted and described. Similarly the humanist, while feeling the social sciences to be especially near to him, will not balk at any method or datum of the physical sciences, because the physical sciences help one in forming a right conception of what Man the Measure is, and, as Mr. Schiller puts it, of how Man measures, and by what devices one may make concordant his

measures with those of his fellow-man. The humanist is thus able to transfer the conception of the unity of all knowledge, which to the epistemological idealist is a barren postulate of an ultimate but unrealizable achievement, into a working postulate of present method. It becomes the idea of the *continuity* of experience; the only idea, so far as I can see, which saves us from the mutually sterilized, and hence sterile, nothing of the natural and the ideal in which the transcendentalist indulges, and from the wholesale merging of the spiritual in the natural which is the materialist's objective.

In the second place, characteristic of Mr. Schiller's work is a worthy and adequate recognition of the significance of experience in its immediate aspect. Were not the term sure to be misconstrued as one of denial (that is, of the mediate as real), humanism as expounded by Mr. Schiller might almost be termed *Immediatism*. This phase of his thought is so well wrought out in what seems to me the ablest essay in his volume, that 'On Preserving Appearances,' that I need hardly do more than refer to it. "The only reality we can start with is our own personal, immediate experience. We may lay it down therefore that *all immediate experience is as such real, and that no ultimate reality can be reached except from this basis, and upon the stimulation of such immediate experience....* The distinction of 'appearance and reality' is *not* one which transcends our experience, but one which arises in it. It does *not* constitute a relation between our world and another, nor tempt us to an impossible excursion into a realm inexorably reserved for the supreme delectation of the Absolute" (p. 192). And the same may be said of course of the distinction between the absolute and the relative, the finite and the infinite, the real and the ideal, subject and object, and all the other antitheses which are dear to philosophy's heart. They all arise *within* immediate experience. And to quote further from Mr. Schiller: "The process of reaching them is everywhere the same; we experiment with notions which are suggested to our intelligence by our immediate experience, until we hit upon one which seems to be serviceable for some purpose which engrosses us... . They remain on the same plane of interpretation, and all alike are attempts, more or less successful, to supplement some unsatisfactory feature or other in our primary experience" (pp. 193-194). Here I shall simply add what indeed Mr. Schiller does not deny, but hardly seems to realize the full force of: the necessity of the *genetic* method to put before us (1) the *meaning* of philosophic categories and philosophic antitheses, in terms of their *origin* in typical crises or junctures of immediate experience, and (2) the *validity* of such conceptions in terms of their relative success witnessed in their further career in 'supplementing the unsatisfactory features' which called them out. It is this methodological feature which, so far as

I understand the matter, specially characterizes the recent *Studies in Logical Theory*, rather than a broader Humanism on one side, or a narrower Pragmatism on the other.

In the third place, a feature which used to be called Voluntarism, which is now termed Pragmatism, and which personally I should, for reasons which I shall not go into, prefer to call Instrumentalism, is characteristic of Mr. Schiller's thought. In his own words: It is the "thorough recognition that the purposive character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive activities... . It is a systematic protest against the practice of ignoring in our theories of Thought and Reality the purposiveness of all our actual thinking, and the relation of all our actual realities to the ends of our practical life. It is an assertion of the sway of human valuations over every region of our experience, and a denial that such valuation can validly be eliminated from the contemplation of any reality that we know" (p. 8). Or, as he develops one phase of it in a footnote which contains some of the most pregnant thinking of the entire volume (pp. 11 and 12), it is the recognition that knowing is itself a kind of action, which like any mode of action modifies the world of reality in which it occurs, the objects at which it is directed. In my judgment the volume would be noteworthy if it advanced only this one idea: that it is sheer superstition, crude survival, that knowing simply reveals a nature which Reality already has, not affecting or transforming or farther determining it in any way. "The determinate nature of reality does *not* subsist 'outside' or 'beyond' the process of knowing it," and all our knowing is a mode of action in which the known reality gains more specifically determined character – this is an Idealism which is experimental, not merely epistemological, and which is ethical, not merely intellectualistic, and which, so far as I can see, alone makes possible a metaphysic which in truth and not merely in word acknowledges Evolution.

This is little enough to say of Mr. Schiller's Pragmatism. But it ought to be enough to suggest, (1) that it is *one* feature of Mr. Schiller's thought, not the 'whole thing.' It is an important feature, indeed; but it gains its especial prominence just now because of the persistent ignoring in current epistemology of psychological, biological and sociological teachings as to the intimate connections of thought processes with larger emotive and volitional issues. I confess to surprise that its critics have not recognized that if this phase of the new philosophic movement is at times exaggerated beyond its due import, this exaggeration is simply a natural reflex of the prevalent minimizing of it. In any case, there is no excuse for the view which identifies this philosophic movement, in head and in members, with just and only pragmatism. Mr. James, who surely ought to know since he gave the term its present currency, has used it

only to express a certain method of testing and evaluating philosophic conceptions. He has never designated the *substance* of his philosophy (as distinct from one aspect of its method) anything but Radical, or Pluralistic, Empiricism. The category of purpose is a category, not the only one, and it is a category which, like any other, has its own specific conditions and function within experience; it is not *a priori*, and externally determinative.

(2) There is nothing in pragmatism which commits it to a narrow or offensively practical conception of 'Practice.' I would not say that there are no serious problems involved in getting a sufficiently broad and comprehensive conception of Practice, of conduct; to define Practice is no easy matter. I would not say that Mr. Schiller, in particular, has not moments in which he gives coloring to the claims of the critics that knowledge is relegated to a mere utilitarian device. But how unnecessary this is appears from the scope of his own definition: "The purposive character of mental character must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive activities."

(3) And the sapient remark of almost all the critics that theory is itself a form of action, that knowing too is a mode of practice, instead of standing as a charge or accusation, only repeats one of the most cherished convictions of pragmatism. The only difference is that pragmatism in holding to knowledge, to intellectual operations as a mode of activity, does not believe in the reality of an activity which is confined merely to mirroring, to re-presenting, a preëxisting reality. It believes that activity really effects, really counts, really constructs; and that in so doing, it actually modifies Reality, entering into its own inherent evolution. And this by its inherent and primary, not by a derived and accidental law.

“HUMANISM”

Addison W. Moore. “Humanism.” Review of F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism*. *Monist* 14.5 (October 1904): 747–52.

It appears that philosophy once more has an “issue.” Since the days of T. H. Green’s attack upon the fortifications of English empiricism, neo-Hegelian Idealism has held most of the field in England and America. The legends on its banners are: “Reality consists of an absolute system of immutable ideas.” “Truth consists in the reflection, representation, or symbolization, by finite ideas of this absolute system.” Though, incidentally, thought may perform a reconstructing function in experience, its chief business as the subject matter of logic is to “represent” or “correspond to” the unchanging and unchangeable system of ideas.

The problem set by these conceptions, since the days of Plato, is that of a criterion for truth thus defined. How is this “correspondence,” “representation,” etc., to be tested? The difficulty is Janus-faced. On the one side we are confronted by the ancient and honorable problem of “The Finite and Infinite”; on the other, by the no less honorable and ancient one of “Permanence and Change.” The latter has been rendered particularly acute by the work of psychologists of the last twenty-five years in showing up the dynamic character of ideas. How can anything so flexible, as psychologists have shown ideas to be, reflect or represent an unchangeable reality?

It would seem that the logical and epistemological treatises based on the conceptions embodied in the above “legends” must needs have kept this crucial problem steadily in view. But strangely enough, at any rate certainly enough, such has not been the case. Volume after volume of logical theory has appeared in which the topic of “validity” appears as an incidental but always a troublesome matter, yet one which, belonging to the field, must be covered. Hence, too, after several hundred pages have been filled with an account of how this correspondence is effected (though it is indeed difficult to recognize much of it as an account of “correspondence”) we find the chapter on “Validity” consisting chiefly of a confession that the account of correspondence has ended in failure. It would seem that the necessity of such confessions must long ago have led to a suspicion of the assumed conceptions upon which such

confessed failures are constructed. Instead, it has for the most part only stimulated more subtle and refined analyses within the limits prescribed by these assumptions.

However, these conceptions have meanwhile not gone entirely unchallenged. Over twenty-five years ago, Mr. C. S. Peirce wrote in *The Popular Science Monthly*: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we can see the object of our perception to have, then our conception of these effects is the whole conception of our object." A few years later, the challenge again appears in Mr. William James' chapter on "Reasoning." Although that chapter was bound in a large volume labelled "Psychology" in large gilt letters there were statements in it very important for logic and epistemology. These statements were to the effect that thinking takes place at the point where activity encounters difficulty in going on in a non-thinking fashion; and that the chief business of thinking, from the psychologists' stand-point, at any rate, appears to be that of resolving this difficulty. (Of course it is equally in order to regard the "difficulty" as teleological for thought, *i.e.*, it occurs that thought may go on; each is teleological to the other. Teleology is thus inside, not outside, the process.)

No one who remembers his history of philosophy would think of calling this in either its content or its method a "brand new" discovery. Such a claim would and should quickly be met with such names as Augustine, Fichte, Schopenhauer, to say nothing of the "primacy" of Kant's *Practical Reason*. On the other hand, this same historical sense should make it equally impossible, even from a very superficial survey, to regard the movement as a mere masquerade of some earlier type of voluntarism.

Since the appearance of Mr. James' psychology this instrumental character of thinking has been the dominant standpoint for its treatment by psychologists, and in the meantime the conviction has been growing that this must have its significance for the relation of thought to truth and reality; that if it is sound psychology, it must be good logic and epistemology. Within the past few years, this conviction has found explicit expression to such an extent as to constitute what is now a recognized movement and issue in philosophy. To these expressions Mr. James has continued his contributions in his *Will to Believe* more explicitly still in his *Philosophical Concepts and Practical Results*, in 1896, and in his more recent *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Much also of Prof. J. M. Baldwin's writings, *e.g.*, his article on "Selective Thinking," is essentially of the same import. The most detailed and articulate contribution to this period of literature, however, is Mr. Dewey's article on "The Reflect Are Concept," (*Psychological Review*, Vol. III, 1896), the logical implications of which, most readers appar-

ently failed to discover at the time it appeared. This failure is doubtless another witness to the intensity of the ancient prejudice between logic and psychology. Scarcely less significant, if not so explicit, have been many contributions from Germany, and especially from France.

While the literature of the movement clearly shows it to be a general one, the most self-conscious and detailed manifestations of it have appeared within the past two years in America and England, and interestingly enough, almost simultaneously. In England, Mr. F.C.S. Schiller is by far the most thorough-going and militant representative. Mr. Schiller has recently put his contributions to the movement into a volume which he calls "Humanism." By Humanism Mr. Schiller means "the philosophic attitude which, without wasting thought upon attempts to construct experience *a priori*, is content to take human experience as the clue to the world of human experience...to remember that man is the measure of all things, i.e., of his whole experience-world and that if our standard measure be false all our measurements are vitiated; to remember that man is the maker of the sciences which subserve his human purposes; to remember that a philosophy which analyses us away is thereby merely exhibiting its failure to achieve its purpose...this is the real root of Humanism."

Mr. Schiller feels that "more than the usual amount of apology" is due for the small proportion of new matter in the volume, all but one of the fifteen essays having appeared in more or less complete form elsewhere. However, I think that Mr. Schiller may be sure that his readers will be glad to have these essays in the revised, permanent and attractive form which they now possess.

Mr. Schiller prefers the term "Humanism" to "Pragmatism" on the ground that the latter "is in reality only the application of Humanism to the theory of knowledge." However valid Pragmatism may be as a method of logic. "we must yet concede that the man is greater than any method he has made and that our Humanism must interpret it." (pp. xxi.) This certainly appears well taken. But some, even of those most in sympathy with Mr. Schiller's general view, may feel that however central human experience may be, it may not after all include all experience and they may continue to long, therefore, for a term that shall express the instrumental, reconstructive character of thought in experience as such.

The most explicit exposition of Mr. Schiller's Humanism is to be found in the essays on: "The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics," "Useless Knowledge," the new essay on "Truth." "The Metaphysics of the Time Process," – an illuminating discussion of that much befogged subject; "Reality and Idealism," "On Preserving Appearances," and Essay XII, on "Activity and Substance."

In the first two essays we get some very general variations of the central *motif* announced in the preface. The theses of "The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics" are: (1) "The purposive character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive activities." (p. 8); (2) Reality is not something which cognition is to merely represent. Hence "is awarded to the ethical conception of good, supreme authority over the logical conception of true, and the metaphysical conception of real. The good becomes a determinate both of the true and the real. For from the pursuit of the latter we may never eliminate the reference to the former." (p. 9)

As an illustration of the competition between old and new habits of thinking, and of the eternal vigilance necessary to a consistent maintenance of the lane; it is interesting to note that even Mr. Schiller's thoroughly sophisticated consciousness of the problem is almost betrayed into an identification of reality with the "objective" as opposed to the "subjective." (Note p. 11.) I say "almost," for the case is perhaps saved by the statement immediately following: "The actual situation is, of course, a case of interaction, a process of cognition, in which the subject and object determine each other and both we and reality are involved, and we might add – *evolved*."

The central theme, – cognition a function in conduct – is further elaborated in the dialogue "Useless Knowledge," which is in Mr. Schiller's most characteristic style and which serves as an excellent introduction to the chapter on "Truth." In the latter, after a negative criticism of the views of truth as: (1) "agreement with reality," (2) "as systematic coherence," Mr. Schiller sets forth his conception of truth as "a form of value" and finds that the logic which expounds this view with truth is hand in glove with psychology. The outcome of Mr. Schiller's analysis is: "As regards the psychical fact of the truth valuation, truth may be called an ultimate function of our intellectual activity." As regards the object valued as true, "truth is that manipulation of them which turns out upon trial to be useful, primarily for any human end, but ultimately for that perfect harmony of our whole life which forms our final aspirations." (p. 61.)

The essay "On Preserving Appearances" is a very telling criticism of "the familiar antithesis between 'appearance' and reality," the vogue of which Mr. Schiller regards as the chief constructive result of the work of Mr. F. H. Bradley. (p.184.) Again we read (p. 199) "our inferences must approve themselves...by the power they give us to *transform* our experiences... . The transmutation of appearances, therefore, must not be represented as an inscrutable privilege of the Absolute; it must be made a weapon mortal hands can actually wield."

The last thesis of this chapter, viz., that Ultimate Reality must be

absolutely "perfect" and "harmonious" and the contents of the essay following on "Activity and Substance" develop a conception of Mr. Schiller's that is likely to give some of his most sympathetic readers pause, and is certain to be seized upon by the critic looking for "internal inconsistencies." The conception is that of an ultimate "changeless activity," and immutable "beatific consciousness" as the goal of thought-burdened experience. The limits of these remarks forbid even an outline of Mr. Schiller's very incisive argument. But it would not be strange if some should have trouble with the conception of "a changeless activity." Not that activity is to be identified with *mere change* (as most of the critics of "Pragmatism" assume) but that it is to be changeless, that there is to be no change anywhere in it, is surely a hard saying. Some will be puzzled also on reading (p. 105) "if therefore the ultimate explanation of the world is to be in terms of ends, it would seem as though it must be in terms of individual ends realized in and through the time-process"; and then to find (p. 227) that "self realization must assume the form, not of a hideous, barbarous neurotic restlessness, nor of an infinite, and therefore futile struggle, but of an activity, which, *transcending change and time* [italics mine] preserves itself in an harmonious equipoise." Nor is it inconceivable that some one should profess to find in this conception of an "ultimate," "unchangeable" "completely beatific" experience certain features not altogether unlike Mr. Bradley's and Mr. Royce's Absolute. However, one gathers that the conception has an interrogation mark after it in Mr. Schiller's own mind, and its exposition is made in quite an hypothetical spirit. And one is here reminded that the complaints by critics of "lack of system," of "the ignoring of fundamental points," etc., in "Pragmatic" literature is certainly premature. Nothing so far has been put out that pretends to be anything more than prolegomena.

On the whole it is safe to say that whatever becomes of the "Pragmatic movement," when the history of "the revival of Pragmatism" or "Humanism," or "Teleological Empiricism" is written, Mr. Schiller's contributions are certain to have a prominent and permanent place.

REVIEW OF PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING

James R. Angell. "Review of William James, *Pragmatism*." *International Journal of Ethics* 18.2 (January 1908): 226–35.

Review of *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*. By William James. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907. Pp. xiii, 309.

Pragmatism is primarily a name for an intellectual attitude, for a method of thought, and should not be interpreted as necessarily designating a specific philosophical creed. To be sure, a considerable body of common doctrine has grown up among pragmatists and this material may properly be called the pragmatic philosophy. Nevertheless, the term is at present properly applicable to a point of view and a mode of procedure, rather than to a body of metaphysical conclusions. Its enemies give it a bad name. Not since the appearance of the utilitarian ethics has a philosophical position been at once so roundly abused and so staunchly defended. Its more acrimonious assailants allege that as metaphysics whatever is new in it is but a shallow empiricism founded upon the ruins of logic, while its pretended novelties are mainly plagiarisms from time-honored philosophic systems, and its chief stock in trade is an unbridled audacity. Its defenders, on the other hand, are loud in its praises as a philosophic movement which promises that for the first time a full and discriminating justice shall be done to facts – a promise which positivism once made but only partially redeemed. Its disciples uphold it as the one philosophic method competent to take complete account of the teeming possibilities of reality. It is the only view, they assert, which truly apprehends and fearlessly sets forth the *creative* aspects of this reality. For the old-fashioned "set pieces" of rationalistic absolutism, it offers living, breathing creatures of flesh and blood, fallible and imperfect, but alive and fecund. Where the truth really lies amid these divergent estimates of the pragmatic doctrine may well puzzle the impartial onlooker.

One thing is certain, one must go back three or four decades to find any intellectual movement which has so stimulated the philosophic blood in the veins of English and American thinkers. Even its enemies

are obliged to admit (in deed if not in word) the tonic effect of its presence. At all events the flood of vitriolic criticism which they have discharged upon it is itself a tribute to the virility and importance of the thing attacked. Though certain of its fundamental tenets be as venerable as its antagonists maintain, they have nevertheless been freshly formulated and in a thousand ways essentially revitalized. It is not merely a case of twice-told tales, otherwise there would be fewer listeners and far fewer critics. National lines have been for the nonce largely obliterated. Germany, to be sure, has persistently preserved her insulation, but Italy has been much affected by the agitation, and France only in lesser degree.

It is surely obvious that in our own country no undertaking of the professional philosophers has in recent years appealed so strongly to the imagination of metaphysical amateurs, to that large body of persons of general intelligence who cultivate a sporadic interest in speculative affairs. To the man in the street (the back alley of philosophy) the attractiveness of pragmatism comes at least in part from its genial disrespect for the abstractions of philosophic thought and its hail-fellow-well-met attitude toward the lowliest yellow dog of a fact. It is evidently no respecter of persons or traditions. It goes on all fours with the crowd and is both pugnacious and game. It makes its more serious appeal to the unprofessional public by reason of its avowed effort to adopt the temper and the methods of modern science. The more highly developed of the sciences aim fundamentally at descriptive insight into the *behavior* of things, and if this behavior can be made intelligible, and particularly if it can be subjected to control, no great interest is felt in the search for a possible higher order of realities lying back of the empirical facts. Now the ambition of pragmatism is all of a piece with this disposition of modern science. It seeks first and foremost an account of behavior, and having gained something which answers in this direction to the requirements of practice, it is disposed to regard as idle any further speculation about the possible ultimates residing behind the scenes.

This mood inevitably gives to pragmatic writing a certain buoyant vitality and spontaneity which is extremely alluring. It conveys a sense of intellectual resiliency which invites confidence and fortifies courage. The fresh breezes of vital fact blow so freely through Professor James' pages that, despite the exhilarating stimulation which one experiences, one is at times left sadly out of breath. The close and stuffy atmosphere of the traditional philosophy has been exchanged for the large air of life itself.

Professor James opens his case with an indictment of the prevailing philosophic systems, particularly those of rationalistic proclivities. Indeed, we are never long deprived of the merry sound of the belligerent

shillalah ringing lustily about the shoulders of the unfortunate rationalist, whom Professor James belabors at every turn with rare gusto. Possibly we are here encountering the influences of his Hibernian ancestry. In any case, he finds that the philosophies of an empirical character, although they keep close to fact, are commonly irreligious, and so fail of satisfying an important part of the human demand laid upon a philosophy: whereas the more rationalistic and religious-minded cults preserve an aloofness from fact which renders them hollow, unreal, and repellent, both to science and to common sense. In pragmatism he finds a method which promises a philosophy that can be religious with the best of the rationalisms, and nevertheless cherish, with empiricism, the most sensitive reverence for fact.

This hopeful note reminds us that philosophy with the courage of eternal youth is always starting her career afresh, casting off the old outworn rags and decking herself forth in new garments of seeming beauty and worth. Pragmatism is the last costume in which she has attired herself. That it will endure to the end of her journey, who can say?

What then is the pragmatic procedure? Professor James says that it stands for "The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts" (p. 54). Pragmatism "agrees with nominalism, for instance, in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions, useless questions, and metaphysical abstractions" (p. 53.). "Rationalism sticks to logic and the empyrean. Empiricism sticks to the external senses. Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either logic or the senses, and to count the humblest and most personal experiences. She will count mystical experiences if they have practical consequences. She will take a God who lives in the very dirt of private fact – if that should seem a likely place to find him" (p. 80). These quotations exhibit in the most graphic manner the temper and drift of the pragmatic position as Professor James advocates it.

In his early chapters the author offers some illuminating examples of pragmatic procedure in connection with the examination of such categories as substance, matter, the soul, design, and free-will, and in a special chapter he attacks single-handed the oldest and most protean of the problems of philosophy – the problem of the one and the many. From this conflict, be it said, he brings forth triumphant a somewhat battered pluralistic doctrine, a doctrine which holds that, although we MAY live in a real universe, there is at present no compelling reason for feeling *certain* that we have about us an order which either is, or ever will be, wholly unified.

On the question of the important categories, such as space, time, causality and the like, he takes a somewhat Spencerian position, holding that these mental devices for manipulating experience are presumably the inventions of some early human genius, which have survived because of their practical usefulness in enabling us to get about successfully in our world. That they have any such immanent and inseparable connection with the nature of mind, as Kant maintains, he utterly scouts.¹

Pragmatism means the effort to discern philosophic truth by submitting hypotheses and beliefs to the test of practice. That one is true which survives this appeal by showing itself fit to guide us amid the exigencies of actual experience. Any two doctrines which lead to identical conduct and consequences are in essence one and the same. At first blush this sounds like a new deification of the philosophy of common sense, and so in a measure it is. But it is a common sense which would have scandalized Reid and his Scottish followers, for, as we shall see in a moment, it manifests but scant respect for a fixed order of any kind, whether this be thought of as mental or physical.

When applied to the interpretation of many of the older and more familiar philosophic problems, it is undoubtedly helpful in the emphasis which it lays upon the discovery of concrete and specific consequences to be apprehended from one or other of the possible solutions of these problems. That, in reaching these solutions, it can in any way dispense with the devices of an intellectualistic kind, which have hitherto been fashionable in both science and philosophy, by no means follows. In other words, the appeal to *results* in *practical* experience is in no sense equivalent to the banishment of rationalistic considerations. Nor do the pragmatists mean that their view shall be so interpreted, for they recognize thoroughly that practice, concretely taken, involves rationalistic elements, quite as inevitably as it does motor elements. Their constant insistence is, however, wisely and rightly, that we must always and again carry back into the stream of actual human life the results of our philosophic speculation, in order that we may there subject them to what is their most crucial and significant test. It is against the anæmic and devitalized abstractions of rationalism that the pragmatist rails, and if rationalism has in reality allowed any of its abstractions to become thus disconnected with the vital facts of experience, it is quite certain that the pragmatic bogey-man will get them.

The doctrine which is most likely to give pause to the average lay

¹ Professor James is far less successful as a wrecker than he is as a builder. His criticisms of rationalism, especially of Kantianism are couched in a slap-dash manner, which makes most diverting reading, but in the reviewer's judgment they are often quite wide of the mark.

reader is Professor James' account of the nature of truth. His philosophic critics find it difficult to discover respectable words in which adequately to voice their sentiments on the subject. A few quotations may best set forth what this view is. "The 'facts' themselves meanwhile are not *true*. They simply *are*. Truth is the function of beliefs that start and terminate among them" (p. 225). "Truth is *made*, just as health, wealth, and strength are made, in the course of experience" (p. 218). "Truth makes no other kind of claim and imposes no other kind of ought than health and wealth do" (p. 230). "*The true, 'to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving'...*"expedient in the long run and on the whole, of course" (p. 222). "Truth in science is what gives us the maximum possible sum of satisfaction, taste included, but consistency both with previous truth and with novel fact is always the most imperious claimant" (p. 217). "You can say of it then either that 'it is useful because it is true,' or that 'it is true because it is useful'" (p. 204). "Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events" (p. 201). "The reasons why we call things true is the reason why they are true, for 'to be true' means only to perform this marriage function" *i.e.*, marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts (p. 64). "Truth is *what we say* about them," (*i. e.*, new contents) "and when we say that they have come, truth is satisfied by the plain additive formula" (p. 62).

Obviously it would be easy to travesty these statements as a pronouncement favoring truth as dependent upon the caprice of the individual mind which in its leisure moments takes the trouble to pronounce certain things true and others false. All the stark rigidity of truth, as ordinarily thought of, is gone, leaving a merely invertebrate mass devoid of any informing purpose. Not such a protoplasmic jelly is the truth of science and religion, however it may fare with the modest little truths of common sense and commonplace human nature. At least such is sure to be the first reaction of the normally hard-headed person.

The view which the author is here defending is one which appears to magnify into truth itself the *method* by which we *ascertain* truth and *test* it. Unquestionably, we get our truth from rough actual experience and equally, without question, we test it by its adequacy to experiential demands. But it is not so clear to the ordinary mind that the nature of truth is exhausted by any such account of it. There is a core of reality upon which our predications of truth and falsity must inevitably be grafted, and to which they are in part relative. In other writings, Professor James has more fully recognized this fact. There is, to use his own word, a "grain" in things against which we cannot go if we would. To this stubborn grain in things his present exposition does scant justice.

The world out of which we construct our truth is not wholly fluid. There is in Mr. Schiller's phrase "a primary reality" which is in part given, whether we will or no, and although we refashion it in many ways to our own ends, we never get entire power to determine its nature. [Professor James might well urge that in fairness quotation should be made of certain passages in which he more explicitly recognizes the significance of "old truth" and "funded truth." The reviewer's point touches, however, not so much the author's attitude toward old truth, although this does not appear to be always consistent, as it does his conception of the part played in the formation of any truth whatsoever by the non-human element in it, the element over which we have no complete control.]

To illustrate: We may interpret the events of history as much as we like, and the successful interpretations we shall call true and the others false, and aside from such success and failure in the interpretation, we have no means of determining truth and error. But the occurrence of some actual historical phenomenon is a *sine qua non* of the whole interpretative process, and in his present work Professor James hardly gives the consequences of this fact their proper perspective. Had he done so, many of his sayings would have taken on a far less paradoxical air. In the mere occurrence as such, certain predicates are forever excluded from truth and certain others forever included, whatever our disposition about the matter. We must, in the first instance, conform ourselves to the event, not it to us. That a person called Napoleon lived for a time on an island called Elba can never be truthfully denied, however possible it may prove successfully to incorporate such a false assertion in our practical affairs. That kind of predicate *as true* is, by the event itself, rendered forever impossible. Even though it should be feasible to conduct successfully our purely personal career (a perfectly conceivable hypothesis) while asserting that nothing occurred corresponding to the supposed event, its reality would not be obliterated, except in our thought, and our assertion, though pragmatically true for us, would not correspond with the facts.

In this connection it seems to the reviewer that Professor James has somewhat slurred the social side of the truth-determining process, although he has not overlooked it. If all men agreed that no such event as the Napoleonic residence on Elba had occurred (an error which the historians of a million years hence may well make), the positive human outcome might quite well be as though the event had not in reality come to pass. Certainly, as a matter of fact, what we call truth, is, in most cases, a socialized product in which the less acute and less developed minds take advantage of the discoveries of the more talented and more widely experienced. In many cases the interpretation of facts which

comes to be accepted as truthful is determined by a sort of plebiscite in which the verdict of the mass of mankind determines the issue. Whether we identify truth with Professor James' pragmatic edition of it or not, it is clear that the method of discovering and testing it is more social and less purely individualistic in character than he sometimes makes evident.

The reviewer goes with the pragmatist entirely so far as regards the determination and the verification of truth, and he feels that many truths are simply such by virtue of the part which they play in human affairs. They refer to phenomena which are interpretable in several ways, and the truth or falsehood of these interpretations is simply another name for their capacity or incapacity to serve certain ends, but surely there is a residual element in all phenomena which is not thus subject to utterly flexible interpretation. This view may seem to leave one mired in the bogs of an old-fashioned epistemological dualism, a doctrine which is at least not ultra-fashionable nowadays, but this is not the place to discuss either the ancestry or the posterity of this formula.

The moral and religious world into which pragmatism gives ingress is cast in a heroic mold. It is a world in which there is no assurance that righteousness and happiness will prevail. But on the other hand, it partially insures against the pessimistic belief in the final victory of either blind chance or malicious wickedness. Professor James entitles it melioristic. It is no doctrine for weaklings, nor for those in the extremes of spiritual depression. "There can be no doubt that when men are reduced to their last sick extremity absolutism is the only saving scheme. Pluralistic moralism simply makes their teeth chatter, it refrigerates the very heart within their breast" (p. 293).

On pragmatic principles this last statement apparently offers a clear warrant of superiority to absolutism, for it is in just such extremities that men most crave and need the comforts of religious faith. If pragmatic meliorism cannot provide a heart-satisfying belief for these moments, it is in so far tried by its own test and found wanting. Of course, the non-pragmatist will urge that what we want under such circumstances, has no bearing whatever on the question as to what are the true facts. But this answer sounds ill in the mouth of pragmatism.

Professor James draws a picture of an unfinished world in which growth is going on everywhere, in which righteousness and sin are ever fighting a real battle, and in which the issue is ever in doubt. There is here no promise that the Almighty will preserve the faithful or give him victory. For that we must look to religious absolutism. The brave soldier can but do his duty, and, if need be, die. The solid comfort which has always come to human souls in the great moments of human agony from the conviction that God lives and loves his children, that happiness will finally be achieved, that justice will ultimately be done, that peace

will eventually be gained in a life beyond the grave, is not for the pragmatist – at least, not on the usual terms. These are convictions which he is free to cherish, but for *assurance* he can only look to his own unflinching purpose and resolution.

To one already endued with nobility of spirit, this form of pragmatism speaks a bracing Stevensonian gospel. But to the mean and miserable, to the wretched and downcast, it is but another curse in the cup of despair. No doubt, for one of the author's unflinching moral and intellectual courage such a program is inspiriting and elevating, but to those minted from a softer metal it offers a bleak and cheerless prospect, with little to instigate hope, and nothing to inspire confidence. This is a faith for the spiritual aristocracy, and pragmatically tested by the proletariat, its condemnation is sure.

In his volume on religious experience the author intimated, as he had previously done elsewhere, a faith of a more mystical complexion. There is still room for such a faith here, but it is badly crowded by the regnant empiricism of a scientific kind which pervades the present volume. One who had not read the earlier writings of the author, would hardly suspect its existence from this book. So swamped is this former leaning of the author, that even his overt reference to his expositions of it elsewhere serves but to emphasize its absence here.

Professor James fearlessly advocates the view that philosophic convictions are the result of temperaments, and that the great system makers can all be divided into either the "tender minded" or the "tough minded," into rationalists or empiricists, into intellectualists or sensationists, optimists or pessimists, monists or pluralists. However adequate these divisions, there can be little doubt that the pragmatic deductions which the author makes in moral and religious directions are colored by his own temperamental prepossessions. It is not at all clear that a consistent application of the same pragmatic principle to the issues of the moral and religious life would not in other hands result in a quite different conclusion.

In the "Varieties of Religious Experience," the author himself made inferences as to the implication of the experiences of the great saints and religious leaders, to say nothing of the experiences of plainer folk, which were distinctly pragmatic in basis, and spiritually much more positive in their outcome. They looked with much greater confidence than is here disclosed toward a view of life in which spiritual affairs play a conspicuous rôle, and in which the life of the soul after physical death is more than a speculative possibility. At all events, such was the interpretation commonly placed upon the author's words. The reviewer can only feel that in writing this part of his book the author has had too much in mind the conventional difficulties which philosophy has always

raised for religious belief; and too little the actual pragmatic warrant for religious faith itself as tested in actual life.

Taken as a whole, "Pragmatism" must be counted a great book. No one can read it and escape constant stimulation in his own thinking. It freshens and revivifies every topic upon which it touches, and even if each tenet in it be proven false, it must nevertheless be recognized as one of the most serviceable of contemporary works in philosophy by reason of the vivid way in which it raises vital issues. Moreover, despite its occasional coquetting with paradox, it contains an amazing amount of sheer solid good sense. It embodies a courageous and lucid defense of a doctrine notoriously unpopular in many professional circles. It reveals in a most delightful manner the inner workings of one of the foremost minds of our own time, and in sustained brilliancy of style it would be difficult to name a peer. Whether its teachings, like those of Socrates, will be adjudged dangerous for the younger generation and subversive of good citizenship can only be determined by time. Signs are not wanting that the asperity of its critics is already softening – specially those who come out from behind the screen of anonymous reviews.

The movement which the book represents suffers most from the ordinary faults of youth, *i. e.*, impatience, precipitancy, and a certain raw enthusiasm. Under the mellowing influences of age it should take its place among the real progressive factors in the history of thought. In any case it is but the focal point of influences which radiate from every branch of science and philosophy. It is no sporadic phenomenon, no stray meteor in the intellectual heavens. It belongs to a larger system, for which the term "enlightened empiricism" may serve as a title.

REVIEW OF WILLIAM JAMES, *ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM*

John Dewey, "Review of William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*." *New York Times Review of Books* (9 June 1912): 357. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 7 (1979), pp. 142–48.

Review of *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, by William James. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912.

The history of philosophic thought exhibits few more surprising events than the intellectual achievements of William James in the last decade of his life. Careful readers knew that his monumental *Principles of Psychology* carried, scattered through its pages, the essentials of a philosophic attitude. The essays published in 1897, with the title *The Will to Believe*, elaborated many of these points and gave the name of radical empiricism to the attitude. But, none the less, Mr. James's important work and that to which his reputation attached was in the field of psychology. Indeed, among professional philosophers it was rather the fashion to speak in a tone of amused disparagement of his philosophic attempts. The unusual, the almost unique thing is that after having reached an age when most men simply repeat and expand their own past, Mr. James compelled the whole world to take note that a new way of thinking in philosophy had made its appearance. Of course, much of his influence is due to the remarkable vitality and picturesqueness of his style. But literary style alone does not explain the phenomenon. The times were ready; the general state of the imagination had moved so that it was ready and eager for the very ideas that in the earlier days of James's prophetic vision had meant nothing to it.

The words that happen to close the present volume express the general spirit of Prof. James's thought, and help us understand the rapid extension of his influence: "All philosophies are hypotheses to which all our faculties, emotional as well as logical, help us, and the truest of which will at the final integration of things be found in the possession of the men whose faculties on the whole had the best divining power." We are far enough away from any "final integration of things." But every

generation must make its own relative integration, and the extraordinary rapidity with which Pragmatism, as the name for a method, and Radical Empiricism, as the name for a system, have made their way is sufficient tribute to the genuineness of Mr. James's divination. That philosophies are hypotheses, rather than mathematical demonstrations; that personal factors, emotional and aesthetic, enter into the formation of these systems; that strictness of logical reasoning is ultimately effective only in the degree in which it works out an original non-logical vision or divination; and that the vision of Mr. James is extraordinarily pertinent to the general trend of contemporary thought — these things the progress of events has proved.

The present volume of *Essays in Radical Empiricism* is the third and presumably the last (unfortunately) of the writings published since Mr. James's all too early death. Taken together, they leave his philosophy incomplete, a sketch and a program, rather than a carefully wrought and enclosed system, like that, for example, of Bergson. While we cannot too much regret that Mr. James is not still with us to give needed developments and explanations, there is still something congenial to Mr. James's personal temperament and to his philosophy in this unfinished state. For there is nothing more characteristic of the substance of his thought than the belief that the world itself has an element of unfinishedness in it and that one of the standing errors of philosophers has been to attribute to reality a completeness which as matter of fact it does not possess.

In the final essay from which we have already quoted, Mr. James gives so precious an expression of this belief that it may well be quoted at length:

The "through-and-through" universe seems to suffocate me with its infallible impeccable all-pervasiveness. Its necessity, with no possibilities; its relation, with no subjects, makes me feel as if I had entered into a contract with no reserved rights, or rather as if I had to live in a large seaside boarding-house with no private bed-room in which I might take refuge from the society of the place... . The "through-and-through" philosophy seems too buttoned-up and white-chokered and clean-shaven a thing to speak for the vast, slow-breathing, unconscious Kosmos, with its dread abysses and its unknown tides. The "freedom" we want to see there is not the freedom, with a string tied to its leg and warranted not to fly away, of that philosophy.

The present volume falls in with his *Meaning of Truth* rather than with his *Pragmatism* or his *Pluralistic Universe*. It is not a volume of

spoken lectures addressed to a more or less popular audience, but a series of written essays addressed for the most part to his professional colleagues. This does not mean that Mr. James has parted with his direct and living style of expression: he could never have surrendered that and remained himself. But it does mean that it occupies itself largely with technical matters and is more argumentative, and less purely expository, in expression. It is concerned not so much with setting forth and making vivid and persuasive a certain attitude and method as with applying that method to the consideration of a number of problems mooted among philosophers. As a consequence, it is quite likely that while pragmatism will be popularly identified with the name of James, in professional philosophic circles the considerations presented in this last volume of posthumous essays will be in the end most influential. At all events, as the editor, Prof. Perry, rightly notes in his preface, Prof. James "came toward the end of his life to regard radical empiricism as more fundamental and more important than pragmatism."

What, then, is this "Radical Empiricism"? Empiricism is an old and well-established doctrine, and it is clear that the key to what is distinctive in the Jamesian type of empiricism is to be found in the adjective "radical." Yet of empiricism in its more generic form he gives his own statement, which must be quoted in order that we may understand its radical quality, for even here Mr. James puts the emphasis in a different place than would be expected by those who have learned to identify empiricism with the sensationalism of Hume and the Mills. In the first place, he dwells upon its hypothetical, non-dogmatic character. It is "contented to regard its most assured conclusions regarding matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience." And in the second place, it is a postulate of method of procedure in philosophy. This method may be stated as follows:

Nothing shall be admitted as fact except what can be experienced at some definite time by some experient; and for every feature of fact ever so experienced, a definite place must be found somewhere in the final system of philosophy. In other words: Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real.

Some light is thrown upon part of the significance of this definition by what Mr. James says elsewhere in reply to a critic who asked him if his view precluded the possibility of things beyond experience, acting and being acted upon by experience. "Assuredly not their possibility," replies Prof. James, adding, "yet in my opinion, we should be wise not to consider any thing or action of that nature, and to restrict our universe of philosophic discourse to what is experienced, or, at least, experienceable."

So far, however, we are well within the limits of an empiricism which was held by many thinkers prior to the writings of James. If we read between the lines, the radical quality of this empiricism is at least suggested in that part of the passage quoted where it is said, "Every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real." Those who have gone by the name of empiricists have been practically unanimous in denying the reality of universals, indeed, of relations generally. They have spent much time and ingenuity in explaining them away; in showing how they are grafted from without upon particulars which alone are real. In short, they have set out with an idea of what experience must be, and have then translated the facts of experience into accord with their prior assumption. In opposition, James holds that if we go to experience itself "we find the relations between things are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves."

The development and application of this proposition are contained particularly in the first five essays of the present volume, all of them, however, enforcing the thesis that various problems which have given philosophers all kind of difficulties are simplified and made solvable if we stick to the empirical relations of different sorts which are found among the various items of our experience. The net outcome is that philosophy must regard reality as an "experience-continuum": the doctrine, more elaborately stated, that "though one part of experience may lean upon another part to make it what it is in any one of several aspects in which it may be considered, experience as a whole is self-sustaining and leans upon nothing else."

The first essay applies the conception of empirical relation to the vexed question of the nature of the physical and psychical, things and consciousness. It propounds the radical, almost revolutionary, doctrine of pure experience which is prior to the distinction of mental and physical and wholly neutral as to the distinction. This room, as directly experienced, for example, is not in itself either physical or mental; it is just what it is as experienced; it is an experience. This experience, however, may enter, in its totality, into two different contexts, or may function in two different ways. When it enters into one context, that which we call the history of the house to which the room belongs, it becomes physical; to be taken in this kind of empirical relationship is, indeed, what we mean by physical. As entering into the context of personal biography, it becomes mental or psychical. Taken in this relation, it is what is called consciousness, and it is all that consciousness is or means in experience. Thus the splitting up of experience into thing and mental state is not original, but is added to an experience as that enters into relations in different ways. Or, as Mr. James sums up the

doctrine: "Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and does not denote a special stuff or way of being."

This doctrine is sufficiently thoroughgoing that it will occupy philosophers a long time while they digest and criticise it. But it has equally revolutionary attachments. Mr. James also holds that concepts, the world thought of, as well as the world perceived, is in its first presentation a matter of pure experience, in itself neither mental nor physical. We do not remember a memory, we do not imagine a fancy, we do not think a thought. We remember, imagine and think realities, bits of pure experience which as directly experienced are perfectly real. Only because of their subsequent history do these realities get split up, some of them forming, say, the world of ideal mathematical relations wholly objective in their ideality, and some the world of our purely mental reveries.

In the fifth essay, called "The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience," Mr. James makes a very interesting application of the doctrine of a pure experience to the matter of values and of appreciation. Emotions and affections are generally regarded as purely mental and subjective. At the same time naïvely we treat qualities of value as belonging not just to our feelings but to objects. We speak of a precious diamond, a fine day, a beautiful painting, a good man. Those committed to the doctrine of the purely subjective nature of such qualities regard this attribution of value-qualities to objects as a case of transfer or projection, and build up an elaborate machinery for objectifying the subjective. How much simpler and more direct, says in effect Mr. James, to take these qualities of value as realities, just as they are experienced, recognizing that they afterward become subjective or objective according as they act upon their neighbors in experience. The ambiguity of the qualities of appreciation – such qualities as hateful, lovely, good, evil, fine, ugly, precious, trivial – thus becomes a confirmation of the doctrine of pure experience. The doctrine itself saves us from the necessity either of making the values upon which ethics, aesthetics, and logic depend purely subjective and mental, or of calling in some transcendental, unexperienceable principle to give them validity. It would be hard to find a better illustration of the importance which Mr. James attached to the recognition of the complete reality of the empirical relations which the parts of experience bear to one another.

It is impossible to try in passing to give anything more than indications of the meaning of the principle of pure experience. But we cannot close without noting the classification of kinds of relations which is developed in the second and third essays, especially as this affords the systematic basis of the well-known pluralism of Mr. James. The usual procedure of philosophers, facing the problem of relations, has been either (with the empiricists) to deny their reality altogether, or (with the

rationalists) to resolve all things into a single closely knit system of relations, or some kind of all-inclusive absolute. Mr. James suggests the simple but almost revolutionary method of sticking to direct experience and recognizing that various types of relations exist which are incapable of resolution into one another, from the comparative externality and mutual indifference of space, mere coexistence, up to the intimacy and mutual interpenetration of our personal strivings. That the world arrived at by such a method is a much more loosely jointed thing than the world of orthodox realism or idealism, empiricism or rationalism, is indeed true. But what stands in the way of accepting the principle save an a priori prejudice that the whole universe must be made on a single uniform plan? It must also be noted that the same essay contains an application of the Jamesian conception of empirical relations to the explanation of the nature of knowledge – a theory which gives the foundation of his pragmatic theory of truth. It would not do to say that an adequate consideration of this foundation would convert Mr. James's critics, but it is not too much to say that it would put the whole controversy on quite a different basis from that on which it is usually conducted.

The review should not close without a recognition of the care and thoroughness with which the editor of the volume, Prof. Perry of Harvard, has done his work – an acknowledgment all the more due since he has kept this work in the background in the most objective way. It is impossible to estimate as yet what the fate of the Jamesian Radical Empiricism is to be. But this review has wholly failed of its purpose if it has not made clear the reviewers conviction that Mr. James has opened a new road in philosophic discussion. He has compelled philosophers to rethink their conclusions upon many fundamental matters, because he has led them to a new mode of approach. Mr. James left the new philosophy in too undeveloped a state for it to win disciples wholesale; but the contribution of a new organ of vision and criticism is a more precious contribution than that of a complete system based upon any traditional point of view.

A TRENCHANT ATTACK ON LOGIC

John Dewey. "A Trenchant Attack on Logic." Review of F. C. S. Schiller, *Formal Logic*. *Independent* 73 (25 July 1912): 203–5. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 7 (1979), pp. 131–34.

Review of *Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem*, by F. C. S. Schiller. New York: Macmillan Co., 1912.

The reader does not have to go far in Dr. Schiller's *Formal Logic* to discover that the author's purpose is a systematic destructive criticism of what is known as formal logic, not an addition to the almost innumerable textbooks on the subject. "Nonsense fortified by technicality" is his more casual way of referring to it; his more formal statement is that it is "inconsistent, incompetent and meaningless." But we must hasten to add that the book is in no sense adequately characterized by such a selection of abusive epithets. Indirectly, if not directly, the aim of the book is constructive: "to clear the ground for a new logic that will not disdain to reflect upon real thinking, nor confine itself to fictions and falsifications." The book makes its appeal to a narrower, because more technically trained, circle of readers than Schiller's previous books upon humanism. While possessing their lucidity of style, his mode of treatment is more rigorous and more restrained. Probably some academic philosophers who have been offended by his unconventionality and occasional flippancy, and by his disregard of the professional technique for playing the philosophic game, will revise their opinion of Schiller on account of the sobriety, the severe consecutiveness and obvious scholarliness of the present volume.

In substance, the volume (a large octavo of about four hundred pages) is an unrelenting, dogged pursuit of the traditional logic, chapter by chapter, section by section. Not a single doctrine, nor, I think, a single distinction of the official textbooks escapes Schiller's demolishing hand. Those who have forgotten their college logic – which includes all, I imagine, whose fate it has not been to teach it subsequently – would not follow much of the book intelligently unless with a text in hand. Accordingly, I shall make no attempt to summarize its specific contents, as that would take the reader into the far off mysteries of extension and

intension of terms, the nature of categories and predicables, the laws of thought and the opposition of propositions, through the syllogism and its rules to the inductive canons and the various kinds of fallacies, formal, semi-logical and material. For purposes of technical students, the value of the book resides in the thorough and detailed way in which Schiller has followed up and criticised all the conceptions of formal logic, never letting up till he has subjected the last one to examination. But, as our author points out, there is a guiding principle of unity that holds together all these detailed criticisms, for there is a single source of the incurable defects of formal logic. And this principle of unity involves a point which concerns any intelligent reader, whatever his lack of interest in the technicalities of formal logic. The difficulties and inconsistencies, the final meaninglessness of formal conceptions, is that formal logic is engaged in the impossible attempt of considering modes of thought "in themselves," apart from their application to actual situations. It is the absurdity of this attempt which deprives formal logic not only of truth, but of meaning. This is the clue that Schiller follows so unrelentingly through the logical labyrinth, and which gives an almost dramatic interest to the driest of the criticisms – dry, because the things criticised are so hopelessly mummified. In every case he shows the abstraction from the concrete conditions of human use of logic, and the fatally paralyzing effect of leaving human application out of account.

Incidentally, one of the most interesting things in the book is the glimpse that it gives, by way of contrast, of a genuine logic which shall report the conditions and aims of actual human thinking. Some of the conceptions which will be fundamental in it and which are totally omitted from formal logic are meaning, truth and error in their concrete difference from each other in a specific case, selection, relevance and risk. Meaning depends upon context, bearing and intention; and formal logic must exclude these from its ideal, for they are human and psychological. While traditional logic has much to say about truth, the truth it talks about is mere formal consistency, since it declines to consider the material application of its premises. Relevance – a fundamental conception of concrete thought – is excluded because it goes with selection, with selection of the part that is useful, while formal logic professes an all-inclusive ideal. Selection, moreover, is a voluntary and hence arbitrary act, and so is shut out from a doctrine that acknowledges only what is purely theoretical. Finally, formal logic, with its creed of absolute certitude, abhors the very mention of adventure and risk, the life-blood of actual human thinking, which is aroused by doubts and questions, and proceeds by guesses, hypotheses and experiments, to a decision which is always somewhat arbitrary and subject to the risk of later revision.

A vital and wholesome sense of the realities of actual thinking pervades the whole book; it supplies the background against which the criticisms of formal doctrine are projected. The book should not only attract new readers to Schiller and increase his already enviable reputation, but it should lead some thinkers to reconsider their prejudices against the introduction of psychological – that is, human – factors into logical theory. Mr. Schiller brings out, in case after case, with a cumulative effect which is fairly deadly, that at the crucial point each formal distinction is saved from complete meaninglessness only by an unacknowledged and surreptitious appeal to some matter of context, need, aim and use. Why not, then, frankly recognize the indispensableness of such volitional and emotional factors, and instead of pretending to a logic that excludes them, build up a logic that corresponds to human intellectual endeavor and achievement. It is difficult to see how even the most hardened devotee of a purely theoretical intellectualism can lay down the book without such questions haunting him.

To many it will probably seem that Mr. Schiller exaggerates the importance of the foe which he attacks. He will seem to them to be making too much of what at most is hardly more than a temporary annoyance of some college students. In one respect, I think this feeling is justified. Mr. Schiller is evidently stirred by the educational situation in which he finds himself at Oxford, and to which he wittily refers as follows: Both logic and science can academically prosper under the delightfully paradoxical regulations of e.g., Oxford, where what is supposed to be the theory of science is only taught to those who know nothing of its practice, while those who are experts in the practice of science are not allowed to study “a theory of science” which could only delay their progress.

At Oxford, one gathers from many of Schiller’s statements and still more from his general tone, formal logic is so deeply entrenched as a subject for study in its traditional form that one runs risk in attacking it. Certainly, it occupies no such consecrated and protected position in American higher education, nor in the esteem of American educational authorities. There would be a general popular willingness to accept the characterization of it as “nonsense (or at least pedantry) fortified by technicalities” without taking the trouble to read the arguments upon which Mr. Schiller bases his description. From our educational point of view, then, there can be no doubt that Mr. Schiller takes the subject-matter of formal logic altogether too seriously. But when one leaves the technical subject-matter and comes to the general conception of the nature of thought and of the intellectual ideals and methods which should operate in life, the same cannot be said. It is impossible to exaggerate the extent of the influence of formal consistency and formal

demonstration, and of the notion of an "intellect" working in detachment from need, motive and specific application to a concrete situation. As Mr. James said of a similar matter, the change invoked in passing over to a logical ideal based upon opposite conceptions of the nature of mind and its relation to life, marks a revolution hardly second in importance, with reference to the change indicated in the seat of intellectual authority, to the Protestant Reformation. From this point of view Mr. Schiller's volume, in spite of its technical subject-matter and mode of treatment, is a significant contribution to one of the most fundamental of our social issues. His sub-title, in its reference to a "social problem," is more than justified.

PRAGMATISM AND MYSTICISM

Douglas C. Macintosh. "Pragmatism and Mysticism." Review of John Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*. *American Journal of Theology* 15.1 (January 1911): 142–46.

The interest in viewing together the recent volumes of Professor Dewey¹ of Columbia and Professor Inge² of Cambridge is due to the extremely antithetical positions held by the two authors. It would not be unfair to characterize the former as an anti-mystical, or even, in ordinary senses of the term, anti-religious pragmatist, and the latter as an anti-pragmatic mystic. Neither of them seems to regard as worthy of consideration the attempt to transcend the opposition and reach a synthesis in religious pragmatism.

Professor Dewey has done a service to philosophical readers in republishing in the volume under review some of the most important of those acute and stimulating philosophical essays of his which have been appearing in various periodicals for more than a decade past. Moreover, viewing thus in better perspective the recent work of this significant thinker, one can detect more unmistakably the motives which underlie his philosophical work.

What one at least of these fundamental motives is, becomes abundantly clear from several passages in the book before us. It is nothing less than the complete eradication from philosophy of the last vestiges of the positively religious view of the universe. Toward this end the author makes his instrumentalism an instrument, and it is largely this fact which accounts for the violently anti-metaphysical character of his pragmatism. It is a new and revised positivism, not based like Comte's upon the physical sciences primarily, but upon functional psychology.

To enter into particulars, one notes that Professor Dewey finds the significance of Darwinism for philosophy in its tendency to withdraw attention from such religio-philosophical questions as have to do with the origin, purpose, and destiny of all things. The endeavor to give a

¹ John Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin upon Philosophy, and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1910. vi + 309 pages.

² William Ralph Inge, *Faith and Its Psychology*. New York: Scribner, 1910. x + 248 pages.

philosophical defense of belief in God, freedom, and immortality, is treated with ill-disguised contempt. The effort to substantiate a spiritual view of the universe is regarded as a mythologizing of reality, a mere survival of animism. No interest being felt in the validity of religious knowledge, epistemology is naturally (and justifiably, according to common-sense) dismissed on the ground that knowledge is not a mystery, but a natural event. In short, all metaphysics, it is held, is bound to decline and disappear, like the theology of which it is the last lingering shadow. Only psychology and social ethics are to be allowed to remain.

Out of his own mouth one is inclined to judge this pragmatic positivist, when he defines philosophy as "a Catholic and far-sighted theory of the adjustment of the conflicting factors of life," but the opening here for metaphysics is apparent only; for religion, in any significant sense of the word, is not regarded as one of the legitimate factors of life. Religion is held to be essentially pre-scientific, that blank submission of the individual, under the compulsion of external authority, to the blank reality beyond, a surrender which was an excusable weakness when tools were rare and clumsy and when, in general, man's command of the methods that control action was precarious and disturbed. Now, however, science is the recognized instrument for the maintenance even of moral values, and as such has fallen heir to the religious value formerly found in theological beliefs. Of course, then, if one admits that this is an adequate account of what religion is, not only is theology bound to go, but the chief element of interest in the problems of cosmology and epistemology likewise disappears.

To the support of his positivistic propaganda Professor Dewey brings powers of analysis, construction, and exposition that are worthy of a better cause. The essays entitled, "The Intellectualist Criterion of Truth," "Experience and Objective Idealism," and "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," for example, show the fruitfulness of the application of functional psychology to logical problems; while the historical interpretations contained in the title-essay and in those on "Beliefs and Existences" and "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge" are most suggestive.

It is not necessary to attempt here an exposition of the now well-known and, as it seems to the reviewer, largely justified instrumentalism of Dewey's logical theory. It may be noted, however, that he expressly repudiates the narrow utilitarianism commonly charged against pragmatism, and defines truth cumbrously, but carefully, as "the union of abstract postulated meanings and concrete brute facts in a way that circumvents the latter by judging them from a new stand-point, while it tests concepts by using them as methods in the same active experience."

He is not always equally careful, however. For example, when he asserts that the effective working of an idea and its truth are one and the same thing, and that the capacity of the idea to fulfil the purpose for which it was projected is equivalent to its truth, the ambiguity of statement certainly leaves his position exposed to the charge of being unduly subjective and individualistic. The idea may work effectively with reference to an unduly narrow or unjustifiable purpose, and yet not be true at all. And with reference to the statement that the pragmatic account of truth is nothing but a statement of its nature, one is inclined to ask whether pragmatism is not primarily a view of the *test* of truth, rather than a definition of its *nature*; and whether, further, it is not because pragmatists commonly pass uncritically from the one to the other that their important positive contribution still fails to meet with adequate appreciation. Or, to state the criticism differently, pragmatists become confusing when they speak, as Professor Dewey repeatedly does in the work before us, as if truth were a quality of ideas, instead of being, as it always is, a quality of judgments. And, inasmuch as judgments always involve a relation of ideas to reality, one may admit the essential contention of pragmatism, that the test of the truth of the judgment, however thorough-going, is always the testing of the usefulness of the idea, while still maintaining that the nature of truth is such a relation of idea to reality as makes possible adjustment to it with satisfaction to every interest that *ought* to be recognized. Thus the ideal character at truth is preserved, while its invariably practical test is recognized.

Professor Inge's book is one of the new "Studies in Theology" edited by Dr. Fairbairn. Some of the most marked features of the book are the admirable critique of external authority, the antagonism manifested toward pragmatism and Ritschlianism, and the decidedly sympathetic attitude toward mysticism, it being this last well-known feature of Dr. Inge's thinking which makes him such an interesting figure in contemporary religious thought.

One cannot but regret that the author's criticism of pragmatism is not based upon a more intelligent appreciation of what that much-discussed philosophy essentially is. It is characterized as a philosophy of personal atomism, a skeptical opportunism, which habitually disparages the intellectual life. In short, he identifies it with the pseudo-pragmatism of modernist Catholics, such as Laberthonnière and LeRoy, who hold that, while many of the dogmas of the church are intellectually objectionable, they are to be regarded as symbols, so serviceable, practically, to the church and ultimately to life, that they are to be affirmed as true on the ground that all truths anyway are simply useful symbols. Now the fallacy here is obvious, and Dr. Inge's criticisms are undoubtedly valid

as against this Catholic pragmatism, but they are pointless as directed against essential pragmatism.

But it is in mysticism that our author is specially interested. His central thesis is that the life of faith (intense subjective religion) admits us to an immediate experience of God. This faith is not to be grounded on mere feeling, but rational and practical tests are needed to enable one to distinguish genuine divine revelation. Thus a place is made for metaphysics in religious knowledge; but that there is involved in the practical criterion a virtual subjection of mystical knowledge to the pragmatic test, the author does not seem to realize. On the contrary, he regards the sane mysticism he intends to stand for, and the religious pragmatism he opposes, as mutually exclusive. For example, he says that Christ's knowledge of God must have been derived from direct personal union with God, or else have been only the intellectual concomitant of the right direction of his will. What is needed is a synthesis of these mutually supplementary elements.

The failure to sufficiently test in practical life the suggestions of the more pronounced and even abnormal states of the mystical experience leaves Dr. Inge favorably disposed to most of the peculiar doctrines of the extreme mystics. Thus, in addition to the religiously essential ideas of the immanence of God in human experience and the possibility of a genuine communion with God in the spiritual life, great value is attached to a mystical christology, the exalted Christ being identified with the Holy Spirit, and complaint being made against Ritschl for repudiating this doctrine. One finds also a favorable attitude expressed toward the view that the real world is timeless, a static heaven in which desire and will have ceased to be. It should be recognized that this is a suggestion coming from the abnormal trance experience of the mystic, and that it is due to the inhibition of activity and the consequent intensely emotional character of such states. The fact that it does not work in practical life to so regard the real world should be, decisive against the suggestion, even when it is supported by subsequent metaphysical speculation.

What seems desirable, then, is the fusion and mutual supplementation of pragmatism and mysticism. If pragmatism is to be saved from an ignoble utilitarianism, it must learn to appreciate and use as a fundamental norm the values experienced in vital personal religion. And if mysticism is to be anything but a form of spiritual dissipation it must submit all its insights and values to the test of practical life.

REPRESENTATIONAL PRAGMATISM

Douglas C. Macintosh. "Representational Pragmatism." *Mind* 21.2 (April 1912): 167–81.

The purpose of the present paper is to indicate with reference to the problem of truth a point of view which may be regarded as intermediate between traditional intellectualism and current pragmatism. The writer will hope to remain on speaking terms with the intellectualist while acknowledging great indebtedness to the pragmatist.

Any careful and unbiased analysis of the judgment as it exists in the moment of its creation will find it to consist in an idea – an abstraction from reality – being predicated of some reality. It is not the mere joining of term to term or of idea to idea, for even when one turns about upon his ideas to criticise and judge of them, it is not of the logical idea as such that he judges; he predicates another logical idea of a reality, *viz.*, either a particular or a generalised psychological reality. If it be pointed out that the subject of the judgment – or at least its known content – is made up of a complex unity of data of sense and predicates of former judgments, then practically the whole content of the subject, together with the new predicate, is taken as an idea and predicated of reality; or, it may be, all this is taken as subject and the idea "real" is used as its predicate. This latter course is simply the bringing out explicitly of the existential character belonging to all judgment, and this reversibility of the formally existential judgment is justified by the fact that, generally speaking, reality and all that we can say about reality are, for the guidance of conduct, practically identical.

Now it is probably this characteristic of the existential judgment of recapitulation that has led to the initial assumption of the intellectualist that truth is identity with reality.¹ But since truth is essentially a quality of judgments, that is, of the relation of predicates to subjects, it would follow from the intellectualist principle that for a judgment to be really true the predicate ought to be quite identical with the subject. In this

¹ Among recent writers see, for example, R. B. Perry, *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., vol. iv., p. 422, and W. P. Montague, same *Journal*, vol. vi., p. 546. The latter says: "Truth is the relation of identity between the content as believed and the content as existing."

connexion Bradley at least has the courage of his intellectualist convictions, as one may see from his well-known chapter on "Thought and Reality." But it is this lurking suspicion that the idea ought to be identical with the reality, the predicate with the subject, that gives rise to the most acute of the epistemological difficulties felt by all Simon-pure intellectualists when they think consistently. It is of course readily recognised that the identity of subject and predicate does not hold in the case of the judgments which we actually do make in practical life, and as a compromise adjustment to the discrepancy which *is*, as compared with the identity which *ought to be*, the vaguer terms of the correspondence or copy-theory of truth are adopted. This view, to which the realist is peculiarly prone, undertakes to measure the degree of a judgment's truth by the accuracy with which the predicate imitates the subject. It is soon recognized, however, that many predicates do not really copy the subject; they are symbols more or less arbitrarily chosen – symbols which have been associated with the thing (as, for example, names), and which structurally form a mere addition to it. Further distinctions ought also to be made, for sometimes the predicate more closely copies some other object than the one of which it is predicated, as in metaphorical judgments, and sometimes the predicate resembles the particular subject no more than it does a great many other possible subjects, all of which may greatly differ among themselves, as is true of the generic predicate. If then the "correspondence" is sometimes generic, sometimes metaphorical, sometimes purely symbolical, and only sometimes – and that imperfectly – imitative what becomes of truth according to the intellectualist ideal? Manifestly it is not truth that we have at all, even in our most trusted judgments, but at best something somewhat like it, and at worst something not at all like it. If a special effort be made to secure a closer correspondence between subject and predicate, the questions arise: Inasmuch as the predicate is an idea, and ideas are abstractions from reality, must not the idea remain ever not quite identical with the thing? How indeed can any number of fragmentary ideas be equivalent to the thing, which is an undivided unity?² But anyway, if we have the thing in our possession in such a way that we can copy it, why do we need to make a duplicate? Will not the original suffice? Is not the judgment a tautology? Or if we have not the original, how can we copy it? Must not the judgment remain forever unwarranted?

"But," suggests the subjective or epistemological idealist, "since it is true that we are shut up to ideas, we have no right to suppose that there are any real things which are not ideas. All we have to do, then, is to

² Cf. A. W. Moore, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, p. 54. "To be completely true an idea (according to absolutism)...must *be* the whole of reality."

relate our ideas to each other in an orderly fashion, which is what the judgment really undertakes to do. Coherence, not correspondence is the test of truth." Thus we see a growing vagueness in the view of the relation of ideas to reality, of predicate to subject. As identity gave place to correspondence, so correspondence simmers down to mere coherence, the sticking together in some way of subject and predicate, both being thought of as mere ideas, and the cohesive substance being a compound of the categories, themselves a special sort of ideas. But, even with this second retreat, the intellectualist's peace is short-lived. However many ideas he may have related to each other in his system, he has to acknowledge that his work is incomplete, and that, if a complete, all-inclusive system of ideas were constructed, it might radically differ from his system; and so, abandoning subjective for objective idealism, he is forced by the same act to return to the correspondence view of truth with all its difficulties. In so far as he transcends solipsism he is forced to estimate the truth of his system by its identity with an absolute standard which is always beyond his reach. The coherence of idea with idea may have been obtained, but now the problem is how to secure *adherence* of these ideas to the absolute reality beyond. Consequently, as Bradley says, there is "no truth which is entirely true."³ Or, to quote Joachim, "the truth is – from the point of view of human intelligence – an Ideal, and an Ideal which can never *as such* or in its completeness be actual in human experience."⁴ Nevertheless, it is claimed by Prof. Boyce that there *are* accessible absolute truths – truths that is, to deny which is to reassert them in a new form.⁵ But even here the thoroughgoing intellectualist does not ultimately disentangle himself from his dilemma. In the first place these so-called absolute truths, being implications, are all hypothetical, and so their truth, in the intellectualist sense of identity with reality, remains ever suspended by a doubt so long as, in avoiding solipsism by recognising the incomplete character of his system, the thinker puts absolute reality beyond himself.⁶ Judged by the canon of intellectualism, these "absolute truths" are mere ideas, hypotheses, not known truths. We can never derive the application from the implication; we have to make the application. The way to get from "implies" to "is" "not by arguing but by trying." And even when we do employ general principles, our axioms are judgments which, according to strict intellec-

³ *Appearance of Reality*, p. 362.

⁴ *The Nature of Truth*, p. 79.

⁵ *The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion*, p. 86.

⁶ Prof. Royce frankly accepts solipsism – the solipsism of the Absolute – thus leaving, in strict logic, only the Absolute Self to know the truth.

tualism, are either tautologous or false. Moreover, in so far as these "absolute truths" in being denied are reasserted *in new form*, for the consistent intellectualist it is not they which are reasserted, but different judgments.

Again, when, as by Prof. Boodin,⁷ it is claimed that in so far as our knowledge is concerned with social and ideal structures, it is no longer *of* reality, but it *is* reality, not even here does the intellectualist escape from the necessity of agnosticism. For if B's judgment has for its subject A's whole judgment, then B's judgment, like all other judgments, is to the intellectualist either tautologous or not quite true. And even facts of implication, being general mental facts, are judged about by means of predicates which are themselves, as predicates, not facts but ideas, so that the relation of predicate to subject cannot be one of exact identity. But if B's judgment has for its subject the same reality as was taken as subject of A's judgment, and if B predicates of this same subject exactly the same idea as A predicated, then B's judgment may be said to be identical with A's (except that it is B's rather than A's); but *the identity is not the truth*, for the supposed identity is not, like the relation we call truth, between the subject and the predicate of the judgment; it is between two judgments. All of which shows of course, not the inaccessibility of truth, but the futility of strict intellectualism.

In Mr. Bertrand Russell's theory of truth we have what looks like the last stand of a retreating and practically defeated intellectualism. This author, although disclaiming all ability to find any universal criterion of truth, still ventures to define its nature."⁸ But it would seem vain to attempt a definition of that for which there is no criterion; the proximate genus might indeed be given, but not the differentia of the species. Something true about truth might be stated, but not that which distinguishes it from falsity. Furthermore, Mr. Russell says that judgment is not a dual but a multiple relation of mind to its various terms or objects.⁹ But when he comes to define truth, he not only offers, although in a somewhat covert way, a truth-criterion; he also fails to quite extricate himself from the time-honoured view of truth as a dual relation. "The judgment is true," he says, "when the relation which is one of the objects relates, the other objects."¹⁰ This somewhat cryptic expression, when translated into more phraseology, can only be taken to mean that truth (or idea) to reality, such that the relation which unites

⁷ "Truth and Agreement," *Psychological Review*, 1909, No. 1.

⁸ *Philosophical Essays*, p. 173.

⁹ *Philosophical Essays*, pp. 117 ff.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

the objects in mind (or idea) is the relation which unites the objects in reality. But this is a return to that view of truth and the judgment which makes them consist in some sort of a dual relation between idea and reality, even if both the idea and the reality are somewhat complex entities. And so all the difficulties of the correspondence theory recur. Nor will it do to measure the truth by the identity of the relation between the mental terms and the relation between the real objects if the judgment is true, there must be an identity also between the terms related and the objects existing. And in the case of terms and relations both, since there cannot be absolute identity between idea and reality, between predicate and subject, if there is to be any judgment at all, *just how much identity* is necessary for truth? To this question the intellectualist has no answer; he has no real criterion of truth.

Some, to escape the agnostic fate of the intellectualist, take refuge in a form of irrationalism. In reaction from the vain attempt to find knowledge in mere ideas, conceptual predicates apart from any immediately given subject, they go to the opposite extreme of endeavouring to find knowledge in the bare immediacy of the subject, apart from all conceptual predicates. The real value of this reaction is not in its negative but in its positive doctrine; in its insistence upon the necessity of immediacy for perfect knowledge, not in its assertion of the futility of mediation. This is but doing for our own day what was done before when it was pointed out that concepts without intuition are empty. What it needs is the complementary insistence that intuition without concepts is blind. Of course, as Bergson sees, the concept as a substitute for immediacy is an impoverishment of reality, but the concept as an addition to immediacy is an enrichment of reality; just as the perception of physical reality is its consummation, not its mutilation. Bergson claims that any true metaphysic must get beyond symbols,¹¹ but in so far as he states his own metaphysical position, he makes use of concepts. He does valuable work in criticising some of our metaphysical concepts, but in doing so he substitutes for them others which are either more accurate copies of the subject-matter, or else still more highly metaphorical and symbolic. And indeed some of our most valuable knowledge is contained in metaphorical judgments. What we know with is always necessarily somewhat different from what we know, and it is a distinct advantage in many ways to *experience* time as duration and to *think* it in terms of space-concepts. But, in any case, anti-conceptualism violates its own principle in becoming a doctrine; and if we are going to take seriously him who holds it, we must regard him as simply an intellectualist who has become so thoroughly sceptical that he has begun to

¹¹ *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1903, p. 4.

advocate the giving up of the effort to make a judgment at all. Obviously, his only consistent course would be to cease to speak or even to think, in which case he would become philosophically negligible.

Let it be assumed then once more that, for the knowledge we are here concerned with, subject and predicate are both required. How can we then arrive at judgments which shall be true? Just here it is important to note that intellectualist and anti-conceptualist alike admit the practical value and even necessity of the ideas which we predicate, although they do not deign, of course, to make use of this consideration in discussing the problem of truth. It may very well be, however, that the stone which has been rejected of these would-be builders is to become the headstone of the corner in the temple of truth. This practicality of ideas current pragmatism seizes upon, claiming to find in the function of truth the key both to its criterion and to its essential nature.

A mere recognition of the practical function of our judgments or of truth does not make one a pragmatist, although as Dr. Schiller points out¹² to admit the proposition, "All truth is useful," logically carries with it some of the most characteristic doctrines of pragmatism. Prof. Baldwin,¹³ for instance, holds to the purposive character of thought, but he defends the intellectualist criterion of truth as opposed to the pragmatic. No one is a genuine convert to pragmatism unless he proposes to live, intellectually speaking, by the principle of measuring truth, however cautiously, by the standard of usefulness. Once safely converted it remains for the pragmatist to show his still doubting intellectualist friends that he is able to recognise just what sort and what degree of usefulness may be taken as a guarantee of truth. Everybody knows that not every sort or every degree of usefulness can be taken as a test of truth, if the notion of truth itself is to retain for us any practical value.

Essential pragmatism, then, does not content itself with saying that all real live judgments which are true are in some sense useful to the person making them, although it would say that with certain qualifications as to the kind of usefulness meant. And yet, on the other hand, the true pragmatist would not go so far as to say that all judgments that happen in particular cases to be useful in leading to the fulfilment of any kind of purpose, or even to the fulfilment of thoroughly worthy ulterior purposes, are true; although one has to admit that Prof. James in his *Pragmatism* declares that when we make new application of a "cold-storage" truth, we "can say of it either that 'it is useful because it is true,' or that 'it is true because it is useful,'" and still more surprisingly

¹² *Humanism*, p. 38.

¹³ *Thought and Things*, vol. ii., ch. xiii.

adds, "Both of these phrases mean exactly the same thing."¹⁴ The moderate pragmatist, however, can agree with his critic that it must always be the purpose to know the purpose of the investigator, the truth-seeker, fulfilment of which is to constitute verification, and not necessarily the fulfilment of the later developed purpose to make some further use of the truth after it has been obtained.

Is this, then, the capitulation of the pragmatist? By no means. It remains to ask, What sort of purpose is the purpose to know? What makes one a pragmatist is his insistence that as in science, so in philosophy and all truth-seeking, the idea in question should be *used* as a working-hypothesis, and its truth tested by the way in which it works. An idea is constructed to serve, in the guidance of action, as a substitute for an immediate perception; if, when the immediate perception does occur, it prompts to the same action as did the original idea, the idea "agrees" with, or is practically the same as, the perception. The test of truth is thus, as the intellectualist has supposed, some sort of identity between the idea and reality, but the point is that it is *practical* identity, sufficient identity for practical purposes. And the cognitive purpose, as distinguished from the purpose to make use of truth, is the purpose to obtain or frame an idea which shall prove sufficiently identical with the reality for practical purposes. Or, to put the matter differently, every cognitive purpose is an employee, the right-hand man, as it were, of some practical purpose, and the employee's ultimate satisfaction is in the satisfaction of the employer. Sometimes the employee may modify the demand of the employer, but in general the business of the employee, the cognitive purpose, is to secure an idea which is sufficiently identical with reality to suit the employer, the practical purpose. It is important here for the sake of clearness that we have in mind the difference between the purpose of the original judgment and the purpose of the later statement. The judgment is always relatively sincere: the statement, as we know, need not be. It is what the reporter *takes* as true when collecting his materials that we are concerned with here, and not with what he *gives* as true to the readers of the daily paper. Understanding the term "practical" in this sense, then, it remains that the mark of truth is the practical identity of the idea with the reality, of the subject with the predicate. And so at the very heart of essential pragmatism we have found representationalism, the element of truth in intellectualism. It is not, however, a representationalism which contradicts pragmatism, but one which supplements the pragmatic criterion at the same time that it is supplemented by that criterion itself.

¹⁴ *Pragmatism*, p. 204.

But sometimes the verifying perception is either temporarily or permanently unattainable or else not important enough to be sought at the expense of something else. Does this necessarily mean the total cessation of belief, the total absence of knowledge? Not according to everyday life, not according to science, and not according to pragmatism. It often occurs that acting upon the idea continues to work so uniformly well in connexion with its most intimately associated practical purposes, that even in the absence of the immediately verifying perception, the idea is kept in action, that is, we believe it to be true, we are *practically* certain that the idea is *practically* identical with reality.

The justification of this is that the race has needed to postulate, and through long experience has acquired the inveterate habit of postulating, that nature is dependable. So far, pragmatism is simply the logical theory of everyday scientific procedure. But what would make pragmatism practically significant would be the further extension of the pragmatic criterion, under whatever limitations might prove necessary, to certain ontological judgments which have important practical bearings on human life, but with regard to which complete perceptual verification is out of the question. In other words, can the pragmatic criterion be legitimately applied in a philosophy which deals with ultimate problems? Here the question is whether not nature simply, but man's moral nature, is dependable. Manifestly not every warning thought or encouraging faith that any individual may find temporarily useful for the strengthening of his moral resolution can forthwith be declared true. But the question is whether the postulates which morality – not any grade of morality, but the highest morality – finds not in mere first impressions but as a result of the most critical examination, that it not merely is able to use but absolutely needs in order to maintain itself – whether such postulates, in the absence of the possibility of perceptual verification, can be legitimately regarded as at least more trustworthy than their contradictories. This is undoubtedly the most vital issue in connexion with pragmatism. It is not our purpose here, however, to develop or to defend the postulates of an ethico-religious pragmatism. Suffice it to remark that while such a pragmatism, loosely interpreted, may indeed become justly odious to the conscientious scientist, if critically applied it may supplement in a most welcome manner the deficiencies of the ordinary scientific world-view.

But current pragmatism, besides being often inexcusably careless in the application of the pragmatic criterion, has gone so far in its enthusiasm as to overstate its principle and thereby to destroy in large measure the value of its achievements. Not content with deriving the criterion of truth from its function, it has hastened to identify the nature

of truth with its criterion. Truth has been equated with verification, and verification with consequences that are good.¹⁵ Although Prof. James calls this the "wider pragmatism," he has himself said that truth is a process, something which happens to an idea.¹⁶ Dr. Schiller's statement is that "'truth' means successful operation on reality."¹⁷ Prof. Dewey agrees with Prof. James that truth denotes specific verifications,¹⁸ success resulting from the use of an idea,¹⁹ and Dr. Bawden insists that if truth be one thing and the practical consequences a wholly different thing, then pragmatism is not true.²⁰ The pragmatic refutation of this procedure is that it so confuses the idea of truth as to make it of very little service.²¹ The way in which the fallacy of this hyper-pragmatism²² parallels that of utilitarianism has been repeatedly pointed out.²³ The definition of true judgments simply in terms of practical utility fails to safeguard the element of value in the intellectualist conception. It gives, although in a too general way, the differentia of the species, *viz.* usefulness; but it does not bring out sufficiently, if at all, the proximate genus, *viz.* representation.

This defect of extreme pragmatism it is the aim of representational pragmatism to remedy. In our attempt to state the pragmatic criterion we found that we had to make use of the intellectualist's favourite idea of identity, though interpreting it in a functional way. Similarly in attempting to define truth in terms of representation, one can succeed only by recognizing the pragmatic criterion. In undertaking this definition one has to take account of the fact that representation belongs to meanings outside of explicit judgments, as well as existing in judgments which claim to be true. What is the specific difference belonging to the representation found in true judgments? The functional analysis of meaning shows it to be representation which *can* mediate purpose. Or,

¹⁵ Cf. James, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 52.

¹⁶ *Pragmatism*, p. 201.

¹⁷ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 118.

¹⁸ *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays*, pp. 109, 139.

¹⁹ *Journal of Philosophy*, iv., p. 202. Cf. *Influence of Darwin*, etc., p. 143.

²⁰ *The Principles of Pragmatism*, p. 203.

²¹ Mr. J. W. Snellman in *MIND*, April, 1911, rightly maintains that "the intellectualist 'meaning' of truth becomes unverifiable if it is deprived of its pragmatic criterion," but goes to the opposite extreme when he asserts that "the meaning of truth . . . is indistinguishable from its test."

²² Paulhan uses the term "hyper-pragmatism" (*Revue Philosophique*, vol. 67, pp. 614 ff.), but in a different sense from that in which it is used here.

²³ See, for example, G. A. Tawney, "Utilitarian Epistemology," *Journal of Philosophy*, i., pp. 337 ff., and T. De Laguna, *Dogmatism and Evolution*, pp. 140 ff.

stated the other way about, meaning is essentially mediation: what an idea means, *ultimately*, is what it is a means to; *proximately* it is the means itself, *viz.*, representative material, proxy experience. Thus, as was noted by Peirce, the grandfather of pragmatism, the purposes which the idea can mediate form the key to the meaning of the idea. But he ought to have gone farther and applied this key, the meaning of meaning, to unlock the door to the meaning of truth, and not to have been frightened by the bogey of a pseudo-pragmatism. Meaning, then, is representation which can mediate purpose; but in the case of every live judgment some possible purpose has become actual, and in that judgment some meaning is actually employed to accomplish that purpose. *What is taken as truth*, then, *is representation* (of subject by predicate, of reality by idea) *sufficient to mediate satisfactorily the purpose with which the judgment is made.*²⁴ *What is really true, however, is representation sufficient to mediate satisfactory whatever purpose or purposes ought to be recognized in making the judgment.* In other words, real truth is practical identity of idea with reality, of predicate with subject, where the *practice* in question is ultimately satisfactory, as well as the mental instrument which serves it. Thus representational pragmatism is truer to the intellectualist ideal than intellectualism itself is able to be. So long as the subject is taken as an idea like the predicate, the equating of subjects and predicate is impossible in any judgment which conveys any meaning. Indeed even from the practical point of view two ideas cannot be identified save as both are predicated of the same reality, with no practical difference in the consequences. But when the subject is taken as a reality, although on intellectualist grounds it becomes even more hopeless to try to identify subject and predicate, on grounds of representational pragmatism the problem is readily solved. The relation of predicate to subject is that of *functional equivalence* in the control of the

²⁴ An approach to this position is briefly indicated in the following sentences from E. D. Fawcett's *The Individual and Reality* (p. 38): "Often the agreement (of propositions with outward fact) may seem inconsiderable, nay, trifling; but provided that such agreement forwards a purpose, the proposition or arrangement or propositions is sufficiently true. Truth means propositions which, in view of our ends, can be taken as, and substituted for, the appearances with which they agree." Mr. Oliver C. Quick, in a recent article in *MIND* (April, 1910), endorses the pragmatic criterion while rejecting the current pragmatic definition of truth. He himself, however, leaves truth undefined. This is in almost complete antithesis to the position of Mr. Bertrand Russell, who, as we have seen, claims to define the nature of truth while regarding it as having no criterion that can be stated in universal terms. Prof. Pratt endorses the pragmatic test of truth which sacrifices clearness to simplicity. "Truth means," he says, "that the object of which one is thinking is as one thinks it." (*What is Pragmatism?* p. 67). Pragmatically interpreted, this definition will serve; but intellectualistically interpreted, as it is evidently intended to be, it is involved in all the old epistemological difficulties.

action required. The judgment is true when the idea will do practically as well at least as further experience of the thing in stimulating and controlling action in adjustment to that thing.

Here we have, then, in contrast with current pragmatism, a view which explicitly recognises the ideal element in truth. The practical failure of ordinary pragmatism at this point has given basis for the charge that it leads to sordid utilitarianism. Truth is to be measured – so our view will have it – not simply by the idea's working "in the way it sets out to work,"²⁵ but also by the way in which it does set out to work. Ends, and not simply the adjustment of means to ends, come in for critical examination. The moral quality of the purpose is often reflected in the judgment itself, and learning the truth becomes – in its higher reaches, almost always, it would seem – a *moral* achievement.

But while recognising the ideal character of truth, representational pragmatism makes this ideal of truth essentially human. It substitutes for the insoluble, artificial problems or modern epistemology the soluble, real problems of the psychology and logic of the processes of knowledge. In so far as any judgment fails short of ideal truth, the norms are at hand by which it can be corrected. Even telling "the whole truth," whenever it is a moral duty, becomes at the same time a real possibility; it is telling what is *practically* the whole truth so far as all purposes – which ought to be recognised are concerned. Truthfulness consists in the habitual care to make one's statement always approximate one's own judgment sufficiently for whatever purposes ought to be recognised in each particular situation.²⁶

²⁵ See Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, etc., p. 150; Moore, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, p. 87; Bawden, *The Principles of Pragmatism*, p. 119; Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx* (1910), p. 133.

²⁶ The criterion of "the purposes which ought to be recognized" in turn is ultimately to be stated in terms of human welfare, interpreted from a point of view in which the distinctly spiritual interests are duly dominant. There may be degrees of approximation to the truth and degrees of verification of the truth, but, given the purposes which ought to be recognized, the judgment which represents reality sufficiently for these purposes is true. Mathematically-worked-out laws, as in physics and astronomy, are only hypothetically truths, except in so far as they have been verified. Many of them have been sufficiently verified empirically for practical purposes, and so may be taken as practically true of the actual world. If by more critical tests they should be verified more completely, this would not make them any truer than they were. If by means of these more critical tests a discrepancy should be found between the mathematically deduced law and the actual fact, then for the purposes which dominated these tests the supposed law is not true. If these purposes which ought to be recognized by humanity, then the more accurate empirical observation must be regarded as the truth, and not the mathematical anticipation. If, however, there is no valid human reason for recognizing such hyper-critical purposes, there is practically no difference between the two expressions; the one statement is as true, practically, as the other.

If it be asked whether there is not a superhuman truth, the answer is, Doubtless there may be, but what is generally meant by absolute truth, or truth as it is for the Absolute, is simply a regulative idea. If absolute truth be defined, with Schiller, simply as "truth adequate to every human purpose,"²⁷ we are furnished with an accessible standard, and in this sense Prof. Royce's contention that we are in possession of absolutely true propositions²⁸ may be readily granted. But when the absolutist assumes that there must of necessity actually be an eternally existent sum-total of all possible true judgments, he indulges in speculative dogmatism. Superhuman truth, if we are going to speak of it at all, we had better call divine rather than absolute, for in the whirling of the history of philosophy it has again become less ambiguous to speak of God than of the Absolute. And if we are going to speak of God's truth, there is no manifestly valid reason, from the religious side at least, why it should not be regarded as essentially similar to man's, *viz.* not a timeless, changeless, purposeless, absolutely complete representation of an eternally-complete reality, but representation, the content of which may vary from time to time, and yet which is sufficient always to satisfactorily mediate whatever purposes God may have in view. God may be more anthroponoetic than we think. Religion's only essential postulate here is that all reality he thought of as representable, and actually represented in so far as is necessary for the purposes of God.

One of the most important of the implications of representational pragmatism is that by which it enables one to take a more conservative attitude toward the question of the permanence of truth than obtains in current pragmatism. And yet even pragmatism as it is and has been, has often shown unnecessary haste in concluding that it must, to be consistent, maintain that all truths are of but temporary validity. It would be more in keeping with the supposedly empirical temper of pragmatism to wait for any particular judgment to be refuted, instead of dogmatically assuming beforehand that it is certain to be outgrown. But representational pragmatism can go farther in defending the permanence of truth. Every honest judgment intends to be of permanent validity, and if at any later time it is seen to need revision, this is commonly to be explained either as due to the fact that the purposes active in the original judgment were deficient with reference to the situation, including often a

Given no change in the purposes to be served, there are no degrees of truth; either the judgment is true, or it is not true. What is untrue cannot become true, nor what is true become untrue – *unless* there comes to be a change in the purposes which ought to be recognized in making the judgment, and not necessarily even then.

²⁷ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 213.

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 84.

lack of will or ability for mental thoroughness, or else as due to the former insufficient accessibility of the reality judged about, in both of which cases the earlier judgment was not really true, but only seemed to be. The geocentric hypothesis in astronomy is a case in point; we regard it not as a superseded truth, but as a former theory which never was in reality true. If any judgment is really true, the presumption is in favour of its predicate always remaining the idea which will represent the reality sufficiently for all purposes which ought to be recognised in making the judgment. That many of our judgments in practical life are of this character no one really doubts. Nor need we say with Prof. Royce that such truths are accessible only in the realm of our knowledge of the forms that predetermine all of our concrete activities.²⁹ If that were so, we could have no real or permanent truth about anything which we are practically concerned to know. The representational pragmatist can claim not merely hypothetical judgments but many categorical judgments – judgments of historical fact, for example – as permanently true; the hard and fast intellectualist, as we saw, is not logically entitled to claim even that much. If a later judgment differs from an earlier one because the purposes which *ought* to be recognised have changed, then, even if there should be a formal contradiction between the two judgments, the contradiction is not real. The new truth is not the old truth, but the old truth is still the judgment which, sufficiently for all purposes which ought to have been recognised in making it, represented the reality, and which, with reference to that earlier situation and the rightful purposes controlling it, still sufficiently represents the reality. For example for the purposes which ought ordinarily to be recognised the carrying out of the value of π to a few decimal places gives a practically true judgment; but in some situations a more extended determination is required, so that the earlier judgment is not true in these later situations, just as, in the earlier situations, the later judgment would have contained irrelevant representation in addition to the truth. The contradiction between the two judgments, therefore, when each is viewed *in situ*, is easily seen to be merely formal and not real. Moreover, representations of reality sufficient for all practical purposes are not to be rejected as untrue simply because of the possibility of making the representation closer, should there arise any occasion for doing so. Thus the representational pragmatist, while he shares the advantage which current pragmatism has over intellectualism in possessing a usable criterion of truth, is able to say with as much confidence as the most intellectualistic absolutist, “Once true, always

²⁹ Op. cit., p. 90.

true”; although, because of a change in the “ought,” old truths may come to be superseded and be no longer used.

Our conclusion then is that while the traditional intellectualism gives the proximate genus of truth (representation of reality) but not its specific difference (sufficiency for all proper practical purposes), and while current pragmatism rightly insists upon the latter, but wrongly ignores the former, an adequate definition of truth must combine the partial truths of both positions.

DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION

James R. Angell. "Review of James Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*." *Philosophical Review* 12.4 (July 1903): 442–51.

Review of James Mark Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1902. – pp. xvi, 395.

The theory of evolution enjoys the unique distinction of being at once the most important and the most ambiguous of modern scientific hypotheses. To doubt that slow ancestral evolution is in some way responsible for the various forms of organic life which we see about us, has long been to put oneself outside the pale of conventional scientific respectability. But when the interested inquirer seeks for some precise account of the manner in which organisms undergo modifications in their structure, and much more when he attempts to ascertain the exact mode in which heredity operates, he finds himself confronted with a perfect jungle of divergent opinion. Recent biological writing on these subjects has served to clarify the issues at stake, but the household of organic science is still far from being at peace with itself.

The striking book before us affords an interesting and representative exposition of a tendency which has been regaining in scientific repute a position that for a generation past has often been denied it. Indeed, the extremer advocates of physico-chemical biology *et id omne genus* still view it with undisguised contempt. The tendency referred to involves the introduction of consciousness as a factor of fundamental moment in the explanation of genetic phenomena. So important is the role which Mr. Baldwin seems disposed to assign it, that it promises to furnish a means through which the most radical differences of Darwinian and Lamarckian may be converted into amicable harmony – provided, of course, that the Lamarckian is willing, for it must be confessed that he is harmonized largely by absorption, a process he may resent.

Moreover, Mr. Baldwin's book offers another significant exemplification of current biological conditions in its extensive drafts upon philosophy. To many a scientific man it must seem an evil day when the fair raiment of science is disfigured with the tawdry pretensions of metaphysics. For better or for worse, however, biology appears to be

entering upon a period of fresh synthetic effort, and all thoroughgoing synthesis is doomed to a measure of invasion by the philosophy of its own day. We shall make the grounds of this fact clearer as it bears on the present case a little further on.

The cardinal tenet in Mr. Baldwin's evolutionary creed, – a creed which is largely shared, be it said, both in content and originality of formulation by Messrs. Lloyd Morgan and Osborn, – may be put thus: By a process of preservative individual accommodation involving consciousness, single organisms keep themselves alive in times of danger, and thus secure the accumulation in successive generations of the variations which they may chance to represent. In this way useful structures and functions, *e.g.*, instincts, gain time to mature, even though during the period of their development they may not have been useful. Through the destruction by natural selection of all harmful variations, the resulting effects would have at first sight all the appearance of a 'use-inheritance' origin of Lamarckian type, whereas, in point of fact, there may have been no real transmission of acquired characteristics at all. The important group of social and gregarious influences (imitation, tradition, etc.), by means of which young creatures are guided by their elders, would also contribute to achieve the same outcome. The chief corollary of this principle is found in the theory of pleasure-pain factors acting upon the accommodatory movements of adaptation. Mr. Baldwin's formula runs somewhat as follows: Painful stimulations produce movements of retraction and restriction; pleasurable stimulations, on the other hand, occasion profuse expansive movements. Out of the matrix of over-produced movements brought about by pleasurable stimuli, the organism selects the particular coördinations relevant to the special situation to be met. These movements persist rather than others primarily because they are agreeable, and because all such reactions tend by virtue of the very constitution of the organism to reinstate themselves, so long as they are agreeable.

Stated in its most general form, 'organic' selection, as Mr. Baldwin calls his active principle, appears to offer an exceedingly sensible and plausible account of one stage in the operation of natural selection. It thus becomes a subordinate chapter in the whole statement of evolutionary process from the natural selection point of view. It contains a more precise description of the early stages in the acquirement of modifications (ontogenetic) and variations (phylogenetic, congenital) than had before been clearly articulated. For those who accept the genuineness of sexual selection, organic selection must constitute a similar but more general category, inasmuch as it involves consciousness in *all* of its directions of expression, whereas sexual selection involves only *one* of its modes of activity. Such a theory seems almost truistic

once it is propounded, and yet it is undoubtedly of conspicuous value in unifying the discrepant forms of interpretation advanced by different biologists for certain groups of facts. To the Lamarckian who bases his faith either upon alleged instances of inheritance of acquired characteristics, or upon the asserted impossibility of explaining by the destructive action of natural selection the evolution of structures and functions which were useless up to the time of their complete development, the theory offers an alternative hypothesis showing how the semblance of transmission of acquired characters may arise from the cumulation of modifications in organisms whose adaptive reactions enabled them to live and beget offspring during the period in which these modifications (originally useless, perhaps) were becoming established. To the Darwinian, on the other hand, who has been wont to lay all the stress upon the controlling influence of natural selection in weeding out the unfit, such a theory invites a redistribution of emphasis, by exhibiting the primary value of individual adaptations, through which many variations may have become permanent that otherwise would have been ruthlessly stamped out. When phrased in this way, it is hard to conceive that any serious criticism should be directed against the hypothesis, save by those who wish to couch the whole series of developmental and evolutionary processes in totally different terms, *e.g.*, physico-chemical reactions. To such persons natural selection is itself an abomination. There is, however, one phase of the theory to which further attention should be directed.

All is clear sailing so long as one contents oneself with the mere statement that organisms do in some manner accommodate themselves to the rigors of their peculiar environments, thus succeeding in surviving and secondarily succeeding in assisting the crystallization of useful variations. Such a statement is, like that of natural selection itself, simply a formulation of the general method by which certain results have been attained; not an analytical apportionment of causal responsibility to specific factors in the process. But when one introduces consciousness into one's explanatory system explicitly to account for the execution of accommodatory movements, and especially when one attempts to sketch the details of the operation in terms of pleasure-pain phenomena, the dangers of scientific and philosophic shipwreck are immensely enhanced. Needless to say, Mr. Baldwin is thoroughly alive to this danger. He faces it without flinching, and his position deserves notice. It may be remarked in passing, that the whole range of evolutionary processes in plant life falls outside the limits of such a formulation as that of our author, unless one adopts the precarious hypothesis that plants are conscious.

Mr. Baldwin is what may be styled a 'scientific parallelist' (if he will

pardon this gratuitous distribution of titles) and a 'philosophic monist' of the 'double aspect theory' variety. By which is meant that he accords to both the psychical and the physiological series of events in an organism the possibility – and for certain scientific purposes the necessity – of separate treatment. He would evidently countenance the validity of the mechanical categories in the physical series, so far as one might be consulting the interests of exact science. In the psychical series, however, another type of category holds sway. When he comes to such a question as that raised by the evolutionary hypothesis, *i.e.*, How has the psychophysical organism come to be what it is? he passes on to his monistic position, in which he maintains that neither the psychical nor the physical phase of our organic entity can be neglected to the cost of the other, and that the categories appropriate to the one cannot be set up as absolute to the prejudice of those appropriate to the other. As a philosophic point of view, this position has, of course, an honorable ancestry. But there have always been carping critics who have insisted that the standpoint simply represented an attempt in philosophic speculation to run with the hare and course with the hounds. The question here, therefore, is as to the relevancy of this criticism, which clearly has an important bearing on Mr. Baldwin's point of view. If the theory of organic selection requires even occasionally the assistance of consciousness to make it work, one is at once confronted with the task of showing how consciousness succeeds in producing causal changes in the physical world of muscles; for if it does not produce such changes, it is evidently futile to cite it at all in connection with explanations supposedly based upon physical causation. That Mr. Baldwin does not mean to blink the issue is shown by the following words: "The fact of accommodation requires on the part of the individual organism something equivalent to what we call consciousness in ourselves" (p. 121).

Now I do not understand that, in his setting forth of the case, Mr. Baldwin means to go further than the utterance of a hope that somehow or other a point of view may be worked out in accordance with which it shall be found tenable to countenance in a vital way the immediate implications of the deliverances of consciousness, concerning the reality of the control which our minds exercise over our movements, and at the same time to adhere without shuffling to the conclusions of physical science in its treatment of causal and mechanical relations, as these bear upon the operations of the neuro-muscular processes. At all events, he says in one place: "And it is the problem of the metaphysics of experience to find the broader category, the final principle of experience as a whole, both objective and subjective. This I do not care to discuss," etc., etc. (pp. 130, 131).

Apparently, then, the recognition that consciousness plays an important part in organic evolution must for the present remain a relatively unilluminating postulate. For it can only be efficient for some large view in which are harmoniously included the rights of both the mechanical and the non-mechanical categories. Until biologists are ready to write the history of evolution in the terms of this larger view (*e.g.*, the “æsthonomic idealism” of a recent article by Mr. Baldwin) instead of in those of the natural science and causation view, all references to efficient factors of the conscious kind must inevitably involve contradiction. One cannot, of course, impute to Mr. Baldwin responsibility for this situation, but it certainly constitutes a serious limitation of the significance for contemporary biology of his formulation of organic selection. The rank and file of biologists insist on attempting to find their real explanations in the physiological series of events where *physical* causation presumptively holds sole sway. This may indicate a narrow and unphilosophic provincialism of mind on their part, but it is at present the uncontrovertible fact, a fact rendered more conspicuous by an occasional illustrious exception. For example, one learned American biologist has recently said that “consciousness stands in immediate causal relation with physiological processes.”

Psychologists have for a long time consciously faced this difficulty, but it does not appear to have taken an important place among the puzzles of biological theory until very recently. It is not to the reviewer's mind at all obvious that the difficulty need be raised, so far as concerns the value of organic selection. Let it be granted that in some way (frankly we do not know just how, Mr. Baldwin nor the rest of us) organisms do make accommodatory movements, which serve to tide them over times of environmental menace, until useful modifications have become firmly established. Let it be also admitted that consciousness is in some manner concerned in these operations. The effort to determine its exact place may well be postponed until “æsthomotic idealism,” or some other equally mellifluous ‘ism,’ is generally accepted as cosmic theory. In the interim we shall be just as far ahead for all essential purposes of scientific theory, and we shall have been spared much needless wrangling. Moreover, even on Mr. Baldwin's own showing, “æsthonomic idealism” does not for a moment exonerate us from the necessity of finding the physiological counterparts of the conscious processes concerned in the selection of adaptive movements.

When one comes to Mr. Baldwin's account of the mode in which pleasure and pain influence the selection of movements, one opens up a more purely psychological question than those previously adverted to, and one which has already been treated in a similar manner in the

author's preceding works. The formula baldly stated is this: Pain, depression, cessation of movements; pleasure, expansion, profusion of movements; selection and continuation of useful reactions. To my mind there are probably essential fallacies in this position, despite the wide endorsement among psychologists of several of the premises upon which it rests. In the first place, there is an erroneous estimate of the motor values attaching respectively to pleasure and pain psychoses. Pain is by no means to be described merely in terms of depression and constriction. A view which does this cannot rest upon ordinary introspection, but must look for its support to the alleged effect of pain upon the circulatory and respiratory movements, and upon the tonus of the voluntary muscles under certain experimental conditions. These conditions are by no means immediately comparable with normal circumstances. One of the first and most persistent effects of pain is a violent motor overflow, directed, it is true, to escape from the stimulus, but resulting none the less on that account in the production of movements which may readily furnish a basis for subsequent useful coördinations of protection and flight. Surely the singed cat that dreads the fire has acquired a useful coördination from excess movements that were not called out by any thrills of pleasure. Moreover, the unpleasantness connected with effortful activity seems to be given scant justice in such a statement as that which Mr. Baldwin propounds. Indeed, the theory is classic, even if not popular, which looks to pain as the prime mover in human affairs. On the other hand, pleasure is by no means the invariable antecedent of overproduced movements. Many pleasures are distinctly narcotizing in their immediate effects. In Mr. Baldwin's statements about pleasure and pain, there appears to be a confusion between the *ultimate* effects of these psychical elements upon motor power, and their *immediate* effects upon the profusion of movements which they occasion. Though it should be admitted that all pain is at once followed by depressed vitality, and all pleasure by increased vitality, it would not necessarily follow, and, indeed, it is not true, that all pain produces immediate decrease of movement and all pleasure increase. The contrary is surely much the more frequent and more immediate result, and it is the immediate consequences which are of crucial importance in leading to the establishment of useful reactions. It will be seen that I call in question simply the *modus operandi* of pleasure and pain in Mr. Baldwin's description. The importance of the affective factors I do not doubt, but his analysis of their operation seems to me precisely to invert certain relations.

A final point which requires notice, and to which the last chapter of Mr. Baldwin's book is devoted, is the development of a theory of genetic

modes, a heading under which the author indulges his readers in a dash through wide fields of metaphysics. The problem treated is an old one; but Mr. Baldwin, as is his wont, has touched it in an extremely fresh and suggestive manner, and it is sincerely to be hoped that he will at an early date elaborate it more fully. As it stands now, the doctrine is somewhat puzzling both to expounder and critic. One hesitates to put it briefly lest one distort it. Nevertheless, acknowledging this risk, a few sentences must be given to it. Negatively, it is a vigorous protest against the unwarranted advocacy of the purely mechanical and chemical categories as complete and adequate media for the explanation and appreciation of vital phenomena. It is also a protest, eminently sane in its contentions, against the loose and inaccurate extensions of analogy from one stage to another of life processes, save when an examination of each series concerned may have shown the analogy just. Positively, the theory assigns to "agenetic science" the securing of exact quantitative formulæ descriptive of phenomena in convertible propositions. Thus, $A = B$, and $B = A$. In all truly genetic science, on the other hand, descriptive formulæ are never reversible. The product of any genetic series at any stage of its development always contains something unique which was not previously in the series. The author says: "Genetically $A = B$, but it does not follow that $B = A$ " (p. 303). Again, that series of events only is truly genetic which can not be constructed before it has happened, and which cannot be exhausted by reading backwards after it has happened" (p. 311). "In the life processes there seems to be a real genetic series, an irreversible series. Each stage exhibits a new form of organization" (p. 330). From Mr. Baldwin's point of view, history as well as biology is a genetic science. One cannot employ exact science for prediction (even theoretically), but after historical events have occurred they should, according to our author, be capable of formulation in the terms of exact science.

So far as Mr. Baldwin is attempting to curb the overweening pride of the prophets of a physico-chemical philosophy of life, he will find sympathizers in plenty. Whether the method which he proposes can finally be accepted, it will hardly be possible to say until the doctrine is more fully developed. Take, for example, his expressions about reversibility. If the irreversibility of vital phenomena refers to the mere conceivability of a given order, then the contention is obviously false. If it refers to causal relations of any kind, then it is true of all series, inorganic as well as organic, and the distinction becomes useless. Mr. Baldwin will have to make his peace with Kant, Royce, and others for the liberties he takes – as I understand him – with irreversibility. Moreover, it is not clear in what sense a genetic series produces results which are *unique* in any way which is not equally true of inorganic

processes. Surely the distinction here is not so obviously one of uniqueness in the product, as it is one resting upon the degree of our ability to control the producing factors. If we once know what the series of fission processes are by which a cell divides, we are just as sure how the divisions will occur under given conditions, as we are that $H_2 + O$ will give water. We have to find out both facts experientially to start with, and both are novel then and never so again. However all this may be, Mr. Baldwin's pronunciamiento will, in its negative aspects at least, undoubtedly have a salutary influence upon the discussions at present going forward.

It has now been sufficiently illustrated what was meant by saying at the outset that a synthetic era in biology must necessarily involve a measure of philosophy. Biologists find, in bringing together all the lines of evidence bearing upon evolution, the great synthetic hypothesis, that they must define the scope of the principles with which they work, *e.g.*, causation, mechanism, teleology, etc. The problems of heredity, variation, selection, and the like, inevitably involve these categories. Moreover, consciousness must at least be recognized, and so the psychologist is called in and given respectful attention. Mr. Baldwin's book is an admirable example of this convergence of scientific and philosophic interests, and the biologist must acknowledge his obligation for the forceful way in which these matters outside his own sphere have been laid before him.

Of the nineteen chapters in the present volume, eleven are reprints, with more or less of change, from articles previously published. In addition to the seven new chapters, in which the most important material deals with psychology and its relations to biology, including the chapter on genetic modes, Mr. Baldwin submits in appendices a list of admirable discussions upon organic selection and its near relatives by Osborn, Lloyd Morgan, Poulton, Headley, Conn, and himself.

Although the book inevitably suffers somewhat from its mode of construction, it is nevertheless, in the reviewer's opinion, much the most lucid and vigorous of the series to which it belongs. Despite a certain measure of repetition, there are almost none of the annoying cross references to the author's other works of which reviewers of his previous books have so often complained. One may think the argument good, bad, or indifferent; but at all events it is straightforward and ready to rest upon its own merits. The shortcoming which the lay reader most often feels, is the lack of richer illustrative material. In its place one finds a strong disposition to "logical disquisition," as Mr. Baldwin calls it, when criticising Romanes for a similar sin. Such a defect is, perhaps, unavoidable when a scientist steps outside his own specialty, and it should be said in fairness that Mr. Baldwin makes no pretense of

biological proficiency. Taken together, *Mental Development*, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, and *Development and* constitute a masterly exposition of genetic processes which will long remain a starting point for future explorers.

DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION

James M. Baldwin. "Development and Evolution." *Philosophical Review* 12.5 (September 1903): 588–90.

It gives me pleasure to recognize the kind appreciation by Professor Angell of the book *Development and Evolution* in the July issue of this REVIEW. His points of criticism are so apt that I take occasion to send a word of reply, which will, I think, serve to indicate even greater accord between us than appears on the surface.

In the first place, the criticisms of my "circular reaction" theory of accommodation have been urged in the main before by other writers, and they should have been taken up in a revision of the book on *Mental Development* (where the theory is principally expounded). This I hoped to do; and to some extent did in the French and German versions. But through the unfortunate procedure – to say the least – of the publishers in repeatedly reprinting the book without my knowledge and against my specific request and understanding, my revisions have never been allowed to appear.¹ I hope however, to go in detail into the points at issue, in the theory of accommodation at an early date. The general point of view, however, from which Professor Angell's strictures may, I think, be met is that of the recognition of the necessary variations and special forms which the typical pleasure-pain reactions have gone through in the processes of evolution and development. Admitting that there are cases of seemingly wide departure from the antithetic motor reactions of expansion and withdrawal, I still hold that in no other formulation are the great facts of habit and accommodation to so large an extent explained. If this be admitted, it then becomes a problem – or a series of problems – to account for the special phenomena of this sort cited by Professor Angell (p. 448. *loc. cit.*), as being in some sense variations, special adaptations, pathological aberrations, etc., of or from these fundamental types of organic reaction. It is somewhat the same sort of question as that of the variations and special cases occurring in

¹ Four times has the second edition of this book been reprinted, after what in each case I supposed to be a distinct understanding with the publishers that it was not to be. I think it is due to other writers to let this sort of thing be known.

the entire mass of “emotional expressions,” considered as in some way following upon the operation of Darwin’s principal formula – that of “serviceable associated habits.”

Second, as to the criticisms of the main teachings of *Development and Evolution*, I may say that the theory of organic selection as a *scientific formulation* may be appraised quite apart from “psychophysical parallelism” and the theory of “genetic modes.” Biologists have received it hospitably, simply as a theory of the method of evolution supplementary to Darwinism. It implicates the mind only by recognizing “mental characters,” equally with any other characters, of the individual which have “orthoplastic” value – that is, which serve during individual development to screen and supplement inadequate variations. *This may hold quite apart from any particular theory of the relation of mind and body.*²

Further, it is in the *interest entirely of such a scientific neutrality* that the theories of “parallelism” and “genetic modes” are developed in connection with organic selection. Only on the theory of parallelism can, in my opinion, the questions of cause and effect, interaction, etc., be ruled out.³ So what seems to be Professor Angell’s feeling that I am to be ranged on the side of mental causal efficiency, because of the emphasis laid upon mental characters, is in so far mistaken. I argue for a *psychophysical unit* of explanation, rather than a dualism of organic and mental units, in all cases involving the joint phenomena of the two series. As it is stated in the book in question (p. 15): “The principle of parallelism assumed, we claim once for all the right to *neglect the relation of the two terms, mental and physical, in all circumstances whatsoever*” (italics in the original).

Third, the theory of “genetic modes” also tends to simplify the scientific problem; it urges the recognition by science of the possibility of real genetic series and the development of methods of dealing with and interpreting them. This calls a truce in the discussion between vitalism and physico-chemical theory, inasmuch as it distinguishes the ideals of the two scientific procedures, and allows each the free application of its own methods. It may turn out that all science is genetic – that there are no cases fulfilling the ideal of exact mechanical equivalence and convertibility still fruitful results are arrived at by treating facts in chemistry and physics, if not in biology, *as if they were agenetic*: so it may be that biological and psychological series are after all strictly agenetic,

² As is seen in the very varied views of certain of its advocates, Professors Morgan, Osborn, Poulton, etc.

³ This has now been developed in an article on “Mind and Body” in the *Psychological Review*, May, 1903.

mechanical – but again it is fruitful for these sciences to treat them under categories of teleology and real genetic change. In the theory of genetic modes, a point of view is sketched in which genetic science assumes a recognized place and function, by its own right, and armed with its own categories and ideals.

These points seem to be largely realized by Professor Angell in his own appreciation of the scientific value of “organic selection” (p. 447, sentence beginning – “It is not to the reviewer’s mind, etc.” and p. 445, sentence beginning – “Such a statement is, like, etc.”); but he seems to find that I prejudice them by the additional theories (pp. 445–6; p. 447, first line – “it constitutes,” etc.) of parallelism and genetic modes. These, on the contrary, have both as their purpose, and, in my judgment as their effect, to make secure the net scientific result of the theory of evolution.

One point remains which shows the result of Professor Angell’s interpretation: he finds “organic selection” working only when consciousness is present – that is, he interprets me as finding consciousness the only “orthoplastic” (accommodation) influence in evolution. This is not my view. I classify such influences as mechanical, vital (nervous), and conscious (p. 93), placing the conscious or mental character on precisely the same plane as any physical character which, in a given case, may be found to play the rôle of supplementing or screening congenital variations. Since, indeed, *where psychophysical process is concerned*, the pleasure-pain reaction is, I think, the original mechanism⁴ of accommodation, it follows that conscious characters become most important; but there are perhaps cases in highly evolved organisms in which certain adaptive processes may be construed as possibly not psychophysical at all, but only vital or mechanical.⁵ I find, however, that it is not made sufficiently clear in this passage (p. 109 ff) of the book that there may be such cases of modification, and the statement is therefore in place here. It is possibly this misunderstanding that leads Professor Angell to say that the orthoplasia theory of evolution does not apply to plant life, “unless one adopt the precarious hypothesis that plants are conscious” (p. 445). On the contrary, the hypothesis finds some of its best illustrations in plants, where the accommodation processes are so great and rapid in their working, quite apart from the question as to whether these accommodations are in whole or part psychophysical (conscious).

⁴ See p. 109 f. Yet I add (p. 109): “It may be said with emphasis that the position taken in the foregoing pages, which simply makes the fact of ontogenetic accommodation a factor in development [evolution] is not involved in the solution of the further question as to how the accommodations are secured.”

⁵ As, for example, possible color effects of the environment in organisms, so far as such effects are “coincident” with “protective” variations.

PROFESSOR BAWDEN'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PHYSICAL AND THE PSYCHICAL

Grace Mead Andrus. "Professor Bawden's Interpretation of the Physical and the Psychical." *Philosophical Review* 13.4 (July 1904): 429–44.

Among the recent attempts to reach a new formulation of the psycho-physical problem is the 'functional' theory which has been presented by Professor Bawden in several articles lately published.¹ Professor Bawden begins his discussion in the first article by condemning the traditional statement of the problem. Its very formulation has involved the point at issue, namely, the existence of two orders of reality, mind and matter, the psychical and the physical. In the light of modern thought, however, it must be recognized that the distinction has no existence in nature apart from the intelligence that made it. Mind and matter, the entities of the old ontological theory, are merely scientific abstractions made for methodological purposes, which have become hypostasized as real existences. It is because the psycho-physical problem has been stated in terms of these abstractions that a solution has been impossible.

The only hope for a solution lies in a restatement of the problem, in carrying back the abstractions to the concrete unity of experience whence they were drawn, and reinterpreting the problem in concrete terms. The universe is not a system of static entities. This may have been a useful and hence legitimate conception for the thought of Descartes, but it is hopelessly inadequate and hence untrue for the purposes of modern thought. The only true reality is concrete experience. All distinctions concerning reality, all formulations of law, are responses to the needs of conscious life, and owe their validity to their ability to satisfy those needs. To solve the psycho-physical problem, then, we must consider it in its relation to practical experience, and state it in terms of function, or use, in that experience. The older and unsuccessful efforts

¹ "The Functional View of the Relation between the Psychical and the Physical." *Philosophical Review*, XI, p. 474. (2) "The Functional Theory of Parallelism." *Ibid.*, XII, p. 299. (3) "The Necessity from the Standpoint of Scientific Method of a Reconstruction of the Ideas of the Psychical and the Physical." *The Journ. of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, I, p. 62. (4) "The Meaning of the Psychical." *Phil. Rev.*, XIII, p. 298.

toward solution "grow out of the attempt to state a teleological distinction in ontological terms. They grow out of the attempt to state a relative, a fluid, or functional division of labor in terms of absolute, fixed, structural elements."² The only statement of the problem making possible a real solution is in terms of concrete practical experience. Such a statement Professor Bawden attempts to give in the 'functional' theory.

In the following examination of this theory an attempt will be made (I) to show that the articles already referred to, instead of giving a single consistent statement of the psycho-physical problem, present no less than four distinct and mutually incompatible positions. I shall attempt to point out (1) that the problem is stated in terms of concrete experience and the physical and psychical defined as correlative functions in this experience; (2) that the statement is made in terms of biology, the physical and psychical appearing as functions of the organism; (3) that the psychical is defined as the meaning of existence, while existence itself is identified with the physical; and (4) that both the physical and the psychical are reduced to the common term 'energy.' (II) The significance of these changes in the author's mode of treating the problem will be discussed, and an attempt will be made to show that the inconsistencies may be traced in large part to a fundamental ambiguity and shifting in the meaning of the chief terms employed, viz., 'experience,' 'function,' and 'tension.' It will also appear that, by an extension in the application of the term 'tension,' the distinction between physical and psychical, originally defined as a distinction existing only for the purposes of reflective thought, is erected into a distinction of ultimate ontological significance, and made the basis of a system of metaphysics.

I

(I) As has already been said, the necessity for a reinterpretation of the psycho-physical relation in functional terms forms the point of departure for Professor Bawden's treatment of the problem. In the first article he writes: "As contrasted with all the ontological theories, the functional view would hold that all our reflective distinctions arise within the life of action. We begin with immediate experience, and within this emerges the distinction between means and ends. That part of our experience which is already under control, in the form of available habits, becomes *means*. That part of the experience which is in process of being brought under control or is still beyond definite control, our ideas and ideals, presents unrealized values or *ends*."³ This

² *Phil. Rev.*, XI, p. 479.

³ *Ibid.*

is the essence of the distinction between physical and psychical. What in any experience or situation is taken as given becomes means, or is the physical, for the purpose in view. What, on the other hand, is not given, what we wish to attain, our purpose or end, is psychical for that particular experience.

This distinction is not always present in experience. While experience is running on smoothly and no interruptions or breaks occur, we are conscious of our surroundings and acts as neither psychical nor physical. But as soon as a difficulty arises, preventing us from following our usual course of action, we become conscious at once of what we have to do and the means we have for doing it. The one is psychical, in that it is our idea or ideal. The means we have for attaining this ideal or end, *i.e.*, available habits and fixed modes of action, are physical. "The direct experience of the child or animal, or even of the human adult when he is not thinking, is made up of a series of states or acts which present no conscious distinction between subject and object, between psychical and physical. But if some uncertainty or doubt or difficulty arises, this experience is broken up so that a duality appears in it – a duality of function which serves to dichotomize the experience into a part which is regarded as uncertain or problematic, and another part which is taken as certain or given."⁴

It is evident from this that not only is the distinction between physical and psychical dependent on the needs of experience, but that what is physical or psychical in any particular case is determined solely by the exigencies of the situation. The end will vary with the nature of the difficulty interrupting the course of experience, and with it the means. What is means for one experience, may, under the changed conditions of another situation, become end, and *vice versa*.

In a further account of this relation, given in the second of the articles, the break or interruption occurring in the habitual course of experience is described as a 'tension' in consciousness. As a result of this tension, a certain part of the content is said to become problematic and uncertain, while the rest remains fixed and constant, or is taken for granted. The part which as problematic is undergoing reconstruction is said to occupy the *focus* of the tension. This is the psychical. Similarly, the relatively fixed content forms the *marginal* area, and as such is the physical. "Experience at one time is equilibrated or automatic; at another time it is tensional or conscious. When it is conscious, two aspects come into tension. The relatively stable and permanent aspect of experience is taken as given, as there, as actual. The relatively fluid and changing aspect is regarded as the possible or potential merely, as ideal.

⁴ Loc. cit., XI, p. 481.

Experience, or the real, is the interaction of the actual and the ideal; it is the realization of the ideal in the actual. One throughout as to content (structurally), as to form it is two-fold – actual (physical) and ideal (psychical), according to the demands of the reconstructive or growth process (*i.e.*, functionally).⁵ Again, “Every experience has a focal point in consciousness and a marginal area which with reference to this focal point is called the external world. This focus of attention is identified with the subjective or psychical self; this external world is called the objective or physical not-self. But both are aspects of, or factors within, experience, just as the center and circumference are essential elements in the circle.”⁶

It would seem from these passages that the distinction between focus and margin corresponds to the distinction between end and means, the focus, as the psychical, being identical with end, while the margin of the tension is equivalent to means, or the physical. It must be asked, however, whether it is possible thus to equate the two pairs of terms. The question arises whether, in describing the psychophysical relation as a relation of end to means, the author is not giving a logical account of the distinction, and whether, on the other hand, the definition of physical and psychical as margin and focus of attention is not essentially psychological.⁷ It may be maintained that logical and psychological descriptions of the psycho-physical relation are quite capable of being harmonized, but it nevertheless seems doubtful whether such reconciliation can be successfully accomplished by assuming without discussion the equivalence of such metaphors as means and end, and margin and focus. But even if it be admitted that it is possible to regard these terms as equivalent when used abstractly, their discrepancy becomes apparent so soon as the attempt is made to ask what they really mean, and to apply them to concrete instances. This may best be shown by quoting an illustration used by Professor Bawden in the first article published.

“For example, my experience of the temperature in this room up to the present moment has been neither physical nor psychical, neither objective nor subjective. All at once I become conscious, let us suppose, of the fact that it has been growing colder and colder. I feel a draft. But I see no open window, no open door. What can be the cause of it? Here is

⁵ Loc. cit., XII, pp. 303 f.

⁶ Ibid., p. 318.

⁷ It is perhaps significant that Professor Bawden refers indiscriminately to the physical and psychical as margin and focus of a ‘tension’ and of ‘attention.’ As I understand it, ‘tension’ is a crisis in reflective thought and as such is a logical term, while ‘attention’ is of course a psychological term. The loose use of terms would seem to be a fruitful source of confusion throughout the articles, as I have attempted to show at greater length in the discussion.

a polarizing, a bifurcation, in my experience. There is something which is uncertain, – the cause of this chilling atmosphere. This occupies the foreground in consciousness: it is the salient, the absorbing content of this experience. And in addition there is the general background of things in the environment, which, being irrelevant in this situation, are simply taken for granted, the chairs, the desk, the blackboard, etc. The door, the windows, the draft, are in the focus of consciousness: they are psychical. My overcoat hanging on the hat-rack is on the border-line: it is in a fair way to become psychical if it grows cold enough, and I am not able to discover the cause of the draft. That is, the overcoat, in such a case, passes into the foreground, – and this is what we mean by the functionally psychical aspect of the experience. The draft, the door, the windows, and the overcoat will, then, remain the psychical aspect of this experience until I locate and remove the cause of the discomfort. Then the experience will lapse back again to the former level of direct stimulus and response, at least so far as temperature is concerned.”⁸

In the first place, it is to be noted that the objects in the margin of the tension, the chairs, etc., which are physical for this situation, certainly cannot be defined as *means* to any end. They are, as the author says, “irrelevant in this situation,” and consequently can have no ‘functional’ relation whatever to this experience. Further, the ‘psychical’ elements, the door; windows, etc., scarcely seem to represent any end. Nor does the overcoat; if it is brought into the foreground at all, it would seem to perform the function by means rather than end. Again, before this particular difficulty in regard to the draft arose, the temperature of the room might be supposed to have occupied the margin of the preceding tension, to have been “irrelevant” in that situation, just as the chairs, etc., are said to be in this, and consequently to be defined as physical. Yet the author expressly states that his experience of the temperature up to the time when the tension arises “has been neither physical nor psychical.”

The other illustrations used by the author present similar difficulties. In no case, I think, has it been shown concretely how the definition of physical and psychical as means and end is to be reconciled with their description as margin and focus of attention. But however inconsistent these two definitions appear, especially when concrete application of them is attempted, they nevertheless represent a certain community of standpoint. The distinction between physical and psychical has so far been consistently described as a distinction called forth and determined by the course of concrete experience. The contention so far has been that the distinction is one merely of *meaning* and not one of existence.

⁸ Loc. cit., XI, pp. 481 f.

(2) Passing now to what has been already referred to as the second position, we find the psycho-physical problem treated in biological terms.⁹ The functioning of the psycho-physical organism under conditions of complete adaptation to environment is, it is said, wholly physical. It is only when new conditions arise, demanding readjustment of the organism, that the customary reactions fail, and the habitual, or physical, functions become conscious, or psychical. Thus, under normal conditions, the processes of digestion and assimilation are almost wholly unconscious, and come to consciousness only when prevented by some interference from following their ordinary course. The case is similar in the development of new functions. Adjustments, which at first are made only by conscious effort, gradually become habitual, and finally lapse into unconscious functioning. The condition which calls forth the new function, or brings the habitual function to consciousness, may in general be described as a 'tension' between organism and environment. Habitual or stable acts, which are performed under conditions of adaptation, are described as 'non-tensional' or 'physical.' On the other hand, acts performed under conditions of non-adaptation are 'tensional' or 'psychical.' Thus consciousness "simply represents the life of the organism under a given set of conditions."¹⁰ "Conscious acts may be viewed as automatic acts in the making. They represent 'the felt struggle of the organism to do deliberately what later it comes to do naturally and by way of habit'."¹¹

A few pages earlier we find that mental life "is simply a name for the orderly continuous functioning of an organism under conditions of tension in adaptation. When, therefore, we speak of mental activity we are certainly speaking of the activity of this living machine that we call the organism. Mental acts are not different from other acts in the world. The sole difference consists in their being tensional or conscious acts instead of stable or habitual acts. Not all the activities of the organism are conscious. Fully nine-tenths are unconscious or automatic. Digestion, assimilation, circulation, respiration, etc., are under normal conditions, almost wholly subconscious operations."¹²

⁹ This position appears chiefly in the second article, although it is by no means confined to this, but may be found more or less explicit, I think, in each of the articles published. It should perhaps be stated that none of the four positions which have been distinguished as involving essentially different modes of treatment of the psycho-physical problem by Professor Bawden, is developed exclusively in any one article. While the various positions may appear more prominently in certain of the articles, yet I think they may all be found implicit, at least, in each of the articles published.

¹⁰ Loc. cit., XII, p. 310.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Loc. cit., XII, p. 308.

The briefest examination of these passages is sufficient to show that the position here taken is wholly incompatible with the description of the psycho-physical problem which has already been discussed. It will be remembered that the physical and psychical were defined as 'meanings' given to the content of experience *only when a tension arose in consciousness*. We found an experience, before the arising of a tension, described as "neither physical nor psychical." Now, however, in the last passages quoted, non-tensional activity is identified with the 'physical,' while tensional or conscious activity as a whole is defined as 'psychical.' That is, in this case, physical and psychical are mutually exclusive phases or stages in the functioning of a biological organism, while before they were defined as coexistent meanings, constituent elements, in the content of consciousness, correlative in the sense that the emergence of one necessarily involves the appearance of the other. Again, in this latter account, physical and psychical are distinct *modes of existence*, determined by objective and physical conditions. Before, it was maintained that the distinction was created by, and existed only for thought. "It has no existence in nature apart from the intelligence that makes it."¹³ Instead of being determined by physical conditions, it was urged that the "reality of the distinction is conditioned by the methodological and epistemological demands which first gave rise to it."

The real significance of the change may perhaps be stated thus: A distinction, which originally was defined as one made in response to the needs of conscious experience and existing only for intelligence, and which was further described as shifting with every change of conscious interest and purpose, is now erected into a distinction obtaining in objective reality, and its terms, the physical and psychical, hypostasized as objective existences. Finally, this hypostasization having been accomplished, one of these terms, the psychical, is identified with conscious life, or experience itself, which was originally the inclusive term for all reality.

It is interesting to note further that this change in treatment involves a complete reversal of the earlier position which defined the physical as means, and the psychical as end. For if perfect adaptation means wholly habitual or physical functioning, and if consciousness emerges only when this is interfered with, and exists only until readjustment is secured, if conscious acts are only automatic acts in the making, the only conclusion possible seems to be that the physical is the trite end for which the psychical is the means.

Enough has now been said, I think, to show that there is a fundamental inconsistency in Professor Bawden's mode of treatment, or

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

rather, that there is a fundamental change from one mode of treatment to another. Before discussing further what is involved in this change and how it was made possible, it seems best to proceed at once to the account of the other two statements of the psycho-physical relation, after which it will be possible to consider these questions in the light of the whole theory.

(3) The statement of the psycho-physical problem which will now be considered, seems to be relatively unimportant and to have but slight connection with the development of the functional theory as a whole. We have already seen that, in the first position, physical and psychical were defined as correlative meanings, or 'functions' of experience. This explicit statement was made with reference to experience: "One throughout as to content (*structurally*), as to form it is twofold – actual (physical) and ideal (psychical) according to the demands of the reconstructive or growth process (*i.e., functionally*)."¹⁴ In the second or biological position, we saw that Professor Bawden still insisted that physical and psychical must be defined in terms of function or activity. Now as a third position, however, we find the physical described as 'structure,' while the psychical is defined as its 'function,' and we are also told that the relation between the two is that of 'existence' to 'meaning of existence.' "And, just as the conception of inert matter has given place to the doctrine of energy on the physical side, so the conception of fixed, ready-made faculties has given place to the doctrine of psychic functions. It is but a step further to say that these functions are the functions of this energy, that the function is but the meaning of structure, that the psychical is but the significance of the physical... . Why not go the whole way and say that the psychical has no *existence as such* at all, but is simply an expression for the *meaning* of existence?"¹⁵

It is evident that this passage is incompatible with both of the earlier positions. The contradiction which the identification of the physical with structure presents both to the original definition of the physical as function of experience, or margin of attention, and to its later definition as the functioning of the organism under conditions of adaptation, is too obvious to require elaboration. It may be pointed out, however, that the assertion that the psychical "has no existence as such at all," and the further identification of it with function, would seem to imply that the only real existence is structure, which is scarcely compatible with the author's insistence that all reality must be interpreted in terms of function or activity. Indeed, it is apparent that, while the biological

¹⁴ Loc. cit., XII, p. 304. Italics mine.

¹⁵ Ibid., XI, pp. 477 f. See also XII, p. 307.

position transformed both the physical and the psychical from mere methodological distinctions into actual existences, this position hypostasizes merely the physical. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that Professor Bawden, in thus investing the physical alone with real existence, has involved himself in materialism, in spite of his repeated repudiations of this position. However this may be, it is sufficiently evident that this account of the psycho-physical relation represents a mode of treatment fundamentally incompatible with both of the descriptions already given.

(4) The statement of this position involves again the necessity for a reconstruction of the ontological theory of the universe. Under the influence of modern science, it is said, the interpretation of reality in terms of static entities has given place to a description of all existence in terms of action, force, or energy. In the physical sciences, under the leadership of such men as Professor Ostwald, the atomic theory is being superseded by the new doctrine of 'energism.' Instead of conceiving reality as reducible to atoms and their movements, the atom is conceived, from this point of view, as itself a force or center of motion. "The existence of matter has not been disproved, but its utility as a concept in its old static form has vanished in the light of a new understanding of the nature of motion. In place of the dead inert matter have been put the positive conceptions of energy and force... . What was formerly called the material object or thing is now regarded as the latent or potential as contrasted with the active or kinetic form of energy."¹⁶

Along with this transformation of the fundamental concepts of the physical sciences, a similar change is taking place on the side of psychology. "We no longer speak of mind *and* its faculties, of functions and that which *has* the functions. The mind does not *have* functions; it *is* the functions. It is real only in its activity, or rather, its activity, its functioning, is its reality."¹⁷

The transformation of the traditional static terms into dynamic terms of interpretation, it is held, makes possible a new statement of the psycho-physical problem in a form admitting of its solution. The physical and psychical are no longer distinct ontological entities incapable of being brought together, but they are alike interpreted in terms of force or activity, *i.e.*, in common terms. It is true that the concept of energy, as used by Professor Ostwald, "is too poor to express the contents of the ideas of life and mind. Unquestionably, these latter concepts, as they are at present used, will have to be modified before

¹⁶ *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, I, p. 63.

¹⁷ Loc. cit., I, p. 67.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

they will form a continuous series with the concept of energy.”¹⁸ But “the modification cannot be all on the side of the biological and psychological categories. The concepts of biology and psychology must reconstitute the concepts of physical science as truly as the converse. Indeed, is not the modern concept of energy itself a good illustration of the idealization of a material category, of the spiritualization of matter? Psychical phenomena are not to be ‘subordinated’...to the concept of energy, but both concepts are to be reconstituted, each in terms of the other. Viewed in this light, we may even accept the words of the writer just mentioned [Professor Ostwald] when he says: ‘In all that we know of intellectual processes, there is nothing to hinder us from regarding them as a particular form of energetic activity.’”¹⁹

This position proves most perplexing when we try to coördinate it with the other statements of the writer. What relation, it must be asked, can a psychical which is a phase of the ultimate reality, energy, bear to a psychical which is merely a convenient distinction made by men for the practical purposes of everyday life? Or, again, to a psychical which is equivalent to functioning of the biological organism, *e.g.*, digestion, under deranged conditions? Or, lastly, how can the psychical be at once “the meaning of existence,” and “a particular form of energetic activity”?

From this last account we again see how a distinction which was originally described as one created and determined solely by the exigencies of practical thinking, has been transformed into a distinction inherent in ultimate reality itself. Here, again, as in the biological position, the physical and psychical are both hypostasized. How complete is the transformation in the author’s mode of thought may be best realized by comparing this last position with a few of the sentences that he wrote in connection with the first account. “There is constant need of bringing back the abstractions which we employ methodologically in science and philosophy, and reinterpreting them in terms of that concrete experience which, since the time when those abstractions took definite form, has been undergoing development and evolving new meaning.”²⁰ “We are forced to interpret these words [‘mind’ and ‘matter’] in terms of our present understanding of that concrete experience in which alone their true reality is found.”²¹ “The solution of the problem lies in getting back to the principle involved in the practical attitude.”²²

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 64 f.

²⁰ *Phil. Rev.*, XII, p. 306.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., XI, p. 478.

After this repeated insistence on the necessity for tracing scientific abstractions back to the practical distinctions of immediate experience, and for the definition of psychical and physical in terms of their function or use in concrete experience, we find the psycho-physical problem solved by its statement in terms of 'energy,' the most abstract conception, perhaps, which is employed in modern science. It is true that the author states that the term energy, as ordinarily used, is "too poor to express the contents of the ideas of life and mind," and that it must be "reconstituted" together with the fundamental concepts of biology and psychology. But whatever such mutual "reconstitution" may mean, it certainly is not an interpretation of the abstraction in terms of concrete experience, nor does Professor Bawden's employment of the term 'energy' suggest, even remotely, a return to the "practical attitude."

II

In the light of the foregoing analysis, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 'functional' theory, as presented by Professor Bawden, contains irreconcilable contradictions, and that the most serious confusion pervades his whole treatment of the problem. It has already been seen that, in the articles published, four distinct accounts of the psycho-physical relation have been given, representing fundamentally distinct modes of treatment, or points of view. We are now in a position to consider further the significance of this frequent change in standpoint, and to ask how such apparently unconscious transitions from one standpoint to another have been made possible.

It is now generally recognized that the sciences do not give final and complete accounts of reality. In each represents the investigation of only a particular phase or aspect of reality. In each case, the reality with which a science deals is the reality of concrete experience, but in no case does it remain the unchanged concrete experience. Each science abstracts a particular phase of this reality as its own field of investigation. The laws and formulas which it discovers are not final truths expressing the ultimate nature of existence, but they are abstractions of merely methodological validity, made for particular purposes of thought. They are true so long as applied to the particular abstractions from concrete experience with which the science deals, but their application either to experience as a whole, or to the subject-matter of other sciences, is entirely illegitimate.

Since, however, the subject-matter of every science is an aspect of the same concrete reality, it follows that the same fundamental problems may exist for different sciences. Such a problem is that of the psycho-physical relation. Each science concerned may state such a problem, provisionally at least, in terms of its own technique, but an ultimate

statement and solution can be given, as Professor Bawden says, only in terms of concrete experience. The provisional solution made by each science is valid, but valid only for the purposes of that science, and any attempt to regard it as an ultimate and complete solution must lead to confusion. As a further result of this community in subject-matter, it sometimes happens, as in the case of the psycho-physical problem, that the same terms are used in different sciences. But it must be remembered, – and this, it seems to me, is what Professor Bawden forgets, – that while these terms may refer to the same fundamental reality of concrete experience, they represent for each science a distinct and abstract phase of this reality, each bearing its own peculiar connotations. That is, the reality may be the same for each science, but it is the reality as it appears from different points of view.

The first statement of the psycho-physical problem given by Professor Bawden seems to be based on the acceptance of this general view. The attempt seems definitely to be made to treat the problem from the standpoint of experience, and to interpret it in terms of concrete reality. In the second position, however, we find this standpoint left behind, and an account frankly given in terms of biology, which, from the first standpoint, could only represent a view that is abstract and provisional. Similarly, in the other positions, instead of an interpretation of the problem as it exists for experience as a whole, the relation is defined in terms of scientific technique, and the physical and psychical reduced to energy, a term in the highest degree abstract.

We are now in a position to consider the question: How has it been possible for Professor Bawden to effect such apparently unconscious changes in standpoint? The answer to this question is to be found, I think, in the fact that the chief terms employed, ‘experience,’ ‘function,’ and ‘tension,’ are used in very different senses, and transferred from the description of one standpoint to another with no apparent recognition of the changed meaning in the different context.²³ When the first point of view is taken and the problem is stated in terms of concrete reality, experience seems to be used in its legitimate sense, *i.e.*, as the conscious life of the individual. On the other hand, when the standpoint of concrete experience is abandoned, we find passages where it seems undeniably to be used as a scientific abstraction. In some passages, as in the following statement, for example, it seems to be equivalent to the whole of organic life: “Experience is not psychical all the time, either in the individual or in the race; nor is it physical; it is both, or either, only

²³ It is difficult to decide whether this loose use of terms is the cause or the effect of the frequent change in standpoint and mode of thought. It seems probable, however, that these are factors which mutually contribute towards the total result.

at critical points.”²⁴ When we interpret the term in this biological sense, as the whole of organic life, we are forced to the paradoxical conclusion that conscious life is merely an incident in experience.

Again, the word seems to be used in the psychological sense of process, or possibly as equivalent to energy. “From this [functional] point of view, experience is regarded primarily as process... . By process here is meant activity, without specifying that it is either physical or psychical. The most fundamental statement we can make about experience is that it is action. It is as much action when it is conscious as when it is unconscious, but the conditions of conscious action are different from the conditions of unconscious action.”²⁵

The biologist, looking at life from his particular abstract point of view, may perhaps regard conscious experience as a means to the maintenance of organic life, which is taken as an end; the psychologist for his purposes may regard it as a process; the physicist or the chemist may even define it as a form of energetic activity; but experience, when regarded from any of these special points of view, is at least as much an abstraction as the extended substance or the thinking substance of the older ontologists. To call such abstractions ‘experience,’ and to fail to distinguish these various abstract descriptions from each other and from the concrete experience which includes all reality, must inevitably prove disastrous to any theory.

A similar ambiguity may, however, be found in the use of the term ‘function.’ This is the more noticeable because a considerable part of the second article is devoted to its discussion and definition. The word is there defined as follows: “By function is meant orderly, continuous activity with reference to an end, and this activity consists of changes in structure.”²⁶ This definition would seem to be made from the biological standpoint, and to be applicable to organic life. Thus digestion would be a function of the organism in that it subserves an end, the nutrition of the individual. The significance of function, Professor Bawden says, lies in the meaning or end of the activity. The most serious ambiguity in the use of the term ‘function,’ however, arises from the fact that it is sometimes used to signify *activity*, and sometimes mere *meaning*. For example, it sometimes means an organic activity, like digestion, having a definite end, while again it signifies correlative meanings given to the content of experience. Thus consciousness, or the psychical, is said to be the function of the organism under conditions of non-adaptation. Again, the psychical is a function of experience, correlative to the physical, in

²⁴ Loc. cit., XII, p. 318.

²⁵ Ibid., XIII, p. 299.’

²⁶ Loc. cit., XII, p. 301.

that they are meanings given together in reflective thought. Still a different use appears in the following passage: "The mind does not *have* functions, it *is* the functions... . Its various 'faculties,' – sense-perception, memory, imagination, etc., – do not 'belong to' the mind; they *are* the mind."²⁷ We thus see that function is used indifferently in the biological, the logical, and in the psychological senses, without any apparent appreciation on the author's part of the shift in standpoint.

While this confusion prevails in the use of the terms 'experience' and 'function,' the application of the third term 'tension,' seems to involve, if possible, even greater difficulties. In the earlier articles the usual ambiguity is found. When the author is writing from the point of view of experience, tension seems to be used in Professor Dewey's sense of a conscious difficulty, an interference with the habitual course of our experience, which gives rise to the distinctions of reflective thought. Again, it is somewhat loosely identified with the psychological term 'attention.' In the second position, on the other hand, it is a biological term denoting lack of adjustment of the organism to environment, which gives rise to conscious experience itself.

Moreover, the articles last published show another important change. From signifying an interruption in experience, or a biological condition, the term 'tension' is extended to describe the nature of the cosmic process. It becomes the explanation at once of the origin of consciousness in the universe, of the evolution of society, and of the ultimate nature of individuality. In short, by this extension of the term 'tension,' the 'functional' theory, originally formulated as a solution of the psycho-physical problem, is expanded into a metaphysical explanation of the universe. Instead of a difficulty giving rise to reflective thought, or a lack of adjustment between organism and environment marking the emergence of consciousness, tension is now regarded as a phase of the ultimate cosmic reality, energy. "Now just as an organ may be relatively at rest or in active operation, so the universe...may be in a relatively stable or in a relatively tensional state."²⁸ While we saw before that tensional functioning of the organism was identified with the psychical or consciousness, so here, by making tension universal in its application, consciousness is extended from a phase of individual life to an aspect of the cosmos. "Consciousness is not something which belongs exclusively to you or to me. It is simply our name for tension, for variation, for progress, of the whole system of reality."²⁹ "Consciousness is no more confined to the individual than is tension... . It is

²⁷ *The Journal of Phil.*, etc., I, p. 67.

²⁸ Loc. cit., I, p. 67.

²⁹ Ibid., I, p. 67.

focussed here and there in what we call individuals, but it is the focussing of the whole system.”³⁰ The individuality of consciousness, in any real sense, Professor Bawden denies. “It is an historical accident, one might say, that my consciousness is so peculiarly mine.”³¹ The individual consciousness is to be separated from the rest of the universe, or from the social consciousness, only as the focus of a tension is separated from that margin. So, biologically, “what we call the individual organism is a fragment arbitrarily torn from nature, a part distinguished simply for convenience from the rest of the universe.”³²

It is evident that in these passages Professor Bawden is discussing the question of individuality and consciousness in metaphorical terms, if we pause to ask what real meaning these metaphors have, it seems to be impossible to obtain any satisfactory answer. Indeed, the whole account seems to depend so largely on metaphorical terms, and to contain so many questionable assumptions, that it is difficult to suppose that it is meant seriously. How, for example, can my individuality, which is constituted by my being the focus of an adjustment in the whole system of reality, be “an historical accident,” be “a sign of my limitation,” or “a sign of my unsociality”? What meaning can be ascribed to such expressions?

Again, Professor Bawden suggests that the individual consciousness may be a development from a kind of racial consciousness. “It may be that consciousness began in this generic way, that just as the human individual consciousness emerged by slow degrees out of a sort of group consciousness, so the lower forms of consciousness first represented the tensional stress of some life problem of the species rather than any specific crisis in the life of any so-called individual organism. And, ultimately, on this principle, mental life would have begun in one great cosmic throb of feeling or pulse of cognition. But, of course, all our ordinary categories break down when we attempt to state the origin of anything.”³³ Surely we are justified in asking for the grounds of the assumption that individual human consciousness originated from a “sort of group consciousness,” as well as for some interpretation of the latter conception. As to the origin of mental life in a cosmic throb of feeling or pulse of cognition, is not such an hypothesis both unintelligible from the standpoint of our ordinary categories, and without other foundation than a figure of speech?

³⁰ *Phil. Rev.*, XIII, p. 310.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 308.

³³ *Loc. cit.*, XIII, p. 310. Footnote.

But even if the metaphysical speculation to which this last article is devoted were acceptable on its own merits, it is difficult to see how the 'functional' theory, as here expounded, can be cleared from the imputation of ontology. Here, even to a greater extent than in the earlier positions we have noted, the author appears to have forgotten his own maxim of the "constant need of bringing back the abstractions which we employ methodologically in science and philosophy and reinterpreting them in terms of...concrete experience."

THE PHYSICAL AND THE PSYCHICAL

H. Heath Bawden. "The Physical and the Psychical." *Philosophical Review* 13.5 (September 1904): 541–46.

The criticism which Miss Andrus has made of the point of view set forth in my various articles on the psychical and the physical merits a reply. She finds "four distinct and mutually incompatible positions" in my writings, and says that they grow out of "a fundamental ambiguity and shifting of meaning of the chief terms employed."¹

This raises a question which has been present in the writer's mind from the first in his attempts to throw light on the problem – the question of terminology. It is not strange that the critic finds the problem approached from diverse points of view, since this was the deliberate intent of the writer. The issue concerns the alleged ambiguity and incompatibility of the terms used.

Professor Herrick has called the mind-matter problem "the Great Bad" in modern metaphysics, because of the unformulated assumptions and flagrant contradictions which lurk in the very language we are compelled to use, if we are to speak of the subject at all. Nothing has impressed the writer more forcibly from the beginning than the great difficulty of expressing one's self intelligibly in discussing the problem. It was his original intention to begin by showing up some of the inconsistencies of current theories on the subject; but this plan was abandoned on the principle that the best way to remove false theories is to erect true ones in their stead. Moreover, it was recognized that the only true method is that of immanent criticism which, in the case of the prevailing doctrine on the subject, is impossible because the error lies, not in the arguments used, but in the presuppositions involved in the terms themselves.

The matter is an exceedingly important one, and one calling for the greatest skill in logical and psychological, if not philological, analysis, in order to treat it adequately. The present writer cannot hope to do more than indicate the nature of the problem as it appears to him.

Before going further, however, it may be said here that all that is

¹ *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (July), p. 429.

written in the articles criticized was intended seriously. It was not meant as a joke, nor written merely to make copy. The writer did his best at that time to express his serious beliefs. He is still open to conviction. These remarks are made for the reassurance of the critic, who seems to be in doubt on the point.

A famous German philologist has said that language is but a dictionary of faded metaphors. Some are more obviously metaphorical than others, but words are, after all, in the last analysis, merely reduced acts. And just as our various modes of behavior become grafted one upon another, producing in habit a sort of composite photograph of all past reactions, so words, no matter how careful we may try to be, represent a sort of composite photograph, at once preserving and blurring the ideas of the past.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of all the terms used to describe our spiritual life, which terms have found their way into philosophy and psychology with all, or with most, of the ambiguities which they have in ordinary usage. Such terms as 'experience,' 'consciousness,' 'function,' 'tension' are illustrations.

What is 'experience'? It is used in the articles by the present writer in the most general sense possible, as identical with the whole of reality. Whether this is a defensible use of the term is, of course, a question admitting of discussion. But it would seem that this is at least an intelligible use of the term.

Now, it is perfectly compatible with such a use, to describe experience as 'process,' as 'activity,' or even as 'energy,' though this last was not done without an explicit proviso. To be sure, this is to describe concrete experience in terms of an abstraction. But even to call experience "concrete" is to use an abstraction. One cannot *say* anything without using abstractions. It is the very nature of a proposition to abstract and hold in tension predicate and subject, while, at the same time and in that very act, they are being referred to each other. 'Activity,' 'process,' even 'experience' itself, in one sense, is an abstraction. If we are going to philosophize at all, we are compelled to operate with abstractions or partial aspects. But one abstraction may be more fundamental than another abstraction, and we may seek to show the morphology, as it were, of our abstractions, while recognizing that, in the end, so long as we are making any statements at all, they must remain abstractions and cannot *be* the full reality.

This is one of the difficulties which has doubtless baffled every writer in his attempt to express himself on a question of ultimate or philosophical significance – how to *state* something which in its full reality is essentially unstateable how to express one's view of the matter when one is certain that the very fact of *stating* it, distorts and depletes it.

The same may be said of the term 'function,' which the critic declares to be used inconsistently. The term is defined by the writer as "orderly, continuous activity with reference to an end." The critic objects that this definition is "made from the biological standpoint," and objects to the application to experience at large or abstractions made from the point of view of special fields of inquiry like the different sciences.

But if philosophy is anything, it is the attempt to do just this: to interpret experience in general in terms of a synthesis of the abstractions of the special sciences. Each science itself represents only a special mode of experience. Each science represents an abstraction. Its significance for concrete experience, then, can only be got by bringing it into the common clearing-house of philosophy with other similar abstractions, where they may all be adjusted in some mutual synthesis.

The articles criticized are an attempt at such a synthesis. And if, as the critic finds, the term 'function' is used in three different senses in the articles, it seems that the author has at least been successful in bringing them together. Whether his particular view of the synthesis is adequate or not, is, of course, another question.

The critic has touched the nerve of the terminological difficulty in this criticism of the concept of 'function.' The author, in comparing the psychical and the physical to the complementary concepts of function and structure, speaks of the conscious acts as tensional and the unconscious acts as relatively equilibrated. A reconsideration of the passage, in the light of the criticism, has led the author to see that the matter is there stated in a misleading way. But the author still feels that the meaning is clear enough and is perfectly consistent with the other arguments presented. Conscious acts are tensional acts, *i.e.*, acts in which the psychical and the physical aspects come into opposition. Other acts, as is clearly enough stated in several places, are pre-conscious or pre-reflective; they belong to an immediate type of experience which is neither psychical nor physical, or may be said to be both. Instinct and habit are such immediate types of experience, and the fact that they at the present time figure equally in biological and in psychological discussions bears out the contention here made, that they are modes of experience in which are merged the phases which, in conscious life, are held apart.

Moreover, the author took distinct pains to avoid this possible interpretation of this very passage, by adding as a concluding remark, that "instead of saying that the psychical is the functioning of the physical, it would be truer to say that the psychical and the physical are constituent and correlative functions within experience" (PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, XII, p. 301). On page 303, it is distinctly indicated that the application of the term 'physical' to this equilibrated state is a concession to

ordinary usage. Again, it ought to have been clear from a reading of the discussion in the immediate context (on pp. 309 f.) that there was no intention of identifying reality with the physical or of identifying experience with the psychical (the two charges made by the critic). In this passage, the difference between consciousness and habit is distinctly referred to as the difference between a "tensional equilibrium" and a "relatively stable equilibrium." Here, obviously, the distinction between the two is one of degree of explicitness of the factors in tension. They could not be in equilibrium without at least the possibility of their being in tension, and, conversely, their being in tension is at the same time a state of relatively unstable equilibrium.

Nowhere does the author say, what the critic represents him as saying, that the "physical and psychical are distinct *modes of existence*" (italics not mine, p. 435). This is the exact position that the articles set out to combat. The critic seems to the author to have subordinated the statements which clearly set forth the main argument of the articles to certain minor passages which, it must be conceded, are open to the interpretation which she has put upon them, and which the author has taken this opportunity of setting right. One cannot say everything at once, and, in a controversy where it is so difficult to say anything intelligible at all and still use the terms of common speech, it is a source of gratification to the author that the errors detected have been in details rather than in any of the fundamental postulates.

Once more, consider the term 'tension,' which comes in for a good share of the "ambiguity," and thus of the criticism. The critic objects that, in one place, this term is significant only for the intelligence that makes it, and is thus methodological only, while in another place it is given ontological value. Here is a good illustration of the impossibility of escaping the thrall of the very conceptions one is trying to transcend. In defending a functional view of experience and of all its categories, one does not deny a validity to the ontological category; he simply tries to give it a defensible meaning. He shows that experience becomes conceived in terms of existence only when it is proving inadequate as a progressive activity. This is not to deny that the activity is existent; it denies only that it is existent in the static sense of the term.

In this sense it may be said (what the critic seems to object to the most) that reality is experience, existence is meaning, significance, utility. If I am going to predicate anything whatever of bare existence or of blank reality, whither can I go better than to experience for the predicates? To make the statement at all is, of course, in so far forth to put apart what are fully real only when together, but if this temporary putting apart is necessary to their really being together, it is difficult to see what else one could do.

To the objection that the relation of the psychical and the physical is represented in various ways, as the means-end relation, as the relation of existence to meaning, as the relation of structure to function, under the figure of the margin and focus of a visual field, what has already been said will perhaps be sufficient answer. But, as a possible further clarification, it might be added that it is nothing against the theory that all these various statements should prove to be true. Whatever may be the special difficulties involved in each conception (and the author does not wish to minimize these), they all equally show the functional character of the relation between the two factors involved, and this is the main contention of the articles. Structure and function, existence and meaning, means and ends, like the periphery and center of a dynamic system, have significance only in relation to one another. They appear and disappear together. They emerge within what, for want of a better term, we have described as a pre-reflective experience, which is no more (and no less) to be described in terms of one than in terms of the other of these two factors.

What this pre-reflective experience may be, we can only describe in terms of what it becomes in our reflective consciousness. And, on the scientific principle of continuity, we extend to the rest of the universe the psychological law of tension, which we find to be basal in the explanation of what we call reflective experience, just as we do with the corresponding laws of biology and physics. The only assumptions underlying the extension of the principle in this way are (1) the scientific principle of the unity and continuity of nature, and (2) the assumption that reality *is* only as it *is experienced*.

The first of these assumptions may be passed over here, as not being involved in the criticism of the articles. The second assumption is cleared of the charge of subjective idealism by the conception urged in the last of the articles mentioned (as also in another article by the writer in the *Elementary School Teacher* for February, 1904), in which, at some length, the view is defended that experience is not the mere private and limited possession of any finite individual, but a universal medium, as Professor MacLennan puts it, of which or in which the individual consciousness is but a center of transformation.

The author is grateful for the criticism of details, and will profit by some of the strictures made. But his chief interest is in the validity of the method which is at stake. And none of these criticisms touch the main thesis of the point of view in question, viz., the emphasis upon the functional character of all the categories of experience. Whether this is materialism or idealism, will not matter much to those who are aware of the existing ambiguity of these terms. The important point is: Is it true?

THE LIMITS OF PRAGMATISM

James M. Baldwin. "The Limits of Pragmatism." *Psychological Review* 11.1 (January 1904): 30–60.

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Pragmatism – variously understood, variously approached, variously turned to account – is in the air. I shall not venture to define pragmatism, much less to ascribe any definite form of it to any particular writer; on the contrary, I shall merely state broadly the general idea involved in it, as a way of looking at things, and from the outcome try to reach an understanding as to what in fact it is.

Broadly speaking, enquiries are pragmatic which, with more or less thoroughness, make such conceptions as thought, existence, truth, reality, etc., relative to other terms in a movement, development, or evolution; relative to antecedents, consequences, modes of function, ends. All such determinations are not only ends reached in a movement, but also means to ends yet to be reached; and all of them, considered thus functionally, as terms of genetic organization, in so far forbid definition in a static, absolute, once-for-all-fixed system. Now whether or not all those who call themselves pragmatic – not to say pragmatists – admit that this fairly characterizes that feature of their thought, still that is what I now mean, and that is what this paper is about.

In the theory of knowledge, it is one of the main claims – and one of the prime advantages – of pragmatic theory; that it avoids and denies any dualism between reality and thought, in the sense that thought, or knowledge, somehow represents or reveals a system of realities which are already fixed, definite, and absolute, apart from the processes of cognition. It claims that reality is determined as truth, and truth is a mode of mental organization. It claims to be able to point out the adequate processes of knowledge and action, of selection and systematization, which determine truth; and thus to yield a theory of reality which admits dualism only in the mechanism of the psychological processes themselves.

Now fully admitting both this claim and this advantage up to a certain point – I have myself worked out in recent publications such a view of truth, and of reality as cognized – I wish now to suggest and discuss certain limitations of this standpoint.¹

The discussion may be brought on under suggestions made in reply to the general question whether there is anything in the conception and implications of reality considered reflectively and for the purposes of philosophical theory, which is not explained both as to its origin and mechanism, and also as to its validity, by this theory of pragmatically determined cognitions or truths. And this question may be resolved into certain more restricted ones:

1. Are there any realities apprehended apart from the cognitive function, or at least not adequately apprehended through it? If so, what is their relation to cognitive reality or truth?

2. Are there any realities not, or not yet, discovered at all; and if so what meaning do they have for us?

3. Are there any types of thought, or modes of treating reality generally whose meaning is not exhausted in the statement of their pragmatic origin?

I

These are large questions, and it is the outcome of centuries of effort that rationalism or rational idealism – the philosophy with which pragmatism comes most evidently into opposition – has worked out intelligible answers to them all. Its answer to the first question is: ‘No’ – but with hesitation; for it has great difficulty in mediating the first contact of thought and reality. To the second it answers: “Yes; there is a system of real, but cognizable, relationships which are yet to be developed in the system of thought.” To the third question its answer is an emphatic affirmative, for here is the region of its strength; it claims that there are two, at least two, marks of thought which must lift it in

¹ This suggestion of the need of limitation, made in articles in the writer’s *Dict. of Philosophy* (arts. ‘Pragmatism,’ and ‘Truth in Psychology’) is cited by Mr. Schiller in his book *Humanism*, p. 8, as involving an inconsistency. I wish to work it out here, fully maintaining this theory of the relation of truth to reality, however, as suggested there (art. ‘Truth’) as stated out more fully earlier in the address ‘Selective Thinking’ (now Chap. VII. In the work *Development and Evolution*). Mr. Schiller asks how on pragmatic principles of origin we can ‘get at reality without knowing it’; I reply (see the end of this paper), by some other experience better qualified to report it exhaustively. His other question – how our estimation of what truth is can disregard and become independent of our modes of establishing it? – is also answered here: i.e., they can not, but they (our estimations of truth) can include and revise the results of the theory of the establishment of it.

our estimation out of the empirical and pragmatic movement – its teleological character, on the one hand, and its normative character on the other hand. In these respects, say the logicist thinkers, thought not only reveals reality but it is a unique and most distinguished mode of reality *in its very self*.²

How then, we may ask, may the pragmatic thinker answer these three questions? Before taking that up, however, I think it would be profitable to inquire as to the presuppositions of a pragmatic theory as such: that is considered as an account not merely of knowledge but also of reality.

In the restricted sphere of knowledge any genetic or developmental account of thinking necessarily makes the thought function in some manner utilitarian, instrumental, adaptive. Thought proceeds by a series of constructions, discoveries, serviceable adjustments, etc. But unless we admit that the system is a self-developing one which advances under imminent rules of its own, which is just the assumption of the ‘rationalists,’ there must be a series of points of origin, stimulation – and to the onlooker, points of observation – with reference to which, and by the mediation of which, all the readaptations and new discoveries are accomplished. Of course, this is what in the biological and sociological sciences is called the *environment*. Even from the strictly psychic point of view, even for reflective thought itself, there is not entire autonomy within the movement of thinking. So true is this that the determinations of reality, not alone in the sphere of the external world, but also in that of the most abstract truth, now most current among psychologists, differ as to the place of such coefficients as ‘resistance,’ ‘stubbornness,’ ‘limitation of activity,’ ‘experience of control’; but they do not ask whether they are there at all. The real, the fact, the truth, is in some sort or other, that which is accommodated to, that which *must be recognized* whatever else is refused recognition.³ Putting this purely in psychic

² It is this claim with reference to thought which has had nothing like enough attention on the part of the pragmatic logicians, such as Dewey and his colleagues, in pressing home the refractory and persistent dualism of the idealistic theory of knowledge (Dewey, Miss Thompson, in *Studies in Logic*). The idealist, e.g., Bosanquet, may reply that there is a fundamental identity of thought and reality, whereby the development of thought is a mode of reality which is fully realized only in the system of which thought, the individual’s thought, is a part. For a criticism of the selective theory of thinking, as an exhaustive account of truth, see Bosanquet’s strictures on the present writer’s views in the *Psychological Review*, July, 1903 (following up a discussion in earlier numbers).

³ It is an interesting instance of *Werthurtheile*, that pragmatic thinkers instinctively emphasize the manageable, selected, ‘workable’ aspects of external (including logical) reality. But the very question why some thoughts ‘work,’ while others do not, throws us back upon the environmental tests.

Professor Dewey seems genetically quite right (*loc. cit.*, p. 76) in making psychic

terms, sensational or other, we have to say that there are modes of conscious experience, entering essentially into the determination of truth, which are not determined entirely by earlier modes of experience; and these have their place and value just in virtue of their character as essentially determining future reality. Mr. Roosevelt's recognition of the Republic of Panama determines to me the truth or reality of that State. No one can view the pathological thought systems, with their pseudo-truths and realities, and refuse to admit that thinking is thus essentially conditioned upon what is both to the individual and to the onlooker extra-psychic.

Now what is this something, this environment) for pragmatism? Something itself constructed, selected, postulated by the thought processes? – something itself a part of that system of discovered truths and facts which it is the merit of this view to identify with reality? So the answer may read, when it is written: I know of no writer so far who has seriously proposed this question or who has seemed aware of the vital characters of the presupposition.⁴ But such an answer would be open to certain grave objections. First, to maintain that all there is in the reality called the environment is what has already been through processes of thought and discovery and established as true, would mean that future thought processes should be entirely autonomous – entirely undisturbed by intrusions or stimulations which could disturb them and require new adjustments. Earlier truth would be *in* the thought system. Again, on this supposition, we might trace backwards the path of knowledge, and when we reached the first glimmer of cognition, ask what stimulated it, what were the necessary conditions of this sort of function in consciousness. Surely it could not be said that *its* environment is *its* truth-system. Further we might ask a similar question of the movement at thought as a whole in society or in history; if each step has been a tentative one, secured by the struggle and adaptation to which the thought function is ministrant and instrumental, with reference to what system, to what larger whole, are *these* adaptations and discoveries

objectivity an aspect of experience of control, rather than control a result of objectivity (externality); but before the rise of dualism of which objectivity in this sense, is a term, there is no subjectivity or 'inner' experience. If we are to have any explanation of the reason of the determination of both terms it must be one which does not assume one term – the sphere of subjectivity, the purely psychic – to account for the other (see the next point in the text).

⁴ Mr. Schiller dabbles in it (*Personal Idealism*, II.), I think to little profit Professor Moore intimates it in avowing a biological point of view (as does also Professor Angell, *Relations of Psychol. to Philos.*, p. 12 f.), but just then he stops! (*Studies in Logic*, p. 374.) Possibly the 'fragmentary' character of the pragmatic discussions is what we should expect from the truth of this theory of thought! Certain of these writers do seem to be urged on by what Royce calls a 'certain indefinite restlessness.'

made? To deny that there is such a whole – such an environment progressively adjusted to – would be, it would seem, to give up the pragmatic method; for then there would be no recourse except to the idealistic position that thought is a self-sufficient and self-developing teleological system, not an instrument to anything.⁵

Another presupposition appears when we ask from what point of view pragmatism cites evidence of its truth: it must be replied – *from an objective point of view*. The adjustments, active adaptations, instrumental achievements, consequential sequences, etc., attendant upon an act of reasoning, for example, whereby the pragmatist defines it and validates it, are such *to him, a spectator*, not to the thinker himself. The psychic claim of thought is to be simply and only objective, *to terminate in the object which it constructs*. Granted the philosopher's 'will-to-believe,' even with it the believer claims to think exclusively on evidence, claims to free his mind from prepossession, prejudice, and voluntary bias. To be sure, in many reflective thought-processes, thinking is a conscious instrument, a means to a practical end; but to say that is far from saying that such pragmatic reference is a mark of thought, or constitutes its validity to the thinker. Such a general criterion can be claimed only from the psychological, in distinction from the psychic, point of view. I hold indeed that the instrumental character of thinking is marked, and that it is a function of utility in development and evolution: but that is my theory; I can not say that I am conscious of such features in my thought. It is just its own claim that thought is held to standards quite divorced from the individual's private volitions.

But once admitted that pragmatism takes an objective point of view of the thought function as a whole, and certain embarrassments at once follow. To assume this point of view is to accept the objective criteria of the whole process of thought and that, when we find it in a *mélange* of phenomena of other sorts and classes – physical, social, inferential – each claiming objective value also by reason of its own set of objective coefficients. Once admit the validity of such an objective claim, and all sorts of truths follow, with the sorts of existence to which they belong: mental existence, physical existence, ideal existence, etc. In short, we have, when we assume that we can rely upon objective phenomena which pose as embodying a type of reality and claim to constitute it – we have by the same act to validate all such types as being what they claim. It suffices to make this point here; it comes up again below more

⁵ An alternative would be a form of 'radical empiricism' which actually accepts the postulate of various sorts of reality external to the individual as pragmatic development requires them. I suppose such a genetic realism, if it stopped there, might still by courtesy be called a philosophy! But on this see below.

forcefully where the dualistic implications of pragmatism are brought out. Here it may suffice to have made it clear that pragmatic philosophy involves this presupposition.

II

Coming back now to the definite questions which we proposed to put to the pragmatist we may proceed to consider his answers to them one by one.

First, the question of *acognitive*, and what may be called *mixed modes of reality*.

In the literature, the development of pragmatic views has been largely in connection with the determination of cognitive reality as a system of accepted truths. Apart from the procedure of inferring from the results of the criticism of opposing views, the method characteristic of the writers of the Chicago publications, this has proceeded upon the psychological view of cognition which makes it a phase in a process of which action is another phase, the whole being the process of *the treatment of experience for practical purposes*.⁶ If this be a valid way of looking at those modes of reality which are constituted by the exercise of the cognitive function, it would seem possible to pursue the same method in reference to those other aspects of mental function which also in some manner lay claim to real reference. If it be true, that is, that the criteria of truth upon which cognitive reality reposes and which serve as its coefficients, have their significance as being points of advantage in the life of active adaptation, the same may be true of the coefficients of reality of other sorts – external, aesthetic, ethical, ideal, etc. It would be

⁶ Such a view is explicitly carried out in my own development of the relation of thought and action in *Social and Ethical Interpretation*, Chap. III., VII. and *Mental Development*, Chap. XI. My treatment is to the last degree pragmatic (cf. The remarks of Caldwell, *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, Sept., 1899), but being stated in terms of reaction it is objective in its point of view. Professor Dewey stated in terms of reaction it is objective in its point of view. Professor Dewey seems to prefer to speak in psychic or experiential terms, but gives us no account of the actual psychophysical factors entering into the concrete determinations of thought (such as kinæsthetic sensations, images, etc.) and thus, to my mind, loses the advantage of such psychophysical explanations as those given by the 'action,' 'synergy,' and other theories. Another result is his failure to work out the selective tests and checks upon thinking which are fully discovered only from an explicitly objective point of view. I have described the function as a self-repeating 'circular' (imitative) reaction, illustrating 'habit' and issuing in 'accommodation'; but I am quite ready to say, with the psychologist Dewey, that there is a conscious organization resolved into strains and tensions and reorganized in a new thought under 'stimulation' (but can not this term 'stimulation' be avoided? – it is shockingly objective!), or with the philosopher Bosanquet, 'that the thoughts which precede and follow, taken together, really illustrate 'identity in difference'!

our task, as genetic psychologists, to work out the processes by which, in the active life, such and such marks of experience serve the life of adaptation in the sphere of reality respectively which this or that class of experience postulates. The objects of the external world, thus construed, are the experiences which mediate organic adjustments; æsthetic realities, those which mediate emotional adjustments; ethical, personal adjustments, etc. This would seem to be a legitimate and fruitful task – a larger problem of the genetic logic of reality – and one in whose accomplishment the pragmatist has a distinct advantage over the rationalist, by virtue of his doctrine of the concrete experiential determination of reality of whatever sort. So far, I think, the pragmatic method has great value, inasmuch as it recognizes the protests of heart and will – and anything else that can make good its claim – against an exclusively intellectualist theory of reality.⁷

But this is so far psychology, and, in a sense, logic. Can we stop there, and simply recognize the pluralistic real postulates of practical life? One of the fathers of pragmatism, Professor James, seems content to do so. Others again seem to have each his favorite among these different modes of reality. Some abhor pluralism, but rest content in dualism. Some say there are a lot of reals, but they are all ethical – thus deserting the pragmatic point of view. The question for the pragmatist here would seem to be: Is there any practical need for further adjustment of these realities to one another? – any issue of life which is subserved by the dominance of one mode of reality over the others? – or is there a further real construction which is realized by the subsumption of these varied realities? In connection with such an attempt at reduction the question as to the motive to it would arise. Is it a practical one – that is, is the demand for philosophy pragmatic and not purely theoretical? If so then are not the scales in any such weighing of claims loaded from the start with various personal, utilitarian and other practical preferences of individuals? – all of which are to this type of thought in themselves legitimate – or with social and conventional, types of belief, judgments of value, etc., which would hopelessly prevent any general unanimity or permanence of world-view? Possibly, then, we should have to appeal to the statistical logician, who deals with purely theoretical matter, after all, and asks him to establish a *pragmatic equation of error* whereby we might correct up the conclusions of those philosophers who ventured to think beyond the rankest pluralism!

But there is more than that in this question of the modes of reality. The objective standpoint itself issues in a dualism more sweeping than the various dualisms of the objective reality coefficients themselves. The

⁷ Cf. Dewey, *Studies in Logic*, p. 432, and the papers of Stuart in the same volume.

prime and fundamental dualism is the old subjective-objective distinction. It is true it is now becoming, to present-day thought, a dualism for cognition, that is, a dualism between two objective constructions – *the me and the not-me*. Genetic and social psychology are making the ‘me’ the same as the ‘other-me’ of the social fellow, and both a part of the system of constructions determined as objective. But over and above this essentially objective dualism of ‘me and not-me’ there is, together with it and necessary to it, the dualism of the *subjective and the external* of the ‘inner’ sphere of experience itself and, over against it, the ‘trans-subjective.’ This latter dualism would seem to be genetically earlier, at least earlier than the full form of that which embodies the distinction of mind and body; yet the self-not-self distinction, in the form in which it precedes the inner-outer distinction is largely one of organic or strictly presentative data. The dualism – to return to the last positive statement – which remains for reflection is that of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’; it opposes *experience-as-such*, with its constructive principles of unity, continuity, identity, etc., to *outer-reality-as-such*. Here are two spheres, one of cognized realities *including selves as objects*, the other of *mental reality which functions as agent of the constructions of cognized reality*. Now what is pragmatism able to do with these great dualisms?

As to the me-not-me distinction there is no difficulty in securing full pragmatic justification for it. It has been a labor of the present writer in recent years to attempt to work out just that problem; the functional and active adjustments, principally social, under stress of which the me and the not-me are first distinguished in thought and furthered to maturity. If a person is to be a person, he must know that he is a person, and that others are persons; also that there are things which are not persons. So we may say: so much to the credit of a pragmatic method in psychology, so far as its attempt bears fruit.

But there is the other, the inner-outer dualism. This puts to pragmatism the different question: what is the practical origin and value of this distinction? And upon this the further question: is it possible to give a pragmatic account of this distinction without assuming it? This second question is put as it is in order to suggest the point of criticism now to be made – a criticism which, I think, lays bare one of the essential limitations of the pragmatic method.

The question raised in attempting to account for the inner-outer distinction is really that of a genetic account of reflection: for this dualism cuts through consciousness just where the spontaneous dualism of me-not-me passes over into a way of treating data of both these classes which recognizes the possibility that that which is objective may also be and perhaps only be ‘inner’ or peculiar to the individual’s

constructive processes, and not trans-subjective at all. The 'me' is objective but not external. Here the representative theory of knowledge at once springs up to interpret this naïve or common-sense reflection. The treatment of illusion, from the dictum that 'the senses deceive' of the Heraclitians and the Greek Sceptics, down to the elaborate theories of ideas and 'imagination' in modern times, witnesses to the real problem raised here: a world of 'inner' events and objects, ideas, images, etc., which may or may not be external or 'outer' also.

The ordinary idealistic solution is simply to take consciousness at its word, and concede that the representative series does not actually embody reality, but only copies or duplicates it. Then the problem is not so much to account for error in some representations as to account for truth in others: how can we be sure that reality really is in any case and anywhere what we in our 'truths' conceive. On the other hand, the pragmatist has on his hands the problem of error if reality is that which the cognitive function normally reports, with no further reference to an outside system or series, how then can such a distinction ever arise as that between what is somehow referred to an external system, and what, though fully cognitive, is nevertheless only the product of the thinker's mind, while possibly to the thinker still making an erroneous claim to external value.⁸ I see no great difficulty here, to the extent, at least, of finding pragmatic justification for the distinction of inner and outer, and with it of truth and error – provided we assume a thoroughgoing objective point of view. The pragmatist indeed must admit that such a point of view is, as we have found it to be, his necessary presupposition. The play of images necessitates mistakes and error; certainly so, if the imaging function is the vehicle of tentative, trial-and-error processes working in the interest of practical accommodation to an environment, physical, social, and other. So far so good we have a genetic science, genetic psychology, depicting a development or evolution process in which truth and error are correlative aspects.

But in recognizing this necessity of the objective standpoint, we bring up again, and with increasing embarrassment, the problem of the environment. It is possible, as we saw above, to look upon the environment itself as a mode of pragmatically determined reality, but only on the assumption of the reality of mental function and development. But now we find that such recognition of mental function as a

⁸ The difficulties of the representative theories are brought out with especial force by certain of the Chicago pragmatist writers: notably by Moore in *Existence, Meaning, and Reality* and by Dewey in *Studies in Logic*. But their treatment of the problem of error and illusion is correspondingly halting and inadequate, except so far as error is made from a psychological process is experimental (see, however, below).

mode of real process is possible only in a dualism with the external – the dualism of inner and outer – of mind and that external reality or environment which we are to explain as a construction of the inner reality or mind. There is here a vicious circle. The only point of view (that is, the inner) from which the pragmatist can possibly explain the external environment is one from which *the very principle of his explanation*, a mental development by which the external is constituted as real, *is quite destroyed*.

It is a case of what I would fain call the *genetic fallacy*. In a recent paper⁹ there are worked out the stages, called there ‘progressions,’ successively reached by consciousness in the development of the me-not-me dualism. And reason is there found for saying that a theory which would be consistent must not read into connection with a term on one side of this dualism at a given progression, a term from another stage or progression; the great case of it being, as there pointed out, the treatment of mind as real and body as subjective, when the very progression in which mind is found as real guarantees mind *only in a dualism with real body*. This is the ‘genetic fallacy’ – confusing the terms of different genetic progressions.¹⁰

We have here a case of it. The pragmatist must be a monist if he would explain the environment; but he can not account for error – nay, he can not be a pragmatist – without being a dualist. *He takes advantage of dualism to refute dualism.*

It is easy to see the necessity of insisting upon this requirement in comparative and child psychology, where it forbids us to construe the individual’s mental constructions apart from the sort of function then and there possible; as in expecting any sort of moral insight in an individual which is not yet self-conscious. But it is harder to keep clear of the fallacy when we are theorizing about the mind. We fall to using the outcome of a later stage of reflection, which has its validity only as proceeding from an earlier, to criticise and invalidate the postulates or requirements of the earlier. Reflective idealism is possible only by refining one term of a crude dualism; it is then a logical circle to show that this refined self can not be a term in such a dualism. The proper method is to ask what becomes of both terms of the dualism in the process of further mental development. Pragmatism itself insists upon this in its protest against the extreme logicism which reads its developed ‘universals’ back into the crudest allogical states of mind.

⁹ *Psychological Review*, May, 1903.

¹⁰ This general requirement of genetic consistencies is recognized in his comments on my paper by Professor Mead (*The Definition of the Psychical*). I could not wish a stronger enforcement of it than that of Dewey, loc. cit., pp. 16 f.

The difficulty arising from this dualism is undoubtedly emphasized when we consider the question of time – a question which the idealist is not slow in urging upon the pragmatist. Time considered as a mode of pragmatically derived reality must be considered real in the sense that other abstract or conceptual modes are. The pragmatist has, from such a theory of time, a weapon of advantage in one respect, inasmuch as he can thus deny the reality of future, undiscovered, possibilities of existence, considering them as projections from realities already discovered and justified. But now the critic may say: you admit the reality of mind as a principle having a development in a time series, and recognize it as having constituted for itself a series of corresponding realities at its several stages of development; the reality of a time series considered as a mode of development of mental reality must be acknowledged, and with it the reality of time as a mode of other realities so constituted. The time mode is, in short, a mode common to the self postulated and to the realities in dualism with which the self all along knows itself. The independent time development of reality of whatever sort, therefore, must be admitted if the time development of the self be assumed. It is difficult to understand, indeed, why the reality of the future time-mode should not also be granted if we grant that of the past time-mode.

The advocate of some form of logical construction of reality avoids this dilemma by making time a mere cognitive mode – not real. But that has all the difficulties of a logical deduction of time, and also labors under the acute embarrassment of denying the progressive or dynamic character of reality. Here again the only solution possible to the genetic and pragmatic method would be one which actually depicted consciousness passing out of the dualism under which it is compelled to think both mental and external reality as in time.¹¹

Writers of a pragmatic bent delight to press home the dilemma of dualism upon the representative theory of knowledge; and their indictment is, in psychology, unanswerable. And it is amusing how they instinctively fight shy of taking up their own dualism. Yet withal they give signs of a certain apprehension of it. Notably is this the case in the able papers of Professor Moore. He concludes his examination of Professor Royce (*Studies in Logic*, XI.) by asking the question as to the tests or checks upon the action-knowledge process which the environment brings to bear; and makes the entire external and organic

¹¹ An analogous question arises regarding space, except that it is a mode of external reality only; but pragmatic dualism would require us to recognize real space in the sense that physical existence in general is real. Only a mode of experience which not only satisfies but transcends spatial properties would be sufficient for a general theory of reality.

world as such environmental to the psychic function.¹² But such a dualism is just the last refinement of reflection in the distinction of self and not-self: it is the inner-outer antithesis which consciousness reaches only in its most extreme personal determinations. And it is this dualism of the reflective consciousness which is one with that of the philosophical theorist. Whether we consider the terms of the dualism as present to the actor or only to the philosopher, still the 'inner' and the 'outer' are in both cases alike cognitive constructions, and each is valid by the same right that the other is, and exactly to the same degree. If, however, we put the question to Professor Moore with reference to a stage of development at which the psychic dualism is not yet come, we must then take the objective point of view and treat that consciousness as *to us* – *not to it* – having such and such an environment. *It* has no ends, no self-determinations; *it* makes no postulates; it simply acts straight-away as its stimulations bring it out. And any fruitful constructions of its 'purpose,' 'plan of action,' etc., are read into it by us. Much of the plausibility of the pragmatic philosophy comes from this playing between the two points of view.

In short – to sum up – the pragmatist must either frankly swallow the camel of a real environment which the knowledge function may then both truthfully and also erroneously reflect – a step which would involve him in all the epistemological litigation of the representative theories of knowledge – or he must find some guarantee for the reality of the mental principle which is not *rein pragmatisch*. This latter is his better course; the present writer adopts it as a limitation on his pragmatism. As psychological and logical method, the instrumental point of view is true and inevitable in present day evolution thinking; but there must be found a way to preserve it without expanding it into a one-sided metaphysics which then eats it up!

¹² Yet he calls it all 'habit,' thus somewhat surreptitiously bringing the external world into the sphere of that which is *already adapted to*, neglecting that aspect of it which makes it that which is still to be *adapted to*. This is, of course, an easy way of 'begging' the pragmatist's dualism. In another place he explicitly speaks of 'habit somehow developing its own interruptions' in order to give thought a chance (*Existence, Meaning, and Reality*, p. 16). Remarking upon Professor Moore's treatment of my 'extra-organic' test (*Development and Evolution*, pp. 250–51) under that of the 'effectiveness of an idea to organize habit' (*ibid.*), I should say that it is just the intrusion of something that breaks up habit, and hence cannot itself be described as habit, that makes the reorganization by the idea necessary and possible. For example, I am in the habit of walking comfortably in a shoe with low heel; and when a new shoe with a higher heel strains my tendo achillis (as it just has!) my new idea of walking (on my toe!) arises and is effective as an accommodation to this new, in no sense habitual, experience of the high heel. In other words my old truthful idea of walking based on habit has broken down under the test of working in the extra-organic environment which includes the new shoe. This I have described (*loc. cit.*) as the 'test

III

The second general question proposed to advocates of pragmatism in philosophy is this: Are they undiscovered realities? What meaning can such a conception have for the pragmatist?

In order to give an adequate answer to this question, a detailed theory of the different modes of cognitive and logical process would have to be worked out. So far as I know, no one has yet attempted it from the pragmatic point of view. Especially would it be necessary to have an interpretation of the general, and universal, and normative aspects of experience, with accounts of the claims made by these modes, respectively, to report or embody reality. It would then be seen how successfully their claim to exhaustiveness was in truth made out. So far as these thinkers have gone they seem to be aware that if reality is to be consistently interpreted as a construction of experience, then there could be no realities which are not so made up in experience, in the way we call discovery. We are explicitly told that reality is actually made when it is discovered; that its development is, or proceeds *pari passu* with, the system of truths which is in process of progressive establishment. Of course in this matter the pragmatist is to be allowed all the possible reaches of cognition, and of other modes of experience, such as that found in social relationships, whereby all possible forms of apprehension are brought into play.

It seems to me, speaking tentatively, and subject to confirmation from the detailed study of the demands made by logical process generally,¹³ that pragmatism is able to give a fairly consistent account of itself in this matter up to a certain point; a point which again marks the transition from psychology to metaphysics. The aspects of reality very clearly distinguishable, and with them the habits of mind which yield these aspects of reality, in complementary relation to each other and seeming when taken together to be exhaustive, are those called variously 'fact and value,' 'appreciation and description,' 'science and real life,' 'habit and accommodation,' 'prospective and retrospective reference,' and in the writings of pragmatic thinkers, though not so clearly expressing the same distinction, 'fact (or image) and meaning.' If we look at the distinction from the point of view of the psychic processes and attitudes involved, we may place on one side all that which is cognitively or actively apprehended, as the given, the established, the-now-and-here-

of fact,' supplementary to the 'test of habit.' So when Professor Moore says, quoting me, that a reorganization under stress of experience is entirely in "terms of '*activities already going on*'" (*Existence, Meaning, and Reality*, p. 18) he omits the new sensation experience whose urgency compels the reconstruction.

¹³ An attempt made in the volume on 'Genetic Logic' which is to be published in the near future, and of which certain of the developments are anticipated in this paper.

existing; and, on the other side, those aspects of our mental determinations of all sorts which qualify the given or aim to establish it in any indefinite, hypothetical, or prospective way. Thus having divided the entire real predicate into that which to consciousness already real, and that which merely may be, seems desirable is not yet realized, we have to ask as to the pragmatic meaning and value of the latter member of this antithesis.

So far as pragmatic derivation and justification is concerned, they are not far to seek; the utility of hypothetical and normative motives to action is admitted on all sides. The reference to reality is, from the point of view of the pragmatic onlooker, that of a demand for progressive organization of the content already given and still subject to organization. Two questions arise, however, so soon as we press the problem of objective status of such hypothetical predications.

First, we have to ask: does the psychic movement postulate more than the reality already given in the datum? In reply to this it seems to be true that it does not. The real subject in any judgment of value is only that which just by being constituted as possibly real, already exists for action. So far as determined for action – that is, pragmatically – such judgments are true. The real predicates involved in the ideal and normative, no less than in the logically hypothetical states of mind, are constructed from the data of existence then and there at hand. So far we may go with a thoroughly pragmatic psychology.

The will to believe, for example, is effective, or enters into the determination of reality, only in so far as the belief postulates the result as already actually accomplished: the existence of the thing believed enters into the psychosis and determines the act of will. From the psychic point of view the will to believe is as much determined by real existence as is any other sort of intentional act (*e.g.*, that of moving my head to escape a blow); for psychically the reality or existence is taken for true in the act of belief. It is only to the onlooker that some new mode of existence is determined by the action in accordance with the belief. And even that is, to the onlooker, a mode of real determination only after it has happened. From neither point of view does it involve the postulation of unrealized reality.

How is it then that we, in real life, assume such a sphere of the undiscovered? Is not all ignorance failure to know what there is to know? True: but so far as this is reality at all, it is known reality in its warp and woof. The mental attitude here is essentially the same as that by which we depend upon the continued existence of what we have once known. Both are re-readings of the established order under familiar categories, and both are – when all is said in individual and in social psychology – through and through pragmatic; that is, both, determined by necessities

and utilities of real life, are to the same extent that the originally acquired items of reality were.

But, all is not yet said. If we ask, second, for the relation between action and thought in the determination of the joint function which issues in reality, we find a consistent and attractive doctrine, as has already been said: thought – cognitive product in general – is a reflection of habits of action, an organization for future safe action and practical handling of experience. It is the static term in an active process. So far as static, its reference is trans-subjective; it is *reality*. So far as a mental organization of habits, it is dynamic, a ‘meaning,’ a ‘plan of action,’ a ‘purpose,’ an ‘instrument,’ an ‘end’ – to use current designations of different writers, all of whom aim broadly at expressing about the same thing.¹⁴ The thought term is the term which is hypostatized as real for the self and for others. It stands as valid in experience until more effective handling of experience issues in a modified thought.

On this view the psychological and biological utility of thought or cognition in general *resides precisely in its static quality*. It is a definition, a specification, a determination. If it is a ‘purpose,’ it is a defined, usable, purpose; if it is an end, it is a presented, communicable, end; if it is a meaning, it is because it fits into a context of available meanings; if it is a ‘plan of action,’ it is as much a ‘plan’ as it is an ‘action.’ In minimizing the static aspect and reference of thought, pragmatic writer are depriving it of just those features by which its usable and effective character is to be established in mental development. Where would language be, and with it all the socially derived determinations of action, without this assumption. I am sure there will be a reaction on this point from the extreme view whose only justification is novelty.¹⁵

If this be allowed, we find it necessary to ask for each thought determination not only what sort of action is served, what dynamic pragmatic meaning it has, but also what static, theoretical system of realities it finds its place in. Every true thought is true not only because it has active determinants but also because it reflects all the meaning for life which those active determinants have. So, to reverse the proposition,

¹⁴ My own formulation, arrived at from a detailed exploration of the factors, individual, social, and other and stated from the objective point of view is: ‘what we do is a function of what we think and what we shall think is a function of what we have done’ (*Social Interpretations*, pp. 106, 301).

¹⁵ An extreme view which, in its emphasis on action, practically issues in a dualism of thought and action, is that of Mr. Schiller (*Humanism*), and ‘Axioms as Postulates’ in *Personal Idealism*). The ‘Instrumental Logic’ of the Chicago writers avoids this extreme (who for this reason, as I am informed by one of them, refuse to use the term pragmatism for their point of view); but it is still open to the limitation developed in the text.

we may say that every successful active adaptation or line of conduct must, in its development, reflect itself in cognitions or thoughts which are the reflection of all its meaning. It thus becomes definite, socially available, and more than concrete. The categories of general, social, and communicable thought are the normal vehicle and embodiment of the utilities which are turned to account in development.

From this we see that a pragmatism which denies or discounts the validity of the logical point of view truncates its own assumed psychological process and becomes helpless. Thought becomes a by-product, a second-band way of reaching reality, which is 'suspect' to those other and more valid intuitions given in feeling and action. And this becomes glaringly evident when such a view blows itself up into the dimensions of a philosophy. A philosophy is an attempt to think things: to reach a general and communicable theory of reality. Its characteristic feature is just its generality as opposed to concrete practical enterprises which, no matter how valuable, are still inarticulate. So the mere assertion that in its origin thought is a mode of action, and its revelations are possible because of its origin as serving the utilities of real life – even so much of a general statement as this is itself a logical reinterpretation of the bare reactions which it claims to interpret and generalize. To prove its own truth; indeed, pragmatism can not be content with its own formulation: for such a principle in action must itself issue in a theoretical or logical system.

We might indeed stop here; having a dualism of pragmatic and logical explanations, the logical being the naive system of thought reflecting the adaptations of which pragmatism takes note. But another alternative would be to reach an interpretation which should reconcile the two essential phases of the action-thought process, and itself issue in the solution of the contrasts in our experience.

There is still lacking, I think, an attempt of the last-named sort; but in Dr. Peirce's and Professor James' formula for pragmatism, we find something of an attempt at the first named – an attempt to state logical meaning consistently with pragmatic origin. James' formula is: "The whole meaning of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended or in that of experience to be expected if the conception be true."¹⁶ This would seem to be – disclaiming, however, the attribution

¹⁶ In the writer's *Dictionary of Philosophy*, 'Pragmatism' (there also Peirce's formulation and criticism). I know of no other attempt to formulated a constructive principle of logical meaning on the pragmatic basis. Professor Dewey aims, it would seem, at justifying the logical processes from the point of view of genesis, rather than at treating of the structure or morphology of thought. And yet by defining thought explicitly in instrumental terms. (*Studies in Logic*, I ff, 40, 76, ff, etc.) he really excludes the so-

of what follows to Professor James – a formula of the sort of logical systematization of meanings in which pragmatically determined thinking would be reflected. The meanings intended and accepted would all the while be subject to the selective, corrective, substitutive and other revisory processes of practical life, and the realities reflected in such a system of truths would be the stable system of meanings thus produced. The limit of the meaning to be preserved in any case would be, I suppose, its lack of inhibitory or ‘interfering’ effects, its negative fitness as not producing confusion, ‘either in action to be recommended or in experience to be expected’; and the tests, final and conclusive, of logical meaning, would be such concrete practical fitness. This seems to me to be quite consistent, and, for the sort of truths it really explains, to explain them! It is ‘radical empiricism’ in both its members, pragmatism of origin and pragmatism of meaning. The tests of utility are simply converted into criteria of logical meaning and value.

The questions, however, which it excites are those involved in certain of the idealist’s most pregnant positions: those which assert the essentially teleological and universal character of thought. The criticisms¹⁷ brought from such a point of view deserve more adequate notice and refutation than that which calls all universal and analytic judgments ‘dead,’ and ‘no judgment at all.’¹⁸ Not to account for such judgments is

called analytic and deductive operations. James’ formula would also seem to be limited to those ‘conceptions’ which *no* have some sort of practical consequences – a matter returned to below. Cf. James’ address, *Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results*.

A concise statement of the requirements of deductive and ratiocinative thinking, from the pragmatic point of view, is to be found in Professor Angell’s *Relations of Psychol. to Philos.* (Univ. of Chicago Publications), p. 11. I do not deny his contention that experience is a “universe or system, in which truth is ultimately synonymous with the effective”; but this can not be used to deny the competency of the logical point of view within the system and the need of imminent logical criteria. The whole tendency of this way of thinking is to deny the validity of ‘cross-section’ or morphological principles, in favor of ‘longitudinal section’ or genetic principles – to use a figure whose meaning is enforced by the writers now under discussion (Cf. Dewey, loc. cit., p. 17.)

¹⁷ See Bosanquet’s concise statement of points in his criticism of the present writer’s theory of selective thinking (a theory directly in the line of the position required by a pragmatic logic), in the *Psychological Review*, July, 1903, already referred to.

¹⁸ Miss Thompson, in Dewey’s *Studies in Logic*, p. 108. It is only on such a view that inference can be made a wider term than judgment (ibid., p. 117). ‘A judgment is an inference which is conscious of its ground’ to this view; but if inference be a process of analysis or composition in higher reflection, involving a setting together of the elements of a thought-situation under certain rules of logical grounding, then it must be separately accounted for and not smuggled in as unconscious and prelogical. Inference is, or may be, preliminary to judgments are thus determined. But to deny that they are judgments (as these writers do) makes it necessary to deny also that there is

to fail to account for all deductive, mathematical, and subsumptive reasoning – or, indeed, to call it logically abortive and tautological! Instrumental or pragmatic logic must take up this problem with all its resources: the problem of the structural principles of thought, which are not in any evident way in their origin connected with experience at all. The theory of variations, with natural selection, bravely stated in James' 'back-door process' chapter, and repeated more feebly in Schiller's 'axioms as postulates,' goes a long way from the objective biological point of view; but that completely deserts the processes of knowledge, throws the epistemologist back upon native principles implicit in concrete thinking, and so sets a direct limit upon pragmatism as a working theory even in the individual. We have – that is, he has – to work out individual pragmatism and then, to explain its limitations, assert pragmatism in a racial sense from an objective point of view; to explain the environment he must, as we saw above, take a subjective monistic point of view, which again subverts the pragmatic theory of reality with which he started out, by involving him in the genetic fallacy.

It is quite possible that a more or less successful defense against these criticisms is to be found in the line of a theory maintaining the social constitution of knowledge, with social embodiment and social transmission. I myself have found it necessary to hold that a strain of universality and generality is imparted to knowledge in the aspect which constitutes it 'public' to a social group. The utility upon which pragmatism may insist, therefore, as socially practical and concrete, may be, from the individual point of view, general and universal. A social practical value might be reflected in an individual's theoretical value. The psychological point of view might then be conserved in the continuity of social thinking, although lost in the biological constitution of the individual. Thus, as I have intimated elsewhere,¹⁹ there might be a

anything in inference not already in the preliminaries of the act of judgment. The real question is: can a genetic process of determination that of psychological conditioning found in the unreflective stage of mental development, be substituted for the logical determination, that of inference, found in the reflective stage?

¹⁹ *Social Interpretations*, Chap. III., where it is shown that the judgment of the individual, though privately competent, is the reflex, through organic and natural selection of social life. Such a theory would repay working out in all the departments where the individual's norms of value seem independent of all experience – in ethics and aesthetics, as well as in logic. It promises a theory of the origin of the categories which would go far to reconcile the claims of a priorism (making it individual) and *empiricism* (making it social). It is, indeed, in this field that the battle has been joined by utilitarianism and hedonism in their substitution of 'general' happiness and utility for individual. It is not sufficiently understood that these schools have already worked the pragmatic hypothesis in their fields in ways which should instruct the novice in pragmatism in logic. Mr. Spencer's attempt at a physiological theory of the *a priori* should also be remembered with respect.

social derivation of the categories. I have great faith in future work along this line. But withal the limitation remains that such a theory would give a logic of a stage of cognitive process – that at which pragmatic tests are transferred to the social group – rather than a philosophy of the entire movement of reality. We should then have the formula that the individual's and society's common system of logical meanings would be tested by private consent and social consequences jointly.²⁰

It would remain, therefore, to take up the other alternative mentioned above and try to realize an actual reconciliation of the pragmatic and logical points of view in a synthesis in which they are equally essential members. This can not be entered upon here and now; it is the same need that we found under the earlier head where it was a question of finally escaping the dualism of inner and outer, with its necessary implication of an extra-mental order of realities. I think, however, that it is possible, as intimated at the end of this paper, and that it will take full account of the social aspects of logical determination.

IV

It remains to take up the third of our general questions: that of the exhaustiveness, as measure of reality, of the modes of apprehension based upon empirical marks and coefficients. Are there modes or types of reality reached in experience for which there practical criteria are not sufficient?

It has been intimated, under the last heading, that a genetic account of the rise of all the modes of thinking – general, universal, normative, no less than particular and concrete – may be worked out successfully from the pragmatic standpoint; it must be done if evolution is to be a general theory.²¹ But the quite different question arises as to the meaning of

²⁰ A state of things analogous to the establishing of truth as to the external world by joint tests of the individual's habit *and* the external environment, as we saw above.

²¹ The line of least resistance to the writer, worked out in earlier publications leads to the view that the general aspects of our apprehension are supplied by our general habits of treating things and hence are motor in their seat; motor habit is thus a means of reducing and grouping the embarrassing details of sensory stimulations. M. Harvard (*Revue de Métaph. et de Morale*, 1896, pp. 670 ff.) discusses this view as le nouveau nominalisme; and if no further logical account than this can be given of 'generals' his description and criticism would seem to hold. This is one of the points on which I do not find myself able to follow Professor Angell in his identification of logic with functional psychology – though disposed, indeed, to claim as much of 'the earth' as possible for psychology (Angell, *The Relations of Psychology to Philosophy*, University of Chicago publications). The authors of *Studies in Logic* seems to adopt the view (see pp. 113, 176, 198; and Moore, *Existence, Meaning, and Reality*, p. 24, quoting *Mental Development*, pp. 323 ff.) that such a psychophysical account of the rise of the general meaning attaching to concepts is sufficient without more ado as a logic of 'general' validity.

certain of these modes of construing reality, together with the tests or criteria for their valid and successful application. The 'general' concept, for example, pretends to be valid as a vehicle of real apprehension of the world; but it would be impossible to make a conclusive test even of the workableness of such a concept by an appeal to a concrete or practical instance. In the absence of further standards it would be impossible to separate concrete consequences or other pragmatic marks from general consequences. On the contrary, it is just the meaning of a mode of thought that it stands for the particular case in the sense of organizing it with other experiences. It introduces organization, relationship, and systematization into experience just to the dropping off of those aspects which are individual. This is the sort of reality which such a concept claims to reflect; and its claim could be tested only by some principle which could span the system in which the particular case in question is organized. No appeal to a concrete situation can validate an aspect of reality which is *ipso facto* a systematization of various such situations or cases.²² There must be, therefore, if such thinking is to have any control or positive validation, certain principles of organization of logically apprehended reality as such. This would throw us back upon the traditional 'laws of thought,' I suppose, or some analogous self-applying criteria of sound thinking.

This may be a way of saying, with many modern logicians, that only particular, not universal, judgments carry the affirmation of reality; if we limit ourselves to pragmatic tests, available only in concrete experience, I see no way of avoiding such a view. But such a position, it seems to me, allies pragmatism to extreme nominalism, and it stands or falls with that as logical doctrine. Moreover, it is a pragmatic psychology which most of all feels the need of some justification for universal truths and judgments, for their 'utility' is in some way to be reflected into reality, if reality is to be *no more nor less than the system of judged truths*. The difficulty arises, indeed, only when pragmatism aims to be a universal logic, and so essays the impossible.²³

²² Though from a logical point of view it might invalidate it. An application of this is at hand in the genetic account of the development of self and dualism of self and not-self. These concepts are essentially general, and no single act of a single self, no matter what its consequences, could validate them as modes of reality, though by requiring a new psychological reconstruction of the material their logical meaning might be invalidated. It is interesting to note that the word 'general' does not occur in the rather full Index to the Chicago *Studies in Logic*.

²³ As to the position itself regarding universals, I think, it survives simply because nominalistic logic has not yet fully yielded to pragmatic psychology (which really requires instrumental and real logic). Psychologically the universal judgment refers to reality exactly as the particular does, *i. e.*, by the reference to the sort of real universe in which both judgments are made. It is said that particular judgments are experiential;

The case seems stronger still for the so-called normative or ideal aspects of experience. In their origin these are functions of the progressive organization of experience under pragmatic rules: they illustrate the 'prospective reference' of thought to the unfulfilled career and possibilities of reality. This we may concede and defend. But we do not find – it is a contradiction to conceive of finding – test cases, practical situations, which exhaust the meaning or establish the validity of these modes of reference *in futuro atque in eternitate*. How can we estimate the practical consequences of ideal virtue, whereby there would issue forth the 'highest good'?²⁴ How can practical life adequately test the validity of modes which essentially claim to transcend the experiences of real life? If the normative modes of apprehension or thought are of pragmatic origin, then it is just the pragmatist himself who must give them validity as interpreters of real aspects of things and events; and he is the last person to be able, when the practical criteria break down, to throw over these categories and resort to subjectivism or pure nominalism. They have utility, as he says, as ways of interpreting experience; but they issue just by this interpretation in modes of reality. The outcome is that these modes of thought must carry in their exercise their own means of validating their claim to organize experience essentially beyond its actual realization.

An interesting turn may be given to this point by asking for the interpretation of the normative in logical values as such: what is ideal or perfect thinking, and what makes it ideal? Evidently it must be flawless thinking, as tested by adequate rules and criteria. The pragmatist would have to say that all thinking which fulfils the demand that it deal successfully with the concrete situation which stimulates it is in so far flawless: that is, that all thinking is flawless which does not issue in practical embarrassment and confusion. It can not say, in the particular case, that thought might have done better; for – to point again a foregoing criticism – there is for this view no way to test relative or

but then universal judgments are never made except as holding true some experience. Certainly pragmatism can not distinguish universal judgments from particular by that mark. The reader may see in Professor Royce's treatment of the two sorts of judgment with reference to their implication of reality ('outer meaning' of ideas) an attempt to make the real reference of universal judgments to reality negative only (*World and Individual*, I., Sect. VII.). This is a logical way of saying that a particular case may invalidate a general (which must be expressed in a universal judgment) but may not suffice to validate it.

²⁴ As intimated above utilitarian and hedonistic theories in ethics do attempt something of this sort; but they depart from their pragmatic formula in so far as they seek a logical justification of their conception of the highest good rather than an actual concrete experience, or situation, which would realize it. In either case the individual has no practical test of conduct which is adequate to establish its general or universal utility.

alternative solutions: such a test would involve the application of general criteria of validity for which this view makes no provision. So soon, however, as we do admit, in the body of the logical processes themselves, certain criteria of the valid organization of thoughts, we then have standards whereby to determine a greater or less validity and conclusiveness with reference to an ideal of flawlessness in the logical process. As a matter of fact, we actually find many grades and modes of inferential process – the disjunctive, the hypothetical, the categorical – having varying degrees of psychological determinateness and of logical conclusiveness; and there are also various groundings of proof, as in universal or particular judgments, which actually do issue in varying degrees of logical cogency and validity. This is in so far confirmation of the presence of regulative or normative principles in the logical process, as such, *having this logical value no matter what their origin*.

It follows from these criticisms that in our final interpretation of reality as, in any sense general, universal, or normative pragmatism does not take us far. It omits all such modes of logical reality, although by its pragmatic account of their origin for utilities of life, it gives them some presumptive value. It must deny this presumption or – refuse to be a logic or philosophy! This latter is the only sensible course, if we are to remain pragmatists in our genetic psychology.²⁵

V

The requirements of a philosophy of reality based upon – or at least not invalidating – the results of mental development under the law of utility, are fairly plain; at least, in the negative sense of not incurring the criticisms urged in this discussion. They come out with some clearness in connection with the statement of the problem of error.

The problem of error as involved in that of truth has been a theme in many of the discussions in pragmatism. The possibility and meaning of error are somewhat more clear on the theory which holds that

²⁵ This is explicitly the course taken lately by one of the fathers of pragmatism, Dr. Peirce; and the considerations he sketches in the *Dictionary* article already referred to are similar to those worked out here. He suggests a philosophy called 'Synechism' (see his art. of that title also in the *Dictionary*), in which he makes 'reasonableness' its own justification, and attempts to do justice to logical 'generals.'

The failure to explain these aspects of reality with constructive thoroughness stands out in such writings as Moore's detailed criticism of Royce already cited. Royce makes a constructive effort to overcome the dualism of thought and action. He reaches an absolute system of thought which may also be looked upon as an absolute purpose systematizing and completing finite purposes. Moore claims that this is no real reconciliation of the representative (logical) and practical aspects of the idea; but Moore, in his turn, goes no further than the re-assertion of the concrete action-thought process as genetic function.

knowledge is a copy, an inadequate or defective copy, of a separate system of realities. The problem to this theory is not to account for the presence of error, but to reconcile it with the validity of thought. Otherwise all guarantee and reliability fail in respect to truth. If thought may report reality erroneously, how are we to know that it ever reports it truthfully? The positive constructive task therefore is to eliminate error, or to make it an incident only in a generally valid process. The limit and ideal of the apprehension of the real is an errorless experience: a system of logical values in which reality is completely and finally revealed; this is the ideal of intellectualist or logical theories as opposed to pragmatic theories.

To the pragmatist, on the contrary, error presents a different problem. It must arise by some variation or interference in the process whereby truth, and with it reality, are normally constituted. As a fact there is no difficulty, for the method of discovery, called in science that of 'trial and error,' is just that which is taken over and made the typical method of mental development. It is a matter of 'cases,' trials, efforts, only the *ex post facto* inspection of which reveals some – those which are unfruitful or embarrassing – as errors. Error then, to the pragmatist, is a normal aspect of the process of the discovery of truth.

To this theory also, the limit of the process of apprehending reality would appear to be the elimination of error. The development processes, at their limit, would issue in an errorless system of cognitions and judgments – logical processes – which would be the reflection into thought of a perfectly adapted and satisfied conation. Such system would be, within its own point of view, closed and self-maintaining. If pragmatism asks at all²⁶ for the meaning and limit of its process, this would be about the answer: a state of equilibrium, or an errorless experience.

The problem set to both theories, intellectualism and pragmatism alike, therefore, is the elimination of error, in the treatment of reality whether by thought or by action.

But to depict an errorless experience is to depict one in which the dualism of experience and reality is overcome. *Error is essentially a phenomenon of dualism.*

By no fair definition can error be attributed to a thought-system which is self-sustaining and has no reference to what is outside itself. But errorlessness is also the resolution of the active processes of adjustment to which the thought aspect of ideas is ancillary. Embarrassment, conflict and hesitation, restlessness, are the motor or practical results of cognitive error.

²⁶ Perhaps it doesn't! – see Moore, *Existence, Meaning, and Reality*, p. 25.

The problem therefore of philosophy – as it arises from the discussion of the demands of pragmatism – *is no longer that of the reconciliation of two logical categories*, being and becoming, identity and diversity, teleology and mechanism, thought and reality; it is, on the contrary, *that of the reconciliation of two opposed schemes of evaluation of experience in general*, that of logical systematization and that of practical manipulation, each, by the very terms of their relation claiming to be valid. It is possible that there may be no reconciliation; but the consistent development of personality as a whole by the activities in which these two evaluations arise, would lead us to expect that they reveal modes rather than diverse kinds of reality, and that there is some possible experience which, while enriched by this contrast, is not torn asunder by it.

Such an experience would be a deeper revelation of the nature of all the real than is either of the partial modes, and it would, at the same time, admit of the criteria by which each of the alternative points of view establishes the claim it makes.²⁷

It would seem that this sort of requirement should commend itself to the Chicago thinkers who refuse to stop in the dualism of thought and action. Professor Dewey says (*loc. cit.*, pp. 80 f.): “Both material and tool [matter and thought] have been secured and determined with reference to...the maintenance of a harmonious experience...life proposes to maintain at all hazards the unity of its own process. Experience insists on...securing integrity even through and by means of conflict.” Certainly then the final unity is one to be experienced or lived in, an experience which is the immediate unity of an autotelic whole; a whole which includes logical realities whose ends are practical and also practical realities whose ends are logical. This is what Moore’s criticism of Royce points out, I think (*cf.* his utterance as to dualism on p. 372, with his quite sentimental conclusion on p. 382, *Studies in Logic*). And in the matter of its treatment of dualism this view is not inconsistent with those of Mead (*The Definition of the Psychical*). Even James’ penchant for pluralism is to Dewey a case of æsthetic unity in the thinker’s contemplation!

In such an issue, reached from the previous criticism, I find one of the approaches to a type of philosophy to which other considerations,

²⁷ This, I take it, is essentially the reconciliation which Professor Royce attempts, though without, I think, the clear apprehension that it requires a category of experience not definable ultimately as either ideas or ‘purposes’ (conations), nor yet by saying that it is both. Professor Royce’s recent work is however a notable advance upon a certain dualism of value and fact to be found in many recent writings (and also in his earlier papers; *cf.* his art. in *International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1895, and the present writer’s examination of it in *Fragments in Philosophy and Science*, V., reprinted from the same journal, October, 1895).

developed in various recent studies, have also pointed.²⁸ These 'approaches' converge upon a position which finds in æsthetic experience, at each grade in the development of the dualism of fact and values, truth and practice, inner and outer, just the union and reconciliation of the two sets of claims.²⁹

Our conclusions may be summed up as follows:

1. Having successfully depicted the genetic processes by which consciousness reaches the dualism of the thinking principle and reality, it is the 'genetic fallacy' to treat one term of this dualism, the thinking principle, as valid in the sense it claims to be, and to deny that the other is.

2. If either of the terms of this dualism is to be made primary as a philosophical principle, it would seem to be the logical reality term; since it is genetically, at each stage of mental development, just the definite, general, and communicable term in which pragmatic gains are reflected. The pragmatic account of thought fully justifies its function of having general meaning as well as concrete. Pragmatism can not complete itself until it issues in a logical account of reality.

3. The universal and normative modes of thought do not get adequate logical justification in a theory which finds the facts and criteria of reality solely in concrete experiences of usefulness, workableness, etc. It is just the general and universal aspects of such modes of thought whose meaning would not appear in any set of practical consequences. General tests of systematization or organization as such within the body of logical data would alone accomplish this. This throws us back upon such principles as consistency, contradiction, etc. – yet without prejudice to a thorough-going pragmatic account of the origin of the function of thinking.

4. The final demand is for a real reconciliation of the dualism of logical truth and experienced value; both making claim to interpret reality. This reconciliation must not deny the claim of logic wherever the material is logical, not that of value wherever a valuation is made; and no solution is possible except as itself an experience in which the dualism is actually outlived. Any other solution would be hypothetical only, and derive its support from one or other of the two modes of the dualism which is to be explained.

²⁸ See especially the article 'Mind and Body' in the *Psychological Review*, May, 1903.

²⁹ It may be said (cf. Urban, *Psychological Review*, January, 1896) that the self is the source of union of the two contrasting modes of experience; and that is of course true. But to use the *thought of self* is to resort to one of the categories in question, which involves the genetic fallacy of pragmatism; and to point out an experience in which the self finds its attitudes and values free from the dualism is just the question at issue.

5. The thoroughgoing application of the genetic method, as illustrated in the foregoing point (4), requires that no member of a genetic dualism, or other contrast, be taken as explaining principle of the process in which that dualism or contrast arises. This is held to introduce a new philosophical point of view: that of finding the further genetic process by which the dualism is itself overcome, and of interpreting the nature of the reality which is then constituted.³⁰

³⁰ This has been insisted upon, as necessary in science generally, and formulated in the theory of 'Genetic Modes,' in the work *Development and Evolution*, Chap. XIX.

PROFESSOR BALDWIN ON THE PRAGMATIC UNIVERSAL

Addison W. Moore. "Professor Baldwin on the Pragmatic Universal."
Psychological Bulletin 1.12 (15 November 1904): 415–23.

In a very comprehensive and suggestive article on 'The Limits of Pragmatism' in the *PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW*, Volume XI., No. 1,¹ Professor Baldwin finds, as do many others, one of the chief 'limits' to be the inability of pragmatism to make universal judgments. He finds it "interesting to note that the word 'general' does not occur in the rather full index to the Chicago *Studies in Logical Theory*,"² which is freely cited as representative literature of pragmatism. Now if Professor Baldwin had but recalled what he must well know, that nothing is so fickle as an index, he would have turned to 'universal,' especially as he interchanges this term with 'general,' under which he would have found eight references, some of them extended with 'ffs.' And in the monograph on 'Existence, Meaning and Reality,' to which he also refers, there is space to the amount of five octavo pages given almost entirely to the discussion of universality. Indeed it is difficult to see how one could go through the 'Chicago Contributions' and emerge with an impression that this topic had been neglected.

As there is a conception of abstract universality, which is difficult to reconcile with any sort of pragmatism, so there is current, largely among its critics, a conception of pragmatism which is difficult to square with any kind of universality. So far as I have seen, the imputations of 'Atomism,' 'Nominalism,' etc., are based, not on a criticism of the fundamental conceptions of pragmatism, but on an atomistic interpretation of Professor James' pluralism. I say 'an atomistic interpretation,' for it seems to me that it does not require a second look to discover that Professor James' pluralism is not sheer atomism. Everywhere there is 'inter-action,' 'stimulus and response,' 'generation, and 'growth.' The emphasis of the pluralistic character is simply a reaction against a lust

¹ The tardiness of this discussion has only the time-honored excuse – 'the press of other work.'

² Footnote, p. 53.

for a unity so absolute that there is no room in it for any movement of differences. And here, to my mind, we touch the metaphysical nerve of the whole pragmatic movement. Pragmatism is not concerned primarily with the problem of unity and plurality, although experience is as manifestly a plurality as a unity. Its chief concern is with the problem of change, of development. It is an attempt to reach such a conception of unity, *and* differences, as shall permit of 'real' movement. It is a crusade to release Change from the limbo of Appearances, and Reality from the stocks of a changeless Unity.

Seeing that the champions of unity have almost with one voice insisted that the unity of reality involves its unchangeableness, some, who cherish convictions against such cashiering of change, have apparently accepted this verdict of absolutism and said in effect, 'if the choice is between absolute unity with absolute fixity on the one hand, and absolute plurality with movement, development, on the other, we accept the latter.' But the pluralist at once restores unity by his categories of 'interaction' 'stimulus and response,' etc.; only now he has a dynamic instead of a static unity. It is quite 'possible, then, that one may be a pragmatist' and insist emphatically upon this moving unity. At all events, the attempt to throw the pragmatist's case out of court at the start on the plea of 'atomism' is certainly premature.

Returning to Professor Baldwin's 'limit,' he finds that while perfectly capable of making particular judgments, pragmatic logic is impotent when it attempts to deal with the universal (pp. 50, 52 ff.). Now to many modern logicians, including perhaps most pragmatists, it would seem that such an indictment could be drawn only on the conception of a pretty separate and independent relation between the particular and the universal. Most pragmatists, I think, would regard it impossible to have a valid logic of particular judgments apart from a logic of universals. For every judgment is a development of experience through a universal. A standpoint, therefore, which is able to construct a valid logic of the particular judgment must have in it, whether or not it has actually been brought out, a logic of the general.

In Professor Baldwin's account of the universal it seems to play, as in the statements of Professor Royce and Mr. Bradley, two quite different rôles, and the relation between them is very difficult to discover.³ "It is

³ As another illustration of the strange *tête-à-tête* a philosophical discussion may bring about the following is interesting: On p. 53 Professor Baldwin says: "This may be a way of saying, with many modern logicians, that only particular, not universal judgments carry the affirmation of reality: if we limit ourselves to pragmatic tests, available only in concrete experience, I see no way of avoiding such a view. But such a position it seems to me allies pragmatism with extreme nominalism." But what about the 'many modern logicians' holding this view, who are not pragmatists? (Indeed I

just the meaning of a general mode of thought that it stands for the particular case in the sense of organizing it with other experiences" (p. 53). On the other hand, the general concept pretends to be valid as a vehicle of the real apprehension of the world. Now this is capable of an interpretation quite in agreement with (I); and indeed Professor Baldwin comes near giving it such a treatment on the page quoted, as will be shown below. But on the very next page we read that this world, the real apprehension of which it is the business of the universal and normative aspects of experience to give us, is one that transcends the experiences of real life. "How can practical life adequately test the validity of modes which essentially claim to transcend the experiences of real life?" Here, indeed, I am inclined to think there is nothing for the pragmatist but to humbly confess his impotence.

On the test of the universal Professor Baldwin says (p. 53): "No appeal to a concrete situation can validate an aspect of reality which is *ipso facto* a systematization of various such situations or cases. There must be, therefore, if such thinking is to have any control or positive validation, certain principles of logically apprehended reality as such. This would throw us back upon the traditional 'laws of thought,' I suppose, or some analogous self-applying criteria of sound thinking."

At the risk of appearing captious, the discussion at this point will have to run somewhat to an exposition of terms. If we take 'concrete' etymologically it should mean the unified harmonious grown-together stage of experience which does not need 'systematizing.' It is the immediate outcome or forerunner of systematization. It is only when experience ceases to be 'concrete' in this sense that organization is required. The general, therefore, is not a system 'of various concrete experiences as such.' It is only when experience is broken up and becomes material, a 'matrix,' a 'platform,' to use a term of Professor Baldwin's, for further experience, that it needs organization.

The point can be stated in terms of the conception of 'system.' Why should various 'concrete' experiences need systematizing anyway? And in just what does the systematization consist? And how is it known when systematization is reached? Professor Baldwin says that systematization consists in 'organizing a particular case with other experience.' Here, of course, we have only exchanged terms. For we have forthwith to answer for 'organization.' Nor are we much better off in the next sentence. "It introduces organization, relationship and systematization into experience just to the dropping off those aspects which are

know of no pragmatist who holds it.) And it is just the absolutists who are the chief expounders of this view. Behold then, according to our author, the pragmatist and the absolutist sitting together in the tent of nominalism!

individual." Thus, experience becomes general by being organized with other experiences, and it is organized by becoming general, that is, by 'leaving off the individual aspect.' And what, by the way, are these individual aspects? Does every experience have a certain quality that is in itself individual and a certain other that is in itself universal? But of this more below. So far, at any rate, we have made little progress in finding a criterion of organization and system. And the difficulty in starting out to systematize and organize experiences just at large is very great. None of this is intended to call in question the fact of system and organization in experience. It desires only to call for an interpretation instead of a mere assumption of them.

Nor do I see that we gain much by 'falling back upon the traditional laws of thought' – consistency, contradiction, etc. For we must at once face the question: What is the meaning of 'consistent,' or, as Professor Baldwin calls it, 'flawless' thinking, in terms simply of the process itself? Professor Baldwin does not explicitly deal with this question, but I imagine the only answer he could make is the one generally made, viz., that it is simply 'the sense of a harmonious, unified, unimpeded flow of the thought process within itself.' If so, are we not caught on the very sands of 'subjectivism' and 'atomism' from which we have been so frantically warning the pragmatist? If the test of thinking is consistency and the mark of consistency is simply the immediate sense of harmony and freedom in the process in itself, apart from any limit in further experience, and if we take this as in itself yielding truth, reflecting reality, is not this the very essence of subjective atomism? The abstract universal is thus just as subjective and atomistic as the abstract particular. Nor can we escape by an appeal to 'the essential uniformity of intelligence as such.' This is as gigantic a *petitio* – to say nothing of 'the facts in the case' – as its 'empirical' correlative 'the uniformity of nature.'

There appears, then, to be need for some further analysis of 'system,' 'organization,' 'consistency,' 'contradiction,' etc. Roughly sketched, the pragmatist's contribution to this demand runs somewhat as follows: he points out that every experience (and the distinction between 'experience in general' and 'my experience' matters not just here) has two values; (1) it has a unique value of its own as immediate experience; (2) it has a value as the basis, the 'platform' of further experience. And it is to this latter function that the categories of organization, consistency, universality and particularity, validity, truth and error belong. Taken in its bare immediacy, experience is neither valid nor invalid, true nor false, systematic nor chaotic, consistent nor inconsistent. It is only as a means to, or as an outcome of other experience that any content takes on these

characteristics. Of course the process of systematizing has its own immediate sense value. But the point is that when we get at the conditions and significance of this 'sense' we find they lie in *its relation to further experience*. Shorn of this developmental character, organization, system, validity, etc., are indeed left without any 'limits' by which to define them. They remain terms referring to immediate qualities of experience offering and requiring no credentials of any sort.

If we pass now to the process of systematization itself, Professor Baldwin says that it proceeds by 'dropping off those aspects which are individual.' Taken as it stands, this certainly has in it a suggestion of old-time 'realism.' It reads as if there were in experience something *per se* individual and something else *per se* universal. But even if this were the case, why should the 'dropping' of the individual characteristics produce system or organization? Why would not the individual aspects themselves make as good a system as the universal? Now I do not think that any one who has read Professor Baldwin's most suggestive chapter on 'Selective Thinking'⁴ and his debate with Mr. Bosanquet⁵ on it, could regard any such statements as the above as representing his 'settled views.' Just as we there are taught that a content of experience 'is not selected because it is true, *but is true because it is selected*'; so, while the point is not explicitly treated, the whole trend and tenor of 'Selective Thinking' would lead us to say that systematization is not something determined wholly in and to itself, but is a process which is relative to and has its goal in a further concrete experience.⁶ The doctrine of that chapter, also, would lead us to say, not that certain elements of experience are 'dropped' because they are *per se* particular, and others are retained because *per se* general, but the rather that they are particular because they are dropped and general because they are retained. It is just the fact that a certain content persists as the basis, the 'platform,' the *point d'appui* of further concrete experience, that makes it general. Also since Locke's analysis of Essence it has been well understood that what is 'dropped' as particular in one situation is retained as general in another. Generality, therefore, is not a kind or quality of content, but is the relation which any content bears to the further devel-

⁴ *The Psychological Review*, January, 1898, and Chap. XVII. Of *Development and Evolution*.

⁵ *The Psychological Review*, Vol. X.

⁶ Here it must be remembered that 'concrete' is used, not as the correlative of universal, *i.e.*, not in the sense of particular, but as meaning that stage or 'aspect' of experience to which the universalizing and particularizing process leads and in which they, as such, disappear.

opment of experience. In short, universality does not mean an absolutely changeless possession of all intelligence. It means rather the *continuity* of experience – the fact that experience is a self-developing process.

If this be the meaning of universality, and if by ‘concrete’ we mean just the further experience in which both the general and the particular disappear, then what else but the ‘concrete’ can be the ‘test’ of the universal? To be sure, it cannot test it as a representation or reflection of a reality which ‘transcends all real life.’ But it can test it as a developmental device *inside* the process of ‘real life.’ It is when we lose sight of this productive, developmental, this forward-moving function of the universal, that we have nothing left but to ‘fall back on the traditional laws of thought’ for the test of its validity.

Now pragmatism is not an attempt to sponge these ‘traditional laws of thought’ from the statutes. It simply insists that in themselves they do not constitute the final test of truth. *They constitute the cues and guides of the generalizing process.* They are part of the *technique* of thinking. In terms of habit they are, as Professor Baldwin well shows, part of the machinery whereby an hypothetical selection of material for adjustment is made. Here is where the so-called ‘universal judgment’ appears with its technique of ‘consistency,’ ‘contradiction,’ etc. The universal judgment is an expression of the habit elements involved in *every* judgment.⁷ Hence, indeed, its ‘hypothetical’ character. But again not ‘hypothetical’ *in itself*. As an immediate experience it is as ‘categorical’ and ‘real’ as any other. It is ‘hypothetical’ only with reference to further experience, only because *it is not only an immediate but at the same time a mediating experience.* And in this latter rôle, the test of its validity cannot lie merely ‘within itself.’

And this suggests that the solution of the different views of the function of the universal in ‘real life’ is perhaps to be found in the avoidance of a confusion of the immediate and mediating values of experience. The critics of pragmatism insist that thought is just as ‘good’ and ‘real’ and ‘true’ an experience as any other; to all of which the pragmatist enthusiastically subscribes. Aye, the intellectually tempered pragmatist (paradoxical as this may sound to some) may go even further and say with some of his critics that instead of being merely instrumental (in any *subordinate* sense) thought may well be regarded as the *end* to which all the other aspects of experience may be considered as means.

⁷ Here may be the place to remark that it is possible that the treatment in logics of the Universal Judgment as *kind* of judgment, apparently complete in itself, tends – despite subsequent qualifications – to nourish the notion that there must therefore be a special kind of reality corresponding to it – which, not being found of course in ‘real life,’ must exist in a ‘transcendent’ realm.

Even so, this yields the pragmatist's whole contention, viz., *that thought is not sufficient unto itself*. It must have 'means.' It can renew and feed itself only in and through the great stream of instinctive emotional and volitional content. It too must lose its life to find it. In insisting on the 'real' 'true,' valid-in-itself character of thought the critic is taking thought in its immediate character. But this is not thought as a logical process; and 'true,' 'real,' 'valid' are here not logical categories. It is the mediating function of thought that gives it its logical quality, and to speak here of 'truth' and 'validity' with no reference to the goal of the mediation is surely a flagrant case of Hamlet without the Prince.

Such an omission too would seem to be pretty nearly equivalent to cutting off the second part of what Prof. Baldwin in his 'Selective Thinking' gives as, 'The test of truth in the external world.'⁸ 'The first test is that of assimilation to established habits.' Instead of 'test' etc., I should prefer to say, 'step towards constructing truth,' and instead of 'assimilation to' I should prefer 'response of.' Professor Baldwin continues: 'This is the test of the general character of a new experience.' Again, instead of 'test of' I should write 'constitutes.' Second, 'there is the environmental test or test of fact.' That is, 'there is a further selection from these established habits of those which work in the specific environment.' Here, for 'selection from,' etc., I should say 'reconstruction or modification of.' At any rate it is here clearly recognized that there may be an internal technique of generalization that does not as such give truth. Thought does not become 'true,' is not 'validated,' until it is tested by its results under the specific conditions. "A truth is an item of content which is expected when issuing in a movement to work under the exactions of fact." Again: 'There is no question of truth until *both* these selective functions have been operative.'⁹ Here it is certainly implied that in the first 'test' alone we get only the abstract, formal universal – the mere statement that whatever the outcome is to be, it will be some kind of a reconstruction of certain established habits.

But from the standpoint of his paper on 'The Limits of Pragmatism' Professor Baldwin might be expected to reply, "Ah, but you have been quoting from my account of 'tests of truth *in the external world*,'"¹⁰ whereas my point here is that there is a realm of purely universal truth as expressed in the universal judgment, which is independent of 'the test of fact' or environment." The rejoinder obviously would repeat the burden of the whole preceding discussion, the net outcome of which is

⁸ Section 6 of the chapter.

⁹ *Development and Evolution*, p. 251; italics mine.

¹⁰ Italics mine.

that when thought is thus cut off from the rest of 'real life' and is regarded as a self-sufficient, self-perpetuating process, it becomes essentially a subjective and atomistic affair. Truth and error consist merely in an immediate sense of harmony or contradiction unchecked by any 'limits' in further experience.

As already intimated this consequence is masked under the assumption of 'the essential unity of intelligence as such.' This really is a back door resumption of the social and other 'real-life' tests and checks of thought denied in the premises. For this means that the established habits which are the basis of the universal judgment have been developed, as Professor Baldwin has long contended, in a thoroughly social matrix. Hence we can trust the sense of consistency in the responses of these habits for a working hypothesis in the world of 'real life,' – the world in which the habits grew and to which therefore they are relevant.

To this Professor Baldwin could say that he has freely admitted that in a social pragmatism (and who has ever preached any other?) 'a strain of universality and generality is imparted to knowledge in the aspect which constitutes it public to a social group.' 'But,' he adds, 'the limitation remains that such a theory would give a logic of a stage of cognitive process, that at which pragmatic tests are transferred to the social group, rather than a philosophy of the entire movement of reality.'¹¹

Now, in his *Logic*, the pragmatist does not profess to state *all* the content of 'the entire movement of reality.' The business of logic is to discuss the part thought plays *in* reality. This, of course, cannot be done without giving a general statement of one's view of the nature of reality. Hence, any logic seems bound to this extent 'to blow itself up into the dimensions of a philosophy.'¹² However, it is true that in so far as he is thus forced to state his view of reality the pragmatist confesses that the only reality he can find in which thought is playing a discoverable part is just the world of instinctive, emotional volitional, social, 'real life,' and this he says too without prejudice to the conviction that this world of 'real life' may have in it things not dreamed of in our philosophies. And he would insist that when thought is thus placed in such a world it can claim not a mere 'strain' of universality but all it is capable of – all it can use and verify.

And elsewhere it seems to me Professor Baldwin has regarded this sort of verification as quite sufficient, not merely as a confirmation of a theory of the 'genesis' of thought, but as logical verification, – as a

¹¹ *The Limits of Pragmatism*, p. 51.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 48.

criterion of truth. In his effective rejoinder to Mr. Bosanquet¹³ he says: “Genetic theory therefore explains both under what influence we have come to hold (often wrongly) certain judgments to be true and *also by what character judgments are true*.¹⁴ To be sure this is prefaced with such statements as, “I agree with Dr. Bosanquet in confining genetic theory to questions of genesis... . Personally I am not a pragmatist... . I think pragmatism is not able as such to explain the general or universal aspects of reality.” But if it is valid as a theory of genesis and if genetic theory can explain ‘*just by what character judgments are true*,’ it has gone beyond the question of *mere* genesis. It is in the thick of Logic. And if truth involves universality, and if truth must be conceived in some sort of intelligible relation to reality, it is difficult to see just what there is left to be explained or interpreted by some other *kind* of metaphysics.¹⁵

¹³ *The Psychological Review*, July, 1903.

¹⁴ Italics mine.

¹⁵ The MSS. Of this article was received October 6, 1904. – ED.

A WORD OF REJOINDER TO PROFESSOR MOORE

James M. Baldwin. "A Word of Rejoinder to Professor Moore."
Psychological Bulletin 1.12 (November 1904): 424–29.

The reply which Professor Moore makes above, to my original criticism, allows a word of rejoinder, both from the need of clearing up the point involved, and also from his seeming to convict me out of my own mouth. The latter sort of argument would indeed prove me inconsistent, but would not in itself do much more. I shall, however, first state again the 'limitation of pragmatism' in as objective and plain a way as I can – for I feel that Professor Moore does not meet it – and then take a paragraph to vindicate my own consistency.

1. One of the 'limits of pragmatism' pointed out in my article is, looked at in a broad way, this: A statement, judgment, concept which seems to be and is accepted as being general, or universally valid – in the sense that it allows fruitful deduction and valid argumentation – can not have this value justified or positively tested, or have anything added to its import, by an appeal to cases, that is, by any pragmatic or experimental test. Such an appeal could only show that it was not universally valid, in case it does not work in the concrete¹ situation, or *that it was valid only so long as it did not fail*.² For instance, the appeal to consequences might show that two rival concepts both held good, possibly having no difference of result, through certain stages of a research, though both could not be at once logically universal. It follows, then, either that we have no such strictly logical universals, or that they must have other means of hanging together and justifying themselves than that of their experimental results. This leads unavoidably to the query whether there are strictly logical – non-experimental, in their use and value to us as now constituted – principles, rules or whatever we may

¹ Concrete in Professor Moore's meaning, if I understand it.

² It is in this sense only that it is true that all judgment is a 'development of experience through a universal'; yet I should prefer to call this meaning 'psychically general' rather than 'logical universal.' It is in this sense also that all universals, considered as generals, are hypothetical. In terms of habit, they are preliminary general meanings.

call them, apparent in the organization³ of the experiences, by which these sorts of concepts, judgments, etc., have been constituted;⁴ so that their universality is *ipso facto* just a mark of their nature.

Professor Moore denies such things; but suppose we admit them: what effect does this admission have upon our instrumental theory of the origin of knowledge? As I conceive it, no effect whatever! And it is here that I find the pragmatists 'claiming the earth.' They say that a statement of origin is *ipso facto* an account of nature and validity. This is, so far as the ground given is concerned, a fallacy from several points of view. Logically it is an illegitimate conversion: they say 'all truth has been through processes of selection,' hence, by conversion, 'processes of selection are the only tests and criteria of truth.'⁵ On the contrary, the possible and, I believe, the real state of things is that while all truths have their necessary origin in processes of selection, yet once come, they, like every other genetic product, are a *new mode*, a *new form of reality*, *something added to the system of things* – as James is fond of insisting – which can be understood only by seeing what it is like and what it claims to be. So when we find a logical whole that seems to be organized by intrinsic rules, and to have certain immanent relational values, and find it pursued by the sort of interest called theoretical – itself selected, no doubt, as a useful variation – what, pray, is the objection, after all is said as to the genetic aspects of it, to giving it a fair chance to stand alone on its own broad and competent bottom? Perchance if the doors be not closed and hermetically sealed to its entrance, an entirely new mode of cosmic being may steal into our mental domicile even while we are unaware! – a mode whose motto is 'objects for objects' sake.' I see no reason that a psychology should, simply because it is genetic, be able to stay the hand of an idealism of thought.⁶

³ I cannot follow Professor Moore's difficulties in the application of the term 'organization': what I mean is any sort of cognitive construction of data – by association, imitation, etc.

⁴ Let us say, indeed, by social intercourse.

⁵ 'Pragmatic' literature is full of this fallacy: see it, e.g., in another form in Bawden's exposition of James (*Jour. of Philos.*, I., 16, p. 422): "Beliefs are really rules for action, and the *whole function* of thinking is but one step in the production of habits of action." This passage was brought to my attention by C. Ladd Franklin.

⁶ Yet to me the logical is not the final explaining category.

The ethical was put in a similar antithesis by Huxley, only he worked the thing the other way, finding the claim of the moral in some way inconsistent with its natural history origin. It is just this situation that instigated my theory of 'genetic modes,' which recognizes new phases of reality arising and shining at any time, and holds that the genetic conditions are not exhaustive statements of their nature and value, except to a theory which holds to a mechanical equivalence of cause and effect in such a case,

So I think – to turn the tables on them – the pragmatists are not radical enough; they balk at the postulate of new modes, new revelations in the nature and texture of reality, of a sort which do not carefully refrain from having any but hypothetical and instrumental value!

Of course they say – and here James too seems to be with the others – still these new things are proved by their working, and so alone is nature justified of her children. Again, quite true, things must work – but *ad terminum quem?* To say so much does not tell us what place this use, this function, this phase of reality has in the *tout ensemble*, the *Gesamtbild* that philosophy desiderates. Here is another illegitimate conversion: is this nature's *only* justification of her children? A parent is economically justified of his child, but is that the only justification? If we once recognize the theoretical point of view, as summing up, standing for, and organizing in short-hand, generally applicable, formulas the utilities brought up to date, why may not this be, as it proceeds through the stages of development of thought, just a really inside view of things, a private rehearsal behind the curtain suited to the contemplative eye of reason? Again, I see nothing – except illegitimate conversion – to hinder one from thinking this: the conversion, namely, from 'the thought function is instrumental to practical adjustment,' to 'therefore practical adjustment is the only end of thought.' What indeed I contend for is the 'open-door' policy; and the limitation I aim to point out applies only to a pragmatism which refuses to allow thought to conduct its business in Manchuria by its own methods and rules of work – or allows it only under a special pragmatic *visé*. This Professor James, to refer again to his fine article in the October *Mind*,⁷ seems to concede in allowing Royce (and others) to 'throw his own peculiar absolute around' the pragmatic scheme; and I am only interested to say that therein he has accepted a limitation of the pragmatic method necessary by those who crave something less relative. The problem of philosophy is left open.

2. As to my personal inconsistencies, they are of little moment except as the reconciliation of the seemingly inconsistent may involve – as in

and which is therefore not genetic at all, but a-genetic. On any theory of real growth a statement of conditions of origin is in no way a prophesy of all the new thing is to be like or worth.

⁷ And how it contrasts with Mr. Schiller's writing! I intentionally said a little of the latter's book in any former article because of a certain æsthetic revolt which prevents my reading much of it. I am helpless before the vulgarity of such writing as Mr. Schiller's – using this adjective only after others have. I must wait until Mr. Schiller's thought is filtered by his expositors!

this case I think it does – an attempt to reach higher ground. The passages cited from me, by Professor Moore, as allowing the pragmatic view of truth, are from my paper on ‘Selective Thinking’ and the subsequent discussion with Prof. Bosanquet. The general argument, in the latter discussion, is to the effect that while logic may be allowed to have its province, dealing with wholes which have their own criteria and norms of organization, nevertheless the theory of selective thinking must account for the origin and establishment of all possible marks of such logical wholes, including these criteria and norms.⁸ This I maintain in opposition to the view that there is something in the logical so far exempt from selective processes, and so far ‘pure’ in character, as not to allow of any experimental or instrumental method of establishment.

It is, I freely admit, a rather negative sort of task to attempt to ward off trespassers from both confines of a single plot at one and the same time; but there is more at stake in my own case than the checking of trespassers upon a given territory. In the paper on ‘Selective Thinking’ it is maintained that there are two tests – to keep to the old terms⁹ – of a truth: that of the ‘platform’ of what is already established, the test of habit; and after that the further ‘test of fact.’ Prof. Moore seems to think that I am now not holding to this scheme. But in the test of habit – integration in a previously established body of knowledge – it is just in this that the logical as such gets in its criteria, making its demands of consistency, etc. Without this a new item can not get that preliminary *exequatur* which is necessary to any intelligible application of the other test, that of fact. No hypothesis, even of the most inductive sort, can be brought to the bar of fact without first meeting the demands of consistency and inherent reasonableness. And although we hold, as indeed I do, that this antecedent ‘platform’ has been itself constituted by gradual selections, still, once come, its rules must be taken for what they really are, even though we have to call them by the old-fashioned term ‘laws of thought.’

And the issue will be sharpened when I further say, in answer to Professor Moore’s charge that I desert the ‘test of fact’ in certain cases, *that I do!* – not desert it, indeed, but simply recognize that it is not in actual operation. The whole body of sciences of ‘abstract relationships,’ the deductive and mathematical sciences, dispense with such a test: they

⁸ That is, ‘genetic theory explains by what character judgments are true’ – a sentence which I do not find inconsistent with the ‘limit’ now set up, as Professor Moore seems to.

⁹ Although, functionally considered, some of the terms suggested by Professor Moore are no doubt better.

reach results which we still have to call truths and reach them just by allowing the claim of true logical universality.¹⁰ Without attempting a positive evaluation of such bodies of science, still it will not do to cut them off with the indirect sort of toleration due to by-products of a function which is in other conditions useful.

I hold in short that something further in the way of constructive interpretation of the *entire developmental situation* is needed. And the cue should be taken just from the further progress of reflection in actually handling the dualism of thought and action. This is the positive problem before us. And in approaching it I find place for the conception of genetic modes. The test of fact operates in the practical mode, while that of the truth-system invokes the logical mode. I would fain see this recognized before we admit that development lands us in a *cul de sac* for theory, while in life we find no final opposition. And it then remains to find the still more developed psychic mode in which the claims of both are adjusted without favor. I think in the 'semblant' or play mode – broadly and richly defined, *the æsthetic* – this sort of reconciliation actually does take place as a real experience. Instead of reading-back the genetic line and finding neutrality in 'pure experience,' so protoplasmic that the distinction of conscious and non-conscious itself seems to disappear – a reading in which for other purposes one may concur – I am compelled to read the other way, up the genetic line to the fruitful top. The realest experience, the true universal, is one that not only 'secures us God, freedom, and immortality,' but also 'bakes our bread.' So much at any rate in justification of a line of thought which has the appearance of facing two ways at once. I have elsewhere attempted to justify this method from genetic considerations ('Mind and Body,' PSYCH. REV., May, 1903).

I cannot here take space to notice certain interesting points of detail in Prof. Moore's article. But these I note: my expression 'transcends real life' means only having meaning not exhausted by any real situation (as the ethical rule of 'right,' or the general concept of 'horse'). – As to 'nominalism,' my sense of its pertinent application to habit theories of the 'general' as such is sharpened by a discussion of my own view on the subject (in *Mental Development*) by M. Havard of Paris, under the term 'nouveau nominalisme.' – As to 'flawless thinking,' I cannot define it without invoking just the sort of criteria we are discussing – it is 'logical,' 'consistent,' 'valid' thinking; not merely comfortable psychic process! It *is* comfortable, and it *is* social and pragmatic in origin, *but* – Ah! There's the rub of conversion again – is it more? Mr. Peirce's

¹⁰ See for example Professor Keyser's formulation of the 'Axiom of Infinity' (*Hibbert Journal*, April, 1904) and the whole literature of the 'new' infinite.

remarks on 'reasonableness,' apropos of pragmatism, are interesting in this connection (*Dict. of Philos.*, 'Pragmatism'). – Why need a system of abstract universals – a deductive science, in short – be merely a 'subjective and atomistic affair' as Prof. Moore claims? 'Twould be so, I conceive, only to a theory that is already subjective and atomistic; not to one that has a critique of the various sorts of reality-coefficients leading up to the 'general.'

PRAGMATISM AND THE A PRIORI

Charles H. Rieber. "Pragmatism and the A Priori." *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1904. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 72-91.

No aspect of present philosophy is charged with deeper interest and significance than the doctrine of pragmatism. It is receiving a most generous reception as a new philosophy, but its essential theory is not so entirely modern as some of its enthusiastic disciples of the present time are wont to insist. Pragmatism is a protest against every species of ontology. It is an attempt to refute realism by other than the traditional methods of transcendental idealism. It identifies logic with functional psychology. By an outright identification of the logical with the ontological categories it dispenses entirely with the conception of *a priori* knowledge. It adheres to a reciprocal determination of thought and reality, insisting with equal emphasis upon two propositions: "thinking must conform to being," and, "being must conform to thinking." But the modern pragmatists are by no means the first thinkers who have held these doctrines. They are views that have appeared many times in the history of thought and are found even in the thinking of the earliest Greek sages.

One fundamental agreement about the nature of truth seems to have emerged from all the many weary centuries of dispute over the foundations of knowledge. If consensus of opinion may be taken as a warrant for the assertion, then traditional philosophy has proved that it is essential to the conception of truth to regard it as timeless, *i.e.*, that it is expressible only in terms of an *ought* or *must be*. Now it is here that the pragmatist registers his first and central protest and reaffirms a doctrine that is as old as speculative thought itself. He insists that truth can be defined in terms of bare relativity and change, even within the narrow range of the individual's own fleeting experience. Reality as a whole is evolving, says the pragmatist. Nothing is static, not even truth. Heraclitus was indeed right in the fundamental contention of his ontology; all things flow. But the theory of conduct which he founded upon this conception of reality, according to the new doctrine, was unnecessarily truncated. Even if all is flux and our conceptions of the

true, the beautiful, and the right are always changing, we need not despair. We must not think that we are therefore consigned hopelessly to the quagmire of uncertainty and error. The discovery that nothing is stable need not paralyze action. Our criterion of truth may not be, indeed can not be, ultimate and exhaustive, but we may, nevertheless, secure knowledge whose specific contents will have a real validity, and will therefore be entirely adequate for guidance in the practical affairs of life.

Among the pragmatic theories of the last quarter of a century we observe two marked tendencies. Peirce and James, the pioneers among modern pragmatists, have given very suggestive accounts of the teleological aspect of empirical thought. They hold that we must look forward and not backward for the real meaning of an idea. The value of a conception, they say, is to be measured entirely in terms of the work it does. The origin of a belief does not figure in this assessment of its worth. A belief is true if it works, false if it fails, regardless of what the history of its constituent ideas may have been. Even in their latest and maturest thinking on the subject, these fathers of pragmatism still adhere exclusively to the test of consequences. In their recent definitions¹ they still insist that the pragmatic criterion of truth has no reference to the question of origin. Professor Dewey and his disciples supplement the pragmatism of Peirce and James by saying that the essence of an idea is never fully comprehended until both its *whence* and its *whither* are known. The members of the Chicago School are quite agreed that, in searching for the complete meaning of an idea, we must inquire into its past as well as its future. They require two dimensions, so to speak, in order fully to describe thought. This improved pragmatism views thought both *ante rem* and *post rem*. It declares that in the logical interpretation of our empirical judgments, history and prophecy function together. Every idea stands midway between a past and a future situation. We have an essentially inadequate view of thought if, following the earlier pragmatists, we regard it as related to action only on the side of effects. The larger view is that it bears a functional relation to experience both preceding and following; and, hence, that it necessarily has some sort of effects, but only such as can be estimated by taking into account the entire situation both before and after.

In this paper I wish to reaffirm, with several additions of my own, the general position taken by a number of recent critics of pragmatism. The total meaning of an idea is not to be found by searching only forward from the idea to its consequences, as the earlier pragmatists teach; nor yet by looking both forward and backward, as the later forms of the

¹ Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.

new philosophy insist. Truth is found in an entirely different dimension of thought. It lies in a world that is logically prior to the postulates of either of these toxins of pragmatism. Thought is constructive as well as *reconstructive*. Not what an idea has come from, nor what it is just flow discovered to be, nor what it is going to *do* by and by, but what it eternally *is*, must furnish us with our deepest insight into the world of reality.

When the pragmatist talks about *arriving* at truth independent of the *a priori* he is making a self-contradictory assertion. It can be pointed out, even to the unsophisticated, that there can be no *arriving* at knowledge without *starting*. There must be a beginning somewhere, an initial point of departure which is itself underived. It is difficult satisfactorily to define the *a priori*. However, the pragmatist will admit that the pivotal point about which the speculative curiosity of men has revolved ever since they first began to philosophize is the query whether there is any thought which we can take as final – any cognition that will help us to explain all others, but which, being underived, needs no explanation. Now there can be no objection to the broad definition of the *a priori* as just that primary self-explanatory category, or system of categories. These we must accept upon their own authentication as justifying all derivative knowledge and preventing its dissolution into universal skepticism.

The pragmatists are doing a large traffic with the word “fact.” All knowledge, they say, must have its foundations deep down in the world of concrete fact. To this one immediately replies: In order to realize itself thought must, to be sure, pass through fact. This the *a-priorist* has never denied. The mere tyro in the philosophy of Kant has learned almost in his first lesson that the *a priori* forms of thought are empty and without meaning, until they have received their material filling. Thought does not see itself start. In this the pragmatist is entirely right, but he is wrong in contending that, because it does not see itself start, it arrives without starting. It does first become aware of its own movement in the recognition that it passes through fact. But this is not the last step in the self-realization of thought. It is an unwarranted arrest of the thinking process not to allow thought to pass on through fact and, returning to itself, discover the *a priori*. Thought does find itself by the way of fact, but in so doing it must necessarily transcend fact. It first discovers itself as mirrored in the objective fact, but when its activity is unimpeded it passes to the higher stadium where it sees that it itself furnishes the prior condition of its own reflection in the mirror of fact.

All systems of philosophy are agreed that the only adequate knowledge is that which has the ring of necessity, and this requires validity in all three tenses, past, present, and future. Idealists were once

bold enough to say that necessary truth is that from which every external or *given* element has disappeared. The empiricists, and particularly the later pragmatic empiricists, have quite rightly insisted that truth as thus defined would be relegated to the world of mathematical abstractions, to the realm of "bloodless categories." But no thorough-going idealism, at the present time, requires the given element in knowledge to vanish entirely. It is possible so to define the "given" that it may be kept as a constituent element of the highest knowledge. Data which are just hurled at a passive mind would, of course, always contaminate knowledge and forever reduce it to relativity and incertitude. In perfect knowledge there can be no *Strenggegebenes*, nothing genuinely given, "But," says the agnostic pragmatist, "the *Strenggegebenes* is an irreducible and inexplicable element in the knowing process, and for this very reason, absolute knowledge is rendered forever impossible." If we admit the pragmatist's primary contention that reality as a whole is a dynamic somewhat, then, of course, there is nowhere in the universe a stable point of view from which it becomes possible to read ultimate meaning into the conception of evolution. If we agree with him that the mind of man was created by phenomena for converse with them, in other words, that it is a mere phenomenon among phenomena, and is not essentially different from the objects which it contemplates in the evolutionary series, then we must again confess that it is impossible to meet his objection to *a priori* metaphysics.

This realism that lies at the heart of every form of pragmatism is not easy to refute. It is the legitimate inheritance from the agnosticism that lurks in the Critique of Pure Reason. The only way to dissolve this agnosticism, constituting as it does a perpetual menace to the *a priori*, is to make use of Kant's immortal discovery, and to carry on his dialectic to the logical conclusion of its own movement. Kant was the first thinker to point out the path that must be pursued in order to transcend and explain the inherent contradictions in the realistic conception of causality. He has demonstrated for all time that efficient causality is not a characteristic of reality, but that it is brought by the mind to experience. But having taken this vast stride in thought, he failed to see that for this very reason there can be no genuine *datum* in knowledge. If *data* are really *given*, if they are cast at the mind out of the realm of ultimate reality – the world of things in themselves – then that world from which the given issues, must needs contain the principle of efficient causality. This, however, Kant's own principle explicitly denies. Thus we see that a world of objects independent of mind could never be known. In the first place, mind could not reach out to the objects. This of course is most obvious. If thought and reality are twain, then there is no path by which thought could find access to reality. But the pragmatist fails to

observe that knowledge is rendered just as impossible when, instead of attempting to make thought pass out to the object, we try to make the object throw its content in upon the mind. Kant's wonderful insight enables us to see what he himself seems never to have been fully aware of, that if this world of things-in-themselves is devoid of the principle of efficient causality, as his own doctrine teaches, it is incapable of *giving* anything to mind or in any way contributing causally to the content of knowledge.

If we regard merely its face value and do not penetrate to its deeper implications, we find the new philosophy teaching a doctrine that bears a marked resemblance to idealism. The pragmatist is as opposed as the idealist to the notion that man counts for nothing in the world; that he is held in the fatal clutches of a reality that transcends him, and that it therefore makes no difference what he does. No transcendental idealist has ever announced the doctrine that man is a creative first cause more forcibly than have some of the pragmatists. Mr. Schiller says: "Our action is essential and indispensable. The world, (our world) is of our making, without us, nothing is made that is made."² This is indeed an inspiring doctrine, and it is not at all surprising that it has made many converts among idealists. But in their haste to adjust the old idealism to the new philosophy these proselytes have lost sight of the fundamental truth of the traditional doctrine. Now what we object to is not the doctrine that man is a creative first cause, but the foundations which here are made to support that doctrine. This theory of genuine human freedom is an entirely unwarranted inference from the pragmatist's fundamental postulate. If our total human nature – mental as well as physical – is a product of evolution, there is no real freedom. It is then an illusion to talk about a "world of our making." The only escape from this dilemma, and the one way to provide for a real freedom, is to read off the story of the universe in the opposite direction; to translate evolution in time into a thought process that transcends time and of which the temporal evolution is only the outward expression. Thus mind, which the pragmatist puts last in the evolutionary series, is in the profoundest sense of the word first. Manifestly such a transformation can only be effected by rising above the temporal order to a timeless point of view.

The pragmatist protests as vigorously as the idealist against an isolated world of things independent of mind. He holds that thought and its object can be reduced to unity, but that it is not necessary to transcend the world of *fact* in order to find the union of the two. They can be unified within the bounds of immediate experience itself. They

² Humanism, p. 6.

are merely two stages or aspects within the experience which as a whole we call thought. Now there undoubtedly is a connection between thought and action. This constitutes the irrefutable starting point of pragmatism. But pure pragmatism never is, and from the very nature of the case never can be, the final account of just what this connection is. The connection between thought and action, upon which the pragmatist so strenuously insists, is a relation in time, and he can never get a satisfactory explanation of it without resorting to the despised *a priori*; without, that is, beginning his theory of knowledge from a stable point of view that lies beyond the momentary experience. Thought and idea will be finally unified when both are found to be part of a common design. And this identity mere empirical thought can never discover, for it is not a bare identity, but an identity in the midst of difference.

The pragmatist holds that the intuitionist is unable to provide for valid objective reference for his innate ideas, because these ideas rise, in the first instance, as pure mental constructions. The idea can only fit an object when the object has had a share in making the idea. If the idea is genuinely *a priori*, as the ordinary intuitionist conceives that it must be, it is cut off from all organic connection with the object. A tailor on the planet Mars could not make a suit of clothes that would fit an inhabitant of the earth, nor can an idea born in the cloudland of the *a priori* fit an object in the world of fact. By an analogous process of reasoning the pragmatist maintains that apriorism as it is usually defined makes all knowledge in the last analysis pseudo-knowledge. Our vaunted *a priori* judgments, whether they are taken in the ethical, esthetical, or logical forms are worthless because, if the a-priorist is right, they have been framed without reference to the very objects to which they are later to apply.

The doctrine we are here examining protests – to use Mr. Schiller's words – “against every form of *a priori* metaphysical criticism that condemns the results of our experience up to date as an illusory ‘appearance’ without trial. The only valid criticism they can receive must come in, and through their actual use.” But all such attacks upon the *a priori* are unjustifiable, for no system of idealism since Kant has attempted to deny that all knowledge begins in experience. It is one of the cardinal principles upon which the a-priorist grounds his ontology that nothing can be ultimately real unless our immediate experience can be reconciled with it. The *a priori* does not condemn or abolish the *a posteriori*, it transcends and clarifies it.

The pragmatist condemns metaphysics, and yet when he does so, he is, and cannot avoid being, a metaphysician himself. One metaphysics can be condemned only by another. As I shall attempt to show, he borrows just enough underived knowledge from the a-priorist to set his world of

experience in motion, then disavows the indebtedness and talks about a dynamic realism. Like every other form of empiricism that we find in the history of thought, pragmatism begins its career as a provisional method for the examination of the categories as they issue in the world of time. But soon it attempts to leave this secondary world (the world of experience, within which its method has an entirely valid application) and becomes a dogmatic metaphysics. It undertakes the search for first principles, guided only by the light of its tentative empirical concepts. Yet it essays to measure reality by means of these secondary categories and insists that the universe must ultimately conform to its deductions from them.

The epistemology of the pragmatist is full of strange inconsistencies. In the first place he insists that it is an idle fancy to suppose that if the core of reality is beyond thought we can in any way become cognizant of it, for a judgment cannot refer to a reality lying entirely outside of experience. In this he is of course quite right. Then he goes on to say that in defining thought and reality, the metaphysician sets up an impassable barrier and afterward spurs thought on to the impossible feat of surmounting that barrier. But now the pragmatist does this very thing in his own account of judgment, for he holds that in judging we actually pass beyond the present into the past and into the future. It is just as difficult to see how a judgment can refer to an object in the past or future, as to see how it can refer to an object lying outside of experience in the realistic sense. The pragmatist recognizes this difficulty and attempts to overcome it by the fundamental tenet of his system, that an idea can only affect or be affected by that which is a direct continuation of its own essence. The object is the cosmic end of the idea, and the two poles of thought are connected by a series of infinitesimal gradations. Past and present are likewise connected by a series of imperceptible differences. But now we hold that there is here a dualism in the pragmatic theory of thought which its unaided empirical logic cannot span. The past, to be known as past, must be connected with the present through some identity of content. However, unless thought can transcend the present, how can it bring the past into connection with that present? But the pragmatist announces at the outset that thought, being a function in the present situation, exhausts its entire meaning in that situation. All the pragmatic apparatus of argument, therefore, is powerless to answer this simplest of questions. How can a mind come to be which knows at the present moment what it experienced in the past? The pragmatist, of course, protests most indignantly against being classed with the materialists. But so long as he gives a fundamental place to matter, or that which is other than mind, and regards mind as simply episodic – the mere attendant phenomenon in the evolutionary scheme –

he can never avoid a dangerous alliance with all that is most objectionable in materialism. We may say that matter is not the crass thing that shallow thought would have it, and hold that it is possible to substitute for this vulgar conception of matter the notion of force or energy, but we do not thereby escape the reproach of materialism. A doctrine which makes force, or even will, the ultimate principle of the universe differs only in degree and not in kind from the generally accepted view of materialism. It is a somewhat more refined materialism, but nevertheless a genuine materialism. It has very appropriately been called *veiled materialism*. If we would avoid the deterministic implications of materialism, we must make mind a constitutive principle in the universe and not merely a factor in its reconstruction.

It is surely a clever theory that says, following Spencer, that those thoughts of ours which seem so irresistible are simply the results of transmitted inheritance; that we have come to regard them as necessary truths because they have been handed down to us from such remote ancestral experiences that their origin has disappeared from sight. But this ingenious doctrine misses entirely the fundamental contention of transcendental idealism. The great idealists, from Plato to Hegel, have given us different accounts of thought and reality, but they have been in closest agreement about the central fact. However widely they may have differed about details of doctrine, they have all held that we do have knowledge that is logically prior to experience, – that we cannot reach necessary truths by experience alone. The a-priorist continues to affirm, in full view of all that the pragmatists have thus far affirmed, that the principle by means of which our associations of ideas are welded together into a whole of knowledge – the synthetic unity of apperception – is itself the condition of experience, and therefore cannot be derived from experience. It is idle to talk of evolving that which is legislatively sovereign over the evolving process itself. What meaning can we possibly attach to the pragmatist's conception of a reality, that, as a whole, changes always? If he does not wish us to take him literally and after all intends to provide for some sort of permanence, how can he give his world of fluent inherited ideas any stability of meaning? We insist, again, that a *dynamic realism* requires to be grounded upon a *dynamic idealism*. And therein is found the anchorage that is needed to give knowledge stability.

The cause of the logical coherence in our judgments, according to the new theory, is our interest in the situation before us. We have a purpose to reconstruct reality, and the union of the subject and predicate in judgment is the outer expression of this purpose or interest. This is, as far as it goes, certainly a true account of the judging process. But after we have said that interest or purpose is the cause of coherence among

our cognitions, we have by no means given an exhaustive statement of the nature of judgment. We are now confronted with the more serious problem of finding the ground of the interest or purpose. This is far from being self-explanatory. Cause and ground need not be identical; in fact they may be totally different. It is one thing to say that we judge because we have a need or an interest, and quite a different matter to discover the need of this need. Why should I have this present purpose to reconstruct reality? If I am to know that it is a true purpose, there is need of a higher and ultimate purpose to serve as the criterion of this specific purpose.

We see, then, that pragmatism emphasizes effects of action as tests of validity, but does not furnish a criterion by means of which we may distinguish good from bad effects. Every judgment reconstructs reality and thereby helps to continue the present order, says the pragmatist. We pronounce it true if it contributes to the existing order, and false if it does not. But now in order that we may distinguish a good effect from a bad one, we need some extrinsic criterion to tell us why it is best to have the present system perpetuated. For the pragmatist, truth means objectivity, the criterion of which is utility. Now there are different grades of utility. One thing is useful, another more useful, and a third most useful. If the useful is the true, we ought likewise to have grades of truth, and to be able to speak of the true, the truer, and the truest, which is manifestly absurd. Moreover, even if we admitted the possibility of gradations in truth, the pragmatic test furnishes no criterion for distinguishing between different kinds of truth. It is therefore evident that it is not mere utility, but utility of the right kind, that is needed to establish the objectivity of any belief. A judgment must be more than a mere effort to reconstruct the situations in which we find ourselves from moment to moment. So much is of course the first condition that it must fulfill. But in addition to being a successful present response, it must be true. This requires that it not only conform to a passing *is*, but to a permanent *ought*. Each judgment of mine is in one aspect my response to a present situation. But before I am entitled to call it true, I must know why the response has been what it is; that is, I must be able to say that another than myself would have responded to the situation in precisely the same way.

In every real judgment something new is added to the system of cognitions already in the possession of the one who judges. According to the pragmatic theory of knowledge, the test of the rationality of this *new* element is its compatibility with the *old*. If it works it is pronounced true, and given its appropriate place in the established order. If it does not fit in with the old it is rejected as false. But in this adroit definition

of truth the pragmatist is all the while begging the whole question, for he presupposes the truth or rationality of the *old*. His criterion of congruity works very well, indeed, if we grant him just enough rationality to start the process. Now obviously this determination of the primal rationality can never be achieved by a *posteriori* methods. That which is workable is not *ipso facto* true. As several writers of the new school have themselves pointed out, there may be systems of falsehood where the new will fit in with the old, and yet be error. The lever which the mechanic employs in his useful trade and the "jimmy" by means of which the burglar twists the hinges from the safety vaults both do their work well. They are both useful instruments, but one is useful in a good business and the other in a bad business. Now if these levers were endowed with consciousness each would feel the same thrill of satisfaction in the successful accomplishment of the work for which it was intended. From their own subjective points of view their experiences would be the same, but from a point of view that lies outside of either they are seen to belong to radically different systems of utility.

It is true that knowledge, whatever else it does, functions with reference to our needs. Thought certainly has a utility aspect. But when we have said that cognition is teleological, have we given a complete account of it? "We want what we need," is the epigrammatic formula in which the central doctrine of pragmatism may be expressed. But such an explanation of the nature of the thinking process is not final. It involves an unwarranted stifling of the mind's clear demand for a farther explanation of these very needs. Our thoughts are born of our needs. True, but as I have already said these needs themselves cannot be left unexplained. They cannot be abandoned to drift with the tide in the evolving cosmos. They must ultimately be referred to a stable order of reality. Otherwise how could one distinguish between a real need and a whim, a capricious want and a real want. It is useless to say, as the pragmatist does, that this will be determined by the way in which the two issue in the world of fact. The practical or workable is the reasonable. We have a right now to ask for the *reason* of the *reasonableness*.

The most conspicuous doctrine that all pragmatic theories have in common is, that the meaning of an idea or concept is revealed only when it is thrown into action. An idea as such is powerless to show forth its full content until it functions in conduct. As a mere state of consciousness, it entirely conceals the truth within. In this description of the thinking process, the only difference between idea and object, between theory and fact, is that the idea is a plan of action, while the fact is the fulfillment of that plan. But observe, now, in the pragmatist's

own account of the matter, the plan or purpose is never entirely realized. In so far, then, as the idea never attains to a complete fulfillment of its purpose, there is no real fact, but only pseudo-fact. That is to say, the idea is ever on the way to become fact, but never quite reaches its goal.

This now familiar doctrine, which Professor James first made current, that belief in an objective existence corresponding to an idea helps to make that object real, manifestly teaches that our ideas are facts in the bud. When we can frame an opinion on which we can act consistently as if it expressed the essence of reality, then this is no longer a mere opinion; it thickens into existence – to use a favorite expression of pragmatists. Now the difficulty about a theory that defines an object as an idea to which the environment responds amicably may be stated very briefly. Suppose that I have acted once, or a thousand times, *as if* a certain object of belief really existed, this does not assure me that I shall not be frustrated the very next time I undertake to act “as if.” For thousands of years men acted *as if* the sun revolved around the earth, and never once did the environment fail to respond to this belief. They sailed the sea, tilled the soil, kept their appointments with their fellow-men by acting “as if,” and yet the belief refused to thicken up into reality. Men also at the same time believed that the earth was flat. Now in what sense was the earth really flat as long as men found it useful to believe it so?

The genetic theory of judgment, upon which pragmatism grounds its entire logic, is stated most clearly and concisely by Mr. Schiller. “I cannot but conceive the reason as being, like the rest of our equipment, a weapon in the struggle for existence and a means of achieving adaptation. It must follow that the practical use, which has developed it, must have stamped itself upon its inmost structure, even if it has not moulded it out of pre-rational instincts. In short, a reason which has not practical value for the purposes of life is a monstrosity, a morbid aberration or failure of adaptation, which natural selection must sooner or later wipe away.³ But now I would submit that thought is not merely an instrument in the struggle for existence, not simply one of the devices with which nature has equipped us to secure a more comfortable adaptation to our environment. That is certainly an important, but not the only function of thought. Aside from being a useful instrument in the struggle for existence, it has the more important office simply to be true. Some of our judgments we certainly do make for practical purposes. But when we have said so much we are still far from a complete account of the import of judgment. Judgment has a two-fold aspect. It has an external meaning, through which it refers to an end beyond itself,

³ Humanism, p. 7.

and an internal meaning which constitutes an end-in-itself. It is one function of a judgment to be useful, that is, to reach out beyond itself. But its other and most fundamental function is just to be true.

Ideas, says the pragmatist, are mere stages within the continuous process of experience. Thoughts stand midway between sensations and volitions, and are inseparably linked in both directions. But if that is all that thought is – if it is merely a phase in a single process – it is difficult to see how it can have any efficiency at all. How can the idea be an instrument and have creative, or even reconstructive power, if it is only a function of action? Let me by means of an illustration make my meaning clear upon this point, since it is of the most vital importance for the central contention of my paper. The light in an electric globe may be said to stand midway between the current that goes in and the current that goes out of the globe. It represents a stage in the process. Now suppose the outgoing current of electricity did some work, turned a motor, for example. The light, then, would be in inseparable connection with this activity. We could appropriately speak of it as a function of the action in the motor. The light, however, does not turn the motor, it is a mere attendant phenomenon in the process. Now in the action-theory of thought, the idea occupies an analogous position. It is the brain end of a motor process. The idea comes into existence only when the channel of motor discharge, with which its ganglion cell is connected, is actually earning off a nervous impulse. The Lange-James theory of the emotions declares that the emotion always follows the action. We are afraid because we run, etc. Now the action-theory of thought is a corollary of this celebrated doctrine, or, at any rate, a parallel theory. Thought is not the cause of action, but rather the reverse. We do not act because we think, but we think because we act. Therefore the pure pragmatist – one who grounds his entire theory of thought on a radical empiricism – cannot escape from epiphenomenalism. The world of my thoughts is the product, says the pragmatist, of a long and strenuous evolution; a struggle in which only the useful thoughts have survived. It is not surprising, therefore, that I should find my thoughts fitting in serviceably with my desires. My ideas are responsive to my needs because the needs in the first instance fashioned the ideas. To this one would again reply: But if my thoughts have been actually *made* in the process of evolution, they can do nothing except what that process will let them do. In other words they can do nothing at all. They merely transmit the impetus which they have received out of the past.

The pragmatist's description of the thinking process bears a marked resemblance to Spencer's well-known definition of life. It is of course quite consistent with its fundamental assumptions that it should do so.

It is not this obvious fact which I wish to point out, but to insist that the condemnation of a-priorism, by the pragmatist of today, must therefore stand or fall with the Spencerian agnosticism. An inquiry into the limits of pragmatism is an inquiry into the limits of evolution. But it lies beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss the limits of evolution; then, too, such an undertaking would be a superfluous task at this late date. All the professed teachers of pragmatism admit that it has its roots deep down in Spencerism for they all accept evolution as their battle-cry. It is interesting, however, to observe that while every member of the new school frankly acknowledges at the outset a fundamental allegiance to Spencer, each soon attempts to escape from the embarrassments of such an alliance by claiming to have supplemented or transcended the crude agnosticism of the Synthetic Philosophy. And yet they have added nothing of significance to the doctrine of the great protagonist of evolution. They have only re-stated in a new form his theory of the origin of thought. At a late stage in the evolution of life the organism becomes so complex that it cannot keep up the reactions which the environment calls for by simple reflexes, and thought appears to be the guide in the struggle for existence. It ought to be obvious to the pragmatist, however, that no conclusions can be reached respecting the final limits of knowledge in exclusively psychological terms. The path along which empirical thought moves cannot be marked out except by reference to some fixed point of view that lies outside of that path. A circle cannot be defined without reference to a centre, nor is any other curve strictly definable in terms only of points that lie in that curve. There must always be a point of orientation. Now the *a priori*, – the point of orientation for the path of our immediate experience – can be reached only by means of the historical discipline known as metaphysics.

If we accept the genetic theory as a final account of the import of judgment, then we never judge except in order to better ourselves. Every thought is aimed at reconstruction of reality. Now this is a doctrine that we may very properly challenge both on biological and on theoretical grounds. There is good reason for believing that, even when engaged in the conscious struggle for existence, the organism does aim at other things than its own advantage. There are activities which represent merely an overflow of the surplus energy which attends the evolution of the organism. They are not aimed at anything in particular, certainly not at the preservation of the life of the organism. This is likewise true in the region of higher thought. It was not an idle fancy that led the Cambridge mathematician to say of a certain theorem that the best thing about it was that it could not be of any possible use to anybody. Men do not always think because they would perish in the struggle for existence

if they did not think. The thought factor in those states of consciousness that we call wonder, surprise, or awe, certainly lie quite near to the non-practical interests. Here the individual seems to contemplate the situation with a view simply to understand, not to reconstruct it.

Now although the facts do not fit in very smoothly with their leading assumptions, the majority of the pragmatists have felt obliged to accept the biologists' view that, in the evolution of physical life, a great deal of activity is produced over and above what is needed for practical purposes. So too, though quite reluctantly, they admit that in the evolution of mental life there arise many thoughts which have not the remotest bearing upon conduct, and which, in keeping with their primary assumptions, they must therefore condemn as irrational. Professor James, for example, frankly admits that there are these two kinds of knowledge. Then, in order to account for the anomalous non-practical thought, he is driven to make an arbitrary distinction between rational philosophy and merely logical systems of thought. Purely useless thoughts may be internally consistent, but such a system would constitute only a logical philosophy. Reasonable philosophy is the entire system of useful knowledge. Other pragmatists provide for the truth of apparently useless propositions, *e.g.*, those of higher mathematics, by saying that they are indirectly true; their use will become manifest by and by. They are integral parts of a larger system which as a whole is useful, and therefore true. But this does not solve the difficulty; it simply evades or postpones it. We still need a criterion beyond the mere facts themselves to distinguish between the useful and the useless.

Several of the foremost defenders of pragmatism have criticised the generally accepted theory among idealists that the "true" is that which fits into a system. To this they object, among other things, that there is no complete system of truth within the scope of our human cognition, but many partial systems. It is difficult to understand how these thinkers are able to say of the many partial systems of truth that they are partial unless they have knowledge of an ideal system which embodies these fragmentary systems. A partial system, in order to know itself as really incomplete, must be potentially the whole. The radical wing of the pragmatist school – those who adhere to a thorough-going agnosticism – hold that the world of experience shows by means of its ragged margins, so to speak, that it has been torn away from the complete reality, and is a mere fragment of the whole. But here again, I insist, the boundary line of our empirical knowledge would appear in no wise a ragged or irregular margin unless we were able to contrast the margin of this fragmentary world with the regular lines that bound the complete reality. The pragmatist never wearies of telling us that it is a difficult problem to conceive how the idea of the infinite, the perfect or the *a*

priori, can arise in a finite, imperfect being, all of whose knowledge must begin in experience and therefore can never be divorced from experience. He fails to observe, however, that in describing empirical, or *a posteriori*, knowledge as imperfect he is employing the very conception of the totalizing whole which he condemns in the *a-priorist*. He should come to see that he cannot know that the finite or imperfect is such, except in so far as he has logically prior knowledge of the infinite or perfect. Every judgment of imperfection requires that the mind judging be possessed of a standard of perfection against which the so-called imperfect knowledge is measured and found wanting. If my mind were confined to the *a posteriori* it could never know it. I know an *a posteriori* fact by one act, and I know that I know it, and that it is a *a posteriori* by another, and that other is a *a priori*. In every act of thought, even the most elementary, we must assume an absolute criterion of truth, a standard of knowledge. Thought which does not presuppose this ideal and conform to it loses itself in a chaos of sense impressions.

We have now seen how the pragmatist essays to arrive at valid knowledge without the *a priori*. How he attempts to answer one of the central questions in philosophy, the question, namely, as to the way in which the particular is related to the universal, by declaring that a genuine specific validity is ascertainable independent of any prior attainment of validity *überhaupt*, in other words that we can know the part, and have absolute knowledge of it too, without knowing the whole. If this could be accomplished, it would, indeed, be a wonderful achievement, as the pragmatist thinks. It would have a most important bearing upon the theory of conduct, for we should then be able to establish a science of ethics, without first arriving at a *a priori*, or universally valid knowledge. There would be no need of a Categorical Imperative exercising legislative authority over each specific instance of conduct, but these specific instances would each be self-determining. This new practical ethics, therefore, declares that there is no need of passing beyond the content of each particular situation in order to know how to act. Each specific situation determines its own reaction without reference to any *a priori* form of conduct. In other words, the pragmatist insists that he can answer Kant's second question, "What ought I to do?" without previously answering in any final fashion the first question, "What can I know, and how do I know it?"

According to Professor Dewey, it belongs to transcendental logic, to the theory of the categories, to discuss the ultimate validity of morality. In the science of ethics as such we are not concerned with matters of final validity. The fundamental problem here is, to discover a method of deciding questions of specific validity. What we want in the science of ethics is some way of determining the value of each particular judgment,

without passing beyond the situation in which it arises. The particular moral judgment must be the final authority within the scope of its own activity. But if our conscious life is nothing more than the flow of transient experiences, how do we know whither these experiences are tending? And if we do not know whither they are tending, how can we say that we are acting right in any specific situation? If there is nothing but a flux of states of consciousness, what right have we to talk about an absolute perfection towards which our universe is evolving? Absolute truth is beyond our human ken, says the pragmatist, and yet he is certain that we are on the track of it. This is the strangest and most elementary of all the paradoxes that the pragmatists are uttering. All knowledge is merely relative to the particular situation in which it arises, and yet there is somewhere absolute truth. The goal of our human endeavors is genuinely out of sight, but we nevertheless know that we are moving towards that goal. To all of which I reply: Unless man does have some knowledge that goes to the very center of reality, and enables him to see by the light of the absolute intelligence, he has no right to say that he is on the track of truth.

REVIEW OF RIEBER'S "PRAGMATISM AND THE A PRIORI"

H. Heath Bawden. "Review of Rieber, 'Pragmatism and the A Priori'." *Journal of Philosophy* 2.9 (27 April 1905): 238-45.

Paper in collection: University of California Publications. *Philosophy*. Volume I. Studies in Philosophy prepared in Commemoration of the Seventieth Birthday of Professor George Holmes Howison. Berkeley: The University Press. November 29, 1904.

Professor Rieber in the fourth paper, on *Pragmatism and the A priori*, has stated clearly one or two important principles of pragmatism and misstated others; or, at least, the reviewer thinks that the pragmatists themselves will regard them as misstatements. There is great need just at this time of a clear definition of the issues here involved.

The author's main contention is for an *a priori*, eternal or absolute element in experience, and especially in knowledge. 'Not what an idea has come from, nor what it is just now discovered to be, nor what it is going to *do* by and by, but what it eternally *is*, must furnish us with our deepest insight into the world of reality.' Therefore he objects to the appeal to evolution upon which he conceives the pragmatist to rest his case. 'Mind, which the pragmatist puts last in the evolutionary series, is in the profoundest sense of the word first.' Hence the necessity of 'rising above the temporal order to a timeless point of view.' Likewise he objects to pragmatism as a pure empiricism, because he conceives that the pragmatist announces at the outset that thought, being a function in the present situation, exhausts its entire meaning in that situation,' whereas in truth, he says, 'we do have knowledge that is logically prior to experience,' which 'is itself the condition of experience, and therefore can not be derived from experience.' 'What meaning,' he asks, 'can we possibly attach to the pragmatist's conception of reality, that, as a whole, changes always? If he does not wish us to take him literally and after all intends to provide for some sort of permanence, how can he give his world of fluent inherited ideas any stability of meaning?'

In reply to this it might be asked what is meant by permanence and by change. If idealism insists on a permanent element in a static sense, then

pragmatism is not idealistic, since it maintains that permanence means permanence in the midst of change, a moving equilibrium in which the stability of a gyroscope or the life of an organism may serve as the type. But is idealism necessarily synonymous with absolutism?

A similar line of argument would show that pragmatism is not necessarily identified with a pure empiricism, as the author thinks it is. He says: 'The path along which empirical thought moves can not be marked out except by reference to some fixed point of view that lies outside of that path.' This the pragmatist denies. A 'fixed' point of view, he says, is no point of view at all. A point of view is a developing thing. It is fixed, that is, it is taken as relatively fixed, only for the given situation, but is itself constantly undergoing evolution with the development of experience. This is empiricism, but it is not mere empiricism; it is not sheer relativism. As the author himself puts it in his exposition of the pragmatist's position, 'Even if all is flux and our conceptions of the true, the beautiful and the right are always changing, we need not despair. We must not think that we are thereafter consigned hopelessly to the quagmire of uncertainty and error. The discovery that nothing is stable need not paralyze action.'

The author further objects that 'pragmatism emphasizes effects of action as tests of validity, but does not furnish a criterion by means of which we may distinguish good from bad effects? The reply might be made that the pragmatist finds the criterion in the social implications of the consciousness of the individual. The pragmatist says, 'Our thoughts are born of our needs? But in saying that he does not deny that these needs themselves need to be explained. To explain them is the socio-genetic problem. The pragmatist simply insists on basing his philosophy of life in the most obvious truths of experience and then working out from this as a basis to the consideration of the terminal problems.

The author objects to the 'genetic theory of the judgment,' upon which he says the pragmatist bases his entire logic. 'Aside from being a useful instrument in the struggle for existence,' he says, thought 'has the more important office simply to be true.' 'It is one function of a judgment to be useful, that is, to reach out beyond itself. But its other and most fundamental function is just to be true.' But surely truth is true only under specific conditions. There is no such thing as truth at large or truth in the abstract. And the specification of the conditions always introduces the possibility, nay, the necessity, of elements of utility.

He links what he calls the 'action-theory of thought' of the pragmatist with the James-Lange theory of the emotions. 'We do not act because we think, but we think because we act.' He is unable to see that both are true. He points his criticism with an illustration. 'The light in an electric globe may be said to stand midway between the current that goes in and

the current that goes out of the globe. It represents a stage in the process. Now suppose the outgoing current of electricity did some work, – turned a motor, for example. The light then would be in inseparable connection with this activity. We could appropriately speak of it as a function of the action in the motor. The light, however, does not turn the motor, it is a mere attendant phenomenon in the process. Now in the action-theory of thought, the idea occupies an analogous position.’ The terms of this illustration show how completely the author has missed the gist of pragmatism. From the standpoint of a strict continuity, light has existence solely in terms of vibrations (or whatever change the physicist regards as the objective counterpart of the experience of light), and in this sense ‘light’ does play its part in relation to the turning of the motor, at least negatively, in diverting energy that would otherwise be available for turning the motor. It is not a mere ‘attendant phenomenon’ in the process. The pragmatist is not committed to epiphenomenalism. One of the main contributions of a true pragmatism is to get back of the dualism implied in that theory.

Instead of its being true that pragmatism must ‘stand or fall with the Spencerian agnosticism,’ it is the case rather that in pragmatism we for the first time see evolution in its true setting. He is the first to take the evolution principle really seriously. Spencer’s philosophy, in spite of its pretensions, never really penetrated to the real significance of evolution, as is sufficiently shown, not only by his doctrine of the unknowable, but also, as Professor Royce has recently shown, in his formal statement of the evolution principle itself. Pragmatism is no more bound up with Spencerism than it is with Hegelism.

Finally, the author falls into the error, common to nearly all of the recent critics of pragmatism, of supposing that this doctrine is committed to subjective idealism and individualism, and therefore that it is ‘a protest against every species of ontology.’ But identification of the logical with the ontological categories, the notion of a reciprocal determination of thought and reality, does not necessarily imply a denial of the ontological categories; it simply means protest against a certain kind of ontology.

AN OPEN LETTER TO PROFESSOR DEWEY CONCERNING IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM

Charles M. Bakewell. "An Open Letter to Professor Dewey concerning Immediate Experience." *Journal of Philosophy* 2.19 (14 September 1905): 520–22.

On first reading your article entitled '[The Postulate of] Immediate Empiricism' [see this volume pp. 158-67] it seemed to bear out the promise of its title and to give us a statement of an empiricism at once radical and thoroughgoing. But on carefully rereading it the impression forces itself upon me that you have made the empiricism so thorough that it has overleaped itself. My difficulty is so obvious a one that I dare say you have a ready answer. Probably I have missed part of your meaning. But as I think that others of your readers may share that difficulty, I venture to lay it before you in the hope of eliciting an explicit reply.

The name *immediate empiricism*, or *immediatism*, is intended, if I have caught your meaning, to emphasize two characteristics of the 'new philosophy' now generally called pragmatism (1) 'Things are what they are experienced *as*,' – which gives us the one 'postulate' of immediate empiricism; and (2) Every experience is 'that experience which it is and no other,' or, in other words, every experience is a '*determinate* experience,' – which gives us the 'criterion' of immediate empiricism. "This determinateness," you write, "is the only, and is the adequate, principle of control or 'objectivity'" (p. 164). And, elsewhere, "If one wishes to describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as being."

Now as you further explain the first of the above propositions you make it mean, sometimes, no more than this: every experience, as experience, is what it is experienced as. Or, again, you interpret it as meaning simply, that if one starts out to explain any fact of experience, he must stick 'in the most uncompromising fashion' to that definite initial experience from which he sets out, as a real experience. With either interpretation the first proposition becomes as simple, elementary, 'tautologous' even, as the second; and both would be accepted at a

glance, as a matter of course, precisely as one would assent without argument to the propositions, *A is A*, and *A is not non-A*.

The obviousness of these propositions gives your general position its plausibility. But to get out of them any 'criterion,' or "principle of 'objectivity,'" do you not then, and without giving any logical defense, substitute this highly questionable interpretation of your first proposition; everything experienced is, and is no more than, it is then and there experienced as? Is this what immediatism means? I gather that it is, not only from the general drift of your discussion, but in particular from such expressions as the following, which you use as equivalent in describing a typical case of a 'corrected experience': 'the experience has changed,' 'the thing experienced has changed,' 'the concrete reality experienced has changed' (p. 160). And, in speaking of the Zöllner lines, you write, "the lines of *that* experience (the initial 'uncorrected' experience) *are* divergent: not merely *seem* so" (p. 163).

I am aware that by a certain placing of the emphasis, and by introducing qualifying and explanatory phrases, all of these expressions could be reduced to the tautological form. But they suggest the interpretation that the real thing aimed at in the original experience is gone and that we are dealing with another, and maybe even a different kind of a real thing. And some such interpretation seems to be required if immediatism is to furnish a 'key to the question of the objectivity of experience.' In the 'corrected experience' of the Zöllner lines, you imply, the lines that then are at once *seen* as converging and *known* as parallel are the lines of that particular experience, and not the real and self-same lines of the initial experience. But why should there be any problems at all if each experience is a new and a different reality? Why must experience be 'corrected,' and how can we speak of it as being corrected if it is in fact simply superseded? You write: "It is in the concrete thing as *experienced* that all the grounds and clues to its own intellectual or logical rectification are contained." Here the phrase 'its own' seems to bring back the reference to a permanent objective reality that is carried through the process of correcting, – a view which immediatism aims to supplant. And when you speak of the initial experience, say of the Zöllner lines, as containing, *as experienced*, 'all the grounds and clues' to its correction, how can you make this out except by reading into that initial experience as part of *its* reality that fuller meaning and larger context which only a later knowledge (experience) brings to light? This would, however, give us, as far as it goes, an idealism, – and of a decidedly transcendental kind.

My difficulty, in short, is simply this: Either everything experienced is real exactly as, and no further than, it is then and there experienced, – and then there is no occasion to speak of correcting or rectifying

experience; or, there is in every experience a self-transcendency which points beyond that thing *as experienced* for *its own* reality, – and then good-by to immediatism, Either atomism¹ or transcendentalism. And either view seems, in your article, to pass over very easily into its opposite, in good old Hegelian fashion

Is there another alternative which I have overlooked?

¹ Not, to be sure, the atomism of the earlier English psychology, to which you refer in a footnote. But immediatism seems to give us a kind of atomism differing from that only in greater complexity of the atoms. The reals are chopped off from one another. If, on the other hand, this consequence is avoided by making the earlier experience contain implicitly the later to which it leads, immediatism gives way to a doctrine of mediation.

IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM

John Dewey. "Immediate Empiricism." *Journal of Philosophy* 2.22 (26 October 1905): 597–99. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey*, *John, I can't find this on the list provided!!!!!!*

Professor Bakewell writes as follows, in an open letter to me in this JOURNAL concerning 'Immediate Empiricism'¹: "My difficulty, in short, is simply this: Either everything experienced is real exactly as, and no further than, it is then and there experienced – and then there is no occasion to speak of correcting or rectifying experience; or, there is in every experience a self-transcendency which points beyond that thing as *experienced for its own* reality – and then good-by to immediatism." And in a foot-note he says that my view is atomistic, chopping reals off from one another, and that if 'this consequence is avoided by making the earlier experience contain implicitly the later to which it leads, immediatism gives way to a doctrine of mediation.'

There was once a botanist who suggested that instead of deducing botany from the concept of plants (and from certain allied concepts) the proper method was to study plants to see what each was in itself. Whereupon an opponent replied that such a doctrine destroyed botany. "Take the case of a seed"; he urged, "either you mean that this seed just as it now is, and no further, is real, and then growth is impossible; or else there is in the seed a self-transforming somewhat which changes it first into a sprouting plant, and then, finally, into a mature plant with seed of its own – and then good-by to the idea that the reality of the seed is to be sought in just what the seed now, and no further, is. Moreover," he continued, "since each plant in itself is something different from every other, the doctrine makes relation of plants to one another, and hence generalization, and hence science, impossible."

Whereupon the first-mentioned botanist replied that either a given seed is alive and capable of growth, or, dead and incapable of becoming a plant, and that the actual state of affairs in this respect is precisely one of the things to be determined by a study of the particular seed; that it is of the very essence of the method that the question of 'further' or 'no

¹ Vol. II., No. 19, p. 521. See also this Journal, Vol. II., No. 15, p. 393.

further' should be settled by reference not to general notions, but by reference to the *determinate* character of the particular seed. Moreover, it was just by a study of each plant 'in itself' that one would find out whether it was something unrelated, atomistic, or something genetically and responsibly connected with other plants, relationship being precisely an affair of the determinate character of the seed.

In other words, while I expressly state in my article (1) that a thing which is rectified in a subsequent cognitive experience 'contains within itself' (that is as part of its own concrete determinate thinghood) 'the elements of the transformation of its own content,' and (2) expressly disclaim the possibility of deriving any conclusions whatever from the concept of immediate experience, Professor Bakewell expressly assumes (1) that the very *concept* of immediate experience carries with it some necessary implication regarding the character or nature of *what* is experienced, and (2) that it precludes any continuity of experienced things. As an immediate empiricist, I can only reply that it is to things *as* experienced that I go for instruction as to continuity, transformation and mediation; and that it is just because I find things immediately experienced *as* continuous, and as self-rectifying that I believe in continuity and self-rectification. Compare the distinction of cognitive and cognized in the former article, and the reference to the importance of the 'drift, occasion and contexture' of things – distinctions which are inherent and not external to the things. Does the transcendentalist believe that things *as* experienced are continuous? If yes, why should he charge an empiricist with *ex officio* denial of this empirical fact? But if he holds that a transcendental principle or function is required to give continuity to what as experienced is 'chopped-off,' then *he* would seem to be the one denying actual, empirical, continuity. I am always wishing that some transcendentalist would expound and expose his own positive doctrine about the problems which he accuses the empiricist of maltreating, instead of assuming that the transcendental position is self-evident, or at least thoroughly understood. Perhaps Professor Bakewell will help in this illumination, bearing in mind that an important motive in developing the newer philosophy has been the conviction that mediation, continuity, reconstruction and growth are facts which transcendentalism has failed consistently to define and account for. I do not understand the notion that because things of immediate experience are real, mediation can not be real. I am quite sure that the logic of immediate empiricism would include mediation along with the categories 'subjective, objective, physical, mental, psychic, etc.' (see Vol. II., p. 399) and say, 'if you wish to find out what it means, go to experience and see what it is experienced as.' I find difficulty in realizing the difficulty which one has with immediately experiencing something *as*

mediate. I don't see *any* way of experiencing the mediate (any more than of experiencing a cat or a dog) excepting that of immediately experiencing it as what it is, viz., mediate. If I were to make a guess as to the origin of the difficulty, I should refer it to a mental habit of employing a conceptual, instead of an empirical, philosophy,² a habit so inveterate as to display itself even when one is attempting to appreciate the position of an empiricist.

I conclude with a question and a remark: Does Professor Bakewell mean to deny (1) that all philosophic conceptions must somehow enter into experience, or (2) that all experience is, *as existence*, immediate? The remark is, that I quite meant my earlier statement, (Vol. II., p. 399), that from the postulate I gave, not a single philosophical proposition could be deduced – that its significance was that of affording a method of philosophical analysis.

² Lest I be charged with intimating that concepts are unreal and unempirical, I say forthwith that I believe meanings may be and are immediately experienced *as* conceptual.

THE CONCEPT OF PURE EXPERIENCE¹

Boyd H. Bode. "The Concept of Pure Experience." *Philosophical Review* 14.6 (November 1905): 684-95.

"The problem of a logic which aligns itself with the origin and employ of reflective thought in every-day life and in critical science is to follow the natural history of thinking as a life-process having its own generating antecedents and stimuli, its own states and career, and its own specific objective or limit."²

According to Professor Dewey, the author of this statement, epistemological logicians usually misconceive the relation between thought and its conscious antecedents or stimuli, and thus stultify logical procedure from the start. This misconception is common to thinkers of widely divergent standpoints, and is of a twofold character. In the first place, sensation, as the antecedent or stimulus of thought, is supposed to be essentially different in nature from thought and to constitute an absolute datum or 'given.' And, secondly, it is assumed that ideas are something which are somehow superadded to a given sense-content or datum. Thought, therefore, appears at first bluish as a foreign element, which sensationalistic writers, on the one hand, vainly endeavor to deprive of its alien character, while, on the other hand, the intellectualists strive, though with equal futility, to effect some sort of a compromise by which thought and sense may be persuaded to dwell together on a basis of harmonious *coöperation*. We are thus left with two constituent elements, neither of which is reducible to the other, and both of which appear uncompromisingly hostile to all overtures looking towards a reconciliation.

All this difficulty, as is claimed by the rival theory, which can invoke such authorities as James and Dewey, is due to the fact that an illegitimate abstraction has been made, whereby sensation and thought are divorced from each other and erected into self-sufficient elements. Place this distinction between sensation and thought within reflective thought

¹ In preparing this article, I have become indebted to Professor F. C. Sharp for numerous suggestions.

² *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 13.

itself, we are told, and all our perplexities vanish as a troubled dream. Our conceptions of experience are fundamentally at fault, because logic has too long neglected the psychological genesis and the functional, instrumental character of thought within experience. The distinction between sense-content and meaning is not of the ready-made kind, inherent in the structure of being, but arises within reflective thought as a result of the endeavor to effect adjustment. So long as the activities of life are performed smoothly and uninterruptedly, experience remains unreflective in character. But when the old reactions no longer suffice, the former activities are inhibited, and a tension or conflict is set up, whereby the concrete whole of stimulus and response is in a manner broken up and a certain isolation of the conscious stimulus brought about, which, as a consequence, becomes sensational in character, according to the degree of isolation. The limiting term, corresponding to complete isolation, is pure sensation.

It appears, then, that sense-elements do not exist as such until after the situation has become problematic and conflict has set in, thus creating a need for the mediating offices of thought. In a sense they are artificial products; for they are elements which are seized and drawn forth from the onrushing stream of consciousness or 'concrete ways of living,' but which change in our hands as we hold them fast. Furthermore, they are not absolute data, but simply functions which vary with the nature of the concrete situation and which set the problem for the next act or create a demand for it. "Sensation as stimulus is always that phase of activity requiring to be defined in order that a coördination may be completed. What the sensation will be in particular at a given time, therefore, will depend entirely upon the way in which an activity is being used. It has no fixed quality of its own. The search for the stimulus is the search for exact conditions of action; that is, for a state of things which decides how a beginning coordination should be completed."³

This account of the nature and origin of sensation may be made to apply quite directly to the case of images as well. Like the sensation, the image is an abstraction from the concrete processes of consciousness it also owes its origin to the interruption of the onward flow, when response is uncertain or when we become interested in images for their own sake. While the accustomed reaction to a given situation is being held in check and the question as to the appropriate response is under consideration, various impulses are awakened, which, unless they issue forth in immediate reaction, are likewise inhibited, thus producing

³ Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept," *Psychological Review*, Vol. III, p. 368.

another tension and a corresponding isolation of certain elements, *i.e.*, images arise in the mind. The process is in all essential respects the same as in the case of sensation, except that the image marks a degree of isolation which is less complete than that of the sensation.⁴

Ideas or concepts, on the other hand, are simply that part or aspect of the concrete whole which is non-isolated. All about the sense-element is the 'free water' of the stream of consciousness or the 'concrete ways of living,' which indicates the direction of the current and thus constitutes ideas or meanings. "The response to any stimulus *via* an image – mediated, controlled or directed by an image – is the meaning of that image."⁵ At first the sensuous content of the image occupies the foreground of consciousness, but, as the response becomes more and more habitual, the tension diminishes and the content of the image wears away, until the entire resultant state of consciousness has become sufficiently shadowy to be entitled to rank as a concept. This result indicates that the mediation of response to stimulus has been accomplished and that the new mode of behavior has become assimilated to the type of unreflective experience.

The special merit to which this doctrine lays claim is that it avoids doing violence to the seamless garment of experience. In the entire stretch from unmediated to completely mediated experience, there is no eruption of any new element, no break in the organic connections between part and part. Reflective thought is not a *deus ex machina*, but arises simply as a differentiation within experience, and so is absolutely continuous with what has gone before for in the last resort all explanation goes back to the category of unreflective experience. That is to say, the purely immanent and instrumental character of thought depends upon the fact that it is reducible to the form of immediate or 'pure' experience. Reference is exhausted in present functioning. That both meanings and the data for thinking should fall within the function of individual experience, and thought itself be born from the matrix of experience, is thus readily intelligible. And the logical motive for the procedure is likewise sufficiently obvious. Between such a reduction and the much anathemized 'thought-in-itself' possessing the function of self-transcendence, there seems to be no middle ground.

Ingenious and comprehensive as this theory undoubtedly is, it yet suggests several difficulties which do not yield readily to explanation. To

⁴ Cf. W. C. Gore, *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. I, p. 437.

⁵ *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 193.

take the one nearest at hand, how is it, from this point of view, that we are enabled to distinguish between perceptions and images? If we are to rely solely upon a functional explanation, it is not at all obvious how the distinction gets itself made. As we have seen, both perceptions and images are said to acquire whatever sense-content they possess as a result of stress and conflict. And since the diminution of tension, as is evidenced especially in the case of images, results in a wearing away of the sense-content, it follows that the initial difference between perceptions and images must be due to differences in tension, *i.e.*, differences in the degree to which they are isolated or thrown into relief. Differences in setting are relevant only in so far as they indicate the degree to which the respective psychical elements have been isolated in consciousness. For physiological theory, the matter of course involves no difficulty, since the assumption that currents coming in from the sense-organs are stronger than those originating within the cortex seems sufficient to account for the difference between perceptions and images. But this assumption being inadmissible to us, how shall we explain the fact that an image which suddenly appears in consciousness may involve, to the same extent as a perception, an arrest of whatever other activities may be going on, and may become the object of just as much anxious attention? From the point of view of this theory, it seems a peculiar fact that images normally do not even tend to become confused with perceptions, in spite of the fact that the image may create considerable tension, whereas perceptions to which we have become habituated arouse scarcely any such tension whatever. It may very well be true that, when other things are equal, the degree of sense-quality varies with the degree of isolation in consciousness but the assumption that other things *are* equal in all essential respects appears to be hardly in accord with the facts.

Another fact for which the explanation seems inadequate is that of native differences in the matter of imagery, differences of the kind that were brought to light by the investigations of Galton. We may grant that, in cases where images seem conspicuously absent, the thinking is really done by means of reduced forms of imagery and that discrimination in thinking does, as a matter of fact, involve discrimination in imagery. But this, after all, would hardly account for the inability of some individuals to call up images at will. No doubt facility in 'the more internal forms of response' to images tends to make them lose their sensuous content. But, according to the theory, these images ought to stand out the moment the individual turns psychologist and inhibits these responses for purposes of introspection. Such inhibition would create the tension, the conflict, to which images are supposed to owe

their origin. Nor can it be alleged that the failure to discover the images is due to lack of training in introspection, since wide differences exist also among professional psychologists. To dispose of the case by stating that thinkers whose imagery is of the unobtrusive kind possess "a highly developed technique, a species of virtuosity, with reference to the sense-content actually in use,"⁶ suggests a concession to the exigencies of theory, rather than an acceptable explanation of the difficulty. That tension and conflict, – to state both this and the preceding objection in general terms, – will bring the sense-elements into the focus of consciousness, will lead to analysis and abstraction, seems indubitable; and this, as it appears to me, is the element or truth in the position. To hold that such tension and conflict *creates* the sense-elements is a very different matter, for which there is as yet no sufficient proof.

A further difficulty yet awaits us. As we have seen, experience is represented as continually falling apart, yet emerging from each crisis in a state of higher integration. Conflict becomes the law of life. And in order that conflict may arise, the situation must have become problematic to the percipient individual. The object suggests certain responses which are incompatible with each other, which are in some sense contradictory, and which hence lead to doubt and hesitancy. "In order that judgment may take place, there must be interruption and suspense. Under what conditions, then, is this suspense and uncertainty possible? Our reply must be that we hesitate because of more or less sharply defined alternatives we are not sure which predicate, which method of reaction, is the right one."⁷

In other words, it is the awareness of alternatives that brings on the conflict and not the fact of conflict that leads to an awareness of alternatives. This view, however, seems to involve an infinite regress. If sense-contents owe their existence to conflict, it would seem fairly obvious that the hesitation which arises from the awareness of alternatives presupposes a conflict by means of which these alternatives were previously discriminated and defined. And if this conflict in turn originated from an awareness of alternatives, another conflict must be presupposed, and so *ad infinitum*.

In a general way, this view seems to be expressed also in James's doctrine of attention, which holds that the fixation of attention is, on the conscious side, identical with an anticipatory image of the experience which is about to occur. Attention is the "reproduction of

⁶ *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 202.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 155.

the sensation from within.”⁸ Before a sense-content can become the object or attention, it must have previously been isolated or discriminated from its setting. But the next step, viz., to explain, in terms of conscious functioning, the process by which the discrimination is brought about, is precisely the difficulty. An appeal to evolution simply postpones the problem.⁹ The explanation given involves, as I venture to think, a *petitio principis*. And the plausibility of the explanation is due to the fact that the two meanings of the term ‘conflict’ are not kept sufficiently distinct. A conflict which, while it is indeed a conflict, is such only for the onlooking psychologist, is evidently a very different affair from that in which the uncertainty comes about through an incompatibility of results that are foreseen. That a factor is involved for which the theory has provided no place, because it falls outside the range of functional explanation, does not become apparent because the conscious realization of conflict is read into cases where the conscious realization occurs only in the mind of the observer.

It appears, then, that the attempt to account for the sensory elements within experience solely in terms of function does not look very promising. No satisfactory explanation is given of the difference between perception and image, or of the immense variations in native imagery, or of the processes of attention and hesitation. And to this may be added the difficulty of accounting for the emergence in consciousness of unexpected occurrences. A functional explanation is necessarily insufficient for this purpose so long as it is impossible to trace in the different stages of a conscious process a continuity or identity of a logical or teleological kind. So long as experience thrusts itself upon us in its characteristically crude, disjointed fashion, an explanation in terms of functional reference to what has gone before must remain hopelessly inadequate. For example, though we pass continuously from silence to thunder, the thunder is not an explication of the meaning of silence. The thunder does not grow out of the silence in any functional way, but simply comes.

If we turn now to the other factor or element within the conscious process, we meet with a further difficulty. In spite of the brilliant manner in which the doctrine of ‘feelings of relation’ has been turned to account, it has not been made entirely clear that these feelings have shown themselves adequate to the function which they are supposed to perform. It is alleged that the whole difficulty involved in the question

⁸ *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I., p. 447.

⁹ Cf. Schiller, *Personal Idealism*, p. 55; *Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 291.

or reference arises from the irrepressible tendency of the mind to abstract portions of experience, which portions are then regarded as rounded, self-contained wholes, known as sensation and thought respectively, so that the problem immediately arises how to join again what the analyzing intellect has ruthlessly torn asunder. Such a view, it is pointed out, mistakes a process for a finished product. It overlooks the fact that "the rush of our thought forward through its fringes is the everlasting peculiarity of its life. We realize this life as something always off its balance, something in transition, something that shoots out or a darkness through a dawn into a brightness that we know to be the dawn fulfilled... . We feel at the moment of dawning, this is not yet the meaning, there is more to come."¹⁰ The conjunctions or feelings of relation are literally states of transition. The 'ands' and 'ifs' and 'buts' are states of conscious onward flow, and thus necessarily 'point' to a beyond.

As against this view, I venture to maintain that this function of 'pointing' is impossible, unless the *terminus ad quem* is already present in some form. In discussing the existence of feelings of relation, it is only fair to confine the illustrations to passive sensory experience. Experiences in which intention plays a part draw so obviously upon previous experience that they cannot be considered conclusive evidence. And in the case of passive experience there seems to be little basis for the doctrine of feelings of relation.

In sensory experience the most common of the *soi-disant* relational feelings, perhaps, is that of difference. Whenever the stream of consciousness moves from one 'substantive' state to another, there must always be a 'shock of difference,' whatever else we may assume besides. In so far as a state is substantive it is pure experience, and so does not lead to a further state by any inner motivation. The second state is consequently of the nature of the unexpected, and so the onward movement must necessarily involve the shock of difference. The point to be proved is that there is a transitional state, such as is indicated by the term 'feeling of difference,' which appears in consciousness in advance of the *terminus ad quem* and heralds its approach.

We may now state the point at issue in the form of a dilemma. Either a feeling of difference is everywhere the same, irrespective of the terms which it connects, and then it fails to perform the function assigned to it, or every such feeling is unique, and then such uniqueness can be accounted for only by the presence of the *terminus ad quem*.

¹⁰ James, "The Knowing of Things Together," *Psychological Review*, Vol. II, p. III.

The first horn of the dilemma it would require little argument to substantiate. If there were pure 'differences' (or pure 'ands' and 'buts'), these states could not develop by any logical or teleological continuity into a final term possessing specific characteristics. The relational states cannot be at the same time pure and also contain the promise and potency of every specific form of final term. At best the relational terms would refer only to the universe at large; all specific 'pointing' would be out of the question.

If the theory is to work, then, we must make appeal to the second alternative. Every relational reeling must have a unique character from the start. And this uniqueness can only be due to the fact that it already shares the general character of the subsequent states. The 'difference' which connects thunder with silence is unique only in that it is an undefined form of thunder, the character of which is modified by the preceding state of silence. In other words, the relational feeling of difference can be realized, if at all, only on condition that both terms be present to consciousness. The fact that subsequent moments of consciousness may make more explicit the character or the second term is irrelevant. That a sense experience is not already perfectly definite can be suggested only by previous experience. As James himself says, in a different connection: "Take the example of an altogether unprecedented experience, such as a new taste in the throat. Is it a subjective quality of feeling or an objective quality felt? You do not even ask the question at this point. It is simply *that taste*."¹¹

It appears, then, that the feeling of difference does not occupy consciousness in advance of the *terminus ad quem*. In the case of a consciousness confined to immediate experience, the apprehension of the element of identity or continuity which is necessary for the act of reference could only mean some process of 'mutilation' or 'dissection' such as we find, in all its crudity and nakedness, in Bradley. But even this is not 'pointing.' 'We live forwards but understand backwards,' it has been truly said, but this can scarcely be taken to mean that the experience of the moment genuinely gets ahead of itself. Yet, in order to satisfy the conditions laid down by the theory, it must be held that "*past and future* are already parts of the feast experience that can really be."¹² In order to explain away the self-transcendence of knowledge, this doctrine enthrones a paradox and calls it an ultimate principle; for Becoming is incorporated in the structure of experience in such a way

¹¹ *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 272.

¹² James, "The Knowing of Things Together," *Psychological Review*, Vol. II, p. 113. *Italics mine*.

that a state of consciousness must be considered, if not its own other, at least its own fulfilment.

If the foregoing considerations are valid, it follows that, apart from the self-transcending reference of thought, experience cannot be reduced to inner harmony. And it follows further that those modes of functioning by which thought transcends what is immediately given must lie beyond the reach of all criticism which is not self-destructive. The validity of certain fundamental principles must be the presupposition of all knowledge. These principles are not simply devices by which we secure inner harmony, but must necessarily be 'ultimate and underivable facts of our mental structure.' Any theory which questions this fact may reasonably be expected to show how other principles might be employed instead. Is it entirely fair to put aside this challenge on the ground that "to think always costs an effort, and the effort of thought required to undo the structure of mind which has grown up with the ages would be so gigantic that we should shrink with a shudder from the very thought thereof"?¹³ The bare assertion that other postulates might have answered the purpose just as well appears, when inspected more closely, to be about equivalent to the idle reflection that, if experience were utterly different from what we at present know it to be, the postulates likewise would presumably be entirely different.

The further criticisms which might be urged need not detain us at present. I have tried to show that the concept of pure experience, instead of forming a proper datum or starting point for thought, has no standing ground whatever. The new doctrine has done valiant service by its criticism of theories which relate sensation and thought merely in an external way, and it offers much that is suggestive in its functional interpretation of these two elements. That sensation is not an absolute datum upon which thought operates *ab extra* may be cheerfully conceded. To insist upon this fact is but to emphasize anew a truth which has already received abundant verification from the history of philosophy. If we start with such a datum, we are effectually shut off from any reality which may lie beyond. But from the fact that an erroneous doctrine of sensation and thought hems us in to the narrow circle of our own impressions, it surely does not follow that all reference or self-transcendence is to be interpreted in terms of present functional value within the experience of the individual. Indeed, such a conclusion merely indicates that the craving for an absolute datum is to be satisfied in a different way. 'Pure experience' and 'concrete ways of living' are simply names for this datum. And the reduction of reference to a purely immanent

¹³ Schiller, *Personal Idealism*, p. 93.

function within the experience of the individual is the device whereby it is hoped to avoid the fate which has overtaken other theories in which the presupposition of an absolute datum also formed the starting-point.

To attempt a definition of truth is no part of my present purpose. It is true that pragmatism, as it has taken frequent occasion to indicate to its adversaries, 'desires it to be produced.' It seems also true that the latter have shown much more inclination to sally forth in onslaughts upon the newcomer than to oblige him by indicating the precise whereabouts of their stronghold and awaiting his attack. But something will have been accomplished, if it is shown that the problem of reference to a beyond, of the correspondence between individual thought-processes and a reality external to them, remains a genuine problem and is not to be set aside as essentially meaningless.

The difficulties and perplexities of the question which we have been considering have perhaps been felt by no one more keenly than by Professor Stout. While on the whole plainly unwilling to concede that sense-content and thought-reference are reducible to a common category, he never seems to get quite at close quarters with the subject, and at times even capitulates to the enemy.¹⁴ In a comparatively recent utterance, however, where the sigh of relief is distinctly audible, he maintains that in the use of language, "besides the verbal images or percepts, there are connected with these other peculiar modifications of our psychical state which can not properly be called images. Each word has a distinctive meaning, because, owing to its preformed associations and its context, it modifies immediate experience in a distinctive way, which does not seem capable of further analysis. But I do not see how it can possibly be maintained that what we think of is even partially determined for our thought as being in nature identical with these peculiar contents of immediate experience. On the contrary, we must regard the word and its psychic 'fringe' or 'halo' as constituting together the sign of something specifically distinct from them, not only in existence but in nature."¹⁵

That is to say, the 'beyond' to which our thought refers is not a reality identical with the fragmentary part of a present content, as Bradley contends, nor is it identical with such a content in the sense which compels the statement that "past and future are already parts of the least experience that can really be." Whatever the nature of reference may ultimately turn out to be, there is at present no sufficient ground

¹⁴ Cf. *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 79-91; *Philosophical Review*, Vol. VII, pp. 72-76; *Manual of Psychology*, pp. 76-93; *Groundwork of Psychology*, pp. 104-6.

¹⁵ *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society*, Vol. III, p. 12, 13.

for the view that an adequate account of it can ever be given in terms of immediate experience.

COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE AND ITS OBJECT

Boyd H. Bode. "Cognitive Experience and Its Object." *Journal of Philosophy* 2.24 (23 November 1905): 658–63.

In a recent issue of the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*¹ Professor Dewey contributes an interesting discussion of the postulate which forms the basis of immediate empiricism. According to his presentation this postulate amounts to the statement that things are what they are experienced to be. One experience must be held to be as real, as ultimate, as any other, and so the usual distinction between appearance and reality is necessarily wrong in principle. That is to say, the standard according to which we condemn certain experiences as erroneous, while others are judged to be 'true,' is not some fact external to the experience itself to which the experience in question either does or does not manage to conform, but resides within the experience itself. This seems to mean that if the experience by inner motivation 'points' to some further experience in which the prior experience fulfills itself, then this later experience is true to the extent to which the transition to the later experience takes place without any fundamental change in the quality or characteristic which continuously fulfills the corresponding quality present in the initial stage. Truth, then, is simply a relation which obtains among experiences that are equally real, and does not imply that certain experiences are simply appearances, in contrast to others which are not.

That this postulate is actually involved in immediate empiricism appears to be beyond rational dispute. All experiences are equally real. At this point, however, Professor Woodbridge raises the doubt whether immediate empiricism has been sufficiently mindful of the unique character of those experiences which are commonly called cognitive.² He expresses the fear that in their zeal to avoid the postulate of idealism the pragmatists have gone to the opposite extreme, and tend to dispose of all facts as 'experiences,' without much regard to the difference between the cognitive and the non-cognitive.

¹ Vol. II., No. 15, pp. 393–99. [*Middle Works* 3: 158–67.]

² *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. II., No. 21, pp. 573–76.

The point involved becomes apparent when, having accepted the empiricist's definition of reality, we take up the 'fruitful and important question, what is the nature of the real, when is it most fittingly and appropriately defined?' (p. 393). For in the face of this question another inevitably suggests itself: 'If reality as true is but one sort of reality, or one sort of experience, how can it possibly be affirmed that the nature of reality is most fittingly defined when...reality is experienced as true?' (p. 394).

All experiences, as has been said, are equally real, and, moreover, they alone are real, yet this discovery does not absolve us from the obligation to answer the question, 'In what sort of experience do I find out what any sort of experience is, and is *actually* or otherwise?' (p. 395). And the answer to this question, it is held, necessitates the conclusion that 'the whole knowing experience is a transcendent kind of experience, related to all other kinds in a way in which they are not related to it' (p. 394). That is to say, 'In the cognitive experience all other sorts of experience may exist without alteration,' or, 'In the cognitive sort of experience all other sorts appear to be transcended' (p. 396).

At first sight it may appear that whatever difficulty may be felt arises from the fact that too sharp a separation is made by the critic between the cognitive experience and 'other experiences.' Professor Dewey says, 'I should define a cognitive experience as one which has certain bearings or implications which induce and fulfill themselves in a subsequent experience in which the relevant thing is experienced *as* cognized, *as* a known object, and is thereby transformed or reorganized' (p. 162). And this definition seems to take in all kinds of experiences, so that no injustice can be charged with regard to a special class of experiences. Thus, in the illustration given by Professor Dewey, the first experience is a 'fearsome noise,' which by its own peculiar constitution induces an investigation or inquiry, and so leads on to the experience labeled, 'noise as a wind-curtain fact.' With regard to the latter two things may be noted: (a) Its character differs from that of the preceding experience only in the circumstance that it is more predominantly of the kind described by James as 'knowledge-about' or 'pointing,' rather than of the kind known as direct 'acquaintance-with'; and (b) It is 'a change of experienced reality effected through the medium of cognition' (p. 161). Considered as 'true' it is superior to the prior experience, because in it we find the fulfillment, the readjustment, the satisfaction of the preceding experience, which 'clamored for reform.' Considered as real, both experiences are simply instances of present functioning, and so stand on the same level.

This seems to dispose of the suggestion that the difference between the cognitive and the non-cognitive has been overlooked and that the

transcendent nature of cognition has been treated with neglect. If all experiences are the same in kind, there need be no occasion to emphasize a difference of this sort, nor is it obvious that the transcendent character of cognition does not receive due consideration. While there is doubtless 'a change of experienced reality effected through the medium of cognition,' this does not preclude the possibility of satisfying the demand of the critic that 'in cognitive experience all other sorts of experience may exist without alteration.' (For 'other sorts' we must substitute 'other instances.') The other instances exist within it in the sense that they are continuous with it and are the objects to which the experience in question refers or 'points.' A difficulty can arise here, it would seem, only if we treat the former experiences as entities which are transferred bodily in order to be included as integral parts of the present experience.

Yet the point urged by Professor Woodbridge can not be set aside so easily. The explanation of the pragmatist gains whatever plausibility it may possess from the fact that the implications involved in the concept of an experience developing solely by inner motivation are not carried out to their logical conclusion. In a developing experience the later stage, as we have seen, is to be described as predominantly of the 'pointing' type, and this characteristic indicates that it is not a final stage. If the experience beginning with the 'fearsome noise' were permitted to run its full course, the experience of 'noise as a wind-curtain fact' would turn out to be simply a stage in a process, the goal of which would be another experience of the type of 'acquaintance-with,' differing, however, from the initial stage in the fact that it would be of this type, not merely predominantly, but completely or ideally. The complete 'truth' of any experience, it seems, must be sought in this final stage.

This final stage or term, however, can not, apparently, be considered as cognitive in the sense of answering a question regarding the nature of any other experience, nor can it be termed cognitive as this term is defined by Professor Dewey. I can not say, 'This is what that means,' for such affirmation implies pointing, and pointing is a characteristic that pertains solely to the stages which precede the final goal. The final stage, therefore, is neither true nor untrue, except for the onlooking psychologist. Though it be conceded that the progressive fulfillment of an experience brings out with increasing clearness the truth or meaning of the starting-point, the last stage is a bourne whence no traveler returns, even in retrospect. And the nature of this final stage is necessarily a question of supreme interest and importance.

I wish to repeat that the final stage is not one in which any questions are asked or answered. And, as Professor Woodbridge contends, if this

be true, it follows that 'no one sort of experience is identified or distinguished. And what sort of an experience would that be if not precisely what we should mean by an unconscious experience?' (p. 396).

In a measure this sudden transition from a world which is synonymous with experience to a world which is most startlingly realistic is anticipated or at least suggested by statements such as the following, quoted from Professor Dewey: "The reader is begged to bear in mind that from this standpoint, when 'an experience' or 'some sort of experience' is referred to, 'some thing' or 'some sort of thing' is always meant" (p. 159). If these final terms can be properly characterized as unconscious experience, then conscious experience is a phrase which must be confined to relations between such final terms, and it seems to follow at once that 'consciousness may be defined, therefore, as a kind of continuum of objects.'³

It may, perhaps, be objected that Professor Woodbridge passes too hastily from an experience in which 'no one sort of experience is identified or distinguished' to the conclusion that such an experience or reality can be properly termed an unconscious experience. It takes too much for granted. The opponent may point out that identifying and distinguishing are lacking only in the sense which presupposes comparison with other experiences.

Nevertheless, this inference that the final experience may properly be termed unconscious seems capable of sufficient justification. In other words, it appears that, as the doctrine is stated, the element of 'knowledge-about' or 'pointing' is a constitutive and essential part of any experience of which we can form any respectable conception. While in the presentation of this doctrine it is usually made to appear that the first and the last stages of the continuous development through which experience becomes differentiated both belong to the same general type of 'acquaintance-with,' there is a difference which seems essential. This difference has been indicated already by the statement that the first stage is only predominantly of this type, while the last is completely or ideally so. If the first stage were ever complete in this sense the inner motivation by which it leads on to further experience could not be present, for the complete stage is a cave where all tracks lead inward. It would be a sort of island in an ocean of 'pointing' experiences. In the actual experience the feature which we discriminate is the one which forms the point of departure, which prompts investigation and further observation. Such a feature is necessary in order that this particular bit of experience may form organic connections with other experiences. And if we attempt the

³ F. J. E. Woodbridge, "The Nature of Consciousness," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. II., No. 5, pp. 119-25.

task of trimming away, mentally, from this experience all such features as would lead beyond themselves, we seem in the end to have nothing left but a mass of undifferentiated 'material' for which the epithet 'unconscious' seems entirely appropriate. And since the first stage can be made self-sufficient only by 'trimming,' it would appear that in the last stage also such sufficiency can be attained only at the cost of all inner differentiation. That is to say, pragmatism tacitly postulates an object of reference which lies beyond the experience of the individual.

To this conclusion it may perhaps be objected that the final stage or term is simply an abstraction or limiting term and not to be regarded as an experience anywhere realized or realizable. On the basis of this interpretation, however, it is difficult to see how solipsism is to be avoided. If we are to have a common world there must be numerically identical points which are common to the different systems of experience, and such identical points can be provided only by these final terms.

It appears, then, that the realistic conclusion follows from the premises laid down by the doctrine of pure experience. The distinction between the cognitive and the non-cognitive can not be evaded. And from the utter disparity between the two it seems necessary to conclude that 'consciousness and knowledge do actually disclose to us that which is in no way dependent on consciousness and knowledge for its existence or character. Knowledge is thus palpably realistic.'

Is a realistic view of knowledge, then, our final hope? The acceptableness of this conclusion must depend in part upon the account which is given of the nature of those objects which knowledge is said to reveal. It seems that consciousness is, in a sense, an accidental feature of reality, since objects are not particularly affected by the circumstance of being known. It is claimed that even in a world like this no limits can be set to knowledge, but it is not clear that any increase in knowledge would even approximate to the inner unity by virtue of which things are what they are. Knowledge reveals to us a set of qualities and relations, but the thing-hood of objects inevitably escapes us. Or shall we say that this demand is a return to scholastic essences and that whatever characteristics or attributes an object may possess are of the sort that are revealed to us in all knowing? This also involves implications which it is not easy to accept. What shall we say to such experiences as sweetness, contrast effects and harmoniousness? They undoubtedly have a basis in fact, but what sort of a fact is it? To say that it is the same sort of fact as that which we know when we experience them is to me rather unintelligible. And if it is conceded to be a different sort of fact, we seem forced to fall back on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which is simply the entering wedge of idealism.

Considerations of the sort here presented make it impossible for me to convince myself that the time has come to abandon the conception of selfhood as the ultimate category in metaphysics for that of pure experience or of objects existing independently of consciousness. Professor Woodbridge rightly warns the pragmatists against the tendency to do violence to the character of transcendence pertaining to the cognitive experience. That this character is put in jeopardy by their procedure I am forced to believe. But, in order to be just to this character, is it necessary, or even defensible, to postulate objects which are not dependent upon consciousness for their existence and their nature? Idealism, whatever its form, has difficulties in plenty; yet, to my mind, it indicates the direction in which the solution of our problems is to be sought, if it is to be found at all.

THE ISSUE BETWEEN IDEALISM AND IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM

Charles M. Bakewell. "The Issue between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism." *Journal of Philosophy* 2.25 (7 December 1905): 687–91.

There are, I am sure, many students of philosophy who are in sympathy with much that the 'newer' movement is accomplishing, and in particular with its insistence upon greater respect for experience, greater sobriety of philosophical construction, greater freedom of play for the individual, a fuller recognition of the thoroughgoing primacy of the practical, who are in sympathy with its humanism and anti-absolutism – not to speak of the life that it is injecting into the dry veins of epistemology – and yet who find themselves unable to follow its radicalism in a good portion of what it denies, or to accept its definition of what is left. Now it seems quite evident that we would come to a better mutual understanding if we should stop long enough over our fundamental conceptions and postulates and points of departure to clear away all initial ambiguities. It was with this end in view that I addressed my letter to Professor Dewey.¹ His reply² seems to me to preserve the ambiguities of his first statement,³ and to further confuse the issue.⁴ It is with the purpose of sharpening the issue between idealism and immediate empiricism that I continue the discussion.

The very term 'immediatism,' which Professor Dewey suggests to describe the 'newer' philosophy, promises to bring into relief the precise issue created by the radicals. And if we are to make any progress in our discussion, this issue should not be obscured by irrelevant cross-firing.

¹ 'An Open Letter to Professor Dewey concerning Immediate Empiricism,' this JOURNAL, Vol. II., No. 19.

² 'Immediate Empiricism,' *Ib.*, Vol. II., No. 22.

³ 'The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,' *Ib.*, Vol. II., No. 1.

⁴ As an illustration of the ambiguity referred to, take the following: "I do not understand the notion that because things of immediate experience are real, mediation can not be real" (p. 599). I do not either, and I wonder who does. But if one first identifies 'reality,' *things of immediate experience*, with the immediate experience, as the immediatist explicitly does (see Professor Dewey's original article), then it is hard to see how in that sense mediation can be real and still be mediation.

We can at least be clear at the outset as to what the issue is not. It is certainly not an issue between immediatism and the sort of a thing reached by Professor Dewey's entertaining parable of the botanist. Such comments only divert attention from the point in dispute by firing at a man of straw. At least, in my reading of philosophy, I am unable to find any idealist who can fairly be charged with anything like the attempt to spin a botany out of concepts, although it must be admitted, every one, philosopher and scientist alike, is more or less chargeable with the human frailty of giving his well-grounded conceptions a larger scope than their actual grounding warrants. And, once for all, the immediatist should recognize the fact that the idealist does not hold that 'there is a world of pure delight' where categories immortal reign, far aloof from the world of experience. They live in experience and give it its meaning. And one can not evade the idealist's criticisms by tossing the critic up into the cold circumambient ether. The antithesis is not between a philosophy grounded in experience and a philosophy manufactured in a den of abstractions. For the idealist also holds that his philosophy is grounded in experience; from experience it starts, to experience it ever returns. But the difference comes out in the interpretation of the nature of experience. Experience is a treacherously ambiguous word. For the idealist, experience is always a complex of the immediately perceived and the mediately conceived, and that no matter how far one goes down the scale for his starting-point; and therefore immediatism of itself can supply neither starting-point nor method.

The very conception of immediatism as furnishing starting-point and method seems therefore to draw sharply the lines of the issue. But unfortunately the old ambiguity about experience forthwith creeps into Professor Dewey's account of immediatism. That conception seems to mean two very distinct things. One meaning seems formally in accord with radical empiricism, but deprives of meaning the quest after truth; the other restores the meaning of that quest but only at the cost of abandoning the standpoint of radical empiricism.

The question is: How, strictly, are we to interpret the word 'immediate'? The illustration of the Zöllner lines seemed to leave no doubt as to the meaning intended. There, immediate experience is taken as the direct, unmediated, here-and-now experience. When, further, the real thing in question is postulated as one with the immediate experience so taken, and the thing is regarded as precisely what it is immediately experienced as, then in place of speaking of solving problems and correcting experience would it not be a more accurate description of the situation to say: In the process of evolution one immediate experience (reality) gives place to another immediate experience (reality)? Now it does not at all fit the case to declare, Johnsonian-wise, as Professor

Dewey does: But there are real problems, and we do go to experience to solve them. Of course! But is it not true that the problem in each case is a real problem only because the real thing in question is viewed as *not* just what it is by me immediately experienced as?⁵

But at this juncture, and to make the postulate tally with the facts, does not Professor Dewey substitute another, and quite different, interpretation of immediate? It now appears that the immediate experience which shall be equivalent to the reality (of the seed, for example) is what I at present immediately experience it as, plus all that I have or shall experience it as, all that I might experience it as were my powers sharper, all that my fellow men experience or might experience it as; *plus*, furthermore, all its thought relations, all its linkages to other things, past and present, all the principles of such linkages. Over all these is thrown the blanket of immediacy. For we are informed that besides immediately experiencing the immediate, one immediately experiences mediation, one immediately experiences categories, concepts, continuity; and these things also really *are* just what they are immediately experienced as. And that, further, the immediate experience which shall be one with the reality of the thing experienced, includes the possible as well as the actual immediate experiences of these several kinds, seems clearly implied in the illustration given, for in the case of the seed one certainly conceives of its continuity of development, and its mediation with other experience, as real beyond the actual immediate experiences of any, or all, observers. But to call the object as conceived in its inmost structure, and placed in its total setting, the object as immediately experienced, is a confusing use of terms.

This shifting of the meaning of immediate is given plausibility by the fact that thoughts also, like things, and immediate experiences, actual or imagined, are together warm in the unity of one's own experience. The *ich denke* – however interpreted – is continuously present in all one's speculations; concepts are not out in the cold. But when one identifies the reality of the thing with the immediate experience taken in this comprehensive and pregnant sense, is this not equivalent to saying that the real thing is the thing as it might be immediately experienced by a universal thinker or experiencer viewing all things *totum simul*, after the manner of the Roycean absolute? This is not what immediate means when we refer to our own experience as immediate, for then the here

⁵ Professor Dewey insists that from the postulate of immediatism not a single philosophical conclusion can be drawn, and accuses me of assuming from the very notion what the character of experience shall be. I have assumed nothing whatever about the character of experience, except that if immediatism is to give us a new method we must be able to find our starting-point in immediacy. Experience does not give us such a starting-point.

and the now, and the negative prefix, are of the essence of the conception. And, taking immediacy in this enlarged and general sense, as noting that aspect of direct ownership, of personal appropriation, which is always found in concepts and principles of mediation, so far as these are given any definite meaning, quite as much as it is present in percepts – this is a fact fully taken into consideration by idealism, as well as the fact that ‘conceptions enter into experience.’

What the idealist denies is that ‘any single actual experience, as existent or as known, is immediate, and simply immediate.’ Not that he denies immediacy, but that he affirms mediation to be equally fundamental. Nowhere in experience does he find sheer immediacy. Further, the principles of mediation can not be analyzed into immediate experiences without losing their unique meaning. He can not see any hope of success in the method of immediatism, since he can find no fact in experience of such a kind as facts must be if immediatism is ever to get a fair start. The facts of experience are one and all, and from first to last, tainted with mediation. One calls upon the experience philosopher to give us a method which recognizes this obvious fact. Otherwise, immediatism, as a method, seems as artificial, abstract, untrue to experience, as any barren conceptualism that can be imagined.⁶

The question, in short, is: Precisely what does immediate mean in the latest formulation of the new philosophy; how strictly is it taken? If taken strictly, how does immediatism escape the fate of Hume? If loosely taken, how does immediatism differ from idealism after all? What we need is the immediatist’s account of the ‘categories,’ the ‘a priori,’ the principles of mediation, by whatever name, in terms of immediacy strictly taken.

⁶ The immediatist is fond of tautology. ‘I don’t see any of experiencing the mediate,’ writes Professor Dewey, ‘excepting that of immediately experiencing it *as* what it is.’ Having previously declared experience to mean immediate experience, this is idle declaration. The question is whether the principles of mediation (causality, for example), as we actually think them, and as we employ them in getting any definite experience, as well as in further defining and interpreting experience, can be adequately described wholly in terms of immediacy.

THE KNOWLEDGE EXPERIENCE AGAIN

John Dewey. "The Knowledge Experience Again." *Journal of Philosophy* 2.26 (21 December 1905): 707–11. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 3 (1977), pp. 178–83.

I owe an apology to the editor and to the readers of the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* for returning a third time to the defense of my article on "Immediate Empiricism,"¹ but Dr. Bode's recent article² is so clear and compact that I can not refrain from again taking a hand.

Dr. Bode points out that since I recognize that an experience (which is not itself a knowledge experience) may be cognitive, *i.e.*, have bearings which lead out into a distinctively knowledge experience, I can not readily be charged with making such a gap between the (dominantly) non-knowledge experience and the knowledge experience as deprives the latter of all point when it comes. But he claims (1) that this later experience which identifies the thing of the first as being thus and so (a fearsome noise as a wind-curtain fact) is essentially a "pointing" experience, a "knowledge about," and hence does not give the full meaning or truth of the first, which can be found only (2) in an experience which is wholly of the "acquaintance with" type, having neither the "leadings" of the first nor the "pointings" of the second. And this he claims must be (3) an "unconscious experience," a term which can have no other meaning assigned to it than the implication or presupposition of an object out of experience, conscious experience being then confined (on this basis) to relations between final out-of-consciousness terms. This position is (4) acutely identified with Woodbridge's definition of consciousness as a continuum, with its realistic implications.

I agree wholly with the first two points (save that empirically the "complete acquaintance" thing need not necessarily be an entire experience, but may be an element in a more complex experience, and this, as a whole, may have cognitive leadings). But if this third point is

¹ Vol. II, No. 15, p. 393 [*Middle Works* 3: 158–67].

² Vol. II, No. 24, p. 658 [*Middle Works* 3: 398–404].

correct, empiricism, in presupposing things which can not be experienced, has hanged itself on the topmost bough of the tree whose seed and fruit it meant and pretended to be. I marvel that Dr. Bode, in seeing so clearly the first two implications, did not follow the empirical clue; and, instead of arguing conceptually that the terminal experience *must* refer to something unexperienced, did not look about for some experience which should meet the conditions of complete cognitive fulfillment in a thing which itself is neither a "leading on" nor a "pointing back." Take again the case of the fearsome noise which develops into a wind-curtain fact. What is its appropriate career? Surely not into an "unconscious experience," but into an experience which in so far forth is practical (or moral) and aesthetic. The complete acquaintance which is self-adequate is, one might say, a relationship of friendship or affection (or of contempt and disregard) and of assurance or control. The complete "acquaintance" determines the attitude of, say, management of the thing as a means to an end; or of, say, amused recollection – not remembrance as logical pointing; *i.e.*, you are what once fooled me (an S-P experience, or judgment), but remembrance as recreation, or revival, in their literal immediate senses.

I am enough of a Hegelian to believe that "perfect" knowledge is not knowledge (in its intellectual or logical connotation) at all, but such a thing as religionists and practical people have in mind; an attitude of possession and of satisfaction, – the peace that passes understanding. It means control of self, because control of the object on which the status of the self contemporaneously depends. Here, if anywhere, the pragmatic is justified, like wisdom, of its children; and if we have something more than the pragmatic, it is because this attitude of attained adjustment is so saturated with emotional, or morally and aesthetically conscious, content. If one will realize how largely discursive knowledge empirically fulfills itself in a coloring or toning – an immediate value element – in subsequent experiences,³ one will, I think, be fully guarded against supposing that "unconscious experience" is the sole alternative to intellectualized experience. "Unconscious" the experience is with respect to logical determinations; but immediate experience is saturated with values that are not logical determinations. The epistemological idealist can not deny this as a fact, because it is precisely this fact which makes him discredit immediate experience, and insist, therefore, upon its absorption into an "absolute" which is just and wholly logical.

³ There is much in Dr. Gordon's article on "Feeling" (*Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. II, Nos. 23 and 24) which I should gladly adopt as exegetical of my position.

Such a position also differentiates itself from the realism which Bode criticizes. If consciousness were just cognitional awareness, Woodbridge would seem to have said the last word in calling it a “continuum of objects” – of objects which are, as objects, out of consciousness. For as cognitional or intellectual, it is surely the business, so to say, of consciousness to be determined (that is, determinate) solely in and through objects. Otherwise common sense is crazy and science an organized insanity. But the “things” of which knowledge constitutes a continuum may be precisely immediate values which are not constituted by logical considerations, but by attitudes, adjustments, coordinations of personal activities. Knowledge, in the strict or logical sense, mediates these activities (which include, of course, passivities), establishing certain “leadings” and “pointings,” certain equivalences, and thereby certain intermediaries and transitional points of immediate valences or worths; and, when it has completely wrought out a certain equivalence, finds its own surcease in a new value, expressive of a new aesthetic-moral attitude. From this point of view, knowledge is not, but develops, a continuum; an emotional content being, as substrate, the continuum of which knowledge “pointings,” or discriminated-identities, are the discretes.⁴

Have we not the elements of a reconciliation of what is significant in realism and in idealism? We have something which is beyond consciousness as *cognitional* and which determines consciousness as cognitional – *literally* determines it in the sense that the practical-aesthetic attitude, in order to maintain itself, evokes the reflective attitude; and *logically* determines it, in that the content of knowledge must conform to conditions which the knowledge consciousness does not itself supply.⁵ But this “efficient” and “formal” cause presents a situation in which a conscious agent or person is indispensably present. It is not a non-empirical thing-in-itself (against which idealism has stood as a protest); and it is something in which a conscious being plays a part. Is epistemological idealism anything but a transfer into the knowledge situation of a relation which actually holds in the practical-aesthetic situation – a mistranslation which always calls out “realism” as a counterbalance; which tends, in the end, to destroy the peculiar individuality that is the essence of such situations (resolving individuality into terms of the universal, objective content which is alone appro-

⁴ See, again, Dr. Gordon’s articles, and also her thesis, *The Psychology of Meaning*, pp. 22–26.

⁵ See, *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 85, and, for a statement in psychological language, pp. 253–56.

priate to knowledge); and which hopelessly complicates the treatment of the knowledge situation itself by deliberately throwing away the key to its interpretation?

I wish to take this occasion to say a few words also about Professor Bakewell's interesting contribution to this discussion.⁶ My original contribution was intended, as Bakewell sees, to bring into sharper relief what seemed to be the fundamental point at issue, so that the artillery of the opponents of recent empiricism (for whose range and shot I profess the greatest respect) might fire there, rather than at bogey-men or side-issues. I must confess I did not succeed in so presenting it to Professor Bakewell. He says the idealist denies that "any single actual experience, as existent or as known, is immediate, and simply immediate" (p. 690). By turning to p. 394 of my original article, it will be seen that I there declare the nub of *immediate* empiricism to be precisely the thorough-going fallacy of the absolute identification, for metaphysics, of experience "*as known*" with experience "*as existent*." This is the point at issue; hence objections which rest upon the fact that all *knowledge* involves a mediate element, are just non-relevant. That the distinction between the immediate *content* and the mediate *content* (together with their reference to one another) is necessary in and to the knowledge experience *as such*, I not only fully accept, but have been at considerable pains to expound and to attempt to explain (In *Studies in Logical Theory*).

So when "the idealist" (p. 688 of Bakewell's article) says that "experience is always a complex of the immediately perceived and the mediately conceived" he is saying something which the empiricist accepts so far as the content of a *distinctively* knowledge, or logical, experience is concerned, while he (1) takes fundamental issue with the implication that experience is "always" distinctively logical, and also (2) points out that even the distinctively logical experience is still "always" *in toto* an immediate experience; or, more specifically that the distinction between "immediate perception" and its material ("data") and "mediate conception" and its methods ("thinking") is always within and for the sake of a value in experience which is "pragmatic" (personally, I should add aesthetic), not reducible to cognitional terms. Since it is only as *elements in the content* of an immediate experience that the distinction between the immediately perceived (the sensibly given) and the mediately conceived (the relationally thought) occurs, it is

⁶ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. II, No. 25, p. 687. The preceding paragraph's stand as written prior to the appearance of Professor Bakewell's article.

obvious that immediate empiricism does not identify the immediacy for which it stands with one of the *terms* of its own content at a special juncture.⁷

When Professor Bakewell says that "immediacy in this enlarged and general sense, as noting that aspect of direct ownership, of personal appropriation, which is always found in concepts and principles of mediation...is a fact fully taken into consideration by idealism," he is saying something which doubtless *his* idealism takes due account of, but which many of us believe epistemological idealism is wholly impotent to take account of. It gladly assumes the benefit of such facts, but only by introducing elements which are not, and can not be reduced to, cognitive terms and relations; which connote emotional and volitional values; and to which "humanism," "pragmatism," "radical empiricism," are desirous of assigning their metaphysical weight. If Professor Bakewell's idealism takes *such* facts into consideration, then, I believe, he is, for all intents and purposes, an immediate empiricist, though seemingly one not yet entirely free from epistemological bondage.

⁷ I repeat what I have said before: it is the essential vice of *sensationalistic* empiricism to make this identification between a *functionally determined instrument and test of knowledge* and experience as such.

OBJECTIVE IDEALISM AND REVISED EMPIRICISM

John E. Russell. "Objective Idealism and Revised Empiricism."
Philosophical Review 15.6 (November 1906): 627–33.

There appeared in this REVIEW for September a very able and suggestive article from Professor Dewey, on "Experience and Objective Idealism." I propose to discuss three points in this article: (1) Professor Dewey's criticism of objective idealism; (2) the revised empiricism which Professor Dewey puts in place of this idealism; (3) the significance of this revised empiricism for one's Weltanschauung, particularly for one's ethical and religious ideals and faiths.

To begin with Professor Dewey's criticism of objective idealism. It is in substance the following: Objective idealism is involved in contradictions in its explanation of experience. "Idealism is condemned to move back and forth between two inconsistent interpretations of this *a priori* thought. It is taken to mean both the organized, the regulated, the informed, established character of experience, an order immanent and constitutional; and that which organizes, regulates, forms, synthesizes, a power transcendent and noumenal." "The first sense, if validated, would leave us at most an empirical fact, whose importance would make it none the less empirical. The second sense, by itself; would be so thoroughly transcendental, that while it would exalt 'thought' in theory, it would deprive the categories of that constitutional position *within* experience, which is the exact point of Kant's supposed answer to Hume."¹

Objective idealism, therefore, gives no explanation of experience. It is unable to do so, because, in one of its meanings of *a priori* thought, that thought reduces to an empirical function; while the other meaning of the *a priori* makes thought incapable of coming into any intelligible relation to experience. In particular does Kant's doctrine fall into a fatal fallacy, because of the contradictory meanings of *a priori* in his epistemology. This *a priori* worth of thought is taken in the sense of regulation, direction, controlling, *i.e.*, of consciously and intentionally making

¹ Pp. 429 f.

experience different; and this *a priori* is again taken as something which is already immanent in any experience, and, accordingly, it makes no determinate difference to *this* experience as discriminated from that.² But not only is idealism self-contradictory in its meaning of *a priori* thought; it is contradicted by the character of our experience. Error, inefficiency, and the need of revision and correction characterize our experience; and the practical work of revising and correcting experience is not done by the idealist's *a priori* thought. "As a special favor, will not the objective idealist show how, in some one single instance, his immanent 'reason' makes any difference as respects the detection and elimination of error, or gives even the slightest assistance in discovering and validating the truly worthful."³ Were objective idealism true, the character of our experience as needing correction and revision would be inexplicable.

But objective idealism is untenable for another reason. It affords no explanation of ideality; nay, it is even incompatible with the true meaning and serviceableness of human ideals. "Spirituality, ideality, meaning as purpose, would be the last things to present themselves if objective idealism were true. Values cannot be both ideal and given."⁴ Ideality as the good, the beautiful, not only does not need the presence of some immanent reason; these are even incompatible with this transcendental origin.

I shall now examine this criticism of objective idealism; and first, the alleged contradictory meanings of *a priori* thought. I confess I cannot find any such contradictions as Professor Dewey lays to the charge of idealism. Between experience as simply possessing an immanent, constitutional order, and that *a priori* thought which is supposed to effect this constitution of experience, I can see no contradiction whatever. Idealism teaches that this constitution of experience, its order, the systematic connection of its parts, etc., is explicable only if there be some principle of connection and order which is other than merely empirical content, but which, working within experience, moulds and determines these structural features which experience presents. I am also quite unable to find that "fatal fallacy," from which Professor Dewey says "Kant never emerges." I do not think Kant ever got into such a fallacy. I do not think Kant's doctrine vibrates between two discrepant meanings or uses of *a priori* thought. It seems to me that his point of view when he is speaking of the revolution which the *Critique* has effected in philosophy, and his point of view when he is meeting Hume's sceptical solution of the

² P. 470.

³ P. 474.

⁴ P. 480.

problem of causal connection, are the same. Kant met Hume's doctrine of causation by showing that the experience from which Hume professed to derive the idea of causal connection, is itself possible, intelligible, only if the causal principle is presupposed.

Now this same meeting of the *a priori* underlies what Kant says about the revolution which he had effected in philosophy, or rather in epistemology. This profound change consisted, as the sufficient of the Critical Philosophy knows, in reversing what had been regarded to be the relation of mind and object in knowledge. So long as determination was on the side of the object, and dependence on the side of the mind, the solution of the problem of knowledge was impossible. But if mind determines by its own nature the condition under which there can be objects *for* mind, then the question, How is knowledge of matters of fact possible? can be answered. Kant, as every student of philosophy knows, formulated the problem of scientific knowledge in the question: How are objects of experience possible? And his answer to this question consisted in showing, that such objects can exist for us, only if there are *a priori* conditions of possible experience within which all objects exist. I do not think Kant ever departs from this meaning of the *a priori* nature of thought. Kant's *a priori* principles present two aspects, according as we look at them at work in the making of knowledge, in weaving the web of objective experience, and again as logically prior conditions of possible experience. It is the oversight of this distinction that leads Professor Dewey to say that Kant has two contradictory meanings of *a priori* thought. Thus, in the case of the triangle, Professor Dewey says: "The concept of a triangle taken geometrically...means a determinate method for construing space elements; but it also means something which exists in the mind *prior* to all such geometrical constructions and unconsciously lays down the law not only for their conscious elaboration, but also for any space perception."⁵ Professor Dewey finds the first meaning intelligible and accepts it, but finds in it only a "contribution to a revised empiricism." The second meaning is to him, however, a "dark saying." Now, Kant would say that this determinate method of construing space elements is an instance of the actual working of the *a priori* principles, the actual creation of an object of experience; while if, in abstraction from this actual functioning, we look at the *a priori* as a constituent factor in a possible knowledge, we shall say that this factor is prior (logically not temporally) to the existence of this triangle as an object of experience, or as purely geometrical object. It is this triangle constitution, not the psychological origin of knowledge, that Kant has in mind. To say with Kant that something is in the mind

⁵ Pp. 470 f.

prior to the existence of a known object, is not, it seems to me, to utter "a dark saying." My conclusion upon this point in Professor Dewey's criticism is, that he has not made out a contradiction in the meanings of *a priori* thought on the part of the objective idealist.

But the idealist's *a priori* thought, if it is not virtually identical with empirical thought, must, because transcendental, be incapable of coming into any intelligible relation to experience; it can consequently have nothing to do with our actual knowledge. This is Professor Dewey's charge against objective idealism. But this criticism misses the mark, it seems to me, by pressing upon idealism extreme alternatives. Thought need not be transcendental in the sense Professor Dewey takes it, in order to be *a priori* in relation to experience. Because thought is other than a merely empirical process or content, it does not follow that it cannot come into relation with experience- data so as to be one of the two factors in the constitution of knowledge or objective experience. Thought and experience data can be distinguishable – nay, be different in their *esse* – without being separable in actuality. Nor *need* thought be superhuman; indeed, Kant's *a priori* thought is human *only*. Kant's *a priori* principles and his categories are not transcendental things in the sense which Professor Dewey's criticism contemplates; they are supra empirical, but only in this meaning, that they are other than, and not derived from, sensation or sense-presentation experience. That there is a supra-empirical consciousness or functioning in this meaning of the term, is by no means an impossible supposition. Nor is there a serious difficulty in holding that these supra-empirical functions should so deal with the sensation or presentative data of experience, as to make experience objective in the Kantian meaning of experience, viz., the sum total of objects and their relations.

Professor Dewey's second objection to objective idealism is a more serious one; and it seems to put the idealist in a difficult position. If error abounds in our experience, and there is much in its constitution that demands correction and revision (this must be admitted), and if it is not *a priori* thought which, in a single instance, corrects error, or revises the inadequate, or remedies the inefficient; if, in short, the idealist's theory of *a priori* thought contradicts the actual character of our experience, his theory would seem to break down completely. The only reply which the idealist can make to this objection is the following: Were it the case that our *entire* experience stands in need of correction and revision, that fact would not disprove the existence of *a priori* thought. *A priori* thought is not bound to be infallible, nor to do work that needs no correction or revision. The fact that something is *a priori* is no guarantee of its inerrancy or its supreme worth. But it is *not* the

fact that our experience is through and through in need of correction and revision; that there are no features of it that need not be altered; on the contrary, there are, in the constitution of our experience, certain constructive and determining lines which need not, and will not suffer correction or change, unless experience is to become a chaos or *disjecta membra*. Our experience is to some extent unorganized: the necessary and the contingent, the unchanging and the ever changing, the static and the flux, error and truth, finite processes and infinite things as ideals, partial and fragmentary actuality, and the absolute, the completing whole, as an ideally conceived thing; the partly good, good in the making, the absolutely good, good as final achievement in our idealizing thought – such is the world of experience. Now it is the doctrine of idealism that *a priori* thought supplies those elements in the constitution of our experience that need not and suffer not correction or revision; and likewise this thought is the source of those ideas, those postulates, and those appreciations in virtue of which any complete and satisfying revision of our experience is possible.

But idealism is incompatible with ideality in our human world. This is Professor Dewey's third objection. "Values cannot be both ideal and given." And if idealism is true, these values *must* be given things; they are already achieved, they exist in a Platonic world, and consequently they are not our human creations, living and warm with the life and passion of human struggle and achievement. The ideal good, like the ideal true, can have meanings and relevancy, only if it be *our* ideal and *our* valuation. But may not *both* be true, viz., the absolutely good and beautiful and true, existing as a life, as Absolute Experience, and ideality in us as purpose, and depending upon our endeavors for the measure of actualization it attains in our finite experience? Why may not the ideal significance of our lives and our human valuations be our own, and at the same time be the temporal embodiment of the Eternal and All-Good, "in whom we live and move and have our being"?

Why should ideality and values cease to be ours, because we recognize in them a greater purpose than we can realize in our fragmentary and ever changing experience? Why should anything lose its value, because, in achieving and valuing it, His hidden meaning lies in our endeavors, and our value judgment is the response to an absolute worth? What we call "Divine purposes," if there are such things, need not be "automatically injected" into our human world in order to be with us; nor need they "ride in a cosmic automobile to predestined ends." Why cannot our own purposes ride in the same "cosmic automobile," and be inseparable from the purpose that include and complete them? Professor Dewey will find it a hard task to maintain against objective idealism his proposition:

"Spiritually, ideality, meaning as purpose, would be the last things to present themselves if objective idealism were true."

I come next to Professor Dewey's revised empiricism. I am not quite sure that I rightly understand this part of his article; but if I do understand his doctrine, it logically leads, either back to the older empiricism explanation of knowledge, or forward to an idealistic epistemology not materially different from that of Kant, according as one interprets the terms in which this new doctrine is set forth.

If that which Professor Dewey calls "reflective thought" is anything more than Hume's associative memory if its function consists in anything else than "harking back to former experience," I fail to see how it can be materially different from a *a priori* thought. If "empirical thought" means anything more than just experience processes, biological activities; if it is something which newly directs, changes, revises, and reshapes experience, — why does not this thought perform essentially the same function which the *a priori* thought of the idealist performs? To call thought a "biological activity," a "vital activity," etc., describes well enough the practical value and service of thought for life; but that does not tell its what thought *is* or how it is able to possess this value for the ends of life. I confess it is not easy for me to recognize the truth of Kant's geometric concept in the definition which makes it "the practical locomotor function of arranging stimuli in reference to the maintenance of life activities *brought into consciousness*, and then *serving* as a center of reorganization of such activities to freer, more varied flexible and valuable forms."⁶ Professor Dewey would hardly maintain that the mere existence of these stimuli, so arranged as to maintain life activities, is any explanation of the knowledge of this fact; nor is the problem of knowledge, in respect to this fact, solved by saying that a practical locomotor function of this description is somehow brought into consciousness, etc.; the essential problem is only propounded, not solved, by such a definition as the one just quoted.

Again, when a concept is defined as "the practical activity doing consciously and artfully what it has aforesaid done blindly and aimlessly"⁷ and thereby doing it better, etc. we are impelled to ask: What does this consciousness add to what was done aforesaid unconsciously and aimlessly? How does consciousness change or better the situation? Would not Hume's associative memory do all that Professor Dewey seems to make consciousness do? If *not*, what different function of thought as "a reorganization of biological functions" is said to do "naturally what Kantian forms and schematizations do supernaturally,"

⁶ P. 472.

⁷ Ibid.

we ask: What is the relation of thought to the biological functions, and how does it effect their reorganization? I think the answer to the epistemological question must be found either along the line of the older empiricism, or in the direction of that idealism which Professor Dewey reject. To conclude my discussion of this second point, I do not think Professor Dewey can hold a *via media* between Humian empiricism and Kantian idealism as solutions of the problem of knowledge.

I pass to the third point of this discussion: the significance of Professor Dewey's revised empiricism for one's *Weltanschauung*. It is Professor Dewey's doctrine that all ideals and values are created and sustained by our human activities; and, consequently, that they have significance and relevancy only in our experience.

Now, it seems to me that the consequence which follows from this meaning of ideality and value judgments is, that the world of our human experience is the only universe we can legitimately acknowledge; certainly the only reality to which we can sustain intelligible relations. The Infinite, the Eternal, the Absolute, the All-good – *these* are names empty of all real meaning, idle fancies for minds that will dream or idly speculate instead of seeking to know and to make better the only real world there is, the world of experience. This world permits no reference to a superhuman reality. We are thus left with reality that is fragmentary only, with experience that is made up of flying, ever changing moments, with thought that never wins final truth, with temporal processes, and no eternal to justify and give them meaning; with finite progress and no goal finally won; with a better and no best as the ultimate standard of value judgments. For the satisfaction of ethical and religious ideals and aspirations, we must look to our possibly better selves. Our idealized selves are our gods; and the cry after the Divine, the Eternal, the Complete in knowledge and in goodness, must be satisfied with that fragment of truth and goodness which is all that our finite lives can possess in their best estate. Such, I am compelled to conclude, is the metaphysical import of this new empiricism.

REVIEW OF *THE INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY*

James E. Creighton. "Review of John Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays*." *Philosophical Review* 20.2 (March 1911): 219–21.

In this volume Professor Dewey has brought together a number of essays and addresses belonging to recent years. All of the papers except one, "A Short Catechism Concerning Truth," have been previously published, although in some of them certain changes have been made. The hitherto unpublished paper, which has the form of a dialogue between a teacher and pupil, is a defense of pragmatism against certain popular criticisms and misunderstandings. The other essays have the following titles: "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy"; "Nature and Good: A Conversation"; "Intelligence and Morals"; "The Experimental Theory of Morals"; "The Intellectualist Criterion for Truth"; "Beliefs and Existences"; "Experience and Objective Idealism"; "The Postulates of Immediate Empiricism"; "Consciousness and Experience"; "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge."

The fundamental idea underlying all of these essays is the necessity of a new formulation of philosophical problems and a radical transformation of philosophical ideas in the light of the new methods and problems that are now dominant in the other fields of human inquiry. "Classic philosophies have to be revised because they must be squared up with the many social and intellectual tendencies that have revealed themselves since those philosophies matured. The conquest of the sciences by the experimental method of inquiry; the injection of evolutionary ideas into the study of life and society; the application of the historical method to religions and morals as well as to institutions; the creation of the sciences of 'origins' and of the cultural development of mankind – how can such intellectual changes occur and leave philosophy what it was and where it was? Nor can philosophy remain an indifferent spectator of the rise of what may be termed the new individualism in art and letters, with its naturalistic method applied in a religious, almost mystic spirit to what is primitive, obscure, varied,

inchoate and growing in nature and human character" (p. v.). The full realization of the changed intellectual conditions. Professor Dewey believes, will lead to the abandonment on the part of philosophy of the old metaphysical and epistemological problems, – the inquiries regarding the nature of the universe as a whole or of the universal conditions of experience, – and to the acceptance of the less pretentious, but more responsible, task of discovering the meaning of concrete situations as they arise in social and political life, and the practical methods of transforming them. "Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins and absolute finalities in order to explore specific values and the specific conditions that generate them" (p. 13). "But if insight into special conditions of value and into specific consequences of ideas is possible, philosophy must in time become a method of location and interpreting the more serious of the conflicts that occur in life, and a method of projecting ways for dealing with them: a method of moral and political diagnosis and prognosis" (p. 17).

It is the final dismissal of all the general problems about the world and man's relation to it in order that philosophy may afford guidance and direction in the practical affairs of life, that is the most striking feature of Professor Dewey's program. Several of the papers, indeed, set forth in detail and with much vigor and persuasiveness the pragmatic view of truth; but pragmatism itself seems to be subordinate and in a sense incidental to the tremendous reconstruction that is taking place or has taken place. At any rate, the pragmatic theory of knowledge has already received so much attention that it seems unnecessary to attempt to summarize Professor Dewey's arguments, or to bring up once more the difficulties which so many have found in that theory. Instead of doing so, I should like to raise the question whether the injunction against metaphysics and epistemology is really binding. Have the new methods of inquiry and changed intellectual conditions really rendered it superfluous to search for some consistent conception of reality as a whole?

There can be no question that the progress and vitality of philosophy depend upon its ability to substitute genuine problems for those that have become merely abstract and formal. Nor can anyone doubt that at the present day important reconstructions of traditional philosophical conceptions are taking place and that the movement must go on. The question at issue is only whether it is necessary to abandon as unmeaning the ultimate problems that have always occupied philosophy since its first beginnings, or whether it can be shown that the old formulas are capable of transformation without any such radical breach of continuity. Genuine problems, of course, grow out of life and are not manufactured in the schools. But human life is reflective as well as practical – in fact, if it were merely practical it could have no problems

at all. Professor Dewey holds that all genuine problems refer problems to particular situations in experience because only the analysis of such situations can have any bearing on practice. But in what sense are we to understand the over-worked term 'practice'? Some pragmatists, at least, include under it logical activity, so that the 'practical consequences' necessary to make a problem 'genuine' might well be logical in character. But leaving out of account this ambiguity in the use of the word 'practical' (which really seems to be essential to pragmatism as a distinct theory), is it anything more than dogmatism to assert that theories about the world and the general nature of experience are futile and unmeaning? "Were it a thousand times dialectically demonstrated that life as a whole is regulated by a transcendent principle to a final inclusive goal none the less and error, health and disease, good and evil, hope and fear in the concrete, would remain just what and where they are now" (p. 17). I am not certain what Professor Dewey means by a "transcendent" principle; but I cannot admit that metaphysical theories do not affect our concrete experiences. I should say that if such a demonstration were made, truth and error and all the rest would not remain what they are now, or rather that they would be what they are to one who held to a different theory of the course of events.

It would not be difficult to show that a metaphysics is implied in Professor Dewey's own doctrines, and that his failure to develop this side of his theory has been one of the chief sources of the misunderstandings of which he complains. Some theory of the conditions and general nature of experience and of the origin and function of consciousness is involved, for example, in his claim that his own view is 'naturalistic' as opposed to all forms of transcendentalism. In all references to the relation of the individual to the objective situation and to other individuals in society, a theory a knowledge and of reality is necessary in order to render the account completely intelligible: the specific problem is part of a larger problem which is always more or less explicitly involved in its formulations. We all are trying in our own way to be naturalistic in our thinking, – to get rid of ultimate dualisms and transcendent principles and to find explanations within experience itself. This, however, does not mean the abandonment of the old problems, but their restatement. The progress of philosophy requires that the meaning of specific problems be revised and modified in the light of general theories of experience, just as the latter are transformed and reconstructed through the analysis of particular situations.

It would not be right to close this review, in which I have emphasized points of difference, without speaking of the stimulating quality of these essays, which is perhaps the best evidence that they are, what their author intended them to be, a 'contribution to the revision of our stock

notions.' Especially interesting are the historical summaries and interpretations which many of the papers contain. Even when one cannot admit that the generalizations do full justice to the historical facts, one never fails to find the treatment suggestive and instructive.

REVIEW OF GEORGE SANTAYANA, *THE LIFE AND REASON OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS*

Addison W. Moore. "Review of George Santayana, *The Life of Reason*." *Journal of Philosophy* 3.8 (12 April 1906): 211–21.

In the addresses delivered last year at the many memorial celebrations of the late Herbert Spencer's life and work, there was one very common theme: it was the anachronism of such an encyclopedic program as Spencer attempted – an anachronism which even the Hegelians of Spencer's day discovered in the similar ambition of their master, and one, it was said, which Spencer would have avoided had he possessed a larger historical knowledge and appreciation. And it was freely predicted that Spencer's attempt would be the last of the kind to be seen for many generations.

In the face of the extended currency of such comment among philosophers, to say nothing of the cynical attitude of scientists, it must be as significant as it is interesting that one who can not be suspected of any lack of large historical orientation – one, indeed, whose method is historical – deliberately, 'with malice aforethought,' sends through the press within a year a volume of what may be called first principles, a philosophy of society, a philosophy of religion, a philosophy of art and a philosophy of science.

To be sure, we are in the midst of a great revival of metaphysical interest. But the products of this revival thus far, as presented in the works of Mr. Bradley, Professor Royce, Professor Fullerton and Professor Taylor, have been in the main of the systematic formal type inevitable in abstract metaphysics. Professor Santayana's work, however, is of a different character. He is interested in tracing the effect of the method upon the content. He is concerned in showing the connection between the general conceptions of reality, truth and goodness and their conditions and effects in society, religion, art and science. In his own sentences, "The problem is to unite a trustworthy conception of the conditions under which man lives with an adequate conception of his interest"; again, "Starting with the immediate flux in

which all objects and impulses are given, to describe the life of reason; that is, to note what facts and purposes seem to be primary, to show how the conception of nature and life gathers around them, and to point to the ideals of thought and action which are approached by the gradual mastering of experience by reason" (I., p. 32).

And Professor Santayana is fully aware of the proportions of his task. He hastens to nip in the bud any suspicion of quixotism by saying that such a program 'would be beyond the powers of a writer in this age, either to execute or conceive, had not the Greeks drawn for us the outlines of an ideal culture at a time when life was simpler than at present and individual intelligence more resolute and free.'

In general, of course, Professor Santayana's courageous attempt, as all others, must be justified by its fruits. But I can imagine it quite possible for him to say that such an attempt is not only justified but necessitated in advance by his very conception of the place of reason in experience. An inkling of this appears in the subtitle itself, the whole caption being 'The Life of Reason, or the Phases of Human Progress.' The implication is that the character and function of thought is to be discovered not by isolating it and attempting an analysis of it as 'pure' reason, but by observing reason at work in the world, catching it in the act, taking it in its context in the whole concrete stream of experience. The attempt to discover the nature of reason apart from its products leads to a monstrous misconception of it and the proposal to substitute this changeling for normal reason, for reason as it is in operation, is called 'visionary insolence.' "Retrospective self-consciousness is dearly bought if it inhibits the intellect and embarrasses the inferences which in its spontaneous operation it has known perfectly how to make" (I., p. 29). If, then, the nature of reason is to be discovered only by observing it at work in science, in religion, in art and in social organization, is it, after all, presumptuous to propose to describe the processes, the phenomena and the results in which the nature of reason, even for one proposing to give the most abstract account of it, must be revealed?

What, then, is the life of reason, or, conversely, what is the rôle of reason in life? The reviewer has to confess that in the end the answer does not appear so univocal as the introduction promises. The problem centers in the relation of reflection to impulse. In other words, in the sort of 'efficacy' ideals have. In the introduction ideals, ends, constructed in reflection, are apparently regarded as actually organizing the material of habit and instinct. Here reason is defined as 'efficacious reflection.' And the 'efficacy' here consists not merely in an 'added content' which it brings, but in the added *function* of control. Hence we read, "To the ideal function of envisaging the absent, memory and reflection will add...the practical function of modifying the future. Vital

impulse, however, when it is *modified* by reflection and *veers* in sympathy with judgments pronounced on the past, is properly called reason" (I., p. 2). "The life of reason will, then, be a name for that part of experience which perceives and pursues ideals, all conduct so *controlled*, and all sense so interpreted as to perfect natural happiness" (p. 3). Again, "In the life of reason, as it were brought to perfection, intelligence would be the universal *method of practise* and its continual reward. All reflection would then be *applicable in action* and all actions fruitful in happiness" (p. 5, italics mine). Here we are very properly warned that this controlling, instrumental character of thought does not make it a mere means. It does not prevent its having an immediate value of its own. But though reason may in this sense be 'its own excuse for being,' yet in order to *be*, it must *do*; and its 'doing' is just the work of converting isolated impulses and instincts into a mutually stimulating and checking, *i.e.*, controlled, system.

But when we reach the chapter on 'How Thought is Practical,' one is puzzled to find thought losing this character of control and becoming a mere 'expression,' 'effect,' 'register,' 'celebration' of 'mechanical,' 'material' activity, into which now all dynamic efficacy is transferred. We now read, "Thought is nature's concomitant expression or entelechy, never one of her instruments" (I., p. 228). "Consciousness itself is not dynamic... It is merely an abstract name for the actuality of its random objects. All force, implication or direction inhere in the constitution of specific objects" (I., p. 220). "Preferences are in themselves, if the dynamic order alone be considered, works of supererogation, expressing force but not producing it, like a statue of Hercules" (p. 221). Yet near the close of this puzzling chapter we read that the function of thought is 'to lend utility to its causes' (p. 288), which here are material. "It is potential energy *producing* life and becoming an actual appearance." Again, in Chapter XI., on 'Conditions of the Ideal,' "Reason and the ideal are not active forces, nor embodiment of passion at all" (p. 265). Yet on the same page, "This suggested peace (for the conflict of impulses) . . . is the ideal which *borrowes its practical force* from the irrational impulses which it embodies" (italics mine).

It may be said that the mere appearance of a 'sense of value' in a process 'bestows utility,' simply by giving the process a limit, a *terminus ad quem*. But even so this involves some sort of reaction of this 'sense of value' upon the mechanism, otherwise why should the process not simply go on grinding out 'senses of value,' without using them as limits? It is Aristotle's problem of the unmoved mover.

This discrepancy, as it appears to the reviewer, can be charged to an oversight of the distinction between consciousness in general and reflective, cognitive consciousness. 'Consciousness,' 'thought,' 'mind,'

'reason,' are freely interchanged throughout the chapter. Recognizing that the 'sense of value' belongs to consciousness-mind, it is apparently inferred that this is *all* that belongs to it and that all dynamic efficacy must therefore be referred to material nature, of which thought is the mere 'symbol,' and which even 'can hardly lie in the same plane of reality with the thought to which it appears' (p. 219). Value is obviously a category of conscious activity, and as immediate 'content' is perhaps not dynamic. But is it not just the business of reflection to convert this 'sense of value' into an ideal, an end? And as an ideal it surely must be regarded as dynamic in the sense of being an essential factor in a system conceived as 'dynamic.'

In its more general form this question which divides the first and the last four chapters of Volume I. is, How can the ideal be both an 'expression' and a reconstruction of instinct and habit? How can it arise out of and yet be the standard for impulse? In logic it would be the old problem of universals. Now one of Professor Santayana's theses, – indeed, one might say, the fundamental one, – is that the ideal, whether in government, religion, ethics or art, must grow out of, must be an 'expression' of, impulse. The clearness and force of his exposition of the vanity of an absolute ideal given to the impulses from without could not be surpassed. "Demands could not be misdirected, goods could not be false, if the standard by which they are to be corrected were not constructed out of them" (p. 258). Again, "Whence fetch this seminal force and creative ideal? It must evidently lie already in the matter it is to organize. Otherwise it would have no affinity to that matter, no power over it, and no ideality or value in respect to the existences whose standard and goal it is to be" (III., p. 88). The ideal, then, must be an expression of the matter, in order that it may have enough 'affinity' with it to organize it; this despite what is said above about thought not lying in the same plane with its material.

Corresponding to these two conceptions of the ideal, the one as an 'expression,' the other as control, there are two conceptions of the 'matter' to be organized. Where the controlling, organizing character of the ideal is emphasized, as in the introduction and in Volume III., impulse, instinct, immediate flux, etc., constitute the 'matter.' But where the ideal is expounded as an 'expression' of impulse, the matter appears as 'physical,' as 'body,' in opposition to consciousness and as the latter's 'cause,' – and this, too, apparently in quite an ontological Cartesian sense. Indeed, the whole treatment of the distinction of mind and body is to the reviewer as equivocal as that of reflection. Sometimes the distinction appears to be a rational construction within a process of experience which can not be described as either or merely both (*e.g.*, I., pp.39, 234). But again, and perhaps oftener, appears as an existential

prius, as 'the antecedent of human life' (II., p. 200) to which somehow 'mind accrues.'

The present writer is well aware of the enormous capacity of reviewers' quotations for misrepresentation. He is also aware that there are many passages which could be cited to show that what has been described as different and discrepant conceptions of reason and its place in experience, are simply two supplementary phases of one conception, namely, that reason is *both* an 'expression' and a control, and must be the one in order to be the other. However, the reviewer can only record his impression of ambiguity in the account as it stands.

To many such captious, logic-chopping criticism as this may appear *mal apropos* in a review of a work whose style makes the reader feel much of the time as if he were following a brilliant impressionistic commentary on 'phases of human progress,' rather than a systematic treatise. But Volume I. is obviously intended as an exposition of general principles, and must therefore, be held to the canons of systematic criticism.

Passing to the treatment of reason in society, religion and art, we find that the indigenous relation of the ideal to impulse so forcibly, if not altogether consistently, expounded in the first volume, is the nerve of the doctrine of these volumes. The history of these aspects of human progress is the story of the reciprocal creation and maintenance of impulse and reflection which constitute the process of human life. Accounts of its defeats are invariably descriptions of the failure to maintain an organic relation of these factors, of attempts to appropriate a ready-made ideal in either an absolute or an anachronous historical form.

Thus the ideal side of love does not merely 'add' a larger and more permanent value to the instinctive side, but it constitutes the salvation of the instincts. It is the method whereby any instinctive expression of love can be 'converted' in order to be saved under the new conditions which its own previous activity has created. Instinctive love, therefore, must be reformed in order to survive. This does not mean that it becomes less instinctive. It means only that the instinct shall emerge enriched in quality and extent of its content. When the need of conversion, of idealization is unrecognized, or unheeded, or when the conversion is attempted through extrinsic ideals of another race or clime, or when it becomes virtual annihilation, then all sorts of 'perversions' occur.

Obviously one of the results of immediate, instinctive love, which calls for expansive reconstruction, is the presence of offspring. The family is the ideal construction through which the reproductive impulse is expanded into interest in the protection and development of life. But just because it is thus necessarily one of the earliest organizations of impulse, 'it becomes a point of departure for many other institutions.' And 'it

often assumes offices which might have been allotted to some other agency had not the family preempted them.' The annexing of these adventitious, parasitic functions' to the family so overloaded it that it did none of them well. With more stable occupation of land, the reverse process of unloading these functions on new institutions begins.

Here we face again the perennial problem of balance. On the one hand, the refusal to surrender old prerogatives in the face of a new world, or the attempt to conduct the new family by the rules of the old, leads inevitably to dualism and disintegration. This is a problem for experience to solve. It can not be solved in a Utopia. The statesman in his sphere and the individual in his must find as they go the best practical solution. On the other hand, this unloading upon other institutions, as the school, church, the factory, etc., may go on until the family may be emptied of almost everything but the reproductive function, – bringing up again the problem of maintaining the control and value of the latter. This, perhaps, may be effected by the reaction of these emigrated functions 'in stimulating a larger social, philosophical, scientific and artistic interest.'

In view of what precedes, one is somewhat surprised at the beginning of the discussion of government to find it identified with 'what in physics is inertia, in psychology habit.' "In society it (habit) takes the form of custom, which, when codified in law and when enforced, is government. Government is the political representation of a natural equilibrium of custom, inertia; it is by no means a representative of reason" (II., p. 10). But, the reader may ask, if custom were really effective as a custom, why codify it? And what need to enforce it if it is already enforced as a habit? Codification surely is a process of reconstruction, therefore of idealization. And this is really implied in statements which immediately follow. "But like any mechanical complication it (government) may become rational... . Government can by its existence define the commonwealth it tends to preserve." But if it is government through codification, the 'can' should be 'must.'

This is also implied in an interesting and suggestive discussion of the various forms of government which follows. The problem is presented as just that of the best method of constructing and presenting a social ideal. The answer, as Aristotle saw, depends upon the specific conditions. "All just government pursues the general good. The choice between aristocratic and democratic forms touches only the means to that end. One arrangement may well be better fitted to one place and time than another" (II., p. 121). Where there is stratified stagnation, some form of aristocracy, theocracy, monarchy or oligarchy may be the best means to get reconstructive idealization started. However, history seems to warrant the claim of democracy that these forms of aristocracy

'have been unable to remain representative.' But the inferences which democratic theory often draws, that 'eminence is therefore not representative, and that representative character is bestowed by the mechanical expedient of universal suffrage,' do not follow.

Many stimulating things are said in the discussion of the distinction between 'political' and 'social' democracy. Political democracy is 'a symbolic extension of aristocratic privileges in the form of universal suffrage.' "It is quite compatible with complex government, great empire, and may retain, as in England, many vestiges of aristocratic institutions" (II., p. 115). Social democracy, on the other hand, 'is a general ethical ideal looking to human equality and brotherhood.' "It is the democracy of Arcadia, Switzerland and the American pioneers." Instead of measuring our prosperity by the quantity of wealth produced, as our present system of economy does, it decries this enormous production, demands less labor, a simpler and more rural life. "It would abandon the great cities to ruin, as seats of Babylonian servitude and folly, leaving the railway bridges to collapse, the tunnels to choke and the hulks of steamers to rust in the harbors." In the present high tide of commercialism such anticipations may seem fantastic. "But does any thoughtful man suppose that this commercial tendency will be eternal or that the present experiment in civilization is the last the world will see?" (II., p. 127). If social democracy would take a more liberal form and permit the benefits of civilization to be integrated in eminent men, whose influence should direct and temper the general life, it would become a timocracy and would, in the author's opinion, 'unite the advantages of all forms of government and avoid their respective abuses' (II., pp. 128, 129).

Despite the fact that some readers are sure to renew the complaint of dualism in the character of the relation between the ideal and its material, they may possibly find the author's brilliant power of analogical analysis at its best in the volume on religion. "Another world to live in, whether we expect ever to pass wholly into it, is what we mean by having a religion" (III., p. 6). What, now, is the relation of religion to the life of reason? Let us recall that the essence of reason is the construction of an ideal. And what is the 'other world' of religion but this ideal? "Religion thus exercises a function of reason" (p. 7). What, then, are the differentiae? First, religion carries over into the ideal a part of the material of experience, while in scientific reason the ideal is conscious of its formal and hypothetical character. Further, in its attempts to carry up the material, the masses of sentiment and ideas, into the ideal, it must construct its ideal through the intuitive instead of the conceptual image. Here lies both the real strength and the historical weakness of religion. The statement of the ideal in terms of the material,

i.e., in terms of instinctive and perceptual imagery, gives a richness and fullness to religious idealization impossible in science where idealization is more abstract. Indeed, 'religion has the same original relation to life that poetry has.' The only difference between poetry and religion, purged of its errors, is that 'religion deals with higher and more practical themes, with sides of life which are in greater need of some imaginative touch than are those pleasant and pompous things which ordinary poetry dwells upon.' Historically, however, 'the religious pursuit of the life of reason has been singularly abortive? This because it has constantly confused the perceptive instinctive material which it utilizes to embody the ideal with the unidealized, that is, the actual existent material, and has accordingly often tried to usurp the work of science (II., pp. 8-13.)

Here the reader wishes the volume on science were at hand. From what is here said of science, one suspects that in science, at any rate, the ideal constructions of reason are likely to be something more than mere 'additions' of value and 'celebrations' of work done by reflexes. Doubtless they are all this, but one gathers that in science, as in the passages above cited in Volume I., the ideal controls as well as 'celebrates'; that the distinction between 'efficient' and 'final' cause is likely to break down.¹

The fact that ideal construction in religion, as elsewhere, must, on the one hand, be loyal to the impulses out of which and for the sake of which it arises, and yet can only be loyal by 'remodeling' them, determines the two fundamental phases of religious experience - 'piety' and 'spirituality.' Piety is 'man's reverent attachment to the sources of his being and the steadying of his life by that attachment' (III., p. 119). "It drinks at the deep elemental sources of power and order. It studies nature, honors the past, appropriates and continues its mission." Spirituality is the creative or rather recreative function of the ideal. Piety is retrospective. Spirituality has its face toward the future, while piety dwells in the realms of established order. Spirituality pitches its tent out on the frontier, not in order to gain a worldly advantage over piety, - for 'competitive worldliness is the most deadly foe of spirituality,' - but it abides there by virtue of the demands of its free recreative work. By that same token is its habitation also on the borders of mysticism. Mysticism arises out of the element of failure in the work of recreation. It serves to tide over a period of intellectual arrest until there is recuperation sufficient for the work of reconstruction to again become articulate.

Maintenance of spirituality therefore depends upon a proper balance

¹ The volume on science has appeared since the review went to press.

between impulses and ideal. Hence a too rapid differentiation, multiplication of impulses, or a too great sophistication destroys spirituality. However, some readers may experience difficulty in following Professor Santayana to the conclusion that brute life 'may be as truly spiritual as human,' and that 'the only pure mystics are the brutes.' For, while mysticism is a renunciation of discursive reflection, the latter must after all first be there to be renounced. The neo-platonist reaches the summit of his mount of transfiguration by the tortuous path of discursive intellection. As a preparation for the ecstatic vision he must first experience the impotence and vanity of reflection.

As for individual immortality, Professor Santayana regards most of the empirical evidence as 'beneath consideration.' "The palpitating mood in which it is gathered and received make gullibility and fiction play a very large part in the report; for it is not to be assumed that a man, because he speaks in the first person and addresses a learned society, has lost the primordial faculty of lying" (III., p. 280). Even at their face value these reports show only more subtle and subhuman sensibilities than ordinarily appear. They would show only that the process of dying is more complicated than is supposed, rather than point to the existence of disembodied spirits. "A disembodied life would not betray itself in specters, rumblings and spasms" (p. 284). That operations more subtle than ordinary should occur is entirely consonant with reason and experience. But "only a hankering tenderness for superstition, a failure to appreciate the function both of religion and science, can lead to reverence for such oracular gibberish as these influences provoke" (p. 288).

The moral and metaphysical grounds of individual immortality are but little less convincing to Professor Santayana than the empirical evidence. What reason is there to suppose that more justice or that better fulfillment of ideals can take place in another life than here? If there is any continuity in content and method with this life – and without such continuity nothing remains of individual existence – life elsewhere must involve the same reference of ideals to specific conditions and the same possibility of their lapsing and yielding to others more capable of execution (p. 248). Individual immortality is an hypostasis of 'the vision of eternity in time.' When a fact is idealized through reflection it acquires 'a status in eternity.' But 'having a status in eternity does not mean being a part of an eternal existence petrified and congealed into something real, but motionless.' It means only that 'every fact in being recognized takes its place in that ideal sphere of truth which is the common and unchanging standard for all assertions' (p. 267).

In view of what is said (p. 248) concerning the basis of the ideal in 'a dynamic world,' and more especially concerning its relevance to 'specific

tendencies' and the consequent necessity of its 'lapsing and yielding to others,' some will question this conception of an ideal sphere of truth which is 'the unchanging standard for all assertions,' and wonder whether, despite the illumination which Professor Santayana turns on in his exposition of the indigenous ideal, the ghost of absolutism does not still walk in places.

Following the general plan of the entire work, between the initial chapters of definitions and principles and the closing chapters of general conclusions and applications to current problems, are a number of chapters devoted more conspicuously to historical and genetic interpretation, in which the author's unusual ability in suggestive epigrammatic generalization has large play. Many will find these the most attractive part of the volume. The reviewer would note especially the chapters on 'The Christian Epic' and 'The Christian Compromise.'

It was to be expected that Professor Santayana's volume on art would be authoritative; and in the main this expectation is not disappointed. Especially is this true of the chapters presenting the specific contents of art – 'music,' 'poetry and prose,' etc.; and of the chapters on 'The Justification of Art' and 'The Criterion of Taste.'

In its largest sense, art is simple, practical reason or reasoned practise. "It is plastic instinct, conscious of its aim" (IV., p. 4). But here again we encounter the issue between the epiphenomenal and the instrumental character of consciousness; and again the outcome seems ambiguous. On the one hand, this consciousness of aim 'simply accompanies' instinct (p. 5). It is not an instrument of control. It is a mere 'expression.' "Only by virtue of a false perspective do ideas seem to govern action" (p. 6). "All invention is automatic, ideas come of themselves, dropping in their sudden form from the blue" (p. 7). "All useful things have been discovered as the Lilliputians discovered roast pig" (p. 10). On the other hand, 'art is reason propagating itself' (p. 18) and 'reason with the order in every region it imposes on life is grounded on an animal nature and has no other function than to *serve* the same' (p. 191, italics mine). Also we read of objects of art as 'things which would not only have *betrayed* the agent's habits, but would have *served* and expressed his intent' (p. 4). This seems to make overt action the expression of the intent instead of the converse.

In view of the remarks already made on this issue in the discussion of Volume I., we must leave it here with these observations: (1) Of course, from the standpoint of experience regarded as a whole, all activity within it, whether viewed as conscious or unconscious, must be 'automatic,' in the sense of being self-active. From this standpoint the operation of ideas is as 'automatic' as that of the heart or lungs. But (2) this does not prevent ideas being 'instrumental' from exercising real

control, any more than the automatic action of the heart and lungs destroys their interaction. One stage of activity may condition another without either becoming thereby less 'spontaneous' in its immediate activity. (3) On Professor Santayana's own most excellent showing, ideas can not quite 'drop from the blue.' They must 'express,' 'grow out of,' be 'relevant to' some instinct or set of instincts. While, in the stock instance, the forgotten name 'just comes' when it does come, yet it would not come even 'in its sudden form' were it not for the want and for the agonizing effort which precedes, fruitless as the latter may appear at the time.

But, after all, this binomial conception of the general relation of art to reason does not seriously affect the rest of the treatment. For in such a case it is always possible when danger threatens from one side to pass instinctively to the other.

Resuming then the account of art in general as activity mediated by an aim, it is evident that contrary to much current opinion, art is not to be defined by mere correlative contrasts with industrial utility, science or morality. Nor is it to be identified with immediate esthetic valuation, which is only a prominent element in 'fine art' as distinguished from 'industrial art.' It is not a specific sort of experience, coordinate with other sorts. It is rather the concrete whole of consciously mediated life of which industry, fine art science and morality are differentiations.

The general basis of art, then, lies in the fact that in the end an unmediated or a completely mediated activity is an impossible conception. "Activity, achievement, a passage from prospect to realization, is evidently essential to life. If all ends were already reached and no art were requisite, life could not exist at all, much less a life of reason" (p. 28).

In art in this large sense, as the art of living, there are obviously two fundamental factors: the 'material' in the form of the structural products of past activity, which are demanding opportunity for further function; and the 'ideal' which supplies this opportunity. But once more we must beware of an ideal imposed from without. "The ideal is a concomitant emanation from the natural, and has no other possible status" (p. 28).

The organic relation between these two constituent functions of activity furnishes also the basis for the distinction between 'servile' and 'liberal,' or 'fine' art. If the demand of some particular part or organ of the total structure for expression, or for maintenance, is so immediately urgent that a comprehensive organization, *i.e.*, idealization of the response, is impossible, the result is a 'servile' art in the form of the barren automatisms of savage dance and song, or a utilitarian struggle for mere existence. Liberal, or fine art, is the result of a balanced interaction between the activity of that part of the structure calling for expression

and maintenance and the idealizing activities of the response. This means that the demands for expression and maintenance are themselves more ideal, less immediate in their insistence; and, on the other hand, that the ideals are more effective because they embody more material.

From this standpoint it is evident that no impassable distinction can be drawn between 'industrial' and 'fine' art. For, "Every proximate end in being attained, satisfies the mind and manifests the intent which pursued it, while every operation upon a material, even one so volatile as sound, finds that material somewhat refractory. . . . A certain amount of technical and instrumental labor is thus involved in every work of genius, and a certain genius in every technical success" (p. 33). In so far as the distinction is to be made, it is simply one of stages in one continuous process. The industrial stage is the one 'in which untoward matter is being better prepared or impeding media are overcome.' In the liberal stage, the prepared matter 'is appropriated to ideal uses and endowed with a direct spiritual function' (p. 32).

After this identification of the essential elements of art with those of other rational functions, one is not surprised to find the volume closing with an eloquent arraignment of the modern separation of art from its industrial, moral, religious and social matrix. As usual, Professor Santayana's own words can not be improved, hence I quote freely. "The great obstacle which art finds in attempting to be rational is its function isolation." At present art 'too much resembles an opiate or a stimulant.' Our museums are 'mausoleums in which a dead art heaps up its remains.' "Art whose products are so collected and exhibited is gratuitous and sophisticated and the greater part of men's concern about it is affectation" (p. 209). "Art, like religion, needs to be absorbed in the life of reason... . It needs to have its processes diffused throughout all life activity, instead of being confined to abstract productions called 'works of art'" (p. 208). At present art is symbolic and vicarious and stands in contrast with reality. But if 'it were knit more closely with other rational functions, to beautify things might render them more useful, and to represent them most imaginatively might be to see them in their truth' (p. 213). Then, "No work would be called in a special sense a work of art,' for all works would be such intrinsically. There would need to be no division of mankind into mechanical, blind workers and half-demented poets, and no separation of useful from fine art, such as people make who have understood neither the nature nor the ultimate reward of human action. All arts would be practised together and merged in the art of life, the only one wholly useful or fine."

THE EFFICACY OF THOUGHT

George Santayana. "The Efficacy of Thought." *Journal of Philosophy* 3.15 (19 July 1906): 410–12.

Professor A. W. Moore, in his courteous review of my book on 'The Life of Reason,'¹ has pointed out what he feels to be a discrepancy in my language, and perhaps a difficulty in the subject-matter itself, touching a point of very great importance. This point is the sense in which mental facts may be called influential, may have a function or power.

There are many possible readings of this problem, some of which may be distinguished as follows:

1. It is a function of thought to give an intrinsic value to the moment in which it occurs. Thought has an esthetic or ecstatic quality. This function, inefficacious as it is, would suffice to make thought the most important thing in the world.

2. Thought has the power of asserting ideal verities; it has a contemplative and dialectical function. An ephemeral seraph, alone in the universe, might recite the multiplication table and die. His thought would have possessed two ideal functions, one beatifying, the other self-explicative or discursive.

3. Thought may have a transitive but merely cognitive function; it may represent, and mean to represent, some independent fact, as when I say to myself that Cæsar died on the Ides of March. The eventual test of this truth, its consistency with other judgments, its prevalence, its destiny, or its being a thought that would subsist permanently in an organism usefully adapted to a special environment – all this does not enter into the cognitive pretensions of the thought. These are ideal; but as the truth of the thought hangs on the existence of the external fact to which it refers, its truth remains always an assumption from its own point of vantage; though a third person might perhaps have further means of deciding for himself whether that thought had been true or false.

4. Thought may have prophetic scope: it may foretell what is about to take place. This harmony, purely speculative in itself, would, if at all

¹ This Journal, Vol. III., No. 8.

frequent, very much increase the inner wealth and dignity of thought mentioned in 1 and 3.

5. Mingled with prophecy may be desire; and if to confident prophecy and eager desire an eventual verification accrues, the result is a sense of power. Thought is then supposed to have brought about its own realization, and to be responsible for it. This felt efficacy is always moral, or rather magical. It is a power attributed to thought, in its ideal capacity and by virtue of its intent, to bring about what it calls for, as an incantation or an exorcism might do, through empty reaches of time and space.

6. Thought, taken as a psychological existence, might have a causal influence on a succeeding state of mind, quite apart from the ideal burden of either. Thus, a dialectical argument might bring on a headache or (if mental association were directly efficacious) hearing others speak with a certain accent might cause me to hear myself later speaking with the same, no physical links intervening.

7. Thought might be carried on for a while by dialectical progression, the meaning constituting an evolutionary 'force.' The thought might then be transformed into another irrelevant state of mind, as in 6; but a moment later this state of mind might become a cerebral process, which, in turn, might be propagated for a while mechanically, but might finally evaporate out of the physical world altogether, the 'force' of it going to constitute a fresh mental event, either irrelevant or, by preestablished harmony, cognitive of the physical fact that caused it; and so on as before.

8. Thought might be without efficacy, either in its moral or in its existential capacity; yet the bodily function, the instinct or habit, which it accompanied, might involve the maintenance of that thought, or its dialectical development in time. In this case the thought would be so grounded as to vouch for its occasional reappearance, whenever the juncture reoccurred at which it was evoked originally. Thus books, customs and works of art insure the perpetuity of spiritual experience as, in a larger sense, do the unchanged face of nature and the hereditary structure of animals. Thought might still be called efficacious in the only sense, not magical, in which its efficacy would be at all congruous with its intent; namely, through the natural efficacy of the creature whose life it expressed.

As to my personal opinion in this matter, which I am sorry to see Professor Moore finds ambiguously expounded in my book, it is probably plain enough from the above statement of the various possibilities. 1, 2, 3 and 4 describe purely ideal functions of thought, all of which it undoubtedly reaches at certain moments, 5, on the contrary,

describes a superstition; yet it is this superstition, clung to by the unrec-
onciled childishness of man, that alone induces anybody to defend the
extravagances and confusions of 6 and 7. People wish thought to be
mechanically efficacious because they think it would be a *better guide*
than the cerebral process which underlies it; yet why a better guide,
unless it operated miraculously, by its intent, and not by virtue of some
irrelevant evolution of its substance? 8, accordingly, represents the
conclusion to which I arrive; and it explains certain phrases which I
have not studied to avoid, thinking that their metaphorical character
would be obvious to the reader. We all speak of Malthus's ideas
'governing' the movement of population, yet hardly expect to be accused
of maintaining that poor Malthus's hard thinking caused Israel's
fecundity or the congestion in our large cities. A thought is said to
govern those portions of existence the movement of which it serves to
predict or to describe. One may well say that 'reason is vital impulse
modified by reflection.' It is certain that when a man 'reflects' his action
changes in consequence, just as he turns aside when he 'sees' an obstacle
in front of him; but as his seeing was an impression on his organs,
without which his fancy would have pictured nothing, and as his turning
was an instinct or habit of his organism, without which the image would
have signified no danger; so the pause in reflection was a physical event,
accompanied by an oscillation of projects in the mind (for reflection can
not decide when reflection shall arise, nor how long it shall last, nor
what course it shall take). The consequences of reflection are due to its
causes, to the competitive impulses in the body, not to the wistful
lucubration itself; for this is mere poetry. People's thoughts are most
inadequate and choked just when their action is most rapid and urgent.
That consciousness is a lyric cry, even in the midst of business, is
something which must be felt, perhaps, to be understood; and they that
have feeling, let them feel it.

I may add that the ambiguity which others as well as Professor Moore
find in my book seems to come, at least in part, from their generously
attributing to it loftier pretensions than it ever puts forth. They begin by
reading into my words two doctrines which perhaps they think highly
of, namely, that the genesis of knowledge is the genesis of things, and
that truth is useful illusion; but they soon find that my expressions
contradict these doctrines, which I not only never entertained, but can
not even conceive. For in assigning any origin to nature we assume
another nature operating behind, while it is hard to see how one illusion
could be more useful than another in a vacuum; yet if a determinate
environment existed, the true idea of it would be determined by what
that environment was, not by the uses which the idea of it might have.

What I can readily conceive, however, is how puzzled and disappointed a reader must be who begins by taking for a complete cosmogony what is merely a biography of human reason, and how miserably this whole drama of thought must seem to him to end, if it ends in discovering what has always been true.

THE FUNCTION OF THOUGHT

Addison W. Moore. "The Function of Thought." *Journal of Philosophy* 3.19 (13 September 1906): 519–22.

In a discussion in Vol. III., No. 15, of this JOURNAL, Professor Santayana deals with the complaints of ambiguity in his conception of the function of thought as expounded in his 'Life of Reason.' Professor Santayana's treatment consists in reducing to metaphor all the passages in 'The Life of Reason' which speak of thought as a reconstruction of mechanical processes; and in frankly accepting thought as a mere 'accompaniment,' a 'lyric cry' of the mechanical processes. To many this method, in so far as it succeeds in curing the ambiguity, may seem worse than the original malady.

I say 'in so far,' for even here where the issue is up for explicit discussion, I confess I find that some of Professor Santayana's sentences still puzzle me. Thus in the eighth thesis (p. 411) regarding the function of thought, which Professor Santayana says represents his own view, after reading that 'thought is without efficacy either in its moral or its existential capacity,' we find immediately following that 'thought might still be called efficacious in the only sense, not magical, in which its efficacy would be at all congruous with its intent; namely, *through the natural efficacy* of the creature whose life it expressed.'¹ What do 'through' and 'natural efficacy' here mean? Again, on the following page we read: "It is certain that when a man reflects his action changes in consequence. Yet, in the next sentence, 'the consequences of reflection are due to its causes – to the competitive impulses in the body, not to the wistful lubrication itself.' Here 'consequence' evidently does not mean effect; and mechanical processes appear to have two kinds of effects – thought and other mechanical processes. Now, if there is to be such a distinction and separation of the mechanical and the psychical as to call one 'cause' and the other 'effect,' it is somewhat difficult to see why the causal relation in one direction should be so hospitably received, while in the other it is regarded as a 'superstition' of the 'unreconciled childishness of man.' Or if in one direction it is such a superstition, why is it not equally so in the other?

¹ Italics mine.

Passing an analysis of cause and effect, which this really calls for, but which is beyond the limits of this note, I should go all the way with Professor Santayana in denying 'mechanical efficacy' to thought. But I should deny it mechanical efficacy just in order to bestow upon it its own sort of constructive efficacy. Also, I should be as loth as Professor Santayana to regard thought's function as 'interfering' with mechanical processes. But I should reject this view only to insist on thought's work of 'mediation' when the mechanical processes 'interfere'² with each other. In other words, it seems to me that when Professor Santayana is insisting on the 'non-interfering' and purely 'lyric' character of thought, he has in mind that stage of experience where thought has done its work, where mechanism has been established, where, therefore, any further work of thought in that situation would be an 'interference.' But it seems to me also that he is overlooking the situation in which 'interference' has already arisen among the mechanical processes, the habits and instincts themselves, and that the work of resolving this interference is the work of thought. Not, however, of thought exclusively, or as an outside force, coming in or added to the mechanical processes, but as a mode which the whole activity takes on and which the conception of 'mechanism' alone does not appear to me to cover.

Again, I think I see how every cause might be regarded as 'mechanical.' In so far as experience can fall into the form of a definite effect with its correlative definite cause, it is in the mechanical form; thought has performed its work. Well-defined causes and effects are simply well-articulated habits. Antitoxine 'causes' immunity from diphtheria. But take the present status of the pneumonia problem where such a cause does not yet exist. Here thought is at work helping to construct a 'cause.' It is, of course, not working in a vacuum. Thought *is* the material of old habits, old causes, undergoing analysis and synthesis. Would Professor Santayana be willing to say that thought is merely predicting or prophesying the antitoxine for pneumonia, that it is having nothing to do in constituting it? If it should be said that 'the elements of the cure already exist, and thought has merely to bring them into relation to the disease,' we must reply: (1) That, even so, this makes thought pretty efficacious in constituting the cure; and (2) that such a statement involves us in the fallacy of elements apart from relations, which Mr. Bradley delights in exposing. And if we try to escape this by haying that, 'the elements have always existed, and have always been in *actual* relation to the disease, only thought has not yet discovered it,'

² I am aware of the 'telic' character of the term 'interfere,' that in a purely mechanical world there would be neither mechanism nor 'interference.' But this only shows how thoroughly mechanical efficiency and constructive efficacy are.

how far are we from the condition of the poor fellow who imagined that his toothache had been cured over in another county, but that he still continued to suffer because his enemies prevented the announcement of the cure from reaching him?

Professor Santayana rightly says, that 'no one would care to maintain that poor Malthus's hard thinking caused Israel's fecundity or the congestion in our large cities.' But would he say that Malthus's thinking had nothing to do with certain reform movements of his day, or with Darwin's work which followed? May not thought be really efficacious without creating (wholly) its object, or without committing us to the doctrine, which Professor Santayana imputes to some of his critics, that 'the genesis of knowledge is (wholly) the genesis of things'? Is it not possible to describe experience in terms of thoughts and things generating other thoughts and things without regarding thoughts and things as causing each other?

Professor Santayana's characterization of his critic's view of truth as 'useful illusion' (p. 42), and his counter thesis that 'the true idea is determined by what the environment is, not by the uses which the idea of it might have,' seems to send us back to a purely representative view of knowledge and to raise rather elementary questions – those with which Locke and Berkeley struggled, such as: Just what is included in environment? From the standpoint of one making this statement, is not the environment as responsible for false as for true ideas? How tell when the idea is 'true' to the environment? What is the test of an illusion? Etc.

In conclusion, I would say that I believe that the passages in the 'Life of Reason' giving thought a constructive and constitutive character are so numerous, so convincing, and so vital to so much of his doctrines, that the reader will find Professor Santayana's instruction to take them in a Pickwickian sense a very difficult one to execute.

THE LIFE OF REASON

Addison W. Moore. "The Function of Thought." *Journal of Philosophy* 3.19 (13 September 1906): 519–22.

The Life of Reason, or the Phases of Human Progress, by George Santayana. Five volumes. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905–1906.

That which makes it difficult for me to give, even from my own standpoint, a just account of the criticism of life recorded in Professor Santayana's *The life of reason*, is that which seems to me, after all, a most characteristic feature of the book. It is an interfusion of a lively, sympathetic, delicate, and direct sense for the realities of human experience, with an equally acute, equally subtle, but correspondingly indirect and antagonistic, sense of what almost all philosophers have thought and said about them. I know of no writing in modern philosophy which evidences more just and kindly appreciation of the forces of human life, taken simply, frankly, and naturally, – with less refraction thru the medium of artificial philosophic lenses. But I must add that I also know no book more indirect, more permeated with allusions – mostly unlabeled – more colored by recollections of other – but mostly disliked – philosophic interpretations. The series of five volumes is (in comparison with most philosophic literature) at once ultra-direct and personal, and ultra-academic, "learned," and reminiscent.

And it is an interfusion! We get both things not only in the same chapter, but on the same page, in the same sentence. Rarely does Mr. Santayana let himself go for even a paragraph. He starts to tell the truth about something as he himself feels it and sees it, and he diverts himself (to the diversion or the annoyance of the reader, according to the tastes of the latter) with side-hits at three or four other views of the same matter which, decidedly, do not commend themselves to him. The book – it is one, tho printed in five volumes – will accordingly affect different readers in the most extraordinarily different ways. So many philosophers gathered together, so many opinions about not only the merits, but the purpose and character of *The life of reason*. One (and I may notify the reader that I take my own stand here) is most stirred by those

portions which give Mr. Santayana's own evaluation of the facts and motifs of human life; another is moved – to admiration or to hostility – by his treatment of other philosophic isms; a third feels himself torn asunder in the rapid panoramic transformation scenes at which he is invited to assist and is quite sure the book is only “literature” (tho admirably written literature), quite lacking in philosophic standpoint or method.

Truth to tell, while Mr. Santayana generally takes life at its best, he as regularly takes philosophers and theologians, and scientists so far as they generalize, at their worst. Views which are dangerously like Mr. Santayana's own vigorously criticized when proceeding from suspected quarters, and the reader, who is not willing to make as fine distinctions as Mr. Santayana himself, accuses him of inconsistency and lack of any single standpoint. The style helps out the impression – classic, academic, quasi-mathematical in outward form, it is in truth clinging and yielding, almost chameleon in its elusive adaptation to the particular matter in hand. In it, all things flow; nothing projects. It is vibrating, but not resonant. The secret of it all, I suspect, is an intelligence of easy sympathy conjoined with a sympathy not always broad enough to be intelligent. Mr. Santayana's method sometimes reminds one of what Mazzini said about Carlyle's attitude towards social reform – he was a thoro believer in it provided no reformers had a hand in bringing it to pass. Mr. Santayana is thoroly appreciative of the various elements in experience – save when some philosopher has formulated them.

But this is enough, and more than enough, of general impression. The subject-matter is distributed thru five volumes devoted respectively to The life of reason in Common Sense, in Society, in Religion, in Art, in Science. Of these five, the first and the last go most closely together and hardly can be understood, in their bearing upon Mr. Santayana's own philosophy, apart from each other. The standpoint and method are, loosely, historical. The book purports to give not a finished philosophy of reality, but an account of the various ways in which humanity has exprest its tentative efforts to rationalize itself, with a critical estimate of the respective worth of these attempts, this estimate being a further work of that clarifying, purging, and selective Life of Reason whose tale is told. He criticizes so-called philosophies of history for virtually assuming “that events have directed themselves prophetically upon the interests which they arouse” – in spite of the fact that these interests are many and contradictory; he criticizes the pompous appeal to a “historical force which breaks up on inspection into a cataract of miscellaneous natural processes and minute particular causes.” But he suggests a purification of this method. If the philosopher, in reviewing events, confesses that he is scrutinizing them in order to abstract from them

whatever tends to illustrate his own ideals, as he might look over a crowd to find his friends, the operation becomes a perfectly legitimate one. "A sort of retrospective politics, an estimate of events in reference to the moral ideal which they embodied or betrayed, might supervene upon positive history... . The present work is an essay in that direction." The enlightened historian will, however, recognize that the ideal which he uses as a touchstone must not be an arbitrary personal dogma, but itself an outcome of the historical events which he is testing and sifting by their relation to it. He must be sensitive to all the goods which life in its various manifestations has evolved and sustained; his standard will be a "variegated omnipresent happiness." The philosophic historian "needs to make himself the spokesman for all past aspirations" – barring those of mystics, transcendentalists, and militant liberals, it may be remarked parenthetically.

The method, as I said, is loosely historical. It is also, in the loose sense, psychological. And since Mr. Santayana speaks too rarely in precise terms, of his own intentions, I quote again. It constantly happens in philosophic writings that what is supposed to go on in the human mind is described and appealed to in order to support some observation or illustrate some argument – as continually, for instance, in the older English critics of human nature, or in these very pages. What is offered in such cases is merely an invitation to think after a certain fashion. A way of grasping or interpreting some fact is suggested, with a more or less civil challenge to the reader to resist the suasion of his own experience so evoked and represented. Such a method of appeal may be called psychological, in the sense that it relies for success on the total movement of the reader's life and mind, without forcing a detailed assent thru ocular demonstration or pure dialectic." In short, the appeal is to the developing experience of mankind so far as that can be imaginatively reproduced by the individual in terms of his own experience.

I make no apology for these extended quotations, because I think the reader who fails to grasp the aim and method of the hook as set forth in them will not grasp the continuity of its ideas, however much of incidental delight – or irritation – they may severally furnish him.

Whether Mr. Santayana conceives that any philosophy or metaphysics, aside from critical valuation of human experience in its historic development as verified in reflection upon the individual's own experience, is or is not possible, I am not sure. At times, such critical valuation would appear to exhaust to Mr. Santayana the whole realm of profitable "metaphysics." At other times, he seems to regard such an account as *merely* genetic or "subjective"; and as presenting, if viewed as positive metaphysics, an attempt to erect an account of the processes of human discovery into an account of the reality discovered. That philosophy can

be anything but a historic phenomenon, a part of man's efforts to read and criticize the story of his own life in the universe in which he is set, seems to the present writer the initial fallacy of vicious metaphysics; and he would fain believe that Mr. Santayana has renounced the heresy of supposing that, whether for himself or for some one else, history is going to stop long enough for one to step outside of its processes, and kodak reality "*sub specie æternitatis*." In other words, the present writer desires to take Mr. Santayana's *The life of reason* as representing the only type of philosophy with which it is worth while to engage one's self; a return to the ancient identification of philosophy with morals, with love of wisdom. A survey by intelligence of the past struggles, failures, and successes of intelligence with a view to directing its own further endeavors, emphasizing and safeguarding its achievements, avoiding repetitions of its futile and wasteful excesses, stimulating it to greater patience and courage – this, indeed, is a conception of philosophy fit to rescue it from the slough of disrespect and despondency into which it has fallen in evil days. It is this, I take it, in Mr. Santayana's writing which will permanently count, spite of its signs of hankering after the flesh-pots of "metaphysics."

What then, is reason, and what is its life? The answer is implicit in the quotations already made. "*The life of reason* will then be a name for that part of experience which perceives and pursues ideals – all conduct so controlled and all sense so interpreted as to perfect natural happiness." As soon as man ceased to be immersed in the flux of sense, he lookt to the future and the past; in this way experiences were gathered and graded in their value; they were apprehended in their relative worth. The past is judged in the light of the present it evokes and the present is judged in the light of the future it makes possible. The foresight of the consequence which the present imports is consciousness of end, of purpose. All reflection is thus ideal; reason always involves emergence from the present, the immediate, the merely existent; it is the estimate, the survey and criticism of this from the standpoint of the eventual, the ulterior. But such foresight and discrimination introduces a new complication into the existent itself; it is a modification of it which thereby modifies the future. Reason is inevitably practical as well as speculative; it is an attitude of intention, of will. "Vital impulse when it is modified by reflection add veers in sympathy with judgments pronounced on the past is properly called reason. Man's rational life consists in those moments in which reflection not only occurs but proves efficacious. What is absent then works in the present." The forecast of the possible future on the basis of the best experienced in the past is itself an impulse to realize the better, to ward off the worse.

Reflection thus functions in the interest of value, of the good, of the

variegated omnipresent happiness – that *is* its life. “It is the unity given to all existence by a mind in *love with the good*. In the higher reaches of human nature, as much as in the lower, rationality depends on distinguishing the excellent... . When definite interests are recognized and the values of things are estimated by that standard, then reason has been born and a moral world has arisen.”

We have here the factors upon which the whole philosophy of Mr. Santayana turns. On the one hand, there is brute existence, shifting, transitive, in flux; sheer nature, a world innocent of spirit, of purpose, but gifted with impulse, with experimentation. This world in its movement bears moments of value, excellence – moments which gladly would have stay, they are so fair. Their memory abides; that is, the ideal supervenes. Standing upon them, man surveys and classifies, organizes the brutally existent; thru them he reacts upon the flux and brings it into more permanent order. These values, these meanings, are, when arrested in reflection, what the ancients called the form of things; and “we exist thru form and the love of form is our whole real aspiration.” With Mr. Santayana as with the ancients – the Greeks, of course – “order is what is meant by intelligence and order productive of excellence what is meant by reason.” But this order, which is intelligence, is not creative; is not original; is not absolute. It is divinely human. Everywhere there is the fluctuating process of nature which first bears and then sustains meanings. It is the office and the reward of those in whom they are born to cherish and to extend them. Thereby is the relatively unmeaning flux further subdued and rendered more efficaciously, stably, and pervasively the source and stay of reason.

The five volumes are variations on this theme. They trace the directions in which, the experiments by which, that excellence and harmony which are our happiness are secured and spread by increased acknowledgment of that natural basis from which they were generated. They trace also fruitless sidesteps, the inconsequential deviations which have been the efflorescence of an exaggerated and maniacal consciousness which nature indeed generates but refuses to accept further responsibility for. They record also the relapses, the blind surrenders, the abnegations of reason, which, in one form or another, Mr. Santayana finds to be characteristic of positivist, skeptic, mystic, and transcendentalist alike. For as success is attained but in one way, by following nature in the conscious, deliberate, persistent, and artful love of those values which she generates casually, occasionally, and accidentally, so the source of all error, practical and theoretical, is in forgetting or denying natural basis or ideal end. On the one hand, the rooting of the spiritual in the natural is ignored: that “it must be a resultant or synthesis of impulses already afoot. An ideal out of relation to the actual

demands of living beings is so far from being an ideal that it is not even a good." Other philosophies, recognizing that the good of existence *is* the good which it generates, change this moral truth into a false physics, and hold that therefore the good, the spiritual, and the ideal are the cause or productive source of the physical. The Greeks first "made a mock physics in moral terms, out of which theology was afterwards developed." The result was the non-natural spiritual world of orthodox tradition. "A mechanism composed of values and definitions was placed behind phenomena to constitute a substantial world." The moral and logical sense in which values and meanings make things what they are was transformed into a quasi-physical, and therefore wholly magical and mythological, mode of causation and substantiation. This way lies the fallacy of false idealisms and spiritualities.

Another type of fallacy consists in sticking brutally by the brute natural situation. Here are the positivists, the materialists, the over-naturalists who "look at life from the outside"; the "processes of Nature make them forget her uses." Such, priding themselves upon their enlightenment, "have discarded the machinery in which their ancestors embodied the ideal; they have not perceived that those symbols stood for the Life of Reason and gave fantastic and embarrassed expression to what, in itself, is pure humanity; and they have thus remained entangled in the colossal error that ideals are something adventitious and unmeaning, not having a soil in mortal life, nor a possible fulfilment there."

It is to this idea of nature generative of value that the argument in every volume returns; from it the argument proceeds. The basic idea of the interpretation of society is that "love has an animal basis; but an ideal object." But since these propositions usually seem contradictory "no writer ventures to present more than half the truth and that half out of its true relations." Popular sentiment makes the affections which are the bond of union among men divine in origin and natural in object: "which is the exact opposite of the truth." The end of the family as of other social arrangements, industry, war, government, is "to turn the friction of material forces into the light of ideal goods." Relatively speaking, however, the entire function of the family and of states based on the family, is natural: it is to *produce* the individual and equip him with the *prerequisites* of moral freedoms. Then ensues free society, where physical association is elevated, thru participation in some ideal interest, into friendship and sympathy. But "ideal society transcends accidental conjunctions altogether; its companions are the symbols it breeds and possesses for excellence, beauty, and truth. Religion, art, and science are the chief spheres in which ideal companionship is found."

Reason is interested in value, in meaning, in perpetuating and extending it. Religion may be said to be the emotion, imaginatively express, of this supremacy of the ideal as the end and standard of life. The consciousness of meaning, of worth, is always, as we have said, ideal – it is of the absent, the ulterior. And so religion is naturally born in devotion to this ulterior. “The vistas it opens and the mysteries it propounds are another world to live in; and another world to live in – whether we expect ever to pass wholly into it or no – is what we mean by having a religion.” But religion, so close to rationality in its purpose, has fallen far short of it in its texture and results. Instead of using the ideal as an ethical inspiration and fulcrum, it tends to materialize it, to make it an explanation, a cause, a quasi-physical force and substance. It forgets that it is poetry and arrogates to itself “literal truth and moral authority, neither of which it possesses.” To make the ideal effective in life it must be imagined, given sensuous embodiment. And these poetical conceits come to pass for reports of another objective world, somehow enveloping the natural world.

Religion fails to recognize that it is concerned with experience as it should be, and supposes that its idealized symbols of a better reality “are information about reality elsewhere.” Hence mythology; which has the genuinely poetic character of revealing some function of nature in human life,” but which is regarded as literally true of something which exists beyond nature. Hence magic, and sacrifice, and various other devices for entering into favorable relations with this other kind of existence.

None the less, under favorable circumstances religion comes to subserve the life of reason. The imagination at least maintains “an ideal standard for action and a perfect object for contemplation.” In this, its proper function, it is piety and spirituality. Piety is attachment to whatever in the sources of man’s being also serves as the natural and historic fount of the values which make this being worth having. It is a cherishing consciousness that the human spirit is derived and responsible, having its toots in nature and in the past endeavor of society. Spirituality is freer; it is attachment to the values themselves as ends; it is prospective as piety is retrospective. “Piety drinks at the deep, elemental sources of power and order: it studies nature, honors the past, appropriates and continues its mission. Spirituality uses the strength thus acquired, remodeling all it receives, and looking to the future and the ideal. True religion is entirely human and political... . Supernatural machinery is either symbolic of natural conditions and moral aims or else it is worthless.”

Art is an even more potent expression of living reason – that is, of

nature exercising function and use, and achieving order and stable harmony. In origin again, it is wholly natural; the spontaneous overflow of instinct and impulse. In process, it is instinct become aware of its use and shaping nature to better manifestation of that use. In effect, it is nature idealized, harmonized: the union of practical achievement, reasonable insight, and disciplined happiness. In art, happy instinct both perpetuates its own function and reproduces and extends itself, for art, being an intelligent, a deliberate process, is teachable. Art is thus doubly rational.

Beauty, the distinctively esthetic element, is thus an incident. In reshaping nature by making it a more apt embodiment of value, nature is rendered a more congenial stimulus to the soul, and the immediate apprehension of this congeniality is the beauty of the object. "The esthetic good is hatched in the same nest with the others [utility, etc.] and is incapable of flying far in a different air." Purely industrial art, on the other hand, is instrumental only. It is the liberal life, which the subjection of nature to economic use makes possible, which justifies industry. To fail to recognize this instrumental function is genuine materialism. This forgets that the worth of the end realized is the sole warrant for the labor of realization. Its moral philosophy "dwells by preference on the possibility that a violent and continual subjection in the present might issue in a glorious future dominion." Industrial art merely "gives nature that form which, if more thoroly humane, she might have originally possess for our benefit; liberal arts bring to spiritual fruition the matter which either nature or industry has prepared and rendered propitious."

The fine arts are a union, as already said, of original animal spontaneity or automatism, and of success in achieving the realization of value. Their goal is the complete superimposition of these two characters. Meantime, the two factors run their course somewhat apart. Much spontaneous activity is wasteful and irrelevant. Much achievement is laborious painful, compulsory, illiberal, and, in a sense, unnatural. Some fine arts, like dancing, music, and the arts of speech, – poetry, the drama, – emphasize the factor of spontaneity. They leave less definite impress; less modification of their own conditions. Their delight is this spontaneity, but so is their weakness: "If pure music, even with its immense sensuous appeal, is so easily tedious, what a universal yawn must meet the verbiage which develops nothing but its own iridescence." The plastic arts, architecture, sculpture, painting, emphasize use; achievement; the accomplished transformation of nature thru an action which makes it the more pertinent and pliant embodiment of the ideal.

The ultimate problem is the union of the industrial and the fine arts. "Art, in the better sense, is a condition of happiness for a practical and

laboring creature, since without art he remains a slave; but it is one more source of unhappiness for him so long as it is not squared with his necessary labors and merely interrupts them. It then alienates him from his world without being able to carry him effectually into a better one." And present "fine" art is mainly vain, "a brief truancy from rational practise."

That science is an expression of the life of reason is perhaps only too obvious to the "modern" man, who is so conscious of it that he is apt to forget what Mr. Santayana so sincerely expresses: that society and art and religion are also of the life of reason. But I am not sure just how Mr. Santayana conceives the respective relations of art and science to reason: a doubt which makes me uncertain in just what perspective his whole scheme is to be interpreted. On its face, art would seem to be a more concrete and final expression of living reason than science; for art can hardly be regarded as other than the recognition in intelligence of order and harmony in so far as that acknowledgment functions thru action in the service of conscious excellence or happiness. (To apprehend what Mr. Santayana means by happiness is to have apprehended the ultimate of morals.) In comparison with art, science would then be preliminary and preparatory – itself a form of art, indeed, but of art still halting from its ulterior destiny. There is much in Mr. Santayana that bears out this conception. Such a philosophy, in the philosophic nickname of the day, would be pragmatism – pragmatism of a noble and significant type. But there is much in Mr. Santayana (and the weight in the end falls upon this side) which prevents such an interpretation. The final paragraph in the book is entitled "It [*i.e.*, science] suffices for the Life of Reason." And, aside from words, while there are many assertions in the book that all science is moral, human, practical, eventual, symbolic, hypothetical, determined by vital bias, impulse, purpose; that it is "an instinctive product, a stepping forth of human courage in the dark," – "a claim which we put forth"¹: there are many other passages which declare action to be servile and instrumental; the end of life to be contemplation – in the Greek sense, of course – and science to be the ultimate revealer and judge of reality. In other words, the reader – this reader at least – is left at a loss to know just what, in the end, Mr. Santayana conceives to be the relation of natural basis and ideal end to one another and to reality. Is reality for the philosopher the moral life itself, the life of reason, and are physics – the statement of the order or mechanism by which nature sustains its end and dialectic – the expli-

¹ See vol. v. p. 177. "Intelligence is not a substance; it is a principle of order and of art; it requires a given situation and some particular natural interests brought into play."

cation of the meanings, the intents which are suggested and sustained – integral instruments of this life? Or are the mechanism which science progressively reveals, and the eternal order of immutable truth which dialectic determines,² *the* reality, while the purposes, and endeavors, and achievements of human experience are only an evanescent and superficial mirror in which *the* Reality happens, for our passing delectation and confusion, to reflect itself? I do not know. The more explicit and official declarations of our author are all in the latter sense. The spirit and vital accomplishment of the book are in the former.

Mr. Santayana seems – I may misrepresent him – to have his own reconciliation of the apparent contradiction. One account, that of the noble, artistic, and moral “pragmatism” – I care much less for the word than for the life of reason – holds good historically; of the processes by which man has come to discover what really is; while the coldly scientific, physical, and dialectic view holds of the reality itself of which this history is but one transitory manifestation. Hence to regard the “life of reason” as the philosopher’s reality is to fall into the idealist’s usual fallacy of supposing that the instrumentalities, methods, and states of coming to know abrogate the realities which are known.³

But surely there is another alternative. Let Mr. Santayana extend his well-guarded aversion to the results of idealism – whether of the “malicious psychology” type or the transcendental type – to their postulate about the processes and methods of knowing, let him stick to his own postulate that knowing is an operation of reality (not of subjects, egos, or consciousnesses) thru vital impulse; and it surely remains true that dialectic and physics hold of reality, but hold or it *not* apart from the courage, adventure, and achievement of vital impulse, but thru and in so far as reality embodies itself thru a vital impulse which chooses the excellent and strives to make it prevail. Mr. Santayana seems to me to be in the precarious position of at once throwing an immense burden upon “vital impulse” and of then damning it in the light of its own ulterior products in the way of “form.”

But even in this respect Mr. Santayana remains, altho unconsciously and perhaps against his intention, a true historian. For the contemporary life of reason still oscillates between the ancient principle of form and the modern principle of vital impulse, lacking any sure synthesis of intellect and action. We are grateful to Mr. Santayana for what he *has*

² Compare v. p. 315 – Mathematics “is absolutely self-justified and necessary before it is discovered to be so. Here, then, is a conspicuous region of truth disclosed to the human intellect by its own internal exercise, which is nevertheless altogether independent, being eternal and indefeasible, while the thought that utters it is ephemeral.”

³ See, for example, II. p. 200.

given us: the most adequate contribution America has yet made – always excepting Emerson – to moral philosophy. And we may conclude with a quotation breathing its most Emersonian spirit: “The darkest spots are in man himself, in his fitful, irrational disposition. Could a better system prevail in our lives a better order would establish itself in our thinking. It has not been for want of keen senses, or personal genius, or a constant order in the outer world, that mankind have fallen back repeatedly into barbarism and superstition. It has been for want of good character, good example, and good government. There is a pathetic capacity in men to live nobly, if only they would give one another the chance.”

PURE EXPERIENCE AND REALITY

Evander B. McGilvary. "Pure Experience and Reality." *Philosophical Review* 16.3 (May 1907): 266-84.

In this scientific age no philosopher feels comfortable, if he finds that his doctrines bring him into conflict with scientific facts. Scientific theories at variance with his own philosophical theories he can venture to criticise and reject, but facts made out by science he prefers not to deny. As Professor Dewey says: "One is entitled to enter a *caveat* against any attempt to impose science, whether physical or psychological, as philosophy... . Yet most empiricists would hardly be willing to adopt any philosophic position of which it could be clearly shown that it depends upon ignoring, denying or perverting scientific results."¹

Now the philosophy of pure experience which has recently been developed by Professors James and Dewey has been suspected by many of involving just such a denial of 'scientific results.' If the reality of anything is the reality it has as experienced and only when experienced, then it would seem that the sciences which deal with objects purporting to have existed before any verifiable experience do not have to do with reality; yet these very sciences claim to prove as scientific fact the real existence of objects prior to zoic periods. Hence the philosophers of pure experience feel it incumbent on them to set themselves at rights in this matter.

Professor James has recently so defined his position that it ceases to have any anti-realistic suggestions which might bring him into contradiction with the sciences of geology and astronomy. In answer to a question put to him by Mr. Pitkin, as to whether his theory precludes the possibility of something not experienced, Professor James says: "Assuredly not...how could it? Yet in my opinion we should be wise not to *consider* any thing or action of that nature, and to restrict our universe of philosophic discourse to what is experienced *or, at least, experienceable*."² What kind of reality the experienceable has when it is

¹ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. III, p. 253. Hereafter this journal will be referred to simply as *Journal*.

² *Journal*, Vol. IV, p. 106. The italics in the last four words are mine.

not experienced, Professor James does not tell us, at least in his recent writings. In his *Psychology* there was no attempt to abbreviate such reality and write it down to a tentative programme, waiting for the signature and seal of experience to put it into execution. Likewise there is nothing in the address on the pragmatic method, delivered before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, which should commit him, so far as one can see, to denying the full and genuine reality of the things which, though not experienced, make a tremendous difference in what we do experience and shall continue to experience. In default, therefore, of any express avowal by Professor James of adherence to the notion that unexperienced but experienceable reality is incomplete reality, one may assume, provisionally at least, that there is nothing in his experientialism to which a scientist may reasonably object on the score that it deprives him of the very objects of his investigation. Whether Professor James's philosophy remains pure experientialism when it is interpreted in the light of the sentences just quoted, is another question which does not concern us here.

Professor Dewey has taken another course. He has tried to put himself at one with science by admitting *something* "non-contemporaneously experienced."³ But he also maintains his pure experientialism by qualifying this admission: the pre-experiential something is not to be considered completely real. The readers of Professor Dewey's *Studies in Logical Theory* must have been prepared for such a statement from him. In that work he insisted that the object of thought, when it has emerged from the experience of stress and strain and appears in a subsequent tranquil experience as the result of pragmatic adjustment, must not be read back anachronistically into the time preceding the adjustment. The reader was therefore left to infer that no truth made out by intellectual labor is to be held valid of anything real that may have existed before that labor was ended. This inference is now for the first time explicitly confirmed by Professor Dewey in the article just referred to. This article has therefore the importance of a definitive statement of his attitude towards facts dealt with in some fundamental sciences. We have here a touchstone of the scientific character of his experiential philosophy. If his philosophy cannot stand at this point the test of comparison with the results of science, then that philosophy is anti-scientific; and the pure experientialist of Professor Dewey's type stands at the parting of the ways. Either he must take leave of science, or he must surrender his

³ *Journal*, Vol. III, p. 254; italics mine. The question from Professor Dewey in what follows are all from his article on "Reality as Experience" in Volume III of the *Journal*, pp. 253, 257, except where otherwise designated; and as the article is short and the passages and phrases quoted are easily found in it, I shall not page the references.

peculiar views and the logic which issues in these views. We need not here decide which course anyone would reasonably choose with these alternatives before him. We must first see whether these are exclusive and exhaustive alternatives. Professor Dewey himself evidently appreciates the crisis which his system here faces. The article in question is a resolute attempt to avert the crisis. Let us see whether it succeeds.

As we have already said, Professor Dewey admits the existence of something prior to experience, – something “non-contemporaneously experienced.” This something, however, though it is called an “earlier reality,” is not to be set over against the “later experience” of it, as one complete reality against another. “It is only the earlier portion, historically speaking, of what later is experience. So viewed, the question of reality *versus* experience turns out to be only the question of an earlier version of reality against a later version, – or, if the term ‘version’ be objected to, then, of an earlier rendering or expression or state of reality compared with its own later condition. We can not, however, say an earlier reality *versus* a later reality, because this denies the salient point of *transition towards*. Continual-transformation-in-the-direction-of-this is the fact which excludes on the basis of science (to which we have agreed to appeal) any chopping off of the non-contemporaneously experienced earlier reality from later experience. So viewed, the question for philosophy reduces itself to this: What is the better index, for philosophy, of reality: its earlier or its later form?”

In the earlier form “something essential to reality is still omitted,” and thus the ‘earlier reality’ was not really and entirely real

“Wanting is – what?
 Summer redundant,
 Blueness abundant,
 Where is the blot?
 Beamy the world, yet a blank all the same,
 Framework which waits for a picture to frame:
 What of the leafage, what of the flower?
 Roses embowering with naught they embower!
 Come then, complete incompleteness, O comer,
 Pant through the blueness, perfect the summer!
 Breathe but one breath
 Rose-beauty above,
 And all that was death
 Grows life, grows love,
 Grows love!”

The 'comer' fulfils the promise and potency of the past, immersing the knowledge-object, which before was only reality in the making, "in an inclusive, vital, direct experience," and lo! reality is made, perfect and entire, wanting nothing. But it does not remain made for good and all. It has a way of slipping back into its inchoate state every time it ceases to be experienced, every time it is withdrawn from the bath. Reality is invulnerable to philosophical attack only so long as the waters of experience flow over it. But this gives no serious trouble, for it can be dipped again and again. The charm, though momentarily lost, can be regained. Reality is always at hand, a portable bath for any one who needs it in his pragmatic business: a need is possible only in experience, and experience is itself the magic water. "Every experience thus holds in suspense within itself knowledge with its entire object-world, however big or little. And the experience here referred to is *any* experience in which cognition enters. It is not some ideal, or absolute, or exhaustive experience." Every pre-experiential creature is by experience delivered from the bondage of incompleteness into glorious reality. The vision beatific culminates and reifies the 'qualitative-transformation-towards.'

We have in this theory a daring de-realization of the pre-experiential past. What is the justification for it? We are told that the justification is round in the fact that all the objects of which astronomy and geology treat are *objects for the scientific experience*. When the scientist predicates reality of them apart from his experience of them, he ignores the fact that he is necessary to make this predication and therefore to *realize* them. This realization of them in his scientific judgment abates the perfection or the reality they had before they were ever experienced. For to realize means to make real, and when the scientist realizes the existence of long bygone things, he makes that existence real. If he *makes* that existence real, it could not have *been* real before; for what already is, why doth a man yet make? Recognize that the transformation of pre-experiential qualities towards experience "is realized in present experience, and the contradiction vanishes. Since the qualitative transformation was towards experience, where else *should* its nature be realized save in experience – and in the very experience in which O, the knowledge object, is present? ... What is omitted from reality in the O is always restored in the experience in which O is present. The O is thus really taken as what it is – a condition of reality as experience."

In other words, the world of knowledge is from start to finish a performance going on before the eyes of virginal experience. Even though she cannot bar from the boards certain really objective facts, they are not objectionable, for they appear completely clad in robes she

has provided. What they might have been before they were thus clothed upon she can never see. Should, perchance, visions of the dressing-room flit before her maiden fancy, she merely thinks of the occupants as undergoing continual-transformation-in-the-direction-of investiture. They could never be *real* for her, because they become real only when they appear garbed before the foot-lights.

Everything that experience touches is thereby made clean for the grace of her favor and made whole in the entirety of her embrace. Without such cleansing and such integration nothing can enter into her presence. The object as it existed before it was experienced, was not reality, but only a condition of reality, and the condition is not sufficient to produce reality. Only when the condition is supplemented by an experience which realizes the object does the object become real.

It is a great pity that, before writing of the realizing power of experience, Professor Dewey had not made as exhaustive a study in some dictionary of the word 'realize' as he has made of the words 'idea' and 'consciousness.' For any even fairly complete dictionary would have shown him that 'realize' means at least two things: (1) 'make real,' and (2) 'recognize or think of as real.' To argue that, because the nature or the object is 'realized' only in experience, it could not have been completely real before the experience, looks suspiciously like a play upon words. A pun can hardly be a "scientific fact on which are wrecked all strictly objectivistic realisms."

The result will not be substantially different if we regard the emphasis which Professor Dewey lays on the word 'realize' in his article as merely the employment of the convenient word to enforce a view obtained otherwise, and not as an attempt to rear a pretentious philosophic structure on such a logical study of language. The foundation of his system is laid on the fact that, before any object can be posited as real, there must be some (cognitive?) experience in which the object is thus posited. Experience as the presupposition or scientific objects, it is asserted, is ignored in the physical sciences, which deal with objects and abstract from the experience for which such objects exist as real. "The reason the scientist can suppress in his *statement* of the reality factors which the reality possesses," more specifically the factor of being experienced, "is just because (1) he is not interested in the total reality, but in such phases or it as serve as trustworthy indications of imports and projects, and because (2) the elements suppressed are not totally suppressed, but are right there in his *experience*: in its extra-scientific features. In other words, the *scientist* can ignore some part of the *man's* experience just because that part is so irremediably there in experience."

There is no question that we have here a very important truth which

realism may ignore to its ultimate philosophic undoing. But we have the truth stated in a way that leads to confusion, and it is on this confusion that Professor Dewey builds that part of his philosophy which is anti-realistic. By avoiding the confusion and yet by recognizing the truth which Professor Dewey expresses, – only to impress it wrongfully into the service of a false experientialism, – the realist can round off his realism with an idealism. He would thus get an ontological realism and an epistemological idealism. Of course, this result would be an abomination to any one who abhors the very word epistemology, and who has brought himself to believe that “knowing the external world through ideas which are merely within us is” “an inherent self-contradiction.”⁴

The confusion to which I refer is that between the intellectual cognition of a fact, as a present experience, and a fact cognized as a reality temporally prior to the experience which cognizes it. The former is ‘pure experience,’ in Professor Dewey’s meaning of the term. All the mediations by which such a cognition has been attained have also been purely experienced as processes of tension and inner distraction, terminating in purely experienced redintegration of contents: in pure experience of rest after toil, port after stormy seas. Nothing can enter into the kingdom of knowledge and acquire citizenship in the scientific domain, with all the rights and privileges appertaining thereunto, without having taken out naturalization papers in the court of experience. Without this preliminary process even a star cannot be domiciled as a star and allowed to stake out a claim to a quarter-section in the stellar universe – of *science*!

This necessity that something should first be experienced in some way and then be known in a scientific way, before that thing can be treated by science, does not seem to be overlooked by scientists to-day. Most of these worthy gentlemen would probably be amused by the suggestion that they could ignore the knowing part or their experience and pay attention only to the known part, because forsooth the knowing part is irremediably there in experience. What are microscopes and telescopes and spectrosopes, from the epistemological point of view, but eloquent witnesses to the scrupulous exaction the scientist makes that every object should first be experienced before it be inventoried in the scientific catalogue? What are the method of least squares and the allowance for personal equations but the recognition that, whatever may be the final scientific statement, that statement must take as its point of departure the experience of the scientist? The scientific statement is not shot out of a pistol: it is the fruition of a developmental process whose

⁴ *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 83.

germination and whose florescence occur in the atmosphere of 'pure experience.' Experience is the very life, the self-conscious life, of science, and of such life the scientist agonisingly exclaims:

"Tis life, whereof our nerves are scant,
Oh life, not death, for which we pant;
More life, and fuller, that I want."

And then he is told by a philosopher, who desires a *rapprochement* between his philosophy and science, that "in a very real sense, the present experience of the veriest unenlightened ditch-digger does philosophic justice to the earlier reality in a way which the scientific statement does not and cannot: cannot, that is, as formulated knowledge!" I presume that the ditch-digger is dignified with laudatory mention in disparagement of the scientist because the ditch *becomes real* in the digging experience, while the fossil does not. If the geologist could only dig his fossils in while he is digging them out, then his pure digging experience would do philosophic justice to the reality. Where else should the nature of fossils be realized save in experience, – and in the very experience in which fossils as knowledge-objects are present? This kind of pure experience, however, would probably be branded by professional geologists as impure science.

It is well enough to lay emphasis on the experience of the scientist as indispensable to the scientific validity of his results. When we do, we get what I have ventured to call an epistemological idealism, or the doctrine that there would be no *scientific* reality were there no scientists, with scientific ideas and ideational experiences. If there were a universe of real things which did not include somewhere or sometime within its cognitive experience of at least some part of it, and which were so completely self-contained that no thinker of another universe could even guess its existence, the reality of that universe could not be *scientific* reality, whatever else in its meaninglessness it might be. Even the idlest dream of such a universe would require a dream experience for which it could have a quasi-reality. The reality we know and the reality we predicate with any intelligibility or significance is reality for us as predicates. Even when we think of this kind of reality as being possible in another universe unradiated by a single gleam of intelligence or sense-experience, we still *are thinking* of it; we cannot think ourselves and everything else out of *such* a universe without being in *this* universe to do this thinking away. No thinker, no thought-object; no experience somewhere and somewhen, no meaningful reality anywhere and anytime. This is the truth which is contained in Professor Dewey's contention.

But it is one thing to say, No experience; no reality, and it is another thing to say, No *contemporaneous* experience, no reality. It is this contemporaneousness that Professor Dewey surreptitiously introduces into the statement of the truth, thereby converting it into, – well, let us say a huge assumption. “Thus, the knowledge-object *always* carries along, *contemporaneously with itself* an other, something to which it is relevant and accountable, and whose union with it affords the condition of its testing, its correction and verification. This union is intimate and complete. The distinction in experience between the knowledge portion, as such, and its own experienced context, as non-cognitional, is a reflective, analytic distinction – itself real in *its* experienced content and function.”⁵

By thus synchronizing the experience and the reality, the object of knowledge, which for the scientific geologist may be a real object belonging to the remote past, becomes so tied down to the present by the fact that it is cognitively experienced, that it loses the *character of past reality which it claims to have for scientific knowledge*. Knowledge of the past becomes a self-contradictory thing. To use expressions of Bosanquet’s, – the ‘time of judgment’ and ‘the time in judgment’ get so badly mixed that they must be reduced to the same time, the time of judging. Lotze’s view that the ways of thought and the ways of things are different is ridiculed out of court to make way for the sole alternative “view which regards reality as developing in and through judgment.”⁶ The development of our ideas of reality and the development of reality itself are economically merged into one development, the development of objects in our cognitive experience of them.

Let us now follow the results of this merger. I think that we shall see that the stock of the holding company rises at the expense of the manipulated stock, which falls to zero. In geology the scientist deals with facts cognized as prior to his cognizing experience of them. Professor Dewey tries to acknowledge this; he goes as far as his theory will allow him. But his theory will not allow him to regard the geological fact as complete reality. It is simply reality-in-the-process-of-transformation-towards-experience. This process of transformation toward reality is a fact “as objectively real as anything else,” and is “realized in present experience.” Hence “what is omitted from reality” in the scientist’s statement of the nature of the object “is always restored in the experience in which “that fact” is present.”

In dealing with reality-in-the-process-of-transformation-towards-experience, if, dropping out the first hyphen, you try the experiment of

⁵ All the italics are mine except the last.

⁶ Dr. Helen Bradford Thompson, in *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 126.

the “chopping off of the non-contemporaneously experienced earlier reality from later experience,” you do violence to “the pragmatic variety of empiricism with its interpretation of the place of reflective knowledge, or thought, in control of experience,” and you must remember that this pragmatic variety of empiricism “seems to have the call” here. If you put down your axe and let the hyphen be, that hyphen will wreck every fortune that is tied up in “strictly objectivistic realisms.”

The real trouble with this pragmatic variety of empiricism is that it is so much engaged in the business of the interpretation of the place of *reflective knowledge*, or *thought*, in the control of experience, that it ignores the right of the *object* to the place it claims, – a place in time prior to the date of the experience. It claims that place, not as an incomplete reality, but as a genuine ready-made reality, waiting all these ages to be recognized as such. The recognition does not, in the knowing experience, pretend to *give* reality to what it recognizes as real, any more than the registration of a deed of conveyance with the registrar of deeds makes the deed real. The deed is already real, or no registrar registering to doomsday can register reality into it.

The pragmatist of Professor Dewey’s type of empiricism writes as if a change in geological science involved a change in the actual past history or geological objects. But I am afraid that he would find it hard to make terms with the scientific geologist on the proposition that the discovery of geological development made that development real. The geologist would be unkind enough to say that discovery is not invention. The map of the past may be changed after the discovery, but that does not change the real past. If the map becomes more accurate in the effort of reflective knowledge to control present experience, that is because there was a real past, now fixed in its eternal state, which one map can more truthfully represent than another. It would be a queer sort of a past that should complaisantly adjust itself to conform to every change that the cartographer felt obliged to make in the effort to reintegrate his pure experience of cartographical distractions.

Or let us take the momentous day when Copernicus first hit upon his famous reintegration of astronomical experience after Ptolemaic tensions. Was the real earth at that time uprooted out of its place in the center of the universe and sent spinning in an elliptical orbit about the sun? Mighty as was the thought of Copernicus, it would be hard to suppose that it could suddenly impart a motion of many miles per second to the huge masses of the earth and the other planets, and cap the climax by performing the miracle of Joshua. The scientist is more apt to suppose that the real solar system at that moment kept on in the equable course it had been pursuing for countless milleniums, and that it

did not fret a single tremor throughout its whole frame save in the little nervous system of Copernicus himself.

In all these pre-Copernican æons, where was that "other" which the "knowledge object" of Copernicus had always carried along "contemporaneously with itself"? Had Copernicus's experience existed continuously through all pre-Copernican times? Or did the "knowledge object" of Copernicus not exist except contemporaneously with the historical Copernicus? I must confess that the attempt to think out this puzzle in terms of the "pragmatic variety of empiricism with its interpretation of the place of reflective knowledge, or thought, in control of experience" gives me a pure experience of tension and distraction, "of particular elements which are in strife." The facts I seem to get "are crude, raw, unorganized, brute. They lack relationship, that is, assured place in the universe: they are deficient as to continuity."⁷ And this, I am told, is an index of pragmatic untruth.

But we are assured that we can escape all this difficulty by recognizing the objects prior to Copernicus as incompletely real. The 'real' is a sop to science, the 'incompletely' is the acknowledgment of the truth of the pragmatic variety of empiricism. This seems to be an easy way out of the difficulty but let us look ahead a little before committing ourselves to this reconciliation of science and philosophy. "The non-contemporaneously experienced earlier reality" is not complete reality, because it is undergoing "change-in-the-direction-of, which is, to say the least, as objectively real as anything else." Does not this prove too much? The function of the solar system as an object of knowledge was not exhausted in the experience of *Copernicus*. It continues in the experience of every educated man to-day. If it be said that what is continuously undergoing transformation-in-the-direction-of is not complete, the solar system is incomplete yet, because it seems to be undergoing just such a hyphenated transformation every day, and it is hard to fix the term of that transformation before Byron's Last Man shall have found surcease for his unshared sorrows in the grave of all experience. And yet even then the solar system cannot be real, for the experience which is necessary to realize it is gone. We thus get the interesting result that nothing can be completely real till nothing is left to be possibly real. No wonder that the philosopher whose view of complete reality involves this paradox should have found that the paradox wrecks "all strictly objectivistic realisms." But why does he not see that every other ism shares the same fate?

But it may be argued that, although pure experientialism may be a floating mine which wrecks the whole philosophic navy in exploding

⁷ *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 52.

itself, still any other philosophic doctrine negatives the value and the reality of thought. The reply is: Not in the least, unless by reality is meant the whole universe, past, present, and to come; and by value is meant inclusiveness of such total reality. Thought may be real without being *omnitudo realitatis*. It may be an integral part of the universe, with its definite place in time and its definite work to do. What its place is, is scientifically determined, as everything is properly determined in science, by appeal to the witness of harmonized and reintegrated experience. Experience assigns to itself a place in the world of reality, as posterior to much of the reality experienced in scientific ideation. Experience also recognizes its own function in the world, just as it recognizes the function of other parts or the whole of reality. When it recognizes itself as necessary for the recognition of reality, it recognizes in itself a unique value but if it tries to emancipate itself from the duties of its sphere and to usurp the function of another sphere, it makes itself a laughing-stock, much as the would-be male females of our time do. Even though experience is bone of the bones and flesh of the flesh of reality, still she ought to realize that there were some real ribs whose prior existence was necessary to her making. She may give names to the animals brought before her, but if she arrogates to herself the power of giving reality to the very conditions that brought her into being, she is trying to become greater than Spinoza's God, who is merely *causa sui*. She wants to become *causa causæ sui*. Experience may look before and after, but she may not translocate. She may embrace the real, but not reduce it to a dependency of herself.

If it be asked how the real, which may exist prior to experience, can come to be an object of subsequent experience of it, unless the obsolete doctrine of representative knowledge be true, I should answer that perhaps there is more truth in that doctrine than many would be disposed to acknowledge to-day. Let us look at experience as it actually is, and see what are the facts. At present I am experiencing my typewriter, *i.e.*, there is an awareness of it along with other things, among which is a group of contents called by Professor James 'the empirical Me.' The awareness comprehends them all, including many relations subsisting between them severally and collectively. The awareness is not in any one of them but of them together. These various things do not exist for the awareness as borrowing their reality from it. They exist for it as just being there, in various relations to each other. The awareness, as embracing the color and the shape of the typewriter, is called *seeing* it; as embracing the hardness of the keys is called *touching* them. What is thus seen and touched stands in bold relief in space before my body. Now let me close my eyes and raise my fingers. There is a change in the field of objects. Instead of the thing in clear

outlines, there is now something of which I am aware as similar to what was before my body a while ago, but also as somehow different. What I formerly experienced is not now present along with this new something, and by its presence furnishing one of the 'relata' for the relation or similarity. On the contrary, I am aware only of this new something *as similar* and yet *as different*. The thing it resembles and does not entirely resemble is absent from my awareness as a definite content of my present experience, but I know that it was experienced only a moment ago. Now I move my fingers, still keeping my eyes closed; I again become aware of the kind of hardness I experienced a moment ago when I touched the keys before. The present hardness is much more similar to that previous hardness than the present color I see with closed lids is to the color viewed with open eyes. The keys I still see are ghostly white and black; the fingers I see are ghostly fingers; but the hardness I feel is not ghostly. Now this object of my vision, so 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,' is called a visual image, corresponding to and resembling the *thing* I saw once and can again see if only I open my eyes. The image is, moreover, not merely something in the field of vision; it is there as standing for something else, – for what is called the real typewriter, which I can see and do touch. I know the reality through this image. If you ask me what is the color of the typewriter frame, I answer, 'Black.' I see the black of my image and it *means* the black of the real typewriter. In this case, unquestionably, I know the reality through the image. I can do so because I am aware of the resemblance the image has to the real typewriter, which I saw a moment ago standing in its naked reality before my eyes. If I were to doubt the resemblance, I should only have to open my eyes, and lo! the real thing would stand revealed as having just the color I attributed to it, because I saw that color in the image. That is to say, when my eyes are closed I have a representative visual image of the reality I have previously seen face to face.

It is to be noted that such representative knowledge differs greatly from the representative knowledge of the school of Hamilton. Hamilton thought that the thing we saw with open eyes was not the real thing; it was merely a replica of the real thing. Hence he believed that all our knowledge is representative. According to the account given above, not all knowledge is representative. The knowledge of the real thing's visual characters which we get when our eyes are open is direct and immediate: it is intuitive. It is only when my eyes are closed that I have to depend on representative knowledge. Now as I can have both intuitive and representative knowledge of reality, and as I can be aware of the similarity or dissimilarity between them, I can, when I have intuitive knowledge, test the correctness of the representative knowledge I previously had. The

arguments, therefore, which have been directed against the theory of the representative character of *all* knowledge lose their force when turned against the asserted fact of the representative character of a large part of our knowledge. If we call this representative part of our knowledge "knowing the external world through ideas which are merely within us," it is hard to see the justification which Professor Dewey has for saying that such knowing is "an inherent self-contradiction."

The question, however, may properly be asked whether the image is "merely within us." Answering from experience, I should say that it is. I have never found any reason for supposing that the image can exist apart from the awareness of it, and I presume that by "merely existing within us" Professor Dewey means "existing only when there is an awareness of what exists." On the other hand, I think that I have good reason for believing that the real thing I see continues to exist when I no longer see it, when I do not even think of it, and when so far as I know no one experiences it in any way.

The trouble with Hamilton's school is that, having convinced themselves that some of our knowledge is representative, they allowed themselves to infer that all knowledge is representative. The trouble with philosophers of Professor Dewey's way of thinking is that, having convinced themselves that some of our knowledge is not representative, and that, if all our knowledge were representative, we should never have any criterion for truth, they jump to the conclusion that none of our knowledge is representative. If people would only give up trying to reduce all knowledge to a dull uniformity of character and would describe facts as they are, we should have neither the insoluble problem of proving copies authentic when we can never get at the originals, nor the anti-scientific view that things are real only in experience, and that real things change when our purely experienced images of them change, and that the changes of these images are the changes of the things.

The theory above outlined as to the partially intuitive and partially representative character of our knowledge makes possible a meaning of transsubjective reference, which accords with the facts and does not involve contradictions. By transsubjective reference, according to this theory, is meant reference to what exists beyond the direct object of awareness when that object is merely subjective.

When I close my eyes and remove my fingers from the keys of my typewriter, I am aware of images (which are called merely subjective, because they are supposed to have no existence except as they appear in consciousness); but I am also aware of a 'reference' of these images to what is not now directly present in consciousness, viz., my typewriter. This transsubjective reference finds its simplest illustration in memory. The thing remembered and the image present in consciousness when we

remember, are of course not the same thing. We cannot literally recall our boyhood days, but we do have images which, however, are not mere images and nothing more we have images which reproduce with some verisimilitude those bygone days. Not only is there reproduction, there is also recognition, of the past experience. The images come to us in the character of representatives, present ambassadors bearing credentials from a court which has long been levelled in the dust of time. But we honor the credentials, and treat the embassy with all the consideration due to the power they represent. This treatment of the present image as representative of a past reality is a transsubjective reference. The image is a 'relatum' in relation to a non-existent 'correlatum.' We might call the relation, so far as the immediate contents of experience are concerned, a one-term relation; the other term is not present in the 'pure experience' of the moment. But its absence does not mar the character of the present term as a related term, recognized as such. There is pure experience of reference to; and if the phrase is to be completed, the complement lies beyond the immediate experience. An image thus referred to what is not present in consciousness to complete the reference, is what I should call an 'idea.' All our reminiscent knowledge is by means of ideas.

Now if we may know the past, of which we are no longer immediately aware, by means of ideas, why may we not know present objects, of which we are not immediately aware, in the same way? At present, for instance, I have an image of my bed in another room. The image is not my bed, and the bed is not an object of my immediate pure experience, while I am writing. Nevertheless the image refers to the real bed, now existing, in the same way in which the memory refers to something not itself something not now existing but having existed in the past. The fact that in the one case the object referred to is past and in the other case exists simultaneously with the image, does not make any difference in the transsubjective character of the reference.

If it be asked how I know that the bed is up in my room, a distinct reality from my image of it as my body sits here at my inking table, I should say that Hume has fairly stated the facts on which my belief in the distinction rests, although of course Hume did not think that the belief was logically valid; the belief was for him a mere fiction of the imagination. But for him, when he was consistent, the memory image had no transsubjective reference either. Whether we call the motive which prompts to the belief an instinct, or reason, or common sense, the fact is that the belief is in normal experience present; and no argument can be given for its untenableness which does not at the same time assume its tenableness and its correctness.

Now, just as I have memory images referred to realities previously

experienced, and just as I have images referring to present realities not immediately experienced, so I can have images referring to past or future realities which have never been experienced. The fall of Constantinople, the martyrdom of Bruno, the next Fourth of July, and my death-bed experience are all present to me by representative images. I know them more or less accurately by means of ideas. All my knowledge of the past, all my forecast of the future, and all my knowledge of facts now existing save the few I have before me in the way of sense-perception 'inner' and 'outer,' are representative. Bosanquet, therefore, does not seem to be far from the truth when he says that we come into contact with reality in sense-perception. Everywhere else, we have images referring to reality, ideas of reality, but not reality itself.

If I read Professor James aright, this view is not far from his, yet it differs from his in one important respect. He seems to make the truth of experience where substitutional images are employed, to consist in the fact that these images do actually continue uninterruptedly into the experience where the reality becomes an object of sense-perception. I should rather say that one important *test* of my imaging experience is found in subsequent or prior sense-perceptions. The *truth* of the images, however, consists in the correspondence of the images with a transsubjective reality which now exists, or with a transsubjective reality which has existed in the past or will exist in the future, whether ever actually an object of immediate experience or not. The sense-perception confirms the truth, but is not the truth.

Truth is the agreement between ideas and reality. Such agreement does not necessitate exact correspondence, point for point, between images and reality. But for truth there must be correspondence in regard to the feature which is transsubjectively referred.

PURE EXPERIENCE AND REALITY: A DISCLAIMER

John Dewey. "Pure Experience and Reality: A Disclaimer." *Philosophical Review* 16.4 (July 1907): 419–22. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 4 (1977), pp. 120–24.

It is hard to judge how far it is advisable to enter into controversial discussion in reply to criticism. Observation of its usual course tends to the conclusion that the time devoted to it might ordinarily better be spent upon independent analysis or construction. And if one's original writings, put forth without controversial entanglements, are so awkwardly phrased as to provoke serious misunderstanding, why give the philosophic brethren additional cause for offense? But "Silence gives assent," and may propagate misunderstanding in minds hitherto innocent. Moreover, Professor McGilvary's misconception of my position, as he sets it forth in the May number of this REVIEW, under the caption of "Pure Experience and Reality" (Vol. XVI, pp. 266–284), is so extreme that, to some extent, it may be categorically dealt with.

1. He refers to me as among those who hold that the "reality of anything is the reality it has as experienced and *only when experienced*" (p. 266, italics mine); and again "No *contemporaneous* experience, *no* reality" (p. 274). I do not hold, never have held, and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, have never intimated nor implied any such views. That experience means experienced things; that all philosophic conclusions are to be drawn from the things as experienced (not from the concept of experience, which I have held to be purely empty excepting as indicating a *method* of procedure and recourse); that things are what they are experienced *as*, or experienced *to be*, I have asserted. The "only when" in the quotation has no standing in anything I have written. And books, chairs, geological ages, etc., are experienced, so far as I am aware, as existent at other times than the moments *when* they are experienced. Does not Professor McGilvary *experience* them *as* that sort of thing, *to be* that sort of thing?

2. The question raised in the paper upon which Professor McGilvary bases his criticism is (granting the existence of things prior to ex-

periencing organisms), "What is the better index, for philosophy, of reality: its earlier or its later form?" (These words are in the original text and are quoted by Professor McGilvary himself) That is to say, shall philosophy build its interpretation of reality upon reality as existent prior to its experience, or upon the reality of *that as now experienced*? The answer given is in the latter sense that the earlier (say Eozoic geological age) is experienced as the condition of a present experience which expresses reality more adequately (for philosophy, not for science) than the conception of it as merely preexistent. This may be a false conception, but it is a totally different idea from that to which Professor McGilvary devotes much poetry, eloquence, and humor. How could it be a *condition* of the present experience unless it existed prior in time? But Professor McGilvary is so well aware that the prior existence of one thing to another thing in time leaves entirely untouched the question of the nature of the reality of time, and hence of the reality, for philosophy, of the temporal sequence, that I do not understand the satisfaction he gets from writing as if I were totally ignorant of this rudimentary distinction. Moreover, if the doctrine be false, it is still one that Professor McGilvary himself holds. He writes: "No experience somewhere and somewhen, no meaningful reality anywhere and anytime. *This is the truth which is contained in Professor Dewey's contention*" (p. 274, italics mine). I should say it was; the only truth for which I contended. My enjoyment, accordingly, of the ludicrous position in which Professor McGilvary places the "pure empiricist," with me as *corpus vile*, is heightened by the fact, that in view of his expressed agreement, I can stand the joke – if he can.

3. Professor McGilvary quotes from me: "The present experience of the veriest unenlightened ditch-digger does philosophic justice to the earlier reality [whose existence he charges me with denying!] in a way which the scientific statement does not and cannot; *cannot* that is, *as formulated knowledge*" (p. 273, italics mine). Unfortunately for his logic (though doubtless fortunately for his humor and poetic metaphor), he fails to quote, or take into account, the next sentence, which runs as follows: "As itself vital or direct experience...the latter is more valuable and is truer in the sense of worth more for other interpretations." The point at issue is not in the least whether the experience *creates* the things known, but whether the scientific formula as such or the direct, vital experience as such is, for the philosopher, a better index of the nature of reality, it being expressly declared that a direct experience which *includes* the scientific formulation is better than one which does not. When Professor McGilvary himself comes out strongly for the *representative* character of knowledge, he seems to be again in favor of my contention that a direct experience is a better index for philosophy than

the knowledge phase as such of an experience. But perhaps only the erring empiricist holds that direct is better than merely representative experience. If so, I am still content to err; and shall abide by my conviction that an experience in which a symbol is experienced in its fulfillment or embodiment, is better than one in which the symbol alone is experienced, just as it is also better than one which remains as yet unrepresentative. And there are certain echoes from one Hegel, who held that the mediation finds its fruition in a new immediacy which I hope still also reaches the ears of Professor McGilvary.

4. Professor McGilvary refers to *Studies in Logical Theory* as follows: "In that work he [*i.e.*, the present writer] insisted that the *object of thought* when it has emerged from the experience of stress and strain and appears in a subsequent tranquil experience as the result of pragmatic adjustment, must not be read back anachronistically into the time preceding the adjustment. The reader was therefore left to inter that no *truth* made out by intellectual labor is *to be held valid* of anything real that may have existed before that labor was ended" (p. 267, *italics mine*).

The reader was not only left to 'infer' this, but the reader who did infer it was 'left.' The point of the contention to which Professor McGilvary refers is the anachronism of referring back the "object of *thought*" (as characteristically a *thought/object*) to reality prior to the thinking. The old-fashioned empiricist held that thinking has no forms or modes of its own at all, being merely a complex of sensations or a disintegration of a prior complex; the epistemological idealist held that such forms or categories not only exist but are characteristic of reality as such, which therefore is to be conceived, philosophically, as a system of thought relations; that thought as such is constitutive of reality as such. Now one object of the *Studies* was to insist, as against the sensationalist, that thinking does determine a characteristic objective situation, and, *against the idealist*, that it determines an object in process, through doubt and inquiry, of *redetermination*. Its purport, in short, is that all thinking is reflective, and that it is constitutive not of reality *per se* or at large, but only of such reality as has been reorganized through specific thinking, the reorganization finally taking place through *an action* in which the thinking terminates and by which it is tested. Thought is thus conceived of as a control-phenomenon biological in origin, humane, practical, or moral in import, involving in its issue real transformation of real reality. Hence the text abounds in assertions of reality existing prior to thinking, prior to coming to know, which, through the organic issue of thinking in experimental action, is reconstructed.

That it should be possible for a thinker of Professor McGilvary's equipment – to say nothing of his command of wit and of the poetry of

picturesque and catastrophic metaphor – completely to invert the sense of my writing, even after its obscure and awkward character is taken into account, would be finally discouraging, were it not that I am buoyed up by three considerations. In the first place, he holds that knowledge is by subjective images which acquire a ‘transsubjective reference’ to the realities to which they subjectively mean to refer, – the connection of the intention with the image, unfortunately, not being elucidated. Hence it would not be surprising if an image of my logical beliefs should spring up in Professor McGilvary’s subjective resort for such creatures which should be totally unlike its object. If such an ‘image’ were of great æsthetic brilliancy and of an unusually vivacious quality, it might easily impose upon him. Or the image might get switched off during its ‘transsubjective’ travels and finally light upon my devoted head, though originally intended, say, for some sensationalistic idealist. It would be obviously unjust to hold Professor McGilvary responsible for such a *faux pas* on the part of his image after it left him.

Again, thinkers who have got habituated to a mode of psychological analysis, which, in the interests of psychology, resolves experience into certain transient acts and states of a person, into sensations and images of a psycho-physical organism, may forget that others employ the term experience in a more vital, concrete, and pregnant sense. Hence, when others talk about experience, it is assumed that this means the psychological abstract which it means to the critic. Finally, modern philosophy has been built up on the foundations of epistemology; that is, it has held that reality is to be reached by the philosopher on the basis of an analysis of the procedure of knowledge. Hence, when a writer endeavors to take naïvely a frankly naturalistic, biological, and moral attitude, and to account for knowledge on the basis of the place it occupies in such a reality, he is treated as if his philosophy were only, after all, just another kind of epistemology.

PURE EXPERIENCE AND REALITY: A REASSERTION

Evander B. McGilvary. "Pure Experience and Reality: A Reassertion."
Philosophical Review 16.4 (July 1907): 422–24.

A page and a day are given me for replying to the above disclaimer; hence on this occasion I cannot well take up all the points that need further discussion.

Professor Dewey attributes my failure to understand him to the fact that my image of his logical views got switched off during its trans-subjective travels. But of course this is absurd. In fact no mistake has occurred, and none could occur. "Immediate empiricism postulates that things – anything, everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term 'thing' – are what they are experienced as. Hence, if one wishes to describe anything *truly*, his task is to tell what it is experienced as being." (*Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. II, p. 393; italics mine.) Now in my article, I told exactly what Professor Dewey's logical philosophy was by me experienced as being; hence that article has described his philosophy truly.

Professor Dewey disclaims having ever intimated or implied that he ever held any such view as that the reality of anything is the reality it has only when experienced. No doubt he does not experience having made any such intimations or implications. But on my part, after tensions over what seemed the absolute contradiction involved in the statement that "things are what they are experienced *as*, or experienced *to be*," I finally got the satisfying and reintegrating experience that Professor Dewey supposed the reality of anything is the reality it has only when experienced. I thereupon took the pragmatic outcome of my previous perplexity over the doctrine as containing the meaning of the doctrine. If I have made a mistake in this, it is simply the mistake of a disciple who follows too literally the master's instructions.

Now let me describe the logical process which issued in my mistake. Zöllner's lines "*are* divergent" when experienced as divergent; they are parallel when experienced as parallel (*Loc. cit.*, p. 397). This was the cue. The second epochal stage was reached when I began to think of

what would happen if the reality of the divergence and the reality of the parallelism could somehow extricate themselves from the times of the experiences to which they severally belonged. It looked very much as if there would be imminent danger that these realities might in their wanderings meet each other in some common time to the logical embarrassment of each. This unpleasantness was obviated when the third stage of the logical process was reached. In this stage I found peace in the thought that the real divergence and the real parallelism of Zöllner's lines were severally pinned down to the times of the several experiences of which they formed each a part. Of course the issue of this logical procedure makes the *experientia mensura* doctrine very much like the old *homo mensura* doctrine, but then one must describe things as he finds them in his experience.

Professor Dewey claims that, in the article which I examined, he repeatedly referred to reality prior to experience, and that he spoke of such reality as the condition of the subsequent experience. This is true: I saw the words. But when I tried to get any meaning out of them, the 'past' reality became for me a present one, for Professor Dewey's past realities have a way of *now* undergoing *past* changes every time they are differently experienced. A thing which now changes I cannot bring myself to experience as a past reality. A leopard which died in Jeremiah's day and yet now manages to change the spots it had during the Exile, seems to me not so much a creature of the past as an interesting monstrosity of the present.

PROFESSOR DEWEY'S VIEW OF AGREEMENT

Roy Wood Sellars. "Professor Dewey's View of Agreement." *Journal of Philosophy* 4.16 (1 August 1907): 432–35.

The article by Professor Dewey on the 'Control of Ideas by Facts'¹ presents such an opportunity for definite questions by reason of its analysis of a specific situation that I can not forbear stating, in an interrogatory form, the difficulties I experience. My agreement with his logical position is so fundamental that any outstanding divergence on minor points must be capable of amendment.

Foregoing preliminaries, I shall plunge into the heart of the matter. Suppose, to use his illustration of the man lost in the wood (p. 201), the man has been hunting and, having bagged enough game, decides to return home. Presently he discovers an unfamiliarity in the appearance of things. We have now desire on the man's part to get home and a recognition that he is lost. Temporarily his action is stopped. He must reflect; but this reflection is for the purpose of enabling him to fulfill his primary desire to get home. Under the new conditions, the old desire has given place to a more complex one involving, consciously, means and end. This signifies that the focus of attention has been shifting gradually. He must find the *way* home. This gives a very complex reflective situation. Observation follows. He sizes up the surroundings, attempting to take in all the relevant facts, such as the lay of the land, the presence of conspicuous objects, the direction of the sun, etc. If he recognizes a landmark, a more or less definitely organized idea of the environment arises. "It is not some little psychical entity or piece of consciousness-stuff, but is the interpretation of the locally present environment in reference to its absent portions..." (p. 202). It may be that he isn't certain of the correctness of his idea. If he reaches by its means, however, a place he is sure of, he remarks, if he is reflective, "That idea of mine *was* true." I would lay considerable stress upon the past tense of the proposition.

¹ This Journal, Vol. IV., p. 197.

First, I would raise the question of a possible ambiguity in the use of the term 'plan of action' as synonymous with idea. I admit frankly that the thinking has been purposive, but is the idea a purpose? "That is, acted upon sincerely, it has led to the desired conclusion; it has *through action* worked out the state of things which *it contemplated or intended*" (italics mine). Now I would submit that the *man* intended to go home, not the idea. Referring back to the analysis above, – in order to get home (primary desire) he discovered that he must find the way (secondary desire). The idea is connected with *that*, not *directly* with the getting home. "The agreement, correspondence, is between purpose, plan and its own execution, fulfillment." Here, again, purpose is made synonymous with plan, and plan, apparently, with idea. It strikes me there are two purposes in the case, one subordinate to the other: (1) to get home, and this is not the idea; (2) to get a true idea of the way, and this again is not the idea.

'As to the agreement of the idea and the environment' (p. 202), Professor Dewey shuts out, first, presented reality, 'for that reality is the reality of himself lost.' I should say, because, by the terms of the problem, presented reality is not the reality wanted. "Not with the complete reality, for that at this stage of proceedings is the idea itself." No, once more, for the reality sought is not present by the very nature of the search. The conscious experience is, I submit, more complex than Professor Dewey realizes. The individual is, in all probability, a practical realist. He has just come from home and believes that the forest stretches away beyond his ken and then gives place to the fields which lead up to his home. Now an adult has certain organized constructs; one of these is the impersonal physical world. I would refer in this connection to James's doctrine of the many worlds.² These constructs always have gaps in them when a problem arises concerning them. The man's construct of the physical world is of this kind. He may know the plan of the next village or the direction of New York from Albany, but, just now, he wants to know the way home. Consequently he disregards his other geographical knowledge, because it isn't relevant. It is to fill this particular gap that the idea arises. Until it drops into place, so to speak, it is psychical, personal, *his* idea. If it is admitted to be true, it flows over and, behold! we have our construct with the 'aching void' filled; the problem has disappeared. My terms must remind the reader of James's description of remembering a name, and it is built upon analogy with that. What, then, is the agreement? It would be paradoxical to say 'agreement with this gap,' and yet, in a sense, that is the fact. If it were not for this functional relation of idea as psychical and the physical,

² 'Principles of Psychology,' Vol. II., p. 291.

impersonal world, postulated but not completely known, the idea would not when its truth is recognized, fill the gap, in the physical construct, just where it does. This is the movement in what I would call the organization and building up of the physical world. We say the idea *is* true. Why? Because it agrees with the now constructed physical world. We can look at the *same reality as physical and as psychical*. But, natural realists that we are, we believe that the world was that way all the time. We say the idea *was* true. This is where an unconscious duplicity or straddling enters, which I believe accounts for a good deal of the trouble with 'correspondence.' 'Agreement' represents an endeavor to harmonize structure and function, the past and the present. Now this is a perhaps unduly technical way of asserting that we seek to *disregard the fact of reconstruction and growth because we are dealing with a construct that we look upon as non-temporal and impersonal and common*. I do not think this dialectic movement in the erection of an impersonal and *common* world is adequately recognized in discussions of truth. Extreme pragmatists emphasize too strenuously the fact of function, of reconstruction, of change, the personal aide. Extreme intellectualists see only the formal, the structural, the timeless, and thus may fall into the copy view. As in most controversies, a middle position is more likely to be right. 'Agreement' involves an unconscious attempt by our thought at a reconciliation. Common sense believes 'it was that way all the time if we had only known it.' A warning may prevent misinterpretation. This is a logical question, primarily, and logic has nothing to do, directly, with realism and idealism as metaphysical systems.

Early in this article I criticized Professor Dewey for a confusion of idea and purpose, asserting that the term 'plan of action,' so much used to-day, is ambiguous. An illustration occurs to me that may bring out my position better. Suppose I am standing at one side of a house with a friend, a house we are both acquainted with, and the question arises about the structure of another part of the house, not visible from where we stand. Both of us have ideas which until they are proved by actual observation we regard as personal, while the house is common and impersonal. Later we may have the purpose of going around to see which of us is right, but that is not the idea, nor does the idea guide us. Our 'plan of action' will be to walk around. Before we seek to verify our ideas, what do we believe? If I am not mistaken, that the house there is of a certain form and the invisible portion 'hangs on' the part seen by us. The question before each is, Have I filled it out properly?

Perchance, a side-light can be thrown on this problem by a contrast. Some ideas are plans of action, literally, and yet not concerned with truth. I have a problem at present. It is this, Shall I go to the library or

down town? It is surely a reflective situation, and I can think of myself as doing either, but I do not raise the truth question. Why? After I go down town I do not say, I was right. Why, again? Because I am dealing here with another sort of reality. Ordinarily people do not regard themselves as determined, as the house is. The very nature of this sort of reality is to be changing, active. It strikes me that genetic analysis of the various constructs we make, would go a long way towards solving logical problems.

THE CHICAGO "IDEA" AND IDEALISM

Evander B. McGilvary. "The Chicago 'Idea' and Idealism." *Journal of Philosophy* 5.22 (22 October 1908): 589–97.

Every fundamentally new attempt at reconstruction in science involves, to some extent at least, a new terminology. The old words of a language may still be employed, but they are made to carry new meanings, and it is the task of the attentive reader to keep from slipping back into the old meanings when he would understand the new message. This commonplace reflection is suggested by the present status of the pragmatistic controversy. Professor Dewey has repeatedly complained that his critics have failed to understand him because they have interpreted what he says as if he were employing old words in their old meanings. The complaint is amply justified, and, of course, this misunderstanding is a bar to any true appreciation of his instrumental logic. There is no word which is apt to give more trouble to Professor Dewey's readers than the word "idea." The fault is not Professor Dewey's, for he has taken great pains to make clear just what he means by the term. But what he means is so different from what is ordinarily meant that it is no wonder that his critics have failed to remain true to his definition when they try to appraise the value of his statements about ideas. For instance, when one finds this challenge thrown down by Professor Dewey: "Do ideas present themselves except in situations which are doubtful and inquired into?"¹ one is apt to take up the gauntlet with confident heart, for does not every one know that ideas do present themselves constantly in situations which are untroubled by any doubt? But the cautious reader knows that the gauntlet has a string attached to it and may not be lightly taken up.

In this paper I shall try to state as best I may the new meaning of idea in Professor Dewey's writings, and then ask some questions which this new meaning suggests. But before doing this, let us take a brief survey of the current meanings of the term. The word idea has at least two quite different types of meaning in common use. These two meanings can be traced back in English to Locke and Hume. They may be called the

¹ This Journal, Vol. V., p. 378. [*Middle Works* 4: 93.]

inclusive and the exclusive significations of the word. Locke used the word of everything of which we are conscious when we think; Hume used it in antithesis to "impression." And since their days, not to go farther back, both these usages have been classic. Of course, the particular nuance which the term has in either sense is determined by the views which are held in regard to the genesis and the function or reference of ideas; and these views are various. For instance, Lotze, like Locke, set over against the world of ideas, used inclusively, a world of reality outside of ideas, which ideas are to deal with as well as they can: Professor Dewey has shown with masterly skill how Sisyphean is the task which is set for ideas in this scheme of things. The idealist, also using idea in the inclusive sense, denies that there is any reality that is not idea; he has, therefore, no need to make ideas adjust themselves to a reality which is not ideal: the only adjustment necessary is among the ideas themselves. Hume, taking the term in an exclusive sense, finds, however, no work cut out for ideas in the fact that they are not exhaustive of reality. They carry no reference to the other class of realities. All they have to do is to be more or less lively, and the laws of association manage this business for them. The psychologist of the present day is apt to use the word in the exclusive sense fixed by Hume, but, following the hint given by Hume himself, although not developed by him, the psychologist regards ideas as those elements in experience that are due to central stimulations of the cortex, as opposed to sensations which are due to peripheral stimulations. The "plain man" uses the term in a manner similar to that adopted by the psychologist, although, of course, he has very vague notions of the basis of the distinction between idea and sensation. I think that it can properly be said that the psychological employment of the term is merely a refined and critical adaptation of the vulgar use. Now, when ideas are used in this way in antithesis to sensation, it may be recognized that they not only are occurrences accounted for by their connection with brain-processes, but also are in some way the vehicles of knowledge. They have not only a structure and a genesis, but also a function and a value determined by the success with which they perform their function. This function is knowing. The examination of this function and of the value of ideas in this functional process is generally turned over by the psychologist to the epistemologist. If the latter takes up the problem on its own account and ignores the psychological problems of structure and genesis, we have then two abstract sciences standing side by side, much to the scandal of pragmatists and humanists. The division of labor is regarded as an ultimate and hopeless scission of the material taken in hand. The living unity of experience is dissected into dead members, and where is the Isis to gather up the scattered anatomy of experience, and

where is the Ezekiel to prophesy upon the dead bones that they may live? There is no goddess in Egypt and no prophet in Israel in these days.

But we have the pragmatist who can see to it that the default of supernatural beings shall not be fatal to natural human knowing. He employs an ounce of prevention where they would have resorted to tons and tons of miraculous cure. He would have no division of labor between psychology and epistemology, for, of course, division of labor is division of what you labor on, and this is to be avoided at all hazards. One unspecialized type of laborer is to be employed on the work, and this secures unity of finished product. Assembling is an impossibility in manufacture; hence do nothing that will make it necessary. The logician can do all the work and keep the parts together from start to finish.

This, of course, necessitates a new terminology in the factory. The real trouble with the antiquated method is found in the kind of distinction that is made between "ideas, meanings, thoughts, ways of conceiving, comprehending, interpreting facts," "suggestions, guesses, theories, estimates," etc., on the one hand, and "facts," "objects," "data," and what not, on the other. These are not forever fixed in their eternal state else they have done with things below. They are simply instrumental distinctions, functional variants, and are just what at any time you take them to be. Of course, even thus, you can not get rid of the distinctions, and so can not get rid of division of labor; but you have a different kind of division of labor. The division here falls upon the material which the logician studies, not upon the students of the material. As this material is living reflective experience, it can temporarily endure all sorts of tensions and distractions, taking these up and working them over till it effects a reorganization. Indeed, without this tension and distraction, there would be no thinking life. But the student of this life must not divide what in life is connected even in its division. So that, while in this new way of ideas "datum and ideatum are divisions of labor, cooperative instrumentalities, for economical dealing with the problem of the maintenance of the integrity of experience," the logician must recognize that either "is a sheer abstraction from the standpoint either of the organized experience left behind, or of the reorganized experience which is the end – the objective."² "Thus the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is not one between meaning as such and datum as such. It is a specification that emerges, correspondently, in *both* datum and ideatum, as affairs of the direction of logical movement. That which is

² "Studies in Logical Theory," p. 52. [*Middle Works* 2: 339.] The second quotation is taken out of its narrower context, where the subject of the sentences is a particular datum, namely, "Mere change of apparent position of sun, which is absolutely unquestioned as datum." But the larger context, I think, justifies the use to which I have put this clause.

left behind in the evolution of accepted meaning is characterized as real, but only in a psychical sense; that which is moved toward is regarded as real in an objective, cosmic sense.”³ The psychic, the ideal, on the one hand, the cosmic, the objective, on the other, are thus nothing but shifting values in the ever growing unity of experience. Just what shift is made is determined by the problem and its solution in any definite concrete situation. When an intellectual problem is taken up in experience, there is always something that for the time being is accepted as fact – this is the datum; there is something else which is suggested as somehow appertaining to this fact – this is idea. The idea may be subsequently rejected in the outcome of thought’s travail – it is then definitively for this occasion characterized as merely psychic. On the contrary, the suggestion may be accepted; it then merges with the datum, after the latter has been correspondingly changed to receive the suggested content, and it ceases to be an idea for the occasion and becomes objective cosmic fact.

Not only is this shifting according to the concrete emergencies and the concrete achievements of the logical process a fate which befalls ideas and data, it likewise draws into its kaleidoscopic field even the terms sensation and image. “One of the aims of the ‘Studies in Logical Theory’ was to show...that...such distinctions as sensation, image, etc., mark instruments and crises in the development of controlled judgment, *i.e.*, of inferential conclusions.”⁴ Whether any experience is to be considered sensational is not determined then by resort to psychophysical investigation – except, perhaps, where the problem is psychophysical and not logical? – but by consideration of the harmonious outcome of the previously disturbed situation. We are not told whether sensation is synonymous with accepted fact, but we are at any rate warned not to consider it “in terms of the psychology which obtained in the *critic*’s mind.”⁵

Now these are perfectly clear distinctions, and although I may not have done justice to the clean-cut thought in which this view is worked out, still I hope that I have blocked the distinctions out sufficiently for recognition by their author and by others. But what follows? I think that we must agree that one thing follows; namely, the necessity of giving just the kind of answer that Professor Dewey gives to the five sets of questions which he asks on page 378 of this JOURNAL [this volume, pp. 93–94]. According to this new definition of ideas and of facts, ideas do *not* present themselves except in situations which are doubtful and

³ Op. cit. pp. 53–54. [*Middle Works* 2: 341.]

⁴ This Journal, Vol. V., p. 376. [*Middle Works* 4: 92–93.]

⁵ Ibid., p. 377. [*Middle Works* 4: 93.]

inquired into. They do not exist side by side with the facts to which they refer *when* these facts are themselves known. They do *not* exist except when judgment is in suspense. They are *nothing but* the suggestions, conjectures, hypotheses, theories, tentatively entertained during a suspended conclusion, and so forth and so forth. *These answers are determined by the definitions already given of fact and idea*, and no examination of actual thinking experience is necessary for making the appropriate reply. All one has to do is to examine the definitions of the terms used, just as in Euclidean geometry all that one has to do in determining whether parallel lines meet is to consult the definition of parallel lines. The scheme is beautifully simple, and if you adhere to it, you get rid of some very disagreeable questions which force themselves on you if you refuse to adopt it. But if the questions referred to are asked with a view to determining whether the new way of ideas comports with facts, then we have a different matter on our hands. Into this question I can not go at present.

However, there are some questions which force themselves on me when I try to accept the new scheme on which the definitions rest. Is not the scheme a thoroughgoing idealism, and a subjective idealism at that? But to guard against misunderstanding in putting the question, let me hasten to say at once that I do not conceive the point of view underlying these definitions to be idealistic, if the connotation of "idealistic" is adapted to that of "idea" in the scheme. The "Studies in Logical Theory" admits the existence of facts as well as of ideas, each defined in a special way. Professor Dewey, therefore, has a perfect right to repel the suggestion that his scheme is idealistic, if idealism is defined according to "idea" in that scheme. We all remember how mildly indignant Bishop Berkeley used to get when the suggestion arose that his way of ideas did away with matter. He easily showed that it did no such thing. Did not the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth find its place in his idealism, and what is meant by matter anyway but just such things as make heaven vocal and earth comfortable? But I believe that it is fairly settled these days, if it were ever doubted, that the fact that Berkeley's views admitted these material things did not make his doctrine non-idealistic. There is a *current* definition of idealism according to which we gauge systems as idealistic or not. Is Professor Dewey's system idealistic *according to this definition*? Idealism seems to be generally applied to any theory which regards all reality as embraced within experiences or within Experience. It is the view that recognizes no residual reality uncatalogued after the inventory of all experience is taken. The thinker called idealistic may not even use the term experience; but we can see from his writings whether, if he had used that term as it is now generally used, he would have been willing to say with

Mr. Bradley: "I am driven to the conclusion that for me experience is the same as reality. The fact that falls elsewhere seems, in my mind, to be a mere word and a failure, or else an attempt at self-contradiction. It is a vicious abstraction whose existence is meaningless nonsense, and is therefore not possible."⁶ If any thinker endorses these words, he is an idealist. Now when any of Professor Dewey's critics calls him idealistic, the critic uses the term in this current sense. When Professor Dewey repudiates the epithet, does he use the term in another sense? If so, are they not both right, each in his own way? Professor Dewey hardly refutes the claim of his opponent by failing to meet the claim on its own grounds. A clear unambiguous answer from Professor Dewey to the question whether he is an idealist in the current sense of idealism as defined above would, I am sure, make his view much more intelligible. Most of his readers have found him idealistic, only to be told that they are miserably mistaken. This has left them miserably nonplussed. If Professor Dewey thinks that it is too much of an accommodation to the weakness of his readers to answer the above question, he can at least tell us what he means by idealism, when he denies that he is an idealist. And if in the definition he employs the term *idea*, he can tell us whether that term is to be taken in the sense of the "Studies in Logical Theory."⁷

But, of course, when experience is used in the definition of idealism, we have another difficulty what is meant by experience? The ordinary man in his ordinariness uses this term as in the first instance not inclusive of all reality. For he seems to find experience a very shifting thing. What is part of experience at one time is not part of it at another. Even if experience be used in the most inclusive sense as embracing ideas, guesses, hypotheses, theories, as well as facts, still these, of course, are in constant flux, as pragmatism tells us. Not only do these unstable beings chassé backwards and forwards in the figures they describe, but they often chassé incontinently out of these figures altogether. When this evanishment occurs, the ordinary man is apt to say that the wayward beings are no longer parts of the experience. Experience goes along without them. Yesterday I saw a certain stone by a brookside. To-day I remember that I saw it. In the interval I neither saw it nor remembered seeing it, nor had the least inkling of its presence. *Abiit, excessit, evasit*,

⁶ "Appearance and Reality," 2d edition, p. 145.

⁷ While I am asking questions, I should like to put another: What does Professor Dewey mean by "rationalism" and "rationalistic"? The rationalism of the *Aufklärung* we think we know, and we know that we are not rationalist of that sort; but we do not know whether we are rationalists in this seemingly new and derogatory sense in which the term is frequently used in his recent writings. It is natural that we do not like to be charged with being rationalists without being allowed to plead guilty or not guilty with the law of the term before us.

erupit. Its eruption was clean out of experience. Experience, thus used, is a most labile thing; but this very slipperiness and instability is a part of its essence in ordinary thought. But there is another meaning of the term, an extraordinary meaning, but nevertheless prevalent in philosophical writings. Out of this Experience there is no exit, not even by way of fire-escape. It does even more for what we in our finitude and mutability lose from time to time than what the Grecian Urn does for the lover and his lady. The urn stereotypes just one moment of their lives. "Forever wilt thou love and she be fair." But Experience stereotypes all the moments of all lives, everything that was or is or ever shall be, upon the bosom of a flowing river, where it is both fixed and fluid. Either kind of experience has its difficulties for experience, although we are told that neither kind has any for Experience. But either kind is just what it is, not what it is not; it contains just what it contains, not what it does not. Professor Dewey will have none of the capitalized sort, yet he will have nothing that is not experience. But as we have seen, lowercase experience has no room for vanished stones, except as memories which themselves vanish most of the time; and this seems to be the reason why the humanistic pragmatist turns stones into self-supporting experiences. In this Professor Dewey disdains to follow the humanist. Now, the question is whether Professor Dewey uses experience in some other sense than one of those above mentioned. If he does not, is he not a subjective idealist? He is full of admiration for the "miracle" which the epistemologist works in getting his ideas united with fact; the epistemologist would feel justified in retorting the admiration if the pragmatist should attempt to make fragmentary and elusive experience, without a purchase in something more permanent, bring out of non-existence just what it always needs for the solution of its logical puzzles. But if what has disappeared from experience still lives on in spite of its disappearance, and yet does so in no eternal Experience, then how does this way of taking experience and its needed complement differ from strictly objectivistic realism? But how, according to the "Studies," can what vanishes from experience continue to exist except as a sheer (unwarranted?) abstraction from the standpoint of organized or reorganized experience?

There is one further difficulty that I wish to lay before Professor Dewey in connection with his new distinction between fact and idea. I suppose that most of us accept the other side of the moon as a fact, on a par *as fact* with this side of it. If we do not accept it, there seems to be considerable disturbance in experience, which, I believe, will continue in most of us till the other side gets accepted. Then it becomes "fact." This fact, while as accepted fact it is on a parity with this side of the moon, yet as experienced fact seems to differ considerably from it. I can see the

one; I can not see the other. Grant that the term sensation should lose its ordinary acceptance and become merely a term to mark an instrument or crisis in the development of inferential conclusions. Still there is, after the conclusion is reached that the moon has two hemispheres, a considerable difference in our experience between the two hemispheres, and this difference does not seem to budge however we may pry upon it with changed meanings of terms. The realist, following the ordinary usage, says that while there are two lunar hemispheres, only one can be immediately experienced, and the other is accessible to us only by means of idea. If he is forced to accept the Chicago lexicography he finds himself at a loss to express himself on this point, but unfortunately he does not find any loss of the fact to be expressed. What is pragmatism going to do with this difference? If it ignores it, can it keep peace with science – a peace it is proud of proclaiming as one of its achievements? Science makes a thoroughgoing distinction between observation and inference, between empirical facts and scientific constructions *upon* the basis of facts. Now it is one of the great merits of the “Studies” that it has pointed out the ambiguous nature of much of what is taken by science to be fact and what is taken to be theory. But may not the ambiguity be pressed just a little too far? What we take to be a satellite, 240,000 miles distant from the planetary earth, may after all not prove to be what we think it is. But suppose that such a change in scientific construction should ever take place? All is not lost from present scientific fact; there remains the fact that there is a bright something occasionally in experience, growing from slender crescent to full orb. This fact antedated Ptolemy and has long survived Copernicus, and will, I think, survive Copernicanism if the latter, having had its day, should ever cease to be. This fact may come to be interpreted as anything you please, and get accepted as that thing; but it will be there to be accepted somehow whenever any one constituted like us opens his eyes and turns them in the right direction at an opportune time. This kind of fact, and there are many of them, forms the inexpugnable datum of thought. It is the givenest of givens, *datissimum datorum*. Thought does not seem to have anything to do with the making of it – although the idealist has another account of the matter. Nor can thought do much⁸ in the way of changing these *datissima*. Not only do they constitute the prime starting-point of all scientific problems, but they retain their pristine character throughout the thought process and after thought has done its perfect work. While ideas and data of a secondary order play their game of hide-and-seek with each other, these data of the first order are in the

⁸ How much thought can do in this matter is an interesting question which we can not enter into here.

game, but *not* of it. They give to one lunar hemisphere a primacy which no terrestrial thought-reorganization can give to the other. Now a philosophy which keeps close to experience can not well ignore this distinction between the two kinds of data. Bow the difference out of the front door by refusing to recognize it under its old style of difference between sensation and idea, and it will come in at the back door unnamed, but no less obtrusive. Can logic afford to ignore it? If it does not ignore it, can pragmatic logic fix it somewhere, mid this dance of plastic circumstance which it portrays so well, but which the old logic would fain arrest; can it fix it there without giving up the thorough plasticity of circumstance?

OBJECTS, DATA, AND EXISTENCES: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR MCGILVARY

John Dewey. "Objects, Data, and Existences: A Reply to Professor McGilvary." *Journal of Philosophical* 6.1 (7 January 1909): 13–21. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 4 (1977), pp. 146–55.

I can not be otherwise than grateful to Professor McGilvary for the pains he has taken in acquainting himself with my logical analysis and in setting forth his results so clearly and succinctly.¹ Gratitude, if nothing else, would lead me to respond to his friendly challenge.

I

I begin by quoting almost *in toto* one section of his criticism, having inserted letters for convenience of subsequent reference to portions involved in the discussion.

"There is one further difficulty that I wish to lay before Professor Dewey in connection with his new distinction between fact and idea. (a) I suppose that most of us accept the other side of the moon as a fact, on a par *as fact* with this side of it... (b) This fact, while as accepted fact it is on a parity with this side of the moon, yet as experienced fact seems to differ considerably from it. I can see the one; I can not see the other.... There is, after the conclusion is reached that the moon has two hemispheres, a considerable difference in our experience between the two hemispheres, and this difference does not seem to budge however we may pry upon it with changed meanings of terms. The realist, following the ordinary usage, says that while there are two lunar hemispheres, only one can be immediately experienced, and the other is accessible to us only by means of idea... What is pragmatism going to do with this difference? If it ignores it, can it keep peace with science? ... (c) Science makes a thoroughgoing distinction between observation and inference, between empirical facts and scientific constructions upon the basis of facts... What we take to be a satellite, 240,000 miles distant

¹ In his article entitled "The Chicago 'Idea' and Idealism," in this *Journal*, Vol. V., p. 589.

from the planetary earth, may after all not prove to be what we think it is. But suppose that such a change in scientific construction should ever take place? (d) All is not lost from present scientific fact; there remains the fact that there is a bright something occasionally in experience, growing from slender crescent to full orb... . This fact may come to be interpreted as anything you please, and get accepted as that thing; but it will be there to be accepted somehow whenever any one constituted like us opens his eyes and turns them in the right direction at an opportune time. This kind of fact, and there are many of them, forms the inexpugnable datum of thought. It is the givenest of givens, *datissimum datorum*... . These data of the first order are in the game, but not of it. They give to one lunar hemisphere a primacy which no terrestrial thought-reorganization can give to the other. Now a philosophy which keeps close to experience can not well ignore this distinction between the two kinds of data."

Contradictions confront one in the subject-matter of this passage – the natural inference is that they have their source in my position. Is this the case, or do they inhere in the ground taken by my critic? Let me first state the gravamen of the charge brought against me, as briefly and as impartially as may be. I have held that objects accepted at the *conclusion* of a judgment (the lunar sphere, for instance) issue from a *process* of judging in which data (brute observational facts) and hypothetical meanings (conceptual *ideata*) are at once discriminated from and referred to each other; and that they issue in such fashion that the finally accepted object presents both a reorganization of the data through the "idea" and verification of the "idea" through the experimental processes by which a meaning is taken up into the data. Mr. McGilvary holds that this lands me in subjective idealism – for it admits no "facts" or "objects" except those into whose constitution "ideas" have entered. It also puts me in conflict with scientific method for it ignores "data of the first order" which remain the same yesterday, today, and forever, so far as any "thought reconstruction" is concerned.²

II

My reply, in substance, is (1) that I have *not* ignored the existence of *datissima datorum*; that the assertion of their existence antecedent to ideas as such is essential to my theory of the reconstructive nature and work of the reflective process; (2) that my critic confuses such data, wholly non-cognitional, non-logical in character, with data which are in

² Mr. Nunn in his suggestive "Aims and Achievements of the Scientific Method" has also criticized the view of hypothesis and its function set forth in the "Contributions to Logical Theory" on substantially the same ground. See sections 67 and 68.

and of judgment, and hence distinctively logical in quality; (3) that he puts himself in conflict with science in ascribing to data (of the second kind) a higher knowledge value than belongs to the objects which are accepted as the conclusions of judgment.

The following discussion, while involving the above propositions, will follow, however, a different order. I shall try to show that in the portions of the citation marked off by the letters (*b*), (*c*), and (*d*), he has repeatedly transferred what holds good in one sort of situation to another sort of situation, and that the difficulties he notes flow not from my position, but from this interchange of propositions, each sound in itself, but so distinctive in meaning and reference as to negate the possibility of such transfer.

1. The lunar sphere (it is suggestive, as we shall see below, that my critic sticks closely to “two hemispheres” rather than to one sphere) is related – as stated in (*b*) – to the individual’s act of recognizing it in a twofold way. Just *because* the assertion in (*a*) is true, *viz.*, that the two hemispheres stand as accepted facts on a parity, the individual in apprehending the single total fact *can not* be related to the far and to the near sides in the same way. The statement about the *difference in the modes of experiencing* the two sides is thus congruous with the acceptance of the object in which a judgment is concluded – and it is congruous only with its acceptance. *An analysis of the way a fact is apprehended can not, by the nature of the case, be made to yield a statement of the nature of that fact which is incompatible with the nature whose method of apprehension is under analysis.* I come in the sequel to the question of why I deny I am an idealist; but the gist of the matter lies right here. All idealist epistemologies with which I am acquainted perform exactly the self-contradictory act indicated in the last sentence.

There are two alternative ways of interpreting the statement of my critic that “as an *experienced* fact” the other side of the moon differs from this side, even though it be on a *parity* “as an *accepted* fact.” In one way of interpretation, the fact that “only one side can be immediately experienced, and the other is accessible to us only by means of idea,” refers precisely to the ways in which the different related elements in one complex fact are *accessible* to us. The proposition has as its universe of discourse not the relative cognitional status, or respective knowledge-values, of this side and the other side of the moon, but the mode of *our access* to elements possessed of the same cognitional value. The other mode of interpretation concludes that because our mode of access is different, therefore the elements to which we have access *stand on a different footing*.³

³ This implication in the quoted passage that the fact as *immediately experienced*

2. Let us consider both of these alternatives in relation to Mr. McGilvary's argument. If we take the first (which seems to me perfectly sound) we may discriminate, with respect to the lunar sphere, different relations of the two sides to our manner of apprehension; and from the standpoint of the *relation of the moon to our cognizing organism* distinguish the *sensory* quale of this side from the *ideal* or *suggested* quale of the other side. We may even, if we wish to (but I wish nobody wished to), speak of the former qualities as, *in this relation*, sensations; the latter as *ideas* – but, of course, if we so name them the facts control the meaning of the names, not the names the character of the facts. "Sensations" mean what Professor McGilvary in an earlier article⁴ well termed *sensa*, i.e., *qualities* of an object in relation to our mode of apprehension. It is a disappointment that Mr. McGilvary has not borne in mind in this article what he so clearly pointed out before – viz., "that the term sensation is an *omnibus* term" (p. 458). If he had done so, he would have realized that in pointing out a fifth passenger in an obscure corner of the coach in which Mr. McGilvary had already discovered four fellow-travelers, I was neither altering the "ordinary acceptation" of the term (*which* of the four is the "ordinary," I wonder?) nor yet denying the existence of the facts to which any one of the other four refers. But in any case, if Mr. McGilvary intended or accepts this alternative interpretation, no inconsistency lies at my door. It is true as an accepted fact of astronomy that the two sides of the moon are on a parity; and it is true as an accepted fact of psychology (or whatever the universe of reference may be) that, *given this astronomical fact*, the experience of apprehending it is related to its two sides in different fashions.

If the other interpretation is accepted, then and then only, does *this* side have a certain priority and supremacy over the other side; and only then can Professor McGilvary charge me with ignoring the plain procedure of science. But if he intends and accepts this second alternative, then he uses his analysis of our *recognizing-experience* to *discredit scientific knowledge* – the conclusion that the two sides stand as hemispheres on a parity. In this case, it turns out to be he, not I, who should be worried about "keeping peace with science" – for I do not think he will persuade the astronomer to accept a moon which is fact on this side and idea on the other: green cheese possibly, but "idea" never.

3. In the portion designated (c) a further confusion comes to view. The

occupies a position cognitively superior to the fact *accepted* after judgment is somewhat startling in view of Mr. McGilvary's previous criticisms of me, on the basis of attributing this notion to me. But of this "more anon."

⁴ This JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 457.

difference between the two modes of cognitive access to due fact appears now to be confused with a *distinction lying within the process of judging or coming to know*, viz., that between “observation and inference,” “empirical facts” and scientific constructions upon them. Again two alternatives are possible. Either it is meant that this distinction (with superiority resting on the side of “observation” and “empirical facts”) holds during the process of judging the real form of the moon, while, that is, we are still in search of an “acceptable” fact; or it is meant that this quality of values persists after the conclusion is reached – even after the problem of its form is solved! If he means the former, he has no quarrel with me, for it is precisely this antithetical relation of datum and ideatum which I have made the peculiar differentia of judgment-in-process, as distinct from in conclusion. But if he means the latter, how shall he keep peace with science! For the characteristic of *scientific* knowledge is that it finds its genuinely acceptable object in the conclusions of a systematic process of inferential inquiry rather than in “observations” *isolated* from all inferential matter, or in “empirical facts” set over against *rationally* organized and explained facts. When doubt as to the objective character occurs or recurs, then, of course, the antithesis recurs; and then the *datum* becomes the factual element and the *ideatum*, the hypothetical element. But as long as the conclusion remains unchallenged, so long the object *is* as the conclusion describes it. Moreover, when there is doubt (and hence when judgment is going on, not concluded) the factual superiority is only of the datum in *that* judgment over *its* hypothetically suggested interpretation, not over the accepted facts of scientific conclusions as such. For the entire process of re-coordinating the raw data *rests upon the acceptance of a whole system of other facts, not questioned simultaneously, which are conclusions of other judgments in which thought has intervened*.

4. In the passage marked (d) the issue shifts to what seems to me a more tenable position. Up to this point, my critic has assumed the hemispherical quality of *this* side of the moon to be a given “empirical fact” from which the hemisphericity of the *other* side is an inference! If we had any direct knowledge that this side of the moon is a hemisphere, the “conclusion” that the other side is a hemisphere might adorn an exposition of Kant’s analytic judgments, or enliven a treatise on “immediate inference,” but it would not illuminate the history of astronomy. Of course, the inference is that the *moon is a sphere*, the hemi-sphere character of *both* sides being involved in this conclusion. This obvious fact is indicated in Mr. McGilvary’s reference to the “bright something occasionally in experience growing from slender crescent to full orb as the primary datum.”

The substitution of this statement for the hemispherical character of

this side only strengthens, however (it may he truly replied) Mr. McGilvary's argument, for here at last are indeed *datissima datorum*. But how does this bear down on me? I have insisted (much to my discredit among "objective idealists") that there are non-logical antecedents for every specific reflective situation (and that *all* reflective situations are specific) so that knowledge involving thought is occasioned by non-reflective or alogical ("practical") factors in an antecedent experience.⁵ I ask for no better proof of the hold of *intellectualistic*⁶ epistemology upon current thought than is afforded by the fact that the position that thought operates in all judging processes (and hence is embodied in all judgment-conclusions) has seemed to so many critics to involve an idealistic theory of the nature of existence. It would, if to *exist* and to be subject-matter or result of cognition were equivalent terms. But the very denial of intellectualism claims that to exist – to exist even as matter of "experience" – is *not* to be identified with the status of a cognized something, whether during judgment or as its conclusion. And this mode of existence furnishes me as well as Professor McGilvary an impregnable fortress, a "givenest of givens." If to believe in it makes him a realist, then it also makes me one.

If there be a difference between us, it must be in the character assigned the prior factor. What *is* the nature of what happens "whenever one constituted like us *opens his eyes and turns them* in the right direction" (italics mine), so that a crescent or an orb is seen? I say that what happens has the nature of an *act*; that it *exists* as an act. I have said that while the act may be *cogni-tive* (that is, exercise an influence upon further knowledge) it is not itself properly called cognition.⁷ What does Professor McGilvary say?

⁵ I may remark in passing that some of the criticisms made against this position from the side of the objective idealists would not have been made if it had been seen that my position does not demand that the prior situation as prior should be non-reflective *per se*, but only *as calling out thought* – that it does this in virtue of a clash or conflict which itself is wholly non-reflective, no matter how reflective the situation in which it is found.

⁶ Professor McGilvary incidentally questions the use of the term "rationalism" in my "later writings." I do not recall how extensive that use is, but I plead guilty. Rationalism is too closely associated with "free thought," or free criticism, on one hand, and with the antithesis to empiricism on the other, to be conveniently used as a term to designate intellectualism as against pragmatism: – for pragmatism may be "rationalistic" in the first sense, while empiricism may be – sensational empiricism *has* been – as intellectualistic as any rationalistic theory.

⁷ Aside from the question of fact, a dialectical difficulty should perhaps, to avoid misapprehension, be referred to. It may be said that I am assuming that "primary" data are here known – or may be known – as acts, and hence I have myself reduced them either to "data" undergoing interpretation or else to accepted objects of judgment. This

If he says that it is a mode or content or object of knowledge, *qua* knowledge, what relation does its content bear to the datum in judgment? Is it identical with the former? Are the heavens and the furniture of the earth which we see when we *open our eyes and turn our heads* the same thing as those isolated, selected data of observation which the astronomer accepts as given, and works upon in figuring out the shape of the moon? Then is the rational or objective idealist lying in wait to swallow up Professor McGilvary by his simple method of pointing out the merely particular, *merely* observational (*i.e.*, sensible), merely fragmentary, chaotic, lawless character of such data, and the necessity of conceptual (or thought) relations to organize such brute trivialities into our significant world of related objects. Or, on the other hand, does Professor McGilvary mean that looking and seeing things *is* knowledge *par excellence*? that it represents the cognitional function at its best? Then how does he keep peace with science? How does he avoid the conclusion that scientific knowledge is a hoax, an intentional arbitrary perversion of or declension from what we already know in a better, truer way? But, on the other hand, if it be admitted that what occurs when “one constituted as we are” uses his organs in accordance with their own structure is not knowledge at all – in any intellectual or scientific sense of that term – we are free to admit the primary existence of something with respect to any and all thinking, and at the same time free to admit that when the standpoint of knowledge as knowledge is once taken, the conclusions of systematized inference have a status superior to any other determinations.

This, I hope, at least answers the question of Professor McGilvary as to what I mean when I say that I do not conceive my position to be idealistic. I do not think it requires “thought” to see and to hear any more than it does to digest; though I also think that after thought has intervened such an action may be performed better, more economically and effectively – and also more chaotically and wastefully – to say nothing of its results having an infinitely more precious value.

III

Professor McGilvary inquires whether I am not, in any case, an idealist

objection, so frequently made, show again the domination of the intellectualistic assumption. My position is that the term “experience” denotes primarily a mode of *existence*; experience may *exist* as an act-of-a-certain-specific quality, and that does not have to be reduplicated as knowledge in order to possess the character which it has. As for the other objection frequently made, that this reference to an act is pure individualism, I only want here to point out that it is the critic’s assumption, not mine, that an act such as seeing is something attached to or possessed by an individual. As I see it, the individual is within, not without, the act, and within it as only one of its factors.

in the current sense of idealism – a sense which he states as follows: “the theory which regards all reality as embraced within experiences or within experience.” He adds, “A clear unambiguous answer by Professor Dewey to the question whether he is an idealist in the current sense as defined above would, I am sure, make his view much more intelligible.” Ah, my dear questioner, I am tempted to reply, there are certain prerequisite conditions for “a clear and unambiguous answer”: namely, that the question be clear and unambiguous. What is meant by “embraced?” Is it to have an *existential* meaning? – that some *thing* called experience holds physically or metaphysically other things in its embrace? Then I do *not* accept the theory. Or is its meaning *methodological*? that philosophy, like science, proceeds intelligibly and fruitfully to verifiable results only by taking experienced, not transcendental, things, and by discussing them in the characters they empirically possess, not in the characters which, according to some *a priori* method, they *ought* to possess? In that case my answer might be affirmative, coupled with the admission that I know shamefully little about “all reality,” since my empiricism is precisely that the only realities I do know anything about or ever shall know anything about are just experienced realities – for I do not suppose the phrase “all reality” was a trap laid for me.

Again, would not a “clear and unambiguous” definition of experience be both a boon in general and a prerequisite to a clear and unambiguous answer to the question asked? In neither of the two senses of experience which Mr. McGilvary expressly sets forth (on page 595) can I answer his question affirmatively. In the sense in which he *uses* the term on his next page (in the passages quoted) but without defining it, my answer would probably be affirmative. But in that case I am confused, for Professor McGilvary says *that* view is realism. And a reply that made me out both realist and idealist at the same time might not strike anybody as “clear and unambiguous.” But perhaps if Mr. McGilvary should make explicit the sense in which he uses the word “experienced” when he talks, for example, about our experience of the moon as changing from crescent to full orb, and should contrast that with his use of “experience” in the instance of the perceived stone, he would discover a vital and pregnant meaning of experience which would reveal that he and I as human beings are much alike in what we mean by experience. And in that case I am quite willing to leave it to my critic by what names he and I are to be labeled.

WHAT IS PRAGMATISM?

Addison W. Moore. "Review of James B. Pratt, *What Is Pragmatism?*" *American Journal of Theology* 13.3 (July 1909): 477-78.

Among the anti-pragmatists Professor Pratt is known as one of the clearest and cleverest writers. On the whole the present volume supports and enhances this reputation. It consists of six semi-popular lectures delivered at the Glenmore Summer School, and published, the author says in the preface, "to show those who did not attend the summer school (and this includes a fairly large portion of the human race) how much they missed."

The subjects of the lectures are: "Meaning and Method in Pragmatism;" "The Ambiguity of Truth;" "The Pragmatic View of the Truth Relation;" "Pragmatism and Knowledge;" "Pragmatism and Religion;" "The Practical Point of View."

In the space allotted me I can report only a few general features. Professor Pratt's style is delightfully free and easy, and some readers, especially the pragmatic ones, may find that this applies also to some of his criticisms. This might be charged to the limitations of a popular audience did not the author expressly declare in his preface that he has "nowhere allowed the desire for simplicity and popularity to interfere with thoroughness of treatment."

As an instance of the difference between Professor Pratt's notion of "thoroughness" and theirs on some points, pragmatic readers will probably cite Professor Pratt's "simple" disposition of the "correspondence" view of truth (p. 65 ff.), in which he says: "Truth or the relation of correspondence means not copying, but merely this simple thing, that the object of which one is thinking is as one thinks it," and adds a little farther along: "I confess it is impossible for me to see how anything can be simpler than this." And yet philosophers generally, from Plato to pragmatism, seem to have found this problem anything but "simple." Moreover if the relation of correspondence is so "ultimately simple" and "irreducible" that it is "absurd" (pp. 68, 69) to ask a realist to "explain" it, pragmatists will wonder why it is that the capacity of ideas to serve as "instruments" and "guides" of action should be for Professor Pratt such a dark riddle for which he says pragmatists have no solution.

Why should not the pragmatist also say that the relation of guidance is an "ultimately simple" and "irreducible" one, needing no explanation?

The pragmatist, however, is not content with so "simple" a solution. And this brings us to the fundamental point, and I would add, weakness, of Professor Pratt's book. It is written from the standpoint of what he calls "the private stream of consciousness," which is so highly private that its ability to "correspond" with "outer realities which never come within that private stream" remains, Professor Pratt confesses, a "mystery," even if a "simple" and "irreducible" one.

Moreover, Professor Pratt also persists in attributing his own standpoint to pragmatists, and so he finds it easy under this attribution to convict them of solipsism. This he does in the face of no end of most explicit and repeated proclamations by pragmatists that their logic and metaphysics assume a *social interpretation* of this "private stream of consciousness"; that it holds that the individual consciousness arises in and remains an organic part of a social world; that it is not a function of an isolated, lonely, windowless "mind" or "soul," or even brain, but always of the total "social situation." An idea, a hypothesis therefore, is never wholly a private monopoly. So far as the individual is concerned there is always an unearned increment in it. Arising out of a social matrix, being a function of it, and being therefore always in vital connection with it, there is for the pragmatist nothing "mysterious" in the efficient relation of ideas to the "outer" world of people and things. It would indeed be a "mystery" if they had no such relation.

This total disregard of the social conception of the private individual consciousness, makes much of Professor Pratt's clever and interesting writing seem to the pragmatic reader wholly beside the mark. But Professor Pratt's book reveals the fact that pragmatists have been premature in their assumption that everyone was prepared to accept and start with this social conception of consciousness, and shows that what is now needed is a return to detailed exposition and applications of this conception.

Such an exposition of the "social situation" will also turn the point of much of Professor Pratt's criticism of the religious bearings of pragmatism. From Professor Pratt's standpoint God, as a working hypothesis, is *nothing but* a mere idea of "a private stream of consciousness." From the standpoint of the social origin and significance of ideas, every *working* hypothesis must have a reality behind it as well as in front of it.

THE SHORT-CUT TO REALISM EXAMINED

John Dewey. "The Short-Cut to Realism Examined." *Journal of Philosophy* 7.20 (29 September 1910): 553–57. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 6 (1978), pp. 138–42.

Many who do not wish to enroll themselves in a school of realism, sympathize with the desire for more cooperation and greater consensus among philosophers expressed in the "Platform of Six Realists."¹ A threshing out of problems is, however, necessary to a consensus, and criticism is one mode of cooperation. It may facilitate understanding the remarks that follow if I say that so far as realism means anti-idealism, I agree with it, especially in its contention that it is a parallogism to argue that because things must be known before we can discuss knowledge of them, things must themselves always be known (or in relation to mind); and, indeed, with its contention that knowledge always implies existences prior to and independent of their being known.

But realism claims to be a positive 'ism on its own account, and here I can not follow it; or, at least, I am in great doubt about a principle upon which some of the realists implicitly rely in formulating their positive contribution. I refer to the doctrine of "external relations."² To attempt to derive conclusions regarding existence from analysis and manipulation of a concept seems to me to savor more of old-fashioned rationalism than of realism – unless it be Platonic-medieval realism. And, as so often happens in rationalistic procedure, the concept is itself a hotbed of ambiguities. There is a basic ambiguity between the application of the concept to (I.) *terms* and (II.) *existences*; and there are minor ambiguities whichever alternative be accepted.

I. The doctrine seemingly refers to the relation which terms in a proposition hold to each other. Is it, however, denotative or connotative in scope? That is to say, does it mean that the logical content of a term is not modified when it enters into relation with some other logical

¹ This Journal, Vol. VIII., No. 15

² It should be understood that my criticisms are not made in behalf of the "internal" theory. I suspect that concept is subject to the same ambiguities that I shall point out in the "external" theory, and in any case I do not understand the theory.

content – the connotative aspect? Or, does it mean that an existence to which logical contents refer is unmodified by such reference – the denotative aspect?

1. If the former, we must certainly distinguish. There is a difference between knowing as an active process and knowledge as a finished result. (a) Where knowledge is assumed to be achieved, it is undoubtedly true that the meaning – or content – of the terms of a proposition are not affected by the relation in which they stand. Any other doctrine is suicidal, since it sets up an infinite regress which is not only inherently futile, but which openly contradicts the assumption that knowledge has been achieved. It is not easy, however, to see the bearing of this truth – which appears to be simply a formulation of the logical canon of identity – upon realism. Any philosophic system can safely admit it. The proposition, for example, that existences undergo change because of knowing them is quite compatible with it; the terms “existence,” “knowing” and the relation “undergo change” each has its own fixed, independent, and unaltered meaning in the proposition. (b) If the doctrine means that contents do not undergo change in knowing taken as an active process of inquiry, it is obviously false. The meaning of a term – mammal, species, metal, orchid, circle – is quite different at the end and at the beginning of scientific reflection. Now the realist in ignoring the distinction between knowing, between active thinking or investigating, and achieved knowledge ignores also the problems of doubt, hypothesis, and error. He wins an easy victory because he assumes a completed ideal without telling by what criterion he distinguishes between the static ideal of possessed knowledge in which meanings do not undergo change, and the active process of getting knowledge, where meanings are continuously modified by the new relations into which they enter.³

2. In its denotative aspect, the theory means that the existence known does not change in being referred to by a proposition. This is undoubtedly axiomatic in the sense that we can not swap horses in midstream. We can not begin by referring to cows and then abruptly change our reference to horses. This truth is, however, quite compatible (as just pointed out) with a change of meaning in the existence referred to, because it has become a subject of knowing. It is, moreover, consistent with alteration of the existence itself through knowing, as well as with the doctrine that the purpose of knowing is to effect some alteration. Any other conception implies that *any* change is fatal to the

³ This alteration *may* be mainly by addition, but it assuredly also involves *some* qualitative reconstruction. Only each specific case of inquiry reveals the ratio of addition and transformation to each other – there is no general theory which decides.

identity of a thing. And I do not take it that the realists wish to commit us irretrievably to Eleaticism, whether of the monistic or the atomistic type. More specifically, if knowing a thing is a factor in the normal process of a thing under certain conditions of that thing, then for that thing to undergo change in knowing is as consistent with its retaining its own identity as the growth of a plant is compatible with its maintaining its integrity as a plant. Interpreted denotatively, then, the “external” theory comes perilously close to maintaining that knowing is accidental or supernatural, not a normal incident in the history of existences.⁴

II. 1. This matter of reference to existence brings us to what, after all, is the fundamental ambiguity in the theory of “external relations.” (a) Is it a doctrine of the relation sustained by *terms* in a proposition? If so, what is the warrant for transferring it over to the quite different matter of the relation of the proposition (in its content and intent) to existences? Does the realist assume that to *be* a thing and to *be* a term of a proposition are identical? (b) Or is it a theory of the relation of existences *qua* existences to one another? Then it is demonstrably false. For “biological” and “chemical” relations are accompanied by considerable alteration in prior existence, “physical” relations by some alteration; and of only spatial relations does the doctrine hold. And even there (since it is impossible to isolate spatial changes from physico-chemical changes) all we can rightly say is that the alteration of things effected by change of spatial relation is *practically* negligible for most purposes. If we take knowing as one existence, one event in relation to other events, what happens to existences when a knowing event supervenes, is a matter of bare, brute fact. No manipulation of the concept of relation (“internal” or “external”) will show whether the situation is similar to the biological, the chemical, or the spatial case.

2. One of the six realists (bottom of p. 400) goes so far as to make the external theory of relations the basis of an inference to the possibility of the qualitative dissimilarity of the “knowing process and its object.” If any inference is possible, it is only upon the assumption that the “knowing process” is one of the terms of knowledge, the existence known being the other. Surely it should be self-evident that the “knowing process” is not one of the *terms* of a proposition – unless the case of the special proposition about the relation of the knowing process to existence be exclusively taken. And to suppose that the relation of a knowing process to the existence it deals with can be settled by an

⁴ While I wish to stick as closely as possible to the logical analysis of the concept of external relations, I can not refrain from pointing out that the only sure way of getting knowledge of existences – experiment – proceeds expressly by planning and carrying through a certain alteration in the existences referred to. In other words, denotative reference is of the nature of an act or event, not of self-contained thought.

analysis of the relation of the terms (as terms) of the very proposition which passes upon the relation would seem to go to the limit in the way of begging the question.

The above inquiry is certainly schematic, and I fear dry and seemingly barren. Its purport is, incidentally, to show that the realistic platform (regarded as a positive doctrine and not simply as anti-idealism) ignores two vital problems one, that of the significance of knowing as a natural event in relation to other natural events; the other, that of getting knowledge, of passing from doubt and guesswork to grounded conclusions. The main object of my discussion is to protest against a professedly new and significant movement trying to reach results by the manipulation of a concept – an unanalyzed and ambiguous concept at that. To proceed in this fashion is, to my mind, to perpetuate the most regrettable feature of idealism; the smothering of inquiry into (and even interest in) special problems by wrapping them all up in a blanket of a stereotyped pattern. Should not the formulation of a platform of results, in the way of any 'ism, wait upon a scheduling of questions? Some of these questions, questions antecedent to any use of a concept of relations, are: (1) Is knowing a natural event? If so, what is its factual character and how does it evolve out of other natural events? (2) Is logic primarily an account of *getting* knowledge, with a concept of achieved knowledge serving only as a limiting term, or is it a theory of knowledge *achieved*? If the latter, what sort of a thing is the account of getting knowledge? (3) Is it of any significance that achieved knowledge is expressed in propositions composed of terms – *i.e.*, of *symbols*? If so, what? (4) What is the relation of knowing as an event, a happening, to knowledge as a logical relation, whether of things or of terms?

REALISM: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR DEWEY AND AN EXPOSITION¹

Edward G. Spaulding. "Realism: A Reply to Professor Dewey and an Exposition." *Journal of Philosophy* 8.3 (3 February 1911): 63–77.

Professor Dewey's examination of the "Platform of Six Realists" in a recent number of the *Journal of Philosophy* under the title "The Short-Cut to Realism Examined" is certainly very welcome to the members of the group.² Criticism is a mode of cooperation which we gladly accept; for, if we are in error, we had rather know this than not, and are quite willing, indeed anxious, not only to amend our platform, if such error be demonstrated, but, finally, to find in some set of principles, either in those of our platform or in such others as criticism may show to be correct amendments or substitutes, a common standing-ground for an ever-widening circle of philosophers.

Professor Dewey makes his criticism from the standpoint of genesis. Now genesis and realism are not incompatible. If there is a real, existential genesis, just as if there is a real existential theistic God, or a real vital energy, etc., then these must be accepted. Only, the realist contends, the very same conditions on which one "thing," say a genesis, can be and is accepted as real, must be allowed to make it possible to accept other "things" as real also. Accordingly he finds that it is quite as possible that there should be real limits to genesis, that there should be some "things" which do not evolve – among these certain logical principles – and that these should have a *real* logical priority³ over the genesis either of knowledge or of things, or of the genetic account of this

¹ This reply and exposition is published after discussion with the other members of the group and has received in general their approval.

² See *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. VII, pp. 393 and 553.

³ By logical priority there is meant that relation which subsists if *B* presupposes or implies *A*, but *A* does not imply *B*; *A* is then the logically prior, *B* the logically subsequent. For example, logic is logically prior to Euclidean geometry, objects, existent or subsistent, are to the knowledge of them, truth is to proof, the theory of "external relations" to the theory of "internal relations."

genesis, *as that there should be* a genesis either physical or mental. The realist would wish that Professor Dewey could do this too, for then, by realizing that there is nothing incompatible between the logical antecedence of logic over psychology and at least the partial psychological (historical) antecedence of the knowledge of genesis over the knowledge of logic, that further agreement would be reached which should be the final purpose of all discussion.

I shall reply to Professor Dewey in essentially the order in which he presents his several criticisms of our platform.

Criticism 1. The realist is attempting "to derive conclusions regarding existence from analysis and manipulation" of the theory of "external relations" (p. 138).

The charge is difficult to reply to as a whole because it contains diverse elements; in itself it is to be criticized. Thus it conjoins the terms "analysis" and "manipulation," and seemingly seeks to discredit the former by the unfortunate suggestion derived from the latter, especially if this means *mere* manipulation, as Professor Dewey intimates it does. Clearly, however, analysis stands as a perfectly valid method. But both analysis and manipulation are perfectly valid methods, especially when used together with other methods, for drawing conclusions about existence or anything else. Indeed how else than by such methods does Professor Dewey proceed in getting his own genetic philosophy? The realist is then, as much opposed as Professor Dewey intimates he is to the method of deriving conclusions by mere analysis and manipulation – indeed this is one of the reasons why he opposes idealism. Not mere manipulation, but manipulation, analysis, observation, hypothesis, and confirmation form his methods. And that this is the case can be shown by stating what his actual procedure is in dealing with the theory of "external relations."

The realist finds that in logic there are the two theories of relations as "external" and "internal" respectively,⁴ and his attention is especially directed to these by the fact that idealistic and phenomenalistic theories are without exception constructed and arrived at by what amounts to a

⁴ The theory of "external relations" can be found formulated in our platform as follows:

"In the proposition 'the term *a* is in the relation *R* to the term *b*,' *aR* in no degree constitutes *b*, nor does *Rb* constitute *a*, nor does *R* constitute either *a* or *b*." Also: "One identical term may stand in many relations; a term may change some of its relations to other terms without thereby changing all its other relations to those same or to other terms; what relations are changed by a given change of relation can not be deduced merely from the nature of either the terms involved or their relation."

The theory of "internal relations" can be found formulated and the arguments for it analyzed in my article on "The Logical Structure of Self-refuting Systems," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 3.

purely manipulative use of the theory of "internal relations." Now to this construction of a philosophical theory by mere manipulation of any concept or doctrine the realist is thoroughly opposed. But that to which he is especially opposed in this idealistic procedure is the arbitrary application of the "internal theory" to the cognitive relation; for he finds empirical grounds for holding not only that this theory does not apply to this particular relation and that it is self-contradictory, but also that the "external theory" does apply. In considering the cognitive relation, then, and in laying emphasis on the theory of "external relations" as applying to this, the realist is actuated by his desire to join issue with his opponent at that point where it can be joined most sharply. And that point is furnished by the opponent himself in his selection and emphasis of the cognitive relation as the pivotal philosophical point, and by his application to it of the "internal theory." Accordingly, although the realist finds empirical grounds against this emphasis, he too, in order to meet his opponent squarely on his own ground, considers the cognitive relation. He both joins issue with his opponent and proceeds empirically by asking which of the two theories, that of "external" or that of "internal relations," is involved in genuine knowing. And he finds that that theory which logically allows for the fact that in genuine knowledge the object known is not modified (falsified), constituted, or altered by the knowing, *i.e.*, the "external theory," is implied. He finds this theory of relations to be implied in certain specific cases of supposedly genuine knowledge, in such cases, *e.g.*, as the idealist's knowing of his own theory and in Professor Dewey's knowing of his own genetic account. If, now, the cognitive relation in certain specific cases of genuine knowledge implies the theory of "external relations," then, the realist generalizes, it is to be considered as valid for all instances of genuine knowledge until demonstration to the contrary is effected. And since at some point in every theory, even in a genetic theory, the genuineness of knowledge and what it implies (*viz.*, the "external theory") is assumed or granted, the realist has a fulcrum on which to meet squarely the adherent of opposed theories and force him to yield. Just as, then, the realist leaves it to empirical investigation to ascertain which theory of relations is valid for the cognitive relation, so the further question as to what other relations the "external theory" is valid for, he decides by the same method. Finding empirically that the "external theory" applies to or is valid for the cognitive relation (where there is genuine knowledge), the realist proceeds further by asking, "What follows?" And he finds that, among other things, realism follows; *i.e.*, it follows (1) that anything whatsoever can be found to be real – unmodified by the knowing; (2) that only by detailed empirical investigation can it be found what the real is, how manifold and diverse it is; and (3) that

knowing itself need not be studied (epistemology) in order to have genuine knowing (in chemistry, physics, biology, etc.). But these consequences are found empirically to be facts. Therefore the deductions from our hypothesis are confirmed, and an empirical presumption in favor of the truth of that hypothesis created. This is the method, then, which the realist uses, and he may well insist that he is not proceeding merely manipulatively, as he is charged with, but just as empirically as our critic would have him.

Criticism 2. "There is a basic ambiguity between the application of the concept of 'external relations' to (I.) *terms* and (II.) *existences*." "Seemingly it refers to the relation which terms in a proposition hold to each other." "Is it, however, denotative or connotative in its scope?" If the latter "does it mean that the logical content of a term is not modified when it enters into a relation with some other logical content?" If it means this, then, in the case of the growth of knowledge, "it is obviously false," although for achieved knowledge it is to be admitted; for "there is a difference between knowing as an active process and knowledge as a finished result." "The realist ignores this and so achieves an easy victory."

Reply: No, the realist does not ignore this difference; indeed it can be shown that he formulates it more clearly and makes an even greater use of it than Professor Dewey himself. This the realist does by using the closely allied distinction, which modern analysis justifies, between judgments and propositions. Judgments are psychological entities, propositions are subsistents. Professor Dewey confuses these two. Using this distinction, the realist can readily solve the questions concerning the growth of knowledge, etc., which Professor Dewey puts to him. Thus, as concerns this particular question, the realist finds that it is not necessary to have completed knowledge in all particulars in order to have genuine knowledge in some particulars. Professor Dewey's own theory might conceivably be an instance of such completed genuine knowledge within a limited field, not to be further modified by similar knowledge in other fields. Or his theory might be partly right and partly wrong. Making the valid distinction, then, between the judgments of discourse and propositions, it is to be admitted that the former with their constituents – call these concepts – may be and doubtless are somewhat in error and are modified and corrected as knowledge develops. But the only kind of modification which it is possible for such judgments to undergo is either their rejection as false *in toto* or their analysis into two parts, one of which is true, and the other false. Indeed, these two modifications are the only modifications which Professor Dewey's own theories, as a whole, or the judgments which constitute them, could undergo, and he himself would not, without a struggle, accept the first alternative. He

would certainly insist that some parts of his theory, some propositions, some concepts, or some parts of these – say of the complex concept of genesis – are genuinely true. Such parts can be related and supplemented without thereby being modified, and it is such parts that the realist has in mind when he applies the theory of “external relations” to achieved knowledge. This theory, then, is quite compatible with the growth and change of knowledge.

But, just as other knowledge may grow and change, as explained above, so also may the knowledge of the “external theory” develop and change. It has done this and the realist hopes that it will continue to do so – stimulated by such criticism as Professor Dewey’s. But, with certain accurate and precise formulations and applications already on hand, the assertion (p. 141) that the theory is unanalyzed is not justified or justifiable, faulty as such analysis may be. Indeed one has only to turn to a work like Russell’s “Principles of Mathematics” to find such an analysis and formulation and application of the theory, although it must be admitted that these are not segregated, but are scattered here and there through that most interesting and valuable presentation of advanced logic.

Now it seems to the writer that Professor Dewey does not attribute sufficient importance to this modern logical analysis and its bearing on the questions at issue, *e.g.*, on his own leading concept, genesis. At least it is a fact that he employs certain words with a meaning which this analysis has shown good reasons for not accepting, and which the realist does not accept. Thus, for example, Professor Dewey distinguishes between terms and existences (p. 138) and defines a term as = a symbol. The realist proceeds otherwise. For him, words are symbols for terms, and terms are either existent or subsistent, simple or complex, things or concepts.

Now it is also one of the results of this modern analysis not only that it makes it possible to admit change – which, of course, must be done – but that it shows (in mathematical physics) that change, interaction, genesis, imply the theory of “external relations.” Accordingly no assertion about the general character of genesis, change, etc., can be safely made without considering this modern analysis of them. For, if such assertions ignore this analysis, they may be in error. But Professor Dewey does seem to ignore this analysis in his accounts of genesis! With him we admit that existential complexes do change, do interact, do have a genesis. But change, interaction, genesis, in those cases at least to which Professor Dewey refers (p. 140), namely, biological, chemical, and some physical, can be shown not to be logically simple. Thus, to illustrate and prove my point, interaction can be analyzed into at least six simpler relations: (1) diversity between things; (2) diversity between

the states of things; (3) simultaneity; (4) succession; (5) causality; (6) the relation of a thing to its states. And some of these can be further analyzed; for example, succession involves a certain type of relation between instants which eternally have the relations which they have and are what they are, unmodified although related – the “external theory.” But further and very relevantly, there is that mode of treatment of physical alteration which is made in the case of heat, gravitation, and magnetic and electrical phenomena, as this is found to-day in authoritative treatises on the subject. The analysis of physical alteration in such cases reveals the fact that there is implied in each of them a potential-field which is made up of intensity-points bearing relations of a certain type to each other. Certain of these relations when integrated are identical with a potential surface, others with a potential difference, etc. But the intensity-points are eternally what they are, although they are related – the “external theory.” This is the method of modern mathematical physics,⁵ and if it be called “Eleaticism” (p. 140), then the charge can be safely admitted. Chemical and biological changes and genesis have not yet been so treated, but to succeed in so treating them is always an ideal for the chemist and biologist. In the light, then, of such results, Professor Dewey’s qualified admission that the theory of “external relations” holds only of spatial relations is wrong. In every case of physical alteration or interaction or genesis, where $y=f(x)$, representing the interaction, change, or alteration of two complexes, we have the theory of “external relations” applied when we get

$$(I) \quad \frac{dy}{dx} \quad \text{and} \quad (II) \quad \int y dx$$

The finite change or alteration of a complex is the definite integral of values which, though related, do not change. With it the fact, then, that alteration and genesis are found, in those instances where they have been most precisely analyzed, to involve the “external theory,” it is manifestly illogical to attempt to disprove this theory by appealing to those instances for which this analysis has not been made, but for which the presumption is that it can be. Until, then, our critic considers these

⁵ See such subjects as the Newtonian Potential Function, Green’s Theorem and Spherical Harmonics in such authoritative treatises as Webster, “The Dynamics of a Particle,” and Jeans, “Electricity and Magnetism.”

facts, he has not really joined issue with us on this specific point. Indeed in arbitrarily accepting and arguing from any genesis, etc., as logically simple, without raising the question of the possibility of its analysis, he begs the question at issue.

The foregoing considerations also answer, then, the group of objections which constitute

Criticism 3. Is the theory of "external relations" "a doctrine of the relation sustained by terms in a proposition"? Answer: "Yes," so far as we have a genuine proposition and not merely a judgment (psychological), or so far as judgments contain true parts as distinct from false. Is the theory one "of the relation of existences *quâ* existences to one another?" Answer: "Yes" and "No"; "No" for unanalyzed complexes, "Yes" for analyzed, *i.e.*, for those "simples" to which analysis leads.

We now come to a fourth group of objections which may be put together under

Criticism 4. These objections concern the relation of knowing to its object – to existents and subsistents. They are all actuated by the dominance of the concept of genesis in Professor Dewey's thinking – a concept whose detailed logic he has nowhere given; *i.e.*, the objections are made from the standpoint of genetic psychology and without a thorough examination of the realist's contention that logic is logically prior to psychology. Thus the realist would maintain that what Professor Dewey has given in his many contributions is chiefly a genetic psychological account of the growth of knowledge, but that in doing this he has tacitly made use of certain logical principles which in their subsistence are neither accounted for nor produced by the genesis of knowledge or its study, although the knowledge of them may be. Professor Dewey objects somewhat (p. 141) to our speaking of the relation of knowing to its objects – especially if we regard knowing as itself a relation between two terms – which we do. But he himself always assumes that knowing is related to its objects. Then the reply can be made on the same basis, since this view, further, is justified! Modern logic shows that a relation, *R*, both relates and is related to its terms, and yet that the infinite regress thus implied is quite harmless (see Russell, *loc. cit.*, pp. 99–100). However, that which Professor Dewey would seemingly have regarded as his most cutting criticism is that "surely it should be self-evident that the knowing process is not one of the terms of a proposition, unless the case of the special proposition about the relation of the knowing process to existence be exclusively taken." But "to suppose that the relation of the knowing process to the existence it deals with can be settled by an analysis of the relation of the terms (as terms) of the very proposition which passes upon the relation

would seem to go the limit in the way of begging the question." This is his criticism of one of the propositions in one of the platforms to the effect that "by the 'external view' it is made logically possible that the knowing process and its object should be qualitatively dissimilar."

Reply: First, we are at liberty to speak of the relation of knowing to its object. Professor Dewey himself does so, and the question as to what is the character of this relation has been a great one historically, and that there is such a relation is a justified position. Now in the criticism last quoted, Professor Dewey hits us only at the cost of putting himself in a very serious predicament. And yet we believe that he will not, indeed, that he can not, accept the consequences of his own criticism. For, by its logic, he would be prevented from studying the genesis of knowledge, provided his own knowing has a genesis – which, of course, it has! Indeed, that it has is implied by the fact that he does study the genesis of knowledge in general, and in so doing he is analyzing a process which necessarily includes his own studying; he does study the relation of knowing to things, and this necessarily includes the relation of his own knowing to his own theory. By his own study, then, he is doing that which, by the logic which he uses in his criticism of us, invalidates his own efforts, his own study, his own results, and makes him "beg the question to the limit." Either he is guilty with us or we are innocent with him. But that he himself is innocent, he tacitly assumes. He does study knowing by knowing = the study, does know genesis by that which has a genesis, namely, the knowing. By his own procedure and tacit assumptions, then, he himself invalidates his own criticism of our procedure. What he himself discredits, we can not take as serious. What he will not and can not accept, he can not compel us to. And so we proceed and join issue with him as regards his general theory on that basis which he, in common with us, must accept, even if the effort be made not to. To explain further Professor Dewey argues against us that we place ourselves in a predicament (beg the question) in attempting to find out about the relation of knowing to its object, because this relation of knowing to its object includes the attempt to find out about it, and so on in an infinite series. But he himself tacitly assumes in studying and giving his genetic account that these difficulties are not insuperable. Then he must allow us to proceed on the same basis, *which we do*. He himself assumes, and in fact it can be shown, that the predicament is quite harmless. The point is this: Professor Dewey is especially interested in the genetic account of things. Now assume that the account which he has given is a true account – even to a large extent. He himself would feel hurt were this assumption not made, and he himself tacitly makes it. But the account is a set of propositions, and the genesis which it

describes a process, which are or have been at same time the objects of *his* knowing. And yet, although *his* knowing has had a genesis and the account has grown and changed, he has always made the tacit assumption (and must make it) that, in so far as the account is true and the genesis real, they, although related to *his* knowing, are not created, altered, modified, or constituted by this, but are discovered in it. Briefly, for this relation between his own knowing and its object, the theory of "external relations" is used by Professor Dewey, and would still be used even if the claim were made, contrariwise, that there was a *real* alteration of the object by genuinely knowing it. For the discovery of even such a *real* alteration would itself presuppose the "external theory," so that this claim would defeat itself. It is in this way, then, that we can answer Professor Dewey's question as to what is the "warrant" for "transferring" the "external theory" to the cognitive relation, or to the relation between propositions, or the terms of these, or to existents. It is very evident that this warrant is one, not of manipulation, but of discovery by analysis, if one please, that the theory is involved, is applicable, is valid, as a matter of fact. And so to the further question as to whether or not the view applies to the relation between propositions and the existences to which some propositions refer, the answer must also be "Yes, it does!" For, if this distinction between propositions and existences is made, the "external theory" must apply to their relation; otherwise it would be impossible to discover a proposition which should refer to existences as they really are.

These considerations concern, then, a crucial point in the realist's difference with Professor Dewey. The realist admits that one may study genesis – the genesis of anything which one finds empirically to have a genesis. But, if one can find the facts about genesis, it is also possible that it should be found that some "things" do not have a genesis, although the knowledge of them may have. And among such "things" he would insist that there are certain logical facts (as there are also certain existential terms), which not only are logically prior to any genesis, but are presupposed in any genuine knowledge of real genesis. The realist can find room for both interests, although his own interest is in other facts, rather than in genesis exclusively. And this is, indeed, the method and purpose of such special sciences as chemistry, physics, mathematics, etc. To suppose that genuine knowledge in these fields can not be achieved until we know about the knowing of the chemist, the physicist, etc. – whether, for example, it is a natural event – is to commit the epistemological fallacy. For were this the case, then Professor Dewey could not know about genesis of any other kind until he knew about the genesis of his own knowing, and so on in an infinite series. The result

would be, seemingly, that he could never have genuine knowledge of anything until this series is completed.

What the realist does, then, indeed what Professor Dewey tacitly does in this situation is to assume that at some point genuine knowledge not only is possible, but is actual. Professor Dewey makes this assumption in setting out to know genesis and in giving his results; the realist makes it in studying other things than genesis, and in giving results. Both Professor Dewey and the realist make it, each for his own theory, either as a whole, or for some parts. It is on this point, then, that the realist joins sharp issue with Professor Dewey. The realist recognizes that, wherever the assumption is made, either tacitly or explicitly, that genuine knowledge has been obtained, the tacit assumption is also made that the object known is not modified, altered, or constituted by the knowing. This means that the realist recognizes that in every case of genuine knowing, whatever the object known may be, the theory of "external relations" is presupposed as valid for the cognitive relation. Otherwise, *i.e.*, if the object known were modified or constituted either in whole or in part by virtue of being known – results which follow from the forced application of the theory of "internal relations" to the cognitive relations – then knowing were falsification, no knowing were possible, all knowing were not knowing!

These facts enable us to reply to an objection which, although not explicitly formulated by Professor Dewey, really underlies his whole criticism, and might be raised against our reply so far. This implied objection is that our reply is not *ad rem*, since in it we use "genuine knowledge" in a sense which Professor Dewey would not admit, and do not use it in that sense which he insists upon. According to Professor Dewey's explicit accounts, genuine knowledge can have a meaning only in reference to genesis. That is, of course, his pragmatism. For him genesis conditions genuineness. He would say to us, then, that we have not joined issue with him until we have considered the relation between genuineness and genesis. And for him genuineness = efficiency in the genetic series.

Our reply to this implicit objection, which we herewith anticipate, is, in agreement with our preceding contentions, as follows: We can not alone consider that view of knowledge which Professor Dewey presents explicitly. We must also consider that view which he has tacitly assumed in working out and in offering his explicit genetic accounts to us as true. And the one crucial tacit assumption which we discover Professor Dewey making, and which we use as a fulcrum for an argument both *ad rem* and *ad hominem*, is that there is one instance which he assumes is genuine knowledge without giving, and without its being necessary to

this reliance on empirical investigation. And so, by the “external theory,” the empirically discovered object may be anything whatsoever, either dissimilar or similar to the knowing – such a typical case of dissimilarity being Professor Dewey’s own knowing of a physical genesis or of his own (subsistent) theory. Thus it is shown that in “deriving the possibility of a qualitative dissimilarity of the knowing and its object from the ‘external theory,’” we are not begging the question, as Professor Dewey accuses us of doing, but are finding empirically that the situation involved in the cognitive relation, even as he himself accepts this, implies the possibility of this dissimilarity. And experience confirms this consequence.

But not only do these consequences follow; other very important ones do also. If the cognitive relation is such that it implies that we can know as if the knowing were not taking place, then it follows that we can go ahead and know without first studying knowing either epistemologically, or psychologically, or genetically. For, if we join issue with the philosopher who pursues such studies at the point of his own assumption, that a genuine knowledge of knowing in its genesis, etc., is possible, and that his own knowing does not *here* modify its object, *i.e.*, the propositions which make up his objective theory, then, *on the basis of this very same condition, knowing need not be studied in its genesis, etc., before we study other problems.* The temporal order of study is indifferent, or at least largely so. This consequence is confirmed by the way in which the special sciences have actually developed. And this is the way, too, in which we can get a real knowledge of logic. And, having it, we find that, just as in order to explain physiological phenomena, the facts of chemistry and physics must be used, so, to explain genesis, alteration, etc., logic must be used. This does not mean that validity is denied the problems of genesis, of psychology, etc., but does mean that logic is presupposed in the attempt to solve them, and that it is logically prior not only to this discovery, but to the genetic account of this discovery, and to its use.

This conclusion, then, brings to a clear focus the issue between the realist and Professor Dewey. Professor Dewey’s dominant interest is in genesis, and he views even logic from this standpoint; that of the realist is in other facts as well, independent of the fact that the information about these has, as a knowledge process, a genesis. So far, then, there is nothing incompatible in the two viewpoints. But there is a radical incompatibility as soon as the question is raised as to which is antecedent, at least when “antecedence” is defined with precision – which Professor Dewey does not do (p. 142). The realist, distinguishing logical and temporal antecedence, takes the position and grounds it, that

give, its genetic account. This is the instance of *his own knowing* of his own account. But if there is one case of this kind, there may be others! And if in this case the definition of genuine knowing which is tacitly used by Professor Dewey himself is that "knowing is genuine when the object is known as it really is, unmodified and unconstituted by the knowing, no matter what the history of this knowing may have been," then we are quite justified in making this a definition of genuine knowing in all cases. The definition in terms of genesis and efficiency can not displace this non-genetic definition, since the former presupposes the latter and the latter does not imply the former. Professor Dewey, then, must himself consider this tacit presupposition which he himself makes, and which we recognize, In order to join issue with us; for the continued insistence on the genetic definition will mean only that he continues to beg the question which we dispute, and that he hesitates or fails to consider all the implications of his own procedure and results.

The realist, then, accepts as the definition of genuine knowing that one which Professor Dewey himself tacitly uses and which his genetic definition presupposes, and further finds, since his attention is directed to this point by the idealist's application of the theory of "internal relations" to the cognitive relation, that for genuine knowing the acceptance of the theory of "external relations" is demanded. This theory presents the logical situation which is involved in the cognitive relation. And the necessity of ascertaining what this situation is, is shown by the fact that it is possible to discover what follows logically from the character of genuine knowing, as even Professor Dewey himself tacitly uses this, only by discovering what logical principles are involved in this knowing.

With this as a starting-point, then, the realist proceeds further by asking "what follows?" And he finds that a number of very interesting and important consequences follow, which, moreover, are confirmed by the actual history and development of knowledge. Among these consequences, now, of the validity of the "external theory" for the cognitive relation, the realist finds that there is the possibility of genuine knowledge in any field, of anything, independently of knowing the genesis which this knowledge has. This holds, of course, for the knowing of genesis itself, even the genesis of knowledge. But the character and the details of the entities known are not in the least derived from or by manipulation of this theory or of the definition of knowledge. To find out these the realist depends upon experience, upon observation and experiment, and consistent analysis. Indeed it is one of the most important consequences of the "external theory" as valid for the cognitive relation that it not only logically allows, but *demand*s just

the logic of proof, of classes, or relations, etc., is logically antecedent to the solving of questions of genesis, even to *proving* that there is a real genesis. Professor Dewey would, in consistency, seem to be obliged to accept this position, for, since he explicitly accepts the core of our realistic position in the statement (p. 138), "I agree with realism's contention that knowledge always implies existences prior to and independent of their being known," it would seem that he would be obliged to accept the logic which this realism implies, or give such reasons to the contrary as are not inconsistent with their own presuppositions. From the standpoint of the conclusions referred to above, then, and with the issue thus clearly defined, the four questions (p. 142) which Professor Dewey asks at the end of his criticism can be answered with precision.

Question 1. "Is knowing a natural event?" Answer: Yes, of course, but to show what is its factual character as such an event, and how it evolves out of other natural events, is to solve a problem in genetic psychology, and does not meet the realist's contention that logic is logically prior to both the genesis and the genetic account. For both the solution of the question and the occurrence of the genesis which that solution describes, and the final attainment of a true result, presuppose certain logical principles which subsist prior to and independently of their being known and used. The fact that these questions of genesis may be studied antecedently in time to the study of logic does not make them logically antecedent. A very similar reply can be made to

Question 2. "Is logic an account of getting knowledge or is it a theory of knowledge achieved?" Answer: Neither! Logic is a body of information about facts, a true knowledge of principles of proof, relations, classes, implication, etc. With this knowledge (logic) on hand, it can be and is used as a means to the getting of genuine knowledge, even of the knowledge of the knowing process, and also as a means of discovering what the logical situation is in achieved knowledge. But the account of getting knowledge and of what this is when once achieved is psychology and the history of science, and not logic, although it involves logic both in process and result. Logic, then, has no closer alliance with a theory either of getting knowledge or of knowledge achieved than it has with, *e.g.*, chemistry.

Question 3. "Is it of any significance that achieved knowledge is expressed in propositions composed of terms – *i.e.*, of symbols?" Answer: The realist would question the equating of terms with symbols. However, ignoring this as a minor point, it may be said that the fact that knowledge is symbolized is of significance primarily to psychology, but presupposes certain logical principles – *e.g.*, that the symbol does not

alter the symbolized although related to it – the theory of “external relations” again.

Question 4. “What is the relation of knowing as an event, a happening, to knowledge as a logical relation, whether of things or terms?” Answer: Relations, at least existential relations, “come and go”; some of the relations between terms, both subsistent and existent, are independent of others. Now the cognitive relation “comes and goes.” This, then, is the relation of knowing as an event to knowledge (knowing) as a relation. The “coming and going” of the cognitive relation, under certain conditions, of course, is itself an event. However, the cognitive relation is not simply and purely a logical entity, any more than are other natural events and things; but it is logical in part and belongs to a certain type, say, that of symmetrical, transitive relations. Still, what this type is, the realist would admit to be an open question.

All four of Professor Dewey’s final questions concern primarily and for the most part, then, the psychology of knowing. Therefore, by them, he does not really join issue with us in our contention that, in answering them, even to a limited extent, certain logical principles are presupposed, and that a more complete answer demands the explicit formulation of an extensive logic of relations, their types, their character, of classes, both finite and infinite, of implication, both formal and material, etc. In fact the realist would go so far as to say that if Professor Dewey gives a true account of the real genesis of knowing and of its conditions, he at least tacitly employs, in so doing, not only this logic, but also the principles of our platform, which incorporates some of this logic in its propositions.

The replies to all the foregoing criticisms which have been considered make clear also what is the realist’s reply to one other criticism (p. 140) that the “external theory” makes knowing “accidental” or “supernatural,” whereas this consequence is refuted by the fact that knowing is essentially “purposive” and “natural” – in effecting some alteration in existence itself. Our reply is: The “external theory” makes knowing no more accidental or supernatural than it makes any other existent, *e.g.*, heat, electricity, etc., in whose explanation and exact scientific treatment it is implied (see *supra*). These are “natural things,” and yet they involve the “external theory”! Therefore the fact that knowing involves the same theory does not make it accidental or supernatural. Second, real alteration of complexes is a fact, but a fact compatible with the “external theory” and the unalterability of “simples.” So also with knowing! Taken descriptively and integrally, it is a complex process in the larger series of complex processes, and may be said to play its part in the larger process. But it plays the part that it plays, and that is, that

when it occurs, under certain conditions, reality is known, and conversely. Third, this, too, maybe said to be its purpose; but if so, the purpose is just that: specific one of making reality known, so that quite analogously, and with as much reason, no more and no less, any existent, and indeed any subsistent, may be said to have the purpose of giving to "being" that characteristic which "being" would lack were such an existent or subsistent lacking. Accident, supernaturalness, and lack of alteration and of purpose, if they characterize knowing because it implies the "external theory," must characterize everything else which implies the same theory. But they do not characterize knowing because of this validity. Therefore the presence of alteration and of purpose and the naturalness of knowing can be admitted, and yet these be treated by the "external theory" in just those respects in which, as a matter of fact, this theory is found to be involved in them.

REJOINDER TO DR. SPAULDING

John Dewey. "Rejoinder to Dr. Spaulding." *Journal of Philosophy* 8.3 (3 February 1911): 77–79. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 6 (1978), pp. 143–45.

I have read with interest Dr. Spaulding's reply to my earlier criticism of one aspect of the realistic platform.¹ The only reply it occurs to me to make is that Dr. Spaulding's article, in spite of the many interesting things it contains, is not a response to my criticism. Doubtless owing to some obscurity in my original article, he conceives it to be written from the standpoint of a philosophic position, which, on other grounds (whether logical or psychological I know not) he attributes to me. He says "Professor Dewey makes his criticism from the standpoint of genesis." On the contrary, it is made from a formal standpoint. Believing heartily that philosophical discussion suffers from ambiguous terms, and welcoming the "Platform" as an attempt to clear some of them away, I thought I found the "Platform" using the term "external relations" in ways which involved taking advantage of an ambiguity. The reference to "knowledge getting," the phrase upon the basis of which Dr. Spaulding attributes a genetic standpoint to my article, is used simply in pointing out one formal aspect of the ambiguity. To repeat: External relations *may* hold of the terms of a proposition, without being a description of the relation of the proposition as an *existence* to other *existences*. I did not claim that it does not hold in this existential case; I claimed that to conclude that it holds (as the "Platform" does at a crucial point) *on the basis of an analysis of the relation of the terms of a proposition to each other as terms*, is to beg the precise question at issue; it is to assume that one can decide from the *im*-plication of a proposition a question of fact having to do with its *ap*-plication.

Without going outside the limits of my original criticism to discuss the new points raised by Dr. Spaulding (some of which I should be very glad to discuss, were it not that such discussion at this time would be sure to lead to further misunderstanding of my original criticism), I may borrow from his account of mathematical physics a way of restating my formal

¹ This JOURNAL, September 28, 1910.

point. Suppose that a mathematical physicist stated that he could settle *in* a proposition of mathematical physics the scope and place in existence generally of the entities (or subsistents) forming the subject-matter of mathematical physics. Suppose some one (myself, for example) retorts that such a procedure begs the only point at issue. Would that retort be met by pointing out that I was ignorant of mathematical physics? Would that retort be equivalent to a denial of the validity and importance of mathematics within its own province, whatever that may turn out to be? Is it inconsistent even with an acknowledgment that it is possible – and desirable if possible – to state the relation in question mathematically? And if I went on to point out that the procedures by which the mathematical propositions are themselves established do not, on their face, agree with the claim made respecting the place of mathematical subject-matter, as such, in existence would a reply that I am speaking about the “getting” of true propositions and hence arguing from an irrelevant standpoint, that of genetic psychology, have anything to do with the case?

I may add that the matter of Dr. Spaulding’s reply adds to the evidence that the “Platform” at certain specific points (and I am speaking only of those points) does commit precisely the logical fallacy I charged it with. I mean his concluding to certain Eleatic properties of existence from a consideration of the implications of mathematical physics. I am not denying that mathematical physics has these implications; or that, as matter of fact, existence *may* have these Eleatic properties; I am only questioning the formal logic of a procedure which assimilates physical and biological operations to static spatial relations because of the form the former take *when and as* they become the subject-matter of mathematical physics. And I add: Do the actual propositions of mathematical physics themselves rest upon purely mathematical implications and considerations, or do they rest upon experimental inquiries into matters of fact? If the latter, do these inquiries (being modes of “knowledge getting”) belong to genetic psychology? And whether Dr. Spaulding answers “yes” or “no,” what becomes of all that portion of his reply which claims that my criticism is irrelevant because made from the standpoint of genetic psychology?

I do not assume to know whether my statements deserve attention or not. If they receive it, I venture to hope that the discussion will confine itself to the points of procedure involved in my discussion.

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR DEWEY'S REJOINDER

Edward G. Spaulding. "A Reply to Professor Dewey's Rejoinder." *Journal of Philosophy* 8.21 (12 October 1911): 566–74.

My purpose in replying to Professor Dewey's recent rejoinder¹ is to point out and, if possible, to remove the misunderstanding which I think he still has of what is at least the intent of the realist platform, especially as concerns procedure. Professor Dewey regards my previous reply as not having met his criticism, and now makes it his main point that questions of fact concerning the application of a proposition can not be decided from its implications. This, however, seems to me to have been only one of many points and inquiries which he made in his original criticism, although he did say that the main object of his discussion was "to protest against trying to reach results by the manipulation of a concept." But, however that may be, and whether or not Professor Dewey may regard my reply as having met the points he intended to raise, now that he has singled out one main question and has made quite clear that he means by manipulation "the deciding the application of a proposition from its implication," I am glad to reply to it alone, reformulating, in so doing, certain parts of my previous reply.²

I have reexamined the various statements of the platform, and can not find that any of these in its intent justifies Professor Dewey's interpretation or intimation that the realist would decide a "question of fact having to do with the application of a proposition from its implication" *provided he could* employ methods of observation and experimentation for deciding or helping to decide this application. Nor, more specifically, do I find any statement which seems to justify the criticism that the realist decides the application of the theory of "external relations" from its own implications or from its implications as applied in any specific case. But the platform may, of course, suffer from the ambiguous use of terms, or words, and this may be the source of Professor Dewey's misin-

¹ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. VIII, No. 3.

² The present reply also was submitted to the members of the group and received their general approval.

terpretation. Indeed, I conceive his misinterpretation to be due to the way in which the word "term" is used in the platform and to the formulation of the theory of "external relations" to the effect, namely, that "in the proposition 'the term a is in the relation R to the term b ,' aR in no degree constitutes b , nor does Rb constitute a , nor does R constitute either a or b ." The platform contains other formulations of the theory, but this one might be misleading because of the word "term." These formulations, however, state only the meaning of the theory for whatever instances it may be found to apply, – indeed, whether it applies to anything or not, – and make no assertion as to what terms in relation the theory does apply to, not even that it applies to the terms of a proposition in the strict sense of these words. "Term a " and "term b " are used as variables, *i.e.*, in such a way that there could be substituted for them any entities in relation for which relation the theory, as stated, is found empirically to apply. Such terms or entities might *a priori* be the terms of propositions, or propositions as wholes, or points, or instants, etc. To which of these the theory applies is to be determined by empirical investigation for each case separately and independently, and not by implication from one another; and the formulation of the theory, indeed the entire platform, allows for just this independent investigation. However, with this investigation once made, the result may, of course, be stated in the form of a proposition, with terms (*e.g.*, the point a is in the relation R to the point b), and yet the entities denoted may be anything whatsoever other than the terms (in the strict sense) of a proposition. They might be physical objects, mental states, numbers, atoms, etc. In this sense, then, anything whatsoever may be made the subject of an empirical investigation to determine what terms and relations are present, and whether the "external theory" applies or not; *i.e.*, anything whatsoever may be observed and reasoned about and the results be stated in the form of propositions, *i.e.*, judgments may be made, and inferences drawn from these, and the way thus opened up, perhaps, to new observations.

The realist would certainly agree, then, in general, with Professor Dewey's contention that from the "implications of propositions questions of fact" can not be decided – provided, he would add, these facts are not themselves implied facts, or, if they are, provided there is another way of helping to decide them, namely, by observation or experiment of some kind. Sometimes, however, the only way of deciding certain facts, indeed of discovering them, is by implication from propositions applied on the basis of observation and experiment; and it is, of course, always quite legitimate procedure to develop these implications, confirming them, if possible, by observation and experiment. But Professor Dewey would undoubtedly quite agree with this. And yet he

seems to be somewhat critical of the realist's use of this procedure in certain cases, *e.g.*, in those in which, where by observation the theory of "external relations" has been found to be applicable, the implications from this application are developed – whether they are confirmed or not. In certain cases they are, in others they are not. To state certain results of this kind, namely, observed results with implied results which are confirmed, was also the intent of the platform, and to further explain this procedure was part of the purpose of my first reply. However, to further show just what, in our own minds, our procedure is, and to reply to Professor Dewey's recent inquiries quite succinctly, I will state on just what grounds the "external theory" is held to apply in each case.

The realist would distinguish a number of different types of empirical procedure and a number of different kinds of facts. That there are these seems to be a fact which is itself empirically established. Now among the different types of empirical procedure there are different kinds of observation and experiment, two at least; by one, sense observation and experiment, we get at the physical world; by the other, which, for want of a better name, I call ideal observation, we get at mental processes, and at more subtle, ethereal entities like numbers, possibility, infinity, etc. Professor Dewey, tacitly at least, accepts this second kind of observation; for in his position that the application of a position shall be decided by observation and experiment, he tacitly grants that such a subtle, diaphanous thing as the *applicability* of a proposition can be observed. The realist is quite in agreement with Professor Dewey in this respect; other than physical and mental entities can be observed. Furthermore, the realist also distinguishes different kinds of facts, such as observed and implied facts, physical, mental, logical; and mathematical facts, and, perhaps also as distinct from these, spatial and temporal facts. These facts are to be discovered, analyzed, and their relations to one another ascertained by any specific empirical method which proves efficient. In accordance, now, with these distinctions, the realist decides the application of the "external theory" in each specific case for which it has been asserted in this recent discussion to apply as follows:

1. By "ideal" observation and experiment the realist finds that the theory of "external relations" applies to that cognitive situation in which there is achieved knowledge of theories, of propositions, of numbers, etc.

2. By observation of, and perhaps also by experiment on, physical objects, the realist finds the theory to be applicable to that cognitive situation in which there is genuine knowledge of physical existents.

Comment. – The application in the first case may be said to make the

second logically possible – to imply it; but the realist is of the opinion that this implied fact can be confirmed by observation, and so a direct as well as an implied application be established. But still the direct application, by observation and experiment, in the second case is not so convincing as it is in the first, for the reason that on its basis it is *difficult to meet the contention of the idealist and phenomenalist that the so-called physical object known is in some degree constituted by or modified by the knowing*. This contention ought to be met and answered satisfactorily, and while I hold that the observational evidence establishes a presumption in favor of the validity of the “external theory” in this second case, I have, because of the retort to which it is open, emphasized the first case as a better means of getting hold of the idealist and the phenomenalist. I can observe quite empirically, it seems to me, their knowing of their own theory, and find that the “external theory” applies.

3. By observation of, and perhaps also by experiment on, mental events, the realist finds that the theory applies to that cognitive situation in which there is genuine knowledge of mental existents.

4. Making the distinction between judgment as the act of assertion and the proposition as the state of affairs asserted or the judgment-content, the realist finds that the “external theory” applies (a) to the relation of the terms (in the strict sense) of a proposition; (b) to the relation of a proposition to that to which it refers, whether this be existential or subsistential; (c) to the relation of propositions to one another.

5. By “ideal” observation and experiment the realist finds that the theory applies to the relations between those entities, *such as* intensity-points, space-points, instants, etc., which can not be directly observed physically, but which are implied by certain facts that are so observed.

There may be other cases of the applicability of the theory of “external relations,” indeed it may be that it applies to all cases of terms in relation, and that the “internal theory” has no application. But realism is not concerned primarily with the question of the extensive or universal applicability of the “external theory,” but only with its validity as respects the cognitive situation. In all of the above cases I should say that it is as much a matter of observation and perhaps also of experimentation that the “external theory” applies as it is a matter of observation and experiment that, for example, the law of inverse squares applies to celestial and molar phenomena, and to the phenomena of static electricity and magnetism (Coulomb’s law), etc. Indeed, in the case of these phenomena, in whose investigation inductive, empirical methods are admittedly used, it is often said that the observed facts *imply* the law. Now it is a similar usage which I have sometimes made in

saying that the cognitive situation implies or presupposes the theory of "external relations" in the case of knowing *quâ* knowing. This usage may also have been a source of Professor Dewey's misunderstanding, and perhaps such usage is open to criticism. Indeed I think that some other word than "imply" might be advantageously used here, for this "imply" is different from the deductive "imply." But I have employed the term "imply" in just this sense, that one may say either that a certain law applies to certain phenomena, or, conversely, that the phenomena "imply" the law, and this is frequent usage. But if "imply" be used in this way, then our procedure is certainly quite different from that of deciding the application of a proposition from its implication – *provided* direct observational methods can be used to decide this.

To the other questions and statements of Professor Dewey's rejoinder I reply only that it may not be said that I am avoiding any issue raised therein. In reply to these I would say:

1. The mathematical physicist *does* decide by the *implication* of the (existential) propositions of mathematical physics "the scope and place in existence of the entities forming the subject-matter of this science," provided he can decide them in no other way. For example, such a method gives the greater part of the physics of the ether, and it is the only method which does. He decides these questions by physical experiment, or by experiment *and* implication where he can; but in case certain phenomena, discovered by implication, are not accessible to direct experimentation, they remain decided to a certain extent by implication. It is to certain ones of such implied facts, checked up only indirectly by experiment, that the realist by "ideal" observation finds the "external theory" applicable; he accepts them simply at their face value; they are implied existential facts.

2. I quite agree with Professor Dewey that the actual propositions of *mathematical physics* do not rest upon *purely* mathematical implications. Nowhere have I said, either directly or indirectly, that they do. Nor do they rest upon purely experimental inquiries into matters of fact. That which they do rest upon is both experimental inquiries and the use of implicative methods interwoven as closely as possible. That is why one can not argue from the biological, chemical, and physical properties of existence without considering also the implied existential properties.

3. Further, and with apologies to Professor Dewey for seeming to insist on that which he disclaims in his rejoinder. I must reply that the experimental inquiries which he emphasizes are themselves part of the subject-matter of genetic psychology – genetic at least in the broad sense – and that they must be so made is indeed a point of view which is at least implicitly taken by him in *his* view of the nature of that true knowledge to which such inquiries are held to lead. Therefore, an

inquiry concerning the extent to which the genesis of knowledge is relevant to its truth itself becomes relevant in a discussion with an opponent whose general philosophical position means that the truth of achieved knowledge can be defined only in relation to the prior inquiry, and to success, to satisfactoriness – *this all the more* so if it is claimed that “antecedently to any use of a concept of relations” it must be decided whether “knowing is a natural event” and, “if so, how it evolves out of other natural events.” *Why* this should be the case, and *why* we should *not* go ahead and make the question as to whether we can use “a concept of relations” in any case a question of fact to be decided by observation and experiment on the things to which we wish to apply the concept, I can not see, unless there is the wish to decide, from the implications of the proposition that “knowledge is a natural event,” something concerning the use of a “concept of relations.” But such a claim seems to me to contradict the main contention of Professor Dewey’s rejoinder regarding procedure, and yet it is a point which he insists upon in his original criticism. Further, while of course such a claim very evidently raises the question of procedure, it is direct evidence for me that that criticism was, as a whole, made from the standpoint of a philosophical position which may well be called broadly genetic. Nor has the rejoinder removed this conviction. For in this I again find evidence that Professor Dewey regards procedure and empiricism and fact in that more limited way which is characteristic of the pragmatic and genetic standpoint, and in accordance with which there are *fewer types* of experimentation and observation and fact than the realist recognizes. So again I have found, since it is my purpose to argue and not merely to deny, that I must go beyond the merely explicit statements in Professor Dewey’s rejoinder and consider the more fundamental position upon which they are dependent. This I have done above, and such a procedure again appears to me, as it did in my original reply, quite pertinent to the discussion. However, my former reply did not purport to be only an answer to Professor Dewey’s criticisms; it had also the purpose of being an exposition, and of pointing out lines of possible agreement between the realistic and other positions.

In conclusion I would like to raise one more point, or, indeed, to make an inquiry, and this I would address to whomever it may interest rather than regard it as a further reply to Professor Dewey. My inquiry concerns, on the one hand, the problem of the relation of knowing *quâ* knowing to its object, and on the other, the question of procedure in attacking this problem. The problem and the solutions given to it form that which the realists as well as their critics have recognized as the pivotal question at issue between them, while the further question as to what means shall be employed in attacking it is important, because no

procedure has yet been suggested by any one which seems to be of the nature of a crucial experiment or to lead to a solution which is decisive and uniformly convincing. The problem has been narrowed down in the recent discussion between the realists and their critics to the more precise one of whether or not knowing *quâ* knowing modifies or constitutes its object, or, what is the same thing, what theory of relations applies to this situation; and, of course, if knowing does modify or constitute its object, there is the further problem as to the degree or extent of this "effect."

As concerns procedure in attacking this problem, there is to be found one party which insists that ordinary empirical methods not only are sufficient to solve it, but, indeed, are the only ones which can. Thus, by this party it is usually held, for example, that ordinary empiricism (in common sense and science) shows that any object known (or unknown) is independent of the knowing *quâ* knowing, although knowing may lead indirectly to experiment and so to change. But the objection to this procedure is that it is not crucial; evidence that it is not so is the fact that at least it does not satisfy or convince the idealist and the phenomenalist of the Kantian type, who calmly accept all ordinary empirical methods and results and fit them into their larger idealism and phenomenalism without a murmur. Ordinary empiricism is, then, seemingly incapable of setting this knowing problem; for, seemingly, its results can be absorbed, and it offers no crucial observation or experiment by which to disprove either the idealist's or the phenomenalist's claims. But, on the other hand, neither does the idealist, nor the phenomenalist, nor even the pragmatist offer *any crucial observation or experiment* as a basis for his position, but only arguments. Phenomenalism is based on the premise that knowing modifies or constitutes its object to a certain degree, idealism makes this "effect" either partial or complete, and pragmatism holds that "things undergo change in knowing"; but in each case the position is only argued and not established by a crucial observation or experiment. It may be, of course, that no such mode of establishment or of settling the question is possible; but, if this be the case, it is itself a fact of significance and should receive establishment.

With this the actual state of affairs, then, at the present time, *i.e.*, with each party unable to show decisively by a crucial observation or experiment either that knowing modifies or constitutes its object or that it does not, but able only to argue, the problem of procedure in attacking this fundamentally important problem of knowledge still remains. Is there, or is there not, a crucial experiment or observation by which it may be decisively shown either that knowing modifies or constitutes its object or that it does not, and if it does, to what extent, and in what

cases? And if there is not such an experiment, why is this so and what does it indicate? Is it because of the very nature of the problem? I simply wish to narrow down this question regarding procedure, and so I would respectfully address my inquiry to any and to all parties, and I make it in order to get information, and not to arouse controversy. I myself have used and stated what seems to me to be a crucial observation creating a presumption in favor of the position that knowing *quâ* knowing in no case modifies or constitutes its object. That is the observation of a philosopher's or scientist's knowing of his own theory – whatever this may be. But this observation of mine has been called dialectic, although to use this appellation constitutes imputation and not refutation. So I make appeal for an observation or experiment of another type, if there be such, which *shall be crucial* in nature, and be one which I can repeat, for this is the character of a scientific crucial experiment. If such an one can not be given, what does that indicate? Does it show that the problem is of such a character that it can not be solved in this way, but only by argument? If this be so, then let us find it out. For the purpose of thus narrowing down my inquiry, I request of the empiricist that observation and experiment – and not argument – which will show so decisively that knowing does not modify or constitute its object that there will be no chance for the idealist or phenomenalist to escape. Or of the idealist and phenomenalist I request that observation and experiment – and not argument – which will show decisively that knowing does modify or constitute its object, and *how much*. Or of the pragmatist who states, as does Professor Dewey, that “things undergo change in knowing,” I request the experiment and observation, physical, ideal, or what not, but in any case crucial, by which it may be shown that this change is universal for all things, or limited, and in either case *how much* the change is. For *either* universal, for all knowing, for all things, or limited it must be! In either case I ask for the crucial observation and experiment – and not argument – by which the universality or the limitation can be shown and the amount of the change determined approximately. And if in none of these cases the crucial experiment can be given, then I ask not only *why this* is so, but for that mode of procedure which *shall be adopted* in attacking the knowing problem, *and why*.

It does not answer my questions to say that experience alone solves them. And if the crucial experiment and observation can not be given by which the problem can be solved decisively one way or the other, then must we conclude that for the present the solution is only one of argument influenced by emotional bias and perhaps an arbitrary use of some theory of relations? Indeed it is to put this alternative to the test that I formulate my request as I do – that I exclude argument and ask

for observation and experiment crucial in character. Yet as concerns the outcome, should any one favor me with a response, and whether he cite the observation and experiment asked for, or avoid the issue by presenting only argument, I am confident, indeed I can now observe, that somewhere the principle that knowing *quâ* knowing does not modify or constitute its object will emerge supreme.

I have endeavored to answer the inquiries of Professor Dewey's rejoinder directly, and have done so in the sincere desire to make clear the realist's position, and so to further that agreement with which Professor Dewey in his original criticism acknowledges his sympathy.³ My final inquiry I make not so much by way of replying to him as to seek information concerning a problem of general interest.

³ Since this reply was written, Professor Dewey and I have held a number of conferences for the purpose of discussing the points at issue between us. We have preferred this method of verbal discussion to that of alternate reply and rejoinder. This reply was submitted to Professor Dewey, and the result of our conferences are published subsequently in this issue. [See this volume, pp. 146–52.]

JOINT DISCUSSION WITH ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT: PROFESSOR DEWEY AND DR. SPAULDING

John Dewey and Edward G. Spaulding. "Joint Discussion with Articles of Agreement and Disagreement." *Journal of Philosophy* 8.21 (12 October 1911): 574–97. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 6 (1978), pp. 146–52.

Professor Dewey and I have presented in the pages of this JOURNAL during the current academic year articles in discussion of the "Platform of Six Realists." That discussion might have been continued, at least with probable interest to ourselves, for some time by alternate articles of reply and rejoinder. But such a method might easily have involved the danger of a continually increasing mutual misunderstanding and misdirected emphasis. Accordingly, both to avoid this danger and to bring our discussion to a close, we have, rather than continue it by the usual journalistic methods, conferred and discussed in person the matters at issue. The results of our conferences, both agreements and disagreements, we offer as a close to our previous discussion. These results concern all but one of the main points raised in that discussion, including my last reply, the exception being my final inquiry concerning procedure in attacking the problem of the relation of knowing *quâ* knowing to its object. That question, however, I raised as one of general interest rather than by way of reply to Professor Dewey. The following are the results of our verbal discussion, "D. and S." showing agreement, single initials showing reservations, comments, etc.

E. G. SPAULDING

1. Judgments may be a natural outgrowth of preceding natural events, and may lead to other natural events; but it is an empirical question as to what degree or in what respects they differ from other natural events. (D. and S.)

2. Judgments are things in course (form a mode) of discovery and of inquiry. They lead to "knowing" or an act of assertion. (D. and S.)

3. Judgments, as links in a causal or natural series of events, may change realities, or, through an intervening causal series, lead to changes in reality. (D. and S.)

4. A judgment terminates in a proposition, which is a subsistent and relational complex stating the truth about existents or other subsistents. (D.)

A proposition is a subsistent and relational complex stating the truth about existents or other subsistents. It is the content or "state of affairs" which the judgment asserts, or which is "known." (S.)

5. Judgments as related to entities existing or subsisting simultaneously with the knowing, or assertion, do not change the entities as known or asserted. (D. and S.) (See comments under S.)

Comment (S.). This holds good in some cases also for entities existing either before or after the "knowing," and in all cases of subsistents.

6. There may be different types of subsistents, among which the proposition is one (type), and discrimination of the relative value or validity of these types may involve the question of the relation of propositions to judgments. (D. and S.)

Reservation (D.). In all cases the determination of the validity of the subsistent depends upon the connection of the subsistent with prior and subsequent inquiry, *i.e.*, upon the judgment series. There are differences in types of inquiry which control the differences of validity.

Comment (S.). In some cases, at least, subsistents are (found to be) independent of the inquiries in which they are discovered, for example, in the case of numbers.

7. Propositions do not modify entities to which they refer (of which they are propositions). (S.) (See 8.)

The subsistent which constitutes the subject-matter of a proposition does not modify any existent or other subsistent to which it may refer. (D.) (See S.)

8. This whole situation concerning or involving observation, judgments, propositions, entities known, the relations between these, their character, etc., may itself be made the subject of special study and inquiry, and the result constitute or be the discovery of propositions to which 7 applies. (D. and S.)

Comment (S.). A. Not only does 7 apply to the results, stated as propositions, of the inquiry, but 4, 5, 6, 11, 13, and 14 also apply to these results in the respect emphasized by each of these statements, while 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 apply to the process of inquiry into the situation under discussion. One may say either that the conditions which make inquiry into this specific situation possible, and the propositions which are discovered about it, must be presumed to hold good for any other specific inquiry whose purpose is to discover the truth, or one may

state the presumption in the inverse order. Either statement is made simply in recognition of the demands of consistency.

B. In the case of “achieved knowledge” or “knowing,” as an outcome of the process of inquiry, it is discovered that there is a distinction between (1) the knowing, as an existent, (2) the proposition, a subsistent, and (3) the entity, either existent or subsistent, which is known and to which the proposition refers. There is also a “knowing” of the proposition. Designating these three entities by *a*, *b*, and *c*, respectively, there are, then, three relations, *aRb*, *aRc*, and *bRc*, in which the terms, though related, may be different, – indeed, very different and independent. (Cf. 4, 5, 6, and 7, especially 5 and 7.) This means (1) that “knowing” does not modify or constitute either the proposition or the entity (*cf.* 4), and (2) that the proposition does not modify or constitute the entity or entities to which it refers, – briefly, that the theory of “external relations” applies to each of these three relations. The applicability or validity of this theory for these three relations is discovered by that observation which is made possible by making the judgment-proposition-observation situation itself an object of inquiry. (*Cf.* 9.)

Comment (D.). I hold that the process of inquiry and discovery which terminates in a proposition is necessary to the existence of the subject-matter or subsistent of the proposition. In holding that this prior process does not modify its own objective when reached, (i.) I also hold that “study and inquiry” show that the subsistent *is* the existent to which it refers, modified; that this particular sort of modification is just what is denoted by proposition, assertion, knowledge. The subsistent does not, then, modify the existent, for, being logical in status (see 14), it has no existential efficiency, but it *is* a modification of a prior existent, through the entrance of this latter into a process of doubt-discovery, having for its objective the proposition. (ii.) While the subsistent does not modify, cognitively speaking, the existent to which it refers, the act of assertion, which is existential, operates to bring about a transformation into a more desirable form of the existent referred to. Thus indirectly, a proposition is a medium of a practical, non-cognitive alteration of the thing referred to in knowledge. Otherwise put, the term “thing” in relation to knowledge may denote at least three different matters: (i.) the existent referred to, or denoted; (ii.) the thing *as* known – the propositional subsistent which refers to the thing it is about or of; (iii.) the existent as finally determined through the actual working out of the act of referring the proposition to the thing to which it means to refer or apply. This gives the sense in which I understand 1 and 3.

9. The general method of inquiry consists of observation, experimentation, and inference in reciprocal support of one another, and the inference-judgment situation thus created may be enlarged by the

observation or discovery of further implications which show the way to further new observations of "brute facts." Anything can be studied in this way – even the inference-judgment-proposition situation itself – judgments being formed (or occurring) in the course of the inquiry, and propositions being discovered as a result. (D. and S.)

10. There are different kinds of observation and, perhaps, also of experimentation. Thus relations of implication and implied entities and subsistents of different types may be as directly observed as are "brute" existential facts or entities. Some of these observations are made possible only in or through the inference situation, but, *quâ* observations, they are distinct from the inference process itself. (D. and S.)

11. Just as there are different kinds of observation, so there are different kinds or types of entities among both existents and subsistents. (D. and S.)

Reservation (D.). (Cf. 6.) In all cases of subsistents the validity or status of these entities depends upon the prior inquiry.

Comment (S.). It is discovered as a result of the inquiry that among both subsistents and existents there are certain types which are *independent* not only of the prior inquiry and of the process of discovery, but of one another; accordingly, not only might certain subsistents subsist, were there no existents, but both certain subsistents and existents might subsist and exist respectively without other types of subsistents and existents. This is but another way of saying that implication is limited by "brute facts," or that certain entities are logically prior to others, *e.g.*, numbers to counting; *i.e.*, counting presupposes (or implies) numbers, but numbers do not imply counting – or, indeed, anything physical, mental, spatial, or temporal.

Comment (D.). As a result of inquiry, I do not discover that subsistents subsist apart from any existences. On the contrary (see my comment to 8) I think I discover that all subsistents are cognitive references to some existence. One subsistent is logically independent of another subsistent in the measure to which the existent to which one refers is existentially independent of the existence to which the other refers. A subsistent may be "logically prior" to another subsistent; but to speak of a subsistent or logical entity (see 14) being *logically* prior to an existent seems to me meaningless. It is either tautological, like saying that a logical treatment of a thing is a logical treatment of the thing it refers to, or else it confuses logical relationship with existential status. Counting is an act or event; it is existential; numbers are subsistents. Hence to talk about numbers being "logically prior" to counting is to treat counting as if it were one of the numbers. Correspondingly, it is absurd to say that counting is logically prior to numbers; for counting is a brute act, and hence, *quâ* counting, non-logical. One connotation or

logical contact is logically prior to some others; denotation and connotation do not bear a logical relationship to each other.

12. There are other logical principles than those of inference in the usual and narrow sense of the term, *i.e.*, than the rules and principles of "immediate and mediate reasoning" and of "induction" as found in the text-books. Among these "other logical principles" are those which are involved in the logic of infinite series, of continuity, of relations, of mathematical induction, etc. Use of these enters into inference in a broader sense. (S.)

Comment (D.). I assent, with the restriction that the "usual sense" is purely conventional, and should be surrounded. In the proper sense of "inference" I find all logical principles to be involved in inference, in the sense of existing only because the fact of inference exists. (See 14, Comment, Dewey.)

13. Logic in this broader sense is nevertheless limited, *i.e.*, not all that exists or subsists is logical or, at least, completely logical. Connotation and denotation, then, are to be recognized as having each its proper sphere and limitation, and "denotative matters" can not be treated as connotative in the sense that the former ever lose their distinctly denotative character. The two supplement one another, and anything can be inquired into and so put into the denotative-connotative situation, or, rather, this situation can be found. (D. and S.) (*Cf.* 8 and 9.)

14. All entities, both existent and subsistent, are, however, partly logical in the sense that, while an alogical aspect may be distinguished, this aspect coexists or cosubsists with the logical in much the same way as do a relation and its converse. The particular existence or subsistence of any logical aspect or entity of a certain type is itself "brute fact," and, while it is to be discovered by any method which proves efficient for this, it exists or subsists independently of this inquiry and discovery. Entities, either those wholly or those partly logical, are not made logical by being taken into an inference-judgment situation of any type; but, on the contrary, they can be taken into this situation because they already are logical entities of some type and in some respect, one of the outcomes of the inquiry being the discovery of this "respect" and type. Then, since everything can be taken into the inference situation in some way, *i.e.*, can be reasoned about, everything is logical in some "aspect" and of some type prior to this "taking-in," though the discovery of the aspect and type be made by observation, with or without the assistance of inference methods. (S.)

Comment (D.). As a matter of discovery, I think I find that the existence of logical entities and of a process of inferential inquiry are one and the same thing. The process of inferential inquiry has its own

characteristic or distinguishing marks, just like any other natural occurrence. Its peculiar marks are precisely those traits and relations that are called logical. This does not mean that they are constituted in the process of *their* being known. On the contrary, inferences, or existences having logical traits, must exist before they can be inquired into. When inquired into, the resulting proposition bears the same kind of relation to the existence it is about – or refers to – as any proposition sustains to the existence it is about. (I understand that here, as well as in 8 and 11, the difference between Dr. Spaulding and myself is one of fact; that is, it is a difference as to the state of things discovered upon inquiry. Hence my statements are not arguments against Dr. Spaulding's statements, but are reports of different findings.)

15. It is a consequence of *these results* (of making the judgment-proposition-observation situation itself a subject of inquiry) that the physical sciences, mathematics, logic, and metaphysics can be studied without the results of such studies or inquiries receiving a readjustment from so-called epistemology. This consequence is confirmed by observation of the history of science, mathematics, etc. (D. and S.)

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INTRODUCTION

In 1920 Morris Cohen proclaimed John Dewey our “national philosopher,” the “one preeminent figure today in American philosophy.”¹ Dewey, and the Chicago School he built prior to his move to Columbia University in 1904, epitomized the American virtues of optimism, industry, initiative, and progress. Originally a “functional psychology” that championed the constructive character of thought against the rationalistic *a priori* and the passive sense data of traditional empiricism, the Chicago School pushed beyond C. S. Peirce’s criterion of meaning and William James’s theory of truth toward a comprehensive philosophy of pragmatism. Addison Moore focused upon logic and epistemology. James H. Tufts worked on moral theory and ethical practices. George Herbert Mead developed an ingenious conception of the social self. Edward Ames extended this broad humanism to the philosophy of religion. Only Dewey, as Mead’s gifted student Charles Morris observes, “ranged over the whole field.”

The essays in this volume capture the Chicago pragmatists at the pinnacle of their power and influence. By 1915 they had distinguished themselves from the pragmatic personalism of their mentor, James, drawing more inspiration from Peirce’s work in logic and language. Although this distressed both idealists and loyal Jamesians such as F. C. S. Schiller, Dewey and his followers were positioning themselves to compete with the scientific realism and logical positivism that was soon to dominate Anglo-American circles. By the 1920s the Chicago School was not only a Mecca for pragmatists, it had begun to sway some positivists from their initial flirtation with nominalism, atomic primitives, and context-free verification.

The might of the Chicagoans was not sustained by the efforts of Mead, Moore, Tufts, and Ames alone. The philosophy department was the centerpiece of founding president William Rainey Harper’s vision of an institution dedicated to progressive social justice. As Mortimer Adler observes, this “central point of view” was shared by scholars in psychology, biology, economics, political science, and religion. But though Dewey epitomized this progressive view as America’s “national

¹ Morris R. Cohen, “On American Philosophy,” *The New Republic* 22 (1920) 82.

philosopher," it clearly fell short of a "national philosophy," and even within the university the deep pockets of conservative benefactors fed equally deep pockets of resistance. A donnybrook erupted when Robert M. Hutchins succeeded Harper in 1931 with the announced intention of stopping the "aimless gadgeteering" of laboratory scientists and the restoration of traditional moral and religious values. Coincident with this reactionary revolt was the decimation of the Philosophy Department with the deaths of Moore and Mead, and Tuft's retirement. Without these energetic leaders the cause of progressivism was hopeless, and the Chicago School, in both the broad and narrow sense, ceased to exist.

Chicago Pragmatists and Other Pragmatisms

William James introduced Chicago pragmatism to the world, and at first Dewey declared he was merely casting a logical framework for James's ideas. But Dewey's ties to C. S. Peirce went back even farther. At Johns Hopkins Dewey attended Peirce's course on philosophy and several lectures on logic, but reportedly found them "too mathematical." This reticence receded by 1893, however, when Dewey cites Peirce's inspiration for his breakthrough piece, "The Superstition of Necessity." He also incorporates Peirce's "leading principles" into his 1903 essay, "The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment on Morality." By 1916, Dewey declares Peirce even "more pragmatic" than James.

Peirce, on his part, regarded Dewey as yet another "kidnapper" of pragmatism. He calls Dewey "intolerant" for insisting that even logical and mathematical laws are evolving cultural artifacts and not true "no matter what." Dewey's approach, Peirce warns, "forbids" his entire program of research.

In a way this anxiety was justified, for Dewey was indeed "intolerant" of the wholesale generalization of relations of signs to the universe-at-large that spawned a cosmology of objective idealism. This difference, however, is minor compared to the substantial concurrence between Peirce and Dewey. For both the foundational insight is the pragmatic maxim, whereby the meaning of any thing cannot exceed the sum of possible consequences achieved from working with it. At a stroke, says Dewey, obscure sense impressions and things-in-themselves are ruled out of court, and empiricism is returned to the bedrock of experimental science and common sense. Peirce is thus a common-sense realist. But in proclaiming the reality of things "independent of our opinions about them," cautions Dewey in "The Pragmatism of Peirce," he has *not* slid back into the mire of inquiry-independent reality. Quite to the contrary, "reality" plays a *hypothetical* role in inquiry – the "real" sets a general standard for consequences, perhaps never attainable in fact, that nonetheless *would* "command agreement." "Reality" thus means

objects of belief fully stabilized by inquiry. This in no way makes them subjective or mind-dependent, though we must realize that the very notions of “objectivity” and “independence” from human affairs are themselves intelligible only as products of “persistent and conjoint” inquiry. This, claims Dewey, “is the pragmatic way out of the ego-centric predicament.”²

Peirce’s “Scholastic realism” provides a second approach to the “general standard for consequences.” Duns Scotus, he tells us, pioneered the attack upon the dualism of “thought” versus “thing” by realizing that universal idea and articular entity are but different expressions of the “very same nature”: respectively “to the mind” and *in re*. As such, the perceptual grasp of any particular is requires to (should this be “is required for” or just “requires a background?”) a “background” of generality. This background, an “intellectual intuition” for Scotus, is recast naturalistically as “habit” by Peirce. With this, offers Dewey in a review of writings collected by Morris Cohen, the ground is firm both for Peirce’s own account of belief as “fixed” with the termination of doubt and for the “pure” and “primary” experience of the later pragmatists.

Dewey’s already significant appreciation of Peirce expanded exponentially with the release of the *Collected Papers* beginning in 1932. He reviewed several volumes in the series, and contributed two important papers, “Peirce’s Theory of Quality” (1935) and “Peirce’s Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought, and Meaning” (1946). His extensive correspondence about Peirce with Arthur Bentley, including detailed examinations of arcane topics such as “diagrammatic mathematica,” indicates that he studied each volume carefully. In this period Dewey was especially drawn to Peirce’s theory of signs and his categorical triad of “firstness,” “secondness,” and “thirdness.” Like Peirce himself, Dewey renders these in various ways, though a recurring pattern casts firstness as the aesthetic immediacy of primary experience, secondness as shock or brute interruption, and thirdness as the mediation of universals that resolves the conflict and restores an immediacy nonetheless “shot through” with thirdness – *i.e.*, with habits of greater generality and control. Dewey also follows Peirce in identifying secondness with “existence” and thirdness with “reality.” Unlike some later pragmatists, who have come to regard the shock of secondness as the “knock of the noumenal,” however, Dewey warns against any tendency to regard this as a “primary principle.” Quoting Peirce, he reminds us that “the elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of

² See pp. ____ (last three pages) ____.

perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both these gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.”³ For Dewey, the “real” Peirce is centered in the meaning-structures of thirdness, in the generalizing power of language as social conduct Mead calls the “symbol.” This, in Peirce’s memorable phrase, is indeed “man’s glassy essence.”

Another insightful analysis of Peirce is contributed by Mead’s gifted student, Charles Morris, who earned his doctorate from Chicago in 1925 and joined the faculty in 1931. Today hailed as a pioneer of semiotics, Morris drew from Peirce, Mead, Dewey, and the positivists to develop a system of language and signs that champions pragmatics as the equal partner of syntactics and semantics. Morris opens his 1938 essay “Peirce, Mead, and Pragmatism,” by affirming the basic agreement between the father of pragmatism and its most discerning social scientist. Peirce and Mead both agree that signs are necessary for thought, that generality is fully real, that mind and self are constructed in directed action, and that the experienced world is social and teleological and not merely mechanical. But where Mead’s approach is wholly scientific and naturalistic, at times Peirce’s logical and metaphysical aspirations lead him astray. Mead, for example, advances a genetic theory of signs. Mind and meaning originate when anticipated responses to gestures become a general symbol accepted by all members of a social group. This “conversation of gestures” presupposes no anterior mind; for mind is merely the ability to engage in symbolic behavior. In thus limiting the domain of mind to this genetic and behavioral account, Mead avoids extending mind throughout nature or otherwise falling into idealism. Peirce’s account is similar to Mead’s. In his triadic pattern, an object is represented as a sign when the latter is grasped by an interpreting mind as a substitution or indication of the object.⁴ But because Peirce’s account is logical rather than genetic, there are no checks on its possible extension. Thus when mind (as thirdness) is identified with reality, Peirce leaps to an idealistic cosmology whereby

³ See pp. ____ (last page) ____.

⁴ It is worth noting that Dewey vehemently disputes Morris’s analysis, at one point calling it a “complete falsification” of Peirce’s theory. In Dewey’s view, Peirce consistently held that 1) signs represent other signs, not objects, and 2) the “interpretant” is not a “mind” or “interpreter,” but a social “background of meaning” that underlies the selection of signs and the determination of objects. See “Peirce’s Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought, and Meaning,” in *John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Vol. 15: 1942–1948*, Ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986) 141–52. (Hereafter references to *The Later Works* (LW), *The Middle Works* (MW), and *The Early Works* (EW) in the Southern Illinois University Press Series are abbreviated as indicated. *John Dewey, The Later Works, Vol. 15: 1942–1948*,

the universe itself is a vast representational field for the evolution of the world-mind.

In two earlier essays, "The Prediction Theory of Truth" and "The Nature of Truth," Morris rejects both the apriorism of coherence theories and the dualism of correspondence theories. Pragmatic truth does involve a sort of correspondence, but this is between an instrumental thought and the behavior that follows from acting upon it, not in the unbreachable gap between the psychical and the physical. Unlike James, who often equated behavior with personal satisfaction, Morris follows Dewey's more objective appeal to the satisfactory resolution of an "entire situation." The "prediction" theory he advances from this identifies truth with "verified prediction": a hypothesis or prediction is true whenever it generates an experience that fulfills the prediction. According to Morris, this removes the ambiguous role of "conduct" or "behavior" in pragmatic accounts of truth, for behavior is relevant only insofar as it leads to framing and fulfilling predictions. And in reply to the critics of pragmatism who claim that many truths are discovered by behavior but not created by it, the prediction theory allows that pre-existing and undiscovered truths are projections of "ideal verification."

Nowhere is the Chicago gravitation from James to Peirce more evident than in the running feud between Morris and F. C. S. Schiller in the 1930s. In review of Schiller's *Must Philosophers Disagree?* Morris chides the aging Oxford iconoclast for failing to appreciate pragmatism's turn toward objectivism. Schiller continues to glorify the personal, the subjective, the romantic; he thinks philosophers must forever disagree because their work, like "lyric poetry," is ultimately a form of self-expression. The reason for such sentimentalism is not hard to find; Schiller has not only refused to learn the powerful new techniques of mathematics and logic, he's made a career of heaping abuse upon them. Without these, however, he's incapable of building an objective theory of meaning, so he "retreats without discussion" into subjectivity. He thus fails to see that philosophy can follow the lead of natural science toward objectivity and consensus building – that philosophers in fact can agree.

Schiller's reply, "Must Pragmatists Disagree?" does not discourage the impression of an somewhat shopworn pragmatism. In their headlong rush to "objectivity," Morris and company overlook the fact that meaning is ultimately personal – what *I* want to communicate. Subjectivity underlies all objective determination, for individuals select realities out of a large mass of "crude appearances" to suit their own needs and interests. Schiller has no quarrel with mathematics, so long as it is applied to practical problems and not purely abstract. Formal logic is indeed scorned, but deservedly so inasmuch as it feigns "certainty"

while actually serving up a mulligan's stew of linguistic and psychological morsels.

In response, Morris eviscerates Schiller's claim that meaning is "ultimately personal." Dewey and Mead have demonstrated beyond doubt that the expressive self originates in the recognition of a "generalized other," the source of engendered attitudes and values we come to affirm as "our own." Subjectivity thus begins with the internalization of the socially objective. To cling to an ulterior "personality" abandons pragmatism for something perilously close to Cartesianism. Regarding mathematics and logic, Schiller is right when he points out that both pursuits arose from practical needs and interests. Indeed, were he less cantankerous he could be instructing the positivists, who are only now becoming aware of this underlying fact. But Schiller does not realize that empirical content can be separated from purely relational systems, and that uncertainty and psychological factors come into play only when formal systems are re-applied to such content.

The remaining articles in this section are not about "other" pragmatisms, but are "in house" tributes and reflections. They are valuable not as substantive critiques, but as windows into the lives and thoughts of this circle of friends. For Addison Moore, *Democracy and Education* is Dewey's most important book, for education is the ongoing social process of enrichment and fulfillment. Moore, in turn, is eulogized by Morris as Dewey's most loyal and tireless defender whose philosophy nonetheless was a faithful expression of his own inner and outer life. Mead, whose friendship Dewey valued as among his "sweetest possessions," is remembered for the awesome power of his lectures, though not his published works. Morris fondly recalls the "forgotten" Chicagoan, Edward Scribner Ames, whose incandescent social religiosity perhaps embodied the broader ideals of the Chicago School more than anyone other than Dewey himself; Ames's *The Psychology of Religious Experience* may have been the prototype for Dewey's *A Common Faith*.

Disputes with Idealists

As the twentieth century shed its downy coat, the decline of American idealism was increasingly obvious. The near monopoly of academic philosophy once enjoyed by ministers and theologians was now predominantly secular, and more young philosophers sampled the fresh zephyrs of pragmatism, realism, or logical positivism than the siren song of Hegel or Bradley. Forces as diverse as social Darwinism, industrialization, immigration, and the Great War also cast doubt upon the intellectual quest for an idyllic world. At first some besieged idealists saw Dewey as a potential messiah – in R. F. A. Hornele words, the "heaven sent champion of absolute idealism." Dewey's disillusionment with both

heaven and the absolute was soon manifest, however, and what idealism remained was at best “methodological” or “experimental.” Some idealists remained convinced they could salvage Dewey’s meritorious psychological theory from his dismaying dalliance with biological naturalism. They thus focused upon two areas of perceived vulnerability: 1) the inability of instrumentalist logic to attain genuine truth and universality, and 2) the regeneration of the ego-centric predicament by the failure to account for nature beyond experience.

Edgar A. Singer, Jr., was an old-style idealist whose “fellowship with God” was never far from his philosophical speculations. In “Man and Fellow Man” (1913) he examines the foundational category of the Chicago School, the “social.” Is Dewey’s appeal to the “social” psychological – is he just talking about, *e.g.*, the gregariousness of humans and the importance of social relations to a full life? Or is he advancing, in the manner of Kant, a logical condition for the possibility of consciousness? Singer has no problem with the psychological inquiry into social relations, but mere “accidents of history” are woefully inadequate as grounds of consciousness. Dewey is correct when he says it takes two minds to know one; indeed a man without a “fellow” is logically impossible. But if this fellow is another finite human, then its consciousness depends upon yet *another* mind, and an infinite regress ensues. We avoid this only by accepting an infinite “fellow,” God, who is the source and sustenance of our finite minds.

A more contemporary idealism is advanced by the Oxford-trained philosopher Alfred Hoernle of Harvard. In a review of the *Essays in Experimental Logic*, Hoernle places Dewey with the generation of young intellectuals who, having failed to reason their way to the absolute, in disillusionment embraced contingency, humanity, and Darwinian biology. From this orientation, of course, a logic of ultimate existence must indeed seem impossible. Dewey easily uncovers contingent elements in Russell’s empirical logic and in Lotze, the one idealist whose logic is tainted with psychology. But such criticisms don’t touch recent developments in pure mathematics and formal logic, especially the dialectic of relations advanced by Bradley and Bosanquet. With sufficient attention to forms of inference and judgment, Dewey might still achieve a logic of experience that discloses the proper relationship of science, art, and the spiritual ‘beyond,’ and thus rediscover his idealistic roots. At this point biological categories will play only a subordinate role: reason began in biological struggle, but its full realization is in the “disinterested curiosity of science and philosophy.”

Where Hoernle stresses the abstractness of absolute logic, California professor Charles H. Reiber reminds us of its applicability. Dewey chides idealism for chasing the clouds of wonder while neglecting the

here and now. But virtually every idealist since Plato has known that knowledge begins in *troubled* wonder. Only through the experience of conflict can thought begin the process of self-transcendence that establishes its relation to objects. Although full reality would be the final *aufheben* of this opposition, idealism neither requires its attainment nor claims that knowledge is impossible without it, for we may have parts of perfect knowledge. And once achieved, idealistic knowledge is every bit as pragmatic as one might wish, for it quite literally transforms the possibility of a better world into its ownmost reality.

After the release of Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic* in 1916, we find a gradual yet unmistakable movement beyond an instrumentalist theory of truth and knowledge toward a sweeping reconstruction of the "Western Canon" itself. In this period emerges the comprehensive naturalism which marks the pinnacle of his career. "The Need for a Recovery in Philosophy" of 1917 is the prototype of *Reconstruction in Philosophy* completed three years later. Dewey's metaphysical masterpiece, *Experience and Nature*, appeared in 1925, and the full case against the "Tradition" is advanced in *The Quest for Certainty* of 1929. Clearly the idealists had their hands full, but just as earlier disputes had focused upon the issue of mediate-immediacy in the knowledge relation, there now was a general sense that the test of Dewey's naturalism would be the relation of experience to nature.

This is clearly on the mind of Edmund H. Hollins in the 1917 essay "Some Comments on Instrumentalism." The entire Chicago philosophy is predicated on the notion that an organism comes to know its environment by interacting with it. Obviously, the compelling question is how this "outside" comes to have an "inside" – *i.e.*, how an in-itself *existence* is presented to an organism as a *subsistence*. But Dewey, Hollins alleges, merely waves this away by calling it a "mystery."⁵ He declares a "naïve realism" and turns all "metaphysical" questions over to biological science. But this defies our natural curiosity about such matters; indeed, to *abstain* from metaphysics is a "laborious attainment." And since Dewey affirms biological categories, he appears to have a speculative metaphysics after all. Objective idealism can explain the origin of human consciousness and its integral connection to the external world because it presupposes a universal mind. By limiting itself to the inner assimilation of organic responses, however, naturalism can explain nothing about the world or how we know it.

⁵ By way of clarification, Dewey does declare a "mystery" in the passage cited by Hollins, but it seems clear from the context that he is merely stating that surprise is an ineradicable trait of experience, not that the true nature of a noumenal 'outside' remains a mystery to a phenomenal 'inside.' See p._____.

One might think that the extended metaphysical discourse in *Experience and Nature* would have mollified such critics, but in some cases it seems to have invigorated them. In his 1926 review, Reiber's colleague George P. Adams pointedly asks the question on the minds of so many: is experience in nature, or is nature in experience? Adams admits he'd hoped for a genuine metaphysical account of how experience gets to nature. Dewey, however, disbars this or any suggestion of a boundary between "had" experience and "unhad" nature. When pressed, he hides behind the obscurity of "the visible set in the invisible." But there are only two possible interpretations: either Dewey is saying 1) both the visible and the invisible are wholly *within* experience, in which case he's an objective idealist lacking only the dialectic of experience's self-revelation; or 2) nature (despite his protests) is in fact *outside* experience, in which case he's no more immune to the problem of how in-itself *existence* bequeaths *subsistence* to human experience than the realists he enjoys chasing around the barn. Either option, of course, is lethal to the claim that Chicago pragmatism is a legitimate *tertium quid* between idealism and realism.

In "Dewey's Concepts of Experience and Nature," the notable idealist William Ernest Hocking offers a different but inventive perspective. Kant's empirical and intellectual conditions of objectivity are a "logical englobement" of nature within experience. Dewey aims are similar, though his apparatus is "psychological englobement." But unlike Kant, who in main confines his methods to a *propedeutic* (**most common spelling is propaedeutic; shall I use ligature?**) to metaphysics, Dewey assumes he can theorize his way to a superior grasp of reality, and so he spins a confusing web of psychology and ontology into concepts like "experience" and "reality." Thus immobilized, he is unable to see past "feelings" and "qualitative immediacies" to the fact that the ultimate ground of both thought and thing is the totality of reality itself – what continental philosophers call *Existenz*. We cannot theorize our way to reality, nor is reality in the resolution of problematic situations. Instead, a moment of reality is attained in the ecstatic "hypothetical leap" when, as any scientist knows, a "just seeing" is conjoined with a "must be so." No final or complete grasp of reality is possible, but a dialectical metaphysics can disclose what is "always arriving" yet "never arrives."

If Adams and Hocking are right, the philosophical 'Tradition' is not as moribund as Dewey would have us believe, and this is the contention of Cornell idealist G. Cunningham Watts's in review of *The Quest for Certainty*. The Tradition, as Watts interprets Dewey's criteria, looks primarily to the past: 1) ideas are linked to antecedent existences, 2) these existences are independent of human experience, and 3) knowledge is attained when meanings are successfully referred back to

these existences. Dewey rejects these for forward-looking alternatives: 1) objects are *objectives* of inquiry, eventual products of the reflective process; 2) things are *had* in nonreflective experience with no appeal to anything independent of human experience; and 3) things presently *had* are integrally related to future things *known*. In Watts's view, Dewey's ardor for the future is as limiting as the Tradition's adherence to the past, and he proposes a more balanced notion of objects of knowledge that look ahead to reflective purposes and consequences while also looking back from present empirical *hads* to their independent existential causes.

Although space restrictions prevent inclusion in this volume, it is only fair to at least mention Dewey's reply to the most serious of the charges raised by the idealists – the dilemma of nature versus experience. The 1940 essay *Nature in Experience*⁶ is a joint reply to the idealist Hocking and to the naturalistic realist Morris Cohen, who had accused Dewey of inflating experience within nature to the point of anthropocentrism. Both criticisms, says Dewey, illustrate the incapacity of realism and idealism alike to grasp the genuine double-barrelledness of experience. Realism hails hard scientific facts, idealism champions methodology, when in actuality these are reciprocal halves of a circle. On the one side, the analysis of nature requires the scientific findings of physics and biology. On the other, we must realize that experience itself contains the instrumentalities for both natural science and a general theory of experience. This circle is not vicious, for it is historical and existential rather than dialectical. It explains how experience gives rise to science, and, reciprocally, how sciences expands and enriches experience. Realists think they detect anthropocentrism because they mistake this functional and methodological account of experience for a cosmology of the natural universe. Idealists make the same error, but from the opposite direction, for they see only nominalism and mechanical materialism instead of a genuine pragmatic sense of reality where ideas have a normative and teleological control over other materials.

Disputes with Realists

The first twentieth-century American realists were 'new' realists. Rejecting all forms of idealism and subjective empiricism, their 1906 "Program and Platform" declared that external realities are given to us "just as they are" in themselves. The perceiving organism does not alter, condition, or interpret the 'external relations' of such realities in any way. Perception is thus "transparent."

Perhaps the sheer simplicity of the new realism made it such an easy

⁶ John Dewey, "Nature In Experience," *LW* 14, 141–54.

candidate for refutation. For if perception's 'transparency' is taken literally, the world suddenly seems a very strange place: an approaching spotlight does not just seem to grow larger due to the perspective of the motorist, it *is* growing larger; the initial brightness of a room that soon recedes is not, as we commonly think, our "eyes adjusting," but a change in the light itself; the visible star must be just "as it is" without perception, though science tells us its light traveled hundreds of years in which time the star itself may have ceased to exist.

Such complaints motivated a second wave of realists to allow a greater role for discrimination and interpretation in perception. Roy Wood Sellars admits having overcome a "natural realism" to accept that perceivers have only "mental substitutes" of external realities, though this still permits access to their "essential natures." The contributors to Sellars's 1916 anthology *Critical Realism* include Durant Drake, Arthur Kenyon Rogers, George Santayana, Arthur O. Lovejoy, James B. Pratt, and C. A. Strong. Though thereafter recognized as a movement, the critical realists had no common platform beyond their opposition to idealism and the notion that realities are perceived indirectly. They differed, for example, in the ratio of 'existence' to 'subsistence' in perception. And whereas Drake and Sellars regarded "mental substitutes" as physical brain processes, Lovejoy and Pratt held to an ineradicable psychical element.

This last point sparked an early skirmish between Drake and Dewey. In "A Cul de Sac for Realism," Drake applauds Dewey's rejection of the epistemological monism of new realism. In acknowledging the constructive role of thought in the ascertainment of natural realities, Chicago pragmatism apparently affirms the epistemological dualism of sensation and its object. Dewey rebuffs Drake's overture in "Duality and Dualism," declaring himself free of so much as a "chemical trace of interest" in either epistemological monism or dualism. Drake has completely missed the point that instrumentalism rejects any notion that a "sensation image" merely "represents" an "extra-organic" cause. Sensation has no such cognitive status; instead it is representative only in its *use* – in the material it supplies for the resolution of encountered problems. There is no need, then, to erect a second "order of genus or being" to overcome the dilemma of transparency in epistemological monism. And since the nature of the reality achieved reflects the needs, ideas, and tools of its procurement, instrumentalism is a neither a monism nor dualism, but an empirical pluralism.

From his brief reply, "Dr. Dewey's Duality and Dualism," it is not clear that Drake grasps Dewey's radically divergent empiricism, but the remark about a second "order of being" drew a quick response. Dewey has failed to distinguish epistemological from metaphysical dualism. A

dualist of the second sort indeed faces the quandary of pitting "mind stuff" against physical reality. But in fact Drake hooks epistemological dualism to metaphysical monism: a mental representation is distinguishable from its object, but both are wholly physical and natural.

In "The Status of Epistemology," Sellars tries to convince Dewey that the role of thought in critical realism is dynamic and constructive, and not the mere association of sense impressions of traditional empiricism. Natural realism recognizes only conscious mental representations and external objects. In Sellars's critical realism, however, consciousness takes in an entire situation. As we recognize and solve problems, the character and relations of these representations change: they acquire settled meanings that, as Dewey asserts, are "cues for behavior" rather than "cases of knowing. But what of knowing? Here Sellars asserts an "empirical transcendence": not, of course, the simple reference of an idea to an external reality, but the cognitional reference from an individual's entire field of experience to the corresponding field of reality that controls it. This dynamic and context-dependent *reference* "outward" reverses the older empiricism for which the mental representation is the presence of the real world or some surrogate of it.

A more traditional "outside-in" dualism is advocated by Arthur Kenyon Rogers, the self-proclaimed "unconverted realist" among Dewey's Chicago flock. In "Pragmatism versus Dualism," Rogers decries the "perverse" connection Dewey demands between thought and future experience. Dewey is oblivious to that which is obvious for just about everybody else: the chief function of thought is to discover the nature of antecedent existences which themselves are neither thought nor necessarily connected to thought. According to Rogers, such existences affect subsequent realities by being causally related to them. One such reality, to be sure, is human experience. Existences do not generally directly enter experience; the substance of a brick or sword in physical contact with internal nerve endings is hazardous to the perceiver's health! Still, existences have a "substantial quality" or "essence" which affects experience and imparts a sense of "present as absent." Dewey would be wise to abandon the subjective psychology which denies existence beyond present needs and interests for a biological behaviorism grounded in organism-environment interaction.

Addison Moore focuses on the relation of essence to existence in a 1922 review of Sellars's anthology. Like pragmatists, critical realists acknowledge primary or 'given' experience. Instead of the pragmatists' dispositional background of experience, however, these realists posit 1) an existential mental state and 2) a logical function they call "essence" that "instinctively" affirms 3) an actual physical existence. Essence

looms large for critical realists such as Santayana – a floating Platonic barge that bears all qualities – primary, secondary, and tertiary. And though the latter two forms of quality reflect the subjective colorations and desires of the perceiver, somehow “truth” reigns when a mental state mirrors the essence of the mind-independent physical object. Others, such as Drake and Sellars, emphasize existence. Since essences are characters of existential mental states, they are too are existential rather than ontologically “queer” substantial qualities. Here, too, knowledge is the appearance of the actual characters of physical objects. But Drake admits that all tertiary and secondary, and most primary (even time and space!) qualities are mental states and “not really there” in the physical world – to it is left only the “bare and empty concept of existence.” This, Moore concludes, is a “realism” Berkeley would be proud to affirm!

Meanwhile, the depleted crew of new realists were also conjuring subsistences to stave off their demons. In “Subsistence and Existence in Neo-Realism,” Moore takes his machete to their “dialectical thicket.” Two fundamental mistakes lead philosophers to “subsistence”: 1) the fallacy of simple location, where, for example, thought must be in “someone’s head” instead of being an instrument of control in a situation; and, relatedly 2) the quest for an ontological ground for the generality that underlies particular objects in ignorance of the social “significant symbol” of Dewey and Mead. For W. P. Montague, this *summum-genus* is “the possible objects of thought,” a subsistence that includes all existence as the “sea [includes] its waves.” But where a physical sea can be the source of a physical wave, how, Moore asks, can a subsistential sea (or anything) give rise to an existential wave (or anything)? Perhaps it’s best not to ask, for Montague here bails out to a “Cosmic will”: a rescuing Neptune for whom “where there’s a will there’s a wave!” Possibility, as subsistential, underlies all actuality. Thus, for Montague, each actual existence requires a possible subsistential object “waiting for all eternity for it to be.” To believe this, warns Moore, is to be hoodwinked into interpreting “possible object” as a quasi-entity, when all that is really signified is the possibility of a future actual entity.

The final word goes to Sellars, who in reviewing *Experience and Nature* remains convinced that Dewey is only a small epiphany away from critical realism. What he and his School decry as the fallacy of simple location is in fact accepted as plain truth by every other empiricist. Only in Chicago do they blush and become evasive at the suggestion that thought is “in the head” of the thinker. In refusing to admit that experience is similarly personal, they alone aggrandize it into

an enveloping fog. If Dewey can get over this idealistic hangover and expand his biological basis to include physiology and physics, he'd surely find his way to critical realism.

Debates on Value and Morality

In its fight to survive against powerful adversaries, it is not surprising that most of the battles between the Chicago School and its critics were fought in the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, and logic. But pragmatism was conceived as the antithesis of purely contemplative philosophy, and Dewey never forgot that its theoretical techniques were ultimately "intellectual instrumentalities which will progressively direct inquiry into the deeply and inclusively human – that is to say, moral – facts of the present scene and situation."⁷

Dewey's theory of morality defies easy classification. It has ties to utilitarianism and consequentialism, in places speaking of the "construction of good" and even of the ultimate good as "growth." Yet there is the equally strong Aristotelian tendency to channel impulses into beneficial habits and soundness of character, as exemplified in social virtues such as whole-heartedness, persistence, and impartiality. There is even a deontological component, for among three irreducible factors in human morality are 1) *obligations* we must accept in respecting the rights of others, along with 2) *rights* individuals possess for the fulfillment of their desires, and 3) social *approbation* and *condemnation* that inculcate these rights and obligations within a cultural matrix.

Despite the many facets of Dewey's theory, a guiding thesis is that *value*, the taproot of moral law and ethical conduct, is inexorably bound to *judgment*. No genuine value is wholly immediate, intuitive, or self-evident, nor is it the mere expression of a preference, liking or desire. To be sure, a preference or desire enters into a judgment of value as a "value candidate" – a starting point for a *prediction of worth* that, when vindicated by consequences achieved in inquiry, converts liking into the likeable, desiring into the desirable, a mere expression of preference into a judgment of value. And because no judgment of value is absolute or final, but always connected to past and potential future outcomes, the prime focus of Dewey's thesis is not *value* per se but a method of *valuation*.

Although the moral theory advanced by Dewey and the Chicago School was wholly naturalistic and scientific, its complexity and scope bucked the trend toward emotivism and physicalism in the 1920s. Eager to rid philosophy of the empty pontificating of idealists and theologians,

⁷ John Dewey, "Reconstruction as Seen Twenty-Five Years Later," MW 12: 269.

positivists such as A. J. Ayer exposed the meaninglessness of statements neither true by definition nor empirically verifiable. Moral talk in general, and of “value” in particular, is merely an expression of preference, an “affective motor response” of approval or disapproval.

Ralph Barton Perry, David W. Prall, and George P. Adams were among the vanguard of American reformers eager to pit scientific empiricism against the theory of valuation advocated by Dewey and the Chicago School. Perry, who studied with James before beginning his own distinguished career at Harvard, was a new realist whose important contributions to ethics include his *General Theory of Value* (1926). Perry’s basic view is that an object acquires value only when an interest is invested in it. Greater value simply means a greater interest, though humans possess foresight that foster delayed gratifications and long term goals. Moral theory should develop models of discourse that harmonize the divergent interests of persons in a society. Although Dewey and Perry thus share the vision of a community forged by constructive intelligence, it is the very different perception of value for this or any community that motivates Perry’s “Dewey and Urban on Value Judgments” (1917). In insisting that value is coextensive with judgment, Dewey generates a paradox wherein value is in both a present judgment and in future consequences which, so far as this judgment is concerned, are mere possibilities. According to Perry, Dewey has failed to see that value primarily inheres in facts rather than in judgments. Some values are immediate “givens” with no connection to judgment at all. Others are as yet unrealized “fulfillments of desire.” In such cases, as Dewey avows, judgment may well intervene to determine worthy consequences and the means to attain them. But value primarily remains in the facts of the matter, *e.g.*, in a physician’s prescribed drug and the patient’s restored health, not in the judgment that the drug will work. No paradox occurs when we regard desired ends not as present possibilities of judgments, but as attainable future realities.

In “Objects of Valuation,” Dewey replies that Perry has misunderstood his intended distinction between value and *valuation*, and the germaneness of the latter alone to judgment. He agrees that examples such as the physicians’ prescription do not illustrate the construction of value by judgment, for in such circumstances the value – the restoration of health – has already been determined. Authentic *valuation judgment*, as distinguished from statements about predetermined values, is needed when the worth of a projected end is itself still in doubt, and deliberation must occur to resolve it. Though not Dewey’s example, consider the case where a patient’s life might be temporarily prolonged only at the cost of substantial suffering. In such a predicament, the worth of physician intervention itself must be ascertained, and this involves

weighing of alternatives to identify the most desirable (or least undesirable) outcome. Dewey thus agrees that valuation is not primarily vested in judgments themselves, or even in their role in ascertaining means to ends. To the contrary, valuation judgment refers to “the *function* of all judgment, qua judgment,” to project mere *desirings* into demonstrably *desirable* ends subject to experimental confirmation.

Even if credible, Dewey’s distinction between value and valuation is not likely to impress positivists who insist on directing moral discourse toward value, and value toward immediate expressions of approval. A case in point is University of California philosopher David W. Prall’s 1921 essay “The Pragmatic Theory of Valuation as Expounded by Dewey.” As an empiricist, Dewey should endorse limiting moral inquiry to reports of physiological and psychological responses environmental stimuli. But to admit that value is thus reducible to liking or disliking is to reject any *necessary* connection to judgment: primitive feelings of approval or disapproval “just are,” independent of any judgment we might make with or about them. This does not deny, of course, that at times we must be able to judge *that* something is in order to like it, for not all that glitters is gold. And surely we can judge *that* we liked something. Indeed, we should further acknowledge the vital role of judgment in the *reconstitution* of values. But Dewey goes radically, and wrongly, beyond this by integrating judgment into value itself, and thereby linking it to present and future consequences that deny its manifest immediacy. And if Dewey’s theory demands too much by linking judgment to value, Prall writes two years later in “In Defense of a Worthless Theory of Value,” it is too parsimonious for holding that values are forged solely in the formulation and testing of hypotheses. For surely such rational guides are conjoined with a myriad of emotional and irrational factors that mutually yield an appreciated value. We do not normally achieve worthy values by cultivating judgments of practice, but by acquiring tastes in all fields of experience. Dewey’s appeal to “a priori logic” betrays the fact that most values are irrational preferences.

Not to be outdone, Prall’s California colleague George P. Adams accuses Dewey of an outlandish pragmatism that ultimately cherishes “pure activity” alone. In a review of *Human Nature and Conduct*, Adams charges Dewey with devaluing objects to mere potentialities and clues for activities to be valued for their own sake. Instead of “engineering” objects of moral worth, he should take stock of objective realities “beyond our control” whose intrinsic value we must simply accept. To do so would create a healthy ethical realism, where contact with “empirical objects” and social forces helps forge constructive habits and meaning structures. Practices, of course, are integral to the

selection of worthwhile objects, but value properly resides in these desirous ends, not in the means by which we procure them.

Admitting that his earlier work in moral theory had focused on valuation rather than value, Dewey clarifies the pragmatic conception of value in two essays written in the mid-1920s. In "Values, Liking, and Thought," he rejects Adams's depiction of pragmatic value as "pure activity." Congruent with realism, a value is a quality of an object or event. But this by no means divorces value from directed activity: the value of penicillin, for example, lies foremost in knowing how to manufacture and prescribe it, and only secondarily in its physical or chemical composition. Dewey also reiterates his agreement with Prall that a judgment of value is distinguished from the value itself. We do not value judgments or likings, but *objects*, and these, as the realists avow, we value in an immediate and nonreflective way. But though they are not *values* per se, liking and judgment are reciprocally joined in the activity of *valuation*. Liking alone is an insufficient condition of valuation, for without judgment it generates only animalistic and impulsive motor affective attitudes. Genuine valuation, to the contrary, combines liking with the results of cognitive judgment. The quality of value remains nonreflective, but when challenged our response is no longer purely impulsive or defensive. We can, instead, evaluate the viability of our preference in terms of our best interests and the interests of others. What survives such scrutiny is, to rehearse Dewey's memorable phrase, not just liked but *likeable*, not just preferred but *preferable*, not just desired but *desirable*.

In "The Meaning of Value," Dewey returns to "immediate value" to note an important difference between realist and pragmatic interpretations. By insisting upon the "intrinsic" character of value, while quite sensibly rejecting any existential "value stuff," realists such as Prall and Adams are compelled to construe value as an *essence*, an abstract noun or *ens rationis*. They thus find themselves in the strange company of Plato and Leibniz, or at least of Santayana, for whom value's essence is a "dialectical coordination of intentions." Even this, however, is at drastic odds with their contention that value is immediate liking. Dewey thus invites his fellow empiricists to abandon the quest for an essence or intrinsic quality, and return to the existential question: "how do things come to possess value?" Dewey's answer, now five decades in development, is that *thinking* is a necessary condition of value. Even the rawest feeling of liking or preference is not *pure* feeling, but "intent or meaning imbedded in feeling," *i.e.*, an implicit reference to an objective state beyond the subjective feeling. Thought, in the form of deliberation and judgment, directs immediate impulses to appropriate ends, it channels desires toward desirability; and only with the completion of the

circuit, as we have seen, may we claim the genuine instantiation of a *value*. By limiting value to immediate liking, Prall and Adams cannot explain why humans are compelled to *improve* their condition. When, instead, value is identified in the directive function of thought upon impulse, we can explain the cultivation of tastes and hope for authentic advances in the education of morals.

Complementing Dewey's justification of the cognitive component in value is Chicago pragmatist Thomas V. Smith's reply to Prall's claim that instrumentalist ethics dismisses the noncognitive and irrational aspects of value. Experience, Smith reminds us in "Dewey's Theory of Value," is most often noncognitive or primary: reflective thought enters only when primary experience is interrupted by a problematic situation. A moral judgment is not itself a value, but rather a hypothesis for deciding what to do when something previously valued becomes conflicted or detrimental. Thus a moral judgment is never complete in itself, but always directive of future actions that, if successful, return the now reconditioned object of value to primary experience. It is in this sense, says Smith, that Dewey affirms the immediate value of things. In some ways Dewey's theory resembles Bradley's, for a settled value in primary experience, like Bradley's absolute value, is beyond the reach of direct cognitive scrutiny. In this sense it is "invaluable," appreciated in a way that is "trans-rational." But for Dewey, of course, this merely means that this thing of value has proven itself beneficial to the conduct of life, though it remains literally open to re-evaluation should its worth be challenged. It is emphatically not the unreachable ideal of an other-worldly absolute. Though long relegated to the periphery of the discussion, Smith's reference to Bradley might have preserved the idealists' hope that the Chicago School would yet rescue their foundering craft. The venerable idealist James Seth would have us rise above verbal quibbles about value to propose a more expansive view of Dewey's moral and social thought. For though he attacks both the crustaceous philosophical Tradition and the depersonalized conformity of modern society, Dewey's bark is worse than his bite. His cry of rebellion against all forms of rigidity is really a plea for loyalty to a progressive social order. When Dewey speaks of the transformative power of ideas in the construction of good, he proffers an experimental idealism to which all idealists lend their hearty assent. When he strays toward naturalism, however, he traffics in second hand goods that are relative and transitory.

Whatever one thinks of an alliance between idealism and pragmatism, Seth's proposal has the merit of broadening the horizon of moral inquiry to include its historic and social ramifications, and in this tenor it is fitting to conclude this section with the broader strokes of George

Herbert Mead and James H. Tufts. In "Scientific Method and the Moral Order," Mead argues that the very notion of an intelligible world presupposes an unconscious acceptance of a "moral order," an idealized "way the universe must be" that justifies our endeavors and, indeed, our very existence. In the last few centuries this traditional domain of religion has been increasingly usurped by a scientific naturalism where "the kinship of man and nature is established in the social order."⁸ Mead has no wish to pit religion against science, but points out that the latter has developed a methodology of potential benefit to both. It is not a question of accepting or rejecting an "idealized order," for, as we have seen, such must be assumed in an intelligible world. Instead, the issue is whether this idealization has "cult value" or "functional value." Cult value congealed in ages when humans were easy prey to natural calamities and sought refuge in ends and institutions deemed eternal and sacrosanct; when such ends conflicted, there was no recourse beyond burning heretics or declaring war. Functional value, fashioned in an age of science, restructures institutions so as to minimize conflicting ends. No values are wholly absolute – the nature of encountered problems prompt the examination and reconfiguration of values.

Tufts's alternative to moral absolutism opens with an account of the ascendance of twentieth century "genetic" or "sociological" ethics. Though social ethics in Europe is based largely upon economic disputes, in America the mores of sex and family relations take center stage. Realists such as Russell and Perry proclaim that morality lies wholly in a quantitative measure of desires or impulses, but their own efforts toward harmonizing interests suggests a strong qualitative component rooted in the give-and-take of compromise and a respect for the common good. Idealists such as Croce insist upon "intrinsic values" independent of individual interests, an "each for all" beyond an "each for himself." Spranger transforms this *in esse* distinction into a division of labor between the community and the individual. In his application of scientific methods to the conduct of life, Dewey challenges the metaphysics of "intrinsic values" while preserving a teleological function for the transformation of immediate desires into socially beneficial *desirables*. A person, for Dewey, is not just a concretion of drives and impulses, but an *achievement*.

Assessments of the Chicago School.

As we noted at the outset, between 1929 and 1931 the Chicago School ended rather abruptly, both in the narrow sense with the retirements and deaths of Moore, Mead, and Tufts, and in the larger sense with an

⁸ See p.____.

administrative sea change. The inevitable accolades and tributes that followed ensured Dewey and his friends of their deserved place in American intellectual history, but could not, of course, sustain the momentum and vitality pragmatism had enjoyed for three decades. And was no shortage of hopefuls to the vacated throne. Logical empiricism was the prohibitive favorite, but new realism, critical realism, naturalism, continental philosophy, and even Thomism carved appreciable niches.

Morris Raphael Cohen was a naturalist whose substance and breadth was comparable to Santayana's. His 1920 essay "On American Philosophy," is intriguing on several levels. Though Dewey's rival, Cohen lavishes almost too much praise on the "one preeminent figure in American philosophy," our "national philosopher" who alone has captured the "American temper." We soon discern, however, the dagger in this velvet glove. Dewey's great popularity is a direct result of the fact that he "impresses the world with his profound simplicity." He preaches the Protestant ethic that literally nothing is beyond the reach of initiative and hard work. All intelligence and knowledge must be directed toward practical goals, and those who contemplate the flowers of knowledge for their own sake are the cardinal sinners. Dewey thus limits his interest to the world of visible human conduct, abandoning all interest in the universe at large. In restricted fields such as education and psychology, Dewey is at his best. But when he stretches the "practical" to cover everything the poverty of his world view is conspicuous. But "no philosophy that lacks a cosmic outlook can hope to do full justice to the specifically human problem." Dewey turns a blind eye to the loneliness of the human soul bared before the abyss of the universe. Unlike a "real" philosopher such as Cohen himself, he has no sense of the frailty of human existence whose only solace is in worship. Dewey's own charisma and inner strength will sustain his popularity throughout his lifetime, but his movement won't survive him.

Cohen's critique might have come closer to its mark had he targeted a pragmatist such as Max Otto who, unlike Dewey himself, wholeheartedly endorses the practical over the theoretical. Cohen gains a reprieve, however, for Otto's preoccupation with Dewey's political and psychological contributions plays right into his hands. According to Otto, it was politics rather than metaphysics that motivated Dewey's rise idealism to pragmatism. Democracy became his faith and religion, a cause he championed less for the sake of personal liberty than from the ethical ideal of an informed and responsible community. Dewey's view of knowledge and meaning is also grounded in this context, for social reform epitomizes the liberation and expression of meanings. He further advocates a psychological behaviorism that rejects both "soul" and

“consciousness in general” for the establishment and redirection of habits and dispositions. But this isn’t a mechanistic behaviorism, for it honors the function of creative thought in such constructions. In framing ideas of attainable objectives subsequently realized in directed actions is all the “reality” we could ever want or desire. But this does not preclude aesthetic and spiritual contemplation. Quite to the contrary, once our physical needs have been met through successful problem solving, “*most* room is left for objects of contemplation, adoration, love, and worship.”

Among the more thought-provoking essays in this anthology is Mortimer Adler’s 1940 elegy to the Chicago School. With the charm of a master storyteller, Adler recaptures the epic rise of the first great American research university and the vision of its founding president, William Rainey Harper. At its height in the early 1920s, Dewey’s vision of a productive “community” fused an interdisciplinary “central point of view”: a “Mecca for pragmatism” not just in philosophy but in physics, biology, mathematics, economics, and sociology, and religion as well. Adler’s story is all the more intriguing since, despite his Columbia education under Dewey, his Aristotelian instincts led him to support the efforts of Harper’s successor, Robert Hutchins, to break the “religion of militant modernism” at Chicago. As Adler tells it, Hutchins was only trying to restore balance and a respect for tradition amid the “endless gadgeteering” of scientists and intolerance among the pragmatists. Nevertheless, his own account of the period attests to the extreme polarization among faculty and students as the Chicago School deteriorated into the Chicago Fight.

Although he does not discuss the larger conflagration, Morris’s memoir presents a different view of Mead, Moore, Tufts, and Ames. A typical student, such as Morris himself, would probably not even have been conscious of a “school.” There was little discussion of Dewey or assignment of his writings, and even less of Peirce and James. These four mentors were, above all, great teachers who fostered a broad exposure to the history of philosophy. They actively encouraged divergent views, and invited visiting scholars typically quite hostile to pragmatism. Any support they received from their colleagues was a product of following their own paradigm of open discussion and consensus building.

Despite Cohen’s prediction, the end of the Chicago School was not the end of pragmatism. Dewey retained his vigor and acuity almost until his death in 1952; his greatest works on aesthetics and logic, as well as his summary philosophy of ‘transaction,’ were produced in the thirties and forties. And though they lacked the unity of a ‘school,’ the next generation of pragmatists, including Sidney Hook, Ernest Nagel, John Herman Randall, Jr., Joseph and Sidney Ratner, Herbert Schneider,

Charles Morris, Lewis Hahn, and Gerard Deledalle, kept the movement very much alive. Morris was indeed correct about the ongoing pragmatization of logical empiricism, reflected not only in the changed perspectives of the vanguard of Ayer, Carnap, Gruenbaum, and Neurath, but also their influential successors whose ranks include W. V. Quine, Hilary Putnam, and Donald Davidson.

Pragmatism's current renaissance is undoubtedly indebted to Richard Rorty, whose far-ranging influence has forged new pathways in deconstructionism, postmodernism, multiculturalism, and feminism. Yet even more recent, and at least as promising, is the resurgence of interest in classical American pragmatism, especially that of Dewey and the Chicago School. A careful reading of the essays collected here, despite their range and quality, can't help but leave the impression that the Chicago pragmatists were unable to "connect" with adversaries who, in perhaps unconsciously twisting these remarkable ideas into traditional frameworks, never fully appreciated their novelty and power. If this is true, then the volumes in this series may constitute not a new hearing for Chicago pragmatism, but a first hearing.

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DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION

Addison W. Moore. "Review of John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*." *International Journal of Ethics* 26.4 (July 1916): 547–50.

Book Review: *Democracy and Education*. By John Dewey. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916. Pp. xxi, 434.

The thinking world has long since learned to expect from Professor Dewey matters of prime importance. Of the general significance of this volume it is perhaps enough to say that, in the reviewer's opinion, it is the most important of Professor Dewey's productions thus far. In defiance of possible imputations of chauvinism, the reviewer will also say that it would be difficult to overstate its import and value for all students of education, philosophy, and society.

The sub-title of the volume is "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education." Most books that have appeared under that caption have left recollections either of an external, mechanical application to education of a philosophy fashioned for other purposes; or of a conception of the philosophy of education in which the philosophical element is regarded as a particular 'part' or 'phase' or 'kind' of philosophy concerned with the particular problems of education. But the thesis of this volume is that art philosophy is, at bottom, social philosophy; and all social philosophy is the philosophy of education. Hence the significant, not to say startling, statement: "The most penetrating definition of philosophy which can be given is that it is the theory of education, in its most general phase."

William James was fond of quoting Chesterton's statement, "The most important thing about a man is his philosophy." It may be added that the most important thing about a man's philosophy is its conception of philosophy – its opinion of itself, of its origin, and its mission. A philosophy, therefore, which believes that the 'most penetrating' definition of itself identifies it with the philosophy of education and in the end with the philosophy of democracy is something that demands attention. There is no doubt of the 'penetrating' character of this definition. It quickly penetrates all conceptions of philosophy

2 *Later Debates on Instrumentalism*

which find its origin in a 'pure reason' or a pure 'sentience' that by some inexplicable cosmic accident or 'fall' is in but not of our human world; and it penetrates all theories of education which are *a priori* deduction from ready made systems of such philosophy. In this brief notice only the main headlands of the argument can be pointed out.

In the face of the 'ineluctable fact' of the death of its individuals, life in all its phases and contents has to perpetuate and develop itself by transmission, by communication. It must then to some extent be social in character. And the more complex the life-bearing being, the more communicatory, the more social it is obliged to become. This social process of transmission by which life maintains and develops itself is education. Education is then no mere 'auxiliary'; it is literally a matter of life or death.

The point at which ideas, the capacity for reflection, appear in this process marks a great epoch in its development. It means the inestimable power of remembered successes and failures, and the capacity for utilizing them in future operations. And with a little further development, it means a theory of education, a deliberately planned inquiry and experimentation. Here is the point at which philosophy gets its identity with the theory of education, and at which the whole method of Professor Dewey's treatment appears. If we take seriously the view that ideas, theories, have their origin in and their operations determined by this process of perpetuating life through education, philosophical ideas and theories can be no exception. But, if this were all, it could be said: "Neither can any other ideas be excepted; and if all ideas are 'educational' the meaning of the term 'educational' becomes too diffused and thin to be useful." Professor Dewey's exposition goes on to show (1) how in point of content, philosophical problems, like the problems of education, are more directly concerned with active 'attitudes' and 'dispositions' than are the sciences which deal with specific fields of nature and society; and (2) how, historically, 'the fact that the stream of European philosophical thought arose as a theory of educational procedure, remains an eloquent witness to the intimate connection of philosophy and education.'

But all this is 'instrumental' to the matter which Professor Dewey has particularly at heart in this volume, and indeed everywhere, – namely, 'the implications of democracy in human association' and therefore, as we have seen, in education and philosophy. "In all social life whatever, even in a gang of thieves, we find (1) interests held in common and (2) interaction and cooperation with other groups." "How numerous and varied are the interests which are commonly shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?" – these are the test questions for every society; and they both point to democracy. The first

means 'not only a mutual sharing of interests but a reliance upon the recognition of these mutual interests as the chief factor in social control.' The second demands 'not only free interaction between social groups but the continuous readjustment of social habits in meeting the new situation produced by varied intercourse.'

With inexorable continuity the pedigree of the 'problems' of government, of education, and of philosophy is traced back to the disjunctions and conflicts due to the failure to recognise both these 'criteria of human association.' When the social, human aim of education is prostituted to exclusive, aggressive national interests, division, confusion, and strife enter. "Art, science, and commerce are international both in quality and method. But with national sovereignty regarded as the basic conception and motive of government each nation lives in a state of hostility and incipient or actual war with its neighbors." The antitheses of educational aims, of subject matter and methods; the problems of 'interest and discipline,' of 'efficiency and culture,' of 'labor and leisure,' of 'naturalism and humanism,' are all shown, with convincing detail, to be symptoms of social cleavage. To the same source are traced the issues of philosophy. The problems of 'mind and matter,' of 'body and soul,' of 'the world and the individual,' of 'knowledge and practise,' of 'truth and goodness,' – all these 'record the main lineaments and difficulties of contemporary social practice.'

Within the present generation we have seen departments and schools of education grow shy of the 'philosophy of education.' There are schools of education that even boast the absence from the curriculum of any such thing as 'the philosophy of education.' The reason is not far to seek. When 'the philosophy of education' consists, as it so often does, of the antinomies of transcendental metaphysics, translated into educational terms, thus tending to fix in education the very disjunctions it should heal, or when it consists, on the other hand, of a collection of theorems and rules – a sort of pedagogical Euclid, little wonder departments of education feel they can get on without it. But if the conception of 'the philosophy of education' be one in which 'the most penetrating definition' of the philosophy in it is that it is 'the theory of education in its most general phases' and one in which the theory of education is conceived as an account of the actual operations whereby human society is perpetuated in the world then no department or school of education which pretends to touch bottom can ignore it. The attempt to do so is quite analogous to the attempt of a well known school of philosophy to construct a new logic which excludes the act of knowing, because, forsooth, the act of knowing has been regarded in the past as 'subjective' and has kept logic in the throes of epistemology. As logic has been in need of a different conception of the act of knowing, so the philosophy

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of education has been in need of a new conception of philosophy. This need “Democracy and Education” supplies. The subtitle of this volume might well be “The Restoration of the Philosophy of Education” – its restoration – not only to students of departments and schools of education – but to all who have any interest in the problems of our common life and in the future of democracy in our world.

THE PRAGMATISM OF PEIRCE

John Dewey. "The Pragmatism of Peirce." *Journal of Philosophy* 13.26 (21 December 1916): 709–15. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 10 (1980), pp. 71–78.

The term pragmatism was introduced into literature in the opening sentences of Professor James's California Union address in 1898. The sentences run as follows "The principle of pragmatism, as we may call it, may be expressed in a variety of ways, all of them very simple. In the *Popular Science Monthly* for January, 1878, Mr. Charles S. Peirce introduces it as follows:" etc. The readers who have turned to the volume referred to have not, however, found the word there. From other sources we know that the name as well as the idea was furnished by Mr. Peirce. The latter has told us that both the word and the idea were suggested to him by a reading of Kant, the idea by the "Critique of Pure Reason," the term by the "Critique of Practical Reason."¹ The article in the *Monist* gives such a good statement of both the idea and the reason for selecting the term that it may be quoted *in extenso*. Peirce sets out by saying that with men who work in laboratories, the habit of mind is molded by experimental work much more than they are themselves aware. "Whatever statement you may make to him, he [experimentalist] will either understand as meaning that if a given prescription for an experiment ever can be and ever is carried out in act, an experience of a given description will result, or else he will see no sense at all in what you say." Having himself the experimental mind and being interested in methods of thinking, "he framed the theory that a *conception*, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and *there is*

¹ See article on "Pragmatism," in "Baldwin's Dictionary," Vol. II., p. 322, and the *Monist*, Vol. 15, p. 162.

absolutely nothing more in it. For this doctrine, he invented the name *pragmatism*.”

After saying that some of his friends wished him to call the doctrine *practicism* or *practicalism*, he says that he had learned philosophy from Kant, and that to one “who still thought in Kantian terms most readily, *praktisch* and *pragmatisch* were as far apart as the two poles, the former belonging to a region of thought where no mind of the experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet, the latter expressing relation to some definite human purpose. Now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and human purpose.”²

From this brief statement, it will be noted that Peirce confined the significance of the term to the determination of the meaning of terms, or better, propositions; the theory was not, of itself, a theory of the test, or the truth, of propositions. Hence the title of his original article: “How to Make Ideas *Clear*.” In his later writing, after the term had been used as a theory of truth, – he proposed the more limited “pragmaticism” to designate his original specific meaning.³ But even with respect to the meaning of propositions, there is a marked difference between his pragmaticism and the pragmatism of, say, James. Some of the critics (especially continental) of the latter would have saved themselves some futile beating of the air, if they had reacted to James’s statements instead of to their own associations with the word “pragmatic.” Thus James says in his California address: “The effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequences, in our future practical experience, whether active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be *particular*, than in the fact that it must be *active*.” (Italics mine.)

Now the curious fact is that Peirce puts more emphasis upon *practise* (or *conduct*) and less upon the *particular*; in fact, he transfers the emphasis to the *general*. The following passage is worth quotation because of the definiteness with which it identifies meaning with both the future and with the general. “The rational meaning of every proposition lies in the future. How so? The meaning of a proposition is itself a proposition. Indeed, it is no other than the very proposition of which it is the meaning: it is a translation of it. But of the myriads of forms into which a proposition may be translated, which is that one which is to be

² Kant discriminates the laws of morality, which are *a priori*, from rules of skill, having to do with technique or art, and counsels of prudence, having to do with welfare. The latter he calls pragmatic; the *a priori* laws practical. See “Metaphysics of Morals,” Abbott’s trans., pp. 33 and 34.

³ See the article in the *Monist* already mentioned, and another one in the same volume, p. 481, “The Issues of Pragmaticism.”

called its very meaning? It is, according to the pragmatist, that form in which the proposition becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those special circumstances nor when one entertains this or that special design, but that form which is most applicable to self-control under every situation and to every purpose." Hence, "it must be simply the general description of all the experimental phenomena which the assertion of the proposition virtually predicts." Or, paraphrasing, pragmatism identifies meaning with formation of a habit, or way of acting having the greatest generality possible, or the widest range of application to particulars. Since habits or ways of acting are just as real as particulars, it is committed to a belief in the reality of "universals." Hence it is not a doctrine of phenomenalism, for while the richness of phenomena lies in their sensuous quality, pragmatism does not intend to define these (leaving them, as it were, to speak for themselves), but "eliminates their sential element, and endeavors to define the rational purport, and this it finds in the purposive bearing of the word or proposition in question." Moreover, not only are generals real, but they are physically efficient. The meanings "the air is stuffy" and "stuffy air is unwholesome" may determine, for example, the opening of the window. Accordingly on the ethical side, "the pragmatist does not make the *summum bonum* to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals...in other words, becomes, through action an embodiment of rational purports or habits generalized as widely as possible."⁴

The passages quoted should be compared with what Peirce has to say in the Baldwin Dictionary article. There he says that James's doctrine seems to commit us to the belief "that the end of man is action – a stoical maxim which does not commend itself as forcibly to the present writer at the age of sixty as it did at thirty. If it be admitted, on the contrary, that action wants an end, and that end must be something of a general description, then the spirit of the maxim itself...would direct us toward something different from practical facts, namely, to general ideas... . The only ultimate good which the practical facts to which the maxim directs attention can subserve is to further the development of concrete reasonableness... . Almost everybody will now agree that the ultimate good lies in the evolutionary process in some way. If so, it is not in individual reactions in their segregation, but in something general or continuous. Synecism is founded on the notion that the coalescence, the becoming continuous, the becoming governed by laws, the becoming

⁴ It is probably fair to see here an empirical rendering of the Kantian generality of moral action, while the distinction and connection of "rational purport" and "sensible particular" have also obviously Kantian associations.

instinct with general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process of the growth of reasonableness. This is first shown to be true with mathematical exactitude in the field of logic, and is thence inferred to hold good metaphysically. It is not opposed to pragmatism...but includes that procedure as a step."

Here again we have the doctrine of pragmatism as a doctrine that meaning or rational purport resides in the setting up of habits or generalized methods, a doctrine passing over into the metaphysics of synchism. It will be well now to recur explicitly to Peirce's earlier doctrine which he seems to qualify – although, as he notes, he upheld the doctrine of the reality of generals even at the earlier period. Peirce sets out, in his article on the "Fixation of Belief,"⁵ with the empirical difference of doubt and belief expressed in the facts that belief determines a habit while doubt does not, and that belief is calm and satisfactory while doubt in an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to emerge; to attain, that is, a state of belief, a struggle which may be called inquiry. The sole object of inquiry is the fixation of belief. The scientific method of fixation has, however, certain rivals: one is that of "tenacity" – constant reiteration, dwelling upon everything conducive to the belief, avoidance of everything which might unsettle it – the will to believe. The method breaks down in practise because of man's social nature; we have to take account of contrary beliefs in others, so that the real problem is to fix the belief of the community; for otherwise our own belief is precariously exposed to attack and doubt. Hence the resort to the method of authority. This method breaks down in time by the fact that authority can not fix all beliefs in all their details, and because of the conflict which arises between organized traditions. There may then be recourse to what is "agreeable to reason" – a method potent in formation of taste and in esthetic productions and in the history of philosophy, – but a method which again fails to secure permanent agreements in society, and so leaves individual belief at the mercy of attack. Hence, finally, recourse to science, whose fundamental hypothesis is this: "There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those realities affect our senses according to regular laws, and...by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain *by reasoning* how things really are, and any man, if he have sufficient experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true conclusion."⁶

⁵ *Popular Science Monthly*, Volume XII., pp. 1–15. It is much to be desired that the series of articles be printed in book form. Discussion since 1878 has caught up with Peirce, and his views would awaken much more response now than when published.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

It will be noted that the quotation employs the terms “reality” and “truth,” while it makes them a part of the statement of the *hypothesis* entertained in scientific procedure. Upon such a basis, what meanings attach to the terms “reality” and “truth?” Since they are general terms, their meanings must be determined on the basis of the effects, having practical bearings, which the object of our conception has. Now the effect which real things have is to cause beliefs; beliefs are then the consequences which give the general term reality a “rational purport.” And on the assumption of the scientific method, the *distinguishing* character of the *real* object must be that it tends to produce a single universally accepted belief. “All the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which they can be applied.” “This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the operation of destiny... . This great law is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all *who investigate*, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.”⁷ In a subsequent essay (on the “Probability of Induction”) Peirce expressly draws the conclusion which follows from this statement; viz., that this conception of truth and reality makes everything depend upon the character of the methods of inquiry and inference by which conclusions are reached. “In the case of synthetic inferences we know only the degree of trustworthiness of our proceeding. As all knowledge comes from synthetic inference, We must also infer that all human certainty consists merely in our knowing that the processes by which our knowledge has been derived are such as must generally have led to true conclusions”⁸ – true conclusions, once more, being those which command the agreement of competent inquiries.

Summing up, we may say that Peirce’s pragmatism is a doctrine concerning the meaning, conception, or rational purport of objects, namely, that these consist in the “effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”⁹ “Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects,” and if we have any doubt as to whether we really believe the effects to be sensible or no, we have only to ask ourselves whether or no we should act any differently in their presence. In short our own responses to sensory stimuli are the ultimate, or testing, ingredients in our

⁷ Ibid., pp. 298–300, *passim*.

⁸ Ibid., p. 718.

⁹ Ibid., p. 293.

conception of an object. In the literal sense of the word pragmatist, therefore, Peirce is more of a pragmatist than James.

He is also less of a nominalist. That is to say, he emphasizes much less the *particular* sensible consequence, and much more the habit, the generic attitude of response, set up in consequence of experiences with a thing. In the passage in the Dictionary already quoted he speaks as if in his later life he attached less importance to action, and more to "concrete reasonableness" than in his earlier writing. It may well be that the relative emphasis had shifted. But there is at most but a difference of emphasis. For in his later doctrine, concrete rationality means a change in existence brought about *through* action, and through action which embodies conceptions whose own specific existence consists in habitual attitudes of response. In his earlier writing, the emphasis upon habits, as something generic, is explicit. "What a thing means is simply what habits it involves."¹⁰ More elaborately, "Induction infers a rule. Now the belief of a rule is a habit. That a habit is a rule, active in us, is evident. That every belief is of the nature of a habit, in so far as it is of a general character, has been shown in the earlier papers of this series."¹¹

The difference between Peirce and James which next strikes us is the greater emphasis placed by the former upon the method of procedure. As the quotations already made show, everything ultimately turned, for Peirce, upon the trustworthiness of the procedures of inquiry. Hence his high estimate of logic, as compared with James – at least James in his later days. Hence also his definite rejection of the appeal to the Will to Believe – under the form of what he calls the method of tenacity. Closely associated with this is the fact that Peirce has a more explicit dependence upon the social factor than has James. The appeal in Peirce is essentially to the consensus of those who have investigated, using methods which are capable of employment by all. It is the need for social agreement, and the fact that in its absence "the method of tenacity" will be exposed to disintegration from without, which finally forces upon mankind the wider and wider utilization of the scientific method.

Finally, both Peirce and James are realists. The reasonings of both depend upon the assumption of real things which really have effects or consequences. Of the two, Peirce makes clearer the fact that in philosophy at least we are dealing with the *conception* of reality, with reality as a term having rational purport, and hence with something whose meaning is itself to be determined in terms of consequences. That "reality" means the object of those beliefs which have, after prolonged

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 292.

¹¹ *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. XIII., p. 481.

and cooperative inquiry, become stable, and "truth" the quality of these beliefs is a logical consequence of this position. Thus while "we may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be...it would be a great mistake to suppose that this definition makes the idea of reality perfectly clear."¹² For it is only the outcome of persistent and conjoint inquiry which enables us to give intelligible meaning in the concrete to the expression "characters independent of what anybody may think them to be." (This is the pragmatic way out of the egocentric predicament.) And while my purpose is wholly expository I can not close without inquiring whether recourse to Peirce would not have a most beneficial influence in contemporary discussion. Do not a large part of our epistemological difficulties arise from an attempt to define the "real" as something given prior to reflective inquiry instead of as that which reflective inquiry is forced to reach and to which when it is reached belief can stably cling?

¹² *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. XII., p. 298.

CHANCE, LOVE, AND LOGIC

John Dewey. "Review of Charles S. Peirce, *Chance, Love, and Logic*." *New Republic* 40 (25 June 1924): 69-71. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 15 (1983), pp. 226-28. Correct #s???

Review of *Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical Essays* by Charles S. Peirce. Edited, with an Introduction by Morris R. Cohen. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1923.

Charles Peirce was probably the most original philosophic mind this country has produced; certainly one of the seminal minds of this generation. As Mr. Cohen says in his introduction he was a "restless pioneer soul with the fatal gift of genuine originality." His reputation bears little relation to his endowment. For this discrepancy, his very originality is in part responsible. He was ahead of his time; he belonged to no school and while his contemporaries were developing older theories, making them over to suit the temper of the day, he was breaking new ground. Only in symbolic logic was he really in communication with other minds of his time, and that subject, restricted in its appeal in any case, had none of the generic philosophic significance a generation ago which it has won in recent years. Even today he is hardly known to the cultivated public save as the author of the word and idea, "pragmatism," which William James borrowed from him and popularized with his literary skill.

The somewhat fragmentary character of his writings is also responsible for his failure to make his ideas duly known. There is more than one allusion in his writings to larger, more systematic and ambitious works in progress, of which his published writings give but sketches. He was a wayward worker, and all that is now in print is but an indication of what might have been accomplished under happier circumstances. From the 'sixties through the 'nineties these United States were a less congenial nursery, both in universities and out of them, than they are even today for men who do not readily "fit in," especially when they lack the inner impetus to controlled sustained endeavor. Before it was wholly too late, an appeal was made to the Carnegie Foundation to

subsidize continuous effort and productivity on his part. But its directors in their wisdom, although its professed aim was to discover and encourage "the exceptional man," did not see fit to try the experiment. We shall never know whether or not it would have been successful.

The collection of the essays that form this volume is thus the performance of a needed work of piety. It has been most admirably performed by Professor Cohen. His twenty-five page introduction gives a succinct account of Mr. Peirce's chief conceptions, and sketches their influence upon subsequent thinkers. It is not only a clear and competent introduction to the essays of the volume, but is a valuable contribution to the history of American intellectual life. The contents of the volume fall into two parts. The first part constitutes the material of the "logic" portion of the title. It consists of six articles published in the *Popular Science Monthly* during the years 1877-78. It is a treatise on logic, in the sense of methods and terms of thinking in fruitful inquiry. The second essay, on *How To Make Our Ideas Clear*, contains the pragmatic formula (although not the word "pragmatism") made familiar by William James. Other essays discuss the doctrine of chances, the nature and probability of induction, its relation to deduction, the order of nature, etc. If the mind of the Fundamentalist were amenable to reason, he should familiarize himself with the latter chapter and with the first on the *Fixation of Belief*. The faith which animates these chapters, that the methods of tenacity, authority, iteration, etc., contain within themselves the seeds of their own destruction, and that "the state of the facts, whatever it may be, will surely get found out," is under an eclipse just at present. But Mr. Peirce lived habitually possessed of a sense of time, which accomplished more for him than the vaunted sense of eternity has done for most of its devotees in protection against impatience and intolerance.

The second portion of the book reprints five essays published in the *Monist* during the years 1891-93; in giving Mr. Peirce the hospitality of its pages, Dr. Paul Carus added to the debt which the American public owes him. The essays develop his conception of the place of chance, of continuity and of evolution in nature. With respect to the latter, he is particularly interested in an extension of the principle of continuity by which it becomes what he terms "love" development by attraction rather than by minute chance variations or by inner or outer necessity. These essays contain his boldest speculations. But they are certainly much easier reading than they were thirty years ago, and his idea of chance plural and diverse individualities as characteristic of nature, although a monstrous heresy in the Victorian period, now has many adherents.

If the day of Mr. Peirce has not arrived, his night has passed. Harvard University has in preparation an edition of Peirce's works, including

those still in manuscript. The volume so ably edited by Professor Cohen will serve as an admirable introduction, both to awaken keener curiosity as to this original thinker, and to prepare the way for a better understanding of his more systematic and presumably more technical ideas.

COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE

John Dewey. "Charles Sanders Peirce." Review of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 1. *New Republic* 68 (6 January 1932): 220–21. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 6 (1985), pp. 273–77.

Review of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Vol. 1, *Principles of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931.

The first word of a reviewer of these papers must be in acknowledgment of the patient devotion of the editors, Doctors Hartshorne and Weiss, and of the service rendered by the department of Philosophy in Harvard University and the Harvard Press. No outsider can begin to appreciate the difficulties experienced in editing the manuscripts which are to appear in the series of ten volumes. Unpublished papers, the introduction tells us, number several hundreds, and exist in all stages of incompleteness; there are beginnings without endings, conclusions without record of what led to them, hiatuses, repetitions. The material covers a vast range of subjects, yet none of it falls readily, because of the originality of Peirce's mind, into conventional divisions.

Nevertheless, judging from this first volume, the work of editing has succeeded to a degree which one would hardly have thought possible, in arranging the material in orderly fashion. When the first six volumes have appeared, the public will be in possession of the contributions made by the most original philosophical mind this country has produced to general philosophy; to logical theory, both in the traditional form, as a theory of scientific method and a modern symbolic logic; to metaphysics, to pragmatism, to mathematics. The remaining four volumes will contain his writings on physics and psychology, his book reviews, correspondence, etc.

It is not at all likely that Peirce will ever become popular even in that highly limited sense in which the adjective "popular" ever applies to a

philosopher. He is a philosopher's philosopher, and in an unusual degree. The fragmentary condition in which he left his writings is one reason. As the editors say, he possessed the system-making mind. In one of his fragments, printed as a preface, he confesses to the ambition of setting forth a philosophy as deep and massive in its foundations as that of Aristotle. He wanted to outline, in terms of modern knowledge, a theory so comprehensive that the findings of thought in all fields, for a long time, would be used only as illustrative detail. The scheme was too grandiose to be carried out; it agreed neither with Peirce's own habits nor with his relations to other thinkers, to universities or publishers. He was, as the editors all say, not "a leader of movements," but "an originator of ideas." The ideas are seminal ideas, often left, even those which he wrote out most fully, as undeveloped germs, still needing to be planted, cultivated and brought to harvest.

The contrast between Peirce's intent and the conditions of executing it, both personal and environmental, resulted in an intellectual tragedy. There is no adequate presentation of his thought as a well developed whole. In consequence, thinkers will go to him to find novel suggestions, fresh points of view, fertilizing ideas often thrown out almost arbitrarily and at random, "flashes of brilliant light," as James called them, extraordinary emancipations from tradition on themes seemingly grown so commonplace as to be subjected only to conventional treatment. They will find eccentric, almost fantastic, notions, explained, I think, by the isolation from other minds in which he worked. Even so, however, I would not count too confidently upon the entirely erratic character of these notions. His flat denial of some of the principles of the physics of his day is, for example, wholly in line with recent discoveries. It is possible that if a sterner discipline of himself had given the presentation of his thought greater completeness and consecutiveness, it would have been at the expense of a regimentation which would have lessened his freshness and originality. He was a meteor – one of those meteors whose appearance is unpredictable and whose course is unchartable.

In consequence, no two persons would probably select the same ideas as those most truly characteristic of Peirce's thought, and most significant for present philosophizing. One, for example, might select his emphasis upon the reality of final causes and the efficiency of objective thought. Another might be interested in assembling ideas that seem, in spite of a radically different terminology, to anticipate some of the principles Whitehead has been setting forth. The fact is that he not only throws out ideas without developing them, but sometimes sets forth ideas which in their older historic setting have been employed to contradict one another. His intuition of the connecting links which

would bring these ideas into harmony is not elaborated. Consequently, in what follows I shall doubtless put the selective emphasis on points which appeal most to me.

I am reasonably sure, however, of being on safe ground when I say that what Peirce called “fallibilism” is central in his thinking. There is nothing extraordinary in the assertion that it is human to err. Skeptics, as well as Peirce, have held that nothing in human belief is exempt from this liability. But the peculiarity of Peirce is that in his thought the idea is not connected with skepticism, and proneness to err is itself taken to be a reliable indication of the state of the universe, instead of being a merely human trait. Peirce is not a skeptic, for he has an intense faith in the possibility of finding out, of learning – if only we will inquire and observe. The assertion of certainty is harmful precisely because it blocks the road to the inquiry by which things are found out. It is a fallacy, he says, to suppose that science signifies knowledge. It is rather “the pursuit of those devoured by a desire to find things out.” It is in a state of constant “metabolism and growth.” Established truths are so far from defining science that they are things “labelled and put on the shelves of the scientist’s mind, arranged to suit his convenience, while science, the living process, is busied only with conjectures which are either getting framed or getting tested.”

Fallibilism is also more than a necessary postulate of method. It has definite philosophical implications. It points to the continuity of all things in nature. “The principle of continuity is the principle of fallibilism objectified.” It signifies that as our knowledge swims in a continuum of indeterminacy, so things themselves swim in continua; there are no exact breaks and divisions such as would make exact knowledge possible. Only the idea of fallibilism opens the mind to observation of the merging edges, the fluidity of all things. To Peirce the idea of evolution is one form of the principle of continuity. The scientific dogmatist (or mechanist, since the two are synonymous for Peirce) holds to uniformity, repetition; his mind is closed to all evidence for variety, novelty, spontaneity. Continuity points to the conclusion that all things can be explained only on the basis that they grow. Even laws themselves are evolutionary growths. Wherever there is genuine diversification, there must be spontaneity and contingency.

Peirce had an excellent knowledge of the past history of thought, especially of Aristotle, the scholastics and Kant – whose *Critique of Pure Reason* he says he knew practically by heart. Like all independent minds, however, he took great liberties in interpreting historic views, and often gives their authors the benefit of his own greater insight. A striking case is seen in his adoption of logical realism in opposition to

the fashionable nominalism of his day. Peirce believed thoroughly in the objective reality of the general. But he understands it in a way which would have been abhorrent to Aristotle and the scholastics, and to some at least of the contemporary philosophers who appeal to Peirce as if he confirmed their views. For Peirce understands by the reality of a "general" the reality of a way, habit, disposition, of behavior; and he dwells upon the fact that the habits of things are acquired and modifiable. Indeed, he virtually reverses Aristotle in holding that the universal always has an admixture of potentiality in it.

There is one aspect of Peirce's thought which comes out most clearly, I think, in his conception of philosophy itself, a conception which in my judgment is likely to be revived in the future and to dominate thought for a period at least. He holds that philosophy is that kind of common sense which has become critically aware of itself. It is based upon observations which are within the range of every man's normal experience; it does not include matters which are more conveniently studied by students of the special sciences. To my mind this statement is the more weighty because it comes from a man who was so devoted to the sciences and so learned in them. What makes me believe that this notion of philosophy will dominate thought in some future time is perhaps its similarity to my own conception that the starting point and the ultimate test of philosophy is what I have called gross or macroscopic experience. Philosophy leans on science not for its subject matter, but for its attitude of experimentation (what Peirce calls the laboratory mind, as distinct from the seminary mind), and draws from science the apparatus by which common experience is critically viewed. What will cause the movement in the direction of Peirce's conception is, I imagine, the increasing remoteness of physical science from everyday experience and its increasing involvement in paradoxes. I do not mean, any more than Peirce meant, that the results of the sciences are negligible, much less erroneous, but that philosophy is concerned with the outgrowth of the sciences from everyday experience and their reabsorption back into it. Much of present-day philosophy that claims to be ultra-scientific seems to be wandering in a wilderness because, instead of taking this point of view, it tries to build upon the results of the special sciences in independence of, and in opposition to, coarse everyday experience.

In what I have said I have only touched upon the larger points in which Peirce connects with the tendencies of present-day thought. I have passed over the things which are, technically speaking, of greatest importance to philosophers. But professional philosophers will, it is to be hoped, betake themselves in any case to the volumes of which this is the first. What professional philosophy most needs at the present time is

new and fresh imagination. Only new imagination is capable of getting away from traditional positions and schools – realism, idealism, pragmatism, empiricism and the rest of them. Nothing much will happen in philosophy as long as a main object among philosophers is defense of some formulated historic position. I do not know of any other thinker more calculated than Peirce to give emancipation from the intellectual fortifications of the past and to arouse a fresh imagination.

THE FOUNDER OF PRAGMATISM

John Dewey. "The Founder of Pragmatism." Review of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 5. *New Republic* 81 (30 January 1935): 338–39. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Later Works*, vol. 11 (1982), pp. 421–24.

Review of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Volume 5: *Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934.

The present volume in the series, not yet completed, of the published and hitherto unpublished writings of Peirce, is concerned with the topic generally associated with his name, pragmatism. Yet it makes clear what careful students already knew, that his version of pragmatism, the original one, cannot be grasped except as a part of his general philosophical enterprise, together with his logic of relatives. It is likely to be the most widely read of all the volumes in the series. Some of it is not easy to grasp, and yet the reading of it should be obligatory for all philosophers, and somewhat more than optional for all cultivated persons who want to know what the most original philosophical mind produced by this country thought about fundamental matters. The philosophers who have not the patience to follow through his connected exposition of pragmatism can at least derive, from the present volume, ideas of the utmost value independent of the connection in which they occur. The book contains, for example, the most independent and thoroughgoing analysis that I know of the nature of common-sense perception, from which all natural science proceeds and to which it must go back. It occurs, to be sure, in digging for the foundations of his pragmatism. But Peirce was so thorough in laying his foundations that they stand of their own solidity, no matter what doctrinal superstructure is erected thereon.

The first two hundred pages contain a series of lectures delivered in 1903 and are, with articles in the *Monist* dating from 1905 (also contained in this volume), the most mature expression of his pragmatic philosophy – as he finally called it to distinguish it from the

pragmatism of James and the humanism of Schiller. James referred to the lectures as “flashes of brilliant light relieved against Cimmerian darkness.” If, in their published form, the light shines more brightly and constantly, it is not wholly because of the advantages possessed by a printed book, in which one can turn back and forth at will, contrasted with the difficulties in taking in through the ear alone an ordered argument on unfamiliar matters. It is also because many intellectual movements, in science as well as in philosophy, have brought Peirce’s ideas closer to us. His thought is nearer the mind of today than it was to the mind of thirty years ago. One thing that would give difficulty to any auditor is that after beginning with a statement of pragmatism and the difficulties in the position, he apparently leaves it for three or four lectures, returning to it only toward the close. Another difficulty concerns frequent discussions of the normative sciences and of esthetic and moral good – discussions which, without the whole argument before one, must have seemed irrelevant. But in print there emerges a definite structure that has only minor, largely personal, irrelevancies.

If Peirce’s own exposition in seven addresses (one seems to be missing) gave pause to a philosophically trained audience, a reviewer in a short notice can hardly be expected to give an intelligent exposition of the foundation stones upon which Peirce built his doctrine. Yet it is worth while to cite once more his statement of the pragmatic principle. The meaning of terms, propositions, and arguments or reasoned inference, of ideas and trains of ideas, is always found in the consequences, in the practical effects to which they lead. The doctrine that the meaning, say, of a premise is found in its conclusion was revolutionary for logical theory when it was enunciated, and what is implied in it is still far from having found its way into a systematic restatement of logical theory. And if anybody supposes that this failure is a matter of little practical consequence, let him remember that logic is but the statement of what men do when they think, before they reach a belief, and that the method urged by Peirce as a formulation of the method employed to arrive at scientific beliefs, has so far had little application in the thinking from which most beliefs in social and moral matters issue. To have grasped in its totality the significance of scientific experimental method and to have applied it to a restatement of traditional logic is, I am convinced, an achievement whose importance will stand out more and more as the years go by.

The statement of the pragmatic principle is, however, incomplete without reference to a fundamental point to which the editors properly and clearly direct the reader’s attention in their brief Editorial Note. Peirce realized most explicitly that the relationship postulated by his principle – between ideas or judgments and their consequences – cannot

be maintained except upon the basis of real continuity in nature. He was peculiarly, and with intellectual conscientiousness, concerned with working out the implications of this idea of continuity. The digging of foundations to which I referred mostly centres about this point. Perhaps the net outcome may be suggested by saying that his conception of continuity leads him totally to reject the notion that the consequences, the practical effects, to which his principle refers are so many independent particular items. On the contrary, they are the establishment of habits of ever increasing generality, of what he terms "concrete reasonableness" – a reasonableness that is concrete because it does not consist in reasoning merely, but in ways of acting – that have an ever widening scope and ever deepening richness of meaning. His recurrent emphasis upon that which is esthetically good, and upon logic as ultimately a branch of morals, springs from this source.

I have confined myself to the first collection of papers in the present volume, without touching upon any of the great number of "flashes" that are found in it. I mention one: Experience teaches, Peirce says, by means of a series of surprises. It is through the conflict of our expectations with what happens in actuality that we learn. Even in scientific experiment nothing is learned from an experiment that merely confirms a prior hypothesis; it is the surprise of a new disclosure that counts. This element of surprise, moreover, indicates interaction between the self and the world and so disproves every subjective idealism. Another point that should be instructive to philosophers – though one would be daring indeed who predicted that it will be – is his insistence that while perceptual judgments are forced upon us by processes we cannot ultimately control or criticize, yet there is no logical justification for them as primary logical principles, so that they are less certain intellectually than the conclusions they lead to. I do not know that I can better sum up the pragmatic import of Peirce's pragmatism than by quoting a sentence that occurs near the end of his course of lectures: "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both these gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason." The notion that thinking is genuine when it is carried on in terms of possible action is perhaps more readily understood now than when Peirce wrote. But we are still a long way from realizing the significance of cumulative continuity in our conception of the kind of action in whose terms we should think.

In concluding this notice of Peirce I cannot refrain from expressing the debt of gratitude that all students owe the editors in their conduct of a laborious task, one almost thankless, indeed, save as it promotes the concrete reasonableness that was the purpose of Peirce's labors.

CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE

John Dewey, "Charles Sanders Peirce." Review of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols. 1–6. *New Republic* 89 (3 February 1937): 415–16. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Later Works*, vol. 11 (1982), pp. 479–84.

Review of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. 6 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931–1935.

The work of Charles Sanders Peirce has been a long time in coming to its own; indeed, there is every reason to believe that the process is only just beginning and to expect that its influence will grow greatly in the future. The fundamental reason for the long period of inattention is that he was ahead of his times. The "climate of opinion" was not favorable to the reception of his ideas. The intellectual and moral soil was not prepared. While this soil is hard at any given time because of preoccupations and preconceptions, it is nevertheless worked and cultivated so constantly that finally areas appear that will receive and nourish seed that would not grow earlier.

But the reason given is not the sole reason for the neglect of Peirce. It must be admitted that he flung abroad many stones, sometimes pebbles, sometimes boulders, while he was sowing germinal ideas. He mixed his anticipations of the direction in which science would move and the consequences which would ensue with matters that not only seemed fantastic at the time but that, there is every reason to suppose, will always seem fantastic. There is much that is casual and arbitrary in his writings. They exhibit a strange mixture of unusual industry and thoroughly systematic thinking with inability to carry through to completion almost every line of thought that was started. He united, one might say, a disciplined mind and an undisciplined personality. The combination is an unusual one. Its product is the appearance in his writing of not only such difficulties as may be expected when a thinker is breaking new fields, but of perplexing contradictions and a multitude of starts that get almost nowhere. Moreover, there is hardly any subject

that he did not touch. What I have to say omits everything save a few leading ideas.

In consequence, Peirce will always remain a philosopher's philosopher. His ideas will reach the general public only through the mediations and translations of others. This fact is the more paradoxical because Peirce, more than any other philosopher of modern times, insisted that philosophy should begin with the common-sense world and its conclusions and terminate in application to the common-sense world. Yet he united with this point of view an extraordinarily technical approach that was not confined to technicalities of expression, which he invented ad hoc if he could not find them already made – as his remarkable knowledge of scholastic thought as well as of Kant often enabled him to do.

I imagine that some account of his conception of common sense and of its relation to philosophy forms the best introduction to his ideas. He did not think of Common Sense in the way the Scotch school (called by that name) thought of it. It consisted to him not so much of a body of opinions that are widely held as of the ideas that are forced upon us in the processes of living by the very nature of the world in which we live. Men may be theoretically skeptical about them, but as long as they live they act upon them. He attached basic importance therefore to what he called instincts, not as forms of knowledge but as the ways of acting out of which knowledge grows.

I recall a passage in which he says that “the instincts conducive to assimilation of food, and the instincts conducive to reproduction, must have involved from the beginning certain tendencies to think truly about physics, on the one hand, and psychics, on the other.” Because man cannot live without some degree of practical adaptation to the actual conditions of the world, physical and social, man's ideas, in spite of all the extravagances with which they are embroidered, must also have some degree of natural adaptation to the world and to society. Philosophy should be, however, Critical Common-sensism, a Peirce term in which the adjective “critical” is highly important. Uncriticized common sense is both too vague to serve as a dependable guide to action in new conditions and too fixed to allow the free play of inquiry – which always begins in doubt. The first rule of reason, he says, is not to block inquiry. Uncriticized common sense is often the great block to inquiry.

While Peirce, in common with many other philosophers, holds that philosophy deals in some sense with what is universal, he understands that which is universal in a sense different from most philosophers. Common sense is essentially an affair of experience, but not an affair, as

most previous empiricists had held, of sensations. In one passage, he describes it as consisting of those ideas and beliefs which man's situation forces upon him – a saying that may be thus paraphrased: It consists of the ideas and beliefs that a man must hold in order to meet in his activities the urgent and imperative demands made upon him by his situation. It follows that the universal or common subject matter of philosophy consists “of those observations which every person can make in every hour of his waking life.” Although Peirce was above all a scientist and had what he called the laboratory mind as distinct from the “seminary mind,” he had no sympathy with those who hold that philosophy must be based upon the conclusions of science. On the contrary, every science, according to him, rests upon taking important principles for granted. Rejecting the notion that these principles are a system of axioms or self-evident truths, the critical examination of common sense is left as the only method by which scientific principles can be organized.

It does not follow, however, that because the material of philosophy is derived from observations which every man can make, these observations are easy to make. I know of nothing that cuts deeper than his remark, “It is extremely difficult to bring our attention to elements of experience that are constantly present... Roundabout devices have to be resorted to, in order to enable us to perceive what stares us in the face with a glare that, once noticed, becomes almost oppressive with its insistency.” Consequently uncriticized common sense is a very mixed affair. The difficulty of seeing what its constituents are makes us believe we are seeing them, when in fact we are seeing through the glasses of philosophical notions that have been picked up from education and tradition.

Outside of his logical writings, the published volumes consist to a large extent of exposition of the elements that he thought were found in every experience of every man. Even his logical writings were in his own mind not separate matters, but connected, even when most formal, with common experience. One of the elements is the existence in everything whatever of potentialities that are not actualized at the time, that have not been actualized in the past, and that may not be actualized in any finite future time. Hence the continual emergence of the novel and the unpredictable. Before William James, he taught the doctrine of an Open Universe, grounding the doctrine upon every experience that anybody has.

The second main element he called actuality, taking the word in its most literal and brute sense. The “proof” of existence in general and in particular is found in the fact that we are forced to react and that things

react upon us in return for our reaction to them. It is the non-intellectual, non-rational element in our experience. It cannot be explained, much less explained away. It simply is; we cannot leave it because we must take it. It cannot even be described in its own terms; it can only be experienced, and then indicated to others (who undergo the same brute interactions) by means of demonstrative words such as this, that, now, here, and the names for colors, sounds, etc. Our sensations are not knowledge nor a source of knowledge; they just are.

Were there no other element in experience, then thought and knowledge would be impossible. But there is a third element, for each experience contains an element of expectation, of virtual prediction. Every brute reaction has consequences that are anticipated as part of the experience. This element constitutes the phase of continuity; it is the rational element that makes reflection possible and that is the ground of knowledge, which always expresses generality. It is the business of inquiry to develop this element of foreshadowing the future contained in what is otherwise the stupidest experience. Understanding the continuity of the thing experienced with other things makes subsequent action more intelligent and this action creates in turn greater continuity, greater reasonableness, in nature. Science is manifest in activities that bring things into closer connections with one another. It is thus basically a moral enterprise. For the basic principle of morals is the growing identification of the individual with whatever modes of thought and action render the existing community still more completely a community. Such attitudes are at the opposite pole from those in which the individuals merely conform to what is already thought and done in a community. Peirce lived when the idea of evolution was uppermost in the mind of his generation. He applied it everywhere. But to him it meant, whether in the universe of nature, of science or of society, continual growth in the direction of interrelations, of what he called continuity. Since the conclusions of inquiry are valid only in so far as they may be experienced by other individuals who go through the same experimental inquiries, the existence of the community is involved in all knowledge. "The social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic" – there is no logic apart from it. Were there such a thing as a completely "rugged individualist," he would have neither language, thought nor knowledge. Hence, incidentally, the fundamental importance Peirce attached in his logical writings to signs and symbols, as well as to making all logic a logic of relatives.

Insistence upon ever growing continuity, or generality of ways of action and disposition, differentiates the pragmatism of Peirce from that of James. The latter was correct in attributing his pragmatic doctrine to

Peirce as far as emphasis upon consequences and the inclusion of an element of action in all knowledge are concerned. Aside from these considerations, there are two basic differences between them. Peirce was much more of a pragmatist in the literal sense in which the word expresses action or practice. To James some action was necessary in order to ensure action; it was a necessary means. To Peirce habits of reasonable action, of general modes of action, were the end of knowledge. The fact that the consequence of knowledge is general marks the other difference. Knowledge tends to produce ways of action, and these ways of acting are immensely more important than is any particular result effected by action.

The other main aspect of Peirce's philosophy he called Probabilism, which he opposed to Infallibilism in its myriad forms. In his assertion that every scientific proposition is only probable, no matter how exact in itself and how sound the reasoning involved in reaching it, he anticipated the conclusion that science in its own development (largely against the will of scientists) has since been compelled to reach. Even the proposition that two things and two things make four things is not in any special case a perfectly certain proposition. The import of the doctrine of probabilism, in accord with the general pragmatic position, lies in the general attitudes and ways of acting that follow from its acceptance. These attitudes, like all attitudes, are moral in final account. They rule out all dogmatism, all cocksureness, all appeal to authority and ultimate first truths; they keep alive the spirit of doubt as the spring of the work of continually renewed inquiry – which is a work and not an argumentative skepticism. Science does not consist in any body of conclusions, but in the work of ever renewed inquiry, which never claims or permits finality but leads to ever renewed effort to learn. The sole ultimate justification of science as a method of inquiry is that if it is persisted in, it is self-correcting and tends to approach ever closer to stable common agreement of beliefs and ideas. Because science is the method of learning, not a settled body of truths, it is the hope of mankind.

In some respects this idea, taken pragmatically or in terms of the consequences that would result if it were generally accepted in action, is the most revolutionary of all possible ideas. It is much more revolutionary than are prescriptions for the future of social relations that rest upon acceptance of a fixed doctrine, although that doctrine be revolutionary with respect to existing conditions. The idea is so far from being accepted in current practice that in almost all quarters – among adherents of “revolutionary” political and economic doctrines as well as among those whose beliefs survive from earlier conservative ecclesiastic conceptions – it is thought to lead to almost complete uncertainty and

confusion, instead of giving direction to progressive agreement and concord. Insecurity and fear make people adhere to some fixed body of social truth supposed to be already scientifically established. The conflict as to just what are the authoritative fixed truths which are to direct social action then becomes the great cause of confusion and discord which are such marked features of present social life within and among nations.

I cannot close this all too bare outline of the potential contribution of Peirce to living thought without recording the great debt of gratitude we all owe to Drs. Hartshorne and Weiss for editing Peirce's scattered papers, and to Harvard University for making possible their labors and the publication of the results.

THE WORK OF GEORGE MEAD

John Dewey. "The Work of George Mead." Review of George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*. *New Republic* 87 (22 July 1936): 329–30. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Later Works*, vol. 11 (1982), pp. 450–55.

Review of *Mind, Self and Society*, by George H. Mead. Edited by Charles W. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934. Review of *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, by George H. Mead. Edited by Merritt H. Moore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936.

George Mead held while he lived and taught a peculiar position among American teachers of philosophy. He published but little, and that little was of a comparatively scattered and almost fragmentary character. Yet his intellectual influence upon associates and the students in his classes was so profound as to be revolutionary. Moreover, there is something paradoxical as well as peculiar about his work. For his mind, in contrast to his published writings, was of the unifying and systematizing type to an unusual degree. The materials he strove to synthesize were of a remarkably wide range. They extended from the technicalities of physical and biological science to the phenomena of human life, historical, political, economic and cultural. More than any recent thinker whom I can call to mind, he felt that no philosophy can satisfy the demands of the present that does not bring these two seemingly opposed things into a just relation with one another – just, because not permitting one to swallow the other, but allowing each to express itself in its own terms.

Thus the problem that he set himself, unconsciously rather than deliberately, is the most difficult that any thinker can face. He was too well aware of the new conceptions and method of science and the new movements in social life to take the short-cut method of adherence to some one of the types of philosophy that had already been formulated. He thus denied himself the relatively easy recognition that can be obtained by developing further some already established point of view. Yet he was not animated by any zeal for novelty and originality. On the

contrary, he was personally given to attributing ideas that he undoubtedly originated to authors from whom he had derived suggestions. He was original because of unusual sensitiveness to underlying problems that most philosophers do not feel. This sensitiveness took him into new fields in which absence of established formulas, and of vocabularies made familiar by prior use, made expression difficult. The very scope of his knowledge increased rather than lessened his difficulties. Judicious ignorance is always an aid to simplification. The period in which he taught was one of revolutionary change in science and one of great social change. Mead was keenly sensitive to these changes, and so aware of their quality that he was not tempted to fit them mechanically into preconceptions, no matter how current and influential the latter had become.

One cannot read any of the volumes now being edited and published by a group of his former students and colleagues without being struck by the central importance he attached to the idea of reconstruction as something continuously going on in nature, in human institutions and in ideas. This idea, as developed in the first published volume, *Mind, Self and Society*, exemplifies Mead's sense of the basic problem every significant present philosophy must face: How are we to unite in a coherent way the presence of those relatively settled orders to which the name of all uniformities, laws, universals is given, with the unremitting occurrence of individuality, novelty and the unpredictable? The idea of continuity, of remaking, of reconstruction, was with Mr. Mead more than an idea in any abstract sense of the word; it was an immediate and living feeling. As such it provided the binding thread by which he interpreted the great variety and seeming disparity presented by the movements of nineteenth-century thought.

In one sense, the use he made of this conception allies him closely with that conception of evolution and development which is probably the most characteristic contribution of the period dealt with by *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. But in another sense, his identification of the process of evolution with that of continuous reconstruction by which nature and man (as a part of nature that has become conscious) solve the problem of the relations of the universal and the individual, the regular and the novel – this identification is his own outstanding contribution to philosophy. Mead's sensitiveness – not just in general but in extensive detail – to both sides of the problem explains, I think, the seeming contradiction between the systematizing character of his mind and the unsystematic nature of his public actions. He was continually engaged in the reconstructive development of his own ideas.

It is impossible for me to give here even a bare outline of the various topics treated by Mead in *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth*

Century. Mr. Moore, in the introduction prefixed to the work, has provided its readers with an excellent guide to understanding. There are, however, three general points, all of them connected with what I have just said, to which I would call special attention. One of them is the demonstration of how nineteenth-century thought was in continuity with the whole intellectual European tradition, including not merely the ideas of the Renaissance and of the seventeenth century, but those of medieval theologians. The first chapter shows clearly the connection of the scientific postulate as to the intelligibility of nature with earlier theological notions, and brings out the otherwise surprising fact that the emphasis of the Romantic philosophers upon individual consciousness makes explicit the earlier religious idea that nature is but a theatre in which is enacted the drama of the human soul. At the same time, there are clearly portrayed the reconstructive forces that changed dependence upon the authority of the institutional church to dependence on the authority of human reason in knowledge and of the secular community in politics. In the second place, throughout the whole discussion there is exhibited constant correlation between changes in science and those in social institutions and philosophy – two things usually kept in separate compartments.

The third point concerns the main original contribution of Mead's constructive philosophy. He recognizes, with no attempt to explain them away, the facts that have led so much of modern philosophy into subjectivism, but shows that these facts are to be explained in terms of active connection between individual organisms and the world, not in terms of "consciousness," while he shows the importance of the social nature of selves in making possible a common and universal point of view. The concluding chapter, "Individuality in the Nineteenth Century," is worth the most careful study. It alone more than justifies the publication of the volume. I do not know its equal in anything like similar compass for far-reaching suggestiveness.

As the reader will infer from what has been said, the second volume, like its predecessor, does not come directly from the hand of Mead, but is the result of editing, from stenographic reports, lectures given by him at Chicago. As the editor indicates in his preface, there is no guarantee that the text states exactly what Mead would have said if he had himself given the volume its final form. While doubtless the work suffers from some defects on this account, nevertheless there are compensations. The lecture is more conducive to excursions and side-remarks than is the studied form of the published book. The variety of Mead's interests and the range of his knowledge were so great that there is hardly a page not enriched by some suggestion, comparison or comment that might not have found its way into a more formal treatment. Everyone interested in

philosophic thought that is profoundly original and productive of creative thought in others, as well as grounded in genuine scholarship, cannot be too grateful for the intellectual piety that has made available to a wider public the wealth of ideas and of knowledge that Mead conveyed to his own students. It would be difficult to find a work that displays such constant respect for scientific method and for human values as do these books, and that connects them together so integrally without either apologetics, forced sacrifice or sentimentality.

DOCTOR MOORE'S PHILOSOPHY

George H. Mead. "Dr. Addison W. Moore's Philosophy." *The University [of Chicago] Record* n.s. 17.1 (January 1931): 47-49.

Like many young men of his period Addison Moore inherited his philosophic problem from an evangelical home, community, and college; but the problem was rather social than theological. He did not question the scientists' findings nor their interpretation of nature, nor was he loath to reconstruct the documents of the church by the aid of the historian's method. But the inner flame of spiritual life which the church had sheltered and nourished, her great affirmations of a truth to be tested by devotion to the welfare of the human soul and of human society; these had to be brought into intellectual accord with the scientist's nature and the historian's past. While as a youth he had looked toward the ministry, the whole set of the intellectual life of the larger community into which he entered inevitably carried so vivid a mind and emotional nature as his to philosophy. For philosophy promised to reach the profounder meaning of dogma, to discover why its doctrines had expressed men's inner moral life, and why they had been the custodians of the spiritual goods of human communities.

At Cornell University an idealistic philosophy taught an evolution of mind that was also an evolution of nature and an evolution of history. It was an alembic within which the oppositions of creeds and doctrines, the clash of institutions, the warfare between ecclesiastical inquisition and the scientist's laboratory disappeared as moments in the dialectic of an absolute mind. To an eager speculative spirit, this Hegelian philosophy was perhaps the most fascinating resolution of antinomies that philosophic genius has ever exhibited. It fed upon conflicts and its syntheses undertook to distil out and preserve on higher levels the values which conflicting ideas defended against each other. It was the same philosophy of the absolute which Josiah Royce was expounding with a different intonation at Harvard University. In contrast with the traditional philosophy of the American college, that of the Scottish school, the philosophy of so-called common sense, which evaded problems and discouraged speculation, it was profound, adventurous and armed with

a dialectic that could cope with any contradiction. It was peculiarly facile in its subsumption of the past while it failed to provide a method for present and future conduct. In England and America neo-Hegelianism was a cultural philosophy rather than a philosophy of action.

At Cornell University then Mr. and Mrs. Moore – for they were already joined in that companionship of all their varied interests, which lasted, becoming steadily more profound, throughout her life – settled for graduate study, and Mr. Moore eagerly plunged into absolute idealism. In the following year they came to the University of Chicago I do not know whether Mr. Moore then felt at all the dissent from absolute idealism which he afterward so vigorously expressed. He came to Chicago to study with Professor Dewey, who had been bred in the same philosophic faith, but whose writings in philosophic journals and especially in the field of ethics already showed that he had broken with the absolutism of idealism and that he insisted upon a doctrine that should be a method of conduct.

Mr. Moore lived through the years here in Chicago, during which Professor Dewey worked out his philosophy of thought, which was also a philosophy of action. He was a member of that historic seminar, papers of which were joined with Professor Dewey's exposition and appeared as the first edition of *Studies in Logical Theory*, as a part of the "Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago." It placed thought definitely within the act, and dealt in a masterly fashion with the logical problems which this orientation carried with it. In this work Mr. Moore was an enthusiastic collaborator. He published an important study of Locke from the standpoint of pragmatism, and became in the philosophic world after Mr. Dewey the most important and most authoritative member of the so-called Chicago school. The publications by which he was known were his *Pragmatism and Its Critics* together with numerous articles in the journals, in which he brilliantly countered the assaults of the idealists and the realists upon the pragmatic position. The profound work which he accomplished in metaphysics and logic that was carried on in his Seminars was never fully published, but has borne its fruit in the stimulation and training of a long line of University of Chicago doctors who have taken their degrees in philosophy. For years these seminars were the core of the training for those that were going on to the degree in the department.

We speak of the philosophy of a man's life, with the sure feeling that back of his conduct through the years lies some consistent attitude toward society and the world about him which if made articulate would reveal the man to the world and to himself. There have been philoso-

phers whose daily walk and conversation have been living epistles expressing, in the full dimensionality of space and time, the ideas which their published writings have expounded. William James was such a philosopher, whose pages are the transcript of the direct impact of systems of thought and of events and people upon a profound and passionate nature. Spinoza and Kant at the opposite pole of personality, only thought out and wrote down, themselves reflecting the universe that confronted them. And then on the other hand there was Hume whose systematic doctrine issued in a scepticism which his own genial life belied, and a Josiah Royce whose lifelong speculative engagement was a conflict between the finality of his absolute idealism and the contingency of human experience. Addison Moore comes under the first of these categories. His philosophy was his inner and outer life writ large. He was no Epimetheus. He began his speculative thinking with a world which was there, a world that put up to our intelligence the precarious task of living within it, and he refused to arrest action in order to prove the existence of that world. For him the epistemological problem was an unreal problem. His logic was a running back of all the intricate processes of thought to the competent statement of the problem of life – life in its deepest sense – and of the conditions of its solution, and his ethics was the restatement of the conflicting values which are there as means of reaching a larger good which must envisage them all, if the problem of life is to be solved. The relation of thought to life he found in evolution. Evolution was the process of the universe, and thought was the development of intelligence within the struggle for existence of living beings with increasing social organization. And so his philosophy was a social philosophy. It was through communication that social organization appears, and it was through communication that self-consciousness arises with all the intricate apparatus of thinking in its analysis and in its hypothetical rebuilding.

His philosophy was no ponderous armor, whose whole task is to defend its own right to existence, and though he was never more brilliant than in the bright swordplay of polemics, his philosophy never justified itself by the skill of his fence, or the technical defeat of his adversary. It was, what he maintained thought to be, a means of action. He was the fortunate man whose inner and outer life was all of a piece. And the most abstruse of his professional undertakings were but parts of the common task of socially constituted and socially organized minds, that of stating their problems in terms of the means of their solution. He went from his seminar to the study of issues national or international, to the political meeting, to the appeal of the oppressed and defeated, to the club and to the theater and to the golf links with the same apparatus of

intelligence. He did not sacrifice life to be a philosopher, nor was it necessary to address to him the admonition, *non propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*.

Addison Moore had something of that unusual combination of lively imagination with acuity and subtlety of analysis which characterized Bradley and of that full-blooded vivacity of expression which belonged to James. His very style advertised the fact that the whole man passed into his thought, and that his thought was an integral part of the life which we have lost.

THE PREDICTION THEORY OF TRUTH

Charles W. Morris. "The Prediction Theory of Truth." *Monist* 38.3 (July 1928): 386–401.

I

If some kind of a distinction between thought and things be admitted, whether the distinction be metaphysical or functional, there are three possible areas in which the search for the meaning of the term truth may be carried on: the realm of ideas, the non-ideational realm, or some relation of the ideational and non-ideational realms. Corresponding to the areas of search, three primary types of truth theory have arisen: the rationalistic-coherence theory, the existential theory, and the correspondence theory.

With the avalanche of present day realisms and empirical analyses of thought, the rationalistic-coherence theories of truth, which regard truth as an inherent quality of single or systematically related ideas, find few earnest champions. Whether we accept Descartes¹ identification of truth with simple, clear, and distinct ideas, error being due to the outrunning of the understanding by the will, or Spinoza's² belief that the understanding untainted by the imagination gives truth, or Royce's³ claim that a true idea is one which is affirmed when its denial is attempted, four major difficulties seem to appear: either we tend to confuse truth with formal consistency, or we have to confess that as finite human beings truth always eludes us, or we have to admit that no clear and precise test of truth is available, or we must content ourselves with a few simple absolute truths – really definitions in the last analysis – which are so insignificant that only a philosopher could enthuse over them.

One possible way out of these difficulties is to search for truth beyond the realm of ideas. Bradley,⁴ baffled in the above quest, finds truth in a

¹ *Meditations*, IV.

² *Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding*.

³ "The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion," in *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 237, 244.

⁴ *Truth and Reality*, pp. 113, 114 note, 223. Bradley's vacillation between the two types of theory leads him to the conclusion that truth is really unattainable, for to become truth it must become reality, but this it could not do without losing its character of

single coherent and comprehensive whole which in its quality of sentience is more than thought. For Hegel⁵ truth is God, the Whole, the eternally Real. The mystics search for 'truth' is often a longing to escape from the difficulties of thought to some consummative supra-intellectual experience. For the earlier Russell truth was a function of propositions in themselves non-mental. For the new realists⁶ truth is a function of non-mental objects rather than a junction of ideas or judgments. But the attempt to identify truth with some form of existence as such is open to two main objections. In the first place, as the development of new realism has demonstrated, some kind of dualism is necessary to explain error; and in the second place, the intellectual connotation of truth renders any mere dualism of existences incapable of explaining error adequately. Truth or error has no meaning when completely severed from the reflective process.

We are then driven to formulate a correspondence theory of truth if we do not wish to be arbitrary in our definition, or unbecomingly modest in our pretensions. An idea is true if in some sense or other it corresponds to something not an idea. Such a statement, however, only raises the central difficulty itself – the nature of correspondence. I take it that any form of the Humean copy theory of ideas as representative images is inadequate and need not be further discussed. Nor does it seem profitable to find truth, with Eaton and Russell, in "the identity of form in propositions (symbolic groups) and perceived objects,"⁷ for structure varies with the language chosen, while truth is independent of the structure of the particular symbolic language. Correspondence, as essential to truth, is more than the purely formal identity of structure between the order of symbols and the order of existences, as we shall see in a later consideration of Russell's position. If with the critical realist we regard truth as "the identity of an essence with the actual character of the reality referred to,"⁸ and then claim that this reality itself does not directly appear in experience, we have not merely introduced new difficulties in the ambiguous concept of essence, but have rendered any direct test of truth impossible. It is interesting to note that both Rogers and Sellars⁹ who hold this theory as to the nature of truth, admit that

truth. *Ibid.*, pp. 343, 344. He adds graciously, "how in detail all this is possible, cannot be understood."

⁵ *Logic*, Wallace translation, pp. 3, 32, 387.

⁶ *The New Realism*, pp. 256, 257.

⁷ Eaton, *Symbolism and Truth*, p. 177.

⁸ Rogers, "The Problem of Error," in *Essays in Critical Realism*, p. 117.

⁹ Rogers' statements may be found on pages 11 and 68 of his volume, *What is Truth?* Sellars', in *Evolutionary Naturalism*, p. 56.

there is no final test for correspondence, and fall back upon coherence as the main test for truth. But to say the least, it is difficult to see how correspondence can be tested by coherence, how an extra-experiential reference can be tested in intra-experiential terms. The very nature of the case would seem to render such a claim unprovable.

The pragmatists approach the concept of correspondence from the general relation of thought to behavior.¹⁰ If the thought process is a means of adjustment employed by an organism whose behavior has been interrupted, so the story goes, where *can* truth be found except in the success that ideas have in solving behavior problems? Follow this lead that truth is a function of ideas working satisfactorily in the solution of behavior problems they are intending to solve, and you will find, we are told, that the nature of truth and the test of truth are identical.¹¹ Truth is a relation of experienced factors, and its nature can only be found by discovering what it is experienced as.¹² It is believed that the pragmatist has pointed out the right road, but has become unnecessarily confused in his wanderings, particularly as concerns the relation of truth to success in behavior.

It is, of course, an old story that James unwittingly let loose the notion that what gives us personal satisfaction and proves useful is as such true. This doctrine, realists smiled, is itself too good to be true, and even invoked the Nietzschean sentiment¹³ that "a strong faith, which produces happiness, causes suspicion of the object of that faith, it does not establish its 'truth,' it does establish a certain probability of its –illusion." James never intended the extremes of the popular interpretation, but in stressing satisfactory working as a test for truth, he vacillated between an emphasis on personal satisfaction and on a satisfaction of the demands of the objective situation.¹⁴ In very few passages did he adequately combine both senses of this ambiguous doctrine.

¹⁰ Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 24.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 240, 241. *Influence of Darwin*, pp. 139, 140.

¹² Dewey, *Influence of Darwin*, pp. 95, 239.

¹³ *Genealogy of Morals*, part 3, sec. 24. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, section 39, he states that a theory could be true even though it were in the highest degree injurious. Nietzsche, however, often goes to the other extreme, as in section 534 of *The Will to Power*, where he states that "the criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power."

¹⁴ For the emphasis on personal satisfaction see the *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 249, while p. 254 stresses the satisfaction of the demands of the objective situation. Pages 247, 253, 260 refer to truth as the satisfactory working of ideas. Perry's claim that James' doctrine covered both senses of satisfaction is found on p. 363 of the *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, and Dewey makes a similar claim on p. 324 of the *Essays in Experimental Logic*.

Dewey at this point stresses the view that satisfactory working depends upon the entire situation,¹⁵ and regards personal satisfaction as relevant only when it is part of the intent of the idea.¹⁶ Now, although the deeper position that nothing not part of the intent of the idea is relevant to the truth or falsity of the idea is undoubtedly Dewey's underlying contention,¹⁷ it must be confessed, I believe, that there are many passages in his works where the relation of truth to successful behavior remains ambiguous, and some passages at least where truth comes perilously near to becoming a species of the useful.¹⁸ Thus, even though the position to be now developed is indicated by Dewey, it may be well to clearly generalize the doctrine that his maturest thought implies. It is the present contention that by approaching the problem of truth through the concept of prediction an unambiguous pragmatic account is attained which is not embarrassed by the realistic criticisms directed against the looser formulations, and which is capable of handling the difficult problem of the relation of truth to behavior.

II

A prediction is a claim made by symbols as to what would be found in a certain specific area of experience. Psychologically, the ability to make predictions requires the operation of symbols.¹⁹ By the combination of symbols, claims can be made as to the relation of the referents of the symbols, so that although prediction is based upon past experience, it now becomes possible to claim that the experience meant by the symbols would or would not be actually obtained under certain specified conditions.

Prediction, then, is a function of symbols, and truth may be regarded

¹⁵ *Influence of Darwin*, pp. 155, 166.

¹⁶ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 322, note.

¹⁷ *Influence of Darwin*, p. 95, note: "It is the failure to grasp the coupling, of truth of meaning with a specific promise, undertaking, or intention expressed by a thing which underlies, so far as I can see, the criticisms passed upon the experimental or pragmatic view of the truth."

¹⁸ I refer to such statements as the definition of correspondence as the agreement between a plan and the fulfillment of the plan when acted upon (*Essays*, etc., p. 240), and the identification of the true idea with the idea which solves the problem it intends to solve (*Influence of Darwin*, p. 150). In this volume, pp. 133, 139, 158, 160, 166, notice his use of correspondence for the "harmonious interlocking" of the consequence which flow from the problematic situation and those which result from the plan. On p. 143 he identifies the "effective working of an idea and its truth." On p. 130, note, he states that "truth is the adequate fulfillment of the function of intelligence."

¹⁹ A development of the nature of the symbol will be found in an article, "The Concept of the Symbol," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXIV (1927), pp. 253-62, 281-91.

as a function of prediction. When the predicted experience is obtained as predicted, the prediction is said to be true. A truth is a verified prediction, and 'truth' is the general name for the specific truths. Since predictions are components of the reflective process, it follows that there is no truth which does not issue from a reflective process. The essence of correspondence, then, is to be found in the relation between a prediction and the obtaining or the failure to obtain the experience predicted. If the experience meant is the experience obtained, then the prediction is true, and if the experience obtained is not the experience meant, the prediction is false. The prediction as such is not true, but becomes true when what it claims will be experienced is experienced as it was claimed it would be.²⁰

The same fulfilling experience changes a prediction into a truth, and tests the truth claim of the original prediction, so that the nature of truth and the test for truth are, as the pragmatist maintains, ultimately identical. To retort that an idea is either true or false before it is actually tested is merely to imagine an instantaneous or collapsed verification attributed to some actual or ideal observer. But to claim that the verification could have taken place sooner than it did in actuality is to make a new prediction and not to render the first prediction true or false. There is no important difference as regards truth, between going through a process in which truth emerges, and in imagining the process to have already been gone through. To remove all possibility of verification is to

²⁰ Although greatly influenced by such realistic criticisms as G. E. Moore gave in his review of James' *Pragmatism*, and found in his *Philosophical Studies*, the present theory is most heavily indebted to pragmatic writings. The generalization of the main doctrine from Dewey's treatment of satisfaction has already been mentioned. A. W. Moore has strongly insisted that "satisfactory working" must mean the specific working of ideas "in the way they set out to work" (*Pragmatism and Its Critics*, p. 87). James in many places practically puts his theory of truth in terms of verified predictions, as on pp. 40, 86, and 236 of *The Meaning of Truth*. An emphasis on the specific intent of the idea in truth claims is found in Royce's *The World and the Individual*, Lecture 7; in parts II and III of Boodin's *Truth and Reality*; and in Ducasse's article, "A Liberalistic View of Truth," *Philosophical Review*, XXXIV, pp. 580-98. This is not to say, of course, that the above thinkers need agree with the present account.

Dr. Karl Schmidt has called my attention to the fact that Hertz's theory of truth, hinted at in the Introduction to *The Principles of Mechanics*, is a form of prediction theory. According to Hertz "We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and the form which we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured" (*ibid.*, p. 1). Only in this sense, he maintains, do thoughts have to correspond with things. This not merely suggests the nature of truth, but it indicates the principle which determines that the conclusions drawn from a symbol system are not merely consistent with the system, but are also true. I hope to return to this aspect of Hertz's thought at a later time.

remove all meaning from the term truth; to transfer this possibility to an ideal observer is to make another prediction, but not to change the status of the former prediction.

The essential contrast is not, as the realist maintains, between the nature and the test for truth, but between those cases where the verification is fairly direct and easy to obtain, and those cases where the verification is temporally distant or difficult. Because many predictions remain hypotheses or become truths only after great difficulty, does not mean that those specific predictions were true all the time, but only that for a more favorably located real or imaginary observer, the test, and hence the truth, would have been attained sooner. Thus the prediction is made that Mars is inhabited. This means that to an observer who could directly observe the surface of Mars, and who understood the symbols in the same way that we do, he would find on Mars beings that would be called 'alive.' From the standpoint of an instantaneous verification of a postulated ideal observer, all human truth seems woefully behind time. But such an observer is only an ideal, and concrete specific predictions do involve a time element. To abstract from this is not to separate the nature of truth from its test, but to set a premium upon ideal instantaneous verifications. In any ordinary use of the term, a recognition of this true state of affairs is certainly 'realistic.'

Provided that the concept of prediction is not limited to the future, in spite of the etymological validity of such limitation, no particular difficulty need be encountered in regard to statements about the past. Such statements imply that under certain conditions as to space and time the predicted experience was or would have been obtained.²¹ Where the predicted experience is not available to the present maker of the prediction, it is impossible to pass entirely beyond a hypothetical element, but by means of indirect evidence we endeavor to reconstruct the experience in question, and in many cases we reach a practical certainty that the predicted experience was obtained or could have been obtained by a suitably located contemporary observer similar in nature to ourselves, and sharing our meanings. Claims can be made about the past as well as the present and the future. Although in statements about the past the event precedes the claim, and although in these cases the verification is always indirect and hypothetical, the truth relation remains a relation between a predicted experience and the occurrence or non-occurrence of the experience as predicted.

III

This section will deal briefly with three further problems connected with

²¹ Cf. James on "potential" truth, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 293 ff.

the nature of truth: the relative versus the absolute status of truth, the relation of truth to consistency, and the relation of belief to truth.

It follows from the above account of truth, that truth is relative in at least two ways. Since truth is dependent upon meaning, the same words would give rise to different predictions for different claimants if the words did not have the same meaning. It is for this reason that precision of meaning precedes agreement as to the truth or falsity of predictions, and that where the meaning is ambiguous, the truth status is correspondingly ambiguous. The question as to whether animals have 'minds,' much debated in present day thought, obviously depends upon the meaning of the term mind. Under certain meanings of the term it is true that animals have minds, and under other meanings, it is false that animals have minds.

The failure to note that correspondence is between the experience meant and the experience obtained, and the insistence that truth involves an identity of structure between propositions and facts, is the source of Bertrand Russell's ambiguous position in regard to truth,²² Russell states clearly the position that has here been presented. As he says, "One of the plainest cases of verification, perhaps ultimately the only case, consists in the happening of something expected" (p. 269). But under the influence of his more general identity of structure doctrine, he finds a peculiar difficulty in the prediction theory. He states the theory in this fashion: "When an image accompanied by an expectation-belief is thus succeeded by a sensation which is the 'meaning' of the image, we say that the expectation-belief has been verified." (*ibid.*). So stated, difficulties arise. "How do we know that the sensation resembles the previous image? Does the image persist in the presence of the sensation, so that we can compare the two? And even if *some* image does persist, how do we know that it is the previous image unchanged?" (p. 270). Once having stated the theory in this Humean representative fashion, his own position wavers. Thus he switches to this account of verification: "We have first an expectation, then a sensation with the feeling of expectedness related to memory of the expectation." (*ibid.*). But just how a feeling related to memory gives truth even Russell's diabolical cleverness is incompetent to explain. Then in defining truth he introduces the vague notion of true propositions pointing toward their objective, and false ones pointing away from it (p. 272). An image-proposition of a window to the left of a door is true if both in the image and the perceived situation the window is to the left of the door. He admits that this simple correspondence of structure is not obtained in certain verbal propositions, particularly in negative propositions. (p.

²² References are to his volume, *The Analysis of Mind*.

277). But in spite of this admission, and without reasoned justification, Russell continues to believe that the general theory of truth as identity of structure between proposition and objective is valid. This conclusion may be seriously questioned.²³ As we have seen, truth is neither a representational or structural correspondence between two sets of existences, but a correspondence between a predicted and an obtained experience. It is the presence of symbols with the same meaning in the predicted and the actual experience that gives the bridge between the two situations and which determines whether what is found is what the symbols claimed would be found.

Since truth is dependent upon the experience obtained, there is a second sense in which truth is relative. In cases where the final experience is partly or entirely dependent upon the observer, even though the meaning be the same, a prediction may be true for some observers and false for others. Two observers, to take a simple example, may predict that a certain paper is colored yellow, but the testing experience will vary with the color of the glasses worn, even if the color meant be the same. It is for this reason that science, as precise thought, specifies the so-called normal conditions under which the truth claim is to be tested.

Turning to the second topic, we shall for the present only insist that truth must be sharply distinguished from consistency. A consistent set of symbols is any set such that the conclusions can be derived from the premises by means of specified operations. Such systems, constituting pure mathematics and formal logic, are as such, that is, independent of predictions based upon them, neither true nor false, but only consistent or inconsistent. (Predictions that specific systems are consistent or inconsistent are, of course, true or false.) Arguments may be consistent, but the conclusions untrue, and conclusions inconsistent with certain premises may yet be true. Truth does not refer to the internal relations of symbols, but to symbols functioning in predictions.²⁴

²³ More detailed criticisms of Russell's thought may be found in Chapter II of Joachim's *The Nature of Truth*, and pp. 150 to 159 of Eaton's *Symbolism and Truth*. Both the earlier and the later phases of Russell's theory of truth are criticized in Chapter V of Reid's *Knowledge and Truth*.

²⁴ A confusion of truth and consistency is well illustrated by a quotation from J.B. Baillie, found on pp. 39 and 40 of Muirhead's *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. I: "Those scientists who aim at logically exact conceptual connection do not suppose that their theories are at the mercy of what, for them, is looked upon as an inferior level of experience – the experience of the sense; ... If their theories are logically consistent and their conceptual scheme coherent, they are satisfied; they have all the reality and they may even say, all the 'truth' they want...it seems rather naïve to suppose that the logical validity of the connected system of mathematical concepts constituting the mathematical theory of relativity can possibly be decided and its fate

The difficulties concerning the relation of truth to belief arise from a duality of meaning of the term, 'belief' designating both an intellectual act and a psychological feeling of conviction. Russell defines belief as "that way of being conscious which may be either true or false,"²⁵ and yet agrees with James that belief is a kind of feeling.²⁶ According to the first usage truth is a function of belief. But belief so used is identical with what we have called a prediction, and it is doubtful if Russell has put his finger on the essence of belief considered as an intellectual act. Strictly speaking, a belief is a secondary attitude to a prediction – a prediction that another prediction is true or false.²⁷ To believe that Aristotle died in 322 B.C. is to claim that the proposition Aristotle died in 322 B.C. is true, or that it is highly probable that it is true (since belief need not require entire conviction). So stated, it is clear that with an exception to be mentioned, the truth or falsity of the primary prediction is independent of the belief, but the truth status of the belief is dependent upon the truth status of the primary proposition. The feeling of conviction is, as a feeling, neither true nor false, but in some cases the sense of conviction may act as the stimulus for action which generates or makes actual the completing experience. Although in these cases the holding of a belief is a causal condition of the attainment of truth, truth is still dependent upon the completing experience and not upon the previous belief that that experience could be obtained. Truth, then, is independent of the James-Clifford controversy as to the moral right to believe in certain cases upon insufficient evidence.

IV

In closing we may well turn to the relation of truth to conduct. On the present theory, even though the general instrumentalistic doctrine be

determined by the aid of the somewhat trumpery devices of telescope and photographic plate." We would add that, though the consistency cannot be so determined the truth must. Note Einstein's statement (*Relativity*, Eng. Trans. P. 159): "If the displacement of spectral lines towards the red by the gravitational potential does not exist, then the general theory of relativity will be untenable." On p. 2 he says, "The concept of 'true' does not tally with the assertions of pure geometry, because by the word 'true' we are eventually in the habit of designating always the correspondence with a 'real' object; geometry, however, is not concerned with the relation of the ideas involved in it to objects of experience, but only with the logical connection of these ideas among themselves."

²⁵ *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 13.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

²⁷ Eaton, op. cit., p. 179, admits the secondary status of belief, but by regarding all judgments as beliefs is led to the view that the "ultimate evidence of truth is the compulsion of a belief," and to the claim that it is impossible to break the chain of beliefs. (p. 190.)

accepted, it does not follow that in the reflective process the term truth stands solely for those ideas which 'work' in successfully terminating, when acted upon, the difficulties in behavior which initiated the reflective process. Success in behavior is relevant to the truth of an idea only in so far as such success is part of the prediction. In judgments of practice the effect upon behavior is part of the prediction and so is essential to the truth claim, but in cases where the effect upon behavior is not embodied in the prediction, such effects are irrelevant to the question of truth. So that even if all predictions occur in a wider problematic situation which reflection is endeavoring to solve, the meaning of truth need not be stated in terms of usefulness in behavior. Predictions that have been fulfilled or that will be fulfilled when acted upon are better guides for behavior than those which turn out to be false, since the former allow the organism to prepare in advance for that which is yet to come, but satisfactory adjustment is not a general criterion for the nature and test of truth.

For Dewey pragmatism is the doctrine that all judgments are judgments of practice, and all ideas are plans of action.²⁸ At first sight, at any rate, the so-called judgments of fact or description do not always reduce to explicit judgments of practice, and to say as Dewey does that only the *relevant* judgments of description are used in a problematic situation, does not destroy the possibility that the irrelevant descriptions were found to be true or false even though useless for the purpose in hand. To imply as Moore does²⁹ that if judgments are not judgments of practice they are not judgments at all, would not prevent a critic from replying that if judgments be so defined, there are still statements or predictions which while not judgments are still true or false. Even if the reflective process is always a plan of action, need each component idea be a plan of action? May not the selection of certain true descriptions be part of the process of building up a plan of action? Whatever their setting, many predictions make no explicit reference to results upon behavior.

It is necessary to distinguish between those predictions which in themselves make a prediction as to behavior or to results upon behavior, and those which involve behavior only as a means of bringing about the predicted experience. We can discriminate between such statements as 'if I believe and act upon this idea my behavior problem will be solved,' and 'if I perform such and such an action, a certain experience will result.'³⁰ In the latter case, doing a certain thing is required to get the

²⁸ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 347-49.

²⁹ *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, pp. 124, 125.

³⁰ The above distinction can be illustrated by pragmatic statements. James, in the article

completing experience, but the good or bad effects upon behavior are not relevant to the question of the truth or falsity of the prediction.

Even if all predictions were judgments of practice, it would still be possible to predict truly that certain ideas would be useless or injurious even if the ideas be true, or that certain ideas would be useful although untrue. If 'works' means only 'specific working in and for behavior problems' an idea may work in the way it sets out to work and yet just as well be false as true or harmful as well as useful.

The more inclusive theory of truth which makes all judgments predictions of what is to be expected under specific conditions, holds both for expected experiences and for expected results on behavior. Prediction is a more essential category for discussions of truth than the categories of 'usefulness' or 'satisfactory working.' On the present theory nothing not predicted is relevant to the truth or falsity of the prediction.

on Pragmatism in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy*, makes meaning depend upon "practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that experiences to be expected, if the conception be true." (Italics mine.) He adds, "which consequences would be different if it were untrue." It would be better to say, "which conception would be untrue if the consequences were different from those expected." Dewey's statement (*Influence of Darwin*, p. 107) that "The thing that means another by means of an intervening operation either succeeds or fails in accomplishing the operation indicated, while this operation either gives or fails to give the object meant. Hence the truth or falsity of the original cognitional object," would illustrate the same distinction more sharply if the word "while" was changed to the word "or," for in specific cases these two predictions may be distinct. It is only where both are made that both are involved in truth.

MUST PHILOSOPHERS DISAGREE?

Charles W. Morris. "Review of F. C. S. Schiller, *Must Philosophers Disagree?*" *Personalist* 16.4 (October 1935): 388–90.

Must Philosophers Disagree? And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. By F. C. S. Schiller. The Macmillan Company, London. 1934. Pp. vii, 359.

About half of the papers in this Schilleresque volume were delivered or published in California, and seven of the twenty-four first appeared in THE PERSONALIST. The volume is divided into three parts, entitled Educational, Historical, and Speculative; the various papers cover a wide range of topics: education, logic, William James, Nietzsche, Spencer, James Thomson, novelty, history and prospects of man, psychical research, pragmatism, humanism, and religion. So that a body of material is given which allows the reader to see the author at full length and in an atmosphere of informality often more revealing than ponderous studies.

The Schiller which emerges from these pages reminds one in a multitude of ways of William James. Schiller's statement about James that "his personality, and his belief in personality, are the clue to all his philosophic achievements," can equally well be applied to himself. Out of this common source flow the many other common emphases and doctrines: the opposition to all manifestations of formalism, the interest in the cultural setting and role of philosophy, the racy and genial style of writing, the sensitivity to the unique and differential, the predominantly biological and psychological cast of mind, the preference for a finite God and a world of genuine novelty in which men can play a creative part, the meliorist temper, the emphasis upon freedom and teleology, the tendency to take seriously the epistemological implications of human desires, the interest in psychical research as a way of approach to the metaphysically possible worlds "of higher reality and greater value." Personality and subjective experience should make us think twice, Schiller believes, before assuming that "the present universe of physics is all the being that there is, and that the human soul is inextricably entangled in it and cannot conceivably arise above it" (286). Nor is he reluctant to state that this stress upon the personal as the seat of value,

combined with the suggested metaphysics of novelty, “reinstates in principle the *romantic* attitude towards the world we live in” (85). The tone is not, however, one of complacent smugness: Schiller is careful to say that scientific data permit but do not demand a teleological interpretation (253 ff.); he states that “politically, it would seem that the era of Democracy is ending” (279); in various ways he makes it clear that the future of the human race is by no means assured. It is also recognized that while some persons are enthused with the possibility of seeing the creative world process as God, other persons are bothered by change and can only see the features of the Devil in such an open universe (234), – and philosophers *must* disagree, since philosophies are expressions of persons, and persons are unique. Indeed, “a system of Philosophy is best regarded as a sort of poetry, and often of lyrical poetry at that” (11).

Candor requires me to say that I do not believe that Professor Schiller has in any substantial way advanced the status of the ideas he defends beyond what James had done. The aspect of pragmatism found in Peirce, and for the most part the kind of development characteristic of Dewey and Mead, have found little response in Schiller’s world of ideas. These men all stressed the social element in experience, meaning, and knowledge, but Schiller will have no more of it than he will of the logicians’ stress upon formal (he would say, verbal) meaning. To use a word Schiller likes to apply to other philosophers, he is “obsessed” with the personal and the subjective. The only meaning that is real is declared to be “personal meaning” (43), as if the fact that every meaning is for a person signifies that it is a meaning for only one person. Schiller thus becomes as one-sided in his emphasis as any of those he opposes. For even to say that meanings are, in part at least, private is to utter a proposition that is in intent intersubjective. We find that often we do not have meanings in common, but this should not blind us to the extent that meanings are socially shared, nor does it negate the view that it is possible in principle to find objectively the meaning of any symbol used by any person. Lacking a general theory of meaning, and a theory of universals which such a doctrine could supply, Schiller simply retreats without discussion to the view that meanings are private, subjective, and objectively undiscoverable to any significant degree. The result is that the key terms upon which all the results depend (“mind,” “subjective,” “psychical,” “teleology,” “value,” “personality”) are never analyzed, and at crucial turns the account becomes fuzzy.

It is worth pausing a moment on the term ‘personality.’ The argument is constantly repeated that science by its very nature abstracts from personality (which is unique and particular), and that philosophy distinguishes itself from science by being responsive to all data, and especially

to the fact of personality. I pass by the difficulty of reconciling this statement with the view that "particular cases are precisely what the sciences are engaged in predicting" (7). But if philosophy is to *say* anything about personality, must not the meanings used be inter-subjective, and if so, can philosophy differentiate itself from science in this manner, or can personality be given any unique place? As far as I can see, the answers must be in the negative. For to say that "even in 'introspection' there is an inspecting person as well as an inspected character" (83), does not carry the implication that we cannot inspect acts of inspection, – indeed if the statement quoted is true, and if "all knowledge is empirical" (306), someone has done such inspecting.

Space does not permit me to indicate how this failure to explicate the empirical nature of meaning is reflected in the absence of an account of knowing which would support Schiller's belief in a plurality of selves.

The failure to take account of all dimensions of meaning is illustrated in Schiller's animosity to mathematics and formal logic. Here he seems to me to be at his weakest. It is true that the formal sciences have been negligent of the social, psychological, and empirical aspects of meaning and have not given an account of their non-formal foundations or their function in the reflective process. But these facts provide an opportunity for philosophers, and one would think that a pragmatist would relish the chance to show the instrumental significance of the formal sciences, instead of belittling them or speaking of the "rejection of Formal Logic, root and branch" (307). As logicians and mathematicians like Carnap and Hahn are beginning to show, one can assimilate the formal sciences within an empirical and even pragmatic view, but one cannot push them out of existence by the quixotic lance, *Personal Meaning*. Schiller has both exaggerated the claims and underestimated the significance of the new logic. Like James, he is too afraid of desiccation. The phobia of the formal is the reverse side of the obsession with the personal.

This is not to say that the theses represented by James and Schiller are not a valid part of the pragmatist-humanist-empiricist tradition, nor to deny that this part is so important that it warrants Professor Schiller's insistence. It is merely not the whole part, and when emphasized in isolation, leads to distortion. It needs to be supplemented by equal devotion to the concept of the social, by a more rigorous habit of mind, by a sympathy for the physical and mathematical sciences as well as for the biological and psychology, by the utilization of the new formal logic and logic of probability, and by the development of a general theory of meaning, if the pragmatist-humanist-empiricist tradition is not to become of historical interest only, or merely an intellectual gymnasium where athletes of the mind attempt to reinvigorate timid and tired persons.

MUST PRAGMATISTS DISAGREE?

F. C. S. Schiller. "Must Pragmatists Disagree?" Reply to Morris's review. *Personalist* 17.1 (January 1936): 56–63. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* (1939), pp. 57–64.

Granting that the various brands of philosophers do, and must, disagree, how far must such disagreement go among philosophers who have consented to wear the same labels? Professor C. W. Morris's extended review of my *Must Philosophers Disagree?* in the last *Personalist* seems to raise this question, and affords me a welcome opportunity to discuss what must, to outside observers at least, seem very marked divergences between the pragmatists who drew their inspiration from William James and those who obtained their training in the Chicago School headed by Dewey. For some reason, not easily apparent, the latter often seem anxious to differentiate themselves from the former. But they never seem able to explain what precisely are their grounds for dissent: they content themselves with rehearsing a few rather obvious platitudes and ancient *clichés*, the application of which to the objects of their criticism is never specified. Strangely enough their attitude does not seem to be reciprocated by the former. These gulp down every extension or new application of pragmatic principles made by Professor Dewey, with relish and without a qualm and appear to be merely puzzled why a line between the sheep and the goats should be drawn right through what appears to them to be essentially the same body of doctrines.

It is upon this paradoxical situation that, with the help of Professor Morris's review, I hope to throw a little light, for in it what I cannot but call the grievances nourished by the Chicagoans against the Jacobbeans (or Jacobins?) come out much more clearly than is usually the case.

1. To begin with, there is a reiteration that "Chicago has stressed the social element in experience, meaning and knowledge," and a profession of exclusive "devotion to the concept of the social"; but I find it difficult to attach to this the enormous importance claimed for it. I cannot accept it as a differentia among pragmatists, because ever since Aristotle declared that man was a social animal it has been the merest commonplace, shared by practically all philosophers. But after some two

thousand years of philosophic endorsement, is it not time that philosophers got busy and set about showing *how, precisely*, man's social nature reveals itself in human activities and affects his thinking and his knowing in *concrete detail*? Moreover is not this just what every form of pragmatism may be said to have attempted ever since it was hatched? Has it not proclaimed that "truth" always emerges from a social context and is relative to social uses? Has it not shown also how these apparent drawbacks might be turned to cognitive advantage?

I myself have always felt particularly innocent where wild charges of ignoring society were flung about. For though I had never shut my eyes to the undesirable effects on human truth-seeking which social intolerance and stupidity so frequently have – effects which in the present vogue of dictatorships should hardly need emphasizing – I had pointed out from the outset¹ how important was the difference between a truth-claim and a fully authenticated truth and how necessary was social approval to develop the one into the other. It is apparently the implications of this distinction between truth-claim and truth which so many of the Chicagoans have either not observed or not understood: this failure has led them to imagine that I had denied the social environment of truth-seeking. Moreover I had adopted with alacrity Carveth Read's charming wolf-ape theory of the genesis of social co-operation, just because it seemed to fill in the vagueness of Aristotle's "devotion to the concept of society" and to suggest how man's nature had grown social. For it is clearly to anthropology rather than to metaphysics that an empiricist should look for light upon such matters. So I feel entitled simply to dismiss this count of the indictment, or at least to demand chapter and verse in support of it.

2. At any rate the social nature of knowing is so obviously a commonplace to be taken for granted by any pragmatist that the charge of denying it could not possibly be important if it were not made the basis for a further charge of taking meaning as a wholly private affair and overlooking its social aspects. I should admit that the question of meaning would provide a more substantial grievance if it were true (as Professor Morris assumes²) that personal meaning is exclusive of social.

¹ Cf. *Humanism*, 1903, p. 58 "man is a social being and truth indubitably is to a large extent a social product... Truth has to win social recognition, to transform itself into a common property" – p. 59. "Social usefulness is an ultimate determinant of 'truth.'" See also p. 55 for the way in which personal truth-claims acquire social currency, and *Studies in Humanism* (1907) Ch. vii.

² He does not seem to be aware that the modern discussion of meaning started with Lord Russell's Aristotelian Society Paper on *How Propositions Mean* in 1919 and the Symposium in *Mind* on the *Meaning of Meaning* (for which I supplied the title and the first paper) in 1920.

But a moment's reflexion should convince even the naïvest that such an assumption is absurd. For no one wishes to keep his meaning to himself: all crave to communicate it to others, if they can. Only the critical pragmatist has observed also that this is by no means an easy matter: he has been convinced by long and painful experience that communication of meaning is one of the major problems of philosophy, which has been woefully neglected ever since Gorgias despaired of it two thousand four hundred years ago. He is not content therefore to be told that "meanings are in intent intersubjective;" or that "it is possible in principle to find objectively the meaning of any symbol used by any person." He wants to know in each case of actual knowing whether the meaning *intended* has been successfully *conveyed*, and whether the abstract principle that symbols have discoverable meanings finds exemplification in the actual case. Accordingly, he investigates how meanings are in fact communicated. He observes that every meaning is to begin with personal – that is, that some one wishes to convey *his* meaning, by the verbal meanings of the words he employs. But he does not rashly assume that it is therefore "private and subjective," nor that what is so is therefore utterly unintelligible to every one else. He insists merely that a *claim* to "objectivity" and communication shall not be mistaken for the accomplished fact, and that an inquiry may always be opened whether a personal meaning and a verbal meaning have coincided and been *correctly* understood.

He thus begins his inquiry at a point which the Chicagoans would seem never to have reached. I may be mistaking their (surely personal) meaning but they do not seem to me to have got clear about the relation of the objective to the subjective. The former they seem to treat as a self-evident given, and not as a difficult social achievement; while the latter is used merely as a term of abuse. Presumably this means that they have not noticed the basic subjectivity which underlies all our objectivities; and it is surprising that charges of "fuzziness" should be brought without any attempt to meet the argument for its existence. I had intentionally stated this argument on p. 5–6, in order to challenge all the ordinary brands of "realism"; but although my essay was read to about a dozen philosophic audiences, and then published, nowhere has this challenge been taken up. I can only continue to hold therefore that the objective realities of the sciences are in every case *selections* out of a much larger mass of crude appearances and experiences. If we inquire what determines these selections, our only possible answer is: the various interests and purposes of the inquirers. These interests and purposes, moreover, are in all cases "subjective" in the sense held to be opprobrious?

3. I pass to the charge of "animosity to mathematics and formal

logic.” Here I must distinguish. Animosity to mathematics (or any science) would be a serious charge to bring against a pragmatist seeing that pragmatism claims to be essentially the philosophic appreciation of scientific method. But all I have ever criticized is the philosophic habit of taking “pure” mathematics in abstraction from applied, as if it were the whole story. But the existence of pure mathematics does not mean that the nature of mathematical abstractions can be grasped apart from their use. It is due only to an accident of academic organization, like the assigning of the grammar and the literature of a language to different professors. It is true that pure and applied mathematics usually have different professors, but this does not mean that they are different sciences. In short, to cherish animosity towards pure mathematics is about as impossible as to show disrespect towards the Equator: what is fit to make angels weep is the way philosophers have misapprehended their scientific functions for some two thousand years.

4. Formal Logic is in a totally different position. I admit that I have long argued that it is a pseudo-science (or alternatively a game with words). But I have given three convincing reasons for this belief, and no formal logician ever tries to meet them. I wish that Professor Morris would attempt a rational defence of Formal Logic, but fear he will not. My reasons are briefly these:

a. Alfred Sidgwick has shown for the past thirty years or more that, owing to the potential ambiguity inherent in all terms, the notion of formal validity is untenable.

b. The basic unit of all the formal and symbolic logics, the proposition appears to be non-existent. It is essentially a confusion and a conflation of a linguistic entity, the propositional function, and a psychological entity, the (personal) judgment – and so can provide only a *fictitious* basis for logic. Moreover this confusion leads to a systematic and incurable ambiguity in Formal Logic’s use of the conception of truth.

c. I infer from this situation that the fundamental fact about Formal Logic is that it rests on an abstraction from real (i.e. personal) meaning, and thereby becomes an artificial and unreal game with verbal meaning.

From the fact that these charges have been before the philosophic public for anything between twenty and thirty years and that no one has attempted to rebut them, may it not justly be inferred that they are not answered because they are unanswerable? Of course nothing short of completely universal neglect can stop logicians from cultivating their pseudo-science; but they are not, surely, entitled to pride themselves on the degree of scientific contempt which they have already earned.

5. I will next take up a minor point. Professor Morris finds it difficult to reconcile my saying that scientific method abstracts from personality with my pointing out that it does so for the purpose of arguing from one

particular case to another. Has it then ever occurred to him that, in order to obtain a general formula that can be transferred from case to case, the particular circumstances of the first case (place, time and personality) must be abstracted from? Of course this procedure imports an element of fiction into the use of "universals," "laws of nature," and the like; but this in no way invalidates scientific procedure, and it should be remembered that it was the astronomers who first discovered the "personal equation," of which the latest scientific instance has cropped up in the famous principle of Heisenberg. What is truly deplorable, and has been so since Plato's day is the preposterous interpretation philosophers have sought to put upon a legitimate scientific procedure. I am truly sorry that Professor Morris has not been able to apprehend what seems to me the simple and straightforward argument of p. 6-7.

Having now cleared away the motes which have long been floating about in the philosophic fog and appear to have blurred Professor Morris's vision of my doctrine, I will endeavor to display the beams upon which his own case appears to rest.

6. He still seems to regard Peirce as the exemplar and standard to whom pragmatism should conform; yet the recently published fifth volume of his *Collected Papers* seems to show that this tradition stands in need of radical correction. In the first place Peirce himself reveals that James had exaggerated his (Pierce's) share in the founding of pragmatism, and that many other members of the Harvard Metaphysical Club besides Peirce and James deserve part of the credit. It appears moreover that Peirce himself had greatly changed his interests in the twenty years that elapsed between 1877 and 1899: he did not exactly withdraw what he had said, but he became very unwilling to sanction any further extension or application of his own principle. Particularly he had fallen completely under the spell of the old elusive ideal of mathematics, that of "exactness," and reprobated any attempt to carry pragmatism beyond the point he had himself formerly reached.

7. So it is not surprising that he had no appreciation for Dewey's work, and bestows only one contemptuous mention upon Dewey himself. But it is surprising that so many of those who profess to be Dewey's disciples should think it possible to combine Deweyism with formalism. For Dewey's greatest discovery, and the core of his specific doctrine, is surely that of the need for constant reconstruction of beliefs. It is for this reason that science is progressive, and no truth is absolute. But how is this insight compatible with the old ideal of pinning down for all eternity the meaning of every idea by an exact "analysis"?³

³ At the recent Prague Congress of Philosophy I had an opportunity to put this point to no less a personage than Professor Carnap, who very candidly, admitted that no

8. How it is possible to combine belief in formal logic and in probability is a further puzzle. Formal Logic has always longed for absolute truth and irrefutable demonstration, scorned probable reasoning, and twisted scientific reasoning into an alleged conformity with its prejudices. But, as persistently, probability has remained the guide of life, and scientific reasoning has remained probable and content with, at most, "practical certainty." Even the hypothetical reasoning of pure mathematics reduces to probability so soon as its application to reality is contemplated. Moreover, mathematical probability admits of an infinity of degrees. Absolute truth (or error), therefore, becomes an ideal which is never reached: in effect the notion becomes otiose. At the Prague Congress I succeeded in extracting from the chief German authority on probable reasoning, Professor Hans Reichenbach, an admission to this effect. I do not remember whether Professor Morris was present; but whether he was or not, it is high time he ceased to take it for granted that probability and demonstration are compatible, and addressed himself to their reconciliation. When he has *failed* to meet my arguments on these eight points, it will, perhaps, no longer seem necessary for pragmatists to disagree?

finality could be claimed for any analysis. But does not this admission destroy also the greater part of its utility? Why torment ourselves to devise an "exact" analysis which may be antiquated next day by growth of knowledge?

PROFESSOR SCHILLER AND PRAGMATISM

Charles W. Morris. "Professor Schiller and Pragmatism." *Personalist* 17.3 (July 1936): 294–300.

The article by Professor F. C. S. Schiller, *Must Pragmatists Disagree?* in the January 1936 issue of the *Personalist*, raises two major questions: the question as to the relation of the personal and social aspects of meaning, and the question as to whether pragmatism is or is not compatible with the new formal (or mathematical) logic and the emphasis upon logical analysis which has today become of central interest. Since the answers to these questions are important in the determination of the natural affiliations and future direction of pragmatism, and since I believe that Dr. Schiller's position is often wrong, and misleading or one-sided when not positively wrong, a few words seem advisable. I will follow the eight-fold division given in the article itself.

1. It is affirmed by Schiller that the emphasis upon the category of the social by Peirce, Dewey, and Mead is a platitude which all philosophers have recognized since Aristotle said that man is a social animal. But certainly to repeat a phrase is not to take seriously the notion of the social, and as far as I can see the traditional epistemology (even by empiricists) was individualistic in orientation. Certainly the psychology of Comte, Dewey, and Mead is a social psychology in a way and to a degree which the psychology of James or of English empiricism (including Schiller) is not, and the resulting theories of knowledge and cosmology reflect this different orientation. I do not believe that the epistemological implications of the way social factors enter into the actual procedure of scientific knowing have yet received any adequate study or formulation. Even today the phrase "social experience" seems strange to many persons.

2. It is admitted by Dr. Schiller that meaning has a social aspect, but it is also claimed that this social aspect is included within personal meaning. It is further asserted that "every meaning is to begin with personal." With Schiller's dislike for "exactness" we cannot perhaps expect sharp definitions, but until the meaning of "personal meaning" and of "begin with" are clarified the status of such affirmations is very

nebulous indeed. One can only say that Mead at least has attempted to regard the sphere of subjective meaning as an internalization of socially objective meaning. To merely affirm the opposite is hardly to do justice to Mead's position as elaborated in a lifetime of concern with the problem of mind and meaning. Of course in deliberate communication, "personal meanings" form the starting part. It is further admitted that *de facto* meanings are seldom if ever completely intersubjective. The basic question as to whether there is anything in the phenomena of meaning which makes a meaning in principle incapable of intersubjectivity is not discussed by Dr. Schiller. Until it is, it is only prejudice which permits of the facile equation of personal meaning and "real" meaning. The genuine problem is not to express an exclusive devotion to either personal meaning or social meaning in isolation, but to investigate the place each plays within the knowledge process.¹

3. It is claimed by Professor Schiller that the nature of mathematical abstractions cannot be grasped "apart from their use." Neglecting the possible ambiguities of the term "use," it may be admitted that as a matter of history many mathematical concepts did arise as abstractions from empirical concepts and empirical operations, and in this sense mathematics may be considered from an empirical point of view. Nevertheless, to understand a term like "point" in geometry as a mathematical science is merely to understand the relational connections which the symbol sustains to other symbols of the system – and this does not depend upon whether there are objects to which the term "point" can be applied or to any use which can be made of the system. Dr. Schiller talks of the misapprehension by the philosophers of the function of mathematics in science. It is perhaps itself a misapprehension of this function to believe that it involves a blurring of the distinction between the mathematical and the natural sciences (which include applied mathematics). According to many contemporary thinkers, the function of mathematics is to give us knowledge of the propositional consequences which follow from the acceptance of certain initial propositions. Mathematics is thus a linguistic aid rather than a science with a unique non-linguistic subject-matter. It is an ironic fact that it is the logical positivists who have confirmed the pragmatic view of instrumental function of mathematics (see Hahn: *Logik, Mathematik und Naturerkennen*; Carnap, *Formalwissenschaft und Realwissenschaft* and my paper, 'The Relation of Formal to Instrumental Logic,' in *Essays in Philosophy* [Open Court, 1929]). The wise tactics of pragmatism would be to assimilate rather than to oppose the formal sciences, and contem-

¹ A beginning of such analysis is made in the article, *Pragmatism and Metaphysics: Philosophical Review*, vol. XLIII, 1934, pp. 549–64.

porary views of mathematics show that the recognition of the instrumental function of mathematics does not require that one confuse the relation of pure and applied mathematics.²

4. To contemporary formal logicians and mathematicians Schiller's statement that formal logic is in a "totally different position" from mathematics can only provoke astonishment – for almost the whole of contemporary opinion supports the view that there is no fundamental difference. Professor Schiller gives three "unanswerable" points to prove that formal logic is a pseudoscience:

a. Owing to the potential ambiguity inherent in all terms, the notion of formal validity is untenable." But if so, one would think that pure mathematics is also a pseudo-science, for its validity is certainly a formal one. Later we are told indeed that "even the hypothetical reasoning of pure mathematics reduces to probability so soon as its application to reality is contemplated." But need any logic emancipated from metaphysics say more of itself? The old formal logic was not so emancipated, but the new versions would not maintain that formal validity is ever more than hypothetical (even analytic propositions are now recognized as involving relativity to a language), and would admit that an element of probability enters as soon as an empirical meaning is given to the terms in the formal system.

b. It is further held that the "basic unit of all the formal and symbolic logics, the proposition, appears to be non-existent," and so "can provide only a *fictitious* basis for logic." Schiller is undoubtedly correct that the "proposition" of the classical tradition is "essentially a confusion and a conflation of a linguistic entity...and a psychological entity." This itself, however, is not a criticism of formalism but an exhibition of the dangers of an impure and incomplete formalism. Even Russell recognized that propositions are incomplete symbols (*Principia Mathematica*. vol. 1, p. 44), and Carnap replaces completely the term "proposition" by the term "sentence." Formal logic is the study of the formal dimension of linguistic meaning: it does not study non-linguistic objects nor psychological events.

c. From the above two points Schiller infers (though certainly not "formally") that the "fundamental fact about Formal Logic is that it rests on an abstraction from real (i.e. personal) meaning, and thereby becomes an artificial and unreal game with verbal meaning." It is true

² This statement is not in opposition to the (Peircean) view that mathematics involves a kind of observation – i.e. an observation of symbols. The sense in which mathematics may be conceived as an empirical science is not a sense which allows one to drop the sharp distinction of pure and applied mathematics. See the article, 'The Relation of the Formal and Empirical Sciences within Scientific Empiricism,' *Erkenntnis*, vol. 5, 1935, pp. 6–14, reprinted in *Einheit der Wissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1935).

that formal logic abstracts from the empirical and psychological dimensions of meaning and concentrates upon the formal (or “verbal” – though the term is ambiguous) dimension of meaning, but this does not mean that this dimension is less “real” nor that formal logic is “an artificial and unreal game” without great practical and theoretical significance for both science and philosophy. It is my impression that Schiller constantly attributes to the new formal logic those metaphysical claims and pretensions and those psychological and logical confusions which encrusted the classical version of formal logic and which he himself helped to puncture. In doing this he fails to see that the new formal logic provides a methodological (rather than a metaphysical) rationalism which is perfectly compatible with the empiricist temper. Symbolic logic is, as it were the mathematics of an empirical philosophy.

5. My difficulty was not, as Schiller supposes, in accepting the statement that “scientific method abstracts from personality...for the purpose of arguing from one particular case to another.” The point rather was that if scientific abstraction is so relevant to particular cases (which of course is not denied) then the personal features of personality no more fall outside of science than do the individual aspects of any other objects. There can be a science of personality as well as a science of anything else. Thus a scientific account of meaning would include intersubjective propositions about the personal aspect of meanings and would be relevant to particular instances of meaning. Schiller’s animosity to Mead’s form of behaviorism (as shown in his review of *Mind, Self and Society* in the same issue of *The Personalist*), and his belief that philosophy must do justice to the factor of personality which science ignores, do not seem to me to be easily compatible with the account of science which he himself gives.

6. Schiller seems to feel that it is necessary to disparage Peirce in order to elevate the importance of James. I should rather assume that James’ eminence needs no adventitious support. To believe that Peirce “had greatly changed his interests in the twenty years that elapsed between 1877 and 1899,” presumably because “he had fallen completely under the spell of the old elusive ideal of mathematics, that of ‘exactness,’” is to forget that much of Peirce’s writings on pragmatism occurred in the present century, that he was as much interested in mathematics in 1877 as he was at a later time, and that Peirce’s views on mathematics are distinguished precisely by his attempt to bring mathematics within the general scope of his empiricism and probabilism. It is astonishing to see how Schiller could have so missed the spirit and doctrines of Peirce.

7. Dr. Schiller is surprised that “so many of those who profess to be Dewey’s disciples should think it possible to combine Deweyism with formalism.” Dewey’s insistence upon the “need for constant recon-

struction of beliefs" is held to be "incompatible with the old ideal of pinning down for all eternity the meaning of every idea by an exact 'analysis.'" Dewey himself, however, has constantly maintained that "the instrumental theory...contrary to the impressions of some critics, sets much store upon the apparatus of deduction" (*Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 148. The entire page, and also page 149, deserves attention). One of the strong features of Dewey's account of reflection lies in fact in the way that it is able to assimilate and account for the instrumental significance of the formal sciences; it is perfectly compatible with the theory of mathematics held by the logical positivists. Nor of course does the stress on logical analysis mean that one pins down for all eternity the meaning of every idea. And if it does not, Mr. Schiller then asks, "Why torment ourselves to devise an 'exact' analysis which may be antiquated next day by the growth of knowledge?" Would he counsel physicists or mathematicians to give up system-building because the systems will in time need rebuilding? Has he overlooked the fact that one of the best ways to further "constant reconstruction of beliefs" is to find out what the beliefs reveal themselves to be under analysis and systematization? For nothing is then easier to change than the beliefs, since any change in the primitive ideas or propositions changes the system. The incompatibility which is charged rests only on a misunderstanding of the two theses whose relation is in question.

8. With Schiller's stress upon the importance of the concept of probability agreement is not difficult. Indeed, Peirce had written that "the problem of probabilities is simply the general problem of 'logic'" (*Collected Papers*, Vol. 5, p. 392). But what he can possibly mean by the implied incompatibility between probability and demonstration is not clear. Thus the most elaborate system of probability now presented (in Reichenbach's *Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre*) is a formal system whose conclusion are demonstrated on the basis of primitive ideas and propositions. "Demonstration" is always within a formal language system, and in itself carries no warrant for the applicability of what is demonstrated to existence beyond the system. Only a metaphysical view of the nature of demonstration could contradict the view that all propositions about objects are, in varying degrees, only probable. Pragmatists and logical positivists reject the former view and accept the latter one and there is nothing objectionable in their so doing.

In summary, the relation between the personal and the social aspects of meaning is a subject for investigation and not for verbal fencing between pragmatists, and the attempt to find any incompatibility between pragmatism and the new formal logic rests on an overgeneralization of the former and a misunderstanding of the latter. The signifi-

cance of pragmatism lies in its exploration of the philosophic and scientific significance of the pragmatic (or action) dimension of meaning – and this was a great service. But because this dimension of meaning is *always* present, there is a danger of thinking that it is the *only* dimension present – and this is the possible overgeneralization of pragmatism which leads to a neglect of the empirical and formal factors in meaning and knowledge. So overgeneralized, pragmatism becomes abortive; taken in its defensible form it is readily compatible with the temper of the natural scientist and mathematician (as the writings of Hahn, Carnap, P. Frank, Bridgman, and C. I. Lewis show).³ If pragmatism is not to become of historic interest alone, it must link itself with the vigorous and constructive contemporary movements in logic and the philosophy of science.

³ An article 'Semiotic and Scientific Empiricism,' to appear in the *Proceedings of the First International Congress for the Unity of Science* (Hermann, Paris, 1936), includes reference to the way in which pragmatism, traditional empiricism, and formalism may unite as the three complementary dimensions of scientific empiricism.

COMMENTS BY F. C. S. SCHILLER

F. C. S. Schiller. "Comments by F. C. S. Schiller," *Personalist* 17.3 (July 1936): 300-306.

I was greatly pleased to find how numerous and important were the points of agreement between Professor Morris's conception of pragmatism and mine, and how easy it would be to dispose of the points of difference that remained if only he would consent to consider quite a limited number of questions which grow up naturally on what is, for us, common ground.

To begin with I entirely agree with him that the relation (1) of the personal to the social aspects of meaning, and (2) of pragmatism to the new formal logic or logical analysis are questions of major importance. If so, I should expect him also to agree that the next thing needed is a full, careful, and explicit account of the way in which personal meanings acquire social currency. For Professor Morris admits that "of course in deliberate communication personal meanings form the starting-point," and further that "*de facto* meanings are seldom if ever completely inter-subjective." Presumably this means that good intentions are not enough, and that the effective communication is something of an achievement. It behooves us therefore to be careful in our account of the communication of meaning.

Let us therefore suppose a fully concrete case. Let A and B be two persons who have difficulty in communicating, either because they do not know each other's language any too well, or because they are both philosophers. If A has the initiative and the first move, his is the first meaning to be communicated, and if he is clear-headed he knows what it is. He has at his disposal the established (verbal) meanings of all the words he knows in any language: out of these he has to select those most likely to convey his meaning on each particular occasion. Obviously, he will select words which he supposes B also to be likely to understand. Thus his initial problem will be a psychological one, viz., how to effect a contact between two minds, so that they may share their meanings. After due deliberation A constructs a formula and compiles

an assertion which he hopes will convey his meaning and be understood by B.

Whether he succeeds or not he cannot usually tell till he gets B's response, or still better, observes his action. If all goes well, the response will seem to him intelligent and the action satisfactory. This success constitutes understanding and closes the primary transaction between A and B.

But does it thereby establish an "intersubjective proposition" and a social meaning in the fullest sense? It seems to me that A and B are still a long way from such an achievement, and still further from any meaning that is universally and absolutely true or "valid." A and B have constructed a formula which has been understood, on one occasion and in a certain context. But is this any guarantee that they will always understand each other, or that everybody else will use their formula in the meaning which it then conveyed? The next time A meets B he may find him drunk or insane. It is of course theoretically possible that a single success may impose a fairly lasting verbal meaning on terms once used, and may so establish what may fairly be called a social meaning; but even that is no guarantee against future alteration and misuse. Hence a mere *capacity* for intersubjectivity is very far from adequate either for social understanding, pragmatic use, or (I should have thought) logical theory. For none of these purposes is it enough to be told that words are such that they *can* be used to convey meaning (and not merely to conceal thought, or its absence), and that when they are *successfully* so used their meaning ceases to be individual but is shared and becomes "intersubjective."

I utterly fail to see moreover how any amount of "devotion to the concept of the Social" can have any practical value. How can it diminish the probabilities of misunderstanding in actual social intercourse? What we want to know is not whether under specially favorable circumstances meaning *can* be conveyed by a set of symbols, but whether *we* have succeeded in conveying *our* meaning in the various emergencies of life. And of this no contemplation, however devoted, of the verbal vehicles of meaning will ever assure us. If so, why should anyone ever trouble to allege or deny any meaning "incapable in principle of intersubjectivity"? Our real business is to determine how far and how widely a personal meaning has been really understood, and so has become socially effective.

Nor need I have the least reluctance to admit that "the epistemological implications of the way social factors enter into the actual procedure of scientific knowing have not yet received any adequate study or formulation." Even before the War any quick-witted observer would have had little difficulty in tracing social influences on academic appointments,

and since the rise of the new Dictatorships in Russia, Italy and Germany even the dullest could hardly close their eyes to the enormity of social influences on what passes for 'truth.' Those who recognize the disadvantages and dangers of these influences, are not likely to be deterred by the vague charge of being "individualistic in orientation"; they will reply by pointing out that discoveries are made by individuals (set no doubt in a social context which more often hinders than helps them), and that society can exploit or suppress them only *after* they have been made. I still feel therefore that there is no substantial issue here.

Professor Morris's second important question concerns the philosophy of mathematics and logic and their relation to pragmatism. Now, that so profound a change as pragmatism has effected, should affect also the philosophy of mathematics, which had been ultra-rationalistic for several thousand years, is in no wise astonishing; but it raises also the general question of how far a philosophy is entitled to criticize the accounts given by a special science of its aims, assumptions, or postulates. As a rule such criticism is definitely unwise when a science is flourishing and its authorities are all agreed about its assumptions and methods; but when it is distracted by alternatives, torn by dissensions, and cleft by contradictions, a situation arises for the intervention of neighboring sciences, and even for an appeal to philosophy. It may then be well to remember that scientists are not in general the only, or even the best, authorities on the first principles of the sciences, for the simple reason that in the choice of fundamental assumptions the interests and requirements both of other sciences and of philosophy may need to be considered. The mathematicians and logicians in particular can hardly base on their historical record a very strong case why their present selections should pass unquestioned.

The mathematicians for over 2000 years submitted without a murmur to the Platonism Euclid foisted on their science; since his deposition in the 19th century they have quarrelled violently about its principles. There are now three distinct and divergent accounts of mathematical principles, championed by Hilbert, Russell and Brouwer, and they have all scrapped Euclidean rationalism more or less. It would not be at all difficult to devise a fourth version which would be wholly and consistently pragmatic. This would take its stand (as I indicated in my paper) firmly on a refusal to sanction the divorce of 'pure' mathematics from applied, and would reduce its claim to "exactness" to proper proportions. At present it is vague, ambiguous and usually meaningless.¹

The logicians are in an even worse case than the mathematicians.

¹ Cf. my paper on How Is "Exactness" Possible? Presented to the Prague Congress of Philosophy 1934.

They, too, are divided, into four factions,² three of which have failed so far to emancipate themselves completely from the Greek traditions and to abandon the ideals of absolute necessity and formal truth. And this although Hume had long ago discredited the objectivity of necessary connexion, and although they themselves had failed to distinguish logical from psychological necessity and certainty, to elucidate the notion of formal truth, and even to discover a genuine example of purely formal validity!

Professor Morris admits most of my criticisms of the current mathematics and logic on specific points, even that I am "undoubtedly correct" in calling the "proposition" a confusion and a conflation of linguistics and psychology. But he thinks the situation can be improved by making logic a wholly linguistic affair and defines formal logic as "the study of the formal dimension of linguistic meaning." If by this he means "the formal aspect of verbal meaning," I could agree that the verbalism of "logic" cries out for further investigation. But I am a little staggered by his calling up Peirce as a witness for the defence of such ultra-nominalism, when I remember Peirce's constant tirades against all nominalism.

In short the remaining difference between Professor Morris and myself seems to be wholly due to the great impression made on him by the consensus of expert opinion. Certain mathematicians and logicians have combined to concoct a sort of hybrid between rationalism and pragmatism which is a definite advance on anything they used to assume, and promises further progress. But I am not so much impressed as Professor Morris, because their views do not seem to me to rest on a very deep study of pragmatism or to be really complete and coherent. They deserve a welcome because they probably go as far as can be expected psychologically, when rationalists for the first time encounter pragmatism and seriously try to adjust themselves to its novelties; but they will doubtless prove transitional forms.

In token whereof let me point out that philosophic development can hardly stop short with a theory of meaning alone: yet neither the logicians of the Vienna Circle, nor C. S. Peirce before them, have ever displayed any willingness to proceed from the theory of meaning to that of truth, although the former was plainly applicable to the latter. Alfred Sidgwick indeed perceived this connexion, but I am in doubt whether Professor Morris does. So it may be better to explain how the connexion of truth with meaning comes about.

When our two former inquirers have agreed upon a common meaning, *Is it true?* is the next question which arises. For though the

² See my articles in *Mind* for Oct. 1935 and Jan. 1932.

question of meaning naturally takes precedence over that of truth, it is the latter which raises the ulterior question of the *value* of intersubjective intercourse and agreement, and achieves the end of cognitive process. No doubt it is meaningless to discuss the truth of an assertion until its meaning has been ascertained; yet, once assured of this, we always desire to know also its value, i.e. whether it is "true" or "false." For meaning does not spring up *in vacuo*; it arises in a context and as an incident in a train of thought; it has a purpose, it claims value, it points forward to a use. Thus the same psychological background exists both for meaning and for truth. Neither exists in abstraction from a definite problem and personally interested inquirers into it; and in both cases the meanings and the truth alleged have to be tested. Hence no problem of meaning can really be treated in abstraction from that of truth, and a philosopher who stops short of the latter has not become more than a semi-pragmatist. A philosopher on the other hand who tries to combine a pragmatic theory of meaning with a correspondence theory of truth has not effected a reconciliation between antagonistic views, but has merely constructed a chimera and confused a vital issue.

An important question remains on which Professor Morris ought to define his position more clearly. Can science take cognizance of particular cases, and so of personal differences between them? I had feared that Professor Morris would have followed the rationalist tradition in denying this, but am gratified to find that he is willing to recede considerably from the extreme Platonic position. But his language is ambiguous. "There can be a science of personality as a science of anything else," he says. Here everything depends on what is meant by "science." Traditionally science was supposed to deliver absolute and universal truth about the immutable. In modern practice it is satisfied with growing probabilities about the mutable course of actual events. If "science" is understood as most philosophers have, since Plato, understood it, if, that is, it is of the universal, and of the particular only in so far it cannot depart from its universal, it is clear that there can be no science of the particular as such, and the difference between persons can have no scientific interest. This is precisely the excuse which has always been given for the general neglect of personality: But if science is understood as is implied in the practice of scientists, viz. as a *technique* for calculating the course of events, there *can* be a science of the individual and the personal – and indeed of nothing else, because all events exhibit individuality and dependence on personality. It may not then always be possible to predict individual behavior with absolute exactness, as Heisenberg has done well to remind the physicists; but for most purposes the results of statistical "laws" are quite accurate enough, and psychological and sociological laws can be quite as valuable as physical.

Moreover Aristotle, despite his emphasis on the universal character of science, did not fail to perceive that particularity (and so personality) infected the whole sublunary world with a flavor of contingency.³

What Aristotle did not fully realize was that he had not succeeded in actually exemplifying his basic notion of formally valid reasoning. But the formal logicians that came after him have been even less successful in detecting the flaw in the foundations of their systems, and have made no attempt whatever to repair it. Until the notion of formal validity has been distinguished from that of truth and shown to have an intelligible meaning, it hardly seems worthwhile to discuss whether formal logic has any "practical and theoretical significance" either for science or for philosophy.

There remains only one little point of difference which at present seems irreducible. Professor Morris will not admit my contention that probability and demonstration are incompatible. Nor will he allow my appeal to Professor Reichenbach, presumably because the *Proceedings* of the Prague Congress are not yet published. So I must fall back on the Aristotelian tradition that demonstration yields absolute and immutable truth, whereas probability is variable and at the mercy of every wind of doctrine. But I cannot of course prevent him from changing the (verbal) meaning of "demonstration." He can therefore say that "Demonstration is always within a formal language system, and in itself carries no warrant for the applicability of what is demonstrated to existence beyond the system. Only a metaphysical view of the nature of demonstration could contradict the view that all propositions about objects are, in varying degrees, only probable." For Professor Morris Aristotelian logic may be "metaphysics," and I dare say it is. But it seems to me very inconvenient to retain a word which embodies an exploded error in a new and misleading sense instead of dropping it altogether.

³ Cf. my article on Aristotle's Refutation of Aristotelian Logic in *Mind*, No. 89 (1914).

PEIRCE, MEAD, AND PRAGMATISM

Charles W. Morris. "Peirce, Mead, and Pragmatism." *Philosophical Review* 47.2 (March 1938): 109–27.

Presidential address to the western division of the American Philosophical Association, Knox College, April 23, 1937.

I

In recent years we have had spread before us the results of the intellectual labors of Charles S. Peirce and George H. Mead. In the same period John Dewey has rounded out the implications of his views for esthetics, religion, and political theory, and has given us a glimpse of the reformulation and systematization of his logical doctrine. William James' mode of thought has been kept before us by Ferdinand Schiller's collection of his own later cosmological essays, and by the full length portrait of James' life and thought painted in words by Ralph Barton Perry. C. I. Lewis has devoted himself to the theory of knowledge from the point of view which he calls "conceptualistic pragmatism." And a number of characteristic pragmatic theses have begun to show their familiar faces in the writings of American and European philosophers of science – especially among the logical empiricists and the defenders of operationalism.

In terms of this deluge of new material, representing as it does the main interests and the main thinkers in the pragmatic movement, the task of appraising America's most distinctive philosophic expression is rendered at once more easy and more difficult. It is more difficult because the very richness of the material makes impossible the facile explanations, acceptances, and damnations which ran riot during the futile decades in which discussion centered almost exclusively around the concept of truth. Those decades are happily past, and the phoenix which has arisen from the ashes reveals herself as a much more luxuriant creature. We find ourselves confronted with the task of assessing a distinctive version of empiricism, an extensive logical tradition, a developed theory of value, a comprehensive formulation of ethics and social philosophy, a detailed theory of mind, and a minutely

elaborated cosmology. And this is a more difficult task than either the friends or the enemies of the pragmatic movement have hitherto set themselves. Indeed, the relevant critical task has hardly been envisaged, to say nothing of being performed.

Yet in another sense, the recent literature has made the task of assessment easier. It becomes clearer than ever before that there is a sustained unity to the pragmatic movement. Pragmatism reveals itself in all phases as a series of constantly deepening analyses of a single set of theses. The differences between the leading representatives are primarily variations on a common theme, variations in part dictated by differences in fields of interest and application. There are genuine differences to be sure, but these too are often merely differences as to permissible range of extension of a doctrine otherwise held common. Pragmatism comes thus to take on an integrated character. One has the sense of a complex philosophic tapestry which has been woven through coöperative enterprise. The movement has in our day achieved something of an esthetic culmination, like a fine conversation which has worked itself out to its natural termination.

It is not of course possible on this occasion to attempt either of the tasks which the pragmatic movement makes imperative. We can neither try to show the systematic contours of pragmatism nor critically to estimate it as a whole. But as a step in these directions, it has seemed worth while to compare and contrast Peirce and Mead in certain selected respects. The American philosophical public is now at work digesting the published results of these thinkers, but as yet little has been written on the men individually, and nothing, so far as I know, of a comparative sort. The selection to be made also has the advantage of drawing attention to the somewhat neglected cosmological theories of the pragmatists in relation to the constant consideration by such thinkers of the general theory of signs. The fact that no obvious influence of Peirce on Mead is discernible, coupled with the fact that Peirce approached his problems as a logician while Mead approached his as a social psychologist, makes more significant their convergences and their differences. It is believed, further, that this comparison of the earliest and the latest stage of pragmatism makes the continuity and the discontinuity of the development stand out vividly, and provides a basis for evaluating the change that has taken place from the metaphysical idealism of Peirce through the radical empiricism of James to the empirical naturalism of Dewey and Mead. The lines of this evolution likewise throw light on the possible future of the pragmatic movement.

II

Even the most superficial sampling of the writings of Peirce and Mead

reveals certain striking similarities between the thought of the two men. Mead held that "philosophy is concerned with the import and presence in the universe of human reflective intelligence." Peirce and Mead, in common with all pragmatists, were led to their views by a consideration of the phenomenon of reflective intelligence – as perhaps was Aristotle in an earlier age. This is in a sense the center with reference to which all pragmatic doctrines form an ever-expanding series of circumferences. A consideration of reflective intelligence suggests a number of important consequences: it leads to attaching central importance to the theory of signs – and both Peirce and Mead spent a large part of their life in the elaboration of this discipline; it inevitably raises questions as to the relation of signs and thought – and both men shared the view that there is no thought without signs; it demands an answer in post-Darwinian days as to the relation of thought and organic action – and both men insisted that thinking functions in the context of interested action as an instrument in the realization of sought values. The consideration of reflective thinking provokes queries as to the relation of thought to empirical data – and the common answer was given that all thought must find its ultimate validation in terms of such data; such consideration sensitizes the inquirer to the phenomenon of universality – and both Peirce and Mead aim adequately to take account of the objectivity of universality, generality, law; it seems to indicate that the envisagement of ends is a genuine factor in the attainment of these ends – and both philosophers insisted upon the reality of final causes, defending the objectivity of teleology, chance, and novelty against any type of mechanistic theory which would take from mind its rôle as an active agent. The study of reflective thinking inevitably draws attention to the social aspect of thought – and both men held in high respect the category of the social, discerning in the universe wider social processes of which the sociality of the human mind is a particular manifestation; finally, such study raises doubts as to the validity of any form of dualistic separation of mind and the world – and both Peirce and Mead chop at the roots of the lingering traces of Cartesianism and present a universe unfractured by the dichotomies of subjective experience and external nature, quality and quantity, mind and matter, mechanism and purpose.

So it is that the earliest and latest phases of pragmatism show significant agreement on basic issues. There is presented an expanded and renovated empiricism which has relinquished the individualistic, subjectivistic, sensationalistic, and nominalistic extremes of late British empiricism; linked with this empiricism is an evolutionary cosmology, constructed with minute fidelity to modern physical and biological science, but in which mechanical law has not squeezed out novelty, chance, or purpose; while the keystone of the arch is found in a theory

of mind in terms of which mind is at once set in the framework of interested action and yet linked with things in such a way that envisaged ends are concretized into embodied actualities.

Nevertheless, in spite of these basic convergences, the same superficial sampling also discloses profound divergences which at first glance perhaps obscure the fact that the differences are more as to the range of applicability of a doctrine than as to the doctrine itself. Peirce shows more the mentality of the traditional metaphysician; Mead writes more as a scientist. Peirce discusses fully the doctrines of pragmatism and the empirical theory of meaning, but often fails to live up to his own methodological precepts; Mead does not write much concerning these topics, but his thinking moves more firmly within a pragmatic and empirical orbit. One characteristic of the metaphysical type of mind – perhaps the dominant characteristic – is to note the existence of series and then to affirm the existence of the limits of these series. Some things are better than other things – hence there must be an absolute best; one theory is truer than another – hence there is one absolutely true theory; one perspective is more embracing than another – hence there is an absolute perspective; there are purposes which include subordinated purposes – hence there is one final purpose to which all things move. Peirce's writings show strongly this metaphysical tendency: truth, reality, meaning, probability, value are all defined in terms of the "long run." Mead's thinking is by contrast contextual or situational he defines all of these terms in reference to specific contexts and situations. He agrees more with the attitude of the mathematician that the existence of a series in itself gives no assurance that the series has a limit. He stresses the point that while science approximates to the conception of the world at an instant, the existence of such a limit cannot be reached without rendering meaningless the very concepts which science employs. And while Mead sets no practical bound to the degree to which thought may symbolically embrace common features of a plurality of existential perspectives, the very nature of a perspective as he conceives it makes impossible an actual single all-inclusive perspective, so that the metaphysics of absolute idealism is closed to him as it was not to Peirce. Mead's system accounts in various ways for the organization of nature, but not at the expense of the fundamental pluralism which is characteristic of his thought.

The mention of idealism furnishes another way to bring out the contrast. We are all familiar with Peirce's dictum that "the one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws."¹ Thinking of

¹ *Collected Papers*, VI. 25 (Harvard University Press).

mind as the operation of final causes, and making liberal use of the principle of continuity, Peirce extends the operation of mind to the cosmic scale, so that mind becomes "the fountain of existence" (VI.61). Mead, on the contrary, while admitting that mind is a particular form of processes which everywhere occur, insists more sharply on the biological, social, and linguistic preconditions of mind, with the result that the term 'mind' is not extended so widely: mental processes are not assigned throughout nature, and mind, though one active factor in the organization of nature, can in no sense be said to be the general source of existence. Mead's account is thus more naturalistic than Peirce's, and the principle of discontinuity is treated with as much respect as the principle of continuity.

Peirce's statement that mind is the fountain of existence recalls another characteristic feature of his cosmology, namely, his tendency to conceive of possibility, existence, and law as constituting three "Realms of Being" or "Universes of Experience" parallel to the three categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) and the three kinds of signs (Icon, Index and Symbol). Although Peirce often stresses the interdependence of the three categories, yet in practice his cosmology tends to fall apart into realms, and we are presented with a description of the world as a process by which mind (as Thirdness) converts possibility (Firstness) into determinate forms of existence (Secondness). There is thus a decided tendency to hyostatize the eternal possibilities, the laws which control the characters and relations of existences, and the final causes which direct the process into an embodiment of "concrete Reasonableness." No such tendency is found in Mead. The reality of possibility, law, and the efficacy of mind are admitted, but as we shall see later, they are integrated by Mead's distinctive concept of the act and his resulting objective relativistic cosmology.

As a final way of exhibiting relevant differences, attention may be called to the place of pragmatism in the two philosophies. Peirce to be sure speaks of his proof of pragmatism as "the one contribution of value that he has to make to philosophy" (V. 415). And yet it is clear that the importance of pragmatism for Peirce lay primarily in its metaphysical implications and only secondarily in its contribution to the method of determining the meaning of any concept. He thought that the establishment of pragmatism carried with it the establishment of critical common-sensism, the reality of laws, and the doctrine of continuity – and these were the philosophical treasures which Peirce sought. For when the pragmatic maxim seemed to conflict with these and other prized results he drew back: thus in spite of his analysis which would make the meaning of any concept ultimately identical with a habit (V. 494), he continually raised doubts "whether belief is a mere nullity so

far as it does not influence conduct" (V. 32); he feared certain applications of the doctrine to mathematical concepts (V. 3); and he even came to add a fourth stage of the clearness of ideas over and above the third or pragmatic stage: the meaning of a concept is then found in the contributions of the reaction it produces to "concrete Reasonableness" (V. 3). Such tendencies are absent in Mead's account; in his writings the instrumentalist position is never compromised, and meaning remains embedded to the end in its empirical and behavioristic context. Pragmatism is peripheral in Peirce, but focal in Mead; to the one it is a step in the establishment of certain metaphysical and religious beliefs, while to the other it becomes the persistent center for detailed analysis of philosophic and scientific concepts.

Thus we see that while Peirce and Mead have much in common, Mead in every case gives a more restricted validity to doctrines accepted by both, and the restriction always tends toward a more empirical, pluralistic, behavioristic, and naturalistic formulation. We must now attempt to see the sources of this difference, and then note their effect in determining the cosmological formulations of the two men.

III

It is my suggestion that the source of the differences should be most evident in the analyses of signs which Peirce and Mead gave, for both men very early singled out the field of semiotic as of central importance, and in a life-time of devotion to this ancient philosophical discipline made contributions second to none in the modern period.

First we must note in a summary fashion the striking convergence of the two analyses. In both cases the sign is held to function within a triadic situation. The members of this triad are called by Peirce the Representamen, Interpretant, and Object. Something becomes a representamen by functioning as a substitute for some object in virtue of being interpreted as indicating that object. Two further qualifications are needed, and these must be discussed separately. The first qualification is that for Peirce not all representamens are signs: a representamen becomes a sign if the interpretant is a cognition of a mind (II.242). Thus the concept of representamen is not restricted to situations involving minds or even living beings. Nevertheless, it is characteristic of Peirce to maintain that even in such situations something akin to mind is involved, and he occasionally speaks in this connection of a "quasi-mind." He not merely holds that "meaning is obviously a triadic relation," but also that "every genuine triadic relation involves thought or meaning" (I.345). Since Thirdness is taken to be a categorical character of reality, the fact that Peirce makes the sign situation a special case or triadic relations and ascribes thought or meaning to all such

relations constitutes one of the essential sources for his idealism, and the ground for the view that the universe is a vast representamen working out God's purposes. It is this aspect of Peirce's thought that Royce could so easily turn to the service of absolute idealism.

At this point we find one source of Mead's divergence. Mead does not ground his analysis of signs on a general theory of triadic relations, but there is no incompatibility between his position and such a formulation. He too holds that signs involve a triadic relation, and distinguishes non-significant from significant symbols, the latter corresponding to Peirce's genuine sign. Using a terminology developed by Brewster² to make more explicit what is involved in Mead's analysis we may say that Mead's non-significant symbol includes two sorts of signs: physical signs and gesture signs. A physical sign is any property of an object interpreted by a reacting organism as an indication of further properties of the object which are to be encountered in a later stage of the act: thus the bone as seen is a physical sign to the dog of the bone to be snatched and chewed. A gesture sign is an early phase of the act of one living form which is interpreted by another living form as an indication of the later stage of the act of the first form: thus the clenched fist of *A* may serve as a sign to *B* of *A*'s coming blow. As contrasted with both physical signs and gesture signs, the significant symbol (or language sign) is a sign common to a number of living beings, so that what it designates to one is designated to all alike. We shall not consider in detail Mead's analysis of the origin and nature of such signs, but merely state that in his opinion it is through the spoken word connected with common reactions in a number of organisms engaged in coöperative activity that the gesture-sign situation becomes transformed into a situation involving genuine language signs or significant symbols. It is essential to note, however, that the transformation from one level of sign to another is not explained by introducing the term 'mind' for higher levels in contrast to 'quasi-mind' for lower ones. Rather the different situations are taken to characterize the concept of mind: to have a mind and to take cognizance of objects by the mediation of significant symbols are in Mead's terminology one and the same thing. Signs do not therefore presuppose a previously existent mind; mind is rather a characteristic of behavior involving a unique kind of sign – the language sign. The result is that by the genetic differentiation of levels of signs, Mead is able to isolate features distinctive of these levels, and the recognition of common features offers no temptation to read down into the lower levels features distinctive of the upper levels. Mind is not extended throughout nature

² John M. Brewster, "A Behavioristic Account of the Logical Function of Universals," *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 33, 1936.

and no idealistic conclusions are drawn. It may perhaps be said that this difference is only terminological, since 'mind' can be defined as distinctive of certain levels of signs or as a common factor involved in all sign situations. Nevertheless, however the term is used, the actual differences of various levels of triadic situations must not be neglected, and the danger of a wide use of the term 'mind' lies precisely in the emotional temptation surreptitiously to extend the distinctive characteristics of higher levels to the lower, stressing continuities and disregarding the equally basic discontinuities. The avoidance of this temptation may be taken as one advantage of Mead's genetic approach over the purely logical analysis of Peirce, for the latter approach in isolation contains no check against a too-wide extension of its results.

This line of argument may become clearer if we introduce the second qualification to Peirce's view that a sign involves a representamen functioning as a substitute for some object in virtue of its being interpreted as indicating that object. For Peirce it is characteristic of a genuine sign that the interpretant of a representamen in turn becomes a representamen indicating for a successive interpretant the same object indicated by the first representamen (I.541, II.242, V.138). Peirce is impressed by this situation because it seems to make evident the doctrine of continuity in the realm of mind and meaning, and to support the contention of idealism that the world process is a continuous expansion and interpretation of meaning. Mead admits the fact in regard to language signs,³ but once again his explanation involves no such metaphysics. The fact is explained in terms of the social character of the significant symbol. Since at the level of mind (the level of the functioning of significant symbols) the thinking individual has internalized the social process of communication, he tends to reply to his own symbols as another would reply. He thus progressively interprets the meaning of his symbols in terms of further symbols, and so amplifies and extends his response to the object indicated by the symbols at the initiation of the process. Mead thus gives the background which makes intelligible such statements of Peirce as the following: "I call this putting of oneself in another's place *retroconsciousness*" (I.586); "the inner world, apparently derived from the outer..." (V.493); "all thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your deeper self for his assent" (VI.338); "we become aware of ourself in becoming aware of the not-self" (I.324). Dozens of statements of this sort might be quoted, and could have been written by Mead as well as by Peirce; they indicate the remarkable degree of convergence of the two analyses of signs and their relation to thought. The point important for our purpose is that these

³ *Mind, Self, and Society*, 181 (University of Chicago Press, 1934)

statements of Peirce attain a consistent explanation when interpreted in terms of Mead's social behavioristic approach, but when so interpreted the recognition of the distinctive preconditions for the appearance of mind and significant symbols removes the warrant for regarding nature as a great mind interpreting itself by the ever-unfolding chain of signs. If it be said that such an extension is justified by the principle of continuity, it must be answered that Peirce himself occasionally admits that this is a methodological rather than a metaphysical principle, and certainly the triumphs of the atomic theory and quantum mechanics in our own day indicate that the principle of discontinuity is methodologically of equal importance to its much overworked complementary principle.

So much by way of substantiating the hypothesis that the significant differences between Mead and Peirce center in their interpretation of the phenomena of signs. We have seen how Mead's social behavioristic approach permits of a theory of signs which concurs with Peirce's results obtained by logical analysis, and yet furnishes a principle of limitation which does not require that these results be interpreted in the idealistic manner. We now wish to explore in more detail the resulting cosmological differences, concentrating our attention especially upon the treatment of possibility, existence, and generality, and upon the relation of mind to nature.

IV

We have been contrasting the metaphysical aspect of Peirce's thought with Mead's more constant scientific temper. In one sense this is unfair. It is possible to pick from Peirce's writings many passages in which he insists that philosophy is to be scientific, never passing beyond probable statements based on empirical evidence; that metaphysics is to be grounded on formal logic and this in turn upon semiotic; that metaphysical principles are simply logical principles accepted "by a figure of speech" as "truths of being"; that metaphysics consists primarily in "thoughts about words, or thoughts about thought" (V.244, 343). And such passages would make possible an interpretation of Peirce as primarily a logician, reducing metaphysics to a somewhat literary and metaphorical extension of logical results. This is clearly not a false interpretation, but it can hardly be regarded as the full story. Peirce certainly permits himself many statements that from this point of view would have to be regarded as sentences which are really about signs but are wrongly interpreted as being about non-symbolic objects. Peirce however could hardly accept this correction, for it is clear that he is congenial to the typical rationalistic belief in an isomorphism between signs and things that are not signs; he expressly holds that thought is

“the mirror of being” (I.487). The issues here are complex and not to be resolved by a word. Nevertheless, one can admit that there are some propositions true both about signs, and things that are not signs, without holding that the isomorphism is complete: not merely is a reference to the conventional factors in language relevant, but the introduction of special signs in a language to indicate the relation between signs in the language makes it impossible to find ontological significance for all signs. It follows that one must exercise great caution in reading out logical principles metaphysically. Peirce’s Scotist affiliations occasionally cause him to transgress such caution.

However, it is not the general issue that occupies our attention at this point, but rather the special form of the problem presented by the Peircean categories. Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, isolated by attention to iconic, indexical, and symbolic types of signs, are given metaphysical validity as the generalized expression of the “realms” or “universes” of possibility, existence, and mind. We have already remarked that Peirce tends often to talk metaphorically about these realms, as if mind works on possibility to direct existence into the form of embodied lawfulness. Now in terms of the general thesis that the difference between Peirce and Mead is rather upon the extension of certain doctrines than in the doctrines themselves, our problem is not to deny the Peircean doctrine of “realms” and their interactions, but to see how in Mead’s formulation the somewhat hypostatized and metaphorical description drops away. This requires that we comprehend Mead’s concept of the act and the objective relativistic cosmology which results from its application.⁴

Keeping for the moment to the level of biological existences, we may say roughly that for Mead an act is a process of adjustment of a living form to an environing world, the process moving from an initial want or interest through stages of perception and manipulation of objects to the satisfaction of the want or interest by a suitable object. The act may be relatively simple, as in the case of satisfying hunger, or very complex, as in the social act by which a nation realizes such a complex end as victory in war. The act is an instance of “natural teleology” in that its statement involves reference to the goal to which the early stages of the act tend; it does not however necessarily involve “psychical states” nor consciousness of the goal or deliberation concerning the steps to be taken in reaching the goal. Now the important point is that the complex behavior-object circuit can be considered from the point of view of behavior, or with reference to the object, and a significant parallelism of statements results. In terms of the agent the process may be analyzed

⁴ See Mead’s *The Philosophy of the Act* (University of Chicago Press, 1938).

into the stages of perception, manipulation, and consummation; in terms of the object the object may be said to manifest in this process corresponding distance, manipulatory, and value properties. This is the clue to the most significant feature of Mead's objective relativistic cosmology, for it involves the view that secondary, primary, and tertiary qualities are genuine properties of the object relative to the appropriate stage of the act. The food object is odorous at the perceptual stage of the act, it is a physical object as revealed at the manipulatory stage, and it is a value object relative to the consummatory goal of the act. Thus objects in nature have qualitative, quantitative, and value characters relative to certain situations, and these situations must be stated if the sentences which ascribe these characters are to be complete. Mead's thought is in harmony with the growing recognition that objects have properties only in virtue of existing within one or more systemic contexts; his position is a generalized objective relativism in that nature is regarded as the organization of such contexts (situations, systems, perspectives, presents).

Mind appears within the act when the later stages of the act are controlled by the intervention of significant symbols which indicate these stages and the corresponding properties of objects. With the appearance of mind, itself a phenomenon in nature, the agent is able to transform the end or goal of the act into an end-in-view and to take account of the conditions set by the object which must be met if the act is to pass to its culmination. "Final causes" in this way gain reality, but not in a wholesale and speculative fashion: the term either refers to the objective purposiveness of the act, or, preferably, to the fact that a symbolically indicated future is made available for the control of the ongoing act. The tendency to hypostatize mind loses its excuse for being and the metaphysical statements often made in terms of 'control by the future' or 'the interaction of the realm of final causation with the realm of existence' are replaced by their empirical equivalents.

The same transformation occurs with respect to the concept of mechanism. The world which physical science presents is primarily the world as it reveals itself at the level of manipulation. This physical world assumes great importance since the passage from the stage of perception to the stage of consummation of all or most acts involves passing through the stage of manipulation. Hence in isolating the most constant physical features of objects, physical science gives the conditions necessary for the completion of all or most acts. This central importance of the world presented by science does not however render any less real the status of distance and consummatory qualities in nature, nor permit of an all-embracing generalization of the concept of the mechanical. For the mechanical, conceived as the conditions of the completion of the act,

coincides with the predictable, and the completion of the act is not predictable in terms of the conditions it must meet. Science presents at the best the conditions necessary for the successful termination of the act, but not the sufficient conditions. What possible characters of objects will be realized depends on how the agent will react to and use those objects, and this depends in turn upon the purposes of the agent. Even when the biological sciences present accounts of the act, of how symbols operate, and of what purposes agents normally have under certain conditions, these accounts are still theoretical constructions within still more complex acts whose termination will utilize those accounts without being uniquely determined by them. A completely generalized mechanical account, if meant as more than a methodological precept, reveals itself as another instance of the metaphysical passage to the existence of a limit of a serial process. I think it is a fair interpretation of Mead's results to say that they render the generalized opposition of the mechanical and the teleological a false formulation and the problem of their reconciliation a pseudo-problem. For on the one hand there is no limit to the attempt of science to isolate what is predictable, and yet on the other hand the results of science, however much they may interact upon purposes actually held, never uniquely determine the terminations of the wider acts within which scientific theories function.

The implications of Mead's approach for the status of possibility, law, and mind in nature are clear and need no extended discussion. Possibilities are objective in that the properties which objects manifest depend on the interaction of these objects with other objects within determinate systems. There is no temptation to erect possibilities into "eternal objects" in the sense of Peirce and Whitehead. Possibilities are objective, but not as entities; statements of possibility are statements of the behavior of objects within various systemic contexts. It is evident that this account does not minimize Secondness or existence. That there are physical things with characteristic modes of interaction under stipulated conditions is simply a fact, and the laws of science are statements of these modes of behavior in a form suitable for prediction. As for Thirdness, Mead admits its objective character through his insistence upon the occurrence of acts in nature, and in his recognition that the eventuation of these acts may be directed by the symbolic indication of a hypothetical future. In all three cases Mead is able to take account of what is vaguely and ambiguously referred to under the term 'universality.' Many objects persist through many contexts and exhibit common properties in these contexts; the same laws are applicable to many situations and entities; some signs have a common meaning to a number of persons. Signs are universal (or general) to the degree that

they apply to diverse entities and occasions; entities and occasions are universal (or general) to the degree that they may be designated by the same signs. But in neither case do universals constitute a class of entities in addition to the domain of natural processes and acts of symbolization. Mead's account implements more thoroughly than Peirce had done the latter's thesis that the being of universals "consists in the truth of an ordinary predication."

Hence in Mead's cosmology all of Peirce's characteristic emphases are satisfied, but with the important difference that possibility, existence, and mind do not fall apart into realms: they remain as distinguishable but mutually implicative aspects of nature, and their predication in propositional form is valid only under definite and specific conditions. In this way, unless I am mistaken, the ambiguities and difficulties which many readers have found in the Peircean categories are resolved. Just as Mead's social behaviorism avoids the idealistic consequences inherent in Peirce's theory of signs, so does Mead's objective relativism provide the basis for the integration of Peirce's three Realms of Being.

One remark may be added at this point, though it cannot be given the importance it warrants. In our account of Mead's cosmology we limited ourselves to the biological aspect of the concept of the act. It must now be pointed out that the concept of act is only a form of a wider category of process, just as the biological concept of the social is only a particular form of a wider concept of the social. In places Mead used the Whiteheadian term 'organism' for what we called process or act, and then distinguished inanimate and animate organisms.⁵ Regardless of the suitability of the terms, the intent is clear: Mead wishes to assert the reality of processes or "acts" at all levels of nature. To this extent natural teleology, Thirdness, chance, and novelty are extended throughout nature. Nature then consists of interrelated social systems or perspectives – nature is social both in the sense that its basic constituents are systems in which the nature of the members is determined by the relationship to other members of the system, and in the sense that these systems are integrated by members which are social in virtue of their inclusion in a number of systems. There is, however, on Mead's analysis no possibility of one all-embracing system of the type found in the absolutistic philosophies. There are sub-biological, biological, and mental levels of nature, and the later levels are interpreted as emergents from the other levels and integrated with them by emergent entities common to all. The terms 'process (or 'act'), 'social,' 'emergent,' and 'possibility' apply at all levels and in the interconnection of levels, but

⁵ *Philosophy of the Present*, 175 (Open Court Publishing, Co., 1932).

recognition of continuity is accompanied by an equal recognition of discontinuity, so that Mead, unlike Peirce, Whitehead, and certain contemporary philosophers of science, does not apply throughout nature the concepts of thought, feeling, mind, self, end-in-view, final cause, deliberative self-control – for the good reason that the conditions necessary for the appearance of the phenomena in question are not found throughout nature. Once again we see how Mead's analysis, while agreeing with certain general theses of Peirce, interprets these theses in a more empirical and restricted manner, so that in place of a metaphysical idealism there results a thorough-going naturalistic cosmology.

V

If our account has been reasonably accurate it should allow us to discern both the historical continuity of the pragmatic movement and the possible direction of its future development. We have noticed on the one hand the tendency to submit certain general and metaphorical expressions to a more critical analysis – and in this sense pragmatism has become increasingly less metaphysical and increasingly more empirical and naturalistic; on the other hand, provided we bring Dewey's work within the range of our attention, we noticed a tendency for pragmatism to round itself out by giving its version of all the traditional philosophic interests (logic, ethics, esthetics, social philosophy, cosmology) – and in this sense pragmatism moves in the direction of systematization. More careful analysis and wider attention to fields subject to such analysis: this is the twofold direction which pragmatism has gained from its past and the probable twofold direction of its future.

While pragmatism has been becoming at once more critical and more ambitious, a new flower has come to bloom in the philosophical garden – logical empiricism. Its roots are as deep historically, and its growths have already assumed a sturdy size. Are these flowers of the same or different stock? Can they grow in a common soil? Schiller seems to think not; he apparently finds in the logical empiricist's striving for careful logical analysis the seeds of a new dogmatic absolutism.⁶ Schiller's protest at least makes us aware of the persistence of the Jamesean tradition within pragmatism, but since he makes the same criticism of Peirce it is possible that his interpretation is as wrong in the one case as in the other. It is no doubt true that the biological orientation of most pragmatists after Peirce is unmistakably different from the analytic orientation of the logical empiricists. Nevertheless it seems

⁶ See his discussion with the author in the *Personalist*, Vol.17; 1936, pp. 56–63; 294–306.

possible to regard the two traditions as complementary and convergent components within a wider and more inclusive movement which I have called scientific empiricism.⁷ It must not be forgotten that Peirce's version of pragmatism in no sense weakened his interest in logical analysis or in a theory of meaning stated in terms of the criterion of verifiability. There is evidence in C. I. Lewis and others of the possibility of regaining this wide orientation of Peirce without sacrificing the contributions of James, Dewey, and Mead. From this point of view the logical empiricist's refinement of the techniques of logical analysis and of the empirical criteria of the meaningful are further steps in the direction which Peirce indicated. Thus Peirce's distinction of logical and material leading principles comes to sharper formulation in Carnap's treatment of logical and physical rules; Peirce's stress on the "strata of signs" is developed in the concept of meta-language and in the theory of types; Peirce's stress on the importance of probability inferences is amplified in Reichenbach's theory of probability and induction. In incorporating into itself the attitude of Peirce, contemporary pragmatism is thus moving into the circle of interests which characterize the logical empiricists.

It is also true that the logical empiricists have in their own way been moving with remarkable rapidity in the direction of typical pragmatic emphases. Hahn and Carnap have stressed the instrumental significance of formal structures within the total scientific enterprise; the earlier tendency to regard judgments of perception as indubitable has given way to the recognition that the verification of all propositions is in varying degrees only partial; the empirical theory of meaning has been widened by Carnap⁸ and Reichenbach in a way which obviates the main criticisms often raised by pragmatists against positivism; Reichenbach⁹ has recently written that "there is as much meaning in a proposition as can be utilized for action," and has himself seen the connection of his views with pragmatism; the earlier somewhat Machian sensationalism has been replaced by a behavioristically oriented psychology; the term logical empiricism is now generally preferred to the term logical positivism, and an empirical realism is explicitly defended by Reichenbach, Feigl, and Schlick; the tendency to neglect the category of the social has attained partial correction in Neurath's conception of social behaviorism; the growing stress upon the concept of convention, the relativity of logical propositions to a specific language, and the

⁷ C. W. Morris, *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism* (Hermann et Cie, Paris, 1937).

⁸ R. Carnap, "Meaning and Testability," *Philosophy of Science*, 1936, 1937.

⁹ H. Reichenbach, *Experience and Prediction*, 80 (University of Chicago Press, 1938).

dependence of formal linguistic structures upon rules of operation would all seem inevitably to lead to a more conscious consideration of the pragmatic aspect of thought and language.

In the light of such convergences – and many more might be mentioned on both sides – it does not seem unreasonable to think of pragmatism and logical empiricism as different emphases within a common movement. Peirce was at once formal logician, empiricist, and pragmatist, and all of these points of view are integrated in scientific empiricism just as they are all incorporated in the scientific enterprise itself. In working within this wider perspective, pragmatism will remain faithful to its founder and will avoid a one-sided emphasis upon the biological which has at times hindered the recognition, and led to the distortion, of some of its most central insights. It is true that the logical empiricists have done little with judgments of value or with assessing the cultural implications of science or with the systematization of a cosmology. Here the work of Dewey and Mead may offer stimulation towards a more exact and systematic formulation of their insights which the newer techniques of analysis make possible. That the unity of science movement, with the *International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science*¹⁰ as one of its organs, will in its development enlarge its considerations to include such matters seems certain. Within the framework of the larger movement – whether called scientific empiricism or by some other name – there is manifest the striving for a coöperative intellectual synthesis which would bear to our day the relation which the thought of Aristotle and Leibniz bore to theirs. Within this modern form of the Great Tradition the impulses which have carried the pragmatic movement to its present culmination will be preserved and amplified.

¹⁰ To be published by the University of Chicago Press, beginning March, 1938.

EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES AS PHILOSOPHER

Charles W. Morris. "Edward Scribner Ames as a Philosopher." *The Scroll: Journal of the Campbell Institute* (Chicago) 44 (1958): 7-10.

Mr. Ames wrote, that to be vital, "a religion must be virile, realistic, sane, and gay." Well, religious clothes also revealed the man, and I can think of no better characterization of Edward Scribner Ames than as virile, realistic, sane, and gay – provided of course that the religious quality itself not be forgotten: the quality which in Mr. Ames' view of religion is the commitment and devotion to the forces in nature and in man which conserve and enhance human values.

Others, however, will speak of Mr. Ames as a religious man. I shall speak more specifically of him as a philosopher in the University of Chicago. It happened that my first contact with the University, and with philosophy as a possible profession, was through Professor Ames thirty-six years ago. I had finished a Bachelor of Science degree at Northwestern, and had been told that I might do well to do some work with the philosopher George H. Mead of the University of Chicago, because of my growing interest in signs and language. So I decided to explore the situation, even though I was then somewhat suspicious of philosophers and hardly intended to become one myself. It so happened that Professor Ames was student adviser in 1922 at the time of Fall Quarter registration. I told him of my doubts concerning philosophy, of my interest in science, and even suggested that I might want to write a thesis on Nietzsche. And then from him came that incredibly wonderful, wry, comprehensive smile! Here was a religious man who was a philosopher, who welcomed science in relation to philosophy, and who would even permit a young upstart to consider a thesis on the author of *The Antichrist*! That smile certainly in part determined my career. (Incidentally, the thesis on Nietzsche was never written and never further considered.)

Those were the days of what William James called the "Chicago School of Philosophy," and of which Mr. Ames was the last surviving

member. He had decided to be a minister in the Disciples of Christ after his graduation from Drake College. He then entered the Yale Divinity School, though, as he later wrote, "without much encouragement from the denominational leaders." Here it is best to let him tell the story of his contact with philosophy in his own words:

It need hardly be added that Mr. Ames became in time a professor in the Department of Philosophy and served for some years as its Chairman.

It is to be noted, as the preceding quotations make clear, that Professor Ames' interest in philosophy centered primarily around the philosophy of religion. This was part of the division of labor characteristic of the early Chicago group. Addison Moore concerned himself primarily with logic and the theory of knowledge, James H. Tufts with ethics and political philosophy, George H. Mead with the philosophy of mind, Edward Scribner Ames with the philosophy of religion. Only John Dewey attempted the whole gamut of philosophy. It is natural to think of him as the leader of the group, and in a sense this is true. But the influences worked both ways. Tufts, Mead and Ames were "on their own" prior to contact with Dewey. Dewey has acknowledged his great indebtedness to Mead. It was Tufts who suggested to Dewey the plan of the *Ethics* of which they were joint author. And although I do not know whether Dewey had Ames explicitly in mind when he wrote his views on religion in *A Common Faith*, the position he takes is essentially the position which Ames had elaborated many years earlier in his major books, *The Psychology of Religious Experience* and *Religion*.

If we ask, then, what was Ames' philosophy. I think we would have to say that it was he shared in common with his colleagues Dewey, Mead, Tufts, and Moore, plus his distinctive elaboration of these views when applied to religion. It seems to me that this was essentially Mr. Ames' own conception of the relation between his work as a minister and as a philosopher. To quote from him again:

"I am often asked how I can teach philosophy and be a preacher. Everyone seems to sense the difficulty. To some extent the acuteness of the problem is a reflection upon both schools and churches, for it suggests that they are both somewhat withdrawn from real life where thinking and action are closely interactive. In my experience the church has been a kind of laboratory for observation and cultivation of the living processes of religion, and the university has been a place for systematic study of them and of similar phenomena from many sources, in the light of psychology and philosophy. I have grown to have increasing appreciation of this rare combination and to feel the value of each interest for the other."

"During that year I began to realize that many problems raised in theology are dealt with more fully and freely in philosophy. I borrowed money from my sister and plunged into courses with George T. Ladd. We read Pfleiderer's *Philosophy of Religion* and I was asked to write a paper on the Hebrews. In that task it dawned upon me, like a great light, that the religion of the Hebrews had evolved, and that its evolution moved with the changing fortunes of the tribes and nation. I also read Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Idea*. He shook me out of my complacent optimism and showed me the abysmal craving, cruelty and cunning in the human heart. More important, he set forth the deeper nature of the will as impulse, desire, habit, and partly conscious action. Being forced thus to look at all life from a new and contrasted point of view, and to gain some conception of the complex, tangled, and desire-driven human world, I was thrust upon deep and wide seas of inquiry and reflection."

"Then I came upon William James, His *Principles of Psychology* had just been published and we went through it in a seminar. His range of scholarship, penetrating analyses, lively and intensely human rewriting of psychology without a soul, opened the field of the new science just then entering upon an epoch of the profoundest significance in all fields, including religion."

"An appointment to a special fellowship at the new University of Chicago brought me to Chicago for the last year of graduate study. With Professor Tufts I made a special study of English philosophy and discovered the intimate relation between Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding* and the religious thought of Alexander Campbell. Here were revealed the sources of my own religious inheritance and new insight into its empirical character. For two years, as instructor in the Disciples Divinity House and a privat-docent in philosophy I had opportunity to carry research in that field and establish a point of view of permanent fruitfulness."

"After three years as professor of philosophy and pedagogy at Butler College I returned to Chicago in 1900 to accept the pastorate of the Church of Disciples, near the University. I was soon invited to assist again in the department of philosophy, and later became a regular part-time instructor. My interest naturally led to specialization in the psychology and philosophy of religion while also giving courses in psychology, ethics, logic and the history of philosophy."

My own work was not in the philosophy of religion and fell under Moore's and Mead's direction rather than Ames! But his qualities as a teacher remain vivid with me, and were indeed the qualities of his colleagues. The problem was the central thing, and what others had

thought about it was only a starting point. Student and teacher were drawn into a common inquiry, and both had their say. There was no lesson to be simply learned, but a work to be done, and done in common. Philosophy was taken seriously, as of human importance. It was not a matter of play or of recitation. The teacher drew the student out and the student the teacher. Ames' smile was always at work, and never a whip. One had the sense of being in the presence of a humanly large man.

The mutual relevance of science and religion which Edward Scribner Ames so much emphasized has become an important present-day concern. Conferences on the East Coast and the West Coast now make it a recurrent theme. Nothing that I have heard or read in these discussions seems to me to have negated or gone much beyond Ames' own position.

Finally, to let Mr. Ames himself speak again: "‘The world is young,’ I heard a chapel speaker say years ago, and the word precipitated into clearness many impressions until that moment vague, and induced a mood of acceptance and expectancy which remained."

And, indeed, the mood of acceptance and expectancy did remain with Edward Scribner Ames. When I saw him a few months ago, the smile was still the same. One felt he was himself entire in that smile.

MAN AND FELLOW-MAN

Edgar A. Singer, Jr. "Man and Fellow-Man." *Journal of Philosophy* 10.6 (13 March 1913): 141–48.

At every turn of my thought respecting the meaning of truth, I am met by a figure that has no dwelling on land or sea and whom I have come to call the Man Without a Fellow. It is strange that so lonely a phantom should have anything in his aspect to trouble the quiet of a philosopher, yet the more I consider him, the more the impression forces itself on me that he holds in his hands the fate of my philosophy and of the science of many another.

I say the science of many another must be concerned for the laying of this ghost, if ghost he be, yet it is exactly because the philosophers of our own day who I should have thought had most to fear from him have either noticed him not at all or passed him cavalierly by, that I wonder whether I can have understood these philosophers aright.

Have I, for example, caught the meaning of the instrumentalist when he insists upon the "social reference" of even the most intimate of our personal experiences? "The fact is," writes Professor Dewey, summing up the case for instrumentalism – "the fact is that the life, the experience of the individual man, is already saturated, thoroughly interpenetrated, with social inheritances and references... . Education, language, and other means of communication are infinitely more important categories of knowledge than any of those exploited by absolutists. And as soon as the methodological battle of instrumentalism is won...the two services that will stand to the credit of instrumentalism will be calling attention first to the connection of intelligence with a genuine future, and, second, to the social constitution of personal, even of private experience, above all of any experience that has assumed the knowledge-form."

Do I, I ask, take Mr. Dewey aright in supposing that he is here not merely calling attention to certain facts respecting the psychology of a being who happens to stand in various social relations with others of his kind; but rather that he is deducing from the very meaning of truth and error certain conditions without which truth and error, and so experience, knowledge, mind, can neither be nor be conceived? He

means, does he not, that consciousness is so essentially social in its reference that if there were no society to refer to, there would be no consciousness to refer? He means, in a word, that it takes at least two minds to make one, or, as Fichte has put it, "*ein Mensch ist nur unter Menschen ein Mensch?*"

If this is what the instrumentalist stands for, then the image of our man without a fellow must be as critical for his philosophy as for mine, and nothing could more quickly and effectively clear the way for his onward march than the removal of this enigmatic figure from his path. But if the instrumentalist means less than this – if he means no more than to observe that minds which happen to have been brought in contact are so profoundly affected by this accident of their history that the result is better symbolized as an interpenetration than as a point or surface contact – then instrumentalism may have called attention to an interesting fact of psychology, but I fail to see in what sense the categories used to arrive at this conclusion can be judged either more or less important than "those exploited by absolutists." For the absolutist is not interested in these historical accidents of mind, not merely because he hopes in the end to show that there are no historical accidents, but also because at no stage of his reasoning does it appear to him accidental that the finite mind owes its being and its meaning to its fellowship with another mind. For him quite frankly it takes two minds to make one, and one of the two is the Absolute. Therefore I should expect him to take up the instrumentalist's reflection on his categories in some such terms as these: I am trying, he would say, to arrive at a definition of truth, if you are only interested in some accidents that attach to truth as it is found in this or that empirical situation we have no quarrel, for we have no common problem. If, however, you have my problem in mind, then you must show that the categories you deem so important are suitable to the discussion of truth wherever truth may exist. They can only be so if thinking beings exist essentially, and not merely *per accidens*, in social groups. You must show that for you too it takes two minds to make one, that the man without a fellow is not merely a possible imbecile but an impossible square circle.

It is only on the assumption that the instrumentalist means to accept this challenge that I can suppose the problem of the man without a fellow to have more than a passing interest for him. But for the absolutist who makes the challenge the lonely being of my imagining can not but be vital, has been vital throughout the history of absolutism, and should be more than ever vital to the absolutist of our day. For in spite of Mr. Dewey's claim upon the gratitude of posterity for the service rendered by instrumentalism in calling attention to the "social

constitution of personal, even of private experience," I can not think that posterity; supposing it to be duly grateful for the idea itself, will find much to choose between instrumentalist and absolutist in the matter of calling attention to the idea. Indeed, when I said that the image of the man without a fellow must be as critical for other philosophies as for my own, it was rather the absolutist than the instrumentalist I had in mind; for not only is it the central thesis of absolutism that the finite mind can not exist save in fellowship with God, but it is to historic absolutism that we owe the first *Deduktion* of the dependence of finite mind on finite mind. And the absolutist of our day is no whit behind his forerunners in calling attention to the social reference of the most impersonal as well as of the most personal and private of our experiences, – for Professor Royce, nature itself is a social concept, nature is that in the description of which many men agree, in the moulding of which to their harmoniously different purposes many men cooperate.

So it has seemed to me that Mr. Dewey's claims for the service rendered by instrumentalism in "calling attention to" a doctrine that was old before we were young were *tant soit peu* exaggerated. The school that invented the theory has not abandoned it, has not spared emphasis in continuing to call attention to it, has outdone all others in the bold clearness with which it has set forth its meaning.

And yet this last statement of mine is perhaps in its turn an exaggeration. If there can be no doubt as to what a Fichte means to prove in the opening of his "Rechtslehre," there are whole chapters of Hegel's "Phaenomenologie" that leave me uncertain as to what they are intended to establish, and I am quite prepared to be told that my understanding of Mr. Royce's doctrine is a complete misunderstanding. When Mr. Royce speaks of nature as a "social concept" I have taken him to mean that a non-social being – a man without a fellow-man – would lack this concept; that a finite mind shut off from converse with other finite minds would be without any notion of a world in space and time, following mechanical laws and heaving with great rhythms. But such is the delicacy of the issue here involved that were Mr. Royce or another to tell me that he had no such meaning, but that his intention was merely to point out the extent to which we who are as a matter of fact social beings are influenced by that fact in our conception of all things – not merely in our ideas of property, credit, love, hate, and such like mutualities, but in our notion of nature itself – if any one were to tell me this I could not gainsay him with chapter and verse precluding such interpretation. I should be left trembling alone before the image of the man without a fellow, abandoned to the laying of my own ghost in my own way since for me alone is the portent.

But for me portent there would seem to be and the ghost must be faced if it can't be laid. In a number of papers addressed to this association in previous years, I have found myself maintaining a thesis that may best be defined in terms of what it denies. And what it denies is the spirit of Augustine's saying – "*Noli in foras ire* – Go not out into the world; but return into thyself, for there in the inner man dwells truth." From this monkish sentence I have turned because I could find no way of getting at the truth about myself – even my innermost self – save by going abroad for it and receiving it as often as not at the hands of my fellows. It takes, I find myself having written – it takes all the science of all the world to tell whether I am really in love as I think I am, whether I am really in pain as I take myself to be, whether I really see the color red as I sincerely assert that I do. No one familiar with the history of modern philosophy will find anything new or revolutionary in such utterances, though their import be to deny even to an idea any immediacy of meaning that is more than a relative immediacy, any truth that can be established without appeal to another. Such denial is sympathetic with the development of many modern idealisms and it antagonizes only such philosophies as starting with an immediate datum of consciousness – sensation or feeling – attempt to construct a world, a society of fellow-men, it may be a deity out of these data. What it accords with most intimately is that experience of life which one may have for the trouble of living. Is it a sound disjunction that one who proclaims his love is either really a lover or really a liar? Is it true that laments are either final evidence of grief or proof of insincerity? Is the master of an art a convicted hypocrite when it is discovered that art for art's sake is not so surely the motive of his conduct, but that, free to exercise his mastery to his heart's content, he does so in infinite discontent until recognition comes his way? Is he not rather in his deepest heart uncertain of the truth about himself, of the reality of his mastery until it is recognized, acknowledged, confirmed to him by another? In short, is there not that in the very meaning of truth which makes every truth depend upon an appeal to another?

And if this necessity of appeal is evident when the truth to be established by it concerns the most intimate and personal of private experiences, is it not all the more evident when there is question of the truth of ideas respecting nature? Whatever else we may think of those hard facts and inexorable laws which make up our image of physical nature, we always contemplate ourselves returning from the empirical study of them with our hands more firmly tied. But who or what is it that ties our hands? Part, at any rate, of the answer is to be read in that recurrent phrase of scientific literature: "So-and-so reports that he has obtained

such-and-such results, but his observations remain unconfirmed by other experimenters." Experience so reported leaves our hands as uncomfortably free as before and we look to other observers to tighten our bonds for us.

It will readily be understood that this manner of reflection would leave me in closest sympathy with such utterances whether of instrumentalist or of absolutist as point out the dependence of an idea upon the appeal that it makes to another, and it was natural that I should have turned to these philosophers with my anxious question, But what if there is no other? What truth can there be for a man without a fellow-man to whom to appeal? Is it indeed true that my brother is so completely my keeper that without him I must dwindle and vanish? Their ways of answering these questions I must have imperfectly understood, for I find myself still addressing the same question to myself with what result the remainder of this paper shall set forth.

The situation from which we depart is in the nature of an antinomy. On the one hand we admit that a mind, to exist, must appeal to another; on the other we are not prepared to maintain that the conditions which bring into being such minds as we know, conditions of inheritance, education, intercommunication, are the only ones that could produce a mechanism reacting purposefully to the world about it. A first step toward the solution of this antinomy is clearly enough indicated, for if in order that we may attribute an idea to a finite being we must see to it that he is provided with another to whom to appeal, and if at the same time we place him in a situation that furnishes no Peter to his Paul, then we must regard this finite self as capable of being its own other.

I know that those who recognize in such a formula one of those amusing Hegelisms from the odd compulsion of which they have long since, praise God, emancipated themselves, will have nothing more to do with a "self that is its own other." But out of this situation I may be permitted to derive some amusement in my turn, for each of these emancipated ones is by way of congratulating himself on having become other than he was, without having ceased to be himself. And the truth of one's idea about Hegel will serve as well as any other example of truth to illustrate my meaning when I say that the finding of truth is indeed an appeal, an intercommunication between points of view; but every man, however complete his social isolation, is himself a society of points of view. If indeed he live with other men, their point of view respecting any truth, even one touching most intimately himself, his own emotions, his own mastery, may be worth as much as his own; but if he live by himself, his own other points of view may be depended on to try out his present opinion – we say that he may change his mind. The first

condition or there being a mind is simply a situation in which there is room enough for a change of mind; instead of Fichte's formula, No man without a fellow, I should conclude, No mind without a change of mind.

I am not sure whether the instrumentalist would accept this interpretation of his category of "social reference"; but it is certain the absolutist would not be done with me if I were to let matters drop here. He would lose no time in pointing out that our troubles were not over, but only fairly begun. "If," he would say, "truth involves an appeal from one point of view to another, which point of view holds the truth and how are we to know it? An appeal to truth is something more than a polite conversation between different view-points content to remain in such agreement or disagreement as their intercourse reveals." He would ask this question knowing full well that my answer must be, No point of view holds the truth, nor dots any finite group of actually expressed opinions give us a way of calculating the truth. And to come at once to the point to which the absolutist would have me come, I may as well admit that the series of points of view to which we must appeal for the truth of the most private of our meanings is essentially infinite. "Then," the absolutist would urge, "some of these points of view, and of course an infinity of them, must be merely possible points of view?" The confession that such is my understanding of the case would probably end his interest in the matter, for absolutism might well enough be defined as the philosophy that flees from an infinite series to take refuge in an infinite mind. But from this very definition it follows that it is not from the infinite that the absolutist flees; he would distinguish between infinities and would represent himself as delivered from the bad infinite by an acknowledging of the good. Now the bad infinite is one that endlessly loses itself in bare possibilities – in bare possibilities that are for him impossible. He flees from infinite to infinite indeed, but from the possible infinite in which meaning is lost to the actual infinite in which meaning is realized.

With all the absolutist's criticism of the category of possibility I find myself in close accord. If I judge a proposition to be possibly true, it is because its contradictory does not follow from certain premises presupposed. Often enough these premises are tacitly presupposed and then we have the illusion that we are dealing with pure possibilities; but this is only illusion, the premises are there or the possibility is not there – take these actualities away and the possibility left on our hands is indeed too bare for presentation. Against the danger of falling into a way of thinking in terms of bare possibilities, I would be as anxious as the absolutist to protect myself, and if I have escaped from an antinomy to fall into the pit of "permanent possibilities" I ask no one to join me there – the place is uncomfortably full and full of discomfort.

But while the absolutist's caution against bare possibilities is wise and admirable, his precaution against them is exaggerated. It is not enough for him to be assured that there is a core of actuality to an infinite series, he must be assured that it is actual in all its endlessness. Most of us, however, find no difficulty in handling an infinite whose law is given in a finite number of terms – and not merely some finite number, but a perfectly definite finite number. Such a series is that of the integral numbers, whose law is given as soon as the phrase “and so on” with which any such law must end is meaningful and unambiguous. But this phrase does become meaningful and unambiguous after the two equations, $0 + 1 = 1$, $1 + 1 = 2$ are written down; then and not till then is the third equation defined to be $2 + 1 = 3$. Since the series is infinite, no one can construct all of its terms without accomplishing a contradiction; but the terms that remain at any given time unconstructed are no bare possibilities, their possibility is a logical consequence of actually given premises, finite and definite in number.

The bearing of these reflections upon the nature of that infinite series of points of view to which an idea must appeal for its truth and meaning is obvious enough. I have said that there could be no mind without a change of mind; let me put the result in another and more definite form: It takes two points of view to make one, and both of these points of view must be guaranteed as actual before that infinite series can be constructed without an appeal to which no truth can be defined, no idea can have meaning.

Of the minimal situation which permits of ascribing an idea to any perceiver we may now draw a preliminary picture. This attribution is made by an onlooker *A* whose world contains a perceiver *B*, and the object *C* of *B*'s perception. It is essential to this situation that the perceiver *B* should himself be perceived; for “it takes two points of view to make one.” As for the object *C* of this perception, it is doubtless inaccurate to speak of it as though it existed ready-made in *A*'s world; my meaning is that this world contains the actual material out of which the notion of the object may be constructed. Suppose *B* to be observed in the act of measuring the length of a rod. *A*, the onlooker, calls this measurement *B*'s idea of the length of the rod. In doing so he contrasts this single measurement with a series whose average, as the series progresses, is subject to a decreasing probable error and freed from one source after another of constant error. Without the data and the method for constructing this series, object and idea lose their meaning together. The onlooker *A* sees clearly that the series is infinite, but there is enough that is actual to define this infinite and to keep its unrealized terms from becoming bare possibilities.

Nor is this infinite reference of the idea to other points of view the

only series that develops from our minimal situation. The onlooker *A* takes to heart the lesson he has learned from watching, commenting on, and defining *B*'s idea and its object. From a new point of view he applies the result to the former situation. His world with *B* in it, a highway to truth stretching out before him becomes itself the idea of a world. The philosopher sees his old self part of a new world, and in this world his old self stands in its turn racing an infinite highway at the end of which lies the truth about *B*'s idea and the object of *B*'s idea. A second infinite series is defined, but like the first it grows out of hard actualities and its possibilities are not bare.

In this analysis the otherness of the standpoints that I have called *A*'s and *B*'s, the onlooker's and the perceiver's, is a matter of definition; the otherness of the men who occupy these standpoints is an historical accident. My man without a fellow might occupy both, for such is the nature of the self that it can well enough be its own other. Nor do I see that a mind so isolated need be limited in its possibilities. True, a hundred men can build a house more quickly than one, but if that one happen to be a genius he might – give him time – build a finer house. Just so our dependence upon neighbors for the acquisition of knowledge is a question of speed; give him time and it all depends upon the manner of man he is whether our man without a fellow turn out imbecile or philosopher.

In view of these reflections, is the importance attached by the instrumentalist to his social categories altogether justified? I do not say that they are less significant than the categories exploited by absolutists, for if I have gone so far as to maintain that the man without a fellow will not be lost for lack of a brother hand to guide him, I must go to the extent of denying that he will need the everlasting arms to uphold him. In which conclusion I find a certain interest, for I have suspected at times that our lonely figure was less a homeless ghost than the being who dwells deep down under the familial, convivial, social surface of each one of us.

ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé. "Review of John Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*." *Philosophical Review* 26.4 (July 1917): 421–30.

Review of *Essays in Experimental Logic*. By John Dewey. The University of Chicago Press, 1916. – Pp. viii, 444.

Philosophers, like lesser mortals, begin by sowing a crop of wild oats. They pass through a period of youthful indiscretions. They have a past. Professor Dewey is no exception to this rule, but he is one of the favored few whose repentance takes the form of originality. It was by a mere accident that I stumbled upon his philosophical past. Years ago, when, as an undergraduate at Oxford, I was wrestling with the profundities of T. H. Green, and the dialectics of F. H. Bradley, and watching white-bearded, kindly-eyed Edward Caird smooth out the crinkles and creases of Kant's philosophy, I discovered in the back numbers of *Mind* some essays by John Dewey, entitled *The Psychological Standpoint, Psychology as Philosophical Method, Knowledge as Idealization*. At the time of this discovery, though I knew it not, Mr. Dewey was already a rising star on the pragmatist horizon, destined presently to enter into a major constellation with James and Schiller. But to me in these essays he appeared as the heaven-sent champion of absolute idealism. His way of putting them seemed to illuminate for me the many dark sayings of my idealist teachers. "All that is, is for consciousness or knowledge" – why, how obvious it seemed! I thrilled to his declaration that "Psychology as the science of this consciousness is the explicit and accurate determination of reality in its wholeness... is the ultimate science of reality." Indeed, I found, it is "the science of the absolute itself." It all seemed so clear and helpful, and, fascinated, I read on: "Ultimately the growth of experience must consist in the development out of itself by intelligence of its own implicit ideal content upon occasion of the solicitation of sensation. But this is a thought to be elaborated another time." Thereupon I began a research magnificent for the fulfillment of this promise, and what I found was – 'instrumentalism.'

Now the point of this resurrection of Mr. Dewey's dead self is not to score a cheap debating point or make play with a petty charge of inconsistency. Rather I am reminded of James's remark in *A Pluralistic Universe* (p. 20), that systems of philosophy are "just so many visions, modes of feeling the whole push, and seeing the whole drift of life, forced on one by one's total character and experience, and on the whole *preferred* – there is no other truthful word – as one's best working attitude." It is a commonplace among philosophers that if we could once enter into another's angle of philosophic vision, if we could once feel the whole push of the universe as he feels it, the details of his philosophy would come as a matter of course. Our criticisms would seem pointless. Our objections would fall to the ground. The best way of entering into Mr. Dewey's experimental logic is to study the forces which have remolded his vision from the idealism of his earlier to the instrumentalism of his later days. At any rate, that is the best way for one who, like myself, after a period of acute critical reaction, has returned, mainly under the influence of the writings of Bosanquet, to what is still commonly called 'idealism.'¹

Piecing together, then, passages from several of Mr. Dewey's writings, I picture to myself the course of his philosophical development as follows. Idealism brought to him, as it has done to many others who are led into philosophy by religious doubts, the first taste of intellectual emancipation. It mediated for him, as it did for Royce, the transition from the supernatural theology of religion which no longer satisfied his thought, to an unprejudiced inquiry into the actual structure of our universe as revealed in all forms of our experience. But Mr. Dewey travelled further along this path than Royce; too far perhaps. Idealism, he came to hold, is still tainted with supernatural, or at least non-empirical, elements. Its concept of the absolute, eternal and perfect, makes unintelligible the empirical character of our lives, cast in the form of time, shot through with evil, struggling painfully to progress to better things. As for James, so for him, the problems of time, evil, and creative activity stood in the way of any acceptance of the absolute. This line of thought was reinforced by the influence of modern science, especially biology with its concept of evolution. It made Mr. Dewey a 'behaviorist' before that term had been invented. It led him to regard thinking as a mode of response to the environment ("knowing is, biologically, a differentiation of organic behavior," p. 276); as reflex action become fore-seeing, creative, constructive; as involving always physical action and thereby a physical transformation of the environment: a remolding

¹ Cf. Bosanquet's proposal to drop the ambiguous term 'idealism' in favour of 'speculative philosophy,' in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVI, No. I, p. 6.

of the world nearer to the heart's desire, and that, not in imagination or by a trick of theory, but in actual fact and in practical living. At this point entered the third main determinant, as it seems to me, of Mr. Dewey's philosophical vision, viz., the zeal of the moral, social, educational reformer. In this zeal he lifts the scope of thought and action from the biological level of survival to the ethical level of "control of the environment in behalf of human progress and well-being" (p. 22). Knowledge now for him is "something going on in the world, in the observatory and the laboratory, and in the application of laboratory results to the control of human health, well-being, and progress" (p. 66). The evolutionary point of view, so he claims, transforms "the logic of knowledge" and demands an intellectual face-about. He hails it as the charter of the experimental methods of science, by the lack of which he accounts for the present stagnation and the practical barrenness of the social and political sciences. It is the same in education. The desideratum is an experimental technique by which to get results that will guide us to intelligent reforms. So, again, if we are not to grope about blindly in the reconstruction of our world after this war, we need a method of testing and determining what plans of reform are wholesome and beneficial and what are not. This, at least, I understood to be the burden of Mr. Dewey's address before the Psychological Association at New York last December. In this spirit he calls for "a logic of ethical inquiry," meaning not a study of how we do inquire in ethical matters, but rather a technique yet to be developed for conducting ethical inquiries more effectively, *i.e.*, experimentally. The concept of experiment clearly bridges for Mr. Dewey the gap between a methodology of inquiry and a methodology of reform. The chief enemy which blocks the path is absolute idealism which he accuses of denying the efficacy of thinking for the betterment of the world, and thereby of robbing the intellect of its specific work and responsibility. It divorces the ideal from the actual, leaving ideals impotent for control and change of the actual. It makes of the philosopher an 'aloof knower,' whose profession is an 'otiose contemplative survey' of the universe. It makes of him a 'parasite' without sense of social calling and responsibility; a mere theorist, not a leader in wise reform and constructive action.²

² Of course this whole point of view is by no means unique or novel in the history of philosophy, though this remark must not be understood as belittling the genuine freshness and originality with which Mr. Dewey presents it. An instructive parallel, exhibiting the same hostility to supernaturalism and the same confidence in man's power of reforming the world by means of science is to be found in a passage in Huxley's autobiography (*Collected Essays*, Vol. I, p. 16): "To promote the increase of natural knowledge and to forward the application of scientific methods of investigation to all the problems of life to the best of my ability, in the conviction which has

Though in developing these ideas Mr. Dewey touches on a great many issues, large and small, of contemporary philosophical discussion, there stands in the centre of interest for him a single problem, viz., to determine the place and function of thinking in the world. This is the problem on which his philosophical vision is focused. Biology yields him the basis of fact for his theory: thinking is an instrument in the service of life. Ethical interests supply the ideal: to use thinking as an instrument for the betterment of life, for the reform of education, of political institutions, of social relations. The enemy to be fought is the theory, in whatever shape or form it may disguise itself, which denies to thinking this instrumental function, thereby divorcing it from action and condemning it to an idle contemplation of an eternally perfect, static, changeless universe.

What then is the task of logic in the context of such a view? If we are to judge from the *Essays*, the task of an experimental logic is simply to set forth and defend at length and in detail precisely the experimental character of thinking, by pointing out the conditions under which thought-experiments become necessary, the antecedents which evoke thinking, the data which it uses as materials, the aim it seeks to realize, and the relativity of 'knowledge-objects' to the processes by which they get elaborated. The main point is "the proper placing of thinking in its temporal context." This means that experience (*cf.* "our universe of life and love," p. 75) is in the main non-cognitive – an affair of non-reflective action and enjoyment. Cognition (*alias* reflection, intellect, thought), with its trick of analyzing and objectifying, arises only when incompatible factors, calling for incompatible responses, occur in the empirical situation. Its function is to locate and identify the difficulty, and devise means for coping with it. Its general method of procedure is inferential: "mind is but another word for the fact of inference" (p. 421). The most characteristic account of inference from Mr. Dewey's point of view is found in such descriptions as "an attitude of response to an absent thing as if it were present" (p. 423), or "behaving to the given situation as involving something not given" (p. 425). These give Mr. Dewey an opportunity for many excellent observations on signs and meanings. But the central thesis is always this, that every datum is really a basis of action, that the present is always incomplete and requiring to be completed, that every proposition states really a programme of

grown with my growth, and strengthened with my strength, that there is no alleviation for the sufferings of mankind except veracity of thought and action, and the resolute facing of the world as it is, when the garment of make-believe by which pious hands have hidden its uglier features is stripped off." The historical affinity of this marriage of naturalism with philanthropy is clearly with Comte and Mill and 'the religion of humanity.'

action. Thinking, to put it in my own words, asks not, What is this? but, What is to be done with this? Or, This being what it is, what is to be expected from it? What possibilities are there for the future? By what means can such and such ends be realized in this given situation? We are always interested in the analysis of the given with a view to the possibilities it offers for future action. Mr. Dewey suggests that all scientific or descriptive statements of matters of fact imply indirectly, if not directly, something to be done (*cf.* p. 347). In the same spirit he writes, "The passage of a proposition into action is not a miracle, but the realization of its own character – its own meaning as logical" (p. 389). Further, without action no verification, no learning, no testing, no responsibility in thinking. The risks of action compel us to elaborate a nice technique in determining our data precisely, so that we may read off their clues with as few mistakes as possible. If all goes well, the conflict with which thought began dissolves in harmonious action. Reflection dips back into the main stream of non-cognitive experience, running smoothly along without hitch or trouble. The following passage is a fair sample of how Mr. Dewey conceives the procedure of thinking: "Thinking, or knowledge-getting, is far from being the armchair thing it is often supposed to be. The reason it is not an armchair thing is that it is not an event going on exclusively within the cortex or the cortex and vocal organs. It involves the explorations by which relevant data are procured and the physical analyses by which they are refined and made precise; it comprises the readings by which information is got hold of, the words which are experimented with, and the calculations by which the significance of entertained conceptions or hypotheses is elaborated. Hands and feet, apparatus and appliances of all kinds are as much a part of it as changes in the brain" (p. 14).

It is clear from such a passage as this that hardly any of the topics ordinarily discussed in treatises on logic (of whatever school) would come up for consideration in experimental logic. Even allowing for the fact that Mr. Dewey does not pretend to have written a system of logic, but has only sketched a new point of view for approaching logical problems, my difficulty is to imagine what the positive content and doctrine of an experimental logic would be, or what particular logical issue it would enable us to settle. Nor has this difficulty been removed by a study of Mr. A. W. Moore's essay on logic in *Creative Intelligence*. Mr. Dewey speaks of knowing as something at which some men work as others work at farming or engineering. He speaks of science as a highly specialized industry. But I can discover no attempt to formulate the rules by which we practice this art or business, or to study the activity in the light of its products. Indeed, Mr. Dewey would apparently forbid us to consider the products in order to study the activity. He

complains, in language reminiscent of Bergson, that traditional logic analyzes the syllogism retrospectively, as a *fait accompli*, not the activity of syllogizing. He accuses modern realist logicians of studying results achieved, not the process of achieving; knowledge-objects not knowledge-getting. Though he has much to say on the 'making' of inferences, he ignores entirely what we can learn, from the study of inferences *made*, about the nexus of implications which guides and controls valid inference. Though he insists on thinking, or knowing, being identical with judgment, there is no attempt to study judgment forms, nor, so far as I can see, any suggestion of a principle which would make it possible to give a systematic account of such forms, of the import of each and its place in the system of knowledge. It is hard to see what light, if any, would be thrown on such questions as the relation of hypothetical to categorical propositions, the mutual exclusiveness of alternatives in disjunctions, the differences of modality, of abstract and concrete universals, of material and formal implications. The very analysis of propositions is left untouched, beyond a brief suggestion which I paraphrase to myself as meaning that the subject is what we experiment on, the predicate what we experiment with, and the copula the linguistic symbol for the act of experimenting. I have in mind here the passage in which Mr. Dewey says also that fact or datum and meaning or idea, percept and concept, particular and universal are to be interpreted in terms of the difference between "what is there (whether as obstacle or as resource) and suggested inventions – projections of something else to be brought to bear upon it, ways of dealing with it" (p. 24). However interesting and suggestive such a remark may be, it hardly helps one to see what modifications it would involve in any standard treatise on logic (say that of Keynes, or of Joseph, or of Bosanquet, let alone our mathematical logicians), if it were to be rewritten from Mr. Dewey's point of view. I could imagine it possible, for example, to recast Bosanquet's logic in Mr. Dewey's language of experiment. Each form of judgment would then be a standardized type of intellectual experiment found successful in a certain context and up to a certain point. But would the order of the forms, and the general account of the import of each be appreciably altered?

The fact is that Mr. Dewey's whole outlook upon logic is distorted by his antagonism to what he calls 'epistemological' logic. The vice of this logic which he is never tired of denouncing, *e.g.*, in Kant or Lotze, is a sharp separation between data and intellect, reality as such and thought as such. When sense-data are opposed to categories by which they are supposed to be synthesized, without any explanation of what determines the relevance of a category to the data in a concrete case; when reality and thought are divided from one another by an unbridgeable gulf, so

that we get an unknowable real on the one side and mere subjective ideas on the other, then it is easy to agree with Mr. Dewey's protests against the artificiality and futility of such points of view. Then his reminder that thinking is performed only at specific need, like taking a walk or eating a dinner; that it always arises in specific situations in order to solve specific difficulties, comes as a wholesome and timely challenge to all 'epistemological dualists.' His call to study 'thinking behavior' as a historic and natural event in a historic and natural setting dispels a good many of these clouds of philosophical dust. But once more I repeat, it does not touch the traditional body of logical doctrine in the strict sense of the word at all. It does not touch mathematical logic, because that does not offer any theory of thinking in Mr. Dewey's sense, as little as does any other science. It is true that some students of this logic in their character as neo-realists have also talked about sense-data and knowing, and Mr. Dewey's criticisms of their strictly epistemological theories seem to me to have a great deal of pertinence and force (*cf. e.g.*, essay xi on Bertrand Russell's views). But this has nothing to do with the subject matter of their logic. Again Mr. Dewey's polemic does not touch such a logical theory as Bosanquet's, which, as Bosanquet himself has recently pointed out (*Logic*, 2d ed., Vol. II, p. 263), is not open to the charge of dualism brought against it in *Studies in Logical Theory*. In short, the blunder which Mr. Dewey is attacking, though it is to be found in the works of a good many writers on theory of knowledge, can not, I think, be laid at the door of a single great modern logician, with the exception of Lotze. Yet in criticizing Lotze, Mr. Dewey writes as if he were demolishing 'idealistic' logic in general.

I have found only one passage where Mr. Dewey expresses himself at length on the problem of logic. He distinguishes a specific and a general problem. The former is, "How does the particular functional situation termed the reflective behave?" His answer to this I have just passed in review, and my main criticism on it has been that, as handled by Mr. Dewey, it really has nothing to do with the topics which constitute the logician's proper field. The general problem is formulated as follows: "How does one type of functional situation and attitude in experience pass out of and into another; for example, the technological or utilitarian into the aesthetic, the aesthetic into the religious, the religious into the scientific and this into the socio-ethical and so on?" This inquiry Mr. Dewey calls the "logic of experience" and identifies with philosophy (pp. 97, 8). From it he expects the solution of such questions as "the value of research for social progress, the bearing of psychology upon educational procedure; the mutual relations of fine and industrial art; the question of the extent and nature of specialization in science in comparison with the claims of applied science; the adjustment of

religious aspirations to scientific statements; the justification of a refined culture for a few in face of economic insufficiency for the mass; the relation of organization to individuality" (p. 99). It is a great pity that Mr. Dewey has not given us a glimpse of the solutions which the logic of experience supplies for him to these problems. It would have been an invaluable help in appreciating the nature and efficacy of experimental thinking as practiced by a master of the craft. Howsoever that may be, Mr. Dewey has here laid his finger on some phases of our civilisation which stand badly in need of the most enlightened thinking we can devote to them. His exhortation to us philosophers to take the lead in this thinking and to test our theories on these matters by the richer experience which action brings is excellent advice, and not nearly enough heeded by most of us. But in all that is sound in Mr. Dewey's advice, he is surely but calling us back to the tradition of the great philosophers. Not one of them, even if we go back no farther than Descartes, but has offered us, in the very spirit of a logic of experience, his answer to one or more of Mr. Dewey's problems (*e.g.*, the adjustment of religion to science) – an answer not merely of the armchair and the study, but of its author's life and practice. As for the barrenness of idealism, it would be hard to overrate the weight which, *e.g.*, T. H. Green's example and teaching lent to the various movements for social reform in the England of the 70's and 80's of the last century. Mr. Dewey has needlessly cast himself in the rôle of the lonely voice crying in the wilderness.

I have already explained why I do not think Mr. Dewey's instrumentalism has much to do with logic. It remains to set down in conclusion the grounds of my profound difference from Mr. Dewey in respect of his central thesis that all propositions assert *agenda*, and that when thinking is not instrumental, it is parasitic and worse than useless. The fundamental fault, as I see it, lies in Mr. Dewey's surrender to the biological point of view which not only fits awkwardly with his own programme of a logic of experience, but which pulls out of focus his whole view of the nature and function of thinking as revealed in its highest manifestations. Though we may still talk about 'response to environment' and 'organic behavior,' yet it is clear, at least to me, that in the study of the 'right relationships' of various attitudes of experience such as religion, morality, art, science, philosophy, we have left biological categories far behind. If we commit ourselves to biology at the start, we prejudice the issue. We make it impossible for ourselves to do justice to what these very experiences reveal concerning the nature of the environment, or, as I should prefer to say, the world or the universe. We exclude arbitrarily the possibility that it may possess the character which is predicated of it under the name of the absolute. We close the door

upon modes of experience, such as the mystical, without which no logic of experience can be complete, let alone any account of the 'well-being' of man. I know it is no use arguing about this matter with Mr. Dewey. He knows what can be said on it as well as I; indeed better. It is just a profound difference in the way in which each of us "feels the whole push" of the universe. But this difference engenders all sorts of further differences. I should agree that thinking probably began under the stimulus of baffled action in the struggle for existence. But I should add, with a realist like Russell, and an idealist like Bosanquet, that it comes to its own only when it is exercised for the satisfaction of the disinterested curiosity of science and philosophy. I should agree that thinking is always practical, in the sense of being an activity which involves the thinker's body and may involve experimental manipulation of other bodies. But I should add that all this doing may be instrumental to understanding, that we may act simply in order to know or think truly, and that this sort of thinking may be an end in itself. I do not say it is the only end in itself. On the contrary, other modes of experience, *e.g.*, art, or social intercourse, are also worth while for their own sakes, and may be non-cognitive as Mr. Dewey describes them. That thinking is genuinely instrumental to them I should not deny. But I should insist that it is not always a means to ends such as these or as statesmanship, education, or social reform, but that in pure science and philosophy it rises to the level of a coördinate end, and that other modes of experience are then instrumental to it, furnishing it with materials for its effort to contemplate the nature of things as they are. Yes, contemplate; and I am not to be bullied out of this fair word by abusive adjectives like "otiose." Of course, by thinking the world is changed and transformed in the sense that it appears very different at the end from what it appeared at the beginning of systematic inquiry. But we also think that the outcome is a fuller revelation of the nature of the world, and this I hold to be decisive. Hence, thinking for me is not exclusively concerned with *agenda*, unless it be in the wide, and therefore harmless, sense in which the phrase includes the things we have to do in order to know more and know better. In short, I plead for the recognition of the fact that the pursuit and the attainment of knowledge is a form of experience, or life, which is worth while for its own sake, which is essential to any complete ideal of well-being, and which cannot be adequately dealt with from the biological angle of adaptation to environment, or even from the ethical angle of reform. What I have been urging is as old as the hills, but it is none the less true for all that, and Mr. Dewey's experiment of ignoring it is none the less disastrous. Granted that most of our thinking is done in order to live and to live better, yet one of the ways of living best consists precisely in emanci-

pation from the service of life, and in living for the sake of 'theoria.' To me this is the lesson of the logic of my own experience, confirmed by the continuous testimony down the ages of thinkers far greater than I. Not even Mr. Dewey's latest siren song in *Creative Intelligence* has lured me over to his point of view. On the contrary, it has made me ponder more than ever the paradox, that pragmatists, though they talk most about the efficacy of thinking, have made the smallest positive contributions either to logic or to any other recognized branch of philosophy.

SOME COMMENTS ON INSTRUMENTALISM

Edmund H. Hollands. "Some Comments on Instrumentalism." In *Philosophical Essays in Honor of James Edwin Creighton*, ed. George H. Sabine (New York: Macmillan, 1917), pp. 214–28.

Some fifteen years have passed since the critics of pragmatism first objected that it had taken no account of theoretical truth as distinct from 'practical'; that the thought-situations which it discussed were always cases of 'finding one's way out of the woods,' 'discovering the remedy for my dyspepsia,' and so on; and never cases of 'finding the algebraic equation to a geometrical locus,' 'ascertaining the relation of the hypothetical judgment to the disjunctive,' or 'determining the true cause of the ostracism of Themistocles.' The criticism seemed to hit a tender spot; at all events, the supposed restriction of pragmatic theory was at once disclaimed, and rather indignantly. It was explained that the 'practical' had been meant to include all interests, and of course that of theoretical cognition among the rest. "It is...simply idiotic," said Professor James, for example, "to repeat that pragmatism takes no account of purely theoretic interests. All it insists on is that verity in act means *verifications*, and that these are always particulars." Such verifications for James meant attaining, getting to, a sought percept, or a sought concept; for concepts belonged to the manifold reality, he held, quite as much as percepts, though in a different order.

James did not leave a finished system of metaphysics behind him; it is left doubtful, for example, how far he would have required or accepted panpsychism in completing his account of the real. Things-percepts-ideas and ideas-concepts, the physical order and the psychical order, are classes which cut across each other in his conception of them; but they get into working connection, so to speak, in the activities of living bodies, or at least in those of some of them, – 'psycho-physical organisms.' This is the position in which James's theory of reality and truth agrees with that of Professor Dewey and the instrumentalists; but while he did not develop it, and continued to use the terminology of

introspective analysis and empiricism, they have based their whole philosophy on an explicit use of organism and environment, stimulus and response, in short, the categories of biology.

The most important example of this difference in emphasis and method, it seems to me, is to be found in the contrast between James's attempt at solving the classical problem of the 'meaning of an idea,' and the answer given by the instrumentalists. Using the traditional terminology, we say that the true idea must agree with its object. Of course, James remarked, we must not take 'agreement' too literally; any kind of resemblance, or getting at, or substitutability, that meets the needs of the particular case, will be 'agreement.' But the object with which the idea agrees must be the object which the idea 'means'; accidental agreement, of course, is not enough; agreement must be *intended*. The question at once occurs, since the whole connection referred to is described as a process in time, how we know in advance what the idea means, unless it transcends itself, as the 'idealist' logicians sometimes say; and James answered that we did not, that we find out what an idea really means by seeing to what it leads. In other words, its meaning really is its agreement! Meaning is simply a process of leading begun, and agreement the same process terminated. On this view, truth is very literally something which happens to an idea. The circle in the original definition, taken in this way, seems evident; we ought not to say, the true idea agrees with *its* object, but, the true idea agrees with *some* object. But what becomes then of the caution that it must agree with an object which it means; that "if it resemble without operating on, it is a dream; if it operate without resembling, it is an error?"¹

James did not allow himself to be troubled by the paradox; and this was undoubtedly, I should say, because he felt that the whole interest of the question, as he viewed it, lay in the 'operation,' of which the 'resemblance' was only the result; 'meaning' really made 'agreement,' brought it into being. In fact, agreement is the means, and successful operation (operation *with* resembling) the end. The operation of a true idea (whatever that may be, and it must be admitted that the term was a vague one when extended to cover theoretical knowing) is a process, then, which produces its own means. But this is exactly one thing which we say of life; it is a process which produces its own means.

This is the dialectic by which the pragmatism of James passes over into the instrumentalism of Dewey. The instrumentalists attacked the same problem by making knowledge from the first and throughout an incident in organic behavior of a certain type. Intelligence is regarded as a series of fulgurations, so to speak, elicited by special difficulties in the

¹ *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 28.

adaptation of a living individual to its environment, which require a new kind of response. 'Agreement' from this point of view is successful functioning in such a response, the fact that the 'idea' has been a means in the prosperous preservation and redirection of the organic activities. Meaning is always a prospective matter, a leading, which gets made and established, originally at least, in the active process of choice and discovery when the originally presented responses to the given situation are incompatible courses of action. How the idea can mean in advance what it agrees with is thus an idle question. "The process of organization is as much a process of securing a stimulus" (*i.e.*, meaning) "as it is a process of securing response" (*i.e.*, agreement).² The paradox is thus avoided, and meaning is accounted for without appeal to any factor transcending the momentary situation, which in the end, as it extends beyond the focus of adjustment, is just the physical world. How, at such points, it proves capable of modification into meanings, how existents can become subsistents, how the outside has an inside, – this is a mystery; but no more so than any other complexity appearing in the course of things over and above its more elemental factors. "That suggestion occurs is doubtless a mystery; but so is it a mystery that hydrogen and oxygen make water. It is one of the hard, brute facts that we have to take account of." Use a suggested thing, "develop it in connection with other meanings and employ it as a guide of investigation," and "you have a full-fledged meaning."³

The metaphysics implied in this logic, so much more consistently worked out than that of James, is evidently naturalism. What produces and supports all values, including truth, is the physical world, nature with living men as included in it. All verification is, in the last resort, physical. "Overt action is demanded if the worth or validity of the reflective considerations is to be determined. Otherwise, we have, at most, only a hypothesis that the conditions of difficulty are such and such, and that the *way* to get at them so as to get over or through them is so and so. This way must be tried in action; it must be applied, physically, in the situation... . That all knowledge, as issuing from reflection, is experimental (*in the literal physical sense of experimental*) is then a constituent proposition of this doctrine." I continue to quote, because these statements of Professor Dewey are the clearest and most definite in regard to this side of instrumentalism that I know. "*The reason is [thinking] is not an armchair thing is that it is not an event going on exclusively within the cortex or the cortex and the vocal organs....*

² B. H. Bode, "The Psychological Doctrine of Focus and Margin," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXIII, 1914, p. 403.

³ John Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 49, 50.

Hands and feet, apparatus and appliances of all kinds are as much a part of it as changes in the brain... Thinking is mental, not because of a peculiar stuff which enters into it or of peculiar non-natural activities which constitute it, but because of what physical acts and apparatus do; the distinctive purposes for which they are employed and the distinctive results which they accomplish." And "mere meaning" is "supernatural or transcendental nonsense 'Terms' signify that certain absent existences are indicated by certain given existences, in the sense that they are abstracted and fixed for intellectual use *by some physically convenient means, such as a sound or a muscular contraction of the vocal organs.*"⁴

It is evident that imageless thought would be indeed the great scandal of instrumentalism, worse than the incommensurability of the square's diagonal was for the Pythagoreans. But this is perhaps too controversial a matter to insist on now, though it seems to me of considerable importance in this connection. Imageless thought would mean a gap in that physical series which instrumentalism requires to be absolutely continuous, since it identifies terms entirely with things. If for the moment we pass over this, and some other questions which might be raised about the meaning of what is past, and so on, we must admit, I think, that the instrumentalists' account of the production of meanings in practical situations of physical adjustment really does clear many things up. In fact, its straightforward naturalism and realism, so far taken, are genuine elements of appeal and strength in their position.

But while the instrumentalists succeed better with the question of meaning than did James, it is doubtful whether they can as readily find room for theoretical knowing within their account as James could in his less strait and consistent theory. In one matter, to be sure, I believe that Professor Dewey's account is to be preferred here also. James usually regarded concepts as having two kinds of value. Their primary and direct use, of course, was to take the place of the many percepts which temporal and spatial limitations prevented our attaining and having directly; but then, in the second place, concepts have certain values of their own for our appreciation, especially as they fall into the systems of logic and mathematics. The enriching overtones and wider significances which such general meanings add to experience, and the thorough change in the perceptual which is thus accomplished, James did not emphasize. He had something of the impressionist about him, and his ideas and impressions rather co-existed than fused. Professor Dewey adequately recognizes this enriching character of the concept: "While reflective knowing is instrumental to gaining control in a troubled

⁴ John Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 13 f., and 51, note. Italics mine.

situation...it is also instrumental to the enrichment of the immediate significance of subsequent experiences. And it may well be that this by-product; this gift of the gods, is incomparably more valuable for living a life than is the primary and intended result of control, essential as is that control to having a life to live... . There exists no disjunction between æsthetic qualities which are final yet idle, and acts which are practical or instrumental."⁵ This states the matter well; but ought not such a recognition of the work of mind, and of the smooth continuity of the notional with the total texture of experience, to have some modifying effect upon the naturalistic basis of this theory?

These functions of concepts are, however, only a small part of the problem of theoretical truth. The real question, of course, is whether there are not thought-situations never adequately to be stated in naturalistic terms. That the situations with which the theorist deals have, taken in their entirety, physical factors and effects, may be in one sense true; but can they be adequately defined in terms of these, or are these relevant to his specific interests in them? Once on a time, the scientific account of comets destroyed some false beliefs concerning their ominous significance for human affairs, and thereby changed men's actions. That result is over and done. Should the scientist now withdraw his interest in comets as no longer vital, or is he justified in continuing to study them? And if so, why? How can the study in any way help us to a desired control which is other than intellectual? I can think of but two replies to such questions as these, from the point of view of a naturalistic instrumentalism: either it might be said that such study and interest is a prophylactic against the superstition which might return if it lapsed, or a faith might be asserted that no knowledge whatever will be without practical effects sometime, somewhere. Neither answer seems very satisfactory.

Professor Dewey, of course, recognizes the scientific interest; but it is described as a professional or specialist interest. "In the actual stress of any needed determination it is of the greatest importance to have a large stock of possible meanings to draw on, and to have them ordered in such a way that we can develop each promptly and accurately, and move quickly from one to another. It is not to be wondered at then that we not only conserve such suggestions as have been previously converted into meanings, but also that we (or some men at least) turn professional inquirers and thinkers; that meanings are elaborated and ordered in related systems quite apart from any immediately urgent situation." "As a specialised class of scientific inquirers develops, terms that were originally *by-products* of reflection become primary objects

⁵ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 17 f.

for the intellectual class. The troubles which occasion reflection are then *intellectual* troubles, discrepancies within some current scheme of propositions and terms... . The resulting objects – the terms and propositions – are for all, except those who produce them, instruments, not terminal objects.”⁶ How such discrepancies are physically present, as the general theory seems to require, is not stated. Presumably they must be incompatible contractions of the vocal organs or other like activities of gesture or speech, such as terms are defined as being. It has been said that the imagery of Platonists is probably of the visual type, and the same remark, I believe, has been made concerning the British Empiricists. One wonders whether a psychological census of the instrumentalists would not put most of them, – or all, – in the ‘motilist’ class. However this may be, such statements as those just quoted concerning theoretical reflection seem to take two things for granted: first, that naïve experience raises no problems save those of action; and second, that the theoretical interest makes no appeal to any but the specialistic few.

But is it not true, in the first place, that it is common sense which produces most of the problems for which Professor Dewey sometimes reproaches philosophy, since he regards them as unreal and futile? How a mind can know things, how the soul and body are related to each other, – these and other problems are involved in notions which are earlier than philosophy. What philosophy has done is to help men to think their way through them, and sometimes out of them, or, in sheer weariness, by them. The enthusiastic return of the instrumentalist to “naïve realism” is that of a highly sophisticated wanderer, and its full meaning can be appreciated only by those who have likewise wandered. Deliberate abstinence from metaphysics is an unnatural and laborious attainment, to achieve which requires the arduous training of philosophy.

For, in the second place, it is true that to theorize is natural to man. Men delight in theorizing, in taking synoptic views of experience, and the contemplative mind has its own rights, – and duties. A philosophy which devotes itself to the reflective satisfaction of this interest in theory is not “undemocratic,” but more broadly humane than one which rejects this task. Some years ago a book was written in which pragmatism was described as the philosophy of a materialistic democracy, envying and suspecting intellectual superiority, and bent on comfort and success at the expense of truth. James thereupon characterized the book as a “sociological romance.” Is there not something of the sociological romance in the frequent assumption that only instru-

⁶ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 49, 59 f.

mentalism is genuinely democratic, since other philosophies are devoted to the 'aristocratic' end of contemplation, and scorn to concern themselves with the urgent difficulties of ordinary men? Philosophy as a program of social reform is not a new thing in the world, and it is the business of thought to enable men to appreciate the good they already have as well as to enable them to bring new good into being. It is the business of philosophy, also, to raise the principles on which men act to the level of explicit reflection and system, in order that they may be criticised and tested, and also in order that the ideal achievement of one generation may be preserved for the generations that follow. These are all human interests, and their successful realization can be only through speculation and theory.

It is characteristic that instrumentalism, speaking broadly, has been most successful in the field of ethics, where its methodology is practically a theory of the subject matter as well. No system which omits a metaphysic is a complete philosophy, and such systems in the past have never preserved their equilibrium against the normal metaphysical impulse. But while instrumentalism in its present form is certainly naturalistic, Professor Dewey tells us that it neither will nor can be a metaphysic. Particular explanations of particular facts are all it either gives or requires. "The chief characteristic trait of the pragmatic notion of reality is precisely that no theory of Reality in general, *überhaupt*, is possible or needed. It occupies the position of an emancipated empiricism or a thoroughgoing naïve realism. It finds that 'reality' is a *denotative* term, a word used to designate indifferently everything that happens... . Pragmatism is content to take its stand with science...for science finds all such events to be subject-matter of description and inquiry."⁷ The meaningless problem of determining the real by way of contrast with the unreal is thus rejected; but along with it goes every discrimination between the constituents of the real as to significance for a general theory of reality. In fact, there is no such theory; the sciences are enough.

Two questions arise in regard to this refusal to be metaphysical: (1) Is it consistently adhered to? (2) Is it a sufficient justification, supposing its propriety were admitted, for a certain noteworthy gap in instrumentalism?

Instrumentalism takes its stand with the sciences. But among the sciences, for its own purposes as a general theory of control, it finds biology especially significant. Now the most striking characteristic of modern biological theory is that it comprises two classes of ideas, widely different in nature and tendency. To the one class belong the ideas of

⁷ *Creative Intelligence*, p. 55.

organism and environment, stimulus and response, adaptation and selection, and all the intellectual apparatus of the evolution-hypothesis; to the other belong Mendelian determinants, unit-characters, and all the mechanics of heredity. The latter may be congenial matter for the contemplation of an analytic realist; but they have no special appeal for the instrumentalist, and they are in logical contradiction with any genuine evolution. This does not especially perplex the working biologist, perhaps, so far as he is not concerned with ultimate logical consistency; *he* is dealing with particular 'events' as "subject-matter of description and inquiry." But it is a matter of vital interest for the instrumentalist, and he does not hesitate to select the first set of ideas as his categories, because they enable him to reflectively construe experience, while the other set, used in the same inclusive and analogical way, do not. Now what is this selective use of categories, so far as it goes, but the method of a critically speculative metaphysics? And what forbids us to push it farther, to recognize frankly the limits of naturalistic explanation, and so add to this view of things the peculiar qualities of the real that thought reveals as it frees itself from the network of immediate circumstance?

I come in conclusion to the "noteworthy gap" mentioned above. It has been sometimes objected that instrumentalism does not face the mind and body problem; that the reflex-arc theory might perhaps state the conditions under which intellection appears, but did not account for consciousness. Now the instrumentalist, so far as he conducts his discussion with the idealist, may counter with the remark that neither does idealism account for mind. But it must be replied that idealism presupposes mind systematically, which is a very different matter: it regards reality as always and everywhere involving thought as well as things. Thus, making thought an ultimate factor in experience, Hegel for instance may be asked what work or place is left for individual mind, perhaps; or he may be asked how mind and body are related in an individual conscious organism. Such questions may be reasonably addressed to the objective idealist; but he cannot be reasonably asked to account for mind in general. But this is just what instrumentalism must be asked to do, since it systematically refuses to presuppose mind, and recognizes only particular cases, so to speak, of mind arising from situations in which there was no mind in any sense. And this is just the question which instrumentalism is necessarily incapable of answering, because it insists on remaining a method of particular cases, and relying on the naturalistic explanation of these.

These statements require some further explanation. Reflection, as the instrumentalist rightly insists, arises in situations which are non-reflectional: "situations of prizing and aversion, of seeking and finding, of

converse, enjoyment and suffering, of production and employment, of manipulation and destruction.” Such phrases, the use of the term ‘experience’ to cover the whole continuum of situations and reflections, and the description of these situations as “social, affectional, technological, æsthetic, and so on,” apparently imply that another form of consciousness is present where reflection is not. But we must not suppose that this is meant *universally*; we are warned against such an understanding of these statements. “Consciousness is only a very small and shifting portion of experience... . In the experience, and in it in such a way as to *qualify* even what is shinningly apparent, are all the physical features of the environment, extending out into space no one can say how far, and all the habits and interests, extending backward and forward in time, of the organism... . And if we are asked why not then use a general objective term like ‘world,’ or ‘environment,’ the answer is that the word ‘experience’ suggests something indispensable which these terms omit: namely, an actual focussing of the world at one point in a focus of immediate shining apperency.”⁸

The instrumentalist use of the term ‘experience,’ then, does not connote that consciousness is present even when reflection or judgment is not; but it means rather that consciousness is present *somewhere* in the world, and that the rest of the world is in ‘dynamic connection’ with it. There remains the question: Is consciousness in some form present *sometimes* when reflection is not? In other words, is there such a thing as non-reflective, “immediate” consciousness? And, as far as Professor Dewey is concerned, the answer seems, at first glance, to be plainly affirmative. The passages already quoted concerning the enrichment of subsequent experience by reflection which appears primarily as control, and many others of the same kind, plainly indicate this.⁹ In fact, the ideas of tension, conflict, and so on, as yet unsolved, but stimulants to intellectual activity, connote such non-reflective consciousness. And if we have some lingering suspicion that its status is left uncertain, and that after all it may be taken as physiological behavior with *no* conscious side, these may be removed by examining such a fuller statement of instrumentalist psychology as that now given by Professor Bode.¹⁰ It is there made plain that what is essential is the explanation of consciousness as an organization of behavior with regard to future consequences: “The rendering of future stimulations or results into terms of present existence. Consciousness is a name for a certain change

⁸ Quotations from Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 2, 3, 6–7.

⁹ Cf., for example, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 4, 23 (the remark about “imagination”), 62 f.

¹⁰ See his essay in *Creative Intelligence*, pp. 228–81.

that takes place in the stimulus; or, more specifically, it is a name for the control of conduct by future results or consequences." This applies to perception as well as to judgment, "to every form of quality and relation."¹¹

Consciousness then has two forms: unreflective and reflective. But it is always a particular activity of individual organic adjustment, and judgment is simply the sort of adjustment or control required when the kind of response needed is as yet unknown. It is worth noticing, also, that there is a very pretty correspondence between Professor Dewey's account of judgment and Professor Bode's account of consciousness, so far as the latter reinterprets the current psychological distinction of "focus and margin." What judgment terminates in is a thing known, and not knowledge, says Professor Dewey; what is at the focus is a thing in the physical world, a thing perceived, and not consciousness, says Professor Bode. Consciousness is the 'margin,' where control is in the making, where the stimulus is changing.

As it stands, then, this psychology is consistent as well as acute; there are certain parallels in it to Hegel's account of subjective mind which are interesting, but must be omitted here. My present question is: Is this psychology a sufficient account of mind? It confines itself to the topics of perception and of judgment. What can it do, at one extreme, with feeling, and at the other, with the recognition of other minds, with knowing the same truth as others do, and with the acknowledgment of the social institutions which embody common interests and ideals? What can it do, that is, with enjoyments and aversions? And how can it account for the universal and the social in conscious experience, and for what Hegel called 'objective mind'?

That enjoyment and aversion may be elements in control, or results of control, is admitted. On the theory proposed, however, they can be elements only if they have already been results; and as *results* (that is, as 'focal') they are *not* consciousness. One may be ready to grant the truth of James's shrewd remark that pleasures and pains are ambiguous things, which may be taken as either 'physical' or 'psychical.' But to take them as ever not 'psychical' at all seems absurd.

The second question is, of course, a more serious one. At first sight, it may seem surprising that it should be asked. Is instrumentalism, which makes so much of the social, incapable of really recognizing it, compatibly with its general theory? The answer is: Yes, if it remains naturalistic and positivistic; if it insists on regarding everything that is real as a particular fact or event in the physical world. Take the character of my friend, for instance. It is something which I judge and

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 243, 244.

infer; but it is even more something which I sympathetically appreciate. It is good for what it is, more than for what it does. It belongs to an order of ideal goods, which rise out of nature but are not physical; and my adaptation or response to it must take place by an inner assimilation to it. It is no event, or series of events, though it may be in part a result of events, and a cause of further events. How can it be known, on the account of the instrumentalists' psychology, for which mind is always particular reactions in a particular organism?

Or again, take any institution of organized society, such as a school system. It is the product of human wills and purposes, it is a means to realize certain interests, and it makes use of and includes physical things as well as human acts. But what holds it together, maintains it, and keeps it going, is a common recognition of an end as valuable. This end is subject to revision and change; but for the most part it serves as a standard to judge by, instead of a problem to judge about. How is it known as a common end? It is not, while being used as a standard, the result of that judgment; and it is not, of course, in a sensational margin. So apparently it is not in 'consciousness'; but neither is it any other event or fact in nature.

All of this corresponds to the remark already made that thought must enable us to know and appreciate attained good as well as to create new; or again, to the statement that developed social control involves a factor which is at once independent of that particular case of control, and also not adequately described as a fact, event, or thing in the physical world. For what happens in such cases as these is no pre-established harmony, but a unity of action created from within by a common recognition of a common good. Nature thus turns out to be more than its first appearance as physical.

Any reader who has followed to this point will, I hope, have read between the lines of the objections to instrumentalism an acknowledgment of its real achievements. The conclusions of the argument maybe summarily stated as follows: First, the naturalism of instrumentalism, as it stands, is at odds with its insistence on moral values; second, instrumentalism ought to subordinate naturalism, and become whole-heartedly metaphysical. If it did so, it would make instrumentalism itself a chapter in a new development of idealism.

FOOTNOTES TO FORMAL LOGIC

Charles H. Rieber. "The Modern Indictment of Formal Logic," and portions of "Novelty and Identity in Inference." In *Footnotes to Formal Logic*, *University of California Publications in Philosophy* vol. 3, no. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1918. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 8–33, 169–77.

Chapter I The Modern Indictment of Formal Logic

I

The new theories of thought all make a common criticism upon the old idealistic Formal Logic. Whether we call these modern theories of knowledge pragmatic, realistic or empirical, matters little for our present purpose. They all agree in saying that the conceptual, a priori logic has never undertaken to set forth the conditions out of which actual thought has arisen; nor has it defined the principles that estimate the success of thought's accomplishments. It has no theory of the *whence* and the *whither* of thought. "What we have to reckon with," Professor Dewey writes, "is not the problem of How can I think *überhaupt*? but How shall I think right *here and now*? not what is the test of thought at large, but what validates and confirms *this* thought."¹

I wish to submit at once, and it will be one of the central contentions of these studies that it is unfair to the formal logician, even of the old orthodox type, to say that he is unwilling to take notice of the concrete facts, that he has a contempt for the particulars, that the universals are more precious to him than the particular cases to which they apply. Only a hasty and reckless idealist affirms any such doctrine. An essential part of thought is always engaged in the effort to reach final truths – propositions that are not merely finally true in the sense of being a complete and adequate adjustment to an immediate situation, but truths that are certain and universally valid. Even the most zealous defender of the modern "flowing philosophy," admits the existence of this logic *überhaupt*, albeit, he insists that it is a useless pursuit. Another part of thought, which regards itself just as essential, attempts to arrive at

¹ *Studies in Logical Theory* (University of Chicago Press, 1903), p. 3.

practical truth; it is concerned with the reconstruction of the "immediate situation." Now, Experimental Logic asserts its competency to pass judgment not only upon its own pragmatic process, but also upon the epistemological aspirations of the Real Logic. And it is to this basic doctrine of the new school that the old school registers its earnest caveat.

The idealism represented in these pages is of a very old-fashioned type. It essays to defend even so abstract an idealist as Plato against the assaults of the modern realist.² It has often been said that the logic of Platonism, or any absolute idealism, drives one either to pure intellectualism or to pure mysticism. But even Plato did not put the whole emphasis in his thinking on the theory of knowledge. Philosophy was for him, to be sure, primarily a discipline of the mind; but it was a discipline which ended always in the service of action; it was the propaedeutic for character. Thought was quite as pragmatic for Plato as it is for any of the modern voluntarists, only it was pragmatic, I should say, in a thoroughly defensible sense. The mind's essential nature is exhibited in its everlasting aspiration after truth. But perfect insight, genuine wisdom, has as *its* essential characteristic the inevitable necessity of expressing itself. The knowledge that the mind wins must flow out into character. Man's complete life consists not only in thinking perfect thoughts, working them out like nuggets of gold, but also in coining them into action. Plato insisted always that Logic is the absolutely indispensable prerequisite of Ethics, and, conversely, that Ethics was the inevitable outcome of Logic.

Logic in the fullest sense of the word is therefore the source, but not the final goal of the Platonic philosophy, or of any serious idealism. Insight is not for its own sake but for the sake of action. Knowledge turns not inward upon itself, but outward upon conduct. It is practical; it is pragmatic. According to the sublime Platonic formula of life (even in its most modern interpretation by Caird, Royce, Howison and others), knowledge is virtue, not, knowledge is knowledge. Plato would have agreed entirely with a modern up-to-date metaphorical epigram; "knowledge that turns inward upon itself creates a current so hot that it burns out the fuse."

Knowledge begins with surprise and ends in the rational dissipation of

² In these studies I shall often speak of instrumentalism, realism, and pragmatism as if they were identical doctrines. I am, of course, fully aware of the several points of vital difference which have been insisted upon by various members of the two schools. But for the purpose of the contrast with idealism we may neglect these differences and deal with their central agreement. Both realism and instrumentalism declare that thinking is instrumental or reconstructive and not constructive as idealism always professes. They hold that thought finds real brute existences in the world of presented fact – structures that are not created but discovered.

surprise; it is original, underived, reminiscent. This is the basic doctrine of Plato's philosophy which has been echoed and reëchoed through twenty-three centuries of idealism. But now we must bear in mind that it is not pure wonder, just unalloyed surprise, but rather a troubled wonder that is the source of knowledge. We are not and cannot be just the passive happy spectators of a stream of fugitive impressions flitting across the stage of consciousness. The presentations from the sense world come as competing alternatives. This it is very important to remember in considering any conceptual logic. The Platonic conception of wonder has lent itself to poetic imagination and striking rhetoric, but it is a misunderstanding of it that makes it synonymous with pure reverie, mystic contemplation. Consciousness is not merely passive, it is essentially active. All waking consciousness is one continuous affirmation, an affirmation which, to be sure, always expresses itself in a disjunctive judgment, as we shall see later. Now Plato insisted – at times with almost indignant emphasis – that sense presentations are incapable of thickening up into any final meaning, or validity of their own. Objects of sense perception are always particulars. And no accumulation of particulars by sheer juxtaposition or association can yield true knowledge. An aggregate of particulars is just another particular. Knowledge presupposes universals. There is, therefore, a world of ideas above this world of fleeting sense perception. And the mere beginner in the study of Platonic philosophy knows that the ideas are entities, genuine objects of knowledge, and that they must never be taken as states of consciousness merely.

The New Logic cancels the distinction between origin and validity, between what we discover about a particular fact through an analysis of its present content, and what we learn about it by an historical study of the conditions of its birth and development. Professor Dewey³ says of the orthodox logician: "He deals with the question of the eternal nature of thought and its eternal validity in relation to an eternal reality. He is concerned, not with genesis, but with value, not with a historic cycle, but with absolute distinctions and relations"; and again: "We have no choice save either to conceive of thinking as a response to a specific stimulus, or else to regard it as something 'in itself,' having just in and of itself certain traits, elements, and laws. If we give up the last view, we must take the former."

It is an engaging and important question which instrumental Logic asks; How does empirical science come by its general principles, and particularly how does it prove them? But the idealistic Logic has always insisted that this is not the same as the determination of the principles of

³ *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 14.

knowledge. If the New Logic intends merely to assert that we never reach a conclusion unless we have already come by it through experience, no idealist will take exception. There is a deep truth in the assertion that we believe first and prove afterward or not at all. We do not know because we have reasoned but we reason because we know. Kant was very explicit on this point. He says, "Logic, on the contrary, being the general propaedeutic of every use of the understanding and of the reason, can not meddle with the sciences, and anticipate their matter, and is therefore only a *universal Art of Reason*, the art of making any branch of knowledge accord with the form of the understanding. Only so far can it be called an organon, one which serves not for the *enlargement*, but only for the *criticism and correction* of our knowledge."⁴

I need only refer to a significant fact that has been pointed out frequently, namely, that several different meanings – some of them quite diametrically opposed – have been given to the term "practical" as applied to judgment. Even the pragmatists who may now be said to have appropriated to themselves the "trade mark," of the term practical, seem to differ widely in their definition of it. In Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical reason, the theoretical reason is always practical, or pragmatic, although certainly not in the sense in which the word is employed in some of the recent theories of judgment. When the pragmatist declares that all judgments are practical, does he mean to assert that the object of the judgment is *created* in the act of judging? The question as to precisely what the expression "creates its own object" may mean – the question upon the answer to which depend so many vital issues in Logic – will be considered more fully in a later chapter in dealing with the postulated objectivity in thought. I wish only to say, in passing, that this creative activity is the essence of all the alleged theoretical judgments in any type of idealism, even the most ancient. The primary object of the *Critique of the Pure Reason* was to show that thought does actually create its object; or, the least we may say, is that it assists in its creation, in so far as it supplies the form that matter must take in knowledge.

Any Logic that regards all judgments as practical labors under this inherent difficulty. How can any concrete, particular instance of knowing hope, at one and the same time, to *create* a valuable object and to *know* its creation as valuable. I am restating, I know, a very familiar and old criticism of pragmatism when I say that value cannot be regarded as the hidden worth within a situation, which needs only to be brought to light, or evaluated. Value is not the self-determined issue of

⁴ *Introduction to Logic*; translated by T. H. Abbott (London, Longmans, 1885), p. 3.

facts. Value proceeds from the activity which relates particular to universal, fact to law. The world of value is beyond the world of fact in the same sense that the straight line is beyond the curve which it determines.

Pragmatic logicians are over-filled with the spirit of natural science. This they say, begins with practical definitions and follows practical methods to practical conclusions. Natural science has come to have such an enormous place in the common life, as well as in the academic world, that we can readily see how the New Logic has come by its over-weening sense of the importance and certainty of the scientific method. The enthusiastic devotees of natural science easily win the approbation of the fickle public, when they contrast the definite advance which the so-called pragmatic sciences have made, with the confusion and dispute which we seem still to find in the world of speculative Logic. The experimental logician insists that the difficulty with all the philosophical sciences – and not less so with Logic than with any of the others – is that they are all destitute of either accurate, initial definitions or certain methods, for the solution of their problems. The analysis and the evaluation of judgments of practice without external points of orientation would be as difficult as the determination of a system of conics without the axes of reference. The conditions of assertion are manifold – sometimes operating singly, but for the most part combined in amazing complexity.

It is the task of practical thought (upon this point the idealist agrees entirely with the pragmatist) to determine in what measure each of the antecedents enters into the joint effect. The difficulty in accomplishing this task is the same as the difficulty that we meet elsewhere in the inductive sciences, for example, in the application of Mill's Method of Agreement. There the plurality of causes renders the causal determination uncertain. And as in the world of *outer* natural sciences we find plurality of causes and intermixture of effects so in the world of *inner* natural science we discover each phenomenon to be the meeting-point of converging strands of conditions coming out of the past and diverging strands of effects going out into the future. They are like the knots in a net into which and from which various cords run. All of this is a most interesting study in Psychology but it is not Logic. However cleverly phenomena may be explained as the cross-section of the evolutionary series, that is, as the meeting-point of forces, there still remains to be explained the essential identity or form of the whole.

II

Every act of thought is in the first instance an immediate presence, but it is also embedded in a continuum. This continuum, in its entirety, is

reality. It includes the present thinking, and it is or may be the object of that present thinking. We have illustrated here the axiom of higher mathematics that the part can be put into a one to one correspondence with the whole of which it is a genuine part. On this point I should differ from Professor Dewey in the central thesis of his system that "thinking is set in a continuum which is not an object of thought."⁵ On the view which I am presenting it is evident that the term reality is not so "particularly treacherous," as Professor Dewey thinks. There is no contradiction in its two uses – as a term of indefinite reference and as a term of discriminate reference. The part of the continuum which is out of sight and is, therefore, not an object of thought is in the instrumental view, nevertheless, always *suggested* by the present thinking. Now the difference between the idealistic and the instrumental theory of judgment hinges upon the meaning of the word *suggest*. The instrumentalist says that this suggested aspect of the continuum is never a part of the *given*; the idealist insists that the suggested fact is already in a profound sense a present fact, otherwise it would not be even suggested. Idealism provides, without contradiction, for both the discrete and the continuous aspect of the whole within which present thinking is set. Bradley and his followers, in making reality the ultimate subject in judgment have kept in mind these two uses of the word.⁶

Moreover, I can not think it wholly just to the traditional theories of knowledge to say with Professor Dewey that they were concerned entirely with the "question of the eternal nature of thought and its eternal validity in relation to an eternal reality – that they were engaged, not with the genesis but with value, not with a historic cycle, but with absolute distinctions and relations."⁷ The old pre-Darwinian metaphysics did not ignore the question of genesis, but it saw that all historical questions are at last dependent upon questions of value, upon absolute distinctions. Even Plato recognized the fact that truth and falsity were organically related to practical life, to action, to the very needs in concrete experience upon which the logic of pragmatism lays such emphasis. And it is not attributing to Plato doctrines that are not his, to say, in the terminology of the new theory, that he did not teach that truth and falsity should be wholly divorced from the particular activities that we perform at a specific need. But he would reply to the

⁵ *Experimental Logic*, p. 10.

⁶ Bosanquet says: "The subject in every judgment of Perception is some given spot or point in sensuous contact with the percipient self. But as all reality is continuous, the subject is not *merely* this given spot or point." *Logic* (ed. 2; Oxford Press, 1911), I, 78.

⁷ *Logical Theory*, p. 14.

pragmatists today in the spirit of his reply to the sophists, "The constructions of these specific activities are not true unless they conform not only to the intra-temporal *is* but to the supra-temporal *ought*."

Professor Schiller asks the logician of the old school a simple question which he rightly says cannot be shirked: "When he asserts what seems to him a truth does he take any steps to ascertain whether or not it is 'objective,' and whether other men (all or any) agree with him? If he does, what are they and what is their logical value? If he does not, why should not his claim be treated as a random one?"⁸ But now this is precisely the question which a score of critics have been asking the pragmatist for the last two decades. In an essay on "Pragmatism and the *a priori*" printed in 1905, I said:

A judgment must be more than a mere effort to reconstruct the situation in which we find ourselves from moment to moment; so much is, of course, the first condition it must fulfil. But in addition to being a successful present response, it must be true. This requires that it not only conform to a passing *is*, but to a permanent *ought*. Each judgment of mine is, in one aspect, my response to a present situation. But before I am entitled to call it true, I must know why the response has been what it is; that is, I must be able to say that another than myself would have responded to the situation in precisely the same way.

Experimental Logic tells us that we must take all of our problems, logical, ethical, and even religious, to experience for solution. We must let the particular concrete facts of sense experience tell their story. But the result is, as I have tried to point out, experience has in the end no necessary story to tell. Did not Hume prove that once for all? If we follow the realist far enough, as he lets facts recite their tale of explanation, he invariably brings us back to the point from which he set out. He displays a remarkable combination of true insight, with what seem inexcusable lapses from reason in his empirical explanations. These modern apostles of the "flowing philosophy," are standing upon a platform from under which all support has been taken. The pragmatist proceeds with his empirical test for truth paying no heed to the constant protest of the idealist against the circular reasoning that is involved in any attempt to make experience self-explanatory. To the idealist's question, How do you explain the contradiction in experience? he replies naïvely, "There are no contradictions." Of course no contra-

⁸ *Mind*, n. s. XVIII (1909), 402.

diction will ever be discovered in experience if he test experience by itself.

The difference between the idealistic and the pragmatic interpretation of experience is to be found in the way in which each of the two schools reads off the relationship between external and internal meaning. For the idealist the whole problem of knowledge reduces itself to the question, How are primary or internal meanings of ideas related to their secondary or apparently external meanings? For the realist, the pragmatist, and in fact for every type of positivist, the question is, How are the brute facts of the primary objective reality related to the secondary apparently internal meanings which we call ideas? If experience be taken in a wide sense as synonymous with the entire content of consciousness, and thus made to cover both the active as well as the passive aspects of thought, then of course the idealist would agree with the empiricist that the laws of thought, as well as the laws of existence come from experience.

III

The critics of Formal Logic have failed, I venture to think, to distinguish between the thought form and the language form in which that thought form expresses itself. The two are not the same; and Formal Logic deals with form in the first, not the second sense. Professor Sidgwick says, "Preoccupied as Logic has chosen to be with forms of statement, it cannot wholly desert the idea that the meaning of a statement is something that belongs to its form, instead of the form being a more or less successful attempt on the part of a speaker to express a meaning."⁹ Not all teachers of Formal Logic, I am sure, would agree with this statement. The translation of the literary or rhetorical forms of statements into the logical form of thought, is the work of the grammarian and the philologist. We admit that the grammatical form is often highly ambiguous, and that it is a more or less successful attempt on the part of the speaker to express a meaning – it is a thought form. But the thought forms are not ambiguous, although they have manifold meanings. It is the work of the formal logician to explicate the various implications, or manifold meanings.

It is a significant fact that in its indictment of the Traditional Logic the New Logic does not condemn formal reasoning *in toto*. Sidgwick says: "We do occasionally reason about the extensive relation of two accepted classes to each other by means of the relation of each of them to a third class, and for that purpose we may put letters like X, Y, and Z, in place

⁹ *Elementary Logic*, p. 166.

of the terms and so test the validity of a syllogism apart from the truth of its premises and conclusion." (*Elementary Logic*, p. 164). Now the defenders of Formal Logic may well regard this as a concession of the greatest importance. If there can be found a single instance where the form of thought does not have to wait upon the matter, controversy is at an end and the formal logicians have won the debate. This is all that Formal Logic has ever contended for, and we do not here avail ourselves of the principles that the exception proves the rule in the narrower sense of that axiom. These instances, where it is admitted that we reason formally, are abstractions from the concrete situations, and if the form can be divested of its matter in a single instance there is nothing to prevent our applying the principle universally.

Formal Logic, today, has set for itself the task of determining all indefinable concepts and all indemonstrable propositions. The several contributors to the volume on *Logic* in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* are quite in agreement on this point. We must bear in mind, however, that the modern process of logical definition consists in pursuing a concept back to some prior indefinable concept. And we must always remark that, when we are dealing with a class of inter-related concepts, it is often immaterial which of the group are taken as the indefinable prerequisites of the others. In like manner the present-day Formal Logic regards the process of demonstration as the reduction of all propositions to the least number of indemonstrable propositions. And here, too, in considering any collection of propositions constituting a real group it is immaterial to the structure of the group which is placed in the position of the indemonstrable proposition, and which are its derivatives.¹⁰

IV

Of the four authors who in recent years have led the attack on Formal Logic, Dr. Mercier is the most vehement in his denunciations of the traditional system. He thinks it a serious indictment that among the foremost writers on the subject, since the time of Aristotle, no two are agreed on what the subject matter is, what its limits are, or even whether it is a science or an art. He insists that it is neither logical nor useful to write upon a subject without first determining the nature of the subject matter. But this I think is not a serious indictment. Many investigators are doing most logical and most useful work in Dr. Mercier's own special province of insanity, and yet we may say of these workers, as Dr.

¹⁰ Cf. Croce, *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, I, 186. "It depends on us whether any particular axiom be taken as a theorem and any particular theorem as an axiom, according to the order which we adopt in our deductions."

Mercier says of the formal logicians, that no two writers on the subject since the time of Pinel have agreed as to precisely who should be included in the class, insane.

In his attack upon the Traditional Logic, Dr. Mercier has said that the system which he has propounded is so different from all previous expositions as to warrant the title, *A New Logic*, which he has given to his book. But in the opening pages of the volume we find him giving an account of the nature of the reasoning process almost identical with that which Aristotle gave in the *Prior Analytics*. Dr. Mercier maintains that there are three processes of reasoning – induction, deduction and analogy. Now, however much logicians through the centuries may have differed from Aristotle in their own personal opinions at the nature of the reasoning process, they have all admitted that we owe to him the tripartite division of the reasoning process into analogy, deduction and induction. Although Dr. Mercier has condemned in very emphatic language the whole of Traditional Logic, yet when he comes to his own account of the three types of reasoning he says, when writing about deduction: “The Logic expounded in that book is the Logic of Inference; of Consistency; of Proof and Disproof; of Form. Useless in the discovery of Fact; ignoring the truth or falsity of the matter of which it treats; its value is in testing Consistency; in argument, in explicating, convincing, refuting. This is the field of Traditional Logic.”¹¹ We thus observe that while denying the uselessness of the Traditions Logic in the discovery of facts, Dr. Mercier nevertheless accords to it a wide field of usefulness in other directions.

Dr. Mercier criticizes the logicians of the old school because they employ a nomenclature that is often inappropriate and ambiguous. He discovers, in the words describing the classification of propositions as real and verbal, a clear misnomer in the term, verbal; “for all propositions,” he says, “are expressed in words, and are therefore verbal. Here therefore at the very outset of our logical studies, we meet with a striking instance, the first of very many, of the inaccuracy, looseness, and ambiguity with which words, the material of their craft, are used by logicians.”¹² But I submit that we should none of us write much upon the subject of Logic or upon any other subject, if we waited until words said exactly what they mean, or meant exactly what they said. It is interesting to observe, also, that the classification which Dr. Mercier suggests, instead of the one ordinarily found in textbooks, is itself not free from ambiguity of the very kind which he criticises. We are all of us at the mercy of vocabulary.

¹¹ *New Logic*, p. 11.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

The idealists join the empiricists in deploring the imperfection of language as a means of conveying thought about first principles. It is not a new discovery that language is inadequate to speculative thought. Nor does it require elaborate proof to show that language was created for the utilitarian purpose of communication in the world of appearances. The idealist, therefore, describes his conceptions of final reality very unsatisfactorily by means of a vocabulary which has had its origin in the world of relative reality. All who believe in the world of things that abide, must therefore express themselves imperfectly by myth, parable or metaphor. Plato, Christ and Buddha often deplored the defects of language in their attempt to teach the glad tidings of salvation through the sense of the universal. The scientist and the pragmatic thinker in general, who traffic in things seen, are not so handicapped by the short comings of language as are those who are concerned with the unseen. We make many allowances for the scientist when he expresses himself in halting ways by means of our imperfect instrument of language, which does not keep pace, in its revisions, with the revisions of knowledge. We understand the astronomer when he says, "Tomorrow when the sun rises I shall make some observations." We do not rebuke him for the inaccuracy and expect him to say, "Tomorrow when the earth revolves and causes the sun to appear to rise, etc." The idealist bespeaks a like patience and tolerance from his hearers when he attempts to describe the still more distant realities by means of illustrations from the world of sense. He is fully aware that his metaphors are faulty, defective, and inconclusive.

V

The genetic theory of judgment, upon which pragmatism rests its entire logic, is stated most clearly and concisely by Mr. Schiller:

I cannot but conceive the reason as being, like the rest of our equipment, a weapon in the struggle for existence, and a means of achieving adaptation. It must follow that the practical use, which has developed it, must have stamped itself upon its inmost structure, even if it has not moulded it out of prerational instincts. In short, a reason which has not practical value for the purposes of life is a monstrosity, a morbid aberration or failure of adaptation, which natural selection must sooner or later wipe away.¹³

In the present essay I wish to reaffirm the central criticism that idealism has made upon the logic of pragmatism ever since its birth – in its

¹³ *Humanism: Philosophical essays* (London, Macmillan, 1903), p. 7.

present reincarnation – in Professor James' lecture on "Philosophical Conception and Practical Results," before the Philosophical Union of the University of California in 1898. I shall attempt to show, as I have maintained elsewhere¹⁴ that thought is not merely an instrument in the struggle for existence, not simply one of the devices with which nature has equipped us to secure a more comfortable adaptation to our environment. I shall contend that aside from being a useful instrument in the struggle for existence – its secondary and derived function – it has the more important primary office merely to be true. It has been asserted often in the history of Logic that thought has an external meaning, through which it refers to an end beyond itself, and an internal meaning which constitutes an end in itself. It is one function of judgment to be useful, that is, to reach out beyond itself. But its other and more fundamental function – a function without which that other function is meaningless – is just to be true, to be self-consistent.

Some pragmatists have hesitated to commit themselves to the doctrine that all judgments are practical. Such leaders, however, as Schiller, Sidgwick and Mercier have unhesitatingly declared, not only, that all truth works, but also that all that works is true. But Professor Dewey seems always to leave his readers in doubt as to precisely what view he holds. In his very latest utterances he has again failed to make his position clear.

In an article entitled, "An Alleged New Discovery in Logic" Mr. D. S. Robinson criticises Professor Dewey's *Experimental Logic* and remarks¹⁵ that he is in doubt whether Professor Dewey would say that all judgments are practical. In his rejoinder Professor Dewey admits "There is danger of a serious ambiguity in discussing practical judgments as a distinctive type and also intimating that in some sense all judgments may be practical." But when Professor Dewey "intimates" (not asserts), that "some" (not all) judgments "may be" (not are) practical, I, too, find myself in doubt. I am still old-fashioned enough in my idealistic convictions to think that the pragmatist can not avoid committing himself to at least one assertion that is not practical – or at any rate not practical in the same sense as the others – namely, this very judgment that all judgments are practical. And it is not mere quibbling to say that the judgment that all judgments are practical, is not itself a practical judgment. It is another way of saying that the judgments of utility are in one dimension of thought and the judgments that pronounce upon the members of the series of useful judgments are in a different dimension of thought.

¹⁴ "Pragmatism and the *a priori*," Present series, I (1904), pp. 72–91.

¹⁵ *Jour. philos. and psych.*, XIV, 225, April 26, 1917.

Empirical Logic¹⁶ has always declared that all definition presupposes a psychological treatment of mental states; and idealists have always admitted that a study of psychic facts as they are immediately presented to consciousness is indispensable to any doctrine of truth. But they insist that this is not the sufficient condition of truth; the apperceiving or unifying of the sense-presented facts is performed by the self-active principle of mind. If there is value to our individual experiences, as they come to us strung along in time, and if it is unnecessary to make this temporal validity rest back upon a validity that is not in time, all talk about a world of absolute truth and perfection is meaningless. If Experimental Logic is self-sufficing, then there is no Logic *überhaupt*.

Experimental Logic would explain my present thought by locating it between an a priori situation out of which it emerged and a subsequent situation into which it flows. Idealistic Logic maintains that the three situations – past, present and future – even when thus casually connected in the chronological series are not self-explanatory. There is exhibited in Instrumental Logic, we hold, the ancient fallacy of failure to distinguish between psychological cause and logical ground.

The logical coherence in our judgments, according to Experimental Logic, is our interest in the situation in which we find ourselves, when called upon to judge. We are constrained to reconstruct that part of the world with which we are in immediate contact. The union of the subject and predicate in judgment is the outer expression of this purpose or interest. This is certainly true as a psychological account of the judging process. But having said that interest or purpose is the cause of the inter-connection of ideas, we still have on our hands the more serious problem of finding the ground of the present purpose. This, as the idealist has often insisted, is not self-explanatory for cause and ground are not identical. It is one thing to say that we judge because we have a need, an interest, or a purpose; but an entirely different thing to discover the ground of this need. How may I know that this present purpose to reconstruct reality is a true purpose? Only when I have laid hold of a higher and ultimate purpose, namely, a criterion of this specific purpose. In short, I fail to see how purposes are capable of self-evaluation.

Experimental Logic while emphasizing effects of action as tests of validity, does not furnish a criterion by means of which we may distinguish good from bad effects. Every judgment reconstructs reality, and

¹⁶ There is an important sense in which every theory of judgment is empirical. When I say that a judgment, or anything else, is empirical, one implication always is that it might have been otherwise. And in our theory that judgment is just such a selection from competing alternatives presented to the mind, this constitutes one of the earliest and most basic characteristics of the judging consciousness. Wherever we find the possibility of error, we are dealing with empirical facts. And there is this paradox about

thereby helps to continue the present order, say the defenders of the new theory of knowledge. We pronounce the judgment true if it contributes to the existing order, and false if it does not. But now, in order that we may distinguish a good effect from a bad one, we need some criterion extrinsic to the situation to tell us why it is best to have the present system perpetuated. In every experimental logic, truth means objectivity, and its criterion is utility. But in the practical world there are different kinds of utility. If the useful is the true, we ought likewise to have grades of truth, and be able to speak of the true, the truer and the truest. This is, indeed, precisely what the pragmatist does say – a doctrine open to criticism, to say the least. Moreover, even if we admitted the possibility of gradations in truth (for the logic of realism insists that this is by no means manifestly absurd), the pragmatic test furnishes no criterion for distinguishing between the different kinds of truth. But it is evident that it is not mere utility, but utility of the right kind, that is needed to establish the objectivity in judgment.¹⁷

In every judgment, according to the pragmatic theory of knowledge, something new is added to the system of cognitions already in the possession of the one who judges. The test of the rationality of this *new* element is its compatibility with the *old*. If it works it is pronounced true, and is given its appropriate place in the established order. If it does not fit in with the old it is rejected as false. But this definition of truth is more adroit than accurate. Is not the pragmatist all the while begging the whole question? Does he not presuppose the truth or rationality of the *old*, namely, this thought system which he possesses at the moment of judgment? His criterion of inner consistency works very well, if we grant him enough rationality to start the process. The instrumentalist, I should say, borrows just enough of the idealistic insight to set his scheme in motion and then disavows the debt. The idealist has ever insisted that this determination of the primal rationality can never be achieved by a posteriori methods. That which is workable is not, for that reason alone, true. A new fact may fit in with the old, and yet may not know itself to be error, because it does not know the system into which it has been accepted, is false.

facts: to be real facts they must possess the inherent possibility of being different, and hence not facts.

¹⁷ Cf. Windelband, *Ency. Philos. Sci.*, I, 24. "And here we come on a double aspect of all logical laws: on the one hand they are rules for the empirical consciousness, according to which all thinking which has truth for its aim should be carried on; on the other they have their inner and independent significance and being, quite independent of the actual happening of ideational processes, which are or are not in accordance with them. We may call the latter their *value-in-themselves*, the former their *value-for-us*."

I cannot think that the total meaning of an idea is to be found by searching only forward from the idea to its consequences, as Professor James teaches, nor yet by looking both forward and back as Professor Dewey and his disciples insist. The deepest truth about thought is found in an entirely different dimension. It lies in a world that is logically prior to the postulates of either of these forms of pragmatism. Thought is constructive as well as reconstructive. It is not merely an instrument in the struggle for existence, but is itself legislatively sovereign over the process of evolution within which it manifests itself as an instrument. Not what an idea has come out of, nor what it is just now seen to be, nor what it is going to do hereafter, but what it eternally *is*, must furnish us with our deepest insight into the nature of thought.

VI

The agnostic realism at the heart of every form of pragmatic logic is not easy to refute. It has descended directly from the agnosticism of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The only way to dissolve this realism is to make use of Kant's own discovery, and pursue his logic to the legitimate conclusion of its own movement. Kant pointed out the path that must be pursued in order to explain the inherent contradictions in the realistic conception of causality. He demonstrated, it would seem for all time, that the principle of efficient causality cannot belong to reality, but that it is the mind's contribution to experience. However, he failed to see that for this very reason there can be no genuine datum in knowledge. If the facts of experience are really *given*, if they are thrown at the mind from the world of things in themselves – then this transcendent reality possesses the principle of efficient causality. This, however, Kant's own doctrine explicitly denies. His insight enables us to see what he himself seems never to have been fully aware of, that if the things-in-themselves have not in them the principle of efficient causality they are incapable of *giving* anything to mind. Things-in-themselves can not contribute *causally* to the content of knowledge.

The fundamental point at issue between Plato and Aristotle on the import of judgment has been perpetuated, in philosophical discussions, to the present day. The idealists say with Plato that necessary truth is that from which every purely material external or given element has been cancelled. The only truth is formal truth. The later-day pragmatic or instrumental logicians have insisted that truth as thus defined would be relegated to the world of mathematical abstraction, to the realm of "bloodless categories." Plato provided for a more vital connection between the universal and the particular, the abstract *and* the concrete than appears on the surface. Aristotle's attack on Plato on this subject was not entirely defensible. And no serious idealism at the present time

imposes this requirement on knowledge. Plato did not demand that the given, the concrete, the particular element in knowledge should vanish entirely. Now it is obviously a question as to the precise meaning of the *given*. The *given* may be so defined that it can be kept as a constituent element of the highest knowledge. A datum which is just hurled at a passive mind would, of course, contaminate knowledge and forever reduce it to relativity and incertitude. In perfect knowledge there can be no *Streng-gegebenes*, nothing genuinely novel or totally different. But the logic of naïve realism declares that such a *Streng-gegebenes* is an inexplicable and irreducible element of the knowing process. Absolute knowledge, it declares, is forever impossible; such opinions or beliefs as we have, we arrive at by a posteriori methods entirely. The logic of naïve realism and the Instrumental Logic declare that we are not at all concerned with the ultimate beginning of thought. In fact, thought cannot be traced back to its source. It cannot see itself start; it must simply accept itself as fact. But now it can be pointed out, even to the proverbial *plain man on the street*, that there can be no *arriving* at knowledge or anything else without *starting*. There must be a beginning somewhere, an initial point of departure which is itself underived.

VII

Empirical Logic has always dealt extensively with the word *fact*. All knowledge, it says, must have its foundation deep down in the world of concrete fact. To this we may reply: In order to *realize* itself, thought must, to be sure, pass through fact. This Plato never denied, and the student in the philosophy of Kant learns, almost in his first lesson that the a priori forms of thought are empty and without meaning, until they have received their material filling. Thought does not see itself start. But we are not warranted in saying that because it does not see itself start, it arrives without starting. Of course, men reasoned accurately before they knew the reason for their accurate reasoning. They followed out premises to their conclusion, or traced conclusions back to their grounds, guided by principles of correct thinking before those principles were noticed or understood, Aristotle was preceded by many centuries of exact thinking. It was not his primary purpose to make men rational – that, for the most part, they already were. He was interested to show men, by critical analysis, in what their existing rationality consisted.

Thought does first become aware of its own movement as it passes through fact – as it issues out of one situation to go over into another. But this is not the last step in its self-realization. It is an unjustified arrest of thought's activity not to allow it to pass through fact and, returning to itself, to discover the *underived* laws of its movement. Thought does find itself by the way of fact, but when its activity is

unhindered it passes to the higher level where it sees that itself furnishes the prior condition of the discovery of itself in the facts. To think actually, we must indeed think about something; this something, the object matter of thought, whatever it may be, must in the first instance be supplied through the medium of the senses. Thought itself does not become an object of thought until after it has been called into exercise by objects presented from without. But while the material or external element varies with every successive act of thought, the formal or internal element remains the same in all; thus the necessary law, or form, binding on the thinker in every instance, is distinguished from the contingent objects, about which he thinks on this or that occasion. Obviously the words *material*, *external*, and *object* are not here employed in any naïve sense. In a later chapter, when we come to discuss more in detail the nature of the objective element in thought we shall define the object entirely in terms of the expected self-transcendence of the subject.

The new pragmatic Logic and the modern realistic metaphysics underlying it – so their devotees frankly confess – acknowledge important contributions which they claim modern natural science makes to their doctrine. There has been a very prevalent tendency in the thinking of the last quarter of a century, to abandon or to ignore almost entirely what through all the ages has been considered the highest concern of the human mind, namely, the search for first principles, logically prior to the causal series and its validating ground in time and space. This tendency to abandon all attempts to orient our temporal experiences – our dynamic lives – by resting them back upon a static encircling reality is undoubtedly due to the enormous place that the method of natural science has come to occupy in the higher intellectual life of our time. The vast and comparatively sudden development in the biological sciences under the guidance of the master principle of evolution has filled many minds with an overpowering sense of the importance, the certainty and the usefulness of this principle in other fields. But there are yet many unshaken idealists,¹⁸ who still believe that Kant's first question, "What can I know and how do I know it?" has to be raised and answered, too, in a final and affirmative fashion, before the scientist has valid possession of his method even within the field where alone it is applicable. The validity of the scientific method, lies entirely in its application to its proper object, namely, the facts of sensible experience both

¹⁸ E.g., Windelband says: "Modern Metaphysic, with its attempt to piece itself together out of borrowings from the sciences, is far more contemptible than the old Ontology which, starting from the realm of validity, had at any rate the courage to attempt the deduction of the interconnection of the universe as an articulated whole." *Ency. Philos. Sci.*, I, 65.

inner and outer. But it does not follow that, because science can give no certitude in the real world beyond sense, there is no method of certainty possible in that super-sensible world. Metaphysics is absolutely indispensable to the existence of Logic or of any other science.

The theory of judgment that is offered in these pages demands an objective system which the judgment itself confesses must lie beyond its primary activity. But this postulated objectivity in judgment, as I shall try to show later, is not inconsistent with a monistic theory of the universe; it is even compatible with the most naïve subjective idealism. However, it provides for a relaxing of a too-rigid monistic ontology. When we declare that the subject awaits its object, and then define that object as no other than this expected self-transcending, synthetic achievement of the subject, we avoid the contradictions of an epistemological dualism on the one hand, and an ontological monism on the other. Both for knowledge and for existence the idea and its object are – to use Bradley's very apt expression – “coupled apart.”

The New Logic is distinguished from all the older idealistic systems by its refusal to accept the distinction between *ground in fact* and *ground in thought*. As has now frequently been pointed out, pragmatic Logic dispenses entirely with ontology in the historic sense of the word, and therefore, identifies the *cause* of the existence of serial facts – in their serial manifestation – and the *ground* of our thinking them serially. We hold that this distinction is vital and that, while there is a practical viewpoint from which it may be ignored, it cannot be totally cancelled. This is one of the first and most persistent criticisms that various idealists have made upon the instrumental theory of judgment.

The genetic theories of judgment are all compelled to admit that the ground of belief is finally an unsolved problem. Psychology seems to have discovered that chronologically we believe things first and afterwards demonstrate them. Thinking as distinguished from believing is retrospective rather than prospective; it is demonstration rather than inference. Now it is not only Psychology that confesses itself baffled with this puzzling question of the reason for our beliefs, but Logic also finds the ground of knowledge in a sense inexplicable. As I have already said, knowledge is a postulate of logic; it is a fact that must be assumed before logic itself can come into existence. If Logic is “thinking about thought,” then this thought is obviously taken for granted when the thinking about it begins.

Professor Dewey has often admitted,¹⁹ by implication at any rate, that

¹⁹ Cf. *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 36. “There is no such thing as either coincidence or coherence in terms of the elements or meanings contained in any couple or pair of ideas taken by itself. It is only when they are co-factors in a situation or function which includes more than either the “coincident” or the “coherent” and more than the

he has not remained true to the Hegelian idealism of his earlier writings. And yet many of his later utterances seem to me as entirely opposed to the naïve associationism of the earlier empiricists, Locke, Mill, and Bain, as is any idealism. And there are also serious divergencies from the even more radical empiricism of the later pragmatists, Schiller, Sedgwick and Mercier. For Professor Dewey's ideas taken by themselves are entirely discrete facts. They are continuous only when embedded in the specific situation out of which they arise and into which they descend. And yet I must repeat that I fail to see how the "situation" with all its "brute" objectivity can ever provide for the continuity that is necessary for "knowing things together."

I wish to offer a homely illustration of an illusion of continuity in the optical world analogous to the essential discontinuity that lurks in the instrumental theory of thought. Each of the various moments of a motion picture as they are flashed on the screen might be described in terms of what precedes and what follows it. We say we watch the scene being enacted, we follow the plot and we think we see explanatory continuity there. But if an imaginary being, living in that screen world – totally unaware of the projecting power of the stereopticon – were asked to give an account of what really does happen, he would say precisely what Hume said about the world that we actually see. No causal continuity is found on the screen. One picture appears and then disappears and another totally disconnected from the preceding one takes its place. The clever makers of the motion pictures, taking advantage of actual discontinuity, can feign all kinds of continuity by piecing together parts of films taken miles and days apart. The only truly explanatory continuity is found when we read our way back at each instant to and through the projecting power of the stereopticon itself. So, too, must the states of consciousness that appear chronologically in the instrumental theory of judgment be translated into a thought process that transcends time and of which that outer evolution is but the projection.

A less concrete, and therefore in some ways a more satisfactory illustration may be taken from geometry to show the essential discontinuity in the stream of consciousness. The points of a parabola, for example, take their places *seriatim* in obedience to the requirements of facts external to themselves. Each point obeys the law of keeping equidistant from a fixed straight line and a fixed point; as a particular fact in the series, it is independent of the points that lie next to it. An external spectator might imagine that the points arranged themselves in this orderly fashion by a kind of reciprocal reference to each other. Each point, it might be thought, could find its place in the series by taking its

arithmetical sum of the two, that thought's activity can be evoked."

bearings from its predecessor and passing the angular reading on to its successor. But the curve has no such intrinsic principle for its spatial determination; it is the result of the individual compliance of each point with entirely external conditions. The straight line, however, can and does define itself as a quantity in extension by precisely such an intrinsic principle. One has a practical illustration of this in watching a company of soldiers "fall into line."

Novelty and Identity in Inference

Since judgment always refers to something other than itself, it has been maintained that Logic is the science of thought when engaged upon an object other than Logic. This is a doctrine which I think is entirely defensible although the common understanding of it leads to all manner of contradictions. The living judgment, perhaps, can not become its own object and still live. The Hegelians have always held that immediate consciousness is self-contradictory. For them there is no such thing as the vivisection of a thought. But, continuing this metaphor, may we not say that there can be a postmortem examination of departed thinking by its own resurrected self?

The attempt to make a distinction between the judgment of perception and cognitive judgment breaks down with any careful analysis of psychical facts. There is no difference in kind, on our theory, between perceiving and perceiving that I perceive, or between thinking and thinking that that is one of my thoughts. Idealism of every form declares that objects of thought, just because they are thought, have a different kind of existence from what belongs to them when they are not thought – if that may ever be. Mind is, in other words, in some sense creative. The realist says that the validity of thought depends quite as finally upon the object thought about, as upon the thought itself. He contends for a fundamental distinction between idea and object. He grants the idealist's main contention that certain objects of thought do not exist outside of the mind, but he denies that therefore the mind creates these objects. When reduced to its lowest terms and stripped of all unnecessary verbiage, there is, one fundamental difference between the old and new Logic. Every form of idealism has asserted that experience does create its object, that the self does beget the not-self.

Professor Dewey²⁰ has stated in a very concise form what he takes to be "the point of contact and hence of conflict" between idealism and instrumentalism. The significant sentence reads: "The idealistic logic started from the distinction between immediate plural data unifying, rationalizing meanings as a distinction ready made in experience, and it

²⁰ *Experimental Logic*, p. 22.

set up as the goal of knowledge (and hence as the definition of true reality) a complete, exhaustive, comprehensive, and eternal system in which plural and immediate data are forever woven into a fabric and pattern of self-luminous meaning." A liberal idealist could accept this statement by changing the one word "self-luminous" to "self illuminating." This would make the difference between static and dynamic idealism. Thought is not perfect but self-perfecting. Thought strives for something; it needs something apparently beyond itself; it is permeated with wonder, with curiosity, which points to a fundamental defect in its nature. But in this never-ending aim to be a whole, to be self-complete, thought is incessantly discovering that there is nothing genuinely outside of itself. If in this striving for self-completeness, it should actually reach its goal, thought as such would obviously be destroyed. Thought's aim is to get hold of an object as a whole, the separate elements of which it already has. Now it is precisely this self-completion of thought beyond itself, which constitutes the object, the independent thing in every type of realism. In the subject-object relation, then, *the expected self-transcendancy of the subject constitutes the object*. Thought moves by means of relations toward a goal which lies beyond relations. The attainment of its goal by transcending relations would be the annihilation of thought.

What Idealistic Logic discovers when it reaches final reality is a whole in which distinctions can be made and are made, but in which the genuine diversity bona fide independence –demanded by the New Realism does not exist. The position of modern realism on this central question of Logic can be stated briefly, but with rough justice thus: The perception of relations which is the fundamental characteristic of the judging consciousness, is a self-contradictory but necessary blending of the one and the many, unity and variety. This relation is unique, logically indefensible and undefinable. Consciousness, it is asserted, has the undeniable feature of immediacy. The idea has hold of its object. This establishes continuity. But equally undeniable is the characteristic of self-dependence, or independence. The terms which consciousness unites in the relating activity of judgment are, in truth, given to it, and not actually made by it. This given reality with which it deals is therefore essentially pluralistic.

But I submit that at this point the modern realist has allowed his dialectic to halt. He has stated only half of the whole truth. The other half is the indisputable fact that this cognition which binds together the many, represents at its center an original underived whole. It is a synthesis, a unity, which is not made by the original differences in the presented facts, but is placed upon them. The whole is not just composed of its parts, it constitutes them and is legislatively sovereign

over them. Now it is this characteristic and apparently paradoxical feature of thought that neither the Instrumental Logic nor the analytic realism seems able to surmount. Thought does aim to retain these two features, unity and plurality, and at the same time weld them into a higher harmony. It strives to reach an all-embracing whole which shall not in any way conflict with the immediate elements. It therefore bestows upon its elements a kind of independence. But at the same time it seeks for elements that shall be subordinated to the entirely independent (i.e., superior) whole.

There is, then, this paradoxical fact about thought and its object; they are two and yet can never be studied in isolation. Thinking, is always thinking about something, and thought can never be divorced from this postulated objectivity and treated as pure subjectivity. This point, which has now so often been insisted upon, seems invariably to be ignored by realists and pragmatists in their criticism of idealism. Thought can never be investigated in abstraction from its objective reference. Such a view as I am here stating, concerning the relation of subject to object, may when taken at its face value, appear to be a concession to the central thesis of pragmatic logic, namely, that the form of thought must wait upon its matter. On this view, it will be asked, how can Logic be regarded as the study of the forms of thought? If the form and the matter are thus inseparable, inter-related in each concrete instance of thought, how can there be any form in general? I cannot think the answer to these questions and the justification of Formal Logic is far to find. Just as we can inquire into the laws of gravitation without examining all the objects that have ever fallen, so we may study the laws of thought without studying all the objects that may conceivably be discovered at the other end of the subject-object relation.

IV

There now arises a question of singular gravity, the central question of speculative Logic through all the centuries. That portion of thought's content which constitutes its meaning or external reference as distinguished from its existence, we have insisted, is a systematic totality. This is what we mean when we speak of the world of all possible objects of thought. How far into this realm of objective reference must thought go before it can claim finality for its deliverance? One school of philosophy has held that perfect validity of thought would require perfect insight into the objective system. Bosanquet has said, "Ultimately nothing can be rightly known without knowing all else rightly." Others insist that we have some knowledge that is incomplete and yet perfect, and that we can pronounce judgments that are not subject to future revision. The agnostics, from the ancient sophists to the new realists have declared

that never in the growth of knowledge do we reach a stage at which we may say, "The evidence is now all in, and the judgment of finality can be pronounced. We do not have perfect control over the object; if we did it would cease to be an object. It is just this alien character that constitutes its objectivity. John, where is the end quote?????

The Idealists have always given a decisive affirmative answer to this fundamental question; we do have perfect knowledge in part. Professor Hocking has defended this cardinal tenet of traditional idealism with impressive clarity of illustration. He pointedly tells us that unfinishedness is not itself a blemish, and says: "There are tolerable and intolerable kinds of unfinishedness. A thing is properly unfinished when it is finishable; and it has an identity that finishing will not change. Let an artist sketch a face with all conceivable haste and roughness. The unfinishedness is justified if only it is a thing, if only it has a character and a significance that all later finishing does but develop without displacement or substitution."²¹

The truth about our fragmentary thought, as it comes to us by the pathway of experience, is not that it is imperfect or inconsistent, but that it is incomplete. It is indeed not adequate to the whole of reality, but what it does deliver is genuine. From its one shore, thought bridges the gulf between it and reality by pushing out cumulative cantilever arches, each firmly and unchangeably anchored. It is not a pontoon bridge whose units are swayed by the dashing tide, and whose mooring to the shore may require to be changed as its length increases.

Actuality, which is just one aspect of objectivity, is the *necessitated possible*. This is Bradley's well-known view. The most fundamental law of thought is the law by which we assume that every isolated, unique possibility is also real. In other words, the *uncombated possible* is the *actual*. This law, cannot be exhibited as the operation of either analysis or synthesis or both correlated, and yet it is a normal, universal way of thought's functioning. Every time reality presents itself as a subject for a possible judgment, and reaches out among the possible predicates, that one of these possible predicates which finally stands alone, either because there are no other possible predicates, or because other competing possibilities have been rejected, is appropriated by the subject. This appropriation elevates the predicate from possibility to actuality. We may not be cognizant of the operation of this law, and may indeed when our attention is directed to its operation, be inclined to disclaim it, but we nevertheless do finally and always owe allegiance to it. Instead of saying that the mind selects one of the several alterna-

²¹ *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1912), p. x.

tives and so depresses the others, it would be more accurate to say that the several impossible possibilities having been destroyed the single uncombated possibility stands self-affirmed. The actual, the real, the object, is that which resists the subject. A thing has objectivity if it exhibits, in its own name, any force or necessity.

This doctrine again must not be confused with the teaching of pragmatic Logic, which at first sight it resembles. The Logic of Pragmatism tries out the various possibilities and tests truth by acting *as if*. When the question arises whether the new possibilities which are applying for acceptance are true, or real we must test them, one by one, by acting as if they were true, and accept in each instance those that work in with the old. But this pragmatic test of truth, as I have shown elsewhere, assumes the rationality of the old, and asserts that the new which works in with this, is true. Of course, if we start with an original matrix of truth, then whatever this accepts as true, will be true, and whatever it rejects because it does not work, will be false. But the Pragmatic Logic is incapable of endowing this original mass with the essential truth necessary to make the principle *as if* operate. Bradley's doctrine does on the surface seem identical with the pragmatic test – wherever a suggestion is not rejected by the facts with which we start, or again by some other suggested quality, and we are left not with disparate possibilities, but with one *uncombated maybe*, that suggestion must always be taken as fact. The facts with which the pragmatist starts are not possessed of universality; with Bradley they are. He says: "The striving for perfection, the desire of the mind for an infinite totality is indeed the impulse which moves our intellect to appropriate everything from which it is not forced off." Possibility is a kind of necessity, and consequently there is no difference in kind between the problematic and the apodeictic judgment. A thing is possible when at least one of its conditions is present, and actual when none of its conditions is absent.

V

As a typical illustration of the sceptical attitude of the new movement toward reality, objectivity, or necessity, we may quote two Protagorean passages from Professor Sidgwick: "Absolute truth is never attained but that further improvement is always possible." "There is no need to make any pretence of securing infallibility of judgment, even in a single instance. If Absolute Truth means Truth as it would appear to a super-human mind, how can we presume to have reached it! Or, if by any chance we did reach it, what means would we have of distinguishing between it and the truth that merely suffices for human purposes?"²²

²² *Elementary Logic*, pp. 123, 170.

The modern idealist always replies to this agnosticism in the spirit of Socrates' reply to the ancient sceptics. Knowledge has this peculiar paradox about it: We have a criterion of truth – we know what valid knowledge ought to be; and yet we can never in our practical experience reach any such knowledge as is guaranteed by this criticism of validity.

Professor Sidgwick's own statement that "absolute truth is never attained but that further improvement is always possible" is itself an illustration of this "self-perfecting" criterion of knowledge. When we assert that further improvement is possible, we imply a criterion of stable values, or else the word improvement does not mean what it purports. Improvement and progress are indeed dignified words but no one has any right to use them, either in Logic or Ethics, who does not admit something absolute, some definable standards of value. The modern enemy of Traditional Logic and Ethics declares that knowledge is limited to a world of comparatives, whose superlatives are never in sight. We do not know the beautiful, the true, the right, and never can know them, for there are no esthetic, logical, or ethical standards. We simply have knowledge of the first two degrees, namely, the good and the better; and from these as a base we must triangulate our journey. But in full view of all the many indictments the idealist still asserts, with renewed emphasis, that any genuine improvement implies direction, a goal. If we are in the least degree uncertain about the goal, we must in the same degree be uncertain about the improvement. Improvement is not measured in terms of mere movement. We can be much "on the go" without making any improvement – witness many aspects of our present civilization. In other words, briefly, improvement is estimated not by the distance one has gone, but by the distance one has yet to go.

"There are probably few people at the present day," says Sidgwick, "who would confess to holding that the general rules by which our thoughts and our lives are mostly guided deserve to be applied through thick and thin."²³ One may agree with this statement so far as the word "mostly" is concerned, and admit that humanity does depend for its practical faiths very largely upon insights that are transitory, partial and for the most part subconscious. We act most often before the arrival of certainty and under the guidance of shifting standards. But surely Professor Sidgwick must believe in some things that abide. Can the solemn agreements among men never be final? Is there no pact that deserves to be applied through thick and thin? If not, then the most pragmatically consistent of the nations in the great world-war is Germany. A treaty is indeed merely a scrap of paper to be respected only so long as it is convenient to respect it.

²³ *Elementary Logic*, pp. 160, 161.

Another illustration of how the pragmatist fails, it seems to me, to grasp the idealistic notion of a self-perfecting control of the object I may quote from Mr. H. O. Knox: "We simply deprecate as futile the assuming of a transcendent and absolute reality as the standard to which our actual judgments are to correspond. For (a) if an absolute standard were available for actual comparison the comparison itself would be purely superfluous. We should already be *de facto* in possession of absolute and infallible certitude. And (b) to say, that reality is transcendent is simply to say that it is not available as a standard at all."²⁴ This is clearly a restatement of the ancient paradox of the apparent futility or idleness in judgment which I have attempted to answer in the chapter on "The Import of Judgment."

All necessity is in the end conditional, since every *must be* rests back upon a *because*. All objectivity is in the end subjectivity since reality is continuous and since the thinking self (*apud Cartesianism*) is the initial indefeasible reality. If the object lay genuinely outside the system of thought it could never be reached by thought. The knowing process does not involve a transition from subject to object; it consists in a progressive analysis and development of the objective aspect of the total continuous reality. This view will seem to resemble Professor Dewey's account of the *subject-object* relation. He writes: "The distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is not one between meaning as such and datum as such. It is a specification that emerges, correspondently, in both datum and ideatum, as affairs of the direction of logical movement."²⁵ There is, however, an essential difference between this position and that which I have now urged from several points of view in these pages. A cross-section of the stream of consciousness in Professor Dewey's doctrine, it seems to me, does not raise the vital question of the correspondence or coherence in the longitudinal section of the thinking process. No matter how completely we may seem to explain the subject-object in any situation as the meeting point of converging forces, we still need the help of a principle outside of the pragmatic movement to explain the identity that persists in the spatial or temporal series. Spatial judgments are far from being as particular or factual as on the surface they appear to be. Every *here* contains a *there* and hence it is never a particular. Spatial references in judgment are always universal. There is never given to thought a genuine *this* or *that*, but always *thisness* and *thatness*. We may say the same of our temporal judgments. It has justly been maintained that every present includes a past, and therefore no temporal judgment can be strictly particular.

²⁴ *Mind*, n. s., XVIII (1909), 602.

²⁵ *Experimental Logic*, p. 55.

EXPERIENCE AND NATURE

George P. Adams. "Review of John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*." *International Journal of Ethics* 36.2 (January 1926): 201–5.

Experience and Nature. Lectures upon the Paul Carus Foundation, First Series. By John Dewey. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1925. Pp. xi + 443. Price, \$3.00.

One looked forward to a book by Dr. Dewey upon *Experience and Nature* with the hope and expectation that here at last would be declared the metaphysical implications of "pragmatism" and "instrumentalism." Hitherto in his writings Mr. Dewey has, in the main, concerned himself with an inquiry into the adequacy of accepted and traditional ideas and methods with respect to the definition and the control of the goods and values of experience. His explicit treatment of metaphysical doctrines has been critical. That he rejected all of the current types of "idealism" and "realism" we knew. We wanted to know whether he had a metaphysics, and if so what in detail it was. We wanted to know what Mr. Dewey believed our experience to disclose concerning the nature of things. We hoped that the experience which men have and have had would be surveyed, analyzed, and interpreted so as to throw some light upon – not the experiences which are "had" – but upon the nature of that world or worlds which comprise the environment of human life and experience. We hoped that the emphasis would now fall not so much upon experience as upon nature and the nature of things. This desire and this interest seemed inevitable, significant, and innocent. It had always seemed to have been the impelling energy of both science and philosophy. It was experience that we *had*, and it was the nature of things that we didn't have, but which we wanted to get at and to know or, at least, reasonably to surmise. The only clues in our possession, of course, fall within our experience. How could we use them, with critical intelligence and controlled imagination, to divine something of the true outlying nature of things? It was an answer to just this question which a philosophical discussion of *Experience and Nature* seemed to promise.

Now the present reviewer is in some doubt as to whether the book really does this or not. He is uncertain whether the discussion undertakes to scrutinize experience in order to ascertain what the environment of experience really is, or whether a certain type of answer to just this question is assumed to be altogether obvious, inevitably dictated by the present state of our sciences, the discussion then proceeding to certain questions and conclusions whose significance and validity hinge upon these prior assumptions. Experience does indeed, it is urged, disclose the kind of thing that nature is. There are two traits of existence upon which repeated emphasis is laid. Existence is a blend of the precarious and the stable, the one as real as the other, and neither of them capable of being exorcized to an inferior grade of being by philosophical theory. Existence again is a history, and not a structure. Or rather, existences are events which transpire, whose histories overlap and are interwoven. There is not a single "thing" of which philosophers have ever spoken – life, mind, selves, meanings, essence – which are not themselves events and the outcomes of the interactions of historic episodes. Nature is the collection of such events, interactions, and histories. A valid theory of anything which we find in our experience, for instance, thought, "is actually a theory about nature." Now this "theory about nature," suggested by a scrutiny of experience, is the kind of thing we want. We have experience and we want to *know* what nature is.

But it is overwhelmingly disconcerting also to be told certain other things which make it appear that this whole way of formulating the interest of philosophy and science proceeds upon false premises. We have assumed that experience is something had, and that we were to use it to penetrate to the nature of things which weren't "had." But this implies some sort of boundary separating experience and nature, or reality, into two regions. And this is just what we must avoid doing. Experience is not at all any "distinctive subject-matter." It is a *method*. And just "this fact convicts upon sight every philosophy that professes to be empirical and yet assures us that some especial subject-matter is experience and some other not" (p. 10). To ask, therefore, what experience which we have teaches us about the nature which we haven't got but want to know is ruled out as meaningless. Shall we then say that nature *is* had in experience, and that experience is the method of disentangling nature and knowing it? But it is just as vicious to suppose nature to be a substantive part of experience as it is to suppose experience to be a substantive portion of nature. Experience is not at all substantive, but is method. Yet objects are said to appear "in experience." And immediately after it is said that "the visible is set in the invisible; and in the end what is unseen decides what happens in the seen; the tangible rests precariously upon the untouched and ungrasped"

(p. 43). Does this contrast occur *within* experience, or is it a contrast between what is within experience and something outlying? If the former, are we to be said to see the invisible, to touch the intangible, and to grasp the ungrasped? If the latter, does not experience become a substantive region set over against an environing world of the nature of things?

Still more disconcerting to us who wanted to know what experience might teach us about the real is the declaration that science yields no knowledge of things at all, in any meaning of the term "knowledge," according to which knowledge is "insight into, or grasp of, real being as such" (p. 135). This is precisely what we must not suppose knowledge or science to be. "The objects of science, like the direct objects of the arts, are an order of relations which serve as tools to effect immediate havings and beings" (p. 136). Yet later on H₂O is said to embody in its essence "instrumental efficiency in respect to things *independent of human affairs*" (p. 193; italics mine). To have discovered *any* feature or structure of things "independent of human affairs" would seem to be an instance of a kind of insight into the real texture of things, an instance of knowledge of the sort which has been repudiated, but which in all our theoretical science and philosophy we most deeply want. And, possessing at least so much knowledge about instrumental efficiencies "independent of human affairs" (which must mean "independent of human experience," if it means anything at all) we would like to go on and ask whether any further knowledge about the nature of things (not knowledge of how to enhance the goods and meanings in human experience) is available, and if so, of what sort and of what degree of validity. But this is precisely one of those questions which is necessary and unanswerable only on the premise that scientific or philosophical theory yields knowledge – grasp and envisagement – of real being. It is a question which arises out of "the separations which trouble present thinking: division of everything into nature *and* experience" (p. 358). The only significant question is said to be that which concerns the distinction "between those modes of practice that are not intelligent, not inherently and immediately enjoyable, and those which are full of enjoyed meanings" (p. 358). This is a distinction which occurs *within* experience, and we have gone astray just because we have taken experience to be a specific province and have wanted to know what lies across its boundaries. There simply are no such boundaries. Various sorts of consummations, ends, goods, and meanings are *had* (not known) within experience. Our sole concern is with the liberation, enhancement, and fortification of such meanings and goods as prove to be instrumental and fruitful for further meanings and goods, significant in proportion as they are enduring and sharable. All knowledge is a

method and an art for the achievement of this end. There is no knowledge worth the name which is other than this. The nature of things as a realm stretching out beyond experience which we, in our naïveté and innocence wanted to "know," simply vanishes away. We are left with just the things "had" within experience, precariously had until we learn how to insure for them a greater measure of stability and fruitfulness.

It is this clear and dominant interest in the definition, the liberation, and the enhancement of human goods and meanings that lends to Mr. Dewey's philosophy its verve and appeal. It is the most liberal, the most intellectual, the farthest removed from sentimentality of the *humanisms* which spring up from the background and upon the premises of naturalism. And the naturalism which does supply the premises for this humanism has a character of flexibility; it is suffused with imagination and with feeling which mark it off from every type of materialism and most historic types of naturalism. But even so, a metaphysical thesis *is* assumed as an initial premise, *on the basis of which* most, if not all, of the persistent problems of philosophy are either shown to be meaningless or to be, in principle, already answered.

Experience and Nature thus seems to the present reviewer to be not an inquiry into the most valid metaphysical hypotheses about the nature of things which the scrutiny of experience and the present state of our knowledge best warrant. It is, rather, an inquiry into the nature of human goods and meanings and the possibility of their intelligent liberation and control, an inquiry and interpretation which proceeds throughout upon the assumptions of a type of metaphysical naturalism. There is no need of saying how penetrating and stimulating this delineation of human goods and meanings is, and it is futile to attempt here a summary of the rich store of insight and wisdom which the book offers. The large question remains as to the influence upon Mr. Dewey's ethical analysis, upon his survey of human "goods and meanings," of just that type of metaphysical naturalism which is, if I am right, rather a presupposition than a reasoned conclusion. The perplexing paradox of the situation is that neither the things "had" in experience nor any outlying environing world may be said to be known. Since the former "are *had*, there is no need to *know* them" (p. 264), and knowing never discloses, reveals, or grasps "real being." Just as the latter statement makes it necessary to dismiss every metaphysical problem as otiose and meaningless, so the former statement rules out, it would appear, any knowledge and interpretation of values had in experience, i.e., any ethics. Yet an ethics and a metaphysics are perforce here, a humanistic ethics and a naturalistic metaphysics, both of them envisaged in a new and fresh light, suffused with imagination and a wide perspective. They

are here, it would almost seem, in spite of the impedimenta which Mr. Dewey's explicit statements would impose upon any theoretical and constructive interpretation, for the sake of sheer "old-fashioned" knowing, both of the goods and meanings of experience and also of the stage upon which experience itself appears, the reality which envelopes it. No one in our time has done more than Mr. Dewey to insist upon the prime necessity of bending every effort to the intelligent liberation and control of the latent and stupidity hemmed-in energies and values of human experience. It may be, however, that this eminently practical and pragmatic task cannot be intelligently and fully entered upon until we seek not simply for a method of enhancing the values of experience, but also for some insight into the kind of world which must be supposed to be real if our human impulse to the liberation and the expansion of our deepest interests is really the thing that it is.

ON THE SECOND COPERNICAN REVOLUTION IN PHILOSOPHY

G. Watts Cunningham. "On the Second Copernican Revolution in Philosophy." *Philosophical Review* 41.2 (March 1932): 107–29.

Address of the President of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, delivered before the General Meeting at Berkeley, December 30, 1930.

The subject to which I am venturing to direct your attention on the present occasion has, in a measure, been forced on me. Last year, you will recall, my predecessor in this office, Professor M. C. Otto, delivered an eloquent plea, evidently born of profound conviction, in behalf of a special view of the nature of the whole philosophical enterprise and of the function of the philosopher at the present juncture of our cultural development – a view which obviously was by him supposed to be quite radical in its modernity.¹ Through the kindly indulgence of my friends in the Western Division of this Association, his mantle has for the moment fallen on me. I am clear, however, that I can accept his message with his mantle, despite my general sympathy with much of what he explicitly says. And if I am at any point to hesitate, I feel under obligation to him and the cause he represents, while momentarily occupying the honorable post recently vacated by him, to present as definitely as I may the difficulties that see to lie in the way of my full allegiance of the significance of the issue raised by his impassioned challenge.

But, in doing, I hope to accomplish more. The issue itself is historically quite important, underlying as it does a tendency which has been more or less current throughout the history of philosophy and which has recently come to a head in what is proclaimed as a genuine Copernican Revolution. My ulterior purpose is, frankly, to inquire whether the revolution as proclaimed can stand, and what precisely is the foundational consideration on which it rests. Such an inquiry, if at all

¹ M. C. Otto: "Mediation on a Hill," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 329–50.

successful, may at least serve to sharpen basal issues; and this would certainly be gain.

Philosophy, I understand Otto to maintain, should be primarily a philosophy of life. If philosophy is to achieve its goal and if philosophers are to accomplish what they should accomplish in relation to our present cultural needs, he seems to say, the philosophical enterprise should be made consciously to converge, with more or less exclusive concern, upon those problems that have a direct connection with the business of living. Traditional philosophy, I understand him to say further, has on the whole and in the main not been a philosophy of life; it has been occupied, rather, with highly technical epistemological questions about the two tables or with arid metaphysical speculations concerning the ultimate nature of the world and the 'reality' behind 'appearances.' And the consideration of such matters, it seems to be implied, it not positively inimical to any sane solution of the problems of life, is at best irrelevant to them and, so, is of little genuine philosophical importance. Thus have the traditional philosophers supposedly failed. They have gone astray after strange gods; they have wandered off into idle, because empty, metaphysical and epistemological speculations, and have left undone the one needful thing they could, and should, have done. What at present is a desideratum, it is asserted, is a re-orientation of the whole philosophical enterprise. Philosophers must learn "to turn from philosophy in the sense of intellectual mastery of ultimate reality and to find it a method for achieving a comprehensive and dependable theory for concrete living." And this re-orientation is apparently held to mark a break with the tradition view in some more or less radical manner. For the tradition is credited with a claim to supreme knowledge on the part of philosophers, the surrender of which is to deprive them of their unique status as knowers and put them on a par with other thinkers, "happy if they may share equally with them in the project of unraveling the conditions of a progressively satisfying life for the children of men."²

I cannot suppose that Otto wishes seriously to contend that the philosophers of the tradition have not in any degree been occupied with "the project of unraveling the conditions of a progressively satisfying life for the children of men." As a matter of historical fact, that project has been of some concern to all of them, and to many of them it has been of primary concern. Wherein, then, does Otto's break with the tradition enter? Apparently it enters at the issue concerning the significance of epistemological and metaphysical inquiries for a philosophy of life. Otto seems to assume that such inquiries have no significance for such a

² Op. cit., p. 349.

philosophy, whereas the traditional philosophers have on the whole assumed quite the reverse. For Otto "the philosophy which aims at universality of knowledge is of no help to men the quest for a theory of the good life"; such a philosophy throws "no light on the problem of happy choices as forced upon people in the concrete."³ In the tradition from Socrates, on the other side, such a philosophy has not infrequently been held to be the *sine qua non* of a theory of the good life.

I do not find that Otto, within the compass of his address, gives us any information with reference to the ground on which he rests his view. There is in his address, however, a suggestion where such information may be found. The address itself is avowedly a call for recruits to the movement in philosophy headed formerly by William James and latterly by John Dewey, and presumably Otto is content that any who wish to know the foundation on which he stands should seek for it in the constructions of these leaders. I shall therefore act on this suggestion and turn at once to the analyses of Dewey, who has recently, as it happens, given us a cumulative criticism of the tradition which brings to the fore the fundamental considerations here specially relevant with a definiteness not, I think, hitherto achieved either by Dewey himself or by any other representative of the new revolution. I refer, of course, to the criticism expressed in his challenging volume of Gifford Lectures. My further discussion of the question will be lurked with this impressive statement of principles. So linked, it certainly will not be occupied with merely external considerations; and I venture to hope that it may direct attention to the crucial point of difference between the new view of philosophy and that of the tradition which it repudiates.

As we enter upon this discussion I desire, in the first place, to delimit its scope. It is not concerned, on the one side, with any attempt to estimate the general significance of the movement in philosophy headed formerly by James and latterly by Dewey. That movement is doubtless very significant and, apart from debatable details, I am quite willing to agree with the spirit of Otto's estimate: "The tendency in which James and Dewey invested their lives belongs to the great creative heritage of mankind" and "will be reckoned with until men stop seeking for meaning in human experience." There is here no issue, or at least no issue which is of moment to the present purpose; and I wish explicitly to eliminate the question from consideration. On the other side, the discussion is also not concerned with any inquiry into the general significance of the very complex movement vaguely called 'the tradition'; and I am particularly anxious to have this understood from the beginning. In that movement there is certainly much which seems to me of lasting

³ Op. cit., p. 343.

value, and which contemporary philosophy has neglected to its own hurt; there is also much which should, I think, be relegated to the lumber-room of speculative curiosities – useful in its historical setting, no doubt, but now outworn. But what is there valuable and what valueless is not now in question, except with reference to the revolutionist's special point of attack. On that point indeed the tradition seems to me to stand firm, as I shall try to show in the sequel; but apart from that point I neither praise the tradition nor condemn it. And, finally, the present discussion does not undertake to formulate in set terms a specific answer to the question whether those problems arising at once out of the business of living should alone be deemed significant problems for philosophy. In the end, to be sure, I expect to ask you to return with me upon this question, but only to give final point to considerations which meanwhile will be developed in connection with the central issue towards which the discussion is primarily directed. And that issue may be briefly and roughly indicated thus: What is the basal point of difference on which turns the peculiar view of the nature of philosophy advocated against the traditionist by the revolutionist, and what is to be said with reference to it? Such is the main theme of the following discussion, and without further preliminary remarks I turn at once to its elaboration.

That this difference centres in a theory of knowledge may presumably be taken for granted. So much at least, if not much else, has been clear from the beginning of the controversy. Hardly had William James presented his formulation of what he called a "new name for some old ways of thinking" before the traditionist sensed that some of his most cherished epistemological doctrines were involved. Hereupon a heated controversy began, as is well known, and for several years it was waged with great acumen on both sides. Despite the critical ability invested in it, however, it died down at last without apparent result, largely because the disputants seemed unable explicitly to agree on what precisely the fight was about. But it was clearly seen on all sides that the *casus belli* lay in the general field of epistemology.

Later developments within the revolutionary movement itself, however, have done much to focalize the issue. These developments have throughout been led by Dewey; and in his recent attack on the tradition he lays the foundation for a fixation of the locus of the conflict with a precision heretofore hardly possible. This accomplishment of the Gifford Lectures lies in their emphatic statement of the thesis wherein, from the standpoint of the revolutionist, the traditional epistemology has basically erred, and the light which is thereby thrown upon the corresponding basal doctrine of the epistemology that is supposed to

supplant it. Viewed from the angle of one who is inclined to be sympathetic and yet is still sufficiently bound by the tradition to remain querulous, this accomplishment renders *The Quest for Certainty* one of the most significantly constructive documents of the revolutionary literature. The accomplishment has long been a desideratum, and it marks a definite step in advance so far as the logic of the controversy is concerned.

Traditional philosophy, we are here informed, is grounded in the "spectator theory" of knowledge, the main thesis of which is "that knowledge is concerned with disclosure of the characteristics of antecedent existences and essences" and that the tests of the validity of thought are found in "what is fixed prior to it and independently of it."⁴ This theory of knowledge, we are further informed, is false and is definitively shown to be false by an analysis of knowing in the concrete, as exemplified particularly in the experimental method of the physical sciences. Such an analysis discloses that the traditional separation between knowing and doing has by science been completely abandoned, and that "the experimental procedure is one that installs doing as the heart of knowing." The conclusion is therefore inescapable that traditional philosophy, as an intellectual enterprise, has all along been mis-oriented and directed upon the pursuit of an essentially illusory goal; it has been in search of antecedent being and has tried to find the test of its validity in such antecedent being, but this conception of philosophy's function cannot stand in the light of "reflection upon actual conditions of science and life." The traditional view of philosophy must therefore be repudiated, along with the erroneous epistemology underlying it. In its place must be set up the view of philosophy as a search for security of values, which view follows directly from the only epistemological theory now tenable – the theory, namely, that thought is "a mode of directed overt action," that ideas are "anticipatory plans and designs which take effect in concrete reconstructions of antecedent conditions of existence," and that "standards and tests of validity are found in the consequences of overt activity."⁵

This bare summary of an argument which in its details is familiar to all is here set down solely for the purpose of emphasizing what, as viewed by the revolutionist, is the radical error of the old epistemology. This, clearly, lies in the assumption attributed to the entire tradition that ideas or objects of knowledge are revelatory of the nature of antecedent being, and that herein is found their chief function as well as the

⁴ *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 36, 71, 73, etc.

⁵ *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 73, 166–67.

criterion of their validity.⁶ The question immediately before us is whether, and in what sense, the attribution of this assumption to the tradition is warranted. The further question, whether the tradition is to be repudiated because of the assumption if correctly attributed to it, falls to be considered below after the corresponding doctrine of the new epistemology has been surveyed.

The question whether the so-called "spectator theory" of knowledge may justly be attributed to the tradition cannot be answered by a simple yes or no. It all depends on what is understood by the tradition, and what by the theory. And on each of these points clarity is essential.

By the "tradition" is apparently intended, not only the classical philosophy as exemplified in the major systems from Plato to Hegel, but also the more recent philosophy up to the eve of the latest revolution. Traditional philosophers are the pre-revolutionary philosophers, even including those of sceptical bent. This comprehensive sweep of "the tradition" must be borne in mind as we turn to the other question concerning the meaning of the spectator-theory of knowledge.

Clearly, if this theory is justly to be attributed to the tradition in this comprehensive sense, then it must be defined in such a way as to be acceptable to all of the outstanding representatives – to the Sophists and Plato and Aristotle, to empiricists and rationalists, to Kant and Hegel, to sceptics like Hume and dogmatists like Reid, to modern idealists and realists. For it would be historically quite unfair to place beneath any important representatives of the tradition, through the guise of an ambiguous label, a theory intended in a sense they would not be willing to accept. In what sense then, we must ask, has the spectator-theory of knowledge been accepted, implicitly or explicitly, by all of the traditionists? The answer, of course, involves many complicated puzzles of interpretation; and, if adequately formulated, it would be equivalent to a tolerably complete survey of the entire history of philosophical speculation. Nevertheless, it is possible to state succinctly and with a definiteness adequate for the present context the meaning in which the spectator-theory of knowledge has underlain the tradition from the beginning. That meaning may, with fair accuracy, I think, be resolved into the following three propositions: (i) that the object of knowledge,

⁶ There are in fact two basal theses attributed to the tradition: (i) the one mentioned above in the text, namely, "that knowledge is concerned with disclosure of the characteristics of antecedent and essences;" and (ii) "that the properties of value found therein provide the authoritative standards for the conduct of life" (*The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 36, 71, and elsewhere). The first of these is clearly logically prior, since if it is rejected the second certainly cannot stand – it would not even have sense; consideration of the second is, therefore, omitted. Its omission involves the omission of only subsidiary, though indeed quite important, principles.

or idea, in respect of what Dewey elsewhere calls its "referential meaning,"⁷ is linked by implication with what he here calls "antecedent existences and essences"; (ii) that these antecedent existences and essences are entities which, in some sense, are independent of, not relative to or entirely compassed by, human experience; and (iii) that the validity of the meaning of objects of knowledge, or ideas, is in the end to be tested in terms of their reference to such antecedent existences or essences. If this is what is understood by the spectator-theory of knowledge, then it may be said to be foundational within the procedure of the tradition; in this sense, but as I think in this sense alone, it is either an explicit conviction or an underlying assumption of practically all philosophers from Plato down to the latest revolution.

This preliminary delimitation of the meaning of the spectator-theory of knowledge is essential, in view of the treacherous ambiguity which lies hidden in the assertion that all of the pre-revolutionary philosophers assumed that ideas are 'revelatory' of antecedent being, or that, in their opinion, the chief function of the philosopher is to 'discover' the nature of such being. Such a statement may suggest to some minds that what is intended is the assertion that the pre-revolutionary philosophers supposed knowledge capable or disclosing the nature of being in some pictographic fashion, as the eye discloses the landscape, and that they made such mental photography the goal of philosophizing. I do not for a moment assume that Dewey himself intends this, though he is not always as clear on the point as could be desired. But the above ambiguity threatens, and the conclusion to the effect indicated is not far off; so the warning is not amiss. If we are to attribute to the traditionist this spectator-theory of knowledge, it is essential that we be clear what we attribute to him. The theory is attributable to him only in the sense in which he accepted it. And he accepted it only as the thesis that objects of knowledge are 'revelatory' of antecedent being, and 'disclose' its nature in the sense that their 'referential' meaning points to it in such a manner that both the meaning and its validity are implicatively involved in the antecedent being which in the case is relevant. As thus understood, the theory not only may, but must, be held to be basal within the classic tradition; so far as my acquaintance with that tradition extends, the theory is not basal when understood in any other sense.

It is agreed, then, that the spectator-theory as above defined is foundational in the tradition. It is clear, also, that the revolutionist holds this theory to be radically false in its claim concerning the relation between

⁷ This meaning is exemplified in "an event that has the meaning of indicating, signifying, being the sign or evidence of something else" (*Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXV, p. 351).

the object of knowledge and antecedent being, and for this reason he repudiates both the theory and the tradition formed on it. And with this, the locus of his quarrel with the traditionalist is precisely fixed and his negative position definitely formulated. What, we are now to inquire, is his own constructive statement on the point?

In this statement, the basal notions most directly relevant to the point in debate are: "objects of knowledge" and "things had in experience." And the full significance of the statement turns around the meaning of these notions and their relation, on the one side, to each other and, on the other side, to what in the tradition are called "antecedent existences and essences."

With reference to the first notion there is, I think, no particular difficulty. An object of knowledge is the product of that type of activity known as reflection, and both its meaning and its validity are dependent upon the operation which produces it. "A definition of the nature of ideas in terms of operations to be performed and the test of the validity of the ideas by the *consequences* of these operations" – this, we are informed, is the accomplishment of the "empirical theory of ideas," which accomplishment for the first time gives genuine freedom to reflection and "is one of three or four outstanding feats of intellectual history."⁸ In the new epistemology, then, the object of knowledge, or the idea, is the eventual product of the reflective process; and within the scope of that operation are to be found both its meaning and the test of that meaning's validity.

The notion of "things had in experience" is, unfortunately, not so clear, and consequently is not amenable to a simple description. It includes two elements, namely, the content which is 'had' and the state of 'being had.' These are, of course, mutually involved, but a separate consideration of them may aid clarity.

My impression is that we are given at least two accounts of what is intended by 'being had,' when it is said that things or events are had in experience; and these seem to me quite distinct and even contradictory. At times, it appears to be affirmed that 'being had' in experience is logically identical with being the result of a completed inference. This view is often an implicit assumption, but on occasion it is explicitly maintained. For instance, we are told that a signifying event, as a sound, is as such not self-contained, otherwise "it would not signify; the very meaning of being a signifying event is that it stands in the *relation* of indicating." But "when the inference is completed, there is a 'whole,' a situation in which the distinction between signifying and signified no longer holds; for the completion of the inference is found in a situation

⁸ In *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 114; the italics are in the text.

which is directly 'had' – the situation 'we go to' and then from."⁹ From this it seems natural to conclude that 'being had' is intended to be identical with being a completed inferential product – or, as Dewey expresses it more technically, being an "immanent meaning." Elsewhere, however, and I am inclined to think generally, we are led to believe that what is intended is to identify 'being had' with a state of immediate and non-cognitive experience which in no sense involves inference. In this other context the state of 'being had' is described either as the result of the 'natural' interaction between organism and environment, or as a simple state of being 'enjoyed'; but in either case inference seems to be entirely excluded and the state to be quite free from meaning.¹⁰ Thus, so far as I am able to determine, the state of 'being had' is left quite ambiguous in the new epistemology. And I venture to suggest, in passing, that an understanding of that epistemology would be considerably facilitated if an explicit and precise pronouncement on the ambiguity were authoritatively made.

Until such a pronouncement is made, however, no definite statement concerning the nature of that which is had seems possible. It may be one of two notions, which are logically quite different. On the one hand, 'the had' may be conceived as the product of an inferential process, and, so, as a peculiar sort of object of knowledge, namely, an object of knowledge with an immanent meaning; on the other hand, it may be conceived as that which is in experience wholly *de novo* so far as inference is concerned and consequently not in any sense an object of knowledge and in itself entirely without meaning. Which it is to be taken as is, of course, a matter of profound epistemological significance. But I do not find a definite position on the point affirmed by the new epistemology, despite the very heavy rôle assigned in that epistemology to "things or events had in experience." What I do find, or certainly seem to find, is an acceptance of two contradictory views in varying contexts; nor is it quite clear which of the two receives the main emphasis.

This ambiguity with reference to the nature of "things had in experience" leads to confusion concerning the relation between such "things" and objects of knowledge. What is *said* about that relation is, indeed, quite specific. It is that the object of knowledge is "a deliberately effected re-arrangement or re-disposition, by means of overt operations" of the antecedent 'hads,' and that the latter constitute both the *termini a*

⁹ Dewey, "Meaning and Existence," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXV, p. 352; the italics are in the text. Compare pp. 349, 351. Cf. *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 99, 137.

¹⁰ Cf. *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 172–73, 178; and the article, "In Reply to Some Criticisms," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXVII, especially p. 273.

quibus and the *termini ad quos* of those operations. The full significance of this assertion, however, does not appear on its surface; and when one tries to read it in the light of its general context, one is immediately faced by certain difficulties arising from the ambiguity in the nature of “things had in experience” noted above.

Since these difficulties are not directly germane to the main purpose of the present exposition, they may here be set aside without detailed statement. I shall pause only long enough to note that they centre around the question, How, if the meaning-character of the object of knowledge is as defined in the new doctrine of ideas, things or events had in experience can function in the reflective process either as *termini a quibus* or as *termini ad quos*? A survey of this question would soon run into matters that have often been discussed, and I have no intention here to turn once more the ashes of these old controversies. But I cannot resist the temptation to urge again the consideration that the question cannot be finally answered by the simple expedient of calling the ‘hads’ problematic, or of insisting that they are ‘takens’ as well as ‘hads.’ For in the end the question is in fact this: How can the ‘hads,’ as defined, be problematic, or be taken? It is clear that the first step in answer brings one face to face with the issue as to what precisely is to be understood by that which is had. And I venture to suggest that a rigorous analysis of the conception of the ‘hads’ and their relation to ‘objects of knowledge’ would do much to illumine this part of the new epistemology, which to my mind at least still remains dark.

The question of primary importance to the present purpose, however, concerns the disposition which the revolutionist makes of the traditionist’s “antecedent existences and essences.” If the polemic against the spectator-theory of knowledge is to be taken seriously, there is only one answer to this question: the antecedent being of the tradition is simply set aside as an epistemological illusion. For, according to that polemic, the chief fatuity of the older theory lies in its persistent but essentially vain effort to include such being within the process of reflection and to give it a significant function there; and the essential vanity of that effort springs from the fact, revealed by a study of experimental science in respect of both its method and its results, that ideas are as they are – namely, not “innate properties of mind corresponding to ultimate prior traits of Being,” but either directing factors in reflective activity (ideas as hypotheses) or the consequences of such directed activity (ideas as “objects that have the property of being known”).¹¹ Thus it would appear that the traditionist’s “antecedent existences and essences” are once for all set aside.

¹¹ *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 86–87, 166–67.

Despite this apparently inescapable conclusion of the polemic as well as of the construction that supports it, there remains the fact – to the expositor, a disconcerting fact – that numerous passages may readily be quoted from recent revolutionary literature in which something whose logical function is strikingly like the traditionist's being is introduced into the reflective situation under another name. And I fear that these passages are not infrequently so intended. We read, for instance, that “events acquire meaning by having their potential consequences identified with them as their properties” and that “when it is a question of *critical* search for *valid* meaning, namely, for that meaning we are *entitled* to treat as the genuine meaning of the events in question, we are obliged to have recourse to antecedent conditions.”¹² This passage is typical of many others to the same effect. And when reading them one wonders whether the discarded being of the tradition is not brought back into the reflective occasion under such terms as “potential consequences,” “events” and “antecedent conditions,” and whether the passages do not owe their significance precisely to this fact.

Closer inspection, however, reveals ambiguities in such terms as “events” and “conditions.” As conceived by the revolutionist, they must be merely “things or events had in experience,” and they are handicapped by the equivocation of that much-worked phrase. Such statements may consequently be given two diverse readings. On one reading, they certainly seem to say that both meaning and validity of meaning are attached to something that is antecedent to the reflective occasion and differs only verbally from what in the tradition are “antecedent existences and essences” – in other words, they seem to say that the traditional antecedent being must be taken as an object of knowledge. And when they are given this reading, one who ventures to insist that the new epistemology repudiates this view, and should in consistency abide by the consequences of the repudiation, is all too easily pilloried for doing violence to the plain text of chapter and verse. But such passages may also be read to quite another effect. They may be read as intending simply to say that meaning and validity are tied to the ‘hads’ of experience – these ‘hads’ being explicitly differentiated from the traditional antecedent being, and taken as entirely *ad hoc* with none of the independence of such being. I have indeed ventured to suggest that certain difficulties seem to stand in the way of logically connecting these ‘hads,’ thus understood, with the objects of knowledge or ideas as conceived by the revolutionist. Granting, however, that these difficulties are only figments arising from misunderstanding and that the logical

¹² Dewey, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXV, p. 348; the italics are all in the text. See the same *Journal*, Vol. XXVII, p. 179.

relation between ideas and these antecedent 'hads' is quite plain on the principles of the revolutionary epistemology, it still remains possible to interpret the 'hads' as fundamentally distinct from the traditional existences and essences. This reading of such passages, I now wish to insist and to emphasize, must be taken in all seriousness as the only correct reading; or the polemic against the tradition loses its whole point. If this reading is permitted to stand, such statements are in principle harmonious with the criticism of the older epistemology; but, so far at least as I am able to see, they are not harmonious on any other reading.

Presumably we are safe in assuming that the general claim of the new epistemology on this crucial issue is foundational, and that subordinate ambiguous passages must be read so as to make them consistent with their systematic context. If so, then the positive thesis of this epistemology is that objects of knowledge, in respect of both their meaning and the validity of this meaning, are attached only to the "consequences" of the reflective process; and that among these consequences "things had in experience" are some how to be included – though just how is not clear – but only in the sense in which such things are quite other than the antecedent existences and essences of the tradition. As thus understood, the new epistemology is not merely a new name for an old way of thinking, but is truly what it claims to be – namely, an essentially new view of the nature and significance of thought, a genuine Copernican revolution in epistemological theory. It is not such a revolution unless its basal thesis is thus understood.

Despite its length, the preceding expository statement could hardly be shortened and at the same time buttressed against the accusation of being arbitrary. Doubtless it is even now too short to do justice to the complexities involved. But, in intent at least, it has tried to touch the fundamentals and to guard against misinterpreting or overlooking alternatives. If in this it has failed, it may perchance still be useful as indicative of important points on which further analysis by the revolutionists might be helpful.

If it has not failed, we are at last in position to state the crucial issue between the new epistemology and the old with a precision which may help us forward towards more constructive considerations. According to the old epistemology; the object of knowledge is 'revelatory' of antecedent being in the sense (if repetition for the sake of clarity is permissible) that the referential meaning of the object of knowledge is, or may be, joined by way of implication¹³ with an objective situation which is antecedent to, and wholly independent of, not only the

¹³ This notion is, of course, puzzling. But presumably it is sufficiently definite for the

immediate reflective occasion, but also human experience itself. According to the new epistemology, on the other hand, there is no implicative linkage between the object of knowledge and this sort of antecedent being, but the referential meaning of the object of knowledge is implicatively attached only to the consequences of the overt operation of reflection in which it psychologically functions – it being understood that “things or events had in experience” are somehow to be included among these consequences, but only as things or events taken entirely *ad hoc* and having none of the independence belonging to the traditional existences and essences. Thus is the issue between the old and the new quite definitely joined.

Further consideration of this issue on the present occasion must necessarily be brief, and I fear I can hardly do more than affirm impressions. Presumably it is needless to request that the apparently dogmatic tone of these concluding comments be attributed solely to my desire to spare you the pain and me the embarrassment of an unduly protracted discussion. And I shall endeavor further to conserve time by keeping to matters that are foundational within the main issue before us.

The issue at once resolves itself, of course, into the old problem of meaning. What the controversy obviously calls for is a rigorous analysis of this notion. Such an analysis cannot here be carried through with any thoroughness, but something may be done in a preliminary way. Fixing attention upon the meaning-situation – the situation, that is, in which objects of knowledge empirically function – I wish briefly to inquire concerning some of the chief features of that which in the object of knowledge is called its meaning, and then to suggest an application of the results to a resolution of the conflict between the revolutionist and the traditionalist.

Beginning with the analysis, we must hold in the first place that what is called the referential meaning of the object of knowledge is always dual. On the one side it is prospective, referring to the purpose and the consequences of the reflective process itself; on the other side, it is, so to say, retrospective, referring back to something antecedent to the purpose and the consequences of the reflective process. The question of special importance here concerns the nature of this ‘something’ which is thus antecedent to the occasion and the answer to the question, I should wish to hold, is that it is an immediate psychological content which somehow (how is not now before us) reaches logically beyond itself to a context which is entirely independent of the reflective occasion. In other words, the retrospective side of the idea’s meaning refers back directly to

purposes of its context here and elsewhere where used in this paper, apart from any attempt to define it or to consider whether it is definable.

“things or events had in experience” and indirectly, through them, to independent essences or existences; and in the latter reference the meaning must be said to be trans-empirical.

To carry the analysis here a step further, it would appear that the prospective meaning of an object of knowledge may be said to be relative to the universe of discourse which generates it and makes use of it. The retrospective meaning, however, is only partly relative to this universe it is relative to the empirical ‘hads’ which belong to the universe of discourse, but through the trans-empirical reach of these ‘hads’ it is saved from being entirely relative because it is thereby attached to another universe, namely, that of essences and existences, which gives to it something of the nature of an absolute signification. The atom as an object of knowledge, for example, means something for Democritus and it also means something for Dalton; what it means for the one is quite different from what it means for the other, and its meaning for either is determinable only with reference to his special point of view. But, on the other side, the meaning of the atom of Democritus is also the meaning of the atom of Dalton in some quite important and fairly definite sense – in the sense, namely, that the same general existential situation (proximately as “things or events had in experience,” but remotely as independent existences) is relevant to the two objects of knowledge and furnishes a ground which is common to them. Taken in its first setting, the meaning of the atom is what Democritus or Dalton intends it to mean, and it is not the same in the two instances; taken in its second setting, however, it is ideally the same for both, and this fact it is which makes possible an intelligible view of scientific progress.

Our first thesis, then, is that every object of knowledge has in its meaning a dual nature. On the one side, it refers to reflective purposes and consequences; on the other side, it refers directly to the empirical ‘hads’ (or, if you prefer, the ‘takens’) and through them to all independent existential or subsistential order.

A further thesis which I should think must be accepted is that these two aspects of meaning are logically inseparable. What does a given object of knowledge mean? It means, on the one side, what the one who entertains it intends it to mean; but, on the other side, what one intends it to mean is in the end logically connected with the trans-empirical aspects of the empirical ‘hads.’ What the atom means for Democritus, to recur to our former example, is what Democritus intends by the atom, is what the atom *does* for him in the context in which he makes use of it. But what he intends by the atom is, in its turn, logically dependent on what he takes as data, and these, while in an important sense relative to the special occasion, are in an equally important sense independent of it

and reach beyond the limits of the empirical situation. Thus the two references of the object of knowledge are inseparably joined; strictly considered, they are logical correlatives, and the full meaning of the object of knowledge involves both. This, I should hold, is true generally. Analyse the meaning of any object of knowledge in its concrete setting (such is the contention), and you will be driven to acknowledge that the prospective and retrospective references are mutually dependent for their signification. Sunder them in theory and treat them as if they were irrelevant to each other, and you will find that the meaning-situation withers under such abstract handling. The two stand together, or meaning is viciously truncated. Of course, one may on occasion place emphasis on one or the other; but if either emphasis be taken as exclusive, it thereby becomes empirically ruinous.

Despite their inseparability, however, these two aspects of referential meaning do not lie on quite the same logical level. It is the retrospective aspect which is the final court of appeal, not the prospective; and in the end authority rests in the farther reaches of the retrospective reference – in what I have above called the trans-empirical aspect of the empirical ‘hads.’ And this point needs careful attention in view of the fact that it has been so frequently neglected or misread in recent theories of meaning, idealistic as well as pragmatic.

In it there are indeed many complications which cannot even be so much as mentioned here. But the main principle involved may at least be stated and the broad outline of the argument in support of it indicated. The principle is this: the universality and corrigibility of objects of knowledge run ultimately to ground in the retrospective reference of their meaning. The justification of the principle is to be sought and found in a thorough-going attempt to attain a satisfactory definition of the notions of ‘objects’ and ‘logical necessity.’ There is here no time for such an undertaking, of course, and I must perforce content myself with a bare assertion of the conviction that such is the case. I can, however, call attention to the fact that much at least of the preliminary analysis has long since been done by others – in respect of ‘necessity,’ by the participants in the old debate about the significance and validity of “clear and distinct ideas,” particularly by Spinoza and Leibniz; and in respect of ‘object,’ negatively by Hume and Berkeley and positively by Kant and Hegel.

The immediately preceding observations are, of course, not proved; but they are at least indicative of theses which are important for the debate and which must be attended to if the debate is to be carried forward. And in my opinion they may be proved by a detailed analytical study of meaning-situations.

Assuming that they are empirically grounded, what is their bearing on the controversy between the revolutionist and the traditionist? If they are well grounded, then each side of the controversy partly stands and partly falls. The traditionist is in principle right in his insistence upon the revelatory function of objects of knowledge; he is in error, however, in so far as he fails (if and where he does fail) to take into account the influence of prospective meanings on such a revelatory function. The revolutionist, on his side, is partly on solid ground, but only partly so, and in what seems to be his chief contention he is in error. I wish briefly to draw out each of these points.

We have already urged that the attribution of the spectator-theory of knowledge to that complex movement known as 'the tradition' may be allowed only with qualification. I recall the point here primarily to note its bearing upon our estimate of the significance of the traditional epistemology.¹⁴ The sense in which the spectator-theory of knowledge underlies the tradition is precisely the sense in which ideas have meaning, if the analysis of meaning suggested above is in principle permitted to stand. For what that theory in this sense says is simply that ideas are by their meaning attached to things-in-themselves; and this cannot be denied, if the analysis outlined is affirmed. So far, then, the traditionist is solid against the attack of the revolutionist; to deny his thesis is to deny that ideas have this sort of meaning, and this on our showing above is to deny that they have what empirically is characteristic of them.

A good deal can perhaps be said in support of the position that some representatives of the tradition have held the spectator-theory in the special sense in which that theory means that independent being is present to ideas, so to say, *in propria persona*. The theory in this sense cannot, I repeat, be attributed to all representatives of the tradition; but it may perhaps be fairly attributed to some. If so, then such representatives of the tradition must be said to be in error on a basal epistemological doctrine. In empirical meaning-situations, at any rate, independent being is present partly in an interrogative form, incomplete and with ragged edges; it is not there in a finished or complete form, unless it may be said to be so in those situations which are hypothetical at bottom and characterized by what one might call a certain sort of

¹⁴ It should be noted that the qualification is also quite important with reference to the significance of the revolutionary epistemology. For the revolutionary epistemology denies the older epistemology in principle; and this denial, if the older theory is accepted as qualified, logically commits the revolutionist at once and irrevocably to a denial of any implicative relationship between ideas and things-in-themselves. If the qualification is not accepted, then the spectator-theory cannot justly be attributed to the tradition at all.

hypothetical absoluteness. In such cases, however, the absoluteness is by no means ultimate; they share the ragged-edgedness of the more categorical situations, and include independent being in part at least as a question-mark. And this is apparently inevitable, since independent being is present as a datum, and every datum, as Dewey rightly insists, is also a 'taken.' The referential meaning of the idea reaches independent being only through the medium of "things or events had in experience"; and the being is modified by the medium through which it enters functionally into the cognitive situation. It is there as in some degree problematic, and not as a self-contained entity.

On this point the position of the revolutionist is fundamentally sound. The psychological and biographical context in which objects of knowledge are generated and function is unquestionably partly determinative in respect of the meaning and validity of such objects. And a frank acceptance of this fact, together with a recognition of its significant implications, would prevent our deluding ourselves – as some of the traditionists apparently deluded themselves – with a false hope about 'absolutes,' whether written with an initial capital or not.

But there is the other side to the situation which must not be overlooked, and this is the side which the traditionist in his basal thesis rightly emphasizes. The meaning of the object of knowledge is also retrospective and linked with an order which cannot without falsification be identified with any mere psychological or biographical context of the meaning-situation. In so far as the revolutionist denies this reference – and such a denial I understand to be his main polemic against the tradition¹⁵ – he is open to effective attack; for in such denial is involved the negation of a characteristic which not only belongs to all meaning-situations, but is even foundational to them. Though not present in hypostatic union, independent being is certainly functionally involved in such situations.

Suppose we take in good faith the thesis that doing must be "installed as the heart of knowing," that every idea is merely a plan of action. What then? Surely the significance of any reconstruction of a situation involves reference to antecedent essences and existences? Taken as means, and even as mere expedients for the given occasion, ideas owe their practical value to the fidelity with which they 'disclose' the relevant aspects of the existential order in its trans-empirical character; while the

¹⁵ If the revolutionist does not intend this denial, then, I repeat, it is impossible to make sense either of his reiterated assertion that both the nature and the validity of meaning must be defined exclusively in terms of its prospective reference, or of his persistent claim that his epistemological doctrine for the first time frees philosophy from the *ignis fatuus* which during these centuries has kept the pre-revolutionary philosophers wandering in the wilderness.

significant, both theoretical and practical, of ideas taken as ends impinges in a very definite manner on their ontological status. The revolutionist himself admits explicitly, though as I think inconsistently with his view of meaning, that, when taken as plans of action, ideas are referentially linked with the 'hads' of experience and owe their utility precisely to this linkage; this admission is always involved in the notions of 'purpose' and 'consequences' as made use of by him in his more descriptive accounts of reflective experience, and it is an admission which he must avow or else run counter to the plain facts of that experience. What is needed to complete his account, I urge, is, in the first place, a re-orientation of his view of meaning so as to include all explicit acknowledgement of this linkage of the objects of knowledge with the empirical 'hads,' and in the second place, a frank recognition of the trans-empirical reach of this reference – its reach, that is, through and by means of the 'hads' to the underlying order of antecedent being which is quite independent of the reflective occasion. And he will be forced to such a double qualification of his theory, I maintain, by an analytical study of meaning-situations.

Along these lines, then, I should wish to safeguard the epistemology of the traditionist and revise that of the revolutionist. I should try to persuade the revolutionist, while maintaining in principle his thesis that data are functional, to grapple more sternly with the retrospective aspect of the meaning of objects of knowledge, their linkage with things or event had in experience, and particularly to follow this reference to its logical termination in what I cannot but think is essentially the traditionist's antecedent being. And I should warn the traditionist against permitting his doctrine of the revelatory nature of ideas to blind him to the implications of the fact that the medium of linkage between ideas and existences or essences is always empirical, and that the human view of things-in-themselves is, as Kant urges in principle, always from the hither side.

The novelty of this position, if indeed there be any novelty in it, lies in its patent affirmations and negations, and its consequent explicit synthesis of *prima facie* radical oppositions. Whether novel or not, the position is quite important. It at least brings assumptions into the open; and, unless I am mistaken in my estimate, it puts us in position to go forward to the fruitful consideration of other issues which lie before. But these issues fall beyond the scope of this discussion, which has already transgressed the limits of my hour. I may not bring it to a close, however, without returning for a moment upon my predecessor's view of the nature and function of philosophy with which we began.

What, I felt impelled in the beginning to ask, is my loyalty in respect

of this view? The intervening discussion has, in intent at least, disclosed the principles which are basic to the answer that must be given. And in the light of these principles, the answer seems clear. Assuming that one is sympathetic with the spirit of the contention that philosophy proper is blankly identical with a philosophy of life, one still seems compelled to hold that the philosopher cannot in the end escape ontological issues. Nor are such issues relatively unimportant; on the contrary, they must be met, implicitly or explicitly, at each step in the formulation and organization of values. There is, to be sure, a confusion here which tends to darken the question. A philosophy of life may mean a special way of living, or it may mean a theory about living; and one who is a good philosopher in one sense of the term is not necessarily so in the other. Which of these two meanings is intended by those who advocate an identification of philosophy with the philosophy of life is, unfortunately, not always clear. I am assuming, however, that what is intended by the view here under discussion is that philosophy should be identified with an intellectual discipline whose main concern is with the problems arising out of the content and the art of the business of living. And I urge that the philosopher in this sense must necessarily be a metaphysician to the extent at least of being forced to make some systematic disposition of the quite fundamental issues arising from the entanglement between the search for security and the quest for certainty. And what disposition he is to make of these issues should certainly be outspoken; it constitutes no insignificant part of his general philosophy of life.

If the principles I have urged are to stand, the philosophical search for security is *eo ipso* a quest for certainty – a quest, that is, which seeks its goal beyond any biographical experience, and which within this reference is characterized by both a need of and a ground for its constant self-correction. If this mutual involvement of the search and the quest be accepted, then I should have no objection in principle to the identification of philosophy with a philosophy of life; but I fail to see here any radical break with the tradition. If the involvement be denied, then I see no reason for holding that philosophy can be identified with a philosophy of life, unless the term ‘philosophy’ is arbitrarily narrowed in its scope and the justification of the denial is handed over to a logically prior discipline designated by some other name. But if the involvement is denied, we should frankly face the alternatives that remain for the philosopher in this limited capacity. And they would appear to be either to proclaim the doctrine of opportunism and muddling through; or to dogmatize in the name of his pet absolute, whether in the form of an *a priori* imperative to be reasonable or the equally empty empirical exhor-

tation to be up and doing; or, finally, to avow the utter vanity of life and, in the grand manner, perhaps to seek a compensatory thrill in the counsel of heroic despair.

DEWEY'S CONCEPTS OF EXPERIENCE AND NATURE

William Ernest Hocking. "Dewey's Concepts of Experience and Nature."
Philosophical Review 49.2 (March 1940): 228–44.

Ten years ago, when Mr. Dewey was only seventy years old, a session of the Association meeting in this place was devoted to a phase of his philosophy. I seem to remember reading a paper at that session in which I recounted the tragedy of thirty-two years occupied in refuting Dewey while Dewey remained unconscious of what had happened!

I have now a different and happier report to make. Not, I hasten to say, that Dewey has changed, but that I have largely ceased to read him with polemical intent: I read him to enjoy him. In this I succeed far better, in fact I am almost completely successful! Only, the question continues to trouble me whether Dewey, if he knew about this, would regard it as an improvement on my part or as a retrogression.

Let me enlarge briefly on this parable.

Experience, as Dewey says, consists in the first instance not of highly theorized contents, but of things *had and enjoyed*. And even highly theorized contents, sciences, and philosophies, in so far as they are among the facts of the world, we must also as empiricists count among the objects to be, first of all, had and enjoyed. Dewey suggests that he can take even a transcendental philosophy that way, as well as all the (other?) dreams, illusions, enthusiasms, superstitions of the race. For every mode of thought and feeling has its history; it has been begotten somewhere and somehow; there is a motivation which attends its genesis and its continued seat in the minds of active men. In brief, there is a factual *psychological englobement* of the theory, which is bound to be instructive because it is human; and by way of this englobement, empiricism becomes or should become the most hospitable of all attitudes of the mind. All modes of thinking, feeling, speculating, fancying, believing, come to an ultimate democracy on this level of experience.

I am reminded that Kant introduced a similar democracy, but from a

different angle. When he said that the 'I-think' can always be prefixed to any notion we may entertain, he defined the *logical englobement* of ideas, or what has since been called the 'logo-centric predicament.' Dewey's empiricism makes in substance the same remark; but the 'I-think' (or 'they-think') which Dewey can always prefix is not a mere logical point of reference; it is a bit of history having its date, and arising in the quandary of an actual thinker and doer; it defines the psychological¹ englobement of that notion or thought.

On the face of it, this addition of the psychological 'I-think' gives us a completer view of the whole situation. But – and here is the puzzle – with the addition *something seems to have escaped*. To assert 'John is a rascal' is less complete than to say 'I think John is a rascal,' but it is more forceful: the prefix 'I think' may relieve me from an action for libel, because in telling the truth more circumspectly it withdraws the force of assertion from the outer world. Just because we can all take Zen Buddhism as one of the empirical shapes of human self-discipline it falls short of the way Zen Buddhism would like to be taken. And if I halt at the point of taking Dewey's philosophy that way, as a mode of thought to be had and enjoyed in its psychological englobement, I am paying it less than its due respect. Just because the psychological 'I-think' (or 'he-thinks' or 'they say') is a sun which shines equally on the just and on the unjust, it is an absolute which evades the battle. If we examine the psychology of the teacher in the moment of his teaching, his motive contains the paradoxical demand that the personal and historical origins of his propositions shall be forgotten, and that his teaching be taken in its naked propositional force.

Thus when we celebrate today the eightieth birthday of John Dewey, we do so because Dewey's philosophy is not merely a philosophy thought out today and yesterday by John Dewey, but also a majestic body of thought to which the years and their story are irrelevant. If I may venture the paradox, what makes history important is that it englobes something superhistorical; the *meaning of the particular is in the universal*.² This is the substance of what I shall here try to illustrate, by way of comment on Dewey's concepts.

I shall begin with the concept of Experience.

I. Experience

In the second edition of his *Carus Lectures*, Dewey abandons the remark

¹ The biological englobement, fundamental in Dewey's thought, may be taken as implied in this term; 'historical englobement' might be used to cover both.

² This is but a half-truth. It is also true that the universal means the particular. I want here to emphasize the fact that 'meaning' is a two-way conception.

that experience is a weasel word, and says instead that experience is a double-barrelled idea. This change implies, I think, an improvement in the moral status of the weasel; a residue of his duplicity has seemed on reflection to be worth keeping. In the undivided totality which experience is, there can be distinguished (1) a stuff of experience and (2) a way of dealing with it. We never know what experience is by simply knowing the grist fed into the mill of perception. Somebody has 'gone through the experience' of having smallpox or has 'had the experience' of trying to climb Mount Everest; in such expressions we habitually denote the experience by its subject-matter; but the question of interest is, *How did he take it?* Did he whine through it? did he 'get a kick out of it'? Did he make something of it? is there a *story* in it?

Why should any experience give rise to a story? Because a given stuff may be *taken* in an incalculable variety of ways. The physician's case-record of the smallpox patient, or the log of the expedition, makes no story; but in the way this stuff is taken there is emotion, imagination, moral and esthetic meaning; and the true empiricist will include all this, because it is all *there*. Experience is a grist interfused with the way of taking it.

The grist itself has to be understood as that which we mean to be dealing with; and since we mean to be dealing with *things* and not with *sensa*, with chairs rather than with odd perceptions, shapes, colors, experience is of *things*. In calling attention to the 'doing and suffering' which make experience, Dewey has no intention of dissolving its objects into perceptions. Men 'do and suffer' farming (for example): but they experience not only farming but the farm, the fields, the wood-lots, the stock, the implements, the weather, the crops. Experience is the inseparable engagement of the objects of our concern with the concern, the beings loved and hated with the loving and hating.

(So far, I think I am on the ground of Dewey's conception; and I believe I shall be still within his meaning if I make a simple inference. The objects of experience blend into their own backgrounds; as we experience things, we experience the setting of things. Some of these backgrounds – like space and time – are common backgrounds; and the common setting of all things having such common backgrounds is briefly describable as 'nature.' If this is the case, we establish one point in the relation between the conceptions of 'experience' and 'nature,' namely that nature is a persistent object, a constant in all experience. Experience is *of nature*, as incorporated into our doings and carings; or, Experience is our doing and caring "penetrating into nature and expanding through it.")

It is this undivided totality which for Dewey is the beginning and ending of all thinking. it is near to what some of our Continental

brethren have been calling the "Concrete," and some others "*Existenz*"; and if I am not mistaken it is akin to what Muensterberg once called "*die reine Erfahrung*."

II. Thought as a Function within Experience

Now, for Dewey, thought is a function within experience, understood in this concrete fashion.

As I understand the contrast which he wishes to make between his way of thinking and other ways, it lies here: he points out that thought always has a working relation to its beginning and ending in gross experience; it has something to resolve and to clarify through its task of enquiry; and *what thought is* must be judged by that temporal function.

It is for this reason that Dewey regards scientific method as exemplary for philosophy also.

For the theoretical journey of science is everywhere understood to be a part of experience: it debouches in experience; its terminal wire is well grounded. If the conceptions devised in this journey hold good, they provide control of the course of events and also an enlargement of the meaning of the plainest of plain facts. Philosophical thought ought to have the same kind of rôle: it should be applicable to experience and testable by experience; it should enlarge the meaning of experience. And *its* conceptions have 'reality' – if we wish to use this dangerous term – (or 'validity' if we do not) (and I do, because the substitutes are worse) – only because and in so far as they fulfil these conditions.

Lumping together scientific and philosophic thought, we might, I believe, resume the position as follows. Thought is a function within experience, engaged in *remaking experienced* by enlarging our resources for the understanding and control of nature (*i.e.*, for our ways of *taking* the grist); and there is no 'reality' outside this process with which either experience or thought have anything to do.

And this conception of the work of thought adds an important trait to the conception of experience. Experience is a history in which the world (including nature itself, so far as it is "incorporated into our doings and carings") is being progressively remade by thought. The sardonic comment of Karl Marx to the effect that "philosophers have been engaged in interpreting the world, whereas the task is to change it," is here met by the doctrine that to interpret the world in a truly empirical sense *is to change it*.

III. Emerging Questions

The only apology I can offer to Mr. Dewey and to you for so truncated an exposition, or for any exposition at all, is an instrumental apology; I

had to avow the jumping-off place for the comments I now have to offer.

With the conceptions of experience and nature so far sketched out I am in general agreement. These conceptions have a good cutting edge, and most of what is cut away and rejected by them seems to me worthy of rejection. They exclude any scheme which sets up a result of analysis as candidate for the honorific position of 'the real,' in the sense of the unit of all being. The sense-datum, the physical object, the mental state considered as 'idea,' the neutral entity, the eternal entity or essence, are all alike disqualified for *this* ambitious rôle. Analysis surely has something to do in philosophy as well as in science; but it is not to discover the metaphysical atom.

I agree also that the philosopher's balloon must confess the circumstances of its flight, and that once ascended it must not anchor itself in the sphere of the fixed stars. Unless it returns to do work in the world it left, and in the same situation as launched its voyage of enquiry, it affords no answer to *that* question.

Dewey's work has been so well done, that some of his propositions which were contentious in his youth have become almost the axioms of the world of his mature age. But our fraternity, for whom the play of thought is the most germane expression of our seriousness, needs continually to be reminded of the profound human stake in the issues with which we deal, and owes perennial gratitude to the man who has so unswervingly done that reminding.

The point at which I tend to diverge from the conceptions as stated has to do, first, with the relation between experience and reality, and second with the relation between the products of thought and that same reality. I begin to feel this divergence in Dewey's account of the meaning of scientific method; let me then first say a few words about that.

Scientific questioning and answering have the virtues which Dewey attributes to them; they arise (ultimately) from gross experience and report back to the same sort of situation in which they arose. But, *en route*, the process is intellectualized to the last limit. The question is altered so as to refer to a body of existing theory; it reads, now must this theory be amended or developed to provide for phenomenon X? And experience is interfered with, so that a single sense-datum will provide a straw looking to an answer. Experiment may be defined as an arrangement of controllable events such that a terminal sense-fact shall *mean a verdict of life or death to a theory*. That terminal sense-fact, pointer-reading or what not, stands at the extremest distance which any grist of experience can reach *from immediacy*, or from that minimal cognitive burden which 'gross experience' carries.

And this disparity between starting point and the consummatory moment of answer-getting is the *peculiarly scientific thing*. Refined, and ever more refined, speculation is there embedded in the course of facts, and there is no way to un-embed it! The weight of bodies near the earth continues to mean, for our experience, terrestrial gravitation, until we get a better theory. There are to be sure three ways of escaping awareness of this meaning: forgetfulness, the artificial naïveté of the artist, the acquired integrity of the mystic. But these anodynes are passing, and the mischief done by the scientist remains; for by the nature of his calling, he is transforming experience for all mankind; we all suffer the fate of having to see things through his eyes. That is why science is front-page news for our time and henceforth.

My point is that this highly theorized moment of cognitive contemplation in which the fact means the theory is, to my mind, the characteristically scientific moment, rather than that flood of subsequent moments in which gross experience is lifted by the improved theory to a new level for all mankind. And it is so, I believe, because science in crowding the maximum of theory into the narrowed flux of event supposes itself to be coming nearer to the goal we call 'reality,' rather than removing us from it.

This brings me to my main enquiry, that of the relation between experience and reality.

(Idealistic metaphysics is supposed to have a vested interest in denying reality to the conceptual terms in which physical equations are couched, physical substances of whatever sort, atoms, electrons, positrons, or what not, and in indicating that these entities mean simply calculable relations between moments of overt experience. The fine-spun theoretical mesh of physics means no more and no less than precise reliability in succession; its particular terms are in a literal sense 'constructions,' not reals. And contemporary physics is inclined to accept the idealist analysis to the extent of saying that it has no interest in non-phenomenal reals, but only in the validity of predictions. In this respect, Dewey's concept of experience is congenial to idealism, and I find myself beginning to dissent at precisely the point in which idealism is in general most swift to agree.)

IV. Experience and Reality

'Reality' like 'experience' is a weasel word; but, also like 'experience,' it is better to call it double-barrelled.

In one sense it is coextensive with experience. Everything which enters experience, whether physical object, feeling, illusion, dream, system of metaphysics, is real as experienced, *i.e.*, in its psychological

englobement. And on this level of reality, cognition, as Dewey has rightly insisted, has no privileged place.

In the other sense, 'reality' is an *object of search*, and, by that sign, not on the surface; and certainly not identical with whatever is had and enjoyed. In this sense the 'real' is in contrast to whatever puts up a false show of self-sufficiency, and (to be dogmatic for brevity) may be defined as *independent being, on which other being depends*. It is an inescapable concept simply because this relation of dependence is itself a matter of experience; we keep finding out that things which look, and may feel to themselves, independent (as we ourselves feel in our more robust moments) are not so, but depend on something else.

In so far as things depend on the real, it *explains* them; and conversely, whoever seeks explanation seeks the real, whether under that name or under some other name he may like better. Since independence is a matter of degree, and C may depend on B, while B in turn depends on A, there are *degrees of reality*. And since there are degrees of reality, there may be degrees of approach to reality; enquiry might conceivably approach reality forever without reaching it.

In so far as enquiry moves toward understanding (as distinct from mere description) it moves by definition toward the real; its organ for so moving is 'hypothesis' or 'theory.'³ hence follows the dictum: *the more theory the nearer reality*. This is in direct contrast with the rule: the more thought the more artificial the construction and the more subjective the result. It is in direct contrast with the whole Kantian assumption that whatever is categorized by the mind is by that fact altered or veiled away from the condition of the thing-in-itself. Philosophies evidently split at this point.

The philosophies of Dewey, Bradley and Bergson, diverse as they are, agree in this one respect, that they all distrust conceptual judgment as arriving at reality. For Dewey, as I read him, the man who in a moment of insight leaps to an hypothesis which afterwards proves to be valid is not at that *happy moment of successful induction* in any particularly close contact with reality; the full process whereby it is (1) verified and (2) shows its power to bring about adaptations, controls, integrations. The other alternative, to which I adhere, is that the moment of insight is without further process a moment of grasping reality. The more theory, if it is true theory, the more reality. Let me develop this point.

Accepting the maxim that the ingredients of experience are first had and then thought about, this subsequent thinking deals in general with the enquiries 'What is this object?' 'On what does it depend?' In the

³ By definition this is cognitive enquiry. Cf. Schilpp, 525.

course of these enquiries, which are always pertinent, the relative immediacy of the experience of 'having' is lost; the immediate becomes charged with 'mediation.' This is a definite change within experience, a psychological change; the boy's experience of the locomotive as somehow understood is far removed from his first admiring impression of dark concentrated might. But this psychological change must be compatible with the identity of the object as meant throughout the enquiry, otherwise the enquiry is not about something. Hence the maxim: The psychological non-identity of the immediate and the mediated must be compatible with their objective identity.

(Psychological history, so far as it is cognitive, is, on this showing, always grappling with a relatively non-historical object. Now is this relatively unchanging object merely meant, or believed in, or *is it observed?* Dewey is ready to say, if the object is a chair, and my psychological history as I walk around it and have many perspectives is still taken as a changing experience of the same physical thing, that I observe *this thing*. He is ready to take this into the total of gross experience, and regards the analysis which severs the perspectives from that of which they are perspectives as a vicious and unreal kind of empiricism from which he wishes to depart. But, if the object is a molecule in the wood of the chair, or an atom in the molecule, or an electron in the atom, Dewey will not say that I observe that, but only that I think it. I agree. But is the atom, then, less real than the chair which I observe? The difference seems to be simply this: that the single chair, which I at no time see, is assigned an invariant position in *space*; and I am inseparably aware of space with my awareness of the several perspectives. I have no such direct intuition of the atom as explanatory of the many actual aspects of the chair. Nevertheless, the atom has, not a place, nor a region, but a spatial reference, and is at least as real as the chair, and on the same ground; there is a variety of phenomena which depend on it, and which it 'explains' or unifies; with reference to them it is the independent being and the independent variable; it endures through their changes.)

I am prepared to carry this principle to its consequences. For example, in spite of the impossibilities of imagination into which we are led by recent advances in physics, I must maintain (as against such operationalists as Bridgman) that the reality with which we are concerned lies not in the operations or eventualities but in the entities whose behavior responds to our differential equations. It is quite evident that we have not yet finished defining those entities, or formulating our equations; but this is very different from saying that there are no such entities. There is no way of building up a philosophy which believes in the overt phenomena of gross experience and disbelieves in the X's indicated by the intermediate theoretical structure. Operationalism is a counsel of

despair where despair is not allowable; and, however congenial such philosophies may be to the subjective temper, we must decline their comfort.

That Dewey is unwilling to follow the subjectivist way of escape he has amply indicated. He states his belief, for example, that there is a physical world which antedates the arrival of consciousness, and to some extent conditions that arrival; this is to give credence to thought as providing an outlook on reality beyond the reach of observation and indeed of possible verification.

But the consequences of accepting the two principles I have here put forward – (1) the more thought the more reality; (2) the objective identity of mediate and immediate – are far-fetching. One of these consequences is that, if theory severs the original amalgam of experience and nature into two aspects, the mental and the physical, that *severance must be accepted* as a better version of truth. It divides the original unity, but it is a step toward the real, not away from it.

V. the Mental and the Physical

Now my belief is that theory does require this separation and that Descartes was on a true scent when he made it as sharp as he did. Dewey and Whitehead agree in making Descartes responsible for much of the modern metaphysical confusion. He split asunder what experience had joined together. And since mind was in his view not body, and body was not mind, he had to attempt a mending of his world out of materials which would not take his wider. Not alone could mind not affect body, nor body mind; the possibility of knowledge became dubious, and a whole host of artificial problems sprang up which a true empiricism would never encounter. Dewey's philosophy has as one of its main motives the rejection of these sophistic puzzles.

I wish that I could accept this liberation from the metaphysical burden. Chinese philosophy has been celebrated by some of its exponents because it has never sundered mind and body, matter and spirit. My own feeling is that it is to that extent an undeveloped philosophy; it has not suffered the pain of dualism, and it will be unable, until it has done so, to work its way toward a remedy. We cannot solve our metaphysical problems by preventing them from arising. We cannot reject the analysis of water into hydrogen and oxygen solely on the ground that it is much better for drinking purposes in its undivided state.

The principle which required the Cartesian distinction was not due to Descartes; it was embedded in the new science. It was nothing less than the modern conception of causality. The resolve to clear final causes out of our theories of nature carried all the other consequences with it.

What replaced final cause was a causality which required (and could use) *no goal* because the next stage of events was always completely determined. This new and severely self-sufficient mode of scientific description was supposed (at first) to be a sort of *identity in change*; cause and effect were equal in amount, and to be equal in amount they had to be alike in kind. But where there is complete likeness of kind (an ideal which reached its completion in the description of all physical change as flux of energy) *quality cancels out of the equations*, and we are dealing perforce with pure mathematics; in the real world of modern physics the differential equations (including constants and coefficients) describe all that happens.

It is just this neat result which has been the charter of liberty to scientific speculation, at the same time that it has been fraught with profound metaphysical embarrassment. One of its first implications in this field was the “bifurcation of nature”; for, if the qualities of nature are no part of the business of scientific description, these qualities find themselves relegated to the subjective, and the integral Nature of experience is split in two, primary properties in the real, secondary in the mental appearance. Against this bifurcation, Berkeley made the first ringing protest; then Hegel; then Fechner; then Dewey; then Whitehead. Dewey’s expressions on this point seem to me the most vigorous and eloquent as well as the most extreme; for he would put back into Nature not alone colors, sounds, tastes and smells, but qualities commonly ascribed to feeling: beauty, ugliness, loveliness, terribleness, and the like.

He can do this, in part, because he detaches these properties from subjectivity – at least from the subjectivity of the private mind – and allows to nature the impersonal possession – I will not say enjoyment – of traits which earlier centuries could conceive only in terms of the individual subject.

Now all these protests against mutilating Nature are well justified; they recall us to sanity of judgment both about what unsophisticated experience is, and about what we mean by Nature. But the various remedies of the scandal of bifurcation miss fire, I believe, because of a misconception of the difficulty.

This difficulty appears most patent when we try to explain *perception* in terms of the physical order as an effect of qualityless causes. We can explain everything except the qualities which appear in perception; that is, we can explain everything except the only thing that matters; that is, we do not and cannot explain perception at all in these terms.

But then it may occur to us with some relief that the modern conception of causal order was *not intended* to do this work. Its whole function has been to formulate quantitative aspects of sequence. In this it has been a complete success. And this is all we should have expected

from it. Those mathematical relationships are valid: and in so far as this is the case, the theoretical construction which gives the terms of our equations is a move toward 'reality.'

It would indeed be an error to dignify this construction with the name of '*the real*,' which would be to assert that the mathematical order could exist by itself. This claim science does not make, for it does not raise the question. This error *was made*; and all the metaphysical difficulties we have mentioned followed from it.

The remedy lies in recognizing (1) that the qualityness and desiccated Nature is an abstraction from full and concrete reality; but also (2) that this abstraction has an invaluable significance for the life of the mind. The remedy does not lie in the Berkeleian direction, of refusing to space and its substance-contents any relative autonomy. Nor does it lie (if I am right) in the direction taken by Dewey and Whitehead, of ascribing to Nature a plenum of qualities commonly regarded as mental. It lies rather in recognizing that this very autonomy of Nature, its impersonality and exactitude, its absence of quality and sense, are requisites for the free life of the mind; and are themselves to be understood as dependent aspects of a total mental life.

For observe – an old observation – : unless there is a realm of regular nature, no habits can be built, no cumulative mental mastery of Nature, be accomplished. And then an observation not so old: unless there is a realm of being, empty of life and quality, impersonal and desiccated, we could not plow a field nor fell a tree without the sense of destroying life and value. The moral freedom to exploit nature is the requisite background for the moral unfreedom to exploit one another. There is thus a positive meaning in the existence of a realm of the meaningless; and, in this sense, a perception of the meaninglessness of physical nature is a radical step toward an idealist interpretation of reality.

Thus the scandal of bifurcation is only genuinely repaired by a type of objective idealism (still to be worked out in detail); and the extraordinary generosity with which contemporary naturalism enriches the concept of Nature with the attributes of the soul (which I might irreverently describe as a sort of give-away!) is striking evidence of the need for such a philosophy.

VI. Experience as Dialectical

Let me now in conclusion recur briefly to the concept of experience, and to the place of thought in experience.

Thought is indeed an enquiry devoted to the resolving of problematic situations; it is also true that thought often creates the dilemmas which further thinking has to resolve. The abstraction of nature from experience was one of those thought-begotten dilemmas, The historical

conception of thinking will recognize some of these dilemmas as natural, perhaps inevitable, stages of growing insight; and such recognition is the source of the 'dialectic' in its modern form, according to which experience *is* dialectical. Experience, in being remade by thought, is remade in a certain order of cumulative meaning.

I should like to recommend a view of the 'dialectic' as an empirical method in philosophy, a sort of *consecutive induction*. In its simplest form it is a succession of hypotheses about the nature of the world, each one tested in experience, each one in turn found inadequate and replaced by a better one, when mankind has been fortunate enough to find a thinker. It assumes racial persistence in continuing its metaphysical enquiry; its nerve is that there is a reality to be apprehended by thought, and that thinking may under favorable conditions continue to approach it.

(In its more detailed form, the reporters of the dialectical progress of mankind have been prone to point out that new hypotheses tend to arrive, not in a sporadic or linear fashion, but commonly in pairs of contrasting views, as if thought in exploring a distinction in experience, as between universal and particular, mind and matter, fact and value, lost its balance and became partisan on two sides at once. Thus, as Dewey has well pointed out, the same situation (Descartes' dualism) produced the subjectivist and the materialist movement in philosophy; and again the same situation which permitted the spread of Hegelianism begot the revolt of the Left Wing and the Marxian version of history.)

But let these formal peculiarities of experience as a thinking process be what they will; what I wish now to consider is the temporal *arrival* of that thinking. Is it possible that the dialectic should reach a goal? And that experience should thereby contain an element which is not transitional? My belief is that two things can be said of the dialectic of experience: it never arrives and it is always arriving.

It never arrives in the sense that its task is finished, the last hypothesis verified, and interest in the temporal aspect of thought thereby lost. Since every idea by its nature is a member of the total system of ideas, to experiment with any idea is to experiment with the system; in this sense all ideas are undergoing experiment all the time. On the other hand, *truth is reached*; and all truth is in one sense eternal truth. We have only to consider how revolting a world it would be if all insight and valid judgment were reserved for those who come in at the end of an infinite time-series, that is, who never come at all, to perceive that this is not the world we live in. There is a sense, and I can quote Dewey for it, in which we *know*; that is, knowing is an experience which is *had*. But if it is knowing which is *had*, and not merely supposing we know, then in

some sense there is *certainty and absolute knowledge*, for in this phrase the adjective 'absolute' merely emphasizes without changing the fact.

There is a difference which every man knows by experience between believing it probable that something is so and seeing that it *must be so*. We do have the occasional experience of perceiving necessity; and when we have it, the time-process has produced something free of time. This is, in fact, the normal result of experimentation. The Egyptians did a lot of good experimentation with astronomy and surveying; then the Pythagoreans saw the law of the hypotenuse, and further experimentation became at once superfluous. Once we see that the diagonals of a square must be equal, to continue measuring them to see if they are equal is a sign not of intelligence but of stupidity.

We experiment with many a more complicated object in which certitude is difficult. We are experimenting, for example, with democracy. We have not made a complete success of democracy. Some have given it up as a bad job, and are experimenting with something radically different. Now if our attitude toward the matter were purely empirical, we could have no manner of objection to having anyone experiment with anything, for instance, with killing off the surplus population, as one humanitarian old Pharaoh is said to have done by throwing 80,000 beggars into a quarry, both for their sake and for that of the survivors. Why not? A *simon-pure* empiricism should admit the possibility that any effect might come from any cause; the singing of a tea-kettle may cause the grain to sprout in the fields. But *we do not believe it*; nor do we believe that rulers who cannot rule without frequent purgings of party and army and populace are on the right scent. That is, *we are not pure empiricists*. If our version of democracy is not working too well, we shall not try the full totalitarian program; we shall try another version of democracy. There is a *lurking conviction which guides the choice of the next hypothesis*. Something about democracy, we fancy, is necessary. That something is not expressed in the supposed axiom that 'all men are created equal.' But there may be a better formula; some kind of equality is assumed in conversation, in small groups of friends, in coöperation of all sorts; and if we could capture *that* we might have the key to the larger equality. We can abandon any formula for our absolute; we cannot abandon the thing itself without being swung back to it. The principle which has been appealed to in discourse that there are some propositions which we cannot deny without in some way implying their affirmation, and that such propositions must be true – this principle has its experimental expression, illustrated in this compulsory return to some incorporation of equality. Such compulsory return is the experimental sign of an

absolute, hidden but doing its work, and some day we shall see it; and it will then appear to us as an *a priori* truth.

Our philosophical era has, I believe, accepted too easily a defeatist attitude in regard to its certainties. Having to surrender a formula, it has surrendered its meaning. And this is serious, for it is essential that truth be cumulative; and it cannot accumulate unless something of what is achieved can *last*. Our concept of experience then will be incomplete unless it contains this element of stability, this backbone. Vitality indeed requires that even the backbone have its metabolism; and our certitudes are perhaps best held, less in the shape of inflexible axioms, than in the shape of that persistent and mystical sense of direction in the succession of our hypotheses which is the secret of induction, and – shall we say? – the spinal cord of experience.

DUALITY AND DUALISM

John Dewey. "Duality and Dualism." *Journal of Philosophy* 14.18 (30 August 1917): 491–93. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 12 (1980), pp. 64–66.

In what follows I am not to be understood as arguing in behalf of epistemological monism. So far as I know I have not a chemical trace of interest in it. And if my argument does not on that account run in behalf of epistemological dualism, it is because dualism appears to me only two monisms stuck loosely together, so that all the difficulties in monism are in it multiplied by two. If my position must be labeled, I should prefer to call it empirical pluralism, for it is actuated by respect for the plurality of observable facts.

To my mind the logic of Dr. Drake¹ is unduly simplified. It amounts to assuming that wherever you have numerical duality in perceiving there you have epistemological dualism. Now there is numerical duality in perception, namely, the difference in time and place, etc., of the organic event of sensing, imagining, *etc.*, from that of its extra-organic cause. Consequently there is epistemological dualism. Q.E.D. Whether this argument affects the monistic realists or not is for them to determine. But an empirical pluralist is certainly untouched by it. To him the duality is also a triplicity, a fourness, a fiveness...and in addition the numerical diversity, however great or small, has nothing to do with knowledge. It is of precisely the same nature as the numerical diversity in any train of events which is construed as causes-effects – or antecedents-consequents. The affair of knowledge enters in only when one of the series is *used* as evidence for inferring some other one in the series, whether antecedent to it or consequent upon it. Only when the numerical diversity of evidence and what is inferred from it becomes an adequate ground for epistemological dualism, will the numerical duality of extra-organic cause and intra-organic event, which is found in all perceptions, even set a problem for an empirical pluralist.

I might well leave the matter here. But it happens that Dr. Drake uses

¹ This Journal, Vol. XIV., especially pp. 368–69.

terms which show what the cause of his difficulty is. He says: "The question is: Do the images exist in the object, are they numerically identical with some parts of it, or, are they numerically different, existing at other points in space, and only similar to it and representative of it"? Now so far as his reference to me is concerned (and the same holds as to his earlier article),² the last clause, "similar to it and representative of it," shows that he has missed the point of my analysis of perception and of knowledge by means of perception. For Dr. Drake assumes that I must hold what he holds; namely, that the organic sensory-cerebral event (sensation-image in the usual phraseology) is intrinsically *representative* of its extra-organic cause; in short, is in its very occurrence a fact of the knowledge order or genus. Now this is just what I deny, holding that the event *becomes* cognitive only when *used* as representative, that is to say, as evidence for inferring some other event. Smoke is numerically different from fire, has (or may have) a different locus in space, exists at a different time, *etc.* But it is not inherently representative of fire, although we learn to use it as sign or evidence or representation of fire. This sort of physical numerical duality is literally that which I find figuring in all knowledge. And as I have already said, there is always *more* than duality. The smoke affects my nostrils – there is a smell; my eyes – there is a sight. The smell, the sight affect my brain, my muscles. A whole series of physical effects is found in every case of the happening of sensory responses. A popular account would be content to say that we go direct from smoke to inferring fire. A more careful one will say that we go from an intra-organic event to smoke and from that to fire. But this is the difference between a more careful and extensive account and a rougher, more summary account. It is a difference in the detail of a series continuously physical in all its constituents. At no point is there a switch from one order or genus of Being to another. And without such a switch there is neither epistemological dualism nor does the demand for an epistemological monism arise. The key to the notion that there is such a switch (to be formulated in a dualism or explained away in a monism) arises from failing to note that representation is an *evidential function* which supervenes upon an occurrence, and from treating it as an inherent part of the structure of the organic events found in sensings. There are no physical events which contain representation of other events as part of their structure. Hence a separate world called psychical is provided for these hasty products of elision and telescoping.

To avoid misunderstanding let me say that the retort that the smoke is not a "conscious datum" while sensations and cerebral events are

² This Journal, Vol. IX., p. 152.

conscious data is not a reply, but a repetition of the same ignoring of the position. For the position herein recapitulated holds that to call anything “conscious” (so far as the requirements of this argument concern the word) is simply to say that it figures within the inferential or evidential function.

DR. DEWEY'S DUALITY AND DUALISM

Durant Drake. "Dr. Dewey's Duality and Dualism." *Journal of Philosophy* 14.24 (22 November 1917): 660–63.

Dr. Dewey's "Duality and Dualism"¹ furnishes another depressing bit of evidence that even the ablest philosophers sometimes can not grasp the simplest distinctions of those who hold views alien to their own. At the outset of the article whose logic Professor Dewey criticizes I had taken pains to explain the distinction between what many of us call epistemological dualism and what we call ontological dualism. I had tried in earlier articles (to one of which he also refers) to make clear that my view, although epistemologically dualistic, was ontologically monistic. My distinction had been ignored by several critics, who attacked my doctrine as an ontological dualism. In this article, therefore, I wrote: "I wish to leave no excuse for any further confusion of my epistemological dualism with ontological dualism." "In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I wish to state as explicitly as possible that I personally side with the dominant tendency in American realism in denying the existence of a non-physical stuff or realm or awareness or subject or ego – 'there ain't no such animal.' The 'mental' is a subclass of the physical, or refers, if you prefer, to a relation between certain physical entities. This is ontological monism."

This distinction, and this use of terms, is no idiosyncrasy of mine. All of these terms are, or course, open to objection and misunderstanding. But it has seemed to me wisest to keep to the terms used by those whom I know to hold the doctrine which I hold. I recently discussed this matter of terminology with four leaders of philosophic thought in this country, frequent contributors to these columns, who hold the doctrine. It was their unanimous feeling that these are the best terms to use for the doctrines to which I refer, and that the distinction which I have emphasized, and which Dr. Dewey persists in ignoring, is important. I must ask, then, in all courtesy, to have my terms accepted in this sense, in

¹ This Journal, Vol. XIV., p. 491.

which they are currently used by responsible writers, and which I have been careful to explain.

We have often offered evidence that our sense-data constitute information (even when not recognized as such) concerning existents outside of consciousness. The perceiver gains his knowledge of these outer existents through his sense-data. They may be said to represent those outer existents, in the sense that they vary concomitantly with them, and act as substitutes for them in guiding the organism. If this is the situation, our term "epistemological dualism" seems to us warranted. Professor Dewey does not discuss the evidence we offer; and I must not here repeat it. Nor am I concerned to defend our terms as the best available. All that I wish to do is to clear them from an evident misinterpretation, and thereby to defend myself from the accusation of logical fallacy.

My logic, my critic says, "amounts to assuming that wherever you have numerical duality in perceiving there you have epistemological dualism." But we do not say "wherever," nor do we say that *any* "numerical duality" implies epistemological dualism. What we say is that *in certain situations* (perception, memory, *etc.*) there is numerical duality (*viz.*, between sense-datum, memory-datum, *etc.*, on the one hand, and object-perceived, object-remembered, *etc.*, on the other hand), *of a certain sort* (described above); and any theory which clearly recognizes this kind of duality in these situations we call epistemological dualism. That is what we who hold the doctrine *mean* by it.

Professor Dewey's misunderstanding seems to be twofold. In the first place, the "numerical duplicity" which he speaks of is apparently not that which we are speaking of, not that which leads us to call our doctrine by the name which he thinks unwarranted. The numerical duplicity which he recognizes is "the difference in time and place, *etc.*, of the organic event of sensing, imagining, *etc.*, from that of its extra-organic cause...a difference in the detail of a series continuously physical in all its constituents." This duality he has often spoken of, apparently supposing that this is the duality which we epistemological dualists are talking about. We have replied, in effect, that we recognize that physical series, and rejoice in it, but that our doctrine rests upon another duality entirely, the duality, namely, which I have mentioned in the preceding paragraph. By "object perceived" we refer to what he is apparently referring to by the phrase "extra-organic cause." But by "sense-datum" we mean something else than "the organic event of sensing." Hence the statement that the two items of which he chooses to speak (together with various other items of which we are likewise not speaking) stand in a continuous physical series is an irrelevance.

Even, however, if he were speaking of the same two items as we, it would be still irrelevant to show that they stand in a continuous physical series. Suppose they do! We shall none the less call ourselves epistemological dualists. For the meaning of that term has nothing to do with the question whether or no our two items stand in such a series. It is just the simple *fact* of the duality plus the fact of the use by the organism of the one item as if it were the other, that leads us to adopt that term, in contradistinction to those who deny or ignore that duality.

Butt his chief misunderstanding is that of which I spoke at the outset, the assumption that I mean by the term "epistemological dualism" the belief in two kinds or realms of Being, that I believe in "a separate world called psychical." After admitting a duality (*his* duality, not mine) in perception, he says, "At no point is there a switch from one order or genus of Being to another. And without such a switch there is neither epistemological dualism nor does the demand for an epistemological monism arise." Here, as throughout, he seems to be reading into the term "epistemological dualism" what, in the very article he is criticizing, I explicitly declared to be not its meaning for me. His confusion results no doubt from the fact that many, perhaps most, epistemological dualists are also ontological dualists; and some of them on occasion have made the very illogical leap which he attributes to me. The distinction, however, between the two senses of the word "dualism" is clear enough; and the failure to recognize it leads him to misread my conclusion as well as my premise. It is small wonder that he finds my logic faulty!

The incident deserves this attention, not for the sake of protecting the honor of my logic, but in order to win a better comprehension for a doctrine held by not a few, and persistently misrepresented by its opponents. The whole issue between us and the epistemological monists evidently seems factitious to Professor Dewey; he declares he has not a "chemical trace of interest" in the one doctrine, and no more in the other. If it is not discourteous, I should like to suggest the possibility that the pragmatist's lack of interest in certain problems with which other workers are grappling may occasionally be due, like the sense of superiority of the contemporary pacifist who is "above the battle," not to an actual transcendence of the problems, or discovery of their unreality, but to obsession by an inhibiting idea which prevents their acuteness from being felt.

THE STATUS OF EPISTEMOLOGY

Roy Wood Sellars. "The Status of Epistemology." *Journal of Philosophy* 14.25 (6 December 1917): 673–80.

Certain recent attacks upon epistemology are, if allowed validity, so destructive of the usual conception of philosophy that they demand serious consideration. Those who are convinced that epistemology is a genuine reflective science which is called out by the facts of both common sense and science are bound to ask themselves whether there has not been some misunderstanding. Is this severe indictment directed against epistemology as they conceive it, or against what they would regard as an outgrown interpretation of its setting and problems? I have asked myself this question while reading Professor Dewey's scathing attack upon epistemology, and have been led to answer – to use the appropriate phrase for such events – "Epistemology is dead, long live epistemology." The present paper will be an attempt to explain what I mean. Because the pragmatists have so often complained that their views, though containing new analyses and new modes of approach, have been given traditional labels and condemned without that sympathetic hearing to which they were entitled, I have hope that they will try to do for what claims to be a new movement that which they desired for themselves.

It may be a help to the interpretation of my thesis if I say that there is practically nothing in their theory of the growth and testing of concrete human knowledge from which I dissent. Where I part company is afterwards. They do not seem to me to take knowledge seriously enough. I know that a grieved expression will come over their faces at this saying, yet I can not help it. But my assertion needs explanation. In one sense, they take knowledge as seriously as I do or as any one could. Knowledge is valuable because it solves problems and is applicable to similar situations. It consists of ideas which are validated in specific, empirical ways. Such ideas enable us to control things in relation to plans and purposes which arise out of the experimental and adventurous character of human life. With this I agree. There is nothing of the quietist about my outlook. But the pragmatist has not been empirical enough. Perhaps he

has not had time to be. He has been so busy demolishing absolute idealism and all forms of the neo-Kantian movement that he has not been able to look beyond the negative side into the positive possibilities. And this brings me to my thesis. Achieved knowledge actually does claim to be cases of knowledge of reality. Examine the field of the individual's experience carefully and you will find distinctions which furnish the basis for this *empirical* reference of cognitive ideas to that which can not be literally present in the field of experience. The concrete individual does, and can, distinguish between his consciousness (his changing field of experience, not the psychologist's artifact) and a realm which his achieved ideas can intend as their object. So interested have the pragmatists been in the temporal dimension of experience that they have not made the exhaustive empirical study of the coexistential dimension that is needed. But such an examination would supplement their conclusions and enable pragmatism to outgrow that vagueness on, and hostility to, the questions of traditional philosophy which is a sore point with both them and their opponents.

It has been one of my convictions that modern philosophy rests upon an acceptance of the inability to carry through successfully any form of representative realism. Berkeley riddled Locke's representative realism with its naïve, copy notion and its assumption of an unknowable substance possessing qualities somehow reproducible in the minds of individual's. Hume admitted the validity of Berkeley's criticism. Kant did not go beyond this point, for his is an agnostic realism. The objective idealists left mental pluralism for a consciousness-in-general and cut the Gordian knot by simply eliminating the thing-in-itself. That is, they ignored the problem instead of solving it. Now the pragmatists are inheritors of this tradition. They come of idealistic stock epistemologically. While disliking absolutism, they equally dislike mental pluralism and any suggestion of a renewed attempt to carry through some form of representative realism by means of a new analysis of the meaning of knowledge. In one sense, they can not be blamed for this attitude. The neo-realists are equally dogmatic in their rejection of any hope in re-analyzing representative realism in the light of modern science and logic.¹ Comprehensive as this general attitude is, I believe it to be the great mistake of modern philosophy. May not the knowledge achieved by science be other than an attempt either to apprehend extra-mental entities or to gain images *like* such assumed entities? May it not consist of propositions referred to an acknowledged realm outside the individual's consciousness as accepted knowledge about it? The content

¹ Cf. *The New Realism*, pp. 4–5.

of such knowledge could be empirically studied. The tests of it would be those used in science and accepted by the pragmatists themselves.

I have given chapter and verse for the neo-realists. It is not difficult to do the same for the pragmatists. In his excellent address entitled "Beliefs and Existences," Professor Dewey demands a revision of the theory of inquiry, "a revision which should cease trying to construe knowledge as an attempted approximation to a *reproduction of reality* under conditions that condemn it in advance to failure; a revision which should start frankly from the fact of thinking as inquiring, and purely external realities as terms in inquiries, and which should construe validity, objectivity, truth, and the test and system of truths, on the basis of what they actually mean and do within inquiry."² But is not this disjunction dogmatic? Can we not give up any such ideal of knowledge as the one criticized and still hold that inquiry as a process must lead to some kind of knowledge as a product? *What kind of knowledge* is an empirical matter to be studied in the light of the facts.

In a recent book,³ I have made a fairly complete analysis of the distinctions within the field of the individual's consciousness. It is my conclusion that the individual possesses the distinction between his consciousness and a realm which controls it, consisting of other persons and the continuous world of physical things. At the level of natural realism, this distinction allows the equal presence of both consciousness and what Professor Dewey calls external realities. It is at this level that the pragmatist wishes to remain. He may want to deepen both terms, but he is satisfied with the outlook. Situations are objective. While reading up recently for a course in which I had to interpret pragmatism, I reexamined Moore's *Pragmatism and its Critics*. I fully sympathize with his surprise that critics cried "subjectivism." They should have cried, "No epistemology at all." Professor Dewey has fortunately done this and it is their fault if they continue to accuse pragmatism of subjectivism. But Professor Moore's admissions are worthy of more attention than they have received. He writes: "On the contrary, *the individual consciousness is regarded as an element inside the 'situation.'* The 'situation,' if you will, is the pragmatist's absolute. *Just how the individual is constituted, just what is his rôle in the situation, are questions demanding more serious attention from pragmatist and absolutists alike than they have so far received.* The array of assumptions, masked behind the line of personal (and may I add social?) pronouns thrown up on every page of philosophic writing, is, in Mr.

² *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays*, p. 186. Italics mine.

³ *The Essentials of Philosophy*, Ch. X.

Bradley's phrase, 'scandalous.'"⁴ Now for the purposes of logical analysis, this outlook of a more flexible natural realism is adequate. Hence, the pragmatists have contentedly remained there, crying, "The situation is objective." And it is the critical realist who seeks; to analyze the whole situation more thoroughly to see whether he must raise himself to a more reflective level. May not the whole objective situation *as experienced* be within the field of the individual's experience (his consciousness) and be a function of the doing and suffering of the individual – to use Professor Dewey's phrase – in dynamic relation to his environment? That is the thesis of the critical realist.

Let us now pass to Professor Dewey's interpretation of epistemology. "The problem of knowledge as conceived in the industry of epistemology is the problem of knowledge *in general* – of the possibility, extent, and validity of knowledge in general." What is this knowledge in general? He does not deny that we can make general statements about knowledge, and asserts that the problem of attaining these general statements is a genuine one. In other words, the science of logic exists. What he has in mind when he speaks of knowledge in general is a kind of knowledge which implies a difference between experience and the world. "The problem of knowledge *überhaupt* exists because it is assumed that there is a knower in general, who is outside the world to be known, and who is defined in terms antithetical to the traits of the world."⁵ His argument thus runs that the old setting of epistemology implied a supernatural knower not immersed in the world as a highly organized part of it. But I challenge Professor Dewey to be more naturalistic in his thinking than I, and yet I believe that the various human organisms doing and suffering in their dynamic continuity with their environment achieve knowledge within their consciousness, a knowledge empirically referred to the world of which they are part. If this empirically motivated reference, which yet involves no literal transcendence, comes under his condemnation as knowledge in general, my reply is that he is not a true empiricist. He has been so busy fighting old supernaturalistic views, pre-evolutionary views, that he dogmatically assumes that epistemology implies some sort of ontological dualism.

Thus my understanding of experience is essentially the same as his. I claim that I have learned from James and himself to take experience as it is given, as concrete, full of relations and references, undergoing reconstruction, an experience which is a function of many conditions. But I hold as he does not, though on the whole James did, that each individual has his own experience which he can not literally share with

⁴ *Pragmatism and its Critics*, p. 146.

⁵ *Creative Intelligence*, p. 33.

another. The mistake of the Chicago School has been this too facile adoption of experience-in-general. In spite of himself, Moore seems to be uneasily conscious of the problem. He stills it by an appeal to the teaching of social psychology. But all that the social psychologist teaches is that the individual's consciousness is controlled by his relations to his fellow men. Hence, it is the pragmatists who lean on something *in general*. Mental pluralism does not involve social atomism. Mental conditions are functions of individuals in dynamic relations with their environment, whether organic or inorganic, whether human or animal.

I have suggested certain reasons why the pragmatists tend to stop their analysis with this blanket-term, experience, which means the objective situation. To bring them together, they are (1) the identification of consciousness with a psychological artifact instead of with the actual field of the individual's experience; (2) the acceptance of naïve realism with thought as a process within the objective field; (3) the unconscious influence of the tradition of objective idealism as against realism; (4) the assumption, due to that tradition, of the impossibility of working out a new form of representative realism. Thus I am convinced that Professor Dewey has a whole epistemology without giving it its traditional name. Evidently, he is persuaded that his outlook follows so inevitably from the biological facts that no other interpretation of these facts is possible, a perilous assumption for a philosopher to make and near akin to dogmatism. As I understand the implications of his argument, any other position is supernaturalistic and dualistic. It is this implication that I challenge.

But criticism is not enough. Let me suggest another position and define epistemology in relation to it.

Actual consciousness is the concrete field of the individual's experience. At the level of natural realism, this field is divided into two elements, consciousness and the external objects. Reflection, however, forces the individual to advance consciousness to include the whole field. As he thinks, solves problems, the relations and characters of these objects change. They secure meanings and inter-references which are of use for the furtherance of the plans of the individual. Once we realize that this flexibility of objects is due to the fact that they are objects within the individual's experience (consciousness) the conflict with the meanings of natural realism, commonness, independence, and perdurableness, ceases. But the problem of the nature of knowledge arises in an acute form. These given objects must be mental substitutes for a controlling realm to which the individual organism must adapt itself. They are valuable as means of adjustment; they are cues for behavior. They are not cases of knowing (Professor Dewey is perfectly right there), but of given experience. They may furnish the foundation

and means for knowing, but they are not other than they are experienced as.

But reflection will not rest here. The structure of the field of the individual's experience is realistic, as the pragmatists admit. The nature of this structure is an empirical problem. Examining it, I have come to the conclusion that there are two meanings for knowledge within it. The one has been stressed by traditional philosophy and, to-day, by neo-realism. It is that knowing is a case of presentation or presence. So far as Professor Dewey is a naïve realist, he implicitly admits this, but refuses to see any problem in it.⁶ It is not knowing, as he understands that term. The second meaning of knowledge is cognitional reference, intended meaning, which may be true or false.⁷ Let us examine this second type of knowing somewhat carefully.

This *empirical* transcendence is described as follows: "The thing meaning is one thing; the thing meant is another thing, and is (as already pointed out) a thing presented as not given in the same way as is the thing which means. It is something *to be* so given." In other words, we can think of something not present, but this something must in its turn be present. I accept this interpretation for the level of natural realism. But the question I would raise is: May not the facts within the field of experience in its co-existential dimension enable and force reflection to distinguish between the field of the individual's experience and that which controls it? If so, may not this empirical transcendence be utilized as the mechanism for the reference of cognitive ideas to that which is outside of consciousness? Such is the theory of critical realism.

And here we come back to the hasty alternatives assumed by Professor Dewey. "But the non-empirical account of this transcendent (or beyond) relationship puts *all* the error in one place (*our* knowledge), and *all* the truth in another (absolute consciousness or else thing-in-itself)." Not at all. In the first place, reference is never a literal transcendence. In place of "empirical transcendence" I would prefer to say "empirical reference." In the second place, truth and error are values attached to ideas which claim to be cases of knowledge, ideas which are the end-terms of thinking, what Professor Dewey calls beliefs. I can not see, for the life of me, why things-in-themselves (the physical world) should be spoken of as possessing truth. They are no more true or false than our ordinary run of experience is.

⁶ That is, he refuses to break the objective situation (experience) into two parts which must be gotten together by an omnipresent cognitive relation. I refuse, but because I think that the whole field is mental.

⁷ See the excellent account of empirical cognitional reference in his *The Experimental Theory of Knowledge*.

But the real reason why so many thinkers have not considered this possibility of empirical reference to what lies outside the field of experience by means of distinctions within experience is the assumed impossibility of achieving an intelligible view of knowledge. The copy notion of Locke is admittedly bankrupt. But the truth is, that Locke never had a serious analysis of scientific knowledge. It is this which I have been trying to do.

I have been led to distinguish between a true and a false ideal for scientific knowledge. The false ideal is connected with the outlook of natural realism, *viz.*, that knowledge is the presence of the thing known. Such is the view of presentative realism. Lockean realism held that knowledge is the presence of something *like* the reality to be known, the presence of a mental substitute which is cognitively just as good as the reality, which can't be present, because it is like it. But I hold that this view and ideal of knowledge have led men on the wrong track. Knowledge consists of ideas which are empirically referred to the physical world as knowledge of it. It has nothing to do with either the presence of the physical world to inspection or the presence of a mental substitute like it. In other words, I would transform representative realism by connecting it with the second meaning of knowledge, with propositions empirically referred to the physical world as knowledge about it. When this new setting is once understood, it will at once be realized that the valid, traditional objections to representative realism do not apply to this keener interpretation of actual scientific knowledge. The old ideal of direct, or indirect, apprehension has been discarded. The result is that the philosopher has only to analyze the actual content of scientific knowledge to see what this knowledge about the physical world consists of. Does it not consist of control falling into such categories as position, structure, dynamic properties, behavior, *etc.*? And this is non-apprehensional knowledge.

Now the interesting fact is that the critical realist explains perceptual illusions in the same natural way that Professor Dewey does. Why talk about the real object in relation to a knower when what is given is one real thing in dynamic connection with another real thing? Of course, for the critical realist, the knower is a real thing, the organism; although knowledge is not perception, but rests upon it in the way that science shows. I quite agree, again, that the body ought to make a difference to the stimuli coming to it. Since knowledge is not, for the critical realist, an apprehension, this actual dynamic relationship between conscious organism and environment does not set him an unsolvable problem. Only to the naïve realist of the apprehensional tradition is this the case. And I must frankly assert that Professor Dewey, as a naïve realist, avoids it only because he refuses to crawl out of his blanket terms,

experience and objective situation. After all is said, I honor the neo-realist for his dogged persistency.

What, then, is epistemology? It is the reflective science which studies the nature, conditions, and development of human knowledge in the light of the available facts. It begins with a reflective study of the individual's field of experience, his distinctions and views of knowledge, and passes gradually to an hypothesis which will best harmonize the known facts. Approaching epistemology in this manner, I have been led to raise myself from the level of natural realism to that of critical realism. The result has been a view of knowledge which meets the demands of modern science and fits in with a flexible naturalism.

PRAGMATISM VS. DUALISM.

Arthur K. Rogers. "Pragmatism vs. Dualism." *Philosophical Review* 27.1 (January 1918): 21–38.

The primary danger in philosophical controversy lies in the very considerable uncertainty whether the disputants are talking about the same things. Such a danger has been notably apparent in connection with the literature centering about pragmatism. The pragmatist for his part is practically never willing to allow that his critic has understood him, and accordingly finds all objections beside the mark. And there is always of course the other possibility, that he has himself not understood the critic's objections. The most favorable judgment would hardly contend that pragmatists have been conspicuous for a sympathetic endeavor to enter into their opponents' state of mind; rather the disposition has been to keep placidly within their own particular universe of discourse, and discount all attacks on its sufficiency as a survival of superstitious and non-scientific habits of mind, which lead only to unreal and artificial problems that no longer ought to concern the up-to-date thinker. But this suggests two alternative explanations of the failure of the pragmatist to be satisfied with critical interpretations of his position. It is possible that the critic really does not see what he is driving at. But it also is entirely conceivable that the trouble may come, not from a failure to understand the pragmatist's definitions of his terms, but from an inability to regard these definitions as satisfactory. "The retort," Professor Dewey writes in a recent controversy, "that the smoke is not a 'conscious datum,' while sensations and cerebral events are conscious data, is not a reply, but a repetition of the same ignoring of the position. For the position herein recapitulated holds that to call anything 'conscious' is simply to say that it figures within the inferential or evidential function."¹ Now the question whether the pragmatist moves within a self-consistent circle of ideas is an interesting and important one; but for other philosophers it does not supplant the more ultimate inquiry as to whether the definitions on which his system rests really

¹ *Journal of Philosophy*, XIV, p. 493.

take account of all the facts that ought to be recognized. And it is clear that the passage quoted above would not be a sufficient rejoinder if it meant to say this, that an objection to the pragmatic standpoint is negligible if it involves a different notion of consciousness from that which the pragmatist thinks the proper one. The real point is not whether pragmatism is able to avoid contradiction when you grant its premises, but whether these premises are something that you ought to grant. It makes a good deal of difference in the end whether a rejection of problems is due simply to a temperamental lack of curiosity along certain lines, or whether it can indeed be shown that no real facts exist to call forth legitimate curiosity in any one. And by facts, I may remark, I mean things that men in general actually have found reason to believe; I do not accept the right of the pragmatist to hang up the distinction till he has been allowed to interpret 'facts' as his own peculiar system demands.

I shall in the present article spend most of my time in considering certain terms as pragmatism uses them, and in attempting to show that there are alternative meanings which are not obviously either absurd or artificial. In this I shall speak for no philosophical school, but only for myself; and the position which I shall adopt is that of common-sense dualism, with its familiar distinction between 'consciousness' and the outer world. If the ambiguities can be removed which create the illusion that the contending parties have actually met on common ground, and the dualist been refuted, then the real issue can be considered on its merits – whether, namely, the pragmatic simplification or the philosophic problem is a real simplification, or whether it is a spurious simplification due to a resolute refusal to see something that analysis shows actually to be there. Next I shall remind the reader of one in particular of the fundamental difficulties which critics have frequently thought they found in the pragmatist's position. And, finally, I shall point out, without much argument, two different and not obviously consistent lines which Professor Dewey takes, by identifying which he professes to have met this difficulty, though in reality, as I shall interpret it, he has only evaded the recognition that it has not been squarely faced.

There are three concepts in particular whose meaning needs to be very clearly stated. First is knowledge. Now by knowledge Professor Dewey always means the active process of solving problems, meeting situations, thinking out plans of action. And in the analysis of this there is much that the dualist would have no trouble in accepting. He finds, however, that there is another recognized form that knowledge takes – and it is with this alone that his 'dualism' is concerned – which raises an entirely different set of queries. I am, we will say, engaged in eating my dinner.

Now this, we are told, is not knowing at all; it is experiencing, or enjoying, or acting – a purely natural event with no epistemological status. And of course if knowledge is defined beforehand as the active process of ‘thinking’ or judging, there is nothing to reply to this; by hypothesis it is not knowing, but doing. Something now comes up to make me pause. I am asked how I will take my coffee, and I have to ‘stop to think’ before I answer. Immediately the elements of the dinner situation enter on a new phase. What before was just a ‘thing,’ becomes now a starting point for inference; by suggesting or standing for some further experience to come it serves to guide and redirect my activity; and thereby for the first time it becomes a ‘conscious’ fact, and knowledge is born. And then, the choice once made, again the process undergoes a change; knowledge lapses, and action is resumed.

But now there is a further possibility of experience that we might add to this account. It is quite on the cards that, after settling the matter, I should stop a moment and contemplate, or realize concretely ‘in my mind,’ the object of the finished judgment. This to be sure is not ‘thinking,’ in the sense that it is a process of inferential discovery, or of passing to a novel outcome. But neither is it acting. And it is this contemplative reference – to every one except the pragmatist still a ‘mental’ experience – that the dualist has in mind when he speaks of knowledge and its object. He is thinking of the outcome, capable of being held in solution before the mind, and not the creative activity or process. Doubtless there will be some motive – of enjoyment or of practical utility – to cause me thus to dwell upon the result of the completed judgment. But the motive is easily to be distinguished from the act of contemplative reference to which it leads; and the peculiarity of the experience is not altered by the fact that there is some reason for its existence. And we are not to be put off, either, by a refusal to *call* this knowledge, or by a disparaging estimate of its practical importance as compared with the more active work of ‘thinking.’ The fact remains that it is a perfectly distinctive sort of experience to which the term knowing has always been applied, and that it carries certain implications in which philosophers, and human beings generally, have taken a large amount of interest in the past. And now having recognized this possibility, we can find the same essential fact implicit also in the previous stages. While I am engaged in thinking, with the problem still in process of solution, the data which I am utilizing come before me in the same fashion in the form at least of momentary contemplation. Even in the original act or eating the case is not fundamentally different. “If anybody will condescend to a concrete experience,” Professor Dewey writes, “he will perceive how often a man eats *without* thinking; that he puts into his mouth what is set before him from habit as an infant does from

instinct... . He has acted; he has behaved toward something as food; that is only to say that he has put it in his mouth and swallowed it instead of spewing it forth."² But if one will condescend still further to a concrete experience, it seems to me plain that the situation is not quite so simple as this. We sometimes do eat literally without knowing that we are eating, absorbed not in the act, but in thoughts of something else. But the fact that we distinguish this as in the special sense a case of eating 'mechanically,' or without being aware of what we are doing, shows that normally in the act of eating there is something more than bare action. It is, as we quite naturally may put it, eating *consciously*, not mechanically. This does not mean that we constantly have to interrupt the act in order to overcome difficulties. Professor Dewey's phrase, to 'eat without thinking,' is ambiguous. It *ought* to refer only to the absence of this last necessity. But it gets the right to translate itself into a purely physical act, as the sole alternative to 'conscious' eating, only as 'thinking' is made to cover also the quite different case in which, though we do not 'stop to think,' we have a *realizing sense* of the nature of our act. And the fact that we may call this eating consciously, with a knowledge or awareness of what we are about, as opposed to eating mechanically and unconsciously, is enough to indicate that 'knowledge' has a natural meaning which Professor Dewey's definition ignores. And this 'realization' does not merely involve a blank sense of enjoyment either, but has an intelligible character as well, in which the distinctive features of the situation, such as we *might* stop to think about mediately, are before us in a luminous whole which has no tendency to interfere with action. It goes without saying that also it is something more than eating with complete *effectiveness*, in the purely biological sense.

In insisting, then, that knowledge should always be taken in the sole sense of active thinking, or problem solving, the pragmatist has to exclude another and perfectly natural sense of the term, in at least equally common use. And as I remarked before, when we take seriously this contemplative and static reference to objects, as opposed to the use we may then go on to make of our knowledge in new and constructive judgments, I quite fail to see how, except by an arbitrary narrowing of our interest, we get the right to set aside as meaningless the sort of problem that 'epistemology' traditionally has found there. For, in the first place, it appears to me a pure perversion of our ordinary belief to find in this 'thought of an object' a reference simply to a *future* experience. Granting that the significance or value to us of objects of knowledge lies in their relationship to future conduct – to which, when

² *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 355.

cautiously interpreted, I make no objection whatever, – I submit that when I hold before my mind the thought of an article of food, I do not naturally find myself meaning *simply* that a present experience is the sign of a definite experience to come, so that by taking it as a cue this last can be brought about; but I mean also that the food is an actual contemporaneous existent with a status of its own outside the organic situation, a thing possessing independent casual efficacy, to which, and not simply to a future possibility, the present thought or experience stands opposed as a second fact or entity; and that the food gets its power of affecting the future only because of its substantial quality, and its permanent and independent status. And then the dualistic problem of knowledge is at once on our hands. And it is certainly no sufficient ground for setting aside this belief that, by denying any sense to ‘knowledge’ except that of an inferential function, we should be making the philosopher’s job so very much easier, in that we render it unnecessary for him to find an answer to certain difficult problems.

However I do not suppose that, while it seems clear enough to me, the pragmatist will accept this analysis of the common belief.³ But after all the same problem emerges even when he is allowed to substitute his own analysis, in terms of the relation of the present thought to a *future* experience. For I think it must certainly be admitted that the future consequence is not, at the moment when it is still future, ‘experienced’ in any very precise sense of the term. And Professor Dewey’s somewhat cavalier way of meeting this difficulty is a good example of the possibilities of juggling to which, as I shall call attention presently, the concept of experience lends itself. Both things, he says, are present, but both are not present in the same way. In fact, one is present as *not-present-in-the-same-way-in-which-the-other-is*.⁴ And he urges us not to balk at a purely verbal difficulty.⁴ But I should equally urge that we do not rest satisfied with a purely verbal solution. Practically Professor Dewey rests the case on an appeal to the fact that things can in some sense be thought as absent. Of course they can; and dualism attempts to show *how* this is possible, by making a distinction. It says, that is, that while future events are absent in the body, they are present in the spirit as represented or anticipated in a present *idea*. Professor Dewey apparently makes some use of the same distinction, though he cannot avow it.

³ For the reason, I take it, that he refuses to concern himself here with anything except the logical analysis of the judging process. As playing a part in judgment, the object is primarily a cue for inference, and its ontological status is ignored because it can ordinarily be taken for granted. But it does not follow that in other situations we may not be vitally interested in the question of its interested in the question of its independent reality.

⁴ *Influence of Darwin*, p. 88.

For when he comes to explain, 'present-as-absent' turns without warning into '*presented* as absent.' If this means, not there bodily, but still thought about or looked forward to (*how*, one may enquire, unless somehow represented by what *is* there?), it is everything that dualism contends for in principle; if it does *not* mean this, I fail to see that it has any meaning at all. We simply have a paradox treated as a self-evident truth. Of course if the pragmatist is allowed to maintain – and unless he means this his reply is irrelevant – that being present in *any* sense, – e.g., present to 'thought' – is being 'experienced' in the pragmatist's sense, he has, verbally speaking, his opponent helpless. But so far as I can see; this makes meaningless his assertion of the reality of time. If the future experience when it comes has not a being and substantial quality which it does not have when anticipated, and which while we are still aware of looking forward to it must somehow be represented by a present substitute if we are ever to be able to talk about it *as* future at all – talk, that is, about the realized fact which is *not* present – there seems no reason why we should not rest satisfied with the anticipation instead of going on to its fulfilment. Nor is the mere fact of 'dissatisfaction' enough to differentiate the two ways of 'being present,' as Professor Dewey would seem to suggest. Surely we find no trouble in distinguishing a blind sense of uneasiness, or unpleasant feeling – which alone is characterized by Professor Dewey's phrase 'an unsatisfactory mode of presence' – from the 'something not there' *of* which we have an 'idea,' even though this idea may also be attended by the feeling of discontent. The only other meaning I can suggest for the expression 'present as absent' is this, that a scientific *observer* might, by waiting on the event, see that the act *was* actually on the way to this outcome, and so speak of the latter *as if* anticipated. But this does no more than identify a particular connection – causal it may be – in the world of things, and covers not at all what we all mean by conscious anticipation; the difference is that between the animal whose instinct is set off for the first time by a stimulus to a totally unlooked-for consequence, and the intelligent being for whom the outcome is no surprise, because it was 'in his mind' from the start. The point is emphasized by the halting and somewhat cryptic utterances⁵ of Professor Dewey when he is trying to convey a notion of the kind of experience which by definition is not and cannot be 'known,' – the process of experience, namely, when it is flowing smoothly, and is not in need of reconstruction. If this turns into something different the moment it becomes knowledge, *and if the philosopher can only talk about it in a knowing experience*, it is not strange that trouble is found in describing it consistently. The fact re-

⁵ Cf. *Essays*, p. 10.

mains, however, that Professor Dewey constantly presupposes it as a background, and calls upon his readers, under penalty of failing to understand him, to recognize (or know) what its nature is as *not* known.⁶

The same illusory sort of solution, it may be added, is given to the problem of past existence. "There is nothing in the text," Professor Dewey writes, "that denies the existence of things temporally prior to human experiencing of them;" but it immediately transpires that by this he means something quite different from his critics, namely, that we "experience most things *as* temporally prior to our experiencing of them."⁷ In other words, the fact which to philosophers generally has been supposed to call for a more exact analysis, and an explanation, is by Professor Dewey put forward as itself a sufficient answer to the question to which it gives occasion. The point at issue is not whether there is such a thing as a present experience carrying a reference to the past, but what this makes it necessary for us to believe about the relation of such present experiencing to the actual past event, in so far as this latter is confessedly not now experienced *in the same sense* of the term. To cover this up by reiterating the ambiguous statement with its ambiguity unresolved and even emphasized, is not, I submit, quite a fair way of dealing with an honest difficulty.

The second ambiguous concept to be noted is consciousness. This deserves a much fuller examination than I can give it here; and in the absence of this I have to speak more or less dogmatically. But it is at least pertinent to observe that when the dualist talks of an entity as belonging to 'consciousness,' or to the 'psychical,' or to the 'inner' life of the self, he intends it in a sense to which Professor Dewey's strictures do not directly apply. For the latter, consciousness is solely a 'knowledge' term. A fact is conscious only as it is explicitly used to mean or suggest some future fact. Thus a sensation or percept is by itself never a fact of consciousness; it is a thing, an event, a purely objective process. And I again agree that in a certain interpretation this is so. An odor may, for example, intelligibly be said simply to *be*, on my own as well as on

⁶ Professor Dewey's theory seems to me to pass the bounds of paradox when he translates the anticipation of the future into the existence of present 'intra-organic events.' It is of course true that any physical process, intra-organic or not, may lead up to and pass into a later process. But to express this causal relationship to the future in the form of a statement that the nervous activity is an inchoate future cosmic object (*Essays*, p. 228), as if the existential difference between the present and the future were thus bridged, only brings the contradiction into plainer view. And in any case to reduce thought and inference to hypothetical nerve processes is to throw overboard not only everything that common sense means by the words, but apparently also the standpoint of 'experience.' But of this more later.

⁷ Influence of Darwin, p. 240.

Professor Dewey's definition of knowledge. I become 'conscious' of it, or know it in the stricter sense, only as it ceases to function directly in experience, and I direct my attention expressly to its nature or existence. And directing attention involves necessarily a further background or context against which the odor now for the first time stands out as something known. In this narrower and perhaps exacter sense we certainly cannot speak of a sensation as 'conscious of itself.' It does not break up in to two parts, one of which knows the other. But while this is so, in another sense it is not meaningless to hold that a bit of experience has a quality of 'awareness,' and that this constitutes its being as a 'conscious' fact. But consciousness thus interpreted is not an epistemological, but an ontological term. The difference is that between having a conscious feeling, and being conscious *that* we have a feeling; between being conscious, and being conscious *of*. I am willing to entertain a doubt whether it is altogether desirable to use the *word* consciousness in this double sense, but the use is neither new nor arbitrary; it is what commonly the traditional psychology had in mind when it talked of states of consciousness, mind stuff, psychical facts or elements. It did not suppose that such a 'state of consciousness' is split into a knower and something known; no 'knower' is at all implied. It simply meant that the existential nature of the fact possessed an immediacy, a direct and luminous and permeating quality of 'feltness,' a status as a bit of stuff marked not only by this or that quality in particular – redness or sourness or the like, – but by a quality brought home immediately to what we call psychological experience, and seen, when we come to look back upon it in its continuity, and in the stricter sense to 'know' it, to constitute the very being of the flow of inner life which makes up our concrete selves. I take it that at bottom this does not differ from what James came to mean by 'pure experience,' the word experience carrying with it the same reference to immediate felt being; or even, perhaps, from what Professor Dewey means by a 'thing.' But there seems some point in adhering to the older usage just because, for one thing, 'state of consciousness' calls attention to the 'stuff' or 'ontological' aspect which it presents, and so enables us to distinguish the facts of the inner life from the processes of physical science. For the real point at issue is, whether this stream of 'immediacy' constitutes the world, or whether it is, as traditionally it has been taken to be, a new sort of fact *in* the world, superimposed upon the biological fact, and constituting the 'inner' life history or a conscious being, – a claim which is not disposed of by manipulating terms and definitions.⁸

⁸ Professor Dewey, who is a specialist in the use of subtly disparaging terms, calls this new sort of fact 'non-natural'; and the implication is that it is a super-naturalistic and

And now, finally, this gives the only sense in which I am able to convey any account to myself of the third ambiguous concept, 'experience,' – that highly dubious term which plays so large a rôle in recent philosophy, and especially in pragmatism. As I see it, the term experience is an inevitable source of obscurantism if we elect to apply it to everything alike. The word is fundamentally a psychological term, which came into being only when attention was directed away from things *an sich* to the human way of realizing things; and it cannot profitably be denuded of its psychological connotation. Loosely, in common speech, the word may be used to cover anything that in any sense we are brought into immediate contact with; but if there is occasion we respond also to a more careful use of language. We say unhesitatingly that we experience the eating or the taste of an apple, whereas if we stop to discriminate we shall probably hesitate over 'experiencing' the apple, without explanation, though the apple will easily be accepted as an 'object of experience.' I think that if we use either phrase, what we should mean would clearly be that we know the apple *through* experience; the apple itself however is not *an* experience in the same sense that the eating of it – or the perception of it – is. It follows that if there *are* such things as the dualist claims – and we can scarcely rule this out arbitrarily at the start, – things that exist independently of experience, though the *knowledge* of them may be a part of the experience of this or that individual subject, we shall already have prejudged the claim if we begin with experience as our ultimate category. Since language justifies the loose identification of 'experiencing' a reality with 'knowing' a – possibly independent – reality *through* experience (as distinct from getting at it through imagination or guess work or hearsay), we have the stage set for a very pretty evasion of the issue. We have only to use words in the broader way (which

superstitious survival of pre-scientific days. What he really means is that it is 'non-physical'; and the acceptance of the doctrine that all reality is physical is surely not yet to be regarded as a test of rationality. Of course consciousness is a 'natural' fact in the more inclusive sense that it depends upon, and stands in intelligible functional relationships to, the world of physical fact and law. Notice again Professor Dewey's invidious assumption that a 'non-natural' (psychical) view of the self makes of it a purely otiose spectator of the world's happenings; and that an entanglement with this 'spectator' ideal is the source of the critic's inability to accept pragmatism. With the larger contention that knowledge is for use, and that it looks to the active creation of more adequate ideals rather than to the contemplation of eternal good, I am in full agreement; but I seem to find no difficulty in holding this in conjunction with the 'spectator' point of view. A man does not ultimately find the value of knowing a machine in the satisfaction of pure intellectual curiosity; but neither does he have otherwise to be only a step in the machine's own evolution. We constantly take for granted that the mechanician stands apart from his machine as a 'knower,' even though he also puts the knowledge to good use.

includes possible independents) when we want to gain the suffrage of common sense, while shifting to the more exact psychological interpretation (*excluding* independence) when we are concerned with enforcing our immediatist conclusions. It is only necessary to displace 'experience' by 'reality' – a perfectly fair substitute if the pragmatist's thesis is correct, – to see the importance of the rôle which the word plays. Presumably no one would suppose that he was giving any philosophical account of the universe by saying that reality alone is real, or that everything is reality. The existence of reals starts the philosophical problem, but it does not settle it; philosophy consists in trying to find out how these realities are to be interpreted and understood (in order, I have no objection to adding, that we may know how to conduct ourselves toward them). To substitute now experience for reality is indeed to tell us something, *if* experience means a particular sort of – psychological – reality into which other supposed reals can be translated; if, on the contrary, experience is not one specific kind of real among others, but only a synonym for 'the real,' it tells us nothing at all.⁹ Or, in terms of the more immediate issue, it is an obvious begging of the question to say that there is no reality beyond experience since reality *is* experience. If by experience we mean a special kind of psychological fact in the real world, common sense says unhesitatingly that there are many realities beyond experience. If experience means reality and nothing more, let us *call* it reality, and then our philosophical results are all still to be achieved; and any word that creates the illusion that this is not so had better be avoided.

It is this situation which has given rise to a familiar line of attack upon the pragmatist's position, – that it is really subjectivism in disguise. The critic has often had great difficulty in seeing how to avoid accepting one of the two alternatives: either by experience pragmatism means the real world, and then it says nothing whatever; or else it means psychological

⁹ If Professor Dewey should reply that he is not interested in an account of 'reality,' which is one of the problems that the instructed philosopher has left behind him, I frankly do not know how to answer. I can only go by actions, not by words; and if the pragmatist's theoretical account of 'experience' does not profess to tell us what he conceives 'reality' to be like, I despair of pinning him down to anything whatever. I can conceive that a man should be primarily interested only in the practical consequences which things hold for him, and not in their nature otherwise; but how one can turn this into a philosophy without implying a measure at least of knowledge about the general character of the real, I cannot in the least understand. I am, I may add, no better able to understand why the repudiation of any curiosity about the nature of the world in which we have to live, in favor of an exclusive concern with what is going to happen to us in the future, should be calculated to excite, as it seems to do in so many minds at the present day, a proud sense of superiority, and a conviction that the philosophical millennium is about to dawn.

experience, and is by its own confession subjectivistic.¹⁰ And as it naturally has been assumed that it did mean something in particular, the last alternative has frequently been adopted. And in this the critic has been strengthened by the fact that the distinctive doctrines of the school involve precisely what he has been accustomed to call an analysis of the stream of conscious experience, identified by philosophers traditionally with the inner life of an individual. Indeed they are often spoken of as constituting a new or 'functional' psychology; and for minds trained in English traditions, it is puzzling to be called upon suddenly to erase the difference between a psychological, and an ultimate philosophical vocabulary. And for some time about the only reply elicited by the critic's doubts took the form of a rather impatient expression of surprise that he should be checking philosophic progress by raising captious objections, along with an offhand reference to the supposedly settled doctrine of experience as 'social' – itself one of the very most ambiguous and question-begging formulas that modern ingenuity has devised. But apparently the leaven has been at work; and in the later developments of Professor Dewey's thought, in particular, we find the difficulty met unostentatiously by a new account of experience; at any rate it is an account which I am incapable of identifying – or of reconciling – with the classical doctrines of the school.

The common denominator in the two accounts is the conception of 'activity.' Hitherto activity has represented, apparently, a certain teleological structure of experience in its more immediate and specific sense. It is this which gives its meaning to the fundamental doctrine that reality is what it is *experienced as*. Take what ordinary people have been accustomed to regard as a more or less connected flow of conscious experience, constituting in the psychological sense an individual person's life; one can, ignoring anything else in the way of existence, still give meaning in terms of this to the pragmatist's analysis. Here is present a constantly shifting world of things. These things are just what they are at the moment for experience, no more and no less. Taking a cross section, we find a group of 'objects' unified by their relation to a specific 'activity' or end. To use the previous illustration, I am eating my dinner. Chair, table, dishes, food, are present in various degrees of definiteness as elements in the experience functioning; anything else is for the purpose nonexistent. The reals that do function here, moreover, have only that measure of reality that we find represented in the 'human'

¹⁰ Of course, what the critic means by subjective. It is, once more, no real answer for the pragmatist to say that experience is not subjective because it is not what he – the pragmatist – means by subjective, the word having been narrowed to stand only for certain experiences.

world as evolved up to date; the qualities are limited to such as past human experience has created, embodied on the active side in habits. An occasion now arises for reconstruction, and a knowing experience intervenes. Since reality is only for experience, the reconstructed object is, as the pragmatist is fond of affirming, a growth not in our *ideas* of reality; it is the object itself that changes, becoming capable thus of new functional utilities. Through a more careful analysis, we come to know more accurately what future experiences it really portends, and thus enlarge our control over the world. And this new analysis is not an account of what the object was before the analysis was made. It is what the object itself turns into; it is the object transformed to meet the new requirements of the situation. Thus knowledge is made definable not as the process of our growing acquaintance with a world existentially there with qualities to be discovered and utilized, but as the process by which the object itself grows and recreates itself; dualism of reality, and experience or knowledge, is avoided; and truth and error, instead of involving the idea of a correspondence between thought and thing, stand for nothing but the issue, successful or otherwise, of the adjusting process.

But now the stubborn advocate or common sense returns again to his charge; what about the 'real' world, with its vastly wider reach of contemporaneous fact, and its own evolutionary process, in most part wholly antecedent to, and descriptively never coincident with, the evolution of the world as embodied in human experience so far as this has gone, – the evolution of the solar system, say, as against the evolution of human activities in their relation, practical and theoretical, to the solar system? Common sense here might be too contemptible for the philosopher to heed; but science is another matter, and demands to be taken into account. And here comes in the new way – I speak subject to correction – in which Professor Dewey proposes finally to escape subjectivism, and satisfy science. And it consists in abandoning the psychology which has furnished him so far with his apparatus, and in adopting a thoroughgoing 'scientific' behaviorism. From the start he has been ready to define activity literally in terms of bodily acts, such as eating, walking, and the like; but the context nevertheless has been a psychological one, including only that part of the world of objects actually *experienced as* functioning in human conduct – the content of the perceptual field, plus such added content, implied in 'habit,' as thought and memory bring up when the reconstructing knowledge process occurs. A main point in his contention has been that 'reality' has no transcendent content beyond this to complicate the theory of knowing; and hence, once more, the protest from the non-pragmatist,

who, convinced that reality is really much wider, has refused to define knowledge in a way to make this conviction meaningless. But now there is another context which may be given to 'activity.' This is the context, not of what things are 'experienced as,' but of scientific biology.¹¹ But between this context and the other there is, from the standpoint of consistent identity, a fundamental discrepancy. The world of organism and environment is no longer the limited world of 'experience,' it is the total universe of science; and while only a part of this world needs to be appealed to for explaining any given act of the organism, it is all assumed to be there ready to function if needed, and not to be created by the functioning. But this is precisely the transcendent world which the dualist assumes has meaning apart from its entrance into organic situations;¹² and which as such can be known. And the problem of what is involved in our ability to talk about and know it fails to bother Professor Dewey only because, in taking the scientific or biological point of view, he is leaving questions of epistemology on one side, and assuming – as the *scientist* has a right to do – a field of knowledge or known objects, without asking what is meant by its 'being known,' though such knowledge is necessarily assumed when it is made a term in philosophic discourse. With a world of already existing things and organisms to fall back on, we have now indeed no longer that mysterious creation of objects out of nothing due to the exigencies of 'experience.' But neither are we within the range of considerations with which pragmatism has hitherto made us familiar. Not only is the outlying and ready-waiting world not – except in small parts on certain special occasions – an experienced world; even the organism, as science looks upon it, is not ordinarily 'experienced.' The genuine world of 'experience' to which concretely Professor Dewey's theory has related, is a very different world from this. It is vaguely bounded, incomplete in detail, represented equally in the most precise experience of the scientist, and in the befogged and confused world of him who rises quickly from sleep in a pitch dark room; this "vagueness, this doubtfulness, this

¹¹ Cf. *Creative Intelligence*, p. 36.

¹² When he is speaking most exactly, Professor Dewey appears to define experience as the scientific fact of biological adjustment; (*Creative Intelligence*, p. 37; *Influence of Darwin*, p. 157; *Essays*, p. 7) and he gives this as a reason for the refusal to substitute some more inclusive term such as 'reality.' But when one has left the psychological realm for that of physical science it is wholly arbitrary to stop with organic actions as alone ultimately real. Biology for the scientist – as opposed to a metaphysical interpreter of science – is not the ultimate science plainly, but presupposes a whole universe of reality capable of being described in non-biological terms. If one is going to appeal to scientific prejudices to recommend one's doctrine, one has no right to stop short of the full accepted belief.

confusion, is the thing experienced, and, *qua* real, is as 'good' a reality as the self-luminous vision of an Absolute."¹³ But now again, it is only by presupposing the other and scientific world that the charge of subjectivism is really met. So long as 'biology' is suggested, and the reader carries in his mind the whole existing universe in which the biological fact is set, and of which both science and common sense are fully assured, he will be willing to discount the charge of psychologism. But then 'experience' has turned into 'behaviorism,' in its most naïve and dogmatic form. All that we have left is a physical structure performing

¹³ *Influence of Darwin*, p. 236. "Another trait of every *res* is that it has focus and context: brilliancy and obscurity, conspicuousness or apparency, and concealment or reserve, with a constant movement of redistribution... 'Consciousness,' in other words, is only a very small and shifting portion of experience. The scope and content of the focused apparency have immediate dynamic connections with portions of experience not at the time obvious. The word which I have just written is momentarily focal; around it there shade off into vagueness my typewriter, the desk, the room, the building, the campus, the town, and so on. In the experience, and in it in such a way as to qualify even what is shiningly apparent, are all the physical features of the environment extending out into space no one can say how far, and all the habits and interests extending backward and forward in time, of the organism which uses the typewriter and which notes the written form of the word only as temporary focus in a vast and changing scene. I shall not dwell upon the import of this fact in its critical bearings upon theories of experience which have been current. I shall only point out that when the word 'experience' is employed in the text it means just such an immense and operative world of diverse and interacting elements." (*Essays*, p. 6.)

This passage seems to me to involve an almost inextricable confusion, so I should perhaps suspect that I have failed to understand it. What it has to say in its earlier half is to my notion totally unconvincing when applied to what science knows as organic action, although it is an excellent description of the old-fashioned 'psychological' fact (James's stream of consciousness, with its focus and fringe). To the observer of organic action, every physical process involved is on a level as regards definiteness with every other, and the 'focus' is at best only a very misleading figure of speech to stand for the fact that all the forces at work converge to this specific physical outcome. When now the physical features of the environment, and the habits of the organism, are put 'in the experience,' what apparently must be meant is rather that, in the second or scientific sense, they have some 'causal' influence on the act, and would need to be taken into account in a complete scientific explanation of it. But in this sense, as I say, the environment does not 'shade off into vagueness': nor is there any ground for calling it experience except as experience is arbitrarily defined as biological adjustment. For the physical features 'qualify' experience, not at all now in the form of what they are 'experienced as' but through a physical influence, extending into space 'no one can say how far,' and for the most part first discovered by laborious physical inquiry (relatively very few of them however having been discovered by any one as yet; does that have anything to say about their being 'in the experience'?). And meanwhile the physical facts which lie beyond this range of influence (I assume Professor Dewey means to leave this open by his phrase 'no one can say how far' – otherwise he might have been expected to say 'into all space') are supposedly for the scientist equally 'real,' though not equally a part of 'experience,' with the entities that stand related to the 'act of writing'; at least there is no good reason apparent on the surface for reducing the cosmos to the necessity, if it is to maintain its status, of cooperating in some human act.

certain self-conserving and environment-modifying actions of a literally physical sort, modified in various ways by past actions, and capable of new modifications as its career proceeds.¹⁴ If this is the final outcome of philosophy, we may as well admit that philosophy is bankrupt, and turn over its assets to biology. Professor Dewey evidently has supposed that he was doing more than give us second-hand biology. But in that case I am constrained to believe that under the ambiguous head of activity he has included two quite different conceptions, and that he has been able to evade the charge of subjectivism for his first and more significant conception only by shifting to the second when necessity demanded.

¹⁴ Professor Dewey's doctrine of mind or consciousness – that the organism becomes a knower or a mind when anticipation of future consequences operates as its stimulus – is to be judged in this connection. Of course the objector will reply that this may be the criterion of mind for the one who stands apart from an organism and, watching it, endeavors to draw up a scientific definition of the difference between its action and that of inorganic objects. If behaviorism is conceded as a final and complete account of the 'human' fact, then it becomes the only possible meaning of mind as well. But the critic simply denies that the point of view of the scientific observer is final, and maintains the orthodox doctrine that from the inside of a living creature is aware of his life as something more than physical movement directed as if to a future object.

SOME LOGICAL ASPECTS OF CRITICAL REALISM

Addison W. Moore. "Some Logical Aspects of Critical Realism." *Journal of Philosophy* 19.22 (26 October 1922): 589–96.

In isolating the logical aspects of "Critical Realism" as set forth in the recent volume of essays under this caption, certain obstacles are early encountered. First, there are numerous and important differences of opinion among the writers which makes it difficult to reach a common doctrine. Second, the discussions of knowledge are confined almost entirely to perception. Keeping strictly to perception, we could hardly expect it to carry us very far into logical operations. Still, for critical realism perception is knowledge; and though it involves no inference, it has the character of "truth," or "error," to which a special chapter is devoted. In the rôle of knowledge and with the capacity for truth and error, perception, while held to be "immediate," gets to be a very highly mediated case of immediacy, requiring a lot of logical machinery to run it.

Indeed, to my mind we have here that first disobedience, which is the source of so much subsequent logical and epistemological woe; namely, the confusion of the entities and machinery of logical operations with the familiar things of immediate experience. It is the old, old sin of the reflective fallacy, the logician's vanity, which has dogged philosophy from the beginning. As soon as we acquire a little reflective capacity and machinery we are like a farmer with a new grinding machine, who wants to run everything on the place through it, until even the members of the family are in danger.

This generates a double set of difficulties. It reduces immediate experience, or, to use the critical realist's term, the given, to the impoverished state of an hypostatized logical function called "essence," with the result that this emaciated given has to be surreptitiously fed up as the exposition proceeds. On the other hand, it forces logical operations and categories in their attempt to play the rôle of immediate experience to become a hybrid sort of metaphysical entity, half subsistent and half existent, with little prospect of ever reaching their *own* goal of truth and error.

In perceptual knowledge, we are told, there are three fundamental factors. First, the given, the datum. This can not be an existence, physical or psychical, else, so runs the tale, there is no place for error. It must then be a subsistential, logical essence. Second, there is an existential "mental state" which is the "carrier," the "vehicle" of the essences. In passing, we may note that the critical realist does not seem at all disturbed by the troubles which the Greeks encountered in thinking of a subsistential essence as a passenger in an existential taxi. Third, there is the physical object of which essences are "instinctively" and "irresistibly" affirmed.

Such is the official cast of the characters in the drama of perceptual knowledge. Whereupon someone may say that so simple a plot for a one-act play scarcely warrants the charge of complications and entanglements. But those of you who have followed the text will agree, I think, that we do not get very far before we discover that the official cast and plot is really only a part of one scene. For it becomes evident, at once, that one of the star performers – it is a little uncertain whether it is the hero or the villain – is left out of the official cast altogether; namely, the *bodily organism* of the knower. For we are told that not only do mental states, but the very constitution of the given essence, depend on the bodily organism. As the plot thickens, we note, too, that some of the other characters begin to assume new rôles. The mental states which at the beginning are simply "vehicles" for the essences soon, like Locke's cabinet and sheet of paper, begin to do strange things for vehicles. They perform operations which the authors call "associating," "willing," "having an interest," "turning the attention," *etc.* One writer speaks of turning on and off the searchlight. The image of a psychical taxi turning its own headlights on its own passengers is engaging. Whether the lights are properly dimmed is not stated: but it doesn't stop with turning on and off the lights. It begins to take liberties with its subsistential passenger. For we are told that the total character of the passenger (the essence) depends on associative operations of the vehicle (*i.e.*, mental states) as well as on the constitution of the bodily organism.

Not to overwork the figure, it is obvious, I think, that the various problems of this account of perceptual knowledge center about the origin and nature and function of these essences in their relation to the other three main factors, the mental states, the bodily organism, and the physical object. On the one hand, in many statements, especially of Santayana, to whom Professor Strong says he owes the "precious" conception of essence, these data seem to be detached, floating, subsistential essences quite in the Platonic and neo-realistic sense. They include all possible qualities and complexes of qualities, primary,

secondary, and tertiary. These seem to appear in the mental state on the *occasion* of certain activities of the bodily organism, which may or may not be a response to the stimulus of the physical object perceived according as the perception is veridical or illusory. When the perception is "true," the essence given in the mental state is identical with the essence of the physical object. Thus, in the case of veridical perception, the essence has two loci, it rides simultaneously in two "vehicles," the mental state and the physical object.

On the other hand, we find such statements as this: "Perceptual error is possible because data, that is the essences, are directly dependent on the individual organism, not on the external object, varying in their character, with the constitution of the sense organs, and the way in which these are effected." Such passages might be charged to careless composition, the meaning intended being that the *appearance* of the essence depends on the organism. But there is the phrase "varying in their *character* with the constitution of the sense organs." Moreover, three of the group, Lovejoy, Pratt, and Sellers, insist that the essences are not floating, nomadic entities, but are the characters of the mental states themselves, and as such are existential, not subsistentia.¹

But how far is this determination of essence by the bodily organism and the mental states to be carried? and just what then is to be their relation *as so constituted* to the physical object? In the first essay, Drake says, "It is the thesis of this volume that in so far as perception gives us accurate knowledge, it does so by causing the actual characteristics of objects to appear to us." "In so far as," but how far is this? Drake's answer is that the essences which we refer to the world about us, are not really there, except in so far as they really were there before perception took place. And (this is the interesting clause) "so far as secondary and tertiary qualities and most of the primary qualities, they are never there at all!" One may well rub his eyes over this passage. It is certainly queer-looking realism. Over and over we are told that it is the heart of the doctrine of realism that the *what* of the object, that is, its qualities and character, are given in the essences. But when all the secondary and tertiary, and most of the primary qualities are thrown out of the what, we begin to wonder just what "what" is left. The situation recalls a scene in the play "Happy-go-lucky" in which a tipsy English constable is making an invoice in bankruptcy of dilapidated furniture. Standing before an unusually rickety piece, he makes this entry, "One wot-not, more not than wot." Drake doesn't say what this poor remnant of a "wot" is. Sellers, who is less cautious, ventures to give a list. He says

¹ Professor Sellers' repeated references to the essences as "subjective," must be a source of great distress to Santayana.

that “time, space, structure, causal relations, behavior, are the only essences which *can* belong to the object in case of veridical perception.” This is a fairly substantial list. But as Drake doubtless foresaw, its difficulties are proportionately numerous. First, it is important to observe that Sellers puts time as well as space into the essence, into the content, of the physical object, as distinguished from its existence. With time and space and all the primary qualities put into the “essence,” what is left to constitute the “existence” of the object? The neo-realists have always carefully, if somewhat dogmatically, reserved space and time, as – to speak in a paradox – the essence of existence. But what is an existence that is neither of nor in time and space? How does it differ from subsistence? Further, if time and space, and the primary qualities are essences, what is the difference between the physical object as physical, and the mental state? The difference can’t lie in existence, for the mental state is as much an existence (whatever that now means) as the physical object. If it be said that, while the primary qualities are given in the mental state, they are not given as *its* essence but as the essence of the physical object, we can only ask again since time and space have been transferred to essence, what constitutes the “physicality” of the physical object?²

But, conceding a physical object of some sort, and essences that may somehow “belong” to the physical object, how do we determine when they do and when they do not belong. This is of course the question of truth and error. Next to the longest chapter in the book is devoted to error. But most of the chapter is occupied with difficulties in other theories, a little of it to the formal definition of truth as consisting in identity of the essence *in* mental states with the essence *in* a physical object, and practically none to the question of how we find out whether and when these objects do really have them. In view of all the hard things said by critical realists about the “copy-theory” of naïve realism and the “identity” theory of neo-realism and idealism, the definition of the nature of truth as consisting in identity of essences, or of the reproduction in a mental state of the essence of the physical object, has a queer look. To be sure, we are assured early and often that the true and proper object of perception is not the essence, but the physical object, which is not to be thought of as at all “like” the essence. But while the

² In the midst of such questions as these the reader is obliged to return often for reassurance to the closing sentence of the preface, which says, “We have found it entirely possible to isolate the problem of Knowledge” (*i.e.*, from metaphysics). In the midst of his struggle with these questions, which multiply at a terrific rate, in dealing with the problem of introspection, Drake wistfully says, “The writer has his own ontological views, the exposition of which *would clear up this whole situation!*” For this boon I am sure most readers would gladly absolve Professor Drake from his oath, however solemn, to avoid metaphysics. (*Italics mine.*)

object of perception must remain unlike the essence we get truth only in so far as the latter “reproduces” and is identical with the essence of the physical object. The essence must be unlike its object, but it can be true only as it is not only like but identical with the essence of the object. This implies that the “object” is different from its own qualities, which means that, throughout the entire discussion the term “physical object” should stand for nothing but the bare and empty concept of existence – an existence which has not even spatial or temporal character – since these belong to essence.

It is as easy to lay down a formal definition of truth as of anything else. It is quite another matter to show what we can do with it, and how the requirements of the definition can be met. If we search elsewhere than in the essay on “error” for an answer to these questions, we get this meager response from Pratt; “When the question of veridical or illusory perception arises, first of all, one appeals from one of the senses to the others to see whether they confirm one another. Second, we may appeal to other persons; third, we may watch the supposed object function. If it works out consistently with our own experience, and the experience of others, we may conclude that there is a real object.” How far this is short of an answer to the problem appears when we recall that these formulæ are used by all theories alike and mean nothing until we go on to show in detail how they can be *applied* to the particular definition and description of knowledge which we have laid down. In the case of critical realism, the question is how can these three tests be applied to knowledge defined as identity of essence appearing in a mental state with the essence of a physical object. Take the first test – the appeal from one sense to others. Keeping in mind that sense qualities are essences, when we pass to another sense we simply pass to another essence. Now how can piling up any number of additional essences establish the existence of any one of them, if there is no existence to start with? When Pratt speaks of appealing from one sense to another, he, along with us, has in mind the ordinary and salutary experiences of appealing from our ears and noses to our eyes, from our eyes to our hands, and so on. But we have to remember that in the theory we are discussing “all the secondary qualities” and “most of the primary qualities” are out of court on this appeal, since they never are existential. The appeal to other senses and other persons must then be confined to a remnant of the primary qualities. For example, in the case of appeal from our noses to our eyes, we should first have to filter out all of the secondary qualities, that is, the quality and intensity of the odor and reduce the smell to its spatial and temporal form, whatever that would be, and then repeat the performance with vision to which we

appeal. How far this is from what actually occurs when we make these appeals is, I take it, sufficiently obvious. It is equally obvious that the appeal to other persons does not touch the real question at issue, which is, how they and we alike reach a decision on this question of the identity of essences. As for the third test, consistency with the rest of experience, this, for critical realism, can scarcely be more than a summary of the other two – that is, the appeal to the other senses and to other persons. And even if it involves anything more than this, the question is what *kind* of consistency can furnish evidence for this identity of essences? Once more in raising these difficulties, I am not challenging these time-honored tests. On the contrary, assuming their value, the challenge is on the definition of knowledge which it is supposed they can test; it is on their availability as tests of truth defined as identity of essences.

As said at the outset, all these difficulties flow from the initial mistake of confusing logical and non-logical experience, or if you shy at the term “experience,” let us say logical and non-logical things or affairs. The theory starts with the thesis that what is given is simply a bare subsistential essence. Then we find: that the essence is domiciled in an existent mental state; that it is conditioned by the constitution of the bodily organism; that it is affirmed – (Sellers) – through the very pressure and suggestion of experience,” and – (Santayana) – “through the assault, the strain, the emphasis, the prolongation of our life toward the not given,” – involving such things as interest and will and other persons, and yet none of these things are supposed to be given. No existence can be given. There is no doubt that this situation is “critical”; but is it “realistic”?

It is of course this complete evisceration of the given, this reduction of it to a pale, impalpable essence that still leaves critical realism in the toils of the epistemological problem, which is just the problem of the “leap,” to use Santayana’s term, from subsistence to existence. But why set the stage for this spectacular “leap.” Realism, “neo-” and “critical,” needs to become more realistic; it needs to make a truly realistic start with existence. In so doing, it would at once be on good terms with that “common sense” *to* which it appeals when it talks of “the physical object,” and *from* which it appeals when it talks of “essences.” That it really does start with existences, such as bodily organisms, mental images, urges, strains, other persons and things, as given, must be, I think, now perfectly obvious. In an astonishing passage, in his section on the biological truths of critical realism, Santayana explicitly utters this. He says: “That this object – (that is, the physical object) – exists in a known space and time, and has traceable physical relations with all

other physical objects, is *given from the beginning*. It is given in the fact that we can point to it.”³ How can the official doctrine of the volume stand alongside this passage, indeed, alongside the whole section? Yet at the close of the next section, on “the logical proof,” Santayana writes: “Knowledge has two stages or leaps, one the leap of intuition, from the state of the living organism, to the consciousness of some essence; and second, the leap of faith and action from this essence to some ulterior existing object.” But in the passage just quoted the second “leap” comes first; and wipes out the first “leap”; for the physical object in space and time “is given from the beginning.”

But some one may ask, if we begin with existence as given, where is the place for error? Now, if we were supposed to begin with all existence, or with a static, fixed existence, the question would be pertinent and embarrassing. But if we assume that we begin only with some existence which is also a changing existence, and that we as also existents have the capacity to determine in some measure the direction and character of this change, we need not be alarmed at the prospect of losing the possibility of making mistakes. It should go without saying that these existences with which we begin are not the ultimate elements of physics, or biology, or psychology, or any other particular science, nor are they “physical” or “mental,” or “true” or “false.” So to take them, is again to fall into the reflective fallacy. But whenever any given existence is used to get some other existence, then it begins to take on the character and function of a logical essence. It no longer exists for itself as the object of admiration or fear or love or hate. It no longer holds the center of the stage, but has become now a means, a basis of inference, to another existence. This sudden change in the status of the thing, from existing “for itself,” from its position in the spot light, will seem to some a surrender or at any rate a degradation of its former existential glory. A good rationalist will of course say that, on the contrary, this is a promotion of the thing. It is thus lifted from the pit of existential particularity into the glorious light of universality.

This change of status is further enhanced by the fact that usually it is only a small fragment or quality of the original thing that is used for this purpose of getting other things. And even this fragment gets a new incarnation in words and other symbols and in the nervous system of beings who continue to use it. But nowhere in all this is there a detached, floating essence. Always there is some remnant of the old existence, functioning in a new and wonderful way, but existence, none the less. Freely conceding that in reflective inferential operations specific qualities of given things may be “detached” by attention to serve as

³ Italics mine.

logical data and *as thus serving* may appropriately be called “essences,” yet, if we are good realists, “critical” or otherwise, we shall not *begin* by convincing the perfectly good “things and folks” of immediate experience into Bradley’s celebrated “unearthly ballet of bloodless categories.”

SUBSISTENCE AND EXISTENCE IN NEO-REALISM

Addison W. Moore. "Subsistence and Existence in Neo-Realism." In the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, at Harvard University, 13–17 September 1926, ed. Edgar S. Brightman (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 278–84.

We are all familiar with the appealing recital which Socrates, in his last hours, gives of his own youthful search through preceding philosophy and science for help in the midst of the moral, political, and religious confusion in which he and all other thinking Greeks found themselves. We recall also the pathetic failure of the search, – how nothing could be found that would explain why, for example, he should be sitting there awaiting the poison with the prison doors open and why his legs should not be well on their way to Megara with him, as, "by the dog," they would have been if they had got their way.

The import of this failure of Socrates's search is that pre-Socratic, even as pre-Einsteinian, science was unable to deal with what we call by the much used and abused term – "Values." The explanation of this disability was then, and in many quarters still is, that science deals with existence, with the world of "becomings," while values are "eternal." Such an explanation overlooks the possibility that values may have been forced into a non-existential realm because science, ancient and modern, has been operating with an inadequate conception of existence based upon what Professor Whitehead has happily called "the fallacy of simple location."

If the helplessness of pre-Socratic science in the presence of values appeared to call for the conception of a supra-existential world, this conception was further strengthened by the mistaken support of the ancient and still powerful religious interest in the possible survival of the self beyond its apparent termination with the body. We all know how soon the new capacity for abstraction in which Greek science began was turned upon this problem – how the abstracted patterns and relations of

existence were transmuted into a subsistent abode for a subsistent self. We know too how this failed. We recall Mr. Bradley's famous footnote to the effect that "for many souls heaven will be a failure if the family dog is not there." On the other hand, Mr. Bradley was no less facetious about a heaven of "bloodless categories." Historically what always happens is, – the "bloodless categories" are used in the formal proof of a subsistent world which as soon as formally established is promptly refilled with the existential, terrestrial qualities discarded for purposes of the proof.

Another circumstance that made this early hypostasis technically easy was the fact that an important part of the existential mechanism of abstraction was overlooked. This is not strange as we are only beginning to discern the importance of it. Aforetime when we have talked of abstraction the best we could do was to refer to a "faculty" or "power" of attention. But thanks to the work that has been done on "the significant symbol," notably by Mead, we know that language is not a tag attached to the results of abstraction but that it is a necessary part not only of the act of abstraction, but of the experience of an object and the existence of a self. Dewey goes so far as to say: "That any event that can be psychic, that is, anything more than a diffused consciousness of pain or comfort, has language as one of its necessary conditions." This suggests that in the midst of neo-realisms, neo-rationalisms, and neo-idealisms, it is about time for the appearance of "neo-nominalism."

The conditions, then, under which the early doctrine of subsistence developed were: (1) a science based on the fallacy of simple location; (2) the consequent divorce of science from values; (3) the interest in the continuance of the self; (4) the ignorance of the fundamental importance of "the significant symbol" as the existential instrument and locus of meanings. All these conditions have played their part in the formation of the modern theory of subsistence, with the additional influence of the use by modern mathematicians of the blessed term "entity."

The official point of departure for the present doctrine is a challenge of the subjectivism which is alleged to infect other theories of knowledge, particularly the *objects* of knowledge. The boldness and simplicity of the *coup* by which this subjectivism is eliminated, commands our admiration. The elimination is effected by the simple device of a "true *summum-genus*" defined as "the possible objects of thought" or "the objects of possible thought."

Once upon a time in writing on some logical aspects of subsistence, I began a paragraph with the words, "we shall steer around the dialectical thicket that here confronts us." But I now propose to plunge into the thicket at the risk of never getting out and it is no trivial risk. In the discussion I have followed largely Professor Montague's exposition, in

his interesting and important book on *Ways of Knowing*, as the clearest and most comprehensive statement.

At the outset we encounter some old difficulties. First, it is obvious that the *summum-genus* is a class of all classes, and this Mr. Bertrand Russell with all his dialectical virtuosity had finally to give up, because such a class could not include itself. The same point, of course, is involved in the question, Can “the objects of thought” include the thought of which they are objects? We are properly told that if we think of anything as excluded it is thereby included. And it is obvious that any thought may be thus included by a succeeding thought. But is the succeeding thought itself ever included? If we try to capture it by spreading our net still wider and announcing, in terms of the lawyers, that all possible succeeding thoughts are hereby and herein expressly referred to as objects, – still the thought that spreads this net is not itself caught in the net. And Professor Montague, himself, clearly concedes this, I think, when he says, “That a brain state can never be conscious of (that is, have as its object) itself, but only the state preceding.”

But we have not reached the thickest of the thicket until we get into the internal structure of the *summum-genus* itself. We first note that while all illusions and contradictions are “objective,” it is a highly dilute non-existent, unreal, objectivity they enjoy. Now the fact that this kind of objectivity is just what previous theories had called “subjective” puts us on guard for the possible reappearance of the old difficulties in new guise inside the *summum-genus*. And we do not go far, before signs that all is not well in the all-inclusive household of subsistence begin to appear. We read that “The *summum-genus* includes existence as relations include their terms or the sea its waves.” In the first simile surely we cannot argue from the way relations in general include their terms to the inclusion or exclusion of one term by another. If we suppose that “democrats exclude republicans,” we may say, though I doubt the wisdom of it, that the relation of exclusion “includes” its terms, but it includes them as excluding each other. It only includes them as terms in discourse. But when it is said that subsistence includes existence more is meant than that it is included as terms in discourse. The inclusion of existence by subsistence is not a merely logical but an ontological inclusion. This is indeed the cornerstone of neo-realisms. Its ontological character is further evident from the fact that the inclusion of the waves by the sea is offered as an equivalent simile and also from a later appeal to a cosmic will to effect the inclusion – an appeal which would not be necessary if inclusion meant only inclusion in discourse.

Passing to the second simile, – the inclusion by the sea of its waves, – given a good breeze or a lively earthquake the emergence of existential waves from an existential sea puts no great strain, I take it, on our

imagination or powers of inference. But in the emergence of an existential sea and its waves from a subsistential sea and its waves there appears nothing – as yet – to take the place of the wind and the earthquake. However, such a hiatus, which strongly resembles the old subject-object disjunction, cannot be left open indefinitely. It must be closed somehow. And ironically enough it is closed as both rationalists and empiricists, Descartes and Leibniz, Locke and Berkeley, closed it – by an appeal, in Professor Whitehead's frank terms, to God; in Professor Montague's phrase, to a "Cosmic will." Hence when we are watching the waves we should not say: "where there is a wind there is a wave," but "where there is a will there is a wave." To be sure, in days of old God was wont to appear in whirlwinds and earthquakes: But if in the teeth of a spanking gale we are to say that the waves are due to the emergence of subsistential waves, "waiting from all eternity" to be miraculously transmuted into existence, why not return to good old Neptune?

Another phase of the difficulties in the relation of subsistence to existence appears in the treatment of possibility. On the one hand the locus of possibility seems to be in the realm of eternal subsistence. We read that "a couple could not be two unless there were a subsistent two waiting from all eternity for it to be." By the same token we must say that nothing could be hot or disgusting unless there were a subsistent hotness or disgustingness waiting from all eternity for it to be. But, on the other hand, we are told that an egg is a possible chicken because it is an actual space-time egg. This has a comforting sound, but it leaves us in a dilemma. If the actual egg is the possibility of a chicken, where does the eternal egg come in? On the other hand, if the possibility resides in the eternal egg "waiting from all eternity," where does the actual egg come in?

In the discussion of possibility I wonder how much we have been bewrayed and betrayed by the phrase, "a possible object." On its face, and after the traditional grammar, the term "object" looks substantival and the term "possible," adjectival, but the real meaning is just the reverse. The phrase, "a possible object," means the possibility of an object in which, of course, possibility is the substantive and "of-an-object" the adjective. "A possible chicken" means "the possibility of a chicken." And this is not a possible possibility. It is an actual, existent character of the egg as truly as its shape; color, or weight. The egg is not a collection of essences "occupying" space-time, on the principle of "simple location." The egg is an event with a drift or direction, denoted by the term "chicken." This *drift*, this direction, is the possibility.

A parallel confusion is to be found in the use of the terms "things" and "objects" as equivalents. We may cordially agree with the realist in

his contention that “things” are not dependent on thought for existence and at the same time cheerfully subscribe to the doctrine of the idealist that “objects” are dependent on thought for their existence. “Things” not dependent on thought for existence are converted into “objects” by thought. But, failing to make the distinction, the independence of “things” is extended by the realist to “objects” and the dependence of “objects” is extended by the idealist to “things.”

There is another matter that troubles me even as it did the Fathers. The essences, redness and hotness, are neither red nor hot. And all that is required to make them existent is that they be given position in the space-time order. But how does bare position in space-time order make an unhot hotness actually hot? However the question is beside the mark. For a cosmic will that can give it position can surely make it hot. Having already appealed to miracle, one more or less should not matter.

The main feature of the treatment of truth and error in the theory of subsistence is that the characters “true” and “false” are transferred from the acts to the objects of knowledge. Such a disjunction between the act and the object of knowledge and between the organism and its world is ominous. Error consists in perceiving a false, that is, an unreal, object. There is no bad or erroneous *act* of knowing. In general appearance, this resembles, as I have said elsewhere, the “aviary” theory of truth and error tried and found wanting in the *Theaetetus*. Other comparisons suggest themselves. On this theory a poor marksman should say in his defense, “There is nothing wrong with my shooting, the bullets simply persist in hitting the wrong ‘objects.’” And a lazy school boy should say, “My spelling is perfect, it’s the words that are wrong and that is no fault of the spelling.”

Another difficulty appears in the relation of these “false,” “unreal” objects to existence. On the general theory they should have been patiently and watchfully waiting from all eternity to trip us up. But in the more detailed account we are told that they are *produced* by distortions of ether waves, brain processes, etc. – all perfectly good orthodox existences. There are two questions here: (1) how do these existent, real, space-time processes produce unreal, nonexistent objects? Again we need our cosmic magician but this time for a task just the reverse of the former one. There he had to produce existent objects from non-existent subsistence. Here he is to conjure non-existent and unreal objects out of very existent and very real refractions of ether waves and variations of brain processes. The second question is: if error be entirely a property of the unreal objects, what do we mean by “distorted” processes? “Distortion” certainly is reminiscent of error. But perhaps this is another case of fallacious metonymy.

However, I find myself in hearty agreement with that part of the exposition which teaches that the characters "true" and "false" do not belong to processes of perception. In Professor Montague's account these processes consist of ether waves, organic variations etc., for which the characters "true" or "false" have no meaning. But on what basis are we to separate the existential processes of perception which are neither true nor false from the substantial products which are either true or false? No knife falls or bell rings in the existent series of vibration and organic changes to mark the separation of the products from the processes. The poor stick bent with refraction and age, the two fingers, the converging tracks, etc., are obviously continuous with, and as existent as, the processes which produce them.

There is neither time nor need to review details of alleged incompatibility of the bent stick, etc., with scientific and public space, and the consequent necessity of finding a habitation for them in a non-spatial-temporal realm. I think Professor Whitehead has given the *coup de grâce* to this doctrine by showing, in his explanation of mirror space, that it rests again on the fallacy of "simple location." The perceptions of the stick in the water or through a retracting lens are "perspectives" on a level with the perspectives we get through the air or through touch. There is an indefinite number of these "perspectives" – these "modes of location." To select the particular "perspective," – the particular "mode of location," – that happens to occur most often, because things are most often seen and handled in the air, as the "real" perspective, is to identify space and reality with our particular visual-motor habits – a rather subjective procedure for a hardy realism. These various "perspectives" are all equally "real." But when one of these perspectives takes on the function of signifying another, then "true" and "false" as characters of that function emerge. "True" and "false" are characters of the *act* of inference not of the "perspectives" as such. Once more I agree with Professor Montague that the treatment of truth and error has suffered from misplaced metonymy. But the misplacement I find in the reverse of the one Professor Montague deplors.

In this discussion on the terms "miracle" and "magician" have been used somewhat invidiously. From this some may gather that in the view of the paper nothing in the world is strange or marvelous. On the contrary, it holds that in the end everything is marvelous in the sense that it has a uniqueness, not of mere position in space-time, but of quality to which our "significant symbols" may point but cannot imitate. But this, I take it, does not call for a return to magic. In the presence of things which overflow our equations we may still behold, wonder, and often rejoice.

EXPERIENCE AND NATURE

Roy Wood Sellars, "Review of John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*." *Journal of Religion* 6.1 (January 1926): 89–91.

Dr. John Dewey's latest volume¹ is noteworthy for two things: it is a systematic presentation of Dewey's philosophy of nature, and it is the first series of lectures on the Paul Carus Foundation. And upon both of these points remark is justified.

The Paul Carus Foundation offers the possibility of a long series of important statements by leading American philosophers of their mature convictions. There are several lectureships in America, but these – with scarcely an exception – have been connected with theological schools or with small colleges having a similar attitude and bias. We welcome this new lectureship as genuinely scientific in its aims and atmosphere. If the lecturers are wisely selected, America may have a series of books which may be put on the same shelf with the products of the Gifford Foundation.

John Dewey is now the dean of productive American thinkers. Santayana is, perhaps, the only other thinker with American antecedents whose books are as much welcomed. In the strict sense both have disciples. But Dewey is of interest because his thought is more indigenous. There is almost the trace of homespun in his writings. He strikes us as a self-made thinker to a degree that does not hold true of Santayana. This latter draws deeply from classic culture and reflects an old tradition in a unique and personal way. Dewey, on the contrary, gives one the sense of persistent reflection on the problems and movements of the present. While he has learned from history, he is concerned with its contrast with the present rather than with its agreements.

The present volume consists of ten lectures. The first defends his own type of *denotative empiricism*. Empiricism means for him faithfulness to experience in all its crudity and rawness. If we are not so faithful, we run the danger of lapsing into dialectic. "Professed scientific philoso-

¹ *Experience and Nature*, John Dewey, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1925, xi + 443 pages. \$3.00.

phers have been wont to employ the remoter and refinished products of science in ways which deny, discount, or pervert the obvious and immediate facts of gross experience, unmindful that thereby philosophy itself commits suicide." The remaining lectures develop his historical view of reality under such topics as the following: "Existence as Precarious and as Stable," "Nature, Ends, and Histories," "Nature, Communication, and Meaning," etc. Let me say frankly that I found the middle five lectures by far the most interesting and suggestive. I would recommend particularly Lecture 5, which deals with the profound effect of communication upon the human mind, really making it human and capable of developing meanings of a logical sort.

So much in this brief review in the way of description and indication of content. Like all of Dewey's books, *Experience and Nature* is solid reading. This book, in particular, covers a large field, and none of the difficulties are trifled with.

But a reviewer has another task than mere description. What shall we say of the doctrines set forth? Is there here an adequate philosophy of nature? And has man been properly seen in his physical setting?

The weakness of pragmatism has been in its treatment of nature. It has been a biological philosophy, and not a philosophy which has grappled with the structure and categories of the exact sciences. Can we say that Dewey has here made this usual criticism no longer true? I fear not. We must still go to Alexander, Russell, Whitehead, and Poincaré for suggestive analyses of inorganic nature. Dewey's strength still lies in biology and psychology. Why is this? To a certain degree, I suppose, it expresses a difference of training. Let us be thankful that Dewey is so decidedly good in his own special field. Thus I would expect more from Dewey in the psychological domain than from Russell. But I do think that there is another reason, and that epistemological. It is this term "experience" which makes me shudder. I quite agree with Perry and Lovejoy that it is a "weasel word." Is there not in it always an implication of an experienter? Of a conscious organism? I think that there is. If so, it is not a satisfactory cosmological term.

As I see it, Dewey has been moving steadily toward realism of the frankest, most naturalistic kind. But, while partially sympathetic with the new realism, he cannot accept the Platonism involved in it. And he finds the same flaw in the Santayana type of critical realism. Much of Lecture 8 is motivated by this opposition. And with it I have sympathy, as do many of the critical realists. Ideas are discriminated meanings given in consciousness and made possible by language and communication. There is no separate realm of eternal essences. It is my own personal opinion that it would require small change in Dewey's outlook to make him a critical realist of the type I, for instance, represent. As it is,

his epistemology seems to the majority of contemporary thinkers vague and ambiguous. But Dewey has shown such capacity for growth all through his career that we all have hope that some new development will occur.

In his treatment of the body-mind and life problem he comes near what has come to be called the emergence theory, as he himself recognizes. "The distinction between physical, psycho-physical, and mental is thus one of levels of increasing complexity and intimacy of interaction among natural events." Just why he thinks that his present doctrine is not identical with such a theory of levels in nature as I put forth in my *Evolutionary Naturalism* I do not see. Obviously his is a theory of evolutionary naturalism.

And this brings me to the statement of one of the weaknesses – as I see it – of Dewey's philosophy, viz., his neglect of the problem of localization. Just where are feelings, sense-qualities, and ideas? He admits the central importance of the organism for all these affairs and yet, because the events with which these are connected are more inclusive than the organism, he refuses to locate feelings and ideas in the organism. In this way he escapes from the problems of epistemology and remains in the fog of "experience."

I have said these things rather sharply because they need sharp saying. And yet I wish again to register my admiration for the manlier in which he has handled the psycho-physical problem. I know that it has heartened me in my fight against traditional dualism.

There is less that is novel in the concluding lectures. Dewey is not an aesthete, and his remarks on art strike me as rather flat. His treatment of the value question is good because he is here at home with his intimate knowledge of morality and education.

I have been critical of this book because it deserves that attitude. I mean this in the way of a compliment. I believe that Dewey is on the right track and that something of the nature of a humanistic naturalism has come upon the modern world to stay. Let those who are working in the field of religion take note.

DEWEY AND URBAN ON VALUE JUDGMENTS

Ralph B. Perry. "Dewey and Urban on Value Judgments." *Journal of Philosophy* 14.7 (29 March 1917): 169–81.

There is an important class of theories according to which value is an object of judgment. This does not mean simply that values, like other things, may be and are judged; but that in this case, at least, the object is created by the act of being judged. Valuation is judgment, and to be valued is to be valuable. It is possible to hold that all judgment is, in keeping with this view, either valuation, or to hold that valuation is a special kind of judgment. The latter or dualistic view of judgment is familiarly expressed in the antithesis between the "practical" and the "theoretical" reasons, or between "appreciation" and "description," or between "normative judgments" and "judgments of fact," or between "*Beurteilung*" and "*Urtebung*."¹ The former view is exemplified by Schiller's view that all judgments are "practical,"² and by Rickert's view that judgment is essentially an act of acceptance or rejection.³ Most dualistic views are only provisional, a stage in the reduction of all judgments to the type of valuation. This is broadly true of all those theories of judgment that appear in voluntaristic philosophies, such as pragmatism and Fichtean idealism. The practical version of judgment is first distinguished from a popular or traditional version of judgments of fact, after which the latter is corrected and reduced to the former.

Among the views which regard the practical or valuating judgments as constitutive of values, it is important to distinguish two classes, the humanistic and the absolutistic. The former construe judgment in an anthropological or psychological sense, the latter in a transcendent,

¹ Windelband, *Präludien*, third edition, pp. 52–53.

² F. C. S. Schiller, "Are All Judgments 'Practical'?" this Journal, Vol. XII, p. 682.

³ "...der eigentliche logische Kern des Urteils, das Bejahen und Verneinen, ein Billigen oder Missbilligen, ein Stellungnehmen zu einem Werte ist." H. Rickert, *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* (1904), second edition, p. 108.

metaphysical or "logical" sense. According to the views of the former class, values are created by the actual judgments of men, with all their relativity and variability; whereas according to views of the latter class, values are created only by some qualified, standard, or universal judgment which is somehow immanent or presupposed in the fallible judgments of finite minds.

To the former, or humanistic class, belongs the relatively crude view of Westermarck, and the more sophisticated and circumspect views that have recently been set forth by instrumentalists and pragmatists. Professor Dewey may be assumed to speak representatively if not authoritatively for this school. He presents the crux of the matter when he states that "practical judgments" imply "the seeming paradox of a judgment whose proper subject-matter is its own determinate formation." "To judge value," he says, "is to engage in instituting a determinate value where none is given." In other words, "the object of a practical judgment is some change, some alteration to be brought about in the given, the nature of which change depends upon the judgment itself and yet constitutes the subject-matter of judgment."⁴ This means, I take it, that in this peculiar and "paradoxical" case value is both that which is judged, in other words the objective component of the judgment, and also a larger whole which embraces or involves the judgment. This is, to say the least, paradoxical, and could scarcely be regarded as a satisfactory disposition of the matter even though no other account of the facts should appear to be possible.

It is fair to state that Professor Dewey disclaims any intention of dealing with the nature of values. "I am going to deal with valuation," he says, "not with value."⁵ It soon appears, however, that he regards "valuated objects" as the only values worth studying; and he continually speaks of values when he means valuated objects, as though the two expressions were interchangeable. Thus, for example, he speaks of value as "practical," "existent," "objective," and as a factor in "completing a situation," when the whole force of the argument depends on identifying value and valuated object. It is true also that he takes pains to distinguish two senses of "valuing." There is, on the one hand, the attitude of "prizing," or "esteeming," merely, which is a "practical, non-intellectual attitude"; and there is the attitude of "appraising or estimating," which implies a judgment. The two are commonly merged and confused in the conception of "appreciation."⁶ But though he calls attention to the

⁴ J. Dewey, "The Logic of Judgments of Practise," this Journal. Vol. XIII, pp. 516, 517, 521-22. [*Middle Works* 8: 35, 36, 47.]

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 512. [See *Middle Works* 8:499.]

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 512-13, 520. [*Middle Works* 8:25-27, 45.]

confusion and deprecates it, he does not, as we shall see, avoid it. And though he does not deny that the simpler emotional attitude defines values of a sort, he does at any rate clearly affirm that the judicial or intellectual attitude also determines values, and it is to these values that he confines attention in the present paper.

In examining the examples upon which Professor Dewey bases his contention, and which he thinks have been strangely neglected in the orthodox accounts of judgments, it is very important to bear the following general consideration in mind. *It is impossible to interpret any judgment merely from its verbal record.* What is judged in any given case depends upon what is intended at the time by the judging mind. A dozen different judgments may be expressed in the same linguistic form. This is peculiarly true of the very complicated judgments which the author cites. He would himself, I take it, be the last person to deny this; nevertheless his failure to specify in each case just what the judge may be supposed to mean by what he says, gives to his whole discussion an ambiguity which assists his argument, but does not clarify the issue. Take, for example, his favorite instance, the judgment "I should consult a physician." This might mean: 'In view of the general practise of mankind, this is a case for medical advice.' One would be mistaken in this judgment provided one were misinformed as to the general rule of procedure, or provided one had exaggerated one's symptoms. There would be no reference, express or implied, to the probable outcome; and should the act prove fruitless, one's judgment would in no wise be proved at fault. Or this same linguistic form might mean: 'My state of health being such as it is, if I consult a physician I shall probably be cured.' In the case of such a judgment of probable outcome, while there is a future reference, the contingent event would still not affect the truth of the judgment. Though one should in the sequel not be cured, one's cure would still have been probable in view of the statistical evidence. Or one might mean: 'If I consult a physician I shall be cured.' Here again, although there is a hypothetical reference to a future event, the non-occurrence of that event would not disprove the judgment, in case I did not fulfil the condition and consult the physician. Or, finally, one might mean: 'Because I am going to consult a physician I shall recover my health.' This is evidently a complex judgment, one component of which does depend for its truth or error on a future contingency. It should be analyzed into two judgments, because either one of two independent facts would disprove it. If there should be no causal relation between consulting physicians and the recovery of health, I should be mistaken; or if I should not as a matter of historical fact recover my health, I should be mistaken, but on different grounds.

In other words, the identity of a judgment depends not on its verbal

form, but on what it virtually appeals to for its disproof or verification. Every judgment has objective reference of two sorts, both of which are necessary as an act of judgment, independently of its being true or false. In the first place, it is "about" something, whose reality is not in question, and which serves as the locus of verification. In the second place, there is something judged. A judgment, in short, is like a promissory note, which has its date and place of maturity, and its amount. The first of these factors has usually been termed the "subject" of the judgment, because it is commonly named by the grammatical subject. If, however, we regard the judgment as an act of mind directed to some feature of its environment, it is more convenient to term this the "object" of the judgment. It must somehow be equally compatible with the fact which would prove the judgment, and with the fact which would disprove it. It may, perhaps, best be regarded as a constituent of both alternative facts. Thus, in judging that "the Emperor of Austria is dead," there is "the Emperor of Austria," in any case, as the common constituent of his being dead or alive. The object of the judgment is "the Emperor of Austria" in the sense that both the verifying fact and the discrediting fact would concern him. I am judging something *about* "the Emperor of Austria"; who constitutes, therefore, the quarter to which one must resort for evidence relevant to this particular judgment. Were there no such person, then the judgment would be no judgment; or it would be analyzable, as Mr. Russell has shown, into two judgments: "there is an Emperor of Austria," and "he is dead." I leave open the possibility that all judgments may ultimately be reducible to the form "there is so and so," or "this is so and so." In this case all judgments would be like a promissory note redeemable at any time or place. But if one were forced to this conclusion it would be owing to the very principle for which I am here contending, the principle, namely, that every judgment is about something whose existence is given or unquestionable.

But in every judgment there is not only what the judgment is about, but *what is judged about it*. Thus the judgments "the Emperor of Austria is dead," and "the Emperor of Austria is alive," are both about the same object, but in the one case one thing is judged about him, and in the other case something else. This we may term the "objective" of the judgment. It is that hypothetical state of the object which would verify the judgment, or fulfil the expectation which the judgment expresses. It is not a fact, simply, but a hypothetical fact. In other words, it is a component of the more complex fact of my judgment. It is that toward which my motor set or determining tendency is directed; but *only in the sense of being the direction of that set or tendency*. It is

adverbial in character, a qualification or description of the judgment; in short, the way I judge.⁷

It is because, then, of such a virtual appeal to the same object, and such an identical expectation with reference to that object, that it is possible for two or more minds, or the same mind at different times, to judge the same. Thus the outcome of the present war is the object of many contemporary judgments. Some of these judgments are, furthermore, such that the victory of the Allies would fulfil the expectation that underlies them. In that case, though they be expressed by different minds, at different times, and in different languages and grammatical forms, they would be said to constitute the same judgment. Unless this sort of epistemological identity were possible, knowledge could have no history and no social status. It would not even be possible for a hypothesis to be verified, for it could not be the same hypothesis which was first entertained, and then held persistently in mind until the appropriate evidence should be forthcoming. It would not be possible for old judgments to be overthrown, or for one scientist's judgment to be confirmed by another's, because the same judgment could not be reconsidered or tested by different investigators.

Professor Dewey's failure to state precisely what constitutes the identity of a judgment and makes it just that judgment, gives to his whole discussion an elusiveness and fluidity that makes it almost impossible to criticize it. The critic must first formulate the view for himself, and since he can not certainly be sure of exhausting the possible meanings of an ambiguous text, he must always run the risk of missing the point. I shall endeavor to put that construction on the text which reflects its characteristic motive, and which at the same time sheds most light on our general problem of value.

Suppose a situation in which I suffer from ill-health and hope to recover through the agency of a physician. There are several items in this situation which must be distinguished. I suffer from ill-health and am aware that I dislike it. I desire recovery and am aware that I desire it. I believe that consulting a physician conduces to recovery. I adopt the course of consulting a physician, as a course conducive to my recovery. I believe that I am going to recover, and since in this case the object of belief and of desire coincide, I hope that I am going to recover,

⁷ I can not here enter into a detailed analysis of this type of process. I am confident that it can be dealt with in behaviorist terms, provided we recognize that all behavior has to be described in terms of direction and goal, as is implied in the use of such terms as "set," "tendency," "*Aufgabe*," etc. The function of words requires the same sort of analysis. For a further discussion of these matters, cf. my articles on "The Truth-Problem," this Journal, Vol. XIII, especially pp. 561 ff.

Subsequently, because of what I dislike, desire, and believe, I do consult the physician, and thereupon, in consequence of having consulted the physician, I recover. There are evidently many more or less independent components in this very complex process, some of them judgments, and some of them "non-intellectual" affective or motor attitudes which condition values. But there is no case so far as I can see of a value's being constituted by a judgment of it, or of value's being both cognized and created by the same mental act.

In so far as I dislike my present symptoms, they are evil. My judging that I dislike them does not make them evil, but simply refers to their being evil as a fact. It is like any perceptual judgment, except in respect of its peculiar degree of certainty.

In so far as I desire recovery, my future recovery is good. It is good relatively to my present desire, and its goodness would not be undone even though I should perish in the very moment of desire. This is the kind of value that attaches to all ideals, however quixotic, though they be "unrealized" or even unrealizable. That I should have dreamed a dream is sufficient to impart to the content of that dream a value that is quite independent of my rude awakening. Owing to this fact, which no theory of value can afford to disregard, it is evident that the realm of values exceeds that of existence. It is necessary to attach the predicate of value to "prospectives," possibilities, hypotheticals, or subsistents. That I should be aware that such is my desire introduces no new value, but merely makes me cognizant of the fact of my desire.

The belief that the consulting of physicians conduces to recovery is like any belief in a law or general rule. It is not peculiar to a practical or valuing situation, and it conforms to the ordinary and unparadoxical notion of judgment as referring to a given and independent state of things to which the judging mind appeals and defers.

The act of adopting the proposed plan as conducive to the desired result may seem to introduce something new, but that is only because it requires further analysis. We must distinguish the act of adoption from the judgment which justifies it. In so far as my adoption of the projected course of action implies that I give it preference or take a favorable attitude to it, it possesses value. Though doubtless weak in intensity, this is a case of what Professor Dewey calls "prizing" or "esteeming." It invests its object with value, but it does not judge or cognize value; though it might, of course, be accompanied by a reflective awareness of the attitude. The judgment as to the sequel does cause me to take the attitude. I do adopt the plan as one believed to conduce to a certain result; but that which in this case gives value to the plan is not its relation to the sequel, but the affective attitude to it which my judgment as to the sequel has led me to take. Or, it is because my judgment as to the

sequel has caused me to take the attitude, that the plan possesses value. Though a judgment led me to the attitude which invests the plan with value, *that* value was not what I judged.

But does the mediating judgment in this case possess another value as its object? In a certain sense, yes. The judgment that the plan will bring the desired result, does attribute to the plan a transferred or indirect value. There is no objection, so far as I can see, to extending the realm of value to include things which, though not valued themselves, are instrumentally or causally related to things which are. But in this case it is evident that the transferred value in question is owing not to the *judgment* of its causal relation, but to the *fact* of that relation. The plan would not have this kind of instrumental value, unless the causal judgment were *true*. The existence of the judgment is not sufficient if the judgment is erroneous; and the plan would have the value in question even if there were no judgment. It follows that while the judgment is in this case in a certain sense a judgment of or about value, it does not create the value which it judges.

The attitude of hope is, as we have seen, a mixed attitude. It is desire qualified by belief. But its object possesses value by virtue of the component of desire. Beliefs as to the future, predictions or expectations, have nothing to do with value, except in so far as they are affectively tinged. Desiring recovery, that future contingency possesses value independently of the element of belief with which it is here associated. It would not be less valuable in the case of despair than it is in the case of hope. The expectation or prediction does undoubtedly refer for its verification to events that have not transpired at the moment of the judgment; but this is equally the case with scientific predictions in which one is not in the least emotionally concerned. Such verifying events must be awaited, but their futurity does not contradict their given or independent character. They are not the products of the judgment, but are facts to which the judgment is prepared to submit.

When the whole performance is consummated, as we suppose it to be, by my recovery of health, we have value in two new senses. In the first place, the state of health is good as having been antecedently desired. Its value is not determined by an act of judgment, but by what we call the "fulfilment of desire." The same state may also possess value, although this is not necessarily the case, as something now presently liked or enjoyed. Its value in this respect also would be independent of any act of judgment. In these two senses, as fulfilling and terminating desire, and as being the immediate object of feeling, an existence may be said to possess value. To judge value of this type would involve the additional act of reflective awareness of the desire as satisfied by the existence, or of the feeling as directed to it. While it might plausibly be maintained

that such a reflective awareness invariably accompanies the affective attitudes in question, it is in any case a different and distinguishable thing, having a different object. The difference of object is the same difference that must be supposed to obtain in any case of introspection between a mental state and the observation of it.

Finally, we have to consider the fact that the outcome of the performance, the condition of health itself, was due to the antecedent judgments concerning it. In this case, we appear to have a judgment or a series of judgments which bring to pass their own object. I judged that I was going to recover my health, and then for my very judging of it, I do recover my health. How can my judgment have had its object, when that object still lay in the future, and when through its being causally dependent upon the judgment, it could not come into existence until after the judgment had had time to operate? We seem to have a judgment which is somehow antecedent to a part of itself. Here, as I understand it, is Professor Dewey's paradox.

But instead of allowing ourselves to be driven to a paradox, we should, I submit, insist upon such an account of the matter as shall avoid the paradox. We must deny that that future contingency which is the objective component of the judgment, and which is indispensable to the judgment's occurring at all, is *not* the same as that later event which may or may not occur, or which if it does occur is conditioned by the previous occurrence of the judgment. We must, in other words, supply enough entities to go round. This is entirely possible if we provide an *objective*, or *hypothetical*, or *possibility*, as the content of the antecedent judgment, and distinguish it from the later existence; precisely as we would distinguish the hypothetical payment or failure to pay which is defined by the face of the note as what would honor or dishonor it, from the actual conduct of the payer. These two objects must sustain a peculiar and intimate relation to one another, in that the latter must be the case that "satisfies" the former. It is even true, as we have seen, that the two must intersect, or possess some common constituent, which constitutes the judgment's "maturity," or locus of verification. In the example before us this common constituent comprises the time of the recovery vaguely marked as later than the consultation with the physician, and the particular individual whose health is in question. Health is *now due from this individual*, according to the terms of the judgment. These, and doubtless other factors as well, enter into both the objective and the historical occurrence, and without them neither the judgment nor the occurrence could exist. But even though the constituents of the objective and of the fact should coincide altogether, it would be necessary to attribute to them some difference of ontological status. I have proposed above that the objective should be regarded as a

description of the behavior of the judging organism, a goal defined by its set or determining tendency. In some sense this sort of thing must be provided for, and however we provide for it, it must be entitatively distinguished from that actual occurrence or event which would realize it. An objective sustains two relations, one to the act of mind which intends it, the other to the existence which exemplifies or is, in the mathematical sense, a value of it. It may sustain the former relation before it sustains the latter, or even in cases when it does not sustain the latter at all.

In some such way as this the paradox may and must be avoided. We should then have a judgment not bringing about its own objective component, but bringing about the existence which exemplifies its objective component. And the value which is prospectively created by antecedent desire, and prospectively apprehended by the judgment which illuminates and guides that desire, would be different from that value which eventually comes to pass.

I submit, then, that the character of practical judgments requires no amendment of our ordinary notions of judgment. Judgments of value do not create that value-object which they judge; nor are they causes of their own component parts.

In a recent article,⁸ Professor Urban professes, albeit darkly and dubiously, to be of one mind with Professor Dewey. I shall not attempt to determine whether two views, both of which unfortunately impress me as dark and dubious, are or are not identical. But since Professor Urban "thinks" they are "in agreement," I shall take his word for it and assume that the following remarks are not irrelevant.

Professor Urban comes out expressly for the doctrine that the "value-judgment" is to be distinguished from all "judgments of truth and fact"⁹ Unlike most of the authorities he cites (including, I should suppose, Professor Dewey) Professor Urban is a dualist in respect of judgment. But what he means by the antithesis is far from clear. What is a "judgment of truth"? Is it a judgment which predicates truth of a proposition? That would surely be too occasional a form of judgment to constitute a type coordinate with valuation. It is more probable, since he links judgments of truth with judgments of fact, that he means to refer to judgments which *are* true or false. The antithesis would then be between judgments that are, and judgments that are not, either true or false. But since it is customary to mean by judgment that act of cognition that is distinguished by the alternative of truth or falsity,

⁸ This Journal, vol. XIII, p. 673.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 683.

valuation would appear to be a judgment that lacks the generic judgment character. Certainly the antithesis must remain hopelessly obscure until one has defined what one means by judgment in general, and has distinguished this cognitive form independently of the accident of truth or error. It would seem much more in accordance with usage to say that if valuation is neither true nor false, it is something other than judgment.

But let us consider some of the motives that have induced Professor Urban to set up his antithesis. In the first place, he points out that value attaches not to objects, but to objectives, that is, to complexes of the type "that x is ϕ ."¹⁰ But this is peculiar neither to value nor to judgment. Factuality certainly attaches to complexes of the same sort, as when we say, "It is a fact *that*, etc." This would be regarded as a case of judgment, but not of value. On the other hand, that which is desired, hoped, feared, commanded, forbidden, or otherwise regarded in dozens of ways that constitute the commonest affective-motor attitudes, is also "that so and so shall be." In these cases we have values, but not judgments. It is undoubtedly true, as Meinong, Russell, and many others have recognized, that these attitudes require the admission of *Gegenstände* that are not objects or things in the ordinary sense. But they furnish no criterion by which to distinguish judgments of truth and fact from other judgments, nor valuing from non-valuing attitudes.¹¹

In the second place, Professor Urban argues that there are certain *a priori* "propositions about value" (are these propositions truths or facts?) which are independent of the particular psychological facts about interests, and which are coordinate with the *a priori* propositions about being. Thus, he contends that all objects have either positive or negative value, and that of any two values one must be higher than the other. But it seems perfectly clear upon an examination of the argument, that these alleged *a priori* propositions are either applications of *a priori* propositions concerning being, or are obtained from the empirical character of interest. That every object must possess positive or negative value, can be regarded as a *priori* only in so far as it is derived from the law of excluded middle, negative value being regarded as the non-possession of value. To argue that all objects possess value requires an appeal to the empirical character of interest, "All objects, as objects, are of interest either actually or potentially, and wherever there is interest there is

¹⁰ "That" is here used as a conjunction.

¹¹ I find nothing seriously objectionable in Professor Urban's contention that "value is an objective" ("Value and Existence," this Journal. vol. XIII, p. 464); although I think its universality to be doubtful, and I think it undesirable to leave objectives as entitative finalities. But I do object to the supposition that this in the least argues for the uniqueness of "value judgments."

value.”¹² But how does Professor Urban know that all objects are as such capable of being objects of interest? If he knows it at all, which is doubtful, it is because of the actual ubiquity of interest as a modality of consciousness, or the psychological possibility of associating an attitude of interest with any other attitude by which a thing becomes an object.

The necessity of a value's being “higher or lower” than any other value is derived, if at all, either from the empirical fact that values have all-commensurable intensive magnitude, a contention that has often been disputed; or from the empirical fact that interest is always psychologically associated with preference, that is, from the fact that interests are always (?) so interconnected with other interests in one subject that the expression of one interest implies at least the momentary subordination of other interests. In other words, Professor Urban's generalizations about value are facts about value, which are either of the general logical sort common to all facts, or of a particular sort derived from the special peculiarities of that sort of psychophysical fact known as interest.

In the third place, Professor Urban insists that the conception of “ought,” which he believes to be peculiar to value-judgments, is irreducible to the categories of being and non-being. “The value-judgment,” he says, “is not *A is as it ought to be*, but rather ‘that *A* ought to be.’”¹³ But Professor Urban must be aware that the difficulties, if any, attaching to this form of judgment, are not peculiar to value. What is required is a judgment that shall assert something only hypothetically or contingently existential. But that is the case with all judgments involving variables. Suppose that one says that “*x* is a man implies *x* is mortal.” One does not assert that “there is a man,” or that “this is a man.” Nevertheless, one is judging either truly or falsely concerning a logical or implicational fact. One may express it, if one wishes, by saying, “if a case of man should occur, it would be mortal.” And similarly with obligation. Some purpose requires or implies *x*. This can equally well be expressed as “*x* ought to occur,” or as “if *x* occurs and is a value of *x*, then it is such as ought to occur.” Similarly, “the comet ought to be visible in such and such a place at such and such a time,” or “the key ought to be of such and such a shape”; meaning that the law of the comet's motion and the shape of the lock determine the conditions of visibility or fitness, whether or not these conditions are fulfilled by existence. Judgments of this sort are not peculiar to value, nor are they distinguishable from judgments of truth and fact.

The *prospective* character of judgments of “ought” is even less calcu-

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 675.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 687.

lated to prove what Professor Urban wants to prove. "It is the very nature of the value-judgment," he says, "that it apprehends, not something completely given, but rather something to be. Value is not a determination of being, but a direction of becoming."¹⁴ It is incredible that Professor Urban should propose to restrict judgments of truth and fact to judgments concerning the completely given. The commonest of all scientific judgments are those concerning the future, the so-called judgments of prediction. And only less common than these are judgments asserting a direction of becoming, such, for example, as the generalization based on the second law of thermodynamics, or such laws as Spencer believed to determine cosmic evolution. The most familiar biological phenomena, such as growth and instinct, can not be judged at all except in such terms. Are such judgments, then, value-judgments? And are they not judgments of fact and truth?

Professor Urban accuses me of confusing "the qualities of an object on account of which it is valued with the value itself, the fact that it ought to be."¹⁵ Now whether we prefer to use the substantive "value" to denote the object which is valuable, or the fact that it is valuable, is a matter of no importance. In any case, Professor Urban's essentially sane habits of mind prompt him here to identify value with the *fact* that a thing ought to be. A judgment of value would then be a judgment regarding such a fact. Like any other judgment, this would be true if the fact were as judged, and otherwise false. This leaves one quite in the dark as to the constituents of this particular kind of fact, whether, for example 'ought' is an intuited ultimate, not further definable, or whether, as I think, it consists in an implicative relation of interests. But at least it makes it perfectly clear that there is no differentia of value to be found in the analysis of judgment.

I still believe that the underlying cause of this whole muddle is a confusion of the essential act of judgment with the motor-affective attitudes with which it is psychologically associated. This is almost invariably betrayed by an author's fondness for such hybrids as "appreciation," "approval," "acknowledgment," *etc.* If one wishes to emphasize the fact that in our experiences of value, judgment, affection and will are intimately associated, well and good. But then let the essential character of judgment be first distinguished from its accidental associations. Fact, existence, truth, object, objective, are terms belonging to the analysis of judgment as such. The structure and function of judgment can not be described without reference to them. Then, and then only, after one has discriminated judgment abstractly, can one

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 687.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 685.

safely venture into the perplexing field of the subjective and objective varieties of judgment. Then one may, if one wishes, collect and label a whole menagerie of judgments, not only value judgments, but verbal judgments, visual judgments, private judgments, public judgments, German judgments, American judgments, and German-American judgments, – with some guarantee that at least they are all judgments.

THE OBJECTS OF VALUATION

John Dewey. "The Objects of Valuation." *Journal of Philosophy* 15.10 (9 May 1918): 253–58. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 11 (1982), pp. 3–9.

In an earlier number of the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*,¹ I presented a theory about valuation-judgments. In so doing, I intentionally put to one side the question of the nature of value. I did not wish to add further complication by introducing a subject about which so much difference of opinion already existed. It seemed to me that it was theoretically possible to distinguish the logical or formal aspect of valuation from the nature of value in the same way in which it is possible to distinguish the logical form of, say, a descriptive judgment from the particular subject-matter described, or an asymmetrical transitive relation from the question as to whether the relation concerns a spatial, temporal or numerical series. I still think this distinction of problems is logically sound, but intervening discussions have changed my mind about its availability at the present time. Consequently, I hope at a later time to take up a discussion of the nature of value itself. Just now I want, however, to take advantage of some of the recent discussions to show wherein I failed to make clear the primary point of my theory. I shall use selections from the articles of Mr. Perry² and Mr. Bush as texts upon which to hang certain comments.

Mr. Perry says: "Suppose a situation in which I suffer from ill-health and hope to recover through the agency of a physician. There are several items in this situation which must be distinguished. I suffer from ill-health, and am aware that I dislike it. I desire recovery and am aware that I desire it. I believe that consulting a physician conduces to recovery. I adopt the course of consulting a physician, as a course conducive to my recovery... . Subsequently, because of what I dislike,

¹ Vol. XII, pp. 512–23, since reprinted with some additions in my *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 349–89.

² *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. XIV, No. 7, "Dewey and Urban on Value Judgments," the quotation being from pp. 173–74.

desire and believe, I do consult the physician, and, thereupon, in consequence of having consulted the physician, I recover... . But there is no case of a value's being constituted by a judgment of it."

Now on the basis of the particular situation described by Mr. Perry I quite agree. According to the terms of the illustration, there is already in determinate existence a negative value, ill- health, there is also a determinate positive value, recovery (which, of course, is none the less determined for knowledge because it does not as yet physically exist). In addition to these intrinsic, immediate, or independent values, as they are variously termed by different writers, there is also a determined instrumental, or dependent, value: seeing the physician is serviceable, useful, valuable, *for* the positive value of health. Nothing could be clearer or more satisfactory. The most that a deliberative judgment could effect under such circumstances would be to assist in bringing into *physical* existence a value already, as value, given. And only an extreme bungler could confuse the assistance given by judgment in bringing a value into existence with that given by judgment in determining a value as such.

Of that particular bungling performance I plead not guilty. It might be a purely verbal matter to say that I do not conceive that propositions *about* values already given *as* values are valuation- judgments at all, whether they are about value as immediate or about value in the sense of useful, any more than I should wish to term a judgment about a pin a pin-judgment. In such a case as that stated above, there is nothing whatever to mark off any distinctive logical type of judgment. If we call such judgments valuation-judgments, they are on precisely the same logical level as any propositions about matters of established fact. I can not make it too emphatic that I started out, *so far as respects cases of this kind*, from precisely the point of view maintained by Mr. Perry.

But there remains a question of fact, a question which is not concerned with the proper linguistic use of the term valuation or value-judgment. Are there not situations in which, while a man dislikes ill-health, it is not, *under the specific circumstances*, the object of his supreme dislike, and where, moreover, he does not know what he should supremely dislike and supremely desire? Are there not situations wherein the adequate data for settling a determinate like and dislike *can not* be had until after an act which issues from a preliminary estimate or valuation as to what the good *will* be? This does not mean that health has not been a good in the past, or that it is not a good "in general." It means that there may be a case in which an agent is genuinely uncertain whether to desire – or like – the recovery of health or to desire making a medical discovery at the cost of his own health. In such cases there is no good or value given to judgment; whether the good be recovery of health or loss-of-health-along-with-increase- of-reputation-and-a-

medical-discovery-to-aid-others is genuinely unsettled. Now it was of this sort of situation and of this only that I contended that valuations aid in determining a new good; and contended that *such* valuations possess a distinctive logical character which the orthodox logics have passed over too lightly. Now either or both of these convictions may be wrong, but their error can hardly be shown until the prior question has been raised: Are there situations such that it is objectively uncertain what *their* good, value or end is – it being understood that their good *if* determinately given would be an intrinsic and immediate good? After this question has been dealt with, the question of the nature of the judgment of valuation (estimation or appraisal) involved in them will naturally follow.³

The passage from Mr. Bush is as follows: “The city of Syracuse has a very beautiful institution. The state fair is held there every autumn, and on the evening of the last day there is a parade of all the city’s children. The people of Syracuse regard this parade with an almost passionate affection. It seems natural to say that they value it supremely. Does value really attach to things like this or to the means used to bring them about? Of course, it is a verbal question, but it is a question that takes us to considerations where instrumentalism is no longer a sufficient point of view.”⁴

As in the case of the former quotation, I can only express my unqualified agreement – except that instrumentalism is not so much insufficient as grossly impertinent, irrelevant. It would be, as Mr. Bush intimates, a purely verbal matter to say that in such cases no valuing at all occurs.

³ It is possible, though I am not sure, that I might make my point in terms of Mr. Perry’s own thinking by reference to his theory of the “objective” of judgments involving belief or committal. See *the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. XIII, pp. 569–73. It seems reasonable to suppose that there are cases of genuine doubt as to what the “objective” should be, as to what the purport or deliverance of an entertained belief better be. In such a case, if we employ reflection, if we make a judgment to decide upon an “objective” as a precondition of applying that “objective” in a further judgment, there is found, I fancy, a kind of judgment logically similar to that with which I was dealing. When Mr. Perry in the same connection says that the “pragmatic theory is correct in emphasizing the formative, creative action of mind, and in likening the cognitive situation to the desiderative or volitional situation” (p. 572), and yet in a later article takes such pains to deny any formative action on the part of thought in constituting the object of a desiderative situation, I confess myself perplexed. I get the feeling that he has left his older opinion about the nature of valuation-judgment untouched by his revision of his theory of belief-judgment, and that if he applied his latter theory to the former topic it would inevitably result in a view of valuation not incompatible with that which I set forth.

⁴ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. XV, No. 4, pp. 95–96.

Yet such a verbal approach might be one way of getting at a fact, namely, that no valuing occurs in the sense of reflective comparison, an inquiry which involves deliberating, weighing one consideration against another. This might be a rhetorical way of getting at the fact that to the citizens the object is in-valuable, that is to say one whose worth is not subjected to critical questioning. The citizens value it "supremely" not in the sense that after considering and comparing any number of things they have arrived at a definitive scale in which the procession outweighs all other goods, but in the sense that they unreservedly, without any questioning, prize and cherish the institution.

So far there is, I take it, no difference of opinion between Mr. Bush and myself; he recognizes as explicitly as any one could desire that I expressly drew a distinction between the non-cognitive act of prizing, finding good or dear, and the cognitive act of valuation. But he goes on to ask whether in making this distinction "the word value does not become synonymous, in the instrumentalist presentation, with the word use." And if such be the case, why not, as Mr. Bush pertinently asks, drop the word value and confine one's self to the term use or valuable? And he goes on to interpret my position as meaning "value occurs when we face the question, What things or methods have the value of utility under the circumstances?"

Just here is where I entirely failed to make myself comprehensible to Mr. Bush. Just how far the obscurity of my exposition is the cause I can not well judge; if my exposition as a whole gave Mr. Bush this impression, I express my appreciation of his tenderness in dealing with an account which is complicated and prolix to no other end than to arrive at a result which can be stated in a few sentences and with which, as he says, no one would disagree. Possibly the term "instrumentalism" itself suggests that judgments are held to be about instruments or means; possibly calling a judgment of valuation a practical judgment suggests, in the current implications of the word practical, the same idea. If so, both suggestions are quite misleading. The instrumental theory of judgment does not mean that judgment is about instruments; it refers to the *function* of all judgment *qua* judgment, not to the subject-matter of some judgments. In any case, the emphasis was put not upon the instrumental, but upon the *experimental* character of valuations. It may well be that the primary linguistic connotation of the term "practical" is useful; unfortunately we have no unambiguous words in this connection. But I tried to make it clear that by "practical" I meant *what* is to be done, rather than *how* to accomplish something already given as a satisfactory end. Judgments about means, so far as they do not themselves enter into judgment about the constitution of an end or

good,⁵ are, I should say, technical rather than practical; by which I mean that our important practical inquiries concern ends and goods.

This brings me, of course, to exactly the point which I made in discussing the passage from Mr. Perry. Sometimes every immediate or intrinsic good goes back on us. We do not confront any indubitable good. We are in the dark as to what we *should* regard with passionate esteem; we are beginning to suspect that something which we prized unquestioningly and directly in the past is no longer worth our while, because of some growth on our part or some change in conditions. Now in such a state of affairs we may of course trust to luck; we may wait for something to turn up which will afford a new unquestioned object to cherish and hold to. But sometimes we attempt to further by means of deliberation the production of such a good. We search in order to form an estimate of what would be the good of the situation if we could attain it. Add to these conditions the further condition that we can not be *sure* that we shall prize or like the thing in question until it has been brought into existence by an act following upon a judgment, and we have before us the kind of situation with which I was concerned. It frequently happens that, being in uncertainty, I conclude after consideration that the best thing that I can do is so and so – in short, that if I act so as to bring certain consequences into existence I *shall* like them or find them good. But when I act and the consequences follow, I do not relish them at all. Now this, I submit, is a very different sort of thing from discovering that I have made a mistake in my judgment as to the useful means of accomplishing something. It means that I have made a mistake in my valuation of an immediate good – that is of what, *when it is brought into existence*, will be an immediate good – or bad.

Let us return to the illustration of Mr. Bush. It is conceivable that some citizen of Syracuse who had habitually regarded the procession with passionate regard, might be led to question its worth. He might learn that a number of children had been made ill, or become seriously over-excited, or were becoming over-fond of display for sake of attracting attention to themselves. This would not alter what was past, his former liking, the fact that he *had* experienced an immediate, independent good. But it would lead him to a new act of valuation; he would seriously question whether he is henceforth to regard the parade with liking, hesitation or repugnance. He might attempt to use his judgment to come to a reasoned conclusion in the matter, and might then try to arrange so that the next parade would not involve these obnoxious features. Or he might attempt to arrange some other function

⁵ See *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 340–44, and pp. 358–62 for cases in which valuation of means and of ends, respectively, are two ways of getting at the same thing.

giving the opportunity for an immediate realization of the beauty of congregated child-life. In any case, the result when it occurs will be an immediate good or bad – a matter of direct liking or the reverse. But, none the less, it will have been constituted, in part,⁶ by the prior valuation – the prior reflective estimate of a non-instrumental good.

I should be glad to think that this explanation, if I have succeeded in making anything plain, would evoke an opinion that if this is what is meant, nobody will disagree. But I am not sanguine that such will be the case. For my view goes contrary to the classic view not only as to the logic of all judgments, but of moral and political conceptions. For the prevailing view is that goods, ends, “values” are all given, given in the sense of being completely there for knowledge, provided only we could get at them. Disputes in ethical and social theory have concerned themselves for the most part only with the question of *where* and *how* the goods are given: whether in experience, feeling, sensation, or in thought, intuition, reason; whether in the subject or in the object; whether in nature or in some transcendental realm. The important fact (provided it be a fact) that serious inquiries into conduct, individual and collective, must be concerned with an hypothetical and experimental effort to bring *new* goods into existence, an attempt made necessary by the slipping away of all given determinate goods, fails to secure recognition. I console with a belief that while my own inexpertness in statement is largely responsible for my failure to make myself understood, some of the difficulty lies with the immensely difficult transformation in methods of thinking about all social matters which the theory implies.

⁶ I have never said that judgment is the sole determinant of a new object, but only that it serves to reconstruct or reorganize, which implies another and independent variable.

THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF VALUATION AS EXPOUNDED BY DEWEY

David W. Prall. "The Pragmatic Theory of Valuation as Expounded by Dewey." Chap. 4 of *A Study in the Theory of Value*. *University of California Publications in Philosophy* vol. 3, no. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1921), pp. 215-26.

In the last chapter I tentatively presented a definition of value formulated in terms of liking and disliking, in terms of interest; more precisely this definition makes value subjective in the sense that anything is properly said to have value in case, and only in case, it is the object of the affective motor response which we call in general liking or disliking, or which we call being *interested* in, positively or negatively. The question will at once be asked, Does judgment make no difference here? Is the value already constituted before any judgment concerning the object in question has been pronounced? And the answer in terms of the definition as given is altogether unambiguous. Judgment has nothing to do with the presence of value as such. For example, hell has value, or the popular evangelist's presentation of hell torments has value just in so far as hell, or the evangelist's presentation of the torments of hell, is the object of a motor-affective response on the part of a subject, which response in this particular supposed case might be disgust or fear or loathing or some similar attitude. A member of the evangelist's audience who had entertained this attitude would, by virtue of so doing, have invested the object of his dislike with value, in this case *negative* value. He might upon reflection almost immediately pronounce any one of a great number of judgments concerning the evangelist, or the evangelist's presentation of the torments of hell; but these would not anyway annul the original value which was constituted by the motor-affective attitude above mentioned. If I look at the sunshine on a white stone wall and enjoy it, then this sunshine on the white stone wall is valuable by virtue of my enjoyment. I may judge that I should have kept my eyes on my book or on the lecturer, or that looking at the sunshine is bad for my eyes, or anything else I am capable of judging; but these subsequent

judgments will not deny the truth of the assertion that the sunshine was valuable, any more than they will alter the fact that I enjoyed it; for the value was constituted once and for all by this enjoyment. This may seem like harping on one string, but it is very important to have this distinction between motor-affective attitude and judgment clearly in mind before we survey any more equivocal or ambiguous theory of value or even any elaboration of a theory based on our tentative definition in terms of interest.

Even in Dewey's own theory, which it is the object of this chapter to present as the most fully worked out and most authoritative of the pragmatic views, even here the keeping clear of this distinction is imperative, whether Dewey himself succeeds completely in doing so or not. Dewey at any rate sees the distinction, and if he ends by losing sight of it, this is because he has made it unrecognizable except, perhaps, by careful analysis. He has, so to speak, shifted it along to a position where it is less easy to detect.

His explicit recognition of it, and of the danger of confusion subsequent upon a failure to see it, is made as follows¹ "There is," he says, "a deep-seated ambiguity which makes it difficult to dismiss the matter of value...summarily" (p. 512). He continues: "The *experience* of a good and the *judgment* that something is a value of a certain kind and amount, have been almost inextricably confused" (p. 512). His own position is that of Hume in the *Treatise of Human Nature*, pt. III, iii, whom he quotes as follows: "A passion is an original existence... . When I am angry I...have no more a reference to any other object than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five feet high" (p. 513).² To quote Dewey himself again: "Only a prior dogma to the effect that every conscious experience *is, ipso facto*, a form of cognition leads to any

¹ These quotations, as are all the rest in this chapter, are taken from an article in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, vol. 12, no. 19, the issue for September 16, 1916. The article is entitled "The Logic of Judgments of Practise." It is reprinted with a good deal of elaboration and some minor changes in *Essays in Experimental Logic*, University of Chicago Press, 1916, from which I have taken the expressions "value of reason" and "value of behavior."

² This is the view that Professor Mackenzie deprecates in his criticism of Ehrenfels in "Notes on the Theory of Value," *Mind*, n. s., vol. 4, p. 429. "On the whole he [Ehrenfels] appears to mean that our irrational feelings and impulses have a priority over our rationally determined ends, and that the worth which we attribute to the latter must in the long run be explained by the presence of the former. Now this view seems to me to be a relic of Hume's doctrine of the subordination of reason to passion... . Its illusory appearance of truth is due to our tendency to think of each of our desires and impulses as an independent force; instead of recognizing that they are elements in a more or less systematic whole, and take their character from the totality within which they stand."

obscuration of the fact" (p. 513)... the fact, namely, that motor-affective attitudes are clearly distinct from cognitive judgments.

It is true that judgments and motor-affective attitudes may be dependent upon each other in various ways, and this fact is very easy to illustrate. If I were not in a position to judge that a particular object before me on the table is a volume of, say, the *Journal of Philosophy*, I should not value the object, perhaps; i.e., my valuing of this object may depend upon the prior judgment that the object is a particular book. But the prior judgment is one thing; my liking or valuing of the book another. On the other hand, I am capable of judging *that* I liked a particular book; but this judgment *that* I liked the object is distinctly not identical with the liking. The judgment in this case follows the liking in time, and it would seem to depend upon it in a perfectly definite way; but the judgment is not the *same as* the liking. Such possible dependence of judgments on likings and dislikings, or of likings and dislikings on the previous making of judgments – such dependence of one on the other is only the more reason for keeping the two distinct in our minds. Otherwise there is little hope of intelligently analyzing the relations between them.³

But although Dewey makes this distinction clearly, he is equally clear about disagreeing with the definition of value in terms of interest as given above in the present chapter, for according to him value is not subjective,⁴ nor is valuing in any significant sense to be confused with those motor-affective attitudes which we call holding dear, or cherishing, or caring for, or neglecting or condemning (p. 520). To call the objects of these attitudes values is, he says, merely repeating that they are loved, cherished, neglected, etc. (p. 520). Our definition in terms of interest he thus apparently considers mere tautology.⁵ His sentence is as follows: "To call these things (viz., cherished, loved, etc., things) values is just to repeat that they are loved, and cherished; it is not to give a reason for their being loved and cherished" (p. 520). Such a statement indicates, it seems to me, in the first place that he does admit the use of the word *value* in the sense of our definition in terms of

³ For further illustration of this distinction see *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 355 ff.

⁴ "The conclusion is not that the value is subjective, but that it is practical." *Jour. of Phil., Psychol. and Sci. Methods*, vol. 12, p. 516.

⁵ Cf. Mackenzie's article above referred to, p. 433, for a similar criticism of Ehrenfels' position on the nature of desire: "I can hardly tell what is meant by desiring an object except reading it as supplying a defect in our, present consciousness; and I do not see how we can think of the supplying of such a defect without a feeling of gratification in the thought of it. . . . So far from seeking to controvert his [Ehrenfels'] position, I would only suggest whether it is not tautological."

interest, but that the definition seems to him not significant, or at least that value in this sense is not worth investigating.⁶ In the second place this sentence of Dewey's which accuses our definition of irrelevance for his purposes, suggests that the significant mode of attack is one which *does* attempt to "give a reason" for loving and cherishing, i.e., for valuing in precisely this irrelevant or unimportant sense. Dewey suggests, in other words, that the giving of a reason for loving and cherishing would avoid the tautology and answer the purpose of an investigation of value. This would seem to imply that to give the reason for loving and cherishing would be to offer a solution to the problem of value; so that he certainly admits that value in the sense in which we have defined it, and which he seems to think irrelevant, is the very matter that he is investigating. The "reason" in question, however, he seeks in a study of what he calls valuation as distinguished from any such merely affective-motor attitudes as loving or cherishing. For valuation is, according to Dewey, not a mere repetition of anything, but the actual instituting of a value by a process of judgment. "To judge value is to engage in instituting a determinate value where none is given" (p. 516).

Before proceeding to give an account of this judging process which institutes determinate values, it seems to me best to indicate at once where, in Dewey's theory of practical judgments, value as defined by Dewey comes in, and where, in Dewey's theory, value as defined in our definition comes in. For, after all, Dewey does admit two kinds of value. "Value," he says, "has two meanings, to prize and to appraise, to esteem and to estimate" (p. 520). Obviously, our definition in terms of interest fits the former of either of these pairs of alternatives, and this is the aspect of value that does *not* interest Dewey in his present investigation.

This sort of value is found according to Dewey at the beginning of any particular situation; it is a datum or series of data; it is what we start with when we are going to make a judgment. The value that Dewey is interested in is to be found later on in the process; it is as he sees it actually constituted by the judging activity. It is in a special sense the object of the judgment itself. And this being constituted by judgment, this practical creation of a logical activity, is the definition of value. It is then, in Dewey's theory, not very significant to say whether value is subjective or objective; but it is significant to say whether value is practical. Value is the outcome of logical activity in a particular

⁶ At the beginning of the article from which I have been quoting Dewey seeks to avoid a discussion of value as such by announcing that his interest is in *valuation*, not in the nature of *value*. But in the later form of the article in *Essays in Experimental Logic* this announcement is omitted.

situation demanding action, and this particular form of logical activity is what Dewey calls in general a judgment of practice.

In case Dewey is right the definition which we are defending in the present chapter is not to be denied as false, but discarded as irrelevant, as defining a datum present in all cases where the significant valuation process goes on to institute a determinate value in the significant and clarifying sense of the word. But in case we are right in proceeding on the basis of the definition which we are at present upholding, we should expect by analysis to reduce all the values that Dewey discovers as constituted by "valuation" (which is one type of judgment of practice) to values in terms of our definition.⁷

Let me now try to make Dewey's position a little clearer. I have said that for Dewey values are instituted in a process called valuation or judgment of value, a type of judgment subsumed under the more general heading *judgments of practice*. Dewey considers judgments of practice a special form of judgment distinguished by its expression in propositions which have a special type of subject matter. A judgment of practice is always made in a situation demanding action. It takes the form, A should do so-and-so. It is advisable, expedient, well, better, best, for A to do so-and-so. It is a judgment of *agendum*, something to be done; it is a judgment, as he says, "to treat a given subject matter in a particular way" (p. 506). His view is that such judgments deserve special treatment and a special name, because neglect of such special treatment has brought about much confusion, especially in the case of moral judgments of value (pp. 506, 514). The special characteristics of the judgment of practice are the special characteristics of the subject matter of the propositions in which such judgments are rendered.⁸ This subject matter implies an objectively incomplete situation which is to be completed, and this not indifferently but in the better way, a situation in which the judgment itself is a factor in this better way of completion. Clearly, if the subject matter implies that the situation *should* be completed in a given way, it also implies at least that the given situation admits of such completion.⁹ Furthermore, such a judgment is hypothetical in the sense that only *if* all the relevant data have been considered will the judgment be correct. And it will thus remain for the determined-

⁷ Professor Perry does this in his article, *Dewey and Urban on Value Judgments*, in the *Jour. of Phil. Psychol. and Sci. Methods*, vol. 14, p. 169.

⁸ The confusion introduced by this sort of characterization of judgments by means of the wording of the expression of the judgment instead of the intent of the judgment is exhibited and criticized in Professor Perry's article above referred to.

⁹ The practical judgment is thus an imperative, a moral imperative; but instead of being *categorical* like Kant's, it is, as explained below, a sort of hypothetical imperative.

upon action which completes the situation to show the truth or falsity of the judgment.

To say, then, that a judgment of value is a judgment of practice is to say, in Dewey's own words (1) "that the judgment of value is never complete in itself, but always in behalf of determining what is to be done"; and (2) that "judgments of value (as distinct from the direct experience of something as good) imply that value is not anything as yet given, but is something to-be-given by future action, itself conditioned upon (varying with) the judgment" (p. 514). One of the implications, then, of subsuming judgments of value under judgments of practice is, in Dewey's own words, an implication as to the nature of value, viz., that value is always "something to-be-given by future action," something "conditioned upon the judgment."

This account is not very clear, but its meaning is not very hard to see in a concrete instance such as the one Dewey gives, namely, the situation in which I choose a suit of clothes, put upon one suit, that is, a value higher than upon the others offered, or rather upon *getting* one particular suit a value higher than upon doing something else to complete the situation. This situation offers such data as my knowledge about suits in general, my particular wants just now, the purchasing power at my immediate disposal, the various qualities of the various suits, and the combinations of these to be had in any one suit, etc. The value-judgment to be rendered might well be expressed in the form, I ought to get suit X, or, It is on the whole advisable to get suit X, or, In the circumstances I value the getting of suit X more highly than doing anything else to complete the situation.

Obviously this is very different from saying that I like X better than any other suit, or that suit X is the highest priced suit, or that X is the best bargain; for I may be choosing a low priced suit, and circumstances may require a dark shade, which I dislike, and so on. The valuation or act of value-judgment consists in my filling out the situation by pronouncing the judgment in question; and in so doing I institute a determinate value, I name X as that suit best fitted for my needs and most satisfactory, as far as my knowledge goes. If it turns out, when I come to wear the suit, that it has no watch pocket, or that another suit would have fitted my purposes better, or that the same suit could have been had at a bargain the next day, then the judgment, X is the right suit to buy, has turned out false. It was really a hypothetical judgment with a suppressed condition: *If I have considered everything that is to be considered, then X is the best suit to buy; if I am valuing correctly, then the getting of X has for me in the circumstances greater value than getting any other of the suits.*

If we follow this, it appears that the truth of the value-judgment

depends upon its outcome in later action and that the value is not subjective, for it is determined in the end practically. I institute a determinative value when I pronounce the judgment that X is the right suit to buy; but the truth of the judgment, and consequently the validity of the value instituted by this judgment, depend upon later action and later circumstances. Value is in this sense objective; but the significant fact is that value is practical, i.e., the object of a practical judgment and determined in judgment. Value may thus be either valid or not according as the judgment turns out true or false. And this is clearly an entirely different sort of value from the value of our definition in terms of interest.

It may very well be that I have not given Dewey's view adequately; but aside from the fact that the view is difficult and that the whole of his own article scarcely makes it clear there is the further fact that it contains confusions of thought, or at least that as far as I can make out it contains confusions of thought; and that until these have been clearly exhibited one can hardly expect to grasp the theory completely. As I see it, these confusions arise in the main as follows:

Dewey speaks definitely of the judgment as being incomplete *as judgment* until the *act* is accomplished which is the real object of the judgment (p. 522). In other words, I have not finished judging that I ought to get suit X until I have *got* suit X. This seems to me to confuse a logical process with a succeeding set of motor-activities. It seems to me that there clearly is a point in time at which the judgment is complete, and after which the getting of the suit occurs. If this seems to present the difficulty of a judgment the object of which does not yet exist, the way out is to revise one's theory of judgment so as to include such very frequent examples of judging activity as those which refer to objects either spatially or temporally removed.¹⁰

There is also a confusion involved in making the judgment depend upon the outcome for its truth. It would seem to be the case on any but a pragmatic theory of truth, that a judgment is either false or true as it stands when it is made. When we decide to act, it is true, I suppose, that we are usually suppressing some such condition as, *if my judgment is right*, or *if I fully know what I am talking about and deciding on*, then I should act so-and-so. In this case the so-called judgment of practice is an ordinary hypothetical judgment; and it will follow that, when circumstances occur to show that I should *not* have acted as I did, it will likewise be shown that my judgment that I should so act as I did *was* wrong. My hypothetical judgment, however, stands good. It simply happens that the consequent is denied by circumstances. But my not

¹⁰ Professor Perry's article above referred to briefly suggests such a theory of judgment.

knowing at the time when I acted whether my judgment was true or false does not show that the judgment itself was neither true nor false at the time when it was made. Again, it is not a difficulty in the situation but a difficulty in a theory of judgment that is revealed here.

What, then, are we to say of value as instituted by judgment? Is the value of getting suit X actually determined by judging that X is the right suit to get? From what I have just said, this would seem clearly not to be the case. As the judgment is complete when it is pronounced, regardless of our knowledge as to its truth or falsity, so the suit either has the value we attribute to it in judgment or it has not. And whether it has or has not depends precisely on its relation to our demands, our likings or dislikings. It is true that our *getting* the suit has value as well as the suit itself; but these are merely two different values, one of which depends on our attitude towards *getting* a suit, the other upon our attitude towards the suit itself.

Dewey tries to avoid value as another name for loving, cherishing, etc., but it turns out that just this definition of value satisfies all the conditions of his description of valuation, and that the sort of value that he defines as determined in judgment or as constituted by judgment or more directly still as *value-in-judgment* reveals itself as merely *another* value of the sort defined in terms of interest.

It is perhaps worth while summarizing both the view presented in this chapter and the chief objections that I have urged against it.

Summary of Dewey's Position

1. Dewey sees the distinction made between motor-affective attitudes and cognitive judgment.

2. He admits a use of the word *value* in the sense of that which is liked or disliked.

3. He discards this sort of value, which he calls the "good of immediate behaviour,"¹¹ as being unimportant and not the matter of the genuine judgment of value, and substitutes as the significant sort of value that which he calls the "good of reason."

4. This good of reason, he says, is instituted by a logical process called valuation or value-judgment; and value is thus to be tested for its validity in a way analogous to that in which the truth of any judgment is to be tested.

5. The process of valuation is thus active in creating, is a factor in creating, its own subject matter, and in this way is paradoxical, for the judgment as such is not complete until the act is accomplished.

6. But it remains that value is the result of such a paradoxical logical

¹¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 358, footnote.

process called valuation, and that the *good of reason* is the real matter of the genuine judgment of value, not a judgment merely *about* goods and bads, but a judgment which creates a determinate value, which institutes a good.

Summary of Criticism

1. The theory of Dewey, in making value, even in the sense of *value as judged*, or in the sense of the good of reason instead of the good of behaviour, a creation of judgment or valuation, makes the validity of the value or the test of the value as such the same as the validity or the test of truth of the judgment. As a theory of a particular sort of judgments called value-judgments, then, this theory of valuation is open to the same criticism as the pragmatic theory of truth. It identifies the truth of a judgment with the subject's knowledge of that truth, and so finds this truth in the future workings of the idea, in the success or failure of the activity following the making of the judgment.

2. The paradoxical nature of the valuation process, which creates its own subject matter (a part of itself), which *is* its own subject matter, depends upon failing to analyse the situation completely. Analysis shows that what the judgment creates is not its own subject matter, that the judgment is not about itself, but about something outside itself. It may be a hypothetical judgment; but a hypothetical judgment does not constitute a paradox.

3. The values created by valuation, which Dewey exhibits as radically different from mere goods of behaviour, turn out to be in all cases instances of value as defined in terms of interest. My valuing the rain or the raining positively, as a force or a factor in a situation, is as truly my liking the rain or liking it to rain, as my valuing the rain negatively (as disagreeably wet) is my disliking the wetting I get. The one valuing only happens *after* I have found by means involving intellectual processes how valuable the rain is; but my valuing it, as a result of my information, is entirely distinct from that information or from any judgments I may have made in acquiring the information. It is thus the same confusion that Dewey so specifically warns against that he himself makes, namely, that between motor-affective attitudes and cognitive judgment. The only difference is one of temporal sequence. The confusion he cleared up was that resulting from a neglecting of the difference between motor-affective experience itself and the subsequent judgment that something was a good. The confusion he falls into results from failing to distinguish between the making of a series of judgments concerning goods and the *subsequent* complexly built-up motor-affective attitude towards, or experience of, good things.

DEWEY'S THEORY OF VALUE

Thomas V. Smith. "Dewey's Theory of Value." *Monist* 32.3 (July 1922): 339-54. John, NB: there's "Clyce" and "Klyce"; which is correct?

I

In the belief that John Dewey's theory of value is not only the hub of his philosophy, but that it also constitutes the chief contribution of Pragmatism to current philosophy, I wish, in this paper, to show what Dewey's theory of value is, to indicate its relations and significance, and to adduce corroborations of the theory from certain unexpected quarters.

No one can hope to understand Dewey's theory of value who does not grasp rather fully the meaning that he attaches to the term "experience." Such an intellectualistic penumbra hangs over the word that some readers never understand that Dewey means other than what they would mean if they used the word in a similar connection. That he does mean something different, and something more, he has emphasized most vigorously in the introduction to his *Essays in Experimental Logic*. It seems that Professor Dewey himself did not for a long while get fully clear the significance of the distinction; and he gives Mr. S. Klyce credit for pointing out to him this and "other indispensable considerations." Upon this point Dewey explains: "Our words divide into *terms* and into names which are not (strictly speaking) terms at all, but which serve to remind us of the vast and vague continuum, select portions of which only are designated by words as terms."¹ Now the word "experience" and such other words are not terms at all; they are what Mr. Clyce calls "infinity and zero" words. As opposed to such a word as "desk" (which is a term referring to a definite object, on which consciousness is or may be focussed), the word "experience" refers to the fringe or penumbra of the situation in which "desk" or any other term is the focus. As Dewey says: "The word 'experience' is...notation of an inexpressible as that which decides the ultimate status of all which is expressed; inexpressible not because it is so remote and transcendent, but because it is so

¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 8n.

immediately engrossing and matter of course.”² Such a word, then, connotes what is before and after and around that which at any given time is denoted. “I shall only point out,” says Dewey, “that when the word ‘experience’ is employed in the text, it means just such an immense and operative world of diverse and interacting elements.”³

Experience, as this will indicate, is a much broader term than knowledge. Instead, therefore, of putting the question as some philosophers have, i.e., whether there are different ways of *knowing*, we must cease begging the question and ask whether there are not different ways of *experiencing*, of which knowing is only one. We certainly must be content to put the matter in this way, if we are to understand Dewey; for Dewey makes this point in wholly ambiguous language. “Knowing,” says he, “is one mode of experiencing, and the primary philosophic demand...is to find out *what* sort of an experience knowing is – or, concretely how things are experienced when they are experience as known things... . To assume that, because from the *standpoint of the knowledge experience* things are what they are known to be, therefore, metaphysically, absolutely, without qualification, everything in its reality (as distinct from its “appearance,” or phenomenal occurrence) is what a knower would find it to be, is from the immediatist’s standpoint, if not the root of all philosophical evil, at least one of its main roots.”⁴

While Dewey has carried the analysis of experience somewhat into detail in the foregoing citation, we may rest, for the purpose of this paper, in his usual dichotomy. If we analyze the various aspects of our experience, we find on the one side what Dewey refers to variously as “appreciation,” “realization,” “direct, non-cognitive doing-suffering,” and on the other side what he refers to as “reflection,” “thinking,” “cognition,” “judgment.” Experience, of its own intrinsic nature, falls thus into a dualism – qualitative at least – and the nature and relation of these two parts constitute both ethics and logic. Perhaps nowhere better than in *Democracy and Education* has Dewey plainly set over against each other these two aspects of experience.

“To value means primarily to prize, to esteem; but secondarily it means to apprise, to estimate. It means that is, the act of cherishing something, holding it dear, and also the act of passing judgment upon the nature and amount of its value as compared with something else. To value in the latter sense is to valuate or evaluate. The distinction coincides with that sometimes made between intrinsic and instrumental values. Intrinsic values are not objects of judgment, they cannot (as

² *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 10n.

³ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 7.

⁴ *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 229.

intrinsic) be compared, or regarded as greater and less, better or worse. They are invaluable and if a thing is invaluable, it is neither more nor less so than any other invaluable. But occasions present themselves when it is necessary to choose, when we must let one thing go in order to take another. This establishes an order of preference, a greater and less, better and worse. Things judged or passed upon have to be estimated in relation to some thing, some further end. With respect to that they are means, or instrumental values."⁵

From this quotation as a basis, Dewey's theory of value may, I think, be fairly summarized in the four following theses:

II

1. *Experience, which furnishes the context of all values, is largely non-cognitive.*⁶ It is well to emphasize this non-cognitive basis of cognition itself; for upon this plane of experiencing lie most of the contents of our living. Here are included our loves and our hates, our eating and our sleeping, our friendships and our animosities, our illness and our health; here too are the fine arts;⁷ here the dumb gladness that welcomes the dawn, the quiet contemplation of the sun's trailing glory at eventide, and the silent watching of the passing life. It is the good-in-itself, from which reflection rises and for whose sake reflection exists as an instrument.

2. *Experience becomes cognitive only when incompatibilities demand more than mere appreciation for their successful resolution.*⁸ Dewey is primarily interested in intrinsic values, in the appreciative life described above. Indeed, no living being, thinks he, ever becomes interested in "extrinsic" value until he must in order to save and extend some of the "intrinsic" content of his appreciative life. Then judgment comes into play as an instrument that is justified by resolving the difficulty back into a situation that permits intrinsic goods again to become possible. If judgment begins building upon itself a hierarchy that forbids the energy of life to dip again into its stream, it meets Nemesis upon its upward way, who robs it of its vaunted glory and leaves it quite inane. "In fact, 'good' is an empty term unless it includes satisfactions experienced."⁹

⁵ *Democracy and Education*, p. 279.

⁶ "Experience is primarily an active-passive affair: it is not primarily cognitive." *Essays in Experimental Logic*.

⁷ "For Dewey's feeling estimate of the place of art in life, see *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 212. Cf. *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 159 ff.

⁸ "Difficulties occasion thinking only when thinking is the imperative or urgent way out..." *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 139. Cf. *Democracy and Education*, p. 280.

⁹ *Democracy and Education*, p. 412.

3. *Such adjustments*¹⁰ *arises from, exists for the sake of, and dips again into, non-cognitive experience.* Thinking becomes thus an instrument, but an indispensable instrument, for the continuous preservation of the values for which it exists.

4. *Moral judgments do not discover value outside experience, but reconstruct and create values within experience.* Let it be carefully borne in mind what has been said about the genesis of judgments of all kinds. Value judgments are not unique, as Dewey thinks, save in that they deal with a content that in direct experience was valuable. Value judgments arise out of a situation made embarrassing by a conflict between two equally valuable parts of experience or out of some other equally unsatisfactory turn of experience; and the judgments are but citations of what seems necessary to make experience once more satisfactory. Judgments are – if one wishes to put it so – discoveries of what, under the circumstances, one ought to do, if he is successfully to resolve the unsatisfactory situation. The judging process is not only the discovering of what is to be done, but it is also the first step of action itself. It is not a discovery of something already existent (though it has such as its data), because the situation to which the judgment looks as an end that is to resolve the maladjustment, has never yet existed and would not come to exist but for the process of action which is initiated by the judgment itself.¹¹ The restored equilibrium is the creation of the active life through the judgment as its tool. “At whatever risk of shock,” thinks Dewey, “this doctrine should be exposed in all its nakedness. To judge value is to engage in instituting a determinate value where none is given.”¹² The contention that judgments of value are practical includes two points: “one, that the judgments of value is never complete in itself, but always in behalf of determining what is to be done; the other, that judgments of value (as distinct from the direct experience of something as good) imply that value is not anything previously given, but is something to be given by future action, itself conditioned upon (varying with) the judgment.”¹³ For an ill person to decide that it is well for him to see a doctor is but for him to take the first step in the creation of the good of his then situation, i.e., the seeing of the doctor a good that but for his judgment would never come to exist at all.

It is well for Dewey to insist upon the practical nature of judgments of

¹⁰ “It comes after something and out of something, and for the sake of something.” *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 75. See also *ibid.*, p. 36.

¹¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 358–59.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 368.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 361.

value: for if he can establish that fact, he has not only added something to our understanding of such judgments, but he has also in a way as effective as it is indirect warded off from his general theory criticisms from both idealists and realists. From both schools alike have come charges of subjectivism against pragmatism. Those who incline toward subjective idealism have wished to claim Dewey; those who have espoused the cause of objective idealism have joined with the realists in saying that Dewey is a subjectivist. Only in so far as Dewey's general theory of knowledge is involved in his theory of value am I interested here in discussing his views on epistemology. Dewey has elsewhere attempted to show that those who, with Bertrand Russell, state the existence of the world as a logical problem are but unconsciously chasing their own shadows; for the very words in which they are forced to state the problem show that they have already answered the question in the affirmative before the question is put.¹⁴ But as regards the epistemological gulf in the study of value, if it were true that there is such a thing as the objective world and such a thing as the subjective world, and the integrity of the subjective were determined by its "correspondence" with the objective, then it were a most serious charge against Dewey to say that he is a subjectivist. For in the field of value, it means that he proclaims what could be hardly less serious than moral solipsism. To both the idealist and the realist who feel that they must have the objectivity of moral judgments before their judgments can command respect, Dewey seems, if not himself corrupt, at least a corrupter of youthful America.¹⁵

How, then, does Dewey escape the seriously meant charge of denying the objectivity of value? He escapes by pleading a change of venue, by denying the jurisdiction of the court. "I can but think," says he, "that much of the recent discussion of the objectivity of value and of value-judgments tests upon a false psychological theory. It rests upon giving certain terms meanings that flow from an introspective psychology which accepts a realm of purely private states of consciousness... . To refer value to choice or desire, for example, is in that case to say that value is subjectively conditioned. Quite otherwise, if we have steered clear from such a psychology."¹⁶

Once granted that there is another way of approaching the problem than the subjective-objective route; i.e., once granted that not all experience involves the knowing relation, one will have little difficulty in

¹⁴ *Logic*, p. 281 ff.

¹⁵ W. H. Sheldon, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 18:309–20.

¹⁶ *Essays in Exp. Logic*, p. 364. See also *Democracy and Education*, p. 195.

seeing that Dewey's claim that value-judgments are practical, is an effective refutation to either the claim that they are subjective or the claim that they are objective. Even though one himself does not accept all that Dewey puts into his conclusions, he must then admit, I think, that Dewey is at least consistent with himself. This robbing of the subjective-objective problem of its meaning is by no means the least thing for which students of value have to thank Dewey, as I see it. So long as we did not see that value-judgments arise out of a specific non-cognitive situation in need of adjustment, that it is the first step in an action that seeks to resolve the difficulty, and that it dips then to a non-reflective level where intrinsic good are again possible – so long did we wander from the meaning of concrete experiences and lose ourselves in the attempt the good, *überhaupt*.

This has been the besetting sin of philosophers beginning with and including Plato.¹⁷ But whether they have been on the search for “*the end, the summum bonum, the final goal*” or for inflexible standards with which to sound conduct for “external values,” they have uniformly returned empty-handed. The sufficient reason why they have failed, says Dewey, is that “in the abstract or at large, there is no such thing as degrees or order of value.” “It is reasonable to believe,” says he in another place, “that what holds moral knowledge back is above all, the conception that there are standards of good given to knowledge apart from the work of reflection in construction of methods of action.”¹⁸ The reason for this faith on Dewey's part he elsewhere indicates in these words: “Physical knowledge did not as matter of fact advance till the dogma of models or forms as standards of knowledge had been ousted. Yet we hold tenaciously to a like doctrine in morals for fear of moral chaos.”¹⁹ just as the abolition of this point of view in the natural sciences has led to such phenomenal widening of the boundaries of our knowledge, even “in like fashion,” thinks Dewey, “we may anticipate that the abolition of *the final goal, and the single motive power and the separate and infallible faculty in morals, will quicken inquiry into the diversity of specific goods of experience, fix attention upon their conditions, and bring to light values now dim and obscure.*”²⁰ Renouncing, then, once for all “the diversion of intelligence from discrimination of plural and concrete goods...which has done more than brute love of

¹⁷ *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 50.

¹⁸ *Logic*, p. 382.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

²⁰ *Darwin*, p. 70.

power to establish inequality and injustice among men,"²¹ and leaving henceforth to "poetry and to art, the task (so inartistically performed by philosophy since Plato) of gathering together and rounding out, into one abiding picture, the separate and special goods of life,"²² we shall "converge all the instrumentalities of the social arts, of law, education, economics, and political science upon the construction of intelligent methods of improving the common lot."²³

III

It is this ringing call for man to live in his own world and this justification for his so doing, that constitutes the essence of Dewey's philosophy. While others have cried "lo, here; lo, there!" Dewey has continually insisted that the kingdom of good is within human experience. It is difficult to see why this course should need to be emphasized. For other-worldliness is supposed to have passed with many other anemic beauties of the mediaeval world. And this is that Dewey is really saying in his theory of value: values are immanent in human experience. Take them for what they are: if they are many, so much the better; if they are found within classes that aforesaid were vulgar, judge the classes by the values, rather than the values by the classes. When Dewey insists that values are *here*, he also indicates the very important social doctrine that they are *everywhere* here. No class has a monopoly upon them; if so, the chief task of man is to see that monopoly ended. To make values common to all men, to deepen them, and to guarantee them – this is the threefold problem common to philosophy, to science, to government. This is the Problem of Man. The first step in the solution of the problem is the whole-hearted recognition that values are immanent in human experience, rather than secluded in some transcendental or conceptual realm accessible to common men only through priestly or philosophic or governmental intermediaries. It is this recognition that philosophers have often failed consciously to make. I say "consciously," for since all the values there are, *are* really in human experience, it would not be marvelous if philosophers were found, when off guard, to speak more wisely than when in the cold ecstasy of philosophic sophistication. With this hypothesis let us ramble a bit in the out-of-way preserves of the two modern system-builders.

Of all moderns who have found human experience most lacking,

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 71.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

whether taken as a whole or by parts, F. H. Bradley perhaps comes first. *His Appearance and Reality* succeeds so fatally well as practically to mean for man, as Schiller facetiously suggested, the *disappearance* of reality. Begin where he will in the evaluation of human experience, Bradley can find nothing that is not shot through and through with inadequacies, contradictions, infinitude. "Surely," he would say, "nothing here can be thought to be finally valuable." It is only in the Absolute that value can be found (though he even quibbles at predicating good of the Absolute).²⁴ Here, it would seem, is a complete antithesis to Dewey's theory of value; for Dewey finds all values in human experience, whereas Bradley finds none possible in it. If human experience has any values at all, they can appear as valuable only in the Absolute, never in themselves. Here we see a traditionally recurring effort to belittle man's world carried through to its logical completion. Man's world remains good only for its bads.

But the Absolute, in relation to which alone can anything else possess value, gets its value from its reconciling nature. The Absolute seems the complete embodiment of the seventh beatitude: in it all the contradictions of a bedeviled world are set right. In it all questions cease from troubling and all problems are at rest. But how is this consummation (so devoutly to be wished!) attained? It is attained by the abolition of thought (relationally infected thought!); for the Absolute is not only trans-temporal, trans-spatial, but trans-rational as well.²⁵ If solution of contradictions is the great end that the Absolute attains, then absence of reflection is the great means through which the great end is reached.

At this stage, the question will inevitably arise: If the solution of contradictions is the end to be sought, and the means to its solution is the absence of thought, then why go to such length to attain what is already present at the outset? For unless the term "thought" be used in such a double sense as really to destroy its meaning, thought certainly does have its *genesis* in just the sort of situation that Bradley thinks it attains only at the end. The appreciative realm in which we daily live, move, and have our being is, as such, non-reflective; and being non-rational, it has neither contradictions nor problems. These do arise, but their birth means its death. We do not value and evaluate the same object at the same time. Whether one recognizes it or not, it is the deep concern with which he views the interruption of his a-logical experiencing by a hostile environment, a concern growing out of the unspeakably, the un-rationally profound significance this mode of experiencing has for his life, – it is this concern, I say, that leads to such

²⁴ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 411.

²⁵ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 172.

persistent efforts, as Bradley's, to think out the contradictions and restore the values. In his description of the Absolute, Bradley has described with vivid accuracy a genuine part, the most meaningful part, of *human* experience. In a paradoxical epigram, half-playfully placed in the preface to his *Appearance and Reality* (an epigram apparently evolved in a moment of detached musing), Bradley has done more than in the entire book that follows accurately to analyze human experience and precisely to indicate the relations between its parts. Says he: "*To love unsatisfied the world is a mystery, a mystery which love satisfied seems to comprehend.*"²⁶ (Italics mine.) Not even the incorrigibly intellectualistic sentence²⁷ with which he closes the excerpt can obscure the genuine significance that Bradley himself finds in immediate experience, such as is represented by "love." Indeed, Bradley's epigram indicates in a sentence Dewey's own theory of value. Bradley's naïve insight at the beginning states, it seems to me, quite as intelligibly as does his much belabored dialectic that follows for six hundred pages, the nature of thought and reality and their relations to each other. Since Bradley graciously leaves to the reader "how seriously"²⁸ he shall take the epigram, I for one have long preferred to take it more seriously than I do the remainder of *Appearance and Reality*.

Another corroboration of Dewey's analysis and emphasis that comes from quite as unexpected a source and comes, even as in Bradley's case, from a moment of relaxation rather than from a serious intellectual endeavor, is found in a recent note of Bernard Bosanquet's.²⁹ Bosanquet, who through labored volumes loses human experience and values in a conceptual Absolute at their close, Bosanquet, whose "inmost aspiration"³⁰ was, and is, to be able to say to the "critics of Absolutism": "Mark now, how a plain tale shall put you down," – even Bosanquet has here told so plain a tale as to justify the feeling that the Absolute may be brought down as effectively by its friend as by its enemies. Bosanquet, surveying the *Studio*, feels an obvious impatience with those who (following his own footsteps) would push values out of human experience. "In a world of supreme values, wholly beyond doubt," he found himself saying, "What is the use of talking? Why do we not look?" There before him, the great apostle of the Absolute, were some pictures, "any one of them fit to bring heaven into our time and

²⁶ *Appearance and Reality*, p. xv.

²⁷ "The latter is wrong only because it cannot be content without thinking itself right."

²⁸ *Appearance and Reality*, p. xv.

²⁹ *The Philosophical Review*, 30:216.

³⁰ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. vi.

place." In that moment of insight, he confesses, "that the *inexhaustibleness* of values, of *human experience*, is *altogether beyond the need of reasoning*," and the thought left him, as he further confesses, "a little indifferent to the *precise remoter* inferences which we may draw from it, and a little impatient of any discussion which implies that we are not *constantly* in presence of *supreme realities* and *immeasurable values*. (All italics mine.) This "Undesigned Coincidence," as Bosanquet entitles his brief note, furnishes further corroboration of the theory of value enunciated in the earlier pages of this paper. Undesigned these corroborations are, but perhaps of greater weight because the *are* designed; for they indicate an *unbiased* recognition of just such a state of reality as Dewey's theory of value has so logically elaborated.

IV

If one must have in every philosophy a *metaphysics*, I wonder if we might not call Dewey's theory of value, his metaphysics? This is suggested to me by the discovery that Dewey is treating in his theory of immediate values what those who have monopolized the term "metaphysics" treat under that head. The Absolute is the metaphysical object, *par excellence*; and Dewey also has his doctrine of the absolute or of absolutes. Every act of thinking finds its specific absolute in the restored immediate experience to which the act is instrumental. Immediate experience *is* absolute in the sense that it is the *end* of the problematic situation, and as such is consequently "invaluable."³¹ Immediate experience enjoys the same surcease from the exigencies of thinking as does Bradley's Absolute. It seems to me that all the really distinctive and valuable attributes of the historical Absolute is preserved in Dewey's absolute(s), for the doctrine of the Absolute (absolutists to the contrary notwithstanding) has ever been an effort to guarantee emotional satisfaction through the procedure of rationalization. Dewey guarantees it, not by rationalizing, but by recognizing it for what it is and setting about with scientific foresight to *make* it permanent. In short, Dewey has succeeded in showing how within human experience itself, thought, instead of breeding vast contradictions through its relational nature, is, in the ascent of man, the instrument evolved for the resolution of the difficulties that arise on a lower level. Thought, precisely because it is relational, is the one means through which the absolute(s), which we so much prize, may retain their absoluteness; i.e., may remain unproblematical.

³¹ See *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 175.

V

I wish now to return briefly to Dewey's own theory in order to consider what seems to me the most significant objection made to it, an objection raised curiously enough not more by critics than by Dewey himself. Dewey's theory of value, as we have seen, calls for a dichotomy within experience; i.e., appreciation and reflection. But do these actually exist, separated from each other, as the discussion seems to imply? However appreciative it may be, is not all experience judgmental, *implicitly* at least? It is too easy to beg the question with the use of the term "implicit." That all experience, however purely appreciative, may (and does) become judgmental on occasion, Dewey both admits and affirms. Moreover, he explains what is "the occasion." But if the critics should affirm that all experience is *actually* judgmental, they would be doing no more than Dewey himself seems more than once to admit.³² With this admission one might still maintain that these two aspects – judgmental and appreciative – predominate in different situations, as Dewey himself affirms. But once admit that all experiences are all the time actually infected with more or less of the judgmental aspect, it seems to me that the distinction loses much of its significance. It may still be justified as an explanatory device, but it can no longer be sharply descriptive of actual experiences. Believing that the division is not only explanatory but accurately descriptive of human experience as well, I do not feel that Dewey need make the admission (if the passages quoted below and other similar ones constitute an admission.)³³

The fact that one is always (during waking hours) thinking, leads too easily to the conclusion that all our experiences are more or less thought experiences. True, of course, that all our experiences are thought experiences while they are being thought about. But the question really is: Are all our experiences all the time being thought about? It seems clear to me that they are not, even to the degree that Dewey thinks probable. Thinking is never of things in general, never *überhaupt*. To the contrary, thinking is always quite utterly specific, as Dewey has repeatedly emphasized. Ignoring the apparent facts of sleep (in which one may afterwards distinguish satisfactory or unsatisfactory rest, though he remember not so much as a dream during the sleeping period), I should say that, since thought is genuinely specific, one is always *experiencing* more than he is thinking about; and this "more" (though it may at any time through

³² "No experience having a meaning is possible without some element of thought. But we may contrast two types of experience, according to proportion of reflection found in them." (*Democracy and Education*, p. 169.)

³³ "That something of the cognitive...enters in as a catalyzer...in even the most aesthetic experiences, seems to be altogether probable." (*Logic*, p. 394.)

developing disharmonies become the object of judgment) is for the time being experienced *only* appreciatively.³⁴ To use Dewey's illustration, I may *value* my meal while *evaluating* the argument of my friend; or I may *evaluate* grit in my bread while *valuing* the presence of my friend. It seems to me that the two may not only be thought of as separate, but that they are actually quite separate; i.e., that Dewey's oft-repeated dichotomy does constitute a social and ethical metaphysics.

³⁴ It is, I think, because he does not clearly recognize this that Mr. Delton Thomas Howard in *Dewey's Logical Theory* (Cornell Studies in Philosophy, No. 11), is betrayed first into admitting that "it is doubtless true that men think only occasionally and with some reluctance" (p. 124), later into the declaration that "there is nothing in evidence to show that thinking is a special kind of activity, which operates now and then" (p. 127), and finally into the distinction that "the moment of *real*, earnest thinking is at the high tide of life, when all the powers are awake and operating" (p. 132).

ACTIVITY AND OBJECTS IN DEWEY'S *HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT*

George P. Adams. "Activity and Objects in Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct*." *Journal of Philosophy* 20.22 (25 October 1923): 596–603.

The designation of an ethical theory as "naturalistic" would appear to mean one of two things. It might express the belief that everything with which Ethics deals – desires and preferences, moral judgments as well as the objects of such preferences and judgments, the good and the right – are all aspects of existences and processes which belong to "nature." But if this is what naturalistic Ethics means, and if it is thought to be a significant thing to say that Ethics is or should be naturalistic, then it at once becomes necessary to make clear what it is that one means by "nature." To make this clear obviously requires that one shall settle his accounts with all of the major theoretical and metaphysical issues concerning the status, the scope, and the characteristics of nature. This is evidently not what is in Professor Dewey's mind when he defines his main problem as that of "seeing what objectivity in morals means on a naturalistic basis."¹ A naturalistic Ethics which is for him the prime desideratum is one in which the formulation and the solution of ethical problems shall be guided by the same logical methods and instruments which the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century brought to bear upon the knowledge of physical nature. It is a matter primarily of the scientific attitude and method, and not a matter of any ultimate interpretation of what nature is and means. A naturalistic Ethics, in this sense, will view all moral issues as in truth "engineering issues" which are to be solved only through a scientific, *i.e.*, an intelligent, analysis of the "knowable facts of life, man, and the world."²

Human Nature and Conduct is the outline – with an extraordinarily rich filling – of a naturalistic Ethics in this sense of the term. A careful reading of this book has left me with certain problems and doubts both

¹ *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 52.

² P. 11.

as to the precise meaning of its central theses together with their logical implications, and also as to their adequacy. Any appreciation of the extraordinary stimulus and fertility of this survey of Ethics and Social Psychology is certainly not called for on any part. I propose to go to the root of my difficulty and my query and to state it as clearly as I can. What then are the “knowable facts of life, man, and the world” which offer themselves for ethical analysis?

Throughout the book Professor Dewey appears to me to have woven together two quite different themes, two diverse accounts of the relation between the activities of individuals – habits, impulses, and deliberations – and the objective situations which constitute the environment and the setting of these human activities. On the one hand, it is repeatedly urged that the activities of individual experience depend *entirely* for their meaning, their content, and their specific character upon some objective fact or situation or consequence. In themselves, these “activities” are sheer potentialities and abstractions. (a) Habits are in no wise merely ways of acting which belong to individual organisms and minds. They “incorporate objective forces.” “Honesty, chastity, malice, peevishness, courage, triviality, industry, irresponsibility are not private possessions of a person. They are working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces. All virtues and vices are habits which incorporate objective forces.”³ The self is never isolated either from nature or from other selves. “We live mentally and physically only *in and* because of our environment.”⁴ The fallacies and perversions of all transcendental Ethics arise from the failure to observe this solid attachment of selves and of desires, of motives and habits, to empirical objects. (b) The objective situations, factors and consequences which selves and habits “incorporate” are the source of all the specific *meanings* which activities possess. The “only *components of the meaning* of the act” are its objective consequences, the elements and aspects of the environment upon which the act impinges. There are no “inherent qualities” of psychic elements “which might be directly read off by introspection.”⁵ Meanings are never internal and psychic; they are objective and factual. Activity as such is “fluid,” abstract and wholly potential. It gets all of its precision, content, and definition through “contact with objects.” “These experiences of contact with objects and their qualities give meaning, character to an otherwise fluid, unconscious activity. We find out what seeing means by the objects which are seen. They constitute

³ P. 16.

⁴ P. 327.

⁵ P. 151.

the significance of visual activity which would otherwise remain a blank. "‘Pure’ activity is for consciousness pure emptiness."⁶ (c) This dependence of all conscious and inherent activities upon the objective environment, upon "static termini"⁷ lies at the basis of Professor Dewey's criticism of the traditional concept of instinct. There are no native instinctive activities which provide for or in any way contain their own meaning and nature. "The *meaning* of native activities is not native; it is acquired."⁸ And it is acquired from and molded by the objective social medium and environment. It is "social conditions which have educated original activities into definite and significant dispositions."⁹ These social conditions provide the objective stimuli which give definite content and meaning to the plastic and fluid potentialities of all that is original. The so-called instincts of acquisition and sex are dependent for everything which makes them the specific things they are upon the nature of the stimulus which elicits them, and the object to which they are attached. Instinctive activities and proclivities are the raw material, the potential stuff of any and every human interest and institution. In themselves they contain no explanation of the specific nature of any one of these. For such an explanation we must look to the "social patterns woven out of the stuff of instinctive activities."¹⁰ It is these concrete and specific social patterns which provide instinctive activities both with a definite stimulus and a definite object. Such objects are the source of all the meaning which these activities acquire. (d) Lastly, that reasonableness of activity, of conduct, which consists in the "order, perspective, proportion which is achieved, during deliberation, out of a diversity of earlier incompatible preferences," this internal harmony of conduct and of activity "implies, of course, the *presence of a comprehensive object*, one which coördinates, organizes, and functions each factor of the situation which gave rise to conflict, suspense, and deliberation."¹¹ Here are indicated, then, various ways in which activity and conduct are dependent, both for their meaning and for their specific character, upon objective factors. In these passages there seems to be clearly implied an ethical realism in which meaning and value, just because they originate from objective factors, must be something discovered, and must be discovered as being located not in activities, but

⁶ P. 191.

⁷ P. 191.

⁸ P. 90.

⁹ P. 91.

¹⁰ P. 110.

¹¹ P. 194–95, *italics mine*.

in objects, whether these objects be "social patterns," consequences of conduct, or what not.

But this realism, this emphasis upon objects which endow activities – in themselves wholly "fluid" and potential – with all of the meaning which they ever acquire, would seem to veer off in a direction quite different from that required by the logic of a humanistic and pragmatic Ethics. And, indeed, this motive in *Human Nature and Conduct* is offset by another motive according to which objects are but the potentialities of and the clues to activity, deriving *their* content and *their* meaning from the activities and habits of the organism. For, the deliberation and thinking which so far have appeared really to discover something objective, and to depend upon what objects reveal, are now said to disclose a meaning which originates in the arrested momentum of activities themselves. The objects which, in recollection and in deliberation, appear to be real objects, actually "represent habits turned inside out."¹² To be sure, these "objects" are said to exhibit "both the onward tendency of habit and the objective conditions which have been incorporated within it."¹³ But repeatedly the emphasis is placed upon the "momentum," the "onward tendency," "the satisfaction of the forces of human nature," "the push and drive of life." Sensations and perceptions, objects discriminated and "ends" deliberated upon, derive *their* meaning from the energy of impulses and activities meeting with obstruction and shock, and again surging forward redirected and reconstructed. These objects and qualities get their significance from the activities which they block or release. "Sensations in immediate consciousness are elements of action dislocated through the shock of interruption. They never, however, completely monopolize the scene; for there is a body of residual undisturbed habits which is reflected in remembered and perceived objects having a meaning. Thus out of shock and puzzlement there gradually emerges a figured framework of objects, past, present, future. These shade off variously into a vast penumbra of vague, unfigured things, a setting which is taken for granted and not at all explicitly presented. The complexity of the figured scene in its scope and refinement of contents depends wholly upon prior habits and their organization."¹⁴ It is not now activities getting their meaning through the "discovery of objects,"¹⁵ but objects getting their meanings through the activities which they obstruct or release, into which they fit or with

¹² P. 182.

¹³ P. 182.

¹⁴ P. 182.

¹⁵ P. 212.

which they jar. "Complacency and annoyance follow hard at the heels of any object presented in image as they do upon its sensuous experience. Some objects when thought of are congruent to our existing state of activity. They fit in, they are welcome. They agree, or are agreeable, not as matter of calculation, but as matter of experienced fact. Other objects rasp; they cut across activity; they are tiresome, hateful, unwelcome. They *disagree with the existing trend of activity*, that is, they are disagreeable, and in no other way than as a bore who prolongs his visit, a dun we can't pay, or a pestiferous mosquito who goes on buzzing."¹⁶ Objects serve only to aid us in "perceiving the tendency of our inchoate dawning activities."¹⁷

Now it is one thing to say that activities get their definition and their meaning from objects and from what they discover in objects; it is another thing to say that objects get their meaning from activities, that they are incidents or phases in the career of activities. The first statement is realistic; the second is humanistic and pragmatic. I think I can understand something of a theory of value which builds upon either one of these premises. To weave them together without (so far as I can find) any clear recognition of the problematic character of the combination suggests hunting with the hounds and running with the hares. But if we are left with an unsolved contradiction on our hands, we are at least given a suggestion as to the source of the difficulty. For, the emphasis upon the significance of activity rather than of objects, as the source of meaning and value, occurs in connection with the rejection of the view that in deliberation and reflection present activities are or should be subordinated to future ends and enjoyments. Goals and ends remote from present activities do not absorb and concentrate in themselves the meaning of present activities. "They are ways of defining and deepening the meaning of activity. Having an end or aim is thus a characteristic of *present* activity. It is the means by which an activity becomes adapted when otherwise it would be blind and disorderly, or by which it gets meaning when otherwise it would be mechanical. In a strict sense an end-in-view is a *means* in present action; present action is not a means to remote end. Men do not shoot because targets exist, but they set up targets in order that throwing and shooting may be more effective and significant."¹⁸ This insistence upon present significance, this protest against the perpetual postponement of the present to the future is far-reaching and sound. But because present activity and present experience

¹⁶ P. 200–201.

¹⁷ P. 207.

¹⁸ P. 226.

can not safely be subordinated to meanings and achievements lying wholly in the future, it does not follow that the significance of present activities lies wholly within themselves, and is self-contained, something definable apart from the objects and values to which present activity is attached and directed.

There is a possible ambiguity in urging that "ends arise and function within activity, and that they are not, as current theories too often imply, *things lying beyond activity* at which the latter is directed."¹⁹ The "things lying beyond activity" may refer to either of two very different things. They may mean some end or goal eventually to be attained, and which is "outside" present activity because it is not now possessed in present experience and appreciation. Or, they may refer to some object or value which is "outside activity" only in the sense that present conscious activity discovers in something not itself a meaning and value upon which it is focussed and directed, something objective which is at the same time discovered by an activity and is also independent of its discovery and its appreciation. A sonnet, together with its meaning and its beauty, does exist "outside activity" in the second sense, but not in the first. The "enrichment of content," the increase in the "intrinsic significance of living," for the sake of which "study and planning" exist,²⁰ is the fruit of discovery of the meaning and value of objects, or reality. It is no projection into the void of the meanings which belong primarily only to the activity itself. At least, unless this is so, I can see no point to the repeated emphasis upon the dependence of activities, for their definition and their significance, upon objects, upon social structures, upon all that our conscious activities discover within the world in which they happen to find themselves. It is such a discovery of what can only, in its own proper sense, be thought of as "outside activity" that is capable of yielding that "peace in action" which is the "contribution of the ideal to conduce."²¹

I think that attentive readers of *Human Nature and Conduct* can not fail to be struck by the explicit recognition of the partial and even subordinate rôle assigned to the pragmatic and instrumental concept of control. "The amount of control which will come into existence in the future is not within our control."²² What else can this mean than that activities are surrounded and permeated by objective situations which have to be accepted and *contemplated*. "There is a point in *every* intel-

¹⁹ P. 223, italics mine.

²⁰ P. 267.

²¹ P. 264.

²² P. 267.

ligent activity where effort ceases; where thought and doing fall back upon a course of events which effort and reflection can not touch."²³ What does this outlying "enveloping whole" contain and comprise? *It* is certainly "outside activity," yet does it not offer to all of our experience and our activity objects and structures, all of the values which it is the business of intelligence and reason – and feeling – to discover and to apprehend? But to say this, which Professor Dewey does come perilously near to saying, seems to me to embark upon an enterprise which might in the end call for a very considerable revision of that "naturalism" which regards consciousness as a "natural" function, serving only to straighten out the tangles and confusions of conflicting impulses and habits, and which regards values solely as dependent upon the release and the unified free expansion of these natural activities of living organisms.

There are two distinct human interests which are served by the study of Ethics. Only confusion can result from a failure clearly to distinguish them, at least as a preliminary step in the further consideration of their mutual relations. The study of Ethics may grow out of a reflective interest in determining what it is that I ought next to do, confronted as I am by a specific situation and a specific problem. Reflection and analysis, knowledge and science, exist here for the sake of activity, in order that present activity may be intelligent, confident, significant, and effective. I can see good reasons for speaking of this type of question as involving nothing but an "engineering issue." Professor Dewey is undoubtedly right in urging that very much of the classical ethical tradition is irrelevant to this enterprise. But there is another distinct interest out of which Ethics arises. It lies in the attempt, not to determine specifically what next to do, but to offer some adequate interpretation of the pervasive characteristic of the human situation as a whole, the situation in which men desire, strive, and seek after things which they believe to be fraught with value. Any hypothesis or theory concerning the nature and the meaning of the processes in which human activities are directed upon objects and values is something quite different from a specific plan of action. It is theoretical and not immediately practical. It will yield knowledge and not "control." In supposing that traditional Ethics is vitiated in so far as it set up "fixed" and static ends and universal principles, there is always the possibility that the question and interest of traditional Ethics which has been thus answered is *not* that of formulating a plan of action, but has been instead the interest in understanding and in interpreting the processes and their environment in which plans of action arise. In this latter case something

²³ P. 264.

of a “fixed” and “universal” import is inevitable, though the particular nature of the answer yielded may be as false as you please. And when it comes to the “enhancement of the meaning of present activity,” it is a fair question whether there is not more to be hoped for from a theoretical survey and contemplation of the total setting of our active processes – so far as we can win such – that there is from the specific knowledge of the “next thing to be done.” After all, with whatever meaning our present activities may be endowed and enhanced, *that* meaning is something to be discovered, apprehended, and enjoyed; that meaning is in no sense a plan of action. It is a fixed and definitive constituent of the total situation present to our conscious awareness. It is an objective value.

IN DEFENSE OF A WORTHLESS THEORY OF VALUE

David W. Prall. "In Defense of a *Worthless* Theory of Value." *Journal of Philosophy* 20.5 (1 March 1923): 128–37.

There are two objections which it seems to me important to register at once to Mr. Picard's recent article "Value and Worth"¹ supported as it is in part by Mr. Dewey's article "Valuation and Experimental Knowledge"² For the rest I may leave the theory to the criticism of others more competent to deal with it as a whole.

My first objection is that the distinction which Mr. Picard draws between worth and value, while it rests upon a perfectly clear (I should have said fully and currently acknowledged) difference, is not a distinction within the field of value; nor does the term *worth* seem to me a particularly appropriate designation to apply to what is admittedly not a value. The procedure is too much like choosing a more or less adequate definition of value; finding a case in which value is imputed but which the definition does not fit; and then ruling out the case as not being one of value precisely, but of something more or less like value, which for convenience we call worth. If, as a matter of fact, any sort of worth is really not a case of value, then it seems quite clear that it is also not a sort of worth. *Non-valuable worth* is in English a plainly non-significant term, and thus even the terminology would be a serious blemish in Mr. Picard's theory – particularly serious in a field where terminology has been so fruitful of confusion and needless controversy.

But I have other fault to find than the use of questionably selected terms. What Mr. Picard calls worth he says appears on reflection, and he would say also, I suppose, that it was therefore the product of reflection, constituted by reflection. Now our acknowledgment of worth in any given case may very well be accounted for by the activity of

¹ This journal, Vol. XIX, No. 18, pp. 477–89.

² *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXI, 4, pp. 325–51.

reflection, may, that is, be the result of cognitive process; but what we thus come to acknowledge in cognition is, at least in those cases which Mr. Picard suggests, nothing more than a fact, and the acknowledgment can be put in the form of a judgment of fact. On reflection we come to see that such and such an act, such and such a thing, such and such a person, is or was or will be valuable – valuable, of course, to some one. And this some one is a conscious being, between whom and the valuable object, act, or person, there is, was, or will be that relation that we call a value-relation. If I acknowledge in reflection that an act is morally good or a picture esthetically good, my cognitive processes, as engaged in this acknowledgment, have nothing whatever to do with making the act good or the picture beautiful. The act is good or the picture beautiful as it enters into relation with a subject to whom it gives satisfaction in contemplation – a whole society of subjects, perhaps, who agree in their tastes, moral or esthetic or even logical.³

To make the point plainer we may use the examples which Mr. Picard offers as sufficient evidence of the distinction he is mainly drawing, the distinction which he thinks has not been taken into account in value theory of the type which has been most rigorously expounded by Mr. Perry. In this sort of theory, says Mr. Picard, “intrinsic values defined as affective-volitional relations of interest are the same sort of entities as the intrinsic values which appear when we ask questions as to whether the worths are justified.”⁴ Such a theory “does not take into account the additional element of worth that may appear upon reflection,” and the theory thus uncritically “identifies affective interest with interest that is wholly cognitive.”⁵ The answer to this criticism is simply that the reality of what appears is not added by the reflective cognition which discovers it, and secondly that a wholly cognitive interest is not interest at all, unless by cognitive interest Mr. Picard means an interest in the act or the object of cognition. And in either of these cases the interest had better be called motor-affective or affective-volitional. The purest of pure mathematicians may, I should suppose, unless he be a Kant, take delight in his cognitive processes or the objects of his cognition without the slightest

³ The essential disagreement that is cited so often to rule out the case of esthetic taste here is very largely a Philistine myth or a misunderstanding of the intensity of artists' interest in the particulars of their productions. Such intensity of interest in detail, and annoyance with differences of opinion about it, or at least with the expression of these differences of opinion, has led critics to find a disagreement in the fundamentals of taste that is not present. It is among genuine artists of larger mould, says Stark Young in a recent discussion of this subject, that a real communion of saints is likely to be realized. (*New Republic*, August, 30, 1922.)

⁴ This journal, Vol. XIX, No. 18, p. 482.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 484.

danger to the rigor of his demonstrations or the validity of his discoveries.

Take the examples which Mr. Picard suggests: "I may like a certain picture that my newly acquired esthetic taste condemns."⁶ It is plain here either that the taste has not been acquired,⁷ or that taste simply means ability to perceive that the picture fulfills certain requirements. This is indeed purely a matter of judgment, and the judgment is one of fact, not one of value. But even if it is a correct judgment, the esthetic worth of the picture depends on the picture's conforming to the requirements, not on an observer's knowing that it does so conform. And this does not make the worth or value of the picture objective and independent, or constituted otherwise than in a subject-object relation. For the standard is of course the formula drawn up by some one in accordance with likings and dislikings, whether of the formulator himself or of some one whose likes and dislikes he was attempting to satisfy or to define. And conformity to the standard (an objective fact which any properly trained person may note) means being of such sort that, when the subject comes along whose likes the standard names, this subject will like the work of art, the picture. It will be for him immediately valuable. It will really suit his real taste.⁸

Mr. Picard's other example, that of disliking "good" music, seems to me to fall under the same analysis, but I should like to use it to comment upon Mr. Dewey's contribution to this phase of the subject. It is instrumental values in which Mr. Dewey's interest seems greatest, and with reference to which he has with great clarification of the issues renewed his arguments – arguments which would establish the status of a sort of values called into existence by an activity which he insists is logical as well as experimental, and which he names the judgment of evaluation. But for his theory he finds such apparently unaccountable cases of intrinsic value as this of the music, especially illuminating, and he uses them as confirming his analysis.⁹ He says that in such cases, as in all

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 484.

⁷ This is Mr. Dewey's view in the article cited, p. 350: "We go through the act in deference to habit and social expectations, but at the bottom of our hearts we are aware that we are going through a supernumerary rite. The judgment is faked, not genuine. There is, accordingly, no ground for surprise in the fact that the judgment does not determine a motor-affecto attitude."

⁸ People whose tastes are formed on models may gradually come to adopt a standard suited primarily to these others. But they thus come very often really to like what is in the "best taste." Their taste has been educated, genuinely acquired – and very good taste it may be. The training, however, is mostly one in perceptive discrimination, not, as Mr. Dewey would have it, in judgments of valuation.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 350–51.

valuation, we must first make the “proximate judgment” that “it is good – or better – to perform a certain act in order to make a complete ulterior judgment possible.”¹⁰ Now take the case where the complete ulterior judgment called for is that this particular “good” music, which at present I do not like, *is* good. This ulterior judgment is to be the record of a new affecto-motor attitude which is really mine, which I have really acquired. It is to be an actual part of my genuinely new taste; but the acquiring of the taste is itself the result of the “proximate judgment,” whose object or content is an act I am to perform, and the “proximate judgment” will be of the valuation type just mentioned: “that it is good – or better – to perform a certain act in order to make a complete ulterior judgment possible.”

Mr. Dewey seems less interested than formerly to prove that this is a new or peculiar type of judgment from the point of view of logical theory; but he still insists on its being just that rational, logical process which makes the genuinely new event part of a rational experience. To any one who supposes reason itself as an existence to be natural and irrational like the rest of nature, it is not important that this specific act of valuation be called logical or even rational. It takes reflection upon activity of *any* sort to fit that activity into the Life of Reason, and evaluation, being an event, can hardly by a naturalist be considered as in itself logical. Discourse alone may have that characteristic. The issues are metaphysical, as all issues end by being, and as Mr. Dewey notes. But to take the example offered – the case of the music – what judgments and what acts ought to be performed? When I have reached the state of admitting the music to be good, and of wanting to have this judgment, not as what Mr. Dewey calls faked, but as a record of my own actual liking, what “proximate judgment” or series of judgments am I to make, whose object or objects are acts?

The following appears to be a fair account of what happens in such a case. I ask myself how I am to come to like good music, for I have already admitted that this music *is* good, albeit it falls at present unpleasantly on my ear. And I then say that I had better listen to more music, or that I had better study harmony, or I had better learn to play the violin; for these are acts through the performance of which people come to like good music. Which I do requires deliberation upon the circumstances; there is real doubt as to what I have time for, what ways are suited to my capacities, and so on; and this doubt becomes resolved only when I have arrived at the issue of this deliberation. The deliberation may have involved the use of all my mental powers, but it is only at the end of it that I make the judgment itself – the “proximate

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

judgment" required. At this point in my activities, however, the value in question will not have been enstated. In fact, if it ever does become enstated – and this seems to me a very well authenticated empirical account of the facts – the making of the judgment will have been but one step in a long causal sequence, at the end of which there will occur a value situation, a situation caused by the judgment no more than by the various activities of eyes and ears and other organs, of violins and bows and perhaps of pianos and piano-movers; perhaps also of a very large number of other persons and things. There will occur at the end of all this a situation in which I as subject contemplate with pleasure and satisfaction, through my ears and by means of all the newly developed connections which these have established with previously inactive or uncoordinated cortical areas, the sounds of the music which fell on them before so unacceptably. And in the occurring of this relation the value of the music occurs; without this situation it does not. And what is more, unless this situation occurs, it can never with truth be said that I like the music; unless this *sort* of situation occurs with *some* subject, it can never be truly said that the music is good.

So that the last stage in the process, which is not judging, but is contemplating and liking, constitutes the value in a very different sense from that in which the value situation itself is constituted by the "proximate" valuation judgment, the judgment of practise that I had better listen to music or study music, or whatever it happened to be. It is admitted that the value situation would not have occurred without the judgment, that the judgment was one link in a causal chain leading to the situation; but the judgment no more constitutes it than the violin does, or the music that I hear in the course of my education, or any of the other links in any of the other causal chains involved. The judgment may have been made because I wanted to come to value good music, and it may have helped to put my mind in a condition which was necessary for it to be in before I could come to enjoy the training through which I finally came to enjoying good music. And this judgment is an example of the type of judgment that constantly occurs in the minds of rational beings. But I see no reason for saying that it ever constitutes either the enjoyment or the value. Not *this* value, Mr. Dewey would answer, but value of the special type that just this sort of judgment does constitute. But always I find that all of Mr. Dewey's values, in so far as they have any common elements or characteristics to justify grouping them under the term *value* at all, can be shown to be constituted in the motor-affective relation which constitutes immediate value. It is only the particular sort of entity that Mr. Picard has attempted to establish as worth that I am here attempting to deny as a form of value, or, if it is a form of value, to bring under an affecto-

motor theory. Mr. Dewey seems in this case not to have helped Mr. Picard's position. The valuation judgment helps, as do a thousand other things and activities, to enstate the value, to bring me to the point, that is, of being able to do the actual valuing. But I can not see that a study of such judgments is particularly important for understanding values, or for learning to value justly. For it is clear that even evaluating in Mr. Dewey's sense is preferring, and preference springs as a genuine new experience out of previous experience, as all new things come out of old. To insist that, because a theory of value finds the preceding judgments all old at the time when the new valuing occurs, such a theory denies the reality of doubt or of possibilities, is like insisting that the distinguishing of the past as past denies that a really new, that is, *future*, future can or does issue from the past.

What Mr. Perry's type of value theory asserts is that values do occur, that they are genuinely new; and it would seem to me that they are satisfactory or unsatisfactory according as the subject's faculties are acute or not, and his training in specific fields thorough or not. It is not training in the field of a special sort of judgments called valuation judgments but a training in the field of scientific facts and in the principles and the peculiarities of the arts, that will make the act in which deliberation issues satisfactory. But this act will always be preference or liking; it will never be "intellectual, logical, cognitive," as Mr. Dewey would have it.¹¹ The object of all study and education is to achieve taste, the ability to like rightly and adequately in all the fields of our experience; but surely Hume's discussion of necessary connection is enough to convince us that it is only experience already had that establishes knowledge of matters of fact, such as the relation of taste to its formation in mental history. Mr. Dewey appears to be insisting *per contra* that we progress by an *a priori* logic, his process of logical evaluation as performed in judgments of practise, to our values. No one need doubt that even individual values are determined in their existence in the individual's history, part of which is his strictly intellectual, or even his logical, life; but the act in which value is constituted is an act of irrational preference. It is part of life and existence, not part of dialectic; our knowledge, therefore, of its actual connection with its preceding causes, judgmental or other, comes only with *post facto* reflection. Values are thus not constituted in judgment, albeit they *are* constituted only in a relation of which a mind that in most cases has done much judging is one term.

Criticism on this basis is, indeed, as Mr. Dewey says, a *post facto* account of irrational prejudice. But what else do we ask, since irrational prejudice is exactly human preference? In the case of morals what do we

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 335.

ever mean by Mr. Dewey's "should-be-liked" but that which men of knowledge and discernment *do* like in imagined ideals or in contemplated states, and which we feel sure, therefore, that all men would like were they sufficiently enlightened?

From the above discussion it appears that Mr. Dewey's theory offers a justification, albeit unsuccessful, for Mr. Picard's worths in the cases I have discussed. But it justifies them as a particular sort of values, and this is far from Mr. Picard's conception of them. For Mr. Picard makes worth entirely distinct from value, as being what judgment or cognition acknowledges in the absence of any constitutive affective interest; while Mr. Dewey says that "'worth' is the tribute paid by reason to value,"¹² which, I take it, means that in certain cases of value, value is acknowledged to be worth. And reflection on the matter, instead of revealing the confusion which Mr. Picard imputes to my own previous discussion, indicates rather the very real objection that I should have to making cognition responsible for the facts which it comes to recognize. The recognition of the fact that a particular value exists is, as Mr. Picard himself is at great pains to point out, not the setting up of that relation which constitutes value. It is, however, an acknowledgment that such a relation has been or is or will be or can be set up. And this acknowledgment is all that I find in these cases of "worth," which, so far as Mr. Picard illustrates them, are plainly enough either not values, or else values which are acknowledged, but not at the time of the acknowledgment felt. This acknowledgment is the sort that value-theorists are constantly making when they tell you, for example, that from the point of view of the organism value may occur when there is a center of activity to serve as the basis of an interest that is directed outward.¹³ Surely Mr. Picard does not assert that his reflective acknowledgment of this fact about value constitutes a "worth" here, where the *amœba*, let us say, enters into a relation which is constitutive of an immediate value. The uncritical assumption to which he has called attention¹⁴ is in my own case, at least, a reflective conclusion.

Further to justify this "uncritical" theory, let me indicate how it would deal with the criterion of formal structure which Mr. Picard has drawn up to make his distinction clear – to show, that is, that intrinsic worth is not constituted by the same sort of interest-relation as that which constitutes immediate value. The one relation – that of value – he calls dyadic; the other is triadic and constitutes worth. The dyadic relation is the one I am defending as being the only value relation, and I

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 351.

¹³ Cf. Picard: *Values: Immediate and Contributory*, p. 42.

¹⁴ This journal, Vol. XIX, No. 18, p. 482.

need not discuss it further. But Mr. Picard says that “a worth-relation has three terms: *individual*, the *object* or *act judged*, and the *object* or *act* to which the judged object is referred.”¹⁵ In the judgment of intrinsic worth the reference is made thus: *A* is worthy *on its own account*. This is the sort of worth that may appear only on reflection, the sort that is an additional worth over and above any immediate value, such value at times even being negative when the worth is present. The three terms, then, in the triadic relation are (1) the individual who does the judging, who acknowledges the fact that *A* is worthy, (2) the object judged, namely, *A*, and (3) the object to which *A* is referred in the judgment – in this case also *A*. *A* is worthy, that is to say, on *A*’s own account. This is Mr. Picard’s analysis, not mine; but I do not see that it even follows necessarily that there is any worth involved in such a situation. The judgment may be incorrect, false, and *A* may not in any sense be worthy. My thinking that it is will surely not make *A* valuable; why should it make it worthy? – either in itself worthy, or as a means? In fact, if *A* is frankly a means to *B*, and the ease is one of contributory value, which Mr. Picard finds has the same triadic structure as intrinsic worth, the triadic relation, if it holds, is simply a judgment. The first term is the individual doing the judging, the second term is *A*, and the third term is *B*, to which *A* is, in Mr. Picard’s analysis, referred as cause. More simply, the judging individual stands in relation to two terms, *A* and *B*, and to the universal which actually relates *A* and *B*. The judging individual stands in relation to the complex consisting of the terms *A* and *B* and the relation connecting them. The judgment is expressed in the form “*A causes B*.” Now when we value anything as a means, it is true that we are most likely to have made such a judgment, and there are at least three terms involved in the situation. But it is equally clear that we may be mistaken in the judgment, as we may be in the case of the judgment of intrinsic worth above. *A* may thus have no value at all. It may also be the case that the judgment “*A causes B*” is correct, and still that *A* has no value. For it may turn out that our end *B* is not liked by us, and so that the means *A*, which we correctly judged to be a cause of *B*, has no value. According to Mr. Picard, *A* would have worth in both of these cases; and if this be so, worth may be entirely valueless. It is at least an extraordinary use of language that thus identifies worth with what an object must have because we have made the mistake either of thinking it causally connected with that of which it is not a cause, or of thinking that that with which it is actually connected is valuable when it is not.

My discussion does not attempt to cover all the ground which Mr.

¹⁵ This journal, Vol. XIX, No. 18, p. 488.

Picard covers, much less to refute his theory of value; it only attempts to indicate that what he takes to be an uncritical assumption on my part was what I considered an integral portion of a thesis to be made clearly intelligible and so far as might be generally acceptable. It seems to me also to offer a very strong reason for ruling out the suggested use of the term *worth* for *standard value*, which is either a case of genuine value, past or present, for so many people or for such a length of time that it has come to be considered standard without being necessarily felt as a value at all; or which is not a case of value, but either the assertion that something or other should be valued, or that some one or other considers it valuable, or wishes it so considered. In Dr. Pepper's paper, read before the Philosophical Association in December, 1921, but not published, which Mr. Picard cites,¹⁶ the suggestion is less, I think, that intrinsic worth is constituted in or by judgment, as that what he calls standard-value (Mr. Picard's intrinsic – and triadic – worth) is not really a case of value at all. To use *worth* as a designation for this, which is in no sense a value, seems to me to give up one of the main clarifications which modern value theory offers to ethics; namely, that value is one thing, conformity another; so that duty ethics, Puritan ethics, formal ethics, Kantian ethics; is seen to have no right to the conception "moral worth" at all, no right to talk about anything but *conformity* of acts. The value of such conformity, if I may speak a little loosely and still not be interpreted as adhering to the myth of a social mind – the value of such conformity is constituted in that relation in which society observes the pattern of the act as it is performed and likes it or dislikes it as it sees it embellishing the edifice of civilization or disfiguring it. The relation in which such liking joins the terms (the socially minded individual and the contemplated act) constitutes the goodness of the act, its moral value, its intrinsic, and as I should say, necessarily *esthetic* worth – or *value*.

So much for my first objection. My second is merely that Mr. Picard has apparently misread *disinterested* as uninterested in the passage which he quotes as my unconscious illustration of a distinction which he thinks I should make, but which as I have shown above appears to me to be either irrelevant or mistaken.¹⁷ That disinterested attentiveness not only may be, but characteristically is – indeed that it is the very type of – "the interest of which we speak when we discuss affective relations" seems to me quite clear. At any rate the estheticians all think so, from Kant down and it would be a strange criticism of the "disinterested esthetic attitude" of Kant and Croce and Bosanquet and Santayana and Mr. Clive Bell to say that it lacked feeling-tone or was not essentially a

¹⁶ This journal, Vol. XIX, No. 18, p. 485.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 480.

specific sort of feeling-tone. Whether the Christian mystics were altogether disinterested or not is something of a question, but in their visions there was no lack of affective tone; and in the typical contemplation of esthetic objects it is generally agreed that the emotional content, the liking, not to say loving, adoring, worshipping, is the essential, and as I should assert *constitutive*, character of the disinterested attitude.

VALUES, LIKINGS, AND THOUGHT

John Dewey. "Values, Liking, and Thought." *Journal of Philosophy* 20.23 (8 November 1923): 617–22. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Middle Works*, vol. 15 (1983), pp. 20–26.

Speaking literally, there *are* no such things as values, the first word of the title. There are things, all sorts of things, having the unique, the experienced, but undefinable, quality of value. Values in the plural, or a value in the singular, is merely a convenient abbreviation for an object, event, situation, *res*, possessing the quality. Calling the thing a value is like calling a ball struck in baseball, a hit or a foul. Verbally the usage may save a long explanation. But while in discussing baseball a sense of the concrete context will save one from making independent entities out of hits and fouls, discussion of the theory of values and goods, whether moral or esthetic, manifests a tendency to forget the concrete things to which the value-quality is attached. Thus it is said that liking constitutes values. Since liking does not constitute the *things*, the poems, sounds, pictures, persons, flowers, or whatever they are, it is clear that what is really meant is either (*a*) that liking is a *condition* of a thing acquiring the quality of valuity or valueness (if I may coin words to assist in avoiding the ambiguity), or (*b*) that liking is an ingredient, a constituent part of the total situation possessing the quality. There are, as far as I can see, no other alternatives. The following article is in effect an expansion of this remark.

I

Mr. Prall's recent contribution in this JOURNAL, entitled "In Defense of a 'Worthless' Theory of Value," in part a criticism of some views previously expressed by me, illustrates to my mind the ambiguity in question. What does the word "value" in the title signify? Does it mean the quality of valuity or the thing having value? The point at issue between us is the relation of a kind of judgment, called valuative, to values. As I apprehend the article the truth in it is that judgment does not constitute the quality. This I admit. But nothing else constitutes the quality, either – constitutes it, that is, in the sense of *being* it. The quality is itself and

nothing else. The only intelligible subject of discussion is whether judgment helps constitute *values*, that is, whether it is a condition of the acquisition of valuity by things, or is a constituent part of the total complex situation having valuity. And the theme of this article is that in both of these senses the relation of judgment or reflection to things having value is as direct and integral as that of liking.

As the body of the discussion will consist of a running commentary upon selected passages of Mr. Prall's article,¹ it may assist comprehension if we summarize the main points at the outset.

1. Because of the ambiguity pointed out, there is a double meaning in Mr. Prall's assertion that value is constituted by a motor-affective act. If he is talking about value in the strict sense, the quality, then his statement signifies that the motor-affective attitude *is* the quality. But this statement appears obviously false, or rather meaningless. If he is talking about a thing or situation having the quality, then the natural interpretation is that this attitude is a condition of the acquisition or possession of the quality by anything. This is an intelligible proposition, and taken in a restricted sense, to mean that liking is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the occurrence of a thing with value-quality, it is to my mind true. But it is a proposition about the occurrence of a thing or quality, and as such is a causal proposition. Since Mr. Prall admits that judgment may also be a causal condition of the existence of things having value, it forms no basis for drawing a hard and fast line between liking and judgment with respect to values.

2. This admission is fatal to that part of Mr. Prall's theory which holds that there is always a difference in kind in the relationship of liking and judgment to values. But I shall go further than to hold that judgment is *sometimes* a condition of the occurrence of things possessed of valuity. I hold that thought as well as liking, an affective thought or a thoughtful affection, is always the condition of the occurrence of value-things. There is no reason for assuming the factual incompatibility of thought and a motor-affective act; on the contrary, a motor-affective act that has no element of judgment in it is a purely animal act. Exclusive of integration with thought, such acts are events of appetitive assimilation accompanied, we may imagine, by pleasurable quality; events like the gorging of food, sexual conjugation, *etc.* Only when the act contains discriminating *meaning* does it constitute an act capable of being called taste, appreciation, or that sort of a motor-affective act which determines the existence of a value. There is nothing in the nature of a motor-affective act which prevents integration within it of reflective meaning;

¹ This Journal, Vol. XX, No. 5, pp. 128-36 (1922).

only when the two are incorporated together, only when the motor-affective act carries meanings due to prior valuations, do appreciation and a value exist. This conception does not imply that *all* judgments about values determine their occurrence. Judgments about an esthetic object – about an object which is primarily or usually esthetic, – are not necessarily esthetic; they may not be valuations. One may form judgments about the historic origin, technical construction, dimensions, *etc.*, of the Parthenon which do not differ in the least from judgments about a locomotive or a potato. But even such judgments may *become* evaluative; they may be factors in generating an object with enriched esthetic meaning. They then are integral constituents in a fuller appreciation.

II

We now come to the details of Mr. Prall's argument. Using type of instance suggested by me in a previous article, namely, such judgments as that it is worth while to study music to improve one's musical taste, he admits that such judgments may lead to the existence of values which would not otherwise exist for a person since he may thereby come to like different arrangements of sounds. But he goes on to say that "the making of the judgment will have been [a] but one step in a long causal sequence, at the end of which there will occur a value situation, a situation caused by the judgment no more than by the various activities of eyes, ears, and other organs, violins and bows... . There will occur at the end of all this [b] a situation in which I... contemplate with pleasure and satisfaction... the sounds of the music which fell on them [ears] before so unacceptably. And in the occurring of this relation the value of music occurs... . [c] So that the last stage in the process which is not judging, but is contemplating and liking, constitutes the value in a very different sense from that in which the value situation is constituted by the 'proximate' valuation judgment...that I had better listen to music or study music.... ." (*Op. cit.*, pp. 131–32.)

I may point out in passing that the articles of mine which Mr. Prall criticized were not concerned with the nature of value, either the quality or things having the quality, but with the nature of valuation as a judgment. And my point was that such judgments are "practical," that is, they concern cases where the value of things or acts is uncertain, indeterminate, and relate to an act to be performed as a condition of the existence of something with determinate value. It happens that Mr. Prall is interested in his writing in value, while my interest was logical – that is, was in a certain type of judgment. This difference of interest is accountable, I think, for some writing at cross-purposes on both sides,

and I am not sure yet how far Mr. Prall concedes my point as to valuation judgments. So I will pass over the matter of judgment and take the matter from Mr. Prall's side, the nature of a value.

In passage (a) Mr. Prall is dealing with the conditions of the *occurrence* of a situation having value, the causation of a value. Judgment is admitted in some cases at least to be one such causal condition.² In (b) values (things with valuity) are identified with a complex situation, namely, sounds contemplated with pleasure and liking. In (c) we are told that contemplation with liking "constitutes the value" in a very different sense from that in which judging constitutes it.

I do not believe that Mr. Prall would even appear to have reached this conclusion if it were not for the ambiguity between value as a quality of something and value as a metaphorical term for a thing with the quality. Three cases are possible. (1) Mr. Prall may mean that liking constitutes the quality as quality, not in any causal sense, but in the sense of being it. This meaning is, I take it, what his argument requires. But how liking can *be* the quality I do not understand, and until Mr. Prall expressly asserts that this is what he intends I shall not believe him to mean it. (2) "Constitutes" is an ambiguous term. It may signify either to be a constituent in a thing or to cause the thing to be. That liking is a factor in causing the thing to acquire value, a cause of the occurrence of the value-situation, I do not deny. It was part of the point of my article on value-judgment that judgment determines the existence of a value by determining a certain liking to exist which would not otherwise exist. But there is here no "very different" kind of constituting on the part of liking and judgment; there is precisely the same kind, liking being the nearer and judgment the more remote causal condition. (3) Mr. Prall may mean to assert that contemplation with liking is a constituent portion of the situation having value, that situation being complex, musical sounds being one constituent and contemplative liking another. Valuity, the quality, on this notion may be undefinable and simple, like any ultimate empirical quality, but the thing which possesses the undefinable is two things-in-relation, one the object the other the human attitude.

I have no objections to this third conception, any more than I have to the second. But unless Mr. Prall confuses either or both the second and third with the first, his conclusion does not seem to be established. For the fact that contemplative liking is an ingredient or constituent in the complex situation possessing value in no way precludes an act of

² Mr. Prall's statement that judgment is no more a causal condition than eyes and ears, violins, etc., hardly meets my point. According to my conception a certain use of eyes, ears, violin, etc., is the subject-matter of the valuation judgment; consequently, being the material of judgment, they can hardly be contrasted with it.

thought being also an ingredient or constituent factor; it may be included within the motor-affective act. Mr. Prall's own account suggests that it is so included. It is not mere liking that he relies on, like the liking of a pig for his swill; the motor affective attitude by description includes contemplation. And how there can be contemplation without thought I do not understand. The other factor in the complex is some recognized object, some *thing* contemplated and liked, such as sound. And a recognized, an identified and discriminated, object assuredly involves an act of thought.

A phrase employed in the quotation by Mr. Prall seems to make it the more likely that Mr. Prall has confused being a constituent part in a complex whole (value quality is not the other constituent it must be remembered; the other constituent is an object, like sound) with constituting the quality. He says that "in the occurring of this *relation* the value of music occurs" (*italics mine*). Of course, this may mean only the view just considered, that the situation *having* value is complex, consisting of related things. But, except upon the basis of the wholly undemonstrated position (and one inconceivable in point of fact) that contemplative liking excludes thought, this does not imply that thought is not also within the relationship. Somehow the passage intimates that since the quality occurs when the relation occurs, the quality is a relation to liking. But to identify qualities with relations seems meaningless; value is not one of the related terms of the complex situation; it is either the situation itself, if *a* value is meant, or it is a quality of a situation consisting of related things.

We pass on to another quotation. He goes on to say of the "values of my theory" that "in so far as they have any common elements or characteristics to justify grouping them under the term *value* at all, they can be shown to be constituted in the motor-affective *relation* which constitutes immediate *value*" (*op. cit.*, p. 132, *italics mine*). Here there can be no question of Mr. Prall's confusing different things. The following specific questions may be asked: (1) Does the plural "they" in the first clause signify the same thing as the following "value" in the singular? Or does "they" refer to what strictly are not values at all, but only certain objects (like sounds) having value-quality, while the singular value refers to the latter? (2) What does the final term "immediate value" refer to, value or *a* value? (3) And when he says that a motor-affective *relation* constitutes this immediate value, in what sense is he using the word "constitutes": in the sense (*a*) of being it, (*b*) of a causal condition of a thing's acquiring value-quality, or (*c*) in the sense of being one constituent in a complex? If Mr. Prall would be good enough to answer these questions, I am sure it will conduce to the clearing up of the issue.

A further passage reads: "A valuation judgment helps, as do a thousand other things and activities, to enstate the value, to bring me to the point, that is, of being able to do the actual valuing." Here the ambiguity is in a verb instead of in substantive form. "Valuing" as distinct from valuation is an unfortunate word. It suggests that we value values, and thus suggests that valuation is something radically different from judgment. Substitute for "actual valuing" some word like prizing, or appreciating, or contemplative liking, and it becomes clear that the question at issue is open, not even touched. For that question is whether appreciation enjoyed contemplation, or whatever term be used, does or does not include an element of reflective apprehension. The true contrast is not between appreciation and thought, but between mere appetitive liking that excludes thought and the kind of liking that includes a thoughtful factor; between an appreciation which embodies a minimum of thought and one which embodies the results of much thoughtful interest.

This fact throws light upon Mr. Prall's comment in a passage in which he says that he can not see that the study of judgments which help enstate a value situation is "particularly important for understanding values, or for learning to value justly." The study of judgments of valuation is, indeed, of no importance in understanding value as a *quality*. But neither is the study of anything else. As a quality it is ultimate, simple, and undefinable. But "values" in the plural means things having the quality: sounds, colors, friends, birds, flowers, *etc.*, *etc.* Now since the cultivation of judgment about these things is the means by which liking is transferred from some of them to others of them, it would seem to be a primary business of any theory of criticism, ethical or esthetic, to recognize this fact.

Mr. Prall insists upon the importance of the cultivation of taste; he speaks about learning "to value justly," where value clearly means not valuating, but liking, appreciating. This is, of course, an admission that we may like wrongly, and that some likings do *not* properly determine the existence of things with value. He says that values are "satisfactory or unsatisfactory according as a subject's faculties are acute or not, and his training in specific fields thorough." Just how by his theory a value can possibly be unsatisfactory – or not a value – I don't know. But all these sayings may be taken as an indication that Mr. Prall's subconsciousness works more truly than his theorizing. For all the statements testify to acknowledgment of a factor in determining what things have value other than a *bare* affecto-motor attitude. And what is this other factor operative in cultivation of taste, in making faculties acute and sensitive, likings just, and training thorough, save thought?

THE MEANING OF VALUE

John Dewey. "The Meaning of Value." *Journal of Philosophy* 22.5 (26 February 1925): 126–33. Reprinted from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, Later Works*, vol. 2 (1984), pp. 69–77.

I hope it is not altogether too late to continue the discussion concerning the nature of value in which Mr. Prall and myself have previously engaged. I shall confine myself to two points, one of a primarily logical nature, and the second and, doubtless, the more important, a question of fact. The first, however, is involved, not only because of prior discussions, but because some statement about it seems to be necessary to clear the ground for a consideration of the issue as to fact. The first point concerns the ambiguity in the term "value," it being both a concrete and an abstract noun, in the former case designating (although metaphorically) a thing having value-quality and in the latter sense designating an essence, an entity of the sort that the scholastics called *ens rationis*. The second point concerns the *de facto* relationship of thought to cases of the *occurrence* of value.

I

In my article I raised a question regarding the use of the term "value," although not the one just mentioned. I queried whether in certain passages Dr. Prall did not sometimes use the term to designate a thing having value, and sometimes to denote the quality. There was nothing original in drawing attention to the possible ambiguity; it is almost a commonplace of discussion concerning value, however difficult it may be to avoid falling into the equivocation. I can not complain of any lack of definiteness in the reply made by Dr. Prall. It turns out that by "value" and "values" he does not mean either of these things, but rather the quality taken as itself an entity or essence. "Value has only its abstract meaning – the meaning of an abstract noun, that is; and when I use the plural *values* I mean also the plural of the same abstract noun. One says color and colors, red and reds, redness and rednesses, beauty and beauties; and such terms are, of course, used very frequently to indicate things 'having' the qualities. But the plurals are just as

important and just as accurately used to indicate (a) a number of cases of the quality, or, if the term includes many qualities having this more general quality in common, to indicate (b) the quality in its various kinds (instead of number) of occurrences" (p. 119 [locate reference]). And again on the previous page. "So far as I know, I have always been careful to use *value* as the properly abstract noun that I take it to be." And on the same page it is expressly stated that value thus taken is a logical essence such as discourse might define. "Values in the strictest terms of discourse *are*; they have no existence, but they have being and reality, which is to say they are natures or characters or qualities – essences if we are to use the term of such metaphysical logicians as Plato and Leibniz and Spinoza and Mr. Santayana." And he endorses the position of Mr. Santayana that "nothing given exists"¹ so that, I take it, an existence having value represents an embodiment or actualization of what otherwise is eternal and a possibility.

I have no wish to raise difficulties captiously. But while I appreciate Mr. Prall's definite reply to my question, I am forced to believe that the reply complicates the question instead of simplifying it. I can understand, I hope, the theory of essences and universals as held by the school of metaphysicians to which Mr. Prall refers, and, irrespective of my own views as to the nature of essence, I respect consistent appeal to that doctrine. What I do not understand is Mr. Prall's appeal to it in view of his statements about the exclusive correlation of liking with value. For "liking," I take it, is used to indicate an existential event on the part of an existential creature. If this be so, it is logical to correlate liking with the coming into existence of value, the concrete embodying of eternal value-essence. But to say this is simply to take the position which I pointed out in my prior article [locate reference] and which Mr. Prall expressly repudiates in the article now under consideration: *viz.*, definition in the sense of stating how a quality comes to exist as a possession or acquisition of a thing. I had always supposed that this was the sense and the only sense in which Mr. Santayana defined value as connected with liking, since he expressly distinguishes between the causal occurrence of things possessed of value and the nature of value as essence. Nor do I see how any one who holds the theory of essence in the Platonic-Leibnizian sense can attach any meaning to the proposition that value as an essence is constituted by liking. This sort of statement is precisely the sort of statement, I had always supposed, that gives members of that school the horrors. The position of Moore and Russell

¹ It does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Prall that his acceptance of this dictum is incompatible with his definition of value as constituted by liking. The obverse of this point is considered below.

is surely the one that follows when one proclaims that he is dealing with value as essence. Mr. Santayana has sustained his particular position by making it clear that in connecting liking with value he is dealing with existence, not essence, that is to say, with causal or physical considerations.

Taking Mr. Prall literally, we have, I should say, a most curious reversal of positions. While he has accused me of over-rationalizing value, it is he who now makes value something wholly envisaged by reason. He has done so by treating abstract value as the only significant subject-matter of discussion, and by ruling out as irrelevant, or at least subordinate, the question of the causation of existences having value. And I am borne out in this conclusion by the fact that when Mr. Santayana deals with value as essence he insists that the theme and method are wholly dialectical – an explication or clarification of intent which brings one intent into systematic coherent relationship with other intents. Instead of defining value by liking as a feeling, he recognizes expressly that feeling is purely existential; he says “why any one values anything at all, or anything in particular, is a question of physic... .What ethics asks is not why a thing is called good, but whether it is good or not, whether it is right or not so to esteem it. Goodness, in this ideal sense, is not a matter of opinion, but of nature.” And he accuses the utilitarian school because of its neglect of this distinction of having substituted a “dubious psychology for Socratic dialectic.”²

II

I come now to the question of fact. I have held that the only thing which can be intelligibly discussed concerning value as such is the existential question – the question of how values come to be, *i.e.*, how things come to possess the quality of value. I have asserted that the theories which link value with liking, bias, interest, are in fact theories about how cases of value existentially occur. To this statement I have added another, namely, that only a liking, bias, interest, which includes thinking is an adequate causal condition of the presence of a thing having value. And to avoid misapprehension I explicitly state that this position does not imply that a dialectic of goods or values described by Mr. Santayana is either impossible or illegitimate. On the contrary, it is because the thing enstated as having value involves thought, that there is a character or general nature capable of development in thought, of comparison and synthesis. As Mr. Santayana points out, if liking were wholly a matter of feeling and not of intent or meaning embedded in feeling, there would be nothing to say.

² *Life of Reason*, Vol. 5, *Reason in Science*, p. 172; pp. 214–15; p. 256.

The discussion of the previous section regarding value as essence confirms my position. It is significant that in restating his position Mr. Prall says that he means an affecto-motor attitude constitutes value in the sense of *being it*, not of generating, and adds: "For since I was asserting that the motor-affective relation constitutes the value, and since I had been careful to explain – Mr. Dewey quotes the clause – that 'in the *occurrence* of this relation the value...*occurs*,' I felt at liberty to say that the relation constituted the value... . The relation means the situation, the constituted relation with the two terms present. Further this relation can not *occur* without the attitude of the subject" (p. 120 [locate reference], italics not in original). And in defining the issue between us as regards the presence or absence of thought he says: "For value to *occur* or to *arise*, and to arise in the occurrence itself, there must be an attitude." And, again, he says the question is "What does the *occurrence* of the value-quality consist in? What is the nature of what *happens*, if value is to *occur* in the happening?" (Both quotations from p. 121 [locate reference]; italics all mine.) And he says that definition here is in the empirical form of pointing. As one points to a color, so in order to define value one points to this kind of situation where this kind of relation exists between a subject's attitude and an object. "Value is thus constituted in tropisms" (p. 122 [locate reference]).

I shall not here press the point that he has shifted the ground from his prior statement that he was defining an essence, something abstract, and is now asserting that the only way to "define" value is to point to existential situations in which the quality is concretely found – a position with which as an empiricist I wholly agree. Nor will I here urge the point that he has now taken his stand on the third of the ambiguous conceptions which I pointed out in the article to which he is replying – namely, not that liking constitutes or *is* value, but that liking is an ingredient or constituent in any situation having value quality; or that there is a constant correlation between the existence of likings and of value-situations. This position I admitted then and re-assert now. I quote his passages to define the issue of fact which, as far as I can see, is the important difference between us. For they make it clear that the question can be stated in this way: In the situations having value-quality, is liking the sole and exclusive ingredient from the side of the subject, or is thought also involved? However value be defined in the abstract, or whether it be indefinable or not, this question raises a definite issue of fact.

Since Mr. Prall says he gets from what I have said an irresistible "suggestion that value is not the creation of irrational preference, but is somehow at bottom rational" (p. 124 [locate reference]), I state as explicitly as possible that I regard liking as an indispensable ingredient

or constituent in those situations which have value quality, but not as a *sufficient* ingredient or constituent. This position is, I hope, an intelligible one, even if it should turn out not to express the actual fact. It makes provision for the fundamentally irrational factor in situations having value, and makes no effort to explain that factor away or reduce it to something rational. (I might insert the remark that after having been the subject of so many animadversions on the alleged ground of my “irrationalism” and more specifically after having been treated with some contempt for giving such a large place to “interest” in education, I find it at least an amusing change to be charged with excessive rationalism.)

Differences as to matter of fact are not to be settled by argument; they are decided by competent observation, and I have no reason to suppose that my observation is more competent than that of Mr. Prall. But certain considerations may be presented which have a bearing on the kind of observations which need to be made. In the first place, when it is said that “thought” is involved in the attitude of the subject in the situation in which value occurs as a quality, the word “thought” requires definition – which I failed to give in my previous article. By thought I mean at least a *recognition of meaning*; and in meaning is implied reference beyond the present or immediate state, a reference to something ulterior or eventual: to something which, being outside the immediate state and yet implied in it, may be called, in the logical sense at least, “objective.”³

The distinction between thoughtful liking and blind, *merely* impulsive, “liking” is certainly a familiar and obvious one; it is not invented *ad hoc* by me for purposes of identifying value situations. Mr. Prall has, I am sure, a respect for the word of Mr. Santayana which he has not for mine. I shall quote, accordingly, a passage. “No existence is of moment to a man, not even his own, unless it touches his will and fulfils or thwarts his *intent*. Unless he is *concerned* that existence *should* be of *specific kinds*, unless he is interested *in form*, he can hardly be interested in being” (locate reference, 5, 167; italics mine). Since we are not disputing about words, I should be willing to let the case rest on this one

³ Mr. Prall, in the absence of any explicit statement on my part, was entitled to quote from me a definition of reflective thinking which includes problematic factors, doubt and search. While I hold that these elements are essential to the evaluating judgment which is, in some degree, a causal condition of the occurrence of the situation having value-quality, it is the resultant definitive meaning which characterizes the value situation itself, and which may be directly recognized or envisaged. In speaking of the attitude as one of “reflective apprehension” my use of the adjective “reflective” was unfortunate; in my own mind it was apprehension that was significant, and the adjective conveyed the idea stated in the next sentence: “embodying the results of much thoughtful interest.”

point: Does or does not Mr. Prall include in his conception of liking as a defining constituent in value-situations the element of *concern* for the *object* liked? If he does, I am willing to surrender the use of the word "thought," although I should be glad to have suggested some word to indicate recognition of meaning as such. In any event, it is this element of *concern for an object*, for a specific kind of object, which I do not find included in bare animal appetite and assimilation.

In the second place, it is clear that Mr. Prall does not mean by liking a mere state of feeling, but an active attitude, a motor and selective act which not merely is a difference in consciousness, but which makes a difference to external things. It is of the nature of a tropism. Now a blind bias or appetite makes a difference as much as one having meaning and intent. But in a significant or thoughtful liking, meaning expresses awareness of objective difference as making, or of the *force* of the selective bias in altering the otherwise existent. It is connected with the concern that existence be of a certain sort rather than of another. It hence deserves the name of interest, as a blind liking does not save metaphorically.

It is for this reason that the good is capable of judgment, of development and comparison and connection and systematization in thought. For while in many cases there is no thought beyond that of a narrow and nearby difference, there is nothing in the nature of the case to limit the scope of the meaning inherent in the object of interest, the differences it imports. Accordingly, and this is the third consideration, the conception that mere liking is adequate to constitute a value situation makes no provision for the education and cultivation of taste and renders criticism, whether esthetic, moral, or logical, arbitrary and absurd. The conception of thoughtful liking, on the other hand, makes refinement and criticism intrinsic outgrowths of a factor already contained in the value situation. When I find a writer who nominally holds the same conception as that advanced by Mr. Prall saying, "One topic of empirical importance is the education of discriminating appreciation, the attainment of progressive connoisseurship,"⁴ I can not help feeling that the author virtually includes in his conception of bias, liking, or interest precisely the thought phase I am concerned to point out, and omits to make his inclusion explicit only because his chief interest is in upholding the general theory of interest against theories of good which deny it. I am sorry that in his reply Mr. Prall did not go into this point and explain what he meant by just and unjust valuing and satisfactory and unsatisfactory values, and in general what he means by criticism,

⁴ Bush, "Value and Causality," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. 15, p. 91.

education, and cultivation in connection with such likings as exclude any element of thought and meaning. (See my original criticism, p. 621 [locate reference].) His only allusion to my pointing out that he admitted “unsatisfactory values” (which flatly contradicts that mere immediate liking constitutes a value) is to say that there are negative values, values of disliking. Of course there are; but this was not the issue. The point concerned his admission that there were unsatisfactory values in cases of *liking*, “according as the subject’s faculties are acute or not, and his training in specific fields thorough.” I do not refer to this for the sake of charging a personal contradiction; any one may fall into a temporary lapse of thought as well as of speech. I refer to it because it seems to be so obviously true and so highly important. And I do not see how its truth and importance are consistent with any theory of value except the thought-liking theory. Mere likings may differ in intensity; they may differ in quality; but by definition they can not differ as to constitution of values. Upon this doctrine a more “acute” liking may determine a more intense value, and more thorough training may constitute a *different* value. But this can not, on the liking theory, mean a difference as to valuableness of value; it can not imply improvement or cultivation or refinement or education in any eulogistic sense of these terms; it can not imply anything as to the desirableness of the change; or that one value is more “satisfactory” than another. It means only that one liking has replaced another and hence one value been substituted for another – as if a man had abandoned tea for coffee or coffee for Postum, for no cause at all except a bare change in immediate liking.

It is just because I hold, as I take Mr. Prall to hold, that educated interest or taste is, ultimately, supreme, the *unum necessarium*, in morals (where it is called conscience), in matters intellectual (where it is called insight), as well as in esthetics where it is more usually called taste, that the case for taste should not be weakened, and made easy of attack by non-empirical and non-humanist theories. It is the omission and denial of meaning and intent in that “liking” which constitutes good which give rise to the remote and transcendental type of theories of value – whether of the idealistic variety of Bosanquet, Münsterberg *et al.*, or of the realistic type of Moore and Russell. The empirical theories which rule out and deny the intelligible and objective factor of meaning are the chief bulwarks of “transcendental” rationalism. It is because I so thoroughly agree with what I take to be the ulterior spirit and aims of Mr. Prall that I would fain see an adequate basis for them provided.

PRAGMATIST AND IDEALIST ETHICS.

James Seth. "Pragmatist and Idealistic Ethics." *Philosophical Review* 32.2 (March 1923): 182–97.

A leading feature of Professor Dewey's two recently-published books, *Human Nature and Conduct* and *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, is the repudiation of "the classic tradition," "the ancient and medieval tradition," "the traditional philosophy," and even of the traditional and the conventional, as such. "For one man who thanks God that he is not as other men there are a thousand to offer thanks that they are as other men, sufficiently as others are to escape attention. Absence of social blame is the usual mark of goodness for it shows that evil has been avoided. Blame is most readily averted by being so much like everybody else that one passes unnoticed. Conventional morality is a drab morality, in which the only fatal thing is to be conspicuous. If there be flavour left in it, then some natural traits have somehow escaped being subdued. To be so good as to attract notice is to be priggish, too good for this world. The same psychology that brands the convicted criminal as forever a social outcast makes it the part of a gentleman not to obtrude virtues noticeably upon others."¹ In reality, however, if I may be allowed the homely proverb, Professor Dewey's bark is much worse than his bite. As we shall see, he does respect the traditional and the conventional, and would be the last to repudiate it, and if he is indeed averse to the medieval tradition, he is profoundly influenced by the ancient and classical. His real quarrel is with philosophical idealism, transcendentalism or rationalism. Even here it is rather the practical temper suggested by these terms than the philosophical theory which they describe against which his polemic is directed; but on its philosophical or theoretic side the former book is a plea for pragmatism, as against idealism – for naturalism, as against transcendentalism – in ethics.

Apart from any controversial issue, there is much in this book for which all students of ethics ought to thank the author. His account of

¹ *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 4, 5.

Habit, for example, recalls attention to the Aristotelian account of it as an acquired disposition or tendency to action, in Professor Dewey's words, "a certain ordering or systematisation of minor elements of action," rather than a mere tendency to repeat actions previously performed. "Repetition is in no sense the essence of habit... . The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to *ways* or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express a way of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It means will" (p. 42).

The individual, however, is not left to himself to form such habits or predispositions or to develop a will of his own. He is a creature of custom, as well as of habit, custom being, so far as the individual is concerned, "routine, unintelligent habit," or social as distinguished from individual habit. Thus "in conduct the acquired is the primitive" (p. 89). The individual does not start with an equipment of native instincts which find expression in conduct; his conduct from the first is the expression of social custom. The tendency of present psychology, according to Professor Dewey, is greatly to exaggerate the part played by instinct in the determination of human action. "After ignoring impulses for a long time in behalf of sensations, modern psychology now tends to start out with an inventory and description of instinctive activities. This is an undoubted improvement. But when it tries to explain complicated events in personal and social life by direct reference to these native powers, the explanation becomes hazy and forced. It is like saying the flea and the elephant, the lichen and the redwood, the timid hare and the ravening wolf...are alike products of natural selection. There may be a sense in which the statement is true: but till we know the specific environing conditions under which selection took place we really know nothing. And so we need to know about the social conditions which have educated original activities into definite and significant dispositions before we can discuss the psychological element in society. This is the true meaning of social psychology" (pp. 90, 91).

This emphasis upon custom or social habit, determined by social conditions, as the real starting point of individual development implies that emphasis upon the importance of social conditions and their improvement in the interests of a better morality which is the chief lesson of the book. The same point is insisted upon in another work which has recently appeared and which moves along the same general lines as those followed by Professor Dewey. In his *Study in Moral Problems* Mr. B. M. Laing says: "The real question of causation in action turns upon the conditions which bring about an impulse of a certain kind or a certain form of activity. The stimulus or cause of an

action is not to be sought in an instinct or impulse, but in the situation which calls forth or provokes a reaction" (p. 86). Psychology "ignores the objective or non-mental factor that is operative, and it interprets the whole process in mental terms." But "what effects organization is not mental forces like emotion, desire or sentiment... . The organizing factor is to be found in the objective situation that provides the various stimuli provoking various reactions"² (p. 94).

But, lest one good custom should corrupt the world, room must be left, Professor Dewey urges, for the "reconstruction of customs...in accord with some desire which...is felt to belong to one's self, to be the mark and possession of an individual in partial and temporary opposition to his environment." "For impulse, when it asserts itself deliberately against an existing custom, is the beginning of individuality in mind." But "the plasticity of the young presents a temptation to those having greater experience and hence greater power, which they rarely resist. It seems putty to be moulded according to current designs. That plasticity also means power to change prevailing custom is ignored. Docility is looked upon not as ability to learn whatever the world has to teach, but as subjection to those instructions of others which reflect *their* current habits. To be truly docile is to be eager to learn all the lessons of active, inquiring, expanding experience. The inert, stupid quality of current customs perverts learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way, into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and experiment. When we think of the docility of the young we first think of the stocks of information adults wish to impose and the ways of acting they want to reproduce. Then we think of the insolent coercions, the insinuating bribes, the pedagogic solemnities by which the freshness of youth can be faded and its vivid curiosities dulled. Education becomes the art of taking advantage of the helplessness of the young; the forming of habits becomes a guarantee for the maintenance of hedges of custom" (p. 64).

While there may be a certain amount of truth in this criticism of current educational practice and a certain justification for Professor Dewey's protest against the reign of the conventional in education, yet, as Dr. Drever says, "in our advocacy of freedom for the child we must not forget that the true freedom of the adult is inner freedom on the rational level, which may well be irretrievably lost and destroyed by well-meant but ill-directed attempts to give a freedom which, if education means anything at all, involves in the long run a negation of

² Cf. G. C. Field, "Faculty Psychology and Instinct Psychology," *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XXX, pp. 257 ff.

true freedom.”³ The child has to be educated for the proper use of freedom, has to be freed from the dominion of mere impulse. As Dr. Drever urges, education must be disciplinary; natural impulse must be repressed in order that it may be ‘sublimated.’ Professor Dewey himself indeed supplies this complement to his own account of education quoted above. “To view institutions as enemies of freedom, and all conventions as slaveries, is to deny the only means by which positive freedom in action can be secured. A general liberation of impulses may set things going when they have been stagnant, but if the released forces are on their way to anything, they do not know the way nor where they are going. Indeed, they are found to be mutually contradictory and hence destructive – destructive not only of the habits they wish to destroy, but of themselves, of their own efficacy. Convention and custom are necessary to carrying forward impulse to any happy conclusion. A romantic return to nature and a freedom sought within the individual without regard to the existing environment, finds its terminus in chaos... . Not convention, but stupid and rigid convention is the foe.” The truth is that “a convention can be re-organised and made mobile only by using some other custom for giving leverage to an impulse” (pp. 166, 167).

On the other hand, Professor Dewey rightly holds the spirit of stupid conservatism or conventionalism responsible for the rise of rebellion and revolution. “The rebel is the product of extreme fixation and unintelligent immobilities. Life is perpetuated only by renewal. If conditions do not permit renewal to take place continuously it will take place explosively. The cost of revolutions must be charged up to those who have taken for their aim arrest of custom instead of its readjustment” (p. 167).

While thus denouncing unsparingly the spirit of a stupid and selfish conservatism that resists all change in the *status quo* and, as the enemy of progress, is responsible for the revolutionary spirit evoked by its resistance, Professor Dewey insists, in language which Burke himself might have employed, upon the duty of loyalty to the established order in so far as it is well-founded and the condition of further progress. “Loyalty to whatever in the established environment makes a life of excellence possible is the beginning of all progress. The best we can accomplish for posterity is to transmit unimpaired and with some increment of meaning the environment that makes it possible to maintain the habits of decent and refined life” (p. 21). Yet the ‘radical’ note immediately recurs and makes itself the dominant note of his discourse. Individual impulse and

³ *Educational Psychology*, p. 64.

initiative are the indispensable conditions of moral progress, the all-important agents in the reconstruction of custom. But impulse is not a law unto itself. It is dependent upon intelligence for the needed guidance in its own re-organization into better customs and institutions, that is, customs and institutions better suited to the new environment or conditions. And the great difference between the older controls and the newer is that while the former are oligarchic, the latter must be truly democratic. The classes have in the past controlled the masses; the masses must now control themselves. "Control has been vested in an oligarchy. Indifference to regulation has grown in the gap which separates the ruled from the rulers. Parents, priests, chiefs, social censors have supplied aims, aims which were foreign to those upon whom they were imposed, to the young, laymen, ordinary folk; a few have given and administered rule, and the masses have in a passable fashion and with reluctance obeyed" (p. 2). The individual must now rely upon his own intelligence for guidance in the organization of his impulses and the re-organization of social custom. "The real opposition is not between reason and habit, but between routine, unintelligent habit, and intelligent habit or art" (p. 77).

All that is needed, however, is the exercise of that intelligence which is itself the result of experience or growing acquaintance with the conditions of action, not any special endowment of 'reason' or intuition. Professor Dewey's expressed aim is to substitute a naturalistic or realistic for a transcendental or idealistic scheme of morals. "Our problem is to see what objectivity signifies upon a naturalistic basis" (p. 52). Though he hardly mentions the doctrine of Pragmatism in this book, his theory is in reality one of Ethical Pragmatism. "Rationality of mind is not an original endowment but is the offspring of intercourse with objective adaptations and relations" (p. 77). Rational thought is thought that has working value; the mind acquires rationality as it learns to adapt its ideas to the changing 'situation.' The characteristic of intelligence is its docility; its school is experience. In ethics, as in metaphysics, the doctrine of pragmatism is, as James described it, one of "radical empiricism." "The so-called intuitionist theories of moral knowledge concentrate in themselves all the ideas which are subject to criticism in these pages: Namely, the assertion that morality is distinct in origin, working and destiny from the natural structure and career of human nature" (p. 188). Otherwise expressed, the issue lies between a subjective and an objective interpretation of morality. "Purely subjective morals arise when the incidents of the temporary (though recurrent) crisis of re-organization are taken as complete and final in themselves. A self having habits and attitudes formed with the coöperation of objects runs ahead of immediately surrounding objects to effect a new equi-

bration. Subjective morals substitute a self always set over against objects and generating its ideals independently of objects, and in permanent, not transitory, opposition to them. Achievement, any achievement, is to it a negligible second best, a cheap and poor substitute for ideals that live only in the mind, a compromise with actuality made from physical necessity not from moral reasons. In truth, there is but a temporal episode. For a time, a self, a person, carries in his own habits against the forces of the immediate environment, a good which the existing environment denies. For this self moving temporarily, in isolation from objective conditions, between a good, a completeness, that has been and one that it is hoped to restore in some new form, subjective theories have substituted an erring soul wandering hopelessly between a *Paradise Lost* in the dim past and a *Paradise to be Regained* in a dim future" (pp. 54, 55).

Mr. Laing's view of the function of Reason in the moral life is essentially the same. His view of "the good," he claims, "removes the problem of value from an inner subjective sphere to the objective world; and it is thus opposed to any view that finds value in reason, in will, or in desire (as a subjective process). Mind in all its phases is a mere blank and is unintelligible unless it is considered in relation to the medium within which it displays itself; and for that reason it would be hopeless to treat morality on the basis of a reason or will which prescribes rules and ends of conduct, or on the basis of a mental phenomenon like desire, apart from its relation to conditions beyond itself. Reason does no doubt play a part in moral action, but the part hitherto assigned it remains mysterious. Instead of its rôle being that of a legislative and prescriptive agent, uttering its oracular precepts and carrying out its task in a divinely mystic manner, its function is that of discovering the tendencies of things with which human beings have to contend and of formulating rules of action on the basis of the conditions of human life. Its rules and precepts are not evolved from its own pure abstract essence but from a material with which human beings are confronted" (pp. 202, 203).

So far as such arguments are directed against an abstract idealism which disregards the actual conditions of the realisation of the ideal, they ought to be welcomed by the ethical idealist. He should be the first to repudiate a merely abstract view and should have no difficulty in incorporating such a 'realism' in his own conception of the moral ideal. All that is contended by these writers has, indeed, been anticipated by such representative ethical idealists as T. H. Green and Dr. Bosanquet. It is taken into full account by Green in his view of the gradual discovery, through moral experience, of the detailed content of the moral ideal. Reason alone, according to that view, could give only the form of the

ideal; the content comes from experience. And in his *Psychology of the Moral Self*, published in 1897, Dr. Bosanquet anticipates the very language of Professor Dewey. In the chapter on "Reasonable action" (ix) we find the following statements: – "If we take as the end something very abstract, such as goodness, perfection, or happiness, then its concrete realisation is really made what it is by the means we adopt to it. If, *e.g.*, you say your object is to be good and live a good life, then I ask what you mean by a good life; and the concrete way of living which you point out as a means to good life in your sense really qualifies the whole thing, and is the first distinct statement which gives me a definite idea of what you mean by good life" (p. 101). "The abstract idea of 'reasonable,' then, really indicates that there must be a concrete purpose to which the term moral reasonableness, strictly speaking, applies" (p. 106). "The discrepancy in your ideal from reality depends for justification on your right understanding of the given fact as it is. It is a mistake, therefore, to say that the ideal is confined to the future. Just as Natural Science has to do with what happened in the past or at any time, so a right moral ideal has to do with giving true value to elements in the past or present" (p. 108). If, therefore, we ask "how the object of the will can be said to have the characteristic of rationality," the answer is that "as with other organisms, it lies in its capability of evading discord, of receiving new experience without creating discord" (p. 109). "There is one kind of moral judgment of which the predicate is a positive idea of a course of action, and the subject is 'What I ought to do.' Here we have a real perception or inference. It is concrete, it applies to the circumstances of the moment, and it is constructive; that is, it depends on successfully understanding how what is actually *given* may be made to conform to its idea. To suppose that the moral choice is always between two ready-made courses is a great mistake; we are like scientific men with new facts before them, and our duty is to be equal to the situation. *This* judgment is essential to morality and is the very process of morality" (p. 111).

It would be difficult, if at all possible, to find an instance of the pernicious 'idealism' which Professor Dewey is so fond of describing and denouncing in any version of ethical idealism of the philosophical type either of the present or of the past. It is not a vagary of ethical theory, unless possibly of Plato (or more probably of Socrates) in certain moods, but of practical Christianity in its more mystical manifestations. "Idealistic revolt is blind and like every blind reaction sweeps us away. The quality of the ideal is exalted till it is something beyond all possibility of definite plan and execution. Its sublimity renders it inaccessibly remote. An ideal becomes a synonym for whatever is inspiring – and impossible. Then, since intelligence cannot be wholly suppressed, the

ideal is hardened by thought into some high, far-away object. It is so elevated and so distant that it does not belong to this world or to experience... . The ideal is then a goal of final exhaustive, comprehensive perfection which can be defined only by complete contrast with the actual... . It is supposed that the thought of the ideal is necessary to arouse dissatisfaction with the present and to arouse effort to change it. But in reality the ideal is itself the product of discontent with conditions. Instead however of serving to organise and direct effort, it operates as a compensatory dream. It becomes another ready-made world... . It is a refuge, an asylum from effort" (pp. 259–261). An alternative description of the same spirit of abstract idealism is what Professor Dewey calls "the doctrine of fixed ends" which, he says, "not only diverts attention from examination of consequences and the intelligent creation of purpose, but, since means and ends are two ways of regarding the same actuality, also renders men careless in their inspection of existing conditions... . The result is failure. Discouragement follows, assuaged perhaps by the thought that in any case the end is too ideal, too noble and remote, to be capable of realization" (p. 233). His conclusion is one with which all philosophical idealists will entirely agree. "Idealism' must indeed come first – the imagination of some better state generated by desire. But unless ideals are to be dreams and idealism a synonym for romanticism and phantasy-building, there must be a most realistic study of actual conditions and of the mode or law of natural events, in order to give the imagined or ideal object definite form and solid substance – to give it, in short, practicality and constitute it a working end" (p. 236).

But Professor Dewey is not content with a restatement of ethical idealism on such realistic lines. He dissents entirely from the idealistic theory, and desires to substitute for it a naturalistic account of moral values. As we have seen, he applies his general pragmatism to ethics and denies to reason any positive function in moral judgment. Morality is not merely conditioned by the circumstances; the circumstances determine or constitute the morality of the action. Its moral value is entirely relative, and changes with the changing conditions. Good and evil might be expressed in Spencer's terms, adaptation and non-adaptation to the environment. But if we use the terms, 'conditions' and 'situation,' rather than the biological term 'environment,' it is obvious that the problem of conduct is, How are we to use the conditions or to meet the situation; in the interest of what ends are we to utilise the means at our disposal? What things, we must ask, have intrinsic, and what have only extrinsic value? In his *Reconstruction in Philosophy* Professor Dewey himself states the distinction between what he calls a materialistic interpretation of morality and one which stops short of such a conclusion. "To profess to have an aim and then neglect the

means of its execution is self-delusion of the most dangerous sort. Education and morals will begin to find themselves on the same road of advance that, say, chemical industry and medicine have found for themselves when they too learn fully the lesson of wholehearted and unremitting attention to means and conditions – that is, to what mankind so long despised as material and mechanical. When we take means for ends we indeed fall into moral materialism. But when we take ends without regard to means we degenerate into sentimentalism” (p. 73). “The mechanisation of nature is the condition of a practical and progressive idealism in action” (p. 72).

The condemnation of moral idealism, in *Human Nature and Conduct*, is the logical result of its author’s general Pragmatism. Mr. Laing, though he stresses the importance of the conditions as much as Professor Dewey, is no pragmatist, and therefore has no difficulty in recognising the distinction to which we have called attention. “It is possible,” he says, “to maintain that moral qualities depend on conditions without thereby implying that moral qualities are natural factors. As mind need not be identified with its conditions, so morality must not be identified with its conditions. It is not necessary to fall into Spencer’s error, when he thought he had given a scientific treatment of human conduct by reducing it to terms of four sciences – physics, biology, psychology, sociology. Factors belonging to each of these sciences may be implicated in human action; but what is still necessary is to bring them into relation with the unique character of morality... . When, therefore, it is said that morality rests on conditions, what is meant is that the quality of goodness or badness attaching to an action, an activity, or an attitude of human beings, is dependent on the conditions which call forth the reaction on the part of human beings. It is not meant that the conditions make the quality of goodness or badness. The action of an individual is a new phenomenon that arises when certain conditions are present” (pp. 174, 175). The conditions alone can never discover to us moral values or the distinction between good and evil. All that they can do is to dictate to the individual the selection of certain elements of good, or of certain goods, as alone possible of realisation; they direct his choice by marking out the limits of possibility or practicability so far as he is concerned. They define his duty in the endeavour after good; and “from the obligation to employ those factors which in any situation will effect the greatest possible good, there issues the obligation to devote one’s self to increasing human knowledge and human control over the conditions of life, so that an absolute good may be achieved.”

Without such knowledge of moral values to direct his reactions to the conditions, the individual will be unable to utilise these conditions in the service of good, and even less able to improve them so as to make them

better means to ends that he judges to be worth attaining. The same conditions determine the possibility alike of good and of evil, and afford us no guidance in the discrimination of good or desirable from evil or undesirable results of action. Professor Dewey himself admits the necessity of ideals; he only insists that they must lie near enough to the actual to be capable of realisation: they must be concrete and relative, not abstract and absolute ideals. But it is the first step that costs; it is the possibility of this distinction between the ideal and the actual, of dissatisfaction with the actual, of criticism of it, that has to be accounted for and that can be accounted for only by reference to judgments of value, which again are impossible without some standard or standards of value. Mr. Laing so far agrees with Professor Dewey as to deny any absolute unitary Good, but he finds it necessary to postulate a number of absolute goods which in their totality would constitute the Good. This question of the unity or plurality of ethical good is, however, irrelevant to the question before us. That question is whether it is or is not necessary to affirm moral values other than the results of the conditions – moral values which, so far from being constituted by the conditions, enable man to direct his reactions to these conditions in the unique light which they supply. The capability of such moral valuations is surely to be reckoned among “the facts of human nature” to which Professor Dewey makes his appeal; they are among the facts of human nature which not even Hume found it possible to deny.

The inevitability of such an appeal to an ultimate standard of moral value forces itself upon Professor Dewey himself in his careful and illuminating account of deliberation. “There is seen to be but one issue involved in all reflection upon conduct: The rectifying of present troubles, the harmonizing of present incompatibilities by projecting a course of action which gathers into itself the meaning of them all. The recognition of the true psychology also reveals to us the nature of good or satisfaction. Good consists in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly release in action” (p. 210). The good consists, as Utilitarianism has contended, in satisfaction or happiness, but Utilitarianism has mined the distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ good or satisfaction. Its failure is due to its reduction of all moral alternatives to quantitative terms. “The utilitarian theory demands that...the two alternatives still be of the same kind, alike in quality, that their only difference be a quantitative one, of plus or minus in pleasure. This assumption that all desires and dispositions, all habits and impulses, are the same in quality is equivalent to the assertion that no real or significant conflict among them is possible; and hence there is no need of discovering an object and an activity which

will bring them into unity” (pp. 215, 216). But it is only with the discovery of such a unifying object or activity that the meaning of the moral alternative is appreciated. “Deliberation is not an attempt to do away with this opposition of quality by reducing it to one of amount. It is an attempt to *uncover* the conflict in its full scope and bearing. What we want to find out is what difference each impulse and habit imports, to reveal qualitative incompatibilities by detecting the different courses to which they commit us, the different dispositions they form and foster, the different situations into which they plunge us. In short, the thing actually at stake in any serious deliberation is not a difference of quantity, but what kind of person one is to become, what sort of self is in the making, what kind of a world is making” (pp. 216, 217). What really occurs in our minor as well as in our major choices is what becomes clear in the latter, namely, “a choice of careers which are incompatible with one another, within each of which definite inclusions and rejections are involved. With the difference in career belongs a difference in the constitution of the self, of habits of thought and feeling as well as of outward action” (p. 217).

The implied distinction between ends and means, or between intrinsic and extrinsic goods, is clearly stated in the following passage: – “A radical distinction thus exists between deliberation where the only question is whether to invest money in this bond or that stock, and deliberation where the primary decision is as to the *kind* of activity which is to be engaged in. Definite quantitative calculation is possible in the former case because a decision as to kind or direction of action does not have to be made. It has been decided already, whether by persistence of habit, or prior deliberation, that the man is to be an investor. The significant thing in decisions proper, the course of action, the kind of a self simply, doesn’t enter in; it isn’t in question. To reduce all cases of judgment of action to this simplified and comparatively unimportant case of calculation of quantities, is to miss the whole point of deliberation” (pp. 217, 218).

The crux of the whole question is the unexplained fact of the presence and operation, at the heart of the moral life, of ideals or final ends apart from which our judgments of moral value are themselves inexplicable. The only possible explanation of these ideals is to be found in the organisation of native instincts into definite impulses or desires and habits through the response of the self to the conditions of action. Professor Dewey would find the whole explanation of human action in the external conditions, physical and social, rather than in human nature itself. In this sense he can hardly be said to live up to the title of his work, “Human Nature and Conduct.” The polemical interest of the book is indicated in the sub-title, “An Introduction to Social

Psychology," as explained in the preface. "The book does not purport to be a treatment of social psychology. But it seriously sets forth a belief that an understanding of habit and of different types of habit is the key to social psychology, while the operation of impulse and intelligence gives the key to individualised mental activity. But they are secondary to habit so that mind can be understood in the concrete only as a system of beliefs, desires and purposes which are formed in the interaction of biological aptitudes with a social environment." The view against which the argument is directed is that of the "instinct psychology" of such writers as McDougall and Shand and the psycho-analysts. As against their interpretation of human nature as reducible to a number of separate and more or less fixed instincts Professor Dewey maintains the indefinite plasticity of human nature, which makes it like putty in the hands of the circumstances that play upon it. Just as the natural sciences have been forced to abandon the belief in "special forces," since "it turned out that these 'forces' were only the phenomena over again translated from a specific and concrete form (in which they were at least actual) into a generalised form in which they were verbal," so must psychology abandon the notion of separate psychic forces or impulses. "When we recognise the diversity of native activities and the varied ways in which they are modified through interactions with one another in response to different conditions, we are able to understand moral phenomena otherwise baffling" (pp. 149, 156). But, as Mr. Field has remarked in a review of Professor Dewey's book,⁴ "it is certainly going far beyond what the observable facts warrant to talk as if there was no limit to the plasticity of human impulse or as if human conduct was indefinitely variable by the influence of the 'social context.' It is surely just the task of Social Psychology to try to find what the limits of possible variation are." It is certainly going too far to represent human nature as simply the product of its external conditions. As Mr. Field says, in dealing with any "moral phenomenon" "we must look for its cause, no doubt, in the first place in the peculiar institutions and circumstances...but we must also consider what there is in man's mental make-up which makes these particular institutions possible and responds in this way to those particular circumstances."

On the other hand the importance of the external, and more especially the social conditions, is not to be questioned or minimised. The writers whose views we have discussed in this paper have done well to recall attention to the part played in the moral life by what Aristotle called 'external goods'; and it is an improvement upon Aristotle's terminology to call these factors 'conditions' rather than 'goods,' though they were

⁴ *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XXXII, pp. 79 ff.

for Aristotle also rather conditions than goods, as he indicated by calling them merely 'external' goods. That the good is not unconditioned but always relative to the conditions of individual action, and that the individual's attainment of it is similarly conditioned, is undeniable. But both Professor Dewey and Mr. Laing have emphasised the importance of the external conditions at the expense of the internal, and Professor Dewey, ignoring the reaction of the self, has confused the conditions with the causes of moral action. The improvement of the external conditions is, as both writers insist, an indispensable factor in moral advance; but the improvement of the individual character is at least a not less important factor. We must always remember that, important as they are, the conditions are only conditions, not causes, of moral progress, and that without the reaction of the self the most favourable conditions, social as well as physical, are of no avail.

SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE MORAL SCIENCES

G. H. Mead. "Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences." *International Journal of Ethics* 33.3 (April 1923): 229–47.

It had become a commonplace of the psychologist that there is a structure in our experience which runs out beyond what we ordinarily term our consciousness; that this structure of idea determines to a degree not generally recognized the very manner of our perception as well as that of our thinking, and yet that the structure itself is generally not in the focus of our attention and passes unnoticed in our thought and perceiving. It was this dependence of our field of direct experience upon such an unrecognized part of what we call mind that Freud has made the theme of his doctrines, in a realm that lies on the border of the abnormal or just over it. It is one of the valuable by-products of the Freudian psychology that it has brought many people to recognize that we do not only our thinking but also our perceiving with minds that have already an organized structure which determines in no small degree what the world of our immediate and reflective experience shall be. It is possible to recognize other censors beside those dramatically placed by Freud at the door of so-called consciousness to pass upon the figures that enter our dreams.

It is to one of these that I wish to call attention. It is that the intelligible order of the world implies a determined moral order – and for a moral order we may substitute a social order, for morality has to do with the relations of intelligent beings with each other – and that this determined moral or social order is a world as it should be and will be. We may express this as Kant expressed it as a world in which happiness will be proportioned to worth, or as the Utilitarians expressed it by saying that it will be one in which there will be realized the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or we may give it more concreteness by looking to a New Jerusalem that religious doctrine pictures, or we may find it in a perfect Absolute of which we and our finite universe are but imperfect and inadequate parts and expressions. Whatever the

conception of this moral order, definite or vague, it always has implied that the process of the universe in which we live in a real sense is akin to and favorable to the most admirable order in human society.

The most definite form which this belief or faith has taken in the western world is that of the plan of salvation as presented in Christian doctrine. The import of this doctrine was that whatever further purposes a divine providence might have in the conduct of the universe, man's moral regeneration and the growth of a society which this made possible was an end which was always involved in the physical world which was man's habitat. This was most succinctly expressed by St. Augustine, and passed into the form which is perhaps most familiar to us in Milton's "Paradise Lost" and "Paradise Regained." The sharpness of outline of the Plan has faded with the entirely new heavens and new earth which natural science, since the time of Galileo, has unfolded before men's eyes and minds, but the idea that the universe is in some way geared to the intelligence and excellence of our social and moral order has not disappeared from the back of men's minds. Scientists such as Huxley have pointed out the incongruities that lie between this conception and the findings of a physical science, that sees in the whole life of the human race but an inconsiderable moment on an inconsiderable speck within the physical universe, that finds in a civilized moral society an aberration from a biological nature that is red in tooth and claw, and subject to a ruthless law of the survival of the fittest. And yet men, even in moods which were not emotional nor mystical, have rarely regarded their habitat as hostile or indifferent to what was best in their social life and structure.

However, it is very evident that the aspect of this kinship between human society and its secular habitat which belongs to our present scientific age is and must be profoundly different from that of St. Augustine, or St. Thomas Aquinas, or Luther, or Milton. In no one respect is this perhaps more evident than in our attitude toward the evils which the catastrophes of nature, disease and physical suffering entail upon us.

The view that the ordering of the world was primarily for the greater glory of God in the salvation of man, made of every event that affected men a direct action of providence with reference to the members of the human race, and there could be but one intelligent as well as but one pious attitude over against the action of providence, that of acceptance with thanksgiving or with resignation. Suffering and evil came as discipline.

It is hardly necessary to rehearse the steps in the development of the insistent curiosity of recent science, which has refused to accept any given order of nature as final, or to believe that seemingly inevitable

events may not conceivably become quite different if we only comprehend what the manner of their happening is, or to forego the hope that human ingenuity may avert misfortunes if we can only understand their causes and conditions.

Here are two quite fundamentally opposed attitudes toward the kinship of the intelligence of men and the order of the world they live in. It is customary to call the one teleological and the other mechanical, to call the one spiritual and the other materialistic. The first attitude takes it pretty definitely for granted that we know what is right and what is wrong, that in certain definite respects we know what the social order should be; that the intelligent man in his moral conduct, and this is social conduct, starts off with certain truths given in his nature or by revelation, and shows his intelligence by shaping his action to these truths; that the path of righteousness is one that he who runs may read and a man though a fool need not err therein. If the moral order, of which these truths are an essential part, is given, then the kinship of men's intelligence to the order of the physical universe will show itself in the triumph of this moral or social order, and men can themselves start off with this order as a presupposition in their conduct in the world. The end is given in advance, this is the meaning of teleology, and if we are confident that the universe is so constituted as to achieve this end, we will be intelligent in acting on this assumption.

We have seen that Huxley quite frankly denies, in the name of science, any justification for this faith. He saw nothing in nature that was akin to the social or moral order. In fact he regarded what he called altruistic conduct as an abandonment of the road along which nature was going. This view of Huxley arose in part out of an interpretation of biological evolution that is seen to be inadequate. Kropotkin could point out that social organization, with just that sort of conduct which Huxley called altruistic, is as legitimately to be considered an outcome of an evolutionary process as is the survival of the fittest individual in the struggle for existence. But Huxley's position is of interest because it so ingenuously assumes that a moral order must be an order which is given in advance, while our knowledge of nature is all drawn from what has happened. In our acquaintance with nature we can never assume a determining idea that fixes the result before it happens, as is the case when our ideas determine what the results of our conduct will be. So we speak of nature as mechanical or materialistic. This is just where the break seems to come between what we consider men's intelligence in moral and social conduct, and in men's understanding of nature. We can still believe, of course, that in the end the process of the universe will further ideals of a morally ordered society, and probably most men who are conversant with the findings of science and committed to its

methods of research, still in the back of their minds carry this faith, or attitude of mind, but this attitude can be of no service in understanding objects about us in the everyday life of the scientifically minded. It is reserved for religious moods, when we try to bring together what are in their logic incompatible.

Let us state this incompatibility in its simplest form. In our moral conduct we control our actions inconsiderable degree, *i.e.*, in proportion as we are intelligent, by our purposes, by the ideas of results not yet attained, that is, our conduct is teleological. In our comprehension of nature the result is controlled entirely by antecedent causes, that is nature proceeds mechanically, and there seems to be no kinship between such a nature and the intelligence of men seeking for a better social order.

I have no intention of broaching the metaphysical problem of the relation of a mind that is spiritual and a nature that is material. The question that I want to ask is this: Can the world of natural science provide objects for the world of social and moral conduct?

If we drop back two or three centuries, whether we measure them historically or in present attitudes of mind, we find a view of the physical world which furnished the objects that purposive social and moral conduct demanded. In the first place the physical cosmos as a whole appeared simply as the stage on which the plans of a divine providence were being enacted. In the second place the separate objects with which men's conduct was engaged found their meaning in this providential plan and led to conduct which this plan for human society demanded. Men's attitudes toward disease, toward events which in present legal phraseology are denominated "acts of God," were those of supplication and resignation. In general those things which engaged human personal interest most acutely and which still had to be regarded from the standpoint of the community to which men belonged could always be conceived of as existing to fulfil the destinies of men in human society. In essence these physical things and occurrences were identical with their import for the success or failure of men's undertakings. They were as physical things and occurrences just what they meant for human conduct. To-day a disease is the history of a bacillus, an earthquake is a shift in surface strata due to gravitational forces, while the incredible vastness of the spread of matter and its inconceivable temporal stretches in comparison with the inconsequential minuteness of humanity and its momentary duration rob the physical universe of any seeming relevancy to the fortunes of our race.

This is the more striking because the period within which this shift of cosmical values has taken place is that within which physical things and their forces have become subservient to men's purposes, to an extent

that would have been beyond the imaginal stretch of the medieval or ancient world. The physical universe which by its enormity has crushed the human insect into disappearing insignificance has like a jinn in the Arabian tale shown itself infinitely complaisant in magnifying man's mechanical capacity. In accepting his negligible crevice in the physical whole man has found access to the minute structure of things and by this route has reached both the storehouse and powerhouse of nature. The heraldic device of man's conquering intelligence should be a design blending differential x , the bacillus, and the electron. If humanity has fled shivering from the starry spaces, it has become minutely at home in the interstices of the speck that it inhabits for an instant.

But if we have succeeded in applying science to our mechanical task, and in this have accomplished prodigies, we do not seem to have succeeded in applying scientific method to the formulation of our ends and purposes. Consider the Great War. The ideas that plunged Europe and then dragged the rest of the world into that catastrophe, the imperialisms, national, militaristic and economic, are roughly identical with those that embroiled Christendom in the seventeenth century. It was only the weapons that crashed through those four years that belonged to the intellect of the twentieth century. There attaches to it the grotesquerie of a Yankee at the Court of King Arthur. Or consider the government of a cosmopolitan city, or of a great nation. There is at the disposal of the community for the carrying out of its policies the apparatus of a hundred sciences, but to secure the bare formulation of a policy we are forced to involve ourselves in the factional interests of parties that are Psychologically closely parallel to the turbulent politics of an ancient or a medieval commonwealth. We are enormously clever at fashioning our means, but we are still in no small measure dependent for conceiving our ends upon outworn mental structures that our very science has invalidated.

But it would be a mistake to assume that scientific method is applicable only in the fashioning and selection of means, and may not be used where the problem involves conflicting social ends or values. The advance of scientific medicine in dealing with public health amply substantiates this.

In this advance numerous social values embodied or championed by various institutions, government, the church, the school and the family, have sought to maintain themselves against scientific procedure in combating disease and safeguarding health. Individual rights, religious dogmas and cults, family control of children, the economic advantage of cheap child labor for business, and many other accepted social values have been set up as absolute, across the path of progress of scientific public health conservation. But the demonstrated results of the hospital,

vaccination, quarantine, and other means of medical service to the health of the community have forced men to bring these values into the field of other public goods and restate them so that public health could be the better preserved.

I imagine that the scientific advance of medicine presents as enlightening an illustration as could be found of the issue that seems to exist between scientific method and our conduct in social and moral affairs. The human community did not wait for a medical science to convince it that health is a community good. Combating disease by its medicine men has been one of the chief common concerns even in primitive societies whose technique was entirely magical. We do not turn to scientific method to determine what is a common good, though we have learned to avail ourselves of it in some of our common efforts and practices in pursuit of the good. However, scientific method is not an agent foreign to the mind, that may be called in and dismissed at will. It is an integral part of human intelligence, and when it has once been set at work it can only be dismissed by dismissing the intelligence itself. Unfortunately men have committed this sin against their intelligence again and again. They have incontinently rejected the very method which human intelligence has learned to employ because its results came in conflict with other social goods which they were unwilling to either sacrifice or restate. But again and again when they have undertaken to use their minds thereafter, they have found that their minds had become committed to the method they had rejected. The past history of and the present struggle with venereal disease illustrate this, chapter for chapter. Scientific method does not undertake to say what the good is, but when it has been employed, it is uncompromising in its demand that that good is no less a good because the scientific pursuit of it brings us within the taboos of institutions that we have regarded as inviolable. Nor does scientific method assert that the family and the church are not goods because its pursuit of public health has trenched upon conceptions of them which men have held to be practically absolute. What scientific method does require, if it is to be consistently used, is that all the conflicting ends, the institutions and their hitherto inviolable values, be brought together and so restated and reconstructed that intelligent conduct may be possible, with reference to *all* of them. Scientific method requires this because it is nothing but a highly developed form of impartial intelligence.

Here, then, is the issue, so far as an issue exists, between scientific method and social and moral conduct. If the community is seeking an end by the intelligent method of science and in doing this runs counter to its habits in attaining and maintaining other ends, these ends are just as subject to restatement and reconstruction as are the means

themselves. Nor does science pretend to say what this restatement or reconstruction must be. Its one insistent demand is that all the ends, all the valuable objects, institutions, and practices which are involved, must be taken into account. In other words, its attitude toward conflicting ends is the same as its attitude toward conflicting facts and theories in the field of research. It does not state what hypothesis must be adopted. It does insist that any acceptable hypothesis must take into account all the facts involved.

Now such a method can be in conflict with social conduct only if that conduct sets up certain ends, institutions and their values, which are to be considered as inviolable in the form in which they have been received and are now accepted. There is no issue between scientific method and moral and social conduct that springs from the fact that science deals with the relation of past facts to each other while conduct deals with future ends.

Science does not attempt to formulate the end which social and moral conduct ought to pursue, any more than it pretends to announce what hypothesis will be found by the research scientist to solve his problem. It only insists that the object of our conduct must take into account and do justice to all of the values that prove to be involved in the enterprise, just as it insists that every fact involved in the research problem must be taken into account in an acceptable hypothesis. Scientific method is at war with dogmatism whether it appears in doctrine, or cult, or in social practice. Scientific method is not teleological in the sense of setting up a final cause that should determine our action, but it is as categorical in insisting upon our considering all factors in problems of conduct, as it is in demanding the recognition of all of the data that constitute the research problem.

Scientific method does not insure the satisfactory solution of the problem of conduct, any more than it insures the construction of an adequate hypothesis for the research problem. It is restricted to formulating rigorously the conditions for the solution. And here appears a profound difference between the two situations, that of moral and social conduct, and that of so-called scientific research. In problems of conduct we must act, however inadequate our plan of action may be. The research problem may be left because of our inability to find a satisfactory hypothesis. Furthermore, there are many values involved in our problems of social conduct to which we feel that we are unable to do justice in their whole import, and yet when they are once envisaged they appear too precious to be ignored, so that in our action we do homage to them. We do not do justice to them. They constitute our ideals. They abide in our conduct as prophecies of the day in which we can do them the justice they claim. They take on the form of institutions that

presuppose situations which we admit are not realized, but which *demand* realization.

Such an ideal is democracy written into our governmental institutions. It implies asocial situation so highly organized that the import of a protective tariff, a minimum wage, or of a League of Nations, to all individuals in the community may be sufficiently evident to the mall, to permit the formation of an intelligent public sentiment that will in the end pass decisively upon the issue before the country. This is what democratic government means, for the issue does not actually exist as such, until the members of the community realize something of what it means to them individually and collectively. There cannot be self government until there can be an intelligent will expressed in the community, growing out of the intelligent attitudes of the individuals and groups in whose experience the community exists. Our institutions are in so far democratic that when a public sentiment is definitely formed and expressed it is authoritative. But an authoritative public sentiment upon a public issue is very infrequent. My guess is that the number of instances of that in the history of the United States of America could be told upon the fingers of two hands, perhaps upon the fingers of one hand. In the meantime, as the then President Taft assured us on an historic occasion, we are governed by minorities, and the relatively intelligent minorities are swayed by the import of the issue to these minorities.

However, we are unwilling to surrender the ideal of such a government, if only for the sake of the exceptional occasions upon which it is realized, but more profoundly because we cherish the hope that the form of the institution in some way helps toward the realization of what it promises. The most grandiose of these community ideals is that which lies behind the structure of what was called Christendom, and found its historic expression in the Sermon on the Mount, in the parable of the Good Samaritan, and in the Golden Rule. These affirm that the interests of all men are so identical, that the man who acts in the interest of his neighbors will act in his own interest. Actually the history of Christendom has been a history of war and strife, and we are forced to admit that in these wars dynastic, national, and civil has arisen the intensive consciousness of the larger communities. It was the horror of the Great War that aroused, perhaps for the first time in the human race, a public sentiment passing all national bounds and demanding some organization that could express this sentiment and avert a still more terrible horror. The history of Christianity is the history of men's refusal to surrender this ideal.

To indicate in what concrete ways, psychological, social, and technological, the presence of these ideals in men's minds may have directly or

indirectly favored their realization lies beyond the scope of this paper. What must be indicated is that they have only been kept in men's minds by institutions set up for this specific purpose. An institution should arise and be kept alive by its own function, but in so far as it does not function, the ideal of it can be kept alive only by some cult, whose aim is not the functioning of the institution, but the continued presence of the idea of it in the minds of those that cherish it.

The church is the outstanding illustration of such an institution. Its most important function has been the preservation in the minds of the community of the faith in a social order which did not exist. At the other end of the scale may be placed certain economic institutions, notably that of exchange. The economic man may be an abstraction, but he certainly exists and functions, and we need no cult to keep alive the faith in the functioning of money, though there is hardly an agency that has had more profound effects in bringing all men into association with each other. Between these lie our various institutions. We feel from time to time the necessity of arousing in our souls an emotional appreciation of the value of the family, of democracy, of the common school, of the university, because in their actual operation they do not express that value adequately.

The psychological technique of maintaining such a cult is the presentation by the imagination of asocial situation free from the obstacles which forbid the institution being what it should be, and we organize social occasions which in every way favor such a frame of mind. We gather together in a place of worship, where we meet on the single common basis of all being worshippers of one God, or gather at a Thanksgiving, where all the differences and indifferences of family life are ignored, or we turn with affectionate regard to the Little Red School House where all the children were found studying the same books and immersed in the same common school life. Now the emotional and intellectual attitude of these occasions is essentially different from that of any common undertaking to make the institution more effective, to reform it. The attitude implied in the cult of an institution is frankly hostile toward that which seeks its reform. The mental attitude attending a cult is always conservative, and if we are undertaking its reform we consider it reactionary. The emotional attitude in the cult of an institution flows from the very obstacles that defeat its proper functioning. We may become profoundly interested in the reform of an institution for better service, but if we wish to appraise it emotionally we envisage the wrongs, the vice, the ignorance, the selfishness, which the ideal of the institution condemns, and which frustrate its operation.

Now it is just these factors in social and moral conduct which render the application of scientific method, in that field, so profoundly different

from its application in the field of the natural sciences. The formula is simple enough. Your conduct must take into account all of the values which are involved in the social or moral problem. But how are we to define these values? They ought to be defined by the conflict out of which the problem has arisen. In many cases they are sufficiently defined to enable us to act intelligently. If it is a question of visiting distant friends we find out how valuable it is to us, by the sacrifice of other things for which we wish to spend the money which the journey would cost. When we have counted up the cost, we may conclude that it isn't worth what we should have to forego. Of course the mere surrender of the contemplated visit is not the whole result. We have found out how much we want it, and have probably prepared to bring it about under more favorable conditions. For purposes of conduct, values define themselves definitely enough when they are brought into conflict with each other. So facts define themselves in scientific problems. The facts in the problem of the prevention of arteriosclerosis are the observations which indicate that none of the causes that have been supposed to conduce to it do actually account for it. The facts in the hunt for a pneumonia serum are that none of those constructed after the fashion of other successful sera give the desired immunity. The facts are determined by conflict.

But see how different the situation becomes when the problem is not the prevention of a disease, but the prevention of crime. If the problem were simply the determination of the values involved in terms of loss to the victims and to the community, over against the effort and expense involved in catching and punishing the criminal, the problem would not be a difficult one. No civilized community has ever hesitated to take these steps in view of the danger which the existence of crime entails. The difficulties arise over the methods of so-called criminal justice. It is supposed to prevent crime, but it does not prevent it. At least it does not prevent it as vaccination prevents smallpox epidemics. It has some preventive effect. It is a palliative. But we cannot simply surrender criminal justice as inefficient, to use some other method, nor even to reform it simply from the standpoint of rendering it more efficient. For criminal justice has a cult value. We cherish the attitude of public reprobation of crime, or rather let us say of public vengeance upon the criminal, because of the emotional sanction it gives to a community ordered by a common law. We overlook the fact that we cannot keep up this emotional attitude without branding the criminal as an outcast, without in some sense preserving a criminal class or caste, and we are quite unwilling to estimate the value of this branding simply in terms of its preventive power. It has an absolute value too precious to be surrendered. If our social problem were simply that of prevention, we should

have a standard by which we could fairly measure the values involved. We could never treat leprosy scientifically if we retained the older attitude of regarding the leper as unclean. The relatively recent history of the scientific treatment of the mentally diseased is one of passing out of a cult attitude toward the insane. Or consider nationalism. We cannot simply set about the elimination of war by methods which history has amply justified, because of the cult value of patriotism. The time-honored and simplest method of arousing the emotional consciousness of national unity is presentation of the common enemy. It is confessedly most difficult if not impossible to arouse this emotional consciousness out of the common life within the community itself. And at times patriotism seems to have an almost infinite value. The cult values are incommensurable.

And yet these problems are not only real problems, they are insistent problems, and as I have before observed, we cannot defer action with reference to them, although these and most of the other social and moral problems are shot through with these incommensurable cult values. Nor can we take the attitude of the superior person, and affect the pose of one whose higher intelligence has raised himself above these incommensurables. They and what they represent are the most precious part of social heritage. But it is not their incommensurability that constitute their value, nor should we hesitate to abandon the cult estimate of these institutions if their values can be stated in terms of their functions. The cult value of the institution is legitimate only when the social order for which it stands is hopelessly ideal. In so far as it approaches realization, its functional value must supersede its ideal value in our conduct.

It is to this task that a scientifically trained intelligence must insistently devote itself, that of stating, just as far as possible, our institutions, our social habits and customs, in terms of what they are to do, in terms of their functions. There are no absolute values. There are only values which, on account of incomplete social organization, we cannot as yet estimate, and in face of these the first enterprise should be to complete the organization if only in thought so that some rough sort of estimate in terms of the other values involved becomes conceivable. And there is only one field within which the estimation can be made, and that is within the actual problem. The field within which we can advance our theory of states is that of the effort to avert war. The advance in our doctrine of criminal justice will be found in the undertaking of intelligent crime prevention. The problems of social theory must be research problems. It is to one group of these problems which I wish particularly to refer. These are the problems of practical politics in the nation and especially in our municipalities.

I have already called attention to the chasm that separates the theory and practice of our democracy. The theory calls for the development of an intelligent public sentiment upon the issues before the community. In practice we depend not upon these to bring the voters to polls, but upon the spirit of party politics. The interest in the issues is so slight that any machine in a great city, that can insure by party organization and patronage a relatively small group of partisans who will always vote with the machine, can continue its hold on the city government for a considerable period no matter how corrupt its administration may be. It is perhaps this situation that leads us to overestimate the somewhat rough and clumsy method of registering public sentiment which the ballot box affords in a democracy. And in our heated efforts to reform corrupt administrations we accept the shibboleths of the professional politician that the essence of democracy is in voting on one side or the other. We attach a cult value to these somewhat crude methods of keeping a government of some sort going. The real hope of democracy, of course, lies in making the issues so immediate and practical that they can appear in the minds of the voter as his own problem. The wide spread of the manager instead of the manger or feed box form of city government is perhaps the most heartening sign of the times that this is beginning to take place. It does not seem to be an impossible task to get the average voter to see that the bulk of the administration of his municipality consists in carrying on a set of operations of vital importance to himself in an efficient businesslike fashion, that the question of public ownership of public utilities is simply a phase of this efficient administration, and that it is perfectly possible for a community to get such an efficient administration. The advance in the practice and theory of democracy depends upon the successful translation of questions of public policy into the immediate problems of the citizens. It is the intensive growth of social interrelations and intercommunications that alone renders possible the recognition by the individual of the import for his social life of the corporate activity of the whole community. The task of intelligence is to use this growing consciousness of interdependence to formulate the problems of all, in terms of the problem of every one. In so far as this can be accomplished cult values will pass over into functional values.

Finally I wish to recur to the dictum to which I referred at the opening of this paper: That the intelligible order of the world implies a moral or social order, *i.e.*, a world as it should be and may be. What form does this take if we apply scientific method to social conduct?

We have seen that the earliest formulation of it by Christian theology was that the intelligence of the creator and ruler of the world must show itself in bringing about in this world or the next the perfect society

which man's moral and social nature implied and that our intelligence consists in accepting the inspired statement of this order. Scientific method has no vision, given in the mount, of a perfected order of society, but it does carry with it the assumption that the intelligence which exhibits itself in the solution of problems in natural science is of the same character as that which we apply or should apply in dealing with our social and moral problems; that the intelligible order of the world is akin to its moral and social order because it is the same intelligence which enters into and controls the physical order and which deals with the problems of human society. Not only is man as an animal and as an inquirer into nature at home in the world, but the society of men is equally a part of the order of the universe. What is called for in the perfection of this society is the same intelligence which he uses in becoming more completely apart of his physical environment and so controlling that environment. It is this frank acceptance of human society as a part of the natural order that scientific method demands when it is applied to the solution of social problems, and with it comes the demand, that just as far as possible we substitute functional values for cult values in formulating and undertaking to solve our social problems.

The difference in the pictures of the universe presented by these two attitudes is striking enough. The one contemplates a physical world in which man and the society of men are but pilgrims and strangers, seeking an abiding city not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. The goal toward which all creation moves was to be attained through the individual members of the human community becoming good, *i.e.*, living by certain absolute and incommensurable values housed and hallowed by social institutions. This morality or social *dressur* calls for only so much intelligence as is required to recognize these institutions and the claims which their ideals make upon us. Anyone can be good, though but a few can be clever. There is hardly any kinship between this attitude and the age-long struggle of the human community to make itself intelligently at home in the physical habitat in which it finds itself. Man has domesticated the animals now these many centuries. He is but slowly advancing with painful effort in the domestication of the germ, though it is at present much more essential to community life.

The scientific attitude contemplates our physical habitat as primarily the environment of man who is the first cousin once removed of the arboreal anthropoid ape, but it views it as being transformed first through unreflective intelligence and then by reflective intelligence into the environment of a human society, the latest species to appear on the earth. This human society, made up of social individuals that are selves, has been intermittently and slowly digging itself in, burrowing into

matter to get to the immediate environment of our cellular structure, and contracting distances and collapsing times to acquire the environment that a self-conscious society of men needs for its distinctive conduct. It is a great secular adventure, that has reached some measure of success, but is still far from accomplishment. The important character of this adventure is that society gets ahead, not by fastening its vision upon a clearly outlined distant goal, but by bringing about the immediate adjustment of itself to its surroundings, which the immediate problem demands. It is the only way in which it can proceed, for with every adjustment the environment has changed, and the society and its individuals have changed in like degree. By its own struggles with its insistent difficulties, the human mind is constantly emerging from one chrysalis after another into constantly new worlds which it could not possibly pre-see. But there is a heartening feature of this social or moral intelligence. It is entirely the same as the intelligence evidenced in the whole upward struggle of life on the earth, with this difference, that the human social animal has acquired a mind, and can bring to bear upon the problem his own past experiences and that of others, and can test the solution that arises in his conduct. He does not know what the solution will be, but he does know the method of the solution. We, none of us, know where we are going, but we do know that we are on the way.

The order of the universe that we live in *is* the moral order. It has become the moral order by becoming the self-conscious method of the members of a human society. We are not pilgrims and strangers. We are at home in our own world, but it is not ours by inheritance but by conquest. The world that comes to us from the past possesses and controls us. We possess and control the world that we discover and invent. And this is the world of the moral order. It is a splendid adventure if we can rise to it.

RECENT ETHICS IN ITS BROADER RELATIONS

James H. Tufts. "Recent Ethics in Its Broader Relations." *University of California Publications in Philosophy* 12.2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930), pp. 181–201.

By recent ethics, I shall understand for the most part ethical theory since the great war. Yet of course the war made no complete break. And one phase of ethical study which is important not simply for itself but for its bearing upon other lines of theory, came to a sudden flowering in 1906–1908. The field known variously as Evolutionary, or Genetic, or Comparative Ethics, was opened half a century ago by Darwin, Spencer, Maine, and Robertson Smith in Great Britain, Wundt and Nietzsche in Germany, Guyau in France, L. H. Morgan in America. But a new epoch, resulting from more thorough anthropological studies, was opened early in this century by Hobhouse, Westermarck, Sumner, and Levy-Brühl. Disregarded by some as belonging to Anthropology or Sociology rather than to Ethics, this study of the facts of the moral life has not only set problems for the older traditions of theory, but is, I am convinced, fundamental for understanding two of the great world issues of our day. These issues are, broadly, the international tensions between nations, and the domestic tensions between native and foreign groups and cultures, between classes, racial groups, and occupational groups. Both these threats to peace are rooted in conditions which were already in existence before the war brought them to open and acute recognition. The international situation grows from loyalties to kinship, tribal, and national groups, stretching back untold centuries and millenniums, reenforced by intoxications of glory and economic welfare; by traditions, language, art, and struggles for liberty or power. Such loyalties divide as truly as they unite. Over against the aloofness or hostility between group and group, there were the teaching of the religion nominally professed by all the warring peoples, and the steady advance in means of communication, in intellectual sympathies, in commercial

and industrial interdependence. National, racial, cultural, separative forces, were opposed to religious, scientific, and economic unifying ties. The shock of arms left the issue undecided. It has only been adjourned from the wage of battle to the arena of political and religious discussion, and to the processes of science and invention. The need for constructive ideas has never been more exigent. On the one side, men may cite the *dulce et decorum pro patria* of art and literature, and the sincere feeling of millions that a supreme cause claims devotion and, if need be, sacrifice of life for something greater. On the other, stand alike the gospel of love to all men, the "treat Humanity as end" of Kant, and the "every man to count as one" of Bentham.

To regard wars as due chiefly to an instinct of pugnacity is silly. To suppose that peace will come by a demonstration that war does not pay, is fatuous. To abolish all nationalism and patriotism, if this were practicable, in the interest of peace, is to empty the baby with the bath. To attempt it within the near future is to invite antagonisms that are likely to postpone the formation of a peaceful world order strong enough to protect liberty and justice. To retreat from the ideal of brotherhood and a community of mankind is to abandon the road built by inventive skill and lighted by religious hope. The path to peace lies rather in such sympathetic understanding of humanity as views it, not as two billions of detached individuals, standardized units like the parts of a modern automobile, but as persons bound together by ties into families, kindred, cultures, races, and nations. A humanity all cut from one fabric, according to a single pattern, Nordic or Mediterranean, Western or Oriental, would be a poor exchange for the rich variety of cultures and ideals which have emerged in various lands and peoples. To continue in divisive pride of nationalism is the easy way. It is another easy way – on paper – for the philosopher to abolish patriotism, race differences, and cultural traditions. The more difficult path is to secure a peaceful cooperation which can recognize and respect differences. A whole with parts is less simple than one without parts. Yet nature has solved the problem for one level in plant and animal life. Is it too much for man to attempt the synthesis in the sphere of human society? The scholar or statesman who would contribute to a better state of affairs must know the facts of human nature as disclosed in comparative study, and act with these in view.

French and German writers especially have been moved by the tragic conflicts and bitter experiences of recent years to rethink the relations of state to state, and of state to individual. The school of Durkheim inherited from the master a conception of society as the collective end, the source of all values and all ideals. It is now giving larger place to science as method and to justice as end. We need a better science of the

moral world to distinguish what is grounded on the nature of the social and what is abnormal. The group, Bouglé holds, does not present its own life as supreme end; it is only a means. Justice, or regard for personal autonomy, is supreme end.

In Germany¹ the traditions of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel form a background for deeper analyses of freedom, of the function of the nation, of the basis of law, of the relation between the legal conception of force and the moral conception of right, of the political-economic principles of socialism and the moral principles of Christianity. Stammler, Binder, Brünstad, Bauch, Görland, and many others have been active in reflection upon these problems.

In England, Hobhouse attacked the metaphysical theory of the state. In America, McDougall has presented nationalistic ethics in sharp collision with universal ethics. Dewey has discussed the peculiarly pressing task for a democratic society, namely, how can human association in such days as ours become in reality the Great Community which had been the theme of Josiah Royce in his later years.

Group morality is no less to be reckoned with in meeting domestic issues. Rivalries, jealousies, and hatreds between class and class, white and color, group and group, are the ever present threat to democracy. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, see violence between industrial groups with the impartiality of government in danger of submergence beneath the passion of class. Chicago, Mississippi, California see color groups in deadly riots. The North charges the South with nullification of the Fifteenth if not of the Fourteenth Amendment; the South retorts, you do not understand. In Europe, Russia shows what a dictatorship of the proletariat may mean to other groups, economic or religious. In Italy, a nationalist group is repressing what we regard as liberty. In India and China, native cultures are arrayed against the West.

Democracy to Thomas Jefferson was a simple problem. Given a nation of farmers of common race, language, and tradition, in a fairly homogeneous area of land and climate, liberty and equality seemed close at hand. Today when in a single city of the United States more than forty languages are spoken; when instead of the independent owners – farmers, the majority of our people work for some one else, usually for some impersonal corporation; when instead of dwelling either as neighbors in the village or as less close neighbors on farms, the majority live in cities, in districts classified almost as rigidly by economic status into residential and workingman's areas as a Southern community is divided between the white and the colored – when we are confronted by

¹ Bruno Bauch, "The Development of Ethical Problems," in *Philosophy Today*, edited by E. L. Schaub (Chicago, 1928).

such conditions we need just such an education for studying and understanding our complex democracy as the lessons of comparative ethics.

The results of such study of group relations have bearings also upon certain classic theories which were framed in abstract terms. For example, it justifies and even compels a revised interpretation of Kant's noble imperative. For the humanity which that enjoins us to treat as end, is not justly to be considered in defiance of facts as embodied in isolated individual units, or, in the language of metaphysics, in terms independent of relations. Humanity breaks up, when looked at concretely, into group units. Life and person get definition through the intimate ties of common speech, common job, common scale of living, common recreation. With these supports the individual may hope for self-respect and a measure of justice in the courts and in economic and political relations; without them he is weak not merely before the established social order, but in his own self-consciousness. And if he no longer answers to Kant's postulate, that man necessarily conceives his own existence as an end in itself, it is difficult for any one else so to treat him effectively. For however great your good will, what you can actually achieve in human relations depends on the response of the other party scarcely, if at all, less than upon your own attitude.

A more general bearing of comparative ethics upon classical theory is its seeming menace to standards. Standards have supposedly been set by reason, or by moral sense, or by an estimate of consequences. In any case they claim a certainty and validity. The reasonable man, it is held, will recognize the authority of what is right. The morally sensitive will shrink from the indecent and unbecoming. The scientifically and practically minded will look to consequences, and fix his conduct by what is useful. But if "the *mores* can make anything right," what becomes of all three claims for validity? Mores vary with time and place, with social class and economic status. They notoriously are often irrational, inconsistent, dependent upon whim or chance, upon habit and mass pressure of our group. Why should any intelligent being feel bound by right and duty if this is their true source? The onslaught of Marxism upon *bourgeois* morality, and Nietzsche's denunciation of the *Sklavenmoral* of Judaism and Christianity seem to find a general setting in the relativity of all mores.

If now we ask what is today the most potent factor in shaping the course of mores for the future we find answer, "the machine." Our present confusion of standards, it is said,² is due to our attempt to carry on with the mores of feudalism and the dead hand, whereas we live in the age of the machine. The labors of past ages, of idealists, rationalists,

² E.g., C. E. Ayres, *Holier than Thou*.

and utilitarians, to find the standards of right and good and hold them up to guide their fellow-mortals are vain for our age. We must wait to see what mores the machine will bring about when it has had its way and done its perfect work. Thinking and talking make no difference in the process; efforts at reform change nothing; the machine is steadily making our habits of acting and thinking; it is bound to prevail.

Yet the "discovery" of the mores is but one factor in a general trend of thought and action. In the war, loyalty to the state outweighed all other motives and claims. Reenforced by religious appeals, by love of country, by the thought of serving a great cause, millions of young men in the warring nations made the supreme sacrifice of life or health. Millions more accepted the issue and faced the miseries of the long conflict. Millions of women showed the same readiness of response to a supreme duty. As my village neighbor put it, who had seen her three sons enlist, "When it comes to us, we have to do our part." Business enterprises, ordinarily conducted with an eye single to profits, now learned to think in terms of producing for the public need. We ate in obedience to the suggestion of the food administrator. We enacted the Eighteenth Amendment.

But in the years since 1918 the general temper seems to have changed well-nigh completely. Impatience of authority, whether of God and church, of law and convention, of monarchy or democracy, of economic system, with its Babbitts, rotary clubs, and middle-class ideals, of patterns in literary forms, of metaphysical absolutes, is manifest not only in the public press but in action. The recrudescence of fundamentalism in theology, the repression in many of our states of the liberty of speech and action to which we had supposed America committed by its history, are in the nature of fear-reactions called out by the drive toward freedom in various guises or disguises.

For undoubtedly in religion and politics, the two great spheres of organized authority, many lines of influence have converged to lessen the hold of dogma and sovereignty.

The system of doctrine which had endured almost intact from the time of Augustine has in our day lost its power over large numbers of people. And this has perhaps been due less to negative argument than to the machine, the automobile, the golf course, the movie, and the sense of unreality which now attaches to an unseen order patterned after the empire of the Caesars.

Political authority and the majesty of the law has suffered from many an attack. The influence of the conception of Marx that government is by a class and for a class has not been limited to Russia or even to the socialist party. The extension of governmental control has irritated certain classes, especially those engaged in large business enterprises

who have coined the slogan "Less government in business." Some, who as property owners would indignantly repudiate the Marxian doctrine that government by a class of property owners has no rightful authority over others, yet as opposers of prohibition take a similar position, namely, that the amendment was enacted by fanatics and therefore has no authority over the non-fanatical. But the most serious blow to political authority in general was doubtless the revelation of the folly which brought on the war. Disillusionment has followed as to the reliability of public opinion to which democracy has appealed. For this has been shown to be swayed and subtly influenced by skilful propaganda, whether for military purposes, or for the control of political action by some group or class. The Russian revolutionary express did not stop as the allied powers desired, at the way station, democracy, but went past to the terminal of class rule and communism.

In religion, politics, and the institution of property, authority has undoubtedly been weakened.

From the exclamations of delighted surprise with which some have discovered that the present era is one of revolt, one might suppose that authority had held unchallenged sway prior to the great war. This has not been the view of former observers. "Authority in our day is sadly broken down," said Dr. Samuel Johnson. "No man has the authority his father had except the jailer." The student knows how many chapters in the story of liberty had already been written in blood. In comparison with these, our present revolts, except that in Russia, seem mild diversions rather than times that try men's souls. It seldom costs martyrdom today to disavow God and church, to flout inconvenient laws or social conventions. Indeed it is done with gusto. But Socrates drank hemlock; Saint Paul and multitudes of others suffered imprisonment; Bruno and Servetus were burned; thousands hazarded lives, fortunes, and friendships in struggles for religious, political, and civil liberty.

Past uprisings against religious or governmental rules have been reflected in ethical systems. Seldom has any moralist rested his case upon authority. The ground for reverence and justice is that only through these can men live together in cities, said one of the earliest radicals. Socrates is challenged by his young friends to examine justice by itself, leaving out of the argument not only the gods but also prestige and reputation. Self-preservation is the basis of all government and natural law, proclaimed Hobbes, when King and Parliament contended for supremacy. The leading appeals of his opponents – bishops, deists, and free-thinkers alike – were to reason, to the fitness of things, to feeling and conscience, not to God or State.

Even Kant did not, as might be inferred from some of his critics,

invent duty or the moral law. He was but putting into moral equivalents the thesis of Rousseau. Man gains a better liberty by exchanging the natural liberty of the savage for the civil liberty of a social order in which each citizen is a sharer in sovereignty as well as a subject of the general will. So in the moral world man finds freedom by emancipation from his physical nature with its appetites and selfish desires; and by recognition of a kingdom of ends, of a community of rational beings, each sovereign as well as subject, each to be treated as end and not as means only, and free in a high sense because they are themselves as rational beings, authors of the universal laws which are binding on all. We may grant to the critic that to regard all human inclinations as selfish and evil is a survival of the theological dogma of original sin, and to locate all the universalizing of the moral life in reason, to the exclusion of sympathy, is a radical error. But viewing Kant as an interpreter of his age I find far more to honor than to carp at. To be impatient because he still thought in terms of duty instead of banishing entirely the conception of 'ought,' is to blame the eighteenth century because it was not the twentieth; it is to blame Locke, Rousseau, and Jefferson for seeking to justify government rather than to deny it any rightful authority.

And yet when we meet the Utilitarian movement we breathe a new atmosphere. The American and French revolutions had done the task of political reconstruction. England and America found something else claiming their attention. Invention gave new power and new tools to industry and commerce. The middle class in England, based on the newly available sources of economic power, came forward to dispute the claims of landowning aristocracy. In America, this same class spread over the continent except for those areas where cotton was king. The economic order replaced the political and religious as the dominant power. Goods instead of duty became the natural focus of interest. Such reassertion of political supremacy as our civil war or the nationalistic conflicts of Europe, served but to accent by contrast the peaceful pursuit of goods – health, wealth, comfort, education – which were threatened with destruction.

The ethical interpretation of this shift was utilitarianism. The theological branch of Paley, long taught in college, stressed everlasting happiness; the social and legal-reform branch of Bentham and the Mills stressed the pleasures of this life. Paley to be sure introduced "the revealed will of God," but only as something to be reckoned with as a guide to happiness. Bentham's immediate objective was to banish privilege, surviving from it entrenched position in law, but instead of justifying government by Rousseau's principle of the will of the people,

he tested it by its results for happiness. Instead of a self with reason as rightful sovereign giving laws to a rebellious set of appetites and desires he proclaimed boldly, "it is for pleasure and pain to determine what we ought to do." Reason comes in when we calculate what pleasure is greatest or what means will procure it. Duty was by Paley resolved into its psychological causes: We say that a man is obliged "when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another." The main thing was the shift from duties to goods. Right and wrong are not only measured by consequences; they *mean* that which leads to good or bad consequences. Whether goods were to be measured solely by quantity of pleasure, or by quality as well, was incidental to the method of looking to goods rather than to authority. Indeed it may well be that the very crudity of Bentham's "pushpin is as good as poetry," served to make its popular appeal all the greater. It seemed to offer a broad highway to happiness, on which every driver could set his own speed, park where he would, and find no traffic police.

The idealists opposed with vigor the definition of the good as pleasure, but not by appeal to authority. The good is still the central conception, and is defined as that which satisfied the self; moral good as that in which a moral being can find rest.

If then we ask why the present temper should so register in public discussion and private conduct, the answer is that this time it is not a revolt against the authority of church and state, nor is it even Russia's assault upon property, or the rejection of democracy by Russia and Italy. These are in another part of the world. With us it is rather a threat to the mores of sex and family relations, which are far more intimate and affect particularly the young of both sexes at the period when youth is always restive at the restraints imposed by age. Sex and family have in all cultures been controlled by rigorous customs and taboos. Family life of the past was reenforced by property interests and joint occupation. The home had been the center of economic, social, and religious activity. With the changes brought in by a machine age, the spread of education, the economic independence of many women, the general trend toward equality between the sexes, and the Freudian doctrine of the danger of repressing impulse, the mores for sex and family which had scarcely been touched by earlier movements toward religious and civil liberty have suddenly entered the focus of attention.

It is no longer a question of easier or more difficult divorce. "Modern culture," says Professor Groves, "has reached the point where it no longer tolerates the restrictions that are taken as a matter of course in primitive marriage and family experience. Now it is demanded of both marriage and the family that they accept the testing of the pleasure

standards which in our time are commonly used as a means of measurement for allsorts of social activities.”³

The claim, as voiced by Bertrand Russell,⁴ is that “in the absence of children sexual relations are a purely private matter.” “The importance attached to adultery is quite irrational.”

If sex satisfaction can be had without incurring the responsibilities of marriage, why not? Men have always been able to follow their inclinations in this respect without encountering insurmountable obstacles. Women have been restrained not only by social convention but by inner inhibition. The philosophy of self-expression is now invoked to dissolve this restraint. Its application is no longer limited to one sex.

This attitude indicates a revolt which goes deeper than liberty from external restraint. It demands liberty from inner restraints likewise. If it should prevail, it would affect life more intimately than political liberty or the Russian abolition of the seven-day week. It would go deeper than the bolshevist revolution against property.

And yet if we are to be fair to our age we cannot overlook one trait which is seemingly in glaring contradiction to its alleged impatience of authority. For there is today a greater eagerness for expert, competent guidance than the world has ever known. The man on the street, the student in the laboratory, the physician in the hospital, respect the word of science as final. The war reenforced the training spread broadcast by the automobile. The avidity with which housewives and mothers have accepted scientific conclusions and brought up their infants according to the authority of doctors and nurses is a notable proof that the kind of authority rejected is the external authority of a power, or tradition, or precedent. We are eager to learn from those who know.

And yet we are uncertain how far science is a competent authority. It gives eagerly accepted directions for engineering and use of natural forces, for hygiene and medicine, for efficiency in government, and for enjoying our radio. Can it be relied upon for guidance when we are deciding between war and peace, between common good and individual advantage, between the values of liberty and the values of order?

Such is the mixed temper which ethical theory must recognize if it will give aid to an age distrustful of unseen worlds, disillusioned as to the wisdom or disinterestedness of government, sure of the concrete goods and resources poured into its lap by science and economic organization, persuaded of the right of liberty and full expression of thought and impulse. What is the attitude of ethical theory?

³ Groves and Ogburn, *America Marriage and Family Relationships*, 26 (1928).

⁴ Bertrand Russell, *What I Believe*.

The principal theories of the period face this problem under various names, but it is central for all. It would be impossible within the limits of this paper to do justice to the many thinkers who have contributed to the definition of the problem. I must select somewhat arbitrarily, representatives of several positions, and first, a theory which seems to jump entirely with the radical opinion of the day in banishing the conception of duty and making our actual desires supreme.

"All moral rules," writes Mr. Russell, "must be tested by examining, whether they tend to realize ends that we desire." "I say," he continues, "ends that we desire, not ends that we ought to desire. What we 'ought' to desire is merely what some one else wishes us to desire – parents, schoolteachers, policemen, and judges. Outside human desires there is no moral standard."

This certainly sounds as though Callicles and Thrasymachus had returned to defend the cause of moral anarchy. And this is strengthened by a definition of right as a "means to an end widely desired." But while a majority may doubtless enact its desires into statutes, men have reserved as for a higher appeal the question whether the statute and the desires behind it are right. And certainly Mr. Russell in his opposition to war has not felt the desires of the majority to be a rule for him to follow. A good life for him consists of "love guided by knowledge" and the reason for holding this to be good is that "In a community where men live in this way, more desires will be satisfied than in one where there is less love and less knowledge." From this attempt at a quantitative standard we might suppose every desire to count as one, but a little later he speaks of winning freedom" when men have acquired the same dominance over their own passions that they already have over the physical forces of the external world." We conclude then that it is only certain kinds of desires that we are to be permitted to register and vote – above all, those which are first of all desirous of a society in which the greatest number of desires can be satisfied, as contrasted with a society in which my own private desires may all be satisfied. It is difficult to see how Mr. Russell can have it both ways.

A somewhat analogous appearance of subjectivity is presented by an approach to ethics along the path of value theory under the motto "Value is any object of any interest." For interests are as variable as desires and are more inclusive. They cover also liking, will, seeking. Value is the object of effective motor response. The cat values cream, the scientist values truth, and the artist values beauty. This seems to baptize every impulse or craving alike with the highly respectable name of value. The name "value" undoubtedly carries with it a certain claim. To say, "I like it," is a modest declaration which no one can dispute, however

much one may deplore likings for nasty or queer or unhealthful objects. But to say "The thing has value," puts the matter on a different level. The statement is in form independent of any subjective condition. It claims assent or provokes denial. It offers plausible ground for my going on to enjoy or possess.

Whether we speak the language of Kant and say we have made a universal judgment or whether we speak the language of realism and say we are now in the realm of essence, we are no longer making statements about liking or disliking, desiring or not desiring, but about things or persons, or acts.

The question then arises: Shall every interest count as one? Even in the field of economic values many have learned to their cost that values cannot be measured entirely by demand as registered in the stock exchange. Security and return are factors which belong to some stocks in higher degree than to others, and the wise investor will consult his banker before venturing. Some lovers of beauty are more sensitive and have finer taste than others. We have higher respect for the moral judgments of some than for those of others.

Professor Perry, the protagonist of the doctrine in question, leaves no doubt as to his attitude. Every interest vouches for a value, but some objects have more value, and the morally good is not a simple unit, but an organization of values. In the moral sphere there is a highest good. Harmonious personal life is better than a riot of impulses and desires; and this means subordination. Harmonious society is better than strife, and is dependent on love or benevolence.

What gives rise to question is Professor Perry's faith in the quantitative method to furnish a basis for the superiority of so-called higher values of love and beauty. He who considers the ultimate balance of values in the crucial form, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul" – does he really put into the scale simple units, count the sum on each side, and merely take the mathematical balance? Can or ought he to decide on the basis of quantity? Professor Perry quotes William James's platform, "We must try to satisfy as many demands as possible," but it is difficult to consider this as James's whole position without taking into account not only, as Perry does, the classic case of the happiness of millions at the cost of one lost soul, but also that other fine and profound insight: "But the deepest question that is ever asked admits of no reply but the dumb turning of the will and tightening of our heartstrings as we say, '*Yes, I will even have it so.*'" To this Perry would no doubt reply, "This is just what I provide for in the test of preference, which is one of the three standards for the comparison of values." Is not this to abandon the case for the

quantitative method? For a strictly quantitative method must posit fixed units. If any unit can by choice of will be weighted so heavily as to outweigh all else, we have a method that is no longer quantitative. And if it is urged that the decision proves that we gave preference to what was the greater value, I should reply that this would mean either, if I must speak in terms of interest, I prefer what I prefer, or if in terms of value, the old fallacy of the will governed by the strongest motive. The way to a more adequate statement is suggested by Perry's own words. "An interest finds its place in the scale of personal preference only in so far as it participates through reflection in the synthetic choice by which its own place is allocated." I refer especially to the words "*synthetic* choice."

At the opposite extreme of realistic thinking stand those thinkers who hold to a scale of values which we apprehend or experience but do not wholly create. In partial agreement are idealists, and some of the French and German writers who seem less concerned to be numbered under a definite "ism." Typical is the position of G. E. Moore. We have a conception of "intrinsic value." To judge that anything has such value implies that its existence would be worth while, even if nothing else should exist beside. Good is a unique category. It is not to be defined in terms of pleasure or interest – this would afford a psychology but no ethics; nor in terms of survival values – this would yield problems for a biology but no ethics; nor in terms of some ultimate reality – this would give a metaphysics or a theology but no ethics. Typical likewise is the affirmation by Scheler and Hartmann of a scale of values. Relativity of value to the subject, the latter holds, is by no means relativity of the value essences as such. To regard values as constituted by interest is to be caught in the telecentric predicament.

Far from basing all values upon facts of existence or subjective psychological processes, Rickert, from a different school, insists that the very essence of any judgment implies an objective standard. The "ought" for our world of knowledge, as well as for our world of ethics, is deeper, more real than the "is."

This doctrine of values, as Professor Adams pointed out in his *Idealism and the Modern Age*, is akin in spirit to the position of idealism. The fundamental issue of the age is, according to Professor Adams, whether man's life and his mind may still be thought as participating in the objective, significant structures, or whether life and mind are but the expression and prolongation of interests. In other words, when a man seeks goods can he trust his own nature as a guide, or is there a standard which is independent of what may chance to be his interests? To illustrate the position by an analogy which I do not recall

that Professor Adams employs; we all admit that there is such a good as health. But if we follow our interests we are often made aware too late that they cannot be trusted to secure it. This man is interested in business and that in metaphysics, this woman in her books, and that in social popularity, and the physician says sternly that all may endanger their health by following these interests. There are objective laws of a healthy life quite independent of the individual's desires. There is likewise a health of the mind, or if you are not afraid of Plato's word, of the soul. Or if you prefer religious terms, there is a life of the spirit, which is to be sought and found, which has its conditions not dependent on our desires – there is a kingdom of God which is for us to seek.

All religion has held to such a call, and at the same time has faced two difficulties. How does it happen that man does not naturally strive to enter the kingdom and how can he be led to seek it? The fall and regeneration by divine grace have been the orthodox answers. And if we stay within the field of ethics we have to meet an analogous question. Will the "good from above" of Bosanquet, the "significant structure," the independent scale of values, be a good *for me*, unless somehow they appeal to human nature?

Croce has an answer for this problem. Recognizing the gap between each for himself and each for all, he identifies the first with the economic order, and reserves the second for the ethical will. Each has its place in the practical. Each is an interest, but the economic interest is for an individual object, the moral for a universal object. And if we raise our previous question: How can the individual or utilitarian interest rise to the universal, he answers man is not a "consumer of pleasures," but a "creator of life." Man has a logical intellect, and so thinks by universal concepts; he has a moral will, and so sets before him universal ends. "Morality triumphs over interests only because it is itself the supreme interest." Is this answer only another instance of explaining sleep by a "dormitive faculty" or is it necessary for any solution of truth and good that we ultimately come to human nature as the source of ideals as well as of interests?

More directly related to the problems raised by the war are studies, which instead of employing categories of subjectivity and objectivity, approach the issue from the angle of personality and community.

The very possibility of moral values, according to Spranger, implies a will which is both self-conscious and able to relate itself to law and value. Individuals as such may not recognize the law, but moral personality is an achievement, which is possible only as the will is thus able to represent the law and translate it into deed. Such personalities in interrelation form a community. The old antithesis between individual and

society, individualism and socialism, is thus replaced by a correlation between personality and community. For each of these is a task rather than an existence, and each requires the other for its fulfillment.

French thinkers⁵ reach an objective standard by scientific method, which, with several, leads to justice as its specific content. The scientific method leads us to look first of all for the facts in the field. What then is the "moral fact?" This according to Bayet is the distinction between right and wrong as it appears in such social facts as formulas, languages, laws, manners, literature. If we look to the ends of human action, writes Goblot, we find not only happiness but justice. Man, says Alain, loves action more than pleasure, and action for justice above all. Or if we consider man's whole nature, thinks Brunschvicq, we must take into our reckoning his capacity and bent for reflection, as contrasted with the inertia of organic impulse or social suggestion. Now reflection leads us to a conception of the whole, and thus "to introduce at the root of our will a condition of reciprocity, which is the rule of justice and the foundation of love."

Scientific method finds fullest scope finally, in Professor Dewey's *Quest for Certainty*. It is made to cut both ways. In his rejection of older ways to certainty by seeking security for our faiths and our ideals through resting them on some metaphysical entity, some already existing real, Professor Dewey is more deeply radical than the age. He would liberate the mind and will not merely from the more obvious fetters of tradition, but from the more subtle and persistent hold of presuppositions and habits of thought which underlie the great theologies and metaphysics of the past. Yet, on the other hand, the very conception of scientific method applied to the guidance of life means criticism of perceptions in the interest of scientific truth, and criticism of immediate desires and enjoyments to discover not what is actually desired, but really desirable. In Dewey's view, a desire or liking cannot merely as such claim the dignity of a value. A value implies a judgment. "Any doctrine that identifies the mere fact of being liked with the value of the object liked, so fails to give direction to conduct when direction is needed that it automatically calls forth the assertion that there are values eternally in Being that are the standards of all judgments, and the obligatory ends of all action." The keynote of present physical science is the experimental method. To adopt this in social affairs may appear to be a surrender of all standards. "But in principle, experimental method does not signify random and aimless action. It implies direction by ideas and knowledge."

⁵ E. Leroux, "Ethical Thought in France since the War," *International Journal of Ethics*, Jan. 1, 1930.

To the further objection that scientific method seems to imply attention to means rather than to ends, Professor Dewey replies that the separation of ends as the morally important from means as morally indifferent, of the ethical from the economic and industrial, is a crying evil for which moral theory cannot escape partial responsibility.

The subjectivism which matters after all is the doctrine that "our thought makes no difference in what is significantly real." This is "a retreat and an escape from existence." "An idealism of action that is devoted to creation of a future, instead of to staking itself upon propositions about the past is invincible."

Such a hasty glance at trends of recent theory shows nearly all seeking a society in which justice and good will are controlling forces. Some put their trust in human nature as competent to chart its own path in the great adventure, although we have long since ceased to regard human beings as so completely rational and naturally well disposed as to need only freedom from rulers to ensure the millenium. (Check the spelling here) Others believe that there is a good and right independent of passionate human desires, just as there is a world of things and events unaffected by human perception; although this is no longer conceived as a world of purely formal structures. Even William James wrote: "There is a mystery of rightness about the Parthenon that I cannot understand. It sets a standard for other human things, showing that absolute rightness is not out of reach."

One common ground between ethical theory and the temper of the age is in the attitude toward science. By the rapid changes which physical science is bringing about in all our external affairs, it tends to loosen the hold of the past and even to discredit the past. At the same time it suggests possibilities of a better, more generous future than men have hitherto dared to dream of. Ethical theory seeks by the aid of scientific method to understand, and so to improve, human nature and human relations, but it finds in the social sciences and the humanities the importance of individuals as well as of statistical averages, of historical persons as well as of general laws of mass movement, of the treasures of art in which man has given lasting form to priceless ideals.

If we take scientific method in the narrowly technical sense of quantitative measurement, it can furnish no ultimate authority for supreme ends. The spirit does not accept the absolute of numbers, any more than it accepts the absolute of force and might. The supreme issue is after all moral, that is, of choice. But in the broader sense of knowing as fully as possible all the circumstances and consequences and thus furnishing the conditions of intelligent choice, what is science but that "large discourse," that "looking before and after" by which the great and wise have ever sought to guide themselves and fellowmen?

We may perhaps find suggestions for a further common ground in the position that, if with the naturalists we say

that values are constituted by the personal, the personal itself is not "natural," in the sense in which nature is often opposed to art. The personal is not just any chance interest or drive of impulses and desires; it is an achievement. It began, as comparative ethics has learned, in a social group in which each met others in definite relations of kin, of marriage, of neighbor and fellow-worker, exchanged thought through language, shared feeling in sympathy, combined purposes in mutual aid, and yielded obedience to the old men and to an order which is not of yesterday or today. The personal born thus, incorporates greater and greater measures of intelligence and reflection.

Judgments of thought, though framed in the imagery of perception and asserted in a fleeting instant, grasp universals, and build a world of knowledge, forgetting the transient conditions under which they were born. Judgments of moral good have their background in the conflicts of impulses and desires. Judgments of kindness, right, and duty are framed in imagery of actual groups and relations. Both judgments of good and judgments of right likewise forget the fleeting organic conditions or blind gropings of their birth. They are illumined and criticized by reflection. But instead of constructing a system of impersonal knowledge in which a world of things or events appears as if independent of the knower, these moral judgments construct a personal world, a community. These claim and recognize rights and duties. They pass over into conduct. Their world too becomes objective as will becomes deed.

In part they find objective and "real" existence in institutions, which do not easily forget the earlier hard and crude conditions of their ancestry. They resist change; they are subject to criticism and reconstruction. Yet in so far as they embody and foster personal and community life, mankind is not likely to cast them aside. For now abideth, if we may enlarge the list of the apostle, freedom, justice, faith, hope, love. State, church, and family will stand or fall as they embody and foster these values.

ON AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

Morris R. Cohen. "On American Philosophy. III. John Dewey and the Chicago School." *New Republic* 22 (17 March 1920): 82–86.

III.

John Dewey and the Chicago School

John Dewey is unquestionably the one preeminent figure today in American philosophy; and if there could be such an office as that of national philosopher, no one else could properly be mentioned for it. The incomparable charm of William James's style has doubtless attracted more readers than the more closely knit technical arguments which make up Dewey's somewhat fragmentary philosophic writings. Yet it is a fact that Dewey is the only American to have established a new philosophical school, still known as the Chicago school. Whenever we meet with any apostles of the new philosophic dispensation called pragmatism or instrumentalism, we may be sure to find them using the arguments, metaphors, and phrases coined by John Dewey. That which in James is a matter of vision and intuitive suggestion becomes in the hands of Dewey a well organized argument that can be learned and taught, expounded and defended, used as a justification for educational policies, or as a battering ram against sanctimonious complacencies. Thus, the number and the aggressive enthusiasm of Dewey's disciples, not only in philosophy but in related realms, is rapidly increasing.

Clearly this extensive influence is due not only to rare personal qualities as a teacher, but also to the extent that his thought corresponds to the prevailing American temper of the age. His doctrine that all our ideas are, and ought to be, practical, i.e. instrumental for reforming the world and making it a better place to live in, appeals powerfully to popular utilitarianism, to the American worship of visibly practical results, of which Theodore Roosevelt was such a conspicuous representative. In a country where so many great deeds in the conquest of nature are still to be performed, the practical man's contempt for the contemplative and the visionary is reinforced by the puritanic horror of idle play and of that which is uselessly ornamental. To the pragmatic evolutionist, as to our preachers of the gospel of success, nature is like one of

the prudent heroes of Smiles's *Self Help*. It never indulges in any play or riot of exuberant activity for its own sake. It generates intelligence only to help in the serious business of life. As a "come-outer" of the idealistic church Dewey carries with him the air of sober disillusion; but a philosophy which views external nature as just so much material to be transformed by our intelligence, appeals to the thin optimism of an industrially prosperous people, which sees success as the sure reward of intelligent effort and finds no inherent obstacle to the establishment of a heaven on earth – though it will not do for practical people to inquire too curiously what should constitute such a heaven. Dewey's confidence in the power of human intelligence to change our environment is so strong that his attention is never solicited by the incurable evils which, in an imperfect world, every child of mortal men and women must fate before reaching the crowning agonies of death. His most distinguished disciples, like Professors Bode and Addison Moore, do not hide their contempt for a philosophy that can serve as a consolation, or can admit that there are evils against which our only remedy is same form of wisely cultivated resignation.

The American temper, however, to which Dewey appeals, the temper which is known and likes to be known as practical-minded and distrustful of all forms of other-worldliness, is only a part of our national trait. It may be dominant in our industrial life and even in some of our churches which are trying to replace theology and religion with "social work." But there is another America, god-fearing and evangelical or vaguely spiritualistic, which though less noticed in our urban press and literature, is still perhaps the most dominant force in our country, as our Sunday legislation and the prohibition amendment may indicate. If we judge merely by the number of adherents, there can be no doubt that our distinctive national philosophy is the diluted and Americanized form of theosophy or neoplatonism which manifests itself in the various forms of New Thought from Mother Eddy's *Science and Health* to R. W. Trine's *In Tune with the Infinite*, and which crops out in our Pollyanna literature. The books of no other intellectual or semi-intellectual movement find so many millions of readers among our tired men of affairs, as well as in more amply leisured feminine America. Now, orthodox Christians, as well as those who hunger for the newer mystic visions to save them from the dreary emptiness of worldly success, know from experience that salvation comes not solely through our own conscious efforts but depends on the grace of powers beyond us.

It is curious that the America which believes in faith above visible works gets no recognition in Dewey who comes from the rural state of Vermont, but finds dignified expression in William James who can be

regarded as Celtic or European as much as American. In fact, however, we are dealing here with a fundamental difference between two temperaments, which the older Henry James would have called the moralistic and religious. Dewey is essentially a moralist. His philosophy is full of the sense of responsibility, of tasks to be achieved, and of the possibilities of philosophy in helping us to perform our job more efficiently. Everything in his universe has a job or function and ought to be up and doing. The otiose observer, the one who idly admires the flowers of knowledge for their own sake rather than for their consequences, is the cardinal sinner. James, on the other hand, is essentially religious in his interests. His attention is attracted by that which makes things objects of love or worship rather than merely useful or instrumental. He is less interested in conduct than in the quality of life and our ultimate fate and well-being. Moral holidays solicit his attention more than the day's work. His frank belief in supernaturalism arises not so much out of a reasoned theory as to what really exists, as out of a sympathy with those who feel how little our conscious thought can shape our individual destinies, and how seldom the works our hand can completely satisfy our heart's desire. With the austere self-control of the trained scientist, Dewey is willing to restrict his philosophy to that part of the cosmos for the handling of which he is technically equipped – the world of visible human conduct. Unlike James, who had a more rigid scientific training, Dewey is willing to abandon all interest in the mystery of the universe at large. He manifests no sense of the dark and unfathomable seas of being, wherein the world of human conduct occupies but an infinitesimal portion of time and space.

Despite the complexity of his sentences, which a too conscientious regard for accuracy causes to be overloaded with qualifications, Dewey is essentially one of those philosophers who, like Spinoza, impresses the world with their profound simplicity. He is entirely free from that human complexity which makes James capable of banishing the soul and even consciousness as psychologic entities, and yet capable of believing in subconscious minds, Fechner's earth spirits, and the like. Dewey is a thoroughgoing and consistent naturalist, i.e. one who accepts without question the method and the results of the natural sciences, especially Darwinian biology. In his youth he was an idealist, of the orthodox neo-Hegelian school, which professes to combine modern science and ancient religion in one harmonious system. Reflection, however, led him to find an incurable incompatibility between the diluted supernaturalism latent in idealism and the biologic or naturalistic account of the origin of consciousness which one gets from modern experimental psychology in such works as Spencer's or James's *Principles of Psychology*. Whether because the consequent break with

the idealistic school came too late in his intellectual life to enable him to ignore his former views and to throw himself unreservedly into the development of his new insight, or whether because the temptation of controversy and the prospect of securing the triumph of a righteous cause are too irresistible in the quiet monotony of academic life, the fact remains that an inordinate proportion of Dewey's philosophic writings is polemic in character. I cannot but regard this as a great loss to philosophy, since philosophers, like others, are generally more fortunate in giving us the substance of their own vision than in denying the vision of others. The polemic spirit generally leads to a sharpening of issues which is congenial to large and enthusiastic followings, but does not promote just insight into complicated problems.

That intelligence arises in the process of organic life and in furtherance of it, that the structure of our ideas can be understood only in the light of the transformations of our environment which they affect, is the central theme of Dewey's philosophy. When he applies it to current public issues it leads to a fresh reassertion of the liberal or hellenic element of civilization, viz. that action should be illumined by the freest intelligence. In the field of education, where his essentially psychologic philosophy finds most direct application, it means not only an intelligent appreciation of our environment but a liberalizing of human capacity. But when he addresses his fellow-philosophers he tends to emphasize the practical character of ideas in a way to do scant justice to their theoretic or contemplative function. From a scientific point of view pragmatism can establish what seems to me its inherently just claims only by actual analysis of our leading scientific ideas. But such analysis requires deliberate detachment and long patient labor which can be sustained only by a love of intellectual play for its own sake. The conditions of American philosophy today do not favor such laborious undertaking. Philosophers like others are expected to show immediate results. Dewey himself is by the natural subtlety of his mind and the immensity of his liberal knowledge eminently qualified to make pragmatism an achievement rather than a promising program. But missionary zeal for a righteous cause urges more immediate tasks and more hurried methods.

When, as in his *Democracy and Education*, and elsewhere, he is not engaged in controversy or propaganda, the rich sensitiveness and ingrained honesty of Dewey's mind shows itself at its best in his natural responsiveness to all sorts of diverse elements, in his habitual avoidance of sweeping or unqualified generalizations and of artificial dilemmas by which easy intellectual triumphs are obtained at the cost of just discriminations. But when the spirit of combat is upon us, it becomes practically impossible to devote much attention to saving what is valuable in the enemy's cause. Thus when he insists that thinking arises as an effort to

control our environment so as to get out of trouble, he is undoubtedly emphasizing an important and hitherto neglected truth. But the zeal of controversy leads him and his disciples to assert this, not as a general but as a universal or exclusive proposition, and thus to deny the Aristotelian view that philosophic knowledge arises from natural wonder or curiosity, from the desire to know just for the sake of knowing.

Professor Moore is especially vehement in denying that there is a fundamental desire to know, coordinate with, rather than subordinate to, other desires. But no one who has ever watched unspoiled children, can deny the tremendous reality of the desire to know, not in order to throw light on the object of other desires but for its own sake. Nor should this desire be dismissed as childish. The history of science shows clearly that when this idle and unfettered curiosity about the world is indulged in as a joyous pastime, it leads to such momentous results as the discovery of mathematics by the Greeks or of modern physics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On the other hand, when stoic philosophies rigidly insist that our thoughts should be directed to the ends of ordinary human conduct, they dry up the springs of intellectual vision. I mention this, not only to show the very serious danger to American philosophy from this neo-stoicism, but to illustrate how the controversial attitude cuts it off from the more adequate performance of its own task, to wit, the analysis of the nature of knowledge. For the tendency of philosophy is to stretch terms like "practical" to include everything, even the purely theoretical; but the tendency of controversy is to restrict terms so as to leave room for assailable alternatives. If the Holy Sepulchre be everywhere one cannot effectively preach a crusade to redeem it from the infidels.

That thought arises because of the desire to get out of trouble, is certainly true, if "desire to get out of trouble" is stretched to include what it does not ordinarily connote, such as the love of intellectual play, or the impulse to imitate, as when philosophers rush to adopt an idea like natural selection after it acquires eclat in biology. Knowledge is experimental – aye, if we recognize with that there are mental, as distinct from physical, experiments, and that pure mathematics is full of them. The truth of general propositions is to be tested by their consequences – certainly; but if this is to mean anything definite and not a mere shifting of the difficulty, we must have a real clue to what consequences make a proposition true. The old-fashioned assumption that there are certain absolute particular facts and that these of themselves can confirm or deny general beliefs, is one that a clear-minded man like Dewey cannot accept. For what we should consider the fact in a given case is never independent of previous assumption. Thus when Dewey

rejects God, freedom, and immortality on the general ground that philosophic concepts can no longer serve as sanctions, he opens himself to the *ad hominem* argument that his alternative concepts, experience, evolution, and democracy are also sanctions, resting on no really superior evidence. The consequences of accepting one set of categories are assuredly different from the consequences of accepting the other. But that which determines people to accept one or other set of initial assumptions makes them differ also as to which set of consequences they regard as preferable, and the pragmatic test of truth does not in fact settle philosophic issues.

Though essentially a moralist, Dewey does not give us a clear answer to the fundamental ethical question, what is good? In trying to make the world better, what is to be the test as to which of two alternatives is the better? The reason for this failure comes out clearly in his essay on Nature's Good (in the volume called *The Influence of Darwin*). He is so averse to the old classical formulas for the *summum bonum* that made no particular difference in specific cases, that he falls back on a very naive ethical atomism: every situation has its own good. But that is to dodge the whole difficulty. For, not only does life fail to divide itself into a convenient number of disconnected "situations," but in every actual ethical problem, as he himself points out, there is a conflict between rival considerations. If, e.g. class exploitation is to be regarded as evil and rejected, it is to be rejected not only when it affects Mr. A or Mr. B, on the 5th or the 6th day of the month, but as a general rule to control judgments in particular cases.

When Dewey and his disciples insist that philosophy must serve human weal and welfare, they assert something which no one can or wishes to dispute. Compassion for human suffering is at the bottom of all that is noble in human effort. But the significant question really is, wherein does human weal consist? When they exclude from human welfare the philosophy which is naught but a distant vision, and can serve only as a consolation, or intellectual pastime, they seem to me to be falling into a most grievous error. For not only do consolations and pastimes – the essence of religion and fine art – most directly minister to human welfare by bringing as relief from anguish and offering us positive joy, but no human work could long prosper without them. A foolish use of pastimes and consolation may indeed dull the edge of industry. But the humblest human wisdom has always recognized the dullness of naught but work. Vacations and holidays, wherein we can completely forget the routine of our daily tasks, are necessary, even in the interests of the narrowest kind of industrial efficiency. Nor would the pragmatist be inclined to overlook this obvious point, if it were not for the zeal to contrast sharply the spirit of the new as against the old

philosophy. They are also misled by the phrase, "making the world a better place to live in," which suggests mastery of the environment rather than of our own desires. But so long as human desire outruns human capacity, even as the range of our vision exceeds the field of our reach, the way of happiness must include not only the mastery of nature but also the mastery of our own selves. The latter cannot be attained without fearless examination of the limitations of human capacity, due to the fact that we live in a world that is not expressly designed for human comfort. That is why no philosophy that lacks a cosmic outlook can hope to do full justice to the specifically human problem. Even if it were true, as Dewey contends, that the fate of the cosmos has no bearing on the specific issues of education, morals, or politics, it would still not be devoid of the profoundest human interest. In seeing human fate as part of a great cosmic drama, men rise above their petty limitations and learn to look upon their own passions and achievements with that measure of aloofness which is essential to the liberal life. In this respect pragmatist have never improved on the founder of their school, Chauncy Wright, who, though as rigorously scientific a mind as ever lived on this side of the Atlantic, could still admit that religion and metaphysics had probably done more for human happiness than the narrow evidence of material science can well estimate.

Though some degree of impartiality is necessary to render his account even intelligible, the philosophic critic knows: that complete impartiality is unattainable, and that he must leave to the discriminating reader the task of discerning and correcting the distortion resulting from partisan bias. But if my account of Dewey fails to bring into proper relief the great positive achievements which make him one of the great figures of recent philosophy, the failure is due to the fact that I am writing not as much about Dewey's own vision as about the general tendency in American philosophy of which he is the most distinguished representative. With the kernel of pragmatism I am in hearty agreement. But it is difficult to emphasize properly such fundamental agreements as one has been habitually taking for granted. Having been led to philosophy through the concrete problems of physics and social policy, I share as a matter of course Dewey's scorn for those who in indolent piety continue to worship at empty shrines. But I cannot grow enthusiastic at the sight of a really first-rate mind crusading against those for whom time is already erecting proper sepulchres. The multitude will not be fed by exhorting to work those who will be unproductive in any case. Nor does the interest of agriculture demand discontinuance of all worship. Rather ought we to look for new objects more worthy of human adoration. For the human need to worship is fundamental; and those most absorbed or skilled in producing the material necessities, the Sancho Panzas or the

Huck Finns, always recognize the inherent superiority of those who can see visions, even if the latter be no better than those of Don Quixote or Tom Sawyer. For, where there is no vision, the human spirit perishes from suffocation.

As one who has been brought up in the humanistic tradition, Dewey himself loves to see things with their historic vistas. His own interest in the clean and dexterous manipulation of ideas is so strong that the keenness of his arguments arouses breathless admiration. One might readily quote him to the effect that philosophy is vision, imagination, reflection, and that sympathetic understanding and the free play of ideas are superior to skill in the accumulation of external products. He is, therefore, perfectly sincere in protesting that when he speaks of the practical character of ideas he does not mean that they should minister to ends of the bread and butter type. But a philosophy must not be judged simply by the character and intention of the founder, but by its emphasis and general tendencies. And the main tendency of this crusade on behalf of the practical is undoubtedly to disparage and leave no room for purely theoretic studies like the theory of prime numbers, which for all their glory have not, and perhaps never will, find any application to the specific problems of conduct. Dewey himself seldom takes his illustrations of knowledge from theoretic sciences like mathematics or from the sort of knowledge that a philosopher acquires when he understands the pragmatic theory. He repeatedly expresses his dislike for "contemplative surveys of existence" analyses of "what is past and done with." His greatest fear is lest philosophy should lose touch with that which for the moment absorbs the multitude, and he is never weary of trying to eliminate "otiose" or purely contemplative thought – forgetting in his plea for philosophy as a guide to action, at mere contemplation is itself a most intense kind of action, preferred to all other forms of action by great and richly experienced minds, like Plato, Aristotle, and Dante. Indeed, it is difficult for enthusiastic devotees of the idea of universal evolution to avoid altogether the genetic fallacy, the confusion between the organic origin of knowledge and its present human value. But though vision may be an outgrowth of touch, it is certainly different and no longer restricted to the tangible.

Dewey's philosophy is essentially urban, industrial, and entirely public. There are no nooks in his universe which the soul can call its own is full of the sense of men hurrying to work, struggling against all sorts of material difficulty and the stupid selfishness of their fellow-beings, and finally succeeding by dint of superior intelligence in the manipulation of things. It is pervaded also by a noble indignation that there should be so many parasitic idlers and unused palaces, so much class exploitation. But there is no sense in it of natural sunlight or God's

free air, wherein even now the children of men sometimes play in utter abandon. No sense of the loneliness of the individual human soul, facing the indifferent earth, sea, or sky, or the eternal procession of the stars that ever mock man's silly pretension to exalt himself as the master of the universe.

It would be idle for anyone to undertake today a definitive judgment on Dewey's philosophical achievement. He is still fortunately in the prime of his intellectual activity, some years younger than was James when he published his *Pragmatism* and his *Pluralistic Universe*. But I doubt not that history will record that in an age of waning/faith in human reason, he was one of the few who rallied those who believed in the cause of liberalism based on faith in the value of intellectual enlightenment. But the future may wonder at the naive and entirely uncritical way in which such a keen mind could accept the hypothesis or myth of universal evolution, and at his failure to recognize that despite its supreme worth, human intelligence is frail, pathetically impotent in the face of great physical stress, or vital impulse. Important as are the intellectual differences between men, we are all of the same clay as the insane and the criminal, even as the most potent and enlightened emperor, Marcus Aurelius, is father in the flesh to the unspeakable Commodus. Such reflections may be useless and unpleasant, but no philosophy can claim to be the liberating truth unless it faces them resolutely.

INSTRUMENTALISM

Max C. Otto "Instrumentalism." *Monist* 36.4 (October 1926): 577–93.

Late in the seventies of the last century two singularly gifted Americans, working on independent problems, arrived at original conclusions bearing on the nature and function of human thinking. Out of the amalgamation of their views a new philosophy took its rise. The better known published result of these labors is a paper by Charles S. Peirce. In recent philosophic literature frequent reference has been made to his article, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," which appeared in January, 1878. In this article he attacked the doctrine that the clearness of an idea is an abstract quality which the idea wears on its face, discoverable by sufficiently persistent introspection. In contrast to this notion, Peirce maintained that "there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice."¹ He insisted that at the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be, we come down to what is tangible and practical. "Our idea of anything," accordingly, "is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself."² Or, to put it in another way: "The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no mere difference in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes."³ The position was summarized by Peirce in this much-quoted passage: "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to

¹ Peirce, C. S.: *Chance, Love, and Logic* (New York, 1923), p. 44. (Reprinted from *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. 12, pp. 286–302.)

² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42.

have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."⁴

In so far as a philosophic movement may be said to have begun at a definite time, this essay has been taken to mark the beginning of Pragmatism. The word does not appear in the essay, although Peirce had been using it for two or three years in philosophical conversations;⁵ but pragmatic doctrine is obviously there, and it is presented with perspicuity and force. As Peirce declares, his theory is the outgrowth of his laboratory experience. It is the expression of an attempt to slough concepts which have their "only true place in philosophies which have long been extinct," and to introduce the experimental, laboratory temper of mind into the whole range of human thinking. Thus the instrumental character of ideas is made to appear. They are shown to be rules of action, experimental means employed by man to get himself forward in the world.

In the same month and year was published the first essay from the pen of William James, under the title, "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence."⁶ The essay is sufficiently remarkable in itself, but it is even more significant as the prelude to all that James did as writer and philosopher. Not only is it written in the clean, fluent, urbane style for which James later became well known; not only does it exhibit the same catholicity of interest, analytical keenness, and constructive imagination conspicuous in his maturer years; but it presents and defends the teleological conception of the human mind, of which his philosophy as a whole is the enriched and deepened elaboration. Rejecting the conception of mental activity which regards it as an act of corresponding to a world antecedently given, he argues that "interests which we bring with us, and simply posit or take our stand upon, are the very flour out of which our mental dough is kneaded. The organism of thought, from the vague dawn of discomfort or ease in the polyp to the intellectual joy of Laplace among his formulas, is teleological through and through."⁷ Again, in a penetrating passage prophetic of what James, as pragmatist, was to contend for, he says: "I, for my part, cannot escape the consideration, forced upon me at every turn, that the

⁴ Ibid., p. 45.

⁵ *Monist*, Vol. XV, p. 166, note.

⁶ In the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, January, 1878, Vol. XII, pp. 1-18. Reprinted in *Collected Essays and Reviews*, New York, 1920, pp. 43-68. This paper had been preceded by book reviews and literary notices extending through a period of ten years in which, as we can now see, there were adumbrations of what was to come.

⁷ James, William: *Collected Essays and Reviews*, p. 61.

knower is not simply a mirror floating with no foothold anywhere, and passively reflecting an order that he comes upon and finds simply existing. The knower is an actor, and co-efficient of the truth on one side, whilst on the other he registers the truth which he helps to create. Mental interests, hypotheses, postulates, so far as they are bases for human action – action which to a great extent transforms the world – help to *make* the truth which they declare. In other words, there belongs to mind, from its birth upward, a spontaneity, a vote. It is in the game, and not a mere looker-on; and its judgments of the *should-be*, its ideals, cannot be peeled off from the body of the *cogitandum* as if they were excrescences, or meant, at most, survival.”⁸

This essay – which clearly enunciates the active, reconstructive character of human intelligence and emphasizes the validity of such non-cognitive elements of experience as preferences and ideals, and which presages the doctrine that truth is a working-value of ideas – is a second source of Pragmatism. The word source is used in the face of what we know to have been James’s intellectual obligations to Peirce. When, twenty years after this time, James inaugurated the pragmatist movement so to speak officially, he acknowledged his indebtedness to Peirce in the handsome manner characteristic of him.⁹ And the acknowledgment had its basis in fact. He had known Peirce, who was only three years his senior, from at least his nineteenth year, and he was a member of the Metaphysical Club, started by Peirce, where in the early seventies “the name and the doctrine of pragmatism saw the light.”¹⁰ There can be no doubt that Peirce’s logical genius had an influence on the more artistic temperament of James. But James did more than merely develop the ideas he got from Peirce – which is the impression one is apt to carry away from what has been written on the subject.¹¹ Letters and memo-

⁸ Ibid., p. 67.

⁹ Ibid., p. 410.

¹⁰ *Journal of Philosophy*, etc. Vol. XIII, p. 719.

¹¹ There are some exceptions. See especially A. K. Rogers: *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, New York, 1922, p. 359 ff.

It is true that Peirce, repudiating James’ brand of Pragmatism, says, “No doubt he derived his ideas on the subject from me” (*Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIII, p. 719). But the remark must be understood in its context. Peirce is not implying that James takes credit for ideas which he had in fact borrowed. On that question we have this statement from Peirce: “There never was the smallest disloyalty on James’s part. On the contrary, he dragged in mention of me whenever he could.” (*Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIII, p. 719.) He is objecting to the strange doctrines which James has introduced. He feels that he must acknowledge responsibility for such *true* pragmatic elements as James’s philosophy may include, but he wishes it understood that the philosophy current under the name Pragmatism differs profoundly from the theory that had its rise with him. (Cf. Peirce’s reasons for changing the name

randa dating from the years 1869–1872 – the critical period in James’s emotional and intellectual life – make it sufficiently clear that the germinal idea of the philosophy advanced in his first printed essay was born out of a struggle so intimate, personal, and momentous that he hid the depth of it from those about him. The problem was a moral or religious, rather than, as with Peirce, a logical one. It concerned man’s place in the universe, a problem which at the time was disturbing many thoughtful youths who had come under the influence of Herbert Spencer’s universalization of Evolution.¹² Put in a sentence the problem was this: Is man impotent and meaningless in the whole of things or are human individuality and power of initiative real? And until he had hit upon what seemed at least a possible way of validating man’s significance, James was weighed down by a sense of frustration. How deeply depressed he was is vividly suggested by his portrayal of the experience which, thirty years later, he incorporated in his treatment of the “sick soul” in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, there attributing it to an anonymous “French correspondent.”¹³ If I had not clung to scripture-texts like *The eternal God is my refuge*, etc. [so the account concludes] I think I should have grown really insane.”¹⁴

Under date of April 30, 1870, a new note is sounded. “I think,” James writes, “that yesterday was a crisis in my life... . Hitherto, when I have felt like taking a free initiative, like daring to act originally, without carefully waiting for contemplation of the external world to determine all for me, suicide seemed the most manly form to put my daring into; now I will go a step further with my will, not only act with it, but believe as well; believe in my individual reality and creative power. My belief, to be sure, *can’t* be optimistic – but I will posit life (the real, the good) in the self-governing resistance of the ego to the world. Life shall [be built in] doing and suffering and creating.”¹⁵ This note of victory was immediately induced by the reading of Renouvier, and James, it is well known, remained all his life “endlessly thankful” for the decisive

Pragmatism to Pragmaticism. *Monist*, Vol. XV, p. 162.) See also, Violet Paget’s stimulating book, *Vital Lies*, London, 1912, more particularly Vol. I, Chap. 1.

¹² James’s friend, John Fiske, had no difficulty in turning Evolution to moral and religious account, but Fiske was incurably optimistic. The two friends debated a phase of the subject in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. XLVI, pp. 441 ff.; XLVII, pp. 75 ff. And in connection with this debate James good-naturedly acknowledged a “spanking.” James’s article is reprinted in *The Will to Believe*, Chap. 7. See also Clark, J. S., *John Fiske*, Vol. II, pp. 192–99. Mr. Clark does not understand James and he is too worshipful of Fiske ever to question his position.

¹³ *Letters*, Vol. I, pp. 144–47.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

impression made upon him at this time by Renouvier's "masterly advocacy of pluralism," but for which he fears he might never have freed himself from what he calls the "monistic superstition."¹⁶ James's debt to Peirce, as we have indicated, was not of a superficial sort; it is expressed with his unfailing aptness in the dedication of *The Will to Believe*.¹⁷ But it was Renouvier who touched the deeper need of his being, who gave him a supporting push at a critical stage in the ascent to a point of vision.¹⁸

It must not be forgotten that the man who is influenced has something to do with the influence. Unquestionably the 1878 essay owed much to others. James was an extraordinarily wide, appreciative, and meditative reader. It owed even more to the unique genius of its author. And this is true of his work as a whole. The contributions made by himself not only far outweighed what he took from others, but he gave to his philosophy the rare quality peculiar to it. There can be no doubt that James would have acknowledged the important bearing of his own mental and emotional idiosyncrasy; would have admitted that he became the Pragmatist he did become because (borrowing words of his own) the instability of his brain was "such as to tip and upset itself in just that particular direction."¹⁹ We, looking back upon his thought from a position which sets it in perspective, can recognize that the philosophic current which he caused to move into the spiritual life of his time, while affected by the confluence of streams of influence, yet owed its volume, its contour, and its rhythm chiefly to James himself.²⁰

When these essays by Peirce and James were published, a youth of

¹⁶ James, William, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 165.

¹⁷ "To My Old Friend, Charles Sanders Peirce, To whose philosophic comradeship in old times and to whose writings in more recent years I owe more incitement and help than I can express or repay."

¹⁸ See, among other things, *Letters*, Vol. I, p. 186. Cf. pp. 80, 149.

¹⁹ "Great Men and Their Environment," in *The Will to Believe*, p. 249. This essay is of peculiar interest in this connection.

²⁰ The limits set for this paper do not permit a discussion of Hans Vaihinger's *Die Philosophie des Als Ob*, a notable work also dating from the period under discussion and showing striking affinities with Pragmatism. The teleological character of mental activity, the instrumental function of ideas, the creative conception of truth – these, and other doctrines congenial to the pragmatic temper, are brilliantly defended. The erudition and originality of the author are conspicuous. Unfortunately the book was not published until 1911, a year after James's death. One can easily imagine the reception he would have endeavored to secure for it. The English translation did not appear in America until 1924. The reception of Vaihinger's work by the American pragmatists has scarcely been hearty. He, on the side, seemed anxious (in the Preface written nearly a generation after the completion of the book) to avoid being classed with the pragmatists. In a letter to the writer in the spring of 1925, Vaihinger explains

nineteen was completing his college course in Burlington, Vermont, who was to give to Pragmatism the developed form by which it will probably be known in the history of thought. Graduating a year later, John Dewey had already heard the call of philosophy, but it was not a philosophy which reflected the American scene. That phase was still to come. Mr. Dewey began, as he himself tells us, as a Neo-Kantian.²¹ As late as the beginning of the present century Peirce refused to accept him as a pragmatist, placing him with those who "hover between Absolute Idealism and Sensationalism."²² This characterization overlooked developments which had been taking place for at least a decade. At the moment it was written Mr. Dewey was collaborating with Drs. Ashley, Gore, Heidel, MacLennan, Moore, Stuart, and Thompson on a volume entitled *Studies in Logical Theory*, which, upon its publication in 1903, laid the foundation of the instrumental school. James, with his usual sensitiveness and quickness of appreciation, hailed the book with enthusiasm. "I have the duty on Monday," he wrote, "of reporting at a 'Philosophical Conference' on the Chicago School of Thought. Chicago University has during the last six months given birth to the fruit of its ten years of gestation under John Dewey. The result is wonderful – a *real school*, and *real Thought*. Important thought, too! Did you ever hear of such a city or such a University? Here we have thought, but no school. At Yale a school, but no thought. Chicago has both."²³ Mr. Dewey's four chapters of thoroughly pragmatistic doctrine had been preceded, in 1900, by his equally pragmatistic paper. "Some Stages in Logical Thought," and the instrumentalism thus avowed has been expanded, deepened, and clarified during the intervening quarter of a century.

It is not without significance that Mr. Dewey, on completing college, broke with the tradition of going abroad for graduate work, and, instead, joined the small group of able young men who took advantage of the opportunity for graduate study then newly offered at Johns

that his objections were not aimed at James, Dewey, or any form of "critical Pragmatism," but at the "uncritical Pragmatism" which ignorantly distorts and exaggerates what is valuable in this philosophy. This regrettable failure in mutual acquaintance and understanding is well considered in James Gutmann's recent review of Vaihinger's book. (*Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 77–80.) I think with him that "there seems to be here an interesting and unconsidered instance of a significant community of thought." And I hope with him, that it may be replaced by "an international 'comparing of notes.'"

²¹ *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale*, Vol. XXIX, p. 423. Reprinted in *Studies in the History of Ideas*, N. Y., 1925, Vol. II, p. 368.

²² *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIII, p. 720.

²³ *Letters*, Vol. II, pp. 201–2.

Hopkins. Nor is it without significance that he sought his career, although an academic one, not in the ripened East, but in the unformed society of the West. Although born in New England, he was a child of America. His academic service began in Minnesota only a decade and a half after the close of the Civil War, and his formative years, as a pragmatist, were spent in Chicago. From Michigan, in one of his earliest papers, published nearly forty years ago, at a time when democracy was under fire in the older centers of education, he became philosophic spokesman for the democratic ideal.²⁴ He was then a Neo-Kantian, and the paper shows interesting traces of this; nevertheless in his defense and interpretation of democracy he laid down a cardinal principle of the philosophy now known as Instrumentalism. Democracy, as an instrument of a shared and progressively ennobled common life, has been and is the central aim of those who belong to this school of Pragmatism. A. W. Moore, one of the keenest, most valiant instrumentalists, finds it an implication of Pragmatism that "social organization be essentially (whatever its name) that of a social democracy as against all forms of hierarchism";²⁵ while B. H. Bode, another of the gifted leaders of this pragmatic persuasion, voices his faith in these words: "The whole drift of things has been towards the interpretation of the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness in the sense that we are members one of another, with a common share in our common life. No one, not even the humblest citizen is to serve simply as a hewer of wood and a drawer of water; but everyone is to be recognized as a member of a great brotherhood, and to share in the opportunities, the achievements, and the aspirations which are our common possessions. There are to be no peasants, no serfs, as there are no hereditary privileges and titles, because each citizen is to rise to the full stature of his spiritual manhood, even as a son in his father's house."²⁶ From J. H. Tufts, an outstanding member of the group, we have an illuminating study of the historical development of democracy intended to give us a juster and finer appreciation of our form of society;²⁷ and it need scarcely be mentioned that one of Mr. Dewey's most influential books is called *Democracy and Education*. One cannot read the writings of instrumen-

²⁴ "The Ethics of Democracy," in *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*, Second Series, No. 1 (1888).

²⁵ *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, Chicago, 1910, p. 22. Cf. p. 72.

²⁶ From an address on "Our Great American Tradition," printed in *School and Home Education*, Vol. XLI, p. 94 (1922). See also *Fundamentals of Education*, New York, 1921, Chap. III.

²⁷ *Our Democracy, Its Origins and Its Tasks*, New York, 1917.

talists without sensing the depth of their democratic convictions. They think of Pragmatism as the philosophic counterpart of the democratic movement in modern society, and it would not be wrong to say that for most of them Democracy is Religion.

This interest in democracy is no more characteristic than the sort of democracy it is attached to. In the early article by Mr. Dewey he stresses the necessity of making a distinction between the numerical and ethical concept. "To define democracy simply as the rule of the many," he there says, "as sovereignty chopped up into mince meat, is to define it as the abrogation of society, as society dissolved, annihilated."²⁸ Against this conception, conceived after the analogy of the abstractions of physical science, he objects throughout the paper. "There is an individualism in democracy," he admits, "which there is not in aristocracy; but it is an ethical, not a numerical individualism; it is an individualism of freedom, of responsibility, of initiative to and for the idea, not an individualism of lawlessness. In one word, democracy means that *personality* is the first and final reality... It holds that the spirit of personality dwells in every individual and that the choice to develop it must proceed from that individual."²⁹ And this he goes on to show involves democracy of wealth and industry, a society in which "all industrial relations are to be regarded as subordinate to human relations," in which economic and industrial life shall be a social function.³⁰ In more recent writings the emphasis is upon *distinctness* of personality. Society is deemed democratically efficient to the extent that it develops the incommensurable something which constitutes its citizens individuals. For "if democracy has a moral and an ideal meaning," says Mr. Dewey now, "it is that a social return be demanded from all and that opportunity for development of distinctive qualities be afforded all."³¹ But this is the same conception fashioned in response to contemporary needs. It is at any rate democracy after this pattern – a life together which shall enhance the significance of each life – that these gentlemen have at heart and aim to conceptualize. Under the spell of this vision they speak in glowing terms such as these: "Democracy and the one, the ultimate, ethical ideal of humanity are to my mind synonyms."³² "This great national faith in the common man is the first political recognition, on a large scale, of the immeasurable worth of the individual human soul. It is our national

²⁸ *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*, as cited, p. 7.

²⁹ *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*, pp. 22–23.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 26–37.

³¹ *Democracy and Education*, p. 142.

³² Mr. Dewey, in *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*, p. 28.

holy of holies, the shining ideal which we call America the Beautiful.”³³ And if it be objected that such interests, while becoming to a social reformer, derogate from the dignity of a philosopher, an answer is at hand in Mr. Dewey’s latest book. “Social Reform,” he says, “is conceived in a Philistine spirit if it is taken to mean anything less than precisely the liberation and expansion of the meanings of which experience is capable... . Nothing but the best, the richest and fullest experience possible, is good enough for man.”³⁴ What therefore can be nearer to philosophy than the problem of rendering this best more general, more significant, and more secure, through the comprehensive criticisms of values?

Closely related to the social theory of Instrumentalism is its psychological theory. On the face of it, this is behavioristic. “I should also like to point out,” says Mr. Dewey in reference to a series of articles, “that the essays in their psychological phases are written from the standpoint of what is now termed behavioristic psychology.”³⁵ And this is certainly supported by many passages that might be cited from his writings, such as this one: “Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving, and reasoning that is done.”³⁶ Or again: “A mind or consciousness or soul in general which performs these operations is a myth”;³⁷ and “the scientific man and the philosopher like the carpenter, the physician and politician know with their habits not with their ‘consciousness.’”³⁸ Yet in close proximity to these passages appear others of a different purport. The reader is told that “habit does not, of itself, know, for it does not of itself stop to think, observe, or remember.”³⁹ And a few sentences further on, the knowledge which lives in habits is denied to be knowledge, except by courtesy; and knowledge, in the strict sense, is said to be “knowledge of and *about* things, knowledge *that* things are thus and so, knowledge

³³ Bode, in *School and Home Education*, p. 94.

³⁴ *Experience and Nature*, pp. 411, 412. For some direct applications of this interest see Smith, T. V., *Notes on the American Doctrine of Equality*, Chicago, 1925; Thayer, V. T., “Democratic School Administration,” in *Education Administration and Supervision*, Vol. II, pp. 361 ff.

³⁵ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. vi.

³⁶ *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 177.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 182. A thoroughly characteristic discussion is Ethel Sabin’s brilliant paper, “Giving Up the Ghost,” in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XVII.

³⁹ *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 177.

that involves reflection and conscious appreciation.”⁴⁰ To which must be added the fact that the most widely known behaviorist is peculiarly anxious to protect behaviorism from being contaminated by pragmatic psychology,⁴¹ and that the leading pragmatist reciprocates by accusing behavioristic psychology of “aping the manners of physics.”⁴² It is clear, then, that the movement with which the behavioristic tendency originated and which has steadily extended the range of the behavioristic principle of explanation, is yet fundamentally antagonistic to *pure* behaviorism.⁴³

The difference between pragmatic and pure behaviorism has developed three main foci. The latter theory reduces human behavior solely to “a segment of the cosmic movement continuum,”⁴⁴ making psychology a branch of mechanical physics; the former insists upon the presence in human behavior of experimental, purposive, and meaningful activity, without which, according to this view, psychology is deprived of subject-matter. Back of this divergence and responsible for it is the determination of one set of investigators to take experience at its face value, and an equal determination of another set of investigators to reject so-called experience as a tissue of illusions and to accept as real only the world of electrons and protons.

If experience is taken as it comes, the instrumentalists hold, and not illegitimately reduced to something else, we must recognize a tentative, feeling-its-way kind of behavior met with nowhere in the realm of mechanics. In such cases the stimulating environment calls forth a variety of competing responses; these block one another, thereby disintegrating activity. The resulting state of the organism is one of equilibrium, of hesitancy. The process of changing this equivocal stimulus into a univocal one, thus making possible a unified response, is thoroughly experimental in character. The various possible competing actions are imaginatively projected and compared, until a mode of activity is achieved which can serve as a direct stimulus to overt action.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 178.

⁴¹ Watson, J. B.: *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, Phila., 1924 (2nd Ed.), pp. vii–viii.

⁴² Dewey, J., in *The New Republic*, Vol. XLV, p. 361.

⁴³ This antagonism to behavioristic exaggeration is already suggested in Peirce’s criticism of James’s sensationalism, and James’s criticism of Spencer’s mechanical conception of mental action.

⁴⁴ Weiss, A. P., *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior*, Columbus, 1925, p. 80. See also Chap. XVII.

⁴⁵ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 189–98; Bode, B. H.: “What Is Psychology,”

Out of this type of experimental behavior grows purposive action, action guided by the thought of foreseen consequences. When a consummation has once been hit upon it may thereafter become an objective, an end of conscious endeavor. These ends do not exist outside of, or distinct from, action; they are instrumental functions of behavior; but *in* this behavior they are deliberately employed to shape the course of events. Ends are aims, or, rather, *aimings*, by means of which activity is steadied and directed. Unique in their individual operation, they may nevertheless incorporate past experiences of the actor or draw upon those of others. They are conscious devices which, when employed, transform mere sequence of behavior into coherent projects for attaining foreseen consequences.⁴⁶

A third divergence from Behaviorism grows out of radical disagreement on the subject of meaning. Instrumentalism holds that meanings indubitably occur. They are not psychic entities, though in view of their significance for life it is natural that some thinkers should hypostatize them as essences, thinking of them as by right subsisting eternally in the unchanging realm of spirit, though fortunately captured now and again in a brief, imperfect actualization, bringing sweetness and light to an earthly existence that is brutal and meaningless without them. Meanings are properties of behavior; they have their origin in language, in discourse. Mr. Dewey looks upon communication as the world's supreme wonder, because "it changed dumb creatures— as we significantly call them — into thinking and knowing animals and created the realm of meanings."⁴⁷ But language must not be confused with the signal reflexes of animals to which behaviorists would reduce it. Signaling acts are ego-centric, language is participative. A hen's clucking may call forth a response from a chick but it is not induced in any way by the response it calls forth. A gesture, say, gets meaning, as Mr. Mead well expresses the matter, when "the individual takes the attitude of another toward himself, and in some sense arouses in himself the tendency to action, which his conduct calls out in the other individual."⁴⁸ For "it is not enough that he should indicate this meaning — whatever meaning is — as it exists for himself alone, but that he should

in *The Psychological Review*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 250–58 (especially pp. 255 ff.); "Consciousness and Psychology," in *Creative Intelligence*, New York, 1917, and "Intelligence and Behavior," in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 10 ff. See also, in the same volume, the highly suggestive discussion of a germane phase of the subject by H. W. Stuart.

⁴⁶ See *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part 3, Sections 6–7; *Experience and Nature*, Chap. III.

⁴⁷ *Experience and Nature*, p. 166.

⁴⁸ Mead, G. H., *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIX, p. 161.

indicate that meaning as it exists for the other to whom he is pointing it out.”⁴⁹ Signals become signs, sounds become words, when they occasion action which takes its specific character from being the common endeavor of at least two centers of activity; when they induce reciprocal cross-reference and joint anticipation which, when acted out, result in a conjoined undertaking, regulated, as to each partner, by his participation in the partnership. And when meanings have developed, they may, as Mr. Dewey says, “be infinitely combined and rearranged in imagination, and the outcome of this inner experimentalism – which is thought – may issue forth in interaction with crude or raw events.”⁵⁰ Through the experience and expansion of meanings human life attains to the coherence of growth and the enrichment of culture.⁵¹

The views adumbrated in this too brief survey involve others. If in experience, taken as authoritative, genuine deliberation occurs and issues in the choice of an alternative that adds meaning to existence, then we live in a world which is in a real sense indeterminate; “a real world,” as Mr. Mead puts it in one of the profound documents of philosophical literature, “which consists not of an unchanged universe, but of a universe which may be continually readjusted according to the problems arising in the consciousness of the individuals in society.”⁵² There is, then, freedom of action; not freedom to act unconditionally, but freedom in “formulating the ends toward which our conduct shall be directed.”⁵³ In such a world the real and the ideal will be conceived to be continuous in the flux of events; *things* being achieved objects on which we can depend, *ideals* possible objects yet to be made into dependable things. And if the objects of experience are features of reality, ideas which lead us into propitious relation with them are true – true to us in our need. There is, consequently, no quarrel between pragmatistic philosophy and nature. Nature, it is true, is not assimilated to man’s desires, but it is recognized as the condition of all achievement; and knowledge is the articulate awareness of the conditions. The quarrel

⁴⁹ Mead, G. H., *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁵⁰ *Experience and Nature*, p. 166.

⁵¹ Mead, G. H.: “A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol,” in *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIX, pp. 157–63. Compare with this his “Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning,” in *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. VII, pp. 397–405. Dewey, J., *Experience and Nature*, Chap. 5. The coming decade should supply us with important data throwing light on the problem of meaning. Mr. Koehler’s and Mr. Yerkes’ studies of higher apes are reopening the question of the place of deliberately adaptive behavior in animal life. It would seem that pragmatists face the dilemma of granting more “mind” to apes or less to men.

⁵² Mead, G. H., *In Creative Intelligence*, p. 223.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

of Pragmatism is with those social, industrial, and economic circumstances, those blind prejudices and customs, those inhibiting concepts regarding man and his environment which stand in the way of higher individual and communal attainment. Its goal is not narrowly utilitarian, as has been so often asserted and as often denied. Room is left, *most* room is left, in Mr. Moore's words, for "objects of contemplation, adoration, love, and worship."⁵⁴ It welcomes the opportunity to assist in redeeming knowledge from materialism, and appreciation from tribalism.⁵⁵ Rooted in American soil, growing in response to a newer civilization's hunger for higher satisfactions. Pragmatism is precisely the philosophy that strives to discover and to render pervasive and secure all that makes life meaningful and precious. The aim of philosophy so conceived, as we have been told by Mr. Kallen, who takes us back to the immortal James' "is the liberation and enlargement of human capacities, the enfranchisement of man by the actual realization of values. Where it is successful, beauty and use are confluent and identical with it. It converts sight into insight. It infuses existence with value, making them one. It is the concrete incarnation of Creative Idealism."⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Moore, A. W.: "Some Lingering Misconceptions of Instrumentalism," in *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XVII, p. 515.

⁵⁵ Moore, A. W., in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVII, p. 129.

⁵⁶ Kallen, H. M. in *Creative Intelligence*, p. 467.

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL

Mortimer J. Adler. "The Chicago School." *Harper's Magazine* 183 (September 1941): 377–88.

I

"I have the duty on Monday of reporting at a 'Philosophical Conference' on the Chicago School of Thought. Chicago University has during the past six months given birth to the fruit of its ten years of gestation under John Dewey. The result is wonderful – a *real school*, and *real Thought*. Important thought too! Did you ever hear of such a city or such a University? Here we have thought, but no school. At Yale, a school, but no thought. Chicago has both... "

So wrote William James to Mrs. Henry Whitman in October, 1903. We have no record of the report he gave to his colleagues at Harvard, but the general tenor of his remarks can be gathered from a review he wrote shortly thereafter of philosophical papers by Dewey, Mead, Angell, and others, reprinted from the first series of Decennial Publications. "The rest of the world," he began, "has made merry over the Chicago man's legendary saying that 'Chicago hasn't had time to get round to culture yet, but when she does strike her, she'll make her hum! Already the prophecy is fulfilling itself in a dazzling manner. Chicago has a School of Thought! – a school of thought which, it is safe to predict, will figure in literature as the School of Chicago for twenty-five years to come.'" And he went on to say that the work of Dewey and his disciples presented "a view of the world, both theoretical and practical, which is so simple, massive, and positive that, in spite of the fact that many parts of it yet need to be worked out, it deserves the title of a new system of philosophy."

This September the University of Chicago celebrates its fiftieth anniversary. This September the world may not have time or patience to give much attention to an academic celebration – to its learned symposia, its recital of degrees *honoris causa*, its ritual of eulogy. But if there is still any time left for us to think about what we are doing we might well use a little of it to consider the institution and development of a university which, more than any other, reflects the temper of our culture. Universities in general may symbolize the achievement of Euro-

pean civilization – the endurance at which flow seems to depend upon soldiers, not gentlemen or scholars; but the University of Chicago, like the city in which it was founded, is almost one hundred percent American.

When Chicago got around to culture she was not content to make it hum. She turned out an American brand. It was not merely a “new system of philosophy” – the pragmatism or humanism which William James applauded – but a new orientation of the higher learning itself. President Harper accepted the definition of a university as “an agency recognized by the people for resolving the problems of civilization”; but from the beginning, and increasingly ever since, Chicago’s university applied this maxim by doing the sort of work which took its bearings from, and exerted influence upon, the main directions of American life. The pragmatic philosophy of Dewey and others simply made articulate the principles of this new departure – a higher learning indigenous to America, the birth of a typically American university.

The University of Chicago is popularly thought of as one of America’s youngest institutions. In truth it is one of the oldest, if we discriminate between an undergraduate college and a university, a place for graduate study and research. Harper’s Chicago is preceded only by Gilman’s Johns Hopkins (1876) and by G. Stanley Hall’s Clark (1888). Before these institutions there was only sporadic and casual graduate work at Harvard and Columbia, Yale and Cornell. There was neither a formal program for graduate study nor a faculty to give full-time instruction to graduate students. At Yale, in 1871, there was only one full-time graduate professor. Americans went to Europe, especially to the universities of Germany, to complete the studies for which an A.B. degree was supposed to prepare. After Johns Hopkins and Chicago led the way some of the older colleges on the eastern seaboard quickly transformed themselves into universities by collecting professional schools and organizing graduate faculties. Harvard and Columbia, under Lowell and Butler, became universities; but Chicago was founded as one, at once exceeding even Johns Hopkins and Clark in the degree to which it realized the ideal which had motivated Gilman and Hall.

Gilman started with forty graduate students and a small faculty; Hall also had a handful of students doing work in five divisions of graduate study. But when Harper opened Chicago’s doors it was prepared to offer instruction and conduct research in twenty-seven departments; it had a staff of 120, divided into two faculties (of arts and literature, and of science); and in the very first quarter of the university’s operation these men taught 594 students, about half of whom came to do post-graduate work.

Harper vigorously fought the American college system which, in his view, impeded the intellectual growth of able men by giving them heavy programs of undergraduate teaching. Teaching loads at Chicago were light, and promotion depended on successful research rather than on meritorious teaching. This, more than anything else, set the academic style and nourished what William James was later to call "the Ph.D. octopus." In part, Harper's intention seems to have miscarried, for his emphasis on research sacrificed many promising young men to the coils of the octopus, crushing (if not killing) them as much as a heavy burden of sophomores. But this must not lead us to neglect another point from which to view his intention, and its execution by Chicago's faculty. In 1895 he said:

It is not enough that instructors in a university should merely do the class and lecture work assigned them. This is important, but the university will in no sense deserve the name, if time and labor are not also expended in the work of producing that which will directly or indirectly influence thought and life outside the University... . The true university is the center of thought on every problem connected with human life and work, and the first obligation resting upon the individual members who compose it is that of research and investigation.

Steadfast devotion to and brilliant performance of this mission brought Chicago fair renown in the first ten years of its existence.

Just four years ago Harvard celebrated its Tercentenary. At that time, when peace still encouraged us to think of the future's promise, Professor Whitehead congratulated Harvard on having completed its process of growth. "About twenty-five for a man," he wrote, "and about three hundred years for a university are the periods required for the attainment of mature stature." Once full-grown, the measure of a university is "in terms of its effectiveness." After three hundred years of growing up, Oxford and Cambridge played their part effectively in what Whitehead regards as "*the brilliant period of European civilization,*" the 17th and 18th centuries.

It did not take Chicago three hundred years. Chicago sprang full-grown from Harper's head. In ten years it had become a dominantly effective force in "American civilization," as the testimony of William James suggests. It is easy to make light of this achievement by saying that the delivery was well-oiled by Rockefeller millions, by saying that rapid growth and quick cash returns simply expressed the American way of doing everything in the industrial nineties. Of course it is true that

money talked, then as now. Harper bought whatever he thought was needed to start right off in a big way. During the preliminary negotiations Harper wrote to Goodspeed: "Naturally we ought to be willing to begin small and grow, but in these days when things are done so rapidly, it seems a great pity to wait for growth when we might be born full-fledged." He brought the best professors, paying the unheard-of top salary of \$7,000, and taking as many as twelve from Stanley Hall's sixteen carefully selected scientists. He disregarded deficits. That was a problem for "the Founder." His problem was to waste no time in using money, in pocket or promised, to create the superlative university. To that end he not only collected the best staff of men, but also managed, under forced draft, to get them to publish a tremendous body of completed research within the first ten years.

But the twenty-eight volumes of "the decennial publications," containing the work of 81 contributors, and costing the university \$50,000 which it did not have, expressed more than Harper's ability to do big things in a hurry by pyramiding with money. They expressed, in more ways than William James realized, *a school of thought*. It was neither the eminent qualities of its individual professors nor the great quantities of research done in various fields which made Chicago the leading, the most typical, American university within a decade. Money bought professors for Chicago; it could buy them back for Eastern institutions, as the competition for triple-starred names during the last half-century reveals. Harvard, for example, has always had a larger endowment than Chicago and could usually procure the services of academic leaders. The fact that Chicago and Harvard have been for some time now closely tied in the ranking of American universities according to the number of "eminent names" on their faculties, or according to the number of "eminent departments" (as measured by productivity), is not the important fact about Chicago – except perhaps in the eyes of those who think Harvard provides the absolute standard for comparison. The important fact about Chicago – the fact so distinguishing that in this respect Chicago escapes comparison – is the intellectual life it has cultivated, and the influence which this has exerted, educationally and culturally, upon the rest of the country.

In 1904 "the Chicago School" meant one thing; in 1936 it meant another; but at both times it signified the existence there of an extraordinary intellectual ferment, a leaven which worked from there outward to raise the whole cultural mass. During this month of celebration on the Midway academic orators may praise Chicago for many things, but the main point will be missed if Chicago's peculiar vitality is not analyzed. Unfortunately the main point cannot be made as a paean of unalloyed praise. Chicago has defects peculiar to its special virtues, and

the defects, as well as the virtues, are characteristic of American life during the past fifty years. The contribution of Chicago in the first and in the last decade of that period calls for criticism, not eulogy.

II

When I was a student at Columbia in the early twenties the return of John Dewey from China, to resume his professorial duties at the university, was a long-awaited event. At last I was going to find out about that "Chicago school of thought." Even though John Dewey made his hegira from Chicago in 1904, even though William James had published a book called *Pragmatism* (1908) which successfully popularized some of the notions that had been much more technically expounded in *Studies in Logical Theory*, anyone who was interested in the pragmatic philosophy still turned in the twenties toward Chicago as toward Mecca. Though Dewey had been at Columbia for many years, and though James had left some disciples to carry on his teaching at Harvard, neither the Columbia nor the Harvard philosophy department could claim to be the seat of orthodoxy. Only at Chicago was there a homogeneous body of men who worked together with apparent understanding of a common doctrine. Some of these men, Tufts and Mead and Ames, had been at Chicago from the beginning; they had collaborated with Dewey in the early publications of the Chicago School.

But to think of the Chicago School entirely in terms of a doctrine called "pragmatism," or to restrict it to the "thought" of its philosophy department, misses the forest for the trees. The homogeneity which could be found in the philosophy department in 1904 or in 1924 (in fact, almost until the arrival of Hutchins), characterized the whole university. Whether it was an extraordinary accident, or whether Harper's feeling for the *zeitgeist* was so strong that he intuitively picked men in every field who uniformly reflected the same spirit, the remarkable fact remains that the University of Chicago had a central point of view which dominated most of its departments and united its faculty in a common enterprise. With few exceptions – notably Paul Shorey, the Platonist – the Chicago faculty consisted of men who saw eye to eye on fundamentals, whether they were professors of geology or economics, of physiology or religion, of education or sociology.

I do not mean to imply that the various departments always collaborated in research – although more of that has occurred at Chicago than anywhere else – but I do say that the large round tables of the faculty club could usually assemble a diversity of specialists who really understood what the other fellow's research was driving at because it was a common objective they all shared. If a university should be a *community* of scholars, if it should sustain a *universe* of discourse, then the pre-

Hutchins Chicago almost (I say “almost”) rang the bell. Paradoxically, Hutchins was attacked by the Old Guard at Chicago for wishing to “unify” the university by “imposing” a fundamental point of view (loosely called “a metaphysics”), when, in fact, his efforts to introduce new elements were restricted by a faculty trying to maintain its unity. The issue in the past ten years has not been a fight of schismatics against a unifier (if anything Hutchins and his group were the schismatics) but a conflict of basic doctrines.

That, however, is another story which I shall presently tell. Here I am concerned to define the unity of the earlier Chicago.

The general line of Chicago’s pragmatism is too well known to need discussion beyond pointing out that much of its case rested on “the new science of psychology.” According to Dewey’s own report, it was James’s *Principles of Psychology* which had awakened him from his dogmatic slumbers in the bower of Hegelianism. That book was radical in its chapters on instinct, habit, and emotion, in its attempt to give a physiological diagram for every aspect of behavior, in its view of man as an animal – whether rational or not. Although Aristotle had known long before about man’s animality, this fact had been obscured or forgotten by the psychologists of the early 19th century who dealt almost exclusively in “states of consciousness” or “the association of ideas.” But when the old truth was rediscovered it packed a new punch because the human animal, like every other, was now primarily viewed as engaged in the struggle for existence by adaptation to environment.

It was not merely discoveries in neurology, but Darwinism that altered the conception of man as a knowing or a desiring animal, as political or artistic. This “evolutionary” conception of man as a system of reflexes which could be conditioned, as a bundle of drives which impelled him to adapt, gave rise to the new logic and the new ethics – both pragmatic in the sense that the ultimate criterion of the true or the good was successful adjustment, in thinking or action, to a changing world or a changing society. But most important of all was the emphasis on change itself. Darwin had shattered the illusion of a static universe. Evolution made a mockery of the quest for certainty. Everything, including truth, is in flux. Creative intelligence must look to the contingent future. Novelty should be prized rather than feared; for with the aid of Science the Savior man could be optimistic about winning the struggle for existence under the most adverse and unforeseen circumstances.

William James epitomized this new view of things when he wrote, in *The Nation* (1904):

Not only has the doctrine of Evolution weaned us from fixities and inflexibilities in general, and given us a world all plastic, but it has

made us ready to imagine almost all our functions, even the intellectual ones, as “adaptations,” and possibly transient adaptations, to practical human needs. The enormous growth of the sciences in the past fifty years has reconciled us to the idea that *Not quite true is as near as we can ever get.*¹ For investigating minds there is no sanctity in any theory, and “laws of nature” absolutely expressible by us are the idols of the popular-science level of education exclusively. Up-to-date logicians, mathematicians, physicists, and chemists vie with one another as to who will break down most barriers, efface most outlines, supersede most current definitions and conceptions.

This may not be a fair summary of pragmatism or, as James called it, humanism (because human needs were the ultimate measure). But it does define the point of view which unified Chicago, and made the University a single school of thought. One has only to recall a few of the famous names on the early faculty to see how this way of looking at things prevailed on all sides.

In biology there was Jacques Loeb, who pushed mechanism to its limits by trying to interpret even human adjustments to environment as physico-chemical tropisms. In psychology there was James Rowland Angell, who as a follower of William James, developed “functionalism,” and this ultimately became, in the hands of John B. Watson, his student, radical behaviorism. In the social sciences there was Thorstein Veblen, whose iconoclasm demolished conventional views of the human enterprise, social and political, as well as economic; there were Albion Small and W. I. Thomas who instituted data collecting to make sociology descriptive and scientific instead of normative and moralistic, and used biological and evolutionary principles to account for social facts. In theology, or shall we say “religion,” there were President Harper, himself completely modernist (not without cause did the Baptists question his orthodoxy), Shailer Matthews, Shirley Jackson Case, and others, who not only made Chicago famous for “higher criticism” but also introduced “social service” into the divinity school and turned the emphasis from dogmatic theology to comparative religion, studying the varieties of religious experience as psychological phenomena, creeds as ethnic byproducts, and religion itself as part of man’s struggle for existence. In education there were again Harper and Dewey who agreed perfectly that educational institutions must serve, to use Harper’s words, as “the Messiah of democracy, its to-be-expected deliverer.” To this end, Harper, as president, started university extension work and called research from the ivory tower to the street; Dewey, as founder and head

¹ Italics are mine.

of the first school of education, started, with the help of Ella Flagg Young, reforms in the Chicago school system, which spread nationwide as "progressivism."

All of this paints a picture of an institution resourcefully carrying out the impetus originally given it by such men as Harper and Dewey, zealously devoted to putting a new line of thought to work in every academic field, its members united in what might be called the religion of militant modernism.

But though it stands in the foreground, the University of Chicago must not be allowed to occupy the whole picture, for its School of Thought soon dominated the work of other institutions (in philosophy and education, in biology, social science, and religion); and when the background is completely envisaged we see the outlines of American culture itself during the past half century. Even if, in part, Chicago merely went with the tide, its clear formulation of principles and policies, its energetic application of them in practice cannot be denied profound influence upon the whole contemporary scene. More than the Academy of Plato (a real ivory tower so far as the main currents of Greek life were concerned), more than the medieval University of Paris (which never achieved sufficient unity of doctrine to maintain a "school of thought"), Chicago had, in its first long period, both homogeneity in itself and affinity with the general trend of American culture. It was the larger community in microcosm.

Why should anyone have wished to reform the University of Chicago? Was it not everything a university should be, doing everything a university should do? The answer is simply that its unity had been achieved too quickly and at too great a cost. The price must be measured in terms of the things which Chicago, and American culture generally, had been willing to give up, had, in fact, renounced as outmoded. At its *very* center, exercising centrifugal force, was a hard core of negations and exclusions. The denial of metaphysics and theology as independent of empirical science, the denial of stability in the universe and certainty in human knowledge, the denial of moral values transcending adaptation to environment and escaping relativity to time and place, the denial of intellectual discipline in education and of the light shed by an abiding tradition of learning, the denial of a personal God, self-revealed, and of a Divine Providence concerned with man's supernatural salvation – these kept the ball rolling, and gave it its terrific impact on American life.

It would be difficult to enumerate a set of propositions, codifying the Chicago School of Thought, which did not convey, explicitly or with merely verbal concealment, these profound negations. There were positive points of course, and therein lies the truth of pragmatism, of a

functional psychology, of progressivism in education, of empirical methods in social science. Professor Barzun to the contrary, Darwin's discoveries were momentous, and the concept of evolution legitimately changed men's fundamental views. The misfortune, for which Chicago, not Darwin, can be blamed, arises from the over-emphasis, the exclusions, the "nothing-but" fallacy, in the drawing of the implications.

The "nothing-but" fallacy is a common human failing. We do not seem able to appreciate a new departure in thought which occurs by way of *addition* to the old. Novelty by itself does not stir us; it must be proclaimed as dispensing us from former allegiances. We are not content to say "This too is true"; we must revolutionize thought by saying "Nothing but this is true." If the positive points in the Chicago movement had been temperately affirmed truth might have been increased, even transformed, by their addition; but there would probably be no record to-day of any Chicago School of Thought. Given a sharp, negative twist, they not only created a school of thought but unified its members in a crusading movement against the old and supposedly outworn. Once remove the negations and make the contrary supposition – that the old is not outworn, but must be integrated with the new – and you will see how hollow at its center was Chicago's unity before Hutchins came along.

What Hutchins attempted to establish at Chicago was not a new school of thought, just as exclusive in its own way as its predecessor. The faculty misinterpreted him in terms of their own extremism. They charged him with wanting "nothing but Thomism," "nothing but principles," or "nothing but the past" where before there had been "nothing but pragmatism," "nothing but facts," or "nothing but the present." On the contrary, Hutchins' aim was synthesis – to relate science, philosophy, and theology harmoniously without sacrificing the autonomy of each, to be contemporary and American in education without promoting militant modernism or cultural isolationism. It was not merely the university that Hutchins sought to reform. He wished to free American education and culture from the negations and provincialism which Chicago typified.

III

In 1936, a little more than thirty years after William James had reviewed some of the Decennial Publications, under the title "The Chicago School," another review appeared bearing that same title. But this time the book was President Hutchins' *No Friendly Voice*, and the reviewer was a later day follower of John Dewey – Professor T. V. Smith. Had the title been truly deserved, its compact irony would have summarized a remarkable shift in the winds of doctrine at Chicago. William James

had predicted that Chicago's School of Thought would be known as such "for twenty-five years to come." The time had run, the prediction had been verified; but despite Professor Smith's suggestion to the contrary, the first Chicago School has not been displaced by a second and opposite intellectual movement, under the leadership of Hutchins.

It takes more than one man or a few to make a school of thought in the sense in which Harper's Chicago deserved that description. In the past ten years there have been numerous references to "the neo-scholastic movement at Chicago," "Chicago Thomism," "Aristotelianism on the Midway," "the revival of classicism," "the return to the Middle Ages" – all suggestive of the fact that Chicago had become the center of another orthodoxy, the seat of an opposite school of thought. That, however, is simply not the fact; and, surprising as this statement will seem to some of his opponents, I do not believe that Hutchins ever wished it to be. It was not merely that he and his associates in reform were vastly outnumbered by the dissident voices on the faculty – more than an echo of the old Chicago spirit, which John Chamberlain neatly caught in Anton J. Carlson's reiterated "Vat iss the ef-fidence?" The truth is rather that Hutchins fought the old school not to replace it by another, but to place its positive contributions, shorn of their "nothing-but" exaggerations, in the perspective of the whole European tradition. Justice could be done to modernity without throwing ancient wisdom out of court.

The Editor of *The Christian Century*, commenting on the change from Harper to Hutchins, saw this truth when he wrote:

The essential distinction of this [the first Chicago] school which characterized its departure from orthodox metaphysics was its adoption of the scientific method as the true method for the discovery not only of scientific truth but of metaphysical truth as well... . When President Hutchins came upon the scene the first phase of this development had run its course. This phase had been characterized by what is now generally regarded as a too narrow conception of scientific method. Especially in the philosophical disciplines, it has come to be recognized that its procedure, copying too closely the procedure of the physical scientists, has left on one side large portions of reality, and the most important portions, which now clamor for attention. The new President voiced this insistent demand. He spoke not for himself alone, but for a wide body of disillusionment with regard to the sufficiency of science.

There is here the additional point that, just as Harper's Chicago reflected and formulated the "religion of science" which dominated

American culture from the nineties to the thirties, so Hutchins' Chicago, in the past ten years, has focused attention upon – more than that, has become the leading forum for – the crucial issue of our day: *whether science is enough, theoretically or practically*; whether a culture can be healthy, whether democracy can be defended, if theology and metaphysics, ethics and politics are either despised or, what is the same, degraded to topics about which laboratory scientists pontificate after they have won the Nobel Prize or are called to the Gifford Lectureship.

Chicago's leadership in American education and its formative influence upon American thought are just as clear in the Hutchins era as they were under Harper. But it would be a mistake to suppose that Hutchins has succeeded in the sense in which Harper did. Harper built a school of thought which lasted for almost forty years, and during that time was the generator of educational movements and intellectual trends that spread over the country, east and west. Hutchins has neither built a school of thought nor been able to transmute the heat of the controversies he generated into the light of resolutions. But those controversies, which have gradually come to be recognized as the leading issues of our day, have been more heatedly agitated at Chicago than anywhere else in the country. Where there is so much heat there is always hope, at least for the emergence of light.

The Chicago Fight now plays the role in American culture once played by the Chicago School. The University which, in its first period, mirrored the prevailing ideology in its own solidarity of doctrine, still functions as the cultural microcosm. For the past ten years it has been the arena in the spotlight. The heavyweights in its ring have staged a fight for a nation-wide audience – an audience drawn not by their lust for blood, but by their genuine concern with the points in issue. Chicago did not make the issues important. They had gradually risen, by nature's demands, to the forefront of popular consciousness. But Chicago was willing to see the fight through, wherever the chips fell. It did not run away from trouble by insisting upon academic dignity, by hiding behind the falseface of academic politeness. Dispensing with kid gloves and Queensberry rules, the discussion turned into something of a public brawl, with all sorts of kibitzers on the sidelines mixing in. But, however lamentable some aspects of the controversy now seem, the Chicago Fight, like the Chicago School, performed the type of service which a university owes to the Community.

Before we consider the defect which mars the virtue of Hutchins' Chicago, let me be sure that the reader understands what I mean by the exceptional character of Chicago's intellectual vitality. Unless he has lived through the past ten years at Chicago he will probably not believe me when I say that there has been more real tangling over basic issues at

Chicago than has occurred at a dozen other places during the same time, or at some during their whole existence. I have taught elsewhere, visited a great many institutions, and know about many more from intimate report. Their faculties may harbor differences of opinion about fundamentals, but you would never know it by listening to the talk at the faculty club, reading the student papers, or detecting signs of strife in administrative decisions. From this usual state of affairs, Chicago differs almost in kind, not degree. The campus has been a seething ferment these past ten years, and everybody has been involved from the President down to the janitors – the students as well as the faculty. I shall make no effort to explain this extraordinary phenomenon: it may be the Middle West; it may be the lawless Windy City; it may be a sulphurous vapor exuded by the Midway or animal spirits blown from the Stockyards. Whatever the cause, the fact remains that the University is incomparably alive and kicking.

A few stories may help to gain credence for this fact. In December, 1933, President Hutchins delivered a convocation address entitled “The issue in the Higher Learning.” Negatively, he criticized aimless gadgeteering on the part of laboratory scientists, and the social scientists’ propensity to collect facts for their own sake. Positively, he urged that research of every sort be directed by leading principles, be illuminated by ideas. “We have confused science with information,” he said, “ideas with facts, and knowledge with miscellaneous data... . I am far from denying the accomplishments of modern empirical science. Its record has been a grand one... . But as the Renaissance could accuse the Middle Ages of being rich in principles and poor in facts, we are now entitled to inquire whether we are not rich in facts and poor in principles... . Our bewilderment has resulted from our notion that salvation depends on information. The remedy may be a return to the processes of rational thought.”

Hell broke loose shortly thereafter. “Facts *vs.* ideas” became fighting words. On Hutchins’ side the *Daily Maroon’s* student editor ran articles which got students and faculty engaged with each other in all sorts of alliances and oppositions. There was a running feud between Editor Barden and Professor Gideonse, now President of Brooklyn College, in which Gideonse posted his answers on a faculty bulletin board, answers that later formed the substance of his reply to Hutchins in a pamphlet called *The Higher Learning in a Democracy*. In that same year the *Maroon* published four long criticisms of the faculty’s syllabi for the basic courses, written by pro-Hutchins youngsters, and based on the December proclamation. Other students rose in defense of their teachers. The feeling between student groups ran so high that it spilled

over into sports: the Aristotelians crossed bats with the Social Scientists in baseball!

But the high point of the year came when the old warhorse "Ajax" Carlson stopped his researches on thirst and hunger long enough to challenge the opposition to a public debate. It was arranged at first to take place in a laboratory theater before graduate students in biology. But the demand for tickets was so great that the scene shifted to Mandel Hall, the University's largest auditorium. The tickets were free, but at such a premium that some students trafficked in them, selling them for as much as a dollar apiece. The faculty, by departmental groups, bought boxes in the horseshoe circle to defray the expenses of the hall. On the day of the event every chair that could be squeezed into the hall or on to the platform was added to accommodate the overflow. I know what the audience looked and sounded like, the intensity of its feeling, the thunderclap of its partisan applause whenever a punch landed on either side. I know how heating, if not enlightening, Chicago polemic can become, for I was the other man in that debate.

The story of the Chicago Fight in 1933 has its mate in almost every other year of the Hutchins' regime. There have been other debates, one between Hutchins and Dean Melby of Northwestern, sponsored by the *Daily Maroon*; one between Hutchins and Chancellor Carmichael of Vanderbilt, sponsored by the Alumni Council. The Alumni have been drawn into the controversy by attacks and replies printed in the Alumni magazine, some by the faculty and some by the old grads themselves. But one more story will suffice to show that students and faculty never miss an opportunity for intellectual fisticuffs, and the extent to which local wrangling has national repercussions.

Last year I delivered a paper at a Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, held in New York City. Its title was "God and the Professors." Its argument bore directly on the controversy between Hutchins and his academic opponents. When, by way of the Hearst papers, which published my speech in full, or by way of *The New Republic*, which published Professor Sidney Hook's attack on it, the Chicago boys got wind of this off-campus dispute they were soon "r'aring" to go. The *Maroon* at first reprinted my piece and Hook's, and editorialized on the pros and cons. But the faculty, and other students, had to have their say. Columns were filled with attacks and replies, mostly attacks; until finally, the *Maroon* issued a special six-page supplement which contained the gems of the occasion. The astonishing fact is that this supplement sold 3,000 copies. Requests for copies in small and large lots came from colleges all over the country long after none were left. Nor was the controversy confined to the *Maroon*: it

raged in classrooms and drawing-rooms, both in Chicago and elsewhere – wherever, in fact, the Chicago Fight had gained adherents to its sides.

The ultimate comment on all this, revealing the trouble with Chicago in the past decade, was contained in the title of Milton Mayer's contribution to the *Maroon* Supplement. He, speaking for the innocent bystander headed his piece "I Can't Hear Myself Think." Despite the amazing vitality which Chicago has exhibited in seeing the fight through, it has never seen through the issues, nor clarified them sufficiently, for itself or for the public, to permit a sober resolution. The issues have been the same for the past ten years. Each year, when the shouting dies and the smoke lifts, prejudice and passion are left mumbling and smoldering until the bell rings for the next round.

IV

First, unity without diversity! Then, conflict without community! The defects of Chicago in its first and last decades are equally symptomatic of our cultural malaise. The causal connections here are manifold. A healthy unity requires the harmony of differences. But when, in the University or in our culture, other elements began to claim a place along with science, the weak unity, which had been maintained by negations and exclusions, gave way to discord rather than to the harmony of ordered differences. Nevertheless, the shift from the Chicago School to the Chicago Fight is a small step toward the ideal of civilization, the ideal of a university, which Whitehead, writing of Harvard's future, defined as "the possible harmony of diverse things." It is, he said, "the peculiar function of a university to be an agent of unification. This does not mean the suppression of all but one." From a negative unity to a warring diversity is change from a false peace to a significant conflict. From the conflict of violent extremes to a reconciliation of differences would be motion toward that genuine peace which still lies ahead. This is the University's future. There is more chance of its happening at Chicago than elsewhere, because at Chicago the opponents at least try to talk to one another.

What is needed to bring this about? Last September a conference of scholars was called not merely for the purpose of assembling leading representatives of Science, philosophy, and religion, but *supposedly* to have them understand one another's role in the development of culture. Those who called this meeting felt that unless philosophy and religion are genuinely acknowledged – that is, given their *proper* place *above*, not just *along with*, science – democracy is threatened from within culturally, perhaps even more seriously than from without by force.

Anyone who had been through the Chicago Fight could have predicted the outcome of this Conference on Science, Philosophy, and

Religion. It would fail. Though it meets this September in a second session, and next year again, the prediction remains unchanged, because what happened last year will continue to occur until the causes for such frustration are overcome. The failure I refer to is failure of communication. When there is no communication between reconcilable elements they appear to be irreconcilable extremes. Ten years' experience at Chicago indicates what one might expect from a gathering of scientists, philosophers, and theologians, who have no common universe of discourse. Nor can such community be achieved, in a university or at a conference, simply by bringing the diverse elements together and having them read papers at one another. The obstacle to be surmounted first, the most difficult task to discharge, is teaching the specialists *how* to talk to one another.

As a matter of fact, conferences of this sort should not be necessary to achieve the end in view. That should be the main business of our universities. Their greatness should not be measured by the number of eminent scholars on their faculty lists, or by the holding of symposia at which learned papers are read, as at Harvard four years ago and at Chicago this September. A university's greatness consists in its being the intellectual forum of the community, the place where the basic issues of its culture are fruitfully debated. Chicago's greatness lies in the *partial* performance of this service. For ten years it has debated issues which the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion met to consider – made necessary only by the fact that such debate has not occurred at other universities, as at Chicago. But the point still remains that the debate has not been fruitful. What is needed to make it so? What must happen before Chicago can perform *completely* a university's function, before it can fulfill the promise of light which its career of intellectual ferment perhaps portends?

The extremes to be avoided are easy to point out. A university must avoid, on the one hand, the "peace" of sleep, resulting either from conventional academic politeness or from the hollow unity achieved by "the suppression of all but one"; and, on the other hand, it must avoid the violence of fruitless polemic. It must not commit the "nothing-but" fallacy which exaggerates the claims of any indispensable part at the expense of excluding others equally indispensable; nor should it be satisfied with an armistice, instead of real peace, by compromising issues rather than resolving them. Neither domination by one exclusive extreme nor suspended hostilities among many is desirable. Both counterfeit the ideal of true unity won from diversity by right order.

What is desirable is that peace of understanding which enables intelligent discussion to work progressively toward agreement – an end which may never be fully realized but which, nevertheless, gives

discussion its highest meaning, if not its only justification. Unless controversy is to be as inconsequential as ping-pong, those who join issue in debate must aim at, and hope for, an ultimate resolution of the issues. But agreement, which is the concurrence of minds in the truth about things, cannot be reached, cannot even be aimed at by discussion, until there is understanding – the communication of minds through shared meanings in a single universe of discourse. The liberal arts and a common intellectual tradition are, therefore, indispensable prerequisites for the work of a university – the one giving men the technic of communication, the other rooting them all in the same cultural soil. Lack of liberal discipline has made our debates a babel of jargons, incurable by the logical esperanto of the semanticists. Lack of a common tradition has turned our universities into a jungle of predatory growths, impenetrable by special conferences or academic symposia.

The disease itself indicates the therapy. The cure will come only by a fundamental educational reform below the level of the university. The great tragedy of American education is that our universities were founded just at the time when genuinely liberal colleges were ceasing to exist. In fact it was the developing university which, imposing the elective system, helped to kill the liberal arts curriculum of the colleges. The other wound came from below, from the defection of the elementary and secondary schools. Crushed from above by a burden of specialization, which insisted upon departmental autonomy at the college level, its underpinnings removed by failures in preparatory education, the college gave up the ghost of its liberal arts curriculum, retaining only the name of the degree.

The great difference between the medieval and the modern university is not that the former reached its apex in theology, and the latter laid its foundation in science; rather it is that the members of the medieval university, its students and faculty, were truly bachelors of liberal arts. They had learned how to communicate before engaging in the disputations which made the medieval universities the vital forums of their day. Embraced in a common tradition of learning, they could at least understand one another when they did not agree. The medieval universalism, of which Etienne Gilson spoke at the Harvard Tercentenary, did not derive from the universality of Latin as the learned tongue, nor from the catholicism of the Christian faith; for this universalism included the Jews and Arabs, many languages and many faiths. The European community of culture flowered because of excellence in liberal education – the cultivation of its arts, the possession of a common heritage of learning.

Walter Lippmann did not exaggerate when he said that “the prevailing education is destined, if it continues, to destroy Western civilization, and is in fact destroying it.” He might just as well have said

that we shall not have genuine universities again until all the preparatory stages of education are radically reformed, until the college, above all, is restored to its liberal function. The fate of Western civilization, as a cultural community, cannot be separated from the state of its educational institutions. Only one college in this country, St. John's at Annapolis, is working for the revival of a liberal curriculum. Only the University of Chicago has throughout its history manifested devotion to the true functions of a university – formation of fundamental doctrines, debate of the most serious issues. If the performance of these functions could be elevated by liberal education the doctrines might be moderated to the sanity of truth, the debate might become fruitful of sober resolutions. If in some way the spiritual union of St. John's and Chicago could be consummated, we might hope for the blessed event of a cultural rebirth.

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL

Charles Morris. "The Chicago School." Appendix Three of *The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy* (New York: George Braziller, 1970), pp. 174–91.

This material is part of a paper given as a presidential address before the Florida Philosophical Association, November 4, 1966.¹

This discussion of the Chicago school of pragmatism will be in two parts. First, a general consideration of the distinctive characteristics of this group of pragmatist philosophers; and secondly, some details of the late years of this group when I was a student at the University of Chicago from the fall of 1922 through the summer of 1925.

I

The phrase "the Chicago school" was applied to pragmatist thinkers at the University of Chicago by William James. In a letter of October 17, 1903, written to John Dewey, James refers to "your School (I mean your philosophic school) at the University of Chicago";² and "The Chicago School" is the title of James's 1904 review³ of *Studies in Logical Theory* by Dewey and his collaborators which had appeared in 1903. Charles Peirce also used the phrase "the Chicago School" in his 1904 review of the same book in *The Nation*.⁴

Studies in Logical Theory was issued as part of the Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago. Other independent philo-

¹ There has recently appeared a much more extended account in Darnell Rucker's 1969 book *The Chicago Pragmatists*. A review-article of this book, rich in reminiscences of the period when we were fellow students at the University of Chicago, has been written by Van Meter Ames, and is to appear in *The Journal of the History of Philosophy* in July 1970.

² Quoted in R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, vol. II, p. 524.

³ *Psychological Bulletin*, 1, 1904, 1–5.

⁴ Reprinted in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, 8.188–90.

sophical papers in the series were "Existence, Meaning and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology" by Addison W. Moore; "The Definition of the Psychical" by George H. Mead; "On the Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories" by James H. Tufts; and "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality" by John Dewey. It was these writings that signaled the existence of "the Chicago school" and on their basis James gave it its name.

These men, Dewey, Mead, Moore, and Tufts, together with Edward Scribner Ames, constitute the Chicago school of pragmatist philosophers. In the early years philosophy and psychology were not separated, and the psychologist James Rowland Angell was an important member of the combined groups – his paper "Relation of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy" also appeared in the Decennial Publications. And there were a number of other persons who collaborated in *Studies in Logical Theory* and, later, in *Creative Intelligence*. But in a distinctive sense Dewey, Mead, Moore, Tufts, and Ames were the "Chicago school," and Dewey was its acknowledged leader.

Tufts was at Chicago at its opening in 1892. He had been at the University of Michigan, a colleague of Dewey in the philosophy department. Tufts suggested to President William Rainey Harper that Dewey be brought in as head of the department, and this was done in 1894. Dewey appointed his Michigan colleague, Mead, and also Angell, who had been a student of Dewey and Mead at Michigan. Moore and Ames both took their doctorates at Chicago. Dewey remained at Chicago through 1904, when he went to Columbia University.⁵

What is characteristic of the thought of these men such that they formed a distinctive school? Light is thrown on this issue if we consider some of the early relations of Dewey with James and Peirce.⁶

James was enthusiastic in his review of *Studies in Logical Theory*: "It deserves the title of a new system of philosophy"; "If it be as true as it is original, its publication must be reckoned an important event. The present reviewer, for one, strongly suspects it of being true."

In the preface to the book itself the authors had agreed on "the intimate connections of logical theory with functional psychology," and had acknowledged "a pre-eminent obligation...to William James."

⁵ All the material in this paragraph is taken from the valuable article "John Dewey: The Chicago Years," by George Dykhuizen. I am also indebted to this article in a number of other respects. A companion article, "John Dewey in Chicago: Some Biographical Notes," is especially relevant for the circumstances which led to Dewey's resignation from the University of Chicago.

⁶ I omit the pages on Peirce, since the relation of Peirce and Dewey has been discussed in the body of the book (1969).

Dewey, in reply to James's review, wrote to him: "None the less as far as I am concerned I have simply been rendering back in logical vocabulary what was already your own."⁷

While these words of Dewey and his co-workers are to be taken seriously, two considerations modify somewhat the picture which these acknowledgments, taken in isolation, might convey.

Although James certainly played an important part in the movement toward a functional psychology, the bulk of his own psychology can hardly be described as functional. Present-day phenomenological psychologists, for instance, find much to their liking in James's *Principles of Psychology* and regard it as essentially a phenomenological work, superior to James's later functional and pragmatic course of thought.⁸ James's distinctively functionalist paper "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" appeared only in 1904 – after *Studies in Logical Theory* and Mead's penetrating essay on "The Definition of the Psychical."

In the second place, it must not be forgotten that Dewey had been an avowed Hegelian. The focus of Hegel and his followers was upon the whole range of cultural phenomena; the orientation was to social process – however much the temporal character of social evolution was ultimately undermined by its doctrine of the Absolute. Dewey continued this process orientation as he developed from a Hegelian cultural idealist to a cultural naturalist. Dewey's own basic center of interest was ethical. Functional (and later, behavioral) psychology mainly helped him to find a new terminology to express the direction to which he in his ethical analysis was already moving. Mead maintained that James's *Psychology* was not Dewey's starting point: "Dewey passed out of his idealistic position by the way of the psychological analysis of the moral act." According to Mead, in Dewey's *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics*, which was published in 1891 and makes only minor reference to James, "we find the will, the idea, and the consequences all placed inside the act, and the act itself placed only within the larger activity of the individual in society."⁹ Thus contact with James at best facilitated the direction of Dewey's thought which was already under way.

Dewey's basic interest in ethics, and his early concern for applying scientific method to moral affairs, had led him into an analysis of moral action and into a consideration of the kind of inquiry appropriate to the

⁷ R. B. Perry, op. cit., p. 526.

⁸ For example see *The Field of Consciousness* by Aron Gurwitsch, translation of his *Théorie du champs de la conscience*.

⁹ G. H. Mead, "The Philosophies of Royce, James, and Dewey, in their American Setting." The first quotation is from p. 228, the second from p. 227.

problems encountered in such action. James's movement toward a functional psychology and Peirce's theory of inquiry fitted in with this independent direction of Dewey's thought, and served as agencies for its advancement beyond the early Hegelian framework within which Dewey began his ethical studies. Dewey's development in turn gave to the Chicago school of pragmatism a distinctive social and ethical emphasis different from the individualistic oriented pragmatism of James and the logical-analytic orientation of Peirce's pragmatism.

II

We now turn to some characteristics of the Chicago school of pragmatism as it existed in the years 1922–1925.

Dewey had long since resigned in protest over the situation in the department of education, and had established another period of his career at Columbia University. Nevertheless, Dewey was still the major intellectual influence in the Chicago environment. He had by that time, in addition to writings already mentioned, published *Essays in Experimental Logic* (1916); *Democracy and Education* (1916); *Creative Intelligence* (1917), of which he was editor and co-author; and *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920).

Addison W. Moore, James H. Tufts, Edward Scribner Ames, and George H. Mead were there during the period of my study. All of them were sympathetic to Dewey's direction of thought. Dewey himself ranged over the whole field of philosophy; Moore stressed logical theory (in Dewey's sense of the term); Tufts's work was in ethics, political theory, and aesthetics; Ames concentrated on the philosophy and psychology of religion; and Mead had by that time essentially completed his philosophical version of social psychology with especial reference to the topics of mind and selfhood.

These men formed a school in a very distinctive sense: they were all elaborating aspects of a philosophic position the framework of which they held in common. Their individual work in turn fed into and influenced the further elaboration of Dewey's own comprehensive and systematic endeavors. They were not just a set of "disciples" but a group of constructive thinkers cooperatively engaged in building a philosophical edifice. I do not believe that in this sense there has been a comparable school of philosophy in the United States, and few, if indeed any, in the history of philosophy.

The Chicago pragmatists in 1922–1925 did not present the works of Dewey as texts upon which they lectured and wrote commentaries. Indeed, there was very little assignment of Dewey's writings and even very little discussion of Dewey in the classes of these men (with the

exception of the classes in elementary ethics where the Dewey and Tufts *Ethics* was used as a text; and in a seminar of Moore to which reference will be made). A student in the philosophy department of those years might very well not have been conscious of it being a "school" at all. It was in the writings of Moore, Tufts, Ames, and Mead that a thoughtful student might sense that they were workers constructing a single edifice, but hardly in their classes. They were all excellent teachers and did justice to the complexity of the various subject-matters and the varieties of thought they had engendered. There was no propagandizing, though of course as good teachers their own convictions were on occasion made manifest. There was little if any talk of a general "pragmatic movement." Not only was Dewey's name used sparingly in the various courses, but there were hardly any references to James, and only once or twice a bare mention of Peirce. In none of the courses which I took was any writing of either James or Peirce assigned. I recall only one assignment of Dewey, though several papers of Dewey were reported on in seminars. Nowhere was there a trace of a doctrinaire pragmatism.

Furthermore, the staff at that time included Edwin A. Burtt and T. V. Smith. And in the visitors brought in during the summer quarter, the student encountered a variety of opinions, often quite critical of pragmatism. During my student years I worked in this way with W. K. Wright, Morris Cohen, G. Watts Cunningham, and C. I. Lewis.

The genetic and functional orientation of Dewey showed itself, however, in a number of ways. With very few exceptions the departmental courses were historical in orientation, and often the thought of the philosopher under consideration was related to his own problems in his own historical setting more fully than is usually the case in the teaching of philosophy. In the contemporary and near contemporary period the emphasis in those years was greatest upon idealist philosophers such as Francis Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet; the realist philosophers received much less attention – Bertrand Russell, for instance, was quite neglected except in an occasional seminar report. The reverse side of the historical emphasis was the comparative absence of graduate subject-matter courses such as metaphysics, philosophy of science, and symbolic logic.

I now turn to some remarks on Moore, Tufts, Ames, and Mend. I rely mainly on my class notes, upon conversations with them, and upon addresses given at the memorial services held for them.

Addison Webster Moore

Moore came closest of the Chicago group to being a "disciple" of Dewey. He had come from Cornell in 1894 expressly to study with

Dewey. He was in Dewey's first seminar, and was the only member of the Chicago group to have a paper in the *Studies in Logical Theory*. James had written Dewey enthusiastically about Moore's "Existence, Meaning and Reality" paper; Dewey in reply generously said that Moore gave as much as he received. Yet Moore certainly never influenced Dewey as basically as did Mead, and he was of all the group nearest to expositor and defender of Dewey's position. This comes out in his book *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, as it did in some (but not all) of his classes.

Moore was of a sparkling mind, witty, polemical, even at times satirical. He was frailer in constitution than his robust colleagues, and more intense. He suffered seriously from insomnia, and ill health forced him to retire several years earlier than he wished. He once told me that his health had at least cut in half what he had hoped to accomplish. Moore was at his best in two seminar sequences – Foundations of Modern Logic, and Modern Logic. The first covered the major philosophers from Descartes through Hegel; the second stressed Mill, Bradley, Bosanquet, Royce, and Dewey, with some reference to the realists Montague, Holt, Russell, and Spaulding. Moore's own position was essentially that of Dewey in *Essays in Experimental Logic*, the book which he assigned in the modern logic course when dealing with Dewey. He regarded Dewey's 1896 paper, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,"¹⁰ as "the primary essay in the pragmatic movement." In another course he called it "the pioneer paper in the pragmatic movement." I take it that he meant that the paper was both the pioneer paper historically and the primary paper in the sense of being basic.

Moore never considered James to be the major formative influence on Dewey's thought, which he regarded as an independent development precipitated by both formal and ethical difficulties in Bradley's position ("Bradley's difficulties precipitated the pragmatic movement" is a sentence in my notes). He saw Dewey's pragmatism as essentially a revolt against absolute idealism. Instead of thought reproducing or reflecting in wholesale fashion "the real," Dewey, according to Moore, had sought the occasion for thought in a specific disturbance of the "organic circuit" comprising the organism and its environment and regarded the task of thought to be the specific resolution of such specific disturbances. In this way Dewey was said to have laid the basis for an answer to both the formal and the ethical difficulties he found in Bradley's position.

¹⁰ *Psychological Review*, 3, 1896, 357–70. Reprinted in Dewey's *Philosophy and Civilization* (1931) under the title "The Unit of Behavior."

I do not wish to leave the impression that Moore was just a “defender of the faith,” while Dewey’s thought was back of Moore’s critical analysis of other thinkers, it was never offensively on the surface. He always gave meticulous and scrupulous attention to each philosopher being considered. And as a teacher, he was superb.

James Hayden Tufts

If Moore was the logician (methodologist, epistemologist) of the post-Deweyan Chicago group, Tufts was the ethicist – or even more widely, the axiologist, since he was also concerned with aesthetics and sociopolitical theory. His two-term seminar in ethics played a role in the training of graduate students analogous to that played by Moore’s seminars in logic.

Tufts had from his youth been interested in primitive societies, and had later studied a year with Sumner at Yale. He had also studied theology there with Harper, and when Harper became president of the University of Chicago he appointed Tufts to a position in philosophy. Tufts was thus at Chicago several years before Dewey. Tufts’s ethical interests antedated his contacts with Dewey, but he found in Dewey the complement to his own ethical interests. He once said to me that after every half-hour conversation with Dewey he felt like writing a book. It was Tufts who suggested to Dewey the plan of the famous *Ethics*, with Dewey to write the more analytic second part, and he to write the historical and much of the applied parts.

Tufts’s other books continue his stress upon contemporary ethical problems: *The Ethics of Cooperation*, *The Real Business of Living*, and *America’s Social Morality*. The high quality of his own theoretical ability is attested in his paper “On the Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories,” and in his chapter in *Creative intelligence* entitled “The Moral Life and the Construction of Values and Standards” (where he stressed the difference between the concepts of “good” and “ought” more strongly than any pragmatist did until C. I. Lewis).

With Tufts I had courses in aesthetics, social and political philosophy, the evolution of morality, and the seminar in ethics. All of these were historically oriented, but the first three were filled with concrete material drawn from Tufts’s wide ranging in literature, anthropology, and contemporary life. I recall especially his extended treatment of romanticism and the moral development of the Hebrews. The long seminar in ethics dealt with Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Hutchinson, Butler, Clarke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, Paley, Sidgwick, and T. H. Green, and with some consideration of Bosanquet, Hobhouse, and Dewey. With respect to Dewey’s development away from absolute idealism, Tufts

stressed the importance of Dewey's critical reaction to T. H. Green¹¹ – just as Moore had stressed Dewey's critical reaction to Bradley.

Perhaps because of the effect that anthropology had had upon the formation of his ethical interest, Tufts was more cautious than Dewey as to the extent to which man could or should rely on science in his moral life, though he agreed with Dewey as to the importance of introducing critical intelligence into the conduct of human affairs.

Long before Dewey had turned his attention to art, Tufts had stressed the importance of the aesthetic experience. Perhaps this was connected with his constant emphasis on the complementarity of the individual and society. He wrote in one of his books that the ideal could be expressed either as "the social individual" or as "the society which recognizes individuality." He believed that this was the ideal of American democracy, and his concrete concern was that this society progressively embody this ideal. In my class notes occur both these phrases: America is "steadily moving toward social control," and "the ultimate value is the complete person."

In *The Real Business of Living* Tufts wrote: "The finest and largest meaning of democracy is that all people should share as largely as possible in the best life." Tufts saw this as an ideal applicable to mankind. He stressed that man must pass beyond nationalism to internationalism, to a larger political organization and sense of mutual destiny. "Loyalty to mankind must finally be supreme."

Edward Scribner Ames

Ames received in 1895 the first doctorate granted by the Chicago department of philosophy. He became a member of the staff in 1900, after teaching philosophy and education at Butler College for three years. He was the last member of the Chicago school to die (in 1958 at the age of eighty-eight). Ames was my first contact with the department when I registered in 1922, and I knew him best of all its members; I saw him much during the last years of his long life.

Ames came from the Yale Divinity School to Chicago for the last year of his graduate study. He had been deeply influenced by James and by Schopenhauer, and to some extent by Comte. At Chicago he worked especially with Tufts. The effect of science upon him came through psychology and anthropology. His sense of the importance of social science was augmented by the work going on at Chicago, and especially by W. I. Thomas.

Ames was minister of the University Church of Disciples of Christ for

¹¹ See Dewey's article "Green's Theory of the Moral Motive," pp. 593–612.

forty years, beginning in 1900, as well as a member of the department of philosophy, in which he taught for thirty-five years. Although he gave some courses in psychology, ethics, logic, and the history of philosophy, his special domain was the psychology and philosophy of religion. His books *The Psychology of Religious Experience* and *Religion* are the major products of his thought and experience in the area of religion.

I took only one course with Ames, the psychology of religion. As I look over my notes, it seems to me to have been a model example of how problems were being handled at that time by the Chicago pragmatists in terms of their functional psychology.

The stress was upon religion as a form of social activity, and upon religious ideas as instruments to deal with difficulties encountered in that activity. Religious activity was conceived as activity to reach the highest values cherished by a social group. As the strivings for these values encountered difficulties, ceremonials arose as means to surmount these difficulties and attain the cherished goals. The ceremony is thus essentially a practical activity, and precedes the reasons given to account for it and to justify it. Myth and prayer were originally part of the ceremony. The idea of God was interpreted as the universe in its value-supportive aspects, viewed from the standpoint of a social group and idealized and personified.

Ames's activity in the Church of Disciples of Christ at the university was his attempt to enlist religion in the service of contemporary man's highest social values. His influence upon the University of Chicago community, and indeed upon the Disciples of Christ as a religious movement, was very great. The spirit of his life is vividly caught in his autobiography, edited by his son Van Meter Ames, and published under the title *Beyond Theology*.

I do not know whether Dewey had Ames explicitly in mind when he wrote his own book, *A Common Faith*, but the position he takes there is essentially the position which Ames had elaborated in his books many years earlier and which he had exemplified for forty years as pastor of his church.

George Herbert Mead

In a paper prepared for the memorial service for Mead held in 1931, Dewey said of Mead: "His mind was deeply original – in my contacts and my judgment the most original mind in philosophy in the America of the last generation... I dislike to think what my own thinking might have been were it not for the seminal ideas which I derived from him."¹²

¹² Dewey's address is printed as "George Herbert Mead." The words quoted are on pp. 310–11. An article by Mead and Dewey was published after Mead's death under the title "The Philosophy of John Dewey."

Mead had studied for a while with James, but he was not a student of Dewey. He terminated his graduate work at Berlin to accept a position at the University of Michigan. It was then that Dewey met Mead and began the friendship which Dewey regarded as "one of the most precious possessions of my life." Dewey brought Mead to Chicago, where Mead remained until his death in 1931.

At the University of Chicago Mead taught courses in psychology as well as in philosophy. His course "Social Psychology" was the center of his teaching. It exerted year after year a strong influence upon psychologists and social scientists as well as upon students of philosophy. It was from stenographic notes of his lectures in this course (and from other student notes) that his *Mind, Self, and Society* was compiled – a book already a classic. As the title indicates, the nature of mind and selfhood was a central problem for Mead, and he accounted for their emergence in terms of language as a social process. Another basic course, "The Problem of Consciousness," attests the depth of his interest in the philosophy of mind.

Mead was more than a major social psychologist. He became increasingly interested in the place of the human mind in the cosmos. This interest – greatly stimulated by his contact with the earlier works of Whitehead – was beginning to show itself at the time I was a student, especially in a course entitled "Relativity from the Standpoint of a Pragmatist." Mead did not live to fully elaborate the cosmology toward which he was then already working, but the direction and the magnitude of his endeavor is apparent in the book based on his Carus Lectures, *The Philosophy of the Present*, and in the book formed from manuscripts left at his death, *The Philosophy of the Act*. In the light of his whole enterprise I think it is correct to say that Mead was the cosmologist of the late Chicago group, as Moore was the logician, Tufts the ethicist, and Ames the religionist.

Mead's favored mode of expression was the lecture and not the seminar. One went to Mead to listen, to experience a fine philosophic mind at work. It was as if Mead were talking aloud to the "generalized other," rather than to the assembled students. The lectures were remarkable; almost any one of them could be taken down and published as delivered. For one whole term I heard him give three lectures one right after the other in three different courses, each lecture a gem, and all this done without notes of any kind. That the lectures were carefully prepared is shown by an incident. Once when he was to give a final talk during a period officially set for the final exam (he did not give exams), he started to give the lecture meant for another course. When one of the students interrupted him to say that he must have confused the courses,

Mead stood up, and with the words, "Then I have nothing to say," walked out of the room.

Mead's thoughts were like waters bubbling up from subterranean sources. Even in the form of my old lecture notes they still are fresh and sparkling. I had gone to Chicago primarily to work with Mead. The reward was indeed rich.

In concluding this account of the Chicago school of pragmatism there are two points to be added.

The first concerns the important role that the members of the Chicago group played in the liberal and progressive forces of the America of their time. Dewey's social participation was nationwide, and of a range and intensity that is fabulous. Moore, Tufts, Ames, and Mead were all deeply involved in the problems and affairs of the Chicago community – in management-labor arbitration, in the public schools, in civic matters, in settlement work. They were committed men of high moral integrity. Their philosophic orientation and their social participation were of one piece. The philosophy they built and taught was the philosophy by which they lived.

The second point concerns the termination of the Chicago school. This termination was a voluntary decision, though not made at one specific moment. There was a common feeling that the group had done its work, and that the department henceforth should manifest a diversity of viewpoints.

I was fortunate to have been a student at the University of Chicago when Moore, Tufts, Ames, and Mead were all there and with all their powers. Soon the ranks began to thin. First Moore died, then Mead, then Tufts, and then Ames. A fine theme had been sounded by Dewey, had received at Chicago an orchestral development, and had been brought in Dewey's later writings to a consummatory close.